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diff --git a/43329-8.txt b/43329-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 421a296..0000000 --- a/43329-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19833 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's The Life of Jefferson Davis, by Frank H. Alfriend - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: The Life of Jefferson Davis - -Author: Frank H. Alfriend - -Release Date: July 27, 2013 [EBook #43329] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS *** - - - - -Produced by The Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images -generously made available by The Internet Archive.) - - - - - - - - - -THE LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS - - - - -[Illustration: Jefferson Davis] - - - - - THE LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. - - - _BY FRANK H. ALFRIEND, - Late Editor of The Southern Literary Messenger._ - - - CINCINNATI AND CHICAGO: - CAXTON PUBLISHING HOUSE. - - PHILADELPHIA, RICHMOND, ATLANTA AND ST. LOUIS: - NATIONAL PUBLISHING CO. - - BALDWYN, MISS.: P. M. SAVERY & COMPANY. - - SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.: J. LAWS & CO. - - 1868. - - - - -Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1867, by FRANK H. -ALFRIEND, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United -States, for the District of Virginia. - - - - -PREFACE. - - -In offering this volume to the public, the occasion is embraced to avow, -with unfeigned candor, a painful sense of the inadequate manner in which -the design has been executed. Emboldened rather by his own earnest -convictions, than by confidence in his capacity, the author has undertaken -to contribute to American History, an extended narration of the more -prominent incidents in the life of JEFFERSON DAVIS. Whatever may be the -decision of the reader upon the merits of the performance, the author has -the satisfaction arising from a conscientious endeavor to subserve the -ends of truth. In pursuit of the purpose to write _facts_ only, to the aid -of familiar acquaintance with many of the topics discussed, and to -information derived from the most accurate sources, has been brought -laborious investigation of numerous interesting papers, which his -avocation made accessible. It is therefore claimed that no statement is to -be found in this volume, which is not generally conceded to be true, or -which is not a conclusion amply justified by indisputable evidence. - -Nor is it to be fairly alleged that the work exhibits undue sectional -bias. As a Southern man, who, in common with his countrymen of the South, -was taught to believe the principles underlying the movement for Southern -independence, the only possible basis of Republicanism, the author has -regarded, as a worthy incentive, the desire to vindicate, as best he -might, the motives and conduct of the South and its late leader. - -Disclaiming the purpose of promoting sectional bitterness, or of a -wholesale indictment of the Northern people, he deems it needless to dwell -upon the obvious propriety of discrimination. Holding in utter abhorrence -the authors of those outrages, wanton barbarities and petty persecutions, -of which her people were the victims, the South yet feels the respect of -an honorable enemy for those distinguished soldiers, Buell, Hancock, -McClellan and others, who served efficiently the cause in which they were -employed, and still illustrated the practices of Christian warfare. To -fitly characterize the remorseless faction in antagonism to the sentiments -of these honorable men, it is only necessary to recall the malice which -assails a "lost cause" with every form of detraction, and aspires to crown -a triumph of arms with the degradation and despair of a conquered people. - -In his especial solicitude for a favorable appreciation of his efforts, by -his Southern countrymen, the author has striven to avoid affront to those -considerations of delicacy which yet affect many incidents of the late -war. He has not sought to revive, unnecessarily, questions upon which -Southern sentiment was divided, and has rarely assailed the motives or -capacity of individuals in recognized antagonism to the policy of -President Davis. Perhaps a different course would have imparted interest -to his work, and have more clearly established the vindication of its -subject. But besides being wholly repugnant to the tastes of the author, -it would have been in marked conflict with the consistent aim of Mr. -Davis' career, which was to heal, not to aggravate, the differences of the -South. - -A large part of the labor, which would otherwise have devolved upon this -enterprise, if adequately performed, had already been supplied by the -writings of Professor Bledsoe. To the profound erudition and philosophical -genius of that eminent writer, as conspicuously displayed in his work -entitled, "Is Davis a Traitor?" the South may, with confidence, intrust -its claims upon the esteem of posterity. - -The author heartily acknowledges the intelligent aid, and generous -encouragement, which he has received from his publishers. - -JANUARY, 1868. - - - - -CONTENTS. - - -INTRODUCTION. (Page 13-19.) - - ATTRACTIONS OF THE LATE WAR TO POSTERITY--MR. LINCOLN'S - REMARK--DISADVANTAGES OF MR. DAVIS' SITUATION--SUCCESS NOT SYNONYMOUS - WITH MERIT--ORIGIN OF THE INJUSTICE DONE MR. DAVIS--REMARK OF - MACAULAY--REMARK OF MR. GLADSTONE--THE EFFECT THAT CONFEDERATE SUCCESS - WOULD HAVE HAD UPON THE FAME OF MR. DAVIS--POPULAR AFFECTION FOR HIM - IN THE SOUTH--HIS VINDICATION ASSURED. - -CHAPTER I. (Page 20-33.) - - BIRTH--EDUCATION--AT WEST POINT--IN THE ARMY--RETIREMENT--POLITICAL - TRAINING IN AMERICA--MR. DAVIS NOT EDUCATED FOR POLITICAL LIFE AFTER - THE AMERICAN MODEL--BEGINS HIS POLITICAL CAREER BY A SPEECH AT THE - MISSISSIPPI DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION--A GLANCE PROSPECTIVELY AT HIS - FUTURE PARTY ASSOCIATIONS--HIS CONSISTENT ATTACHMENT TO STATES' RIGHTS - PRINCIPLES--A SKETCH OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUESTION OF STATES' - RIGHTS--MR. CALHOUN NOT THE AUTHOR OF THAT PRINCIPLE--HIS VINDICATION - FROM THE CHARGE OF DISUNIONISM--MR. DAVIS THE SUCCESSOR OF MR. CALHOUN - AS THE STATES' RIGHTS LEADER. - -CHAPTER II. (Page 34-48.) - - RESULTS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN 1844--MR. DAVIS ELECTED TO - CONGRESS--HIS FIRST SESSION--PROMINENT MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE--DOUGLAS, - HUNTER, SEDDON, ETC.--DAVIS' RAPID ADVANCEMENT IN REPUTATION-- - RESOLUTIONS OFFERED BY HIM--SPEECHES ON THE OREGON EXCITEMENT, AND ON - THE RESOLUTION OF THANKS TO GENERAL TAYLOR AND HIS ARMY--NATIONAL - SENTIMENTS EMBODIED IN THESE AND OTHER SPEECHES--A CONTRAST IN THE - MATTER OF PATRIOTISM--MASSACHUSETTS AND MISSISSIPPI IN THE MEXICAN - WAR--DEBATE WITH ANDREW JOHNSON--JOHN QUINCY ADAMS' ESTIMATE OF - JEFFERSON DAVIS. - -CHAPTER III. (Page 49-67.) - - THE NAME OF JEFFERSON DAVIS INSEPARABLE FROM THE HISTORY OF THE - MEXICAN WAR--HIS ESSENTIALLY MILITARY CHARACTER AND TASTES--JOINS - GENERAL TAYLOR'S ARMY ON THE RIO GRANDE, AS COLONEL OF THE FAMOUS - "MISSISSIPPI RIFLES"--MONTEREY--BUENA VISTA--GENERAL TAYLOR'S ACCOUNT - OF DAVIS' CONDUCT--DAVIS' REPORT OF THE ACTION--NOVELTY AND - ORIGINALITY OF HIS STRATEGY AT BUENA VISTA--INTERESTING STATEMENT OF - HON. CALEB CUSHING--RETURN OF DAVIS TO THE UNITED STATES--TRIUMPHANT - RECEPTION AT HOME--PRESIDENT POLK TENDERS HIM A BRIGADIER'S - COMMISSION, WHICH HE DECLINES ON PRINCIPLE. - -CHAPTER IV. (Page 68-84.) - - MR. DAVIS IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, FIRST BY EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENT, - AND SUBSEQUENTLY BY UNANIMOUS CHOICE OF THE LEGISLATURE OF HIS - STATE--POPULAR ADMIRATION NOT LESS FOR HIS CIVIC TALENTS THAN HIS - MILITARY SERVICES--FEATURES OF HIS PUBLIC CAREER--HIS CHARACTER AND - CONDUCT AS A SENATOR--AS AN ORATOR AND PARLIAMENTARY LEADER--HIS - INTREPIDITY--AN INCIDENT WITH HENRY CLAY--DAVIS THE LEADER OF THE - STATES' RIGHTS PARTY IN CONGRESS--THE AGITATION OF 1850--DAVIS OPPOSES - THE COMPROMISE--FOLLY OF THE SOUTH IN ASSENTING TO THAT - SETTLEMENT--DAVIS NOT A DISUNIONIST IN 1850, NOR A REBEL IN 1861--HIS - CONCEPTION OF THE CHARACTER OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT--LOGICAL - ABSURDITY OF CLAY'S POSITION EXPOSED BY DAVIS--THE IDEAL UNION OF THE - LATTER--WHY HE OPPOSED THE COMPROMISE--THE NEW MEXICO BILL--DAVIS' - GROWING FAME AT THIS PERIOD--HIS FREQUENT ENCOUNTERS WITH CLAY, AND - WARM FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THEM--SIGNAL TRIUMPH OF THE UNION SENTIMENT, - AND ACQUIESCENCE OF THE SOUTH. - -CHAPTER V. (Page 85-97.) - - OPPOSITION TO THE COMPROMISE IN SOUTH CAROLINA AND MISSISSIPPI--DAVIS - A CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR--HIS DEFEAT REALLY A PERSONAL TRIUMPH--IN - RETIREMENT, SUPPORTS GENERAL PIERCE'S ELECTION--DECLINES AN - APPOINTMENT IN PIERCE'S CABINET, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY ACCEPTS - SECRETARYSHIP OF WAR--REMARKABLE UNITY OF PIERCE'S ADMINISTRATION, AND - HIGH CHARACTER OF THE EXECUTIVE--DAVIS AS SECRETARY OF WAR-- - KANSAS-NEBRASKA BILL AND THE EXCITEMENT WHICH FOLLOWED--DAVIS AGAIN - ELECTED TO THE SENATE--SPEECHES AT PASS CHRISTIAN AND OTHER POINTS - WHILE ON HIS WAY TO WASHINGTON. - -CHAPTER VI. (Page 98-191.) - - RETURN OF MR. DAVIS TO THE SENATE--OPENING EVENTS OF MR. BUCHANAN'S - ADMINISTRATION--TRUE INTERPRETATION OF THE LEGISLATION OF - 1854--SENATOR DOUGLAS THE INSTRUMENT OF DISORGANIZATION IN THE - DEMOCRATIC PARTY--HIS ANTECEDENTS AND CHARACTER--AN ACCOMPLISHED - DEMAGOGUE--DAVIS AND DOUGLAS CONTRASTED--BOTH REPRESENTATIVES OF THEIR - RESPECTIVE SECTIONS--DOUGLAS' AMBITION--HIS COUP D'ETAT, AND ITS - RESULTS--THE KANSAS QUESTION--DOUGLAS TRIUMPHS OVER THE SOUTH AND THE - UNITY OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY LOST--"SQUATTER SOVEREIGNTY"--PROPERLY - CHARACTERIZED--DAVIS' COURSE IN THE KANSAS STRUGGLE--DEBATE WITH - SENATOR FESSENDEN--PEN-AND-INK SKETCH OF MR. DAVIS AT THIS - PERIOD--TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICAL EVENTS TO THE SOUTH--SHE - RIGHTLY INTERPRETS THEM--MR. DAVIS' COURSE SUBSEQUENT TO THE KANSAS - IMBROGLIO--HIS DEBATES WITH DOUGLAS--TWO DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF - PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKING--DAVIS THE LEADER OF THE REGULAR DEMOCRACY IN - THE THIRTY-SIXTH CONGRESS--HIS RESOLUTIONS--HIS CONSISTENCY--COURSE AS - TO GENERAL LEGISLATION--VISITS THE NORTH--SPEAKS IN PORTLAND, BOSTON, - NEW YORK, AND OTHER PLACES--REPLY To AN INVITATION TO ATTEND THE - WEBSTER BIRTH-DAY FESTIVAL--MR. SEWARD'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE - "IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT"--MR. DAVIS BEFORE MISSISSIPPI DEMOCRATIC - STATE CONVENTION--PROGRESS OF DISUNION--DISSOLUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC - PARTY--SPEECHES OF MR. DAVIS AT PORTLAND AND IN SENATE. - -CHAPTER VII. (Page 192-232.) - - ELECTION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN--HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE EVENT--THE - OBJECTS AIMED AT BY HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY IDENTICAL IN THE DISCUSSION - OF EVENTS OF THE LATE WAR--NORTHERN EVASION OF THE REAL QUESTION--THE - SOUTH DID NOT ATTEMPT REVOLUTION--SECESSION A JUSTIFIABLE RIGHT - EXERCISED BY SOVEREIGN STATES--BRIEF REVIEW OF THE QUESTION--WHAT THE - FEDERALIST SAYS--CHIEF-JUSTICE MARSHALL--MR. MADISON--COERCION NOT - JUSTIFIED AT THE NORTH PREVIOUS TO THE LATE WAR--REMARKS OF JOHN - QUINCY ADAMS--OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN--OF HORACE GREELEY--SUCCESSFUL - PERVERSION OF TRUTH BY THE NORTH--PROVOCATIONS TO SECESSION BY THE - SOUTH--AGGRESSIONS BY THE NORTH--ITS PUNIC FAITH--LOSS OF THE BALANCE - OF POWER--PATIENCE OF THE SOUTH--REMARKS OF HON. C. C. CLAY--WHAT THE - ELECTION OF MR. LINCOLN MEANT--HIS ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY--REVELATIONS - OF THE OBJECTS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY--WENDELL PHILLIPS--NO SECURITY - FOR THE SOUTH IN THE UNION--MEETING OF CONGRESS--MR. DAVIS' ASSURANCE - TO PRESIDENT BUCHANAN--CONCILIATORY COURSE OF MR. DAVIS--HIS - CONSISTENT DEVOTION TO THE UNION, AND EFFORTS TO SAVE IT--FORESEES WAR - AS THE RESULT OF SECESSION, AND URGES THE EXHAUSTION OF EVERY - EXPEDIENT TO AVERT IT--THE CRITTENDEN AMENDMENT--HOPES OF ITS - ADOPTION--DAVIS WILLING TO ACCEPT IT IN SPITE OF ITS INJUSTICE TO THE - SOUTH--REPUBLICAN SENATORS DECLINE ALL CONCILIATORY MEASURES--THE - CLARKE AMENDMENT--WHERE RESTS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DISUNION?-- - STATEMENTS OF MESSRS. DOUGLAS AND COX--SECESSION OF THE COTTON - STATES--A LETTER FROM JEFFERSON DAVIS TO R. B. RHETT, JR.--MR. DAVIS' - FAREWELL TO THE SENATE--HIS REASONS FOR WITHDRAWING--RETURNS TO - MISSISSIPPI--MAJOR-GENERAL OF STATE FORCES--ORGANIZATION OF THE - CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT--MR. DAVIS PRESIDENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES. - -CHAPTER VIII. (Page 233-265.) - - THE CONFEDERACY ESTABLISHED AND IN OPERATION--CALMNESS AND MODERATION - OF THE SOUTH--THE MONTGOMERY CONSTITUTION--THE IMPROVEMENTS UPON THE - FEDERAL INSTRUMENT--POPULAR DELIGHT AT THE SELECTION OF MR. DAVIS AS - PRESIDENT--MOTIVES OF HIS ACCEPTANCE--HIS PREFERENCE FOR THE - ARMY--DAVIS THE SYMBOL OF SOUTHERN CHARACTER AND HOPES--ON HIS WAY TO - MONTGOMERY--A CONTRAST--INAUGURATION AND INAUGURAL ADDRESS--THE - CONFEDERATE CABINET--TOOMBS--WALKER--MEMMINGER--BENJAMIN--MALLORY-- - REAGAN--HISTORICAL POSITION OF PRESIDENT DAVIS--THE TWO POWERS-- - EXTREME DEMOCRACY OF THE NORTH--NOBLE IDEAL OF REPUBLICANISM CHERISHED - BY THE SOUTH--DAVIS' REPRESENTATIVE QUALITIES AND DISTINGUISHED - SERVICES--THE HISTORIC REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CONFEDERATE CAUSE--EARLY - HISTORY OF THE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY--CONFIDENCE IN PRESIDENT DAVIS - UNLIMITED--PRESIDENT DAVIS' ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY--HIS MILITARY - ADMINISTRATION--THE CONFEDERATE ARMY--WEST POINT--NEGOTIATIONS FOR - SURRENDER OF FORTS SUMTER AND PICKENS--MR. BUCHANAN'S PITIABLE - POLICY--THE ISSUE OF PEACE OR WAR--PERFIDIOUS COURSE OF THE LINCOLN - ADMINISTRATION--MR. SEWARD'S DALLIANCE WITH THE CONFEDERATE - COMMISSIONERS--HIS DECEPTIONS--THE EXPEDITION TO PROVISION THE - GARRISON OF SUMTER--REDUCTION OF THE FORT--WAR--GUILT OF THE - NORTH--ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR. - -CHAPTER IX. (Page 266-293.) - - EVENTS CONSEQUENT UPON THE BOMBARDMENT OF FORT SUMTER--MR. LINCOLN - BEGINS THE WAR BY USURPATION--THE BORDER STATES--CONTINUED DUPLICITY - OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT--VIRGINIA JOINS THE COTTON STATES--AFFAIRS - IN MARYLAND, MISSOURI, AND KENTUCKY--UNPROMISING PHASES OF THE - SITUATION, AFFECTING THE PROSPECTS OF THE SOUTH--DIVISIONS IN SOUTHERN - SENTIMENT--THE NORTHERN DEMOCRACY--PRESIDENT DAVIS' ANTICIPATIONS - REALIZED--HIS RESPONSE TO MR. LINCOLN'S PROCLAMATION OF WAR--PUBLIC - ENTHUSIASM IN THE SOUTH--PRESIDENT DAVIS' MESSAGE--VIRGINIA THE - FLANDERS OF THE WAR--REMOVAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CAPITAL TO - RICHMOND--POLICY OF THAT STEP CONSIDERED--POPULAR REGARD FOR MR. DAVIS - IN VIRGINIA--ACTION OF THE VIRGINIAN AUTHORITIES--NORTH CAROLINA; HER - NOBLE CONDUCT, AND EFFICIENT AID TO THE CONFEDERACY--MILITARY - PREPARATIONS IN VIRGINIA--GENERAL LEE--HIS SERVICES IN THE EARLY - MONTHS OF THE WAR--MINOR ENGAGEMENTS--PREPARATIONS FOR THE GREAT - STRUGGLE IN VIRGINIA--AN IMPORTANT HISTORICAL QUESTION--CHARGES - AGAINST MR. DAVIS CONSIDERED--HIS STATESMAN-LIKE PREVISION--DID HE - ANTICIPATE AND PROVIDE FOR WAR?--WHEN MR. DAVIS' RESPONSIBILITY - BEGAN--HIS ENERGETIC PREPARATION--THE PREVAILING SENTIMENT AT - MONTGOMERY AS TO THE WAR--QUOTATIONS FROM GENERAL EARLY AND GENERAL - VON MOLKTE. - -CHAPTER X. (Page 294-325.) - - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WAR IN 1861--THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MORE DIRECTLY - CONNECTED WITH RESULTS IN THE FIELD THAN AT SUBSEQUENT PERIODS--MR. - DAVIS' CONNECTION WITH THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE CONFEDERACY--THE - CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT ADOPTS, IN THE MAIN, THE DEFENSIVE POLICY OF - THE VIRGINIAN AUTHORITIES--FEDERAL PREPARATIONS--GENERAL SCOTT-- - DEFENSIVE PLANS OF THE CONFEDERATES--DISTRIBUTION OF THEIR FORCES--THE - CONFEDERATE CAMPAIGN OF 1861 JUSTIFIED--DISTRIBUTION OF THE FEDERAL - FORCES--PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN--GENERALS PATTERSON AND JOHNSTON-- - JUNCTION OF BEAUREGARD AND JOHNSTON--MANASSAS--PRESIDENT DAVIS ON THE - BATTLE-FIELD--HIS DISPATCH--HIS RETURN TO RICHMOND--A SPEECH NEVER - PUBLISHED BEFORE--REFLECTIONS UPON THE RESULTS OF MANASSAS--MR. DAVIS - NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ABSENCE OF PURSUIT--STONEWALL JACKSON'S - VIEWS--DAVIS IN FAVOR OF PURSUIT OF THE FEDERALS--MISREPRESENTATIONS-- - MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN VARIOUS QUARTERS--THE "TRENT AFFAIR"--RESULTS OF - THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR. - -CHAPTER XI. (Page 326-360.) - - PROSPECTS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1862--EXTREME CONFIDENCE OF THE - SOUTH--EXTRAVAGANT EXPECTATIONS--THE RICHMOND EXAMINER ON CONFEDERATE - PROSPECTS--WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES PREDICTED--THE - BLOCKADE TO BE RAISED--THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY DECREED BY HEAVEN-- - RESULT OF THE BOASTFUL TONE OF THE SOUTHERN PRESS--THE CONFEDERATE - GOVERNMENT NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISASTERS OF 1862--PRESIDENT DAVIS - URGES PREPARATION FOR A LONG WAR--HIS WISE OPPOSITION TO SHORT - ENLISTMENTS OF TROOPS--PREMONITIONS OF MISFORTUNES IN THE WEST--THE - CONFEDERATE FORCES IN KENTUCKY--GENERAL ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON--HIS - CAREER BEFORE THE WAR--CHARACTER--APPEARANCE--THE FRIEND OF JEFFERSON - DAVIS--MUTUAL ESTEEM--SIDNEY JOHNSTON IN KENTUCKY--HIS PLANS--HIS - DIFFICULTIES--THE FORCES OF GRANT AND BUELL--CRUEL DILEMMA OF GENERAL - SIDNEY JOHNSTON--A REVERSE--GRANT CAPTURES FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON-- - LOSS OF KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE--FEDERAL DESIGNS IN THE EAST--BURNSIDE - CAPTURES ROANOKE ISLAND--SERIOUS NATURE OF THESE REVERSES--POPULAR - DISAPPOINTMENT--ORGANIZED OPPOSITION TO THE CONFEDERATE - ADMINISTRATION--CHARACTER AND MOTIVES OF THIS OPPOSITION--AN EFFORT TO - REVOLUTIONIZE PRESIDENT DAVIS' CABINET--ASSAULTS UPON SECRETARIES - BENJAMIN AND MALLORY--CORRECT EXPLANATION OF THE CONFEDERATE - REVERSES--CONGRESSIONAL CENSURE OF MR. BENJAMIN--SECRETARY - MALLORY--CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOUTHERN MIND--THE PERMANENT - GOVERNMENT--SECOND INAUGURATION OF MR. DAVIS--SEVERITY OF THE - SEASON--THE CEREMONIES--APPEARANCE OF PRESIDENT DAVIS--HIS INAUGURAL - ADDRESS--ITS EFFECT--POPULAR RE-ASSURANCE--MESSAGE TO CONGRESS-- - COMMENTS OF RICHMOND PRESS. - -CHAPTER XII. (Page 361-389.) - - POPULAR DELUSIONS IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE WAR--A FEW CONFLICTS AND - SACRIFICES NOT SUFFICIENT--MORE POSITIVE RECOGNITION OF MR. DAVIS' - VIEWS--HIS CANDID AND PROPHETIC ANNOUNCEMENTS--MILITARY REFORMS-- - CONSCRIPTION LAW OF THE CONFEDERACY--THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS AND COURSE - AS TO THIS LAW--HIS CONSISTENT REGARD FOR CIVIL LIBERTY AND OPPOSITION - TO CENTRALIZATION--RECOMMENDS CONSCRIPTION--BENEFICIAL RESULTS OF THE - LAW--GENERAL LEE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, "UNDER THE PRESIDENT"--NATURE OF - THE APPOINTMENT--FALSE IMPRESSIONS CORRECTED--MR. DAVIS' CONFIDENCE IN - LEE, DESPITE POPULAR CENSURE OF THE LATTER--CHANGES IN THE CABINET-- - MR. BENJAMIN'S MANAGEMENT OF THE WAR OFFICE--DIFFICULTIES OF THAT - POSITION--THE CHARGE OF FAVORITISM AGAINST MR. DAVIS IN THE SELECTION - OF HIS CABINET--HIS PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH THE VARIOUS MEMBERS OF HIS - CABINET--ACTIVITY IN MILITARY OPERATIONS--THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI-- - BATTLE OF ELK HORN--OPERATIONS EAST OF THE MISSISSIPPI--GENERALS - SIDNEY JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD--ISLAND NO. 10--CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS - BY THE CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES--FAVORABLE SITUATION--SHILOH--A - DISAPPOINTMENT--DEATH OF SIDNEY JOHNSTON--TRIBUTE OF PRESIDENT - DAVIS--POPULAR VERDICT UPON THE BATTLE OF SHILOH--GENERALS BEAUREGARD, - BRAGG, AND POLK ON THE BATTLE--THE PRESIDENT AGAIN CHARGED WITH - "INJUSTICE" TO BEAUREGARD--THE CHARGE ANSWERED--FALL OF NEW - ORLEANS--NAVAL BATTLE IN HAMPTON ROADS--NAVAL SUCCESSES OF THE ENEMY. - -CHAPTER XIII. (Page 390-421.) - - THE "ANACONDA SYSTEM"--HOW FAR IT WAS SUCCESSFUL--TERRITORIAL - CONFIGURATION OF THE SOUTH FAVORABLE TO THE ENEMY--ONE THEATRE OF WAR - FAVORABLE TO THE CONFEDERATES--THE FEDERAL FORCES IN VIRGINIA--THE - CONFEDERATE FORCES--THE POTOMAC LINES--CRITICAL SITUATION IN - VIRGINIA--EVACUATION OF MANASSAS--TRANSFER OF OPERATIONS TO THE - PENINSULA--MAGRUDER'S LINES--EVACUATION OF YORKTOWN--STRENGTH OF THE - OPPOSING FORCES BEFORE RICHMOND--DESTRUCTION OF THE "VIRGINIA"--PANIC - IN RICHMOND--MR. DAVIS' CALMNESS AND CONFIDENCE--HE AVOWS HIMSELF - "READY TO LEAVE HIS BONES IN THE CAPITAL OF THE CONFEDERACY"--REPULSE - OF THE GUNBOATS--"MEMENTOES OF HEROISM"--JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN--A - SERIES OF VICTORIES, WITH IMPORTANT RESULTS--BATTLE OF "SEVEN - PINES"--A FAILURE--GENERAL JOHNSTON WOUNDED--PRESIDENT DAVIS ON THE - FIELD--PRESIDENT DAVIS AND GENERAL JOHNSTON--AN ATTEMPT TO FORESTALL - THE DECISION OF HISTORY--RESULTS OF LEE'S ACCESSION TO COMMAND-- - JOHNSTON'S GENERALSHIP--MR. DAVIS' ESTIMATE OF LEE--LEE'S PLANS--THE - ADVISORY RELATION BETWEEN DAVIS AND LEE--THEIR MUTUAL CONFIDENCE NEVER - INTERRUPTED--CONFEDERATE STRATEGY AFTER M'CLELLAN'S DEFEAT BEFORE - RICHMOND--MAGICAL CHANGE IN THE FORTUNES OF THE CONFEDERACY--THE - INVASION OF MARYLAND--ANTIETAM--TANGIBLE PROOFS OF CONFEDERATE - SUCCESS--GENERAL BRAGG--HIS KENTUCKY CAMPAIGN--CONFEDERATE HOPES-- - BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE--BRAGG RETREATS--ESTIMATE OF THE KENTUCKY - CAMPAIGN OF 1862--OTHER INCIDENTS OF THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN--REMOVAL OF - M'CLELLAN--A SOUTHERN OPINION OF M'CLELLAN--BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG-- - BATTLE OF MURFREESBORO'--BATTLE OF PRAIRIE GROVE--THE SITUATION AT THE - CLOSE OF 1862--PRESIDENT DAVIS' RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS--HIS VISIT - TO THE SOUTH-WEST--ADDRESS BEFORE THE MISSISSIPPI LEGISLATURE. - -CHAPTER XIV. (Page 422-449.) - - RESPECT OF MANKIND FOR THE SOUTH--THE MOST PROSPEROUS PERIOD OF THE - WAR--HOW MR. DAVIS CONTRIBUTED TO THE DISTINCTION OF THE SOUTH-- - FACTION SILENCED--THE EUROPEAN ESTIMATE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS--HOW HE - DIGNIFIED THE CAUSE OF THE SOUTH--HIS STATE PAPERS--HIS ADMINISTRATION - OF CIVIL MATTERS--THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS--MR. DAVIS' - OBSERVANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS--ARBITRARY ADMINISTRATION OF - MR. LINCOLN--MR. DAVIS' MODERATION--HE SEEKS TO CONDUCT THE WAR UPON - CIVILIZED IDEAS--AN ENGLISH CHARACTERIZATION OF DAVIS--COLONEL - FREEMANTLE'S INTERVIEW WITH HIM--MR. GLADSTONE'S OPINION--THE PURELY - PERSONAL AND SENTIMENTAL ADMIRATION OF EUROPE FOR THE - SOUTH--INCONSISTENT CONDUCT OF THE EUROPEAN GREAT POWERS--THE LONDON - "TIMES" BEFORE M'CLELLAN'S DEFEAT--THE CONFEDERACY ENTITLED TO - RECOGNITION BY EUROPE--ENGLAND'S SYMPATHY WITH THE NORTH--DIGNIFIED - ATTITUDE OF PRESIDENT DAVIS UPON THE SUBJECT OF RECOGNITION--HIS EARLY - PREDICTION UPON THE SUBJECT--FRANCE AND ENGLAND EXPOSED TO INJURIOUS - SUSPICIONS--TERGIVERSATIONS OF THE PALMERSTON CABINET--THE BROAD FARCE - OF "BRITISH NEUTRALITY"--ENGLAND DECLINES TO UNITE WITH FRANCE IN AN - OFFER OF MEDIATION BETWEEN THE AMERICAN BELLIGERENTS--ENGLAND'S - "POLICY"--SHE SOUGHT THE RUIN OF BOTH SECTIONS OF AMERICA--CULMINATION - OF THE ANTISLAVERY POLICY OF THE NORTH--MR. LINCOLN'S CONVERSATION - WITH A KENTUCKY MEMBER OF CONGRESS--THE WAR A "CRIME" BY MR. LINCOLN'S - OWN SHOWING--VIOLATION OF PLEDGES AND ARBITRARY ACTS OF THE FEDERAL - GOVERNMENT--THE MASK REMOVED AFTER THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM--THE REAL - PURPOSE OF EMANCIPATION--MR. DAVIS' ALLUSION TO THE - SUBJECT--INDIGNATION OF THE SOUTH AT THE MEASURE--MILITARY OPERATIONS - IN TEXAS AND MISSISSIPPI--VICKSBURG--PORT HUDSON--LOSS OF ARKANSAS - POST--FEDERAL FLEET REPULSED AT CHARLESTON--PREPARATIONS FOR THE - CAMPAIGN--UNITY AND CONFIDENCE OF THE SOUTH--MR. DAVIS' ADDRESS TO THE - COUNTRY--IMPORTANT EXTRACTS--GENERAL LEE PREPARES FOR BATTLE--HIS - CONFIDENCE--CONDITION OF HIS ARMY--BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE-- - JEFFERSON DAVIS' TRIBUTE TO STONEWALL JACKSON. - -CHAPTER XV. (Page 450-476.) - - CONFEDERATE PROSPECTS AFTER THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE--THE - MILITARY SITUATION--PRIMARY OBJECTS OF THE CONFEDERATES--AFFAIRS IN - THE WEST--A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF SEVERAL PLANS OF CAMPAIGN SUGGESTED - TO THE CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES--VISIONARY STRATEGY--AN OFFENSIVE - CAMPAIGN ADOPTED--THE INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA JUSTIFIED--CONDITION OF - THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA AT THIS PERIOD--THE MOVEMENT FROM THE - RAPPAHANNOCK--LEADING FEATURES OF THE CONFEDERATE PLAN--LEE'S STRATEGY - AGAIN ILLUSTRATED--GETTYSBURG--A FATAL BLOW TO THE SOUTH--LEE RETURNS - TO VIRGINIA--THE SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG--OTHER REVERSES--EXULTATION OF - THE NORTH--THE CONFEDERATE ADMINISTRATION AGAIN ARRAIGNED BY ITS - OPPONENTS--THE CASE OF GENERAL PEMBERTON--POPULAR INJUSTICE TO A - GALLANT OFFICER--A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE SUBJECT--PEMBERTON'S - APPOINTMENT RECOMMENDED BY DISTINGUISHED OFFICERS--HIS ABLE - ADMINISTRATION IN MISSISSIPPI--HIS RESOLUTION TO HOLD VICKSBURG, AS - THE GREAT END OF THE CAMPAIGN--HIS GALLANTRY AND RESOURCES--NOBLE - CONDUCT OF THIS PERSECUTED OFFICER--A FURTHER STATEMENT--THE MISSION - OF VICE-PRESIDENT STEPHENS--ITS OBJECTS--PRESIDENT DAVIS SEEKS TO - ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERINGS OF WAR--MAGNANIMITY AND HUMANITY OF THE - OFFER--PROUD POSITION IN THIS MATTER OF THE SOUTH AND HER RULER--THE - FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DECLINES INTERCOURSE WITH MR. STEPHENS--EXPLANATION - OF ITS MOTIVES--CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MESSRS. DAVIS AND STEPHENS. - -CHAPTER XVI. (Page 477-501.) - - OPERATIONS OF GENERAL TAYLOR IN LOUISIANA--THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY - IRRECOVERABLY LOST TO THE CONFEDERACY--FEDERALS FOILED AT - CHARLESTON--THE DIMINISHED CONFIDENCE OF THE SOUTH--FINANCIAL - DERANGEMENT--DEFECTIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEM OF THE SOUTH--MR. DAVIS' - LIMITED CONNECTION WITH IT--THE REASONS FOR THE FINANCIAL FAILURE OF - THE CONFEDERACY--INFLUENCE OF SPECULATION--ANOMALOUS SITUATION OF THE - SOUTH--MR. DAVIS' VIEWS OF THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF THE SOUTH AT THE - BEGINNING OF THE WAR--MILITARY OPERATIONS IN TENNESSEE--BRAGG RETREATS - TO CHATTANOOGA--MORGAN'S EXPEDITION--SURRENDER OF CUMBERLAND - GAP--FEDERAL OCCUPATION OF CHATTANOOGA--BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA--BRAGG'S - EXPECTATIONS--GRANT'S OPERATIONS--BRAGG BADLY DEFEATED--PRESIDENT - DAVIS' VIEW OF THE DISASTER--GENERAL BRAGG RELIEVED FROM COMMAND OF - THE WESTERN ARMY--CENSURE OF THIS OFFICER--HIS MERITS AND - SERVICES--THE UNJUST CENSURE OF MR. DAVIS AND GENERAL BRAGG FOR THE - REVERSES IN THE WEST--OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA IN THE LATTER PART OF - 1863--CONDITION OF THE SOUTH AT THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR--SIGNS OF - EXHAUSTION--PRESIDENT DAVIS' RECOMMENDATIONS--PUBLIC DESPONDENCY--THE - WORK OF FACTION--ABUSE OF MR. DAVIS IN CONGRESS--THE CONTRAST BETWEEN - HIMSELF AND HIS ASSAILANTS--DEFICIENCY OF FOOD--HOW CAUSED--THE - CONFEDERACY EVENTUALLY CONQUERED BY STARVATION. - -CHAPTER XVII. (Page 502-532.) - - AN EFFORT TO BLACKEN THE CHARACTER OF THE SOUTH--THE PERSECUTION OF - MR. DAVIS AS THE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ASSUMED OFFENSES OF THE - SOUTH--REPUTATION OF THE SOUTH FOR HUMANITY--TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF - WAR--EARLY ACTION OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT UPON THE SUBJECT--MR. - DAVIS' LETTER TO MR. LINCOLN--THE COBB-WOOL NEGOTIATIONS--PERFIDIOUS - CONDUCT OF THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES--A CARTEL ARRANGED BY GENERALS DIX - AND HILL--COMMISSIONER OULD--HIS CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE FEDERAL AGENT - OF EXCHANGE--REPEATED PERFIDY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT--SUSPENSION - OF THE CARTEL CAUSED BY THE BAD FAITH OF THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION, - AND THE SUFFERING WHICH IT CAUSED--EFFORTS OF THE CONFEDERATE - AUTHORITIES TO RENEW THE OPERATION OF THE CARTEL--HUMANE OFFER OF - COMMISSIONER OULD--JUSTIFICATION OF THE CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES--GUILT - OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT--MR. DAVIS' STATEMENT OF THE MATTER--COLONEL - OULD'S LETTER TO MR. ELDRIDGE--NORTHERN STATEMENTS: GENERAL BUTLER, - NEW YORK TRIBUNE, ETC.--THE CHARGE OF CRUELTY AGAINST THE SOUTH--A - CONTRAST BETWEEN ANDERSONVILLE AND ELMIRA--IMPOVERISHMENT OF THE - SOUTH--DISREPUTABLE MEANS EMPLOYED TO AROUSE RESENTMENT OF THE - NORTH--THE VINDICATION OF THE SOUTH AND OF MR. DAVIS--HIS STAINLESS - CHARACTER, HIS HUMANITY AND FORBEARANCE--AN INQUIRY OF HISTORY. - -CHAPTER XVIII. (Page 533-562.) - - INDICATIONS OF POPULAR FEELING AT THE BEGINNING OF 1864--APATHY AND - DESPONDENCY OF THE NORTH--IMPROVED FEELING IN THE CONFEDERACY--THE - PROBLEM OF ENDURANCE--PREPARATIONS OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT-- - MILITARY SUCCESS THE GREAT DESIDERATUM--A SERIES OF SUCCESSES-- - FINNEGAN'S VICTORY IN FLORIDA--SHERMAN'S EXPEDITION--FORREST'S - VICTORY--THE RAID OF DAHLGREN--TAYLOR DEFEATS BANKS--FORREST'S - TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN--HOKE'S VICTORY--THE VALUE OF THESE MINOR - VICTORIES--CONCENTRATION FOR THE GREAT STRUGGLES IN VIRGINIA AND - GEORGIA--FEDERAL PREPARATIONS--GENERAL GRANT--HIS THEORY OF WAR--HIS - PLANS--THE FEDERAL FORCES IN VIRGINIA--SHERMAN--FEEBLE RESOURCES OF - THE CONFEDERACY--THE "ON TO RICHMOND" AND "ON TO ATLANTA"--GENERAL - GRANT BAFFLED--HE NARROWLY ESCAPES RUIN--HIS OVERLAND MOVEMENT A TOTAL - FAILURE--SHERIDAN THREATENS RICHMOND--DEATH OF STUART--BUTLER'S - ADVANCE UPON RICHMOND--THE CITY IN GREAT PERIL--BEAUREGARD'S PLAN OF - OPERATIONS--VIEWS OF MR. DAVIS--DEFEAT OF BUTLER, AND HIS CONFINEMENT - IN A "CUL DE SAC"--FAILURE OF GRANT'S COMBINATIONS--CONSTANTLY BAFFLED - BY LEE--TERRIBLE LOSSES OF THE FEDERAL ARMY--GRANT CROSSES THE - JAMES--HIS FAILURES REPEATED--HIS NEW COMBINATIONS--EARLY'S OPERATIONS - IN THE VALLEY AND ACROSS THE POTOMAC--THE FEDERAL COMBINATIONS AGAIN - BROKEN DOWN--FAVORABLE SITUATION IN VIRGINIA--THE MISSION OF MESSRS. - CLAY, THOMPSON, AND HOLCOMBE--CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. LINCOLN--THE - ARROGANT AND MOCKING REPLY OF THE FEDERAL PRESIDENT. - -CHAPTER XIX. (Page 563-589.) - - DISAPPOINTMENT AT RESULTS OF THE GEORGIA CAMPAIGN--HOW FAR IT WAS - PARALLEL WITH THE VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN--DIFFERENT TACTICS ON BOTH - SIDES--REMOVAL OF GENERAL JOHNSTON--THE EXPLANATION OF THAT STEP--A - QUESTION FOR MILITARY JUDGMENT--THE NEGATIVE VINDICATION OF GENERAL - JOHNSTON--DIFFERENT THEORIES OF WAR--THE REAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE - SOUTHERN FAILURE--THE ODDS IN NUMBERS AND RESOURCES AGAINST THE - SOUTH--WATER FACILITIES OF THE ENEMY--STRATEGIC DIFFICULTIES OF THE - SOUTH--THE BLOCKADE--INSIGNIFICANCE OF MINOR QUESTIONS--JEFFERSON - DAVIS THE WASHINGTON OF THE SOUTH--GENERAL JOHN B. HOOD--HIS - DISTINGUISHED CAREER--HOPE OF THE SOUTH RENEWED--HOOD'S - OPERATIONS--LOSS OF ATLANTA--IMPORTANT QUESTIONS--PRESIDENT DAVIS IN - GEORGIA--PERVERSE CONDUCT OF GOVERNOR BROWN--MR. DAVIS IN MACON--AT - HOOD'S HEAD-QUARTERS--HOW HOOD'S TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN VARIED FROM MR. - DAVIS' INTENTIONS--SHERMAN'S PROMPT AND BOLD CONDUCT--HOOD'S - MAGNANIMOUS ACKNOWLEDGMENT--DESTRUCTION OF THE CONFEDERATE POWER IN - THE SOUTH-WEST. - -CHAPTER XX. (Page 590-613.) - - INCIDENTS ON THE LINES OF RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG DURING THE SUMMER - AND AUTUMN--CAPTURE OF FORT HARRISON--OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS BY - GRANT--THE SITUATION NEAR THE CONFEDERATE CAPITAL--EARLY'S VALLEY - CAMPAIGN--POPULAR CENSURE OF EARLY--INFLUENCE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN - UPON THE SITUATION NEAR RICHMOND--WHAT THE AGGREGATE OF CONFEDERATE - DISASTERS SIGNIFIED--DESPONDENCY OF THE SOUTH--THE INJURIOUS EXAMPLES - OF PROMINENT MEN--THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL LEE--MR. DAVIS' - POPULARITY--WHY HE DID NOT FULLY COMPREHEND THE DEMORALIZATION OF THE - PEOPLE--HE HOPES FOR POPULAR REANIMATION--WAS THE CASE OF THE - CONFEDERACY HOPELESS?--VACILLATING CONDUCT OF CONGRESS--THE - CONFEDERATE CONGRESS A WEAK BODY--MR. DAVIS' RELATIONS WITH - CONGRESS--PROPOSED CONSCRIPTION OF SLAVES--FAVORED BY DAVIS AND - LEE--DEFEATED BY CONGRESS--LEGISLATION DIRECTED AGAINST THE - PRESIDENT--DAVIS' OPINION OF LEE--RUMORS OF PEACE--HAMPTON ROADS - CONFERENCE--THE FEDERAL ULTIMATUM--THE ABSURD CHARGE AGAINST MR. DAVIS - OF OBSTRUCTING NEGOTIATIONS--HIS RECORD ON THE SUBJECT OF PEACE--A - RICHMOND NEWSPAPER ON THE FEDERAL ULTIMATUM--DELUSIVE SIGNS OF PUBLIC - SPIRIT--NO ALTERNATIVE BUT CONTINUED RESISTANCE--REPORT OF THE HAMPTON - ROADS CONFERENCE. - -CHAPTER XXI. (Page 614-636.) - - MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE EARLY PART OF 1865--LAST PHASE OF THE - MILITARY POLICY OF THE CONFEDERACY--THE PLAN TO CRUSH SHERMAN--CALM - DEMEANOR OF PRESIDENT DAVIS--CHEERFULNESS OF GENERAL LEE--THE QUESTION - AS TO THE SAFETY OF RICHMOND--WEAKNESS OF GENERAL LEE'S ARMY-- - PREPARATIONS TO EVACUATE RICHMOND BEFORE THE CAMPAIGN OPENED--A NEW - BASIS OF HOPE--WHAT WAS TO BE REASONABLY ANTICIPATED--THE CONTRACTED - THEATRE OF WAR--THE FATAL DISASTERS AT PETERSBURG--MR. DAVIS RECEIVES - THE INTELLIGENCE WHILE IN CHURCH--RICHMOND EVACUATED--PRESIDENT DAVIS - AT DANVILLE--HIS PROCLAMATION--SURRENDER OF LEE--DANVILLE - EVACUATED--THE LAST OFFICIAL INTERVIEW OF MR. DAVIS WITH GENERALS - JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD--HIS ARRIVAL AT CHARLOTTE--INCIDENTS AT - CHARLOTTE--REJECTION OF THE SHERMAN-JOHNSTON SETTLEMENT--MR. DAVIS' - INTENTIONS AFTER THAT EVENT--HIS MOVEMENTS SOUTHWARD--INTERESTING - DETAILS--CAPTURE OF MR. DAVIS AND HIS IMPRISONMENT AT FORTRESS MONROE. - -CHAPTER XXII. (Page 637-645.) - - MOTIVE OF MR. DAVIS' ARREST--AN AFTER-THOUGHT OF STANTON AND THE - BUREAU OF MILITARY JUSTICE--THE EMBARRASSMENT PRODUCED BY HIS - CAPTURE--THE INFAMOUS CHARGES AGAINST HIM--WHY MR. DAVIS WAS TREATED - WITH EXCEPTIONAL CRUELTY--THE OUTRAGES AND INDIGNITIES OFFERED - HIM--HIS PATIENT AND HEROIC ENDURANCE OF PERSECUTION--HIS RELEASE FROM - FORTRESS MONROE--BAILED BY THE FEDERAL COURT AT RICHMOND--JOY OF THE - COMMUNITY--IN CANADA--RE-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE FEDERAL COURT--HIS - TRIAL AGAIN POSTPONED--CONCLUSION. - - - - -LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. - - - - -INTRODUCTION. - - ATTRACTIONS OF THE LATE WAR TO POSTERITY--MR. LINCOLN'S REMARK-- - DISADVANTAGES OF MR. DAVIS' SITUATION--SUCCESS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH - MERIT--ORIGIN OF THE INJUSTICE DONE MR. DAVIS--REMARK OF MACAULAY-- - REMARK OF MR. GLADSTONE--THE EFFECT THAT CONFEDERATE SUCCESS WOULD - HAVE HAD UPON THE FAME OF MR. DAVIS--POPULAR AFFECTION FOR HIM IN THE - SOUTH--HIS VINDICATION ASSURED. - - -To future generations the period in American history, of most absorbing -interest and profound inquiry, will be that embracing the incipiency, -progress, and termination of the revolution which had its most pronounced -phase in the memorable war of 1861. Historians rarely concur in their -estimates of the limits of a revolution, and usually we find quite as much -divergence in their views of the scope of its operations, as in their -speculations as to its origin and causes, and their statements of its -incidents and results. If, however, it is difficult to assign, with minute -accuracy, the exact limits and proper scope of those grand trains of -consecutive events, which swerve society from the beaten track of ages, -divert nations from the old path of progress into what seems to be the -direction of a new destiny, and often transform the aspect of continents, -it is comparatively an easy task to reach a reliable statement of their -more salient and conspicuous incidents. It is in this aspect that the -Titanic conflict, which had its beginning with the booming of the guns in -Charleston harbor in April, 1861, and its crowning catastrophe at -Appomattox Court-house in April, 1865, will be chiefly attractive to the -future student. As a point of departure from the hitherto unbroken -monotony of American history, the beginning of a new order of things, the -extinction of important elements of previous national existence, embracing -much that was consecrated in the popular affections; in short, as a -complete political and social transformation, an abrupt, but thorough -perversion of the government from its original purposes and previous -policy, this period must take its place, with important suggestions of -theory and illustration, among the most impressive lessons of history. - -The profound interest which shall center upon the period that we have -under consideration, must necessarily subject to a rigid investigation the -lives, characters, and conduct of those to whom were allotted conspicuous -parts in the great drama. It is both a natural and reasonable test that -the world applies in seeking to solve, through the qualities and -capacities of those who direct great measures of governmental policy, the -merits of the movements themselves. The late President of the United -States, Mr. Lincoln, avowed his inability to escape the judgment of -history, and the bare statement sufficiently describes the inevitable -necessity, not only of his own situation, but of all who bore a prominent -part on either side of the great controversy. - -JEFFERSON DAVIS confronts posterity burdened with the disadvantage of -having been the leader of an unsuccessful political movement. "Nothing -succeeds like success," was the pithy maxim of Talleyrand, to whose astute -observation nothing was more obvious than the disposition of mankind to -make success the touchstone of merit. It is, nevertheless, a vulgar and -often an erroneous criterion. What could be more absurd than to determine -by such a test the comparative valor, generalship, and military character -of the two contestants in the late war? Concede its applicability, -however, and we exalt the soldiership of the North above all precedent, -and consign the unequaled valor of the Southern soldiery to reproach, -instead of the deathless fame which shall survive them. To such a judgment -every battle-field of the war gives emphatic and indignant contradiction. -History abounds with evidence of the influence of accident and of -extraneous circumstances, in the decision of results, which, if controlled -by the question of merit, as understood by the predominant sense of -mankind, would have borne a vastly different character. - -But, in addition to the disparaging influence of the failure of the cause -which he represented, Mr. Davis has encountered an unparalleled degree of -personal hate, partizan rancor, of malignant and gratuitous -misrepresentation, the result, to a great extent, of old partizan -rivalries and jealousies, engendered in former periods of the history of -the Union, and also of the spirit of domestic disaffection and agitation -which inevitably arises against every administration of public affairs, -especially at times of unusual danger and embarrassment.[1] The almost -fanatical hatred of the Northern masses against Mr. Davis, as the wicked -leader of a causeless rebellion against the Government of his country, as -a conspirator against the peace and happiness of his fellow-citizens, and -as a relentless monster, who tortured and starved prisoners of war, -springs from the persistent calumnies of such leaders of Northern opinion, -as have an ignoble purpose of vindictive hatred to gratify by the -invention of these atrocious charges. Yet this feeling of the North hardly -exceeds in violence, the resentment with which it was sought to inflame -the Southern people against him, at critical stages of the war, as an -unworthy leader, whose incapacity, pragmatism, nepotism, and vanity were -rushing them into material and political perdition. Of popular -disaffection to the Confederate cause, or dislike of Mr. Davis, there was -an insignificantly small element, never dangerous in the sense of -attempted revolt against the authorities, but often hurtful, because it -constituted the basis of support to such prominent men as fancied their -personal ambition, or _amour propre_, offended by the President. A -misfortune of the South was that there were not a few such characters, and -their influence upon certain occasions was as baleful to the public -interests as their animus was malignant against Mr. Davis. Hoping to -advance themselves by misrepresentations of him, during the war they -persistently charged upon him every disaster, and do not scruple to impute -to his blame those final failures so largely traceable to themselves. A -patriotic regard for the public safety imposed silence upon Mr. Davis -while the war continued, and a magnanimity which they have neither -deserved nor appreciated, coupled with a proper sense of personal dignity, -have impelled him since to refrain from refutation of misstatements -utterly scandalous and inexcusable. - -The distinguished English statesman,[2] who, during the progress of the -late war, declared that "Mr. Jefferson Davis had created a nation," stated -more than the truth, though he hardly exaggerated the flattering estimate -which the intelligent public of Europe places upon the unsurpassed ability -and energy with which the limited resources of the South, as compared with -those of her enemies, were, for the most part, wielded by the Confederate -administration. Nor, indeed, would such an estimate have been too -extravagant to be entertained by his own countrymen, had the South -achieved her independence by any stroke of mere good fortune, such as -repeatedly favored her adversaries at critical moments of the war, when, -apparently, the most trifling incidents regulated the balance. More than -once the South stood upon the very threshold of the full fruition of her -aspirations for independence and nationality. Had Jackson not fallen at -Chancellorsville, the Federal Army of the Potomac, the bulwark of the -Union in the Atlantic States, would have disappeared into history under -circumstances far different from those which marked its dissolution two -years later. At Gettysburg the Confederacy was truthfully said to have -been "within a stone's-throw of peace." If at these fateful moments the -treacherous scales of fortune had not strangely turned, and in the very -flush of triumph, who doubts that now and hereafter there would have come -from Southern hearts, an ascription of praise to Jefferson Davis, no less -earnest than to his illustrious colaborers? At all events, it is -undeniable that, as the Confederate arms prospered, so the affection of -the people for Mr. Davis was always more enthusiastic and demonstrative. -Only in moments of extreme public depression could the malcontents obtain -even a patient audience of their assaults upon the chosen President of -the Confederacy. - -The people of the late Confederate States, whose destinies Jefferson Davis -directed during four years, the most momentous in their history, are -competent witnesses as to the fidelity, ability, and devotion with which -he discharged the trust confided to him. - -Their judgment is revealed in the affectionate confidence with which, -during their struggle for liberty, they upheld him, and in the joyful -acclaim, which echoed from the Potomac to the Rio Grande upon the -announcement of his release from his vicarious captivity. As he was the -chosen representative of the power, the will, and the aspirations of a -chivalrous people, so they will prove themselves the jealous custodians of -his fame. Be the verdict of posterity as it may, they will not shrink from -their share of the odium, and will be common participants with him in the -award of eulogy. There is more than an unreasoning presentiment, something -more tangible than vague hope, in the calm and cheerful confidence with -which both look forward to that ample vindication of truth which always -follows candid and impartial inquiry. - -That time will triumphantly vindicate Mr. Davis is as certain, as that it -will dispel the twilight mazes which yet obscure the grand effort of -patriotism which he directed. The rank luxuriance of prejudice, asperity, -and falsehood must eventually yield to the irresistible progress of reason -and truth. Bribery, perjury, every appliance which the most subtle -ingenuity of eager and unscrupulous malice could invent, have been -exhausted in the vain effort to make infamous, in the sight of mankind, a -noble cause, by imputation of personal odium upon its most distinguished -representative. Day by day he rises beyond the reach of calumny, and his -character expands into the fair proportions of the grandest ideals of -excellence. An adamantine heroism of the _antique_ pattern; purity exalted -to an altitude beyond conception even of the vulgar mind; devotion which -shrank from no sacrifice and quailed before no peril, were qualities -giving tone to the genius, which, wielding the inadequate means of a -feeble Confederacy, for years, withstood the shock of powerful invasion, -baffled and humiliated a nation, unlimited in resources, and in spite of -disastrous failure, lends unexampled dignity to the cause in which it was -employed. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - BIRTH--EDUCATION--AT WEST POINT--IN THE ARMY--RETIREMENT--POLITICAL - TRAINING IN AMERICA--MR. DAVIS NOT EDUCATED FOR POLITICAL LIFE AFTER - THE AMERICAN MODEL--BEGINS HIS POLITICAL CAREER BY A SPEECH AT THE - MISSISSIPPI DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION--A GLANCE PROSPECTIVELY AT HIS - FUTURE PARTY ASSOCIATIONS--HIS CONSISTENT ATTACHMENT TO STATES' RIGHTS - PRINCIPLES--A SKETCH OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUESTION OF STATES' - RIGHTS--MR. CALHOUN NOT THE AUTHOR OF THAT PRINCIPLE--HIS VINDICATION - FROM THE CHARGE OF DISUNIONISM--MR. DAVIS THE SUCCESSOR OF MR. CALHOUN - AS THE STATES' RIGHTS LEADER. - - -Jefferson Davis was born on the third day of June, 1808, in that portion -of Christian County, Kentucky, which, by subsequent act of the -Legislature, was made Todd County. His father, Samuel Davis, a planter, -during the Revolutionary war served as an officer in the mounted force of -Georgia, an organization of local troops. Subsequently to the Revolution -Samuel Davis removed to Kentucky, and continued to reside in that state -until a few years after the birth of his son JEFFERSON, when he removed -with his family to the neighborhood of Woodville, Wilkinson County, in the -then territory of Mississippi. At the period of his father's removal to -Mississippi, Jefferson was a child of tender years. After having enjoyed -the benefits of a partial academic training at home, he was sent, at an -earlier age than is usual, to Transylvania University, Kentucky, where he -remained until he reached the age of sixteen. In 1824 he was appointed, -by President Monroe, a cadet at the West Point Military Academy. - -Among his contemporaries at the academy were Robert E. Lee, Joseph E. -Johnston, Albert Sidney Johnston, Leonidas Polk, John B. Magruder, and -others who have since earned distinction. Ordinary merit could not have -commanded in such an association of talent and character the position -which Davis held as a cadet. A fellow-cadet thus speaks of him: "Jefferson -Davis was distinguished in the corps for his manly bearing, his high-toned -and lofty character. His figure was very soldier-like and rather robust; -his step springy, resembling the tread of an Indian 'brave' on the -war-path." He graduated in June, 1828, receiving the customary appointment -of Brevet Second Lieutenant, which is conferred upon the graduates of the -academy. Assigned to the infantry, he served with such fidelity in that -branch of the service, and with such especial distinction as a staff -officer on the North-western frontier in 1831-32, that he was promoted to -the rank of First Lieutenant and Adjutant of a new regiment of dragoons in -March, 1833. - -About this period the Indians, on various portions of the frontier, -stimulated by dissatisfaction with the course of the Government concerning -certain claims and guarantees, which had been accorded them in previous -treaties, were excessively annoying, and the Government was forced to -resort to energetic military measures to suppress them. Lieutenant Davis -had ample opportunity for the exhibition of his high soldierly qualities, -cool courage, and admirable self-possession, in the Black Hawk war, during -which he was frequently employed in duties of an important and dangerous -character. During the captivity of Black Hawk, that famous Indian -chieftain and warrior is said to have conceived a very strong attachment -for Lieutenant Davis, whose gallantry and pleasing amenities of bearing -greatly impressed the captive enemy. After his transfer to the dragoons, -Lieutenant Davis saw two years of very active service in the various -expeditions against the Pawnees, Camanches, and other Indian tribes, and -accompanied the first expedition which successfully penetrated the -strongholds of the savages, and conquered a peace by reducing them to -subjection. - -Though attached to the profession of arms, for which he has on repeated -occasions, during his subsequent life, evinced an almost passionate -fondness and a most unusual aptitude, Lieutenant Davis resigned his -commission in June, 1835, and returning to Mississippi devoted his -attention to the cultivation of cotton and to the assiduous pursuit of -letters. Not long after his resignation, he had married the daughter of -Col. Zachary Taylor, under whose eye he was destined, in a few years, to -win such immortal renown upon the fields of Mexico. Living upon his -plantation in great seclusion, he devoted himself with zeal and enthusiasm -to those studies which were to qualify him for the eminent position in -politics and statesmanship which he had resolved to assume. In that -retirement were sown the seed, whose abundant fruits were seen in those -splendid specimens of senatorial and popular eloquence, at once models of -taste and exhibitions of intellectual power; in the pure, terse, and -elegant English of his matchless state papers, which will forever be the -delight of scholars and the study of statesmen, and in that elevated and -enlightened statesmanship, which scorning the low ambition of demagogues -and striving always for the ends of patriotism and principle, illumines, -for more than a score of years, the legislative history of the Union. - -The period of Mr. Davis' retirement is embraced within the interval of -his withdrawal from the army, in 1835, and the beginning of his active -participation in the local politics of Mississippi, in 1843, a term of -eight years. The diligent application with which he was employed daring -these years of seclusion constituted a most fortunate preparation for the -distinguished career upon which he at once entered. There is not, in the -whole range of American biography, an instance of more thorough -preparation, of more ample intellectual discipline, and elaborate -education for political life. - -The _trade_ of politics is an avocation familiar to Americans, and in the -more ordinary maneuvers of party tactics, in that lower species of -political strategy which, in our party vocabulary, is aptly termed -"wire-pulling," our politicians may boast an eminence in their class not -surpassed in the most corrupt ages of the most profligate political -establishments which have ever existed. Statesmanship, in that broad and -elevated conception which suggests the noblest models among those who have -adorned and illustrated the science of government, combining those higher -attributes of administrative capacity which are realized equally in a -pure, sound, and just polity, and in a free, prosperous, and contented -community, is a subject utterly unexplored by American politicians at the -outset of their career, and is comparatively an after-thought with those -intrusted with the most responsible duties of state. - -The political training of Mr. Davis was pursued upon a basis very -different from the American model. It has been more akin to the English -method, under which the faculties and the tastes are first cultivated, and -the mind qualified by all the light which theory and previous example -afford for the practical labors which are before it. The tastes and habits -formed during those eight years of retirement have adhered to Mr. Davis -in his subsequent life. When not engrossed by the absorbing cares of -state, he has, with rare enthusiasm and satisfaction, resorted to those -refining pleasures which are accessible only to intellects which have -known the elevating influences of culture. - -Emerging from his seclusion in 1843, when the initiatory measures of party -organization were in course of preparation for the gubernatorial canvass -of that year and the Presidential campaign of the next, he immediately -assumed a prominent position among the leaders of the Democratic party in -Mississippi. At this time, probably, no state in the Union, of equal -population, excelled Mississippi in the number and distinction of her -brilliant politicians. Especially was this true of Vicksburg, and of the -general neighborhood in which Mr. Davis resided.[3] The genius of Seargent -S. Prentiss was then in its meridian splendor, and his reputation and -popularity were coëxtensive with the Union. Besides Prentiss were Foote, -Thompson, Claiborne, Gholson, Brown, and many others, all comparatively -young men, who have since achieved professional or political distinction. -The appearance of Mr. Davis was soon recognized as the addition of a star -of no unworthy effulgence to this brilliant galaxy. - -The Democratic State Convention, held for the purpose of organization for -the gubernatorial canvass, and for the appointment of delegates to the -National Convention, assembled at Jackson in the summer of 1843. From the -meeting of this convention, which Mr. Davis attended as a delegate, may be -dated the beginning of his political life. In the course of its -deliberations he delivered his first public address, which immediately -attracted toward him much attention, and a most partial consideration by -his party associates. The occasion is interesting from this circumstance, -and as indicating that consistent political bias which, beginning in early -manhood, constituted the controlling inspiration of a long career of -eminent public service. The undoubted preference of the convention, as of -an overwhelming majority of the masses of the Southern Democracy, was for -Mr. Van Buren, and its entire action in the selection of delegates, and -formal expressions of feeling, was in accordance with this -well-ascertained preference. To a proposition instructing the delegates to -the National Convention, to support the nomination of Mr. Van Buren so -long as there was a reasonable hope of his selection by the party, Mr. -Davis proposed an amendment instructing the delegates to support Mr. -Calhoun as the second choice of the Democracy of Mississippi, in the event -of such a contingency as should render clearly hopeless the choice of Mr. -Van Buren. In response to an inquiry from an acquaintance if his amendment -was meant in good faith, and did not contemplate detriment to the -interests of Mr. Van Buren, Mr. Davis rose and addressed the convention in -explanation of his purpose, and in terms of such earnest and appropriate -eulogy of Mr. Calhoun and his principles as to elicit the most -enthusiastic commendation. - -So favorable was the impression which Mr. Davis made upon his party, and -so rapid his progress as a popular speaker, that in the Presidential -campaign of 1844, the Democracy conferred upon him the distinction of a -place upon its electoral ticket. In this canvass he acquired great -reputation, and established himself immovably in the confidence and -admiration of the people of Mississippi. - -This seems an appropriate point from which to glance prospectively at the -political principles and party associations of Mr. Davis in his after -career. Until its virtual dissolution at Charleston, in 1860, he was an -earnest and consistent member of the Democratic party. To those who are -familiar with the party nomenclature of the country, no inconsistency with -this assertion will appear involved in the statement, that he has also -been an ardent disciple of the doctrine of States' Rights. The Democratic -party and the States' Rights party were indeed identical, when a -profession of political faith in this country was significant of something -ennobling upon the score of principle, something higher than a mere -aspiration for the spoils of office. When, in subsequent years, to the -large majority of its leaders, the chief significance of a party triumph, -consisted in its being the occasion of a new division of the spoils, many -of the most eminent statesmen of the South became in a measure indifferent -to its success. Its prurient aspiration for the rewards of place provoked -the sarcasm of Mr. Calhoun, that it "was held together by the cohesive -power of the public plunder," and the still more caustic satire of John -Randolph, of Roanoke, that it had "seven principles: five loaves and two -fishes." - -Nevertheless, in its spirit thoroughly national, catholic in all its -impulses, for many years shaping its policy in harmony with the protection -of Southern institutions, and with few features of sectionalism in its -organization, it worthily commanded the preference of a large majority of -the Southern people. To this organization Mr. Davis adhered until the -inception of the late conflict, supporting its Presidential nominations, -in the main favoring such public measures as were incorporated in the -policy of the party, and he was, for several years prior to the war, by -no means the least prominent of those named in connection with its choice -for the Presidency in 1860. - -It is no part of the task which has been undertaken in these pages to -sketch the mutations of political parties, or to trace the historical -order and significance of events, save in their immediate and -indispensable connection with our appropriate subject. So closely -identified, however, has been the public life of Mr. Davis with the -question of States' Rights, so ardent has been his profession of that -faith, and so able and zealous was he in its advocacy and practice, that -his life virtually becomes an epitome of the most important incidents in -the development of this great historical question. His earliest appearance -upon the arena of politics was at a period when the various issues which -were submitted to the arbitrament of arms in the late war began to assume -a practical shape of most portentous aspect. The address which first -challenged public attention, and that extensive interest which has rarely -been withdrawn since, was an emphatic indorsement of the political -philosophy of Mr. Calhoun and a glowing panegyric upon the character and -principles of that immortal statesman and expounder. Unreservedly -committing himself, then, he has steadfastly held to the States' Rights -creed, as the basis of his political faith and the guide of his public -conduct. - -If it be true that the decision of the sword only establishes facts, and -does not determine questions of principle, then the principle of States' -Rights will be commemorated as something more valuable, than as the mere -pretext upon which a few agitators inaugurated an unjustifiable revolt for -the overthrow of the Government of the Union. Nothing is more likely than -that many who recently rejoiced at its suppression by physical force, may -mourn its departure as of that one vital inspiration, which alone could -have averted the decay of the public liberties. Practically a "dead -letter" now in the partizan slang of the demagogues who rule the hour, -since its prostration by military power in the service of the antipodal -principle of consolidation, it will live forever as the motive and -occasion of a struggle, unparalleled in its heroism and sacrifices in -behalf of constitutional liberty. - -There is little ground for wonder at the total ignorance and persistent -misconception in the mind of Europe, at the commencement of the war, of -the motives and purposes of the Confederates in seeking a dissolution of -the Union, when we consider the limited information and perverted views of -the Northern people and politicians respecting the nature of the Federal -Government and the intentions of its authors. Naturally enough, perhaps, -the North, seeing in the Union the source of its marvelous material -prosperity, and with an astute appreciation of its ability, by its -rapidly-growing numerical majority, to pervert the Government to any -purpose of sectional aggression agreeable to its ambition or interests, -refused to tolerate, as either rational or honest, any theory that -contemplated disunion as possible in any contingency. In their willful -ignorance and misapprehension most Northern orators and writers denounced -the doctrines of States' Rights as _new inventions_--as innovations upon -the faith of the fathers of the Republic--and professed to regard the most -enlightened and patriotic statesmen of the South, the pupils and followers -of illustrious Virginians and Carolinians of the Revolutionary era, as -agitators, conspirators, and plotters of treason against the Union. Upon -the score of antiquity, States' Rights principles have a claim to -respectability--not for a moment to be compared with the wretched devices -of expediency or the hybrid products of political atheism, to which the -brazen audacity and hypocrisy of the times apply the misnomer of -"principles." - -They are, in fact, older than the Union, and antedate, not only the -present Constitution, but even the famous Articles of Confederation, under -which our forefathers fought through the first Revolution. The Congress -which adopted the Declaration of Independence emphatically negatived a -proposition looking to consolidation, offered by New Hampshire on the 15th -of June, 1776, that the Thirteen Colonies be declared a "free and -independent State," and expressly affirmed their separate sovereignty by -declaring them to be "free and independent States." The declaration of the -Articles of Confederation was still more explicit--that "each State -retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, -jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly -delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." The Convention of -1787 clearly designed the present Constitution to be the instrument of a -closer association of the States than had been effected by the Articles of -Confederation, but the proof is exceedingly meager of any general desire -that it should establish a consolidated nationality. - -At this early period the antagonism of the two schools of American -politics was plainly discernible. The conflict of faith is easily -indicated. The advocates of States' Rights regarded the Union as a -_compact between the States_--something more than a mere league formed for -purposes of mutual safety, but still a strictly _voluntary_ association of -Sovereignties, in which certain general powers were specifically delegated -to the Union; and all others not so delegated were reserved by the States -in their separate characters. The advocates of Consolidation considered -the Union a _National_ Government--in other words, a centralized power--to -which the several States occupied the relation of separate provinces. - -The famous resolutions of '98, adopted respectively by the Virginia and -Kentucky Legislatures, were the formal declarations of principles upon -which the States' Rights party was distinctly organized under Mr. -Jefferson, whom it successfully supported for the Presidency against the -elder Adams at the expiration of the term of the latter. With the progress -of time the practical significance of these opposing principles became -more and more apparent, and their respective followers strove, with -constantly-increasing energy, to make their party creed paramount in the -policy of the Government. A majority of the Northern people embraced the -idea of a perpetual Union, whose authority was supreme over all the -States, and regulated by the will of a numerical majority, which majority, -it should be observed, they had already secured, and were yearly -increasing in an enormous ratio. The South, in the course of years, with -even more unanimity, clung to the idea of State Sovereignty, and the -interpretation of the Government as one of limited powers, as its shield -and bulwark against the Northern majority in the collision which it was -foreseen the aggressive spirit of the latter would eventually occasion. - -A common and totally erroneous impression of the Northern mind is that -John C. Calhoun _invented_ the idea of State Sovereignty for selfish and -unpatriotic designs, and as the pretext of a morbid hatred to the Union. -That eminent statesman and sincere patriot never asserted any claim to the -paternity of the faith which he professed. It is true that, in a certain -sense, he was the founder of the States' Rights party as it existed in his -day, and which survived him to make a last unsuccessful struggle to save -first the Union, and, failing in that, to rescue the imperiled liberties -of the South. During the eventful life of Mr. Calhoun the question of the -relative powers of the Federal and State Governments assumed a more -practical bearing than before, and his far-reaching sagacity was -illustrated in his efforts to avert the impending evils of consolidation. -He was the authoritative exponent and revered leader of the votaries of -those principles which he advocated, but did not originate or invent, and -sought to apply as the legitimate and safe solution of the circumstances -by which he was surrounded. - -Equally absurd and unfounded with the pretense, asserted at the North, of -the novelty of the idea of State Sovereignty and its incompatibility with -the spirit of the Constitution, was the charge so persistently iterated -against Mr. Calhoun and his followers, of disunionism; of a restless, -morbid discontent, which sought continually revenge for imaginary wrongs -in a dissolution of the Union. To the contrary we have the irrefutable -arguments of Mr. Calhoun himself in favor of the superior efficacy of the -States' Rights interpretation, as an agency for the preservation of the -Union as it was designed to exist by its authors. So far from having an -anarchical or disorganizing tendency, he, on all occasions, maintained -that his theory was "the only solid foundation of our system and the Union -itself." - -To this faith the public life of Jefferson Davis has been dedicated. For -more than twenty years he sought to illustrate it in the realization of a -splendid but barren vision of a time-honored and time-strengthened Union, -consecrated in the common affections and joint aspirations of a people, -now, alas! united only in name. - -During the period of their public service together, Mr. Davis received a -large share of the confidence and regard of Mr. Calhoun, and when the -death of the latter deprived the South of the counsels of an illustrious -public servant, Mr. Davis, though comparatively a young man, stood -foremost as heir to the mantle of the great apostle of States' Rights.[4] - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - - RESULTS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN 1844--MR. DAVIS ELECTED TO - CONGRESS--HIS FIRST SESSION--PROMINENT MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE--DOUGLAS, - HUNTER, SEDDON, ETC.--DAVIS' RAPID ADVANCEMENT IN REPUTATION-- - RESOLUTIONS OFFERED BY HIM--SPEECHES ON THE OREGON EXCITEMENT, AND ON - THE RESOLUTION OF THANKS TO GENERAL TAYLOR AND HIS ARMY--NATIONAL - SENTIMENTS EMBODIED IN THESE AND OTHER SPEECHES--A CONTRAST IN THE - MATTER OF PATRIOTISM--MASSACHUSETTS AND MISSISSIPPI IN THE MEXICAN - WAR--DEBATE WITH ANDREW JOHNSON--JOHN QUINCY ADAMS' ESTIMATE OF - JEFFERSON DAVIS. - - -The Presidential canvass of 1844 was one of the most memorable and -exciting in the annals of American politics. By its results the popular -verdict was rendered upon vital questions involved in the administrative -and legislative policy of the Government. The Democratic party was fully -committed to the annexation of Texas, with the prospect of war with Mexico -as an almost inevitable condition of the acquisition of that immense -territory, desirable to the Union at large, but especially popular with -the South, for obvious and sufficient reasons. But apart from the signal -victory achieved by the Democracy, in favor of this and other leading -measures of that party, the election of 1844 had an incidental -significance, which the country generally recognized, in its final and -irrevocable disappointment of the Presidential aspirations of Henry Clay. -This canvass, too, has a peculiar historical interest in the demonstration -which it gave of the real popular strength of the respective parties -which had so long divided the country. Comparatively few temporary issues, -of a character to excite strong popular feeling respecting either party or -its candidates, were made, and there was a square and obstinate battle of -Democracy against Whiggery, of what Governor Wise called the old-fashioned -"Thomas-Jefferson-Simon-Snyder-red-waistcoat-Democracy," against Henry -Clay and his "American System." - -The canvass was remarkable not only for its duration and the ardor with -which it was conducted, but for its unsurpassed exhibitions of "stump -oratory." The best men of both parties were summoned to the fierce -conflict; and many were the youthful paladins, hitherto unknown to fame, -who won their golden spurs upon this their first battle-field. Mr. Davis -had borne a leading part in support of Polk and Dallas and Texas -annexation in Mississippi. His services were not of a character to be -forgotten by his party, nor did an intelligent and appreciative public -fail to discover in the young man whose eloquence and manly bearing had so -enlisted their admiration, such abilities and acquirements as qualified -him to represent the honor of his State in any capacity which they might -intrust to his keeping. - -Of Mississippi it might have been said, as of Virginia, that "the sun of -her Democracy knew no setting." If possible, however, the State was more -closely than ever confirmed in her Democratic moorings by the decisive -results of the election in 1844. When Mr. Davis received the appropriate -acknowledgment of popular appreciation in his election to the House of -Representatives, in November, 1845, Mississippi sent an unbroken -Democratic delegation to Washington. His associates were Messrs. Roberts -and Jacob Thompson (afterward Secretary of the Interior under Mr. -Buchanan) in the House, and Messrs. Foote and Speight in the Senate. - -On Monday, December 8, 1845, Mr. Davis was qualified as a member of the -House of Representatives, and from that day dates his eventful and -brilliant legislative career. The Twenty-ninth Congress was charged with -some of the gravest duties of legislation. The questions of the tariff, -the Oregon excitement, during which war with England was so imminent, and -the settlement of important details pertaining to the Texas question, were -the absorbing concerns which engaged its attention until the provisions -and appropriations necessary to the successful prosecution of the Mexican -war imposed still more serious labors. The records of this Congress reveal -many interesting facts concerning individuals who have since figured -prominently in the history of the country. The fact to which we have -alluded of the unusual interest which had been exhibited in the recent -Presidential contest, doubtless had a considerable influence in the choice -of members of Congress in the various States, and largely contributed to -its elevated standard of ability. - -The debates in the House of Representatives of the Twenty-ninth Congress, -are unsurpassed in ability and eloquence by those of any preceding or -subsequent session of that body, and upon its rolls are to be found many -names, now national in reputation, which were then but recently introduced -to public attention. Stephen A. Douglas, the most thoroughly -representative American politician of his time, uniting to a more than -average proportion of the respectability of his class, his full share of -its vicious characteristics, politic, adroit, and ambitious, was -comparatively a new member, and, at this time, in the morning of his -reputation. R. M. T. Hunter, of Virginia, a statesman of sound judgment -and accurate information, who based his arguments upon the facts, and -reduced the complicated problems of governmental economy to the conditions -of a mathematical demonstration, had not yet been transferred to the -Senate. James A. Seddon, the safe theorist, whose study, like Edmund -Burke's, was "_rerum cognoscere causas_," the acute dialectician, who, in -his mental characteristics, no less than in his principles, was so closely -allied to Mr. Calhoun, was, like Jefferson Davis, for the first time a -member of Congress. Andrew Johnson was then a member of the House and at -the outset of his remarkable career; and in addition to these were -Brinkerhoff, Washington Hunt, Dromgoole, George S. Houston, and a score of -others, whose names recall interesting reminiscences of the day in which -they figured. - -To a man of ordinary purpose, or doubtful of himself, the prospect of -competition with such men, at the very outset of his public career, would -not have been encouraging. But there are men, designed by nature, to -rejoice at, rather than to shrink from those arduous and hazardous -positions to which their responsibilities summon them. An attribute of -genius is the consciousness of strength, and that sublime confidence in -the success of its own efforts, which doubly assures victory in the battle -of life. It was with an assurance of triumph, far different from the -harlequin-like effrontery which is often witnessed in the political arena, -that Jefferson Davis advanced to contest the awards of intellectual -distinction. With the activity and vigor of the disciplined gladiator, -with the _gaudia certaminis_ beaming in every feature, with the calm -confidence of the trained statesman, and yet with all the radiant _elan_ -of a youthful knight contending for his spurs at Templestowe, he pursued -his brief but impressive career in the lower house of Congress. - -As a member of the House of Representatives Mr. Davis rapidly and steadily -won upon the good opinion of his associates, and the favorable estimate of -him, entertained by his constituents and friends, was confirmed by his -greatly advanced reputation at the period of his withdrawal from Congress -in the ensuing summer. He became prominent, less by the frequency with -which he claimed the attention of the House, than by the accuracy of his -information, the substantial value of his suggestions and the easy dignity -of his demeanor. His speeches, though not comparable with his senatorial -efforts, were characterized by great perspicuity, argumentative force, and -propriety of taste, and frequently rose to the dignity of true eloquence. -They, in every instance, gave promise of that rhetorical finish, power of -statement, unity of thought and logical coherence, which, in subsequent -years, were so appropriately illustrated on other theaters of intellectual -effort. Mr. Davis participated prominently in the debates upon the Oregon -excitement, Native Americanism, and the various other contemporary topics -of interest, which were then before Congress, but was especially prominent -in the discussion of military affairs, the interests and requirements of -the army, and the measures devised for the prosecution of the Mexican war. -Upon the latter subjects his experience was of great practical value. - -On the 19th of December, 1845, he offered the following resolutions: -"_Resolved_, That the Committee on Military Affairs be instructed to -inquire into the expediency of converting a portion of the forts of the -United States into schools for military instruction, on the basis of -substituting their present garrisons of enlisted men, by detachments -furnished from each State of our Union, in the ratio of their several -representation in the Congress of the United States." - -"_Resolved_, That the Committee on the Post-office and Post-roads be -required to inquire into the expediency of establishing a direct daily -mail route from Montgomery, Alabama, to Jackson, Mississippi." - -The occasion of these motions was the first upon which he occupied the -floor of the House. - -On the 29th of December, Mr. Davis spoke in a very earnest and impressive -manner upon Native Americanism, which he strongly opposed, and on -subsequent occasions addressed the House in favor of the bill to receive -arms, barracks, fortifications, and other public property, the cession of -which to the Federal Government, by Texas, had been provided to take place -upon its admission to the Union; in favor of the proposition to raise -additional regiments of riflemen; in opposition to appropriations for -improvement of rivers and harbors; upon the Oregon question, and in favor -of a resolution of thanks to General Taylor and his army. - -The extracts from his speech on the Oregon question, and the speech in -favor of thanks to General Taylor and his army, which is here given in -full, are taken from the reports of the _Congressional Globe_. The -intelligent reader will appreciate their real value, as to accuracy, -without any suggestion from us. - -On February 6, 1846, the House, having resolved itself into Committee of -the Whole, and having under consideration the joint resolution of notice -to the British Government concerning the abrogation of the Convention -between the United States and Great Britain respecting the territory of -Oregon, Mr. Davis spoke at some length, and in an attractive and -instructive style, upon the subject before the House. A great portion of -the speech consists of interesting historical details, evincing a most -accurate acquaintance with the subject, and giving a clear and valuable -analysis of facts. We have space for only brief extracts, which are -sufficient to reveal Mr. Davis' position upon this important question: - -... "Sir, why has the South been assailed in this discussion? Has it been -with the hope of sowing dissensions between us and our Western friends? -Thus far, I think, it has failed. Why the frequent reference to the -conduct of the South on the Texas question? Sir, those who have made -reflections on the South as having sustained Texas annexation from -sectional views have been of those who opposed that great measure and are -most eager for this. The suspicion is but natural in them. But, sir, let -me tell them that this doctrine of the political balance between different -portions of the Union is no Southern doctrine. We, sir, advocated the -annexation of Texas from high national considerations. It was not a mere -Southern question; it lay coterminous to the Western States, and extended -as far north as the forty-second degree of latitude. Nor, sir, do we wish -to divide the territory of Oregon; we would preserve it all for the -extension of our Union. We would not arrest the onward progress of our -pioneers; we would not, as has been done in this debate, ask why our -citizens have left the repose of civil government and gone to Oregon? We -find in it but that energy which has heretofore been characteristic of our -people, and which has developed much that has illustrated our history. It -is the onward progress of our people toward the Pacific which alone can -arrest their westward march, and on the banks of which, to use the -language of our lamented Linn, the pioneer will sit down to weep that -there are no more forests to subdue.... It is, as the representative of a -high-spirited and patriotic people, that I am called on to resist this -war clamor. My constituents need no such excitements to prepare their -hearts for all that patriotism demands. Whenever the honor of the country -demands redress; whenever its territory is invaded--if, then, it shall be -sought to intimidate by the fiery cross of St. George--if, then, we are -threatened with the unfolding of English banners if we resent or -resist--from the gulf shore to the banks of that great river, throughout -out the length and breadth--Mississippi will come. And whether the -question be one of Northern or Southern, of Eastern or Western aggression, -we will not stop to count the cost, but act as becomes the descendants of -those who, in the war of the Revolution, engaged in unequal strife to aid -our brethren of the North in redressing their injuries.... We turn from -present hostility to former friendship--from recent defection to the time -when Massachusetts and Virginia, the stronger brothers of our family, -stood foremost and united to defend our common rights. From sire to son -has descended the love of our Union in our hearts, as in our history are -mingled the names of Concord and Camden, of Yorktown and Saratoga, of -Moultrie and Plattsburgh, of Chippewa and Erie, of Bowyer and Guildford, -and New Orleans and Bunker Hill. Grouped together, they form a monument to -the common glory of our common country; and where is the Southern man who -would wish that monument were less by one of the Northern names that -constitute the mass? Who, standing on the ground made sacred by the blood -of Warren, could allow sectional feeling to curb his enthusiasm as he -looked upon that obelisk which rises a monument to freedom's and his -country's triumph, and stands a type of the time, the men and event that -it commemorates; built of material that mocks the waves of time, without -niche or molding for parasite or creeping thing to rest on, and pointing -like a finger to the sky, to raise man's thoughts to philanthropic and -noble deeds." - -It is well known that, upon this subject, there was considerable division -among the Democracy. The effort to commit the party, as a unit, to a -position which would have inevitably produced war with England signally -failed. The country had not then reached its present pitch of arrogant -inflation, which emboldens it to seek opportunity for exhibition in the -vainglorious role of braggadocio. Mr. Davis, upon this and other -occasions, significantly rebuked the demagogical clamor which would have -precipitated the country into a calamitous war. His reply, on the 17th of -April, 1846, to Stephen A. Douglas, who was among the leading instigators -of the war-feeling in the House, is exceedingly forcible and spirited. - -The following speech in favor of the resolution of thanks to General -Taylor, the officers and men of his army, for their recent successes on -the Rio Grande, was delivered May 28, 1846: - -"As a friend to the army, he rejoiced at the evidence, now afforded, of a -disposition in this House to deal justly, to feel generously toward those -to whom the honor of our flag has been intrusted. Too often and too long -had we listened to harsh and invidious reflections upon our gallant little -army and the accomplished officers who command it. A partial opportunity -had been offered to exhibit their soldierly qualities in their true light, -and he trusted these aspersions were hushed--hushed now forever. As an -American, whose heart promptly responds to all which illustrates our -national character, and adds new glory to our national name, he rejoiced -with exceeding joy at the recent triumph of our arms. Yet it is no more -than he expected from the gallant soldiers who hold our post upon the Rio -Grande--no more than, when occasion offers, they will achieve again. It -was the triumph of American courage, professional skill, and that -patriotic pride which blooms in the breast of our educated soldier, and -which droops not under the withering scoff of political revilers. - -"These men will feel, deeply feel, the expression of your gratitude. It -will nerve their hearts in the hour of future conflicts, to know that -their country honors and acknowledges their devotion. It will shed a -solace on the dying moments of those who fall, to be assured their country -mourns their loss. This is the meed for which the soldier bleeds and dies. -This he will remember long after the paltry pittance of one month's extra -pay has been forgotten. - -"Beyond this expression of the nation's thanks, he liked the _principle_ -of the proposition offered by the gentleman from South Carolina. We have a -pension system providing for the disabled soldier, but he seeks well and -wisely to extend it to all who may be wounded, however slightly. It is a -reward offered to those who seek for danger, who first and foremost plunge -into the fight. It has been this incentive, extended so as to cover all -feats of gallantry, that has so often crowned the British arms with -victory, and caused their prowess to be recognized in every quarter of the -globe. It was the sure and high reward of gallantry, the confident -reliance upon their nation's gratitude, which led Napoleon's armies over -Europe, conquering and to conquer; and it was these influences which, in -an earlier time, rendered the Roman arms invincible, and brought their -eagle back victorious from every land on which it gazed. Sir, let not that -parsimony (for he did not deem it economy) prevent us from adopting a -system which in war will add so much to the efficiency of troops. Instead -of seeking to fill the ranks of your army by increased pay, let the -soldier feel that a liberal pension will relieve him from the fear of want -in the event of disability, provide for his family in the event of death, -and that he wins his way to gratitude and the reward of his countrymen by -periling all for honor in the field. - -"The achievement which we now propose to honor richly deserves it. Seldom, -sir, in the annals of military history has there been one in which -desperate daring and military skill were more happily combined. The enemy -selected his own ground, and united to the advantage of a strong position -a numerical majority of three to one. Driven from his first position by an -attack in which it is hard to say whether professional skill or manly -courage is to be more admired, he retired and posted his artillery on a -narrow defile, to sweep the ground over which our troops were compelled to -pass. There, posted in strength three times greater than our own, they -waited the approach of our gallant little army. - -"General Taylor knew the danger and destitution of the band he left to -hold his camp opposite Matamoras, and he paused for no regular approaches, -but opened his field artillery, and dashed with sword and bayonet on the -foe. A single charge left him master of their battery, and the number of -slain attests the skill and discipline of his army. Mr. D. referred to a -gentleman who, a short time since, expressed extreme distrust in our army, -and poured out the vials of his denunciation upon the graduates of the -Military Academy, He hoped now the gentleman will withdraw these -denunciations; that now he will learn the value of military science; that -he will see, in the location, the construction, the defenses of the -bastioned field-works opposite Matamoras, the utility, the necessity of a -military education. Let him compare the few men who held that with the -army who assailed it; let him mark the comparative safety with which they -stood within that temporary work; let him consider why the guns along its -ramparts were preserved, whilst they silenced the batteries of the enemy; -why that intrenchment stands unharmed by Mexican shot, whilst its guns -have crumbled the stone walls in Matamoras to the ground, and then say -whether he believes a blacksmith or a tailor could have secured the same -results. He trusted the gentleman would be convinced that arms, like every -occupation, requires to be studied before it can be understood; and from -these things to which he had called his attention, he will learn the power -and advantage of military science. He would make but one other allusion to -the remarks of the gentleman he had noticed, who said nine-tenths of the -graduates of the Military Academy abandoned the service of the United -States. If he would take the trouble to examine the records upon this -point, he doubted not he would be surprised at the extent of his mistake. -There he would learn that a majority of all the graduates are still in -service; and if he would push his inquiry a little further, he would find -that a large majority of the commissioned officers who bled in the action -of the 8th and 9th were graduates of that academy. - -"He would not enter into a discussion on the military at this time. His -pride, his gratification arose from the success of our arms. Much was due -to the courage which Americans have displayed on many battle-fields in -former times; but this courage, characteristic of our people, and -pervading all sections and all classes, could never have availed so much -had it not been combined with military science. And the occasion seemed -suited to enforce this lesson on the minds of those who have been -accustomed, in season and out of season, to rail at the scientific -attainments of our officers. - -"The influence of military skill--the advantage of discipline in the -troops--the power derived from the science of war, increases with the -increased size of the contending armies. With two thousand we had beaten -six thousand; with twenty thousand we would far more easily beat sixty -thousand, because the general must be an educated soldier who wields large -bodies of men, and the troops, to act efficiently, must be disciplined and -commanded by able officers. He but said what he had long thought and often -said, when he expressed his confidence in the ability of our officers to -meet those of any service--favorably to compare, in all that constitutes -the soldier, with any army in the world; and as the field widened for the -exhibition, so would their merits shine more brightly still. - -"With many of the officers now serving on the Rio Grande he had enjoyed a -personal acquaintance, and hesitated not to say that all which skill, and -courage, and patriotism could perform, might be expected from them. He had -forborne to speak of the general commanding on the Rio Grande on any -former occasion; but he would now say to those who had expressed distrust, -that the world held not a soldier better qualified for the service he was -engaged in than General Taylor. Trained from his youth to arms, having -spent the greater portion of his life on our frontier, his experience -peculiarly fits him for the command he holds. Such as his conduct was in -Fort Harrison, on the Upper Mississippi, in Florida, and on the Rio -Grande, will it be wherever he meets the enemy of his country. - -"Those soldiers, to whom so many have applied depreciatory epithets, upon -whom it has been so often said no reliance could be placed, they too will -be found, in every emergency renewing such feats as have recently graced -our arms, bearing the American flag to honorable triumphs, or falling -beneath its folds, as devotees to our common cause, to die a soldier's -death. - -"He rejoiced that the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Black) had shown -himself so ready to pay this tribute to our army. He hoped not a voice -would be raised in opposition to it--that nothing but the stern regret -which is prompted by remembrance of those who bravely fought and nobly -died will break the joy, the pride, the patriotic gratulation with which -we hail this triumph of our brethren on the Rio Grande." - -A striking feature of these two speeches, as, indeed, of all Mr. Davis' -Congressional speeches, is the strong and outspoken _national_ feeling -which pervades them. It is a part of the history of these times, that -while Jefferson Davis eloquently avowed a noble and generous sympathy with -his heroic compatriots in Mexico, a prominent Northern politician bespoke -for the American army, "a welcome with bloody hands to hospitable graves." -When, a few months afterwards, the names of Jefferson Davis and his -Mississippi Rifles were baptized in blood amid those frowning redoubts at -Monterey, and when, upon the ensanguined plain of Buena Vista, he fell -stricken in the very moment of victory, just as his genius and the valor -of his comrades had broken that last, furious onset of the Mexican -lancers, New England and her leaders stood indifferent spectators of the -scene.[5] Yet the same New England bounded eagerly to the conquest and -spoliation of their countrymen, and the same leaders clamored valiantly -for the humiliation, for the blood even, of Jefferson Davis, _as a traitor -and a rebel. Quosque tandem._ - -An interesting sequel of this speech was the debate, which it occasioned -two days afterwards, between Mr. Davis and Andrew Johnson, now President -of the United States. Mr. Johnson, who boasts so proudly of his plebeian -origin, and is yet said to be morbidly sensitive of the slightest allusion -to it by others, excepted to Mr. Davis' reference to the "tailor and -blacksmith," warmly eulogized those callings and mechanical avocations in -general, and took occasion to expatiate extensively upon the virtue and -intelligence of the masses. Mr. Davis, whose language is clearly not -susceptible of any interpretation disparaging to "blacksmiths and -tailors," disclaimed the imputation, saying that he had designed merely to -illustrate his argument, that the profession of arms, to be understood, -must be studied, and that a mechanic could no more fill the place of an -educated soldier, than could the latter supply the qualifications of the -former. Mr. Johnson, however, was resolved to seize the opportunity for a -panegyric upon the populace, and no explanations could avail. The _Globe_ -reports this debate as, "in all its stages, not being of an entirely -pleasant nature." - -As an appropriate conclusion to this sketch of Mr. Davis' career in the -House of Representatives, we quote the following extract from an -interesting work,[6] published some years since: "John Quincy Adams had a -habit of always observing new members. He would sit near them on the -occasion of their Congressional _debut_, closely eyeing and attentively -listening if the speech pleased him, but quickly departing if it did not. -When Davis first arose in the House, the Ex-President took a seat close -by. Davis proceeded, and Adams did not move. The one continued speaking -and the other listening; and those who knew Mr. Adams' habits were fully -aware that the new member had deeply impressed him. At the close of the -speech the 'Old Man Eloquent' crossed over to some friends and said, 'That -young man, gentlemen, is no ordinary man. He will make his mark yet, mind -me.'" - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - THE NAME OF JEFFERSON DAVIS INSEPARABLE FROM THE HISTORY OF THE - MEXICAN WAR--HIS ESSENTIALLY MILITARY CHARACTER AND TASTES--JOINS - GENERAL TAYLOR'S ARMY ON THE RIO GRANDE, AS COLONEL OF THE FAMOUS - "MISSISSIPPI RIFLES"--MONTEREY--BUENA VISTA--GENERAL TAYLOR'S ACCOUNT - OF DAVIS' CONDUCT--DAVIS' REPORT OF THE ACTION--NOVELTY AND - ORIGINALITY OF HIS STRATEGY AT BUENA VISTA--INTERESTING STATEMENT OF - HON. CALEB CUSHING--RETURN OF DAVIS TO THE UNITED STATES--TRIUMPHANT - RECEPTION AT HOME--PRESIDENT POLK TENDERS HIM A BRIGADIER'S - COMMISSION, WHICH HE DECLINES ON PRINCIPLE. - - -The name of Davis is inseparable from those lettered glories of the -American Union, which were the brilliant trophies of the Mexican war. In -those bright annals it was engraven with unfading lustre upon the -conquering banners of the Republic, and his genius and valor were rewarded -with a fame which rests securely upon the laurels of Monterey and Buena -Vista. - -Jefferson Davis is a born soldier. Even if we could forget the glories of -the assault upon Teneria and El Diablo, and banish the thrilling -recollection of that movement at Buena Vista, the genius, novelty, and -intrepidity of which electrified the world of military science, and -extorted the enthusiastic admiration of the victor of Waterloo, we must -yet recognize the impress of those rare gifts and graces which are the -titles to authority. The erect yet easy carriage, the true martial dignity -of bearing, which is altogether removed from the supercilious _hauteur_ -of the mere martinet, the almost fascinating expression of _suaviter in -modo_, which yet does not for an instant conceal the _fortiter in re_, -constitute in him that imperial semblance, to which the mind involuntarily -concedes the right to supreme command. It is impossible, in the presence -of Mr. Davis, to deny this recognition of his intuitive soldiership. Not -only is obvious to the eye the commanding mien of the soldier, but the -order, the discipline of the educated soldier, whose nature, stern and -unflinching, was yet plastic to receive the impressions of an art with -which it felt an intuitive alliance. This military precision is -characteristic of Mr. Davis in every aspect in which he appears. There is -the constant fixedness of gaze upon the object to be reached, and the -cautious calculation of the chances of success with the means and forces -ready at hand; a constant regard for bases of supply and a proper concern -for lines of retreat, and, above all, the prompt and vigorous execution, -if success be practicable and the attack determined upon. Even in his -oratory and statesmanship are these characteristics evinced. In the former -there is far more of rhetorical order, harmony, and symmetry, than of -rhetorical ornament and display; and in the latter there is purpose, -consistency, and method, with little regard for the shifts of expediency -and the suggestions of hap-hazard temerity. - -The attachment of Mr. Davis for the profession of arms is little less than -a passion--an inspiration. True, he voluntarily abandoned the army, at an -age when military life is most attractive to men, but the field of -politics was far more inviting to a commendable aspiration for fame, than -the army at a season of profound peace. But a more potent consideration, -of a domestic nature, urged his withdrawal from military life. He was -about to be married, and preferred not to remain in the army after having -assumed the responsibilities of that relation. His speeches in the House -of Representatives, indicating his earnest interest in military affairs, -his solicitude in behalf of the army, his enthusiastic championship of the -Military Academy, and his thorough information respecting all subjects -pertaining to the military interests of the country, show his ambitious -and absorbing study of his favorite science. - -In common with an overwhelming majority of the Southern people, he had -favored the annexation of Texas, and cordially sustained Mr. Polk's -Administration, in all the measures which were necessary to the triumphant -success of its policy. While in the midst of his useful labors, as a -member of Congress, in promoting the war policy of the Government, he -received, with delight, the announcement of his selection to the command -of the First Regiment of Mississippi Volunteers. He immediately resigned -his seat in Congress and started to take command of his regiment, after -obtaining for it, with great difficulty, the rifles which were afterwards -used with such deadly effect upon the enemy. Overtaking his men, who were -already _en route_ for the scene of action, at New Orleans, by midsummer -he had reinforced General Taylor on the Rio Grande. - -The incidents of the Mexican war are too fresh in the recollection of the -country to justify here a detailed narrative of the operations of the -gallant army of General Taylor in its progress toward the interior from -the scenes of its splendid exploits at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. -For several weeks after the arrival of Colonel Davis and his -Mississippians, active hostilities were suspended. When the preparations -for the campaign were completed, the army advanced, and reached Walnut -Springs, about three miles from Monterey, on the 19th of September, 1846. -Two days afterwards began those series of actions which finally resulted -in the capitulation of a fortified city of great strength, and defended -with obstinate valor. Of the part borne in these brilliant operations -which so exalted the glory of the American name, and immortalized the -heroism of Southern volunteers, by Colonel Davis and his "Mississippi -Rifles," an able and graphic pen shall relate the story: - -"In the storming of Monterey, Colonel Davis and his riflemen played a most -gallant part. The storming of one of its strongest forts (Teneria) on the -21st of September was a desperate and hard-fought fight. The Mexicans had -dealt such death by their cross-fires that they ran up a new flag in -exultation, and in defiance of the assault which, at this time, was being -made in front and rear. The Fourth Infantry, in the advance, had been -terribly cut up, but the Mississippians and Tennesseeans steadily pressed -forward, under a galling fire of copper grape. They approached to within a -hundred yards of the fort, when they were lost in a volume of smoke. -McClung,[7] inciting a company which formerly had been under his command, -dashed on, followed by Captain Willis. Anticipating General Quitman, -Colonel Davis, about the same time, gave the order to charge. With wild -desperation, his men followed him. The escalade was made with the fury of -a tempest, the men flinging themselves upon the guns of the enemy. Sword -in hand, McClung has sprung over the ditch. After him dashes Davis, -cheering on the Mississippians, and then Campbell, with his Tennesseeans -and others, brothers in the fight, and rivals for its honors. Then was -wild work. The assault was irresistible. The Mexicans, terror-stricken, -fled like an Alpine village from the avalanche, and, taking position in a -strongly-fortified building, some seventy-five yards in the rear, opened a -heavy fire of musketry. But, like their mighty river, nothing could stay -the Mississippians. They are after the Mexicans. Davis and McClung are -simultaneously masters of the fortifications, having got in by different -entrances. In the fervor of victory the brigade does not halt, but, led on -by Colonel Davis, are preparing to charge on the second post, (El Diablo,) -about three hundred yards in the rear, when they are restrained by -Quitman. This desperate conflict lasted over two hours. The charge of the -Mississippi Rifle Regiment, without bayonets, upon Fort Teneria, gained -for the State a triumph which stands unparalleled. - -"Placed in possession of El Diablo, on the dawn of the 23d Colonel Davis -was exposed to a sharp fire from a half-moon redoubt, about one hundred -and fifty yards distant, which was connected with heavy stone buildings -and walls adjoining a block of the city. Returning the fire, he proceeded, -with eight men, to reconnoitre the ground in advance. Having reported, he -was ordered, with three companies of his regiment and one of Tennesseeans, -to advance on the works. - -"When they reached the half-moon work a tremendous fire was opened from -the stone buildings in the rear. Taking a less-exposed position, Davis was -reinforced, and, the balance of the Mississippians coming up, the -engagement became general in the street, while, from the house-tops, a -heavy fire was kept up by the Mexicans. 'The gallant Davis, leading the -advance with detached parties, was rapidly entering the city, penetrating -into buildings, and gradually driving the enemy from the position,' when -General Henderson and the Texan Rangers dismounted, entered the city, and, -through musketry and grape, made their way to the advance. The conflict -increased, and still Davis continued to lead his command through the -streets to within a square of the Grand Plaza, when, the afternoon being -far advanced, General Taylor withdrew the Americans to the captured -forts."[8] - -Thus, in their first engagement, the Mississippians and their commander -achieved a reputation which shall endure so long as men commemorate deeds -of heroism and devotion. Veteran troops, trained to despise death by the -dangers of a score of battles, have been immortalized in song and story -for exploits inferior to those of the "Mississippi Rifles" at Monterey. -Colonel Davis became one of the idols of the army, and took a prominent -place among the heroes of the war. The nation rang with the fame of "Davis -and his Mississippi Rifles;" the journals of the day were largely occupied -with graphic descriptions of their exploits; and the reports of superior -officers contributed their proud testimony to the history of the country, -to the chivalrous daring and consummate skill of Colonel Davis. A becoming -acknowledgment of his conduct was made by General Taylor in assigning him -a place on the commission of officers appointed to arrange with the -Mexicans the terms of capitulation. The result of the negotiations, -though approved by General Taylor, was not approved by the Administration, -which ordered a termination of the armistice agreed upon by the -commissioners from the respective armies and a speedy resumption of -hostilities. The terms of capitulation were assailed by many, who thought -them too lenient to the Mexicans; among others, by General Quitman, the -warm, personal, and political friend of Colonel Davis. A very important -portion of the history of the war consists of the latter's defense of the -terms of surrender and his memoranda of the incidents occurring in the -conferences with the Mexican officers. - -To sustain the proud prestige of Monterey--if possible to surpass it, -became henceforth the aspiration of the Mississippians. But the name of -Mississippi was to be made radiant with a new glory, beside which the -lustre of Monterey paled, as did the dawn of Lodi by the full-orbed -splendor of Austerlitz. All the world knows of the conduct of Jefferson -Davis at Buena Vista. How he virtually won a battle, which, considering -the disparity of the contending forces, must forever be a marvel to the -student of military science; how like Dessaix, at Marengo, he thought -there was "still time to win another battle," even when a portion of our -line was broken and in inglorious retreat, and acting upon the impulse -rescued victory from the jaws of defeat; saving an army from destruction, -and flooding with a blaze of triumph a field shrouded with the gloom of -disaster, are memories forever enshrined in the Temple of Fame. Americans -can never weary of listening to the thrilling incidents of that -ever-memorable day. By the South, the lesson of Buena Vista and kindred -scenes of the valor of her children, can never be forgotton. In these days -of her humiliation and despair, their proud memories throng upon her, as -do a thousand noble emotions upon the modern Greek, who stands upon the -sacred ground of Marathon and Plætea. - -The following vivid and powerful description of the more prominent -incidents of the battle is from the pen of Hon. J. F. H. Claiborne, of -Mississippi: - -"The battle had been raging sometime with fluctuating fortunes, and was -setting against us, when General Taylor, with Colonel Davis and others, -arrived on the field. Several regiments (which were subsequently rallied -and fought bravely) were in full retreat. O'Brien, after having his men -and horses completely cut up, had been compelled to draw off his guns, and -Bragg, with almost superhuman energy, was sustaining the brunt of the -fight. Many officers of distinction had fallen. Colonel Davis rode forward -to examine the position of the enemy, and concluding that the best way to -arrest our fugitives would be to make a bold demonstration, he resolved at -once to attack the enemy, there posted in force, immediately in front, -supported by cavalry, and two divisions in reserve in his rear. It was a -resolution bold almost to rashness, but the emergency was pressing. With a -handful of Indiana volunteers, who still stood by their brave old colonel -(Bowles) and his own regiment, he advanced at double-quick time, firing as -he advanced. His own brave fellows fell fast under the rolling musketry of -the enemy, but their rapid and fatal volleys carried dismay and death into -the adverse ranks. A deep ravine separated the combatants. Leaping into -it, the Mississippians soon appeared on the other side, and with a shout -that was heard over the battle-field, they poured in a well-directed fire, -and rushed upon the enemy. Their deadly aim and wild enthusiasm were -irresistible. The Mexicans fled in confusion to their reserves, and Davis -seized the commanding position they had occupied. He next fell upon a -party of cavalry and compelled it to fly, with the loss of their leader -and other officers. Immediately afterwards a brigade of lancers, one -thousand strong, were seen approaching at a gallop, in beautiful array, -with sounding bugles and fluttering pennons. It was an appalling -spectacle, but not a man flinched from his position. The time between our -devoted band and eternity seemed brief indeed. But conscious that the eye -of the army was upon them, that the honor of Mississippi was at stake, and -knowing that, if they gave way, or were ridden down, our unprotected -batteries in the rear, upon which the fortunes of the day depended, would -be captured, each man resolved to die in his place sooner than retreat. -Not the Spartan martyrs at Thermopylæ--not the sacred battalion of -Epaminondas--not the Tenth Legion of Julius Cæsar--not the Old Guard of -Napoleon--ever evinced more fortitude than these young volunteers in a -crisis when death seemed inevitable. They stood like statues, as frigid -and motionless as the marble itself. Impressed with this extraordinary -firmness, when they had anticipated panic and flight, the lancers advanced -more deliberately, as though they saw, for the first time, the dark shadow -of the fate that was impending over them. Colonel Davis had thrown his men -into the form of a reëntering angle, (familiarly known as his famous V -movement,) both flanks resting on ravines, the lancers coming down on the -intervening ridge. This exposed them to a converging fire, and the moment -they came within rifle range each man singled out his object, and the -whole head of the column fell. A more deadly fire never was delivered, and -the brilliant array recoiled and retreated, paralyzed and dismayed. - -"Shortly afterwards the Mexicans, having concentrated a large force on the -right for their final attack, Colonel Davis was ordered in that direction. -His regiment had been in action all day, exhausted by thirst and fatigue, -much reduced by the carnage of the morning engagement, and many in the -ranks suffering from wounds, yet the noble fellows moved at double-quick -time. Bowles' little band of Indiana volunteers still acted with them. -After marching several hundred yards they perceived the Mexican infantry -advancing, in three lines, upon Bragg's battery, which, though entirely -unsupported, held its position with a resolution worthy of his fame. The -pressure upon him stimulated the Mississippians. They increased their -speed, and when the enemy were within one hundred yards of the battery and -confident of its capture, they took him in flank and reverse, and poured -in a raking and destructive fire. This broke his right line, and the rest -soon gave way and fell back precipitately. Here Colonel Davis was severely -wounded." - -The wound here alluded to was from a musket ball in the heel, and was -exceedingly painful, though Colonel Davis refused to leave the field until -the action was over. For some time grave apprehensions were entertained -lest it should prove dangerous by the setting in of erysipelas. - -General Taylor, who was deeply impressed with the large share of credit -due to Colonel Davis, in his official report of the battle, says: "The -Mississippi Riflemen, under Colonel Davis, were highly conspicuous for -their gallantry and steadiness, and sustained throughout the engagement, -the reputation of veteran troops. Brought into action against an immensely -superior force, they maintained themselves for a long time, unsupported -and with heavy loss, and held an important part of the field until -reinforced. Colonel Davis, though severely wounded, remained in the saddle -until the close of the action. His distinguished coolness and gallantry, -at the head of his regiment on this day, entitle him to the particular -notice of the Government." - -The report of Colonel Davis, of the operations of his regiment, is highly -important as a description of the most important features of the action, -and as an explanation of his celebrated strategic movement. We omit such -portions as embrace mere details not relevant to our purpose. - - "SALTILLO, MEXICO, 2d March, 1847. - - "SIR: In compliance with your note of yesterday, I have the honor to - present the following report of the service of the Mississippi - Riflemen on the 23d ultimo: - - "Early in the morning of that day the regiment was drawn out from the - head-quarters encampment, which stood in advance of and overlooked the - town of Saltillo. Conformably to instructions, two companies were - detached for the protection of that encampment, and to defend the - adjacent entrance of the town. The remaining eight companies were put - in march to return to the position of the preceding day, now known as - the battle-field of Buena Vista. We had approached to within about two - miles of that position, when the report of artillery firing, which - reached us, gave assurance that a battle had commenced. Excited by the - sound, the regiment pressed rapidly forward, manifesting, upon this, - as upon other occasions, their more than willingness to meet the - enemy. At the first convenient place the column was halted for the - purpose of filling their canteens with water; and the march being - resumed, was directed toward the position which had been indicated to - me, on the previous evening, as the post of our regiment. As we - approached the scene of action, horsemen, recognized as of our troops, - were seen running, dispersed and confusedly from the field; and our - first view of the line of battle presented the mortifying spectacle of - a regiment of infantry flying disorganized from before the enemy. - These sights, so well calculated to destroy confidence and dispirit - troops just coming into action, it is my pride and pleasure to - believe, only nerved the resolution of the regiment I have the honor - to command. - - "Our order of march was in column of companies, advancing by their - centers. The point which had just been abandoned by the regiment - alluded to, was now taken as our direction. I rode forward to examine - the ground upon which we were going to operate, and in passing through - the fugitives, appealed to them to return with us and renew the fight, - pointing to our regiment as a mass of men behind which they might - securely form. - - "With a few honorable exceptions, the appeal was as unheeded, as were - the offers which, I am informed, were made by our men to give their - canteens of water to those who complained of thirst, on condition that - they would go back. General Wool was upon the ground making great - efforts to rally the men who had given way. I approached him and asked - if he would send another regiment to sustain me in an attack upon the - enemy before us. He was alone, and, after promising the support, went - in person to send it. Upon further examination, I found that the slope - we were ascending was intersected by a deep ravine, which, uniting - obliquely with a still larger one on our right, formed between them a - point of land difficult of access by us, but which, spreading in a - plain toward the base of the mountain, had easy communication with - the main body of the enemy. This position, important from its natural - strength, derived a far greater value from the relation it bore to our - order of battle and line of communication with the rear. The enemy, in - number many times greater than ourselves, supported by strong - reserves, flanked by cavalry and elated by recent success, was - advancing upon it. The moment seemed to me critical and the occasion - to require whatever sacrifice it might cost to check the enemy. - - "My regiment, having continued to advance, was near at hand. I met and - formed it rapidly into order of battle; the line then advanced in - double-quick time, until within the estimated range of our rifles, - when it was halted, and ordered to 'fire advancing.' - - "The progress of the enemy was arrested. We crossed the difficult - chasm before us, under a galling fire, and in good order renewed the - attack upon the other side. The contest was severe--the destruction - great upon both sides. We steadily advanced, and, as the distance - diminished, the ratio of loss increased rapidly against the enemy; he - yielded, and was driven back on his reserves. A plain now lay behind - us--the enemy's cavalry had passed around our right flank, which - rested on the main ravine, and gone to our rear. The support I had - expected to join us was nowhere to be seen. I therefore ordered the - regiment to retire, and went in person to find the cavalry, which, - after passing round our right, had been concealed by the inequality of - the ground. I found them at the first point where the bank was - practicable for horsemen, in the act of descending into the ravine--no - doubt for the purpose of charging upon our rear. The nearest of our - men ran quickly to my call, attacked this body, and dispersed it with - some loss. I think their commander was among the killed. - - "The regiment was formed again in line of battle behind the first - ravine we had crossed; soon after which we were joined upon our left - by Lieutenant Kilbourn, with a piece of light artillery, and Colonel - Lane's (the Third) regiment of Indiana volunteers.... We had proceeded - but a short distance when I saw a large body of cavalry debouche from - his cover upon the left of the position from which we had retired, and - advance rapidly upon us. The Mississippi regiment was filed to the - right, and fronted in line across the plain; the Indiana regiment was - formed on the bank of the ravine, in advance of our right flank, by - which a reëntering angle was presented to the enemy. Whilst this - preparation was being made, Sergeant-Major Miller, of our regiment, - was sent to Captain Sherman for one or more pieces of artillery from - his battery. - - "The enemy, who was now seen to be a body of richly-caparisoned - lancers, came forward rapidly, and in beautiful order--the files and - ranks so closed as to look like a mass of men and horses. Perfect - silence and the greatest steadiness prevailed in both lines of our - troops, as they stood at shouldered arms waiting an attack. Confident - of success, and anxious to obtain the full advantage of a cross-fire - at a short distance, I repeatedly called to the men not to shoot. - - "As the enemy approached, his speed regularly diminished, until, when, - within eighty or a hundred yards, he had drawn up to a walk, and - seemed about to halt. A few files fired without orders, and both lines - then instantly poured in a volley so destructive that the mass yielded - to the blow and the survivors fled.... At this time, the enemy made - his last attack upon the right, and I received the General's order to - march to that portion of the field. The broken character of the - intervening ground concealed the scene of action from our view; but - the heavy firing of musketry formed a sufficient guide for our course. - After marching two or three hundred yards, we saw the enemy's infantry - advancing in three lines upon Captain Bragg's battery; which, though - entirely unsupported, resolutely held its position, and met the attack - with a fire worthy the former achievements of that battery, and of the - reputation of its present meritorious commander. We pressed on, - climbed the rocky slope of the plain on which this combat occurred, - reached its brow so as to take the enemy in flank and reverse when he - was about one hundred yards from the battery. Our first fire--raking - each of his lines, and opened close upon his flank--was eminently - destructive. His right gave way, and he fled in confusion. - - "In this, the last contest of the day, my regiment equaled--it was - impossible to exceed--my expectations. Though worn down by many hours - of fatigue and thirst, the ranks thinned by our heavy loss in the - morning, they yet advanced upon the enemy with the alacrity and - eagerness of men fresh to the combat. In every approbatory sense of - these remarks I wish to be included a party of Colonel Bowles' Indiana - regiment, which served with us during the greater part of the day, - under the immediate command of an officer from that regiment, whose - gallantry attracted my particular attention, but whose name, I regret, - is unknown to me. When hostile demonstrations had ceased, I retired to - a tent upon the field for surgical aid, having been wounded by a - musket ball when we first went into action.... Every part of the - action having been fought under the eye of the commanding General, the - importance and manner of any service it was our fortune to render, - will be best estimated by him. But in view of my own responsibility, - it may be permitted me to say, in relation to our first attack upon - the enemy, that I considered the necessity absolute and immediate. No - one could have failed to perceive the hazard. The enemy, in greatly - disproportionate numbers, was rapidly advancing. We saw no friendly - troops coming to our support, and probably none except myself expected - reinforcement. Under such circumstances, the men cheerfully, ardently - entered into the conflict; and though we lost, in that single - engagement, more than thirty killed and forty wounded, the regiment - never faltered nor moved, except as it was ordered. Had the expected - reinforcement arrived, we could have prevented the enemy's cavalry - from passing to our rear, results more decisive might have been - obtained, and a part of our loss have been avoided.... - - "I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant. - - "JEFFERSON DAVIS, - "_Colonel Mississippi Rifles_. - - "MAJOR W. W. S. BLISS, _Assistant Adjutant-General_." - -The reputation earned by Colonel Davis at Buena Vista could not fail to -provoke the assaults of envy. An effort, equally unwarranted and -unsuccessful, has since been made to deprive him of a portion of his -merited fame of having conceived and executed a movement decisive of the -battle. It has been pretended, in disparagement of the strategy of Colonel -Davis, that his celebrated V movement (for so it is, and will always be -known) had not the merit of originality, and besides was forced upon him -by the circumstances in which he was placed, and especially by the -conformation of the ground, which would not admit of a different -disposition of his troops. Such a judgment is merely hypercritical. There -is no account in military history, from the campaigns of Cæsar to those of -Napoleon, of such a tactical conception, unless we include a -slightly-analogous case at Waterloo. The movement in the latter -engagement, however, differs essentially from that executed by Davis at -Buena Vista. A party of Hanoverian cavalry, assailed by French huzzars, at -the intersection of two roads, by forming a salient, repulsed their -assailants almost as effectually as did the reëntrant angle of the -Mississippians at Buena Vista. As to the second criticism, it is certainly -a novel accusation against an officer, that he should, by a quick -appreciation of his situation, avail himself of the only possible means by -which he could not only extricate his own command from imminent peril of -destruction, but also avert a blow delivered at the safety of the entire -army. - -In a lecture on "The Expatriated Irish in Europe and America," delivered -in Boston, February 11, 1858, the Hon. Caleb Cushing thus alludes to this -subject: "In another of the dramatic incidents of that field, a man of -Celtic race (Jefferson Davis) at the head of the Rifles of Mississippi, -had ventured to do that of which there is, perhaps, but one other example -in the military history of modern times. In the desperate conflicts of the -Crimea, at the battle of Inkermann, in one of those desperate charges, -there was a British officer who ventured to receive the charge of the -enemy without the precaution of having his men formed in a hollow square. -They were drawn up in two lines, meeting at a point like an open fan, and -received the charge of the Russians at the muzzle of their guns, and -repelled it. Sir Colin Campbell, for this feat of arms, among others, was -selected as the man to retrieve the fallen fortunes of England in India. -He did, however, but imitate what Jefferson Davis had previously done in -Mexico, who, in that trying hour, when, with one last desperate effort to -break the line of the American army, the cavalry of Mexico was -concentrated in one charge against the American line; then, I say, -Jefferson Davis commanded his men to form in two lines, extended as I have -shown, and receive that charge of the Mexican horse, with a plunging fire -from the right and left from the Mississippi Rifles, which repelled, and -repelled for the last time, the charge of the hosts of Mexico." - -These puerile criticisms, however, were unavailing against the concurrent -testimony of Taylor, Quitman, and Lane, and the grateful plaudits of the -army, to shake the popular judgment, which rarely fails, in the end, to -discriminate between the false glare of cheaply-earned glory and the just -renown of true heroism. - -The term of enlistment of his regiment having expired, Colonel Davis, in -July, 1847, just twelve months after the resignation of his seat in the -House of Representatives, returned to the United States. His progress -toward his home was attended by a series of congratulatory receptions, the -people every-where assembling _en masse_ to do honor to the "Hero of Buena -Vista." Mississippi extended a triumphant greeting to her -soldier-statesman, who, resigning the civic trust which she had confided -to his keeping, had carried her flag in triumph amid the thunders of -battle and the wastes of carnage, carving the name of Mississippi in an -inscription of enduring renown. - -During his journey homeward, there occurred a most impressive illustration -of that strict devotion to principle which, above all other -considerations, is the real solution of every act of his life, public and -private. While in New Orleans, Colonel Davis was offered, by President -Polk, a commission as Brigadier-General of Volunteers, an honor which he -unhesitatingly declined, on the ground that no such commission could be -conferred by Federal authority, either by appointment of the President or -by act of Congress. As an advocate of States' Rights, he could not -countenance, even for the gratification of his own ambition, a plain -infraction of the rights of the States, to which respectively, the -Constitution reserves the appointment of officers of the militia.[9] The -soldier's pride in deserved promotion for distinguished services, could -not induce the statesman to forego his convictions of Constitutional -right. The declination of this high distinction was entirely consistent -with his opinions previously entertained and expressed. Before he resigned -his seat in the House of Representatives, the bill authorizing such -appointments by the President was introduced, and rapidly pressed to its -passage. Mr. Davis detected the Constitutional infraction which it -involved, and opposed it. He designed to address the House, but was -suddenly called away from Washington, and before leaving had an -understanding with the Chairman of the Committee from which the bill had -come, that it would not be called up before the ensuing Monday. On his -return, however, he found that the friends of the measure had forced its -passage on the previous Saturday. - -This is but one in a thousand evidences of an incorruptible loyalty to his -convictions, which would dare face all opposition and has braved all -reproach. It is an attribute of true greatness in the character of -Jefferson Davis, which not even his enemies have called in question, to -which candor must ever accord the tribute of infinite admiration. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - MR. DAVIS IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, FIRST BY EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENT, - AND SUBSEQUENTLY BY UNANIMOUS CHOICE OF THE LEGISLATURE OF HIS - STATE--POPULAR ADMIRATION NOT LESS FOR HIS CIVIC TALENTS THAN HIS - MILITARY SERVICES--FEATURES OF HIS PUBLIC CAREER--HIS CHARACTER AND - CONDUCT AS A SENATOR--AS AN ORATOR AND PARLIAMENTARY LEADER--HIS - INTREPIDITY--AN INCIDENT WITH HENRY CLAY--DAVIS THE LEADER OF THE - STATES' RIGHTS PARTY IN CONGRESS--THE AGITATION OF 1850--DAVIS OPPOSES - THE COMPROMISE--FOLLY OF THE SOUTH IN ASSENTING TO THAT SETTLEMENT-- - DAVIS NOT A DISUNIONIST IN 1850, NOR A REBEL IN 1861--HIS CONCEPTION - OF THE CHARACTER OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT--LOGICAL ABSURDITY OF - CLAY'S POSITION EXPOSED BY DAVIS--THE IDEAL UNION OF THE LATTER--WHY - HE OPPOSED THE COMPROMISE--THE NEW MEXICO BILL--DAVIS' GROWING FAME AT - THIS PERIOD--HIS FREQUENT ENCOUNTERS WITH CLAY, AND WARM FRIENDSHIP - BETWEEN THEM--SIGNAL TRIUMPH OF THE UNION SENTIMENT, AND ACQUIESCENCE - OF THE SOUTH. - - -Within less than two months from his return to Mississippi, Colonel Davis -was appointed by the Governor of the State to fill the vacancy in the -United States Senate occasioned by the death of General Speight. At a -subsequent session of the Legislature, the selection of the Governor was -confirmed by his unanimous election for the residue of the unexpired term. -Seldom has there been a tender of public honor more deserved by the -recipient, and more cheerfully accorded by the constituent body. It was -the grateful tribute of popular appreciation to the hero who had risked -his life for the glory of his country, and the worthy recognition of -abilities which had been proven adequate to the responsibilities of the -highest civic trust. Doubtless Colonel Davis owed much of the signal -unanimity and enthusiasm which accompanied this expression of popular -favor to his brilliant services in Mexico. The military passion is strong -in the human breast, and the sentiment of homage to prowess, illustrated -on the battle-field and in the face of danger, is one of the few -chivalrous instincts which survive the influence of the sordid vices and -vulgarisms of human nature. In all ages men have declaimed and reasoned -against the expediency of confiding civil authority to the keeping of -soldiers, and have cautioned the masses against the risk of entrusting the -public liberties to the stern and dictatorial will educated in the rugged -discipline and habits of the camp. Yet the masses, in all time, will -continue their awards of distinction to martial exploits with a fervor not -characteristic of their recognition of any other public service. - -But the tribute had a higher motive, if possible, than the generous -impulse of gratitude to the "Hero of Buena Vista," in the universal -conviction of his eminent fitness for the position. His service in the -House of Representatives, brief as it was, had designated him, months -before his Mexican laurels had been earned, as a man, not only of mark, -but of promise; of decided and progressive intellectual power; of -pronounced mental and moral individuality. - -Of all the public men of America, Jefferson Davis is the least indebted -for his long and noble career of distinction to adventitious influences or -merely temporary popular impulses. The sources of his strength have been -the elements of his character and the resources of his genius. Never -hoping to _stumble_ upon success, by a stolid indifference amid the -fluctuations of fortune, nor engaged in the role of the trimmer, who -adjusts his conduct conformably with every turn of the popular current, -his hopes of success have rested upon the merits of principle alone. He -has succeeded in all things _where success was possible_, and failed, at -last, in contradiction of every lesson of previous experience, with the -light of all history pleading his vindication, and to the disappointment -of the nearly unanimous judgment of disinterested mankind. - -A peculiar feature in the public career of Mr. Davis was its steady and -consecutive development. He has accepted service, always and only, in -obedience to the concurrent confidence of his fellow-citizens in his -peculiar qualifications for the emergency. From the beginning he gave the -promise of those high capacities which the fervid eulogy of Grattan -accorded to Chatham--to "strike a blow in the world that should resound -through its history." His first election to Congress was the spontaneous -acknowledgment of the profound impression produced by his earliest -intellectual efforts. The consummate triumph of his genius and valor at -Buena Vista did not exceed the anticipations of his friends, who knew the -ardor and assiduity of his devotion to his cherished science, and now in -the noble arena of the American Senate his star was still to be in the -ascendant. - -At the first session of the Thirtieth Congress, Jefferson Davis took his -seat as a Senator of the United States from the State of Mississippi. The -entire period of his connection with the Senate, from 1847 to 1851, and -from 1857 to 1861, scarcely comprises eight years; but those were years -pregnant with the fate of a nation, and in their brief progress he stood -in that august body the equal of giant intellects, and grappled, with the -power and skill of a master, the great ideas and events of those -momentous days. Mr. Davis could safely trust, whatever of ambition he may -cherish for the distinguished consideration of posterity, to a faithful -record of his service in the Senate. His senatorial fame is a beautiful -harmony of the most pronounced and attractive features of the best -parliamentary models. He was as intrepid and defiant as Chatham, but as -scholarly as Brougham; as elegant and perspicuous in diction as Canning, -and often as profound and philosophical in his comprehension of general -principles as Burke; when roused by a sense of injury, or by the force of -his earnest conviction, as much the incarnation of fervor and zeal as -Grattan, but, like Fox, subtle, ready, and always armed _cap a pie_ for -the quick encounters of debate. - -Among all the eminent associates of Mr. Davis in that body, there were -very few who possessed his peculiar qualifications for its most -distinguished honors. His character, no less than his demeanor, may be -aptly termed senatorial, and his bearing was always attuned to his noble -conception of the Senate as an august assemblage of the embassadors of -sovereign States. He carried to the Senate the loftiest sense of the -dignity and responsibility of his trust, and convictions upon political -questions, which were the result of the most thorough and elaborate -investigation. Never for one instant varying from the principles of his -creed, he never doubted as to the course of duty; profound, accurate in -information, there was no question pertaining to the science of government -or its administration that he did not illuminate with a light, clear, -powerful, and original. - -It has been remarked of Mr. Davis' style as a speaker, that it is "orderly -rather than ornate," and the remark is correct so far as it relates to the -mere statement of the conditions of the discussion. For mere rhetorical -glitter, Mr. Davis' speeches afford but poor models, but for clear logic -and convincing argument, apt illustration, bold and original imagery, and -genuine pathos, they are unsurpassed by any ever delivered in the American -Senate. Though the Senate was, undoubtedly, his appropriate arena as an -orator, and though it may well be doubted whether he was rivaled in -senatorial eloquence by any contemporary, Mr. Davis is hardly less gifted -in the attributes of popular eloquence. Upon great occasions he will move -a large crowd with an irresistible power. As a popular orator, he does not -seek to sway and toss the will with violent and passionate emotion, but -his eloquence is more a triumph of argument aided by an enlistment of -passion and persuasion to reason and conviction. He has less of the -characteristics of Mirabeau, than of that higher type of eloquence, of -which Cicero, Burke, and George Canning were representatives, and which is -pervaded by passion, subordinated to the severer tribunal of intellect. It -was the privilege of the writer, on repeated occasions, during the late -war, to witness the triumph of Mr. Davis' eloquence over a popular -assemblage. Usually the theme and the occasion were worthy of the orator, -and difficult indeed would it be to realize a nobler vision of the majesty -of intellect. To a current of thought, perennial and inexhaustible, -compact, logical and irresistible, was added a fire that threw its warmth -into the coldest bosom, and infused a glow of light into the very core of -the subject. His voice, flexible and articulate, reaching any compass that -was requisite, attitude and gestures, all conspired to give power and -expression to his language, and the hearer was impressed as though in the -presence of the very transfiguration of eloquence. The printed efforts of -Mr. Davis will not only live as memorials of parliamentary and popular -eloquence, but as invaluable stores of information to the political and -historical student. They epitomize some of the most important periods of -American history, and embrace the amplest discussion of an extended range -of subjects pertaining to almost every science. - -The development in Mr. Davis of the high and rare qualities, requisite to -parliamentary leadership, was rapid and decisive. His nature instinctively -aspires to influence and power, and under no circumstances could it rest -contented in an attitude of inferiority. Independence, originality, and -intrepidity, added to earnest and intelligent conviction; unwavering -devotion to principle and purpose; a will stern and inexorable, and a -disposition frank, courteous, and generous, are features of character -which rarely fail to make a representative man. After the death of Mr. -Calhoun, he was incomparably the ablest exponent of States' Rights -principles, and even during the life of that great publicist, Mr. Davis, -almost equally with him, shared the labors and responsibilities of -leadership. His personal courage is of that knightly order, which in an -age of chivalry would have sought the trophies of the tourney, and his -moral heroism fixed him immovably upon the solid rock of principle, -indifferent to the inconvenience of being in a minority and in no dread of -the storms of popular passion. His faith in his principles was no less -earnest than his confidence in his ability to triumphantly defend them. In -the midst of the agitation and excitement of 1850, Henry Clay, the Great -Compromiser, whose brilliant but erring genius so long and fatally led -estray, from the correct understanding of the vital issue at stake between -the North and the South, a numerous party of noble and true-hearted -Southern gentlemen, furnished the occasion of an impressive illustration -of this quality. Turning, in debate, to the Mississippi Senator, he -notified the latter of his purpose, at some future day, to debate with him -elaborately, an important question of principle. "Now is the moment," was -the reply of the intrepid Davis, ever eager to champion his beloved and -imperiled South, equally against her avowed enemies, and the not less -fatal policy of those who were but too willing to compromise upon an issue -vital to her rights and dignity. And what a shock of arms might then have -been witnessed, could Clay have dispelled thirty years of his ripe -three-score and ten! Each would have found a foeman worthy of his steel. -In answer to this bold defiance, Clay, like Hotspur, would have rushed to -the charge, with visor up and lance _couchant_; and Davis, another -Saladin, no less frank than his adversary, but far more dexterous, would -have met him with a flash of that Damascus scymetar, whose first blow -severed the neck of the foeman. - -That would have been a bold ambition that could demand a formal tender of -leadership from the brilliant array of gallant gentlemen, ripe scholars, -distinguished orators and statesmen, who, for twenty years before the war, -were the valiant champions in Congress of the principles and aspirations -of the South. Yet few will deny the preëminence of Mr. Davis, in the eye -of the country and the world, among States' Rights leaders. Equally with -Mr. Calhoun, as the leader of a great intellectual movement, he stamped -his impress upon the enduring tablets of time. - -Like Mr. Calhoun, too, Mr. Davis gave little evidence of capacity or taste -for mere party tactics. Neither would have performed the duties of -drill-sergeant, in local organizations, for the purposes of a political -canvass, so well as hundreds of men of far lighter calibre and less -stability. Happily, both sought and found a more congenial field of -action. - -The unexpired term, for which Mr. Davis had been elected in 1847, ended in -1851, and, though he was immediately reëlected, in consequence of his -subsequent resignation his first service in the Senate ended with the term -for which he had first been elected. A recurrence to the records of -Congress will exhibit the eventful nature of this period, especially in -its conclusion. In the earlier portion of his senatorial service, Mr. -Davis participated conspicuously in debate and in the general business of -legislation. Here, as in the House of Representatives, his views upon -military affairs were always received with marked respect, and no measure -looking to the improvement of the army failed to receive his cordial -coöperation. - -The extensive conquests of the army in Mexico, and the necessity of -maintaining the authority of the Federal Government in the conquered -country until the objects of the war could be consummated, created -considerable embarrassment. Upon this subject Mr. Davis spoke frequently -and intelligently. His sagacity indicated a policy equally protective of -the advantages which the valor of the army had achieved, and humane to the -conquered. In a debate with Mr. John Bell, in February, 1848, he defined -himself as favoring such a military occupation as would "prevent the -General Government of Mexico, against which this war had been directed, -from reëstablishing its power and again concentrating the scattered -fragments of its army to renew active hostilities against us." He -disclaimed the motive, in this policy, of territorial acquisition, and -earnestly deprecated interference with the political institutions of the -Mexicans. The estimate entertained by the Senate, of his judgment and -information upon military subjects, was indicated by his almost unanimous -election, (thirty-two for Mr. Davis, and five for all others,) during the -session of the Thirty-first Congress, as Chairman of the Committee on -Military Affairs. His speeches on the subject of offering congratulations -to the French people upon their recent successful political revolution, -resulting in the establishment of a republican form of government, the -proposed organization of the territorial government of Oregon, upon -various subjects of practical and scientific interest, and his incidental -discussions of the subject of slavery, were able, eloquent, and -characteristic. - -The session of Congress in 1849 and 1850 brought with it a most angry and -menacing renewal of sectional agitation. Previous events and innumerable -indications of popular sentiment had clearly revealed to candid minds, -every-where, that the increasing sectional preponderance of the North, and -its growing hostility to slavery, portended results utterly ruinous to the -rights and institutions of the South. To the South it was literally a -question of vitality, to secure some competent check upon the aggressive -strength of the North. To maintain any thing like a sectional balance, the -South must necessarily secure to her institutions, at least, a fair share -of the common domain to be hereafter created into States. The immense -territorial acquisitions resulting from the Mexican war were now the -subjects of controversy. After a contest, protracted through several -months, and eliciting the most violent exhibitions of sectional feeling, a -plan of adjustment, under the auspices chiefly of Henry Clay, whose fatal -gift was to preserve, for a time, the peace of the country by the -concession of the most precious and vital rights of his section to an -insolent and insatiate fanaticism, was finally reached. This settlement, -known, by way of distinction, as the "Compromise of 1850," averting for -the time the dangers of disunion and civil war, met the approval of the -advocates of expediency, but was opposed, with heroic pertinacity, by Mr. -Davis and his associates of the States' Rights party. They saw the -hollowness of its pretended justice, its utter worthlessness as a -guarantee to the South, and sought to defeat it--first in Congress, and -afterwards by the popular voice. But the sentiment of attachment to the -Union triumphed over every consideration of interest, principle, even -security, and the snare succeeded. Again the South receded, again received -the stone instead of the asked-for loaf, and again did she _compromise_ -her most sacred rights and dearest interests, receiving, in return, the -reluctant and insincere guarantee of the recovery of her stolen slaves. - -The folly of the South in assenting to this adjustment is now obvious to -the dullest understanding, and subsequent events were swift to vindicate -the wisdom, patriotism, and foresight of Mr. Davis and those who sustained -him in opposition to the much-vaunted Union-saving compromise. Yet, they -were no more disunionists in 1850 than rebels and traitors in 1861. The -charge of disunionism was freely iterated against them, and not without -effect, even in their own section, where the sentimental attachment to the -Union was stronger, just as its sacrifices in behalf of the Union were -greater, than those of the North. Jefferson Davis never was a disunionist, -not even in his subsequent approval of secession, in the sense of a wanton -and treasonable disposition to sever the bonds of that association of -co-equal sovereignties which the founders of the Federal Government -bequeathed to their posterity. - -His action, at all times, has been thoroughly consistent with his -declared opinions, and with the earnest attachment to the Union, avowed in -his congressional speeches and in his public addresses every-where. In -1850 and in 1861 his course was the logical sequence of his opinions, -maintained and asserted from his introduction to public life. To save the -Union, upon the only basis upon which it could rest as a guarantee of -liberty,--the basis of absolute equality among the States; to blend -Federal power and States' Rights, was the grand, paramount object to which -all his aspirations and all his investigations of political science were -directed. Repudiating the power of a State to nullify an act of Congress, -and yet not surrender its normal relations as a member of the Union, he -always asserted the right of secession, in the last resort, as an -original, inherent, and vital attribute of State Sovereignty. The Federal -Government, to his mind, was a mere agent of the States, created by them -for a few general and intestate purposes, but having in it no principle -subversive of the paramount sovereignty of the States. Rapidly extending -its power by enactments of Congress and judicial constructions, he -foresaw, and sought to counteract, its tendency to obliterate all State -individuality, and ultimately absorb into its own keeping the liberties of -the people. With dread and indignation, he contemplated its progress -towards that _monstrum horrendum_, a consolidated democracy--the Union of -to-day, in which we see that the _will of the majority is the sole measure -of its powers_. - -Such was his consistency, and such his sagacity, as vindicated in the -light of subsequent events, and patent to the eyes of the world to-day. -Who can now doubt which was the better and more logical theory? Clay said: -"I owe allegiance to two sovereignties, and only two: one is to the -sovereignty of this Union, and the other is to the sovereignty of the -State of Kentucky." Thus he held to the paradox of an _imperium in -imperio_, that obvious absurdity in our system of government, a divided -sovereignty. In his ardent Unionism, the great exponent of expediency -disavowed allegiance to the _South_, though still holding to his -allegiance to Kentucky. But suppose Kentucky asserts her sovereignty, and -chooses to unite with the South, what, then, becomes of State Sovereignty -and State allegiance? Just here was the _hiatus_ in Clay's logic, and, -closely pressed by Davis, he emphatically declared his _first_ allegiance -to the Union as the supreme authority; and the State Sovereignty of Clay's -conception was seen to be as intangible and unreal as the "baseless fabric -of a vision." - -Far more fair in its semblance, noble in its proportions, and beautiful in -its harmonies, was the ideal of Davis. In his speech on the compromise -measures, July 31, 1850, he said: - - "Give to each section of the Union justice; give to every citizen of - the United States his rights as guaranteed by the Constitution; leave - this Confederacy to rest upon that basis from which it arose--the - fraternal feelings of the people--and I, for one, have no fear of its - perpetuity; none that it will not survive beyond the limits of human - speculation, expanding and hardening with the lapse of time, to extend - its blessings to ages unnumbered, and a people innumerable; to include - within its empire all the useful products of the earth, and exemplify - the capacity of a confederacy, with general, well-defined powers, to - extend illimitably without impairing its harmony or its strength." - -The grounds of Mr. Davis' opposition to the so-called "Compromise" -programme of Mr. Clay were far otherwise than a factious and impracticable -hostility to an amicable adjustment of sectional differences. He -conscientiously doubted the disposition of the North to abstain from all -future interference with Southern institutions, and he detected and -exposed the utter want of efficacy of the compromise measures as an -assurance of protection against future aggression. He abhorred the -substitution of expediency for principle; could see no _compromise_ where -one side simply _surrendered_ what the other had no right to demand, and -correctly estimated this settlement, like those which had preceded it, as -but an invitation to still more intolerable exactions by an implacable -sectional majority. While discussing, in private conversation with Mr. -Clay, the merits of Mr. Webster's memorable speech of the 7th of March, -1850, a few days after its delivery, he briefly, but sufficiently defined -his position. "Come," said Mr. Clay, "my young friend; join us in these -measures of pacification. Let us rally Congress and the people to their -support, and they will assure to the country thirty years of peace. By -that time" (turning to John M. Berrien, who was a party to the -conversation) "you and I will be under the sod, and my young friend may -then have trouble again." "No," said Davis, "I can not consent to transfer -to posterity a question which is as much ours as theirs, when it is -evident that the sectional inequality, as it will be greater then than -now, will render hopeless the attainment of justice." - -His clear, penetrating glance discovered, under the guise of a friendly -and pacific purpose, the insidious presence so mischievous to Southern -interests, just as George Mason, more than fifty years before, had seen -the "poison under the wing of the Federal Constitution." While the bill -for the organization of the Territory of New Mexico was pending, the -vigilance and sagacity of Mr. Davis elicited the most flattering -commendation from his Southern associates. In this bill there was a -general grant, in loose and ambiguous phraseology, of legislative power, -with a reservation that no law should be passed "in respect to African -slavery." Strangely enough, this provision, though obviously involving an -inhibition against the enactment of laws for the protection of Southern -property, escaped general detection. Mr. Davis promptly exposed its -purpose, and offered an amendment, striking out the restraint against -legislation "in respect to African slavery," and prohibiting the enactment -of any law interfering "with those rights of property growing out of the -institution of African slavery as it exists in any of the States of this -Union." To meet the concurrence of other Senators, the amendment was -variously modified, until, as explained by Mr. Davis, it embodied "the -general proposition that the Territorial Legislature should not be -prevented from passing the laws necessary for the protection of the rights -of property of every kind which might be legally and constitutionally held -in that territory." It is needless to say that so just a proposition, -affording equal protection to Southern with Northern institutions, was -defeated. - -While there was little in Mr. Clay's plan of pacification to recommend it -to Southern support, beyond the merely temporary staving off of a -dissolution of the Union and civil war, it embodied propositions utterly -incompatible with the security of the South. Mr. Davis especially and -persistently combated its provision for the abolition of the slave-trade -in the District of Columbia, and the concession that slavery did not -legally exist in the newly-acquired territory. His position upon the -general issues involved can not be more clearly and forcibly stated than -in his own language: - - "But, sir, we are called upon to receive this as a measure of - compromise!