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diff --git a/43317-0.txt b/43317-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..64513e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/43317-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,14254 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 43317 *** + +LORD LYONS + +VOLUME I + +[Illustration: _Lord Lyons, +from a photograph taken at Boston, U.S. in 1860._] + + + + + LORD LYONS + + A RECORD OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY + + BY + + LORD NEWTON + + IN TWO VOLUMES + + VOLUME I + + WITH PORTRAITS + + LONDON + + EDWARD ARNOLD + + 1913 + + _All rights reserved_ + + + + +PREFACE + + +It was the practice of the late Lord Lyons to preserve carefully the +whole of his correspondence, whether official, semi-official, or +private, and upon his death this accumulation of papers passed into the +possession of his nephew, the present Duke of Norfolk. + +I have been able to draw to some extent upon my own diary and +recollections of the five years (1881-1886) during which I served as a +member of Lord Lyons's staff at the Paris Embassy, but that period +represents only a very small portion of his official career, and it is +from the above mentioned papers that this work has been almost entirely +compiled. All the material was placed unreservedly at my disposal, and I +desire to make full acknowledgment of this mark of confidence. I desire +also to express my gratitude to the numerous persons who have readily +given their consent to the publication of important letters in which +they possess a proprietary interest: notably to Emily Lady Ampthill, +Lord Clarendon, Lord Derby, Lady Granville, Lady Ermyntrude Malet, Lord +Rosebery, the Hon. Rollo Russell, Lord Salisbury, and Lord Sanderson. + +I am indebted to Mr. J. F. Marshall and Mr. Alan Parsons for their +assistance in sifting the enormous mass of documents found at Norfolk +House, and to the Hon. Arnold Keppel for a service rendered at a +subsequent period. Finally, I have to thank Mrs. Wilfrid Ward for an +interesting contribution entitled "Lord Lyons in private life," +containing personal details only available to a near relative. + + NEWTON. + +_October, 1913._ + + + + +CONTENTS OF VOL. I + + + CHAPTER I + PAGE + EARLY LIFE + + Early Life--Enters Diplomatic Service, 1839--Appointed unpaid + attaché at Athens--Unfavourable prospects--Paid attaché at + Rome, 1853--Condition of the Papal States--Life at Rome--Appointed + Secretary of Legation at Florence--Question of the + 'Tavola di Stato'--Sent to Naples to deal with the case of the + _Cagliari_--Success of his mission and appointment as Minister + at Florence--Succeeds to peerage on death of his father--Appointed + Minister at Washington, 1858 1 + + + CHAPTER II + + WASHINGTON + + 1859-1860 + + Arrival at Washington--Effect produced in America by the Franco-Austrian + War--Feeling in America with regard to England--San + Juan and Mexico--Rising passions between Northern and + Southern States--Disclaimer of matrimonial intentions--Accompanies + Prince of Wales on Canadian tour--Delight of President + Buchanan at receiving a letter from Queen Victoria--Prince + of Wales's visit to the United States 12 + + + CHAPTER III + + OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR--THE 'TRENT' CASE + + 1860-1861 + + Crisis caused by election of President Lincoln--Mr. Seward as + Secretary of State: his threatening language--Capture of Fort + Sumter--Desirability of England and France acting in conjunction--Danger + of an attack upon Canada--Growth of ill-feeling + towards England--Effect of battle of Bull's Run--Mr. Seward + on the essential difference between American policy and that + of Foreign Nations--Seizure of a Foreign Office bag--British + Consuls and the Confederate Government--The Trent incident: + seizure of Messrs. Mason and Slidell--Lord Lyons's decision to + maintain complete reserve--H.M. Government urged to provide + for defence of Canada--Attitude of American public--Instructions + of Her Majesty's Government--Mr. Seward's reception of + the despatch--Liberation of Messrs. Mason and Slidell--Lord + Lyons's consideration acknowledged by Mr. Seward--Advantage + of occasional silence 29 + + + CHAPTER IV + + COURSE OF THE CIVIL WAR + + 1862-1865 + + Course of the Civil War--Mr. Seward's altered policy towards + England--Visit of the French Minister, M. Mercier, to the Confederate + Headquarters--Lord Lyons declines to accompany him--Rumoured intention + of France and England to mediate--Breakdown in health owing to + overwork--Failure of French attempt at intervention--Dissatisfaction in + Northern States--Indiscretion of a British Consul--Arbitrary + proceedings of American cruisers--Lord Russell and the + _Alabama_--Grievances of foreigners resident in the United + States--Liability of British subjects to military service--Method of + recruiting the Northern armies--Hardships of 'Volunteers'--The Bounty + System--Surprising proposal by Mr. Seward--Reciprocity negotiations: + Lord Lyons's objections to a Canadian representative--Difficulty of + obtaining redress for aggrieved British subjects--Lord Lyons directed + to proceed to Canada and to report on its defence--Return to + Washington--Breakdown in health--The work at the Washington + Legation--Proceeds to England--Retires temporarily from Diplomatic + service owing to ill-health 79 + + + CHAPTER V + + CONSTANTINOPLE + + 1865-1867 + + Offer and Acceptance of Constantinople Embassy--Sir Henry + Bulwer--Comparative calm at Constantinople--Arrogance of + French Ambassador, M. de Moustier--Lord Stratford de Redcliffe + on Turkey--Sultan Abdul Aziz and his passion for ironclads--The + Principalities: Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen + chosen as Hereditary Prince--Difficulties relating to his + Investiture--Crete: The Fortress of Belgrade--Lord Stanley on + Greece--Russian policy towards Turkey--Pro-Russian proclivities + of Napoleon III.--Projected visit of the Sultan to France and + England--Mr. Hammond's apprehensions with regard to the + Sultan--The Dragoman system at Constantinople--Appointed + Ambassador at Paris 144 + + + CHAPTER VI + + THE SECOND EMPIRE + + 1867-1869 + + Arrival at Paris--The Empress on the Roman Question--The Emperor's + desire for a Conference--Mr. Odo Russell on erroneous French impressions + with regard to the Papacy--Prince Napoleon on the probability of war + with Germany--Credulity of the Emperor of Russia--Visit of Prince + Napoleon to Germany: his impressions--Difficulties of Napoleon + III.--General uneasiness in France and depression of Emperor--Suggested + offer of throne of Spain to Duke of Edinburgh--Lord Clarendon's + conversations with the King of Prussia and Moltke--Lord Clarendon and + Napoleon III.--Lord Clarendon at the Foreign Office--Views of the Crown + Prince of Prussia--Emperor's love of Conferences--The Luxemburg Railway + affair--Apprehensions in England and Belgium of French designs--Views + of Queen Victoria and Gladstone--Confidential instructions to Lord + Lyons--Desire of Empress to visit India--Lord Lyons requested to vote + on party question in House of Lords--Formation of Constitutional + Administration under Emile Ollivier--Distrust of the Emperor 177 + + + CHAPTER VII + + SECRET PROPOSALS FOR DISARMAMENT + + 1870 + + Attempt by Lord Clarendon, at request of Count Daru, to induce + the Prussian Government to partially disarm--Emile Ollivier + on disarmament--Memorandum by Lord Clarendon communicated + to Bismarck--Objections raised by Bismarck--Count + Daru on Bismarck's arguments--Intended reduction of the + French army--Second attempt by Lord Clarendon--Bismarck's + final answer 246 + + + CHAPTER VIII + + THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR + + 1870 + + Internal situation in France--Further military reduction sanctioned--The + Plébiscite: general uneasiness--Official satisfaction at result + of Plébiscite--Sycophantic diplomatists--Gramont appointed + Foreign Minister--Official views respecting the value of British + colonies--Accurate prophecy by Lord Clarendon--Death of Lord + Clarendon: Lord Granville Foreign Secretary--The Hohenzollern + Candidature--Explosion of Chauvinism--Lord Lyons's explanation + of the manner in which the war was forced upon the Emperor + Napoleon--Conduct of the Empress during the early stages of the + war--Fall of the Empire: Thiers and Jules Favre--Thiers's + mission--Malet's mission to Bismarck--Consent of Bismarck to receive + a representation of the Provisional Government 280 + + + CHAPTER IX + + THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE + + 1870-1871 + + Departure from Paris to join Provisional Government at Tours--Chaudordy + on cession of territory--Attempt of Gustave Flourens to overthrow the + Government at Paris--Thiers's interviews with Bismarck--Bismarck and + _Les militaires_--Gladstone on cession of territory--Denunciation + by Russia of Black Sea clauses in Treaty of Paris--Question of + Bismarck's connivance--French and German grievances against + England--Lord Lyons joins Provisional Government at Bordeaux--Difficulty + in securing a French Representation at Black Sea Conference--Revival of + French hopes at close of 1870--Bombardment of Paris--Thiers willing to + cede territory: his superiority to Jules Favre--Armistice--General + election--Thiers's conduct of the Peace Negotiations--Peace conditions + accepted--Outbreak of the Commune: Lord Lyons and other diplomatists go + to Versailles--Malet and Paschal Grousset--Murder of the Archbishop of + Paris and the hostages--Suppression of the Commune--Return to Paris. + 322 + + + + +LIST OF PLATES IN VOL. I + + + FACING PAGE + + LORD LYONS _Frontispiece_ + _From a photograph taken at Boston, U.S., in 1860_ + + WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD 32 + + PRINCE NAPOLEON 194 + + + + +LORD LYONS + +A RECORD OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY + + + + +CHAPTER I + +EARLY LIFE + + +Born in 1817, Richard Bickerton Pemell Lyons, second Baron and first +Viscount and Earl Lyons, eldest son of the distinguished Admiral Sir +Edmund (subsequently first Baron Lyons), was apparently destined like +his younger brother for a naval career, since at the age of ten he was +already serving as an honorary midshipman. A sailor's life, however, +must have been singularly uncongenial to a person of pronounced +sedentary tastes whom nature had obviously designed for a bureaucrat; in +after years he never alluded to his naval experiences, and it was +probably with no slight satisfaction that the navy was exchanged for +Winchester. From Winchester he proceeded to Christ Church, Oxford, where +he took his degree in 1838, being apparently at that period a quiet, +well-behaved, hard-working youth, living carefully upon a modest +allowance, and greatly attached to his parents and family. + +In the following year he entered the diplomatic service as unpaid +attaché at Athens, where his father occupied the position of Minister. +In 1844 he became a paid attaché at Athens, and passed thirteen +uneventful years at that post. + +At this stage of his career, prospects looked far from promising; he +had started later than usual, being twenty-two at the period of his +entry into the service; younger men were senior to him; he had had no +opportunity of distinguishing himself at Athens, and as he laments in a +letter to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Malmesbury, written in April, +1852, he felt 'mortified and humiliated that a man six years younger +than himself had been passed over him as Secretary to the Legation in +which he had served for thirteen years.' Promotion indeed seemed so +remote that, having reached the age of thirty-five, he seriously +contemplated abandoning diplomacy altogether. + +As a matter of fact, there was no cause for uneasiness. In 1852 he was +transferred as paid attaché to Dresden, and early in the following year +received the gratifying intimation that Lord John Russell, who had been +struck with his capacity, had appointed him paid attaché at Rome. 'What +I mean for him,' wrote Lord John Russell, 'is to succeed Mr. Petre, and +to conduct the Roman Mission, with £500 a year. If there were any post +of Secretary of Legation vacant I should gladly offer it to him, as I +have a very good opinion of him.' The importance of the post at Rome +consisted in the fact that, whereas technically dependent on the Tuscan +Mission at Florence, it was virtually semi-independent, and might +easily form an excellent stepping-stone to higher and more important +appointments if activity and discretion were displayed. + +In June, 1853, Lyons started for his new post carrying despatches, and +as an illustration of the conditions of travel upon the continent at +that period, it is worth noticing that the expenses of his journey to +Rome amounted to no less a sum than £102 3_s_. 3_d_., inclusive of the +purchase and sale of a carriage, although no man was ever less prodigal +of public money. Nor is there any record of any official objection to +this somewhat alarming outlay. + +In 1853 the Pontifical Government, exercising its sway over some +3,000,000 inhabitants of the Roman States, was in possession of no +inconsiderable portion of the Italian peninsula, and presented the +remarkable spectacle of a country jointly occupied by two foreign armies +whose task it was to protect the Pope against his own subjects. With +this object, 10,000 Austrians were stationed in the Ancona district, and +10,000 French troops in Rome, the latter paying their own expenses, but +the former constituting a heavy charge upon the Holy Father with his +embarrassed revenue and increasing deficit. The foreign policy of the +Government was in the hands of Cardinal Antonelli, and not long after +his arrival Lyons was able to write that in spite of 'his peculiar +position' (unaccredited to the Government in Rome), and that in some +quarters England is regarded as the natural enemy of the Papacy, I have +found that notwithstanding a very strong opinion to the contrary, at +Rome, as at most other places, one succeeds best by transacting one's +business in the most plain and straightforward manner, and through the +most direct channels. By acting on this principle and by being very +quiet and unobtrusive, I think I have in part allayed the suspicions +which are felt towards us always more or less at Rome, and I am +certainly on a better footing with Cardinal Antonelli than I had +at all expected to be. + +The business between His Majesty's Government and that of Rome was not +of an overpowering nature, and was chiefly concerned with the proposed +establishment of regular diplomatic relations; with the alleged +intention of the Papal Government to create a Hierarchy in Scotland, and +with the inconvenient zeal of ardent Protestants in the Papal dominions. +As regards the establishment of diplomatic relations it seems highly +doubtful whether the Papal Government really desired to see a new +Protestant Mission at Rome: Cardinal Antonelli disclaimed any intention +of creating Roman Catholic Bishops in Scotland, but the religious +activity of British subjects in the Pope's dominions was a constant +source of petty troubles. It must be admitted, however, that it was +singularly easy to fall out with the Papal Government. The importation +of Bibles was forbidden, the distribution of tracts was punished with +imprisonment; one man of English extraction was incarcerated for a +lengthy period because, according to his own statements, he had not +communicated with sufficient regularity; and there were over 600 +political prisoners in gaol at Rome at the same time. + +As for the official relations between England and the Papal Government +they were friendly enough, and when the Crimean war broke out, feeling +at the Vatican was strongly anti-Russian, for it was believed that +whereas the Roman Catholic Church had nothing to fear from Protestants +and Mussulmans, the Greek schism was a real and threatening danger. + +The following letter addressed to his brother, Captain Lyons, gives a +not uninteresting description of the life led in Rome by an unmarried +diplomatist without much private means, and incidentally shows the deep +affection which he entertained for his family. + + * * * * * + + Rome, January 3rd, 1855. + + You may imagine what a relief to me it was, after reading your + letter of the 18th, to see Admiral Dundas' arrival at Constantinople + announced in the Malta paper. Your letter of the 3rd is almost, + indeed I think quite, the most interesting I ever read. The only + drawback to the delight all these letters are to me, is that you + were still lying up. That I hope is over, and that you will be very + prudent about it. We have now a weekly post from Constantinople and + Malta, which is a great comfort. Mention all the details you can in + your letters about the siege and operations by sea and land. The + Malta papers bring nothing that can be depended upon. Besides the + intense interest, it is a great advantage to me diplomatically to + have good intelligence to communicate here, and is a great help to + getting information, which is useful to me, on Roman matters. + Details about Sir E. and yourself are always the most precious + things you can write, and they cannot be too numerous or too minute. + + My _ménage_ consists of two men. I am obliged to have two, in order + not to have to open the door myself, if I send one out. I have a + good-sized sitting room, much better furnished than most Roman + Lodgings, a second sitting room, which serves as Anteroom, and + Breakfast Room, good Bedroom and a Dressing Room. I have very little + sun, which I think an advantage, though in general it is thought the + greatest of disadvantages--I breakfast at home, and dine with some + of the other Diplomatists at a little quiet Table d'Hôte, where + there is a very good dinner. In winter I dine out three or four + times a week, and always spend the evening in society. I never do + anything at all in the way of hospitality. With the immense number + of English here, it would be impossible for me to get on, unless I + made this rule. In summer I had some men occasionally to play at + Whist, all of course Foreigners. I have taken my present lodging to + the end of June. My hope is to go to England for two or three months + about that time. I pay between 14 and £15 sterling a month for my + apartment. It is in a capital situation--and a second floor. It is + an admirable country for long rides, but very bad for short ones. + The pavement of the Town is so slippery that it is dangerous to ride + over it--most of the gates are at a very great distance, and after + you pass them, you have a mile or two of stone wall, before you get + out into the open country--which is beautiful and excellent for + riding. The result is that I never do ride. Being almost the only + Englishman here who has anything to do, beyond sight seeing and + amusement, my hours do not suit my Countrymen. My great friend is a + Count Gozze, Austrian Secretary of Legation. He is an old Dresden + friend of mine. Rome is a very rainy place, which obliges me often + to hire a carriage to go out in the evening. The hired carriages are + good, but dear, about nine shillings for an evening. Lord Walpole is + here--no one else I think that you know. I have scribbled all this + because you ask me, and because little details about the writer (if + one really cares for him) are generally the most interesting parts + of letters, written where there are no great events going on. You + would think me oldwomanish if I mentioned half my anxieties about + you and my Father. + +A few months later, the brother, Captain Lyons, an exceptionally +promising and gallant naval officer, died of wounds received before +Sebastopol. + +In 1856 promotion came in the shape of the secretaryship of Legation at +Florence, but he continued to be employed in Rome, and stood +twenty-second on a list of twenty-four secretaries of Legation. His +prospects of further advance did not appear reassuring, and in March +1857, he writes to his father (now a peer), 'My chance at present seems +to rest almost entirely on Lord Clarendon's disposition to give +practical effect to the good opinion he expresses of me. I should trust +with more confidence to that, if he had not promoted six secretaries of +Legation before me during my residence here, and afterwards offered me +as promotion the post of Secretary of Legation at Florence. Had it not +been for your visit to England at the critical moment, I should now have +been no more than simple Secretary of Legation, doing nothing at +Florence.' + +In the autumn of 1857, Lord Normanby, Minister at Florence, having gone +on leave, Lyons was sent to take his place, and, instead of having +nothing to do, found himself at once involved in one of those trivial +questions which so deeply exercised the diplomacy of a former +generation, but which are now of rare occurrence. + +Earlier in the year the Pope had paid a visit to Tuscany, and during his +stay at Florence a banquet was held in his honour, to which the members +of the diplomatic corps were invited. Much to their indignation they +were not accommodated at the Tavola di Stato or Sovereign Table, where +His Holiness was seated, and Lord Normanby, the British Minister, a +K.G., Ex-Viceroy, and social magnate, considered that an apology was +due from the Tuscan Government. Unfortunately for Lord Normanby, his +colleagues, having previously agreed to support him, backed out of their +undertaking, and the task of extracting an apology fell upon Lyons, for +Lord Normanby had departed uttering dark threats that he would not +return unless the apology was forthcoming. The Foreign Office took up +the matter seriously, and for no less than three months an animated +controversy was carried on, in the course of which 'The Tuscan +authorities showed themselves so thoroughly wrongheaded that every time +the subject was mentioned they said or did something which made it more +difficult for them to go back,' and Lord Clarendon administered to them +'a severe rebuke.' Finally, whether owing to the severe rebuke or not, +some sort of expression of regret was obtained; the injured Lord Normanby +returned to his post, and Lyons resumed his duties at Rome. Whence he +writes on March 6, 1858:-- + + The question of Reforms in the Papal Administration, which was so + much agitated during the Pope's journey and immediately afterwards, + appears to be entirely forgotten. The repressive measures which have + been adopted in France since the attempt on the Emperor[1] would + seem to render it difficult for H.M. to urge other sovereigns to + Liberal reforms. The mode in which the intelligence of the attempt + was received at Rome was shocking. One can hardly say that any class + expressed horror: the lower people openly declared their regret that + the crime had not been successful, and the middle classes took + little pains to conceal that they shared this feeling. In fact the + policy which is supposed to be adopted by France of coquetting with + the Liberal Party, without doing anything serious in their favour, + has alienated the sympathies of this part of Italy. + +Reforms of a simple character were evidently urgently needed in the +Papal Administration, for just about this time a Canadian bishop and +other British tourists were openly plundered on the main road between +Rome and Civita Vecchia. + +The turning point in Lyons's fortunes may be said to have arrived when +early in March he received orders from Lord Malmesbury to proceed to +Naples to inquire into the case of the _Cagliari_. + +The _Cagliari_ was a mail steamer plying between Genoa, Sardinia and +Tunis, and on June 25, a number of Mazzinians who had taken passage in +her seized the master and the crew, altered the course of the vessel, +landed at the Island of Ponza in Neapolitan territory, where they +liberated three hundred political prisoners, and subsequently proceeded +to Sapri, in the neighbourhood of Salerno. Here they again disembarked, +expecting the inhabitants to rise in their favour, but encountered a +superior force of Neapolitan troops who killed or captured the whole +party, whilst the _Cagliari_ was seized by Neapolitan warships as +she was making her way ostensibly to Naples. Some weeks later it was +ascertained that amongst the prisoners in Naples were two English +engineers, Watt and Park by name, and it was stated that these two men +were entirely ignorant of the conspiracy, and had been forced by the +conspirators to work the engines under threats of being summarily +shot if they refused. Under the circumstances, as was only natural, +application was made by the British Government that they should at least +have a fair trial, and that the acting Vice-Consul at Naples should be +permitted to visit them in gaol. + +Diplomatic relations between England and the Neapolitan Government +having been suspended for some years, Lord Clarendon wrote himself +direct to Signor Carafa, the Neapolitan Foreign Minister, in November, +urging the necessity of dealing with the case in an equitable spirit, +but with incredible perverseness and stupidity the Neapolitan Government +continued to refuse upon one pretext or another either to release the +men or to bring them to trial, or even to permit the Vice-Consul to +visit them. In March, 1858, Watt and Park were still in gaol, and had +been subjected to such abominable treatment that the health of both +was completely broken down, and Watt had become partially insane. Under +these circumstances, a change of government having in the meanwhile +occurred in England, Lord Malmesbury directed Lyons to proceed at once +to Naples and inquire into the case. Although the whole question had +been considerably complicated, partly owing to a note of Sir James +Hudson to the Sardinian Government having been unaccountably altered by +a member of his staff, and partly owing to a rooted belief on the part +of high Neapolitan legal authorities that engineers were responsible for +a ship's course, the Lyons Mission soon bore fruit, and the two +unfortunate Englishmen were both set free, nominally on bail, before the +end of the month, it having become evident to every one that they were +absolutely innocent. But the Neapolitan Government was by no means out +of its difficulties. It was pointed out that as two innocent men had +been imprisoned for nine months, and treated with great barbarity during +the greater part of the time, they were entitled to an indemnity which +was fixed at £3000. Worse was to follow, for, egged on by the Sardinian +Government, the British Government put forward a demand that the +_Cagliari_ should be surrendered on the ground that its capture had +been illegally effected. Both these demands were refused, and finally, +in May, 1858, a special messenger was sent to Naples instructing Lyons +to leave unless within ten days the Neapolitan Government consented to +accept mediation, and stating that England would make common cause with +Sardinia under certain circumstances. + +The message could not have been an agreeable one to deliver, and what +the Neapolitan Government disliked more than anything else was the +appearance of yielding to Sardinia. 'Ah! s'il n'y avait que l'Angleterre!' +had always been the expression used by Signor Carafa; but his Government +had placed itself hopelessly in the wrong, and Lyons was able to report +that the indemnity would be paid, and that the _Cagliari_ had been +placed 'at his disposal.' It was an additional satisfaction to him to +add that: 'Far from threatening, I did not even go so far as my +instructions warranted, for I did not say that His Majesty's Government +proposed that the mediator should retire at the end of three months, nor +did I tell Signor Carafa that I was myself ordered to go back to Rome if +the mediation should be refused at the expiration of ten days.' + +In spite of the unpleasant nature of this affair, Lyons contrived to +remain on the very best of terms with the Neapolitan Ministers with whom +he had to deal, and Lord Malmesbury was so favourably impressed with his +tact and skill that he at once appointed him Minister at Florence. His +professional future was now assured; but far greater honours were in +store for him, for in November, 1858, came the offer of the Washington +Legation, an offer which, with characteristic modesty, he accepted with +considerable misgivings as to his competence. Nor could it be said that +success had arrived with unusual rapidity, for he was already forty-one. + +In the same month he succeeded to the peerage on the death of his +father. His mother had died some years previously; his brother had +perished in the Crimea, and the only remaining near relatives were his +two sisters, one of whom was married to the Duke of Norfolk, and the +other to a Bavarian gentleman, Baron von Würtzburg. + + +FOOTNOTES: + + [1] Napoleon III. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +WASHINGTON + +(1859-1860) + + +In February, 1859, Lord Lyons, accompanied by some members of his staff +(a novelty to one who hitherto had been obliged to work unaided) was +despatched to Washington in H.M.S. _Curaçoa_, and owing to the limited +coal capacity of that vessel, the voyage occupied no less than forty-two +days, a period which must have been singularly disagreeable to a man who +in spite of some years' naval service always suffered from sea sickness. +The new Minister was received with marked courtesy by the U.S. +authorities, and presented his letter of credence on April 12, Mr. +Buchanan being President at the time, and General Cass occupying the +position of Secretary of State. + +Although the Presidential message of the previous December had +contained some rather ominous passages with regard to the relations +between England and the United States, the sentiments now expressed +were friendly in character and showed a disposition to settle pending +difficulties in an amicable spirit. + +The first letter of importance addressed by Lord Lyons to Lord +Malmesbury deals with the effect produced in the United States +by the outbreak of war between France and Austria. + + * * * * * + + Washington, May 24, 1859. + + I had intended to write a despatch respecting the effect produced + in the U.S. by the War in Europe, but we are so short of hands in + the Chancery, that it is as much as we have been able to do to get + through the regular matters of business which must be treated + officially. I can however give you in a very few words an account of + the state of feeling here, which is probably just what you would + have expected it to be. + + The sympathies are all with France and against Austria, but they do + not seem very strong; one sentiment however does appear to be both + strong and universal--the desire to take advantage of the state of + things in Europe to carry out American Views on this side of the + Atlantic; in short to get hold of Mexico and Cuba. The present wish + of the President is, I think, both to be and to appear to be on the + best terms with us. He is careful to vindicate us, in the newspaper + which is his organ, against all imputation of insincerity in Central + American Affairs. The Departments are particularly attentive to all + the smaller matters I have to bring before them, and apparently + anxious to do what I ask. But here I am afraid the practical effect + of their goodwill is likely to end. The Government is so weak that I + do not think it would venture, even in a small matter, to do + anything for us which would expose it to the least unpopularity. I + feel my way cautiously, endeavouring to be very plain and firm upon + clear British Questions, and to avoid doubtful topics as much as + possible. + + The immediate object of the President with regard to Mexico appears + to be to avoid the ridicule which would be heaped upon him if the + Government of Juarez were to fall immediately after the American + Cabinet had at last made up their mind to recognize it. Instructions + are, I am told, on the point of being sent to Mr. McLane to + negotiate a treaty with Mexico, partly, it is said, with the object + of giving Juarez a little moral support, partly perhaps to get so + advantageous a Treaty from him, as to engage public opinion here to + declare itself more strongly in favour of his being upheld by the + U.S. Whether Mr. McLane will be instructed (as Mr. Forsyth was) to + propose to purchase part of the Mexican territory, I am unable to + say. + + I am very much obliged by your sending out Mr. Warre, and am + impatiently expecting him. It is absolutely necessary to have a good + man here to direct the Chancery; I think too this mission would be a + very good school for a young man who really wished to learn his + business, and I should welcome any one who was industrious, and + wrote a thoroughly good legible hand. + + It is particularly desirable that the Staff should be complete, + because if the Minister is to have any knowledge of the Country and + people, it is indispensable that he should visit, from time to time, + the principal cities. This is not like a European State, in which + politics and business are centred in the Capital, and can be studied + more advantageously there than elsewhere. No political men make + Washington their principal residence, in fact they cannot do so, as + it sends no members to Congress, either to the Senate or the House + of Representatives. Commerce it has none. It is in fact little more + than a large village--and when Congress is not sitting it is a + deserted village. + +Another letter dated May 30, shows that he was under no illusion as to +the feelings entertained by a large section of the American public, +while fully conscious of the difficulties with which the United States +Government, however well intentioned, was forced to contend. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Malmesbury._ + + Washington, May 30, 1859. + + You will anticipate from my private letter of the 24th my answer to + your inquiry as to what would be the animus of this Government if + England became involved in the present war. + + The first notion both of Government and People would be to take + advantage of the circumstance to take their full swing upon this + side of the Atlantic, and especially so far as the people are + concerned to get hold of Cuba and Mexico. The wiser heads see + very distinctly the imprudence of fresh acquisitions of territory, + and the great danger to the Union of introducing large Bodies of + Citizens of Spanish and mixed Races. I believe this to be the + feeling of the present Administration, but no administration + disregards the popular cry. + + So far as I can learn, the American acquisitiveness is directed + rather South than North, and is disposed to be content for the + present, with what is most easy to lay hold of. Except on the part + of the most rancorous of the Irish here there does not appear to + be much desire of exciting disturbances in Canada or any of our + Colonies. + + I think that if we were engaged in war the Americans would be + (particularly with reference to neutral rights at sea) punctilious, + exacting and quarrelsome to a degree. There is hardly any amount of + violence to which a captain of an American man of war, if he were + clearly in superior force, might not be expected to resort, in order + to prevent American merchantmen being interfered with. And however + outrageous in itself and opposed to International Law the conduct of + the American officers might be, it would meet with enthusiastic + applause from the multitude, and consequently the Government would + not dare to disavow it. This admiration of bullying and violent + proceedings on their own side, which appears to be universal among + the populace here, and the want of firmness on the part of the + Government in withstanding it, seem to me to constitute some of the + greatest difficulties we should have to contend with in keeping at + peace with America when we were at war with other Powers. + + I do not think the general sympathies of the Americans need be taken + much into the account. The violent feelings aroused at particular + conjunctures by the events of the war, or by special matters of + dispute, are what will sway the mob, and therefore control the + Government. The upper classes here have certainly in general a + strong sympathy with England; they are proud of her position in the + world, they are anxious for her good opinion, they admire her + political institutions, and are extremely discontented with those of + their own country. But the upper classes keep aloof from political + life, and have little influence in public affairs. The mass of the + Irish Emigrants appear to regard England with bitter hatred, their + numbers give them weight in elections, but their moral power is + small. I should hardly say that the Bulk of the American people are + hostile to the old country but I think they would rather enjoy + seeing us in difficulties. Those even who are most friendly like to + gratify their pride by the idea of our being reduced to straits and + of their coming to our rescue. + + I conceive that the wish both of Government and people would certainly + at first be to remain neutral, and reap all the advantages to their + commerce which could not fail to result from that situation, and + their interest in remaining at peace with us is so apparent and so + immense, that it could not fail to tell for some time. But the + People are irritable, excitable, and have a great longing to play + the part of a first-rate power. + + The Government would no doubt endeavour to maintain neutrality, but + it would follow public feeling, and probably become exacting, + captious, and (to use a term more expressive than classical) + 'bumptious' to a very irritating extent. A great deal would depend + upon firmness on our side. If they thought they could attain their + ends by threats and bluster, there would be no limit to their + pretensions. Perhaps the best way to deal with them would be to + gratify their vanity by treating them in matters of form as great + people, being careful to communicate with them respecting our views + and intentions in something the same manner as if they were really a + considerable military power: to avoid interfering in matters in + which we are not sufficiently interested to make it worth while to + raise serious questions, and above all in matters directly affecting + British interests and British Rights to be clear and distinct in our + language, and firm and decided in our conduct, to convince them that + when we are in the right and in earnest, we are more unyielding, not + less so than formerly--in short to avoid as much as possible raising + questions with them, but not to give way upon those we raise. + + I need not remind you that these are the crude ideas of a man who + has been only seven weeks in the country, and who has necessarily + passed them in a small, and at this season, almost deserted town, + which is merely the nominal Capital. + + I am anxiously looking out for Mr. Warre, whose arrival you announce + that I may soon expect. It would add much to the efficiency of the + Mission, and be a great comfort to me to have an additional unpaid + attaché, provided he were industrious, desirous to improve, and + capable of writing a good hand. + +The change of Government which took place in England during the summer +substituted Lord John Russell for Lord Malmesbury at the Foreign Office, +and following the example of his predecessor, Lord John desired to be +supplied with confidential information by private letters. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._ + + Washington, July 11, 1859. + + At present the President and his Cabinet appear to desire both to + be, and to be thought by the Public to be on the best terms with us. + They are however so weak in Congress, that I doubt whether they + would venture to do anything for us which would be the least + unpopular. It is not therefore to be hoped that they will make any + effort to open to us the Coasting Trade, to extend the provisions of + the Reciprocity Treaty with Canada, to make a Copyright Convention, + or, in short, take any liberal course in commercial matters. Nor + indeed is it likely to be in their power to carry any measures + tending to put us on equal terms with themselves in these respects. + The Democratic spirit in this country appears to be all in favour + of Protection and Exclusive Privileges. Happily the interest of + the South is against a high Customs Tariff; and this checks the + Protectionist Tendencies of the Manufacturing North. + + Mr. Dallas will have communicated to you the Statement which has + been for months preparing here, of the views of this Government + respecting neutral rights. The Cabinet, I understand, hope that they + shall obtain great credit with the people for their efforts to + establish American views on this point. They are very anxious to + obtain our co-operation, and imagine, I think, that they may induce + us to claim now concessions to Neutrals which would result in being + a considerable restraint to our assertion for ourselves of + Belligerent rights if we should become involved in war. + + I think that our Relations with the U.S. require more than ever--at + this moment--caution and firmness. Caution--to avoid raising + questions with them, without a positive necessity; firmness--to make + them feel that they cannot take advantage of the State of affairs in + Europe to obtain undue advantages in matters directly affecting + British Interests or British Rights. For my own part I endeavour to + speak firmly and distinctly upon all matters which fall within the + proper province of the British Minister in this country and to avoid + all doubtful topics. + + * * * * * + + The Americans, both Government and People, are I think very much + pleased by attentions and civilities, and very prone to fancy + themselves slighted. This quality may be sometimes turned to good + account, and should certainly be borne in mind when it is necessary + to keep them in good humour. + +One of the many questions which had for some time engaged the attention +of the two Governments was the disputed ownership of the island of San +Juan on the Pacific coast, and this case afforded an instance in which +the Government of the United States was hampered by an agent whom it was +not inclined to disavow. The culprit was a certain General Harney who +in a high-handed manner occupied the island without authorization, +and conducted himself in a generally offensive manner, but although +President Buchanan was considerably embarrassed by his action, he was +too much afraid of the press and the mob to order the withdrawal of +the troops. For some time there appeared to be a chance of an actual +collision, and Lord John Russell showed considerable irritation. + + * * * * * + + _Lord John Russell to Lord Lyons._ + + Abergeldie, Sept. 21, 1859. + + The affair of San Juan is very annoying. It is of the nature of the + U.S. citizens to push themselves where they have no right to go, and + it is of the nature of the U.S. Government not to venture to disavow + acts they cannot have the face to approve. + + The best way perhaps would be that we should seize some other island + to which we have as little right as the Americans to San Juan. But + until we know the answer of the American Government to your note and + the proceedings of Governor Douglas, we can hardly give you + instructions. + + If you could contrive a convention with the U.S. by which each Power + should occupy San Juan for three or six months, each to protect + person and property till the boundary question is settled, it will + be the best arrangement that can be made for the present. + +As a matter of fact the U.S. Government showed itself more reasonable +than had been expected: a superior officer, General Scott, was sent to +settle matters, Harney, to use Lord John Russell's expression, was 'left +in the mud,' and after a joint occupation and protracted negotiations +the question of the ownership of San Juan was referred to the arbitration +of the King of Prussia, who gave his award in favour of the United +States some years later. + +San Juan, however, was but one amongst a multitude of questions +requiring solution, and the great difficulty which Lord Lyons had to +contend with was--to use his own words, 'The idea that, happen what may, +England will never really declare war with this country has become so +deeply rooted that I am afraid nothing short of actual hostilities would +eradicate it.' One of these questions concerned the Slave Trade. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._ + + Dec 6, 1859. + + You will see by my despatches of this date, that there is very + little prospect of any satisfactory result from our remonstrance + concerning the Slave Trade. Lamentable as it is, I am afraid the + President goes beyond public opinion already in the measures he + takes against it. In the South the rendering it legal has many + avowed advocates, and it is to be feared that some of the professed + Abolitionists of the North derive too much profit from dabbling + themselves in the trade to desire any efficient measures for its + suppression. The greater part of the vessels engaged in it seem to + be fitted out at New York. The state of feeling at this moment in + the South upon the whole question of slavery is shocking. The + Harper's Ferry affair seems to have excited Southern passions to an + indescribable degree. The dissolution of the Confederation is but + one of the measures which are loudly advocated. There are plans for + the re-enslavement of all the emancipated negroes and for the + purging the South of all whites suspected of Abolitionist + tendencies. The difficulty which we shall have in obtaining decent + treatment for coloured British subjects will be almost insuperable. + + * * * * * + + Another source of trouble between us and the Southern States may + arise from the measures which they are taking to drive out all + persons suspected of unorthodox notions on slavery, and the orthodox + notion seems to be that slavery is a divine institution. In many + parts of the South, Vigilance Committees are formed who turn people + out at a moment's notice, without any pretext even of law. If any + attempt is made to treat British subjects in this manner, I trust + you will approve of my encouraging the Consuls to insist upon the + law being observed in their case, and to resist any endeavour to + inflict banishment or any other penalty upon an Englishman, except + in due form of law. But it will require a great deal of prudence + and discretion to act in each case, for a fair trial is a thing + impossible in this country of election judges and partisan juries + when party feeling is excited, and any redress we may exact for the + wrong to England, will be too late for the individual in the hands + of Lynch Law Assassins. + + The great hope is that the excitement is too violent to last, but + before it subsides, it may do incalculable harm to these states and + raise very painful and awkward questions for us. + +If the hope expressed in the last paragraph was fallacious, the +forebodings as to the possible tribulations of British subjects proved +before long to be only too well founded. + +Asked by Lord John Russell for his opinion on the position of affairs in +Mexico, he points out _inter alia_, that-- + + The actual annexation of Mexico to this Confederation raises + immediately one of those questions between the Northern and Southern + States which have already gone a great way to dissolve the Union + altogether. The Southern States desire the addition of territory + _south_, with a view to extending slavery and adding to the + Pro-Slavery votes in the U.S. Senate. To this the North is + conscientiously opposed on religious grounds, to say nothing of the + indignation it feels at the notion of its own vast superiority in + wealth and population being swamped in the Senate. Even now, since + every State sends equally two senators, whatever may be its + population, the North has not the influence it ought to have in the + Senate which is the more important branch of the Legislature. As + the religious sentiment in the North approaches very nearly to + fanaticism, and as the Southern feeling on the point has become + furious passion, there is little chance of their coming to an + agreement upon a matter which calls these feelings into play. In + this particular question the South have on their side the national + vanity which seems always childishly gratified by any addition to + the already enormous extent of the territory. In the meantime the + course of events seems to be bringing about the gradual annexation + of Mexico. The Mexicans in the northern part of their country have + fallen to that point, that they can neither maintain order on the + frontier nor hold their own against the savage Indians within it. + They will (to use an American expression) be 'squatted out' of their + country whenever and wherever any considerable number of the more + energetic race choose to settle. But this is a very different thing + from the sudden incorporation of a vast territory and of a large + population totally different in race, language, religion and + feeling, and (so far as the experiment has been tried) utterly + incapable of maintaining order among themselves under the U.S. + system of government. All the wiser and more conservative + politicians in this country deprecate as an unmitigated evil the + sudden annexation of Mexico; nor are such men willing to undertake + a protectorate of Mexico. This they say would be an enormous + innovation upon their whole political system which has never + admitted of any other connexion than that of perfectly equal + sovereign states, bound by a Federal tie on terms the same for all. + +The Presidential Message of December, 1859, was noticeable for an +earnest appeal to the North and South to cultivate feelings of mutual +forbearance. + +The message also made clear the policy of the President towards Mexico; +in accordance with the principles of the Monroe doctrine, European +intervention in that country was repudiated, and American intervention +recommended. + +A passage referring to San Juan while obviously intended to exculpate +General Harney, paid a handsome tribute to the moderation and discretion +shown by the British Admiral (Baynes) commanding on the Pacific +station; and the President in conversation expressed the hope that the +approaching close of his administration would leave 'a clear score' with +England. No doubt President Buchanan was sincere in his expressions, +but unfortunately, early in 1860, signs were not wanting, that in the +distracted state of the country owing to the rising passions between +North and South, many people believed that a foreign war would be the +best means of promoting unity, nor was there much doubt as to which +foreign country would be selected for the experiment. + +Washington has already been disrespectfully alluded to as little better +than a large village, and as bearing little resemblance to an ordinary +capital, but it is evident that Lord Lyons found plenty of enjoyment +there. He was on excellent terms personally with the State officials and +his diplomatic colleagues; liked the members of his staff, and above all +rejoiced in the fact that there was plenty of work to be done--a good +deal more, indeed, than the ordinary person would have approved of. One +of his few complaints is that he is much beset by the inventors of +implements of war. 'I have not the slightest knowledge practical or +theoretical respecting implements of war, and should consequently never +be justified in recommending one more than another to the authorities at +home. I absolutely decline to see, touch, or have brought into my house +any explosive material, I should not feel easy at having even in a +garret such a box as you (the Consul at New York) have received for Her +Majesty. I should be inclined to ask for authority from England to sink +it in the Atlantic Ocean.' + +'I am getting on tolerably well here, I hope, on the whole, and have no +complaints to make of the Americans,' he admits in letters to other +correspondents, and adds: 'I am afraid marriage is better never than +late. The American women are undoubtedly very pretty, but my heart is +too old and too callous to be wounded by their charms. I am not going to +be married either to the fascinating accomplished niece of the +President, or to the widow of a late Foreign Minister, or to any other +maiden or relict to whom I am given by the newspapers.' + +These sentiments sound rather rash even at the age of forty-two, but +they remained unchanged. It would be incorrect to describe him as a +misogynist, but he successfully withstood all attempts to marry him. +In after years, an exalted personage (neither Queen Victoria nor the +Empress Eugenie) was so insistent upon the advisability of his espousing +one of her ladies-in-waiting, that she eventually couched her proposal +in the form of an ultimatum. Lord Lyons asked for and obtained a delay +of twenty-four hours, and decided upon consideration to refuse. In view +of an event which occurred not long afterwards the decision proved to be +a prudent one, and probably confirmed him in the suspicions which he +appeared to entertain of the opposite sex. + +It had been decided that the Prince of Wales should make a tour in +Canada in the summer of 1860, and the Duke of Newcastle, at that time +Colonial Secretary, consulted Lord Lyons as to the advisability of +H.R.H. paying a visit to America. The latter, upon consideration, +pronounced in favour of it. He did not arrive at this decision without +some hesitation. It was feared by persons of experience that the +disaffected Irish in New York and elsewhere might make themselves +disagreeable; the Prince's time was limited, and he would obviously +be unable to make an extended tour, and so might involuntarily cause +offence, whilst it was highly probable that the necessity for preserving +a strictly non-official character might also give rise to difficulties. + +On the other hand, President Buchanan extended an invitation in such +cordial terms that it would have been ungracious to decline. + +Lord Lyons joined the Prince of Wales in Canada in August, and the tour +must have been an agreeable change even to a person of his sedentary +inclinations. Since his arrival at Washington, fifteen months before, he +had never slept or been six miles outside the town. 'Whenever,' he +explains to a friend, 'I have planned a journey, I have been stopped by +invasions of islands in the Pacific or some other "difficulty" as a +dispute is called here.' It may be surmised, however, that such +obstacles were much less objectionable to him than they would have been +to any one else; he hated travel, openly avowed that he loathed +sight-seeing, and welcomed the opportunity of 'getting Niagara and the +Lakes done this way; it will be a good thing over.' + +It was eventually decided that the Prince's visit to the States should +take place in September, and the announcement was not only received +with unbounded satisfaction, but caused prodigious excitement. 'The +President was moved from the usual staid solemnity of his demeanour by +his gratification at receiving an answer from Her Majesty written with +her own hand. At the close of our interview he hurried off with it in +great delight (no doubt to show it to his niece) saying: "It is indeed +something to have an autograph letter from Queen Victoria!"[2] Nor was +the President's gratification confined to the family circle, for he +asked and obtained permission to publish the royal letter which had +afforded so much satisfaction. As soon as the news became known +invitations of every kind at once began to pour in from all quarters, +and offerings of the most varied description made their appearance at +the Legation, which included such objects as equestrian sugar statues of +H.R.H., pots of ointment for the Queen, books of sermons for "Baron +Renfrew," and a set of plates for the "Prince of Whales." Innumerable +requests arrived too for interviews, autographs, and mementos, amongst +which may be cited an application for a photograph from a citizen of +Lowell "for his virgin wife."' + +It was, of course, unfortunately necessary to decline the invitations, +for the itinerary had been settled beforehand, and it had been wisely +decided that the Prince should never stay with any private individual, +but always be lodged at an hotel at his own expense, that he should +refuse to receive addresses and deputations, and should neither hear nor +make public speeches. It was also considered desirable that receptions +of British subjects should not be encouraged, and that he should not +attend any demonstration of his fellow-countrymen so as not to excite +any feeling of jealousy. + +As for the gifts which were proffered in great profusion, they were +regretfully declined in accordance with the usual practice of the Royal +Family. + +In spite of the nominally private character of the Prince of Wales's +tour in the United States, most careful arrangements were found to be +necessary wherever he made a stay. At New York, in particular, which +city appears to be, beyond all others, interested in Royal personages, +the programme could hardly have been of a more elaborate nature had an +Emperor been visiting an Imperial Sire and Brother; even the ladies with +whom H.R.H. was expected to dance, having been selected long in advance. +The chief difficulty in New York and elsewhere seems to have been the +prohibition of speeches at banquets. The Americans, overflowing with +hospitable enthusiasm, were only too anxious to display their friendship +in public utterances, but the British Government had wisely decided that +nineteen was too early an age at which to begin making speeches in a +foreign country, and the rule of silence was rigidly adhered to. + +The Prince of Wales's tour, although necessarily brief, included, +besides Washington, some of the principal cities in the States, and +judging from the contemporary correspondence, was attended by singularly +few untoward incidents, proving, in fact, successful beyond expectation. + +The happy effect produced by this visit was described in an official +despatch, and private letters corroborate the favourable impression +created. + +'I have more completely realized, as the Americans say, the wonderful +success of the Prince of Wales's tour than I did when it was in +progress. I have now had time to talk quietly about it with men +whose opinion is worth having, and also to compare newspapers of various +shades of politics. I am glad to see that the incognito and other +restrictions maintained are represented as a peculiar compliment to +the Americans as showing a desire to associate with them on more equal +terms than would be possible with subjects.'[3] + +'The Prince of Wales's tour in the U.S. went off completely to the +satisfaction of all parties from the beginning to the end. It was rather +hard work for me, as he never went out without me, nor I without him, +and I had quantities of letters to write and people to see and keep in +good humour. Nevertheless H.R.H. himself and all the people with him +were so agreeable, that on the whole I enjoyed the tour very much while +it was going on. I look back to it with unmixed satisfaction.'[4] + +Much of the success, although he was too modest to allude to it, was +probably due to his own carefulness and forethought. + + +FOOTNOTES: + + [2] Lord Lyons to Lord J. Russell, July 9. + + [3] Lord Lyons to the Duke of Newcastle, Oct. 29. + + [4] Lord Lyons to Mr. Griffith, Nov. 10. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR--THE 'TRENT' CASE + +(1860-1861) + + +Before the close of 1860 the relations between North and South had +reached the critical stage: the mutterings of the coming storm grew +louder, and when it became clear, in November, that Abraham Lincoln was +to be the new President, secession advanced with rapid strides, while +conviction became general that a collision was inevitable. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Duke of Newcastle._ + + Dec. 10, 1860. + + It is difficult to believe that I am in the same country which + appeared so prosperous, so contented, and one may say, so calm when + we travelled through it. The change is very great even since I wrote + to you on the 29th October. Our friends are apparently going ahead + on the road to ruin with their characteristic speed and energy. + + The President (Buchanan) is harassed beyond measure. It is a very + unfortunate moment for our negotiations, but the present state of + things makes me more than ever anxious to get the San Juan question + safely landed beyond the reach of the incoming administration. + +The approaching rule of Lincoln entailed the disquieting probability of +the appointment of Mr. Seward as Secretary of State. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._ + + Washington, Jan. 7, 1861. + + It is considered almost certain that Mr. Seward is to be Mr. + Lincoln's Secretary of State. This will be regarded as a defiance + of the South, unless (as is expected) Mr. Seward comes out with a + conciliatory speech in the Senate. With regard to Great Britain, I + cannot help fearing that he will be a dangerous Foreign Minister. + His view of the relations between the United States and Great + Britain has always been that they are a good material to make + political capital of. He thinks at all events that they may be + safely played with without any risk of bringing on a war. He has + even to me avowed his belief that England will never go to war with + the United States. He has generally taken up any cry against us, but + this he says he has done from friendship, to prevent the other + Party's appropriating it and doing more harm with it than he has + done. The temptation will be great for Lincoln's party, if they be + not actually engaged in a civil war, to endeavour to divert the + public excitement to a foreign quarrel. I do not think Mr. Seward + would contemplate actually going to war with us, but he would be + well disposed to play the old game of seeking popularity here by + displaying violence towards us. I don't think it will be so good a + game for him as it used to be, even supposing we give him an + apparent triumph, but I think he is likely to play it. + + This makes me more than ever anxious to settle the San Juan + question. + +The forebodings came true. Mr. Seward, a lawyer, who had aimed at the +Presidency himself, became Secretary of State, and caused the British +Government and the diplomatists at Washington many uncomfortable +moments. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._ + + Washington, March 26, 1861. + + Mr. Seward came to me on the evening of the 20th ultimo, and asked + me to let him speak to me very confidentially.... + + Mr. Seward observed that he considered it all important to ward off + a crisis during the next three months; that he had good hopes that + if this could be effected a counter revolution would take place in + the South; that he hoped and believed it would begin in the most + distant State, Texas, where indeed he saw symptoms of it already. It + might be necessary towards producing this effect to make the + Southern States feel uncomfortable in their present condition by + interrupting their commerce. It was however most important that the + new Confederacy should not in the mean time be recognized by any + Foreign Power. + + I said that certainly the feelings as well as the interests of Great + Britain would render H.M.'s Government most desirous to avoid any + step which could prolong the quarrel between North and South, or be + an obstacle to a cordial and speedy reunion between them if that + were possible. Still I said, if the U.S. determined to stop by force + so important a commerce as that of Great Britain with the + cotton-growing States, I could not answer for what might happen. + + Mr. Seward asked whether England would not be content to get cotton + through the Northern Ports, to which it could be sent by land. + + I answered that cotton although by far the most important article of + the Trade was not the only point to be considered. It was however a + matter of the greatest consequence to England to procure cheap + cotton. If a considerable rise were to take place in the price of + cotton, and British ships were to be at the same time excluded from + the Southern Ports, an immense pressure would be put upon H.M.'s + Government to use all the means in their power to open those Ports. + If H.M.'s Government felt it to be their duty to do so, they would + naturally endeavour to effect their object in a manner as consistent + as possible first with, their friendly feelings towards both + Sections of this Country, and secondly with the recognized + principles of International Law. As regards the latter point in + particular, it certainly appeared that the most simple, if not the + only way, would be to recognize the Southern Confederacy. I said a + good deal about my hopes that Mr. Seward would never let things come + to this, with which it is unnecessary to trouble you. + + I thought that Mr. Seward, although he did not give up the point, + listened with complacency to my arguments against interference with + Foreign Commerce. He said more than once that he should like to take + me to the President to discuss the subject with him. The conclusion + I came to was that the questions of a forcible collection of the + duties in the Southern Ports, and of a blockade of those Ports were + under discussion in the Cabinet, but that Mr. Seward was himself + opposed to those measures, and had good hopes that his opinion would + prevail. + + It would appear however that a change took place in the interval + between this conversation and yesterday. Mr. Seward, the principal + Members of the Cabinet, the Russian Minister, M. de Stoeckl, and the + French Minister, Mons. Mercier, with some other people dined with + me. After dinner, Mr. Seward entered into an animated conversation + with my French and Russian Colleagues, and signed to me to join + them. When I came up I found him asking M. Mercier to give him a + copy of his Instructions to the French Consuls in the Southern + States. M. Mercier made some excuse for refusing, but said that what + the instructions amounted to was that the Consuls were to do their + best to protect French Commerce 'sans sortir de la plus stricte + neutralité.' Mr. Seward then asked me to give him a copy of my + instructions to H.M.'s Consuls. I, of course, declined to do so, but + I told him that the purport of them was that the Consuls were to + regard questions from a commercial not a political point of view, + that they were to do all they could to favour the continuance of + peaceful commerce short of performing an act of recognition without + the orders of Her Majesty's Government. + +[Illustration: William Henry Seward. + +London: Edward Arnold] + + Mr. Seward then alluded to the Peruvian Papers, and speaking as he + had done all along very loud, said to my French and Russian + Colleagues and me, 'I have formed my opinion on that matter, and I + may as well tell it to you now as at any other time. I differ with + my Predecessor as to _de facto_ Authorities. If one of your Ships + comes out of a Southern Port without the Papers required by the laws + of the U.S., and is seized by one of our Cruisers and carried into + New York and confiscated, we shall not make any compensation.' My + Russian Colleague, M. de Stoeckl, argued the question with Mr. + Seward very good humouredly and very ably. Upon his saying that a + Blockade to be respected must be effective, Mr. Seward replied that + it was not a blockade that would be established; that the U.S. + Cruisers would be stationed off the Southern Coast to collect + duties, and enforce penalties for the infraction of the U.S. Customs + Laws. Mr. Seward then appealed to me. I said that it was really a + matter so very serious that I was unwilling to discuss it; that his + plan seemed to me to amount in fact to a paper blockade of the + enormous extent of coast comprised in the Seceding States; that the + calling it an enforcement of the Revenue Laws appeared to me to + increase the gravity of the measure, for it placed Foreign Powers in + the Dilemma of recognizing the Southern Confederation, or of + submitting to the interruption of their Commerce. + + Mr. Seward then went off into a defiance of Foreign Nations, in a + style of braggadocio which was formerly not uncommon with him, but + which I had not heard before from him since he had been in office. + Finding he was getting more and more violent and noisy, and saying + things which it would be more convenient for me not to have heard, I + took a natural opportunity of turning, as host, to speak to some of + the ladies in the room. + + M. de Stoeckl and M. Mercier inferred, as I do, that within the last + two days the opinion of the more violent party in the Cabinet had + prevailed, at all events for the moment, and that there is a danger + that an interference with Foreign Trade may take place at any + moment. I hope that it may still be prevented by the fear of its + producing a recognition of the Southern Confederacy. But I am afraid + we must be prepared for it. + + It may perhaps be well, with a view to the effect on this + Government, that the Commissioners who are on their way to Europe + from the Southern States should not meet with too strong a rebuff in + England or in France. Such a rebuff would be a great encouragement + to violent measures. In fact, notwithstanding my contradictions, the + Senate, and indeed, I fear, the President is not uninfluenced by the + bold assertions made by some Members of the violent Party that they + have positive assurances from Y.L. and other Members of H.M.'s + Government that _under no circumstances whatever_ will Great + Britain recognize the independence of the South. + + M. Mercier thinks it advisable that he and I should have a + discretionary Power to recognize the South. This seems to me to be + going too fast. I should feel a good deal embarrassed by having such + a power in my pocket, unless the contingency in which it was to be + used should be most clearly stated. What does appear to be of + extreme importance is that England and France should act in concert. + +Lincoln had been inaugurated as President in March, and in the following +month the long-awaited collision occurred at Charleston, when the +Confederates opened fire upon and captured Fort Sumter. The forts in +Charleston harbour had by common consent become the test case, and the +capture of Fort Sumter signalized the fact that a population of little +over 5 millions of white men had had the audacity to challenge over 22 +millions of their fellow-countrymen. + +Charleston, by the way, besides its importance in American history, +seems to have been a place where slavery was a very thorough-going +institution, judging from the following advertisement in the _Mercury_, +of March 25th, 1861. + + * * * * * + + NOTICE. TEN DOLLARS REWARD. + + Runaway on Friday night, March 23rd, my woman 'Silvey,' about forty + years of age, of a light brown complexion, and has spots on her + face as if done with powder, and limps a little, and speaks very low + when spoken to. She formerly belonged to the Rev. Mr. Keith, and of + late to Johnson the tailor, in King Street, near George Street. When + she left she had a chain around her ankles to keep her from going + off, but she went anyhow. Apply to P. Buckheit, north-west corner of + Line and Meeting Streets. + +Mr. W. H. Russell, the well-known correspondent, was in Charleston a few +days after the fall of Fort Sumter, and wrote as follows:---- + + * * * * * + + Charleston, April 19, 1861. + + I arrived here the night before last _viâ_ Baltimore, Norfolk and + Wilmington. North Carolina was in revolt--that is, there was no + particular form of authority to rebel against, but the shadowy + abstractions in lieu of it were treated with deserved contempt by + the 'citizens,' who with flint muskets and quaint uniforms were + ready at the various stations to seize on anything, particularly + whisky, which it occurred to them to fancy. At Wilmington I sent a + message to the electric telegraph office for transmission to New + York, but the 'citizens' of the Vigilance Committee refused to + permit the message to be transmitted and were preparing to wait upon + me with a view of asking me what were my general views on the state + of the world, when I informed them peremptorily that I must decline + to hold any intercourse with them which I the more objected to do in + that they were highly elated and excited by the news from Sumter. I + went over the works with General Beauregard: the military injury + done to Sumter is very trifling, but Anderson's defence, negative as + it was, must be regarded as exceedingly creditable to him. + + * * * * * + + In a week's time the place will be a hard nut to crack. One thing + is certain: nothing on earth will induce the people to return to the + Union. I believe firmly their present intention is to march upon + Washington, if it were merely as a diversion to carry the war away + from their interior. + +War having now actually broken out, the question of the blockade of the +Southern ports became all important for England. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._ + + Washington, April 15, 1861. + + I am getting very uneasy about the intention of the Government with + regard to stopping intercourse with Southern Ports. Now that war has + begun it seems difficult to suppose that they will abstain from + taking advantage of their one great superiority, which is their + navy. I suppose that a regular blockade would be less objectionable + than any such measures as closing the Southern Ports as Ports of + entry, or attempting to collect duties for the U.S. by ships + stationed off them. The rules of a blockade are to a great extent + determined and known, and our ships could at all events resort to + any Ports before which the U.S. did not establish a regular + effective blockade. But if the U.S. are to be permitted to seize any + ship of ours wherever they can find her within their jurisdiction on + the plea that by going to a Southern port she has violated the U.S. + custom laws, our commerce will be exposed to vexations beyond + bearing, and all kinds of new and doubtful questions will be raised. + In fact, this, it seems to me, would be a paper blockade of the + worst kind. It would certainly justify Great Britain and France in + recognizing the Southern Confederacy and sending their fleets to + force the U.S. to treat British and French vessels as neutrals in + conformity with the law of nations. + + Just as Mr. Seward was confident that he had prevailed in the + Cabinet, the President and the violent party suddenly threw over his + policy. Having determined not to resign, he pretends to be pleased, + and one of his colleagues says of him that in order to make up for + previous lukewarmness he is now the fiercest of the lot. It is a + great inconvenience to have him as the organ of communication from + the U.S. Government. Repeated failures have not convinced him that + he is not sure to carry his point with the President and the + Cabinet. He is therefore apt to announce as the fixed intentions + of his Government what is in reality no more than a measure which he + himself supports. + + I am in constant apprehension of some foolish and violent proceeding + of the Government with regard to Foreign Powers. Neither the + President nor any man in the Cabinet has a knowledge of Foreign + Affairs; they have consequently all the overweening confidence in + their own strength which popular oratory has made common in this + country. I believe the best chance of keeping them within bounds + will be to be very firm with them, particularly at first, and to act + in concert with France, if that be possible. + + As I have mentioned in my despatches, information coming from the + Southern Commissioners sent to negotiate with the Government here, + it may be as well to mention that they did not seek any intercourse + with me, and that I never had any communication with them, direct or + otherwise. I do not know that I should have thought it necessary to + refuse to communicate with them, if it had been proposed to me, but + the fact is as I have just said. + +The policy of acting in conjunction with France was adopted with +considerable success, as will appear later, but hitherto the British +Government had not given any very clear lead, Lord John Russell +contenting himself with the view that he relied upon 'the wisdom, +patience, and prudence of the British Minister to steer safely through +the danger of the crisis.' It was absolutely necessary, however, to deal +with the Blockade Question, and the Cabinet consulted the Law Officers +of the Crown, with the result that the Southern States were recognized +as belligerents. + + * * * * * + + _Lord John Russell to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, May 6, 1861. + + I cannot give you any official instructions by this mail, but the + Law Officers are of opinion that we must consider the Civil War + in America as regular war--_justum bellum_--and apply to it all + the rules respecting blockade, letters of Marque which belong to + neutrals during a war. They think moreover it would be very + desirable if both parties would agree to accept the Declaration of + Paris regarding the flag covering the goods and the prohibition of + privateers. + + You will of course inform our naval officers that they must conform + to the rules respecting Blockade, of which they are I believe in + possession. The matter is very serious and very unfortunate. + +An important conversation took place on May 17, between Lord J. Russell +and Mr. Adams, the new American Minister in London, in which the latter +went so far as to state that Lord John Russell's language to his +predecessor, Mr. Dallas, had been construed in an unfavourable light in +the United States, and that he was afraid that his own mission might +come to an end unless the unfavourable impression was corrected. He +further complained of the recognition of the South as a belligerent. +Lord John Russell in reply declined to give an undertaking that, apart +from belligerent rights, England would never recognize the Southern +States, but he endeavoured to make it clear that, if anything, popular +sympathy in England was with the North, and that H.M. Government were +only desirous of maintaining a strict neutrality. Any one reading the +correspondence of the period cannot fail to realize that Lord John +Russell was perfectly sincere in his expressed wish to preserve perfect +impartiality, in spite of the querulous and acrimonious tone which +occasionally characterized his communications. + +Lord Lyons, on his side, was only too anxious to avoid the slightest +semblance of anything which might cause offence to the United States +Government. He was constantly impressing upon the various Consuls that, +strict neutrality being the policy of H.M. Government, they must not be +led away by their sympathies, but confine themselves to obeying orders. +He vetoed the requests for warships, which they occasionally clamoured +for, in the traditional consular spirit, and urged caution upon the +British naval Commanders and the Canadian authorities. Fortunately, both +Admiral Milne and Sir Edmund Head, the Governor-General of Canada, were +prudent and tactful men, who ably co-operated with him. With both of +these he corresponded confidentially, and made no secret of the +apprehensions which he entertained. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Sir E. Head._ + + Washington, May 22, 1861. + + You will perhaps consider the notion that the U.S. should at this + moment provoke a war with a great Power as preposterous, and _à + priori_ it must seem incredible to any one. Nevertheless I am + so seriously alarmed by what I see passing around me here and + especially by the conduct of the Cabinet that I have thought it my + duty to call the attention of our Government to the danger which I + conceive to exist. To avert it is the main object of all I do here. + I am afraid however that things are coming to a point at which my + diplomacy will be completely at fault. + + * * * * * + + I could write a great deal to explain my reasons for fearing that if + a war be not imminent the risk is at any rate so great that it ought + at once to be guarded against. My mind is almost unremittingly + employed in devising means to maintain the peace. In this, even more + than in ordinary cases, I think the best safeguard will be found in + being evidently prepared for war. Nothing is so likely to prevent an + attack as manifest readiness to prevent one. I have thought it right + to state to H.M. Government my opinion that it is not even now too + soon to put Canada into a complete state of defence and to provide + both in the West Indies and on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts the + means of resisting attack in case of war or of making our neutrality + respected if peace can be maintained. + + Canada is, as you know, looked upon here as our weak point. There + are in the Cabinet men who are no doubt as ignorant of the state of + feeling in Canada as they were of that in the Southern States and + who believe that there is a strong American feeling in Canada. You + will not have forgotten that Mr. Seward, during the Presidential + canvass, publicly advocated the annexation of Canada as a + compensation for any loss which might be occasioned by the + disaffection of the South. The people calculate here (I am afraid + not without reason) upon being effectively aided in an inroad upon + Canada by the Irish Secret Societies which have been formed + especially in the State of New York nominally for the purpose of + invading Ireland. + + I can hardly hope that you will not think the antecedent + improbability of this country's rushing to its ruin by adding + Foreign to Civil war so great as to prove that I must be led away by + visionary apprehensions. However this may be, it may be convenient + to you to know what my knowledge of men and things here has brought + me to believe and what I have in consequence written home. + + Our Government has taken the only position sanctioned by + International law and by precedent. It observes absolute neutrality + and impartiality between the contending parties, recognizing, as it + is bound to do, both as invested with belligerent rights. No other + course was open to it, except that of an offensive alliance with one + side against the other. The North have certainly not asked for such + an alliance and would doubtless reject an offer of it with disdain. + And yet they choose to be in a fury because we do not try to occupy + some untenable position as their partisans. + + No one defines our position more clearly than their own great + authority Wheaton. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._ + + Washington, May 21, 1861. + + One of the great difficulties I have to contend with in my endeavour + to keep this Government within such bounds as may render the + maintenance of peace possible is the persuasion which prevails even + with sensible men that _no_ outrage will compel England to make + war with the North. Such men, although seeing the inexpediency and + impropriety of Mr. Seward's treatment of the European Powers, still + do not think it worth while to risk their own mob popularity by + declaring against it. If they thought there was really any danger + they would no doubt do a great deal to avert it. + + Of these men the most distinguished is Mr. Sumner. He has + considerable influence in Foreign Questions and holds the important + office of Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He + is in correspondence with many people in England, and I believe with + the Duke and Duchess of Argyll. I think no greater service could be + rendered to the cause of peace than to make Mr. Sumner aware of the + real perils to which Mr. Seward and the Cabinet are exposing the + country. If some means cannot be devised of checking them, they will + carry not only arrogance but practical vexations to a pitch which + will render the maintenance of peace impossible. If Mr. Sumner's + correspondence from England convinced him that there was real danger + in Mr. Seward's proceedings, he might do a good deal to put a stop + to them. I think I have done something to shake his confidence, but + I believe he still relies to a great degree upon assurances he + received from England under circumstances wholly different from + those which now so unhappily exist. + +Only a few years earlier, a British Minister, Sir John Crampton (like +Lord Sackville, in 1888), had been offered as a sacrifice to the Irish +vote, and received his passport, and it began to look as if this +spirited action might be repeated. