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diff --git a/43317-8.txt b/43317-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index ec8a5c7..0000000 --- a/43317-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14649 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Lord Lyons: A Record of British Diplomacy, by -Thomas Wodehouse Legh Newton - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: Lord Lyons: A Record of British Diplomacy - Volume 1 of 2 - -Author: Thomas Wodehouse Legh Newton - -Release Date: July 26, 2013 [EBook #43317] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A RECORD OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Foley, Jane Robins and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - - - - - - - - - - -LORD LYONS - -VOLUME I - -[Illustration: _Lord Lyons, -from a photograph taken at Boston, U.S. in 1860._] - - - - - LORD LYONS - - A RECORD OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY - - BY - - LORD NEWTON - - IN TWO VOLUMES - - VOLUME I - - WITH PORTRAITS - - LONDON - - EDWARD ARNOLD - - 1913 - - _All rights reserved_ - - - - -PREFACE - - -It was the practice of the late Lord Lyons to preserve carefully the -whole of his correspondence, whether official, semi-official, or -private, and upon his death this accumulation of papers passed into the -possession of his nephew, the present Duke of Norfolk. - -I have been able to draw to some extent upon my own diary and -recollections of the five years (1881-1886) during which I served as a -member of Lord Lyons's staff at the Paris Embassy, but that period -represents only a very small portion of his official career, and it is -from the above mentioned papers that this work has been almost entirely -compiled. All the material was placed unreservedly at my disposal, and I -desire to make full acknowledgment of this mark of confidence. I desire -also to express my gratitude to the numerous persons who have readily -given their consent to the publication of important letters in which -they possess a proprietary interest: notably to Emily Lady Ampthill, -Lord Clarendon, Lord Derby, Lady Granville, Lady Ermyntrude Malet, Lord -Rosebery, the Hon. Rollo Russell, Lord Salisbury, and Lord Sanderson. - -I am indebted to Mr. J. F. Marshall and Mr. Alan Parsons for their -assistance in sifting the enormous mass of documents found at Norfolk -House, and to the Hon. Arnold Keppel for a service rendered at a -subsequent period. Finally, I have to thank Mrs. Wilfrid Ward for an -interesting contribution entitled "Lord Lyons in private life," -containing personal details only available to a near relative. - - NEWTON. - -_October, 1913._ - - - - -CONTENTS OF VOL. I - - - CHAPTER I - PAGE - EARLY LIFE - - Early Life--Enters Diplomatic Service, 1839--Appointed unpaid - attaché at Athens--Unfavourable prospects--Paid attaché at - Rome, 1853--Condition of the Papal States--Life at Rome--Appointed - Secretary of Legation at Florence--Question of the - 'Tavola di Stato'--Sent to Naples to deal with the case of the - _Cagliari_--Success of his mission and appointment as Minister - at Florence--Succeeds to peerage on death of his father--Appointed - Minister at Washington, 1858 1 - - - CHAPTER II - - WASHINGTON - - 1859-1860 - - Arrival at Washington--Effect produced in America by the Franco-Austrian - War--Feeling in America with regard to England--San - Juan and Mexico--Rising passions between Northern and - Southern States--Disclaimer of matrimonial intentions--Accompanies - Prince of Wales on Canadian tour--Delight of President - Buchanan at receiving a letter from Queen Victoria--Prince - of Wales's visit to the United States 12 - - - CHAPTER III - - OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR--THE 'TRENT' CASE - - 1860-1861 - - Crisis caused by election of President Lincoln--Mr. Seward as - Secretary of State: his threatening language--Capture of Fort - Sumter--Desirability of England and France acting in conjunction--Danger - of an attack upon Canada--Growth of ill-feeling - towards England--Effect of battle of Bull's Run--Mr. Seward - on the essential difference between American policy and that - of Foreign Nations--Seizure of a Foreign Office bag--British - Consuls and the Confederate Government--The Trent incident: - seizure of Messrs. Mason and Slidell--Lord Lyons's decision to - maintain complete reserve--H.M. Government urged to provide - for defence of Canada--Attitude of American public--Instructions - of Her Majesty's Government--Mr. Seward's reception of - the despatch--Liberation of Messrs. Mason and Slidell--Lord - Lyons's consideration acknowledged by Mr. Seward--Advantage - of occasional silence 29 - - - CHAPTER IV - - COURSE OF THE CIVIL WAR - - 1862-1865 - - Course of the Civil War--Mr. Seward's altered policy towards - England--Visit of the French Minister, M. Mercier, to the Confederate - Headquarters--Lord Lyons declines to accompany him--Rumoured intention - of France and England to mediate--Breakdown in health owing to - overwork--Failure of French attempt at intervention--Dissatisfaction in - Northern States--Indiscretion of a British Consul--Arbitrary - proceedings of American cruisers--Lord Russell and the - _Alabama_--Grievances of foreigners resident in the United - States--Liability of British subjects to military service--Method of - recruiting the Northern armies--Hardships of 'Volunteers'--The Bounty - System--Surprising proposal by Mr. Seward--Reciprocity negotiations: - Lord Lyons's objections to a Canadian representative--Difficulty of - obtaining redress for aggrieved British subjects--Lord Lyons directed - to proceed to Canada and to report on its defence--Return to - Washington--Breakdown in health--The work at the Washington - Legation--Proceeds to England--Retires temporarily from Diplomatic - service owing to ill-health 79 - - - CHAPTER V - - CONSTANTINOPLE - - 1865-1867 - - Offer and Acceptance of Constantinople Embassy--Sir Henry - Bulwer--Comparative calm at Constantinople--Arrogance of - French Ambassador, M. de Moustier--Lord Stratford de Redcliffe - on Turkey--Sultan Abdul Aziz and his passion for ironclads--The - Principalities: Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen - chosen as Hereditary Prince--Difficulties relating to his - Investiture--Crete: The Fortress of Belgrade--Lord Stanley on - Greece--Russian policy towards Turkey--Pro-Russian proclivities - of Napoleon III.--Projected visit of the Sultan to France and - England--Mr. Hammond's apprehensions with regard to the - Sultan--The Dragoman system at Constantinople--Appointed - Ambassador at Paris 144 - - - CHAPTER VI - - THE SECOND EMPIRE - - 1867-1869 - - Arrival at Paris--The Empress on the Roman Question--The Emperor's - desire for a Conference--Mr. Odo Russell on erroneous French impressions - with regard to the Papacy--Prince Napoleon on the probability of war - with Germany--Credulity of the Emperor of Russia--Visit of Prince - Napoleon to Germany: his impressions--Difficulties of Napoleon - III.--General uneasiness in France and depression of Emperor--Suggested - offer of throne of Spain to Duke of Edinburgh--Lord Clarendon's - conversations with the King of Prussia and Moltke--Lord Clarendon and - Napoleon III.--Lord Clarendon at the Foreign Office--Views of the Crown - Prince of Prussia--Emperor's love of Conferences--The Luxemburg Railway - affair--Apprehensions in England and Belgium of French designs--Views - of Queen Victoria and Gladstone--Confidential instructions to Lord - Lyons--Desire of Empress to visit India--Lord Lyons requested to vote - on party question in House of Lords--Formation of Constitutional - Administration under Emile Ollivier--Distrust of the Emperor 177 - - - CHAPTER VII - - SECRET PROPOSALS FOR DISARMAMENT - - 1870 - - Attempt by Lord Clarendon, at request of Count Daru, to induce - the Prussian Government to partially disarm--Emile Ollivier - on disarmament--Memorandum by Lord Clarendon communicated - to Bismarck--Objections raised by Bismarck--Count - Daru on Bismarck's arguments--Intended reduction of the - French army--Second attempt by Lord Clarendon--Bismarck's - final answer 246 - - - CHAPTER VIII - - THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR - - 1870 - - Internal situation in France--Further military reduction sanctioned--The - Plébiscite: general uneasiness--Official satisfaction at result - of Plébiscite--Sycophantic diplomatists--Gramont appointed - Foreign Minister--Official views respecting the value of British - colonies--Accurate prophecy by Lord Clarendon--Death of Lord - Clarendon: Lord Granville Foreign Secretary--The Hohenzollern - Candidature--Explosion of Chauvinism--Lord Lyons's explanation - of the manner in which the war was forced upon the Emperor - Napoleon--Conduct of the Empress during the early stages of the - war--Fall of the Empire: Thiers and Jules Favre--Thiers's - mission--Malet's mission to Bismarck--Consent of Bismarck to receive - a representation of the Provisional Government 280 - - - CHAPTER IX - - THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE - - 1870-1871 - - Departure from Paris to join Provisional Government at Tours--Chaudordy - on cession of territory--Attempt of Gustave Flourens to overthrow the - Government at Paris--Thiers's interviews with Bismarck--Bismarck and - _Les militaires_--Gladstone on cession of territory--Denunciation - by Russia of Black Sea clauses in Treaty of Paris--Question of - Bismarck's connivance--French and German grievances against - England--Lord Lyons joins Provisional Government at Bordeaux--Difficulty - in securing a French Representation at Black Sea Conference--Revival of - French hopes at close of 1870--Bombardment of Paris--Thiers willing to - cede territory: his superiority to Jules Favre--Armistice--General - election--Thiers's conduct of the Peace Negotiations--Peace conditions - accepted--Outbreak of the Commune: Lord Lyons and other diplomatists go - to Versailles--Malet and Paschal Grousset--Murder of the Archbishop of - Paris and the hostages--Suppression of the Commune--Return to Paris. - 322 - - - - -LIST OF PLATES IN VOL. I - - - FACING PAGE - - LORD LYONS _Frontispiece_ - _From a photograph taken at Boston, U.S., in 1860_ - - WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD 32 - - PRINCE NAPOLEON 194 - - - - -LORD LYONS - -A RECORD OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY - - - - -CHAPTER I - -EARLY LIFE - - -Born in 1817, Richard Bickerton Pemell Lyons, second Baron and first -Viscount and Earl Lyons, eldest son of the distinguished Admiral Sir -Edmund (subsequently first Baron Lyons), was apparently destined like -his younger brother for a naval career, since at the age of ten he was -already serving as an honorary midshipman. A sailor's life, however, -must have been singularly uncongenial to a person of pronounced -sedentary tastes whom nature had obviously designed for a bureaucrat; in -after years he never alluded to his naval experiences, and it was -probably with no slight satisfaction that the navy was exchanged for -Winchester. From Winchester he proceeded to Christ Church, Oxford, where -he took his degree in 1838, being apparently at that period a quiet, -well-behaved, hard-working youth, living carefully upon a modest -allowance, and greatly attached to his parents and family. - -In the following year he entered the diplomatic service as unpaid -attaché at Athens, where his father occupied the position of Minister. -In 1844 he became a paid attaché at Athens, and passed thirteen -uneventful years at that post. - -At this stage of his career, prospects looked far from promising; he -had started later than usual, being twenty-two at the period of his -entry into the service; younger men were senior to him; he had had no -opportunity of distinguishing himself at Athens, and as he laments in a -letter to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Malmesbury, written in April, -1852, he felt 'mortified and humiliated that a man six years younger -than himself had been passed over him as Secretary to the Legation in -which he had served for thirteen years.' Promotion indeed seemed so -remote that, having reached the age of thirty-five, he seriously -contemplated abandoning diplomacy altogether. - -As a matter of fact, there was no cause for uneasiness. In 1852 he was -transferred as paid attaché to Dresden, and early in the following year -received the gratifying intimation that Lord John Russell, who had been -struck with his capacity, had appointed him paid attaché at Rome. 'What -I mean for him,' wrote Lord John Russell, 'is to succeed Mr. Petre, and -to conduct the Roman Mission, with £500 a year. If there were any post -of Secretary of Legation vacant I should gladly offer it to him, as I -have a very good opinion of him.' The importance of the post at Rome -consisted in the fact that, whereas technically dependent on the Tuscan -Mission at Florence, it was virtually semi-independent, and might -easily form an excellent stepping-stone to higher and more important -appointments if activity and discretion were displayed. - -In June, 1853, Lyons started for his new post carrying despatches, and -as an illustration of the conditions of travel upon the continent at -that period, it is worth noticing that the expenses of his journey to -Rome amounted to no less a sum than £102 3_s_. 3_d_., inclusive of the -purchase and sale of a carriage, although no man was ever less prodigal -of public money. Nor is there any record of any official objection to -this somewhat alarming outlay. - -In 1853 the Pontifical Government, exercising its sway over some -3,000,000 inhabitants of the Roman States, was in possession of no -inconsiderable portion of the Italian peninsula, and presented the -remarkable spectacle of a country jointly occupied by two foreign armies -whose task it was to protect the Pope against his own subjects. With -this object, 10,000 Austrians were stationed in the Ancona district, and -10,000 French troops in Rome, the latter paying their own expenses, but -the former constituting a heavy charge upon the Holy Father with his -embarrassed revenue and increasing deficit. The foreign policy of the -Government was in the hands of Cardinal Antonelli, and not long after -his arrival Lyons was able to write that in spite of 'his peculiar -position' (unaccredited to the Government in Rome), and that in some -quarters England is regarded as the natural enemy of the Papacy, I have -found that notwithstanding a very strong opinion to the contrary, at -Rome, as at most other places, one succeeds best by transacting one's -business in the most plain and straightforward manner, and through the -most direct channels. By acting on this principle and by being very -quiet and unobtrusive, I think I have in part allayed the suspicions -which are felt towards us always more or less at Rome, and I am -certainly on a better footing with Cardinal Antonelli than I had -at all expected to be. - -The business between His Majesty's Government and that of Rome was not -of an overpowering nature, and was chiefly concerned with the proposed -establishment of regular diplomatic relations; with the alleged -intention of the Papal Government to create a Hierarchy in Scotland, and -with the inconvenient zeal of ardent Protestants in the Papal dominions. -As regards the establishment of diplomatic relations it seems highly -doubtful whether the Papal Government really desired to see a new -Protestant Mission at Rome: Cardinal Antonelli disclaimed any intention -of creating Roman Catholic Bishops in Scotland, but the religious -activity of British subjects in the Pope's dominions was a constant -source of petty troubles. It must be admitted, however, that it was -singularly easy to fall out with the Papal Government. The importation -of Bibles was forbidden, the distribution of tracts was punished with -imprisonment; one man of English extraction was incarcerated for a -lengthy period because, according to his own statements, he had not -communicated with sufficient regularity; and there were over 600 -political prisoners in gaol at Rome at the same time. - -As for the official relations between England and the Papal Government -they were friendly enough, and when the Crimean war broke out, feeling -at the Vatican was strongly anti-Russian, for it was believed that -whereas the Roman Catholic Church had nothing to fear from Protestants -and Mussulmans, the Greek schism was a real and threatening danger. - -The following letter addressed to his brother, Captain Lyons, gives a -not uninteresting description of the life led in Rome by an unmarried -diplomatist without much private means, and incidentally shows the deep -affection which he entertained for his family. - - * * * * * - - Rome, January 3rd, 1855. - - You may imagine what a relief to me it was, after reading your - letter of the 18th, to see Admiral Dundas' arrival at Constantinople - announced in the Malta paper. Your letter of the 3rd is almost, - indeed I think quite, the most interesting I ever read. The only - drawback to the delight all these letters are to me, is that you - were still lying up. That I hope is over, and that you will be very - prudent about it. We have now a weekly post from Constantinople and - Malta, which is a great comfort. Mention all the details you can in - your letters about the siege and operations by sea and land. The - Malta papers bring nothing that can be depended upon. Besides the - intense interest, it is a great advantage to me diplomatically to - have good intelligence to communicate here, and is a great help to - getting information, which is useful to me, on Roman matters. - Details about Sir E. and yourself are always the most precious - things you can write, and they cannot be too numerous or too minute. - - My _ménage_ consists of two men. I am obliged to have two, in order - not to have to open the door myself, if I send one out. I have a - good-sized sitting room, much better furnished than most Roman - Lodgings, a second sitting room, which serves as Anteroom, and - Breakfast Room, good Bedroom and a Dressing Room. I have very little - sun, which I think an advantage, though in general it is thought the - greatest of disadvantages--I breakfast at home, and dine with some - of the other Diplomatists at a little quiet Table d'Hôte, where - there is a very good dinner. In winter I dine out three or four - times a week, and always spend the evening in society. I never do - anything at all in the way of hospitality. With the immense number - of English here, it would be impossible for me to get on, unless I - made this rule. In summer I had some men occasionally to play at - Whist, all of course Foreigners. I have taken my present lodging to - the end of June. My hope is to go to England for two or three months - about that time. I pay between 14 and £15 sterling a month for my - apartment. It is in a capital situation--and a second floor. It is - an admirable country for long rides, but very bad for short ones. - The pavement of the Town is so slippery that it is dangerous to ride - over it--most of the gates are at a very great distance, and after - you pass them, you have a mile or two of stone wall, before you get - out into the open country--which is beautiful and excellent for - riding. The result is that I never do ride. Being almost the only - Englishman here who has anything to do, beyond sight seeing and - amusement, my hours do not suit my Countrymen. My great friend is a - Count Gozze, Austrian Secretary of Legation. He is an old Dresden - friend of mine. Rome is a very rainy place, which obliges me often - to hire a carriage to go out in the evening. The hired carriages are - good, but dear, about nine shillings for an evening. Lord Walpole is - here--no one else I think that you know. I have scribbled all this - because you ask me, and because little details about the writer (if - one really cares for him) are generally the most interesting parts - of letters, written where there are no great events going on. You - would think me oldwomanish if I mentioned half my anxieties about - you and my Father. - -A few months later, the brother, Captain Lyons, an exceptionally -promising and gallant naval officer, died of wounds received before -Sebastopol. - -In 1856 promotion came in the shape of the secretaryship of Legation at -Florence, but he continued to be employed in Rome, and stood -twenty-second on a list of twenty-four secretaries of Legation. His -prospects of further advance did not appear reassuring, and in March -1857, he writes to his father (now a peer), 'My chance at present seems -to rest almost entirely on Lord Clarendon's disposition to give -practical effect to the good opinion he expresses of me. I should trust -with more confidence to that, if he had not promoted six secretaries of -Legation before me during my residence here, and afterwards offered me -as promotion the post of Secretary of Legation at Florence. Had it not -been for your visit to England at the critical moment, I should now have -been no more than simple Secretary of Legation, doing nothing at -Florence.' - -In the autumn of 1857, Lord Normanby, Minister at Florence, having gone -on leave, Lyons was sent to take his place, and, instead of having -nothing to do, found himself at once involved in one of those trivial -questions which so deeply exercised the diplomacy of a former -generation, but which are now of rare occurrence. - -Earlier in the year the Pope had paid a visit to Tuscany, and during his -stay at Florence a banquet was held in his honour, to which the members -of the diplomatic corps were invited. Much to their indignation they -were not accommodated at the Tavola di Stato or Sovereign Table, where -His Holiness was seated, and Lord Normanby, the British Minister, a -K.G., Ex-Viceroy, and social magnate, considered that an apology was -due from the Tuscan Government. Unfortunately for Lord Normanby, his -colleagues, having previously agreed to support him, backed out of their -undertaking, and the task of extracting an apology fell upon Lyons, for -Lord Normanby had departed uttering dark threats that he would not -return unless the apology was forthcoming. The Foreign Office took up -the matter seriously, and for no less than three months an animated -controversy was carried on, in the course of which 'The Tuscan -authorities showed themselves so thoroughly wrongheaded that every time -the subject was mentioned they said or did something which made it more -difficult for them to go back,' and Lord Clarendon administered to them -'a severe rebuke.' Finally, whether owing to the severe rebuke or not, -some sort of expression of regret was obtained; the injured Lord Normanby -returned to his post, and Lyons resumed his duties at Rome. Whence he -writes on March 6, 1858:-- - - The question of Reforms in the Papal Administration, which was so - much agitated during the Pope's journey and immediately afterwards, - appears to be entirely forgotten. The repressive measures which have - been adopted in France since the attempt on the Emperor[1] would - seem to render it difficult for H.M. to urge other sovereigns to - Liberal reforms. The mode in which the intelligence of the attempt - was received at Rome was shocking. One can hardly say that any class - expressed horror: the lower people openly declared their regret that - the crime had not been successful, and the middle classes took - little pains to conceal that they shared this feeling. In fact the - policy which is supposed to be adopted by France of coquetting with - the Liberal Party, without doing anything serious in their favour, - has alienated the sympathies of this part of Italy. - -Reforms of a simple character were evidently urgently needed in the -Papal Administration, for just about this time a Canadian bishop and -other British tourists were openly plundered on the main road between -Rome and Civita Vecchia. - -The turning point in Lyons's fortunes may be said to have arrived when -early in March he received orders from Lord Malmesbury to proceed to -Naples to inquire into the case of the _Cagliari_. - -The _Cagliari_ was a mail steamer plying between Genoa, Sardinia and -Tunis, and on June 25, a number of Mazzinians who had taken passage in -her seized the master and the crew, altered the course of the vessel, -landed at the Island of Ponza in Neapolitan territory, where they -liberated three hundred political prisoners, and subsequently proceeded -to Sapri, in the neighbourhood of Salerno. Here they again disembarked, -expecting the inhabitants to rise in their favour, but encountered a -superior force of Neapolitan troops who killed or captured the whole -party, whilst the _Cagliari_ was seized by Neapolitan warships as -she was making her way ostensibly to Naples. Some weeks later it was -ascertained that amongst the prisoners in Naples were two English -engineers, Watt and Park by name, and it was stated that these two men -were entirely ignorant of the conspiracy, and had been forced by the -conspirators to work the engines under threats of being summarily -shot if they refused. Under the circumstances, as was only natural, -application was made by the British Government that they should at least -have a fair trial, and that the acting Vice-Consul at Naples should be -permitted to visit them in gaol. - -Diplomatic relations between England and the Neapolitan Government -having been suspended for some years, Lord Clarendon wrote himself -direct to Signor Carafa, the Neapolitan Foreign Minister, in November, -urging the necessity of dealing with the case in an equitable spirit, -but with incredible perverseness and stupidity the Neapolitan Government -continued to refuse upon one pretext or another either to release the -men or to bring them to trial, or even to permit the Vice-Consul to -visit them. In March, 1858, Watt and Park were still in gaol, and had -been subjected to such abominable treatment that the health of both -was completely broken down, and Watt had become partially insane. Under -these circumstances, a change of government having in the meanwhile -occurred in England, Lord Malmesbury directed Lyons to proceed at once -to Naples and inquire into the case. Although the whole question had -been considerably complicated, partly owing to a note of Sir James -Hudson to the Sardinian Government having been unaccountably altered by -a member of his staff, and partly owing to a rooted belief on the part -of high Neapolitan legal authorities that engineers were responsible for -a ship's course, the Lyons Mission soon bore fruit, and the two -unfortunate Englishmen were both set free, nominally on bail, before the -end of the month, it having become evident to every one that they were -absolutely innocent. But the Neapolitan Government was by no means out -of its difficulties. It was pointed out that as two innocent men had -been imprisoned for nine months, and treated with great barbarity during -the greater part of the time, they were entitled to an indemnity which -was fixed at £3000. Worse was to follow, for, egged on by the Sardinian -Government, the British Government put forward a demand that the -_Cagliari_ should be surrendered on the ground that its capture had -been illegally effected. Both these demands were refused, and finally, -in May, 1858, a special messenger was sent to Naples instructing Lyons -to leave unless within ten days the Neapolitan Government consented to -accept mediation, and stating that England would make common cause with -Sardinia under certain circumstances. - -The message could not have been an agreeable one to deliver, and what -the Neapolitan Government disliked more than anything else was the -appearance of yielding to Sardinia. 'Ah! s'il n'y avait que l'Angleterre!' -had always been the expression used by Signor Carafa; but his Government -had placed itself hopelessly in the wrong, and Lyons was able to report -that the indemnity would be paid, and that the _Cagliari_ had been -placed 'at his disposal.' It was an additional satisfaction to him to -add that: 'Far from threatening, I did not even go so far as my -instructions warranted, for I did not say that His Majesty's Government -proposed that the mediator should retire at the end of three months, nor -did I tell Signor Carafa that I was myself ordered to go back to Rome if -the mediation should be refused at the expiration of ten days.' - -In spite of the unpleasant nature of this affair, Lyons contrived to -remain on the very best of terms with the Neapolitan Ministers with whom -he had to deal, and Lord Malmesbury was so favourably impressed with his -tact and skill that he at once appointed him Minister at Florence. His -professional future was now assured; but far greater honours were in -store for him, for in November, 1858, came the offer of the Washington -Legation, an offer which, with characteristic modesty, he accepted with -considerable misgivings as to his competence. Nor could it be said that -success had arrived with unusual rapidity, for he was already forty-one. - -In the same month he succeeded to the peerage on the death of his -father. His mother had died some years previously; his brother had -perished in the Crimea, and the only remaining near relatives were his -two sisters, one of whom was married to the Duke of Norfolk, and the -other to a Bavarian gentleman, Baron von Würtzburg. - - -FOOTNOTES: - - [1] Napoleon III. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -WASHINGTON - -(1859-1860) - - -In February, 1859, Lord Lyons, accompanied by some members of his staff -(a novelty to one who hitherto had been obliged to work unaided) was -despatched to Washington in H.M.S. _Curaçoa_, and owing to the limited -coal capacity of that vessel, the voyage occupied no less than forty-two -days, a period which must have been singularly disagreeable to a man who -in spite of some years' naval service always suffered from sea sickness. -The new Minister was received with marked courtesy by the U.S. -authorities, and presented his letter of credence on April 12, Mr. -Buchanan being President at the time, and General Cass occupying the -position of Secretary of State. - -Although the Presidential message of the previous December had -contained some rather ominous passages with regard to the relations -between England and the United States, the sentiments now expressed -were friendly in character and showed a disposition to settle pending -difficulties in an amicable spirit. - -The first letter of importance addressed by Lord Lyons to Lord -Malmesbury deals with the effect produced in the United States -by the outbreak of war between France and Austria. - - * * * * * - - Washington, May 24, 1859. - - I had intended to write a despatch respecting the effect produced - in the U.S. by the War in Europe, but we are so short of hands in - the Chancery, that it is as much as we have been able to do to get - through the regular matters of business which must be treated - officially. I can however give you in a very few words an account of - the state of feeling here, which is probably just what you would - have expected it to be. - - The sympathies are all with France and against Austria, but they do - not seem very strong; one sentiment however does appear to be both - strong and universal--the desire to take advantage of the state of - things in Europe to carry out American Views on this side of the - Atlantic; in short to get hold of Mexico and Cuba. The present wish - of the President is, I think, both to be and to appear to be on the - best terms with us. He is careful to vindicate us, in the newspaper - which is his organ, against all imputation of insincerity in Central - American Affairs. The Departments are particularly attentive to all - the smaller matters I have to bring before them, and apparently - anxious to do what I ask. But here I am afraid the practical effect - of their goodwill is likely to end. The Government is so weak that I - do not think it would venture, even in a small matter, to do - anything for us which would expose it to the least unpopularity. I - feel my way cautiously, endeavouring to be very plain and firm upon - clear British Questions, and to avoid doubtful topics as much as - possible. - - The immediate object of the President with regard to Mexico appears - to be to avoid the ridicule which would be heaped upon him if the - Government of Juarez were to fall immediately after the American - Cabinet had at last made up their mind to recognize it. Instructions - are, I am told, on the point of being sent to Mr. McLane to - negotiate a treaty with Mexico, partly, it is said, with the object - of giving Juarez a little moral support, partly perhaps to get so - advantageous a Treaty from him, as to engage public opinion here to - declare itself more strongly in favour of his being upheld by the - U.S. Whether Mr. McLane will be instructed (as Mr. Forsyth was) to - propose to purchase part of the Mexican territory, I am unable to - say. - - I am very much obliged by your sending out Mr. Warre, and am - impatiently expecting him. It is absolutely necessary to have a good - man here to direct the Chancery; I think too this mission would be a - very good school for a young man who really wished to learn his - business, and I should welcome any one who was industrious, and - wrote a thoroughly good legible hand. - - It is particularly desirable that the Staff should be complete, - because if the Minister is to have any knowledge of the Country and - people, it is indispensable that he should visit, from time to time, - the principal cities. This is not like a European State, in which - politics and business are centred in the Capital, and can be studied - more advantageously there than elsewhere. No political men make - Washington their principal residence, in fact they cannot do so, as - it sends no members to Congress, either to the Senate or the House - of Representatives. Commerce it has none. It is in fact little more - than a large village--and when Congress is not sitting it is a - deserted village. - -Another letter dated May 30, shows that he was under no illusion as to -the feelings entertained by a large section of the American public, -while fully conscious of the difficulties with which the United States -Government, however well intentioned, was forced to contend. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Malmesbury._ - - Washington, May 30, 1859. - - You will anticipate from my private letter of the 24th my answer to - your inquiry as to what would be the animus of this Government if - England became involved in the present war. - - The first notion both of Government and People would be to take - advantage of the circumstance to take their full swing upon this - side of the Atlantic, and especially so far as the people are - concerned to get hold of Cuba and Mexico. The wiser heads see - very distinctly the imprudence of fresh acquisitions of territory, - and the great danger to the Union of introducing large Bodies of - Citizens of Spanish and mixed Races. I believe this to be the - feeling of the present Administration, but no administration - disregards the popular cry. - - So far as I can learn, the American acquisitiveness is directed - rather South than North, and is disposed to be content for the - present, with what is most easy to lay hold of. Except on the part - of the most rancorous of the Irish here there does not appear to - be much desire of exciting disturbances in Canada or any of our - Colonies. - - I think that if we were engaged in war the Americans would be - (particularly with reference to neutral rights at sea) punctilious, - exacting and quarrelsome to a degree. There is hardly any amount of - violence to which a captain of an American man of war, if he were - clearly in superior force, might not be expected to resort, in order - to prevent American merchantmen being interfered with. And however - outrageous in itself and opposed to International Law the conduct of - the American officers might be, it would meet with enthusiastic - applause from the multitude, and consequently the Government would - not dare to disavow it. This admiration of bullying and violent - proceedings on their own side, which appears to be universal among - the populace here, and the want of firmness on the part of the - Government in withstanding it, seem to me to constitute some of the - greatest difficulties we should have to contend with in keeping at - peace with America when we were at war with other Powers. - - I do not think the general sympathies of the Americans need be taken - much into the account. The violent feelings aroused at particular - conjunctures by the events of the war, or by special matters of - dispute, are what will sway the mob, and therefore control the - Government. The upper classes here have certainly in general a - strong sympathy with England; they are proud of her position in the - world, they are anxious for her good opinion, they admire her - political institutions, and are extremely discontented with those of - their own country. But the upper classes keep aloof from political - life, and have little influence in public affairs. The mass of the - Irish Emigrants appear to regard England with bitter hatred, their - numbers give them weight in elections, but their moral power is - small. I should hardly say that the Bulk of the American people are - hostile to the old country but I think they would rather enjoy - seeing us in difficulties. Those even who are most friendly like to - gratify their pride by the idea of our being reduced to straits and - of their coming to our rescue. - - I conceive that the wish both of Government and people would certainly - at first be to remain neutral, and reap all the advantages to their - commerce which could not fail to result from that situation, and - their interest in remaining at peace with us is so apparent and so - immense, that it could not fail to tell for some time. But the - People are irritable, excitable, and have a great longing to play - the part of a first-rate power. - - The Government would no doubt endeavour to maintain neutrality, but - it would follow public feeling, and probably become exacting, - captious, and (to use a term more expressive than classical) - 'bumptious' to a very irritating extent. A great deal would depend - upon firmness on our side. If they thought they could attain their - ends by threats and bluster, there would be no limit to their - pretensions. Perhaps the best way to deal with them would be to - gratify their vanity by treating them in matters of form as great - people, being careful to communicate with them respecting our views - and intentions in something the same manner as if they were really a - considerable military power: to avoid interfering in matters in - which we are not sufficiently interested to make it worth while to - raise serious questions, and above all in matters directly affecting - British interests and British Rights to be clear and distinct in our - language, and firm and decided in our conduct, to convince them that - when we are in the right and in earnest, we are more unyielding, not - less so than formerly--in short to avoid as much as possible raising - questions with them, but not to give way upon those we raise. - - I need not remind you that these are the crude ideas of a man who - has been only seven weeks in the country, and who has necessarily - passed them in a small, and at this season, almost deserted town, - which is merely the nominal Capital. - - I am anxiously looking out for Mr. Warre, whose arrival you announce - that I may soon expect. It would add much to the efficiency of the - Mission, and be a great comfort to me to have an additional unpaid - attaché, provided he were industrious, desirous to improve, and - capable of writing a good hand. - -The change of Government which took place in England during the summer -substituted Lord John Russell for Lord Malmesbury at the Foreign Office, -and following the example of his predecessor, Lord John desired to be -supplied with confidential information by private letters. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._ - - Washington, July 11, 1859. - - At present the President and his Cabinet appear to desire both to - be, and to be thought by the Public to be on the best terms with us. - They are however so weak in Congress, that I doubt whether they - would venture to do anything for us which would be the least - unpopular. It is not therefore to be hoped that they will make any - effort to open to us the Coasting Trade, to extend the provisions of - the Reciprocity Treaty with Canada, to make a Copyright Convention, - or, in short, take any liberal course in commercial matters. Nor - indeed is it likely to be in their power to carry any measures - tending to put us on equal terms with themselves in these respects. - The Democratic spirit in this country appears to be all in favour - of Protection and Exclusive Privileges. Happily the interest of - the South is against a high Customs Tariff; and this checks the - Protectionist Tendencies of the Manufacturing North. - - Mr. Dallas will have communicated to you the Statement which has - been for months preparing here, of the views of this Government - respecting neutral rights. The Cabinet, I understand, hope that they - shall obtain great credit with the people for their efforts to - establish American views on this point. They are very anxious to - obtain our co-operation, and imagine, I think, that they may induce - us to claim now concessions to Neutrals which would result in being - a considerable restraint to our assertion for ourselves of - Belligerent rights if we should become involved in war. - - I think that our Relations with the U.S. require more than ever--at - this moment--caution and firmness. Caution--to avoid raising - questions with them, without a positive necessity; firmness--to make - them feel that they cannot take advantage of the State of affairs in - Europe to obtain undue advantages in matters directly affecting - British Interests or British Rights. For my own part I endeavour to - speak firmly and distinctly upon all matters which fall within the - proper province of the British Minister in this country and to avoid - all doubtful topics. - - * * * * * - - The Americans, both Government and People, are I think very much - pleased by attentions and civilities, and very prone to fancy - themselves slighted. This quality may be sometimes turned to good - account, and should certainly be borne in mind when it is necessary - to keep them in good humour. - -One of the many questions which had for some time engaged the attention -of the two Governments was the disputed ownership of the island of San -Juan on the Pacific coast, and this case afforded an instance in which -the Government of the United States was hampered by an agent whom it was -not inclined to disavow. The culprit was a certain General Harney who -in a high-handed manner occupied the island without authorization, -and conducted himself in a generally offensive manner, but although -President Buchanan was considerably embarrassed by his action, he was -too much afraid of the press and the mob to order the withdrawal of -the troops. For some time there appeared to be a chance of an actual -collision, and Lord John Russell showed considerable irritation. - - * * * * * - - _Lord John Russell to Lord Lyons._ - - Abergeldie, Sept. 21, 1859. - - The affair of San Juan is very annoying. It is of the nature of the - U.S. citizens to push themselves where they have no right to go, and - it is of the nature of the U.S. Government not to venture to disavow - acts they cannot have the face to approve. - - The best way perhaps would be that we should seize some other island - to which we have as little right as the Americans to San Juan. But - until we know the answer of the American Government to your note and - the proceedings of Governor Douglas, we can hardly give you - instructions. - - If you could contrive a convention with the U.S. by which each Power - should occupy San Juan for three or six months, each to protect - person and property till the boundary question is settled, it will - be the best arrangement that can be made for the present. - -As a matter of fact the U.S. Government showed itself more reasonable -than had been expected: a superior officer, General Scott, was sent to -settle matters, Harney, to use Lord John Russell's expression, was 'left -in the mud,' and after a joint occupation and protracted negotiations -the question of the ownership of San Juan was referred to the arbitration -of the King of Prussia, who gave his award in favour of the United -States some years later. - -San Juan, however, was but one amongst a multitude of questions -requiring solution, and the great difficulty which Lord Lyons had to -contend with was--to use his own words, 'The idea that, happen what may, -England will never really declare war with this country has become so -deeply rooted that I am afraid nothing short of actual hostilities would -eradicate it.' One of these questions concerned the Slave Trade. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._ - - Dec 6, 1859. - - You will see by my despatches of this date, that there is very - little prospect of any satisfactory result from our remonstrance - concerning the Slave Trade. Lamentable as it is, I am afraid the - President goes beyond public opinion already in the measures he - takes against it. In the South the rendering it legal has many - avowed advocates, and it is to be feared that some of the professed - Abolitionists of the North derive too much profit from dabbling - themselves in the trade to desire any efficient measures for its - suppression. The greater part of the vessels engaged in it seem to - be fitted out at New York. The state of feeling at this moment in - the South upon the whole question of slavery is shocking. The - Harper's Ferry affair seems to have excited Southern passions to an - indescribable degree. The dissolution of the Confederation is but - one of the measures which are loudly advocated. There are plans for - the re-enslavement of all the emancipated negroes and for the - purging the South of all whites suspected of Abolitionist - tendencies. The difficulty which we shall have in obtaining decent - treatment for coloured British subjects will be almost insuperable. - - * * * * * - - Another source of trouble between us and the Southern States may - arise from the measures which they are taking to drive out all - persons suspected of unorthodox notions on slavery, and the orthodox - notion seems to be that slavery is a divine institution. In many - parts of the South, Vigilance Committees are formed who turn people - out at a moment's notice, without any pretext even of law. If any - attempt is made to treat British subjects in this manner, I trust - you will approve of my encouraging the Consuls to insist upon the - law being observed in their case, and to resist any endeavour to - inflict banishment or any other penalty upon an Englishman, except - in due form of law. But it will require a great deal of prudence - and discretion to act in each case, for a fair trial is a thing - impossible in this country of election judges and partisan juries - when party feeling is excited, and any redress we may exact for the - wrong to England, will be too late for the individual in the hands - of Lynch Law Assassins. - - The great hope is that the excitement is too violent to last, but - before it subsides, it may do incalculable harm to these states and - raise very painful and awkward questions for us. - -If the hope expressed in the last paragraph was fallacious, the -forebodings as to the possible tribulations of British subjects proved -before long to be only too well founded. - -Asked by Lord John Russell for his opinion on the position of affairs in -Mexico, he points out _inter alia_, that-- - - The actual annexation of Mexico to this Confederation raises - immediately one of those questions between the Northern and Southern - States which have already gone a great way to dissolve the Union - altogether. The Southern States desire the addition of territory - _south_, with a view to extending slavery and adding to the - Pro-Slavery votes in the U.S. Senate. To this the North is - conscientiously opposed on religious grounds, to say nothing of the - indignation it feels at the notion of its own vast superiority in - wealth and population being swamped in the Senate. Even now, since - every State sends equally two senators, whatever may be its - population, the North has not the influence it ought to have in the - Senate which is the more important branch of the Legislature. As - the religious sentiment in the North approaches very nearly to - fanaticism, and as the Southern feeling on the point has become - furious passion, there is little chance of their coming to an - agreement upon a matter which calls these feelings into play. In - this particular question the South have on their side the national - vanity which seems always childishly gratified by any addition to - the already enormous extent of the territory. In the meantime the - course of events seems to be bringing about the gradual annexation - of Mexico. The Mexicans in the northern part of their country have - fallen to that point, that they can neither maintain order on the - frontier nor hold their own against the savage Indians within it. - They will (to use an American expression) be 'squatted out' of their - country whenever and wherever any considerable number of the more - energetic race choose to settle. But this is a very different thing - from the sudden incorporation of a vast territory and of a large - population totally different in race, language, religion and - feeling, and (so far as the experiment has been tried) utterly - incapable of maintaining order among themselves under the U.S. - system of government. All the wiser and more conservative - politicians in this country deprecate as an unmitigated evil the - sudden annexation of Mexico; nor are such men willing to undertake - a protectorate of Mexico. This they say would be an enormous - innovation upon their whole political system which has never - admitted of any other connexion than that of perfectly equal - sovereign states, bound by a Federal tie on terms the same for all. - -The Presidential Message of December, 1859, was noticeable for an -earnest appeal to the North and South to cultivate feelings of mutual -forbearance. - -The message also made clear the policy of the President towards Mexico; -in accordance with the principles of the Monroe doctrine, European -intervention in that country was repudiated, and American intervention -recommended. - -A passage referring to San Juan while obviously intended to exculpate -General Harney, paid a handsome tribute to the moderation and discretion -shown by the British Admiral (Baynes) commanding on the Pacific -station; and the President in conversation expressed the hope that the -approaching close of his administration would leave 'a clear score' with -England. No doubt President Buchanan was sincere in his expressions, -but unfortunately, early in 1860, signs were not wanting, that in the -distracted state of the country owing to the rising passions between -North and South, many people believed that a foreign war would be the -best means of promoting unity, nor was there much doubt as to which -foreign country would be selected for the experiment. - -Washington has already been disrespectfully alluded to as little better -than a large village, and as bearing little resemblance to an ordinary -capital, but it is evident that Lord Lyons found plenty of enjoyment -there. He was on excellent terms personally with the State officials and -his diplomatic colleagues; liked the members of his staff, and above all -rejoiced in the fact that there was plenty of work to be done--a good -deal more, indeed, than the ordinary person would have approved of. One -of his few complaints is that he is much beset by the inventors of -implements of war. 'I have not the slightest knowledge practical or -theoretical respecting implements of war, and should consequently never -be justified in recommending one more than another to the authorities at -home. I absolutely decline to see, touch, or have brought into my house -any explosive material, I should not feel easy at having even in a -garret such a box as you (the Consul at New York) have received for Her -Majesty. I should be inclined to ask for authority from England to sink -it in the Atlantic Ocean.' - -'I am getting on tolerably well here, I hope, on the whole, and have no -complaints to make of the Americans,' he admits in letters to other -correspondents, and adds: 'I am afraid marriage is better never than -late. The American women are undoubtedly very pretty, but my heart is -too old and too callous to be wounded by their charms. I am not going to -be married either to the fascinating accomplished niece of the -President, or to the widow of a late Foreign Minister, or to any other -maiden or relict to whom I am given by the newspapers.' - -These sentiments sound rather rash even at the age of forty-two, but -they remained unchanged. It would be incorrect to describe him as a -misogynist, but he successfully withstood all attempts to marry him. -In after years, an exalted personage (neither Queen Victoria nor the -Empress Eugenie) was so insistent upon the advisability of his espousing -one of her ladies-in-waiting, that she eventually couched her proposal -in the form of an ultimatum. Lord Lyons asked for and obtained a delay -of twenty-four hours, and decided upon consideration to refuse. In view -of an event which occurred not long afterwards the decision proved to be -a prudent one, and probably confirmed him in the suspicions which he -appeared to entertain of the opposite sex. - -It had been decided that the Prince of Wales should make a tour in -Canada in the summer of 1860, and the Duke of Newcastle, at that time -Colonial Secretary, consulted Lord Lyons as to the advisability of -H.R.H. paying a visit to America. The latter, upon consideration, -pronounced in favour of it. He did not arrive at this decision without -some hesitation. It was feared by persons of experience that the -disaffected Irish in New York and elsewhere might make themselves -disagreeable; the Prince's time was limited, and he would obviously -be unable to make an extended tour, and so might involuntarily cause -offence, whilst it was highly probable that the necessity for preserving -a strictly non-official character might also give rise to difficulties. - -On the other hand, President Buchanan extended an invitation in such -cordial terms that it would have been ungracious to decline. - -Lord Lyons joined the Prince of Wales in Canada in August, and the tour -must have been an agreeable change even to a person of his sedentary -inclinations. Since his arrival at Washington, fifteen months before, he -had never slept or been six miles outside the town. 'Whenever,' he -explains to a friend, 'I have planned a journey, I have been stopped by -invasions of islands in the Pacific or some other "difficulty" as a -dispute is called here.' It may be surmised, however, that such -obstacles were much less objectionable to him than they would have been -to any one else; he hated travel, openly avowed that he loathed -sight-seeing, and welcomed the opportunity of 'getting Niagara and the -Lakes done this way; it will be a good thing over.' - -It was eventually decided that the Prince's visit to the States should -take place in September, and the announcement was not only received -with unbounded satisfaction, but caused prodigious excitement. 'The -President was moved from the usual staid solemnity of his demeanour by -his gratification at receiving an answer from Her Majesty written with -her own hand. At the close of our interview he hurried off with it in -great delight (no doubt to show it to his niece) saying: "It is indeed -something to have an autograph letter from Queen Victoria!"[2] Nor was -the President's gratification confined to the family circle, for he -asked and obtained permission to publish the royal letter which had -afforded so much satisfaction. As soon as the news became known -invitations of every kind at once began to pour in from all quarters, -and offerings of the most varied description made their appearance at -the Legation, which included such objects as equestrian sugar statues of -H.R.H., pots of ointment for the Queen, books of sermons for "Baron -Renfrew," and a set of plates for the "Prince of Whales." Innumerable -requests arrived too for interviews, autographs, and mementos, amongst -which may be cited an application for a photograph from a citizen of -Lowell "for his virgin wife."' - -It was, of course, unfortunately necessary to decline the invitations, -for the itinerary had been settled beforehand, and it had been wisely -decided that the Prince should never stay with any private individual, -but always be lodged at an hotel at his own expense, that he should -refuse to receive addresses and deputations, and should neither hear nor -make public speeches. It was also considered desirable that receptions -of British subjects should not be encouraged, and that he should not -attend any demonstration of his fellow-countrymen so as not to excite -any feeling of jealousy. - -As for the gifts which were proffered in great profusion, they were -regretfully declined in accordance with the usual practice of the Royal -Family. - -In spite of the nominally private character of the Prince of Wales's -tour in the United States, most careful arrangements were found to be -necessary wherever he made a stay. At New York, in particular, which -city appears to be, beyond all others, interested in Royal personages, -the programme could hardly have been of a more elaborate nature had an -Emperor been visiting an Imperial Sire and Brother; even the ladies with -whom H.R.H. was expected to dance, having been selected long in advance. -The chief difficulty in New York and elsewhere seems to have been the -prohibition of speeches at banquets. The Americans, overflowing with -hospitable enthusiasm, were only too anxious to display their friendship -in public utterances, but the British Government had wisely decided that -nineteen was too early an age at which to begin making speeches in a -foreign country, and the rule of silence was rigidly adhered to. - -The Prince of Wales's tour, although necessarily brief, included, -besides Washington, some of the principal cities in the States, and -judging from the contemporary correspondence, was attended by singularly -few untoward incidents, proving, in fact, successful beyond expectation. - -The happy effect produced by this visit was described in an official -despatch, and private letters corroborate the favourable impression -created. - -'I have more completely realized, as the Americans say, the wonderful -success of the Prince of Wales's tour than I did when it was in -progress. I have now had time to talk quietly about it with men -whose opinion is worth having, and also to compare newspapers of various -shades of politics. I am glad to see that the incognito and other -restrictions maintained are represented as a peculiar compliment to -the Americans as showing a desire to associate with them on more equal -terms than would be possible with subjects.'[3] - -'The Prince of Wales's tour in the U.S. went off completely to the -satisfaction of all parties from the beginning to the end. It was rather -hard work for me, as he never went out without me, nor I without him, -and I had quantities of letters to write and people to see and keep in -good humour. Nevertheless H.R.H. himself and all the people with him -were so agreeable, that on the whole I enjoyed the tour very much while -it was going on. I look back to it with unmixed satisfaction.'[4] - -Much of the success, although he was too modest to allude to it, was -probably due to his own carefulness and forethought. - - -FOOTNOTES: - - [2] Lord Lyons to Lord J. Russell, July 9. - - [3] Lord Lyons to the Duke of Newcastle, Oct. 29. - - [4] Lord Lyons to Mr. Griffith, Nov. 10. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR--THE 'TRENT' CASE - -(1860-1861) - - -Before the close of 1860 the relations between North and South had -reached the critical stage: the mutterings of the coming storm grew -louder, and when it became clear, in November, that Abraham Lincoln was -to be the new President, secession advanced with rapid strides, while -conviction became general that a collision was inevitable. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Duke of Newcastle._ - - Dec. 10, 1860. - - It is difficult to believe that I am in the same country which - appeared so prosperous, so contented, and one may say, so calm when - we travelled through it. The change is very great even since I wrote - to you on the 29th October. Our friends are apparently going ahead - on the road to ruin with their characteristic speed and energy. - - The President (Buchanan) is harassed beyond measure. It is a very - unfortunate moment for our negotiations, but the present state of - things makes me more than ever anxious to get the San Juan question - safely landed beyond the reach of the incoming administration. - -The approaching rule of Lincoln entailed the disquieting probability of -the appointment of Mr. Seward as Secretary of State. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._ - - Washington, Jan. 7, 1861. - - It is considered almost certain that Mr. Seward is to be Mr. - Lincoln's Secretary of State. This will be regarded as a defiance - of the South, unless (as is expected) Mr. Seward comes out with a - conciliatory speech in the Senate. With regard to Great Britain, I - cannot help fearing that he will be a dangerous Foreign Minister. - His view of the relations between the United States and Great - Britain has always been that they are a good material to make - political capital of. He thinks at all events that they may be - safely played with without any risk of bringing on a war. He has - even to me avowed his belief that England will never go to war with - the United States. He has generally taken up any cry against us, but - this he says he has done from friendship, to prevent the other - Party's appropriating it and doing more harm with it than he has - done. The temptation will be great for Lincoln's party, if they be - not actually engaged in a civil war, to endeavour to divert the - public excitement to a foreign quarrel. I do not think Mr. Seward - would contemplate actually going to war with us, but he would be - well disposed to play the old game of seeking popularity here by - displaying violence towards us. I don't think it will be so good a - game for him as it used to be, even supposing we give him an - apparent triumph, but I think he is likely to play it. - - This makes me more than ever anxious to settle the San Juan - question. - -The forebodings came true. Mr. Seward, a lawyer, who had aimed at the -Presidency himself, became Secretary of State, and caused the British -Government and the diplomatists at Washington many uncomfortable -moments. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._ - - Washington, March 26, 1861. - - Mr. Seward came to me on the evening of the 20th ultimo, and asked - me to let him speak to me very confidentially.... - - Mr. Seward observed that he considered it all important to ward off - a crisis during the next three months; that he had good hopes that - if this could be effected a counter revolution would take place in - the South; that he hoped and believed it would begin in the most - distant State, Texas, where indeed he saw symptoms of it already. It - might be necessary towards producing this effect to make the - Southern States feel uncomfortable in their present condition by - interrupting their commerce. It was however most important that the - new Confederacy should not in the mean time be recognized by any - Foreign Power. - - I said that certainly the feelings as well as the interests of Great - Britain would render H.M.'s Government most desirous to avoid any - step which could prolong the quarrel between North and South, or be - an obstacle to a cordial and speedy reunion between them if that - were possible. Still I said, if the U.S. determined to stop by force - so important a commerce as that of Great Britain with the - cotton-growing States, I could not answer for what might happen. - - Mr. Seward asked whether England would not be content to get cotton - through the Northern Ports, to which it could be sent by land. - - I answered that cotton although by far the most important article of - the Trade was not the only point to be considered. It was however a - matter of the greatest consequence to England to procure cheap - cotton. If a considerable rise were to take place in the price of - cotton, and British ships were to be at the same time excluded from - the Southern Ports, an immense pressure would be put upon H.M.'s - Government to use all the means in their power to open those Ports. - If H.M.'s Government felt it to be their duty to do so, they would - naturally endeavour to effect their object in a manner as consistent - as possible first with, their friendly feelings towards both - Sections of this Country, and secondly with the recognized - principles of International Law. As regards the latter point in - particular, it certainly appeared that the most simple, if not the - only way, would be to recognize the Southern Confederacy. I said a - good deal about my hopes that Mr. Seward would never let things come - to this, with which it is unnecessary to trouble you. - - I thought that Mr. Seward, although he did not give up the point, - listened with complacency to my arguments against interference with - Foreign Commerce. He said more than once that he should like to take - me to the President to discuss the subject with him. The conclusion - I came to was that the questions of a forcible collection of the - duties in the Southern Ports, and of a blockade of those Ports were - under discussion in the Cabinet, but that Mr. Seward was himself - opposed to those measures, and had good hopes that his opinion would - prevail. - - It would appear however that a change took place in the interval - between this conversation and yesterday. Mr. Seward, the principal - Members of the Cabinet, the Russian Minister, M. de Stoeckl, and the - French Minister, Mons. Mercier, with some other people dined with - me. After dinner, Mr. Seward entered into an animated conversation - with my French and Russian Colleagues, and signed to me to join - them. When I came up I found him asking M. Mercier to give him a - copy of his Instructions to the French Consuls in the Southern - States. M. Mercier made some excuse for refusing, but said that what - the instructions amounted to was that the Consuls were to do their - best to protect French Commerce 'sans sortir de la plus stricte - neutralité.' Mr. Seward then asked me to give him a copy of my - instructions to H.M.'s Consuls. I, of course, declined to do so, but - I told him that the purport of them was that the Consuls were to - regard questions from a commercial not a political point of view, - that they were to do all they could to favour the continuance of - peaceful commerce short of performing an act of recognition without - the orders of Her Majesty's Government. - -[Illustration: William Henry Seward. - -London: Edward Arnold] - - Mr. Seward then alluded to the Peruvian Papers, and speaking as he - had done all along very loud, said to my French and Russian - Colleagues and me, 'I have formed my opinion on that matter, and I - may as well tell it to you now as at any other time. I differ with - my Predecessor as to _de facto_ Authorities. If one of your Ships - comes out of a Southern Port without the Papers required by the laws - of the U.S., and is seized by one of our Cruisers and carried into - New York and confiscated, we shall not make any compensation.' My - Russian Colleague, M. de Stoeckl, argued the question with Mr. - Seward very good humouredly and very ably. Upon his saying that a - Blockade to be respected must be effective, Mr. Seward replied that - it was not a blockade that would be established; that the U.S. - Cruisers would be stationed off the Southern Coast to collect - duties, and enforce penalties for the infraction of the U.S. Customs - Laws. Mr. Seward then appealed to me. I said that it was really a - matter so very serious that I was unwilling to discuss it; that his - plan seemed to me to amount in fact to a paper blockade of the - enormous extent of coast comprised in the Seceding States; that the - calling it an enforcement of the Revenue Laws appeared to me to - increase the gravity of the measure, for it placed Foreign Powers in - the Dilemma of recognizing the Southern Confederation, or of - submitting to the interruption of their Commerce. - - Mr. Seward then went off into a defiance of Foreign Nations, in a - style of braggadocio which was formerly not uncommon with him, but - which I had not heard before from him since he had been in office. - Finding he was getting more and more violent and noisy, and saying - things which it would be more convenient for me not to have heard, I - took a natural opportunity of turning, as host, to speak to some of - the ladies in the room. - - M. de Stoeckl and M. Mercier inferred, as I do, that within the last - two days the opinion of the more violent party in the Cabinet had - prevailed, at all events for the moment, and that there is a danger - that an interference with Foreign Trade may take place at any - moment. I hope that it may still be prevented by the fear of its - producing a recognition of the Southern Confederacy. But I am afraid - we must be prepared for it. - - It may perhaps be well, with a view to the effect on this - Government, that the Commissioners who are on their way to Europe - from the Southern States should not meet with too strong a rebuff in - England or in France. Such a rebuff would be a great encouragement - to violent measures. In fact, notwithstanding my contradictions, the - Senate, and indeed, I fear, the President is not uninfluenced by the - bold assertions made by some Members of the violent Party that they - have positive assurances from Y.L. and other Members of H.M.'s - Government that _under no circumstances whatever_ will Great - Britain recognize the independence of the South. - - M. Mercier thinks it advisable that he and I should have a - discretionary Power to recognize the South. This seems to me to be - going too fast. I should feel a good deal embarrassed by having such - a power in my pocket, unless the contingency in which it was to be - used should be most clearly stated. What does appear to be of - extreme importance is that England and France should act in concert. - -Lincoln had been inaugurated as President in March, and in the following -month the long-awaited collision occurred at Charleston, when the -Confederates opened fire upon and captured Fort Sumter. The forts in -Charleston harbour had by common consent become the test case, and the -capture of Fort Sumter signalized the fact that a population of little -over 5 millions of white men had had the audacity to challenge over 22 -millions of their fellow-countrymen. - -Charleston, by the way, besides its importance in American history, -seems to have been a place where slavery was a very thorough-going -institution, judging from the following advertisement in the _Mercury_, -of March 25th, 1861. - - * * * * * - - NOTICE. TEN DOLLARS REWARD. - - Runaway on Friday night, March 23rd, my woman 'Silvey,' about forty - years of age, of a light brown complexion, and has spots on her - face as if done with powder, and limps a little, and speaks very low - when spoken to. She formerly belonged to the Rev. Mr. Keith, and of - late to Johnson the tailor, in King Street, near George Street. When - she left she had a chain around her ankles to keep her from going - off, but she went anyhow. Apply to P. Buckheit, north-west corner of - Line and Meeting Streets. - -Mr. W. H. Russell, the well-known correspondent, was in Charleston a few -days after the fall of Fort Sumter, and wrote as follows:---- - - * * * * * - - Charleston, April 19, 1861. - - I arrived here the night before last _viâ_ Baltimore, Norfolk and - Wilmington. North Carolina was in revolt--that is, there was no - particular form of authority to rebel against, but the shadowy - abstractions in lieu of it were treated with deserved contempt by - the 'citizens,' who with flint muskets and quaint uniforms were - ready at the various stations to seize on anything, particularly - whisky, which it occurred to them to fancy. At Wilmington I sent a - message to the electric telegraph office for transmission to New - York, but the 'citizens' of the Vigilance Committee refused to - permit the message to be transmitted and were preparing to wait upon - me with a view of asking me what were my general views on the state - of the world, when I informed them peremptorily that I must decline - to hold any intercourse with them which I the more objected to do in - that they were highly elated and excited by the news from Sumter. I - went over the works with General Beauregard: the military injury - done to Sumter is very trifling, but Anderson's defence, negative as - it was, must be regarded as exceedingly creditable to him. - - * * * * * - - In a week's time the place will be a hard nut to crack. One thing - is certain: nothing on earth will induce the people to return to the - Union. I believe firmly their present intention is to march upon - Washington, if it were merely as a diversion to carry the war away - from their interior. - -War having now actually broken out, the question of the blockade of the -Southern ports became all important for England. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._ - - Washington, April 15, 1861. - - I am getting very uneasy about the intention of the Government with - regard to stopping intercourse with Southern Ports. Now that war has - begun it seems difficult to suppose that they will abstain from - taking advantage of their one great superiority, which is their - navy. I suppose that a regular blockade would be less objectionable - than any such measures as closing the Southern Ports as Ports of - entry, or attempting to collect duties for the U.S. by ships - stationed off them. The rules of a blockade are to a great extent - determined and known, and our ships could at all events resort to - any Ports before which the U.S. did not establish a regular - effective blockade. But if the U.S. are to be permitted to seize any - ship of ours wherever they can find her within their jurisdiction on - the plea that by going to a Southern port she has violated the U.S. - custom laws, our commerce will be exposed to vexations beyond - bearing, and all kinds of new and doubtful questions will be raised. - In fact, this, it seems to me, would be a paper blockade of the - worst kind. It would certainly justify Great Britain and France in - recognizing the Southern Confederacy and sending their fleets to - force the U.S. to treat British and French vessels as neutrals in - conformity with the law of nations. - - Just as Mr. Seward was confident that he had prevailed in the - Cabinet, the President and the violent party suddenly threw over his - policy. Having determined not to resign, he pretends to be pleased, - and one of his colleagues says of him that in order to make up for - previous lukewarmness he is now the fiercest of the lot. It is a - great inconvenience to have him as the organ of communication from - the U.S. Government. Repeated failures have not convinced him that - he is not sure to carry his point with the President and the - Cabinet. He is therefore apt to announce as the fixed intentions - of his Government what is in reality no more than a measure which he - himself supports. - - I am in constant apprehension of some foolish and violent proceeding - of the Government with regard to Foreign Powers. Neither the - President nor any man in the Cabinet has a knowledge of Foreign - Affairs; they have consequently all the overweening confidence in - their own strength which popular oratory has made common in this - country. I believe the best chance of keeping them within bounds - will be to be very firm with them, particularly at first, and to act - in concert with France, if that be possible. - - As I have mentioned in my despatches, information coming from the - Southern Commissioners sent to negotiate with the Government here, - it may be as well to mention that they did not seek any intercourse - with me, and that I never had any communication with them, direct or - otherwise. I do not know that I should have thought it necessary to - refuse to communicate with them, if it had been proposed to me, but - the fact is as I have just said. - -The policy of acting in conjunction with France was adopted with -considerable success, as will appear later, but hitherto the British -Government had not given any very clear lead, Lord John Russell -contenting himself with the view that he relied upon 'the wisdom, -patience, and prudence of the British Minister to steer safely through -the danger of the crisis.' It was absolutely necessary, however, to deal -with the Blockade Question, and the Cabinet consulted the Law Officers -of the Crown, with the result that the Southern States were recognized -as belligerents. - - * * * * * - - _Lord John Russell to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, May 6, 1861. - - I cannot give you any official instructions by this mail, but the - Law Officers are of opinion that we must consider the Civil War - in America as regular war--_justum bellum_--and apply to it all - the rules respecting blockade, letters of Marque which belong to - neutrals during a war. They think moreover it would be very - desirable if both parties would agree to accept the Declaration of - Paris regarding the flag covering the goods and the prohibition of - privateers. - - You will of course inform our naval officers that they must conform - to the rules respecting Blockade, of which they are I believe in - possession. The matter is very serious and very unfortunate. - -An important conversation took place on May 17, between Lord J. Russell -and Mr. Adams, the new American Minister in London, in which the latter -went so far as to state that Lord John Russell's language to his -predecessor, Mr. Dallas, had been construed in an unfavourable light in -the United States, and that he was afraid that his own mission might -come to an end unless the unfavourable impression was corrected. He -further complained of the recognition of the South as a belligerent. -Lord John Russell in reply declined to give an undertaking that, apart -from belligerent rights, England would never recognize the Southern -States, but he endeavoured to make it clear that, if anything, popular -sympathy in England was with the North, and that H.M. Government were -only desirous of maintaining a strict neutrality. Any one reading the -correspondence of the period cannot fail to realize that Lord John -Russell was perfectly sincere in his expressed wish to preserve perfect -impartiality, in spite of the querulous and acrimonious tone which -occasionally characterized his communications. - -Lord Lyons, on his side, was only too anxious to avoid the slightest -semblance of anything which might cause offence to the United States -Government. He was constantly impressing upon the various Consuls that, -strict neutrality being the policy of H.M. Government, they must not be -led away by their sympathies, but confine themselves to obeying orders. -He vetoed the requests for warships, which they occasionally clamoured -for, in the traditional consular spirit, and urged caution upon the -British naval Commanders and the Canadian authorities. Fortunately, both -Admiral Milne and Sir Edmund Head, the Governor-General of Canada, were -prudent and tactful men, who ably co-operated with him. With both of -these he corresponded confidentially, and made no secret of the -apprehensions which he entertained. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Sir E. Head._ - - Washington, May 22, 1861. - - You will perhaps consider the notion that the U.S. should at this - moment provoke a war with a great Power as preposterous, and _à - priori_ it must seem incredible to any one. Nevertheless I am - so seriously alarmed by what I see passing around me here and - especially by the conduct of the Cabinet that I have thought it my - duty to call the attention of our Government to the danger which I - conceive to exist. To avert it is the main object of all I do here. - I am afraid however that things are coming to a point at which my - diplomacy will be completely at fault. - - * * * * * - - I could write a great deal to explain my reasons for fearing that if - a war be not imminent the risk is at any rate so great that it ought - at once to be guarded against. My mind is almost unremittingly - employed in devising means to maintain the peace. In this, even more - than in ordinary cases, I think the best safeguard will be found in - being evidently prepared for war. Nothing is so likely to prevent an - attack as manifest readiness to prevent one. I have thought it right - to state to H.M. Government my opinion that it is not even now too - soon to put Canada into a complete state of defence and to provide - both in the West Indies and on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts the - means of resisting attack in case of war or of making our neutrality - respected if peace can be maintained. - - Canada is, as you know, looked upon here as our weak point. There - are in the Cabinet men who are no doubt as ignorant of the state of - feeling in Canada as they were of that in the Southern States and - who believe that there is a strong American feeling in Canada. You - will not have forgotten that Mr. Seward, during the Presidential - canvass, publicly advocated the annexation of Canada as a - compensation for any loss which might be occasioned by the - disaffection of the South. The people calculate here (I am afraid - not without reason) upon being effectively aided in an inroad upon - Canada by the Irish Secret Societies which have been formed - especially in the State of New York nominally for the purpose of - invading Ireland. - - I can hardly hope that you will not think the antecedent - improbability of this country's rushing to its ruin by adding - Foreign to Civil war so great as to prove that I must be led away by - visionary apprehensions. However this may be, it may be convenient - to you to know what my knowledge of men and things here has brought - me to believe and what I have in consequence written home. - - Our Government has taken the only position sanctioned by - International law and by precedent. It observes absolute neutrality - and impartiality between the contending parties, recognizing, as it - is bound to do, both as invested with belligerent rights. No other - course was open to it, except that of an offensive alliance with one - side against the other. The North have certainly not asked for such - an alliance and would doubtless reject an offer of it with disdain. - And yet they choose to be in a fury because we do not try to occupy - some untenable position as their partisans. - - No one defines our position more clearly than their own great - authority Wheaton. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._ - - Washington, May 21, 1861. - - One of the great difficulties I have to contend with in my endeavour - to keep this Government within such bounds as may render the - maintenance of peace possible is the persuasion which prevails even - with sensible men that _no_ outrage will compel England to make - war with the North. Such men, although seeing the inexpediency and - impropriety of Mr. Seward's treatment of the European Powers, still - do not think it worth while to risk their own mob popularity by - declaring against it. If they thought there was really any danger - they would no doubt do a great deal to avert it. - - Of these men the most distinguished is Mr. Sumner. He has - considerable influence in Foreign Questions and holds the important - office of Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He - is in correspondence with many people in England, and I believe with - the Duke and Duchess of Argyll. I think no greater service could be - rendered to the cause of peace than to make Mr. Sumner aware of the - real perils to which Mr. Seward and the Cabinet are exposing the - country. If some means cannot be devised of checking them, they will - carry not only arrogance but practical vexations to a pitch which - will render the maintenance of peace impossible. If Mr. Sumner's - correspondence from England convinced him that there was real danger - in Mr. Seward's proceedings, he might do a good deal to put a stop - to them. I think I have done something to shake his confidence, but - I believe he still relies to a great degree upon assurances he - received from England under circumstances wholly different from - those which now so unhappily exist. - -Only a few years earlier, a British Minister, Sir John Crampton (like -Lord Sackville, in 1888), had been offered as a sacrifice to the Irish -vote, and received his passport, and it began to look as if this -spirited action might be repeated. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._ - - Washington, June 4, 1861. - - The present game of the violent party appears to be to discover or - invent some shade of difference in the conduct of England and France - in order to use violent language, or even to take violent measures - against England without necessarily involving themselves in a - quarrel with France also. The plan most in vogue at this moment - seems to be to send me my passport. After their experience in the - case of Sir J. Crampton they look upon this as a measure which would - gain them most applause by its appearance of vigour without exposing - them to any real danger. They have not yet hit upon any fault to - find with me personally, except that I _must_ have written - unfriendly despatches to my government, because my government has - taken a course which they do not like. The whole is no doubt an - attempt to carry a point by bluster which will perhaps fail if it be - encountered with mild language and very firm conduct. For my own - part I conceive my best line will be to avoid giving any possible - reason for complaint against myself personally and to keep things as - smooth as I can. If H.M. Government concede nothing to violent - language it will _probably_ subside, but there is such a dementia - in some of the people here that we must not be surprised at any act of - violence they may commit. - - Mr. Seward will be furious when he finds that his adherence to the - Declaration of Paris will not stop the Southern privateering. This - is one of the difficulties of making the proposals respecting - maritime law. But the great trouble will be the fuss which the - Southern government will make about receiving a communication from - England and France. It will be a great advantage to have a discreet - and able man like Mr. Bunch to employ in the South. I trust it may - be possible to grant him some compensation for the risk and loss to - which he is exposed by remaining there. - -Another long letter of June 10 illustrates the tension of the situation, -and again urges the necessity of attending to the defence of Canada. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._ - - Washington, June 10, 1861. - - I owe you more than common thanks for your private letter of the - 25th. - - Mr. Adams' Report of his first conversation with you appears to have - produced a good impression on the Cabinet. This I learn from Mr. - Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, who dined with me the day - before yesterday. I have not seen Mr. Seward since they arrived. It - is too dangerous to talk to him on such subjects for me to bring - them up unnecessarily. - - I hope we may see some moderation in the tone of the Newspapers. - The people in the North are beginning to be aware of the immense - encouragement which their predictions of a war with England have - given to their Southern Foe. I understand that the effect at - Richmond of the repeated assertions in the Northern Papers of the - hostility of England to the North has been prodigious. - - I have written so much officially on the risk of a sudden - Declaration of War against England by the U.S. that I have nothing - to add on that subject. That such an act of madness is so far from - impossible, that we ought to be prepared for it at any moment, I - am thoroughly convinced. I am doing all I can to avoid awkward - questions--for to give way upon any such question would be still - more dangerous to peace than to make a firm stand. The safe course - therefore is to prevent questions arising, if possible. But the - first thing to be done towards obtaining anything like permanent - security is to remove the temptation to attack Canada. - - I am a little nervous about our Company of Marines on San Juan. I - don't know that I can suggest any precautions to Governor Douglas - which would not be more likely to do harm than good. I have besides - no means of sending him a letter, which would not be liable to - be read on the way. I can communicate with the Admiral in the - Pacific in cypher, but I do not know where he may be. Under any - circumstances the Government here would of course be able to send - intelligence of war having broken out to the Pacific sooner than I - could. - - M. Mercier, the French Minister here, appears to be very frank and - cordial with me. The instructions which he read to me insist very - strongly upon his acting in entire concert with me. I think he may - perhaps have received a confidential Despatch desiring him to - proceed cautiously, for he is going at a much slower pace than his - language a short time ago would have led one to expect. His giving - Mr. Seward a copy of the Exposition of the French Jurists on the - question of Belligerent Rights, as he did before of M. Thouvenel's - account of his conversation with Mr. Sanford, seems to show a - straightforward desire to make this Government acquainted with - the real sentiments and intentions of the Emperor. The language - M. Mercier uses to me and to his other Colleagues, as well as - that which he uses to Americans in my presence, is in direct - contradiction to the reports that France will assist the North, - which are so assiduously repeated and commented upon in the American - Newspapers. I am very willing to let him take the lead in our - communications about the Declaration of Paris. It would be playing - the game of the enemies to peace with England for me to go faster in - these matters than the French Minister. - - Among other difficulties in the way of making your communication to - the Southern Consuls, is that of getting it safely to them. All - regular communication with the South is cut off. I suppose the - Government here would give either M. Mercier or me a Pass for a - special Messenger if we asked for one--but it may be desirable to - afford as little evidence as possible of our being connected with - the communication. The Southern Government will no doubt do all in - their power to give importance and publicity to the communication. - This Government will very probably withdraw the Exequaturs of the - Consuls who make it. The withdrawal would not be altogether free - from inconvenience to us, as it would interfere with the Consuls' - holding intercourse with the Blockading Squadrons, which it is - sometimes of importance that they should be able to do. - - I think the English and French Governments will find it necessary to - make the Cabinet of Washington clearly understand that they _must_ - and _will_ hold unofficial communication with the Southern - Government on matters concerning the interests of their subjects. - The announcement should if possible be made _collectively_, and in - such a form as to preclude the Cabinet's pretending to find a - difference between the conduct of France and England. The Government - of the U.S. can perform none of the duties of a Government towards - Foreigners in the Seceded States; and it is a preposterous - pretension to insist upon excluding Foreign Governments from - intercourse with the authorities however illegitimate, to whom their - Subjects must in fact look for protection. - - The inactivity of the Troops on both sides would be satisfactory, if - one could hope that there was still any chance of the question's - being solved without any serious fighting. As it is, one would be - glad that something should be done as soon as possible to enable an - opinion to be formed on the relative strength and spirit of the - Armies. I believe that the real secret is that from want of training - in the men, and total lack of waggons, horses and other means of - transport, neither Government can move troops in any considerable - numbers except by railroad. I can see as yet no signs of the spirit - of conquest in the North flagging, or of the South losing courage. - The Financial Difficulty will be the great one on both sides. The - Southern men are said to serve without pay--but this Government has - fixed the pay of the volunteers and militiamen at the same rate as - that of the regular army, eleven dollars (about 45 shillings) a - month, for a private, in addition to clothes and rations. - - I must do the little I can to influence the Senators and - Representatives when they come up next month; but there is only too - much reason to fear that fierceness against England will be popular, - and that the Legislators will vie with each other in manifesting it. - What I think they are most likely to do is to give the President - authority to declare war with us, without waiting for the sanction - of Congress. - - * * * * * - - Since I wrote what precedes I have been informed privately that in - Mr. Dayton's Report of his audience of the Emperor, there is a - rather ambiguous phrase put into the Emperor's mouth, respecting His - Majesty's desire to contribute to put an end to the dispute between - North and South. My informant says that the President and Mr. Seward - _really_ interpret the phrase as signifying that the Emperor would - be willing to assist the North to subdue the South--and that it is - from this supposition that Mr. Seward does not send M. Mercier back - the 'Exposition' and enter into the discussion about neutral Rights. - Mr. Seward is naturally puzzled by the apparent discrepancy between - the Emperor's language and that of His Majesty's Minister here. The - men in the State Department who are accustomed to business look, it - seems, upon the Emperor's words, even as reported by Mr. Dayton, as - no more than a vague assurance of goodwill, pointing to mediation - rather than to anything else. I will endeavour to get M. Mercier to - set the President and Mr. Seward right as soon as possible, for the - delusion is a very dangerous one for England, and a much more - dangerous one for the U.S. - -The ill-feeling towards England continued to grow worse as time went on, -and apparently was due largely to sentiment. The success of the South in -founding a practically independent government was so galling to the -North that anything which implied the admission of a self-evident fact, -such as the recognition of the Southern States as belligerents, was -inexpressibly galling. Fortunately, England and France were acting in -unison, and even Mr. Seward's ingenuity was unable to show that there -was any difference between the attitude of the two countries. Writing on -June 24, Lord Lyons reported that he had discovered that Mr. Seward had -prepared a despatch which was all but a direct announcement of war, and -that it was only the intervention of the President and of the more -reasonable members of the Cabinet which prevented its being sent to the -American Minister in London. The great qualities of President Lincoln, -by the way, do not appear to have been recognized at this early period, -for competent judges pronounced that although well-meaning and -conscientious, he gave no proof of possessing any natural talents to -compensate for his ignorance of everything but Illinois village -politics. - -Towards the end of July the military inactivity, due to causes mentioned -earlier, came to an end, and the historic fight of Bull's Run took place -on the 21st. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, July 22, 1861. - - It is too soon to form any speculations on the result of the defeat - of yesterday. Neither General Scott nor the Government had - calculated on the possibility of anything like it, and as for the - people of the North, they talked at all events as if the victory was - already theirs. If the North have anything like the spirit to which - they lay claim, they will rise with more resolution than ever to - avenge the defeat. The test will be the conduct of the Militia - Regiments. The three months' term of service of most of them has - just expired: some had gone home and the rest were on the point of - following--leaving the war to be carried on by the Volunteers and - the Regular Army. If the Militia regiments remain and others come - up, we may conclude that the warlike spirit of the North is - unbroken. If they do not, there may be a chance of peace. For this - battle will not facilitate recruiting for the army and the - Volunteers--and unless the Capitalists are urged by patriotism or - squeezed by mob pressure, the loans will fail and the money to pay - the Volunteers will not be forthcoming. - - I am myself inclined to hope that Congress may show some dignity - and good sense. The general opinion is that it will be violent and - childish--vote men and money on paper by millions--slay its Southern - enemies by treason bills--and ruin them by confiscation acts--decree - the immediate and unconditional abolition of slavery in the Southern - States--the closing of the Ports, and what not. - -Amongst other results of Bull's Run was the production of the following -minute by Lord Palmerston. If his judgment on the temper of the North -was completely wrong, his other observations might be profitably studied -by the numerous persons in this country who hold the view that efficient -military forces can be improvised whenever an emergency arises. - - * * * * * - - MINUTE OF LORD PALMERSTON. - - Aug. 15, 1861. - - The defeat at Bull's Run or rather at Yankee's Run proves two - things. First, that to bring together many thousand men and put - uniforms upon their backs and muskets in their hands is not to make - an army: discipline, experienced officers and confidence in the - steadiness of their comrades are necessary to make an army fight and - stand: secondly, that the Unionist cause is not in the hearts of the - mass of the population of the North. The Americans are not cowards: - individually they are as reckless of their own lives as of the lives - of others: ..., and it is not easy to believe that if they had felt - they were fighting for a great national interest they would have run - away as they did from the battle, or that whole regiments would have - quietly marched away home just before the fight was to begin. The - Truth is, the North are fighting for an Idea chiefly entertained by - professional politicians, while the South are fighting for what they - consider rightly or wrongly vital interests. - -The defects and weaknesses disclosed by this defeat produced much -contemptuous criticism upon the military inefficiency of the United -States. In reality there was no cause for surprise. In April, 1861, the -entire regular army of the United States only amounted to 16,000 -officers and men. Many of the officers had taken sides with the South. -Not one of them had ever had the opportunity of commanding any -considerable number of troops, and public opinion was so entirely -uninstructed concerning military questions that every local politician -considered himself competent to become a colonel, or even a general. But -what Bull's Run showed more conclusively than anything else, was that -the task of subjugating the South was infinitely greater than had -been anticipated, and that the confident boastings of enthusiastic -Northerners were as foolish as they were unjustified. We, however, as -a nation, had not then, and have now, little cause to jeer at the -Americans for their failure: we had embarked, only a few years earlier, -upon the Crimean Campaign almost equally unprepared for a serious -struggle, and less than forty years later, in 1899, one of our most -eminent military authorities undertook to finish off the Boers before -the date of the Lord Mayor's Banquet. - -About this time Anglo-American relations showed a slight improvement, -although Mr. Seward, in a characteristic outburst, took occasion to -point out that 'the policy of Foreign Governments was founded upon -considerations of interest and of commerce, while that of the United -States was based on high and eternal considerations of principle and the -good of the human race; that the policy of foreign nations was regulated -by the government which ruled them, while that of the United States was -directed by the unanimous and unchangeable will of the people.' Yet he -had clearly become more peaceable, and this welcome tendency was perhaps -due to the British Government having increased the Canadian garrisons in -response to the urgent pressure of Lord Lyons and the Canadian -authorities. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Sir E. Head._ - - Washington, Aug. 2, 1861. - - The intentions of the Government are at this moment more peaceful - than they have been. But I do not yet see any reason to modify the - views I expressed in my previous confidential letters. The present - change has been mainly produced by our preparations for defence and - by the quiet firmness with which we have maintained the position we - took up with regard to Belligerent Rights. I think it as necessary - as ever to complete our preparations for defence, and I find that - the knowledge that we are making such preparations calms instead of - irritating this people. - - There is nothing very surprising in raw levies being seized with - such a panic as that which led to the flight from Bull's Run. The - want of spirit before and since shown by the Militia regiments is a - worse sign. Two went away, on their term expiring, one may say from - the battlefield itself. The defeat, and even the danger of - Washington being taken, have been unable to induce any whose time is - up to remain. The Government considers that we are now safe again - from an attack here, but for some days our reliance was only upon - its not entering into the enemy's plan to come here. - - As day after day passes without an onward movement of the Southern - troops, the war spirit seems to revive in the North. But it will - require a decided Northern victory to bring back the enthusiasm and - the unanimity which appeared on the fall of Fort Sumter. A peace - party is beginning to show itself timidly and weakly, but much more - openly than it would have dared to do two months ago. - - We have nearly got through another Tariff Bill without a serious - attack upon the Reciprocity Treaty, thanks more to the haste, I am - afraid, than the good will of the Legislators. It will be a - wonderful tariff, whichever of the plans now before Congress is - adopted. - - Mr. Seward some weeks ago took credit to himself for having recalled - Mr. Ashman on finding that his mission was ill looked on. This gave - me a good opportunity of telling him that H.M. Government - considered that they had a good right to complain of his having been - sent at all without proper communication being previously made to - them and to me. - - I have applied for the discharge of the two minors about whom you - wrote to me officially. I am not sure of getting it. My applications - for discharge from the Army and Navy have become necessarily so - numerous that they are not viewed with favour. - -Such elaborate pains had been taken to prevent anything in the least -likely to irritate the Government of the United States, that it was all -the more annoying when an incident occurred which gave excuse for -complaint. - -The Consuls in the Southern States were permitted to send their -despatches in Foreign Office bags through the lines on the reasonable -condition that no advantage was to be taken of the privilege in order to -provide information which might be of use to the enemies of the United -States Government. The rule was rigidly observed at the Legation, and -the Consuls had been repeatedly warned not to infringe it in any way; -but in an evil hour, Mr. Bunch, the British Consul at Charleston, a -capable and industrious official, committed his bag to a friend, who, -unknown to the Consul, also took charge of about two hundred private -letters. The messenger was arrested by the United States authorities, -and imprisoned. The letters, of course, were seized, but so also was the -Foreign Office bag, addressed to Lord Russell, and a Foreign Office bag -has always been considered as one of the most sacred objects upon earth. -The United States Government, professing that a most serious offence had -been committed, and taking advantage of an error in the passport of the -messenger, sent the bag over to London by special messenger, and -demanded the recall of the unfortunate Consul Bunch. The opportunity, in -short, was too good to be lost. When the bag was eventually opened, in -Downing Street, it was found to contain nothing but despatches and a few -letters from British governesses and servants who had been permitted to -make use of it in consequence of the discontinuance of the post. In -fact, it was an essentially trivial matter, but the tension between the -two countries was so great that Lord Russell thought that it might -possibly lead to a rupture of official relations, and sent the following -instructions:-- - - * * * * * - - _Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._ - - Abergeldie Castle, Sept. 13, 1861. - - It is not very probable, but it is possible that the complaint - against Bunch may be a preliminary to the breaking off of official - intercourse between the two countries. - - Your name has been kept out of the correspondence on both sides, - but if the Envoys are to be withdrawn, you will be sent away from - Washington. - - In that case I wish you to express in the most dignified and guarded - terms that the course taken by the Washington Government must be the - result of a misconception on their part, and that you shall retire - to Canada in the persuasion that the misunderstanding will soon - cease, and the former friendly relations be restored. - - It is very desirable to obtain an explanation from Consul Bunch, and - you may authorize Admiral Milne, after due notice, to Mr. Seward, to - send a gunboat to Charleston for the purpose. - -Consul Bunch, in spite of his troubles, remained for over a year in -Charleston after this incident. Eventually the American Government -revoked his exequatur, and he made a semi-state return to England in a -man-of-war. - -In the late autumn, Mr. Seward began to show signs of returning to his -earlier manner, and it was plain enough that he had only been seeking to -gain time by his moderation. He now maintained that any communication -between a Foreign Government and the Confederate Government was an -offence against the United States, and it became more and more necessary -for England and France to come to some distinct agreement as to what the -nature and extent of those communications should be. Mr. Seward's -contention was obviously absurd. South Carolina had seceded nearly a -year previously. State after State had followed its example; the United -States Government had not made the slightest progress in restoring its -authority, and exercised no power or influence in any portion of the new -Confederation. On the other hand, there was a _de facto_ government in -that Confederation which was obeyed without question and exercised the -functions of government with perfect regularity. It was clear that a -government which was without the means of protecting British subjects -had no right to prevent us from holding necessary and informal -communications with the only power to which British subjects could look -for protection and redress of grievances. Cases of British subjects -being compulsorily enlisted, of British goods being seized on board -vessels captured by Southern privateers, and instances of a similar -nature were of constant occurrence. It was preposterous that under these -conditions British Consuls should be expected to refrain from -communication with the Confederate authorities. Fortunately, although -the British interests involved were infinitely the more important, -French interests were affected too, and upon this, as upon most other -difficult questions, Lord Lyons received the hearty and loyal support of -his French colleague, M. Mercier. - -On November 8, an incident of the gravest nature occurred, which seemed -likely to render futile all the laborious efforts which had been made to -keep the peace between England and the United States. - -The English mail steamer _Trent_, one day out from Havannah, was met by -the American warship _San Jacinto_ and stopped by a shell fired across -her bows. She was then boarded by a party of marines, and the officer in -command of the party demanded a list of the passengers. The production -of the list having been refused, the officer stated that he knew the -Confederate delegates to Europe, Messrs. Mason and Slidell, to be on -board, and insisted upon their surrender. Whilst the discussion was in -progress, Mr. Slidell made his appearance and disclosed his identity. -Thereupon, in defiance of the protests of the captain of the _Trent_ and -of the Government mail agent, Mr. Slidell and Mr. Mason, together with -their secretaries, were seized and carried off by force to the _San -Jacinto_, and taken as prisoners to New York. - -The news arrived in England on November 27, and, naturally, caused the -greatest excitement and indignation. It was felt that the limits of -concession had been reached, that a stand must now be made if we ever -intended to maintain our national rights, and, as a proof that they were -in earnest, the Government decided upon the immediate despatch of 8000 -men to Canada. - -The first private letter from Lord Lyons was written on November 19. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, Nov. 19, 1861. - - I have written so much officially on this unfortunate affair of - Mason and Slidell that I have hardly left myself time to thank you - for your kind private letter of the 2nd. - - I am told confidently that orders were given at Washington which led - to the capture on board the _Trent_, and that they were signed by - Mr. Seward without the knowledge of the President. I do not vouch - for the truth of this. I am afraid he is not sorry to have a - question with us like this, in which it is difficult for France to - take a part. - -Lord Lyons had made up his mind from the first that, as it was -impossible for him to form a correct opinion as to what had actually -occurred, the only thing to do was to maintain an attitude of complete -reserve. In the absence of authentic information, he felt that on the -one hand it would be unsafe to ask for a reparation which might be -inadequate; on the other hand he was reluctant to make a demand which -might be unnecessarily great. Consequently, he resolved to take no steps -until he received instructions from home, refused to say a word on the -subject either officially or unofficially, and instructed the Consuls to -maintain silence. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, Nov. 22, 1861. - - I have all along been expecting some such blow as the capture on - board the _Trent_. Turn out how it may, it must I fear produce an - effect on public opinion in both countries which will go far to - disconcert all my peaceful plans and hopes. I am so worn out with - the never-ending labour of keeping things smooth, under the - discouragement of the doubt whether by so doing I am not after all - only leading these people to believe that they may go all lengths - with us with impunity that I am sometimes half tempted to wish that - the worst may have come already. However I do not allow this feeling - to influence my conduct, and I have done nothing which can in the - least interfere with any course which you may take concerning the - affair of the _Trent_. - - If the effect on the people and Government of this country were the - only thing to be considered, it would be a case for an extreme - measure one way or the other. If the capture be unjustifiable we - should ask for the immediate release of the prisoners, promptly, - imperatively, with a determination to act at once, if the demand - were refused. If, on the other hand, the capture be justifiable, - we should at once say so and declare that we have no complaint to - make on the subject. Even so, we should not escape the evil of - encouraging the Americans in the belief that we shall bear anything - from them. For they have made up their minds that they have insulted - us, although the fear of the consequences prevents their giving vent - to their exultation. They would not however consider it so manifest - a proof of yielding on our part if we at once declared that we had - nothing to complain of, as if we did complain without obtaining full - reparation. Of course, however, I am well aware that public opinion - in this country is not the only thing to be thought of in this - question. While maintaining entire reserve on the question itself, I - have avoided any demonstration of ill-humour. My object has been, on - the one hand, not to prevent the Government being led by its present - apprehensions to take some conciliatory step, and on the other hand - not to put H.M. Government or myself in an awkward position, if it - should after all appear that we should not be right to make the - affair a serious ground of complaint. - - Congress will meet on December 2nd, which will not diminish the - difficulty of managing matters here. It is supposed that General - McClellan will be obliged to attempt some forward movement, in - order that he and the Government may be able to meet the fiery - legislators. They hoped the Beaufort affair would have been - sufficient, but like all they do, the effect is so much weakened, - first by the preposterous boastings beforehand, and secondly by the - fabulous accounts of the success first given, that something new - must if possible be provided. - - The Finances are kept in an apparently prosperous condition, by - postponing all but the most pressing payments. In this manner the - New York Banks are not pressed to pay up the sums they have taken of - the Loan. The people are so enamoured of their last brilliant - discovery in political economy that it was seriously intended to - raise the Morrill Tariff, in order that no money might go out of the - country and nothing be imported but 'gold and silver to carry on the - war with.' The Cabinet has now however, I understand, determined to - recommend that the Morrill Tariff be not touched. One cannot help - hoping that some one may be reasonable enough to suggest the idea of - a Revenue Tariff. - - General McClellan's own plan is said to be to gain a great victory, - and then, with or without the sanction of Congress and the - President, to propose the most favourable terms to the South if it - will only come back. It is a curious sign of the confusion into - which things are falling, that such a plan is coolly discussed. I - mean that part of it which consists in the General's acting without - the consent of the President and Congress. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, Nov. 25, 1861. - - The people here are extremely frightened about the capture on board - the _Trent_. The New York money market gives signs of this. Another - indication is the moderation of the newspapers, which is for them - wonderful. They have put in more correct accounts of my language (or - rather silence). I rather suspect that this must have been done on a - hint from Mr. Seward. As a general rule I abstain from noticing - anything the newspapers say about me. On this occasion in particular - contradiction from me would have been almost as dangerous as - affirmation, so I left the assertions to take their chance. - - The Consuls in the South do not behave well about forwarding private - letters. There is a fresh case which I report to-day. Mr. Seward - has, I think, behaved properly about it. I am afraid I shall be - obliged to ask you to support me by some severe act, if my last - instruction is not obeyed. - - I write, as indeed I act, as if our relations with this Government - were to be unchanged. Let the affair of the capture on board the - _Trent_ turn out how it may, I am not confident that I shall long - be able to do so. - -Writing on the same date to Admiral Milne, he repeats that nothing -whatever has passed between him and the U.S. Government on the subject -of the _Trent_, and adds: 'I suppose I am the only man in America who -has expressed no opinion whatever either on the International Law -question, or on the course which our Government will take.' Such -reticence appears almost superhuman. - -The attitude, however, of an important section of the American public -was anything but reticent. Captain Wilkes sprang at once into the -position of a national hero. Congress passed a vote of thanks to him; he -was banqueted, toasted, serenaded, and shortly became an admiral. A -member of the Government, Mr. Welles, Secretary of the Navy, noted for -his hostility to England, distinguished himself by officially -congratulating Captain Wilkes upon his heroic action; intimating at the -same time that the 'generous forbearance' he had shown in not capturing -the _Trent_ could not be treated as a precedent in subsequent cases of -the infraction of neutral obligations. The Governor of Boston also -distinguished himself by the following statement at a public banquet: -'That there may be nothing left to crown this exaltation, Commodore -Wilkes fired his shot across the bows of the ship that bore the British -lion at its head,' while many other prominent citizens followed his -example. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, Nov. 29, 1861. - - The Consuls in the South are crying out for ships again. This is the - solution for every difficulty in the Consular mind, as my experience - in the Mediterranean taught me long ago; though what the ships were - to do, except fire a salute in honour of the Consul, I could never - discover. I had some trouble, as you may perhaps recollect, in - checking the Consular ardour to send ships up the Potomac to my own - relief last spring. Sir A. Milne objects strongly to sending ships - to the Southern Ports, unless with a specific object and definite - instructions, and I think he is quite right. It is quite true that a - town _may_ be bombarded some day by the United States forces: that - British subjects may have their throats cut by the negroes in a - servile insurrection, or be tarred and feathered by a Vigilance - Committee. But we cannot keep a squadron at every point to protect - them, and I do not know what points are particularly threatened. - - I shall do all in my power to keep things smooth until I receive - your orders about the _Trent_ affair. This can in any event do no - harm. There is a story here that, in a recent hypothetical case, the - Law Officers of the Crown decided in favour of the right of the - United States to take Mason and Slidell out of a British ship or - postal packet. I do not know whether Mr. Adams has written this to - Mr. Seward, but I am inclined to think that the Government believe - it to be true. - -The uncertainty as to the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown -rendered it all the more necessary to keep quiet and wait for orders, -and the situation was rendered a little easier on account of there being -no mention of the _Trent_ in the Presidential Message. Mr. Galt, -the Canadian Finance Minister, happened to be in Washington at the -beginning of December, and had an interesting conversation with -President Lincoln, who disclaimed for himself and the Cabinet all -thought of aggression against Canada. The President also stated that he -himself had been opposed to Mr. Seward's circular putting the coasts -into a state of defence, but had been overruled. On being asked what the -recommendation to make fortifications and depôts of arms on the Great -Lakes meant, he only said, 'We must say something to satisfy the -people.' About the Mason and Slidell case, he remarked, 'Oh, that'll be -got along with!' He further volunteered the observation that if he could -not within a reasonable period get hold of Virginia, Kentucky, and -Missouri, and keep Maryland, he should tell the American people to give -up the contest, for it would be 'too big' for them. - -The impression produced upon Mr. Galt was that President Lincoln himself -was honest and sincere in what he said, but that he was very far from -being master of his Cabinet. Mr. Galt returned to Canada, bearing a -letter to Lord Monck, the new Governor-General, urging the necessity of -preparing for defence, and also an ingenious arrangement for warning the -Canadian Government in case of emergency, without having recourse to -cypher telegrams, which might arouse the suspicions of the Americans. - -On December 13, intelligence was received in America of the arrival in -England of the first news of the capture of Mason and Slidell, the -submarine cable, of course, not being at that time in operation. A great -fall in all securities immediately took place. - -At midnight on the 18th, the Queen's messenger bearing the fateful -despatches from Lord Russell arrived at the British Legation at -Washington. - -The principal despatch, dated November 30, 1861, had been drawn up after -consideration by the Cabinet, and the purport of it was that the United -States Government were informed that International Law and the rights of -Great Britain had been violated, that H.M. Government trusted that the -act would be disavowed, the prisoners set free and restored to British -protection. Should this demand be refused, Lord Lyons was instructed to -leave Washington. - -The draft of this despatch was submitted to the Queen, and, in the -opinion of the Prince Consort, the wording was of somewhat too -peremptory a character. The suggestions of the Prince Consort were -embodied in a memorandum quoted by Sir Theodore Martin in his book, and -the object of them was to remove any expressions in the despatch which -might unduly affront a sensitive nation, and at the same time enable it -to retreat from a false position without loss of credit or dignity. The -Prince was suffering from a mortal illness at the time, and was dead -within a fortnight; it was the last occasion upon which he took any part -in public affairs, but never, probably, did he render a greater service -to the country of his adoption than when he persuaded the Cabinet to -modify the wording of this momentous despatch. As amended in accordance -with the Prince Consort's suggestions, the crucial passages ran as -follows:-- - - Her Majesty's Government, bearing in mind the friendly relations - which have long subsisted between Great Britain and the United - States, are willing to believe that the United States's naval - officer who committed this aggression was not acting in compliance - with any authority from his Government, or that if he conceived - himself to be so authorized, he greatly misunderstood the - instructions which he had received. - - For the Government of the United States must be fully aware that - the British Government could not allow such an affront to the - national honour to pass without full reparation, and Her Majesty's - Government are unwilling to believe that it could be the deliberate - intention of the Government of the United States unnecessarily to - force into discussion between the two Governments a question of so - grave a character, and with regard to which the whole British nation - would be sure to entertain such unanimity of feeling. - - Her Majesty's Government, therefore, trust that when this matter - shall have been brought under the consideration of the Government of - the United States, that Government will, of its own accord, offer to - the British Government such redress as alone would satisfy the - British nation, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen, and - their delivery to your Lordship, in order that they may again be - placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the - aggression which has been committed. - - Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward, you will propose - them to him. - -It will be observed that in the above there is nothing of an aggressive -or minatory nature, but in a further despatch of the same date, Lord -Lyons was instructed to allow Mr. Seward a delay of seven days, if the -latter asked for it. If at the end of seven days no answer was returned, -or any answer which was not a compliance with the demands of Her -Majesty's Government, then the British Minister was directed to leave -Washington with all the members of his staff and the archives, and to -repair forthwith to London. - -Accompanying the despatches was a private letter from Lord Russell to -Lord Lyons. - - * * * * * - - Pembroke Lodge, Dec. 1, 1861. - - The despatches which were agreed to at the Cabinet yesterday and - which I have signed this morning impose upon you a disagreeable - task. - - My wish would be that at your first interview with Mr. Seward you - should not take my despatch with you, but should prepare him for it, - and ask him to settle with the President and his Cabinet what course - they would propose. - - The next time you should bring my despatch and read it to him fully. - - If he asks you what will be the consequence of his refusing compliance - I think you should say that you wish to leave him and the President - quite free to take their own course, and that you desire to abstain - from anything like menace. I think the disposition of the Cabinet is - to accept the liberation of the captive commissioners and to be - rather easy about the apology: that is to say if the Commissioners - are delivered to you and allowed to embark in a packet for England, - and an apology or explanation is sent through Mr. Adams that might - be taken as a substantial compliance. But if the Commissioners are - not liberated, no apology will suffice. - - M. Thouvenel promises to send off a despatch on Thursday next giving - our cause moral support, so that you may as well keep the despatch - itself a day or two before you produce it, provided you ask at once - for an interview with Seward. - - The feeling here is very quiet but very decided. There is no party - about it: all are unanimous. - - The best thing would be if Seward could be turned out, and a - rational man put in his place. I hear it said that the Americans - will not fight, but we must not count upon that. - - I have every reliance that you will discharge your task in the - temper of firmness and calmness which befits a British - representative. - -Mr. Hammond, the permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, whose -judgment was in after years shown to be far from infallible, expressed -the opinion that Messrs. Mason and Slidell would be immediately -executed, so that there might be an answer ready whenever their release -was demanded. A warship was ordered to proceed from Halifax to New York -to receive the members of the Legation in case an unfavourable reply -should be received from the American Government. - -On December 7, Lord Russell wrote again privately to Lord Lyons. - - * * * * * - - Foreign Office, Dec. 7, 1861. - - I have been going over in my mind the possible evasive answers of - Mr. Seward, falling short of substantial compliance with our - demands, in order to give you some contingent instructions. - - But the result is that I fear I should embarrass you more by such a - course, than by leaving you to the exercise of your own excellent - judgment. - - What we want is a plain Yes, or a plain No to our very simple - demands, and we want that plain Yes or No within seven days of the - communication of the despatch. - - The devices for avoiding the plain course are endless, and the - ingenuity of American lawyers will seek perhaps to entangle you in - endless arguments on Vattel, Wheaton and Scott. - - Here are two plain answers. If the _Trent_ had been brought into - Boston harbour, the Prize Court must have condemned the captors to - pay costs for illegal detention. This, at least, is our opinion. - - But Captain Wilkes superseded the authority of the Courts instituted - and recognized by the Law of Nations. Seeing that there was no - chance that any Court of Justice, or any law could justify the - capture of the four Americans, Captain Wilkes has set aside all - Courts of Justice and all law, and has taken into his own hands, by - virtue of his cannons and cutlasses, the solution of a question - which demanded if raised at all, a regular, a solemn and a legal - decision. - - These are the grounds therefore upon which our demands are based and - upon which they should be urged. - - P.S.--I have just received your letter of the 22nd. If you receive - the Confederate prisoners under the protection of the British flag, - we shall be satisfied. But if that is not to be obtained, you will - only have to obey your instructions and withdraw. - -Mr. Hammond, a very unfortunate prophet, predicted that 'the Americans -will never give way. The humiliation will be too great, and after all -their boastings against Europe, they will scarcely be satisfied to yield -to the common reprobation with which the act has been received. We hear, -too, that the President himself is most determined against concession, -having rejected peremptorily General McClellan's conciliatory advice.' -It must be admitted, however, that if Mr. Hammond was wrong, plenty of -other people shared his views on both sides of the Atlantic. - -Lord Russell's despatch having arrived at Washington late at night on -December 18, Lord Lyons called upon Mr. Seward on the 19th, and -acquainted him with its general tenour. Mr. Seward received the -communication seriously and with dignity, nor did he manifest any -dissatisfaction. At the conclusion of the interview, he asked to be -given the following day for consideration, and also for communication -with the President. He thought that on the 21st he would be able to -express an opinion upon the communication, and in the meanwhile -expressed his gratification at the friendly and conciliatory manner in -which it had been made by the British Representative. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, Dec. 19, 1861. - - Before I left Mr. Seward he said that there was one question which - he would put to me 'informally,' but which it was most important - that I should answer. Was any time fixed by my instructions within - which the U.S. Government must reply? I told him that I did not like - to answer the question; that what of all things I wished to avoid - was the slightest appearance of a menace. He said I need not fear - that; he only wished me to tell him privately and confidentially. I - said that on that understanding, I would tell him that the term was - seven days. He then said that much time would be lost if I did not - let him have a copy of your despatch 'unofficially and informally'; - that so much depended upon the wording of it, that it was impossible - to come to a decision without reading it. I told him that the only - difficulty I had about giving it to him at once officially was that - the seven days would at once begin to run. He said that was very - true, but I might let him have it on the understanding that no one - but himself and the President should know that I had done so. I was - very glad to let him have it on these terms. It will give time for - the Packet (which is indeed already due) to arrive with M. - Thouvenel's Despatch to M. Mercier, and in the meantime give Mr. - Seward who is now on the peace side of the Cabinet time to work with - the President before the affair comes before the Cabinet itself. I - sent the Despatch to him in an envelope marked 'Private and - Confidential.' Almost immediately afterwards he came here. He told - me he was pleased to find that the Despatch was courteous and - friendly, and not dictatorial or menacing. There was however one - question more which he must ask me, without an answer to which he - could not act, but at the same time he must have the answer only in - strict confidence between himself and me. I had told him in - confidence that I was to wait seven days for an answer on the - subject of the redress we required. Supposing he was within the - seven days to send me a refusal, or a proposal to discuss the - question? I told him that my instructions were positive and left me - no discretion. If the answer was not satisfactory, and particularly - if it did not include the immediate surrender of the Prisoners, I - could not accept it. - - I was not sorry to tell him this in the way I did. I avoided all - menace which could be an obstacle to the U.S. yielding, while I did - the only thing which will make them yield if they ever do, let them - know that we were really in earnest. - - I don't think it likely they will give in, but I do not think it - impossible they may do so, particularly if the next news from - England brings note of warlike preparations, and determination on - the part of the Government and people. - - Mr. Seward has taken up all my time, which is my excuse for this - scrawl. I shall be able to write to you to-morrow. - -The second interview took place on the 21st, and the following letter -explains the reasons for allowing Mr. Seward an additional two days--a -happy expedient, which probably contributed in great measure to the -ultimate solution of the difficulty--and also graphically depicts the -general uncertainty and alarm which prevailed. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, Dec. 23, 1861. - - I have followed, I think to the letter, in my communications with - Mr. Seward on the _Trent_ affair, the plan laid down in your private - letter of the 1st. The packet is unfortunately so late that M. - Mercier will not receive the promised instruction from M. Thouvenel - until to-morrow, but I could not have again put off communicating - your despatch to Mr. Seward without an appearance of vacillation - which would have been fatal. No time was practically lost by my - consenting to the delay from Saturday to Monday, for whether the - seven days expired on Saturday next or Monday next, I should have - been equally unable to announce the result to you sooner than by the - packet which will sail from New York on Wednesday, the 1st January. - - I feel little or no doubt that I shall have an answer of some kind - before the seven days are over. What it will be depends very much - upon the news which will be brought by the packet to-morrow. If it - convinces the people here that it is surrender or war, without any - hope of a diversion in their favour by France, our terms will - perhaps be complied with. If there is any hope left that there will - be only a rupture of Diplomatic Relations, or that we shall accept - the mediation of France, no concession will be made. There is no - doubt that both government and people are very much frightened, but - still I do not think anything but the first shot will convince the - bulk of the population that England will really go to war. - - M. Mercier went of his own accord to Mr. Seward the day before - yesterday and expressed strongly his own conviction that the choice - lay only between a compliance with the demands of England and war. - He begged Mr. Seward to dismiss all idea of assistance from France, - and not to be led away by the vulgar notion that the Emperor would - gladly see England embroiled with the United States in order to - pursue his own plans in Europe without opposition. He said that if - he could be of use, by making these sentiments known to Senators and - other influential people, he was quite ready to do so. Mr. Seward - asked him whether he had received special instructions from his - Government on the subject. M. Mercier said no, but that he expected - some immediately, and that he had no doubt whatever what they would - be. Mr. Seward did not accept his offer to prepare influential men - here for giving way, but merely said, 'Let us wait and see what your - instructions really turn out to be.' - - It is announced that General Scott is more than halfway across the - Atlantic on his way here, I suppose in the hope of appearing again - on the stage as the Grand Pacificator. If he gives the sanction of - his name to a compliance with our terms he will certainly render the - compliance easier to the Government and less unpalatable to the - people. But I cannot foresee any circumstances, under which I should - be justified in departing from your instructions. Unless I receive - an announcement that the prisoners will be surrendered to _us_, and - at least not a refusal to make an apology before noon on this day - week, no other course will be open to me than to demand my passports - and those of all the members of the Legation and go away at once. In - case of a non-compliance, or of the time elapsing without any - answer, it will probably be desirable for me to take myself, the - Secretary of Legation, and the greater part of the Attachés off at - once, leaving, if necessary, one or two of the junior attachés to - pack up the archives and follow as quickly as possible. It is a case - in which, above all others, delay will be dangerous. I am so - convinced that unless we give our friends here a good lesson this - time, we shall have the same trouble with them again very soon, - under less advantageous circumstances, that even my regard for them - leads me to think it all important that they should receive the - lesson. Surrender or war will have a very good effect upon them, but - anything less will make them more self-confident than ever, and lead - them on to their ruin. - - I do not think there is any danger of the Government's deliberately - taking any step to precipitate hostilities upon my departure. On the - contrary, if they let me go, it will be in the hope that the - interruption of diplomatic relations will be all they have to fear - from us. But they have so little control over their officers, that I - think we must be prepared for acts of violence from subordinates, if - they have the chance of performing them, in cases where no immediate - danger is incurred. I shall suggest to the Governors and Naval - Officers to take reasonable precautions against such acts. A - filibustering expedition of the Irish on the frontiers of Canada, to - damage the canals, or something of that sort, may also be on the - cards. - - It is generally believed that the Government will insist on an - immediate advance of the Grand Army of the Potomac, in the hope of - covering a surrender to England with (to use President Lincoln's - phraseology) a 'sugar coating' of glory, in another quarter if - possible. - - You will perhaps be surprised to find Mr. Seward on the side of - peace. He does not like the look of the spirit he has called up. Ten - months of office have dispelled many of his illusions. I presume - that he no longer believes in the existence of a Union Party in the - South, in the return of the South to the arms of the North in case - of a foreign war; in his power to frighten the nations of Europe by - great words; in the ease with which the U.S. could crush rebellion - with one hand and chastise Europe with the other; in the notion that - the relations with England in particular are safe playthings to be - used for the amusement of the American people. He sees himself in a - very painful dilemma. But he knows his countrymen well enough to - believe that if he can convince them that there is a real danger - of war, they may forgive him for the humiliation of yielding to - England, while it would be fatal to him to be the author of a - disastrous foreign war. How he will act eventually, I cannot say. - It will be hard for him to face present unpopularity, and if the - President and Cabinet throw the whole burden on his shoulders, he - may refuse to bear it. I hope that without embarrassing him with - official threats, I have made him aware himself of the extreme - danger of refusing our terms. - - Since I have been writing this letter, M. Mercier has come in and - related to me more in detail the conversation he had with Mr. Seward - the day before yesterday. In addition to what I have already - mentioned, he says that he told Mr. Seward that it would be - impossible for France to blame England for precisely the same course - that she would herself have pursued in similar circumstances: that - of course he could not pretend to give advice on a question - concerning national honour without being asked to do so, but that it - might be of advantage to the U.S. Government for him to dispel - illusions which might exercise a baneful influence on its - determination. - - M. Mercier reports the conversation to-day to his Government. I - think it as well, at all events for the present, not to put it into - an official despatch, but it might perhaps be well that Lord Cowley - should know that I am disposed to speak in very high terms of the - moral support given to my demands by M. Mercier. - - I am told that the Senate is still more angry about the combined - expedition against Mexico than about the _Trent_ affair. They will - hardly be so absurd as to manifest their displeasure in such a way - as to add France and Spain to their adversaries. - - P.S.--I have kept M. Mercier _au courant_ of all my communications, - confidential as well as official, with Mr. Seward, but I have given - no information as to either to any one else. - -There was now nothing to be done but to sit and wait for the American -reply. It arrived on December 27, in the shape of a note from Mr. Seward -of the most portentous length abounding in exuberant dialectics, but the -gist of which was contained in the two following short paragraphs:-- - -'The four persons in question are now held in military custody at Fort -Warren in the State of Massachusetts. They will be cheerfully liberated. - -'Your lordship will please indicate a time and place for receiving -them.' - -The question of peace or war had hung in the balance for weeks, but the -victory was complete, and British diplomacy achieved a success which was -not equalled until Fashoda supplied a somewhat similar case in 1897. - -So far from being intoxicated with his remarkable triumph, as would have -been the case with some diplomatists, Lord Lyons communicated the news -to Lord Russell in matter-of-fact terms which were typical of his calm -and practical nature. - - * * * * * - - Washington, Dec. 27, 1861. - - It is of course impossible for me to give an opinion upon the - argumentation in Mr. Seward's voluminous note. Time barely admits of - its being read and copied before the messenger goes. But as the four - prisoners are given up, immediately and unconditionally, it is quite - clear to my mind that you will not wish me to decide the question - of peace or war without reference to you. A rupture of diplomatic - relations, not followed by war, would be worse than war itself, for - after that, nothing but actual hostilities would ever convince the - Americans that there was any limit to our forbearance. - - I hope, however, that the Note will, on further examination, be - deemed sufficient. In that case it might not be unadvisable to give - credit to Mr. Seward, in speaking to Mr. Adams, and the more so - perhaps because Mr. Adams is, or at all events was, devoted to Mr. - Seward and his policy. I cannot say that my general opinion of Mr. - Seward has undergone any change; but without inquiring into his - motives, I must allow him the merit of having worked very hard and - exposed his popularity to very great danger. - - I shall not be able to give you any information to-day as to the - effect produced upon the public. Mr. Seward has begged me to keep - the answer a secret until to-morrow. He intends to publish it in the - newspapers here to-morrow, and has sent a copy to New York to be - published simultaneously there. In the latter case it will be - conveyed to the public in Europe, as well as to you, by the same - packet which takes this letter. Mr. Seward told me he 'had been - through the fires of Tophet' in order to get the prisoners - surrendered. - - I have seen with very great satisfaction that you have informed Mr. - Adams, in answer to the remonstrances about Mr. Bunch, that H.M. - Government must and will hold communication with the Confederate - Government. I am also extremely glad that the instructions to the - Consuls on the subject have been sent to the Admiral to forward, not - to me. In fact, if we are able to maintain peace with the U.S. it - will be very desirable to separate the Consuls in the South as much - as possible from this Legation. It will hardly be possible for me to - keep well with the Government here, if I am supposed to have the - direction of communication with the enemy's Government. - - I think it very important, with a view to the preservation of peace, - that advantage should be taken of the opportunity to put Canada into - a state of defence; and indeed (as I said in a despatch which I - wrote in May last) to provide for the security of all our - possessions on both sides of this Continent. While Canada, in - particular, is apparently defenceless, the Americans will never - believe that we contemplate the possibility of war. And it must - never be forgotten that when they make peace with the South, they - may have a large army to provide with employment, and an immense - amount of popular dissatisfaction and humiliation to find a safety - valve for. - - My intention is to propose to Mr. Seward that I shall send a - man-of-war or a British mail packet to Boston to receive the - prisoners. I should propose that they should go in the first - instance to Halifax. But I should suggest to the Captain to consult - their wishes as far as possible, but certainly _not_ to take them to - a Confederate port. Neither of the ships of war at New York would, I - suppose, be large enough to take them across the Atlantic, but I do - not think I ought to refuse to provide them with a passage to - Europe, if they ask for one. This seems due to them, inasmuch as it - was the failure of the British flag to afford them protection which - lost them their passage on board the _Trent_. Of course if they go - in a mail packet, I shall take precautions against any risk of an - 'heroic' Captain applying the doctrines maintained here and bringing - the packet before an American Prize Court for adjudication. In any - case I shall give a caution to the Commander of the ship which takes - them, that they are not to be received with honours or treated - otherwise than as distinguished _private_ gentlemen. - - Those who have not seen the Americans near, will probably be much - more surprised than I am at the surrender of the prisoners. I was - sure from the first that they would give in, if it were possible to - convince them that war was really the only alternative. My - difficulty has been to make them aware that it was surrender or war, - without making such threats as would render the humiliation too - great to be borne. This was the object of my confidential - communications with Mr. Seward before I gave him your despatch. - -The main point having been gained, it remained to settle how the -surrender of the prisoners could best be carried out without causing -unnecessary ill-feeling and arousing a popular agitation which might -drive the United States Government into committing some high-handed -action in order to maintain itself. It was finally decided that, in -order to avoid the trouble which Mr. Seward feared from the inhabitants -of Boston, they should embark at Provincetown. They were accordingly -conveyed in an American ship from Fort Warren to Provincetown, and there -embarked on a British warship for Halifax, it having been expressly -stipulated that the transfer should not take place at night. From -Halifax they proceeded subsequently to Europe. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, Dec. 31, 1861. - - The Americans are putting the best face they can upon the surrender - of Slidell and Mason, and as far as has depended upon me I have done - everything to make the pill as easy to swallow as possible. But I - cannot disguise from myself that the real cause of the yielding was - nothing more nor less than the military preparations made in - England. They are horribly out of humour and looking out for some - mode of annoying us without danger to themselves. There is a talk of - discriminative duties on British goods, of a non-intercourse Act, - and other absurdities. What is more serious is a proposal, which it - is said will be introduced into Congress next week, to repeal the - Act for carrying into effect the Reciprocity Treaty. This would be a - direct breach of the treaty, and would of course be an indisputable - _casus belli_. It has often been suggested before, in the old belief - that we should bear anything rather than go to war with the U.S. I - hope they have had a lesson which will make them wiser. - - I cannot help fearing that it is as necessary as ever, nay more than - ever necessary, to be prepared to give a warm reception whether to - regular invaders or to filibusters from the U.S. who may make an - attempt upon Canada. In fact I am not reassured respecting the - maintenance of peace. For the present we have some security in Mr. - Seward. For he must do his best to maintain peace or he will have - made the sacrifice in the case of Mason and Slidell in vain. As in - that case, so in others, he sees now that besides the utter ruin of - the country, a war with us would give the ascendancy to the ultra - party who are opposed to him in the Cabinet and in Congress. He - fears too, and with great reason, that it would throw the country - into a state of anarchy, in which chiefs of a totally different - frame of mind from him would have the upper hand. But he may be - swept away, or, if he find it impossible to hold his position or his - own principles, turn round and play a desperate game with the - ultras. I have given him the opportunity of offering amends - spontaneously in three rather awkward matters, and, as you will see - by my despatches, he has been prompt in seizing it. - - On reading his enormous note at leisure, I find that it is much more - of an apology than I thought from the hurried perusal which was all - I had time to give to it before I sent it off to you. But with your - letters before me, I should have taken much less _ad referendum_; - for the surrender of the prisoners is after all the main question. - On the other hand, I should not have gone out of my way to declare, - on my own responsibility, that the note was perfectly satisfactory, - unless it had contained a formal apology in plain words. - - I have a better opinion of the Boston mob than Mr. Seward has, and - should have had very little fear of the prisoners being insulted, if - I had taken them from Fort Warren directly on board a British - man-of-war. I am not sorry however to spare the Bostonians (who are - among the most friendly to us of the Americans) what they might - consider a mortifying and humiliating spectacle. I have at Mr. - Seward's request not made the name of the place at which the - prisoners are to be transferred generally known. Indeed, I found - that many people were going to Boston to be present on the occasion, - and there is no advantage in having a crowd or a sensation about it. - -It is sad to record that some of the American clergy showed a most -unchristianlike spirit in connection with the termination of the _Trent_ -case; the following remarkable prayer uttered in the Senate affording an -instructive example:-- - - * * * * * - - Thirty-Seventh Congress--Second Session. - In Senate--Monday, December 30, 1861. - - [Prayer by Revd. Dr. Sunderland.] - - O Thou, just Ruler of the world, in this hour of our trial, when - domestic treason stabs at the nation's heart, and foreign arrogance - is emboldened to defeat the public justice of the world, we ask help - of Thee for our rulers and our people, that we may patiently, - resolutely, and with one heart abide our time; for it is indeed a - day of darkness and reproach--a day when the high principle of human - equity, constrained by the remorseless sweep of physical and armed - force, must for the moment succumb under the plastic forms of soft - diplomacy. Yet, in the face of this, will we not be shaken in our - conviction that Thou art ever with him who, in the interest of human - liberty and the Christian faith, by all the means in his power works - righteousness and defends the truth. - - O God, give to this our nation honesty, unity and courage; bring - this unnatural rebellion to a speedy end; and then prepare us to - assert upon a broader scale, and with a vaster force, the - inalienable rights and responsibilities of man: through Jesus - Christ. Amen. - -Upon the whole, except for occasional manifestations of ill-humour, such -as, for instance, a resolution in the House of Representatives in favour -of creating a great navy to 'defend the seas from the sway of an -arbitrary trident,' the surrender was taken quietly, and Mr. Seward -handsomely acknowledged the great consideration which had been shown by -Lord Lyons in his conduct of the negotiations. - -Congratulations now began to pour in upon him, and Lord Russell wrote -that nothing could have been better than his conduct, and that his -patience, forbearance, and friendly discretion had gone far to secure -the favourable result obtained. Another communication from Lord Russell -intimated that the Queen, 'taking into consideration the judgment and -conciliatory temper which you have shown in your negotiations at -Washington, especially in regard to the _Trent_, has directed that you -should be raised to the rank of G.C.B. - -In acknowledging these congratulations, Lord Lyons disclaimed having -performed any brilliant or striking service. The only merit which he -attributed to himself was that of having laboured quietly and sedulously -to smooth over difficulties and to carry out the instructions he -received from the Foreign Office. Writing to Mr. Hammond, he explained -that he had resisted the temptation 'to do something' 'which always -besets one when one is anxious about a matter'; and that from the first -he had been convinced that the more quiet he kept the better would be -the chance of the instructions from home producing their effect. To -other correspondents he expressed the view that it was the British -military preparations which had turned the scale in favour of peace. - -It would, of course, be an exaggeration to attribute solely to Lord -Lyons the credit of having successfully prevented the calamity of a war -between England and the United States. That credit is in reality due to -others as well as to himself: to the Home Government for their prompt -and decisive precautions, to the Prince Consort for his timely -interposition, to the French Government for their loyal support at a -critical moment, and to the good sense eventually displayed by the -Americans themselves. But no one reading the _Trent_ correspondence can -fail to realize that the issue of peace or war depended to a great -extent upon the method in which the British representative at Washington -carried out his task, and that the slightest error in judgment on his -part would have rendered the conflict inevitable. - -In after years Lord Lyons frequently expressed the opinion that if there -had then been telegraphic communication across the Atlantic it would -have been impossible to avert war, and it is more than likely that he -was correct, although it is improbable that many people realized it at -the time. - -It is also evident that a judicious silence may occasionally be of -inestimable value. It not unfrequently happens that taciturnity is -mistaken for profundity-- - - 'O, my Antonio, I do know of those, - That therefore only are reported wise - For saying nothing.' - -and many a diplomatist and many a politician has gained a reputation for -excessive sagacity by possessing sufficient good sense to conceal his -ignorance by maintaining silence, but the restraint which enabled Lord -Lyons to refrain from saying a single word upon a question over which -the whole population of the United States was buzzing for six or seven -weeks was little else than an inspiration. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -COURSE OF THE CIVIL WAR - -(1862-1865) - - -Although the immediate danger of war between England and America had at -all events temporarily vanished, and the United States Government had -put a good face upon the matter, it was only natural that a soreness -should remain; nor did the slowness of military operations tend to -restore that government to a more equable frame of mind. Much of the -enthusiasm which marked the outbreak of hostilities had already -evaporated, but the hatred of the South had continued to grow in -intensity, and although the latter was undoubtedly suffering great -hardships and privations, there was no sign of failing courage, and -every prospect of a long and bitter contest. The difficulty of finding -men for the Northern army continued to increase; the prospect of having -to raise twenty or thirty millions sterling in taxes from a people -unaccustomed to pay any apparent taxes at all for Federal purposes was -particularly unpleasant, more especially as there appeared to be no -immediate probability of a striking military success; and it was not -surprising that the country showed signs of great depression. Under -these circumstances, a marked division of parties in the North began to -show itself. One, which may be termed the Revolutionary Party, was in -favour of prosecuting the war at all hazards and by all means; of -proclaiming the immediate abolition of slavery in the South; promoting a -servile insurrection there; turning out the Cabinet, and even deposing -the President if he proved to be an obstacle; keeping Congress -permanently in session to spur on the Government, and the Generals, -maintaining a paper currency by inflicting heavy penalties for -depreciating it, and so on. The Foreign Policy of this party consisted -in a return to reckless conduct and language towards Europe in general, -and an attempt to obtain the support of France against England. - -On the other side, however, were now ranged the President, Mr. Seward, -and the more moderate men. Mr. Seward had now, strange to say, become a -kind of guarantee for peace, for after the concessions he had made, a -foreign war would have been fatal to his reputation, and it was only -fair to assume that his conversion to a more moderate course was -genuine. Still there was danger to England from both sides. If the party -of violence should show itself reckless enough to risk anything, the -moderate party might conceivably provoke a foreign war either as an -excuse for giving up the contest with the South, or to divert popular -irritation after having abandoned the contest as hopeless. - -Meanwhile, Mr. Seward's demeanour towards England had changed so much -that, early in 1862, his friendliness had become actually embarrassing. -Quite a considerable force, according to British standards, amounting to -something like 12,000 men, had been already despatched, or were under -orders to proceed to Canada, and Mr. Seward now made the surprising -offer that these troops and stores should be landed at Portland, a port -in the United States, and sent overland to Canada. However well meant -the invitation, it would manifestly have been most imprudent to accept -it. It must have been plain to the densest understanding that these -troops and stores were only being sent to Canada in order that we might -be prepared, if unhappily a rupture should take place between England -and the United States. Therefore, if troops and stores so conveyed were -eventually used against the United States, there would have been a -violent outcry of treachery against us throughout the country. The -danger, too, of some unpleasant incident occurring during the landing or -during the passage of the trains with which it would be impossible to -deal, was so obvious, that the invitation was declined with thanks. Too -much love is sometimes almost more inconvenient in diplomacy than -hatred. - -Mr. Seward's anxiety, at this time, however, to show himself a friend to -England continued, and he took particular care to point out, in proof of -his new attitude, that up till the last moment (December 26) he had been -the only person in the Government who was in favour of the surrender of -Slidell and Mason, and that President Lincoln had been opposed to -surrender and was in favour of arbitration only. In fact, Mr. Seward -appeared to be seized with the desire of overwhelming not only England, -but France as well, with demonstrations of friendship and confidence, -and it is perhaps not uncharitable to assume that two reasons were -contributory causes to this agreeable change of tactics. One of these -was that the appearance of a good understanding with these two Powers -would exercise a beneficial influence upon the money market; the other -was the fear of one or both of them recognizing the South and breaking -up the blockade. Probably Mr. Seward's fears of French interference were -increased by a visit paid by M. Mercier, in the spring, to Richmond, the -Confederate Headquarters. M. Mercier, whether instructed from home or -not, was bent upon this visit, which the United States Government could -not prevent, but which they could hardly be expected to view with -favour, and after the manner of French diplomatists of the period, he -was probably unable to resist the temptation of trying to effect a -striking _coup_, although there was not the slightest reason to suspect -him of any disloyalty to his English colleague. Lord Lyons wisely -declined to accompany him, and prophesied that he would end by getting -into trouble, which proved to be the case, for the journey naturally -gave rise to all sorts of comments. As will be seen from the following -letter, both M. Mercier and Mr. Seward drew incorrect conclusions from -the information derived during this visit; the former being convinced -that the subjugation of the South was an impossibility, and the latter -confidently believing that the end of the war was close at hand. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, April 23, 1862. - - M. Mercier came back from Richmond yesterday. He went soon after his - arrival to see Mr. Seward and came afterwards to me. He is persuaded - that the confidence and the resolution of the Confederates are - increased rather than diminished by recent events. If they are - worsted anywhere they will still not surrender. They will destroy - their stores of cotton and tobacco, and all other property which - they cannot remove. They will retire into the interior of their - country and defy the North to follow them. They will endure any - privations and sufferings rather than be again united to the North. - Their unanimity and devotion to the cause are wonderful. They are - not carrying on a war in the usual manner for dominion as the North - is: they consider themselves to be fighting for their homes and - their liberty, and are making and are ready to make any sacrifices. - - Such is the impression which M. Mercier says was made upon him by - what he saw and heard. - - I asked him whether he had obtained any specific information as to - the extent of the naval and military resources of the Confederates. - He said that they admitted that they were in want of arms and - ammunition, and said that but for this they could keep a very much - larger army in the field. They had no difficulty about men. On the - contrary, they had more than they could arm. They had another - 'Merrimac' nearly ready at Norfolk: they had an iron-plated vessel - on the James River: they had iron-plated vessels nearly ready at New - Orleans. If they lost New Orleans and all the seaboard, they would - be as far from being subdued as ever. - - I inquired of M. Mercier whether he had entered upon any particular - matter of business with the members of the Confederate Government. - He said he had avoided the appearance of having come to transact - business: that the French tobacco would be spared if the rest was - burnt, provided it could be distinguished and separated from that - belonging to private persons. - - I asked M. Mercier if anything had passed on the subject of the - position of the Consuls. He said that if the idea of calling upon - them to take out exequaturs from the Confederate Government had ever - been entertained, it was now abandoned; there appeared to be a very - good disposition towards foreigners in general; less good perhaps - towards the English as a nation than others, perhaps because more - had been expected from that country than from any other, and the - disappointment had consequently been greater. On the other hand, the - Confederate leaders professed to have abandoned all expectation of - succour from Europe: indeed, they declared that all they desired was - such an interruption of the blockade as would enable them to get - arms. - - M. Mercier said that he was more than ever convinced that the - restoration of the old Union was impossible; that he believed the - war would, if the Powers of Europe exercised no influence upon it, - last for years; that he thought that in the end the independence of - the South must be recognized, and that the governments of Europe - should be on the watch for a favourable opportunity of doing this in - such a manner as to end the war. The present opportunity would, - however, he thought, be peculiarly unfavourable. - - I did not express any opinion as to the policy to be eventually - pursued by France or England, but I entirely agreed with M. Mercier - that there was nothing to do at the present moment but watch events. - - This morning Mr. Seward spoke to me about M. Mercier's journey. He - said that M. Mercier had, probably without being altogether aware of - it himself, obtained very valuable information for the U.S. - Government. He himself was quite convinced from M. Mercier's account - of what had passed, that the Confederates were about to make a last - effort: that they had their last armies in the field; and that their - last resources were brought into action. Their talking of retiring - into the interior was idle. If the U.S. were undisputed masters of - the border states, including Tennessee, and of the sea coast, there - would be no occasion for any further fighting. Anybody who liked to - retire into the interior was welcome to do so and stay there till he - was tired. Mr. Seward went on to say that he had had some difficulty - in preventing M. Mercier's journey making an unfavourable impression - upon the public. With this view he had caused it to be mentioned in - the papers that M. Mercier had had a long interview with him on his - return from Richmond; he had in the evening taken M. Mercier to the - President, which also he should put in the newspapers: to-night he - was to dine with M. Mercier to meet the captain of the French ship - of war which had brought M. Mercier back: to-morrow the President - would pay a visit to that ship. - - I suppose the truth lies somewhere between M. Mercier's views of the - prospects of the South and Mr. Seward's. Mr. Seward was of course - anxious to weaken any impression M. Mercier's language may have made - upon me. - - The Slave Trade Treaty has met with much more general approval than - I expected. It has excited quite an enthusiasm among the - Anti-Slavery party. I have never seen Mr. Seward apparently so much - pleased. Mr. Sumner, who has had the management of it in the Senate, - was moved to tears when he came to tell me that it had passed - unanimously. - -As had been foreseen and pointed out to M. Mercier, the most -unsatisfactory result of his visit was the impression it produced that -France was disposed to act independently of England, but there is no -evidence to show that such were the intentions of the French Government -at the time, and M. Mercier himself always showed himself to be a most -frank and honest colleague. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, May 16, 1862. - - The Government here is very much disquieted by the rumoured - intentions of England and France with regard to intervention. This - is not altogether without advantage, as they are more disposed to be - considerate, or, at all events, civil, when they have doubts about - us, than when they feel sure of us. They are more civil to France - than to England partly because they are more doubtful about her, and - partly because they never will have, do what she will, the same - bitterness against her as they have against England. Mr. Seward is - encouraged by some of his English correspondents to believe that the - Mexican affair will produce a serious disagreement between England - and France. - - M. Mercier thinks it quite within the range of possibility that the - South may be victorious both in the battles in Virginia and in - Tennessee. He is at all events quite confident that whether - victorious or defeated they will not give in, and he is certainly - disposed to advise his Government to endeavour to put an end to the - war by intervening on the first opportunity. He is however very much - puzzled to devise any mode of intervention which would have the - effect of reviving French trade and obtaining cotton. I shall - suppose he would think it desirable to go to great lengths to stop - the war, because he believes that the South will not give in until - the whole country is made desolate, and that the North will very - soon be led to proclaim immediate emancipation, which would stop the - cultivation of cotton for an indefinite time. - - I listen and say little when he talks of intervention. It appears to - me to be a dangerous subject of conversation. There is a good deal - of truth in M. Mercier's anticipations of evil, but I do not see my - way to doing any good. - - * * * * * - - The credit of the Government has been wonderfully kept up, but it - would not stand a considerable reverse in the field. It is possible - under such circumstances that a peace party might arise, and perhaps - just _possible_ that England and France might give weight to such a - party. However, all this is a mere speculation. We are (as usual) on - the eve of a crisis which is to clear up everything. - -A threatened breakdown in health, due chiefly to overwork, forced Lord -Lyons reluctantly to apply for leave to return to England before the -severe heat of a Washington summer had set in, and in making the -application he pointed out that during the three years which had elapsed -since his arrival in the United States he had only been absent for four -nights from Washington, with the exception of the two months during -which he was officially in attendance on the Prince of Wales. The work -in fact was incessant, the staff of the Legation scanty, and things were -not made easier by the autocratic Hammond, who suddenly recalled one of -the attachés to London, that enlightened bureaucrat being apparently -quite incapable of realizing that a young man's time might be more -profitably employed at Washington during the Civil War than in preparing -for some perfunctory and trumpery examination which could perfectly well -have been undertaken at any subsequent period. The appeals to the -autocrat of the Foreign Office for assistance are as pathetic as they -are moderate. 'I conjure you to send me out two or at least one good -working attaché as soon as possible. Brodie is completely out of health; -Warre is always prostrated by the abominable heat of this place; Monson -can do a great deal, but his constitution is not of iron; and as for -myself I cannot do much Chancery work in addition to my proper duties. -Indeed, I shall soon break down. What you see of our work gives a very -small idea of the amount of it. It seems to me that everybody North and -South who gets into trouble discovers that he or she is a -non-naturalized British subject.' - -Nor were any high qualifications demanded. Geniuses were not in request. -'What we want is a good steady industrious copier, _well conducted in -private life_. I have no objection to quite a young one; such a man as -Jenner would suit me perfectly. Anderson, Monson, and I are all -sufficiently well up in ordinary Chancery management to make it -unnecessary to have more genius or more experience than is required for -copying.' - -Writing to his old chief Lord Normanby, the confession is made that -Washington 'is a terrible place for young men; nothing whatever in the -shape of amusement for them, little or no society of any kind now; no -theatre, no club. I have no time to think whether I am amused or not.' - -Being constitutionally incapable of exaggeration, this last statement -may be accepted as literally accurate. - -Leave for three months having been granted, the sanguine Mr. Seward did -not fail to draw hopeful conclusions from the circumstance, and there -appeared to be no sign of immediate trouble in the near future. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, June 9, 1862. - - I was so unwell yesterday that I was unable to do anything, which - has prevented my sending you by this mail some general information - on the prospects of the war and some other matters. - - I did not think that Mr. Seward would object to my going. He has, in - fact, taken up the idea with so much enthusiasm that I have been - obliged to endeavour to check his anticipation of the wonders I am - to effect, or rather to make him understand that my own views, not - his, are those which I must express to you. - - I take his willingness that I should go as a sign that he does not - expect serious trouble, for I think that he would rather be in my - hands than those of a man new to him if he did. - - I am afraid that there are three things to which we must not blind - ourselves: - - 1. That we have a very small chance of getting cotton from this - country for a long time to come. - - 2. That there is no Union feeling in the South. - - 3. That the war has become one of separation or subjugation. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, June 13, 1862. - - I had quite an affectionate parting with the President this morning. - He told, as is his wont, a number of stories more or less decorous, - but all he said having any bearing on political matters was: 'I - suppose my position makes people in England think a great deal more - of me than I deserve, pray tell 'em that I mean 'em no harm.' He - does not pay much attention to foreign affairs, and I suppose did - not like to talk about them without Mr. Seward. I am to hear Mr. - Seward's last words at New York on Tuesday evening. I embark the - following morning, and hope to pay my respects to you in person a - few days after this letter reaches you. - - It is quite time for me to get away from this place. The heat to-day - is overpowering. - -Lord Lyons arrived in London about the end of June, and a letter to Mr. -Stuart who had been left in charge of the Legation at Washington shows -that he was considerably alarmed at the hostile feeling prevailing -throughout the country against the North, largely due to the inability -to obtain cotton, but also embittered by the tone of the American press. -As an instance of this feeling, alluding to the rumour that McClellan -had suffered a serious defeat, he adds: 'I am afraid no one but me is -sorry for it.' McClellan's misfortunes certainly provoked demonstrations -of pleasure in the House of Commons during an ill-timed debate which -took place in July, and a celebrated speech by Gladstone in which he -asserted that 'Jefferson Davies and the leaders of the South have made -an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made, what -is more than either--they have made a nation,' certainly tended to show -that however impartial the Cabinet intended to be, the sympathies of -England were to a great extent with the South. - -During his stay in England he was in constant communication with the -Cabinet, and the general belief of ministers was that whilst extremely -reluctant to interfere in any way in the American contest, interference -might be forced upon them. Mediation was again in the air, and M. -Mercier and the French Government thought that an opportunity had -arrived for proposing it. - -Lord Lyons, after having been detained by Lord Russell for the purpose -of additional consultations, set out again for Washington in October -accompanied by the late Sir Edward Malet, who remained for a -considerable period on his staff, and became one of his closest friends. -In fact, with the exception of the late Mr. George Sheffield, who was -already acting as his private secretary, and of the late Sir Michael -Hubert, who subsequently acted in the same capacity, it is doubtful -whether any other person of his acquaintance ever reached the same -degree of intimacy or shared his confidence to an equal extent. - -The visit to England had in no sense changed the policy of the British -Government towards the United States, and there were no fresh -instructions with regard to mediation, intervention, recognition of the -South, and the numerous other matters which occupied attention. Nor had -any essential change taken place in the situation in America, and Lord -Lyons, immediately after his return expressed the opinion that foreign -intervention, short of the use of force, would only make matters worse. -The indefatigable M. Mercier, however, in whose thoughts intervention -was always uppermost, was full of a new plan, although, with the violent -party predominant in the Cabinet, the moment did not appear propitious. -M. Mercier's idea was that France, with the consent and support of -England, should offer mediation alone. He thought that the difficulty -which the irritation against England threw in the way of mediation might -thus be avoided, while the fact of England supporting France would give -to France the weight of both Powers. According to his information, -Russia, probably from a desire to separate France and England, was -disposed to join France in offering good offices, but, independently of -other considerations, the presence of Russia might be an obstacle to the -success of his plan. It would take away from the offer of mediation the -element of intimidation, which, though kept in the background, must be -felt by the United States to exist. The mediation of all the European -Powers (France, England, Russia, and perhaps Prussia) would be a -different matter. It might have the effect of reconciling the pride of -the United States to negotiation with the South, and might, in certain -conjunctions, be usefully employed. But it would be more easy for the -Government of the United States to reject an offer from the four Powers -than from England and France, or from France only. England and France -had an obvious and pressing interest in putting an end to hostilities -and the means of supporting their counsels by their navies. - -Such was M. Mercier's plan, but he received little encouragement from -his British colleague, who had anticipated something of the kind, and -with habitual caution declined to pronounce any opinion until he had -received instructions from home. As a matter of fact, he had foreseen -this proposal when in England, and had obtained an assurance from Lord -Russell that it should be discussed by the Cabinet. - -The two following letters from Lord Russell to Lord Lyons show that -M. Mercier was really in accordance with his own Government. - - * * * * * - - Woburn Abbey, Nov. 1, 1862. - - The Emperor of the French wishes to offer peace to both parties, and - he says both parties will agree to peace, the one on the ground of - Union and the other on the ground of Separation! I fear we are no - nearer to peace, if so near, as we were a year ago. - - Seward's avowal to Mr. Stuart that he looks to mutual extermination - and the superior numbers of the North, in order to restore the - Union!!! is the most horrible thing I ever heard. - - Cobden, I fear, is right when he says that to preach peace to them - is like speaking to mad dogs. I am much less sanguine than I was, - but I shall be glad to hear your views on your return. Russia must - be a party to any thing done by us and France--if we do anything. - - * * * * * - - Woburn Abbey, Nov. 8, 1862. - - Flahault has been instructed to propose to us in conjunction with - Russia to ask North and South to suspend their war for six months. I - have not seen the despatch. - - We shall consider our answer on Tuesday next. - -The Emperor's proposal was declined by the British Government, and at -first peremptorily declined also by the Russian Government, but as soon -as the latter perceived, by a speech made by Lord Palmerston at the -Guildhall, that there was no chance of an acceptance of the proposal by -England a circular was issued, stating that if France persisted in her -intention, the Russian Minister at Washington would be instructed to -give it moral if not official support. Thus, as on many other occasions, -did Louis Napoleon's elaborate scheme vanish into space. - -One fresh difficulty which had arisen in the meantime was the diminished -influence of Mr. Seward with the President and his ministers. He -had become much more conciliatory in his dealings with foreign -representatives, but was apparently unable to carry his points with -other departments, and had fallen in public estimation by signing the -Abolition Proclamation which had been imposed upon him, in opposition to -all his views by the Radical party in the Cabinet. Towards the end of -the year it seemed quite probable that he would have to resign, and the -contingency was viewed with consternation, for although Mr. Seward had -very pronounced faults, he now represented the Moderate party, and his -departure would signify the surrender of President Lincoln to the Ultra -Radical party, prepared to risk everything, even to a foreign war, in -order to maintain itself in power. - -Upon the whole, there was every excuse for dissatisfaction with their -Government on the part of the Northern public. After about two years' -fighting the two main armies of the North and South remained in much the -same position, but, if anything, the balance of gain appeared to rest -with the South. New Orleans, it is true, had been captured, but the -invasion of Virginia had failed, and Richmond was as unapproachable as -ever. The North were the attacking party, and if they failed to advance -it was equivalent to a defeat. Disappointment and discouragement had -succeeded to confidence and enthusiasm, and if the contest imposed much -severer hardships upon the Confederates than upon their opponents, there -was no sign of faltering, and their spirit remained as high as ever. - -Before the end of 1862 the prices of ordinary articles in the -Confederate States had already greatly increased. As early as October, -according to the consular reports, the price of tea at Savannah was -sixteen dollars a pound; brown sugar sixty cents; loaf sugar -unobtainable, and the commonest brown soap seventy-five cents. At -Charleston, coal was unprocurable; black cloth fetched fifty-three -dollars a yard; shoes cost thirty-four dollars a pair; beer thirty -dollars a dozen; sugar a dollar a pound; butter a dollar and a half, and -the pound sterling was worth fourteen dollars. In view of these figures -it would be interesting to learn the cost of a banquet given by General -Ripley in December 1862, to some French officers at Charleston, at which -Consul Bunch, of revoked exequatur fame, was present, and which must -surely have been the most sumptuous meal ever partaken of in a besieged -town since the days of Belshazzar. - - * * * * * - - BILL OF FARE. - - Oysters on Shell. - - FISH. - Salmon, Anchovy sauce. - - SOUP. - Green Turtle. Oyster. - - RELEVÉES. - Fillet of Beef, braisé with Mushrooms, - Capon, with Truffes à la Regence. - - BOILED. - Leg of Mutton, Caper sauce, - Turkey, Celery sauce. - - COLD. - Boned Turkey, garnished with Jelly, - Chicken Salad, à la Française, - Game Pattie, with truffles, decorated with Jelly. - - ENTRÉES. - Sweet Breads, larded en croustade, sauce petits pois, - Fillets of Teal Duck, bigare, sauce Italienne, - Quails, braisés, sauce Champignons, - Snipe, broiled on Toast, - Fillets of Venison, sautés, sauce Poivrade, - Fried Oysters. - - RELISHES. - Sardines, Olives, Celery, Assorted Pickles, - Horseradish, Pickled Onions, Cranberry Jelly, - Worcestershire sauce. - - VEGETABLES. - Baked Sweet Potatoes, New Irish Potatoes, Mashed Potatoes, - Spinach, Cauliflowers, Turnips, Rice. - - ROAST. - Turkey, stuffed with truffles, Saddle of Mutton, - Baked Ham, Madeira sauce. - - GAME. - Wild Duck, Wild Turkey, Venison, with Jelly. - - PASTRY. - Plum Pudding, Brandy sauce. - Apple and Mince pies, Omelette Soufflée, Lady Fingers, - Vanilla Kisses, Sponge Cake, Cup Custard, Madeira Jelly. - - DESSERT. - Apples, Nuts, Coffee, etc. - -If, however, the South was feeling the effects of privation, the North -had no cause to rejoice. In September, 1862, Lincoln had issued the -preliminary proclamation of Emancipation, but the hope that it would -consolidate the North had not been realized. The second proclamation -appeared on January 1, 1863, and had no greater success, serving only to -exasperate the South still further and increasing the divisions in the -North. The Democratic party was afraid to declare openly for peace, but -disguised efforts in favour of it were now made, and it was sought to -induce some of the State Legislatures to pass resolutions in favour of -an armistice and a convention. Men of all shades of politics had lost -heart, but the most probable cause of peace seemed to be the -impossibility of raising or keeping together a great army unless the -national spirit could be raised by some striking military successes, -meanwhile the division of feeling in the North had reached such a -pitch that the patriots who had formerly clamoured for a foreign war to -reunite North and South were now calling for a foreign war to reunite -the North itself. - -The general demoralization induced M. Mercier to make yet another -attempt at mediation. Upon this occasion he was approached by the -well-known journalist, Mr. Horace Greeley, whose object it was to -ascertain whether the Emperor Napoleon could be relied upon as a real -friend to the United States in case of his being accepted as a mediator, -a 'real friend,' meaning, of course, one who would insist upon the -restoration of the Union. M. Mercier's fresh attempt met with no greater -success than before, nor was it surprising, for his action was based -upon an entire misconception. - -Being firmly convinced that the restoration of the Union was impossible, -he failed to realize that this must be the basis of all negotiations, -and although most people were heartily sick of the war and were not -prepared to refuse to the South all terms short of unconditional -surrender, they had not been brought to the point of acquiescing in a -cession of territory. - -The French proposal, with which we had been careful not to associate -ourselves, was, of course, declined by the American Government. Mr. -Seward re-established some of his popularity by the character of his -answer; distrust of the Emperor Napoleon increased, and the only party -which benefited in any way was England, for the increase in ill-feeling -towards France had the result of diminishing to some extent the -animosity against us, and M. Mercier himself was now almost as much -attacked in the press as the British Minister had been in the past. - -Early in the year, an incident occurred which might have had unpleasant -consequences had it not been promptly dealt with. In spite of the -endless embarrassments created by the blockade, the British Government -was sincerely anxious not to give the United States Government any -ground for complaint, and the Consuls had been continually enjoined by -Lord Lyons to adhere closely to the recognized rules of International -Law where a state of blockade existed. To his consternation he now -learnt that the Consul at Mobile proposed to send away from that port a -quantity of specie in a British man-of-war. 'I should be very much -alarmed,' he wrote, 'if I thought it likely that he would find a captain -of man-of-war as foolish as himself. I really could not answer for peace -if, in addition to the irritation about the _Alabama_, should come the -fury which would be excited, if it were shown that our men-of-war had -carried Confederate gold through the blockade. No proof that the money -was intended for, or even that it had been actually paid to, British -bondholders would ever convince people here that it had not been used to -purchase munitions of war.' Unfortunately a simple-minded captain had -been discovered by the Consul, and before it was possible to communicate -with him the specie had been shipped. This action, which was due solely -to stupidity, was impossible to defend, and would have provided the -American Government with a first-class grievance; clearly the best thing -to do was to anticipate any complaints, and consequently the Consul was -wisely dismissed before the matter became really public. The promptitude -with which this regrettable incident was dealt with contrasts favourably -with the difficulty which was experienced in persuading the American -Government to deal adequately with grievances arising out of the -proceedings of their own officials. - -At this period of the war innumerable complaints were received from -British Governors, Naval officers and Consuls with regard to the -arbitrary proceedings of United States cruisers, and it was plain that -these proceedings were largely due to the exasperation caused by the -exploits of the _Alabama_, and by the rumours that similar vessels were -being built in England for the Confederates. This exasperation was -perfectly natural, but not altogether reasonable, for it never seems to -have occurred to the Americans that the fault lay partly with their own -Navy. Great pressure was put upon President Lincoln to issue letters of -marque, and had privateers made their appearance and exercised -belligerent rights against neutral merchantmen, the difficulty of -preserving peace would have been increased tenfold. Mr. Seward was known -to be strongly in favour of the policy of issuing letters of marque, and -the matter was brought to the attention of Mr. Adams by Lord Russell, -who always appeared somewhat unnecessarily disposed to suspect Mr. -Seward of hostile intentions. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._ - - Chesham Place, March 14, 1863. - - I don't think Mr. Seward means to quarrel with us, but perhaps he - will bluster rather more when he has lost the support of Congress. - - Adams told me that the privateers, if sanctioned at all, were not - intended to interfere with nice questions of International Law, but - only to encounter the _Alabama_ and other vessels of that sort. - If this be so I doubt if they will be fitted out at all, but if - they are fitted out I think they will not keep their hands off - English merchant ships. - - We have no thoughts of recognizing at present. If you are asked our - intentions by Seward, say that our opinion is that the Republican - Party ought not to leave the glorious work of peace to the - Democrats, but as a Neutral Power, our intention and wish is to let - the war work itself out, as it is sure to do by the moral exhaustion - of the war spirit. - - Our procession and wedding went off splendidly. The Princess of - Wales is charming and would make New York stand on tiptoe to behold - her. - -In a further conversation with Mr. Adams he made the significant remarks -that if the contemplated privateers sought for Confederate merchant -ships they would not find any, and that if they interfered with neutral -vessels and the law of blockade they would probably involve their own -and the British Government in 'very awkward questions.' - -Lord Russell, in spite of his sincere and often proclaimed desire to -remain absolutely impartial, hardly seems at this time to have realized -the disastrous consequences of not having prevented the departure of the -_Alabama_ and similar vessels. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, March 28, 1863. - - The outcry in America about the _Oreto_ and the _Alabama_ is much - exaggerated, but I must feel that her roaming the ocean with English - guns and English sailors to burn, sink and destroy the ships of a - friendly nation, is a scandal and a reproach. I don't know very well - what we can do, but I should like myself to refer the question of - indemnity to an impartial arbiter. - - When things are more advanced towards a termination, I think this - might be done. It would be dangerous to do it at present, or even - to hold out hopes of it. I will think further of it, and if I remain - in the same mind, will submit the question to the Cabinet. - - The _Peterhoff_ and the _Magicienne_ are now before the Law - Officers. I will send you instructions about them next week. The - seizures by Admiral Wilkes seem like a plan to embroil our two - countries. He always protests that such is not his object, but his - acts do not agree with his words. - - I should like anything better than being obliged to take the part of - the Confederates. But then President Lincoln must not be getting up - war cries to help his declining popularity. - -The two vessels alluded to had been captured on their way to Matamoros, -in Mexican territory, and the British Government contended that the -traffic to that place was legitimate, while the United States Government -maintained, probably with justice, that the goods were intended for -Texas. Matamoros, which was situated on the Rio Grande, separating -Mexico from the United States, sprang into prominence in 1862 in -consequence of the war, became the seat of a brisk trade, and provided -one of the numerous difficulties arising out of the blockade, which had -now been greatly extended owing to the rapid development of the Federal -Navy. - -As for Admiral Wilkes, the hero of the _Trent_, his arbitrary conduct -was the subject of continual complaints; he showed marked discourtesy in -connection with H.M.S. _Barracouta_, and upon one occasion a cruiser -under his command went so far as to fire a shot across the bows of -H.M.S. _Cygnet_, and as the long-suffering British Admiral Sir A. Milne -observed, to fire a shot across the bows of a neutral ship of war when -hove to, was going a step further in the already uncourteous proceedings -of the American cruisers. Admiral Wilkes always disclaimed any -intention of unfriendliness, but his proceedings were a fruitful source -of irritation, and Lord Russell certainly conceived the impression that -he and his official chief, Mr. Welles, were bent upon picking a quarrel -with us. - -Feeling between the two countries was not improved by the inopportune -publication of a Blue Book. The Democrats, who had been faring badly, by -some mysterious process of reasoning, came to the conclusion that the -object was to destroy them and denounced Lord Russell for having lost -them an election in Connecticut by his Machiavellian proceedings. They -vented their indignation upon the Legation at Washington, and the -position of the minister became more and more unpleasant, added to which -his health again showed signs of giving way. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, April 13, 1863. - - I have written as much as I have time and strength for officially. I - have been unwell all the last week, but not seriously so. I think - the state of things here, as far as peace with us is concerned, more - alarming than it has been since the Trent affair. They are not a - people who can be soothed by concessions, and they are a people who - after any amount of bluster will give in if they think that their - opponents are in earnest and are stronger than they. I would rather - the quarrel came, if come it must, upon some better ground for us - than the question of the ships fitted out for the Confederates. The - great point to be gained, in my opinion, would be to prevent the - ships sailing, without leading the people here to think that they - had gained their point by threats. I am in trouble altogether, for - the good will to me personally, which had miraculously survived so - long, seems at last to have sunk altogether under the stroke of the - last Blue Book. - -It must have been peculiarly irritating, after all the efforts he had -made, to find them neutralized by the clumsy action of the Home -Government, but in his private correspondence there occur no expressions -of resentment against those who had thus weakened his position, probably -because his sense of discipline and loyalty to his official chiefs was -so strong as to preclude anything in the nature of criticism. It is -customary, before publishing Blue Books on Foreign Affairs, to consult -both the Foreign Government concerned and the British representative -accredited to it, but presumably in this case the usual practice was not -observed. - -In one direction, however, there was an improvement. The British -Government tardily realizing the danger arising from the building of -Confederate cruisers in England took steps to prevent it, and the -situation was eased for the time being. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, April 24, 1863. - - So far as I can judge in this short time the Americans have eagerly - grasped at the intelligence of the endeavours to stop the - Confederate vessels building in England, as a relief from their - dread that they were really drifting into a war with us. I cannot - yet say whether the exasperation is subsiding. I have not much fear - that they will ever put a _casus belli_ to us, but I do fear that - they may force us to make demands upon them to which, however - plainly just, party considerations may render it difficult for the - administration to yield. I seem to be getting on pretty well again - with Mr. Seward, but not with others since the Blue Book, and Mr. - Seward cannot control the feelings or the actions of the other - members of the administration either as regards England or her - Representative here personally. However, for the moment, things - certainly look more peaceful than they did a week ago. I mean - peaceful towards us, for there are no symptoms of an approaching end - of the civil war. - -One danger at any rate was removed, at all events temporarily, for the -American Government determined not to proceed with the issuing of the -letters of marque. The chief danger, however, lay not so much in the -exasperation caused by the Confederate ships as in the proceedings of -the United States cruisers, and it was feared that a repetition of such -seizures as those of the _Peterhoff_ and _Magicienne_ might rouse such a -feeling of indignation in England that it might become necessary to put -forward demands for redress which the Americans would be too angry to -comply with. For some reason, too, the relations between the British -Legation and the Navy Department (perhaps owing to Mr. Welles's -anti-English proclivities), were much less satisfactory than was the -case with the other Government offices, and whenever an American naval -officer had been admittedly in the wrong, explanation, regret, or -redress were generally postponed so long (as in the case of the _Trent_) -that the United States Government found itself in the position of having -either to make a marked concession to England, or to run the risk of -refusing just demands. Lord Lyons's usual practice was to leave the door -open for spontaneous action on their part up to the last moment, and to -abstain from making anything like a demand or even an embarrassing -observation for as long as possible; but his difficulties in dealing -with such questions were increased by a quarrel between Mr. Seward and -Mr. Welles. Mr. Seward, to do him justice, generally seems to have -exercised a pacific influence, but party spirit ran so high, and the -Democrats detested him so cordially, that even those who were known -to be friendly towards England could not resist the temptation of -denouncing his 'humiliating concessions to British arrogance' when -they got the opportunity. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Admiral Sir A. Milne._ - - Washington, May 11, 1863. - - I have given Mr. Seward verbally a warning from H.M. Government that - the impression which prevails in England that the United States are - systematically endeavouring by fair means and by foul to stop our - trade with Matamoros is producing very dangerous effects. Mr. Seward - said that he should be able to give very satisfactory assurances on - this head. I observed to him that I thought some decided practical - steps were necessary to do away with this impression. I reminded him - of his previous assurances and of his instructions to the Navy - Department, and pointed out those instructions were apparently set - at nought by the U.S. officers. I said that the great point was to - make the subordinate officers feel the effects of the displeasure of - the Government, when they violated neutral rights; that it was not - likely the naval officers would pay much attention to the assurances - given by the Government to Foreign Powers, and that it was not to be - expected that they would pay much attention to formal instructions - to themselves, if they found that they could practically violate - them with impunity. The Government ought, I said, to remove its - subordinates from situations in which they were peculiarly exposed - to temptations to make an unlawful use of belligerent powers. I told - Mr. Seward that I should regard another questionable seizure of a - British merchant vessel in the neighbourhood of St. Thomas, or - another questionable seizure anywhere of a British vessel bound to - Matamoros, as little less than a calamity. - - I trust that I made so much impression as to render it probable that - these matters will be arranged for the present, as far as _words_ - go, and that something will be done to check the vexatious - proceedings of the cruisers. What this Government ought to do is to - remove their ships from St. Thomas altogether and recall Admiral - Wilkes. I have not however much confidence in their doing anything - really effectual. Many of the naval officers would like a war with - England. They know well enough that it would not be a naval war, but - they are envious of Captain Semmes and the _Alabama_, and would - rather roam about picking up prizes, than go on with the dull and - harassing work of blockading. Then the universal exasperation in the - country against England makes the Government unwilling and afraid to - do anything which looks like a concession to us. Thus things are in - a dangerous state, and it will be a great comfort to me to be within - reach of you by telegraph. - - If any more privateers get out of our ports, the Government here may - be forced by public clamour to issue letters of marque somewhat - suddenly. Mr. Seward has verbally promised to give us notice, but - this is a very vague assurance: of course it will not do for me to - discuss beforehand any particular arrangements about them, because - this would imply acquiescence in their being issued, which we are - far from wishing to signify beforehand. - - I have been unwell for more than a month, and am beset by a quantity - of small vexatious business concerning the wrongs of British - subjects who have suddenly proclaimed their unswerving loyalty to - the British Crown and demanded my protection. - - Many thanks for your private letter. You will think that I am trying - to make up for the quality of my information by quantity of writing. - The fact is I am too much knocked up to be able to write shortly. - -The representations made with regard to Admiral Wilkes, partly owing to -the good offices of Mr. Seward, at length produced a satisfactory -result, and that enterprising officer was promoted to a command in the -Pacific, much doubtless to the relief of all concerned. Lord Lyons was -extremely careful to conceal the fact that he had been in any way -instrumental in obtaining this transfer, and congratulated himself upon -the advent of a temporary lull in the storm against England: a lull, -however, which the escape of another _Alabama_ from Liverpool, of a -considerable Federal success or even a mere accident, might convert into -an even more furious tempest. - -Two years previously Mr. Seward had announced that the policy of the -United States, unlike that of other countries, was 'based on high and -eternal consideration of principle and the good of the human race,' but -aliens resident in America, and more especially Englishmen, might have -been excused for complaining that this lofty and inspiring ideal was -accompanied by a vast amount of inconvenience and hardship. - -Foreigners who have taken up their abode in a country where a state of -war prevails are naturally subjected to much that is objectionable to -them, in the natural course of things, and as a general rule find it -extremely difficult to obtain redress, for whilst they remain in a -country which is not their own they must submit to any exceptional -legislation which the force of circumstances may require. Foreign -Governments are not in a position to decide whether this exceptional -legislation is justifiable or not, and the utmost that the alien can -expect is, either that he should be allowed time to depart, or that his -Government should protect him by remonstrance or otherwise when he is -dealt with illegally; and the general principle which is usually adopted -is that foreign interference should be as sparing as possible and that -the foreigner should take his chance with the native citizen. - -It was not long before foreigners in the United States were made to -realize the disadvantages of living in a country where civil war -prevailed. When hostilities began, the Government, reasonably enough, -took steps to suspend when necessary the ordinary law, that being a -practice almost invariably adopted by civilized countries under similar -circumstances. Persons suspected of disaffection or treason were -arbitrarily arrested, kept in prison under the authority of the -military, and detained there without trial; and amongst these were -occasionally _bonâ fide_ British subjects and others who claimed to -be such. Where martial law exists, it is only natural that occasional -cases of injustice or harshness should arise, and it is clear that a -certain number of British subjects suffered without due cause, but upon -the whole it does not appear the United States Government exercised its -powers with undue severity, or that it acted in a more arbitrary manner -than would have been the case with a European Power in a similar -position. - -In February, 1862, nearly all political prisoners, other than spies, -were ordered to be released on parole, and in April Lord Lyons was able -to report that although the Executive Government retained the power to -make political arrests it was rarely exercised. He stated that he was -not aware of any British subject being detained arbitrarily as a -political prisoner, and that although arrests without form of law were -still being made by the military authorities in places occupied by the -forces of the United States, they appeared to be confined in general to -persons accused of offences affecting, more or less, the discipline or -safety of the army. - -As was only to be expected, there were an enormous number of -applications made to the Legation by persons who were aggrieved by the -operation of martial law, but what gave far more trouble was the attempt -of the United States Government to exact military service from resident -British subjects. - -The established principle is that resident aliens, in return for the -enjoyment of ordinary civil rights, should be liable to discharge -certain duties in connection with the administration of justice and the -maintenance of order, and that in certain cases they may reasonably be -called upon to take part in the defence of the country against invasion. -On the other hand, the incorporation of aliens in the regular army or -navy is manifestly unjust, for it prevents departure from the country -and might conceivably incur the obligation of having to fight against -their own countrymen. This, it is true, is not applicable to a civil -war, but an alien might well argue that a civil war, waged between -citizens for an object in which he, as an alien, had no concern, was a -totally insufficient reason for dragging him into the contest. It is -difficult to believe, for instance, that the United States Government -would tolerate the compulsory service of American citizens in the army -of a South American Republic in the event of an attempt being made to -impress them during a civil war. Consequently, when hostilities began, -the Washington Legation was besieged by persons who desired to be -exempted from service by getting registered as British subjects, many of -whom had announced their intention of becoming American citizens at the -earliest opportunity. _Prima facie_ it seems only reasonable that -persons who deliberately exchange one nationality for another, more -especially if like many of the Irish emigrants they have professed -undying hostility to England, and everything English, should accept any -liability imposed upon them, but the question was complicated by the -fact that they had not acquired full rights of citizenship, the -naturalization of a foreigner in America, necessitating a residence of -five years in the United States, and a declaration of intention three -years in advance. - -Instructions upon this question were requested from Her Majesty's -Government before the war broke out, and in reply it was stated that -there was nothing in International Law which prohibited a Government -from requiring resident aliens to serve in the police or militia; if, -however, the militia were to be embodied for active service, and -substitutes were prohibited, then 'the position of British subjects -would appear to deserve very favourable consideration, and to call for -every exertion being made in their favour.' A similar opinion was -expressed in July, 1861. - -The difficulty really arose out of the defective military organization -of the United States, which was based upon the voluntary system. The -so-called voluntary system, which is in reality only a high-sounding -device to impose upon an impecunious minority what ought to be a general -obligation, may be an admirable institution in time of peace, but it -invariably breaks down in a really serious emergency, and it was the -totally inadequate nature of that system which forced both combatants in -the American Civil War to have recourse to all sorts of discreditable -expedients. - -It has already been stated that at the beginning of the war the American -regular army consisted of only 16,000 officers and men all told. -Immediately after the seizure of Fort Sumter, in April, 1861, President -Lincoln called out 75,000 militia, and in May he called for 42,000 -volunteers for three years, half of whom were to serve in the regular -army, and half in the navy. At first these appeals were responded to -with the greatest enthusiasm, but it was not long-lived, for, as has -been related, even as early as the battle of Bull's Run in July, militia -regiments insisted upon leaving at the completion of their period of -service, and from that date the difficulty in finding recruits continued -to increase. - -The pay of the privates was in May, 1861, raised to thirteen dollars a -month, which, however, may be considered low when compared with the five -shillings a day we paid to untrained men during the Boer War, and it -became clear that not only was it difficult to attract volunteers, but -also to keep them when obtained. In view of the methods employed in -recruiting them it was not surprising that the results were frequently -unsatisfactory. - -The usual method employed was to inform the Governor of a State of the -number of men required. The Governor having made the necessary -announcement, private persons came forward offering to raise regiments. -Each set forth his claims, his influence in the State or among a certain -portion of the population, and his devotion to the party in power. - -From the persons thus presenting themselves the Governor made his -choice. Generally the person upon whom the choice fell laid it down as -a condition that he should have the command of the regiment. The next -thing was to find soldiers. Friends seized with the same martial ardour -promised to bring so many recruits if they were made--the one a -Captain--another a Lieutenant--another a Sergeant, and so forth. The -framework was thus formed and partially filled up, and the regiment -being thus organized, the lists were carried to the Governor for his -approval. - -The inconveniences of such a system were obvious, and experience showed -that it was much less adapted, than had been supposed, for the purpose -of raising an efficient army. It was considered, however, to possess -certain political advantages, one of which was that there was little -fear of the officers ultimately forming anything like a separate -military or aristocratic caste. - -The real inconvenience of the system, however, was that sufficient men -were not forthcoming in spite of the inducements offered by means of -high pay, and the Government was forced to have recourse to all sorts of -iniquitous devices in order to get hold of so-called volunteers, many of -whom were foreigners. The most objectionable practice was that of giving -bounties to agents for bringing in recruits. The effect of this at the -beginning of the war was that great numbers of men deserted from the -British navy, and the Admiral at Halifax reported that at one time there -were a hundred deserters from one ship alone, the _St. Vincent_, but as -the contest progressed the bounty system was responsible for innumerable -cases of kidnapping in which British subjects were the sufferers. -Kidnapping especially flourished in New York where the emigrants were an -easy prey, and to such a point had corruption been carried that the -Governor admitted to the British Consul that out of every million of -dollars expended in bounties, fully four-fifths of the amount were -secured by bounty and substitute brokers and crimps. - - * * * * * - - 'The fraud and violence combined,' wrote Consul Archibald from New - York, 'which are now used in procuring recruits for both army and - navy are disgraceful, and it is idle for the authorities to think of - putting down the malpractices of the villains who carry on the - business of kidnapping recruits, or of making the world believe they - are sincere, while they hold out such inducements to these vagabonds - for carrying on their White Slave Trade and Black Slave Trade too. I - have numerous complaints, but, as in a great majority of cases the - victims, at last, succumb and take a portion of the bounty, for they - rarely get more than a portion, it would be unavailing to ask for - their release.' - - In the autumn of 1862, Fire Island was filled with unfortunates - cheated and deluded, or forced thither by the police who received - ten dollars a head for each man. Now in addition to the enormous - bounties offered, there is placarded in conspicuous places on the - walls of the New Park barracks at the City Hall the following very - suggestive notice: 'Fifteen dollars Hand Money given to any man - bringing a volunteer.' - -The following report from a Federal General shows that the strictures of -Consul Archibald were thoroughly justified. - - * * * * * - - _Important Letter from General Wistar._ - - VICTIMS OF THE BOUNTY SWINDLERS DESERTING IN LARGE NUMBERS,--EVILS - OF THE PLUNDERING SYSTEM ON OUR ARMIES IN THE FIELD, ETC. - - * * * * * - - Headquarters United States Forces, - Yorktown, Va., April 15, 1854. - - General--An extended spirit of desertion prevailing among the - recruits recently received from the North, in some of the regiments - of my command, has led me to make some inquiries resulting in - apparently well-authenticated information, which I beg respectfully - to communicate to you in this unofficial manner, deeming it required - by humanity, no less than by our common desire to benefit the - service. - - There seems to be little doubt that many, in fact I think I am - justified in saying the most, of these unfortunate men were either - deceived or kidnapped, or both, in the most scandalous and inhuman - manner, in New York city, where they were drugged and carried off to - New Hampshire and Connecticut, mustered in and uniformed before - their consciousness was fully restored. - - Even their bounty was obtained by the parties who were instrumental - in these nefarious transactions, and the poor wretches find - themselves on returning to their senses, mustered soldiers, without - any pecuniary benefit. Nearly all are foreigners, mostly sailors, - both ignorant of and indifferent to the objects of the war in which - they thus suddenly find themselves involved. - - Two men were shot here this morning for desertion, and over thirty - more are now awaiting trial or execution. - - These examples are essential, as we all understand; but it occurred - to me, General, that you would pardon me for thus calling your - attention to the greater crime committed in New York, in kidnapping - these men into positions where, to their ignorance, desertion must - seem like a vindication of their own rights and liberty. - - Believe me to be, General, with the highest esteem, your obedient - servant, - - * * * * * - - J. J. WISTAR. - - To Major-General John A. Dix, New York City. - -These outrages committed in the name of the Voluntary System, and many -of the victims of which were Englishmen, constantly took place even -after the Act of July, 1862, which provided for the enrolment in the -militia of all able-bodied citizens between the ages of eighteen and -forty-five, and it may be presumed therefore either that the United -States Government was afraid to enforce its laws or that the so-called -'volunteers' were chiefly foreign subjects. In any case, amongst -these unhappy victims were numerous British youths under twenty-one -years of age, and the efforts made to obtain their discharge on the -ground of their being minors were rarely successful and eventually -abandoned altogether. - -In the South, apparently, the state of things was equally bad, if not -worse; British subjects were imprisoned on all sorts of pretexts in -spite of Consular protection papers, and enlistment was frequently the -price of liberty. The Southern press was particularly scathing on the -subject of aliens, especially Irishmen who endeavoured to evade military -service. - - * * * * * - - We can conceive nothing more disgraceful than the conduct of - Irishmen, for example--but we trust they are few--who have been - cursing the British Government ever since they could talk, who have - emigrated to this country to escape the British Yoke, but who now - run to an English Consul and profess themselves subjects of Queen - Victoria in order to evade their duties in the land of their - adoption. We say that we fervently trust there are but few Irishmen - of whom this can be said, for such are a disgrace to their old - island, and bring the blush of shame to the cheek of their - compatriots who fight in our foremost ranks upon every field. Nobody - will be more pleased than our good Irish citizens if these fellows - are sent under guard to the camp. - - The attention of conscript officers is therefore called to the - foreign Consul's offices, to the railroad cars and the roads. - -The question of the liability to conscription of British subjects -naturally produced a voluminous correspondence. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, July 24, 1863. - - Military events, or at all events military news, have been scarce - during the last few days. The really important question seems to be - the enforcement of the Conscription Act. On the one hand we hear of - wide-spread plans of resistance to it, organized among the Germans, - as well as the Irish population in all parts of the Country; on the - other hand it is represented that the Government is determined to - enforce it at the point of the bayonet, and to begin at New York, as - soon as it can get things ready. We have as yet had no proof that - any serious resistance to the Government will be provoked by any - measures it may take. The Democrats at New York are, as might be - expected, frightened by the mob--they dare not encourage resistance - to the Conscription, lest they should let loose an uncontrollable - gang of plunderers. On the other hand, if the Government succeeds in - getting military command of New York there is very little chance of - any but the Government candidate's coming in as President when Mr. - Lincoln's term expires. - - British subjects are not the least violent in language about the - Draft, and are far from being pleased either with H.M. Government or - with H.M. Minister here. I have given myself a world of trouble to - make the burthen of proving their claim to exemption as light as - possible. If I have not succeeded as well as I ought, I have done - more than most people, who knew anything about the difficulties, - expected. I have written you a very long despatch about it--much - longer than I intended, but I thought it well to put something on - record to show that the matter had been properly attended to. I have - taken more pains myself about it, and given Mr. Seward more trouble - about it, than about any matter which I have had to treat with him. - - M. Mercier's absence has made it difficult to concert measures - speedily about the Cotton question, but his Secretary of Legation - and I intend to speak to Mr. Seward about it to-morrow. We do not - mean to go to Mr. Seward together. I have so little hope of - effecting anything practical, that I should hardly feel in earnest - about it, if it were a matter of less importance. As it is, I shall - of course do my best. As soon as this affair is in train, I hope to - set out for Canada. My present notion is to wait here for the - despatches from London of the 18th--which ought to arrive the middle - of next week--and to wait at New York for the despatches from London - of the 25th, and then, if they bring nothing to hinder it, to go on - to Quebec. I shall present Mr. Stuart as _Chargé d'affaires_ before - I leave Washington. It would be impossible to carry on the immense - amount of protection to British subjects' business here, without - some one on the spot who could write officially to the Government. - Mr. Stuart is both perfectly capable of managing difficult questions - himself, and perfectly willing to refer them to men higher in office - when it is proper to do so--a rare combination of merits. - -The question was finally decided to the satisfaction of His Majesty's -Government by a Proclamation of the President which allowed aliens a -period of sixty-five days, during which their departure was permitted, -and interference on behalf of persons who had failed to take advantage -of the opportunity was subsequently refused. As for the difficulties -experienced by the United States Government, they seem to have been met -by enforcing conscription where it was possible, and delaying it where -serious opposition was feared. - -In August, 1863, a somewhat surprising proposal came from Mr. Seward. In -a confidential conversation with Lord Lyons he expatiated upon the -necessity of reviving a better feeling between Great Britain and the -United States, and of making some demonstration calculated to produce -the desired effect. England, he said, had made such a demonstration -before the war by the visit of the Prince of Wales, which had been -productive of the happiest results. Now it was the turn of the United -States to make a corresponding display of goodwill, but it was difficult -to devise the means of doing so, as the President could not travel, and -America possessed no Princes. Would Lord Lyons think the matter over? - -The latter, having duly reflected, expressed the opinion that there was -no real hostility to the United States in England, although there was -undoubtedly a certain amount of sympathy with the South, and that -consequently there was no necessity to take any extraordinary step. Mr. -Seward, however, having returned to his suggestion of making some -counter demonstration in the nature of the visit of the Prince of Wales. - - * * * * * - - 'The only conjecture I can make,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'is that he - thinks of going to England himself. He may possibly want to be - absent for some reasons connected with the Presidential contest. If - he thinks that he has himself any chance of being taken as a - candidate by either party he is the only man who thinks so at this - moment. It is however generally considered to be an advantage to a - candidate to be out of the country during the canvass. I cannot see - any good which his going to England could effect with regard to - public opinion. If he considered himself as returning the Prince of - Wales's visit, the absurdity of the notion would alone prevent its - being offensive. The majority of the Americans would probably be by - no means pleased if he met with a brilliant reception. He has, - besides, so much more vanity, personal and national, than tact, that - he seldom makes a favourable impression at first. When one comes - really to know him, one is surprised to find much to esteem and even - to like in him. It is however hardly worth while to say more on the - subject, for it is a mere conjecture of mine that he was thinking - of going to England when he spoke to me. It might however be of - advantage for me to know whether you would wish to encourage the - idea of some public demonstration or other, if he should return to - the subject when I get back to Washington. I told him that so far as - public opinion in England was concerned, the one thing to do was - to let us really have a supply of cotton; that without this - demonstrations and professions would be unsuccessful: that with it - they would not be required.' - -Whether Lord Lyons's conjecture was well founded or not, the prospect of -a visit from Mr. Seward possessed no charms for Lord Russell, whose -antipathy to the American Secretary of State has been already noted. The -following letter appears to be full of good sense and instructive as -regards the real value of those visits of exalted personages which -produce such illimitable enthusiasm in the press. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._ - - Oct. 2, 1863. - - Upon considering Mr. Seward's hints to you of doing something here - as an equivalent or a return for the Prince of Wales's visit to the - United States, I do not see my way to anything satisfactory. These - visits of Great Personages seldom have more than a transient effect; - they form no real and solid relation of friendship between nations, - though if undertaken at a fortunate moment, they serve to bring out - and demonstrate a friendship already existing. - - The visit of the Prince of Wales was thus fortunately well timed; - but if Mr. Seward or any conspicuous statesman of the United States - were to visit this country now he would find us all divided. The - Government would show him every attention and civility: the - Anti-Slavery party would probably make great show of sympathy by - addresses and public receptions. But the party who press for - recognition of the South would hold aloof, and in some unmistakable - manner, prove that there is a great deal of sympathy with the South - in this country. - - In these circumstances I do not think that any such mark of - friendship as Mr. Seward suggests would be likely to produce the - good effect of which he is desirous. Mr. Sumner's conduct is very - bad; he has taken infinite pains to misrepresent me in every - particular. I have done my best to counteract his efforts by my - speech at Blairgowrie. I don't know how far I may be successful, but - I rely on your constant watchfulness to prevent any rupture between - the two countries, which of all things I should most lament. - - The question of the ironclads is still under investigation. The - Cabinet must consider it very soon, and I have no doubt we shall do - all that is right to preserve our neutrality free from just - reproach--unjust reproach we shall not yield to. - - I hope you are now quite well, and as the heats must be over I trust - you will not suffer for the next six months from the climate of - Washington. - -Owing to continual ill-health, Lord Lyons was compelled to pay a visit -to Canada in the autumn, and upon his return to Washington in October, -accompanied by Admiral Milne, he found Mr. Seward in a more conciliatory -frame of mind than ever, chiefly owing to the detention of Confederate -ironclads in England. Mr. Welles and the lawyers at the Navy Department, -however, still 'appeared to be thoroughly wrongheaded and unable to see -that municipal law is one thing and International Law and the relations -between Governments another.' The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Chase, -engaged on an electioneering tour, distinguished himself by spirited -speeches, talking of 'taking Old Mother England by the hair and giving -her a good shaking,' and was himself outdone in rancour against England -by another distinguished politician, Mr. Sumner. There was in fact no -sign of change in the feeling of the people at large towards us, and the -visit of a Russian squadron to New York was made the occasion of an -anti-British and anti-French demonstration. - -Considering that the war had now lasted for several years, it seems -rather remarkable that the British Government had not thought it worth -while to send military or naval officers to watch the operations, but -judging from the following letter, the idea never seems to have occurred -that there was anything to learn. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, Nov. 3, 1863. - - I have no news of importance--political or military to write to-day. - The crisis at Chattanooga has not yet taken place, so far as we - know. - - I doubt whether people in Europe are aware of the extent of the - progress of this Country in military strength or of the preparations - which have been made for the contingency of a War with an European - Power. It is impossible for me to undertake to give anything like - detailed information on the subject; but it may be worth while for - Her Majesty's Government to consider whether it is important for - them to know what is really being done, and if so, what measures - will be best with a view to their obtaining regularly information - practically useful. I have no fancy for having a military or Naval - Attaché--and I am not certain how the appointment of one might be - taken here. It _might_ create suspicion--on the other hand it - _might_ be taken as a compliment. I am inclined to think that - Officers unconnected with the Legation sent quietly, but by no means - secretly, would learn most. But if the Legation is to be depended - upon for the information, it is absolutely necessary that there - should be in it some one having a professional knowledge both of - naval and military matters. I myself know as little of such matters - as any man--and were it otherwise, I have as much proper Diplomatic - business to do as I can manage. The correspondence with Mr. Seward, - which requires minute care in many cases, grows more and more - burdensome. New cases arise daily, and the old ones never seem to - come to an end. I have had considerably more than nine hundred notes - from Mr. Seward already this year. - - I don't think the Government here at all desires to pick a quarrel - with us or with any European power, but the better prepared it is, - the less manageable it will be. - -This suggestion was eventually acted upon as appears later. - -About this time, the mission to Europe of Messrs. Mason and Slidell -having failed in its object, the Confederate Government resolved upon -the expulsion of the British Consuls resident in the South, who were -informed that they could no longer be permitted to exercise their -functions, or even to reside within the limits of the Confederacy. -Doubtless the active part the Consuls had taken in endeavouring to -prevent the compulsory enlistment of British subjects contributed -towards this action, but the ostensible reasons were, firstly, that they -received their instructions from the British Minister residing in -Washington, and secondly, that Mr. McGee, the Consul at Mobile, had been -dismissed from his post because he had allowed specie intended for the -payment of interest on a State debt to be shipped from that blockaded -port to London on board of a British warship. In Lord Lyons's opinion -the action of Mr. Jefferson Davis's Government appeared reasonable. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, Nov. 17, 1863. - - Mr. Walker has sent me a copy of his despatch to you enclosing Mr. - Benjamin's letter to Mr. Slidell explaining the reasons to be given - for the expulsion. The objection to the Consuls being under the - orders of the Minister at Washington appears reasonable enough. As - you know, I have all along been of opinion that the connexion - between the Southern Consulates and the Legation was full of - inconvenience. The objection to Mr. Cridland's appointment, that it - was made by me, has, in fact, no other foundation than that your - orders to Mr. Moore on the subject were sent through me; in - transmitting them I took the precaution expressly to desire Mr. - Moore to word the appointment as one coming from H.M. Government - and not to mention me. - - Mr. Benjamin's lecture on the duty of Belligerents to pay their - debts is totally beside the purpose. Of course no one could have - wished more than I did that the British creditors should receive - their money. I wished that all British subjects should be able to - remove their property from the Confederate States, and most of all I - wished that an unlimited amount of cotton should be exported. What I - objected to was that a British Consul should engage himself in - committing a breach of blockade, and that a British man of war, - which had been admitted on the faith that she should carry away - nothing but despatches, should carry through the Blockade the very - article to the exportation of which the United States most objected. - It is rather cool of Mr. Benjamin to say that the United States - could not but have been glad that specie should be exported, when he - knew that at the time the great anxiety of the Confederates was to - get specie through the blockade to pay for their purchasers of - warlike stores in Europe, and that the great anxiety of the United - States was to prevent this. - -At the close of 1863 it became evident that the cause of the South was -failing, but the reverses of the Confederates seemed only to stimulate -them to fresh exertions, while President Davis's eloquent message in -December proclaimed that the patriotism of the people was equal to every -sacrifice demanded by their country's needs. - -In the preceding autumn, Mr. Seward, in pursuance of his laudable policy -of conciliation, had suggested that the Reciprocity Treaty with Canada, -which would expire shortly, might afford an opportunity of making a -friendly demonstration. His suggestion was that the British Government -should make inquiries from him on the subject of its renewal, but Lord -Russell, who was prone to regard him with suspicion, had not responded -to this advance with any favour. In the early part of 1864 it became -evident that the treaty was in considerable danger, and the Canadian -Government began to show signs of natural anxiety, especially in view of -the fact that a hostile motion was pending in Congress. The following -letters disclose the objections of the professional diplomatist to being -saddled with amateur assistants. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Viscount Monck._ - - Washington, Jan. 28, 1864. - - The Canadians appear to me to be acting unwisely about the - Reciprocity Treaty at this moment. Their true policy is to keep as - quiet about it as possible. The more they agitate, the more they - convince people here that the Treaty is a good bargain for Canada - and a bad bargain for the United States. The utmost we can ever - dream of doing now is to stave off a successful motion in Congress - calling upon the President to give the notice for abrogating the - Treaty. I doubt whether we shall be able to do this, but our only - chance lies in keeping quiet and endeavouring to induce the Executive - Government to exert its influence unostentatiously against the - motion. If the Executive Government can be induced to do so, it will - be by considerations connected with its relations with the Imperial - Government. The moment the question is treated as one between the - United States and the Provinces, all hope of maintaining the Treaty - vanishes. - - I cannot have a Canadian here supposed to be peculiarly in - my confidence on the subject. This would impose upon me a - responsibility which I cannot undertake. Directly there was the - least appearance of a Canadian being here in any such position, I - should feel bound to take decisive steps to show that the appearance - was false. My own opinion is that the Canadians will only do - themselves harm by coming lobbying here; but if they choose to do - so, they must do it entirely independently of me, and I would - suggest that any who came for this purpose should not be furnished - with letters of introduction to me, and should be advised not to - call upon me. - - At the same time, I think it right to say that I do not believe that - we shall find it possible to maintain the Treaty long after the U.S. - can abrogate it. The impression is very strong that it is a bad - bargain for them, and they will probably give the notice very soon - after the terms of the Treaty allow of their doing so, with a view - perhaps to negotiating another. If matters reach this point, it will - no doubt be very desirable that whoever negotiates the new Treaty - should be thoroughly informed on all the details of Canadian - commerce, and then will be the time for a Canadian Cobden to be sent - here. At present there are no questions of detail to be considered: - the only practical thing is to stave off the notice of the - abrogation as long as possible, and the only chance of doing this, - is, in my opinion, the exertion of the _Imperial_ influence. - - I very well understand the difficulty of keeping quiet when one is - very anxious on a subject, and the immense relief it is to be doing - something. I can also well understand that if there were a - discussion on the details of the Treaty, the Canadians would wish to - have an advocate better informed on the details than the British - Minister at Washington is ever likely to be, but the object now is - to _avoid_ discussion. - -It became necessary, however, to modify these views, for Mr. Seward -changed his mind, and whereas he had at first discountenanced the -presence of official and semi-official Canadian representatives he now -expressed himself in favour of their coming over privately and lobbying -Members of Congress, that being, in his opinion, an effective method of -promoting good relations between the two countries. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, Feb. 9, 1864. - - I am very sorry to say that the agitation against the Reciprocity - Treaty has gone on increasing, and that it now appears probable that - a Resolution calling upon the President to give as soon as possible - notice for abrogating it, will be passed by Congress. The Canadian - Ministers are very anxious to be doing something in the matter, in - order to cover their responsibility as regards their constituents - hereafter. They had a desire to send an agent here to advise with me - and to speak to the American Cabinet and to members of Congress. - This I have told Lord Monck privately, I will not hear of. I could - not undertake to keep the peace for a month if I had a man here by - my side, over whom I could have no practical control, and who would - be really guided only by Canadian party politics, but who would yet - be supposed to be more or less in my confidence, and therefore to be - entitled to speak for me and H.M. Government. My troubles are great - enough without adding Canadian electioneering views to the - difficulties I have to contend with. - - Mr. Seward's opinion was that the quieter the Canadians kept the - better, and so was mine, and so it would be still, if Mr. Seward had - not changed his. He now thinks that discussion on the subject cannot - be avoided, and a good effect would be produced by visits to - Washington of influential Canadians coming 'on their own hook' and - talking in a friendly manner to Senators and Deputies. He does not - recommend that they should appear to have any special connexion with - me, nor any semblance of an official or quasi-official character of - any kind, nor does he consider it to be desirable that any one - individual should stay long. - - I am corresponding privately with Lord Monck about this action of - Mr. Seward's, and I defer writing about the Treaty officially until - I come to some understanding with him about it. Mr. Seward's opinion - is so much more likely to be correct than mine, that I do not like - to discourage Canadians coming in the way he suggests. Beside which - I have very little hope of staving off the Resolution for the - abrogation of the Treaty in any way, and therefore do not feel - justified in preventing efforts being made by the Canadians - themselves, provided I am clear of all connexion with them, and - that they do not compromise me or the Imperial Government. - - The attack on the Treaty is now caused much more by ill will to - England and her Colonies than by any commercial or financial - considerations. The same spirit has caused the introduction of a - Bill into Congress to repeal the Act allowing goods to pass through - the United States without paying duty in transit to and from Canada. - In fact the absence of any serious opposition in Congress renders - both Houses very unmanageable. - -The views expressed in these two letters may appear unsympathetic as -regards Canada, but apart from his rooted and well-founded distrust of -amateur diplomatists, Lord Lyons's main task was to keep the peace if -possible between England and the United States, and he was therefore -justified in refusing to be associated with any persons who might -conceivably add to the difficulty of a very critical situation. In -addition to this he was always inclined to resent the tendency of -Canadian Ministers to do a little diplomacy of their own, and held -strongly that it would be time enough for them to think of diplomacy -when they had provided themselves with an army and a navy. - -The extreme caution which he constantly displayed in avoiding anything -which might disturb American susceptibility in the smallest degree is -well illustrated by a letter to Mr. Hammond respecting the appointment -of a new secretary to the Washington Legation. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Mr. Hammond._ - - Washington, April 5, 1864. - - I have been terribly frightened by hearing that there has been a - notion of sending Mr. Horace Johnstone to this Legation. To have the - brother of a man married to the sister of Slidell's Secretary of - Legation in Paris would expose the whole of this mission to all - kinds of suspicion and ill will. It is impossible for any one not - here to conceive the captiousness of the Federals, in and out of - office, on these points. It is almost beyond my power to keep - matters straight with them, do what I can, and if I had a man in the - Legation who was personally suspicious to them I should have no hope - of keeping out of scrapes. If Mr. Johnstone were here, I think the - only way I could employ him for the advantage of H.M.'s service - would be in carrying the next despatches home. - -So much alarmed was he at the prospect of Mr. Johnstone's appearance -that he also communicated his objections to the Private Secretary at the -Foreign Office, and even wrote to Lord Russell saying that if Mr. -Johnstone arrived he should feel it his duty to order him to remain at -the port of disembarkation until further instructions were received. -Most men would probably have considered that the family connexions of a -junior member of the Legation were of no importance, but Lord Lyons -was one of those who never took any risks. - -In accordance with the suggestion made in the previous autumn, some -officers were at last despatched from England in order to follow the -operations of the Federal Army. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, April 19, 1864. - - The two military officers, Colonel Gallway and Captain Alderson, - sent by the War Office to report on military matters here, are about - to set out for the Army of the Potomac. Some great attempt will - probably be made by that army within a very short time. Everything - is supposed to depend on the success of the operations. The - Presidential Election and the Finances in particular hang in the - balance. Captain Goodenough, the officer sent here by the Admiralty, - confirms my impression that the Americans are very seriously - preparing for a Foreign War. I think we should never be for long - without naval and military officers here to watch and to report on - these matters. The men employed should be made to understand that - their principal duty is to keep H.M. Government so well informed of - the state of preparation and of the position of the naval and - military forces of the United States that if a war were to break out - at a moment's notice, our Admiralty and War Office would know - exactly what to do. It is quite impossible that a Diplomatic Mission - can do this without the assistance of professional men; and the more - completely the responsibility is thrown on the professional men, the - more effectually will the work be performed. With the present - feeling of the United States Government I think the officers had - better come with a decidedly official character, either as naval or - military attachés to the Legation, or under any other name: but I do - not think that the most effective mode of obtaining the requisite - information would be to let them subside into permanent attachés - residing here, and making mere routine reports by each mail. - It would, of course, be well before publishing any appointment of a - definite official character, to let me ascertain that it would be - acceptable to this Government to have officers here in that - particular character. - - There can unhappily be no doubt that three-fourths of the American - people are eagerly longing for a safe opportunity of making war with - England, and to what extent this feeling may be played upon, and - with what results, during the Presidential Elections, no one can - say. - - The ill will shows itself in many ways--principally in vexatious - proceedings in regard to the neighbouring Colonies. The last attempt - in Congress is to repeal an Act of 1831 in virtue of which there are - no higher duties levied on British rafts, boats, and Colonial - vessels in the American ports on the Lakes, than are levied on - similar American craft in the British ports. I have spoken to Mr. - Seward about it, and I hope, if it is a matter of importance to - Canada, that we shall be able to stop it. - -The ill will alluded to above showed itself in an unpleasant and -undignified manner in connection with the visit of the British officers. -Application had been made on behalf of Major-General Lindsay, M.P., -commanding the Brigade of Guards in Canada to be allowed to visit the -Army of the Potomac, and, much to the surprise of the Legation, a pass -was refused by the Secretary of War, although the point was pressed as -far as was prudent; but worse was to follow, for the Secretary of War -actually refused passes also to Colonel Gallway and Captain Alderson, -the two officers specially sent out by the British Government. 'I do not -trust myself,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'to say all I think about this -discourtesy, but I have let the people here know that this is not the -way to maintain friendly feelings, and have reminded them of the very -different manner in which we treated the officers sent by the United -States to the Crimea.' - -Of more importance than this act of discourtesy was the apparent -preparation for a foreign war on the part of the United States -Government. There could, unfortunately, be little doubt as to the -country against which these preparations were being made, and the danger -was that, in the existing temper of the American people, advantage might -be eagerly taken of any conjunction of circumstances which would enable -a declaration of war against England to be made with tolerable safety. -The letters of Lord Russell do not display a realization of the enormous -increase of the military and naval power of the United States, and it -does not appear that he appreciated the vast change which had taken -place in the relative power of England and the United States. In the -past, the latter had been restrained from provoking hostilities by fear -of the advantages which the greatly superior military and naval forces, -then habitually maintained by England, would confer on their enemy at -the outset. Now, however, they considered the reverse to be the case. -They believed, and probably they were right, that they could throw an -overwhelming force into Canada, and that sudden attacks on some of the -British colonies, such as Bermuda and the Bahamas, would in all -probability be successful. They believed that they could inflict -enormous injury to British commerce, and it was plain that an immense -booty could be obtained by sending out their swift cruisers with as -little notice as possible. - -It was difficult to discover an adequate explanation of the bitter -feeling which, at that time, actuated the majority of the American -people against England; and it was still more difficult to combat it, -because it was largely unreasonable and quite regardless of facts -and arguments. In reality it resulted from the exasperation caused by -the civil commotion which constituted the first check to a previously -uninterrupted course of progress and prosperity, and the Americans, -mortified and angry, found it a relief to vent their ill-humour upon -England, against whom they had an old grudge. Under these adverse -circumstances, it is easy to realize how difficult must have been the -position of the British Minister at Washington, and it is not surprising -that his letters and despatches of the period were couched in a more -pessimistic tone than had been the case for some time. 'I am out of -heart altogether,' he wrote to Lord Russell, in consequence of the -manner in which his representations to the American Government, with -regard to the grievances of British subjects, were treated. These -grievances related chiefly, at this period, to the hardships inflicted -upon the crews of blockade runners and to the iniquities of the United -States recruiting agencies, iniquities which were fully admitted in an -official report of General Dix, the Military Commandant at New York, and -in neither case was it found possible to obtain adequate redress. The -following note will serve as a sample of the communications which -passed:-- - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Mr. Seward._ - - Washington, July 3, 1864. - - This day week you came to my door with the President to tell me that - I might write to England to say that Mr. James McHugh would be - released immediately. He was still in Fort Lafayette yesterday. What - to say in writing to England to-morrow I know not. Could not orders - be sent by telegraph to the military authorities at New York to - release McHugh at once and to report by telegraph that they have - actually done so? - - I am very much pained by what has happened about Eneas and Rahming, - as well as about McHugh, and am utterly unable to devise any - satisfactory explanation to send home. - -To add to his troubles the health of Lord Lyons again began to give way -under the strain, and as the following letter shows, his staff was -insufficient for the work. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Mr. Hammond._ - - Washington, June 14, 1864. - - We cannot get on without more hands in the Chancery here. I could - not refuse to let Heneage go, on the death of his father, but he was - ill to be spared. - - One really first-rate second secretary and two ordinary working - second or third secretaries should come out at once if the work is - to be done. It has doubled since last year. We ordered an immense - register which we calculated would last through the year, having - made ample allowance as we thought for the usual progressive - increase of correspondence. We are already obliged to order another - of the same size. - - For my own part I am worn out altogether. - -Although never prone to spare himself or to exaggerate, such phrases as: -'I am worked to death here,' and 'I am worn out by the heat and the -work,' occur in letters to other correspondents, and in order to prevent -a complete breakdown he was directed by Lord Russell to proceed to -Canada to confer with Lord Monck as to the defence of the Dominion. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._ - - July 23, 1864. - - I think it will be useful that you should go to Canada soon. If, as - you think, the Americans may take a sudden resolution to attack us, - it will be important to consider how and when we can best defend - ourselves. I should be very glad that with this view you should - consult Lord Monck, and also that you should, if possible, see Sir - James Hope, who might come up the St. Lawrence to meet you at - Quebec. The defence of Quebec both by land and sea is one of the - most important points for the consideration of the Cabinet. It is - also of great importance to ascertain what the Canadian Government - are prepared to do for themselves. - - If, as is probable, Grant will not succeed in reaching Richmond and - is obliged to retire, the American Government may not be willing to - add to the number of their enemies, especially as the Emperor of - Mexico may have the assistance of French troops, and may hold an - unfriendly position to the Northern, and a friendly attitude to the - Southern States. I shall be glad to send a civil or military agent - or commissioner to the Confederate States, and think of sending him - by Mexico and Texas. It would be by no means a recognition, but - would be useful as regards our interests in the Southern States. - -Lord Russell never seems to have thoroughly believed in the ultimate -success of the North, and frequently expressed the opinion that, as the -re-establishment of the Union was impossible, it would be well to come -to terms with the South, but he could scarcely have been expected to -foresee that the day would come when the United States Government would -order the Emperor Napoleon out of Mexico. - -As regards the mission to Canada, Lord Lyons pointed out that whereas it -was very desirable that he should confer with the Governor-General on -many questions, amongst others, the 'wholesale system of seducing, -entrapping and kidnapping recruits for the United States Army from -Canada,' yet that his own opinion on the naval and military questions -concerning the defence of that country was worth nothing at all. His -general impression, however, was that the Dominion was altogether -indefensible, unless the Canadians were prepared to make such a stand -and such sacrifices as the Southerners had done. Whether he ever made -any recommendations, as the result of his visit, or whether, if they -were ever made, any attention was paid to them does not appear, but -there is reason to believe that the British Government eventually nerved -itself to spend the stupendous sum of £50,000 on Canadian defence. - -The Canadian visit was undertaken very reluctantly, in spite of -weariness and ill health, partly on account of the press of work, and -partly because it would be necessary to leave as Chargé d'Affaires a -Secretary of Legation (Mr. Burnley), who had only just arrived in the -country, and of whose abilities and judgment he was completely ignorant. -Consequently he took the precaution of asking the Foreign Office to -intimate clearly that, whether outside American territory or not, he -should still be considered the superior authority in the Legation, and -that if he deemed it necessary to give an instruction, it must be -obeyed. This stipulation was not intended as a reflection upon Mr. -Burnley, who indeed showed himself perfectly competent, but was merely -an instance of that extreme caution which never left anything to chance. - -At the end of August he was suffering so much from the excessive heat of -Washington and from nervous prostration that he no longer felt able to -discharge his duties satisfactorily, and set out for Canada much against -his will, remaining there until October. The change of air, however, -effected little improvement, and letters to friends announcing his -return complain of ill health and low spirits. While on the journey -back, he met at dinner, at New York, by a singular coincidence, General -Dix, on the night when the news of the St. Albans raid arrived. During -the dinner the latter received a telegram stating that a band of -Confederate desperadoes had made a raid from Canada upon a place called -St. Albans, raided some banks and committed some murders. General -Dix said that he had sent orders to the military officers in the -neighbourhood to take measures for apprehending the raiders, and that he -had directed these officers to use their best endeavours to seize them -on American territory, but that rather than allow them to escape, they -were to be pursued beyond the frontier, such action being, in his -opinion, justifiable under International Law. Upon being asked whether -he had given this order on his own authority or under instructions -from Washington, the General admitted that he had acted on his own -responsibility. This was clearly one of the most alarming incidents that -had yet occurred, and had General Dix's orders been carried out, there -must inevitably have been war between England and the United States. -Fortunately, however, the American Government disavowed General Dix's -ill-advised orders, and the prompt action of the Canadian authorities -contributed towards a peaceful solution. The raiders were seized and -made to give up their booty; police were stationed along the frontier, -the volunteers were called out, and effective steps taken to prevent -similar occurrences in the future. - -The settlement of this affair must have been one of Lord Lyons's last -transactions with the American Government, for upon his return to -Washington his health rapidly grew worse, and as scarcely any letters -from him are to be found between the end of October and the middle of -December it is to be presumed that he was so incapacitated that the work -devolved upon Mr. Burnley. Early in November he was forced to apply for -leave, which was granted in December. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Washington, Dec. 5, 1864. - - I am truly obliged to you for so promptly sending me leave to come - home. When I wrote to you on the 1st of last month to ask for it, I - hardly expected to have such urgent need of it as I have now, but a - few days afterwards I became so ill as to be utterly unable to do - any work. I have not made any satisfactory progress towards a - recovery, and am scarcely in a state to travel. There seems however - to be no prospect of my getting any better while I stay here, and I - shall therefore, if possible, set out for New York to-morrow, in the - hope of being able to embark there for England on the 14th. - - I am told that the American papers have stated that I have been - dangerously ill with typhoid fever. I have had no fever at all. My - principal malady is a nervous headache. - -In letters to other correspondents he explained that being quite unable -to work he considered himself simply an impediment to the transaction of -public business, and was going away simply on leave of absence. During -the last few days of his stay in America he was too unwell to write, or -even, as he explained to Mr. Seward, equal to a conversation, and it was -doubtful whether he would be well enough to travel. Accompanied, -however, by Mr. Sheffield, he embarked at New York and arrived in London -during the closing days of December. - -The fact was that he had completely broken down under the continuous -strain of the last four years, and in view of the circumstances it was -not surprising. Some idea of the work at Washington may be gathered from -the following official figures. - - * * * * * - - _Despatches and Letters sent to and from Her Majesty's Legation at - Washington during the year 1864._ - - Foreign Office to Lord Lyons 966 From Lord Lyons 653 - United States Government " " 1816 " " 2782 - Consuls " " 1155 " " 1390 - Naval and Colonial - Departments " " 311 " " 360 - Miscellaneous " " 2242 " " 3141 - ---- ---- - 6490 8326 - -To these figures must be added a number of lithographs and other answers -for which forms had been devised and which therefore were not -registered, nor does it seem probable that Lord Lyons's numerous private -letters to the Secretary of State and other correspondents are included; -whilst there is no mention of telegrams. - -It would really not be much of an exaggeration to assert that, unless -absent or incapacitated by illness, nearly every one of these thousands -of documents was either originated by or submitted to the British -Minister. The late Sir Edward Malet in his book 'Shifting Scenes,' has -borne witness to the indefatigable industry of his chief. 'At Washington -any quantity of letters arrived daily asking every imaginable question, -and often making untenable complaints. They were all opened by Lord -Lyons, who made a pencil note upon them indicating the tenor of the -answer to be sent, and returned them to the Chancery. Draft answers were -then written, which were again sent up to Lord Lyons with the letters. -He would nearly always alter the wording. Then he put an "L" at the -bottom, and returned them to be written out for signature. In this way -not a letter issued from the Legation which had not been approved by the -chief. It was a most valuable safeguard, for you can never be sure what -a young man may say when he gets a pen into his hand. It is the moment -when the evil spirit of the Jack-in-office, unless he be entirely exempt -from it, which is very rare, gets the better of him, and prompts him to -make some epigrammatic or cutting reply. I learned no more valuable -lesson while working under Lord Lyons than that every letter received -must be answered, and that the answer must be staid in form and well -considered in substance, whatever might be the ignorance, the petulance, -or the extravagance of the writer to whose letter you were replying.' It -may be added that he rigidly adhered to this practice throughout his -official career, and that there must be many members of the Diplomatic -Service now living who would corroborate the opinion expressed by Sir -Edward Malet. - -From the same source we learn the usual routine of the Chancery during -the Civil War. The secretaries and attachés had to be at their desks at -9 a.m. They worked continuously without a luncheon interval until past 7 -p.m., then adjourned to Willard's Hotel to indulge in the pernicious -local habit of swallowing cocktails, dined at 8, and were frequently -obliged to return to the Chancery afterwards and work till midnight or -even later. There is no reason whatever to suppose that Sir Edward Malet -indulged in any exaggeration, and it is therefore not surprising either -that the junior members of the Legation occasionally broke down or that -many of them were desirous of being appointed to some less exacting post -than Washington. In spite, however, of the disadvantageous circumstances -under which Sir Edward Malet passed his time at Washington, it is worthy -of note that he considered that every one in the British Diplomatic -Service should rejoice if he had the chance of going there, and he bore -emphatic testimony that, according to his experience, English people -were treated with extraordinary courtesy and hospitality however high -political feeling may have run. - -Lord Lyons, upon arriving in England, found a home provided for him at -Arundel by his sister, the widowed Duchess of Norfolk, to whom he was -deeply attached, and it was hoped that the rest and retired life would -restore him sufficiently to enable him to resume his post at Washington. -He made, however, little progress towards recovery, and for some time -was almost incapable of either physical or mental exertion; in fact, so -unsatisfactory was his condition, and so remote appeared the probability -of his being able to resume his duties, that, in the spring of 1865, it -became necessary for him to resign his post and to retire temporarily if -not permanently from the service. A letter to Mr. Stuart, a former -member of his staff, explains the circumstances of his retirement. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Mr. Stuart._ - - Norfolk House, March 16, 1865. - - I am very much obliged by your kind letter inquiring for me. You - will have seen that I have gone out of the service altogether and - have become a gentleman at large without pay or pension. My health - did not admit of my fixing a time for going back, and the Cabinet - became nervous about leaving Washington without a Minister in these - critical times. I confess I do not feel so much relief or even - pleasure as might have been expected, and I seriously thought of - offering to go back immediately when I heard of the decision of the - Cabinet. But my own feelings as to health and still more the - opinions of the doctors deterred me. I have certainly got a great - deal better, but I seem to stick at a certain point. I can go about - without inconvenience, but still a small thing brings on a headache. - The old Legation at Washington is completely broken up. Malet goes - to Lisbon, Sheffield to Frankfort and Kennedy and Seymour to Vienna. - I to a certain extent enjoy being in England, but I am not well - enough nor quite sufficiently satisfied with the wind up of my - Washington Mission, to enjoy myself thoroughly. Lord Russell has - been extremely kind to me, and so indeed has every one here, but - neither I nor they can do much for my benefit while my health is in - its present state. - - You seem to be doing well as usual in your present post, and you - are, I trust, flourishing in all respects. - -In a letter to Mr. Seward expressing his regret at being prevented from -thanking President Lincoln in person for the unvarying kindness and -consideration shown to him during the last four eventful years the -following passage occurs:-- - - You will find Sir Frederick Bruce (his successor at Washington) as - anxious as I was to act in concert with you for the maintenance of - peace and good will, and you will, I am sure, be glad to form with - him the confidential and intimate relations which did so much, in my - case, to make my task easy and agreeable. The friendly and - unconstrained terms on which we were produced so much good, that I - am most anxious that my successor's intercourse with you should be - placed at once on the same footing. - - * * * * * - - _Mr. Seward to Lord Lyons._ - - Washington, March 20, 1865. - - I accept your farewell with sincere sorrow. But I reconcile myself - to it because it is a condition of restoration of your health. All - of my family commend me to tender you assurances of sympathy. - - I have never desponded of my country, of emancipation of her slaves - and of her resumption of her position as an agent of peace, progress - and civilization--interests which I never fail to believe are common - with all branches of the British family. So I have had no doubt that - when this dreadful war shall be ended, the United States and Great - Britain would be reconciled and become better friends than ever. - - I have thought that you are entitled to share in these great - successes, as you have taken so great a part of the trials of the - war. But God disposes. I feel sure that if I never find time to go - abroad again, you with recovered health will come here to see the - reign of peace and order. So I shall not dwell upon our parting as a - final one. - -It is satisfactory to realize that these two men, between whom so many -encounters had taken place, parted on terms of friendship and mutual -esteem. Each, in fact, had been able to appreciate the good qualities of -the other, and in subsequent communications with his own Government, -Lord Lyons frequently expressed the hope that Mr. Seward would continue -to be responsible for the foreign policy of the American Government. - -The official acknowledgment of Lord Lyons's services at Washington was -couched in warmer terms than is usually the case. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, March 25, 1865. - - As your successor, Sir Frederick Bruce, is to take his departure - this day from the shores of England, I take this opportunity to - testify to your Lordship the sense which Her Majesty's Government - entertain of your invaluable services as Her Majesty's - Representative at Washington. - - The return which I enclose of the number of despatches and letters - received by Her Majesty's Mission to the United States during the - years 1864 gives some notion of the amount of labour which has been - undergone by Your Lordship, the Secretary of Legation and other - members of the Mission. - - But the prudence, the moderation, the good temper, the - discrimination and the just regard to a friendly Government shown by - Your Lordship during the trying period which has elapsed while Your - Lordship was charged with the most honourable, but at the same time, - the most difficult duties with which any diplomatic agent can be - entrusted, these are incapable of any remuneration and cannot be - estimated by any measurement. - -It is to be hoped that the previous pages have, to some extent, -demonstrated that Lord Russell's language was not that of hyperbole, -and that the value of Lord Lyons's unobtrusive services was not -over-estimated. It was the good fortune of this country to be -represented during a protracted and dangerous crisis by a man who, -distinguished by exceptional prudence, tact, judgment, and sincerity, -added to these qualities a most minute knowledge of his own duties -accompanied with indefatigable industry. It is not too much to say that -any one wanting in these qualities would have found it impossible to -prevent the calamity of war between England and the United States, and -the diplomatist who successfully avoids a catastrophe of this nature and -at the same time protects the interests of his country is as deserving -of gratitude as the successful commander who appears upon the scene when -diplomacy had failed. - -One little detail characteristic of the man is worth noting. He used to -state, in after life, with much apparent satisfaction, that during his -five years' residence in the United States, he had never 'taken a drink, -or made a speech.' - - - - -CHAPTER V - -CONSTANTINOPLE - -(1865-1867) - - -Although temporarily retired, it was scarcely probable that the -Government would fail to utilize a man who had proved himself to be so -valuable a public servant, and as early as February Lord Russell had -already intimated that he proposed to offer to Lord Lyons the Lisbon -Legation, although to transfer a minister from Washington to Lisbon -seems a somewhat dubious compliment. - -In June he was sufficiently recovered to receive the degree of D.C.L., -and in the following month there arrived from Lord Russell the offer of -the Embassy at Constantinople, Lord Russell being careful to state in -his letter that the Queen highly approved of the appointment and that -Lord Palmerston heartily concurred. The offer was of course gratefully -accepted, and an urgent request that Malet and Sheffield should be -permitted to accompany him was granted, although both had been already -named to other posts. The appointment, when it became known, was -received with general approval, and congratulations came from all -quarters, but the signal compliment which had been paid him, far from -turning his head, only elicited the expression that he knew rather less -of the East than most people and that he entered upon his duties with -many misgivings. - -Accompanied by Malet and Sheffield, Lord Lyons arrived at Constantinople -in October, 1865, under somewhat peculiar circumstances. It is unusual -for two ambassadors to be present at the same post at the same time, but -Sir Henry Bulwer, in spite of many protestations that he wished to be -relieved of his duties, was still residing at the Embassy, having -possibly imbibed the spirit of procrastination from the locality, and it -is conceivable that the Foreign Office considered that the best means of -accelerating his departure was to send out his successor with orders to -present his credentials as soon as possible. - -The two ambassadors were lodged under the same roof. At first Lord Lyons -was the guest of Sir Henry Bulwer, then the conditions were reversed, -Sir Henry becoming the guest of his successor, and the comedy concluded -with the simultaneous presentation at the palace of the letters of -recall and letters of credence of the outgoing and incoming ambassadors. -After rather more than a fortnight, Sir Henry Bulwer was induced to take -his departure to some unknown destination, but, much to the -embarrassment of his successor, announced his intention of returning -before long. Those who are acquainted with the history of British -diplomacy must remember a very similar episode which also occurred at -Constantinople about twenty-six years ago, when a special envoy was -residing there in addition to the ambassador. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ - - Constantinople, Oct. 25, 1865. - - Sir Henry Bulwer received me very kindly and cordially, and has told - me very fully what his views are, both as to Turkish politics in - general, and as to the particular questions now uppermost. He had a - private audience of the Sultan the day before yesterday, and after - it, went on board the _Caradoc_, intending to sail the same evening. - This, however, he did not do, and I went on board to see him - yesterday afternoon. He meant then to sail at daylight this morning. - I hear that he has now put off his departure till to-morrow. As to - his destination, he seems to waver between Malta, Naples and - Palermo. Lady Bulwer stays a little longer. Sir Henry talks vaguely - of coming back here as a traveller in the spring, and the Sultan has - offered to place a house at his disposal if he does so. I could not - tell him that I thought it advisable either for the public service - or for himself that he should come back so soon, especially as he - thinks the place particularly disagrees with him. He has been so - friendly and agreeable that I half blame myself for not being more - willing to see him again here. - - I can write little that can be depended upon about public matters - here. Everybody represents everybody else as being engaged in a - series of intrigues so complicated as to be utterly beyond my - comprehension. Fuad and Ali appear very easy to get on with, and I - think that I shall have little difficulty in transacting all - important business directly with them, as long as they remain in - office. My idea is not to give an opportunity for starting - difficulties by announcing a great change which I should not be able - to carry out, but actually to do the business myself, as much as - possible without dragomans. My colleagues seeing this will no doubt - follow my example. The dragoman system will then languish, and the - opportunity may then be taken of giving it the _coup de grace_ if - that should seem advisable. - - The impression made upon my mind by Fuad Pasha's conversation on the - finances was that he will make every effort to pay the interest on - the Foreign Loans regularly, but that the Government will frequently - be very hard up for money and will then raise it by any expedient - and on any terms for the moment. In this way a new irregular - internal or quasi-internal debt will arise, which, when it reaches a - certain point, will have to be converted, or funded, or provided for - in some way; and then the country becomes more and more involved. - Whether the undeveloped resources of the country, which must be very - great, can be brought into play soon enough to balance the growing - debt, I cannot of course pretend to say. The great measure in - contemplation is to secularize the Vacoufs. The tenures on which - this property is held and transmitted are so peculiar and - complicated that it will require some study to enable me to - understand the subject. I confess one cannot help feeling that most - of the property will be interrupted by dishonest agents on its way - to the Treasury. - - My colleagues seem very well disposed to be cordial and easy to deal - with, but M. de Monstier, whom they all seem to regard as the great - difficulty, is not yet here. - -The Constantinople Embassy, justly regarded as one of the big prizes in -the British Diplomatic Service, is, under ordinary circumstances, the -most onerous post of all; and, as past occupants know to their cost, the -distinguished position occupied by the British ambassador, the almost -princely state in which he lives, the magnificence of his residences, -the charm of the Bosphorus and the pleasure derived from living in what -is at once one of the most beautiful and one of the most interesting -cities in the universe, are somewhat dearly bought by the constant, -thankless, and fruitless labour in which they are habitually engaged. -Their time is ceaselessly occupied in combating the intrigues of other -Powers, in ineffectual attempts to redress the real or fictitious -grievances of British subjects, in the urging of nebulous schemes -vaguely described as reforms, and in hopeless efforts to avert the -inevitable doom awaiting a people, who, in spite of some admirable -qualities, are constitutionally incapacitated from realizing what are -their true interests. After the stress and turmoil of the last five -years at Washington, however, Constantinople must have appeared to the -new ambassador almost in the agreeable light of a rest cure. - -For once in a way, things were fairly quiet: there were no signs of any -immediate crisis, and although the Turkish Government was involved in -its habitual financial difficulties, in the autumn of 1865 the only -questions which appeared likely to give rise to trouble were those -relating to the Moldo-Wallachian Principalities, to Crete, and to a -Firman for the Bey of Tunis. But whatever may be the internal condition -of the Turkish Empire at any given period, or whatever may be its -external relations, there is invariably one representative of the Great -Powers at Constantinople whose _rôle_ it is to threaten, browbeat, and -coerce. At the period in question this duty was discharged with zest by -the French Ambassador, the Marquis de Moustier, whose mission it was to -'_porter haut le drapeau de la France_'--in other words, to bully and -bluster whenever opportunity permitted, and of whom the Turks and his -foreign colleagues stood in deadly fear. The Russian Minister at that -time was the celebrated General Ignatieff, of whom Lord Lyons -subsequently expressed the opinion that 'General Ignatieff would be an -admirable diplomatist if he were only a little more veracious.' And it -seems odd nowadays to read that on nearly every matter the French and -the Russians were in opposition to each other. In fact, General -Ignatieff used to declare that his French colleague was so insupportably -arrogant that it was impossible to do business with him. Each -endeavoured to enlist the new British Ambassador upon his side; -naturally, without success, as intrigue was essentially foreign to his -nature, and he had no intention of allowing himself to become embroiled -in their quarrels. Writing in November to Mr. Erskine, the British -Minister at Athens, he was able to say that 'Here we are as quiet as -possible; the disease with which the Turk is threatened appears to be -atrophy; want of money and want of men. There are no questions of -interest at this moment, nor even any particular matter for the -diplomatists to quarrel about.' - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Earl of Clarendon._[5] - - Constantinople, Dec. 6, 1865. - - I don't know what to say of the Turkish finances. Notwithstanding - the drought, the cholera, etc., etc., it is alarming that in a year - of profound tranquillity at home and abroad, the Government should - find itself absolutely without money. As this was the case, I - suppose a new foreign loan was better than scraping together, at - enormous sacrifices, enough money here to provide for the interest - of the old loans next month. They promise that they will pay over to - the Bank, as it comes in, the revenue from the sources which are - most certain, so as to provide in ample time for the interest on the - foreign loans. But what will they have left to live upon? I am - trying to get something like an accurate notion of what their - prospects are for next year. - - The only probability of trouble for the present seems to be in the - Principalities. If Mr. Green[6] is right, the overthrow of Couza by - an internal revolution is imminent. As he is unable to suggest - any means of saving Couza or of making any improvement in the - administration of the Principalities, I don't know that he is wrong - in thinking it best to leave things for the present to the chapter - of accidents. At any rate I think I shall do well to try and keep - the question as quiet as possible here until I have instructions - from you about it. - - As you will see by my despatches I do all the important business - myself with Aali Pasha. Of course, I do not take a Dragoman with me - when I go to him. I shall do away with the Dragoman system, as far - as it is possible and compatible with the public service to do so. - By degrees it may be done away with altogether--but it will be some - time before it will be possible to get ordinary matters done at the - Turkish office without having some one perpetually nagging at them - who can speak to them in their own language. - -A letter from the veteran Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Lord Lyons is -not without interest as showing the views he held towards the close of -his life with regard to the Turkish Empire. - - * * * * * - -Dec. 13, 1865. - - It gave me much pleasure to hear from you. I hope, and indeed I - doubt not, that as time moves on you will be more and more pleased - with the situation. You are lucky I think, to have no great - questions to begin with. Sooner or later some will arise, and - meanwhile you have time to sound the depths and shallows around you - and to lay a good foundation for future action. Be assured that my - good wishes will go with you, and if you surpass me in my own line, - so much the better. I am now too old to be jealous. - - It does not surprise me that the Principalities continue to give - trouble. They stand in a false position towards Turkey. The allies - have not been happy in their manner of dealing with them. Prince - Couza's government is an anomaly. Austria would be a safer neighbour - to the Porte, even the whole length of the Danube, than either - Russia or an independent Union. - - The finances of Turkey are, no doubt, a great and growing difficulty. - They _need not_ be so with Russia in abeyance, the Empire - guaranteed, an increasing trade, a Sultan who professes economy and - no interruption of peace. But they _are naturally_ so in right of - ministerial ignorance, of an inveterate habit of abuses, of too much - facility for borrowing, and of the little personal prudence at the - Porte. I tremble at hearing of another large loan from France. It - might be better if, acting in concert with our neighbour, we made - the Turkish Ministers feel more deeply the responsibility of their - extravagance and unwillingness to reform. I was glad to learn some - little time ago that our Government presses the Porte for statements - of its financial condition which may be relied on, and that the - Ottoman Bank maintains its independence, as opposed to the rash - requirements launched from Constantinople. - - I sincerely hope that you will be able by and by to see your way to - some progress in other matters of essential reform. - -The financial outlook became so alarming that at the beginning of 1866 -the Turks contemplated engaging a British Controller; but--and this -throws an instructive light upon the intrigues which prevail at -Constantinople--they were afraid to apply for one because they knew that -if they did so, the French would insist upon a Frenchman being engaged -as well. Aali and Fuad Pasha used to appear and make long speeches which -'would have done credit to a Chancellor of the Exchequer,' but their -eloquence produced no practical result, and Sultan Abdul Aziz, who, -according to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, was pledged to economy, -possessed singularly extravagant tastes, foremost amongst his -extravagances being a mania for buying ironclads and endeavouring to -create an imposing Turkish fleet. As there was no necessity to build up -a big navy and little probability of the Turks ever being able to make -any effective use of it if ever created, the only thing to be said in -favour of Abdul Aziz's hobby was that the ironclads were always ordered -in England. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Earl of Clarendon._ - - Constantinople, February 14, 1866. - - There is rather a delicate matter for us which bears materially upon - the Ottoman finances. The Sultan has a passion for ironclad frigates - and insists upon ordering them. His Ministers (except, I believe, - the Capitan Pasha) make some feeble opposition. We have, I believe, - rather encouraged the thing than otherwise. The orders are executed - in England to the advantage of our shipbuilders, and I think Sir - Henry Bulwer had an idea that though they would not be much use in - the hands of the Turks, they might be manned and used to advantage - by allies of the Turks in case of war. - - I think it would be undesirable, on many accounts, that we should - now take the initiative in remonstrating against this particular - expense. If however the question of Turkish finance comes up in - Europe we shall hear a great deal of these ironclads and we may be - asked to join France in a representation against them. We may - possibly have to propose to France to join us. If we do anything it - would be well to consult Musurus confidentially, as he has a great - deal to do with ordering them in England. - - There are, I think, three mailed frigates here, one nearly ready in - England and one laid down there. It is also said that the Sultan - insists upon one still larger and more powerful being ordered, but I - do not know whether the order is actually given. The expense is of - course immense in proportion to the revenue of the country and - considering the rate at which the Porte borrows money. - -What the result of consulting Musurus Pasha was, does not appear; but, -in view of the determined obstinacy of Sultan Abdul Aziz, it is not -likely that remonstrances from any quarter would have had much effect. - -In February, the difficulties with regard to the Principalities came to -a head. Prince Couza, who had been elected Hospodar in 1859 (and who -incidentally had given a great deal of trouble) was deposed by -successful conspirators and expelled from the country, Mr. Green, the -British Minister at Bucharest, having thus proved himself a true -prophet. The inhabitants of the Principalities appeared to be unanimous -in desiring the continuation of the Union, and, at the same time, a -foreign prince as their ruler, to the consternation of the Porte, which -had a well-grounded foreboding that a similar phenomenon would shortly -manifest itself in other outlying provinces of the Empire, and that -disintegration would follow. As for the other Powers concerned, the -Russians were strongly in favour of a separation of Moldavia and -Wallachia. The Austrians were credited with the same views, while it was -feared by the Turks that the French would put forward a candidate of -their own in the shape of a foreign prince. Eventually it was agreed to -refer the whole question to a conference at Paris, into which the -British Government entered unshackled by any pledges or previous -announcement of its views. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Earl of Clarendon._ - - Constantinople, March 14, 1866. - - The Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha seem to be in very low spirits about - the Paris Conference. M. de Moustier seems to be constantly - frightening them. I am willing to comfort them, but I am determined - not to say anything which may be interpreted by them as a pledge, - either from my Government or myself. They are horribly afraid of - France and they would like to lean upon us, but they think that we - care more for France than for them, and believe that we are apt to - blame them for weakness without being willing to protect them - against the consequences of their resistance. I think they are wrong - in thinking that it would have been better for them to have had the - Conference here. The French Government itself seems to me to be - always more reasonable than its agents abroad. - - I have not been able to get any fresh information about the - Finances. The Syndicate to receive the revenues set apart for the - payment of the Foreign Loans is not yet established, though it is a - month since Fuad Pasha assured me that the decree was 'all but - printed.' The Commission which is examining the actual state of the - Finances seems to have great difficulty in getting at the truth. - None of its proceedings have yet been made public. I preach economy - and retrenchment, but I have not mentioned the ironclads - particularly to the Ottoman authorities as General Ignatieff appears - to suppose. I have certainly not attempted to defend the expenditure - incurred for these vessels when I have heard it attacked by my - colleagues and other people. - - I have certainly got on very well with my colleagues hitherto, but - then we have had no serious questions to discuss. - -The unhappy Turks, bullied by Moustier, at their wit's ends to find -money, and distracted at the threat of internal troubles, seem about -this period to have once more recurred to the old proposal of a Russian -Protectorate, and to have hit upon the brilliant idea of making money, -at the same time, out of the Principalities. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Earl Cowley._ - - April 18, 1866. - - The Turks are very low, and I hear that a good deal of discussion - goes on about the hopelessness of obtaining any efficient protection - from the Western Powers, and the consequent necessity of making the - best terms they can with Russia. France they look upon as an enemy; - England as a lukewarm and indifferent friend. They hope that they - might get a good sum out of Russia for the Principalities; that they - might satisfy her appetite for territory by giving them to her, and - that then by letting her exercise great influence for the protection - of the Eastern Church in the rest of the Empire, they might satisfy - her, and persuade her to abstain from coming to Constantinople - herself, and to keep other Powers off. Of course nothing so absurd - as this, or at all like it, has been said to me by Aali or Fuad, but - I hear that this sort of language is held by a great many Turks - amongst themselves, and it may be a symptom worth noting. - - We are all anxiety to hear something from Paris about the Plébiscite - and Prince Charles of Hohenzollern. Till I know what our Government - think, I can give no advice to the Turks. - -The result of the Paris Conference was that Prince Charles of -Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was chosen as Hereditary Prince of Roumania, -much to the consternation of the Turks, who saw in this practical -abandonment of their suzerainty, the approaching disintegration of their -Empire, and therefore began to threaten an occupation of the -Principalities. This they were dissuaded from attempting, and the -efforts of British diplomacy were directed towards obtaining a -recognition of Prince Charles on reasonable terms, a task which was not -facilitated by the Sultan's sudden dismissal of the capable Grand -Vizier, Fuad Pasha, or by the refusal of the Roumanians to behave with -even decent courtesy towards the Porte. A prodigious amount of -negotiation and correspondence passed with reference to the Investiture -of the Prince by the Sultan, and that the fault lay with the Roumanians -is shown by the following extract from a letter[7] written in August: -'The Turks have been wonderfully yielding and moderate about the -Principalities, and if there had been anything of the same spirit at -Bucharest, Prince Charles would have been invested long ago. There is a -hitch now, and there will be at least more delay.' In this troublesome -matter the English and the French Governments worked together in order -to arrive at a satisfactory solution, and the much-denounced M. de -Moustier seems to have done something to help his colleague. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._[8] - - Constantinople, Sept. 12, 1866. - - M. de Moustier sets out for Paris this day week. He and I have been - very good colleagues. Since Lord Clarendon decided to advise the - Porte to recognize Prince Charles, M. de Moustier and I have worked - cordially together to settle the Principalities question in that - sense, and I hope the thing may be done before he goes. A stable - honest government in the Principalities is the best thing for all - parties, and the recognition of Prince Charles is the obvious means - of arriving at this. Whether he will prove a success or a failure - will depend upon his character and his ability to govern through the - constitutional forms, for the Hospodar must in fact for some time be - a Cæsar or he will soon be nothing. - - M. de Moustier is not at all liked by his other colleagues here, and - he has inspired the Turks with more fear than love. As he and I have - not differed on any serious matter (except just at first about the - Suez Canal), I cannot very well say how I should have liked him as - an opponent. - - The Turks seem horribly afraid of Benedetti as his successor. I wish - the mantle had fallen upon Mercier, with whom I got on so well at - Washington. - -It is strange to learn that Prince Charles, who has since developed into -a model constitutional monarch, produced at first the impression of -being a perfect firebrand, full of ambitious schemes, and actually -credited with the design of eventually establishing himself as 'The -Charlemagne of the East.' Mr. Green, the British Minister at Bucharest, -thought it desirable to give him some paternal advice, upon his own -responsibility, telling him that the Roumanians had no intention of -putting up with a mere show Prince; that he would have to work hard; -that great mistakes had been made since his arrival in the country, that -these would eventually be visited upon his head, and that he should take -warning from the fate of Couza. 'He was very polite,' added Mr. Green, -innocently, 'but I don't think he half liked what I said, or that he -quite understood it. It was probably the first time he had heard the -truth since he has been in the country.' - -Foreign princes who undertake to govern Balkan States, however, often -have to put up with worse things than unpalatable truths, and the -conduct of Prince Charles and his advisers with reference to the -question of investiture was of a nature which not only justified strong -language, but necessitated strong pressure from France and England. -After bargaining and haggling for several months, and obtaining all -sorts of concessions from the Porte, the Roumanians actually proposed -that 'in order to meet existing difficulties' the Prince should be -invested at Constantinople without any conditions at all. The chief -stumbling block appears to have the phrase '_partie intégrante_,' in the -Declaration, and it was not until it had been made clear that neither -France nor England would recognize the Prince unless this condition -was complied with that the sacramental words were agreed to. Eventually -more reasonable views prevailed at Bucharest, and Prince Charles at last -proceeded to Constantinople for the ceremony of Investiture. The Turks, -as is their wont, received him with great courtesy, and the impression -he created was of the most favourable kind, the only person who -exhibited dissatisfaction being the Russian Minister. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Mr. Green._ - - Therapia, Nov. 1, 1866. - - The Prince will, I suppose, arrive at Bucharest two or three days - before this reaches you. I hope he is satisfied with his visit to - Constantinople. There was some hitch about the interchange of - civilities with the Russian Minister and one or two other chiefs of - missions, I believe. I suppose however all was set right before His - Highness went away. The Prince himself showed, I thought, great good - sense in these matters of etiquette as well as in more important - matters. I should be glad if you would take an opportunity of - letting him understand discreetly that I personally was thoroughly - satisfied, not that he can doubt it. - -The Principalities Question having been satisfactorily settled, M. de -Moustier, who, in the meanwhile, had become Minister for Foreign -affairs, lost no time in claiming all the credit for himself. With his -usual good sense, Lord Lyons showed complete indifference to the egotism -of his former colleague. - - 'It is the way of French diplomatists everywhere, and of almost all - diplomatists at Pera, to take to themselves the credit of every good - thing that has been done,' he wrote to Lord Cowley, 'so far as the - Turks are concerned. I have borne in mind what you told me in Paris - of your own system of dealing with them, and have endeavoured to let - them have the credit of their good deeds, whatever part I may have - had in bringing them about. M. de Moustier has certainly not - followed the same plan. His article in the _Moniteur_ gives no - credit either to the Turks or to me. Whatever may be our relative - shares in settling the questions, it cannot be doubted that if I had - chosen from jealousy, or any other motive, to thwart him, I could - easily have done so. However, if good is done, I am willing to - forego my share of the boasting.' - -It is hardly necessary to state that the semi-comic question of the -Principalities was but one of many difficulties threatening in every -part of the Turkish Empire, from the Fortress of Belgrade to the -Lebanon. The long letter to Lord Stanley of December 19 is one which, -with slight variations, might have been written by every British -Ambassador at Constantinople at any time during the last fifty years, -but is quoted in full because it seems to constitute a comprehensive -review of the condition of Turkey at the close of 1866; and it is -perhaps worthy of note, as showing how completely the politics of Europe -have changed, that the gigantic struggle between Prussia and Austria -passed unnoticed and without producing the slightest apparent effect in -the Near East. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ - - Constantinople, Dec. 19, 1866. - - I am afraid that it is only too true that a storm is brewing in the - East. There is a very apparent change in the policy of Russia, or at - least, in that of her agents in Turkey. When I arrived a year ago - there was every appearance of a desire on the part of Russia to keep - things quiet in Turkey. Now her agents make no secret of their - sympathy with the Cretan insurrection and with Christian malcontents - throughout the Empire and appear to be determined to recover their - old position as the special friends and protectors of all the - Orthodox Christians, and to be willing enough to see troubles and - disturbances break out in all directions. Greece is bent upon - mischief, and the question whether we are or are not to have an - Eastern Question forced upon us in the spring depends upon whether - or no Greece can be kept in order. All this suits the Russian game. - If we interfere to bring the Hellenes to their senses, she hopes to - recover her lost popularity at our expense. If we do not, she will - claim the merit of having hindered us. - - I cannot make up my mind to recommend the Turks to take a bold - course. Discouraging as is the spectacle afforded by the Turkish - army and navy in Crete, I think it probable that the Turks would in - the end get the better of the Hellenes if they were allowed to deal - with them without any interference from Europe. But Europe - undoubtedly would interfere. I very much dread the effects of - allowing the Greeks to get up disturbances in this country in the - spring. If the disturbances are very serious they will probably lead - to the destruction of Ottoman rule in Europe. What will take its - place it is impossible to foresee, but I think it is pretty clear - that the Turks will not go without a desperate struggle, and that in - mixed districts we shall have massacres and every kind of horror. - Great calamities may possibly be avoided if we can keep the Turks - going and make them go on tolerably well for some years longer. If - they are really capable of radical improvement, if they can live - upon equal terms with the Christians, and establish a good - government, so much the better. If things go on as they have done - lately, the Turks will be gradually squeezed out, as the Americans - say, by the increase in numbers, wealth and intelligence of the - Christians. I am not one of those who look upon the Turkish Empire - as good _per se_--to be upheld at all hazards--but in the interest - of all parties, I should like to let it down gently; but in order to - make this possible, the Turks must be prudent and behave well to all - their subjects. - - The arguments against giving up the Fortress of Belgrade are - strongly put in Mr. Longworth's despatch to me of which he has sent - you a copy. For my own part I doubt whether the _Levée en masse_ of - the Mussulman population of Turkey to defend it, would not shake the - Empire to pieces. In the face of the extreme unpopularity of the - Sultan personally and of the Government with the Mussulmans, I doubt - whether the Ministers would be willing to risk an appeal to them. - The same state of things however makes the Ministers very fearful of - the effect of giving up the Fortress. It seems that Europe will - advise the Porte to abandon it, and this, I am inclined to think, is - the proper advice for Europe to give. I do not think that it is - advice which it would be fair to press very strongly unless (as is - by no means impossible) the Porte may wish to be able to say to the - Sultan and the people that they were obliged to yield to all Europe - united against them on the point. I don't think that England, or any - other power, should encourage the Porte to hold out, unless of - course it were deemed to be a matter of such importance that - material aid would be given to help the Porte out of any scrape into - which its holding out might bring it. On the other hand, unless we - were prepared to do this and to do it effectually, we should make - ourselves unnecessarily odious to the Christian races, and neither - obtain nor deserve any gratitude from the Turks, if we alone advised - them to keep the Fortress. Aali Pasha does not talk as if he had any - idea of yielding. His plan will probably be to say neither yes nor - no, unless circumstances compel him to give a categorical answer to - the Servians. - -Lord Stanley, who at this period ruled at the Foreign Office, was not an -optimist by nature, had no illusions about the future of Turkey, and his -letters contain references to many other questions which appeared likely -to create trouble in Europe; besides Crete and the Fortress of Belgrade. -With regard to the latter he observed that the 'Turks have the same right -to stay there that every one has to do foolish things where only his own -interest is concerned.' 'The Austrians,' he wrote in October, 'have made -their greatest mistake of this year (which is saying a good deal) in the -choice of Beust as Minister. - -'The general impression is that Bismark[9] (_sic_) will not be able to -hold power, from the state of his health. I do not envy the King of -Prussia left alone to carry out plans which he probably has never -understood and to face a German Parliament which he only consented to -call in reliance on his adviser's capacity to manage it.' - -Another letter refers to a contemplated visit of the Prince of Wales to -St. Petersburg, and, in view of 'his strong anti-Turkish opinions of -which he makes no secret,' points out that care should be taken to -explain to the Russian Government that H.R.H. did not represent the -opinions of the Cabinet. - -Other communications from the same Minister mention that the Americans -had revived the _Alabama_ claims 'in a friendly and temperate manner,' -and there are many allusions to the disquieting symptoms in France. 'I -hear,' he wrote in November, 'that the one idea of everybody, high and -low, in France is that the country is defenceless (with 600,000 -soldiers), and that the lowest estimate of the necessary force laid -before the commission now sitting involves an addition of 400,000 more. -They have so long been used in that country to be surrounded by weak -states that the mere neighbourhood of an equal is regarded by them as a -threat.' - -In the beginning of 1867 one difficulty was cleared out of the way, for -Lord Stanley having formally tendered his advice, the Turkish Government -consented to evacuate the Fortress of Belgrade. This unusual display of -good sense was all the more creditable on account of the terror which -Sultan Abdul Aziz inspired in his ministers; but the protracted -insurrection in Crete constituted not only a danger, but also a fertile -source of intrigues amongst Foreign Powers. - -Lord Stanley took the matter-of-fact view that Greece had estranged -British sympathy through financial immorality; and he was probably -correct, for in the case of Turkey, it was not until the repudiation of -her debts, that there was much fulmination against the iniquities of -Ottoman rule. - -'Opinion here is undecided about the Cretan quarrel,' wrote this prosaic -nobleman, who is credited with having himself refused the throne of -Greece. 'Nobody much believes in the Turks, but the old Phil-Hellenism -is dead, and cannot be revived. Greece is too much associated in the -English mind with unpaid debts and commercial sharp practice to command -the sympathy that was felt thirty years ago. And now that questions of -more interest and nearer home are being discussed, Crete will drop out -of men's minds.' - -A little later, the French Government suddenly and quite unexpectedly -proposed the cession of Crete to Greece; and this violent change in the -policy hitherto pursued, rendered difficult joint action on the part of -England and France with regard to Turkey. The original idea underlying -French policy had been that the two Governments should force certain -reforms upon the Porte, more particularly with regard to encouraging -public works to be undertaken by foreign capitalists, and that the Turks -should be made prosperous in spite of themselves. The difficulty in -carrying out this beneficent programme consisted in the fact that there -were no means of influencing the daily details of administration upon -which its execution and success depended, and it seemed highly probable -that the joint guardianship of England and France might degenerate into -a struggle between the two Embassies for personal influences in making -and unmaking governors and ministers, to say nothing of the danger of -the perpetration of gigantic jobs under the guise of giving public works -to foreign capitalists. Nor, of course, was the Turkish Government in -possession of funds to carry out any programme whatever. - -Lord Stanley refused to entertain the French proposal with regard to -Crete, and advanced much the same reasons as those probably brought -forward more than forty years later. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Stanley to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, March 21, 1867. - - The Eastern Question remains where it was. France has certainly not - dropped her idea of urging the cession of Crete. I have distinctly - refused to join in this advice, as you will see by my despatch. The - Russians seem jealous of French interference, though they cannot - object, as it is in the sense of their often expressed opinions. The - Italian Government shows an inclination to take part in the - discussion, but rather, as I conceive, for the purpose of asserting - its position as a first-rate power than with any definite idea of - what it wants. Indeed, I think I trace in Italy a feeling of - jealousy of the increase of the Greek power, lest Greece should - become a troublesome neighbour and rival. - - The chief event which is interesting the diplomatic world at the - present moment is a report--not wholly unfounded as I believe--of - the cession of Luxemburg by Holland to France. Prussia will resent - it (if it comes to pass) and Belgium will not be the happier for - being thus partly surrounded by French territory. - -The Emperor (who had probably abandoned the control of his Eastern -policy to M. de Moustier) received a warning from Lord Cowley. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Cowley to Lord Lyons._ - - Paris, March 22, 1867. - - I found Moustier on my return a very different man from what I had - left him, in respect to Turkey, but I had, a few days after my - arrival, a conversation with the Emperor in which I warned him of - the dangerous game he was playing in hastening the dissolution of - the Turkish Empire, which could only turn to the profit of Russia, - and I think that H.M. sees the matter in this light now and that he - has desired Moustier to hold his hand and not forestall events. I - fear however that things cannot go on much longer in Turkey as they - are. The great matter now should be to educate the Christians for - the emancipation which awaits them, by giving the outlying provinces - as much autonomy as possible, but it 'will be a bitter pill for the - Turks to swallow.' - - There is no particular news here--fresh irritation against Prussia, - which will become dangerous if it does not die out before next year. - -The vagary on the part of the French Government produced much confusion -amongst the diplomatists at Constantinople, who all came to the British -Ambassador with such different stories of what one had done, of what -another was going to do, and of what a third would not do, that he -eventually became as much puzzled as any one else, and adopted an -attitude of strict neutrality. - -The following letter to Lord Stanley is of interest for various reasons. -It expresses the deliberate opinion of an exceptionally impartial man -upon Russian policy towards Turkey, and there are references in it for -the first time to two new factors in the Eastern Question, viz. the -Bulgarians and the Young Turks. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ - - Constantinople, April 10, 1867. - - The Turks stand at bay for the moment. They have sent Omar Pasha to - Crete and are confident that he will reduce the island to - submission. If he fails to do so in a reasonable time, they must - confess that the task is too hard for them and leave the settlement - of the question to the European Powers. France has played the game - of Russia and apparently has not succeeded after all in satisfying - her. She has brought Turkey nearer to ruin than it has yet been. It - all forwards the policy of Russia, which is to keep Turkey unquiet, - to prevent any approach to conciliation between Turks and - Christians, to keep up a constant drain on the finances--in short, - to have the country entirely at its mercy whenever circumstances - render it convenient to seize it. Aali Pasha and Fuad Pasha both - assure me that the dividends due in July on the foreign loans will - be punctually paid; but, with the best intentions, the Porte will - not be able to pay its foreign dividends much longer, if it is - obliged to keep a large force on a war footing on the frontier of - Greece; and to provide against insurrections excited from abroad in - other quarters. The Bulgarians appear to oppose a strong _vis - inertiæ_ to the Russian and Hellenic attempts to induce them to use - and demand autonomy. Their principal quarrel is with the Greek - clergy foisted upon them by the Patriarchate here. I have not been - able to form a positive opinion on their demands for a separate - Patriarch of their own, but I incline to think that the Porte would - do well to grant it. Russia now urges that the Bulgarians should - have a civil representative instead, but this would come very near - to autonomy. - - The discontent among the Mussulmans is very great. It is - particularly so at Constantinople, where the employees of the - Government form an important class, and where in consequence of the - non-payment of salaries, they, and all who live by them, are reduced - to the greatest distress. The 'Jeune Turquie' party is produced - partly by this and partly by the desire of Mustapha Fazyl Pasha and - others to oust Fuad and Aali and to take their places. - - Reports from the Consuls on the treatment of the Christians will - have been pouring in upon you. The greater part of the grievances of - the Christians are the results of bad government and bad - administration of justice, and affect Mussulmans and Christians - alike. Their peculiar grievances are their practical exclusion from - the high offices of the State, the rejection in many cases of their - evidence in the Law Courts, and what is most intolerable, the - position in which they stand socially and politically with regard to - the Turks. The Turks will not look upon them as equals and cannot - trust them. In fact the Christians cannot feel loyalty to the - Government because they are not trusted and employed; and they - cannot be trusted and employed because they are not loyal to the - Government. It is a perfect example of a vicious circle. It is - useless to deny that the position of a Christian subject of the - Porte is a humiliating position, and it is vain to expect that - within any reasonable time the Christians will look upon the - existing Government as anything but an evil to be endured or - possibly even upheld as a less evil than revolution, but nothing - more. - -It will be realized from this instructive letter that however bad the -Turkish Government, it had to contend with obstacles which are not -encountered by other countries, and that in reality it never had a fair -chance, although it is only just to add that when a real chance did -occur, upon the overthrow of Abdul Hamid, in 1908, the opportunity was -deliberately thrown away. - -The Turks, however, had sufficient sense to concede the Bulgarian demand -for a separate church, and by thus affecting a schism between the latter -and the Greeks, succeeded in prolonging their hold over Macedonia for a -longer period than would otherwise have been the case. - -Meanwhile Lord Stanley had been thinking of other matters, and the -allusions to Alaska and to Canada in the letter of April 4, afford a -delightful instance of the light in which British statesmen viewed -Colonial questions at that period. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Stanley to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, April 4, 1867. - - The Eastern Question has left us quiet during the last ten days. I - hear nothing more of the proposed cession of Crete, and I suspect - the French have found out that they had been going a little too fast - and too far. - - The Luxemburg business has monopolized attention. Holland was - willing to sell the Grand Duchy if the consent of Prussia could be - secured, and France wished and wishes to buy, but Prussia steadily - refuses. Holland dares not act without Bismarck's permission, and - for the moment the plan seems to have fallen through. But the - Emperor cannot afford a fresh defeat, and I fear we have not seen - the end of the transaction. There is an almost universal expectation - of war. - - The Americans, as you will see, have bought a large amount of - worthless[10] territory from Russia at a nominal price. Their motive - is probably twofold: to establish a sort of claim in the future to - British North America, lying as it does between their old and their - new possessions; and to gain a victory over us by doing without our - knowledge an act which they probably think will annoy England. In - that expectation they will be disappointed, for I cannot find any - one who cares about the matter, and the press in general treats it - with indifference. It is true that in Canada the feeling may be - different. - -The Luxemburg difficulty (which had the effect of producing a temporary -rapprochement between France and Russia with regard to the Eastern -Question) was settled by a conference in London, and letters from Lord -Stanley and others show that war was narrowly averted, and that the -French were not ungrateful for the action of the British Government. - - 'We have been too busy at home to have much leisure for Eastern - affairs,' wrote Lord Stanley. 'The success of the Conference in - keeping the peace was not, I think, expected by the general public - and has given proportionate satisfaction, more perhaps here than - elsewhere, and more in France than in Russia. The Emperor dreaded - the idea of war and would have accepted almost any terms. The - Prussians, being prepared and knowing that the French were not so, - professed great indifference as to the result of the negotiations. - Many still say that the inevitable quarrel is only postponed. It may - be so, but I am inclined to think that in such matters to gain time - is to gain everything. Irritation subsides, new questions arise to - divert attention, and the opinion of the country has time to declare - itself. I am told that at Paris the feeling of gratitude to England - is general and strong.' - -In May, in spite of Crete, it was arranged that Sultan Abdul Aziz should -pay a visit to France, and both the French and Turks, unlike Lord -Russell, whose opinion on the value of such visits has been already -quoted, thought that it would be productive of great results. The Turks -were especially delighted, because they thought the invitation a proof -that France would not persist in the alliance with Russia which had been -so perilous to the Ottoman Empire. It was hoped that if France could be -brought back to her old attitude of co-operation with England in -deprecating foreign aggression, things might be kept quiet, and that the -internal situation might improve. The recent pro-Russian proclivities of -Napoleon III. had drawn upon him some very sharp remonstrances from Her -Majesty's Government, and a despatch from Lord Cowley shows that the -Emperor had to put up with some remarkably plain speaking. He was told -by the British Ambassador that if he would devote a little more -attention to Eastern affairs he would probably refrain from constant -intervention in the internal affairs of Turkey, unless indeed he wished -to see that Empire collapse; and when he attempted feebly to explain -that Russia deserved some satisfaction for her pride wounded by the -result of the Crimean War, and that the best method of restraining her -aggressive proceedings was to act in conjunction with her, he was -informed that the best way of meeting insidious Russian policy was by -honest and open opposition. It must doubtless have been extremely -irritating to the British Government to see this disposition to fritter -away the effects of the policy which led to the Crimean War, and the -probability is that the Emperor had no definite idea as to what he -wanted and was merely drifting along, in his usual manner, without -realizing the possible results. - - 'I fancy,' said Lord Lyons, 'that great efforts will be made to - please and astonish the Sultan in France and to impress him with the - power of the country. He is not stupid or bigoted, but he has had - very little education. He is more amiable than he looks. He speaks - only Turkish. His hobby is the Navy and the way for us to impress - him would be to show him as many ships, and particularly ironclads, - as we can--that is to say if we can show as many or more than the - French. He is Oriental enough to expect hospitality, as he practises - it here, and I suppose he would be much hurt by any etiquette which - he thought a slight. Politically, I think a visit from him to - England would be a good thing if we received him personally as well - as the French did. As he has taken up the idea of going to England, - he would of course be very much mortified at not being cordially - received, and advantage would be taken of anything of the kind by - the enemies of Turkey here to weaken his and our position. I - suggested to Fuad Pasha to let the question of his visit to England - be still, until I could communicate with you about it, but I - understand he has telegraphed to Musurus to speak to you. I suppose - the Sultan, of whom they all seem as much afraid as if he still cut - off heads, ordered him to do so and he dared not object. I believe - the Sultan will not leave Constantinople till he has made quite sure - of not finding the Emperor of Russia at Paris. Fuad says he will - take a very small suite, but I suppose it will be a larger suite - than a European Sovereign would have. I believe he will take a sort - of noble guard he has, who wear very picturesque costumes of - different parts of the Empire: there used to be fifty of them, but I - hardly suppose all will go.' - -It very soon became evident that the Sultan was quite determined to go -to England, and it was clearly desirable that he should be received with -no less distinction and ceremony than in France. In a courtly manner he -conveyed to the Ambassador that he would be deeply mortified if he were -not given the opportunity of paying his respects personally to Queen -Victoria, and his ministers laid great stress upon the desirability of -His Majesty being received by the Lord Mayor, the importance of that -magnate standing apparently as high in the estimation of the Oriental as -of the Frenchman. The mingled pleasure, alarm, and agitation evoked by -the Sultan's intended visit are well illustrated by the following letter -to Lord Lyons from a man who seemed marked out to add to the gaiety of -nations, Mr. Hammond. - - * * * * * - - Foreign Office, May 30, 1867. - - We should like to know as soon as possible at what time we may - calculate on seeing the Sultan and what members of his family or of - his Government he brings with him, and the rank and description of - his suite and their numbers. It is to be hoped they will not be too - numerous, and that as he is to be lodged in the Palace, the usual - habits of Orientalism will for the time be laid aside and the - services of his Harem be dispensed with during his visit. It would - shock the people in this country to hear of the Sultan being - attended by persons not proper to be mentioned in civilized society, - and no small inconvenience might result if he was known to have - slaves in his suite, for it would be impossible to answer for the - enthusiasts of Exeter Hall with so fair an opportunity before them - for displaying their zeal and doing mischief. - - Aali Pasha has, I think, been in England, and you might have means - of bringing these little matters before him in such a delicate way - as not to shock the Sultan's ideas of propriety or mastery. The - French probably would not be so particular in these respects, but - they have not Writs of Habeas Corpus dangling before their eyes, nor - unrestricted liberty of speech and print to provide against. - - Whatever information you can give us of the Sultan's habits of - living and of the sort of accommodation he will require will be very - acceptable to the Lord Chamberlain's office, and any hints as to - what it would most interest him to see would be valuable. - - In London, you know, we have no manufactories, but there are the - Arsenal at Woolwich; the large private shipbuilding yards in the - Thames, if he did not care to go to Portsmouth for a day; the - Museum, Bank, Post Office and some few things of that sort which are - probably peculiar in their extent to this country. It might also - interest him, if he is a reformer, to see our prisons, from which he - might take useful hints. Does he keep reasonable hours, and would he - be shocked at balls, or restrain himself from throwing a - handkerchief at any beauty that might cross his path? - -Sultan Abdul Aziz's visit to England passed off without administering -any of those shocks to public feeling which Mr. Hammond contemplated -with so much alarm. There are no means of ascertaining what precise -effects were produced upon the Sultan's mind, but it is to be presumed -that the object lesson afforded by an English prison was wasted upon -him, for anything more unlike an English prison than a Turkish gaol it -would be difficult to imagine. The ill-fated Abdul Aziz was accompanied -on this journey by his young nephew, destined to become famous -subsequently as Abdul Hamid II., but he, too, has kept his impressions -to himself, and the only topic upon which he has been known to -expatiate, is the excellence of English servants, who 'always treated -him in a fatherly manner.' - -In the meanwhile Lord Lyons's stay at Constantinople was drawing to a -close, for at the end of April, Lord Stanley had offered him the Embassy -at Paris. The offer was made in highly flattering terms, the Foreign -Secretary expressing his regret at withdrawing the Ambassador from an -important post, the duties of which he so thoroughly understood, but -adding that Paris was the first place in the diplomatic service, and -that the Eastern Question seemed likely to be superseded by even more -serious difficulties nearer home. It is probable that the honour was all -the more appreciated because it was unsolicited and unexpected, as shown -by the following letter from him to Lord Cowley. - - * * * * * - - Constantinople, May 8, 1867. - - When I first heard that you were likely to give up Paris, I felt, as - I think I said in my letter to you, alarmed at the prospect of the - Embassy's falling into other hands. I should have been indeed - alarmed had I then known into what hands it was likely to fall. I - received on the 3rd a letter from Lord Stanley offering it to me. I - have accepted in deference to my father's often repeated injunction - never to refuse promotion, but I confess I am full of misgivings and - anxieties. I had heard nothing whatever from the Foreign Office till - I received Lord Stanley's letter last week. - -The appointment, when it became known publicly, was generally approved, -and no one wrote in warmer terms of congratulation than Lord Clarendon, -who had been Lord Stanley's predecessor at the Foreign Office, and who -stated that he had himself suggested Lord Lyons to his successor as the -most suitable man for the post. - -Thus, at the comparatively early age of fifty he had attained the -highest place in the British diplomatic service. - -As regards Lord Lyons's two years occupation of the Constantinople -Embassy, it has already been pointed out that the period was one of -comparative calm, and that there were no sensational questions to be -dealt with. Unlike some of his predecessors and successors, he had not -been instructed to make any change in the policy pursued by the British -Government towards Turkey, and it had not fallen to his lot to be forced -to adopt a threatening and aggressive attitude. Consequently, his -experiences of Constantinople were agreeable and unexciting; his -relations with the Turkish Ministers and with his colleagues had been -singularly amicable, and he left the place with regret. It would be -affectation to claim that his stay there left any permanent mark upon -our policy in the East, but there were two minor matters in which his -influence made itself felt. Entertaining a profound dislike to intrigue -and tortuous methods, he made it his business to diminish as much as -possible the so-called Dragoman system and to substitute for it a -different and more open method of transacting the business of the -Embassy. The other matter related to the practice of extorting favours -and concessions from the Porte. It has always been the tradition of -British diplomacy in the East, and it may perhaps be said to be unique -in this respect, that the influence of the Ambassador should not be used -to procure concessions, honours, or favours on behalf of British -subjects. Upon this point he carried the principle of abstention to -almost extravagant lengths, as the following incident shows. The -daughter of a gentleman connected with the Embassy was about to be -married, and the newspaper _La Turquie_ announced that the Sultan had -sent a magnificent present. The announcement caught the eye of the -vigilant ambassador, who immediately wrote to the father: - - I think you will do well to take steps to remove the unfavourable - impression which this paragraph cannot but make. There can be little - if any difference between such a present and one made directly to - yourself; and the most friendly course I can take is to advise you - to prevent the acceptance of it, and to have a paragraph inserted in - the _Turquie_ explaining that it has not been retained. - -This must have been singularly unpleasant for all parties, and it is -quite likely that the Ambassador found himself morally bound to -compensate the lady by making an equally magnificent present as a -substitute for the Sultan's rejected gift. - -An application to support a concession to Mr. Brassey for the -construction of a railway from Constantinople to Adrianople met with no -favour at all. He explained that he was constantly applied to in order -to support all sorts of concessions for railways and similar -undertakings, and that his practice was to reply that it was not his -business to meddle in such matters unless instructed to do so by the -Foreign Office, and that concessionaires should therefore in the first -place address themselves to the Home Government. 'The fact is that there -is often much dirty work connected with the management of such matters -at the Porte, and I wish to be clear of them.' Over and over again there -appears in his letters the emphatic statement that he 'refuses to take -part in the dirty work by which European speculators are apt to get -concessions out of the Turks.' - -It would not be difficult to find arguments against this attitude, which -in these days of increased international competition it would be -impossible rigidly to maintain, but the views which prevailed fifty -years ago with regard to the abstention of British diplomacy from every -species of concession mongering probably did more than anything else to -inspire Orientals with a belief in our integrity as a nation. - - -FOOTNOTES: - - [5] Lord Clarendon, upon the death of Lord Palmerston, became Foreign - Secretary in place of Lord Russell. - - [6] British minister at Bucharest. - - [7] Lord Lyons to Mr. Stuart. - - [8] In consequence of the change of Government, Lord Stanley - (subsequently Earl of Derby) had now become Foreign Secretary. - - [9] It used to be said that it took a Franco-German war to secure the - correct spelling of this name. It is certainly a curious fact that - another Foreign Secretary also used to spell it incorrectly. - - [10] Alaska. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -THE SECOND EMPIRE - -(1867-1869) - - -Lord Lyons, accompanied by Malet and Sheffield, whom he had again been -permitted to retain on his staff, entered upon his duties at Paris in -October, 1867, and there he remained until within a few months of his -death, some twenty years later. He arrived at a time when, although the -outward splendour of the Empire still dazzled the popular imagination, -the prestige, influence, and popularity of the Imperial Government, and -more especially of the Emperor himself, had suffered a series of -disastrous shocks. If Napoleon III.'s career had ended in 1862 he would -presumably have left a great name in history and a record of brilliant -successes; after that period, however, everything seemed to go wrong for -him. Poland, the Danish War, and the Austro-Prussian War had shown that -his pretension to control the policy of Europe had practically vanished; -the incomprehensible Mexican enterprise had ended in disaster and -disgrace, and to add to these glaring failures in foreign policy there -was deep-seated discontent at home. In the autumn of 1867 a fresh -embarrassment to France was created by the action of Garibaldi, who -succeeded in embroiling two Governments which had latterly been on most -friendly terms. The alliance between Italy and Prussia in 1866 had been -a temporary expedient only; the sympathies of Victor Emmanuel had always -been on the side of France, and when at the close of that year, the -Emperor decided upon the withdrawal of his troops from Rome, it seemed -not improbable that a permanent alliance between Italy and France might -be effected. This combination was defeated by the action of Garibaldi in -invading the Papal States, and the Emperor, dominated by the clerical -party, found himself compelled not only to use threatening language -towards the Italian Government, but to send a French expedition to -re-occupy Rome and defend the Pope against his enemies. Mentana was the -result, and it soon became plain that the policy of the French -Government was to prevent Italy from obtaining possession of Rome, M. -Rouher, the French Prime Minister, at a subsequent period going so far -as to declare that France would never tolerate such an outrage on its -honour. In spite of all this, signs were not wanting that there was no -desire on the part of either France or Italy to go to war. Mentana had -cleared the air, and the chief danger seemed to consist in the renewed -French occupation of Rome. As Lord Stanley pointed out, it was -comparatively easy for the Emperor to go to Rome, but the difficulty lay -in getting out again, for who was to keep order after the evacuation? -Napoleon III. had, in fact, released himself from momentary -embarrassments at the cost of heavy trouble in the future. In accordance -with his favourite practice, he now made the proposal that the so-called -Roman Question should be submitted to a Conference of the Powers at -Paris--a proposal which did not commend itself to England, and was -opposed by Prussia at the instigation of Bismarck, whose object it was -to accentuate the differences between France and Italy. To what extent -the Empress Eugénie participated in the direction of French foreign -policy has often been the subject of discussion, but there can be no -doubt that she held decided views with regard to the Roman Question and -the proposed Conference. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ - - Paris, Nov. 11, 1867. - - After I had presented the Queen's letter this morning, the Empress - kept me in conversation for an hour. She began by expressing in warm - terms respect and affection for the Queen and in particular - gratitude for Her Majesty's kind reception of her at the last visit. - - The Empress proceeded to speak of the Roman question and insisted - strongly on the necessity for a Conference and on the importance and - propriety of non-Catholic as well as Catholic powers taking part in - it. She expressed a very strong desire that England should not stand - aloof. - - Without taking upon myself to anticipate your decision on the - matter, I endeavoured to make the Empress aware of the very great - difficulty and delicacy of a Conference to us. It appeared to result - from that. Her Majesty said that, in her own opinion, the proper - basis for the deliberations would be the maintenance of the _status - quo_. This, she seemed to think, would be a fair compromise between - the demand of the Pope that all the provinces he had lost should be - restored to him and the pretensions of Italy to Rome itself. - - The conversation having been brought round to the measures to be - taken immediately, I endeavoured to impress upon the Empress the - advantage of withdrawing the troops without a day's unnecessary - delay, if not from the Roman territory altogether, at least from - Rome itself. Her Majesty said that there was nothing in principle - against withdrawing to Civita Vecchia at once, and that certainly - the Emperor and she herself were anxious to bring all the troops - back to France as soon as it was safe to do so. - - The Empress spoke discouragingly of the state of Italy--of the - little progress that had been made towards uniting and assimilating - the various sections of the population--of the financial - difficulties and other unfavourable points. She said however that - the unity of Italy had been the work of the Emperor, and that it - would be absurd and disadvantageous to allow it to be destroyed. She - believed that the French expedition had in reality been of as much - or more service to King Victor Emmanuel than to the Pope. His - Majesty's throne was threatened, she thought, by the revolutionary - party quite as much as was the Temporal power of the Pope. - - Among a great variety of topics which came up, the Empress spoke, by - way of an illustration, of the Kingdom of Greece. She said it had - been a mistake, if that Kingdom was to be created at all, not to - give it territory enough to enable it to exist. She did not however - seem to think it would be advisable at this moment to make over - Crete or any other Ottoman province to Greece. She appeared to be - aware of the extreme peril to the whole Ottoman Empire of detaching - any portion of it in this way. - - The Empress spoke with much grace both of manner and of expression, - and I think with very great ability. - - For my own part I endeavoured principally to make an impression on - her mind respecting the immediate withdrawal of the troops to Civita - Vecchia at least, and I am inclined to think that I succeeded so far - as to ensure the repeating to the Emperor what I said on this point. - - I hear from all quarters that the Emperor's own position in France - becomes more and more critical. Every one seems to admit that he - could not do otherwise than send the expedition to Rome, but the - success which attended it does not seem to have made much - impression. All parties except the ultra-clerical appear to desire - to get out of the intervention as soon as possible. So far as I can - make out, the weakness of the Emperor's position lies simply in - loss of prestige arising partly from his want of success on many - recent occasions, and mainly, I imagine, from the inconstancy of men - and Frenchmen in particular. In fact he has reigned eighteen years, - and they are getting tired of so much of the same thing and want - novelty. - -Lord Stanley's comment upon this letter was that the Empress's 'frank -and sensible conversation' furnished the best reason he had received yet -for keeping out of the affair altogether, and he observed with some -justice that what Her Majesty's proposed compromise amounted to, was -that the Pope should keep all that he had already, and merely renounce -his claim to what, under no circumstances, he could ever hope to -recover. The more he considered the proposed Conference the more -hopeless it appeared to him. There was no plan, nothing settled, no -assurance that there was even a wish for agreement amongst the Powers -interested. They were being asked to discuss a question on which they -were certain to differ, and the sole reason given for summoning a -Conference was that the Emperor disliked bearing the responsibility -which he had assumed. Why should we be asked to bear it for him? It must -have been a congenial task for a man of Lord Stanley's temperament to -throw cold water upon the vague and slipshod proposals of the unlucky -Emperor, and he was probably fortified in his conclusions by the -attitude of Prussia and by the reluctance of Russia, in spite of a -Conference being 'always a temptation to Gortschakoff.'[11] - -Another personage of some importance, Prince Napoleon, also held decided -views upon the Roman question, which he imparted to the Ambassador in -the hope that they would thus be brought before the Emperor. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ - - Paris, Nov. 15, 1867. - - I have had a long interview with Prince Napoleon this afternoon. He - does not desire that England should agree to the Conference. He - thinks that the best service England could render to the Emperor - would be to advise him to give up the idea of a Conference and - settle the matter with Italy, by satisfying, at least in a certain - measure, Italian aspirations. He declares that Italy will never be - quiet, and that the unity of Italy will never be assured until she - gets Rome for her capital. He believes that the Emperor's support of - the Pope is very unpopular with the great majority of the French - people, and that it will, if persevered in, be a serious danger to - the dynasty. He takes a gloomy view altogether of the state of - feeling in France, and thinks that the Emperor will not be able to - hold his own, unless he abandons the system of personal government - and gives a large increase of liberty. He wishes England to give - this advice to the Emperor. - - He volunteered to say all this to me and entered into a great many - details. He spoke with great animation and remarkably well. - - My share of the conversation was but small. I think the advice which - the Prince wishes us to give to the Emperor would be sound in - itself, but that it would produce no good effect, unless His Majesty - felt that he was in a strait, and asked our opinion. I am myself - very little inclined to thrust advice upon him out of season. - -Prince Napoleon on this and, as will be seen, on subsequent occasions, -showed that his judgment was remarkably correct, but it is not probable -that his Imperial cousin benefited by his sage advice, for Lord Stanley -agreed that it was undesirable that the British Government should become -the channel of his opinions. Both he and the Ambassador, however, -thoroughly realized that the Emperor had no fixed plan, and was merely -following his usual hand-to-mouth policy of staving off present at the -cost of future embarrassments. - -Napoleon's vague and unpractical views were exposed in a conversation -with Lord Lyons, which apparently took place in a crowded ball-room. -Asked what was to be the basis of the Conference, he made the cryptic -reply: '_Mon Dieu! la base est d'assimiler le pouvoir du Pape à -l'Italie_,' which sounds like unadulterated nonsense; and when pressed -to explain how an unpalatable decision was to be enforced upon a -recalcitrant Pope, His Majesty was only able feebly to suggest 'moral -influence.' Nevertheless, he showed no ill-feeling, and, with habitual -good nature, addressed no reproaches to the Ambassador with regard to -the unsympathetic attitude of Her Majesty's Government. In spite of many -rebuffs and discouragements, the Emperor and his ministers continued to -labour on behalf of their ill-starred project with an energy worthy of a -better cause; but circumstances were eventually too strong for them. The -real opponent all along had been Prussia, and the aim of the Prussian -Government was to throw the blame on to England. The French were well -aware of the fact, and did not consequently display ill-will towards us, -and it seems to have been the speech of M. Rouher, already referred to, -which made it clear that a Conference would be little better than a -waste of time; for when the Italians asked for an explanation they were -informed that M. Rouher's speech only asserted more emphatically what -had been said before. Meanwhile the French troops continued to remain at -Rome, although King Victor Emmanuel complained bitterly to Lord Clarendon -of their presence and declared that, should they be withdrawn, he would -undertake that there should be no aggressive action against the Pope. -The erroneous impression which influenced French policy with regard to -the Papacy was explained in a letter to Lord Lyons from that acute -observer, Mr. Odo Russell,[12] who was the British representative at Rome -at the time. - - * * * * * - - Rome, Dec. 10, 1867. - - Cardinal Antonelli constantly talks of you with affection and - respect and often expresses his desire to see you again. - - Many thanks for your letter of the 4th about a preliminary - conference. Rouher's speech, I take it, has put an end to all - that--at least so Cardinal Antonelli tells me--and the joy caused at - the Vatican that France will never allow Italy to hold Rome is - immense. - - You are perfectly right in not thinking that the Court of Rome has - changed since you were here. - - French diplomatists and statesmen are but too apt to interpret the - clear and precise language of the Court of Rome according to their - own wishes and to think and proclaim that the Pope will adopt and - follow the wise counsels of France, etc. etc. - - Now I say, give the Pope his due, and at least give him credit for - being consistent, whether you agree with him or not. - - In the long run, an Italian priest will always outwit a French - statesman, and no Frenchman can resist the influence of Rome. A - year's residence suffices to make him more Papal than the Pope, whom - he fondly believes to be a French institution under the immediate - control of the French clergy. - - I have often marvelled at French notions of the Papacy, and now it - has grown the fashion to mistake the cause of the Pope for that of - France, even among men who might know better. - - A permanent French occupation is the only possible machinery by - which the Temporal Power can be imposed on Italy. The national - feeling against the Temporal Power is certainly much stronger than I - myself thought in Italy, and the bitter hostility of the Romans has - been proved by the hideous means employed by them to destroy life - and property in the October conspiracy. - -The accuracy of these views was sufficiently demonstrated in 1870. - -Before the end of the year Prince Napoleon made another of his frequent -appearances at the Embassy, and announced that he looked upon a war with -Germany in the spring as certain. He considered that there were only two -courses which could have been taken with prudence--the one to resist the -aggrandizement of Prussia immediately after Sadowa--the other to accept -it with favour; what had been done had merely caused so much irritation -that France would eventually be forced into war. He denounced Thiers, -who, while pretending to advocate peace, was always crying out that -France was being wronged and humiliated, and thought that even a -successful war would be full of danger to the Empire. Apparently his own -policy was to unite with Italy against the Pope and establish liberal -institutions in France, a course which the Emperor had now rendered it -impossible to adopt, as he had committed himself to the Pope, and was -not likely to play the part of a Constitutional monarch after eighteen -years of absolute power. 'He speaks very well, and with a good deal of -animation,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'and his opinions sound much better as he -delivers them than they read as I write them.' But, making every -allowance for exuberant verbosity, this Prince seems to have held much -sounder and more definite opinions than his Imperial relative. - -Not long after Prince Napoleon came the Foreign Minister, M. de -Moustier, with his story. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ - - Paris, Jan. 16, 1868. - - M. de Moustier says that the reports he receives from Berlin and - other quarters confirm his impression that Prussia is averse to a - war with France; that the relations between Austria and Prussia are - improving, and that such being the case Prussia is awakening to a - sense of the danger of Russian designs in Eastern Europe. On the - other hand he says that Baron Brunnow gives the most positive - assurances that Russia will do nothing against Turkey. He trusts - that these assurances may be depended upon, but he thinks that the - Russian Government uses its ambassadors as screens, behind which to - carry on its own manoeuvres. - - Nigra, the Italian Minister here, tells me that his last news from - Florence gives him strong hopes that the Menabrea Ministry will - maintain itself. I presume that the object of Italy should be to - convince the Emperor that Rome will be safe without the French - troops--I mean to make the Emperor himself really confident of it. - This done, I suppose diplomacy is capable of devising some formal - guarantees to satisfy the French public. I do not believe that - France has as yet done more than hinted at some security that Italy - will take her side, if she quarrels with Prussia. I do not know that - she has even hinted at anything of the kind. A demand for an - engagement of this sort would be unreasonable and probably futile. - If France is ever hard pressed by Prussia, the Italians will go to - Rome unless some other Powers step forward to bar the way. At all - events, it will not be by promises extracted beforehand that they - will be stopped. - - The real danger to Europe appears however to be in the difficulties - of the Emperor Napoleon at home. The discontent is great and the - distress amongst the working classes severe. The great measure of - the session, the new Conscription Act, is very unpopular. There is - no glitter at home or abroad to divert public attention, and the - French have been a good many years without the excitement of a - change. I think that Europe, and England in particular, are more - interested in maintaining the Emperor, than in almost anything else. - -The accuracy of this forecast, like that of Mr. Odo Russell, was also -demonstrated in 1870, when, upon the retirement of the French garrison, -the Italian troops marched into Rome, and the temporal power of the Pope -came to an end. It is not, however, altogether fair to place the whole -responsibility for the collapse of French policy in Italy upon Napoleon -III., for whereas he was no doubt personally in favour of an united -Italy; there was a strong party in France which was strongly -opposed to it, and convinced that French interests lay in a divided -country. The mention of Russia in the above letter makes the following -remarkable communication not inappropriate. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ - - Paris, Jan. 22, 1868. - - The Emperor told me last night that his Ambassador at St. Petersburg - had had a curious conversation with the Emperor Alexander. - - The Emperor Alexander had, he said, asked the Ambassador whether the - French Government were fully aware of the extent of the plot which - was actively carried on for the destruction of all the monarchical - governments in Europe, and the assassination of sovereigns and Royal - families. After giving some details His Majesty had suggested to - the Ambassador that the several Governments should communicate - information to each other and unite their efforts to defend - themselves. - - The Emperor Napoleon proceeded to tell me that it was asserted that - the first and principal attempt was to be made in England; that the - palaces and public buildings were to be blown up, and the Queen and - Royal Family seized and put on board a steamer in the Thames and - 'disposed of.' The Emperor Napoleon went on to say that the supposed - details of the scheme to overthrow the Government of England were of - course absurd, but he seemed to intend to suggest that we should be - vigilant, and that he himself would be glad to co-operate with us. - He said that Mazzini, who had let him alone for some time, had now - again taken up the idea of assassinating him, and was busily - employed in making plans for effecting their purpose. He told me - that Mazzini was very ill and he did not express any wish for his - recovery. - - The Emperor talked to me a long time and related to me interesting - anecdotes, some very amusing, of the conduct of various persons - towards him in past times. - -Cheap sensational magazines were not in existence in 1868, or one would -be disposed to infer that the Emperor Alexander had been indulging in -this species of literature, since it seems difficult otherwise to -account for such credulity in high places. As for the Emperor Napoleon's -anecdotes of his youth, they are unfortunately denied to the world, for -the most distressing feature in Lord Lyons's correspondence is the -almost complete absence of anything in the nature of indiscretions. The -conversation, however, serves to show on what intimate terms he already -stood with Napoleon III. - -In the spring, letters received from Lord Stanley show that the British -Government was feeling some uneasiness with regard to America, more -especially in connection with the _Alabama_ question, and, as now was -frequently the case, Lord Lyons's advice was requested on various -points. As to the general policy which should be pursued, he reiterated -his former opinion that the chief danger consisted in the belief of the -ordinary American politician that England would submit to anything -rather than fight. Neither party would wish to have the responsibility -of actually making war with England, but each party would very much like -to be able to boast of having made her yield without fighting, and would -vie with each other in calling for unreasonable concessions if they -thought there was any chance of obtaining them. The best chance, -therefore, of keeping the peace was to be very firm and uncompromising -in questions of arrests and other measures necessary for putting down -Fenianism, as these were manifestly well grounded, and the rights of the -same kind so frequently claimed and exercised by the Americans during -the war had never been contested. In anything doubtful, we should be -mild and conciliatory--not that mildness and conciliation would make -much impression in America--but in order to satisfy a section of the -British public. The present danger, he considered, lay in the -over-conciliatory, over-yielding tone of a great number of English -writers and public men, which might lead the Americans to fancy they -would be quite safe in pushing us into a corner, and so bring about a -state of things which would render a fight unavoidable. As for the -_Alabama_ question, he urged that the more quietly the claims were -discussed, the more satisfactory the result was likely to be, and he -strongly advised that the discussion should take place in Europe -rather than in the United States: it would be a mistake to send a -_mission d'éclat_ to Washington, as such a mission would be taken as a -surrender at discretion. Whether the mission of Lord Ripon and his -colleagues to Washington three years later could be correctly described -as a _mission d'éclat_ or not is of little importance, but it certainty -ended in surrender. - -The letters from Paris about this period abound in misgivings as to the -political situation in France. The conviction was becoming general that -the Bonaparte dynasty was too weak to stand any shock. The Emperor, it -was true, began to show indications of proceeding gradually towards -Parliamentary government, in the hope of founding a state of things -which might render the position tenable on his death for his son, but it -seemed more probable that the progress might be too slow for the object. -Towards the end of February some apprehension was created by a -circumstantial rumour that the Emperor had announced positively to -Russia that France would not allow the annexation of the Grand Duchy of -Baden to the North German Confederation, and a month later a vague fear -was felt of the imminence of a _coup de théâtre_. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ - - Paris, March 27, 1868. - - I ought to say that there are, among not unreasonable or - inexperienced people, vague apprehensions that the Emperor may, - _more suo_, resort to a _coup de théâtre_ and declare war when it is - least expected. The only act which can be cited in support of these - apprehensions is the formation of two more camps of instruction this - year than usual. It is said that the effect of this will be to have - two additional army corps ready to take the field at short notice. - But the real ground of the apprehension appears to be a resemblance - real or fancied between the declaration and proceedings of the - Emperor now, and those which preceded the war with Italy. I believe - it to be true that Prince Napoleon has told the Emperor that war - with Germany must be made this year or never, but I do not think the - Prince advises the war being made at all. The general impression - indeed here appears to be that there is at this moment an amount of - discontent in the annexed provinces which might be turned to account - now by France, but which will subside in a year's time, if the - Prussian Government is left to carry into effect its plans. Southern - Germany, it is thought, would go with France _after_ a French - victory, but not without one. For my own part I am more inclined to - believe that the Emperor is sincerely anxious to preserve peace. In - case of war he must take the field in person, and it is much doubted - whether he is willing or able to endure the mental and bodily - fatigue of a campaign. Defeat would be fatal and anything short of - great success and additions of territory far from advantageous. It - is of course impossible to say what a man so reserved and really so - little in the habit of making up his mind long beforehand, may or - may not do, and therefore the possibility of a _coup de théâtre_ - must I suppose always be kept in one's mind. Still I must say that - all I can make out leads me to believe that his present wishes and - intentions are peaceful. - -A good deal of interest had been aroused by a visit of Prince Napoleon -to Germany in the spring, which gave rise to much speculation in the -political world. His friends gave out that it was merely an ordinary -tour. Others, who were supposed to be well informed, declared (probably -much to the satisfaction of the Prince) that he had been sent on a -private mission from the Emperor, of which none of His Majesty's -Ministers had any cognizance. Two different objects were assigned to the -mission; one that he was commissioned to assure Bismarck of the -Emperor's determination to remain at peace if possible, but to represent -that Bismarck should act so as to make it easy, and should not use the -presumed hostility of France so frequently as a lever to move public -opinion in Germany. The other and less probable object with which he was -credited, was that he was to summon Prussia to join France against Russia -in Turkey, a fantastic absurdity which was directly contrary to -Moustier's policy in the East. The probability is that Prince Napoleon -had no mission at all, but the long letter which follows is interesting -as showing what correct conclusions an intelligent person can -occasionally draw from a well-timed visit to a foreign country. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ - - Paris, March 31, 1868. - - Although I have not seen Prince Napoleon myself since his return - from Germany, I think I can give you a tolerably accurate notion of - the language he holds. - - He speaks with satisfaction of the manner in which he was himself - received at Berlin. He thinks that Count Bismarck will not provoke - France to war by increasing at present the area of the North German - Confederation, or any other overt act. He believes him to be - sincerely desirous of avoiding a war, but not to be willing to allow - any interference on the part of France in the affairs of Northern - Germany, or to make any patent concession whatever to France. He - conceived it to be vain to talk to Prussia of disarmament, as she - would answer that she was already disarmed, having only 200,000 men - under arms. Her system, which would enable her to put from 4 to - 600,000 men in a condition to take the field in eight or ten days, - she could not be persuaded to change. - - The Prince has seen nothing, except in the United States, like - the contempt in which foreign nations are held in Prussia. Austria - is not considered to be worth taking into account at all. Great - indifference is professed as to Italy and Turkey. The Prince does - not believe that there is any formal treaty between Russia and - Prussia, but is convinced that there is an understanding that, in - return for a friendly neutrality in the West, Prussia is, in case of - being at war with France, to give Russia free scope in the East. - - The Prince gives no weight to the assertions that the recently - annexed provinces would see with pleasure an attack by France upon - Prussia and use it to recover their independence. He is not blind to - the discontent which prevails among a great part of the populations - in those provinces, but he is convinced that an attack from abroad - would rouse an almost universal spirit of resistance in Germany - which would extend even to the German possession of Austria. The - allegations to the contrary come from adherents of the dispossessed - dynasties, who fancy that their own peculiar feelings are the - feelings of the mass of their countrymen. The Saxon army might - possibly be a danger to the Prussians, if the Prussians should be - defeated, and in that event, Bavaria and Wurtemberg might also - support France. But they would none of them do anything for France - until she had gained so decided a victory as to have no need of - them. In Saxony the Prince found the army to be ill-disposed to - Prussia, but not the commercial classes. - - The Prince has not come back with the idea that France could easily - attempt to annex Rhenish Prussia. He believes that the inhabitants - are now prosperous and contented and better off than they would be - under France with her present institutions. Cologne might turn out - to be another Saragossa to France. The case might in his opinion be - different in the Palatinate, and France would, he supposes, have - little difficulty in 'assimilating' Belgium if she obtained - possession of that country. - - So far the impressions brought back by the Prince are calculated to - show that the policy of France should be to remain at peace, and his - language to the Emperor may have had a good effect. But he has also - said to the Emperor and others that a war with Prussia should be - made this year or never; that the consolidation of Germany is - proceeding surely and rapidly; that the adhesion of Southern Germany - will soon follow, and that hereafter war would have to be waged with - a Germany thoroughly united and perfectly organized. - - Prince Napoleon is himself opposed to war. He considers that an - unsuccessful war would overthrow the Emperor and his dynasty and - send the whole Bonaparte family to the right about. A war only - partially successful would, he thinks, rather weaken than strengthen - the Emperor at home, while a thoroughly successful war would simply - give His Majesty a fresh lease of 'Cæsarism' and adjourn - indefinitely the liberal institutions which he considers essential - to the durability of the dynasty. At the same time the Prince is not - without apprehension as to war being made this season. He fears weak - men, and he looks upon the Emperor as a weak man. He fears the - people who surround His Majesty, the Generals, the Chamberlains, the - ladies of the Palace. It has been particularly observed that while - the Prince has been very communicative as to the opinions expressed - by him to the Emperor, he has been, contrary to his wont, wholly - silent as to what the Emperor said to him. - -This account of Prince Napoleon's views was derived from Colonel -Claremont, the British Military Attaché, who was on intimate terms with -him. Prince Napoleon, one of the best abused and most unpopular of -Frenchmen, had, with all his talents, little fixity of purpose, no real -perseverance, and was too much wanting in courage to become the head of -a party; but the insight which he displayed with regard to the real -situation between France and Prussia is really remarkable. There is -hardly a single opinion, in the letter quoted above, which was not shown -subsequently to be absolutely accurate and well founded, and one cannot -help suspecting that he afterwards must have derived some melancholy -consolation from the realization of his prophecies of evil. - -[Illustration: _Prince Napoleon._ - -LONDON EDWARD ARNOLD] - -The general uneasiness which was felt in France, and to which constant -allusion is made in private letters and in despatches, was in no way -allayed by the pacific declarations of the Emperor, which seem, indeed, -to have made an effect exactly contrary to what was intended. It was in -vain that ministers made reassuring statements; bankers and capitalists -had lost confidence in the maintenance of peace, and, although the -diplomatic world was quiet, the public was convinced that war was -imminent. The one thing that was certain was that France was preparing -for a war of some kind, and the suspicions of Lord Stanley were aroused -by a request from Moustier that Her Majesty's Government should 'give -advice' to the Prussian Government. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Stanley to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, April 14, 1868. - - You will receive from me to-day a despatch which seems to confirm in - some degree the apprehensions so generally felt at Paris. It may - mean less than it appears to imply, but a warning given at Berlin - that any attempt or any measure tending towards the annexation of - the South German states will be regarded unfavourably at Paris, - is so like a threat that one cannot help feeling anxious as to the - result, and how it can be conveyed in language which will not be - considered offensive, passes my comprehension. If nothing else had - occurred, one might think that it was only a piece of unnecessary - fuss on the part of Moustier, whose alternations of activity and - indolence are not always easy to follow; but looked at together with - the military preparations which have so much alarmed Colonel - Claremont and which you do not seem to contemplate without some - uneasiness, the state of things indicated is certainly not pleasant. - Perhaps I make too much of this: up to the present time I have - always contended against the alarmist view of the situation, and - Bernstorff,[13] whose information is generally good, shows no - anxiety. It is the business of war departments in all countries to - look at foreign policy from their special point of view, and I class - the utterances of General Moltke with those of Marshal Niel, as - professorial rather than political. - - In any case I am not disposed to volunteer advice which would - certainly be uncalled for, probably useless, and perhaps altogether - out of place. Nor can I fail to detect in Moustier's language a - wish, hardly concealed, to enlist England on the side of the French - claim that Prussia shall not be enlarged--though it is disguised - under the form of asking us to give advice in the interests of - peace. - - * * * * * - -There can be no doubt that Lord Stanley was right, and that Moustier's -intention was to commit England to the French side under the guise of a -friendly communication to the Prussian Government. The refusal to be -drawn into Franco-Prussian entanglement was sound, but, as will be seen, -the British Government did attempt to intervene shortly afterwards. - -In spite of highly coloured orations by Marshal Niel, and of an -important speech by General Moltke on the position which Germany should -hold as a predominant power in Europe, and of the use to be made of the -army and navy in consolidating German unity, which caused much -irritation in France, the fear of the outbreak of war passed temporarily -away, and calm again reigned in the diplomatic world. In August, Lord -Cowley, former ambassador at Paris, paid a visit to the Emperor Napoleon -at Fontainebleau, and found him in a very depressed mood. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ - - Paris, Aug. 11, 1868. - - Lord Cowley wrote me a short note after his return from - Fontainebleau and sent me an account of what had been said there. - - He appears to have thought the Emperor aged, and to have found him - much depressed. His Majesty said little of Foreign Politics, but - spoke gloomily of his own position in France. He said that the - country districts were still for him, but that all the towns were - against him: a vast number of persons had congregated at Troyes to - see him, but he had been assured by the Prefect that most of them - were in reality red Republicans. The Emperor does not seem to have - said anything about the Queen. The Empress held the same language - that she and her entourage did to us, but from an expression she let - fall, it would seem that she is sore at heart about the visit. The - public appear to be rather accepting the version that it was in - compliance with a request from the Empress, that Her Majesty, being - ill and fatigued, abstained from returning the visit. - - It is not certain whether the Emperor and Empress will be at - Biarritz or at St. Cloud at the time of Her Majesty's return. If - they are at Biarritz there can be no question of any visit, and this - might give an opportunity for a letter, which might smooth the - difficulties of the point of etiquette. If the Emperor and Empress - are at St. Cloud, it must be considered the same thing as if they - were at Paris. - - I hear from other persons besides Lord Cowley that the Emperor is - very much out of spirits. It is even asserted that he is weary of - the whole thing, disappointed at the contrast between the brilliancy - at the beginning of his reign and the present gloom--and inclined, - if it were possible, to retire into private life. This is no doubt a - great exaggeration, but if he is really feeling unequal to governing - with energy, the dynasty and the country are in great danger. - Probably the wisest thing he could do, would be to allow real - parliamentary government to be established, so as to give the - opposition a hope of coming into office by less violent means than - a revolution. - -The 'soreness of heart' referred to a visit of Queen Victoria, who had -passed through Paris in July on her way to Switzerland. It had been -arranged, after prodigious correspondence, that the Empress should come -up to the Elysée Palace and call upon the Queen at the Embassy (the -Elysée having been selected on account of its proximity), but apparently -nothing was settled about a return visit on the part of the Queen. At -all events, no return visit was paid to the Elysée, and the consequence -was that a section of the French press seized upon the occasion -maliciously to represent that the Emperor and Empress were no longer -treated with consideration by the ancient Royal Houses, and that England -was all in favour of the pretensions of the House of Orleans. - -These attacks naturally caused much annoyance to the Emperor, who was -always very sensitive where the Orleans family was concerned, and he was -placed in a somewhat embarrassing position with regard to the return -journey of Queen Victoria through Paris, since, owing to the visit of -the Empress not having been returned, he was unable to pay his respects -as he had been anxious to do. The difficulty was eventually solved by -the Emperor and Empress arranging to go to Biarritz at the time when the -Queen was expected to pass through Paris on the return journey, and an -explanatory letter from the latter was considered to have closed the -matter satisfactorily. If any trace of soreness remained it was -doubtless removed by the highly successful visit of the Prince and -Princess of Wales later in the year. - -The Imperial spirits, which were much in need of a tonic, were -temporarily revived by the demonstrations of loyalty shown by the -National Guards at a review held in August, and this evidence of -personal popularity appears to have surprised most people. It may be -presumed, however, that the unfortunate Emperor was frequently misled on -these occasions. Astonishment and admiration had frequently been evoked -at the spectacle of the autocrat shaking hands freely with blouse-clad -working men and exchanging fraternal greetings with them on the occasion -of public festivities, but, according to the Prefect of Police, these -favoured individuals were in every case his own detectives masquerading -as horny-handed sons of toil. - -Two questions of secondary importance about this period were brought to -the attention of the British Government, the one concerning Tunis, and -the other the Throne of Spain. In Tunis the French showed an -unmistakable intention to establish themselves as the paramount power, -and it was not clear whether England would remain indifferent or not. -Lord Stanley, upon being asked for instructions, gave it as his personal -opinion that there was no occasion to show any jealousy of French -influence there, and that the position of the French as near neighbours -gave them a strong interest. He declined to believe in annexation, as -Algeria had not been such a success that any government would be likely -to desire to extend the French dominions in North Africa. The French -Government therefore obtained, as far as we were concerned, a free hand, -and although Bismarck intimated that the claims of Prussia in Tunis -would have to be considered, it is probable that had it not been for the -Franco-German War, that country would have become a French possession in -1870 instead of in 1880. - -With regard to Spain, it is worthy of note that the Spanish Government -was in 1868 desirous of offering the throne to the Duke of Edinburgh. -Both Queen Victoria and her ministers, however, were strongly opposed to -the project, and their opposition was founded on good sense. The throne, -they considered, was insecure. New dynasties took root with difficulty, -more especially in Spain, where respect for foreigners was not a -national characteristic, and it would be disagreeable for England to -have an English prince, however detached from England, involved in a -civil war, and possibly ejected. Again, even if the experiment were -successful, it would confer no real advantage on England, while it would -probably excite extreme jealousy in France. Further, we should probably -be asked to give up Gibraltar in return, and if this were refused, which -of course would be the case, there would be a complaint, if not of -absolute unfairness, yet at least of ingratitude on our part. If any -form of monarchy was to be retained, the opinion was expressed that the -cause of religious freedom would be better served by a moderate Catholic -on the throne than by a Protestant. - -Such were the matter-of-fact views of Her Majesty's Government as -expressed by Lord Stanley, and nothing more was heard of the proposed -candidature of the Duke of Edinburgh. The straightforward action of the -British Government on this occasion contrasts favourably with that of -other Powers when the question of the choice of a King of Spain recurred -two years later. - -In October, Lord Clarendon, who had been Lord Stanley's predecessor at -the Foreign Office, arrived in Paris. Lord Clarendon, in addition to a -thorough acquaintance with foreign political questions, enjoyed -apparently the great advantage of being a _persona grata_ to all the -principal personages in Europe, and was honoured with the confidence of -Napoleon III., the King of Prussia, King Victor Emmanuel, the Pope, and -a host of other persons occupying high and responsible positions. As the -Liberal party was at that time in opposition, he bore no responsibility, -and it was therefore possible for him to use language and arguments -which might not have been appropriate to any one speaking officially on -behalf of a government. The valuable and interesting information which -Lord Clarendon thus obtained was, in accordance with the high principles -upon which he acted, placed unreservedly at the disposition of his -political opponents. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ - - Paris, Oct. 13, 1868. - - Lord Clarendon arrived here on Saturday. He has given me accounts of - interesting conversations he has had with the King and Queen of - Prussia and with General Moltke. The details he will no doubt repeat - to you when you see him. The sum of what was said by all three is - that Prussia earnestly desires to keep at peace with France; that - she will be very careful not to give offence and very slow to take - offence: that if a war is brought on she will act so as to make it - manifest to Germany and to Europe that France is the unprovoked - aggressor: that a war brought on evidently by France would infallibly - unite all Germany. Moltke seemed to believe that the Emperor - Napoleon must know too well how thoroughly prepared Prussia is to - provoke a war lightly. He was, on his side, well aware of the - complete state of preparation in which the French were: he thought - Prussia had lost an opportunity after Sadowa, and that if she had - then known that France could not bring more than 150,000 men into - the field, she might have settled the whole affair of German unity - out of hand. This opportunity had been lost, according to him, by - the incorrectness of the information from the Embassy at Paris, and - now Prussia must have peace if possible in order to organize her - system of government civil and military. - - In short, Lord Clarendon is sure that the Emperor Napoleon may be - confident that he has nothing to fear from Prussia, if he does not - give her just provocation: but, on the other hand, that Prussia does - not fear a war, if she can show Germany and the world that she is - really forced into it. - - I think I might very well mention to Moustier the impression Lord - Clarendon has brought back, and indeed to the Emperor, if I have an - opportunity. - - Lord Clarendon gathered from Moltke and others that there is a very - strong feeling in the Prussian army against Russia and a very great - repugnance to accepting Russian assistance. In case however of a war - with France, Prussia must of course (Moltke observed) get help - wherever she could find it, and must at all events use Russia to - paralyze Austria. Austria he thought hostile, and very naturally so, - to Prussia, and ready to do all the harm she can. She is not - however, in his opinion, in a condition to be otherwise than neutral - at the beginning of a war. - - Lord Clarendon tells me he most forcibly pointed out to the King of - Prussia and Moltke the extreme danger of giving France any - provocation; anything like a challenge could not be passed over by - the Emperor: if the glove were thrown down, public feeling would - oblige His Majesty to take it up. Lord Clarendon urged them to - settle the Danish question, and even suggested that some way should - be sought of giving a satisfaction to French _amour propre_. - - It will be seen that the information obtained by Lord Clarendon - coincided more or less with the impressions derived by Prince - Napoleon. Upon Lord Stanley it produced a reassuring effect, and - confirmed him in his opinion that the Prussians were in a state of - alarm which they were endeavouring unsuccessfully to conceal, under - an ostentation of being ready for whatever might happen. In any - case, he thought, they would have a respite until the spring. - - Lord Clarendon was fortunate enough to be able to give the Emperor - Napoleon the benefit of his Prussian experiences. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ - - Paris, Oct. 20, 1868. - - Lord Clarendon dined at St. Cloud yesterday, and had a long - conversation with the Emperor after dinner. He repeated to His - Majesty the pacific language which he had heard from the King of - Prussia, the Queen of Prussia, and General Moltke. The Emperor heard - the pacific assurances with evident satisfaction, and spoke very - strongly himself in the same sense. Lord Clarendon was thoroughly - convinced that the Emperor was exceedingly anxious to avoid war and - thoroughly convinced that peace was desirable for the interests of - the dynasty. At the same time, His Majesty declared that if anything - like a challenge came from Prussia it would be impossible for him to - oppose the feeling of the army and the nation, and that he must, in - such a case, for the sake of his own safety, make war. He was most - anxious that England should step in to enable France and Prussia to - withdraw with honour from their present antagonistic attitude. This - is an idea which, as you know, has been vaguely suggested to me more - than once by men more or less in the Emperor's confidence. It has - never been hinted by Moustier in speaking to me. The Emperor - appears, however, to have dwelt a good deal upon it with Lord - Clarendon yesterday, and even to have entered a little upon details. - He seems to have relished the idea of other great powers being - united with England in a sort of mediation, but I did not gather - that he had any matured plan, or any distinct notion of the way in - which practical effect could be given to his wishes. His object was - to calm public opinion in France, and the means of doing this were - to be a sort of collective confirmation by Europe of the Treaty of - Prague, and a sort of pressure to be exercised by Europe on France - and Prussia which would compel them, or rather enable them, to - diminish their military preparations and take effectual steps to - restore public confidence. Whatever may be the feasibility of the - Emperor's project, it is important to know what is in his mind, and - convenient to learn it with so much certainty, and at the same time - in a way which prevents its being presented to H.M. Government as a - proposal or a suggestion to them. There is nothing as the matter - stands which necessitates even an expression of opinion from us. - - The Emperor told Clarendon in strict confidence of a proposal which - he had not, he said, mentioned even to his Ministers. Men of weight - (_des hommes sérieux_) had proposed a Confederation between the - South German States and Switzerland. Lord Clarendon pointed out - objections to the notion, such as the want of any real bond of - sympathy or interest between Switzerland and the proposed - confederates, and the offence which would be taken by Prussia, and - the Emperor appeared (for the moment, at least) to have given up the - idea. - - The King of Prussia told Lord Clarendon, and Lord Clarendon repeated - it to the Emperor, that the speech at Kiel was intended to be - thoroughly pacific, and that its object was to make the Prussian - army and the public take quietly the anti-Prussian cries stated to - have been uttered by the French troops at the camp at Chalons. The - Emperor positively declared that no anti-Prussian cries and no - political cries of any kind beyond the usual loyal cheers had been - uttered at the camp. - - Of Spanish affairs little seems to have been said in the - conversation with the Emperor. At dinner the Empress talked of - little else. She did not appear to favour any particular solution of - the question or any particular candidate for the Crown. She appeared - to expect both political troubles and extreme misery from the famine - which she says is undoubtedly impending. As to her own estates and - those of her relations in Spain she says they return absolutely - nothing, and that the peasants have not even put by grain enough to - sow the land. No one dares to store up grain or to bring it from - abroad lest he should be torn to pieces by the ignorant people as an - _accapareur_. - -From this interesting communication it will be noted that Napoleon III. -apparently reposed more confidence in Lord Clarendon than in his own -ministers; the '_hommes sérieux_' were, however, probably mythical, as -the proposed Confederation of Switzerland and the Southern German States -was not a project which would commend itself to practical people, and is -more likely to have been conceived in his own nebulous imagination. The -important conclusion to be drawn from his language is that the Emperor -was, at all events, at that period, sincerely anxious to avoid war, -conscious of the military power of Prussia, and extremely anxious to -induce the British Government to take some step in the nature of -mediation which should avert the threatened conflict and enable France -to withdraw with honour. This suggestion had already been ineffectually -made to Lord Stanley in the spring; but, as will be seen, a similar -suggestion was again put forward in the following year and acted upon. - -Before the end of 1868 changes took place both in the British and in -the French Foreign Offices. The return of the Liberal party to power -restored Lord Clarendon to his old post, and M. de Moustier gave -place to M. de La Valette. The departure of Moustier was no loss. At -Constantinople he had shown himself to be restless and overbearing; in -France he was not considered to be entirely satisfactory where -semi-financial matters were concerned, and he finished his career by -nearly getting into a serious scrape with the Prussian Government over -the question of the latter being represented on a proposed Commission at -Tunis. The Emperor Napoleon, although he entertained no grievance -against Lord Stanley, naturally welcomed the return to office of Lord -Clarendon. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, Dec. 15, 1868. - - I came back from Compiègne yesterday. During the week I was there - the Emperor seemed to be in remarkably good health and spirits, and - was to all appearance very free from care. If he has any special - plan regarding foreign politics, he is keeping it _in petto_ to - electrify the Corps Diplomatique on New Year's Day, or the Chambers - in his opening speech. He talked a great deal to me of his desire to - maintain his cordial understanding with England and of his - confidence in your helping him to do so, but he did not speak as if - he had any intention of putting our friendship to any special test - at present. - - He said that the conduct of the Greeks was very annoying, but that - in dealing with them, we must make some allowance for their feeling - of nationality and not _froisser_ it too much. I observed to him - that the Greeks, by their conduct with regard to Crete, were - producing a state of things which would be absolutely intolerable, - and that they were in my opinion doing themselves much more harm - than they did the Turks. In this he seemed to concur. My Russian - colleague, Stackelberg, was in a dreadful fuss about the Turco-Greek - question. The main anxiety he expressed was, not unnaturally, for - the King and the dynasty. We might perhaps work upon Russia by - showing that the dynasty would be continually popular if Greek - aggressions, and consequently excitement and disorder in Greece, are - allowed to become chronic. - - The Emperor talked a little and the Empress a great deal about - Spain; both took a gloomy view of the prospects, but neither gave - any hint of the solution to be desired. - -The Crown Prince of Prussia, whose peaceful proclivities became -subsequently known to the world, happened to be in England at this -time, and Lord Clarendon took the opportunity of discussing the -Franco-Prussian situation with him. The Crown Prince had already -impressed Lord Stanley with his amiability, modesty, and good sense, but -it is evident that, like many others, he had not fully realized the -great sacrifices which the Germans were ready to make in the cause of -national unity. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyon._ - - Foreign Office, Dec. 18, 1868. - - My inchoate letter on the 16th was cut short by the Crown Prince of - Prussia, with whom I had an interesting conversation. He is even - more pacific than his Father, and unlike his Father would be glad to - put the army on something more like a peace footing. The King - however is unapproachable on this subject, but the Prince says that - in a year or two he will have to yield to the outcry of the people - against the increased taxation that such monster armaments entail. - He means to consult some experienced officers as to the manner in - which reduction can be made without offence to the dignity of his - martial Sire, and he said that something had been done in that - direction by postponing till January the assembling of the levies - that ought to have taken place in October. I urged strongly upon him - the necessity of maintaining the _status quo_, and particularly - warned him against the incorporation of the Grand Duchy of Baden - into the Northern Confederation. He quite entered into the reasons - for this and said it would probably be a long time before the - interests of the South would necessitate a junction with the North, - although it would ultimately be inevitable. - - When I last saw you on my way home from St. Cloud I told you that - the Emperor wished me to report my conversation with him to the - Queen of Prussia--I did so. She forwarded my letter to the King and - sent me his answer, which was not only pacific but extremely - courteous to the Emperor. He said there was no fear of the _status - quo_ being changed now, but that some time or other the South and - North must be united, and that it would be far better to _calmer les - esprits_ by teaching people to expect it and not to look upon it as - a danger or a menace to France, which it would not be any more than - the existing state of things. I wrote all this to the Emperor who - assured me that the King of Prussia's opinions had interested him - much and that he agreed in his views about the inexpediency of a - Congress.--Disraeli made a bad use at the Lord Mayor's dinner of - your letter giving an account of my interview with the Emperor, for - he gave it to be understood that Stanley was successfully mediating - between France and Prussia, etc; La Tour d'Auvergne, to whom the - Emperor had told our conversation, was much annoyed and feared that - he might be thought guilty of an indiscretion. - - I was glad to learn by your letter of the 15th that you thought well - of the Emperor's health, as reports have of late been rife that he - was failing both in body and mind--their object was probably, and as - usual, some Bourse speculation. - -The chronic anxiety with regard to the relations between France and -Prussia which prevailed at this time was partially forgotten early in -1869 in consequence of a slight crisis in the East. The Cretan -Insurrection had lasted for several years, and the Turks had shown -themselves incapable of suppressing it in consequence of the attitude -of the Greek Government, which, supported by Russia, openly encouraged -the revolutionary movement. Greek armed cruisers ran the blockade, -volunteers openly showed themselves in uniform in the Greek towns, and -the Greeks showed a disposition to go to war, rightly assuming that -Europe would never allow their country to be reconquered. At length the -situation, from the Turkish point of view, became intolerable, and in -December, 1868, the Turkish Government delivered an ultimatum, which was -rejected by the Greeks and diplomatic relations were broken off. The -opportunity was at once seized by the Emperor Napoleon in order to -propose a Conference. Conferences had, as is well known, a special -attraction for Napoleon III., who delighted to figure as a magnificent -and beneficent arbiter graciously condescending to settle the squabbles -of inferior beings, but a Conference has also often captivated the -imagination of many diplomatists besides the late Prince Gortchakoff, -whose chief delight it was to make orations to his colleagues. Nothing -produces so agreeable a flutter in diplomacy as the prospect of a -Conference. Where shall it be held? What is to be its basis? Who are to -be the representatives? What Governments shall be entitled to appear? If -such a one is invited, will it be possible to exclude another? And -supposing these knotty points to be satisfactorily settled, shall some -Power possessing doubtful credentials be allowed a _voix consultative_, -or a _voix délibérative_? In this particular case, there was no -difficulty in fixing upon the place, but there was considerable -difficulty with regard to the participation of Greece, as Turkey flatly -refused to meet her. The prospect of a Conference was not viewed with -much satisfaction by Lord Clarendon, who asked awkward but necessary -questions about 'basis' and so forth, and warned Lord Lyons that he -would have to be very firm with La Valette on this point, 'as I know by -experience in 1856 how fickle the Emperor is, and how invariably his -minister changes with him, and throws over the engagements upon which we -had the best reason to rely.' - -Neither did Lord Lyons look forward to it with any pleasure: 'The -Conference seems likely to bring into strong light some things which -would perhaps be better in the shade,' he wrote. 'For instance, an -understanding between Russia and Prussia on the Eastern Question; -bitterness between Austria and Russia, etc., etc. I understand that -there is great rejoicing over the prospect of the Conference at the -Tuileries.' Probably Lord Lyons's distaste arose partly from the fact -that foreign diplomatists have a habit of coming and rehearsing to their -colleagues the speeches with which they propose subsequently to -electrify the assembled Conference. It is only fair to admit, however, -that the Conference was brought to a fairly satisfactory conclusion. The -Greeks, who had given a great deal of trouble with their consequential -pretensions, were admitted under a _voix consultative_ condition, and a -settlement was arrived at which enabled diplomatic relations to be -resumed with Turkey. To put it shortly, the Greeks were informed that -they were bound to respect the rules common to all Governments in their -future dealing with the Ottoman Empire (surely not a very onerous -provision), and the hope was expressed that all the causes for complaint -embodied in the ultimatum of the Porte would be removed. Crete, in -consequence, remained comparatively quiet for about ten years. -When, however, a few days after the satisfactory conclusion of this -business, the Prussian Government came forward with a proposal that -there should be yet another Conference at Paris on International -Postage, M. de La Valette was obliged summarily to reject it, as -'the French public was sick to death of the very word.' - -Early in 1869, considerable apprehension was created by the Luxemburg -railway affair. A French and a Belgian railway company whose lines -adjoined, had endeavoured to bring about an amalgamation, and the -Belgian Chamber, naturally afraid of the consequences which might result -from French influences within Belgian territory, passed an Act -prohibiting concessions of railways without the authorization of the -Government. This action caused considerable ill-feeling in France, and a -universal belief existed that the Belgian Government had been instigated -by Bismarck. It was obvious that England could not remain indifferent to -the danger of what would now be called the 'peaceful penetration' of -France into Belgium,--in other words, the ultimate annexation of that -country--and one of the first notes of alarm seems to have been sounded -by no less a person than Queen Victoria. - - * * * * * - - _General Grey to Lord Clarendon._ - - Osborne, Jan. 14, 1869. - - The Queen desired me to write to you yesterday in returning the - private letters you sent her with reference to what you said in one - of your letters of the probable designs of France in Belgium. Her - Majesty wished me to inform you that she had more than once called - the attention of the late Government to this subject. The King of - the Belgians in writing to her had repeatedly expressed his - apprehensions that either by means of a Customs convention or by the - purchase by a French company of the Luxemburg Railway to which - unusual privileges and advantages would be conceded by the French - Government, France might seek to obtain a footing in Belgium highly - dangerous to her future independence and neutrality. Her Majesty, - though hoping the King might exaggerate the danger, has invariably - expressed the strongest opinion that England was bound, not only by - the obligations of treaties, but by interests of vital importance to - herself, to maintain the integrity and independence as well as the - neutrality of Belgium; and that the best security for these - essential objects would be found in the knowledge that any - proceedings which seemed to threaten their violation would bring - England at once into the field. - - Her Majesty did not mean that any official communication should be - made on the subject, but that the habitual language of our ministers - at Berlin and Paris should be such as to leave no doubt as to the - determination of England. - -This communication from the Queen was followed not long afterwards by a -memorandum from Mr. Gladstone, laying stress upon the fact that the -'independence of Belgium was an object of the first interest to the mind -of the British People,' and hoping that it would be made clear to the -French Government 'that the suspicion even of an intention on the part -of France to pay less respect to the independence of Belgium than to the -independence of England would at once produce a temper in the country -which would put an end to the good understanding and useful and -harmonious co-operation of the two Governments.' This was very clear -language--especially for Mr. Gladstone--and the Ambassador was directed -to hint to the French Government that Belgium was under our special -protection. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, Feb. 16, 1869. - - Baron Beyens, the Belgian Minister, comes to me frequently about the - Grand Luxemburg Railway affair, and is very naturally in great - tribulation both for himself and his country. - - M. de La Valette also loses no opportunity of speaking to me about - it, and appears also to be very much disturbed. For my own part, I - can only preach in general terms conciliation to both. - - I have found M. de La Valette calm and moderate, but I am afraid - there can be no doubt that the affair is extremely annoying to the - Emperor, and that His Majesty is very angry. M. de La Valette asked - me to call upon him to-day, and told me in the strictest confidence, - though he did not pretend to have absolute proof of it, that the - whole thing was instigated by Count Bismarck. He considered that - there were three possible solutions of the question. - - The first, that France should at her own risk and peril annex - Belgium to herself. To this solution M. de La Valette was himself - utterly opposed. - - The second was the adoption of retaliatory financial and commercial - measures. To this he was also opposed, considering it to be - undignified, to be injurious to the interests of Frenchmen, and to - constitute a punishment for all Belgians innocent as well as guilty. - - The third course was to pursue the line already taken. To admit - fully the right of the Belgian Government to act as it had done, but - to declare in very distinct terms that it had been guilty of a very - _mauvais procédé_ towards France, and that the Government of the - Emperor was deeply wounded and very seriously displeased. He said - that he was about to prepare a despatch in the above sense. - - I need not say that I did all in my power to strengthen his aversion - to the two first courses, and to induce him to soften the tone of - his communication to Belgium. - - He seemed however to be afraid that the Emperor would be hardly - satisfied with so little, and he declared it to be quite impossible - that any friendship could hereafter exist between the French - Government and the present Belgian Ministry. In fact, he was far - from sure that his policy would be adopted. - - He talks of Bismarck and his ways in a tone which is not - comfortable, and the irritation in France against Prussia seems to - increase rather than diminish. Certainly confidence in peace has not - increased lately. - -M. de La Valette may have been calm and moderate, but his Imperial -Master was very much the reverse, and his conduct of the affair was a -striking instance of his ineptitude. He had thoroughly frightened the -Belgians, alienated public opinion in England, and aroused well-founded -suspicions throughout Europe that he intended to fasten a quarrel upon -Belgium in order to facilitate its eventual annexation. According to -Lord Clarendon, the idea that Bismarck had prompted Belgian action was a -complete mare's nest, but even if that were not so, it ought to have -been plain to the Emperor that if there was one thing more than another -which would gladden Prussia, it was a misunderstanding between France -and England. The feeling in England at the time may be judged by -Gladstone's language, who wrote to Lord Clarendon in March 12-- - - 'That the day when this nation seriously suspects France of meaning - ill to Belgian independence will be the last day of friendship with - that country, and that then a future will open for which no man can - answer.' - -This apparently was what the Emperor was unable to see. - - 'Bismarck is biding his time quietly,' wrote Lord Clarendon. 'If - France annexes Belgium and we take no part he will be delighted, as - France could no longer complain of Prussian aggrandisement. If we do - take part, he would be equally delighted at the rupture between - England and France, and would come to our assistance. Either way he - thinks Prussia would gain. Why should Napoleon and La Valette assist - him? A quarrel between France and England or even a coolness is the - great German desideratum.' 'I believe,' he adds in another letter, - 'nothing would be more agreeable to Prussia than that the intimacy - between the two countries should be disturbed by a territorial - encroachment which would run on all fours with Prussian - aggrandisement.' - -For some reason, which was not clear, the Emperor persisted in making -the question a personal one, announcing that he 'could not and would not -take a _soufflet_ from Belgium,' and the British Government became so -apprehensive of his attitude that the somewhat unheroic course was -adopted of sending a warning to the French Government, but leaving the -responsibility of presenting, or of withholding it, to the Ambassador. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, March 16, 1869. - - We are very anxious about the Belgian business because more or less - convinced that the Emperor is meaning mischief and intending to - establish unfriendly relations with Belgium preparatory to ulterior - designs. It is very imprudent on his part, and he will only reap - disappointment, for even if he meditates war with Prussia he could - not undertake it upon a worse pretext or one less likely to win - public opinion to his side, as it would wantonly entail an - interruption, to use a mild term, of friendly relations with - England. It is unnecessary to say that we attach extreme importance - to the maintenance unimpaired of those relations, and it is - therefore our paramount duty to omit no effort for that object. - - I have accordingly, by the unanimous desire of the Cabinet, written - you a despatch calling the serious attention of the French Government - to the dangerous eventualities that we see looming in the distance, - but the mode of dealing with that despatch may be delicate and - difficult, and we therefore leave the decision on that point to your - discretion. You can either read it, or tell the substance of it at - once to La Valette, or you may keep it for a short time until some - crisis arrives when it could best be turned to account. I feel that - this is rather hard upon you, and I would much rather have been more - precise, but, on the spot, you will be such a much better judge of - opportunity than I can pretend to be here, and if the warning is to - have any success it will depend on its being given at the right - moment and in the right manner.' - -One cannot help wondering whether a similar confidence in an -Ambassador's judgment is still shown at the present day, the views of -the so-called 'man on the spot' being now generally at a considerable -discount. In this case, Lord Lyons gave reasons showing that the warning -was not needed, and would not be of any advantage to Belgium, while -complaining that he disliked going about with a live shell in his -pocket. A few days later, however, Lord Clarendon wrote again saying -that he thought that the warning would have to be addressed shortly, as -public opinion in England was beginning to become excited, and attacks -were being made upon the Government for not using stronger language or -showing its determination to stand by Belgium, while the King of the -Belgians was anxious to make his woes known through the English press. -'If,' said Lord Clarendon, 'the Emperor attaches value to the English -Alliance he ought not to sacrifice it by a sneaking attempt to -incorporate Belgium by means of a railway company and its employés. If -he wants war it is a bad pretext for doing that which all mankind will -blame him for.' - -It was not unnatural that Lord Clarendon should have felt uneasy at the -threatening development of this apparently insignificant railway -difficulty, because it was plain that the one object which the Belgians -were bent upon was to entangle us in their concerns, and to make us -responsible for their conduct towards France; nor, again, was this an -unreasonable proceeding upon their part, for Belgium was an artificial -state, and as dependent upon foreign guarantees for her existence as -Holland was dependent upon her dykes. Perhaps in order to reassure the -British Government, Marshal Niel's aide-de-camp and General Fleury were -sent over to London in April. They brought a message from the Marshal to -the effect that France was ready for anything, and that the Emperor had -only to give the word; but that to begin by a rupture with England about -a miserable Belgian difference would be a _sottise_. These visitors did -more to convince the French Ambassador in London that there was no -danger of war than all his correspondence with the French Foreign -Office, but Lord Clarendon continued to be apprehensive of the influence -excited upon the Emperor by shady financiers and by an untrustworthy -representative at Brussels. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, April 19, 1869. - - I have never, as you know, felt any confidence in the soft sayings - and assurances of the French Government, but I did not think they - would have exposed the cloven foot so soon and completely as they - have done. No affair has given me so much pain since my return - to this place, and I foresee that out of it will grow serious - complications and an end to those friendly relations between England - and France that are so advantageous to both countries and which have - had an important influence on the politics of Europe. - - What provokes me is that _sales tripotages_ should be at the bottom - of it all, and upon that I have reliable information. I know of all - the jobbery and _pots de vin_ that are passing, and yet it is to - fill the pockets of half a dozen rascals, just as in the case of - Mexico, that the Emperor allows himself to be dragged through the - mud and to imperil the most manifest interests of France. - - The policy of the French Government is perfectly understood at - Berlin, where the leading object of Bismarck is to detach us from - France. We might to-morrow, if we pleased, enter into a coalition - with Prussia against France for the protection of Belgian - independence, which is a European and not an exclusively French - question; but we will do nothing of the kind so long as there is a - hope that France will act with common honesty. I wish you would - speak seriously to La Valette about the _tripoteurs_, and represent - the disgrace to his Government of playing the game of such people, - which will all come out and be known in the same way as the Jecker - bonds are now unanimously acknowledged to have been the cause of - that fatal Mexican expedition. - - I send you rather a curious despatch from Loftus. Bismarck's ways - are inscrutable, and he is never to be relied upon, but he has had a - union with us against France in his head ever since the Belgian - business began, for Bernstorff, who never speaks without - instructions, has said on more than one occasion to Gladstone and to - me that though Prussia would not undertake to defend Belgium - single-handed, as that country concerned England more nearly than - Prussia, yet that we had but to say the word, and we should soon - come to terms. I treated this, as did Gladstone, rather as a _façon - de parler_ and a ruse to detach us from France, which is Bismarck's - main object, as I did not choose that Bernstorff should have to - report the slightest encouragement to the suggestion, but it _may_ - come to that after all. - -Colonel Walker, the British military attaché at Berlin, whom Lord -Clarendon considered to be one of the most enlightened and intelligent -men of his profession, was in London at the time, and he reported that -there was not the slightest sign of any active military preparation in -any part of Prussia, and that the idea of war was so much discouraged by -the military authorities that it was no longer talked of in military -circles, whereas formerly it had been the only topic of discussion. The -manoeuvres were to be held in the Prussian provinces most remote from -France, and there was a fixed determination to give the latter no cause -for offence, not from fear of that country, for there was a conviction -that Prussia would have the best of a war, but owing to internal -difficulties. Colonel Walker added that the mutual indisposition of the -North and South to each other was becoming so manifest that the -unification of Germany was far distant. - -This comforting piece of intelligence Lord Lyons was instructed to -communicate to the French Foreign Minister. - -The Luxemburg Railway difficulty was finally disposed of by a Commission -at London, but before this took place, the Belgian Liberal Minister, M. -Frère-Orban, found it necessary to pay a visit to Paris. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, April 28, 1869. - - Frère-Orban had a farewell audience of the Emperor this morning. He - tells me that his Majesty was very gracious. Frère appears to have - insinuated that the business was finished. The Emperor expressed a - hope that something good would be done in the Commission. The - Emperor dwelt upon the necessity of France and Belgium being upon - the best terms in order to put a stop to all the ideas of annexation - which certain journals were continually putting forward. His Majesty - said that the annexation of Belgium to France would be disagreeable - to England, which would of itself be a reason sufficient to make him - averse from it. His Majesty had on his table the Arcolay pamphlet - which asserts that Prussia would be unable to defend South Germany - against France. He said that in an answer to this pamphlet published - at Berlin, the Belgian army was counted among the forces to act - against France, and observed that France and Belgium ought to be on - too good terms to render such an employment of the Belgian army - possible. Frère said that His Majesty had only to make Belgium feel - convinced that her independence was safe, in order to ensure her - sympathy with France. Frère appears to have been much pleased with - the audience on the whole, though he would rather the Emperor had - said distinctly that he did not expect any result from the - Commission, and looked upon the whole question as at an end. He is - very well satisfied with the result of his mission to Paris, as he - has placed the relations on a friendly footing, and conceded - absolutely nothing. - - The great points now are for the Belgians not to sing songs of - triumph, and for us and everybody to avoid all appearance of having - exercised any pressure. The Emperor cannot safely take a snub from - any foreign nation, and he feels this very strongly. - -It is to the Emperor's credit that, in spite of disastrous failures, he -always seems to have preserved a courteous and amiable demeanour. In -this particular case, it is probable that he did not know clearly what -he wanted himself, and that, misled by unscrupulous advisers, he -entertained vague notions as to the possibility of annexing Belgium, and -then withdrawing, as best he could, when the difficulties were realized. -At all events, the sole result was a rebuff and an increased want of -confidence in his integrity. In short, the mismanagement of this railway -affair, which should never have been allowed to attain so much -importance, and the collapse of his previous attempt upon Belgium, -justified the sneer levelled at him by Bismarck, who, as recorded by -Busch, remarked in 1870, 'He (Napoleon III.) should have occupied----and -held it as a pledge. But he is, and remains a muddle-headed fellow.' A -still more scathing definition was applied to him by his distinguished -countryman, M. Thiers--_une immense incapacité méconnue_. - -The private correspondence in 1869 with Lord Clarendon, who was by far -the most voluminous letter-writer amongst English Foreign Secretaries, -contains references to many topics besides the relations between France -and Prussia, such as Tunis, the Eastern Question, Spain, the internal -situation in France, the inauguration of a new Prussian seaport, the -Suez Canal, and a host of other subjects. Amongst these may be mentioned -two projected visits of exalted personages. The Khedive Ismail was -expected in England, and there was some uncertainty as to how he should -be treated. In the previous year he had ingratiated himself with the -Sultan of Turkey by agreeing to pay an increased tribute, and as a -consideration had obtained the title of Khedive and the privilege of -securing the Viceroyalty of Egypt for his own family. Being of a vain -and ostentatious disposition, however, he had now fallen into disfavour -with his Suzerain by reason of the royal airs which he assumed and of -actions which seemed to imply that he considered himself to be an -independent ruler. 'Pray let me know,' wrote Lord Clarendon, 'how the -Viceroy is received at Paris. The Turkish Ambassador has been boring me -with protestations against the royal receptions already given to him and -which he fears may be repeated here. He yesterday showed me a telegram -from Constantinople, saying that _l'effet serait fort regrettable_ if -the Viceroy was lodged in the same apartment at Buckingham Palace that -the Sultan occupied. He declares that this voyage through Europe is to -dispose Governments favourably to recognize his independence, and that -he will be backed by France against his suzerain.' - -Upon making inquiries at Paris it was found that the same question had -been raised there, the Turkish Ambassador having made a remonstrance -against the Khedive being lodged in the Elysée, and a special request -that at least the room in which the Sultan slept should not be -desecrated by his obnoxious vassal. The French Foreign Minister had -thereupon advised the Ambassador to consider the remonstrance about the -Elysée and the bedroom as _non avenue_, as it could only serve to make -the Ambassador and his Government look ridiculous. Nevertheless, M. de -La Valette admitted that the Viceroy was taking too independent a line, -and that the proposal to neutralize the Suez Canal was an Imperial -question which should originate from the Porte, and not from the -Egyptian ruler. - -The other and more illustrious traveller was the Empress Eugénie, who -was desirous of attending the inauguration of the Suez Canal, and who -unexpectedly intimated that she wished to make a tour in India. Upon -this becoming known, Queen Victoria caused her to be informed that her -presence in any part of the British dominions would always be most -welcome, and that every arrangement would be made for her comfort and -convenience. - - 'The Empress talked to me last night,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'for a very - long time and with great animation, not to say enthusiasm, of her - project of going to India. She gives herself two months away from - France, during which she proposes to go to Ceylon and most of the - principal places in India except Calcutta. She repeated her thanks - to the Queen and to you, and said that as the Queen had never been - herself to India, she herself, as a Foreign Sovereign, could not - think of receiving Royal Honours, and besides, that she particularly - wished for her own sake to observe the incognito and to be allowed - to go about and see things in the quickest and most unostentatious - manner. I told her that she had only to let us know exactly what her - wishes were and every effort should be made to carry them out. She - particularly begged that her idea of going to India might not be - talked about, lest it should be discussed and criticized in the - papers. I cannot suppose she will ever really go to India, but she - is full of it now. La Valette will stop it if he can, for his own - sake; for he depends a good deal upon her support at the Palace.' - -This journey, of course, never took place. La Valette prevented it by -representing to the Empress that if she went to Suez she must also go to -Constantinople, and thus sufficient time for a tour in India was not -available. - -A trivial incident in French high society which occurred about this time -serves to show with what extraordinary facility the most exaggerated -statements can be circulated and credited. Writing to Lord Lyons, Lord -Clarendon stated that he had been informed that the former had been -placed in a most disagreeable position at a party given by Princess -Mathilde, at which a recitation had been delivered marked by the most -furious abuse of the English, and that the Emperor had gone up to the -reciting lady and ostentatiously complimented her. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, May 9, 1869. - - The only foundation for the story you mention is the fact that I was - at a party at the Princesse Mathilde's at which a play was acted and - some verses recited. The room however was so small that only the - Emperor and Empress and some of the principal ladies had seats in - it. The rest of the company were dispersed in other rooms. For my - own part I was two rooms off, entirely out of sight and out of - hearing of the performance and recitation. Among the verses was, I - believe, an old ode of Victor Hugo's in praise of the First Emperor. - I have never read it, but I dare say it is not over-complimentary to - England. I hear the Emperor was affected to tears by it, but it - certainly neither placed me in an awkward situation, nor gave me any - emotion, for it was out of sight and hearing, and I did not know it - had been recited. - -In June Lord Lyons received his first request to take part in a division -in the House of Lords. As far as is known, he had never made any -declaration as to his political views, but apparently he figured on the -Whip's list as a Liberal or Whig, and Lord Clarendon wrote saying that -the Conservative Lords had determined upon the suicidal course of -throwing out the Irish Church Bill, and that as the House of Commons was -'capable of anything' it was imperative to prevent such a disaster; that -every vote in the Lords was of value, and that if he had no serious -objection it was desirable that he should come over and vote on the -second Reading. The answer to this appeal strikes one as a model of -common sense. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, June 6, 1869. - - I am very much obliged by your kind consideration in not _pressing_ - me on the subject of coming over to vote on the Irish Church Bill. - I will frankly say that I have a very strong disinclination to do - so. The professional objections are too obvious to mention, and I - have another feeling which would make me hesitate. I have as yet - never taken any part whatever in home politics. If I ever come to - live in England, I shall of course endeavour to take a political - line and to be of any use I can. In the meantime I should have great - difficulty in reconciling myself to the idea of now and then giving - a sort of blind vote, either for the sake of party, or from - deference to friends however much I might value and esteem them. - -In other words, he knew scarcely anything about the merits or demerits -of the Bill which he was expected to support, and was, of all men, the -least inclined to give a vote on a question with which he was -unacquainted. Lord Clarendon, however, doubtless much against his -inclination, was compelled to return to the charge. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ - - June 12, 1869. - - I am writing in the Cabinet room, and by the unanimous desire of my - colleagues, to request that, unless you object to the Irish Church - Bill, you will come over and give us the benefit of your vote on - Friday. - - It is not often that the vote of the Ambassador at Paris is wanted, - and if I remember rightly, Cowley only once or twice sent me his - proxy; but proxies are now abolished, and the real presence is - necessary. Every vote is of importance, as the question is one of - great gravity not only as respects the Irish Church but the conflict - between the two Houses that is impending, and that must if possible - be averted. - - Gladstone has just expressed a strong opinion as to the duty of a - peer not to abstain from voting when he is not disabled from doing - so, and does not admit that diplomatic convenience is a sufficient - reason against his doing so. - - I hope therefore you will come over if you are not opposed to the - Bill. - -It being practically impossible to resist an intimation of this kind -from an official chief, Lord Lyons reluctantly went over to London to -vote, and as he had not yet even taken his seat, took the precaution of -asking a trusty friend in the Foreign Office to find out what the -necessary formalities were. The following somewhat naïve communication -possesses a modern interest as it discloses the fact that backwoodsmen -were as much in existence then as they are now. - - * * * * * - - _Mr. Staveley to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, June 16, 1869. - - Not being able to get any reliable information in the Foreign Office - as to your _modus operandi_ in regard to taking your seat to-morrow, - I have been down to the House of Lords this afternoon and saw one of - the clerks in the Crown Office, who says that all you have to do is - to present yourself at the Peers' entrance to-morrow not later than - 4.45 p.m., when you will receive from the clerk in attendance for - that purpose the necessary writ to enable you to take your seat. - - Nothing further is necessary, and many peers presented themselves - and took their seats for the first time this session, for the debate - of Monday last, with no further formalities. - -The obvious comment on this incident is that Mr. Gladstone and his -colleagues were totally wanting in a sense of proportion, and their -action justifies the belief that the eminent persons who govern this -country are sometimes literally incapable of looking beyond the next -division list in Parliament. - -If a British Ambassador is to inspire confidence in his countrymen -it is all important that he should not be a partisan or dependent in any -degree upon party favours. The majority for the second reading of the -Bill was 33, and no fewer than 108 peers were absent from the division -unpaired. Yet because the whip (probably a person of very mediocre -intelligence) said that he wanted every vote that could be obtained, the -Ambassador was sent for, made to figure as a party hack, and forced to -give a vote on a question of which he had admittedly no knowledge, and -upon which his opinion was valueless. It will be seen later that similar -attempts to force him to vote were subsequently made by people who ought -to have known better, but fortunately without much success. - -Towards the close of April, 1869, the French Legislative Session came to -an end, and with it expired the Chamber elected in 1863. The General -Election took place in May, and, as an insignificant number of -opposition deputies were returned, owing to the unscrupulous -intervention of the Executive, the results were received with much -satisfaction in Government circles. It was generally felt, however, that -even the huge Government majority would be more independent than in the -late Chamber, and that a very real control would be exercised over the -Ministers. It was even expected by some that the Emperor would formally -announce the acceptance of the principle of the responsibility of -Ministers to Parliament. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, May 25, 1869. - - I understand that the result of the elections gives pleasure at the - Tuileries. The Imperialists generally seem very well satisfied. - They consider the result to be a complete defeat of the Orleanists, - a defeat of the Legitimists and a defeat of the moderate - Republicans; the Chamber being thus divided into supporters of the - dynasty and Ultra-Republicans. They think the prominence of the - _Spectre Rouge_ will frighten and unite the people at large, and - cause them to rally round the dynasty. I cannot help being afraid - that there are more _rouges_ elected than is very safe, and the - election of such a sanguinary socialist as Baucel both at Paris and - Lyons is an uncomfortable symptom. The opposition will not be - inconveniently numerous, and its violence will be in all probability - simply a source of weakness. - - I could not get Rouher to listen to any hint to propose to Prussia - that a French vessel should be sent to Jahde,[14] though he seemed - willing enough to send one if invited. You have, however, I think, - entirely prevented them having any suspicion of our having been - coquetting with Prussia, or having been willing to curry favour with - her at the expense of France. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, May 29, 1869. - - It is very generally believed that Rouher will be made the scapegoat - and placed in the honourable retreat of the Presidency of the - Senate. Since the great rally of the Moderates to the dynasty it has - become the fashion to throw upon Rouher personally the blame of all - the measures which he has had to defend. I don't know who can be - found to take his place as Government orator. - - Speculation is occupied in divining how the Emperor will take the - elections. Some think that, finding himself in front of an - opposition of _Rouges_, he will again take the part of the Saviour - of Society and begin a new epoch of Cæsarism. Others, looking to the - comparatively large number of independent members, whose elections - the Government did not oppose, and to the liberal professions made - even by the official candidates, expect a formal announcement of the - responsibility of Ministers to the Chamber, and Parliamentary - Government in form and in fact. An opinion not the least probable is - that His Majesty will make no change, but appoint Ministers and - direct his policy more or less in deference to the Chamber, - according to circumstances. - - I hope Beust's meddling in the Belgian question has been merely an - awkward attempt to curry favour with the Emperor, but it may have - had the mischievous effect of encouraging fresh pretensions on the - part of France. Jealousy of Prussia will for a long time to come - ensure sympathy between France and Austria. - -The complacent feelings with which the election results were at first -received at the Tuileries soon gave place to very different emotions. M. -de La Valette was under no illusion as to the unimportance of a victory -over the Orleanists, and had frequently assured the Emperor that they -had no real backing in the country, and that His Majesty's extreme -susceptibility with regard to the attention shown to the Princes of that -House by the Court and by society in England was totally unnecessary. -The more the elections were considered the less they were liked. It -began to dawn upon the Emperor that it had been a mistake to help the -Reds with a view to crushing the Orleanists or Moderate Liberals. A -majority in the Chamber was indeed secured to the official candidates, -but the moral weight of the votes given for them was small, for the -influence of the Government had been unsparingly and unscrupulously used -to secure their return, and even the official candidates had, with few -exceptions, been forced to issue very Liberal addresses. Fear of the -extreme men might bring the officials and the independent members -together in the Chamber, but it was generally realized that the -Government would have to go at least halfway to meet the Liberals. In -short, it was difficult to conceal the fact that the elections had not -resulted in a manifestation of confidence in the Imperial Government, -and that they had shown that the party bent upon revolution at any price -was dangerously large. Under these circumstances it was not surprising -that the French Government showed itself alarmed and irritable, and -although the country appeared to have declared against war there were -not wanting Imperialists who would have been ready to look upon a -provocation from abroad as a godsend. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, June 8, 1869. - - The elections of yesterday in Paris seem to me satisfactory, for I - certainly prefer Orleanists and Moderate Republicans to Reds, and it - is a great thing to be rid of all the questions Rochefort's return - would have produced. In the Provinces the official candidates seem - to have had the worst of it. - - The lessons to be drawn from the general election are not pleasant, - for it is impossible to find anywhere a symptom of approval of - personal government. It is not that the French desire a - Parliamentary government _à l'Anglaise_, but they are tired of the - uncertainty and disquiet in which they are kept by the fact that - peace and war, and indeed everything, depend upon the inscrutable - will of one man whom they do believe capable of giving them - surprises, and whom they no longer believe to be infallible. I don't - like the look of things. I dare say we shall be quiet for some time, - but like the French public, I live in dread of a surprise. - - It is true that Fleury is likely to go as Minister to Florence, - though it is a secret. He would keep his office of Grand Ecuyer, but - he would go because he felt that he had lost his influence with - the Emperor and would not choose to stay here only to look after - horses and carriages. I don't think his departure a good sign. He - has lately been rather liberal in politics, and he is one of the few - men who would be certainly true to the Emperor and brave and - resolute if it came to actual fighting in the streets. The object of - his mission to Florence would be to manage the withdrawal of the - French troops from Rome. I have no doubt the Emperor wants to - withdraw them, but he wants also to be sure that the Pope will be - safe without them. I dare say, too, that His Majesty is angry about - the conduct of the clergy in the elections. They voted according to - their own predilections, and certainly did not make the support of - the Government a primary object. - -General Fleury, a man of charming personality, and a prominent figure in -French society, was the author of the celebrated rejoinder, _Pourtant, -nous nous sommes diablement bien amusés_, upon an occasion when the -Second Empire was severely criticized some years later. Lord Clarendon -was another of those who felt misgivings over the elections. 'I feel -precisely as you do,' he wrote to Lord Lyons, 'about the elections and -the danger of a surprise that they create. Cæsar thinks only of his -dynasty, and I expect he foresees greater danger to it from responsible -Government than from war. It is not surprising that the French should be -exasperated at always living on a volcano and never knowing when it may -burst out and what mischief it may do them. The Bourgeoisie and the -_actionnaires_ must fear revolution, but they must be beginning to weigh -its evils against those which they are now suffering from. Fleury was a -friend of peace and of England, and I am very sorry that he should so -much have lost his influence as to make him accept a foreign mission.' - -The elections were followed by a certain amount of rioting in Paris, and -some hundreds of persons were arrested, but the only effect of these -disorders was to strengthen the hands of those who advised the Emperor -to hold fast to absolute and personal government. The latter was quite -willing to sacrifice individuals to the Chamber, and was aware of the -necessity of making some concessions in a Liberal sense, but he -continued to resist any extension of the power of the Legislative Body. -The latter might have obtained what was desired by calm and patience, -for no minister would have been strong enough to successfully withstand -the demand, but it is not in the nature of Frenchmen to achieve -practical successes without noise and ostentation, and it was plain that -troublous times were ahead. Had Napoleon III. been wise he would have -taken the bull by the horns and announced something that would have -satisfied the Chamber and the country. Unfortunately, the one thing he -refused to give up was the one thing which his opponents were determined -to wrest from him--personal government. - -In July the Constitutional agitation was advanced a stage by an -important interpellation of the Government demanding that the country -should be given a greater share in the direction of affairs and asking -for a ministry responsible to the Chamber. This demand was very -numerously signed, and much to the general surprise amongst the -signatures were many names belonging to the Government majority. It was -evident that the country and the Chamber were determined to put some -check on personal government. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, July 7, 1869. - - We are going on here _à toute vitesse_, whither, it is not very - pleasant to think. A new form has been agreed upon for the famous - interpellation. - - More than a hundred Deputies have signed the demand, and among the - signatories are to be found even some of the regular courtiers, such - as Prince Joachim Murat and the Duc de Mouchy. It is entirely - illegal for the Corps Legislatif to discuss the Constitution, but - things seem to have gone much too far for such scruples to have any - weight. It would be amusing, if it were not rather alarming, to see - the eagerness among men of all parties to be forward in the race - towards Liberalism. Rouher preaches patience and moderation, but the - Oracle from St. Cloud gives no certain response to the many votaries - who try to extract a declaration of its views. This it is, which has - been one of the main causes of the falling away of the Imperial - Deputies. To keep the majority together, it would have been - necessary that a distinct _mot d'ordre_ should have been given them, - the moment the Chamber met. No one is willing to take the unpopular - side without some assurance that he will not be thrown over by the - Prince he wishes to serve; and what is worse, the want of decision - shown has very much diminished confidence in the resolution and - ability of the Sovereign, and consequently the willingness of - politicians to throw their lot in with his. When one looks at the - position in which things stood, I will not say before the election, - but between the election and the meeting of the Chamber, one is - astonished at the rapid descent of the personal power and the - reputation. Whether concessions will come in time to enable him to - stop before he is dragged to the bottom of the hill, is even - beginning to be questioned. - -The Prince de La Tour d'Auvergne, the French Ambassador in London, who -was much astonished at the number of persons who had signed the -Interpellation Demand, told Lord Clarendon that the French Government -had brought it entirely on themselves by the scandals perpetrated at the -elections. Both he and Lord Clarendon were convinced that Rouher was -destined to be the Imperial scapegoat. In this they were correct. -Rouher resigned; and La Tour d'Auvergne himself changed places with La -Valette. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, July 14, 1869. - - When France enters upon a new road it is difficult to guess where it - will lead her to, and revolution may be looming in the distance, but - I think and hope it may be staved off for a time. The Senate will - probably put on as many checks as it dares, and the Emperor will - have a good many dodges for defeating his own programme, but he has - proceeded so unskilfully that he must have shaken the confidence of - those whose support he ought to reckon upon. - - He should at once, after the unmistakeable verdict of the country - against personal government, have made up his mind how far he would - go with, or resist public opinion, and not have left his supporters - without that _mot d'ordre_ that Frenchmen cannot dispense with; but - his silence compelled them to speak, and no one will now persuade - the people that he has not yielded to the threatened interpellation. - - If they are once thoroughly impressed with the notion that he is - squeezable they will continue to squeeze him, and the language held - even by his immediate entourage is ominous. The middle-class fear of - violent charges, and, above all, of the Reds, may come to his aid, - but he must be sadly in want of sound advice. Rouher's retirement, - even though it be temporary, is, I conclude, indispensable, but I - hope the Imperial confidence will not be given to Drouyn, who - besides being the most untrustworthy of men, is the most dangerous - of councillors. The point which concerns us most is the successor to - La Valette, whose resignation Prince La Tour bears with perfect - equanimity. - -The ministerial changes seemed to produce no beneficial effects as far -as the Emperor's position was concerned, and the letters from the -Ambassador became increasingly pessimistic. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, July 27, 1869. - - I grieve to say that the Emperor seems to lose ground. His own - partisans seem more and more to doubt his having energy and decision - enough to hold himself and them. What is serious is that this doubt - is strong among the generals. They would stick to him if they felt - sure of him, because a reduction of the army is one of the leading - doctrines of his opponents. Prince Napoleon has found an occasion - for having a letter published repudiating all responsibility for the - conduct of the Government of late years. I have been told very - confidentially that the Empress complained bitterly to the Grand - Duchess Mary of Russia of the inconstancy and ingratitude of the - French people, and said that if the people were tired of her and the - Emperor, they were quite ready to leave the country and save their - son from the dangerous and thankless task of trying to content - France. No one seems to apprehend any immediate danger. The general - impression is that if the Senatus Consultum is a fair execution of - the promises in the message, things will go on quietly enough until - the meeting of the Chamber, which may be safely put off till - December. The most hopeful sign to my mind is the reasonable and - Constitutional way in which the French seem to be getting accustomed - to work for Reforms. If the Emperor sees pretty clearly what to - yield and what to keep, and will express his intentions in time and - stick to them, all may go well yet. But can decision and firmness be - inspired, if they are not in the natural character, or the - reputation for them, if once lost, be recovered? - -In spite of the evident deterioration in Napoleon's position and of the -growing distrust in him which was now universally felt, unfavourable -rumours as to the state of his health caused something resembling a -panic. The French funds, which were higher than they had ever been -before, fell suddenly in August. They had risen because the -Constitutional concessions were believed to make it certain that the -Emperor would not make war: they fell because alarming reports were -spread about his ill-health. As a matter of fact, he was suffering from -rheumatism, and there was no real danger, but there is always a -difficulty in ascertaining the truth about illustrious invalids. Much -inconvenience and delay, however, were caused by his indisposition, for -it seems to have been his habit to retire to bed at any hour of the day, -if he felt unwell, and there was no certainty of seeing him, even when -he made an appointment. As his plans depended upon his health, and as -there was further a certain amount of complication caused by the -projected visit of the Empress to the East, nobody quite knew what would -happen, and the _joueurs à la baisse_ profited by the situation to bring -off a big _coup_ on the Bourse. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ - - Weisbaden, Aug. 31, 1869. - - I hope the report given to you of the Emperor's health is correct. - The banker has told me to-day that he had not remembered for years - such a panic at Frankfort as was produced by the news that he was - dangerously ill. If his illness is not serious and he soon gets well - again, the fright will rather do good as making people awake to the - enormous importance of his life. Even, however, if he lives, your - able despatch describing the state and the prospect of affairs in - France gives cause sufficient for anxiety, and I have an instinct - that they will drift into a republic before another year is over. - -Had Lord Clarendon lived a few months longer he would have been able to -congratulate himself upon one of the most accurate political prophecies -on record, for the Republic was actually proclaimed in Paris on -September 4, 1870. It should be added that his voluminous letters show -a thorough knowledge of and profound insight into French politics. - -The political situation in France at the end of August, 1869, was, on -the whole, apparently somewhat more reassuring than had been the case -earlier in the year. The Emperor's message announcing a great -Constitutional reform had been read in the Corps Législatif in July, -and was followed by a general amnesty for all political and press -offences. The change of Ministry was well received, because it involved -the retirement of M. Rouher, the ablest supporter of the old system of -government, although it was known that many eminent deputies were -unwilling to take office until the Constitutional change had come into -effect. The general impression produced upon the public was favourable, -and although many Liberals were careful to declare that they accepted -the proffered changes simply as an instalment, only the -ultra-Republicans and irreconcilables affected to repudiate them and -treat them with contempt. Even the latter, however, were obliged to -express approval of the amnesty. Meanwhile the country had remained -calm, and so far, the stream of reform appeared to be flowing swiftly -and with unruffled surface. Close observers, however, were under no -illusion as to the critical situation which was concealed behind these -favourable appearances. - -The preservation of the Monarchy and of order in France depended as much -upon the Emperor as it had done during the early years of his reign, and -he was far from being as strong as then. He had been at the head of the -Government for more than eighteen years, and the temperament of the -French seemed to preclude the idea that they could tolerate any rule for -a lengthy period. A young generation had sprung up free from the dread -of the bloodshed and disorder which accompanied the revolution of 1848, -and eager for change and excitement. The Emperor's foreign policy had -not of late years succeeded in gratifying the national pride, nor had -his recent concessions done as much as might have been expected to -recover his reputation. The ultra-Imperialists believed that if he had -shown resolution and decision immediately after the General Election, no -reforms would have been necessary; they thought that the reforms became -inevitable simply because he vacillated and gave his majority no -assurance of support. The Liberals had not much belief in his good -faith, and the friends of the Empire entertained a well-grounded fear -that the new powers granted to the people would be used for the purpose -of overthrowing the dynasty and establishing a republic. On the one -hand, there was an impression that the Emperor had no longer sufficient -firmness to resist these subversive attempts; on the other, the Liberals -found it difficult to believe that a sovereign who had for many years -exercised so directly, in his own person, absolute power, could ever be -brought voluntarily to abandon it. Thus there was apprehension on both -sides, and while some feared that the Emperor would be led from -concession to concession until he had no power left, others feared that, -finding it impossible to reconcile himself to his new position, he would -have recourse to some violent expedient, such as war or a _coup d'état_, -in order to extricate himself from his difficulties. - -It was generally taken for granted that the choice lay between the -Bonaparte dynasty and a republic of an extreme character. The Emperor -still retained some personal popularity, but he no longer inspired the -fear and the admiration which had hitherto prevented revolutionary -attempts. His best chance seemed to lie in foreign Governments treating -international questions in such a way as to enhance as far as possible -his reputation, and it was certainly not to the interest of England that -he should be displaced, for his own commercial policy was decidedly -liberal, and it was highly doubtful whether the Corps Législatif would -be equally so, when it came to dealing with Tariffs and Commercial -Treaties. - -When Lord Lyons returned from his leave in November, he found the -Emperor in good spirits, full of amiable sentiments with regard to -England, and very cheerful about the political prospects in France. He -did not appear to know much about the Porte and Khedive question, -which had for some time been giving rise to considerable trouble, but -responded at once to the Ambassador's appeal to his own _amour propre_ -in favour of the Commercial Treaty, which seemed to be in jeopardy. The -Empress had gone to the East, and he was consoling himself for her -absence by giving small dances at the Tuileries for some American young -ladies. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, Dec. 3, 1869. - - I am more than ever impatient to settle this Khedive affair because - I am afraid that I see symptoms of the French Press taking up his - cause against his lawful master. La Tour d'Auvergne's tenure of - office is very precarious, and if he goes before it is settled, his - successor is as likely as not to take the popular side, which in - France is undoubtedly that of the contumacious vassal. La Tour - d'Auvergne is himself uneasy, and it is apparent that it is only the - desire to act with us which keeps the Emperor from taking the - Khedive's side decidedly. If the Porte plays many more of these - pranks, it will bring about the independence of Egypt, or a quarrel - between England and France on the subject. - - It is in vain to draw any conclusions from the proceedings of the - Deputies, or the innumerable commentaries made upon them. The - Ministers profess to be delighted with the elections of President - and Vice-Presidents, but then I cannot forget that they were - enchanted for the first few days with the results of the General - Election which produced the present Chamber. My own hope is that out - of the chaos a working Liberal-Conservative majority will be - developed; but who is to be the Minister? Emile Ollivier seems to be - losing, not gaining ground in the Chamber. If the Emperor goes - straight and throws himself a little more on the classes, who, - having something to lose, are naturally conservative, he may do well - yet. There is certainly a return of goodwill towards him. The fear - is that he may hope to strengthen himself by coquetting with his pet - ouvriers, who have so little gratitude for the really important - services he has rendered them. If reproached, they answer, he has - done something for us, but what have we not done for him? What I - mean by coquetting with them, is trying to gain by their support, - power, and popularity at the expense of the Chamber. - - I can't pretend to say whether the new majority will hold together - when the question of distributing the places arises; whether they - will find it possible to get on with the Emperor, or (which most - concerns us) whether they can and will maintain the Commercial - Treaty. I am afraid we shall never again, either in political or - commercial affairs, have as good times as we had under the personal - power of the Emperor--by _we_ of course I mean the _English_. - -With this sentiment Lord Clarendon fully concurred: the Emperor, he -said, was parting with power so reluctantly that he would create -distrust, but 'I quite agree with you that we shall never have such good -times again under a Parliamentary instead of a personal _régime_.' - -A few days after this letter was written, La Tour d'Auvergne and his -colleagues were already anxious to resign, although the Emperor wished -to retain them. It was supposed that Drouyn de Lhuys would be one of -their successors: 'Angels and Ministers of grace, defend us!' was the -comment of Lord Lyons upon this rumour, which Lord Clarendon received -with equal apprehension. Another political event at this juncture was an -announcement by the Empress that she intended to keep aloof from -politics in the future, and to devote herself to works of charity--an -announcement which did not carry universal conviction at the time. - -The Cabinet, which was in so shaky a condition, contained some nominal -free traders, and it was feared, not without cause, that the new -Government might denounce the existing Commercial Treaty, although La -Tour d'Auvergne expressed confidence that such would not be the case. 'I -have my misgivings,' wrote the Ambassador, sadly, 'for I am afraid the -country is Protectionist, and I think the Free Trade zeal in the south -will cool, as they become aware that we shall not retaliate.' - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, Dec. 21, 1869. - - Nothing but absolute force will turn French Ministers and their - wives from their sumptuous official palaces. La Tour d'Auvergne, - whom I should indeed like to keep, is really anxious to go. I don't - feel sure that any of the others are. I suppose the Emperor must - change the Ministry as soon as the verification of powers is over, - but he has not made up his mind yet, and his hesitation is doing him - harm in all ways. There is, I believe, a Conservative reaction, or - rather a revival of the fear of the red spectre in the country. The - Emperor may turn this to good account, if he will govern - constitutionally through a Parliamentary Ministry, but it will not - sustain him in a return to personal government. - - I don't think things look well for the Commercial Treaty, and the - notion of some Free Traders that it should be denounced on account - of its origin, and with a view to making a greater advance towards - real free trade, will probably give the _coup de grâce_ to it. - The difficulty of passing new free trade measures through the Chamber - would, I should think, be infinitely greater than that of - maintaining the present Treaty. - -The formation of the new Government was not actually completed before -the end of the year, although the Emperor in true Constitutional fashion -wrote a letter to M. Emile Ollivier in his own hand, asking him to form -a Cabinet. There was a feeling that his Ministry would not be long -lived, and moderate men shrank from joining it, thus playing into the -hands of the revolutionary parties. Amongst those who thought that the -new Government would be short-lived was Lord Clarendon-- - - 'Ollivier's task,' he wrote, 'requires tact, experience, firmness, - knowledge of men, and a few other qualities in which he seems - singularly deficient, and I cannot think his Ministry will last. La - Valette thinks that the object of the implacables is to discredit - the Chamber collectively and individually, so as to make its - dissolution appear a necessity; then to pass a new electoral law; - then to have a General Election with which the Government would be - prohibited from interfering; then to have a Chamber of Rocheforts - and Raspails, which would be more than the _commencement de la fin_. - - 'This is rather a gloomy view, expressed confidentially, of course, - and we must hope that the Emperor will be able to defeat intrigues - of the existence and gravity of which he must be well aware.' - -As an instance of the general uncertainty prevailing, it may be -mentioned that M. de La Valette, until the contents of the Emperor's -letter to Emile Ollivier became known, was convinced that Imperial -indecision would take the form of resumption of absolute power. - -The new ministry was finally completed in the early days of January, -1870, and proved to be considerably stronger than had been believed -possible. Some of the new Ministers had curious antecedents with regard -to the Emperor. Ollivier himself had previously been an opponent of the -Empire, and his father had been sentenced to be deported to Cayenne, -while Count Daru, the new Foreign Minister, had actually voted for the -Emperor's impeachment. It was creditable, therefore, that personal -matters did not exclude men from office. What chiefly concerned England -was the line which the new Government was likely to take with regard to -the Commercial Treaty which was about to expire. According to the -Emperor, there was nothing to fear, and he assured the Ambassador that -he had come to an understanding with Ollivier on the subject, but it was -ominous that several members of the Cabinet were ardent Protectionists, -amongst them being the Minister of Public Works. In conversation the -Emperor spoke cheerfully about the political situation, quite in the -tone of a Constitutional Monarch. The Empress, on her side, declared -that she had no _caractère politique_ in the State, and enlarged on the -enormity of the attacks in the press upon a person so entirely without -political position, attacks which were certainly odious, and generally -directed to matters unconnected with politics. As for the Ministers, -they all praised the Emperor, and declared that their relations with him -were perfectly Constitutional and satisfactory; everything seemed going -smoothly until the death of the journalist Victor Noir at the hands of -Prince Pierre Bonaparte once more threw politics into confusion. After a -certain amount of rioting, however, and much trouble caused by -Rochefort, things resumed their usual condition for the time being. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, Jan. 18, 1870. - - I am one of the hopeful, and I see or fancy I see signs of the - success of the present Ministry in their attempt to found - Parliamentary Government. But people are very uneasy, and the - tactics of the Revolutionists are to keep up an agitation enough to - paralyze trade, and make the peaceably-disposed think that the - present Government is not strong enough to be worth having. These - manoeuvres might lead to a resumption of personal power, which - would be almost as dangerous as a republican revolution. - - People seem to find it difficult to believe that the Emperor will - abstain from intriguing against his Ministers. They say it is in his - nature to do so, and remind one that he set up a newspaper against - Rouher. The Ministers themselves, on the other hand, seem to be - thoroughly satisfied with His Majesty. Daru says that he and his - colleagues are confident of success; that they would have two or - three difficult months to pass, but that they expect to have - convinced the Republicans by that time that a revolution is hopeless. - He spoke with great satisfaction of the complete adhesion of the - middle class at Paris to the Ministry, and of the offers they make - of their services in case of need. - - Claremont saw the Emperor this afternoon. He thought His Majesty - looking fat and heavy. He found an opportunity of making a remark to - him on the necessity of the Ministry being supported by the Chamber, - which seems to have been taken in good part. - - I hear on good authority that the Empress professes to find much - greater good than she expected in the Parliamentary Government, and - that she says the Pierre Bonaparte affair would have been much more - disastrous under the old system. Several of the new Ministers and - their wives appeared last night at a ball at the Tuileries for the - first time since 1848. The Empress, as well as the Emperor, was - particularly gracious to them. - -It may be mentioned in connection with the Tuileries balls, that the -Ambassador used to receive very numerous applications from persons in -English society who were desirous of being invited to these -entertainments, and it was usually not possible to satisfy their wishes. -After the fall of the Empire, this particular species of application -practically disappeared, there being apparently no overwhelming anxiety -to attend the Republican social functions. - -Before the end of January an important debate took place in the Chamber -on the Commercial Treaty, M. Thiers appearing as the chief Protectionist -champion. Free Traders professed to derive some encouragement from it, -as a vote against the denunciation of the Treaty was carried by 211 to -32; but it was obvious that these figures could not be taken as a test -vote of the strength of the Free Trade and Protectionist parties, since -the votes of the majority were influenced by a variety of -considerations. - - -FOOTNOTES: - - [11] The vanity which was responsible for Prince Gortschakoff's love - of conferences is frequently referred to in Busch's 'Bismarck.' - - [12] Subsequently Lord Ampthill. - - [13] Prussian Ambassador in London. - - [14] Now Wilhelmshafen. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -SECRET PROPOSALS FOR DISARMAMENT - -(1870) - - -It will be remembered that in October, 1868, the French Government had -practically suggested that Her Majesty's Government should 'give advice' -to Prussia on the subject of disarmament, and that Lord Stanley, who was -Foreign Secretary at the time had resolutely declined to do anything of -the kind. A fresh effort was now made in the same direction, no details -of which, so far as is known, have ever been made public. - -_Mutatus mutandis_, there was a curious similarity between the language -held at Paris and at Berlin respectively. The French proclaimed that -they would not go to war with the Prussians, provided the latter did -nothing objectionable. The Prussians replied that they did not want to -go to war with France, provided they were allowed to do as they pleased, -and both asserted that the maintenance of peace depended upon England, -which they explained by affirming that England had only to declare that -she would join against whichever Power broke the peace; the real meaning -of this being that at Paris it was expected that England should announce -beforehand that she would side with France in case of war, while at -Berlin it meant that she should announce beforehand that she would side -with Prussia. - -Early in January it had become known to the British Government, and -presumably also to the French Government, that Bismarck intended to -create a North German Empire, and that the King of Prussia was by no -means disinclined to become an Emperor, and it may have been this -knowledge which prompted the French Government to make another attempt -to induce England to suggest disarmament. It was felt that the only -chance of success was to set about the work as quietly as possible, and -if there was one individual who was better fitted than any other to -undertake this delicate task it was undoubtedly Lord Clarendon, who, as -has already been pointed out, was on intimate terms with the principal -personages concerned. Lord Clarendon was approached in January by La -Valette, the French Ambassador, and consented to make the attempt. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, Jan. 26, 1870. - - I had a long talk with La Valette to-day about disarmament. It is no - new subject to me, but one which I have long had at heart, although - it presents serious difficulties on account of the King of Prussia's - obstinacy. He does not meditate, or desire war--far from it. But his - army is his idol, and he won't make himself an iconoclast. Not so - the Crown Prince, with whom I discussed the subject at great length - a year ago. Our relations with Prussia are very friendly, and - perhaps we are in as good a position as any other Power to make an - attempt to bell the cat, and Count Daru may be sure that I will do - all I can to meet his views, but I am sure that he will admit that - some tact and _ménagements_ are necessary. I spoke to Gortchakoff - in the summer about Prussian disarmament, and he entirely concurred, - though he said Russia would take no initiative. - -Further letters from Lord Clarendon emphasized the necessity of keeping -the matter secret, and authorized Lord Lyons to assure the French -Government that it would not be compromised in any way, and that he -undertook the business with hearty good will, but with small hope of -success, as the King of Prussia was almost unapproachable on the subject -of the army. - -On January 30th, M. Emile Ollivier called upon Lord Lyons. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, Jan. 30, 1870. - - I have just had a visit from M. Emile Ollivier and we have spoken - confidentially on several subjects. - - The thing uppermost in his mind was Disarmament. He said he was very - anxious that England should exert her influence with Prussia. He - explained the position of the present French Ministers with regard - to the subject. They depended, he said, principally on the great - agricultural population of France for support against Socialism and - Revolution. It was essential therefore that they should do something - for that population. To conciliate them, either taxes might be - remitted or the call upon them for recruits be diminished. There - were great difficulties in the way of remitting taxes, and when a - reduction of the army was proposed, the Ministers were met by the - Emperor and the military party with a declaration that it would be - unsafe to diminish the forces of France, while those of Prussia were - on their present footing--that the effect would be that Prussia - would make some attempt on Southern Germany, and war be the - consequence. If, however, Prussia would make a simultaneous - disarmament, all would, he thought, be well and a great security for - peace would be given. It was true that the Prussians urged that - their army was on a peace footing already, and that they could not - be expected to change their whole military system, but M. Ollivier - conceived that while no doubt the Prussian system enabled the - Government to call nearly the whole male population to arms, it - depended upon the Government to decide how many it would actually - call upon each year. - - I explained to M. Ollivier the difficulty and delicacy of the - question, the peculiar views of the present King of Prussia, and the - small hope there could be of prevailing upon His Majesty to consent - to a reduction of the army. I said that it would be your special - care that the French Government should not be compromised by any - step you might take. I added that it was plain that the only chance - of success was to approach Prussia in a strictly confidential - manner; that any formal diplomatic move on our part would be - resented or misrepresented as a pretension to interfere in the - internal affairs of the country, and would expose France as well as - ourselves to a rebuff. - - M. Ollivier said that he was extremely grateful to you, and that he - entirely concurred in the opinion that the move must be made in a - cautious and confidential manner. He was particularly alive to the - importance of not exposing France to the appearance of being - slighted; in fact, he would not conceal from me that, under present - circumstances, a public rebuff from Prussia would be fatal. '_Un - échec_,' he said, '_c'est la guerre_!' Those who had to render an - account to Parliament and the country were less able than the former - Government to put up with any wound to the national pride. Their - main object was peace, but they must show firmness, or they would - not be able to cope with Revolution and Socialism at home. - - M. Ollivier went on to say that, whether we succeeded or not at the - present moment, it was very necessary that the way should be paved - for disarmament in Prussia, and that it should be felt that England - was in favour of it. The time must come when France would be obliged - to make a public proposal to Prussia to disarm: it was impossible - that the French Government could assume, in the eyes of France and - the world, any share of the responsibility for the present - exaggerated armaments and expenses. They would be obliged to show - the French people and the German people too where the responsibility - really lay. The best course would be to avoid, by a confidential - arrangement for simultaneous action, the necessity of claiming - special praise for either party, or throwing special blame on - either. If this could not be, the next best thing would be that - Prussia should be prepared to receive, in a proper spirit, a - proposal from France, and the confidential steps you thought of - would, in his opinion, certainly be likely to effect so much at - least. - - He spoke with great affection of the Emperor, and assured me that - H.M. acted in the most perfect harmony and confidence with his new - Ministers, and that no difficulty had arisen on any subject, though - the Ministers had maintained and were determined to maintain their - independence and their authority as the responsible Government of - the country. - -An opportunity for Lord Clarendon's good offices presented itself very -soon; Count Bismarck had written a despatch to the Prussian Minister in -London in which he alluded in complimentary terms to the friendly -interest which Lord Clarendon had always shown in the welfare of -Prussia, and the latter made this an excuse for communicating his views -on disarmament, the method selected being a memorandum which Lord -Augustus Loftus[15] was directed to bring to Bismarck's notice in strict -confidence. - -In communicating to Lord Lyons a copy of this memorandum it is -instructive to learn that the British Cabinet Ministers, with one -exception, were kept in ignorance of Lord Clarendon's action. 'I have,' -he wrote on February 3, 1870, 'only mentioned the matter to the Queen -and Gladstone, both of whom highly approve. The Queen will be ready -to write to the King of Prussia whenever I think her doing so may be -useful. You will be able to assure Daru that I have in no way -compromised the French Government.' - -The memorandum which, it was faintly hoped, might impress the -flinty-hearted Bismarck ran as follows:-- - - * * * * * - - _Lord Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus._ - - Foreign Office, Feb. 2, 1870. - - A few days ago, Count Bernstorff read to me a despatch from Count - Bismarck concerning the German Confederation which contained some - allusions to myself that gave me particular satisfaction, as a proof - that Count Bismarck recognized the sincerity of my interest in the - welfare and greatness of Germany. - - If I am not mistaken in this I hope he will not think that I abuse - the confidence he seems disposed to place in me by asking him - privately through you to consider a subject that I have long had at - heart, and in making this request, it is, I am sure, unnecessary for - me to disclaim any intention to interfere in the internal affairs of - Prussia--such an intention would be alike presumptuous and useless. - - But it is in the general interest of Europe, of peace, and of - humanity that I desire to invite the attention of Count Bismarck to - the enormous standing armies that now afflict Europe by constituting - a state of things that is neither peace nor war, but which is so - destructive of confidence that men almost desire war with all its - horrors in order to arrive at some certainty of peace--a state of - things that withdraws millions of hands from productive industry and - heavily taxes the people for their own injury and renders them - discontented with their rulers. It is a state of things in short - that no thoughtful man can contemplate without sorrow and alarm, for - this system is cruel, it is out of harmony with the civilization of - our age, and it is pregnant with danger. - - To modify this system would be a glorious work, and it is one that - Prussia, better than any other Power, might undertake. She would not - only earn for herself the gratitude of Europe, but give a great - proof of her morality and her power; it would be a fitting - complement of the military successes she has achieved. - - I know full well the difficulties that would beset such a course of - policy. I know how great and deserved is the King's parental feeling - and affection for his army--that he would view its reduction with - pain, and that he might not think it safe to diminish its numerical - force; but His Majesty is wise and foreseeing, and his moral courage - is always equal to the measures he believes to be right, and should - Count Bismarck think it not inconsistent with his duty to recommend - a partial disarmament to the King, I cannot but consider that the - moment is a singularly propitious one for the purpose. - - The great standing army of France would of course come first under - the consideration of the King, but France has been never more - peacefully disposed than at the present time, under a responsible - Government which cannot make war 'for an idea,' because it - represents a nation that is determined to maintain peace so long as - there is no just cause for war, and because the Emperor entirely - shares the feelings of his people. I know that the present - Government of France will seek for popularity and power in a - peaceful policy and in economy, notwithstanding the vast and - increasing wealth of the country and the almost proverbial - indifference of the people to taxation. - - There would consequently, I am convinced, be no opposition on the - part of the French Government to a reduction of the army _pari - passu_ with Prussia. For reasons, however, quite intelligible, - neither Government may choose to take the initiative in such a - proposal; but if I had authority to do so, I do not doubt that the - Queen would allow me to sound the ground at Paris, in a manner - entirely confidential, that should in no way compromise either - Government, whatever might be the result of the suggestion. - - Pray read this letter to Count Bismarck with the sincere expression - of my esteem. - -With all due respect to Lord Clarendon, this lecture (for that is what -it amounted to) betrayed some want of appreciation of the real -situation, for he seems to have regarded the Prussian army as largely -the plaything of the King, and not to have fully realized the great -object for which it was intended. Were he alive at the present day his -moralizings on the iniquity of armaments would presumably be still more -condemnatory. Lord Lyons's comment on the communication was, that if the -Prussians would not listen to Lord Clarendon, they would certainty not -listen to any one else, but he so little expected success that he -regretted that the French Government had raised the question at all. If, -he pointed out, the Prussian Government would not agree to disarm, the -new French Ministers would be very angry and might turn round and say, -'If you will not disarm, you must mean ill towards us, and we would -rather fight it out at once, than ruin ourselves by keeping up, for an -indefinite time, war establishments.' No doubt it would be an excellent -thing if Prussia would take the opportunity of disarming while the -French Government and the French nation were in the mood, for the happy -moment might pass away, and war might again be looked upon as a remedy, -though a desperate one, against socialism and revolution. Evidently he -had small belief in the efficacy of the step. - -The forebodings entertained both by Lord Lyons and by Lord Clarendon -himself were very shortly realized. In a few days there arrived from -Lord Augustus Loftus a long letter reporting his conversation with -Bismarck, from which the following extracts are quoted:-- - - * * * * * - - _Lord A. Loftus to Lord Clarendon._ - - Berlin, Feb. 5, 1870. - - I read your private and confidential letter to Count Bismarck. - - * * * * * - - He first observed that he should wish to know what guarantee you - could give, or propose should be given, for the maintenance of - peace, or the security against danger. 'You,' he said, 'live in a - happy island and have not to fear an invasion. For 250 years Germany - has been exposed to and suffered French invasion; no one can accuse - us of being aggressive; Germany, as now constituted, has all that - she wants, and there is no object of conquest for her. But our - position,' he added, 'is an exceptional one. We are surrounded by - three great Empires with armies as large as our own, any two of whom - might coalesce against us.' He then reverted to March of last year. - He said that he was aware that at that moment, had it not been for - the influence of M. Rouher, an occupation of Belgium would have - taken place. Although there had been no direct understanding with - England, it was felt and known at Paris that Prussia would have - supported England, if action had been taken. It was this knowledge - that warded off action, and Belgium was saved. He had not at the - time mentioned the imminence of the danger to the King, for he was - afraid that His Majesty would have taken military measures which - would have rendered the situation more critical. He then observed - that in 1867 he had had a conversation of several hours with the - Emperor Napoleon. He had discussed with him the causes which had led - to the overthrow of Louis XVI., Charles X., and Louis Philippe--that - their fall was owing to want of energy and decision. He had told the - Emperor that, when he was travelling in dangerous company, the only - thing to do was to have a revolver in his pocket. The Emperor - had adopted this principle; he had the army with him, especially the - Guards; but Bismarck observed that lately one or two cases had - occurred which proved that the army was beginning to be tainted with - socialism. Bismarck said that the Emperor had had but two courses to - pursue; either to grant more internal liberty, or war; and the - Emperor had told him very clearly that if the one failed, there - could be no other alternative. 