--as a measure in which we of the minority are to receive - something. A measure of compromise! I look upon it as a modest mode of - taking that, the claim to which has been more boldly asserted by - others; and that I may be understood upon this question, and that my - position may go forth to the country in the same columns that convey - the sentiments of the Senator from Kentucky, I here assert that never - will I take less than the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific - Ocean, with specific right to hold slaves in the territory below that - line; and that before such territories are admitted into the Union as - States, slaves may be taken there from any of the United States, at - the option of the owners. I can never consent to give additional power - to a majority to commit further aggression upon the minority in this - Union; and I will never consent to any proposition which will have - such a tendency without a full guarantee or counteracting measure is - connected with it." - -The parliamentary annals of the Union embrace no period more prolific of -grand intellectual efforts than the debates incident to this gigantic -struggle. The prominence of Mr. Davis, with his extreme ardor in behalf of -the rights and interests of his section, brought him constantly into -conflict with the most eminent leaders of both the great political -parties, who had cordially agreed to ignore all minor issues and unite in -the paramount purpose of saving the Union. Cass, Douglas, Bright, -Dickinson, and King, earnestly coöperated with Clay, Webster, and other -Whig champions, in the advocacy of the measures of compromise. That Davis, -younger in years and experience than most of these distinguished men, -amply sustained his honorable and responsible role as the foremost -champion of the South, contemporary public opinion and the Congressional -records give abundant testimony. The great compromise chieftain, between -whom and Davis occurred such obstinate and protracted encounters in -debate, delighted to testify his respect for the talents and intrepidity -of his "young friend," which was his habitual salutation to Davis. Despite -the pronounced antagonism between them, on all measures of public policy, -and their comparatively brief acquaintance, Mr. Clay repeatedly evinced, -in a most touching manner, his warm regard for one who had been the -companion-in-arms and cherished friend of a noble son,[10] who lost his -life on the same field, upon which Davis won such deathless distinction. -"My poor boy," were his words to the latter, upon his return from Mexico, -"usually occupied about one-half of his letters home in praising you." A -still more touching incident, illustrative of his friendly regard, at the -moment not understood by those present, occurred, in the heat of -discussion during the exciting period, which we have had under -consideration. Replying to Davis, said Mr. Clay: "My friend from -Mississippi--and I trust that he will permit me to call him my friend, for -between us there is a tie, the nature of which we both well understand." -At this moment the utterance of the aged statesman became tremulous with -emotion, and, bowing his head, his eyes were seen to fill with tears. This -friendship was warmly reciprocated by Mr. Davis, and its recollections are -among those the most highly-cherished of his public life. - -With the defeat of those who had opposed the compromise, terminated, for -the present, Southern resistance in Congress, though it did not for an -instant check Northern aggression. Yet many prominent public characters at -the South, and, as the sequel demonstrated, indorsed by popular -sentiment, avowed themselves fully satisfied with a mere show of triumph -and pretense of justice--a few paltry concessions, not worth the parchment -upon which they were written. In the meantime, upon another arena, Mr. -Davis entered upon a gallant struggle, in opposition to a policy from -which he foresaw and predicted a fruitful yield of disaster in the -future. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - OPPOSITION TO THE COMPROMISE IN SOUTH CAROLINA AND MISSISSIPPI--DAVIS - A CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR--HIS DEFEAT REALLY A PERSONAL TRIUMPH--IN - RETIREMENT, SUPPORTS GENERAL PIERCE'S ELECTION--DECLINES AN - APPOINTMENT IN PIERCE'S CABINET, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY ACCEPTS - SECRETARYSHIP OF WAR--REMARKABLE UNITY OF PIERCE'S ADMINISTRATION, AND - HIGH CHARACTER OF THE EXECUTIVE--DAVIS AS SECRETARY OF WAR-- - KANSAS-NEBRASKA BILL AND THE EXCITEMENT WHICH FOLLOWED--DAVIS AGAIN - ELECTED TO THE SENATE--SPEECHES AT PASS CHRISTIAN AND OTHER POINTS - WHILE ON HIS WAY TO WASHINGTON. - - -But, though the battle had been fought and won in Congress, and it was -evident, at an early date, that the weight of great names in favor of the -Compromise, aided by the ever-timid counsels of capital and commerce, -would command for that measure the overwhelming support of the country, -the States' Rights men were resolved upon a test of popular sentiment. -Accordingly, in South Carolina and Mississippi, States at all times the -most advanced in Southern feeling, the opponents of the Compromise -organized, as did its friends also. The issue, though substantially the -same, was presented in a somewhat different form in these two States. - -In South Carolina, where public sentiment was always singularly unanimous, -upon all questions affecting the honor and interests of the South, and in -entire accord as to the mode and measure of redress for the grievances of -the States, the propriety of resistance was a foregone conclusion. The -only question was, whether South Carolina should act separately, or await -the coöperation of other Southern States. The party of coöperation -triumphed in the election of members to a State convention, by the -decisive popular majority of seven thousand votes. - -In Mississippi the issue was one of _resistance_ or _acquiescence_. The -States' Rights, or resistance party, embraced four-fifths of the Democracy -of the State and a small accession of States' Rights Whigs; while the -Union, or Compromise party, was composed of the Clay Whigs and a fraction -of the Democracy. - -The Legislature provided an election for members of a State convention to -consider the subject of Federal aggressions, to be held in September, -1851, and, in the ensuing November the regular election of Governor -occurred. Much interest centred upon the gubernatorial contest, and the -State was for months previous to the election the scene of great -excitement. General John A. Quitman, one of the most distinguished -officers of the army, during the Mexican war, a man of the loftiest -character, a reliable statesman, and sterling patriot, was nominated by -the States' Rights Convention. Mr. Henry S. Foote, then a Senator from -Mississippi, and an active supporter of the Compromise measures, was the -candidate of the Union party. While an exceedingly animated canvass -between these candidates was still in progress, the election for members -of the convention resulted in an aggregate majority of seven thousand five -hundred votes for the Union candidates. General Quitman, disappointed by -such an unexpected and decisive exhibition of public sentiment, and -viewing it as the forerunner of the result of the gubernatorial election -in November, withdrew from the contest. - -Mr. Davis, who had already been elected for a second term to the Senate, -was now looked to as almost the sole dependence of the States' Rights men, -and they summoned him to take the field as the adversary of Mr. Foote. -There was little inducement, had he consulted selfish considerations, to -relinquish a high position, already secured, and become the leader of a -forlorn hope. Though greatly enfeebled in health, and at that time an -acute sufferer, he accepted the nomination. His sense of duty and devotion -to his principles triumphed even over his physical infirmities, and, -resigning his seat in the Senate, he entered upon the canvass. - -The result was, as had been foreseen, the defeat of Mr. Davis. Mr. Foote, -a man of more than average ability, and of varied and extensive -attainments, whose excessive garrulity and total want of discretion -disqualified him for usefulness as a member of a legislative body, or for -any practical end of statesmanship, was, nevertheless, an adroit party -tactician. With great dexterity he had conducted the canvass with General -Quitman, by skillfully evading the real issue, introducing side questions, -and thus breaking the force of the plain and statesman-like arguments of -his more open and less dexterous adversary. When Mr. Davis entered the -field, under all the disadvantages to which we have alluded, the election -of Foote was almost universally conceded. Had the canvass lasted a few -weeks, however, the result, in all probability, would have been different. -The popularity of Mr. Davis was indicated by the paltry majority (nine -hundred and ninety-nine votes) given against him, as compared with the -Union majority at the election in September, for members of the -convention. Under all the circumstances, his friends rightly viewed it as -a personal triumph, and he emerged from the contest with increased -reputation and public regard. - -The results of these appeals to popular judgment were scarcely less -decisive, in favor of the Compromise, than had been its congressional -victory. It was evident that the Southern people were yet far from being -ready for organized and practical resistance, and were not likely to be, -until some flagrant outrage should arouse their resentment. - -Mr. Davis was now in retirement, and, though abiding the decision of -Mississippi, he was yet avowedly determined to devote his energies to the -efficient organization of the States' Rights party for future struggles. -Yet nothing was farther from his purpose than a factious agitation. His -aim was to secure for the States' Rights principle a moral and numerical -support in the ranks of the Democracy, which should enable its friends to -wield an appropriate influence upon the policy of that party. He -contemplated no organization outside of the Democracy, for the promotion -of disunionism _per se_; and, in the Presidential canvass of 1852, -separated himself from many of his closest personal and political friends, -who had nominated the Presidential ticket of Troup and Quitman, upon the -distinctive platform of States' Rights and separation. - -The nomination of Franklin Pierce, upon the Baltimore platform, met his -cordial approbation, and received his active support. With General Pierce, -Mr. Davis held the most friendly relations, and in his constitutional -opinions he had entire confidence. His support of the platform was quite -as consistent as his advocacy of the nominee. Both indorsed, with -emphasis, the Compromise, which he had opposed, but which Mississippi had -ratified, and both avowed their acceptance of it, as a _finality_, beyond -which there was to be no farther agitation of the slavery question. In -Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennessee he participated actively in the -canvass, and rendered most efficient service to his party, especially in -the two latter States. - -General Pierce indicated his estimate of Davis, by a prompt tender of a -position in his Cabinet. Considering himself committed to the fortunes of -his principles in Mississippi, he preferred to "remain and fight the issue -out there," and reluctantly declined. Subsequently the President-elect -addressed him a letter expressing a desire that, upon personal grounds at -least, Mr. Davis should be present at his inauguration. After he had -reached Washington the tender of a Cabinet appointment was repeated. The -obvious advantages to the States' Rights party of representation in the -Government, an argument earnestly urged upon him by prominent Southern -statesmen, at length overcame his personal preference, and he accepted the -position of Secretary of War. - -With the policy of President Pierce's administration, Secretary Davis was, -of course, fully identified. Whatever of influence and sympathy he could -command, were employed in promoting its success, and between the President -and himself there was an uninterrupted harmony of personal and official -intercourse. Indeed the glory of this administration and the explanation -of its title to that high award which it earned from impartial criticism, -for its courageous pursuit of an upright, constitutional policy, was the -characteristic unity which prevailed between its head and his advisers. -During the four years of its existence the Cabinet of President Pierce -continued unchanged, at its close the head of each department surrendering -the seals of office which he had received at its inauguration. The history -of no other administration is adorned with such an instance of cordial and -unbroken coöperation, and the fact is equally creditable to the sagacity -of General Pierce in the selection of his advisers, and his consummate -tact in the reconciliation of those antagonisms, which are hardly to be -avoided in the operations of the complicated machinery of Government. - -A common statement of its enemies, that the administration must eventually -break down by disorganization, in consequence of the utterly discordant -elements which composed it, was never realized. At one time Mr. Marcy, the -Secretary of State, was the wily Macchiavelli, against whose intrigues the -rest of the Cabinet was in arms, while Mr. Davis was charged with playing -alternately the roles of Richelieu and Marplot. - -Of all American executives, Franklin Pierce is preëminently entitled to -the designation of the constitutional President. The great covenant of -American liberty, so ruthlessly despoiled in these degenerate days, when -opportunity and pretext are the sufficient justification of flagrant -violations of justice, was the guide whose precepts he followed without -deviation. His Northern birth and training did not swerve from his -obligations to extend an equal protection to the interests of other -sections, the patriotic executive, whom posterity will delight to honor, -for his wisdom, purity, and impartiality, just in proportion as those -qualities provoke the clamor of the dominant ignorance and passion of -to-day. - -In a Cabinet, noted for its ability, of which William L. Marcy was the -Premier, and Caleb Cushing the Attorney-General, Secretary Davis occupied -a position worthy of his abilities and his previous reputation, and -peculiarly gratifying to his military tastes. It is no disparagement of -his associates to say that his strongly-marked character commanded a -constant and emphatic recognition in the policy of the Government. - -Under his control the department of war was greatly advanced in dignity -and importance, receiving a character far more distinctive and independent -of other branches of the Government than it had previously claimed. He -infused into all its operations an energy till then unknown, introducing -improvements so extensive and comprehensive as to occasion apprehension of -an almost too powerful and independent system of military organization. It -is a fact universally conceded that his administration of the War Office -was incomparably superior to that of any official who has filled that -position--contributing more to the promotion of efficiency in the army, to -the advancement of those great national establishments so vital to the -security of the nation, and to the systematic, practical management of the -details of the office. In reviewing Mr. Davis' conduct of this important -department of the Government, the splendid improvements which he -inaugurated, his earnest and unceasing labors in behalf of the efficiency -of the army, it is impossible to overestimate his eminent services to the -Union, which even at that time his traducers and those of the South would -pretend he was plotting to destroy. In the Cabinet, as in the Senate, -there was no measure of national advantage to which he did not give his -cordial support, no great national institution which he would not have -fostered with generous and timely sympathy; nothing to which he was not -zealously committed, promising to redound to the glory, prosperity, and -perpetuity of that Union, in whose service he had been trained, whose -uniform he had proudly worn, and beneath whose banner he had braved a -soldier's death. - -Secretary Davis made many recommendations contemplating radical -alterations in the military system of the Union. One of his first measures -was a recommendation for the thorough revision of the army regulations. -He opposed the placing of officers, at an early period of service, -permanently upon the staff, and advocated a system, which, he contended, -would improve the discipline and efficiency of officers, "whereby the -right of command should follow rank by one certain rule." The increase of -the medical corps; the introduction of camels; the introduction of the -light infantry or rifle system of tactics, rifled muskets, and the -Minie-ball were all measures advocated by Secretary Davis, and discussed -in his official papers with a force and intelligence that make them highly -valuable to the military student. He urged a thorough exploration of the -Western frontier, and important changes in the arrangement of defenses -against the Indians, demonstrating the inefficiency of the system of small -forts for the purposes of war with the savages. To obviate, in a measure, -the expense, and almost useless trouble, of locating military posts in -advance of settlement, he suggested the plan of maintaining large -garrisons at certain points, situated favorably for obtaining supplies and -accessible by steamboat or railway. From these posts strong detachments -could be supplied and equipped for service in the Indian country. His -efforts were most strenuous to obtain an increase of pay to officers of -the army, and pensions to the widows and orphans of officers and men, upon -a basis similar to that of the navy. - -During the Crimean war, Secretary Davis sent a commission, of which -Major-General McClellan, then a captain of cavalry, was a member, to study -and report upon the science of war and the condition of European armies, -as illustrated in the operations incident to that struggle. At his -suggestion four new regiments--two of cavalry--were added to the army, and -numerous appropriations made for the construction of new forts, -improvements in small arms, and the accumulation of munitions of war. - -The Presidential term of Pierce expired on the 4th of March, 1857, and -with it terminated the connection of Mr. Davis with the executive branch -of the Government. He retired with the hearty respect of his associates, -and in the enjoyment of the most confiding friendship with the late head -of the Government, a feeling which is cherished by both, with unabated -warmth, at this day. All parties concurred in pronouncing Mr. Davis' -conduct of his department successful, able, and brilliant, and in the -midst of the tide of misrepresentation, with which, during and since the -war, it has been sought to overwhelm his reputation, the least candid of -his accusers have been compelled to this reluctant confession. - -Incidental to the late administration, but by no means traceable to its -influence, had been legislation by Congress of a most important character, -which was to give a powerful impulse to agencies long tending to the -destruction of the Union. The election of Pierce had been carried with a -unanimity unprecedented, upon the distinct pledge of the acceptance of the -Compromise as a _finality_. The country, for months subsequently, reposed -in profound quiet, produced by its confidence in an approaching season of -unequaled prosperity, and exempt from all danger of political agitation. -This hallucination was destined to be speedily and rudely dispelled by -events, which afford striking evidence of how completely the peace and -happiness of the American people have always been at the mercy of aspiring -and unscrupulous demagogues. Mr. Stephen A. Douglas must ever be held, -equally by both sections, responsible for the disastrous agitation, which -followed his introduction of certain measures, under the pretense of a -sentimental justice, or a concession of principle to the South, but in -reality prompted by his personal ambition, and which greatly aided to -precipitate the catastrophe of disunion. - -Upon the application of the Territory of Nebraska for admission into the -Union, Senator Douglas, from the Committee on Territories, submitted a -bill creating the two Territories of Nebraska and Kansas, and affirming -the supersession of the Missouri restriction of 1820, which prohibited -slavery north of 36° 30', by the Compromise of 1850. It declared the -Missouri restriction inconsistent with the principle of _non-intervention_ -by Congress with territorial affairs, which had been adopted in the -settlement of 1850, and therefore inoperative. - -This bill was apparently a mere concession of principle to the South, not -likely to be of much practical value, but still gratifying, as it gave to -her citizens the right to carry their property into districts from which -it had been hitherto inhibited. Passing both houses of Congress, in 1854, -it was approved by the Pierce administration,[11] sanctioned by the -Democracy generally, and greeted by the South as a triumph. It was not -imagined that a victory, so purely sentimental and intangible, could be -accepted by the North, as a pretext for violent eruptions of sectional -jealousy, and least of all did the South believe its author capable of the -subsequent duplicity with which, by specious arguments and verbal -ingenuity, he claimed for the measure, a construction far more insidious, -but not less fatal to her interests, than the designs of proclaimed -Abolitionists. The immediate result was a tempest of excitement in the -Northern States, in the midst of which the so-called Republican party, for -the first time, appeared as a formidable contestant in political -struggles, and defeated the Democracy in almost every State election. The -latter, with extreme difficulty, elected Mr. Buchanan to the Presidency -two years afterwards. - -In the meantime, while his term of office as Secretary of War was still -unexpired, Mr. Davis had been elected, by the Legislature of Mississippi, -to the Senate, for the term beginning March 4, 1857. On his return home, -he was received by the Democracy of the State with distinguished honors. -Dinners, receptions, and public entertainments of various kinds were -tendered him; and, during the summer and autumn, previous to his departure -for Washington, he addressed numerous large popular gatherings with his -accustomed force and boldness upon pending issues. These addresses -commanded universal attention, and were highly commended for their able, -dispassionate, and statesman-like character. - -His speech at Pass Christian, while on his journey to Washington, was a -masterly and eloquent review of the condition of the country, with its -causes and remedies. He attributed the national difficulties chiefly to -the puritanical intolerance and growing disregard of constitutional -obligations of the North. These influences seriously menaced the safety of -the Union, for which he had no hope, unless in the event of a reaction in -Northern sentiment, or of such resolute action by a united South as should -compel her enemies to respect their constitutional duties. To the latter -policy he looked as the best guarantee of the security of the South and -the preservation of the Union. Interference by one State with the -institutions of another could not, under any circumstances, be tolerated, -even though resistance should eventually result in a dissolution of the -Union. The latter event was possible--indeed, might become necessary--but -should never be undertaken save in the last extremity. He would not -disguise the profound emotion with which he contemplated the possibility -of disunion. The fondest reminiscences of his life were associated with -the Union, into whose military service, while yet a boy, he had entered. -In his matured manhood he had followed its flag to victory; had seen its -graceful folds wave in the peaceful pageant, and, again, its colors -conspicuous amid the triumphs of the battle-field; he had seen that flag -in the East, brightened by the sun at its rising, and, in the West, gilded -by his declining rays--and the tearing of one star from its azure field -would be to him as would the loss of a child to a bereaved parent. - -This speech--one of the most eloquent he has ever made--was received by -his audience with unbounded enthusiasm, and was approvingly noticed by the -press of both sections. - -At Mississippi City he delivered an address in explanation of his personal -course, and in vindication of the administration of which he had lately -been a member. He had obeyed the will of Mississippi, respecting the -legislation of 1850, though against his convictions, and, in the present -disorders in Kansas, he saw the fruits of the unwise substitution of -expediency for principle. Of President Pierce he could speak only in terms -of eulogy, defended his vetoes of bills "for internal improvements and -eleemosynary purposes," depicting, in passages of rare and fervent -eloquence, his heroic adherence to the Constitution, elevated patriotism, -and distinguished virtues. Contrasting the conduct of the Fillmore and -Pierce administrations concerning the Cuban question, he avowed his belief -that Cuba would then be in possession of the United States had Congress -sustained General Pierce in his prompt and decided suggestions as to the -Black Warrior difficulty. - -Mr. Davis expressed his approbation of the course pursued by the late -administration with reference to Nicaragua. "Unlawful expeditions" should -be suppressed, though he should rejoice at the establishment of American -institutions in Central America, and maintained the right of the United -States to a paramount influence in the affairs of the continent, with -which European interference should be, at all times, promptly checked. - -When the Thirty-fifth Congress assembled in December, 1857, the Kansas -question had already developed a difficult and critical phase. The rock -upon which Mr. Buchanan's administration was to split had been -encountered, and the wedge prepared, with which the Democratic party was -destined to be torn asunder. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - RETURN OF MR. DAVIS TO THE SENATE--OPENING EVENTS OF MR. BUCHANAN'S - ADMINISTRATION--TRUE INTERPRETATION OF THE LEGISLATION OF 1854-- - SENATOR DOUGLAS THE INSTRUMENT OF DISORGANIZATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC - PARTY--HIS ANTECEDENTS AND CHARACTER--AN ACCOMPLISHED DEMAGOGUE--DAVIS - AND DOUGLAS CONTRASTED--BOTH REPRESENTATIVES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE - SECTIONS--DOUGLAS AMBITION--HIS COUP D'ETAT, AND ITS RESULTS--THE - KANSAS QUESTION--DOUGLAS' TRIUMPHS OVER THE SOUTH AND THE UNITY OF THE - DEMOCRATIC PARTY LOST--"SQUATTER SOVEREIGNTY"--PROPERLY - CHARACTERIZED--DAVIS' COURSE IN THE KANSAS STRUGGLE--DEBATE WITH - SENATOR FESSENDEN--PEN-AND-INK SKETCH OF MR. DAVIS AT THIS PERIOD-- - TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICAL EVENTS TO THE SOUTH--SHE RIGHTLY - INTERPRETS THEM--MR. DAVIS' COURSE SUBSEQUENT TO THE KANSAS - IMBROGLIO--HIS DEBATES WITH DOUGLAS--TWO DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF - PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKING--DAVIS THE LEADER OF THE REGULAR DEMOCRACY IN - THE THIRTY-SIXTH CONGRESS--HIS RESOLUTIONS--HIS CONSISTENCY--COURSE AS - TO GENERAL LEGISLATION--VISITS THE NORTH--SPEAKS IN PORTLAND, BOSTON, - NEW YORK, AND OTHER PLACES--REPLY TO AN INVITATION TO ATTEND THE - WEBSTER BIRTH-DAY FESTIVAL--MR. SEWARD'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE - "IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT"--MR. DAVIS BEFORE MISSISSIPPI DEMOCRATIC - STATE CONVENTION--PROGRESS OF DISUNION--DISSOLUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC - PARTY--SPEECHES OF MR. DAVIS AT PORTLAND AND IN SENATE. - - -Mr. Davis returned to the Senate at a period marked by agitation, no less -menacing to the Union than that which had so seriously threatened it in -1850. His health at this time was exceedingly infirm, and for several -months he was so much prostrated by his protracted sufferings, that a -proper regard for the suggestions of prudence would have justified his -entire abstinence from the labors and excitements of this stormy period. -Again and again, however, did his heroic devotion carry him from his sick -bed to the capitol, to engage in the death-struggle of the South, with her -leagued enemies, for safety in the Union, which she was still loath to -abandon, even under the pressure of intolerable wrong. Frequently, with -attenuated frame and bandaged eyes, he was to be seen in the Senate, at -moments critical in the fierce sectional conflict; and at the final -struggle upon the Kansas question, not even the earnest admonitions of his -physician, that to leave his chamber would probably be followed by the -most dangerous results, were availing to induce his absence from the -scene. - -The opening events of the first session of the Thirty-fifth Congress, (the -first incidental to the administration of Mr. Buchanan,) were far from -being auspicious of the continued unity of the Democratic party, which, -for several years past, the intelligence of the country had correctly -appreciated as an essential condition to the preservation of the Union. - -Mainly through the undivided support given him by the South, Mr. Buchanan -was elected upon the Cincinnati platform of 1856, which was a -re-affirmation of the cardinal tenets of the Democratic faith, involving -also emphatic approval of the Kansas-Nebraska legislation two years -previous. Not until months after his inauguration were there any -indications of hostility to his administration within the ranks of his own -party. Nor had there been any avowed difference of construction as to the -end and effect of the legislation of 1854. The rare unanimity with which -the South had been rallied to the support of the Democracy was based upon -the unreserved admission, by all parties, that the Kansas-Nebraska act -was designedly friendly in its _spirit_, at all events, to Southern -interests. No Southern statesman, for a moment, dreamed that it was -capable of an interpretation unfriendly to his section. That the plain -purpose of the bill was to remove the subject of slavery outside the -bounds of congressional discussion, and to place it in the disposition of -the States separately, and in the _Territories_, _when organizing for -admission as States_, was regarded by the South as the leading vital -principle which challenged her enthusiastic support. Such, indeed, was the -doctrine asserted by the entire Democratic party of the South, enunciated -by the administration, and tacitly approved by the Northern Democracy. -Very soon, however, after the meeting of Congress, the action of Senator -Douglas revealed him as the instrument of disorganization in his party. To -a proper understanding of his motives and conduct at this conjuncture, a -brief statement of his antecedents is essential. - -Stephen A. Douglas was now in the meridian of life and the full maturity -of his unquestionably vigorous intellectual powers. For twenty-five years -he had been prominent in the arena of politics, and as a member of -Congress his course had been so eminently politic and judicious as to make -him a favorite with the Democracy, both North and South. To an unexampled -degree his public life illustrated the combination of those -characteristics of the demagogue, a fertile ingenuity, facile -accommodation to circumstances, and wonderful gifts of the _ad captandum_ -species of oratory, so captivating to the populace, which in America -peculiarly constitute the attributes of the "rising man." Douglas was not -wanting in noble and attractive qualities of manhood. His courage was -undoubted, his generosity was princely in its munificence to his personal -friends, and he frequently manifested a lofty magnanimity. In his early -youth, deprived of the advantages of fortune and position, the discipline -of his career was not propitious to the development of the higher -qualities of statesmanship--with which, indeed, he was scantily endowed by -nature. It is as the accomplished politician, subtle, ready, fearless, and -indefatigable, that he must be remembered. In this latter character he was -unrivaled. - -Not less than Davis was Douglas a representative man, yet no two men were -more essentially dissimilar, and no two lives ever actuated by aspirations -and instincts more unlike. Douglas was the representative of -expediency--Davis the exponent of principles. In his party associations -Douglas would tolerate the largest latitude of individual opinion, while -Davis was always for a policy clearly defined and unmistakable; and upon a -matter of vital principle, like Percy, would reluctantly surrender even -the "ninth part of a hair." To maintain the united action of the -Democratic party on election day, to defeat its opponents, to secure the -rewards of success, Douglas would allow a thousand different constructions -of the party creed by as many factions. Davis, on the other hand, would, -and eventually did, approve the dissolution of the party, when it refused -an open, manly enunciation of its faith. For mere party success Douglas -cared every thing, and Davis nothing, save as it ensured the triumph of -Constitutional principles. Both loved the Union and sought its perpetuity, -but by different methods; Douglas by never-ending compromises of a -quarrel, which he should have known that the North would never permit to -be amicably settled; by staving off and ignoring issues which were to be -solved only by being squarely met. Davis, too, was not unwilling to -compromise, but he wearied of perpetual concession by the South, in the -meanwhile the North continuing its hostility, both open and insidious, -and urged a settlement of all differences upon a basis of simple and exact -justice to both sections. - -Douglas was preëminently the representative politician of his section, and -throughout his career was a favorite with that boastful, bloated, and -mongrel element, which is violently called the "American people," and -which is the ruling element in elections in the Northern cities. In -character and conduct he embodied many of its materialistic and -socialistic ideas, its false conception of liberty, its pernicious dogmas -of equality, and not a little of its rowdyism. - -Davis was the champion of the South, her civilization, lights, honor, and -dignity. He was the fitting and adequate exponent of a civilization which -rested upon an intellectual and æsthetical development, upon lofty and -generous sentiments of manhood, a dignified conservatism, and the proud -associations of ancestral distinction in the history of the Union. Always -the Senator in the sense of the ideal of dignity and courtesy which is -suggested by that title, he was also the _gentleman_ upon all occasions; -never condescending to flatter or soothe the mob, or to court popular -favor, he lost none of that polished and distinguished manner, in the -presence of a "fierce Democracie," which made him the ornament of the -highest school of oratory and statesmanship of his country. - -The ambition of Douglas was unbounded. The recognized leader, for several -years, of the Northern Democracy, his many fine personal qualities and -courageous resistance of the ultra Abolitionists secured for him a -considerable number of supporters in the Southern wing of that party. The -Presidency was the goal of his ambition, and for twenty years his course -had been sedulously adjusted to the attainment of that most coveted of -prizes to the American politician. On repeated occasions he had been -flattered by a highly complimentary vote in the nominating conventions of -the Democracy. Hitherto he had been compelled to yield his pretensions in -favor of older members of his party or upon considerations of temporary -availability. It was evident, however, that in order to be President, he -must secure the nomination in 1860. The continued ascendancy of the -Democracy was no longer, as heretofore, a foregone conclusion, and, -besides, there were others equally aspiring and available. His -Presidential aspirations appeared, indeed, to be without hope or resource, -save through the agency of some adroit _coup d'etat_, by which the -truculent and dominant free-soil sentiment of the North, which he had so -much affronted by his bid for Southern support in the introduction of the -Kansas-Nebraska bill, could be conciliated. In Illinois, his own State, -the Abolition strength was alarmingly on the increase, and to secure his -return to the Senate at the election to be held in 1858, an object of -prime importance in the promotion of his more ambitious pretensions, he -did not scruple to assume a position, falsifying his previous record, -wantonly insulting and defiant to his Southern associates, and in bold -antagonism to a Democratic administration. The sequel of this rash and -ill-judged course was the overthrow of his own political fortunes, the -disintegration of his party, and the attempted dissolution of the Union. - -The earliest recommendations of Mr. Buchanan, respecting the Kansas -controversy, which, several months since, had developed in that Territory -into a species of predatory warfare, marked by deeds of violence and -atrocity, between the Abolition and Pro-slavery parties, were signalized -by a coalition of the followers of Douglas with the Abolitionists and -other opponents of the administration. The speedy pacification of the -disorders in Kansas, by the prompt admission of that Territory, was the -condition essential to the success of Mr. Buchanan's entire policy. He -accordingly recommended the admission of Kansas into the Union, with the -"Lecompton" constitution, which had been adopted in September, 1857, by -the decisive vote of six thousand two hundred and twenty-six in favor of -that constitution, with slavery, and five hundred and nine for it, without -slavery. A rival instrument, adopted by an election notoriously held -exclusively under the control of Abolitionists, prohibiting slavery, was -likewise presented. - -For months the controversy was waged in Congress between the friends of -the administration and its enemies, and finally resulted in a practical -triumph of the Free-soil principle. The Anti-Lecompton coalition of -Douglas and the Abolitionists, aided by the defection of a few Southern -members, successfully embarrassed the policy of the administration by -defeating its recommendations, and eventually carried a measure acceptable -to Northern sentiments and interests. - -Mr. Douglas thus triumphed over a Democratic administration, at the same -time giving a shock to the unity of the Democratic party, from which it -has never recovered, and effectually neutralized its power as a breakwater -of the Union against the waves of sectional dispute. The alienation -between himself and his former associates was destined never to be -adjusted, as indeed it never should have been, in consideration of his -inexcusable recreancy to the immemorial faith of his party. Mr. Douglas -simply abandoned the South, at the very first moment when his aid was -seriously demanded. Nay, more; he carried with him a quiver of Parthian -arrows, which he discharged into her bosom at a most critical moment in -her unequal contest. - -It is not to be denied that Mr. Douglas' new interpretation of the -Kansas-Nebraska act was urged by himself and his advocates as having a -merit not to be overlooked by the North, in its suggestion of a method of -restricting slavery, presenting superior advantages. "Squatter -sovereignty," as advocated by Mr. Douglas, proposing the decision of the -slavery question by the people of the Territories, while yet unprepared to -ask admission as States, was far more effectual in its plans against -slavery, and only less prompt and open, than the designs of the -Abolitionists. It would enable the "Emigrant Aid Societies," and imported -janizaries of Abolition to exclude the institutions of the South from the -Territories, the joint possessions of the two sections, acquired by an -enormously disproportionate sacrifice on the part of the South, with a -certainty not to be realized, for years to come, perhaps, from the -Abolition policy of congressional prohibition.[12] According to Mr. -Douglas' theory, the existence of slavery in all the Territories was to -depend upon the verdict of a few hundred settlers or "squatters" upon the -public lands. It practically conceded to Northern interests and ideas -every State to be hereafter admitted, and under the operation of such a -policy it was not difficult to anticipate the fate of slavery, at last -even in the States. - -From the inception of this controversy until its close Mr. Davis was fully -committed to the policy of Mr. Buchanan, and his position was in perfect -harmony with that of all the leading statesmen of the South. Less -prominent, perhaps, in debate, from his constant ill-health during the -first session, than at any other period of his public life, he was still -zealous and influential. - -An interesting incident of the session was a discussion between Mr. Davis -and Mr. Fessenden, of Maine, a Senator second only to Mr. Seward among -Abolition leaders, in point of intellect, and behind none in his truculent -animosity to Southern institutions. Reviewing the message of Mr. Buchanan -with great severity, Fessenden took occasion to discuss elaborately the -slavery question, with all its incidental issues. Mr. Davis replied, not -at great length, but with much force and spirit. The discussion terminated -with the following colloquy, which is interesting chiefly in its personal -allusions: - - "MR. FESSENDEN. ... Sir, I have avowed no disunion sentiments on this - floor--neither here nor elsewhere. Can the honorable gentleman from - Mississippi say as much? - - "MR. DAVIS. Yes. - - "MR. FESSENDEN. I am glad to hear it, then. - - "MR. DAVIS. Yes. I have long sought for a respectable man who would - allege the contrary. - - "MR. FESSENDEN. I make no allegation. I asked if he could say as much. - I am glad to hear him say so, because I must say to him that the - newspapers have represented him as making a speech in Mississippi, in - which he said he came into General Pierce's cabinet a disunion man. If - he never made it, very well. - - "MR. DAVIS. I will thank you to produce that newspaper. - - "MR. FESSENDEN. I can not produce it, but I can produce an extract - from it in another paper. - - "MR. DAVIS. An extract! then that falsifies the text. - - "MR. FESSENDEN. I am very glad to hear the Senator say so. I made no - accusation--I put the question to him. If he denies it, very well. I - only say that, with all the force and energy with which he denies it, - so do I. The accusation never has been made against me before. On what - ground does the Senator now put it?... - - "MR. DAVIS. Does the Senator ask me for an answer? - - "MR. FESSENDEN. Certainly, if the Senator feels disposed to give one. - - "MR. DAVIS. If you ask me for an answer, it is easy. I said your - position was fruitful of such a result. I did not say you avowed the - object--nothing of the sort, but the reverse.... - - "MR. FESSENDEN. That is a matter of opinion, on which I have a right - to entertain my view as well as the Senator his.... - - "MR. DAVIS. Mr. President, I rise principally for the purpose of - saying that I do not know whence springs this habit of talking about - intimidation. I am not the first person toward whom a reply has been - made, that we are not to carry our ends by intimidation. I try to - intimidate nobody; I threaten nobody; and I do not believe--let me say - it once for all--that any body is afraid of me--and I do not want any - body to be afraid of me. - - "MR. FESSENDEN. I am. [Laughter.] - - "MR. DAVIS. I am sorry to hear it; and if the Senator is really so, I - shall never speak to him in decided terms again. - - "MR. FESSENDEN. I speak of it only in an intellectual point of view. - [Laughter.] - - "MR. DAVIS. Then, sir, the Senator was in a Pickwickian sense when he - began; there were no threats, no intimidations, and he is just where - he would have been if he had said nothing." [Laughter.]... - -While the Kansas question was pending in Congress, a sketch of Mr. Davis, -in connection with two other prominent Southern Senators, which appeared -in the correspondence of a leading journal, was extensively copied in the -newspapers of the day. We extract that portion which relates specially to -Mr. Davis. The portrait is from the pen of one who had no sympathy with -his political views: - - DAVIS, HUNTER, AND TOOMBS, THE SOUTHERN TRIUMVIRATE. - - [Correspondence of the Missouri Democrat.] - - "WASHINGTON CITY, January 21. - - "Yesterday, when Hale was speaking, the right side of the chamber was - empty, (as it generally is during the delivery of an antislavery - speech,) with the exception of a group of three who sat near the - centre of the vacant space. This remarkable group, which wore the air - if not the ensigns of power, authority, and public care, was composed - of Senators Davis, Hunter, and Toombs. They were engaged in an earnest - colloquy, which, however, was foreign to the argument Hale was - elaborating; for though the connection of their words was broken - before it reached the gallery, their voices were distinctly audible, - and gave signs of their abstraction. They were thinking aloud. If they - had met together, under the supervision of some artist gifted with the - faculty of illustrating history and character by attitude and - expression, who designed to paint them, in fresco, on the walls of the - new Senate chamber, the combination could not have been more - appropriately arranged than chance arranged it on this occasion. - Toombs sits among the opposition on the left, Hunter and Davis on the - right; and the fact that the two first came to Davis' seat--the one - gravitating to it from a remote, the other from a near point--may be - held to indicate which of the three is the preponderating body in the - system, if preponderance there be; and whose figure should occupy the - foreground of the picture if any precedence is to be accorded. Davis - sat erect and composed; Hunter, listening, rested his head on his - hand; and Toombs, inclining forward, was speaking vehemently. Their - respective attitudes were no bad illustration of their individuality. - Davis impressed the spectator, who observed the easy but authoritative - bearing with which he put aside or assented to Toomb's suggestions, - with the notion of some slight superiority, some hardly-acknowledged - leadership; and Hunter's attentiveness and impassibility were - characteristic of his nature, for his profundity of intellect wears - the guise of stolidity, and his continuous industry that of inertia; - while Toomb's quick utterance and restless head bespoke his nervous - temperament and activity of mind. But, though each is different from - either of the others, the three have several attributes in common. - They are equally eminent as statesmen and debaters; they are devoted - to the same cause; they are equals in rank, and rivals in ambition; - and they are about the same age, and none of them--let young America - take notice--wears either beard or mustache. I come again to the - traits which distinguish them from each other. In face and form, Davis - represents the Norman type with singular fidelity, if my conception of - that type be correct. He is tall and sinewy, with fair hair, gray - eyes, which are clear rather than bright, high forehead, straight - nose, thin, compressed lips, and pointed chin. His cheek bones are - hollow, and the vicinity of his mouth is deeply furrowed with - intersecting lines. Leanness of face, length and sharpness of feature, - and length of limb, and intensity of expression, rendered acute by - angular, facial outline, are the general characteristics of his - appearance." - -The controversy, excited by the question of the admission of Kansas, can -not be viewed as having terminated with the mere practical decision of her -status, as a State tolerating or prohibiting slavery. Southern men had -freely admitted the improbability of the permanent abiding of the -institution in that Territory, or elsewhere, north of the line of 36° 30', -and their defeat had a far more alarming significance than the exclusion -of slavery from soil where the laws of nature opposed its location. -Important conclusions were deducible from the lesson of Kansas, which the -South must have been smitten with voluntary blindness not to have -accepted. Of the purpose of the Republican party, never to consent to the -admission of additional slave States, there was added to constantly -accumulating proof from other sources, the bold declarations of Abolition -members of Congress. Recent experience clearly demonstrated that the South -could no longer rely upon the Northern Democracy in support of the -plainest guarantees of the Constitution, for the protection of her -property, when they were in conflict with the dominant fanaticism of that -section. Accordingly, the Southern Democracy, wisely and bravely resolved, -and the unfortunate issue should not prejudge their action, to require of -their Northern associates, as the condition of continued coöperation, a -pledge of better faith in the future. - -It was in the progress of events, which may be justly called the sequel of -the Kansas controversy, that Mr. Davis was most conspicuous during his -second service in the Senate. His course was such as might have been -anticipated from his zealous and vigilant regard for constitutional -principles, and the rights and interests of his section. His feeble health -had prevented his frequent participation in the struggles incidental to -the Kansas question, but in those subsequent struggles, which marked the -dissolution of the Democratic party, he was the constant, bold, and able -adversary of Douglas. The ingenious sophistries of the latter were -subjected to no more searching and scathing refutations than those with -which Davis met his every attempt at their illustration. - -At this period the position of Mr. Davis was no less prominent than in -1850, though his speeches were less frequent and voluminous. Upon both -occasions his elevation was an ample reward to honorable ambition, but -would have been perilous in the extreme had he been deficient in those -great and rare qualities which were necessary to its maintenance. Among -his numerous contests with the distinguished exponents of the sentiment in -opposition to the South, none are more memorable than his collisions with -Douglas. - -Of these the most striking occurred on the 23d of February, 1859, and on -the 16th and 17th of May, 1860. To have matched Douglas with an ordinary -contestant, must always have resulted in disaster; it would have been to -renew the contest of Athelstane against Ivanhoe. Douglas was accustomed to -testify, cheerfully, to the power of Davis, as evinced in their senatorial -struggles; and it is very certain that at no other hands did he fare so -badly, unless an exception be made in favor of the remarkable speech of -Senator Benjamin, of Louisiana. The latter was an adept in the strategy of -debate, a parliamentary Suchet. - -The 23d of February, 1859, was the occasion of a protracted battle between -Davis and Douglas, lasting from midday until nearly night. This speech of -Mr. Davis is, in many respects, inferior to his higher oratorical efforts, -realizing less of the forms of oratory which he usually illustrated so -happily, and is wanting somewhat in that symmetry, harmony, and comeliness -in all its features, with which his senatorial efforts are generally -wrought to the perfection of expression. The circumstances under which it -was delivered, however, fully meet this criticism, and show a most -remarkable readiness for the instantaneous and hurried grapple of debate, -and this latter quality was the strong point of Douglas' oratory. The -latter had replied at great length, and with evident preparation, to a -speech made by Mr. Davis' colleague (Mr. Brown), who was not present -during Douglas' rejoinder. Without hesitation Mr. Davis assumed the place -of his absent colleague, and the result was a running debate, lasting -several hours, and exhibiting on both sides all the vivacious readiness of -a gladiatorial combat. - -In their ordinary and characteristic speeches there was an antithesis, no -less marked than in their characters as men. Douglas was peculiarly -_American_ in his style of speaking. He dealt largely in the _argumentum -ad hominem_; was very adroit in pointing out immaterial inconsistencies in -his antagonists; he rarely discussed general principles; always avoided -questions of abstract political science, and struggled to force the entire -question into juxtaposition with the practical considerations of the -immediate present. - -In nearly all of Davis' speeches is recognized the pervasion of intellect, -which is preserved even in his most impassioned passages. He goes to the -very "foundations of jurisprudence," illustrates by historical example, -and throws upon his subject the full radiance of that noble light which is -shed by diligent inquiry into the abstract truths of political and moral -science. Strength, animation, energy without vehemence, classical -elegance, and a luminous simplicity, are features in Mr. Davis' oratory -which rendered him one of the most finished, logical, and effective of -contemporary parliamentary speakers. - -During the Thirty-sixth Congress, which assembled in December, 1859, Mr. -Davis was the recognized leader of the Democratic majority of the Senate. -His efforts, during this session, were probably the ablest of his life, -and never did his great powers of analysis and generalization appear to -greater advantage. On the second of February, 1860, Mr. Davis presented a -series of seven resolves, which embodied the views of the administration, -of an overwhelming majority of the Democratic members of the Senate, and -of the Southern Democracy, and were opposed by Mr. Douglas (though absent -from the Senate by sickness), Mr. Pugh, and by the Abolition Senators. -They are important as the substantial expression of the doctrines upon -which the Southern Democracy were already prepared to insist at the -approaching National Convention. - -The _first_ resolution affirms the sovereignty of the States and their -delegation of authority to the Federal Government, to secure each State -against _domestic_ no less than foreign dangers. This resolution was -designed with special reference to the recent outrages of John Brown and -his associate conspirators, several of whom had expiated their crimes upon -the gallows, at the hands of the authorities of Virginia. - -Resolution _second_ affirms the recognition of slavery as property by the -Constitution, and that all efforts to injure it by citizens of -non-slaveholding States are violations of faith. - -_Third_ insists upon the absolute equality of the States. - -The _fourth_ resolution of the series, which embodied the material point -of difference between Mr. Douglas and the majority of Democratic Senators, -was modified, as stated by Mr. Davis, "after conference with friends," and -finally made to read thus: - - "_Resolved_, That neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature, - whether by direct legislation, or legislation of an indirect and - unfriendly character, possesses power to annul or impair the - constitutional right of any citizen of the United States to take his - slave property into the common Territories, and there hold and enjoy - the same while the territorial condition remains." - -_Fifth_ declares it the duty of Congress to supply any needed protection -to constitutional rights in a Territory, provided the executive and -judicial authority has not the adequate means. - -The _sixth_ resolution was an emphatic repudiation of what Mr. Douglas, by -an ingenious perversion of terms, and a bold array of sophisms, was -pleased to designate "popular sovereignty"--reading thus: - - "_Resolved_, That the inhabitants of a Territory of the United States, - when they rightfully form a constitution to be admitted as a State - into the Union, may then, for the first time, like the people of a - State when forming a new constitution, decide for themselves whether - slavery, as a domestic institution, shall be maintained or prohibited - within their jurisdiction; and 'they shall be admitted into the Union, - with or without slavery, as their constitution may prescribe at the - time of their admission.'" - -The _seventh_ and last of the series affirmed the validity and sanctity of -the Fugitive Slave Law, and denounced all acts, whether of individuals or -of State Legislatures, to defeat its action. - -The struggle upon these resolutions lasted more than three months, the -Senate not reaching a vote upon the first of the series until May 24, -1860. They constituted substantially the platform presented by the South -at the Charleston Democratic Convention, in April, and upon which, after -the withdrawal of the Southern delegations, the Presidential ticket of -Breckinridge and Lane was nominated, and supported in the ensuing canvass, -receiving the electoral votes of eleven States of the South. - -It was alleged against these resolutions, and the general principle of -protection to Southern property in the Territories, which their advocates -demanded should be asserted in the Democratic creed, that they involved a -new issue, raised for factious purposes, and were not sanctioned by any -previous action of the party. This, even if it had been true, which -assuredly it was not, constituted no sufficient reason for denying a plain -constitutional right. - -But, however sustained might have been this charge of inconsistency -against other Southern leaders, it had no application to Davis. Indeed, -Douglas unequivocally admitted that the position assumed by Davis in 1860 -was precisely that to which he had held for twenty years previous. While -the Oregon Bill was pending in the Senate, on the 23d of June, 1848, Mr. -Davis offered this amendment: - - "_Provided_, That nothing contained in this act shall be so construed - as to authorize the prohibition of domestic slavery in said Territory - whilst it remains in the condition of a Territory of the United - States." - -Eleven years afterwards, in his address before the Mississippi Democratic -Convention, July 5, 1859, he said: - - "But if the rules of proceeding remain unchanged, then all the - remedies of the civil law would be available for the protection of - property in slaves; or if the language of the organic act, by - specifying chancery and common-law jurisdiction, denies to us the more - ample remedies of the civil law, then those known to the common law - are certainly in force; and these, I have been assured by the highest - authority, will be found sufficient. If this be so, then we are - content; if it should prove otherwise, then we but ask what justice - can not deny--the legislation needful to enable the General Government - to perform its legitimate functions; and, in the meantime, we deny the - power of Congress to abridge or to destroy our constitutional rights, - or of the Territorial Legislature to obstruct the remedies known to - the common law of the United States." - -In 1848 he advocated General Cass' election _in spite_ of the Nicholson -letter, and not because he either approved or failed to detect the -dangerous heresies which it contained. As a choice of evils, he preferred -Cass, even upon the Nicholson letter, to General Taylor, his -father-in-law, both because Cass was the choice of his own party, and he -distrusted the influences which he foresaw would govern the administration -of Taylor. - -The attention of Mr. Davis was far from being confined to the slavery -question and the issues which grew out of it during the important period -which we have sketched. His extensive acquaintance with the practical -labors of legislation, and his uniformly thorough information upon all -questions of domestic economy, foreign affairs, the finances, and the -army, were amply exemplified, to the great benefit of the country. - -During the debate in the Thirty-fifth Congress, on the bill proposing the -issue of $20,000,000 of Treasury notes, which he opposed, he avowed -himself in favor of the abolition of custom-houses, and the disbanding of -the army of retainers employed to collect the import duties. Free trade -was always an important article of his political creed. He valued its -fraternizing effects upon mankind, its advantages to the laboring classes; -and held that, under a system of free trade, the Government would not be -defrauded. He traced the financial distress of the country, in the -"crisis" of 1857, to its commercial dependence on New York, whose -embarrassments must, so long as that dependence continued, always afflict -the country at large. The army, as on previous occasions, received a -large share of his attention, and he advocated its increase on a plan -similar to that of Mr. Calhoun, when Secretary of War under President -Monroe, providing a skeleton organization in peace, capable of expansion -in the event of war. The fishing bounties he opposed, as being obnoxious -to the objections urged against class legislation. - -In the summer of 1858, during the recess of Congress, Mr. Davis visited -the North, with a view to the recuperation of his health. Sailing from -Baltimore to Boston, he traversed a considerable portion of New England, -and sojourned for some time in Portland, Maine. His health was materially -benefited by the bracing salubrity of that delightful locality, and, both -here and at other points, he was received with demonstrations of profound -respect. Upon several occasions he was persuaded to deliver public -addresses, which were largely read and criticized. They were every-where -commended for their admirable catholicity of sentiment, and not less for -their bold assertions of principles than for their emphatic avowals of -attachment to the union of the States. His speech at Portland, Maine,[13] -was especially admired for its statesman-like dignity, and was singularly -free from partisan or sectional temper. In his journey through the States -of Massachusetts and New York, he was tendered distinguished honors, and -addressed the people of the leading cities. On the 10th of October, he -spoke in Faneuil Hall, Boston, and, on the 19th, he addressed an immense -Democratic ratification meeting in New York. - -The following is an extract from his address upon the latter occasion: - - "To each community belongs the right to decide for itself what - institutions it will have--to each people sovereign in their own - sphere. It belongs only to them to decide what shall be property. You - have decided it for yourselves, Mississippi has done so. Who has the - right to gainsay it? [Applause.] It was the assertion of the right of - independence--of that very right which led your fathers into the war - of the Revolution. [Applause.] It is that which constitutes the - doctrine of State Rights, on which it is my pleasure to stand. - Congress has no power to determine what shall be property anywhere. - Congress has only such grants as are contained in the Constitution; - and it conferred no power to rule with despotic hands over the - independence of the Territories." - -The second session of the Thirty-fifth Congress was comparatively -uneventful. Mr. Davis was an influential advocate of the Pacific Railroad -by the Southern route. His most elaborate effort during this session was -his argument against the French Spoliation Bill--denying that the failure -of the Government, in its earlier history, to prosecute the just claims of -American citizens on the Government of France, made it incumbent upon the -present generation to satisfy the obligations of justice incurred in the -past. - -In reply to an invitation to attend the Webster Birthday Festival, held in -Boston, in January, 1859, Mr. Davis wrote as follows: - - "At a time when partisans avow the purpose to obliterate the landmarks - of our fathers, and fanaticism assails the barriers they erected for - the protection of rights coeval with and essential to the existence of - the Union--when Federal offices have been sought by inciting - constituencies to hostile aggressions, and exercised, not as a trust - for the common welfare, but as the means of disturbing domestic - tranquillity--when oaths to support the Constitution have been taken - with a mental reservation to disregard its spirit, and subvert the - purposes for which it was established--surely it becomes all who are - faithful to the compact of our Union, and who are resolved to maintain - and preserve it, to compare differences on questions of mere - expediency, and, forming deep around the institutions we inherited, - stand united to uphold, with unfaltering intent, a banner on which is - inscribed the Constitutional Union of free, equal, and independent - States. - - "May the vows of 'love and allegiance,' which you propose to renew as - a fitting tribute to the memory of the illustrious statesman whose - birth you commemorate, find an echo in the heart of every patriot in - our land, and tend to the revival of that fraternity which bore our - fathers through the Revolution to the consummation of the independence - they transmitted to us, and the establishment of the more perfect - Union which their wisdom devised to bless their posterity for ever! - - "Though deprived of the pleasure of mingling my affectionate memories - and aspirations with yours, I send you my cordial greeting to the - friends of the Constitution, and ask to be enrolled among those whose - mission is, by fraternity and good faith to every constitutional - obligation, to insure that, from the Aroostook to San Diego, from Key - West to Puget's Sound, the grand arch of our political temple shall - stand unshaken." - -In the meantime a variety of events measurably added to the vehemence of -the sectional dispute, which never, for a moment, had exhibited any -abatement since the opening of the Kansas _imbroglio_. The antagonism -between the two sections, becoming more and more pronounced each day, -rapidly developed the true character of the struggle, as one for existence -on the part of the South, against the revolutionary designs of the North. -Mr. Seward, the Ajax of Black Republicanism, the founder and leader of -the party organized for the destruction of Southern institutions, in the -fall of 1858, at the city of Rochester, for the first time proclaimed his -revolutionary doctrine of an "irrepressible conflict" between the -civilizations of the two sections. This announcement, from such a source, -could only be accepted by the South as a menace to her peace and security. -Such was her construction of it. - -In his address before the Mississippi Democratic Convention, in July, -1859, from which we have already quoted, Mr. Davis said: - - "We have witnessed the organization of a party seeking the possession - of the Government, not for the common good, not for their own - particular benefit, but as the means of executing a hostile purpose - against a portion of the States." - -Approaching more directly the doctrine of Mr. Seward, he said: - - "The success of such a party would indeed produce an 'irrepressible - conflict.' To you would be presented the question, Will you allow the - Constitutional Union to be changed into the despotism of a majority? - Will you become the subjects of a hostile Government? or will you, - outside of the Union, assert the equality, the liberty and sovereignty - to which you were born? For myself I say, as I said on a former - occasion, in the contingency of the election of a President on the - platform of Mr. Seward's Rochester speech, let the Union be dissolved. - Let the 'great, but not the greatest, evil' come; for, as did the - great and good Calhoun, from whom is drawn that expression of value, I - love and venerate the Union of these States, but I love liberty and - Mississippi more." - -When Congress assembled, in December, 1859, the lawless expedition of -John Brown had greatly accelerated the inevitable climax of disunion. -Thenceforward the incipient revolution was, to a great extent, transferred -from the hands of Congress, whose action was but lightly regarded in -comparison with the animated scenes which marked the State conventions and -popular assemblages, held with reference to the approaching presidential -nominations. - -Mr. Davis approved the test made at the Charleston Convention, by the -Southern Democracy, as to the construction of the Cincinnati platform, and -the demand for a more explicit announcement of the position of the party -concerning slavery in the Territories. His speech, in reply to Judge -Douglas, on the 16th and 17th of May, 1860, is a vindication of Southern -action at Charleston, and an exhaustive discussion of all the phases of -the issue upon which the Democracy had divided. - -Events soon demonstrated the irreconcilable nature of the antagonism which -had severed this giant organization. It had simply realized the destiny of -political parties. In one generation they rise, as a virtue and a -necessity, to remedy disorders and reform abuses; in another generation, -they are themselves the apologists of corruption and the perpetrators of -wrong. The Democratic party became insensible to the appeals of principle, -and its fifty years' lease of power terminated, not speedily to be -recovered. - - -HON. JEFFERSON DAVIS AT PORTLAND, MAINE. - -[From the Eastern Argus.] - -We are gratified in being able to offer our readers a faithful and quite -full report of the speech of Hon. Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, on the -occasion of the serenade given him by the citizens of Portland, without -distinction of party, on Friday evening last. It will be read with -interest and pleasure, and we can not doubt that every sentiment, uttered -by the distinguished Mississippian, will find a hearty response and -approval from the citizens of Maine. The occasion was indeed a pleasing, a -hopeful one. It was in every respect the expression of generous -sentiments, of kindness, hospitality, friendly regard, and the brotherhood -of American citizenship. Prominent men of all parties were present, and -the expression, without exception, so far as we have heard, has been that -of unmingled gratification; and the scene was equally pleasant to look -upon. The beautiful mansion of Rensallaer Cram, Esq., directly opposite to -Madame Blanchard's, was illuminated, and the light thrown from the windows -of the two houses revealed to view the large and perfectly orderly -assemblage with which Park and Danforth Streets were crowded. We regret -that our readers can get no idea of the musical voice and inspiring -eloquence of the speaker from a report of his remarks; but it is the best -we can do for them. After the music had ceased, Mr. Davis appeared upon -the steps, and as soon as the prolonged applause with which he was greeted -had subsided, he spoke in substance as follows: - -FELLOW-CITIZENS: Accept my sincere thanks for this manifestation of your -kindness. Vanity does not lead me so far to misconceive your purpose as to -appropriate the demonstration to myself; but it is not the less gratifying -to me to be made the medium through which Maine tenders an expression of -regard to her sister, Mississippi. It is, moreover, with feelings of -profound gratification that I witness this indication of that national -sentiment and fraternity which made us, and which alone can keep us, one -people. At a period but as yesterday, when compared with the life of -nations, these States were separate, and, in some respects, opposing -colonies, their only relation to each other was that of a common -allegiance to the Government of Great Britain. So separate, indeed almost -hostile, was their attitude, that when General Stark, of Bennington -memory, was captured by savages on the headwaters of the Kennebec, he was -subsequently taken by them to Albany, where they went to sell furs, and -again led away a captive, without interference on the part of the -inhabitants of that neighboring colony to demand or obtain his release. -United as we now are, were a citizen of the United States, as an act of -hostility to our country, imprisoned or slain in any quarter of the world, -whether on land or sea, the people of each and every State of the Union, -with one heart and with one voice, would demand redress, and woe be to him -against whom a brother's blood cried to us from the ground. Such is the -fruit of the wisdom and the justice with which our fathers bound -contending colonies into confederation, and blended different habits and -rival interests into a harmonious whole, so that, shoulder to shoulder, -they entered on the trial of the Revolution, and step with step trod its -thorny paths until they reached the height of national independence, and -founded the constitutional representative liberty which is our birthright. - -When the mother country entered upon her career of oppression, in -disregard of chartered and constitutional rights, our forefathers did not -stop to measure the exact weight of the burden, or to ask whether the -pressure bore most upon this colony or upon that, but saw in it the -infraction of a great principle, the denial of a common right, in defense -of which they made common cause--Massachusetts, Virginia, and South -Carolina vieing with each other as to who should be foremost in the -struggle, where the penalty of failure would be a dishonorable grave. -Tempered by the trials and sacrifices of the Revolution, dignified by its -noble purposes, elevated by its brilliant triumphs, endeared to each other -by its glorious memories, they abandoned the Confederacy, not to fly apart -when the outward pressure of hostile fleets and armies were removed, but -to draw closer their embrace in the formation of a more perfect Union. - -By such men, thus trained and ennobled, our Constitution was framed. It -stands a monument of principle, of forecast, and, above all, of that -liberality which made each willing to sacrifice local interest, individual -prejudice, or temporary good to the general welfare and the perpetuity of -the republican institutions which they had passed through fire and blood -to secure. The grants were as broad as were necessary for the functions of -the general agent, and the mutual concessions were twice blessed, blessing -him who gave and him who received. Whatever was necessary for domestic -government--requisite in the social organization of each community--was -retained by the States and the people thereof; and these it was made the -duty of all to defend and maintain. Such, in very general terms, is the -rich political legacy our fathers bequeathed to us. Shall we preserve and -transmit it to posterity? Yes, yes, the heart responds; and the judgment -answers, the task is easily performed. It but requires that each should -attend to that which most concerns him, and on which alone he has rightful -power to decide and to act; that each should adhere to the terms of a -written compact, and that all should coöperate for that which interest, -duty, and honor demand. - -For the general affairs of our country, both foreign and domestic, we have -a national Executive and a national Legislature. Representatives and -Senators are chosen by districts and by States, but their acts affect the -whole country, and their obligations are to the whole people. He who, -holding either seat, would confine his investigations to the mere -interests of his immediate constituents, would be derelict to his plain -duty; and he who would legislate in hostility to any section, would be -morally unfit for the station, and surely an unsafe depository, if not a -treacherous guardian, of the inheritance with which we are blessed. No one -more than myself recognizes the binding force of the allegiance which the -citizen owes to the State of his citizenship, but that State being a party -to our compact, a member of the Union, fealty to the Federal Constitution -is not in opposition to, but flows from the allegiance due to one of the -United States. Washington was not less a Virginian when he commanded at -Boston, nor did Gates or Greene weaken the bonds which bound them to their -several States by their campaigns in the South. In proportion as a citizen -loves his own State, will he strive to honor by preserving her name and -her fame free from the tarnish of having failed to observe her obligations -and to fulfill her duties to her sister States. Each page of our history -is illustrated by the names and deeds of those who have well understood -and discharged the obligation. Have we so degenerated that we can no -longer emulate their virtues? Have the purposes for which our Union was -formed lost their value? Has patriotism ceased to be a virtue, and is -narrow sectionalism no longer to be counted a crime? Shall the North not -rejoice that the progress of agriculture in the South has given to her -great staple the controlling influence of the commerce of the world, and -put manufacturing nations under bond to keep the peace with the United -States? Shall the South not exult in the fact that the industry and -persevering intelligence of the North has placed her mechanical skill in -the front ranks of the civilized world--that our mother country, whose -haughty Minister, some eighty odd years ago, declared that not a hob-nail -should be made in the colonies, which are now the United States, was -brought, some four years ago, to recognize our preëminence by sending a -commission to examine our workshops and our machinery, to perfect their -own manufacture of the arms requisite for their defense? Do not our whole -people, interior and seaboard, North, South, East and West, alike feel -proud of the hardihood, the enterprise, the skill, and the courage of the -Yankee sailor, who has borne our flag far as the ocean bears its foam, and -caused the name and character of the United States to be known and -respected wherever there is wealth enough to woo commerce and intelligence -to honor merit? So long as we preserve and appreciate the achievements of -Jefferson and Adams, of Franklin and Madison, of Hamilton, of Hancock, and -of Rutledge, men who labored for the whole country, and lived for mankind, -we can not sink to the petty strife which would sap the foundations and -destroy the political fabric our fathers erected and bequeathed as an -inheritance to our posterity forever. - -Since the formation of the Constitution a vast extension of territory, and -the varied relations arising therefrom, have presented problems which -could not have been foreseen. It is just cause for admiration, even -wonder, that the provisions of the fundamental law should have been so -fully adequate to all the wants of government, new in its organization, -and new in many of the principles on which it was founded. Whatever fears -may have once existed as to the consequences of territorial expansion must -give way before the evidence which the past affords. The General -Government, strictly confined to its delegated functions, and the State -left in the undisturbed exercise of all else, we have a theory and -practice which fits our Government for immeasurable domain, and might, -under a millennium of nations, embrace mankind. - -From the slope of the Atlantic our population, with ceaseless tide, has -poured into the wide and fertile valley of the Mississippi, with eddying -whirl has passed to the coast of the Pacific; from the West and the East -the tides are rushing toward each other, and the mind is carried to the -day when all the cultivable land will be inhabited, and the American -people will sigh for more wildernesses to conquer. But there is here a -physico-political problem presented for our solution. Were it purely -physical your past triumphs would leave but little doubt of your capacity -to solve it. A community which, when less than twenty thousand, conceived -the grand project of crossing the White Mountains, and unaided, save by -the stimulus which jeers and prophecies of failure gave, successfully -executed the Herculean work, might well be impatient if it were suggested -that a physical problem was before us too difficult for mastery. The -history of man teaches that high mountains and wide deserts have resisted -the permanent extension of empire, and have formed the immutable -boundaries of States. From time to time, under some able leader, have the -hordes of the upper plains of Asia swept over the adjacent country, and -rolled their conquering columns over Southern Europe. Yet, after the lapse -of a few generations, the physical law, to which I have referred, has -asserted its supremacy, and the boundaries of those States differ little -now from those which were obtained three thousand years ago. - -Rome flew her conquering eagles over the then known world, and has now -subsided into the little territory on which the great city was originally -built. The Alps and the Pyranees have been unable to restrain imperial -France; but her expansion was a feverish action, her advance and her -retreat were tracked with blood, and those mountain ridges are the -reëstablished limits of her empire. Shall the Rocky Mountains prove a -dividing barrier to us? Were ours a central consolidated Government, -instead of a Union of sovereign States, our fate might be learned from the -history of other nations. Thanks to the wisdom and independent spirit of -our forefathers, this is not the case. Each State having sole charge of -its local interests and domestic affairs, the problem, which to others has -been insoluble, to us is made easy. Rapid, safe, and easy communication -between the Atlantic and the Pacific will give co-intelligence, unity of -interest, and coöperation among all parts of our continent-wide Republic. -The net-work of railroads which bind the North and the South, the slope of -the Atlantic and the valley of the Mississippi, together testify that our -people have the power to perform, in that regard, whatever it is their -will to do. - -We require a railroad to the States of the Pacific for present uses; the -time no doubt will come when we shall have need of two or three, it may -be, more. Because of the desert character of the interior country the work -will be difficult and expensive. It will require the efforts of a united -people. The bickerings of little politicians, the jealousies of sections -must give way to dignity of purpose and zeal for the common good. If the -object be obstructed by contention and division as to whether the route -shall be Northern, Southern, or Central, the handwriting is on the wall, -and it requires little skill to see that failure is the interpretation of -the inscription. You are practical people, and may ask, How is that -contest to be avoided? By taking the question out of the hands of -politicians altogether. Let the Government give such aid as it is proper -for it to render to the company which shall propose the most feasible -plan; then leave to capitalists with judgment, sharpened by interest, the -selection of the route, and the difficulties will diminish, as did those -which you overcame when you connected your harbor with the Canadian -provinces. - -It would be to trespass on your kindness and to violate the proprieties of -the occasion were I to detain the vast concourse which stands before me by -entering on the discussion of controverted topics, or by further indulging -in the expression of such reflections as circumstances suggest. I came to -your city in quest of health and repose. From the moment I entered it you -have showered upon me kindness and hospitality. Though my experience has -taught me to anticipate good rather than evil from my fellow-man, it had -not prepared me to expect such unremitting attention as has here been -bestowed. I have been jocularly asked in relation to my coming here, -whether I had secured a guarantee for my safety, and lo! I have found it. -I stand in the midst of thousands of my fellow-citizens. But, my friends, -I came neither distrusting nor apprehensive, of which you have proof in -the fact that I brought with me the objects of tenderest affection and -solicitude, my wife and my children; they have shared with me your -hospitality, and will alike remain your debtors. If, at some future time, -when I am mingled with the dust, and the arm of my infant son has been -nerved for deeds of manhood, the storm of war should burst upon your city, -I feel that, relying upon his inheriting the instincts of his ancestors -and mine, I may pledge him in that perilous hour to stand by your side in -the defense of your hearth-stones, and in maintaining the honor of a flag -whose constellation, though torn and smoked in many a battle by sea and -land, has never been stained with dishonor, and will, I trust, forever fly -as free as the breeze which unfolds it. - -A stranger to you, the salubrity of your location, and the beauty of its -scenery were not wholly unknown to me, nor were there wanting associations -which busy memory connected with your people. You will pardon me for -alluding to one whose genius shed a lustre upon all it touched, and whose -qualities gathered about him hosts of friends wherever he was known. -Prentiss, a native of Portland, lived from youth to middle age in the -county of my residence; and the inquiries which have been made show me -that the youth excited the interest which the greatness of the man -justified, and that his memory thus remains a link to connect your home -with mine. A cursory view, when passing through your town on former -occasions, had impressed me with the great advantages of your harbor, its -easy entrance, its depth, and its extensive accommodations for shipping. -But its advantages and its facilities, as they have been developed by -closer inspection, have grown upon me, until I realize that it is no -boast, but the language of sober truth, which, in the present state of -commerce, pronounces them unequaled in any harbor of our country. - -And surely no place could be more inviting to an invalid who sought refuge -from the heat of Southern summer. Here waving elms offer him shaded walks, -and magnificent residences, surrounded by flowers, fill the mind with -ideas of comfort and rest. If, weary of constant contact with his -fellow-men, he seeks a deeper seclusion, there, in the background of this -grand amphitheater, lie the eternal mountains, frowning with brow of rock -and cap of snow upon smiling fields beneath, and there in its recesses may -be found as much wildness and as much of solitude as the pilgrim, weary of -the cares of life, can desire. If he turn to the front, your capacious -harbor, studded with green islands of ever-varying light and shade, and -enlightened by all the stirring evidences of commercial activity, offer -him the mingled charms of busy life and nature's calm repose. A few miles -further, and he may sit upon the quiet shore to listen to the murmuring -wave until the troubled spirit sinks to rest; and in the little sail that -vanishes on the illimitable sea we find the type of the voyage which he is -soon to take, when, his ephemeral existence closed, he embarks for that -better state which lies beyond the grave. - -Richly endowed as you are by nature in all which contributes to pleasure -and to usefulness, the stranger can not pass without paying a tribute to -the much which your energy has achieved for yourselves. Where else will -one find a more happy union of magnificence and comfort? Where better -arrangements to facilitate commerce? Where so much of industry with so -little noise and bustle? Where, in a phrase, so much effected in -proportion to the means employed? We hear the puff of the engine, the roll -of the wheel, the ring of the ax and the saw, but the stormy, passionate -exclamation so often mingled with the sounds are nowhere heard. Yet -neither these nor other things which I have mentioned, attractive though -they be, have been to me the chief charm which I have found among you. Far -above all these, I place the gentle kindness, the cordial welcome, the -hearty grasp which made me feel truly and at once, though wandering afar, -that I was still at home. My friends, I thank you for this additional -manifestation of your good-will. - - -REPLY OF HON. JEFFERSON DAVIS, OF MISSISSIPPI, TO THE SPEECH OF SENATOR -DOUGLAS, IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, MAY 16 AND 17, 1860. - -[The Senate resumed the consideration of the resolutions submitted by Mr. -Davis on the first of March, relative to State rights, the institution of -slavery in the States, and the rights of citizens of the several States in -the Territories.] - -MR. DOUGLAS having concluded his speech-- - -MR. DAVIS arose and said: - -_Mr. President_: When the Senator from Illinois commenced his speech, he -announced his object to be to answer to an arraignment, or, as he also -termed it, an indictment, which he said I had made against him. He -therefore caused extracts to be read from my remarks to the Senate. Those -extracts announce that I have been the uniform opponent of what is called -squatter sovereignty, and that, having opposed it heretofore, I was now, -least of all, disposed to give it quarter. At a subsequent period, the -fact was stated that the Senator from Illinois and myself had been opposed -to each other, on those questions which I considered as most distinctly -involving Southern interests in 1850. He has not answered to the -allegation. He has not attempted to show that he did not stand in that -position. It is true he has associated himself with Mr. Clay, and, before -closing, I will show that the association does not belong to him; that -upon those test questions they did not vote together. He then, somewhat -vauntingly, reminded me that he was with the victorious party, asserted -that the Democracy of the country then sustained his doctrine, and that I -was thus outside of that organization. With Mr. Clay! If he had been with -him, he would have been in good company; but the old Jackson Democracy -will be a little surprised to learn that Clay was the leader of our party, -and that a man proves his allegiance to it by showing how closely he -followed in the footsteps of Henry Clay. - -When the Senator opened his argument, by declaring his purpose to be fair -and courteous, I little supposed that an explanation made by me in favor -of the Secretary of State, and which could not at all disturb the line of -his argument, would have been followed by the rude announcement that he -could not permit interruption thereafter. A Senator has the right to claim -exemption from interruption if he will follow the thread of his argument, -direct his discourse to the question at issue, and confine himself to it; -but if he makes up a medley of arraignments of the men who have been in -public life for ten years past, and addressing individuals in his -presence, he should permit an interruption to be made for correction as -often as he misrepresents their position. It would have devolved on me -more than once, if I had been responsible for his frequent references to -me, to correct him and show that he misstated facts; but as he would not -permit himself to be interrupted, I am not responsible for any thing he -has imputed to me. - -The Senator commenced with a disclaimer of any purpose to follow what he -considered a bad practice of arraigning Senators here on matters for which -they stood responsible to their constituents; but straightway proceeded to -make a general arraignment of the present and the absent. I believe I -constitute the only exception to whom he granted consistency, and that at -the expense of party association, and, he would have it, at the expense of -sound judgment. He not only arraigned individuals, but even -States--Florida, Alabama, and Georgia--were brought to answer at the bar -of the Senate for the resolutions they had passed; Virginia was held -responsible for her policy; Mississippi received his critical notice. -Pray, sir, what had all this to do with the question? Especially, what had -all this to do with what he styled an indictment against him? It is a mere -resort to a species of declamation which has not been heard to-day for the -first time; a pretext to put himself in the attitude of a persecuted man, -and, like the satyr's guest, blowing hot and cold in the same breath, in -the midst of his complaint of persecution, vaunts his supreme power. If -his opponents be the very small minority which he describes, what fear has -he of persecution or proscription? - -Can he not draw a distinction between one who says: "I give no quarter to -an idea," and one who proclaims the policy of putting the advocates of -that idea to the sword? Such was his figurative language. That figure of -the sword, however, it seemed, as he progressed in his development, -referred to the one thought always floating through his brain--exclusion -from the spoils of office, for, at last, it seemed to narrow down to the -supposition that no man who agreed with him was, with our consent, to be -either a Cabinet officer or a collector. Who has advanced any such -doctrine? Have I, at this or any other period of my acquaintance with him, -done any thing to justify him in attributing that opinion to me? I pause -for his answer. - -MR. DOUGLAS. I do not exactly understand the Senator. I have no complaint -to make of the Senator from Mississippi of ever having been unkind or -ungenerous towards me, if that is what he means to say. - -MR. DAVIS. Have I ever promulgated a doctrine which indicated that if my -friends were in power, I would sacrifice every other wing of the -Democratic party? - -MR. DOUGLAS. I understood the making of a test on this issue against me -would reach every other man that held my opinions; and, therefore, if I -was not sound enough to hold office, no man agreeing with me would be; and -hence, every man of my opinions would be excluded. - -MR. DAVIS. Ah, Mr. President; I believe I now have caught the clue to the -argument; it was not before apprehended. I was among those who thought the -Senator, with his opinions, ought not to be chairman of the Committee on -Territories. This, I suppose, then, is the whole imposition. But have I -not said to the Senator, at least once, that I had no disposition to -question his Democracy; that I did not wish to withhold from him any -tribute which was due to his talent and his worth? Did I not offer to -resign the only chairmanship of a committee I had if the Senate would -confer it upon him? Then, where is this spirit of proscription, the -complaint of which has constituted some hours of his speech? If others -have manifested it, I do not know it; and as the single expression of "no -quarter to the doctrine of squatter sovereignty" was the basis of his -whole allegation, I took it for granted his reference to a purpose to do -him and his friends such wrong must have been intended for me. - -The fact that the Senator criticised the idea of the States prescribing -the terms on which they will act in a party convention recognized to be -representative, is suggestive of an extreme misconception of relative -position; and the presumption with which the Senator censured what he was -pleased to term "the seceders," suggested to me a representation of the -air of the great monarch of France when, feeling royalty and power all -concentrated in his own person, he used the familiar yet remarkable -expression, "the State, that's me." Does the Senator consider it a modest -thing in him to announce to the Democratic Convention on what terms he -will accept the nomination; but presumptuous in a State to declare the -principle on which she will give him her vote? It is an advance on Louis -Quatorze. - -Nothing but the most egregious vanity, something far surpassing even the -bursting condition of swollen pride, could have induced the Senator to -believe that I could not speak of squatter sovereignty without meaning -him. - -Towards the Senator, personally, I have never manifested -hostility--indeed, could not, because I have ever felt kindly. Many years -of association, very frequent coöperation, manly support from him in times -of trial, are all remembered by me gratefully. The Senator, therefore, had -no right to assume that I was making war upon him. I addressed myself to -a doctrine of which he was not the founder, though he was one of the early -disciples; but he proved an unprofitable follower, for he became -rebellious, and ruined the logic of the doctrine. It was logical in Mr. -Cass's mind; he claimed the power to be inherent in the people who settled -a new Territory, and by this inherent power he held that they might -proceed to form government and to exercise its functions. There was logic -in that--logic up to the point of sovereignty. Not so with the Senator. He -says the inhabitants of the Territories derive their power to form a -government from the consent of Congress; that when we decide that there -are enough of them to constitute a government, and enact an organic law, -then they have power to legislate according to their will. This power -being derived from an act of Congress--a limited agency tied down to the -narrow sphere of the constitutional grant--is made, by that supposition, -the bestower of sovereignty on its creature. - -I had occasion the other day to refer to the higher law as it made its -first appearance on earth--the occasion when the tempter entered the -garden of Eden. There is another phase of it. Whoever attempts to -interpose between the supreme law of the Creator and the creature, whether -it be in the regions of morals or politics, proclaims a theory that wars -upon every principle of government. When Congress, the agent for the -States, within the limits of its authority, forms, as it were, a -territorial constitution by its organic act, he who steps in and proclaims -to the settlers in that Territory that they have the right to overturn the -Government, to usurp to themselves powers not delegated, is preaching the -higher law in the domain of politics, which is only less mischievous than -its other form, because the other involves both politics and morals in one -ruinous confusion. - -The Senator spoke of the denial of Democratic fellowship to him. After -what has been said and acknowledged by the Senator, it is not to be -supposed that it could have any application to me. It may be proper to -add, I know of no such denial on the part of other Democratic Senators. -Far be it from me to vaunt the fact of being in a majority, and to hold -him to the hard rule he prescribes to us, of surrendering an opinion where -we may happen to have been in a minority. Were I to return now to him the -measure with which he metes to us, when he assumes that a majority in the -Charleston Convention has a right to prescribe what shall be our tenets, I -might, in reply to him, say, as a sincere adherent of the Democratic -party, how can you oppose the resolutions pending before the Senate? If -twenty-seven majority in a body of three hundred and three constituent -members had, as he assumes, the power to lay down a binding law, what is -to be said of him who, with a single adherent, stands up against the whole -of his Democratic associates? He must be outside of the party, according -to his enunciation; he must be wandering in the dark regions to which he -consigns the followers of Mr. Yancey. - -The Senator said he had no taste for references to things which were -personal, and then proceeded to discuss that of which he showed himself -profoundly ignorant--the condition of things in Mississippi. It is -disagreeable for me to bring before the Senate matters which belong to my -constituents and myself, and I should not do so but for the fact of their -introduction into the Senator's elaborate speech, which is no doubt to be -spread over all parts of the country. The Senator, by some means or other, -has the name of very many citizens of Mississippi, and as there is nothing -in our condition to attract his special attention, his speech is probably -to be sent over a wide field of correspondence; and it is, therefore, the -more incumbent on me to notice his attempt to give a history of affairs -that were transacted in Mississippi. He first announces that Mississippi -rebuked the idea of intervention asserted in 1850; then that Mississippi -rejected my appeal; that Mississippi voted on the issue made up by the -compromise measure of 1850, and vaunts it as an approval of that -legislation of which he was the advocate and I the opponent. Now, -Mississippi did none of these things. Mississippi instructed her Senators, -and I obeyed her instructions. I introduced into this body the resolutions -which directed my course. On that occasion I vindicated Mississippi, and -especially the Southern rights men, from the falsehood of that day, and -reiterated now, of a purpose to dissolve the Union. I vindicated her by -extracts from the proceedings as well of her convention as of her primary -assemblies; and my remarks on that occasion, as fully as the events to -which he referred in terms of undeserved compliment, justified the Senator -in saying to-day that he knew I had always been faithful to the Government -of which I was a part. - -Acting under the instructions from Mississippi--not merely voting and -yielding reluctant compliance; but, according to my ideas of the -obligation of a Senator, laboring industriously and zealously to carry out -the instructions which my State gave me, I took and maintained the -position I held in relation to the measures of 1850. As it was with me a -cordial service, I went home to vindicate the position which was hers, as -well as my own. Shortly after that a canvass was opened, in which a -distinguished gentlemen of our party, who had not been a member of -Congress, was nominated for Governor. Questions other than the compromise -measures of 1850 arose in that canvass; they were discussed in a great -degree to the exclusion of a consideration of the merits of the action of -Congress in 1850; and, at the election in September, for delegates to a -convention, we had fallen from a party majority of some eight thousand to -a minority of nearly the same number. It was after the decision of the -question involved in calling a convention--after our party was -defeated--after the candidate for Governor had retired, that the Democracy -of Mississippi called upon me to bear their standard. It was esteemed a -forlorn hope, therefore an obligation of honor not to decline the -invitation. But so far as the action in the Senate in 1850 was concerned, -if it had any effect, it must have been the reverse of that assumed, as, -in the subsequent election for State officers on the first Monday in -November, this majority of nearly eight thousand against us was reduced to -about one thousand. - -But when this convention assembled, though a large majority of the members -belonged to the party which the Senator has been pleased to term the -"Submissionists"--a name which they always rejected--this convention of -the party most adverse to me, when they came to act on the subject said, -after citing the "compromise" measures of the Congress of 1850: - - "And connected with them, the rejection of the proposition to exclude - slavery from the Territories of the United States, and to abolish it - in the District of Columbia; and, _while they do not entirely - approve_, will abide by it as a permanent adjustment of this sectional - controversy, so long as the same, in all its features, shall be - faithfully adhered to and enforced." - -Then they go on to recite six different causes, for which they will resort -to the most extreme remedies which we had supposed ever could be -necessary. The case only requires that I should say that the party to -which I belonged did not then, nor at any previous time, propose to go out -of the Union, but to have a Southern convention for consultation as to -future contingencies, threatened and anticipated. It was at last narrowed -down to the question, whether we should meet South Carolina and consult -with her. Honoring that gallant State for the magnanimity she had -manifested in the first efforts for the creation of the Government, in the -preliminaries to the struggle for independence, when she, a favored -colony, feeling no oppression, nursed by the mother country, cherished in -every method, yet agreed with Massachusetts, then oppressed, to assert the -great principle of community independence, and to carry it to the extent -of war--honoring her for her unvarying defense of the Constitution -throughout her whole course--believing that she was true to her faith, and -would redeem all her pledges--feeling that a friendly hand might -restrain, while, if left to herself, her pride might precipitate her on -the trial of separation, I did desire to meet South Carolina in -convention, though nobody but ourselves should be there to join her. - -But, to close the matter, this convention, in its seventh resolution, -after stating all those questions on which it would resist, declared: - - "That, as the people of Mississippi, in the opinion of this - convention, desire all further agitation of the slavery question to - cease, and have acted upon and decided the foregoing questions, - thereby making it the duty of this convention to pass no act in the - perview and spirit of the law under which it is called, this - convention deems it unnecessary to refer to the people, for approval - or disapproval, at the ballot-box, its action in the premises." - -So that when the Senator appealed to this as evidence of what the people -of Mississippi had done, he was ignorant of the fact that the delegates of -the people of Mississippi did not agree with him; that their resolutions -did not sustain the view which he took, and that the people of Mississippi -never acted on them. If, then, there had been good taste in the -intervention of this local question, there was certainly very bad judgment -in hazarding his statements on a subject of which he was so little -informed. - -The Senator here, as in relation to our friends at Charleston, takes kind -care of us--supposes we do not know what we are about, but that he, with -his superior discrimination, sees what must necessarily result from what -we are doing; he says that, at Charleston, they--innocent people--did not -intend to destroy the Government; but he warns them that, if they do what -they propose, they will destroy it; and so he says we of Mississippi, not -desiring to break up the Union, nevertheless pursued a course which would -have had that result if it had not been checked. Where does he get all -this information? I have been in every State of the Union except -two--three now, since Oregon has been admitted--but I have never seen a -man who had as much personal knowledge. It is equally surprising that his -facts should be so contrary to the record. - -We believed then, as I believe now, that this Union, as a compact entered -into between the States, was to be preserved by good faith, and by a close -observance of the terms on which we were united. We believed then, as I -believe now, that the party which rested upon the basis of truth; -promulgated its opinions, and had them tested in the alembic of public -opinion, adopted the only path of safety. I can not respect such a -doctrine as that which says, "You may construe the Constitution your way, -and I will construe it mine; we will waive the merit of these two -constructions, and harmonize together until the courts decide the question -between us." A man is bound to have an opinion upon any political subject -upon which he is called to act; it is skulking his responsibility for a -citizen to say, "Let us express no opinion; I will agree that you may have -yours, and I will have mine; we will coöperate politically together; we -will beat the opposition, divide the spoils, and leave it to the court to -decide the question between us." - -I do not believe that this is the path of safety; I am sure it is not the -way of honor. I believe it devolves on us, who are principally sufferers -from the danger to which this policy has exposed us, to affirm the truth -boldly, and let the people decide after the promulgation of our opinions. -Our Government, resting as it does upon public opinion and popular -consent, was not formed to deceive the people, nor does it regard the men -in office as a governing class. We, the functionaries, should derive our -opinions from the people. To know what their opinion is, it is necessary -that we should pronounce, in unmistakable language, what we ourselves -mean. - -My position is, that there is no portion of our country where the people -are not sufficiently intelligent to discriminate between right and wrong, -and no portion where the sense of justice does not predominate. I, -therefore, have been always willing to unfurl our flag to its innermost -fold--to nail it to the mast, with all our principles plainly inscribed -upon it. Believing that we ask nothing but what the Constitution was -intended to confer--nothing but that which, as equals, we are entitled to -receive--I am willing that our case should be plainly stated to those who -have to decide it, and await, for good or for evil, their verdict. - -For two days, the Senator spoke nominally upon the resolutions, and upon -the territorial question; but, like the witness in the French comedy, who, -when called upon to testify, commenced before the creation, and was -stopped by the judge, who told him to come down, for a beginning, to the -deluge, he commenced so far back, and narrated so minutely, that he never -got chronologically down to the point before us. - -What is the question on which the Democracy are divided? Are we called -upon to settle what every body said from 1847 down to this date? Have the -Democracy divided on that? Have they divided on the resolutions of the -States in 1840, or 1844, or 1848? Have the Democracy undertaken to review -the position taken in 1854, that there should be a latitude of -construction upon a particular point of constitutional law while they did -await the decision of the Supreme Court? No, sir; the question is changed -from before to after the event; the call is on every man to come forward -now, after the Supreme Court has given all it could render upon a -political subject, and state that his creed is adherence to the rule thus -expounded in accordance with previous agreement. - -The Senator tells us that he will abide by the decision of the Supreme -Court; but it was fairly to be inferred, from what he said, that, in the -Dred Scott case, he held that they had only decided that a negro could not -sue in a Federal Court. Was this the entertainment to which we were -invited? Was the proclaimed boon of allowing the question to go to -judicial decision, no more than that, one after another, each law might be -tested, and that, one after another, each case, under every law, might be -tried, and that after centuries should roll away, we might hope for the -period when, every case exhausted, the decision of our constitutional -right and of the federal duty would be complete? Or was it that we were to -get rid of the controversy which had divided the country for thirty years; -that we were to reach a conclusion beyond which we could see the region of -peace; that tranquillity was to be obtained by getting a decision on a -constitutional question which had been discussed until it was seen that, -legislatively, it could not or would not be decided? If, then, the Supreme -Court has judicially announced that Congress can not prohibit the -introduction of slave property into a Territory, and that no one deriving -authority from Congress can do so, and the Senator from Illinois holds -that the inhabitants derive their power from the organic act of Congress, -what restrains his acknowledgment of our right to go into the Territories, -and his recognition of the case being closed by the opinion of the court? -I can understand how one who has followed to its logical consequences the -original doctrine of squatter sovereignty might still stand out, and say -this inherent right can not be taken away by judicial decision; but is not -one who claims to derive the power of the territorial legislation from a -law of Congress, and who finds the opinion of the court conclusive as to -Congress, and to all deriving their authority from it, estopped from any -further argument? - -Much of what the Senator said about the condition of public affairs can -only be regarded as the presentation of his own case, and requires no -notice from me. His witticism upon the honorable Senator, the Chairman of -the Committee on the Judiciary [Mr. Bayard], who is now absent, because of -the size of the State which he represents, reminds one that it was -mentioned as an evidence of the stupidity of a German, that he questioned -the greatness of Napoleon because he was born in the little island of -Corsica. I know not what views the Senator entertained when he measured -the capacity of the Senator from Delaware by the size of that State, or -the dignity of his action at Charleston by the number of his constituents. -If there be any political feature which stands more prominently out than -another in the Union, it is the equality of the States. Our stars have no -variant size; they shine with no unequal brilliancy. A Senator from -Delaware holds a position entitled to the same respect, as such, as the -Senator from any other State of the Union. More than that, the character, -the conduct, the information, the capacity of that Senator might claim -respect, if he was not entitled to it from his position. - -Twice on this occasion, and more than the same number of times heretofore, -has the Senator referred to the great benefit derived from that provision -which grants a trial in the local court, an appeal to the Supreme Court of -the Territory, and an appeal from thence to the Supreme Court of the -United States, on every question involving title to slaves. I wish to say -that whatever merit attaches to that belongs to a Senator to whom the -advocates of negro slavery have not often been in the habit of -acknowledging their obligations--the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. -Hale], who introduced it in 1850 as an amendment to the New Mexico Bill. -We adopted it as a fair proposition, equally acceptable upon one side and -the other. On its adoption, no one voted against it. That proposition was -incorporated in the Kansas Bill, but unless we acknowledge obligations to -the Senator from New Hampshire, how shall they be accorded for that to the -Senator from Illinois? - -I am asked whether the resolutions of the Senate can have the force of -law. Of course not. The Senate, however, is an independent member of the -Government, and from its organization should be peculiarly watchful of -State rights. Before the meeting of the Charleston Convention, it was -untruly stated that these resolutions were concocted to affect the action -of the Charleston Convention. Now we are asked if they are to affect the -Baltimore Convention. They were not designed for the one; they are not -pressed in view of the other. They were introduced to obtain an -expression of the opinion of the Senate, a proceeding quite frequent in -the history of this body. It was believed that they would have a -beneficial effect, and that they were stated in terms which would show the -public the error of supposing that there was a purpose on the part of the -Democracy, or of the South, to enact what was called a slave code for the -Territories of the United States. It was believed that the assertion of -sound principles at this time would direct public opinion, and might be -fruitful of such reuniting, harmonizing results as we all desire, and -which the public need. Whether it is to have this effect or not; whether -at last we are to be shorn of our national strength by personal or -sectional strife, depends upon the conduct of those who have it in their -power to control the result. The Democratic party, in its history, -presents a high example of nationality; its power and its usefulness has -been its co-extension with the Union. The Democrats of the Northern States -who vote for these resolutions, but affirm that which we have so often -announced with pride, that there was a political opinion which pervaded -the whole country; there was a party capable to save the Union, because it -belonged to all the States. If the two Democratic Senators who alone have -declared their opposition should so vote, to that extent the effect would -be impaired, and they will stand in that isolation to which the Senator -points as a consequence so dreadful to the Southern men at Charleston. - - [Here Mr. Davis gave way for a motion to adjourn, and on the 17th - resumed.] - -MR. DAVIS. At the close of the session of yesterday, I was speaking of the -hope entertained that the Democratic party would yet be united; that the -party which had so long wielded the destinies of the country, for its -honor, for its glory, and its progress, was not about to be checked midway -in its career--to be buried in a premature grave; but that it was to go -on, with concentrated energy, toward the great ends for which it has -striven since 1800, by a long pull, and a strong pull, and a pull -altogether, to bring the ship of State into that quiet harbor where - - "Vessels safe, without their hawsers, ride." - -This was a hope, however, not founded on any supposition that we were to -escape from the issues which are presented--a hope not based on the -proposition that every man should have his own construction of our creed, -and that we should unite together merely for success; but that the party, -as heretofore, in each succeeding quadrennial convention, would add to the -resolutions of the preceding one such declarations as passing events -indicated, and the exigencies of the country demanded. - -In the last four years a division has arisen in the Democratic party, upon -the construction of one of the articles of its creed. It behooves us, in -that state of the case, to decide what the true construction is; for, if -the party be not a union of men upon principle, the sooner it is dissolved -the better; and if it be such a union, why shall not those principles be -defined, so as to remove doubt or cavil, and be applied in every emergency -to meet the demands of each succeeding case? Thus only can we avoid -division in council and confusion in action. - -The Senator from Illinois, who preceded me, announced that he had -performed a pleasing duty in defending the Democratic party. That party -might well cry out, Save me from my defender. It was a defense of the -party by the arraignment of its prominent members. It was the preservation -of the body by the destruction of its head--for the President of the -United States is, for the time being, the head of the party that placed -him in position; and the head of the party thus in position can not be -destroyed without the disintegration of the members and the destruction of -the body itself. I suppose the Senator, however, was at his favorite -amusement of "shooting at the lump." The "lump" heretofore has been those -Democratic Senators who dissented from him: this time he involved -Democrats all over the country. Not even the presiding officer, whose -position seals his lips, could escape him. And here let me say that I -found nothing in the extract read from that gentleman's address, which, -construed as was no doubt intended, does not meet my approval; but if -tried by the modern lexicon of the Senator, it might be rendered a -contradiction to his avowed opinions, and by the same mode of expounding, -non-intervention would be a sin of which the whole Democracy might be -convicted, under the indictment of squatter sovereignty. The language -quoted from the address of the Vice-President is to be construed as -understood at the time, at the place, and by men such as the one who used -it. - -With that force which usually enters into his addresses--with even more -than his usual eloquence--the Senator referred to the scene which awaited -him upon his return to Chicago, when, as represented, he met an infuriated -mob, who assailed him for having maintained the measures of 1850--those -compromises which, in the Northern section, it was urged had been passed -in the interest of the South. But, pray, what one of those measures was it -which excited the mob so described? Only one, I believe, was put in issue -at the North--the fugitive slave law; that one he did not vote for. But it -was the part of manliness to say that, though absent and not voting for -it, he approved of it. Such, I believe, was his commendable course on that -occasion. I give him, therefore, all due credit for not escaping from a -responsibility to which they might not have held him. Are we to give -perpetual thanks to any one because he did not yield to so senseless a -clamor, but conceded to us that small measure of constitutional -right--because he has complied with a requirement so plain that my regret -is that it ever required congressional intervention to enforce it? It -belonged to the honor of the States to execute that clause of the -Constitution. They should have executed it without congressional -intervention; congressional action should only have been useful to give -that uniformity of proceeding which State action could not have secured. - -Concurring in the depicted evil of the destruction of the Democratic -organization, it must be admitted that such consequence is the inevitable -result of a radical difference of principle. The Senator laments the -disease, but instead of healing, aggravates it. While pleading the evils -of the disruption of the party, it is quite apparent that, in his mind, -there is another still greater calamity; for, through all his arraignment -of others, all his self-laudation, all his complaints of persecution, like -an air through its variations, appears and re-appears the action of the -Charleston Convention. That seemed to be the beginning and the end of his -solicitude. The oft-told tale of his removal from the chairmanship of the -Committee on Territories had to be renewed and connected with that -convention, and even assumed as the basis on which his strength was -founded in that convention. I think the Senator did himself injustice. I -think his long Career and distinguished labors, his admitted capacity for -good hereafter, constitute a better reason for the support which he -received, than the fact that his associates in the Senate had not chosen -to put him in a particular position in the organization of this body. It -is enough that that fact did not divert support from him; and I am aware -of none of his associates here who have forced it upon public attention -with a view to affect him. - -He claims that an arraignment made against his Democracy has been answered -by the action of a majority of the Convention at Charleston; and then -proceeds to inform the minority men that he would scorn to be the -candidate of a party unless he received a majority of its votes. There was -no use in making that declaration; it requires not only a majority, but, -under our ruling, a vote of two-thirds, for a nomination. It was -unnecessary for any body to feel scorn toward that which he could not -receive. Other unfortunate wights might mourn the event; it belonged to -the Senator from Illinois to scorn it. The remark of Mr. Lowndes, which -has been so often quoted, and which, beautiful in itself, has acquired -additional value by time, that the Presidency was an office neither to be -sought nor declined, has no application, therefore, to the Senator, for, -under certain contingencies, he says he would decline it. It does not -devolve on me to decide whether he has sought it or not. - -But, sir, what is the danger which now besets the Democratic party? Is it, -as has been asserted, the doctrine of intervention by Congress, and is -that doctrine new? Is the idea that protection, by Congress, to all rights -of person or property, wherever it has jurisdiction, so dangerous that, in -the language employed by the Senator, it would sweep the Democratic party -from the face of the earth? For what was our Government instituted? Why -did the States confer upon the Federal Government the great functions -which it possesses? For protection--mainly for protection beyond the -municipal power of the States. I shall have occasion, in the progress of -my remarks, to cite some authority, and to trace this from a very early -period. I will first, however, notice an assault which the Senator has -thought proper to make upon certain States, one of which is, in part, -represented by myself. He says they are seceders, bolters, because they -withdrew from a party convention when it failed to announce their -principles. There can be no tie to bind me to a party beyond my will. I -will admit no bond that holds me to a party a day longer than I agree to -its principles. When men meet together to confer, and ascertain whether or -not they do agree, and find that they differ--radically, essentially, -irreconcilably differ--what belongs to an honorable position except to -part? They can not consistently act together any longer. It devolves upon -them frankly to announce the difference, and each to pursue his separate -course. - -The letter of Mr. Yancey--acknowledged to be a private letter, an -unguarded letter, but which, somehow or other, got into the press--was -read to sustain this general accusation against what are called the Cotton -States. I do not pretend to judge how far the Senator has the right here -to read a private letter, which, without the authority of the writer, has -gone into the public press. It is one of those questions which every man's -sense of propriety must, in his own case, decide. Whether or not the use -of that letter was justifiable, how is it to be assumed that the Southern -States are bound by any opinion there enunciated? How to be asserted that -we, the residents in those States, have pinned our faith to the sleeve of -any man, and that we will follow his behest, no matter whither he may go? -But was this the only source of information, or was the impression -otherwise sustained? Did Mr. Yancey, in his speech delivered at -Charleston, justify the conclusions which the Senator draws from this -letter? Did he admit them to be correct? There he might have found the -latest evidence, and the best authority. Speaking to that point, Mr. -Yancey said: - - "It has been charged, in order to demoralize whatever influence we - might be entitled to, either from our personal or political - characteristics, or as representatives of the State of Alabama, that - we are disruptionists, disunionists _per se_; that we desire to break - up the party in the State of Alabama--to break up the party of the - Union, and to dissolve the Union itself. Each and all of these - allegations, come from what quarter they may, I pronounce to be false. - There is no disunionist, that I know of, in the delegation from the - State of Alabama. There is no disruptionist that I know of; and if - there are factionists in our delegation, they could not have got in - there, with the knowledge upon the part of our State Convention that - they were of so unenviable a character. We come here with two great - purposes: first, to save the constitutional rights of the South, if it - lay in our power to do so. We desire to save the South by the best - means that present themselves to us; and the State of Alabama believes - that the best means now in existence is the organization of the - Democratic party, if we shall be able to persuade it to adopt the - constitutional basis upon which we think the South alone can be - saved." - -He further says: - - "We have come here, then, with the twofold purpose of saving the - country and saving the Democracy; and if the Democracy will not lend - itself to that high, holy, and elevated purpose; if it can not elevate - itself above the mere question of how perfect shall be its mere - personal organization, and how wide-spread shall be its mere voting - success, then we say to you, gentlemen, mournfully and regretfully, - that, in the opinion of the State of Alabama, and, I believe, of the - whole South, you have failed in your mission, and it will be our duty - to go forth, and make an appeal to the loyalty of the country to stand - by that Constitution which party organizations have deliberately - rejected." [Applause.] - -Mr. Yancey answers for himself. It was needless to go back to old letters. -Here were his remarks delivered before the convention, speaking to the -point in issue, and answering both as to his purposes and as to the -motives of those with whom he conferred and acted. - -The Senator next cited the resolutions of the State of Alabama; and here -he seemed to rest the main point in his argument. The Senator said that -Alabama, in 1856, had demanded of the Democratic convention, -non-intervention, and that, in 1860, she had retired from the convention -because it insisted upon non-intervention. He read one of the resolutions -of the Alabama Convention of 1856; but the one which bore upon the point -was not read. The one which was conclusive as to the position of Alabama -then, and its relation to her position now, was exactly the one that was -omitted--I read from the resolutions of this year--was as follows: - - "_Resolved, further_, That we re-affirm so much of the first - resolution of the platform adopted in the convention by the Democracy - of this State, on the 8th of January, 1856, as relates to the subject - of slavery, to-wit." - -It then goes on to quote from that resolution of 1856, as follows: - - "The unqualified right of the people of the slaveholding States to - the protection of their property in the States, in the Territories, - and in the wilderness, in which territorial governments are as yet - unorganized." - -That was the resolution of 1856; and like it was one of February, 1848: - - "That it is the duty of the General Government by all proper - legislation, to secure an entry into those Territories to all the - citizens of the United States, together with their property, of every - description; and that the same shall be protected by the United - States, while the Territories are under its authority." - -So stands the record of that State which is now held responsible for -retiring, and is alleged to have withdrawn because she received now what, -in former times, she had demanded as the full measure of her rights. Did -she receive it? The argument could only be made by concealing the fact -that her resolutions of 1848 and 1856 asserted the right to protection, -and claimed it from the General Government. What, then, is the necessary -inference? That, in the Cincinnati platform, they believed they obtained -that which they asserted, or that which necessarily involved it. So much -for the point of faith; so much for the point of consistency in the -assertion of right. But if it were otherwise; if they had neglected to -assert a right; would that destroy it? If they had failed at some time to -claim this protection, are they to be estopped, in all time to come, from -claiming it? Constitutional right is eternal--not to be sacrificed by any -body of men. A single man may revive it at any period of the existence of -the Constitution. So the argument would be worthless, if the facts were as -stated. That they are not so stated, is shown by the record. - -Here allow me to say, in all sincerity, that I dislike thus to speak about -conventions; it does not belong to the duties of the Senate; we did not -assemble here to make a President, except in the single contingency of a -failure by the people and by the House of Representatives to elect. When -that contingency arrives, the question will be before us. I am sorry that -it should have been prematurely introduced. But since the action of the -recent convention at Charleston is presented as the basis of argument, it -may be as well to refer to it, and see what it is. The majority report, -presented by seventeen States of the Union, and those the States most -reliable to give Democratic votes--the States counted so certain to give -Democratic votes that they have been regarded as a fixed basis, a nucleus -to which others were to be attracted--these seventeen States reported to -the convention a series of resolutions, one of which asserted the right to -protection. A minority of States reported another series, excluding the -avowal of the right--not exactly denying it, but not avowing it--and a -second minority report was submitted, being the Cincinnati platform, pure -and simple. It is true that a majority of delegates adopted the minority -report, but not a majority of States, nor does it appear, by an analysis -of the votes, and the best evidence I have been able to obtain, that it -was by a majority of delegates, if each had been left to his own choice; -but that, by one of those ingenious arrangements--one of those incidents -which, among jurists, is described as the favor the vigilant receives from -the law--it so happened that, in certain States, the delegates were -instructed to vote as a unit; in other States they were not; so that, -wherever they were instructed to vote as a unit, the vote must so be cast, -and wherever they were not, they might disintegrate. Thus minorities were -bound in one instance, and released in another; and, by a comparison made -by those who had an opportunity to know, it appears that the minority -report could not have got a majority of the delegates, if each delegate -had been permitted to cast his own vote in the Convention. Neither could -it have obtained, as appears by the action of the committee, in a majority -of the States, if they had been spoken as such. So that this vaunt as to -the effect of the adoption of the platform by a majority, seems to have -very little of substance in it. Again, I find that, after this adoption -of a platform, a delegate from Tennessee offered a resolution: - - "That all the citizens of the United States have an equal right to - settle, with their property, in the Territories of the United States; - and that, under the decision of the Supreme Court of the United - States, which we recognize as a correct exposition of the Constitution - of the United States, neither their rights of person or property can - be destroyed or impaired by congressional or territorial legislation." - -It does not appear that a vote was taken on it. There is a current belief -that it would have been adopted. If it had been, it would have been an -acknowledgment by the Democracy, in convention assembled, that the -question had been settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court. But in -the progress of the convention, when they came to balloting, it appears, -by an analysis of the vote for candidates, that the Senator from Illinois -received from seventeen undoubted Democratic States of the Union, casting -one hundred and twenty-seven electoral votes, but eleven votes. It is not -such a great triumph, then, in the Democratic view, as is claimed. It does -not suffice to add up the number of votes where they do not avail. It is -not fair to bring the votes of Vermont, where I believe nobody expects we -shall be successful, and count them for a particular candidate. The -electoral votes--and these alone, tell upon the result; and it appears -that in those States which have been counted certain to cast their -electoral votes for the candidate who might have been nominated at that -convention, the Senator received but eleven. This is but meagre claim to -bind us to his car as the successful champion of the majority. This is but -small basis for the boast that his hopes were gratified, that he would not -receive the nomination unless sustained by a majority of the party, and -that his opinions had received the indorsement of the Democracy. - -My devotion to the party is life-long. If the assertion be allowable, it -may be said that I inherited my political principles. I derive them from a -revolutionary father--one of the earnest friends of Mr. Jefferson; who, -after the revolution which achieved our independence, bore his full part -in the civil revolution of 1800, which emancipated us from federal -usurpation and consolidation. I therefore have all that devotion to party -which belongs to habitual reverence and confidence. But, sir, that -devotion to party rests on the assumption that it is to maintain sound -principles; that it is to strive hereafter, as heretofore, to carry out -the great cardinal creed in which the Democratic party was founded. When -the resolutions of 1798 and 1799 are discarded; when we fly from the -extreme of monarchy to land in the danger to republics, anarchy, and the -Democratic party says its arm is paralyzed--can not be raised to maintain -constitutional rights, my devotion to its organization is at an end. It -fails thenceforward in the purposes for which it was established; and if -there be a constitutional party in the land which, in the language of Mr. -Jefferson, would find in the vigor of the Federal Government the best hope -for our liberty and security, to that party I should attach myself -whenever that sad contingency arose. - -The resolutions of 1798 and 1799, though directed against usurpation, were -equally directed against the dangers of anarchy. Their principles are -alike applicable to both. Their cardinal creed was a Federal Government, -according to the grants conferred upon it, and these righteously -administered. It is not fair to the men who taught us the lessons of -Democracy that they should be held responsible for a theory which leaves -the Federal Government, as one who has abdicated all authority, to stand -at the mercy of local usurpations. Least of all does their teaching -maintain that this Government has no power over the Territories; that this -Government has no obligation to protect the rights of person and property -in the Territories; for, among the first acts under the Constitution, was -one which both asserted and exercised the power. - -After the adoption of the Constitution, in 1789, an act was passed, to -which reference is frequently made as being a confirmation of the -ordinance of 1787; and this has been repeated so often that it has -received general belief. There was a constitutional provision which -required all obligations and engagements under the confederation to hold -good under the Constitution. If there was an obligation or an engagement -growing out of the ordinance of 1787, out of the deed of cession by -Virginia, it was transmitted to the Government established under the -Constitution; but that Congress under the Constitution gave it no -vitality--that they added no force to it, is apparent from the fact which -is so often relied upon as authority. It was in view of this fact, in full -remembrance of this and of other facts connected with it, that Mr. Madison -said, in relation to passing regulations for the Territories, that -"Congress did not regard the interdiction of slavery among the needful -regulations contemplated by the Constitution, since, in none of the -territorial governments created by them, was such an interdict found." I -am aware that Justice McLean has viewed this as an historical error of Mr. -Madison. I shall not assume to decide between such high authorities. The -act is as follows: - - "_An Act to provide for the government of the Territory north-west of - the Ohio River._ - - "WHEREAS, In order that the ordinance of the United States in Congress - assembled, for the government of the territory north-west of the river - Ohio, may continue to have full effect, it is requisite that certain - provisions should be made so as to adapt the same to the present - Constitution of the United States. - - "SECTION 1. _Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives - of the United States of America in Congress assembled_, That, in all - cases in which, by the said ordinance, any information is to be given, - or communication made, by the governor of the said Territory to the - United States in Congress assembled, or to any of their officers, it - shall be the duty of the said governor to give such information, and - to make such communication, to the President of the United States; and - the President shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent - of the Senate, shall appoint all officers which, by the said - ordinance, were to have been appointed by the United States in - Congress assembled; and all officers so appointed shall be - commissioned by him; and in all cases where the United States in - Congress assembled might, by the said ordinance, make any commission, - or remove from any office, the President is hereby declared to have - the same powers to revocation and removal. - - "SEC. 2. _And be it further enacted_, That in the case of the death, - removal, resignation, or necessary absence of the governor of the said - Territory, the secretary thereof shall be, and he is hereby authorized - and required to execute all the powers and perform all the duties of - the governor during the vacancy occasioned by the removal, - resignation, or necessary absence of the said governor. - - "Approved August 7, 1789." - -All that is to be found in this act which favors the supposition and -frequent assertion that, under the Constitution, the ordinance of 1787 was -ratified and confirmed is to be found in the preamble, and that preamble -so vaguely alludes to it that the idea is refuted by reference to an act -which followed soon afterwards--the act of 1793--from which I will read a -single section: - - "SEC. 3. _And be it further enacted_, That when a person held to labor - in any of the United States, or in either of the Territories on the - north-west or south of the river Ohio, under the laws thereof, shall - escape into any other of the said States or Territories, the person to - whom such service or labor may be due, his agent, or attorney, is - hereby empowered to seize or arrest such fugitive from labor," etc. - -Is it not apparent that, when the Congress legislated in 1793, they -recognized the existence of slavery and protected that kind of property in -the territory north-west of the river Ohio, and is it not conclusive that -they did not intend, by the act of 1789, to confirm, ratify, and give -effect to the ordinance of 1787, which would have excluded it? - -This doctrine of protection, then, is not new. It goes back to the -foundation of the Government. It is traceable down through all the early -controversies; and they arose at least as early as 1790. It is found in -the messages of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison, and in the legislation of -Congress; and also in the messages of the elder Adams. There was not one -of the first four Presidents of the United States who did not recognize -this obligation of protection, who did not assert this power on the part -of the Federal Government; and not one of them ever attempted to pervert -it to a power to destroy. If division in the Democratic party is to arise -now, because of this doctrine, it is not from the change by those who -assert it, but of those who deny it. It is not from the introduction of a -new feature in the theory of our Government, but from the denial of that -which was recognized in its very beginning. - -As I understood the main argument of the Senator, it was based upon the -general postulate that the Democratic Convention of 1848 recognized a new -doctrine, a doctrine which inhibited the General Government from -interfering in any way, either for the protection of property or -otherwise, with the local affairs of a Territory; he held the party -responsible for all the opinions entertained by the candidate in 1848, -because the party had nominated him, and he quoted the record to show what -States, by voting for him, had committed themselves to the doctrine of the -"Nicholson letter." He even quoted South Carolina, represented by that man -who became famous for a single act, and, as South Carolinians said, -without authority at home to sustain it. But this was cited as pledging -the faith of South Carolina to the doctrine of the "Nicholson letter;" -and, worse than all, the Senator did this, though he knew that the -doctrine of the "Nicholson letter" was the subject of controversy for -years subsequently; that, what was the true construction of that letter, -entered into the canvass in the Southern States; that the construction -which Mr. Cass himself placed upon it at a subsequent period was there -denied; and the Senator might have remembered, if he had chosen to -recollect so unimportant a thing, that I once had to explain to him, ten -years ago, the fact that I repudiated the doctrine of that letter at the -time it was published, and that the Democracy of Mississippi had well-nigh -crucified me for the construction which I placed upon it; there were men -mean enough to suspect that the construction I gave to the Nicholson -letter was prompted by the confidence and affection I felt for General -Taylor. At a subsequent period, however, Mr. Cass thoroughly reviewed it. -He uttered, for him, very harsh language against all who had doubted the -true construction of his letter, and he construed it just as I had done -during the canvass of 1848. It remains only to add that I supported Mr. -Cass, not because of the doctrine of the Nicholson letter, but in despite -of it; because I believed a Democratic President, with a Democratic -cabinet and Democratic counselors in the two houses of Congress, and he as -honest a man as I believed Mr. Cass to be, would be a safer reliance than -his opponent, who personally possessed my confidence as much as any man -living, but who was of and must draw his advisers from a party, the tenets -of which I believed to be opposed to the interests of the country as they -were to all my political convictions. - -I little thought at that time that my advocacy of Mr. Cass, upon such -grounds as these, or his support by the State of which I am a citizen, -would at any future day be quoted as an indorsement of the opinions -contained in the Nicholson letter, as those opinions were afterwards -defined. But it is not only upon this letter, but equally upon the -resolutions of the convention as constructive of that letter, that he -rested his argument. I will here say to the Senator that if, at any time, -I do him the least injustice, speaking as I do from such notes as I could -take while he progressed, I will thank him to