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._ + + Washington, June 4, 1861. + + The present game of the violent party appears to be to discover or + invent some shade of difference in the conduct of England and France + in order to use violent language, or even to take violent measures + against England without necessarily involving themselves in a + quarrel with France also. The plan most in vogue at this moment + seems to be to send me my passport. After their experience in the + case of Sir J. Crampton they look upon this as a measure which would + gain them most applause by its appearance of vigour without exposing + them to any real danger. They have not yet hit upon any fault to + find with me personally, except that I _must_ have written + unfriendly despatches to my government, because my government has + taken a course which they do not like. The whole is no doubt an + attempt to carry a point by bluster which will perhaps fail if it be + encountered with mild language and very firm conduct. For my own + part I conceive my best line will be to avoid giving any possible + reason for complaint against myself personally and to keep things as + smooth as I can. If H.M. Government concede nothing to violent + language it will _probably_ subside, but there is such a dementia + in some of the people here that we must not be surprised at any act of + violence they may commit. + + Mr. Seward will be furious when he finds that his adherence to the + Declaration of Paris will not stop the Southern privateering. This + is one of the difficulties of making the proposals respecting + maritime law. But the great trouble will be the fuss which the + Southern government will make about receiving a communication from + England and France. It will be a great advantage to have a discreet + and able man like Mr. Bunch to employ in the South. I trust it may + be possible to grant him some compensation for the risk and loss to + which he is exposed by remaining there. + +Another long letter of June 10 illustrates the tension of the situation, +and again urges the necessity of attending to the defence of Canada. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._ + + Washington, June 10, 1861. + + I owe you more than common thanks for your private letter of the + 25th. + + Mr. Adams' Report of his first conversation with you appears to have + produced a good impression on the Cabinet. This I learn from Mr. + Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, who dined with me the day + before yesterday. I have not seen Mr. Seward since they arrived. It + is too dangerous to talk to him on such subjects for me to bring + them up unnecessarily. + + I hope we may see some moderation in the tone of the Newspapers. + The people in the North are beginning to be aware of the immense + encouragement which their predictions of a war with England have + given to their Southern Foe. I understand that the effect at + Richmond of the repeated assertions in the Northern Papers of the + hostility of England to the North has been prodigious. + + I have written so much officially on the risk of a sudden + Declaration of War against England by the U.S. that I have nothing + to add on that subject. That such an act of madness is so far from + impossible, that we ought to be prepared for it at any moment, I + am thoroughly convinced. I am doing all I can to avoid awkward + questions--for to give way upon any such question would be still + more dangerous to peace than to make a firm stand. The safe course + therefore is to prevent questions arising, if possible. But the + first thing to be done towards obtaining anything like permanent + security is to remove the temptation to attack Canada. + + I am a little nervous about our Company of Marines on San Juan. I + don't know that I can suggest any precautions to Governor Douglas + which would not be more likely to do harm than good. I have besides + no means of sending him a letter, which would not be liable to + be read on the way. I can communicate with the Admiral in the + Pacific in cypher, but I do not know where he may be. Under any + circumstances the Government here would of course be able to send + intelligence of war having broken out to the Pacific sooner than I + could. + + M. Mercier, the French Minister here, appears to be very frank and + cordial with me. The instructions which he read to me insist very + strongly upon his acting in entire concert with me. I think he may + perhaps have received a confidential Despatch desiring him to + proceed cautiously, for he is going at a much slower pace than his + language a short time ago would have led one to expect. His giving + Mr. Seward a copy of the Exposition of the French Jurists on the + question of Belligerent Rights, as he did before of M. Thouvenel's + account of his conversation with Mr. Sanford, seems to show a + straightforward desire to make this Government acquainted with + the real sentiments and intentions of the Emperor. The language + M. Mercier uses to me and to his other Colleagues, as well as + that which he uses to Americans in my presence, is in direct + contradiction to the reports that France will assist the North, + which are so assiduously repeated and commented upon in the American + Newspapers. I am very willing to let him take the lead in our + communications about the Declaration of Paris. It would be playing + the game of the enemies to peace with England for me to go faster in + these matters than the French Minister. + + Among other difficulties in the way of making your communication to + the Southern Consuls, is that of getting it safely to them. All + regular communication with the South is cut off. I suppose the + Government here would give either M. Mercier or me a Pass for a + special Messenger if we asked for one--but it may be desirable to + afford as little evidence as possible of our being connected with + the communication. The Southern Government will no doubt do all in + their power to give importance and publicity to the communication. + This Government will very probably withdraw the Exequaturs of the + Consuls who make it. The withdrawal would not be altogether free + from inconvenience to us, as it would interfere with the Consuls' + holding intercourse with the Blockading Squadrons, which it is + sometimes of importance that they should be able to do. + + I think the English and French Governments will find it necessary to + make the Cabinet of Washington clearly understand that they _must_ + and _will_ hold unofficial communication with the Southern + Government on matters concerning the interests of their subjects. + The announcement should if possible be made _collectively_, and in + such a form as to preclude the Cabinet's pretending to find a + difference between the conduct of France and England. The Government + of the U.S. can perform none of the duties of a Government towards + Foreigners in the Seceded States; and it is a preposterous + pretension to insist upon excluding Foreign Governments from + intercourse with the authorities however illegitimate, to whom their + Subjects must in fact look for protection. + + The inactivity of the Troops on both sides would be satisfactory, if + one could hope that there was still any chance of the question's + being solved without any serious fighting. As it is, one would be + glad that something should be done as soon as possible to enable an + opinion to be formed on the relative strength and spirit of the + Armies. I believe that the real secret is that from want of training + in the men, and total lack of waggons, horses and other means of + transport, neither Government can move troops in any considerable + numbers except by railroad. I can see as yet no signs of the spirit + of conquest in the North flagging, or of the South losing courage. + The Financial Difficulty will be the great one on both sides. The + Southern men are said to serve without pay--but this Government has + fixed the pay of the volunteers and militiamen at the same rate as + that of the regular army, eleven dollars (about 45 shillings) a + month, for a private, in addition to clothes and rations. + + I must do the little I can to influence the Senators and + Representatives when they come up next month; but there is only too + much reason to fear that fierceness against England will be popular, + and that the Legislators will vie with each other in manifesting it. + What I think they are most likely to do is to give the President + authority to declare war with us, without waiting for the sanction + of Congress. + + * * * * * + + Since I wrote what precedes I have been informed privately that in + Mr. Dayton's Report of his audience of the Emperor, there is a + rather ambiguous phrase put into the Emperor's mouth, respecting His + Majesty's desire to contribute to put an end to the dispute between + North and South. My informant says that the President and Mr. Seward + _really_ interpret the phrase as signifying that the Emperor would + be willing to assist the North to subdue the South--and that it is + from this supposition that Mr. Seward does not send M. Mercier back + the 'Exposition' and enter into the discussion about neutral Rights. + Mr. Seward is naturally puzzled by the apparent discrepancy between + the Emperor's language and that of His Majesty's Minister here. The + men in the State Department who are accustomed to business look, it + seems, upon the Emperor's words, even as reported by Mr. Dayton, as + no more than a vague assurance of goodwill, pointing to mediation + rather than to anything else. I will endeavour to get M. Mercier to + set the President and Mr. Seward right as soon as possible, for the + delusion is a very dangerous one for England, and a much more + dangerous one for the U.S. + +The ill-feeling towards England continued to grow worse as time went on, +and apparently was due largely to sentiment. The success of the South in +founding a practically independent government was so galling to the +North that anything which implied the admission of a self-evident fact, +such as the recognition of the Southern States as belligerents, was +inexpressibly galling. Fortunately, England and France were acting in +unison, and even Mr. Seward's ingenuity was unable to show that there +was any difference between the attitude of the two countries. Writing on +June 24, Lord Lyons reported that he had discovered that Mr. Seward had +prepared a despatch which was all but a direct announcement of war, and +that it was only the intervention of the President and of the more +reasonable members of the Cabinet which prevented its being sent to the +American Minister in London. The great qualities of President Lincoln, +by the way, do not appear to have been recognized at this early period, +for competent judges pronounced that although well-meaning and +conscientious, he gave no proof of possessing any natural talents to +compensate for his ignorance of everything but Illinois village +politics. + +Towards the end of July the military inactivity, due to causes mentioned +earlier, came to an end, and the historic fight of Bull's Run took place +on the 21st. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, July 22, 1861. + + It is too soon to form any speculations on the result of the defeat + of yesterday. Neither General Scott nor the Government had + calculated on the possibility of anything like it, and as for the + people of the North, they talked at all events as if the victory was + already theirs. If the North have anything like the spirit to which + they lay claim, they will rise with more resolution than ever to + avenge the defeat. The test will be the conduct of the Militia + Regiments. The three months' term of service of most of them has + just expired: some had gone home and the rest were on the point of + following--leaving the war to be carried on by the Volunteers and + the Regular Army. If the Militia regiments remain and others come + up, we may conclude that the warlike spirit of the North is + unbroken. If they do not, there may be a chance of peace. For this + battle will not facilitate recruiting for the army and the + Volunteers--and unless the Capitalists are urged by patriotism or + squeezed by mob pressure, the loans will fail and the money to pay + the Volunteers will not be forthcoming. + + I am myself inclined to hope that Congress may show some dignity + and good sense. The general opinion is that it will be violent and + childish--vote men and money on paper by millions--slay its Southern + enemies by treason bills--and ruin them by confiscation acts--decree + the immediate and unconditional abolition of slavery in the Southern + States--the closing of the Ports, and what not. + +Amongst other results of Bull's Run was the production of the following +minute by Lord Palmerston. If his judgment on the temper of the North +was completely wrong, his other observations might be profitably studied +by the numerous persons in this country who hold the view that efficient +military forces can be improvised whenever an emergency arises. + + * * * * * + + MINUTE OF LORD PALMERSTON. + + Aug. 15, 1861. + + The defeat at Bull's Run or rather at Yankee's Run proves two + things. First, that to bring together many thousand men and put + uniforms upon their backs and muskets in their hands is not to make + an army: discipline, experienced officers and confidence in the + steadiness of their comrades are necessary to make an army fight and + stand: secondly, that the Unionist cause is not in the hearts of the + mass of the population of the North. The Americans are not cowards: + individually they are as reckless of their own lives as of the lives + of others: ..., and it is not easy to believe that if they had felt + they were fighting for a great national interest they would have run + away as they did from the battle, or that whole regiments would have + quietly marched away home just before the fight was to begin. The + Truth is, the North are fighting for an Idea chiefly entertained by + professional politicians, while the South are fighting for what they + consider rightly or wrongly vital interests. + +The defects and weaknesses disclosed by this defeat produced much +contemptuous criticism upon the military inefficiency of the United +States. In reality there was no cause for surprise. In April, 1861, the +entire regular army of the United States only amounted to 16,000 +officers and men. Many of the officers had taken sides with the South. +Not one of them had ever had the opportunity of commanding any +considerable number of troops, and public opinion was so entirely +uninstructed concerning military questions that every local politician +considered himself competent to become a colonel, or even a general. But +what Bull's Run showed more conclusively than anything else, was that +the task of subjugating the South was infinitely greater than had +been anticipated, and that the confident boastings of enthusiastic +Northerners were as foolish as they were unjustified. We, however, as +a nation, had not then, and have now, little cause to jeer at the +Americans for their failure: we had embarked, only a few years earlier, +upon the Crimean Campaign almost equally unprepared for a serious +struggle, and less than forty years later, in 1899, one of our most +eminent military authorities undertook to finish off the Boers before +the date of the Lord Mayor's Banquet. + +About this time Anglo-American relations showed a slight improvement, +although Mr. Seward, in a characteristic outburst, took occasion to +point out that 'the policy of Foreign Governments was founded upon +considerations of interest and of commerce, while that of the United +States was based on high and eternal considerations of principle and the +good of the human race; that the policy of foreign nations was regulated +by the government which ruled them, while that of the United States was +directed by the unanimous and unchangeable will of the people.' Yet he +had clearly become more peaceable, and this welcome tendency was perhaps +due to the British Government having increased the Canadian garrisons in +response to the urgent pressure of Lord Lyons and the Canadian +authorities. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Sir E. Head._ + + Washington, Aug. 2, 1861. + + The intentions of the Government are at this moment more peaceful + than they have been. But I do not yet see any reason to modify the + views I expressed in my previous confidential letters. The present + change has been mainly produced by our preparations for defence and + by the quiet firmness with which we have maintained the position we + took up with regard to Belligerent Rights. I think it as necessary + as ever to complete our preparations for defence, and I find that + the knowledge that we are making such preparations calms instead of + irritating this people. + + There is nothing very surprising in raw levies being seized with + such a panic as that which led to the flight from Bull's Run. The + want of spirit before and since shown by the Militia regiments is a + worse sign. Two went away, on their term expiring, one may say from + the battlefield itself. The defeat, and even the danger of + Washington being taken, have been unable to induce any whose time is + up to remain. The Government considers that we are now safe again + from an attack here, but for some days our reliance was only upon + its not entering into the enemy's plan to come here. + + As day after day passes without an onward movement of the Southern + troops, the war spirit seems to revive in the North. But it will + require a decided Northern victory to bring back the enthusiasm and + the unanimity which appeared on the fall of Fort Sumter. A peace + party is beginning to show itself timidly and weakly, but much more + openly than it would have dared to do two months ago. + + We have nearly got through another Tariff Bill without a serious + attack upon the Reciprocity Treaty, thanks more to the haste, I am + afraid, than the good will of the Legislators. It will be a + wonderful tariff, whichever of the plans now before Congress is + adopted. + + Mr. Seward some weeks ago took credit to himself for having recalled + Mr. Ashman on finding that his mission was ill looked on. This gave + me a good opportunity of telling him that H.M. Government + considered that they had a good right to complain of his having been + sent at all without proper communication being previously made to + them and to me. + + I have applied for the discharge of the two minors about whom you + wrote to me officially. I am not sure of getting it. My applications + for discharge from the Army and Navy have become necessarily so + numerous that they are not viewed with favour. + +Such elaborate pains had been taken to prevent anything in the least +likely to irritate the Government of the United States, that it was all +the more annoying when an incident occurred which gave excuse for +complaint. + +The Consuls in the Southern States were permitted to send their +despatches in Foreign Office bags through the lines on the reasonable +condition that no advantage was to be taken of the privilege in order to +provide information which might be of use to the enemies of the United +States Government. The rule was rigidly observed at the Legation, and +the Consuls had been repeatedly warned not to infringe it in any way; +but in an evil hour, Mr. Bunch, the British Consul at Charleston, a +capable and industrious official, committed his bag to a friend, who, +unknown to the Consul, also took charge of about two hundred private +letters. The messenger was arrested by the United States authorities, +and imprisoned. The letters, of course, were seized, but so also was the +Foreign Office bag, addressed to Lord Russell, and a Foreign Office bag +has always been considered as one of the most sacred objects upon earth. +The United States Government, professing that a most serious offence had +been committed, and taking advantage of an error in the passport of the +messenger, sent the bag over to London by special messenger, and +demanded the recall of the unfortunate Consul Bunch. The opportunity, in +short, was too good to be lost. When the bag was eventually opened, in +Downing Street, it was found to contain nothing but despatches and a few +letters from British governesses and servants who had been permitted to +make use of it in consequence of the discontinuance of the post. In +fact, it was an essentially trivial matter, but the tension between the +two countries was so great that Lord Russell thought that it might +possibly lead to a rupture of official relations, and sent the following +instructions:-- + + * * * * * + + _Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._ + + Abergeldie Castle, Sept. 13, 1861. + + It is not very probable, but it is possible that the complaint + against Bunch may be a preliminary to the breaking off of official + intercourse between the two countries. + + Your name has been kept out of the correspondence on both sides, + but if the Envoys are to be withdrawn, you will be sent away from + Washington. + + In that case I wish you to express in the most dignified and guarded + terms that the course taken by the Washington Government must be the + result of a misconception on their part, and that you shall retire + to Canada in the persuasion that the misunderstanding will soon + cease, and the former friendly relations be restored. + + It is very desirable to obtain an explanation from Consul Bunch, and + you may authorize Admiral Milne, after due notice, to Mr. Seward, to + send a gunboat to Charleston for the purpose. + +Consul Bunch, in spite of his troubles, remained for over a year in +Charleston after this incident. Eventually the American Government +revoked his exequatur, and he made a semi-state return to England in a +man-of-war. + +In the late autumn, Mr. Seward began to show signs of returning to his +earlier manner, and it was plain enough that he had only been seeking to +gain time by his moderation. He now maintained that any communication +between a Foreign Government and the Confederate Government was an +offence against the United States, and it became more and more necessary +for England and France to come to some distinct agreement as to what the +nature and extent of those communications should be. Mr. Seward's +contention was obviously absurd. South Carolina had seceded nearly a +year previously. State after State had followed its example; the United +States Government had not made the slightest progress in restoring its +authority, and exercised no power or influence in any portion of the new +Confederation. On the other hand, there was a _de facto_ government in +that Confederation which was obeyed without question and exercised the +functions of government with perfect regularity. It was clear that a +government which was without the means of protecting British subjects +had no right to prevent us from holding necessary and informal +communications with the only power to which British subjects could look +for protection and redress of grievances. Cases of British subjects +being compulsorily enlisted, of British goods being seized on board +vessels captured by Southern privateers, and instances of a similar +nature were of constant occurrence. It was preposterous that under these +conditions British Consuls should be expected to refrain from +communication with the Confederate authorities. Fortunately, although +the British interests involved were infinitely the more important, +French interests were affected too, and upon this, as upon most other +difficult questions, Lord Lyons received the hearty and loyal support of +his French colleague, M. Mercier. + +On November 8, an incident of the gravest nature occurred, which seemed +likely to render futile all the laborious efforts which had been made to +keep the peace between England and the United States. + +The English mail steamer _Trent_, one day out from Havannah, was met by +the American warship _San Jacinto_ and stopped by a shell fired across +her bows. She was then boarded by a party of marines, and the officer in +command of the party demanded a list of the passengers. The production +of the list having been refused, the officer stated that he knew the +Confederate delegates to Europe, Messrs. Mason and Slidell, to be on +board, and insisted upon their surrender. Whilst the discussion was in +progress, Mr. Slidell made his appearance and disclosed his identity. +Thereupon, in defiance of the protests of the captain of the _Trent_ and +of the Government mail agent, Mr. Slidell and Mr. Mason, together with +their secretaries, were seized and carried off by force to the _San +Jacinto_, and taken as prisoners to New York. + +The news arrived in England on November 27, and, naturally, caused the +greatest excitement and indignation. It was felt that the limits of +concession had been reached, that a stand must now be made if we ever +intended to maintain our national rights, and, as a proof that they were +in earnest, the Government decided upon the immediate despatch of 8000 +men to Canada. + +The first private letter from Lord Lyons was written on November 19. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, Nov. 19, 1861. + + I have written so much officially on this unfortunate affair of + Mason and Slidell that I have hardly left myself time to thank you + for your kind private letter of the 2nd. + + I am told confidently that orders were given at Washington which led + to the capture on board the _Trent_, and that they were signed by + Mr. Seward without the knowledge of the President. I do not vouch + for the truth of this. I am afraid he is not sorry to have a + question with us like this, in which it is difficult for France to + take a part. + +Lord Lyons had made up his mind from the first that, as it was +impossible for him to form a correct opinion as to what had actually +occurred, the only thing to do was to maintain an attitude of complete +reserve. In the absence of authentic information, he felt that on the +one hand it would be unsafe to ask for a reparation which might be +inadequate; on the other hand he was reluctant to make a demand which +might be unnecessarily great. Consequently, he resolved to take no steps +until he received instructions from home, refused to say a word on the +subject either officially or unofficially, and instructed the Consuls to +maintain silence. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, Nov. 22, 1861. + + I have all along been expecting some such blow as the capture on + board the _Trent_. Turn out how it may, it must I fear produce an + effect on public opinion in both countries which will go far to + disconcert all my peaceful plans and hopes. I am so worn out with + the never-ending labour of keeping things smooth, under the + discouragement of the doubt whether by so doing I am not after all + only leading these people to believe that they may go all lengths + with us with impunity that I am sometimes half tempted to wish that + the worst may have come already. However I do not allow this feeling + to influence my conduct, and I have done nothing which can in the + least interfere with any course which you may take concerning the + affair of the _Trent_. + + If the effect on the people and Government of this country were the + only thing to be considered, it would be a case for an extreme + measure one way or the other. If the capture be unjustifiable we + should ask for the immediate release of the prisoners, promptly, + imperatively, with a determination to act at once, if the demand + were refused. If, on the other hand, the capture be justifiable, + we should at once say so and declare that we have no complaint to + make on the subject. Even so, we should not escape the evil of + encouraging the Americans in the belief that we shall bear anything + from them. For they have made up their minds that they have insulted + us, although the fear of the consequences prevents their giving vent + to their exultation. They would not however consider it so manifest + a proof of yielding on our part if we at once declared that we had + nothing to complain of, as if we did complain without obtaining full + reparation. Of course, however, I am well aware that public opinion + in this country is not the only thing to be thought of in this + question. While maintaining entire reserve on the question itself, I + have avoided any demonstration of ill-humour. My object has been, on + the one hand, not to prevent the Government being led by its present + apprehensions to take some conciliatory step, and on the other hand + not to put H.M. Government or myself in an awkward position, if it + should after all appear that we should not be right to make the + affair a serious ground of complaint. + + Congress will meet on December 2nd, which will not diminish the + difficulty of managing matters here. It is supposed that General + McClellan will be obliged to attempt some forward movement, in + order that he and the Government may be able to meet the fiery + legislators. They hoped the Beaufort affair would have been + sufficient, but like all they do, the effect is so much weakened, + first by the preposterous boastings beforehand, and secondly by the + fabulous accounts of the success first given, that something new + must if possible be provided. + + The Finances are kept in an apparently prosperous condition, by + postponing all but the most pressing payments. In this manner the + New York Banks are not pressed to pay up the sums they have taken of + the Loan. The people are so enamoured of their last brilliant + discovery in political economy that it was seriously intended to + raise the Morrill Tariff, in order that no money might go out of the + country and nothing be imported but 'gold and silver to carry on the + war with.' The Cabinet has now however, I understand, determined to + recommend that the Morrill Tariff be not touched. One cannot help + hoping that some one may be reasonable enough to suggest the idea of + a Revenue Tariff. + + General McClellan's own plan is said to be to gain a great victory, + and then, with or without the sanction of Congress and the + President, to propose the most favourable terms to the South if it + will only come back. It is a curious sign of the confusion into + which things are falling, that such a plan is coolly discussed. I + mean that part of it which consists in the General's acting without + the consent of the President and Congress. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, Nov. 25, 1861. + + The people here are extremely frightened about the capture on board + the _Trent_. The New York money market gives signs of this. Another + indication is the moderation of the newspapers, which is for them + wonderful. They have put in more correct accounts of my language (or + rather silence). I rather suspect that this must have been done on a + hint from Mr. Seward. As a general rule I abstain from noticing + anything the newspapers say about me. On this occasion in particular + contradiction from me would have been almost as dangerous as + affirmation, so I left the assertions to take their chance. + + The Consuls in the South do not behave well about forwarding private + letters. There is a fresh case which I report to-day. Mr. Seward + has, I think, behaved properly about it. I am afraid I shall be + obliged to ask you to support me by some severe act, if my last + instruction is not obeyed. + + I write, as indeed I act, as if our relations with this Government + were to be unchanged. Let the affair of the capture on board the + _Trent_ turn out how it may, I am not confident that I shall long + be able to do so. + +Writing on the same date to Admiral Milne, he repeats that nothing +whatever has passed between him and the U.S. Government on the subject +of the _Trent_, and adds: 'I suppose I am the only man in America who +has expressed no opinion whatever either on the International Law +question, or on the course which our Government will take.' Such +reticence appears almost superhuman. + +The attitude, however, of an important section of the American public +was anything but reticent. Captain Wilkes sprang at once into the +position of a national hero. Congress passed a vote of thanks to him; he +was banqueted, toasted, serenaded, and shortly became an admiral. A +member of the Government, Mr. Welles, Secretary of the Navy, noted for +his hostility to England, distinguished himself by officially +congratulating Captain Wilkes upon his heroic action; intimating at the +same time that the 'generous forbearance' he had shown in not capturing +the _Trent_ could not be treated as a precedent in subsequent cases of +the infraction of neutral obligations. The Governor of Boston also +distinguished himself by the following statement at a public banquet: +'That there may be nothing left to crown this exaltation, Commodore +Wilkes fired his shot across the bows of the ship that bore the British +lion at its head,' while many other prominent citizens followed his +example. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, Nov. 29, 1861. + + The Consuls in the South are crying out for ships again. This is the + solution for every difficulty in the Consular mind, as my experience + in the Mediterranean taught me long ago; though what the ships were + to do, except fire a salute in honour of the Consul, I could never + discover. I had some trouble, as you may perhaps recollect, in + checking the Consular ardour to send ships up the Potomac to my own + relief last spring. Sir A. Milne objects strongly to sending ships + to the Southern Ports, unless with a specific object and definite + instructions, and I think he is quite right. It is quite true that a + town _may_ be bombarded some day by the United States forces: that + British subjects may have their throats cut by the negroes in a + servile insurrection, or be tarred and feathered by a Vigilance + Committee. But we cannot keep a squadron at every point to protect + them, and I do not know what points are particularly threatened. + + I shall do all in my power to keep things smooth until I receive + your orders about the _Trent_ affair. This can in any event do no + harm. There is a story here that, in a recent hypothetical case, the + Law Officers of the Crown decided in favour of the right of the + United States to take Mason and Slidell out of a British ship or + postal packet. I do not know whether Mr. Adams has written this to + Mr. Seward, but I am inclined to think that the Government believe + it to be true. + +The uncertainty as to the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown +rendered it all the more necessary to keep quiet and wait for orders, +and the situation was rendered a little easier on account of there being +no mention of the _Trent_ in the Presidential Message. Mr. Galt, +the Canadian Finance Minister, happened to be in Washington at the +beginning of December, and had an interesting conversation with +President Lincoln, who disclaimed for himself and the Cabinet all +thought of aggression against Canada. The President also stated that he +himself had been opposed to Mr. Seward's circular putting the coasts +into a state of defence, but had been overruled. On being asked what the +recommendation to make fortifications and depôts of arms on the Great +Lakes meant, he only said, 'We must say something to satisfy the +people.' About the Mason and Slidell case, he remarked, 'Oh, that'll be +got along with!' He further volunteered the observation that if he could +not within a reasonable period get hold of Virginia, Kentucky, and +Missouri, and keep Maryland, he should tell the American people to give +up the contest, for it would be 'too big' for them. + +The impression produced upon Mr. Galt was that President Lincoln himself +was honest and sincere in what he said, but that he was very far from +being master of his Cabinet. Mr. Galt returned to Canada, bearing a +letter to Lord Monck, the new Governor-General, urging the necessity of +preparing for defence, and also an ingenious arrangement for warning the +Canadian Government in case of emergency, without having recourse to +cypher telegrams, which might arouse the suspicions of the Americans. + +On December 13, intelligence was received in America of the arrival in +England of the first news of the capture of Mason and Slidell, the +submarine cable, of course, not being at that time in operation. A great +fall in all securities immediately took place. + +At midnight on the 18th, the Queen's messenger bearing the fateful +despatches from Lord Russell arrived at the British Legation at +Washington. + +The principal despatch, dated November 30, 1861, had been drawn up after +consideration by the Cabinet, and the purport of it was that the United +States Government were informed that International Law and the rights of +Great Britain had been violated, that H.M. Government trusted that the +act would be disavowed, the prisoners set free and restored to British +protection. Should this demand be refused, Lord Lyons was instructed to +leave Washington. + +The draft of this despatch was submitted to the Queen, and, in the +opinion of the Prince Consort, the wording was of somewhat too +peremptory a character. The suggestions of the Prince Consort were +embodied in a memorandum quoted by Sir Theodore Martin in his book, and +the object of them was to remove any expressions in the despatch which +might unduly affront a sensitive nation, and at the same time enable it +to retreat from a false position without loss of credit or dignity. The +Prince was suffering from a mortal illness at the time, and was dead +within a fortnight; it was the last occasion upon which he took any part +in public affairs, but never, probably, did he render a greater service +to the country of his adoption than when he persuaded the Cabinet to +modify the wording of this momentous despatch. As amended in accordance +with the Prince Consort's suggestions, the crucial passages ran as +follows:-- + + Her Majesty's Government, bearing in mind the friendly relations + which have long subsisted between Great Britain and the United + States, are willing to believe that the United States's naval + officer who committed this aggression was not acting in compliance + with any authority from his Government, or that if he conceived + himself to be so authorized, he greatly misunderstood the + instructions which he had received. + + For the Government of the United States must be fully aware that + the British Government could not allow such an affront to the + national honour to pass without full reparation, and Her Majesty's + Government are unwilling to believe that it could be the deliberate + intention of the Government of the United States unnecessarily to + force into discussion between the two Governments a question of so + grave a character, and with regard to which the whole British nation + would be sure to entertain such unanimity of feeling. + + Her Majesty's Government, therefore, trust that when this matter + shall have been brought under the consideration of the Government of + the United States, that Government will, of its own accord, offer to + the British Government such redress as alone would satisfy the + British nation, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen, and + their delivery to your Lordship, in order that they may again be + placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the + aggression which has been committed. + + Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward, you will propose + them to him. + +It will be observed that in the above there is nothing of an aggressive +or minatory nature, but in a further despatch of the same date, Lord +Lyons was instructed to allow Mr. Seward a delay of seven days, if the +latter asked for it. If at the end of seven days no answer was returned, +or any answer which was not a compliance with the demands of Her +Majesty's Government, then the British Minister was directed to leave +Washington with all the members of his staff and the archives, and to +repair forthwith to London. + +Accompanying the despatches was a private letter from Lord Russell to +Lord Lyons. + + * * * * * + + Pembroke Lodge, Dec. 1, 1861. + + The despatches which were agreed to at the Cabinet yesterday and + which I have signed this morning impose upon you a disagreeable + task. + + My wish would be that at your first interview with Mr. Seward you + should not take my despatch with you, but should prepare him for it, + and ask him to settle with the President and his Cabinet what course + they would propose. + + The next time you should bring my despatch and read it to him fully. + + If he asks you what will be the consequence of his refusing compliance + I think you should say that you wish to leave him and the President + quite free to take their own course, and that you desire to abstain + from anything like menace. I think the disposition of the Cabinet is + to accept the liberation of the captive commissioners and to be + rather easy about the apology: that is to say if the Commissioners + are delivered to you and allowed to embark in a packet for England, + and an apology or explanation is sent through Mr. Adams that might + be taken as a substantial compliance. But if the Commissioners are + not liberated, no apology will suffice. + + M. Thouvenel promises to send off a despatch on Thursday next giving + our cause moral support, so that you may as well keep the despatch + itself a day or two before you produce it, provided you ask at once + for an interview with Seward. + + The feeling here is very quiet but very decided. There is no party + about it: all are unanimous. + + The best thing would be if Seward could be turned out, and a + rational man put in his place. I hear it said that the Americans + will not fight, but we must not count upon that. + + I have every reliance that you will discharge your task in the + temper of firmness and calmness which befits a British + representative. + +Mr. Hammond, the permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, whose +judgment was in after years shown to be far from infallible, expressed +the opinion that Messrs. Mason and Slidell would be immediately +executed, so that there might be an answer ready whenever their release +was demanded. A warship was ordered to proceed from Halifax to New York +to receive the members of the Legation in case an unfavourable reply +should be received from the American Government. + +On December 7, Lord Russell wrote again privately to Lord Lyons. + + * * * * * + + Foreign Office, Dec. 7, 1861. + + I have been going over in my mind the possible evasive answers of + Mr. Seward, falling short of substantial compliance with our + demands, in order to give you some contingent instructions. + + But the result is that I fear I should embarrass you more by such a + course, than by leaving you to the exercise of your own excellent + judgment. + + What we want is a plain Yes, or a plain No to our very simple + demands, and we want that plain Yes or No within seven days of the + communication of the despatch. + + The devices for avoiding the plain course are endless, and the + ingenuity of American lawyers will seek perhaps to entangle you in + endless arguments on Vattel, Wheaton and Scott. + + Here are two plain answers. If the _Trent_ had been brought into + Boston harbour, the Prize Court must have condemned the captors to + pay costs for illegal detention. This, at least, is our opinion. + + But Captain Wilkes superseded the authority of the Courts instituted + and recognized by the Law of Nations. Seeing that there was no + chance that any Court of Justice, or any law could justify the + capture of the four Americans, Captain Wilkes has set aside all + Courts of Justice and all law, and has taken into his own hands, by + virtue of his cannons and cutlasses, the solution of a question + which demanded if raised at all, a regular, a solemn and a legal + decision. + + These are the grounds therefore upon which our demands are based and + upon which they should be urged. + + P.S.--I have just received your letter of the 22nd. If you receive + the Confederate prisoners under the protection of the British flag, + we shall be satisfied. But if that is not to be obtained, you will + only have to obey your instructions and withdraw. + +Mr. Hammond, a very unfortunate prophet, predicted that 'the Americans +will never give way. The humiliation will be too great, and after all +their boastings against Europe, they will scarcely be satisfied to yield +to the common reprobation with which the act has been received. We hear, +too, that the President himself is most determined against concession, +having rejected peremptorily General McClellan's conciliatory advice.' +It must be admitted, however, that if Mr. Hammond was wrong, plenty of +other people shared his views on both sides of the Atlantic. + +Lord Russell's despatch having arrived at Washington late at night on +December 18, Lord Lyons called upon Mr. Seward on the 19th, and +acquainted him with its general tenour. Mr. Seward received the +communication seriously and with dignity, nor did he manifest any +dissatisfaction. At the conclusion of the interview, he asked to be +given the following day for consideration, and also for communication +with the President. He thought that on the 21st he would be able to +express an opinion upon the communication, and in the meanwhile +expressed his gratification at the friendly and conciliatory manner in +which it had been made by the British Representative. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, Dec. 19, 1861. + + Before I left Mr. Seward he said that there was one question which + he would put to me 'informally,' but which it was most important + that I should answer. Was any time fixed by my instructions within + which the U.S. Government must reply? I told him that I did not like + to answer the question; that what of all things I wished to avoid + was the slightest appearance of a menace. He said I need not fear + that; he only wished me to tell him privately and confidentially. I + said that on that understanding, I would tell him that the term was + seven days. He then said that much time would be lost if I did not + let him have a copy of your despatch 'unofficially and informally'; + that so much depended upon the wording of it, that it was impossible + to come to a decision without reading it. I told him that the only + difficulty I had about giving it to him at once officially was that + the seven days would at once begin to run. He said that was very + true, but I might let him have it on the understanding that no one + but himself and the President should know that I had done so. I was + very glad to let him have it on these terms. It will give time for + the Packet (which is indeed already due) to arrive with M. + Thouvenel's Despatch to M. Mercier, and in the meantime give Mr. + Seward who is now on the peace side of the Cabinet time to work with + the President before the affair comes before the Cabinet itself. I + sent the Despatch to him in an envelope marked 'Private and + Confidential.' Almost immediately afterwards he came here. He told + me he was pleased to find that the Despatch was courteous and + friendly, and not dictatorial or menacing. There was however one + question more which he must ask me, without an answer to which he + could not act, but at the same time he must have the answer only in + strict confidence between himself and me. I had told him in + confidence that I was to wait seven days for an answer on the + subject of the redress we required. Supposing he was within the + seven days to send me a refusal, or a proposal to discuss the + question? I told him that my instructions were positive and left me + no discretion. If the answer was not satisfactory, and particularly + if it did not include the immediate surrender of the Prisoners, I + could not accept it. + + I was not sorry to tell him this in the way I did. I avoided all + menace which could be an obstacle to the U.S. yielding, while I did + the only thing which will make them yield if they ever do, let them + know that we were really in earnest. + + I don't think it likely they will give in, but I do not think it + impossible they may do so, particularly if the next news from + England brings note of warlike preparations, and determination on + the part of the Government and people. + + Mr. Seward has taken up all my time, which is my excuse for this + scrawl. I shall be able to write to you to-morrow. + +The second interview took place on the 21st, and the following letter +explains the reasons for allowing Mr. Seward an additional two days--a +happy expedient, which probably contributed in great measure to the +ultimate solution of the difficulty--and also graphically depicts the +general uncertainty and alarm which prevailed. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, Dec. 23, 1861. + + I have followed, I think to the letter, in my communications with + Mr. Seward on the _Trent_ affair, the plan laid down in your private + letter of the 1st. The packet is unfortunately so late that M. + Mercier will not receive the promised instruction from M. Thouvenel + until to-morrow, but I could not have again put off communicating + your despatch to Mr. Seward without an appearance of vacillation + which would have been fatal. No time was practically lost by my + consenting to the delay from Saturday to Monday, for whether the + seven days expired on Saturday next or Monday next, I should have + been equally unable to announce the result to you sooner than by the + packet which will sail from New York on Wednesday, the 1st January. + + I feel little or no doubt that I shall have an answer of some kind + before the seven days are over. What it will be depends very much + upon the news which will be brought by the packet to-morrow. If it + convinces the people here that it is surrender or war, without any + hope of a diversion in their favour by France, our terms will + perhaps be complied with. If there is any hope left that there will + be only a rupture of Diplomatic Relations, or that we shall accept + the mediation of France, no concession will be made. There is no + doubt that both government and people are very much frightened, but + still I do not think anything but the first shot will convince the + bulk of the population that England will really go to war. + + M. Mercier went of his own accord to Mr. Seward the day before + yesterday and expressed strongly his own conviction that the choice + lay only between a compliance with the demands of England and war. + He begged Mr. Seward to dismiss all idea of assistance from France, + and not to be led away by the vulgar notion that the Emperor would + gladly see England embroiled with the United States in order to + pursue his own plans in Europe without opposition. He said that if + he could be of use, by making these sentiments known to Senators and + other influential people, he was quite ready to do so. Mr. Seward + asked him whether he had received special instructions from his + Government on the subject. M. Mercier said no, but that he expected + some immediately, and that he had no doubt whatever what they would + be. Mr. Seward did not accept his offer to prepare influential men + here for giving way, but merely said, 'Let us wait and see what your + instructions really turn out to be.' + + It is announced that General Scott is more than halfway across the + Atlantic on his way here, I suppose in the hope of appearing again + on the stage as the Grand Pacificator. If he gives the sanction of + his name to a compliance with our terms he will certainly render the + compliance easier to the Government and less unpalatable to the + people. But I cannot foresee any circumstances, under which I should + be justified in departing from your instructions. Unless I receive + an announcement that the prisoners will be surrendered to _us_, and + at least not a refusal to make an apology before noon on this day + week, no other course will be open to me than to demand my passports + and those of all the members of the Legation and go away at once. In + case of a non-compliance, or of the time elapsing without any + answer, it will probably be desirable for me to take myself, the + Secretary of Legation, and the greater part of the Attachés off at + once, leaving, if necessary, one or two of the junior attachés to + pack up the archives and follow as quickly as possible. It is a case + in which, above all others, delay will be dangerous. I am so + convinced that unless we give our friends here a good lesson this + time, we shall have the same trouble with them again very soon, + under less advantageous circumstances, that even my regard for them + leads me to think it all important that they should receive the + lesson. Surrender or war will have a very good effect upon them, but + anything less will make them more self-confident than ever, and lead + them on to their ruin. + + I do not think there is any danger of the Government's deliberately + taking any step to precipitate hostilities upon my departure. On the + contrary, if they let me go, it will be in the hope that the + interruption of diplomatic relations will be all they have to fear + from us. But they have so little control over their officers, that I + think we must be prepared for acts of violence from subordinates, if + they have the chance of performing them, in cases where no immediate + danger is incurred. I shall suggest to the Governors and Naval + Officers to take reasonable precautions against such acts. A + filibustering expedition of the Irish on the frontiers of Canada, to + damage the canals, or something of that sort, may also be on the + cards. + + It is generally believed that the Government will insist on an + immediate advance of the Grand Army of the Potomac, in the hope of + covering a surrender to England with (to use President Lincoln's + phraseology) a 'sugar coating' of glory, in another quarter if + possible. + + You will perhaps be surprised to find Mr. Seward on the side of + peace. He does not like the look of the spirit he has called up. Ten + months of office have dispelled many of his illusions. I presume + that he no longer believes in the existence of a Union Party in the + South, in the return of the South to the arms of the North in case + of a foreign war; in his power to frighten the nations of Europe by + great words; in the ease with which the U.S. could crush rebellion + with one hand and chastise Europe with the other; in the notion that + the relations with England in particular are safe playthings to be + used for the amusement of the American people. He sees himself in a + very painful dilemma. But he knows his countrymen well enough to + believe that if he can convince them that there is a real danger + of war, they may forgive him for the humiliation of yielding to + England, while it would be fatal to him to be the author of a + disastrous foreign war. How he will act eventually, I cannot say. + It will be hard for him to face present unpopularity, and if the + President and Cabinet throw the whole burden on his shoulders, he + may refuse to bear it. I hope that without embarrassing him with + official threats, I have made him aware himself of the extreme + danger of refusing our terms. + + Since I have been writing this letter, M. Mercier has come in and + related to me more in detail the conversation he had with Mr. Seward + the day before yesterday. In addition to what I have already + mentioned, he says that he told Mr. Seward that it would be + impossible for France to blame England for precisely the same course + that she would herself have pursued in similar circumstances: that + of course he could not pretend to give advice on a question + concerning national honour without being asked to do so, but that it + might be of advantage to the U.S. Government for him to dispel + illusions which might exercise a baneful influence on its + determination. + + M. Mercier reports the conversation to-day to his Government. I + think it as well, at all events for the present, not to put it into + an official despatch, but it might perhaps be well that Lord Cowley + should know that I am disposed to speak in very high terms of the + moral support given to my demands by M. Mercier. + + I am told that the Senate is still more angry about the combined + expedition against Mexico than about the _Trent_ affair. They will + hardly be so absurd as to manifest their displeasure in such a way + as to add France and Spain to their adversaries. + + P.S.--I have kept M. Mercier _au courant_ of all my communications, + confidential as well as official, with Mr. Seward, but I have given + no information as to either to any one else. + +There was now nothing to be done but to sit and wait for the American +reply. It arrived on December 27, in the shape of a note from Mr. Seward +of the most portentous length abounding in exuberant dialectics, but the +gist of which was contained in the two following short paragraphs:-- + +'The four persons in question are now held in military custody at Fort +Warren in the State of Massachusetts. They will be cheerfully liberated. + +'Your lordship will please indicate a time and place for receiving +them.' + +The question of peace or war had hung in the balance for weeks, but the +victory was complete, and British diplomacy achieved a success which was +not equalled until Fashoda supplied a somewhat similar case in 1897. + +So far from being intoxicated with his remarkable triumph, as would have +been the case with some diplomatists, Lord Lyons communicated the news +to Lord Russell in matter-of-fact terms which were typical of his calm +and practical nature. + + * * * * * + + Washington, Dec. 27, 1861. + + It is of course impossible for me to give an opinion upon the + argumentation in Mr. Seward's voluminous note. Time barely admits of + its being read and copied before the messenger goes. But as the four + prisoners are given up, immediately and unconditionally, it is quite + clear to my mind that you will not wish me to decide the question + of peace or war without reference to you. A rupture of diplomatic + relations, not followed by war, would be worse than war itself, for + after that, nothing but actual hostilities would ever convince the + Americans that there was any limit to our forbearance. + + I hope, however, that the Note will, on further examination, be + deemed sufficient. In that case it might not be unadvisable to give + credit to Mr. Seward, in speaking to Mr. Adams, and the more so + perhaps because Mr. Adams is, or at all events was, devoted to Mr. + Seward and his policy. I cannot say that my general opinion of Mr. + Seward has undergone any change; but without inquiring into his + motives, I must allow him the merit of having worked very hard and + exposed his popularity to very great danger. + + I shall not be able to give you any information to-day as to the + effect produced upon the public. Mr. Seward has begged me to keep + the answer a secret until to-morrow. He intends to publish it in the + newspapers here to-morrow, and has sent a copy to New York to be + published simultaneously there. In the latter case it will be + conveyed to the public in Europe, as well as to you, by the same + packet which takes this letter. Mr. Seward told me he 'had been + through the fires of Tophet' in order to get the prisoners + surrendered. + + I have seen with very great satisfaction that you have informed Mr. + Adams, in answer to the remonstrances about Mr. Bunch, that H.M. + Government must and will hold communication with the Confederate + Government. I am also extremely glad that the instructions to the + Consuls on the subject have been sent to the Admiral to forward, not + to me. In fact, if we are able to maintain peace with the U.S. it + will be very desirable to separate the Consuls in the South as much + as possible from this Legation. It will hardly be possible for me to + keep well with the Government here, if I am supposed to have the + direction of communication with the enemy's Government. + + I think it very important, with a view to the preservation of peace, + that advantage should be taken of the opportunity to put Canada into + a state of defence; and indeed (as I said in a despatch which I + wrote in May last) to provide for the security of all our + possessions on both sides of this Continent. While Canada, in + particular, is apparently defenceless, the Americans will never + believe that we contemplate the possibility of war. And it must + never be forgotten that when they make peace with the South, they + may have a large army to provide with employment, and an immense + amount of popular dissatisfaction and humiliation to find a safety + valve for. + + My intention is to propose to Mr. Seward that I shall send a + man-of-war or a British mail packet to Boston to receive the + prisoners. I should propose that they should go in the first + instance to Halifax. But I should suggest to the Captain to consult + their wishes as far as possible, but certainly _not_ to take them to + a Confederate port. Neither of the ships of war at New York would, I + suppose, be large enough to take them across the Atlantic, but I do + not think I ought to refuse to provide them with a passage to + Europe, if they ask for one. This seems due to them, inasmuch as it + was the failure of the British flag to afford them protection which + lost them their passage on board the _Trent_. Of course if they go + in a mail packet, I shall take precautions against any risk of an + 'heroic' Captain applying the doctrines maintained here and bringing + the packet before an American Prize Court for adjudication. In any + case I shall give a caution to the Commander of the ship which takes + them, that they are not to be received with honours or treated + otherwise than as distinguished _private_ gentlemen. + + Those who have not seen the Americans near, will probably be much + more surprised than I am at the surrender of the prisoners. I was + sure from the first that they would give in, if it were possible to + convince them that war was really the only alternative. My + difficulty has been to make them aware that it was surrender or war, + without making such threats as would render the humiliation too + great to be borne. This was the object of my confidential + communications with Mr. Seward before I gave him your despatch. + +The main point having been gained, it remained to settle how the +surrender of the prisoners could best be carried out without causing +unnecessary ill-feeling and arousing a popular agitation which might +drive the United States Government into committing some high-handed +action in order to maintain itself. It was finally decided that, in +order to avoid the trouble which Mr. Seward feared from the inhabitants +of Boston, they should embark at Provincetown. They were accordingly +conveyed in an American ship from Fort Warren to Provincetown, and there +embarked on a British warship for Halifax, it having been expressly +stipulated that the transfer should not take place at night. From +Halifax they proceeded subsequently to Europe. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, Dec. 31, 1861. + + The Americans are putting the best face they can upon the surrender + of Slidell and Mason, and as far as has depended upon me I have done + everything to make the pill as easy to swallow as possible. But I + cannot disguise from myself that the real cause of the yielding was + nothing more nor less than the military preparations made in + England. They are horribly out of humour and looking out for some + mode of annoying us without danger to themselves. There is a talk of + discriminative duties on British goods, of a non-intercourse Act, + and other absurdities. What is more serious is a proposal, which it + is said will be introduced into Congress next week, to repeal the + Act for carrying into effect the Reciprocity Treaty. This would be a + direct breach of the treaty, and would of course be an indisputable + _casus belli_. It has often been suggested before, in the old belief + that we should bear anything rather than go to war with the U.S. I + hope they have had a lesson which will make them wiser. + + I cannot help fearing that it is as necessary as ever, nay more than + ever necessary, to be prepared to give a warm reception whether to + regular invaders or to filibusters from the U.S. who may make an + attempt upon Canada. In fact I am not reassured respecting the + maintenance of peace. For the present we have some security in Mr. + Seward. For he must do his best to maintain peace or he will have + made the sacrifice in the case of Mason and Slidell in vain. As in + that case, so in others, he sees now that besides the utter ruin of + the country, a war with us would give the ascendancy to the ultra + party who are opposed to him in the Cabinet and in Congress. He + fears too, and with great reason, that it would throw the country + into a state of anarchy, in which chiefs of a totally different + frame of mind from him would have the upper hand. But he may be + swept away, or, if he find it impossible to hold his position or his + own principles, turn round and play a desperate game with the + ultras. I have given him the opportunity of offering amends + spontaneously in three rather awkward matters, and, as you will see + by my despatches, he has been prompt in seizing it. + + On reading his enormous note at leisure, I find that it is much more + of an apology than I thought from the hurried perusal which was all + I had time to give to it before I sent it off to you. But with your + letters before me, I should have taken much less _ad referendum_; + for the surrender of the prisoners is after all the main question. + On the other hand, I should not have gone out of my way to declare, + on my own responsibility, that the note was perfectly satisfactory, + unless it had contained a formal apology in plain words. + + I have a better opinion of the Boston mob than Mr. Seward has, and + should have had very little fear of the prisoners being insulted, if + I had taken them from Fort Warren directly on board a British + man-of-war. I am not sorry however to spare the Bostonians (who are + among the most friendly to us of the Americans) what they might + consider a mortifying and humiliating spectacle. I have at Mr. + Seward's request not made the name of the place at which the + prisoners are to be transferred generally known. Indeed, I found + that many people were going to Boston to be present on the occasion, + and there is no advantage in having a crowd or a sensation about it. + +It is sad to record that some of the American clergy showed a most +unchristianlike spirit in connection with the termination of the _Trent_ +case; the following remarkable prayer uttered in the Senate affording an +instructive example:-- + + * * * * * + + Thirty-Seventh Congress--Second Session. + In Senate--Monday, December 30, 1861. + + [Prayer by Revd. Dr. Sunderland.] + + O Thou, just Ruler of the world, in this hour of our trial, when + domestic treason stabs at the nation's heart, and foreign arrogance + is emboldened to defeat the public justice of the world, we ask help + of Thee for our rulers and our people, that we may patiently, + resolutely, and with one heart abide our time; for it is indeed a + day of darkness and reproach--a day when the high principle of human + equity, constrained by the remorseless sweep of physical and armed + force, must for the moment succumb under the plastic forms of soft + diplomacy. Yet, in the face of this, will we not be shaken in our + conviction that Thou art ever with him who, in the interest of human + liberty and the Christian faith, by all the means in his power works + righteousness and defends the truth. + + O God, give to this our nation honesty, unity and courage; bring + this unnatural rebellion to a speedy end; and then prepare us to + assert upon a broader scale, and with a vaster force, the + inalienable rights and responsibilities of man: through Jesus + Christ. Amen. + +Upon the whole, except for occasional manifestations of ill-humour, such +as, for instance, a resolution in the House of Representatives in favour +of creating a great navy to 'defend the seas from the sway of an +arbitrary trident,' the surrender was taken quietly, and Mr. Seward +handsomely acknowledged the great consideration which had been shown by +Lord Lyons in his conduct of the negotiations. + +Congratulations now began to pour in upon him, and Lord Russell wrote +that nothing could have been better than his conduct, and that his +patience, forbearance, and friendly discretion had gone far to secure +the favourable result obtained. Another communication from Lord Russell +intimated that the Queen, 'taking into consideration the judgment and +conciliatory temper which you have shown in your negotiations at +Washington, especially in regard to the _Trent_, has directed that you +should be raised to the rank of G.C.B. + +In acknowledging these congratulations, Lord Lyons disclaimed having +performed any brilliant or striking service. The only merit which he +attributed to himself was that of having laboured quietly and sedulously +to smooth over difficulties and to carry out the instructions he +received from the Foreign Office. Writing to Mr. Hammond, he explained +that he had resisted the temptation 'to do something' 'which always +besets one when one is anxious about a matter'; and that from the first +he had been convinced that the more quiet he kept the better would be +the chance of the instructions from home producing their effect. To +other correspondents he expressed the view that it was the British +military preparations which had turned the scale in favour of peace. + +It would, of course, be an exaggeration to attribute solely to Lord +Lyons the credit of having successfully prevented the calamity of a war +between England and the United States. That credit is in reality due to +others as well as to himself: to the Home Government for their prompt +and decisive precautions, to the Prince Consort for his timely +interposition, to the French Government for their loyal support at a +critical moment, and to the good sense eventually displayed by the +Americans themselves. But no one reading the _Trent_ correspondence can +fail to realize that the issue of peace or war depended to a great +extent upon the method in which the British representative at Washington +carried out his task, and that the slightest error in judgment on his +part would have rendered the conflict inevitable. + +In after years Lord Lyons frequently expressed the opinion that if there +had then been telegraphic communication across the Atlantic it would +have been impossible to avert war, and it is more than likely that he +was correct, although it is improbable that many people realized it at +the time. + +It is also evident that a judicious silence may occasionally be of +inestimable value. It not unfrequently happens that taciturnity is +mistaken for profundity-- + + 'O, my Antonio, I do know of those, + That therefore only are reported wise + For saying nothing.' + +and many a diplomatist and many a politician has gained a reputation for +excessive sagacity by possessing sufficient good sense to conceal his +ignorance by maintaining silence, but the restraint which enabled Lord +Lyons to refrain from saying a single word upon a question over which +the whole population of the United States was buzzing for six or seven +weeks was little else than an inspiration. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +COURSE OF THE CIVIL WAR + +(1862-1865) + + +Although the immediate danger of war between England and America had at +all events temporarily vanished, and the United States Government had +put a good face upon the matter, it was only natural that a soreness +should remain; nor did the slowness of military operations tend to +restore that government to a more equable frame of mind. Much of the +enthusiasm which marked the outbreak of hostilities had already +evaporated, but the hatred of the South had continued to grow in +intensity, and although the latter was undoubtedly suffering great +hardships and privations, there was no sign of failing courage, and +every prospect of a long and bitter contest. The difficulty of finding +men for the Northern army continued to increase; the prospect of having +to raise twenty or thirty millions sterling in taxes from a people +unaccustomed to pay any apparent taxes at all for Federal purposes was +particularly unpleasant, more especially as there appeared to be no +immediate probability of a striking military success; and it was not +surprising that the country showed signs of great depression. Under +these circumstances, a marked division of parties in the North began to +show itself. One, which may be termed the Revolutionary Party, was in +favour of prosecuting the war at all hazards and by all means; of +proclaiming the immediate abolition of slavery in the South; promoting a +servile insurrection there; turning out the Cabinet, and even deposing +the President if he proved to be an obstacle; keeping Congress +permanently in session to spur on the Government, and the Generals, +maintaining a paper currency by inflicting heavy penalties for +depreciating it, and so on. The Foreign Policy of this party consisted +in a return to reckless conduct and language towards Europe in general, +and an attempt to obtain the support of France against England. + +On the other side, however, were now ranged the President, Mr. Seward, +and the more moderate men. Mr. Seward had now, strange to say, become a +kind of guarantee for peace, for after the concessions he had made, a +foreign war would have been fatal to his reputation, and it was only +fair to assume that his conversion to a more moderate course was +genuine. Still there was danger to England from both sides. If the party +of violence should show itself reckless enough to risk anything, the +moderate party might conceivably provoke a foreign war either as an +excuse for giving up the contest with the South, or to divert popular +irritation after having abandoned the contest as hopeless. + +Meanwhile, Mr. Seward's demeanour towards England had changed so much +that, early in 1862, his friendliness had become actually embarrassing. +Quite a considerable force, according to British standards, amounting to +something like 12,000 men, had been already despatched, or were under +orders to proceed to Canada, and Mr. Seward now made the surprising +offer that these troops and stores should be landed at Portland, a port +in the United States, and sent overland to Canada. However well meant +the invitation, it would manifestly have been most imprudent to accept +it. It must have been plain to the densest understanding that these +troops and stores were only being sent to Canada in order that we might +be prepared, if unhappily a rupture should take place between England +and the United States. Therefore, if troops and stores so conveyed were +eventually used against the United States, there would have been a +violent outcry of treachery against us throughout the country. The +danger, too, of some unpleasant incident occurring during the landing or +during the passage of the trains with which it would be impossible to +deal, was so obvious, that the invitation was declined with thanks. Too +much love is sometimes almost more inconvenient in diplomacy than +hatred. + +Mr. Seward's anxiety, at this time, however, to show himself a friend to +England continued, and he took particular care to point out, in proof of +his new attitude, that up till the last moment (December 26) he had been +the only person in the Government who was in favour of the surrender of +Slidell and Mason, and that President Lincoln had been opposed to +surrender and was in favour of arbitration only. In fact, Mr. Seward +appeared to be seized with the desire of overwhelming not only England, +but France as well, with demonstrations of friendship and confidence, +and it is perhaps not uncharitable to assume that two reasons were +contributory causes to this agreeable change of tactics. One of these +was that the appearance of a good understanding with these two Powers +would exercise a beneficial influence upon the money market; the other +was the fear of one or both of them recognizing the South and breaking +up the blockade. Probably Mr. Seward's fears of French interference were +increased by a visit paid by M. Mercier, in the spring, to Richmond, the +Confederate Headquarters. M. Mercier, whether instructed from home or +not, was bent upon this visit, which the United States Government could +not prevent, but which they could hardly be expected to view with +favour, and after the manner of French diplomatists of the period, he +was probably unable to resist the temptation of trying to effect a +striking _coup_, although there was not the slightest reason to suspect +him of any disloyalty to his English colleague. Lord Lyons wisely +declined to accompany him, and prophesied that he would end by getting +into trouble, which proved to be the case, for the journey naturally +gave rise to all sorts of comments. As will be seen from the following +letter, both M. Mercier and Mr. Seward drew incorrect conclusions from +the information derived during this visit; the former being convinced +that the subjugation of the South was an impossibility, and the latter +confidently believing that the end of the war was close at hand. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, April 23, 1862. + + M. Mercier came back from Richmond yesterday. He went soon after his + arrival to see Mr. Seward and came afterwards to me. He is persuaded + that the confidence and the resolution of the Confederates are + increased rather than diminished by recent events. If they are + worsted anywhere they will still not surrender. They will destroy + their stores of cotton and tobacco, and all other property which + they cannot remove. They will retire into the interior of their + country and defy the North to follow them. They will endure any + privations and sufferings rather than be again united to the North. + Their unanimity and devotion to the cause are wonderful. They are + not carrying on a war in the usual manner for dominion as the North + is: they consider themselves to be fighting for their homes and + their liberty, and are making and are ready to make any sacrifices. + + Such is the impression which M. Mercier says was made upon him by + what he saw and heard. + + I asked him whether he had obtained any specific information as to + the extent of the naval and military resources of the Confederates. + He said that they admitted that they were in want of arms and + ammunition, and said that but for this they could keep a very much + larger army in the field. They had no difficulty about men. On the + contrary, they had more than they could arm. They had another + 'Merrimac' nearly ready at Norfolk: they had an iron-plated vessel + on the James River: they had iron-plated vessels nearly ready at New + Orleans. If they lost New Orleans and all the seaboard, they would + be as far from being subdued as ever. + + I inquired of M. Mercier whether he had entered upon any particular + matter of business with the members of the Confederate Government. + He said he had avoided the appearance of having come to transact + business: that the French tobacco would be spared if the rest was + burnt, provided it could be distinguished and separated from that + belonging to private persons. + + I asked M. Mercier if anything had passed on the subject of the + position of the Consuls. He said that if the idea of calling upon + them to take out exequaturs from the Confederate Government had ever + been entertained, it was now abandoned; there appeared to be a very + good disposition towards foreigners in general; less good perhaps + towards the English as a nation than others, perhaps because more + had been expected from that country than from any other, and the + disappointment had consequently been greater. On the other hand, the + Confederate leaders professed to have abandoned all expectation of + succour from Europe: indeed, they declared that all they desired was + such an interruption of the blockade as would enable them to get + arms. + + M. Mercier said that he was more than ever convinced that the + restoration of the old Union was impossible; that he believed the + war would, if the Powers of Europe exercised no influence upon it, + last for years; that he thought that in the end the independence of + the South must be recognized, and that the governments of Europe + should be on the watch for a favourable opportunity of doing this in + such a manner as to end the war. The present opportunity would, + however, he thought, be peculiarly unfavourable. + + I did not express any opinion as to the policy to be eventually + pursued by France or England, but I entirely agreed with M. Mercier + that there was nothing to do at the present moment but watch events. + + This morning Mr. Seward spoke to me about M. Mercier's journey. He + said that M. Mercier had, probably without being altogether aware of + it himself, obtained very valuable information for the U.S. + Government. He himself was quite convinced from M. Mercier's account + of what had passed, that the Confederates were about to make a last + effort: that they had their last armies in the field; and that their + last resources were brought into action. Their talking of retiring + into the interior was idle. If the U.S. were undisputed masters of + the border states, including Tennessee, and of the sea coast, there + would be no occasion for any further fighting. Anybody who liked to + retire into the interior was welcome to do so and stay there till he + was tired. Mr. Seward went on to say that he had had some difficulty + in preventing M. Mercier's journey making an unfavourable impression + upon the public. With this view he had caused it to be mentioned in + the papers that M. Mercier had had a long interview with him on his + return from Richmond; he had in the evening taken M. Mercier to the + President, which also he should put in the newspapers: to-night he + was to dine with M. Mercier to meet the captain of the French ship + of war which had brought M. Mercier back: to-morrow the President + would pay a visit to that ship. + + I suppose the truth lies somewhere between M. Mercier's views of the + prospects of the South and Mr. Seward's. Mr. Seward was of course + anxious to weaken any impression M. Mercier's language may have made + upon me. + + The Slave Trade Treaty has met with much more general approval than + I expected. It has excited quite an enthusiasm among the + Anti-Slavery party. I have never seen Mr. Seward apparently so much + pleased. Mr. Sumner, who has had the management of it in the Senate, + was moved to tears when he came to tell me that it had passed + unanimously. + +As had been foreseen and pointed out to M. Mercier, the most +unsatisfactory result of his visit was the impression it produced that +France was disposed to act independently of England, but there is no +evidence to show that such were the intentions of the French Government +at the time, and M. Mercier himself always showed himself to be a most +frank and honest colleague. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, May 16, 1862. + + The Government here is very much disquieted by the rumoured + intentions of England and France with regard to intervention. This + is not altogether without advantage, as they are more disposed to be + considerate, or, at all events, civil, when they have doubts about + us, than when they feel sure of us. They are more civil to France + than to England partly because they are more doubtful about her, and + partly because they never will have, do what she will, the same + bitterness against her as they have against England. Mr. Seward is + encouraged by some of his English correspondents to believe that the + Mexican affair will produce a serious disagreement between England + and France. + + M. Mercier thinks it quite within the range of possibility that the + South may be victorious both in the battles in Virginia and in + Tennessee. He is at all events quite confident that whether + victorious or defeated they will not give in, and he is certainly + disposed to advise his Government to endeavour to put an end to the + war by intervening on the first opportunity. He is however very much + puzzled to devise any mode of intervention which would have the + effect of reviving French trade and obtaining cotton. I shall + suppose he would think it desirable to go to great lengths to stop + the war, because he believes that the South will not give in until + the whole country is made desolate, and that the North will very + soon be led to proclaim immediate emancipation, which would stop the + cultivation of cotton for an indefinite time. + + I listen and say little when he talks of intervention. It appears to + me to be a dangerous subject of conversation. There is a good deal + of truth in M. Mercier's anticipations of evil, but I do not see my + way to doing any good. + + * * * * * + + The credit of the Government has been wonderfully kept up, but it + would not stand a considerable reverse in the field. It is possible + under such circumstances that a peace party might arise, and perhaps + just _possible_ that England and France might give weight to such a + party. However, all this is a mere speculation. We are (as usual) on + the eve of a crisis which is to clear up everything. + +A threatened breakdown in health, due chiefly to overwork, forced Lord +Lyons reluctantly to apply for leave to return to England before the +severe heat of a Washington summer had set in, and in making the +application he pointed out that during the three years which had elapsed +since his arrival in the United States he had only been absent for four +nights from Washington, with the exception of the two months during +which he was officially in attendance on the Prince of Wales. The work +in fact was incessant, the staff of the Legation scanty, and things were +not made easier by the autocratic Hammond, who suddenly recalled one of +the attachés to London, that enlightened bureaucrat being apparently +quite incapable of realizing that a young man's time might be more +profitably employed at Washington during the Civil War than in preparing +for some perfunctory and trumpery examination which could perfectly well +have been undertaken at any subsequent period. The appeals to the +autocrat of the Foreign Office for assistance are as pathetic as they +are moderate. 