'Now,' said Bismarck, 'this danger - occurred only 10 months ago, and who can say that it may not occur - again?' - - * * * * * - - He then went into an account of the hostility of the Muscovite party - towards Germany: of the dislike of the Czarewitch to everything - German, adding that whenever the Emperor Alexander dies, the - relations will undergo a great change. - - * * * * * - - He expressed a hope that you would say nothing at Paris on this - subject, as any refusal of Prussia to a proposal of disarmament - would make the position more dangerous. - - He said that he did not dare even to name the subject of your letter - to the King, much less show it to His Majesty. He would get into a - fury and immediately think that England was trying to weaken Prussia - at the expense of France; nor was the present a judicious moment to - do so, for the King had only lately known what had taken place about - Belgium, and had in consequence expressed his cordial feelings - towards England. If the proposition came from France, the King would - view it as a ruse, but would not listen to it. Coming from England, - said Bismarck, it would make the worst impression on him. - - I used all the arguments I could in support of your suggestion, and - read to him certain extracts from your other letter. - - * * * * * - - In conversation Bismarck remarked that Prussia might have acquired - South Germany without cost and risk, had she pleased to do so, - by which I understood him to refer to the cession of Belgium to - France. - - * * * * * - - I left your letter marked 'confidential' in Bismarck's hands, as - I thought it essential that he should reflect over the powerful - arguments it contains, but he expressly declined to lay it before - the King. He will answer it through Count Bernstorff. It is evident - to me that there is not the smallest chance of inducing the King - to listen to a reduction of his army, and I must fear that any - proposals to him of this nature would only make him suspicious and - distrustful of England. - -In spite of the view expressed in the last paragraph, it may fairly -be presumed that Bismarck's alleged fear of the King of Prussia was -a shameless fabrication. There is nothing whatever in subsequent -revelations to show that he stood in any awe of 'Most Gracious,' and the -latter appears to have always been a more or less passive instrument in -his hands. - -In forwarding this correspondence to Lord Lyons, Lord Clarendon observed -that his suggestion appeared to have been a complete failure, and that -Bismarck was evidently just as hostile to the idea of disarmament as his -royal master. Lord Lyons was directed to communicate the substance of -the correspondence to Count Daru, but only in general terms, as when -Bismarck's answer arrived in London, fresh light might possibly be -thrown upon the subject. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, Feb. 11, 1870. - - When I went to see Daru yesterday he opened the conversation by - telling me that he had received a letter from La Valette, from - which he learned that Count Bismarck had refused to consent to your - suggestion that Prussia should disarm. Three reasons were, Count - Daru said, given by Count Bismarck, none of which appeared to have - any weight. - - The first was that he could not even mention the subject to the - King. This device had, Daru said, been resorted to by Count Bismarck - in the affair of Luxemburg; in fact, it seemed to be the usual mode - which the Count took of avoiding any discussion which he did not - like; it was however the duty of Ministers to bring wholesome - proposals before their Sovereign, whether the proposals were - palatable or not. In fact, Daru seemed to think that if Count - Bismarck himself desired to disarm, he would be able to obtain the - consent of the King. - - The second argument was that the neighbours of Prussia need not be - uneasy at her military strength, because she was not a conquering - Power. This, Count Daru thought, might have been said with reason, - if Prussia had made no acquisition since 1815; but to say so now, he - declared, to be simply preposterous. Prussia had shown herself to be - a particularly ambitious Power, and her ambition had been already - extremely successful. For his own part, he rather admired than - blamed her desire to aggrandise herself, but he could not be - expected to listen seriously to an assertion that her power was no - cause of alarm because she was not a conquering nation. - - Count Bismarck's third argument was that Prussia was not nearly so - ready for war as France--that, in fact, she had only 300,000 men - under arms, while France had upwards of 400,000. This, also, Count - Daru thought, simply ridiculous. Prussia could, he said, at any - moment, without an act of the Legislature, without a law, without - even a Royal Decree, by a simple order of the Minister of War, call - an immense force into the field, a force, too, of trained men, at a - moment's notice. There was nothing in France like this. - - Daru went on to say that Count Bismarck's arguments did not at all - mend the matter. France must act as if Prussia had simply refused - to disarm. How was this state of things to be dealt with? - - 'I have determined,' said Daru, 'to disarm, whether Prussia does so - or not. In fact, I have resolved to ask the Emperor at once to - sanction a considerable reduction of the French army. I cannot make - this reduction as large as I should have done, if I had more - satisfactory accounts of the intentions of Prussia. All I can - propose, is to reduce the annual French contingent from 100,000 men - to 90,000. As our men serve nine years, this will eventually effect - a reduction of 90,000 men--a real absolute reduction. I shall thus - give a pledge to Europe of pacific intentions, and set a good - example to Prussia. I shall probably add great weight to the party - in Germany which demands to be relieved from military burdens, and, - I trust, enlist public opinion everywhere on my side. I shall also - furnish Lord Clarendon with a powerful argument, if, as I sincerely - hope, he will persevere in his endeavours to work upon Prussia. I - beg you to give my warmest thanks to him for what he has already - done, and to express to him my anxious hope that he will not - acquiesce in a first refusal from Prussia.' - - Daru went on to say that it appeared that Count Bismarck had been so - little aware that your suggestion had been made in concert with - France that he had particularly requested that the French Government - might not be made acquainted with it. He begged me to express - particularly to you his gratitude for the care you had taken not to - compromise the French Government. - - He concluded by saying that he could not at the moment say for - certain that the reduction would be made in the French army, because - the Emperor's sanction had not yet been given. He was afraid His - Majesty would not relish the proposal, but he felt confident that - His Majesty would accept the advice of his Ministers. - - I told him that my personal opinion was that the best chance of - obtaining a disarmament in Prussia was to set a good example and - leave public opinion in Germany to work without foreign aid. Demands - from abroad for disarmament seemed to me likely to irritate the King - in Prussia, and to give him and the military party grounds for an - appeal to national patriotism against foreign dictation. I thought - that the effect of the disarmament of France in strengthening the - feeling in Germany against military burdens would be very great if - it were not counteracted by appeals which might wound German - susceptibilities. - - Daru seemed to agree generally with me, but not to be willing to say - anything which would pledge him to abstain from calling officially - upon Prussia to disarm, if it suited the home policy of the Ministry - to do so. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ - - Feb. 12, 1870. - - Daru seems to have taken Bismarck's refusal better than I expected. - We have not, however, got the definitive answer which is to come - through Bernstorff, and as Bismarck kept a copy of my letter I have - little doubt that he will show it to the King, though he pretended - to be afraid of doing so. - - * * * * * - - Count Daru may be sure that I shall not let the subject drop, though - I shall wish to proceed in it as I think most prudent. I have only - mentioned it to Gladstone among my colleagues, and of course, to the - Queen, who takes the warmest interest in the matter. I had a letter - from her yesterday, expressing a hope that the French Government - would not at present make any official _démarches re_ disarmament, - as she is sure, from her knowledge of the King's character, that it - would do more harm than good. I am quite of the same opinion and - think it would arouse German susceptibility, which is quite as great - as the French, whereas we want to make German opinion act in our - behalf. - - Nothing is more likely to bring over Germany than France partially - disarming without reference to Prussia, and I sincerely hope that - this project of Daru's will be carried out. The Germans will be - flattered by it as a proof of confidence, and it will furnish them - with a fresh weapon against their war Budget. - - * * * * * - -Lord Clarendon's statement that he meant to persevere in his efforts -afforded much gratification to Count Daru. With regard to Lord -Clarendon's desire that the matter should be kept as secret as possible, -he explained that he had confined the knowledge of it as much as -possible to himself, Lord Lyons and La Valette, but that of course he -had been obliged to mention it to the Emperor and to Ollivier, and he -'seemed to be rather afraid that neither of these important persons -would be perfectly secret.'[16] - -Bismarck's reply to Lord Clarendon did not afford much ground for hope. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, Feb. 19, 1870. - - The day before yesterday, Bernstorff brought me Bismarck's answer to - my letter, and I enclose a translation. - - It is courteous, but the intention not to disarm is manifest. I have - been detained so late at the Cabinet that I cannot write a letter - for you to read to Daru, so I have marked Bismarck's letter, and you - can extract the passages in the shape of a memorandum which you can - leave with Daru in the strictest confidence. I should much like to - hear what he will think of it, in order to shape my reply. - - Bernstorff, who evidently spoke from a private letter of Bismarck's - that he did not show me, laid much stress upon the active ill-will - of Russia whenever the present Czar is gathered to his fathers--the - present Cesarewitch and the Slav races are very hostile to - Germany--(I believe this is true), and this hostility would be - encouraged, according to Bismarck, if German means of resistance - were weakened, it would invite coalition, under circumstances easily - imaginable, between Austria, Russia, and France against - Prussia--hypothetical cases of this kind are easily invented to - support foregone conclusions, but there is a _sort_ of opening as to - a conference between Powers as to proportionate reductions and - exchange of guarantees. I don't mean to lay much stress on this, nor - should I think that it would be productive of a practical result, - but you might allude to it as a sign that the negation is not - absolute. - - Pray, however, lose no time in correcting the error into which Daru - has been led by La Valette as to an official despatch or a speech in - Parliament from me. I cannot conceive how he made such a mistake, - for I said nothing of the kind. - -Bismarck's answer was of considerable length, and is quoted in full -because it is a document of historical interest. It will be observed -that it was in the main an amplification of the views expressed verbally -to Lord Augustus Loftus a fortnight earlier, and that it contained -specious arguments designed to impress upon Lord Clarendon the entirely -unaggressive nature of Prussian policy. The belief, however, of Lord -Clarendon and of the French Ministers, that Bismarck entertained no -suspicion as to how the proposal originated, implies a simplicity on -their part which he must have thoroughly enjoyed. - - * * * * * - - _Count Bismarck to Count Bernstorff._ - - [_Translation._] Berlin, Feb. 9, 1870. - - Lord Augustus Loftus has read to me a private letter addressed to - him by Lord Clarendon on the 2nd Inst. Its object is to discuss with - me in a manner strictly private and confidential a plan for the - partial disarmament of the Continental Powers. After a few friendly - expressions concerning myself, which I cordially reciprocate, the - English Statesman proceeds to enlarge upon the hardships and burdens - imposed on the Nations of Europe by their excessive armaments;--He - conceives that it would be much to Prussia's credit and well worthy - of her great military renown if she were to co-operate in - endeavouring to alleviate those burdens; he thinks that the King our - August Master, sincerely attached as he is to his army, would not - shrink from the adoption of such a measure, provided he were - convinced of its justice;--he deems the present moment peculiarly - fitted for making this overture, on account of the peaceful - disposition of all the Powers and more especially of the Emperor - Napoleon and of his present Government; and he states his readiness, - provided he can count on our friendly assistance, to sound the - Emperor and his Government with a view to eventually opening - negotiations on the subject. - - The English Ambassador has doubtless sent home a report of the - Verbal answers which I gave to the above communication.--In order, - however, to meet the confidence reposed in me by Lord Clarendon in - a similar spirit, I feel called upon to address you in a manner - equally confidential, and one which for that very reason admits of - my speaking with the utmost frankness. - - Lord Clarendon cannot doubt, as indeed the opening observations in - his letter plainly shew, that I render full justice to the friendly - feelings and intentions which he entertains towards Prussia and the - North German Confederation. - - I am convinced that no European State or Statesman exists who does - not wish to see the feeling of confidence strengthened and Peace - maintained; and further that no German Government would wish to - impose upon its people the maintenance of an army in excess of that - proportion for which the requirements of its safety imperatively - call. - - Were the question officially put to us whether the diminution of our - military strength is compatible with the secure maintenance of our - independence, we should not decline to share in any deliberations - which might take place on the subject; and we should carefully sift - the question whether the great neighbouring Military Powers are - willing or able to give us guarantees such as would compensate - Germany for the decrease in the amount of Security which She has - hitherto owed to her armies. - - Lord Clarendon does His Majesty the King full justice when he infers - that no considerations or feelings of a purely personal nature would - deter him from adopting a measure which he had once recognized as - right and proper, but Lord Clarendon will as readily understand that - however willing we may be to enter into a strictly confidential - interchange of ideas on this important question, we must reserve to - ourselves the Right of making a careful estimate of the relative - position of the Parties most deeply interested in the matter, and of - judging whether the concessions which we ourselves might probably be - expected to make stand in a fair and just proportion to those which - it would be in the power of other Nations to make. Our very - geographical position is itself wholly different from that of any - other Continental Power, and does not of course admit of comparison - with the insular position of Great Britain. We are environed on all - sides by neighbours whose military strength is of such a nature as - to form an important element in all political combinations. Each of - the other three great Continental Powers is on the contrary so - placed that at least on one of its frontiers it is not open to a - serious attack, and France is so situated as to be practically - secure from danger on three sides. These three Powers have of late - years considerably increased their military strength and have done - so in a proportion in excess of our own:--Austria and France have - remodelled wholly their military systems, so as to be able to assail - us at any moment with increased forces. The armies of Austria, - France and Russia, have each an army which, when on a Peace footing, - is superior in numbers to our own. Our system is moreover so to - speak so thoroughly transparent, that any increase in our effective - force can at once be appreciated; the amount of any addition or - decrease which we may make in our military force can therefore be - most accurately calculated. - - The military systems of other Nations are of a different nature. - Even in the case of nominal Reductions they admit of the maintenance - or renewal of their full effective strength; they even admit of a - material increase of force being made without attracting notice or - at all events without entailing the possibility of proof.--With us - on the other hand, the whole military system, which from its very - nature is a matter of publicity, becomes more so owing to the nature - of our Institutions. - - Under these circumstances, and in the event of a discussion on - measures of such great importance being actually opened, we must ask - ourselves what guarantees can be given to us that our Position as - regards other Powers will not be practically impaired by our - signifying our adherence to a system, which however just and - even-handed it might appear in its action, would in reality not deal - with equal fairness with all the Parties concerned. - - Any weakening of Prussia's Power, any disturbance of the balance of - Power in Europe, can hardly be for the interest of England. It must - be acknowledged that whilst, on the one hand, the state of - preparation for War of the Great Powers gives rise to apprehension, - as set forth in Lord Clarendon's letter, still that very state of - preparation may on the other prove a practical guarantee that any - attempt to assail or to disturb existing Rights will be firmly and - effectively met. - - Of this I conceive that the past year has afforded fresh proofs, and - Lord Clarendon, intimately acquainted as he is with the Events of - that Period, will be best able to judge of the truth of my Remark. - - The maintenance of Peace has not been due merely and solely to - pacific views entertained by Rulers personally, for the Power and - readiness of neighbouring states has had great weight in affecting - opinion and in determining Resolutions. The Inclinations of a Nation - may be essentially peaceful, they may rest on a keen appreciation of - its own interests, but they are nevertheless liable to be suddenly - changed either by some unforeseen accident, or by fictitious - agitation. Under such circumstances, neither the most powerful - Monarch, nor the most influential Minister is able to estimate or to - guarantee the duration of peaceful Inclinations. - - I am persuaded that when you submit these Remarks for Lord Clarendon's - consideration, he will not see in them a Refusal to enter into the - Views which he has so happily and eloquently set forth, but rather - as the expression of the very serious responsibility which rests - with a Minister who is called upon to advise his Sovereign in a - matter pregnant with such important consequences. - - I can of course have no objection to your reading this letter to - Lord Clarendon, I must however ask you to make the communication in - the strictest confidence, in accordance with the character of - thorough privacy with which Lord Clarendon, with Great Tact and to - my entire Satisfaction, has invested the matter. - -Bismarck's views, as set forth above, were communicated by Lord Lyons to -Count Daru on February 22, and the latter remarked that, upon the whole, -matters were rather better than he expected, as there was no categorical -refusal to consider the question of disarmament. In his opinion, that -question was a very simple one. The military forces of the great -Continental Powers bore a certain proportion to each other; in order to -maintain that proportion, very heavy burdens were imposed upon each -country, but if, by common agreement, each reduced its army by a certain -number of men, the same proportion would be preserved, while the burdens -were alleviated. If, however, a minute discussion of guarantees and -securities were began, very awkward topics might be brought forward. For -instance, the right of Prussia to garrison Mayence, was, to say the -least, doubtful, and the fortifications she was erecting on the North -Sea might give rise to comment. At this stage of the conversation, Lord -Lyons hastily intervened in order to point out the extreme disadvantage -of mixing up Mayence and the North Sea with the question of disarmament, -and Count Daru concluded by saying that he was quite content to leave -the matter entirely in the hands of Lord Clarendon, as nobody else could -manage it so well. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, March 12, 1870. - - Outsiders are not always good judges, but it seems to me that - Ollivier makes enemies unnecessarily and gives certain pretexts to - the Imperialists, who of course work on the Emperor's mind against - his Government. I fear there will be a split one of these days. - - I agree with you that Prussia will never declare that she will not - complete the unity of Germany, because she looks upon it as - inevitable. Nothing, as the King himself said to me, can prevent the - gravitation of the weak towards the strong, but that it would not - take place in his life, possibly not in that of his son. - - France, if not grown wiser by that time, will probably consider it a - _casus belli_, but I don't see that it would make much difference - to her, as the whole military force of the South is now actually at - the disposal of the Confederation, and she would weld all Germany - together as one man if she attempted by force to prevent Bavaria, - Würtemberg, and Baden from joining the North, when they had - determined that it was for their own interest to do so. - - I have fired another shot at Bismarck about disarmament, but I don't - expect better success from it than from the first. The King of - Prussia, a little time ago, told the Duke of Oldenburg, who pressed - him on the subject, that he would disarm if other Powers did the - same, so he is not so completely unapproachable as Bismarck would - lead us to suppose. - -Lord Clarendon's second attempt upon Bismarck was made on March 9, and -took the form of a lengthy letter to Lord Augustus Loftus, in which the -arguments in favour of disarmament were reiterated and endeavours made -to convince Bismarck that Prussia had really no cause for uneasiness. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus._ - - Foreign Office, March 9, 1870. - - I have delayed writing to request that you would convey to Count - Bismarck my cordial thanks for the courtesy and frankness with which - in a private letter dated Feb. 9th, he answered my letter to you on - the subject of partial disarmament. - - The delay has been occasioned by my endeavours to ascertain - correctly the relative forces of the great military Powers, and I - hope that Count Bismarck will not consider that I trespass unduly on - his time and his confidence if I again revert to a subject which - more than any other I have at heart, and which an English Minister - may have some claim to discuss without suspicion of his motives, - because England is not a military Power, but is deeply interested in - the maintenance of peace, and the progress and prosperity of the - Continent. - - I am as convinced as Count Bismarck himself can be that no German - Government would wish to impose upon its people the maintenance of - an army in excess of that proportion for which the requirements of - its safety imperatively call, and I would not desire the reduction - of a single regiment if I thought it would impair the independence - and the honour of Prussia, which in their plenitude I regard as - essentially beneficial to Europe. - - But can it be honestly affirmed that the power and independence of - Prussia are menaced from any quarter? and, if not, surely the - military force of Prussia is excessive and entails upon other - countries the unquestionable evil of maintaining armies beyond the - requirements of their safety. - - The only countries from which, owing to geographical position, - Prussia could anticipate danger are Russia, Austria, and France, and - can it be said that from either there is any real cause for - apprehension? In the conversation I had with Count Bernstorff, - when he communicated to me the letter of Count Bismarck, he dwelt at - some length upon the ill-will of Russia towards Germany, which might - take an active form on the death of the present Emperor, and for - which Prussia ought to be prepared, but Count Bismarck must know - better than myself that Russia has long since, and wisely, ceased to - aim at influence in Germany or intervention in German affairs, and - that all her energies are now directed eastwards with a view of - extending her territory and her commerce in Asia. Whatever - sentiments may be suggested in other quarters by a rapid development - of the present policy of Russia which has the entire support of - public opinion in that country, it appears certain that Germany can - have no danger to guard against from Russia, whatever may be the - personal feelings or opinions of the reigning sovereign. - - On paper, and only on paper, Austria has an army of 800,000, but she - could not, even on the most pressing emergency, bring 200,000 men - into the field. Her finances are dilapidated and her internal - disorganization affords just cause of alarm. Danger to Prussia from - Austria must, for many years to come, be a chimera. - - The military peace establishment of France is nominally greater than - that of Prussia; the former being 400,000 and the latter being - 300,000; but the number of troops stationed in the costly and - unproductive colony of Algiers is not, and cannot ever be less than - 60,000 men; other colonial possessions require military protection, - and as the garrisons in Lyons and other great towns necessary for - the maintenance of order are not less than 40,000 men, the - establishments of the two countries are as nearly as possible upon - an equality. Can this state of things be regarded as a menace or a - danger to Prussia? I am greatly mistaken if any Prussian statesman - or General would reply to this inquiry in the affirmative. - - The question then to my mind appears quite simple. The military - forces of the great Continental Powers have a certain proportion to - each other; in order to maintain that proportion, very heavy burdens - are imposed upon each country, but if by common agreement, each - reduces its army by a certain number of men, the same proportions - will be maintained, while the burdens, which are fast becoming - intolerable will be alleviated. - - Count Bismarck however thinks that if the question of diminishing - the military strength of Prussia is entertained, it will be - necessary carefully to inquire what guarantees can be given by - neighbouring Military Powers in compensation to Germany for a - decrease in the amount of security which she has hitherto owed to - her armies. - - Upon this I would respectfully beg to observe that a minute - discussion of guarantees would be endless and dangerous. The - legitimate rights and precautionary measures of independent - Governments would be analysed in a spirit possibly of unfriendly - criticism, and if agreements were arrived at, constant vigilance - over their faithful fulfilment would be necessary, and this might - possibly give rise to the quarrels that the agreements were intended - to avert, and which would at once put an end to the compacts. - - It is upon a dispassionate consideration of the probable course of - events that the question of partial disarmament should in my opinion - be decided, and in France (the only country with which we need - concern ourselves) what do we find? A nation resolutely pacific: a - Government depending on popular support and therefore equally - pacific: a responsible Minister declaring that France will not - interfere with the affairs of her neighbours, and the Sovereign - willingly assenting to a diminution of one-tenth of the annual - conscription without asking for reciprocity on the part of Germany, - and thereby showing his confidence in the King's declaration. - - I venture to think that the present state of opinion in France, - founded as it is upon a true estimate of French interests, is a more - solid guarantee than any that the respective governments of France - and Germany could effect for their own security. - - Count Bismarck will admit, and I am sure that a statesman so liberal - and far-sighted will admit without regret, that the people - everywhere are claiming and must obtain a larger share in the - administration of their own affairs, and that, in proportion - as they do so, the chances of causeless wars will diminish. The - people well understand the horrors of war, and that they, and not - their rulers, are the real sufferers: they equally understand and - will daily become more impatient of the taxation for those costly - preparations for war which in themselves endanger peace, and I - believe that there is at this moment no surer road to solid - popularity for Government than attending to the wants and wishes of - the people on the subject of armaments. - - I have reason to know that the reduction in the French army would - have been carried further if the Government could have hoped that - the example would be followed by Prussia. Sooner or later, however, - this reason will be publicly assigned, and then upon Prussia will - rest the responsibility not only of maintaining so large a force - herself, but of compelling other countries reluctantly to do the - same. - - It would be to me a matter of most sincere pleasure to think that no - such responsibility will rest on Prussia, but I should hardly have - presumed to recur to the subject if I had not gathered from the - patriotic letter of Count Bismarck that further discussion was not - absolutely precluded, and I had not therefore been encouraged to - hope that he might think it proper to make my suggestions known to - his Sovereign. - -Bismarck's reply to this exhortation was equally long, and contained -some arguments of such a puerile nature that it can hardly be believed -that he expected them to be taken seriously. - - * * * * * - - _Lord A. Loftus to Lord Clarendon._ - - Berlin, March 12, 1870. - - On the receipt of your private letter yesterday morning, I asked for - an interview with Count Bismarck, and he received me last evening. - - I first observed that you would have hardly ventured to recur to the - subject of disarmament, had you not thought that his letter to Count - Bernstorff abstained from putting a veto on discussion, and from a - feeling that the King of Prussia would reap general esteem and - admiration in Europe by giving a patent proof of his Peace Policy, - whilst on the contrary, His Majesty might incur unpopularity if the - French should be enabled to say that they were compelled by Prussia - to keep up an armament against which the Nation is disposed to - protest.--I then read your letter to Count Bismarck. He listened - with great attention, merely making two observations during my - reading-- - - 1st. That France had only 40,000 men in Algeria, and 2nd that the - Constitutional Government in France was only of three months' - existence, and therefore its stability could not be yet said to be - ensured. When I had finished, Count Bismarck stated that, as far as - France alone was concerned, Prussia and the North German - Confederation might not feel themselves endangered by a diminution - of the Army, but he said Austria and France might join together and - even the 250,000 men which you give to Austria might in conjunction - with France prove to be a serious embarrassment to Prussia. The - 20,000 men which might perhaps be dispensed with, would then be just - the balance which might turn the Scale against Prussia. - - He then reverted to France. He said although the Nation was now - pacific, you know as well as I do that a war cry may be raised in - France, on any emergency, and at the shortest notice. - - If, said Count Bismarck, the present Constitutional Government had - been three years instead of three months in existence, then there - would be some chance for its duration and for the maintenance of - Peace. At the present moment, he observed, there was a party anxious - to restore the former state of things, a personal Government. - Amongst that Party, there was the Empress Eugénie, and they would - not be sorry to divert the public attention from home affairs by - raising some question of Foreign Policy. - - He said that the Provincial Press of France (and he reviewed - articles from all the Small Provincial Papers) teemed with abuse - against Prussia. - - There were other indications in Europe which did not leave him without - some disquietude for the maintenance of Peace. - - He first alluded to the local provincial Press in France as - continually preaching antagonism to Prussia, then to certain reports - which had reached him of the purchase of horses in France, but to - these he did not attach much importance. He then referred to reports - he had received from the Prussian Minister at Copenhagen, who - observed, that if any State of larger dimensions were to do what - Denmark was now doing, some sinister design would evidently be - attributed to it. - - He considered the appointment of Monsignor Klazko by Count Beust to - a post in the Foreign Office at Vienna as significative of the - intentions of Austria, and he observed that Count Beust was - intriguing with the Polish Party for some object which was not clear - to him. He then referred to Southern Germany and to the intrigues of - the Ultra-Montaine party, and cited a saying of the late Prince - Schwarzenberg 'that the three Empires (France, Austria, and Prussia) - should unite against the Heretics in Europe.' - - To these observations I replied that the Safety of Prussia was - secured by her Military system which supplied necessary reserves and - Landwehr, without the incubus of such an enormous standing army, and - that Prussia was therefore in a position to be able to give an - example to Europe. - - On the whole, although Count Bismarck appeared to be somewhat - incredulous as to the pacific appearance of Europe, he was less - decidedly opposed to any disarmament than on the last occasions I - spoke to him. He asked whether it was desired that he should mention - the subject to the King. I replied in the affirmative, and suggested - that he should have your Lordship's two letters translated and - submitted to His Majesty. - - On my mentioning that any attempt at mutual guarantees would be very - unadvisable, he said that without some guarantee the question of - entertaining disarmament would be difficult; but he said it more as - a passing observation than as a fixed decision. - - I am afraid that if the question of disarmament is entertained at - all (and probably neither the King nor Count Bismarck will like to - discard it entirely) it will be hedged round with so many - conditions, that it will be rendered impossible; great care will be - required that the question of disarmament shall not become a - question of Contention, and thus give a pretext for discussion, to - be followed perhaps by war. - - I asked Count Bismarck casually what foundation there was for the - repeatedly recurring reports of General Fleury's attempts to bring - about a Russo-French Alliance. - - Count Bismarck said that General Fleury on his arrival had acted - without instructions, and he attributed no importance to these - reports. - - He said that at first the Emperor of Russia had rather been taken - in, and that he had written a letter to the King of Prussia (he did - not say on what subject), but that the King of Prussia had replied - in a manner most satisfactory and agreeable to the Emperor, and that - it was then that the Emperor of Russia sent the St. George to the - King of Prussia. - - I could see that Count Bismarck has no fear of the Russian policy - towards Prussia, so long as the Emperor lives and that Prince - Gortchakow remains Minister. - - I shall see Bismarck later, and will then inform you what view the - King takes of the proposal for disarmament. - -This unpromising communication was transmitted to Paris, and Lord -Clarendon comforted himself with the thought that there was still a ray -of hope, as Bismarck had promised to bring the matter before the King, -and there might therefore be an opportunity of recurring to it later on. -Daru, too, did not look upon the position as hopeless. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, March 17, 1870. - - I read to Count Daru this afternoon a memorandum giving a short - summary of the principal points in Lord A. Loftus's letter to you of - the 12th about disarmament. - - He said that on the whole the impression made on his mind was good. - There was more disposition to consider the subject, and Count - Bismarck seemed rather to have sought to find something to say - against disarmament, than to have alleged reason which could be - supposed to have any real weight with him. - - At all events, Count Bismarck mistook the state of France. The - people were honestly and sincerely pacific, and the Constitutional - system might be considered as firmly established. He would not deny - that the French were a proud and susceptible people, and that they - could be roused to war by their Government, if their honour or their - patriotism were appealed to. But the present Government were as - pacific as the people, and they had the full confidence of the - Emperor and the nation--of the nation, he said, not of the Corps - Législatif, whose support was not cordial--nor of the Senate, which - did not like them--nor of the countries, who hated them. Count - Bismarck would see in a few days, a series of measures which would - convince him that Constitutional Government was irrevocably - established in France. The Ministers had obtained, or were on the - point of obtaining, His Majesty's sanction to reforms which would - convince all the world that the Emperor had not only landed on the - shore of Parliamentary Government, but had burnt his ships behind him. - - As to Count Bismarck's argument that Prussia must be prepared to - face the united armies of France and Austria, Count Daru remarked - that it was preposterous to maintain that any one Power of Europe - must endeavour to be a match for all the rest united. If Austria - united with France, Prussia might find allies also. It was not to be - supposed that all Europe would stand by and look on at a fight with - France and Austria on one side and Prussia on the other. - - Finally, he repeated that on the whole, Count Bismarck's language - was more satisfactory than it had yet been. - -The conclusion to be drawn from this conversation is that Count Daru -must have been more easy to please than most people; but all hopes -were shortly dashed to the ground when a letter arrived from Lord -Augustus Loftus reporting the result of his further communications with -Bismarck. - -Bismarck stated that Lord Clarendon's letters had been translated and -laid before the King, and that the proposal had not been favourably -entertained by His Majesty. There were only two methods of reducing the -German Army, one to change the present legislative enactments, and -thereby the whole military system; the other, to reduce the term of -military service to two and a half years. The first was considered to be -impossible, and, as for the second, the King had resisted Parliament on -the subject for five years, and now declared that he would rather give -up his throne than yield. Further, the King viewed the proposal as being -put forward in favour of France and French policy, and without regard to -the safety of Prussia. To use Bismarck's own expression: 'It was the act -of a _cool friend_.' 'It is all very well for you,' said Bismarck, -'living in an island, where no one can attack you, to preach -disarmaments, but put yourselves into our skin. You would then think and -act differently. What would you say if we were to observe to you that -your navy was too large, that you did not require so many ironclads, -that you lavished too large a portion of the taxation of the country in -building ships, which in the peaceful disposition of Europe were not -required? If we recommended you to diminish your naval armament?' - -To this home-thrust the Ambassador made the somewhat unconvincing reply -that as evidence of our pacific disposition we had just sold an ironclad -to the Prussian Government, and were ready to sell others--a reply -which was received with irreverent merriment; neither do the imposing -sentiments expressed respecting the general happiness and prosperity of -Europe seem to have made much impression upon the man of blood and iron. -The utmost that could be obtained from him was a vague statement that -the whole question would be discussed by the Parliament 'in a year or -so,' and that a decision must then be taken as to what was required for -the safety of the country. 'I saw,' wrote the Minister sadly, 'that it -was useless to pursue the question further.' Lord Clarendon realized -that the game was up. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, March 23, 1870. - - I send you a copy of Loftus's letter, and you will, I am sure, agree - with me that more harm than good would be done by further pressing - the question of disarmament, after the very decided expression of - the King's opinion. You can tell Daru in mild terms the two - objections raised by His Majesty and that, on the whole, I consider - it better to wait and not to show much anxiety until the War Budget - comes to be discussed next year, when the example of France, as - regards military reductions, the pacific temper of her people, and - the consolidation of her institutions, cannot fail to have a - beneficial effect on the Federal Parliament. At present, it seems - that the Liberal party, upon which Bismarck must lean more and more, - would only support reduction on the condition that he would change - his policy and invite, or coerce the South into the Confederation. - Bismarck on this subject has behaved with prudence, at the expense - of popularity, as regards Baden (the sorest point with the French), - and he should not be pressed into a course he dislikes or thinks - dangerous to the continuance of good relations with France. He is - foolish about the press and always irritated by articles, however - worthless, against Prussia, which he usually thinks are written by - authority, or are the true manifestation of public opinion in the - particular country. - - You will observe that the King thinks I have been acting in the - interest of France, and it is therefore not only on public grounds, - but as regards myself personally, that I am very desirous that the - most complete secrecy should be observed respecting the whole of - these unsuccessful negotiations, if they can be so called. I know - well the suspicious character of the King, and if he thought that we - had cast in our lot completely with France, he would straightway set - about a more intimate alliance with Russia which would not be for - the interest either of England or France. - - Pray therefore impress upon Daru the necessity of complete - discretion. - -Thus ended an attempt in the success of which no one probably felt much -confidence. Various conclusions may be drawn from the correspondence -quoted above. There seems to have been no doubt that the French -Government (whatever may have been the sentiments of the Emperor) was -sincerely anxious for a partial disarmament and the promised reduction -of the annual contingent by 10,000 men was evidence of good intentions. -There was, however, an essential difference between the French and -Prussian view as to what constituted conquest and aggression which in -reality precluded any real settlement. - -Prussia held that it was not conquest or aggression to annex any German -States, while France considered that the annexation of any States south -of the Maine would be as much conquest or aggression on the part of -Prussia, as it would be, on the part of France, to annex them herself. -Prussia refused to declare that she would not complete the unity of -Germany. France, on her side, refused to declare that she would not -interfere to prevent it. - -As for Bismarck's arguments against disarmament, some of them were -positively grotesque, and it must have required more than ordinary -assurance to contend, for instance, that Denmark and Monsignor Klazko -constituted a menace to Prussia, whilst the artifice of representing the -King as a sort of uncontrollable despot was too thin to deceive any one -of ordinary intelligence. On the other hand, Bismarck seems to have -displayed commendable patience and restraint when lectured on the -iniquity of the Prussian military system. Lord Clarendon's language -rather conveyed the impression that England stood upon a moral pinnacle -which entitled her to admonish other nations as to the errors of their -ways, but the claim was vitiated by the fact that she maintained, and -intended to maintain, a navy of overwhelming strength, while if her -military power was even more insignificant than it is at the present -day, the cost of the British Army amounted to much more than that of the -Prussian Army, and therefore the less said about unproductive -expenditure the better. If, in fact, the respective expenditure of the -two countries upon armaments is borne in mind it seems almost incredible -that Lord Clarendon should have ventured to preach economy to the -Prussian Government. During the previous year, the total British -expenditure upon armaments amounted to no less than twenty-four millions -and a quarter. Of this sum, rather more than fourteen millions were -allotted to the Army, and nearly ten millions to the Navy. Now the total -military and naval expenditure of the North German Federation at the -same period only amounted to ten millions eight hundred thousand pounds, -and the Prussian contribution towards the total represented a little -over seven millions. It might also be added that England was quite ready -at all times to supply to an unlimited amount, ironclads, rifles and -munition of war to any foreign customer, however depraved. And yet we -are pained and surprised when any one suggests that we are occasionally -hypocritical! - -But the most striking conclusion to be drawn from the correspondence is -that Lord Clarendon, with all his knowledge of continental politics, -does not seem to have fully grasped the really essential fact; he seems -to have thought that by professions of friendship, by small concessions -on the part of France, and by the establishment of more liberal -institutions in that country, the threatened danger might be averted, -whereas it was the fixed and inexorable determination of Bismarck to -force a conflict upon France whenever the favourable opportunity should -arise. A high tribute to Lord Clarendon's statesmanship was, however, -paid by Bismarck at a later period. On making the acquaintance of one of -his daughters a few years later, he opened the conversation with the -singular remark that, never in the whole course of his life, had he been -so relieved as when her father died; and then proceeded to explain that -had Lord Clarendon lived, there never would have been a Franco-German -war. As he did not enter into details, it may be presumed that he -considered Lord Clarendon's influence to be so great that he might have -successfully persuaded the French to acquiesce in some insignificant -enlargement of Prussia. - -All the participators in the disarmament negotiation appear to have kept -their counsel on the subject, and there is, at all events, no mention of -it in the two standard works which deal with Bismarck's career. - - -FOOTNOTES: - - [15] British Ambassador at Berlin. - - [16] Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon, Feb. 18, 1870. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR - -(1870) - - -Whilst the barren disarmament negotiations were proceeding, the internal -political situation in France had not improved. Though calm on the -surface, a section of the people was becoming more socialistic, and -socialism produced stagnation in business, a desire on the part of the -lower classes for revolution and a corresponding desire on the part of -the middle classes for a strong government again. Ministers were uneasy, -for although the new Constitution had been well received by the country -at large, its weak point lay in the right reserved by the Emperor of -appealing to the people, a right which nothing could induce him to -abandon, and which he was about to exercise by submitting the recent -Constitutional changes to a plébiscite. Theoretically, this should have -afforded gratification to the Republicans, as being in conformity with -their view that the public should decide everything directly itself, but -they were in reality well aware that the French people were not yet -Republican in sentiment. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, April 5, 1870. - - There is a good deal of uneasiness in the French political world. - The great thing for the moment is that the Ministers should get a - good majority in the Chamber at the end of the debate on the new - Constitution which is now going on. They are afraid that some of - their usual supporters will abstain from voting. The 'Appeal to the - People' is so thoroughly Napoleonic an idea, and so completely in - accordance with the peculiar character and modes of thinking of - Napoleon III., that it would be very hard to make him give it up. - One cannot wonder at people's being distrustful of the use he may - make of it. The submitting the present changes in the Constitution - to a plébiscite is certainly legally necessary and admitted to be so - by all parties. What people are afraid of is that the Emperor will - insist upon calling for it in a Proclamation so worded as to make - the acceptance by the people a vote in favour of his person, as - against the Chambers and Ministers. - - You will see from Claremont's report that the Government has agreed - to reduce the military contingent by another 10,000 men, making it - 80,000 instead of 90,000 as the present Government proposed, and - instead of 100,000, as it was fixed by the late Government. - -It was not surprising that the French Ministers, as well as many other -people, should feel suspicious about the plébiscite, and that frequent -councils should have taken place at the Tuileries with the object of -inducing the Emperor to consent that in future no plébiscite should be -submitted to the people unless it had first been voted by the two -Chambers. For one thing, it was feared that few people would care enough -about it to take much trouble to vote, and it really did not seem very -probable that a peasant would take a long walk to express his opinion on -the question of whether the Senate should have the power of originating -certain laws. Therefore the Ministerial crisis which arose, and the -Emperor's determination not to yield about the Appeal to the People, -were attributed to a Machiavellian plot on his part, and it was believed -that the return to personal government was to be brought about by -getting rid of the independent Ministers, Ollivier included. The belief -was possibly unfounded, but the Emperor's previous history had not -inspired his people with implicit confidence in him, and they were -always convinced that he had an incurable taste for conspiracy. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, April 13, 1870. - - It is impossible not to feel very uneasy about the present state of - things in France and the sort of _locus standi_ that the enemies of - the Empire have obtained for suspecting the Emperor, who will be a - long time in recovering, if he ever does, the public confidence he - now seems to have lost. Revolutions are not made with half measures, - any more than with the proverbial rose water, and among the ships - that the Emperor was supposed to have burnt behind him when he - landed on the Constitutional shore, the plébiscite ought surely to - have been included. No doubt he would have divested himself of a - favourite weapon, but he should have foreseen the very serious - objections to it that would arise in the mind of the most moderate - friend of Constitutional Government, and he would have done far - better for himself to have given it up and taken his chance, for - with or without plébiscite, that is what he is now reduced to, and - his chances will be improved by endeavouring with sincerity to guide - the stream rather than oppose himself to it. - -As the result of the crisis, both Daru and Buffet left the Ministry, -thus weakening the Cabinet and diminishing materially the chance of a -quiet and satisfactory establishment of Parliamentary Government. Thiers -was generally supposed to have been the principal mischief-maker. -Lord Russell was at this time in Paris, and in conversation with -Ollivier the latter expressed himself most confidently about the -plébiscite, and thought that if six million people voted it might be -looked upon as a decided success. Another opinion on the plébiscite was -volunteered by Mr. Gladstone. 'If the Emperor is really stickling for -the right to refer when he pleases to the people for an Aye or No upon -a proposition which he is to frame, that, in my opinion, reduces -Constitutional Government to an absolute mockery, just as it would -reduce to a shadow the power of a Legislative Assembly.' - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, April 21, 1870. - - The prospects of the quiet establishment of Constitutional - Government are in some respects better and in some worse. They are - better inasmuch as men of property, bankers, and others, are giving - money and exerting themselves to obtain a decided success for the - Plébiscite. They are worse, inasmuch as the suspicion of the - Emperor's intentions appears to increase, and people become more and - more afraid that if he gets a really large majority on the - Plébiscite, he will revert to personal government. The imprudent - language of the Right and their undisguised avowal of their hopes - produce this feeling. The Emperor himself has neither said nor done - anything to warrant it. - - Ollivier asked me what progress had been made in the disarmament - question. I made him understand, without going into details, that it - must be let sleep for the present, and he agreed immediately. - - There is a hitch about the English evidence before the Parliamentary - Committee on the Régime Parlementaire. The Committee have proposed - that only one English witness shall be heard. Emile Ollivier will do - his best to put things straight. I told him that if a proper and - courteous answer was made to our tender of evidence, I would - undertake that we would not abuse their civility by asking for too - much of their time. - - Emile Ollivier dines with me to-day, and will, I hope, learn and - profit by Lord Russell's instruction in Constitutional Government. - -English manufacturers were naturally desirous of putting their case -before the Parliamentary Committee on the Commercial Treaty, but the -members of the Committee did not appear equally desirous of hearing -them. According to Lord Lyons, who, like all his official contemporaries, -was in principle a Free Trader, and felt compassion for the misguided -economics of continental nations, the majority of the Committee were -infected by a politico-economical heresy which took the form of -demanding that any advantages which foreign manufacturers might enjoy, -should be balanced by import duties, which they persisted in calling -'compensation.' His advice was that any English witnesses who might be -called, should confine themselves very closely to facts and not allow -themselves to be led into discussions on trade principles, 'as it is not -easy to reply in French to a Committee, of which the anti-Free Trade -members are much hotter than the Free Traders.' - -As the date of the plébiscite drew near, Ollivier's confidence and -satisfaction continued to increase, but some discomposure was caused by -the hostile action of Thiers and his friends. No one had ever expected -that Thiers would long endure that any Government of which he was not a -member should go on smoothly, and in the present instance, he was able -to establish a plausible case by protesting that the Emperor, in -reserving the right to appeal to the people, was nullifying liberal -institutions. At an opportune moment, however, a plot against the -Emperor's life was discovered, in which a man named Beaury was -concerned, and although of small importance, it was considered likely -to produce a considerable effect upon public opinion. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, May 6, 1870. - - I thought Emile Ollivier rather out of spirits yesterday, or at all - events not so confident as he is usually. He seemed to hope the - publication of the details of the plot would produce a great effect - and increase the 'Ayes' for the Plébiscite. That there really was a - plot is certain, but it may be doubted whether the conspirators were - numerous enough, or were men of sufficient note, to make the danger - so great as to frighten the voters. I am not surprised at La - Valette's being out of spirits, for the situation is really very - critical, and it is difficult to conceive any ending which will - place him and Rouher where they were again. - - With reference to Loftus's despatch, I sincerely hope that his most - confidential correspondent is not so well informed as he represents - himself to be, and that no change is really contemplated in the - _status quo_ of Hesse and Baden. It would be quite a mistake to - suppose that this is a moment at which it would be safe to defy - France. On the contrary, a war unmistakably provoked by Prussia, - would be hailed by many as a welcome diversion from internal - difficulties. So far as I can judge, _Ollivier is not the man to - shrink from one_. There is more security against a sudden surprise - than there was under the personal government, but there is also less - probability that the Emperor's health and personal views will - prevent war. - -The plébiscite took place on May 8, and an ecstatic note from Ollivier -announced success. - - * * * * * - - _M. E. Ollivier to Lord Lyons._ - - Paris le 9 mai, 1870. - - - La Victoire est complète! - - A Paris nous avons gagné cent mille voix, et jusqu'à présent voici - les resultats. - - Oui 6.189.506 - Non 1.305.881 - - manquent 37 arrondissements, l'armée, la marine, l'Algérie. - -The complete returns showed that about 7,250,000 voted 'Yes,' and -1,500,000 'No.' The Minister was thus justified in his satisfaction. -Nearly all the big towns, including Paris, had voted against the -Government, as had been expected, but on the other hand the agricultural -population had showed itself to be practically unanimous in favour of -the Empire. One of the disquieting surprises was provided by the Army, -no less than 50,000 votes being recorded against the Emperor. Riots, as -usual, broke out in Paris after the voting was over, but were suppressed -without difficulty. In connection with these riots an ingenious but -discreditable device, was resorted to for the purpose of seducing the -soldiers in the Prince Eugène Barracks, these having been supplied by -the Republicans with _bons_ (orders for free admission) on the -neighbouring houses of ill-fame, on the presumption that the holders of -these orders would feel peculiarly aggrieved at being confined to -barracks. - -The general impression created was that a large majority was safer than -a moderate one would have been, and much safer than a very small one. -This was the view entertained by Lord Clarendon, who had always -considered the plébiscite to be a great mistake, but was now anxious to -make the best of it, and instructed the Ambassador to congratulate -Ollivier and to express the hope that he would be able to surround -himself with Liberal Ministers determined to keep order. An Empire based -upon soldiers and peasants could not be said to be placed on a solid -foundation, and no effort should be spared to enlarge the basis. - -The Imperial success at the plébiscite produced a sycophantic outburst -amongst the diplomatists at Paris, and a movement was promoted by the -Nuncio and Prince Metternich, the Austrian Ambassador, with the object -of asking for an audience, and offering the collective congratulations -of the Diplomatic Corps to the Emperor. The ineptitude of the proposal -was evident. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, May 12, 1870. - - I wish the flunkeyism of the Nuncio and Metternich was displayed in - some other way than congratulating the Emperor on the success of his - foolish Plébiscite. It is an improper interference in the internal - affairs of France, which, if allowed, would justify a remonstrance - of the Diplomatic Corps against some measure they disapproved; but, - of course, we can neither oppose nor abstain, and it will be well - for you to join cordially. But I hope there will be no expression of - opinion in favour of the Plébiscite, or recognition of it as a - component part of Constitutional Government. We should be justly - condemned if we joined however indirectly in any such opinion. I - asked La Valette this morning whether such congratulations would be - agreeable to the Emperor, and he answered, with a shrug of the - shoulders: 'Il a le gout des compliments.' - -Upon further consideration Lord Clarendon decided that it would be -unwise if the British representative took any part in the proposed joint -congratulation, as it was foreseen that it might provoke awkward -discussions in the House of Commons. Lord Lyons was therefore directed -to inform Ollivier at once, that, much as the British Government -sympathized with the Emperor and his dynasty, no worse service could be -done to him than by offering compliments upon his success. He would at -once be attacked for having invited or rather tolerated intervention in -the internal affairs of France, and the Queen of England, in an -analogous case, could not possibly accept such an address from -foreigners as that would imply a sort of right to interfere which might -prove extremely inconvenient. The Emperor would gain much more with the -nation by courteously declining to receive foreign opinions upon his own -acts and the domestic affairs of France, than by any assurance that -Foreign Governments were united in approving a measure about which there -existed a considerable difference of opinion in France. These views were -to be communicated to Ollivier in a friendly manner with the assurance -that they should be brought to the Emperor's notice. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - Paris, May 19, 1870. - - I think we are well out of the scrape of the collective - congratulations. The notion was Metternich's and the Nuncio only - came into it to a certain degree, lest his refusing to do so should - give offence. So far as I know, the Nuncio has behaved very well, - and has not brought _us_ forward, but has simply told Metternich - that he found the Diplomatic Corps generally cold on the subject, - and therefore thought it better not to go on with it. Metternich - appears to have acquiesced. I have not seen him; he was out when I - called, which was, I think, lucky; and we have not met. - - There is a Ball at the Tuileries on Monday, at which I shall - probably have a chance of saying something pleasant to Cæsar. I - shall be careful to keep within the terms sanctioned by Mr. - Gladstone. We may at any rate rejoice at the establishment of - Parliamentary Government in France, and hope, till we have evidence - to the contrary, that the means provided for upsetting it will not - be resorted to. The present Plébiscite was undoubtedly technically - necessary to the legality of the new Constitution, and as such was - insisted upon by Daru and other Liberals. Let us hope it will be the - last. - - I have received the usual invitation in the name of the Emperor to - the function on Saturday evening. I must not leave the Embassy in - darkness if everybody else illuminates, but I think the idea a - foolish one, as being likely to give rise to street riots. - - Two of the new Ministers are unknown to fame, but their appointment - is a relief to those who apprehended appointments from the Right. - There is no remarkable speaker in the Ministry except Ollivier - himself. - - Gramont called upon me yesterday and was profuse in expressions of - friendship to England, to you, and to me. - -The appointment, however, of the Duc de Gramont[17] could hardly have -been in the nature of a relief, for, as far back as the beginning of -1868, when Ambassador at Vienna, he had announced that he considered a -Franco-Prussian war unavoidable. - -The formal announcement of the result of the plébiscite was made to the -Emperor on May 21, in the Salle des États of the Louvre, and must have -been one of the last, if not the very last, of the brilliant ceremonies -which marked the reign of Napoleon III. It was attended by all the -dignitaries of the realm, the Senators, the deputies, the civic -functionaries, the Diplomatic Corps; an imposing array of troops filled -the Place du Carrousel; and Cæsar himself, elevated upon a dais, replied -to the congratulations offered to him by the Chambers in a speech full -of those resounding and occasionally meaningless phrases which -invariably meet with a responsive echo in an assembly of Frenchmen. It -was, in fact, the final coruscation of the Imperial fireworks, and, in -the prosaic words of Lord Lyons, 'the ceremony went off extremely well.' - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ - - May 24, 1870. - - I made a little speech to the Emperor about the Plébiscite at the - ball last night. I did not in fact go as far as Mr. Gladstone - allowed, but what I did say appeared to be to His Majesty's taste. - At all events he was extremely gracious and cordial. I don't know - that any one except the Prussian Ambassador has asked for a special - audience to deliver congratulations, but I have not made inquiries, - because I neither wished to put it into my colleagues' heads to do - so, nor to appear as if it seemed to me the natural thing to do. All - seems to be quite right with the Emperor and Empress, so far as H.M. - Government, and you in particular, and I am concerned. He has been a - good deal annoyed and disappointed by the tone of the English press. - After all, he has established a Constitutional form of Government, - more democratic than that which exists in England, and the worst way - to encourage him to persevere is to assume at once that he does not - mean to do so. Selfishly, we ought to remember that his influence in - the Government is the principal security we can have for _Free Trade - and cordiality between the two countries_. - - What the Emperor will really do depends on the course of events. I - believe nothing of the stories of his having deep-laid schemes. It - is a pity that he has not stronger men in the Cabinet--men strong - enough to resist him in case of need--and to direct the Chamber. A - dissolution is hardly to be thought of at present. The people at - large would not stand being disturbed to vote again soon, and - consequently the votes would be few, and principally Republican. - There is danger in the influence of the Emperor's old political - friends, who want to regain their old position, and in some of the - influential military men who want a war for promotion and glory. And - there is danger in the position in which the Plébiscite has placed - him--owing mainly to the Republicans, who, much more than he is, are - to blame for making it a question between him personally and them. - The function of the 21st went off very well; indeed, wonderfully - well, considering how great a part of the audience was composed of - Senators and Councillors of State who have lost in importance by the - Constitutional change. - -The excitement attending the plébiscite gave way before long to a -feeling of political lassitude, and to those surmises concerning the -probabilities of weathering the session which habitually preoccupy -Constitutional Governments. It is of more interest to turn for a moment -to a matter which is now fortunately viewed in a very different light. - -Having been asked his advice on some question concerning Canada, Lord -Lyons wrote to Lord Clarendon the following as his deliberate opinion, -and it must be borne in mind that he had had exceptional opportunities -of studying the Canadian situation:-- - - I never feel comfortable about Canada and our North American - possessions. I do not believe we have the means of defending them - against the United States in case of war, and I am by no means - confident that the colonists would be unanimous and enthusiastic in - helping us to do so. I am afraid too that the colonists are - beginning to see that in matters short of war, we feel that we must - let the United States do very much as they please: in short that we - doubt our having the strength to resist them, and, unless under a - very strong provocation, have not the spirit to try. I was struck - by an observation made some time ago by the Governor of Newfoundland - respecting the French claims and the coast fisheries, viz. that the - Colonists felt that if the United States were their masters, the - questions would soon be settled in their favour. In fact it seems to - be in the nature of things that the United States' prestige should - grow and ours should wane in North America, and I wish we were well - and creditably out of the scrape. - -In the course of the previous year he had already expressed the opinion -that the great problem for us in American politics was to find some fair -and honourable way of dissolving all connection between England and our -North American colonies. - -Lord Clarendon on his side was equally emphatic. 'I agree,' he wrote on -June 1, 'in every word you say about our possessions in North America, -and wish that they would propose to be independent, and to annex -themselves. We can't throw them off, and it is very desirable that we -should part as friends.' - -The views of Lord Stanley on this subject have already been quoted, -and, if search were made, no doubt it would be discovered that similar -sentiments were entertained by nearly all the mid-Victorian statesmen. -I have a clear recollection of hearing, less than thirty years ago, a -Cabinet Minister, who had been Colonial Secretary, express the opinion -that 'colonies were expensive luxuries which only a rich country like -England could afford to indulge in.' - -One of the last letters written by Lord Clarendon refers to suspicions -created by the visit to Ems of the Emperor of Russia, the King of -Prussia, and Bismarck. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, June 8, 1870. - - I have nothing of importance to write about. - - Loftus says that the Berlin public is much _intrigué_ by the sudden - departure of the King and Bismarck for Ems, as the Czar was at - Berlin ten days before, when Bismarck pretended to be too ill to - come and meet him. - - Bernstorff professes entire ignorance on the subject, and supposes - that, as Ems is now Prussian, the King thinks it necessary to give a - personal welcome to his Imperial relative. - - This is possible, but not probable, and I suspect, though I can give - no good reason for so doing, that the more complete unification of - Germany occupies the Prussian mind, beginning of course by the - incorporation of Baden, and that it is thought desirable to get a - Russian sanction of the project, in the event of its leading to war - with France. One fails, however, to discover any reason why Russia - should make an enemy of France and endanger the peace of Europe in - order to justify the ambition of Prussia and enable the King to - unduly tax his subjects for an unnecessary army. - -Lord Clarendon's suspicions in this case were as correct as his prophecy -with regard to the establishment of a Republic in France, although the -words 'unnecessary army' might be taken exception to in the light of -subsequent events. Benedetti[18] happened to be in Paris at the time when -Lord Clarendon's letter arrived, and he informed Lord Lyons that he -had 'entire confidence in the assurances of the King of Prussia and -Bismarck, and that he did not apprehend any danger to peace, unless -circumstances were too strong for His Majesty and his Minister, and this -he thought improbable.' The idea of circumstances being too strong for -Bismarck might fairly be classed with the danger to Prussia -threatened by the appointment of Monsignor Klazko. - -Lord Clarendon died on June 27, and was succeeded at the Foreign Office -on July 6 by Lord Granville. The celebrated announcement that there -had never been so great a lull in foreign affairs was made upon the -authority of Mr. Hammond,[19] whose singularly faulty judgment and -unhappy prophecies have been already commented upon. At the same time, -it must in justice be admitted that appearances in the early summer of -1870 were unusually deceptive owing to the general calm which prevailed -in the diplomatic world. - -When the Hohenzollern candidature thunderbolt fell in the early days -of July, the Duc de Gramont lost no time in intimating to the British -Ambassador that France would go to war with both Spain and Prussia -rather than allow a Hohenzollern to reign at Madrid. But although -Gramont seemed bent upon committing the French Government to this -course, he allowed it to be seen that he would be very grateful for any -exertion England might make to induce the King of Prussia to forbid his -kinsman to go on with his candidature. The election of Montpensier, he -said, might be looked upon as a _mauvais procédé_ towards the Emperor -and the dynasty, but the putting forward a Prussian was an insult and an -injury to all France. Similar language was held by the French Ambassador -in London. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, July 6, 1870. - - Your telegram of yesterday arrived while we were debating the Land - Bill. It took Mr. Gladstone and me by surprise. I received your - despatch and private letter this morning, and on my return from - Windsor, M. de La Valette called on me. He held the same language to - me as that reported by you to have been held by Gramont. France - disclaimed all interference with Spain, but stated the arguments - which made the possession of the Crown of Spain by a Prussian Prince - dangerous to France. I am writing to catch the post, and I cannot - repeat to you all the reasons which he gave, concluding by assuring - me that the circumstances were of the gravest character, and that in - his opinion, the Government of the Emperor could not, under the - pressure of public opinion, admit a project of such a nature. He - added however that there was no reason why any preliminary means - should not be tried to avert so great an evil, and he addressed - himself to the Government of the Queen, on the strength of our - friendly relations, and our desire to maintain the peace of Europe, - to exercise all our influence upon Prussia and upon Spain to stop - the project. - - I told M. de La Valette of the surprise which the matter had been to - H.M. Government, that I perfectly understood the unfavourable effect - which such an announcement was contemplated to produce in France, - although I did not agree with all the arguments which he had used - with respect to the importance to so great a nation as France of a - German prince on the throne of Spain. - - I said it was a matter of some regret to me that such strong - language as that reported by you to have been addressed to the - Prussian Ambassador should have been used. But I added that it was - not so much a moment for the general discussion, as to see what - could be done. - - I readily assented to his request to use what influence we might - possess both with Prussia and Spain, but without any pretension - to dictate to either Power, to induce them to take into the most - serious consideration all the bearings of this question, such as its - gravity required, and I promised to communicate with you, Lord A. - Loftus, and Mr. Layard at once. - - It is very sad that I should be writing to you in the place of one - who would have had so much personal power in such a matter as this. - -In the meanwhile, however, the explosion of Chauvinism in France and the -attitude of the French Ministers rendered the situation more alarming -from day to day. Undoubtedly the French Government desired and hoped to -carry their point without actual war, but Ministers had burnt their -ships and left themselves no means of escape if they failed in their -attempt to win a moral victory over Prussia. As Gramont remarked, -'_l'Avènement du Prince de Hohenzollern, c'est la guerre_!' It was -almost impossible to see what injury to French interests could be caused -by the presence of a Hohenzollern at Madrid, but the question had been -taken up as a point of honour, and was therefore more dangerous than if -treated from a material point of view. The Emperor, according to Lord -Lyons, remained at this stage of the crisis, very calm and extremely -confident that he would get his way without war. There was no doubt that -he was strongly averse from war, partly on account of his own views, and -partly on the ground of his ill-health, which would be a serious -drawback if he were forced to take the command of the army; but he also -felt that it would not be safe for him to submit to another rebuff from -Prussia, and his Constitutional Ministers were inconveniently anxious to -show their spirit. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Paris, July 10, 1870. - - The state of things to-day may be told in half a dozen words. If the - Prince of Hohenzollern's renunciation is announced in 24 or 48 - hours, there will be peace _for the moment_. If not, there will be - an immediate declaration of war against Prussia. I cannot however - answer for even this situation lasting for the 48 hours. The French - are getting more and more excited. They think they have got the - start of Prussia this time in forwardness of preparation; that they - have a better cause of war, as being one less likely to rouse the - Germans, than they are likely to get again; and in fact that they - must have it out with Prussia sooner or later; and that they had - better not throw away this chance. When I say that I cannot answer - for things remaining in as favourable a situation as they are now, - for 48 hours, I mean that if the excitement goes on, the French may - choose to pick a quarrel on the form of the renunciation, or some - other pretext, even if the Prince retires. - - End how it will, the whole affair is a terrible misfortune, for the - French and the Prussians will hate each other more than ever, and I - hardly expect to see their animosity come back to the quiescent - state in which it was a month ago. - - Gramont says that, so far from the energetic language and - preparations of France thwarting your endeavours to preserve peace, - they afford the only chance of your succeeding. - - I told him I did not at all agree with him. - -This letter reveals two colossal errors on the part of the French. They -honestly thought that they were better prepared for war than the -Prussians, and they believed that the latter could be successfully -intimidated. - -As late as July 12 Lord Granville still believed that Prussia did not -really want war, and hoped that the pressure applied to the Hohenzollern -Prince by Queen Victoria and other important personages would avert the -calamity. Writing on the same day, Lord Lyons said that he did not -despair of peace, but that the war feeling was very strong, both in and -out of the Ministry. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, July 13, 1870. - - Nothing can be better than your work at Paris, and I only wish it - may prove successful. My colleagues and the House of Commons are - getting very angry, and Gladstone wishes me to use stronger language - to the French Government than would, in my opinion, be useful for - the object, although it is true that no nation is powerful enough in - these times to stand up against the public opinion of Europe. - - Your telegram of this evening leaves some hope, but I very much - doubt whether, even if we are asked by France, we can exert any more - pressure on Prussia, who in substance has done all that we were told - to ask and all that Gramont said was necessary to put an end to the - dispute. - - La Valette is very angry. He gets a communication from his Foreign - Office once in three days, and then there is hardly anything in it. - His argument to-day is probably not the one his Government uses. 'I - do not, like everybody else, suspect the French of having had a - project of going to war. But having got into the wrangle, having - found their warlike preparations so popular, and having roused - effectually the feelings of France and Prussia, they do not like to - abstain from a fight, which they think will come, and in which - during the next six weeks their enemies would be unprepared. - - I have some thoughts of asking the Cabinet, if war is declared, - whether it would be wise to ask both Governments whether they are - prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium. It is always safer, - or at least, generally so, to do nothing; but both, in doubt, would - be more likely to give a favourable answer, than either flushed with - victory. Let me know what you think, and please make any other - suggestions which may occur to you if the emergency arises. - - As far as I can judge, all the Neutral Powers are sincerely anxious - for peace. Italy, certainly so. The only thing which we have done, - of which I doubt, is having asked Italy a leading question about an - Italian Prince. They seem to wish to entangle us further in the - matter. It was of great importance before Spain and France were - reconciled, but now I presume it will be discreet to let this matter - remain in the hands of the parties concerned. - -The phrase 'in which during the next six weeks their enemies would be -unprepared,' seems to imply that H.M. Government were singularly -ill-informed as to the true state of Prussian military efficiency. - -Upon July 14, Lord Lyons reported that an article in the _North German -Gazette_ seemed to make war absolutely inevitable, and that Benedetti, -who was expected in Paris the following day, confirmed the accuracy of -the newspaper. Werther, too, the Prussian Ambassador, had announced to -Gramont that 'he had been granted leave of absence and was about to take -advantage of it immediately.' Even the guileless Hammond was alarmed. -'Why Bismarck went to Berlin instead of Ems, and finally retired to -Varzin without personal communications with his master, is not easy to -explain, and with a person of his character the proceeding is somewhat -suspicious.' The last hope of peace practically vanished when Bismarck -intimated that he could not recommend to the King for acceptance the -proposal made by H.M. Government. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Paris, July 16, 1870. - - It will be a miracle if we are as good friends with France six - months after the beginning of this wretched war, as we are now, and - it will require the utmost tact, prudence and consideration for - French susceptibilities to prevent all the improvement in feeling - between the two nations, which has grown up in the last twenty - years, being entirely destroyed. - - We have already a question with Gramont about his assertion that we - recognized the justice of his complaint. I hope it may be possible - to let this drop, but if not it is to be noted that, my memorandum - correcting the assertion on your authority was in his hands the - night before he repeated the assertion in his declaration of - yesterday. - - In referring to his declaration that if the Hohenzollern - renunciation were obtained, France would be satisfied, it may be - well to bear in mind that the exact words he used to me were: '_If - the Prince of Hohenzollern should now, on the advice of the King of - Prussia_, withdraw his acceptance of the Crown the whole affair - would be at an end.' - - This point becomes of less importance as France now seems to set the - Hohenzollern affair aside altogether, and to rest her _casus belli_ - wholly on the boast of the affront to Benedetti. - - Above all things we must try and keep as much as possible out of - Blue Books. If it is absolutely necessary to have one now, pray let - me have the opportunity of looking over anything of mine which it is - proposed to publish, and suggesting omissions. It would also be a - great relief to me to be allowed to consult Gramont himself, as I - did La Valette on the Cretan Blue Book. The cases are not the same, - and I might not use the power, but I should like to have it. I am - the more alarmed with regard to Gramont, as his reputation for - inaccuracy is so universal, that there must be some foundation for it. - - Newspaper correspondents, amateur travellers, and so forth, are - already tormenting me to get them leave to accompany the French - Army. I believe none are to be allowed; but if it be otherwise, I - think the danger of being held responsible for their indiscretions - would be so great and so damaging to our relations with France, that - I do not think I should be justified in applying for leave on any - private recommendation, however strong: in fact, I should not be - willing to apply on anything short of a distinct official order, in - each case from you; and such an order I should be sorry to receive. - - I tremble at the thought of the Blockades. Those during the American - Civil War kept us in perpetual hot water and within an inch of war - with the United States, and the labours of working out the cases - without coming to a rupture was very nearly the death of me. Heaven - defend us from anything like an _Alabama_ case with the French! - - It is important that I should know as soon as possible whether our - Embassy at Berlin might take charge of French subjects in Prussia. - I am pretty sure to be sounded very soon, and might perhaps be able - to soften the very bad impression a refusal would make, by - preventing the request being made. I should wish us to accept, and I - don't see why, as impartial neutrals, we might not take charge also - of the Prussians in Paris, if we were asked, though I would rather - avoid this if possible. - -Just at this moment the _Liberté_ caused some embarrassment by -publishing more or less correct details respecting the secret -negotiations which had taken place earlier in the year between Lord -Clarendon and Bismarck on the question of disarmament. Lord Granville -had not been in the confidence of Lord Clarendon, and it now was -necessary to explain to him what had passed. How the _Liberté_ obtained -its information does not appear. Daru always stoutly maintained that he -had not mentioned the matter to any one except the Emperor and Ollivier, -and the disclosures involved not only a gross breach of confidence on -the part of some one--presumably a French Foreign Office official--but -also a danger that Bismarck might demand explanations. The tremendous -events, however, of the next few weeks, diverted attention from the -_Liberté's_ revelations. War was formally declared on July 19. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Paris, July 19, 1870. - - The war has been forced upon the Emperor principally by his - own party in the Chamber, the Right, and by his Ministers. - Constitutional Government has so far established itself that a - Ministry in a minority in the Corps Législatif is as much bound to - go out as a Ministry in the House of Commons. The Emperor was in a - bad position to resist, because after the line taken at the time of - Sadowa, it would have been too dangerous for him to be put forward - as the cause of France's truckling to Prussia. The whole affair is a - series of blunders which has culminated in an awful catastrophe. - - Gramont told me this afternoon that La Valette wrote him a very - _bizarre_ story. La Valette said that it had been considered by the - British Cabinet whether they should not send an English force to - occupy Belgium during the war, which would be a strange way of - showing respect for Belgian neutrality. - - I should myself be very sorry to see a British soldier landed on the - Continent, and seriously alarmed if any force that was landed was - under a hundred thousand strong. - - Gramont told me also that Bray[20] had hit upon a combination to - which France would have no objection if it were possible. Bray - declared that Bavaria would be neutral if the neutrality of Baden - were secured. Gramont said however that of course to carry out such - an arrangement, the Prussian troops must retire from Rastadt. - - He said he had just been informed that Italy had called out two - classes of her military contingent. He did not know what this might - mean. Italy has not yet made to France any declaration of policy. - - Gramont concluded by saying that he supposed all the Minor States - would wait for a battle and then declare for the victor. - -The neutrality of Belgium was, of course, one of the main preoccupations -of H.M. Government, but there is no reason to suppose that a British -occupation was ever seriously contemplated, and La Valette's report on -the subject was probably caused by the vanity of appearing to possess -special pieces of information which often leads diplomatists astray. -Belgium was not, however, the only country which had reason to feel -alarmed. The position of Denmark before hostilities actually began -between France and Prussia was both painful and critical. The Danish -Minister at Paris appeared at the British Embassy in great distress, -saying that he knew nothing of what his Government intended, and asking -for information; as it seemed quite likely that the Danish capital would -be occupied by whichever of the two opposing armies could get there -first. It was common knowledge that a great expedition was fitting out -for Copenhagen at Cherbourg, and that General Trochu, who passed for -about the best French general, was to command it. And if French forces -appeared off Copenhagen it would be impossible to restrain the people -from marching against the Prussians, although there was, as yet -apparently, no understanding between the French and Danish Governments. - -On July 25 the _Times_ surprised the world by publishing the text of a -draft treaty concerning the annexation of Belgium which it was alleged -had been submitted by the French Government to Bismarck in 1866. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Paris, July 26, 1870. - - I have had some conversation with Gramont about the nefarious Projet - de Traité which the _Times_ has given to the world, but as he has - written to La Valette about it, I had better leave you to receive - from him the French version. The only curious, and to me quite new - statement which he made, was that Bismarck had at one time offered, - if France was afraid of the odium of occupying Belgium, to occupy it - first himself, and then to retire in apparent deference to - remonstrances from France, and so give France a pretext for - entering. - - It has long been a common belief among diplomatists that France and - Prussia have at different times discussed the propriety of seizing, - the one upon Belgium, the other upon Holland. No such scandalous - iniquity has been contemplated since the partition of Poland, and it - is much worse than the partition of Poland, for there might be some - colourable assertions that Poland was turbulent, ill-governed, that - most of the population were serfs, and that she was an inconvenient - neighbour. But Belgium and Holland are free, extremely well - governed, and, to say the least, perfectly inoffensive neighbours. - One must leave it to the parties concerned to defend themselves from - the reproach of such odious projects, and I hope they will. - - The insinuation in the leading article in the _Times_ that the - subject has been revived by France since the Hohenzollern crisis - seems to me to be extremely improbable. - - Bernstorff's attempts to make you vouch for the authenticity of the - _Projet_, without committing himself, is as poor a little trick as I - ever heard of. - - I send you in a despatch the official account of the cause of the - tardiness in producing Benedetti's despatch, that is to say, - delicacy on the part of Gramont. The version accepted by the public - is that the whole affair had been forgotten at the Ministère until - at last Benedetti himself remembered it and had it looked up. - -With the object of prejudicing European opinion against Prussia, the -Emperor wrote the well-known letter to Gramont from Metz, on July 28, -accusing Bismarck of having proposed to France the annexation of -Belgium, but the sole result was that both parties were shown to have -played an equally sordid part in the transaction, and they were -consequently both induced to agree to the English proposal that they -should give a new and formal pledge not to violate Belgian integrity. - -In a letter dated July 31, is a dispassionate analysis of the inadequate -causes which had brought about a rupture at that particular moment. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Paris, July 31, 1870. - - I see the public, with their usual tendency to attribute everything - to deep-laid plots and schemes, generally suppose that war was a - foregone conclusion on the part of France and of Prussia. I don't - believe it in the case of Prussia, and I know it not to be the fact - as regards France. Prussia threw the first stone, by bringing on the - Hohenzollern question. France made a peaceful settlement difficult - by Gramont's irritating declaration on the 6th. The cause of the - change from a mild to an irritating declaration was the arrival of - the report from the Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, that Thile[21] - pooh-poohed the French remonstrance, and said that the question - _n'existait pas pour le Gouvernement Prussien_. Then came the - great fault of France in not accepting the renunciation of the - Hohenzollern as a final settlement; but, even at the last moment the - declaration of the 16th would have concluded with a phrase leaving - the door open to the mediation of a Congress, if the article in the - _North German Gazette_ had not arrived, and convinced the French - that Bismarck had decided upon war. However, it is no use crying - over spilt milk. - - I understand that the Emperor writes to the Empress that no great - action is to be expected for three or four days. At the French Head - Quarters there was an apprehension that the Prussians might attempt - to turn the right flank of the French Army. - -Subsequent revelations have shown how profoundly the course of events -was influenced by the action of Bismarck in connection with the tone of -the German press, and by his distortion of the celebrated Ems interview -between the King of Prussia and Benedetti, but this was of course -unknown at the time. - -One humorous incident in connection with the outbreak of hostilities is -worth recording. Animated by what Lord Clarendon would have called the -spirit of flunkeyism, the Paris diplomatists grew greatly excited over -the question of illuminations in the event of French victories. As was -only to be expected, the accommodating Austrian Ambassador was foremost -in advocating rejoicings, and he and his Italian colleague were bent -upon illuminating their Embassies, while the representatives of the -smaller Powers, such as Switzerland, who lived in less conspicuous -abodes, opposed the proposal, and were supported by the British -Ambassador. The question was referred home, and the Foreign Office took -the common-sense view that the Ambassador should not illuminate without -necessity, but should do so rather than cause trouble or give offence. - -The early reverses of the campaign were concealed from the public with -some success, MacMahon's defeat being known at the Embassy twelve hours -before the official announcement; but as soon as the truth came out, the -population of the capital seems to have believed that the Germans would -at once appear before Paris. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Paris, Aug. 8, 1870. - - If the panic in the army is as great as it is in the capital, it is - all over with France. One would think that the Prussians were - already in Montmartre. There must, it is supposed, be a great battle - fought before they can get there, and the French may win it. - - I have been beset with Representatives of small Powers, all except - the Belgian, in consternation, and with Rothschilds and other - bankers in despair. They hope England will interfere to stop the - Prussian army on its road to Paris: not an easy task if the road is - open. - - All Gramont could or would tell me was that the Emperor was - concentrating forces between Metz and Chalons, and that a great - battle was expected. - - I was really ashamed to speak to him about our Treaty, but I thrust - your despatch on him, knowing you were anxious to avoid delay. He - said: _n'ayez pas peur, nous n'avons pas grande envie d'entrer en - Belgique dans ce moment_. - -In the Chamber, no one, even on the Right, had the generosity to say a -single word in defence of the unfortunate Emperor when a declaration was -made from the Tribune that all the disasters were due to the -inefficiency of the Commander-in-Chief. Ollivier and his colleagues -resigned, and General Trochu, who had been given an unimportant command -in the South, was hailed as the possible saviour of the country, and -offered, in vain, the War Office in the new administration of Count -Palikao. It is instructive to note that Gramont (upon whom Bismarck -subsequently heaped the most savage contempt) denied to Lord Lyons that -he had ever been in favour of war. According to him, the strongest -phrase in the declaration of July 6 was inserted at the Council on that -morning, and was not in his draft, and he threw the blame of the -imprudent haste in going to war on Leboeuf's confident declaration that -neither France nor any other country had ever been so well prepared for -war before. Leboeuf's celebrated declaration about gaiter buttons has -always been cited as almost unequalled for fatuity, but it is an -undoubted fact that Gramont himself was convinced that a Franco-Prussian -war was inevitable, and he is not known to have discouraged the idea. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Aug. 16, 1870. - - So far as we can conjecture, the military situation is very bad, and - the political is certainly as bad as can be. There are ups and downs - in the spirits of the French about the war, but the Emperor and the - dynasty seem simply to sink lower and lower. La Tour d'Auvergne[22] - speaks still as a loyal subject, but I know of no one else who does. - The Empress shows pluck, but not hope. She has sent her nieces away, - and she summoned the Bonapartes in Paris to the Tuileries yesterday, - and told them plainly that the time was come for them to look after - themselves. - - No party wishes to come into office, with the risk of having to sign - a disadvantageous peace. It is this which has hitherto kept the Left - within bounds. They wish the peace to be made by the Emperor before - they upset him. No one can tell what the effect of a victory might - be; few people expect one, and fewer still believe that the effect - would be to set the Emperor on his legs again. The Paris population - so far seems to have behaved well. - -The one thing, in fact, upon which there seemed to be general agreement -was that the Empire was doomed. - -By the middle of August the feeling in Paris against England, produced -largely by articles in the London press, had reached a very disagreeable -point, and the Ambassador was obliged to ask that he might be spared -from having to make too many obnoxious communications to the French -Government; these communications consisting of complaints put forward by -the Prussian Government through the channel of the British Embassy at -Paris, which it was really the duty of the United States Legation to -deal with. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Mr. Hammond._ - - Paris, Aug. 23, 1870. - - The last paragraph of your letter of this morning frightens me not a - little. You say the Prussians complain of a flag of truce being - fired upon and of field hospitals being shot at; and you add: 'You - will probably hear from us about these matters, if Bernstorff makes - a formal representation.' I hope this does not imply that you mean - to adopt all Prussian complaints as British, and make me the channel - of communicating them to the French Government. Please do not forget - that the United States Legation, not this Embassy, represents - Prussian interests in France, and that if you impose upon me such - works of supererogation as making unpleasant communications from - Prussia, you will expose me to well-merited snubs, and damage my - position so much that I shall be able to effect very little in a - real emergency. The particular things which you mention ought not to - be made the subject of diplomatic representation at all: they ought - to be discussed by Flag of Truce between the two Generals. - -Why H.M. Government should have taken the inexplicable course of -gratuitously offending the French Government is not explained, but at -all events the practice was abandoned. - -When, towards the end of August, it was announced that the Crown Prince -was advancing upon Paris, the Empress, the members of the Government, -and the Chambers, proclaimed their determination to stay in the town. -The Empress probably feared that if she once left, she might never -return; but the decision to attempt to govern a country from a besieged -town was so obviously unpractical that it can hardly have been taken -seriously, for it was plain that each party in turn would discover that -it was essential to be in communication with the outside world. The -Empress herself seems to have preserved her fortitude during this -unhappy period. 'I saw the Empress yesterday,' wrote Lord Lyons, on -September 1, 'for the first time since the war. She was calm and -natural, well aware, I think, of the real state of things, but -courageous without boasting or affectation. She let me know by La Tour -d'Auvergne that she would like to see me. She did not invite, nor did I -offer any advice or any assurances or conjectures as to what England or -any other Power was likely to do.' - -Within three or four days of this interview the Empress herself was a -fugitive, the Empire had collapsed without a hand being raised to defend -it, and the mob, breaking into the Chamber, had called the Third -Republic into existence. The delight of changing one form of government -was so great that the French almost forgot for the moment that the enemy -was practically at the gates of Paris, but M. Jules Favre, the Minister -for Foreign Affairs in the new Provisional Government, lost no time in -communicating with Lord Lyons and sounding him with regard to mediation. - -According to Jules Favre, the new Government had two courses of action -in view. The first was to proclaim loudly that France would fight to the -death rather than make any undue concessions to Prussia. This was the -course intended for public consumption. The second and practical course -was to accept cordially the intervention of Foreign Powers with the -object of restricting French sacrifices within endurable limits. In -other words, he thought that France ought to submit to paying the -expenses of the war, provided her territorial integrity remained intact. -As for agreeing to a cession of territory, no man in France would -venture even to speak of such a thing, and the Government and the people -were equally determined to perish rather than give way upon it. The -public, and in particular, the inhabitants of Paris were greatly averse -from any pecuniary sacrifice, but he (obviously considering himself -to be an exceptionally far-seeing statesman) felt so strongly that a -pecuniary sacrifice was necessary, that unless the principle was acceded -to, he should feel bound to leave the Government. If, therefore, foreign -Governments would offer mediation upon the basis of keeping French -territory intact, their intervention would be extremely useful and ought -to be admitted gratefully by France. If, however, Foreign Powers could -only mediate on the basis of a cession of territory, their interference -would be ineffectual and offensive, rather than agreeable to France. - -It is rather surprising, in view of this artless opinion, to learn that -Jules Favre seemed to be pretty well acquainted with the feeling in -Germany; and, at all events, he realized that the one neutral Power who -was likely to influence Prussia was Russia. It is also rather surprising -to learn that he considered the immediate proclamation of a Republic to -be a mistake, due to the impetuosity of the Paris population, and -calculated to alienate the French provinces as well as foreign -Governments, and he was forced to admit that the new Government was -completely under the control of the mob. - -On September 6, a surreptitious interview took place between Lord Lyons -and M. Thiers, who was not a member of the Government of National -Defence. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Paris, Sept, 6, 1870. - - I have had conversations to-day, both with Thiers and with Jules - Favre. They think they can bring public opinion to accept a peace - with a large pecuniary indemnity to Prussia, but they are afraid of - being thought by the populace to be begging the aid of England at - this moment: so much so, that Thiers was afraid either of coming - here or of my going to his house, and asked me to meet him at - Alphonse de Rothschild's. - - I put to him the extreme difficulty of inducing Prussia to accept - mediation without securing some cession of territory, and asked him - whether he would still be in favour of its being offered, even if - Prussia were almost certain to reject it. He considered the Pros and - Cons. On the one hand, he saw danger to France and to Europe, if the - neutral Powers should look quietly on, while France was being - destroyed, without any sort of mark of feeling, or of protest - against her dismemberment. On the other hand, he did not conceal - from himself that it might lower the authority of the other Powers, - and in some sort put a seal upon the predominance of Prussia, if - they spoke in vain and took no steps to give effect to their - language. After some consideration, however, he said he inclined - to the opinion that the offer should at all events be made. - - I told Jules Favre that Thiers had hesitated about this. He answered - at once: 'I do not hesitate for a moment. I decidedly wish the - mediation, on the basis of the integrity of our territory, to be - made, whether Prussia accepts it or not.' - - Jules Favre was very decided about the armistice. He thought France - could not herself ask for one, in her present position, but it was - plain enough (which is certainly not at all surprising) that he - would be very grateful to any neutral Power who would try to bring - one about. - - Time presses, for the Prussians may be said to be almost literally - at the gates. - - Thiers pointed out with all his clearness and eloquence the danger - to the different nations of Europe, of the predominance of Prussia, - and dwelt also a good deal upon the risk of a Red Republic, with a - foreign propaganda, etc., etc., if the present Government were - overthrown in consequence of further military reverses, or of a - disgraceful peace. He pointed out that, with the exception of - Rochefort, all the Provisional Government were Moderate Republicans - and honest men. Rochefort was, he said, very manageable and less - dangerous in the Government than out of it. He was in hopes order - would be maintained, but he did not shut his eyes to the fact that - the Government was without the means of resisting the mob of Paris, - if the mob should become excited or enraged by defeats. - - There seems to me to be a great deal of depression in Paris. People - seem to feel that an obstinate defence of the town might only lead - to its destruction and leave France more at the mercy of Prussia - than ever. They have also a great dread, that while the respectable - citizens are on the ramparts, the Reds may pillage the town. - - How all this may turn out, I do not pretend to guess. The first - days of a Revolution are generally those on which the mob behaves - the best. Hitherto everybody has behaved extremely well, and only a - few people have suffered from the unfortunate epidemic which - prevails and makes every one who cannot speak French well be taken - for a Prussian spy. - - Jules Favre has not yet announced his appointment as Minister for - Foreign Affairs, nor, I think, seen any of the Foreign Diplomatists - except me. The circular which he has prepared for Foreign Powers - is very fierce in its language, but it mentions peace, and even - pronounces the word '_traiter_' and he seems to consider it rather a - bold step towards accustoming the people of Paris to the idea of - treating while the Prussians are still on French soil. - -Lord Granville, as his letters show, was at first by no means anxious to -mediate, but altered his mind, because he was under the impression that -the change of government in Paris had made the Prussians more anxious to -treat. The French were not to be informed of this altered attitude on -the part of their adversary but were to be encouraged to put forward -'elastic' proposals, Bismarck having graciously intimated that he had -no objection to England becoming the channel of communication. The -objections to mediation were sufficiently obvious. If the basis of a -cession of territory were to be adopted, then it would be clearly -undesirable for any neutral country to attempt to exercise any pressure -upon France, and there would not be anything to be gained by such -action, for France could always obtain peace on these terms from Prussia -without foreign aid. If, on the other hand, mediation was adopted on the -basis of the integrity of French territory, there appeared to be little -or no chance of success. - -In spite of the unpromising prospects various attempts were made to -sound the views of the Prussian Government with regard to an eventual -peace on the basis of integrity of territory. The Russians were -requested by the French to make known the terms on which the latter were -prepared to treat. Communications at Berlin were made by the Italian -Government, and the meddling Beust caused it to be announced to the -Prussian Government that France would accept an armistice on the -condition of territorial integrity. As he was a _persona ingratissima_ -to Bismarck, his efforts were not likely to meet with much success, and -it was intimated to him and to the others that Bismarck reserved to -himself all discussions concerning the conditions of peace, and that the -Prussian officials at Berlin had no authority to enter upon such -matters. - -Before anything definite was decided upon as to how the Prussian -Government was to be approached, Thiers started upon his historic -mission to the Courts of the various Great Powers with the object of -enlisting their practical sympathy on behalf of France. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Paris, Sept. 12, 1870. - - The provisional Government, though the most moderate and regular I - ever heard of, is sometimes a little sudden in its movements; and - accordingly Thiers's mission was announced in the _Journal Official_ - before Jules Favre mentioned it to me, though I must do him the - justice to say that he came at an early hour for the purpose. It is - patriotic of Thiers to undertake it at his age, and with a prospect - at best of assisting to make a bitter peace just supportable. I am - glad you should hear from him the real state of things as to the - internal condition and prospects of society and Government in - France. He will also, I suppose, bring you the last word of the - Provisional Government on peace. My impression is that they will - give up almost anything to save territory; but they are, or at all - events believe themselves, capable of a great _coup de désespoir_ - rather than yield that. The Reds within are more likely to give - permanent trouble than the Prussians without. - - Some of my colleagues are I am afraid rather cross at my not setting - them the example of going off to Tours. The notion under present - circumstances seems to me most injudicious. Either the French will - make terms as soon as the enemy approach Paris, or being unable to - do so, they will stand a siege and announce a desperate resistance. - Upon this last contingency coming to pass we had better get out of - Paris as fast as we can; but if there is negotiation we may possibly - be of use here, while we could certainly be of none at Tours, to - say nothing of the absurdity of our going off under present - circumstances to Tours, without the Minister for Foreign Affairs. - -The various interviews which took place between Thiers and Lord -Granville have been described at length by Lord Fitzmaurice. In the -main, the causes of the war, as expounded by Thiers, were in accordance -with those described by Lord Lyons in the letters previously quoted, -although he seems to have unjustly laid much of the responsibility upon -the Empress, and to have unduly exalted his own prescience, having -always been obsessed with the idea that he was a military genius. As for -the form of government in France, although an Orleanist himself, he -considered that Bonapartists, Bourbons, and Orleanists were all out of -the question for the time being, and that a Republic was the only -possible solution under existing circumstances. To put it shortly, -he had started on his mission through Europe in order to obtain -intervention, and had began with England in order to persuade her if -possible to use her moral influence in securing peace. This application -was supported by much high-sounding rhetoric on the subject of the -ancient friendship between England and France, and of the necessity of -the former retaining her due ascendency in the Councils of Europe, etc., -etc., etc. Exhausted at the conclusion of his eloquent arguments, he -went to sleep, as recorded by Lord Granville, without waiting to listen -to the latter's reply, and the really practical part of the conversation -seems to have been the suggestion that the way should be paved by the -British Government for an interview between Jules Favre and Bismarck. - -On the next day Thiers proposed that H.M. Government should at once -recognize the Republic; but to this Lord Granville demurred, on the -ground that it would be contrary to precedent, and that the Republic -had at present no legal sanction, because no Constituent Assembly had -yet decided on the future government of the country. - -Upon the occasion of a third interview, Thiers's arguments seem to have -been still more forcible. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, Sept. 16, 1870. - - I called again on M. Thiers at his request to-day. He thanked me for - the letter which I had written to Bernstorff, although he thought it - might have been in warmer terms. - - He informed me of his plan to go to Petersburg, by France, Turin and - Vienna. He said that by that way he should be within reach of - telegraphic and other news, and could be recalled, if wanted. He - should go back if his concurrence was absolutely necessary to the - conclusion of peace. He admitted that it would be most painful to - sign any peace at this time; that M. Jules Favre, on the contrary, - did not dislike the notion of it. - - He spoke sanguinely of the defence of Paris: he counted the number - of armed men and the completeness of the ordnance. He gave some - credence to the report of General Bazaine's bold march. He then came - back to the subject of England's apathy: he dwelt upon the loss to - her dignity; the danger to her and to all Europe of the immense - preponderance of Germany. Austria must lose her German provinces. - What would not 60,000,000 Germans do, led by such a man as Bismarck? - I told him that I would not further discuss that matter with him, - and that his arguments went further than his demands. They were in - favour of an armed intervention. I had no doubt of what public - opinion here was on that point. He spoke of the sad task he had - undertaken, at his age, to go from Court to Court, almost as a - mendicant, for support to his country. I told him that it was most - honourable to him at his age, and after his long public life, to - undertake a task in which it was thought that he might be of use, - and that he ought not to be discontented with his mission here. He - could hardly have hoped, even with his ability, to change the - deliberate course of policy which H.M. Government had adopted, and - which they had announced to Parliament. But his second object, that - of explaining the necessity at this moment of the present Government - in France, and of the merits of M. Favre and General Trochu, and its - leading members, had had much effect upon me, and upon others with - whom he had conversed. We had also during his presence here arranged - the possibility of a meeting between M. Favre and Count Bismarck, - which if it took place (about which I was not sanguine) must, in any - case, be of some use. - - We parted in a most friendly manner. - -The offer to sound Bismarck on the question of receiving Jules Favre -was enthusiastically received by the latter, who had a strong personal -feeling on the subject. As, however, he had just concocted the -celebrated proclamation that France would never consent to yield 'a -stone of her fortresses or an inch of her territory,' he could hardly be -said to approach the question of peace in a practical spirit, nor did he -receive much assistance from his countrymen in general, for at that -period no Frenchman could be found who was willing to admit openly the -possibility of a cession of territory, whatever opinions may have been -entertained in secret. Shrewder judges than Jules Favre, who, although -able and honest, was too emotional for diplomatic work, suspected, with -reason, that Bismarck was determined not to negotiate through neutrals, -and not to negotiate at all except under the walls of Paris or in Paris -itself. - -The emissary appointed to approach Bismarck was Malet, who was selected -because he was discreet, knew German well, and was already acquainted -with Bismarck, but no sooner had he been despatched than the Austrian -Ambassador, Metternich, announced that he had received authority from -Vienna to go in company with his colleagues to the Prussian -Headquarters. Efforts were made to stop Malet, but fortunately without -success, and the private letter from the latter (extracts of which have -already been published) recounting his interview, is a singularly -graphic and interesting presentment of Bismarck's real disposition. - - * * * * * - - _Mr. Malet to Lord Lyons._ - - Paris, September 17, 1870. - - During my two interviews with Count Bismarck on the 15th he said - some things which it may not be uninteresting to Your Lordship to - know although from the confidential familiar manner in which they - were uttered, I did not feel justified in including them in an - official report. - - He stated it was the intention to hang all persons not in uniform - who were found with arms. A man in a blouse had been brought before - him who had represented that he was one of the Garde Mobile: Count - Bismarck decided that as there was nothing in his dress to support - his assertion he must be hung, and the sentence was forthwith - carried into effect. His Excellency added, 'I attach little value to - human life because I believe in another world--if we lived for three - or four hundred years it would be a different matter.' I said that - although some of the Mobile wore blouses, each regiment was dressed - in a uniform manner and that they all bore red collars and stripes - on their wristbands. His Excellency replied that that was not - enough, at a distance they looked like peasants and until they had - a dress like other soldiers those who were taken would be hung. - - He said. 'When you were a little boy you wanted your mother to ask a - lady, who was not of the best position in society, to one of her - parties, your mother refused on which you threw yourself on the - ground and said you would not rise till you had got what you wanted. - In like manner we have thrown ourselves on the soil of France and - will not rise till our terms are agreed to.' In speaking of the - surrender of the Emperor he observed, 'When I approached the - carriage in which the Emperor was His Majesty took off his cap to - salute me. It is not the custom for us when in uniform to do more - than touch the cap--however I took mine off and the Emperor's eyes - followed it till it came on a level with my belt in which was a - revolver when he turned quite pale--I cannot account for it. He - could not suppose I was going to use it but the fact of his changing - colour was quite unmistakable. I was surprised that he should have - sent for me, I should have thought I was the last person that he - would wish to receive him because he has betrayed me. All that has - passed between us made me feel confident that he would not go to war - with Germany. He was bound not to do so and his doing it was an act - of personal treachery to me. The Emperor frequently asked whether - his carriages were safe out of Sedan, and a change indicating a - sense of great relief came over him when he received news of their - arrival in our lines.' M. de Bismarck talked in the most - contemptuous terms of M. de Gramont, allowing him only one merit - that of being a good shot. He touched on the publication of the - secret treaty, but his arguments in defence of it were rather too - subtle for me to seize them clearly. He said the secret should have - died with him had France had a tolerable pretext for going to war, - but that he considered her outrageous conduct in this matter - released him from all obligation. - - 'If,' he remarked, 'a man asks the hand of my daughter in marriage - and I refuse it I should consider it a matter of honour to keep the - proposal a secret as long as he behaved well to me, but if he - attacked me I should be no longer bound. This is quite a different - question from that of publishing a secret proposition at the same - time that you refuse it; you must be a Beust or an Austrian to do - that.' - - In talking of the scheme to replace the Emperor on the throne by the - aid of Bazaine and the French Prisoners in Germany, I asked whether - His Majesty was now in a state of health to be willing to undertake - such a work. He answered that he never in his life had seen the - Emperor in the enjoyment of better health and he attributed it to - the bodily exercise and the diet which late events had forced upon - him. - - Count Bismarck spoke of Italy and appeared to think that it was in - immediate danger of Republican revolution. He said 'If,' as appeared - likely at the beginning, 'Italy had sided with France such a - movement would have broken out at once; we had everything prepared, - and could have forced on a revolution within three days after a - declaration of war.' - - On leaving him he asked me if I had a horse, saying, 'I would offer - you mine but the French are in the habit of firing on our - Parlementaires and as I have only one I cannot afford to lose it.' - -From the French point of view there was very little encouragement to -be derived from these frank and even brutal opinions, but one result -of some importance was obtained, for at the close of the interview, -Bismarck intimated to Malet 'as a friend' that if a member of the -Government of National Defence chose to come he would be happy to -receive him, and added that he need feel no anxiety as to the nature of -his reception. Upon returning to Paris, Malet gave this message to Jules -Favre at the British Embassy, and although the latter said nothing at -the moment, he proceeded shortly afterwards to Ferrières, where the -celebrated interview took place, and the opportunity of making peace on -easy terms was thrown away, for 'as an old friend' Bismarck had also -assured Malet that the Prussians were not going to ask for Alsace or -Lorraine, but only for Strasburg and Metz, as a precaution against -future attacks. - - -FOOTNOTES: - - [17] As Minister for Foreign Affairs. - - [18] French Ambassador at Berlin. - - [19] 'The Life of Lord Granville.' - - [20] Bavarian Minister. - - [21] Prussian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. - - [22] Foreign Minister. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE - -(1870-1871) - - -The investment of Paris being now imminent, the Diplomatists had to make -up their minds as to whether they should remain or leave, and the latter -course was adopted. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Tours, Sept. 19, 1870. - - I was a good deal put out at having to leave Paris. The interest is - still there: there was no danger in staying, and of course the - Diplomatists could have got the Prussians to let them through the - lines. But as soon as Jules Favre himself advised that I should go, - I had nothing to say to my colleagues of the Great Powers, whom I - had withstood, not without difficulty, for some time. At all events - I could not have stayed if they went, without exposing myself to all - kinds of misrepresentation, and presenting myself to the public and - Foreign Powers as the special partisan and adviser of the present - French Government. The Representatives of the small Powers, or most - of them, want to be able to go home when they leave Paris, and are - very much afraid of the expense and difficulty of finding lodgings - here. Well they may be: I myself spent eight hours yesterday walking - about or sitting on a trunk in the porte cochère of the hotel, and - have at last, in order not to pass the night _à la belle étoile_, - had to come to a house out of the town. - - I don't expect much from Jules Favre's interview with Bismarck, but - I am very impatient to know whether he was received, and if so, what - passed. I should be glad that Bismarck should distinctly announce - his terms, though I can hardly hope they will be such as France will - accept now. But it would be well, whatever they are, that the French - should know them, and thus get their minds accustomed to them, and - so know also what amount of resistance is better than yielding to - them. I myself think that the loss of territory and the humiliation - of France and the great diminution of her power and influence would - be great evils and great sources of danger: but, if we can have no - means of preventing them, I am certainly anxious that we should not - aggravate them by holding out hopes that our mediation could effect - a change, or rather by allowing the hopes to be formed, which the - mere fact of our mediating could not but give rise to. I have read - with great interest the accounts of your conversations with Thiers, - and have been still more interested by your correspondence with - Bernstorff on 'benevolent neutrality.' On his part it is just the - old story I used to hear in America from the Northerners: 'The - ordinary rules of neutrality are very well in ordinary wars, such - as those in which we were neutrals, but our present cause is so - pre-eminently just, noble and advantageous to humanity and the rest - of the world, that the very least other nations can do is to strain - the laws of neutrality, so as to make them operate in our favour and - against our opponents.' - - Thiers himself was expected here yesterday. Jules Favre did not - say positively that he was coming here himself, but he gave me to - understand that it was not improbable he should do so. He must make - haste, for we hear that the railway we came by is already broken up, - and all the others were impassable before. - -As Lord Lyons's departure from Paris to Tours was practically the only -action in the course of his career which was subjected to anything like -unfavourable criticism, it is desirable to point out that as far back as -August 31, Lord Granville had written to him in these words: 'I -presume that your post will be with the Government as long as it is -acknowledged; and that if the Empress and her Foreign Minister go to -Lyons or elsewhere, you would go too.' It is almost inconceivable that -any one should have advocated the retention of the Ambassador in Paris -after that city had been cut off from the outside world; some of the -members of the Government, it is true, including Jules Favre remained -there, but the _de facto_ Government of the country was temporarily -established at Tours, and when Tours seemed likely to share the fate of -Paris, the Government was transferred to Bordeaux. It was so obviously -the duty of diplomatists to remain in touch with the French Government -that the wonder is that any objection should ever have been raised, and, -as has already been narrated, Lord Lyons had been urged to move long -before he would consent to do so. The action of the Ambassador was the -subject of an attack upon him subsequently in Parliament by the late Sir -Robert Peel, which proved singularly ineffective. - -Few people had anticipated much result from Jules Favre's visit to -Bismarck, and when the latter insisted upon a surrender of territory -being accepted in principle, the French envoy burst into tears. -According to Bismarck this display of emotion was entirely artificial, -and he even accused Jules Favre of having painted his face grey and -green in order to excite sympathy, but in any case it became perfectly -plain that no agreement was in sight and that the war would have to -continue. In justice to the French it must be said that Bismarck seemed -to have made his terms as harsh in form as they were stringent in -substance, and it was difficult to conceive any Government subscribing -to his conditions; as for poor Jules Favre he had to console himself by -issuing a stirring address to his fellow-countrymen. - -Although the French public naturally began to display some impatience -and irritation at the slowness with which 'Victory' was being organized, -and to talk of Carnot, the old Republic, and the necessity of a Red -Republic if heroes were to be produced, the Tours Government continued -to hold its own fairly well; there was little trouble about the -finances; disorders were suppressed, and the arrival of Gambetta infused -a good deal of energy into the administration. After the manner of -French statesmen, Gambetta, upon his arrival at Tours, issued a spirited -proclamation, announcing _inter alia_ that Paris was impregnable, and -explaining that as the form of Government had changed from a shameful -and corrupt autocracy to a pure and unsullied Republic, success was a -moral certainty. Gambetta, who had assumed the office of Minister of -War, summoned to his assistance the veteran Garibaldi, and the arrival -of the former obviously embarrassed the peace-loving diplomatists, who -expressed regret that his balloon had not capsized on the way from -Paris. - -By the middle of October, however, the French Government began to show -signs of wiser dispositions. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Tours. Oct. 16, 1870. - - As you will see by my long despatch of to-day, I went yesterday with - the Comte de Chaudordy[23] into the questions of the '_pouce de notre - territoire_' and the '_pierres de nos forteresses_.' The fortresses - have in point of fact been tacitly abandoned for a long time, - provided the dismantling them only, not the cession of them to - Prussia is demanded. - - M. de Chaudordy said that he would tell me what was in the bottom of - his heart about the cession of territory, if I would promise to - report it to your Lordship only in such a form as would ensure it - never being published now or hereafter, or even being quoted or - referred to. - - Having received my promise and taken all these precautions, he said - that he did not regard some cession of territory as altogether out - of the question. The men at present in office certainly could not - retreat from their positive declaration that they would never yield - an inch of territory; but if the interests of France appeared to - require positively that the sacrifice should be made, they would - retire from office, and give place to men who were unshackled, and - not only would they abstain from opposing such men, but would give - them full support in signing a peace, which, however painful, - appeared to be necessary. M. de Chaudordy was convinced and indeed - had reason to know that the men now in office had patriotism enough - to act in this way in case of need, but he could not authorize me to - tell you this as a communication from the individuals themselves, - much less as a communication from the French Government. It would be - ruin to the men themselves and to the cause, if it should transpire - that such an idea had ever been contemplated at a moment like this. - For it to be carried into effect with any success, it must appear to - rise at the critical time out of the necessities of the hour. - - He concluded by reminding me of my promise that what he had said - should never be published or even referred to. - - I thanked him for the confidence he had placed in me, and assured - him that he need not have the least fear that it would be abused. I - said however at the same time that he must feel, as I did, that - however useful it might be to be aware of the disposition he had - mentioned, as entertained by the men in power, it would be very - difficult for a Government to make information, given with so much - reserve, the foundation of any positive measures. - -This criticism was sufficiently obvious. If the information was never to -go beyond Lord Lyons and Lord Granville, of what practical use could it -be? It can only be supposed that those who sent Chaudordy, intended that -his confidential communication should somehow or other reach the -Prussian Government. - -Hard upon Chaudordy, followed a man destined before long to achieve a -melancholy celebrity, General Bourbaki. General Bourbaki had been the -victim of a strange mystification, which resulted in his being permitted -to leave Metz upon a secret mission to the Empress at Chislehurst, and -when it was discovered that the whole thing was an ingenious fraud -perpetrated by one Regnier (probably with the connivance of Bismarck), -and that the Empress had never sent for him at all, he returned to -France, but was not permitted to re-enter Metz. Consequently, he -repaired to Tours and gave the Ambassador the benefit of his views. - -General Bourbaki, as a professional soldier, took a most gloomy view of -the military situation. He did not think that an army capable of coping -with the Prussians in the field in anything like equal numbers could be -formed in less than five or six months, even with first-rate military -organizers at the head of affairs, instead of the present inexperienced -civilians. According to him, the Army of Metz was in admirable condition -and might perhaps break out, but even so, where was it to go? Its -provisions and ammunition would be exhausted long before it could get to -any place where they could be replenished. As the surrender of Paris was -really only a question of time, the most prudent thing to do would be to -make peace whilst those two fortresses were still holding out, and it -would be to the interest of Prussia to do so, because if Metz fell, -Bazaine's army would disappear, and there would be no Government left in -France with whom it would be possible to treat, and the Prussians would, -therefore, be forced to administer the country as well as occupy it. The -Provisional Government, who must have had a high opinion of Bourbaki, -offered him the title of Commander-in-Chief and the command of the Army -of the Loire, but he declined the honour on the ground that he would not -be given unlimited military powers, and that nothing could be effected -under the orders of civilians absolutely devoid of military capacity. - -Another visitor was M. Daniel Wilson, who achieved a sinister notoriety -during the Presidency of M. Grévy in connection with the alleged sale of -honours, etc. Wilson's object was to urge the desirability of summoning -a Constituent Assembly without delay, as he and his moderate friends -were convinced that such a body would be in favour of peace. He himself -considered the prosecution of the war under existing circumstances to be -a crime, and he was not disposed to allow the six or seven men who had -seized upon the Government, to achieve the ruin of France. Their only -excuse for postponing the elections was the difficulty of holding them -in the districts occupied by the Prussians, but if an armistice could be -obtained, that difficulty would disappear, and an armistice of only -fifteen days would make the resumption of hostilities impossible. The -interest attaching to this visit lay in the fact that a peace party was -now actually in existence, whereas the Provisional Government at Tours, -the Ministers left in Paris, and the advanced Republicans seemed to -be still fully bent upon war _à outrance_, and as little willing as -ever to hear of a cession of territory. - -Bazaine capitulated on October 27, and shortly afterwards Thiers who had -returned to Paris from his circular tour round the Courts of Europe -proceeded to the Prussian Headquarters to discuss with Bismarck the -question of an armistice, a course of action which the Provisional -Government had agreed to, provided it were initiated by a third party. -The attitude, however, of Gambetta and his friends did not encourage -much hope of success. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Tours, Oct. 31, 1870. - - Gambetta's Proclamation and the language Chaudordy has again been - directed to hold about cession of territory, will show you how vain - it is to try to induce these people to give a negotiation a fair - chance by abstaining during the course of it from violent and - imprudent language. - - Nothing can look worse for France than things do at this moment. A - reign of terror, perseverance in hostilities until the country is - utterly ruined, a dissolution of all order and discipline in the - army, and a total disorganization of society might seem to be - threatened. I take comfort from the thought that much allowance must - be made for the first ebullition of grief and rage at the surrender - of Bazaine, and that some of Gambetta's fire and fury may be - intended to divert blame from himself for a catastrophe which he did - nothing to prevent. Anyhow things are gloomy enough, and I am - nervous and uneasy about Thiers and his mission, and should be glad - to hear that he was at least safe out of Paris again. - -The news of the capitulation of Metz was at once followed by an -unsuccessful outbreak against the Government in Paris, headed by the -well-known revolutionary, Gustave Flourens, who seized the Ministers and -proclaimed the Commune at the Hotel de Ville. The Ministers, however, -were shortly liberated by the Garde Mobile and National Guards and order -was restored without much difficulty in the course of a few hours. -Flourens, who was subsequently shot by the Versailles troops during the -suppression of the Commune in 1871, was generally regarded as the most -formidable 'man of action,' and had lately been residing in London. It -is interesting to record the impression which the wasted potentialities -of England made upon this impartial visitor. _Me voici, avec mes amis -Félix Pyat et Louis Blanc à Londres, dans ce pays d'Angleterre qui -pourrait être si grand à condition de n'avoir point ni les Lords ni la -Bible!_ One almost wishes that he had been spared to witness the -operation of the Parliament Act. - -The Paris Government, adroitly profiting by the overthrow of Flourens -and his friends, at once organized a plébiscite in the city, and emerged -triumphantly with over 500,000 votes recorded in their favour as against -60,000 dissentients. This was all to the good, as it showed that -moderate opinions were still in the ascendency, and whereas the fall of -Metz was at first received with frantic cries of rage and war to the -knife, people began to look a little more calmly on its effect on the -military situation, and hopes were entertained that the mission of -Thiers to Bismarck, which had been promoted by Her Majesty's Government, -would result in the conclusion of an armistice. These hopes were doomed -to disappointment, for after several interviews at Versailles, during -the course of which an agreement for some time appeared probable, -negotiations were finally broken off on the question of revictualling -the various fortresses, more especially Paris. - -Thiers, who had repaired to Tours after the failure of his efforts, gave -Lord Lyons in strict confidence a full and interesting account of his -negotiations with Bismarck. - -At the first important interview, which took place at Versailles on -November 1, no serious objection was raised to the proposals of the -French Government, and after a conversation which lasted two or three -hours, Thiers took his leave with good hopes for the success of the -negotiation. - -The second conference, on the following day, passed equally -satisfactorily. On Thursday, the 3rd, Bismarck kept Thiers waiting a -short time, and said that he had been detained at a military meeting -held by the King. He seemed annoyed and irritable, and indeed on one -occasion, quite lost his temper. Nevertheless, Thiers resenting this, he -apologized and assumed a civil and indeed caressing demeanour. He -asserted that _les militaires_, as he always called them, made -objections to the proposed revictualling of Paris and that they also had -some reservations to make with respect to the suggested elections. _Les -militaires_ also urged that if, as proposed, Paris were to be -provisioned during twenty-five days' armistice, those days would be -absolutely lost to the German arms, and the surrender of the town -deferred for at least that time. On being sounded as to what might be -considered an equivalent, it appeared that two or more of the detached -forts, or some other concession equally inadmissible, would be demanded. -On finding, therefore, that Bismarck was unshaken in declaring that -positively _les militaires_ would not allow Paris to be revictualled, -Thiers had no alternative but to withdraw from the negotiation and to -request facilities for communicating the result to the Government in -Paris. _Les militaires_, it will be observed, played much the same -convenient part in this affair as the King of Prussia in the arguments -used against Lord Clarendon's secret disarmament proposals. - -Upon the Paris Government becoming acquainted with these terms, Jules -Favre directed Thiers to break off the negotiations and leave Versailles -immediately; a decision which Bismarck stated caused him great regret -and induced him to suggest that elections should be held even while -hostilities were going on. He made no offer, however, of any concession -with regard to the revictualling of Paris. - -The conclusion which Thiers arrived at was that there was both a -political and a military party at the Prussian Headquarters. The -political party, with which Bismarck himself to a great extent agreed, -was desirous of bringing the war to an end by concluding peace on -comparatively moderate terms. The military party held that the glory of -the Prussian arms and the future security of Germany demanded that the -rights of war should be pushed to the utmost, and that France should be -laid waste, ruined, and humiliated to such a degree as to render it -impossible for her to wage war again with Germany for very many years. -He could not, however, discover even among the most moderate of the -so-called political party any one who seemed to ask less than the -cession of Alsace and of that part of Lorraine in which German is -spoken. It seems clear that Bismarck impressed Thiers with his sincerity -at the commencement of the negotiations, and with the belief that he was -subsequently overruled by _les militaires_, but whenever it was -suggested that the armistice had been proposed to both parties by the -neutral Powers, Bismarck showed much 'impatience and annoyance.' He -showed Thiers the letters which the Emperor Alexander had written to the -King of Prussia. They were 'warm, earnest letters,' but written as from -a friend to a friend, without in the least assuming the tone of a -sovereign addressing a brother sovereign on a matter concerning the -relations of their respective Governments. Of Great Britain, it is sad -to learn, he spoke with 'special ill-humour.' One subject upon which he -touched is not without interest at the present day. He complained -bitterly of the treatment to which the crews of captured German merchant -vessels were subjected, and said that he should give orders to have an -equal number of French non-combatants arrested and treated in the same -way. When it was mildly suggested that this would hardly be in -accordance with international maritime law, he exclaimed with some -violence: 'Who made the code of maritime law? You and the English, -because you are powerful at sea, it is no code at all, it is simply the -law of the strongest!' To this Thiers appears to have retorted that he, -Bismarck, did not on all occasions seem disposed to repudiate the law of -the strongest. - -So far as the convocation of a National Assembly was concerned Bismarck -alleged complete indifference, explaining that he had now two -Governments with which to treat, one at Paris, and the other at -Wilhelmshöhe, and although he expressed unmitigated contempt for the -Emperor Napoleon, he was nevertheless quite ready to make use of him -to attain his ends. - -During the fruitless negotiations which had taken place, first when -conducted by Jules Favre, and secondly when conducted by Thiers, the -British Government found itself in a somewhat embarrassing position. It -was perfectly sincere in desiring to bring about peace between France -and Prussia, but it was unwilling to identify itself with the one -proposal which would have had that effect, viz. the cession of -territory, and the perplexity in which the English Ministers found -themselves is illustrated by a letter from Mr. Gladstone to Lord Lyons. - - * * * * * - - 11, Carlton House Terrace, Nov. 7, 1870. - - I have seen your letter to Lord Granville in which you notice that - in a note to him I had expressed a hope you would not allow the - French to suppose we adopted their view as to integrity of - territory. - - I do not recollect the exact words to which you may refer, but I - write a line lest I should by chance have conveyed a false - impression. - - At an earlier stage of this tremendous controversy, the French took - their stand upon inviolability of soil. That ground always seemed to - me quite untenable in the case of a country which had made recent - annexations. - - The French also declared that they would surrender neither an inch - of their territory nor a stone of their fortresses. This appeared to - me an extravagant proposition, and, what is more important, I - venture to say it was thought unreasonable by my colleagues and by - the country generally. It is possible that my note may have referred - to either of these views on the part of France. - - But I am very sorry if I have conveyed to you on my own part, or by - implication on the part of any one else, the belief that we approved - of, or were in our own minds indifferent to the transfer of - Alsatians and Lorrainers from France to Germany against their will. - - On this subject, I for one, entirely concur with the opinions you - have so admirably expressed in your letter, and I should be to the - last degree reluctant to be a party not only to stimulating a German - demand of this kind, but even to advising or promoting a compliance - with it on the part of France. - - All this you will see is quite distinct from and consistent with the - desire which you and which we all entertain that the Defence - Government of France should not needlessly deal in abstract - declarations, and with a full approval of your reticence as to the - conditions of peace. - - On the failure of the armistice I think the Cabinet will disperse, - as having nothing more to consider in the present circumstances. I - cannot help feeling doubtful whether the Prussians do not lose more - than the French by the unhappy failure of the negotiations. - - We are all more grieved at the failure than surprised. - -It is difficult to read much meaning into the above involved epistle. -How, for instance, could any fortresses be surrendered without Alsatians -and Lorrainers being handed over to Prussia? Put into plain language, -the letter presumably meant that H.M. Government was anxious to remain -friends with both sides, but was afraid to make the one recommendation -to the French which would have been of any use, and hoped that the -proposal of a cession of territory would eventually be made on the -latter's initiative. - -Thiers, who in the course of his tour round the capitals of Europe had -vigorously denounced (especially to the Italians) the apathy and -selfishness of England, now intimated to the Ambassador that he was -willing to go back to London if he could contribute, by so doing, to -bring about an armistice and a peace, but received no encouragement; -partly because it was thought that the less the British Government -did, which appeared to be prompted by France, the more Bismarck might be -inclined to yield, and partly because it would cause irritation in -France, if Thiers made another formal expedition to England without -producing any marked result. - -A momentary elation was just about this time produced at Tours by the -victory of General d'Aurelle des Paladines and the recapture of Orleans, -but Gambetta does not appear to have lost his head in consequence of -this temporary success or to have attached undue importance to it. -Gambetta's opinion was that France could hold out for four months, and -that the Germans would not be able to stay so long in the country. He -told Lord Lyons that he approved of the armistice on the terms proposed -by the Government of Paris, and implied that he did, rather than not, -approve of the readiness of that Government to conclude one still, if -through the representations of the neutrals Prussia should yet be -brought to consent to reasonable terms for one. He manifested great -indignation at Bismarck's contention that there was no Government in -France, maintained that the Government of National Defence was a -properly constituted Government entitled to exercise all the powers of -the nation, and said that there was no need whatever of a Constitutional -Assembly. As for General d'Aurelle des Paladines, his hour of triumph -was soon terminated; the Prussians drove him out of Orleans, and his -failure was ascribed by the Republicans to his action in proceeding to -venerate some relics in the Orleans cathedral. - -In the meanwhile Mr. Gladstone's Government found themselves confronted -with a difficulty which had to some extent been foreseen, but which was -entirely unexpected at that particular moment. In the beginning of -November, Prince Gortschakoff issued a circular denouncing the clauses -of the Treaty of Paris which related to the Black Sea. Lord Granville -communicated the intelligence in a letter to Lord Lyons dated November -11. - - * * * * * - - Foreign Office, Nov. 11, 1870. - - The shell has fallen suddenly. I expected it, but not in so abrupt a - form. If it was to come, I am not sure that I regret the way it has - done. Do not communicate officially my answer till the Russian - Government has received theirs: the messenger leaves London - to-night. - - I am curious to hear what the Provisional Government will say. I - presume they will try to make a bargain on the subject. You will of - course explain to them that it is, at the very least, a more serious - subject for them than for us. - - The handling of the matter is delicate and difficult. We are - unanimous about the first step, more in doubt about the next. - - If Bernstorff gets permission to give a safe conduct to Odo Russell, - we mean to send him to-morrow to Versailles with our answer and a - private letter from me to Bismarck. I presume there is a private - understanding between Russia and Prussia, but it is not certain; - Bernstorff as usual was dumb, but intimated his surprise at the - form. - - He tells me that my question will be met with a negative as to - provisioning Paris: the Generals will not hear of it. If so, I shall - ask whether he will still give facilities for an election without an - armistice, and then I shall request you to press the expediency of - summoning a Chamber on the Provisional Government--always declaring - that you do not wish to interfere with the self-government of - France. - -Why it should have been assumed that the action of the Russian Government -was more serious as regards the French than ourselves, is not -particularly clear. Whatever the French Government may have said in -public on the subject, there can be little doubt that in secret they -hailed it as a welcome diversion which might be turned to advantage. If -it brought about a congress or conference, it might cause a stir amongst -neutrals resulting in a check to Prussia as well as to Russia. The -ingenious Thiers at once grasped at the possibility of forming an -European Alliance against these two Powers. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Tours, Nov. 14, 1870. - - Thiers has just paid me so long a visit that he has left me very - little time to write. His notion is that England, Austria, Italy, - Turkey and Spain should now unite with France to check the - aggression of Prussia and Russia, and he thinks that without war - this would lead to a Congress in which all Europe would settle the - terms of peace. If England lets the occasion go by, it will, in his - opinion, be she, not France, who will have sunk to the rank of a - second-rate Power. I thought my prudent course was to listen and say - nothing, which, as you know, is easy with him; for he talks too well - for one to be bored with him, and is quite content to talk without - interruption. - - He had a violent argument with Chaudordy in the presence of - Metternich and me on the subject of the elections. Chaudordy - maintains the Government view that they are impossible without an - armistice. Thiers took the other side, and at last cried out: 'They - will at least be much more free under the Prussians than under - Gambetta's Prefects!' - -In 'Bismarck, his Reflections and Reminiscences,' there occurs the -suggestive passage:-- - - 'It was consequently a fortunate thing that the situation offered a - possibility of doing Russia a service in respect to the Black Sea. - Just as the sensibilities of the Russian Court, which owing to - the Russian relationship of Queen Mary were enlisted by the loss of - the Hanoverian Crown, found their counterpoise in the concessions - which were made to the Oldenburg connexions of the Russian dynasty - in territorial and financial directions in 1866; so did the - possibility occur in 1870 of doing a service not only to the - dynasty, but also to the Russian Empire.... We had in this an - opportunity of improving our relations with Russia.' - -There can hardly be a shadow of a doubt that the denunciation of the -Black Sea clauses was what is vulgarly called a 'put up job' between -Bismarck and the Russian Government, probably arranged at Ems in the -spring; but when Mr. Odo Russell made his appearance at Versailles in -order to discuss the question, Bismarck assured him that the Russian -action had not met with his sanction and added that the circular was -ill-timed and ill-advised. (In private, he subsequently expressed the -opinion that the Russians had been much too modest in their demands and -ought to have asked for more.) As, however, the face of the British -Government had to be saved somehow, a Conference in London was -suggested, and the efforts of Lord Granville were concentrated upon an -attempt to persuade the Provisional Government of France to take part in -it. This proved difficult, for the French made it clear that they were -not anxious to do so unless they could get some advantage out of it, and -intimated that they meant to accept aid from any quarter where it might -be obtained--even from the 'Satanic Alliance,' as Thiers called it, of -Russia. One of the difficulties encountered in dealing with the French -Government arose from the discrepancy between language used in London by -the French Ambassador and that used by Chaudordy at Tours. The latter -was not a Minister and the Government consequently did not feel bound to -support him. Chaudordy himself took advantage of his anomalous position -to talk freely and to treat what he had said, according to -circumstances, as pledging or not pledging the Government, and, besides -this, the Government at Tours was liable to be disavowed by the -Government at Paris. - -How serious the situation was considered to be in London may be judged -by the following two letters from Lord Granville to Lord Lyons. - - * * * * * - - Foreign Office, Nov. 28, 1870. - - Pray exert all your influence to obtain the assent of France to the - Conference. It will of course be an annoyance to her that peace - instead of war prevails, and there is no doubt that a general - conflagration might be of advantage to her. But you may point out - that the very nature of the question almost precludes instant and - offensive war, and that hostilities distant in point of time would - be nothing but an embarrassment to her. - - With regard to the Diplomatic position, it is a great step for the - Provisional Government that Prussia has asked us to obtain her - consent to a Conference. On the other hand, it would be a severe - blow to the Provisional Government if they were left out in the - cold, while the other Powers were settling a question of so much - interest to France. - - If such an unfortunate state of things were to occur, we should do - our best to protect the dignity of France, but it would be - difficult. Do not encourage France to suggest delay. - - * * * * * - - Foreign Office, Nov. 30, 1870. - - The French are unwisely playing the same game as they did under - Gramont about the Belgian Treaty. In each case, Bismarck had the - sense to do at once what was to be done. - - It is an enormous step for the Provisional Government to be - recognized by Prussia, Austria, Turkey, Italy, and England as - capable of attending a Conference, and it will be very foolish of - them to lose the opportunity and remain out in the cold. - - As London is the place, it would be my duty to issue the formal - invitations; at least I suppose so. Do your best to persuade them. - - The Government here wish to hold their own, but are most desirous of - a prompt and peaceable solution of this 'Circular' question. - - We shall adhere to anything we say, but you will observe that we are - not rash. - - Turkey, Austria and Italy are not pleasant reeds to rest on. - - If we go to war, we shall be very like the man with a pistol before - a crowd, _after_ he has fired it off. Do not let a pacific word, - however, escape your lips. - -These two letters are a sufficiently clear indication of the highly -uncomfortable position in which H.M. Government found itself involved, -and of the urgent necessity of discovering some face-saving formula. -France being incapacitated, it could hardly be supposed that Austria and -Italy would go to war with Russia on account of a question whether -Russia should or should not maintain a fleet in the Black Sea, and -England with her ludicrous military establishments would therefore have -been left to undertake the contest single-handed, or, at most, with the -assistance of Turkey. - -Ultimately, of course, a Black Sea Conference met in London, and a -French representative, the Duc de Broglie, put in an appearance just as -it was terminating, after ineffectual efforts had been made to secure -the presence of M. Jules Favre. Lord Fitzmaurice, in his 'Life of Lord -Granville,' has elaborately endeavoured to show that the Conference -resulted in a triumph for British diplomacy. If the acceptance of a -particular form of words (of which, by the way, no notice was taken by -Count Aehrenthal when he annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in defiance of -the Treaty of Berlin), constitutes a success, then Mr. Gladstone's -Government were entitled to congratulate themselves; but as the Russians -got their way and established their right to maintain a fleet in the -Black Sea, they could legitimately claim that for all practical purposes -the triumph was theirs. - -In the course of his interviews with Thiers, Bismarck had denounced -England, and before the end of 1870 the feeling between England and -Prussia was anything but friendly. At the outbreak of hostilities -British sympathy had been almost universally on the side of Prussia, but -as the war progressed, public opinion began to veer round. The change in -opinion was due partly to sympathy with a losing cause, partly to an -impression that the Prussians were inclined to put forward unjust and -exaggerated demands, partly to the violent abuse which appeared in the -press of both countries, as well as to a variety of other causes. A -letter from Mr. Henry Wodehouse, one of the secretaries at the Paris -Embassy, shows that the Crown Prince of Prussia, whose Anglophil -sympathies were well known, deplored the tone of the German papers, and -alludes at the same time to a domestic squabble in high German circles, -thus showing that the Prussian Government as well as the French was not -entirely exempt from internal dissensions. - - * * * * * - - _Mr. Wodehouse to Lord Lyons._ - - Rouen, Nov. 16, 1870. - - On Monday morning, before leaving Versailles, I had an interview - with the Crown Prince of Prussia at H.R.H.'s desire. - - H.R.H. informed me that, at the last moment, when it was thought - that all was arranged for the Union of South Germany with the North - German Confederation, the Würtemberg Minister, instigated, it was - believed, by the Bavarian Government, had asked for a delay in order - to consult the other members of the Würtemberg Government, and had - started for Stuttgardt with this object. This sudden decision had - caused the King of Prussia and his Government very great annoyance. - - H.R.H. spoke of the hostile tone lately adopted towards England by - the German press, which he assured me, was quite contrary to the - wishes of the Prussian Government, and that he himself much - regretted it, as he feared it would give rise to a spirit of - animosity between Prussia and England. - - H.R.H. desired me to report this conversation to Lord Granville on - my arrival in England. - -As was shown in the case of the American Civil War, it is extremely -difficult for a neutral to keep on good terms with both parties, however -much it may be desired to preserve an absolutely impartial attitude. The -French blamed us because they considered that we had not rendered them -the kind of assistance which they thought was due to them. The -Prussians, on the other hand, were always discovering grievances which -betrayed our partiality. Upon the whole it is not surprising that our -attitude provoked excessive irritation on their part, for we were -continually harping on and deploring the iniquities of war, while -perfectly ready to make a handsome profit out of it by selling anything -to the belligerents. The late Sir Robert Morier admirably described the -British attitude as it appeared to German eyes. "We sit by like a -bloated Quaker, too holy to fight, but rubbing our hands at the roaring -trade we are driving in cartridges and ammunition. We are heaping up to -ourselves the undying hatred of this German race, that will henceforth -rule the world, because we cannot muster up courage to prevent a few -Brummagem manufacturers from driving their unholy trade."[24] It is only -fair to add, however, that German censure was confined to England; the -Americans, who exported arms in just the same way, were never denounced, -but possibly this was due to the fact that they assumed a less -self-righteous attitude. - -Whatever may have been Bismarck's private sentiments with regard to -England, he was not unconciliatory in public, and the various -difficulties which arose were settled satisfactorily. One of the last -unpleasant episodes was the sinking of several British merchant vessels -in the Seine by the Prussian artillery towards the close of the year, -for which compensation was demanded, and a passage in Busch's 'Bismarck' -shows his method of dealing with such matters. 'When the Germans, a -short time before the conclusion of the Preliminary Peace at Versailles, -sank some English coal ships on the Lower Seine and the English made a -row on the subject, the chief asked me (Lothar Bucher), What can we say -in reply? Well, I had brought with me some old fogies on the Law of -Nations and such matters. I hunted up what the old writers called the -Jus Angariæ, that is to say, the right to destroy the property of -neutrals on payment of full compensation, and showed it to the chief. He -sent me with it to Russell, who showed himself to be convinced by this -"good authority." Shortly afterwards the whole affair with the Jus -Angariæ appeared in the _Times_. We wrote in the same sense to London, -and the matter was settled.' - -Mr. Odo Russell, whose presence at Versailles had been utilized to -ascertain what terms of peace were likely to be granted, wrote before -the middle of December that he was convinced that Bismarck would refuse -to treat except upon the basis of unconditional surrender, and the -failure of the sorties from Paris and of the operations near Orleans -caused Thiers to lose heart, although Gambetta was as determined as ever -to continue the struggle and to postpone the convocation of a National -Assembly for as long as possible. Thiers indeed went so far as to -declare in private to the Ambassador that further resistance was -useless, and that it was a crime as well as a folly to continue it. The -last disasters of the French, which were partly due to two shocking -pieces of bad luck--the balloon which should have brought Trochu's plan -for combined action with the Army of the Loire having been blown off to -Christiania, and a sudden rise of the Marne having rendered co-operation -with General Vinoy impossible--forced the Tours Government and the -Diplomatists to migrate to Bordeaux. An offer on the part of the Foreign -Office to send a warship to that port for the benefit of the Ambassador -and his staff was declined with thanks: 'Under ordinary circumstances, I -think I am better without one, and indeed personally I should be much -less afraid of the Prussians than of the Bay of Biscay.' - -It used to be a tradition in after years that the sole perceptible -effect of the Franco-German War upon the British Embassy was that Lord -Lyons's footmen ceased temporarily to powder their hair, but to judge by -a letter to Hammond, Ambassadors suffered inconveniences as well as -humbler people. - -It is probable too that the social disorganization produced by the war -provided distinguished diplomatists, who are necessarily amongst the -most ceremonious of mankind, with some novel sensations. Upon one -occasion, when Lord Lyons had occasion to call upon Gambetta, the -Dictator was too busy to see him for some minutes, and deputed a -subordinate to make his excuses. The latter began his conversation with -the remark: 'Allons boire un bock!' a hospitable invitation hardly in -accordance with the traditions of conventional diplomacy. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Mr. Hammond._ - - Bordeaux, Dec. 12, 1870. - - Many thanks for the _Bradshaw_ and the _Times_, and very many more - for your letter of the 7th, which has just arrived by messenger. - - Not having the archives here, I cannot look up the regulations about - the expenses of an Embassy on its travels, as this is now. What I am - anxious about is that some compensation should be made to the junior - members who are with me, for the additional expense they are put to - by their migration. I am willing to do anything I can for them, but - there are of course limits to what I can afford, and it would be - utterly repugnant to all my feelings and principles, for me to have - an allowance for entertaining them. In old times, when manners and - feelings were different, this might do; but in the present day the - position of an hotel keeper for his subordinates is destructive of - discipline and comfortable relations between a chief and the members - of his Embassy. - - The difficulty of finding lodgings and the prices are much greater - than they were at Paris. I have nothing but one room for study, - drawing-room, bedroom and all; and have just been asked six hundred - pounds a month for one floor of a moderate sized house. - -The junior members alluded to included Malet and Sheffield. It had, of -course, been necessary to leave some of the staff at Paris. - -In spite of Thiers's failure to obtain an armistice, the French -Government still made strenuous efforts in the same direction and even -succeeded in pressing the Pope into their service. The latter broached -the subject to Count Arnim, the Prussian Minister at Rome, proposing -that the revictualling of Paris should be accepted as a basis, and -received a severe snub for his pains. He was informed, 'in very harsh -terms,' that the proposal could not be considered, and further, that it -was impossible to negotiate with a nation whose bad faith was -scandalously exhibited by the daily appearance in arms of French -officers who had given their word of honour not to serve again during -the war. After much haggling, the French proposals resolved themselves -into three alternatives, each of which was categorically rejected by -Bismarck. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Mr. Layard._[25] - - Bordeaux, Dec. 20, 1870. - - The difficulty of communication is between this place and England, - and arises from the utter irregularity of all trains, caused by the - movements of the troops. St. Malo has become the usual port of - embarkation and disembarkation for our messengers. - - Things are at present at a deadlock. The French want: either a peace - without cession of territory; or an armistice with the revictualling - of Paris for the number of days it lasts; or a European Congress to - settle the terms of peace between France and Germany. Bismarck - peremptorily rejects all three proposals, and does not say precisely - what his conditions of peace are. I suppose the King of Prussia - holds to taking Paris as a satisfaction to military vanity, and that - if the military situation continues favourable to Germany, he will - accept nothing much short of unconditional surrender, while Paris - resists. Of course, unless, by a miracle, Paris is relieved, its - surrender is a question of time--but of how much time? They declare - here that it can hold out without any very material suffering until - the middle of January, and for many weeks longer, if the population - will be content to live on bread and wine. But, supposing Paris to - fall, will peace be made? Here it is declared that the South will - still continue the war, and at any rate there seems to be every - probability that the violent party will not surrender its power - without a struggle. Then the financial question must soon become a - difficulty. I am told that since the investment of Paris began three - months ago, not less than thirty-two millions sterling have been - spent. It is however idle to speculate when events march so fast. I - can tell you little of the present state of the armies. Bourbaki is, - I believe, at Bourges, and Chanzy at Le Mans. I have a military - attaché,[26] Fielding, who has been with Chanzy's army during all the - affairs near Orleans and since, and who has the highest opinion of - his military talents. - - The acceptance, pure and simple, of the Conference on the Russian - question arrived from Paris the day before yesterday. - -Towards the close of December the remarkable elasticity of the French -character was manifested in a recovery from the depression which had -been produced by the failure of the sorties from Paris and the recapture -of Orleans by the Germans. The overpowering energy of Gambetta was -chiefly responsible for the creation of new armies, and the moment again -appeared unfavourable for peaceful counsels. Thiers and his party -considered that the Government was only pushing the country on to more -complete ruin, and were urgent in their call for a National Assembly. -The majority of the great towns of the South, Bordeaux included, were -against an Assembly or any interference with the existing Government, -and Gambetta and his adherents were determined to go on with the war and -keep themselves in power by all means available. Gambetta was the only -member of the Government outside Paris who counted for anything, and the -moderates were placed at a considerable disadvantage owing to Jules -Favre being detained there. - -Thiers, who had never joined the Government, prognosticated that it -would immediately come to an end upon the fall of Paris, and that a -moderate (_honnête_) republic would be established in the greater part -of the country, while Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon and other places in the -south would set up a socialistic form of government, and do an enormous -amount of harm before suppression. In the opinion of competent judges, -if the country could have been fairly polled at this particular period, -the majority (consisting of course mainly of the peasants) would have -been found to be Bonapartist, in spite of all that had taken place. The -bourgeoisie and inhabitants of the smaller towns would have shown -themselves to be in favour of quiet and security of property, and would -therefore have probably voted for the Orleanists, as the best -representatives of those principles; and the masses in the large towns -would have turned out to be republican and socialist. A genuinely free -expression of opinion would, however, have been difficult to secure, for -Gambetta's prefects were, if anything, more unscrupulous than the -Emperor's and, under existing circumstances, had greater means of -downright intimidation. - -In the closing days of 1870 fresh efforts were made by H.M. Government -to start the Black Sea Conference as soon as possible, and to persuade -the French to send a representative without delay. Under the -circumstances, it might have been supposed that they would have named -their Ambassador in London, but for some obscure reason, it was decided -that Jules Favre was the only possible man, and as he was shut up in -Paris it was necessary to obtain a safe conduct for him from the -Germans. The following letter is of interest as an impartial -appreciation of Jules Favre, and as containing some sage opinions upon -the question of the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Bordeaux, Dec. 26, 1870. - - I did all I could in favour of Tissot. He would have been a much - more convenient plenipotentiary than Jules Favre and have - facilitated the business of the Conference and the speedy - termination of it. Jules Favre is, I believe an honest and really - patriotic man--by which I mean a man who will sacrifice his own - position and interests to what he believes to be the real good of - his country. But he has not hitherto shown himself to be a good - diplomatist or a skilful negotiator, and is too much led away by his - feelings to be a good practical man of business. He will at all - events go to London with a real knowledge of the state of things in - Paris, and if he thinks the convocation of a National Assembly - feasible and advisable, will have more means than any one else of - bringing it about in spite of Gambetta. It will be good too that he - should see for himself what the real feelings and intentions of the - English Government are. He is a man, who would, I should think, be - touched by real kindness and consideration for his country and - himself in these times, and sensitive in case anything like a slight - was put upon him or them--and particularly if the situation of - France were not taken very seriously by all who approach him. He was - a fierce and even truculent orator in the Chamber, but in private - life is mild and agreeable. His power of speaking may be an - inconvenience in the Diplomatic Conference, and I fancy he is led - away by his 'verve' when he does get into a speech, and says - sometimes things more forcible than judicious. I should think he - would never himself sign a peace by which territory was yielded, but - I conceive him to be a man who would make room for others to do so, - and help them, if he was really convinced that it was necessary for - France. - - I suppose the Germans will make no difficulty about the safe - conduct: it is for their interest to have some influential member of - the Government who might enable peace to be made in an emergency, in - which Gambetta might, if unchecked, have recourse to desperate - measures. - - At this moment I think the French have recovered their hope of - making a successful resistance to the Dismemberment of the country. - I am not very sanguine after all that has occurred, but I do think - the military prospects less gloomy than they have been since Sèdan, - or at all events, since Metz. You will, I conclude, soon have a - really trustworthy account of things in Paris from Claremont. - - The Conference, I suppose, must end in Russia carrying her main - point practically, and therefore it only remains to make it as much - as possible an antidote to the scheme of raising her prestige in - Turkey, by the form she adopted, of setting the other parties to the - Treaty at defiance. I am afraid not much can be done towards this. I - should suggest a very careful consideration of the meaning of the - restoration to the Sultan of the right to open the Dardanelles and - the Bosphorus at pleasure, and a very cautious wording of the - article establishing it. Otherwise, considering the weakness of the - Porte, I am afraid the new right might become a snare and a danger - rather than a safeguard. It was so much easier for the Porte to say: - 'I cannot' in answer to inconvenient importunity, than it will in - future be to say: 'I will not.' Even under the Treaty prohibition - the Turks had not the firmness they might have had in resisting - demands for vessels to pass. I can conceive circumstances under - which it might suit them to let a Russian fleet through into the - Mediterranean, if only to be rid of it for the time in the Black Sea. - -In Busch's 'Bismarck' there are many references to Jules Favre's -emotional disposition. At the first interview which took place, a French -peasant was told to keep watch outside the house where the Chancellor -and Favre were negotiating, and the latter was unable to resist the -temptation of making a speech to his fellow-countryman. 'Favre, who had -gone into the house with the Chancellor, came out and addressed his -countryman in a speech full of pathos and noble sentiments. Disorderly -attacks had been made, which, he said, must be stopped. He, Favre, was -not a spy, but, on the contrary, a member of the new Government, which -had undertaken to defend the interests of the country, and which -represented its dignity. In the name of International Law and of the -honour of France, he called upon him to keep watch, and to see that the -place was held sacred. That was imperatively demanded by his, the -statesman's, honour, as well as by that of the peasant, and so forth. -The honest rustic looked particularly silly as he listened open-mouthed -to all this high falutin, which he evidently understood as little -as if it were so much Greek.' Bismarck entertained a well-founded -contempt for rhetoric, and Jules Favre's eloquent verbosity was to him -only an instance of the way in which Frenchmen could be successfully -duped. 'You can give a Frenchman twenty-five lashes, and if you only -make a fine speech to him about the freedom and dignity of man of which -those lashes are the expression, and at the same time strike a fitting -attitude, he will persuade himself that he is not being thrashed.' It is -probable too that Jules Favre's inability to appreciate Bismarck's -undisguised cynicism contributed to the disfavour with which he was -regarded as compared with the other negotiator, Thiers. When during one -stage of the negotiations, Jules Favre complained that his position in -Paris was very critical, Bismarck proposed to him that he should -organize a rising so as to be able to suppress it whilst he still had an -army at his disposal: 'he looked at me quite terror-stricken, as if he -wished to say, "How bloodthirsty you are!" I explained to him, however, -that that was the only right way to manage the mob.' - -Whatever the merits or demerits of Jules Favre, a disagreeable surprise -was inflicted upon both the British Government and the Government of -National Defence by a refusal on the part of Bismarck to give him a safe -conduct through the German lines. At first, difficulties were raised in -connection with alleged violations of flags of truce; but upon the issue -of a proclamation by Jules Favre, Bismarck took advantage of the -opportunity in order to prevent his departure for London on the ground -that it would imply an official recognition of the Government of -National Defence. - -At all events, he made such stipulations about the way in which the safe -conduct should be applied for, that Jules Favre with his strong -sentimental character found it impossible to comply with them, and he -was also honourably reluctant to leave Paris just before the bombardment -was about to begin. Bismarck, it is clear, was determined that he should -not go to London if he could prevent it. The meeting of the Conference -was postponed and by the time the final arrangements in connection with -it had been made, negotiations for peace had begun and it became -necessary for Favre to remain in Paris. - -At the close of 1870, the bombardment of Paris had not yet begun: the -French hopes of military success were based upon Generals Chanzy and -Bourbaki; the German terms of peace were still unknown, and there was -every sign that the extreme Republicans were disposed to break with -Favre and Trochu and to perpetuate their power by war _à outrance_ and a -_loi des suspects_, or reign of terror. The most surprising feature in -the situation was that Russia, who had been in fact an active ally of -Prussia, by undertaking to watch Austria, and had obtained nothing -whatever for France, was in much higher favour than the other blameless -neutrals, it being fondly imagined that the Emperor Alexander's -influence would be successful in obtaining favourable peace terms; and -so adroitly did the Russians play their cards, that they persuaded -Moltke that the 'malevolent neutrality' of England was the sole cause of -the continuance of the war. Such at least was the purport of a -communication which the latter made to Mr. Odo Russell at Versailles. - - * * * * * - - Bordeaux, Jan. 7, 1871. - - The French claim a success at Bapaume, but prudent people are - already speculating on what the consequences of the fall of Paris - will be. It is very generally thought that Gambetta will place - himself at the head of the ultra-Republicans, throw himself into - Lyons, or some other southern town, and proclaim war and democracy - _à outrance_. But what will Bismarck do at Paris? Will he try to - obtain a government with whom he may make a reasonable peace, or - will he promote war and anarchy with a view to ruin France utterly, - and induce her to accept a monarch from his hand? In the former case - he will perhaps either summon the old Legislative Body, or get - together some meeting of Notables, who might appoint a provisional - government to sanction a National Constituent Assembly as soon as - possible, and in the meantime to treat upon the preliminaries of - peace. The Moderates and chiefs of the old parties (except the - ultra-Republican) might be not unwilling either to attend a summons - of the old Corps Législatif, or to some other temporary body; for - they are excessively dissatisfied with their present position, and - think they see symptoms of the approach of the reign of terror and - of a violent socialistic government. - - As for Bismarck's notion of bringing back the Emperor at the head of - the captive army, it is, I suppose, very doubtful whether the - Emperor would give in to it, still more doubtful whether the - released army would, and quite certain that the country would loathe - a sovereign thus imposed upon it. If however Bismarck is bent upon - it, it must be supposed that he intends to make some concessions to - the Emperor to make his return to France palatable to the nation. If - so, Belgium will be in danger, and Holland also, and Bismarck may - return to one of his former projects of coming to an understanding - with France, through the Emperor, and dealing with the small states - just as he pleases. I suppose Russia will look after Denmark as well - as she can. These dangers may seem visionary but I don't think they - are so visionary as to make it superfluous to consider how - they may be guarded against. Hateful as it would be to the towns and - the educated classes, to have a sovereign imposed upon them by - Prussia, it must not be forgotten that the peasants are still - Bonapartists, and that a plébiscite in favour of the Empire might be - managed. - - I think I have made them feel here that you have been very friendly - and considerate about Jules Favre. - -At the opening of the year 1871, the hope of relieving Paris depended -upon the three armies which the energy of Gambetta and the Government of -National Defence had created in the North, Centre, and West, and on -paper the prospects of the French were far from hopeless, for their -forces in numbers far exceeded those of the Germans. In Paris alone -there were supposed to be something like half a million fighting men, -and the three armies above mentioned amounted to between four and five -hundred thousand men. The Germans had 220,000 men in position round -Paris, their forces in the provinces were numerically inferior to the -French armies opposed to them, and the strain upon them must undoubtedly -have been severe. The quality of Gambetta's levies, however, was unequal -to the task, and as each of the French armies succumbed in turn, the -fall of Paris became inevitable. The bombardment, which had been -postponed as long as possible, in the hope that internal disorders would -precipitate the capitulation, began in January. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Bordeaux, January 12, 1871. - - If the telegraphic intelligence which is published as having come by - this balloon is to be depended upon, the Prussians have begun the - actual bombardment of the town of Paris itself, without giving - Diplomatists, Neutrals, or any other non-combatants a chance of - withdrawing. To say nothing of other feelings, this makes me very - uneasy about the English left in the place. Most of them have - perhaps only themselves to blame for staying in despite of warning - but there must be many who had valid reasons, or were without the - means to come away. - - People are very much alarmed as to what may happen inside the town - for the last two or three days, if a surrender become inevitable. - There are two or three hundred thousand people (workmen and their - families) who have a positive interest in the continuance of the - siege, during which they are supported by the Government without - being called upon to expose themselves, or at all events without in - fact exposing themselves to much danger. - - The intention of not listening to terms of peace, including any - cession of territory, whether Paris be taken or not, is as loudly - and as positively proclaimed here as ever. I am afraid Bismarck, who - certainly does not at all understand the French character, and who - does not appear to have a very delicate consideration for anybody's - feelings, may add to the difficulties of peace by the manner in - which his conditions are propounded, as well as by the substance of - them. - - The Diplomatists here are beginning to talk hypothetically of what - they should do if one or more Governments should be set up in France - on the fall of Paris. I do not think much good comes of giving - opinions beforehand on supposed cases. It is of course clear that - the Diplomatic Body cannot go wandering about France in the suite of - any set of men, who are not beyond dispute the _de facto_ Government - of the country. And I suppose, _caeteris paribus_, if there be a - Government in the Capital that must be taken to be the Government - for the time being. It is so impossible to foresee what will happen, - that I do not ask you for instructions. - - Chaudordy on the other hand, continues to press for the immediate - recognition of the Government of National Defence by England--saying - that they do not want any fresh letters of credence to be presented, - but would be quite satisfied with a simple note declaring that Her - Majesty's Government entered into official relations with the - existing Government in France. I conclude that Gambetta urges him to - do this, with a view to strengthen the position of the National - Defence Government or of what remains of it, if Paris falls; and on - the other hand Chaudordy himself would be very glad to have obtained - some decided result during his Administration of the _extra muros_ - foreign Department. He has certainly on the whole acted with skill - in a very difficult position, and France and the Government ought to - congratulate themselves on having him to act for them. I don't think - that Jules Favre or any member of the Government would have done - anything like as well. But in France more even than in other - countries a little éclat is more appreciated than years of useful - unobtrusive labour. - - Thiers has told me in the strictest confidence that when he was at - Versailles Bismarck offered to make peace on the basis of a - pecuniary indemnity, the retention of Strasburg and Alsace, and the - restoration to France of Metz and Lorraine. They seem to have - brought the matter sufficiently into shape to be submitted to the - Government at Paris. Thiers wanted Trochu, Picard and Jules Favre to - come to him to the outposts, but, as you may recollect, only Favre - came. Thiers offered to take upon himself the responsibility and - odium of signing a treaty on this basis, if the Government would - make him its plenipotentiary, but Favre declared that it would be - impossible even to mention any cession of territory even to the - people of Paris. - - The most astonishing thing to me perhaps is the buoyancy of the - French finances. I understand that the Government have by strong - persuasion obtained from the Banque de France a new loan (it is said - of upwards of twenty millions sterling) and this will keep them - going for the present. There is already however, some difficulty in - circulating the 'bons du Trésor' even at a discount. - - I had observed the advertisements in the second columns of the - _Times_ and thought of trying to get the paper occasionally into - Paris. In fact however the advertisers have exactly the same means - of sending letters and telegrams to Paris that I have. I will - nevertheless try. No special help can be expected from the - Government. It is only by using the thinnest paper and reducing the - despatches by means of photography that they can bring them within - the weight which pigeons or secret messengers are able to carry. - -There is no reason for doubting the correctness of this important -statement made by Thiers, and it only shows how much more competent he -was to conduct the negotiations than Jules Favre, and what a much better -judge he was of the real situation than Gambetta. It would indeed be one -of the ironies of history if the failure of Picard and Trochu to meet -him at the outposts on that eventful day in November was the cause of -the loss of a province to France, and of a vast addition to the war -indemnity. - -It was not long before a succession of hideous disasters demonstrated -the hopelessness of the French situation. General Chanzy, in command of -the army of the West, although in superior force, was completely -defeated at Le Mans on January 12th. On the 19th, the Northern army -under Faidherbe was defeated at St. Quentin and ceased practically to -take any further part in the war. On the same date a sortie from Paris -on a large scale was repulsed with heavy loss, and produced amongst -other results the resignation of Trochu, a sanguinary riot in the town, -and the liberation from prison of Flourens and other revolutionaries. -The crowning misfortune was the memorable _débâcle_ of Bourbaki, one of -the most tragic episodes in modern warfare. It was evident that further -resistance was useless, and the fictions which had so long sustained the -spirits of the defenders of Paris were finally destroyed. On January 23, -the unfortunate Jules Favre presented himself at Versailles and as there -was no further question of 'pas une pierre de nos forteresses etc.,' an -armistice was finally agreed to on the 28th. Under the provisions of the -armistice it was arranged that elections should be held as soon as -possible for a National Assembly in order that the question of the -continuance of the war, and upon what conditions peace should be made, -might be decided. Jules Favre, unlucky to the last, stipulated that the -National Guards should be permitted to retain their arms, a concession -which he had cause bitterly to regret before long. - -The news of the armistice was received at Bordeaux with rather less -indignation than had been expected, but Jules Favre was loudly denounced -for not having included in it Bourbaki's army, the fact being that -Bismarck, who was well aware of the ruin which threatened the force, had -expressly refused to do so. Gambetta, while not actually repudiating the -armistice, issued violent proclamations, loudly denouncing its authors, -declaring that his policy as Minister of War remained unchanged, and -urging that the period of the armistice should be employed in organizing -the forces which were destined to free France from the invaders. These -proclamations were followed by a decree in which the liberty-loving -democrat enacted that no person should be eligible for the new Assembly -who was connected with the royal families which had hitherto reigned in -France, or any one who had served in any capacity as an official under -the Empire. This outrageous proceeding produced a protest from Bismarck -on the ground that it was a violation of the freedom of election -stipulated in the armistice, and as Gambetta continued recalcitrant, the -Paris section of the Government of National Defence, which included, -amongst others, Favre, Trochu, and Jules Ferry, issued another decree on -February 4, annulling that of Gambetta. Representatives of the National -Defence Government from Paris arrived at Bordeaux on February 6, and -upon that day Gambetta resigned the office of Minister of War, and -Emmanuel Arago was appointed in his place. As Paris was now again in -communication with the outside world, the opportunity was taken, not -only of cancelling Gambetta's decrees, but of getting rid of the -Delegation Government, of which he had been the virtual dictator. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Bordeaux, Feb. 7, 1871. - - So far as we can judge here (and we have not very good means of - judging) the moderate Conservative 'Ticket' is likely to be carried - in most of the Elections. The result would be an assembly composed - of men who in their own hearts will wish for peace, and whose - Constituents will heartily wish for it. But there is always fear of - each individually thinking it necessary to express for himself in - public heroic sentiments, and of no one being willing to bell the - cat and sign or even vote for ratifying the Treaty. Much of course - will depend upon the terms. The cession of Alsace might possibly be - submitted to, if it were distinctly apparent that it was the only - means of saving Lorraine. The terms of the Armistice would make one - hope that Bismarck is at least willing to avoid propounding - conditions unnecessarily irritating. - - Probably the most prudent thing for France to do would be to accept - anything like reasonable terms of peace at once--for every day's - delay in the departure of the German troops from the country, - retards most seriously the beginning of the recovery from the - misfortunes military, political, and financial, which are exhausting - the springs of life. It is nevertheless very probable that the - Assembly, or the Government it appoints, will make a solemn official - appeal to Europe for its mediation. They may also ground a special - appeal to Europe on the plea that the people of the Provinces to be - ceded, ought to have a voice in the matter. In fact they have much - to say to Europe, to which it will be difficult to make an answer. - Bismarck, however, seems to be ready to snap his fingers at Europe. - - Chaudordy naturally declines as far as possible the responsibility - of talking or taking any measures, as he is now the servant of a - Government, whose existence will probably end in a few days. - Privately he urges strongly, with a view to public opinion in - France, that England should be very prompt in recognizing officially - the Government appointed by the Assembly. In this I think he is - right. - - Prudent men (Thiers included) appear to think that at all events as - a temporary measure, a moderate republic, as the form of Government - least likely to produce dissension should be adopted. Indeed, of the - various pretenders, no one I suppose would wish to be in any way - responsible for such a peace as must be concluded. Some people - indeed apprehend that the Assembly may be too conservative, or as it - is called, reactionary, but I don't think this need give any one but - the Rouges the least uneasiness. - - The appearance now is that Gambetta will not go beyond legal - opposition, and that he will content himself with putting himself at - the head of the ultra-democratic and '_guerre-à-outrance_' party in - the Assembly. In fact there is no symptom that an attempt to set - himself up, by the aid of the mob in the great towns, in opposition - to the Assembly would have any success. He is not himself by - character inclined to such courses, but he has people about him who - are. - - Jules Favre is fiercely attacked first for having concluded an - armistice which did not comprehend the Army of the East, and - secondly for not having mentioned this exception when he announced - the armistice to the Delegation here. This last proceeding (which I - attribute to his want of business-like habits), is of course utterly - indefensible. It may however have been rather convenient than - otherwise to Gambetta, as it enables him to attribute to this cause - the flight into Switzerland, which I suppose, the Army of the East - must at all events have been driven to. The attack against him for - not surrendering Paris at discretion, and stipulating nothing for - the Provinces, seems to me to be more unfair--for what would the - Provinces have said if he had let loose upon them the forces, which - after the occupation of the forts might have been spared from the - German Army round Paris. - - Barring accidents, there seems reason to hope that we shall tide - over the time to the meeting of the Assembly next week, pretty - quietly. - - At all events the suspension of the bloodshed and other horrors is a - relief which I feel every moment. Four Prussian shells fell into the - small convent near the Val de Grace at Paris in which I have a - niece--but providentially neither she nor any of her fellow nuns - were hurt. - -The elections to the new National Assembly took place on February 8, all -political groups participating, and resulted more or less in accordance -with general expectation. In Paris, where there were many abstentions, -extreme men like Louis Blanc, Victor Hugo, Gambetta and Rochefort were -returned, and the example of Paris was to some extent followed by the -big towns, but the general tone of the Assembly proved to be -conservative, and almost reactionary, the sole question submitted to the -candidates having been that of Peace or War. In effect, the feeling -apparently predominant in the minds of the majority of the electors was -aversion from the Government of National Defence, a feeling naturally -accentuated by the recent crushing disasters, and the result was to throw -discredit upon the Republican system of Government with which the -Ministers were identified. But although the Assembly was in reality -anti-Republican it was not the opinion of experienced politicians that -it would be advisable to proclaim a monarchy; still less, that any one -of the rival dynasties should be called immediately to the throne. On -the contrary, they considered that a republic, moderate in its -principles, and perhaps tacitly understood to be only temporary, would -best promote union for the present, and that under such a form of -Government it might be easier to obtain a ratification of such a peace -as appeared to be possible, and to carry the painful measures necessary -to give effect to it. It was also thought that if a monarchy were to be -established it would have a better chance of enduring if the dynasty -postponed its accession until the wounds from which the country was -suffering should begin to heal, and that the all-important choice of a -sovereign should be postponed to a calmer period. So far as could be -judged, if a dynasty were decided upon at all, the chances appeared to -be in favour of the House of Orleans, but there were nevertheless, -amongst the members returned, between one hundred and fifty to two -hundred Legitimist supporters of the Comte de Chambord, and not a few -Bonapartists. - -As for the all-important question of peace or war which the Assembly was -to be called upon to decide, it was evident that the majority of the -electors, in voting against the existing Government, intended to vote at -the same time for peace, and therefore the majority of the members -entered it with pacific intentions; but they were not prepared to vote -for peace at any price, and although conditions which would have been -scouted two months earlier were now considered to be worthy of -discussion, the exaction of immoderate and humiliating demands might -again arouse the spirit of desperate resistance, especially when argued -under the excitement produced by heated parliamentary debates. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Bordeaux, Feb. 10, 1871. - - Thiers, Dufaure, and Grévy are likely, so far as one can judge, - without knowing the result of the Paris elections, to take the lead - in the National Assembly. Grévy is avowedly a moderate Republican, - and the two others are for a moderate Republic, as a transitional - government to prepare the way for a Constitutional Monarchy. Such, - at least, are certainly Thiers's views, but I am speaking rather - without book about Dufaure. - - What I am most afraid of is that Bismarck's conditions may be so - hard as to turn the really pacific Assembly into a war _à outrance_ - one. The war could not in all probability go on long, but it might - give us three months more of bloodshed, destruction and misery, and - add to the difficulty of establishing eventually a good government - here. An Assembly elected two months ago would have been very - different from the present one, supposing one could have been - elected at all; but, two months ago, Gambetta would have been strong - enough to reject the armistice and refuse to convoke the Assembly. - His entourage had even now prepared warrants for arrest of his - colleagues, with a view to his assuming the Dictatorship and going - on with the war without an Assembly, but he is wiser and less wicked - than they. He will probably make a vigorous leader of the violent - Republican opposition in the Assembly. - - Of course under present circumstances I have nothing to do but to - stay here, as it will be for the present the seat of government. It - will be a comfort to have a whole real government, and not half a - one, to deal with. - - Chaudordy has at last come round to the opinion that a - plenipotentiary should be named to the Conference, simply to speak - for France on the Black Sea question, without any _arrière pensée_ - about bringing in other matters. He said he would telegraph as well - as he could _en clair_ to let Jules Favre know this. Bismarck will - not let telegrams in cypher through, and there are no more pigeons. - - What the French are craving for is some open, patent sympathy and - support from us. They would give us comparatively little thanks for - taking unostentatious steps in their favour with the Germans, though - such steps were much better calculated to obtain something for them. - -The extreme desirability of showing some evident sign of sympathy with -France was impressed upon Her Majesty's Government who were urged to -lose no time in doing so, with a view to the future relations between -the two countries. The French, who certainty are not less prone than -other nations in seeking to attribute a large share of their misfortunes -to the shortcomings of other people, were inclined to put the blame of -their calamities and disasters as much as possible, upon the Neutral -Powers, who had not interfered actively in their defence; and England, -who had certainly exerted herself more than any other Power in seeking -practical means for making peace attainable, was very unjustly singled -out for peculiar obloquy. This feeling had arisen partly because the -long alliance between the two countries had made the French expect more -from England than from others; partly because other Powers had -ingeniously represented that their own inertness had been caused by the -unwillingness of England to come forward, and had also, on various -occasions, put England forward as the leading Power among the Neutrals, -in order to give her the greatest share of the unpopularity which -accompanies neutrality. French feeling was, therefore, at the time -highly irritable on the subject of England, and it was suggested that a -good impression would be created if Her Majesty's Government would be -very prompt in recognizing whatever Government were adopted by the new -Assembly, even if it did not assume a permanent character. Another -suggestion was, that if the terms offered by the Germans appeared -unendurably hard, the French might make an appeal to the rest of Europe; -that appeal would probably take the form of a request for the mediation -of the Great Neutral Powers, or for the assembling of an European -Congress, and an immediate compliance on the part of England with either -of these requests would go far towards re-establishing good feeling. -Even if Germany rejected all intervention, this would not affect the -impression made by the action of England in responding to the appeal of -France, and although more could probably be obtained by the exercise of -quiet and unostentatious influence upon Germany, yet nothing that might -be obtained in that way would have anything like the same value in the -eyes of France as an open declaration of sympathy with her and an avowed -advocacy of her cause, even if no practical result followed. In short, -what was required, at that particular moment, was a policy of -sympathetic gush. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Bordeaux, Feb. 16, 1870. - - Your telegrams announcing that you have adjourned the Conference, - and that I may recognize the new Government immediately have been a - great satisfaction to me. I hope we shall bring French feeling round - to its old cordial state, if we can give them a little patent - sympathy in their misfortunes. The Commercial Treaty will be a - trouble hereafter, but it was in great danger even before the fall - of the Empire, and I hope will be let remain quiet until the time - approaches for giving the notice next February. - - I had a confidential conversation with Thiers last night. He seems - to have taken already _de facto_ the direction of affairs, and will - probably be given it _de jure_ by the Assembly to-morrow. He is very - anxious to keep the three fractions of the Chamber who are for order - at home and for a reasonable policy about peace together, in order - to resist the Reds. He means therefore to take moderate Republicans, - Legitimists and Orleanists into his Ministry. Jules Favre is to be - his Minister for Foreign Affairs, and there will of course be - moderate Orleanists and Legitimists. If Thiers can succeed in - getting the united support of Orleanists, Legitimists, and moderate - Republicans, he expects to have a working majority of nearly - three-quarters of the Assembly. I suppose his difficulty will arise - from the impatience of the Orleanists, who are believed to have - nearly half the seats in the Assembly, and who are impatient and - hungry after their long deprivation of the sweets of power. - - Thiers told me that he should take great pains to select men of - station and ability for his diplomatic appointments. In furtherance - of his policy of conciliating all parties, he supports M. Grévy, a - moderate Republican, for the Presidency of the Assembly. - - I like Jules Favre and have a good opinion of his character, but I - don't think that he has hitherto shown himself to be skilful as a - diplomatist or a negotiator. Thiers says however that he now gets on - extremely well with Bismarck. There is however a very general - opinion that Thiers means to go himself to Versailles to negotiate - the Peace. He did not give me to understand that he intended to do - so, and there are serious inconveniences in the head of the - Government's being away from the Assembly and the centre of affairs, - to say nothing of the ordinary objections to the chief of a - Government conducting negotiations in his own person. - - The feeling in the Assembly yesterday when Alsace and Lorraine were - mentioned was strong and universal, and gives reason to doubt - whether they will even now be brought to vote a cession of - territory. In that case I suppose the only remedy would be a - plébiscite, if a cession of territory is absolutely insisted upon. - The Assembly might refer the question to the people, and I suppose - that, in their present mood, the great majority of the population - voting secretly, would vote Peace and not War, and that the vote - might be taken in a very short time. I don't know however what the - Germans would say to the notion, and I don't think such a plan of - throwing off the responsibility worthy of the Assembly, or a happy - precedent for Parliamentary Government. - - Of what Thiers means to do respecting the definitive government of - the country, he gave me no hint. His present policy is to try and - get France out of her present straits by the united help of all the - reasonable parties, and not to give any indication as to the future - which might have the effect of alienating any of them. - -As had been expected, Thiers proceeded himself to Versailles to -negotiate the Peace preliminaries. He was obviously the person best -fitted to do so, for he was at once the most moderate and capable -amongst Frenchmen, the least unwilling to make terms in conformity with -the exigencies of the situation, and the only man in a position to carry -his way in the Assembly. - -On February 26, the preliminaries of Peace were signed and contained -even harsher conditions than had been anticipated, but the military -position of France was so absolutely hopeless that resistance to them -was impracticable. The war indemnity was reduced from six milliards to -five, but this constituted the sole success of the French negotiators, -unless the formal entry of the German troops into Paris might be taken -as a somewhat barren substitute for the restoration of Belfort; certain -matters of detail, chiefly connected with finance, were postponed for -future consideration at Frankfort. - -In view of what has already been written respecting the secret -negotiations which took place during the campaign, it is impossible not -to be struck with the heroic folly displayed by the French in the latter -stages of the war. If it is true that their gallant struggle under the -stimulus of Gambetta and the Government of National Defence inspired the -admiration of the world, it is equally obvious that human life and -treasure were ruthlessly wasted in a hopeless cause. Bismarck, it is -well known, was strongly opposed to any accession of territory, beyond -what was absolutely necessary, and would have much preferred a pecuniary -compensation. If, instead of following the lead of Gambetta, the -counsels of Thiers had been adopted, peace would have been made long -before the fall of Paris became imminent; millions of money would have -been saved, thousands of lives would not have been uselessly sacrificed, -and Lorraine would have remained French instead of becoming the chief -contributory cause towards undying hatred of the German people. - -Thiers returned to Bordeaux upon the accomplishment of his melancholy -mission, and a debate took place in the Assembly on the question of the -ratification of the Peace preliminaries. The discussion gave opportunity -for much recrimination and for much display of emotion, especially on -the part of Victor Hugo, but Thiers's success was a foregone conclusion -and the Peace preliminaries were accepted by 546 votes to 107. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Bordeaux, March 2, 1871. - - I suppose we may say peace at last. I hear that the discoveries made - by the Committees on the Military Forces and on the Finances were so - overwhelming, as to convince every member that defence was - absolutely impossible. This reduced the debate yesterday to mere - idle vapouring on the part of the Opposition. One speech was simply - absurd--that of Victor Hugo. The rest were perhaps fair speeches, - but there was no eloquence worthy of the occasion, and there was an - evident unreality about the Opposition. The majority had determined - not to speak. Thiers's few words were very telling; no one but - Thiers could have got so many to vote; the fear was that a great - number would abstain from voting, and so the Ratification would - either not be carried at all, or be carried by too small a majority - to pledge the country. - - Chaudordy did not vote, he hankered to the last after an appeal to - the Neutral Powers. Even supposing the Germans would have given time - by prolonging the Armistice, which they certainly would not, I don't - think France would have gained anything by the appeal. Either - Bismarck would have peremptorily refused to let the Neutrals have - anything to say; or, if, _par impossible_, he had made some - concessions, he would in return of course have required them to - acquiesce explicitly in his other terms; and this, I think, would - have been as bad for France, and worse for the dignity of the - Neutrals themselves, than the present state of things. At least we - are free from any sort of sign of approval of the monstrous - conditions Prussia has imposed by sheer force. - - How France is to be governed, and how the milliards are to be paid, - are hard questions. The majority of the Assembly, which is decidedly - anti-republican, hardly expects to establish a Government to its - taste, without some actual fighting with the Reds in Paris and other - large towns. It therefore does not at all like the idea of moving - the Assembly to Paris. Thiers, I think, wishes to go to Paris, or at - least to move the Assembly to some place near enough to enable the - Executive Government to be carried on in Paris. The inconveniences - of the present roving system are manifold; and I cannot help - thinking that the sooner the Government settles in the Capital, and - has its fight (if fight there really must be) with the Mob over, the - better. - - As to what the New Government is to be, there would, with the - present Assembly in its present mood, be, one would think, little - difficulty in getting a large majority for a Monarchy, if the fusion - between the Legitimists and the Orleanists were once decidedly and - irrevocably made, and I suppose the Moderate Republicans would not - hold aloof from such a Government, provided it was _bonâ fide_ - parliamentary. Thiers, I believe, still thinks that for the present - a Moderate Republic is the best compromise between all opinions, and - the form of Government which least disunites Frenchmen. He has now - immense influence, but the claimants of the throne and their - supporters in the Assembly seem to be already impatient; and Thiers - will have nothing but painful measures to bring forward, and will be - accused of desiring to perpetuate his own power. - - I am afraid our Commercial Treaty is in the greatest danger. With - Thiers as head of the Government and as Minister of Finance, and the - popular feeling hostile to free trade and not in good humour with - England, it will be strange if we hold our own about the Treaty, or - a liberal tariff in France. It was indeed very doubtful whether the - Treaty could be maintained even under the Constitutional Empire. - - Grant's Message has for the moment turned the wrath of the French - from the Neutrals to the Americans. It is strange that the - Americans, who are so abominably thin skinned themselves, never show - the least consideration for the national feelings of other Peoples. - The French are, of course, peculiarly sensitive at this moment, and - prone to resent anything like a demonstration of disregard for them. - I am truly thankful that you stopped Walker's entering Paris with - the Germans. - - I have not been able to speak to Thiers since he came back, but I am - going to present my letters of Credence to him this evening. - -The harshness of the peace conditions shocked Lord Granville, who -thought them not only intolerable to France, but a dangerous menace to -the sacred idol of free trade. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ - - Foreign Office, March 1, 1871. - - _Vae Victis_ indeed! How hard the conquerors have been, and what a - mistake in a great country like Germany to give up all direction of - its affairs to one bold unscrupulous man! - - We do not believe in France being able to bear the burden which has - been put upon her. - - I presume one of the results will be to put protectionist duties on - all imported articles. I do not think we should complain much. We - shall lose to a certain degree, but infinitesimally as compared with - France. You had better, in conversation with Thiers, and others, say - that you shall regret it on French account. They want money, which - is to be chiefly got in England. Here, rightly or wrongly, we - believe that protective duties are most injurious to the revenue to - which money-lenders look for their interest. If it is known that - Thiers means to go in for large armaments and for protection, - self-interest will shut up the hoards here. - -Peace having now at length been assured, there arose the question of -where the new Assembly was to establish itself, and as there was an only -too well-founded suspicion that Paris was no place for a conservative -chamber with a hankering after a monarchy, Versailles was eventually -selected. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Bordeaux, March 6, 1871. - - Thiers asked me yesterday whether I thought it would be advisable - for him to bring the state of affairs between France and Germany - before the Conference in London. - - I did not very well see what there was to submit to the Conference, - as the preliminaries of peace were signed and could not be altered. - I thought it however better to avoid any discussion on this point, - and to say decidedly that in my opinion it would be very unadvisable - to do anything of the kind. I told him that I thought it would be a - particularly bad opportunity to take, if he wished to consult the - European Powers; that the German Plenipotentiary would say, and say - with reason, that his Government had entered into a Conference for a - specific purpose and was not to be entrapped into an extraneous - discussion, that in this view he would no doubt be strongly - supported by the Russian, and that probably none of the - Plenipotentiaries would approve of a proceeding, which would - certainly retard the business for which the Conference had met, and - might very likely break it off altogether. - - I think Thiers rather asked my opinion pour 'l'acquit de sa - conscience,' than from having himself any strong desire to attempt - to bring his affairs before the Conference. At any rate he gave a - very conclusive argument against doing so himself, for he said that - it might have the effect of delaying the Prussian evacuation of the - neighbourhood of Paris. - - He hopes to get the half milliard necessary to get the Prussians out - of the forts on the North side of the Seine, before the end of the - month. He speaks altogether more hopefully of the financial - prospects than any one else whom I have heard. He says Bismarck was - extremely hard about the money, and that the negociation was nearly - broken off altogether on the question of Belfort. On this question - he believes Bismarck was with him, and had a tremendous fight to - obtain leave from the Emperor and Moltke to make the concession. - Strange as it may appear Thiers seems really to have a sort of - liking for Bismarck personally, and to believe that if he had been - let have his own way by the _militaires_, he would have been much - kinder to France. - - It has been generally supposed that the Assembly will adjourn to - Versailles, and St. Germain has also been mentioned; but Thiers told - me yesterday that he should himself propose Fontainebleau. He would - like himself to take it to Paris, as soon as the Prussians are out - of the forts, but the majority will not hear of putting themselves - so near the Belleville mob. I think it will be a great mistake not - to go to Paris, and I hope Thiers will pluck up a spirit, and carry - his point. He said something about being glad to have me near him at - Fontainebleau, but I do not know that it was more than a compliment. - At any rate I am myself strongly of opinion that the best thing for - me to do is to go to Paris as soon as possible, and re-establish the - Embassy there on the normal footing. If there should be (which I - doubt) any necessity for my going to Thiers or Fontainebleau or - elsewhere for more than a few hours at a time I should still propose - to have the headquarters of the Embassy in the Faubourg St. Honoré - and to treat my own occasional absence as accidental. In fact to act - as I did when invited to Compiègne in the Emperor's time. I hope to - be in Paris by the end of this week, or at latest, the beginning of - next. - -The Ambassador and his staff returned to Paris on March 14, finding the -Embassy quite uninjured, no traces of the siege in the neighbourhood, -and the town merely looking a little duller than usual. They were -enchanted to be back, and little suspected that in three or four days -they would again be driven out. - -Previous attempts on the part of the Red Republicans to overthrow the -Government of National Defence during the siege had met with failure, -but Favre's stipulation that the National Guards should be permitted to -retain their arms gave the Revolutionary Party its opportunity. The new -Government was obviously afraid to act, and matters came to a crisis -when an ineffectual and half-hearted attempt was made to remove some -guns which had been seized by National Guards. Regular troops brought up -against the latter refused to fight and fraternized with their -opponents; two generals were shot under circumstances of great -brutality, a Revolutionary Central Committee took possession of the -Hotel de Ville and proclaimed the Commune, and the Government withdrew -such regular troops as remained faithful to Versailles. On March 18, the -insurgents were completely masters of the right bank of the Seine, and -on the following day an emissary from the French Foreign Office appeared -at the Embassy with the information that the Government had been forced -to retire to Versailles, and that as it was no longer able to protect -the Diplomatic Body at Paris, it was hoped that the Representatives of -Foreign Powers would also repair to Versailles with the least possible -delay. Nearly all of these did so at once, but Lord Lyons with his -pronounced sedentary tastes had had quite enough of moving about and -decided to wait for instructions. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Paris, March 20, 1871. - - We are in a strange state indeed. How it will end, who shall say. - The Prussians may be glad of a chance to wipe away the absurdity of - their three days' occupation by a more serious entrance, and it may - suit their rulers to put down Belleville, with a view to checking - the progress of Republicanism. I should think however it would be - wiser of them with their hatred of France, to leave the Parisians to - accomplish their own ruin. - - A good many National Guards have gone out towards Versailles, - whether with the view of making a serious attack on the Government - and the Assembly remains to be seen. It seems to be doubtful whether - there are _any_ troops, except perhaps the Papal Zouaves on - whom the Government can depend. - - The proclamations of the Central Committee in the _Journal - Officiel_, which I send you officially, are worth reading. They seem - to me to be in form much more calm, dignified and sensible than the - proclamations of the Government of National Defence used to be. In - substance they are not specimens of political knowledge and wisdom. - - It is to be hoped that the Assembly will not make matters worse by - violent and ill-considered resolutions. I suppose it will be furious - with Thiers for having brought it to Versailles, and it is on the - cards that it may be really attacked there to-day by the Parisians. - Any way, I should not be at all surprised if the Assembly - transferred itself to some dismal French provincial town. - -Instructions, however, were shortly received to proceed to Versailles, -and he betook himself there on the 21st, taking with him Wodehouse and -Sheffield, and leaving Malet, Colonel Claremont, Lascelles,[27] and -Saumarez[28] at the Embassy. - -At Versailles complete ignorance appeared to prevail as to the actual -situation; Jules Favre knew nothing, and either the Government had no -plan or was not prepared to disclose it; but, as, at all events, during -the early stage of the conflict, railway communication with Versailles -was not interrupted, it was possible to come up to Paris occasionally at -the risk of being seized by the Communists as a spy, and see how matters -were progressing. - -Thiers, in the early days of the Civil War affected to believe that the -revolt would speedily be brought to a satisfactory termination, and the -knowledge that he personally was largely responsible for the existing -situation doubtless prompted him to minimise the danger as much as -possible. By withdrawing the regular troops to Versailles, he had left -the well-disposed inhabitants of Paris at the mercy of an armed -revolutionary mob, and if a renewed bombardment or fresh Prussian -occupation of the town was the result, the fault would have been largely -his. The Assembly too found itself in a ridiculous position; it had been -brought to Versailles because it had been represented that the -Administration could not be carried on away from the capital, and no -sooner did it arrive at Versailles than the whole Government was driven -out of Paris. - -The optimism with which Thiers viewed the progress of events in Paris -was not shared by onlookers at Versailles. They could not help seeing -that the members of the Central Committee were continually gaining -ground, and had now obtained control of the whole or very nearly the -whole of the city: that the slaughter of the 'Men of Order' in the Rue -de la Paix on March 22, had left the Red Republicans the masters of the -day, and that the communal elections on March 26, had given a semblance -of regular authority to the revolutionaries. Thiers, who had taken the -whole management of the affair into his own hands, and was still -unwilling to use force, now endeavoured to conciliate the Communists by -a proclamation conceding complete recognition of the municipal -franchise, the right to elect all officers of the National Guard, -including the Commander-in-Chief; a modification of the law on the -maturity of bills of exchange, and a prohibition to house owners and -lodging-house keepers to give their lodgers notice to quit. These -concessions to blackmail were, however, considered insufficient by the -implacable revolutionary leaders, and negotiations broke down when it -was demanded that the Communal Council should supersede the Assembly -whenever the two bodies might come into collision, and that the control -of finance should be vested in the former. It was evident that civil war -could no longer be avoided, and in view of the doubts which existed -respecting the reliability of the army at Versailles, the gravest -apprehensions were felt as to the result of the struggle. Lord Granville -was convinced that the Prussians would re-enter Paris and restore the -Empire, although the Emperor, while praising the Prussians in the course -of a conversation with the Duke of Cambridge, had recently stated that -no one could remain in France who was brought there by the enemy. - -On March 28, the Commune was proclaimed with much pomp and emblematic -ceremony in which Phrygian caps were conspicuous, and a series of -decrees appeared shortly in the _Journal Officiel_, which announced the -abolition of conscription, but the compulsory enrolment of all -able-bodied men in the National Guard; a remission of lodger's rents; -the suspension of the sale of all articles deposited in pawn; and the -supersession of the Government at Versailles. A vast number of persons -quitted the city before the end of the month, and of those who remained, -there were probably many, who, apart from their political sentiments, -heartily welcomed so convenient a release from embarrassing liabilities. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Versailles, March 30, 1871. - - The Commune are going ahead in Paris. The great comfort the - Government and the Assembly here have, is that the similar movements - in other great towns have failed, and that thus it is plainly Paris - against all France. Their great hope appears to be that the members - of the Commune will quarrel among themselves, and that their social - measures may be so thoroughly socialist, as to rouse resistance - among the Parisians. In the meantime however the delay seems - dangerous; the working classes are said to be going over more and - more completely to the Commune, and the effect of a completely - successful revolution in Paris on the other towns may yet be - serious. Bismarck is said to have given Thiers a limited time (a - fortnight or three weeks) to set things straight, and to have - declared that, when that time is up, the Germans must step in. - -As a matter of fact, the conduct of the Germans does not seem to have -left anything to be desired. They allowed the numbers of the French -troops, which had been fixed under the armistice at 40,000, to be -indefinitely increased: they gave facilities for the return of the -prisoners in Germany, and even gave the French Government to understand -that the assistance of German troops might be counted upon if necessary. -Tact is not generally supposed to be a marked German characteristic, but -Thiers admitted to Lord Lyons that the 'offer had been made with so much -tact and delicacy, that, while of course it could not be accepted, the -Government had been able to pass it by, without appearing to understand -it.' - -In the meanwhile, in spite of much dissatisfaction, Thiers was determined -not to be hurried, and both he and Jules Favre declined to believe -either that there was any danger of excesses being committed at Paris, -or that the Commune was gaining strength in consequence of the delay. -These opinions were not in the least shared by the public at large; the -general impression being that each day's delay added to the strength of -the Commune, discouraged the party of order and increased the -exasperation of that party against the Government and the National -Assembly; it was believed too that if excesses were committed they would -inspire the well-disposed citizens with terror rather than with a spirit -of resistance. - -Fortunately for the cause of order, the Communists soon afforded an -opportunity for testing the temper of the Versailles troops. On April 2, -the National Guards came into collision with the regulars at Courbevoic, -were heavily worsted, and such prisoners as were taken were summarily -shot. The engagement showed that the army could be depended upon, and -that there need be no further fears with regard to a policy of resolute -repression; nevertheless there was little sign on the part of Thiers of -following up the success that had been gained, and he made the -remarkable excuse that the military ignorance of the insurgents and the -eccentricity of their movements rendered military operations against -them correspondingly difficult. Little progress had been made towards -the end of April, although righteous retribution had overtaken Thiers in -the invasion of his house in the Place St. Georges, and in the violation -by National Guards of the sanctity of the apartment of his -mother-in-law. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Versailles, April 21, 1871. - - I suppose we shall get back to Paris, or to the ruins of it, some - day; and certainly the affairs of the Commune are looking more - gloomy than they did, but I must leave to Thiers the responsibility - of the perpetually renewed declaration that we shall be there in a - few days. The sooner it comes the better, for the delay is very - dangerous for Thiers himself and for the country. The great towns in - the south will hardly be kept under if Paris remains in rebellion - much longer, and Thiers will find it very difficult to hold back the - monarchical majority in the Assembly. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Versailles, April 25, 1871. - - I don't hear any guns, but I suppose after what Thiers said to me - last night, that the grand attack upon Fort Issy is going on. I - shall go or send to some safe point of view, as soon as I get the - Messenger off. - - It was high time to begin, for the apparent weakness of the - Government is producing lamentable effects. Colonel Playfair's - reports of the spread of a very serious insurrection in Algeria are - confirmed by recent telegrams, and there is said to be rather an - alarming movement in Savoy, not with a view to reunion with Italy, - but rather to a junction with Switzerland. - - I do not trouble you with any of the programmes for the attack on - Paris which are in everybody's mouth here. The favourite notion is - that, with or without getting their half milliard, the Germans are - to give up the forts, or all of them except St. Denis, to the - French; who are then either to attack Paris on the north, or to - complete the investment of it. Military big-wigs say that Thiers has - not men enough to carry out such a plan. Financial authorities say - that he has no chance of obtaining the money till he is already - master of Paris; and Jules Favre says positively that Paris will not - be bombarded or blockaded. The value to be given to this affirmation - of Jules Favre cannot go beyond there being no _present_ intentions - to make a regular general bombardment or to reduce the place by - famine. I urge him and Thiers to give warning in time to enable - foreigners to withdraw, but I doubt the foreigners getting any - warning beyond that which Malet has given already, and I doubt the - English being persuaded to go; but I shall do all I can about it. - -The bombardment, in spite of Jules Favre's assurance, took place -shortly, and did infinitely more harm than that of the Germans. Amongst -other buildings which suffered was the Embassy, but until the closing -days of the struggle in May, those members of the staff who had been -left there, appear to have suffered no inconvenience; and the relations -of Malet with the self-constituted officials of the Commune were -perfectly amicable, as far as can be judged. Malet, whose management of -a trying situation was marked by much good sense and tact, found no -difficulty in getting on with Paschal Grousset, the Délègué aux Affaires -Etrangères (also described by his adversaries as _Etranger aux -Affaires_), and his relations with this important personage were no -doubt greatly facilitated by a brother who acted as private secretary: -'a very pleasant little fellow, willing to put his brother's signature -to anything.' Paschal Grousset had good reason to congratulate himself -subsequently upon the pains which he had taken to ensure the safety of -foreigners in Paris and for the friendly disposition which he had shown. -When the Versailles troops obtained possession of the city, he was -captured and would in all probability have been shot in company with -other Communist leaders if unofficial representations in his favour had -not been made by Lord Lyons. He was transported, but subsequently -returned to Paris under an amnesty, and, years after, was the cause of a -comic incident at the house of a lady formerly connected with the -British Embassy. This lady, hearing a terrific uproar in her anteroom, -came out to see what was the matter and found Paschal Grousset engaged -in a violent altercation with her _maître d'hôtel_. It turned out that -the latter, who was an ex-gendarme, had been in charge of Paschal -Grousset when the latter was seized by the Versailles Government, and -that he now strongly resented his former prisoner appearing in the -character of an ordinary visitor. - -One of the most abominable acts of the Commune had been the seizure of -the Archbishop of Paris, together with a number of priests, and the -holding of them as hostages for the good treatment of Communist -prisoners. No secret was made of the fact that under certain -circumstances they would be shot, and efforts were set on foot by -various parties--the American Minister, the British Government, and the -German authorities--to prevent so horrible a catastrophe. The -intervention of the American Minister, Mr. Washburne, only caused -irritation. 'They are very angry here with Mr. Washburne,' wrote Lord -Lyons on April 28, 'for interfering about the Archbishop, and they are -still more displeased with him for being so much in Paris. In fact, -although he has a room here he is much more in Paris than at Versailles. -Thiers observed to me last night that my American colleague had a -_conduite très singulière_. They would not stand this in a European -representative, but they allow a great latitude to the American, partly -because he and his Government have nothing to say to European politics, -and partly because they cannot well help it.' An attempt made by -direction of Lord Granville met with no better success, for the -Versailles Government firmly refused to make the exchange of the -revolutionary leader Blanqui, asked for by the Commune, and would only -go so far as to promise in private, that the latter's life should be -spared under certain circumstances. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Versailles, May 16, 1871. - - The poor Archbishop has been constantly in my thoughts, both before - I received your letter of the 13th and since. The state of the case - is simply this. The Commune will not release him on any other terms - than the release of Blanqui; and the Government positively refuses - to give up Blanqui. Every one agrees that intervention with the - Commune is worse than useless; in fact does harm. You will see from - my Confidential Despatch of to-day, that I have gone as far as - possible with Thiers on the subject, but without success. I cannot - hope that I have done any good, but I have certainly done no harm. - Thiers spoke to me freely and confidentially, but absolutely refused - (or rather said positively that it was impossible) to give up - Blanqui. I perhaps went rather far in speaking to M. Thiers even in - the way I did, but I think it will be a comfort to remember that we - did all that could be done. - - I understand that the Archbishop does not suffer any positive - hardship or privation beyond being kept a close prisoner, but I fear - his health is giving way in some degree under the pressure of - anxiety and confinement. - - Perhaps the most painful feature in the whole matter has been the - conduct of the Vicar General, the Abbé Lagarde, who was sent to - Versailles on parole to negociate the release of the Archbishop. - Notwithstanding the entreaties of the Archbishop himself, and the - exhortations of everyone here, he declined to redeem his promise and - has thereby materially injured the Archbishop's position, and given - force to the Communist pretext that no trust can be put in priests. - I am afraid he is still out of Paris. - -Jules Favre was also approached on the subject, but nothing could be got -out of him, and the only chance of success seemed to depend upon a -peremptory demand of the Germans for his release, the Commune being -completely at their mercy. This action the German authorities found -themselves unable to take, and in spite of the frequently expressed -opinions of Thiers and others that the lives of the hostages were in no -real danger, they were all massacred in cold blood during the final days -of the street fighting. - -By the middle of May, most people were of opinion that there was nothing -to prevent the troops entering Paris whenever they pleased, and that the -sooner they did so, the less resistance they would encounter. Thiers, -however, still refused to run any risks, and it was not until nearly the -close of the month that the insurrection was completely suppressed, -amidst scenes almost unprecedented in modern times. - - * * * * * - - _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ - - Versailles, May 26, 1871. - - The state of Paris is heart-breaking. The night I spent there (24th) - was calculated to give one an idea of the infernal regions. Fires in - all directions, the air oppressive with smoke and unpleasant odours, - the incessant roar of cannon and musketry and all kinds of strange - sounds. For the 48 hours before my arrival, the members of the - Embassy and all in the house were in imminent danger; a fire raging - in the next street but one, shells falling on the roof which might - set fire to the house at any moment, and shot flying so fast on both - sides that escape in case of fire would have been hardly possible. - It is a great satisfaction to me that every one in the house behaved - well. Of the members of the Embassy I was quite sure, and all the - men servants appeared to have shown pluck and alacrity in rushing to - the places where the shells fell, in order to extinguish the fire in - case of need. Malet has a first-rate head, and directed everything - with his usual coolness and self-possession. - - One bit of a shell is said to have fallen in the garden yesterday - morning, but it certainly did no mischief, and there was no - appearance of danger while I was there. I cannot, however, feel - quite comfortable so long as the insurgents hold the Buttes de - Chaumont. They must, I should hope, be on the point of being driven - out at the moment I write. Little or no intelligence of what was - going on in the town could be obtained. The least inconvenience on - leaving one's own house was to be seized upon to form a chain to - hand buckets. Sentries stopped our progress in almost every - direction: arrests were frequent and summary executions the order of - the day. I hope it will really all be over by to-night. Sad as it - all is, I felt a satisfaction in finding myself in the old house - again, and am impatient to return to it for good. I hope to do so - directly I can without cutting myself off from uninterrupted - communication with you. - - The fate of the hostages is what makes me the most anxious now. All - the accounts we do receive are hopeful, but we have no positive - assurance of their being safe. The Nuncio came back from his - expedition to the Crown Prince of Saxony much pleased with himself - for having undertaken it, and very grateful to me for having - suggested it. He was referred by the Crown Prince to General - Fabrice, who told him, that by order of Prince Bismarck, he was - doing all that could be done to save the Archbishop. He even hinted - that he had tried offers of money. - - Thiers is trying the patience of the Assembly by keeping in office - Jules Favre, Picard and Jules Simon, who were members of the - Government of National Defence and of the violent Republican - opposition under the Empire. The contempt and disgust of the - Parisians of every shade of opinion for the Government of National - Defence appears unbounded. They consider it to have been a - Government which had neither courage nor capacity, and was equally - inefficient in defending the city against the enemy, and maintaining - order and authority inside. By the country at large, and still more, - by the monarchical representatives in the Assembly, the members of - that Government, by their conduct before and after the 4th September - are held to have been the cause of all the present horrors. - - Notwithstanding all this, Thiers seems to rule the Assembly - completely, however much the members may grumble in private. His - troubles with them will begin when Paris is at last subdued. - - I went to Favre with the offer of the firemen directly the telegram - was decyphered. He took it up to Thiers who immediately accepted it. - -The Commune, which terminated in an orgy of blood, flame, and insensate -fury, had lasted for rather more than two months. Amongst those who -originated the movement were some who honestly believed that they were -merely advocating municipal freedom, and others who thought that the -existence of the Republic was threatened by a reactionary Assembly; but -the control eventually fell into the hands of revolutionaries whose aim -it was to destroy the foundations of society. It showed human nature at -its worst, and the ferocity of the reprisals on the part of the -Government created almost as much repulsion as the outrages which had -provoked them. Now, however, with the restoration of order, a new era -was about to dawn; the ceaseless disasters which had overwhelmed the -country since the end of July, 1870, had come to an end, and within an -almost incredibly short period, France recovered that place amongst the -great nations of the world, which seemed at one time to have been -irretrievably lost. - - -FOOTNOTES: - - [23] Representative at Tours of the French Foreign Office. - - [24] 'Memoirs of Sir Robert Morier.' - - [25] Minister at Madrid; subsequently Ambassador at Constantinople. - - [26] Col. the Honble. Percy Fielding. - - [27] Now Sir Frank Lascelles, G.C.B. - - [28] Now Lord de Saumarez. - - -END OF VOL. I. - -PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND BECCLES - -Telegrams: "Scholarly, London." - -Telephone: No. 1883 Mayfair. - -41 and 43 Maddox Street, Bond Street, London, W. _September, 1913_. - - - - -Mr. Edward Arnold's - -AUTUMN ANNOUNCEMENTS, 1913. - - * * * * * - -LORD LYONS. - -A Record of British Diplomacy. - -By the Right Hon. LORD NEWTON. - -_With Portraits. In Two Volumes._ =30s. net.= - - -The late Lord Lyons was not only the most prominent but the most trusted -English diplomatist of his day, and so great was the confidence felt in -his ability that he was paid the unique compliment of being offered the -post of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. - -Lord Newton, who has now undertaken the task of preparing a memoir of -him, enjoys the advantage of having served under him for five years at -the Paris Embassy. The interest of this work lies, however, less in the -personality of the Ambassador than in the highly important events in -which he played so prominent a part. - -Lord Lyons was the British representative at Washington during the -period of the Civil War; subsequently he was Ambassador at -Constantinople for two years; and finally he spent twenty years--from -1867 to 1887--as Ambassador at Paris. During the whole of this eventful -period his advice was constantly sought by the Home Government upon -every foreign question of importance, and his correspondence throws -fresh light upon obscure passages in diplomatic history. - -In this book will be found hitherto unpublished information relating to -such matters as the critical relations between England and the United -States during the course of the Civil War; the political situation in -France during the closing years of the Second Empire; the secret attempt -made by the British Foreign Secretary to avert the Franco-German War, -and the explanation of its failure; the internal and external policy of -France during the early years of the Third Republic; the War Scare of -1875; the Congress of Berlin; the Egyptian Expedition; Anglo-French -political relations, and many other matters of interest. - -The method selected by the writer has been to reproduce all important -correspondence verbatim, and it may be confidently asserted that the -student of foreign politics will find in this work a valuable record of -modern diplomatic history. - - * * * * * - -LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD. 41 & 43 MADDOX STREET W. - - - - -THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE WILLIAM FREDERICK, FOURTH EARL OF -CLARENDON. - -By the Right Hon. Sir HERBERT MAXWELL, Bart. - -_In Two Volumes, With Portraits. Demy 8vo._ =30s. net.= - - -Born in the year 1800 and dying in 1870, Lord Clarendon lived through a -period of social, political, and economic change more rapid probably -than had been witnessed in any similar space of time in the previous -history of mankind. It was his lot, moreover, to wield considerable -influence over the course of affairs, inasmuch as his public service, -extending over fifty years, caused him to be employed in a succession of -highly responsible, and even critical, situations. British Minister at -Madrid at the outbreak and during the course of the Carlist Civil War -from 1833 to 1839, he was admitted into Lord Melbourne's Cabinet -immediately upon returning to England in the latter year. He was Lord -Lieutenant of Ireland throughout the memorable famine years, 1847-1852. -Relieved of that arduous post, Lord Clarendon entered Lord Aberdeen's -government in 1852 as Foreign Secretary, which office he retained -through the Crimean War, and became responsible for the terms of the -Treaty of Paris in 1856. On Lord Palmerston's death in 1865, he returned -to the Foreign Office, and had to deal with the settlement of the -"Alabama" claims. - -The annals of the first half of Queen Victoria's reign having been -pretty thoroughly explored and dealt with by many competent writers, the -chief interest in these pages will be found in Lord Clarendon's private -correspondence, which has been well preserved, and has been entrusted to -Sir Herbert Maxwell for the purpose of this memoir. Lord Clarendon was -a fluent and diligent correspondent; Charles Greville and others among -his contemporaries frequently expressed a hope that his letters should -some day find their way into literature. Sir Arthur Helps, for instance, -wrote as follows in _Macmillan's Magazine_: "Lord Clarendon was a man -who indulged, notwithstanding his public labours, in an immense private -correspondence. There were some persons to whom, I believe, he wrote -daily, and perhaps in after years we shall be favoured--those of us who -live to see it--with a correspondence which will enlighten us as to many -of the principal topics of our own period." It is upon this -correspondence that Sir Herbert Maxwell has chiefly relied in tracing -the motives, principles, and conduct of one of the last Whig statesmen. -Among the letters dealt with, and now published for the first time, are -those from Lord Melbourne, Lord Palmerston, Lord Aberdeen, Lord Derby, -M. Thiers, M. Guizot, the Emperor Louis Napoleon, etc., and many ladies. - - - - -WILLIAM AUGUSTUS, DUKE OF CUMBERLAND, HIS EARLY LIFE AND TIMES, 1721-1748. - -By the Hon. EVAN CHARTERIS, - -AUTHOR OF "AFFAIRS OF SCOTLAND, 1744-1746." - -_With Plans and Illustrations._ =12s. 6d. net.= [_In preparation._ - - -Mr. Charteris has a good subject in "Butcher" Cumberland, not only on -account of the historical and romantic interest of his background, but -also by reason of the Duke's baneful reputation. - -In the present volume the author has carried the career of the Duke of -Cumberland down to the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. The period includes the -Duke's campaigns in Flanders against Marshal Saxe, the Battle of -Culloden, and the measures taken for the suppression of the Jacobites in -Scotland. Mr. Charteris has had the exceptional advantage of studying -the Cumberland Papers at Windsor Castle, and it is largely by the aid of -hitherto unpublished documents that he is now able to throw fresh light -on a character which has been the subject of so much malevolent -criticism. At the same time the volume deals with the social and -political conditions among which Cumberland was called on to play so -important a part in the life of the nation. These have been treated by -the author with some fulness of detail. Cumberland, in spite of his -foreign origin, was remarkably typical of the characteristics of the -earlier Georgian period, and an endeavour has been made in the present -volume to establish the link between the Duke and the politics, the -morals, the aims, and the pursuits of the age in which he lived. - - - - -MY ART AND MY FRIENDS. - -THE REMINISCENCES OF SIR F. H. COWEN. - -_With Portrait. Demy 8vo._ =10s. 6d. net.= - - -In the course of a long and distinguished musical career, Sir Frederic -Cowen has had opportunities of visiting many parts of the world, of -meeting all the most eminent artists of the last half-century, and of -amassing material for an extremely diverting volume of personal -recollections. As a child he enjoyed the privilege of being embraced by -the great Piccolomini; as a young man he toured with Trebelli, and -became acquainted with the famous Rubinstein, with Bülow, and with -Joachim. In later life he numbered such well-known musicians as -Pachmann, Paderewski, Sir Arthur Sullivan, and the de Reszkes, among his -friends. Nor was the circle of his intimates entirely confined to the -world of music; he was on terms of the closest friendship with Corney -Grain, with George Grossmith and Arthur Cecil; he capped the puns of -Henry J. Byron and Sir Francis Burnand; he laughed at the practical -jokes of Toole, at the caricatures which Phil May drew for him of his -friends. To the public Sir Frederick Cowen is well known as the -conductor of Covent Garden Promenade and Philharmonic Concerts, as the -composer of such celebrated songs as "The Better Land" and "The Promise -of Life," of "The Corsair" and "The Butterfly's Ball." In these pages he -shows himself to be a keen but kindly student of human nature, who can -describe the various experiences of his past life with a genial but -humorous pen. The inexhaustible fund of anecdote from which he draws -tends still further to enliven an amusing and lively volume. - - - - -A CIVIL SERVANT IN BURMA. - -By Sir HERBERT THIRKELL WHITE, K.C.I.E. - -_With 16 Pages of Illustrations. Demy 8vo._ =12s. 6d. net.= - - -Sir Herbert Thirkell White, who has but recently retired from the post -of Lieutenant-Governor of Burma, which he filled with ability and -distinction, has now written what he modestly calls a "plain story" of -more than thirty years of official life in India. In this volume are -narrated the experiences of an Indian Civilian who has devoted the best -part of his existence to the service of the Empire, and is in a position -to speak with assurance of the many complicated problems with which the -white man in India is continually faced. Sir Herbert's acquaintance with -Burma began in 1878; since then he has had every opportunity of judging -the peculiar habits, customs, and characteristics of the native Burmese, -and has been able to compile a valuable record of the impressions they -have made upon his mind. It was his fate to hold official positions of -increasing importance during the Viceroyalties of Lord Ripon, Lord -Dufferin, and Lord Curzon; he was privileged to serve such distinguished -chiefs as Sir Charles Bernard and Sir Charles Crosthwaite, and witnessed -that pacification of Burma which the last-named Chief Commissioner has -described so eloquently in his well-known book on the subject. Sir -Herbert writes clearly and with knowledge of every aspect of Burmese -life and character, and this volume of his recollections should prove -extremely popular among English readers who are interested in the -government of our Indian Empire and the daily routine of the Indian -Civil Servant. - - - - -THIRTY YEARS IN KASHMIR. - -By ARTHUR NEVE, F.R.C.S.E. - -_With Illustrations and a Map. Demy 8vo._ =12s. 6d. net.= - - -The stupendous natural surroundings amidst which they dwell have -inspired sojourners in Kashmir and other Himalayan countries to produce -some of the finest books of travel to be found. Among them will have to -be included in future this book of Dr. Arthur Neve's, so effectively -does the author reveal the wonders of the land of towering peaks and -huge glaciers where he has made his home for the last thirty years. - -Going out to Kashmir in 1882 under the auspices of the Church Missionary -Society, Dr. Neve took over the charge of the Kashmir Mission Hospital -at Srinagur from Dr. Edmund Downes, who was retiring, and has stayed -there ever since. In his earlier chapters he gives some account of the -Punjab and Kashmir in the eighties, and also of the work of the mission. -He then gets to the principal motif of the book--the exploring tours and -mountaineering expeditions to which he has devoted his spare time. Nanga -Parbat, Nun Kun, and many other Himalayan giants, are within hail of -Srinagur, and before he has finished with the book the reader will find -he has acquired the next best thing to a first-hand knowledge of this -magnificent country. Dr. Neve has also a great deal that is interesting -to tell about the people of various races and religions who inhabit the -valleys, and from whom his medical help gained him a warm welcome at all -times. - -A series of rare photographs gives a pictorial support to the -letter-press. - - - - -SPORT AND FOLK-LORE IN THE HIMALAYA. - -By Captain H. L. HAUGHTON. - -(36TH SIKHS.) - -_With Illustrations from the Author's Photographs. One Volume._ - -_Demy 8vo._ =12s. 6d. net.= - - -Captain Haughton has written a book which should prove a welcome -addition to the library of every sportsman, as well as being of supreme -interest to the naturalist and the student of folk-lore. On the subject -of sport the author writes with that thorough insight and sympathy which -are the fruits of many years' practical experience with rod and rifle, -in the jungle, on river-bank or mountain-side. In his agreeable society -the reader may stalk the markhor or the ibex, lightly throw his "Sir -Richard" across some Kashmiri trout-stream, or lie in wait for the -Himalayan black bear on its way to feed; and if the author's description -of his many amusing and exciting adventures and experiences is eminently -readable, the value of his work is still further enhanced by his -intimate knowledge of natural history, and by the introduction of many -of those old Indian legendary tales that he has culled from the lips of -native Shikaris round the camp-fire at night. The book is illustrated -throughout with a series of remarkably interesting photographs taken by -the author in the course of his many sporting expeditions. - - - - -RECOLLECTIONS OF A PENINSULAR VETERAN. - -By the late Lieut.-Colonel JOSEPH ANDERSON, C.B., K.H. - -_With Photogravure Portrait. Demy 8vo._ =10s. 6d. net.= - - -The late Lieut.-Colonel Joseph Anderson was born in 1790, and from the -age of fifteen, when he received a commission as Ensign in the 78th -Regiment, to within a few years of his death in 1877, his career was -almost continuously as adventurous as it was distinguished. In 1806 he -saw active service for the first time, when he took part in the -expedition to Calabria; in the following year he served in the Egyptian -Campaign of that date; and during the Peninsular War he fought at the -battles of Maida, Busaco, Fuentes d'Onoro, was wounded at Talavera, and -accompanied Wellington on the retreat to the lines of Torres Vedras. A -few years later Captain Anderson, now a Captain in the York Chasseurs, -was sent with his regiment to Barbadoes, and was present at the capture -of Guadeloupe in 1815. He was appointed Colonel Commandant of the Penal -Settlement at Norfolk Island in 1834, where his humane endeavours to -reform the prevailing penal system, and his efforts to quell mutinous -convicts, met with marked success. Nine years later Colonel Anderson -went to India to take part in the Mahratta Campaign, and at the Battle -of Punniar (where he commanded a Brigade) was severely wounded when -charging the enemy's guns. After retiring from the Service, Colonel -Anderson settled down in Australia, and it was at his home near -Melbourne that these memories were compiled, during the later years of a -strenuous and active life, for the edification of his family. They are -written in a simple, unaffected style, which renders them peculiarly -readable, and form a most instructive record of the manners and customs, -of the mode of warfare, and the military and social life of a past age, -and a bygone generation. - - - - -MEMORIES OF A SOLDIER'S LIFE. - -By Major-General Sir H. M. BENGOUGH, K.C.B. - -_With Portrait. Demy 8vo._ =8s. 6d. net.= - - -Major-General Sir H. M. Bengough joined the army in 1855, and retired in -1898, after more than forty years of distinguished service in all -quarters of the Empire. His first experience of active warfare dates -from the Crimea; later on he took the field in the Zulu War and the -Burma Expedition of 1885. In days of peace he held various high commands -in India, South Africa, and Jamaica, and finally commanded a brigade of -infantry at Aldershot. In this volume of personal recollections the -author narrates the many varied incidents and experiences of a long -military career and vividly describes the campaigns in which he took -part. He also gives an interesting account of his adventures in the -realm of sport--pig-sticking, tiger-shooting, and pursuing other forms -of game in India and elsewhere; subjects upon which a long experience -enables him to write with expert knowledge. It will be strange indeed if -so interesting an autobiographical volume from the pen of a deservedly -popular soldier and sportsman fails to appeal to a wide public. - - - - -ZACHARY STOYANOFF. - -Pages from the Autobiography of a Bulgarian Insurgent. - -Translated by M. POTTER. - -_One Volume. Demy 8vo._ =10s. 6d. net.= - - -In this volume Zachary Stoyanoff gives us the narrative of his personal -experiences during the Bulgarian outbreaks of 1875 and 1876. Almost by -accident he became an "apostle" of rebellion, and was sent out forthwith -to range the country, stirring up the villagers and forming local -committees. It is an amazing story. With unsurpassable candour he -portrays for us the leaders, their enthusiasm, their incredible -shortsightedness, and the pitiful inadequacy of their preparations. The -bubble burst, and after a miserable attempt at flight, Stoyanoff was -taken prisoner and sent to Philippopolis for trial. There is no attempt -at heroics. With the same Boswellian simplicity he reveals his fears, -his cringing, his mendacity, and incidentally gives us a graphic -picture, not wholly black, of the conquering Turk. The narrative ends -abruptly while he is still in peril of his life. One is glad to know -that, somehow, he escaped. A very human document, and a remarkable -contrast to the startling exhibition of efficiency given to the world by -the Bulgarians in their latest struggle with the Turks. - - - - -SPLENDID FAILURES. - -By HARRY GRAHAM, - -AUTHOR OF "A GROUP OF SCOTTISH WOMEN," "THE MOTHER OF PARLIAMENTS," ETC. - -_With Portraits. Demy 8vo._ =10s. 6d. net.= - - -It is perhaps unlikely that any two individuals will agree as to the -proper definition of the term "A Splendid Failure"--a phrase of which -the origin would appear to be obscure. It may, however, be roughly -stated that the "Splendid Failures" of the past divide themselves -naturally into three classes: those whom their contemporaries invested -with a fictitious or exaggerated splendour which posterity is quite -unable to comprehend or appreciate; those whom the modern world regards -with admiration--but who signally failed in impressing the men of their -own generation; and those who, gifted with genius and inspired with -lofty ideals, never justified the world's high opinion of their talents -or fulfilled the promise of their early days. In this volume of -biographical essays, the author of "A Group of Scottish Women" and other -popular works has dealt with a selection of "splendid failures" of whose -personal history the public knows but little, though well acquainted -with their names. Wolfe Tone, "the first of the Fenians"; Benjamin -Haydon, the "Cockney Raphael"; Toussaint L'Ouverture, the "Napoleon of -San Domingo"; William Betty, the "Infant Roscius"; and "Champagne" -Townshend, the politician of Pitt's day, may be included under this -category. The reader cannot fail to be interested in that account which -the author gives of the ill-fated Archduke Maximilian's attempt to found -a Mexican monarchy; in his careful review of the work and character of -Hartley Coleridge; and in his biographical study of George Smythe, that -friend of Disraeli whom the statesman-novelist took as his model for the -hero of "Coningsby." This book, which should appeal strongly to all -readers of literary essays, is illustrated with eight excellent -portraits. - - - - -THE CORINTHIAN YACHTSMAN'S HANDBOOK. - -By FRANCIS B. COOKE. - -_With 20 Folding Plates of Designs for Yachts, and numerous black and -white Illustrations. Demy 8vo._ =10s. 6d. net.= - - -This new handbook covers the sport of yachting in all its branches. The -writer, who has had many years' experience of cruising and racing in -yachts and boats of all types, has treated the subject in a thoroughly -practical manner. The book is divided into six parts. - -In Part I., which deals with the selection of a yacht, the various types -and rigs suitable for Corinthian yachting are discussed. The designing -and building of new craft are also dealt with at some length, and -designs and descriptions of a number of up-to-date small cruisers are -given. - -In Part II. some hints are given as to where to station the yacht. All -available headquarters within easy reach of London are described, and -the advantages and disadvantages of each pointed out. - -Part III. is devoted to the equipment of yachts, and contains a wealth -of information as to the internal arrangement, rigging, and fittings of -small cruisers. - -Part IV. treats of the maintenance of small cruising vessels, with notes -on the cost of upkeep, fitting out and laying up. Other matters dealt -with in this section are the preservation of sails and gear, and -insurance. - -Part V., on seamanship, covers the handling of fore-and-aft vessels -under all conditions of weather, and upon every point of sailing. - -Part VI. covers the racing side of the sport in a comprehensive manner. -An exhaustive exposition of the International Sailing Rules is followed -by hints on racing tactics. The appendix contains, _inter alia_, an -illustrated description of the British Buoyage System. - -Mr. Cooke's well-known handbooks have come to be regarded by yachtsmen -as standard works, and a new and more ambitious work from his pen can -hardly fail to interest them. - - - - -THE FALL OF PROTECTION. - -By BERNARD HOLLAND, C.B., - -AUTHOR OF "IMPERIUM ET LIBERTAS." - -_One Volume. Demy 8vo._ =12s. 6d. net.= - - -This volume is a political-historical study of the great change which -took place in British commercial and financial policy mainly between the -years 1840 and 1850. The writer examines the state of things in these -respects which existed before this revolution, and describes the -previous protective system, navigation system, and colonial system. He -then narrates the process by which those systems were overthrown, -devoting special attention to the character, career, and changes in -opinion of Sir Robert Peel, and to the attitude and action of the Tory, -Whig, and Radical parties, and of their leading men, especially Mr. -Disraeli, Lord John Russell, and Mr. Cobden. He analyses with care the -arguments used on all sides in these controversies, especially with -regard to the Repeal of the Corn Laws, and he shows the extent to which -questions of imperial preference and the relations between the United -Kingdom and the Colonies entered into the issues. One chapter is devoted -to the Bank Act of 1844, and to the consideration of its causes and -results. The author concludes by tracing very briefly the chain of -events which connect the period in question with our own day, in respect -of commercial and fiscal policy, and expresses his own views as to -existing tendencies and future developments. - -Mr. Bernard Holland is known as the author of the Life of the Duke of -Devonshire, and of "Imperium et Libertas." In a sense the present volume -is a continuation of the latter book, or rather is an attempt to deal -more expansively and in detail with certain history and questions -connected with the same theme, for the full treatment of which there was -insufficient space in that book. Mr. Holland having acted for a number -of years as Private Secretary to two successive Secretaries of State for -the Colonies, has been brought into close touch in a practical way with -colonial questions. This book, it is hoped, will be of some service both -to students of economic history and to politicians in active life. - - - - -PAINTING IN THE FAR EAST. - -By LAURENCE BINYON. - - -_A New Edition, thoroughly Revised, with many new and additional -Illustrations. Crown 4to._ =21s. net.= - -Since the first edition of this book was published in 1907, much has -happened, and a quantity of new material has been brought to light. - -Interest in the subject has been immensely widened and strengthened. The -museums of Europe and America are vying with each other to procure fine -specimens of Chinese and Japanese art. The opening this autumn of a new -museum at Cologne, exclusively devoted to the arts of Eastern Asia, is a -symptom of the times. Collections, public and private, both European and -American, have been greatly enriched; and the exhibition in 1910 at -Shepherd's Bush, of treasured masterpieces lent from Japanese -collections, has provided a standard for the student. - -Six years ago, again, scarcely any of the voluminous literature of art -existing in Chinese and Japanese had been translated. On this side, too, -an added store of information has been made accessible, though still in -great part scattered in the pages of learned periodicals. Above all, the -marvellous discoveries made of recent years in China and Chinese -Turkestan have substituted a mass of authentic material for groping -conjectures in the study of the art of the early periods. - -In preparing a new edition of this book and bringing it up to date, Mr. -Binyon has therefore been able to utilize a variety of new sources of -information. The estimates given of the art of some of the most famous -of the older masters have been reconsidered. The sections dealing with -the early art have been in great measure rewritten; and the book has -been revised throughout. In the matter of illustrations it has been -possible to draw on a wider range and make a fuller and more -representative selection. - - - - -PAINTING IN EAST AND WEST. - -By ROBERT DOUGLAS NORTON, - -AUTHOR OF "THE CHOICE." - -_Crown 8vo._ =5s. net.= - - -The art of painting, which in the days of Gothic church-building -contributed so much both to the education and the pleasure of the -community at large, has admittedly come to appeal to ever-narrowing -circles, until to-day it cannot be said to play any part in popular life -at all. This book seeks to discover the causes of its decline in -influence. A brief review of the chief contemporary movements in painting -gives point to a suggestion made by more than one thoughtful critic that -the chief need of Western painting is spirituality. Since this is a -quality which those competent to judge are at one in attributing to -Eastern art, the author, in a chapter on Far Eastern Painting, sets -forth the ideals underlying the great painting of China and Japan, and -contrasts these ideals with those which have inspired painters and -public in the West. This leads to an inquiry into the uses of -imagination and suggestion in art, and to an attempt to find a broad -enough definition for "spirituality" not to exclude many widely -divergent achievements of Western painting. Finally, the possibility of -training the sense of beauty is discussed in the light of successful -instances. - -Incidentally the book touches on many questions which, though of -interest to picture-lovers, often remain unasked; such, for instance, as -what we look for in a picture; how far subject is important; why it may -happen that the interest of one picture, which pleases at first, soon -wanes, while that of another grows steadily stronger; the value of -technique, of different media of expression, of mere resemblance, etc. - -Without going into the technicalities of æsthetics, the author aims at -investigating certain first principles which are overlooked at times by -possessors of even the widest knowledge of individual schools. - - - - -SHAKESPEARE'S STORIES. - -By CONSTANCE MAUD and MARY MAUD. - -AS YOU LIKE IT--THE TEMPEST--KING LEAR--TWELFTH NIGHT--THE MERCHANT -OF VENICE--A MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM--MACBETH--HAMLET--ROMEO AND JULIET. - -_With Illustrations from the famous Boydell prints. Crown 8vo._ - -=5s. net.= - - -Miss Constance Maud is the author of "Wagner's Heroes" and "Wagner's -Heroines," two books on similar lines to these tales which have had a -great vogue among young people of all ages. In the present volume she -tells the charming stories of nine of the most famous of Shakespeare's -Tragedies and Comedies in prose of delightful and unstudied simplicity. -On occasion the actual text has been used for familiar passages and -phrases. These great world-tales, regarded merely as tales, with the -elemental motives and passions displayed in them, appeal strongly to the -imagination, and when narrated by a competent pen there cannot be finer -or more absorbing reading. In addition to this, he must be a dull reader -in whom they do not awaken a desire to make a closer acquaintance with -the plays themselves. - -The book forms a companion volume to Sir A. T. Quiller-Couch's -well-known "Historical Tales from Shakespeare." - - - - -THE MUSE IN MOTLEY. - -By HARRY GRAHAM. - -AUTHOR OF "RUTHLESS RHYMES FOR HEARTLESS HOMES," ETC., ETC. - -_With 24 Illustrations by_ - -LEWIS BAUMER. - -_Fcap. 4vo._ =3s. 6d. net.= - - -All lovers of humorous verse will welcome a fresh volume of lyrics by -the author of "Deportmental Ditties," "Canned Classics," and other -deservedly popular products of the Minor Muse. Readers of Captain -Graham's new collection of light verse will agree with the _Daily -Chronicle_ in describing its author as "a godsend, a treasure trove, a -messenger from Olympus; a man who really does see the ludicrous side of -life, a man who is a genuine humorist." Once again the author of these -amusing poems attempts to "shoot Folly as she flies," and genially -satirizes the foibles of the age in a fashion that will certainly add to -his reputation as a humorist; and his work is rendered still more -delightful by the drawings of Mr. Lewis Baumer, the well-known _Punch_ -artist, with which it is lavishly illustrated. "It is a great and good -thing," as the _Pall Mall Gazette_ remarked with reference to another of -Captain Graham's books, "to have a man among us who is witty all the -time and lets himself go. We ought to be duly thankful. And we are!" - - - - -HANNIBAL ONCE MORE. - -By DOUGLAS W. FRESHFIELD, M.A., - -VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY; TREASURER OF THE -HELLENIC AND ROMAN SOCIETIES; FORMERLY PRESIDENT OF THE ALPINE CLUB. - -_8vo._ =5s. net.= - - -In this little volume Mr. Freshfield has put into final shape the -results of his study of the famous and still-debated question: "By which -Pass did Hannibal cross the Alps?" The literature which has grown up -round this intricate subject is surprisingly extensive, and various -solutions have been propounded and upheld, with remarkable warmth and -tenacity, by a host of scholars, historians, geographers, military men, -and mountaineers. Mr. Freshfield has a solution of his own, which, -however, he puts forward in no dogmatic spirit, but in such a fashion -that his book is practically a lucid review of the whole matter in each -of its many aspects. To an extensive acquaintance with ancient and -modern geographical literature he unites a wide and varied experience as -an alpine climber and a traveller, and a minute topographical knowledge -of the regions under discussion; and these qualifications--in which many -of his predecessors in the same field of inquiry have been conspicuously -lacking--enable him to throw much new light on a perennially fascinating -problem. - - - - -THE PASTORAL TEACHING OF ST. PAUL. - -By the Rev. Canon H. L. GOUDGE, - -PRINCIPAL OF THE THEOLOGICAL COLLEGE, ELY; AUTHOR OF "THE MIND OF ST. -PAUL," ETC. - -_Crown 8vo. Cloth._ =2s. 6d. net.= - - -These lectures were delivered at the end of May, 1913, at the Palace, -Gloucester, to the clergy of the diocese, and are now published in -response to the request of those who heard them. They do not constitute -a detailed commentary on the Pastoral Epistles, though a good deal of -detailed exegesis necessarily finds a place in them. The writer's aim -has been to collect and arrange St. Paul's teaching as to the work of -the Christian pastor, and to point out its applicability to modern -conditions and modern difficulties. The writer has often found, through -his experience in conducting Retreats, that the Pastoral Teaching of St. -Paul is of the greatest value to the clergy to-day, but that this -teaching is often obscured by the unsystematic character of St. Paul's -writing and by the passing controversies with which he has to deal. In -these lectures the First Epistle to Timothy is used as the basis, but -continually illustrated by passages from the other Pastoral Epistles, -and from St. Paul's earlier writings. The first lecture deals with the -pastor's aim, the second with the pastor's character, the third with the -pastor's work, and the fourth with the adaptation of his message to men -and to women, to old and to young, to rich and to poor. The ground -already covered by the writer's earlier book, "The Mind of St. Paul," -has been carefully avoided, but it is hoped that the one book may throw -light upon the other. An index of texts has been added for those who may -wish to use this second book, as far as that is possible, as a -commentary. - - - - -_NEW NOVELS_ - - - - -SOMETHING AFAR. - -By MAXWELL GRAY, - -AUTHOR OF "THE SILENCE OF DEAN MAITLAND," "THE GREAT REFUSAL," ETC. - -_Crown 8vo. Cloth._ =6s.= - - -The scene of Maxwell Gray's new story is laid in London and in Italy, -where the gradual unfolding of an elaborate but absorbing plot holds the -reader's attention until the very last page of the book. This is a tale -of heroism, of self-sacrifice, of romance, full of incident and -adventure, illumined by those tender and imaginative touches, that vivid -portrayal of character, which the public has learnt to expect from the -author of "The Silence of Dean Maitland." From these pages we may learn -that there is "something afar from the sphere of our sorrow," the -highest aspiration of the lover, the artist, the poet and the saint, -which, beautiful beyond all that man's heart can divine, is yet within -the reach of every one of us. - - - - -THE GENTLE LOVER. - -A COMEDY OF MIDDLE AGE. - -By FORREST REID, - -AUTHOR OF "THE BRACKNELLS," "FOLLOWING DARKNESS," ETC. - -_Crown 8vo._ =6s.= - - -This extremely interesting story, of which the title gives a most apt -description, is written in a lighter vein than the author's previous -work. It is a love story, and while the tale itself is enthralling, it -depends in great measure for its charm on the attractiveness of the -characters who figure in the drama and who are all very pleasant -company. The book is essentially human, the note is never forced, yet -the interest goes on increasing right up to the end. It is actual life -with its comedy and tragedy so closely intermingled that it is not -always easy to distinguish one from the other. The scene is laid abroad, -partly in Bruges, and partly in Italy, but the characters are, with one -or two exceptions, natives of that part of Ireland with which the author -is most familiar, and they lose none of their individuality by being -transplanted to those beautiful old-world cities where we follow their -varied fortunes. Mr. Reid's previous novels have already secured for his -work the warm appreciation of some of the best judges of literary -values, and the present novel may be confidently stated to exhibit his -undoubted power as a writer of fiction in an advanced and progressive -stage. - - - - -_NEW SCIENTIFIC WORKS_ - - - - -INDUSTRIAL POISONING - -From Fumes, Gases, and Poisons of Manufacturing Processes. - -By Dr. J. RAMBOUSEK, - - -PROFESSOR OF FACTORY HYGIENE, AND CHIEF STATE HEALTH OFFICER, PRAGUE - -Translated and Edited by Dr. T. M. LEGGE, - -H.M. MEDICAL INSPECTOR OF FACTORIES. - -_Fully Illustrated. Demy 8vo._ =12s. 6d. net.= - - - - -MALINGERING - -And Feigned Sickness. - -By Sir JOHN COLLIE, M.D., J.P., - - -MEDICAL EXAMINER, LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL; CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, -METROPOLITAN WATER BOARD; CONSULTING MEDICAL EXAMINER TO THE SHIPPING -FEDERATION; MEDICAL EXAMINER TO THE SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, CENTRAL -INSURANCE COMPANY, LONDON, LIVERPOOL, AND GLOBE INSURANCE COMPANY, AND -OTHER ACCIDENT OFFICES; LATE HOME OFFICE MED. REF. WORKMEN'S -COMPENSATION ACT. - -Assisted by ARTHUR H. SPICER, M.B., B.S. (Lond.), D.P.H. - -_Illustrated, xii + 340 pp. Demy 8vo._ =10s. 6d. net.= - -In this work Sir John Collie, whose wide experience has eminently fitted -him for the task, has given an interesting and lucid description of the -methods and peculiarities of the malingerer. He describes fully and in -detail the methods of examination for the detection of malingering and -the diseases usually simulated, and discusses the attitude required by -the medical attendant towards unduly prolonged illness. - - - - -OLD AGE: - -Its Care and Treatment in Health and Disease. - -By ROBERT SAUNDBY, M.D., F.R.C.P., L.L.D., J.P., - - -MEMBER GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL: EX-PRESIDENT BRITISH MEDICAL -ASSOCIATION; PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE, UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM; PHYSICIAN -TO THE BIRMINGHAM GENERAL HOSPITAL. - -_320 pp._ =7s. 6d. net.= - -No English writer having recently dealt with this subject, it has been -felt that there is room for a book which should bring together the -various contributions made to it in modern times, including the results -of the author's extensive experience during forty years of medical -practice. The author discusses the principles of health, by due -attention to which healthy old age may be attained. The diseases to -which the aged are especially liable are fully described, their causes -are clearly indicated, and the author shows in a practical way by what -means they may be avoided and how they may be appropriately treated. -Special attention is given to such important subjects as diet, exercise, -etc. Suggestive dietary tables are given, both for use in health and in -particular diseases, while the chapters devoted to methods of exercise -most suitable in advanced age will also prove of value. - - * * * * * - -LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD, 41 & 43 MADDOX STREET, W. - - - +----------------------------------------------------------+ - | | - | Transcriber's notes: | - | | - | P.ix. 'inpressions' changed to 'impressions'. | - | P.27. 'proferred' changed to 'proffered'. | - | P.58. 'on or' changed to 'or on'. | - | P.120. 'inclned' changed to 'inclined'. | - | P.192. 'Russia' changed to 'Prussia'. | - | P.256. 'ne' changed to 'me'. | - | Various punctuation fixed. | - | Italics are displayed as _Illustrated_. | - | Small caps have been replaced with all caps. | - | | - +----------------------------------------------------------+ - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Lord Lyons: A Record of British -Diplomacy, by Thomas Wodehouse Legh Newton - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A RECORD OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY *** - -***** This file should be named 43317-8.txt or 43317-8.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/3/3/1/43317/ - -Produced by Brian Foley, Jane Robins and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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