correct me. - -But this letter entered into the canvass; there was a doubt about its -construction; there were men who asserted that they had positive authority -for saying that it meant that the people of a Territory could only exclude -slavery when the Territory should form a constitution and be admitted as a -State. This doubt continued to hang over the construction, and it was that -doubt alone which secured Mr. Cass the vote of Mississippi. If the true -construction had been certainly known he would have had no chance to get -it. Our majority went down from thousands to hundreds, as it was. In -Alabama the decrease was greater. It was not that the doctrine was -countenanced, but the doubt as to the true meaning of the letter, and the -constantly reiterated assertion that it only meant the Territories when -they should be admitted as States, enabled him to carry those States. - -But if I mistook the Senator there, I think probably I did not on another -point: that he claimed the support of certain Southern men for Mr. -Richardson as Speaker of the House to be by them an acknowledgment of the -doctrine of squatter sovereignty. - -I suppose those Southern men who voted for Mr. Richardson voted for him as -I did for Mr. Cass, in despite of his opinions on that question, because -they preferred Mr. Richardson to Mr. Banks, even with squatter -sovereignty. They considered that the latter was carrying an amount of -heresies which greatly exceeded the value of squatter sovereignty. It was -a choice of evils--not an indorsement of his opinions. Neither did they -this year indorse the opinions on that point of Mr. McClernand when they -voted for him. According to the Senator's argument I could show him that -Illinois was committed to the doctrine of federal protection to property -in the Territories and the remedy of secession as a State right; committed -irrevocably, unmistakably, with no right to plead any ignorance of the -political creed of the individual, or the meaning of his words. - -In 1852--I refer to it with pride--Illinois did me the honor to vote -consistently for me for the Vice-Presidency, up to the time of -adjournment; though in 1850, and in 1851, I had done all these acts which -have been spoken of, and the Senator has admitted my consistency, in -opinions which were avowed with at least such perspicuity as left nobody -in doubt as to my opinion. Did Illinois then adopt my theory of protection -in the Territories, or of the right of State secession? No, sir. I hold -them to no such consequences. Some of the old inhabitants of Illinois may -have remembered me when their northern frontier was a wilderness, when -they and I had kind relations in the face of hostile Indians. Some of them -may have remembered me, and, I believe, kindly, as associated with them, -at a later period, on the fields of Mexico. The Senator himself, I know, -remembered kindly his association with me in the halls of Congress. It was -these bonds which gave me the confidence of the State of Illinois. I never -misconstrued it. I never pretended to put them in the attitude of adopting -all my opinions. Never required it, never desired it, save as in so far as -wishing all men would agree with me, confidently believing my position to -be true. At a later period, and when these questions were more important -in the public mind, when public attention has been more directed to them, -when public opinion has been more matured, at the very time when the -Senator claims that his doctrine culminated, the State of Illinois voted -for a gentleman for Vice-President at Cincinnati who held the same -opinions with myself, or, if there was a difference, held them to a -greater extreme--I mean General Quitman. - -MR. DOUGLAS. We made no test on any one. - -MR. DAVIS. Then, how did the South become responsible for the doctrine of -General Cass, by consenting to his nomination in 1848, and supporting his -election? But at a later period, down to the present session, what is the -position in which the Senator places his friends--those sterling -Democrats, uncompromising Anti-Know-Nothings; men who give no quarter to -the American party, and yet who voted this year for Mr. Smith, of North -Carolina, to be Speaker of the House of Representatives. Is the Senator -answered? Does he not see that there is no justice in assuming a vote for -an individual to be the entire adoption of his opinions? - -He cited, in this connection, a resolution of 1848, as having been framed -to cover the doctrines of the Nicholson letter; and he claimed thus to -have shown that the convention not only understood it, but adopted it, and -made it the party creed, and that we were bound to it from that period -forward. He even had that resolution of 1848 read, in order that there -should be, at no future time, any question as to the principle which the -party then avowed; that it should be fixed as a starting point in all the -future progress of Democracy. I was surprised at the importance the -Senator attached to that resolution of 1848, because it was not new; it -was not framed to meet the opinions of the Nicholson letter, but came down -from a period as remote as 1840; was copied into the platform of 1844, and -again into that of 1848, being the expression which the condition of the -country in 1840 had induced--a declaration of opinion growing out of the -agitation in the two houses of Congress at that day, and the fearful -strides which antislavery was making, and which Mr. Calhoun had labored to -check by the declaration of constitutional truths, as set forth in his -Senate resolutions of 1837-'8. - -That there may be no mistake on this point, and particularly as the -Senator attached special importance to it, I will turn to the platform of -1840, and read from it, so that it shall be found to be-- - -MR. DOUGLAS. It is conceded. - -MR. DAVIS. The Senator concedes the fact, that the resolution of 1848 was -a copy of that of 1840, and with the concession falls his argument. The -platforms of 1840 and 1844 were re-affirmed in 1848; and, consequently, -the resolution of '48 being identical with that of '40, was not a -construction of the letter written in 1847. - -True to its instincts and to its practices, the Democratic party, from -time to time, continued to add to their "platform" whatever was needful -for action by the Government in the condition of the country. Thus, in -1844, they re-asserted the platform of 1840; and they added thereto, -because of a question then pending, that-- - - "The re-annexation of Texas, at the earliest practicable period, is a - great American measure, which the convention recommend to the cordial - support of the Democracy of the Union." - -In 1848 they re-adopted the resolutions of 1844; and were not a little -laughed at for keeping up the question of Texas after it had been annexed. -In 1852 a new question had arisen; the measures of 1850 had presented, -with great force to the public mind, the necessity for some expression of -opinion upon the disturbing questions which the measures of 1850 had been -designed to quiet. Therefore, in 1852, the party, true to its obligation -to announce its principles, and to meet issues as they arise, said: - - "_Resolved_, That the foregoing proposition (referring to the - resolution of 1848) covers, and was intended to embrace, the whole - subject of slavery agitation in Congress; and, therefore, the - Democratic party in the Union, standing on this national platform, - will abide by and adhere to a faithful execution of the act known as - the compromise measure, settled by the last Congress, the act for - reclaiming fugitives from labor included; which act, being designed to - carry out an express provision of the Constitution, can not, with - fidelity thereto, be repealed, or so changed as to destroy or impair - its efficacy. - - "_Resolved_, That the Democratic party will restrain all attempts at - renewing, in Congress or out of it, the agitation of the slave - question, under whatever shape or color the attempt may be made." - -This was the addition made in 1852, and it was made because of the -agitation which then prevailed through the country against the fugitive -slave act, and it was because the fugitive slave act, and that alone, was -assailed, that the Democratic convention met the issue on that measure -specifically, and for the same reason it received the approbation of the -Southern States. Had this been considered as the indorsement of the slave -trade bill for the District of Columbia, it would not have received their -approval. The agitation was in relation to recovering fugitive slaves, and -the Democratic party boldly and truly met the living issue, and declared -its position upon it. - -In 1856 other questions had arisen. It was necessary to meet them. The -convention did meet them, and met them in a manner which was satisfactory, -because it was believed to be full. I will not weary the Senate by reading -the resolutions of 1856; they are familiar to every body. I only quote a -portion of them: - - "The American Democracy recognize and adopt the principles contained - in the organic laws establishing the Territories of Kansas and - Nebraska as embodying the only sound and safe solution of the 'slavery - question' upon which the great national idea of the people of this - whole country can repose in its determined conservatism of the - Union--non-interference by Congress with slavery in State and - Territory, or in the District of Columbia. - - "That, by the uniform application of this Democratic principle to the - organization of Territories, and to the admission of new States, with - or without domestic slavery, as they may elect, the equal rights of - all States will be preserved intact, the original compacts of the - Constitution maintained inviolate, and the perpetuity and expansion of - this Union insured to its utmost capacity of embracing, in peace and - harmony, every future American State that may be constituted or - annexed with a republican form of government." - -Pray, what can this mean? Squatter sovereignty? Incapacity of the Federal -Government to enact any law for the protection of slave property anywhere? -Could that be in the face of a struggle that we were constantly carrying -on against the opponents of the fugitive slave law? Could that be, in the -face of the fact that a majority had trodden down our constitutional -rights in the District of Columbia, by legislating in relation to that -particular character of property, and that they had failed to redeem a -promise they had sacredly made to pass a law for the protection of slave -property, so as to punish any one who should seduce, or entice, or abduct -it from an owner in this District? - -With all these things fresh in mind, what did they mean? They meant that -Congress should not decide the question, whether that institution should -exist within a Territory or not. They did not mean to withdraw from the -inhabitants of the District of Columbia that protection to which they were -entitled, and which is almost annually given by legislation; and yet -States and Territories and the District of Columbia are all grouped -together, as the points upon which this idea rests, and to which it is -directed. It meant that Congress was not to legislate to interfere with -the rights of property anywhere; not to attempt to decide what should be -the institutions maintained anywhere; but surely not to disclaim the right -to protect property, whether on sea or on land, wherever the Federal -Government had jurisdiction and power. But some stress has been laid upon -the resolution, which says that this principle should be applied to - - "The organization of the Territories, and to the admission of new - States, with or without domestic slavery, as they may elect." - -What does "may elect" mean? Does it refer to organization of the -Territory? Who may elect? Congress organizes the Territories. Did it mean -that the Territories were to elect? It does not say so. What does it say? - - "That by the uniform application of this Democratic principle to the - organization of Territories, and to the admission of new States, with - or without domestic slavery, as they may elect." - -And here it met a question which had disturbed the peace of the country, -and well-nigh destroyed the Union--the right of a State holding slaves to -be admitted into the Union. It was declared here that the State so -admitted should elect whether it would or would not have slaves. There is -nothing in that which logically applies to the organization of a -Territory. But if this be in doubt, let us come to the last resolution, -which says: - - "We recognize the right of the people of all the Territories, - including Kansas and Nebraska, acting through the legally and - fairly-expressed will of a majority of actual residents--" - -Does it stop there? No-- - - "and whenever the number of their inhabitants justifies it, to form a - constitution, with or without domestic slavery, and be admitted into - the Union upon terms of perfect equality with the other States." - -If there had been any doubt before as to what "may elect" referred to, -this resolution certainly removed it. It is clear they meant, that when a -Territory had a sufficient number of inhabitants, and came to form a -constitution, then it might decide the question as it pleased. From that -doctrine, I know no Democrat who now dissents. - -I have thus, because of the assertion that this was a new idea attempted -to be interjected into the Democratic creed, gone over some portion of its -history. Important by its connection with the existing agitation, and last -in the series, is an act with the ushering in of which the Senator is more -familiar than myself, and on which he made remarks, to which, it is -probable, some of those who acted with him, will reply. I wish merely to -say, in relation to the Kansas-Nebraska act, that there are expressions in -it which seem to me not of doubtful meaning, such as, "in all cases -involving title to slaves, or involving the question of personal freedom," -there should be a trial before the courts, and without reference to the -amount involved, an appeal to the Supreme Court of the Territory, and from -thence to the Supreme Court of the United States. If there was no right of -property there; if we had no right to recognize it there; if some -sovereign was to determine whether it existed or not, why did we say that -the Supreme Court of the United States, in the last resort, should decide -the question? If it was an admitted thing, by that bill, that the -Territorial Legislature should decide it, why did we provide for taking -the case to the Supreme Court? If it had been believed then, as it is -asserted now, that a Territory possessed all the power of a State; that -the inhabitants of a Territory could meet in convention and decide the -question as the people of a State might do, there was nothing to be -carried to the Supreme Court. You can not appeal from the decision of a -constitutional convention of a State to the Supreme Court of the United -States, to decide whether slave property shall be prohibited or admitted -within the limits of a State; and if they rest on the same footing, what -is the meaning of that clause of the bill? - -But this organic law further provides, just as the resolution of the -convention had done, that when a legal majority of the residents of either -Territory formed a constitution, then, at their will, they might recognize -or exclude slavery, and come into the Union as co-equal States. This fixes -the period, defines the time at which the territorial inhabitants may -perform this act, and clearly forbids the idea that it was intended, by -those who enacted the law, to acknowledge that power to be existent in the -inhabitants of a Territory during their territorial condition. If I am -mistaken in this; if there was a contemporaneous construction of it -differing from this, the Senators who sit around me and who were then -members of the body, will not fail to remember it. - -The Senator asserts that, in relation to this point, those who acted with -him have changed, and claims for himself to have been consistent. If this -be so, it proves nothing as to the present, and only individual opinions -as to the past. I do not regard consistency as a very high virtue; -neither, it appears, does he; for he told us that if it could be shown to -him that he was in error on any point, he would change his opinion. How -could that be? Who would undertake to show the Senator that he was in -error? Who would undertake to measure the altitude of the Colossus who -bestrides the world, and announces for, and of, and by himself, "We, the -Democracy," as though, in his person, all that remained of the party was -now concentrated! Other men are permitted to change, because other men may -be mistaken; and if they are honest, when convicted of their error, they -must change, but how can one expect to convince the Senator, who, where -all is change, stands changeless still? - -In the course of his reply to me--if indeed it may be called such; it -seemed to be rather a review of every thing except what I had said--he set -me the bad example of going into the canvass in my own State. It is the -first, I trust it will be the last time, I shall follow his example; and -now only to the extent of the occasion, where criticism was invited by -unusual publicity. In the canvass which the Senator had with his opponent, -Mr. Lincoln, and the debates of which have been published in a book, we -find much which, if it be consistent with his course as I had known it, -only proves to me how little able I was to understand his meaning in -former times. - -The Kansas-Nebraska Bill having agreed the right for which I contend to be -the subject of judicial decision; it having specially provided the mode -and facilitated the process by which that right should be brought to the -courts and finally decided; not allowing any check to be interposed -because of amount, that bill having continued the provision which had been -introduced into the New Mexico Bill, how are we to understand the -Senator's declarations, that, let the Supreme Court decide as they may, -the inhabitants of a Territory may lawfully admit or exclude slavery as -they please? What a hollow promise was given to us in the provision -referring this vexed question to judicial decision, in order that we might -reach a point on which we might peacefully rest, if the inhabitants of the -Territories for which Congress had legislated could still decide the -question and set aside any decision of the Supreme Court, and do this -lawfully. I ask, was it not to give us a stone, when he promised us bread; -to incorporate a provision in the organic act securing the right of appeal -to the courts, if, as now stated, those courts were known to be powerless -to grant a remedy? - -Here there is a very broad distinction to be drawn between the power of -the inhabitants of a Territory, or of any local community, lawfully to do -a thing, and forcibly to do it. If the Senator had said, that whatever -might be the decision of the Supreme Court, whatever might be the laws of -Congress, whatever might be the laws of the Territories, in the face of an -infuriated mob, such as he described on another occasion, it would be -impossible for a man to hold a slave against their will, he would but have -avowed the truism that in our country the law waits upon public opinion. -But he says that they can do it lawfully. If his position had been such as -I have just stated, it would have struck me as the opinion I had always -supposed him to entertain. More than that, it would have struck me as the -opinion which no one could gainsay; which, at any time, I would have been -ready to admit. Nothing is more clear than that no law could prevail in -our country, where force, as a governmental mean, is almost unknown, -against a pervading sentiment in the community. Every body admits that; -and it was in that view of the case that this question has been so often -declared to be a mere abstraction. It is an abstraction so far as any one -would expect in security to hold against the fixed purpose and -all-pervading will of the community, whether territorial or other, a -species of property, ambulatory, liable, because it has mind enough to go, -to be enticed away whenever freed from physical restraint, and which would -be nearly valueless if so restrained. It may be an abstraction as a -practical question of pecuniary advantage, but it is not the less dear to -those who assert the constitutional right. It would constitute a very good -reason why no one should ever say there was an attempt to force slavery on -an unwilling people, but no reason why the right should not be recognized -by the Federal Government as one belonging to the equal privileges and -immunities of every citizen of the United States. - -But the main point of the Senator's argument--and it deserved to be so, -because it is the main question now in the public mind--was, what is the -meaning of non-intervention? He defined it to be synonymous with squatter -sovereignty, or with popular sovereignty.... - -The Senator and myself do not seem to be getting any nearer together; -because the very thing which he describes constitutes the only case in -which I would admit the necessity, and, consequently, the propriety of the -people acting without authority. If men were cast upon a desert island, -the sovereignty of which was unknown, over which no jurisdiction was -exercised, they would find themselves necessitated to establish rules -which should subsist between themselves; and so the people of California, -when the Congress failed to give them a government; when it refused to -enact a territorial law; when, paralyzed by the power of contending -factions, it left the immigrants to work their own unhappy way; they had a -right--a right growing out of the necessity of the case--to make rules for -the government of their local affairs. But this was not sovereignty. It -was the exercise, between man and man, of a social function necessary to -preserve peace in the absence of any controlling power--essential to -conserve the relations of person and property. The sovereignty, if it -existed in any organization or government of the world, remained there -still; and whenever that sovereignty extended itself over them, whether -shipwrecked mariners, or adventurous Americans--whether cast off by the -sea, or whether finding their weary way across the desert plains which -lie west of the Mississippi--whenever the hand of the Government holding -sovereign jurisdiction was laid upon them, they became subject; their -sovereign control of their own affairs ceased. In our case, the directing -hand of the Government is laid upon them at the moment of the enactment of -an organic law. Therefore, the very point at which the Senator begins his -sovereignty, is the point at which the necessity, and, in my view, the -claim ceases. - -But suppose that a territorial legislature, acting under an organic law, -not defining their municipal powers further than has been general in such -laws, should pass a law to exclude slave property, would the Senator vote -to repeal it? - -MR. DOUGLAS. I will answer. I would not, because the Democratic party is -pledged to non-intervention; because, furthermore, whether such an act is -constitutional or not is a judicial question. If it is unconstitutional, -the court will so decide, and it will be null and void without repeal. If -it is constitutional, the people have a right to pass it. If -unconstitutional, it is void, and the court will ascertain the fact; and -we pledged our honors to abide the decision.... - -MR. DAVIS. If it will not embarrass the Senator, I would ask him if, as -Chief Executive of the United States, he would sign a bill to protect -slave property in State, Territory, or District of Columbia--an act of -Congress? - -MR. DOUGLAS. It will be time enough for me, or any other man, to say what -bills he will sign, when he is in a position to exercise the power. - -MR. DAVIS. The Senator has a right to make me that answer. I was only -leading on to a fair understanding of the Senator and myself about -non-intervention.... - -I think it now appears that, in the minds of the gentlemen, -non-intervention is a shadowy, unsubstantial doctrine, which has its -application according to the circumstances of the case. It ceased to -apply when it was necessary to annul an act in Kansas in relation to the -political rights of the inhabitants. It had no application when it was -necessary to declare that the old French laws should not be revived in the -Territory of Kansas after the repeal of the Missouri Compromise; but it -rose an insurmountable barrier when we proposed to sweep away the Mexican -decrees, usages, or laws, and leave the Constitution and laws of the -United States unfettered in their operation in the Territory acquired from -Mexico. It thus seems to have a constantly varying application, and, as I -have not yet reached a good definition, one which quite satisfies me, I -must take it as I find it in the Senator's speech, in which he says -Alabama asserted the doctrine of non-intervention in 1856. The Alabama -resolutions of 1856 asserted the right to protection, and the duty of the -Federal Government to give it. So, if he stands upon the resolutions of -Alabama in 1856, non-intervention is very good doctrine, and exactly -agrees with what I believe--no assumption, by the Federal Government, of -any powers over the municipal territorial governments which is not -necessary; that the hand of Federal power shall be laid as lightly as -possible upon any territorial community; that its laws shall be limited to -the necessities of each case; that it shall leave the inhabitants as -unfettered in the determination of their local legislation as the rights -of the people of the States will permit, and the duty of the General -Government will allow. But when non-intervention is pressed to the point -of depriving the arm of the Federal Government of its one great function -of protection, then it is the doctrine which we denounce--which we call -squatter sovereignty; the renunciation by Congress, and the turning over -to the inhabitants a sovereignty which, rightfully, it does not belong to -the one to grant or the other to claim, and, further and worse, thus to -divest the Federal Government of a duty which the Constitution requires it -to perform. - -To show that this view is not new--that it does not rest singly on the -resolutions of Alabama, I will refer to a subject, the action upon which -has already been quoted in this debate--the Oregon Bill. During the -discussion of the Oregon Bill, I offered in the Senate, June 23, 1848, an -amendment which I will read: - - "_Provided_, That nothing contained in this act shall be so construed - as to authorize the prohibition of domestic slavery in said Territory, - whilst it remains in the condition of a Territory of the United - States." - -Upon this, I will cite the authority of Mr. Calhoun, in his speech on the -Oregon Bill, June 27, 1848: - - "The twelfth section of this bill is intended to assert and maintain - this demand of the non-slaveholding States, while it remains a - Territory, not openly or directly, but indirectly, by extending the - provisions of the bill for the establishment of the Iowa Territory to - this, and by ratifying the acts of the informal and self-constituted - government of Oregon, which, among others, contains one prohibiting - the introduction of slavery. It thus, in reality, adopts what is - called the Wilmot proviso, not only for Oregon, but, as the Bill now - stands, for New Mexico and California. The amendment, on the contrary, - moved by the Senator from Mississippi, near me [Mr. Davis], is - intended to assert and maintain the position of the slave-holding - States. It leaves the Territory free and open to all the citizens of - the United States, and would overrule, if adopted, the act of the - self-constituted Territory of Oregon, and the twelfth section, as far - as it relates to the subject under consideration. We have thus fairly - presented the grounds taken by the non-slave-holding and the - slave-holding States, or as I shall call them, for the sake of - brevity, the Northern and Southern States, in their whole extent, for - discussion."--_Appendix to Congressional Globe, Thirtieth Congress, - first Session_, p. 868. - -I will quote also one of the speeches which he made near the close of his -life, at a time when he was so far wasted by disease that it was necessary -for him to ask the Senator from Virginia, who sits before me [Mr. Mason], -to read the speech which his tameless spirit impelled him to compose, but -which he was physically unable to deliver; and once again he came to the -Senate chamber, when standing yet more nearly on the confines of death; he -rose, his heart failing in its functions, his voice faltered, but his will -was so strong that he could not realize that the icy hand was upon him, -and he erroneously thought he was oppressed by the weight of his overcoat. -True to his devotion to the principles he had always advocated, clinging, -to the last hour of his life, to the duty to maintain the rights of his -constituents, still he was here, and his honored, though feeble, voice was -raised for the maintenance of the great principle to which his life had -been devoted. From the speech I read as follows: - - "The plan of the administration can not save the Union, because it can - have no effect whatever towards satisfying the States composing the - Southern section of the Union, that they can, consistently with safety - and honor, remain in the Union. It is, in fact, but a modification of - the Wilmot proviso. It proposes to effect the same object--to exclude - the South from all territory acquired by the Mexican treaty. It is - well known that the South is united against the Wilmot proviso, and - has committed itself, by solemn resolutions, to resist should it be - adopted. Its opposition _is not to the name_, but that which it - _proposes to effect_. That, the Southern States hold to be - unconstitutional, unjust, inconsistent with their equality as members - of the common Union, and calculated to destroy irretrievably the - equilibrium between the two sections. These objections equally apply - to what, for brevity, I will call the executive proviso. There is no - difference between it and the Wilmot, except in the mode of effecting - the object; and in that respect, I must say that the latter is much - the least objectionable. It goes to its object openly, boldly, and - distinctly. It claims for Congress unlimited power over the - Territories, and proposes to assert it over the territories acquired - from Mexico by a positive prohibition of slavery. Not so the executive - proviso. It takes an indirect course, and, in order to elude the - Wilmot proviso, and thereby avoid encountering the united and - determined resistance of the South, it denies, by implication, the - authority of Congress to legislate for the Territories, and claims - the right as belonging exclusively to the inhabitants of the - Territories. But to effect the object of excluding the South, it takes - care, in the meantime, to let in immigrants freely from the Northern - States, and all other quarters, except from the South, which it takes - special care to exclude by holding up to them the danger of having - their slaves liberated under the Mexican laws. The necessary - consequence is to exclude the South from the Territories, just as - effectually as would the Wilmot proviso. The only difference, in this - respect, is, that what one proposes to effect directly and openly, the - other proposes to effect indirectly and covertly. - - "But the executive proviso is more objectionable than the Wilmot in - another and more important particular. The latter, to effect its - object, inflicts a dangerous wound upon the Constitution, by depriving - the Southern States, as joint partners and owners of the Territories, - of their rights in them; but it inflicts no greater wound than is - absolutely necessary to effect its object. The former, on the - contrary, while it inflicts the same wound, inflicts others equally - great, and, if possible, greater, as I shall next proceed to explain. - - "In claiming the right for the inhabitants, instead of Congress, to - legislate for the Territories, the executive proviso assumes that the - sovereignty over the Territories is vested in the former, or, to - express it in the language used in a resolution offered by one of the - Senators from Texas [General Houston, now absent], they 'have the same - inherent right of self-government as the people in the States.' The - assumption is utterly unfounded, unconstitutional, without example, - and contrary to the entire practice of the Government, from its - commencement to the present time, as I shall proceed to - show."--_Calhoun's Works_, vol. 4, p. 562. - -MR. DAVIS. I find that I must abridge, by abstaining from the reading of -extracts. When this question arose in 1820, Nathaniel Macon, by many -considered the wisest man of his day, held the proposed interference to be -unauthorized and innovative. In arguing against the Missouri Compromise, -as it was called--the attempt by Congress to prescribe where slaves might -or might not be held--the exercise, by the Federal Government north of a -certain point, of usurped power by an act of inhibition, Mr. Macon said -our true policy was that which had thus far guided the country in safety: -the policy of non-intervention. By non-intervention he meant the absence -of hostile legislation, not the absence of governmental protection. Our -doctrine on this point is not new, but that of our opponents is so. - -The Senator from Illinois assumes that the congressional acts of 1850 -meant no legislation in relation to slave property; while, in the face of -that declaration, stand the laws enacted in that year, and the promise of -another, which has not been enacted--laws directed to the question of -slavery and slave property; one even declaring, in certain contingencies, -as a penalty on the owner, the emancipation of his slave in the District -of Columbia. If no action upon the question was the prevailing opinion, -what does the legislation mean? Was it non-action in the District of -Columbia? Be it remembered, the resolution of the Cincinnati platform -says, "Non-interference, by Congress, with slavery in State and Territory, -or in the District of Columbia." They are all upon the same footing. - -Again, he said that the Badger amendment was a declaration of no -protection to slave property. The Badger amendment declares that the -repeal of the Missouri Compromise shall not revive the laws or usages -which preëxisted that compromise; and the history of the times, so far as -I understand it, is, that it intended to assure those gentlemen who feared -that the laws of France would be revived in the Territories of Kansas and -Nebraska, by the repeal of the act of 1820, and that they would be held -responsible for having, by congressional act, established slavery. The -Southern men did not desire Congress to establish slavery. It has been our -uniform declaration that we denied the power of the Federal Government -either to establish or prohibit it; that we claimed for it protection as -property recognized by the Constitution, and we claimed the right for it, -as property, to go, and to receive federal protection wherever the -jurisdiction of the United States is exclusive. We claim that the -Constitution of the United States, in recognizing this property, making it -the basis of representation, put it, not upon the footing which it holds -between foreign nations, but upon the basis of the compact or union of the -States; that, under the delegated grant to regulate commerce between the -States, it did not belong to a State; therefore, without breach of -contract, they can not, by any regulation, prohibit transit, and the -compact provided that they should not change the character of master and -slave in the case of a fugitive. Could Congress surrender, for the States -and their citizens, the claim and protection for those or other -constitutional rights, against invasion by a State? If not, surely it can -not be done in the case of a Territory, a possession of the States. The -word "protecting," in that amendment, referred to laws which -preëxisted--laws which it was not designed, by the Democrats, to revive -when they declared the repeal of the Missouri Compromise; and, therefore, -I think, did not affect the question of constitutional right and of -federal power and duty. - -In all these territorial bills we have the language "subject to the -Constitution;" that is to say, that the inhabitants are to manage their -local affairs in their own way, subject to the Constitution; which, I -suppose, might be rendered thus: "In their own way, provided their own way -shall be somebody else's way;" for "subject to the Constitution" means, in -accordance with an instrument with which the territorial inhabitants had -nothing to do; with the construction of which they were not concerned; in -the adoption of which they had no part, and in relation to which it has -sometimes been questioned whether they had any responsibility. My own -views, as the Senator is aware from previous discussions, (and it is -needless to repeat,) are that the Constitution is co-extensive with the -United States; that the designation includes the Territories, that they -are necessarily subject to the Constitution. But if they be subject to -the Constitution, and subject to the organic act, that is the language -used; that organic act being the law of Congress, that Constitution being -the compact of the States--the territorial inhabitants having no lot or -part in one or the other, save as they are imposed upon them--where is -their claim to sovereignty? Where is their right to do as they please? The -States have a compact, and the agent of the States gives to the -Territories a species of constitution in the organic act, which endures -and binds them until they throw off what the Senator on another occasion -termed the minority condition, and assume the majority condition as a -State. The remark to which I refer was on the bill to admit Iowa and -Florida into the Union. The Senator then said: - - "The father may bind the son during his minority, but the moment that - he (the son) attains his majority, his fetters are severed, and he is - free to regulate his own conduct. So, sir, with the Territories; they - are subject to the jurisdiction and control of Congress during - infancy, their minority; but when they attain their majority, and - obtain admission into the Union, they are free from all restraints and - restrictions, except such as the Constitution of the United States - imposes upon each and all of the States." - -This was the doctrine of territorial sovereignty--perhaps that is the -phrase--at that period. At a later period, in March, 1856, the Senator -said: - - "The sovereignty of a Territory remains in abeyance, suspended in the - United States in trust for the people, until they shall be admitted - into the Union as a State. In the meantime, they are admitted to enjoy - and exercise all the rights and privileges of self-government, in - subordination to the Constitution of the United States, and in - obedience to the organic law passed by Congress in pursuance of that - instrument." - -If it be admitted--and I believe there is no issue between the Senator and -myself on that point--that the Congress of the United States have no -right to pass a law excluding slaves from a Territory, or determining in -the Territory the relation of master and slave, of parent and child, of -guardian and ward; that they have no right anywhere to decide what is -property, but are only bound to protect such rights as preëxisted the -formation of the Union--to perform such functions as are intrusted to them -as the agent of the States--then how can Congress, thus fettered, confer -upon a corporation of its creation--upon a territorial legislature, by an -organic act, a power to determine what shall be property within the limits -of such Territory? - -But, again, if it were admitted that the territorial inhabitants did -possess this sovereignty: that they had the right to do as they pleased on -all subjects, then would arise the question, if they were authorized, -through their representatives, thus to act, whence came the opposition to -what was called the Lecompton Constitution? How did Congress, under this -state of facts, get the right to inquire whether those representatives in -that case really expressed the will of the people. Still more; how did -Congress get the right to decide that those representatives must submit -their action to a popular vote in a manner not prescribed by the people of -the Territory, however eminently it may have been advisable, convenient, -and proper in the judgment of the Congress of the United States? What -revisory function had we, if they, through their representatives, had full -power to act on all such subjects whatsoever? - -I have necessarily, in answering the Senator, gone somewhat into the -_argumentum ad hominem_. Though it is not entirely exhausted, I think -enough has been said to show the Senate in what the difference between us -consists. If it be necessary further to illustrate it, I might ask how did -he propose to annul the organic act for Utah, if the recognition by the -Congress of a sufficient number of inhabitants to justify the organization -of a territorial government transferred the sovereignty to the -inhabitants of the Territory? If sovereignty passed by the recognition of -the fact, how did he propose, by congressional act, to annul the -territorial existence of Utah? - -It is this confusion of ideas, it is this confounding of terms, this -changing of language, this applying of new meanings to words, out of -which, I think, a large portion of the dispute arises. For instance, it is -claimed that President Pierce, in using the phrase "existing and incipient -States," meant to include all Territories, and thus that he had bound me -to a doctrine which precluded my strictures on what I termed squatter -sovereignty. This all arises from the misuse of language. An incipient -State, according to my idea, is the territorial condition at the moment it -changes into that of a State. It is when the people assemble in convention -to form a constitution as a State, that they are in the condition of an -incipient State. Various names were applied to the Territories at an -earlier period. Sometimes they were called "new States," because they were -expected to be States; sometimes they were called "States in embryo," and -it requires a determination of the language that is employed before it is -possible to arrive at any conclusion as to the differences of -understanding between gentlemen. Therefore, it was, and, I think, very -properly, (but not, as the Senator supposed, to catechise him,) that I -asked him what he meant by non-intervention, before I commenced these -remarks. - -In the same line of errors was the confusion which resulted in his -assuming that the evils I described as growing out of his doctrine on the -plains of Kansas, were a denunciation, on my part, of the bill called the -Kansas-Nebraska Bill. At the time that bill passed, I did not foresee all -the evils which have resulted from the doctrine based upon it, but which I -do not think the bill sustains. I am not willing now to turn on those who -were in a position which compelled them to act, made them responsible, and -to divest myself of any responsibility which belongs to any opinion I -entertained. I will not seek to judge after the fact and hold the measure -up against those who had to judge before. Therefore I will frankly avow -that I should have sustained that bill if I had been in the Senate; but I -did not foresee or apprehend such evils as immediately grew up on the -plains of Kansas. I looked then, as our fathers had looked before, to the -settlement of the question of what institutions should exist there, as one -to be determined by soil and climate, and by the pleasure of those who -should voluntarily go into the country. Such, however, was not the case. -The form of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill invited to a controversy--not -foreseen. I was not charging the Senator with any responsibility for it, -but the variation of its terms invited contending parties to meet on the -plains of Kansas, and had well-nigh eventuated in civil war. The great -respect which even the most lawless of those adventurers in Kansas had for -the name and the laws of the United States, served, by the timely -interposition of the Federal force and laws, to restrain the excited -masses and prevented violence from assuming larger proportions than -combats between squads of adventurers. - -This brings me in the line of rejoinder, to the meaning of the phrase, -"the people of a Territory, like those of a State, should decide for -themselves," etc., the language quoted against the President in the -remarks of the Senator. This, it was announced, was squatter sovereignty -in its broadest sense; and it was added, that the present Executive was -elected to the high office he holds on that construction of the platform. -Now, I do not know how it is that the Senator has the power to decide why -the people voted for a candidate. I rather suppose, among the many -millions who did vote, there must have been a variety of reasons, and that -it is not in the power of any one man to declare what determined the -result. But waiving that, is it squatter sovereignty in its broadest -sense? Is it a declaration that the inhabitants of a Territory can -exercise all the powers of a State? It says that, "like the people of a -State," they may decide for themselves. Then how do the people of a State -decide the question of what shall be property within the State? Every one -knows that it is by calling a convention, and that the people, represented -in convention, and forming a constitution their fundamental law, do this. -Every one knows that, under the constitutions and bills of rights which -prevail in the republican States of this Union, no legislature is invested -with that power. If this be the mode which is prescribed in the -States--the modes which the States must pursue--I ask you, in the name of -common sense, can the language of the President be construed to mean that -a territorial legislature may do what it is admitted the legislature of a -State can not; or that the inhabitants of a Territory can assemble a -convention, and form a fundamental law overriding the organic act, to -which the Senator has already acknowledged they stand subject until they -be admitted as a State? - -We of the South, I know, are arraigned, and many believe justly, for -starting a new question which distracts the Democratic party. I have -endeavored, therefore, to show that it is not new. I have also asserted, -what I think is clear, that if it were new, but yet a constitutional -right, it is not only our province, but our duty to assert it--to assert -it whenever or wherever that right is controverted. It is asserted now -with more force than at a former period, for the simple reason that it is -now denied, to an extent which has never been known before. We do not -seek, in the cant language of the day, to force slavery on an unwilling -people. We know full well there is no power to do it; and our limited -observation has not yet made us acquainted with the man who was likely to -have a slave forced upon him, or who could get one without paying a very -high price for him. He must first have the will, and, secondly, he must -put money in his purse to enable him to get one. They are too valuable -among those by whom they are now owned, to be forced upon any body. Not -admitting the correctness of the doctrine which the Senator promulgated -in his magazine article in relation to a local character of slave -property, I recognise the laws of nature, and that immigration will follow -in the lines where any species of labor may be most profitably employed; -all, therefore, we have asked--fulfillment of the original compact of our -fathers--was that there should be no discrimination; that all property -should be equally protected; that we should be permitted to go into every -portion of the United States save where some sovereign power has said -slaves shall not be held, and to take with us our slave property in like -manner as we would take any other; no more than that. For that, our -Government has contended on the high seas against foreign powers. That has -entered into our negotiations, and has been recognized by every government -against whom a claim has been asserted. Where our property was captured on -the land during the period of an invasion, Great Britain, by treaty, -restored it, or paid for it. Wherever it has suffered loss on the high -seas, down to a very recent period, we have received indemnity; and where -we have not, it was only because the power and duty of the Federal -Government was sacrificed to this miserable strife in relation to -property, with the existence of which, those making the interference had -no municipal connection, or moral responsibility. - -I do not admit that sovereignty necessarily exists in the Federal -Government or in a territorial government. I deny the Senator's -proposition, which is broadly laid down, of the necessity which must exist -for it in the one place or the other. I hold that sovereignty exists only -in a State, or in the United States in their associated capacity, to whom -sovereignty may be transferred, but that their agent is incapable of -receiving it, and, still more, of transferring it to territorial -inhabitants. - -I was sorry for some of the remarks which he thought it necessary to make, -as to the position of the South on this question, and for his assertion -that the resolutions of the convention of 1848 put the pro-slavery men -and the Abolitionists on the same ground. I think it was altogether -unjust. I did not think it quite belonged to him to make it. I was aware -that his opponent, in that canvass to which I referred, had made a -prophecy that he was, sooner or later, to land in the ranks of the -Republicans. Even if I had believed it, I would not have chosen--and it is -due to candor to say I do not believe----.... - -MR. DAVIS. Well, it is unimportant. I feel myself constrained, because I -promised to do it, to refer to some portion of the joint record of the -Senator and myself in 1850, or, as I have consumed so much time, I would -avoid it. In that same magazine article, to which I have referred, the -Senator took occasion to refer to some part which I had taken in the -legislation of 1850; and I must say he presented me unfairly. He put me in -the attitude of one who was seeking to discriminate, and left himself in -the position of one who was willing to give equal protection to all kinds -of property. In that magazine article the Senator represents Mr. Davis, of -Mississippi, as having endeavored to discriminate in favor of slave -property, and Mr. Chase, of Ohio, as having made a like attempt against -it; and he leaves himself, by his argument, in the attitude of one who -concurred with Mr. Clay in opposition to both propositions. - -I offered an amendment to the compromise bill of 1850, which was to strike -out the words "in respect to," and insert "and introduce or exclude," and -after the word "slavery" to insert the following: - - "_Provided_, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to - prevent said territorial legislature passing such laws as may be - necessary for the protection of the rights of property of any kind - which may have been or may be hereafter, conformably to the - Constitution and laws of the United States, held in, or introduced - into, said Territory." - -Mr. Chase's amendment is in these words: - - "_Provided further_, That nothing herein contained shall be construed - as authorizing or permitting the introduction of slavery, or the - holding of persons as property within said Territory." - -Whilst the quotation in the magazine article left me in the position -already stated, the debates which had occurred between us necessarily -informed the Senator that it was not my position, for I brought him in -that debate to acknowledge it. - -On that occasion, I argued for my amendment as an obligation of the -Government to remove obstructions; to give the fair operation to -constitutional right; and so far from the Senator having stood with Mr. -Clay against all these propositions, the fact appears, on page 1134 of the -_Globe_, that, upon the vote on Chase's amendment, Douglas voted for it, -and Davis and Clay voted against it; that upon the vote on Davis' -amendment, Clay and Davis voted for it, and Douglas voted against it. - -MR. DOUGLAS. The Senator should add, that that vote was given under the -very instructions to which he referred the other day, and which are well -known to the Senate, and are on the table. - -MR. DAVIS. I was aware that the Senator had voted for Mr. Seward's -amendment, the "Wilmot proviso," under these instructions, but I receive -his explanation. Mr. Berrien offered an amendment to change the provision, -which said there should be no legislation in respect to slavery, so as to -make it read, "there shall be no legislation establishing or prohibiting -African slavery." Mr. Clay voted for that; so did Mr. Davis. Mr. Douglas -voted against it. Mr. Hale offered an amendment to Mr. Berrien's -amendment, to add the word "allowing." Here Mr. Douglas voted for Mr. -Hale's amendment, and against Davis and Clay. Then a proposition was made -to continue the Mexican laws against slavery until repealed by Congress. I -think I proved--at least I did to my own satisfaction--that there was no -such Mexican law; that it was a decree, and that the legislation which -occurred under it had never been executed. But that proposition by Mr. -Baldwin, which was to continue the Mexican laws in force, was brought to -a vote, and again Mr. Douglas voted for it, and Mr. Davis and Mr. Clay -voted against it. When another proposition was brought forward to amend by -"removing the obstructions of Mexican laws and usages to any right of -person or property by the citizens of the United States in the Territories -aforesaid," I do not find the Senator's name among those who voted, -though, by reference to the Appendix, I learned he was present immediately -afterwards, by his speaking to another amendment. - -Thus we find the Senator differing from me on this question, as was -stated; but we do not find him concurring with Mr. Clay, as was stated; -and we do not find the proposition which I introduced, and which was -mentioned in the magazine article, receiving the joint opposition of -himself and Mr. Clay; and yet his remarks in the Senate the other day went -upon the same theory, that Mr. Clay and himself had been coöperating. Now, -the fact of the case is, that they agreed in supporting the final passage -of the bill, and I was against it. I was one of the few Southern men who -resisted, in all its stages, what was called the compromise, or omnibus -bill. I have consumed the time of the Senate by this reference, made as -brief as I could, on account of the remarks the Senator had made. - -Coupled with this arraignment of myself, at a time when he says he had -leisure to discuss the question with the Attorney-General, but when there -was nothing in my position certainly to provoke the revision of my course -in Congress, is his like review of it in the Senate. As I understood his -remarks, for I did not find them in the _Congressional Globe_ the next -morning, he vaunted his own consistency and admitted mine, but claimed his -to be inside and mine outside of the Democratic organization. Is it so? -Will our votes on test questions sustain it? The list of yeas and nays -would, on the points referred to, exhibit quite the reverse. And it -strikes me that, on the recent demonstrations we have had, when the -Democratic administration was, as it were, put on its trial in relation -to its policy in Kansas, the Senator's associations, rather than mine, -were outside of the Democratic organization. How is it, on the pending -question--the declaration of great principles of political creed--the -Senator's position is outside of the Senate's Democracy, and mine in it, -so that I do not see with what justice he attempts that discrimination -between him and me? That the difference exists, that it involves a -division greater or less in Democratic ranks, is a personal regret, and I -think a public misfortune. It gives me, therefore, no pleasure to dwell -upon it, and it is now dismissed. - -Mr. President, after having for forty years been engaged in bitter -controversy over a question relating to common property of the States, we -have reached the point where the issue is presented in a form in which it -becomes us to meet it according to existing facts; where it has ceased to -be a question to be decided on the footing of authority, and by reference -to history. We have decided that too long had this question been -disturbing the peace and endangering the Union, and it was resolved to -provide for its settlement by treating it as a judicial question. Now, -will it be said, after Congress provided for the adjustment of this -question by the courts, and after the courts had a case brought before -them, and expressed an opinion covering the controversy, that no -additional latitude is to be given to the application of the decision of -the court, though Congress had referred it specially to them; that it is -to be treated simply and technically as a question of _meum et tuum_, such -as might have arisen if there had been no such legislation by Congress? -Surely it does not become those who have pointed us to that provision as -the peace-offering, as the means for final adjustment, now to say that it -meant nothing more than that the courts would go on hereafter, as -heretofore, to try questions of property. - -The courts have decided the question so far as they could decide any -political question. A case arose in relation to property in a slave held -within a Territory where a law of Congress declared that such property -should not be held. The whole case was before them; every thing, except -the mere technical point that the law was not enacted by a territorial -legislature. Why, then, if we are to abide by the decision of the Supreme -Court in any future case, do they maintain this controversy on the mere -technical point which now divides, disturbs, distracts, destroys the -efficiency and the power of the Democratic party? To the Senator, I know, -as a question of property, it is a matter of no consequence. I should do -him injustice if I left any one to infer that I treated his argument as -one made by a man prejudiced against the character of property involved in -the question. That is not his position; but I assert that he is pursuing -an _ignis fatuus_--not a light caught from the Constitution--but a vapor -which has arisen from the corrupting cess-pools of sectional strife, of -faction, and individual rivalry. Measured by any standard of common sense, -its magnitude would be too small to disturb the adjustment of the balance -of our country. There can be no appeal to humanity made upon this basis. -Least of all could it be made to one who, like the Senator and myself, has -seen this species of property in its sparse condition on the north-western -frontier, and seen it go out without disturbing the tranquillity of the -community, as it had previously existed without injury to any one, if not -to the benefit of the individual who held it. He has no apprehension, he -can have none, that it is to retard the political prosperity of the future -States--now the Territories. He can have no apprehension that in that -country, to which they never would be carried except for domestic -purposes, they could ever so accumulate as to constitute a great political -element. He knows, and every man who has had experience and judgment must -admit, that the few who may be so carried there have nothing to fear but -the climate, and that living in that close connection which belongs to one -or half a dozen of them in a family, the kindest relations which it is -possible to exist between master and dependent, exist between these -domestics and their owners. - -There is a relation belonging to this species of property, unlike that of -the apprentice or the hired man, which awakens whatever there is of -kindness or of nobility of soul in the heart of him who owns it; this can -only be alienated, obscured, or destroyed by collecting this species of -property into such masses that the owner is not personally acquainted with -the individuals who compose it. In the relation, however, which can exist -in the north-western Territories, the mere domestic connection of one, -two, or, at most, half a dozen servants in a family, associating with the -children as they grow up, attending upon age as it declines, there can be -nothing against which either philanthropy or humanity can make an appeal. -Not even the emancipationist could raise his voice, for this is the high -road and the open gate to the condition in which the masters would, from -interest, in a few years, desire the emancipation of every one who may -thus be taken to the north-western frontier. - -Mr. President, I briefly and reluctantly referred, because the subject had -been introduced, to the attitude of Mississippi on a former occasion. I -will now as briefly say, that in 1851, and in 1860, Mississippi was, and -is, ready to make every concession which it becomes her to make to the -welfare and the safety of the Union. If, on a former occasion, she hoped -too much from fraternity, the responsibility for her disappointment rests -upon those who fail to fulfill her expectations. She still clings to the -Government as our fathers formed it. She is ready to-day and to-morrow, as -in her past, and though brief, yet brilliant history, to maintain that -Government in all its power, and to vindicate its honor with all the means -she possesses. I say brilliant history; for it was in the very morning of -her existence that her sons, on the plains of New Orleans, were announced, -in general orders to have been the admiration of one army and the wonder -of the other. That we had a division in relation to the measures enacted -in 1850, is true; that the Southern rights men became the minority in the -election which resulted, is true; but no figure of speech could warrant -the Senator in speaking of them as subdued; as coming to him or any body -else for quarter. I deemed it offensive when it was uttered, and the scorn -with which I repelled it at the instant, time has only softened to -contempt. Our flag was never borne from the field. We had carried it in -the face of defeat, with a knowledge that defeat awaited it; but scarcely -had the smoke of the battle passed away which proclaimed another victor, -before the general voice admitted that the field again was ours; I have -not seen a sagacious, reflecting man, who was cognizant of the events as -they transpired at the time, who does not say that, within two weeks after -the election, our party was in a majority; and the next election which -occurred showed that we possessed the State beyond controversy. How we -have wielded that power it is not for me to say. I trust others may see -forbearance in our conduct--that, with a determination to insist upon our -constitutional rights, then and now, there is an unwavering desire to -maintain the Government, and to uphold the Democratic party. - -We believe now, as we have asserted on former occasions, that the best -hope for the perpetuity of our institutions depends upon the coöperation, -the harmony, the zealous action of the Democratic party. We cling to that -party from conviction, that its principles and its aims are those of truth -and the country, as we cling to the Union for the fulfillment of the -purposes for which it was formed. Whenever we shall be taught that the -Democratic party is recreant to its principles; whenever we shall learn -that it can not be relied upon to maintain the great measures which -constitute its vitality, I, for one, shall be ready to leave it. And so, -when we declare our tenacious adherence to the Union, it is the Union of -the Constitution. If the compact between the States is to be trampled into -the dust; if anarchy is to be substituted for the usurpation and -consolidation which threatened the Government at an earlier period; if the -Union is to become powerless for the purposes for which it was -established, and we are vainly to appeal to it for protection, then, sir, -conscious of the rectitude of our course, the justice of our cause, -self-reliant, yet humbly, confidingly trusting in the arm that guided and -protected our fathers, we look beyond the confines of the Union for the -maintenance of our rights. A habitual reverence and cherished affection -for the Government will bind us to it longer than our interests would -suggest or require; but he is a poor student of the world's history who -does not understand that communities at last must yield to the dictates of -their interests. That the affection, the mutual desire for the mutual -good, which existed among our fathers, may be weakened in succeeding -generations by the denial of right, and hostile demonstration, until the -equality guaranteed, but not secured within the Union, may be sought for -without it, must be evident to even a careless observer of our race. It is -time to be up and doing. There is yet time to remove the causes of -dissension and alienation which are now distracting, and have for years -past divided the country. - -If the Senator correctly described me as having, at a former period, -against my own preferences and opinions, acquiesced in the decision of my -party; if when I had youth, when physical vigor gave promise of many days, -and the future was painted in the colors of hope, I could thus surrender -my own convictions, my own prejudices, and coöperate with my political -friends, according to their views, as to the best method of promoting the -public good; now, when the years of my future can not be many, and -experience has sobered the hopeful tints of youth's gilding; when, -approaching the evening of life, the shadows are reversed, and the mind -turns retrospectively, it is not to be supposed that I would abandon -lightly, or idly put on trial, the party to which I have steadily adhered. -It is rather to be assumed that conservatism, which belongs to the -timidity or caution of increasing years, would lead me to cling to--to be -supported by, rather than to cast off, the organization with which I have -been so long connected. If I am driven to consider the necessity of -separating myself from those old and dear relations, of discarding the -accustomed support, under circumstances such as I have described, might -not my friends who differ from me pause and inquire whether there is not -something involved in it which calls for their careful revision? - -I desire no divided flag for the Democratic party, seek not to depreciate -the power of the Senator, or take from him any thing of that confidence he -feels in the large army which follows his standard. I prefer that his -banner should lie in its silken folds to feed the moth; but if it -unrestrainedly rustles, impatient to be unfurled, we who have not invited -the conflict, shrink not from the trial; we will plant our flag on every -hill and plain; it shall overlook the Atlantic and welcome the sun as he -rises from its dancing waters; it shall wave its adieu as he sinks to -repose in the quiet Pacific. - -Our principles are national; they belong to every State of the Union; and -though elections may be lost by their assertion, they constitute the only -foundation on which we can maintain power, on which we can again rise to -the dignity the Democracy once possessed. Does not the Senator from -Illinois see in the sectional character of the vote he received, that his -opinions are not acceptable to every portion of the country? Is not the -fact that the resolutions adopted by seventeen States, on which the -greatest reliance must be placed for Democratic support, are in opposition -to the dogma to which he still clings, a warning that if he persists and -succeeds in forcing his theory upon the Democratic party, its days are -numbered? We ask only for the Constitution. We ask of the Democracy only -from time to time to declare, as current exigencies may indicate, what the -Constitution was intended to secure and provide. Our flag bears no new -device. Upon its folds our principles are written in living light; all -proclaiming the constitutional Union, justice, equality, and fraternity of -our ocean-bound domain, for a limitless future. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - - ELECTION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN--HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE EVENT--THE - OBJECTS AIMED AT BY HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY IDENTICAL IN THE DISCUSSION - OF EVENTS OF THE LATE WAR--NORTHERN EVASION OF THE REAL QUESTION--THE - SOUTH DID NOT ATTEMPT REVOLUTION--SECESSION A JUSTIFIABLE RIGHT - EXERCISED BY SOVEREIGN STATES--BRIEF REVIEW OF THE QUESTION--WHAT THE - FEDERALIST SAYS--CHIEF-JUSTICE MARSHALL--MR. MADISON--COERCION NOT - JUSTIFIED AT THE NORTH PREVIOUS TO THE LATE WAR--REMARKS OF JOHN - QUINCY ADAMS--OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN--OF HORACE GREELEY--SUCCESSFUL - PERVERSION OF TRUTH BY THE NORTH--PROVOCATIONS TO SECESSION BY THE - SOUTH--AGGRESSIONS BY THE NORTH--ITS PUNIC FAITH--LOSS OF THE BALANCE - OF POWER--PATIENCE OF THE SOUTH--REMARKS OF HON. C. C. CLAY--WHAT THE - ELECTION OF MR. LINCOLN MEANT--HIS ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY--REVELATIONS - OF THE OBJECTS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY--WENDELL PHILLIPS--NO SECURITY - FOR THE SOUTH IN THE UNION--MEETING OF CONGRESS--MR. DAVIS' ASSURANCE - TO PRESIDENT BUCHANAN--CONCILIATORY COURSE OF MR. DAVIS--HIS - CONSISTENT DEVOTION TO THE UNION, AND EFFORTS TO SAVE IT--FORESEES WAR - AS THE RESULT OF SECESSION, AND URGES THE EXHAUSTION OF EVERY - EXPEDIENT TO AVERT IT--THE CRITTENDEN AMENDMENT--HOPES OF ITS - ADOPTION--DAVIS WILLING TO ACCEPT IT IN SPITE OF ITS INJUSTICE TO THE - SOUTH--REPUBLICAN SENATORS DECLINE ALL CONCILIATORY MEASURES--THE - CLARKE AMENDMENT--WHERE RESTS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DISUNION?-- - STATEMENTS OF MESSRS. DOUGLAS AND COX--SECESSION OF THE COTTON - STATES--A LETTER FROM JEFFERSON DAVIS TO R. B. RHETT, JR.--MR. DAVIS' - FAREWELL TO THE SENATE--HIS REASONS FOR WITHDRAWING--RETURNS TO - MISSISSIPPI--MAJOR-GENERAL OF STATE FORCES--ORGANIZATION OF THE - CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT--MR. DAVIS PRESIDENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES. - - -As had been foreseen, and, indeed, as was the inevitable sequence of the -disruption of the Democratic party, Abraham Lincoln, the candidate of the -Republican party, was, in November, 1860, elected President of the United -States. This was the supreme and sufficient incitement to the adoption of -the dreaded resort of disunion. As the _occasion_ which finally brought -the South to the attitude of resistance, the event acquires vast -historical importance. - -When it is conceded that Mr. Lincoln was elected in accordance with the -_forms_ of the Constitution, having received a majority of electoral -votes; that the mere ceremony of election was attended by no unusual -circumstances, we concede every possible ground upon which can be based an -argument denying its ample justification of the course pursued by the -South. Such an argument, however, leads to a wholly untenable conclusion, -and may be easily exposed in its hypocritical evasion of the real -question. We are here required to note the distinction between _cause_ and -_occasion_. As the final consummation of tendencies, long indicating the -result of disunion, this event has an appropriate place in the -recapitulation of those influences, and can be rightly estimated only in -connection with their operation. - -Trite observations upon the influence of passion and prejudice, over -contemporary judgment, are not necessary to a due conception of the -obstacles which, for the present, exclude candor from the discussion of -the late movement for Southern independence. In the face of the disastrous -overthrow of that movement, the wrecked hopes and fortunes of those who -participated in it, discussion is chiefly serviceable, as it throws -additional light upon the development of those eternal principles in whose -ceaseless struggles men are only temporary agents. - -History and biography are here most intimately blended; beginning from -the same stand-point, they encounter common difficulties, and aim to -explore the same general grounds of observation. So far as a verdict--from -whatever tribunal, whether rendered at the bar of justice or in the award -of popular opinion, when the embers of recent strife are still fiercely -glowing--can affect the dispassionate judgment of History, the Southern -people can not be separated, either in fact or in sentiment, from -Jefferson Davis. He was the illustrious compatriot of six millions of -freemen, who struck for nationality and independence, and lost--as did -Greece and Poland before them; or he and they were alike insurgents, -equally guilty of the crime of treason. - -With an adroitness which does credit to the characteristic charlatanism of -the North, an infinite variety of special questions and side issues have -been interwoven with the narrative of the late war, for the obvious -purpose of confounding the judgment of mankind regarding the great -question which really constitutes the gravamen of the controversy. -Conspicuous among these efforts, from both audacity and plausibility, are -appeals to the sympathies of the world, in consideration of the abolition -of slavery, which it is well known was merely an incident, and not the -avowed design of the war. - -Persistent in its introduction of the _moral_ question of slavery, the -North seeks to shield itself from the reproach justly visited upon its -perpetration of an atrocious political crime, by an insolent intrusion of -a false claim to the championship of humanity. Whatever may be the -decision of Time upon the merits of slavery, it is in vain for the North -to seek escape from its responsibility for an institution, protected and -sustained by a government which was the joint creation of Southern and -Northern hands. - -The attempted dissolution of the Union by the South was a movement -involving moral and political considerations, not unlike those incidental -to revolutions in general, yet presenting certain peculiar -characteristics, traceable to the inherent and distinctive features of the -American political system. These latter considerations constitute a vital -part of its justification. The South did not appeal only to the -inalienable right of revolution, which is the natural guarantee of -resistance to wrong and oppression. Nor did the States, severally, as they -assumed to sever their connection with the Union, announce a purpose of -constitutional revolution, or adopt a course inviting or justifying -violence. Mr. Davis and those who coöperated with him, neither by the acts -of secession, nor the subsequent confederation of the States under a new -government, could have committed _treason_ against Mr. Lincoln, since they -were not his subjects. Nor yet were they traitors to the Government of the -United States, since the States of which they were citizens had rescinded -the grant of powers voluntarily made by them to that Government, and begun -to exercise them in conjunction with other powers which they had withheld -by express reservation. - -It is impossible to conceive a movement, contemplating such important -political changes, more entirely unattended by displays of violence, -passion, and disorder. A simple assertion, with due solemnity, by each -State, of its sovereignty--a heritage which it had never surrendered, but -which had been respected by innumerable forms of recognition in the -history of the Union--and the exercise of those attributes of sovereignty, -which are too palpable to require that they shall be indicated, was the -peaceable method resorted to of terminating a political alliance which had -become injurious to the highest interests of one of the parties. Could -there have been a more becoming and dignified exercise of the vaunted -right of self-government? It is that right to which America is so -conspicuously committed, and which has been such an inexhaustible theme -for the tawdry rhetoric of Northern eloquence. - -Even in the insolence of its triumph, the North feels the necessity of at -least a decent pretext for its destruction of the cardinal feature in the -American system of government--the sovereignty of the States. With -habitual want of candor, Northern writers pretend that the Constitution of -the United States does not affirm the sovereignty of the States, and that, -therefore, secession was treason against that Constitution to which they -had subscribed; in other words, the created does not give authority to the -creator--_i. e._, the Constitution, which the States created, does not -accredit sovereignty to the States, and, therefore, the States are not -sovereign. It is not pretended that the States were not, each of them, -originally independent powers, since they were so recognized by Great -Britain, in the plainest terms, at the termination of the first -revolution. Nor is it asserted that the union of the States, under the -title of United States, was the occasion of any surrender of their -individual sovereignty, as it was then declared that "each State retains -its sovereignty, freedom, and independence." A conclusive demonstration of -the retention of sovereignty by the States is seen in the entire failure -of the Constitution, either by direct assertion or by implication, to -claim its surrender to the Union. - -If the sovereignty of the States be conceded, the South stands justified -as having exercised an unquestionable right. It was never formally denied, -even at the North, until Mr. Webster, in his debate with Mr. Calhoun, -affirmed the doctrine of the supremacy of the Union, to which conclusion -the Northern masses sprung with alacrity, as an available justification -for compelling the submission of the South to the outrages which they had -already commenced. - -Volumes of testimony have been adduced, proving the theory of State -sovereignty to have been the overwhelmingly predominant belief among the -statesmen most prominent in the establishment of the Union, and in shaping -the policy of the Government in its earlier history. Argument proved an -unavailing offset to the stern decrees of the sword, and is quite -unnecessary so long as the unanswerable logic of Calhoun, Davis, and a -score of Southern statesmen remains upon the national records--a perpetual -challenge, as yet unaccepted, to the boasted intellect of the North, and a -significant warning of the final adjudication of the centuries. We shall -intrude no argument of our own in support of State sovereignty, upon which -rests the vindication of the South and her leaders. Before us are the -apposite and conclusive assumptions of men who have been the revered -sources of political inspiration among Americans. - -The _Federalist_, that most powerful vindication of the Constitution, and -earnest plea for its adoption by the States, assumes that it was a -"compact," to which "the States, as distinct and independent sovereigns," -were the parties. Yet this doctrine, the basis upon which rests the august -handiwork of Madison and Hamilton, the "architects of the Constitution," -when applied by Davis and his compatriots, becomes treason! Such is the -extremity to which despotism, in its wretched plea of expediency, is -driven; and the candid, enlightened American of to-day realizes, in his -country, a land in which "truth is treason, and history is rebellion." - -Chief-Justice Marshall, the great judicial luminary of America, and an -authority not usually summoned to the support of doctrines hostile to the -assumptions of Federal power, gave most emphatic testimony to the -propriety of the States' Rights view of the relations of State and Federal -authority. In the Virginia Convention which ratified the Constitution, he -said: "The State governments did not derive their powers from the General -Government. But each government derived its powers from the people, and -each was to act according to the powers given it. Would any gentleman deny -this? He demanded, if powers not given were retained by implication? Could -any man say, no? Could any man say that this power was not retained by the -States, since it was not given away?" The view so earnestly urged by -Marshall, was not only avowed generally, but Virginia, Massachusetts, and -Pennsylvania insisted upon a written declaration, in the Constitution, of -the principle that certain attributes of sovereignty, which they did not -delegate to the Union, were retained by the States. - -Mr. Madison, whose great abilities were taxed to the utmost to secure the -ratification of the Constitution by Virginia, vigorously and earnestly -defended it against the allegation that it created a consolidated -government. With the utmost difficulty, he secured a majority of ten -votes, in the Virginia Convention, in favor of the Constitution, which his -rival, Patrick Henry, denounced as destructive of State sovereignty. - -Defining the expression, "We, the people," Mr. Madison said: "The parties -to it were the people, but not the people as composing one great society, -but the people as composing '_thirteen sovereignties_.'" To quote Mr. -Madison again: "If it were a consolidated government, the assent of a -majority of the people would be sufficient to establish it. But it was to -be binding on the people of a State only by their own separate consent." -Under the influence of these arguments, and others of the same import from -Mr. Madison, whom she thought, from his close relations to the -Constitution, high authority upon all questions pertaining to its -character, Virginia finally acceded to the Union. It is especially -noteworthy, however, that Virginia, when becoming a party to the -Constitution, expressly affirmed, in the most solemn manner, the right to -"resume" her grants of power to the Federal Government. - -In deference to the accumulated evidence upon this subject, came the -unqualified statement, from eminent Northern authority,[14] that, "This -right [of secession] must be considered an ingredient in the original -composition of the General Government, which, though not expressed, was -mutually understood." - -But whatever may be thought of the prescriptive and inherent right of -sovereignty, exercised by the South in withdrawing from the Union, as -deducible from the peculiar nature of the American system, and as -expounded by the founders of that system, there can be no question as to -its entire accordance with the _spirit_ of American polity. Authority is -abundant in support of the assertion that, not even in the North, previous -to the inception of the present revolution, was the idea of a constrained -connection with the Union entertained. From every source of Northern -opinion has come indignant repudiation of a coerced association of -communities, originally united by a common pledge of fealty to the right -of self-government. - -Upon this subject Mr. John Quincy Adams spoke in language of -characteristic fervor: "The indissoluble link of union between the people -of the several States of this confederated nation is, after all, not in -the _right_, but in the _heart_. If the day should ever come (may heaven -avert it!) when the affections of the people of these States shall be -alienated from each other--when the fraternal spirit shall give way to -cold indifference, or collision of interest shall fester into hatred, the -bands of political association will not long hold together parties no -longer attracted by the magnetism of conciliated interests and kindly -sympathies; and far better will it be for the people of the disunited -States to part in friendship from each other than to be held together by -constraint." - -Even Mr. Lincoln, whose statesmanship is not likely to be commemorated for -its profundity or scholarship, fully comprehended the exaggerated -reverence of the American mind for the "sacred right of self-government." -Now that his homely phrases are dignified by the Northern masses with the -sanctity of the utterances of Deity, assuredly there should be no -apprehension that his opinions may not be deemed conclusive. In 1848, Mr. -Lincoln said: "Any people whatever have the right to abolish the existing -government, and form a new one that suits them better. This is a most -valuable, a most sacred right." - -A brave affirmation was this of the doctrine of the Declaration of -Independence, that "Governments derive their just powers from the consent -of the governed;" and one which would have commanded the united applause -of the North, then and now, had the application concerned Hungary, Poland, -Greece, or Mexico. But, with reference to the South, there was a most -important modification of this admirable principle of equity and humanity. -When asked, "Why not let the South go?" Abraham Lincoln, _the President_, -in 1861, said: "_Let the South go! Where, then, shall we get our -revenue?_" And the united North reëchoed: "_Let the South go! Where, then, -shall we look for the bounties and monopolies which have so enriched us at -the expense of those improvident, unsuspecting Southerners? Where shall we -find again such patient victims of spoliation?_" - -Mr. Horace Greeley frequently and emphatically, previous to the war, -affirmed the right of changing its political association asserted by the -South. Three days after the election of Mr. Lincoln, in November, 1860, -his paper, the New York _Tribune_, said: "If the Cotton States shall -become satisfied that they can do better out of the Union than in it, we -insist on letting them go in peace.... We must ever resist the right of -any State to remain in the Union, and nullify or defy the laws thereof. -_To withdraw from the Union is quite another matter; and whenever any -considerable section of our Union shall deliberately resolve to go out, we -shall resist all coercive measures designed to keep it in._ We hope never -to live in a Republic whereof one section is pinned to another by -bayonets." On the 17th of December, 1860, the _Tribune_ said: "If it [the -Declaration of Independence] justifies the secession of three millions of -colonists in 1776, _we do not see why it would not justify the secession -of five millions of Southerners from the Federal Union in 1861_." - -Such are a few illustrations, to which might be added innumerable -quotations, of the same import, from the most prominent sources of -Northern opinion. Never has there been a question so capable of positive -solution and easy comprehension, when subjected to the test of candid -investigation, and never so successful a purpose to exclude the -illumination of facts by persistent and ingenious misrepresentation. The -North has reason for its extravagant exultation at the skill and audacity -with which the brazen front of hypocrisy, for a time, at least, has -successfully sustained, in the name of humanity and liberty, the most -monstrous imposition and transparent counterfeit of virtue ever designed -upon an intelligent age. - -To the triumphant historical vindication of the South, there remains only -the essential condition of a clear and truthful statement of the -provocations which impelled her to adopt that long-deferred remedy, which -is the last refuge of a people whose liberties are imperiled. Secession, -however strong in its prescriptive or implied justification as a -principle, was not to be undertaken from caprice, or trivial causes of -dissatisfaction. - -Abuses, numerous, serious, and consecutive, were required before disunion -became either desirable or acceptable to the South. The native -conservatism of the Southern character renders it peculiarly averse to -agitation; to this were added social features, the safety of which would -be greatly imperiled by civil war, and thus a train of influences tended -to make Southern soil, of all others, the least favorable to the growth of -revolutionary principles. - -In the development of this volume, we have glanced at the progress of -those sectional differences, at various periods precipitated by the -insolent aggressions of Abolitionism, which steadily depreciated the -value of the Union in Southern estimation. Continued aggressions by her -enemies; their Punic faith, illustrated in a series of violated pledges, -and habitual disregard of the conditions of the covenant which bound South -and North together; petty outrages, taunts and insults, emanating from -every possible source of public expression at the North, for many years -had banished fraternal feeling and precluded those interchanges of comity -between the sections which were the indispensable requisites to national -harmony. It is undeniable, that for years previous to secession, the -sentimental attachment to the Union, which was the distinctive -characteristic of Southern patriotism--unlike the coarse, utilitarian -estimate of the Union as a source of pecuniary profit, which constituted -its value to the North--had been greatly impaired. Since 1850, and to a -considerable extent during the preceding decade, the most sagacious -statesmen of the South contemplated disunion as an event almost -inevitable, unless averted by a contingency of very improbable occurrence. -There must be an awakening by the North to a more just appreciation of its -constitutional and patriotic obligations, or an unmanly submission by the -South, to a condition of degrading inferiority, in a government to whose -construction, prosperity, and distinction, she had contributed more than a -proportionate share of influence. - -Chief among the considerations which admonished the South of the perils -which environed her situation in the Union, was the total destruction of -that sectional balance, which had been wisely adjusted by its founders, as -the safeguard of the weaker against the stronger influence. Having in mind -the wise saying of Aristotle, that "the weak always desire what is equal -and just, but the powerful pay no regard to it," the statesmen of 1787 -designedly shaped the chart of government with a view to the preservation -of equality. The struggle between the weaker element, naturally contending -in behalf of the equilibrium, and the stronger striving for its overthrow, -was, at an early period, distinctly foreshadowed. With characteristic -prevision, Alexander Hamilton, probably the foremost statesman of his day, -foretold the nature of this contest over the principle of equality. Said -that sagacious publicist: "The truth is, it is a contest for power, not -for liberty." - -This contest, indeed, so long waged, was, many years since, decided -overwhelmingly against the South. In 1850, the Northern majority in the -House of Representatives, the popular branch of the government, had -increased from a majority, in 1790, of five votes, to fifty-four. Years -before, the legislation of Congress assumed that sectional bias, which was -undeviatingly adhered to for the purpose, and with ample success, of the -material depression of the South. Under the baleful influences of hostile -legislation, of tariffs aimed directly at her commercial prosperity, of -bounties for fostering multifarious Northern interests, her position in -the Union was helpless and deplorable in the extreme. Yet, like a -rock-bound Prometheus, with the insidious elements of destruction gnawing -at her vitals, the South suffered herself to be chained by an influence of -sentiment, of association, and reminiscence to the Union, fully conscious -of the growing rapacity of her despoiler and of her own hopeless decline. -Her infatuation was indeed marvelous, in trusting to the dawning of -justice and generosity in a fierce, vindictive, and remorseless sectional -majority. - -The alarming portents of ultimately complete material prostration, to be -consummated by these perversions of the purposes of the Union, were -terribly significant, in view of the venom which actuated the enemies of -the South. The sectional balance was hopelessly gone; Southern material -prosperity destroyed by sectional legislation; not a check, originally -provided by the Constitution for the protection of the weaker section, but -had been virtually obliterated; Northern perfidy illustrated in the -violation of every compact which, in operation, proved favorable to the -South, while the latter was held to a rigid fidelity in all agreements -favorable to her enemies; the nullification, by the legislatures of half -the Northern States, of Federal laws for the protection of Southern -property, are a few of those grievances which presented to the South the -hard and inexorable alternative of resistance, or abject submission to -endless insult and outrage. - -A Southern Senator,[15] announcing the secession of his State, and his own -consequent withdrawal from the Senate, stated the question in a form, -which even then had the authority of history. - - "Not a decade, nor scarce a lustrum, has elapsed (since Alabama became - a State) that has not been strongly marked by proofs of the growth and - power of that antislavery spirit of the Northern people, which seeks - the overthrow of that domestic institution of the South, which is not - only the chief source of her prosperity, but the very basis of her - social order and State polity. It is to-day the master-spirit of the - Northern States, and had before the secession of Alabama, of - Mississippi, of Florida, or of South Carolina, severed most of the - bonds of the Union. It denied us Christian communion, because it could - not endure what it calls the moral leprosy of slave-holding; it - refused us permission to sojourn, or even to pass through the North - with our property; it claimed freedom for the slave, if brought by - his master into a Northern State; it violated the Constitution, and - treaties, and laws of Congress, because designed to protect that - property; it refused us any share of lands acquired mainly by our - diplomacy, and blood, and treasure; it refused our property any - shelter or security beneath the flag of a common government; it robbed - us of our property, and refused to restore it; it refused to deliver - criminals against our laws, who fled to the North with our property or - our blood upon their hands; it threatened us by solemn legislative - acts, with ignominious punishment, if we pursued our property into a - Northern State; it murdered Southern men when seeking the recovery of - their property on Northern soil; it invaded the borders of Southern - States, poisoned their wells, burnt their dwellings, and murdered - their people; it denounced us by deliberate resolves of popular - meetings, of party conventions, and of religious, and even legislative - assemblies, as habitual violators of the laws of God and the rights of - humanity; it exerted all the moral and physical agencies that human - ingenuity can devise, or diabolical malice can employ, to heap odium - and infamy upon us, and to make us a by-word of hissing and of scorn - throughout the civilized world." - -There was no room for uncertainty as to the significance of the election -of Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency, in 1860, by a party exclusively -sectional in organization, and upon a platform, which virtually declared -the Union, as then constituted, in opposition to justice, humanity, and -civilization. - -The real danger to the South, involved in this election, was that it was a -_sectional_ triumph--a victory of North over South, in a contest where the -South risked every thing, the North nothing. From time immemorial sincere -patriots of both sections had deprecated the formation of sectional -parties, organized upon geographical interests, or upon ideas confined to -limited portions of the Union. Washington, in his farewell injunction, -admonished his countrymen of the deplorable results which must follow the -presentation of such issues. - -The Chicago platform was more than a menace to the South; it was a -defiance of law, a declaration of war upon the Constitution. The election -of Lincoln was both a legal and moral severance of the bonds of Union. -While he received the united vote of the North, save New Jersey, he did -not receive one electoral vote from the South. His shaping of his -administration was consistent with the character of the party which -elected him. All his constitutional advisers were Northern men or Southern -Abolitionists; social outlaws in their own section, in consequence of -their notorious personal depravity, and infidelity to their immediate -fellow-citizens. Of like character were the subordinate appointments of -the Federal Government in Southern communities. - -Nor was there reason to doubt the policy of the Government under its new -management. Mr. Lincoln had been sufficiently communicative of his own -bitter hostility to Southern institutions. In fact, with much show of -justice, his admirers claimed for him the original suggestion of the idea -of an "irrepressible conflict," afterwards so elaborately pronounced by -William H. Seward. Public announcements, from prominent speakers of the -successful party, amply revealed the feast to which the South was invited. -Wendell Phillips, the most able, eloquent, and sagacious of the original -Abolitionists, thus pointedly defined the situation: "No man has a right -to be surprised at this state of things. It is just what we have attempted -to bring about. It is the first sectional party ever organized in this -country. It does not know its own face, and calls itself national; but it -is not national--it is sectional. The Republican party is a party of the -North pledged against the South." - -Such was the complexion to which political affairs were brought by the -election of Abraham Lincoln. There remained hardly a hope, even for future -security or domestic tranquillity to the South, except in withdrawal from -an association, in which she had become an inferior and an outcast--an -object of oppression, outrage, and contumely. From a relentless Abolition -majority she could expect no favors; and the Northern Democracy, so long -her ally, for common purposes of party, had cowered before the storm of -fanaticism, and repudiated the first demand made upon its fidelity to -principle. - -Congress assembled on the first Monday of December, 1860, a few weeks -subsequent to the Presidential election. Never had that body met under -circumstances of such gravity. Universal foreboding of peril to the nation -was mingled with hope of such action, as would avert the impending -calamities of disunion and civil war. There were few indications, at the -opening of the session, of conciliatory sentiments; from the -representatives of both sections came open defiance, and Northern members -of both houses were more than ever bold in the utterance of insult and -menace. Before the opening of the session, President Buchanan received -from Mr. Davis the most satisfactory assurances of his coöperation with -the administration in a pacific policy, having for its object the -settlement of the national difficulties upon terms promotive of the peace -of the country, and assuring the security of the South.[16] To such a -settlement the efforts of Mr. Davis were addressed so long as there was -the slightest ground for the indulgence of hope. - -This session of Congress, the last which was held previous to the -commencement of civil war, is chiefly interesting as the historical record -of those patriotic efforts which were made to save the Union, and as -furnishing incontestible proof of the guilt of those who, by their -persistent refusal of all conciliatory propositions, are justly -responsible for the calamities which were to befall the country. Happily -for the reputation of Mr. Davis, the proof is authentic and conclusive in -his favor upon these important questions. There is no portion of his -career in which statesmanship, patriotism, and a noble appreciation of the -claims of humanity shine forth more conspicuously. So overwhelming is the -evidence that, in these last days of the Union, he was false to none of -these high considerations, that the most mendacious assailants of himself -and the cause he lately represented have not yet ventured to call it in -question. - -A disposition is frequently evinced to plead for him immunity from the -responsibility of his position, as the leader of the Confederate movement, -upon the score of his consistent Unionism, manifested in the prevailing -conservatism of his course as a politician. He needs no such palliation. -His devotion to the Union of the American fathers was as unquestionable as -was that of Washington. His patriotism was illustrated by every mode of -exemplification in the service of country. To substantiate his attachment -to that association of States, designed by the fathers, sublime in its -objects of mutual fidelity, generous sympathies, justice, and equality, no -elaborate statement is required, nor could formal vindication strengthen -its defenses.[17] He never arrayed himself against such a Union, but, -abhorring that perverted instrument of sectional aggression, which the -Government had become, he did accompany and lead his fellow-citizens in -their exercise of the highest privilege of freemen. - -He was always prepared to follow the principles of States' Rights to their -logical consequences, and was yet consistent in his attachment to the -Union. Thus he was a firm believer in the absolute sovereignty of the -States, and of the enjoyment, by the States, of all the attributes of -sovereignty, including, necessarily, the right of secession. He had never -urged the expediency of secession, though, upon repeated occasions, he had -foreshadowed its probable necessity in the future, as the only remedy -remaining to the South in certain contingencies. In the Senate, in 1850, -he thus alluded to the possibility of a successful organization of a -sectional party: "The danger is one of our own times, and it is that -sectional division of the people which has created the necessity of -looking to the question of the balance of power, and which carries with -it, when disturbed, the danger of disunion." - -In 1859, again, he proclaimed, in unequivocal terms, his course in the -event of the success of a party indorsing the Rochester pronunciamento of -Mr. Seward. Yet his course, subsequent to the election of Mr. Lincoln, -was directed entirely in the interest of moderation. Having little hope of -concession from the enemies of the South, in the moment of their -overwhelming victory, he yet anxiously, earnestly entered that last -struggle for the Constitution, before it passed into the keeping of -iconoclasts, who were pledged to its destruction. - -His zeal in behalf of pacification was actuated by considerations of -humanity, no less ennobling than his impulse of disinterested patriotism. -Regarding a long and bloody war as the certain result of dissolution, he -anxiously sought to avert that calamitous result, and stood pledged to the -acceptance of any basis of settlement which should guarantee the safety -and honor of the South. At no time, however, did he advocate submission. -His language in the Senate is explicit. Speaking of the secession of -Mississippi, he said: "I, however, may be permitted to say, that I do -think she has justifiable cause, and I approve of her act. I conferred -with her people before that act was taken, counseled them then that, if -the state of things which they apprehended should exist when the -convention met, they should take the action which they have now adopted." - -During the session, numerous efforts at compromise were made, in every -instance emanating from Southern Representatives or Northern Democrats, -the dominant party of the North declining all tenders of pacification, and -offering no terms of conciliation in return. It is unnecessary to trace -the progress of these abortive efforts, which, in the main, received the -support of feeble minorities, and had, from their inception, no prospect -of adoption. - -There was one proposition, and probably only one, which embodied a -competent basis of settlement, and was entitled to favor. This was called -the "Crittenden Compromise," and originated with the venerable Kentucky -Senator, by whose name it is designated. For a time it seemed that the -demonstrations of popular sentiment in its favor, especially the -well-ascertained readiness of a large majority of the Southern people to -accept it, and its exceedingly practical nature, as a _final_ settlement -of the slavery question, would eventually secure its adoption by Congress. -The result was a disappointment of this patriotic expectation, and a -conclusive demonstration of the purpose of the Republican party to consent -to no settlement which the South could accept. - -An examination of the Crittenden proposition will reveal a most striking -illustration of the ever-present spirit of accommodation, in matters -affecting the safety of the Union, which, even in its last hours, was -characteristic of the leaders and people of the South, and of the narrow, -selfish, and exacting sectionalism of the North. In reality, it was little -short of a surrender, in its ample concessions, to the encroachments of -Abolitionism. - -The resolutions introduced by Mr. Crittenden, in the Senate, on the 18th -of December, 1860, contemplated amendments to the Constitution having the -following objects: The prohibition of slavery in all Territories north of -the old Missouri Compromise line, and providing protection for it south of -that line; a denial of the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the -District of Columbia, or in ports, arsenels, dock-yards, or wherever else -the Federal Government exercised jurisdiction; remuneration to owners of -escaped slaves by communities in which the Federal laws, providing -rendition of slaves, might be violently obstructed. Such were the material -features of the "Crittenden Compromise." - -It will be seen at a glance how absurd was the misnomer of "compromise" -applied to so one-sided a settlement. The South was required, by its -provisions, to abandon the sacred right of protection to her property, -guaranteed by the Constitution and unequivocally re-affirmed by the -highest judicial tribunal in the land. The Supreme Court, in the Dred -Scott case, had already decided the right to take slaves into all the -Territories, while the Crittenden proposition prohibited it entirely in -the major portion of the common Territory, and merely tolerated it in the -residue. The Constitution, as expounded by the Supreme Court, guaranteed -the right of introduction and protection of slavery in all the -Territories, in whatever latitude, as the common property of the States. -The Crittenden amendment proposed to confine this right to Territory south -of 36° 30', prohibiting, in the meanwhile, slavery _forever_ north of that -line, and in regions where its legal existence had been emphatically -affirmed by that august tribunal, the Supreme Court. If adopted, it would -have yielded every thing to Abolition rapacity, save a mere abstraction. -Of all the vast territory yet remaining to be hereafter divided into -States, only in New Mexico did it propose even to tolerate slavery, and in -that locality the laws of nature precluded its permanent establishment. - -A few days after its introduction in the Senate, the Crittenden amendment -was proposed by its author to a special committee of thirteen, created on -motion of Senator Powell, of Kentucky, for the consideration of all -questions pertaining to the pending national difficulties. This committee -was composed of the most eminent and influential Senators, embracing five -leading Republicans, five Southern Senators, and Messrs. Bright, Bigler, -and Douglas, on behalf of the Northern Democracy. Mr. Davis, originally -appointed, at first declined to serve, but finally consented, in -compliance with the urgent requests of other Senators. At the first -meeting of the committee, 21st December, it was "resolved that no -proposition shall be reported as adopted, unless sustained by a majority -of each of the classes of the committee; Senators of the Republican party -to constitute one class, and Senators of the other parties to constitute -the other class." - -This resolution was necessary, in consequence of the obvious futility of -any settlement which did not meet the approval of a majority of the -Republican Senators. In this Committee the Crittenden proposition was -defeated. Not one of the Republican Senators voted for it, and Messrs. -Davis and Toombs likewise voted against it when it was ascertained that it -would not receive the sanction of a majority of the Republican Senators. - -Despite its unfairness as a measure of settlement, and its great injustice -to the South, Mr. Davis would have accepted it, as would a large majority -of Southern Senators, as a _finality_, if the Republican Senators had -tendered it. This, however, the latter were determined not to do, nor did -a single Republican Senator, at any time during the session, express even -a desire that any action, conciliatory to the South, should be -adopted.[18] Insolent, dictatorial, and defiant, they proclaimed their -purpose, at all hazards, to assert the authority of the Government, and -their acts clearly indicated their stern purpose to refuse every -proposition contemplating concession or compromise. In substitution of the -Crittenden adjustment, they voted solidly for the amendment of Senator -Clarke, of New Hampshire, which denied the necessity of amendments to the -Constitution, which ought to be obeyed rather than amended, and declared -that the remedy for present difficulties was to be sought in a stern -enforcement of the laws, rather than in assurances to peculiar ideas and -guarantees to peculiar interests. This palpable defiance, and emphatic -avowal of a purpose to concede nothing to Southern demands, was indorsed -by the action of Republican caucusses of both houses of Congress, by -resolutions of State Legislatures, and by tenders of men and means to -compel the submission of the South. The entire Republican party were -clearly committed to the purpose, avowed by Mr. Salmon P. Chase, in a -letter from the Peace Congress, to Portsmouth, Ohio, to "use the power -while they had it, and prevent a settlement."[19] - -On the 31st December, 1860, the Committee of Thirteen reported to the -Senate their inability to "agree upon any general plan of adjustment," and -thus, with the arrival of the new year, had vanished the last hope of -preserving the peace of the country. The failure of the Crittenden -proposition was decisive of the question of pacification; no other plan of -adjustment, that was presented, having either its merits or its practical -features. - -Southern resistance came none too soon for Northern power, hate, and -lust, but far too late for the precious goal of independence. Delay had -been fatal, and the golden opportunity long since lost. But there was -still time to emulate the glorious examples of the past. With marvelous -calmness and dauntless intrepidity, a heroic race prepared an exhibition -of noble devotion and willing sacrifice, the contemplation of which -revives the memories of Thermopylæ. - -Comparatively of little moment, now, is the question, whether the -acceptance of this basis of adjustment by the South would have been -consistent with discretion. In the end the result, in all likelihood, -would have been the same. Had a settlement been reached in 1861, Southern -liberties must eventually have perished, through the influences of -corruption and the demoralization engendered by continued submission to -wrong, no less effectually than by their overthrow in that gallant -struggle of arms, which terminated with such fatal results. But there -still remains the question of responsibility for those horrors of civil -strife, which the failure of the Crittenden amendment soon precipitated -upon the country. Those crimson spots which stain the subsequent history -of the Republic, are traceable to no parricidal hand raised by the South. -No historical question has received more satisfactory decision than this; -and the South is acquitted even by the testimony of her enemies. It is -unnecessary to give the evidence of Southern men, when there is such ample -testimony from those who deprecated and condemned the subsequent course of -the South. - -Senator Douglas, on the 3d January, 1861, only three days after the report -of the Committee of Thirteen had been submitted, and within hearing of its -members, thus expressed himself in the course of an address to the -Senate: - - "If you of the Republican side are not willing to accept this [a - proposition of his own] nor the proposition of the Senator from - Kentucky [Mr. Crittenden,] pray tell us what are you willing to do? I - address the inquiry to the Republicans alone, for the reason, that in - the Committee of Thirteen, a few days ago, every member from the - South, including those from the Cotton States [Messrs. Toombs and - Davis,] expressed their readiness to accept the proposition of my - venerable friend from Kentucky [Mr. Crittenden] as a final settlement - of the controversy, if tendered and sustained by the Republican - members. Hence, the sole responsibility of our disagreement, and the - only difficulty in the way of an amicable adjustment, is with the - Republican party." - -Again, on the 2d March, 1861, Mr. Douglas re-affirmed this important -statement. Said he: - - "The Senator has said that if the Crittenden proposition could have - been passed early in the session, it would have saved all the States - except South Carolina. I firmly believe it would. While the Crittenden - proposition was not in accordance with my cherished views, I avowed my - readiness and eagerness to accept it, in order to save the Union, if - we could unite upon it. No man has labored harder than I have to get - it passed. I can confirm the Senator's declaration that Senator Davis - himself, when on the Committee of Thirteen, was ready at all times to - compromise on the Crittenden proposition. I will go further, and say - that Mr. Toombs was also ready to do so." - -Hon. S. S. Cox, for several years an able and eloquent member of Congress -from Ohio, has made a most interesting statement upon this subject: - - The vote on the Crittenden proposition was well defined, but is not so - well understood. From the frequency of inquiries since the war as to - this latter vote, the people were eager to know upon whom to fix the - responsibility of its failure. It may as well be stated that all other - propositions, whether of the Peace Convention or the Border State - _project_, or the measures of the committees, were comparatively of no - moment; for the Crittenden proposition was the only one which could - have arrested the struggle. It would have received a larger vote than - any other. It would have had more effect in moderating Southern - excitement. Even Davis, Toombs, and others of the Gulf States, would - have accepted it. I have talked with Mr. Crittenden frequently on this - point. Not only has he confirmed the public declarations of Douglas - and Pugh, and the speech of Toombs himself, to this effect, but he - said it was so understood in committee. At one time, while the - committee was in session, he said: "Mr. Toombs, will this compromise, - as a remedy for all wrongs and apprehensions, be acceptable to you?" - Mr. Toombs, with some profanity, replied: "Not by a good deal; but my - State will accept it, and I will follow my State to ----." And he did. - - I will not open the question whether it was wise then to offer - accommodations. It may not be profitable now to ask whether the - millions of young men whose bodies are maimed, or whose bones are - decaying under the sod of the South, and the heavy load of public debt - under which we sweat and toil, have their compensation in black - liberty. Nor will I discuss whether the blacks have been bettered by - their precipitate freedom, passing, as so many have, from slavery, - through starvation and suffering, to death. There is no comfort in the - reflection that the negroes will be exterminated with the - extermination of slavery. The real point is, could not this Union have - been made permanent by timely settlement, instead of cemented by - fraternal blood and military rule? By an equitable partition of the - territory this was possible. We had then 1,200,000 square miles. The - Crittenden proposition would have given the North 900,000 of these - square miles, and applied the Chicago doctrines to that quantity. It - would have left the remaining fourth substantially to be carved out - as free or slave States, at the option of the people when the States - were admitted. This proposition the radicals denounced. It has been - stated, to rid the Republicans of the odium of not averting the war - when that was possible, that the Northern members tendered to the - Southern the Crittenden compromise, which the South rejected. This is - untrue. It was tendered by Southern Senators and Northern Democrats to - the Republicans. It was voted upon but once in the House, when it - received eighty votes against one hundred and thirteen. These eighty - votes were exclusively Democrats and Southern Americans, like Gilmer, - Vance, and others. Mr. Briggs, of New York, was the only one not a - Democrat who voted for it. He had been an old Whig, and never a - Republican. The Republican roll, beginning with Adams and ending with - Woodruff, was a unit against it. Intermingled with them was one - Southern extremist (General Hindman) who desired no settlement. There - were many Southern men who did not vote, believing that unless the - Republicans, who were just acceding to power, favored it, its adoption - would be a delusion. - - The plan adopted by the Republican Senators to defeat it was by - amendment and postponement. On the 14th and 15th of January they cast - all their votes against its being taken up; and on the 16th, when it - came up, Mr. Clark, of New Hampshire, moved to strike it out, and - insert something which he knew would neither be successful nor - acceptable. The vote on Clark's amendment was 25 to 23; every "aye" - being a Republican, and every "no," except Kennedy and Crittenden - (Americans), being Democrats. - - When this result was announced universal gloom prevailed. The people - favored this compromise. Petitions by thousands of citizens were - showered upon Congress for its passage. Had it received a majority - only, they would have rallied and sustained those who desired peace - and union. One more earnest appeal was made to the Republicans. - General Cameron answered it by moving a reconsideration. His motion - came up on the 18th, when he voted against his own motion. It was - carried, however, over the votes of the Republicans, although Wigfall - voted with them. When it was again up on the second of March, 1861, - the Southern States were nearly all gone. Even then it was lost by one - vote only. But on that occasion all the Democrats were for, and all - the Republicans against it. The truth is, there was nothing but sneers - and skepticism from the Republicans at any settlement. They broke down - every proposition. They took the elements of conciliation out of the - Peace Convention before it assembled. Senators Harlan and Chandler - were especially active in preparing that convention for a failure. If - every Southern man and every Northern Democrat had voted for this - proposition, it would have required some nine Republicans for the - requisite two-thirds. Where were they? Dreaming with Mr. Seward of a - sixty days' struggle, or arranging for the division of the patronage - of administration. The only Southern Senators who seemed against any - settlement were Iverson and Wigfall; that no man will challenge if he - will refer to the _Globe_ (1st part, Thirty-fifth Congress, page 270) - for the testimony of Douglas and Pugh, and to Mr. Bigler's Bucks - County speech, September 17, 1863. The latter knew it to be true when - he said that-- - - "When the struggle was at its height in Georgia, between Robert - Toombs for secession, and A. H. Stephens against it, had those men - in the Committee of Thirteen, who are now so blameless in their - own estimation, given us their votes, or even three of them, - Stephens would have defeated Toombs, and secession would have been - prostrated. I heard Mr. Toombs say to Mr. Douglas that the result - in Georgia was staked on the action of the Committee of Thirteen. - If it accepted the Crittenden proposition, Stephens would defeat - him; if not, he would carry the State out by 40,000 majority. The - three votes from the Republican side would have carried it at any - time; but union and peace in the balance against the Chicago - platform were sure to be found wanting." - - If other testimony were wanting, I would ask a suspension of judgment - until those facts, better known to Southern men, transpire. The - intercourse about to be reëstablished between the sections will - cumulate the proof. It will also bring to the light many facts showing - that, while President Buchanan was working for the Peace Conference, - while Virginia had been gained to our side with her ablest men, there - were even then in the Cabinet those who not only encouraged revolt, - but foiled by letter and speech the efforts of the Unionists at - Washington and Richmond. These letters and acts are referred to in the - recent speech of General Blair. They will be, and should be brought - into the sunshine, if only to vindicate the true Union men of that - dark hour, and to condemn those who have since made so much pretension - with so much zealotry, coupled with unexampled cruelty and tyranny. - - In the light of subsequent events that policy was developed. It was - the destruction of slavery at the peril of war and disunion; or, as - Senator Douglas expressed it, "a disruption of the Union, believing it - would draw after it, as an inevitable consequence, civil war, servile - insurrections, and finally the utter extermination of slavery in all - the Southern States." - -While these fruitless efforts at compromise were in progress at -Washington, public sentiment in the South, especially in the Cotton -States, was rapidly reaching a point of exasperation, which refused to -brook longer delay in the vain hope of justice from the exultant and -unyielding North. In several of the States, so excited was popular -feeling, that within a few weeks what was originally merely a purpose of -resistance, intensified into a determination of absolute national -independence and permanent separation. South Carolina, on the 20th -December, 1860, adopted her ordinance of secession, and thus bravely gave -the example, which other States speedily followed. - -The work of secession, so thoroughly started by the opening of the new -year, was not accomplished without a severe struggle in several of the -Cotton States, in which contest, those who advocated unconditional -separation were greatly assisted by the defiant position of the Republican -party. The more sagacious Southern leaders foresaw the inevitable failure -of the movement of separation, unless it should be sustained by an -extensive coöperation among the Southern States. To secure the united -action of the Cotton States, at least, was essential to give the movement -strength and dignity. Mr. Davis, who advocated secession only in the event -of the failure to obtain reasonable guarantees, and had never proposed to -abandon the Union without an effort to save it, was a most earnest and -influential advocate of the policy of coöperation. Of great historical -importance is the fact, that the counsels of himself and those who acted -with him, were adopted in preference to a more hasty policy, which, -however ample the provocation to immediate action, would have deprived the -South of the potent justification of having forborne until "endurance -ceased to be a virtue." - -In a letter written a few days after the election of Mr. Lincoln, he thus -expressed his views: - - WARREN COUNTY, MISS., NOV. 10, 1860. - - Hon. R. B. RHETT, JR.--_Dear Sir_: I had the honor to receive, last - night, yours of the 27th ult., and hasten to reply to the inquiries - propounded. Reports of the election leave little doubt that the event - you anticipated has occurred, that electors have been chosen, securing - the election of Lincoln, and I will answer on that supposition. - - My home is so isolated that I have had no intercourse with those who - might have aided me in forming an opinion as to the effect produced on - the mind of our people by the result of the recent election, and the - impressions which I communicate are founded upon antecedent - expressions. - - 1. I doubt not that the Governor of Mississippi has convoked the - Legislature to assemble within the present month, to decide upon the - course which the State should adopt in the present emergency. Whether - the Legislature will direct the call of a convention of the State, or - appoint delegates to a convention of such Southern States as may be - willing to consult together for the adoption of a Southern plan of - action, is doubtful. - - 2. If a convention of the State were assembled, the proposition to - secede from the Union, independently of support from neighboring - States, would probably fail. - - 3. If South Carolina should first secede, and she alone should take - such action, the position of Mississippi would not probably be changed - by that fact. A powerful obstacle to the separate action of - Mississippi is the want of a port; from which follows the consequence - that her trade, being still conducted through the ports of the Union, - her revenue would be diverted from her own support to that of a - foreign government; and being geographically unconnected with South - Carolina, an alliance with her would not vary that state of the case. - [_Sic._] - - 4. The propriety of separate secession by South Carolina depends so - much upon collateral questions that I find it difficult to respond to - your last inquiry, for the want of knowledge which would enable me to - estimate the value of the elements involved in the issue, though - exterior to your State. Georgia is necessary to connect you with - Alabama, and thus to make effectual the coöperation of Mississippi. If - Georgia would be lost by immediate action, but could be gained by - delay, it seems clear to me that you should wait. If the secession of - South Carolina should be followed by an attempt to coerce her back - into the Union, that act of usurpation, folly, and wickedness would - enlist every true Southern man for her defense. If it were attempted - to blockade her ports and destroy her trade, a like result would be - produced, and the commercial world would probably be added to her - allies. It is probable that neither of those measures would be adopted - by any administration, but that Federal ships would be sent to collect - the duties on imports outside of the bar; that the commercial nations - would feel little interest in that; and the Southern States would have - little power to counteract it. - - The planting States have a common interest of such magnitude, that - their union, sooner or later, for the protection of that interest, is - certain. United they will have ample power for their own protection, - and their exports will make for them allies of all commercial and - manufacturing powers. - - The new States have a heterogeneous population, and will be slower and - less unanimous than those in which there is less of the Northern - element in the body politic, but interest controls the policy of - States, and finally all the planting communities must reach the same - conclusion. _My opinion is, therefore, as it has been, in favor of - seeking to bring those States into coöperation before asking for a - popular decision upon a new policy and relation to the nations of the - earth._ If South Carolina should resolve to secede before that - coöperation can be obtained, to go out leaving Georgia, and Alabama, - and Louisiana in the Union, and without any reason to suppose they - will follow her, there appears to me to be no advantage in waiting - until the Government has passed into hostile hands, and men have - become familiarized to that injurious and offensive perversion of the - General Government from the ends for which it was established. I have - written with the freedom and carelessness of private correspondence, - and regret that I could not give more precise information. - - Very respectfully, yours, etc., - JEFFERSON DAVIS. - -Mr. Davis remained in the Senate, a friend of peace, and, until the last -moment, laboring for adjustment, when he received the summons of -Mississippi, forbidding the longer exercise of the trust which she had -given to his keeping. Mississippi seceded on the 9th of January, 1861. Mr. -Davis, receiving formal announcement of the event, withdrew on the 21st, -after pronouncing an impressive valedictory to the Senate. Its dignified, -courteous, and statesman-like character has challenged the unqualified -eulogy of the enlightened world. - - SPEECH OF HON. JEFFERSON DAVIS, ON WITHDRAWING FROM THE U. S. SENATE. - JAN. 21, 1861. - - MR. DAVIS. I rise, Mr. President, for the purpose of announcing to the - Senate that I have satisfactory evidence that the State of - Mississippi, by a solemn ordinance of her people, in convention - assembled, has declared her separation from the United States. Under - these circumstances, of course, my functions are terminated here. It - has seemed to me proper, however, that I should appear in the Senate - to announce that fact to my associates, and I will say but very little - more. The occasion does not invite me to go into argument; and my - physical condition would not permit me to do so, if otherwise; and yet - it seems to become me to say something on the part of a State I here - represent, on an occasion so solemn as this. - - It is known to Senators who have served with me here, that I have, for - many years, advocated, as an essential attribute of State sovereignty, - the right of a State to secede from the Union. Therefore, if I had not - believed there was justifiable cause; if I had thought that - Mississippi was acting without sufficient provocation, or without an - existing necessity, I should still, under my theory of the Government, - because of my allegiance to the State of which I am a citizen, have - been bound by her action. I, however, may be permitted to say that I - do think she has justifiable cause, and I approve of her act. I - conferred with her people before that act was taken, counseled them - then that if the state of things which they apprehended should exist - when the convention met, they should take the action which they have - now adopted. - - I hope none who hear me will confound this expression of mine with the - advocacy of the right of a State to remain in the Union, and to - disregard its constitutional obligations by the nullification of the - law. Such is not my theory. Nullification and secession, so often - confounded, are, indeed, antagonistic principles. Nullification is a - remedy which it is sought to apply within the Union, and against the - agent of the States. It is only to be justified when the agent has - violated his constitutional obligations, and a State, assuming to - judge for itself, denies the right of the agent thus to act, and - appeals to the other States of the Union for a decision; but when the - States themselves, and when the people of the States, have so acted as - to convince us that they will not regard our constitutional rights, - then, and then for the first time, arises the doctrine of secession in - its practical application. - - A great man, who now reposes with his fathers, and who has often been - arraigned for a want of fealty to the Union, advocated the doctrine of - nullification because it preserved the Union. It was because of his - deep-seated attachment to the Union--his determination to find some - remedy for existing ills short of a severance of the ties which bound - South Carolina to the other States, that Mr. Calhoun advocated the - doctrine of nullification, which he proclaimed to be peaceful--to be - within the limits of State power, not to disturb the Union, but only - to be a means of bringing the agent before the tribunal of the States - for their judgment. - - Secession belongs to a different class of remedies. It is to be - justified upon the basis that the States are sovereign. There was a - time when none denied it. I hope the time may come again, when a - better comprehension of the theory of our Government, and the - inalienable rights of the people of the States, will prevent any one - from denying that each State is a sovereign, and thus may reclaim the - grants which it has made to any agent whomsoever. - - I, therefore, say I concur in the action of the people of Mississippi, - believing it to be necessary and proper, and should have been bound by - their action if my belief had been otherwise; and this brings me to - the important point which I wish, on this last occasion, to present to - the Senate. It is by this confounding of nullification and secession, - that the name of a great man, whose ashes now mingle with his mother - earth, has been evoked to justify coercion against a seceded State. - The phrase, "to execute the laws," was an expression which General - Jackson applied to the case of a State refusing to obey the laws while - yet a member of the Union. That is not the case which is now - presented. The laws are to be executed over the United States, and - upon the people of the United States. They have no relation to any - foreign country. It is a perversion of terms--at least it is a great - misapprehension of the case--which cites that expression for - application to a State which has withdrawn from the Union. You may - make war on a foreign State. If it be the purpose of gentlemen, they - may make war against a State which has withdrawn from the Union; but - there are no laws of the United States to be executed within the - limits of a seceded State. A State, finding herself in the condition - in which Mississippi has judged she is--in which her safety requires - that she should provide for the maintenance of her rights out of the - Union--surrenders all the benefits (and they are known to be many), - deprives herself of the advantages (and they are known to be great), - severs all the ties of affection (and they are close and enduring), - which have bound her to the Union; and thus divesting herself of every - benefit--taking upon herself every burden--she claims to be exempt - from any power to execute the laws of the United States within her - limits. - - I well remember an occasion when Massachusetts was arraigned before - the bar of the Senate, and when the doctrine of coercion was rife, and - to be applied against her, because of the rescue of a fugitive slave - in Boston. My opinion then was the same that it is now. Not in a - spirit of egotism, but to show that I am not influenced, in my - opinion, because the case is my own, I refer to that time and that - occasion, as containing the opinion which I then entertained, and on - which my present conduct is based. I then said that if Massachusetts, - following her through a stated line of conduct, choose to take the - last step which separates her from the Union, it is her right to go, - and I will neither vote one dollar nor one man to coerce her back; but - will say to her, God speed, in memory of the kind associations which - once existed between her and the other States. - - It has been a conviction of pressing necessity--it has been a belief - that we are to be deprived, in the Union, of the rights which our - fathers bequeathed to us--which has brought Mississippi into her - present decision. She has heard proclaimed the theory that all men are - created free and equal, and this made the basis of an attack upon her - social institutions; and the sacred Declaration of Independence has - been invoked to maintain the position of the equality of the races. - The Declaration of Independence is to be construed by the - circumstances and purposes for which it was made. The communities were - declaring their independence; the people of those communities were - asserting that no man was born, to use the language of Mr. Jefferson, - booted and spurred, to ride over the rest of mankind; that men were - created equal--meaning the men of the political community; that there - was no divine right to rule; that no man inherited the right to - govern; that there were no classes by which power and place descended - to families; but that all stations were equally within the grasp of - each member of the body politic. These were the great principles they - announced; these were the purposes for which they made their - declaration; these were the ends to which their enunciation was - directed. They have no reference to the slave; else, how happened it, - that, among the items of arraignment against George III, was, that he - endeavored to do just what the North has been endeavoring of late to - do, to stir up insurrection among our slaves. Had the Declaration - announced that the negroes were free and equal, how was the prince to - be arraigned for raising up insurrection among them? And how was this - to be enumerated among the high crimes which caused the colonies to - sever their connection with the mother country? When our Constitution - was formed, the same idea was rendered more palpable; for there we - find provision made for that very class of persons as property; they - were not put upon the footing of equality with white men--not even - upon that of paupers and convicts; but, so far as representation was - concerned, were discriminated against as a lower caste, only to be - represented in the numerical proportion of three-fifths. - - Then, Senators, we recur to the compact which binds us together; we - recur to the principles upon which our Government was founded; and - when you deny them, and when you deny to us the right to withdraw from - a government, which, thus perverted, threatens to be destructive of - our rights, we but tread in the path of our fathers when we proclaim - our independence, and take the hazard. This is done, not in hostility - to others--not to injure any section of the country--not even for our - own pecuniary benefit; but from the high and solemn motive of - defending and protecting the rights we inherited, and which it is our - duty to transmit unshorn to our children. - - I find in myself, perhaps, a type of the general feeling of my - constituents toward yours. I am sure I feel no hostility toward you, - Senators from the North. I am sure there is not one of you, whatever - sharp discussion there may have been between us, to whom I can not now - say, in the presence of my God, I wish you well; and such, I am sure, - is the feeling of the people whom I represent toward those whom you - represent. I, therefore, feel that I but express their desire, when I - say I hope, and they hope, for peaceable relations with you, though we - must part. They may be mutually beneficial to us in the future, as - they have been in the past, if you so will it. The reverse may bring - disaster on every portion of the country; and if you will have it - thus, we will invoke the God of our fathers, who delivered them from - the power of the lion, to protect us from the ravages of the bear; and - thus, putting our trust in God, and in our firm hearts and strong - arms, we will vindicate the right as best we may. - - In the course of my service here, associated, at different times, with - a great variety of Senators, I see now around me some with whom I have - served long; there have been points of collision, but whatever of - offense there has been to me, I leave here--I carry with me no hostile - remembrance. Whatever offense I have given, which has not been - redressed, or for which satisfaction has not been demanded, I have, - Senators, in this hour of our parting, to offer you my apology for any - pain which, in the heat of discussion, I have inflicted. I go hence - unincumbered of the remembrance of any injury received, and having - discharged the duty of making the only reparation in my power for any - injury offered. - - Mr. President and Senators, having made the announcement which the - occasion seemed to me to require, it only remains for me to bid you a - final adieu. - -A frequent accusation alleged against Mr. Davis and other Southern -Senators who adopted his course of a formal withdrawal from the Senate, is -that they thus gave the Republican party control of the Senate, and -voluntarily surrendered its power to the hostile administration soon to be -inaugurated. It is a sufficient answer to this statement that the mere -admission that the administration was hostile to Southern interests, and -menacing to Southern safety and honor, or even that the South had good -reason for so believing, is to fix the responsibility of disunion -elsewhere than upon the Southern leaders. - -To have retained his seat under such circumstances would have been -altogether inconsistent with Mr. Davis' conception of the nature of the -position. He was committed, by public announcement, to a very different -view of the obligations of the representative of a State in the Federal -Congress. Holding it to be a point of honor not to occupy such a relation, -with the object of hostility to the Government, years ago he announced, in -connection with an allusion to a calumnious insinuation, that he would -answer in monosyllables the man who would charge him with being a -disunionist. - -Entertaining his view of the character of the American political system, -of which the foundation was the doctrine of a paramount allegiance of the -citizen to his State, when Mississippi withdrew from the Union, he had no -other alternative than to vacate the position which he held by her -commission, and which was, at once, the sign of the equality and -sovereignty of the States, and of the adherence of each to the league by -which she was united to the others. To represent a State adhering to the -Union, and use the position to make war upon the Government, or to retain -a seat in Congress when the State had, by its sovereign fiat, revoked its -grants, and withdrawn from the league, were offenses belonging to the last -stage of decadence in political morality and personal honor. - -Retiring from the Senate, Mr. Davis returned, within a few days -thereafter, to his residence in Mississippi. The State was not unmindful -of the necessity of preparations for a war which, though not deemed -inevitable, was yet extremely probable. Mr. Davis was honored by an -appointment to the command of the militia of the State, with the rank of -Major-General. His retirement upon his plantation thus promised to be of -short duration, but before he could assume the responsibilities which -Mississippi, in this reiteration of her confidence, had conferred, the -voice of millions invoked his guidance of their destinies in the hazardous -experiment of independent national existence. - -Secession, in its rapid progress, confirmed the threadbare theory of the -progressive tendency of revolutionary movements. Acquiring impetus as it -advanced, before the first of February, 1861, six States had declared -themselves no longer members of the Union.[20] Representatives from these -States met, in convention, at Montgomery, Alabama, on 4th February, 1861, -for the purpose of forming a provisional government. On the 8th February, -this body adopted a constitution, and proclaimed an addition to the family -of nations, under the title of THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA. - -The next day the Congress of the Confederate States announced its choice -of the two highest constitutional officers of the new Government: - - President, JEFFERSON DAVIS, of Mississippi. - - Vice-President, ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, of Georgia. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - - THE CONFEDERACY ESTABLISHED AND IN OPERATION--CALMNESS AND MODERATION - OF THE SOUTH--THE MONTGOMERY CONSTITUTION--THE IMPROVEMENTS UPON THE - FEDERAL INSTRUMENT--POPULAR DELIGHT AT THE SELECTION OF MR. DAVIS AS - PRESIDENT--MOTIVES OF HIS ACCEPTANCE--HIS PREFERENCE FOR THE ARMY-- - DAVIS THE SYMBOL OF SOUTHERN CHARACTER AND HOPES--ON HIS WAY TO - MONTGOMERY--A CONTRAST--INAUGURATION AND INAUGURAL ADDRESS--THE - CONFEDERATE CABINET--TOOMBS--WALKER--MEMMINGER--BENJAMIN--MALLORY-- - REAGAN--HISTORICAL POSITION OF PRESIDENT DAVIS--THE TWO POWERS-- - EXTREME DEMOCRACY OF THE NORTH--NOBLE IDEAL OF REPUBLICANISM CHERISHED - BY THE SOUTH--DAVIS' REPRESENTATIVE QUALITIES AND DISTINGUISHED - SERVICES--THE HISTORIC REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CONFEDERATE CAUSE--EARLY - HISTORY OF THE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY--CONFIDENCE IN PRESIDENT DAVIS - UNLIMITED--PRESIDENT DAVIS' ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY--HIS MILITARY - ADMINISTRATION--THE CONFEDERATE ARMY--WEST POINT--NEGOTIATIONS FOR - SURRENDER OF FORTS SUMTER AND PICKENS--MR. BUCHANAN'S PITIABLE - POLICY--THE ISSUE OF PEACE OR WAR--PERFIDIOUS COURSE OF THE LINCOLN - ADMINISTRATION--MR. SEWARD'S DALLIANCE WITH THE CONFEDERATE - COMMISSIONERS--HIS DECEPTIONS--THE EXPEDITION TO PROVISION THE - GARRISON OF SUMTER--REDUCTION OF THE FORT--WAR--GUILT OF THE - NORTH--ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR. - - -Thus, without the disorder of anarchy, and without the violence of armed -conflict, a new and imposing structure of state was speedily erected from -the separated fragments. The event was indeed unparalleled, and, to the -mind of the world, unused to the novel spectacle of the dismemberment of -an empire, except as the consummation of years of bloodshed, its -philosophy was difficult of comprehension. - -The sixth of November, 1860, was the ominous day upon which the -revolution, so long threatened, and so often deferred by Southern -concession and sacrifice, was inaugurated. Upon that day, with the -election of Abraham Lincoln, was opened a new volume in American history. -Upon that day, the American Union, "formed to establish justice," resting -upon the principle of equality as its foundation-stone, passed under the -control of an arrogant majority, pledged to its perversion, to the -oppression of nearly one-half its members. From the profession of -fraternity, and the outward pretense of comity, it passed under the -domination of principles whose origin was discord and whose logical result -was dissolution. - -The answer of those who were threatened most seriously by this subversion -of the Government of their fathers, though well considered, neither -debated with passion, nor concluded with rashness, was worthy of men--the -descendants of the authors of American Independence, and educated in that -political school which teaches the assertion of the rights of the few -against the power of the many. A manly resistance, such as only threatened -degradation inspires in the bosoms of freemen, which the insolence of -faction had long defied and a conscious physical superiority had haughtily -derided, was, at length, thoroughly aroused. Within a few months, the -revolutionary movement, begun in November, and pressed, by its authors, to -its inevitable consequences, had reached the important result of a -withdrawal of nearly one-fourth of the States constituting the American -Union. - -The new government, in the incidents attending its construction and -setting in operation, fully vindicated the earnest and conscientious -convictions of the people who had called it into existence. The absence of -tumult and of all passionate display, at Montgomery, was in marked -contrast with the indecent exultation witnessed at Washington from the -adherents of the incoming administration. The calmness, moderation, and -evident earnestness of purpose which prevailed at the South, and was thus -manifested by those who were intrusted with the framing of the new -government, impressed the world to an extent that prepared it to entertain -a sympathy for the Southern cause not to have been expected from the -prevalent, though erroneous, impressions of foreigners respecting the -merits of the sectional quarrel in America. - -That secession was not a revolutionary movement, but merely the necessary -defense of a people threatened with material ruin and political -degradation, by a revolution which had already been consummated, was amply -demonstrated by its immediate consequences. The Confederate leaders, at -Montgomery, exhibited an almost religious veneration for the spirit, -forms, and associations of the government which they had abandoned. The -strict adherence of the Montgomery Constitution to the features of the -Federal instrument, indicates the absurdity of the impression that it was -a proclamation of revolution; and the circumstances of its adoption are -totally inconsistent with a correct conception of the conduct of an -insurgent body. - -It was a signal improvement upon the original American Constitution, and -the few alterations made were commended by enlightened and conservative -intellects every-where, as necessary changes in the perfection of the -American polity. The object sought, and successfully consummated, was to -embody every valuable principle of the old Constitution with certain -remedial provisions for the correction of obvious evils, which experience -had fully indicated. Among these changes, which were universally -recognized as of the utmost value, were provisions making the Presidential -term six years, instead of four, as under the old system, and precluding -reëlection; permitting cabinet ministers to participate in the debates of -Congress, and the virtual abolition of the pernicious system of removing -all officials, of whatever degree, upon each advent of a new -administration. The Confederate Constitution positively prohibited the -African slave-trade, which the Federal Constitution had failed to do. A -striking provision, and one never before avowed in any similar instrument, -was the prohibition of duties for the purpose of protection. There was, -indeed, nothing whatever in the Montgomery instrument which a candid and -enlightened public sentiment, even at the North, might not have fully -approved, excepting the ample and avowed protection to property in slaves. -This, it was claimed, was not an alteration of the old Constitution, but -merely a formal interpretation of its obvious purpose. - -In no respect was the action of the new Confederacy deemed more fortunate -than in the selection of its leader. That, in the choice of Mr. Davis as -President, the Congress only responded to the preconceived choice of the -Southern people, was attested by the spontaneous acclamation with which -the announcement was received. Even those who had been in doubt as to the -proper personage to endow with the powers and responsibilities of a -position, at once the most onerous, and, looking to the contingencies of -the early future, a long and sanguinary war, with the chances of a -disastrous termination, the most precarious of modern times, yielded -hearty recognition of the wise selection of the Congress. - -The responsibilities and difficulties of the trust, did not suggest to Mr. -Davis hesitation as to its acceptance. If this, the highest distinction -which public appreciation had yet tendered him should prove a forlorn -hope, his sense of duty would no more permit hesitation than in the -assumption of more cheaply-earned honors. Entertaining no purpose of -inglorious ease, amid the trials and perils, which, with a prevision, -rare, indeed, at that period, he already anticipated, his own preference -was for a different station of public service. Months subsequently he -indicated the post of danger as the post of duty to which he had aspired -in that gigantic struggle through which his country must pass to the -assurance of independence. "I then imagined," said he, "that it might be -my fortune again to lead Mississippians in the field, and to be with them -where danger was to be braved and glory won. I thought to find that place -which I believed to be suited to my capacity--that of an officer in the -service of the State of Mississippi."