'I conjure you to send me out two or at least one good +working attaché as soon as possible. Brodie is completely out of health; +Warre is always prostrated by the abominable heat of this place; Monson +can do a great deal, but his constitution is not of iron; and as for +myself I cannot do much Chancery work in addition to my proper duties. +Indeed, I shall soon break down. What you see of our work gives a very +small idea of the amount of it. It seems to me that everybody North and +South who gets into trouble discovers that he or she is a +non-naturalized British subject.' + +Nor were any high qualifications demanded. Geniuses were not in request. +'What we want is a good steady industrious copier, _well conducted in +private life_. I have no objection to quite a young one; such a man as +Jenner would suit me perfectly. Anderson, Monson, and I are all +sufficiently well up in ordinary Chancery management to make it +unnecessary to have more genius or more experience than is required for +copying.' + +Writing to his old chief Lord Normanby, the confession is made that +Washington 'is a terrible place for young men; nothing whatever in the +shape of amusement for them, little or no society of any kind now; no +theatre, no club. I have no time to think whether I am amused or not.' + +Being constitutionally incapable of exaggeration, this last statement +may be accepted as literally accurate. + +Leave for three months having been granted, the sanguine Mr. Seward did +not fail to draw hopeful conclusions from the circumstance, and there +appeared to be no sign of immediate trouble in the near future. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, June 9, 1862. + + I was so unwell yesterday that I was unable to do anything, which + has prevented my sending you by this mail some general information + on the prospects of the war and some other matters. + + I did not think that Mr. Seward would object to my going. He has, in + fact, taken up the idea with so much enthusiasm that I have been + obliged to endeavour to check his anticipation of the wonders I am + to effect, or rather to make him understand that my own views, not + his, are those which I must express to you. + + I take his willingness that I should go as a sign that he does not + expect serious trouble, for I think that he would rather be in my + hands than those of a man new to him if he did. + + I am afraid that there are three things to which we must not blind + ourselves: + + 1. That we have a very small chance of getting cotton from this + country for a long time to come. + + 2. That there is no Union feeling in the South. + + 3. That the war has become one of separation or subjugation. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, June 13, 1862. + + I had quite an affectionate parting with the President this morning. + He told, as is his wont, a number of stories more or less decorous, + but all he said having any bearing on political matters was: 'I + suppose my position makes people in England think a great deal more + of me than I deserve, pray tell 'em that I mean 'em no harm.' He + does not pay much attention to foreign affairs, and I suppose did + not like to talk about them without Mr. Seward. I am to hear Mr. + Seward's last words at New York on Tuesday evening. I embark the + following morning, and hope to pay my respects to you in person a + few days after this letter reaches you. + + It is quite time for me to get away from this place. The heat to-day + is overpowering. + +Lord Lyons arrived in London about the end of June, and a letter to Mr. +Stuart who had been left in charge of the Legation at Washington shows +that he was considerably alarmed at the hostile feeling prevailing +throughout the country against the North, largely due to the inability +to obtain cotton, but also embittered by the tone of the American press. +As an instance of this feeling, alluding to the rumour that McClellan +had suffered a serious defeat, he adds: 'I am afraid no one but me is +sorry for it.' McClellan's misfortunes certainly provoked demonstrations +of pleasure in the House of Commons during an ill-timed debate which +took place in July, and a celebrated speech by Gladstone in which he +asserted that 'Jefferson Davies and the leaders of the South have made +an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made, what +is more than either--they have made a nation,' certainly tended to show +that however impartial the Cabinet intended to be, the sympathies of +England were to a great extent with the South. + +During his stay in England he was in constant communication with the +Cabinet, and the general belief of ministers was that whilst extremely +reluctant to interfere in any way in the American contest, interference +might be forced upon them. Mediation was again in the air, and M. +Mercier and the French Government thought that an opportunity had +arrived for proposing it. + +Lord Lyons, after having been detained by Lord Russell for the purpose +of additional consultations, set out again for Washington in October +accompanied by the late Sir Edward Malet, who remained for a +considerable period on his staff, and became one of his closest friends. +In fact, with the exception of the late Mr. George Sheffield, who was +already acting as his private secretary, and of the late Sir Michael +Hubert, who subsequently acted in the same capacity, it is doubtful +whether any other person of his acquaintance ever reached the same +degree of intimacy or shared his confidence to an equal extent. + +The visit to England had in no sense changed the policy of the British +Government towards the United States, and there were no fresh +instructions with regard to mediation, intervention, recognition of the +South, and the numerous other matters which occupied attention. Nor had +any essential change taken place in the situation in America, and Lord +Lyons, immediately after his return expressed the opinion that foreign +intervention, short of the use of force, would only make matters worse. +The indefatigable M. Mercier, however, in whose thoughts intervention +was always uppermost, was full of a new plan, although, with the violent +party predominant in the Cabinet, the moment did not appear propitious. +M. Mercier's idea was that France, with the consent and support of +England, should offer mediation alone. He thought that the difficulty +which the irritation against England threw in the way of mediation might +thus be avoided, while the fact of England supporting France would give +to France the weight of both Powers. According to his information, +Russia, probably from a desire to separate France and England, was +disposed to join France in offering good offices, but, independently of +other considerations, the presence of Russia might be an obstacle to the +success of his plan. It would take away from the offer of mediation the +element of intimidation, which, though kept in the background, must be +felt by the United States to exist. The mediation of all the European +Powers (France, England, Russia, and perhaps Prussia) would be a +different matter. It might have the effect of reconciling the pride of +the United States to negotiation with the South, and might, in certain +conjunctions, be usefully employed. But it would be more easy for the +Government of the United States to reject an offer from the four Powers +than from England and France, or from France only. England and France +had an obvious and pressing interest in putting an end to hostilities +and the means of supporting their counsels by their navies. + +Such was M. Mercier's plan, but he received little encouragement from +his British colleague, who had anticipated something of the kind, and +with habitual caution declined to pronounce any opinion until he had +received instructions from home. As a matter of fact, he had foreseen +this proposal when in England, and had obtained an assurance from Lord +Russell that it should be discussed by the Cabinet. + +The two following letters from Lord Russell to Lord Lyons show that +M. Mercier was really in accordance with his own Government. + + * * * * * + + Woburn Abbey, Nov. 1, 1862. + + The Emperor of the French wishes to offer peace to both parties, and + he says both parties will agree to peace, the one on the ground of + Union and the other on the ground of Separation! I fear we are no + nearer to peace, if so near, as we were a year ago. + + Seward's avowal to Mr. Stuart that he looks to mutual extermination + and the superior numbers of the North, in order to restore the + Union!!! is the most horrible thing I ever heard. + + Cobden, I fear, is right when he says that to preach peace to them + is like speaking to mad dogs. I am much less sanguine than I was, + but I shall be glad to hear your views on your return. Russia must + be a party to any thing done by us and France--if we do anything. + + * * * * * + + Woburn Abbey, Nov. 8, 1862. + + Flahault has been instructed to propose to us in conjunction with + Russia to ask North and South to suspend their war for six months. I + have not seen the despatch. + + We shall consider our answer on Tuesday next. + +The Emperor's proposal was declined by the British Government, and at +first peremptorily declined also by the Russian Government, but as soon +as the latter perceived, by a speech made by Lord Palmerston at the +Guildhall, that there was no chance of an acceptance of the proposal by +England a circular was issued, stating that if France persisted in her +intention, the Russian Minister at Washington would be instructed to +give it moral if not official support. Thus, as on many other occasions, +did Louis Napoleon's elaborate scheme vanish into space. + +One fresh difficulty which had arisen in the meantime was the diminished +influence of Mr. Seward with the President and his ministers. He +had become much more conciliatory in his dealings with foreign +representatives, but was apparently unable to carry his points with +other departments, and had fallen in public estimation by signing the +Abolition Proclamation which had been imposed upon him, in opposition to +all his views by the Radical party in the Cabinet. Towards the end of +the year it seemed quite probable that he would have to resign, and the +contingency was viewed with consternation, for although Mr. Seward had +very pronounced faults, he now represented the Moderate party, and his +departure would signify the surrender of President Lincoln to the Ultra +Radical party, prepared to risk everything, even to a foreign war, in +order to maintain itself in power. + +Upon the whole, there was every excuse for dissatisfaction with their +Government on the part of the Northern public. After about two years' +fighting the two main armies of the North and South remained in much the +same position, but, if anything, the balance of gain appeared to rest +with the South. New Orleans, it is true, had been captured, but the +invasion of Virginia had failed, and Richmond was as unapproachable as +ever. The North were the attacking party, and if they failed to advance +it was equivalent to a defeat. Disappointment and discouragement had +succeeded to confidence and enthusiasm, and if the contest imposed much +severer hardships upon the Confederates than upon their opponents, there +was no sign of faltering, and their spirit remained as high as ever. + +Before the end of 1862 the prices of ordinary articles in the +Confederate States had already greatly increased. As early as October, +according to the consular reports, the price of tea at Savannah was +sixteen dollars a pound; brown sugar sixty cents; loaf sugar +unobtainable, and the commonest brown soap seventy-five cents. At +Charleston, coal was unprocurable; black cloth fetched fifty-three +dollars a yard; shoes cost thirty-four dollars a pair; beer thirty +dollars a dozen; sugar a dollar a pound; butter a dollar and a half, and +the pound sterling was worth fourteen dollars. In view of these figures +it would be interesting to learn the cost of a banquet given by General +Ripley in December 1862, to some French officers at Charleston, at which +Consul Bunch, of revoked exequatur fame, was present, and which must +surely have been the most sumptuous meal ever partaken of in a besieged +town since the days of Belshazzar. + + * * * * * + + BILL OF FARE. + + Oysters on Shell. + + FISH. + Salmon, Anchovy sauce. + + SOUP. + Green Turtle. Oyster. + + RELEVÉES. + Fillet of Beef, braisé with Mushrooms, + Capon, with Truffes à la Regence. + + BOILED. + Leg of Mutton, Caper sauce, + Turkey, Celery sauce. + + COLD. + Boned Turkey, garnished with Jelly, + Chicken Salad, à la Française, + Game Pattie, with truffles, decorated with Jelly. + + ENTRÉES. + Sweet Breads, larded en croustade, sauce petits pois, + Fillets of Teal Duck, bigare, sauce Italienne, + Quails, braisés, sauce Champignons, + Snipe, broiled on Toast, + Fillets of Venison, sautés, sauce Poivrade, + Fried Oysters. + + RELISHES. + Sardines, Olives, Celery, Assorted Pickles, + Horseradish, Pickled Onions, Cranberry Jelly, + Worcestershire sauce. + + VEGETABLES. + Baked Sweet Potatoes, New Irish Potatoes, Mashed Potatoes, + Spinach, Cauliflowers, Turnips, Rice. + + ROAST. + Turkey, stuffed with truffles, Saddle of Mutton, + Baked Ham, Madeira sauce. + + GAME. + Wild Duck, Wild Turkey, Venison, with Jelly. + + PASTRY. + Plum Pudding, Brandy sauce. + Apple and Mince pies, Omelette Soufflée, Lady Fingers, + Vanilla Kisses, Sponge Cake, Cup Custard, Madeira Jelly. + + DESSERT. + Apples, Nuts, Coffee, etc. + +If, however, the South was feeling the effects of privation, the North +had no cause to rejoice. In September, 1862, Lincoln had issued the +preliminary proclamation of Emancipation, but the hope that it would +consolidate the North had not been realized. The second proclamation +appeared on January 1, 1863, and had no greater success, serving only to +exasperate the South still further and increasing the divisions in the +North. The Democratic party was afraid to declare openly for peace, but +disguised efforts in favour of it were now made, and it was sought to +induce some of the State Legislatures to pass resolutions in favour of +an armistice and a convention. Men of all shades of politics had lost +heart, but the most probable cause of peace seemed to be the +impossibility of raising or keeping together a great army unless the +national spirit could be raised by some striking military successes, +meanwhile the division of feeling in the North had reached such a +pitch that the patriots who had formerly clamoured for a foreign war to +reunite North and South were now calling for a foreign war to reunite +the North itself. + +The general demoralization induced M. Mercier to make yet another +attempt at mediation. Upon this occasion he was approached by the +well-known journalist, Mr. Horace Greeley, whose object it was to +ascertain whether the Emperor Napoleon could be relied upon as a real +friend to the United States in case of his being accepted as a mediator, +a 'real friend,' meaning, of course, one who would insist upon the +restoration of the Union. M. Mercier's fresh attempt met with no greater +success than before, nor was it surprising, for his action was based +upon an entire misconception. + +Being firmly convinced that the restoration of the Union was impossible, +he failed to realize that this must be the basis of all negotiations, +and although most people were heartily sick of the war and were not +prepared to refuse to the South all terms short of unconditional +surrender, they had not been brought to the point of acquiescing in a +cession of territory. + +The French proposal, with which we had been careful not to associate +ourselves, was, of course, declined by the American Government. Mr. +Seward re-established some of his popularity by the character of his +answer; distrust of the Emperor Napoleon increased, and the only party +which benefited in any way was England, for the increase in ill-feeling +towards France had the result of diminishing to some extent the +animosity against us, and M. Mercier himself was now almost as much +attacked in the press as the British Minister had been in the past. + +Early in the year, an incident occurred which might have had unpleasant +consequences had it not been promptly dealt with. In spite of the +endless embarrassments created by the blockade, the British Government +was sincerely anxious not to give the United States Government any +ground for complaint, and the Consuls had been continually enjoined by +Lord Lyons to adhere closely to the recognized rules of International +Law where a state of blockade existed. To his consternation he now +learnt that the Consul at Mobile proposed to send away from that port a +quantity of specie in a British man-of-war. 'I should be very much +alarmed,' he wrote, 'if I thought it likely that he would find a captain +of man-of-war as foolish as himself. I really could not answer for peace +if, in addition to the irritation about the _Alabama_, should come the +fury which would be excited, if it were shown that our men-of-war had +carried Confederate gold through the blockade. No proof that the money +was intended for, or even that it had been actually paid to, British +bondholders would ever convince people here that it had not been used to +purchase munitions of war.' Unfortunately a simple-minded captain had +been discovered by the Consul, and before it was possible to communicate +with him the specie had been shipped. This action, which was due solely +to stupidity, was impossible to defend, and would have provided the +American Government with a first-class grievance; clearly the best thing +to do was to anticipate any complaints, and consequently the Consul was +wisely dismissed before the matter became really public. The promptitude +with which this regrettable incident was dealt with contrasts favourably +with the difficulty which was experienced in persuading the American +Government to deal adequately with grievances arising out of the +proceedings of their own officials. + +At this period of the war innumerable complaints were received from +British Governors, Naval officers and Consuls with regard to the +arbitrary proceedings of United States cruisers, and it was plain that +these proceedings were largely due to the exasperation caused by the +exploits of the _Alabama_, and by the rumours that similar vessels were +being built in England for the Confederates. This exasperation was +perfectly natural, but not altogether reasonable, for it never seems to +have occurred to the Americans that the fault lay partly with their own +Navy. Great pressure was put upon President Lincoln to issue letters of +marque, and had privateers made their appearance and exercised +belligerent rights against neutral merchantmen, the difficulty of +preserving peace would have been increased tenfold. Mr. Seward was known +to be strongly in favour of the policy of issuing letters of marque, and +the matter was brought to the attention of Mr. Adams by Lord Russell, +who always appeared somewhat unnecessarily disposed to suspect Mr. +Seward of hostile intentions. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._ + + Chesham Place, March 14, 1863. + + I don't think Mr. Seward means to quarrel with us, but perhaps he + will bluster rather more when he has lost the support of Congress. + + Adams told me that the privateers, if sanctioned at all, were not + intended to interfere with nice questions of International Law, but + only to encounter the _Alabama_ and other vessels of that sort. + If this be so I doubt if they will be fitted out at all, but if + they are fitted out I think they will not keep their hands off + English merchant ships. + + We have no thoughts of recognizing at present. If you are asked our + intentions by Seward, say that our opinion is that the Republican + Party ought not to leave the glorious work of peace to the + Democrats, but as a Neutral Power, our intention and wish is to let + the war work itself out, as it is sure to do by the moral exhaustion + of the war spirit. + + Our procession and wedding went off splendidly. The Princess of + Wales is charming and would make New York stand on tiptoe to behold + her. + +In a further conversation with Mr. Adams he made the significant remarks +that if the contemplated privateers sought for Confederate merchant +ships they would not find any, and that if they interfered with neutral +vessels and the law of blockade they would probably involve their own +and the British Government in 'very awkward questions.' + +Lord Russell, in spite of his sincere and often proclaimed desire to +remain absolutely impartial, hardly seems at this time to have realized +the disastrous consequences of not having prevented the departure of the +_Alabama_ and similar vessels. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, March 28, 1863. + + The outcry in America about the _Oreto_ and the _Alabama_ is much + exaggerated, but I must feel that her roaming the ocean with English + guns and English sailors to burn, sink and destroy the ships of a + friendly nation, is a scandal and a reproach. I don't know very well + what we can do, but I should like myself to refer the question of + indemnity to an impartial arbiter. + + When things are more advanced towards a termination, I think this + might be done. It would be dangerous to do it at present, or even + to hold out hopes of it. I will think further of it, and if I remain + in the same mind, will submit the question to the Cabinet. + + The _Peterhoff_ and the _Magicienne_ are now before the Law + Officers. I will send you instructions about them next week. The + seizures by Admiral Wilkes seem like a plan to embroil our two + countries. He always protests that such is not his object, but his + acts do not agree with his words. + + I should like anything better than being obliged to take the part of + the Confederates. But then President Lincoln must not be getting up + war cries to help his declining popularity. + +The two vessels alluded to had been captured on their way to Matamoros, +in Mexican territory, and the British Government contended that the +traffic to that place was legitimate, while the United States Government +maintained, probably with justice, that the goods were intended for +Texas. Matamoros, which was situated on the Rio Grande, separating +Mexico from the United States, sprang into prominence in 1862 in +consequence of the war, became the seat of a brisk trade, and provided +one of the numerous difficulties arising out of the blockade, which had +now been greatly extended owing to the rapid development of the Federal +Navy. + +As for Admiral Wilkes, the hero of the _Trent_, his arbitrary conduct +was the subject of continual complaints; he showed marked discourtesy in +connection with H.M.S. _Barracouta_, and upon one occasion a cruiser +under his command went so far as to fire a shot across the bows of +H.M.S. _Cygnet_, and as the long-suffering British Admiral Sir A. Milne +observed, to fire a shot across the bows of a neutral ship of war when +hove to, was going a step further in the already uncourteous proceedings +of the American cruisers. Admiral Wilkes always disclaimed any +intention of unfriendliness, but his proceedings were a fruitful source +of irritation, and Lord Russell certainly conceived the impression that +he and his official chief, Mr. Welles, were bent upon picking a quarrel +with us. + +Feeling between the two countries was not improved by the inopportune +publication of a Blue Book. The Democrats, who had been faring badly, by +some mysterious process of reasoning, came to the conclusion that the +object was to destroy them and denounced Lord Russell for having lost +them an election in Connecticut by his Machiavellian proceedings. They +vented their indignation upon the Legation at Washington, and the +position of the minister became more and more unpleasant, added to which +his health again showed signs of giving way. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, April 13, 1863. + + I have written as much as I have time and strength for officially. I + have been unwell all the last week, but not seriously so. I think + the state of things here, as far as peace with us is concerned, more + alarming than it has been since the Trent affair. They are not a + people who can be soothed by concessions, and they are a people who + after any amount of bluster will give in if they think that their + opponents are in earnest and are stronger than they. I would rather + the quarrel came, if come it must, upon some better ground for us + than the question of the ships fitted out for the Confederates. The + great point to be gained, in my opinion, would be to prevent the + ships sailing, without leading the people here to think that they + had gained their point by threats. I am in trouble altogether, for + the good will to me personally, which had miraculously survived so + long, seems at last to have sunk altogether under the stroke of the + last Blue Book. + +It must have been peculiarly irritating, after all the efforts he had +made, to find them neutralized by the clumsy action of the Home +Government, but in his private correspondence there occur no expressions +of resentment against those who had thus weakened his position, probably +because his sense of discipline and loyalty to his official chiefs was +so strong as to preclude anything in the nature of criticism. It is +customary, before publishing Blue Books on Foreign Affairs, to consult +both the Foreign Government concerned and the British representative +accredited to it, but presumably in this case the usual practice was not +observed. + +In one direction, however, there was an improvement. The British +Government tardily realizing the danger arising from the building of +Confederate cruisers in England took steps to prevent it, and the +situation was eased for the time being. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, April 24, 1863. + + So far as I can judge in this short time the Americans have eagerly + grasped at the intelligence of the endeavours to stop the + Confederate vessels building in England, as a relief from their + dread that they were really drifting into a war with us. I cannot + yet say whether the exasperation is subsiding. I have not much fear + that they will ever put a _casus belli_ to us, but I do fear that + they may force us to make demands upon them to which, however + plainly just, party considerations may render it difficult for the + administration to yield. I seem to be getting on pretty well again + with Mr. Seward, but not with others since the Blue Book, and Mr. + Seward cannot control the feelings or the actions of the other + members of the administration either as regards England or her + Representative here personally. However, for the moment, things + certainly look more peaceful than they did a week ago. I mean + peaceful towards us, for there are no symptoms of an approaching end + of the civil war. + +One danger at any rate was removed, at all events temporarily, for the +American Government determined not to proceed with the issuing of the +letters of marque. The chief danger, however, lay not so much in the +exasperation caused by the Confederate ships as in the proceedings of +the United States cruisers, and it was feared that a repetition of such +seizures as those of the _Peterhoff_ and _Magicienne_ might rouse such a +feeling of indignation in England that it might become necessary to put +forward demands for redress which the Americans would be too angry to +comply with. For some reason, too, the relations between the British +Legation and the Navy Department (perhaps owing to Mr. Welles's +anti-English proclivities), were much less satisfactory than was the +case with the other Government offices, and whenever an American naval +officer had been admittedly in the wrong, explanation, regret, or +redress were generally postponed so long (as in the case of the _Trent_) +that the United States Government found itself in the position of having +either to make a marked concession to England, or to run the risk of +refusing just demands. Lord Lyons's usual practice was to leave the door +open for spontaneous action on their part up to the last moment, and to +abstain from making anything like a demand or even an embarrassing +observation for as long as possible; but his difficulties in dealing +with such questions were increased by a quarrel between Mr. Seward and +Mr. Welles. Mr. Seward, to do him justice, generally seems to have +exercised a pacific influence, but party spirit ran so high, and the +Democrats detested him so cordially, that even those who were known +to be friendly towards England could not resist the temptation of +denouncing his 'humiliating concessions to British arrogance' when +they got the opportunity. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Admiral Sir A. Milne._ + + Washington, May 11, 1863. + + I have given Mr. Seward verbally a warning from H.M. Government that + the impression which prevails in England that the United States are + systematically endeavouring by fair means and by foul to stop our + trade with Matamoros is producing very dangerous effects. Mr. Seward + said that he should be able to give very satisfactory assurances on + this head. I observed to him that I thought some decided practical + steps were necessary to do away with this impression. I reminded him + of his previous assurances and of his instructions to the Navy + Department, and pointed out those instructions were apparently set + at nought by the U.S. officers. I said that the great point was to + make the subordinate officers feel the effects of the displeasure of + the Government, when they violated neutral rights; that it was not + likely the naval officers would pay much attention to the assurances + given by the Government to Foreign Powers, and that it was not to be + expected that they would pay much attention to formal instructions + to themselves, if they found that they could practically violate + them with impunity. The Government ought, I said, to remove its + subordinates from situations in which they were peculiarly exposed + to temptations to make an unlawful use of belligerent powers. I told + Mr. Seward that I should regard another questionable seizure of a + British merchant vessel in the neighbourhood of St. Thomas, or + another questionable seizure anywhere of a British vessel bound to + Matamoros, as little less than a calamity. + + I trust that I made so much impression as to render it probable that + these matters will be arranged for the present, as far as _words_ + go, and that something will be done to check the vexatious + proceedings of the cruisers. What this Government ought to do is to + remove their ships from St. Thomas altogether and recall Admiral + Wilkes. I have not however much confidence in their doing anything + really effectual. Many of the naval officers would like a war with + England. They know well enough that it would not be a naval war, but + they are envious of Captain Semmes and the _Alabama_, and would + rather roam about picking up prizes, than go on with the dull and + harassing work of blockading. Then the universal exasperation in the + country against England makes the Government unwilling and afraid to + do anything which looks like a concession to us. Thus things are in + a dangerous state, and it will be a great comfort to me to be within + reach of you by telegraph. + + If any more privateers get out of our ports, the Government here may + be forced by public clamour to issue letters of marque somewhat + suddenly. Mr. Seward has verbally promised to give us notice, but + this is a very vague assurance: of course it will not do for me to + discuss beforehand any particular arrangements about them, because + this would imply acquiescence in their being issued, which we are + far from wishing to signify beforehand. + + I have been unwell for more than a month, and am beset by a quantity + of small vexatious business concerning the wrongs of British + subjects who have suddenly proclaimed their unswerving loyalty to + the British Crown and demanded my protection. + + Many thanks for your private letter. You will think that I am trying + to make up for the quality of my information by quantity of writing. + The fact is I am too much knocked up to be able to write shortly. + +The representations made with regard to Admiral Wilkes, partly owing to +the good offices of Mr. Seward, at length produced a satisfactory +result, and that enterprising officer was promoted to a command in the +Pacific, much doubtless to the relief of all concerned. Lord Lyons was +extremely careful to conceal the fact that he had been in any way +instrumental in obtaining this transfer, and congratulated himself upon +the advent of a temporary lull in the storm against England: a lull, +however, which the escape of another _Alabama_ from Liverpool, of a +considerable Federal success or even a mere accident, might convert into +an even more furious tempest. + +Two years previously Mr. Seward had announced that the policy of the +United States, unlike that of other countries, was 'based on high and +eternal consideration of principle and the good of the human race,' but +aliens resident in America, and more especially Englishmen, might have +been excused for complaining that this lofty and inspiring ideal was +accompanied by a vast amount of inconvenience and hardship. + +Foreigners who have taken up their abode in a country where a state of +war prevails are naturally subjected to much that is objectionable to +them, in the natural course of things, and as a general rule find it +extremely difficult to obtain redress, for whilst they remain in a +country which is not their own they must submit to any exceptional +legislation which the force of circumstances may require. Foreign +Governments are not in a position to decide whether this exceptional +legislation is justifiable or not, and the utmost that the alien can +expect is, either that he should be allowed time to depart, or that his +Government should protect him by remonstrance or otherwise when he is +dealt with illegally; and the general principle which is usually adopted +is that foreign interference should be as sparing as possible and that +the foreigner should take his chance with the native citizen. + +It was not long before foreigners in the United States were made to +realize the disadvantages of living in a country where civil war +prevailed. When hostilities began, the Government, reasonably enough, +took steps to suspend when necessary the ordinary law, that being a +practice almost invariably adopted by civilized countries under similar +circumstances. Persons suspected of disaffection or treason were +arbitrarily arrested, kept in prison under the authority of the +military, and detained there without trial; and amongst these were +occasionally _bonâ fide_ British subjects and others who claimed to +be such. Where martial law exists, it is only natural that occasional +cases of injustice or harshness should arise, and it is clear that a +certain number of British subjects suffered without due cause, but upon +the whole it does not appear the United States Government exercised its +powers with undue severity, or that it acted in a more arbitrary manner +than would have been the case with a European Power in a similar +position. + +In February, 1862, nearly all political prisoners, other than spies, +were ordered to be released on parole, and in April Lord Lyons was able +to report that although the Executive Government retained the power to +make political arrests it was rarely exercised. He stated that he was +not aware of any British subject being detained arbitrarily as a +political prisoner, and that although arrests without form of law were +still being made by the military authorities in places occupied by the +forces of the United States, they appeared to be confined in general to +persons accused of offences affecting, more or less, the discipline or +safety of the army. + +As was only to be expected, there were an enormous number of +applications made to the Legation by persons who were aggrieved by the +operation of martial law, but what gave far more trouble was the attempt +of the United States Government to exact military service from resident +British subjects. + +The established principle is that resident aliens, in return for the +enjoyment of ordinary civil rights, should be liable to discharge +certain duties in connection with the administration of justice and the +maintenance of order, and that in certain cases they may reasonably be +called upon to take part in the defence of the country against invasion. +On the other hand, the incorporation of aliens in the regular army or +navy is manifestly unjust, for it prevents departure from the country +and might conceivably incur the obligation of having to fight against +their own countrymen. This, it is true, is not applicable to a civil +war, but an alien might well argue that a civil war, waged between +citizens for an object in which he, as an alien, had no concern, was a +totally insufficient reason for dragging him into the contest. It is +difficult to believe, for instance, that the United States Government +would tolerate the compulsory service of American citizens in the army +of a South American Republic in the event of an attempt being made to +impress them during a civil war. Consequently, when hostilities began, +the Washington Legation was besieged by persons who desired to be +exempted from service by getting registered as British subjects, many of +whom had announced their intention of becoming American citizens at the +earliest opportunity. _Prima facie_ it seems only reasonable that +persons who deliberately exchange one nationality for another, more +especially if like many of the Irish emigrants they have professed +undying hostility to England, and everything English, should accept any +liability imposed upon them, but the question was complicated by the +fact that they had not acquired full rights of citizenship, the +naturalization of a foreigner in America, necessitating a residence of +five years in the United States, and a declaration of intention three +years in advance. + +Instructions upon this question were requested from Her Majesty's +Government before the war broke out, and in reply it was stated that +there was nothing in International Law which prohibited a Government +from requiring resident aliens to serve in the police or militia; if, +however, the militia were to be embodied for active service, and +substitutes were prohibited, then 'the position of British subjects +would appear to deserve very favourable consideration, and to call for +every exertion being made in their favour.' A similar opinion was +expressed in July, 1861. + +The difficulty really arose out of the defective military organization +of the United States, which was based upon the voluntary system. The +so-called voluntary system, which is in reality only a high-sounding +device to impose upon an impecunious minority what ought to be a general +obligation, may be an admirable institution in time of peace, but it +invariably breaks down in a really serious emergency, and it was the +totally inadequate nature of that system which forced both combatants in +the American Civil War to have recourse to all sorts of discreditable +expedients. + +It has already been stated that at the beginning of the war the American +regular army consisted of only 16,000 officers and men all told. +Immediately after the seizure of Fort Sumter, in April, 1861, President +Lincoln called out 75,000 militia, and in May he called for 42,000 +volunteers for three years, half of whom were to serve in the regular +army, and half in the navy. At first these appeals were responded to +with the greatest enthusiasm, but it was not long-lived, for, as has +been related, even as early as the battle of Bull's Run in July, militia +regiments insisted upon leaving at the completion of their period of +service, and from that date the difficulty in finding recruits continued +to increase. + +The pay of the privates was in May, 1861, raised to thirteen dollars a +month, which, however, may be considered low when compared with the five +shillings a day we paid to untrained men during the Boer War, and it +became clear that not only was it difficult to attract volunteers, but +also to keep them when obtained. In view of the methods employed in +recruiting them it was not surprising that the results were frequently +unsatisfactory. + +The usual method employed was to inform the Governor of a State of the +number of men required. The Governor having made the necessary +announcement, private persons came forward offering to raise regiments. +Each set forth his claims, his influence in the State or among a certain +portion of the population, and his devotion to the party in power. + +From the persons thus presenting themselves the Governor made his +choice. Generally the person upon whom the choice fell laid it down as +a condition that he should have the command of the regiment. The next +thing was to find soldiers. Friends seized with the same martial ardour +promised to bring so many recruits if they were made--the one a +Captain--another a Lieutenant--another a Sergeant, and so forth. The +framework was thus formed and partially filled up, and the regiment +being thus organized, the lists were carried to the Governor for his +approval. + +The inconveniences of such a system were obvious, and experience showed +that it was much less adapted, than had been supposed, for the purpose +of raising an efficient army. It was considered, however, to possess +certain political advantages, one of which was that there was little +fear of the officers ultimately forming anything like a separate +military or aristocratic caste. + +The real inconvenience of the system, however, was that sufficient men +were not forthcoming in spite of the inducements offered by means of +high pay, and the Government was forced to have recourse to all sorts of +iniquitous devices in order to get hold of so-called volunteers, many of +whom were foreigners. The most objectionable practice was that of giving +bounties to agents for bringing in recruits. The effect of this at the +beginning of the war was that great numbers of men deserted from the +British navy, and the Admiral at Halifax reported that at one time there +were a hundred deserters from one ship alone, the _St. Vincent_, but as +the contest progressed the bounty system was responsible for innumerable +cases of kidnapping in which British subjects were the sufferers. +Kidnapping especially flourished in New York where the emigrants were an +easy prey, and to such a point had corruption been carried that the +Governor admitted to the British Consul that out of every million of +dollars expended in bounties, fully four-fifths of the amount were +secured by bounty and substitute brokers and crimps. + + * * * * * + + 'The fraud and violence combined,' wrote Consul Archibald from New + York, 'which are now used in procuring recruits for both army and + navy are disgraceful, and it is idle for the authorities to think of + putting down the malpractices of the villains who carry on the + business of kidnapping recruits, or of making the world believe they + are sincere, while they hold out such inducements to these vagabonds + for carrying on their White Slave Trade and Black Slave Trade too. I + have numerous complaints, but, as in a great majority of cases the + victims, at last, succumb and take a portion of the bounty, for they + rarely get more than a portion, it would be unavailing to ask for + their release.' + + In the autumn of 1862, Fire Island was filled with unfortunates + cheated and deluded, or forced thither by the police who received + ten dollars a head for each man. Now in addition to the enormous + bounties offered, there is placarded in conspicuous places on the + walls of the New Park barracks at the City Hall the following very + suggestive notice: 'Fifteen dollars Hand Money given to any man + bringing a volunteer.' + +The following report from a Federal General shows that the strictures of +Consul Archibald were thoroughly justified. + + * * * * * + + _Important Letter from General Wistar._ + + VICTIMS OF THE BOUNTY SWINDLERS DESERTING IN LARGE NUMBERS,--EVILS + OF THE PLUNDERING SYSTEM ON OUR ARMIES IN THE FIELD, ETC. + + * * * * * + + Headquarters United States Forces, + Yorktown, Va., April 15, 1854. + + General--An extended spirit of desertion prevailing among the + recruits recently received from the North, in some of the regiments + of my command, has led me to make some inquiries resulting in + apparently well-authenticated information, which I beg respectfully + to communicate to you in this unofficial manner, deeming it required + by humanity, no less than by our common desire to benefit the + service. + + There seems to be little doubt that many, in fact I think I am + justified in saying the most, of these unfortunate men were either + deceived or kidnapped, or both, in the most scandalous and inhuman + manner, in New York city, where they were drugged and carried off to + New Hampshire and Connecticut, mustered in and uniformed before + their consciousness was fully restored. + + Even their bounty was obtained by the parties who were instrumental + in these nefarious transactions, and the poor wretches find + themselves on returning to their senses, mustered soldiers, without + any pecuniary benefit. Nearly all are foreigners, mostly sailors, + both ignorant of and indifferent to the objects of the war in which + they thus suddenly find themselves involved. + + Two men were shot here this morning for desertion, and over thirty + more are now awaiting trial or execution. + + These examples are essential, as we all understand; but it occurred + to me, General, that you would pardon me for thus calling your + attention to the greater crime committed in New York, in kidnapping + these men into positions where, to their ignorance, desertion must + seem like a vindication of their own rights and liberty. + + Believe me to be, General, with the highest esteem, your obedient + servant, + + * * * * * + + J. J. WISTAR. + + To Major-General John A. Dix, New York City. + +These outrages committed in the name of the Voluntary System, and many +of the victims of which were Englishmen, constantly took place even +after the Act of July, 1862, which provided for the enrolment in the +militia of all able-bodied citizens between the ages of eighteen and +forty-five, and it may be presumed therefore either that the United +States Government was afraid to enforce its laws or that the so-called +'volunteers' were chiefly foreign subjects. In any case, amongst +these unhappy victims were numerous British youths under twenty-one +years of age, and the efforts made to obtain their discharge on the +ground of their being minors were rarely successful and eventually +abandoned altogether. + +In the South, apparently, the state of things was equally bad, if not +worse; British subjects were imprisoned on all sorts of pretexts in +spite of Consular protection papers, and enlistment was frequently the +price of liberty. The Southern press was particularly scathing on the +subject of aliens, especially Irishmen who endeavoured to evade military +service. + + * * * * * + + We can conceive nothing more disgraceful than the conduct of + Irishmen, for example--but we trust they are few--who have been + cursing the British Government ever since they could talk, who have + emigrated to this country to escape the British Yoke, but who now + run to an English Consul and profess themselves subjects of Queen + Victoria in order to evade their duties in the land of their + adoption. We say that we fervently trust there are but few Irishmen + of whom this can be said, for such are a disgrace to their old + island, and bring the blush of shame to the cheek of their + compatriots who fight in our foremost ranks upon every field. Nobody + will be more pleased than our good Irish citizens if these fellows + are sent under guard to the camp. + + The attention of conscript officers is therefore called to the + foreign Consul's offices, to the railroad cars and the roads. + +The question of the liability to conscription of British subjects +naturally produced a voluminous correspondence. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, July 24, 1863. + + Military events, or at all events military news, have been scarce + during the last few days. The really important question seems to be + the enforcement of the Conscription Act. On the one hand we hear of + wide-spread plans of resistance to it, organized among the Germans, + as well as the Irish population in all parts of the Country; on the + other hand it is represented that the Government is determined to + enforce it at the point of the bayonet, and to begin at New York, as + soon as it can get things ready. We have as yet had no proof that + any serious resistance to the Government will be provoked by any + measures it may take. The Democrats at New York are, as might be + expected, frightened by the mob--they dare not encourage resistance + to the Conscription, lest they should let loose an uncontrollable + gang of plunderers. On the other hand, if the Government succeeds in + getting military command of New York there is very little chance of + any but the Government candidate's coming in as President when Mr. + Lincoln's term expires. + + British subjects are not the least violent in language about the + Draft, and are far from being pleased either with H.M. Government or + with H.M. Minister here. I have given myself a world of trouble to + make the burthen of proving their claim to exemption as light as + possible. If I have not succeeded as well as I ought, I have done + more than most people, who knew anything about the difficulties, + expected. I have written you a very long despatch about it--much + longer than I intended, but I thought it well to put something on + record to show that the matter had been properly attended to. I have + taken more pains myself about it, and given Mr. Seward more trouble + about it, than about any matter which I have had to treat with him. + + M. Mercier's absence has made it difficult to concert measures + speedily about the Cotton question, but his Secretary of Legation + and I intend to speak to Mr. Seward about it to-morrow. We do not + mean to go to Mr. Seward together. I have so little hope of + effecting anything practical, that I should hardly feel in earnest + about it, if it were a matter of less importance. As it is, I shall + of course do my best. As soon as this affair is in train, I hope to + set out for Canada. My present notion is to wait here for the + despatches from London of the 18th--which ought to arrive the middle + of next week--and to wait at New York for the despatches from London + of the 25th, and then, if they bring nothing to hinder it, to go on + to Quebec. I shall present Mr. Stuart as _Chargé d'affaires_ before + I leave Washington. It would be impossible to carry on the immense + amount of protection to British subjects' business here, without + some one on the spot who could write officially to the Government. + Mr. Stuart is both perfectly capable of managing difficult questions + himself, and perfectly willing to refer them to men higher in office + when it is proper to do so--a rare combination of merits. + +The question was finally decided to the satisfaction of His Majesty's +Government by a Proclamation of the President which allowed aliens a +period of sixty-five days, during which their departure was permitted, +and interference on behalf of persons who had failed to take advantage +of the opportunity was subsequently refused. As for the difficulties +experienced by the United States Government, they seem to have been met +by enforcing conscription where it was possible, and delaying it where +serious opposition was feared. + +In August, 1863, a somewhat surprising proposal came from Mr. Seward. In +a confidential conversation with Lord Lyons he expatiated upon the +necessity of reviving a better feeling between Great Britain and the +United States, and of making some demonstration calculated to produce +the desired effect. England, he said, had made such a demonstration +before the war by the visit of the Prince of Wales, which had been +productive of the happiest results. Now it was the turn of the United +States to make a corresponding display of goodwill, but it was difficult +to devise the means of doing so, as the President could not travel, and +America possessed no Princes. Would Lord Lyons think the matter over? + +The latter, having duly reflected, expressed the opinion that there was +no real hostility to the United States in England, although there was +undoubtedly a certain amount of sympathy with the South, and that +consequently there was no necessity to take any extraordinary step. Mr. +Seward, however, having returned to his suggestion of making some +counter demonstration in the nature of the visit of the Prince of Wales. + + * * * * * + + 'The only conjecture I can make,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'is that he + thinks of going to England himself. He may possibly want to be + absent for some reasons connected with the Presidential contest. If + he thinks that he has himself any chance of being taken as a + candidate by either party he is the only man who thinks so at this + moment. It is however generally considered to be an advantage to a + candidate to be out of the country during the canvass. I cannot see + any good which his going to England could effect with regard to + public opinion. If he considered himself as returning the Prince of + Wales's visit, the absurdity of the notion would alone prevent its + being offensive. The majority of the Americans would probably be by + no means pleased if he met with a brilliant reception. He has, + besides, so much more vanity, personal and national, than tact, that + he seldom makes a favourable impression at first. When one comes + really to know him, one is surprised to find much to esteem and even + to like in him. It is however hardly worth while to say more on the + subject, for it is a mere conjecture of mine that he was thinking + of going to England when he spoke to me. It might however be of + advantage for me to know whether you would wish to encourage the + idea of some public demonstration or other, if he should return to + the subject when I get back to Washington. I told him that so far as + public opinion in England was concerned, the one thing to do was + to let us really have a supply of cotton; that without this + demonstrations and professions would be unsuccessful: that with it + they would not be required.' + +Whether Lord Lyons's conjecture was well founded or not, the prospect of +a visit from Mr. Seward possessed no charms for Lord Russell, whose +antipathy to the American Secretary of State has been already noted. The +following letter appears to be full of good sense and instructive as +regards the real value of those visits of exalted personages which +produce such illimitable enthusiasm in the press. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._ + + Oct. 2, 1863. + + Upon considering Mr. Seward's hints to you of doing something here + as an equivalent or a return for the Prince of Wales's visit to the + United States, I do not see my way to anything satisfactory. These + visits of Great Personages seldom have more than a transient effect; + they form no real and solid relation of friendship between nations, + though if undertaken at a fortunate moment, they serve to bring out + and demonstrate a friendship already existing. + + The visit of the Prince of Wales was thus fortunately well timed; + but if Mr. Seward or any conspicuous statesman of the United States + were to visit this country now he would find us all divided. The + Government would show him every attention and civility: the + Anti-Slavery party would probably make great show of sympathy by + addresses and public receptions. But the party who press for + recognition of the South would hold aloof, and in some unmistakable + manner, prove that there is a great deal of sympathy with the South + in this country. + + In these circumstances I do not think that any such mark of + friendship as Mr. Seward suggests would be likely to produce the + good effect of which he is desirous. Mr. Sumner's conduct is very + bad; he has taken infinite pains to misrepresent me in every + particular. I have done my best to counteract his efforts by my + speech at Blairgowrie. I don't know how far I may be successful, but + I rely on your constant watchfulness to prevent any rupture between + the two countries, which of all things I should most lament. + + The question of the ironclads is still under investigation. The + Cabinet must consider it very soon, and I have no doubt we shall do + all that is right to preserve our neutrality free from just + reproach--unjust reproach we shall not yield to. + + I hope you are now quite well, and as the heats must be over I trust + you will not suffer for the next six months from the climate of + Washington. + +Owing to continual ill-health, Lord Lyons was compelled to pay a visit +to Canada in the autumn, and upon his return to Washington in October, +accompanied by Admiral Milne, he found Mr. Seward in a more conciliatory +frame of mind than ever, chiefly owing to the detention of Confederate +ironclads in England. Mr. Welles and the lawyers at the Navy Department, +however, still 'appeared to be thoroughly wrongheaded and unable to see +that municipal law is one thing and International Law and the relations +between Governments another.' The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Chase, +engaged on an electioneering tour, distinguished himself by spirited +speeches, talking of 'taking Old Mother England by the hair and giving +her a good shaking,' and was himself outdone in rancour against England +by another distinguished politician, Mr. Sumner. There was in fact no +sign of change in the feeling of the people at large towards us, and the +visit of a Russian squadron to New York was made the occasion of an +anti-British and anti-French demonstration. + +Considering that the war had now lasted for several years, it seems +rather remarkable that the British Government had not thought it worth +while to send military or naval officers to watch the operations, but +judging from the following letter, the idea never seems to have occurred +that there was anything to learn. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, Nov. 3, 1863. + + I have no news of importance--political or military to write to-day. + The crisis at Chattanooga has not yet taken place, so far as we + know. + + I doubt whether people in Europe are aware of the extent of the + progress of this Country in military strength or of the preparations + which have been made for the contingency of a War with an European + Power. It is impossible for me to undertake to give anything like + detailed information on the subject; but it may be worth while for + Her Majesty's Government to consider whether it is important for + them to know what is really being done, and if so, what measures + will be best with a view to their obtaining regularly information + practically useful. I have no fancy for having a military or Naval + Attaché--and I am not certain how the appointment of one might be + taken here. It _might_ create suspicion--on the other hand it + _might_ be taken as a compliment. I am inclined to think that + Officers unconnected with the Legation sent quietly, but by no means + secretly, would learn most. But if the Legation is to be depended + upon for the information, it is absolutely necessary that there + should be in it some one having a professional knowledge both of + naval and military matters. I myself know as little of such matters + as any man--and were it otherwise, I have as much proper Diplomatic + business to do as I can manage. The correspondence with Mr. Seward, + which requires minute care in many cases, grows more and more + burdensome. New cases arise daily, and the old ones never seem to + come to an end. I have had considerably more than nine hundred notes + from Mr. Seward already this year. + + I don't think the Government here at all desires to pick a quarrel + with us or with any European power, but the better prepared it is, + the less manageable it will be. + +This suggestion was eventually acted upon as appears later. + +About this time, the mission to Europe of Messrs. Mason and Slidell +having failed in its object, the Confederate Government resolved upon +the expulsion of the British Consuls resident in the South, who were +informed that they could no longer be permitted to exercise their +functions, or even to reside within the limits of the Confederacy. +Doubtless the active part the Consuls had taken in endeavouring to +prevent the compulsory enlistment of British subjects contributed +towards this action, but the ostensible reasons were, firstly, that they +received their instructions from the British Minister residing in +Washington, and secondly, that Mr. McGee, the Consul at Mobile, had been +dismissed from his post because he had allowed specie intended for the +payment of interest on a State debt to be shipped from that blockaded +port to London on board of a British warship. In Lord Lyons's opinion +the action of Mr. Jefferson Davis's Government appeared reasonable. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, Nov. 17, 1863. + + Mr. Walker has sent me a copy of his despatch to you enclosing Mr. + Benjamin's letter to Mr. Slidell explaining the reasons to be given + for the expulsion. The objection to the Consuls being under the + orders of the Minister at Washington appears reasonable enough. As + you know, I have all along been of opinion that the connexion + between the Southern Consulates and the Legation was full of + inconvenience. The objection to Mr. Cridland's appointment, that it + was made by me, has, in fact, no other foundation than that your + orders to Mr. Moore on the subject were sent through me; in + transmitting them I took the precaution expressly to desire Mr. + Moore to word the appointment as one coming from H.M. Government + and not to mention me. + + Mr. Benjamin's lecture on the duty of Belligerents to pay their + debts is totally beside the purpose. Of course no one could have + wished more than I did that the British creditors should receive + their money. I wished that all British subjects should be able to + remove their property from the Confederate States, and most of all I + wished that an unlimited amount of cotton should be exported. What I + objected to was that a British Consul should engage himself in + committing a breach of blockade, and that a British man of war, + which had been admitted on the faith that she should carry away + nothing but despatches, should carry through the Blockade the very + article to the exportation of which the United States most objected. + It is rather cool of Mr. Benjamin to say that the United States + could not but have been glad that specie should be exported, when he + knew that at the time the great anxiety of the Confederates was to + get specie through the blockade to pay for their purchasers of + warlike stores in Europe, and that the great anxiety of the United + States was to prevent this. + +At the close of 1863 it became evident that the cause of the South was +failing, but the reverses of the Confederates seemed only to stimulate +them to fresh exertions, while President Davis's eloquent message in +December proclaimed that the patriotism of the people was equal to every +sacrifice demanded by their country's needs. + +In the preceding autumn, Mr. Seward, in pursuance of his laudable policy +of conciliation, had suggested that the Reciprocity Treaty with Canada, +which would expire shortly, might afford an opportunity of making a +friendly demonstration. His suggestion was that the British Government +should make inquiries from him on the subject of its renewal, but Lord +Russell, who was prone to regard him with suspicion, had not responded +to this advance with any favour. In the early part of 1864 it became +evident that the treaty was in considerable danger, and the Canadian +Government began to show signs of natural anxiety, especially in view of +the fact that a hostile motion was pending in Congress. The following +letters disclose the objections of the professional diplomatist to being +saddled with amateur assistants. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Viscount Monck._ + + Washington, Jan. 28, 1864. + + The Canadians appear to me to be acting unwisely about the + Reciprocity Treaty at this moment. Their true policy is to keep as + quiet about it as possible. The more they agitate, the more they + convince people here that the Treaty is a good bargain for Canada + and a bad bargain for the United States. The utmost we can ever + dream of doing now is to stave off a successful motion in Congress + calling upon the President to give the notice for abrogating the + Treaty. I doubt whether we shall be able to do this, but our only + chance lies in keeping quiet and endeavouring to induce the Executive + Government to exert its influence unostentatiously against the + motion. If the Executive Government can be induced to do so, it will + be by considerations connected with its relations with the Imperial + Government. The moment the question is treated as one between the + United States and the Provinces, all hope of maintaining the Treaty + vanishes. + + I cannot have a Canadian here supposed to be peculiarly in + my confidence on the subject. This would impose upon me a + responsibility which I cannot undertake. Directly there was the + least appearance of a Canadian being here in any such position, I + should feel bound to take decisive steps to show that the appearance + was false. My own opinion is that the Canadians will only do + themselves harm by coming lobbying here; but if they choose to do + so, they must do it entirely independently of me, and I would + suggest that any who came for this purpose should not be furnished + with letters of introduction to me, and should be advised not to + call upon me. + + At the same time, I think it right to say that I do not believe that + we shall find it possible to maintain the Treaty long after the U.S. + can abrogate it. The impression is very strong that it is a bad + bargain for them, and they will probably give the notice very soon + after the terms of the Treaty allow of their doing so, with a view + perhaps to negotiating another. If matters reach this point, it will + no doubt be very desirable that whoever negotiates the new Treaty + should be thoroughly informed on all the details of Canadian + commerce, and then will be the time for a Canadian Cobden to be sent + here. At present there are no questions of detail to be considered: + the only practical thing is to stave off the notice of the + abrogation as long as possible, and the only chance of doing this, + is, in my opinion, the exertion of the _Imperial_ influence. + + I very well understand the difficulty of keeping quiet when one is + very anxious on a subject, and the immense relief it is to be doing + something. I can also well understand that if there were a + discussion on the details of the Treaty, the Canadians would wish to + have an advocate better informed on the details than the British + Minister at Washington is ever likely to be, but the object now is + to _avoid_ discussion. + +It became necessary, however, to modify these views, for Mr. Seward +changed his mind, and whereas he had at first discountenanced the +presence of official and semi-official Canadian representatives he now +expressed himself in favour of their coming over privately and lobbying +Members of Congress, that being, in his opinion, an effective method of +promoting good relations between the two countries. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, Feb. 9, 1864. + + I am very sorry to say that the agitation against the Reciprocity + Treaty has gone on increasing, and that it now appears probable that + a Resolution calling upon the President to give as soon as possible + notice for abrogating it, will be passed by Congress. The Canadian + Ministers are very anxious to be doing something in the matter, in + order to cover their responsibility as regards their constituents + hereafter. They had a desire to send an agent here to advise with me + and to speak to the American Cabinet and to members of Congress. + This I have told Lord Monck privately, I will not hear of. I could + not undertake to keep the peace for a month if I had a man here by + my side, over whom I could have no practical control, and who would + be really guided only by Canadian party politics, but who would yet + be supposed to be more or less in my confidence, and therefore to be + entitled to speak for me and H.M. Government. My troubles are great + enough without adding Canadian electioneering views to the + difficulties I have to contend with. + + Mr. Seward's opinion was that the quieter the Canadians kept the + better, and so was mine, and so it would be still, if Mr. Seward had + not changed his. He now thinks that discussion on the subject cannot + be avoided, and a good effect would be produced by visits to + Washington of influential Canadians coming 'on their own hook' and + talking in a friendly manner to Senators and Deputies. He does not + recommend that they should appear to have any special connexion with + me, nor any semblance of an official or quasi-official character of + any kind, nor does he consider it to be desirable that any one + individual should stay long. + + I am corresponding privately with Lord Monck about this action of + Mr. Seward's, and I defer writing about the Treaty officially until + I come to some understanding with him about it. Mr. Seward's opinion + is so much more likely to be correct than mine, that I do not like + to discourage Canadians coming in the way he suggests. Beside which + I have very little hope of staving off the Resolution for the + abrogation of the Treaty in any way, and therefore do not feel + justified in preventing efforts being made by the Canadians + themselves, provided I am clear of all connexion with them, and + that they do not compromise me or the Imperial Government. + + The attack on the Treaty is now caused much more by ill will to + England and her Colonies than by any commercial or financial + considerations. The same spirit has caused the introduction of a + Bill into Congress to repeal the Act allowing goods to pass through + the United States without paying duty in transit to and from Canada. + In fact the absence of any serious opposition in Congress renders + both Houses very unmanageable. + +The views expressed in these two letters may appear unsympathetic as +regards Canada, but apart from his rooted and well-founded distrust of +amateur diplomatists, Lord Lyons's main task was to keep the peace if +possible between England and the United States, and he was therefore +justified in refusing to be associated with any persons who might +conceivably add to the difficulty of a very critical situation. In +addition to this he was always inclined to resent the tendency of +Canadian Ministers to do a little diplomacy of their own, and held +strongly that it would be time enough for them to think of diplomacy +when they had provided themselves with an army and a navy. + +The extreme caution which he constantly displayed in avoiding anything +which might disturb American susceptibility in the smallest degree is +well illustrated by a letter to Mr. Hammond respecting the appointment +of a new secretary to the Washington Legation. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Mr. Hammond._ + + Washington, April 5, 1864. + + I have been terribly frightened by hearing that there has been a + notion of sending Mr. Horace Johnstone to this Legation. To have the + brother of a man married to the sister of Slidell's Secretary of + Legation in Paris would expose the whole of this mission to all + kinds of suspicion and ill will. It is impossible for any one not + here to conceive the captiousness of the Federals, in and out of + office, on these points. It is almost beyond my power to keep + matters straight with them, do what I can, and if I had a man in the + Legation who was personally suspicious to them I should have no hope + of keeping out of scrapes. If Mr. Johnstone were here, I think the + only way I could employ him for the advantage of H.M.'s service + would be in carrying the next despatches home. + +So much alarmed was he at the prospect of Mr. Johnstone's appearance +that he also communicated his objections to the Private Secretary at the +Foreign Office, and even wrote to Lord Russell saying that if Mr. +Johnstone arrived he should feel it his duty to order him to remain at +the port of disembarkation until further instructions were received. +Most men would probably have considered that the family connexions of a +junior member of the Legation were of no importance, but Lord Lyons +was one of those who never took any risks. + +In accordance with the suggestion made in the previous autumn, some +officers were at last despatched from England in order to follow the +operations of the Federal Army. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, April 19, 1864. + + The two military officers, Colonel Gallway and Captain Alderson, + sent by the War Office to report on military matters here, are about + to set out for the Army of the Potomac. Some great attempt will + probably be made by that army within a very short time. Everything + is supposed to depend on the success of the operations. The + Presidential Election and the Finances in particular hang in the + balance. Captain Goodenough, the officer sent here by the Admiralty, + confirms my impression that the Americans are very seriously + preparing for a Foreign War. I think we should never be for long + without naval and military officers here to watch and to report on + these matters. The men employed should be made to understand that + their principal duty is to keep H.M. Government so well informed of + the state of preparation and of the position of the naval and + military forces of the United States that if a war were to break out + at a moment's notice, our Admiralty and War Office would know + exactly what to do. It is quite impossible that a Diplomatic Mission + can do this without the assistance of professional men; and the more + completely the responsibility is thrown on the professional men, the + more effectually will the work be performed. With the present + feeling of the United States Government I think the officers had + better come with a decidedly official character, either as naval or + military attachés to the Legation, or under any other name: but I do + not think that the most effective mode of obtaining the requisite + information would be to let them subside into permanent attachés + residing here, and making mere routine reports by each mail. + It would, of course, be well before publishing any appointment of a + definite official character, to let me ascertain that it would be + acceptable to this Government to have officers here in that + particular character. + + There can unhappily be no doubt that three-fourths of the American + people are eagerly longing for a safe opportunity of making war with + England, and to what extent this feeling may be played upon, and + with what results, during the Presidential Elections, no one can + say. + + The ill will shows itself in many ways--principally in vexatious + proceedings in regard to the neighbouring Colonies. The last attempt + in Congress is to repeal an Act of 1831 in virtue of which there are + no higher duties levied on British rafts, boats, and Colonial + vessels in the American ports on the Lakes, than are levied on + similar American craft in the British ports. I have spoken to Mr. + Seward about it, and I hope, if it is a matter of importance to + Canada, that we shall be able to stop it. + +The ill will alluded to above showed itself in an unpleasant and +undignified manner in connection with the visit of the British officers. +Application had been made on behalf of Major-General Lindsay, M.P., +commanding the Brigade of Guards in Canada to be allowed to visit the +Army of the Potomac, and, much to the surprise of the Legation, a pass +was refused by the Secretary of War, although the point was pressed as +far as was prudent; but worse was to follow, for the Secretary of War +actually refused passes also to Colonel Gallway and Captain Alderson, +the two officers specially sent out by the British Government. 'I do not +trust myself,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'to say all I think about this +discourtesy, but I have let the people here know that this is not the +way to maintain friendly feelings, and have reminded them of the very +different manner in which we treated the officers sent by the United +States to the Crimea.' + +Of more importance than this act of discourtesy was the apparent +preparation for a foreign war on the part of the United States +Government. There could, unfortunately, be little doubt as to the +country against which these preparations were being made, and the danger +was that, in the existing temper of the American people, advantage might +be eagerly taken of any conjunction of circumstances which would enable +a declaration of war against England to be made with tolerable safety. +The letters of Lord Russell do not display a realization of the enormous +increase of the military and naval power of the United States, and it +does not appear that he appreciated the vast change which had taken +place in the relative power of England and the United States. In the +past, the latter had been restrained from provoking hostilities by fear +of the advantages which the greatly superior military and naval forces, +then habitually maintained by England, would confer on their enemy at +the outset. Now, however, they considered the reverse to be the case. +They believed, and probably they were right, that they could throw an +overwhelming force into Canada, and that sudden attacks on some of the +British colonies, such as Bermuda and the Bahamas, would in all +probability be successful. They believed that they could inflict +enormous injury to British commerce, and it was plain that an immense +booty could be obtained by sending out their swift cruisers with as +little notice as possible. + +It was difficult to discover an adequate explanation of the bitter +feeling which, at that time, actuated the majority of the American +people against England; and it was still more difficult to combat it, +because it was largely unreasonable and quite regardless of facts +and arguments. In reality it resulted from the exasperation caused by +the civil commotion which constituted the first check to a previously +uninterrupted course of progress and prosperity, and the Americans, +mortified and angry, found it a relief to vent their ill-humour upon +England, against whom they had an old grudge. Under these adverse +circumstances, it is easy to realize how difficult must have been the +position of the British Minister at Washington, and it is not surprising +that his letters and despatches of the period were couched in a more +pessimistic tone than had been the case for some time. 'I am out of +heart altogether,' he wrote to Lord Russell, in consequence of the +manner in which his representations to the American Government, with +regard to the grievances of British subjects, were treated. These +grievances related chiefly, at this period, to the hardships inflicted +upon the crews of blockade runners and to the iniquities of the United +States recruiting agencies, iniquities which were fully admitted in an +official report of General Dix, the Military Commandant at New York, and +in neither case was it found possible to obtain adequate redress. The +following note will serve as a sample of the communications which +passed:-- + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Mr. Seward._ + + Washington, July 3, 1864. + + This day week you came to my door with the President to tell me that + I might write to England to say that Mr. James McHugh would be + released immediately. He was still in Fort Lafayette yesterday. What + to say in writing to England to-morrow I know not. Could not orders + be sent by telegraph to the military authorities at New York to + release McHugh at once and to report by telegraph that they have + actually done so? + + I am very much pained by what has happened about Eneas and Rahming, + as well as about McHugh, and am utterly unable to devise any + satisfactory explanation to send home. + +To add to his troubles the health of Lord Lyons again began to give way +under the strain, and as the following letter shows, his staff was +insufficient for the work. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Mr. Hammond._ + + Washington, June 14, 1864. + + We cannot get on without more hands in the Chancery here. I could + not refuse to let Heneage go, on the death of his father, but he was + ill to be spared. + + One really first-rate second secretary and two ordinary working + second or third secretaries should come out at once if the work is + to be done. It has doubled since last year. We ordered an immense + register which we calculated would last through the year, having + made ample allowance as we thought for the usual progressive + increase of correspondence. We are already obliged to order another + of the same size. + + For my own part I am worn out altogether. + +Although never prone to spare himself or to exaggerate, such phrases as: +'I am worked to death here,' and 'I am worn out by the heat and the +work,' occur in letters to other correspondents, and in order to prevent +a complete breakdown he was directed by Lord Russell to proceed to +Canada to confer with Lord Monck as to the defence of the Dominion. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._ + + July 23, 1864. + + I think it will be useful that you should go to Canada soon. If, as + you think, the Americans may take a sudden resolution to attack us, + it will be important to consider how and when we can best defend + ourselves. I should be very glad that with this view you should + consult Lord Monck, and also that you should, if possible, see Sir + James Hope, who might come up the St. Lawrence to meet you at + Quebec. The defence of Quebec both by land and sea is one of the + most important points for the consideration of the Cabinet. It is + also of great importance to ascertain what the Canadian Government + are prepared to do for themselves. + + If, as is probable, Grant will not succeed in reaching Richmond and + is obliged to retire, the American Government may not be willing to + add to the number of their enemies, especially as the Emperor of + Mexico may have the assistance of French troops, and may hold an + unfriendly position to the Northern, and a friendly attitude to the + Southern States. I shall be glad to send a civil or military agent + or commissioner to the Confederate States, and think of sending him + by Mexico and Texas. It would be by no means a recognition, but + would be useful as regards our interests in the Southern States. + +Lord Russell never seems to have thoroughly believed in the ultimate +success of the North, and frequently expressed the opinion that, as the +re-establishment of the Union was impossible, it would be well to come +to terms with the South, but he could scarcely have been expected to +foresee that the day would come when the United States Government would +order the Emperor Napoleon out of Mexico. + +As regards the mission to Canada, Lord Lyons pointed out that whereas it +was very desirable that he should confer with the Governor-General on +many questions, amongst others, the 'wholesale system of seducing, +entrapping and kidnapping recruits for the United States Army from +Canada,' yet that his own opinion on the naval and military questions +concerning the defence of that country was worth nothing at all. His +general impression, however, was that the Dominion was altogether +indefensible, unless the Canadians were prepared to make such a stand +and such sacrifices as the Southerners had done. Whether he ever made +any recommendations, as the result of his visit, or whether, if they +were ever made, any attention was paid to them does not appear, but +there is reason to believe that the British Government eventually nerved +itself to spend the stupendous sum of £50,000 on Canadian defence. + +The Canadian visit was undertaken very reluctantly, in spite of +weariness and ill health, partly on account of the press of work, and +partly because it would be necessary to leave as Chargé d'Affaires a +Secretary of Legation (Mr. Burnley), who had only just arrived in the +country, and of whose abilities and judgment he was completely ignorant. +Consequently he took the precaution of asking the Foreign Office to +intimate clearly that, whether outside American territory or not, he +should still be considered the superior authority in the Legation, and +that if he deemed it necessary to give an instruction, it must be +obeyed. This stipulation was not intended as a reflection upon Mr. +Burnley, who indeed showed himself perfectly competent, but was merely +an instance of that extreme caution which never left anything to chance. + +At the end of August he was suffering so much from the excessive heat of +Washington and from nervous prostration that he no longer felt able to +discharge his duties satisfactorily, and set out for Canada much against +his will, remaining there until October. The change of air, however, +effected little improvement, and letters to friends announcing his +return complain of ill health and low spirits. While on the journey +back, he met at dinner, at New York, by a singular coincidence, General +Dix, on the night when the news of the St. Albans raid arrived. During +the dinner the latter received a telegram stating that a band of +Confederate desperadoes had made a raid from Canada upon a place called +St. Albans, raided some banks and committed some murders. General +Dix said that he had sent orders to the military officers in the +neighbourhood to take measures for apprehending the raiders, and that he +had directed these officers to use their best endeavours to seize them +on American territory, but that rather than allow them to escape, they +were to be pursued beyond the frontier, such action being, in his +opinion, justifiable under International Law. Upon being asked whether +he had given this order on his own authority or under instructions +from Washington, the General admitted that he had acted on his own +responsibility. This was clearly one of the most alarming incidents that +had yet occurred, and had General Dix's orders been carried out, there +must inevitably have been war between England and the United States. +Fortunately, however, the American Government disavowed General Dix's +ill-advised orders, and the prompt action of the Canadian authorities +contributed towards a peaceful solution. The raiders were seized and +made to give up their booty; police were stationed along the frontier, +the volunteers were called out, and effective steps taken to prevent +similar occurrences in the future. + +The settlement of this affair must have been one of Lord Lyons's last +transactions with the American Government, for upon his return to +Washington his health rapidly grew worse, and as scarcely any letters +from him are to be found between the end of October and the middle of +December it is to be presumed that he was so incapacitated that the work +devolved upon Mr. Burnley. Early in November he was forced to apply for +leave, which was granted in December. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Washington, Dec. 5, 1864. + + I am truly obliged to you for so promptly sending me leave to come + home. When I wrote to you on the 1st of last month to ask for it, I + hardly expected to have such urgent need of it as I have now, but a + few days afterwards I became so ill as to be utterly unable to do + any work. I have not made any satisfactory progress towards a + recovery, and am scarcely in a state to travel. There seems however + to be no prospect of my getting any better while I stay here, and I + shall therefore, if possible, set out for New York to-morrow, in the + hope of being able to embark there for England on the 14th. + + I am told that the American papers have stated that I have been + dangerously ill with typhoid fever. I have had no fever at all. My + principal malady is a nervous headache. + +In letters to other correspondents he explained that being quite unable +to work he considered himself simply an impediment to the transaction of +public business, and was going away simply on leave of absence. During +the last few days of his stay in America he was too unwell to write, or +even, as he explained to Mr. Seward, equal to a conversation, and it was +doubtful whether he would be well enough to travel. Accompanied, +however, by Mr. Sheffield, he embarked at New York and arrived in London +during the closing days of December. + +The fact was that he had completely broken down under the continuous +strain of the last four years, and in view of the circumstances it was +not surprising. Some idea of the work at Washington may be gathered from +the following official figures. + + * * * * * + + _Despatches and Letters sent to and from Her Majesty's Legation at + Washington during the year 1864._ + + Foreign Office to Lord Lyons 966 From Lord Lyons 653 + United States Government " " 1816 " " 2782 + Consuls " " 1155 " " 1390 + Naval and Colonial + Departments " " 311 " " 360 + Miscellaneous " " 2242 " " 3141 + ---- ---- + 6490 8326 + +To these figures must be added a number of lithographs and other answers +for which forms had been devised and which therefore were not +registered, nor does it seem probable that Lord Lyons's numerous private +letters to the Secretary of State and other correspondents are included; +whilst there is no mention of telegrams. + +It would really not be much of an exaggeration to assert that, unless +absent or incapacitated by illness, nearly every one of these thousands +of documents was either originated by or submitted to the British +Minister. The late Sir Edward Malet in his book 'Shifting Scenes,' has +borne witness to the indefatigable industry of his chief. 'At Washington +any quantity of letters arrived daily asking every imaginable question, +and often making untenable complaints. They were all opened by Lord +Lyons, who made a pencil note upon them indicating the tenor of the +answer to be sent, and returned them to the Chancery. Draft answers were +then written, which were again sent up to Lord Lyons with the letters. +He would nearly always alter the wording. Then he put an "L" at the +bottom, and returned them to be written out for signature. In this way +not a letter issued from the Legation which had not been approved by the +chief. It was a most valuable safeguard, for you can never be sure what +a young man may say when he gets a pen into his hand. It is the moment +when the evil spirit of the Jack-in-office, unless he be entirely exempt +from it, which is very rare, gets the better of him, and prompts him to +make some epigrammatic or cutting reply. I learned no more valuable +lesson while working under Lord Lyons than that every letter received +must be answered, and that the answer must be staid in form and well +considered in substance, whatever might be the ignorance, the petulance, +or the extravagance of the writer to whose letter you were replying.' It +may be added that he rigidly adhered to this practice throughout his +official career, and that there must be many members of the Diplomatic +Service now living who would corroborate the opinion expressed by Sir +Edward Malet. + +From the same source we learn the usual routine of the Chancery during +the Civil War. The secretaries and attachés had to be at their desks at +9 a.m. They worked continuously without a luncheon interval until past 7 +p.m., then adjourned to Willard's Hotel to indulge in the pernicious +local habit of swallowing cocktails, dined at 8, and were frequently +obliged to return to the Chancery afterwards and work till midnight or +even later. There is no reason whatever to suppose that Sir Edward Malet +indulged in any exaggeration, and it is therefore not surprising either +that the junior members of the Legation occasionally broke down or that +many of them were desirous of being appointed to some less exacting post +than Washington. In spite, however, of the disadvantageous circumstances +under which Sir Edward Malet passed his time at Washington, it is worthy +of note that he considered that every one in the British Diplomatic +Service should rejoice if he had the chance of going there, and he bore +emphatic testimony that, according to his experience, English people +were treated with extraordinary courtesy and hospitality however high +political feeling may have run. + +Lord Lyons, upon arriving in England, found a home provided for him at +Arundel by his sister, the widowed Duchess of Norfolk, to whom he was +deeply attached, and it was hoped that the rest and retired life would +restore him sufficiently to enable him to resume his post at Washington. +He made, however, little progress towards recovery, and for some time +was almost incapable of either physical or mental exertion; in fact, so +unsatisfactory was his condition, and so remote appeared the probability +of his being able to resume his duties, that, in the spring of 1865, it +became necessary for him to resign his post and to retire temporarily if +not permanently from the service. A letter to Mr. Stuart, a former +member of his staff, explains the circumstances of his retirement. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Mr. Stuart._ + + Norfolk House, March 16, 1865. + + I am very much obliged by your kind letter inquiring for me. You + will have seen that I have gone out of the service altogether and + have become a gentleman at large without pay or pension. My health + did not admit of my fixing a time for going back, and the Cabinet + became nervous about leaving Washington without a Minister in these + critical times. I confess I do not feel so much relief or even + pleasure as might have been expected, and I seriously thought of + offering to go back immediately when I heard of the decision of the + Cabinet. But my own feelings as to health and still more the + opinions of the doctors deterred me. I have certainly got a great + deal better, but I seem to stick at a certain point. I can go about + without inconvenience, but still a small thing brings on a headache. + The old Legation at Washington is completely broken up. Malet goes + to Lisbon, Sheffield to Frankfort and Kennedy and Seymour to Vienna. + I to a certain extent enjoy being in England, but I am not well + enough nor quite sufficiently satisfied with the wind up of my + Washington Mission, to enjoy myself thoroughly. Lord Russell has + been extremely kind to me, and so indeed has every one here, but + neither I nor they can do much for my benefit while my health is in + its present state. + + You seem to be doing well as usual in your present post, and you + are, I trust, flourishing in all respects. + +In a letter to Mr. Seward expressing his regret at being prevented from +thanking President Lincoln in person for the unvarying kindness and +consideration shown to him during the last four eventful years the +following passage occurs:-- + + You will find Sir Frederick Bruce (his successor at Washington) as + anxious as I was to act in concert with you for the maintenance of + peace and good will, and you will, I am sure, be glad to form with + him the confidential and intimate relations which did so much, in my + case, to make my task easy and agreeable. The friendly and + unconstrained terms on which we were produced so much good, that I + am most anxious that my successor's intercourse with you should be + placed at once on the same footing. + + * * * * * + + _Mr. Seward to Lord Lyons._ + + Washington, March 20, 1865. + + I accept your farewell with sincere sorrow. But I reconcile myself + to it because it is a condition of restoration of your health. All + of my family commend me to tender you assurances of sympathy. + + I have never desponded of my country, of emancipation of her slaves + and of her resumption of her position as an agent of peace, progress + and civilization--interests which I never fail to believe are common + with all branches of the British family. So I have had no doubt that + when this dreadful war shall be ended, the United States and Great + Britain would be reconciled and become better friends than ever. + + I have thought that you are entitled to share in these great + successes, as you have taken so great a part of the trials of the + war. But God disposes. I feel sure that if I never find time to go + abroad again, you with recovered health will come here to see the + reign of peace and order. So I shall not dwell upon our parting as a + final one. + +It is satisfactory to realize that these two men, between whom so many +encounters had taken place, parted on terms of friendship and mutual +esteem. Each, in fact, had been able to appreciate the good qualities of +the other, and in subsequent communications with his own Government, +Lord Lyons frequently expressed the hope that Mr. Seward would continue +to be responsible for the foreign policy of the American Government. + +The official acknowledgment of Lord Lyons's services at Washington was +couched in warmer terms than is usually the case. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, March 25, 1865. + + As your successor, Sir Frederick Bruce, is to take his departure + this day from the shores of England, I take this opportunity to + testify to your Lordship the sense which Her Majesty's Government + entertain of your invaluable services as Her Majesty's + Representative at Washington. + + The return which I enclose of the number of despatches and letters + received by Her Majesty's Mission to the United States during the + years 1864 gives some notion of the amount of labour which has been + undergone by Your Lordship, the Secretary of Legation and other + members of the Mission. + + But the prudence, the moderation, the good temper, the + discrimination and the just regard to a friendly Government shown by + Your Lordship during the trying period which has elapsed while Your + Lordship was charged with the most honourable, but at the same time, + the most difficult duties with which any diplomatic agent can be + entrusted, these are incapable of any remuneration and cannot be + estimated by any measurement. + +It is to be hoped that the previous pages have, to some extent, +demonstrated that Lord Russell's language was not that of hyperbole, +and that the value of Lord Lyons's unobtrusive services was not +over-estimated. It was the good fortune of this country to be +represented during a protracted and dangerous crisis by a man who, +distinguished by exceptional prudence, tact, judgment, and sincerity, +added to these qualities a most minute knowledge of his own duties +accompanied with indefatigable industry. It is not too much to say that +any one wanting in these qualities would have found it impossible to +prevent the calamity of war between England and the United States, and +the diplomatist who successfully avoids a catastrophe of this nature and +at the same time protects the interests of his country is as deserving +of gratitude as the successful commander who appears upon the scene when +diplomacy had failed. + +One little detail characteristic of the man is worth noting. He used to +state, in after life, with much apparent satisfaction, that during his +five years' residence in the United States, he had never 'taken a drink, +or made a speech.' + + + + +CHAPTER V + +CONSTANTINOPLE + +(1865-1867) + + +Although temporarily retired, it was scarcely probable that the +Government would fail to utilize a man who had proved himself to be so +valuable a public servant, and as early as February Lord Russell had +already intimated that he proposed to offer to Lord Lyons the Lisbon +Legation, although to transfer a minister from Washington to Lisbon +seems a somewhat dubious compliment. + +In June he was sufficiently recovered to receive the degree of D.C.L., +and in the following month there arrived from Lord Russell the offer of +the Embassy at Constantinople, Lord Russell being careful to state in +his letter that the Queen highly approved of the appointment and that +Lord Palmerston heartily concurred. The offer was of course gratefully +accepted, and an urgent request that Malet and Sheffield should be +permitted to accompany him was granted, although both had been already +named to other posts. The appointment, when it became known, was +received with general approval, and congratulations came from all +quarters, but the signal compliment which had been paid him, far from +turning his head, only elicited the expression that he knew rather less +of the East than most people and that he entered upon his duties with +many misgivings. + +Accompanied by Malet and Sheffield, Lord Lyons arrived at Constantinople +in October, 1865, under somewhat peculiar circumstances. It is unusual +for two ambassadors to be present at the same post at the same time, but +Sir Henry Bulwer, in spite of many protestations that he wished to be +relieved of his duties, was still residing at the Embassy, having +possibly imbibed the spirit of procrastination from the locality, and it +is conceivable that the Foreign Office considered that the best means of +accelerating his departure was to send out his successor with orders to +present his credentials as soon as possible. + +The two ambassadors were lodged under the same roof. At first Lord Lyons +was the guest of Sir Henry Bulwer, then the conditions were reversed, +Sir Henry becoming the guest of his successor, and the comedy concluded +with the simultaneous presentation at the palace of the letters of +recall and letters of credence of the outgoing and incoming ambassadors. +After rather more than a fortnight, Sir Henry Bulwer was induced to take +his departure to some unknown destination, but, much to the +embarrassment of his successor, announced his intention of returning +before long. Those who are acquainted with the history of British +diplomacy must remember a very similar episode which also occurred at +Constantinople about twenty-six years ago, when a special envoy was +residing there in addition to the ambassador. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._ + + Constantinople, Oct. 25, 1865. + + Sir Henry Bulwer received me very kindly and cordially, and has told + me very fully what his views are, both as to Turkish politics in + general, and as to the particular questions now uppermost. He had a + private audience of the Sultan the day before yesterday, and after + it, went on board the _Caradoc_, intending to sail the same evening. + This, however, he did not do, and I went on board to see him + yesterday afternoon. He meant then to sail at daylight this morning. + I hear that he has now put off his departure till to-morrow. As to + his destination, he seems to waver between Malta, Naples and + Palermo. Lady Bulwer stays a little longer. Sir Henry talks vaguely + of coming back here as a traveller in the spring, and the Sultan has + offered to place a house at his disposal if he does so. I could not + tell him that I thought it advisable either for the public service + or for himself that he should come back so soon, especially as he + thinks the place particularly disagrees with him. He has been so + friendly and agreeable that I half blame myself for not being more + willing to see him again here. + + I can write little that can be depended upon about public matters + here. Everybody represents everybody else as being engaged in a + series of intrigues so complicated as to be utterly beyond my + comprehension. Fuad and Ali appear very easy to get on with, and I + think that I shall have little difficulty in transacting all + important business directly with them, as long as they remain in + office. My idea is not to give an opportunity for starting + difficulties by announcing a great change which I should not be able + to carry out, but actually to do the business myself, as much as + possible without dragomans. My colleagues seeing this will no doubt + follow my example. The dragoman system will then languish, and the + opportunity may then be taken of giving it the _coup de grace_ if + that should seem advisable. + + The impression made upon my mind by Fuad Pasha's conversation on the + finances was that he will make every effort to pay the interest on + the Foreign Loans regularly, but that the Government will frequently + be very hard up for money and will then raise it by any expedient + and on any terms for the moment. In this way a new irregular + internal or quasi-internal debt will arise, which, when it reaches a + certain point, will have to be converted, or funded, or provided for + in some way; and then the country becomes more and more involved. + Whether the undeveloped resources of the country, which must be very + great, can be brought into play soon enough to balance the growing + debt, I cannot of course pretend to say. The great measure in + contemplation is to secularize the Vacoufs. The tenures on which + this property is held and transmitted are so peculiar and + complicated that it will require some study to enable me to + understand the subject. I confess one cannot help feeling that most + of the property will be interrupted by dishonest agents on its way + to the Treasury. + + My colleagues seem very well disposed to be cordial and easy to deal + with, but M. de Monstier, whom they all seem to regard as the great + difficulty, is not yet here. + +The Constantinople Embassy, justly regarded as one of the big prizes in +the British Diplomatic Service, is, under ordinary circumstances, the +most onerous post of all; and, as past occupants know to their cost, the +distinguished position occupied by the British ambassador, the almost +princely state in which he lives, the magnificence of his residences, +the charm of the Bosphorus and the pleasure derived from living in what +is at once one of the most beautiful and one of the most interesting +cities in the universe, are somewhat dearly bought by the constant, +thankless, and fruitless labour in which they are habitually engaged. +Their time is ceaselessly occupied in combating the intrigues of other +Powers, in ineffectual attempts to redress the real or fictitious +grievances of British subjects, in the urging of nebulous schemes +vaguely described as reforms, and in hopeless efforts to avert the +inevitable doom awaiting a people, who, in spite of some admirable +qualities, are constitutionally incapacitated from realizing what are +their true interests. After the stress and turmoil of the last five +years at Washington, however, Constantinople must have appeared to the +new ambassador almost in the agreeable light of a rest cure. + +For once in a way, things were fairly quiet: there were no signs of any +immediate crisis, and although the Turkish Government was involved in +its habitual financial difficulties, in the autumn of 1865 the only +questions which appeared likely to give rise to trouble were those +relating to the Moldo-Wallachian Principalities, to Crete, and to a +Firman for the Bey of Tunis. But whatever may be the internal condition +of the Turkish Empire at any given period, or whatever may be its +external relations, there is invariably one representative of the Great +Powers at Constantinople whose _rôle_ it is to threaten, browbeat, and +coerce. At the period in question this duty was discharged with zest by +the French Ambassador, the Marquis de Moustier, whose mission it was to +'_porter haut le drapeau de la France_'--in other words, to bully and +bluster whenever opportunity permitted, and of whom the Turks and his +foreign colleagues stood in deadly fear. The Russian Minister at that +time was the celebrated General Ignatieff, of whom Lord Lyons +subsequently expressed the opinion that 'General Ignatieff would be an +admirable diplomatist if he were only a little more veracious.' And it +seems odd nowadays to read that on nearly every matter the French and +the Russians were in opposition to each other. In fact, General +Ignatieff used to declare that his French colleague was so insupportably +arrogant that it was impossible to do business with him. Each +endeavoured to enlist the new British Ambassador upon his side; +naturally, without success, as intrigue was essentially foreign to his +nature, and he had no intention of allowing himself to become embroiled +in their quarrels. Writing in November to Mr. Erskine, the British +Minister at Athens, he was able to say that 'Here we are as quiet as +possible; the disease with which the Turk is threatened appears to be +atrophy; want of money and want of men. There are no questions of +interest at this moment, nor even any particular matter for the +diplomatists to quarrel about.' + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Earl of Clarendon._[5] + + Constantinople, Dec. 6, 1865. + + I don't know what to say of the Turkish finances. Notwithstanding + the drought, the cholera, etc., etc., it is alarming that in a year + of profound tranquillity at home and abroad, the Government should + find itself absolutely without money. As this was the case, I + suppose a new foreign loan was better than scraping together, at + enormous sacrifices, enough money here to provide for the interest + of the old loans next month. They promise that they will pay over to + the Bank, as it comes in, the revenue from the sources which are + most certain, so as to provide in ample time for the interest on the + foreign loans. But what will they have left to live upon? I am + trying to get something like an accurate notion of what their + prospects are for next year. + + The only probability of trouble for the present seems to be in the + Principalities. If Mr. Green[6] is right, the overthrow of Couza by + an internal revolution is imminent. As he is unable to suggest + any means of saving Couza or of making any improvement in the + administration of the Principalities, I don't know that he is wrong + in thinking it best to leave things for the present to the chapter + of accidents. At any rate I think I shall do well to try and keep + the question as quiet as possible here until I have instructions + from you about it. + + As you will see by my despatches I do all the important business + myself with Aali Pasha. Of course, I do not take a Dragoman with me + when I go to him. I shall do away with the Dragoman system, as far + as it is possible and compatible with the public service to do so. + By degrees it may be done away with altogether--but it will be some + time before it will be possible to get ordinary matters done at the + Turkish office without having some one perpetually nagging at them + who can speak to them in their own language. + +A letter from the veteran Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Lord Lyons is +not without interest as showing the views he held towards the close of +his life with regard to the Turkish Empire. + + * * * * * + +Dec. 13, 1865. + + It gave me much pleasure to hear from you. I hope, and indeed I + doubt not, that as time moves on you will be more and more pleased + with the situation. You are lucky I think, to have no great + questions to begin with. Sooner or later some will arise, and + meanwhile you have time to sound the depths and shallows around you + and to lay a good foundation for future action. Be assured that my + good wishes will go with you, and if you surpass me in my own line, + so much the better. I am now too old to be jealous. + + It does not surprise me that the Principalities continue to give + trouble. They stand in a false position towards Turkey. The allies + have not been happy in their manner of dealing with them. Prince + Couza's government is an anomaly. Austria would be a safer neighbour + to the Porte, even the whole length of the Danube, than either + Russia or an independent Union. + + The finances of Turkey are, no doubt, a great and growing difficulty. + They _need not_ be so with Russia in abeyance, the Empire + guaranteed, an increasing trade, a Sultan who professes economy and + no interruption of peace. But they _are naturally_ so in right of + ministerial ignorance, of an inveterate habit of abuses, of too much + facility for borrowing, and of the little personal prudence at the + Porte. I tremble at hearing of another large loan from France. It + might be better if, acting in concert with our neighbour, we made + the Turkish Ministers feel more deeply the responsibility of their + extravagance and unwillingness to reform. I was glad to learn some + little time ago that our Government presses the Porte for statements + of its financial condition which may be relied on, and that the + Ottoman Bank maintains its independence, as opposed to the rash + requirements launched from Constantinople. + + I sincerely hope that you will be able by and by to see your way to + some progress in other matters of essential reform. + +The financial outlook became so alarming that at the beginning of 1866 +the Turks contemplated engaging a British Controller; but--and this +throws an instructive light upon the intrigues which prevail at +Constantinople--they were afraid to apply for one because they knew that +if they did so, the French would insist upon a Frenchman being engaged +as well. Aali and Fuad Pasha used to appear and make long speeches which +'would have done credit to a Chancellor of the Exchequer,' but their +eloquence produced no practical result, and Sultan Abdul Aziz, who, +according to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, was pledged to economy, +possessed singularly extravagant tastes, foremost amongst his +extravagances being a mania for buying ironclads and endeavouring to +create an imposing Turkish fleet. As there was no necessity to build up +a big navy and little probability of the Turks ever being able to make +any effective use of it if ever created, the only thing to be said in +favour of Abdul Aziz's hobby was that the ironclads were always ordered +in England. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Earl of Clarendon._ + + Constantinople, February 14, 1866. + + There is rather a delicate matter for us which bears materially upon + the Ottoman finances. The Sultan has a passion for ironclad frigates + and insists upon ordering them. His Ministers (except, I believe, + the Capitan Pasha) make some feeble opposition. We have, I believe, + rather encouraged the thing than otherwise. The orders are executed + in England to the advantage of our shipbuilders, and I think Sir + Henry Bulwer had an idea that though they would not be much use in + the hands of the Turks, they might be manned and used to advantage + by allies of the Turks in case of war. + + I think it would be undesirable, on many accounts, that we should + now take the initiative in remonstrating against this particular + expense. If however the question of Turkish finance comes up in + Europe we shall hear a great deal of these ironclads and we may be + asked to join France in a representation against them. We may + possibly have to propose to France to join us. If we do anything it + would be well to consult Musurus confidentially, as he has a great + deal to do with ordering them in England. + + There are, I think, three mailed frigates here, one nearly ready in + England and one laid down there. It is also said that the Sultan + insists upon one still larger and more powerful being ordered, but I + do not know whether the order is actually given. The expense is of + course immense in proportion to the revenue of the country and + considering the rate at which the Porte borrows money. + +What the result of consulting Musurus Pasha was, does not appear; but, +in view of the determined obstinacy of Sultan Abdul Aziz, it is not +likely that remonstrances from any quarter would have had much effect. + +In February, the difficulties with regard to the Principalities came to +a head. Prince Couza, who had been elected Hospodar in 1859 (and who +incidentally had given a great deal of trouble) was deposed by +successful conspirators and expelled from the country, Mr. Green, the +British Minister at Bucharest, having thus proved himself a true +prophet. The inhabitants of the Principalities appeared to be unanimous +in desiring the continuation of the Union, and, at the same time, a +foreign prince as their ruler, to the consternation of the Porte, which +had a well-grounded foreboding that a similar phenomenon would shortly +manifest itself in other outlying provinces of the Empire, and that +disintegration would follow. As for the other Powers concerned, the +Russians were strongly in favour of a separation of Moldavia and +Wallachia. The Austrians were credited with the same views, while it was +feared by the Turks that the French would put forward a candidate of +their own in the shape of a foreign prince. Eventually it was agreed to +refer the whole question to a conference at Paris, into which the +British Government entered unshackled by any pledges or previous +announcement of its views. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Earl of Clarendon._ + + Constantinople, March 14, 1866. + + The Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha seem to be in very low spirits about + the Paris Conference. M. de Moustier seems to be constantly + frightening them. I am willing to comfort them, but I am determined + not to say anything which may be interpreted by them as a pledge, + either from my Government or myself. They are horribly afraid of + France and they would like to lean upon us, but they think that we + care more for France than for them, and believe that we are apt to + blame them for weakness without being willing to protect them + against the consequences of their resistance. I think they are wrong + in thinking that it would have been better for them to have had the + Conference here. The French Government itself seems to me to be + always more reasonable than its agents abroad. + + I have not been able to get any fresh information about the + Finances. The Syndicate to receive the revenues set apart for the + payment of the Foreign Loans is not yet established, though it is a + month since Fuad Pasha assured me that the decree was 'all but + printed.' The Commission which is examining the actual state of the + Finances seems to have great difficulty in getting at the truth. + None of its proceedings have yet been made public. I preach economy + and retrenchment, but I have not mentioned the ironclads + particularly to the Ottoman authorities as General Ignatieff appears + to suppose. I have certainly not attempted to defend the expenditure + incurred for these vessels when I have heard it attacked by my + colleagues and other people. + + I have certainly got on very well with my colleagues hitherto, but + then we have had no serious questions to discuss. + +The unhappy Turks, bullied by Moustier, at their wit's ends to find +money, and distracted at the threat of internal troubles, seem about +this period to have once more recurred to the old proposal of a Russian +Protectorate, and to have hit upon the brilliant idea of making money, +at the same time, out of the Principalities. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Earl Cowley._ + + April 18, 1866. + + The Turks are very low, and I hear that a good deal of discussion + goes on about the hopelessness of obtaining any efficient protection + from the Western Powers, and the consequent necessity of making the + best terms they can with Russia. France they look upon as an enemy; + England as a lukewarm and indifferent friend. They hope that they + might get a good sum out of Russia for the Principalities; that they + might satisfy her appetite for territory by giving them to her, and + that then by letting her exercise great influence for the protection + of the Eastern Church in the rest of the Empire, they might satisfy + her, and persuade her to abstain from coming to Constantinople + herself, and to keep other Powers off. Of course nothing so absurd + as this, or at all like it, has been said to me by Aali or Fuad, but + I hear that this sort of language is held by a great many Turks + amongst themselves, and it may be a symptom worth noting. + + We are all anxiety to hear something from Paris about the Plébiscite + and Prince Charles of Hohenzollern. Till I know what our Government + think, I can give no advice to the Turks. + +The result of the Paris Conference was that Prince Charles of +Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was chosen as Hereditary Prince of Roumania, +much to the consternation of the Turks, who saw in this practical +abandonment of their suzerainty, the approaching disintegration of their +Empire, and therefore began to threaten an occupation of the +Principalities. This they were dissuaded from attempting, and the +efforts of British diplomacy were directed towards obtaining a +recognition of Prince Charles on reasonable terms, a task which was not +facilitated by the Sultan's sudden dismissal of the capable Grand +Vizier, Fuad Pasha, or by the refusal of the Roumanians to behave with +even decent courtesy towards the Porte. A prodigious amount of +negotiation and correspondence passed with reference to the Investiture +of the Prince by the Sultan, and that the fault lay with the Roumanians +is shown by the following extract from a letter[7] written in August: +'The Turks have been wonderfully yielding and moderate about the +Principalities, and if there had been anything of the same spirit at +Bucharest, Prince Charles would have been invested long ago. There is a +hitch now, and there will be at least more delay.' In this troublesome +matter the English and the French Governments worked together in order +to arrive at a satisfactory solution, and the much-denounced M. de +Moustier seems to have done something to help his colleague. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._[8] + + Constantinople, Sept. 12, 1866. + + M. de Moustier sets out for Paris this day week. He and I have been + very good colleagues. Since Lord Clarendon decided to advise the + Porte to recognize Prince Charles, M. de Moustier and I have worked + cordially together to settle the Principalities question in that + sense, and I hope the thing may be done before he goes. A stable + honest government in the Principalities is the best thing for all + parties, and the recognition of Prince Charles is the obvious means + of arriving at this. Whether he will prove a success or a failure + will depend upon his character and his ability to govern through the + constitutional forms, for the Hospodar must in fact for some time be + a Cæsar or he will soon be nothing. + + M. de Moustier is not at all liked by his other colleagues here, and + he has inspired the Turks with more fear than love. As he and I have + not differed on any serious matter (except just at first about the + Suez Canal), I cannot very well say how I should have liked him as + an opponent. + + The Turks seem horribly afraid of Benedetti as his successor. I wish + the mantle had fallen upon Mercier, with whom I got on so well at + Washington. + +It is strange to learn that Prince Charles, who has since developed into +a model constitutional monarch, produced at first the impression of +being a perfect firebrand, full of ambitious schemes, and actually +credited with the design of eventually establishing himself as 'The +Charlemagne of the East.' Mr. Green, the British Minister at Bucharest, +thought it desirable to give him some paternal advice, upon his own +responsibility, telling him that the Roumanians had no intention of +putting up with a mere show Prince; that he would have to work hard; +that great mistakes had been made since his arrival in the country, that +these would eventually be visited upon his head, and that he should take +warning from the fate of Couza. 'He was very polite,' added Mr. Green, +innocently, 'but I don't think he half liked what I said, or that he +quite understood it. It was probably the first time he had heard the +truth since he has been in the country.' + +Foreign princes who undertake to govern Balkan States, however, often +have to put up with worse things than unpalatable truths, and the +conduct of Prince Charles and his advisers with reference to the +question of investiture was of a nature which not only justified strong +language, but necessitated strong pressure from France and England. +After bargaining and haggling for several months, and obtaining all +sorts of concessions from the Porte, the Roumanians actually proposed +that 'in order to meet existing difficulties' the Prince should be +invested at Constantinople without any conditions at all. The chief +stumbling block appears to have the phrase '_partie intégrante_,' in the +Declaration, and it was not until it had been made clear that neither +France nor England would recognize the Prince unless this condition +was complied with that the sacramental words were agreed to. Eventually +more reasonable views prevailed at Bucharest, and Prince Charles at last +proceeded to Constantinople for the ceremony of Investiture. The Turks, +as is their wont, received him with great courtesy, and the impression +he created was of the most favourable kind, the only person who +exhibited dissatisfaction being the Russian Minister. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Mr. Green._ + + Therapia, Nov. 1, 1866. + + The Prince will, I suppose, arrive at Bucharest two or three days + before this reaches you. I hope he is satisfied with his visit to + Constantinople. There was some hitch about the interchange of + civilities with the Russian Minister and one or two other chiefs of + missions, I believe. I suppose however all was set right before His + Highness went away. The Prince himself showed, I thought, great good + sense in these matters of etiquette as well as in more important + matters. I should be glad if you would take an opportunity of + letting him understand discreetly that I personally was thoroughly + satisfied, not that he can doubt it. + +The Principalities Question having been satisfactorily settled, M. de +Moustier, who, in the meanwhile, had become Minister for Foreign +affairs, lost no time in claiming all the credit for himself. With his +usual good sense, Lord Lyons showed complete indifference to the egotism +of his former colleague. + + 'It is the way of French diplomatists everywhere, and of almost all + diplomatists at Pera, to take to themselves the credit of every good + thing that has been done,' he wrote to Lord Cowley, 'so far as the + Turks are concerned. I have borne in mind what you told me in Paris + of your own system of dealing with them, and have endeavoured to let + them have the credit of their good deeds, whatever part I may have + had in bringing them about. M. de Moustier has certainly not + followed the same plan. His article in the _Moniteur_ gives no + credit either to the Turks or to me. Whatever may be our relative + shares in settling the questions, it cannot be doubted that if I had + chosen from jealousy, or any other motive, to thwart him, I could + easily have done so. However, if good is done, I am willing to + forego my share of the boasting.' + +It is hardly necessary to state that the semi-comic question of the +Principalities was but one of many difficulties threatening in every +part of the Turkish Empire, from the Fortress of Belgrade to the +Lebanon. The long letter to Lord Stanley of December 19 is one which, +with slight variations, might have been written by every British +Ambassador at Constantinople at any time during the last fifty years, +but is quoted in full because it seems to constitute a comprehensive +review of the condition of Turkey at the close of 1866; and it is +perhaps worthy of note, as showing how completely the politics of Europe +have changed, that the gigantic struggle between Prussia and Austria +passed unnoticed and without producing the slightest apparent effect in +the Near East. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ + + Constantinople, Dec. 19, 1866. + + I am afraid that it is only too true that a storm is brewing in the + East. There is a very apparent change in the policy of Russia, or at + least, in that of her agents in Turkey. When I arrived a year ago + there was every appearance of a desire on the part of Russia to keep + things quiet in Turkey. Now her agents make no secret of their + sympathy with the Cretan insurrection and with Christian malcontents + throughout the Empire and appear to be determined to recover their + old position as the special friends and protectors of all the + Orthodox Christians, and to be willing enough to see troubles and + disturbances break out in all directions. Greece is bent upon + mischief, and the question whether we are or are not to have an + Eastern Question forced upon us in the spring depends upon whether + or no Greece can be kept in order. All this suits the Russian game. + If we interfere to bring the Hellenes to their senses, she hopes to + recover her lost popularity at our expense. If we do not, she will + claim the merit of having hindered us. + + I cannot make up my mind to recommend the Turks to take a bold + course. Discouraging as is the spectacle afforded by the Turkish + army and navy in Crete, I think it probable that the Turks would in + the end get the better of the Hellenes if they were allowed to deal + with them without any interference from Europe. But Europe + undoubtedly would interfere. I very much dread the effects of + allowing the Greeks to get up disturbances in this country in the + spring. If the disturbances are very serious they will probably lead + to the destruction of Ottoman rule in Europe. What will take its + place it is impossible to foresee, but I think it is pretty clear + that the Turks will not go without a desperate struggle, and that in + mixed districts we shall have massacres and every kind of horror. + Great calamities may possibly be avoided if we can keep the Turks + going and make them go on tolerably well for some years longer. If + they are really capable of radical improvement, if they can live + upon equal terms with the Christians, and establish a good + government, so much the better. If things go on as they have done + lately, the Turks will be gradually squeezed out, as the Americans + say, by the increase in numbers, wealth and intelligence of the + Christians. I am not one of those who look upon the Turkish Empire + as good _per se_--to be upheld at all hazards--but in the interest + of all parties, I should like to let it down gently; but in order to + make this possible, the Turks must be prudent and behave well to all + their subjects. + + The arguments against giving up the Fortress of Belgrade are + strongly put in Mr. Longworth's despatch to me of which he has sent + you a copy. For my own part I doubt whether the _Levée en masse_ of + the Mussulman population of Turkey to defend it, would not shake the + Empire to pieces. In the face of the extreme unpopularity of the + Sultan personally and of the Government with the Mussulmans, I doubt + whether the Ministers would be willing to risk an appeal to them. + The same state of things however makes the Ministers very fearful of + the effect of giving up the Fortress. It seems that Europe will + advise the Porte to abandon it, and this, I am inclined to think, is + the proper advice for Europe to give. I do not think that it is + advice which it would be fair to press very strongly unless (as is + by no means impossible) the Porte may wish to be able to say to the + Sultan and the people that they were obliged to yield to all Europe + united against them on the point. I don't think that England, or any + other power, should encourage the Porte to hold out, unless of + course it were deemed to be a matter of such importance that + material aid would be given to help the Porte out of any scrape into + which its holding out might bring it. On the other hand, unless we + were prepared to do this and to do it effectually, we should make + ourselves unnecessarily odious to the Christian races, and neither + obtain nor deserve any gratitude from the Turks, if we alone advised + them to keep the Fortress. Aali Pasha does not talk as if he had any + idea of yielding. His plan will probably be to say neither yes nor + no, unless circumstances compel him to give a categorical answer to + the Servians. + +Lord Stanley, who at this period ruled at the Foreign Office, was not an +optimist by nature, had no illusions about the future of Turkey, and his +letters contain references to many other questions which appeared likely +to create trouble in Europe; besides Crete and the Fortress of Belgrade. +With regard to the latter he observed that the 'Turks have the same right +to stay there that every one has to do foolish things where only his own +interest is concerned.' 'The Austrians,' he wrote in October, 'have made +their greatest mistake of this year (which is saying a good deal) in the +choice of Beust as Minister. + +'The general impression is that Bismark[9] (_sic_) will not be able to +hold power, from the state of his health. I do not envy the King of +Prussia left alone to carry out plans which he probably has never +understood and to face a German Parliament which he only consented to +call in reliance on his adviser's capacity to manage it.' + +Another letter refers to a contemplated visit of the Prince of Wales to +St. Petersburg, and, in view of 'his strong anti-Turkish opinions of +which he makes no secret,' points out that care should be taken to +explain to the Russian Government that H.R.H. did not represent the +opinions of the Cabinet. + +Other communications from the same Minister mention that the Americans +had revived the _Alabama_ claims 'in a friendly and temperate manner,' +and there are many allusions to the disquieting symptoms in France. 'I +hear,' he wrote in November, 'that the one idea of everybody, high and +low, in France is that the country is defenceless (with 600,000 +soldiers), and that the lowest estimate of the necessary force laid +before the commission now sitting involves an addition of 400,000 more. +They have so long been used in that country to be surrounded by weak +states that the mere neighbourhood of an equal is regarded by them as a +threat.' + +In the beginning of 1867 one difficulty was cleared out of the way, for +Lord Stanley having formally tendered his advice, the Turkish Government +consented to evacuate the Fortress of Belgrade. This unusual display of +good sense was all the more creditable on account of the terror which +Sultan Abdul Aziz inspired in his ministers; but the protracted +insurrection in Crete constituted not only a danger, but also a fertile +source of intrigues amongst Foreign Powers. + +Lord Stanley took the matter-of-fact view that Greece had estranged +British sympathy through financial immorality; and he was probably +correct, for in the case of Turkey, it was not until the repudiation of +her debts, that there was much fulmination against the iniquities of +Ottoman rule. + +'Opinion here is undecided about the Cretan quarrel,' wrote this prosaic +nobleman, who is credited with having himself refused the throne of +Greece. 'Nobody much believes in the Turks, but the old Phil-Hellenism +is dead, and cannot be revived. Greece is too much associated in the +English mind with unpaid debts and commercial sharp practice to command +the sympathy that was felt thirty years ago. And now that questions of +more interest and nearer home are being discussed, Crete will drop out +of men's minds.' + +A little later, the French Government suddenly and quite unexpectedly +proposed the cession of Crete to Greece; and this violent change in the +policy hitherto pursued, rendered difficult joint action on the part of +England and France with regard to Turkey. The original idea underlying +French policy had been that the two Governments should force certain +reforms upon the Porte, more particularly with regard to encouraging +public works to be undertaken by foreign capitalists, and that the Turks +should be made prosperous in spite of themselves. The difficulty in +carrying out this beneficent programme consisted in the fact that there +were no means of influencing the daily details of administration upon +which its execution and success depended, and it seemed highly probable +that the joint guardianship of England and France might degenerate into +a struggle between the two Embassies for personal influences in making +and unmaking governors and ministers, to say nothing of the danger of +the perpetration of gigantic jobs under the guise of giving public works +to foreign capitalists. Nor, of course, was the Turkish Government in +possession of funds to carry out any programme whatever. + +Lord Stanley refused to entertain the French proposal with regard to +Crete, and advanced much the same reasons as those probably brought +forward more than forty years later. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Stanley to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, March 21, 1867. + + The Eastern Question remains where it was. France has certainly not + dropped her idea of urging the cession of Crete. I have distinctly + refused to join in this advice, as you will see by my despatch. The + Russians seem jealous of French interference, though they cannot + object, as it is in the sense of their often expressed opinions. The + Italian Government shows an inclination to take part in the + discussion, but rather, as I conceive, for the purpose of asserting + its position as a first-rate power than with any definite idea of + what it wants. Indeed, I think I trace in Italy a feeling of + jealousy of the increase of the Greek power, lest Greece should + become a troublesome neighbour and rival. + + The chief event which is interesting the diplomatic world at the + present moment is a report--not wholly unfounded as I believe--of + the cession of Luxemburg by Holland to France. Prussia will resent + it (if it comes to pass) and Belgium will not be the happier for + being thus partly surrounded by French territory. + +The Emperor (who had probably abandoned the control of his Eastern +policy to M. de Moustier) received a warning from Lord Cowley. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Cowley to Lord Lyons._ + + Paris, March 22, 1867. + + I found Moustier on my return a very different man from what I had + left him, in respect to Turkey, but I had, a few days after my + arrival, a conversation with the Emperor in which I warned him of + the dangerous game he was playing in hastening the dissolution of + the Turkish Empire, which could only turn to the profit of Russia, + and I think that H.M. sees the matter in this light now and that he + has desired Moustier to hold his hand and not forestall events. I + fear however that things cannot go on much longer in Turkey as they + are. The great matter now should be to educate the Christians for + the emancipation which awaits them, by giving the outlying provinces + as much autonomy as possible, but it 'will be a bitter pill for the + Turks to swallow.' + + There is no particular news here--fresh irritation against Prussia, + which will become dangerous if it does not die out before next year. + +The vagary on the part of the French Government produced much confusion +amongst the diplomatists at Constantinople, who all came to the British +Ambassador with such different stories of what one had done, of what +another was going to do, and of what a third would not do, that he +eventually became as much puzzled as any one else, and adopted an +attitude of strict neutrality. + +The following letter to Lord Stanley is of interest for various reasons. +It expresses the deliberate opinion of an exceptionally impartial man +upon Russian policy towards Turkey, and there are references in it for +the first time to two new factors in the Eastern Question, viz. the +Bulgarians and the Young Turks. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ + + Constantinople, April 10, 1867. + + The Turks stand at bay for the moment. They have sent Omar Pasha to + Crete and are confident that he will reduce the island to + submission. If he fails to do so in a reasonable time, they must + confess that the task is too hard for them and leave the settlement + of the question to the European Powers. France has played the game + of Russia and apparently has not succeeded after all in satisfying + her. She has brought Turkey nearer to ruin than it has yet been. It + all forwards the policy of Russia, which is to keep Turkey unquiet, + to prevent any approach to conciliation between Turks and + Christians, to keep up a constant drain on the finances--in short, + to have the country entirely at its mercy whenever circumstances + render it convenient to seize it. Aali Pasha and Fuad Pasha both + assure me that the dividends due in July on the foreign loans will + be punctually paid; but, with the best intentions, the Porte will + not be able to pay its foreign dividends much longer, if it is + obliged to keep a large force on a war footing on the frontier of + Greece; and to provide against insurrections excited from abroad in + other quarters. The Bulgarians appear to oppose a strong _vis + inertiæ_ to the Russian and Hellenic attempts to induce them to use + and demand autonomy. Their principal quarrel is with the Greek + clergy foisted upon them by the Patriarchate here. I have not been + able to form a positive opinion on their demands for a separate + Patriarch of their own, but I incline to think that the Porte would + do well to grant it. Russia now urges that the Bulgarians should + have a civil representative instead, but this would come very near + to autonomy. + + The discontent among the Mussulmans is very great. It is + particularly so at Constantinople, where the employees of the + Government form an important class, and where in consequence of the + non-payment of salaries, they, and all who live by them, are reduced + to the greatest distress. The 'Jeune Turquie' party is produced + partly by this and partly by the desire of Mustapha Fazyl Pasha and + others to oust Fuad and Aali and to take their places. + + Reports from the Consuls on the treatment of the Christians will + have been pouring in upon you. The greater part of the grievances of + the Christians are the results of bad government and bad + administration of justice, and affect Mussulmans and Christians + alike. Their peculiar grievances are their practical exclusion from + the high offices of the State, the rejection in many cases of their + evidence in the Law Courts, and what is most intolerable, the + position in which they stand socially and politically with regard to + the Turks. The Turks will not look upon them as equals and cannot + trust them. In fact the Christians cannot feel loyalty to the + Government because they are not trusted and employed; and they + cannot be trusted and employed because they are not loyal to the + Government. It is a perfect example of a vicious circle. It is + useless to deny that the position of a Christian subject of the + Porte is a humiliating position, and it is vain to expect that + within any reasonable time the Christians will look upon the + existing Government as anything but an evil to be endured or + possibly even upheld as a less evil than revolution, but nothing + more. + +It will be realized from this instructive letter that however bad the +Turkish Government, it had to contend with obstacles which are not +encountered by other countries, and that in reality it never had a fair +chance, although it is only just to add that when a real chance did +occur, upon the overthrow of Abdul Hamid, in 1908, the opportunity was +deliberately thrown away. + +The Turks, however, had sufficient sense to concede the Bulgarian demand +for a separate church, and by thus affecting a schism between the latter +and the Greeks, succeeded in prolonging their hold over Macedonia for a +longer period than would otherwise have been the case. + +Meanwhile Lord Stanley had been thinking of other matters, and the +allusions to Alaska and to Canada in the letter of April 4, afford a +delightful instance of the light in which British statesmen viewed +Colonial questions at that period. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Stanley to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, April 4, 1867. + + The Eastern Question has left us quiet during the last ten days. I + hear nothing more of the proposed cession of Crete, and I suspect + the French have found out that they had been going a little too fast + and too far. + + The Luxemburg business has monopolized attention. Holland was + willing to sell the Grand Duchy if the consent of Prussia could be + secured, and France wished and wishes to buy, but Prussia steadily + refuses. Holland dares not act without Bismarck's permission, and + for the moment the plan seems to have fallen through. But the + Emperor cannot afford a fresh defeat, and I fear we have not seen + the end of the transaction. There is an almost universal expectation + of war. + + The Americans, as you will see, have bought a large amount of + worthless[10] territory from Russia at a nominal price. Their motive + is probably twofold: to establish a sort of claim in the future to + British North America, lying as it does between their old and their + new possessions; and to gain a victory over us by doing without our + knowledge an act which they probably think will annoy England. In + that expectation they will be disappointed, for I cannot find any + one who cares about the matter, and the press in general treats it + with indifference. It is true that in Canada the feeling may be + different. + +The Luxemburg difficulty (which had the effect of producing a temporary +rapprochement between France and Russia with regard to the Eastern +Question) was settled by a conference in London, and letters from Lord +Stanley and others show that war was narrowly averted, and that the +French were not ungrateful for the action of the British Government. + + 'We have been too busy at home to have much leisure for Eastern + affairs,' wrote Lord Stanley. 'The success of the Conference in + keeping the peace was not, I think, expected by the general public + and has given proportionate satisfaction, more perhaps here than + elsewhere, and more in France than in Russia. The Emperor dreaded + the idea of war and would have accepted almost any terms. The + Prussians, being prepared and knowing that the French were not so, + professed great indifference as to the result of the negotiations. + Many still say that the inevitable quarrel is only postponed. It may + be so, but I am inclined to think that in such matters to gain time + is to gain everything. Irritation subsides, new questions arise to + divert attention, and the opinion of the country has time to declare + itself. I am told that at Paris the feeling of gratitude to England + is general and strong.' + +In May, in spite of Crete, it was arranged that Sultan Abdul Aziz should +pay a visit to France, and both the French and Turks, unlike Lord +Russell, whose opinion on the value of such visits has been already +quoted, thought that it would be productive of great results. The Turks +were especially delighted, because they thought the invitation a proof +that France would not persist in the alliance with Russia which had been +so perilous to the Ottoman Empire. It was hoped that if France could be +brought back to her old attitude of co-operation with England in +deprecating foreign aggression, things might be kept quiet, and that the +internal situation might improve. The recent pro-Russian proclivities of +Napoleon III. had drawn upon him some very sharp remonstrances from Her +Majesty's Government, and a despatch from Lord Cowley shows that the +Emperor had to put up with some remarkably plain speaking. He was told +by the British Ambassador that if he would devote a little more +attention to Eastern affairs he would probably refrain from constant +intervention in the internal affairs of Turkey, unless indeed he wished +to see that Empire collapse; and when he attempted feebly to explain +that Russia deserved some satisfaction for her pride wounded by the +result of the Crimean War, and that the best method of restraining her +aggressive proceedings was to act in conjunction with her, he was +informed that the best way of meeting insidious Russian policy was by +honest and open opposition. It must doubtless have been extremely +irritating to the British Government to see this disposition to fritter +away the effects of the policy which led to the Crimean War, and the +probability is that the Emperor had no definite idea as to what he +wanted and was merely drifting along, in his usual manner, without +realizing the possible results. + + 'I fancy,' said Lord Lyons, 'that great efforts will be made to + please and astonish the Sultan in France and to impress him with the + power of the country. He is not stupid or bigoted, but he has had + very little education. He is more amiable than he looks. He speaks + only Turkish. His hobby is the Navy and the way for us to impress + him would be to show him as many ships, and particularly ironclads, + as we can--that is to say if we can show as many or more than the + French. He is Oriental enough to expect hospitality, as he practises + it here, and I suppose he would be much hurt by any etiquette which + he thought a slight. Politically, I think a visit from him to + England would be a good thing if we received him personally as well + as the French did. As he has taken up the idea of going to England, + he would of course be very much mortified at not being cordially + received, and advantage would be taken of anything of the kind by + the enemies of Turkey here to weaken his and our position. I + suggested to Fuad Pasha to let the question of his visit to England + be still, until I could communicate with you about it, but I + understand he has telegraphed to Musurus to speak to you. I suppose + the Sultan, of whom they all seem as much afraid as if he still cut + off heads, ordered him to do so and he dared not object. I believe + the Sultan will not leave Constantinople till he has made quite sure + of not finding the Emperor of Russia at Paris. Fuad says he will + take a very small suite, but I suppose it will be a larger suite + than a European Sovereign would have. I believe he will take a sort + of noble guard he has, who wear very picturesque costumes of + different parts of the Empire: there used to be fifty of them, but I + hardly suppose all will go.' + +It very soon became evident that the Sultan was quite determined to go +to England, and it was clearly desirable that he should be received with +no less distinction and ceremony than in France. In a courtly manner he +conveyed to the Ambassador that he would be deeply mortified if he were +not given the opportunity of paying his respects personally to Queen +Victoria, and his ministers laid great stress upon the desirability of +His Majesty being received by the Lord Mayor, the importance of that +magnate standing apparently as high in the estimation of the Oriental as +of the Frenchman. The mingled pleasure, alarm, and agitation evoked by +the Sultan's intended visit are well illustrated by the following letter +to Lord Lyons from a man who seemed marked out to add to the gaiety of +nations, Mr. Hammond. + + * * * * * + + Foreign Office, May 30, 1867. + + We should like to know as soon as possible at what time we may + calculate on seeing the Sultan and what members of his family or of + his Government he brings with him, and the rank and description of + his suite and their numbers. It is to be hoped they will not be too + numerous, and that as he is to be lodged in the Palace, the usual + habits of Orientalism will for the time be laid aside and the + services of his Harem be dispensed with during his visit. It would + shock the people in this country to hear of the Sultan being + attended by persons not proper to be mentioned in civilized society, + and no small inconvenience might result if he was known to have + slaves in his suite, for it would be impossible to answer for the + enthusiasts of Exeter Hall with so fair an opportunity before them + for displaying their zeal and doing mischief. + + Aali Pasha has, I think, been in England, and you might have means + of bringing these little matters before him in such a delicate way + as not to shock the Sultan's ideas of propriety or mastery. The + French probably would not be so particular in these respects, but + they have not Writs of Habeas Corpus dangling before their eyes, nor + unrestricted liberty of speech and print to provide against. + + Whatever information you can give us of the Sultan's habits of + living and of the sort of accommodation he will require will be very + acceptable to the Lord Chamberlain's office, and any hints as to + what it would most interest him to see would be valuable. + + In London, you know, we have no manufactories, but there are the + Arsenal at Woolwich; the large private shipbuilding yards in the + Thames, if he did not care to go to Portsmouth for a day; the + Museum, Bank, Post Office and some few things of that sort which are + probably peculiar in their extent to this country. It might also + interest him, if he is a reformer, to see our prisons, from which he + might take useful hints. Does he keep reasonable hours, and would he + be shocked at balls, or restrain himself from throwing a + handkerchief at any beauty that might cross his path? + +Sultan Abdul Aziz's visit to England passed off without administering +any of those shocks to public feeling which Mr. Hammond contemplated +with so much alarm. There are no means of ascertaining what precise +effects were produced upon the Sultan's mind, but it is to be presumed +that the object lesson afforded by an English prison was wasted upon +him, for anything more unlike an English prison than a Turkish gaol it +would be difficult to imagine. The ill-fated Abdul Aziz was accompanied +on this journey by his young nephew, destined to become famous +subsequently as Abdul Hamid II., but he, too, has kept his impressions +to himself, and the only topic upon which he has been known to +expatiate, is the excellence of English servants, who 'always treated +him in a fatherly manner.' + +In the meanwhile Lord Lyons's stay at Constantinople was drawing to a +close, for at the end of April, Lord Stanley had offered him the Embassy +at Paris. The offer was made in highly flattering terms, the Foreign +Secretary expressing his regret at withdrawing the Ambassador from an +important post, the duties of which he so thoroughly understood, but +adding that Paris was the first place in the diplomatic service, and +that the Eastern Question seemed likely to be superseded by even more +serious difficulties nearer home. It is probable that the honour was all +the more appreciated because it was unsolicited and unexpected, as shown +by the following letter from him to Lord Cowley. + + * * * * * + + Constantinople, May 8, 1867. + + When I first heard that you were likely to give up Paris, I felt, as + I think I said in my letter to you, alarmed at the prospect of the + Embassy's falling into other hands. I should have been indeed + alarmed had I then known into what hands it was likely to fall. I + received on the 3rd a letter from Lord Stanley offering it to me. I + have accepted in deference to my father's often repeated injunction + never to refuse promotion, but I confess I am full of misgivings and + anxieties. I had heard nothing whatever from the Foreign Office till + I received Lord Stanley's letter last week. + +The appointment, when it became known publicly, was generally approved, +and no one wrote in warmer terms of congratulation than Lord Clarendon, +who had been Lord Stanley's predecessor at the Foreign Office, and who +stated that he had himself suggested Lord Lyons to his successor as the +most suitable man for the post. + +Thus, at the comparatively early age of fifty he had attained the +highest place in the British diplomatic service. + +As regards Lord Lyons's two years occupation of the Constantinople +Embassy, it has already been pointed out that the period was one of +comparative calm, and that there were no sensational questions to be +dealt with. Unlike some of his predecessors and successors, he had not +been instructed to make any change in the policy pursued by the British +Government towards Turkey, and it had not fallen to his lot to be forced +to adopt a threatening and aggressive attitude. Consequently, his +experiences of Constantinople were agreeable and unexciting; his +relations with the Turkish Ministers and with his colleagues had been +singularly amicable, and he left the place with regret. It would be +affectation to claim that his stay there left any permanent mark upon +our policy in the East, but there were two minor matters in which his +influence made itself felt. Entertaining a profound dislike to intrigue +and tortuous methods, he made it his business to diminish as much as +possible the so-called Dragoman system and to substitute for it a +different and more open method of transacting the business of the +Embassy. The other matter related to the practice of extorting favours +and concessions from the Porte. It has always been the tradition of +British diplomacy in the East, and it may perhaps be said to be unique +in this respect, that the influence of the Ambassador should not be used +to procure concessions, honours, or favours on behalf of British +subjects. Upon this point he carried the principle of abstention to +almost extravagant lengths, as the following incident shows. The +daughter of a gentleman connected with the Embassy was about to be +married, and the newspaper _La Turquie_ announced that the Sultan had +sent a magnificent present. The announcement caught the eye of the +vigilant ambassador, who immediately wrote to the father: + + I think you will do well to take steps to remove the unfavourable + impression which this paragraph cannot but make. There can be little + if any difference between such a present and one made directly to + yourself; and the most friendly course I can take is to advise you + to prevent the acceptance of it, and to have a paragraph inserted in + the _Turquie_ explaining that it has not been retained. + +This must have been singularly unpleasant for all parties, and it is +quite likely that the Ambassador found himself morally bound to +compensate the lady by making an equally magnificent present as a +substitute for the Sultan's rejected gift. + +An application to support a concession to Mr. Brassey for the +construction of a railway from Constantinople to Adrianople met with no +favour at all. He explained that he was constantly applied to in order +to support all sorts of concessions for railways and similar +undertakings, and that his practice was to reply that it was not his +business to meddle in such matters unless instructed to do so by the +Foreign Office, and that concessionaires should therefore in the first +place address themselves to the Home Government. 'The fact is that there +is often much dirty work connected with the management of such matters +at the Porte, and I wish to be clear of them.' Over and over again there +appears in his letters the emphatic statement that he 'refuses to take +part in the dirty work by which European speculators are apt to get +concessions out of the Turks.' + +It would not be difficult to find arguments against this attitude, which +in these days of increased international competition it would be +impossible rigidly to maintain, but the views which prevailed fifty +years ago with regard to the abstention of British diplomacy from every +species of concession mongering probably did more than anything else to +inspire Orientals with a belief in our integrity as a nation. + + +FOOTNOTES: + + [5] Lord Clarendon, upon the death of Lord Palmerston, became Foreign + Secretary in place of Lord Russell. + + [6] British minister at Bucharest. + + [7] Lord Lyons to Mr. Stuart. + + [8] In consequence of the change of Government, Lord Stanley + (subsequently Earl of Derby) had now become Foreign Secretary. + + [9] It used to be said that it took a Franco-German war to secure the + correct spelling of this name. It is certainly a curious fact that + another Foreign Secretary also used to spell it incorrectly. + + [10] Alaska. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +THE SECOND EMPIRE + +(1867-1869) + + +Lord Lyons, accompanied by Malet and Sheffield, whom he had again been +permitted to retain on his staff, entered upon his duties at Paris in +October, 1867, and there he remained until within a few months of his +death, some twenty years later. He arrived at a time when, although the +outward splendour of the Empire still dazzled the popular imagination, +the prestige, influence, and popularity of the Imperial Government, and +more especially of the Emperor himself, had suffered a series of +disastrous shocks. If Napoleon III.'s career had ended in 1862 he would +presumably have left a great name in history and a record of brilliant +successes; after that period, however, everything seemed to go wrong for +him. Poland, the Danish War, and the Austro-Prussian War had shown that +his pretension to control the policy of Europe had practically vanished; +the incomprehensible Mexican enterprise had ended in disaster and +disgrace, and to add to these glaring failures in foreign policy there +was deep-seated discontent at home. In the autumn of 1867 a fresh +embarrassment to France was created by the action of Garibaldi, who +succeeded in embroiling two Governments which had latterly been on most +friendly terms. The alliance between Italy and Prussia in 1866 had been +a temporary expedient only; the sympathies of Victor Emmanuel had always +been on the side of France, and when at the close of that year, the +Emperor decided upon the withdrawal of his troops from Rome, it seemed +not improbable that a permanent alliance between Italy and France might +be effected. This combination was defeated by the action of Garibaldi in +invading the Papal States, and the Emperor, dominated by the clerical +party, found himself compelled not only to use threatening language +towards the Italian Government, but to send a French expedition to +re-occupy Rome and defend the Pope against his enemies. Mentana was the +result, and it soon became plain that the policy of the French +Government was to prevent Italy from obtaining possession of Rome, M. +Rouher, the French Prime Minister, at a subsequent period going so far +as to declare that France would never tolerate such an outrage on its +honour. In spite of all this, signs were not wanting that there was no +desire on the part of either France or Italy to go to war. Mentana had +cleared the air, and the chief danger seemed to consist in the renewed +French occupation of Rome. As Lord Stanley pointed out, it was +comparatively easy for the Emperor to go to Rome, but the difficulty lay +in getting out again, for who was to keep order after the evacuation? +Napoleon III. had, in fact, released himself from momentary +embarrassments at the cost of heavy trouble in the future. In accordance +with his favourite practice, he now made the proposal that the so-called +Roman Question should be submitted to a Conference of the Powers at +Paris--a proposal which did not commend itself to England, and was +opposed by Prussia at the instigation of Bismarck, whose object it was +to accentuate the differences between France and Italy. To what extent +the Empress Eugénie participated in the direction of French foreign +policy has often been the subject of discussion, but there can be no +doubt that she held decided views with regard to the Roman Question and +the proposed Conference. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ + + Paris, Nov. 11, 1867. + + After I had presented the Queen's letter this morning, the Empress + kept me in conversation for an hour. She began by expressing in warm + terms respect and affection for the Queen and in particular + gratitude for Her Majesty's kind reception of her at the last visit. + + The Empress proceeded to speak of the Roman question and insisted + strongly on the necessity for a Conference and on the importance and + propriety of non-Catholic as well as Catholic powers taking part in + it. She expressed a very strong desire that England should not stand + aloof. + + Without taking upon myself to anticipate your decision on the + matter, I endeavoured to make the Empress aware of the very great + difficulty and delicacy of a Conference to us. It appeared to result + from that. Her Majesty said that, in her own opinion, the proper + basis for the deliberations would be the maintenance of the _status + quo_. This, she seemed to think, would be a fair compromise between + the demand of the Pope that all the provinces he had lost should be + restored to him and the pretensions of Italy to Rome itself. + + The conversation having been brought round to the measures to be + taken immediately, I endeavoured to impress upon the Empress the + advantage of withdrawing the troops without a day's unnecessary + delay, if not from the Roman territory altogether, at least from + Rome itself. Her Majesty said that there was nothing in principle + against withdrawing to Civita Vecchia at once, and that certainly + the Emperor and she herself were anxious to bring all the troops + back to France as soon as it was safe to do so. + + The Empress spoke discouragingly of the state of Italy--of the + little progress that had been made towards uniting and assimilating + the various sections of the population--of the financial + difficulties and other unfavourable points. She said however that + the unity of Italy had been the work of the Emperor, and that it + would be absurd and disadvantageous to allow it to be destroyed. She + believed that the French expedition had in reality been of as much + or more service to King Victor Emmanuel than to the Pope. His + Majesty's throne was threatened, she thought, by the revolutionary + party quite as much as was the Temporal power of the Pope. + + Among a great variety of topics which came up, the Empress spoke, by + way of an illustration, of the Kingdom of Greece. She said it had + been a mistake, if that Kingdom was to be created at all, not to + give it territory enough to enable it to exist. She did not however + seem to think it would be advisable at this moment to make over + Crete or any other Ottoman province to Greece. She appeared to be + aware of the extreme peril to the whole Ottoman Empire of detaching + any portion of it in this way. + + The Empress spoke with much grace both of manner and of expression, + and I think with very great ability. + + For my own part I endeavoured principally to make an impression on + her mind respecting the immediate withdrawal of the troops to Civita + Vecchia at least, and I am inclined to think that I succeeded so far + as to ensure the repeating to the Emperor what I said on this point. + + I hear from all quarters that the Emperor's own position in France + becomes more and more critical. Every one seems to admit that he + could not do otherwise than send the expedition to Rome, but the + success which attended it does not seem to have made much + impression. All parties except the ultra-clerical appear to desire + to get out of the intervention as soon as possible. So far as I can + make out, the weakness of the Emperor's position lies simply in + loss of prestige arising partly from his want of success on many + recent occasions, and mainly, I imagine, from the inconstancy of men + and Frenchmen in particular. In fact he has reigned eighteen years, + and they are getting tired of so much of the same thing and want + novelty. + +Lord Stanley's comment upon this letter was that the Empress's 'frank +and sensible conversation' furnished the best reason he had received yet +for keeping out of the affair altogether, and he observed with some +justice that what Her Majesty's proposed compromise amounted to, was +that the Pope should keep all that he had already, and merely renounce +his claim to what, under no circumstances, he could ever hope to +recover. The more he considered the proposed Conference the more +hopeless it appeared to him. There was no plan, nothing settled, no +assurance that there was even a wish for agreement amongst the Powers +interested. They were being asked to discuss a question on which they +were certain to differ, and the sole reason given for summoning a +Conference was that the Emperor disliked bearing the responsibility +which he had assumed. Why should we be asked to bear it for him? It must +have been a congenial task for a man of Lord Stanley's temperament to +throw cold water upon the vague and slipshod proposals of the unlucky +Emperor, and he was probably fortified in his conclusions by the +attitude of Prussia and by the reluctance of Russia, in spite of a +Conference being 'always a temptation to Gortschakoff.'[11] + +Another personage of some importance, Prince Napoleon, also held decided +views upon the Roman question, which he imparted to the Ambassador in +the hope that they would thus be brought before the Emperor. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ + + Paris, Nov. 15, 1867. + + I have had a long interview with Prince Napoleon this afternoon. He + does not desire that England should agree to the Conference. He + thinks that the best service England could render to the Emperor + would be to advise him to give up the idea of a Conference and + settle the matter with Italy, by satisfying, at least in a certain + measure, Italian aspirations. He declares that Italy will never be + quiet, and that the unity of Italy will never be assured until she + gets Rome for her capital. He believes that the Emperor's support of + the Pope is very unpopular with the great majority of the French + people, and that it will, if persevered in, be a serious danger to + the dynasty. He takes a gloomy view altogether of the state of + feeling in France, and thinks that the Emperor will not be able to + hold his own, unless he abandons the system of personal government + and gives a large increase of liberty. He wishes England to give + this advice to the Emperor. + + He volunteered to say all this to me and entered into a great many + details. He spoke with great animation and remarkably well. + + My share of the conversation was but small. I think the advice which + the Prince wishes us to give to the Emperor would be sound in + itself, but that it would produce no good effect, unless His Majesty + felt that he was in a strait, and asked our opinion. I am myself + very little inclined to thrust advice upon him out of season. + +Prince Napoleon on this and, as will be seen, on subsequent occasions, +showed that his judgment was remarkably correct, but it is not probable +that his Imperial cousin benefited by his sage advice, for Lord Stanley +agreed that it was undesirable that the British Government should become +the channel of his opinions. Both he and the Ambassador, however, +thoroughly realized that the Emperor had no fixed plan, and was merely +following his usual hand-to-mouth policy of staving off present at the +cost of future embarrassments. + +Napoleon's vague and unpractical views were exposed in a conversation +with Lord Lyons, which apparently took place in a crowded ball-room. +Asked what was to be the basis of the Conference, he made the cryptic +reply: '_Mon Dieu! la base est d'assimiler le pouvoir du Pape à +l'Italie_,' which sounds like unadulterated nonsense; and when pressed +to explain how an unpalatable decision was to be enforced upon a +recalcitrant Pope, His Majesty was only able feebly to suggest 'moral +influence.' Nevertheless, he showed no ill-feeling, and, with habitual +good nature, addressed no reproaches to the Ambassador with regard to +the unsympathetic attitude of Her Majesty's Government. In spite of many +rebuffs and discouragements, the Emperor and his ministers continued to +labour on behalf of their ill-starred project with an energy worthy of a +better cause; but circumstances were eventually too strong for them. The +real opponent all along had been Prussia, and the aim of the Prussian +Government was to throw the blame on to England. The French were well +aware of the fact, and did not consequently display ill-will towards us, +and it seems to have been the speech of M. Rouher, already referred to, +which made it clear that a Conference would be little better than a +waste of time; for when the Italians asked for an explanation they were +informed that M. Rouher's speech only asserted more emphatically what +had been said before. Meanwhile the French troops continued to remain at +Rome, although King Victor Emmanuel complained bitterly to Lord Clarendon +of their presence and declared that, should they be withdrawn, he would +undertake that there should be no aggressive action against the Pope. +The erroneous impression which influenced French policy with regard to +the Papacy was explained in a letter to Lord Lyons from that acute +observer, Mr. Odo Russell,[12] who was the British representative at Rome +at the time. + + * * * * * + + Rome, Dec. 10, 1867. + + Cardinal Antonelli constantly talks of you with affection and + respect and often expresses his desire to see you again. + + Many thanks for your letter of the 4th about a preliminary + conference. Rouher's speech, I take it, has put an end to all + that--at least so Cardinal Antonelli tells me--and the joy caused at + the Vatican that France will never allow Italy to hold Rome is + immense. + + You are perfectly right in not thinking that the Court of Rome has + changed since you were here. + + French diplomatists and statesmen are but too apt to interpret the + clear and precise language of the Court of Rome according to their + own wishes and to think and proclaim that the Pope will adopt and + follow the wise counsels of France, etc. etc. + + Now I say, give the Pope his due, and at least give him credit for + being consistent, whether you agree with him or not. + + In the long run, an Italian priest will always outwit a French + statesman, and no Frenchman can resist the influence of Rome. A + year's residence suffices to make him more Papal than the Pope, whom + he fondly believes to be a French institution under the immediate + control of the French clergy. + + I have often marvelled at French notions of the Papacy, and now it + has grown the fashion to mistake the cause of the Pope for that of + France, even among men who might know better. + + A permanent French occupation is the only possible machinery by + which the Temporal Power can be imposed on Italy. The national + feeling against the Temporal Power is certainly much stronger than I + myself thought in Italy, and the bitter hostility of the Romans has + been proved by the hideous means employed by them to destroy life + and property in the October conspiracy. + +The accuracy of these views was sufficiently demonstrated in 1870. + +Before the end of the year Prince Napoleon made another of his frequent +appearances at the Embassy, and announced that he looked upon a war with +Germany in the spring as certain. He considered that there were only two +courses which could have been taken with prudence--the one to resist the +aggrandizement of Prussia immediately after Sadowa--the other to accept +it with favour; what had been done had merely caused so much irritation +that France would eventually be forced into war. He denounced Thiers, +who, while pretending to advocate peace, was always crying out that +France was being wronged and humiliated, and thought that even a +successful war would be full of danger to the Empire. Apparently his own +policy was to unite with Italy against the Pope and establish liberal +institutions in France, a course which the Emperor had now rendered it +impossible to adopt, as he had committed himself to the Pope, and was +not likely to play the part of a Constitutional monarch after eighteen +years of absolute power. 'He speaks very well, and with a good deal of +animation,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'and his opinions sound much better as he +delivers them than they read as I write them.' But, making every +allowance for exuberant verbosity, this Prince seems to have held much +sounder and more definite opinions than his Imperial relative. + +Not long after Prince Napoleon came the Foreign Minister, M. de +Moustier, with his story. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ + + Paris, Jan. 16, 1868. + + M. de Moustier says that the reports he receives from Berlin and + other quarters confirm his impression that Prussia is averse to a + war with France; that the relations between Austria and Prussia are + improving, and that such being the case Prussia is awakening to a + sense of the danger of Russian designs in Eastern Europe. On the + other hand he says that Baron Brunnow gives the most positive + assurances that Russia will do nothing against Turkey. He trusts + that these assurances may be depended upon, but he thinks that the + Russian Government uses its ambassadors as screens, behind which to + carry on its own manoeuvres. + + Nigra, the Italian Minister here, tells me that his last news from + Florence gives him strong hopes that the Menabrea Ministry will + maintain itself. I presume that the object of Italy should be to + convince the Emperor that Rome will be safe without the French + troops--I mean to make the Emperor himself really confident of it. + This done, I suppose diplomacy is capable of devising some formal + guarantees to satisfy the French public. I do not believe that + France has as yet done more than hinted at some security that Italy + will take her side, if she quarrels with Prussia. I do not know that + she has even hinted at anything of the kind. A demand for an + engagement of this sort would be unreasonable and probably futile. + If France is ever hard pressed by Prussia, the Italians will go to + Rome unless some other Powers step forward to bar the way. At all + events, it will not be by promises extracted beforehand that they + will be stopped. + + The real danger to Europe appears however to be in the difficulties + of the Emperor Napoleon at home. The discontent is great and the + distress amongst the working classes severe. The great measure of + the session, the new Conscription Act, is very unpopular. There is + no glitter at home or abroad to divert public attention, and the + French have been a good many years without the excitement of a + change. I think that Europe, and England in particular, are more + interested in maintaining the Emperor, than in almost anything else. + +The accuracy of this forecast, like that of Mr. Odo Russell, was also +demonstrated in 1870, when, upon the retirement of the French garrison, +the Italian troops marched into Rome, and the temporal power of the Pope +came to an end. It is not, however, altogether fair to place the whole +responsibility for the collapse of French policy in Italy upon Napoleon +III., for whereas he was no doubt personally in favour of an united +Italy; there was a strong party in France which was strongly +opposed to it, and convinced that French interests lay in a divided +country. The mention of Russia in the above letter makes the following +remarkable communication not inappropriate. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ + + Paris, Jan. 22, 1868. + + The Emperor told me last night that his Ambassador at St. Petersburg + had had a curious conversation with the Emperor Alexander. + + The Emperor Alexander had, he said, asked the Ambassador whether the + French Government were fully aware of the extent of the plot which + was actively carried on for the destruction of all the monarchical + governments in Europe, and the assassination of sovereigns and Royal + families. After giving some details His Majesty had suggested to + the Ambassador that the several Governments should communicate + information to each other and unite their efforts to defend + themselves. + + The Emperor Napoleon proceeded to tell me that it was asserted that + the first and principal attempt was to be made in England; that the + palaces and public buildings were to be blown up, and the Queen and + Royal Family seized and put on board a steamer in the Thames and + 'disposed of.' The Emperor Napoleon went on to say that the supposed + details of the scheme to overthrow the Government of England were of + course absurd, but he seemed to intend to suggest that we should be + vigilant, and that he himself would be glad to co-operate with us. + He said that Mazzini, who had let him alone for some time, had now + again taken up the idea of assassinating him, and was busily + employed in making plans for effecting their purpose. He told me + that Mazzini was very ill and he did not express any wish for his + recovery. + + The Emperor talked to me a long time and related to me interesting + anecdotes, some very amusing, of the conduct of various persons + towards him in past times. + +Cheap sensational magazines were not in existence in 1868, or one would +be disposed to infer that the Emperor Alexander had been indulging in +this species of literature, since it seems difficult otherwise to +account for such credulity in high places. As for the Emperor Napoleon's +anecdotes of his youth, they are unfortunately denied to the world, for +the most distressing feature in Lord Lyons's correspondence is the +almost complete absence of anything in the nature of indiscretions. The +conversation, however, serves to show on what intimate terms he already +stood with Napoleon III. + +In the spring, letters received from Lord Stanley show that the British +Government was feeling some uneasiness with regard to America, more +especially in connection with the _Alabama_ question, and, as now was +frequently the case, Lord Lyons's advice was requested on various +points. As to the general policy which should be pursued, he reiterated +his former opinion that the chief danger consisted in the belief of the +ordinary American politician that England would submit to anything +rather than fight. Neither party would wish to have the responsibility +of actually making war with England, but each party would very much like +to be able to boast of having made her yield without fighting, and would +vie with each other in calling for unreasonable concessions if they +thought there was any chance of obtaining them. The best chance, +therefore, of keeping the peace was to be very firm and uncompromising +in questions of arrests and other measures necessary for putting down +Fenianism, as these were manifestly well grounded, and the rights of the +same kind so frequently claimed and exercised by the Americans during +the war had never been contested. In anything doubtful, we should be +mild and conciliatory--not that mildness and conciliation would make +much impression in America--but in order to satisfy a section of the +British public. The present danger, he considered, lay in the +over-conciliatory, over-yielding tone of a great number of English +writers and public men, which might lead the Americans to fancy they +would be quite safe in pushing us into a corner, and so bring about a +state of things which would render a fight unavoidable. As for the +_Alabama_ question, he urged that the more quietly the claims were +discussed, the more satisfactory the result was likely to be, and he +strongly advised that the discussion should take place in Europe +rather than in the United States: it would be a mistake to send a +_mission d'éclat_ to Washington, as such a mission would be taken as a +surrender at discretion. Whether the mission of Lord Ripon and his +colleagues to Washington three years later could be correctly described +as a _mission d'éclat_ or not is of little importance, but it certainty +ended in surrender. + +The letters from Paris about this period abound in misgivings as to the +political situation in France. The conviction was becoming general that +the Bonaparte dynasty was too weak to stand any shock. The Emperor, it +was true, began to show indications of proceeding gradually towards +Parliamentary government, in the hope of founding a state of things +which might render the position tenable on his death for his son, but it +seemed more probable that the progress might be too slow for the object. +Towards the end of February some apprehension was created by a +circumstantial rumour that the Emperor had announced positively to +Russia that France would not allow the annexation of the Grand Duchy of +Baden to the North German Confederation, and a month later a vague fear +was felt of the imminence of a _coup de théâtre_. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ + + Paris, March 27, 1868. + + I ought to say that there are, among not unreasonable or + inexperienced people, vague apprehensions that the Emperor may, + _more suo_, resort to a _coup de théâtre_ and declare war when it is + least expected. The only act which can be cited in support of these + apprehensions is the formation of two more camps of instruction this + year than usual. It is said that the effect of this will be to have + two additional army corps ready to take the field at short notice. + But the real ground of the apprehension appears to be a resemblance + real or fancied between the declaration and proceedings of the + Emperor now, and those which preceded the war with Italy. I believe + it to be true that Prince Napoleon has told the Emperor that war + with Germany must be made this year or never, but I do not think the + Prince advises the war being made at all. The general impression + indeed here appears to be that there is at this moment an amount of + discontent in the annexed provinces which might be turned to account + now by France, but which will subside in a year's time, if the + Prussian Government is left to carry into effect its plans. Southern + Germany, it is thought, would go with France _after_ a French + victory, but not without one. For my own part I am more inclined to + believe that the Emperor is sincerely anxious to preserve peace. In + case of war he must take the field in person, and it is much doubted + whether he is willing or able to endure the mental and bodily + fatigue of a campaign. Defeat would be fatal and anything short of + great success and additions of territory far from advantageous. It + is of course impossible to say what a man so reserved and really so + little in the habit of making up his mind long beforehand, may or + may not do, and therefore the possibility of a _coup de théâtre_ + must I suppose always be kept in one's mind. Still I must say that + all I can make out leads me to believe that his present wishes and + intentions are peaceful. + +A good deal of interest had been aroused by a visit of Prince Napoleon +to Germany in the spring, which gave rise to much speculation in the +political world. His friends gave out that it was merely an ordinary +tour. Others, who were supposed to be well informed, declared (probably +much to the satisfaction of the Prince) that he had been sent on a +private mission from the Emperor, of which none of His Majesty's +Ministers had any cognizance. Two different objects were assigned to the +mission; one that he was commissioned to assure Bismarck of the +Emperor's determination to remain at peace if possible, but to represent +that Bismarck should act so as to make it easy, and should not use the +presumed hostility of France so frequently as a lever to move public +opinion in Germany. The other and less probable object with which he was +credited, was that he was to summon Prussia to join France against Russia +in Turkey, a fantastic absurdity which was directly contrary to +Moustier's policy in the East. The probability is that Prince Napoleon +had no mission at all, but the long letter which follows is interesting +as showing what correct conclusions an intelligent person can +occasionally draw from a well-timed visit to a foreign country. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ + + Paris, March 31, 1868. + + Although I have not seen Prince Napoleon myself since his return + from Germany, I think I can give you a tolerably accurate notion of + the language he holds. + + He speaks with satisfaction of the manner in which he was himself + received at Berlin. He thinks that Count Bismarck will not provoke + France to war by increasing at present the area of the North German + Confederation, or any other overt act. He believes him to be + sincerely desirous of avoiding a war, but not to be willing to allow + any interference on the part of France in the affairs of Northern + Germany, or to make any patent concession whatever to France. He + conceived it to be vain to talk to Prussia of disarmament, as she + would answer that she was already disarmed, having only 200,000 men + under arms. Her system, which would enable her to put from 4 to + 600,000 men in a condition to take the field in eight or ten days, + she could not be persuaded to change. + + The Prince has seen nothing, except in the United States, like + the contempt in which foreign nations are held in Prussia. Austria + is not considered to be worth taking into account at all. Great + indifference is professed as to Italy and Turkey. The Prince does + not believe that there is any formal treaty between Russia and + Prussia, but is convinced that there is an understanding that, in + return for a friendly neutrality in the West, Prussia is, in case of + being at war with France, to give Russia free scope in the East. + + The Prince gives no weight to the assertions that the recently + annexed provinces would see with pleasure an attack by France upon + Prussia and use it to recover their independence. He is not blind to + the discontent which prevails among a great part of the populations + in those provinces, but he is convinced that an attack from abroad + would rouse an almost universal spirit of resistance in Germany + which would extend even to the German possession of Austria. The + allegations to the contrary come from adherents of the dispossessed + dynasties, who fancy that their own peculiar feelings are the + feelings of the mass of their countrymen. The Saxon army might + possibly be a danger to the Prussians, if the Prussians should be + defeated, and in that event, Bavaria and Wurtemberg might also + support France. But they would none of them do anything for France + until she had gained so decided a victory as to have no need of + them. In Saxony the Prince found the army to be ill-disposed to + Prussia, but not the commercial classes. + + The Prince has not come back with the idea that France could easily + attempt to annex Rhenish Prussia. He believes that the inhabitants + are now prosperous and contented and better off than they would be + under France with her present institutions. Cologne might turn out + to be another Saragossa to France. The case might in his opinion be + different in the Palatinate, and France would, he supposes, have + little difficulty in 'assimilating' Belgium if she obtained + possession of that country. + + So far the impressions brought back by the Prince are calculated to + show that the policy of France should be to remain at peace, and his + language to the Emperor may have had a good effect. But he has also + said to the Emperor and others that a war with Prussia should be + made this year or never; that the consolidation of Germany is + proceeding surely and rapidly; that the adhesion of Southern Germany + will soon follow, and that hereafter war would have to be waged with + a Germany thoroughly united and perfectly organized. + + Prince Napoleon is himself opposed to war. He considers that an + unsuccessful war would overthrow the Emperor and his dynasty and + send the whole Bonaparte family to the right about. A war only + partially successful would, he thinks, rather weaken than strengthen + the Emperor at home, while a thoroughly successful war would simply + give His Majesty a fresh lease of 'Cæsarism' and adjourn + indefinitely the liberal institutions which he considers essential + to the durability of the dynasty. At the same time the Prince is not + without apprehension as to war being made this season. He fears weak + men, and he looks upon the Emperor as a weak man. He fears the + people who surround His Majesty, the Generals, the Chamberlains, the + ladies of the Palace. It has been particularly observed that while + the Prince has been very communicative as to the opinions expressed + by him to the Emperor, he has been, contrary to his wont, wholly + silent as to what the Emperor said to him. + +This account of Prince Napoleon's views was derived from Colonel +Claremont, the British Military Attaché, who was on intimate terms with +him. Prince Napoleon, one of the best abused and most unpopular of +Frenchmen, had, with all his talents, little fixity of purpose, no real +perseverance, and was too much wanting in courage to become the head of +a party; but the insight which he displayed with regard to the real +situation between France and Prussia is really remarkable. There is +hardly a single opinion, in the letter quoted above, which was not shown +subsequently to be absolutely accurate and well founded, and one cannot +help suspecting that he afterwards must have derived some melancholy +consolation from the realization of his prophecies of evil. + +[Illustration: _Prince Napoleon._ + +LONDON EDWARD ARNOLD] + +The general uneasiness which was felt in France, and to which constant +allusion is made in private letters and in despatches, was in no way +allayed by the pacific declarations of the Emperor, which seem, indeed, +to have made an effect exactly contrary to what was intended. It was in +vain that ministers made reassuring statements; bankers and capitalists +had lost confidence in the maintenance of peace, and, although the +diplomatic world was quiet, the public was convinced that war was +imminent. The one thing that was certain was that France was preparing +for a war of some kind, and the suspicions of Lord Stanley were aroused +by a request from Moustier that Her Majesty's Government should 'give +advice' to the Prussian Government. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Stanley to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, April 14, 1868. + + You will receive from me to-day a despatch which seems to confirm in + some degree the apprehensions so generally felt at Paris. It may + mean less than it appears to imply, but a warning given at Berlin + that any attempt or any measure tending towards the annexation of + the South German states will be regarded unfavourably at Paris, + is so like a threat that one cannot help feeling anxious as to the + result, and how it can be conveyed in language which will not be + considered offensive, passes my comprehension. If nothing else had + occurred, one might think that it was only a piece of unnecessary + fuss on the part of Moustier, whose alternations of activity and + indolence are not always easy to follow; but looked at together with + the military preparations which have so much alarmed Colonel + Claremont and which you do not seem to contemplate without some + uneasiness, the state of things indicated is certainly not pleasant. + Perhaps I make too much of this: up to the present time I have + always contended against the alarmist view of the situation, and + Bernstorff,[13] whose information is generally good, shows no + anxiety. It is the business of war departments in all countries to + look at foreign policy from their special point of view, and I class + the utterances of General Moltke with those of Marshal Niel, as + professorial rather than political. + + In any case I am not disposed to volunteer advice which would + certainly be uncalled for, probably useless, and perhaps altogether + out of place. Nor can I fail to detect in Moustier's language a + wish, hardly concealed, to enlist England on the side of the French + claim that Prussia shall not be enlarged--though it is disguised + under the form of asking us to give advice in the interests of + peace. + + * * * * * + +There can be no doubt that Lord Stanley was right, and that Moustier's +intention was to commit England to the French side under the guise of a +friendly communication to the Prussian Government. The refusal to be +drawn into Franco-Prussian entanglement was sound, but, as will be seen, +the British Government did attempt to intervene shortly afterwards. + +In spite of highly coloured orations by Marshal Niel, and of an +important speech by General Moltke on the position which Germany should +hold as a predominant power in Europe, and of the use to be made of the +army and navy in consolidating German unity, which caused much +irritation in France, the fear of the outbreak of war passed temporarily +away, and calm again reigned in the diplomatic world. In August, Lord +Cowley, former ambassador at Paris, paid a visit to the Emperor Napoleon +at Fontainebleau, and found him in a very depressed mood. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ + + Paris, Aug. 11, 1868. + + Lord Cowley wrote me a short note after his return from + Fontainebleau and sent me an account of what had been said there. + + He appears to have thought the Emperor aged, and to have found him + much depressed. His Majesty said little of Foreign Politics, but + spoke gloomily of his own position in France. He said that the + country districts were still for him, but that all the towns were + against him: a vast number of persons had congregated at Troyes to + see him, but he had been assured by the Prefect that most of them + were in reality red Republicans. The Emperor does not seem to have + said anything about the Queen. The Empress held the same language + that she and her entourage did to us, but from an expression she let + fall, it would seem that she is sore at heart about the visit. The + public appear to be rather accepting the version that it was in + compliance with a request from the Empress, that Her Majesty, being + ill and fatigued, abstained from returning the visit. + + It is not certain whether the Emperor and Empress will be at + Biarritz or at St. Cloud at the time of Her Majesty's return. If + they are at Biarritz there can be no question of any visit, and this + might give an opportunity for a letter, which might smooth the + difficulties of the point of etiquette. If the Emperor and Empress + are at St. Cloud, it must be considered the same thing as if they + were at Paris. + + I hear from other persons besides Lord Cowley that the Emperor is + very much out of spirits. It is even asserted that he is weary of + the whole thing, disappointed at the contrast between the brilliancy + at the beginning of his reign and the present gloom--and inclined, + if it were possible, to retire into private life. This is no doubt a + great exaggeration, but if he is really feeling unequal to governing + with energy, the dynasty and the country are in great danger. + Probably the wisest thing he could do, would be to allow real + parliamentary government to be established, so as to give the + opposition a hope of coming into office by less violent means than + a revolution. + +The 'soreness of heart' referred to a visit of Queen Victoria, who had +passed through Paris in July on her way to Switzerland. It had been +arranged, after prodigious correspondence, that the Empress should come +up to the Elysée Palace and call upon the Queen at the Embassy (the +Elysée having been selected on account of its proximity), but apparently +nothing was settled about a return visit on the part of the Queen. At +all events, no return visit was paid to the Elysée, and the consequence +was that a section of the French press seized upon the occasion +maliciously to represent that the Emperor and Empress were no longer +treated with consideration by the ancient Royal Houses, and that England +was all in favour of the pretensions of the House of Orleans. + +These attacks naturally caused much annoyance to the Emperor, who was +always very sensitive where the Orleans family was concerned, and he was +placed in a somewhat embarrassing position with regard to the return +journey of Queen Victoria through Paris, since, owing to the visit of +the Empress not having been returned, he was unable to pay his respects +as he had been anxious to do. The difficulty was eventually solved by +the Emperor and Empress arranging to go to Biarritz at the time when the +Queen was expected to pass through Paris on the return journey, and an +explanatory letter from the latter was considered to have closed the +matter satisfactorily. If any trace of soreness remained it was +doubtless removed by the highly successful visit of the Prince and +Princess of Wales later in the year. + +The Imperial spirits, which were much in need of a tonic, were +temporarily revived by the demonstrations of loyalty shown by the +National Guards at a review held in August, and this evidence of +personal popularity appears to have surprised most people. It may be +presumed, however, that the unfortunate Emperor was frequently misled on +these occasions. Astonishment and admiration had frequently been evoked +at the spectacle of the autocrat shaking hands freely with blouse-clad +working men and exchanging fraternal greetings with them on the occasion +of public festivities, but, according to the Prefect of Police, these +favoured individuals were in every case his own detectives masquerading +as horny-handed sons of toil. + +Two questions of secondary importance about this period were brought to +the attention of the British Government, the one concerning Tunis, and +the other the Throne of Spain. In Tunis the French showed an +unmistakable intention to establish themselves as the paramount power, +and it was not clear whether England would remain indifferent or not. +Lord Stanley, upon being asked for instructions, gave it as his personal +opinion that there was no occasion to show any jealousy of French +influence there, and that the position of the French as near neighbours +gave them a strong interest. He declined to believe in annexation, as +Algeria had not been such a success that any government would be likely +to desire to extend the French dominions in North Africa. The French +Government therefore obtained, as far as we were concerned, a free hand, +and although Bismarck intimated that the claims of Prussia in Tunis +would have to be considered, it is probable that had it not been for the +Franco-German War, that country would have become a French possession in +1870 instead of in 1880. + +With regard to Spain, it is worthy of note that the Spanish Government +was in 1868 desirous of offering the throne to the Duke of Edinburgh. +Both Queen Victoria and her ministers, however, were strongly opposed to +the project, and their opposition was founded on good sense. The throne, +they considered, was insecure. New dynasties took root with difficulty, +more especially in Spain, where respect for foreigners was not a +national characteristic, and it would be disagreeable for England to +have an English prince, however detached from England, involved in a +civil war, and possibly ejected. Again, even if the experiment were +successful, it would confer no real advantage on England, while it would +probably excite extreme jealousy in France. Further, we should probably +be asked to give up Gibraltar in return, and if this were refused, which +of course would be the case, there would be a complaint, if not of +absolute unfairness, yet at least of ingratitude on our part. If any +form of monarchy was to be retained, the opinion was expressed that the +cause of religious freedom would be better served by a moderate Catholic +on the throne than by a Protestant. + +Such were the matter-of-fact views of Her Majesty's Government as +expressed by Lord Stanley, and nothing more was heard of the proposed +candidature of the Duke of Edinburgh. The straightforward action of the +British Government on this occasion contrasts favourably with that of +other Powers when the question of the choice of a King of Spain recurred +two years later. + +In October, Lord Clarendon, who had been Lord Stanley's predecessor at +the Foreign Office, arrived in Paris. Lord Clarendon, in addition to a +thorough acquaintance with foreign political questions, enjoyed +apparently the great advantage of being a _persona grata_ to all the +principal personages in Europe, and was honoured with the confidence of +Napoleon III., the King of Prussia, King Victor Emmanuel, the Pope, and +a host of other persons occupying high and responsible positions. As the +Liberal party was at that time in opposition, he bore no responsibility, +and it was therefore possible for him to use language and arguments +which might not have been appropriate to any one speaking officially on +behalf of a government. The valuable and interesting information which +Lord Clarendon thus obtained was, in accordance with the high principles +upon which he acted, placed unreservedly at the disposition of his +political opponents. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ + + Paris, Oct. 13, 1868. + + Lord Clarendon arrived here on Saturday. He has given me accounts of + interesting conversations he has had with the King and Queen of + Prussia and with General Moltke. The details he will no doubt repeat + to you when you see him. The sum of what was said by all three is + that Prussia earnestly desires to keep at peace with France; that + she will be very careful not to give offence and very slow to take + offence: that if a war is brought on she will act so as to make it + manifest to Germany and to Europe that France is the unprovoked + aggressor: that a war brought on evidently by France would infallibly + unite all Germany. Moltke seemed to believe that the Emperor + Napoleon must know too well how thoroughly prepared Prussia is to + provoke a war lightly. He was, on his side, well aware of the + complete state of preparation in which the French were: he thought + Prussia had lost an opportunity after Sadowa, and that if she had + then known that France could not bring more than 150,000 men into + the field, she might have settled the whole affair of German unity + out of hand. This opportunity had been lost, according to him, by + the incorrectness of the information from the Embassy at Paris, and + now Prussia must have peace if possible in order to organize her + system of government civil and military. + + In short, Lord Clarendon is sure that the Emperor Napoleon may be + confident that he has nothing to fear from Prussia, if he does not + give her just provocation: but, on the other hand, that Prussia does + not fear a war, if she can show Germany and the world that she is + really forced into it. + + I think I might very well mention to Moustier the impression Lord + Clarendon has brought back, and indeed to the Emperor, if I have an + opportunity. + + Lord Clarendon gathered from Moltke and others that there is a very + strong feeling in the Prussian army against Russia and a very great + repugnance to accepting Russian assistance. In case however of a war + with France, Prussia must of course (Moltke observed) get help + wherever she could find it, and must at all events use Russia to + paralyze Austria. Austria he thought hostile, and very naturally so, + to Prussia, and ready to do all the harm she can. She is not + however, in his opinion, in a condition to be otherwise than neutral + at the beginning of a war. + + Lord Clarendon tells me he most forcibly pointed out to the King of + Prussia and Moltke the extreme danger of giving France any + provocation; anything like a challenge could not be passed over by + the Emperor: if the glove were thrown down, public feeling would + oblige His Majesty to take it up. Lord Clarendon urged them to + settle the Danish question, and even suggested that some way should + be sought of giving a satisfaction to French _amour propre_. + + It will be seen that the information obtained by Lord Clarendon + coincided more or less with the impressions derived by Prince + Napoleon. Upon Lord Stanley it produced a reassuring effect, and + confirmed him in his opinion that the Prussians were in a state of + alarm which they were endeavouring unsuccessfully to conceal, under + an ostentation of being ready for whatever might happen. In any + case, he thought, they would have a respite until the spring. + + Lord Clarendon was fortunate enough to be able to give the Emperor + Napoleon the benefit of his Prussian experiences. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley._ + + Paris, Oct. 20, 1868. + + Lord Clarendon dined at St. Cloud yesterday, and had a long + conversation with the Emperor after dinner. He repeated to His + Majesty the pacific language which he had heard from the King of + Prussia, the Queen of Prussia, and General Moltke. The Emperor heard + the pacific assurances with evident satisfaction, and spoke very + strongly himself in the same sense. Lord Clarendon was thoroughly + convinced that the Emperor was exceedingly anxious to avoid war and + thoroughly convinced that peace was desirable for the interests of + the dynasty. At the same time, His Majesty declared that if anything + like a challenge came from Prussia it would be impossible for him to + oppose the feeling of the army and the nation, and that he must, in + such a case, for the sake of his own safety, make war. He was most + anxious that England should step in to enable France and Prussia to + withdraw with honour from their present antagonistic attitude. This + is an idea which, as you know, has been vaguely suggested to me more + than once by men more or less in the Emperor's confidence. It has + never been hinted by Moustier in speaking to me. The Emperor + appears, however, to have dwelt a good deal upon it with Lord + Clarendon yesterday, and even to have entered a little upon details. + He seems to have relished the idea of other great powers being + united with England in a sort of mediation, but I did not gather + that he had any matured plan, or any distinct notion of the way in + which practical effect could be given to his wishes. His object was + to calm public opinion in France, and the means of doing this were + to be a sort of collective confirmation by Europe of the Treaty of + Prague, and a sort of pressure to be exercised by Europe on France + and Prussia which would compel them, or rather enable them, to + diminish their military preparations and take effectual steps to + restore public confidence. Whatever may be the feasibility of the + Emperor's project, it is important to know what is in his mind, and + convenient to learn it with so much certainty, and at the same time + in a way which prevents its being presented to H.M. Government as a + proposal or a suggestion to them. There is nothing as the matter + stands which necessitates even an expression of opinion from us. + + The Emperor told Clarendon in strict confidence of a proposal which + he had not, he said, mentioned even to his Ministers. Men of weight + (_des hommes sérieux_) had proposed a Confederation between the + South German States and Switzerland. Lord Clarendon pointed out + objections to the notion, such as the want of any real bond of + sympathy or interest between Switzerland and the proposed + confederates, and the offence which would be taken by Prussia, and + the Emperor appeared (for the moment, at least) to have given up the + idea. + + The King of Prussia told Lord Clarendon, and Lord Clarendon repeated + it to the Emperor, that the speech at Kiel was intended to be + thoroughly pacific, and that its object was to make the Prussian + army and the public take quietly the anti-Prussian cries stated to + have been uttered by the French troops at the camp at Chalons. The + Emperor positively declared that no anti-Prussian cries and no + political cries of any kind beyond the usual loyal cheers had been + uttered at the camp. + + Of Spanish affairs little seems to have been said in the + conversation with the Emperor. At dinner the Empress talked of + little else. She did not appear to favour any particular solution of + the question or any particular candidate for the Crown. She appeared + to expect both political troubles and extreme misery from the famine + which she says is undoubtedly impending. As to her own estates and + those of her relations in Spain she says they return absolutely + nothing, and that the peasants have not even put by grain enough to + sow the land. No one dares to store up grain or to bring it from + abroad lest he should be torn to pieces by the ignorant people as an + _accapareur_. + +From this interesting communication it will be noted that Napoleon III. +apparently reposed more confidence in Lord Clarendon than in his own +ministers; the '_hommes sérieux_' were, however, probably mythical, as +the proposed Confederation of Switzerland and the Southern German States +was not a project which would commend itself to practical people, and is +more likely to have been conceived in his own nebulous imagination. The +important conclusion to be drawn from his language is that the Emperor +was, at all events, at that period, sincerely anxious to avoid war, +conscious of the military power of Prussia, and extremely anxious to +induce the British Government to take some step in the nature of +mediation which should avert the threatened conflict and enable France +to withdraw with honour. This suggestion had already been ineffectually +made to Lord Stanley in the spring; but, as will be seen, a similar +suggestion was again put forward in the following year and acted upon. + +Before the end of 1868 changes took place both in the British and in +the French Foreign Offices. The return of the Liberal party to power +restored Lord Clarendon to his old post, and M. de Moustier gave +place to M. de La Valette. The departure of Moustier was no loss. At +Constantinople he had shown himself to be restless and overbearing; in +France he was not considered to be entirely satisfactory where +semi-financial matters were concerned, and he finished his career by +nearly getting into a serious scrape with the Prussian Government over +the question of the latter being represented on a proposed Commission at +Tunis. The Emperor Napoleon, although he entertained no grievance +against Lord Stanley, naturally welcomed the return to office of Lord +Clarendon. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, Dec. 15, 1868. + + I came back from Compiègne yesterday. During the week I was there + the Emperor seemed to be in remarkably good health and spirits, and + was to all appearance very free from care. If he has any special + plan regarding foreign politics, he is keeping it _in petto_ to + electrify the Corps Diplomatique on New Year's Day, or the Chambers + in his opening speech. He talked a great deal to me of his desire to + maintain his cordial understanding with England and of his + confidence in your helping him to do so, but he did not speak as if + he had any intention of putting our friendship to any special test + at present. + + He said that the conduct of the Greeks was very annoying, but that + in dealing with them, we must make some allowance for their feeling + of nationality and not _froisser_ it too much. I observed to him + that the Greeks, by their conduct with regard to Crete, were + producing a state of things which would be absolutely intolerable, + and that they were in my opinion doing themselves much more harm + than they did the Turks. In this he seemed to concur. My Russian + colleague, Stackelberg, was in a dreadful fuss about the Turco-Greek + question. The main anxiety he expressed was, not unnaturally, for + the King and the dynasty. We might perhaps work upon Russia by + showing that the dynasty would be continually popular if Greek + aggressions, and consequently excitement and disorder in Greece, are + allowed to become chronic. + + The Emperor talked a little and the Empress a great deal about + Spain; both took a gloomy view of the prospects, but neither gave + any hint of the solution to be desired. + +The Crown Prince of Prussia, whose peaceful proclivities became +subsequently known to the world, happened to be in England at this +time, and Lord Clarendon took the opportunity of discussing the +Franco-Prussian situation with him. The Crown Prince had already +impressed Lord Stanley with his amiability, modesty, and good sense, but +it is evident that, like many others, he had not fully realized the +great sacrifices which the Germans were ready to make in the cause of +national unity. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyon._ + + Foreign Office, Dec. 18, 1868. + + My inchoate letter on the 16th was cut short by the Crown Prince of + Prussia, with whom I had an interesting conversation. He is even + more pacific than his Father, and unlike his Father would be glad to + put the army on something more like a peace footing. The King + however is unapproachable on this subject, but the Prince says that + in a year or two he will have to yield to the outcry of the people + against the increased taxation that such monster armaments entail. + He means to consult some experienced officers as to the manner in + which reduction can be made without offence to the dignity of his + martial Sire, and he said that something had been done in that + direction by postponing till January the assembling of the levies + that ought to have taken place in October. I urged strongly upon him + the necessity of maintaining the _status quo_, and particularly + warned him against the incorporation of the Grand Duchy of Baden + into the Northern Confederation. He quite entered into the reasons + for this and said it would probably be a long time before the + interests of the South would necessitate a junction with the North, + although it would ultimately be inevitable. + + When I last saw you on my way home from St. Cloud I told you that + the Emperor wished me to report my conversation with him to the + Queen of Prussia--I did so. She forwarded my letter to the King and + sent me his answer, which was not only pacific but extremely + courteous to the Emperor. He said there was no fear of the _status + quo_ being changed now, but that some time or other the South and + North must be united, and that it would be far better to _calmer les + esprits_ by teaching people to expect it and not to look upon it as + a danger or a menace to France, which it would not be any more than + the existing state of things. I wrote all this to the Emperor who + assured me that the King of Prussia's opinions had interested him + much and that he agreed in his views about the inexpediency of a + Congress.--Disraeli made a bad use at the Lord Mayor's dinner of + your letter giving an account of my interview with the Emperor, for + he gave it to be understood that Stanley was successfully mediating + between France and Prussia, etc; La Tour d'Auvergne, to whom the + Emperor had told our conversation, was much annoyed and feared that + he might be thought guilty of an indiscretion. + + I was glad to learn by your letter of the 15th that you thought well + of the Emperor's health, as reports have of late been rife that he + was failing both in body and mind--their object was probably, and as + usual, some Bourse speculation. + +The chronic anxiety with regard to the relations between France and +Prussia which prevailed at this time was partially forgotten early in +1869 in consequence of a slight crisis in the East. The Cretan +Insurrection had lasted for several years, and the Turks had shown +themselves incapable of suppressing it in consequence of the attitude +of the Greek Government, which, supported by Russia, openly encouraged +the revolutionary movement. Greek armed cruisers ran the blockade, +volunteers openly showed themselves in uniform in the Greek towns, and +the Greeks showed a disposition to go to war, rightly assuming that +Europe would never allow their country to be reconquered. At length the +situation, from the Turkish point of view, became intolerable, and in +December, 1868, the Turkish Government delivered an ultimatum, which was +rejected by the Greeks and diplomatic relations were broken off. The +opportunity was at once seized by the Emperor Napoleon in order to +propose a Conference. Conferences had, as is well known, a special +attraction for Napoleon III., who delighted to figure as a magnificent +and beneficent arbiter graciously condescending to settle the squabbles +of inferior beings, but a Conference has also often captivated the +imagination of many diplomatists besides the late Prince Gortchakoff, +whose chief delight it was to make orations to his colleagues. Nothing +produces so agreeable a flutter in diplomacy as the prospect of a +Conference. Where shall it be held? What is to be its basis? Who are to +be the representatives? What Governments shall be entitled to appear? If +such a one is invited, will it be possible to exclude another? And +supposing these knotty points to be satisfactorily settled, shall some +Power possessing doubtful credentials be allowed a _voix consultative_, +or a _voix délibérative_? In this particular case, there was no +difficulty in fixing upon the place, but there was considerable +difficulty with regard to the participation of Greece, as Turkey flatly +refused to meet her. The prospect of a Conference was not viewed with +much satisfaction by Lord Clarendon, who asked awkward but necessary +questions about 'basis' and so forth, and warned Lord Lyons that he +would have to be very firm with La Valette on this point, 'as I know by +experience in 1856 how fickle the Emperor is, and how invariably his +minister changes with him, and throws over the engagements upon which we +had the best reason to rely.' + +Neither did Lord Lyons look forward to it with any pleasure: 'The +Conference seems likely to bring into strong light some things which +would perhaps be better in the shade,' he wrote. 'For instance, an +understanding between Russia and Prussia on the Eastern Question; +bitterness between Austria and Russia, etc., etc. I understand that +there is great rejoicing over the prospect of the Conference at the +Tuileries.' Probably Lord Lyons's distaste arose partly from the fact +that foreign diplomatists have a habit of coming and rehearsing to their +colleagues the speeches with which they propose subsequently to +electrify the assembled Conference. It is only fair to admit, however, +that the Conference was brought to a fairly satisfactory conclusion. The +Greeks, who had given a great deal of trouble with their consequential +pretensions, were admitted under a _voix consultative_ condition, and a +settlement was arrived at which enabled diplomatic relations to be +resumed with Turkey. To put it shortly, the Greeks were informed that +they were bound to respect the rules common to all Governments in their +future dealing with the Ottoman Empire (surely not a very onerous +provision), and the hope was expressed that all the causes for complaint +embodied in the ultimatum of the Porte would be removed. Crete, in +consequence, remained comparatively quiet for about ten years. +When, however, a few days after the satisfactory conclusion of this +business, the Prussian Government came forward with a proposal that +there should be yet another Conference at Paris on International +Postage, M. de La Valette was obliged summarily to reject it, as +'the French public was sick to death of the very word.' + +Early in 1869, considerable apprehension was created by the Luxemburg +railway affair. A French and a Belgian railway company whose lines +adjoined, had endeavoured to bring about an amalgamation, and the +Belgian Chamber, naturally afraid of the consequences which might result +from French influences within Belgian territory, passed an Act +prohibiting concessions of railways without the authorization of the +Government. This action caused considerable ill-feeling in France, and a +universal belief existed that the Belgian Government had been instigated +by Bismarck. It was obvious that England could not remain indifferent to +the danger of what would now be called the 'peaceful penetration' of +France into Belgium,--in other words, the ultimate annexation of that +country--and one of the first notes of alarm seems to have been sounded +by no less a person than Queen Victoria. + + * * * * * + + _General Grey to Lord Clarendon._ + + Osborne, Jan. 14, 1869. + + The Queen desired me to write to you yesterday in returning the + private letters you sent her with reference to what you said in one + of your letters of the probable designs of France in Belgium. Her + Majesty wished me to inform you that she had more than once called + the attention of the late Government to this subject. The King of + the Belgians in writing to her had repeatedly expressed his + apprehensions that either by means of a Customs convention or by the + purchase by a French company of the Luxemburg Railway to which + unusual privileges and advantages would be conceded by the French + Government, France might seek to obtain a footing in Belgium highly + dangerous to her future independence and neutrality. Her Majesty, + though hoping the King might exaggerate the danger, has invariably + expressed the strongest opinion that England was bound, not only by + the obligations of treaties, but by interests of vital importance to + herself, to maintain the integrity and independence as well as the + neutrality of Belgium; and that the best security for these + essential objects would be found in the knowledge that any + proceedings which seemed to threaten their violation would bring + England at once into the field. + + Her Majesty did not mean that any official communication should be + made on the subject, but that the habitual language of our ministers + at Berlin and Paris should be such as to leave no doubt as to the + determination of England. + +This communication from the Queen was followed not long afterwards by a +memorandum from Mr. Gladstone, laying stress upon the fact that the +'independence of Belgium was an object of the first interest to the mind +of the British People,' and hoping that it would be made clear to the +French Government 'that the suspicion even of an intention on the part +of France to pay less respect to the independence of Belgium than to the +independence of England would at once produce a temper in the country +which would put an end to the good understanding and useful and +harmonious co-operation of the two Governments.' This was very clear +language--especially for Mr. Gladstone--and the Ambassador was directed +to hint to the French Government that Belgium was under our special +protection. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, Feb. 16, 1869. + + Baron Beyens, the Belgian Minister, comes to me frequently about the + Grand Luxemburg Railway affair, and is very naturally in great + tribulation both for himself and his country. + + M. de La Valette also loses no opportunity of speaking to me about + it, and appears also to be very much disturbed. For my own part, I + can only preach in general terms conciliation to both. + + I have found M. de La Valette calm and moderate, but I am afraid + there can be no doubt that the affair is extremely annoying to the + Emperor, and that His Majesty is very angry. M. de La Valette asked + me to call upon him to-day, and told me in the strictest confidence, + though he did not pretend to have absolute proof of it, that the + whole thing was instigated by Count Bismarck. He considered that + there were three possible solutions of the question. + + The first, that France should at her own risk and peril annex + Belgium to herself. To this solution M. de La Valette was himself + utterly opposed. + + The second was the adoption of retaliatory financial and commercial + measures. To this he was also opposed, considering it to be + undignified, to be injurious to the interests of Frenchmen, and to + constitute a punishment for all Belgians innocent as well as guilty. + + The third course was to pursue the line already taken. To admit + fully the right of the Belgian Government to act as it had done, but + to declare in very distinct terms that it had been guilty of a very + _mauvais procédé_ towards France, and that the Government of the + Emperor was deeply wounded and very seriously displeased. He said + that he was about to prepare a despatch in the above sense. + + I need not say that I did all in my power to strengthen his aversion + to the two first courses, and to induce him to soften the tone of + his communication to Belgium. + + He seemed however to be afraid that the Emperor would be hardly + satisfied with so little, and he declared it to be quite impossible + that any friendship could hereafter exist between the French + Government and the present Belgian Ministry. In fact, he was far + from sure that his policy would be adopted. + + He talks of Bismarck and his ways in a tone which is not + comfortable, and the irritation in France against Prussia seems to + increase rather than diminish. Certainly confidence in peace has not + increased lately. + +M. de La Valette may have been calm and moderate, but his Imperial +Master was very much the reverse, and his conduct of the affair was a +striking instance of his ineptitude. He had thoroughly frightened the +Belgians, alienated public opinion in England, and aroused well-founded +suspicions throughout Europe that he intended to fasten a quarrel upon +Belgium in order to facilitate its eventual annexation. According to +Lord Clarendon, the idea that Bismarck had prompted Belgian action was a +complete mare's nest, but even if that were not so, it ought to have +been plain to the Emperor that if there was one thing more than another +which would gladden Prussia, it was a misunderstanding between France +and England. The feeling in England at the time may be judged by +Gladstone's language, who wrote to Lord Clarendon in March 12-- + + 'That the day when this nation seriously suspects France of meaning + ill to Belgian independence will be the last day of friendship with + that country, and that then a future will open for which no man can + answer.' + +This apparently was what the Emperor was unable to see. + + 'Bismarck is biding his time quietly,' wrote Lord Clarendon. 'If + France annexes Belgium and we take no part he will be delighted, as + France could no longer complain of Prussian aggrandisement. If we do + take part, he would be equally delighted at the rupture between + England and France, and would come to our assistance. Either way he + thinks Prussia would gain. Why should Napoleon and La Valette assist + him? A quarrel between France and England or even a coolness is the + great German desideratum.' 'I believe,' he adds in another letter, + 'nothing would be more agreeable to Prussia than that the intimacy + between the two countries should be disturbed by a territorial + encroachment which would run on all fours with Prussian + aggrandisement.' + +For some reason, which was not clear, the Emperor persisted in making +the question a personal one, announcing that he 'could not and would not +take a _soufflet_ from Belgium,' and the British Government became so +apprehensive of his attitude that the somewhat unheroic course was +adopted of sending a warning to the French Government, but leaving the +responsibility of presenting, or of withholding it, to the Ambassador. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, March 16, 1869. + + We are very anxious about the Belgian business because more or less + convinced that the Emperor is meaning mischief and intending to + establish unfriendly relations with Belgium preparatory to ulterior + designs. It is very imprudent on his part, and he will only reap + disappointment, for even if he meditates war with Prussia he could + not undertake it upon a worse pretext or one less likely to win + public opinion to his side, as it would wantonly entail an + interruption, to use a mild term, of friendly relations with + England. It is unnecessary to say that we attach extreme importance + to the maintenance unimpaired of those relations, and it is + therefore our paramount duty to omit no effort for that object. + + I have accordingly, by the unanimous desire of the Cabinet, written + you a despatch calling the serious attention of the French Government + to the dangerous eventualities that we see looming in the distance, + but the mode of dealing with that despatch may be delicate and + difficult, and we therefore leave the decision on that point to your + discretion. You can either read it, or tell the substance of it at + once to La Valette, or you may keep it for a short time until some + crisis arrives when it could best be turned to account. I feel that + this is rather hard upon you, and I would much rather have been more + precise, but, on the spot, you will be such a much better judge of + opportunity than I can pretend to be here, and if the warning is to + have any success it will depend on its being given at the right + moment and in the right manner.' + +One cannot help wondering whether a similar confidence in an +Ambassador's judgment is still shown at the present day, the views of +the so-called 'man on the spot' being now generally at a considerable +discount. In this case, Lord Lyons gave reasons showing that the warning +was not needed, and would not be of any advantage to Belgium, while +complaining that he disliked going about with a live shell in his +pocket. A few days later, however, Lord Clarendon wrote again saying +that he thought that the warning would have to be addressed shortly, as +public opinion in England was beginning to become excited, and attacks +were being made upon the Government for not using stronger language or +showing its determination to stand by Belgium, while the King of the +Belgians was anxious to make his woes known through the English press. +'If,' said Lord Clarendon, 'the Emperor attaches value to the English +Alliance he ought not to sacrifice it by a sneaking attempt to +incorporate Belgium by means of a railway company and its employés. If +he wants war it is a bad pretext for doing that which all mankind will +blame him for.' + +It was not unnatural that Lord Clarendon should have felt uneasy at the +threatening development of this apparently insignificant railway +difficulty, because it was plain that the one object which the Belgians +were bent upon was to entangle us in their concerns, and to make us +responsible for their conduct towards France; nor, again, was this an +unreasonable proceeding upon their part, for Belgium was an artificial +state, and as dependent upon foreign guarantees for her existence as +Holland was dependent upon her dykes. Perhaps in order to reassure the +British Government, Marshal Niel's aide-de-camp and General Fleury were +sent over to London in April. They brought a message from the Marshal to +the effect that France was ready for anything, and that the Emperor had +only to give the word; but that to begin by a rupture with England about +a miserable Belgian difference would be a _sottise_. These visitors did +more to convince the French Ambassador in London that there was no +danger of war than all his correspondence with the French Foreign +Office, but Lord Clarendon continued to be apprehensive of the influence +excited upon the Emperor by shady financiers and by an untrustworthy +representative at Brussels. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, April 19, 1869. + + I have never, as you know, felt any confidence in the soft sayings + and assurances of the French Government, but I did not think they + would have exposed the cloven foot so soon and completely as they + have done. No affair has given me so much pain since my return + to this place, and I foresee that out of it will grow serious + complications and an end to those friendly relations between England + and France that are so advantageous to both countries and which have + had an important influence on the politics of Europe. + + What provokes me is that _sales tripotages_ should be at the bottom + of it all, and upon that I have reliable information. I know of all + the jobbery and _pots de vin_ that are passing, and yet it is to + fill the pockets of half a dozen rascals, just as in the case of + Mexico, that the Emperor allows himself to be dragged through the + mud and to imperil the most manifest interests of France. + + The policy of the French Government is perfectly understood at + Berlin, where the leading object of Bismarck is to detach us from + France. We might to-morrow, if we pleased, enter into a coalition + with Prussia against France for the protection of Belgian + independence, which is a European and not an exclusively French + question; but we will do nothing of the kind so long as there is a + hope that France will act with common honesty. I wish you would + speak seriously to La Valette about the _tripoteurs_, and represent + the disgrace to his Government of playing the game of such people, + which will all come out and be known in the same way as the Jecker + bonds are now unanimously acknowledged to have been the cause of + that fatal Mexican expedition. + + I send you rather a curious despatch from Loftus. Bismarck's ways + are inscrutable, and he is never to be relied upon, but he has had a + union with us against France in his head ever since the Belgian + business began, for Bernstorff, who never speaks without + instructions, has said on more than one occasion to Gladstone and to + me that though Prussia would not undertake to defend Belgium + single-handed, as that country concerned England more nearly than + Prussia, yet that we had but to say the word, and we should soon + come to terms. I treated this, as did Gladstone, rather as a _façon + de parler_ and a ruse to detach us from France, which is Bismarck's + main object, as I did not choose that Bernstorff should have to + report the slightest encouragement to the suggestion, but it _may_ + come to that after all. + +Colonel Walker, the British military attaché at Berlin, whom Lord +Clarendon considered to be one of the most enlightened and intelligent +men of his profession, was in London at the time, and he reported that +there was not the slightest sign of any active military preparation in +any part of Prussia, and that the idea of war was so much discouraged by +the military authorities that it was no longer talked of in military +circles, whereas formerly it had been the only topic of discussion. The +manoeuvres were to be held in the Prussian provinces most remote from +France, and there was a fixed determination to give the latter no cause +for offence, not from fear of that country, for there was a conviction +that Prussia would have the best of a war, but owing to internal +difficulties. Colonel Walker added that the mutual indisposition of the +North and South to each other was becoming so manifest that the +unification of Germany was far distant. + +This comforting piece of intelligence Lord Lyons was instructed to +communicate to the French Foreign Minister. + +The Luxemburg Railway difficulty was finally disposed of by a Commission +at London, but before this took place, the Belgian Liberal Minister, M. +Frère-Orban, found it necessary to pay a visit to Paris. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, April 28, 1869. + + Frère-Orban had a farewell audience of the Emperor this morning. He + tells me that his Majesty was very gracious. Frère appears to have + insinuated that the business was finished. The Emperor expressed a + hope that something good would be done in the Commission. The + Emperor dwelt upon the necessity of France and Belgium being upon + the best terms in order to put a stop to all the ideas of annexation + which certain journals were continually putting forward. His Majesty + said that the annexation of Belgium to France would be disagreeable + to England, which would of itself be a reason sufficient to make him + averse from it. His Majesty had on his table the Arcolay pamphlet + which asserts that Prussia would be unable to defend South Germany + against France. He said that in an answer to this pamphlet published + at Berlin, the Belgian army was counted among the forces to act + against France, and observed that France and Belgium ought to be on + too good terms to render such an employment of the Belgian army + possible. Frère said that His Majesty had only to make Belgium feel + convinced that her independence was safe, in order to ensure her + sympathy with France. Frère appears to have been much pleased with + the audience on the whole, though he would rather the Emperor had + said distinctly that he did not expect any result from the + Commission, and looked upon the whole question as at an end. He is + very well satisfied with the result of his mission to Paris, as he + has placed the relations on a friendly footing, and conceded + absolutely nothing. + + The great points now are for the Belgians not to sing songs of + triumph, and for us and everybody to avoid all appearance of having + exercised any pressure. The Emperor cannot safely take a snub from + any foreign nation, and he feels this very strongly. + +It is to the Emperor's credit that, in spite of disastrous failures, he +always seems to have preserved a courteous and amiable demeanour. In +this particular case, it is probable that he did not know clearly what +he wanted himself, and that, misled by unscrupulous advisers, he +entertained vague notions as to the possibility of annexing Belgium, and +then withdrawing, as best he could, when the difficulties were realized. +At all events, the sole result was a rebuff and an increased want of +confidence in his integrity. In short, the mismanagement of this railway +affair, which should never have been allowed to attain so much +importance, and the collapse of his previous attempt upon Belgium, +justified the sneer levelled at him by Bismarck, who, as recorded by +Busch, remarked in 1870, 'He (Napoleon III.) should have occupied----and +held it as a pledge. But he is, and remains a muddle-headed fellow.' A +still more scathing definition was applied to him by his distinguished +countryman, M. Thiers--_une immense incapacité méconnue_. + +The private correspondence in 1869 with Lord Clarendon, who was by far +the most voluminous letter-writer amongst English Foreign Secretaries, +contains references to many topics besides the relations between France +and Prussia, such as Tunis, the Eastern Question, Spain, the internal +situation in France, the inauguration of a new Prussian seaport, the +Suez Canal, and a host of other subjects. Amongst these may be mentioned +two projected visits of exalted personages. The Khedive Ismail was +expected in England, and there was some uncertainty as to how he should +be treated. In the previous year he had ingratiated himself with the +Sultan of Turkey by agreeing to pay an increased tribute, and as a +consideration had obtained the title of Khedive and the privilege of +securing the Viceroyalty of Egypt for his own family. Being of a vain +and ostentatious disposition, however, he had now fallen into disfavour +with his Suzerain by reason of the royal airs which he assumed and of +actions which seemed to imply that he considered himself to be an +independent ruler. 'Pray let me know,' wrote Lord Clarendon, 'how the +Viceroy is received at Paris. The Turkish Ambassador has been boring me +with protestations against the royal receptions already given to him and +which he fears may be repeated here. He yesterday showed me a telegram +from Constantinople, saying that _l'effet serait fort regrettable_ if +the Viceroy was lodged in the same apartment at Buckingham Palace that +the Sultan occupied. He declares that this voyage through Europe is to +dispose Governments favourably to recognize his independence, and that +he will be backed by France against his suzerain.' + +Upon making inquiries at Paris it was found that the same question had +been raised there, the Turkish Ambassador having made a remonstrance +against the Khedive being lodged in the Elysée, and a special request +that at least the room in which the Sultan slept should not be +desecrated by his obnoxious vassal. The French Foreign Minister had +thereupon advised the Ambassador to consider the remonstrance about the +Elysée and the bedroom as _non avenue_, as it could only serve to make +the Ambassador and his Government look ridiculous. Nevertheless, M. de +La Valette admitted that the Viceroy was taking too independent a line, +and that the proposal to neutralize the Suez Canal was an Imperial +question which should originate from the Porte, and not from the +Egyptian ruler. + +The other and more illustrious traveller was the Empress Eugénie, who +was desirous of attending the inauguration of the Suez Canal, and who +unexpectedly intimated that she wished to make a tour in India. Upon +this becoming known, Queen Victoria caused her to be informed that her +presence in any part of the British dominions would always be most +welcome, and that every arrangement would be made for her comfort and +convenience. + + 'The Empress talked to me last night,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'for a very + long time and with great animation, not to say enthusiasm, of her + project of going to India. She gives herself two months away from + France, during which she proposes to go to Ceylon and most of the + principal places in India except Calcutta. She repeated her thanks + to the Queen and to you, and said that as the Queen had never been + herself to India, she herself, as a Foreign Sovereign, could not + think of receiving Royal Honours, and besides, that she particularly + wished for her own sake to observe the incognito and to be allowed + to go about and see things in the quickest and most unostentatious + manner. I told her that she had only to let us know exactly what her + wishes were and every effort should be made to carry them out. She + particularly begged that her idea of going to India might not be + talked about, lest it should be discussed and criticized in the + papers. I cannot suppose she will ever really go to India, but she + is full of it now. La Valette will stop it if he can, for his own + sake; for he depends a good deal upon her support at the Palace.' + +This journey, of course, never took place. La Valette prevented it by +representing to the Empress that if she went to Suez she must also go to +Constantinople, and thus sufficient time for a tour in India was not +available. + +A trivial incident in French high society which occurred about this time +serves to show with what extraordinary facility the most exaggerated +statements can be circulated and credited. Writing to Lord Lyons, Lord +Clarendon stated that he had been informed that the former had been +placed in a most disagreeable position at a party given by Princess +Mathilde, at which a recitation had been delivered marked by the most +furious abuse of the English, and that the Emperor had gone up to the +reciting lady and ostentatiously complimented her. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, May 9, 1869. + + The only foundation for the story you mention is the fact that I was + at a party at the Princesse Mathilde's at which a play was acted and + some verses recited. The room however was so small that only the + Emperor and Empress and some of the principal ladies had seats in + it. The rest of the company were dispersed in other rooms. For my + own part I was two rooms off, entirely out of sight and out of + hearing of the performance and recitation. Among the verses was, I + believe, an old ode of Victor Hugo's in praise of the First Emperor. + I have never read it, but I dare say it is not over-complimentary to + England. I hear the Emperor was affected to tears by it, but it + certainly neither placed me in an awkward situation, nor gave me any + emotion, for it was out of sight and hearing, and I did not know it + had been recited. + +In June Lord Lyons received his first request to take part in a division +in the House of Lords. As far as is known, he had never made any +declaration as to his political views, but apparently he figured on the +Whip's list as a Liberal or Whig, and Lord Clarendon wrote saying that +the Conservative Lords had determined upon the suicidal course of +throwing out the Irish Church Bill, and that as the House of Commons was +'capable of anything' it was imperative to prevent such a disaster; that +every vote in the Lords was of value, and that if he had no serious +objection it was desirable that he should come over and vote on the +second Reading. The answer to this appeal strikes one as a model of +common sense. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, June 6, 1869. + + I am very much obliged by your kind consideration in not _pressing_ + me on the subject of coming over to vote on the Irish Church Bill. + I will frankly say that I have a very strong disinclination to do + so. The professional objections are too obvious to mention, and I + have another feeling which would make me hesitate. I have as yet + never taken any part whatever in home politics. If I ever come to + live in England, I shall of course endeavour to take a political + line and to be of any use I can. In the meantime I should have great + difficulty in reconciling myself to the idea of now and then giving + a sort of blind vote, either for the sake of party, or from + deference to friends however much I might value and esteem them. + +In other words, he knew scarcely anything about the merits or demerits +of the Bill which he was expected to support, and was, of all men, the +least inclined to give a vote on a question with which he was +unacquainted. Lord Clarendon, however, doubtless much against his +inclination, was compelled to return to the charge. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ + + June 12, 1869. + + I am writing in the Cabinet room, and by the unanimous desire of my + colleagues, to request that, unless you object to the Irish Church + Bill, you will come over and give us the benefit of your vote on + Friday. + + It is not often that the vote of the Ambassador at Paris is wanted, + and if I remember rightly, Cowley only once or twice sent me his + proxy; but proxies are now abolished, and the real presence is + necessary. Every vote is of importance, as the question is one of + great gravity not only as respects the Irish Church but the conflict + between the two Houses that is impending, and that must if possible + be averted. + + Gladstone has just expressed a strong opinion as to the duty of a + peer not to abstain from voting when he is not disabled from doing + so, and does not admit that diplomatic convenience is a sufficient + reason against his doing so. + + I hope therefore you will come over if you are not opposed to the + Bill. + +It being practically impossible to resist an intimation of this kind +from an official chief, Lord Lyons reluctantly went over to London to +vote, and as he had not yet even taken his seat, took the precaution of +asking a trusty friend in the Foreign Office to find out what the +necessary formalities were. The following somewhat naïve communication +possesses a modern interest as it discloses the fact that backwoodsmen +were as much in existence then as they are now. + + * * * * * + + _Mr. Staveley to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, June 16, 1869. + + Not being able to get any reliable information in the Foreign Office + as to your _modus operandi_ in regard to taking your seat to-morrow, + I have been down to the House of Lords this afternoon and saw one of + the clerks in the Crown Office, who says that all you have to do is + to present yourself at the Peers' entrance to-morrow not later than + 4.45 p.m., when you will receive from the clerk in attendance for + that purpose the necessary writ to enable you to take your seat. + + Nothing further is necessary, and many peers presented themselves + and took their seats for the first time this session, for the debate + of Monday last, with no further formalities. + +The obvious comment on this incident is that Mr. Gladstone and his +colleagues were totally wanting in a sense of proportion, and their +action justifies the belief that the eminent persons who govern this +country are sometimes literally incapable of looking beyond the next +division list in Parliament. + +If a British Ambassador is to inspire confidence in his countrymen +it is all important that he should not be a partisan or dependent in any +degree upon party favours. The majority for the second reading of the +Bill was 33, and no fewer than 108 peers were absent from the division +unpaired. Yet because the whip (probably a person of very mediocre +intelligence) said that he wanted every vote that could be obtained, the +Ambassador was sent for, made to figure as a party hack, and forced to +give a vote on a question of which he had admittedly no knowledge, and +upon which his opinion was valueless. It will be seen later that similar +attempts to force him to vote were subsequently made by people who ought +to have known better, but fortunately without much success. + +Towards the close of April, 1869, the French Legislative Session came to +an end, and with it expired the Chamber elected in 1863. The General +Election took place in May, and, as an insignificant number of +opposition deputies were returned, owing to the unscrupulous +intervention of the Executive, the results were received with much +satisfaction in Government circles. It was generally felt, however, that +even the huge Government majority would be more independent than in the +late Chamber, and that a very real control would be exercised over the +Ministers. It was even expected by some that the Emperor would formally +announce the acceptance of the principle of the responsibility of +Ministers to Parliament. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, May 25, 1869. + + I understand that the result of the elections gives pleasure at the + Tuileries. The Imperialists generally seem very well satisfied. + They consider the result to be a complete defeat of the Orleanists, + a defeat of the Legitimists and a defeat of the moderate + Republicans; the Chamber being thus divided into supporters of the + dynasty and Ultra-Republicans. They think the prominence of the + _Spectre Rouge_ will frighten and unite the people at large, and + cause them to rally round the dynasty. I cannot help being afraid + that there are more _rouges_ elected than is very safe, and the + election of such a sanguinary socialist as Baucel both at Paris and + Lyons is an uncomfortable symptom. The opposition will not be + inconveniently numerous, and its violence will be in all probability + simply a source of weakness. + + I could not get Rouher to listen to any hint to propose to Prussia + that a French vessel should be sent to Jahde,[14] though he seemed + willing enough to send one if invited. You have, however, I think, + entirely prevented them having any suspicion of our having been + coquetting with Prussia, or having been willing to curry favour with + her at the expense of France. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, May 29, 1869. + + It is very generally believed that Rouher will be made the scapegoat + and placed in the honourable retreat of the Presidency of the + Senate. Since the great rally of the Moderates to the dynasty it has + become the fashion to throw upon Rouher personally the blame of all + the measures which he has had to defend. I don't know who can be + found to take his place as Government orator. + + Speculation is occupied in divining how the Emperor will take the + elections. Some think that, finding himself in front of an + opposition of _Rouges_, he will again take the part of the Saviour + of Society and begin a new epoch of Cæsarism. Others, looking to the + comparatively large number of independent members, whose elections + the Government did not oppose, and to the liberal professions made + even by the official candidates, expect a formal announcement of the + responsibility of Ministers to the Chamber, and Parliamentary + Government in form and in fact. An opinion not the least probable is + that His Majesty will make no change, but appoint Ministers and + direct his policy more or less in deference to the Chamber, + according to circumstances. + + I hope Beust's meddling in the Belgian question has been merely an + awkward attempt to curry favour with the Emperor, but it may have + had the mischievous effect of encouraging fresh pretensions on the + part of France. Jealousy of Prussia will for a long time to come + ensure sympathy between France and Austria. + +The complacent feelings with which the election results were at first +received at the Tuileries soon gave place to very different emotions. M. +de La Valette was under no illusion as to the unimportance of a victory +over the Orleanists, and had frequently assured the Emperor that they +had no real backing in the country, and that His Majesty's extreme +susceptibility with regard to the attention shown to the Princes of that +House by the Court and by society in England was totally unnecessary. +The more the elections were considered the less they were liked. It +began to dawn upon the Emperor that it had been a mistake to help the +Reds with a view to crushing the Orleanists or Moderate Liberals. A +majority in the Chamber was indeed secured to the official candidates, +but the moral weight of the votes given for them was small, for the +influence of the Government had been unsparingly and unscrupulously used +to secure their return, and even the official candidates had, with few +exceptions, been forced to issue very Liberal addresses. Fear of the +extreme men might bring the officials and the independent members +together in the Chamber, but it was generally realized that the +Government would have to go at least halfway to meet the Liberals. In +short, it was difficult to conceal the fact that the elections had not +resulted in a manifestation of confidence in the Imperial Government, +and that they had shown that the party bent upon revolution at any price +was dangerously large. Under these circumstances it was not surprising +that the French Government showed itself alarmed and irritable, and +although the country appeared to have declared against war there were +not wanting Imperialists who would have been ready to look upon a +provocation from abroad as a godsend. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, June 8, 1869. + + The elections of yesterday in Paris seem to me satisfactory, for I + certainly prefer Orleanists and Moderate Republicans to Reds, and it + is a great thing to be rid of all the questions Rochefort's return + would have produced. In the Provinces the official candidates seem + to have had the worst of it. + + The lessons to be drawn from the general election are not pleasant, + for it is impossible to find anywhere a symptom of approval of + personal government. It is not that the French desire a + Parliamentary government _à l'Anglaise_, but they are tired of the + uncertainty and disquiet in which they are kept by the fact that + peace and war, and indeed everything, depend upon the inscrutable + will of one man whom they do believe capable of giving them + surprises, and whom they no longer believe to be infallible. I don't + like the look of things. I dare say we shall be quiet for some time, + but like the French public, I live in dread of a surprise. + + It is true that Fleury is likely to go as Minister to Florence, + though it is a secret. He would keep his office of Grand Ecuyer, but + he would go because he felt that he had lost his influence with + the Emperor and would not choose to stay here only to look after + horses and carriages. I don't think his departure a good sign. He + has lately been rather liberal in politics, and he is one of the few + men who would be certainly true to the Emperor and brave and + resolute if it came to actual fighting in the streets. The object of + his mission to Florence would be to manage the withdrawal of the + French troops from Rome. I have no doubt the Emperor wants to + withdraw them, but he wants also to be sure that the Pope will be + safe without them. I dare say, too, that His Majesty is angry about + the conduct of the clergy in the elections. They voted according to + their own predilections, and certainly did not make the support of + the Government a primary object. + +General Fleury, a man of charming personality, and a prominent figure in +French society, was the author of the celebrated rejoinder, _Pourtant, +nous nous sommes diablement bien amusés_, upon an occasion when the +Second Empire was severely criticized some years later. Lord Clarendon +was another of those who felt misgivings over the elections. 'I feel +precisely as you do,' he wrote to Lord Lyons, 'about the elections and +the danger of a surprise that they create. Cæsar thinks only of his +dynasty, and I expect he foresees greater danger to it from responsible +Government than from war. It is not surprising that the French should be +exasperated at always living on a volcano and never knowing when it may +burst out and what mischief it may do them. The Bourgeoisie and the +_actionnaires_ must fear revolution, but they must be beginning to weigh +its evils against those which they are now suffering from. Fleury was a +friend of peace and of England, and I am very sorry that he should so +much have lost his influence as to make him accept a foreign mission.' + +The elections were followed by a certain amount of rioting in Paris, and +some hundreds of persons were arrested, but the only effect of these +disorders was to strengthen the hands of those who advised the Emperor +to hold fast to absolute and personal government. The latter was quite +willing to sacrifice individuals to the Chamber, and was aware of the +necessity of making some concessions in a Liberal sense, but he +continued to resist any extension of the power of the Legislative Body. +The latter might have obtained what was desired by calm and patience, +for no minister would have been strong enough to successfully withstand +the demand, but it is not in the nature of Frenchmen to achieve +practical successes without noise and ostentation, and it was plain that +troublous times were ahead. Had Napoleon III. been wise he would have +taken the bull by the horns and announced something that would have +satisfied the Chamber and the country. Unfortunately, the one thing he +refused to give up was the one thing which his opponents were determined +to wrest from him--personal government. + +In July the Constitutional agitation was advanced a stage by an +important interpellation of the Government demanding that the country +should be given a greater share in the direction of affairs and asking +for a ministry responsible to the Chamber. This demand was very +numerously signed, and much to the general surprise amongst the +signatures were many names belonging to the Government majority. It was +evident that the country and the Chamber were determined to put some +check on personal government. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, July 7, 1869. + + We are going on here _à toute vitesse_, whither, it is not very + pleasant to think. A new form has been agreed upon for the famous + interpellation. + + More than a hundred Deputies have signed the demand, and among the + signatories are to be found even some of the regular courtiers, such + as Prince Joachim Murat and the Duc de Mouchy. It is entirely + illegal for the Corps Legislatif to discuss the Constitution, but + things seem to have gone much too far for such scruples to have any + weight. It would be amusing, if it were not rather alarming, to see + the eagerness among men of all parties to be forward in the race + towards Liberalism. Rouher preaches patience and moderation, but the + Oracle from St. Cloud gives no certain response to the many votaries + who try to extract a declaration of its views. This it is, which has + been one of the main causes of the falling away of the Imperial + Deputies. To keep the majority together, it would have been + necessary that a distinct _mot d'ordre_ should have been given them, + the moment the Chamber met. No one is willing to take the unpopular + side without some assurance that he will not be thrown over by the + Prince he wishes to serve; and what is worse, the want of decision + shown has very much diminished confidence in the resolution and + ability of the Sovereign, and consequently the willingness of + politicians to throw their lot in with his. When one looks at the + position in which things stood, I will not say before the election, + but between the election and the meeting of the Chamber, one is + astonished at the rapid descent of the personal power and the + reputation. Whether concessions will come in time to enable him to + stop before he is dragged to the bottom of the hill, is even + beginning to be questioned. + +The Prince de La Tour d'Auvergne, the French Ambassador in London, who +was much astonished at the number of persons who had signed the +Interpellation Demand, told Lord Clarendon that the French Government +had brought it entirely on themselves by the scandals perpetrated at the +elections. Both he and Lord Clarendon were convinced that Rouher was +destined to be the Imperial scapegoat. In this they were correct. +Rouher resigned; and La Tour d'Auvergne himself changed places with La +Valette. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, July 14, 1869. + + When France enters upon a new road it is difficult to guess where it + will lead her to, and revolution may be looming in the distance, but + I think and hope it may be staved off for a time. The Senate will + probably put on as many checks as it dares, and the Emperor will + have a good many dodges for defeating his own programme, but he has + proceeded so unskilfully that he must have shaken the confidence of + those whose support he ought to reckon upon. + + He should at once, after the unmistakeable verdict of the country + against personal government, have made up his mind how far he would + go with, or resist public opinion, and not have left his supporters + without that _mot d'ordre_ that Frenchmen cannot dispense with; but + his silence compelled them to speak, and no one will now persuade + the people that he has not yielded to the threatened interpellation. + + If they are once thoroughly impressed with the notion that he is + squeezable they will continue to squeeze him, and the language held + even by his immediate entourage is ominous. The middle-class fear of + violent charges, and, above all, of the Reds, may come to his aid, + but he must be sadly in want of sound advice. Rouher's retirement, + even though it be temporary, is, I conclude, indispensable, but I + hope the Imperial confidence will not be given to Drouyn, who + besides being the most untrustworthy of men, is the most dangerous + of councillors. The point which concerns us most is the successor to + La Valette, whose resignation Prince La Tour bears with perfect + equanimity. + +The ministerial changes seemed to produce no beneficial effects as far +as the Emperor's position was concerned, and the letters from the +Ambassador became increasingly pessimistic. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, July 27, 1869. + + I grieve to say that the Emperor seems to lose ground. His own + partisans seem more and more to doubt his having energy and decision + enough to hold himself and them. What is serious is that this doubt + is strong among the generals. They would stick to him if they felt + sure of him, because a reduction of the army is one of the leading + doctrines of his opponents. Prince Napoleon has found an occasion + for having a letter published repudiating all responsibility for the + conduct of the Government of late years. I have been told very + confidentially that the Empress complained bitterly to the Grand + Duchess Mary of Russia of the inconstancy and ingratitude of the + French people, and said that if the people were tired of her and the + Emperor, they were quite ready to leave the country and save their + son from the dangerous and thankless task of trying to content + France. No one seems to apprehend any immediate danger. The general + impression is that if the Senatus Consultum is a fair execution of + the promises in the message, things will go on quietly enough until + the meeting of the Chamber, which may be safely put off till + December. The most hopeful sign to my mind is the reasonable and + Constitutional way in which the French seem to be getting accustomed + to work for Reforms. If the Emperor sees pretty clearly what to + yield and what to keep, and will express his intentions in time and + stick to them, all may go well yet. But can decision and firmness be + inspired, if they are not in the natural character, or the + reputation for them, if once lost, be recovered? + +In spite of the evident deterioration in Napoleon's position and of the +growing distrust in him which was now universally felt, unfavourable +rumours as to the state of his health caused something resembling a +panic. The French funds, which were higher than they had ever been +before, fell suddenly in August. They had risen because the +Constitutional concessions were believed to make it certain that the +Emperor would not make war: they fell because alarming reports were +spread about his ill-health. As a matter of fact, he was suffering from +rheumatism, and there was no real danger, but there is always a +difficulty in ascertaining the truth about illustrious invalids. Much +inconvenience and delay, however, were caused by his indisposition, for +it seems to have been his habit to retire to bed at any hour of the day, +if he felt unwell, and there was no certainty of seeing him, even when +he made an appointment. As his plans depended upon his health, and as +there was further a certain amount of complication caused by the +projected visit of the Empress to the East, nobody quite knew what would +happen, and the _joueurs à la baisse_ profited by the situation to bring +off a big _coup_ on the Bourse. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ + + Weisbaden, Aug. 31, 1869. + + I hope the report given to you of the Emperor's health is correct. + The banker has told me to-day that he had not remembered for years + such a panic at Frankfort as was produced by the news that he was + dangerously ill. If his illness is not serious and he soon gets well + again, the fright will rather do good as making people awake to the + enormous importance of his life. Even, however, if he lives, your + able despatch describing the state and the prospect of affairs in + France gives cause sufficient for anxiety, and I have an instinct + that they will drift into a republic before another year is over. + +Had Lord Clarendon lived a few months longer he would have been able to +congratulate himself upon one of the most accurate political prophecies +on record, for the Republic was actually proclaimed in Paris on +September 4, 1870. It should be added that his voluminous letters show +a thorough knowledge of and profound insight into French politics. + +The political situation in France at the end of August, 1869, was, on +the whole, apparently somewhat more reassuring than had been the case +earlier in the year. The Emperor's message announcing a great +Constitutional reform had been read in the Corps Législatif in July, +and was followed by a general amnesty for all political and press +offences. The change of Ministry was well received, because it involved +the retirement of M. Rouher, the ablest supporter of the old system of +government, although it was known that many eminent deputies were +unwilling to take office until the Constitutional change had come into +effect. The general impression produced upon the public was favourable, +and although many Liberals were careful to declare that they accepted +the proffered changes simply as an instalment, only the +ultra-Republicans and irreconcilables affected to repudiate them and +treat them with contempt. Even the latter, however, were obliged to +express approval of the amnesty. Meanwhile the country had remained +calm, and so far, the stream of reform appeared to be flowing swiftly +and with unruffled surface. Close observers, however, were under no +illusion as to the critical situation which was concealed behind these +favourable appearances. + +The preservation of the Monarchy and of order in France depended as much +upon the Emperor as it had done during the early years of his reign, and +he was far from being as strong as then. He had been at the head of the +Government for more than eighteen years, and the temperament of the +French seemed to preclude the idea that they could tolerate any rule for +a lengthy period. A young generation had sprung up free from the dread +of the bloodshed and disorder which accompanied the revolution of 1848, +and eager for change and excitement. The Emperor's foreign policy had +not of late years succeeded in gratifying the national pride, nor had +his recent concessions done as much as might have been expected to +recover his reputation. The ultra-Imperialists believed that if he had +shown resolution and decision immediately after the General Election, no +reforms would have been necessary; they thought that the reforms became +inevitable simply because he vacillated and gave his majority no +assurance of support. The Liberals had not much belief in his good +faith, and the friends of the Empire entertained a well-grounded fear +that the new powers granted to the people would be used for the purpose +of overthrowing the dynasty and establishing a republic. On the one +hand, there was an impression that the Emperor had no longer sufficient +firmness to resist these subversive attempts; on the other, the Liberals +found it difficult to believe that a sovereign who had for many years +exercised so directly, in his own person, absolute power, could ever be +brought voluntarily to abandon it. Thus there was apprehension on both +sides, and while some feared that the Emperor would be led from +concession to concession until he had no power left, others feared that, +finding it impossible to reconcile himself to his new position, he would +have recourse to some violent expedient, such as war or a _coup d'état_, +in order to extricate himself from his difficulties. + +It was generally taken for granted that the choice lay between the +Bonaparte dynasty and a republic of an extreme character. The Emperor +still retained some personal popularity, but he no longer inspired the +fear and the admiration which had hitherto prevented revolutionary +attempts. His best chance seemed to lie in foreign Governments treating +international questions in such a way as to enhance as far as possible +his reputation, and it was certainly not to the interest of England that +he should be displaced, for his own commercial policy was decidedly +liberal, and it was highly doubtful whether the Corps Législatif would +be equally so, when it came to dealing with Tariffs and Commercial +Treaties. + +When Lord Lyons returned from his leave in November, he found the +Emperor in good spirits, full of amiable sentiments with regard to +England, and very cheerful about the political prospects in France. He +did not appear to know much about the Porte and Khedive question, +which had for some time been giving rise to considerable trouble, but +responded at once to the Ambassador's appeal to his own _amour propre_ +in favour of the Commercial Treaty, which seemed to be in jeopardy. The +Empress had gone to the East, and he was consoling himself for her +absence by giving small dances at the Tuileries for some American young +ladies. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, Dec. 3, 1869. + + I am more than ever impatient to settle this Khedive affair because + I am afraid that I see symptoms of the French Press taking up his + cause against his lawful master. La Tour d'Auvergne's tenure of + office is very precarious, and if he goes before it is settled, his + successor is as likely as not to take the popular side, which in + France is undoubtedly that of the contumacious vassal. La Tour + d'Auvergne is himself uneasy, and it is apparent that it is only the + desire to act with us which keeps the Emperor from taking the + Khedive's side decidedly. If the Porte plays many more of these + pranks, it will bring about the independence of Egypt, or a quarrel + between England and France on the subject. + + It is in vain to draw any conclusions from the proceedings of the + Deputies, or the innumerable commentaries made upon them. The + Ministers profess to be delighted with the elections of President + and Vice-Presidents, but then I cannot forget that they were + enchanted for the first few days with the results of the General + Election which produced the present Chamber. My own hope is that out + of the chaos a working Liberal-Conservative majority will be + developed; but who is to be the Minister? Emile Ollivier seems to be + losing, not gaining ground in the Chamber. If the Emperor goes + straight and throws himself a little more on the classes, who, + having something to lose, are naturally conservative, he may do well + yet. There is certainly a return of goodwill towards him. The fear + is that he may hope to strengthen himself by coquetting with his pet + ouvriers, who have so little gratitude for the really important + services he has rendered them. If reproached, they answer, he has + done something for us, but what have we not done for him? What I + mean by coquetting with them, is trying to gain by their support, + power, and popularity at the expense of the Chamber. + + I can't pretend to say whether the new majority will hold together + when the question of distributing the places arises; whether they + will find it possible to get on with the Emperor, or (which most + concerns us) whether they can and will maintain the Commercial + Treaty. I am afraid we shall never again, either in political or + commercial affairs, have as good times as we had under the personal + power of the Emperor--by _we_ of course I mean the _English_. + +With this sentiment Lord Clarendon fully concurred: the Emperor, he +said, was parting with power so reluctantly that he would create +distrust, but 'I quite agree with you that we shall never have such good +times again under a Parliamentary instead of a personal _régime_.' + +A few days after this letter was written, La Tour d'Auvergne and his +colleagues were already anxious to resign, although the Emperor wished +to retain them. It was supposed that Drouyn de Lhuys would be one of +their successors: 'Angels and Ministers of grace, defend us!' was the +comment of Lord Lyons upon this rumour, which Lord Clarendon received +with equal apprehension. Another political event at this juncture was an +announcement by the Empress that she intended to keep aloof from +politics in the future, and to devote herself to works of charity--an +announcement which did not carry universal conviction at the time. + +The Cabinet, which was in so shaky a condition, contained some nominal +free traders, and it was feared, not without cause, that the new +Government might denounce the existing Commercial Treaty, although La +Tour d'Auvergne expressed confidence that such would not be the case. 'I +have my misgivings,' wrote the Ambassador, sadly, 'for I am afraid the +country is Protectionist, and I think the Free Trade zeal in the south +will cool, as they become aware that we shall not retaliate.' + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, Dec. 21, 1869. + + Nothing but absolute force will turn French Ministers and their + wives from their sumptuous official palaces. La Tour d'Auvergne, + whom I should indeed like to keep, is really anxious to go. I don't + feel sure that any of the others are. I suppose the Emperor must + change the Ministry as soon as the verification of powers is over, + but he has not made up his mind yet, and his hesitation is doing him + harm in all ways. There is, I believe, a Conservative reaction, or + rather a revival of the fear of the red spectre in the country. The + Emperor may turn this to good account, if he will govern + constitutionally through a Parliamentary Ministry, but it will not + sustain him in a return to personal government. + + I don't think things look well for the Commercial Treaty, and the + notion of some Free Traders that it should be denounced on account + of its origin, and with a view to making a greater advance towards + real free trade, will probably give the _coup de grâce_ to it. + The difficulty of passing new free trade measures through the Chamber + would, I should think, be infinitely greater than that of + maintaining the present Treaty. + +The formation of the new Government was not actually completed before +the end of the year, although the Emperor in true Constitutional fashion +wrote a letter to M. Emile Ollivier in his own hand, asking him to form +a Cabinet. There was a feeling that his Ministry would not be long +lived, and moderate men shrank from joining it, thus playing into the +hands of the revolutionary parties. Amongst those who thought that the +new Government would be short-lived was Lord Clarendon-- + + 'Ollivier's task,' he wrote, 'requires tact, experience, firmness, + knowledge of men, and a few other qualities in which he seems + singularly deficient, and I cannot think his Ministry will last. La + Valette thinks that the object of the implacables is to discredit + the Chamber collectively and individually, so as to make its + dissolution appear a necessity; then to pass a new electoral law; + then to have a General Election with which the Government would be + prohibited from interfering; then to have a Chamber of Rocheforts + and Raspails, which would be more than the _commencement de la fin_. + + 'This is rather a gloomy view, expressed confidentially, of course, + and we must hope that the Emperor will be able to defeat intrigues + of the existence and gravity of which he must be well aware.' + +As an instance of the general uncertainty prevailing, it may be +mentioned that M. de La Valette, until the contents of the Emperor's +letter to Emile Ollivier became known, was convinced that Imperial +indecision would take the form of resumption of absolute power. + +The new ministry was finally completed in the early days of January, +1870, and proved to be considerably stronger than had been believed +possible. Some of the new Ministers had curious antecedents with regard +to the Emperor. Ollivier himself had previously been an opponent of the +Empire, and his father had been sentenced to be deported to Cayenne, +while Count Daru, the new Foreign Minister, had actually voted for the +Emperor's impeachment. It was creditable, therefore, that personal +matters did not exclude men from office. What chiefly concerned England +was the line which the new Government was likely to take with regard to +the Commercial Treaty which was about to expire. According to the +Emperor, there was nothing to fear, and he assured the Ambassador that +he had come to an understanding with Ollivier on the subject, but it was +ominous that several members of the Cabinet were ardent Protectionists, +amongst them being the Minister of Public Works. In conversation the +Emperor spoke cheerfully about the political situation, quite in the +tone of a Constitutional Monarch. The Empress, on her side, declared +that she had no _caractère politique_ in the State, and enlarged on the +enormity of the attacks in the press upon a person so entirely without +political position, attacks which were certainly odious, and generally +directed to matters unconnected with politics. As for the Ministers, +they all praised the Emperor, and declared that their relations with him +were perfectly Constitutional and satisfactory; everything seemed going +smoothly until the death of the journalist Victor Noir at the hands of +Prince Pierre Bonaparte once more threw politics into confusion. After a +certain amount of rioting, however, and much trouble caused by +Rochefort, things resumed their usual condition for the time being. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, Jan. 18, 1870. + + I am one of the hopeful, and I see or fancy I see signs of the + success of the present Ministry in their attempt to found + Parliamentary Government. But people are very uneasy, and the + tactics of the Revolutionists are to keep up an agitation enough to + paralyze trade, and make the peaceably-disposed think that the + present Government is not strong enough to be worth having. These + manoeuvres might lead to a resumption of personal power, which + would be almost as dangerous as a republican revolution. + + People seem to find it difficult to believe that the Emperor will + abstain from intriguing against his Ministers. They say it is in his + nature to do so, and remind one that he set up a newspaper against + Rouher. The Ministers themselves, on the other hand, seem to be + thoroughly satisfied with His Majesty. Daru says that he and his + colleagues are confident of success; that they would have two or + three difficult months to pass, but that they expect to have + convinced the Republicans by that time that a revolution is hopeless. + He spoke with great satisfaction of the complete adhesion of the + middle class at Paris to the Ministry, and of the offers they make + of their services in case of need. + + Claremont saw the Emperor this afternoon. He thought His Majesty + looking fat and heavy. He found an opportunity of making a remark to + him on the necessity of the Ministry being supported by the Chamber, + which seems to have been taken in good part. + + I hear on good authority that the Empress professes to find much + greater good than she expected in the Parliamentary Government, and + that she says the Pierre Bonaparte affair would have been much more + disastrous under the old system. Several of the new Ministers and + their wives appeared last night at a ball at the Tuileries for the + first time since 1848. The Empress, as well as the Emperor, was + particularly gracious to them. + +It may be mentioned in connection with the Tuileries balls, that the +Ambassador used to receive very numerous applications from persons in +English society who were desirous of being invited to these +entertainments, and it was usually not possible to satisfy their wishes. +After the fall of the Empire, this particular species of application +practically disappeared, there being apparently no overwhelming anxiety +to attend the Republican social functions. + +Before the end of January an important debate took place in the Chamber +on the Commercial Treaty, M. Thiers appearing as the chief Protectionist +champion. Free Traders professed to derive some encouragement from it, +as a vote against the denunciation of the Treaty was carried by 211 to +32; but it was obvious that these figures could not be taken as a test +vote of the strength of the Free Trade and Protectionist parties, since +the votes of the majority were influenced by a variety of +considerations. + + +FOOTNOTES: + + [11] The vanity which was responsible for Prince Gortschakoff's love + of conferences is frequently referred to in Busch's 'Bismarck.' + + [12] Subsequently Lord Ampthill. + + [13] Prussian Ambassador in London. + + [14] Now Wilhelmshafen. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +SECRET PROPOSALS FOR DISARMAMENT + +(1870) + + +It will be remembered that in October, 1868, the French Government had +practically suggested that Her Majesty's Government should 'give advice' +to Prussia on the subject of disarmament, and that Lord Stanley, who was +Foreign Secretary at the time had resolutely declined to do anything of +the kind. A fresh effort was now made in the same direction, no details +of which, so far as is known, have ever been made public. + +_Mutatus mutandis_, there was a curious similarity between the language +held at Paris and at Berlin respectively. The French proclaimed that +they would not go to war with the Prussians, provided the latter did +nothing objectionable. The Prussians replied that they did not want to +go to war with France, provided they were allowed to do as they pleased, +and both asserted that the maintenance of peace depended upon England, +which they explained by affirming that England had only to declare that +she would join against whichever Power broke the peace; the real meaning +of this being that at Paris it was expected that England should announce +beforehand that she would side with France in case of war, while at +Berlin it meant that she should announce beforehand that she would side +with Prussia. + +Early in January it had become known to the British Government, and +presumably also to the French Government, that Bismarck intended to +create a North German Empire, and that the King of Prussia was by no +means disinclined to become an Emperor, and it may have been this +knowledge which prompted the French Government to make another attempt +to induce England to suggest disarmament. It was felt that the only +chance of success was to set about the work as quietly as possible, and +if there was one individual who was better fitted than any other to +undertake this delicate task it was undoubtedly Lord Clarendon, who, as +has already been pointed out, was on intimate terms with the principal +personages concerned. Lord Clarendon was approached in January by La +Valette, the French Ambassador, and consented to make the attempt. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, Jan. 26, 1870. + + I had a long talk with La Valette to-day about disarmament. It is no + new subject to me, but one which I have long had at heart, although + it presents serious difficulties on account of the King of Prussia's + obstinacy. He does not meditate, or desire war--far from it. But his + army is his idol, and he won't make himself an iconoclast. Not so + the Crown Prince, with whom I discussed the subject at great length + a year ago. Our relations with Prussia are very friendly, and + perhaps we are in as good a position as any other Power to make an + attempt to bell the cat, and Count Daru may be sure that I will do + all I can to meet his views, but I am sure that he will admit that + some tact and _ménagements_ are necessary. I spoke to Gortchakoff + in the summer about Prussian disarmament, and he entirely concurred, + though he said Russia would take no initiative. + +Further letters from Lord Clarendon emphasized the necessity of keeping +the matter secret, and authorized Lord Lyons to assure the French +Government that it would not be compromised in any way, and that he +undertook the business with hearty good will, but with small hope of +success, as the King of Prussia was almost unapproachable on the subject +of the army. + +On January 30th, M. Emile Ollivier called upon Lord Lyons. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, Jan. 30, 1870. + + I have just had a visit from M. Emile Ollivier and we have spoken + confidentially on several subjects. + + The thing uppermost in his mind was Disarmament. He said he was very + anxious that England should exert her influence with Prussia. He + explained the position of the present French Ministers with regard + to the subject. They depended, he said, principally on the great + agricultural population of France for support against Socialism and + Revolution. It was essential therefore that they should do something + for that population. To conciliate them, either taxes might be + remitted or the call upon them for recruits be diminished. There + were great difficulties in the way of remitting taxes, and when a + reduction of the army was proposed, the Ministers were met by the + Emperor and the military party with a declaration that it would be + unsafe to diminish the forces of France, while those of Prussia were + on their present footing--that the effect would be that Prussia + would make some attempt on Southern Germany, and war be the + consequence. If, however, Prussia would make a simultaneous + disarmament, all would, he thought, be well and a great security for + peace would be given. It was true that the Prussians urged that + their army was on a peace footing already, and that they could not + be expected to change their whole military system, but M. Ollivier + conceived that while no doubt the Prussian system enabled the + Government to call nearly the whole male population to arms, it + depended upon the Government to decide how many it would actually + call upon each year. + + I explained to M. Ollivier the difficulty and delicacy of the + question, the peculiar views of the present King of Prussia, and the + small hope there could be of prevailing upon His Majesty to consent + to a reduction of the army. I said that it would be your special + care that the French Government should not be compromised by any + step you might take. I added that it was plain that the only chance + of success was to approach Prussia in a strictly confidential + manner; that any formal diplomatic move on our part would be + resented or misrepresented as a pretension to interfere in the + internal affairs of the country, and would expose France as well as + ourselves to a rebuff. + + M. Ollivier said that he was extremely grateful to you, and that he + entirely concurred in the opinion that the move must be made in a + cautious and confidential manner. He was particularly alive to the + importance of not exposing France to the appearance of being + slighted; in fact, he would not conceal from me that, under present + circumstances, a public rebuff from Prussia would be fatal. '_Un + échec_,' he said, '_c'est la guerre_!' Those who had to render an + account to Parliament and the country were less able than the former + Government to put up with any wound to the national pride. Their + main object was peace, but they must show firmness, or they would + not be able to cope with Revolution and Socialism at home. + + M. Ollivier went on to say that, whether we succeeded or not at the + present moment, it was very necessary that the way should be paved + for disarmament in Prussia, and that it should be felt that England + was in favour of it. The time must come when France would be obliged + to make a public proposal to Prussia to disarm: it was impossible + that the French Government could assume, in the eyes of France and + the world, any share of the responsibility for the present + exaggerated armaments and expenses. They would be obliged to show + the French people and the German people too where the responsibility + really lay. The best course would be to avoid, by a confidential + arrangement for simultaneous action, the necessity of claiming + special praise for either party, or throwing special blame on + either. If this could not be, the next best thing would be that + Prussia should be prepared to receive, in a proper spirit, a + proposal from France, and the confidential steps you thought of + would, in his opinion, certainly be likely to effect so much at + least. + + He spoke with great affection of the Emperor, and assured me that + H.M. acted in the most perfect harmony and confidence with his new + Ministers, and that no difficulty had arisen on any subject, though + the Ministers had maintained and were determined to maintain their + independence and their authority as the responsible Government of + the country. + +An opportunity for Lord Clarendon's good offices presented itself very +soon; Count Bismarck had written a despatch to the Prussian Minister in +London in which he alluded in complimentary terms to the friendly +interest which Lord Clarendon had always shown in the welfare of +Prussia, and the latter made this an excuse for communicating his views +on disarmament, the method selected being a memorandum which Lord +Augustus Loftus[15] was directed to bring to Bismarck's notice in strict +confidence. + +In communicating to Lord Lyons a copy of this memorandum it is +instructive to learn that the British Cabinet Ministers, with one +exception, were kept in ignorance of Lord Clarendon's action. 'I have,' +he wrote on February 3, 1870, 'only mentioned the matter to the Queen +and Gladstone, both of whom highly approve. The Queen will be ready +to write to the King of Prussia whenever I think her doing so may be +useful. You will be able to assure Daru that I have in no way +compromised the French Government.' + +The memorandum which, it was faintly hoped, might impress the +flinty-hearted Bismarck ran as follows:-- + + * * * * * + + _Lord Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus._ + + Foreign Office, Feb. 2, 1870. + + A few days ago, Count Bernstorff read to me a despatch from Count + Bismarck concerning the German Confederation which contained some + allusions to myself that gave me particular satisfaction, as a proof + that Count Bismarck recognized the sincerity of my interest in the + welfare and greatness of Germany. + + If I am not mistaken in this I hope he will not think that I abuse + the confidence he seems disposed to place in me by asking him + privately through you to consider a subject that I have long had at + heart, and in making this request, it is, I am sure, unnecessary for + me to disclaim any intention to interfere in the internal affairs of + Prussia--such an intention would be alike presumptuous and useless. + + But it is in the general interest of Europe, of peace, and of + humanity that I desire to invite the attention of Count Bismarck to + the enormous standing armies that now afflict Europe by constituting + a state of things that is neither peace nor war, but which is so + destructive of confidence that men almost desire war with all its + horrors in order to arrive at some certainty of peace--a state of + things that withdraws millions of hands from productive industry and + heavily taxes the people for their own injury and renders them + discontented with their rulers. It is a state of things in short + that no thoughtful man can contemplate without sorrow and alarm, for + this system is cruel, it is out of harmony with the civilization of + our age, and it is pregnant with danger. + + To modify this system would be a glorious work, and it is one that + Prussia, better than any other Power, might undertake. She would not + only earn for herself the gratitude of Europe, but give a great + proof of her morality and her power; it would be a fitting + complement of the military successes she has achieved. + + I know full well the difficulties that would beset such a course of + policy. I know how great and deserved is the King's parental feeling + and affection for his army--that he would view its reduction with + pain, and that he might not think it safe to diminish its numerical + force; but His Majesty is wise and foreseeing, and his moral courage + is always equal to the measures he believes to be right, and should + Count Bismarck think it not inconsistent with his duty to recommend + a partial disarmament to the King, I cannot but consider that the + moment is a singularly propitious one for the purpose. + + The great standing army of France would of course come first under + the consideration of the King, but France has been never more + peacefully disposed than at the present time, under a responsible + Government which cannot make war 'for an idea,' because it + represents a nation that is determined to maintain peace so long as + there is no just cause for war, and because the Emperor entirely + shares the feelings of his people. I know that the present + Government of France will seek for popularity and power in a + peaceful policy and in economy, notwithstanding the vast and + increasing wealth of the country and the almost proverbial + indifference of the people to taxation. + + There would consequently, I am convinced, be no opposition on the + part of the French Government to a reduction of the army _pari + passu_ with Prussia. For reasons, however, quite intelligible, + neither Government may choose to take the initiative in such a + proposal; but if I had authority to do so, I do not doubt that the + Queen would allow me to sound the ground at Paris, in a manner + entirely confidential, that should in no way compromise either + Government, whatever might be the result of the suggestion. + + Pray read this letter to Count Bismarck with the sincere expression + of my esteem. + +With all due respect to Lord Clarendon, this lecture (for that is what +it amounted to) betrayed some want of appreciation of the real +situation, for he seems to have regarded the Prussian army as largely +the plaything of the King, and not to have fully realized the great +object for which it was intended. Were he alive at the present day his +moralizings on the iniquity of armaments would presumably be still more +condemnatory. Lord Lyons's comment on the communication was, that if the +Prussians would not listen to Lord Clarendon, they would certainty not +listen to any one else, but he so little expected success that he +regretted that the French Government had raised the question at all. If, +he pointed out, the Prussian Government would not agree to disarm, the +new French Ministers would be very angry and might turn round and say, +'If you will not disarm, you must mean ill towards us, and we would +rather fight it out at once, than ruin ourselves by keeping up, for an +indefinite time, war establishments.' No doubt it would be an excellent +thing if Prussia would take the opportunity of disarming while the +French Government and the French nation were in the mood, for the happy +moment might pass away, and war might again be looked upon as a remedy, +though a desperate one, against socialism and revolution. Evidently he +had small belief in the efficacy of the step. + +The forebodings entertained both by Lord Lyons and by Lord Clarendon +himself were very shortly realized. In a few days there arrived from +Lord Augustus Loftus a long letter reporting his conversation with +Bismarck, from which the following extracts are quoted:-- + + * * * * * + + _Lord A. Loftus to Lord Clarendon._ + + Berlin, Feb. 5, 1870. + + I read your private and confidential letter to Count Bismarck. + + * * * * * + + He first observed that he should wish to know what guarantee you + could give, or propose should be given, for the maintenance of + peace, or the security against danger. 'You,' he said, 'live in a + happy island and have not to fear an invasion. For 250 years Germany + has been exposed to and suffered French invasion; no one can accuse + us of being aggressive; Germany, as now constituted, has all that + she wants, and there is no object of conquest for her. But our + position,' he added, 'is an exceptional one. We are surrounded by + three great Empires with armies as large as our own, any two of whom + might coalesce against us.' He then reverted to March of last year. + He said that he was aware that at that moment, had it not been for + the influence of M. Rouher, an occupation of Belgium would have + taken place. Although there had been no direct understanding with + England, it was felt and known at Paris that Prussia would have + supported England, if action had been taken. It was this knowledge + that warded off action, and Belgium was saved. He had not at the + time mentioned the imminence of the danger to the King, for he was + afraid that His Majesty would have taken military measures which + would have rendered the situation more critical. He then observed + that in 1867 he had had a conversation of several hours with the + Emperor Napoleon. He had discussed with him the causes which had led + to the overthrow of Louis XVI., Charles X., and Louis Philippe--that + their fall was owing to want of energy and decision. He had told the + Emperor that, when he was travelling in dangerous company, the only + thing to do was to have a revolver in his pocket. The Emperor + had adopted this principle; he had the army with him, especially the + Guards; but Bismarck observed that lately one or two cases had + occurred which proved that the army was beginning to be tainted with + socialism. Bismarck said that the Emperor had had but two courses to + pursue; either to grant more internal liberty, or war; and the + Emperor had told him very clearly that if the one failed, there + could be no other alternative. 'Now,' said Bismarck, 'this danger + occurred only 10 months ago, and who can say that it may not occur + again?' + + * * * * * + + He then went into an account of the hostility of the Muscovite party + towards Germany: of the dislike of the Czarewitch to everything + German, adding that whenever the Emperor Alexander dies, the + relations will undergo a great change. + + * * * * * + + He expressed a hope that you would say nothing at Paris on this + subject, as any refusal of Prussia to a proposal of disarmament + would make the position more dangerous. + + He said that he did not dare even to name the subject of your letter + to the King, much less show it to His Majesty. He would get into a + fury and immediately think that England was trying to weaken Prussia + at the expense of France; nor was the present a judicious moment to + do so, for the King had only lately known what had taken place about + Belgium, and had in consequence expressed his cordial feelings + towards England. If the proposition came from France, the King would + view it as a ruse, but would not listen to it. Coming from England, + said Bismarck, it would make the worst impression on him. + + I used all the arguments I could in support of your suggestion, and + read to him certain extracts from your other letter. + + * * * * * + + In conversation Bismarck remarked that Prussia might have acquired + South Germany without cost and risk, had she pleased to do so, + by which I understood him to refer to the cession of Belgium to + France. + + * * * * * + + I left your letter marked 'confidential' in Bismarck's hands, as + I thought it essential that he should reflect over the powerful + arguments it contains, but he expressly declined to lay it before + the King. He will answer it through Count Bernstorff. It is evident + to me that there is not the smallest chance of inducing the King + to listen to a reduction of his army, and I must fear that any + proposals to him of this nature would only make him suspicious and + distrustful of England. + +In spite of the view expressed in the last paragraph, it may fairly +be presumed that Bismarck's alleged fear of the King of Prussia was +a shameless fabrication. There is nothing whatever in subsequent +revelations to show that he stood in any awe of 'Most Gracious,' and the +latter appears to have always been a more or less passive instrument in +his hands. + +In forwarding this correspondence to Lord Lyons, Lord Clarendon observed +that his suggestion appeared to have been a complete failure, and that +Bismarck was evidently just as hostile to the idea of disarmament as his +royal master. Lord Lyons was directed to communicate the substance of +the correspondence to Count Daru, but only in general terms, as when +Bismarck's answer arrived in London, fresh light might possibly be +thrown upon the subject. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, Feb. 11, 1870. + + When I went to see Daru yesterday he opened the conversation by + telling me that he had received a letter from La Valette, from + which he learned that Count Bismarck had refused to consent to your + suggestion that Prussia should disarm. Three reasons were, Count + Daru said, given by Count Bismarck, none of which appeared to have + any weight. + + The first was that he could not even mention the subject to the + King. This device had, Daru said, been resorted to by Count Bismarck + in the affair of Luxemburg; in fact, it seemed to be the usual mode + which the Count took of avoiding any discussion which he did not + like; it was however the duty of Ministers to bring wholesome + proposals before their Sovereign, whether the proposals were + palatable or not. In fact, Daru seemed to think that if Count + Bismarck himself desired to disarm, he would be able to obtain the + consent of the King. + + The second argument was that the neighbours of Prussia need not be + uneasy at her military strength, because she was not a conquering + Power. This, Count Daru thought, might have been said with reason, + if Prussia had made no acquisition since 1815; but to say so now, he + declared, to be simply preposterous. Prussia had shown herself to be + a particularly ambitious Power, and her ambition had been already + extremely successful. For his own part, he rather admired than + blamed her desire to aggrandise herself, but he could not be + expected to listen seriously to an assertion that her power was no + cause of alarm because she was not a conquering nation. + + Count Bismarck's third argument was that Prussia was not nearly so + ready for war as France--that, in fact, she had only 300,000 men + under arms, while France had upwards of 400,000. This, also, Count + Daru thought, simply ridiculous. Prussia could, he said, at any + moment, without an act of the Legislature, without a law, without + even a Royal Decree, by a simple order of the Minister of War, call + an immense force into the field, a force, too, of trained men, at a + moment's notice. There was nothing in France like this. + + Daru went on to say that Count Bismarck's arguments did not at all + mend the matter. France must act as if Prussia had simply refused + to disarm. How was this state of things to be dealt with? + + 'I have determined,' said Daru, 'to disarm, whether Prussia does so + or not. In fact, I have resolved to ask the Emperor at once to + sanction a considerable reduction of the French army. I cannot make + this reduction as large as I should have done, if I had more + satisfactory accounts of the intentions of Prussia. All I can + propose, is to reduce the annual French contingent from 100,000 men + to 90,000. As our men serve nine years, this will eventually effect + a reduction of 90,000 men--a real absolute reduction. I shall thus + give a pledge to Europe of pacific intentions, and set a good + example to Prussia. I shall probably add great weight to the party + in Germany which demands to be relieved from military burdens, and, + I trust, enlist public opinion everywhere on my side. I shall also + furnish Lord Clarendon with a powerful argument, if, as I sincerely + hope, he will persevere in his endeavours to work upon Prussia. I + beg you to give my warmest thanks to him for what he has already + done, and to express to him my anxious hope that he will not + acquiesce in a first refusal from Prussia.' + + Daru went on to say that it appeared that Count Bismarck had been so + little aware that your suggestion had been made in concert with + France that he had particularly requested that the French Government + might not be made acquainted with it. He begged me to express + particularly to you his gratitude for the care you had taken not to + compromise the French Government. + + He concluded by saying that he could not at the moment say for + certain that the reduction would be made in the French army, because + the Emperor's sanction had not yet been given. He was afraid His + Majesty would not relish the proposal, but he felt confident that + His Majesty would accept the advice of his Ministers. + + I told him that my personal opinion was that the best chance of + obtaining a disarmament in Prussia was to set a good example and + leave public opinion in Germany to work without foreign aid. Demands + from abroad for disarmament seemed to me likely to irritate the King + in Prussia, and to give him and the military party grounds for an + appeal to national patriotism against foreign dictation. I thought + that the effect of the disarmament of France in strengthening the + feeling in Germany against military burdens would be very great if + it were not counteracted by appeals which might wound German + susceptibilities. + + Daru seemed to agree generally with me, but not to be willing to say + anything which would pledge him to abstain from calling officially + upon Prussia to disarm, if it suited the home policy of the Ministry + to do so. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ + + Feb. 12, 1870. + + Daru seems to have taken Bismarck's refusal better than I expected. + We have not, however, got the definitive answer which is to come + through Bernstorff, and as Bismarck kept a copy of my letter I have + little doubt that he will show it to the King, though he pretended + to be afraid of doing so. + + * * * * * + + Count Daru may be sure that I shall not let the subject drop, though + I shall wish to proceed in it as I think most prudent. I have only + mentioned it to Gladstone among my colleagues, and of course, to the + Queen, who takes the warmest interest in the matter. I had a letter + from her yesterday, expressing a hope that the French Government + would not at present make any official _démarches re_ disarmament, + as she is sure, from her knowledge of the King's character, that it + would do more harm than good. I am quite of the same opinion and + think it would arouse German susceptibility, which is quite as great + as the French, whereas we want to make German opinion act in our + behalf. + + Nothing is more likely to bring over Germany than France partially + disarming without reference to Prussia, and I sincerely hope that + this project of Daru's will be carried out. The Germans will be + flattered by it as a proof of confidence, and it will furnish them + with a fresh weapon against their war Budget. + + * * * * * + +Lord Clarendon's statement that he meant to persevere in his efforts +afforded much gratification to Count Daru. With regard to Lord +Clarendon's desire that the matter should be kept as secret as possible, +he explained that he had confined the knowledge of it as much as +possible to himself, Lord Lyons and La Valette, but that of course he +had been obliged to mention it to the Emperor and to Ollivier, and he +'seemed to be rather afraid that neither of these important persons +would be perfectly secret.'[16] + +Bismarck's reply to Lord Clarendon did not afford much ground for hope. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, Feb. 19, 1870. + + The day before yesterday, Bernstorff brought me Bismarck's answer to + my letter, and I enclose a translation. + + It is courteous, but the intention not to disarm is manifest. I have + been detained so late at the Cabinet that I cannot write a letter + for you to read to Daru, so I have marked Bismarck's letter, and you + can extract the passages in the shape of a memorandum which you can + leave with Daru in the strictest confidence. I should much like to + hear what he will think of it, in order to shape my reply. + + Bernstorff, who evidently spoke from a private letter of Bismarck's + that he did not show me, laid much stress upon the active ill-will + of Russia whenever the present Czar is gathered to his fathers--the + present Cesarewitch and the Slav races are very hostile to + Germany--(I believe this is true), and this hostility would be + encouraged, according to Bismarck, if German means of resistance + were weakened, it would invite coalition, under circumstances easily + imaginable, between Austria, Russia, and France against + Prussia--hypothetical cases of this kind are easily invented to + support foregone conclusions, but there is a _sort_ of opening as to + a conference between Powers as to proportionate reductions and + exchange of guarantees. I don't mean to lay much stress on this, nor + should I think that it would be productive of a practical result, + but you might allude to it as a sign that the negation is not + absolute. + + Pray, however, lose no time in correcting the error into which Daru + has been led by La Valette as to an official despatch or a speech in + Parliament from me. I cannot conceive how he made such a mistake, + for I said nothing of the kind. + +Bismarck's answer was of considerable length, and is quoted in full +because it is a document of historical interest. It will be observed +that it was in the main an amplification of the views expressed verbally +to Lord Augustus Loftus a fortnight earlier, and that it contained +specious arguments designed to impress upon Lord Clarendon the entirely +unaggressive nature of Prussian policy. The belief, however, of Lord +Clarendon and of the French Ministers, that Bismarck entertained no +suspicion as to how the proposal originated, implies a simplicity on +their part which he must have thoroughly enjoyed. + + * * * * * + + _Count Bismarck to Count Bernstorff._ + + [_Translation._] Berlin, Feb. 9, 1870. + + Lord Augustus Loftus has read to me a private letter addressed to + him by Lord Clarendon on the 2nd Inst. Its object is to discuss with + me in a manner strictly private and confidential a plan for the + partial disarmament of the Continental Powers. After a few friendly + expressions concerning myself, which I cordially reciprocate, the + English Statesman proceeds to enlarge upon the hardships and burdens + imposed on the Nations of Europe by their excessive armaments;--He + conceives that it would be much to Prussia's credit and well worthy + of her great military renown if she were to co-operate in + endeavouring to alleviate those burdens; he thinks that the King our + August Master, sincerely attached as he is to his army, would not + shrink from the adoption of such a measure, provided he were + convinced of its justice;--he deems the present moment peculiarly + fitted for making this overture, on account of the peaceful + disposition of all the Powers and more especially of the Emperor + Napoleon and of his present Government; and he states his readiness, + provided he can count on our friendly assistance, to sound the + Emperor and his Government with a view to eventually opening + negotiations on the subject. + + The English Ambassador has doubtless sent home a report of the + Verbal answers which I gave to the above communication.--In order, + however, to meet the confidence reposed in me by Lord Clarendon in + a similar spirit, I feel called upon to address you in a manner + equally confidential, and one which for that very reason admits of + my speaking with the utmost frankness. + + Lord Clarendon cannot doubt, as indeed the opening observations in + his letter plainly shew, that I render full justice to the friendly + feelings and intentions which he entertains towards Prussia and the + North German Confederation. + + I am convinced that no European State or Statesman exists who does + not wish to see the feeling of confidence strengthened and Peace + maintained; and further that no German Government would wish to + impose upon its people the maintenance of an army in excess of that + proportion for which the requirements of its safety imperatively + call. + + Were the question officially put to us whether the diminution of our + military strength is compatible with the secure maintenance of our + independence, we should not decline to share in any deliberations + which might take place on the subject; and we should carefully sift + the question whether the great neighbouring Military Powers are + willing or able to give us guarantees such as would compensate + Germany for the decrease in the amount of Security which She has + hitherto owed to her armies. + + Lord Clarendon does His Majesty the King full justice when he infers + that no considerations or feelings of a purely personal nature would + deter him from adopting a measure which he had once recognized as + right and proper, but Lord Clarendon will as readily understand that + however willing we may be to enter into a strictly confidential + interchange of ideas on this important question, we must reserve to + ourselves the Right of making a careful estimate of the relative + position of the Parties most deeply interested in the matter, and of + judging whether the concessions which we ourselves might probably be + expected to make stand in a fair and just proportion to those which + it would be in the power of other Nations to make. Our very + geographical position is itself wholly different from that of any + other Continental Power, and does not of course admit of comparison + with the insular position of Great Britain. We are environed on all + sides by neighbours whose military strength is of such a nature as + to form an important element in all political combinations. Each of + the other three great Continental Powers is on the contrary so + placed that at least on one of its frontiers it is not open to a + serious attack, and France is so situated as to be practically + secure from danger on three sides. These three Powers have of late + years considerably increased their military strength and have done + so in a proportion in excess of our own:--Austria and France have + remodelled wholly their military systems, so as to be able to assail + us at any moment with increased forces. The armies of Austria, + France and Russia, have each an army which, when on a Peace footing, + is superior in numbers to our own. Our system is moreover so to + speak so thoroughly transparent, that any increase in our effective + force can at once be appreciated; the amount of any addition or + decrease which we may make in our military force can therefore be + most accurately calculated. + + The military systems of other Nations are of a different nature. + Even in the case of nominal Reductions they admit of the maintenance + or renewal of their full effective strength; they even admit of a + material increase of force being made without attracting notice or + at all events without entailing the possibility of proof.--With us + on the other hand, the whole military system, which from its very + nature is a matter of publicity, becomes more so owing to the nature + of our Institutions. + + Under these circumstances, and in the event of a discussion on + measures of such great importance being actually opened, we must ask + ourselves what guarantees can be given to us that our Position as + regards other Powers will not be practically impaired by our + signifying our adherence to a system, which however just and + even-handed it might appear in its action, would in reality not deal + with equal fairness with all the Parties concerned. + + Any weakening of Prussia's Power, any disturbance of the balance of + Power in Europe, can hardly be for the interest of England. It must + be acknowledged that whilst, on the one hand, the state of + preparation for War of the Great Powers gives rise to apprehension, + as set forth in Lord Clarendon's letter, still that very state of + preparation may on the other prove a practical guarantee that any + attempt to assail or to disturb existing Rights will be firmly and + effectively met. + + Of this I conceive that the past year has afforded fresh proofs, and + Lord Clarendon, intimately acquainted as he is with the Events of + that Period, will be best able to judge of the truth of my Remark. + + The maintenance of Peace has not been due merely and solely to + pacific views entertained by Rulers personally, for the Power and + readiness of neighbouring states has had great weight in affecting + opinion and in determining Resolutions. The Inclinations of a Nation + may be essentially peaceful, they may rest on a keen appreciation of + its own interests, but they are nevertheless liable to be suddenly + changed either by some unforeseen accident, or by fictitious + agitation. Under such circumstances, neither the most powerful + Monarch, nor the most influential Minister is able to estimate or to + guarantee the duration of peaceful Inclinations. + + I am persuaded that when you submit these Remarks for Lord Clarendon's + consideration, he will not see in them a Refusal to enter into the + Views which he has so happily and eloquently set forth, but rather + as the expression of the very serious responsibility which rests + with a Minister who is called upon to advise his Sovereign in a + matter pregnant with such important consequences. + + I can of course have no objection to your reading this letter to + Lord Clarendon, I must however ask you to make the communication in + the strictest confidence, in accordance with the character of + thorough privacy with which Lord Clarendon, with Great Tact and to + my entire Satisfaction, has invested the matter. + +Bismarck's views, as set forth above, were communicated by Lord Lyons to +Count Daru on February 22, and the latter remarked that, upon the whole, +matters were rather better than he expected, as there was no categorical +refusal to consider the question of disarmament. In his opinion, that +question was a very simple one. The military forces of the great +Continental Powers bore a certain proportion to each other; in order to +maintain that proportion, very heavy burdens were imposed upon each +country, but if, by common agreement, each reduced its army by a certain +number of men, the same proportion would be preserved, while the burdens +were alleviated. If, however, a minute discussion of guarantees and +securities were began, very awkward topics might be brought forward. For +instance, the right of Prussia to garrison Mayence, was, to say the +least, doubtful, and the fortifications she was erecting on the North +Sea might give rise to comment. At this stage of the conversation, Lord +Lyons hastily intervened in order to point out the extreme disadvantage +of mixing up Mayence and the North Sea with the question of disarmament, +and Count Daru concluded by saying that he was quite content to leave +the matter entirely in the hands of Lord Clarendon, as nobody else could +manage it so well. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, March 12, 1870. + + Outsiders are not always good judges, but it seems to me that + Ollivier makes enemies unnecessarily and gives certain pretexts to + the Imperialists, who of course work on the Emperor's mind against + his Government. I fear there will be a split one of these days. + + I agree with you that Prussia will never declare that she will not + complete the unity of Germany, because she looks upon it as + inevitable. Nothing, as the King himself said to me, can prevent the + gravitation of the weak towards the strong, but that it would not + take place in his life, possibly not in that of his son. + + France, if not grown wiser by that time, will probably consider it a + _casus belli_, but I don't see that it would make much difference + to her, as the whole military force of the South is now actually at + the disposal of the Confederation, and she would weld all Germany + together as one man if she attempted by force to prevent Bavaria, + Würtemberg, and Baden from joining the North, when they had + determined that it was for their own interest to do so. + + I have fired another shot at Bismarck about disarmament, but I don't + expect better success from it than from the first. The King of + Prussia, a little time ago, told the Duke of Oldenburg, who pressed + him on the subject, that he would disarm if other Powers did the + same, so he is not so completely unapproachable as Bismarck would + lead us to suppose. + +Lord Clarendon's second attempt upon Bismarck was made on March 9, and +took the form of a lengthy letter to Lord Augustus Loftus, in which the +arguments in favour of disarmament were reiterated and endeavours made +to convince Bismarck that Prussia had really no cause for uneasiness. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus._ + + Foreign Office, March 9, 1870. + + I have delayed writing to request that you would convey to Count + Bismarck my cordial thanks for the courtesy and frankness with which + in a private letter dated Feb. 9th, he answered my letter to you on + the subject of partial disarmament. + + The delay has been occasioned by my endeavours to ascertain + correctly the relative forces of the great military Powers, and I + hope that Count Bismarck will not consider that I trespass unduly on + his time and his confidence if I again revert to a subject which + more than any other I have at heart, and which an English Minister + may have some claim to discuss without suspicion of his motives, + because England is not a military Power, but is deeply interested in + the maintenance of peace, and the progress and prosperity of the + Continent. + + I am as convinced as Count Bismarck himself can be that no German + Government would wish to impose upon its people the maintenance of + an army in excess of that proportion for which the requirements of + its safety imperatively call, and I would not desire the reduction + of a single regiment if I thought it would impair the independence + and the honour of Prussia, which in their plenitude I regard as + essentially beneficial to Europe. + + But can it be honestly affirmed that the power and independence of + Prussia are menaced from any quarter? and, if not, surely the + military force of Prussia is excessive and entails upon other + countries the unquestionable evil of maintaining armies beyond the + requirements of their safety. + + The only countries from which, owing to geographical position, + Prussia could anticipate danger are Russia, Austria, and France, and + can it be said that from either there is any real cause for + apprehension? In the conversation I had with Count Bernstorff, + when he communicated to me the letter of Count Bismarck, he dwelt at + some length upon the ill-will of Russia towards Germany, which might + take an active form on the death of the present Emperor, and for + which Prussia ought to be prepared, but Count Bismarck must know + better than myself that Russia has long since, and wisely, ceased to + aim at influence in Germany or intervention in German affairs, and + that all her energies are now directed eastwards with a view of + extending her territory and her commerce in Asia. Whatever + sentiments may be suggested in other quarters by a rapid development + of the present policy of Russia which has the entire support of + public opinion in that country, it appears certain that Germany can + have no danger to guard against from Russia, whatever may be the + personal feelings or opinions of the reigning sovereign. + + On paper, and only on paper, Austria has an army of 800,000, but she + could not, even on the most pressing emergency, bring 200,000 men + into the field. Her finances are dilapidated and her internal + disorganization affords just cause of alarm. Danger to Prussia from + Austria must, for many years to come, be a chimera. + + The military peace establishment of France is nominally greater than + that of Prussia; the former being 400,000 and the latter being + 300,000; but the number of troops stationed in the costly and + unproductive colony of Algiers is not, and cannot ever be less than + 60,000 men; other colonial possessions require military protection, + and as the garrisons in Lyons and other great towns necessary for + the maintenance of order are not less than 40,000 men, the + establishments of the two countries are as nearly as possible upon + an equality. Can this state of things be regarded as a menace or a + danger to Prussia? I am greatly mistaken if any Prussian statesman + or General would reply to this inquiry in the affirmative. + + The question then to my mind appears quite simple. The military + forces of the great Continental Powers have a certain proportion to + each other; in order to maintain that proportion, very heavy burdens + are imposed upon each country, but if by common agreement, each + reduces its army by a certain number of men, the same proportions + will be maintained, while the burdens, which are fast becoming + intolerable will be alleviated. + + Count Bismarck however thinks that if the question of diminishing + the military strength of Prussia is entertained, it will be + necessary carefully to inquire what guarantees can be given by + neighbouring Military Powers in compensation to Germany for a + decrease in the amount of security which she has hitherto owed to + her armies. + + Upon this I would respectfully beg to observe that a minute + discussion of guarantees would be endless and dangerous. The + legitimate rights and precautionary measures of independent + Governments would be analysed in a spirit possibly of unfriendly + criticism, and if agreements were arrived at, constant vigilance + over their faithful fulfilment would be necessary, and this might + possibly give rise to the quarrels that the agreements were intended + to avert, and which would at once put an end to the compacts. + + It is upon a dispassionate consideration of the probable course of + events that the question of partial disarmament should in my opinion + be decided, and in France (the only country with which we need + concern ourselves) what do we find? A nation resolutely pacific: a + Government depending on popular support and therefore equally + pacific: a responsible Minister declaring that France will not + interfere with the affairs of her neighbours, and the Sovereign + willingly assenting to a diminution of one-tenth of the annual + conscription without asking for reciprocity on the part of Germany, + and thereby showing his confidence in the King's declaration. + + I venture to think that the present state of opinion in France, + founded as it is upon a true estimate of French interests, is a more + solid guarantee than any that the respective governments of France + and Germany could effect for their own security. + + Count Bismarck will admit, and I am sure that a statesman so liberal + and far-sighted will admit without regret, that the people + everywhere are claiming and must obtain a larger share in the + administration of their own affairs, and that, in proportion + as they do so, the chances of causeless wars will diminish. The + people well understand the horrors of war, and that they, and not + their rulers, are the real sufferers: they equally understand and + will daily become more impatient of the taxation for those costly + preparations for war which in themselves endanger peace, and I + believe that there is at this moment no surer road to solid + popularity for Government than attending to the wants and wishes of + the people on the subject of armaments. + + I have reason to know that the reduction in the French army would + have been carried further if the Government could have hoped that + the example would be followed by Prussia. Sooner or later, however, + this reason will be publicly assigned, and then upon Prussia will + rest the responsibility not only of maintaining so large a force + herself, but of compelling other countries reluctantly to do the + same. + + It would be to me a matter of most sincere pleasure to think that no + such responsibility will rest on Prussia, but I should hardly have + presumed to recur to the subject if I had not gathered from the + patriotic letter of Count Bismarck that further discussion was not + absolutely precluded, and I had not therefore been encouraged to + hope that he might think it proper to make my suggestions known to + his Sovereign. + +Bismarck's reply to this exhortation was equally long, and contained +some arguments of such a puerile nature that it can hardly be believed +that he expected them to be taken seriously. + + * * * * * + + _Lord A. Loftus to Lord Clarendon._ + + Berlin, March 12, 1870. + + On the receipt of your private letter yesterday morning, I asked for + an interview with Count Bismarck, and he received me last evening. + + I first observed that you would have hardly ventured to recur to the + subject of disarmament, had you not thought that his letter to Count + Bernstorff abstained from putting a veto on discussion, and from a + feeling that the King of Prussia would reap general esteem and + admiration in Europe by giving a patent proof of his Peace Policy, + whilst on the contrary, His Majesty might incur unpopularity if the + French should be enabled to say that they were compelled by Prussia + to keep up an armament against which the Nation is disposed to + protest.--I then read your letter to Count Bismarck. He listened + with great attention, merely making two observations during my + reading-- + + 1st. That France had only 40,000 men in Algeria, and 2nd that the + Constitutional Government in France was only of three months' + existence, and therefore its stability could not be yet said to be + ensured. When I had finished, Count Bismarck stated that, as far as + France alone was concerned, Prussia and the North German + Confederation might not feel themselves endangered by a diminution + of the Army, but he said Austria and France might join together and + even the 250,000 men which you give to Austria might in conjunction + with France prove to be a serious embarrassment to Prussia. The + 20,000 men which might perhaps be dispensed with, would then be just + the balance which might turn the Scale against Prussia. + + He then reverted to France. He said although the Nation was now + pacific, you know as well as I do that a war cry may be raised in + France, on any emergency, and at the shortest notice. + + If, said Count Bismarck, the present Constitutional Government had + been three years instead of three months in existence, then there + would be some chance for its duration and for the maintenance of + Peace. At the present moment, he observed, there was a party anxious + to restore the former state of things, a personal Government. + Amongst that Party, there was the Empress Eugénie, and they would + not be sorry to divert the public attention from home affairs by + raising some question of Foreign Policy. + + He said that the Provincial Press of France (and he reviewed + articles from all the Small Provincial Papers) teemed with abuse + against Prussia. + + There were other indications in Europe which did not leave him without + some disquietude for the maintenance of Peace. + + He first alluded to the local provincial Press in France as + continually preaching antagonism to Prussia, then to certain reports + which had reached him of the purchase of horses in France, but to + these he did not attach much importance. He then referred to reports + he had received from the Prussian Minister at Copenhagen, who + observed, that if any State of larger dimensions were to do what + Denmark was now doing, some sinister design would evidently be + attributed to it. + + He considered the appointment of Monsignor Klazko by Count Beust to + a post in the Foreign Office at Vienna as significative of the + intentions of Austria, and he observed that Count Beust was + intriguing with the Polish Party for some object which was not clear + to him. He then referred to Southern Germany and to the intrigues of + the Ultra-Montaine party, and cited a saying of the late Prince + Schwarzenberg 'that the three Empires (France, Austria, and Prussia) + should unite against the Heretics in Europe.' + + To these observations I replied that the Safety of Prussia was + secured by her Military system which supplied necessary reserves and + Landwehr, without the incubus of such an enormous standing army, and + that Prussia was therefore in a position to be able to give an + example to Europe. + + On the whole, although Count Bismarck appeared to be somewhat + incredulous as to the pacific appearance of Europe, he was less + decidedly opposed to any disarmament than on the last occasions I + spoke to him. He asked whether it was desired that he should mention + the subject to the King. I replied in the affirmative, and suggested + that he should have your Lordship's two letters translated and + submitted to His Majesty. + + On my mentioning that any attempt at mutual guarantees would be very + unadvisable, he said that without some guarantee the question of + entertaining disarmament would be difficult; but he said it more as + a passing observation than as a fixed decision. + + I am afraid that if the question of disarmament is entertained at + all (and probably neither the King nor Count Bismarck will like to + discard it entirely) it will be hedged round with so many + conditions, that it will be rendered impossible; great care will be + required that the question of disarmament shall not become a + question of Contention, and thus give a pretext for discussion, to + be followed perhaps by war. + + I asked Count Bismarck casually what foundation there was for the + repeatedly recurring reports of General Fleury's attempts to bring + about a Russo-French Alliance. + + Count Bismarck said that General Fleury on his arrival had acted + without instructions, and he attributed no importance to these + reports. + + He said that at first the Emperor of Russia had rather been taken + in, and that he had written a letter to the King of Prussia (he did + not say on what subject), but that the King of Prussia had replied + in a manner most satisfactory and agreeable to the Emperor, and that + it was then that the Emperor of Russia sent the St. George to the + King of Prussia. + + I could see that Count Bismarck has no fear of the Russian policy + towards Prussia, so long as the Emperor lives and that Prince + Gortchakow remains Minister. + + I shall see Bismarck later, and will then inform you what view the + King takes of the proposal for disarmament. + +This unpromising communication was transmitted to Paris, and Lord +Clarendon comforted himself with the thought that there was still a ray +of hope, as Bismarck had promised to bring the matter before the King, +and there might therefore be an opportunity of recurring to it later on. +Daru, too, did not look upon the position as hopeless. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, March 17, 1870. + + I read to Count Daru this afternoon a memorandum giving a short + summary of the principal points in Lord A. Loftus's letter to you of + the 12th about disarmament. + + He said that on the whole the impression made on his mind was good. + There was more disposition to consider the subject, and Count + Bismarck seemed rather to have sought to find something to say + against disarmament, than to have alleged reason which could be + supposed to have any real weight with him. + + At all events, Count Bismarck mistook the state of France. The + people were honestly and sincerely pacific, and the Constitutional + system might be considered as firmly established. He would not deny + that the French were a proud and susceptible people, and that they + could be roused to war by their Government, if their honour or their + patriotism were appealed to. But the present Government were as + pacific as the people, and they had the full confidence of the + Emperor and the nation--of the nation, he said, not of the Corps + Législatif, whose support was not cordial--nor of the Senate, which + did not like them--nor of the countries, who hated them. Count + Bismarck would see in a few days, a series of measures which would + convince him that Constitutional Government was irrevocably + established in France. The Ministers had obtained, or were on the + point of obtaining, His Majesty's sanction to reforms which would + convince all the world that the Emperor had not only landed on the + shore of Parliamentary Government, but had burnt his ships behind him. + + As to Count Bismarck's argument that Prussia must be prepared to + face the united armies of France and Austria, Count Daru remarked + that it was preposterous to maintain that any one Power of Europe + must endeavour to be a match for all the rest united. If Austria + united with France, Prussia might find allies also. It was not to be + supposed that all Europe would stand by and look on at a fight with + France and Austria on one side and Prussia on the other. + + Finally, he repeated that on the whole, Count Bismarck's language + was more satisfactory than it had yet been. + +The conclusion to be drawn from this conversation is that Count Daru +must have been more easy to please than most people; but all hopes +were shortly dashed to the ground when a letter arrived from Lord +Augustus Loftus reporting the result of his further communications with +Bismarck. + +Bismarck stated that Lord Clarendon's letters had been translated and +laid before the King, and that the proposal had not been favourably +entertained by His Majesty. There were only two methods of reducing the +German Army, one to change the present legislative enactments, and +thereby the whole military system; the other, to reduce the term of +military service to two and a half years. The first was considered to be +impossible, and, as for the second, the King had resisted Parliament on +the subject for five years, and now declared that he would rather give +up his throne than yield. Further, the King viewed the proposal as being +put forward in favour of France and French policy, and without regard to +the safety of Prussia. To use Bismarck's own expression: 'It was the act +of a _cool friend_.' 'It is all very well for you,' said Bismarck, +'living in an island, where no one can attack you, to preach +disarmaments, but put yourselves into our skin. You would then think and +act differently. What would you say if we were to observe to you that +your navy was too large, that you did not require so many ironclads, +that you lavished too large a portion of the taxation of the country in +building ships, which in the peaceful disposition of Europe were not +required? If we recommended you to diminish your naval armament?' + +To this home-thrust the Ambassador made the somewhat unconvincing reply +that as evidence of our pacific disposition we had just sold an ironclad +to the Prussian Government, and were ready to sell others--a reply +which was received with irreverent merriment; neither do the imposing +sentiments expressed respecting the general happiness and prosperity of +Europe seem to have made much impression upon the man of blood and iron. +The utmost that could be obtained from him was a vague statement that +the whole question would be discussed by the Parliament 'in a year or +so,' and that a decision must then be taken as to what was required for +the safety of the country. 'I saw,' wrote the Minister sadly, 'that it +was useless to pursue the question further.' Lord Clarendon realized +that the game was up. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, March 23, 1870. + + I send you a copy of Loftus's letter, and you will, I am sure, agree + with me that more harm than good would be done by further pressing + the question of disarmament, after the very decided expression of + the King's opinion. You can tell Daru in mild terms the two + objections raised by His Majesty and that, on the whole, I consider + it better to wait and not to show much anxiety until the War Budget + comes to be discussed next year, when the example of France, as + regards military reductions, the pacific temper of her people, and + the consolidation of her institutions, cannot fail to have a + beneficial effect on the Federal Parliament. At present, it seems + that the Liberal party, upon which Bismarck must lean more and more, + would only support reduction on the condition that he would change + his policy and invite, or coerce the South into the Confederation. + Bismarck on this subject has behaved with prudence, at the expense + of popularity, as regards Baden (the sorest point with the French), + and he should not be pressed into a course he dislikes or thinks + dangerous to the continuance of good relations with France. He is + foolish about the press and always irritated by articles, however + worthless, against Prussia, which he usually thinks are written by + authority, or are the true manifestation of public opinion in the + particular country. + + You will observe that the King thinks I have been acting in the + interest of France, and it is therefore not only on public grounds, + but as regards myself personally, that I am very desirous that the + most complete secrecy should be observed respecting the whole of + these unsuccessful negotiations, if they can be so called. I know + well the suspicious character of the King, and if he thought that we + had cast in our lot completely with France, he would straightway set + about a more intimate alliance with Russia which would not be for + the interest either of England or France. + + Pray therefore impress upon Daru the necessity of complete + discretion. + +Thus ended an attempt in the success of which no one probably felt much +confidence. Various conclusions may be drawn from the correspondence +quoted above. There seems to have been no doubt that the French +Government (whatever may have been the sentiments of the Emperor) was +sincerely anxious for a partial disarmament and the promised reduction +of the annual contingent by 10,000 men was evidence of good intentions. +There was, however, an essential difference between the French and +Prussian view as to what constituted conquest and aggression which in +reality precluded any real settlement. + +Prussia held that it was not conquest or aggression to annex any German +States, while France considered that the annexation of any States south +of the Maine would be as much conquest or aggression on the part of +Prussia, as it would be, on the part of France, to annex them herself. +Prussia refused to declare that she would not complete the unity of +Germany. France, on her side, refused to declare that she would not +interfere to prevent it. + +As for Bismarck's arguments against disarmament, some of them were +positively grotesque, and it must have required more than ordinary +assurance to contend, for instance, that Denmark and Monsignor Klazko +constituted a menace to Prussia, whilst the artifice of representing the +King as a sort of uncontrollable despot was too thin to deceive any one +of ordinary intelligence. On the other hand, Bismarck seems to have +displayed commendable patience and restraint when lectured on the +iniquity of the Prussian military system. Lord Clarendon's language +rather conveyed the impression that England stood upon a moral pinnacle +which entitled her to admonish other nations as to the errors of their +ways, but the claim was vitiated by the fact that she maintained, and +intended to maintain, a navy of overwhelming strength, while if her +military power was even more insignificant than it is at the present +day, the cost of the British Army amounted to much more than that of the +Prussian Army, and therefore the less said about unproductive +expenditure the better. If, in fact, the respective expenditure of the +two countries upon armaments is borne in mind it seems almost incredible +that Lord Clarendon should have ventured to preach economy to the +Prussian Government. During the previous year, the total British +expenditure upon armaments amounted to no less than twenty-four millions +and a quarter. Of this sum, rather more than fourteen millions were +allotted to the Army, and nearly ten millions to the Navy. Now the total +military and naval expenditure of the North German Federation at the +same period only amounted to ten millions eight hundred thousand pounds, +and the Prussian contribution towards the total represented a little +over seven millions. It might also be added that England was quite ready +at all times to supply to an unlimited amount, ironclads, rifles and +munition of war to any foreign customer, however depraved. And yet we +are pained and surprised when any one suggests that we are occasionally +hypocritical! + +But the most striking conclusion to be drawn from the correspondence is +that Lord Clarendon, with all his knowledge of continental politics, +does not seem to have fully grasped the really essential fact; he seems +to have thought that by professions of friendship, by small concessions +on the part of France, and by the establishment of more liberal +institutions in that country, the threatened danger might be averted, +whereas it was the fixed and inexorable determination of Bismarck to +force a conflict upon France whenever the favourable opportunity should +arise. A high tribute to Lord Clarendon's statesmanship was, however, +paid by Bismarck at a later period. On making the acquaintance of one of +his daughters a few years later, he opened the conversation with the +singular remark that, never in the whole course of his life, had he been +so relieved as when her father died; and then proceeded to explain that +had Lord Clarendon lived, there never would have been a Franco-German +war. As he did not enter into details, it may be presumed that he +considered Lord Clarendon's influence to be so great that he might have +successfully persuaded the French to acquiesce in some insignificant +enlargement of Prussia. + +All the participators in the disarmament negotiation appear to have kept +their counsel on the subject, and there is, at all events, no mention of +it in the two standard works which deal with Bismarck's career. + + +FOOTNOTES: + + [15] British Ambassador at Berlin. + + [16] Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon, Feb. 18, 1870. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR + +(1870) + + +Whilst the barren disarmament negotiations were proceeding, the internal +political situation in France had not improved. Though calm on the +surface, a section of the people was becoming more socialistic, and +socialism produced stagnation in business, a desire on the part of the +lower classes for revolution and a corresponding desire on the part of +the middle classes for a strong government again. Ministers were uneasy, +for although the new Constitution had been well received by the country +at large, its weak point lay in the right reserved by the Emperor of +appealing to the people, a right which nothing could induce him to +abandon, and which he was about to exercise by submitting the recent +Constitutional changes to a plébiscite. Theoretically, this should have +afforded gratification to the Republicans, as being in conformity with +their view that the public should decide everything directly itself, but +they were in reality well aware that the French people were not yet +Republican in sentiment. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, April 5, 1870. + + There is a good deal of uneasiness in the French political world. + The great thing for the moment is that the Ministers should get a + good majority in the Chamber at the end of the debate on the new + Constitution which is now going on. They are afraid that some of + their usual supporters will abstain from voting. The 'Appeal to the + People' is so thoroughly Napoleonic an idea, and so completely in + accordance with the peculiar character and modes of thinking of + Napoleon III., that it would be very hard to make him give it up. + One cannot wonder at people's being distrustful of the use he may + make of it. The submitting the present changes in the Constitution + to a plébiscite is certainly legally necessary and admitted to be so + by all parties. What people are afraid of is that the Emperor will + insist upon calling for it in a Proclamation so worded as to make + the acceptance by the people a vote in favour of his person, as + against the Chambers and Ministers. + + You will see from Claremont's report that the Government has agreed + to reduce the military contingent by another 10,000 men, making it + 80,000 instead of 90,000 as the present Government proposed, and + instead of 100,000, as it was fixed by the late Government. + +It was not surprising that the French Ministers, as well as many other +people, should feel suspicious about the plébiscite, and that frequent +councils should have taken place at the Tuileries with the object of +inducing the Emperor to consent that in future no plébiscite should be +submitted to the people unless it had first been voted by the two +Chambers. For one thing, it was feared that few people would care enough +about it to take much trouble to vote, and it really did not seem very +probable that a peasant would take a long walk to express his opinion on +the question of whether the Senate should have the power of originating +certain laws. Therefore the Ministerial crisis which arose, and the +Emperor's determination not to yield about the Appeal to the People, +were attributed to a Machiavellian plot on his part, and it was believed +that the return to personal government was to be brought about by +getting rid of the independent Ministers, Ollivier included. The belief +was possibly unfounded, but the Emperor's previous history had not +inspired his people with implicit confidence in him, and they were +always convinced that he had an incurable taste for conspiracy. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, April 13, 1870. + + It is impossible not to feel very uneasy about the present state of + things in France and the sort of _locus standi_ that the enemies of + the Empire have obtained for suspecting the Emperor, who will be a + long time in recovering, if he ever does, the public confidence he + now seems to have lost. Revolutions are not made with half measures, + any more than with the proverbial rose water, and among the ships + that the Emperor was supposed to have burnt behind him when he + landed on the Constitutional shore, the plébiscite ought surely to + have been included. No doubt he would have divested himself of a + favourite weapon, but he should have foreseen the very serious + objections to it that would arise in the mind of the most moderate + friend of Constitutional Government, and he would have done far + better for himself to have given it up and taken his chance, for + with or without plébiscite, that is what he is now reduced to, and + his chances will be improved by endeavouring with sincerity to guide + the stream rather than oppose himself to it. + +As the result of the crisis, both Daru and Buffet left the Ministry, +thus weakening the Cabinet and diminishing materially the chance of a +quiet and satisfactory establishment of Parliamentary Government. Thiers +was generally supposed to have been the principal mischief-maker. +Lord Russell was at this time in Paris, and in conversation with +Ollivier the latter expressed himself most confidently about the +plébiscite, and thought that if six million people voted it might be +looked upon as a decided success. Another opinion on the plébiscite was +volunteered by Mr. Gladstone. 'If the Emperor is really stickling for +the right to refer when he pleases to the people for an Aye or No upon +a proposition which he is to frame, that, in my opinion, reduces +Constitutional Government to an absolute mockery, just as it would +reduce to a shadow the power of a Legislative Assembly.' + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, April 21, 1870. + + The prospects of the quiet establishment of Constitutional + Government are in some respects better and in some worse. They are + better inasmuch as men of property, bankers, and others, are giving + money and exerting themselves to obtain a decided success for the + Plébiscite. They are worse, inasmuch as the suspicion of the + Emperor's intentions appears to increase, and people become more and + more afraid that if he gets a really large majority on the + Plébiscite, he will revert to personal government. The imprudent + language of the Right and their undisguised avowal of their hopes + produce this feeling. The Emperor himself has neither said nor done + anything to warrant it. + + Ollivier asked me what progress had been made in the disarmament + question. I made him understand, without going into details, that it + must be let sleep for the present, and he agreed immediately. + + There is a hitch about the English evidence before the Parliamentary + Committee on the Régime Parlementaire. The Committee have proposed + that only one English witness shall be heard. Emile Ollivier will do + his best to put things straight. I told him that if a proper and + courteous answer was made to our tender of evidence, I would + undertake that we would not abuse their civility by asking for too + much of their time. + + Emile Ollivier dines with me to-day, and will, I hope, learn and + profit by Lord Russell's instruction in Constitutional Government. + +English manufacturers were naturally desirous of putting their case +before the Parliamentary Committee on the Commercial Treaty, but the +members of the Committee did not appear equally desirous of hearing +them. According to Lord Lyons, who, like all his official contemporaries, +was in principle a Free Trader, and felt compassion for the misguided +economics of continental nations, the majority of the Committee were +infected by a politico-economical heresy which took the form of +demanding that any advantages which foreign manufacturers might enjoy, +should be balanced by import duties, which they persisted in calling +'compensation.' His advice was that any English witnesses who might be +called, should confine themselves very closely to facts and not allow +themselves to be led into discussions on trade principles, 'as it is not +easy to reply in French to a Committee, of which the anti-Free Trade +members are much hotter than the Free Traders.' + +As the date of the plébiscite drew near, Ollivier's confidence and +satisfaction continued to increase, but some discomposure was caused by +the hostile action of Thiers and his friends. No one had ever expected +that Thiers would long endure that any Government of which he was not a +member should go on smoothly, and in the present instance, he was able +to establish a plausible case by protesting that the Emperor, in +reserving the right to appeal to the people, was nullifying liberal +institutions. At an opportune moment, however, a plot against the +Emperor's life was discovered, in which a man named Beaury was +concerned, and although of small importance, it was considered likely +to produce a considerable effect upon public opinion. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, May 6, 1870. + + I thought Emile Ollivier rather out of spirits yesterday, or at all + events not so confident as he is usually. He seemed to hope the + publication of the details of the plot would produce a great effect + and increase the 'Ayes' for the Plébiscite. That there really was a + plot is certain, but it may be doubted whether the conspirators were + numerous enough, or were men of sufficient note, to make the danger + so great as to frighten the voters. I am not surprised at La + Valette's being out of spirits, for the situation is really very + critical, and it is difficult to conceive any ending which will + place him and Rouher where they were again. + + With reference to Loftus's despatch, I sincerely hope that his most + confidential correspondent is not so well informed as he represents + himself to be, and that no change is really contemplated in the + _status quo_ of Hesse and Baden. It would be quite a mistake to + suppose that this is a moment at which it would be safe to defy + France. On the contrary, a war unmistakably provoked by Prussia, + would be hailed by many as a welcome diversion from internal + difficulties. So far as I can judge, _Ollivier is not the man to + shrink from one_. There is more security against a sudden surprise + than there was under the personal government, but there is also less + probability that the Emperor's health and personal views will + prevent war. + +The plébiscite took place on May 8, and an ecstatic note from Ollivier +announced success. + + * * * * * + + _M. E. Ollivier to Lord Lyons._ + + Paris le 9 mai, 1870. + + + La Victoire est complète! + + A Paris nous avons gagné cent mille voix, et jusqu'à présent voici + les resultats. + + Oui 6.189.506 + Non 1.305.881 + + manquent 37 arrondissements, l'armée, la marine, l'Algérie. + +The complete returns showed that about 7,250,000 voted 'Yes,' and +1,500,000 'No.' The Minister was thus justified in his satisfaction. +Nearly all the big towns, including Paris, had voted against the +Government, as had been expected, but on the other hand the agricultural +population had showed itself to be practically unanimous in favour of +the Empire. One of the disquieting surprises was provided by the Army, +no less than 50,000 votes being recorded against the Emperor. Riots, as +usual, broke out in Paris after the voting was over, but were suppressed +without difficulty. In connection with these riots an ingenious but +discreditable device, was resorted to for the purpose of seducing the +soldiers in the Prince Eugène Barracks, these having been supplied by +the Republicans with _bons_ (orders for free admission) on the +neighbouring houses of ill-fame, on the presumption that the holders of +these orders would feel peculiarly aggrieved at being confined to +barracks. + +The general impression created was that a large majority was safer than +a moderate one would have been, and much safer than a very small one. +This was the view entertained by Lord Clarendon, who had always +considered the plébiscite to be a great mistake, but was now anxious to +make the best of it, and instructed the Ambassador to congratulate +Ollivier and to express the hope that he would be able to surround +himself with Liberal Ministers determined to keep order. An Empire based +upon soldiers and peasants could not be said to be placed on a solid +foundation, and no effort should be spared to enlarge the basis. + +The Imperial success at the plébiscite produced a sycophantic outburst +amongst the diplomatists at Paris, and a movement was promoted by the +Nuncio and Prince Metternich, the Austrian Ambassador, with the object +of asking for an audience, and offering the collective congratulations +of the Diplomatic Corps to the Emperor. The ineptitude of the proposal +was evident. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, May 12, 1870. + + I wish the flunkeyism of the Nuncio and Metternich was displayed in + some other way than congratulating the Emperor on the success of his + foolish Plébiscite. It is an improper interference in the internal + affairs of France, which, if allowed, would justify a remonstrance + of the Diplomatic Corps against some measure they disapproved; but, + of course, we can neither oppose nor abstain, and it will be well + for you to join cordially. But I hope there will be no expression of + opinion in favour of the Plébiscite, or recognition of it as a + component part of Constitutional Government. We should be justly + condemned if we joined however indirectly in any such opinion. I + asked La Valette this morning whether such congratulations would be + agreeable to the Emperor, and he answered, with a shrug of the + shoulders: 'Il a le gout des compliments.' + +Upon further consideration Lord Clarendon decided that it would be +unwise if the British representative took any part in the proposed joint +congratulation, as it was foreseen that it might provoke awkward +discussions in the House of Commons. Lord Lyons was therefore directed +to inform Ollivier at once, that, much as the British Government +sympathized with the Emperor and his dynasty, no worse service could be +done to him than by offering compliments upon his success. He would at +once be attacked for having invited or rather tolerated intervention in +the internal affairs of France, and the Queen of England, in an +analogous case, could not possibly accept such an address from +foreigners as that would imply a sort of right to interfere which might +prove extremely inconvenient. The Emperor would gain much more with the +nation by courteously declining to receive foreign opinions upon his own +acts and the domestic affairs of France, than by any assurance that +Foreign Governments were united in approving a measure about which there +existed a considerable difference of opinion in France. These views were +to be communicated to Ollivier in a friendly manner with the assurance +that they should be brought to the Emperor's notice. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + Paris, May 19, 1870. + + I think we are well out of the scrape of the collective + congratulations. The notion was Metternich's and the Nuncio only + came into it to a certain degree, lest his refusing to do so should + give offence. So far as I know, the Nuncio has behaved very well, + and has not brought _us_ forward, but has simply told Metternich + that he found the Diplomatic Corps generally cold on the subject, + and therefore thought it better not to go on with it. Metternich + appears to have acquiesced. I have not seen him; he was out when I + called, which was, I think, lucky; and we have not met. + + There is a Ball at the Tuileries on Monday, at which I shall + probably have a chance of saying something pleasant to Cæsar. I + shall be careful to keep within the terms sanctioned by Mr. + Gladstone. We may at any rate rejoice at the establishment of + Parliamentary Government in France, and hope, till we have evidence + to the contrary, that the means provided for upsetting it will not + be resorted to. The present Plébiscite was undoubtedly technically + necessary to the legality of the new Constitution, and as such was + insisted upon by Daru and other Liberals. Let us hope it will be the + last. + + I have received the usual invitation in the name of the Emperor to + the function on Saturday evening. I must not leave the Embassy in + darkness if everybody else illuminates, but I think the idea a + foolish one, as being likely to give rise to street riots. + + Two of the new Ministers are unknown to fame, but their appointment + is a relief to those who apprehended appointments from the Right. + There is no remarkable speaker in the Ministry except Ollivier + himself. + + Gramont called upon me yesterday and was profuse in expressions of + friendship to England, to you, and to me. + +The appointment, however, of the Duc de Gramont[17] could hardly have +been in the nature of a relief, for, as far back as the beginning of +1868, when Ambassador at Vienna, he had announced that he considered a +Franco-Prussian war unavoidable. + +The formal announcement of the result of the plébiscite was made to the +Emperor on May 21, in the Salle des États of the Louvre, and must have +been one of the last, if not the very last, of the brilliant ceremonies +which marked the reign of Napoleon III. It was attended by all the +dignitaries of the realm, the Senators, the deputies, the civic +functionaries, the Diplomatic Corps; an imposing array of troops filled +the Place du Carrousel; and Cæsar himself, elevated upon a dais, replied +to the congratulations offered to him by the Chambers in a speech full +of those resounding and occasionally meaningless phrases which +invariably meet with a responsive echo in an assembly of Frenchmen. It +was, in fact, the final coruscation of the Imperial fireworks, and, in +the prosaic words of Lord Lyons, 'the ceremony went off extremely well.' + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Clarendon._ + + May 24, 1870. + + I made a little speech to the Emperor about the Plébiscite at the + ball last night. I did not in fact go as far as Mr. Gladstone + allowed, but what I did say appeared to be to His Majesty's taste. + At all events he was extremely gracious and cordial. I don't know + that any one except the Prussian Ambassador has asked for a special + audience to deliver congratulations, but I have not made inquiries, + because I neither wished to put it into my colleagues' heads to do + so, nor to appear as if it seemed to me the natural thing to do. All + seems to be quite right with the Emperor and Empress, so far as H.M. + Government, and you in particular, and I am concerned. He has been a + good deal annoyed and disappointed by the tone of the English press. + After all, he has established a Constitutional form of Government, + more democratic than that which exists in England, and the worst way + to encourage him to persevere is to assume at once that he does not + mean to do so. Selfishly, we ought to remember that his influence in + the Government is the principal security we can have for _Free Trade + and cordiality between the two countries_. + + What the Emperor will really do depends on the course of events. I + believe nothing of the stories of his having deep-laid schemes. It + is a pity that he has not stronger men in the Cabinet--men strong + enough to resist him in case of need--and to direct the Chamber. A + dissolution is hardly to be thought of at present. The people at + large would not stand being disturbed to vote again soon, and + consequently the votes would be few, and principally Republican. + There is danger in the influence of the Emperor's old political + friends, who want to regain their old position, and in some of the + influential military men who want a war for promotion and glory. And + there is danger in the position in which the Plébiscite has placed + him--owing mainly to the Republicans, who, much more than he is, are + to blame for making it a question between him personally and them. + The function of the 21st went off very well; indeed, wonderfully + well, considering how great a part of the audience was composed of + Senators and Councillors of State who have lost in importance by the + Constitutional change. + +The excitement attending the plébiscite gave way before long to a +feeling of political lassitude, and to those surmises concerning the +probabilities of weathering the session which habitually preoccupy +Constitutional Governments. It is of more interest to turn for a moment +to a matter which is now fortunately viewed in a very different light. + +Having been asked his advice on some question concerning Canada, Lord +Lyons wrote to Lord Clarendon the following as his deliberate opinion, +and it must be borne in mind that he had had exceptional opportunities +of studying the Canadian situation:-- + + I never feel comfortable about Canada and our North American + possessions. I do not believe we have the means of defending them + against the United States in case of war, and I am by no means + confident that the colonists would be unanimous and enthusiastic in + helping us to do so. I am afraid too that the colonists are + beginning to see that in matters short of war, we feel that we must + let the United States do very much as they please: in short that we + doubt our having the strength to resist them, and, unless under a + very strong provocation, have not the spirit to try. I was struck + by an observation made some time ago by the Governor of Newfoundland + respecting the French claims and the coast fisheries, viz. that the + Colonists felt that if the United States were their masters, the + questions would soon be settled in their favour. In fact it seems to + be in the nature of things that the United States' prestige should + grow and ours should wane in North America, and I wish we were well + and creditably out of the scrape. + +In the course of the previous year he had already expressed the opinion +that the great problem for us in American politics was to find some fair +and honourable way of dissolving all connection between England and our +North American colonies. + +Lord Clarendon on his side was equally emphatic. 'I agree,' he wrote on +June 1, 'in every word you say about our possessions in North America, +and wish that they would propose to be independent, and to annex +themselves. We can't throw them off, and it is very desirable that we +should part as friends.' + +The views of Lord Stanley on this subject have already been quoted, +and, if search were made, no doubt it would be discovered that similar +sentiments were entertained by nearly all the mid-Victorian statesmen. +I have a clear recollection of hearing, less than thirty years ago, a +Cabinet Minister, who had been Colonial Secretary, express the opinion +that 'colonies were expensive luxuries which only a rich country like +England could afford to indulge in.' + +One of the last letters written by Lord Clarendon refers to suspicions +created by the visit to Ems of the Emperor of Russia, the King of +Prussia, and Bismarck. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Clarendon to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, June 8, 1870. + + I have nothing of importance to write about. + + Loftus says that the Berlin public is much _intrigué_ by the sudden + departure of the King and Bismarck for Ems, as the Czar was at + Berlin ten days before, when Bismarck pretended to be too ill to + come and meet him. + + Bernstorff professes entire ignorance on the subject, and supposes + that, as Ems is now Prussian, the King thinks it necessary to give a + personal welcome to his Imperial relative. + + This is possible, but not probable, and I suspect, though I can give + no good reason for so doing, that the more complete unification of + Germany occupies the Prussian mind, beginning of course by the + incorporation of Baden, and that it is thought desirable to get a + Russian sanction of the project, in the event of its leading to war + with France. One fails, however, to discover any reason why Russia + should make an enemy of France and endanger the peace of Europe in + order to justify the ambition of Prussia and enable the King to + unduly tax his subjects for an unnecessary army. + +Lord Clarendon's suspicions in this case were as correct as his prophecy +with regard to the establishment of a Republic in France, although the +words 'unnecessary army' might be taken exception to in the light of +subsequent events. Benedetti[18] happened to be in Paris at the time when +Lord Clarendon's letter arrived, and he informed Lord Lyons that he +had 'entire confidence in the assurances of the King of Prussia and +Bismarck, and that he did not apprehend any danger to peace, unless +circumstances were too strong for His Majesty and his Minister, and this +he thought improbable.' The idea of circumstances being too strong for +Bismarck might fairly be classed with the danger to Prussia +threatened by the appointment of Monsignor Klazko. + +Lord Clarendon died on June 27, and was succeeded at the Foreign Office +on July 6 by Lord Granville. The celebrated announcement that there +had never been so great a lull in foreign affairs was made upon the +authority of Mr. Hammond,[19] whose singularly faulty judgment and +unhappy prophecies have been already commented upon. At the same time, +it must in justice be admitted that appearances in the early summer of +1870 were unusually deceptive owing to the general calm which prevailed +in the diplomatic world. + +When the Hohenzollern candidature thunderbolt fell in the early days +of July, the Duc de Gramont lost no time in intimating to the British +Ambassador that France would go to war with both Spain and Prussia +rather than allow a Hohenzollern to reign at Madrid. But although +Gramont seemed bent upon committing the French Government to this +course, he allowed it to be seen that he would be very grateful for any +exertion England might make to induce the King of Prussia to forbid his +kinsman to go on with his candidature. The election of Montpensier, he +said, might be looked upon as a _mauvais procédé_ towards the Emperor +and the dynasty, but the putting forward a Prussian was an insult and an +injury to all France. Similar language was held by the French Ambassador +in London. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, July 6, 1870. + + Your telegram of yesterday arrived while we were debating the Land + Bill. It took Mr. Gladstone and me by surprise. I received your + despatch and private letter this morning, and on my return from + Windsor, M. de La Valette called on me. He held the same language to + me as that reported by you to have been held by Gramont. France + disclaimed all interference with Spain, but stated the arguments + which made the possession of the Crown of Spain by a Prussian Prince + dangerous to France. I am writing to catch the post, and I cannot + repeat to you all the reasons which he gave, concluding by assuring + me that the circumstances were of the gravest character, and that in + his opinion, the Government of the Emperor could not, under the + pressure of public opinion, admit a project of such a nature. He + added however that there was no reason why any preliminary means + should not be tried to avert so great an evil, and he addressed + himself to the Government of the Queen, on the strength of our + friendly relations, and our desire to maintain the peace of Europe, + to exercise all our influence upon Prussia and upon Spain to stop + the project. + + I told M. de La Valette of the surprise which the matter had been to + H.M. Government, that I perfectly understood the unfavourable effect + which such an announcement was contemplated to produce in France, + although I did not agree with all the arguments which he had used + with respect to the importance to so great a nation as France of a + German prince on the throne of Spain. + + I said it was a matter of some regret to me that such strong + language as that reported by you to have been addressed to the + Prussian Ambassador should have been used. But I added that it was + not so much a moment for the general discussion, as to see what + could be done. + + I readily assented to his request to use what influence we might + possess both with Prussia and Spain, but without any pretension + to dictate to either Power, to induce them to take into the most + serious consideration all the bearings of this question, such as its + gravity required, and I promised to communicate with you, Lord A. + Loftus, and Mr. Layard at once. + + It is very sad that I should be writing to you in the place of one + who would have had so much personal power in such a matter as this. + +In the meanwhile, however, the explosion of Chauvinism in France and the +attitude of the French Ministers rendered the situation more alarming +from day to day. Undoubtedly the French Government desired and hoped to +carry their point without actual war, but Ministers had burnt their +ships and left themselves no means of escape if they failed in their +attempt to win a moral victory over Prussia. As Gramont remarked, +'_l'Avènement du Prince de Hohenzollern, c'est la guerre_!' It was +almost impossible to see what injury to French interests could be caused +by the presence of a Hohenzollern at Madrid, but the question had been +taken up as a point of honour, and was therefore more dangerous than if +treated from a material point of view. The Emperor, according to Lord +Lyons, remained at this stage of the crisis, very calm and extremely +confident that he would get his way without war. There was no doubt that +he was strongly averse from war, partly on account of his own views, and +partly on the ground of his ill-health, which would be a serious +drawback if he were forced to take the command of the army; but he also +felt that it would not be safe for him to submit to another rebuff from +Prussia, and his Constitutional Ministers were inconveniently anxious to +show their spirit. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, July 10, 1870. + + The state of things to-day may be told in half a dozen words. If the + Prince of Hohenzollern's renunciation is announced in 24 or 48 + hours, there will be peace _for the moment_. If not, there will be + an immediate declaration of war against Prussia. I cannot however + answer for even this situation lasting for the 48 hours. The French + are getting more and more excited. They think they have got the + start of Prussia this time in forwardness of preparation; that they + have a better cause of war, as being one less likely to rouse the + Germans, than they are likely to get again; and in fact that they + must have it out with Prussia sooner or later; and that they had + better not throw away this chance. When I say that I cannot answer + for things remaining in as favourable a situation as they are now, + for 48 hours, I mean that if the excitement goes on, the French may + choose to pick a quarrel on the form of the renunciation, or some + other pretext, even if the Prince retires. + + End how it will, the whole affair is a terrible misfortune, for the + French and the Prussians will hate each other more than ever, and I + hardly expect to see their animosity come back to the quiescent + state in which it was a month ago. + + Gramont says that, so far from the energetic language and + preparations of France thwarting your endeavours to preserve peace, + they afford the only chance of your succeeding. + + I told him I did not at all agree with him. + +This letter reveals two colossal errors on the part of the French. They +honestly thought that they were better prepared for war than the +Prussians, and they believed that the latter could be successfully +intimidated. + +As late as July 12 Lord Granville still believed that Prussia did not +really want war, and hoped that the pressure applied to the Hohenzollern +Prince by Queen Victoria and other important personages would avert the +calamity. Writing on the same day, Lord Lyons said that he did not +despair of peace, but that the war feeling was very strong, both in and +out of the Ministry. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, July 13, 1870. + + Nothing can be better than your work at Paris, and I only wish it + may prove successful. My colleagues and the House of Commons are + getting very angry, and Gladstone wishes me to use stronger language + to the French Government than would, in my opinion, be useful for + the object, although it is true that no nation is powerful enough in + these times to stand up against the public opinion of Europe. + + Your telegram of this evening leaves some hope, but I very much + doubt whether, even if we are asked by France, we can exert any more + pressure on Prussia, who in substance has done all that we were told + to ask and all that Gramont said was necessary to put an end to the + dispute. + + La Valette is very angry. He gets a communication from his Foreign + Office once in three days, and then there is hardly anything in it. + His argument to-day is probably not the one his Government uses. 'I + do not, like everybody else, suspect the French of having had a + project of going to war. But having got into the wrangle, having + found their warlike preparations so popular, and having roused + effectually the feelings of France and Prussia, they do not like to + abstain from a fight, which they think will come, and in which + during the next six weeks their enemies would be unprepared. + + I have some thoughts of asking the Cabinet, if war is declared, + whether it would be wise to ask both Governments whether they are + prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium. It is always safer, + or at least, generally so, to do nothing; but both, in doubt, would + be more likely to give a favourable answer, than either flushed with + victory. Let me know what you think, and please make any other + suggestions which may occur to you if the emergency arises. + + As far as I can judge, all the Neutral Powers are sincerely anxious + for peace. Italy, certainly so. The only thing which we have done, + of which I doubt, is having asked Italy a leading question about an + Italian Prince. They seem to wish to entangle us further in the + matter. It was of great importance before Spain and France were + reconciled, but now I presume it will be discreet to let this matter + remain in the hands of the parties concerned. + +The phrase 'in which during the next six weeks their enemies would be +unprepared,' seems to imply that H.M. Government were singularly +ill-informed as to the true state of Prussian military efficiency. + +Upon July 14, Lord Lyons reported that an article in the _North German +Gazette_ seemed to make war absolutely inevitable, and that Benedetti, +who was expected in Paris the following day, confirmed the accuracy of +the newspaper. Werther, too, the Prussian Ambassador, had announced to +Gramont that 'he had been granted leave of absence and was about to take +advantage of it immediately.' Even the guileless Hammond was alarmed. +'Why Bismarck went to Berlin instead of Ems, and finally retired to +Varzin without personal communications with his master, is not easy to +explain, and with a person of his character the proceeding is somewhat +suspicious.' The last hope of peace practically vanished when Bismarck +intimated that he could not recommend to the King for acceptance the +proposal made by H.M. Government. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, July 16, 1870. + + It will be a miracle if we are as good friends with France six + months after the beginning of this wretched war, as we are now, and + it will require the utmost tact, prudence and consideration for + French susceptibilities to prevent all the improvement in feeling + between the two nations, which has grown up in the last twenty + years, being entirely destroyed. + + We have already a question with Gramont about his assertion that we + recognized the justice of his complaint. I hope it may be possible + to let this drop, but if not it is to be noted that, my memorandum + correcting the assertion on your authority was in his hands the + night before he repeated the assertion in his declaration of + yesterday. + + In referring to his declaration that if the Hohenzollern + renunciation were obtained, France would be satisfied, it may be + well to bear in mind that the exact words he used to me were: '_If + the Prince of Hohenzollern should now, on the advice of the King of + Prussia_, withdraw his acceptance of the Crown the whole affair + would be at an end.' + + This point becomes of less importance as France now seems to set the + Hohenzollern affair aside altogether, and to rest her _casus belli_ + wholly on the boast of the affront to Benedetti. + + Above all things we must try and keep as much as possible out of + Blue Books. If it is absolutely necessary to have one now, pray let + me have the opportunity of looking over anything of mine which it is + proposed to publish, and suggesting omissions. It would also be a + great relief to me to be allowed to consult Gramont himself, as I + did La Valette on the Cretan Blue Book. The cases are not the same, + and I might not use the power, but I should like to have it. I am + the more alarmed with regard to Gramont, as his reputation for + inaccuracy is so universal, that there must be some foundation for it. + + Newspaper correspondents, amateur travellers, and so forth, are + already tormenting me to get them leave to accompany the French + Army. I believe none are to be allowed; but if it be otherwise, I + think the danger of being held responsible for their indiscretions + would be so great and so damaging to our relations with France, that + I do not think I should be justified in applying for leave on any + private recommendation, however strong: in fact, I should not be + willing to apply on anything short of a distinct official order, in + each case from you; and such an order I should be sorry to receive. + + I tremble at the thought of the Blockades. Those during the American + Civil War kept us in perpetual hot water and within an inch of war + with the United States, and the labours of working out the cases + without coming to a rupture was very nearly the death of me. Heaven + defend us from anything like an _Alabama_ case with the French! + + It is important that I should know as soon as possible whether our + Embassy at Berlin might take charge of French subjects in Prussia. + I am pretty sure to be sounded very soon, and might perhaps be able + to soften the very bad impression a refusal would make, by + preventing the request being made. I should wish us to accept, and I + don't see why, as impartial neutrals, we might not take charge also + of the Prussians in Paris, if we were asked, though I would rather + avoid this if possible. + +Just at this moment the _Liberté_ caused some embarrassment by +publishing more or less correct details respecting the secret +negotiations which had taken place earlier in the year between Lord +Clarendon and Bismarck on the question of disarmament. Lord Granville +had not been in the confidence of Lord Clarendon, and it now was +necessary to explain to him what had passed. How the _Liberté_ obtained +its information does not appear. Daru always stoutly maintained that he +had not mentioned the matter to any one except the Emperor and Ollivier, +and the disclosures involved not only a gross breach of confidence on +the part of some one--presumably a French Foreign Office official--but +also a danger that Bismarck might demand explanations. The tremendous +events, however, of the next few weeks, diverted attention from the +_Liberté's_ revelations. War was formally declared on July 19. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, July 19, 1870. + + The war has been forced upon the Emperor principally by his + own party in the Chamber, the Right, and by his Ministers. + Constitutional Government has so far established itself that a + Ministry in a minority in the Corps Législatif is as much bound to + go out as a Ministry in the House of Commons. The Emperor was in a + bad position to resist, because after the line taken at the time of + Sadowa, it would have been too dangerous for him to be put forward + as the cause of France's truckling to Prussia. The whole affair is a + series of blunders which has culminated in an awful catastrophe. + + Gramont told me this afternoon that La Valette wrote him a very + _bizarre_ story. La Valette said that it had been considered by the + British Cabinet whether they should not send an English force to + occupy Belgium during the war, which would be a strange way of + showing respect for Belgian neutrality. + + I should myself be very sorry to see a British soldier landed on the + Continent, and seriously alarmed if any force that was landed was + under a hundred thousand strong. + + Gramont told me also that Bray[20] had hit upon a combination to + which France would have no objection if it were possible. Bray + declared that Bavaria would be neutral if the neutrality of Baden + were secured. Gramont said however that of course to carry out such + an arrangement, the Prussian troops must retire from Rastadt. + + He said he had just been informed that Italy had called out two + classes of her military contingent. He did not know what this might + mean. Italy has not yet made to France any declaration of policy. + + Gramont concluded by saying that he supposed all the Minor States + would wait for a battle and then declare for the victor. + +The neutrality of Belgium was, of course, one of the main preoccupations +of H.M. Government, but there is no reason to suppose that a British +occupation was ever seriously contemplated, and La Valette's report on +the subject was probably caused by the vanity of appearing to possess +special pieces of information which often leads diplomatists astray. +Belgium was not, however, the only country which had reason to feel +alarmed. The position of Denmark before hostilities actually began +between France and Prussia was both painful and critical. The Danish +Minister at Paris appeared at the British Embassy in great distress, +saying that he knew nothing of what his Government intended, and asking +for information; as it seemed quite likely that the Danish capital would +be occupied by whichever of the two opposing armies could get there +first. It was common knowledge that a great expedition was fitting out +for Copenhagen at Cherbourg, and that General Trochu, who passed for +about the best French general, was to command it. And if French forces +appeared off Copenhagen it would be impossible to restrain the people +from marching against the Prussians, although there was, as yet +apparently, no understanding between the French and Danish Governments. + +On July 25 the _Times_ surprised the world by publishing the text of a +draft treaty concerning the annexation of Belgium which it was alleged +had been submitted by the French Government to Bismarck in 1866. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, July 26, 1870. + + I have had some conversation with Gramont about the nefarious Projet + de Traité which the _Times_ has given to the world, but as he has + written to La Valette about it, I had better leave you to receive + from him the French version. The only curious, and to me quite new + statement which he made, was that Bismarck had at one time offered, + if France was afraid of the odium of occupying Belgium, to occupy it + first himself, and then to retire in apparent deference to + remonstrances from France, and so give France a pretext for + entering. + + It has long been a common belief among diplomatists that France and + Prussia have at different times discussed the propriety of seizing, + the one upon Belgium, the other upon Holland. No such scandalous + iniquity has been contemplated since the partition of Poland, and it + is much worse than the partition of Poland, for there might be some + colourable assertions that Poland was turbulent, ill-governed, that + most of the population were serfs, and that she was an inconvenient + neighbour. But Belgium and Holland are free, extremely well + governed, and, to say the least, perfectly inoffensive neighbours. + One must leave it to the parties concerned to defend themselves from + the reproach of such odious projects, and I hope they will. + + The insinuation in the leading article in the _Times_ that the + subject has been revived by France since the Hohenzollern crisis + seems to me to be extremely improbable. + + Bernstorff's attempts to make you vouch for the authenticity of the + _Projet_, without committing himself, is as poor a little trick as I + ever heard of. + + I send you in a despatch the official account of the cause of the + tardiness in producing Benedetti's despatch, that is to say, + delicacy on the part of Gramont. The version accepted by the public + is that the whole affair had been forgotten at the Ministère until + at last Benedetti himself remembered it and had it looked up. + +With the object of prejudicing European opinion against Prussia, the +Emperor wrote the well-known letter to Gramont from Metz, on July 28, +accusing Bismarck of having proposed to France the annexation of +Belgium, but the sole result was that both parties were shown to have +played an equally sordid part in the transaction, and they were +consequently both induced to agree to the English proposal that they +should give a new and formal pledge not to violate Belgian integrity. + +In a letter dated July 31, is a dispassionate analysis of the inadequate +causes which had brought about a rupture at that particular moment. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, July 31, 1870. + + I see the public, with their usual tendency to attribute everything + to deep-laid plots and schemes, generally suppose that war was a + foregone conclusion on the part of France and of Prussia. I don't + believe it in the case of Prussia, and I know it not to be the fact + as regards France. Prussia threw the first stone, by bringing on the + Hohenzollern question. France made a peaceful settlement difficult + by Gramont's irritating declaration on the 6th. The cause of the + change from a mild to an irritating declaration was the arrival of + the report from the Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, that Thile[21] + pooh-poohed the French remonstrance, and said that the question + _n'existait pas pour le Gouvernement Prussien_. Then came the + great fault of France in not accepting the renunciation of the + Hohenzollern as a final settlement; but, even at the last moment the + declaration of the 16th would have concluded with a phrase leaving + the door open to the mediation of a Congress, if the article in the + _North German Gazette_ had not arrived, and convinced the French + that Bismarck had decided upon war. However, it is no use crying + over spilt milk. + + I understand that the Emperor writes to the Empress that no great + action is to be expected for three or four days. At the French Head + Quarters there was an apprehension that the Prussians might attempt + to turn the right flank of the French Army. + +Subsequent revelations have shown how profoundly the course of events +was influenced by the action of Bismarck in connection with the tone of +the German press, and by his distortion of the celebrated Ems interview +between the King of Prussia and Benedetti, but this was of course +unknown at the time. + +One humorous incident in connection with the outbreak of hostilities is +worth recording. Animated by what Lord Clarendon would have called the +spirit of flunkeyism, the Paris diplomatists grew greatly excited over +the question of illuminations in the event of French victories. As was +only to be expected, the accommodating Austrian Ambassador was foremost +in advocating rejoicings, and he and his Italian colleague were bent +upon illuminating their Embassies, while the representatives of the +smaller Powers, such as Switzerland, who lived in less conspicuous +abodes, opposed the proposal, and were supported by the British +Ambassador. The question was referred home, and the Foreign Office took +the common-sense view that the Ambassador should not illuminate without +necessity, but should do so rather than cause trouble or give offence. + +The early reverses of the campaign were concealed from the public with +some success, MacMahon's defeat being known at the Embassy twelve hours +before the official announcement; but as soon as the truth came out, the +population of the capital seems to have believed that the Germans would +at once appear before Paris. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Aug. 8, 1870. + + If the panic in the army is as great as it is in the capital, it is + all over with France. One would think that the Prussians were + already in Montmartre. There must, it is supposed, be a great battle + fought before they can get there, and the French may win it. + + I have been beset with Representatives of small Powers, all except + the Belgian, in consternation, and with Rothschilds and other + bankers in despair. They hope England will interfere to stop the + Prussian army on its road to Paris: not an easy task if the road is + open. + + All Gramont could or would tell me was that the Emperor was + concentrating forces between Metz and Chalons, and that a great + battle was expected. + + I was really ashamed to speak to him about our Treaty, but I thrust + your despatch on him, knowing you were anxious to avoid delay. He + said: _n'ayez pas peur, nous n'avons pas grande envie d'entrer en + Belgique dans ce moment_. + +In the Chamber, no one, even on the Right, had the generosity to say a +single word in defence of the unfortunate Emperor when a declaration was +made from the Tribune that all the disasters were due to the +inefficiency of the Commander-in-Chief. Ollivier and his colleagues +resigned, and General Trochu, who had been given an unimportant command +in the South, was hailed as the possible saviour of the country, and +offered, in vain, the War Office in the new administration of Count +Palikao. It is instructive to note that Gramont (upon whom Bismarck +subsequently heaped the most savage contempt) denied to Lord Lyons that +he had ever been in favour of war. According to him, the strongest +phrase in the declaration of July 6 was inserted at the Council on that +morning, and was not in his draft, and he threw the blame of the +imprudent haste in going to war on Leboeuf's confident declaration that +neither France nor any other country had ever been so well prepared for +war before. Leboeuf's celebrated declaration about gaiter buttons has +always been cited as almost unequalled for fatuity, but it is an +undoubted fact that Gramont himself was convinced that a Franco-Prussian +war was inevitable, and he is not known to have discouraged the idea. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Aug. 16, 1870. + + So far as we can conjecture, the military situation is very bad, and + the political is certainly as bad as can be. There are ups and downs + in the spirits of the French about the war, but the Emperor and the + dynasty seem simply to sink lower and lower. La Tour d'Auvergne[22] + speaks still as a loyal subject, but I know of no one else who does. + The Empress shows pluck, but not hope. She has sent her nieces away, + and she summoned the Bonapartes in Paris to the Tuileries yesterday, + and told them plainly that the time was come for them to look after + themselves. + + No party wishes to come into office, with the risk of having to sign + a disadvantageous peace. It is this which has hitherto kept the Left + within bounds. They wish the peace to be made by the Emperor before + they upset him. No one can tell what the effect of a victory might + be; few people expect one, and fewer still believe that the effect + would be to set the Emperor on his legs again. The Paris population + so far seems to have behaved well. + +The one thing, in fact, upon which there seemed to be general agreement +was that the Empire was doomed. + +By the middle of August the feeling in Paris against England, produced +largely by articles in the London press, had reached a very disagreeable +point, and the Ambassador was obliged to ask that he might be spared +from having to make too many obnoxious communications to the French +Government; these communications consisting of complaints put forward by +the Prussian Government through the channel of the British Embassy at +Paris, which it was really the duty of the United States Legation to +deal with. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Mr. Hammond._ + + Paris, Aug. 23, 1870. + + The last paragraph of your letter of this morning frightens me not a + little. You say the Prussians complain of a flag of truce being + fired upon and of field hospitals being shot at; and you add: 'You + will probably hear from us about these matters, if Bernstorff makes + a formal representation.' I hope this does not imply that you mean + to adopt all Prussian complaints as British, and make me the channel + of communicating them to the French Government. Please do not forget + that the United States Legation, not this Embassy, represents + Prussian interests in France, and that if you impose upon me such + works of supererogation as making unpleasant communications from + Prussia, you will expose me to well-merited snubs, and damage my + position so much that I shall be able to effect very little in a + real emergency. The particular things which you mention ought not to + be made the subject of diplomatic representation at all: they ought + to be discussed by Flag of Truce between the two Generals. + +Why H.M. Government should have taken the inexplicable course of +gratuitously offending the French Government is not explained, but at +all events the practice was abandoned. + +When, towards the end of August, it was announced that the Crown Prince +was advancing upon Paris, the Empress, the members of the Government, +and the Chambers, proclaimed their determination to stay in the town. +The Empress probably feared that if she once left, she might never +return; but the decision to attempt to govern a country from a besieged +town was so obviously unpractical that it can hardly have been taken +seriously, for it was plain that each party in turn would discover that +it was essential to be in communication with the outside world. The +Empress herself seems to have preserved her fortitude during this +unhappy period. 'I saw the Empress yesterday,' wrote Lord Lyons, on +September 1, 'for the first time since the war. She was calm and +natural, well aware, I think, of the real state of things, but +courageous without boasting or affectation. She let me know by La Tour +d'Auvergne that she would like to see me. She did not invite, nor did I +offer any advice or any assurances or conjectures as to what England or +any other Power was likely to do.' + +Within three or four days of this interview the Empress herself was a +fugitive, the Empire had collapsed without a hand being raised to defend +it, and the mob, breaking into the Chamber, had called the Third +Republic into existence. The delight of changing one form of government +was so great that the French almost forgot for the moment that the enemy +was practically at the gates of Paris, but M. Jules Favre, the Minister +for Foreign Affairs in the new Provisional Government, lost no time in +communicating with Lord Lyons and sounding him with regard to mediation. + +According to Jules Favre, the new Government had two courses of action +in view. The first was to proclaim loudly that France would fight to the +death rather than make any undue concessions to Prussia. This was the +course intended for public consumption. The second and practical course +was to accept cordially the intervention of Foreign Powers with the +object of restricting French sacrifices within endurable limits. In +other words, he thought that France ought to submit to paying the +expenses of the war, provided her territorial integrity remained intact. +As for agreeing to a cession of territory, no man in France would +venture even to speak of such a thing, and the Government and the people +were equally determined to perish rather than give way upon it. The +public, and in particular, the inhabitants of Paris were greatly averse +from any pecuniary sacrifice, but he (obviously considering himself +to be an exceptionally far-seeing statesman) felt so strongly that a +pecuniary sacrifice was necessary, that unless the principle was acceded +to, he should feel bound to leave the Government. If, therefore, foreign +Governments would offer mediation upon the basis of keeping French +territory intact, their intervention would be extremely useful and ought +to be admitted gratefully by France. If, however, Foreign Powers could +only mediate on the basis of a cession of territory, their interference +would be ineffectual and offensive, rather than agreeable to France. + +It is rather surprising, in view of this artless opinion, to learn that +Jules Favre seemed to be pretty well acquainted with the feeling in +Germany; and, at all events, he realized that the one neutral Power who +was likely to influence Prussia was Russia. It is also rather surprising +to learn that he considered the immediate proclamation of a Republic to +be a mistake, due to the impetuosity of the Paris population, and +calculated to alienate the French provinces as well as foreign +Governments, and he was forced to admit that the new Government was +completely under the control of the mob. + +On September 6, a surreptitious interview took place between Lord Lyons +and M. Thiers, who was not a member of the Government of National +Defence. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Sept, 6, 1870. + + I have had conversations to-day, both with Thiers and with Jules + Favre. They think they can bring public opinion to accept a peace + with a large pecuniary indemnity to Prussia, but they are afraid of + being thought by the populace to be begging the aid of England at + this moment: so much so, that Thiers was afraid either of coming + here or of my going to his house, and asked me to meet him at + Alphonse de Rothschild's. + + I put to him the extreme difficulty of inducing Prussia to accept + mediation without securing some cession of territory, and asked him + whether he would still be in favour of its being offered, even if + Prussia were almost certain to reject it. He considered the Pros and + Cons. On the one hand, he saw danger to France and to Europe, if the + neutral Powers should look quietly on, while France was being + destroyed, without any sort of mark of feeling, or of protest + against her dismemberment. On the other hand, he did not conceal + from himself that it might lower the authority of the other Powers, + and in some sort put a seal upon the predominance of Prussia, if + they spoke in vain and took no steps to give effect to their + language. After some consideration, however, he said he inclined + to the opinion that the offer should at all events be made. + + I told Jules Favre that Thiers had hesitated about this. He answered + at once: 'I do not hesitate for a moment. I decidedly wish the + mediation, on the basis of the integrity of our territory, to be + made, whether Prussia accepts it or not.' + + Jules Favre was very decided about the armistice. He thought France + could not herself ask for one, in her present position, but it was + plain enough (which is certainly not at all surprising) that he + would be very grateful to any neutral Power who would try to bring + one about. + + Time presses, for the Prussians may be said to be almost literally + at the gates. + + Thiers pointed out with all his clearness and eloquence the danger + to the different nations of Europe, of the predominance of Prussia, + and dwelt also a good deal upon the risk of a Red Republic, with a + foreign propaganda, etc., etc., if the present Government were + overthrown in consequence of further military reverses, or of a + disgraceful peace. He pointed out that, with the exception of + Rochefort, all the Provisional Government were Moderate Republicans + and honest men. Rochefort was, he said, very manageable and less + dangerous in the Government than out of it. He was in hopes order + would be maintained, but he did not shut his eyes to the fact that + the Government was without the means of resisting the mob of Paris, + if the mob should become excited or enraged by defeats. + + There seems to me to be a great deal of depression in Paris. People + seem to feel that an obstinate defence of the town might only lead + to its destruction and leave France more at the mercy of Prussia + than ever. They have also a great dread, that while the respectable + citizens are on the ramparts, the Reds may pillage the town. + + How all this may turn out, I do not pretend to guess. The first + days of a Revolution are generally those on which the mob behaves + the best. Hitherto everybody has behaved extremely well, and only a + few people have suffered from the unfortunate epidemic which + prevails and makes every one who cannot speak French well be taken + for a Prussian spy. + + Jules Favre has not yet announced his appointment as Minister for + Foreign Affairs, nor, I think, seen any of the Foreign Diplomatists + except me. The circular which he has prepared for Foreign Powers + is very fierce in its language, but it mentions peace, and even + pronounces the word '_traiter_' and he seems to consider it rather a + bold step towards accustoming the people of Paris to the idea of + treating while the Prussians are still on French soil. + +Lord Granville, as his letters show, was at first by no means anxious to +mediate, but altered his mind, because he was under the impression that +the change of government in Paris had made the Prussians more anxious to +treat. The French were not to be informed of this altered attitude on +the part of their adversary but were to be encouraged to put forward +'elastic' proposals, Bismarck having graciously intimated that he had +no objection to England becoming the channel of communication. The +objections to mediation were sufficiently obvious. If the basis of a +cession of territory were to be adopted, then it would be clearly +undesirable for any neutral country to attempt to exercise any pressure +upon France, and there would not be anything to be gained by such +action, for France could always obtain peace on these terms from Prussia +without foreign aid. If, on the other hand, mediation was adopted on the +basis of the integrity of French territory, there appeared to be little +or no chance of success. + +In spite of the unpromising prospects various attempts were made to +sound the views of the Prussian Government with regard to an eventual +peace on the basis of integrity of territory. The Russians were +requested by the French to make known the terms on which the latter were +prepared to treat. Communications at Berlin were made by the Italian +Government, and the meddling Beust caused it to be announced to the +Prussian Government that France would accept an armistice on the +condition of territorial integrity. As he was a _persona ingratissima_ +to Bismarck, his efforts were not likely to meet with much success, and +it was intimated to him and to the others that Bismarck reserved to +himself all discussions concerning the conditions of peace, and that the +Prussian officials at Berlin had no authority to enter upon such +matters. + +Before anything definite was decided upon as to how the Prussian +Government was to be approached, Thiers started upon his historic +mission to the Courts of the various Great Powers with the object of +enlisting their practical sympathy on behalf of France. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, Sept. 12, 1870. + + The provisional Government, though the most moderate and regular I + ever heard of, is sometimes a little sudden in its movements; and + accordingly Thiers's mission was announced in the _Journal Official_ + before Jules Favre mentioned it to me, though I must do him the + justice to say that he came at an early hour for the purpose. It is + patriotic of Thiers to undertake it at his age, and with a prospect + at best of assisting to make a bitter peace just supportable. I am + glad you should hear from him the real state of things as to the + internal condition and prospects of society and Government in + France. He will also, I suppose, bring you the last word of the + Provisional Government on peace. My impression is that they will + give up almost anything to save territory; but they are, or at all + events believe themselves, capable of a great _coup de désespoir_ + rather than yield that. The Reds within are more likely to give + permanent trouble than the Prussians without. + + Some of my colleagues are I am afraid rather cross at my not setting + them the example of going off to Tours. The notion under present + circumstances seems to me most injudicious. Either the French will + make terms as soon as the enemy approach Paris, or being unable to + do so, they will stand a siege and announce a desperate resistance. + Upon this last contingency coming to pass we had better get out of + Paris as fast as we can; but if there is negotiation we may possibly + be of use here, while we could certainly be of none at Tours, to + say nothing of the absurdity of our going off under present + circumstances to Tours, without the Minister for Foreign Affairs. + +The various interviews which took place between Thiers and Lord +Granville have been described at length by Lord Fitzmaurice. In the +main, the causes of the war, as expounded by Thiers, were in accordance +with those described by Lord Lyons in the letters previously quoted, +although he seems to have unjustly laid much of the responsibility upon +the Empress, and to have unduly exalted his own prescience, having +always been obsessed with the idea that he was a military genius. As for +the form of government in France, although an Orleanist himself, he +considered that Bonapartists, Bourbons, and Orleanists were all out of +the question for the time being, and that a Republic was the only +possible solution under existing circumstances. To put it shortly, +he had started on his mission through Europe in order to obtain +intervention, and had began with England in order to persuade her if +possible to use her moral influence in securing peace. This application +was supported by much high-sounding rhetoric on the subject of the +ancient friendship between England and France, and of the necessity of +the former retaining her due ascendency in the Councils of Europe, etc., +etc., etc. Exhausted at the conclusion of his eloquent arguments, he +went to sleep, as recorded by Lord Granville, without waiting to listen +to the latter's reply, and the really practical part of the conversation +seems to have been the suggestion that the way should be paved by the +British Government for an interview between Jules Favre and Bismarck. + +On the next day Thiers proposed that H.M. Government should at once +recognize the Republic; but to this Lord Granville demurred, on the +ground that it would be contrary to precedent, and that the Republic +had at present no legal sanction, because no Constituent Assembly had +yet decided on the future government of the country. + +Upon the occasion of a third interview, Thiers's arguments seem to have +been still more forcible. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, Sept. 16, 1870. + + I called again on M. Thiers at his request to-day. He thanked me for + the letter which I had written to Bernstorff, although he thought it + might have been in warmer terms. + + He informed me of his plan to go to Petersburg, by France, Turin and + Vienna. He said that by that way he should be within reach of + telegraphic and other news, and could be recalled, if wanted. He + should go back if his concurrence was absolutely necessary to the + conclusion of peace. He admitted that it would be most painful to + sign any peace at this time; that M. Jules Favre, on the contrary, + did not dislike the notion of it. + + He spoke sanguinely of the defence of Paris: he counted the number + of armed men and the completeness of the ordnance. He gave some + credence to the report of General Bazaine's bold march. He then came + back to the subject of England's apathy: he dwelt upon the loss to + her dignity; the danger to her and to all Europe of the immense + preponderance of Germany. Austria must lose her German provinces. + What would not 60,000,000 Germans do, led by such a man as Bismarck? + I told him that I would not further discuss that matter with him, + and that his arguments went further than his demands. They were in + favour of an armed intervention. I had no doubt of what public + opinion here was on that point. He spoke of the sad task he had + undertaken, at his age, to go from Court to Court, almost as a + mendicant, for support to his country. I told him that it was most + honourable to him at his age, and after his long public life, to + undertake a task in which it was thought that he might be of use, + and that he ought not to be discontented with his mission here. He + could hardly have hoped, even with his ability, to change the + deliberate course of policy which H.M. Government had adopted, and + which they had announced to Parliament. But his second object, that + of explaining the necessity at this moment of the present Government + in France, and of the merits of M. Favre and General Trochu, and its + leading members, had had much effect upon me, and upon others with + whom he had conversed. We had also during his presence here arranged + the possibility of a meeting between M. Favre and Count Bismarck, + which if it took place (about which I was not sanguine) must, in any + case, be of some use. + + We parted in a most friendly manner. + +The offer to sound Bismarck on the question of receiving Jules Favre +was enthusiastically received by the latter, who had a strong personal +feeling on the subject. As, however, he had just concocted the +celebrated proclamation that France would never consent to yield 'a +stone of her fortresses or an inch of her territory,' he could hardly be +said to approach the question of peace in a practical spirit, nor did he +receive much assistance from his countrymen in general, for at that +period no Frenchman could be found who was willing to admit openly the +possibility of a cession of territory, whatever opinions may have been +entertained in secret. Shrewder judges than Jules Favre, who, although +able and honest, was too emotional for diplomatic work, suspected, with +reason, that Bismarck was determined not to negotiate through neutrals, +and not to negotiate at all except under the walls of Paris or in Paris +itself. + +The emissary appointed to approach Bismarck was Malet, who was selected +because he was discreet, knew German well, and was already acquainted +with Bismarck, but no sooner had he been despatched than the Austrian +Ambassador, Metternich, announced that he had received authority from +Vienna to go in company with his colleagues to the Prussian +Headquarters. Efforts were made to stop Malet, but fortunately without +success, and the private letter from the latter (extracts of which have +already been published) recounting his interview, is a singularly +graphic and interesting presentment of Bismarck's real disposition. + + * * * * * + + _Mr. Malet to Lord Lyons._ + + Paris, September 17, 1870. + + During my two interviews with Count Bismarck on the 15th he said + some things which it may not be uninteresting to Your Lordship to + know although from the confidential familiar manner in which they + were uttered, I did not feel justified in including them in an + official report. + + He stated it was the intention to hang all persons not in uniform + who were found with arms. A man in a blouse had been brought before + him who had represented that he was one of the Garde Mobile: Count + Bismarck decided that as there was nothing in his dress to support + his assertion he must be hung, and the sentence was forthwith + carried into effect. His Excellency added, 'I attach little value to + human life because I believe in another world--if we lived for three + or four hundred years it would be a different matter.' I said that + although some of the Mobile wore blouses, each regiment was dressed + in a uniform manner and that they all bore red collars and stripes + on their wristbands. His Excellency replied that that was not + enough, at a distance they looked like peasants and until they had + a dress like other soldiers those who were taken would be hung. + + He said. 