[21] - -Of the public conviction as to his preëminent fitness, there could not be -a question. His character, his abilities, his military education and -experience, had long been recognized throughout the Union, and his exalted -reputation was a source of just pride to the South. No Southern statesman -presented so admirable a combination of purity, dignity, firmness, -devotion, and skill--qualities for which there is an inexorable demand in -revolutionary periods. William Tell, with his cross-bow and apple, to the -rustic simplicity of the Swiss, was the very embodiment of the genius of -liberty. Far beyond any influence of fiction was the magic potency of the -red shirt and felt hat of Garibaldi to imaginative Italy; and Washington, -as Lamartine said, with his sword and the law, was the symbol standing -erect at the cradle of American liberty. Equally with the greatest of -these prototypes was Jefferson Davis, the symbol of the noble aspirations -of the proud, impulsive, chivalrous race which confided to him the conduct -of its destinies through the wilderness of revolution to the goal of -independence and nationality beyond. He did not seek the position; had not -been conspicuous in flaming exhortations to popular assemblies; had not -employed any of the arts of the demagogue--of flattery or cajolery of the -masses into a false and extravagant estimate of his qualities; but before -the world were his character, fame, and services, in unadorned simplicity, -painted only in the severe colors of truth. It was the tribute to virtue, -most to be valued when unsought; the award of honor, only appropriate when -merited and becomingly worn. - -Mr. Davis' assumption of his trust was characterized by a dignity, absence -of ostentation, and profound appreciation of its delicate nature, in the -highest degree imposing. From it was augured such a worthy administration -of public affairs as would secure for the Confederacy, if permitted the -blessings of peace, an enviable position among the nations of the earth. -But his first announcement of its policy indicated his appreciation of the -danger of war, in which its utmost exertions would be required to -vindicate the independence which the States had declared. To the heroic -maintenance of that position he committed himself by the most emphatic -avowals; and in whatever contingency, whether of peace or war, his purpose -was one of deathless resistence to any denial of the right of -self-government, which his fellow-citizens had exercised. - -Informed of his election, Mr. Davis immediately left his home for the seat -of government. Along the route to Montgomery he was greeted, by the -people, with every possible demonstration of patriotic enthusiasm and -personal regard. In response to these demonstrations, he at several -points addressed the people in terms of characteristic eloquence, dignity -and moderation. - -Proud, indeed, must ever be, to the Southern people, the contrast of the -noble bearing of their chosen ruler with the display of vulgarity -attending the journey of Mr. Lincoln from Springfield to Washington. These -two men--the one with the calm dignity of the statesman and the polished -bearing of the gentleman; the other with coarse jests and buffoonery, upon -the eve of the most important event in their individual history, and -pregnant with significance to millions--were no bad indices of the -civilization of their respective sections. - -Arriving in Montgomery, Mr. Davis was inaugurated on the 18th February, -with a simplicity of ceremony, an absence of personal inflation, and a -degree of popular enthusiasm, which well befitted the formal assertion of -true republican liberty, equally protected against the license of mobs and -the usurpations of tyrants. The ceremonies of inauguration were little -more than the taking of the oath of office and the delivery of the -inaugural address. The inaugural of President Davis is unquestionably of -the highest order of state papers. As a model of composition, it is rarely -equaled; and its statement of the position of the South, the grievances -which had led to the assumption of that position, her hopes, aspirations, -and purposes, has never been surpassed in power and perspicuity, by any -similar document. - - INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT DAVIS, DELIVERED AT THE CAPITOL, - MONDAY, FEB. 18, 1861. - - _Gentlemen of the Congress of the Confederate States of America; - Friends and Fellow-Citizens_: - - Called to the difficult and responsible station of Chief Executive of - the Provisional Government which you have instituted, I approach the - discharge of the duties assigned to me with an humble distrust of my - abilities, but with a sustaining confidence in the wisdom of those who - are to guide and aid me in the administration of public affairs, and - an abiding faith in the virtue and patriotism of the people. - - Looking forward to the speedy establishment of a permanent government - to take the place of this, and which, by its greater moral and - physical power, will be better able to combat with the many - difficulties which arise from the conflicting interests of separate - nations, I enter upon the duties of the office, to which I have been - chosen, with the hope that the beginning of our career, as a - Confederacy, may not be obstructed by hostile opposition to our - enjoyment of the separate existence and independence which we have - asserted, and, with the blessing of Providence, intend to maintain. - Our present condition, achieved in a manner unprecedented in the - history of nations, illustrates the American idea that governments - rest upon the consent of the governed, and that it is the right of the - people to alter or abolish governments whenever they become - destructive of the ends for which they were established. - - The declared purpose of the compact of union from which we have - withdrawn, was "to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, - provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and - secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and posterity;" and when, - in the judgment of the sovereign States now composing this - Confederacy, it had been perverted from the purposes for which it was - ordained, and had ceased to answer the ends for which it was - established, a peaceful appeal to the ballot-box, declared, that so - far as they were concerned, the government created by that compact - should cease to exist. In this they merely asserted a right which the - Declaration of Independence of 1776 had defined to be inalienable. Of - the time and occasion for its exercise, they, as sovereigns, were the - final judges, each for itself. The impartial and enlightened verdict - of mankind will vindicate the rectitude of our conduct, and He, who - knows the hearts of men, will judge of the sincerity with which we - labored to preserve the government of our fathers in its spirit. The - right solemnly proclaimed at the birth of the States, and which has - been affirmed and re-affirmed in the bills of rights of States - subsequently admitted into the Union of 1789, undeniably recognizes in - the people the power to resume the authority delegated for the - purposes of government. Thus the sovereign States, here represented, - proceeded to form this Confederacy, and it is by abuse of language - that their act has been denominated a revolution. They formed a new - alliance, but within each State its government has remained, and the - rights of person and property have not been disturbed. The agent, - through whom they communicated with foreign nations, is changed; but - this does not necessarily interrupt their international relations. - - Sustained by the consciousness that the transition from the former - Union to the present Confederacy, has not proceeded from a disregard - on our part of just obligations, or any failure to perform any - constitutional duty; moved by no interest or passion to invade the - rights of others; anxious to cultivate peace and commerce with all - nations, if we may not hope to avoid war, we may at least expect that - posterity will acquit us of having needlessly engaged in it. Doubly - justified by the absence of wrong on our part, and by wanton - aggression on the part of others, there can be no cause to doubt that - the courage and patriotism of the people of the Confederate States - will be found equal to any measures of defense which honor and - security may require. - - An agricultural people, whose chief interest is the export of a - commodity required in every manufacturing country, our true policy is - peace and the freest trade which our necessities will permit. It is - alike our interest, and that of all those to whom we would sell and - from whom we would buy, that there should be the fewest practicable - restrictions upon the interchange of commodities. There can be but - little rivalry between ours and any manufacturing or navigating - community, such as the North-eastern States of the American Union. It - must follow, therefore, that a mutual interest would invite good will - and kind offices. If, however, passion or the lust of dominion should - cloud the judgment or inflame the ambition of those States, we must - prepare to meet the emergency, and to maintain, by the final - arbitrament of the sword, the position which we have assumed among the - nations of the earth. We have entered upon the career of independence, - and it must be inflexibly pursued. Through many years of controversy - with our late associates, the Northern States, we have vainly - endeavored to secure tranquillity, and to obtain respect for the - rights to which we were entitled. As a necessity, not a choice, we - have resorted to the remedy of separation; and henceforth our energies - must be directed to the conduct of our own affairs, and the perpetuity - of the Confederacy which we have formed. If a just perception of - mutual interest shall permit us peaceably to pursue our separate - political career, my most earnest desire will have been fulfilled; but - if this be denied to us, and the integrity of our territory and - jurisdiction be assailed, it will but remain for us, with firm - resolve, to appeal to arms and invoke the blessings of Providence on a - just cause. - - As a consequence of our new condition, and with a view to meet - anticipated wants, it will be necessary to provide for the speedy and - efficient organization of branches of the Executive Department, - having special charge of foreign intercourse, finance, military - affairs, and the postal service. - - For purposes of defense, the Confederate States may, under ordinary - circumstances, rely mainly upon the militia; but it is deemed - advisable, in the present condition of affairs, that there should be a - well-instructed and disciplined army, more numerous than would usually - be required on a peace establishment. I also suggest that, for the - protection of our harbors and commerce on the high seas, a navy - adapted to those objects will be required. These necessities have - doubtless engaged the attention of Congress. - - With a Constitution differing only from that of our fathers, in so far - as it is explanatory of their well-known intent, freed from the - sectional conflicts which have interfered with the pursuit of the - general welfare, it is not unreasonable to expect that States, from - which we have recently parted, may seek to unite their fortunes with - ours under the government which we have instituted. For this your - Constitution makes adequate provision; but beyond this, if I mistake - not the judgment and will of the people, a reunion with the States - from which we have separated is neither practicable nor desirable. To - increase the power, develop the resources, and promote the happiness - of the Confederacy, it is requisite that there should be so much of - homogeneity that the welfare of every portion shall be the aim of the - whole. Where this does not exist, antagonisms are engendered which - must and should result in separation. - - Actuated solely by the desire to preserve our own rights and promote - our own welfare, the separation of the Confederate States has been - marked by no aggression upon others, and followed by no domestic - convulsion. Our industrial pursuits have received no check; the - cultivation of our fields has progressed as heretofore; and even - should we be involved in war, there would be no considerable - diminution in the production of the staples which have constituted our - exports, and in which the commercial world has an interest scarcely - less than our own. This common interest of the producer and consumer - can only be interrupted by an exterior force, which should obstruct - its transmission to foreign markets--a course of conduct which would - be as unjust toward us as it would be detrimental to manufacturing and - commercial interests abroad. Should reason guide the action of the - Government from which we have separated, a policy so detrimental to - the civilized world, the Northern States included, could not be - dictated by even the strongest desire to inflict injury upon us; but - if otherwise, a terrible responsibility will rest upon it, and the - suffering of millions will bear testimony to the folly and wickedness - of our aggressors. In the meantime, there will remain to us, besides - the ordinary means before suggested, the well-known resources for - retaliation upon the commerce of an enemy. - - Experience in public stations, of subordinate grade to this which your - kindness has conferred, has taught me that care, and toil, and - disappointment, are the price of official elevation. You will see many - errors to forgive, many deficiencies to tolerate, but you shall not - find in me either a want of zeal or fidelity to the cause that is to - me highest in hope and of most enduring affection. Your generosity has - bestowed upon me an undeserved distinction--one which I neither sought - nor desired. Upon the continuance of that sentiment, and upon your - wisdom and patriotism, I rely to direct and support me in the - performance of the duty required at my hands. - - We have changed the constituent parts but not the system of our - Government. The Constitution formed by our fathers is that of these - Confederate States, in their exposition of it; and, in the judicial - construction it has received, we have a light which reveals its true - meaning. - - Thus instructed as to the just interpretation of the instrument, and - ever remembering that all offices are but trusts held for the people, - and that delegated powers are to be strictly construed, I will hope, - by due diligence in the performance of my duties, though I may - disappoint your expectations, yet to retain, when retiring, something - of the good-will and confidence which welcomed my entrance into - office. - - It is joyous, in the midst of perilous times, to look around upon a - people united in heart, where one purpose of high resolve animates and - actuates the whole--where the sacrifices to be made are not weighed in - the balance against honor, and right, and liberty, and equality. - Obstacles may retard--they can not long prevent--the progress of a - movement sanctified by its justice, and sustained by a virtuous - people. Reverently let us invoke the God of our fathers to guide and - protect us in our efforts to perpetuate the principles which, by his - blessing, they were able to vindicate, establish, and transmit to - their posterity, and with a continuance of His favor, ever gratefully - acknowledged, we may hopefully look forward to success, to peace, and - to prosperity. - -Working in great harmony between its executive and legislative -departments, the new government, within a very few weeks, presented an -extraordinary spectacle of compact organization, though in all its parts -it was yet purely provisional. The Cabinet announced by the President, -embraced, for the most part, names well known to the country in connection -with important public trusts. It may not be inappropriate to speak briefly -here of those who sustained to President Davis the close relations of -constitutional advisers. - -Mr. Robert Toombs, the Secretary of State, was indebted for his -appointment not less to the position of his State, the first in rank in -the Confederacy, than to the public appreciation of his abilities. For -several years he had represented Georgia in the United States Senate, and -in that body his reputation was very high as a debater and orator. His -oratory, however, was a good index of his mind and disposition, strong and -impassioned, but desultory, vehement and blustering. Mr. Toombs had -contributed largely to prepare the people of Georgia for secession, and -his fierce and persistent eloquence had greatly accelerated the movement. -His capacity for agitation and destruction was indeed immeasurably -superior to any qualification that he may have had for reconstructing the -broken and scattered fragments of the governmental column. Restless, -arrogant, and intolerant--a born destructive and inveterate agitator--Mr. -Toombs speedily demonstrated his deficiency in statesmanship. His -connection with the Confederate Cabinet was of brief duration, and his -subsequent military service undistinguished. The War Department--the -second post of distinction in the Cabinet--was given to Alabama, the -second State of the Confederacy, in the person of Mr. Leroy P. Walker. His -connection with the Government, like that of Mr. Toombs, was brief, and -wholly unmarked by evidence of fitness. Mr. Memminger, of South Carolina, -the Secretary of the Treasury, made an exceedingly unpopular officer, and, -as the sequel demonstrated, was incompetent to the delicate task of -financial management. The Attorney-General, Mr. Benjamin, of Louisiana, an -eminent lawyer and a prominent Senator, was, beyond all question, the -ablest of Mr. Davis' Cabinet. He was a man of marvelous intellectual -resources, an orator, a lawyer, and gifted, to an unexampled degree, in -the varied attributes, entering into the _savior faire_ of politics and -diplomacy. Mr. Benjamin continued the trusted counselor of President Davis -during the whole period of his authority. Mr. Mallory, of Florida, was the -Secretary of the Navy--a gentleman of excellent sense, unpretending -manners, who probably conducted his department as successfully as was -possible, with the limited naval resources of the South. The Post-office -Department was given to Mr. Reagan, of Texas, noted for his fidelity, -industry, and good sense. - -The Cabinet of President Davis was destined to many changes in the -progress of subsequent events. Of those originally appointed, Messrs. -Benjamin, Mallory, and Reagan continued their connection with the -Confederate Government during the entire period of its existence. The -brief experiment of Confederate independence was fruitful in illustrations -of the important truth that political distinction achieved in the ordinary -struggles of parties, in times of profound peace, is not the sure -guarantee of the possession of those especial and peculiar qualifications -which befit the circumstances of revolution. That President Davis, in the -selection of some of his advisers, was at fault, is to be ascribed rather -to the novelty and necessities of the public situation than to errors of -his judgment. Not only must public sentiment respecting men be to some -extent consulted, but the test of experience must, necessarily, after all, -determine the question of fitness, where all were untried. - -Jefferson Davis now occupied a position in the highest sense historical. -It was plain that his name was destined to be indelibly associated with a -series of incidents forming a most thrilling and instructive episode in -political history. As the exponent of a theory of constitutional -principles never asserted, and unknown save through the inspiration of the -genius of American Liberty, and as the head of a Government whose birth -and destiny must enter conspicuously into all future questions of popular -government, he stood, in a double sense, the central figure in a most -striking phase of the drama of human progress. Splendid as had been -American history until that day, it was now to contribute, still more -generously, to the illumination of the great truths of political science. - -The issue was again to be joined between constitutional freedom and the -odious despotism of an enthroned mob. On the one side were asserted the -principles of regulated liberty, without which free government can never -be stable--order, allegiance, and reverence for law and authority. On the -other, the wild passions of an infuriated populace, hurling down the -restraints of law, shattering constitutions; and when its frenzied lust -had been satiated by the destruction of every accessible image of virtue -and order, transferring supreme power from its polluted grasp to the hands -of demagogues--capable agents of the depraved will which invests them with -authority. - -Such was really a faithful contrast of the two powers which were now -inaugurated in what had been the United States. It was still the old Greek -question of the "few or the many," the "King Numbers" of the North against -the conservatism of the South. The old contest was to be revived, of Cleon -and Nicias, in the Athenian Agora, and struggling on through the political -battle-fields of free governments in all ages. - -It is not an abuse of language to characterize the North as realizing the -_ultra_ theory of popular government. Its political fabric rests -exclusively upon the Utopian conception of an intelligence and integrity -in the masses which they have never been known to possess. Carrying out -its pernicious construction of the doctrine of the Declaration of -Independence, that "all men are born free and equal," it professes to hold -in light esteem the obvious distinctions of race, property, and color. -Earnestly devoted to the successful illustration of the experiment of -Democracy, it has sedulously directed its social and political development -to the overthrow of caste, the obliteration of necessary social -distinctions, and the practical assertion of the principle of absolute -social, political, and personal equality among all men. The election of -Lincoln was the grand, decisive triumph of these tendencies. He went into -power as the avowed champion of the interests of the poor and laboring -classes, which he declared to be in conflict with those of the -slave-holding aristocrats of the South. Entirely undistinguished, with no -political record, his popularity was based upon his vulgar antecedents--no -slight recommendation to the populace, gratified at the prospective -promotion of one of its own class. - -A free society, politically, in which wealth and distinction were debarred -to none, the aristocratic influences of slavery were the propitious -inducements in the South, to the cultivation of that personal dignity -which marks the refinement of rank, in contradistinction to the vulgar -pretensions and affectation of a mere aristocracy of money. The patrician -society of the South sought the noblest type of republicanism--regulated -liberty--beyond the influence of ignorant and fanatical mobs, that perfect -order which reposes securely upon virtue, intelligence, and interested -attachment, which all human experience teaches are the only reliable -safeguards of freedom. - -The noblest achievement of constitutional liberty would have been the -realization of the Southern ideal of republicanism. The success and -beneficence of such a government would have been in perfect accord with -the philosophy of history. Every nation to which has been guaranteed a -free constitution is indebted for its liberal features to its educated, -patrician classes, while all the decayed republics of history owed their -downfall to the corruption and excesses of an "unbridled Democracy." - -Of such a government, Jefferson Davis was the appropriately chosen head. -An ardent republican, in the truest and noblest sense of that abused term, -a foe to absolutism and radicalism in every shape, he was the noblest -product of a conservatism in which the elements of distinction were -ability, intelligence, refinement, and social position. When, added to -this representative quality, are considered his splendid career of public -service, and his varied talents, exemplified on almost every field of -exertion, it must be conceded that no ruler was ever more worthily invited -to the head of a nation, and assuredly none ever was invited with such -unanimity of popular acclaim. - -We have said that Jefferson Davis must ever appear to the eye of mankind -the historic representative of the Confederate cause. The North can not, -assuredly, reject this decision, since it made him the vicarious sufferer -for what it affected to consider the sins of a nation. Through him, it -actually accomplished that from which the great abilities of Edmund Burke -recoiled in confession of impotent endeavor, the indictment of an entire -people. Those Southern men who have rashly and ungenerously assailed him -as responsible for the failure of the South to win its independence, can -not complain if the verdict of history shall be that the genius of its -leader was worthy of a noble cause, whose fate the laws of nature, not the -resources or the impotence of one man, determined. The star of Napoleon -went down upon the disastrous field of Waterloo, and the millions that he -had liberated passed again under the domination of tyrants whom they -despised. But would the most stupid Bourbon partisan, therefore, call in -question the mighty genius of Napoleon? It is a glorious memory to -France, that her illustrious sovereign, aided by the valor of her -children, defied for twenty years, the arms of combined Europe, but she -has no blush that those energies were not equal to an indefinite -resistance. That the South, struggling against mortal odds, with her -comparatively feeble resources constantly diminishing with each prodigious -effort, finally succumbed to an enemy inexhaustible in strength and -reinforced by the world, is no testimony against either the valor or the -skill with which her struggle was directed. Like Washington, Davis was -embarrassed, in a hazardous cause, with defection, distrust, and -discontent. But, unlike Washington, Davis did not receive the assistance -of a powerful ally at the moment when aid could be most serviceably -employed. - -Recurring to the early history of the Confederacy, during the brief season -when Montgomery was its seat of government, and especially to its -unwritten details, there seems wanting no auspicious omen to presage for -it future security and renown. The cause and its leader equally challenged -the enthused sympathies of a patriotic people, and all that patriotism was -ready to sacrifice for the one was cheerfully confided to the other. -Hopefully, almost joyously, the young Confederacy began its short-lived -career. Those were the halcyon days of that cheap patriotism and ferocious -valor which delights to vaunt itself beyond the sound of "war's rude -alarms." Every aspect of the situation appears tinged with the _couleur de -rose_. In fancied security of certain independence, achieved without the -harsh resort of arms, demagogues boasted that they courted a trial of -strength with the North, as an opportunity for the display of Southern -prowess. Men who subsequently were noted for unscrupulous assaults upon -the Confederate administration, and, since the war, for their ready -prostration before the Northern juggernaut, were then loud in "never -surrender" proclamations of eternal separation from the North. - -Such was not an appropriate season for expressing grave and painful doubts -of the President's fitness for his high trust. No whisper was then heard -of his want of appreciation of his situation. There was no intimation then -that he failed to discern the future, or refused to provide against the -perils that menaced the Confederacy, and were so obvious to more sagacious -minds. Sensational newspaper correspondents, professing to base their -accounts upon reliable hints from the executive quarter, were profuse in -their panegyrics upon his indefatigable industry, his vigilance, -penetration, and marvelous intuition of Yankee designs. They vied with -each other in telling the world, especially the North, of the stupendous -preparations which the Government was making in anticipation of a possible -attempt at coercion by the Lincoln government. It was evident, from the -outgivings of every source of opinion, that the Confederates trusting much -to the merits of their cause and their own valor, yet largely depended for -the successful issue of their assertion of independence upon the -soldier-statesman, who, charged with many public duties, had never proven -either unwilling or incapable in any trust. The time for censure was not -yet at hand. Incompetent generals and recreant politicians were not yet in -want of a scape-goat upon which to throw their own delinquencies. Harsh -and censorious criticism was reserved for a more opportune period, when -the Confederacy, like a wearied gladiator, whose spirit was invincible, -reeled under the exhaustion of a dozen successive combats, with as many -fresh adversaries. - -The high administrative capacity of Mr. Davis had received a most -fortunate discipline in his brilliant conduct of the Federal War -Department. That service was a valuable auxiliary to his efficiency as the -executive head of a new government, whose safety was, from its incipiency, -to depend upon the resources of that rarest phase of genius, the combined -capacity for civil and military administration. The complex machinery of -government, even when moving smoothly in the accustomed grooves, imposes -not only severe labor, but is frequently a painful tax upon the faculties -of those most familiar with its workings. When to the labor of -comprehension is added the task of construction and organization from -comparative chaos, such as prevailed at Montgomery, and as prevails -every-where, as the result of political change, the difficulties are -increased tenfold. Creation must then precede order. Organization is to be -perfected before administration can be successfully attempted. It is this -task of organization which has invoked some of the most splendid displays -of genius, and interposed the obstacles which have occasioned its severest -disappointments. Universal testimony awards to Napoleon, for his wonderful -ingenuity in penetrating social necessities and meeting civil emergencies, -a merit not inferior to his unrivaled genius for war. Frederick the Great, -in times of peace, exhibited a vicious pragmatism which rendered his civil -rule contemptible when contrasted with his military success. - -The underlying secret of all successful administration is the union of the -advantages flowing from unity of purpose, and those resulting from -division of labor--so necessary to exact and intelligent execution. -President Davis, throughout his administration, sought the attainment of -this aim. Confiding the various departments to men of at least reputed -talents and integrity, he yet exercised that constant supervision which -was inseparable from his responsibilities, and exacted by public -expectation, and this without arrogance or dictation. Disingenuous -criticism has alleged that, by an assumption of autocracy, he united in -himself all the powers and prerogatives of government, and thus professes -to hold him alone responsible for the loss of his country's liberties. A -score of years, or even a decade hence, and he will be exalted as the -all-informing mind which directed, vitalized, and inspired the noblest -struggle of republicanism known to ancient or modern story. - -At the organization of the Confederate Government, his individual taste, -capacity and experience, were fortunately coincident with the necessities -of the situation in urging upon President Davis a thorough and efficient -military establishment upon a war footing. The necessity of thorough -preparation for war with the United States was never lost sight of by him. -Whatever his efforts to avert that calamity, its probabilities were too -menacing not to challenge unremitting precautions. In the War Department -and military legislation of the Confederacy was felt the infusion of his -energy and system, and were realized the fruits of his labors. There can -be no more splendid monument of his genius than that superb specimen of -scientific mechanism, the army of the Confederate States. Its nucleus was -prepared in those few weeks' respite from actual war, passed by the -Confederate Government, at Montgomery; and the framework then established -was subsequently enlarged upon, until it was developed into a model of -military anatomy--of complex, yet harmonious organism--seldom rivaled and -never surpassed in the history of war. Whatever may be said of defective -features exhibited in the Confederate military organization, in the -numerous and varied campaigns of the war, those defects are not to be -attributed to the original system. Whatever may be alleged against its -lax discipline--that morbid influence which so fearfully enervated its -efficiency, neutralized valor and strategy, and made the war a series of -magnificent but valueless successes, the shadow without the substance of -victory--the fault was in the execution, not in the original conception. -However admirably tempered the blade, that must be a skillful hand which -would efficiently wield it. - -A graduate of West Point and a practical as well as theoretical soldier, -President Davis naturally and, as the war demonstrated, wisely inclined in -his military administration to those theories which regard war as a -science difficult and laborious of mastery. His marked and judicious -partiality for _educated soldiers_ was often the ground of censorious -comment during the war, but this will hardly be adjudged a fault now. -"West Point" was amply vindicated by the experience of both armies, -against the sneers of those who affected such extreme admiration for the -"native genius" of citizen-soldiers. With a few notable exceptions in the -Confederate army (and here is to be considered the peculiar genius for war -of the South), and scarcely one worth mention in the armies of the North, -the achievements of educated officers, and those of officers from civil -life, are so utterly disproportionate as to forbid comparison. - -The paramount object of all Confederate diplomacy was to secure a -recognition of the new Government by the Government of the United States. -If war with the United States could be averted, the Confederacy was, for -all time, a fixed fact. At an early period President Davis instituted -efforts to secure by negotiation possession of certain fortifications and -other property of the Federal Government located within the limits of the -seceded States. Arsenals, located in the interior, had, in many instances, -been seized by the State troops previous to the formation of the -Confederate Government. Happily, those in authority at these places, -appreciating the folly of resistance in a situation utterly helpless, had -avoided a needless shedding of blood, by a prompt compliance with the -demands of the State authorities. - -When the Confederate Government went into operation, there were but two -fortifications within the limits of its jurisdiction in the possession of -Federal garrisons: Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, and Fort Pickens, -off Pensacola, Florida. These two positions were of the utmost value to -the Confederacy, viewed as to location, and their peaceable acquisition -was of increased importance in consideration of the obstinate defense of -which they were capable. The continued occupation of these positions by -Federal forces was, in the highest degree, inconsistent with the dignity -of the Confederacy after it had proclaimed a distinct and independent -nationality. Moreover, in the present temper of the dominant party in the -United States, a large majority of which favored coercion of the South -back into the Union, Federal occupancy of these forts was a menace to the -safety of the Confederacy. - -It is easy to appreciate the delicate character of the diplomacy now -required by the situation of the Confederacy. Without at all acquiescing -in the Federal possession of Sumter and Pickens--on the contrary, -asserting the right of the Confederacy to those places, and avowing its -willingness to give adequate compensation whenever they should be -surrendered--it was yet necessary to avoid affront to a respectable -minority at the North, influenced, apparently, by pacific intentions. In -short, it became the settled policy of the Confederate Government to -postpone collision with the Federal Government until the latest possible -moment--until obvious considerations of public safety should impel a -resort to hostile measures. - -President Buchanan, whose term of office expired March 4, 1861, after -numerous badly disguised attempts at duplicity with the Confederate -authorities, or more properly, with the authorities of some of the States -constituting the Confederacy, and after a contemptibly weak and driveling -policy of evasion, had left the negotiations between the two Governments -in a most unsatisfactory and confused condition. A brief summary of Mr. -Buchanan's conduct affords a most singular exhibition of mingled -imbecility, timidity, and disingenuousness. His course, until the meeting -of Congress, in December, 1860, was understood to be in thorough accord -with that of the States' Rights party of the South. In that party were his -most trusted advisers, both in and out of the Cabinet, and it had given to -his administration a consistent and cordial support. Like them, he was -pledged to the preservation of a _constitutional Union_, and also to a -full recognition of the perils which menaced the South, resulting from the -late sectional triumph. In his opening message he condemned the exercise -of secession as unauthorized and illegal, but denied emphatically the -right of coercion. Yet, in the sequel, he proved, equally with the -Republican party, an enemy to peaceable secession. - -When South Carolina was preparing for secession, Mr. Buchanan entered into -a solemn understanding with a delegation of several of her most prominent -citizens, that, upon condition that the people and authorities of that -State should refrain from hostile demonstrations, no reinforcements -should be sent to the forts in Charleston harbor, and that "_their -relative military status should remain as at present_." Yet, when Major -Anderson, in positive violation of this agreement, removed his forces from -the weaker forts to Fort Sumter, Mr. Buchanan refused to order him back. -Having broken one stipulation, he now determined to disregard the other, -and, under the pretense of "provisioning a starving garrison," Mr. -Buchanan attempted to send troops to Sumter.[22] - -But the conduct of Mr. Buchanan, weak, offensive, and disgusting, as it -was to both North and South, becomes simply pitiable, when contrasted with -the greater magnitude of the perfidy of the Lincoln government. - -The two Presidents, Davis and Lincoln, were inaugurated within a fortnight -of each other--the first on the 18th of February, the latter on the 4th of -March. Between them the question of peace or war must, after all, -depend--for, however pacific might have been Mr. Buchanan's policy, it -would fail, should Lincoln adopt a belligerent course. Considerable hope -was, at times, indulged, that the negotiations with Mr. Lincoln and his -Cabinet would at least be marked with a better display of candor than had -commemorated the policy of his predecessor. These negotiations, as -fruitless as those attempted in Congress during the preceding winter, for -the prevention of secession, were to involve a question of even more -moment. The direct issue of peace or war was now pending. It is -confidently and successfully maintained by the South, that in the grave -question of responsibility for actual bloodshed, her vindication is as -clear and incontestable as must ever be her acquittal of the -responsibility of disunion. War with the United States was deprecated by -official declaration of the Confederate States as "a policy detrimental to -the civilized world." Most impressive is the declaration of President -Davis' inaugural: "Sustained by the consciousness that the transition from -the former Union to the present Confederacy has not proceeded from a -disregard, on our part, of just obligations, or any failure to perform any -constitutional duty--moved by no interest or passion to invade the rights -of others--anxious to cultivate peace and commerce with all nations, _if -we may not hope to avoid war, we may at least expect that posterity will -acquit us of having needlessly engaged in it_." - -President Davis was at all times most solicitous for peace, and adopted -every expedient of negotiation that could promote that end. Heartily -responding to the wishes of the Congress and people of the Confederacy, he -appointed, in February, an embassy to the Government at Washington. The -resolution of Congress, asking that the embassy should be sent, explains -its object to be the "negotiating friendly relations between that -Government and the Confederate States of America, and for the settlement -of all questions of disagreement between the two governments upon -principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith." - -Two of these commissioners, Messrs. Crawford and Forsyth, arrived in -Washington on the 5th of March, the day succeeding Mr. Lincoln's -inauguration. Wishing to allow the President abundant opportunity for the -discharge of the urgent official duties necessarily crowding upon him at -such a season, the Confederate commissioners did not immediately press -their mission upon his attention. At first giving merely an informal -announcement of their arrival, they waited until the 12th of March before -making an official presentation of their mission. On that day they -addressed a formal communication to the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, -announcing their authority to settle with the Federal Government all -claims of public property arising from the separation of the States from -the Union, and to negotiate for the withdrawal of the Federal forces from -Forts Sumter and Pickens. - -Here begins a record of perfidy, the parallel of which is not to be found -in the history of the world. Mr. Seward, while declining to recognize the -Confederate commissioners officially, yet frequently held confidential -communication with them, by which the faith of the two Governments was -fully pledged to a line of policy, by what should certainly be the -strongest form of assurance--the personal honor of their representatives. -In verbal interviews, the commissioners were frequently assured of a -pacific policy by the Federal Government, that Fort Sumter would be -evacuated, that the _status_ at Fort Pickens should not be changed, and -that no departure from these pacific intentions would be made without due -notice to the Confederate Government. - -The commissioners, conformably to the spirit of their Government, to -avoid, if possible, collision with the United States, made an important -concession in these interviews in consenting to waive all questions of -form. It was alleged that formal negotiations with them, in an official -capacity, would seriously jeopardize the success of Mr. Lincoln's -manipulation of public sentiment at the North, which, it was further -confidentially alleged, he was sedulously educating to concurrence with -his own friendly purposes toward the Confederates. By this cunning device -and the unscrupulous employment of deception and falsehood in his -interviews with the commissioners, Mr. Seward accomplished the double -purpose of successful imposition upon the credulity of the commissioners -and evasion of official recognition of the Confederate embassy. - -In the meantime, while these negotiations were pending, and in the midst -of these friendly assurances, the Lincoln administration was secretly -preparing hostile measures, and, as was clearly demonstrated by subsequent -revelations, had never seriously entertained any of the propositions -submitted by the Confederate Government. Resolved not to evacuate Fort -Sumter, the Federal Government, while amusing the Confederate -commissioners with cunning dalliance, had for weeks been meditating the -feasibility of reënforcing it. To pass the numerous batteries erected by -the Confederates in Charleston harbor was clearly a task of the utmost -difficulty, if, indeed, possible. So complete was the cordon of -Confederate batteries which had been in course of preparation for many -weeks, that the beleaguered fortress was evidently doomed whenever the -Confederates were provoked to fire upon it. The evacuation of Fort Sumter -was clearly a military necessity, so pronounced by the highest military -authority in the United States, and so regarded by the intelligent public -of the North. Never had a Government so auspicious an opportunity to save -the needless effusion of blood, and to avert indefinitely, if not finally, -the calamity of war. - -Such a result was, however, farthest from the wishes of Mr. Lincoln and -the majority of his Cabinet. Reinforcement of Fort Sumter being out of the -question, it became the study of the Federal authorities to devise a -convenient and effective pretext by which the North could be united in a -war of subjugation against the South, and for the extermination of -slavery. To this end an expedition was ordered to Charleston, for the -purpose of supplying the garrison of Sumter with provisions, _peaceably or -forcibly_, as events might decide. As it was well known that the -Confederate authorities would not permit the execution of the object of -this expedition, it was clearly a measure of hostility, prepared and -conducted, too, under the most dishonorable circumstances of secrecy and -falsehood as to its destination. - -In the meantime the Federal authorities continued to practice the base -policy of deception with the Confederate commissioners. Upon one occasion -Mr. Seward declared that Fort Sumter would be evacuated before a letter, -then ready to be mailed, could reach President Davis at Montgomery. Five -days afterward, General Beauregard, commanding the Confederate forces in -Charleston harbor, telegraphed the commissioners at Washington the ominous -intelligence that the Federal commandant was actively strengthening Fort -Sumter. The commissioners were again soothed with Mr. Seward's renewed -assurances of the positive intention of his government to evacuate the -fort. As late as the 7th of April Mr. Seward gave the emphatic assurance: -"Faith as to Sumter fully kept: wait and see." _This was the date of the -sailing of the Federal fleet with a strong military force on board._[23] -The just characterization, by President Davis, of these deceptions, was, -that "the crooked paths of diplomacy can scarcely furnish an example so -wanting in courtesy, in candor, and directness, as was the course of the -United States Government toward our commissioners in Washington."[24] - -The expedition was some hours on its way,[25] when its purpose to -provision the fort was announced to the Governor of South Carolina by an -agent of the United States. This announcement was telegraphed to -Montgomery by General Beauregard, who also asked for instructions. His -government replied, that if the message was authentic, a demand should be -made for the surrender of the fort to the Confederate forces; and in the -event of refusal, its reduction should be undertaken. On the 11th of April -the demand was made and refused.[26] In obedience to the orders of his -government General Beauregard opened fire upon Fort Sumter early on the -morning of the 12th April. On the 13th the fort surrendered. - -The calculations of Mr. Lincoln and his cabinet, as to the result to be -produced by the attack on Fort Sumter, provoked by their deliberate and -dishonest design, were not disappointed. A furious and instantaneous rush -to arms by the North followed the intelligence of the surrender of the -fort, and revealed the ferocious lust with which it had awaited the signal -to begin the crusade against the liberties and property of the South. As -no possible trait of guilt had been wanting in the means employed to -precipitate hostilities, so no conceivable feature of atrocity was to be -wanting in the conduct of a war by the North, produced by its own avarice, -perfidy, and lust of dominion. - -The brief recapitulation which we have given sufficiently exposes the -pretexts upon which the North began the war of coercion. Assuming that the -national dignity had been insulted, and the national honor violated, by an -attack upon the flag of the Union, under the impious profession of -vindicating the law, the North drew its sword against the sovereignty of -the States. It had procured the assault upon Sumter--that essential step -to the desired frenzy of the masses. By a shallow device, the South had -been provoked to initiate resistance--that long-sought pretext which -should justify the most barbaric invasion of modern times. Yet, under this -flimsy imposition, the North cloaks its crime, and exults in its -anticipated immunity from those execrations which have been the reward of -similar examples of turpitude. The spirit of inquiry is not to be thus -deftly eluded, nor the avenging sentence of history so easily perverted. -The question shall not be, who fired the first shot? but, _who offered the -first aggression? who first indicated the purpose of hostility?_ We are -not required to await the bursting forth of the flames over our heads, -when the fell intent of the incendiary is revealed to our sight. The -menace of the murderer justifies his intended victim in eluding the blow -while the steel is uplifted. - -Jefferson Davis signed the order for the reduction of Fort Sumter, but he -did not thereby invoke the calamities of war. That act was simply the -patriot's defiance to the menace of tyranny. It was the choice of the -freeman between resistance and shame. - - - - -CHAPTER IX. - - EVENTS CONSEQUENT UPON THE BOMBARDMENT OF FORT SUMTER--MR. LINCOLN - BEGINS THE WAR BY USURPATION--THE BORDER STATES--CONTINUED DUPLICITY - OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT--VIRGINIA JOINS THE COTTON STATES--AFFAIRS - IN MARYLAND, MISSOURI, AND KENTUCKY--UNPROMISING PHASES OF THE - SITUATION, AFFECTING THE PROSPECTS OF THE SOUTH--DIVISIONS IN SOUTHERN - SENTIMENT--THE NORTHERN DEMOCRACY--PRESIDENT DAVIS' ANTICIPATIONS - REALIZED--HIS RESPONSE TO MR. LINCOLN'S PROCLAMATION OF WAR--PUBLIC - ENTHUSIASM IN THE SOUTH--PRESIDENT DAVIS' MESSAGE--VIRGINIA THE - FLANDERS OF THE WAR--REMOVAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CAPITAL TO - RICHMOND--POLICY OF THAT STEP CONSIDERED--POPULAR REGARD FOR MR. DAVIS - IN VIRGINIA--ACTION OF THE VIRGINIAN AUTHORITIES--NORTH CAROLINA; HER - NOBLE CONDUCT, AND EFFICIENT AID TO THE CONFEDERACY--MILITARY - PREPARATIONS IN VIRGINIA--GENERAL LEE--HIS SERVICES IN THE EARLY - MONTHS OF THE WAR--MINOR ENGAGEMENTS--PREPARATIONS FOR THE GREAT - STRUGGLE IN VIRGINIA--AN IMPORTANT HISTORICAL QUESTION--CHARGES - AGAINST MR. DAVIS CONSIDERED--HIS STATESMAN-LIKE PREVISION--DID HE - ANTICIPATE AND PROVIDE FOR WAR?--WHEN MR. DAVIS' RESPONSIBILITY - BEGAN--HIS ENERGETIC PREPARATION--THE PREVAILING SENTIMENT AT - MONTGOMERY AS TO THE WAR--QUOTATIONS FROM GENERAL EARLY AND GENERAL - VON MOLKTE. - - -Events quickly followed the surrender of Fort Sumter, foreshadowing the -violence and magnitude of the strife about to be joined between the -sundered sections of America. If the North showed itself prompt and -enthusiastic to recognize the signal of conquest and spoliation, the South -was tenfold more resolute and confident in its triple armor of right. If -the adroit appeals of Mr. Lincoln's adherents, in behalf of an "insulted -flag," and an "outraged national dignity," broke down the barriers of -party, and united the Northern masses in an imagined crusade of patriotism -for the rescue of the Union, the occasion brought to the Confederacy -accessions of strength, which, if they did not ensure a successful -defense, established the fact of protracted resistance. - -Mr. Lincoln and his advisers promptly seized upon the favorable -opportunity presented by the fanatical excitement prevalent throughout the -North. Within forty-eight hours after the intelligence of the bloodless -encounter of Sumter was flashed over the land, his proclamation of war -against the seceded States was read by thousands of excited people.[27] A -flimsy and indefensible perversion of an act, passed by Congress, in 1795, -which simply provided the raising of armed _posses_ "in aid of the civil -authorities," was the shallow pretext, under which was masked the real -design of a war which was to terminate in the destruction of the -sovereignty of the States. Beginning with this clear usurpation of the -power of Congress, which is alone authorized to declare war, and -proclaiming a purpose to "maintain the honor, the integrity, and -existence" of the Union, "and the perpetuity of popular government," the -work of conquest was begun. - -The _role_ undertaken by the Federal government was embarrassed by many -difficulties. It had not yet relinquished the hope of retaining the Border -States firm in their adhesion to the Union. As yet the action of those -States had indicated no purpose of separation from the North, unless in -the event of direct interference by the Federal authorities with their -domestic concerns, or in the event of a war of subjugation against the -seceded States. Popular feeling in all the Border States was unmistakably -resolved against the policy of coercion, and in several instances State -Legislatures had declared a purpose to make common cause with the seceded -States, whenever the Federal authorities should appeal to force against -them. It was difficult indeed for the latter to reconcile their hostile -purposes against the Confederate States with the professions of peaceful -intentions which they so freely tendered to the Border States. Well -pleased, however, with the uniform success of its policy of duplicity, the -Federal administration adhered to its "treacherous amusement of double and -triple negotiations," hoping to amuse the Border States, by pacifying -assurances, until its schemes of coercion could be thoroughly -prepared.[28] But the sham was too transparent to deceive. Friendly -assurances and protestations of a desire to avoid the effusion of blood -were not to be accepted in the face of gigantic martial preparations. - -An immediate consequence of Mr. Lincoln's proclamation of war, and -invocation of an army of seventy-five thousand men, for the subjugation of -the Cotton States, was to throw the mighty energies and heroic spirit of -Virginia, hitherto neutral and hesitating, into hearty sympathy with the -Confederacy. The sublime courage and devotion of this noble State, -manifested by the circumstances of her accession to the cause of her -sister States, have been the theme of repeated, but not extravagant -eulogy. With a full conviction of her own peculiar perils in a war which -she had zealously striven to prevent; from which, whatever its -eventualities, she had little to hope, and with a perfect prevision of -the ruin which was to ravage her bosom, Virginia proudly assumed the post -of leadership and of peril in the struggle for those immortal principles, -of which her soil was the nursery and her illustrious sons the foremost -champions. The historic _prestige_ of Virginia was heightened by this act -of supreme devotion, and the value of her influence was speedily -demonstrated by the enthusiastic accession of other States to the cause -which she had espoused. The ordinance of secession, adopted by the -Virginia Convention, was followed immediately by a temporary alliance[29] -with the Confederate States, and in a few weeks afterward the Confederacy -embraced, in addition to its original members, Virginia, North Carolina, -Tennessee, and Arkansas, each of which, by formal State action, ratified -the Confederate constitution. - -The arbitrary acts of the Federal government, in Maryland and Missouri, -not only vindicated the course of those States which had interpreted its -policy as one of subjugation, but greatly strengthened the already -preponderant Southern sympathies of those two commonwealths. Increasing by -consecutive proclamations his demands for troops, Mr. Lincoln soon had -nearly two hundred thousand men under arms. These troops assembled under -false pretenses at different points, were used for purposes of glaring -despotism; overawing the pronounced Southern feeling of the people by -military arrests, by licentious and violent demonstrations of the -soldiery. Missouri was soon in open revolt against the Federal -authorities, and in Maryland a general uprising was prevented by the -thorough precautions which had been adopted, rendering clearly hopeless -such an undertaking. The Legislature of Missouri, unquestionably -representing a large majority of her citizens, eventually adopted an -ordinance of secession and ratified the constitution of the Confederate -States. Kentucky, vainly attempting a policy of neutrality, was divided in -sentiment and in strength between the contestants. A portion of her -citizens, residing within the Confederate lines, several months after the -beginning of the war, declared the State out of the Union, and associated -Kentucky with the Confederacy. - -Such were the immediate consequences resulting from the capture of Fort -Sumter. All hopes of peace vanished in the rush of events which daily -contributed new elements to the incipient strife, and with constant -reinforcements of strength and feeling to each of the contending parties, -there was wanting no omen of a struggle bloody and exhaustive beyond all -previous example. - -There were phases of the situation not to be lightly appreciated by so -thoughtful a statesman as President Davis, which did not encourage that -sanguine conviction, so extravagantly indulged in by many popular leaders, -of an overwhelming and immediate triumph of the Southern cause. The -immense disparity of physical resources, as was abundantly shown by the -lessons of history, could be neutralized by a wise public administration, -by superior valor, and by that high sense of public virtue, in its -original Roman sense of fortitude, endurance, and willing sacrifice in the -cause of country, which is the last and sure defense of a nation's -liberties. Nor were those important advantages of the South, to the value -of which historical precedents have so conclusively testified--a conscious -rectitude of purpose--a supreme conviction that theirs was the better -cause, and that, besides, it was a war for home and family, to be fought -mainly upon their own soil--to be overlooked in an intelligent estimate of -the relative strength of the belligerents. - -It was not a failure to recognize these great advantages which forbade -wise and reflective Southern statesmen to indulge in those grotesque -exhibitions of braggadocio, with which demagogues amused excited crowds at -railway stations and upon street-corners. There was an element of weakness -in the South, which, looking to the contingencies of the future, and -remembering the incertitude of war, might prove the source of serious -danger. This was the absence of that unity in the South, to which all her -statesmen had looked forward, whenever actual battle should be joined -between the defenders and assailants of Southern liberties. To see a -"UNITED SOUTH," had been for years the dream of Calhoun's noble intellect. -Davis, with equal energy and ability, had striven for such united action -by the South as would command peace and security in the Union, or -independence beyond its limits. But now the battle was joined, and the -dream was not to be realized. - -Kentucky was hopelessly divided, and though, from the overwhelming -majority of her people in sympathy with the South, were to come thousands -of gallant soldiers, the Confederacy was to be denied the powerful aid -which the brave heart and mighty resources of united Kentucky should have -thrown into the scale. Missouri, in consequence of her geographical -position, peculiarly assailable by the North-western States, and by -divisions among her population, was similarly situated; while Maryland, a -gallant and patriotic State, not less than South Carolina devoted to the -independence of the South, was securely shackled at the first -demonstration, by her people, of sympathy with their invaded countrymen. - -But not only was there a failure to realize united action by those States, -which, by geographical contiguity, no less than by identity of political -institutions, constituted what was designated as THE SOUTH. There was by -no means a thoroughly harmonious sentiment among the people of those -States which had joined the Southern alliance. This was conspicuously the -case in Western Virginia and Eastern Tennessee.[30] Though apparently -insignificant in the midst of the general enthusiasm which prevailed in -the early months of the war, these and other instances of local -disaffection were to prove, at more than one critical period, fruitful of -embarrassment. Intelligence of Confederate disasters was always the signal -for exhibitions of that covert disloyalty which Confederate success -compelled to concealment. Always ready to assist the invaders of their -country, the so-called "Union men" of the South were valuable auxiliaries -to the Federal armies as spies, and as secret enemies to the cause of the -patriots; but they were not more hurtful and insidious in these capacities -than as the nucleus around which crystallized, under the direction of -disappointed demagogues, the various elements of discontent which were -subsequently developed. - -Yet in both sections was the outward seeming at least of an undivided war -sentiment. The Union party of the South, as it had previously existed--a -powerful political organization, embracing a majority of the people of the -Border States--did not more immediately disappear, as the certainty of war -was developed, than did the party of peace at the North. The Northern -Democracy did not, for a moment, strive to breast the popular current, but -its leaders, the life-long allies of the South, committed, by a thousand -declarations to the cause of States' Rights, eagerly vied with the -Republican leaders in threats of vengeance against the South. The -Dickinsons, Everetts, Cochranes, Logans, and Butlers--hitherto the -professed friends and advocates of the South--with that pliant -accommodation to circumstances, so befitting the instincts of the -demagogue, in their harangues to howling mobs, proclaimed themselves the -advocates of a ruthless and indiscriminate warfare upon a people who had -been driven, by intolerable wrongs, into patriotic resistance. - -We have already described the attitude and condition of the Confederate -Government at Montgomery previous to the attack upon Fort Sumter. The -honorable exertions of President Davis, cordially approved by Congress and -the people, to avoid a collision of arms, were disappointed, and events -had now verified his life-long conviction, that the exercise of their -sovereignty, by the States, would be attended by a war involving their -existence. Sustained by an unlimited popular confidence, with a -comparatively perfected organization, and with every possible preparation -that the difficulties of its situation would permit, the Government met, -with commendable composure, the shock of arms which its chief had foreseen -to be inevitable. - -The proclamation of President Lincoln, declaring war upon the Confederate -States, was promptly responded to by President Davis, in official -announcements, appropriately recognizing the condition of public affairs, -and inviting energetic preparations for immediate hostilities. He at once -called upon the various States for quotas of volunteers for the public -defense. By public proclamation, he invited applications for privateering -service, in which armed vessels might assist in the public defense on the -high seas; under letters of marque and reprisal granted by Congress.[31] - -In every instance, and by all classes of citizens, an enthusiastic -response was given to the demands of the Government. Individuals and -corporations entered into a generous and patriotic rivalry in the tender -of aid to the cause. Wealthy citizens donated large sums of money or -supplies, while railroad and transportation companies tendered valuable -assistance in the conveyance of troops and stores. An enthusiastic desire -to enter the public service was manifested in every community. Men -decrepit from age, or infirm from disease, were importunate in demanding -any service suitable to their condition. Volunteering progressed so -actively that a few weeks only sufficed to show that the Confederacy--for -the present at least--would not want soldiers. In all the States the -responses to the call for volunteers exceeded the quotas. - -Congress assembled in special session, in obedience to a proclamation of -the President, on the 29th of April. The message was an eminently -characteristic document, and made a profound impression both in Europe and -the United States. Its calm and clear statements were in marked contrast -with the wild elements of war convulsing the country. Europe was not less -amazed and delighted with its dignity and force, than was the North -impressed with the earnest terms in which the purpose of resistance was -announced. He reviewed and established the doctrine of secession, detailed -the facts showing the bad faith of the Northern government about Fort -Sumter, and the necessity for its capture; spoke in terms of keen, yet -dignified satire of Lincoln's proclamation, which attempted to treat seven -sovereign States united in a confederacy, and holding five millions of -people and a half million of square miles of territory, as "combinations," -which he proposed to suppress by a _posse comitatus_ of seventy-five -thousand men; congratulated the Congress on the probable accession of -other slave States; informed them that the State Department had sent three -commissioners to England, France, Russia and Belgium, to seek the -recognition of the Confederate States; advised legislation for the -employment of privateers for measures of defense, and for perfecting the -government organization; and concluded with these impressive words: "We -feel that our cause is just and holy; we protest solemnly in the face of -mankind that we desire peace at any sacrifice save that of honor and -independence; we seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, no concession of any -kind from the States with whom we were lately confederated. All we seek is -to be let alone; that those who never held power over us shall not now -attempt our subjugation by arms. This we will, this we must resist to the -direst extremity. The moment that this pretension is abandoned, the sword -will drop from our grasp, and we shall be ready to enter into treaties of -amity and commerce that can not but be materially beneficial. So long as -this pretension is maintained, with firm reliance on that divine power -which covers with its protection the just cause, we will continue the -struggle for our inherent right to freedom, independence, and -self-government." - -The geographical position of Virginia clearly indicated that State as the -Flanders of the war. Within her boundaries was necessarily to be located -the first line of Confederate defense, and also to be found more than one -favorable _point d'appui_ for the invading forces. To the aid of important -geographical and physical considerations, moral and political necessities -were superadded, to urge a prompt and vigorous assistance to Virginia, in -the heroic effort which she was preparing for her deliverance. With the -eye of the soldier and the appreciation of the statesman, President Davis -urged the immediate removal of the seat of government to the neighborhood -of the seat of war. On the 20th of May the seat of the Confederate -Government was transferred from Montgomery to Richmond, the capital of -Virginia, and within a few days afterward Mr. Davis reached the latter -city.[32] - -The transfer of the Confederate capital to Richmond was an event affecting -the direction, character, and destinies of the war to such an extent as -entitles it to be considered one of its salient incidents. As a measure of -policy, it has been variously viewed, and has involved some interesting -discussion of military and strategic considerations. In the progress of -events during the war, its wisdom was generally recognized, and in the -calmer judgment of the present there is scarcely a dissenting voice to the -prevailing opinion that it was a master-stroke of political sagacity and -military forecast. - -High military authority has been quoted in support of the opinion opposed -to locating the Confederate capital at Richmond. Ingeniously enough it was -alleged that such a step involved fighting on the exterior of the circle -instead of the centre, and that thus the great advantage to the party -conducting operations upon an interior line would be surrendered. It was -also tolerably certain that the North would aim, in its invasion, at the -Confederate capital as the vital objective point of its campaigns; and to -transfer the capital to a point so far north as Richmond, greatly -diminished the enemy's difficulties--first, as to space; and secondly, by -shortening his line of transportation and supply. - -But these views were the conclusions of a purely strategic judgment, -overlooking entirely moral and political considerations involved, nor are -they by any means exhaustive of the argument as to the military aspects of -the situation. The courageous and unselfish action of Virginia deserved a -response of similar spirit from the Confederacy. Virginia had voluntarily -become the outpost of the South, and her people needed the presence among -them of that authority which was to wield her great resources, organize -her energies, and give counsel to her courage. Her people invited the -Government to join them and make the battle for the common deliverance of -the South around their homesteads. To accept this invitation was a step no -less characteristic of President Davis than was his prompt, decisive -action in the crisis at Buena Vista. It had the combined advantage of bold -defiance and prudent calculation. This bold courting of the issue by the -infant power, at the very outset of hostilities, was the foundation of -that brilliant _prestige_ which marked its earlier history. To an -adversary intoxicated with an overweening sense of numerical superiority, -and a brutal reliance upon his superior strength, this defiant planting of -the standard in front of his first line was a significant warning of the -difficulties of the task which he had undertaken. - -President Davis has never seen reason to regret the transfer of the -Government to Richmond. It bound Virginia, by indissoluble ties to the -fortunes of the Confederacy, and was the beginning of an affection for -himself, among her citizens, which it was their pride to exhibit in the -face of calamities common to him and to themselves. Not even in his own -gallant State of Mississippi are the genius, virtues, and fame of -Jefferson Davis cherished with a more tender association than in Virginia. - -A brief résumé of events will now assist to a clear understanding of the -situation of affairs when President Davis reached Richmond in the latter -part of May. Virginia, a week previously, had, by formal vote of her -people, ratified the ordinance of secession adopted by her convention. -When the convention passed the ordinance of secession on the 17th of -April, the State authorities, with commendable discretion, prepared to -make important seizures of arms, stores, etc., the property of the Federal -Government within the limits of the State. Governor Letcher--well known -for his steadfast devotion to the Union, and for his honorable zeal to -preserve it--in this trying crisis of the State, was nobly faithful to his -Virginian instincts, and mindful of the honorable part which devolved upon -Virginia's Governor. - -The capture of two places of special importance was sought by expeditions -arranged with secrecy and ingenuity, but resulting, in both instances, in -only partial success. These places were Gosport Navy-yard--famous for its -dry-dock, shops, ammunition, arms, timber, rope-walks, and other -appurtenances of an extensive naval establishment--and Harper's Ferry, on -the Potomac, with its extensive armory and arsenal, large collection of -arms, and valuable machinery. At the latter place, the Federal commander, -by an unworthy subterfuge, obtained a delay in the attack which the -Virginians were about to make, and took advantage of a parley, to attempt -the destruction, by fire, of the buildings and machinery. Much valuable -property was destroyed, but the State secured machinery, which was -afterward turned to most important account, and many excellent arms for -her rapidly gathering volunteers. The attempted destruction, by the -Federals, at Gosport, was imperfectly executed. Among the prizes captured -here was the steam frigate Merrimac, nearly finished, but greatly damaged -by fire. Within a very few months this vessel was destined to a -performance, conspicuous for all time in the annals of naval warfare. - -The authorities of North Carolina--a State which had clung with -unsurpassed fidelity to the Federal Union--acted with a vigor which well -befitted a community conspicuous, in the first American revolution, for -the fidelity of its patriotism. Slow to reach her conclusions, North -Carolina was fully up to the demands of the occasion, in her preparation -for a struggle, during which her revolutionary fame was to be excelled by -a second dedication of her blood and energies to the cause of liberty. On -the 21st of May, North Carolina, by unanimous vote of her convention, -adopted an ordinance of secession. Her brave Governor (Ellis) whose -services were too soon lost to his State and country, had previously -caused the seizure of Forts Macon and Caswell, and the arsenal at -Fayetteville, with nearly sixty thousand arms, of which half were of the -most approved construction. - -On the 19th of April occurred a collision between citizens of Baltimore -and Massachusetts soldiers, _en route_ to the Federal capital, followed by -such a stringent policy as made clearly hopeless the open coöperation of -Maryland, unless by successful invasion of the Confederate forces. - -Missouri, under the guidance of Jackson, Price, and other able and -resolute leaders, was preparing a heroic resistance, but under -difficulties greater than were experienced in any other Southern State, -against the domination established upon her soil. - -When President Davis reached Richmond he found Virginia in an advanced -state of preparation. Thirty thousand troops were in camps of instruction, -or upon duty at Norfolk, upon the peninsula of James and York Rivers, and -at different points upon the northern boundary of the State. In supreme -command was General Robert E. Lee, the friend and former classmate of the -President at West Point; and, under him, Colonel John B. Magruder, also -his associate at West Point, and other officers of promise and ability, -seeking service in defense of their native State and the South. As the -several States acceded to the Confederacy, their troops, arms, stores, -etc., were turned over to the Confederate authorities, and officers were -assigned rank in the Confederate service by a rule, regulated by the rank -which they had held in the Federal army. - -In accordance with this rule, General Lee was third on the list of full -generals appointed by President Davis--General Cooper being first, and -General Albert Sydney Johnston being second. General Lee had been first -commissioned, after the tender of his resignation in the Federal service, -a Major-General of Virginia forces. Until he was commissioned full -general, by President Davis, in June, 1861, he continued to act as the -general commanding the Virginia forces, and was invested also with the -direction of the Confederate troops which were arriving daily from the -States south. His authority was as follows: - - "MONTGOMERY, May 10, 1861. - - "_To Major-General R. E. Lee_: To prevent confusion, you will assume - control of the forces of the Confederate States in Virginia, and - assign them to such duties as you may indicate, until further orders; - for which this will be your authority. - - "L. P. WALKER, _Secretary of War_." - -It would be impossible to overestimate the services of General Lee in the -preparation of the Virginia troops for the field, and in preparing the -general defense of the State by the location and disposition of the -Confederate forces as they arrived in Virginia. His distinguished services -afterwards are hardly better evidence of his genius as a soldier, than the -results of his arduous labor at this trying period, and in a position of -comparative obscurity. President Davis fully indicated his confidence in -the counsels of Lee by his constant retention of him at his side. The -South has probably not yet appreciated the extent to which the genius of -Lee, in coöperation with that of Davis, aided in those earlier -achievements of the war, which secured the immediate preservation of the -Confederacy, and earned so flattering a reputation for others. - -With the establishment of the Confederate authority in Virginia, -reinforcements from other States were constantly added to her own levies, -and by the middle of June, more than fifty thousand men were in arms for -her defense. As yet, collisions between the opposing forces had been rare, -and totally indecisive. A force of raw volunteers, unorganized and -imperfectly armed, was surprised in Western Virginia, by a movement of -considerable vigor on the part of the Federal commander, and the patriots, -under Colonel Porterfield, compelled to retreat. At Great Bethel, near -Fortress Monroe, a few hundred Virginians and North Carolinians, under -Colonel Magruder, handsomely repulsed a large column of Federal troops, -attempting to advance up the peninsula. In the then uneducated popular -idea of military operations, the fight at Bethel was magnified to an -extent greatly beyond its real importance. It had, nevertheless, a timely -significance, in its evidence of the spirit of the Confederate soldiery. -President Davis was pleased to recognize this fact in a congratulatory -letter to Governor Ellis, commending the conduct of the North Carolinians -who were engaged in the fight. - -These minor affairs were preliminary incidents to the thrilling events, -upon a more extended scale of operations, and upon a more important -theatre, which were to make memorable the approaching midsummer. Pending -the preparations, active and extensive on both sides, for the coming grand -encounter, there was a marked pause in military operations, attended by an -agreeable subsidence of the feverish excitement of which war is so -productive. The struggle for the mastery in Virginia, which it was plain -would decide the present fate of the Southern movement, was destined also -to decide, in a large measure, the extent and duration of the war. Viewed -in its historical significance, it becomes chiefly important as a stage of -the revolution indicating a new departure, and an altered direction of -events. Preparation was now to be displaced by action. Skirmishes were to -be followed by heavy engagements, and the high prestige of the South was -now to be subjected to its first test, in that long series of cruel -encounters, between valor and endurance on one side, and mere weight of -numbers on the other. - -Preliminary to the narrative of these important events, appropriately -arises one phase of that historical question which involves the -statesmanship, the forecast, and the general fitness of Jefferson Davis -in the position which he now occupied, and under the circumstances by -which he was surrounded. - -It would be a superfluous and unprofitable task to consider in detail the -numerous allegations, trivial and serious, made against President Davis by -his assailants, in support of their professed belief in his responsibility -for the failure of the Confederate cause. When facts are perverted, -history distorted, and prejudice, rather than truth, is the governing -influence, such allegations will be sufficiently numerous, even though -they be not well sustained. Nor yet is it maintained that President Davis -committed no errors in the long and trying term of his administration. It -is very certain that no such defense, asserting his infallibility, would -be approved by him. But the real historical significance of the question -of Mr. Davis' capacity for his office may be reduced to very simple -dimensions. Conceding him to be mortal, we concede that he is fallible. -Then the question arises, Were his errors sufficiently numerous and -serious, unaided by other and greater causes, to have occasioned the -failure of the South in the late war? Again, conceding still more -liberally to his assailants, were those errors the chief causes of a -failure, which might have been avoided, despite all other adverse -influences, disadvantages, and obstacles, if a different administrative -policy had prevailed? - -The subject now has no value, save in its historical sense, and in that -sense its value must be determined from the stand-point just indicated. At -least it is in that aspect that we propose to consider it, whenever its -discussion shall be appropriate in these pages. The consideration will be -modified by many collateral questions which must incidentally arise. It -may be necessary to ask if no other Southern leader, entrusted with great -responsibilities, and enjoying uninterrupted popular favor, during and -since the war, committed mistakes quite as serious and frequent as did the -President, in proportion to the multiplicity of his cares? It may be -appropriate, too, to consider the influence that these mistakes of others -exerted upon those final disasters for which he alone is held responsible. -These questions we propose to consider, each in its appropriate place, and -with becoming candor. If we shall not meet the arguments and allegations -employed against Mr. Davis with a spirit more ingenuous than has seemed to -actuate his assailants, our success must be poor, indeed. - -Those who profess to consider President Davis wanting in the necessary -qualifications for his position, dwell with especial emphasis upon what -they are pleased to characterize his failure in the early months of the -war, to foresee its character, duration and magnitude, and the consequent -imperfect preparation of the Confederate Government. It is asserted that -he was utterly blind to all the indications of a long and obstinate -struggle, urged upon his attention by a more sagacious statesmanship than -his own; that he was persistent and arrogant in his prophecies of a -struggle, short, brilliant, and overwhelming in favor of the South, even -after the war had commenced; and that before the bombardment of Sumter he -was no less positive in his convictions that there would be no war; that -he was, in short, stupidly unreasoning and inactive, deaf alike to -entreaties, arguments, and facts. - -If, indeed, it could be established that during the era of secession (the -interval between November, 1860, and April, 1861), Mr. Davis had cherished -expectations of peaceable separation, and that during that portion of his -presidential term embraced before the assault upon Sumter, relying upon -this prospect of peace, he had failed to prepare for war, then, indeed, -would his responsibility be great; but it would be shared by every -contemporary statesman of the South, almost, if not quite, without an -exception. History may palliate the amazing infatuation of the Southern -masses at this period, but surely its verdict must be a contemptuous -condemnation of that vaunted statesmanship which scouted war as the result -of secession, as an impossibility, and its anticipation as the product of -timidity. But President Davis is not driven to the extremity of seeking so -poor a refuge as the common and universal blindness and weakness of that -critical period. Recognizing the justice of that test which demands of the -true statesman a prescience beyond the average vision, it is believed that -his defense may be made easy and triumphant. - -Candid investigation will demonstrate the fact that Davis, among Southern -statesmen, was an almost solitary exception in his rejection of the -dominant sentiment of the times. The remarkable consistency of his public -life is in no respect better sustained than in his oft-repeated -apprehensions of eventual war between the sections. His dread of disunion -arose from his dread of civil war, and the latter he always urged to be -the necessary consequence of the former. Striving to save the Union upon a -just and constitutional basis, he yet habitually admonished the South of -the inevitable result of disunion, and coupled his admonitions with -earnest exhortations of thorough preparation for the most serious -emergency in its history. His speeches, addresses, and letters, furnish -irrefutable testimony of his apprehension of civil war as an inevitable -concomitant of disunion. _Not one line, or one sentence, written or -uttered by him in the entire period of his public career, can be so -construed as to indicate a different conviction._ Believing that he -foresaw the impending conflict, he strove with indefatigable energy and -incomparable ability, in company with Calhoun, in 1850, to place the South -in a position which would then have rescued her liberties. If the warning -voice of the South, proclaiming the inexorable decree of disunion, unless -her constitutional rights were fully and forever secured, had then been -disregarded, at least her _resistance_ must have been more effectual than -it could become by postponement. In innumerable passages of rare -eloquence, he has left an imperishable record of patriotic devotion to a -constitutional union, and touching proofs of the emotion with which he -contemplated the evils which were to follow its destruction. The words of -his farewell address to the Senate, ("putting our trust in God, and in our -firm hearts and strong arms, we will vindicate the right as best we may") -do not more clearly indicate the calm determination with which he would -meet the peril, than his appreciation of its serious nature. - -When it is alleged that the inadequate preparation of the South, during -the period which we have characterized as the era of secession, enters as -a most important feature in the explanation of her failure, a proposition -is boldly asserted, which is, at least, debatable; but its discussion does -not devolve upon us.[33] Mr. Davis is assuredly not to be held justly -accountable for what the various States failed to do while he was at his -post of duty in the Senate, and in no manner controlling their action. No -responsibility can attach to him beyond the action of the Confederate -Government, save in the case of his own State, and whatever preparation -Mississippi made was at his instance. By what law of justice or logic can -Mr. Davis be made accountable for the inadequate preparation of Georgia, -(assuming that Georgia _was_ unprepared, or had omitted any preparation -that was possible under the circumstances), which then had the full -benefit of the counsels of reputed statesmen like Messrs. Toombs, -Stephens, and Brown? or of South Carolina, under the counsels of Messrs. -Rhett and Orr, and the _Charleston Mercury_? Of Alabama, led by the -brilliant genius of Mr. Yancey? Yet, upon the aggregate resources and -means of defense of these and the other States must depend the safety of -the Confederacy. While Mr. Davis was yet in Washington, striving against -hope to avert the dreaded issue, many of the States, under the guidance of -their leading men, were passing ordinances of secession. Assuredly, then, -he is not to be censured for any lack of preparation at this period. Yet -no very close examination of the record is necessary to establish the -fact, that those who have since been most forward in denying the prevision -of statesmanship to Davis, were then, by their own showing, precipitating -their several States into secession, totally unprepared for a war, the -very possibility of which they derided. - -The responsibility of Mr. Davis can date only from his inauguration as -President of the Confederate States, on February 18, 1861. Between that -date and the actual breaking out of war was an interval of _less than two -months_. Within this period the results accomplished were certainly all -that could have been anticipated, and all that ever were accomplished by -any government yet in its infancy, within the same space of time. The -organization of the Government had been perfected, efforts made to secure -intercourse with foreign nations, and the civil administration completed -in all important features. With the aid of that master genius for -organization, General Samuel Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General of the -Confederate army, the basis of a military organization, upon which the -most splendid armies of modern history were speedily created, was -prepared; troops were called into the field; and the Confederacy, in -proportion to its means, was actually placed, _in two months_, upon a war -footing, not inferior to that of the enemy at the outbreak of hostilities. - -The unprejudiced Northern or European reader, whose admiration has been -freely expressed for the valor and endurance of the South, and for the -skillful use of its comparatively limited resources, may well be amazed at -the censures of Mr. Davis, from Southern sources. - -But what was his error after assumption of the Presidency? More important -still, what is the evidence? So far as we have been able to gather the -evidence, it consists in the fact that President Davis did not urge the -indiscriminate purchase of arms in Europe, or wherever else they might -have been obtained. The intelligent foreign reader can only be amazed -that, upon this single fact--for it is the only _fact_ alleged--rests the -charge that President Davis did not make adequate preparation for war. The -answer is very simple, and indisputable. First, the Confederate -Government, from the date of its organization, endeavored constantly to -purchase _serviceable_ arms wherever they could be obtained. Second, the -Confederate Government had given extensive orders to Northern -manufactories (because they were nearest) at Chickopee and elsewhere, some -of which were filled and the arms received, while, in other cases, they -were seized by the Federal authorities after the commencement of -hostilities while _en route_ South. Third, there were very few serviceable -arms to be purchased in Europe; and in support of this assertion we have -only to recall the enormous swindles practised on the Federal Government -in its purchase of arms in Europe at this period. Arms were offered, in -some instances, to the Government, and rejected, because President Davis, -while Secretary of War, had become acquainted with their worthlessness; -and thus, while certain speculations were disappointed, the means of the -Government were not squandered. An examination of the records will -demonstrate the fact that the Confederate Ordnance Bureau, under Colonel -Gorgas, was conducted with signal judgment and ability. From the beginning -to the end, it was managed with a success which entitles it to be -considered probably the most ably conducted bureau of the Government. - -But not only do the recorded events of the period vindicate Mr. Davis from -the accusations of a tardy and delinquent policy in providing for the -threatened emergency of war; they are fully conclusive as to the energetic -provision made when hostilities were opened. Nothing can be more emphatic -in its enunciation of a bold, vigorous policy than President Davis' -message to the Confederate Congress, assembled by special convocation, on -the 29th of April:[34] "There are now in the field at Charleston, -Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. Philip, and Pulaski, nineteen -thousand men, and sixteen thousand are now _en route_ for Virginia. _It is -proposed to organize and hold in readiness for instant action, in view of -the present exigencies of the country, an army of one hundred thousand -men._" Surely we must look elsewhere than to such an announcement as this, -for evidence in support of this pretended absence of foresight, and -inappreciation of the extent and character of the approaching struggle. -This, be it remembered, was in Davis' first response to the Federal -declaration of war, only two weeks after the fall of Sumter, and when -President Lincoln had, as yet, called for but seventy-five thousand men. -This was the spirit in which President Davis began the contest, and the -results which immediately followed, in months of brilliant and consecutive -triumphs, demonstrated the ample provision made for the emergency.[35] - -In marked contrast with this vigorous policy were the silly vaporings of -demagogues, prating of Southern invincibility against a world in arms, -protesting that the North, under no circumstances, could be induced to -fight, and scouting a longer duration of a war with "Yankees," than six -months at the farthest. That such was the dominant conviction at -Montgomery, no contemporary authority will deny. An eminent Virginian, a -commissioner from his own State to the Confederate Congress, was amazed to -hear laughed at as an excellent joke, his congratulations to that body, -upon the wise determination to locate the seat of government at Richmond, -in close proximity to the seat of war. The grave legislators at -Montgomery, at least, had not yet comprehended that there was to be war. - -But perhaps we are in fault, in thus offering the evidence of -uncontradicted facts and obvious conclusions, where only vague inferences -and unsupported allegations are urged to the contrary. There are graver -questions yet to be encountered, far better justifying difference of -opinion, and affording better ground for discussion of the philosophy of -the Southern failure. Censure of those who have had the conduct of a -ruined cause is as inevitable as the criticism which ever waits upon -history; but it is not, therefore, always just. A great soldier,[36] who -has but recently contributed a chapter to history, thrilling in interest -and inestimable in importance, when congratulated since upon his brilliant -triumphs, touchingly replied: "How would it have been if success--this -unexampled success--had not crowned our undertaking? Would not this -undeserved exaltation have been so much unreasonable criticism and -undeserved blame?" - -To a certain class of Southern critics, we commend the magnanimous -sentiment of an illustrious fellow-countryman,[37] now mourning, in -exile, the afflictions of his country: "As for myself, I have not -undertaken to speculate as to the causes of our failure, as I have seen -abundant reason for it in the tremendous odds brought against us. Having -had some means of judging, I will, however, say that, in my opinion, both -President Davis and General Lee, in their respective spheres, did all for -the success of our cause which it was possible for mortal men to do; and -it is a great privilege and comfort for me so to believe, and to have been -able to bring with me, into exile, a profound love and veneration for -those great men." - - - - -CHAPTER X. - - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WAR IN 1861--THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MORE DIRECTLY - CONNECTED WITH RESULTS IN THE FIELD THAN AT SUBSEQUENT PERIODS--MR. - DAVIS' CONNECTION WITH THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE CONFEDERACY--THE - CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT ADOPTS, IN THE MAIN, THE DEFENSIVE POLICY OF - THE VIRGINIAN AUTHORITIES--FEDERAL PREPARATIONS--GENERAL SCOTT-- - DEFENSIVE PLANS OF THE CONFEDERATES--DISTRIBUTION OF THEIR FORCES--THE - CONFEDERATE CAMPAIGN OF 1861 JUSTIFIED--DISTRIBUTION OF THE FEDERAL - FORCES--PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN--GENERALS PATTERSON AND JOHNSTON-- - JUNCTION OF BEAUREGARD AND JOHNSTON--MANASSAS--PRESIDENT DAVIS ON THE - BATTLE-FIELD--HIS DISPATCH--HIS RETURN TO RICHMOND--A SPEECH NEVER - PUBLISHED BEFORE--REFLECTIONS UPON THE RESULTS OF MANASSAS--MR. DAVIS - NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ABSENCE OF PURSUIT--STONEWALL JACKSON'S - VIEWS--DAVIS IN FAVOR OF PURSUIT OF THE FEDERALS--MISREPRESENTATIONS-- - MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN VARIOUS QUARTERS--THE "TRENT AFFAIR"--RESULTS OF - THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR. - - -Whatever crudities may appear in the general plans of warfare, adopted by -the American belligerents in 1861, when tested by the maxims which have -obtained in other wars, waged upon different theatres of action, and for -different purposes, at least there was not wanting a palpable and -definitive shape. With remarkable rapidity and precision, the military -situation was adjusted to the attainment of certain general objects, which -continued, during the successive stages of the war, to be pursued, with -varying fortune, by the respective contestants. - -The incipient campaign of the war was peculiarly regulated and determined -by the paramount aims which had impelled the respective parties to arms. -Of necessity, the campaign, on the part of the North, must be offensive, -while the South, in a defensive attitude, must prepare to parry the blows -of her assailant. The pretext of the North was to assert the "national -authority" over what it was pleased to term "rebellious" territory. The -_animus_ of the South was to repel an invasion which menaced her liberties -and firesides. Whatever advantages may have belonged to the position of -the South were not overlooked by those who were charged with her defense; -and it may safely be claimed, in view of the immediate and overwhelming -result in her favor, that whatever compensation, for obvious -disadvantages, she had anticipated from the resources of skillful -leadership, was fairly rendered. - -The two Governments, at Washington and at Richmond, were then more -directly chargeable with the actual results in the field than at -subsequent periods. The army had then become less independent of the -Government. Its organic structure was undeveloped, and it had not yet -become identified with those commanders whose history was hereafter to be -so interwoven with its own. In a general sense, it may be remarked, that -the connection of President Davis with all the campaigns of the -Confederate army, was that which the country designed it should be, when, -in consequence of his military aptitude and experience, it placed him in -charge of the public administration. Moreover, it was consistent with that -inevitable responsibility which attached to the office of chief executive. -Ignorant and intemperate partisans have labored to prove his -responsibility for those casualties of war, which are utterly beyond human -calculations, and to trace to his influence disasters of the battle-field, -with which he could by no possibility have been connected. As is usual in -such cases, these criticisms are made with a total forgetfulness of the -unintentional tribute, which is accorded to Mr. Davis, in ascribing to him -the chief responsibility for a military administration, which the world -declares to have had few parallels in its history. - -When President Davis reached Richmond, from Montgomery, the military -situation had already assumed a well-defined shape. The plans of defense, -adopted by the Virginian authorities, mainly under the direction of -General Lee, and carried into partial execution before the alliance with -the Confederacy had been formally consummated, were adhered to by the -Confederate Government. President Davis, as we have seen, fully impressed -with the demands of the exigency, immediately upon his arrival, addressed -himself, with characteristic vigor and promptitude, to such measures as -would secure a successful campaign. In the meantime, the preparations of -the Federal Government were equally vigorous, and by no means indefinite -in their aims. - -Whatever may be the comparative merits, when placed in antithetical -juxtaposition, of the plans of campaign adopted by the two Governments in -1861, or whatever may be alleged of the blunders and mishaps of the -Federal scheme of warfare, there could be no question of the full -comprehension of the necessities of the situation by the veteran commander -of the Federal armies. We are not called upon here to give an opinion of -General Scott in his personal or political relations, but that combination -of sagacious military minds, upon which devolved the defense of Southern -liberties, was not likely to commit the error of a disparaging estimate of -his abilities. - -General Scott, far in advance of the prevailing opinion at the North, -dreamed of no holiday enterprise. He well knew that Southern valor, -directed by leaders whose names were identified with the proudest -_prestige_ of America, and enlisted in the defense of principles which -were the dearest convictions and traditions of the Southern heart, was not -to be crushed in a "three-months'" wrestle of arms. Accordingly, his -preparations were for _war_ in its broadest and most terrible sense; a war -between powerful nationalities; a war in which, though sustained by -inexhaustible resources and popular enthusiasm, he had yet to contend with -a race essentially military in its instincts, earnest in conviction, led -by men whose capacities he had amply tested, and aided by defensive -position, vast extent of territory, and by those numerous obstacles in the -way of conquest, which must have been apparent to the eye of an -experienced soldier. - -The attitude of the Confederate Government was necessarily defensive. -History would be searched in vain for examples justifying an invasion by a -people entirely agricultural in habits and resources, weak in numbers, and -with a government not yet organized three months, of a powerful -manufacturing and commercial nation, of dense population, and great wealth -and resources. Without supplies, equipment and transportation, and without -the time or opportunity to obtain them, successful invasion of the North, -however attractive to the popular imagination, was clearly impossible. -Viewed from the more educated stand-point, furnished by the later -developments of the war, the crude ideas, from which arose the popular -aspiration of at once "carrying the war into Africa," are ludicrous in the -extreme. Indeed, there can be little doubt that the defensive, subjected -to such modifications as the casualties of war render proper and necessary -in all plans, whether offensive or defensive, was at all times the true -policy of the South. Certain it is, that, upon two occasions, essaying -the offensive under the most favorable circumstances, and under their -greatest commander, the Confederates were overtaken by disaster. There can -be no just criterion, furnished by European wars, by which to test the -Confederate military policy in the main. Parallels between the American -civil war and those waged by Frederick the Great and Napoleon are -inadmissable. Not only were circumstances entirely dissimilar, but able -military critics have indicated physical peculiarities, forbidding the -unexceptional application to American warfare, of maxims which, elsewhere, -are undisputed. - -Nevertheless, war as a science must be worse than useless, unless its -underlying principles have universal application. Nor is it maintained -that there were no circumstances which would have justified a departure -from the usually defensive policy of the Confederates. Upon two occasions -the main army of the South, having successfully encountered upon its own -soil the most prodigious efforts of the enemy's strength, sought to follow -him in the moment of his recoil. The Confederate invasion of 1862, -culminating at Antietam, and that of 1863, culminating at Gettysburg, were -undertaken with the purpose of destroying, upon his own soil, an enemy -already defeated. Each of these endeavors was based upon sound principles; -and there is no little palliation for the disaster, in either case, in -reflecting how great would have been the results of success. Much of the -philosophy of the war in Virginia is to be explained by the fact of the -thoroughly aggressive character, as soldiers, of President Davis and -General Lee. These two directing minds, by whose combined genius and will, -the fortunes of the Confederacy were so long upheld, in full and cordial -coöperation during the entire war, were in nothing more harmonious, than -in the desire for an aggressive campaign, whenever it could be undertaken -with a reasonable promise of success. Hence, the history of the army of -Northern Virginia develops, throughout, that military policy which is -known as the "defensive with offensive returns." - -After the conclusion of the alliance between Virginia and the Confederate -States, which placed all "military operations, offensive and defensive, in -Virginia," under the control of the Confederate President, troops from the -other Southern States had been thrown northward with astonishing rapidity. -As rapidly as they arrived, regiments were sent to the various localities -where it had been thought expedient to establish a defensive force. These -posts were distributed with a view to their strategic bearing upon -particular sections of territory, which it was deemed necessary to defend, -and also with reference to their strategic connection with each other, and -with the chain of combinations making the general plan of defense. - -In the early summer, the distribution of the Southern forces in Virginia -was as follows: At Manassas Junction, thirty-five miles south-west from -Washington, and the point of intersection of the lines of railroad running -southward to Richmond, and to the Shenandoah Valley, was a force, to the -command of which General Beauregard was transferred from the charge of the -defenses of Charleston. Manassas Junction was obviously a strategic point -of the first importance, as the centre of the railroad system of Northern -Virginia, and as a base of operations threatening Washington, and -immediately across the path of any overland expedition against Richmond. -The favorable estimate of General Beauregard's abilities entertained by -the President, added to the popularity which followed his services at -Charleston, occasioned his assignment to what was obviously to be the most -important theatre of operations. - -Auxiliary to the command of Beauregard, but operating independently of -that officer, was a force at Harper's Ferry, on the Potomac, commanded by -General Joseph E. Johnston, an officer of reputed skill, who had earned -honorable distinction in Mexico, and enjoyed high rank and reputation in -the Federal service. This force had a mission second in value only to that -of the army at Manassas. It was charged with the defense of the rich and -populous Shenandoah Valley, teeming with supplies, and inhabited by a -hardy and patriotic population. Its position was intermediate between the -forces operating in Western Virginia, and those in front of Washington, -and threatening to the enemy's line of communication westward _via_ the -Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. - -In Western Virginia were the commands of Generals Wise and Garnett, -respectively, in the Kanawha Valley, and upon the main line of -communication between the sections east and west of the Alleghany -mountains. The forces of Wise and Garnett were designed for the double -purpose of defending the sections of territory in which they were -respectively located, and for the aid and encouragement of the patriotic -portion of the population, then under the joint domination of the Union -men and Federal soldiers. - -Under Magruder, promoted for his victory at Bethel, was a comparatively -small force, holding the peninsula of James and York Rivers, the direct -route to Richmond from the coast; and at Norfolk were several thousand -men, under command of General Huger. - -No very acute analysis is required to penetrate the motives of this -distribution of forces in the face of the plain necessities of the -situation. Yet a vast amount of conceit has been expended in glittering -verbiage, aiming to exhibit the early partiality of President Davis for -the weak policy of dispersion, and that aversion to the "concentration" of -troops, for overwhelming victories, to be followed by decisive results, -which, it is alleged, adhered to his military policy to the last. To this -cant about "concentration," a sufficient answer relative to this -disposition of troops is, that it has the sanction of Lee's great name, to -say nothing of the complete success that followed it. There was no phase -of the situation, either then or for months afterward, which could have -justified for any result, then attainable by "concentration," the -surrendering to the enemy of vast sections of country, which, then and -subsequently, fed the army and supplied thousands of soldiers. Popular -confidence, so indispensable to a government under such circumstances, was -not to be won by such a policy, at the very incipiency of the contest. -Were the patriots of Western Virginia, thousands of whom made heroic -sacrifices, to be abandoned without an effort for their rescue? Magruder -and Huger, too, had duties of no insignificant character to perform. -Fortress Monroe, commanding the tributaries of the Chesapeake--the avenues -leading to the very heart of Virginia, to the doors of Richmond, and the -rear of the armies upon the northern borders--presented, during the entire -war, an insuperable difficulty in the defense of Virginia. More than once -it was the impregnable asylum for discomfited Federal hosts; and as a base -of operations for the enemy, there was no period of the war when it did -not challenge a vigilant observation from Richmond. To the efficient, -bold, and skillful defense of the peninsula, by Magruder, the Confederate -capital owed its safety for twelve months, not less than to the -successful defense made upon the Potomac border. Dependent upon the -command of Huger was the defense, not only of Norfolk and Portsmouth, but -of an extensive back country, besides the naval defenses then in -preparation at Gosport. - -But in addition to these important objects, is to be remembered the -inexperience of both officers and men, totally disqualifying them for -those prompt and vigorous movements for which they were subsequently -distinguished. Discipline and organization were yet to be supplied. The -army at Manassas in July, 1861, at Centreville, in the ensuing autumn, or -even in front of Richmond, in the summer of 1862, was altogether a -different instrument from that compact force, which the genius of Lee had -welded, when he threw it, with crushing impetus, upon the columns of -Hooker at Chancellorsville. But, after all, as will be abundantly -exhibited hereafter, concentration was preëminently the characteristic of -the Confederate military policy. Especially did the present campaign, in -all its parts, hinge upon the successful execution of this principle. - -Confronting the command of Beauregard, at Manassas, was a considerable -Federal army, under General McDowell, covering Washington, and threatening -an advance along the line of the Orange and Alexandria and Virginia -Central Railroads. Under General Patterson another large Federal force -confronted General Johnston, and threatened the Shenandoah Valley. General -McClellan, with a force greatly outnumbering the small commands opposed to -him, operated in Western Virginia--the common name of the section of -country embraced between the Ohio and Cheat Rivers, and the Baltimore and -Ohio Railroad and the Great Kanawha and Gauley Rivers. A heavy force at -Fortress Monroe, threatening, with incursions, the entire tide-water -section of the State, sufficiently occupied the commands of Magruder and -Huger. - -The Confederate plan of campaign, approved in the early summer, in its -leading features was adhered to with pertinacity and success. This plan, -jointly approved by the Government and the two commanders upon whom its -execution devolved, contemplated defensive operations, and the union, at -the critical moment, of the forces of Beauregard and Johnston, for the -destruction of McDowell's command, whenever it should begin its march -southward. President Davis and General Lee, at Richmond, were in regular -communication with the two commanders in the field, and all operations -were directed with a view to the destruction of the main body of the -enemy. - -General Scott, upon the Federal side, also looked to the coöperation of -Patterson with McDowell, and expected him either to defeat Johnston, or to -so employ him as to prevent his reinforcement of Beauregard, when the -latter should be assailed by the overwhelming force of McDowell. The -remoteness of Magruder and Huger, and the impossibility of sufficient -secrecy in the transfer of any portion of their commands to the theatre of -operations, placed them outside of the calculation. The same may be said -of the Confederate forces in Western Virginia. Apprehension of danger from -the command of McClellan was experienced by the Confederate authorities, -especially after the disastrous defeat of General Garnett. There can be -little doubt, however, that the Government and people of the North -considered their army, immediately upon the ground, ample for the -contemplated work, and did not feel the necessity of looking elsewhere for -reinforcements. - -The small force at Manassas, when General Beauregard assumed command, was -increased by subsequent accessions, until, by the middle of July, it -numbered about twenty thousand men. His duties were a vigilant observation -of the enemy and such defensive preparations as were necessary. The pivot -of the campaign was elsewhere. If Patterson could successfully occupy -Johnston until the crisis at Manassas was passed, the result was doubtful, -at least; but if Johnston, at the required moment, could elude his -adversary, and reinforce Beauregard, the probabilities were most promising -to the Confederates. In the sequel, this proved a result far more easily -attained than had been hoped for. The campaign thus became a series of -maneuvres, with the Confederates in possession of the decided advantage of -an interior line. - -General Patterson, apparently imbecile or bewildered, committed a series -of blunders, to be accounted for upon no possible hypothesis accrediting -to him even ordinary acquaintance with the palpable principles of the -science of war. What his repeated advances, retreats, and flank movements -could have been designed to accomplish, it is difficult to imagine, as his -situation plainly prevented his escape from Johnston and reinforcement of -McDowell, before Johnston could reach Beauregard. General Patterson's -failure to _attack_ Johnston preordained the disaster to McDowell on the -21st of July. Johnston, aided by the vigilance and daring of the -"indefatigable" Stuart, was fully apprised of every movement of his -adversary. With comparatively little difficulty he escaped from his front, -and, in accordance with the plan previously indicated, reinforced -Beauregard with the greater portion of his force. - -With the details of the overwhelming disaster to the Federal arms, at -Manassas, on the 21st of July, we are not here interested. Our aim has -been to glance briefly at the relations sustained by President Davis to -the preliminary campaign which culminated in success so brilliant and -valuable. In accordance with his preconceived purpose to be present, if -possible, at the consummation of plans in which he felt so profound an -interest, President Davis left Richmond on Sunday morning, July 21st, for -the scene of the expected battle. Reaching the battle-field while the -struggle was still in progress, it was his privilege to witness the -flight, in utter confusion and dismay, of the Federal hosts in their first -serious conflict with the patriot army. His presence upon the field was -the inspiration of unbounded enthusiasm among the troops, to whom his name -and bearing were the symbols of victory. His dispatch from the -battle-field, on Sunday night, will long be remembered by those who -gathered from it their first intelligence of the great victory: - - "MANASSAS JUNCTION, Sunday Night. - - "Night has closed upon a hard-fought field. Our forces were - victorious. The enemy were routed, and precipitately fled, abandoning - a large amount of arms, knapsacks, and baggage. The ground was strewn - for miles with those killed, and the farmhouses and ground around were - filled with the wounded. Pursuit was continued along several routes - towards Leesburg and Centreville, until darkness covered the - fugitives. We have captured many field batteries and stands of arms, - and one of the United States flags. Many prisoners have been taken. - Too high praise can not be bestowed, whether for the skill of the - principal officers, or the gallantry of all our troops. The battle was - mainly fought on our left. Our force was 15,000; that of the enemy - estimated at 35,000. - - "JEFF'N DAVIS." - -He remained at Manassas, in consultation with Generals Beauregard and -Johnston, until the morning of Tuesday, July 23d. The return of the -President to Richmond was the occasion of renewed patriotic rejoicings. An -immense crowd awaited at the railroad depot, in expectancy of his arrival, -and both there and at his hotel occurred most enthusiastic demonstrations -of popular delight at the success of the army, and of public regard for -himself.[38] At night Mr. Davis addressed, with thrilling effect, an -immense audience, from a window of the Spottswood Hotel, recounting some -of the incidents of the battle, which he declared to be a decisive -victory, if followed by energetic measures, and counseled moderation and -forbearance in victory, with unrelaxed preparations for future trials. It -was upon this occasion that he uttered the memorable injunction, "Never be -haughty to the humble, or humble to the haughty." - -The immediate and palpable consequence of the victory of Manassas was the -rescue of the Confederacy from the peril by which, for weeks, it had been -threatened. The South was now plainly a power, capable of fighting ably -and vigorously, and with greatly improved prospects of success, for the -independence which it had asserted. Time was to develop a far greater -value in this wonderful success than was then made available. A few days -only were required to exhibit, what at first appeared merely a thorough -repulse of the Federal army, as an overwhelming rout, capable of being -followed to such results as might have changed even the fate of a nation. -Not many weeks sufficed to convince the Southern people of the fact which -must ever dwell among their saddest associations, that an opportunity, -inestimable in value, and almost unparalleled in its flattering -inducements to a people situated as they were, had been utterly -unappreciated and irrevocably lost. - -In the numerous accounts which have been written, representing all shades -of opinion from different stand-points on both sides, and from the wide -discussion which has resulted, history can be at no loss for material upon -which to base an intelligent estimate of this battle, and of the extent to -which the victors reaped the advantages of success. Differences of opinion -have prevailed, and will, in all probability, continue to prevail, -respecting the purely military questions involved in the discussion of the -absence of such a vigorous, pertinacious, and unrelenting pursuit by the -Confederates as was necessary to secure the fruits of a decisive victory. -But the stubborn conviction, nevertheless, remains, and will never be -eradicated from the Southern mind--that, barring the immediate security to -the Confederate capital, Manassas was but a barren victory, where results -of a most decisive character were within easy reach. Nor is this popular -impression unsustained by such competent military authority, as will -command respect for its judgment, upon those aspects of the question, upon -which a military judgment is alone valuable. - -So emphatic became the public condemnation of the inactivity of the army, -and especially when, by subsequent information, was revealed the real -condition of the enemy after his overwhelming disaster, that inquiry was -naturally made as to the authorship of such an erroneous policy. The -presence of President Davis, both during a portion of the battle and -during the day following, was promptly seized upon as affording a clue to -the mystery. For months he rested under the suspicion of having, by -peremptory order, stopped the pursuit of the enemy, in the face of the -protestations of his generals, who would have pressed it to the extent of -attainable results. - -How such an impression--_so utterly in conflict with the facts_--could -have obtained, by whom, or for what purpose it was disseminated, it is now -needless to inquire. The slander was, at length, after having been -circulated to the injury of Mr. Davis throughout the country, so -conclusively answered as to receive not even the pretense of belief, save -from an unscrupulous partisanship, at all times deaf to facts which could -not be perverted injuriously to the President. It nevertheless had served -a purpose, in preparing the popular mind for those constantly iterated -charges of "executive interference," in the plans and dispositions of the -armies of the Confederacy, which followed at subsequent stages of the war. - -It may be asked, Why did Mr. Davis suffer this suspicion, when the proof -of its injustice might have been so easily adduced? This inquiry would -indicate an imperfect acquaintance with that devoted patriotism and -knightly magnanimity which belong to his character. Any explanation -acquitting himself, must have thrown the responsibility upon Generals -Johnston and Beauregard, and he preferred rather to suffer an undeserved -reproach, than to excite distrust of two officers, then enjoying the -largest degree of popular confidence. With him, selfish considerations -were never permitted to outweigh the interests of the country. Actuated by -this impulse, he, in more than one instance, where the names of men high -in public favor were used in his disparagement, refused, even in -self-defense, that retaliation, which must have hurt the cause in -proportion as it diminished confidence in its prominent representatives. -Mr. Davis, with that decorum which has equally illustrated his public and -private life, recognized the special propriety of a denial of these -injurious rumors _from other sources_, fully apprized of their falsity, -and from which such an acquittal of himself would have come with becoming -candor and grace. - -Justice, proverbially slow, has been tardy indeed in its awards to Mr. -Davis; but in this instance, as it must inevitably in others, it has come -time enough for his historical vindication. The reader, uninformed as to -the merits of this question, will be content with a limited statement from -the mass of testimony, which has ultimately acquitted Mr. Davis of having -prevented the pursuit of the Federal army after its overthrow upon the -field of Manasses. In a publication, presenting an elaborate indictment -against Mr. Davis, as the main instrument of the downfall of the -Confederacy, written since the war, is found the following admission: "As -is known, he (President Davis) was at Manasses the evening of the 21st -July, 1861. Until a late hour that night he was engaged with Generals -Johnston and Beauregard, at the quarters of the latter, in discussing the -momentous achievements of the day, the extent of which was not as yet -recognized at all by him or his generals. Much gratified with known -results, his bearing was eminently proper. He certainly expressed no -opposition to any forward movement; nor at the time displayed a -disposition to interpose his opinion or authority touching operations and -plans of campaign."[39] - -General Johnston, in a communication published since the war, assumes the -responsibility of the failure to pursue, and, with the advantage of -retrospect, defends that course with cogent reasoning and an interesting -statement of facts. Says General Johnston: "'The substantial fruit' of -this victory was the preservation of the Confederacy. No more could have -been hoped for. The pursuit of the enemy was not continued because our -cavalry (a very small force) _was driven back_ by the 'solid resistance' -of the United States infantry. Its rearguard was an entire division, which -had not been engaged, and was twelve or fifteen times more numerous than -our two little bodies of cavalry. The infantry was not required to -continue the pursuit, because it would have been harassing it to no -purpose. It is well known that infantry, unencumbered by baggage trains, -can easily escape pursuing cavalry." - -That no farther results were to be hoped for than the arrest of the -Federal advance toward Richmond, he endeavors to demonstrate as follows: -"A movement upon Washington was out of the question. We could not have -carried the intrenchments by assault, and had none of the means to besiege -them. Our assault would have been repulsed, and the enemy, then become the -victorious party, would have resumed their march to Richmond; but if we -had captured the intrenchments, a river, a mile wide, lay between them and -Washington, commanded by the guns of a Federal fleet. If we had taken -Alexandria, which stands on low and level ground, those guns would have -driven us out in a few hours, at the same time killing our friends, the -inhabitants. We could not cross the Potomac, and therefore it was -impracticable to conquer the hostile capital, or emancipate oppressed -Maryland." - -But these statements, ample, as far as they go, in the vindication of Mr. -Davis, only partially tell the story of Manassas. They do not fully -describe his real relation to the question, though we are far from -imputing to General Johnston an intentional omission. A statement of Mr. -Davis' views was not necessarily germane to General Johnston's explanation -of his own conduct. His purpose is to establish the reasons which induced -him to decline pursuit of the enemy, or rather, which, in his judgment, -made pursuit impracticable. Nor is it germane to our purpose to discuss -these reasons; to attempt either a demonstration of their fallacy or an -argument in their support. They have not been accepted as conclusive -either by the public, or by unanimous military judgment. - -The great name of Stonewall Jackson, himself an actor in the most -thrilling scenes of that wonderful triumph of Southern valor, and dating -from that day his record upon the "bead-roll of fame," is authoritatively -given in opposition to the policy which General Johnston approves. In -this connection, we can not forbear to quote the biographer of that -illustrious man, in passages showing that wondrous intuition of great -soldiership, more distinctive, perhaps, of Jackson, than of any commander -of the present century, excepting only Napoleon. Professor Dabney says: -"Jackson, describing the manifest rout of the enemy, remarked to the -physicians, that he believed 'with ten thousand fresh men he could go into -the city of Washington.'" Again, after a most graphic picture of the -condition of the Federal army, its demoralization, panic, and utter -incapacity to meet an attack by the victorious Confederates, and an able -statement of the inducements to a vigorous pursuit, the biographer of -General Jackson makes this impressive statement: "With these views of the -campaign, General Jackson earnestly concurred. His sense of official -propriety sealed his lips; and when the more impatient spirits inquired, -day after day, why they were not led after the enemy, his only answer was -to say: 'That is the affair of the commanding generals.' But to his -confidential friends he afterward declared, when no longer under the -orders of those officers, that their inaction was a deplorable blunder; -and this opinion he was subsequently accustomed to assert with a warmth -and emphasis unusual in his guarded manner."[40] - -Mr. Davis was far from approving the inaction which followed Manassas. He -confidently expected a different use of the victory. When called away by -the pressing nature of his official duties at Richmond, he left the army -with a heart elastic with hope, at what he considered the certainty of -even more glorious and valuable achievements. His speech at the depot in -Richmond, which we have given elsewhere, is evidence of his exultant -anticipations. The speech at the Spottswood, entering more into details, -still better authenticates his hopes of an immediate and successful -advance.[41] There could be no misinterpretation of the ardor with which, -in glowing sentences, he predicted the immediate and consecutive triumphs -of what he proudly termed the "gallant little army." - -Indeed, before leaving Manassas, President Davis favored the most vigorous -pursuit practicable. On the evening of the battle, while the victory was -assured, but by no means complete, he urged that the enemy, still on the -field, (Heintzelman's troops, as subsequently appeared,) be warmly -pressed, as was successfully done. During the night following the -engagement he made a disposition of a portion of the troops, with a view -to an advance in the morning. These troops were removed, but not by -himself, to meet an apprehended attack upon the head-quarters of the army. -An advance on Monday, the 22d July, was out of the question, in -consequence of the heavy rain. - -It is not to be understood that President Davis fully appreciated, on -Sunday night, the 21st, the overwhelming rout of the Federal army, nor -that he advocated, as practicable, an immediate movement in pursuit, by -the entire army. No one could have anticipated the utter disorganization -attending the flight of the Federals. He had, too, positive evidence of -the confusion prevailing among portions of the Southern troops. Summoned -by a message from a youthful connection, who was mortally wounded, Mr. -Davis rode over a large portion of the field, in a vain search for the -regiment to which the young man was attached. Upon his return, he -accidentally met an officer who directed him to the locality of the -regiment, where he found the corpse of his relative. The evidences of -disorganization, upon which General Johnston dwells with so much force and -emphasis, were indeed palpable, but Mr. Davis confidently believed that an -efficient pursuit might be made by such commands as were in comparatively -good condition. Such were his impressions then, and that he contemplated -immediate activity as the sequel of Manassas, is a matter of indisputable -record. - -That Mr. Davis did not insist upon the undeferred execution of his own -views, is proof less of his approval of the course pursued, than of an -absence of that pragmatic disposition with which he was afterwards so -persistently charged. His subsequent hearty tributes to Beauregard and -Johnston, and prompt recognition of their services, show how far he was -elevated above that mean intolerance, which would have made him incapable -of according merit to the opinions and actions of others, when averse to -his own conclusions. - -This determined spirit of misrepresentation of the motives and conduct of -the President, beginning thus early--respecting the origin of which we -shall have more to say hereafter--was to prove productive of the most -serious embarrassments to the Confederate cause. The first great success -in arms achieved by the South, was to originate questions tending to -excite distrust in the capacity of the Executive, and subsequently -distrust of his treatment of those who were under his authority. -Misrepresentation was not to cease with the attempt already mentioned to -impair public confidence in Mr. Davis. A pragmatic interference with the -plans of his generals was persistently charged upon him. The almost -uninterrupted inactivity of the main army in Virginia, following the -battle of Manassas, by which the enemy was permitted, without molestation, -to organize a new army--a subject of constant and exasperated censure by -the public--was falsely attributed to Mr. Davis' interference with -Generals Johnston and Beauregard. It is a sad evidence of the license -characteristic of a purely partisan criticism, that this falsely alleged -interference has even been ascribed to the instigations of a mean envy of -the popularity of those officers. - -The purely personal differences of public men are not the proper -subject-matter of historical discussion. In the prosecution of our -endeavor to give an intelligent and candid narrative of the events of the -war, in so far as President Davis was connected with them, we shall have -occasion to dwell upon those differences between himself and others -respecting important questions of policy which are known to have existed. -We do not see that the personal relations of President Davis with Generals -Johnston and Beauregard, are here a subject of appropriate inquiry. Nor -are those minor questions of detail as to the organization of the army, -which arose between them, of such significance as to justify elaborate -discussion here. That President Davis chose to exercise those plain -privileges with which the Constitution invested him; that he should have -consulted that military knowledge which his education and service had -taught him; that he should make available his valuable experience as -Minister of War; and that he should have failed to interpret the acts of -Congress agreeably to the tastes of generals in the field, rather than -according to his own judgment, is certainly singular evidence upon which -to base charges of "pragmatism," "persecution," and "envy" of those -generals.[42] - -While the main struggle in Virginia was yet undecided, the Confederate -force, under General Garnett, in Western Virginia, had been disastrously -defeated by the Federal army of General McClellan. The Confederate -commander, a brave and promising officer, was killed, in a gallant -endeavor to protect the retreat of his command. This achievement of -General McClellan, though attributable mainly to his vastly superior -force, was attended by evidences of skill, which indicated him as a -prominent figure in the events of the immediate future. In the midst of -the gloom and disappointment consequent upon the disaster at Manassas, -General McClellan appeared to the Northern Government and masses to be an -officer specially recommended, by his late success, for the important -charge of the army designed to protect the capital. He was immediately -summoned to Washington, and placed in charge of its defenses. With rare -capacity for general military administration, and with especial aptitude -for organization, General McClellan addressed himself with vigor and -success to the work assigned him. Under his direction, the defenses of -Washington were speedily put in admirable condition, and within a few -months, he had created an army which, in discipline, organization, and -equipment, would have compared favorably with the best armies of the -world. - -General McClellan was too sagacious and prudent a commander to repeat the -errors of his predecessor. He was evidently determined not to undertake an -aggressive campaign until his preparations were completed. During the -progress of those preparations, he endeavored also to provide against -those aggressive movements which he evidently anticipated from his -adversaries. But the autumn and winter were to pass away without any -serious demonstration by the Confederate commanders, and with but one -important movement of the enemy. - -In the early fall, Generals Johnston and Beauregard advanced to a position -in close proximity to the Federal capital. Unable, however, to provoke an -engagement with the Federal commander, whose present purposes were purely -defensive and preparatory, the Confederate army withdrew from the front of -Washington, and retired within its former lines about Manassas and -Centreville. - -In the latter part of October, an engagement of some importance occurred -near Leesburg, occasioned by an attempt of General McClellan to throw a -force across the Potomac, doubtless with the view of an advance on the -Confederate left wing. The numbers engaged in this engagement were -comparatively small, which rendered more remarkable its sanguinary -character. Nearly the entire Federal force, though outnumbering more than -two to one the Confederate force, was captured or destroyed. There was -good reason to regard this movement as preliminary to a general advance of -the Federal army. The battle of Leesburg was very dispiriting in its -effects upon the North, and equally re-assuring to the Southern Government -and people. No other operations of note occurred during the autumn and -winter upon the lines of the Lower Potomac. - -General Jackson, who by a circumstance which is now well known to the -world, had acquired at Manassas the _sobriquet_ of "Stonewall," in -September, 1861, was made a Major-General. Late in December, in charge of -a considerable force, he executed, with indifferent success, a movement -against detachments of the enemy in the neighborhood of Romney, and other -points along the Upper Potomac. - -The disasters sustained by the Confederates in Western Virginia, in the -early summer, were not repaired by the transfer of General Lee to that -quarter. A large and valuable section of country remained as the enemy's -trophy, almost undisputed at the termination of the campaign. The -reputation of General Lee suffered severely from the absence of that -success which was anticipated from his presence in command. It is a -noteworthy circumstance that when, a few months afterward, the President -placed Lee in command of the main army of Virginia, his ill-success in -Western Virginia was alleged as conclusive evidence of his unfitness for -the position to which "executive partiality" had assigned him. - -In the meantime, upon the distant theatre of Missouri, the war had assumed -a most interesting phase. Many months before the legally-elected -legislature of that State adopted an ordinance of secession, Missouri was -contributing valuable aid to the struggling Confederacy. Driven by the -oppressive course of the Federal Government into resistance, in spite of -their efforts to save their State from the destructive presence of war, -the Southern men of Missouri organized under the leadership of General -Sterling Price and Governor Jackson. Accessions of men from all portions -of the State were constantly made to the patriot forces, and, within a few -weeks, a large force was upon the southern border, animated by an -enthusiastic desire to undertake the redemption of their homes. - -But the Missourians, though sufficiently numerous to constitute an -effective army, were confronted by difficulties which would have appalled -men of less heroic purpose, or enlisted in an inferior cause. Hostilities -had been precipitated upon them while they were entirely -unprepared--wanting arms, ammunition, and other indispensable material of -war. The remoteness of Missouri from the seat of government, and the -inadequate transportation, prevented that prompt and efficient aid by the -Confederate authorities which it was equally their interest and -inclination to afford. Nevertheless, with almost miraculous rapidity, the -army of General Price was organized, and supplied with such material as he -could obtain. - -The Federal commander, in his march southward from St. Louis, pursued, -with considerable vigor, the various detachments of the patriots who were -hastening to the standards of Price. After several minor engagements, in -which the Missourians displayed the most devoted heroism, a considerable -battle was fought, early in August, near Springfield, in the south-western -corner of the State, in which the Federal army was disastrously defeated, -and its commander killed. In this battle, the Missouri forces were aided -by a Confederate force, under General McCulloch, which had advanced -northward from Arkansas. Later in the year, General Price advanced through -the central portion of the State, receiving large additions to his army, -and captured the largest garrison of Federal troops in Northern Missouri. -Having accomplished these valuable aims, he, with great skill and daring, -effected a safe retreat to the south-western frontier. President Davis, in -a message to Congress, echoed the hearty appreciation of the Southern -people, in a special tribute to the valor and devotion of the southern -population of Missouri. - -Kentucky also had become the theatre of hostilities. The Federal -Government, recognizing the neutrality of Kentucky so long as was -necessary to mature their plans for her subjugation, finally insisted upon -making her a party to the war, and invaded her territory with a view to -operations against the Confederacy. President Davis thus stated the -motives of the policy adopted by the Confederate Government respecting -Kentucky: - - "Finding that the Confederate States were about to be invaded through - Kentucky, and that her people, after being deceived into a mistaken - security, were unarmed, and in danger of being subjugated by the - Federal forces, our armies were marched into that State to repel the - enemy, and prevent their occupation of certain strategic points, which - would have given them great advantages in the contest--a step which - was justified, not only by the necessities of self-defense on the part - of the Confederate States, but also by a desire to aid the people of - Kentucky. It was never intended by the Confederate Government to - conquer or coerce the people of that State; but, on the contrary, it - was declared by our Generals that they would withdraw their troops if - the Federal Government would do likewise. Proclamation was also made - of the desire to respect the neutrality of Kentucky, and the - intention, by the wishes of her people, as soon as they were free to - express their opinions. - - "These declarations were approved by me; and I should regard it as one - of the best effects of the march of our troops into Kentucky, if it - should end in giving to her people liberty of choice, and a free - opportunity to decide their own destiny, according to their own will." - -Not long after the occupation of various points in Kentucky, by the -respective armies, an engagement occurred at Belmont, on the Missouri -shore, near Columbus, resulting in the defeat of the Federal force -engaged. The Confederate forces engaged were a portion of the command of -General Polk, and the defeated Federal commander was General U. S. Grant. - -Before the first year of the war terminated, the Confederates experienced -reverses resulting from the naval superiority of the enemy. Expeditions -were undertaken against the Carolina coast, and were successful to the -extent of securing a permanent lodgment of the Federal forces. - -In the month of November the forcible seizure, by a Federal naval officer, -of the persons of Messrs. John Slidell and James M. Mason, commissioners, -respectively, from the Confederate States to France and England, and, at -the time, passengers on an English steamer, excited strong hope of those -complications between the United States and European powers which were -reasonably anticipated by the South. This act was a palpable outrage and -violation alike of international law and comity. It was, nevertheless, -indorsed by public sentiment at the North, in manifold forms of -expression. - -In England, the intelligence of an outrage upon the national flag was -received with outbursts of popular indignation, which compelled the -Government to make a resentful demand upon the United States. The course -of the English Government was characteristic of the nation which it -represented. There was neither discussion nor parley, but a simple -imperative demand for the surrender of the commissioners and their -attachès. - -Never was so deep a humiliation imposed upon a people as that imposed by -the course of the Federal authorities upon the North. The prisoners, over -whose capture the whole North had but recently exulted, as at the -realization of the fruits of a brilliant victory, were surrendered -immediately. Mr. Seward even declared that they were surrendered -"cheerfully," and in accordance with the "most cherished principles of -American statesmanship," and advanced an argument in favor of complying -with the demands of the British Government, far more to have been expected -from a British diplomatist, than from the leading statesman of a people -who had promptly indorsed the outrage. - -This concession of the Federal Government was the first of numerous -disappointments in store for the Southern people, in the hope, so -universally indulged, of foreign intervention. Expectation of immediate -complications between England and the United States, received great -encouragement from the earlier phase of the "Trent affair," as was called -the seizure of Messrs. Mason and Slidell. Consequent upon the -correspondence between the Governments of England and the United States, -growing out of the "Trent affair," were announcements in Parliament, which -should have discouraged the anticipation of interference by England, at -least with the cabinet then in power. Lord John Russell declared that the -blockade of the Southern ports was effective, in spite of abundant -evidence, and in spite, even, of the declarations of the British consul at -Charleston to the contrary. This concession was intended, doubtless, as a -salvo to the North for its deep humiliation, and was, indeed, rightly -construed as an evidence of the real sympathies of the British cabinet in -the American struggle. In this aspect, it was an assurance of no little -significance. - -At the election, in November, Mr. Davis, without opposition, was chosen -the first President of the Confederacy, under the permanent government, -which was soon to succeed the provisional organization. Mr. Stephens was -reëlected Vice-President. - -In his message to the provisional Congress, at the beginning of its last -session, the President thus sketched the situation at the close of the -first year of the war: - - "_To the Congress of the Confederate States_: - - "The few weeks which have elapsed since your adjournment have brought - us so near the close of the year, that we are now able to sum up its - general results. The retrospect is such as should fill the hearts of - our people with gratitude to Providence for his kind interposition in - their behalf. Abundant yields have rewarded the labor of the - agriculturist, whilst the manufacturing interest of the Confederate - States was never so prosperous as now. The necessities of the times - have called into existence new branches of manufactures, and given a - fresh impulse to the activity of those heretofore in operation. The - means of the Confederate States for manufacturing the necessaries and - comforts of life, within themselves, increase as the conflict - continues, and we are rapidly becoming independent of the rest of the - world, for the supply of such military stores and munitions as are - indispensable for war. - - "The operations of the army, soon to be partially interrupted by the - approaching winter, have afforded a protection to the country, and - shed a lustre upon its arms, through the trying vicissitudes of more - than one arduous campaign, which entitle our brave volunteers to our - praise and our gratitude. - - "From its commencement up to the present period, the war has been - enlarging its proportions and extending its boundaries, so as to - include new fields. The conflict now extends from the shores of the - Chesapeake to the confines of Missouri and Arizona; yet sudden calls - from the remotest points for military aid have been met with - promptness enough, not only to avert disaster in the face of superior - numbers, but also to roll back the tide of invasion from the border. - - "When the war commenced, the enemy were possessed of certain strategic - points and strong places within the Confederate States. They greatly - exceeded us in numbers, in available resources, and in the supplies - necessary for war. Military establishments had been long organized, - and were complete; the navy, and, for the most part, the army, once - common to both, were in their possession. To meet all this, we had to - create, not only an army in the face of war itself, but also military - establishments necessary to equip and place it in the field. It ought, - indeed, to be a subject of gratulation that the spirit of the - volunteers and the patriotism of the people have enabled us, under - Providence, to grapple successfully with these difficulties. - - "A succession of glorious victories at Bethel, Bull Run, Manassas, - Springfield, Lexington, Leesburg, and Belmont, has checked the wicked - invasion which greed of gain, and the unhallowed lust of power, - brought upon our soil, and has proved that numbers cease to avail, - when directed against a people fighting for the sacred right of - self-government and the privileges of freemen. After seven months of - war, the enemy have not only failed to extend their occupancy of our - soil, but new States and Territories have been added to our - Confederacy; while, instead of their threatened march of unchecked - conquest, they have been driven, at more than one point, to assume the - defensive; and, upon a fair comparison between the two belligerents, - as to men, military means, and financial condition, the Confederate - States are relatively much stronger now than when the struggle - commenced." - - - - -CHAPTER XI. - - PROSPECTS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1862--EXTREME CONFIDENCE OF THE SOUTH-- - EXTRAVAGANT EXPECTATIONS--THE RICHMOND EXAMINER ON CONFEDERATE - PROSPECTS--WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES PREDICTED--THE - BLOCKADE TO BE RAISED--THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY DECREED BY HEAVEN-- - RESULT OF THE BOASTFUL TONE OF THE SOUTHERN PRESS--THE CONFEDERATE - GOVERNMENT NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISASTERS OF 1862--PRESIDENT DAVIS - URGES PREPARATION FOR A LONG WAR--HIS WISE OPPOSITION TO SHORT - ENLISTMENTS OF TROOPS--PREMONITIONS OF MISFORTUNES IN THE WEST--THE - CONFEDERATE FORCES IN KENTUCKY--GENERAL ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON--HIS - CAREER BEFORE THE WAR--CHARACTER--APPEARANCE--THE FRIEND OF JEFFERSON - DAVIS--MUTUAL ESTEEM--SIDNEY JOHNSTON IN KENTUCKY--HIS PLANS--HIS - DIFFICULTIES--THE FORCES OF GRANT AND BUELL--CRUEL DILEMMA OF GENERAL - SIDNEY JOHNSTON--A REVERSE--GRANT CAPTURES FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON-- - LOSS OF KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE--FEDERAL DESIGNS IN THE EAST--BURNSIDE - CAPTURES ROANOKE ISLAND--SERIOUS NATURE OF THESE REVERSES--POPULAR - DISAPPOINTMENT--ORGANIZED OPPOSITION TO THE CONFEDERATE - ADMINISTRATION--CHARACTER AND MOTIVES OF THIS OPPOSITION--AN EFFORT TO - REVOLUTIONIZE PRESIDENT DAVIS' CABINET--ASSAULTS UPON SECRETARIES - BENJAMIN AND MALLORY--CORRECT EXPLANATION OF THE CONFEDERATE - REVERSES--CONGRESSIONAL CENSURE OF MR. BENJAMIN--SECRETARY MALLORY-- - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOUTHERN MIND--THE PERMANENT GOVERNMENT--SECOND - INAUGURATION OF MR. DAVIS--SEVERITY OF THE SEASON--THE CEREMONIES-- - APPEARANCE OF PRESIDENT DAVIS--HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS--ITS EFFECT-- - POPULAR RE-ASSURANCE--MESSAGE TO CONGRESS--COMMENTS OF RICHMOND PRESS. - - -When President Davis held his first New-Year's reception, as the chief -magistrate of the infant Confederacy, there were not wanting signs of the -approaching shadows, which were to throw in temporary eclipse the -brilliant foreground of the first year of the war. Richmond was then in -its exultant spirit, its gayety, festivity, and show, the type of that -fatal confidence in Southern invincibility, which, in a few weeks of -disaster, was brought to grief and humiliation. - -In that numerous and brilliant assemblage, representing the various -branches of the new government, civil, naval, and military, members of -Congress and of State Legislatures, and admiring citizens, eager to make -formal tender of their esteem to the first President of the South, there -were few who discerned the omens of the coming storm, which was to shake -its foundation, the power of which that occasion was an imposing symbol. -Perhaps there were as few who could penetrate his assuring exterior of -grace, gentleness, and dignity, and share the anxiety with which, even in -the midst of popular adulation, he contemplated the approach of that stern -trial for which the country was so deficient in preparation. - -With singular accord of opinion, writers, who had an _inside_ view of the -Southern conduct of the war, have commented upon the disasters consequent -upon the period of fancied security and relaxed exertions which followed -the battle of Manassas. We can not share, however, the shallow and -unphilosophical conclusion which pronounces the glorious triumph of -Manassas a calamity to the South. The temporary salvation of the -Confederacy, guaranteed by that victory, was not its only fruit. Manassas -gave a stamp of _prestige_ to Southern valor and soldiership, which not -even a deluge of subsequent disasters could efface. It gave an -imperishable record and an undying incentive to resolution. - -Yet it is not to be questioned that the public apathy, engendered by an -exaggerated estimate of the value of the numerous and consecutive -triumphs of the preceding summer and autumn, was measurably productive of -evil consequences. Encouraged by the press, in many instances, the -Southern people saw, in the comparatively easy triumphs of their superior -valor over undisciplined Northern mobs--for which Manassas, Belmont, -Leesburg, and similar engagements constituted the mere apprenticeship of -war--the auguries significant of a speedy attainment of their -independence. Inflated orators and boastful editorials proclaimed the -absolute certainty of early interference of foreign powers, in behalf of -the South, as the source of the indispensable staples of cotton and -tobacco. In the face of the enormous preparations of the enemy, his -monster armies, numbering, in December, 1861, more than six hundred -thousand men; his numerous fleets for sea-board operations, and iron-clad -floating batteries for the interior streams, comparatively insignificant -successes were pointed to as sufficient proofs of the inability of the -enemy to make any serious impression upon Southern territory. - -The Richmond _Examiner_, which had early evinced a disposition hostile to -President Davis and his administration, the ablest and most influential -journal of the South, destined to furnish both the brains and inspiration -in support of future opposition, was conspicuous in its contempt for the -fighting qualities of the North, and vehement in its prophesies of good -fortune for the Confederacy. Late in December, the _Examiner_, commenting -upon recent intelligence from the North, said: "All other topics become -trifles beside the tidings of England which occupies this journal, and all -commentary that diverts public attention from that single point is -impertinence. The effect of the outrage of the Trent on the public -sentiment of Great Britain more than fulfills the prophesy that we made -when the arrest of the Confederate ministers was a fresh event. All legal -quibbling and selfish calculation has been consumed like straw in the -burning sense of incredible insult. The Palmerston cabinet has been forced -to immediate and decisive measures; and a peremptory order to Lord Lyons -comes with the steamer that brings the news to the American shore. He is -directed to demand the unconditional surrender of Messrs. Mason and -Slidell, to place them in the position they were found beneath the British -flag, and a complete disavowal of their seizure as an authorized act. -_Now, the Northern Government has placed itself in such a position that it -can do none of these things. The Abolitionist element of the Northern -States would go straight to revolution at the least movement toward a -surrender of the captives_; the arrest was made by the deliberately -written orders of the Government, already avowed and published beyond the -hope of apology or possibility of retraction. - -"The United States can do absolutely nothing but refuse the demands of -Great Britain, and abide the consequences of that refusal. What they will -be can be clearly foretold: _first, there will be the diplomatic rupture; -Lord Lyons will demand his passports, and Mr. Adams will be sent away from -London; then will follow an immediate recognition of the Southern -Confederacy, with encouragement and aid in fitting out its vessels, and -supplying their wants in the British ports and islands. Lastly, a war will -be evolved from these two events._" - -Continuing its comments upon what it terms the "raving madness" of the -North, the _Examiner_ says: "Then came the proclamation of Lincoln. -Nothing but insanity could have dictated it; and without it the secession -of Virginia was impossible. _Then their crazy attempt to subdue a country -not less difficult to conquer than Russia itself, with an armed mob of -loafers._" - -In the contemplation of the pleasing sketch which its imagination had -executed, the _Examiner_ asks: "_Spectators of these events, who can doubt -that the Almighty fiat has gone forth against the American Union, or that -the Southern Confederacy is decreed by the Divine Wisdom?_" It declares -that the "dullest worldling, the coolest Atheist, the most hardened cynic, -might be struck with awe by the startling and continued interposition of a -power beyond the control or cognizance of men in these affairs;" and -triumphantly asks: "Who thought, when the Trent was announced to sail, -that on its deck, and in the trough of the weltering Atlantic, the key of -the blockade would be lost?" - -The natural and inevitable result of the assurances tendered to the -people, was to lull the patriotic ardor which marked the first great -uprising for defense, when two hundred thousand men sprung to arms. There -can be no justice in holding the Confederate Government responsible for -the popular apathy, which it had no agency in producing, or for the -weakness of the armies, which, next to the naval weakness of the South, -was the immediate cause of the disasters of the early months of 1862. - -Since the commencement of hostilities, the Government had been -indefatigable in its efforts to promote enlistments of _volunteers for the -war_, instead of the twelve-months' system, which could be adequate for -the demands of a temporary exigency only, and not for such a terrific -struggle as must result from the temper and resources of the two -contestants. Volunteering was as yet the only method of raising troops -sanctioned by law, or likely to meet popular approval. The country was not -yet prepared for an enforced levy of troops; and it is only necessary to -remember the opposition, in certain quarters, to the execution of the -subsequent conscription law, adopted under the pressure of disasters which -made its necessity plain and inevitable, to conjecture the temper in which -such a measure would have been met, in the over-confident and foolishly -exultant tone of the press and public in the winter of 1861. - -Mr. Davis especially sought to disabuse the public mind of its fallacious -hope of a short contest, by his efforts to place the military resources of -the South upon a footing capable of indefinite resistance to an attempt at -conquest, which was to end only with the success or exhaustion of the -North. Conscious of the perpetual disorganization and decimation of the -armies which must result from the system of short enlistments, he had, -early in the war, attracted unfriendly criticism by his refusal of any -more six or twelve-months' volunteers than were necessary to meet the -shock of the enemy's first advance. It was clear to his mind that, under -the wretched system of short enlistments, which he characterized as a -"frightful cause of disaster," the country must, at some period of the -war, be virtually without an army. Such was the case in January and -February, 1862, when the enemy eagerly pressed his immense advantage while -the process of furloughs and reënlistments was in progress, and the army -almost completely disorganized. - -Such a crisis was inevitable, and had it not occurred then, it would -merely have been deferred, to be encountered at a period when the capacity -of the Confederacy was even less adequate for its perils. The lesson was -not without its value, since it drove the country and the press to a -recognition of the fact that independence was not to be won by shifts and -dalliance, by temporary expedients, and by spasmodic popular uprisings for -temporary exigencies. - -The efforts of the Government were unceasing to prepare for the tremendous -onset of the enemy in almost every quarter of the Confederacy, which it -must have been blind, indeed, not to anticipate. The responses to the -calls of the Government were neither in numbers nor enthusiasm -encouraging. The people were blind in their confidence, and deaf to -appeals admonishing them of perils which, in their fancied security, they -believed impossible of realization. But this soothing sense of security -was soon to have a terrible awakening. The Confederate Government had -recognized the peculiar perils menacing the western section of its -territory. There for weeks rested the anxious gaze of President Davis, and -thence were to come the first notes of alarm--the immediate premonitions -of disaster. - -Immediately, upon the occupation of Kentucky by the Confederate forces, -had begun the development of a plan of defense by the Southern generals. -The command of General Polk, constituting the Confederate left, was at -Columbus. On the upper waters of the Cumberland River, in South-eastern -Kentucky, was a small force constituting the Confederate right, commanded -first by General Zollicoffer, and afterward by General Crittenden. At -Bowling Green, with Green River in front, and communicating by railway -with Nashville and the South, was the main Confederate force in Kentucky, -commanded by General Buckner until the arrival of General Albert Sidney -Johnston, whom President Davis had commissioned a full general in the -Confederate service, and assigned to the command of the Western -Department. - -Apart from the historical interest which belongs to the name of Albert -Sidney Johnston, and from the dramatic incident of his death at the very -climax of a splendid victory, which immediately paled into disaster upon -his fall, as the long and valued friend of Jefferson Davis, he is -entitled to special mention in the biography of the latter. - -Albert Sidney Johnston was born in Mason County, Kentucky, in 1803. He -graduated at West Point in 1826; was commissioned as Lieutenant of -infantry; served in the Black Hawk war with distinction; resigned and -settled in Texas in 1836. He volunteered as a private in her armies soon -after the battle of San Jacinto. His merit soon raised him from the ranks, -and he was appointed senior Brigadier-General, and succeeded General -Houston in the command of the Texan army. In 1838 he was appointed Texan -Secretary of War, and in 1839 organized an expedition against the hostile -Cherokees, in which he routed them completely in a battle on the river -Neches. He warmly advocated the annexation of Texas to the United States, -and after this union was effected, he took part in the Mexican war. His -services at the siege of Monterey drew upon him the public favor and the -thanks of General Butler. He continued in the army, and in 1857, was sent -by President Buchanan as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army to -subdue the Mormons. His successful advance in the Great Salt Lake City, -and the skill and address with which he conducted a difficult enterprise, -largely increased his fame. When the war commenced between the North and -South, he was in California, but when he learned the progress of the -revolution, he resigned his commission and set out from San Francisco, to -penetrate by land to Richmond, a distance of two thousand three hundred -miles. - -The safe arrival of General Albert Sidney Johnston, within the lines of -the Confederacy, was greeted with a degree of public acclamation hardly -less enthusiastic than would have signalized the intelligence of a great -victory. It was known that the Federal authorities, anxious to prevent so -distinguished and valuable an accession to the generalship of the South, -were intent upon his capture. For weeks popular expectation had been -strained, in eager gaze, for tidings of the distinguished commander, who, -beset by innumerable perils and obstacles, was making his way across the -continent, not less eager to join his countrymen, than were they to feel -the weight of his noble blade in the unequal combat. - -Few of the eminent soldiers, who had sought service under the banners of -the Confederacy, had a more brilliant record of actual service; and to the -advantages of reputation, General Johnston added those graces and -distinctions of person with which the imagination invests the ideal -commander. He was considerably past middle age; his height exceeded six -feet, his frame was large and sinewy; his every movement and posture -indicated vigorous and athletic manhood. The general expression of his -striking face was grave and composed, but inviting rather than austere. - -The arrival of General Johnston in Richmond, early in September, was a -source of peculiar congratulation to President Davis. Between these -illustrious men had existed, for many years, an endearment, born of close -association, common trials and triumphs, and mutual confidence, which -rendered most auspicious their coöperation in the cause of Southern -independence. - -"Albert Sidney Johnston," says Professor Bledsoe, in a recent publication, -"who, take him all in all, was the simplest, bravest, grandest man we have -ever known, once said to the present writer: 'There is no measuring such a -man as Davis;' and this high tribute had a fitting counterpart in that -which Davis paid Johnston, when discussing, in the Federal Senate, the -Utah expedition. Said he ... 'I hold that the country is indebted to the -administration for having selected the man who is at the head of the -expedition; who, as a soldier, has not a superior in the army or out of -it; and whose judgment, whose art, whose knowledge is equal to this or any -other emergency; a man of such decision, such resolution that his -country's honor can never be tarnished in his hands; a man of such -calmness, such kindness, that a deluded people can never suffer by -harshness from him.'" - -President Davis immediately tendered to General Johnston the command of -one of the two grand military divisions of the Confederacy, and he as -promptly repaired to the scene of his duties. - -The general features of General Johnston's policy contemplated a line of -defense running from the Mississippi through the region immediately -covering Nashville to Cumberland Gap--the key to the defense of East -Tennessee and South-western Virginia, and thus to the most vital line of -communication in the South. It is easy to conceive the large force -requisite for so important and difficult a task, against the immense -armies of Grant and Buell, numbering, in the aggregate, more than one -hundred thousand men. Despite the earnest appeals of General Johnston, and -notwithstanding that upon the successful maintenance of his position -depended the successful defense of the entire southern and south-western -sections of the Confederacy, his force, at the last of January, 1862, did -not exceed twenty-six thousand men. Informed of his perilous situation, -the Confederate Government could do no more than second the appeals and -remonstrances of General Johnston. Slight accessions were made to his -force from the States which were menaced, but, as results speedily -demonstrated, he was unable to meet the enemy with an adequate force at -any one of the vital points of his defensive line. - -In the immediate front of General Johnston's position was the army of -Buell, estimated at forty thousand men, which, during the entire winter, -was in training for its meditated advance along the line of the railroad -in the direction of Nashville. Under Grant, at Cairo, was an army of more -than fifty thousand men, which, in coöperation with a formidable naval -force, was designed to operate against Nashville, and, by securing -possession of the line of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, to hold -Kentucky and West Tennessee. General Johnston's position was indeed a -cruel dilemma, and was sufficiently explained in a letter to President -Davis, representing the inadequacy of his force, for either front of -attack, upon a line whose every point demanded ample defense. Only a -self-denying patriotism could have induced General Johnston to occupy his -false position before the public, which accredited to him an army ample -even for aggressive warfare. With an almost certain prospect of disaster, -he nevertheless resolved to make the supreme effort which alone could -avert it. - -His plan was to meet Grant's attack upon Nashville with sixteen thousand -men, hoping, in the meanwhile, by boldly confronting Buell with the -residue of his forces, to hold in check the enemy in his immediate front. -During the winter, by a skillful disposition of his forces and adroit -maneuvers, he deceived the enemy as to his real strength, and thus -deferred the threatened advance until the month of February. - -The month of January, 1862, was to witness the first check to the arms of -the Confederacy, after seven months of uninterrupted victory. The scene of -the disaster was near Somerset, Kentucky. The forces engaged were -inconsiderable as compared with the conflicts of a few weeks later, but -the result was disheartening to the impatient temper of the South, not yet -chastened by the severe trials of adversity. General Crittenden was badly -defeated, though, as is probable, through no erroneous calculation or -defective generalship on his part. A melancholy feature of the disaster -was the death of General Zollicoffer. With the repulse and retreat of the -Confederate forces after the battle of Fishing Creek, as the action was -called, followed the virtual possession of South-eastern Kentucky by the -Federal army. The Confederate line of defense in Kentucky was thus broken, -and the value of other positions materially impaired. - -Early in February the infantry columns of Grant and the gunboats of -Commodore Foote commenced the ascent of the Tennessee River. The immediate -object of assault was Fort Henry, an imperfectly constructed -fortification, on the east bank of the river, near the dividing line of -Kentucky and Tennessee. After a signal display of gallantry by its -commander, General Tilghman, the fort was surrendered, the main body of -the forces defending it having been previously sent to Fort Donelson, the -principal defense of the Cumberland River. The capture of Fort Henry -opened the Tennessee River, penetrating the States of Tennessee and -Alabama, and navigable for steamers for more than two hundred miles, to -the unchecked advance of the enemy. - -General Grant promptly advanced to attack Fort Donelson. After a series of -bloody engagements and a siege of several days, Fort Donelson was -surrendered, with the garrison of more than nine thousand men. This result -was indeed a heavy blow to the Confederacy, and produced a most alarming -crisis in the military affairs of the Western Department. General -Johnston was near Nashville, with the force which had lately held Bowling -Green, the latter place having been evacuated during the progress of the -fight at Fort Donelson. Nashville was immediately evacuated, and the -remnant of General Johnston's army retreated southward, first to -Murfreesboro', Tennessee, and afterwards crossed the Tennessee, at -Decatur, Alabama. - -In January, General Beauregard had been transferred from Virginia to -Kentucky, and, at the time of the surrender of Nashville, was in command -of the forces in the neighborhood of Columbus, Kentucky, which protected -the passage of the Mississippi. The entire Confederate line of defense in -Kentucky and Tennessee having been lost with the surrender of Forts Henry -and Donelson, its various posts became untenable. In a subsequent portion -of this narrative, we shall trace the results of the Confederate endeavor -to establish a new line of defense in the West by a judicious and masterly -combination of forces. - -Meanwhile, the preparations of the enemy in the East were even more -formidable and threatening than in the West. It was in Virginia that the -"elastic spirit" of the North, as the Richmond _Examiner_ termed the -alacrity of the consecutive popular uprisings in favor of the war at the -North, was chiefly ambitious and hopeful of decisive results in favor of -the Union. Here was to be sought retrieval of the national honor lost at -Manassas; here was the capital of the Confederacy, which, once taken, the -"rebellion would collapse." The energy and administrative ability of -General McClellan had accomplished great results in the creation of a fine -army and the security of the capital. But, with the opening of the season -favorable to military operations, he was expected to accomplish far more -decisive results--nothing less than the capture of Richmond, the expulsion -of the Confederate authority from Virginia, and the destruction of the -Confederate army at Manassas. - -Until the opening of spring, military operations in Virginia were attended -by no events of importance. But the East was not to be without its -contribution to the unvarying tide of Confederate disaster. In the month -of February, Roanoke Island, upon the sea-line of North Carolina, defended -by General Wise, with a single brigade, was assaulted by a powerful -combined naval and military expedition, under General Burnside, and -surrendered, with its garrison. This success opened to the enemy the -sounds and inlets of that region, with their tributary streams, and gave -him easy access to a productive country and important communications. - -It was not difficult to estimate correctly the serious nature of these -successive reverses covering nearly every field of important operations. -They were of a character alarming, indeed, in immediate consequences, and, -necessarily, largely affecting the destiny of the war in its future -stages. Retreat, evacuation, and surrender seemed the irremediable -tendency of affairs every-where. Thousands of prisoners were in the hands -of the enemy, the capital of the most important State in the West -occupied, the Confederate centre was broken, the great water-avenues of -the south-west open to the enemy, the campaign transferred from the heart -of Kentucky to the northern borders of the Gulf States, and hardly an -available line was left for the recovery of the lost territory. - -Within a few weeks the extravagant hopes of the South were brought to the -verge of extreme apprehension. The public mind was not to be soothed by -the affected indifference of the press to calamities, the magnitude of -which was too palpable, in the presence of actual invasion of nearly one -half the Southern territory, and of imminent perils threatening the speedy -culmination of adverse fortune to the Confederacy. Richmond, which, during -the war, was at all times the reflex of the hopes and aspirations of the -South, was the scene of gloom and despondency, in painful contrast with -the ardent and gratulatory tone so lately prevalent. - -Popular disappointment rarely fails in its search for scapegoats upon -which to visit responsibility for misfortunes. A noticeable result of the -Confederate reverses in the beginning of 1862 was the speedy evolution of -an organized hostility to the administration of President Davis. The -season was eminently propitious for outward demonstrations of feeling, -heretofore suppressed, in consequence of the brilliant success, until -recently, attending the movement for Southern independence. The universal -and characteristic disposition of the masses to receive, with favor, -censure of their rulers, and to charge public calamities to official -failure and maladministration, was an inviting inducement, in this period -of public gloom, to the indulgence of partisan aspirations and personal -spleen. - -To one familiar with the political history of the South during the decade -previous to secession, there could be no difficulty in penetrating the -various motives, instigating to union, for a common purpose, the -heterogeneous elements of this opposition. Prominent among its leaders -were men, the life-long opponents of the President, notorious for their -want of adhesion to any principle or object for its own sake, and -especially lukewarm, at all times, upon issues vitally affecting the -safety of the South. These men could not forget, even when their -allegiance had been avowed to the sacred cause of country and liberty, the -rancor engendered in the old contests of party. Some, in addition to -disappointed political ambition, arising from the failure of the President -to tender them the foremost places in the Government, had personal -resentments to gratify. Much the larger portion of the opposition, which -continued, until the last moments of the Confederacy, to assail the -Government, had its origin in these influences, and they speedily -attracted all restless and impracticable characters--born Jacobins, -malcontents by the decree of nature, and others of the class who are -"never at home save in the attitude of contradiction." - -At first feeble in influence, this faction, by pertinacious and -unscrupulous efforts, eventually became a source of embarrassment, and -promoted the wide-spread division and distrust which, in the latter days -of the Confederacy, were so ominous of the approaching catastrophe. Its -earliest shafts were ostensibly not aimed at the President, since there -was no evidence that the popular affection for Mr. Davis would brook -assaults upon him, but assumed the shape of accusations against his -constitutional advisers. A deliberate movement, cloaked in the disguise of -respectful remonstrance and petition, sustained by demagogical -speeches--which, though artfully designed, in many instances revealed the -secret venom--was arranged, upon the assembling of the First Congress -under the permanent Government, to revolutionize the cabinet of President -Davis. - -Mr. Benjamin, the Secretary of War, and Mr. Mallory, Secretary of the -Navy, were the objects of especial and most envenomed assault. They were -assailed in Congress, and by a portion of the Richmond press, as directly -chargeable with the late reverses. Yet it should have been plain that the -most serious of these disasters were attributable chiefly to the -overwhelming naval preponderance of the enemy--an advantage not to have -been obviated entirely by any degree of foresight on the part of the -Confederate naval secretary--and by a deficiency of soldiers, for which -the country itself, and not Mr. Benjamin, was to be censured. - -The indisputable facts in the case were ample in the vindication of Mr. -Mallory, as to the insufficient defenses of the Western rivers, now in -Federal possession. The obvious dangers of the Cumberland and Tennessee -Rivers, as an avenue of access to the heart of the South, were not -overlooked by the Government. The channels of these rivers are navigable -during a large portion of the year, and the two streams gradually approach -each other, as they pass from Tennessee into Kentucky, on their course to -the Ohio, coming at one point within less than three miles of each other, -and emptying their waters only ten miles apart. The facilities afforded by -their proximity for combined military and naval operations, were -necessarily apparent. The Government contemplated the defense of these -streams by floating defenses the only means by which they could be -debarred to the enemy. The Provisional Congress, however, by a most -singular and fatal oversight of the recommendation of the Government, made -no appropriation for floating defenses on the Tennessee and Cumberland, -until the opportunity to prepare them had passed. - -It authorized the President to cause to be constructed thirteen steam -gunboats _for sea-coast defense_, and such floating defenses for the -Mississippi River as he might deem best adapted to the purpose; but no -provision was made for armed steamers on the large Western interior rivers -until the month of January, 1862, when an act was approved appropriating -one million of dollars, to be expended for this purpose, at the discretion -of the President, by the Secretary of War, or of the Navy, as he might -direct. This was less than _four weeks_ before the actual advance of the -Federal gunboats, and was, of course, too late for the needed armaments. -The appropriation of one hundred thousand dollars, for equipment and -repairs of vessels of the Confederate navy, hardly sufficed to enable the -Secretary of that department to maintain a few frail steamers on the -Tennessee, hastily prepared from commercial or passenger boats, and very -imperfectly armed. - -A congressional investigating committee censured Mr. Benjamin and General -Huger as responsible for the capture of Roanoke Island and its garrison. -The latter affair was indeed a disaster not to be lightly palliated, and -was one of those inexplicable mishaps, which, upon retrospection, we see -should have been avoided, though it is at least doubtful who is justly -censurable. It is, however, only just to state that no view of the Roanoke -Island disaster has ever been presented to the writer, which did not -acquit General Wise of all blame. His exculpation was complete before -every tribunal of opinion. - -Whatever may have been the real merit of these issues made against -Secretaries Mallory and Benjamin, it is very certain that those two -gentlemen continued to be the objects of marked disfavor from those -members of Congress, and that portion of the Richmond press known to be -hostile to the administration of Mr. Davis. Popular prejudice is -proverbially unreasoning, and it was indeed singular to note how promptly -the public echoed the assaults of the hostile press against these -officials, upon subsequent occasions, when they were held accountable for -disasters with which they had no possible connection.[43] - -This period of Confederate misfortunes gave the first verification of a -fact which afterward had frequent illustration, that the resolution of the -South, so indomitable in actual contest, staggered under the weight of -reverses. The history of the war was a record of the variations of the -Southern mind between extreme elation and immoderate depression. -Extravagant exultation over success, and immoderate despondency over -disaster, usually followed each other in prompt succession. -Overestimating, in many instances, the importance of its own victories, -the South quite as frequently exaggerated the value of those won by the -enemy. There was thus a constant departure from the middle ground of -dispassionate judgment, which would have accurately measured the real -situation; making available its opportunities, by a vigorous prosecution -of advantage, and overcoming difficulties by energetic preparation. - -But this despondency happily gave place to renewed determination, as the -success of the enemy brought him nearer the homes of the South, and made -more imminent the evils of subjugation. A grand and noble popular -reanimation was the response to the renewed vigor and resolution of the -Government. - -When the Confederate Government was organized at Montgomery, the operation -of the provisional constitution was limited to the period of one year, to -be superseded by the permanent government. No material alteration of the -political organism was found necessary, nor was there any change in the -_personnel_ of the administration--Mr. Davis having been unanimously -chosen President at the election in November, and retaining his -administration as it existed at the close of the functions of the -provisional constitution. Though the change was thus merely nominal, the -occasion was replete with historic interest to the people whose liberties -were involved in the fate of the government, now declared "permanent." It -was, indeed, an assumption of a new character--a declaration, with renewed -emphasis, of the high and peerless enterprise of independent national -existence; an introduction to a future, promising a speedy fulfillment of -inestimable blessings or "woes unnumbered." - -On the 18th of February, 1862, the first Congress, under the permanent -constitution of the Confederate States, assembled in the capitol at -Richmond. On the 22d occurred the ceremony of the inauguration of -President Davis. - -To the citizens of Richmond and others who were spectators, the scene in -Capitol Square, on that memorable morning, was marked by gloomy -surroundings, the recollection of which recalls, with sad interest, -suggestive omens, which then seemed to betoken the adverse fate of the -Confederacy. The season was one of unusual rigor, and the preceding month -of public calamity and distress had been fitly commemorated by a -protracted series of dark and cheerless days. Never, within the -recollection of the writer, had there been a day in Richmond so severe, -uncomfortable, and gloomy, as the day appointed for the ceremony of -inauguration. For days previous heavy clouds had foreshadowed the rain, -which fell continuously during the preceding night, and which seemed to -increase in volume on the morning of the ceremony. The occasion was in -singular contrast with that which, a year previous, had witnessed the -installment of the provisional government--upon a day whose genial -sunshine seemed prophetic of a bright future for the infant power then -launched upon its voyage. - -But however wanting in composure may have been the public mind, and -whatever the perils of the situation, the voice of their twice-chosen -chief quickly infused into the heart of the people, that unabated zeal and -unconquerable resolution, with which he proclaimed himself devoted anew to -the deliverance of his country. The inaugural address was a noble and -inspiring appeal to the patriotism of the land. Its eloquent, candid, and -patriotic tone won all hearts; and even the unfriendly press and -politicians accorded commendation to the dignity and candor with which the -President avowed his official responsibility; the manly frankness with -which he defended departments of the government unjustly assailed; and the -assuring, defiant courage, with which he invited all classes of his -countrymen to join him in the supreme sacrifice, should it become -necessary. - -The inaugural ceremonies were as simple and appropriate as those witnessed -at Montgomery a year previous. The members of the Confederate Senate and -House of Representatives, with the members of the Virginia Legislature, -awaited in the hall of the House of Delegates the arrival of the -President. In consequence of the limited capacity of the hall, -comparatively few spectators--a majority of them ladies--witnessed the -proceedings there. Immediately fronting the chair of the speaker were the -ladies of Mr. Davis' household, attended by relatives and friends. In -close proximity were members of the cabinet. - -A contemporary account thus mentions this scene: "It was a grave and great -assemblage. Time-honored men were there, who had witnessed ceremony after -ceremony of inauguration in the palmiest days of the old confederation; -those who had been at the inauguration of the iron-willed Jackson; men -who, in their fiery Southern ardor, had thrown down the gauntlet of -defiance in the halls of Federal legislation, and in the face of the enemy -avowed their determination to be free; and finally witnessed the -enthroning of a republican despot in their country's chair of state. All -were there; and silent tears were seen coursing down the cheeks of -gray-haired men, while the determined will stood out in every feature." - -The appearance of the President was singularly imposing, though there were -visible traces of his profound emotion, and a pallor, painful to look -upon, reminded the spectator of his recent severe indisposition. His dress -was a plain citizen's suit of black. Mr. Hunter, of Virginia, temporary -President of the Confederate Senate, occupied the right of the platform; -Mr. Bocock, Speaker of the House of Representatives, the left. When -President Davis, accompanied by Mr. Orr, of South Carolina, Chairman of -the Committee of Arrangements, on the part of the Senate, reached the hall -and passed to the chair of the Speaker, subdued applause, becoming the -place and the occasion, greeted him. A short time sufficed to carry into -effect the previously arranged programme, and the distinguished procession -moved to the Washington monument, where a stand was prepared for the -occasion. - -Hon. James Lyons, of Virginia, Chairman of the House Committee of -Arrangements, called the assemblage to order, and an eloquent and -appropriate prayer was offered by Bishop Johns, of the Diocese of -Virginia. The President, having received a most enthusiastic welcome from -the assemblage, with a clear and measured accent, delivered his inaugural -address: - - FELLOW-CITIZENS: On this, the birthday of the man most identified with - the establishment of American independence, and beneath the monument - erected to commemorate his heroic virtues and those of his - compatriots, we have assembled, to usher into existence the permanent - government of the Confederate States. Through this instrumentality, - under the favor of Divine Providence, we hope to perpetuate the - principles of our revolutionary fathers. The day, the memory, and the - purpose seem fitly associated. - - It is with mingled feelings of humility and pride that I appear to - take, in the presence of the people, and before high Heaven, the oath - prescribed as a qualification for the exalted station to which the - unanimous voice of the people has called me. Deeply sensible of all - that is implied by this manifestation of the people's confidence, I am - yet more profoundly impressed by the vast responsibility of the - office, and humbly feel my own unworthiness. - - In return for their kindness, I can only offer assurances of the - gratitude with which it is received, and can but pledge a zealous - devotion of every faculty to the service of those who have chosen me - as their Chief Magistrate. - - When a long course of class legislation, directed not to the general - welfare, but to the aggrandizement of the Northern section of the - Union, culminated in a warfare on the domestic institutions of the - Southern States; when the dogmas of a sectional party, substituted for - the provisions of the constitutional compact, threatened to destroy - the sovereign rights of the States, six of those States, withdrawing - from the Union, confederated together to exercise the right and - perform the duty of instituting a government which would better - secure the liberties for the preservation of which that Union was - established. - - Whatever of hope some may have entertained that a returning sense of - justice would remove the danger with which our rights were threatened, - and render it possible to preserve the Union of the Constitution, must - have been dispelled by the malignity and barbarity of the Northern - States in the prosecution of the existing war. The confidence of the - most hopeful among us must have been destroyed by the disregard they - have recently exhibited for all the time-honored bulwarks of civil and - religious liberty. Bastiles filled with prisoners, arrested without - civil process, or indictment duly found; the writ of _habeas corpus_ - suspended by executive mandate; a State Legislature controlled by the - imprisonment of members whose avowed principles suggested to the - Federal executive that there might be another added to the list of - seceded States; elections held under threats of a military power; - civil officers, peaceful citizens, and gentle women incarcerated for - opinion's sake, proclaimed the incapacity of our late associates to - administer a government as free, liberal, and humane as that - established for our common use. - - For proof of the sincerity of our purpose to maintain our ancient - institutions, we may point to the Constitution of the Confederacy and - the laws enacted under it, as well as to the fact that, through all - the necessities of an unequal struggle, there has been no act, on our - part, to impair personal liberty or the freedom of speech, of thought, - or of the press. The courts have been open, the judicial functions - fully executed, and every right of the peaceful citizen maintained as - securely as if a war of invasion had not disturbed the land. - - The people of the States now confederated became convinced that the - Government of the United States had fallen into the hands of a - sectional majority, who would pervert the most sacred of all trusts to - the destruction of the rights which it was pledged to protect. They - believed that to remain longer in the Union would subject them to a - continuance of a disparaging discrimination, submission to which would - be inconsistent to their welfare and intolerable to a proud people. - They, therefore, determined to sever its bonds, and establish a new - confederacy for themselves. - - The experiment, instituted by our revolutionary fathers, of a - voluntary union of sovereign States, for purposes specified in a - solemn compact, had been prevented by those who, feeling power and - forgetting right, were determined to respect no law but their own - will. The Government had ceased to answer the ends for which it had - been ordained and established. To save ourselves from a revolution - which, in its silent but rapid progress, was about to place us under - the despotism of numbers, and to preserve, in spirit as well as in - form, a system of government we believed to be peculiarly fitted to - our condition and full of promise for mankind, we determined to make a - new association, composed of States homogeneous in interest, in - policy, and in feeling. - - True to our traditions of peace and love of justice, we sent - commissioners to the United States to propose a fair and amicable - settlement of all questions of public debt or property which might be - in dispute. But the Government at Washington, denying our right to - self-government, refused even to listen to any proposals for a - peaceful separation. Nothing was then left to us but to prepare for - war. - - The first year in our history has been the most eventful in the annals - of this continent. A new government has been established, and its - machinery put in operation, over an area exceeding seven hundred - thousand square miles. The great principles upon which we have been - willing to hazard every thing that is dear to man have made conquests - for us which could never have been achieved by the sword. Our - Confederacy has grown from six to thirteen States; and Maryland, - already united to us by hallowed memories and material interests, - will, I believe, when able to speak with unstifled voice, connect her - destiny with the South. Our people have rallied, with unexampled - unanimity, to the support of the great principles of constitutional - government, with firm resolve to perpetuate by arms the rights which - they could not peacefully secure. A million of men, it is estimated, - are now standing in hostile array, and waging war along a frontier of - thousands of miles; battles have been fought, sieges have been - conducted, and, although the contest is not ended, and the tide for - the moment is against us, the final result in our favor is not - doubtful. - - The period is near at hand when our foes must sink under the immense - load of debt which they have incurred--a debt which, in their efforts - to subjugate us, has already attained such fearful dimensions as will - subject them to burdens which must continue to oppress them for - generations to come. - - We, too, have had our trials and difficulties. That we are to escape - them in the future is not to be hoped. It was to be expected, when we - entered upon this war, that it would expose our people to sacrifices, - and cost them much both of money and blood. But we knew the value of - the object for which we struggled, and understood the nature of the - war in which we were engaged. Nothing could be so bad as failure, and - any sacrifice would be cheap as the price of success in such a - contest. - - But the picture has its lights as well as its shadows. This great - strife has awakened in the people the highest emotions and qualities - of the human soul. It is cultivating feelings of patriotism, virtue, - and courage. Instances of self-sacrifice and of generous devotion to - the noble cause for which we are contending are rife throughout the - land. Never has a people evinced a more determined spirit than that - now animating men, women, and children in every part of our country. - Upon the first call, the men fly to arms; and wives and mothers send - their husbands and sons to battle without a murmur of regret. - - It was, perhaps, in the ordination of Providence that we were to be - taught the value of our liberties by the price which we pay for them. - - The recollections of this great contest, with all its common - traditions of glory, of sacrifices, and of blood, will be the bond of - harmony and enduring affection amongst the people, producing unity in - policy, fraternity in sentiment, and joint effort in war. - - Nor have the material sacrifices of the past year been made without - some corresponding benefits. If the acquiescence of foreign nations in - a pretended blockade has deprived us of our commerce with them, it is - fast making us a self-supporting and an independent people. The - blockade, if effectual and permanent, could only serve to divert our - industry from the production of articles for export, and employ it in - supplying commodities for domestic use. - - It is a satisfaction that we have maintained the war by our unaided - exertions. We have neither asked nor received assistance from any - quarter. Yet the interest involved is not wholly our own. The world at - large is concerned in opening our markets to its commerce. When the - independence of the Confederate States is recognized by the nations of - the earth, and we are free to follow our interests and inclinations by - cultivating foreign trade, the Southern States will offer to - manufacturing nations the most favorable markets which ever invited - their commerce. Cotton, sugar, rice, tobacco, provisions, timber, and - naval stores will furnish attractive exchanges. Nor would the - constancy of these supplies be likely to be disturbed by war. Our - confederate strength will be too great to attempt aggression; and - never was there a people whose interests and principles committed them - so fully to a peaceful policy as those of the Confederate States. By - the character of their productions, they are too deeply interested in - foreign commerce wantonly to disturb it. War of conquest they can not - wage, because the Constitution of their Confederacy admits of no - coerced association. Civil war there can not be between States held - together by their volition only. This rule of voluntary association, - which can not fail to be conservative, by securing just and impartial - government at home, does not diminish the security of the obligations - by which the Confederate States may be bound to foreign nations. In - proof of this, it is to be remembered that, at the first moment of - asserting their right of secession, these States proposed a settlement - on the basis of a common liability for the obligations of the General - Government. - - Fellow-citizens, after the struggles of ages had consecrated the right - of the Englishman to constitutional representative government, our - colonial ancestors were forced to vindicate that birthright by an - appeal to arms. Success crowned their efforts, and they provided for - their posterity a peaceful remedy against future aggression. - - The tyranny of an unbridled majority, the most odious and least - responsible form of despotism, has denied us both the right and the - remedy. Therefore we are in arms to renew such sacrifices as our - fathers made to the holy cause of constitutional liberty. At the - darkest hour of our struggle, the provisional gives place to the - permanent government. After a series of successes and victories, which - covered our arms with glory, we have recently met with serious - disasters. But, in the heart of a people resolved to be free, these - disasters tend but to stimulate to increased resistance. - - To show ourselves worthy of the inheritance bequeathed to us by the - patriots of the Revolution, we must emulate that heroic devotion which - made reverse to them but the crucible in which their patriotism was - refined. - - With confidence in the wisdom and virtue of those who will share with - me the responsibility, and aid me in the conduct of public affairs; - securely relying on the patriotism and courage of the people, of which - the present war has furnished so many examples, I deeply feel the - weight of the responsibilities I now, with unaffected diffidence, am - about to assume; and, fully realizing the inadequacy of human power to - guide and to sustain, my hope is reverently fixed on Him, whose favor - is ever vouchsafed to the cause which is just. With humble gratitude - and adoration, acknowledging the Providence which has so visibly - protected the Confederacy during its brief but eventful career, to - Thee, O God! I trustingly commit myself, and prayerfully invoke Thy - blessing on my country and its cause. - -The effect of this address upon the public was electrical. The anxious and -dispirited assemblage, which, for more than an hour previous to the -arrival of the President, had braved the inclement sky and traversed the -almost impassable avenues of Capitol Square, in eager longing for -re-assuring words from him upon whose courage and will so much depended, -was not disappointed. A consciousness of a burden removed, of doubts -dispelled, of the re-assured feeling, which comes with strengthened -conviction that confidence has not been misplaced, animated and thrilled -the crowd as it caught the impressive tones and gestures of the speaker. -In the memory of every beholder must forever dwell the imposing presence -of Mr. Davis, as, with uplifted hands, he pronounced the beautiful and -appropriate petition to Providence, which forms the peroration. - - * * * * * - -The message sent by President Davis to Congress, a few days after the -inauguration, is hardly inferior in importance, as a historical document, -to the inaugural address. In view of its explanations of the earlier -policy of the Confederate Government, of the causes of recent disasters, -and indications of important changes in the future conduct of the war, we -present entire this first message of Mr. Davis to the First Congress -assembled under the permanent Constitution: - - _To the Senate and House of Representatives of the Confederate - States_-- - - In obedience to the constitutional provision, requiring the President, - from time to time, to give to the Congress information of the state of - the Confederacy, and recommend to their consideration such measures as - he shall judge necessary and expedient, I have to communicate that, - since my message at the last session of the Provisional Congress, - events have demonstrated that the Government had attempted more than - it had power successfully to achieve. Hence, in the effort to protect, - by our arms, the whole of the territory of the Confederate States, - sea-board and inland, we have been so exposed as recently to encounter - serious disasters. When the Confederacy was formed, the States - composing it were, by the peculiar character of their pursuits, and a - misplaced confidence in their former associates, to a great extent, - destitute of the means for the prosecution of the war on so gigantic a - scale as that which it has attained. The workshops and artisans were - mainly to be found in the Northern States, and one of the first duties - which devolved upon this Government was to establish the necessary - manufactories, and in the meantime to obtain, by purchase from abroad, - as far as practicable, whatever was required for the public defense. - No effort has been spared to effect both these ends, and though the - results have not equaled our hopes, it is believed that an impartial - judgment will, upon full investigation, award to the various - departments of the Government credit for having done all which human - power and foresight enabled them to accomplish. - - The valor and devotion of the people have not only sustained the - efforts of the Government, but have gone far to supply its - deficiencies. - - The active state of military preparations among the nations of Europe, - in April last, the date when our agents first went abroad, interposed - unavoidable delays in the procurement of arms, and the want of a navy - has greatly impeded our efforts to import military supplies of all - sorts. - - I have hoped for several days to receive official reports in relation - to our discomfiture at Roanoke Island, and the fall of Fort Donelson. - They have not yet reached me, and I am, therefore, unable to - communicate to you such information of those events, and the - consequences resulting from them, as would enable me to make - recommendations founded upon the changed condition which they have - produced. Enough is known of the surrender of Roanoke Island to make - us feel that it was deeply humiliating, however imperfect may have - been the preparations for defense. The hope is still entertained that - our reported losses at Fort Donelson have been greatly exaggerated, - inasmuch as I am not only unwilling, but unable to believe that a - large army of our people have surrendered without a desperate effort - to cut their way through investing forces, whatever may have been - their number, and to endeavor to make a junction with other divisions - of the army. But in the absence of that exact information which can - only be afforded by official reports, it would be premature to pass - judgment, and my own is reserved, as I trust yours will be, until that - information is received. In the meantime, strenuous efforts have been - made to throw forward reinforcements to the armies at the positions - threatened, and I can not doubt that the bitter disappointments we - have borne, by nerving the people to still greater exertions, will - speedily secure results more accordant with our just expectation, and - as favorable to our cause as those which marked the earlier periods of - the war. - - The reports of the Secretaries of War and the Navy will exhibit the - mass of resources for the conduct of the war which we have been - enabled to accumulate, notwithstanding the very serious difficulties - against which we have contended. - - They afford the cheering hope that our resources, limited as they were - at the beginning of the contest, will, during its progress, become - developed to such an extent as fully to meet our future wants. - - The policy of enlistment for short terms, against which I have - steadily contended from the commencement of the war, has, in my - judgment, contributed, in no immaterial degree, to the recent reverses - which we have suffered, and even now renders it difficult to furnish - you an accurate statement of the army. When the war first broke out, - many of our people could with difficulty be persuaded that it would be - long or serious. It was not deemed possible that any thing so insane - as a persistent attempt to subjugate these States could be made--still - less that the delusion would so far prevail as to give to the war the - vast proportions which it has assumed. The people, incredulous of a - long war, were naturally averse to long enlistment, and the early - legislation of Congress rendered it impracticable to obtain volunteers - for a greater period than twelve months. Now, that it has become - probable that the war will be continued through a series of years, our - high-spirited and gallant soldiers, while generally reënlisting, are, - from the fact of having entered the service for a short term, - compelled, in many instances, to go home to make the necessary - arrangements for their families during their prolonged absence. - - The quotas of new regiments for the war, called for from the different - States, are in rapid progress of organization. The whole body of our - new levies and reënlisted men will probably be ready in the ranks - within the next thirty days. But, in the meantime, it is exceedingly - difficult to give an accurate statement of the number of our forces in - the field. They may, in general terms, be stated at four hundred - regiments of infantry, with a proportionate force of cavalry and - artillery, the details of which will be shown by the report of the - Secretary of War. I deem it proper to advert to the fact that the - process of furloughs and reënlistment in progress for the last month - had so far disorganized and weakened our forces as to impair our - ability for successful defense; but I heartily congratulate you that - this evil, which I had foreseen and was powerless to prevent, may now - be said to be substantially at an end, and that we shall not again, - during the war, be exposed to seeing our strength diminished by this - fruitful cause of disaster--short enlistments. - - The people of the Confederate States, being principally engaged in - agricultural pursuits, were unprovided at the commencement of - hostilities with ships, ship-yards, materials for ship-building, or - skilled mechanics and seamen, in sufficient numbers to make the prompt - creation of the navy a practicable task, even if the required - appropriations had been made for the purpose. Notwithstanding our very - limited resources, however, the report of the Secretary will exhibit - to you a satisfactory progress in preparation, and a certainty of - early completion of vessels of a number and class on which we may - confidently rely for contesting the vaunted control of the enemy over - our waters. - - The financial system, devised by the wisdom of your predecessors, has - proved adequate to supplying all the wants of the Government, - notwithstanding the unexpected and very large increase of expenditures - resulting from the great augmentation in the necessary means of - defense. The report of the Secretary of the Treasury will exhibit the - gratifying fact that we have no floating debt; that the credit of the - Government is unimpaired, and that the total expenditure of the - Government for the year has been, in round numbers, one hundred and - seventy millions of dollars--less than one-third the sum wasted by the - enemy in his vain effort to conquer us--less than the value of a - single article of export--the cotton crop of the year. - - The report of the Postmaster-General will show the condition of that - department to be steadily improving--its revenue increasing, and - already affording the assurance that it will be self-sustaining at the - date required by the Constitution, while affording ample mail - facilities for the people. - - In the Department of Justice, which includes the Patent Office and - Public Printing, some legislative provision will be required, which - will be specifically stated in the report of the head of that - department. - - I invite the attention of Congress to the duty of organizing a Supreme - Court of the Confederate States, in accordance with the mandate of the - Constitution. - - I refer you to my message communicated to the Provisional Congress in - November last, for such further information touching the condition of - public affairs, as it might be useful to lay before you; the short - interval which has since elapsed not having produced any material - changes in that condition, other than those to which reference has - already been made. - - In conclusion, I cordially welcome representatives who, recently - chosen by the people, are fully imbued with their views and feelings, - and can so ably advise me as to the needful provisions for the public - service. I assure you of my hearty coöperation in all your efforts for - the common welfare of the country. - - JEFFERSON DAVIS. - -The message, not less than the inaugural address, was received with many -evidences of public reanimation. The following extracts indicate the state -of feeling in Richmond at this period: - - THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. - - (From the Richmond Whig, Feb. 20, 1862.) - - The President makes a candid and frank confession of our recent - reverses. Very justly, he does not regard them as vital to our cause; - but they will entail a long war upon us. That long war ensures our - independence, and the ultimate confusion and ruin of the Yankees.... - -The _Examiner_, of the same date, in the opening paragraph of its leader, -said: - - The President's Message is a manly and dignified document, but, like - the inaugural, it contains not a solitary word indicating the plan or - policy of the Government. Far from objecting to this characteristic, - we think it eminently proper that the executive should keep its - counsels from the public eye, and that the Congress should withdraw - its deliberations from the public ear. What is wanted from the one is - distinct and peremptory _orders_; and from the other, decisive and - adequate provisions for the public safety. The duty of the country is - unhesitating obedience; of the soldiers, the courage that prefers - death in glory, like Jennings Wise.... - - - - -CHAPTER XII. - - POPULAR DELUSIONS IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE WAR--A FEW CONFLICTS AND - SACRIFICES NOT SUFFICIENT--MORE POSITIVE RECOGNITION OF MR. DAVIS' - VIEWS--HIS CANDID AND PROPHETIC ANNOUNCEMENTS--MILITARY REFORMS-- - CONSCRIPTION LAW OF THE CONFEDERACY--THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS AND COURSE - AS TO THIS LAW--HIS CONSISTENT REGARD FOR CIVIL LIBERTY AND OPPOSITION - TO CENTRALIZATION--RECOMMENDS CONSCRIPTION--BENEFICIAL RESULTS OF THE - LAW--GENERAL LEE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, "UNDER THE PRESIDENT"--NATURE OF - THE APPOINTMENT--FALSE IMPRESSIONS CORRECTED--MR. DAVIS' CONFIDENCE IN - LEE, DESPITE POPULAR CENSURE OF THE LATTER--CHANGES IN THE CABINET-- - MR. BENJAMIN'S MANAGEMENT OF THE WAR OFFICE--DIFFICULTIES OF THAT - POSITION--THE CHARGE OF FAVORITISM AGAINST MR. DAVIS IN THE SELECTION - OF HIS CABINET--HIS PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH THE VARIOUS MEMBERS OF HIS - CABINET--ACTIVITY IN MILITARY OPERATIONS--THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI-- - BATTLE OF ELK HORN--OPERATIONS EAST OF THE MISSISSIPPI--GENERALS - SIDNEY JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD--ISLAND NO. 10--CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS - BY THE CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES--FAVORABLE SITUATION--SHILOH--A - DISAPPOINTMENT--DEATH OF SIDNEY JOHNSTON--TRIBUTE OF PRESIDENT - DAVIS--POPULAR VERDICT UPON THE BATTLE OF SHILOH--GENERALS BEAUREGARD, - BRAGG, AND POLK ON THE BATTLE--THE PRESIDENT AGAIN CHARGED WITH - "INJUSTICE" TO BEAUREGARD--THE CHARGE ANSWERED--FALL OF NEW - ORLEANS--NAVAL BATTLE IN HAMPTON ROADS--NAVAL SUCCESSES OF THE ENEMY. - - -We have briefly indicated the causes which now elevated the Southern -people to a more intelligent appreciation of the nature and necessities of -the struggle in which they were engaged. There was reason for the -congratulation which President Davis experienced at the unmistakable -evidences of the awakening of the public mind to the stern duties which, -from the beginning, he had sedulously inculcated. - -The progress of the war had already developed the existence of numerous -errors upon both sides, and had exploded many cherished theories having -possession of the popular mind of each section, with reference to the -power, resources, and spirit of its antagonist. Both parties had entered -into the contest with the firm conviction of certain triumph, and with the -purpose to make the struggle as short as possible. The war-cry of the -North was "Let it be short, sharp, and decisive;" and they appealed to -their numbers, wealth, and sectional hatred, as elements of superiority, -which would inevitably end the war in their favor in a few months. The -South was equally disposed to a speedy conclusion. With the masses of the -South and the majority of their advisers, the predominant idea and -aspiration was to teach the enemy, by prompt and heavy blows, the -impossibility of successful invasion, and thus shorten the period of -bloodshed. Thus both, from a necessity which neither was able to avoid, -began with gigantic preparations, hoping, by a few mighty conflicts of -arms, and one lavish sacrifice of life and treasure, to bring to prompt -arbitrament an issue which was the growth of a century. - -But the aroused spirit of sectional strife was not to be appeased by a -single holocaust. The American people, a youthful giant, totally -uneducated in the experience of war, having never yet tested their -strength and dimensions, would not consent that the game of empire should -be decided by a single dramatic _denouement_, a Waterloo, a Solferino, or -Sadowa. Manassas had been the bitter but beneficent chastisement of the -North, and the reproof was accepted with that wonderful elasticity, which -afterwards amazed the world with its manifestations after the most -disheartening failures. A rebuke no less signal waited upon the South, and -its correcting influence immediately exhibited a temper which was the -temporary salvation of the Confederacy, and the inspiration to a series of -campaigns among the most memorable in the annals of warfare. - -With the inauguration of the permanent government came not only renewed -resolution in the prosecution of the war, but a more positive recognition -and adoption of the views of President Davis. We have elsewhere described -the antagonism between those views and the theory of the leaders at -Montgomery, shared by the press and people of the South, which derided any -other hypothesis than a six-months' war, with the certainty of -independence. Whatever weight may be accredited to the statements which we -have made in demonstration of Mr. Davis' conviction, that the war would be -one of unexampled magnitude and long duration; whatever may be the -rational inference from his opposition to a military system contemplating -a war lasting six or twelve months; whatever the credence extended to his -own subsequent declarations of the difficulties preventing the complete -preparation for the emergency, which he contemplated,[44] at least there -was no room for misconception of his expectations as to the war in its -future stages. - -Congratulating the Confederate Congress upon the auspicious awakening of -the popular mind from dangerous delusions, even through the hard -experience of adversity, he admonishes Congress and the country to -prepare for a "_war lasting through a term of years_." But a few weeks -later and he invited the Legislature of Virginia to contemplate a possible -duration of the war for twenty years upon the soil of that State. In all -his declarations, public and private, was evidenced the adherence to that -original conviction of a struggle long, bloody, and exhaustive, and with -varying fortune, which had prompted the heroic assurance, at his first -inauguration at Montgomery, of an "inflexible" pursuit of the object of -independence. - -President Davis sufficiently exposed, in his first message to the new -Congress, the evil consequences of the pernicious military system under -which the war had thus far been conducted. Indeed, its evils were -apparent, and the country responded to the urgent appeals of the President -for a more efficient organization of the armies of the Confederacy--one -that should insure a force sufficient to meet the present exigency and to -provide for future defense. It was with considerable reluctance that he -finally recommended the adoption of the act of conscription. -Constitutional scruples were at least debatable, but there could be no -question as to the appearance of bad faith by the Government, with the -patriotic volunteers, who had responded at the first call to arms, and who -were now compelled to remain in the field, by a law adopted, just as their -term of service was expiring. Yet this was the class necessarily -constituting the majority of those who would be subject to the operation -of the law, as they were a majority, or an approximate majority, of the -arms-bearing population. - -To one so peculiarly jealous of encroachments by the central power upon -the privileges of the States, the proposition had additional objections. -Mr. Davis had hoped to avoid the necessity of a measure, so much after the -manner of military despotism, and sought to take advantage of the -patriotic ardor exhibited upon the first rush to arms, by inducing -enlistments for the war. Especially distasteful was a resort to compulsion -into the ranks, in a war the success of which necessarily depended upon -the voluntary and patriotic aid of the people, while the enemy, without -difficulty, raised a half million of men for their schemes of conquest. - -Second to the object of independence only, the controlling aspiration of -President Davis was, that the war might not terminate in the destruction -of civil liberty. With evident pride, he proclaimed the honorable fact -that, "through all the necessities of an unequal struggle, there has been -no act on our part to impair personal liberty or the freedom of speech, of -thought, or of the press."[45] His consistent regard for civil liberty was -preserved even in instances where additions to the executive authority -would result. The rôle of Louis Quatorze, of Frankenstein, or of Cæsar, -presented no attractions to the republican executive, whose position and -authority were, themselves, a protest against the exercise of arbitrary -and ungranted powers. - -It is a striking evidence of the contempt for consistency, manifested by -Mr. Davis' assailants, that these virtues, so commendable in the executive -of a free people, should then have actually constituted the ground of -accusation, by those who subsequently charged him with an ambition to -unite in himself all the departments of the Government. There arose, at -this time, a demagogical demand for a "Dictator"--that morbid aspiration -characteristic of men of weak nerve and deficient fortitude, which vainly -seeks to make Government more powerful for good purposes, by removing all -restraints upon its power to do evil. - -Emphatic in the assertion of the authority conferred by the Constitution -upon his position, President Davis was no less persistent in his refusal -to countenance the investiture of himself with dictatorial powers. - -But the stern and pressing exigencies of the times outweighed -considerations of even the gravest import, and induced a resort to that -measure which the President had hoped to avoid, but upon which now -depended the salvation of the country. In accordance with the -recommendation of the President, Congress, on the 16th of April, 1862, -adopted the conscription law, which was thenceforward, with many material -modifications rendered necessary by circumstances, the basis of the -military system of the Confederacy. This law placed at the disposal of the -President, during the war, every citizen not belonging to a class -exempted, between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, thus annulling all -contracts made with volunteers for short terms. By this act, the States -surrendered their control over such of their citizens as came within the -terms of the act, and in each State were located camps of instruction, for -the reception and training of conscripts. There were other features of the -conscription law, having in view an increased solidity and harmony of the -army organization. - -It is impossible to overestimate the immediate benefits realized to the -Confederacy from this legislation. The incipient disorganization of the -army, consequent upon the numerous furloughs granted to such of the men as -would reënlist for the war, was instantly checked; large additions were -made to commands already in the field, and the discipline and general -frame-work of the army greatly improved. - -Second in importance to the adoption of the act of conscription only, -among the accessions of strength to the military system of the Confederacy -at this period, was the appointment of General Lee to the general command -of the armies, "under the direction of the President."[46] - -The nature of the position thus assigned to one whom the concurrent -criticism of his age pronounces the most eminent of American commanders, -has been much misunderstood, and with its discussion has been associated -much injurious misrepresentation of President Davis. - -General Lee, after the failure of his campaign in North-western Virginia, -in the autumn of 1861, became the object of a vast amount of disparaging -criticism. His case was, indeed, in marked coincidence with that of Sidney -Johnston. Both were distinguished in the Federal service; previous to the -war they were generally conceded to be the ablest officers of that -service; both were known to have been the classmates of Jefferson Davis -and his intimate friends. In their first campaigns, both were adjudged, by -the hot and impulsive temper of the time, to have committed gross and -signal failure. Neither had many apologists. Johnston was declared an -imbecile--a mere martinet, without any of the qualities of true -generalship; and Lee was pronounced incompetent for higher duties than the -clerical performances of the War Office. - -President Davis alone remained firm in behalf of these two men, whom a few -months sufficed to triumphantly vindicate. What nobler vindication should -he himself claim than that, through his firmness and discernment, was -given the needed opportunity to the three great soldiers--Lee, Sidney -Johnston, and Stonewall Jackson--who, above all others, have illustrated -American warfare.[47] - -It has been erroneously supposed and asserted, that General Lee was -assigned the position of commanding general at the special instance of -Congress, and in obedience to the proclaimed will of the people. Whatever -may have been the concurrence of the Confederate Congress in the selection -made by President Davis of Lee for that position, there is no ground for -the hypothesis that the Southern people welcomed this promotion of General -Lee as an assurance of good fortune in the future conduct of the war. - -Indeed, the act of Congress, creating the office of commanding general, -was adopted at the special suggestion of the President, who immediately -assigned Lee to the discharge of its duties. Congress designed General Lee -to be Minister of War, and, with a view to the promotion of that purpose, -repealed a provision which deprived of his rank in the army, a general -assigned to the control of the War Office. But President Davis clearly -understood the broad and palpable distinction, between the talents -requisite for successful administration of that department of the -Government, and the genius of a great soldier. He had too just an -appreciation of the high military qualities of Lee, to consent to their -virtual entombment in a civil position. In accordance with these -suggestions, the President obtained the adoption of the necessary -legislation, and conferred upon General Lee the control and supervision of -the purely military affairs and operations of the war administration. Thus -it was neither in compliance with the action of Congress, nor in deference -to the popular will, that President Davis selected an appropriate sphere -for the genius of Lee, where it "soon dawned upon the admiration of -mankind, and retained its effulgence undimmed to the last."[48] - -The terms of the order assigning General Lee to duty, "under the direction -of the President," have been construed to signify, that it was not -designed that he should exercise those appropriate functions which -obviously appertain to the position of commanding-general. It has been -argued that the President thus created Lee a sort of "chief of staff," or -ornamental attaché of his military household, with a purely complimentary -and meaningless title. The selections made by Mr. Davis, of Lee first, -and, subsequently, of Bragg, as incumbents of the position, sufficiently -repel this absurd conclusion. It is true that the President did not -delegate to these officers his constitutional functions as -commander-in-chief, but to assist and advise him, in the discharge of -those arduous and laborious functions, required no ordinary skill and -experience. The well-known confidence, reposed by the President in -General Lee, may accurately measure the influence of the latter, upon the -Confederate military administration. - -In the progress of those events, which have thus far engrossed our -attention, notable changes had occurred in the cabinet. Early in the -summer of 1861, Mr. Toombs had surrendered the portfolio of State, and Mr. -Hunter, a former United States Senator from Virginia, whose name was -prominently associated with the political history of the Union for more -than twenty years, was placed at the head of the Confederate -administration. During the ensuing winter, Mr. Hunter retired from the -cabinet, and was transferred to the Confederate Senate. - -Mr. Benjamin, originally Attorney-General, had been temporarily assigned -to the War Department, upon the resignation of Mr. Walker, who was the -first incumbent. The connection of Mr. Benjamin with the War Office -continued for several months, when he was transferred to the Department of -State, where he remained until the overthrow of the Confederacy. The -period of his administration of the War Department measures an important -space in the history of the Confederacy. It was a period marked by -numerous, consecutive, and appalling disasters, and, as has been already -seen, Mr. Benjamin did not escape the penalty of official position during -a season of public calamity. We have glanced briefly at the question of -his official responsibility, not with a view of his vindication, though we -have denied the justice of the unlimited reproach, which pursued both -himself and Secretary Mallory, long after even the pretext had -disappeared. - -The censure of Mr. Benjamin was based upon the assumption that he was -responsible for reverses, which a more skillful and attentive management -would have avoided. Yet the facts establish the declaration of Mr. Davis -that those reverses were unavoidable. They, indeed, simply foreshadowed -the fact, which the country soon after realized, of the immense -disadvantage of the Confederate forces in all cases where the naval -facilities of the enemy could be made available. Can it be successfully -maintained that another in the place of Mr. Benjamin would have prevented -the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, of Roanoke Island, of Newbern, of -Memphis, of Island No. 10, and of New Orleans? General Randolph, the -successor of Mr. Benjamin, is universally conceded to have made a -competent secretary of war during his brief term; yet will it be -maintained that had General Randolph, instead of Mr. Benjamin, been the -successor of Mr. Walker, that all, or any of those disasters would have -been prevented? - -Mr. Benjamin can hardly be deemed less fortunate than his successors. -Messrs. Randolph and Breckinridge were, perhaps, fortunate in the brief -period of their responsibility, or they, too, might have shared the public -censure so freely lavished upon Messrs. Walker, Benjamin, and Seddon. - -Perhaps no more thankless position was ever assumed by an official than -the management of the War Department of the Confederate States. The -difficult problem propounded by Themistocles--"to make a small state a -great one"--was of easy solution, compared to that presented the luckless -incumbent of an office, in which the abundance of responsibilities and -embarrassments was commensurate only with the poverty of resources with -which to meet them. To create an army from a population of between five -and six millions, able to successfully cope with an adversary supported by -a home population of twenty-five millions, aided by the inexhaustible -reserves of Europe; with blockaded ports, a newly-organized Government, -and a country of limited manufacturing means; to match in the material of -war the wealthiest and most productive nation in the world; to maintain -the strength and efficiency of an army decimated by its own unnumbered -victories, and from a population depleted by successive conscriptions, was -the encouraging task devolving upon President Davis and his Secretary of -War. It is, at least, reasonable to doubt whether even the genius of -Napoleon, or of Carnot, was ever summoned to such an enterprise. - -No allegation was made more freely and persistently against Mr. Davis than -that of favoritism. At times he was represented as a merciless, -inexorable, capricious master, who would tolerate neither intelligence nor -independence in his subordinates, who were required to be the subservient -agents of his will. Again, he was declared an imbecile puppet in the hands -of Mr. Benjamin, who, with an amazing protean adaptability, assumed the -character of Richelieu, Mazarin, Wolsey, or Jeffreys, as might meet the -convenience of the censors. At all times, however, the public was urged to -believe Mr. Davis was engaged in devising rewards for unworthy favorites, -who, while obsequious to his whims, insolent in the enjoyment of his -bounty, and secure under the executive ægis, were surely carrying the -cause to perdition. - -This allegation of favoritism was assumed to have a conspicuous -illustration in the case of Mr. Benjamin, for whom the President retained -his partiality even after he had been censured by Congress, and when his -unpopularity was not to be concealed. The same motive was affirmed, -however, in the selection of his other advisers; and to obviate the -necessity of detail hereafter, we will dispose of this subject at once. - -Despite the persistent assertion to the contrary, the fact is -indisputable, that, in the selection of no single member of his cabinet, -did Jefferson Davis make use of the opportunity to reward either a friend -or a partisan. In no case did personal favor even remotely influence his -choice, save in the appointment of Mr. Seddon as Secretary of War--an -appointment made with the universal acclaim of the public and the -newspapers. James A. Seddon and Jefferson Davis were, indeed, friends of -twenty years' standing; but, besides, Mr. Seddon was recommended not more -by the confidence of the President, than by the unlimited confidence of -the country in his intellect, integrity, and patriotism. - -Personal details are frequently not to be denied an important historical -bearing, and the motives of Mr. Davis, in the choice of his cabinet, claim -no insignificant page in his official history. We have briefly adverted -elsewhere to some of these considerations. - -When the Confederate cabinet was organized at Montgomery, Robert Toombs -was placed at its head; yet between Davis and Toombs there had not been -close intimacy, hardly mutual confidence--certainly nothing like ardent -friendship. But Mr. Toombs represented an overwhelming majority of the -people of Georgia, the wealthiest and largest State of the Confederacy at -that period, as determined at their last election. He was peculiarly the -representative public man of Georgia; the most prominent citizen of his -State, repeatedly selected for its highest honors, and then a reputed -statesman. When Mr. Toombs resigned, his successor was Mr. Hunter, who had -served with Mr. Davis in the Senate, and in whose qualifications the -President had confidence. They had both been friends of Mr. Calhoun, and -disciples of his political school. Political accord by no means signifies -personal intimacy, and while Mr. Hunter has many admirers, and was greatly -respected in Virginia and in the Senate, he has not been generally -accredited with marked sympathetic tendencies. - -Mr. Benjamin was originally made Attorney-General, because of his high -legal reputation, and because Louisiana was entitled to a representative -in the cabinet, but not because of personal considerations, since his -relations with Mr. Davis were neither intimate nor cordial. The partiality -of the President for Mr. Benjamin was, indeed, an after-thought--the -result of observation of his wonderful mental resources, his unequal -capacity for labor and zealous devotion to the cause. - -Mr. Mallory was recommended for the Navy Department by his previous -experience. There had been mutual kind feeling between himself and Mr. -Davis as Senators, but nothing like close association. Mr. Davis had never -seen Mr. Walker until he was appointed Secretary of War, in accordance -with the emphatic choice of Alabama. General Randolph was appointed solely -in consequence of Mr. Davis' convictions of his fitness. Previous to the -war General Randolph was undistinguished, save in Virginia, where his fine -capacity and exalted worth were becomingly appreciated. General -Breckinridge, the last Confederate Secretary of War, was sufficiently -recommended by his talents and position. Mr. Memminger was made Secretary -of the Treasury, not as the friend of Mr. Davis, but as the choice of -South Carolina. With Mr. Trenholm, his successor, the President had no -personal acquaintance, until he became a member of the cabinet. Mr. Davis, -the last Attorney-General, was originally neither a personal friend nor a -party associate of the President; nor was Mr. Watts, his predecessor. - -With the favorable response of Congress and the people to the vigorous and -timely suggestions of the President, began a more spirited prosecution of -the war, though the season of peril was not yet tided over, nor the -current of adversity exhausted. Already there were numerous indications of -the increased scale, and enlarged theatre of operations, which the war now -demanded. - -At the conclusion of active operations in the Trans-Mississippi district, -in the autumn of 1861, the State forces of Missouri, still retaining their -separate organization, under General Price, and the Confederate forces of -McCulloch, were located south of Springfield, near the Arkansas line. An -unfortunate phase of the Southern conduct of the war in this quarter, and -one from which arose no little apprehension, was the apparently -irreconcilable difference between Generals Price and McCulloch. With a -view to secure the indispensable element of harmony, President Davis, -during the winter, appointed Major-General Earl Van Dorn, an able and -gallant officer, to the supreme command of military operations in the -Trans-Mississippi department. General Van Dorn was a favorite with the -President, and his services had already been of a character to justify the -high expectations, indulged not less by himself than by the public, of -fortunate results of the unanimity, at last secured in a quarter where its -absence had been severely felt. - -The result of the enemy's movements, begun early in January, 1862, was the -retreat of the weak column of Price to the Boston Mountains, in Arkansas, -where McCulloch was encamped. This junction of the two commands did not -result in coöperation until the arrival of General Van Dorn, early in -March. With a vigor characteristic of this officer's career, Van Dorn -advanced against the enemy, advantageously posted, and with numbers -superior to his own force. The result was the battle of Elk Horn, a -brilliant but fruitless engagement, in which the Southern commander, in -consequence of the want of discipline among his soldiers, and partially -through the effects of those earlier dissensions with which he had no -connection, failed to realize the ends at which he aimed.[49] - -Elk Horn was probably the most considerable engagement, in point of the -numbers engaged, fought during the war, west of the Mississippi. -Unimportant in its bearing upon the general character of the war, it was a -decided check upon the aspiration of the Confederate Government to recover -Missouri, and to give its authority a solid establishment in the -Trans-Mississippi region. This was afterward the least important theatre -of the war, though subsequent events there were by no means unworthy of -record. Even at this early stage, the war was rapidly tending to a -concentration of the energies of both parties, upon the more vital points -of conflict in Virginia, and the central zone of the Confederacy. A few -weeks later Generals Van Dorn and Price, with the major portion of the -Trans-Mississippi army, were transferred to the scene of operations east -of the great river. - -General Albert Sidney Johnston, after his retreat from Nashville, -consequent upon the fall of Fort Donelson, paused at Murfreesboro', -Tennessee, for a sufficient period to receive accessions to his force, -which increased it to the neighborhood of twenty thousand men. These -accessions were portions of the command lately operating in South-eastern -Kentucky, and remnants of the forces lately defending Fort Donelson. -General Beauregard, having evacuated Columbus, which, in common with the -other posts of the former Confederate line of defense in Kentucky and -Tennessee, became untenable with the loss of the Tennessee and Cumberland -Rivers, concentrated his forces at Corinth, in the northern part of -Mississippi. - -The evacuation of Columbus did not necessarily give the enemy control of -the Mississippi above Memphis. A strong position was taken by the -Confederate forces at Island No. 10, forty-five miles below Columbus. -Considerable anticipation was indulged by the Southern public, of a -successful stand at this point for the control of the Mississippi. It was, -however, captured by the enemy; and in the loss of two thousand men and -important material of war by its surrender, the Confederacy sustained -another severe blow, and the Federal Secretary of the Navy justly -congratulated the North, upon a "triumph not the less appreciated because -it was protracted and finally bloodless." - -The retirement of the forces of General Albert Sidney Johnston south of -the Tennessee River, and the location of General Beauregard's command at -Corinth, readily suggested the practicability of a coöperation, by those -two commanders, for the defense of the valley of the Mississippi, and the -extensive railroad system, of which Corinth is the centre. With the -approbation of President Davis, a concentration of troops, from various -quarters, ensued, and, about the first of April, an admirable army of -forty thousand men was assembled in the neighborhood of Corinth, and upon -the railroads leading to that point. There was no situation during the war -more assuring of good fortune to the Confederates, than that presented in -Northern Mississippi in the early days of April, 1862. President Davis -indulged the highest anticipations from this grand combination of forces -which he so cordially approved. He confidently expected a victory from the -Western army, led by that officer whose capacity he trusted above all -others, which should more than compensate for the heavy losses of the -previous campaign. General Johnston was no less hopeful of the situation. -The conjuncture was indeed rare in its opportunities. The exposed -situation of General Grant, whose command lay upon the west bank of the -Tennessee River, with a most remarkable want of appreciation of its -precarious position by its commander, and a total absence of provision for -its safety, invited an immediate attack by the Confederate commander, -before the Federal column could be reinforced by Buell, then making rapid -marches from Nashville. - -The incidents of the battle of Shiloh are familiar to the world. It -constitutes, perhaps, the most melancholy of that series of "lost -opportunities" in the Confederate conduct of the war, upon which history -will dwell with sad interest. The first day's victory promised fruits the -most brilliant and enduring. The action of the second day can only be -construed as a Confederate disaster. Such was the sentiment of the South, -and such must be the verdict of history. - -Shiloh was, perhaps, the sorest disappointment experienced by the South, -until the loss of Vicksburg, and the defeat of Gettysburg threatened the -approaching climacteric of the Confederacy. The public grief at the death -of General Johnston was tinged with remorse, for the unmerited censure -with which the popular voice, encouraged by the press, had previously -assailed him. Not until his death did the South appreciate the worth of -this great soldier. Never, perhaps, had there been a more sublime instance -of self-abnegation than was displayed by Sidney Johnston. - -All through the autumn and winter of 1861 he had maintained his perilous -position in Kentucky, confronted by forces quadruple his own, and yet -assailed by an impatient and ignorant public, for not essaying invasion, -with a force which subsequent events proved inadequate for defense. But -not even the hideous array of facts following the reverses of February -secured his vindication; still he was assailed by an unreasoning public, -instigated by a carping, partisan press. He was ridiculed as -incompetent--as one who had traversed the curriculum of West Point, only -to become educated in the frippery of military etiquette. For the first -time, President Davis was charged with a desire to reward favorites, even -at the risk of the public welfare, as illustrated by his retention in high -command, of one whom actual trial had proven incapable, and undeserving of -his previous reputation. - -But President Davis, happily for his own fame, not less than for the fame -of this illustrious victim of popular clamor, was unmoved by the censures -of the public, and the invectives of the newspapers. He did not permit the -confidence which, upon deliberate judgment, and upon a long and intimate -acquaintance, he had reposed in General Johnston, to be shaken, and -sternly repelled the clamor against him, as he afterwards did in the case -of Lee, and even of Stonewall Jackson. His habitual reply to importunate -petitions for the removal of Johnston was: "If Sidney Johnston is -incompetent to command an army, then the Confederacy has no general fit -for that position." - -Humanity rejoices in no attribute more noble than the capacity for warm -and enduring friendship; and there is nothing more exalted in the -character of Jefferson Davis than his devotion to his friends. At all -times as true as steel to those for whom he professes attachment, he -knows no cold medium, cherishes no feeling of indifference, but his nature -kindles responsively to the warmth in the bosom of others. A like -enthusiasm towards himself has usually been the reward of his heroic -constancy. In Sidney Johnston there was that touching union of chivalric -generosity and tender sympathy, which peculiarly qualified him for -fellowship with Jefferson Davis. Such friendship, as that which united -them, rises to the sublimity of the noblest virtue, and presents a -spectacle honorable to human nature. - -President Davis commemorated the death of General Johnston in a -communication to Congress, and in terms of touching and appropriate -feeling. Said he: - - "But an all-wise Creator has been pleased, while vouchsafing to us His - countenance in battle, to afflict us with a severe dispensation, to - which we must bow in humble submission. The last, long, lingering hope - has disappeared, and it is but too true that General Albert Sidney - Johnston is no more. My long and close friendship with this departed - chieftain and patriot forbid me to trust myself in giving vent to the - feelings, which this intelligence has evoked. Without doing injustice - to the living, it may safely be said that our loss is irreparable. - Among the shining hosts of the great and good who now cluster around - the banner of our country, there exists no purer spirit, no more - heroic soul, than that of the illustrious man whose death I join you - in lamenting. In his death he has illustrated the character for which, - through life, he was conspicuous--that of singleness of purpose and - devotion to duty with his whole energies. Bent on obtaining the - victory which he deemed essential to his country's cause, he rode on - to the accomplishment of his object, forgetful of self, while his very - life-blood was fast ebbing away. His last breath cheered his comrades - on to victory. The last sound he heard was their shout of victory. His - last thought was his country, and long and deeply will his country - mourn his loss." - -The battle of Shiloh was an incident of the war justifying more than a -passing notice. Never since Manassas, and never upon any subsequent -occasion, had the Confederacy an opportunity so abundant in promise. The -utmost exertions of the Government had been employed to make the Western -army competent for the great enterprise proposed by its commander. The -situation of Grant's army absolutely courted the tremendous blow with -which Johnston sought its destruction, a result which, in all human -calculation, he would have achieved had his life been spared. At the -moment of his death a peerless victory was already won; the heavy masses -of Grant were swept from their positions; before nightfall his last -reserve had been broken, and his army lay, a cowering, shrunken, defeated -rabble, upon the banks of the Tennessee. That, at such a moment, the army -should have been recalled from pursuit, especially when it was known that -a powerful reinforcement, ample to enable the enemy to restore his -fortunes, was hastening, by forced marches, to the scene, must ever remain -a source of profound amazement. - -It was the story of Manassas repeated, but with a far more mournful -significance. It was not the failure to gather the fruits of the most -complete victory of the war, nor the irreparable loss of Sidney Johnston, -which filled the cup of the public sorrow. Superadded to these was the -alarming discovery that the second great army of the Confederacy, in the -death of its commander, was deprived of the genius which alone had been -proven capable of its successful direction. Johnston had no worthy -successor, and the Western army discovered no leader capable of -conducting it to the goal which its splendid valor deserved. - -A very perceptible diminution of what had hitherto been unlimited -confidence, not only in the genius, but even in the good fortune of -Beauregard, was the result of his declared failure at Shiloh. Not even his -distinguished services, subsequently, were sufficient to entirely efface -that unfortunate record. Military blunders, perhaps the most excusable of -human errors, are those which popular criticism is the least disposed to -extenuate. The reputation of the soldier, so sacred to himself, and which -should be so jealously guarded by his country, is often mercilessly -mutilated by that public, upon whose gratitude and indulgence he should -have an unlimited demand. We shall not undertake to establish the justice -of the public verdict, which has been unanimous, that the course of -General Beauregard involved, at least, an "extraordinary abandonment of a -great victory." It only remains to state the material from which a candid -and intelligent estimate is to be reached. - -General Beauregard has explained his course, in terms which, it is to be -presumed, were at least satisfactory to himself. His official report says: -"Darkness was close at hand; officers and men were exhausted by a combat -of over twelve hours without food, and jaded by the march of the preceding -day through mud and water." - -General Bragg, who conspicuously shared the laurels of the first day's -action, has recorded a memorable protest against the course adopted at its -close. Says General Bragg ... "It was now probably past four o'clock, the -descending sun warning us to press our advantage and finish the work -before night should compel us to desist. Fairly in motion, these commands -again, with a common head and a common purpose, swept all before them. -Neither battery nor battalion could withstand their onslaught. Passing -through camp after camp, rich in military spoils of every kind, the enemy -was driven headlong from every position, and thrown in confused masses -upon the river bank, behind his heavy artillery, and under cover of his -gunboats at the landing. He had left nearly the whole of his light -artillery in our hands."... _The enemy had fallen back in much confusion, -and was crowded, in unorganized masses, upon the river bank, vainly -striving to cross._ They were covered by a battery of heavy guns, well -served, and their two gunboats, now poured a heavy fire upon our supposed -position, for we were entirely hid by the forest. _Their fire, though -terrific in sound, and producing some consternation at first, did us no -damage, as the shells all passed over, and exploded far beyond our -position...._ The sun was about disappearing, so that little time was left -us to finish the glorious work of the day.... Our troops, greatly -exhausted by twelve hours' incessant fighting, without food, _mostly -responded to the order with alacrity, and the movement commenced with -every prospect of success.... Just at this time, an order was received -from, the commanding general to withdraw the forces beyond the enemy's -fire._ - -The testimony of General Polk, also a distinguished participant in the -battle, was concurrent with that of General Bragg, and no less emphatic in -its suggestions. In his report is to be found the following passage: - - "The troops under my command were joined by those of Generals Bragg - and Breckinridge, and my fourth brigade, under General Cheatham, from - the right. The field was clear. The rest of the forces of the enemy - were driven to the river and under its bank. We had one hour or more - of daylight still left; were within from one hundred and fifty to four - hundred yards of the enemy's position, and nothing seemed wanting to - complete the most brilliant victory of the war, but to press forward - and make a vigorous assault on the demoralized remnant of his forces. - - "At this juncture his gunboats dropped down the river, near the - landing, where his troops were collected, and opened a tremendous - cannonade of shot and shell over the bank, in the direction from which - our forces were approaching. The height of the plain on which we were, - above the level of the water, was about one hundred feet, so that it - was necessary to give great elevation to his guns, to enable him to - fire over the bank. The consequence was that shot could take effect - only at points remote from the river's edge. They were comparatively - harmless to our troops nearest the bank, and became increasingly so to - us as we drew near the enemy and placed him between us and his boats. - - "Here the impression arose that our forces were waging an unequal - contest--that they were exhausted, and suffering from a murderous - fire, and by an order from the commanding general they were withdrawn - from the field." - -President Davis could only share the universal dissatisfaction with the -unfortunate termination of the battle of Shiloh. A conclusive evidence of -his forbearance and justice is seen in the fact, that he did not avail -himself of the opportunity to displace an officer, toward whom he was -charged with entertaining such bitter and implacable animosity, when -public sentiment would, in all probability, have approved the expediency -of that step. But General Beauregard was in no danger of mean resentment -from President Davis, who so frequently braved the anger of the public -against its distinguished servants. General Beauregard retained the -control of the Western army, without interference from the executive, and -within a few weeks, by the successful execution of his admirable retreat -from Corinth, which he justly declared "equivalent to a brilliant -victory," did much to repair his damaged reputation.[50] So eminent, in -its perfection and success, was the retreat of Beauregard with his little -army from the front of Halleck, who had more than one hundred thousand -men, that a portion of the Northern press admitted that while Shiloh made -Grant ridiculous, Corinth made a corpse of Halleck's military reputation. - -As yet there had been no compensating advantage gained by the Confederacy -to repair the disasters sustained in the early part of the year. Indeed, -the train of reverses had hardly been more than temporarily interrupted, -when a calamity hardly less serious than the loss of Tennessee happened in -the loss of New Orleans, the largest, most populous, and most wealthy city -of the Confederacy. This event was speedily followed by the calamitous -results which were to be expected. It was the virtual destruction of -Confederate rule in Louisiana. It cut off the available routes to Texas, -so inestimable in its importance as a source of grain and cattle; gave -the enemy a base of operations against the entire gulf region, and was -altogether disheartening to the South.[51] - -Some time previous to the fall of New Orleans, which occurred in the -latter days of April, the Confederacy had made its most serious effort to -dispute the hitherto absolute naval supremacy of the North. On the 8th of -March, 1862, occurred the famous naval engagement in Hampton Roads, -between the Confederate iron-clad Virginia, and the Federal Monitor. Ever -since the summer of 1861, the Navy Department had been preparing, at -Gosport Navy-yard, a formidable naval contrivance--a shot-proof, -iron-plated steam battery. The result of the experiment was a success, -which did much to relieve the Navy Department of undeserved reproach, and -to produce a revolution in theories relating to naval science and -architecture all over the world. - -About this period the activity of the naval forces of the enemy was -rewarded by additional successes. The towns of Newborn, Washington, and -other places of less note in North Carolina, were captured by naval -expeditions in conjunction with detachments from the army of General -Burnside. The successes of the Burnside expedition, which had been -prepared by the North with such large expectations, were by no means -inconsiderable; but they were soon lost sight of in the presence of the -more absorbing operations in the interior. The naval resistance of the -South had thus far necessarily been feeble. In the subsequent progress of -the war, except in rare instances, it disappeared altogether as an element -in the calculation of means of defense. - -The vulnerability of the South upon the sea-coast, and along the lines of -her navigable rivers, measured the extent of the good fortune of the -enemy. The North was shortly to yield a reluctant recognition of the -comparatively insignificant influence of its long train of triumphs in the -promotion of subjugation. Upon the soil of Virginia--classic in its -memories of contests for freedom, the chosen battle-ground of the -Confederacy--was soon to be shed the effulgence of the proudest -achievements of Southern genius and valor--a radiance as splendid as ever -shone upon the blazing crest of war. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII. - - THE "ANACONDA SYSTEM"--HOW FAR IT WAS SUCCESSFUL--TERRITORIAL - CONFIGURATION OF THE SOUTH FAVORABLE TO THE ENEMY--ONE THEATRE OF WAR - FAVORABLE TO THE CONFEDERATES--THE FEDERAL FORCES IN VIRGINIA--THE - CONFEDERATE FORCES--THE POTOMAC LINES--CRITICAL SITUATION IN - VIRGINIA--EVACUATION OF MANASSAS--TRANSFER OF OPERATIONS TO THE - PENINSULA--MAGRUDER'S LINES--EVACUATION OF YORKTOWN--STRENGTH OF THE - OPPOSING FORCES BEFORE RICHMOND--DESTRUCTION OF THE "VIRGINIA"--PANIC - IN RICHMOND--MR. DAVIS' CALMNESS AND CONFIDENCE--HE AVOWS HIMSELF - "READY TO LEAVE HIS BONES IN THE CAPITAL OF THE CONFEDERACY"--REPULSE - OF THE GUNBOATS--"MEMENTOES OF HEROISM"--JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN--A - SERIES OF VICTORIES, WITH IMPORTANT RESULTS--BATTLE OF "SEVEN - PINES"--A FAILURE--GENERAL JOHNSTON WOUNDED--PRESIDENT DAVIS ON THE - FIELD--PRESIDENT DAVIS AND GENERAL JOHNSTON--AN ATTEMPT TO FORESTALL - THE DECISION OF HISTORY--RESULTS OF LEE'S ACCESSION TO COMMAND-- - JOHNSTON'S GENERALSHIP--MR. DAVIS' ESTIMATE OF LEE--LEE'S PLANS--THE - ADVISORY RELATION BETWEEN DAVIS AND LEE--THEIR MUTUAL CONFIDENCE NEVER - INTERRUPTED--CONFEDERATE STRATEGY AFTER M'CLELLAN'S DEFEAT BEFORE - RICHMOND--MAGICAL CHANGE IN THE FORTUNES OF THE CONFEDERACY--THE - INVASION OF MARYLAND--ANTIETAM--TANGIBLE PROOFS OF CONFEDERATE - SUCCESS--GENERAL BRAGG--HIS KENTUCKY CAMPAIGN--CONFEDERATE HOPES-- - BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE--BRAGG RETREATS--ESTIMATE OF THE KENTUCKY - CAMPAIGN OF 1862--OTHER INCIDENTS OF THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN--REMOVAL OF - M'CLELLAN--A SOUTHERN OPINION OF M'CLELLAN--BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG-- - BATTLE OF MURFREESBORO'--BATTLE OF PRAIRIE GROVE--THE SITUATION AT THE - CLOSE OF 1862--PRESIDENT DAVIS' RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS--HIS VISIT - TO THE SOUTH-WEST--ADDRESS BEFORE THE MISSISSIPPI LEGISLATURE. - - -The Federal Government frankly accepted the true teachings of the war in -its earlier stages, and no feature of the lesson was more palpable than -the inferiority of the North in the art of war and military -administration. No longer trusting, to any extent whatever, to a contest -of prowess with an enemy whose incomparable superiority was already -established, Mr. Lincoln, his cabinet, and his military advisers, were -concurrent in their convictions of the necessity of a policy which should -make available the numerical superiority of the North. The "anaconda -system" of General Scott, adhered to by General McClellan, and sanctioned -by the Government and the people, though by no means new in the theory and -practice of war, was based upon a just and sagacious view of the -situation. - -To overwhelm the South by mere material weight, to crush the smaller body -by the momentum of a larger force, comprehends the Federal design of the -war, undertaken at the inception of operations in 1862. The success -attending the execution of this design we have described in preceding -pages. We have accredited to the enemy the full extent of his successes, -and endeavored to demonstrate that they resulted not from Confederate -maladministration, but from a vigorous and timely use of his advantages -and opportunity by the enemy. But while according to the North unexampled -energy in preparation, and an unstinted donation of its means to the -purpose, which it pursued with indomitable resolution, no concession of an -improved military capacity is demanded, from the fact that use was made of -obvious advantages not to be overlooked even by the stupidity of an Aulic -council. - -We have shown that the preponderating influence in the achievement of the -enemy's victories in the winter and spring of 1862, was his naval -supremacy. Even at that period it was palpable that, without his navy, his -scheme of invasion would be the veriest abortion ever exposed to the -ridicule of mankind. The maritime facilities of the enemy were, in the -end, decisive of the contest in his favor. - -Upon those fields of military operations which have thus far occupied our -attention, we have seen how propitious to the enemy's plans, in every -instance, was the geographical configuration. Wherever a navigable river -emptied into the sea, which was the undisputed domain of the North, or -intersected its territory, a short and, in many instances, almost -bloodless struggle had ended in the expulsion or capture of the -Confederates defending its passage. Yet, in many instances, these results -had a most serious bearing upon the decision of the war. It was impossible -for Sidney Johnston to hold Kentucky and Tennessee unless the Mississippi, -running parallel with his communications, and the Cumberland and -Tennessee, running in their rear, should remain sealed to the enemy. It -was equally impracticable to hold the region bordering upon the North -Carolina sounds after the fall of Roanoke Island. After the fall of New -Orleans, the entire avenue of the Mississippi, except the limited section -between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, was open to the enemy, giving him bases -of operations upon both its banks, and opening to his ravages vast -sections of the Confederacy. - -Thus had the naval supremacy of the enemy brought him, in a few days, to -the very heart of extensive sections of territory, which never could have -been reduced to his sway, had he been compelled to fight his way overland -from his frontiers. Thus was the great element of _space_, usually so -potent in the defense of an invaded people, annihilated, almost before the -struggle had been fairly begun. - -The upper regions of Eastern Virginia, remote from the navigable -tributaries of the Atlantic and the larger rivers, was the only theatre of -war, where the superior valor and skill of the Confederates could claim -success from the Federal hosts, deprived of their gunboats and water -communications. Here, though not entirely neutralized, his water -facilities did not at all times avail the enemy; here the struggle was -more equal, and here was demonstrated that superior manhood and -soldiership of the South, which, not even an enemy, if candid, will deny. - -Of the seven hundred thousand men, which were claimed as under arms for -the preservation of the Union, in the beginning of 1862, it is reasonably -certain that more than a half million were actually in the field, and of -these at least one-half, were operating in Virginia, with Richmond as the -common goal of their eager and expectant gaze. The army of McClellan, -numbering little less than two hundred thousand men, in the vicinity of -Washington, was entitled to the lavish praise, which he bestowed upon it, -in his declaration, that it was "magnificent in material, admirable in -discipline and instruction, excellently equipped and armed." In the valley -of the Shenandoah was the army of Banks, more than fifteen thousand -strong. General Fremont, with about the same force, commanded the -"Mountain Department," embracing the highland region of Western Virginia. -By the first of March these various commands, with other detachments, had -reached an aggregate of quite two hundred and fifty thousand men. - -We have sufficiently described those causes, by which the already -disproportionate strength of the Confederates, previous to the adoption of -the conscription act, and the inception of the more vigorous and stringent -military policy of the Confederate Government, was reduced to a condition -in most alarming contrast with the enormous preparations of the enemy. - -General Joseph E. Johnston still held his position, with a force which, on -the first of March, barely exceeded forty thousand men. The command of -General Stonewall Jackson, in the Shenandoah Valley, did not exceed -thirty-five hundred, embracing all arms. General Magruder held the -Peninsula of York and James Rivers, covering the approaches to Richmond in -that direction, with eleven thousand men, and General Huger had at Norfolk -and in the vicinity not more than ten thousand. The Confederate force in -Western Virginia was altogether too feeble for successful defense, and -indeed, the Government had some months previous abandoned the hope of a -permanent occupation of that region. - -The Confederate authorities had long since ceased to cherish hope of -offensive movements upon the line of the Potomac. Circumstances imposed a -defensive attitude, attended with many causes of peculiar apprehension for -the fate of the issue in Virginia. Weeks of critical suspense, and -vigilant observation of the threatening movements of the Federal forces, -were followed by the transfer of the principal scene of operations to the -Peninsula. - -The evacuation of the position so long held by General Johnston at -Manassas, executed with many evidences of skill, but attended with much -destruction of valuable material, was followed immediately by an advance -of General McClellan to that place. The necessity of a retirement by -General Johnston to an interior line had been duly appreciated by the -Confederate Government, though there were circumstances attending the -immediate execution of the movement, which detracted from its otherwise -complete success. The destruction of valuable material, including an -extensive meat-curing establishment, containing large supplies of meat, -and established by the Government, which ensued upon the evacuation of -Manassas, elicited much exasperated censure. Similar occurrences at the -evacuation of Yorktown, a few weeks later, revived a most unpleasant -recollection of scenes incident to the retreat from Manassas. The -extravagant destruction of property, in many instances apparently reckless -and wanton, marking the movements of the Confederate armies at this -period, was a bitter sarcasm upon the practice, by many of its prominent -officers, of that economy of resources which the necessities of the -Confederacy so imperatively demanded. - -Not only the weakness of his forces indicated to General Johnston the -perils of his position, but the territorial configuration again came to -the aid of the enemy, and gave to General McClellan the option of several -avenues to the rear of the Confederate army. It is not improbable that -McClellan appreciated the extremity of Johnston's situation, and has, -indeed, assigned other reasons for his advance upon Manassas than the -expectation of an engagement, where the chances would have been -overwhelmingly in his favor. At all events, the retirement of General -Johnston to the line of the Rapidan, imposed upon the Federal general an -immediate choice of a base from which to assail the Confederate capital. -Originally opposed to an overland movement _via_ Manassas, McClellan was -now compelled to abandon his favorite plan of a movement from Urbanna, on -the Rappahanock, by which he hoped to cut off the Confederate retreat to -Richmond, in consequence of Johnston's retirement behind the Rappahanock. -General McClellan promptly adopted the movement to the peninsula, a plan -which he had previously considered, but which he regarded "as less -brilliant and less promising decisive results."[52] - -When General Johnston left Manassas, it is probable that he was not fully -decided as to the position which he should select. Receiving a -dispatch[53] from President Davis, he halted the army, and immediately the -President left Richmond for Johnston's head-quarters, for the purpose of -consultation. General Johnston's position now was simply observatory of -the enemy. It was yet possible that McClellan might undertake an overland -movement; and, indeed, a portion of his force had followed the retreating -Confederates. In that event Johnston would occupy the line upon which Lee -subsequently foiled so many formidable Federal demonstrations. From his -central position he could also promptly meet a serious demonstration -against Richmond from the Chesapeake waters or the Shenandoah Valley. When -the numerous transports at Fortress Monroe, debarking troops for the -peninsula, revealed the enemy's real purpose, the army of General Johnston -was carried to the lines of Magruder, at Yorktown. Johnston was, however, -decidedly opposed to the movement to the Peninsula, declaring it -untenable, and urging views as to the requirements of the situation, which -competent criticism has repeatedly commended. - -While the transfer of Johnston's army to the Peninsula was in process of -execution, the situation in Virginia was, in the highest degree, critical. -The strength of Magruder was necessarily so divided, that the actual -force, defending the line threatened by McClellan with eighty thousand -men, was less than six thousand Confederates. Meanwhile the various -Federal detachments in other quarters were coöperating with the main -movement of McClellan. Banks and Shields were expected, by their -overwhelming numbers, to crush Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley, and then, -forming a junction with the large force of Fremont, who was required to -capture Staunton, it was designed that these combined forces should unite -with the army of McDowell, advancing from the direction of Fredericksburg, -at some point east of the Blue Ridge. Thus a force, aggregating more than -seventy thousand men, threatening Richmond from the north, was to unite -with McClellan advancing from the east. Such was, in brief, the Federal -plan of campaign, which the North expected to accomplish the reduction of -Richmond and the total destruction of the Confederate power in Virginia. -It does not devolve upon us to discuss, in detail, the defects of this -faulty combination, but the sequel will show how promptly and triumphantly -the Confederate leaders availed themselves of the opportunity presented by -this crude arrangement of their adversaries. - -Happily the bold attitude and skillful dispositions of Magruder were aided -by the over-tentative action of his antagonist. The latter, greatly -exaggerating the force in his front, and convinced of the hopelessness of -an assault upon the Confederate works, permitted the escape of the golden -moment, and prepared for a regular siege of Yorktown. In the meantime -General Magruder describes his situation to have been as follows: -"Through the energetic action of the Government, reënforcements began to -pour in, and each hour the Army of the Peninsula grew stronger and -stronger, until anxiety passed from my mind as to the result of an attack -upon us." - -The untenability of the Peninsula was very soon made apparent, and the -important advantage of _time_ having been gained, and the escape of -General Huger's command from its precarious position at Norfolk secured, -General Johnston abandoned the works at Yorktown, retreating to the line -of the Chickahominy, near Richmond. This movement was made in obedience to -the necessities of the situation, and was in accordance with his original -desire for a decisive engagement with McClellan, at an interior point, -where a concentration of the Confederate forces would be more practicable. -General McClellan did not pursue the retreating column with much energy -after the decisive blow given his advance at Williamsburg, by Longstreet. - -With the arrival of Johnston upon the Richmond lines, the Confederate -Government began, with energy and rapidity, the concentration of its -forces. The superb command of Huger was promptly transferred to Johnston, -and troops from the Carolinas were thrown forward to Richmond as rapidly -as transportation facilities would permit. By the last of May the -Confederate forces in front of Richmond reached an aggregate of -seventy-five thousand men. McClellan had sustained losses on the Peninsula -which reduced his strength to the neighborhood of one hundred and twenty -thousand. - -A cruel necessity of the evacuation of Norfolk and Portsmouth was the -destruction of the Confederate iron-clad "Virginia," which had so long -prevented the ascent of James River by the Federal gunboats. So invaluable -was this vessel in the defense of Richmond, that McClellan had named, as -an essential condition of a successful campaign on the Peninsula, that she -should be "neutralized." It was found impossible to convey the Virginia to -a point unoccupied on either shore of the river by the enemy's forces, -and, by order of her commander, the vessel was destroyed. Immediately a -fleet ascended the river for the purpose of opening the water highway to -the Confederate capital. - -The intelligence of the destruction of the "Virginia," and the advance of -the Federal fleet, was received, in Richmond, with profound consternation. -No one, unless at that time in Richmond, can realize the sense of extreme -peril experienced by the public. There were few who dared indulge the hope -of a successful defense of the city against the dreaded "gunboats" and -"monitors" of the enemy, which, the people then believed, were alike -invulnerable and irresistible. - -The wise precautionary measures of the Government, in preparing its -archives for removal, in case of emergency, to a point of safety, greatly -increased the panic of the public. Rumors of a precipitate evacuation of -the city, by the Confederate authorities, were circulated, and there was -wanting no possible element which could aggravate the public alarm, save -the calm demeanor of President Davis, and the deliberate efforts of the -authorities--Confederate, State, and municipal--to assure the safety of -the city. The courage and confidence of the President, in the midst of -this almost universal alarm, in which many officers of the Government -participated, quickly aroused an enthusiastic and determined spirit in the -hearts of a brave people. Knowing the critical nature of the emergency, he -was nevertheless resolved to exhaust every expedient in the defense of -Richmond, and then to abide the issue. His noble and defiant declaration -was: "I am ready and willing to leave my bones in the capital of the -Confederacy." In response to resolutions from the Virginia Legislature, -urging the defense of the city to the last extremity, he avowed his -predetermined resolution to hold Richmond until driven out by the enemy, -and animated his hearers by an assurance of his conviction, that, even in -that contingency, "the war could be successfully maintained, upon Virginia -soil, for twenty years."[54] - -The accounts of the enemy were required to demonstrate to the citizens of -Richmond, that, by the obstructions in the channel of the river, and the -erection of the impregnable batteries at Drewry's Bluff, their homes were -again secured from the presence of the invaders. The significance of that -brief engagement, during which the guns were distinctly audible in -Richmond, was very soon made evident in the loss of their terrors by the -Federal gunboats. President Davis was a spectator of the engagement, by -which the Confederate capital was rescued from imminent peril of capture. - -But the repulse of the gunboats in James River, with its assuring and -significant incidents, was the precursor of far more brilliant successes, -which, it was evident, would largely affect the decision of the general -issue in Virginia. In the months of May and June, 1862, was enacted the -memorable "Valley campaign" of Stonewall Jackson--a campaign which, never -excelled, has no parallel in brilliant and accurate conception, celerity, -and perfection of execution, save the Italian campaign of Napoleon in -1796. General Jackson's exploits in the Valley of the Shenandoah present -an aggregate of military achievements unrivaled by any record in American -history. - -On the 23d of March, Jackson fought the battle of Kernstown, near -Winchester, with three thousand Virginians against eighteen full Federal -regiments, sustaining, throughout an entire day, an audacious assault upon -Shields' force, and at dark leisurely retiring with his command, after -having inflicted upon the enemy a loss nearly equal to his own strength. -Elsewhere has been mentioned the effort made to induce President Davis to -remove Jackson, in compliance with the popular dissatisfaction at his -failure to achieve, against such overwhelming odds, more palpable fruits -of victory. The immediate consequence of Kernstown was the check of Banks' -advance in the Valley, and the recall of a large force, then on the way -from Banks to aid McClellan's designs against Johnston. - -Leaving General Ewell, whose division had been detached from Johnston, to -intercept any demonstration by Banks in the Valley, or across the Blue -Ridge, Jackson united his command with that of General Edward Johnson, a -full brigade, and defeating the advance of Fremont, under Milroy, at -McDowell, compelled a disorderly retreat by Fremont through the mountains -of Western Virginia. Returning to the Valley, he assaulted, with his -united force, the column of Banks, annihilated an entire division of the -enemy, pursued its fugitive remnants to the Potomac, and threatened the -safety of the Federal capital. Alarmed for Washington, Mr. Lincoln halted -McDowell in his plans of coöperation with McClellan, and for weeks the -efforts of the Federal Government were addressed to the paramount purpose -of "catching Jackson." Eluding the enemy's combinations, Jackson turned -upon his pursuers, again defeated Fremont at Cross Keys, and immediately -crossing the Shenandoah, secured his rear, and destroyed the advance of -Shields within sight of its powerless confederate. Resuming the retreat, -Jackson paused at Weyer's Cave, and awaited the summons of his superiors -to enact his thrilling rôle in the absorbing drama at Richmond. Within the -short period of seventy days, Jackson achieved at Kernstown, McDowell's, -Front Royal, Winchester, Strasburg, Harrisonburg, Cross Keys, and Port -Republic, eight tactical victories, besides innumerable successful -combats. But he had done more. He had wrought the incomparable strategic -achievement of neutralizing sixty thousand men with fifteen thousand; he -had recalled McDowell, when, with outstretched arm, McClellan had already -planted his right wing, under Porter, at Hanover Court-house, to receive -the advance of the coöperating column from Fredericksburg. - -Meanwhile the lines of Richmond had been the scene of no incident of -special interest until the battle of "Seven Pines," on the 31st of May. -After his arrival upon the Chickahominy, McClellan had been steadily -fortifying his lines, and wherever an advance was practicable, preparing -approaches to Richmond. His line, extending over a space of several miles, -was accurately described by the course of the Chickahominy, from the -village of Mechanicsville, five miles north of Richmond, to a point about -four miles from the city, in an easterly direction. Having partially -executed his design of bridging the Chickahominy, McClellan had crossed -that stream, and in the last days of May, his left wing was fortified near -the locality designated the "Seven Pines." This initiative demonstration -by McClellan, which placed his army astride a variable stream, was -sufficiently provocative of the enterprise of his antagonist. To increase -the peril of the isolated wing of the Federal army, a thunder-storm, -occurring on the night of the 29th of May, had so swollen the Chickahominy -as to render difficult the accession of reënforcements from the main body. - -Such was the situation which invited the Confederate commander to -undertake the destruction of the exposed column of his adversary--a -movement which, if successful, might have resulted in the rout of the -entire left wing of the enemy, opening a way to his rear, and securing his -utter overthrow. Seven Pines was an action, in which the color of victory -was entirely with the Confederates, but it was the least fruitful -engagement fought by the two armies in Virginia. There was no engagement -of the war in which the valor of the Confederate soldier was more -splendidly illustrated, though happily that quality then did not require -so conspicuous a test. However able in design, it was in execution a -signal failure--a series of loose, indefinite and disjointed movements, -wanting in coöperation, and apparently in able executive management. - -President Davis, in company with General Lee, was present during most of -the engagement. Frequently under fire, and in consultation with his -generals in exposed positions, he was conspicuous chiefly by his efforts -to animate the troops, and his presence was greeted with evidences of the -enthusiasm and confidence which it inspired. - -The battle of "Seven Pines," in itself barren of influence upon the -decision of the campaign, was nevertheless attended by an incident--the -painful and disabling wound received by General Johnston, in all -probability decisive of the future history of the Army of Northern -Virginia. Leading to an immediate and positive change of policy, it is -hardly a bold declaration that this incident determined the future of the -war in Virginia. - -A disposition has been freely indulged to influence the sentence of -history, by placing President Davis and General Johnston in a sort of -antithetical juxtaposition, as exponents of different theories as to the -proper conduct of the war by the South. In view of the failure of the -Confederacy, it has been ingeniously contended that the result vindicated -the wisdom of General Johnston's views. But besides its evident unfairness -to Mr. Davis, no criticism could be founded less upon the intrinsic merits -of the case. Overzealous and intemperate partisans generally evince -aptitude in the exaggeration of minor differences between the leaders, -whose interests they profess to have at heart. Such results are not -unfrequent in the lives of eminent public men. In the case of General -Beauregard, the unhappy effects of officious intermeddling and -misrepresentation, from such sources, between the President and that -distinguished officer, are especially notable. - -But the assumption that events have indicated the wisdom of General -Johnston's views, in their declared antagonism to those of Mr. Davis, is -altogether unsustained. The immediate results of a change of commanders, -and a consequent inauguration of a different policy[55]--a policy in -accordance with Mr. Davis' own views, may, with far more reason, be -alleged in support of a contrary theory. The vigorous and aggressive -policy adopted and executed by Lee not only accorded with the wishes of -the President, but fulfilled the long-deferred popular expectation, and -agreeably disappointed the public in Lee's capacity. For despite the -general disappointment at the absence of decisive achievements by the Army -of Northern Virginia, General Johnston commanded far more of public -confidence, than did General Lee at the period of the latter's accession -to command. - -Nothing could have been more disadvantageous to Lee, than the contrast so -freely indicated between himself and other officers. Johnston was -criticised merely because of the absence of brilliant and decisive -achievements. Lee was assumed to have proven his incompetency by egregious -failure. He was ridiculed as a closet general. His campaigns were said to -exist only on paper--to consist of slow methodical tactics, and incessant -industry with the spade, and he was pronounced totally deficient in -aggressive qualities. A prominent Richmond editor, criticising his -North-western Virginia campaign, asserted that the unvarying intelligence -from Lee was that he was "hopelessly stuck in the mud," and an officer was -heard to compare him to a terrapin, needing the application of a hot coal -to his back to compel him to action. But with the lapse of a fortnight -that army, which received the intelligence of Lee's appointment to command -with misgiving and distrust, began to experience renewed life and hope. It -was not the few additional brigades given to that army which so soon -started it upon its irresistible career of victory. A mighty hand -projected its impetus, and directed its magnificent valor against those -miles of intrenchments which it had seen grow more and more formidable, -itself meanwhile an inactive spectator. - -Lee found the army within sight of Richmond; he lifted it from the mud of -the Chickahominy, defeated an enemy intrenched and in superior force; -pursued the panting and disheartened fugitives to the shelter of their -shipping; defeated a second army--then both together--within hearing of -the Federal capital; fought an indecisive battle upon the enemy's soil, -and reëstablished the Confederate line upon the frontier. Is it a matter -of wonder that the President, the army, and the people recognized the -significance of these results, and applauded the substitution of the new -system and the new status for the old? A better explanation of so -pronounced a contrast is needed than that the "prejudice" or "injustice" -of Davis withheld from Johnston, five or even ten thousand men, which he -gave to Lee. - -Yet there could be no hypothesis more presumptuous, in view of the -abundant testimony of competent military judgment, and none more palpably -untenable, than that which would deny greatness as a soldier to Johnston. -As a consummate master of strategy, in that sense which contemplates the -movements of heavy masses, and looks to grand ultimate results, Johnston -has probably few equals. His sagacity in the divination of an enemy's -designs is remarkable; and if he be considered as having marked -deficiencies, they must be counted as a lack of Jackson's audacity, of -Lee's confident calculation and executive perfection. The South regards -Lee as beyond criticism. Jefferson Davis is accustomed to say "the world -has rarely produced a man to be compared with Lee." Yet in mere -intellectuality, it is at least questionable whether Johnston had his -superior among the Southern leaders. - -But it often happens that qualities, however great, are not those which -the occasion demands. That marvelous union of qualities in Lee, which has -placed him almost above parallel, probably made him alone adequate to the -hazardous posture of affairs at Richmond in the summer of 1862. The -result, at least, made evident to the world, the wisdom of the President, -in that choice, which was at first declared the undeserved reward of an -incompetent favorite. - -Whatever may be alleged to the contrary, President Davis at all times, to -the full extent of his power, aided General Johnston in the consummation -of his designs. To assert that, upon any occasion, he either interposed -obstacles to Johnston's success, or denied him any means in his power to -confer, is to question that personal fidelity of Jefferson Davis, which -his bitterest enemy should be ashamed to deny. Few Southern men, at least, -have yet attained that measure of malignity, or that hardihood of -mendacity. - -General Lee was not dilatory in his preparations to gratify that longing -aspiration which the President, on his own behalf, and in the name of the -country, briefly expressed, that "something should be done." Lee had a -_carte blanche_, but frequent and anxious were the consultations between -the President and himself. The world now knows what followed those days -and nights of anxious conference, in which were weighed the chances of -success, the cost of victory, and the possibilities of defeat. The plan -executed by General Lee was one of the most hazardous ever attempted in -war, but it was not less brilliant than bold, and at least one precedent -had been furnished by the great master of the art of war at Austerlitz. -Its perils were obvious, but the sublime confidence of Lee in the success -of his combinations went far to secure its own justification. - -During the week of engagements which followed, the President was -constantly with the army and fully advised of its movements.[56] The -cordial recognition of this advisory relation between himself and Lee, is -indicated by the natural pride, and becoming sense of justice, with which -the latter, in the report of his operations against McClellan, mentions -the approving presence of the President, during the execution of his -plans. This noble harmony between Davis and Lee, equally creditable to -each, was never interrupted by one single moment of discord. It was never -marred by dictation on one side, or complaint on the other. Unlike other -commanders, Lee never complained of want of means, or of opportunity for -the execution of his plans. Satisfied that the Government was extending -all the aid in its power, he used, to the best advantage, the means at -hand and created his opportunities. Lee never charged the President with -improper interference with the army, but freely counseled with his -constitutional commander-in-chief, whom he knew to be worthy of the trust -conferred by the country in the control of its armies. President Davis -fully comprehended and respected the jealous functions of military -command, and in the exercise of that trust no one would have more quickly -resented unauthorized official interference. A soldier himself, he -recognized freedom of action as the privilege of the commander; as a -statesman, he rendered that cordial coöperation, which is the duty of -government. - -When Lee had driven McClellan from his position along the Chickahominy, he -had raised the siege of Richmond. The retreat of McClellan to the James -River, conducted with such admirable skill, and aided by good fortune, -placed the Federal army in a position where, secure itself, another -offensive movement against the Confederate capital might, in time, be -undertaken. Confederate strategy, however, soon relieved Richmond from the -apprehension of attack, and in less than two months from the termination -of the pursuit of McClellan, Lee, by a series of masterly strokes, -demolished the armies under Pope, united for the defense of Washington, -and was preparing an invasion of Maryland. - -An almost magical change in the fortunes of the Confederacy was wrought by -these active and brilliant operations, embracing so short a period, and -marked by results of such magnitude. - -Not only were the two main armies of the enemy defeated, but the entire -Federal campaign in the East had been entirely disconcerted. Richmond was -saved, Washington menaced, and McClellan forced back to the initial point -of his campaign. Western Virginia, the Carolina coast, and other -localities, for months past in Federal occupation, were almost divested of -troops to swell the hosts gathering for the rescue of Washington, and to -meet the dreaded advance, northward, of Lee's invincible columns. From the -heart of Virginia the cloud of war was again lifted to the Potomac -frontier; the munificent harvests of the valley counties, of Fauquier, -Loudon, and the fertile contiguous territory, were again in Confederate -possession, and a numerous and victorious army was now anxious to be led -across the Rubicon of the warring sections. - -From harrowing apprehension, from vague dread of indefinable but imminent -peril, the South was transported to the highest round of confident -expectation. The North, which, in the last days of June, eagerly awaited -intelligence of McClellan's capture of Richmond, now regarded its own -capital as doomed, and did not permit itself to breathe freely until -McClellan announced the _safety of Pennsylvania_, when Lee had retired to -Virginia. - -The inducements which invited a movement of the Confederate forces across -the Potomac were manifold. Whatever judgment the result may now suggest, -the invasion of Maryland was alike dictated by sound military policy and -justified by those moral considerations which are ever weighty in war. The -overwhelming defeat of Pope more than realized the hope of President Davis -and General Lee, when the strategic design of a movement northward was put -in execution, by which was sought the double purpose of withdrawing -McClellan from James River and effectually checking the advance of Pope. -The successive and decisive defeats of Pope offered the prospect of an -offensive by which the splendid successes of the campaign might be crowned -with even more valuable achievements. Demoralized, disheartened, in every -way disqualified for effectual resistance, the remnants of the armies -which Lee had beaten, each in succession, and then combined, would be an -easy prey to his victorious legions, could they be brought to a decisive -field engagement. There yet remained time, before the end of the season of -active operations, for crushing blows at the enemy, which would finish the -work thus far triumphantly successful. - -To inflict still greater damage upon the enemy--to so occupy him upon the -frontier as to prevent another demonstration against Richmond during the -present year--to indicate friendship and sympathy for the oppressed people -of Maryland--to derive such aid from them as their condition would enable -them to extend, were the potent inducements inviting the approbation of -the Confederate authorities to a movement across the Potomac. President -Davis was pledged to an invasion of the enemy's country whenever it should -prove practicable. Now, if ever, that policy was to be initiated. Hitherto -the enemy's power, not the will of the Confederate Government, had -prevented. Now that power was shattered. The mighty fabric trembled to its -base, and who would now venture to estimate the consequences of a -brilliant victory by Lee, on Maryland soil, in September, 1862? What -supporter of the Union can now dwell, without a shudder, upon the -imagination, even, of a repetition, at Antietam, of the story of the -Chickahominy, or Second Manassas? - -The climax of the Maryland campaign was the battle of Antietam--a drawn -battle, but followed by the early withdrawal of the Confederate army into -Virginia. It is unnecessary to dwell upon the causes conspiring to give -this portion of the campaign many of the features of failure. With a force -greatly reduced by the straggling of his weary and exhausted troops, Lee -was unable to administer the crushing blow which he had hoped to -deliver.[57] As a consequence, the people of Maryland, of whom a large -majority were thoroughly patriotic and warm in their Southern sympathies, -were not encouraged to make that effective demonstration which would -inevitably have followed a defeat of McClellan. - -Nevertheless, there was some compensation in the terrible punishment -inflicted upon the enemy at Antietam; and there was the heightened -prestige, so greatly valued by the South at this period, in the eyes of -Europe, arising from the temper and capacity of the weaker combatant to -undertake so bold an enterprise. In the tangible evidences of success -afforded by the capture of Harper's Ferry, with its numerous garrison -supplies of arms and military stores, was seen additional compensation for -the abandonment of the scheme of invasion. - -An interval of repose was permitted the Army of Northern Virginia, after -its return from Maryland, in its encampments near Winchester, during which -it was actively strengthened and recruited to the point of adequate -preparation for expected demonstrations of the enemy. - -The operations of the Western army, in many respects, were a brilliant -counterpart to the campaign in Virginia, though lacking its brilliant -fruits. We have mentioned the circumstance which placed General Braxton -Bragg in command of the Western army, after its successful evacuation of -Corinth. General Bragg was equally high in the confidence of the President -and the Southern people. Greatly distinguished by his services in Mexico, -his skillful handling, at Shiloh, of the magnificent corps of troops, -which his discipline had made a model of efficiency, more than confirmed -his Mexican fame. - -Space does not permit us to follow, in detail, the execution of the able -and comprehensive strategy, by which General Bragg relieved large sections -of Tennessee and Alabama from the presence of the enemy, penetrated the -heart of Kentucky, maintained an active offensive during the summer, and -transferred the seat of war to the Federal frontier. A part of these -operations was the hurried retreat of Buell's immense army, from its posts -in Alabama and Tennessee, for the defense of Louisville and Cincinnati; -large captures of prisoners, horses, arms and military stores; and the -brilliant progress and successive victories of Kirby Smith and Morgan. For -weeks the situation in Kentucky seemed to promise the unqualified success -of the entire Western campaign. There was, indeed, reasonable hope of a -permanent occupation of the larger portion of Kentucky and Tennessee by -the Confederate forces. - -But the battle of Perryville--an engagement not unlike Antietam in its -doubtful claim as a Federal victory--was followed by the retreat of -General Bragg, which was executed with skill, and with results going far -to relieve the disappointment of the popular hope of a permanent -occupation of Kentucky. Buell, on his arrival at Louisville, whither he -had retreated, received heavy reënforcements, which greatly increased his -already superior numbers; and Perryville, a battle which General Bragg -fought, rather to secure his retreat than with the expectation of a -decisive victory, would have been an overwhelming Confederate success, had -Bragg been sufficiently strong to follow up his advantage. - -No Confederate commander, save Lee and Jackson, was ever able to present a -claim of a successful campaign so well grounded as the Kentucky campaign -of Bragg. With a force of forty thousand men, he killed, wounded, and -captured more than twenty thousand of the enemy; took thirty pieces of -artillery, thousands of small arms; a large supply of wagons, harness, and -horses; and an immense amount of subsistence, ample not only for the -support of his own army, but of other forces of the Confederacy. During -the succeeding autumn and winter, Bragg's army was conspicuous for its -superior organization, admirable condition and tone; was abundantly -supplied with food and clothing, and in larger numbers than when it -started upon its campaign in August. Moreover, General Bragg redeemed -North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, and recovered possession of Cumberland -Gap, the doorway, through the mountains, to Knoxville and the Virginia and -Tennessee Railroad--the main avenue from Richmond to the heart of the -Confederacy. Evincing his determination to hold the recovered territory, -General Bragg, within a month from his return from Kentucky, was -confronting the principal army of the enemy, in the West, before -Nashville. - -Incidental to the movement of Bragg into Kentucky, and constituting a part -of the programme, attempted upon the large theatre of the Western -campaign, were the repulse of the first attack of the enemy upon -Vicksburg, the partial failure of General Breckinridge's expedition to -Baton Rouge, and the serious reverse sustained by Van Dorn at Corinth. In -connection with the more important demonstration into Kentucky, these -incidents of the Western campaign may be briefly aggregated as the -recovery of the country between Nashville and Chattanooga, and the -important advantage of a secure occupation of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, -thus closing the Mississippi to the enemy for two hundred miles. - -Subsequent operations in Virginia, at the close of 1862, were entirely -favorable to the Confederacy. While the two armies were confronting each -other, with the imminent prospect of active and important operations, -General McClellan was relieved, and one of his corps commanders, General -Burnside, assigned to the command of the Federal army of the Potomac. As -is now universally acknowledged, General McClellan was sacrificed to the -clamor of a political faction. By this act Mr. Lincoln became responsible -for much of the ill-fortune which awaited the Federal arms in Virginia. - -Perhaps among his countrymen, a Southern tribute to General McClellan may -constitute but feeble praise. He was unquestionably the ablest and most -accomplished soldier exhibited by the war on the Northern side. "Had there -been no McClellan," General Meade is reported to have said, "there would -have been no Grant." In retirement, if not exile, General McClellan saw -the armies which his genius created, achieve undeserved distinction for -men, his inferiors in all that constitutes true generalship. He saw the -feeble and wasted remnant of an army, with which he had grappled in the -day of its glory and strength, surrender to a multitudinous host, doubly -as large as the army with which he had given Lee his first check at -Antietam. A true soldier, McClellan was also a true gentleman, an enemy -whose talents the South respects none the less, because he did not -wantonly ravage its homes, nor make war upon the helpless, the aged, and -infirm. President Davis, who, while Federal Secretary of War, conferred -upon McClellan a special distinction, held his genius and attainments in -high estimation. He received the intelligence of his removal with profound -satisfaction. - -The North was not required to wait long for a competent test of the new -commander's capacity. Foiled and deceived by Lee, in a series of -maneuvres, the results of which made him only less ridiculous than the -gasconading Pope among Federal commanders, Burnside finally assailed Lee, -on the 13th December, at Fredericksburg. The result was a bloody -slaughter, unequaled in previous annals of the war, an overwhelming -repulse, and a demoralized retreat across the Rappahannock. - -The Western campaign terminated with the battle of Murfreesboro'. The -Federal commander, Rosecrans, the successor of Buell, advanced from -Nashville to drive Bragg from his position. A brilliant and vigorous -attack by Bragg, on the 31st December, routed an entire wing of the -Federal army; on the second day the action was more favorable to -Rosecrans, who had retreated, after his reverse on the first day, to -stronger positions. Receiving information that the enemy was strongly -reënforcing, General Bragg fell back to Tullahoma, a position more -favorable for strategic and defensive purposes. - -The transfer, after the battle of Shiloh, of the troops of Price and Van -Dorn to the army east of the Mississippi, had almost divested the -Trans-Mississippi Department of interest in the public mind. After Elk -Horn, there was but one considerable engagement, in 1862, west of the -Mississippi. This was the battle of Prairie Grove, a fruitless victory, -won by General Hindman, about the middle of December. The country north of -the Arkansas River continued to be nominally held by the Federal forces. - -Thus, in nearly every quarter, the second year of the war terminated with -events favorable to the prospects of Southern independence. Though the -territorial jurisdiction of the Confederacy was contracted, the world was -not far from regarding the task of subjugation as already a demonstrated -and hopeless failure. All the invasive campaigns of the enemy, save the -first shock of his overwhelming onsets against weak and untenable posts, -in the winter and early spring, had been brought to grief, and nowhere had -he maintained himself away from his water facilities. An unexampled -prestige among nations now belonged to the infant power, which had carried -its arms from the Tennessee to the Ohio, had achieved a week of victories -before its own capital, and carried the war back to its threshold. After -such achievements the Southern Confederacy rightly claimed from those -powers which have assumed to be the arbiters of international right an -instant recognition upon the list of declared and established -nationalities. - -In our brief and cursory glance at military operations, we have omitted to -mention the action of the Government designed to promote the successful -prosecution of the war. This action is mainly comprehended by the various -suggestions of the President's messages to Congress. These recommendations -related chiefly to measures having in view the increased efficiency of the -service. He invited the attention of Congress, especially, to the -necessity of measures securing the proper execution of the conscription -law, and the consolidation of companies, battalions and regiments, when so -reduced in strength as to impair that uniformity of organization, which -was necessary in the army. Legislation was urged, having in view a better -control of military transportation on the railroads, and the improvement -of their defective condition. The President also recommended various -propositions relating to organization of the army, and an extension of the -provisions of the conscription law, embracing persons between the ages of -thirty-five and forty-five years. - -About the middle of December President Davis visited the camps of the -Western Department, spending several weeks in obtaining information as to -the condition and wants of that section of the Confederacy, and devising -expedients for a more successful defense in a quarter where the -Confederate cause was always seriously menaced. His presence was highly -beneficial in allaying popular distrust, founded upon the supposition that -Virginia and the Atlantic region engrossed the attention of the Government -to the exclusion of concern for the West and the Mississippi Valley. When -the President returned to Richmond, there were signs of popular animation -in the South-west, which justified a more confident hope of the cause, -than the South was permitted to indulge at any other period of the -struggle. - -An incident of this visit was the address of the President before the -Mississippi Legislature. The warm affection of Mr. Davis for Mississippi -is more than reciprocated by the noble and chivalrous people of that -State. He was always proud of the confidence reposed in him by such a -community, and Mississippi can never abate her affection for one who so -illustrated her name in the council chamber and upon the field of battle. -In this address he alluded, with much tenderness, to this reciprocal -attachment, declaring, that though "as President of the Confederate -States, he had determined to make no distinction between the various parts -of the country--to know no separate State--yet his heart always beat more -warmly for Mississippi, and he had looked on Mississippi soldiers with a -pride and emotion, such as no others inspired." - -Declaring that his course had been dictated by the sincere purpose of -promoting the cause of independence, he admonished the country to prepare -for a desperate contest, with a power armed for the purposes of conquest -and subjugation. He characterized severely the conduct of the war by the -North. Reviewing its progress, and recounting the immense disadvantages, -with which the South contended, he maintained that the South should -congratulate itself on its achievements, and not complain that more had -not been accomplished. The conscription law was explained and defended as -to many of its features not clearly understood by the people. We give an -extract from Mr. Davis' remarks as to the Confederate conscription, a -subject of vast misrepresentation during the war, and of much ignorant -censure since: - - "I am told that this act has excited some discontentment, and that it - has provoked censure far more severe, I believe, than it deserves. It - has been said that it exempts the rich from military service, and - forces the poor to fight the battles of the country. The poor do, - indeed, fight the battles of the country. It is the poor who save - nations and make revolutions. But is it true that, in this war, the - men of property have shrunk from the ordeal of the battle-field? Look - through the army; cast your eyes upon the maimed heroes of the war - whom you meet in your streets and in the hospitals; remember the - martyrs of the conflict; and I am sure you will find among them more - than a fair proportion drawn from the ranks of men of property. The - object of that portion of the act which exempts those having charge of - twenty or more negroes, was not to draw any distinction of classes, - but simply to provide a force, in the nature of a police force, - sufficient to keep our negroes in control. This was the sole object of - the clause. Had it been otherwise, it would never have received my - signature. As I have already said, we have no cause to complain of the - rich. All our people have done well; and, while the poor have nobly - discharged their duties, most of the wealthiest and most distinguished - families of the South have representatives in the ranks. I take, as an - example, the case of one of your own representatives in Congress, who - was nominated for Congress and elected, but still did a sentinel's - duty until Congress met. Nor is this a solitary instance, for men of - largest fortune in Mississippi are now serving in the ranks." - -The President strongly and eloquently recommended the provision by the -Legislature for the families of the absent soldiers of Mississippi. Said -he: "Let this provision be made for the objects of his affection and his -solicitude, and the soldier, engaged in fighting the battles of his -country, will no longer be disturbed in his slumbers by dreams of an -unprotected and neglected family at home. Let him know that his mother -Mississippi has spread her protecting mantle over those he loves, and he -will be ready to fight your battles, to protect your honor, and in your -cause to die." - -The address concluded with an earnest appeal for unrelaxed exertion, and -the declaration that, "in all respects, moral as well as physical, the -Confederacy was better prepared than it was a year previous"--a -declaration verified not less by the favorable situation than by the -evident apprehension of the North and the expectations of Europe. - - - - -CHAPTER XIV. - - RESPECT OF MANKIND FOR THE SOUTH--THE MOST PROSPEROUS PERIOD OF THE - WAR--HOW MR. DAVIS CONTRIBUTED TO THE DISTINCTION OF THE SOUTH-- - FACTION SILENCED--THE EUROPEAN ESTIMATE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS--HOW HE - DIGNIFIED THE CAUSE OF THE SOUTH--HIS STATE PAPERS--HIS ADMINISTRATION - OF CIVIL MATTERS--THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS--MR. DAVIS' - OBSERVANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS--ARBITRARY ADMINISTRATION OF - MR. LINCOLN--MR. DAVIS' MODERATION--HE SEEKS TO CONDUCT THE WAR UPON - CIVILIZED IDEAS--AN ENGLISH CHARACTERIZATION OF DAVIS--COLONEL - FREEMANTLE'S INTERVIEW WITH HIM--MR. GLADSTONE'S OPINION--THE PURELY - PERSONAL AND SENTIMENTAL ADMIRATION OF EUROPE FOR THE SOUTH-- - INCONSISTENT CONDUCT OF THE EUROPEAN GREAT POWERS--THE LONDON "TIMES" - BEFORE M'CLELLAN'S DEFEAT--THE CONFEDERACY ENTITLED TO RECOGNITION BY - EUROPE--ENGLAND'S SYMPATHY WITH THE NORTH--DIGNIFIED ATTITUDE OF - PRESIDENT DAVIS UPON THE SUBJECT OF RECOGNITION--HIS EARLY PREDICTION - UPON THE SUBJECT--FRANCE AND ENGLAND EXPOSED TO INJURIOUS SUSPICIONS-- - TERGIVERSATIONS OF THE PALMERSTON CABINET--THE BROAD FARCE OF "BRITISH - NEUTRALITY"--ENGLAND DECLINES TO UNITE WITH FRANCE IN AN OFFER OF - MEDIATION BETWEEN THE AMERICAN BELLIGERENTS--ENGLAND'S "POLICY"--SHE - SOUGHT THE RUIN OF BOTH SECTIONS OF AMERICA--CULMINATION OF THE - ANTISLAVERY POLICY OF THE NORTH--MR. LINCOLN'S CONVERSATION WITH A - KENTUCKY MEMBER OF CONGRESS--THE WAR A "CRIME" BY MR. LINCOLN'S OWN - SHOWING--VIOLATION OF PLEDGES AND ARBITRARY ACTS OF THE FEDERAL - GOVERNMENT--THE MASK REMOVED AFTER THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM--THE REAL - PURPOSE OF EMANCIPATION--MR. DAVIS' ALLUSION TO THE SUBJECT-- - INDIGNATION OF THE SOUTH AT THE MEASURE--MILITARY OPERATIONS IN TEXAS - AND MISSISSIPPI--VICKSBURG--PORT HUDSON--LOSS OF ARKANSAS POST-- - FEDERAL FLEET REPULSED AT CHARLESTON--PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN-- - UNITY AND CONFIDENCE OF THE SOUTH--MR. DAVIS' ADDRESS TO THE - COUNTRY--IMPORTANT EXTRACTS--GENERAL LEE PREPARES FOR BATTLE--HIS - CONFIDENCE--CONDITION OF HIS ARMY--BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE-- - JEFFERSON DAVIS' TRIBUTE TO STONEWALL JACKSON. - - -There is much justice in the sentiment that declares that there can be -magnificence even in failure. Men often turn to the contemplation of -rôles enacted in history, ending in disaster and utter disappointment of -the originating and vitalizing aspiration, with far more of interest than -has been felt in following records marked by the palpable tokens of -complete success. - -It may well be doubted, whether the Confederate States of America, even -had victory crowned their prolonged struggle of superhuman valor and -unstinted sacrifice, could have commanded more of the esteem of mankind, -than will be awarded them in the years to come. Retrospect of the most -prosperous period of the fortunes of the Confederacy--the interval between -the battle of Fredericksburg, December, 1862, and the ensuing -midsummer--reveals a period in which there was wanting no element of -glory, of pride, or of hope. Many a people, now proudly boasting an -honored recognition at the council-board of nations, might envy the fame -of the meteor power which flashed across the firmament, with a glorious -radiance that made more mournful its final extinguishment. - -A notable feature of the distinction which the South, at that time -especially, commanded in the eyes of the world, was the enthusiastic and -universal tribute of mankind to the leader, whose genius, purity, dignity, -and eloquence so adorned the cause of his country. The North sought to -console its wounded national pride by accounting for the crushing and -humiliating defeats of the recent campaign, by contrasts between the able -leadership of its antagonist, and its own imbecile administration. At the -South faction was silenced, in the presence of the wondrous results -achieved in spite of its own outcries and prophecies of failure. -Demagogues, in such a season of good fortune, ceased their charges of -narrowness, of rash zealotry, of favoritism, of incompetency, seemingly -conscious, for once, of the praise which they bestowed upon the -Executive, whom they accused of usurping all the authority of the -Government, in ascribing such results to his unaided capacity. - -From Europe, in the beginning, so prejudiced against the South and its -cause, so misinformed of Southern motives, and unacquainted with Southern -history, came the tribute of disinterested eulogy, the more to be valued, -because reluctantly accorded, to the Confederacy and its ruler. To Europe -the South was now known not only through a series of unparalleled -victories; as a people who had successfully asserted their independence -for nearly two years, against such odds as had never been seen before; as -a land of valiant soldiers, of great generals, and of large material -resources. If possible, above these, the statesmen and politicians of -Europe admired the administrative capacity, which, they declared, had -given a superior model and a new dignity to the science of statesmanship. -To the educated circles of Europe the new power was introduced by State -papers, which were declared to be models, not less of skilled political -narration and exposition, than of literary purity and excellence. -Accustomed to hear the South twitted as a people dwarfed and debased by -the demoralization of African slavery, the educated classes of England -acknowledged the surprise and delight they experienced from the powerful -and splendid vindications of the cause of the Confederacy, in the messages -of Mr. Davis. It has been truthfully remarked that there could be no -better history of the war than that contained in his numerous state -papers. They are the exhaustive summary, and unanswerable statement of the -imperishable truths which justify the South, and overwhelm her enemies -with the proof of their own acts of wrong and violence. - -Under the new light given to mankind, as to the origin, nature, and -purposes of the American Union, which Mr. Davis so lucidly explained, -Europe soon recognized his position as something else than that of a ruler -of an insurgent district. But not only as the chosen Executive of eleven -separate communities, several of which European governments had previously -recognized as sovereign; as one who had organized great armies, maintained -them in the field, and selected leaders for their command already -illustrious in the annals of war; not for these and other features of -enduring fame, alone, was Jefferson Davis admired in Europe. The contrast -between the civil administrations of the hostile sections was viewed as, -perhaps, the chiefly remarkable phase of the struggle. - -President Lincoln, beginning the war with usurpation, had committed, in -its progress, every possible trespass upon the Federal Constitution, and -was now under the influence of a faction whose every aim contemplated the -overthrow of that instrument. President Davis, supported by a confiding -people, and an overwhelming majority of every Southern community, ruled in -strict conformity with the laws of the land and its Constitution. In the -midst of a revolution, unexampled in magnitude, in fierceness, and -vindictiveness on the part of the enemy, and of difficulties in his own -administration, he furnished an example of courage, humanity, and -magnanimity, together with the observance of order, civil freedom, and -legal and constitutional restraints unexampled in history. In the -Confederacy, the Roman maxim, _Inter arma silent leges_, universally -recognized and practiced among nations, had an emphatic repudiation, so -far as concerned the exercise of power by the executive department. -Whatever may have been the exceptional cases of unauthorized oppression or -violence, there was always redress in the judiciary department of the -Government, which continued in pure and dignified existence until the end. - -The President, obeying the dictates of exalted patriotism--acting always -for the public good, if not always with unimpeachable wisdom, at least -with incorruptible integrity--made no attempt at improper interference -with Congress, nor sought to exercise undue influence over its -deliberations. The press, usually the first bulwark of the public -liberties to attract the exercise of despotism, so trammeled at the North, -was free in the South every-where; in some instances, to the extent of -licentiousness, and to the positive injury of the cause. - -In marked contrast with these exhibitions were the evidences of coming -despotism at the North. The Federal judiciary was rapidly declining from -its exalted purity, before the exactions of military power; the Federal -Congress was charged by the press with open and notorious corruption, and -was aiding Mr. Lincoln in usurpations which startled the despotisms of -Europe, and have since led to the annihilation of the republican character -of the Government. - -Conspicuous, too, was the desire of Mr. Davis to conduct the war upon a -civilized and Christian basis. His forbearance, his moderation, and stern -refusal to resort to retaliation, under circumstances such as would have -justified its exercise in response to the cruelties and outrages of the -enemy, amazed the European spectator, and at times dissatisfied his own -countrymen. "Retaliation is not justice," was his habitual reply to urgent -demands, and again and again did he decline to "shed one drop of blood -except on the field of battle." Never forgetting the dignity of the -contest, he, up to the last moment of his authority, redeemed the pledge -which he had made in the first weeks of the war: "to smite the smiter -with manly arms, as did our fathers before us." - -There have been few spectacles presented to the admiring gaze of mankind, -more worthily depicted than that union of capacities and virtues in -Jefferson Davis, which so eminently qualified him, in the opinion of -foreigners, for the position he held. An English writer has eloquently -sketched him as "one of the world's foremost men, admired as a statesman, -respected as an earnest Christian, the Washington of another generation of -the same race. A resolute statesman, calm, dignified, swaying with -commanding intellect the able men that surrounded him; eloquent as a -speaker, and as a writer giving state papers to the world which are among -the finest compositions in our time; of warm domestic affections in his -inner life, and strong religious convictions; held up by vigor of the -spirit that nerved an exhausted and feeble frame--such was the chosen -constitutional ruler of one-fourth of the American people." - -Colonel Freemantle, a distinguished English officer, whose faithful and -impartial narrative of his extended observations of the American war, -commended him to the esteem of both parties, thus concludes an account of -an interview with President Davis, in the spring of 1863: - - "During my travels many people have remarked to me that Jefferson - Davis seems, in a peculiar manner, adapted to his office. His military - education at West Point rendered him intimately acquainted with the - higher officers of the army; and his post of Secretary of War, under - the old Government, brought officers of all ranks under his immediate - personal knowledge and supervision. No man could have formed a more - accurate estimate of their respective merits. This is one of the - reasons which gave the Confederates such an immense start in the way - of generals; for, having formed his opinion with regard to appointing - an officer, Mr. Davis is always most determined to carry out his - intention in spite of every obstacle. His services in the Mexican war - gave him the prestige of a brave man and a good soldier. His services - as a statesman pointed him out as the only man who, by his unflinching - determination and administrative talent, was able to control the - popular will. People speak of any misfortune happening to him as an - irreparable evil too dreadful to contemplate." - -Mr. Gladstone, a member of the British cabinet, the eminent leader of a -party in English politics, and a sympathizer with the objects of the war -as waged by the North, avowed his enthusiastic appreciation of the lustre -reflected upon the new Government, by its able administration, in the -assertion that "Mr. Jefferson Davis had created a nation." - -But the admiration of Europe was to prove a mere sentiment, unaccompanied -by any practical demonstration of sympathy. In view of the course so -persistently adhered to by the great powers of Europe, it is curious to -note the purely sentimental and personal character of their professed -sympathy for the South. The earliest expression of foreign opinion -indicated a reluctant recognition of the valor and devotion of a people, -from whom they had not expected the exhibition of such qualities. When, by -the protraction of the struggle, the brilliant feats of arms executed by -the Southern armies, the indomitable resolution of the South, and its -evident purpose to encounter every possible sacrifice for sake of -independence, there was no longer ground for misapprehension, they still -disregarded all the precedents and principles which had governed their -course respecting new nationalities. - -Applauding the valor of the Southern soldiery, the heroism, endurance, and -self-denial of a people whom they repeatedly declared to have already -established their invincibility; rapturous in their panegyrics upon the -genius, zeal, and Christian virtues of the Confederate leaders; they never -interposed their boasted potentiality in behalf of justice, right, and -humanity. English writers were eloquent in acknowledgment of the -additional distinction conferred upon Anglo-Saxon statesmanship and -literature by Davis; diligent in tracing the honorable English lineage of -Lee, and establishing the consanguinity of Jackson; but English statesmen -persistently disregarded those elevated considerations of humanity and -philanthropy, which they have so much vaunted as prompting their -intercourse with nations. Confessing a new enlightenment from the -expositions of Mr. Davis, and from diligent inquiry into the nature of the -Federal Government, Europe soon avowed its convictions in favor of the -legal and constitutional right of secession asserted by the South. It -declared that it but awaited the exhibition of that earnestness of -purpose, and that capacity for resistance, which should establish the -"force and consistency" which are the requisite conditions of recognized -nationality. - -The London _Times_, while the army of McClellan was still investing -Richmond, used language which the North and the South accepted as -significant and prophetic. Said the _Times_: - - "It can not be doubted that we are approaching a time when a more - important question even than that of an offer of mediation may have to - be considered by England and France. _The Southern Confederacy has - constituted itself a nation for nearly a year and a half._ During that - time the attachment of the people to the now Government has been - indubitably shown; immense armies have been raised; the greatest - sacrifices have been endured; the persistence of the South in the war, - through a long series of battles--some victories, some defeats--has - shown the 'force and consistency' which are looked upon as tests of - nationality. Wherever the Government is unmolested, the laws are - administered regularly as in time of peace; and wherever the Federals - have penetrated, they are received with an animosity which they - resent, as at New Orleans, by a military rule of intolerable - brutality. The vision of a Union party in the South has been - dispelled, as the Northerners themselves are compelled, with - bitterness and mortification, to admit. - - "All these circumstances point but to one conclusion: Either this war - must be brought to an end, or the time will at last come when the - South may claim its own recognition by foreign nations as an - independent power. The precedents of the American colonies, of the - Spanish colonies, of Belgium, and of Tuscany, and of Naples the other - day, forbid us to question this right when asserted by the Confederate - States. It is our duty _to anticipate_ this possible event, and it may - be wise, as well as generous, for statesmen on this side of the ocean - to approach the American Government in a friendly spirit, with the - offer of their good offices, at this great crisis of its fortunes." - -If such a statement of the question was just and truthful, when a numerous -and confident army, under a leader of proven skill, was engaged in close -siege of the capital of the Confederacy, how much more unanswerable were -its conclusions when McClellan was defeated? What were the evidences of -"force and consistency" demanded after the combined armies of McClellan -and Pope were hurled back upon the Potomac; after Bragg had forced Buell -to the Ohio; and when Fredericksburg had crowned six months of success -with a victory that inevitably imposed a defensive attitude upon the North -during the entire winter? - -When Chancellorsville inflicted a defeat, the most decisive and -humiliating of the war, upon the North, there was indeed no longer even a -pretext, by which could be disguised the evident purpose of England not to -interfere in behalf of a cause with which she had no sympathy, whatever -her constrained respect for its champions and defenders. The loss of -Vicksburg and Gettysburg in the ensuing summer, so productive of distrust -in Europe of the Confederate cause, was quickly followed by developments -which dispelled nearly all remaining hope of that recognition which it was -equally the right of the Confederacy to hope, and the duty of Europe to -render. - -The attitude of the Confederate Government, in its relations with European -governments, was ever one of imposing dignity. President Davis contented -himself with calm and statesman-like presentation of the claims of the -cause which he represented. His unanswerable exposition of the position of -the Confederacy, and lucid discussions of international jurisprudence, -never took the semblance of supplication, and were accompanied by -dignified remonstrance, even, only when it became evident that the -Confederacy was excluded from the benefits of that policy which the laws -of nations and every precedent demanded. Hope of foreign assistance -unquestionably constituted a large share of that confidence of success -which, until the later stages of the war, continued to animate the South. -Her people hoped for foreign aid in some shape, because they were -confident of their ability to demonstrate their _right_ to it; and they -_expected_ it only when they _had_ demonstrated that right. But never was -there any abatement or relaxation of effort by the Confederate Government -because of this just right and expectation. In the midst of the most -cheering events, and when recognition appeared certain, President Davis -declared his conviction of the necessity of such effort as should secure -independence without aid from any quarter. In his address to the -Mississippi Legislature, December, 1862, from which we have already -quoted, he said: - - "In the course of this war our eyes have been often turned abroad. We - have expected sometimes recognition and sometimes intervention at the - hands of foreign nations, and we had a right to expect it. Never - before, in the history of the world, had a people so long a time - maintained their ground, and showed themselves capable of maintaining - their national existence, without securing the recognition of - commercial nations. I know not why this has been so, but this I say, - 'Put not your trust in princes,' and rest not your hopes on foreign - nations. This war is ours; we must fight it out ourselves; and I feel - some pride in knowing that, so far, we have done it without the - good-will of any body." - -It seems, indeed, difficult to explain the course of Europe, especially of -England and France, in the American war, upon any hypothesis consistent -with either courage, humanity, or the usages of nations. Delay, caution, -and attendance upon results were becoming in the beginning; but, after the -defeat of McClellan upon the Chickahominy, and, still more, at the close -of operations in 1862, they were no longer exacted by moral obligation or -international comity. Having all the attributes of an independent power--a -power at war with a neighbor, assailed by its armies, blockaded by its -fleets, as had been numerous other independent powers--there was nothing -whatever anomalous in the situation of the Confederate States forbidding -the practice of plain justice towards them. Recognition was not only -warranted by the facts of the case, but by immemorial usage in Europe, -especially by the apposite precedent of the separation of Belgium from -Holland. The existence of slavery in the South, even though sanctioned by -law and the religious convictions of her people, is an altogether -insufficient explanation of a policy which has exposed the European great -powers to the suspicion of having been actuated by the most unworthy -motives. - -Especially does the course of England seem indefensible towards a people, -with whom the war developed so much of common instinct, so many appeals of -sympathy and evidences of identity with herself--a people whose ancestors -were the uncompromising enemies of regicides, and had maintained their -loyalty to the crown of England in spite of the power and threats of -Cromwell, whose Puritan dominion New England acknowledged. - -The injustice of England did not end with her refusal of recognition. In -the beginning she promptly proclaimed "strict neutrality," and her Premier -declared the Confederates "belligerents." This phrase, apparently a just -concession of the declared independence of the South, was gratefully -acknowledged by a struggling people, and evoked the fierce indignation of -the North. It was, however, designedly ambiguous, and to be interpreted, -philologically and practically, as the prospects of the controversy or the -wishes of the Palmerston cabinet might dictate. The English cabinet did -not necessarily mean a recognition of a divided sovereignty, justifying -suspension of relations with both sections, until the question of -sovereignty should be settled. The phrase "belligerents" was subsequently -declared to mean, merely, that the "two sections were at war"--a fact -which the participants felt to have already had ocular demonstration. -Meanwhile, relations between London and Washington were not interrupted, -and commercial intercourse continued as before. But England not only -ignored the South, and denied the Confederate commissioners a formal and -official audience--her vessels respected the Federal blockade, while -Confederate vessels were warned from her coasts. Such is only a limited -statement of features which made "English neutrality" the broadest farce -and severest irony of the age.[58] - -Early in 1863, or late in 1862, the Emperor Napoleon proposed to England -to join France and other powers in a joint mediation, to suggest an -armistice and a conference. This humane proposition England refused, -declining to take any step which might aid pacification, and thus did both -North and South finally comprehend what was meant by the "duty and policy" -of that power, which had so industriously propagated American dissensions -for her own aggrandizement. An editorial in the Richmond _Enquirer_, -written, probably, by John Mitchel, pithily described the motives of -England in the remark: "In short, the North is not yet bankrupt enough, -the South not yet desolated enough, to suit the 'policy' of England." -France saved her reputation, upon the score of humanity and justice, by -evincing at least a right disposition, though it is difficult to reconcile -her continued dalliance upon England, respecting the American question, -with that bold policy, which usually characterizes the great master of -European diplomacy. France had, however, less of interest and of -expectation than England, from the dissolution of the Union; less motive -for desiring its downfall, and the exhaustion of both combatants. - -Such, however, was the policy, adhered to by England and France, in -defiance of legal and moral obligation, and to the mortal injury of the -South, in her brave and defiant struggle with that power, which history -may yet declare, the "great powers" of Europe dared not defy. - -An interesting phase of the war, in the beginning of 1863, was the -culmination of the policy of the Federal Government respecting the subject -of slavery. A brief space will suffice to exhibit a record of violated -pledges, of constitutional infractions, and abuse of power by the Federal -Government, altogether unexampled in a war to be hereafter noted for its -arbitrary measures. - -In the early stages of the war the North assumed, as the justification of -coercive measures, not only the purpose of preserving the Union, but the -relief of a "loyal party" in the South, who were oppressed by a violent -minority having "command of the situation." Of this theory of the war, as -waged by the North, the conversation of President Lincoln with a Kentucky -member of Congress, in the presence of Senator Crittenden, was -sufficiently declaratory: - - "'Mr. Mallory, this war, so far as I have any thing to do with it, is - carried on on the idea that there is a Union sentiment in those - States, which, set free from the control now held over it by the - presence of the Confederate or rebel power, will be sufficient to - replace those States in the Union. If I am mistaken in this, if there - is no such sentiment there, if the people of those States are - determined with unanimity, or with a feeling approaching unanimity, - that their States shall not be members of this Confederacy, it is - beyond the power of the people of the other States to force them to - remain in the Union; and,' said he, 'in that contingency--in the - contingency that there is not that sentiment there--THIS WAR IS NOT - ONLY AN ERROR, IT IS A CRIME.'" - -Mr. Lincoln was probably not a very close student of the philosophy of -history, or he would hardly have thus emphatically committed himself to a -pledge, which, if observed, would have inevitably ended the war in a few -weeks. The teachings of history were valueless, without their unvarying -testimony to the potency of the sword of the common enemy in healing the -divisions of an invaded country. It would be difficult, too, to imagine -what he would have deemed that approximation to unity in the South, which -would render a further prosecution of the war a crime. A faction of "Union -men," truculent, treacherous, and insidious, in their hostility to the -Confederate Government, unquestionably existed in the South during the -entire progress of the war, but they were few in numbers, and their -recognized leaders were, with hardly a single exception, men of abandoned -character, notoriously without influence, save with their ignorant and -unpatriotic followers. But this pretense of a Union party in the South, -which the North, at first, declared a majority, was conveniently -abandoned, when other pretexts were sought. In the face of evidence not to -be denied, of the profound and sincere purpose of separation, entertained -by more than seven-eighths of the citizens of the seceded States, the -Northern conscience easily overcame its scruples as to a war which the -Northern President had, by anticipation, pronounced a "Crime." - -Palpable violations of vows were, indeed, marked characteristics of the -conduct of the war as justified by the facile and pliant conscience of the -North. The paramount purpose of coercion was to maintain the authority and -dignity of the Constitution, assailed by "rebels in arms." No theory was -avowed contemplating any other termination of the war, than a simple -restoration of the "Union under the Constitution." The assertions of the -Northern press, and the resolutions of mass meetings were re-affirmed by -the most solemn enactments of the Federal Congress, and public -declarations of Mr. Lincoln, that the North sought merely to save the -Union, with the form and spirit of the Constitution unimpaired. In view of -subsequent events, it is almost incredible that in Mr. Lincoln's first -inaugural address should be found this passage: - - "I declare that I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to - interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it - exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no - inclination to do so.... The right of each State to order and control - its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment - exclusively, is essential to the balance of power on which the - perfection and endurance of our political fabric depended." - -Then, after the defeat at Bull Run, Congress passed the following -resolution, which was signed by Mr. Lincoln as President: - - "_Resolved_, That this war is not waged upon our part with any purpose - of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established - institutions of these States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy - of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union, with all the dignity, - equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired; that, as soon - as these objects are accomplished, the war ought to cease." - -As if to give every possible form of assurance of the legitimate and -constitutional objects of the war, and leaving no room for doubt in the -mind of posterity, of complete and unredeemed perfidy, the Federal -authorities were at especial pains to declare their policy to foreign -governments. - -Mr. Seward, as Mr. Lincoln's Secretary of State, in his instructions to -Mr. Dayton, Minister to France, says: - - "The condition of slavery in the several States will remain just the - same, whether it (the rebellion) succeed or fail. There is not even a - pretext for the complaint that the disaffected States are to be - conquered by the United States, if the revolution fail; for the rights - of the States, and the condition of every human being in them, will - remain subject to exactly the same laws and form of administration, - whether the revolution shall succeed or whether it shall fail." - -There was little room to doubt the purpose of the North to emancipate the -slaves of the South, if at any period of the war such action could be -advantageously taken. Mr. Lincoln always manifested great timidity and -reluctance in approaching the subject, and it was observable that, at -critical moments of the war, he courted the sympathy of the Democratic -party, which was opposed to the policy of emancipation, so importunately -urged upon him by the radical wing of the Republican party. - -General McClellan had, with noble firmness, refused to countenance the -revolutionary designs of the radical faction, and his removal from command -after his repulse at Richmond was the palpable and decisive triumph of the -emancipation policy in the sympathies of Mr. Lincoln. Restored to command, -in order that he might save Washington from capture, no other officer -being deemed to have the requisite ability and confidence of the army, he -retained his position but a few weeks after that object was accomplished. -By successive steps, Mr. Lincoln was finally brought to issue a -preliminary proclamation of emancipation, in September, 1862, which went -into effect January 1, 1863. After the battle of Antietam, no farther -necessity for concealment was deemed necessary, and to the design of -subjugation was now added the proclaimed purpose to destroy the organic -existence of the States and two thousand millions of Southern capital. - -Emancipation was justified by the Federal administration as a "military -necessity"--a wretched explanation from those who had boasted their -ability to "exterminate the South" in a few months. Since the war, a claim -of philanthropy, as the motive of emancipation, has been falsely asserted. -Reckless of the fate of the slave, the North sought only vengeance against -his master. In the sequel, each step of despotism becoming easier than its -predecessor, malice against the master has been still the motive which -instigated the enfranchisement of his former slave. - -The New-Year's proclamation of Mr. Lincoln, reaching the Confederacy at -the most auspicious period of its fortunes, was received with evidences of -just indignation, and of a more stern purpose in the conduct of the war. -President Davis thus referred to the subject in his message to Congress: - - "The public journals of the North have been received, containing a - proclamation, dated on the first day of the present month, signed by - the President of the United States, in which he orders and declares - all slaves within ten of the States of the Confederacy to be free, - except such as are found within certain districts now occupied in part - by the armed forces of the enemy. We may well leave it to the - instincts of that common humanity which a beneficent Creator has - implanted in the breasts of our fellow-men of all countries to pass - judgment on a measure by which several millions of human beings of an - inferior race--peaceful and contented laborers in their sphere--are - doomed to extermination, while, at the same time, they are encouraged - to a general assassination of their masters by the insidious - recommendation 'to abstain from violence unless in necessary - self-defense.' Our own detestation of those who have attempted the - most execrable measure recorded in the history of guilty man, is - tempered by profound contempt for the impotent rage which it - discloses. So far as regards the action of this Government on such - criminals as may attempt its execution, I confine myself to informing - you that I shall--unless in your wisdom you deem some other course - more expedient--deliver to the several State authorities all - commissioned officers of the United States that may hereafter be - captured by our forces, in any of the States embraced in the - proclamation, that they may be dealt with in accordance with the laws - of those States providing for the punishment of criminals engaged in - exciting servile insurrection. The enlisted soldiers I shall continue - to treat as unwilling instruments in the commission of these crimes, - and shall direct their discharge and return to their homes on the - proper and usual parole." - -Mr. Davis urged upon the people the evidence, given by this measure, of -the utterly ruthless and unscrupulous character of the war waged upon the -South, and counseled the resolution of "absolute and total separation of -these States from the United States." The eloquent appeals of Mr. Davis -were sustained by the united press of the Confederacy, and by unmistakable -indications of a thoroughly aroused popular indignation. - -The results of military operations, in the winter months of 1863, were of -a character altogether favorable and re-assuring to the Confederates. -Movements on a large scale were prevented by the heavy rains and extreme -rigor of the season, though there were many incidents evincing activity -and enterprise on both sides. Early in January occurred the recapture of -Galveston, Texas, by General Magruder. This exploit, marked by a display -of energy, daring, and skill, was a handsome vindication of a most -meritorious officer, who, for some months previous, had suffered unmerited -censure. General Magruder had commanded a portion of the Army of Northern -Virginia, in the assault upon McClellan, at Malvern Hill. The partial -failure of the attack secured the Federal retreat, and the public, -impatient at the check sustained at a moment of so much promise, visited -an unwarranted censure upon Magruder. President Davis acknowledged, in a -most flattering letter to his former classmate, the brilliant achievement -of his command at Galveston. - -After the battle of Murfreesboro', the more important operations, in the -West, were enacted in the State of Mississippi. The successful defense of -Vicksburg, in the summer of 1862, effectually closed the Mississippi to -the Federal fleets. To reduce this stronghold became an object of prime -importance to the Federal Government, the North-western States being -especially interested in securing the unobstructed navigation of the great -river. The Confederate Government, equally apprized of the value of -Vicksburg, concentrated forces for its defense, and made the maintenance -of that position one of the leading features of its designs in the West. - -A second attempt, under the auspices of General Sherman, was made against -Vicksburg, in December, 1862. The signal failure attending this expedition -brought upon Sherman a degree of reproach, at the North, in singular -contrast with the applause which he received twelve months later. A few -weeks later, the third attempt against Vicksburg was undertaken by -General Grant, who sought to turn the Confederate defenses, through the -smaller rivers connecting the Yazoo and Mississippi. This attempt was -doomed to a failure no less decided and humiliating than that of its -predecessor. On the 14th of March the Confederate batteries at Port -Hudson, the lower defense of the Mississippi, repulsed the fleet of -Farragut, who sought, by passing the batteries, to coöperate with Porter's -fleet above. - -These repeated failures of the Federal demonstrations against the -Confederate strongholds on the Mississippi, were accepted as auspicious -indications of continued successful defense in a vital quarter of the -Confederacy. The loss of Arkansas Post, with a garrison of three thousand -men, somewhat diminished the ardor of the congratulations experienced by -the South from the successes on the Mississippi, and General Beauregard's -signal defeat of the Federal fleet at Charleston. - -At the opening of spring, there was wanting no indication of the gigantic -struggle which was to make memorable the third year of the war. By common -consent it was declared that this, if not the last, would, at least, be -the decisive year of the struggle. An imperative necessity impelled the -Federal administration to the most powerful efforts. Without brilliant and -decided military results, the party in opposition to the war would -inevitably gain possession of a sufficient number of States, to enable -them to enter the next Presidential contest with fair prospects of -success. The approaching expiration of the terms of service of large -numbers of his veteran troops, also impelled the enemy to early activity. - -On the part of the Confederates, there was apparently nothing left undone -which could increase the chances of success. This period is remarkable in -the history of the war, not less for its auspicious signs for the -Confederacy, than for the union and coöperation every-where observable. It -was equally a period encouraging hope and inviting effort to wring from -the reluctant North confession of final defeat, and to inflict a just -punishment upon an enemy, who had but lately proclaimed his purpose to use -even the slaves of the South for the subjugation of her citizens. -Extraordinary activity was displayed, during the winter and spring, in -strengthening the army and adding to its efficiency, by the execution of -the recent legislation of Congress recommended by President Davis. The -utmost exertions of the Government were, of course, insufficient to -strengthen the armies to the point of equality with the enormous array -presented by the enemy on every theatre of operations. Yet the Government, -the people, and the army, with calmness and confidence, awaited the issue, -in the conviction that every preparation had been made which the resources -of the country admitted. - -Early in April, President Davis, in compliance with a request of Congress, -addressed an eloquent invocation to the country, in behalf of the duties -of patriotism at so critical a moment of the struggle. Stating his -concurrence in the views of Congress, he declared his confidence in the -patriotic disposition of the people to carry into effect the measures -devised for the deliverance of the country. - -"Alone, unaided," said he, "we have met and overthrown the most formidable -combinations of naval and military armaments that the lust of conquest -ever gathered together for the conquest of a free people. We began this -struggle without a single gun afloat, while the resources of our enemy -enabled them to gather fleets which, according to their official list, -published in August last, consisted of four hundred and thirty-seven -vessels, measuring eight hundred and forty thousand and eighty-six tons, -and carrying three thousand and twenty-six guns.... To oppose invading -forces composed of levies which have already exceeded thirteen hundred -thousand men, we had no resources but the unconquerable valor of a people -determined to be free." - -Mr. Davis alluded encouragingly to the immediate prospects of the war: - - "Your devotion and patriotism have triumphed over all these obstacles, - and calling into existence the munitions of war, the clothing and the - subsistence, which have enabled our soldiers to illustrate their valor - on numerous battle-fields, and to inflict crushing defeats on - successive armies, each of which our arrogant foe fondly imagined to - be invincible. - - "The contrast between our past and present condition is well - calculated to inspire full confidence in the triumph of our arms. At - no previous period of the war have our forces been so numerous, so - well organized, and so thoroughly disciplined, armed, and equipped, as - at present. The season of high water, on which our enemies relied to - enable their fleet of gunboats to penetrate into our country and - devastate our homes, is fast passing away; yet our strongholds on the - Mississippi still bid defiance to the foe, and months of costly - preparation for their reduction have been spent in vain. Disaster has - been the result of their every effort to turn or storm Vicksburg and - Port Hudson, as well as every attack on our batteries on the Red - River, the Tallahatchie, and other navigable streams." - -In this address President Davis did not fail to rebuke that tendency to -excessive confidence from which relaxed exertion is ever apt to follow. -Albeit he has been so freely charged with entertaining excessive -confidence himself, and encouraging others to share his over-sanguine and -exaggerated hopes, he yet never lost an opportunity of rebuking it as a -dangerous error. - -The most important feature of the address is the earnest and admonitory -appeal, for immediate exertion, to obviate the difficulty of obtaining -supplies for the army, already becoming a question of alarming concern. -Mr. Davis even then avowed his conviction that, in such a contest as the -war had then become, the question of food was the "one danger which the -Government of your choice regards with apprehension." Earnestly appealing -to the "never-failing patriotism" of the land, he said: "Your country, -therefore, appeals to you to lay aside all thought of gain, and to devote -yourselves to securing your liberties, without which these gains would be -valueless." - -Reminding the country of embarrassments, already encountered, he indicated -the only method of avoiding similar difficulties in future: - - "Let your fields be devoted exclusively to the production of corn, - oats, beans, peas, potatoes, and other food for man and beast. Let - corn be sowed broadcast, for fodder, in immediate proximity to - railroads, rivers and canals; and let all your efforts be directed to - the prompt supply of these articles in the districts where our armies - are operating. You will then add greatly to their efficiency, and - furnish the means without which it is impossible to make those prompt - and active movements which have hitherto stricken terror into our - enemies and secured our most brilliant triumphs." - -Those who witnessed the operation of causes which eventually brought the -country to the verge of starvation, and made Lee's army--whose proud array -of "tattered uniforms and bright muskets" had never yet yielded to the -onset of the enemy--the _victim of famine_, can attest the fidelity of -this graphic and prophetic sketch: - - "It is known that the supply of meat throughout the country is - sufficient for the support of all; but the distances are so great, the - condition of the roads has been so bad during the five months of - winter weather, through which we have just passed, and the attempt of - groveling speculators to forestall the market, and make money out of - the life-blood of our defenders, have so much influenced the - withdrawal from sale of the surplus in hands of the producers, that - the Government has been unable to gather full supplies. - - "The Secretary of War has prepared a plan, which is appended to this - address, by the aid of which, or some similar means to be adopted by - yourselves, you can assist the officers of the Government in the - purchase of the corn, the bacon, the pork, and the beef known to exist - in large quantities in different parts of the country. Even if the - surplus be less than believed, is it not a bitter and humiliating - reflection that those who remain at home, secure from hardship, and - protected from danger, should be in the enjoyment of abundance, and - that their slaves also should have a full supply of food, while their - sons, brothers, husbands, and fathers are stinted in the rations upon - which their health and efficiency depend?" - -The concluding paragraph of this address, so remarkable for its eloquence, -and for its frank and powerful statement of the condition and necessities -of the Confederacy, in one of the most thrilling moments of its fate, is -as follows: - - "Entertaining no fear that you will either misconstrue the motives of - this address, or fail to respond to the call of patriotism, I have - placed the facts fully and frankly before you. Let us all unite in the - performance of our duty, each in his sphere; and with concerted, - persistent, and well directed effort, there seems little reason to - doubt that, under the blessings of Him to whom we look for guidance, - and who has been to us our shield and strength, we shall maintain the - sovereignty and independence of the Confederate States, and transmit - to our posterity the heritage bequeathed to us by our fathers." - -Late in March, General Lee intimated his convictions, to the Government, -of an early resumption of active movements by the enemy. The disparity -between the main armies in Virginia was even greater than in previous -campaigns. General Hooker, the Federal commander, had, under his immediate -direction, more than one hundred thousand men, while General Lee--in -consequence of the necessary withdrawal of Longstreet, with two divisions, -to meet a threatened movement by the enemy from the south of James River, -and to secure the supplies of an abundant section, open to Federal -incursions--had less than fifty thousand.[59] But Lee manifested his -characteristic confidence and self-possession in the presence of the -perilous crisis. Having adequately represented the situation to his -Government, he was aware of the cordial coöperation, to the extent of its -ability, which had been extended. During the suspension of active -hostilities, his every wish for the increased efficiency of his command -was promptly fulfilled, and at the opening of the campaign he lacked no -element of readiness, save _numbers_, that which the country could not -supply, and of the absence of which, Lee, therefore, _never complained_. -In every other element of efficiency, the army of Northern Virginia was -never in better condition, than when it eagerly awaited the advance of -Hooker across the Rappahannock. - -The battle of Chancellorsville is memorable as the most decisive triumph -of the Army of Northern Virginia, and from the mournful incident of the -extinction of that noble life which was identified with its highest glory. -The culmination of Lee's superb strategy, the most splendid illustration -of his master-genius, was sadly emphasized by the irreparable loss of -Stonewall Jackson. - -Commemorating, by a letter of special thanks to the army, a victory which -baffled the most perilous and boastful attempt yet made upon the -Confederate capital, President Davis shared the grief of a stricken -country for the loss of one of its most illustrious champions. In that -procession of mourners which followed, through the streets of Richmond, -the bier of the fallen hero, there was not one who felt anguish more acute -than that of the chief who had so honored and sustained Jackson when -living.[60] - - - - -CHAPTER XV. - - CONFEDERATE PROSPECTS AFTER THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE--THE - MILITARY SITUATION--PRIMARY OBJECTS OF THE CONFEDERATES--AFFAIRS IN - THE WEST--A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF SEVERAL PLANS OF CAMPAIGN SUGGESTED - TO THE CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES--VISIONARY STRATEGY--AN OFFENSIVE - CAMPAIGN ADOPTED--THE INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA JUSTIFIED--CONDITION OF - THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA AT THIS PERIOD--THE MOVEMENT FROM THE - RAPPAHANNOCK--LEADING FEATURES OF THE CONFEDERATE PLAN--LEE'S STRATEGY - AGAIN ILLUSTRATED--GETTYSBURG--A FATAL BLOW TO THE SOUTH--LEE RETURNS - TO VIRGINIA--THE SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG--OTHER REVERSES--EXULTATION OF - THE NORTH--THE CONFEDERATE ADMINISTRATION AGAIN ARRAIGNED BY ITS - OPPONENTS--THE CASE OF GENERAL PEMBERTON--POPULAR INJUSTICE TO A - GALLANT OFFICER--A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE SUBJECT--PEMBERTON'S - APPOINTMENT RECOMMENDED BY DISTINGUISHED OFFICERS--HIS ABLE - ADMINISTRATION IN MISSISSIPPI--HIS RESOLUTION TO HOLD VICKSBURG, AS - THE GREAT END OF THE CAMPAIGN--HIS GALLANTRY AND RESOURCES--NOBLE - CONDUCT OF THIS PERSECUTED OFFICER--A FURTHER STATEMENT--THE MISSION - OF VICE-PRESIDENT STEPHENS--ITS OBJECTS--PRESIDENT DAVIS SEEKS TO - ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERINGS OF WAR--MAGNANIMITY AND HUMANITY OF THE - OFFER--PROUD POSITION IN THIS MATTER OF THE SOUTH AND HER RULER--THE - FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DECLINES INTERCOURSE WITH MR. STEPHENS--EXPLANATION - OF ITS MOTIVES--CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MESSRS. DAVIS AND STEPHENS. - - -The situation of affairs, so eminently favorable to the Confederacy, after -the victory of Chancellorsville, admitted no doubt that the opportune -occasion would be promptly seized, for the delivery of a telling blow, -which should hasten an acknowledgment of Southern independence. A brief -summary of the military situation, at the opening of summer, 1863, will -show the simple and judicious policy, by which the Confederate -administration proposed to make efficient use of its advantages. - -The battle of Chancellorsville, followed by the disorganized retreat of -the largest force yet consolidated for the capture of Richmond, and the -signal failure of an attempt, which, at its outset, the North declared to -be conclusive of the fate of the Confederacy, secured the safety of the -Confederate capital, at least, until another campaign could be organized. -Moreover, it tendered to the Confederate authorities the choice of a -vigorous offensive, holding out tempting inducements; or a detachment of a -portion of Lee's army for the relief of other sections of the Confederacy. -With two-thirds of his own force, Lee had repulsed and crippled the -enormous army of Hooker, and it appeared reasonably certain, that the same -force could maintain a successful defensive, while the segment, or its -equivalent, which was absent at Chancellorsville, might be sent, for a -temporary purpose, to Bragg, in Tennessee, or to the relief of Pemberton -in Vicksburg. - -At the opening of spring the primary objects of the Confederacy were the -safety of Richmond, the safety of Vicksburg--the key to its tenure of the -Mississippi Valley--and the holding of its defensive line in Middle and -East Tennessee, the barrier between the enemy and the vitals of the -Confederacy. The first of these objects was amply secured by the victory -of Chancellorsville, leaving to the main Confederate army, its own choice -of the field of future operations. - -In the Western Department, commanded since December, 1862, by General -Joseph E. Johnston, the situation was less promising, though by no means -forbidding hope of a favorable solution. General Bragg maintained a -somewhat precarious defensive against Rosecrans, who confronted the -Confederate commander, with an army much larger than that with which he -had fought the battle of Murfreesboro'. General Pemberton, after a series -of actions, had retired within the lines of Vicksburg, where he was -closely besieged by General Grant with a numerous army--the Federal fleet -in the river, meanwhile, continuing its bombardment. The characteristic -stubbornness of Grant, aided by his ample force, made evident the ultimate -fate of Vicksburg and Pemberton's army, either by famine, or the assaults -of the enemy, unless succor should come in the shape of a demonstration -against the besieging army, with which the garrison might be expected to -coöperate. Not long after Pemberton's retirement into Vicksburg, General -Johnston reached Mississippi and began the collection of a force, by which -it was expected that the besieged stronghold and its garrison would be -relieved. - -But while the situation in the West thus seemed to invite the presence of -a portion of the army of Northern Virginia, relieved of any immediate -danger from its antagonist, there were cogent considerations in behalf of -another policy which was adopted. Two weeks, at least, would have been -required, in the indifferent condition of the Southern railroads, for the -transportation of a force from Virginia, competent to enable Bragg to -assume the aggressive. A much longer period would have been required to -transfer to Jackson, such a force as General Johnston would have deemed -sufficient to justify an attack upon Grant. Besides, the government was -fully satisfied, that the reënforcements sent to Johnston would soon -enable him to make an effective demonstration against the besieging army, -which, sustained by a simultaneous attack by Pemberton in front, would -have a reasonable prospect of success. - -The project of a direct reënforcement to Johnston, from Lee's army, was -speedily abandoned, and the more practicable plan of reënforcing Bragg was -also dismissed. Nothing whatever was to be expected from a victory by -Bragg over Rosecrans, unless it could be made a _decisive_ victory, -ensuring either the destruction of the Federal army, or the complete -abandonment of its advanced line in Tennessee, for which it had paid such -heavy toll. Such a result, necessitating the reënforcement of Rosecrans -from Grant, meanwhile, after the victory had been won, troops being sent -to Johnston from Bragg, was indeed brilliant to contemplate. Or there was -another prospect equally agreeable. When Rosecrans had been defeated -troops might be sent to capture Fort Pillow, on the Mississippi, which, -cutting off Grant's supplies from the North, as did Port Hudson from the -South, would compel the Federal army at Vicksburg to fight for its -subsistence, and under most discouraging circumstances. In addition to -these prospects, there was also the choice of a movement for the complete -redemption of Kentucky and Tennessee. - -These brilliant designs of a visionary and vaporing strategy, abundant in -the Confederacy during the war, and now ostentatiously paraded by the -cheap wisdom of retrospection, lacked, however, the essential feature of -practicability. To have reënforced Bragg sufficiently from Lee's army, to -have enabled him to undertake the offensive, with any prospect of the -complete success necessary, would have weakened the army in Virginia to -such an extent, as to seriously endanger Richmond. Even though Bragg were -thus sufficiently reënforced to defeat a numerous army, led by an able -commander, and occupying a position of great strength, a full month would -have been required to accomplish the results indicated. Waiving all -consideration of the incertitude of battle, and assuming that success -would attend every movement of the Confederate army, what reasonable -calculation would enable Bragg to have gotten his forces in readiness, and -marched them either into Kentucky to Fort Pillow, or to Jackson, in time -to have saved Vicksburg? But, apart from the folly of so weakening Lee, as -to endanger Richmond (which would have been immediately assailed by -Hooker, with his command of ninety thousand men, in coöperation with the -forces at Suffolk, Fortress Monroe, and Winchester--an aggregate of more -than forty thousand more), to undertake operations so doubtful and -hazardous, was the consideration of the promising inducements for an -offensive campaign in the East. - -President Davis and General Lee were concurrent in their convictions of -the wisdom of a campaign which should drive the enemy from Virginia, -locate the army in an abundant and hostile country, and compensate for any -disasters which might be sustained in the West, by an overwhelming defeat -in the enemy's country of his main army, which at once covered his capital -and the approaches to his large cities. - -This bold and brilliant conception was equally justified by the situation, -and consistent with that able military policy which was throughout -characteristic of the Confederate authorities, and based upon the only -theory on which a weak power can be successfully defended against -invasion. - -The strategic theory which dictated the invasion of Pennsylvania was that -of the "defensive, with offensive returns," made forever famous by its -triumphant practice by Frederick the Great--the favorite theory of -Napoleon--not less signally illustrated by Jackson's Valley campaign, and -grandly executed by Lee in his irresistible onset upon Pope. - -Twitted by the newspapers for their infatuation with the defensive -attitude, and condemned by the voice of the public, for the maintenance of -a policy which continually subjected the soil of the South to the -devastations of the enemy, the Confederate authorities, neither in the -invasion of Maryland, in 1862, nor in the invasion of Pennsylvania, -yielded merely to public clamor. In both instances President Davis and -General Lee were governed by the sound military considerations, which in -each case justified the assumption of the offensive. Nothing is more -universally conceded than the ultimate subjection of a people who permit -themselves to be forced always on the defensive. On the other hand, no -blows have been so telling in warfare, as those delivered by an antagonist -who, lately on the defensive, at the opportune moment, when the foe is -stunned by defeat, assumes a skillful and vigorous offensive. - -It was now the third year of the war, and for more than twelve months no -considerable success had rewarded the enormous sacrifices and expenditures -of the North. The fluctuating sentiment, characteristic of that section, -had settled down into a feeling of indifference and distrust, beyond which -there was but one step to the abandonment of the war as a hopeless -experiment. The evident apprehension, by the Federal Government, of an -invasion of Pennsylvania, attended by a ruinous defeat of Hooker's army, a -result which both sides considered probable, plainly demonstrated, that -the virtual termination of the war would be the reward of a successful -assumption of the offensive by the Confederates. - -A more favorable conjuncture, for a final trial with its old antagonist, -could not have been desired by the Army of Northern Virginia. The -invincible veterans of Longstreet, oftener victors than the Tenth Legion -of Cæsar, had rejoined their companions, who boasted the additional -honors of Chancellorsville. Reënforcements from other quarters were -added,[61] and the Army of Northern Virginia, a compact and puissant -force, seventy thousand strong, which had never yet known defeat, -instinctively expected the order for advance into the enemy's country. -Never was the _morale_ of the army so high, never had it such confidence -in its own prowess, and in the resources of its great commander, and never -was intrusted to its valor a mission so grateful to its desires, as that -tendered by President Davis, "to force the enemy to fight for their own -capital and homes." - -Under Lee were trusted lieutenants, whose fame, like that of their -followers, was world-wide, and whose laurels were a part of the unnumbered -triumphs of the matchless valor of that noble army. Longstreet, the Lannes -of the South, was again at the head of his trained corps--the assembled -chivalry of the South, in whose exploits every State of the Confederacy -claimed a glory peculiarly its own. The bronzed veterans of Jackson, who -had shared the glory of their immortal leader from Manassas to -Chancellorsville, now followed Ewell, the maimed hero, whom Jackson had -named as his successor. Under Hill, the youngest of the corps commanders, -were men worthy of a leader who, in twelve months, had filled the -successive grades from Colonel to Lieutenant General. The cavalry was -still intrusted to Stuart, that bold, able chief, and "rarely gallant and -noble gentleman, well supporting by his character the tradition that royal -blood flowed in his veins." With such leaders, and with thoroughly tried -and efficient subordinate officers, improved transportation, equipment and -clothing, and with numbers approaching nearer an equality with the -Federal army, than at any other period, the Army of Northern Virginia no -more doubted, than did its commander and the Government, that it was at -the outset of a campaign brilliant and decisive beyond parallel in its -history. - -About the middle of May, General Lee visited Richmond, when the general -features of the campaign were determined. The movement from the camps near -Fredericksburg and the Rapidan, commenced early in June. The incipient -feature of General Lee's plan was a flank movement, while still confronted -by the army of the enemy--perhaps the most delicate and difficult problem -in war--by which, leaving the south bank of the Rappahannock, he sought to -draw the Federal army away from its position. To meet the contingency of a -movement by the enemy in the direction of Richmond, A. P. Hill, with his -_corps d'armée_, was left near Fredericksburg. That skillful officer ably -executed his instructions, checking the Federal demonstrations near his -lines, and concealing the absence of the main body of the army until the -advance was well under way. General Stuart fully performed his important -part of covering the movements of the infantry, by seizing the mountain -passes, and detaining the advance of the enemy, in the execution of which -he fought several fierce cavalry engagements, winning them all with -inferior forces. The army was marched through an abundant country, not -desolated by war, and affording good roads. Important incidents of the -advance were the capture of Winchester, Berryville, and Martinsburg, by -the forces of Ewell, with their garrisons, aggregating seven thousand men, -and considerable material of war. - -These brilliant results of Lee's strategy were accomplished with wonderful -regularity and promptitude, and were attended with inconsiderable loss. - -Crossing the Potomac, the second stage of the campaign was the occupation -of Western Maryland--the least friendly section of the State--where the -army could be abundantly supplied, and the important objects of destroying -the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the Cumberland Canal, so valuable to -the enemy, could be accomplished. The next step was to advance into -Pennsylvania, capturing large supplies much needed by the army, occupying -several large towns of that State, and destroying communications--meanwhile -the army living on the enemy, and kept well in hand for a general -engagement, _whenever battle could be advantageously offered_. In the -execution of this portion of the plan, an extensive and fertile section of -Pennsylvania was occupied, strong detachments were pushed far into the -interior, and a movement against Harrisburg was in preparation, when the -advance of the Federal army induced General Lee to concentrate his forces -for battle. - -The consummate strategy of Lee had now made him apparently master of the -situation, and gave him the option of tendering or declining a grand and -decisive engagement. It is impossible to overestimate the generalship, -which, within twenty-five days, had transferred an army, in the presence -of the enemy, from the Rappahannock to the interior of Pennsylvania, -making large captures _en route_, and inflicting heavy damage upon the -Federal communications, without being even momentarily arrested. Never -once had been relaxed the grasp of that master-hand which controlled the -army in all its movements. Its various parts, within easy supporting -distance, were clearly so disposed, as to be readily assembled, to meet -the exigency that was inevitable. When Lee drew in his several columns -around Gettysburg, the South confident in the invincibility of the army, -and in the genius of its leader, never doubted the issue of the grand -trial of arms which was at hand. With more than apprehension the North -awaited the fate of the army, upon which its last hope of security rested. -A defeat of the Army of the Potomac now would signify, not a check in a -boastful advance upon Richmond, but the capture of Washington, the -presence of the avenging columns of Lee upon the banks of the -Delaware--perhaps of the dreaded Stuart upon the Hudson. - -It was contemplated that the invasion of Pennsylvania would result in a -decisive battle. Indeed, that result was inevitable, unless the Federal -authorities should unresistingly submit to the invasion--an event not for -a moment to be anticipated. But a vital feature in the theory of the -invasion was that the position of Lee would necessitate an advance against -him by the Federal commander, leaving to Lee the choice of time and place -for giving battle. The calculation was that Lee would be master of the -situation at all times, as indeed he undoubtedly was until the engagement -of Gettysburg was joined. We are not here at liberty to discuss the -details of that battle, or to consider how far it was a departure from, or -in pursuance of the original design of the Confederate campaign.[62] If -competent criticism shall condemn the tactics of Lee at Gettysburg, he -has yet disarmed censure by the surpassing magnanimity with which he -assumed the responsibility. - -The great joy of the North did not exaggerate the terrible blow sustained -by the Confederacy in the failure of the Pennsylvania campaign. It was the -last serious demonstration upon Federal soil undertaken by the South--all -movements of an offensive character subsequently undertaken being merely -raids or diversions, designed to give relief to the sorely-pressed -Confederate capital. It imposed upon the South the cruel necessity of a -continuation of the war upon its own soil--a precarious defensive, with a -capacity of resistance greatly diminished. - -Gettysburg marked the most serious step in that decline of Confederate -fortunes which the fall of Jackson, in the moment of his greatest triumph, -so ominously presaged.[63] - -Yet the condition of Lee's army was far from desperate on the morning of -the 4th of July, when it still confronted its antagonist, neither -evincing a disposition to attack. Retiring in perfect order, and bringing -off his extensive trains and seven thousand prisoners, he tendered the -enemy battle at Hagerstown, while making preparations to recross the -Potomac. General Meade, an able and prudent soldier, made as vigorous a -pursuit as the crippled condition of his army would permit. In a short -time General Lee was once more upon the lines of the Rapidan, and General -Meade soon took position upon the Rappahannock. Here the campaign -terminated, and the two armies, like giants exhausted by a mighty wrestle, -gladly availed themselves of a season of repose. - -But Gettysburg did not complete the agony of the South. The disastrous -failure of the most prodigious and promising enterprise, undertaken by its -largest, and heretofore invincible army, was simultaneous with an event -hardly less fearful in its consequences. On the fourth of July, the -garrison of Vicksburg, reduced to the point of starvation, surrendered to -the persevering and indomitable Grant. This event signified the loss of an -army of twenty-five thousand men, the possession by the enemy of the -Confederate Gibraltar of the Mississippi Valley, the loss of all tenure -upon the great river by the South, and the severance of the Confederacy. -Port Hudson, with its garrison of five thousand men, being no longer -tenable, after the fall of Vicksburg, was immediately surrendered to the -besieging army of General Banks. The sum of Confederate disasters in the -summer of 1863, was completed by the failure of the attempt to capture -Helena, Arkansas, followed by the capture of Little Rock, and Federal -control of the important valley in which it is situated. - -Within ninety days the South was brought from the hope of almost instant -independence to the certainty of a long, bitter, and doubtful struggle. -Its armies terribly shattered, its resources in men and means apparently -almost exhausted, it seemed for a time doubtful whether the Confederacy -was capable of longer endurance of the terrible ordeal. The exultation of -the North was proportionate to the extent of its victories. A new lease -was given to the war. Confidence was fully restored, and the Federal -Government could now make no demand, that would be thought extravagant, -upon the energies of the North, for the promotion of the object it had so -much at heart. But a few months sufficed to show that the constancy and -fortitude of the South was still capable of a desperate struggle with the -power and determination of the North. - -This period of misfortune and apprehension was signalized by a most -determined arraignment of the Confederate administration. It is worthy of -remark, however, that in all the embittered censure visited upon President -Davis, for his alleged responsibility for the crushing reverses of the -summer campaign, there was avowed but little censure of the most fatal of -those disasters--the failure of the movement into Pennsylvania. The -privilege of assailing Mr. Davis with or without reason, did not include -the privilege to condemn Lee and his army. - -In the case of Vicksburg circumstances were assumed to be different. -Without even waiting for the facts, or for any explanation of that -terrible calamity, General Pemberton was accused of having betrayed his -command. He was of Northern birth, and he had surrendered on the fourth of -July--such was the evidence of Pemberton's treason. Despite the fact that -Johnston was known to be in the neighborhood with a force collected for -the relief of Vicksburg, and though it had been plain to the country for -weeks, that Vicksburg could not be saved, except by a successful -demonstration by that force, it was not admitted among the possibilities -of the case, that Johnston[64] shared the responsibility for the disaster. - -When, however, the Federal accounts revealed the gallant defense made by -Pemberton, and thus put to shame the unworthy insinuation of treachery, -the censure of that unfortunate commander and the President assumed -another direction. Pemberton, it was asserted, was notoriously -incompetent, so proven, and so represented to the President before his -assignment to command in Mississippi; and the indignation of the country -was invoked upon the most signal instance of favoritism yet exhibited. The -extent to which this censure of Mr. Davis was successful, may be -estimated, when it is stated that no act of his administration so -imperiled his popularity as did the appointment of General Pemberton. Yet -it is undeniable that this was the result of the unfortunate sequel at -Vicksburg, and dictated by popular passion in a moment of terrible -disappointment, rather than by any sufficient reason ever urged to show -that the appointment was unwise and undeserved. - -Sustained by the recommendations of several of the first officers in the -Confederate army, President Davis made Pemberton a Lieutenant-General, and -assigned him to the command of the Department of Mississippi. The command -was one of vital importance to the country, and within its limits were -the home and all the possessions of Mr. Davis. In October, 1862, General -Pemberton took charge of his department, finding it in a most disordered -and embarrassing condition. His administration was of a character to give -great satisfaction to the Government, and its fruits were speedily -realized in the thorough and efficient reorganization of an army, but -lately defeated, the improved efficiency of its various departments, and -the successful defense of an extensive district, with forty thousand men, -against the armies of Grant and Banks, the smallest of which nearly -equaled the entire force of Pemberton. Indeed, it can hardly be alleged -that the administration of General Pemberton, previous to the siege of -Vicksburg, was faulty or unsatisfactory. With what justice, then, can it -be charged that Mr. Davis retained in command an officer proven to be -incompetent? - -In the reports of Generals Johnston and Pemberton, written from different -stand-points, and each with the object of vindicating its author, the -operations which led to the retirement of the latter within the lines of -Vicksburg were elaborately discussed. It is at least safe to state that -General Pemberton's reasons are as forcibly stated in explanation of his -own conduct, as are General Johnston's in demonstration of the errors of -his subordinate. Pemberton was controlled in all his movements by the -paramount purpose of holding Vicksburg, the last obstruction to the -enemy's free navigation of the Mississippi, and the connecting link -between the two great divisions of the Confederacy. If he had abandoned -Vicksburg, with a view to save his army, and refused to stand a siege, can -it be reasonably supposed that his assailants would have been more -merciful? His mission was to save Vicksburg and the Valley of the -Mississippi, and, when forced back by the overwhelming numbers of Grant, -he preferred even to risk his army, rather than to surrender the objects -of the whole campaign without an effort. - -During the siege, the engineering skill of General Pemberton, and his -fertility of expedients were conspicuously displayed. Works, which, under -the unceasing and concentrated fire of hundreds of guns, were demolished, -re-appeared, in improved forms, which only consummate ingenuity could have -devised. Works built to withstand guns used in ordinary warfare were found -wholly inadequate to resist the heavy metal of the enemy; and, subjected -to the incessant and galling fire of musketry, the artillery could with -difficulty be worked. But the energy and resources of General Pemberton -met even these difficulties. The position of the pieces was constantly -changing; embankments disappeared under the enemy's fire; but the -Confederate artillery would still be found in position, and stronger than -before. - -But the skill of the commander and the heroic endurance of the garrison -were unavailing. From the first, relief from without was expected. For -forty-eight days this hope stimulated the commander and the garrison, and -General Pemberton subsequently declared that he "would have lived upon an -ounce a day, and have continued to meet the assaults of all Grant's army, -rather than have surrendered the city, until General Johnston had realized -or relinquished that hope." When the hope of aid was finally abandoned, -the surrender of Vicksburg was simply a question of time and honor. The -alternative was either to capitulate or attempt to cut through the enemy's -lines. In a council of his officers, Pemberton favored the latter plan, -but yielded to the views of the majority. - -The case of General Pemberton was a striking instance of public -ingratitude. Vindicating his devotion to the cause of the South, by -surrendering his commission in the Federal service, turning his back upon -his kindred, and leaving a large property in the country of the enemy, he -was stigmatized by the very people in whose cause he had made these -sacrifices. His loyalty, capacity, and fidelity were questioned, even -while he was in the front of death. His noble reply to these accusations -can never be forgotten. Said he to his troops: "You have been told that I -was disloyal and incompetent, and that I would sell Vicksburg. _Follow -me_, and you shall see _at what price_ I shall sell it." The story of the -devotion shown at Vicksburg is no mean one in the history of the -Confederacy. But the great qualities of this abused man have even a nobler -testimony than the gallantry of that defense. Convinced that the cloud of -prejudice and misrepresentation which followed him, rendered useless to -the cause his services in high position, he tendered his resignation as a -Lieutenant-General, and requested to be ordered to duty with his original -rank of Lieutenant-Colonel of Artillery.[65] - -When the facts belonging to the unfortunate campaign in Mississippi were -made known, the censure of Pemberton was rather for what he _failed to -do_, than _what he had done_. But suppose the same test should be applied -to General Johnston; would there not be found an equal wanting of -_results_? If Johnston was powerless to make even a diversion with more -than twenty thousand men, (his force at the time of Pemberton's -surrender,) how much more helpless was Pemberton to check Grant? - -A dispassionate and careful inquiry will demonstrate that the operations -of General Pemberton, antecedent to the siege of Vicksburg, are far less -censurable than was assumed by his assailants. There can be no manner of -doubt, that if worthy of blame, he should not be visited with the whole -responsibility. It is difficult to imagine how Pemberton could have -adopted a different course, consistently with the main purpose of the -campaign--which was to prevent the capture of Vicksburg. It is certain -that he would have been doubly condemned, if he had executed a safe -retreat, and abandoned the stronghold without an effort to save it. - -A sufficient reply to the statement that Pemberton was appointed without -the desirable evidence of fitness, is that the occasion was one precluding -the employment of any officer whose capacity for such a command had been -proven by ample trial. Every officer of established merit was then in a -position from which he could not be spared. The presence of Lee in -Virginia was deemed necessary by the whole country. The most popular of -his lieutenants (Longstreet) was then freely criticised for an assumed -failure in a recent independent command; and, besides, he was obviously -needed in the Pennsylvania campaign. Beauregard was also thought to be in -his appropriate place, in charge of the coast defenses; and, indeed, it -was next to impossible to avoid the employment of a comparatively untried -commander in some important position. The confidence of Mr. Davis in -Pemberton, too, was amply sustained by the testimony of officers, in whose -judgment the country confided. - -But Pemberton _failed_, and it was the misfortune of the President to -have conferred distinction upon an unsuccessful commander. Waiving all -discussion of the extent to which Pemberton may be justified, and even -conceding the appointment to have been a bad one, let us remember how few -really capable commanders are produced by even the greatest wars. Was -President Davis to call twenty into existence, fit to command armies, when -Napoleon declared his armies did not afford half a dozen? Let it be -remembered, too, that it was his penetration that sustained Lee, Sidney -Johnston and Jackson, in the face of popular clamor; that _he_ rewarded, -with suitable acknowledgment, the skill and gallantry of Ewell, Early, -Stuart, Gordon, Longstreet, and Hood; of Breckinridge, Cleburne, Magruder, -Morgan, and others whose names make up the brilliant galaxy of Confederate -heroes.[66] - -That President Davis was tenacious of his opinions is unquestionably true, -and his firm grasp of his purposes was the explanation of his ascendancy -over other minds, and a leading attribute of his fitness for his position. -But this strenuous adhesion to a settled aim, characteristic of all men -born for influence, is a very different quality from that unreasoning -zealotry which belongs to weak minds. If, indeed, the favoritism of Mr. -Davis _lost_ Vicksburg, with equal justice, it may be claimed that it -_won_ the Seven Days' victories, Manassas, Fredericksburg, and -Chancellorsville. - -An interesting event in the history of this period of the war, was the -unsuccessful mission of Vice-President Stephens, to the Federal -authorities, designed, as explained by President Davis, "to place the war -upon the footing of such as are waged by civilized people in modern -times." The annexed correspondence requires hardly a word of explanation. -Consistent with the forbearance and humanity, with which Mr. Davis had -endeavored to prevent war, by negotiation, was this effort to soften its -rigors and to abate the bitterness which it had then assumed. - -Recent atrocities of the Federal authorities[67] had compelled the -Confederate Government to seriously entertain the purpose of retaliation. -Reluctant to adopt a course which would remove the last restraint upon the -spirit of cruelty and revenge, making the war a system of unmitigated -barbarism upon both sides, President Davis determined to make an earnest -appeal to the humanity of the Federal authorities. In addition to this -object the mission of Mr. Stephens sought the arrangement of all disputes -between the governments, respecting the cartel of exchange, upon a -permanent and humane basis, by which the soldiers of the two armies should -be sent to their homes, instead of being confined in military prisons. - -To make the mission more acceptable to the Federal Government, President -Davis removed every obstacle to intercourse upon terms of equality, and -selected a gentleman of high position, of known philanthropy and -moderation, and from several reasons likely to obtain an audience of the -Federal authorities. The choice of time was not less indicative of the -magnanimity of Mr. Davis. The Confederate army was then in Pennsylvania, -apparently upon the eve of a victory already assured, and which, if -gained, would have placed it in possession of the Federal capital and the -richest sections of the North. At such a moment, so promising in -opportunity of ample vengeance for the ravages and desolation, which -every-where marked the presence of the Federal armies, the Confederate -President tendered his noble plea in behalf of civilization and humanity. -With rare justice has it been said, that this position of Mr. Davis -"merited the applause of the Christian world." - -Mr. Stephens was contemptuously denied even a hearing. The sequel soon -revealed the explanation of the conduct of the Federal Government, by -which it became doubly chargeable for the sufferings of a protracted war, -in declining to aid in the abatement of its horrors, and by abruptly -closing the door against all attempts at negotiation. General Meade had -repulsed General Lee at Gettysburg, while Mr. Stephens was near Fortress -Monroe. Flushed with triumph and insolent in the belief that Lee's army -could not escape destruction, the Federal authorities declared such -intercourse with "rebels" to be "inadmissable." In other words, detention -of the Confederate prisoners, and outrages upon the Southern people, were -part of a political and military system at Washington, and _would be -persisted in_. At subsequent stages of the war were seen the objects of -this policy, which the Federal Government virtually proclaimed, and which -it persistently adhered to. - -The correspondence between President Davis and Vice-President Stephens -proudly vindicates the humanity and magnanimity of the South. It is alone -a sufficient reply to the cant of demagogues and the ravings of -conscience-stricken fanatics, over the falsely-called "Rebel barbarities." - - OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE. - - RICHMOND, July 2, 1863. - - _Hon. Alexander H. Stephens, Richmond, Va._-- - - SIR: Having accepted your patriotic offer to proceed, as a military - commissioner, under flag of truce, to Washington, you will receive - herewith your letter of authority to the Commander-in-chief of the - army and navy of the United States. - - This letter is signed by me as Commander-in-chief of the Confederate - land and naval forces. - - You will perceive, from the terms of the letter, that it is so worded - as to avoid any political difficulties in its reception. Intended - exclusively as one of those communications between belligerents, which - public law recognizes as necessary and proper between hostile forces, - care has been taken to give no pretext for refusing to receive it, on - the ground that it would involve a tacit recognition of the - independence of the Confederacy. - - Your mission is simply one of humanity, and has no political aspect. - - If objection is made to receiving your letter, on the ground that it - is not addressed to Abraham Lincoln, as President, instead of - Commander-in-chief, etc., then you will present the duplicate letter, - which is addressed to him as President, and signed by me, as - President. To this latter, objection may be made, on the ground that I - am not recognized to be President of the Confederacy. In this event, - you will decline any further attempt to confer on the subject of your - mission, as such conference is admissable only on the footing of - perfect equality. My recent interviews with you have put you so fully - in possession of my views, that it is scarcely necessary to give you - any detailed instructions, even were I, at this moment, well enough to - attempt it. - - My whole purpose is, in one word, to place this war on the footing of - such as are waged by civilized people in modern times; and to divest - it of the savage character which has been impressed on it by our - enemies, in spite of all our efforts and protests. - - War is full enough of unavoidable horrors, under all its aspects, to - justify, and even to demand, of any Christian rulers who may be - unhappily engaged in carrying it on, to seek to restrict its - calamities, and to divest it of all unnecessary severities. - - You will endeavor to establish the cartel for the exchange of - prisoners on such a basis as to avoid the constant difficulties and - complaints which arise, and to prevent, for the future, what we deem - the unfair conduct of our enemies, in evading the delivery of the - prisoners who fall into their hands; in retarding it by sending them - on circuitous routes, and by detaining them, sometimes for months, in - camps and prisons; and in persisting in taking captives - non-combatants. - - Your attention is also called to the unheard-of conduct of Federal - officers, in driving from their homes entire communities of women and - children, as well as of men, whom they find in districts occupied by - their troops, for no other reason than because these unfortunates are - faithful to the allegiance due to their States, and refuse to take an - oath of fidelity to their enemies. - - The putting to death of unarmed prisoners has been a ground of just - complaint in more than one instance, and the recent execution of - officers of our army in Kentucky, for the sole cause that they were - engaged in recruiting service in a State which is claimed as still one - of the United States, but is also claimed by us as one of the - Confederate States, must be repressed by retaliation, if not - unconditionally abandoned, because it would justify the like execution - in every other State of the Confederacy; and the practice is - barbarous, uselessly cruel, and can only lead to the slaughter of - prisoners on both sides--a result too horrible to contemplate, without - making every effort to avoid it. - - On these and all kindred subjects, you will consider your authority - full and ample to make such arrangements as will temper the present - cruel character of the contest; and full confidence is placed in your - judgment, patriotism, and discretion, that while carrying out the - objects of your mission, you will take care that the equal rights of - the Confederacy be always preserved. - - Very respectfully, - [Signed] JEFFERSON DAVIS. - - - RICHMOND, 8th July, 1863. - - _His Excellency Jefferson Davis_-- - - SIR: Under the authority and instructions of your letter to me of the - 2d instant, I proceeded on the mission therein assigned, without - delay. The steamer Torpedo, commanded by Lieutenant Hunter Davidson, - of the navy, was put in readiness, as soon as possible, by order of - the Secretary of the Navy, and tendered for the service. At noon, on - the 3d, she started down James River, hoisting and bearing a flag of - truce after passing City Point. The nest day, the 4th, at about one - o'clock P. M., when within a few miles of Newport News, we were met by - a small boat of the enemy, carrying two guns, which also raised a - white flag before approaching us. The officer in command informed - Lieutenant Davidson that he had orders from Admiral Lee, on board the - United States flag-ship Minnesota, lying below, and then in view, not - to allow any boat or vessel to pass the point near which he was - stationed, without his permission. By this officer, I sent to Admiral - Lee a note, stating my objects and wishes, a copy of which is hereto - annexed, marked A. I also sent to the admiral, to be forwarded, - another note, in the same language, addressed to the officer in - command of the United States forces at Fort Monroe. The gunboat - proceeded immediately to the Minnesota with these dispatches, while - the Torpedo remained at anchor. Between three and four o'clock P. M., - another boat came up to us, bearing the admiral's answer, which is - hereunto annexed, marked B. We remained at or about this point in the - river until the 6th instant, when, having heard nothing further from - the admiral, at 12 o'clock M., on that day, I directed Lieutenant - Davidson again to speak the gunboat on guard, and to hand the officer - in command another note to the admiral. This was done. A copy of this - note is appended, marked C. At half past two o'clock P. M., two boats - approached us from below, one bearing an answer from the admiral to my - note to him of the 4th. This answer is annexed, marked D. The other - boat bore the answer of Lieutenant-Colonel William H. Ludlow, to my - note of the 4th, addressed to the officer in command at Fort Monroe. A - copy of this is annexed, marked E. Lieutenant-Colonel Ludlow also came - up in person in the boat that brought his answer to me, and conferred - with Colonel Ould, on board the Torpedo, upon some matters he desired - to see him about in connection with the exchange of prisoners. - - From the papers appended, embracing the correspondence referred to, it - will be seen that the mission failed from the refusal of the enemy to - receive or entertain it, holding the proposition for such a conference - "inadmissable." - - The influences and views that led to this determination, after so long - a consideration of the subject, must be left to conjecture. The reason - assigned for the refusal by the United States Secretary of War, to - wit: "that the customary agents and channels are considered adequate - for needful military communications and conferences," to one - acquainted with the facts, seems not only unsatisfactory, but very - singular and unaccountable, for it is certainly known to him that - these very agents, to whom he evidently alludes, heretofore agreed - upon in a former conference, in reference to the exchange of - prisoners, (one of the subjects embraced in your letter to me,) are - now, and have been for some time, distinctly at issue on several - important points. The existing cartel, owing to these disagreements, - is virtually suspended, so far as the exchange of officers on either - side is concerned. Notices of retaliation have been given on both - sides. - - The efforts, therefore, for the very many and cogent reasons set forth - in your letter of instructions to me, to see if these differences - could not be removed, and if a clearer understanding between the - parties, as to the general conduct of the war, could not be arrived - at, before this extreme measure should be resorted to by either party, - was no less in accordance with the dictates of humanity than in strict - conformity with the usages of belligerents in modern times. Deeply - impressed as I was with these views and feelings, in undertaking the - mission, and asking the conference, I can but express my profound - regret at the result of the effort made to obtain it; and I can but - entertain the belief, that if the conference sought had been granted, - mutual good could have been effected by it; and if this war, so - unnatural, so unjust, so unchristian, and so inconsistent with every - fundamental principle of American constitutional liberty, "must needs" - continue to be waged against us, that at least some of its severer - horrors, which now so eminently, threaten, might have been avoided. - - Very respectfully, - ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS. - - - - -CHAPTER XVI. - - OPERATION'S OF GENERAL TAYLOR IN LOUISIANA--THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY - IRRECOVERABLY LOST TO THE CONFEDERACY--FEDERALS FOILED AT - CHARLESTON--THE DIMINISHED CONFIDENCE OF THE SOUTH--FINANCIAL - DERANGEMENT--DEFECTIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEM OF THE SOUTH--MR. DAVIS' - LIMITED CONNECTION WITH IT--THE REASONS FOR THE FINANCIAL FAILURE OF - THE CONFEDERACY--INFLUENCE OF SPECULATION--ANOMALOUS SITUATION OF THE - SOUTH--MR. DAVIS' VIEWS OF THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF THE SOUTH AT THE - BEGINNING OF THE WAR--MILITARY OPERATIONS IN TENNESSEE--BRAGG RETREATS - TO CHATTANOOGA--MORGAN'S EXPEDITION--SURRENDER OF CUMBERLAND - GAP--FEDERAL OCCUPATION OF CHATTANOOGA--BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA--BRAGG'S - EXPECTATIONS--GRANTS OPERATIONS--BRAGG BADLY DEFEATED--PRESIDENT - DAVIS' VIEW OF THE DISASTER--GENERAL BRAGG RELIEVED FROM COMMAND OF - THE WESTERN ARMY--CENSURE OF THIS OFFICER--HIS MERITS AND SERVICES-- - THE UNJUST CENSURE OF MR. DAVIS AND GENERAL BRAGG FOR THE REVERSES IN - THE WEST--OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA IN THE LATTER PART OF 1863--CONDITION - OF THE SOUTH AT THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR--SIGNS OF EXHAUSTION--PRESIDENT - DAVIS' RECOMMENDATIONS--PUBLIC DESPONDENCY--THE WORK OF FACTION--ABUSE - OF MR. DAVIS IN CONGRESS--THE CONTRAST BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS - ASSAILANTS--DEFICIENCY OF FOOD--HOW CAUSED--THE CONFEDERACY EVENTUALLY - CONQUERED BY STARVATION. - - -Though indicating that stage of the war, when began the steady decline of -the Confederacy, the summer of 1863 was not wholly unredeemed by -successes, which, however transient in significance, threw no mean lustre -upon Southern arms. - -A series of brilliant operations marked the career of General Richard -Taylor in Lower Louisiana. Preceded by a successful campaign in the -Lafourche region, an expedition was undertaken by General Taylor against -Brashear City, in the latter days of June. A strong and important position -was carried, and eighteen hundred prisoners, with over five millions of -dollars worth of stores, were captured. For some time the hope was -indulged, that this success of General Taylor would compel the abandonment -of the Federal siege of Port Hudson, and that Taylor could also make a -successful diversion in favor of Vicksburg. This hope was disappointed, -and Taylor, not having the strength to cope with the large force of the -enemy sent against him, after the fall of the Mississippi strongholds, was -forced to abandon the country which he had so gallantly won. The valley of -the Mississippi was irrecoverably in Federal possession, and the -Confederacy was able at no subsequent stage of the war, to undertake any -serious enterprise for its redemption. - -At Charleston the Federal fleet and land forces continued, during the -summer, their fruitless and expensive attacks. The skill of General -Beauregard, and the firmness of his small command, made memorable the -siege of that devoted city, so hated and coveted by the North, yet among -the last prizes to fall into its hands. - -But momentary gleams of hope were insufficient to dispel the shadow of -disaster, which, by midsummer, seemed to have settled upon the fate of the -Confederacy. The violent blow dealt the material capacity of the South by -the surrender of Vicksburg; the diminished prestige, from the serious -check at Gettysburg, in its wondrous career of victory, and the frightful -losses of the Army of Northern Virginia, were immediately followed by a -marked abatement of that unwavering confidence in the ultimate result, -which had previously so stimulated the energy of the South. - -The material disability and embarrassment resulting from the possession, -by the enemy, of large sections of the Confederacy, and consequent -contraction of its territorial area; the destruction of property; the -serious disturbance of the whole commercial system of the South, by the -loss of Vicksburg; and the diminished confidence of the public, were -attended by a fatal derangement of the already failing Confederate system -of finance. - -In the American war, as in all wars, the question of finance entered -largely into the decision of the result. At an early period many sagacious -minds declared that the contest would finally be resolved into a question -as to which of the belligerents "had the longer purse." In acceptance of -this view, the belief was largely entertained that the financial distress -in the South, consequent upon the heavy reverses of this period, clearly -portended the failure of the Confederacy. - -President Davis, since the war, has avowed his appreciation of the -financial difficulties of the South, as a controlling influence in the -failure of the cause. By unanimous consent, the management of the -Confederate finances has been declared to have been defective. The -universal distress attendant upon a depreciated currency, which rarely -improved in seasons of military success, and grew rapidly worse with each -disaster, rendered the financial feature of Mr. Davis' administration, -peculiarly vulnerable to the industry of a class ever on the alert for a -pretext available to excite popular distrust of the President. With entire -justice, we might dismiss this subject, claiming for Mr. Davis the benefit -of the plea which always allows a ruler some exemption from responsibility -for the errors of a subordinate. We have rarely sought to fasten -culpability upon those who differed with him, in some instances, perhaps -where it would have more clearly established his own exculpation. No act -or utterance of Mr. Davis could be urged to show that _he_ ever claimed -for himself the benefit of such a plea. Fidelity to his friends is a trait -in his character, not less worthy of admiration than magnanimity and -forbearance to his foes. His ardent and sympathetic nature doubtless often -condoned the errors of those whose motives he knew to be good; but his -friends can testify that he far more frequently overlooked the asperities -of his enemies.[68] - -We have elsewhere explained the appointment of Mr. Memminger, as having -been dictated by other considerations than that of a reliance upon his -special fitness. But while doubting his capacity for his difficult and -anomalous situation, we are not so sure that he exhibited such marked -unfitness as should have forbidden his retention in office, and called for -the appointment of another, with the expectation of a more satisfactory -administration. In the end, yielding to the vast pressure against him, Mr. -Memminger left the cabinet, and Mr. Davis appointed, as his successor, a -gentleman unknown to himself, but recommended as the possessor of -financial talents of a high order. When Mr. Trenholm became Secretary of -the Treasury, the opportunity for reform had long since passed, if, -indeed, such an opportunity existed after the repulse at Gettysburg and -the surrender of Vicksburg. It is hardly within the range of probability, -that, after those reverses, any conceivable ingenuity could have arrested -the downward tendency of Confederate finances. In the history of -Confederate finance, before those disasters, is to be found much -extenuation, if not ample apology, for a system which was imposed by the -force of circumstances and the novelty of the situation, rather than by -the errors of one man, or a number of men. - -In his message of December, 1863, Mr. Davis reviewed the subject in all -its phases, as it had been presented up to that period, and sketched the -plan, afterwards adopted by Congress, but without the result hoped for of -increasing the value of the currency, by compulsory funding and large -taxation. His discussion of this subject was always characterized by -perspicuity and force, but finance was that branch of administration with -which he affected the least familiarity, and which he least assumed to -direct. Knowing the profound and unremitting attention which the subject -required, he sought the aid of others competent for the inquiry, which he -had little leisure to pursue. - -This subject, during the entire war, was a fruitful theme for the -disquisitions of charlatans. Finance is a subject confessedly intricate, -and but few men in any country are capable of able administration of this -branch of government. Yet the Confederacy swarmed with pretenders, -advocating opposing theories, which their authors, in every case, declared -to be infallible. The Confederate administration neither wanted for -advisers, nor did it fail to seek the advice of those who were reputed to -have financial abilities. Its errors were, to a large degree, shared by -the ablest statesmen of the South. - -Criticism is proverbially easy and cheap, after the result is ascertained, -and we now readily see the leading causes of the depreciation of -Confederate money. In the last twelve months of the war, the rapid and -uninterrupted depreciation was occasioned by the want of confidence in the -success of the cause, on the part of those who controlled the value of the -money. Such was the alarm and distrust consequent upon the disasters of -July, 1863, that the Confederate currency is stated to have declined a -thousand per cent., within a few weeks. Previous to that period the -decline was gradual, but far less alarming in its indications. The plan -adopted by the Government, partly in deference to popular prejudice -against direct taxation by the general Government, and partly as a -necessity of the situation--that of credit in the form of paper issues, -followed by the enormous issues necessary to meet the expenses of a war, -increasing daily in magnitude--pampered the spirit of speculation, which, -by the close of the second year, had become almost universal. This latter -influence may safely be declared to have greatly accelerated the -unfortunate result, and the extent of its prevalence reflects an -unpleasant shadow upon the otherwise unmarred fame of the South for -self-denying patriotism. - -It is customary to speak of the financial management of the Confederacy in -especial disparagement, when contrasted with that of the North. The -injustice of this contrast, however, is palpable. We are not required to -disparage the Federal financial system--which was, indeed, conducted with -consummate tact and ingenuity--to extenuate the errors, in this respect, -of the Confederacy. The circumstances of the antagonists were altogether -different; the position of the South financially, as in other respects, -was peculiar and anomalous. Completely isolated, with a large territory, -with virtually no specie circulation,[69] hastily summoned to meet the -exigencies of the most gigantic war of modern times, the South had no -alternative but to resort to an entirely artificial, and, to some extent, -untried system of finance. From the outset, the basis of the Confederate -system was the patriotism and the confidence of the people. The first was -nobly steadfast, but the second was necessarily dependent upon military -success. When at last the virtual collapse of the credit indicated the -increasing public despondency, it was plain that a catastrophe was near at -hand. - -It has been generally agreed that the only scheme by which the South could -have assured her credit, was to have sent large amounts of cotton to -Europe, during the first year of the war, while the blockade was not -effective. This plan, if successfully carried out, would have given the -Confederacy a cash basis in Europe of several hundred millions in gold, in -consequence of the high prices commanded by cotton afterwards. With even -tolerable management, the Confederacy would thus have been assured means -to meet the necessities of the war. The merit of this plan depended -largely upon its practicability. Mr. Davis approved it, but it is easy to -imagine how--engrossed with his multifarious cares, and occupied in -meeting the pressing exigencies of each day--he lacked opportunity to -mature and execute a measure of so much responsibility. - -While the campaign in Mississippi, which terminated so disastrously, was -still pending, General Bragg continued to occupy his position in Southern -Tennessee. Too weak to attack Rosecrans, because of the reduction of his -army, by the reinforcements sent to the Mississippi, Bragg was able merely -to maintain a vigilant observation of his adversary. After the fall of -Vicksburg General Rosecrans received reënforcements sufficient to justify -an advance against the Confederates. After an obstinate resistance the -Confederate commander was flanked by a force, which the superior strength -of his antagonist enabled him to detach, and abandoned a line of great -natural strength, and strongly fortified. This was an important success -to the enemy, who were hereafter able, with much better prospects, to -undertake expeditions against the heart of the Confederacy. General Bragg -extricated his army from a perilous position, and made a successful -retreat to Chattanooga. Auxiliary to the retreat of Bragg was the -diversion made by General John Morgan, which occasioned the detachment of -a portion of Burnside's forces from East Tennessee, which threatened -Bragg's rear. The expedition of Morgan was pushed by that daring officer -through Kentucky and across the Ohio, to the great alarm of the States -upon the border of that river, but ended in the capture of Morgan and -nearly all his command. - -A most painful surprise to the South was the surrender of Cumberland Gap, -early in September. This was a serious blow at the whole system of defense -in Tennessee and the adjacent States. A Richmond newspaper declared that -the possession of Cumberland Gap gave the enemy the "key to the back-door -of Virginia and the Confederacy." The officer in command of the position -was severely censured by the country, and though he has since explained -his conduct in terms, which appear to be satisfactory, the impression -prevailed until the end of the war, that the loss of this most important -position was caused by gross misconduct. The comment of President Davis -explains the serious nature of this affair: "The entire garrison, -including the commander, being still held prisoners by the enemy, I am -unable to suggest any explanation of this disaster, which laid open -Eastern Tennessee and South-western Virginia to hostile operations, and -broke the line of communication between the seat of government and Middle -Tennessee. This easy success of the enemy was followed by the advance of -General Rosecrans into Georgia, and our army evacuated Chattanooga." - -Thus the coöperating movements of Rosecrans in Middle Tennessee, and of -Burnside in East Tennessee, had the ample reward of expelling the -Confederates from their strong lines of defense in the mountains. -Cumberland Gap controlled the most important line of communication in the -Confederacy. Chattanooga was the portal from which the enemy could debouch -upon the level country of the Gulf and Atlantic States. The capture of -Vicksburg and seizure of the Mississippi Valley, by which the Confederacy -was sundered, was the first stage of conquest. Chattanooga was now the -base from which was to be attempted the next great step of Federal -ambition--the second _bisection_ of the Confederacy. - -When Rosecrans advanced into Georgia, after his occupation of Chattanooga, -the aspect of affairs was exceedingly threatening, and it became necessary -to strengthen Bragg sufficiently to enable him to give battle, and thus -check the advance of the enterprising Federal commander. With this view -the corps of Longstreet was temporarily detached from Lee, and sent to -Bragg. This accession to his forces gave General Bragg the opportunity of -winning one of the most brilliant victories of the war. The signal defeat -of Rosecrans was followed by his precipitate retreat into Chattanooga, -closely pressed by Bragg. - -For weeks the Federal army was besieged with a good prospect for its -ultimate surrender. The imperiled position of Rosecrans had the effect of -relieving the pressure of invasion at other points, forcing the -concentration, for his relief, of large bodies of troops withdrawn from -the armies in the Mississippi Valley and in Northern Virginia. General -Bragg made an able disposition of his forces in the neighborhood of -Chattanooga, and awaited with confidence the surrender of Rosecrans. He -subsequently said: "These dispositions, faithfully sustained, ensured the -enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage. -_Possessed of the shortest road to his depot, and the one by which -reënforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his -destruction was only a question of time._" - -The situation fully justified this statement. So crippled was Rosecrans by -his defeat at Chickamauga, that an attack upon Bragg was out of the -question. The alternative of starvation, or retreat, seemed forced upon -the Federal army. The roads in its rear were in a terrible condition, and -the distance over which its supplies had to be drawn, was sixty miles. At -this critical moment, General Grant, whose command had been enlarged, -after his success at Vicksburg, and now embraced the three main Federal -armies in the West, reached the field of operations. Grant immediately -executed a plan of characteristic boldness, by which he effected a -lodgment on the south side of the Tennessee River, and secured new lines -of communication, thus relieving the beleaguered army. General Longstreet, -to whom the holding of this all-important route was confided, made an -unsuccessful night attack designed to defeat Grant's movement. - -Having relieved the Federal army of the apprehension of starvation or a -disastrous retreat, Grant now meditated operations, which, however -hazardous, or however in violation of probability may have been their -success, were fully vindicated by the result. Waiting until he thought his -accumulation of forces sufficient to justify an assault upon the strong -positions of the Confederates, Grant finally made a vigorous and -well-planned attack with nearly his entire force. The result was a -disastrous defeat and retreat of Bragg's army. General Grant claimed, as -the fruits of his victory, seven thousand prisoners and nearly fifty -pieces of artillery. - -There were circumstances attending this battle peculiarly discouraging to -the South. These circumstances were thus commented upon by President -Davis: - - "After a long and severe battle, in which great carnage was inflicted - on him, some of our troops inexplicably abandoned positions of great - strength, and, by a disorderly retreat, compelled the commander to - withdraw the forces elsewhere successful, and finally to retire with - his whole army to a position some twenty or thirty miles to the rear. - It is believed that if the troops who yielded to the assault had - fought with the valor which they had displayed on previous occasions, - and which was manifested in this battle on the other parts of the - line, the enemy would have been repulsed with very great slaughter, - and our country would have escaped the misfortune, and the army the - mortification of the first defeat that has resulted from misconduct by - the troops." - -With this disastrous battle terminated the connection of General Bragg -with the army, which he commanded during a large portion of its varied -career. Fully acknowledging his defeat, General Bragg candidly avowed to -the Government the extent of a reverse, which he declared disabled him -from any serious resistance, should the Federal commander press his -success. At his own request he was relieved, and, seeking recuperation for -his shattered health, was not assigned to duty until February, 1864, when -President Davis ordered him to the discharge of the duties of "Commanding -General," at Richmond, the position held by General Lee before his -transfer to the command of the Army of Northern Virginia. - -No commander was more harshly criticised than Bragg, and the unfortunate -career of the Western army, under his command, was an inexhaustible theme -for diatribe and invective from the opponents of the Confederate -administration. Bragg was often declared to be, at once the most -incompetent and unlucky of the "President's favorites." Yet nothing is -more certain than that an impartial review of his military career will -demonstrate General Bragg to have been a soldier of rare and superior -merit. It certainly can not be claimed that his campaigns exhibited the -brilliant and solid achievements of several of those conducted by Lee, or -of the Valley campaigns of Jackson. The great disparity of numbers and -means of the two sections, enabled few Confederate commanders to achieve -the distinction of unmarred success, even before that period of decline -when disaster was the rule, and victory the exception with the Confederate -forces. - -But Bragg can not justly be denied the merit of having, with most -inadequate means, long deferred the execution of the Federal conquest of -the West. At the time of his assumption of command, in June, 1862, the -armies of Grant and Buell, nearly double his own aggregate of forces, were -overrunning the northern borders of the Gulf States, and threatening the -very heart of the Confederacy. His masterly combinations, attended by loss -altogether disproportioned to the results accomplished, recovered large -sections of territory, which had been for months the easy prey of the -enemy, and transferred the seat of war to Middle Tennessee. Here he -maintained his position for nearly a year, vigorously assailing the enemy -at every opportunity, constantly menacing his communications, and firmly -holding his important line, in the face of overwhelming odds, while the -Confederate armies in every other quarter were losing ground. Finally, -when forced back by the concentration of Federal forces, released by their -successes elsewhere, Bragg skillfully eluded the combinations for his -destruction, and, at an opportune moment, delivered Rosecrans one of the -most timely and stunning blows inflicted during the war. No fact of the -war is more clearly established than Bragg's exculpation from any -responsibility for the escape of the Federal army from the field of -Chickamauga. His positive commands were disobeyed, his plan of battle -threatened with entire derangement by the errors of subordinates, and the -escape of Rosecrans secured by the same causes. But still more cruel was -the disappointment of Bragg's well-grounded expectation of a successful -siege of Chattanooga. So clear is his exculpation in this case, that no -investigation of facts, severely reflecting upon others, is required. - -While the controversy between Bragg and Longstreet was pending, some -disposition was manifested to censure the former for his rejection of a -plan of campaign proposed by Longstreet after the victory of Chickamauga. -The latter officer suggested crossing the Tennessee above Chattanooga, and -then moving upon the enemy's rear, with a view to force him back upon -Nashville. The pregnant criticism of General Bragg quickly disposes of the -suggestion. Said he: "The suggestion of a movement by our right, -immediately after the battle, to the north of the Tennessee, and thence -upon Nashville, requires notice only because it will find a place on the -files of the department. Such a movement was utterly impossible for want -of transportation. Nearly half our army consisted of reënforcements just -before the battle, without a wagon or an artillery horse, and nearly, if -not quite, a third of the artillery horses on the field had been lost. The -railroad bridges, too, had been destroyed to a point south of Ringgold, -and on all the road from Cleveland to Knoxville. To these insurmountable -difficulties were added the entire absence of means to cross the river, -except by fording at a few precarious points too deep for artillery, and -the well-known danger of sudden rises, by which all communication would be -cut off, a contingency which did actually happen a few days after the -visionary scheme was abandoned." General Bragg continues a recitation of -cogent considerations in support of his objections to a plan which he -declares utterly wanting in "military propriety." - -The culmination of Bragg's unpopularity was his defeat at Missionary -Ridge. No officer, save Lee, could, by any possibility, have hoped for a -dispassionate judgment by the public, at this desperate stage of the war, -of an affair so calamitous. The real explanation of that battle was -unquestionably contained in the extract from President Davis' message -previously given. Although Bragg could oppose but little more than thirty -thousand troops to the eighty thousand which Grant threw against him, the -strength of his position would have compensated for this disparity, had -his troops fought with the usual spirit of Confederate soldiers. - -It was not to be anticipated that the enemies of the President in Congress -and the hostile press would fail to find a pretext upon which to throw the -responsibility upon Mr. Davis. The disaster was declared to have resulted -from the detachment of Longstreet for an expedition into East Tennessee. -It is only necessary to state the facts of the case to show the falsity -and injustice of this criticism. In the first place, as we have already -stated, Bragg's force was sufficient to hold his tremendously strong -position without Longstreet, should his army fight with its usual spirit. -Secondly, Longstreet's corps was a part of Lee's army, detached for a -purely temporary purpose with Bragg, and its absence was a source of -constant anxiety to General Lee. This temporary purpose was well served at -the battle of Chickamauga, which Bragg designed to be a destructive blow, -and which failed in a part of its purpose, through no fault of that -commander. - -It was never intended to leave Longstreet in the West any longer than was -necessary to relieve Bragg in his great exigency after the evacuation of -Chattanooga. That result being accomplished, Longstreet was detained for a -few weeks, in the expectation that Rosecrans, driven to desperation by his -necessities, would attempt to retreat, in which event, Longstreet could -perform valuable service in aiding to destroy the Federal army. When -Grant, however, opened the Federal communications, and Longstreet was -foiled in his effort to prevent it, there was no longer a sufficient -reason for his detention so far from Lee. Accordingly, he was sent through -East Tennessee, with the double design of opening communication with -Virginia, where, at any moment, he might be needed, and of clearing East -Tennessee of the forces of Burnside. - -Had Longstreet's expedition been successful, it can not be doubted that -the pressure against Bragg would have been immediately relieved, and a -vital section restored to the Confederacy. We can not pause, however, to -review the incidents of General Longstreet's movement, nor to revive the -controversy between himself and a subordinate, evoked by an expedition -whose results exhibited few features of success. - -President Davis, better acquainted with the facts of the war than the -critics who so often mislead the public, held General Bragg in that high -estimation to which his unquestioned patriotism and his military qualities -entitled him. Of General Bragg it may be fairly said that he made the most -of his opportunities and his means. If he made retreats, they were always -preceded by bloody fights, and marked by obstinate resistance. If his -constrained and sullen retreats lost territory, they were not comparable -in that respect with that mysterious "strategy" of other commanders in -high favor with the opponents of Mr. Davis, which eventually threatened to -"toll" the enemy to the Atlantic coast, or the Gulf of Mexico, without -once bringing him to a general engagement. - -Bragg never feared to stake his fame on the gage of battle, and, if he -sustained reverses, he won many more victories. An educated soldier, he -was also a rigid disciplinarian, and had little toleration for the -demagogism so conspicuous in volunteer armies. This was the occasion of -much of the personal enmity by which he was embarrassed both in and out of -the army. But, whatever the justice of the public condemnation of Bragg, -his period of usefulness in the Western army was at an end. Very soon -afterwards General Joseph E. Johnston took command of the army in Northern -Georgia. - -The two armies in Virginia, weakened by the detachments from each sent to -the West, continued inactive until autumn. In October, General Lee -prepared a brilliant campaign, the object of which was to place his army -between General Meade and Washington. Meade, though forced back to the -neighborhood of Manassas and Centreville, had become apprized of Lee's -movement in time to prevent the consummation of the strategy of the -Confederate commander. An incident of the expedition was the severe -repulse of a part of General Hill's command, attended with considerable -loss. Meanwhile, General Imboden, coöperating with the movements of the -main army, captured several hundred prisoners and valuable stores in the -Shenandoah Valley. Early in November, nearly two thousand Confederates -were captured at Rappahannock Station by a movement marked by skill and -gallantry on the part of General Sedgwick. The campaign in Northern -Virginia terminated with a handsome success by the division of General -Edward Johnson over a large detachment from Meade's army at Mine Run. In -December, General Averill, with a force of Federal cavalry, made a -destructive raid into South-western Virginia, and destroyed portions of -the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. - -At the close of 1863, there were many signs of the approaching exhaustion -of the South, yet there was good reason to hope that, by a vigorous use of -means yet remaining, the war might be brought to a favorable conclusion. -The peace party of the North, despite the increased strength and -popularity of Mr. Lincoln's administration, resulting from the Federal -successes of the summer, was evidently becoming more bold and defiant. The -whole North, too, was disappointed at the prospect of an indefinite -resistance by the South. Gettysburg and Vicksburg were not followed, as -had been anticipated, by the immediate collapse of the Confederacy. Under -such circumstances, the South had much to anticipate from a bold and -defiant front at the opening of the next campaign. Unquestionably its -resources were less adequate than before, but there was evidently capacity -to prolong the war for an almost indefinite period. Thus, while the -Confederacy could not cherish the hope of daring exploits at the opening -of the campaign, which should again make the enemy apprehensive for his -own homes, there was a well-grounded anticipation of a successful -defensive, which should wear out the enemy's ardor, and again present -opportunities for bold enterprise. - -The message of President Davis to Congress, which met early in December, -was one of his ablest productions. Reviewing the entire field of the war, -in its more important phases, it was equally remarkable for its frank -statement of the situation, and for the energetic policy recommended. - -There could be no difficulty in comprehending the needs of the Confederacy -at this distressing period. The three great elements of war--men, money, -and subsistence--were now demanded to a greatly increased extent. In -nothing was the campaign of 1863 more fatal, than in the terrible losses -inflicted on the armies of the Confederacy. At the close of the year, the -Army of Northern Virginia, including the absent corps of Longstreet, was -weaker, by more than a third of the force carried into Pennsylvania. The -losses of the Western army had fearfully diminished its strength, and its -frequent disasters had greatly impaired its _morale_. Measures were now -required which should repair the losses, and, if possible, increase the -army beyond its strength at the opening of the previous campaign, in order -to meet the enormous conscription preparing at the North. - -President Davis indicated the following methods of adding to the army: -"Restoring to the army all who are improperly absent, putting an end to -substitution, modifying the exemption law, restricting details, and -placing in the ranks such of the able-bodied men now employed as wagoners, -nurses, cooks, and other employés as are doing service, for which the -negroes may be found competent." - -These were evidently the last expedients by which the Confederate armies -could be recruited from the white population. By successive enactments -Congress had empowered the President to call into the field all persons -between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. The exigency consequent upon -the reverses of the summer had necessitated the requisition of the last -reserves provided by Congress--the class between forty and forty-five. -Conscription had failed to give the effective strength calculated upon. -Each extension of the law exhibited, in the result, an accession of -numbers greatly below the estimate upon which it was based. This was -largely due to the inefficient execution of the law, and to the opposition -which it encountered in many localities. But the results also indicated a -most exaggerated estimate of the available arms-bearing population of the -South. In the latter part of 1863, the rolls of the Adjutant-General's -office in Richmond showed a little more than four hundred thousand men -under arms; and Secretary Seddon stated that, from desertions and other -causes, "not more than a half--never two-thirds--of the soldiers were in -the ranks." - -The message of Mr. Davis indicated defective features in the system of -conscription, and suggested improvements as follows: - - "On the subject of exemptions, it is believed that abuses can not be - checked unless the system is placed on a basis entirely different from - that now provided by law. The object of your legislation has been, not - to confer privileges on classes, but to exonerate from military duty - such number of persons skilled in the various trades, professions, and - mechanical pursuits, as could render more valuable service to their - country by laboring in their present occupation than by going into the - ranks of the army. The policy is unquestionable, but the result would, - it is thought, be better obtained by enrolling all such persons, and - allowing details to be made of the number necessary to meet the wants - of the country. Considerable numbers are believed to be now exempted - from the military service who are not needful to the public in their - civil vocation. - - "Certain duties are now performed throughout the country by details - from the army, which could be as well executed by persons above the - present conscript age. An extension of the limit, so as to embrace - persons over forty-five years, and physically fit for service in - guarding posts, railroads, and bridges, in apprehending deserters, - and, where practicable, assuming the place of younger men detailed for - duty with the nitre, ordnance, commissary, and quartermaster's bureaus - of the War Department, would, it is hoped, add largely to the - effective force in the field, without an undue burden on the - population." - -The message further recommended legislation replacing "not only enlisted -cooks, but wagoners, and other employés in the army, by negroes." From -these measures the President expected that the army would be "so -strengthened, for the ensuing campaign, as to put at defiance the utmost -efforts of the enemy." - -But the meagre results of conscription revealed not only an excessive -calculation of the numerical strength of the Confederacy; they indicated -the reluctance with which the harsh necessities of the war, in its later -stages, were met. As the war was protracted, popular ardor naturally -waned, and in the presence of losses and reverses, the spirit of voluntary -sacrifice gradually disappeared. Draft and impressment were now required -to obtain the services and the means, which, in the beginning, were -lavishly proffered. - -Partially the result of a natural popular weariness of the increasing -exactions of a long and exhaustive struggle, these were also the -legitimate fruits of the distrust so assiduously inculcated by the -fault-finders. When reverses to their armies came with appalling rapidity, -and, in many instances, in spite of the exertions of their ablest and most -popular leaders, the people saw confidence and industry only in their -Government, and that Government they were constantly taught to believe -grossly incompetent and unworthy. Under such circumstances, how could -there be that unity and coöperation, without which the cause was -preordained to failure? In that industry which sought every possible -occasion for censure, that ingenuity which exaggerated every error, that -intemperance which filled the halls of Congress with denunciation, and the -land with clamor and discontent, the North at last found allies which ably -assisted its armies. - -More violent, intemperate, and unscrupulous than ever, were the assaults -upon the administration, in that long period of agony which followed the -disasters in Mississippi and Pennsylvania. Such was an appropriate -occasion, when a grief-stricken country implored the unanimity which alone -could bring relief, for agitation, revenge, and invective. In Congress Mr. -Davis was assailed with furious vituperation, because he had refused, at -the instance of a member, to remove Bragg, and place Johnston in command -of the Western army. Yet General Johnston, after a visit to Tennessee, -earnestly advised the President _not_ to remove Bragg, as the _public -interests would suffer by that step_. Almost daily Mr. Davis was assailed -for not having properly estimated the war, in the diatribes of an able -editor, who himself, but a few weeks before hostilities opened, declared -_there would be no war_. Of such a character were the accusers and the -accusations. - -If Jefferson Davis courted revenge, he could find ample satisfaction in -the contrast between himself and some of his foremost accusers, which the -sequel has drawn. _He_ fell at last, but only when that cause was lost, -which he unselfishly loved, and which his heart followed to its glorious -grave. His name is already immortal--the embodiment of the heroism, the -virtues, the sufferings, the glory of a people who revere him and scorn -his persecutors. Nor can the South forget that many, who, during her -arduous struggle, constantly assailed her chosen ruler, have since taken -refuge in the camp of those who first conquered, and now seek to degrade -her people. - -A source of universal alarm in the South, at this period, was the -deficiency of food. We have elsewhere quoted freely the admonitions of -President Davis respecting the question of supplies, and indicating the -cause which led to so much suffering in the armies of the Confederacy. -Ever since the loss of large sections of Tennessee, in the spring of 1862, -this subject had occasioned anxiety. Without entering into details, it may -be briefly stated, that, with the loss of Kentucky and the larger portion -of Tennessee, the Confederacy lost the main source of its supplies of -meat. As other sections were occupied by the enemy, and communications -were destroyed, the area of the Confederacy became more and more -contracted, and its sources of supply still more limited. Even when -supplies were abundant in many quarters, the armies in the field suffered -actual want, in consequence of the want of transportation, and of the -remoteness of the supplies from the lines of the railroads. - -But while the meat in the Confederacy was rapidly diminishing in quantity, -as the Federal armies advanced, and seized or destroyed every thing in the -shape of subsistence, the army was still deprived of supplies which should -have been made available. The unpatriotic practice of hoarding -supplies--a temptation suggested by the rife spirit of speculation, -arising from a redundant and depreciated currency--necessitated the -passage of impressment laws. These laws were practically rendered nugatory -by the inadequate provisions for their execution. In no respect was the -timid and demagogical legislation of the Confederate Congress, so -illustrated as by its adoption of a system of impressment, which -aggravated the very evil it was designed to remedy. - -Various expedients were attempted, with partial success, for obtaining -subsistence beyond the limits of the Confederacy. It will be readily seen, -however, how precarious was this dependence. It was impossible for the -Confederacy to maintain its armies, while its resources in every other -respect were rapidly reaching the point of exhaustion. In the end the want -of food proved the most efficient adversary of the South. The final -military catastrophe made the Federal army master of a country already -half conquered by starvation.[70] - - - - -CHAPTER XVII. - - AN EFFORT TO BLACKEN THE CHARACTER OF THE SOUTH--THE PERSECUTION OF - MR. DAVIS AS THE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ASSUMED OFFENSES OF THE SOUTH-- - REPUTATION OF THE SOUTH FOR HUMANITY--TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR-- - EARLY ACTION OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT UPON THE SUBJECT--MR. - DAVIS' LETTER TO MR. LINCOLN--THE COBB-WOOL NEGOTIATIONS--PERFIDIOUS - CONDUCT OF THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES--A CARTEL ARRANGED BY GENERALS DIX - AND HILL--COMMISSIONER OULD--HIS CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE FEDERAL AGENT - OF EXCHANGE--REPEATED PERFIDY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT--SUSPENSION OF - THE CARTEL CAUSED BY THE BAD FAITH OF THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION, AND - THE SUFFERING WHICH IT CAUSED--EFFORTS OF THE CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES - TO RENEW THE OPERATION OF THE CARTEL--HUMANE OFFER OF COMMISSIONER - OULD--JUSTIFICATION OF THE CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES--GUILT OF THE - FEDERAL GOVERNMENT--MR. DAVIS' STATEMENT OF THE MATTER--COLONEL OULD'S - LETTER TO MR. ELDRIDGE--NORTHERN STATEMENTS: GENERAL BUTLER, NEW YORK - TRIBUNE, ETC.--THE CHARGE OF CRUELTY AGAINST THE SOUTH--A CONTRAST - BETWEEN ANDERSONVILLE AND ELMIRA--IMPOVERISHMENT OF THE SOUTH-- - DISREPUTABLE MEANS EMPLOYED TO AROUSE RESENTMENT OF THE NORTH--THE - VINDICATION OF THE SOUTH AND OF MR. DAVIS--HIS STAINLESS CHARACTER, - HIS HUMANITY AND FORBEARANCE--AN INQUIRY OF HISTORY. - - -It is in vain to invoke the admiration of mankind for qualities of -greatness, displayed either in the history of a nation or the life of an -individual, unless those qualities shall have been adorned by the practice -of humanity and the observance of high moral obligation. Since the -political fabric of the South has been overthrown, a brave and virtuous -people cherish with a more tenacious affection than ever, that honorable -reputation which was their birthright, and which they worthily -illustrated during the late war. The violent commotion with which the -American Union was but lately convulsed has renewed the historical analogy -of revolutions, not less in the sequel than in its progress. When the -strife of arms was ended, and the two great armies ceased their death -struggles, and parted with that mutual respect which is characteristic of -brave antagonists, events were far from encouraging the cessation of -sectional bitterness which was to be hoped for. - -The dominant party at the North, apparently not satisfied with the -political overthrow of the South, and the complete extinction of its -social system, has followed up the triumphs of the Federal armies with a -persistent and implacable war upon the character and reputation of the -South. To affix a stigma upon a conquered foe, to brand with infamy a -class of their own countrymen--the descendants of the compatriots of -Franklin, Hancock, and Adams--and to consign to perpetual obloquy a cause -which enlisted the sympathies of five millions of people, are the aims of -a malignant and remorseless faction. These are the motives which have -instigated the effort to frame an indictment against the Christianity, the -morality, and the humanity of the South, and to visit every form of -degradation, to practice every refinement of cruelty upon its most -distinguished representative. - -It is impossible to explain, upon any other theory, the exceptional rigor -with which, since the termination of the war, Mr. Davis has been pursued. -As the most honored by the South, he has been selected as the proper -substitute upon whom to visit the offenses of his people. To convict -Jefferson Davis of heinous offenses against humanity is to blacken the -cause which he represented--to degrade the people of whom he was the -chosen ruler. The North should have been admonished, by previous -examples, of the futility of its attempts to prejudge historical questions -of such moment. Of what avail were the malignity, the misrepresentation, -and the unrelenting vindictiveness of England against Napoleon? - -As yet, the North has been unable, even by _ex parte_ evidence, to obtain -a pretext for the arraignment of Jefferson Davis for those atrocious -crimes of which it was pretended he was guilty. Even perjury has proven -inadequate to the invention of material with which to sustain a complicity -in guilt, from which his previous character alone should have vindicated -him. Who can doubt the inevitable recoil when the investigations of -history, unobstructed by prejudice and passion, shall lay bare the _facts_ -upon which posterity will render its verdict? History, in such a question, -will know neither North nor South, nor will it accept all testimony as -_truth_ which comes under the guise of "_loyalty_," nor reject as -_falsehood_ all upon which has been placed the odium of "_disloyalty_." - -In this volume, we could not, even if so disposed, avoid reference to that -question which so involves the honor and humanity of the South--_the -extent of her regard, in the conduct of the late war, for those moral -obligations which are recognized by all Christian and civilized -communities_. The course of her enemies has left the South no alternative, -and she can not be apprehensive of the result when the record is fairly -consulted. - -We have now reached, with a due regard for chronological order, a point -where naturally arises the subject of the treatment of prisoners, which, -in the later months of 1863, assumed its most interesting phase. We -approach the subject not with any expectation of enlightenment of the -Northern mind. Upon this subject a large portion of the Northern people -have resolutely turned their backs upon all statements which do not favor -their sectional prejudices. Calumnies are often believed by mere force of -iteration; and so persistent has been the effort to poison the Northern -mind with falsehood that at least a generation must pass away before the -South can expect an impartial hearing. Nevertheless, by grouping together, -in these pages, important testimony from various sources, and _confined to -neither section_, we hope to promote, however feebly, the great end of -historic truth. - -At an early period of the contest, the Confederate Government recognized -its obligation to treat prisoners of war with humanity and consideration. -Before any action was taken by Congress upon the subject, the executive -authorities provided prisoners with proper quarters and barracks, and with -rations--the same in quantity and quality as those furnished to the -Confederate soldiers who guarded them. The first action of Congress with -reference to prisoners was taken on the 21st of May, 1861. Congress then -provided that "all prisoners of war taken, whether on land or at sea, -during the pending hostilities with the United States, shall be -transferred by the captors from time to time, and as often as convenient, -to the Department of War; and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of -War, with the approval of the President, to issue such instructions to the -Quartermaster-General and his subordinates as shall provide for the safe -custody and sustenance of prisoners of war; _and the rations furnished -prisoners of war shall be the same in quantity and quality as those -furnished to enlisted men in the army of the Confederacy_." This declared -policy of the Confederate authorities was adhered to, not only in the -earlier months of the war, when provisions were abundant, but was -afterwards pursued as far as possible under the _peculiar style of warfare -waged by the North_. Even amid the losses and privations to which the -enemy subjected them, they sought to carry out the humane purpose of this -solemn declaration. - -The first public announcement by President Davis, with respect to -prisoners, was made in a letter to President Lincoln, dated July 6th, -1861. This letter was called forth by the alleged harsh treatment of the -crew of the Confederate vessel _Savannah_, then prisoners in the hands of -the enemy. We extract a paragraph of this letter: - - "It is the desire of this Government so to conduct the war now - existing, as to mitigate its horrors as far as may be possible; and, - with this intent, its treatment of the prisoners captured by its - forces has been marked by the greatest humanity and leniency - consistent with public obligation; some have been permitted to return - home on parole, others to remain at large under similar condition - within this Confederacy, and all have been furnished with rations for - their subsistence, such as are allowed to our own troops. It is only - since the news has been received of the treatment of the prisoners - taken on the _Savannah_, that I have been compelled to withdraw these - indulgences, and to hold the prisoners taken by us in strict - confinement." - -In his message, dated July 20th, 1861, he mentioned this letter, and thus -alluded to the expected reply from President Lincoln: - - "I earnestly hope this promised reply (which has not yet been - received) will convey the assurance that prisoners of war will be - treated, in this unhappy contest, with that regard for humanity, which - has made such conspicuous progress in the conduct of modern warfare." - -Several months elapsed, after the beginning of hostilities, before the -captures on either side were sufficiently numerous to demand much -consideration. A proposition was even made in the Confederate Congress, to -return the Federal prisoners, taken at the first battle of Manassas, -without any formality whatever. - -In February, 1862, negotiations occurred between the two governments, with -a view to the arrangement of a system of exchange. In these negotiations -Generals Howell Cobb and Wool represented their respective Governments. -The result was a cartel, by which prisoners of either side should be -paroled within ten days after their capture, and delivered on the frontier -of their own country. A point of difference was, however, raised, as to a -provision requiring each party to pay the expense of transporting their -prisoners to the frontier. This difference General Wool reported to the -Federal Government, which refused to pay these expenses. At a second -interview, March 1st, 1862, this action of the Federal authorities being -made known to General Cobb, the latter immediately conceded the point, and -proposed to make the cartel conform in all its features to the wishes of -General Wool. The latter declined any arrangement, declaring "that his -Government had changed his instructions," and abruptly terminated the -negotiations. - -The explanation of this conduct was apparent. While the negotiations -between Generals Wool and Cobb were pending, Fort Donelson had fallen, -reversing the previous state of things, and giving the North an excess of -prisoners. These prisoners, instead of being sent South on parole, were -carried into the interior of the North, and treated with severity and -indignity. Repudiating this agreement, just as soon as it was ascertained -that their captures at Donelson placed the South at disadvantage, the -Federal authorities foreshadowed that "consistently perfidious conduct," -which President Davis declared to be characteristic of their entire course -upon the subject. - -It was impossible to bring the Federal Government to any arrangement, -until the fortune of war again placed the Confederates in possession of -the larger number of prisoners. An immediate consequence of the -Confederate successes in the summer of 1862, was the indication of a more -accommodating spirit by the enemy. Negotiations between General D. H. -Hill, on behalf of the Confederate authorities, and General John A. Dix, -on behalf of his Government, resulted in the adoption of a new cartel of a -completely satisfactory and humane character. Under this cartel, which -continued in operation for twelve months, the Confederate authorities -restored to the enemy many thousands of prisoners in excess of those whom -they held for exchange, and encampments of the surplus paroled prisoners -were established in the United States, where the men were able to receive -the comforts and solace of constant communication with their homes and -families. In July, 1863, the fortune of war again favored the enemy, and -they were enabled to exchange for duty the men previously delivered to -them, against those captured and paroled at Vicksburg and Port Hudson. The -prisoners taken at Gettysburg, however, remained in their hands, and -should have been at once returned to the Confederate lines on parole, to -await exchange. Instead of executing a duty imposed by the plainest -dictates of justice and good faith, pretexts were instantly sought for -holding them in permanent captivity. General orders rapidly succeeded each -other from the bureau at Washington, placing new constructions on an -agreement which had given rise to no dispute while the Confederates -retained the advantage in the number of prisoners. With a disregard of -honorable obligations, almost unexampled, the Federal authorities did not -hesitate, in addition to retaining the prisoners captured by them, to -declare null the paroles given by the prisoners captured by the -Confederates in the same series of engagements, and liberated on condition -of not again serving until exchanged. They then openly insisted on -treating the paroles given by their own soldiers as invalid, and those of -Confederate soldiers, given under precisely similar circumstances, as -binding. A succession of similar unjust pretensions was maintained in a -correspondence tediously prolonged, and every device employed, to cover -the disregard of an obligation, which, between belligerent nations, is -only to be enforced by a sense of honor. - -We have not space sufficient for even a sketch of the protracted -correspondence, which ensued between the commissioners of exchange, -respecting the suspension of the cartel. In its progress Commissioner Ould -triumphantly vindicated the action of the Confederate Government, in every -instance meeting in an unanswerable manner, the counter-charges of the -Federal authorities. The South can require no better record of its -honorable and humane conduct, than is furnished by this correspondence. -The Confederate Government was singularly fortunate in the selection of -Mr. Ould, who unites to a most honorable and amiable character, an -intellect of unusual vigor and astuteness, as was abundantly shown in his -conclusive demonstrations of the perfidious conduct of the authorities at -Washington. - -For twelve months after the date of the cartel (that is, until after the -battle of Gettysburg), the Confederates held a considerable excess of -prisoners. It has never been alleged, amid all the calumny which has -assailed the South, that during this period, the Federal prisoners (unless -held on serious charges), were not promptly delivered. Commissioner Ould -several times urged the Federal authorities to send increased -transportation for their prisoners. On the other hand, numbers of -Confederate officers and soldiers were kept in irons and dungeons, in many -instances without even having charges preferred against them. - -On the 26th July, 1863, Commissioner Ould said in a letter to the Federal -Agent of Exchange: "Now that our official connection is being terminated, -I say to you in the fear of God--and I appeal to him for the truth of the -declaration--that there has been no single moment, from the time we were -first brought together in connection with the matter of exchange, to the -present hour, during which there has not been an open and notorious -violation of the cartel, by your authorities. Officers and men, numbering -over hundreds, have been, during your whole connection with the cartel, -kept in cruel confinement, sometimes in irons, or doomed to cells, without -charges or trial.... The last phase of the enormity, however, exceeds all -others. Although you have many thousands of our soldiers now in -confinement in your prisons, and especially in that horrible hold of -death, Fort Delaware, you have not, for several weeks, sent us any -prisoners.... For the first two or three times some sort of an excuse was -attempted. None is given at this present arrival. I do not mean to be -offensive when I say that effrontery could not give one." - -In reply to these and similar charges by Commissioner Ould, which he, in -repeated instances, substantiated by naming the Confederate officers and -soldiers thus shamefully treated, the enemy retorted with a charge of -similar treatment of Federal prisoners. Yet the prison records of the -Confederacy, in no instance, show the detention of prisoners while the -cartel was in operation, unless held under grave charges. Commissioner -Ould, in his letter of August 1, 1863, effectually silenced this -replication. Said he: "You have claimed and exercised the right to retain -officers and men indefinitely, not only upon charges actually preferred, -but upon mere suspicion. You have now in custody officers who were in -confinement when the cartel was framed, and who have since been declared -exchanged. Some of them have been tried, but most of them have languished -in prison all the weary time without trial or charges. _I stand prepared -to prove these assertions._ This course was pursued, too, in the face not -only of notice, but of protest. Do you deny to us the right to detain -officers and men for trial upon grave charges, while you claim the right -to keep in confinement any who may be the object of your suspicion or -special enmity?" - -The paroles issued after capture were respected by both parties, until, -about the middle of 1863, the Federal authorities declared void the -paroles of thousands of their soldiers, who had been sent North by the -Confederate Government. At that time, it is noteworthy, the Federal -Government had no lists of paroled prisoners to be charged against the -Confederacy. The latter had previously discharged all its obligations from -its large excess of prisoners, leaving still a large balance in their -favor unsatisfied. In this condition of affairs, Commissioner Ould was -notified that "exchanges will be confined to such equivalents as are held -in confinement on either side." After such a display of perfidy, no -surprise should be occasioned by the subsequent action of the Federal -authorities. This announcement, in unmistakable phraseology, meant simply -that, as the Confederates had returned equivalents for all paroles held -against them, and the Federals held no paroles to be charged against the -Confederacy, hereafter no exchange would be made except for men actually -in captivity. In other words, having received all the benefits which they -could from the observance of the cartel, the Federal Government openly -repudiated it, the moment that its operation would favor their -antagonists. Commissioner Ould promptly declined the perfidious -proposition of the enemy, which would have continued thousands of -Confederate soldiers in prison, after their Government had returned all -prisoners in their possession, and yet held the paroles of Federal -soldiers, largely exceeding in number the Confederate soldiers held -captive by the enemy. Subsequently the Federal officers and soldiers, in -violation of their paroles, and without being declared exchanged, were -ordered back to their commands. Commissioner Ould then very properly -declared exchanged an equal number of Confederate officers and men, who -had been paroled by the enemy at Vicksburg. - -With these transactions ended all exchanges under that provision of the -cartel which provided the delivery of prisoners within ten days. All -subsequent deliveries of prisoners were made by special agreement. The -facts which we have stated, showing the suspension of the cartel to have -been occasioned by the _bad faith of the Federal Government, are upon -record_, and can not be disputed. They are accessible to every Northern -reader, who may feel disposed to satisfy his judgment, _by facts_, rather -than to foster prejudices based upon the most monstrous falsehoods, ever -invented in the interest of fanaticism and hate. The suspension of the -cartel was the direct cause of those terrible sufferings which were -afterwards endured by the true men of both sides. It led directly to the -hardships, the exposure, and hunger of Andersonville, the cruelties of -Camp Douglas, the freezing of Confederate soldiers upon the bleak shores -of the Northern lakes, and those countless woes which are endured by the -occupants of military prisons, even when conducted upon the most humane -system. Having been guilty of a shameful violation of faith, the Federal -Government persisted in a policy, which was not only cruel to the South, -but brought upon the brave men who were fighting its battles, the -sufferings which the North has falsely pictured with every conceivable -feature of horror and atrocity. - -Until the end of the war, the Confederate Government continued its efforts -to secure the renewed operations of the cartel--a policy which humanity to -its own defenders demanded. Why it was not renewed, the motives which -dictated a policy which occasioned an almost unexampled degree of human -suffering, is a question abundantly answered in the testimony here -adduced, the most conclusive portions of which comes from Northern -sources. - -In January, 1864, it was plain from the disposition of the enemy that the -majority of the prisoners of both sides were doomed to confinement for -many weary months, if not until the end of the war. Under this impression, -Commissioner Ould wrote the following letter, which was promptly delivered -to the Federal Agent of Exchange: - - "CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEPARTMENT, - "RICHMOND, VA., January 24, 1864. - - "_Major-General E. A. Hitchcock, Agent of Exchange_-- - - "SIR: In view of the present difficulties attending the exchange and - release of prisoners, I propose that all such on either side shall be - attended by a proper number of their own surgeons, who, under rules to - be established, shall be permitted to take charge of their health and - comfort. I also propose that these surgeons shall act as commissaries, - with power to receive and distribute such contributions of money, - food, clothing, and medicines as may be forwarded for the relief of - the prisoners. I further propose that these surgeons shall be selected - by their own Government, and that they shall have full liberty, at any - and all times, through the Agents of Exchange, _to make reports not - only of their own acts, but of any matters relating to the welfare of - the prisoners_. - - "Respectfully, your obedient servant, - "ROBERT OULD, - "_Agent of Exchange_." - -To this humane proposition _no answer was ever made_. It is needless to -depict the alleviation of misery which its adoption would have secured. -Can there be but one interpretation of the motives of those who rejected -this noble offer? These propositions are indeed extraordinary, in view of -the obloquy heaped upon the Confederate authorities for their alleged -indifference to the health and comfort of their prisoners. Most -noticeable, however, is the invitation extended to the Federal authorities -to investigate, and report to the world, the treatment and condition of -Federal soldiers in Southern prisons. - -But this is far from completing the evidence which convicts the Federal -Government of a purpose to trade upon the sufferings of their prisoners, -and thus inflame the resentment of the North during the war, and shows the -malignant purpose of a faction to establish a foul libel upon the South in -the mind of posterity. On the 10th of August, 1864, Commissioner Ould -wrote as follows: - - "_Major John E. Mulford, Assistant Agent of Exchange_-- - - "SIR: You have several times proposed to me to exchange the prisoners - respectively held by the two belligerents, officer for officer, and - man for man. The same offer has also been made by other officials - having charge of matters connected with the exchange of prisoners. - This proposal has heretofore been declined by the Confederate - authorities, they insisting upon the terms of the cartel, which - required the delivery of the excess on either side upon parole. In - view, however, of the very large number of prisoners now held by each - party, and the suffering consequent upon their continued confinement, - I now consent to the above proposal, and agree to deliver to you the - prisoners held in captivity by the Confederate authorities, provided - you agree to deliver an equal number of Confederate officers and men. - As equal numbers are delivered from time to time, they will be - declared exchanged. This proposal is made with the understanding that - the officers and men, on both sides, who have been longest in - captivity, will be first delivered, where it is practicable. I shall - be happy to hear from you as speedily as possible, whether this - arrangement can be carried out. - - "Respectfully, your obedient servant, - "ROBERT OULD, - "_Agent of Exchange_." - -It will be seen that the Confederate authorities, by this proposition, -consented to waive all previous questions, to concede every point to the -enemy, that could facilitate the release from captivity of its own -soldiers and those of the North. As an inducement to action by the Federal -authorities, this letter was accompanied by a _statement exhibiting the -mortality among the prisoners at Andersonville_. Receiving no reply, -Commissioner Ould made the same proposition to General Hitchcock, in -Washington. The latter making no response, application was made again to -Major Mulford, who replied as follows: - - "_Hon. R. Ould, Agent of Exchange_-- - - "SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of - to-day, requesting answer, etc., to your communication of the 10th - inst., on the question of the exchange of prisoners, to which, in - reply, I would say, I have no communication on the subject from our - authorities, nor am I yet authorized to make any. - - "I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, - - "JOHN E. MULFORD, - "_Assistant Agent of Exchange_." - -Nothing could exceed the generosity of this offer. When it was made, the -North had a large excess of prisoners. By this arrangement every Federal -soldier would have been released from captivity, while a large surplus of -Confederates would have remained in the enemy's hands. The brutal -calculation of the Federal authorities was that an exchange would add so -many thousands of muskets to the depleted ranks of the Confederacy, and -would, besides, deprive them of every pretext for the manufacture of -chapters of "rebel barbarities." - -It was known to the world that the means of subsistence in the South was -so reduced--chiefly through the cruel warfare waged by the North--that -Confederate soldiers were then subsisting upon a third of a pound of meat, -and a pound of indifferent meal or flour each day. Upon such rations, half -naked, thousands of them barefooted, Confederate soldiers were exposed to -sufferings unexampled in history. How could it be possible, under such -circumstances, to prevent suffering among the prisoners? Military prisons, -under the most favorable circumstances, are miserable enough, but the -Federal prisoners in the South were compelled to endure multiplied and -aggravated miseries, imposed by the condition of the South--shared by -their captors, and by the women and children of the country which they -invaded. But what possible palliation can there be for the guilt of a -Government which willfully subjected its defenders to horrors which it so -blazoned to the world? Declaring that "rebel pens" were worse than -Neapolitan prisons and Austrian dungeons, the Federal authorities yet -persistently rejected offers of exchange. - -There could be no more forcible presentation of the question than that -made by President Davis: - - "In the meantime a systematic and concerted effort has been made to - quiet the complaints in the United States of those relatives and - friends of the prisoners in our hands, who are unable to understand - why the cartel is not executed in their favor, by the groundless - assertion that we are the parties who refuse compliance. Attempts are - also made to shield themselves from the execration excited by their - own odious treatment of our officers and soldiers now captive in their - hands, by misstatements, such as that the prisoners held by us are - deprived of food. To this last accusation the conclusive answer has - been made, that, in accordance with our laws and the general orders of - the department, the rations of the prisoners are precisely the same, - in quantity and quality, as those served out to our own gallant - soldiers in the field, and which have been found sufficient to support - them in their arduous campaign, while it is not pretended by the enemy - that they treat prisoners by the same generous rule. By an indulgence, - perhaps unprecedented, we have even allowed the prisoners in our hands - to be supplied by their friends at home with comforts not enjoyed by - the men who captured them in battle, In contrast to this treatment, - the most revolting inhumanity has characterized the conduct of the - United States towards prisoners held by them. One prominent fact, - which admits no denial nor palliation, must suffice as a test: The - officers of our army--natives of southern and semi-tropical climates, - and unprepared for the cold of a northern winter--have been conveyed - for imprisonment, during the rigors of the present season, to the most - northern and exposed situation that could be selected by the enemy. - There, beyond the reach of comforts, and often even of news from home - and family, exposed to the piercing cold of the northern lakes, they - are held by men who can not be ignorant of--even if they do not - design--the probable result. How many of our unfortunate friends and - comrades, who have passed unscathed through numerous battles, will - perish on Johnston's Island, under the cruel trial to which they are - subjected, none but the Omniscient can foretell. That they will endure - this barbarous treatment with the same stern fortitude that they have - ever evinced in their country's service, we can not doubt. But who can - be found to believe the assertion that it is our refusal to execute - the cartel, and not the malignity of the foe, which has caused the - infliction of such intolerable cruelty on our own loved and honored - defenders?" - -Since the war, Commissioner Ould has given testimony of the most -conclusive character. While the subject of the treatment of prisoners was -pending in Congress, during the past summer, he wrote the following -letter. It will be observed that he offers to _prove his statements by the -testimony of Federal officers_. - - "WASHINGTON, July 23, 1867. - - "_To the Editors of the National Intelligencer_-- - - "I respectfully request the publication of the following letter, - received by me from Colonel Robert Ould, of Richmond. It will be - perceived that it fully sustains my statement in the House, with the - unimportant exception of the number of prisoners offered to be - exchanged, without equivalent, by the Confederate authorities. - - "Very respectfully, - "CHARLES A. ELDRIDGE." - - - "RICHMOND, July 19, 1867. - - "_Hon. Charles A. Eldridge_-- - - "MY DEAR SIR: I have seen your remarks as published. They are - substantially correct. Every word that I said to you in Richmond is - not only true, but can be proved by Federal officers. I did offer, in - August, to deliver the Federal sick and wounded, without requiring - equivalents, and urged the necessity of haste in sending for them, as - the mortality was terrible. I did offer to deliver from ten to fifteen - thousand at Savannah without delay. Although this offer was made in - August, transportation was not sent for them until December, and - during the interval, the mortality was perhaps at its greatest height. - If I had not made the offer, why did the Federal authorities send - transportation to Savannah for ten or fifteen thousand men? If I made - the offer, based only on equivalents, why did the same transportation - carry down for delivery only three thousand men? - - "Butler says the offer was made in the fall (according to the - newspaper report), and that seven thousand were delivered. The offer - was made in August, and they were sent for in December. I then - delivered more than thirteen thousand, and would have gone to the - fifteen thousand if the Federal transportation had been sufficient. My - instructions to my agents were to deliver fifteen thousand sick and - wounded, and if that number of that class were not on hand, to make up - the number by well men. The offer was made by me in pursuance of - instructions from the Confederate Secretary of War. I was ready to - keep up the arrangement until every sick and wounded man had been - returned. - - "The three thousand men sent to Savannah by the Federals were in as - wretched a condition as any detachment of prisoners ever sent from a - Confederate prison. - - "All these things are susceptible of proof, and I am much mistaken if - I can not prove them by Federal authority. I am quite sure that - General Mulford will sustain every allegation here made. - - "Yours truly, - "R. OULD. - - "P. S.--General Butler's correspondence is all on one side, as I was - instructed, at the date of his letters, to hold no correspondence with - him. I corresponded with Mulford or General Hitchcock. - - "R. OULD." - -In another letter, written about the same time, Colonel Ould thus invites -investigation: - - "General Mulford will sustain every thing I have herein written. He is - a man of honor and courage, and I do not think will hesitate to tell - the truth. I think it would be well for you to make the appeal to him, - as it has become a question of veracity." - -But though President Davis and Colonel Ould are known by thousands of -people, North and South, to be men of unimpeachable truthfulness, and -though no _honorable_ enemy would question their statements, we can not -hope that their testimony will make headway against the intolerant -prejudices and passions of faction. General B. F. Butler is doubtless -sufficiently orthodox, and, besides, his testimony is voluntary. Says this -exponent of latter-day "loyalty:" - - "The great importance of the question; the fearful responsibility for - the many thousands of lives which, by the refusal to exchange, were - sacrificed by the most cruel forms of death; from cold, starvation, - and pestilence of the prison-pens of Raleigh and Andersonville, being - more than all the British soldiers killed in the wars of Napoleon; - the anxiety of fathers, brothers, sisters, mothers, wives, to know the - exigency which caused this terrible--and perhaps as it may have seemed - to them useless and unnecessary--destruction of those dear to them, by - horrible deaths, each and all have compelled me to this exposition, so - that it may be seen that these lives were spent as a part of the - system of attack upon the rebellion, devised by the wisdom of the - General-in-Chief of the armies, to destroy it by depletion, depending - upon our superior numbers to win the victory at last. - - "The loyal mourners will doubtless derive solace from this fact, and - appreciate all the more highly the genius which conceived the plan and - the success won at so great a cost." - -The New York _Tribune_ will also be accepted as competent authority. -Referring to the occurrences of 1864, the _Tribune_ editorially says: - - "In August the rebels offered to renew the exchange, man for man. - General Grant then telegraphed the following important order: 'It is - hard on our men, held in Southern prisons, not to exchange them, but - it is humanity to those left in the ranks to fight our battles. Every - man released on parole or otherwise becomes an active soldier against - us at once, either directly or indirectly. _If we commence a system of - exchange_ which liberates _all prisoners_ taken, we will have to fight - on till the whole South is exterminated. If we hold those caught, they - amount to no more than dead men. At this particular time, to release - all rebel prisoners North would insure Sherman's defeat, and would - compromise our safety here.'" - -Here is even a stronger statement from a Northern source: - - "NEW YORK, August 8, 1865. - - "_Moreover, General Butler, in his speech at Lowell, Massachusetts, - stated positively that he had been ordered by Mr. Stanton to put - forward the negro question to complicate and prevent the - exchange...._ Every one is aware that, when the exchange did take - place, not the slightest alteration had _occurred_ in the question, - _and that our prisoners might as well have been released twelve or - eighteen_ months before as at the resumption of the _cartel, which - would have saved to the Republic at least twelve or fifteen thousand_ - heroic lives. That they were not saved is due _alone to Mr. Edwin M. - Stanton's peculiar policy and dogged obstinacy_; AND, AS I HAVE - REMARKED BEFORE, HE IS UNQUESTIONABLY THE DIGGER OF THE UNNAMED GRAVES - THAT CROWD THE VICINITY OF EVERY SOUTHERN PRISON WITH HISTORIC AND - NEVER-TO-BE-FORGOTTEN HORRORS. - - "I regret the revival of this painful subject, but the gratuitous - effort of Mr. Dana to relieve the Secretary of War from a - responsibility he seems willing to bear, and which merely as a - question of policy, independent of all considerations of humanity, - must be regarded as of great weight, has compelled me to vindicate - myself from the charge of making grave statements without due - consideration. - - "Once for all, let me declare that I have never found fault with any - one because I was detained in prison, for I am well aware that that - was a matter in which no one but myself, and possibly a few personal - friends, would feel any interest; that my sole motive for impeaching - the Secretary of War was that the people of _the loyal North might - know to whom they were indebted for the cold-blooded and needless - sacrifice of their fathers and brothers, their husbands and their - sons_. - - "JUNIUS HENRI BROWNE." - -Now, what is the "inexorable logic" of this train of evidence? Either the -calumnies against the South stand self-convicted, or those who have -uttered them show themselves to have been worse fiends than they pretend -to believe the Confederate authorities to have been. - -But can a candid world credit the charge of cruelty against the South? -Honorable enemies, even, will scorn the allegation of torture, of -designedly inflicting suffering upon helpless men, against a people who, -within the past six years, have so honorably illustrated the American -name. Brave men are never cruel--cowards only delight in torture of the -helpless. Cruelty to prisoners would be inconsistent not only with the -known generosity of the Southern character, but with that splendid courage -which the North will not dishonor itself by calling in question. - -Until the suspension of the cartel, the Federal prisoners, even at the -risk of their recapture, were kept in Richmond convenient for exchange. -Confederate prisoners, on the other hand, were hurried to the Northern -frontier, where the rigor of the climate alone subjected them to the most -cruel sufferings. Driven by the course of the Federal Government, -respecting the subject of exchange, the Confederate authorities selected a -site for the quartering of prisoners, whom it was impossible to subsist in -Richmond or its neighborhood. Andersonville was selected, in accordance -with an official order contemplating the following objects: "A healthy -locality, plenty of pure, good water, a running stream, and, if possible, -shade trees, and in the immediate neighborhood of grist and saw-mills." -Such were the "horrors of Andersonville," which the world has been urged -to believe the Confederate Government selected with special view to the -torment and death of prisoners. - -The terrible mortality among the prisoners at Andersonville was not due -either to starvation or to the unhealthiness of the locality. Federal -soldiers were unaccustomed to the scanty and indifferent diet upon which -the Confederates were fed, and which caused the death of thousands of -delicate youths in the Southern armies. By this single fact may be -explained much of the mortality at Andersonville. When to scurvy and other -fatal forms of disease, produced by inadequate and unwholesome diet, are -added the mental sufferings, which are peculiarly the lot of a prisoner, -the despondency, and, in the case of the Andersonville prisoners, the -despair occasioned by the refusal of their own Government to relieve them, -we have abundant explanation of the most shocking mortality. - -But the statement that the mortality of Andersonville was in excess of -that of all other military prisons, is a willful falsehood. We present the -following extracts from a letter to the New York _World_, by a gentleman, -whose integrity will be vouched for by thousands of the best people in -Virginia: - - PRISON MORTALITY--ANDERSONVILLE AND ELMIRA. - - "RICHMOND, VA., August 14. - - "_To the Editor of the World_-- - - "SIR: I have just seen, in a city paper, a paragraph, credited to the - _World_, alleging that among the Confederate prisoners at Elmira, - during the last four or five months of the use of that prison, the - deaths only amounted to a few individuals out of many thousand - prisoners. I am not able to controvert that fact, as I left there on - the 11th of October, 1864; but if the impression desired to be - produced is that the general mortality at that pen was slight, I can - contradict it from _the record_. During a portion of the period of my - incarceration in the Elmira pen, it was my duty to receive, from the - surgeon's office, each morning, the reports of the deaths of the - preceding day, and embody them in an official report, to be signed by - the commandant of the prison, and forwarded to the commandant of the - post. I entered, each morning, in a diary, which now lies before me, - the number of reported deaths; and the facts demonstrate that, in as - healthy a location as there is in New York, with every remedial - appliance in abundance, with no epidemic, and with a great boast of - humanity, the deaths were relatively larger than among the Federal - prisoners at Andersonville among a famished people, whose - quartermaster could not furnish shelter to its soldiers, and whose - surgeons were without the commonest medicines for the sick. The record - shows that at Andersonville, between the 1st of February and 1st of - August, 1864, out of thirty-six thousand prisoners, six thousand, or - one-sixth, died--a fearful rate unquestionably. But the official - report of the Elmira pen shows, that during the month of September, - 1864, which was the first month after the quota of that prison was - made up, _out of less than nine thousand five hundred prisoners_, the - deaths were THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIX. In other words, the average - mortality at Andersonville, during that period, was one thirty-sixth - of the whole per month, while at Elmira it was _one twenty-fifth_ of - the whole. At Elmira it was _four per cent._; at Andersonville, less - than _three per cent._... - - "Another item, which I gather from my diary, will indicate the manner - in which the medical officer at Elmira discharged his functions. The - hospitals began to be filled, in the latter part of August, with - obstinate cases of scurvy. Men became covered with fearful sores, many - lost their teeth, and many others became cripples, and will die - cripples from that cause. The commandant of the post ordered a report - to be made of all the scorbutic cases in prison, grave and trifling; - and on the morning of Sunday, September 11, the lists were added up, - when it was found that of nine thousand three hundred prisoners - examined, _eighteen hundred and seventy_ were tainted with scurvy. - - "The Federal Government, as one of its measures of reconstruction, is - officially and expensively engaged in traducing the Southern people, - and the facility with which it procures all necessary evidence, - whether the object be to hang or to calumniate, warrants the belief - that we shall have a couple of volumes a year for the rest of the - century, demonstrating the barbarity of the rebels. Against so - admirable a system of manufacturing evidence, it is, of course, idle - to oppose the feeble efforts of individuals, but I regard the duty - none the less binding on such of us as know the truth to declare it; - and I hope that, throughout the Southern States, intelligent and - credible men are now putting into authentic form, the evidences of - Federal outrages, the exploits of the Shermans and Sheridans, and - Milroys and Butlers, one day to be published by general subscription - of our people, that the world may judge between us and the spoon - thieves, the furniture thieves, the barn-burners, the bummers, and the - brutes who too often wore the uniform of the Federal army. - - "A. M. K." - -Can the North expect impartial history to accept its miserable subterfuge -of "disloyalty," by which such testimony as this is now excluded? - -Any reference to this subject must be wholly inadequate which does not -describe the condition of the South at the period when she is alleged to -have been guilty of unexampled atrocities. The blockade of the South by -the North was stringent beyond any precedent in modern warfare. -_Medicines_ were held as contraband. Southern hospitals were not supplied, -for that reason, with all the medicaments that were needed by sick and -wounded soldiers; and those who were prisoners in our hands necessarily -shared, in this respect, the privations of the Confederate soldiers. But -if there was any thing "cruel and inhuman" in this deficiency, _whose -fault_ was it? Of _whom_ is the cruelty and inhumanity to be alleged? The -South searched her forests and meadows for restoratives. She ran in -medicines, as far as practicable, at great cost and hazard. We shared our -stores with our prisoners. If the supply was inadequate or ill-assorted, -we again ask, are _we_ to be charged with cruelty and inhumanity? - -The same observations are applicable as to supplies of food and clothing. -The war was waged, by the North, on the policy of unsparing devastation. -Mills were burnt, factories demolished, barns given to the flames, and the -means of comfort and of living destroyed on system. What the South was -able to save, she shared with her prisoners. We gave them such rations as -we gave our own soldiers. Does any one suspect the Confederate Government -of deliberately stinting its own soldiers? How, then, can it be pretended -that it was "cruel and inhuman" to prisoners whom it fed as well? If we -could not maintain them as well as we wished, it was through the success -of those who wasted our subsistence, for the purpose of reducing us to -that precise condition of inability. It is obviously _monstrous_ to charge -the fact, and to charge it as blame, upon _us_--to accuse the South of -"cruelty and inhumanity."[71] - -But there is still another revelation to be added to the overwhelming -evidence which demonstrates the murderous purpose of the Federal -authorities, equally toward their own men and toward Confederate soldiers, -by which they adroitly sought to cover the Confederate Government with -accusing blood. A marked feature in the policy of the Lincoln cabinet was, -at concerted intervals, to inflame the heart of the North by appeals to -passion and resentment. The supreme excellence of the Federal -administration, in this respect, was, indeed, its substitute for -statesmanship. To conceal its own iniquitous course, with reference to the -exchange of prisoners, the administration successfully sought to frenzy -the Northern masses by the most ingenious misrepresentations of the -condition of their men in the Southern prisons. - -To this end the foul brood of pictorial falsifiers--the Harpers, Leslies, -etc.--gave willing and effective aid. Men in the most horrible conditions -of human suffering--ghastly skeletons, creatures demented from sheer -misery--a set of wretched, raving, and dying creatures--were photographed, -the pictures reduplicated to an unlimited extent, and scattered broadcast -over the North, as evidence of the brutality practiced upon Federal -prisoners in the South. In view of the well-known and designed influence -of these appeals upon Northern sentiment, what must be the scorn of the -civilized world for the perfidy which used the means which we here relate, -to accomplish its iniquitous ends? - -Immediately preceding the return of these prisoners, the Federal Agent -applied for the delivery of the _worst_ cases of _sick_ Federal prisoners. -Said he: "Even in cases where your surgeons think the men too ill to be -moved, and not strong enough to survive the trip, if _they_ express a -desire to come, let them come." At this time, it should be remembered, -regular exchanges were intermitted. Commissioner Ould, consistently with -his known humanity and the humane disposition of his Government, consented -to send the _worst_ cases of their prisoners, provided that they would not -be accepted as representatives of the average condition of the Federal -prisoners in the South, and used as a means to inflame Northern sentiment. -This condition was sacredly pledged. - -With this understanding, Commissioner Ould prepared a barge adapted -specially to the purpose, and, with the aid of the Richmond Ambulance -Committee, carefully and tenderly delivered the prisoners. The Federal -vessel that received them sailed immediately to Annapolis, where, instead -of receiving the tender treatment that their pitiable condition required, -they were made a spectacle of for an obvious purpose. Photographic artists -made portraits of them; a committee of Congress was sent to report upon -their condition; in short, they had been obtained for a purpose; and, how -well that purpose was subserved, the South, at least, well knows. These -miserable wrecks of humanity, specially asked for, specially selected as -the _worst_ cases, were pointed to as representatives of the average -state of Federal prisoners in the South, although the most sacred -assurances had been given that they would be used for no such purpose. - -History will be searched in vain for such an example of mingled -wickedness, perfidy, and cruelty. Yet the faction that could practice such -treachery and barbarity has dared to impeach the honor and humanity of the -South. Through such means, it, of course, can easily be proven that the -South "starved and tortured" thousands of Union prisoners. Nor can -Stanton, Holt, and Conover have difficulty in proving that these cruelties -were by direct order of President Davis. - -Need we pursue this subject further? We have not adduced one-tenth of the -evidence which completes the record of Southern justice and humanity, yet -what candid mind will deny that this testimony is ample? The vindication -of the South, too, is the assured defense of Jefferson Davis. Nay, more: -the exceptional victim of Northern malice is known to his countrymen to -have a special record of humanity which should have claimed a special -consideration from the enemy. Upon no subject was President Davis more -censured in the South than for what was termed his "ill-timed tenderness" -for the enemy. Stung to madness by the devastations and cruelties -attending the invasion of their country, the people often responded to the -clamor of the newspapers for retaliation against the harsh measures of the -enemy. Before the writer is a Richmond newspaper, of date during the war, -in which the leading editorial begins with the assertion that "The -chivalry and humanity of Mr. Jefferson Davis will inevitably ruin this -Confederacy," and the editor continues to reproach Mr. Davis for culpable -leniency. - -To the same alleged cause the _Examiner_ was accustomed to attribute what -it described as the "humiliating attitude of the Confederacy." Said the -_Examiner_: "The enemy have gone from one unmanly cruelty to another, -encouraged by their impunity, till they are now, and have for some time, -been inflicting on the people of this country the worst horrors of -barbarous and uncivilized war." Yet, in spite of all this, the _Examiner_ -alleged, that Mr. Davis, in his dealings with the enemy, was "as gentle as -the sucking dove." The same paper published a "bill of fare" provided for -one of the prisons, and invoked the indignation of the country upon a -policy which fed the prisoners of the enemy better than the soldiers of -the Confederacy. - -Never, indeed, did the ruler of an invaded people exhibit such forbearance -in the face of so much provocation. When reminded of the relentless -warfare of the enemy, which spared neither age, sex, nor condition, of his -devastation, rapine and violence, Davis' invariable reply was: "The crimes -of our enemies can not justify us in a disregard of the duties of humanity -and Christianity." There can be little doubt that Mr. Davis occasionally -erred in his extreme generosity to the foe. Yet, how noble must be that -fame, which is marred only by such a fault. History has canonized -Lamartine for preventing the re-raising of the red flag in 1848. What will -be its award to the heroic firmness of Jefferson Davis, in preventing the -raising of the black flag, among a people, whose dearest rights were -assailed, whose homes were destroyed, and themselves subjected to the most -ruthless persecutions known in modern warfare? - -But apart from the perjured testimony, which has been utterly inadequate -to establish the charge of "cruelty to prisoners," has the time passed, -when the honorable character of a people and of an individual can be -properly considered? The whole history of the United States does not -exhibit a public career more stainless than that of Jefferson Davis, while -in the service of the Union. Occupying almost every position of honor and -trust, in both houses of Congress, member of the cabinet, and as a gallant -soldier, the breath of slander never once tarnished his name. To his -incorruptible official and private integrity, to the sincerity of his -convictions, and the rectitude and honesty of his intentions, no men could -better testify than those Republican Senators, who were, for years, his -associates. Indeed, Mr. Davis has been peculiar in his complete exemption -from that personal defamation, which is almost a necessity of political -life. - -But, impartial history will ask, whence come these calumnies against the -great, pure, and pious leader of a brave people, in a struggle for -liberty? Then must come that inevitable recoil, which shall bring to just -judgment, a government, which destroyed the houses and the food of -non-combatants; the fruits of the earth and the implements of tillage; -which condemned its own defenders to imprisonment and death; which -imprisoned without charges, gray-haired men, and doomed them to tortures, -which brought them to premature graves; exposed helpless women and -children to starvation, by depriving them of their natural protectors; -which declared medicines contraband of war, and finally sought, by -perjury, to justify cruelty to a helpless captive, because his people, in -the midst of starvation, could not adequately feed and nurture the captive -soldiers of the enemy. - - - - -CHAPTER XVIII. - - INDICATIONS OF POPULAR FEELING AT THE BEGINNING OF 1864--APATHY AND - DESPONDENCY OF THE NORTH--IMPROVED FEELING IN THE CONFEDERACY--THE - PROBLEM OF ENDURANCE--PREPARATIONS OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT-- - MILITARY SUCCESS THE GREAT DESIDERATUM--A SERIES OF SUCCESSES-- - FINNEGAN'S VICTORY IN FLORIDA--SHERMAN'S EXPEDITION--FORREST'S - VICTORY--THE RAID OF DAHLGREN--TAYLOR DEFEATS BANKS--FORREST'S - TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN--HOKE'S VICTORY--THE VALUE OF THESE MINOR - VICTORIES--CONCENTRATION FOR THE GREAT STRUGGLES IN VIRGINIA AND - GEORGIA--FEDERAL PREPARATIONS--GENERAL GRANT--HIS THEORY OF WAR--HIS - PLANS--THE FEDERAL FORCES IN VIRGINIA--SHERMAN--FEEBLE RESOURCES OF - THE CONFEDERACY--THE "ON TO RICHMOND" AND "ON TO ATLANTA"--GENERAL - GRANT BAFFLED--HE NARROWLY ESCAPES RUIN--HIS OVERLAND MOVEMENT A TOTAL - FAILURE--SHERIDAN THREATENS RICHMOND--DEATH OF STUART--BUTLER'S - ADVANCE UPON RICHMOND--THE CITY IN GREAT PERIL--BEAUREGARD'S PLAN OF - OPERATIONS--VIEWS OF MR. DAVIS--DEFEAT OF BUTLER, AND HIS CONFINEMENT - IN A "CUL DE SAC"--FAILURE OF GRANT'S COMBINATIONS--CONSTANTLY BAFFLED - BY LEE--TERRIBLE LOSSES OF THE FEDERAL ARMY--GRANT CROSSES THE - JAMES--HIS FAILURES REPEATED--HIS NEW COMBINATIONS--EARLY'S OPERATIONS - IN THE VALLEY AND ACROSS THE POTOMAC--THE FEDERAL COMBINATIONS AGAIN - BROKEN DOWN--FAVORABLE SITUATION IN VIRGINIA--THE MISSION OF MESSRS. - CLAY, THOMPSON, AND HOLCOMBE--CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. LINCOLN--THE - ARROGANT AND MOCKING REPLY OF THE FEDERAL PRESIDENT. - - -Despite the solid advantages obtained by the North in the campaign just -ended, the close of the winter developed the existence of great -apprehension at Washington, and a correspondingly improved feeling in the -South. It was indeed remarkable that the conviction entertained by both -sides, that the struggle was now about to assume its latest and decisive -phase, should have evoked such different manifestations of feeling at -Washington and Richmond. - -At the North was seen a singular apathy, which temporarily checked -overwrought displays of popular exultation, and a mutual distrust of the -Government and the public, not at all encouraging of success in designs -demanding zealous coöperation. The thoughtful observer of Northern -sentiment readily detected the presence of depression and suspicion--a -general apprehension that the restoration of the Union was an enterprise -developing new and unseen obstacles at each step, and a confusion of views -as to the management of the war. But, in the violent exhibitions of party -spirit, the North realized its chief cause of alarm. The peace party -increased in numbers and influence with the prolongation of the war, and -the preservation of power by the Government party was clearly dependent -upon such military results, as should foreshadow the speedy "collapse of -the rebellion." In short, the North saw that the culmination of the -momentous struggle was to be reached, while it was in the throes of an -embittered Presidential contest. - -There was another explanation of the altered feeling in the two sections -developed during the winter. Throughout the war, the Northern mind was -singularly accessible to the influence of sensation and "clap-trap;" hence -were always to be expected periodical galvanic excitements, followed by -revulsion of feeling. The conservative instincts of the South sought -repose rather than excitement; and the crippled condition of the enemy, -after his achievements of the summer and fall, gave the South a sufficient -respite for the recovery of much of its lost confidence. Nor was the -transition of the Southern mind, within a few weeks, from depression to -something like hopeful anticipation, based upon a mere presentiment of -prosperous fortune. The lessons of the war, not less than the teachings of -previous history, encouraged reanimation. It was contended that the -conquest of a territory so extensive, and the subjection of a people -numerically as strong and as courageous as those of the South, was -physically impossible. It was urged that the Federal successes of the -preceding summer had only placed the enemy upon the threshold of his -enterprise, and that, in surmounting the resolute resistance which had -almost defeated his earliest movements, he had vainly wasted the spirit -and the strength which were now needed for his further progress. - -From such a condition of feeling, the logical conclusion was that the war -had now become a question of endurance, and that the Confederacy must now -depend upon its capacity to resist until the North should abandon the war -in sheer disgust. The Richmond journals pithily stated the problem as one -of "Southern fortitude and endurance against Yankee perseverance." - -In the meantime, the enforced quiet of the enemy was diligently improved -by the Government. Probably at no period of the war did the Confederate -administration exhibit more energy and skill in the employment of its -limited resources, than in its preparations for the campaign of 1864. The -vigorous measures of the President were, in the main, seconded by -Congress, though this session was not wanting in those displays of -demagogism which, throughout the war, diminished the influence and -efficiency of that body. In the sequel, the expedients adopted did not -realize the large results anticipated. The financial legislation of -Congress did not improve the value of the currency, nor did the various -expedients resorted to for strengthening the army obtain the desired -numbers. It was calculated that the Confederate armies would aggregate, by -the opening of spring, something like four hundred thousand men, of which -the repeal of the substitute law alone was expected to furnish seventy -thousand. The real strength of all the Confederate armies, however, did -not exceed two hundred thousand men when the campaign was entered upon. -The execution of the conscription law was a subject of sore perplexity to -the administration, and, though President Davis made strenuous exertions -to remedy the difficulty, the system continued defective until the end. - -The army was, nevertheless, strengthened both in numbers and material, -while its spirit, as shown in the alacrity and unanimity of reënlistment, -was never surpassed. Military success was now the end to which the -Government devoted its whole energies, as the real and only solution of -its difficulties. In time of war military success is the sole nepenthe for -national afflictions. Without victories the Confederacy would seek in vain -a restoration of its finances through the expedients of legislation. -Equally necessary were victories for relief of the difficulty as to food. -Should the spring campaign be successful, the Confederacy would recover -the country upon which it had been mainly dependent for supplies, and such -additional territory as was required to put at rest the alarming -difficulty of scarcity. - -The expectation of the South was much encouraged by a series of successes -upon minor theatres of the war, during the suspension of operations by the -main armies. A signal victory was won late in February, by General -Finnegan, at Ocean Pond, Florida, the important event of which was the -decisive failure of a Federal design to possess that State. - -The most serious demonstration by the enemy, during the winter months, was -the expedition of Sherman across the State of Mississippi. This movement, -undertaken with all the vigor and daring of that commander, was designed -to capture Mobile and to secure the Federal occupation of nearly the whole -of Alabama and Mississippi. It was the second experiment, undertaken by -Federal commanders, during the war, of leaving a regular base of -operations, and seeking the conquest of a large section of territory, by -penetrating boldly into the interior. The first similar attempt was made -by Grant, from Memphis into the interior of Mississippi. It is notable -that both these expeditions were marked by shameful failure. They signally -illustrated the military principle of the impossibility of successful -penetration of hostile territory, even when held by a greatly inferior -force, and, moreover, clearly indicate the fate that would inevitably have -overtaken Sherman, in his "march to the sea," had there been an opposing -army to meet him. When Van Dorn captured Grant's supplies at Holly -Springs, in the autumn of 1862, the Federal commander had no alternative -but to make a rapid retreat to his base. A similar experience awaited -Sherman, who, leaving Vicksburg with thirty thousand men, marched without -opposition through Mississippi--General Polk, with his corps of ten -thousand men, falling back before him. Coöperating with Sherman was a -large cavalry force, which, leaving North Mississippi, was to unite with -him at Meridian, and upon this junction of forces depended the success of -the entire expedition. But General Forrest, a remarkably skillful and -energetic cavalry leader, attacked the Federal column, utterly routing and -dispersing it, though not having more than one-third the force of the -enemy. This necessitated the retreat of Sherman, with many circumstances -indicating demoralization among his troops. His expedition terminated with -no results sufficient to give it more dignity, than properly belonged to -at least a dozen other plundering and incendiary enterprises, undertaken -by Federal officers who are comparatively without reputation. The exploits -of Sherman in Mississippi gave him a "bad eminence," which he afterwards -well sustained by the burning of Rome and Atlanta, the sack of Columbia, -and his career of pillage and incendiarism in the Carolinas. - -A notable event of the winter was the raid of Dahlgren, an expedition -marked by every dastardly and atrocious feature imaginable. When this -expedition of "picked" Federal cavalry had been put to ignominious flight -by the departmental clerks at Richmond, its retreat was harassed by local -and temporary organizations of farmers, school-boys, and furloughed men -from Lee's army. Not until its leader was killed, however, was revealed -the fiendish errand which he had undertaken. Upon his person was found -ample documentary evidence of the objects of the expedition, viz.: _to -burn and sack the city of Richmond, and to assassinate President Davis and -his cabinet_.[72] Yet this man, killed in honorable combat, after his -cut-throat mission had failed, was apotheosized by the North as a "hero," -who had been "assassinated" while on an errand of patriotism and -philanthropy. The shocking details of this diabolical scheme, -substantiated by every necessary proof of authenticity, were published in -the Richmond journals, and instead of provoking the condemnation of the -hypocritical "humanity" of the North, with characteristic effrontery were -ridiculed as "rebel forgeries." - -The Trans-Mississippi region was, in the early spring, the scene of -brilliant and important Confederate successes. About the middle of March, -the famous "Red River Expedition" of General Banks, contemplating the -complete subjugation of Louisiana, and the occupation of Western Texas, -was undertaken. The result was, perhaps, the most ignominious failure of -the war. Defeated by General Taylor, in a decisive engagement at -Mansfield, General Banks, with great difficulty, effected his retreat down -Red River, and abandoned the enterprise, which he had undertaken with such -extravagant anticipations of fame and wealth. - -In the month of April, Forrest executed a brilliant campaign among the -Federal garrisons in Tennessee, capturing several thousand prisoners and -adding large numbers of recruits to his forces. With a force mainly -organized within three months, this dashing officer penetrated the -interior of Tennessee, which the enemy had already declared "conquered," -capturing garrisons and stores, and concluded his campaign by penetrating -to the Mississippi River, and successfully storming Fort Pillow.[73] The -most encouraging event of the spring was the capture of Plymouth, North -Carolina, by General Hoke. This enterprise, executed with great gallantry -and skill, had the tangible reward of a large number of prisoners, many -cannon, and an important position with reference to the question of -supplies.[74] - -The aggregate of these Confederate successes was not inconsiderable. -Expectation was strengthened by them at the South, and proportionately -disappointed at the North. It was chiefly in their influence upon public -feeling that these minor victories were valuable, as they in no way -affected the main current of the war, and were speedily overlooked at the -first sound of the mighty shock of arms along the Rapidan and in Northern -Georgia. Indeed, the actors in these preliminary events were, in most -instances, themselves shifted to these two main theatres, upon which the -concentrated power of each contestant was preparing its most desperate -exertions. Troops on both sides were recalled from South Carolina, and -even Florida, to participate in the great wrestle for the Confederate -capital, and the impending struggle in Georgia absorbed nearly all the -forces hitherto operating west of the Alleghanies and east of the -Mississippi. - -However discouraged may have been the public mind of the North at the -beginning of the year, the preparations of the Federal Government, for the -spring campaign, indicated no abatement of energy or determination. Well -aware of the diminished resources of the South, and of the political -necessities which imperatively demanded speedy and decisive successes, the -Federal administration prepared a more vigorous use of its great means -than had yet been attempted. The draft was energetically enforced, and -volunteering was stimulated by high bounties. At no period of the war were -the Federal armies so numerous, so well equipped and provided with every -means that tends to make war successful. Their _morale_ was better than at -the outset of any previous campaign. The Federal armies were now inured to -war, composed mainly of seasoned veterans, and commanded by officers whose -capacity had been amply tested in battle. - -The agents selected by the Federal Government, to carry out its designs, -were men whose previous career justified their selection. The sagacity of -the North had, at length, realized the one essential object, to the -accomplishment of which all its efforts must contribute. This object was -the destruction of Lee's army. Virginia was justly declared the "backbone" -of Confederate power; Lee's army was the pedestal of the edifice. It was -in the clearer appreciation of this object, and in the determination to -subordinate every concern of the war to its accomplishment, that Northern -sentiment made a step forward, that was, of itself, no insignificant -auxiliary to ultimate success. The blows which Sherman prepared to deliver -upon the distant fields of Georgia, were aimed at Lee's army, not less -than were those of Grant. While the latter "hammered away continuously" in -Virginia, to pulverize, as it were, the column from which so many Federal -endeavors had been forced to recoil, Sherman was expected to pierce the -very centre of the Confederacy, and seize or destroy every remaining -source of sustenance. - -The presence in Virginia of the General commanding all the Federal forces, -was sufficiently indicative of his recognition of the supreme object of -the campaign. The successful career of this officer was the recommendation -which secured for him the high position of Commander-in-Chief of the -armies of the Union. He was the most fortunate officer produced by the -war--fortunate not less in having won nearly every victory which could -promote the successful conclusion of the war, but fortunate in having won -victories where defeat was the result to be logically expected. - -It is not at all necessary to weigh, in detail, the merits of General -Grant as a soldier. With the overwhelming argument of _results_ in his -favor, there would be little encouragement, even if there could be strict -justice, in denying superior ability to Grant. His campaigns have -contributed nothing to military science, in its correct sense, and the -military student will find in his operations few incidents that illustrate -the art or economy of war. In discarding the formulas of the schools, and -condemning the theories upon which the best of his predecessors had -conducted the war, Grant, by no means, proved that he was not a good -soldier. But his independence in this respect did not establish his claim -to genius, since his contempt for military rules and theories was not -followed by the display of any original features of true generalship. His -name was coupled with a great disaster at Shiloh, where he was rescued -from absolute destruction by the energy of Buell, and the delay of his -adversary. At Donelson, at Vicksburg, and at Missionary Ridge, he had -succeeded by mere weight of numbers; and, indeed, in no instance had he -exhibited any other quality of worth, than boldness and perseverance. But -his success was a sufficient recommendation to the material mind of the -North, which did not once pause to consider how far Grant's victories were -due to his military merit. - -But whatever the defects of Grant in the higher qualities of generalship, -he was preëminently the man for the present emergency. If the Federal -Government saw the necessity of vigorous warfare, looking to speedy and -final results, General Grant knew how to conduct the campaign upon that -idea, provided the Government would give him unlimited means, and the -Northern people would consent to the unstinted sacrifice. Grant knew no -other than an aggressive system of warfare, and contemplated no other -method of destroying the Confederacy, than by the momentum of superior -weight--by heavy, simultaneous and continuous blows. The plans of Grant -were remarkable for their simplicity, and contemplated merely the -employment of the maximum of force against the two main armies of the -Confederacy, keeping the entire force of the South in constant and -unrelieved strain. By "continuous hammering" he thus hoped eventually to -destroy or exhaust it. - -General Grant was again fortunate in having the unlimited confidence of -his Government, which placed at his disposal a million of soldiers, and -was prepared to accede to his every demand. To the most trusted of his -lieutenants--Sherman--Grant intrusted the conduct of operations against -the centre of the Confederacy, reserving for himself the control of the -campaign against Richmond, and Lee's army. His plan of operation was to -_destroy_, not to _defeat_, an army which he knew could not be conquered, -so long as its vitality remained. The military talent of the North had -been already exhausted against Lee, and its largest army too often baffled -by the Army of Northern Virginia, to admit the hope of defeating it in -battle. To _outgeneral_ Lee, Grant well knew required a greater master of -the art of war than himself. To _conquer_ the Army of Northern Virginia, -he, not less than his army, knew to be impossible. His calculation was to -wear it out by the "attrition" of successive and remorseless blows. This -theory was based upon the plain calculation that the North could furnish a -greater mass of humanity for the shambles, (as was afterward calculated it -could spare a greater mass for the prisons,) than the South, and that thus -when the latter should be exhausted, the former would still have left -abundant material for an army. Such was Grant's theory of the war. -Whatever may be thought of it as a military conception, the theory was one -that must succeed in the end, provided the perseverance of the North -should hold out. - -General Grant determined upon a direct advance with the Army of the -Potomac against Richmond, by the overland route from the Rapidan. The -frame-work of his plan, however, embraced coöperating movements in other -quarters, which should, at the same time, occupy every man that might be -available for the reënforcement of Lee. Grant was embarrassed by no lack -of the men who were needed to make each one of these movements formidable. -The most important of these was that designed to occupy the southern -communications of Richmond, thus at once making the Confederate capital -untenable, and cutting off the retreat of Lee. This operation was -intrusted to General Butler, who, with thirty thousand men, was to ascend -James River, establish himself in a fortified position near City Point, -and invest Richmond on its south side. The other auxiliary movements were -designed against the westward communications of Richmond, and were to be -undertaken by Generals Sigel and Crook--the former, with seven thousand -men, moving up the Shenandoah Valley, and the latter, with ten thousand, -moving against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. The force immediately -under General Grant was one hundred and forty thousand men of all arms. -Thus the grand aggregate of the Federal armies now threatening Richmond -reached the neighborhood of one hundred and ninety thousand men. In -addition to these was a force at Washington, equal in strength to the -whole of Lee's army. - -The Federal Government was hardly less lavish in the distribution of its -enormous resources to Sherman than to Grant. Sherman had proven himself an -officer of much enterprise. Intellectually he was the superior of Grant, -but not less than other Federal commanders he relied upon superior numbers -to overcome the skill and valor of the Confederate armies. Physical -momentum was needed to overwhelm Johnston, and was amply supplied. Sherman -demanded one hundred thousand men to capture Atlanta, and, by the -consolidation of the various armies which had hitherto operated -independently in the West, his force attained within a few hundreds of -that number. - -In painful contrast with this enormous outlay of forces, were the feeble -means of the Confederacy. When the season favorable for military -operations opened, General Lee confronted Grant upon the Rapidan, and -General Johnston faced Sherman near Dalton, in Northern Georgia. Neither -of these armies reached fifty thousand men. The undaunted aspect and mien -of firm resistance, with which both awaited the perilous onset of the -enemy, were, however, assuring of the steady determination which still -defended the Confederacy. Critical as was the emergency, the Government -and the country yet believed the strength of these two armies equal to the -great test of endurance, at least beyond the perils of the present -campaign. _To hold its own_ was the primary hope of the Confederacy. If -autumn could be reached without decisive victories by the North, and the -great Federal sacrifices of spring and summer should then have proven in -vain, there was ample ground for hope of those dissensions among the -enemy, which, throughout the struggle, constituted so large a share of -Confederate expectation. - -On the 3d of May, 1864, General Grant initiated the campaign in Virginia, -by crossing the Rapidan with his advanced forces; on the 5th, the -correspondent movement of Sherman, a thousand miles away, was begun. By -the morning of the 5th, one hundred thousand Federal soldiers were across -the Rapidan, and on the same day, the first round of the great wrestle -occurred. Entertaining no doubt of his capacity to destroy Lee, Grant -imagined that his adversary would seek to escape. Having, in advance, -proclaimed his contempt for "maneuvres," he was solicitous only for an -opportunity to strike the Confederate army before it should elude his -grasp. But Hooker had made the same calculation a year before, and was -disappointed, and a like disappointment was now in store for Grant. - -Lee had no power either to prevent the Federal crossing of the Rapidan, -nor to prevent the turning of his right. Instead of retreating, he -immediately assumed the aggressive, and dealt the assailant one of the -most effective blows ever aimed by that powerful arm. Three days sufficed -to reveal to the Federal commander his miscalculations of his adversary's -designs, and, baffled in all his operations, he already indicated distrust -of his system of warfare, and was compelled to attempt by "maneuvre," what -he had failed to effect by brute force. The events of the 5th and 6th of -May clearly demonstrated that strategy could not yet be dispensed with in -warfare. Indeed, nothing but Lee's extreme weakness and the untoward -wounding of Longstreet, in just such a crisis, and in exactly the same -manner as marked the fall of Jackson, prevented the defeat of the Federal -campaign in its incipiency. But for these circumstances the Federal -Agamemnon would have been completely unhorsed on the 6th of May, and would -have added another name to the list of decapitated commanders whom Lee had -successively brought to grief. But the luck of Grant did not forsake him, -and he still had numbers sufficient to attempt the "hammering" process -again. Grant's first attempt at "maneuvre" was a movement upon -Spottsylvania Court-house, a point south-east of the late battle-fields, -by which he sought to throw his army between Lee and Richmond. Again he -was to be disappointed, and again did the Confederate commander prove -himself the master of his antagonist, in every thing that constitutes -generalship. The Confederate forces were already at Spottsylvania, when -the Federal column reached the neighborhood, and Lee, so cautious in his -words, announced to his Government that the enemy had been "repulsed with -heavy slaughter." - -But Lee had done far more than foil Grant. He had secured an impregnable -position upon the Spottsylvania heights, against which Grant -remorselessly, but vainly, dashed his huge columns for twelve days. At the -end of that period Lee's lines were still intact, his mien of resistance -still preserved, and the "hammering" generalship of Grant had cost the -North nearly fifty thousand veteran soldiers. Men already began to ask the -question, to which history will find a ready answer: "_What would be the -result if the resources of the two commanders were reversed?_" Not even -the North could fail to see how entirely barren of advantage was all this -horrible slaughter. The "shambles of the Wilderness" became the popular -phrase descriptive of Grant's operations, and the Northern public was -rapidly reaching the conclusion that the "hammer would itself break on the -anvil." - -While the dead-lock at Spottsylvania continued, and Lee held Grant at bay, -Richmond was seriously threatened by coöperating movements of the enemy. -General Grant had organized a powerful cavalry force under Sheridan, for -operations against the Confederate communications. Sheridan struck out -boldly in the direction of Richmond, followed closely by the Confederate -cavalry. For several days he hovered in the neighborhood of the city, -unable to penetrate the line of fortifications, and eventually retired in -the direction of James River. - -A melancholy incident of this raid of Sheridan was the death, in an -engagement near Richmond, of General J. E. B. Stuart, the renowned cavalry -leader of the Army of Northern Virginia. This was a severe bereavement to -the South, and a serious loss to the army. Stuart's exploits fill a -brilliant chapter of the war in Virginia, and he was probably the ablest -cavalry chieftain in the Confederate army. President Davis, who was -constantly on the field during the presence of Sheridan near Richmond, -deeply deplored the loss of Stuart. The President, not less than General -Lee, reposed great confidence in Stuart's capacity for cavalry command, -and the noble character and gallant bearing of Stuart enlisted the warm -personal regard of Mr. Davis--a feeling which was heartily reciprocated. -Upon the day of his death, Mr. Davis visited the bedside of the dying -chief, and remained with him some time. In reply to the question of Mr. -Davis, "General, how do you feel?" Stuart replied: "Easy, but willing to -die, if God and my country think I have fulfilled my destiny and done my -duty." - -The important correspondent movement of Butler upon the south side of -James River, began early in May. Ascending the river with numerous -transports, Butler landed at Bermuda Hundreds, and advanced against the -southern communications of Richmond. The force near the city was -altogether inadequate to check the army of Butler, and almost without -opposition he laid hold of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, and -advanced within a few miles of Drewry's Bluff, the fortifications of which -commanded the passage of the river to the Confederate capital. Troops were -rapidly thrown forward from the South, and by the 14th May, General -Beauregard had reached the neighborhood of Richmond, from Charleston. - -Probably at no previous moment of the war was Richmond so seriously -threatened, as pending the arrival of Beauregard's forces. Mr. Davis was, -however, resolved to hold the city to the last extremity. Though much -indisposed at the time, he was every morning to be seen, accompanied by -his staff, riding in the direction of the military lines. Superintending, -to a large extent, the disposition of the small force defending the city, -he was fully aware of the extreme peril of the situation, but nevertheless -determined to share the dangers of the hour. When Beauregard reached the -scene the crisis had by no means passed. Unless Butler should be -dislodged, not only was Richmond untenable, but it was impossible to -maintain Lee's army north of James River. Yet the force available seemed -very inadequate to any thing like a decisive defeat of the enemy. The -aggregate of commands from the Carolinas, added to the force previously at -Richmond, did not exceed fifteen thousand men, while Butler, with thirty -thousand, held a strongly intrenched position. - -Immediately upon his arrival, General Beauregard suggested a plan of -operations, by which he hoped to destroy Butler, and, without pausing, to -inflict a decisive defeat upon Grant. The plan he proposed was that Lee -should fall back to the defensive lines of the Chickahominy, even to the -intermediate lines of Richmond, temporarily sending fifteen thousand men -to the south side of the James, and with this accession of force he -proposed to take the offensive against Butler. Pointing out the isolated -situation of Butler, he urged the opportunity for his destruction by the -concentration of a superior force. Under the circumstances General -Beauregard thought the capture of Butler's force inevitable, and the -occupation of his depot of supplies at Bermuda Hundreds a necessary -consequence. When these results should be accomplished, he proposed, at a -concerted moment, to throw his whole force upon Grant's flank, while Lee -attacked in front. General Beauregard was confident of his ability to make -the attack upon Butler, in two days after receiving the desired -reënforcements, and was equally confident of the result both against -Butler and Grant. His proposition concluded with the declaration that -Grant's fate could not be doubtful if the proposed concentration should be -made, and indicated the following gratifying results: "The destruction of -Grant's forces would open the way for the recovery of most of our lost -territory." - -Whatever his views as to its feasibility, the President could not refuse a -careful consideration of a plan, whose author, in advance, claimed such -momentous results. Upon reflection President Davis declined the plan as -involving too great a risk, not only of the safety of Richmond, but of the -very existence of Lee's army. The proposition of Beauregard was submitted -on the 14th May. At that time the grapple between Grant and Lee was still -unrelaxed. Twelve days of battle had cost Lee fifteen thousand men. -Meanwhile he had not received _a single additional musket_, while Grant -had nearly supplied his losses by reënforcements from Washington. Thus, -while Lee's force did not reach forty thousand, Grant's still approximated -one hundred and thirty thousand. The President also knew that Grant was at -that moment closely pressing Lee, moving toward his left, and seeking -either to overlap or break in upon the right flank of Lee. - -The proposed detachment of fifteen thousand men from Lee, leaving him not -more than twenty-five thousand, in such a crisis, would have been simply -madness. Butler, it is possible, might have been destroyed, but the end of -the Confederacy would have been hastened twelve months. It is questionable -whether, at any moment after Grant crossed the Rapidan, the overmatched -army of Lee could have been diminished without fatal disaster. The timely -arrival of Longstreet had prevented a serious reverse on the 6th May. Is -it reasonable to suppose that Lee could have detached one-third of his -army, without Grant's knowledge, or that the energy of the Federal -commander would have permitted an hour's respite to his sorely-pressed -adversary after the discovery? The case would have been altogether -different, had Lee been already safe within his works at Richmond. Under -the circumstances proposed, he had before him a perilous retrograde, -followed by a force four times his own strength, and commanded by the most -unrelenting and persistent of officers. - -But there was another view of the proposition not to be overlooked by the -President in his perilous responsibility. It is true Beauregard promised -grand results--nothing less than the total destruction of nearly all the -Federal forces in Virginia. In brief, his plan proposed to destroy two -hundred thousand men with less than sixty thousand. Again it was true the -enemy was to be destroyed in detail--Butler first, and Grant afterwards. -There were precedents in history for such achievements. But it should be -remembered that _if_ Butler should be immediately destroyed, and _if_ Lee -should be guaranteed a safe retrograde, Beauregard would still be able to -aid Lee to the extent of but little more than twenty thousand men. This -would give Lee less than fifty thousand with which to take the offensive -against more than twice that number. Against just such odds Lee had -already tried the offensive, and failed because of his weakness. He had -assailed Grant under the most favorable circumstances, effecting a -complete surprise when the Federal commander believed him already -retreating, but was unable to follow up his advantage. Was there reason to -believe that any better result would follow from a repetition of the -offensive? - -Believing himself not justified in hazarding the safety of the -Confederacy upon such a train of doubtful conditions, and agreeing with -General Beauregard, that Butler could be dislodged from his advanced -positions, so menacing to Richmond, Mr. Davis rejected a plan which, under -different circumstances, he would have heartily and confidently adopted. - -With remarkable promptitude, Beauregard conceived a brilliant plan of -battle, and within twenty-four hours had already put it in virtual -execution. With fifteen thousand men, he drove Butler from all his -advanced works, and confined him securely in the _cul de sac_ of Bermuda -Hundreds, where, in a few months, ended the inglorious military career of -a man who, in every possible manner, dishonored the sword which he wore, -and disgraced the Government which he served. The brilliant conception of -Beauregard merited even better results, which were prevented not less by -untoward circumstances than by the weakness of his command. - -While Beauregard thus effectually neutralized Butler, Grant's -combinations, elsewhere, were brought to signal discomfiture. The -expedition from the Kanawha Valley had been, in a measure, successful in -its designs against the communications of South-western Virginia, but did -not obtain the coöperation designed, by the column moving up the -Shenandoah Valley. Sigel, in his advance up the Valley, was encountered at -Newmarket by General Breckinridge, who signally defeated him, capturing -artillery and stores, and inflicting a heavy loss upon the enemy. Sigel -retreated hastily down the Valley. - -General Grant, on the 11th of May, proclaimed to his Government his -purpose "to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer," yet, within -a week afterwards, he was already meditating another plan of operations. -Forty thousand of the bravest soldiers of the Federal army had been vainly -sacrificed, and yet the Confederate line remained intact upon the -impregnable hills of Spottsylvania. A week was consumed in fruitless -search for a weak point in the breastplate of Lee. Grant was again driven -to "maneuvre." Foiled again and again by the great exemplar of strategy, -with whom he contended, Grant at no point turned his face towards Richmond -without finding Lee across his path. Moving constantly to the left, the 3d -of June--exactly one month from the crossing of the Rapidan--found Grant -near the Chickahominy, and Lee still facing him. The fortune of war again -brought the belligerents upon the old battle-ground of the Peninsula. Just -before Lee reached the defenses of Richmond, for the first time during the -campaign, he received reënforcements.[75] Grant also was strengthened, -drawing sixteen thousand men from Butler at Bermuda Hundreds. - -On the 3d of June occurred the second battle of Cold Harbor. It was the -last experiment of the strictly "hammering" system, unaided by the -resources of strategy. It cost Grant thirteen thousand men, and Lee a few -hundred. Such was a fitting _finale_ of a campaign avowedly undertaken -upon the brutal principle of the mere consumption of life, and in contempt -of every sound military precept. Cold Harbor terminated the overland -movement of Grant, and he speedily abandoned the line upon which he had -proposed "to fight all summer." Not that he willingly abandoned his -"hammering" principle after this additional sacrifice of lives, for he -would still have dashed his army against the impregnable wall in his -front, but his men recoiled, in the consciousness of an impotent endeavor. -They had done all that troops could accomplish, and shrank from that which -their own experience told them was _impossible_. And there should be no -wonder that the Federal army was reluctant to be vainly led to slaughter -again. For forty days its proven mettle had been subjected to a cruel -test, such as even Napoleon, reckless of his men's lives as he was, had -never imposed upon an army. It is safe to say that no troops but Americans -could have been held so long to such an enterprise as that attempted by -Grant in May, 1864, and none but Americans could have withstood such -desperate assaults as were sustained by Lee's army. - -In one month, from the Rapidan to the Chickahominy, more than sixty -thousand of the flower of the Federal army had been put _hors du combat_, -and many of the best of its officers, men identified with its whole -history, were lost forever. In one month Lee had inflicted a loss greater -than the whole of the force which he commanded during the last year of the -war! Yet this was the "generalship" of Grant, for which a meeting of -twenty-five thousand men in New York returned the "thanks of the nation." -The world was invited, by the sensational press of the North, to admire -the "strategy" which had carried the Federal army from the Rapidan to the -James, a position which it might have reached by transports without the -loss of a man. - -For a brief season, hope, positive and well-defined, dawned upon the -South. Thus far the problem of _endurance_ was in favor of the -Confederacy. Grant's stupendous combinations against Richmond had broken -down. The spirit of the North seemed to be yielding, and again the Federal -Government encountered the danger of a collapse of the war. - -The battle of Cold Harbor convinced General Grant of the futility of -operations against Richmond from the north side of James River. He -therefore determined to transfer his army to the south side of the river, -and seek to possess himself of the communications southward, and to employ -coöperative forces to destroy or occupy the communications of Richmond -with Lynchburg and the Shenandoah Valley. This involved new combinations, -and Grant still had abundant means to execute them. If successful, this -plan would completely isolate Richmond, leaving no avenue of supplies -except by the James River Canal, which also would be easily accessible. - -Lee could not prevent the transfer of Grant's army to the south side. -Petersburg and Richmond were both to be defended, and his strength was too -limited to be divided. Grant made a vigorous dash against Petersburg. He -had anticipated an easy capture of that city by a _coup de main_, but in -this he was disappointed. Petersburg was found to be well fortified, and -the desperate assaults made by the Federal advanced forces were repulsed. -In a few days Lee's army again confronted Grant, and Richmond and -Petersburg were safe. - -Thus the system of rushing men upon fortifications failed on the south -side not less signally than in the overland campaign. The Federal -commander had no alternative but a formal siege of Petersburg. Driven by -circumstances beyond his control, General Grant thus assumed a position -which, in the end, proved fatal to the Confederacy, and the results of -which have exalted him, in the view of millions, to rank among the -illustrious generals of history. The south side of James River was always -the real key to the possession of Richmond. Sooner or later the -Confederate capital must fall, if assailed from that direction with -pertinacity, and with such ample means as were given to Grant. - -The new Federal combination was in process of execution by the middle of -June. After the defeat of Sigel, a large force was organized in the lower -valley, and intrusted to the direction of General Hunter, an officer -distinguished by fanatical zeal against the section of which he was a -native, and by the peculiar cruelty of a renegade. Breckinridge had been -withdrawn from the Valley, to Lee's lines, immediately after his defeat of -Sigel, and Hunter without difficulty overwhelmed the small force left -under General Jones. Forming a junction with Crook and Averill from -North-western Virginia, at Staunton, Hunter advanced upon Lynchburg, -meanwhile destroying public and private property indiscriminately, and -practicing a system of incendiarism and petty oppression against which -even Federal officers protested. - -It was necessary to detach a portion of the army from the lines of -Richmond to check the demonstration of Hunter. Accordingly, General Early, -who had acquired great reputation in the battles upon the Rapidan, was -sent with eight thousand men to the Valley. Uniting his forces to those -already on the ground, General Early made a vigorous pursuit of Hunter, -whose flight was as dastardly as his conduct had been despicable. -Retreating with great precipitation through the mountains of Western -Virginia, Hunter's force, for several weeks, bore no relation to -operations in Virginia. With the Shenandoah Valley thus denuded of -invaders, Early rapidly executed a movement of his forces down the Valley, -with a view to a demonstration beyond the Potomac frontier, which was -entirely uncovered by Hunter's retreat. The movement of Early into -Maryland caused, as was anticipated, a detachment from Grant's forces, -for the defense of the Federal capital. Advancing with extraordinary -vigor, General Early pursued the retreating enemy, defeating them in an -engagement near Frederick City, and arrived near Washington on the 10th of -July. Warned of the approach of heavy reënforcements from Grant, which -must arrive before the works could be carried, Early abandoned his design -of an attack upon Washington, and retired across the Potomac, with his -extensive and valuable captures. - -Signal failure attended the cavalry expeditions sent by Grant against the -railroads. Sheridan, while moving northward against Gordonsville and -Charlottesville, from which points, after inflicting all possible damage -upon the railroads to Richmond, he was to join Hunter at Lynchburg, was -intercepted by Wade Hampton, the worthy successor of Stuart, and compelled -to abandon his part of the campaign. An extended raid, under Wilson and -Kautz, on the south side, also terminated in disaster. The expedition of -Burbridge against South-western Virginia was baffled by a counter-movement -of Morgan with his cavalry, into Kentucky, the Federal forces following -him into that State. - -Thus again were all of General Grant's plans disappointed, and by -midsummer the situation in Virginia was altogether favorable to the -Confederacy. There was indeed good reason for the evident apprehension of -the North, that, after all, Grant's mighty campaign was a failure. His -mere proximity to the Confederate capital signified nothing. All his -attempts against both Petersburg and Richmond, whether by strategy or -_coups de main_, had ended in disaster; the Confederate lines were -pronounced impregnable by the ablest Federal engineers, and after the -ridiculous _fiasco_ of "Burnside's mine," the capture of Richmond seemed -as remote as ever. To increase public alarm at the North, was added the -activity of Lee, his evident confidence in his ability to hold his own, -with a diminished force, and even to threaten the enemy with invasion. - -The Confederate Government, fully apprized of the momentous results, with -which the present year was pregnant, and of the increased peril which -assailed the Confederacy, in consequence of its diminished resources, -depended upon other influences, than an exhibition of military strength, -to promote its designs. The cause of the South could no longer be -submitted, unaided, to the arbitrament of battle. At other periods, while -freely avowing his desire for peace, and offering to the Federal -authorities, opportunity for negotiation, President Davis had relied -almost solely upon the sword, as the agency of Southern independence. The -opening of the spring campaign of 1864 was deemed a favorable conjuncture -for the employment of the resources of diplomacy. To approach the Federal -Government directly would be in vain. Repeated efforts had already -demonstrated its inflexible purpose not to negotiate with the Confederate -authorities. Political developments at the North, however, favored the -adoption of some action that might influence popular sentiment in the -hostile section. The aspect of the peace party was especially encouraging, -and it was evident that the real issue to be decided in the Presidential -election, was the continuance or cessation of the war. - -A commission of three gentlemen, eminent in position and intelligence, was -accordingly appointed by Mr. Davis to visit Canada, with a view to -negotiation with such persons in the North, as might be relied upon, to -facilitate the attainment of peace. This commission was designed to -facilitate such preliminary conditions, as might lead to formal -negotiation between the two governments, and their intelligence was fully -relied upon to make judicious use of any political opportunities that -might be presented in the progress of military operations. - -The Confederate commissioners, Messrs. Clay, of Alabama, Holcombe, of -Virginia, and Thompson, of Mississippi, sailed from Wilmington at the -incipiency of the campaign on the Rapidan. Within a few weeks thereafter -they were upon the Canada frontier, in the execution of their mission. A -correspondence with Horace Greeley commenced on the 12th of July. Through -Mr. Greeley the commissioners sought a safe conduct to the Federal -capital. For a few days Mr. Lincoln appeared to favor an interview with -the commissioners, but finally rejected their application, on the ground -that they were not authorized to treat for peace. In his final -communication, addressed "To whom it may concern," Mr. Lincoln offered -safe conduct to any person or persons having authority to control the -armies then at war with the United States, and authorized to treat upon -the following basis of negotiation: "the restoration of peace, the -_integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery_." - -Upon this basis, negotiation was, of course, precluded, and peace -impossible. Mr. Lincoln was perfectly aware that the commissioners had no -control of the Confederate armies, and that the Confederate Government -alone was empowered to negotiate. He therefore did not expect the -acceptance of his passport, and added to the mockery an arrogant -statement, in advance, of the conditions upon which he would consent to -treat. Even if the commissioners had been empowered to treat, Mr. -Lincoln's terms dictated the surrender of every thing for which the South -was fighting, and more than the North professed to demand at the outset. -Abolition was now added to the conditions of re-admission to the Union. -Mr. Lincoln's proposition was a cruel mockery, an unworthy insult to the -manhood of a people, whom his armies, at least, had learned to respect. - - - - -CHAPTER XIX. - - DISAPPOINTMENT AT RESULTS OF THE GEORGIA CAMPAIGN--HOW FAR IT WAS - PARALLEL WITH THE VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN--DIFFERENT TACTICS ON BOTH - SIDES--REMOVAL OF GENERAL JOHNSTON--THE EXPLANATION OF THAT STEP--A - QUESTION FOR MILITARY JUDGMENT--THE NEGATIVE VINDICATION OF GENERAL - JOHNSTON--DIFFERENT THEORIES OF WAR--THE REAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE - SOUTHERN FAILURE--THE ODDS IN NUMBERS AND RESOURCES AGAINST THE - SOUTH--WATER FACILITIES OF THE ENEMY--STRATEGIC DIFFICULTIES OF THE - SOUTH--THE BLOCKADE--INSIGNIFICANCE OF MINOR QUESTIONS--JEFFERSON - DAVIS THE WASHINGTON OF THE SOUTH--GENERAL JOHN B. HOOD--HIS - DISTINGUISHED CAREER--HOPE OF THE SOUTH RENEWED--HOOD'S OPERATIONS-- - LOSS OF ATLANTA--IMPORTANT QUESTIONS--PRESIDENT DAVIS IN GEORGIA-- - PERVERSE CONDUCT OF GOVERNOR BROWN--MR. DAVIS IN MACON--AT HOOD'S - HEAD-QUARTERS--HOW HOOD'S TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN VARIED FROM MR. DAVIS' - INTENTIONS--SHERMAN'S PROMPT AND BOLD CONDUCT--HOOD'S MAGNANIMOUS - ACKNOWLEDGMENT--DESTRUCTION OF THE CONFEDERATE POWER IN THE - SOUTH-WEST. - - -General Johnston had failed to realize either the expectations of the -public, or the hope of the Government, in his direction of the campaign in -Georgia. His tactics were those uniformly illustrated by this officer in -all his operations, of falling back before the enemy, and seeking to -obviate the disadvantage of inferior numbers by partial engagements in -positions favorable to himself. There was, indeed, some parallel between -his campaign and that of Lee, between the Rapidan and James, but the -results in Virginia and Georgia were altogether disproportionate. The -advance of Sherman was slow and cautious, but nevertheless steady; and -when the campaign had lasted seventy days, he was before Atlanta, the -objective point of his designs, and in secure occupation of an extensive -and important section of country, heretofore inaccessible to the Federal -armies. Not only were Sherman's losses small, as compared with those of -Grant, but his force was relatively much weaker. - -There can be no just comparison of these two campaigns, either as -illustrating the same system of tactics, or as yielding the same results. -The aggregate of Federal forces in Georgia did not exceed, at the -beginning of the campaign, one hundred thousand men, if indeed it reached -that figure. To oppose this, Johnston had forty-five thousand. We have -already stated the aggregate of Federal forces in Virginia to have been at -least four times the force that, under any circumstances, Lee could have -made available. The public did not interpret as _retreats_, the parallel -movements by which Lee successively threw himself in the front of Grant, -wherever the latter made a demonstration. Not once had Lee turned his back -upon the enemy, nor abandoned a position, save when the baffled foe, after -enormous losses, sought a new field of operations. At its conclusion, -Grant had sustained losses in excess of the whole of Lee's army, abandoned -altogether his original design, and sought a base of operations, which he -might have reached in the beginning, not only without loss, but without -even opposition. - -Some explanation of the widely disproportionate results achieved in -Virginia and Georgia, is to be found in the different tactics of the -Federal commanders. Sherman, whose nature is thoroughly aggressive, yet -developed great skill and caution. Instead of fruitlessly dashing his army -against fortifications, upon ground of the enemy's choosing, he treated -the positions of Johnston as fortresses, from which his antagonist was to -be flanked. - -But while this explanation was appreciated, the public was much disposed -to accept the two campaigns as illustrations of the different systems of -tactics accredited to the two Confederate commanders. It was seen that in -Virginia the enemy occupied no new territory, and, at the end of three -months, was upon ground which he might easily have occupied at the -beginning of the campaign, but to reach which, by the means selected, had -cost him nearly eighty thousand men.[76] In Georgia, on the other hand, -Sherman had advanced one hundred miles upon soil heretofore firmly held by -the Confederacy, and without a general engagement of the opposing forces. -In Virginia, the enemy had no difficulty as to his transportation, and the -farther Grant advanced towards James River, the more secure and abundant -became his means of supply. In Georgia, Sherman drew his supplies over -miles of hostile territory, and was nowhere aided by the proximity of -navigable streams. - -When in a censorious mood, the popular mind is not over-careful of the -aptness of the parallels and analogies, wherewith to justify its carping -judgments. Without denying his skill, or questioning his possession of the -higher qualities of generalship, people complained that "Johnston was a -retreating general." Whatever judgment may have arisen from subsequent -events, it can not be fairly denied that when Johnston reached Atlanta, -there was a very perceptible loss of popular confidence, not less in the -issue of the campaign than in General Johnston himself. It was in -deference to popular sentiment, as much as in accordance with his views of -the necessity of the military situation, that President Davis, about the -middle of July, relieved General Johnston from command. Sympathizing -largely with the popular aspiration for a more bold, ample, and -comprehensive policy, and appreciating the value of unlimited public -confidence, Mr. Davis had lost much of his hope of those decisive results, -which he believed the Western army competent to achieve. - -The dispatch relieving General Johnston was as follows: - - "RICHMOND, VA., July 17, 1864. - - "_To General J. E. Johnston_: - - "Lieutenant-General J. B. Hood has been commissioned to the temporary - rank of General, under the law of Congress. I am directed by the - Secretary of War to inform you, that as you have failed to arrest the - advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, and _express no - confidence that you can defeat or repel him_, you are hereby relieved - from the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee, which you - will immediately turn over to General Hood. - - "S. COOPER, - "_Adjutant and Inspector-General_." - -This order sufficiently explains the immediate motive of Johnston's -removal, but there was a train of circumstances which, at length, brought -the President reluctantly to this conclusion. The progress of events in -Georgia, from the beginning of spring, had developed a marked difference -in the views of General Johnston and the President. Early in the year Mr. -Davis had warmly approved an offensive campaign against the Federal army, -while its various wings were not yet united. The Federal force, then in -the neighborhood of Dalton, did not greatly exceed the Confederate -strength, and Mr. Davis, foreseeing the concentration of forces for the -capture of Atlanta, believed the opportunity for a decisive stroke to -exist before this concentration should ensue. General Hood likewise -favored this view of the situation. He urged that the enemy would -certainly concentrate forces to such an extent, if permitted, as would -gradually force the Southern army back into the interior, where a defeat -would be irreparable, with no new defensive line, and without the hope of -rallying either the army or the people. General Johnston opposed these -views, on the ground that the enemy, if defeated, had strong positions -where they could take refuge, while a defeat of the Confederate force -would be fatal. This difference of opinion is to be appropriately decided -only by military criticism, but it can not be fairly adjudged that an -offensive in the spring would not have succeeded, because it failed in the -following autumn. Circumstances were altogether different. - -General Johnston's operations between Dalton and Atlanta were -unsatisfactory to Mr. Davis. Here again arises a military question, which -we shall not seek to decide, in the evident difference as to the capacity -of the Army of Tennessee, for any other than purely defensive operations. -It was, indeed, not so much an opposition on the part of the President, to -Johnston's operations, as the apprehension of a want of ultimate aim in -his movements. Whatever the plans of General Johnston may have been, they -were not communicated to Mr. Davis, at least in such a shape as to -indicate the hope of early and decisive execution. Alarmed for the results -of a policy having seemingly the characteristics of drifting, of waiting -upon events, and of hoping for, instead of _creating opportunity_, Mr. -Davis yet felt the necessity of giving General Johnston an ample trial. -During all this period strong influences were brought to bear against -Johnston, and upon the other hand, he was warmly sustained by influences -friendly both to himself and the President. - -For weeks the President was importuned by these conflicting counsels, the -natural effect of which was to aggravate his grave doubts as to the -existence of any matured ultimate object in General Johnston's movements. -Upon one occasion, while still anxiously deliberating the subject, an -eminent politician, a thorough patriot, a supporter of Mr. Davis, and -having to an unlimited extent his confidence, called at the office of the -President, with a view to explain the situation in Georgia, whence he had -just arrived. This gentleman had been with the army, knew its condition, -its enthusiasm and confidence. He was confident that General Johnston -would destroy Sherman, and did not believe that the Federal army would -ever be permitted to reach even the neighborhood of Atlanta. Mr. Davis, -having quietly heard this explanation, replied by handing to his visitor a -dispatch just received from Johnston, and _dated at Atlanta_. The army had -already reached Atlanta, before the gentleman could reach Richmond, and he -acknowledged himself equally amazed and disappointed. - -Despite his doubts and apprehensions, however, Mr. Davis resisted the -applications of members of Congress and leading politicians from the -section in which General Johnston was operating, for a change of -commanders, until he felt himself no longer justified in hazarding the -loss of Atlanta without a struggle. There appeared little ground for the -belief that Johnston would hold Atlanta, nor did there appear any reason -why his arrival there should occasion a departure from his previous -retrograde policy. Of the purpose of General Johnston to evacuate Atlanta -the President felt that he had abundant evidence. Not until he felt fully -satisfied upon this point, was the removal of that officer determined -upon. Indeed, the order removing Johnston sets forth as its justification, -that he had expressed no confidence in his ability to "repel the enemy." -If Atlanta should be surrendered, where would General Johnston expect to -give battle?[77] - -Subsequently to his removal, General Johnston avowed that his purpose was -to hold Atlanta; and, therefore, we are not at liberty to question his -purpose. But this does not alter the legitimate inference drawn by Mr. -Davis at the time of his removal. Can it be believed that the President -would have taken that step, if satisfied of Johnston's purpose to deliver -battle for Atlanta? - -This entire subject belongs appropriately only to military discussion, and -no decision from other sources can possibly affect the ultimate sentence -of that tribunal. Yet the most serious disparagement of Mr. Davis, by -civilian writers, has been based upon the removal of Johnston from the -command of the Western army. Granting that General Johnston would have -sought to hold Atlanta, can it be believed that the ultimate result would -have been different? When Sherman invested Atlanta, the North found some -compensation for Grant's failures in Virginia; and even though his force -should have been inadequate for a siege, can it now be doubted that he -would have been reënforced to any needed extent? The mere presence of -Sherman at Atlanta was justly viewed by the North as an important success. -He had followed his antagonist to the very heart of the Confederacy, and -was master of innumerable strong positions held by the Confederates at the -outset of the campaign. To suppose that he would, at such a moment, be -permitted to fail from a lack of means, is a hypothesis at variance with -the conduct of the North throughout the war. - -General Johnston has that sort of negative vindication which arises from -the disasters of his successor, though, as we shall presently show, Mr. -Davis was nowise responsible for the misfortunes of General Hood.[78] The -question is one which must some day arise as between the general military -policy of the Confederacy, and the antagonistic views which have been so -freely ascribed to General Johnston by his admirers. We have no desire to -pursue that antagonism, which, if it really existed, can hardly yet be a -theme for impartial discussion. Towards the close of the war, it was usual -to accredit Johnston with the theory that the Confederacy could better -afford to _lose territory than men_, and that hence the true policy of the -South was to avoid general engagements, unless under such circumstances as -should totally neutralize the enemy's advantage in numbers. We are not -prepared to say to what extent these announcements of his views were -authorized by General Johnston, or to what extent they were based upon -retrospection. Some confirmation of their authenticity would seem to be -deducible from General Johnston's declaration since the war, that the -"Confederacy was too weak for offensive war." Certainly there could be no -theory more utterly antagonistic to the genius of the Southern people, and -that is a consideration, to which the great commanders of history have not -usually been indifferent. Nor was it the theory which inspired those -achievements of Southern valor, which will ring through the centuries. It -was not the theory which Lee and Jackson adopted, nor, we need hardly -add, that which Jefferson Davis approved. - -Indeed, the philosophy of the Southern failure is not to be sought in the -discussion of opposing theories among Confederate leaders. The conclusion -of history will be, not that the South accomplished less than was to be -anticipated, but far more than have any other people under similar -circumstances. Southern men hardly yet comprehend the real odds in numbers -and resources which for four years they successfully resisted. Other -questions than those merely of aggregate populations and material wealth, -enter into the solution of the problem. - -By the census of 1860, the aggregate free population of the thirteen -States, which the Confederacy claimed, was 7,500,000, leaving in the -remaining States of the Union a free population of over twenty millions. -This statement includes Kentucky and Missouri as members of the -Confederacy; yet, by the compulsion of Federal bayonets, these States, not -less than Maryland and Delaware, were virtually on the side of the North. -Kentucky proclaimed neutrality, but during the whole war was overrun by -the Federal armies, and, with her State government and large numbers of -her people favoring the North, despite the Southern sympathies of the -majority, her moral influence, as well as her physical strength, sustained -the Union. The legitimate government of Missouri, and a majority of her -people, sided with the South; but early occupied and held by the Federal -army, her legitimate government was subverted, and her moral and physical -resources were thrown into the scale against the Confederacy. - -To say nothing of the large numbers of recruits obtained by the Federal -armies from Kentucky, Maryland and Missouri, (chiefly from their large -foreign populations,) their contributions to the Confederate army were -nearly, if not quite, compensated by the accessions to Federal strength -from East Tennessee, Western Virginia, and other portions of the seceded -States. It would be fair, therefore, to deduct the population of these two -States from that of the South, and this would leave the Confederacy five -and one-half millions. Dividing their free populations between the two -sections, and the odds were six and a half millions against twenty and a -half millions. This is a liberal statement for the North, and embraces -only the original populations of the two sections at the beginning of -hostilities. There can hardly be a reasonable doubt, that had the struggle -been confined to these numerical forces, the South would have triumphed. -But hordes of foreign mercenaries, incited by high bounty and the promise -of booty, flocked to the Federal army, and thus was the North enabled to -recruit its armies to any needed standard, while the South depended solely -upon its original population. As the South was overrun, too, negroes were -forced or enticed into the Federal service, and thus, by these -inexhaustible reserves of foreign mercenaries and negro recruits, the -Confederate army was finally exhausted. - -The following exhibition of the strength of the Federal armies is from the -report of the Secretary of War, at the beginning of the session of -Congress in December, 1865: - - Official reports show that on the 1st of May, 1864, the aggregate - national military force of all arms, officers and men, was nine - hundred and seventy thousand seven hundred and ten, to-wit: - - Available force present for duty 662,345 - On detached service in the different military departments 109,348 - In field hospitals or unfit for duty 41,266 - In general hospitals or on sick leave at home 75,978 - Absent on furlough or as prisoners of war 66,290 - Absent without leave 15,483 - ------- - Grand aggregate 970,710 - - The aggregate available force present for duty May 1st, 1864, was - distributed in the different commands as follows: - - Department of Washington 42,124 - Army of the Potomac 120,386 - Department of Virginia and North Carolina 59,139 - Department of the South 18,165 - Department of the Gulf 61,866 - Department of Arkansas 23,666 - Department of the Tennessee 74,174 - Department of the Missouri 15,770 - Department of the North-west 5,295 - Department of Kansas 4,798 - Head-quarters Military Division of the Mississippi 476 - Department of the Cumberland 119,948 - Department of the Ohio 35,416 - Northern Department 9,540 - Department of West Virginia 30,782 - Department of the East 2,828 - Department of the Susquehanna 2,970 - Middle Department 5,627 - Ninth Army Corps 20,780 - Department of New Mexico 3,454 - Department of the Pacific 5,141 - ------- - Total 662,345 - -And again: - - Official reports show that on the 1st of March, 1865, the aggregate - military force of all arms, officers and men, was nine hundred and - sixty-five thousand five hundred and ninety-one, to-wit: - - Available forces present for duty 602,598 - On detached service in the different military departments 132,538 - In field hospitals and unfit for duty 35,628 - In general hospitals or on sick leave 143,419 - Absent on furlough or as prisoners of war 31,695 - Absent without leave 19,683 - ------- - Grand aggregate 965,591 - - This force was augmented on the 1st of May, 1865, by enlistments, to - the number of one million five hundred and sixteen, of all arms, - officers and men (1,000,516). - -And again he says: - - The aggregate quotas charged against the several States - under all calls made by the President of the United - States, from the 15th day of April, 1861, to the 14th - day of April, 1865, at which time drafting and - recruiting ceased, was 2,759,049 - The aggregate number of men credited on the several - calls, and put into service of the United States, in - the army, navy, and marine corps, during the above - period, was 2,656,553 - Leaving a deficiency on all calls, when the war closed, - of 102,596 - -This statement does not include the regular army, nor the negro troops -raised in the Southern States, which were not raised by calls on the -States. It may be safely asserted that the "available force present for -duty," of the Federal armies at the beginning or close of the last year of -the war, exceeded the entire force called into the service of the -Confederacy during the four years. The aggregate of Federal forces raised -during the war numbered more than one-third of the free population of the -Confederate States, including men, women, and children.[79] - -But this disparity of numbers, apparently sufficient of itself to decide -the issue against the South, was by no means the greatest advantage of the -North. When it is asserted that the naval superiority of the North decided -the contest in its favor, we are not limited to the consideration merely -of that absolute command of the water, which prevented the South from -importing munitions of war, except at enormous expense and hazard, which -made the defense of the sea-coast and contiguous territory impossible, and -which so disorganized the Confederate finances. The Confederacy -encountered strategic difficulties, by reason of the naval superiority of -the North, which, at an early period of the war, counter-balanced the -advantages of its defensive position. - -In the beginning the enemy had easy, speedy, and secure access to the -Southern coast, and wherever there was a harbor or inlet, was to be found -a base of operations for a Federal army. Thus, at the outset, the -Confederacy presented on every side an exposed frontier. In every quarter, -the Federal armies had bases of operations at right angles, each to the -other, and thus, wherever the Confederate army established a defensive -line, it was assailable by a second Federal army advancing from a second -base. The advantage of rapid concentration of forces, usually belonging to -an interior line, was obviated by the easy and rapid conveyance of large -masses by water. - -Probably the most serious strategic disadvantage of the South was its -territorial configuration, through the intersection of its soil in nearly -every quarter by navigable rivers, either emptying into the ocean, of -which the North, at all times, had undisputed control, or opening upon the -Federal frontier. In all the Atlantic States of the Confederacy navigable -streams penetrate far into the interior, and empty into the sea. The -Mississippi, aptly termed an "inland sea," flowing through the -Confederacy, was, both in its upper waters and at its mouth, held by the -North. The Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, with their mouths upon the -Federal frontiers, navigable in winter for transports and gunboats, in the -first twelve months of the war, brought the Federal armies to the centre -of the South-west. In the Trans-Mississippi region, the Arkansas and Red -Rivers gave the enemy convenient and secure bases of operations along -their margins. Each one of these streams having inevitably, sooner or -later, become subject to the control of the Federal navy, afforded bases -of operations against the interior of the South, while it was likewise -threatened from the Northern frontier. - -The difficulty of _space_, which defeated Napoleon in his invasion of -Russia, and which has baffled the largest armies led by the ablest -commanders, had an easy solution for the North. Remarkable illustrations -of the extent to which these water facilities aided the North, were -afforded by the signal failure attending every overland advance of the -Federal armies so long as the Confederates could raise even the semblance -of an opposing force. Besides the innumerable Federal failures in the -Appalachian region of Virginia, Sherman and Grant, the most successful of -Northern commanders, illustrated this military principle in instances -already noted. When Sherman finally marched from the Confederate frontier -to the ocean, General Grant's policy of "attrition" had virtually -destroyed the military strength of the South, and Sherman simply -accomplished an unopposed march through an undefended country. There can -be no better illustration of these strategic difficulties of the -Confederacy, than that afforded by the train of disasters in the beginning -of 1862, each of which was directly and mainly attributable to the naval -advantages of the enemy and the geographical configuration. - -A candid review of the events of the first two years of the war will -demonstrate the inevitable failure of subjugation of the South, but for -these advantages of her invaders. Not only are the facilities of -transportation possessed by the North to be considered, but the further -advantage extended by its fleet in the event of military reverse. The -shipping constituted an invulnerable defense and convenient shelter for -the fugitive Federals. Upon at least two occasions, the two main Federal -armies were rescued from destruction by the gunboats--in the case of Grant -at Shiloh, and of McClellan on James River. - -Nor was it possible for the South to make adequate provision to meet the -naval advantages of the North. The Federal Government retained the whole -of the navy. The North was manufacturing and commercial, while the South -was purely agricultural in its means; hence the incomparable rapidity with -which the Federal Government accumulated shipping of every character. The -initial superiority of the North in naval resources prevented the South -from obtaining from foreign sources the men and the material for the -equipment of vessels of war. Then, again, the disputed question of the -capacity of shore batteries to resist vessels of war, had a most -inopportune solution for the South, and in cases where great interests -were involved. We have already noted one instance where this question had -a fatal solution--that of New Orleans. And in this instance, too, the want -of time for preparation was a fatal difficulty. But for the unfinished -condition of the iron-clads at New Orleans, the possession of the -Mississippi by the enemy would have been greatly deferred, though, with -the headwaters and mouth of the great river in Federal control, it was -hardly more than a question of time, should the North skillfully employ -its superior manufacturing resources and preponderant population. - -The special weapon of the North, from which no amount of victories ever -brought the Confederacy one moment's relief, was the blockade--a weapon -which the injustice of foreign powers placed in the grasp of our -adversaries. The blockade ruined the Confederate finances and, by -preventing the importation of military material, weakened the Confederate -armies to the extent of thousands of men who were detailed for -manufacturing and other purposes. It was the blockade, too, which caused -the derangement of the internal economy of the South, creating the painful -contrast in the effects of the war upon the two sections. The North, with -its ports open, the abundant gold of California, and petroleum stimulating -speculation, found in the war a mine of wealth. Patriotism and profit went -hand in hand. The vast expenditures of Government created a lucrative -market; the enormous transportation demanded made the railroads prosperous -beyond parallel; and the sources of popular prosperity and exhilaration -were inexhaustible. The condition of the South was the exact reverse. With -its commerce almost totally suspended; frequently in peril of famine; -whole States, one after another, occupied or devastated by the enemy, so -that when the Confederate armies expelled the enemy they could not -maintain themselves, and were compelled to retreat; deprived of every -comfort, and nearly of all the necessaries of life, the history of the war -in the South is a record of universal and unrelieved suffering. - -It must be apparent that we have here given but a superficial review and -imperfect statement of the obstacles with which the South contended. But, -assuredly, before even this array of odds, such minor questions as the -removal of one officer and the retention of another sink into utter -insignificance. As we have before intimated, many of the most important -incidents in the conduct of the war must be reserved for the decision of -impartial military judgment. What if it should be granted that the -appointment of Pemberton and the removal of Johnston were fatal blunders, -were they compensated by no acts of judicious selection of other officers -for promotion and reward? Is the firm and constant support of Lee, of -Sidney Johnston, of Jackson, and of Early to be accounted as nothing? Are -we to accept the imputation of error to Mr. Davis alone? We need not -pursue the career of General Johnston much farther than its beginning to -discover what his countrymen unanimously deplored as an error, what -Stonewall Jackson declared a fatal blunder. General Lee confessed his -error at Gettysburg. Beauregard, too, has been generally adjudged to have -seriously erred at Shiloh. Yet how easy would it be to construct a -plausible theory, demonstrating the seriously adverse influence upon the -fortunes of the Confederacy, from each one of those errors. And we could -extend the parallel much farther. Napoleon estimated the merits of -different generals by the comparative number of their faults and virtues. -Perhaps that is even a better philosophy which urges us to measure the -reputations of men, "not by their exemption from fault, but by the size of -the virtues of which they are possessed." Assuredly, the South can never -demur to the application of this test either to herself or her late -leader. Judged by such a standard of merit, neither can be apprehensive -for the award of posterity. Two generations hence, if not sooner, -Jefferson Davis, not less for his wisdom than for his virtues, will be -commemorated as the Washington of the South. - -With a view to dramatic unity, we shall disregard somewhat of -chronological order, and follow, with a rapid summary, the movements of -the ill-starred Western army of the Confederacy, to the point where its -existence virtually terminated. The successor of General Johnston, General -John B. Hood, embodied a rare union of the characteristics of the popular -ideal of a soldier. He was the noblest contribution of Kentucky chivalry -to the armies of the South, and his record throughout the war, even though -ending in terrible disaster, was that of a gallant, dashing, and skillful -leader. Identified with the Army of Northern Virginia from an early period -of its history, he shared its dangers, its trials, and its most thrilling -triumphs. "Hood and his Texans" were household words in the Confederacy, -and the bulletins from every battle-field in Virginia were emblazoned with -their exploits. Few commanders have possessed to a greater extent than -Hood that magnetic mastery over troops, which imbues them with the -consciousness of irresistible resolution. Of conspicuous personal -gallantry and commanding _physique_, he united to fiery energy, -consummate self-possession and excellent tactical ability. A favorite -with General Lee and President Davis, he had also received the warm -commendation of Stonewall Jackson for his distinguished services at Cold -Harbor, in 1862. - -Painfully wounded and disabled at Gettysburg, he accompanied his old -division to Georgia, and, while his previous wound was yet unhealed, he -lost a leg at Chickamauga. After months of painful confinement, he was -again in Richmond, soliciting the privilege of additional service to his -country. His conspicuous devotion challenged equally the admiration of the -people and the Government, and President Davis was universally declared -never to have conferred a more deserved promotion than that by which he -made Hood a Lieutenant-General. General Hood was assigned to the command -of a _corps_ under Johnston, and accompanied the army in its movements -from Dalton to Atlanta. - -The appointment of Hood as the successor of Johnston was the occasion of -renewed anticipation to the South. His aggressive qualities, it was -thought, would supply that bold and energetic policy which the country -believed to be the great need of the situation in Georgia. Nor was there -any thing in the record of Hood, to cause apprehension that his possession -of these qualities excluded such an equipoise of mental faculties, as -should ensure a sound and discreet system of operations. - -We shall not discuss in detail the operations which General Hood so -speedily inaugurated. They were necessitated, to a large extent, by a -situation of affairs for which he was not responsible. The one object of -Hood, and the one hope and necessity of the Confederacy, was the expulsion -of Sherman from a vital section. Sherman had not delayed an hour in his -purpose of securing possession of the Macon road, and severing the -communications of Atlanta. Already he was preparing operations similar to -those by which Grant sought the isolation of Petersburg; and if his -strength was not then adequate, there could be no question of his capacity -to obtain ample means from his Government to secure the great results of -his skillfully conducted and successful campaign. The situation required -precisely that immediate execution of a vigorous policy by which Lee had -relieved Richmond of the presence of McClellan. - -While thus foreseeing the fatal result of permitting himself to be -besieged in Atlanta, General Hood did not rashly assail the enemy. A -favorable opportunity was presented, by a gap between two of Sherman's -columns, for a concentrated assault upon that which was most exposed. -Though the Confederate forces were admirably massed and skillfully led, -they were eventually repulsed by the murderous fire of the Federal -artillery, which was concentrated with signal promptitude and served with -rare ability. This demonstration was a failure, though it had promised -favorably, and, for a time, exposed the entire Federal army to serious -danger. A series of subsequent engagements, fought by Hood to prevent the -consummation of Sherman's design to isolate Atlanta, left the enemy in -possession of the Confederate line of supply, and Atlanta was evacuated on -the 1st of September. - -Such was the melancholy conclusion, for the Confederacy, of the first -stage of the Georgia campaign. Military judgment must decide, how far an -able offensive policy, at the outset of the campaign would have delayed, -if not entirely checked the march of Sherman to Atlanta; how far an -offensive was then practicable; to what extent Hood's course was imposed -upon him by a situation which he did not create, and whether his accession -to command, either altered or hastened the ultimate fate of Atlanta. - -The emergency consequent upon the fall of Atlanta, summoned President -Davis to Georgia. His visit was dictated by the double purpose, of healing -dissensions in that State, and of devising measures for the restoration of -the campaign. The perverse course of Governor Brown had proven successful -in the dissemination of disaffection, and his teachings were beginning to -mature those fruits of demoralization in Georgia, which the subsequent -march of Sherman abundantly developed. It would be impossible to -characterize the conduct of this official in terms of extravagant -severity. Capricious and perverse in his hostility to the Confederate -Government, while yet professing fealty to the cause, he contrived, in the -most distressing exigencies, to paralyze the energies of Georgia, and -finally to create a feeling bordering closely upon open disaffection. - -The conduct of Governor Brown, acceptable only to the clique of -malcontents who followed him, was the subject of criticism throughout the -Confederacy, and of suspicion by a large portion of the public. It is a -matter of record that after the fall of Atlanta he refused to coöperate -with the Confederate authorities for the defense of Georgia, and -_demanded_ the return of the Georgia troops in Virginia, unless the -President would send reënforcements. Yet he was perfectly aware that the -Confederate Government then, had not one man to spare in any quarter, and -was in a crisis, produced solely by the want of numbers. His -communications to the Confederate Government were usually splenetic -assaults upon the President, whose military administration he offensively -criticised, and whom he charged with an ambition to destroy every -protection to the reserved rights of the States. There is no point of view -in which the course of Governor Brown is not equally incomprehensible and -indefensible. It was freighted with disaster and defeat to the cause which -he professed to serve. Considered in the aspect of partisan -administration, or the indulgence of personal spleen, its inconsistency -was paralleled only by its folly. It demoralized public sentiment, and -tended largely to that corruption of the public and the army which, in the -last stage of the war, was so palpable. Not the least injurious feature of -Governor Brown's official policy was the unpropitious seasons which he -selected for the indulgence of his capricious and splenetic moods. Upon -the heels of crushing military disasters, and when the Confederate -authorities were most helpless, Governor Brown was most exacting. - -The purposes of his persistent and vindictive impeachments of the -Confederate Government, at such periods, must remain a subject of -speculation. Certainly he did not exalt his dignity as a statesman, nor -approve his earnestness as a patriot, by giving precedence to his personal -animosities over his official duties, and by substituting for coöperation -in support of a cause to which he protested his devotion, a system of -malignant controversy with the national authorities. - -The interviews of President Davis, with Governor Brown, during his visit -to Georgia, in September, failed, as had all previous efforts to that end, -to effect an accommodation of differences. Governor Brown was determined -not to be satisfied, and though Mr. Davis, having made nearly every -concession demanded, left him under the impression that Brown was at last -prepared to coöperate with him heartily and zealously, he was speedily -convinced of the error of such a calculation. - -While on his way to Hood's army Mr. Davis addressed the citizens of Macon, -and spoke with great candor, concerning the perils of the situation, -which, though serious, he believed, might be repaired. Alluding to the -demand made upon him for reënforcements from Virginia, he said that the -disparity in Virginia was greater than in Georgia; the army under Early -had been sent to the Valley, because the enemy had penetrated to -Lynchburg; and now should Early be withdrawn, there would be nothing to -prevent the Federal army from forming a complete cordon of men around -Richmond. He had counseled with General Lee upon all these points; his -mind had sought to embrace the entire field, and the necessities of every -quarter, and his conclusion was, that "if one-half of the men now absent -from the field, would return to duty, we can defeat the enemy. With that -hope, I am now going to the front. I may not realize this hope, but I know -that there are men there, who have looked death too often in the face to -despond now." - -On the 18th September, the President reached Hood's head-quarters, and on -the following day reviewed the whole army. He addressed the troops in -terms of encouragement, and his promise to them of an advance northward, -was received with unbounded enthusiasm. The situation in Georgia admitted -a very limited consideration of expedients, by which to obtain -compensation for the loss of Atlanta. Sherman's presence, unmolested, in -the interior of Georgia, during the autumn and winter, would be fatal. He -would then be in a position to assail, at leisure, the only remaining -source of supplies for the Confederate armies. His cavalry could safely -penetrate in every direction, destroying communications and supplies, and -producing universal demoralization. - -Hood was confident that his army was capable of better fighting than it -had performed against Sherman, provided it could meet the enemy under such -circumstances as should promise the recovery of the ground lost, in the -event of victory. To attack Sherman in Atlanta was not to be considered, -and to await the development of the enemy's plan would be dangerous. -Sherman had already announced his purpose to rest his army at Atlanta, -with a view to its preparation for the arduous enterprises yet before it. -Hence, it became necessary to adopt a plan, which should draw him away -from his defenses, and compel him to fight upon equal ground. - -It may be briefly stated that the subsequent operations of General Hood, -when they ceased to menace the enemy's flank, and assumed the character of -a mere detachment upon the Federal rear, was not the plan of campaign -which Mr. Davis expected to be carried into execution. He approved a -concentration upon the Federal flank, which it was not likely Sherman -would permit to be endangered. Seeing, however, the exposed situation of -the country south of Atlanta, in consequence of the movement into Alabama, -Mr. Davis opposed any operations which should place Hood's army _beyond -striking distance of Sherman, should the latter move southward from -Atlanta_. - -It is remarkable to what extent the movements of Sherman demonstrated the -judicious character of the Confederate movement, so long as it was in -conformity with these views of Mr. Davis. Puzzled, at first, as to Hood's -purposes, Sherman was no longer perplexed as to what his own course should -be, when it was evident that Hood was making a serious demonstration for -the recovery of Tennessee, meanwhile giving up Georgia entirely to Federal -possession. When these larger and more doubtful enterprises were added to -the original scope of the Confederate movement, Mr. Davis was too remote -from the scene to assume the responsibility of recalling the army from an -enterprise which he felt assured would not be attempted without justifying -information by the commander.[80] - -But, after all, the disastrous consequences, following the uncovering of -Georgia, are to be attributed less to the intrinsically erroneous strategy -of Hood, than to the consummate vigor and promptitude of Sherman. Odious -to the South as Sherman is, by reason of his cruelties and barbarities, he -can not be denied the merit of an immediate grasp of the critical -situation, and a no less prompt execution. A commander of less -self-possession, and less audacity, would have been bewildered by the -transfer of an army from his immediate front to his rear, and placed -astride his communications. The "march to the sea" was no military -exploit, and only a brazen charlatanism could exalt it as an illustration -of genius. The proof of Sherman's merit is to be seen in the quick -determination and execution of his purpose, when the real significance of -Hood's operations was revealed. His telegram to Washington fully described -the situation and prophesied the sequel: "Hood has crossed the Tennessee. -Thomas will take care of him and Nashville, while Schofield will not let -him into Chattanooga or Knoxville. _Georgia and South Carolina are at my -mercy, and I shall strike._ Do not be anxious about me. I am all right." - -We are not permitted to trace the unfortunate Tennessee campaign of -General Hood, culminating in his disastrous defeat at Nashville, in -December, and in the virtual destruction of the gallant but ill-starred -army, upon whose bayonets the Confederate power, west of the Alleghanies, -was so long upheld. It was the final campaign of the Confederacy in that -quarter, and, with its failure, perished forever the hope of defending the -western and central sections of the South.[81] Meanwhile, Sherman, -unopposed, had marched like Fate through Georgia, to Savannah, realizing -Grant's assertion that the Confederacy was a mere shell, and revealing a -fact, until then not clearly appreciated, of the exhaustion and -demoralization of its people. - - - - -CHAPTER XX. - - INCIDENTS ON THE LINES OF RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG DURING THE SUMMER - AND AUTUMN--CAPTURE OF FORT HARRISON--OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS BY - GRANT--THE SITUATION NEAR THE CONFEDERATE CAPITAL--EARLY'S VALLEY - CAMPAIGN--POPULAR CENSURE OF EARLY--INFLUENCE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN - UPON THE SITUATION NEAR RICHMOND--WHAT THE AGGREGATE OF CONFEDERATE - DISASTERS SIGNIFIED--DESPONDENCY OF THE SOUTH--THE INJURIOUS EXAMPLES - OF PROMINENT MEN--THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL LEE--MR. DAVIS' - POPULARITY--WHY HE DID NOT FULLY COMPREHEND THE DEMORALIZATION OF THE - PEOPLE--HE HOPES FOR POPULAR REANIMATION--WAS THE CASE OF THE - CONFEDERACY HOPELESS?--VACILLATING CONDUCT OF CONGRESS--THE - CONFEDERATE CONGRESS A WEAK BODY--MR. DAVIS' RELATIONS WITH - CONGRESS--PROPOSED CONSCRIPTION OF SLAVES--FAVORED BY DAVIS AND - LEE--DEFEATED BY CONGRESS--LEGISLATION DIRECTED AGAINST THE - PRESIDENT--DAVIS' OPINION OF LEE--RUMORS OF PEACE--HAMPTON ROADS - CONFERENCE--THE FEDERAL ULTIMATUM--THE ABSURD CHARGE AGAINST MR. DAVIS - OF OBSTRUCTING NEGOTIATIONS--HIS RECORD ON THE SUBJECT OF PEACE--A - RICHMOND NEWSPAPER ON THE FEDERAL ULTIMATUM--DELUSIVE SIGNS OF PUBLIC - SPIRIT--NO ALTERNATIVE BUT CONTINUED RESISTANCE--REPORT OF THE HAMPTON - ROADS CONFERENCE. - - -Meanwhile the siege of Petersburg had progressed drearily through the -months of summer and autumn. The "hammering" principle was abandoned by -General Grant, for a series of maneuvres having in view the possession of -the railroads extending southward and eastward. - -About the middle of August a portion of Grant's army was established upon -the Weldon road. This was by no means a line of communication vital to -General Lee, though several heavy engagements ensued from its disputed -possession. The Federal losses in these engagements were very heavy, and -were hardly compensated by any immediate advantage following the permanent -acquisition, by General Grant, of the Weldon Railroad. The location of the -Federal army gave ample opportunity for the transfer of forces to either -side of the river, and General Grant did not fail to avail himself of his -facilities, for aiding the more important operations before Petersburg, by -numerous diversions in the direction of Richmond. One of these movements -upon the north side of James River, in the last days of September, -resulted disastrously to the Confederates, in the loss of Fort Harrison, a -position of great importance in the defense of that portion of the -Confederate line. Efforts to recapture it were unavailing, and attended -with heavy loss. The enemy was left in secure possession of a position -from which Richmond could be seriously menaced. The last serious -demonstration by General Grant, before winter, was the movement of a heavy -force, with the view of turning the Confederate position, and obtaining -the possession of Lee's communications with Lynchburg and Danville. Though -sustained by a strong diversion on other portions of the line, this -demonstration was barren of results. - -Thus, the beginning of winter found the Confederate forces still safely -holding the lines of Richmond and Petersburg. The situation near the -Confederate capital was encouraging, and indicated an almost indefinite -resistance. But nearly every other quarter of the Confederacy was darkened -by the shadow of disaster. - -The campaign of Hood in Tennessee had its counterpart in the Valley -campaign of General Early. This campaign, the original design of which was -the expulsion of Hunter, was doubly important afterwards in the design to -secure the harvests of the Shenandoah Valley, and to continue the -diversion of a large Federal force from the front of Richmond. The earlier -movements of General Early were attended with success, and the Confederacy -had the promise of a campaign, which should renew the glories of Stonewall -Jackson, in a district which his exploits had made forever famous. In its -conclusion was revealed, perhaps more strikingly than upon any other -theatre of the war, the overwhelming odds and obstacles, with which the -Confederacy contended in this desperate stage of its history. The activity -of General Early in the summer months, and his well-earned reputation as -an officer of skill and daring, induced the enemy to concentrate a heavy -force to protect the Potomac frontier, and, if possible, to overwhelm the -Confederate army in the Valley. In the months of September and October, -several engagements occurred, in which General Early was badly defeated, -and his army at the close of autumn exhibited so many evidences of -demoralization, as to occasion apprehension for its future efficiency. - -The censure of General Early by the public and the newspapers was -unsparing. Most unworthy allegations, totally unsupported, were circulated -in explanation of his disasters. That such a man as Early, whose every -promotion had been won by a heroism and efficiency inferior to those of -none of Lee's subordinates, should have been recklessly condemned for -reverses, which were clearly the results of no errors or misconduct of his -own, is now a striking commentary upon that sullen despondency into which -the Southern mind was fast settling. A victory, in any quarter, was now -almost the last expectation of the public, and still Early was recklessly -abused for not winning victories, with a demoralized army, against forces -having four times his own strength. Neither President Davis nor General -Lee ever doubted General Early's efficiency; and the letter of the -commanding general to Early, written in the last hours of the Confederacy, -constitutes a tribute to patriotic and distinguished services, which the -old hero may well cherish in his exile, as a worthy title to the esteem of -posterity. - -The defeat of Early at Cedar Creek, late in October, was the decisive -event of the last campaign in the Shenandoah Valley. In December nearly -all Early's forces were transferred to General Lee's lines, and the bulk -of the Federal army in the Valley returned to General Grant. General Early -remained in the Valley with a fragmentary command, which Sheridan easily -overran on his march from Winchester to the front of Petersburg. - -Events in the Valley had a marked influence upon the situation near -Richmond. The Confederate authorities had hoped for such a successful -issue in the Valley as should relieve Richmond of much of Grant's -pressure. The disappointment of this hope left the Federal frontier -secure, and gave Grant a large accession of strength, for which Lee had no -compensation, except the _débris_ of a defeated and dispirited army. - -The aggregate of military disasters with which the year 1864 terminated, -established the inevitable failure of the Confederacy, unless more -vigorous measures than the Government had ever yet attempted should be -adopted, and unless the people were prepared for sacrifices which had not -yet been exacted. The reserves of men, which the various acts of -conscription were designed to place in the field, were exhausted, or -beyond the reach of the Government, and the supplies of the army became -more and more precarious each day. There was, indeed, nothing fatal as -affecting the ultimate decision of the contest, in the military events of -the past year, if unattended by a decay of public spirit. It was not -until the winter of 1864-1865 that any considerable body of the Southern -people were brought to the conviction that their struggle was a hopeless -one. The waste of war is in nothing more continuous than in its test of -the moral energy of communities. In the last winter of the war the -distrust of the popular mind was painfully apparent. The South began to -read its fate when it saw that the North had converted warfare into -universal destruction and desolation, and when it exchanged the code of -civilized war for the grim butchery of Grant, and the savage measures of -Sherman and Sheridan. It was plain that while the losses of the Federal -army were shocking, and were sufficient to have unnerved the army and the -people of the North, the "attrition" of General Grant had caused a fearful -diminution of the Confederate armies. - -The facility of the Federal Government in repairing its losses of men, -baffled all previous calculation in the Confederacy, and it had long since -become evident that the resources of the North, in all other respects, -were equal to an indefinite endurance. Indeed, it has been justly said -that the material resources of the North were not seriously tested, but -merely developed by the war. Peculiarly disheartening to the South was the -triumph of the Republican party in the reëlection of Mr. Lincoln--an event -plainly portending a protraction of the war upon a scale, which should -adequately employ the inexhaustible means at the command of the Federal -Government. - -It would be needless to speculate now as to the material capacity of the -South to have met the demands of another campaign. The military capacity -of the Confederacy in the last months of the war, is not to be measured by -the number of men that still might have been brought to the field, or by -the material means which yet survived the consumption and waste of war. -These considerations are admissible only in connection with that moral -condition of the public, which fitted or disqualified it for longer -endurance of the privations and sacrifices of the war. Long before the -close of winter, popular feeling assumed a phase of sullen indifference -which, while yet averse to unconditional submission to the North, -manifestly despaired of ultimate success, viewed additional sacrifices as -hopeless, and anticipated the _worst_. - -Only a hasty and ill-informed judgment could condemn the Southern people -for the decay of its spirit in this last stage of the war. No people ever -endured with more heroism the trials and privations incidental to their -situation. Yet these sacrifices appeared to have been to no purpose; a -cruel and inexorable fate seemed to pursue them, and to taunt them with -the futility of exertion to escape its decree. Victories, which had amazed -the world, and again and again stunned a powerful adversary, and which the -South felt that, under ordinary circumstances, should have secured the -reward of independence, were recurred to only as making more bitter the -chagrin of the present. Previous defeats, at the time seeming fatal, had -been patiently encountered, and bravely surmounted, so long as victory -appeared to offer a reward which should compensate for the sacrifice -necessary to obtain it. But, now, even the hope of victory had almost -ceased to be a source of encouragement, since any probable success would -only tend to a postponement of the inevitable catastrophe, which, perhaps, -it would be better to invite than to defer. - -It must be confessed, too, that the people and the army of the -Confederacy, in this crisis, found but little source of reanimation in -the example of a majority of its public men. Long before the taint of -demoralization reached the heart of the masses, the Confederate cause had -been despaired of by men whose influence and position determined the -convictions of whole communities. In President Davis and General Lee the -South saw conspicuous examples of resolution, fortitude, and -self-abnegation. It is not to be denied that the impatient and almost -despairing temper of the public was visibly influenced by the persistent -crimination of Mr. Davis, by the faction which sought to thwart him even -at the hazard of the public welfare. But when it was discovered that the -unity of counsel and purpose which had animated the President and General -Lee at every stage of the struggle, was still maintained, popular sympathy -still clung to the leader, whose unselfish devotion and unshaken fortitude -should have been a sufficient rebuke to his accusers. - -A vast deal of misrepresentation has been indulged to show that Mr. Davis -had become unpopular in the last stage of the war, and that he was the -object of popular reproach as chiefly responsible for the condition of the -country. To the contrary, there were many evidences of the sympathy which -embraced Mr. Davis as probably the chief sufferer from apprehended -calamities. His appearance in public in Richmond, was always the occasion -of unrestrained popular enthusiasm. Even but a few weeks before the final -catastrophe, there were signal instances of the popular affection for him, -and it was painfully evident to those who knew his character, that these -demonstrations were accepted by him as an exhibition of popular confidence -in the success of the cause. Indeed, the very confidence which these -exhibitions of popular sympathy produced in the mind of Mr. Davis, has -been urged as an evidence of a want of sagacity, which disqualified him -for a clear appreciation of the situation of affairs. - -Perhaps with more color of truth than usual, this view of Mr. Davis' -character has been presented. That he did not fully comprehend the -wide-spread demoralization of the South in the last months of the war, is -hardly to be questioned. Judging men by his own exalted nature, he -conceived it impossible that the South could ever abandon its hope of -independence. He did not realize how men could cherish an aspiration for -the future, which did not embrace the liberty of their country. No -sacrifice of personal interests or hopes were, in his view, too great to -be demanded of the country in behalf of a cause, for which he was at all -times ready to surrender his life. Of such devotion and self-abnegation, a -sanguine and resolute spirit was the natural product, and it is a paltry -view of such qualities to characterize them as the proof of defective -intellect. Just such qualities have won the battles of liberty in all -ages. Washington, at Valley Forge, with a wretched remnant of an army, -which was yet the last hope of the country, and with even a more gloomy -future immediately before him, declared that in the last emergency he -would retreat to the mountains of Virginia, and there continue the -struggle in the hope that he would "yet lift the flag of his bleeding -country from the dust." In the same spirit Jefferson Davis would never -have abandoned the Confederate cause so long as it had even a semblance of -popular support. - -Almost to the last moment of the Confederacy, he continued to cherish the -hope of a reaction in the public mind, which he believed would be -immediately kindled to its old enthusiasm by a decided success. It was in -recognition of this quality of inflexible purpose, as much as of any other -trait of his character, that the South originally intrusted Davis with -leadership. Fit leaders of revolutions are not usually found in men of -half-hearted purpose, wanting in resolution themselves, and doubting the -fidelity of those whom they govern. Desperate trial is the occasion which -calls forth the courage of those truly great men, who, while ordinary men -despair, confront agony itself with sublime resolution. - -If ingenuity and malignity have combined to exaggerate the faults of Mr. -Davis, the love of his countrymen, the candor of honorable enemies, and -the intelligence of mankind have recognized his intellectual and moral -greatness. The world to-day does not afford such an example of those -blended qualities which constitute the title to universal excellence. For -one in his position, the leader of a bold, warlike, intelligent, and -discerning people, there was demanded that union of ardor and deliberation -which he so peculiarly illustrated. Revolutionary periods imperatively -demand this union of capacities for thought and action. The peculiar charm -of Mr. Davis is the perfect poise of his faculties; an almost exact -adjustment of qualities; of indomitable energy and winning grace; heroic -courage and tender affection; strength of character, and almost excessive -compassion; of calculating judgment and knightly sentiment; acute -penetration and analysis; comprehensive perception; laborious habits, and -almost universal knowledge. Of him it may be said as of Hamilton: "He wore -the blended wreath of arms, of law, of statesmanship, of oratory, of -letters, of scholarship, of practical affairs;" and in most of these -fields of distinction, Mr. Davis has few rivals among the public men of -America. - -But it is altogether a fallacious supposition that the military situation -of the Confederacy, in the last winter of the war, was beyond -reclamation. The most hasty glance at the situation revealed the -feasibility of destroying Sherman, when he turned northward from Savannah, -with a proper concentration of the forces yet available. President Davis -anxiously sought to secure this concentration, but was disappointed by -causes which need not here be related. With Sherman defeated, the -Confederacy must have obtained a new lease of life, as all the territory -which he had overrun, would immediately be recovered, and the worthless -title of his conquests would be apparent, even to the North. There were -indeed many aspects of the situation encouraging to enterprise, could an -adequate army be obtained, and the heart of the country reanimated. -President Davis was not alone in the indulgence of hope of better fortune. -Again he had the sanction of Lee's name in confirmation of his hopes, and -in support of the measures which he recommended. - -But the resolution of the President was not sustained by the coöperation -of Congress. The last session of that body was commemorated by a signal -display of timidity and vacillation. Congress assembled in November, and -at the beginning of its session its nerve was visibly shaken. Before its -adjournment in March, there was no longer even a pretense of organized -opinion and systematic legislation. Its occupation during the winter was -mainly crimination of the President, and a contemptible frivolity, which -at last provoked the hearty disgust of the public. The calibre of the last -Confederate Congress may be correctly estimated, when it is stated that as -late as the 22d of February, 1865, less than sixty days before the fall of -Richmond, that body was earnestly engaged in devising a _new flag for the -Confederacy_. - -Not a single measure of importance was adopted without some emasculating -clause, or without such postponement as made it practically inoperative. -Of all the vigorous suggestions of Mr. Davis for recruiting the army, -mobilizing the subsistence, and renovating the material condition of the -country, hardly one was adopted in a practicable shape. Congress had -clearly despaired of the cause. It had not the courage to counsel the -submission, of which it secretly felt the necessity, and left the capital -with a declaration that the "conquest of the Confederacy was -geographically impossible," yet clearly attesting by its flight a very -different view of the situation. - -The history of the Congress of the Confederate States is a record of -singular imbecility and irresolution. It was a body without leaders, -without popular sympathy, without a single one of those heroic attributes -which are usually evoked in periods of revolution. It may safely be -asserted that in the history of no other great revolution does the -statesmanship of its legislators appear so contemptible, when compared -with the military administration which guided its armies. Whatever may be -the estimate of the executive ability of the Confederate administration, -it can not be denied that its courage was abundant; nor can it be -questioned that the courage of Congress often required the spur of popular -sentiment. In the wholesale condemnation of Mr. Davis by a class of -writers, it is remarkable that the defective legislation of the -Confederacy should be accredited with so little influence in producing its -failure. If he was so grossly incompetent, what must be the verdict of -history upon a body which, for four years, submitted to a ruinous -administration when the corrective means were in its own hands? - -Of Mr. Davis' relations with Congress, Ex-Secretary Mallory writes as -follows: - - "I have said that his relations with members of Congress were not what - they should have been, nor were they what they might have been. - Towards them, as towards the world generally, he wore his personal - opinions very openly. Position and opportunity presented him every - means of cultivating the personal good-will of members by little acts - of attention, courtesy, or deference, which no man, however high in - his position, who has to work by means of his fellows, can dispense - with. Great minds can, in spite of the absence of these demonstrations - towards them in a leader--nay, in the face of neglect or apparent - disrespect--go on steadily and bravely, with a single eye to the - public welfare; but the number of these in comparison to those who are - more or less governed by personal considerations in the discharge of - their public duties is small. While he was ever frank and cordial to - his friends, and to all whom he believed to be embarked heart and soul - in the cause of Southern independence, he would not, and, we think, - could not, sacrifice a smile, an inflection of the voice, or a - demonstration of attention to flatter the self-love of any man, in or - out of Congress, who did not stand in this relation. Acting himself - for the public welfare, regardless of self or the opinions of others, - he placed too light a value upon the thousand nameless influences by - which he might have brought others up, apparently, to his own high - moral standard. By members of Congress, who had to see him on - business, his reception of them was frequently complained of as - ungracious. They frequently, in their anxiety amidst public disaster, - called upon him to urge plans, suggestions, or views on the conduct of - the war, or for the attainment of peace, and often pressed matters - upon him which he had very carefully considered, and for which he - alone was responsible. - - "Often, in such cases, though he listened to all they had to say--why, - for example, some man should be made a brigadier, major or - lieutenant-general, or placed at the head of an army, etc.--and in - return calmly and precisely stated his reasons against the measure, - he at times failed to satisfy or convince them, simply because, in his - manner and language combined, there was just an indescribable - something which offended their self-esteem. Some of his best friends - left him at times with feelings bordering closely upon anger from this - cause, and with a determination, hastily formed, of calling no more - upon him; and some of the most sensible and patriotic men of both - Houses were alienated from him more or less from this cause. The - counsel of judicious friends upon this subject, and as to more - unrestrained intercourse between him and the members of the Senate and - the House, was vainly exerted. His manly, fearless, true, and noble - nature turned from what to him wore the faintest approach to seeking - popularity, and he scorned to believe it necessary to coax men to do - their duty to their country in her darkest hour of need." - -When Congress assembled in November it was plain that the army must have -other means of recruiting than from the remnant yet left by the -conscription. There was but one measure by which the requisite numbers -could be supplied, and that was the extension of the conscription to the -slave population. Public sentiment was at first much divided upon this -subject, but gradually the propriety of the measure was made evident, and -something like a renewal of hope was manifested at the prospect of making -use of an element which the enemy so efficiently employed. President Davis -had, for months previous, contemplated the enlistment of the slaves for -service in various capacities in the field. In the last winter of the war -he strongly urged a negro enrollment, as did General Lee, whose letter to -a member of Congress eventually convinced the country of its necessity. - -Whatever may have been the merits of the proposition to arm the slaves, as -a means of renovating the military condition of the Confederacy, the -dilatory action of Congress left no hope of its practical execution. The -discussion upon this subject continued during the entire session, and was -at last terminated by the adoption of a bill providing for the reception -of such slaves into the service as might be tendered by their masters. Mr. -Davis and General Lee both advocated the extension of freedom to such of -the slaves as would volunteer, and this was clearly the only system of -enrollment upon which they could be efficiently employed. But even though -the slave-holding interest had not thus emasculated the measure, by -refusing emancipation, it was too late to hope for any results of -importance. The bill was not passed until three weeks before the fall of -Richmond. - -But Congress found congenial employment in giving vent to its partisan -malignity, by the adoption of measures plainly designed to humiliate the -Executive, and with no expectation of improving the condition of the -Confederacy, which most of its members believed to be already beyond -reclamation. In this spirit was dictated the measure making General Lee -virtually a military dictator, and that expressing want of confidence in -the cabinet. All of this action of Congress was extra-official, and -subversive of the constitutional authority of the Executive, but it -utterly failed in its obvious design. - -President Davis never made a more noble display of feeling, than in his -response to the resolution of the Virginia Legislature recommending the -appointment of General Lee to the command of the armies of the -Confederacy. Said he: "The opinion expressed by the General Assembly in -regard to General R. E. Lee has my full concurrence. Virginia can not have -a higher regard for him, or greater confidence in his character and -ability, than is entertained by me. When General Lee took command of the -Army of Northern Virginia, he was in command of all the armies of the -Confederate States by my order of assignment. He continued in this general -command, as well as in the immediate command of the Army of Northern -Virginia, as long as I could resist his opinion that it was necessary for -him to be relieved from one of these two duties. Ready as he has ever -shown himself to be to perform any service that I desired him to render to -his country, he left it for me to choose between his withdrawal from the -command of the army in the field, and relieving him of the general command -of all the armies of the Confederate States. It was only when satisfied of -this necessity that I came to the conclusion to relieve him from the -general command, believing that the safety of the capital and the success -of our cause depended, in a great measure, on then retaining him in the -command in the field of the Army of Northern Virginia. On several -subsequent occasions, the desire on my part to enlarge the sphere of -General Lee's usefulness, has led to renewed consideration of the subject, -and he has always expressed his inability to assume command of other -armies than those now confided to him, unless relieved of the immediate -command in the field of that now opposed to General Grant." - -A striking indication of the feverish condition of the public mind of both -sections, during the last winter of the war, was the ready credence given -to the most extravagant and improbable rumors. Washington correspondents -of Northern newspapers declared that the air of the Federal capital was -"thick with rumors of negotiation." At Richmond this credulous disposition -was even more marked. Men were found as late as the middle of March, who -believed that President Davis had actually formed an alliance, offensive -and defensive, with the French Emperor. In the month of January the -rumors as to peace negotiations assumed a more definite shape, in the -arrival of Mr. Francis P. Blair at the Confederate capital. - -It is remarkable that the "Blair mission" and its sequel, the Hampton -Roads conference, though palpably contemplating only the discussion of -such mere generalities as belong to other efforts at peace at different -stages of the war, and, indeed, introducing nothing in the shape of formal -negotiation, should have been dignified as a most important episode. -Equally remarkable, in view of the published proceedings of the Hampton -Roads conference, is the disposition to censure President Davis for having -designedly interposed obstacles to the consummation of peace. Mr. Blair -visited Richmond by the permission of President Lincoln, but without any -official authority, and without having the objects of his mission -committed to paper. In short, Mr. Blair's mission had no official -character, and he came to Richmond to prevail upon Mr. Davis to encourage, -in some manner, preliminary steps to negotiation. In his interviews with -the Confederate President, Mr. Blair disclaimed the official countenance -of the Federal authorities for the objects of his visit. It was known to -the world, that Mr. Davis, upon repeated occasions, had avowed his desire -for peace upon any terms consistent with the honor of his country, and -that he would not present difficulties as to forms in the attainment of -that object, at this critical period. Hence, despite the unauthorized -nature of Mr. Blair's conciliatory efforts, Mr. Davis gave him a letter, -addressed to himself, avowing the willingness of the Confederate -authorities to begin negotiations, to send or receive commissioners -authorized to treat, and to "renew the effort to enter into a conference, -with a view to secure peace between the two countries." - -Mr. Lincoln, in a letter to Mr. Blair, acknowledged having read Mr. Davis' -note, and avowed his readiness to receive an agent from Mr. Davis, or from -the authority resisting the Federal Government, to confer with him -informally, with the view of restoring peace to the people of "our common -country." - -The commissioners appointed by Mr. Davis, after this notification, were -Vice-President Stephens, Senator Hunter, and Judge Campbell. The -conference was held on a steamer lying in Hampton Roads, between the three -Confederate commissioners and Messrs. Lincoln and Seward. By both sides -the interview was treated as informal; there were neither notes nor -secretaries, nor did the interview assume any other shape than an -irregular conversation. During the four hours of desultory discussion, -there was developed no basis of negotiation, no ground of possible -agreement. Mr. Lincoln declared that he would consent to no truce or -suspension of hostilities, except upon the single condition of the -disbandment of the Confederate forces, and the submission of the revolted -States to the authority of the Union. The result was simply the assertion, -in a more arrogant form, of the Federal _ultimatum_--the unconditional -submission of the South, its acquiescence in all the unconstitutional -legislation of the Federal Congress respecting slavery, including -emancipation, and the right to legislate upon the subject of the relations -between the white and black populations of each State. Mr. Lincoln, -moreover, refused to treat with the authorities of the Confederate States, -or with the States separately; declared that the consequences of the -establishment of the Federal authority would have to be accepted, and -declined giving any guarantee whatever, except an indefinite assurance of -a liberal use of the pardoning power, towards those who were assumed to -have made themselves liable to the pains and penalties of the laws of the -United States. - -The statement of the Confederate commissioners, and all the known facts of -the transaction, demonstrate, without argument, the injustice of holding -Mr. Davis responsible, to any extent, for the results of the Hampton Roads -conference. With one voice the South accepted the result as establishing -the purpose of the Federal Government to exact "unconditional submission," -as the only condition of peace, and scorned the insolent demand of the -enemy. If the South had shown itself willing to accept the terms of the -Federal Government, or if Mr. Lincoln had suggested other propositions -than that of unconditional submission, then only could Mr. Davis be -charged with having presented obstacles to the termination of the war. - -Nor is it to be assumed that the terms of his letter to Mr. Blair, -referring to his desire for peace between the "two countries," precluded -negotiation upon the basis of reunion. His language was that of a proper -diplomacy, which should not commit the error of yielding in advance to the -demands of an enemy, then insolent in what he regarded as the assurance of -certain victory. The period was opportune for magnanimity on the part of -the North, but not propitious for the display of over-anxious concession -by the South. Mr. Davis was at this time anxious for propositions from the -Federal Government, for, while he had not despaired of the Confederacy, he -was deeply impressed with the increasing obstacles to its success. His -frequent declaration, at this time, was: "I am solicitous only for the -good of the people, and am indifferent as to the forms by which the -public interests are to be subserved." Indeed, the Federal authorities had -ample assurance that Mr. Davis would present any basis of settlement, -which might be offered, to the several States of the Confederacy for their -individual action. Nor did he doubt the acceptance of reconstruction, -without slavery even, by several of the States--an event which would have -left the Confederacy too weak for further resistance. - -In view of the consistent record of Mr. Davis, during the entire period of -the war, to promote the attainment of peace, it is remarkable that there -should ever have been an allegation of a contrary disposition. In a -letter, written in 1864, to Governor Vance, of North Carolina, he -conclusively stated his course upon the subject of peace. Said Mr. Davis, -in this letter: - - "We have made three distinct efforts to communicate with the - authorities at Washington, and have been invariably unsuccessful. - Commissioners were sent before hostilities were begun, and the - Washington Government refused to receive them or hear what they had to - say. A second time, I sent a military officer with a communication - addressed by myself to President Lincoln. The letter was received by - General Scott, who did not permit the officer to see Mr. Lincoln, but - promised that an answer would be sent. No answer has ever been - received. The third time, a few months ago, a gentleman was sent, - whose position, character, and reputation were such as to ensure his - reception, if the enemy were not determined to receive no proposals - whatever from the Government. Vice-President Stephens made a patriotic - tender of his services in the hope of being able to promote the cause - of humanity, and, although little belief was entertained of his - success, I cheerfully yielded to his suggestions, that the experiment - should be tried. The enemy refused to let him pass through their - lines or hold any conference with them. He was stopped before he ever - reached Fortress Monroe, on his way to Washington.... - - "If we will break up our Government, dissolve the Confederacy, disband - our armies, emancipate our slaves, take an oath of allegiance, binding - ourselves to obedience to him and of disloyalty to our own States, he - proposes to pardon us, and not to plunder us of any thing more than - the property already stolen from us, and such slaves as still remain. - In order to render his proposals so insulting as to secure their - rejection, he joins to them a promise to support with his army - one-tenth of the people of any State who will attempt to set up a - government over the other nine-tenths, thus seeking to sow discord and - suspicion among the people of the several States, and to excite them - to civil war in furtherance of his ends. I know well it would be - impossible to get your people, if they possessed full knowledge of - these facts, to consent that proposals should now be made by us to - those who control the Government at Washington. Your own well-known - devotion to the great cause of liberty and independence, to which we - have all committed whatever we have of earthly possessions, would - induce you to take the lead in repelling the bare thought of abject - submission to the enemy. Yet peace on other terms is now impossible." - -The spirit in which the South received the results of the Hampton Roads -conference is to be correctly estimated by the following extract from a -Richmond newspaper, of date February 15, 1865: - - "The world can again, for the hundredth time, see conclusive evidence - in the history and sequel of the 'Blair mission,' the blood-guiltiness - of the enemy, and their responsibility for the ruin, desolation, and - suffering which have followed, and will yet follow, their heartless - attempts to subjugate and destroy an innocent people. The South again - wins honor from the good, the magnanimous, the truly brave every-where - by her efforts to stop the effusion of blood, save the lives and the - property of her own citizens, and to stop, too, the slaughter of the - victims of the enemy's cruelty, which has forced or deceived them into - the ranks of his armies. We have lost nothing by our efforts in behalf - of peace; for, waiving all consideration of the reanimation and - reunion of our people, occasioned by Lincoln's haughty rejection of - our commissioners, we have added new claims upon the sympathy and - respect of the world and posterity, which will not fail to be - remembered to our honor, in the history of this struggle, even though - we should finally perish in it. The position of the South at this - moment is indeed one which should stamp her as the champion, not only - of popular rights and self-government, which Americans have so much - cherished, but as the champion of the spirit of humanity in both - sections; for it can not be supposed that we have all the sorrows as - well as sufferings of this war to endure, and that there are no - desolate homes, no widows and orphans, no weeds nor cypress in the - enemy's country.... - - "One fact is certain, that whatever Seward's design may have been, and - whatever its success may be, the Confederacy has derived an immediate - advantage from the visit of our commissioners to Fortress Monroe. - Nothing could have so served to reanimate the courage and patriotism - of our people, as his attempted imposition of humiliation upon us. - Lincoln will hear no more talk of 'peace' and 'negotiation' from the - Southern side, for now we are united as one man in the purpose of - self-preservation and vengeance, and it may not be long before his - people, now rioting in excessive exultation over successes really - valueless, and easily counter-balanced by one week of prosperous - fortune for the South, will tremble at the manifestation of the spirit - which they have aroused." - -But the evidences of popular reanimation in the South were delusive. For a -brief moment there was a spirit of fierce and almost desperate resolution. -At a meeting held in the African church, in Richmond, President Davis -delivered one of his most eloquent popular orations, and the enthusiasm -was perhaps greater than upon any similar occasion during the war. But -popular feeling soon lapsed into the sullen despondency, from which it had -been temporarily aroused by the unparalleled insult of the enemy. Yet the -_ultimatum_ of Mr. Lincoln, and the declared will of the South, left -President Davis no other policy than a continuation of the struggle, with -a view to the best attainable results. Upon this course he was now fully -resolved, looking to the future with serious apprehension, not altogether -unrelieved by hope. - -The report of the Hampton Roads conference and its results, was made by -President Davis, to Congress, on the 5th February: - - "_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the Confederate States - of America_: - - "Having recently received a written notification, which satisfied me - that the President of the United States was disposed to confer, - informally, with unofficial agents that might be sent by me, with a - view to the restoration of peace, I requested Hon. Alexander H. - Stephens, Hon. R. M. T. Hunter, and Hon. John A. Campbell, to proceed - through our lines, to hold a conference with Mr. Lincoln, or such - persons as he might depute to represent him. - - "I herewith submit, for the information of Congress, the report of the - eminent citizens above named, showing that the enemy refuse to enter - into negotiations with the Confederate States, or any one of them - separately, or to give our people any other terms or guarantees than - those which a conqueror may grant, or permit us to have peace on any - other basis than our unconditional submission to their rule, coupled - with the acceptance of their recent legislation, including an - amendment to the Constitution for the emancipation of negro slaves, - and with the right, on the part of the Federal Congress, to legislate - on the subject of the relations between the white and black population - of each State. - - "Such is, as I understand, the effect of the amendment to the - Constitution, which has been adopted by the Congress of the United - States. - - "JEFFERSON DAVIS. - - "EXECUTIVE OFFICE, Feb. 5, 1865." - - - "_Richmond, Va._, February 5, 1865. - - "_To the President of the Confederate States_-- - - "SIR: Under your letter of appointment of 28th ult., we proceeded to - seek an informal conference with Abraham Lincoln, President of the - United States, upon the subject mentioned in your letter. - - "The conference was granted, and took place on the 3d inst., on board - a steamer anchored in Hampton Roads, where we met President Lincoln - and Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States. It - continued for several hours, and was both full and explicit. - - "We learned from them that the Message of President Lincoln to the - Congress of the United States, in December last, explains clearly and - distinctly, his sentiments as to terms, conditions, and method of - proceeding by which peace can be secured to the people, and we were - not informed that they would be modified or altered to obtain that - end. We understood from him that no terms or proposals of any treaty - or agreement looking to an ultimate settlement would be entertained or - made by him with the authorities of the Confederate States, because - that would be a recognition of their existence as a separate power, - which, under no circumstances, would be done; and, for like reasons, - that no such terms would be entertained by him from States separately; - that no extended truce or armistice, as at present advised, would be - granted or allowed without satisfactory assurance, in advance, of - complete restoration of the authority of the Constitution and laws of - the United States over all places within the States of the - Confederacy; that whatever consequences may follow from the - reëstablishment of that authority must be accepted, but the - individuals subject to pains and penalties, under the laws of the - United States, might rely upon a very liberal use of the power - confided to him to remit those pains and penalties if peace be - restored. - - "During the conference the proposed amendments to the Constitution of - the United States, adopted by Congress on the 31st ult., were brought - to our notice. These amendments provide that neither slavery nor - involuntary servitude, except for crime, should exist within the - United States or any place within their jurisdiction, and that - Congress should have the power to enforce this amendment by - appropriate legislation. - - "Of all the correspondence that preceded the conference herein - mentioned, and leading to the same, you have heretofore been informed. - - "Very respectfully, your obedient servants, - "ALEX. H. STEPHENS, - "R. M. T. HUNTER, - "J. A. CAMPBELL." - - - - -CHAPTER XXI. - - MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE EARLY PART OF 1865--LAST PHASE OF THE - MILITARY POLICY OF THE CONFEDERACY--THE PLAN TO CRUSH SHERMAN--CALM - DEMEANOR OF PRESIDENT DAVIS--CHEERFULNESS OF GENERAL LEE--THE QUESTION - AS TO THE SAFETY OF RICHMOND--WEAKNESS OF GENERAL LEE'S ARMY-- - PREPARATIONS TO EVACUATE RICHMOND BEFORE THE CAMPAIGN OPENED--A NEW - BASIS OF HOPE--WHAT WAS TO BE REASONABLY ANTICIPATED--THE CONTRACTED - THEATRE OF WAR--THE FATAL DISASTERS AT PETERSBURG--MR. DAVIS RECEIVES - THE INTELLIGENCE WHILE IN CHURCH--RICHMOND EVACUATED--PRESIDENT DAVIS - AT DANVILLE--HIS PROCLAMATION--SURRENDER OF LEE--DANVILLE EVACUATED-- - THE LAST OFFICIAL INTERVIEW OF MR. DAVIS WITH GENERALS JOHNSTON AND - BEAUREGARD--HIS ARRIVAL AT CHARLOTTE--INCIDENTS AT CHARLOTTE-- - REJECTION OF THE SHERMAN-JOHNSTON SETTLEMENT--MR. DAVIS' INTENTIONS - AFTER THAT EVENT--HIS MOVEMENTS SOUTHWARD--INTERESTING DETAILS-- - CAPTURE OF MR. DAVIS AND HIS IMPRISONMENT AT FORTRESS MONROE. - - -Military operations in the first three months of 1865 tended to the -concentration of forces upon the greatly-reduced theatre of war, which was -now confined mainly to Virginia and North Carolina. The developments of -each day indicated the near approach of critical and decisive events. With -Sherman sweeping through the Carolinas, and the Confederate forces -retiring before him; with Wilmington, the last port of the Confederacy, -captured, and a new base thus secured for a column auxiliary to Sherman, -it was evident that but a short time would develop a grand struggle, which -should not only decide the fate of Richmond, but which should involve -nearly the entire force at the command of the Confederacy. - -The last definite phase of the military policy of the Confederate -authorities, previous to the fall of the capital, was the design of -concentration for the destruction of Sherman, who was rapidly approaching -the Virginia border. This would, of course, necessitate the abandonment of -Richmond, with a view to the junction of the armies of Lee and Johnston. -The latter officer, with the remnant of Hood's army, and other fragmentary -commands, confronted Sherman's army--forty thousand strong--with a force -of about twenty-five thousand men. When Lee's army should unite with -Johnston's, the Confederate strength would approximate sixty thousand--a -force ample to overwhelm Sherman. - -The success of this design was mainly dependent upon the question of the -_time_ of its execution. If the concentration against Sherman should be -attempted prematurely, that Federal commander would be warned of his -danger in time to escape to the coast, or to retire until reënforcements -from Grant should reach him. It was thus highly important that Sherman -should advance sufficiently far to preclude his safe retreat, while, at -the same time, the distance between Lee and Johnston should be shortened. -On the other hand, if the concentration should be delayed too long, -General Grant might, by a vigorous assault upon Lee, either hold the -latter in his works at Petersburg, or cut off his retreat, either of which -events would defeat the proposed concentration. In the sequel, the -activity of Grant, his overwhelming numbers, and the timely arrival of -Sheridan's cavalry, after the latter had failed in his original design -against Lynchburg and the Confederate communications, precipitated a -catastrophe, which not only prevented the consummation of this design, but -speedily proved fatal to the Confederacy. - -There was nothing in the calm exterior of President Davis, during the days -of early spring, to indicate that he was then meditating an abandonment of -that capital, for the safety of which he had striven during four years of -solicitude, and in the defense of which the flower of Southern chivalry -had been sacrificed. There was no abatement of that self-possession, which -had so often proven invulnerable to the most trying exigencies; no -alteration of that commanding mien, so typical of resolution and -self-reliance. To the despondent citizens of Richmond, there was something -of re-assurance in the firm and elastic step of their President, as he -walked, usually unattended, through the Capitol Square to his office. His -responses to the respectful salutations of the children, who never failed -to testify their affection for him, were as genial and playful as ever, -and the slaves still boasted of the cordiality with which he acknowledged -their civility. - -A similar cheerfulness was observed in General Lee. In the last months of -the war, it was a frequent observation that General Lee appeared more -cheerful in manner than upon many occasions, when his army was engaged in -its most successful campaigns. Hon. William C. Rives was quoted in the -Confederate Congress, as having said that General Lee "had but a single -thing to fear, and that was the spreading of a causeless despondency among -the people. Prevent this, and all will be well. We have strength enough -left to win our independence, and we are certain to win it, if people do -not give way to foolish despair." - -From the beginning of winter, the possibility of holding Richmond was a -matter of grave doubt to President Davis. He had announced to the -Confederate Congress that the capital was now menaced by greater perils -than ever. Yet a proper consideration of the moral consequences of a loss -of the capital, not less than of the material injury which must result -from the loss of the manufacturing facilities of Richmond, dictated the -contemplation of its evacuation only as a measure of necessity. When, -however, the dilatory and vacillating action of Congress baffled the -President in all his vigorous and timely measures, there was hardly room -to doubt that the alternative was forced upon General Lee of an early -retreat or an eventual surrender. When spring opened, the Army of Northern -Virginia was reduced to less than thirty-five thousand men. With this -inadequate force, General Lee was holding a line of forty miles, against -an army nearly one hundred and seventy-five thousand strong. A prompt -conscription of the slaves, upon the basis of emancipation, the President -and General Lee believed would have put at rest all anxiety for the safety -of Richmond. But when the threadbare discussions and timid spirit of -Congress foretold the failure of this measure, preparations were quietly -begun for a retirement to an interior line of defense. - -These preparations were commenced early in February, and were conducted -with great caution. Mr. Davis did not believe that the capture of Richmond -entailed the loss of the Confederate cause should Lee's and Johnston's -armies remain intact. That it diminished the probability of ultimate -success was obvious, but there was the anticipation of a new basis of -hope, in events not improbable, could Lee's army be successfully carried -from Petersburg. A thorough defeat of Sherman would obviously recover at -once the Carolinas and Georgia, and give to the Confederacy a more -enlarged jurisdiction and more easy subsistence, than it had controlled -for more than a year. A reasonable anticipation was the re-awakening of -the patriotic spirit of the people, and the return of thousands of -absentees to the army, as the immediate results of a decisive defeat of -Sherman. Then, even if it should prove that the Confederacy could not cope -with the remaining armies of the enemy, it was confidently believed that -the North, rather than endure the sacrifices and doubts of another -campaign, would offer some terms not inconsistent with the honor of the -South to accept. At all events, resistance must continue until the enemy -abated his haughty demand of unconditional submission. - -The movements of Sherman and Johnston reduced the theatre upon which the -crisis was enacting to very contracted limits. The fate of the Confederacy -was to be decided in the district between the Roanoke and James Rivers, -and the Atlantic Ocean and the Alleghanies. General Grant, fully apprised -of the extremities to which Lee was reduced, for weeks kept his army in -readiness to intercept the Confederate retreat. It was greatly to the -interest of the Federal commander that Lee should be held at Petersburg, -since his superior numbers must eventually give him possession of the -Southside Railroad, which was vital to Lee not only as a means of -subsistence, but as an avenue of escape. But General Grant, sooner than he -anticipated, found an opportunity for a successful detachment of a -competent force against the Southside Railroad by the arrival of -Sheridan's cavalry, ten thousand strong--as splendid a body of cavalry as -ever took the field. The swollen condition of James River had prevented -the consummation of Sheridan's original mission, which was, after he had -effectually destroyed all Lee's communications northward and westward, to -capture Lynchburg, and thence to pass rapidly southward to Sherman. -Finding the river impassable, Sheridan retired in the direction of -Richmond, passed Lee's left wing, crossed the Pamunkey River, and, by the -25th of March, had joined Grant before Petersburg. General Grant was not -slow in the employment of this timely accession. - -The fatal disaster of Lee's defeat at Petersburg was the battle of Five -Forks, on the 1st of April, by which the enemy secured the direct line of -retreat to Danville. For, without that event, the fate of Petersburg and -Richmond was determined by the result of Grant's attack upon the -Confederate centre on the 2d of April. With all the roads on the southern -bank of the Appomattox in the possession of the enemy, there remained only -the line of retreat upon the northern side, which was the longer route, -while the pursuing enemy had all the advantage of the interior line. But -for that disadvantage, Lee's escape would have been assured, and the -Confederate line of defense reëstablished near the Roanoke River. - -President Davis received the intelligence of the disasters while seated in -his pew in St. Paul's Church, where he had been a communicant for nearly -three years. The momentous intelligence was conveyed to him by a brief -note from the War Department. General Lee's dispatch stated that his lines -had been broken, and that all efforts to restore them had proven -unsuccessful. He advised preparations for the evacuation of the city -during the night, unless, in the meantime, he should advise to the -contrary. Mr. Davis immediately left the church with his usual calm manner -and measured tread.[82] The tranquil demeanor of the President conveyed -no indication of the nature of the communication. But the incident was an -unusual one, and, by the congregation, most of whom had for days been -burdened with the anticipations of disaster, the unspoken intelligence -was, to some extent, correctly interpreted. - -The family of Mr. Davis had been sent southward some days before, and he -was, therefore, under the necessity of little preparation for departure. -Though his concern was obvious, his calmness was remarkable. In this -trying exigency in his personal fortunes, he showed anxiety only for the -fate of the country, and sympathy for that devoted community from which he -was now compelled to separate. - -On the night of Sunday, April 2d, 1865, Mr. Davis, attended by his -personal staff, members of his cabinet, and attaches of the several -departments, left Richmond, which then ceased forever to be the capital of -the Southern Confederacy. In a few hours after, that city, whose defense -will be more famous than that of Saragossa, whose capture was for four -years the aspiration of armies aggregating more than a million of men, -became the spoil of a conqueror, and the scene of a conflagration, in -which "all the hopes of the Southern Confederacy were consumed in one day, -as a scroll in the fire." - -In accordance with his original design of making a new defensive line near -the Roanoke River, Mr. Davis proceeded directly to Danville. His -determination was to maintain the Confederate authority upon the soil of -Virginia, until driven from it by force of arms. Reaching Danville on the -3d of April, he issued, two days afterwards, the following proclamation: - - "DANVILLE, VA., April 5, 1865. - - "The General-in-Chief found it necessary to make such movements of his - troops as to uncover the capital. It would be unwise to conceal the - moral and material injury to our cause resulting from the occupation - of our capital by the enemy. It is equally unwise and unworthy of us - to allow our own energies to falter, and our efforts to become relaxed - under reverses, however calamitous they may be. For many months the - largest and finest army of the Confederacy, under a leader whose - presence inspires equal confidence in the troops and the people, has - been greatly trammeled by the necessity of keeping constant watch over - the approaches to the capital, and has thus been forced to forego more - than one opportunity for promising enterprise. It is for us, my - countrymen, to show by our bearing under reverses, how wretched has - been the self-deception of those who have believed us less able to - endure misfortune with fortitude than to encounter danger with - courage. - - "We have now entered upon a new phase of the struggle. Relieved from - the necessity of guarding particular points, our army will be free to - move from point to point, to strike the enemy in detail far from his - base. Let us but will it, and we are free. - - "Animated by that confidence in your spirit and fortitude which never - yet failed me, I announce to you, fellow-countrymen, that it is my - purpose to maintain your cause with my whole heart and soul; that I - will never consent to abandon to the enemy one foot of the soil of any - of the States of the Confederacy; that Virginia--noble State--whose - ancient renown has been eclipsed by her still more glorious recent - history; whose bosom has been bared to receive the main shock of this - war; whose sons and daughters have exhibited heroism so sublime as to - render her illustrious in all time to come--that Virginia, with the - help of the people, and by the blessing of Providence, shall be held - and defended, and no peace ever be made with the infamous invaders of - her territory. - - "If, by the stress of numbers, we should be compelled to a temporary - withdrawal from her limits, or those of any other border State, we - will return until the baffled and exhausted enemy shall abandon in - despair his endless and impossible task of making slaves of a people - resolved to be free. - - "Let us, then, not despond, my countrymen, but, relying on God, meet - the foe with fresh defiance, and with unconquered and unconquerable - hearts. - - "JEFFERSON DAVIS." - -Meanwhile, some semblance of order in several of the departments of -government was established, though, of course, the continued occupation of -Danville was dependent upon the safety of Lee's army. Days of anxious -suspense, during which there was no intelligence from Lee, were passed, -until on Monday, the 10th of April, it was announced that the Army of -Northern Virginia had surrendered. - -Leaving Danville, Mr. Davis and his party went by railroad to Greensboro', -North Carolina. Here Mr. Davis met Generals Johnston and Beauregard. -Consultation with these two officers soon revealed to Mr. Davis their -convictions of the hopelessness of a farther protraction of the struggle. - -Ex-Secretary Mallory gives the following narrative of the last official -interview of President Davis with Generals Johnston and Beauregard: - - "At 8 o'clock that evening the cabinet, with the exception of Mr. - Trenholm, whose illness prevented his attendance, joined the President - at his room. It was a small apartment, some twelve by sixteen feet, - containing a bed, a few chairs, and a table, with writing materials, - on the second floor of the small dwelling of Mrs. John Taylor Wood; - and a few minutes after eight the two generals entered. - - "The uniform habit of President Davis, in cabinet meetings, was to - consume some little time in general conversation before entering upon - the business of the occasion, not unfrequently introducing some - anecdote or interesting episode, generally some reminiscence of the - early life of himself or others in the army, the Mexican war, or his - Washington experiences; and his manner of relating and his application - of them were at all times very happy and pleasing. - - "Few men seized more readily upon the sprightly aspects of any - transaction, or turned them to better account; and his powers of - mimicry, whenever he condescended to exercise them, were irresistible. - Upon this occasion, at a time when the cause of the Confederacy was - hopeless, when its soldiers were throwing away their arms and flying - to their homes, when its Government, stripped of nearly all power, - could not hope to exist beyond a few days more, and when the enemy, - more powerful and exultant than ever, was advancing upon all sides, - true to his habit, he introduced several subjects of conversation, not - connected with the condition of the country, and discussed them as if - at some pleasant ordinary meeting. After a brief time thus spent, - turning to General Johnston, he said, in his usual quiet, grave way, - when entering upon matters of business: 'I have requested you and - General Beauregard, General Johnston, to join us this evening, that we - might have the benefit of your views upon the situation of the - country. Of course, we all feel the magnitude of the moment. Our late - disasters are terrible, but I do not think we should regard them as - fatal. I think we can whip the enemy yet, if our people will turn out. - We must look at matters calmly, however, and see what is left for us - to do. Whatever can be done must be done at once. We have not a day to - lose.' A pause ensued, General Johnston not seeming to deem himself - expected to speak, when the President said: 'We should like to hear - your views, General Johnston.' Upon this the General, without preface - or introduction--his words translating the expression which his face - had worn since he entered the room--said, in his terse, concise, - demonstrative way, as if seeking to condense thoughts that were - crowding for utterance: 'My views are, sir, that our people are tired - of the war, feel themselves whipped, and will not fight. Our country - is overrun, its military resources greatly diminished, while the - enemy's military power and resources were never greater, and may be - increased to any desired extent. We can not place another large army - in the field; and, cut off as we are from foreign intercourse, I do - not see how we could maintain it in fighting condition if we had it. - My men are daily deserting in large numbers, and are taking my - artillery teams to aid their escape to their homes. Since Lee's defeat - they regard the war as at an end. If I march out of North Carolina, - her people will all leave my ranks. It will be the same as I proceed - south through South Carolina and Georgia, and I shall expect to retain - no man beyond the by-road or cow-path that leads to his house. My - small force is melting away like snow before the sun, and I am - hopeless of recruiting it. We may, perhaps, obtain terms which we - ought to accept.' - - "The tone and manner, almost spiteful, in which the General jerked out - these brief, decisive sentences, pausing at every paragraph, left no - doubt as to his own convictions. When he ceased speaking, whatever was - thought of his statements--and their importance was fully - understood--they elicited neither comment nor inquiry. The President, - who, during their delivery, had sat with his eyes fixed upon a scrap - of paper which he was folding and refolding abstractedly, and who had - listened without a change of position or expression, broke the silence - by saying, in a low, even tone: 'What do you say, General Beauregard?' - - "'I concur in all General Johnston has said,' he replied. - - "Another silence, more eloquent of the full appreciation of the - condition of the country than words could have been, succeeded, during - which the President's manner was unchanged. - - "After a brief pause he said, without a variation of tone or - expression, and without raising his eyes from the slip of paper - between his fingers: 'Well, General Johnston, what do you propose? You - speak of obtaining terms. You know, of course, that the enemy refuses - to treat with us. How do you propose to obtain terms?' - - "'I think the opposing Generals in the field may arrange them.' - - "'Do you think Sherman will treat with you?' - - "'I have no reason to think otherwise. Such a course would be in - accordance with military usage, and legitimate.' - - "'We can easily try it, sir. If we can accomplish any good for the - country, Heaven knows I am not particular as to forms. How will you - reach Sherman?' - - "'I would address him a brief note, proposing an interview to arrange - terms of surrender and peace, embracing, of course, a cessation of - hostilities during the negotiations.' - - "'Well, sir, you can adopt this course, though I confess I am not - sanguine as to ultimate results.' - - "The member of the cabinet before referred to as conversing with - General Johnston, and who was anxious that his views should be - promptly carried out, immediately seated himself at the writing-table, - and, taking up a pen, offered to act as the General's amanuensis. At - the request of the latter, however, the President dictated the letter - to General Sherman, which was written at once upon a half sheet of - letter folded as note paper, and signed by General Johnston, who took - it, and said he would send it to General Sherman early in the morning, - and in a few minutes the conference broke up. This note, which was a - brief proposition for a suspension of hostilities, and a conference - with a view to agreeing upon terms of peace, has been published with - other letters which passed between the two Generals. - - "On or about the 16th of April, the President, his staff, and cabinet - left Greensboro' to proceed still further south, with plans unformed, - clinging to the hope that Johnston and Sherman would secure peace and - the quiet of the country, but still all doubtful of the result, and - still more doubtful as to consequences of failure." - -Pending the negotiations between Generals Johnston and Sherman, Mr. Davis -was earnestly appealed to by his attendants to provide for his own safety, -in the event of the failure to obtain terms from Sherman. There would have -been no difficulty in his escaping either across the Mississippi into -Mexico, or from the Florida coast to the West Indies. Apparently -regardless of his personal safety, he was reluctant to contemplate leaving -the country under any circumstances. It is certain that he would not have -entertained the idea of an abandonment of any organized body of men yet -willing to continue in arms for the cause. - -Accompanied by the members of his cabinet, General Cooper, and other -officers, some of whom were in ambulances, and others on horseback, Mr. -Davis went from Greensboro' to Lexington. Here he spent the night at the -residence of an eminent citizen of North Carolina. Continuing their -journey, the party reached Charlotte during the morning of the 18th of -April. At this place were extensive establishments of the Confederate -Government, and arrangements had already been made for the accommodation -of Mr. Davis and his cabinet. During the day of his arrival at Charlotte, -Mr. Davis received a dispatch from General Breckinridge--who, in company -with Mr. Reagan, had returned to Greensboro' to aid the negotiations -between Johnston and Sherman--announcing the assassination of President -Lincoln. - -In connection with this event, Mr. Mallory writes as follows: - - "To a friend who met him a few minutes after he had received it, and - who expressed his incredulity as to its truthfulness, Mr. Davis - replied that, true, it sounded like a canard, but, in such a condition - of public affairs as the country then presented, a crime of this kind - might be perpetrated. His friend remarked that the news was very - disastrous fur the South, for such an event would substitute for the - known humanity and benevolence of Mr. Lincoln a feeling of - vindictiveness in his successor and in Congress, and that an attempt - would doubtless be made to connect the Government or the people of the - South with the assassination. To this Mr. Davis replied, sadly: 'I - certainly have no special regard for Mr. Lincoln, but there are a - great many men of whose end I would much rather hear than his. I fear - it will be disastrous to our people, and I regret it deeply.'" - -Mr. Davis remained at Charlotte nearly a week. Meanwhile the terms of -agreement between Johnston and Sherman were received, and by Mr. Davis -submitted to the cabinet. At a meeting of the cabinet, held on the morning -after the propositions were received, the written opinions of the various -members were concurrent in favor of the acceptance of the Sherman-Johnston -settlement. Three days afterwards, Mr. Davis was informed by General -Johnston of the rejection, by the Federal Government, of the proposed -settlement, and that he could obtain no other terms than those accorded by -General Grant to General Lee. The surrender of General Johnston was, of -course, conclusive of the Confederate cause east of the Mississippi. -Whatever Mr. Davis' hopes might have been previous to that event, and -whatever his determination had been in case of disapproval by the Federal -Government of Sherman's course (a contingency which he anticipated), it -was plain that Johnston's surrender made resistance to the Federal -Government east of the Mississippi impracticable. - -Fully recognizing this fact, Mr. Davis was yet far from contemplating -surrender at discretion. His hope now was to cross the Mississippi, -carrying with him such bodies of troops as were willing to accompany him; -these, added to the force of Kirby Smith, would make an army respectable -in numbers, and occupying a country of abundant supplies. In the -Trans-Mississippi region Mr. Davis would have continued the struggle, in -the hope of obtaining more acceptable terms than had yet been offered. In -this expectation he was greatly strengthened by the spirit of resistance -indicated by bodies of men who had refused to lay down their arms with the -surrendered armies of Lee and Johnston. - -We again quote from the account of Mr. Mallory: - - "No other course now seemed open to Mr. Davis but to leave the - country, and his immediate advisers urged him to do so with the utmost - promptitude. Troops began to come into Charlotte, however, escaping - from Johnston's surrender, and there was much talk amongst them of - crossing the Mississippi, and continuing the war. Portions of - Hampton's, Debrell's, Duke's, and Ferguson's commands of cavalry were - hourly coming in. They seemed determined to get across the river, and - fight it out; and, wherever they encountered Mr. Davis, they cheered, - and sought to encourage him. It was evident that he was greatly - affected by the constancy and spirit of these men, and that, - regardless of his own safety, his thoughts dwelt upon the possibility - of gathering together a body of troops to make head against the foe - and to arouse the people to arms. - - "His friends, however, saw the urgent expediency of getting further - south as rapidly as possible, and, after a week's stay at Charlotte, - they left, with an escort of some two or three hundred cavalry, and, - two days afterwards, reached Yorkville, South Carolina, traveling - slowly, and not at all like men escaping from the country. - - "In pursuing this route, the party met, near the Catawba River, a - gentleman, whose plantation and homestead lay about half a mile from - its banks, and who had come out to meet Mr. Davis, and to offer him - the hospitality of his house. - - "His dwelling, beautifully situated, and surrounded by ornate and - cultivated grounds, was reached about 4 o'clock P. M., and the - charming lady of the mansion, with that earnest sympathy and generous - kindness which Mr. Davis, in misfortune, never failed to receive from - Southern women, soon made every man of the party forget his cares, and - feel, for a time at least, 'o'er all the ills of life victorious.' - - * * * * * - - "At Yorkville, Colonel Preston and other gentlemen had arranged for - the accommodation of Mr. Davis and his party at private houses, and - here they remained one night and part of the next day. - - "A small cavalry escort scouted extensively, and kept Mr. Davis - advised of the positions of the enemy's forces--to avoid which was a - matter of some difficulty. With this view, the party from Yorkville - rode over to a point below Clinton, on the Lawrenceville and Columbus - Railroad, and thence struck off to Cokesboro', on the Greenville - Railroad. - - "Here the party received the kindest attention at private houses. On - the evening of his arrival, Mr. Davis received news by a scout that - the enemy's cavalry, in considerable force, was but ten miles off, and - that he was pressing stock upon all sides; and it was deemed advisable - to make but a brief stay. - - "At 2 o'clock in the morning Mr. Davis was aroused by another scout, - who declared that he had left the enemy only ten miles off, and that - they would be in the town in two or three hours. This intelligence - infused energy throughout the little party. It was composed of men, - however, familiar with real, no less than with rumored perils; men who - had faced danger in too many forms to be readily started from their - propriety; and preparations were very deliberately made with such - force as could be mustered to pay due honor to his enterprise. - - "Several hours elapsed without further intelligence of the enemy's - movements, and at half-past six in the morning the party rode out of - Cokesboro' toward Abbeville, expecting an encounter at any moment, but - Abbeville was reached without seeing an enemy. - - "At Abbeville the fragments of disorganized cavalry commands, which - had thus far performed, in some respects, an escort's duty, were found - to be reduced to a handful of men anxious only to reach their homes as - early as practicable, and whose services could not further be relied - on. They had not surrendered nor given a parole, but they regarded the - struggle as terminated, and themselves relieved from further duty to - their officers or the Confederate States, and, with a few exceptions, - determined to fight no more. They rode in couples or in small squads - through the country, occasionally 'impressing' mules and horses, or - exchanging their wretched beasts for others in better condition; and, - outside of a deep and universal regret for the failure of their cause, - usually expressed by the remark that 'The old Confederacy has gone - up,' they were as gleeful and careless as boys released from school. - Almost every cross-road witnessed the separation of comrades in arms, - who had long shared the perils and privations of a terrific struggle, - now seeking their several homes to resume their duties as peaceful - citizens. Endeared to each other by their ardent love for a common - cause--a cause which they deemed unquestionably right and just, and - which, surrendered not to convictions of error, but to the logic of - arms, was still as true and just as ever--their words of parting, few - and brief, were words of warm, fraternal affection; pledges of endless - regard, and mutual promises to meet again. - - "From information gained here, it was evident that his cavalry was - making a demonstration; but whether to capture Mr. Davis, or simply to - expedite his departure from the country, could not be determined. The - country, or at least those familiar with military movements at this - period, have doubtless long since satisfied themselves upon this - point. - - "To suppose that Mr. Davis and his staff, embracing some eight or ten - gentlemen, all superbly mounted, and with led horses, could ride from - Charlotte, N. C., to Washington, Ga., by daylight, over the highroads - of the country, their coming heralded miles in advance by returning - Confederate soldiers, without the cognizance and consent of the - Federal commanders, whose cavalry covered the country, would be to - detract from all that was known of their activity and vigilance. - - "Political considerations, adequate to account for this unmolested - progress, may readily be imagined. Whether they influenced it is only - known to those who had the direction of public affairs at the time. - But be this as it may, Mr. Davis' progress could not well have been - more public and conspicuous. - - "Mr. Davis, who was more generally known by the soldiers than any - other man in the Confederacy, was never passed by them without a - cheer, or some warm or kindly recognition or mark of respect. The - fallen chief of a cause for which they had risked their lives and - fortunes, and lost every thing but honor, his presence never failed to - command their respect, and to add a tone of sympathy and sadness to - the expression of their good wishes for his future. They knew not his - plans for the future, nor could they conjecture what fate might have - in store for him; but their hearts were with him, go where he might. - - "Bronzed and weather-beaten veterans, who, when other hearts were sore - afraid, still hoped on and fought 'while gleamed the sword of noble - Robert Lee,' grasped his hand, without the power of giving voice to - thoughts which their tear-glistening eyes revealed. Of such men were - the great masses of the Confederate armies composed. Firm and - inflexible in their convictions of right, and yielding not their - convictions, but their armed maintenance of them only, to the stern - arbitrament of war, they may be relied upon to observe with inviolable - faith every pledge and duty to the United States, assumed or implied, - by their submission or parole. - - "At Abbeville Mr. Davis was again urged by his friends to leave the - country, either from the southern shores of Florida or by crossing the - Mississippi and going to Mexico through Texas; but though he listened - quietly to all they had to say upon the subject, and seemed to - acquiesce in their views, he never expressed a decided willingness or - readiness to do so. - - "To some of his friends it was apparent that his capture was not - specially sought by the military authorities, and that he had but to - change his dress and his horse, and to travel with a single friend, to - pass unrecognized and in safety to the sea-shore, and there embark. - Hitherto, as has been already said, his coming along his selected - route was known to the people miles in advance. Schools were dismissed - that the children might, upon the road-side, greet him. Ladies, with - fruits and flowers, presented with tears of sympathy, were seen at the - gates of every homestead, far in advance, awaiting his approach; and - it was hardly supposable that the general in command, whose spies, and - scouts, and cavalry covered the country, and were heard of upon all - sides, was the only person uninformed of Mr. Davis' movements. - - "The assertion that General Sherman, aware of this journey, permitted - it to facilitate the departure of Mr. Davis and his friends from the - country, is not made or designed; for it is possible that his capture - was desired and attempted; but the facts are matters of history, and - are given regardless of the speculations which they may justify. - - "The party left Abbeville at 11 o'clock the same night for Washington, - Georgia, a distance of some forty-five miles, and by riding briskly - they reached the Savannah River at daylight, crossing it upon a - pontoon bridge, and rode into Washington at about 10 o'clock A. M. - Just before leaving Abbeville they learned that a body of Federal - cavalry was _en route_ to destroy this bridge, and might reach it - before them, and hence they pushed on vigorously, meeting no enemy, - but delayed about an hour by mistaking the right road. - - "The night was intensely dark, the weather stormy. In approaching the - bridge through the river swamp the guide and Colonel Preston Johnston, - and another of the party, rode a half mile in advance, and the latter - encountered a mounted Federal officer. The rays of blazing lightwood - within a wood-cutter's small cabin fell upon him as he stood - motionless beneath a tree, and revealed his water-proof riding-coat - and the gold band upon his cap. He hurriedly inquired, as he listened - to the tramp of the coming horsemen: - - "'What troops are these?' - - "'What force is this?' - - "'Is this Jeff. Davis' party?' - - "'Yes,' replied the party addressed, while revolving in his mind the - best course to pursue, 'this is Jeff. Davis' escort of five thousand - men.' - - "The officer vanished in the darkness, and no others were encountered. - - "At Washington it was found that squads of Federal cavalry scouts were - there. A few were in the town at the time, and Mr. Davis was again - urged to consult his safety. His family and servants, with a small - train of ambulances, accompanied by his private Secretary, Mr. Burton - Harrison, had passed through Washington twenty-four hours before, and - the enemy then only some twenty miles distant, and Mr. Davis - ascertained that he might readily overtake them; and before adopting - any plan to leave the country, he desired to see and confer with them. - - "On the following morning, with his party somewhat reduced in numbers, - he left Washington and joined his family. - - "The circumstance of the capture of Mr. Davis, as given officially by - General Wilson, were in harmony with that system of misrepresentation - by which the popular mind was perverted as to all he said, and did, - and designed. His alleged attempt to escape, disguised in female - apparel--a naked fiction--served well enough for the moment to gratify - and amuse the popular mind. Barnum, the showman, true to his - proclivity for practical falsehood, presented to the eyes of Broadway - a graphic life-size representation of Mr. Davis, thus habited, - resisting arrest by Federal soldiers; and many thousands of children, - whose wondering eyes beheld it will grow to maturity and pass into the - grave, retaining the ideas thus created as the truth of history. - Fortunately, however, history rarely leaves her verification wholly to - the testimony of envy, hatred, malice, or falsehood, but contrives, in - her own time and method, ways and means to bring truth to her - exposition. - - "It has been seen that before the President's proclamation connecting - him with the assassination, with every desired opportunity, and with - every means of escape from the country at his command, Mr. Davis - refrained from leaving it; and it is very doubtful whether, in face of - the charge of complicity with this great crime, any power on earth - could have induced him to leave. - - "The sentiment to which the noble Clement Clay, of Alabama, gave - utterance, upon learning that he was charged as _particeps criminis_ - in the assassination doubtless actuated Mr. Davis. Clay was able to - escape from the country, and was prepared to do so; but when his - heroic and loveable wife made known to him this charge, with - indignation and scorn at its base falsehood breathing in every tone, - he rose quietly, and said: 'Well, my dear wife, that puts an end to - all my plans of leaving the country. I must meet this calumny at once, - and will go to Atlanta and surrender myself and demand its - investigation.' - - "Had Mr. Davis left the country, falsehood and malignity would have - multiplied asserted proofs of this black charge against him; and the - shortcomings, errors, and crimes, perhaps, of others, would have been - conveniently attributed to the faults of his head or heart. But his - long captivity, his cruel treatment, the patient, passive heroism with - which, when powerless otherwise, and strong only in honor and - integrity, he met his fate, have combined, not only to seal the lips - of those of his Confederate associates who had wrongs, real or - fancied, to resent, but to concentrate upon him the heartfelt sympathy - of the Southern people, and no little interest and sympathy wherever - heroic endurance of misfortune gains consideration among men. - - "His escape from the country and a secure refuge in a foreign land, - sustained by the respect and affection of the Southern people, were - within his own control; and he might have reasonably looked forward to - a return to his native State, as a result of a change in her political - status, at no distant day. But he refrained from embracing the - opportunities of escape which were his by fortune or by Federal - permission. - - "The suggestions of friends as to his personal safety were heard with - all due consideration, and he manifested none of the airs of a - would-be political martyr; and yet it was evident that captivity and - death had lost with him their terrors in comparison with the crushing - calamity of a defeat of a cause for whose triumph he had been ever - ready to lay down his life. - - "The general language and bearing of the people of the country through - which he passed, their ardent loyalty to the South, their profound - sorrow at the failure of her cause, and their warm expressions of - regard for himself--all confirmatory of the conviction that, - notwithstanding the odds against her, a thorough and hearty union of - the people and leaders would have secured her triumph, affected him - deeply. - - "Throughout his journey he greatly enjoyed the exercise of riding and - the open air, and decidedly preferred the bivouac to the bed-room; and - at such times, reclining against a tree, or stretched upon a blanket, - with his head, pillowed upon his saddle, and under the inspiration of - a good cigar, he talked very pleasantly of stirring scenes of other - days, and forgot, for a time, the engrossing anxieties of the - situation." - -The solicitude of Mr. Davis for the safety of his family led to his -capture. Several weeks had elapsed since he had parted with them, and -almost the first positive information that he received, made him -apprehensive for their safety. In the then disorganized condition of the -country through which he was passing, the inducements to violence and -robbery by desperate characters were numerous. Hearing that the route -which Mrs. Davis was pursuing was infested by marauders, he determined to -see that his family was out of danger, before putting into execution his -design of crossing the Mississippi. While with his family, Mr. Davis was -surprised by a body of Federal cavalry, and at the time being unarmed and -unattended by any force competent for resistance, he was made a prisoner. -On the 19th May, 1865, he was placed in solitary confinement at Fortress -Monroe. - - - - -CHAPTER XXII. - - MOTIVE OF MR. DAVIS' ARREST--AN AFTER-THOUGHT OF STANTON AND THE - BUREAU OF MILITARY JUSTICE--THE EMBARRASSMENT PRODUCED BY HIS - CAPTURE--THE INFAMOUS CHARGES AGAINST HIM--WHY MR. DAVIS WAS TREATED - WITH EXCEPTIONAL CRUELTY--THE OUTRAGES AND INDIGNITIES OFFERED HIM-- - HIS PATIENT AND HEROIC ENDURANCE OF PERSECUTION--HIS RELEASE FROM - FORTRESS MONROE--BAILED BY THE FEDERAL COURT AT RICHMOND--JOY OF THE - COMMUNITY--IN CANADA--RE-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE FEDERAL COURT--HIS - TRIAL AGAIN POSTPONED--CONCLUSION. - - -All doubt has long since been dispelled as to the motive of the pursuit -and arrest of Mr. Davis. His arrest and imprisonment were the -after-thought of the saturnine Secretary of War, and his associate -inquisitors of the Bureau of Military Justice, at Washington. The details -given by Mr. Mallory, of the circumstances of Mr. Davis' progress through -North Carolina, South Carolina, and a part of Georgia, added to facts -which are yet fresh in the public memory, fully justify the conclusion -that the Federal authorities connived at his supposed purpose to escape -the country. The reputation of Mr. Lincoln among his countrymen, for -humanity as well as good sense, renders it extremely probable that such -would have been his method of avoiding the perplexity which must arise -from the capture of Mr. Davis. - -Well understanding that the inflamed public sentiment of the North, -regarding Mr. Davis as a political offender of the worst possible -character, would not tolerate his immediate release, the Federal -Government would have served the ends of humanity and sound policy by -encouraging his escape. On the other hand the laws of the United States -tolerate prolonged imprisonment only after trial and sentence. Hence the -arrest of Mr. Davis must open an endless perspective of embarrassments. He -could not be tried simply as an individual, nor could his punishment for -any alleged crime of his own, be the sole object to be sought. His -arraignment before a judicial tribunal, would be the arraignment of the -principle of State Sovereignty, of the States which had sought to put that -principle in practice, of the five millions of American citizens who had -supported it, and who had cheerfully risked their lives and earthly -possessions for its maintenance. - -Nay, more, the trial of Jefferson Davis, upon a charge of treason, meant -the trial of the North also. Should all efforts to convict the South in -the person of Mr. Davis, of treason, fail, the recoil might well be -dreaded by those who instigated the war upon the rights and existence of -the States. It was not to be safely assumed that the legal decision of a -constitutional question, which divided the framers of the Federal -Constitution, would necessarily affirm the party and sectional dogmas upon -which the North waged the war. Should secession be legally justified, what -justification could the North claim, that is rightfully denied to Russia -in her conduct towards Poland? What plea should England need for her -outrages upon Ireland? With Jefferson Davis acquitted of treason, what -could the conduct of the North for four years have been, but a revelry in -blood--the wanton perpetration of a monstrous crime? - -In this dilemma the industry of the Bureau of Military Justice, which -afterwards achieved an immortality of infamy, by its record of judicial -murders, aided by the ingenuity of Stanton, devised a scheme for the -arrest of Mr. Davis, upon charges designed to cover him and the cause -which he represented, with everlasting obloquy. Not content with having -triumphed by superior numbers, in a war of political opinions, which in -the beginning was declared not to be waged for social or political -subversion; not content with having settled a grave constitutional -question, by brute force, in a government founded upon the idea of popular -consent, the Federal authorities were now made a party to infamous -falsehoods, the circumstances and results of which have fixed a stigma -upon the American name. - -Contemporary with the announcement of events, which proclaimed the -irretrievable downfall of the Confederacy, were the calumnies of the -Northern press, under the alleged inspiration of Stanton, representing -that Mr. Davis was escaping with wagons filled with plunder, and with the -gold of the Richmond banks; and that he had endeavored to escape in the -concealment of female apparel. No one knew better than those who -promulgated this paltry defamation, its utter falsity, and we would not -insult Mr. Davis and the Southern people by bestowing consideration upon -such palpable calumnies. It was not calculated that such a portraiture of -one, whose personal honor, courage, and manhood had triumphantly endured -every test, would be accepted by the intelligence even of the North. But -it nevertheless had an obvious purpose, which was well answered. It -imposed upon the weak and credulous. The besotted and cowardly mobs of the -Northern cities, who filled the air with clamor for the "blood of -traitors," while the men who had conquered the South, were touched with -sympathy for the misfortunes of foes whom they respected, of course -eagerly accepted any caricature of Mr. Davis agreeable to their own vulgar -imaginations. In this manner was consummated the first step in the object -of delaying the feeling of personal respect, and of sympathy for -misfortunes, which eventually assert themselves in the masses, for a -fallen foe, whom it was already resolved to persecute with oppression and -cruelty previously unknown under the American political system. - -Next came the atrocious proclamation charging Mr. Davis with complicity in -the assassination of President Lincoln. It is safe to say that incidents -hitherto prominent by their infamy, will be forgotten by history, in -comparison with the dastardly criminal intent which instigated that -document. Circumstances warrant the belief that not one of the -conspirators against the life and honor of Mr. Davis, believed either then -or now, that the charge had one atom of truth. Had the charge been -honestly made, it would have been disavowed, when its falsity became -apparent. But this would not have subserved the end of the conspirators, -and the poison was permitted to circulate and rankle, long after the -calumny had been exploded during the investigations of the military -commission, in the cases of Mrs. Surratt and Captain Wirz. At length -justice was vindicated by the publication of the confidential -correspondence between Holt and Conover, which disclosed the unparalleled -subornation and perjury upon which the conspirators relied. Well has it -been said that the world will yet wonder "how it was that a people, -passing for civilized and Christian, should have consigned Jefferson Davis -to a cell, while they tolerated Edwin M. Stanton as a Cabinet Minister." - -We have no desire to dwell upon the details of Mr. Davis' long and cruel -imprisonment. The story is one over which the South has wept tears of -agony, at whose recital the civilized world revolted, and which, in years -to come, will mantle with shame the cheek of every American citizen who -values the good name of his country. In a time of profound peace, when the -last vestige of resistance to Federal authority had disappeared in the -South, Mr. Davis, wrecked in fortune and in health, in violation of every -fundamental principle of American liberty, of justice and humanity, was -detained for two years, without trial, in close confinement, and, during a -large portion of this period, treated with all the rigor of a sentenced -convict. - -But if indeed Mr. Davis was thus to be prejudged as the "traitor" and -"conspirator" which the Stantons, and Holts, and Forneys declared him to -be, why should he be selected from the millions of his advisers and -followers, voluntary participants in his assumed "treason," as the single -victim of cruelty, outrage, and indignity? What is there in his -antecedents inconsistent with the character of a patriotic statesman -devoted to the promotion of union, fraternity, harmony, and faithful -allegiance to the Constitution and laws of his country? We have endeavored -faithfully to trace his distinguished career as a statesman and soldier, -and at no stage of his life is there to be found, either in his conduct or -declared opinions, the evidence of infidelity to the Union as its -character and objects were revealed to his understanding. Nor is there to -be found in his personal character any support of that moral turpitude -which a thousand oracles of falsehood have declared to have peculiarly -characterized his commission of "treason." - -No tongue and pen were more eloquent than his in describing the grandeur, -glory, and blessings of the Union, and in invoking for its perpetuation -the aspirations and prayers of his fellow-citizens. In the midst of -passion and tumult, in 1861, he was conspicuous by his zeal for -compromise, and for a pacific solution of difficulties. No Southern -Senator abandoned his seat with so pathetic and regretful an announcement -of the necessity which compelled the step. The sorrowful tone of his -valedictory moistened the eye of every listener, and convinced even -political adversaries of the sincerity and purity of his motives. His -elevation to the Presidency of the Confederacy was not dictated by the -recognition of any supposed title to leadership in the secession movement. -His election was indeed a triumph over the extreme sentiment of the South, -and was declared by those who opposed it to involve a compromise of the -exclusive sectionalism which was the basis of the new government. His -administration of the Confederate Government exhibited the same unswerving -loyalty to duty, to justice and humanity, which his previous life so nobly -exemplified. The people of the South alone know how steadfastly he opposed -the indulgence of vengeance; how he strove, until the last moments of the -struggle, to restrain the rancor and bitterness so naturally engendered -under the circumstances. Yet, when Jefferson Davis lay a helpless prisoner -in the strongest fortress of the Union, with "broad patches of skin -abraded" by the irons upon his limbs, men were practically pardoned who -had devoted years of labor to the purpose of disunion, and had reproached -him for not unfurling the "black flag." Is not the inference, then, -justified that all of these tortures and indignities were aimed at the -people and the cause which his dignity, purity, and genius had so exalted -in the eyes of mankind? - -But how impotent are falsehood and malignity to obstruct the illumination -of truth! As subornation and perjury proved unavailing to convict him of -atrocious guilt, so equally has persecution failed to accomplish its -purpose. To all that shameful picture of barbarous violence and gratuitous -insult; of insolent _espionage_ and vulgar curiosity; of the illustrious -leader of a brave people, whose whole life does not exhibit one act of -meanness or shame, or one word of untruth, crushed by disaster, and -prostrate with disease, fettered as if he were a desperate felon; -restricted in his diet, and not even permitted a change of linen, except -by the authority of a military jailer; an object of unrelaxed scrutiny, -often driven to his cell by the peering curiosity of vulgar men and -unsexed women--to all this there was but one relief--the patient and -constant heroism of the sufferer, giving heart to his despairing -countrymen, and ennobling his own captivity. History furnishes no similar -instance of patient and dignified endurance of adversity and persecution. - -The incidents of Mr. Davis' history since his release from Fortress -Monroe, do not require detailed narration. For the most part they are -confined to that domain of privacy which decency holds to be inviolable. -When two years--wanting a few days--from the date of his incarceration had -elapsed, Mr. Davis was transferred by the military authorities to the -custody of the Federal civil authorities at Richmond. Here, amid the -congratulations of friends, and the rejoicings of the community, which -loves him as it loves but one other--his constant friend and compeer in -fame--he was released from custody under circumstances which are well -known. The interval between his release in May, 1867, and his -re-appearance before the Federal court, at Richmond, in the ensuing -November, was passed by Mr. Davis in Canada. There he was the recipient of -the respect and sympathy which his character and his sufferings might have -been expected to elicit from a humane people. At the November term of the -Federal court, Mr. Davis was again present, with his eminent counsel, -awaiting trial, and was again released upon recognizance to appear on the -25th March, 1868. - -In the face of the close proximity of the event, it would be unprofitable -to speculate as to the sequel of this third appearance of Jefferson Davis -before a judicial tribunal, to answer the charge of treason. Nor do we -propose to add to the brief consideration, which has already been given in -this volume, of the legal and historical question involved in the case of -Mr. Davis. The subject has been exhausted. The masterly expositions by Mr. -Davis of the theory of the Federal Government (some of which we have -given), are at once the complete vindications of himself and his -countrymen, and the sufficient monuments of his fame. - -But are the issues of the war to be subjected to candid and impartial -legal adjudication? Will the North approve this raising of a doubt as to -its own justification, merely in the hope of vengeance upon one who is -powerless for injury? But if there is to be admitted another jurisdiction -than that of War; if the arbitrament of battle is to be carried to the -higher tribunal of Law and Public Opinion; if there is to be a trial and -not a judicial farce, with a foregone conclusion and a prejudged sentence, -the South and its late leader will not shrink from the verdict. Of this, -the world requires no more emphatic iteration than that furnished by past -events. - -But the decision of this question, whatever it may be, can not recover the -wager which the South gallantly staked and irretrievably lost. Time will -show, however, the amount of truth in the prophecy of Jefferson Davis, -made in reply to the remark that the cause of the Confederacy was lost: -"_It appears so. But the principle for which we contended is bound to -re-assert itself, though it may be at another time and in another form._" - - - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] A pertinent remark of Macaulay is, "It is the nature of parties to -retain their original enmities far more firmly than their original -principles. During many years, a generation of Whigs, whom Sydney would -have spurned as slaves, continued to wage war with a generation of Tories -whom Jeffries would have hanged." - -[2] Mr. Gladstone. - -[3] Mr. Davis has, since his withdrawal from the army until the breaking -out of the war, resided on his plantation in Warren County, a few miles -from Vicksburg. - -[4] Dr. Craven relates the following incident, which is an impressive -illustration of the depth and intensity of Mr. Davis' veneration for the -character of Mr. Calhoun: - -"General Miles observed, interrogatively, that it was reported that John -C. Calhoun had made much money by speculations, or favoring the -speculations of his friends, connected with this work (the Rip-Raps, near -Fortress Monroe). - -"In a moment Mr. Davis started to his feet, betraying much indignation by -his excited manner and flushed cheek. It was a transfiguration of friendly -emotion. The feeble and wasted invalid and prisoner, suddenly forgetting -his bonds--forgetting his debility, and ablaze with eloquent anger against -this injustice to the memory of one he loved and reverenced. Mr. Calhoun, -he said, lived a whole atmosphere above any sordid or dishonest -thought--was of a nature to which even a mean act was impossible. It was -said in every Northern paper that he (Mr. Davis) had carried with him five -millions in gold when quitting Richmond--money pilfered from the treasury -of the Confederate States; and that there was just as much truth in that -as in these imputations against Calhoun.... Calhoun was a statesman, a -philosopher, in the true sense of that grossly-abused term--an enthusiast -of perfect liberty in representative and governmental action."--_Prison -Life of Jefferson Davis. Library edition, pages 206, 207._ - -[5] Massachusetts even refused military honors to the remains of a gallant -son of her own soil, (Captain Lincoln,) and a descendant of one of her -most eminent families, who was killed at Buena Vista. Her fanatical -intolerance would not forget that he had fallen in a war which she did not -approve. - -[6] "Our Living Representative Men," by Mr. John Savage. - -[7] Lieutenant-Colonel A. K. McClung. - -[8] For this spirited account of the operations of the Mississippi -regiment at Monterey, the author is indebted to a sketch of Mr. Davis in -Mr. John Savage's "Living Representative Men," which was published a year -or two prior to the war. Though having several other accounts, possibly -more complete, I have selected this as the most graphic. The author -readily acknowledges the assistance which he has derived from the work of -Mr. Savage. - -[9] This Constitutional question was again raised by Mr. Davis, while -President of the Confederacy, and his action with reference to similar -legislation by the Confederate Congress, was in entire accordance with the -reason assigned for declining Mr. Polk's appointment. - -[10] Henry Clay, Jr., a graduate of West Point, and at the time of his -death, Lieutenant-Colonel of volunteers. He fell at Buena Vista. - -[11] The repeal of the Missouri Compromise has been commonly alluded to as -the special and leading measure of the Pierce administration. It was, in -reality, not an administration measure. The well-known cordiality of Mr. -Davis' relations with President Pierce induced a number of Senators to -call upon Mr. Davis, on the Sunday morning previous to the introduction of -the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, and ask his aid in securing them the pledge of -the President's approval. They represented the measure as contemplating -merely the assertion of the rights of property, slavery included, in the -Territories. Mr. Davis objected, at first, to an interruption of the -President, on the Sabbath, for such a purpose, but finally yielded. The -President promptly signified his approbation of a measure contemplating -such a purpose. It is not necessary to say that the legislation of -Congress embraced a far greater scope than that indicated. The -administration indorsed the Kansas-Nebraska Bill in full, because the -principle was correct, though its assertion then was wholly unnecessary, -unprofitable, and likely to lead to mischievous results. This was the real -connection of the Pierce administration with a measure for whose -consequences the ambition of Judge Douglas was almost solely responsible. - -[12] Governor Wise, of Virginia, characterized "squatter sovereignty" as a -"short cut to all the ends of Black Republicanism." - -[13] To be found at the conclusion of this chapter. - -[14] William Rawle, of Philadelphia, an able lawyer and constitutional -expounder. Mr. Buchanan, in his history of his own administration, thus -mentions him: "The right of secession found advocates afterwards in men of -distinguished abilities and unquestioned patriotism. In 1825, it was -maintained by Mr. William Rawle, of Philadelphia, an eminent and -universally-respected lawyer.... His biographer says that, 'in 1791, he -was appointed District Attorney of the United States,' and 'the situation -of Attorney General was more than once tendered to him by Washington, but -as often declined,' for domestic reasons." - -[15] Hon. C. C. Clay, of Alabama. - -[16] It is not to be understood that Mr. Davis approved Mr. Buchanan's -policy in the winter of 1861. The message of the President disappointed -the South, and was offensive to many of his most attached supporters, in -consequence of its denial of the right of secession. Denying the right of -secession, Mr. Buchanan yet denied, also, the power of coercing the -States, but subsequently lent himself to the latter policy. Mr. Davis -freely testified his disappointment at certain positions taken in the -Message, and criticised them with emphasis, but great courtesy. Mr. -Buchanan indicates the special message of January, 1861, as the occasion -of the termination of all friendly relations between himself and those -whom he terms the "secession Senators." - -[17] It is a notable fact that, years ago, the strong and avowed -attachment of Mr. Davis for the Union, was habitually sneered at by some -Southern men, who are now seeking to gratify their lust for place by -"crooking the pregnant hinges of the knee," to those who persecute him and -his countrymen. - -[18] Mr. Crittenden, whose supreme devotion to the Union, can not be -called in question, since he continued to cling to the shadow long after -the substance had departed, and in the midst of actual war continued to -hope for a final pacific settlement, was greatly incensed at the -unpatriotic course of the Republican Senators. His gray hairs, his -eloquence, his unquestioned Unionism, were all unavailing. He was -frequently hotly denunciatory, of what, equally with Mr. Davis, he -regarded a purpose to prevent any adjustment which could have a pacifying -effect upon the country. - -[19] Statement of Hon. S. S. Cox. - -[20] Acts of secession were adopted by the various States as follows: - - South Carolina, December 20, 1860. - - Florida, January 7, 1861. - - Mississippi, January 9, 1861. - - Alabama, January 11, 1861. - - Georgia, January 20, 1861. - - Louisiana, January 26, 1861. - - Texas, February 1, 1861. - -[21] Extract from President Davis' address before the Mississippi -Legislature, December, 1862. - -[22] By the steamer "Star of the West," which was driven back by the South -Carolina batteries. - -[23] It was not until the 8th of April that the commissioners obtained a -reply to their official communication of March 12th. From this reply, it -appeared that "during the whole interval while the commissioners were -receiving assurances calculated to inspire hope of the success of their -mission, the Secretary of State and the President of the United States had -already determined to hold no intercourse with them whatever; to refuse -even to listen to any proposals they had to make, and had profited by the -delay created by their own assurances, in order to prepare secretly the -means for effective hostile operations."--_President Davis' Message, April -29th, 1861._ - -[24] Message to Confederate Congress. - -[25] This expedition, ostensibly "for the relief of a starving garrison," -consisted of eleven vessels, with two hundred and eighty-five guns and -twenty-four hundred men. - -[26] Before instructing General Beauregard to fire upon the fort, -President Davis made another effort to prevent hostilities, which he thus -explains: "Even then" (after Beauregard had applied for instructions), -"under all the provocation incident to the contemptuous refusal to listen -to our commissioners, and the treacherous course of the Government of the -United States, I was sincerely anxious to avoid the effusion of blood, and -directed a proposal to be made to the commander of Fort Sumter, who had -avowed himself to be nearly out of provisions, that we would abstain from -directing our fire at Fort Sumter, if he would promise not to open fire on -our forces unless first attacked. This proposal was refused. The -conclusion was, that the design of the United States was to place the -besieging force at Charleston between the simultaneous fire of the fleet -and fort. The fort should, of course, be at once reduced. This order was -executed by General Beauregard with skill and success."--_Message, 29th -April, 1861._ - -[27] Mr. Lincoln's proclamation was dated April 15, 1861. - -[28] On the day of the surrender of Fort Sumter, Mr. Lincoln protested to -the Virginia commissioners the pacific purposes of his government. When -giving these assurances to Virginia he had heard of the surrender of the -fort, and knew that for two days Beauregard had been firing upon the -"sacred flag." - -[29] April 24, 1861. Virginia joined the Confederacy as a member May 6, -1861. - -[30] "East Tennessee" was a perpetual "fire in the rear" to the -Confederacy. - -[31] President Davis appreciated the immense value to the South of -privateering. The Federal Government employed all the naval force at their -command to blockade the South, recalled the squadrons stationed in foreign -waters, and made extensive purchases of vessels for purposes of war. The -South, of course, had no navy, since there had been no time to prepare or -purchase one within the brief space between the organization of the -Confederate Government and the beginning of hostilities. Under these -circumstances there remained only the resort to private armed ships, under -letters of marque, to assault the floating commerce of the enemy, and, to -some extent, neutralize the blockade. Doubting the constitutional power of -the executive in the premises, he, with characteristic regard for law, -determined not to commission privateers until duly authorized by the -legislation of Congress. The authority to issue commissions, and letters -of marque and general reprisal, to privateers, was given by act of -Congress, passed 6th of May. - -[32] A recent work (_Richmond During the War_) thus mentions the arrival -of Mr. Davis in Richmond: - -"He was received with an outburst of enthusiasm. A suite of handsome -apartments had been provided for him at the Spotswood Hotel, until -arrangements could be made for supplying him with more elegant and -suitable accommodations. Over the hotel, and from the various windows of -the guests, waved numerous Confederate flags, and the rooms destined for -his use were gorgeously draped in the Confederate colors. In honor of his -arrival, almost every house in the city was decorated with the 'Stars and -Bars.' - -"An elegant residence for the use of Mr. Davis was soon procured. It was -situated in the western part of the city, on a hill, overlooking a -landscape of romantic beauty. This establishment was luxuriantly -furnished, and there Mr. and Mrs. Davis dispensed the elegant -hospitalities for which they were ever distinguished. Mrs. Davis is a -tall, commanding figure, with dark hair, eyes and complexion, and -strongly-marked expression, which lies chiefly in the mouth. With -firmly-set yet flexible lips, there is indicated much energy of purpose -and will, but beautifully softened by the usually sad expression of her -dark, earnest eyes. Her manners are kind, graceful, easy, and affable, and -her receptions were characterized by the dignity and suavity which should -very properly distinguish the drawing room entertainments of the Chief -Magistrate of a Republic." - -[33] We intentionally waive the discussion of this question as to the -extent of the preparation made by the States, severally, for actual war. -It is not incumbent upon us here to examine the action of the individual -States. We do not desire to be understood, however, as assenting to the -proposition that all the States were inadequately prepared. It is a -singular commentary upon the wisdom and sagacity of the leaders of -secession in its earlier stages (by the various States), that Virginia and -North Carolina were each better able to arm their troops than were some of -the Cotton States. The latter may have made as much preparation as was -possible under the circumstances. When Mr. Davis reached Mississippi, -after his withdrawal from the Senate, the Legislature had appropriated -$150,000 for military purposes. As Major-General commanding the forces of -the State, he was consulted as to additional appropriations. He -immediately recommended an appropriation of _three millions of dollars_. -It is needless to say that such a recommendation, at that period, was -deemed little less than extravagant folly. - -[34] It should be observed that Mr. Lincoln did not call upon the Federal -Congress to assemble until July 4th, two months after the meeting of the -Confederate Congress. - -[35] In this connection, we quote from a remarkably faithful and careful -chronicle of events during a portion of the war: "On the morning of the -29th of May, President Davis arrived in Richmond.... He found the military -preparations in a state requiring instant energy, and, within a few hours -after his arrival, he telegraphed and wrote messages to every State in the -South, urging that troops should be sent forward with increased -speed."--_Howison's History of the War._ - -[36] General Von Molkte, who planned the Prussian campaign in Bohemia. - -[37] General Jubal A. Early. - -[38] The speech made by Mr. Davis at the depot of the Virginia Central -Railroad was not reported in the newspapers. The writer, in company with -two friends, was in the crowd which greeted the return of Mr. Davis to the -capital, and such was the effect of the scene and the glowing words of the -speaker, that neither can ever be forgotten. A few hours subsequently to -the scene at the depot, the words, as given below, were repeated, in the -presence of several persons who heard Mr. Davis, and were pronounced by -them the identical language used by him. They were preserved in writing, -and are now published for the first time. Apart from its historical -interest, the speech is a remarkable specimen of spontaneous, sententious -eloquence, eminently appropriate to the occasion: - - "_Fellow-citizens of the Confederate States_: - - "I rejoice with you, this evening, in those better and happier - feelings which we all experience, as compared with the anxiety of - three days ago. Your little army--derided for its want of - numbers--derided for its want of arms--derided for its lack of all the - essential material of war--has met the grand army of the enemy, routed - it at every point, and it now flies, in inglorious retreat, before our - victorious columns. We have taught them a lesson in their invasion of - the sacred soil of Virginia; we have taught them that the grand old - mother of Washington still nurtures a band of heroes; and a yet - bloodier and far more fatal lesson awaits them, unless they speedily - acknowledge that freedom to which you were born." - -[39] The _Harper's Magazine_ article of General Jordan. - -[40] The Federal official reports are overwhelmingly in confirmation of -these views of General Jackson. General McClellan stated that "in no -quarter were the dispositions for defense such as to offer resistance to a -respectable body of the enemy." - -[41] The writer heard this speech of Mr. Davis, and his recollection is -positive of the encouragement extended by the President to the hope of an -immediate forward movement. The recollection of the author of "The Diary -of a Rebel War Clerk" seems to be substantially the same. - -[42] One evidence of this "persecution" would appear to consist in the -fact that the President, having reluctantly commissioned Generals Lovell -and G. W. Smith, upon the recommendations of Generals Beauregard and -Johnston, chose also to commission, at the same time, with a similar rank, -General Van Dorn, giving the latter a senior commission. Smith and Lovell -had but recently come to the South, both being residents of New York, -before the war, while Van Dorn had promptly sought service in the -Confederate army before hostilities commenced, had done excellent service, -and been constantly in front of the enemy. Another proof of "persecution" -is that the President refused to permit such an organization of the army -as he believed to be in conflict with the laws of Congress. - -The commonly assigned origin of the difference between President Davis and -General Beauregard, which gave rise to so much scandal and falsehood -during the war, was the suppression of the preliminary portion of General -B.'s report of the battle of Manassas. The correct version of that matter -is now well known. President Davis did not suppress any portion of -Beauregard's report. He did object to certain preliminary statements of -the report, and requested that they should be altered or omitted. When -this was declined, the President sent the report to Congress, accompanied -by an indorsement of his own, correcting what he conceived to be errors. -General Beauregard's friends in Congress, unwilling that these comments of -the President should be published, suppressed both the objectionable -passages and the executive indorsement. So that they, and not the -President, occasioned that "suppression," from which arose much gossip and -mystery. A sufficient answer to these charges of personal antagonism by -the President to these two officers, should be the fact that he retained -them in command of the two largest armies of the Confederacy, until -relinquished by them, in the one case, because of sickness, and in the -other, in consequence of a wound which caused disability. - -[43] The friends of Mr. Mallory, in illustration of this unreasoning -prejudice, were accustomed to declare that, "were a Confederate vessel to -sink in a storm, in the middle of the ocean, the Richmond _Examiner_ and -Mr. Foote would advocate the censure of the Secretary of the Navy, as -responsible for her loss." - -[44] The careful reader will hardly have overlooked the passage, in the -Message to Congress, in the preceding chapter, in which Mr. Davis thus -alludes to this subject: "The active state of military preparation among -the nations of Europe, in April last, the date when our agents first went -abroad, interposed unavoidable delays in the procurement of arms, and the -want of a navy has greatly impeded our efforts to obtain military supplies -of all sorts." - -A few months later, he said, speaking with characteristic candor: "I was -among those who, from the beginning, predicted war as the consequences of -secession, although I must admit that the contest has assumed proportions -more gigantic than I had anticipated. I predicted war, not because our -right to secede and to form a government of our own was not indisputable -and clearly defined in the spirit of that declaration, which rests the -right to govern on the consent of the governed, but saw that the -wickedness of the North would precipitate a war upon us."--_Address before -Mississippi Legislature, December, 1862._ - -Mr. Davis here candidly admits that the "gigantic proportions" of the war -exceeded his expectations, as they did also the expectations of the whole -country and of the world. He did foresee a _great war_, and prepared for -it; but he was not guilty of the foolish pretension that the war simply -realized his expectations, when every statesman of Europe and America was -deceived, both as to its duration and magnitude. Who believes that -Napoleon the First, equally the unrivaled master of war and diplomacy, -would pretend that he foresaw the extent and duration, or the results, of -the wars of the empire? that he realized the inextinguishable nature of -English hostility, or anticipated the numerous perfidies of Austria? Mr. -Seward, who is likely to be remembered, with some distinction, in -connection with the diplomacy and statesmanship of the late war, -constantly predicted its termination in "ninety days." _No opinion can be -truthfully ascribed to Mr. Davis indicating a light estimate of the -struggle either before or during the war._ Yet there is a retrospective -statesmanship in the South which now claims that he should have been -lifted to its own preternatural powers, and from the first have seen every -phase and incident. How absurd must this pretension appear to the sober -judgment of fifty years hence. - -Mr. Davis was even accredited in Richmond, by an extravagant and unfounded -popular report, with the prophecy that "children then (1862) unborn would -be soldiers in the war between the North and South." People in those days -saw nothing in the action of the Government indicating its faith in a -short war. Their only consolation was found in the editorials of Richmond -newspapers predicting foreign intervention should McClellan be defeated. - -[45] Inaugural Address, February 22, 1862. - -[46] The order was in these terms: - - "WAR DEPARTMENT, - "ADJUTANT AND HIS INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE, - "March 13. 1862. - - "General Orders, No. 14. - - "General Robert E. Lee is assigned to duty at the seat of Government; - and, under the direction of the President, is charged with the conduct - of military operations in the armies of the Confederacy. - - "By command of the Secretary of War. - - "S. COOPER, - "_Adjutant and Inspector-General_." - -[47] The fact is not generally known that the President was, upon two -occasions, assailed with urgent petitions for the removal of Stonewall -Jackson, which he peremptorily rejected on both occasions; first, after -the campaign about Romney, in December, 1861, and again, after the battle -of Kernstown. March, 1862. - -[48] I am mainly indebted for these facts to a recent publication by -Professor Bledsoe, late Assistant Secretary of War of the Confederate -States. - -[49] In this engagement General Benjamin McCulloch, of Texan fame, a brave -and efficient soldier, was killed. - -[50] When General Beauregard had eluded Halleck at Corinth, and brought -his army to Tupelo, he turned over the command to General Bragg, and -sought repose and recuperation at Bladon Springs, Alabama. Those who -assume to be the friends and admirers of General Beauregard, but who are -far more anxious to establish a mean malignity in the character of Mr. -Davis, than to exalt their favorite, have laid great stress upon the fact, -that the President then placed Bragg in command of the army for the -ensuing campaign, thus placing Beauregard in retirement. There can be -little difficulty in comprehending the commendable motives which prompted -Mr. Davis to this course. The period of General Beauregard's absence from -his command (three weeks, it is understood) would protract the period of -inactivity until midsummer. Time was precious. The Western army had done -nothing but lose ground all the current year, and, meanwhile, Lee was -preparing his part of the operations, by which the Government hoped to -throw the enemy back upon the frontier. Was, then, the Western army to lie -idle, awaiting the disposition and convenience of one man? With the -approval of the army and the country, the President appointed to the -vacated command, an able and devoted soldier, whose reputation and service -justified the trust. The writer has seen nothing from General Beauregard -approving the assaults of his pretended admirers upon Mr. Davis, and it is -not unreasonable to suppose that he does not indorse them. - -It is also urged that Mr. Davis, when pressed to remove Bragg and replace -Beauregard, declared that he would not, though the whole world should -unite in the petition. Very likely, and altogether proper that he should -not remove an officer while in the actual execution of his plans of -campaign. But there can be no better explanation than that given by Mr. -Davis: "The President remarked, that so far as giving Beauregard command -of Bragg's army is concerned, that was out of the question. _Bragg had -arranged all his plans_, and had co-intelligence with the Department, with -Kirby Smith, and Humphrey Marshall; and _to put a new commander at the -head of the army would be so prejudicial to the public interests, he would -not do it if the whole world united in the petition_." - -But President Davis never designed that General Beauregard should be -without a command. With that just appreciation of the real merits of his -generals, apart from the cheap applause or unmerited censure of the crowd, -which distinguished most of his selections, he placed General Beauregard -in charge of the coast defenses, where his reputation was certainly much -enhanced. In this oft-repeated and unfounded charge of "injustice" and -"persecution," in the case of General Joseph E. Johnston, as in that of -General Beauregard, there is no specification, more awkwardly sustained, -than that which denies the abundant opportunity enjoyed by each of those -officers, for the display of the superior genius asserted for them by -their admirers. The slightest acquaintance with the history of the war -will verify this statement. - -[51] Much crimination and recrimination followed the fall of New Orleans. -It is, at least, safe to say, that public opinion in the South was much -divided, as to where the burden of censure for this dire and unexpected -calamity should properly rest. The intelligence of the capture of the city -was an appalling surprise, not only to the public in Richmond, but to the -Government. President Davis declared that the event was totally unexpected -by him. The fall of New Orleans was one of those instances, in which the -Confederates had decided for them, in a most unsatisfactory manner, the -long disputed question as to the efficiency of shore batteries against -vessels of war. Precedents established, when sailing vessels were used in -warfare, were overthrown by the experience of steam vessels, especially -when iron-plated. Commodore Farragut, with perfect success and comparative -ease, passed the forts below New Orleans, after the chief of the naval -force had despaired of their reduction. - -[52] These revelations of the designs of McClellan are derived from the -admirable work of Mr. Swinton--the "History of the Army of the -Potomac"--perhaps the ablest and most impartial contribution yet made to -the history of the late war. - -It is noteworthy that General Grant attempted nearly the same approach to -Richmond and was signally foiled--a fact which he promptly recognized, by -his change of plan, after his bloody repulse at Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864. - -[53] This dispatch was in substance: "Halt the army where it is." - -[54] The incidents of this trying period, when Richmond was doubly -threatened by the hosts of McClellan, and the gunboats in the river, are -"mementoes of heroism," proudly illustrating the unconquerable spirit of -that devoted city and its rulers. We give the resolution passed by the -Legislature on the occasion referred to--May 14, 1862: - -"_Resolved by the General Assembly_, That this General Assembly expresses -its desire that the capital of the State be defended to the last -extremity, if such defense is in accordance with the views of the -President of the Confederate States; and that the President be assured, -that whatever destruction or loss of property, of the State, or -individuals shall hereby result, will be cheerfully submitted to." - -Two days after, at a public meeting of the citizens of Richmond, Governor -Letcher said, that under no circumstances would he approve the surrender -of the city, and avowed his readiness to endure bombardment, if necessary. -In the same stout spirit spoke Mayor Mayo: - -"I say now--and I will abide by it--when the citizens of Richmond demand -of me to surrender the capital of Virginia, and of the Confederacy, to the -enemy, they must find some other man to fill my place. I will resign the -mayoralty. And when that other man elected in my stead shall deliver up -the city, I hope I may have physical courage and strength enough left to -shoulder a musket and go into the ranks." - -[55] It is only fair to state that General Johnston proposed operations, -similar in their main features to those of Lee, though it does not -therefore follow that they would have been equally successful. Johnston's -ability as a strategist can not be questioned, and to those who closely -and intelligently studied his campaigns, there can be little doubt as to -his aggressive qualities, though in this respect, _results_ were not in -his favor. - -[56] Mr. Davis was every day upon the battle-field, and from this -circumstance the impression prevailed in Richmond that he was directing -the army in person. A common report, which I have never seen contradicted, -was that the President narrowly escaped death during the progress of the -battles. As related to the writer, the circumstance was as follows: The -President, in company with General Magruder and other officers, was at a -farm-house, upon which one of the Federal batteries was preparing to open. -General Lee, apprised of the President's whereabouts, sent a courier to -warn him of his danger, and he and his companions escaped without injury, -just as the Federal battery opened fire. - -[57] A serious disadvantage suffered by General Lee was the capture of his -plan of battle by General McClellan. Completely informed as to his -adversary's movements, and with ninety thousand men against thirty-three -thousand, the wonder is, that McClellan did not overwhelm the Confederate -army. The means by which the enemy obtained this important paper was a -subject of much gossip in the Confederacy. - -[58] A sufficient proof of the injury done the South by the pretended -neutrality of England was the confession of the British Foreign Secretary. -Said he: "The impartial observance of neutral obligation by Her Majesty's -Government has thus been exceedingly advantageous to the cause of the more -powerful of the two contending parties." - -[59] General Lee stated the proportion of the Federal strength to his own -as _ten to three_. Mr. Swinton states Hooker's force at one hundred and -twenty thousand infantry, twelve thousand cavalry, and four hundred guns. -Lee's effective force was considerably less than fifty thousand. - -The absence of Longstreet was severely felt by General Lee in his -operations against Hooker. The presence of a force was absolutely -indispensable upon the south side of James River, in the early spring, to -meet the formidable Federal force in the neighborhood of Suffolk. An -impression, altogether erroneous, however, prevailed, that Longstreet's -detention from Lee was caused by President Davis. The President eventually -ordered Longstreet to Lee, after his delay at Richmond. - -[60] "Of Stonewall Jackson, Mr. Davis spoke with the utmost tenderness, -and some touch of reverential feeling, bearing witness to his earnest and -pathetic piety, his singleness of aim, his immense energy as an executive -officer, and the loyalty of his nature, making obedience the first of all -duties.... He had the faculty, or, rather, gift of exciting and holding -the love and confidence of his men to an unbounded degree, even though the -character of his campaigning imposed on them more hardships than on any -other troops in the service. Good soldiers care not for their individual -sacrifices, when adequate results can be shown, and these General Jackson -never lacked.... 'For glory he lived long enough,' continued Mr. Davis, -with much emotion; 'and if this result had to come, it was the Divine -mercy that removed him. He fell like the eagle, his own feather on the -shaft that was dripping with his life-blood. In his death, the Confederacy -lost an eye and arm; our only consolation being that the final summons -could have reached no soldier more prepared to accept it -joyfully.'"--_Craven's Prison Life of Jefferson Davis_, pp. 180, 181. - -[61] Chiefly conscripts. - -[62] It has been generally assumed that General Lee committed grave errors -at Gettysburg. The following explanation by Lee shows the extreme caution -with which such a judgment should be pronounced: "_It had not been -intended to fight a general battle at such distance from our base unless -attacked by the enemy_; but, finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by -the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the -mountains with our large trains. At the same time, the country was -unfavorable for collecting supplies, while in the presence of the enemy's -main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying -the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. A battle thus -became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of -the first day, and in view of the valuable results which would ensue from -the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew -the attack." - -Mr. Swinton, who derived his information from General Longstreet, makes a -statement which throws much light upon the theory with which this campaign -was undertaken: "Indeed, in entering upon the campaign, General Lee -expressly promised his corps commanders that _he would not assume a -tactical offensive, but force his antagonist to attack him_."--_Campaigns -of the Army of the Potomac._ - -[63] Major John Esten Cooke justly says: "Gettysburg was the -Waterloo--Cemetery Hill the Mount St. Jean of the war.... Not without good -reason is the anniversary of this great battle celebrated at the North -with addresses and rejoicings--with crowds, and brass bands, and -congratulations. The American Waterloo is worth making that noise over; -and the monument proposed there is a natural conception." - -[64] General Johnston, whether willingly or unwillingly, it is not -necessary for us to inquire, was the favorite of the anti-administration -faction. His name and opinions were, upon all occasions, quoted to aid in -the disparagement of the administration. This faction was as blind in its -zealotry in favor of Johnston, as in its prejudice against Davis. The -motive of this zealous championship of Johnston was, however, to offset -the well-known confidence of General Lee in the President. - -[65] The President ordered a Court of Inquiry for investigation of the -facts of the campaign in Mississippi. General Pemberton requested that the -most searching inquiry should be made, and that the court be allowed to -_invite all attainable testimony against him_. - -[66] It is noteworthy that when trial vindicated the confidence of Mr. -Davis in an officer, of whose capacity the critics were doubtful (as was -the case in numberless instances), they made no acknowledgment of error. -For example, the President was accused of the most unworthy nepotism in -his appointment of General "Dick" Taylor, who was a brother of Mr. Davis' -first wife. Yet that appointment was insisted upon by Stonewall Jackson, -in whose army Taylor commanded a brigade. The President made Taylor a -Brigadier, because he thought him competent; and afterward a -Major-General, because Jackson _knew_ him to be worthy of it. Did Taylor's -subsequent career vindicate the President or the critics? - -The case of the brave and efficient Early was another instance in which -Mr. Davis was at variance with the newspaper and congressional censors, -and in which, as usual, the President was sustained by Lee. It is needless -to multiply examples. - -[67] One of the worst of these proceedings of the enemy, was the execution -of Captains Corbin and McGraw. On hearing of their fate, the Confederate -Government inquired of the Federal authorities the reason of their -actions. The response was, that they were executed as spies. The record of -their trial was then demanded. In answer to this request, the Federal -Government furnished a copy of the charges and specifications against -them, and of the sentence of the court which condemned them, _but none of -the evidence_. - -From the papers thus furnished, it appears that it was not true that they -had been accused or tried as spies--that the sole charge against these -unfortunate gentlemen was, that they had recruited soldiers for the -Confederacy in Kentucky, a State embraced in our political system and -represented regularly in the Confederate Congress by Senators and -Representatives. Nor was the evidence of this charge supplied. Not a -scintilla of proof appeared that these men were spies. The sole pretext -for their execution was the technical one that these officers were -recruiting in one of the States claimed by the enemy, as one of the United -States, a principle which applies equally to Virginia or South Carolina, -and which would, if carried out, sentence to the gallows every officer and -private we had in our service. - -[68] General D. H. Hill has given a most manly exhibition of feeling -toward Mr. Davis, in an article published, some months since, in his -magazine. We quote from General Hill, who alludes, at length, to the -alleged rancor of Mr. Davis toward his opponents. General Hill prefaces -his remarks with the declaration, that he "has never been among the -personal friends of Mr. Davis;" that he was "at no time an admirer of his -executive abilities;" and further declares himself to have been the -recipient of an "unexplained, and perhaps unexplainable wrong," at the -hands of Mr. Davis. Says this gallant soldier: - -"It was said of Mr. Davis that he could see no good in his enemies and no -evil in his friends. I know of one instance, at least, of incorrectness of -the former statement. I was present when a discussion took place in regard -to the suppression of a newspaper because of the disloyal character of its -articles, which were producing desertion in the army, and disaffection -among the people at home. The editor had been converted to Unionism by the -battle of Gettysburg and fall of Vicksburg, and, like all newborn -proselytes, was fiery in his zeal. A cabinet officer present said: 'This -man is not more disloyal than ----' (naming a well-known editor, whose -assaults upon Mr. Davis at this time were very virulent.) 'I don't see how -one paper can be suppressed without suppressing the other.' To this a -gentleman replied: 'You are unjust. Mr. ----, though an enemy of the -President, yet shows by his abuse of the Yankees that he has no love for -them. The other editor betrays hatred of the President and of his own -people.' Mr. Davis immediately assented to this, saying: 'You have exactly -described the difference between the two men.'... But it _is not_ true -that he could see no good in his enemies, and that he pursued them with -rancorous hate. I do not doubt that in the comparison with his supposed -friends, they were in his estimation both intellectually weak and morally -perverse. But, apart from this, he could be just and appreciative of their -merits. I saw him several times during the session of a Confederate -Congress in which he had been harshly assailed. Once he alluded -incidentally to his troubles, but without the least resentment in language -or manner. I think that there was no instance of the suppression of a -newspaper, though several editors were notoriously disloyal to the -Confederate cause, and still more of them intensely hostile to the -Confederate President. Like Washington, Mr. Davis held 'error to be the -portion of humanity, and to censure it, whether committed by this or that -public character, to be the prerogative of a freeman.'" - -[69] At the beginning of the war, the South had only fifty millions of -coin, and had a paper circulation of about the same amount. - -[70] My limited space has prevented the extended account of the -Confederate Commissary Department, which was originally designed. The -history of its commissariat is an important chapter in the history of the -Confederacy. President Davis was much abused for his retention of Colonel -Northrop, who has been charged, both during and since the war, with -incompetency, corruption, and every conceivable abuse of his office. The -amount of truth, in the charge of corruption against Colonel Northrop, may -be estimated, when we state a fact known almost universally in Richmond, -that few persons suffered the privations of the war more severely than he. -Hundreds of the most respectable gentlemen in the South willingly testify -to the unimpeachable patriotism and purity of Colonel Northrop. Equally -false was the statement that Mr. Davis gratified merely his personal -partiality in appointing Commissary-General a man who had given no -previous evidence of fitness. Colonel Northrop, when in the regular -Federal army, had seen extensive service in that department, where he was -detailed, after having been disabled. His services were amply testified to -by his superiors, who regarded him as having peculiar qualifications for -the duties of the commissariat. Of these facts Mr. Davis had _personal -knowledge_, though, when he placed Colonel Northrop at the head of the -Confederate commissariat, they had not met for more than twenty years. - -Again, when commissioned by Mr. Davis, Colonel Northrop was the -Commissary-General of South Carolina--a position to which he would hardly -have been invited, without at least some conviction, by the authorities of -that State, of his fitness. It is well known, too, that a committee of the -Confederate Congress investigated the affairs of the Commissary -Department, and made a report which amply and honorably vindicated Colonel -Northrop. Indeed, a member of that committee, one of the ablest men in -Virginia, and not friendly to Mr. Davis, declared it to be the best -managed department of the Confederate Government. - -Editors perpetually clamored against Colonel Northrop for issuing _half -rations_ to the army, who daily issued _half sheets_ to their -subscribers--refusing to understand that in each case the cause was the -same, viz., an exhaustion of supply, resulting from the depletion of the -resources of the country. - -[71] We present two resolutions of a series adopted by Federal prisoners -of war: - - "_Resolved_, That whilst allowing the Confederate authorities all due - praise for the attention paid to our prisoners, numbers of our men are - daily consigned to early graves in the prime of manhood, far from home - and kindred, and this is not caused intentionally by the Confederate - Government, but by the force of circumstances; the prisoner is obliged - to go without shelter, and, in a great portion of cases, without - medicine. - - * * * * * - - "_Resolved_, That whereas, in the fortune of war, it was our lot to - become prisoners, we have suffered patiently, and are still willing to - suffer, if by so doing we can benefit the country, _but we would most - respectfully beg to say that we are not willing to suffer to further - the ends of any party or clique_, to the detriment of our own honor, - our families, and our country; and we would beg this affair be - explained to us, that we may continue to hold the Government in the - respect which is necessary to make a good citizen and a soldier. - - "BRADLEY, - "_Chairman of Committee, on behalf of Prisoners_." - -These resolutions were adopted at a meeting of prisoners in Savannah, -September 28, 1864, and sent to President Lincoln. - -[72] Upon the person of Dahlgren was found the address, from which -extracts relative to the purpose of the expedition are given. The portions -which we omit are mainly exhortations to the courage of the men in a -desperate enterprise: - - "_Officers and men_-- - - "You have been selected from brigades and regiments, as a picked - command, to attempt a desperate undertaking--an undertaking, which, if - successful, will write your names on the hearts of your countrymen in - letters that can never be erased, and which will cause the prayers of - your fellow-soldiers, now confined in loathsome prisons, to follow you - wherever you may go. - - "We hope to release the prisoners from Belle Island first, and, having - seen them fairly started, we will cross the James River into Richmond, - destroying the bridges after us, and exhorting the released prisoners - to destroy and burn the hateful city; and do not allow the rebel - leader, Davis, and his traitorous crew to escape," etc. The conclusion - of this remarkable order is, "Ask the blessing of the Almighty, and do - not fear the enemy." - -We have not space for the indisputable testimony which has established the -authenticity of the "Dahlgren Papers"--a subject upon which there is no -longer room for doubt. The writer, at the time of this raid, had full -descriptions of them from persons who saw the originals. They were found -upon Dahlgren's body by a school-boy thirteen years old, who could not -write, and were immediately placed in the hands of his teacher. The soiled -folds of the paper were plainly visible. The words referring to the murder -of President Davis were a part of the regular text of the manuscript. -Additional proof of the authenticity of the papers was furnished by the -note-book, also found upon the person of Dahlgren, containing a rough -draft of the address to the troops, and various memoranda. The address was -written in pencil in the note-book, and differs very slightly from the -copy, containing, however, the injunction that the Confederate authorities -be "_killed on the spot_." The statement of Mr. Halbach, who is still -living, supported by the testimony of a number of persons, must be deemed -conclusive of the genuineness of the documents published in the Richmond -journals. - -Hon. Stephen R. Mallory, late Confederate Secretary of the Navy, has -recently made the following statement of Mr. Davis' course concerning this -matter: - - "An expedition directed avowedly against the lives of the heads of the - Government, and aiming at firing an entire city, was deemed so - violative of the rules of war as to demand a retribution of death upon - all concerned in it. - - "The subject was one of universal discussion in Richmond; excitement - increased with what it fed upon; Congress participated in it; and a - pressure was brought to bear upon Mr. Davis to order the execution of - some of the captured. - - "He entertained no doubt that justice, humanity, and policy equally - forbade this cruel measure, and refused to sanction it; and at the - same time referred the subject to General Lee, then near Petersburg, - for immediate attention. The General's answer promptly came, - asserting, without having been apprized of them, the views already - presented by Mr. Davis; and the chief of which was, that the men, - having surrendered with arms in their hands, and been accepted and - treated as prisoners of war, could not, in retaliation for the - unexecuted designs of their leader, be treated otherwise. This - disposed of the case, and satisfied the people, who were ever ready to - recognize the wisdom and policy of General Lee's judgment." - -[73] The "Fort Pillow massacre" was a fruitful theme for new chapters of -"rebel barbarities." Forrest was charged with indiscriminate slaughter of -a captive garrison, when, in fact, he only continued to fight a garrison -which had not surrendered. After the Confederates had forced their way -into the fort, the flag was not taken down, nor did the garrison offer to -surrender. The explanation obviously was that the enemy relied upon their -gunboats in the river to destroy Forrest's forces after they had entered -the fort. - -[74] In the last two years of the war, there were few more promising -officers than General Hoke. Mr. Davis thought very highly of his capacity, -and, upon one occasion, alluded to him as "that gallant North Carolinian, -who always did his duty, and did it thoroughly." - -[75] At Hanover Junction, on the 23d of May, General Lee was joined by -Breckinridge's division, numbering less than three thousand muskets, and -by Pickett's division of perhaps three thousand five hundred muskets. -General Lee was compelled, very shortly afterwards, to send Breckinridge's -division back to the Valley. - -[76] This estimate includes Grant's losses in his assaults upon the -fortifications of Petersburg, immediately after his passage of the James -River. I have seen his total losses from the Rapidan, until the siege of -Petersburg was regularly begun, estimated by Northern writers, at over -ninety thousand. - -[77] President Davis regarded the security of Atlanta as an object of the -utmost consequence, for which, if necessary, even great hazards must be -run. His frequent declaration was that the Confederacy "_had no vital -points_." This theory was correct, as there was certainly no one point, -the loss of which necessarily involved the loss of the cause. Yet it was -obvious in the beginning that certain sections, either for strategic -reasons, or as sources of supply, were of vast importance for the -prosecution of the war to a speedy and successful conclusion. The value of -Richmond and Virginia was obvious. Equally important was a secure foothold -in the Mississippi Valley, and the possession of the great mountainous -range from Chattanooga to Lynchburg, the "backbone region" of the South. -Mr. Davis regarded each one of these three objects as justifying almost -any hazard or sacrifice. Under no circumstances could he approve a -military policy which contemplated the surrender of either of these -objects, without a desperate struggle. He had wanted Vicksburg defended to -the last extremity, and now desired equal tenacity as to Atlanta. This -city was a great manufacturing centre; the centre of the system of -railroads diverging in all directions through the Gulf States, and it was -the last remaining outpost in the defense of the central section of the -Confederacy. - -[78] Yet the argument that General Hood's errors establish the wisdom of -General Johnston's policy, can hardly be deemed fair by an intelligent and -impartial judgment. A more competent commander than Hood might have more -ably executed an offensive campaign, even after the fall of Atlanta; or, -again, other tactics than those of Johnston, from Dalton to Atlanta, might -have had better results. - -After Johnston's removal, the President received numerous letters from -prominent individuals in the Cotton States, heartily applauding that step. -The condemnation of the President, for the removal of Johnston, came only -after Hood's disasters; and it must be remembered that Hood's later -operations were not in accordance with Mr. Davis' views. - -The writer remembers a pithy summary of the Georgia campaign, made by a -Confederate officer, shortly before the end of the war. Said he: "While -Johnston was in command there were _no results at all_; when Hood took -command, _results came very rapidly_." - -[79] It has been contended that the odds against the South in numbers and -resources were compensated by the advantages of her defensive position, -and by the strong incentives of a war for her homes and liberties. An -ingenious argument in demonstration of the assumed defective -administration of the Confederacy has been deduced from various historical -examples of successful resistance against overwhelming odds. The most -plausible citation has been the success of Frederick the Great, in his -defense of Prussia against the coalition of Russia, Austria, and France. -This illustration has no value, as it does not at all meet the case. - -Waiving all consideration of the peculiar strategic difficulties of the -South, Frederick first had the advantage of his English alliance. -Frederick never fought odds greater than two to one, while the South -fought three, four, sometimes five to one--but never equal numbers. Again, -Prussia was inaccessible except by overland marches--not penetrated, like -the South, in every direction by navigable rivers, and nearly surrounded -by the sea. Frederick, too, was absolute in Prussia, and had the lives and -property of all his subjects at his control. Mr. Davis, on the other hand, -never could consolidate the resources of the South as he desired, being -constantly hampered by demagogism in Congress, which could at all times be -coerced by the press hostile to the administration, or influenced by the -slightest display of popular displeasure. Pretending to place the whole -means of the country at the disposal of the President, Congress yet -invariably rendered its measures inoperative by emasculating clauses -providing exemptions and immunities of every description. President Davis -was too sincere a republican, and had too much regard for the restraints -of the Constitution to violently usurp ungranted powers. - -It is to be remembered, too, that the South received no foreign aid, while -Frederick was at last saved by the accession of Peter to the Russian -throne, which event dissolved the coalition against Prussia. - -[80] General Hood's magnanimous acknowledgment is sufficient for the -acquittal of Mr. Davis from any responsibility for this ill-starred -movement. On taking leave of his army, in January, 1865, Hood said, -speaking of the late campaign: "_I am alone responsible for its -conception, and strove hard to do my duty in its execution_." - -But in addition to this, there was a correspondence, between Mr. Davis and -a Confederate officer of high rank, which _completely exculpated Mr. -Davis_. In accordance with Mr. Davis' accustomed magnanimity and regard -for the public welfare, this correspondence was never published. The facts -in this matter conspicuously illustrate the persistent and reckless -misrepresentation, which has not ceased with the termination of the war. -With a class of writers, the _facts_ regarding Mr. Davis are things least -to be desired. In many instances, their attacks upon his fame are puerile, -but in others, where facts are either distorted or wantonly disregarded, -the object seems to be merely to gratify a wicked spirit of detraction. - -[81] In the autumn of 1864, General Price advanced into Missouri, -proclaiming his purpose to be a permanent occupation. The expedition ended -in disaster. Defeated in an engagement on the Big Blue, Price retreated -into Kansas, and finally into Southern Arkansas. The campaign did not -affect the current of the war elsewhere, and was a failure. - -[82] The author has seen an absurd statement, made without any inquiry -into the facts, that Mr. Davis was seen to turn "ghastly white" at the -moment of receiving the intelligence of the disaster at Petersburg. It is -simply one of a thousand other reckless calumnies, with as little -foundation as the rest. - -We do not feel called upon here to relate the details of the evacuation of -Richmond and the occupation of the city by the Federal army. They are, -doubtless, known to every intelligent reader, and we are here specially -concerned only in the movements of Mr. Davis. - - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's The Life of Jefferson Davis, by Frank H. 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