'When you were a little boy you wanted your mother to ask a + lady, who was not of the best position in society, to one of her + parties, your mother refused on which you threw yourself on the + ground and said you would not rise till you had got what you wanted. + In like manner we have thrown ourselves on the soil of France and + will not rise till our terms are agreed to.' In speaking of the + surrender of the Emperor he observed, 'When I approached the + carriage in which the Emperor was His Majesty took off his cap to + salute me. It is not the custom for us when in uniform to do more + than touch the cap--however I took mine off and the Emperor's eyes + followed it till it came on a level with my belt in which was a + revolver when he turned quite pale--I cannot account for it. He + could not suppose I was going to use it but the fact of his changing + colour was quite unmistakable. I was surprised that he should have + sent for me, I should have thought I was the last person that he + would wish to receive him because he has betrayed me. All that has + passed between us made me feel confident that he would not go to war + with Germany. He was bound not to do so and his doing it was an act + of personal treachery to me. The Emperor frequently asked whether + his carriages were safe out of Sedan, and a change indicating a + sense of great relief came over him when he received news of their + arrival in our lines.' M. de Bismarck talked in the most + contemptuous terms of M. de Gramont, allowing him only one merit + that of being a good shot. He touched on the publication of the + secret treaty, but his arguments in defence of it were rather too + subtle for me to seize them clearly. He said the secret should have + died with him had France had a tolerable pretext for going to war, + but that he considered her outrageous conduct in this matter + released him from all obligation. + + 'If,' he remarked, 'a man asks the hand of my daughter in marriage + and I refuse it I should consider it a matter of honour to keep the + proposal a secret as long as he behaved well to me, but if he + attacked me I should be no longer bound. This is quite a different + question from that of publishing a secret proposition at the same + time that you refuse it; you must be a Beust or an Austrian to do + that.' + + In talking of the scheme to replace the Emperor on the throne by the + aid of Bazaine and the French Prisoners in Germany, I asked whether + His Majesty was now in a state of health to be willing to undertake + such a work. He answered that he never in his life had seen the + Emperor in the enjoyment of better health and he attributed it to + the bodily exercise and the diet which late events had forced upon + him. + + Count Bismarck spoke of Italy and appeared to think that it was in + immediate danger of Republican revolution. He said 'If,' as appeared + likely at the beginning, 'Italy had sided with France such a + movement would have broken out at once; we had everything prepared, + and could have forced on a revolution within three days after a + declaration of war.' + + On leaving him he asked me if I had a horse, saying, 'I would offer + you mine but the French are in the habit of firing on our + Parlementaires and as I have only one I cannot afford to lose it.' + +From the French point of view there was very little encouragement to +be derived from these frank and even brutal opinions, but one result +of some importance was obtained, for at the close of the interview, +Bismarck intimated to Malet 'as a friend' that if a member of the +Government of National Defence chose to come he would be happy to +receive him, and added that he need feel no anxiety as to the nature of +his reception. Upon returning to Paris, Malet gave this message to Jules +Favre at the British Embassy, and although the latter said nothing at +the moment, he proceeded shortly afterwards to Ferrières, where the +celebrated interview took place, and the opportunity of making peace on +easy terms was thrown away, for 'as an old friend' Bismarck had also +assured Malet that the Prussians were not going to ask for Alsace or +Lorraine, but only for Strasburg and Metz, as a precaution against +future attacks. + + +FOOTNOTES: + + [17] As Minister for Foreign Affairs. + + [18] French Ambassador at Berlin. + + [19] 'The Life of Lord Granville.' + + [20] Bavarian Minister. + + [21] Prussian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. + + [22] Foreign Minister. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE + +(1870-1871) + + +The investment of Paris being now imminent, the Diplomatists had to make +up their minds as to whether they should remain or leave, and the latter +course was adopted. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Tours, Sept. 19, 1870. + + I was a good deal put out at having to leave Paris. The interest is + still there: there was no danger in staying, and of course the + Diplomatists could have got the Prussians to let them through the + lines. But as soon as Jules Favre himself advised that I should go, + I had nothing to say to my colleagues of the Great Powers, whom I + had withstood, not without difficulty, for some time. At all events + I could not have stayed if they went, without exposing myself to all + kinds of misrepresentation, and presenting myself to the public and + Foreign Powers as the special partisan and adviser of the present + French Government. The Representatives of the small Powers, or most + of them, want to be able to go home when they leave Paris, and are + very much afraid of the expense and difficulty of finding lodgings + here. Well they may be: I myself spent eight hours yesterday walking + about or sitting on a trunk in the porte cochère of the hotel, and + have at last, in order not to pass the night _à la belle étoile_, + had to come to a house out of the town. + + I don't expect much from Jules Favre's interview with Bismarck, but + I am very impatient to know whether he was received, and if so, what + passed. I should be glad that Bismarck should distinctly announce + his terms, though I can hardly hope they will be such as France will + accept now. But it would be well, whatever they are, that the French + should know them, and thus get their minds accustomed to them, and + so know also what amount of resistance is better than yielding to + them. I myself think that the loss of territory and the humiliation + of France and the great diminution of her power and influence would + be great evils and great sources of danger: but, if we can have no + means of preventing them, I am certainly anxious that we should not + aggravate them by holding out hopes that our mediation could effect + a change, or rather by allowing the hopes to be formed, which the + mere fact of our mediating could not but give rise to. I have read + with great interest the accounts of your conversations with Thiers, + and have been still more interested by your correspondence with + Bernstorff on 'benevolent neutrality.' On his part it is just the + old story I used to hear in America from the Northerners: 'The + ordinary rules of neutrality are very well in ordinary wars, such + as those in which we were neutrals, but our present cause is so + pre-eminently just, noble and advantageous to humanity and the rest + of the world, that the very least other nations can do is to strain + the laws of neutrality, so as to make them operate in our favour and + against our opponents.' + + Thiers himself was expected here yesterday. Jules Favre did not + say positively that he was coming here himself, but he gave me to + understand that it was not improbable he should do so. He must make + haste, for we hear that the railway we came by is already broken up, + and all the others were impassable before. + +As Lord Lyons's departure from Paris to Tours was practically the only +action in the course of his career which was subjected to anything like +unfavourable criticism, it is desirable to point out that as far back as +August 31, Lord Granville had written to him in these words: 'I +presume that your post will be with the Government as long as it is +acknowledged; and that if the Empress and her Foreign Minister go to +Lyons or elsewhere, you would go too.' It is almost inconceivable that +any one should have advocated the retention of the Ambassador in Paris +after that city had been cut off from the outside world; some of the +members of the Government, it is true, including Jules Favre remained +there, but the _de facto_ Government of the country was temporarily +established at Tours, and when Tours seemed likely to share the fate of +Paris, the Government was transferred to Bordeaux. It was so obviously +the duty of diplomatists to remain in touch with the French Government +that the wonder is that any objection should ever have been raised, and, +as has already been narrated, Lord Lyons had been urged to move long +before he would consent to do so. The action of the Ambassador was the +subject of an attack upon him subsequently in Parliament by the late Sir +Robert Peel, which proved singularly ineffective. + +Few people had anticipated much result from Jules Favre's visit to +Bismarck, and when the latter insisted upon a surrender of territory +being accepted in principle, the French envoy burst into tears. +According to Bismarck this display of emotion was entirely artificial, +and he even accused Jules Favre of having painted his face grey and +green in order to excite sympathy, but in any case it became perfectly +plain that no agreement was in sight and that the war would have to +continue. In justice to the French it must be said that Bismarck seemed +to have made his terms as harsh in form as they were stringent in +substance, and it was difficult to conceive any Government subscribing +to his conditions; as for poor Jules Favre he had to console himself by +issuing a stirring address to his fellow-countrymen. + +Although the French public naturally began to display some impatience +and irritation at the slowness with which 'Victory' was being organized, +and to talk of Carnot, the old Republic, and the necessity of a Red +Republic if heroes were to be produced, the Tours Government continued +to hold its own fairly well; there was little trouble about the +finances; disorders were suppressed, and the arrival of Gambetta infused +a good deal of energy into the administration. After the manner of +French statesmen, Gambetta, upon his arrival at Tours, issued a spirited +proclamation, announcing _inter alia_ that Paris was impregnable, and +explaining that as the form of Government had changed from a shameful +and corrupt autocracy to a pure and unsullied Republic, success was a +moral certainty. Gambetta, who had assumed the office of Minister of +War, summoned to his assistance the veteran Garibaldi, and the arrival +of the former obviously embarrassed the peace-loving diplomatists, who +expressed regret that his balloon had not capsized on the way from +Paris. + +By the middle of October, however, the French Government began to show +signs of wiser dispositions. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Tours. Oct. 16, 1870. + + As you will see by my long despatch of to-day, I went yesterday with + the Comte de Chaudordy[23] into the questions of the '_pouce de notre + territoire_' and the '_pierres de nos forteresses_.' The fortresses + have in point of fact been tacitly abandoned for a long time, + provided the dismantling them only, not the cession of them to + Prussia is demanded. + + M. de Chaudordy said that he would tell me what was in the bottom of + his heart about the cession of territory, if I would promise to + report it to your Lordship only in such a form as would ensure it + never being published now or hereafter, or even being quoted or + referred to. + + Having received my promise and taken all these precautions, he said + that he did not regard some cession of territory as altogether out + of the question. The men at present in office certainly could not + retreat from their positive declaration that they would never yield + an inch of territory; but if the interests of France appeared to + require positively that the sacrifice should be made, they would + retire from office, and give place to men who were unshackled, and + not only would they abstain from opposing such men, but would give + them full support in signing a peace, which, however painful, + appeared to be necessary. M. de Chaudordy was convinced and indeed + had reason to know that the men now in office had patriotism enough + to act in this way in case of need, but he could not authorize me to + tell you this as a communication from the individuals themselves, + much less as a communication from the French Government. It would be + ruin to the men themselves and to the cause, if it should transpire + that such an idea had ever been contemplated at a moment like this. + For it to be carried into effect with any success, it must appear to + rise at the critical time out of the necessities of the hour. + + He concluded by reminding me of my promise that what he had said + should never be published or even referred to. + + I thanked him for the confidence he had placed in me, and assured + him that he need not have the least fear that it would be abused. I + said however at the same time that he must feel, as I did, that + however useful it might be to be aware of the disposition he had + mentioned, as entertained by the men in power, it would be very + difficult for a Government to make information, given with so much + reserve, the foundation of any positive measures. + +This criticism was sufficiently obvious. If the information was never to +go beyond Lord Lyons and Lord Granville, of what practical use could it +be? It can only be supposed that those who sent Chaudordy, intended that +his confidential communication should somehow or other reach the +Prussian Government. + +Hard upon Chaudordy, followed a man destined before long to achieve a +melancholy celebrity, General Bourbaki. General Bourbaki had been the +victim of a strange mystification, which resulted in his being permitted +to leave Metz upon a secret mission to the Empress at Chislehurst, and +when it was discovered that the whole thing was an ingenious fraud +perpetrated by one Regnier (probably with the connivance of Bismarck), +and that the Empress had never sent for him at all, he returned to +France, but was not permitted to re-enter Metz. Consequently, he +repaired to Tours and gave the Ambassador the benefit of his views. + +General Bourbaki, as a professional soldier, took a most gloomy view of +the military situation. He did not think that an army capable of coping +with the Prussians in the field in anything like equal numbers could be +formed in less than five or six months, even with first-rate military +organizers at the head of affairs, instead of the present inexperienced +civilians. According to him, the Army of Metz was in admirable condition +and might perhaps break out, but even so, where was it to go? Its +provisions and ammunition would be exhausted long before it could get to +any place where they could be replenished. As the surrender of Paris was +really only a question of time, the most prudent thing to do would be to +make peace whilst those two fortresses were still holding out, and it +would be to the interest of Prussia to do so, because if Metz fell, +Bazaine's army would disappear, and there would be no Government left in +France with whom it would be possible to treat, and the Prussians would, +therefore, be forced to administer the country as well as occupy it. The +Provisional Government, who must have had a high opinion of Bourbaki, +offered him the title of Commander-in-Chief and the command of the Army +of the Loire, but he declined the honour on the ground that he would not +be given unlimited military powers, and that nothing could be effected +under the orders of civilians absolutely devoid of military capacity. + +Another visitor was M. Daniel Wilson, who achieved a sinister notoriety +during the Presidency of M. Grévy in connection with the alleged sale of +honours, etc. Wilson's object was to urge the desirability of summoning +a Constituent Assembly without delay, as he and his moderate friends +were convinced that such a body would be in favour of peace. He himself +considered the prosecution of the war under existing circumstances to be +a crime, and he was not disposed to allow the six or seven men who had +seized upon the Government, to achieve the ruin of France. Their only +excuse for postponing the elections was the difficulty of holding them +in the districts occupied by the Prussians, but if an armistice could be +obtained, that difficulty would disappear, and an armistice of only +fifteen days would make the resumption of hostilities impossible. The +interest attaching to this visit lay in the fact that a peace party was +now actually in existence, whereas the Provisional Government at Tours, +the Ministers left in Paris, and the advanced Republicans seemed to +be still fully bent upon war _à outrance_, and as little willing as +ever to hear of a cession of territory. + +Bazaine capitulated on October 27, and shortly afterwards Thiers who had +returned to Paris from his circular tour round the Courts of Europe +proceeded to the Prussian Headquarters to discuss with Bismarck the +question of an armistice, a course of action which the Provisional +Government had agreed to, provided it were initiated by a third party. +The attitude, however, of Gambetta and his friends did not encourage +much hope of success. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Tours, Oct. 31, 1870. + + Gambetta's Proclamation and the language Chaudordy has again been + directed to hold about cession of territory, will show you how vain + it is to try to induce these people to give a negotiation a fair + chance by abstaining during the course of it from violent and + imprudent language. + + Nothing can look worse for France than things do at this moment. A + reign of terror, perseverance in hostilities until the country is + utterly ruined, a dissolution of all order and discipline in the + army, and a total disorganization of society might seem to be + threatened. I take comfort from the thought that much allowance must + be made for the first ebullition of grief and rage at the surrender + of Bazaine, and that some of Gambetta's fire and fury may be + intended to divert blame from himself for a catastrophe which he did + nothing to prevent. Anyhow things are gloomy enough, and I am + nervous and uneasy about Thiers and his mission, and should be glad + to hear that he was at least safe out of Paris again. + +The news of the capitulation of Metz was at once followed by an +unsuccessful outbreak against the Government in Paris, headed by the +well-known revolutionary, Gustave Flourens, who seized the Ministers and +proclaimed the Commune at the Hotel de Ville. The Ministers, however, +were shortly liberated by the Garde Mobile and National Guards and order +was restored without much difficulty in the course of a few hours. +Flourens, who was subsequently shot by the Versailles troops during the +suppression of the Commune in 1871, was generally regarded as the most +formidable 'man of action,' and had lately been residing in London. It +is interesting to record the impression which the wasted potentialities +of England made upon this impartial visitor. _Me voici, avec mes amis +Félix Pyat et Louis Blanc à Londres, dans ce pays d'Angleterre qui +pourrait être si grand à condition de n'avoir point ni les Lords ni la +Bible!_ One almost wishes that he had been spared to witness the +operation of the Parliament Act. + +The Paris Government, adroitly profiting by the overthrow of Flourens +and his friends, at once organized a plébiscite in the city, and emerged +triumphantly with over 500,000 votes recorded in their favour as against +60,000 dissentients. This was all to the good, as it showed that +moderate opinions were still in the ascendency, and whereas the fall of +Metz was at first received with frantic cries of rage and war to the +knife, people began to look a little more calmly on its effect on the +military situation, and hopes were entertained that the mission of +Thiers to Bismarck, which had been promoted by Her Majesty's Government, +would result in the conclusion of an armistice. These hopes were doomed +to disappointment, for after several interviews at Versailles, during +the course of which an agreement for some time appeared probable, +negotiations were finally broken off on the question of revictualling +the various fortresses, more especially Paris. + +Thiers, who had repaired to Tours after the failure of his efforts, gave +Lord Lyons in strict confidence a full and interesting account of his +negotiations with Bismarck. + +At the first important interview, which took place at Versailles on +November 1, no serious objection was raised to the proposals of the +French Government, and after a conversation which lasted two or three +hours, Thiers took his leave with good hopes for the success of the +negotiation. + +The second conference, on the following day, passed equally +satisfactorily. On Thursday, the 3rd, Bismarck kept Thiers waiting a +short time, and said that he had been detained at a military meeting +held by the King. He seemed annoyed and irritable, and indeed on one +occasion, quite lost his temper. Nevertheless, Thiers resenting this, he +apologized and assumed a civil and indeed caressing demeanour. He +asserted that _les militaires_, as he always called them, made +objections to the proposed revictualling of Paris and that they also had +some reservations to make with respect to the suggested elections. _Les +militaires_ also urged that if, as proposed, Paris were to be +provisioned during twenty-five days' armistice, those days would be +absolutely lost to the German arms, and the surrender of the town +deferred for at least that time. On being sounded as to what might be +considered an equivalent, it appeared that two or more of the detached +forts, or some other concession equally inadmissible, would be demanded. +On finding, therefore, that Bismarck was unshaken in declaring that +positively _les militaires_ would not allow Paris to be revictualled, +Thiers had no alternative but to withdraw from the negotiation and to +request facilities for communicating the result to the Government in +Paris. _Les militaires_, it will be observed, played much the same +convenient part in this affair as the King of Prussia in the arguments +used against Lord Clarendon's secret disarmament proposals. + +Upon the Paris Government becoming acquainted with these terms, Jules +Favre directed Thiers to break off the negotiations and leave Versailles +immediately; a decision which Bismarck stated caused him great regret +and induced him to suggest that elections should be held even while +hostilities were going on. He made no offer, however, of any concession +with regard to the revictualling of Paris. + +The conclusion which Thiers arrived at was that there was both a +political and a military party at the Prussian Headquarters. The +political party, with which Bismarck himself to a great extent agreed, +was desirous of bringing the war to an end by concluding peace on +comparatively moderate terms. The military party held that the glory of +the Prussian arms and the future security of Germany demanded that the +rights of war should be pushed to the utmost, and that France should be +laid waste, ruined, and humiliated to such a degree as to render it +impossible for her to wage war again with Germany for very many years. +He could not, however, discover even among the most moderate of the +so-called political party any one who seemed to ask less than the +cession of Alsace and of that part of Lorraine in which German is +spoken. It seems clear that Bismarck impressed Thiers with his sincerity +at the commencement of the negotiations, and with the belief that he was +subsequently overruled by _les militaires_, but whenever it was +suggested that the armistice had been proposed to both parties by the +neutral Powers, Bismarck showed much 'impatience and annoyance.' He +showed Thiers the letters which the Emperor Alexander had written to the +King of Prussia. They were 'warm, earnest letters,' but written as from +a friend to a friend, without in the least assuming the tone of a +sovereign addressing a brother sovereign on a matter concerning the +relations of their respective Governments. Of Great Britain, it is sad +to learn, he spoke with 'special ill-humour.' One subject upon which he +touched is not without interest at the present day. He complained +bitterly of the treatment to which the crews of captured German merchant +vessels were subjected, and said that he should give orders to have an +equal number of French non-combatants arrested and treated in the same +way. When it was mildly suggested that this would hardly be in +accordance with international maritime law, he exclaimed with some +violence: 'Who made the code of maritime law? You and the English, +because you are powerful at sea, it is no code at all, it is simply the +law of the strongest!' To this Thiers appears to have retorted that he, +Bismarck, did not on all occasions seem disposed to repudiate the law of +the strongest. + +So far as the convocation of a National Assembly was concerned Bismarck +alleged complete indifference, explaining that he had now two +Governments with which to treat, one at Paris, and the other at +Wilhelmshöhe, and although he expressed unmitigated contempt for the +Emperor Napoleon, he was nevertheless quite ready to make use of him +to attain his ends. + +During the fruitless negotiations which had taken place, first when +conducted by Jules Favre, and secondly when conducted by Thiers, the +British Government found itself in a somewhat embarrassing position. It +was perfectly sincere in desiring to bring about peace between France +and Prussia, but it was unwilling to identify itself with the one +proposal which would have had that effect, viz. the cession of +territory, and the perplexity in which the English Ministers found +themselves is illustrated by a letter from Mr. Gladstone to Lord Lyons. + + * * * * * + + 11, Carlton House Terrace, Nov. 7, 1870. + + I have seen your letter to Lord Granville in which you notice that + in a note to him I had expressed a hope you would not allow the + French to suppose we adopted their view as to integrity of + territory. + + I do not recollect the exact words to which you may refer, but I + write a line lest I should by chance have conveyed a false + impression. + + At an earlier stage of this tremendous controversy, the French took + their stand upon inviolability of soil. That ground always seemed to + me quite untenable in the case of a country which had made recent + annexations. + + The French also declared that they would surrender neither an inch + of their territory nor a stone of their fortresses. This appeared to + me an extravagant proposition, and, what is more important, I + venture to say it was thought unreasonable by my colleagues and by + the country generally. It is possible that my note may have referred + to either of these views on the part of France. + + But I am very sorry if I have conveyed to you on my own part, or by + implication on the part of any one else, the belief that we approved + of, or were in our own minds indifferent to the transfer of + Alsatians and Lorrainers from France to Germany against their will. + + On this subject, I for one, entirely concur with the opinions you + have so admirably expressed in your letter, and I should be to the + last degree reluctant to be a party not only to stimulating a German + demand of this kind, but even to advising or promoting a compliance + with it on the part of France. + + All this you will see is quite distinct from and consistent with the + desire which you and which we all entertain that the Defence + Government of France should not needlessly deal in abstract + declarations, and with a full approval of your reticence as to the + conditions of peace. + + On the failure of the armistice I think the Cabinet will disperse, + as having nothing more to consider in the present circumstances. I + cannot help feeling doubtful whether the Prussians do not lose more + than the French by the unhappy failure of the negotiations. + + We are all more grieved at the failure than surprised. + +It is difficult to read much meaning into the above involved epistle. +How, for instance, could any fortresses be surrendered without Alsatians +and Lorrainers being handed over to Prussia? Put into plain language, +the letter presumably meant that H.M. Government was anxious to remain +friends with both sides, but was afraid to make the one recommendation +to the French which would have been of any use, and hoped that the +proposal of a cession of territory would eventually be made on the +latter's initiative. + +Thiers, who in the course of his tour round the capitals of Europe had +vigorously denounced (especially to the Italians) the apathy and +selfishness of England, now intimated to the Ambassador that he was +willing to go back to London if he could contribute, by so doing, to +bring about an armistice and a peace, but received no encouragement; +partly because it was thought that the less the British Government +did, which appeared to be prompted by France, the more Bismarck might be +inclined to yield, and partly because it would cause irritation in +France, if Thiers made another formal expedition to England without +producing any marked result. + +A momentary elation was just about this time produced at Tours by the +victory of General d'Aurelle des Paladines and the recapture of Orleans, +but Gambetta does not appear to have lost his head in consequence of +this temporary success or to have attached undue importance to it. +Gambetta's opinion was that France could hold out for four months, and +that the Germans would not be able to stay so long in the country. He +told Lord Lyons that he approved of the armistice on the terms proposed +by the Government of Paris, and implied that he did, rather than not, +approve of the readiness of that Government to conclude one still, if +through the representations of the neutrals Prussia should yet be +brought to consent to reasonable terms for one. He manifested great +indignation at Bismarck's contention that there was no Government in +France, maintained that the Government of National Defence was a +properly constituted Government entitled to exercise all the powers of +the nation, and said that there was no need whatever of a Constitutional +Assembly. As for General d'Aurelle des Paladines, his hour of triumph +was soon terminated; the Prussians drove him out of Orleans, and his +failure was ascribed by the Republicans to his action in proceeding to +venerate some relics in the Orleans cathedral. + +In the meanwhile Mr. Gladstone's Government found themselves confronted +with a difficulty which had to some extent been foreseen, but which was +entirely unexpected at that particular moment. In the beginning of +November, Prince Gortschakoff issued a circular denouncing the clauses +of the Treaty of Paris which related to the Black Sea. Lord Granville +communicated the intelligence in a letter to Lord Lyons dated November +11. + + * * * * * + + Foreign Office, Nov. 11, 1870. + + The shell has fallen suddenly. I expected it, but not in so abrupt a + form. If it was to come, I am not sure that I regret the way it has + done. Do not communicate officially my answer till the Russian + Government has received theirs: the messenger leaves London + to-night. + + I am curious to hear what the Provisional Government will say. I + presume they will try to make a bargain on the subject. You will of + course explain to them that it is, at the very least, a more serious + subject for them than for us. + + The handling of the matter is delicate and difficult. We are + unanimous about the first step, more in doubt about the next. + + If Bernstorff gets permission to give a safe conduct to Odo Russell, + we mean to send him to-morrow to Versailles with our answer and a + private letter from me to Bismarck. I presume there is a private + understanding between Russia and Prussia, but it is not certain; + Bernstorff as usual was dumb, but intimated his surprise at the + form. + + He tells me that my question will be met with a negative as to + provisioning Paris: the Generals will not hear of it. If so, I shall + ask whether he will still give facilities for an election without an + armistice, and then I shall request you to press the expediency of + summoning a Chamber on the Provisional Government--always declaring + that you do not wish to interfere with the self-government of + France. + +Why it should have been assumed that the action of the Russian Government +was more serious as regards the French than ourselves, is not +particularly clear. Whatever the French Government may have said in +public on the subject, there can be little doubt that in secret they +hailed it as a welcome diversion which might be turned to advantage. If +it brought about a congress or conference, it might cause a stir amongst +neutrals resulting in a check to Prussia as well as to Russia. The +ingenious Thiers at once grasped at the possibility of forming an +European Alliance against these two Powers. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Tours, Nov. 14, 1870. + + Thiers has just paid me so long a visit that he has left me very + little time to write. His notion is that England, Austria, Italy, + Turkey and Spain should now unite with France to check the + aggression of Prussia and Russia, and he thinks that without war + this would lead to a Congress in which all Europe would settle the + terms of peace. If England lets the occasion go by, it will, in his + opinion, be she, not France, who will have sunk to the rank of a + second-rate Power. I thought my prudent course was to listen and say + nothing, which, as you know, is easy with him; for he talks too well + for one to be bored with him, and is quite content to talk without + interruption. + + He had a violent argument with Chaudordy in the presence of + Metternich and me on the subject of the elections. Chaudordy + maintains the Government view that they are impossible without an + armistice. Thiers took the other side, and at last cried out: 'They + will at least be much more free under the Prussians than under + Gambetta's Prefects!' + +In 'Bismarck, his Reflections and Reminiscences,' there occurs the +suggestive passage:-- + + 'It was consequently a fortunate thing that the situation offered a + possibility of doing Russia a service in respect to the Black Sea. + Just as the sensibilities of the Russian Court, which owing to + the Russian relationship of Queen Mary were enlisted by the loss of + the Hanoverian Crown, found their counterpoise in the concessions + which were made to the Oldenburg connexions of the Russian dynasty + in territorial and financial directions in 1866; so did the + possibility occur in 1870 of doing a service not only to the + dynasty, but also to the Russian Empire.... We had in this an + opportunity of improving our relations with Russia.' + +There can hardly be a shadow of a doubt that the denunciation of the +Black Sea clauses was what is vulgarly called a 'put up job' between +Bismarck and the Russian Government, probably arranged at Ems in the +spring; but when Mr. Odo Russell made his appearance at Versailles in +order to discuss the question, Bismarck assured him that the Russian +action had not met with his sanction and added that the circular was +ill-timed and ill-advised. (In private, he subsequently expressed the +opinion that the Russians had been much too modest in their demands and +ought to have asked for more.) As, however, the face of the British +Government had to be saved somehow, a Conference in London was +suggested, and the efforts of Lord Granville were concentrated upon an +attempt to persuade the Provisional Government of France to take part in +it. This proved difficult, for the French made it clear that they were +not anxious to do so unless they could get some advantage out of it, and +intimated that they meant to accept aid from any quarter where it might +be obtained--even from the 'Satanic Alliance,' as Thiers called it, of +Russia. One of the difficulties encountered in dealing with the French +Government arose from the discrepancy between language used in London by +the French Ambassador and that used by Chaudordy at Tours. The latter +was not a Minister and the Government consequently did not feel bound to +support him. Chaudordy himself took advantage of his anomalous position +to talk freely and to treat what he had said, according to +circumstances, as pledging or not pledging the Government, and, besides +this, the Government at Tours was liable to be disavowed by the +Government at Paris. + +How serious the situation was considered to be in London may be judged +by the following two letters from Lord Granville to Lord Lyons. + + * * * * * + + Foreign Office, Nov. 28, 1870. + + Pray exert all your influence to obtain the assent of France to the + Conference. It will of course be an annoyance to her that peace + instead of war prevails, and there is no doubt that a general + conflagration might be of advantage to her. But you may point out + that the very nature of the question almost precludes instant and + offensive war, and that hostilities distant in point of time would + be nothing but an embarrassment to her. + + With regard to the Diplomatic position, it is a great step for the + Provisional Government that Prussia has asked us to obtain her + consent to a Conference. On the other hand, it would be a severe + blow to the Provisional Government if they were left out in the + cold, while the other Powers were settling a question of so much + interest to France. + + If such an unfortunate state of things were to occur, we should do + our best to protect the dignity of France, but it would be + difficult. Do not encourage France to suggest delay. + + * * * * * + + Foreign Office, Nov. 30, 1870. + + The French are unwisely playing the same game as they did under + Gramont about the Belgian Treaty. In each case, Bismarck had the + sense to do at once what was to be done. + + It is an enormous step for the Provisional Government to be + recognized by Prussia, Austria, Turkey, Italy, and England as + capable of attending a Conference, and it will be very foolish of + them to lose the opportunity and remain out in the cold. + + As London is the place, it would be my duty to issue the formal + invitations; at least I suppose so. Do your best to persuade them. + + The Government here wish to hold their own, but are most desirous of + a prompt and peaceable solution of this 'Circular' question. + + We shall adhere to anything we say, but you will observe that we are + not rash. + + Turkey, Austria and Italy are not pleasant reeds to rest on. + + If we go to war, we shall be very like the man with a pistol before + a crowd, _after_ he has fired it off. Do not let a pacific word, + however, escape your lips. + +These two letters are a sufficiently clear indication of the highly +uncomfortable position in which H.M. Government found itself involved, +and of the urgent necessity of discovering some face-saving formula. +France being incapacitated, it could hardly be supposed that Austria and +Italy would go to war with Russia on account of a question whether +Russia should or should not maintain a fleet in the Black Sea, and +England with her ludicrous military establishments would therefore have +been left to undertake the contest single-handed, or, at most, with the +assistance of Turkey. + +Ultimately, of course, a Black Sea Conference met in London, and a +French representative, the Duc de Broglie, put in an appearance just as +it was terminating, after ineffectual efforts had been made to secure +the presence of M. Jules Favre. Lord Fitzmaurice, in his 'Life of Lord +Granville,' has elaborately endeavoured to show that the Conference +resulted in a triumph for British diplomacy. If the acceptance of a +particular form of words (of which, by the way, no notice was taken by +Count Aehrenthal when he annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in defiance of +the Treaty of Berlin), constitutes a success, then Mr. Gladstone's +Government were entitled to congratulate themselves; but as the Russians +got their way and established their right to maintain a fleet in the +Black Sea, they could legitimately claim that for all practical purposes +the triumph was theirs. + +In the course of his interviews with Thiers, Bismarck had denounced +England, and before the end of 1870 the feeling between England and +Prussia was anything but friendly. At the outbreak of hostilities +British sympathy had been almost universally on the side of Prussia, but +as the war progressed, public opinion began to veer round. The change in +opinion was due partly to sympathy with a losing cause, partly to an +impression that the Prussians were inclined to put forward unjust and +exaggerated demands, partly to the violent abuse which appeared in the +press of both countries, as well as to a variety of other causes. A +letter from Mr. Henry Wodehouse, one of the secretaries at the Paris +Embassy, shows that the Crown Prince of Prussia, whose Anglophil +sympathies were well known, deplored the tone of the German papers, and +alludes at the same time to a domestic squabble in high German circles, +thus showing that the Prussian Government as well as the French was not +entirely exempt from internal dissensions. + + * * * * * + + _Mr. Wodehouse to Lord Lyons._ + + Rouen, Nov. 16, 1870. + + On Monday morning, before leaving Versailles, I had an interview + with the Crown Prince of Prussia at H.R.H.'s desire. + + H.R.H. informed me that, at the last moment, when it was thought + that all was arranged for the Union of South Germany with the North + German Confederation, the Würtemberg Minister, instigated, it was + believed, by the Bavarian Government, had asked for a delay in order + to consult the other members of the Würtemberg Government, and had + started for Stuttgardt with this object. This sudden decision had + caused the King of Prussia and his Government very great annoyance. + + H.R.H. spoke of the hostile tone lately adopted towards England by + the German press, which he assured me, was quite contrary to the + wishes of the Prussian Government, and that he himself much + regretted it, as he feared it would give rise to a spirit of + animosity between Prussia and England. + + H.R.H. desired me to report this conversation to Lord Granville on + my arrival in England. + +As was shown in the case of the American Civil War, it is extremely +difficult for a neutral to keep on good terms with both parties, however +much it may be desired to preserve an absolutely impartial attitude. The +French blamed us because they considered that we had not rendered them +the kind of assistance which they thought was due to them. The +Prussians, on the other hand, were always discovering grievances which +betrayed our partiality. Upon the whole it is not surprising that our +attitude provoked excessive irritation on their part, for we were +continually harping on and deploring the iniquities of war, while +perfectly ready to make a handsome profit out of it by selling anything +to the belligerents. The late Sir Robert Morier admirably described the +British attitude as it appeared to German eyes. "We sit by like a +bloated Quaker, too holy to fight, but rubbing our hands at the roaring +trade we are driving in cartridges and ammunition. We are heaping up to +ourselves the undying hatred of this German race, that will henceforth +rule the world, because we cannot muster up courage to prevent a few +Brummagem manufacturers from driving their unholy trade."[24] It is only +fair to add, however, that German censure was confined to England; the +Americans, who exported arms in just the same way, were never denounced, +but possibly this was due to the fact that they assumed a less +self-righteous attitude. + +Whatever may have been Bismarck's private sentiments with regard to +England, he was not unconciliatory in public, and the various +difficulties which arose were settled satisfactorily. One of the last +unpleasant episodes was the sinking of several British merchant vessels +in the Seine by the Prussian artillery towards the close of the year, +for which compensation was demanded, and a passage in Busch's 'Bismarck' +shows his method of dealing with such matters. 'When the Germans, a +short time before the conclusion of the Preliminary Peace at Versailles, +sank some English coal ships on the Lower Seine and the English made a +row on the subject, the chief asked me (Lothar Bucher), What can we say +in reply? Well, I had brought with me some old fogies on the Law of +Nations and such matters. I hunted up what the old writers called the +Jus Angariæ, that is to say, the right to destroy the property of +neutrals on payment of full compensation, and showed it to the chief. He +sent me with it to Russell, who showed himself to be convinced by this +"good authority." Shortly afterwards the whole affair with the Jus +Angariæ appeared in the _Times_. We wrote in the same sense to London, +and the matter was settled.' + +Mr. Odo Russell, whose presence at Versailles had been utilized to +ascertain what terms of peace were likely to be granted, wrote before +the middle of December that he was convinced that Bismarck would refuse +to treat except upon the basis of unconditional surrender, and the +failure of the sorties from Paris and of the operations near Orleans +caused Thiers to lose heart, although Gambetta was as determined as ever +to continue the struggle and to postpone the convocation of a National +Assembly for as long as possible. Thiers indeed went so far as to +declare in private to the Ambassador that further resistance was +useless, and that it was a crime as well as a folly to continue it. The +last disasters of the French, which were partly due to two shocking +pieces of bad luck--the balloon which should have brought Trochu's plan +for combined action with the Army of the Loire having been blown off to +Christiania, and a sudden rise of the Marne having rendered co-operation +with General Vinoy impossible--forced the Tours Government and the +Diplomatists to migrate to Bordeaux. An offer on the part of the Foreign +Office to send a warship to that port for the benefit of the Ambassador +and his staff was declined with thanks: 'Under ordinary circumstances, I +think I am better without one, and indeed personally I should be much +less afraid of the Prussians than of the Bay of Biscay.' + +It used to be a tradition in after years that the sole perceptible +effect of the Franco-German War upon the British Embassy was that Lord +Lyons's footmen ceased temporarily to powder their hair, but to judge by +a letter to Hammond, Ambassadors suffered inconveniences as well as +humbler people. + +It is probable too that the social disorganization produced by the war +provided distinguished diplomatists, who are necessarily amongst the +most ceremonious of mankind, with some novel sensations. Upon one +occasion, when Lord Lyons had occasion to call upon Gambetta, the +Dictator was too busy to see him for some minutes, and deputed a +subordinate to make his excuses. The latter began his conversation with +the remark: 'Allons boire un bock!' a hospitable invitation hardly in +accordance with the traditions of conventional diplomacy. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Mr. Hammond._ + + Bordeaux, Dec. 12, 1870. + + Many thanks for the _Bradshaw_ and the _Times_, and very many more + for your letter of the 7th, which has just arrived by messenger. + + Not having the archives here, I cannot look up the regulations about + the expenses of an Embassy on its travels, as this is now. What I am + anxious about is that some compensation should be made to the junior + members who are with me, for the additional expense they are put to + by their migration. I am willing to do anything I can for them, but + there are of course limits to what I can afford, and it would be + utterly repugnant to all my feelings and principles, for me to have + an allowance for entertaining them. In old times, when manners and + feelings were different, this might do; but in the present day the + position of an hotel keeper for his subordinates is destructive of + discipline and comfortable relations between a chief and the members + of his Embassy. + + The difficulty of finding lodgings and the prices are much greater + than they were at Paris. I have nothing but one room for study, + drawing-room, bedroom and all; and have just been asked six hundred + pounds a month for one floor of a moderate sized house. + +The junior members alluded to included Malet and Sheffield. It had, of +course, been necessary to leave some of the staff at Paris. + +In spite of Thiers's failure to obtain an armistice, the French +Government still made strenuous efforts in the same direction and even +succeeded in pressing the Pope into their service. The latter broached +the subject to Count Arnim, the Prussian Minister at Rome, proposing +that the revictualling of Paris should be accepted as a basis, and +received a severe snub for his pains. He was informed, 'in very harsh +terms,' that the proposal could not be considered, and further, that it +was impossible to negotiate with a nation whose bad faith was +scandalously exhibited by the daily appearance in arms of French +officers who had given their word of honour not to serve again during +the war. After much haggling, the French proposals resolved themselves +into three alternatives, each of which was categorically rejected by +Bismarck. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Mr. Layard._[25] + + Bordeaux, Dec. 20, 1870. + + The difficulty of communication is between this place and England, + and arises from the utter irregularity of all trains, caused by the + movements of the troops. St. Malo has become the usual port of + embarkation and disembarkation for our messengers. + + Things are at present at a deadlock. The French want: either a peace + without cession of territory; or an armistice with the revictualling + of Paris for the number of days it lasts; or a European Congress to + settle the terms of peace between France and Germany. Bismarck + peremptorily rejects all three proposals, and does not say precisely + what his conditions of peace are. I suppose the King of Prussia + holds to taking Paris as a satisfaction to military vanity, and that + if the military situation continues favourable to Germany, he will + accept nothing much short of unconditional surrender, while Paris + resists. Of course, unless, by a miracle, Paris is relieved, its + surrender is a question of time--but of how much time? They declare + here that it can hold out without any very material suffering until + the middle of January, and for many weeks longer, if the population + will be content to live on bread and wine. But, supposing Paris to + fall, will peace be made? Here it is declared that the South will + still continue the war, and at any rate there seems to be every + probability that the violent party will not surrender its power + without a struggle. Then the financial question must soon become a + difficulty. I am told that since the investment of Paris began three + months ago, not less than thirty-two millions sterling have been + spent. It is however idle to speculate when events march so fast. I + can tell you little of the present state of the armies. Bourbaki is, + I believe, at Bourges, and Chanzy at Le Mans. I have a military + attaché,[26] Fielding, who has been with Chanzy's army during all the + affairs near Orleans and since, and who has the highest opinion of + his military talents. + + The acceptance, pure and simple, of the Conference on the Russian + question arrived from Paris the day before yesterday. + +Towards the close of December the remarkable elasticity of the French +character was manifested in a recovery from the depression which had +been produced by the failure of the sorties from Paris and the recapture +of Orleans by the Germans. The overpowering energy of Gambetta was +chiefly responsible for the creation of new armies, and the moment again +appeared unfavourable for peaceful counsels. Thiers and his party +considered that the Government was only pushing the country on to more +complete ruin, and were urgent in their call for a National Assembly. +The majority of the great towns of the South, Bordeaux included, were +against an Assembly or any interference with the existing Government, +and Gambetta and his adherents were determined to go on with the war and +keep themselves in power by all means available. Gambetta was the only +member of the Government outside Paris who counted for anything, and the +moderates were placed at a considerable disadvantage owing to Jules +Favre being detained there. + +Thiers, who had never joined the Government, prognosticated that it +would immediately come to an end upon the fall of Paris, and that a +moderate (_honnête_) republic would be established in the greater part +of the country, while Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon and other places in the +south would set up a socialistic form of government, and do an enormous +amount of harm before suppression. In the opinion of competent judges, +if the country could have been fairly polled at this particular period, +the majority (consisting of course mainly of the peasants) would have +been found to be Bonapartist, in spite of all that had taken place. The +bourgeoisie and inhabitants of the smaller towns would have shown +themselves to be in favour of quiet and security of property, and would +therefore have probably voted for the Orleanists, as the best +representatives of those principles; and the masses in the large towns +would have turned out to be republican and socialist. A genuinely free +expression of opinion would, however, have been difficult to secure, for +Gambetta's prefects were, if anything, more unscrupulous than the +Emperor's and, under existing circumstances, had greater means of +downright intimidation. + +In the closing days of 1870 fresh efforts were made by H.M. Government +to start the Black Sea Conference as soon as possible, and to persuade +the French to send a representative without delay. Under the +circumstances, it might have been supposed that they would have named +their Ambassador in London, but for some obscure reason, it was decided +that Jules Favre was the only possible man, and as he was shut up in +Paris it was necessary to obtain a safe conduct for him from the +Germans. The following letter is of interest as an impartial +appreciation of Jules Favre, and as containing some sage opinions upon +the question of the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Bordeaux, Dec. 26, 1870. + + I did all I could in favour of Tissot. He would have been a much + more convenient plenipotentiary than Jules Favre and have + facilitated the business of the Conference and the speedy + termination of it. Jules Favre is, I believe an honest and really + patriotic man--by which I mean a man who will sacrifice his own + position and interests to what he believes to be the real good of + his country. But he has not hitherto shown himself to be a good + diplomatist or a skilful negotiator, and is too much led away by his + feelings to be a good practical man of business. He will at all + events go to London with a real knowledge of the state of things in + Paris, and if he thinks the convocation of a National Assembly + feasible and advisable, will have more means than any one else of + bringing it about in spite of Gambetta. It will be good too that he + should see for himself what the real feelings and intentions of the + English Government are. He is a man, who would, I should think, be + touched by real kindness and consideration for his country and + himself in these times, and sensitive in case anything like a slight + was put upon him or them--and particularly if the situation of + France were not taken very seriously by all who approach him. He was + a fierce and even truculent orator in the Chamber, but in private + life is mild and agreeable. His power of speaking may be an + inconvenience in the Diplomatic Conference, and I fancy he is led + away by his 'verve' when he does get into a speech, and says + sometimes things more forcible than judicious. I should think he + would never himself sign a peace by which territory was yielded, but + I conceive him to be a man who would make room for others to do so, + and help them, if he was really convinced that it was necessary for + France. + + I suppose the Germans will make no difficulty about the safe + conduct: it is for their interest to have some influential member of + the Government who might enable peace to be made in an emergency, in + which Gambetta might, if unchecked, have recourse to desperate + measures. + + At this moment I think the French have recovered their hope of + making a successful resistance to the Dismemberment of the country. + I am not very sanguine after all that has occurred, but I do think + the military prospects less gloomy than they have been since Sèdan, + or at all events, since Metz. You will, I conclude, soon have a + really trustworthy account of things in Paris from Claremont. + + The Conference, I suppose, must end in Russia carrying her main + point practically, and therefore it only remains to make it as much + as possible an antidote to the scheme of raising her prestige in + Turkey, by the form she adopted, of setting the other parties to the + Treaty at defiance. I am afraid not much can be done towards this. I + should suggest a very careful consideration of the meaning of the + restoration to the Sultan of the right to open the Dardanelles and + the Bosphorus at pleasure, and a very cautious wording of the + article establishing it. Otherwise, considering the weakness of the + Porte, I am afraid the new right might become a snare and a danger + rather than a safeguard. It was so much easier for the Porte to say: + 'I cannot' in answer to inconvenient importunity, than it will in + future be to say: 'I will not.' Even under the Treaty prohibition + the Turks had not the firmness they might have had in resisting + demands for vessels to pass. I can conceive circumstances under + which it might suit them to let a Russian fleet through into the + Mediterranean, if only to be rid of it for the time in the Black Sea. + +In Busch's 'Bismarck' there are many references to Jules Favre's +emotional disposition. At the first interview which took place, a French +peasant was told to keep watch outside the house where the Chancellor +and Favre were negotiating, and the latter was unable to resist the +temptation of making a speech to his fellow-countryman. 'Favre, who had +gone into the house with the Chancellor, came out and addressed his +countryman in a speech full of pathos and noble sentiments. Disorderly +attacks had been made, which, he said, must be stopped. He, Favre, was +not a spy, but, on the contrary, a member of the new Government, which +had undertaken to defend the interests of the country, and which +represented its dignity. In the name of International Law and of the +honour of France, he called upon him to keep watch, and to see that the +place was held sacred. That was imperatively demanded by his, the +statesman's, honour, as well as by that of the peasant, and so forth. +The honest rustic looked particularly silly as he listened open-mouthed +to all this high falutin, which he evidently understood as little +as if it were so much Greek.' Bismarck entertained a well-founded +contempt for rhetoric, and Jules Favre's eloquent verbosity was to him +only an instance of the way in which Frenchmen could be successfully +duped. 'You can give a Frenchman twenty-five lashes, and if you only +make a fine speech to him about the freedom and dignity of man of which +those lashes are the expression, and at the same time strike a fitting +attitude, he will persuade himself that he is not being thrashed.' It is +probable too that Jules Favre's inability to appreciate Bismarck's +undisguised cynicism contributed to the disfavour with which he was +regarded as compared with the other negotiator, Thiers. When during one +stage of the negotiations, Jules Favre complained that his position in +Paris was very critical, Bismarck proposed to him that he should +organize a rising so as to be able to suppress it whilst he still had an +army at his disposal: 'he looked at me quite terror-stricken, as if he +wished to say, "How bloodthirsty you are!" I explained to him, however, +that that was the only right way to manage the mob.' + +Whatever the merits or demerits of Jules Favre, a disagreeable surprise +was inflicted upon both the British Government and the Government of +National Defence by a refusal on the part of Bismarck to give him a safe +conduct through the German lines. At first, difficulties were raised in +connection with alleged violations of flags of truce; but upon the issue +of a proclamation by Jules Favre, Bismarck took advantage of the +opportunity in order to prevent his departure for London on the ground +that it would imply an official recognition of the Government of +National Defence. + +At all events, he made such stipulations about the way in which the safe +conduct should be applied for, that Jules Favre with his strong +sentimental character found it impossible to comply with them, and he +was also honourably reluctant to leave Paris just before the bombardment +was about to begin. Bismarck, it is clear, was determined that he should +not go to London if he could prevent it. The meeting of the Conference +was postponed and by the time the final arrangements in connection with +it had been made, negotiations for peace had begun and it became +necessary for Favre to remain in Paris. + +At the close of 1870, the bombardment of Paris had not yet begun: the +French hopes of military success were based upon Generals Chanzy and +Bourbaki; the German terms of peace were still unknown, and there was +every sign that the extreme Republicans were disposed to break with +Favre and Trochu and to perpetuate their power by war _à outrance_ and a +_loi des suspects_, or reign of terror. The most surprising feature in +the situation was that Russia, who had been in fact an active ally of +Prussia, by undertaking to watch Austria, and had obtained nothing +whatever for France, was in much higher favour than the other blameless +neutrals, it being fondly imagined that the Emperor Alexander's +influence would be successful in obtaining favourable peace terms; and +so adroitly did the Russians play their cards, that they persuaded +Moltke that the 'malevolent neutrality' of England was the sole cause of +the continuance of the war. Such at least was the purport of a +communication which the latter made to Mr. Odo Russell at Versailles. + + * * * * * + + Bordeaux, Jan. 7, 1871. + + The French claim a success at Bapaume, but prudent people are + already speculating on what the consequences of the fall of Paris + will be. It is very generally thought that Gambetta will place + himself at the head of the ultra-Republicans, throw himself into + Lyons, or some other southern town, and proclaim war and democracy + _à outrance_. But what will Bismarck do at Paris? Will he try to + obtain a government with whom he may make a reasonable peace, or + will he promote war and anarchy with a view to ruin France utterly, + and induce her to accept a monarch from his hand? In the former case + he will perhaps either summon the old Legislative Body, or get + together some meeting of Notables, who might appoint a provisional + government to sanction a National Constituent Assembly as soon as + possible, and in the meantime to treat upon the preliminaries of + peace. The Moderates and chiefs of the old parties (except the + ultra-Republican) might be not unwilling either to attend a summons + of the old Corps Législatif, or to some other temporary body; for + they are excessively dissatisfied with their present position, and + think they see symptoms of the approach of the reign of terror and + of a violent socialistic government. + + As for Bismarck's notion of bringing back the Emperor at the head of + the captive army, it is, I suppose, very doubtful whether the + Emperor would give in to it, still more doubtful whether the + released army would, and quite certain that the country would loathe + a sovereign thus imposed upon it. If however Bismarck is bent upon + it, it must be supposed that he intends to make some concessions to + the Emperor to make his return to France palatable to the nation. If + so, Belgium will be in danger, and Holland also, and Bismarck may + return to one of his former projects of coming to an understanding + with France, through the Emperor, and dealing with the small states + just as he pleases. I suppose Russia will look after Denmark as well + as she can. These dangers may seem visionary but I don't think they + are so visionary as to make it superfluous to consider how + they may be guarded against. Hateful as it would be to the towns and + the educated classes, to have a sovereign imposed upon them by + Prussia, it must not be forgotten that the peasants are still + Bonapartists, and that a plébiscite in favour of the Empire might be + managed. + + I think I have made them feel here that you have been very friendly + and considerate about Jules Favre. + +At the opening of the year 1871, the hope of relieving Paris depended +upon the three armies which the energy of Gambetta and the Government of +National Defence had created in the North, Centre, and West, and on +paper the prospects of the French were far from hopeless, for their +forces in numbers far exceeded those of the Germans. In Paris alone +there were supposed to be something like half a million fighting men, +and the three armies above mentioned amounted to between four and five +hundred thousand men. The Germans had 220,000 men in position round +Paris, their forces in the provinces were numerically inferior to the +French armies opposed to them, and the strain upon them must undoubtedly +have been severe. The quality of Gambetta's levies, however, was unequal +to the task, and as each of the French armies succumbed in turn, the +fall of Paris became inevitable. The bombardment, which had been +postponed as long as possible, in the hope that internal disorders would +precipitate the capitulation, began in January. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Bordeaux, January 12, 1871. + + If the telegraphic intelligence which is published as having come by + this balloon is to be depended upon, the Prussians have begun the + actual bombardment of the town of Paris itself, without giving + Diplomatists, Neutrals, or any other non-combatants a chance of + withdrawing. To say nothing of other feelings, this makes me very + uneasy about the English left in the place. Most of them have + perhaps only themselves to blame for staying in despite of warning + but there must be many who had valid reasons, or were without the + means to come away. + + People are very much alarmed as to what may happen inside the town + for the last two or three days, if a surrender become inevitable. + There are two or three hundred thousand people (workmen and their + families) who have a positive interest in the continuance of the + siege, during which they are supported by the Government without + being called upon to expose themselves, or at all events without in + fact exposing themselves to much danger. + + The intention of not listening to terms of peace, including any + cession of territory, whether Paris be taken or not, is as loudly + and as positively proclaimed here as ever. I am afraid Bismarck, who + certainly does not at all understand the French character, and who + does not appear to have a very delicate consideration for anybody's + feelings, may add to the difficulties of peace by the manner in + which his conditions are propounded, as well as by the substance of + them. + + The Diplomatists here are beginning to talk hypothetically of what + they should do if one or more Governments should be set up in France + on the fall of Paris. I do not think much good comes of giving + opinions beforehand on supposed cases. It is of course clear that + the Diplomatic Body cannot go wandering about France in the suite of + any set of men, who are not beyond dispute the _de facto_ Government + of the country. And I suppose, _caeteris paribus_, if there be a + Government in the Capital that must be taken to be the Government + for the time being. It is so impossible to foresee what will happen, + that I do not ask you for instructions. + + Chaudordy on the other hand, continues to press for the immediate + recognition of the Government of National Defence by England--saying + that they do not want any fresh letters of credence to be presented, + but would be quite satisfied with a simple note declaring that Her + Majesty's Government entered into official relations with the + existing Government in France. I conclude that Gambetta urges him to + do this, with a view to strengthen the position of the National + Defence Government or of what remains of it, if Paris falls; and on + the other hand Chaudordy himself would be very glad to have obtained + some decided result during his Administration of the _extra muros_ + foreign Department. He has certainly on the whole acted with skill + in a very difficult position, and France and the Government ought to + congratulate themselves on having him to act for them. I don't think + that Jules Favre or any member of the Government would have done + anything like as well. But in France more even than in other + countries a little éclat is more appreciated than years of useful + unobtrusive labour. + + Thiers has told me in the strictest confidence that when he was at + Versailles Bismarck offered to make peace on the basis of a + pecuniary indemnity, the retention of Strasburg and Alsace, and the + restoration to France of Metz and Lorraine. They seem to have + brought the matter sufficiently into shape to be submitted to the + Government at Paris. Thiers wanted Trochu, Picard and Jules Favre to + come to him to the outposts, but, as you may recollect, only Favre + came. Thiers offered to take upon himself the responsibility and + odium of signing a treaty on this basis, if the Government would + make him its plenipotentiary, but Favre declared that it would be + impossible even to mention any cession of territory even to the + people of Paris. + + The most astonishing thing to me perhaps is the buoyancy of the + French finances. I understand that the Government have by strong + persuasion obtained from the Banque de France a new loan (it is said + of upwards of twenty millions sterling) and this will keep them + going for the present. There is already however, some difficulty in + circulating the 'bons du Trésor' even at a discount. + + I had observed the advertisements in the second columns of the + _Times_ and thought of trying to get the paper occasionally into + Paris. In fact however the advertisers have exactly the same means + of sending letters and telegrams to Paris that I have. I will + nevertheless try. No special help can be expected from the + Government. It is only by using the thinnest paper and reducing the + despatches by means of photography that they can bring them within + the weight which pigeons or secret messengers are able to carry. + +There is no reason for doubting the correctness of this important +statement made by Thiers, and it only shows how much more competent he +was to conduct the negotiations than Jules Favre, and what a much better +judge he was of the real situation than Gambetta. It would indeed be one +of the ironies of history if the failure of Picard and Trochu to meet +him at the outposts on that eventful day in November was the cause of +the loss of a province to France, and of a vast addition to the war +indemnity. + +It was not long before a succession of hideous disasters demonstrated +the hopelessness of the French situation. General Chanzy, in command of +the army of the West, although in superior force, was completely +defeated at Le Mans on January 12th. On the 19th, the Northern army +under Faidherbe was defeated at St. Quentin and ceased practically to +take any further part in the war. On the same date a sortie from Paris +on a large scale was repulsed with heavy loss, and produced amongst +other results the resignation of Trochu, a sanguinary riot in the town, +and the liberation from prison of Flourens and other revolutionaries. +The crowning misfortune was the memorable _débâcle_ of Bourbaki, one of +the most tragic episodes in modern warfare. It was evident that further +resistance was useless, and the fictions which had so long sustained the +spirits of the defenders of Paris were finally destroyed. On January 23, +the unfortunate Jules Favre presented himself at Versailles and as there +was no further question of 'pas une pierre de nos forteresses etc.,' an +armistice was finally agreed to on the 28th. Under the provisions of the +armistice it was arranged that elections should be held as soon as +possible for a National Assembly in order that the question of the +continuance of the war, and upon what conditions peace should be made, +might be decided. Jules Favre, unlucky to the last, stipulated that the +National Guards should be permitted to retain their arms, a concession +which he had cause bitterly to regret before long. + +The news of the armistice was received at Bordeaux with rather less +indignation than had been expected, but Jules Favre was loudly denounced +for not having included in it Bourbaki's army, the fact being that +Bismarck, who was well aware of the ruin which threatened the force, had +expressly refused to do so. Gambetta, while not actually repudiating the +armistice, issued violent proclamations, loudly denouncing its authors, +declaring that his policy as Minister of War remained unchanged, and +urging that the period of the armistice should be employed in organizing +the forces which were destined to free France from the invaders. These +proclamations were followed by a decree in which the liberty-loving +democrat enacted that no person should be eligible for the new Assembly +who was connected with the royal families which had hitherto reigned in +France, or any one who had served in any capacity as an official under +the Empire. This outrageous proceeding produced a protest from Bismarck +on the ground that it was a violation of the freedom of election +stipulated in the armistice, and as Gambetta continued recalcitrant, the +Paris section of the Government of National Defence, which included, +amongst others, Favre, Trochu, and Jules Ferry, issued another decree on +February 4, annulling that of Gambetta. Representatives of the National +Defence Government from Paris arrived at Bordeaux on February 6, and +upon that day Gambetta resigned the office of Minister of War, and +Emmanuel Arago was appointed in his place. As Paris was now again in +communication with the outside world, the opportunity was taken, not +only of cancelling Gambetta's decrees, but of getting rid of the +Delegation Government, of which he had been the virtual dictator. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Bordeaux, Feb. 7, 1871. + + So far as we can judge here (and we have not very good means of + judging) the moderate Conservative 'Ticket' is likely to be carried + in most of the Elections. The result would be an assembly composed + of men who in their own hearts will wish for peace, and whose + Constituents will heartily wish for it. But there is always fear of + each individually thinking it necessary to express for himself in + public heroic sentiments, and of no one being willing to bell the + cat and sign or even vote for ratifying the Treaty. Much of course + will depend upon the terms. The cession of Alsace might possibly be + submitted to, if it were distinctly apparent that it was the only + means of saving Lorraine. The terms of the Armistice would make one + hope that Bismarck is at least willing to avoid propounding + conditions unnecessarily irritating. + + Probably the most prudent thing for France to do would be to accept + anything like reasonable terms of peace at once--for every day's + delay in the departure of the German troops from the country, + retards most seriously the beginning of the recovery from the + misfortunes military, political, and financial, which are exhausting + the springs of life. It is nevertheless very probable that the + Assembly, or the Government it appoints, will make a solemn official + appeal to Europe for its mediation. They may also ground a special + appeal to Europe on the plea that the people of the Provinces to be + ceded, ought to have a voice in the matter. In fact they have much + to say to Europe, to which it will be difficult to make an answer. + Bismarck, however, seems to be ready to snap his fingers at Europe. + + Chaudordy naturally declines as far as possible the responsibility + of talking or taking any measures, as he is now the servant of a + Government, whose existence will probably end in a few days. + Privately he urges strongly, with a view to public opinion in + France, that England should be very prompt in recognizing officially + the Government appointed by the Assembly. In this I think he is + right. + + Prudent men (Thiers included) appear to think that at all events as + a temporary measure, a moderate republic, as the form of Government + least likely to produce dissension should be adopted. Indeed, of the + various pretenders, no one I suppose would wish to be in any way + responsible for such a peace as must be concluded. Some people + indeed apprehend that the Assembly may be too conservative, or as it + is called, reactionary, but I don't think this need give any one but + the Rouges the least uneasiness. + + The appearance now is that Gambetta will not go beyond legal + opposition, and that he will content himself with putting himself at + the head of the ultra-democratic and '_guerre-à-outrance_' party in + the Assembly. In fact there is no symptom that an attempt to set + himself up, by the aid of the mob in the great towns, in opposition + to the Assembly would have any success. He is not himself by + character inclined to such courses, but he has people about him who + are. + + Jules Favre is fiercely attacked first for having concluded an + armistice which did not comprehend the Army of the East, and + secondly for not having mentioned this exception when he announced + the armistice to the Delegation here. This last proceeding (which I + attribute to his want of business-like habits), is of course utterly + indefensible. It may however have been rather convenient than + otherwise to Gambetta, as it enables him to attribute to this cause + the flight into Switzerland, which I suppose, the Army of the East + must at all events have been driven to. The attack against him for + not surrendering Paris at discretion, and stipulating nothing for + the Provinces, seems to me to be more unfair--for what would the + Provinces have said if he had let loose upon them the forces, which + after the occupation of the forts might have been spared from the + German Army round Paris. + + Barring accidents, there seems reason to hope that we shall tide + over the time to the meeting of the Assembly next week, pretty + quietly. + + At all events the suspension of the bloodshed and other horrors is a + relief which I feel every moment. Four Prussian shells fell into the + small convent near the Val de Grace at Paris in which I have a + niece--but providentially neither she nor any of her fellow nuns + were hurt. + +The elections to the new National Assembly took place on February 8, all +political groups participating, and resulted more or less in accordance +with general expectation. In Paris, where there were many abstentions, +extreme men like Louis Blanc, Victor Hugo, Gambetta and Rochefort were +returned, and the example of Paris was to some extent followed by the +big towns, but the general tone of the Assembly proved to be +conservative, and almost reactionary, the sole question submitted to the +candidates having been that of Peace or War. In effect, the feeling +apparently predominant in the minds of the majority of the electors was +aversion from the Government of National Defence, a feeling naturally +accentuated by the recent crushing disasters, and the result was to throw +discredit upon the Republican system of Government with which the +Ministers were identified. But although the Assembly was in reality +anti-Republican it was not the opinion of experienced politicians that +it would be advisable to proclaim a monarchy; still less, that any one +of the rival dynasties should be called immediately to the throne. On +the contrary, they considered that a republic, moderate in its +principles, and perhaps tacitly understood to be only temporary, would +best promote union for the present, and that under such a form of +Government it might be easier to obtain a ratification of such a peace +as appeared to be possible, and to carry the painful measures necessary +to give effect to it. It was also thought that if a monarchy were to be +established it would have a better chance of enduring if the dynasty +postponed its accession until the wounds from which the country was +suffering should begin to heal, and that the all-important choice of a +sovereign should be postponed to a calmer period. So far as could be +judged, if a dynasty were decided upon at all, the chances appeared to +be in favour of the House of Orleans, but there were nevertheless, +amongst the members returned, between one hundred and fifty to two +hundred Legitimist supporters of the Comte de Chambord, and not a few +Bonapartists. + +As for the all-important question of peace or war which the Assembly was +to be called upon to decide, it was evident that the majority of the +electors, in voting against the existing Government, intended to vote at +the same time for peace, and therefore the majority of the members +entered it with pacific intentions; but they were not prepared to vote +for peace at any price, and although conditions which would have been +scouted two months earlier were now considered to be worthy of +discussion, the exaction of immoderate and humiliating demands might +again arouse the spirit of desperate resistance, especially when argued +under the excitement produced by heated parliamentary debates. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Bordeaux, Feb. 10, 1871. + + Thiers, Dufaure, and Grévy are likely, so far as one can judge, + without knowing the result of the Paris elections, to take the lead + in the National Assembly. Grévy is avowedly a moderate Republican, + and the two others are for a moderate Republic, as a transitional + government to prepare the way for a Constitutional Monarchy. Such, + at least, are certainly Thiers's views, but I am speaking rather + without book about Dufaure. + + What I am most afraid of is that Bismarck's conditions may be so + hard as to turn the really pacific Assembly into a war _à outrance_ + one. The war could not in all probability go on long, but it might + give us three months more of bloodshed, destruction and misery, and + add to the difficulty of establishing eventually a good government + here. An Assembly elected two months ago would have been very + different from the present one, supposing one could have been + elected at all; but, two months ago, Gambetta would have been strong + enough to reject the armistice and refuse to convoke the Assembly. + His entourage had even now prepared warrants for arrest of his + colleagues, with a view to his assuming the Dictatorship and going + on with the war without an Assembly, but he is wiser and less wicked + than they. He will probably make a vigorous leader of the violent + Republican opposition in the Assembly. + + Of course under present circumstances I have nothing to do but to + stay here, as it will be for the present the seat of government. It + will be a comfort to have a whole real government, and not half a + one, to deal with. + + Chaudordy has at last come round to the opinion that a + plenipotentiary should be named to the Conference, simply to speak + for France on the Black Sea question, without any _arrière pensée_ + about bringing in other matters. He said he would telegraph as well + as he could _en clair_ to let Jules Favre know this. Bismarck will + not let telegrams in cypher through, and there are no more pigeons. + + What the French are craving for is some open, patent sympathy and + support from us. They would give us comparatively little thanks for + taking unostentatious steps in their favour with the Germans, though + such steps were much better calculated to obtain something for them. + +The extreme desirability of showing some evident sign of sympathy with +France was impressed upon Her Majesty's Government who were urged to +lose no time in doing so, with a view to the future relations between +the two countries. The French, who certainty are not less prone than +other nations in seeking to attribute a large share of their misfortunes +to the shortcomings of other people, were inclined to put the blame of +their calamities and disasters as much as possible, upon the Neutral +Powers, who had not interfered actively in their defence; and England, +who had certainly exerted herself more than any other Power in seeking +practical means for making peace attainable, was very unjustly singled +out for peculiar obloquy. This feeling had arisen partly because the +long alliance between the two countries had made the French expect more +from England than from others; partly because other Powers had +ingeniously represented that their own inertness had been caused by the +unwillingness of England to come forward, and had also, on various +occasions, put England forward as the leading Power among the Neutrals, +in order to give her the greatest share of the unpopularity which +accompanies neutrality. French feeling was, therefore, at the time +highly irritable on the subject of England, and it was suggested that a +good impression would be created if Her Majesty's Government would be +very prompt in recognizing whatever Government were adopted by the new +Assembly, even if it did not assume a permanent character. Another +suggestion was, that if the terms offered by the Germans appeared +unendurably hard, the French might make an appeal to the rest of Europe; +that appeal would probably take the form of a request for the mediation +of the Great Neutral Powers, or for the assembling of an European +Congress, and an immediate compliance on the part of England with either +of these requests would go far towards re-establishing good feeling. +Even if Germany rejected all intervention, this would not affect the +impression made by the action of England in responding to the appeal of +France, and although more could probably be obtained by the exercise of +quiet and unostentatious influence upon Germany, yet nothing that might +be obtained in that way would have anything like the same value in the +eyes of France as an open declaration of sympathy with her and an avowed +advocacy of her cause, even if no practical result followed. In short, +what was required, at that particular moment, was a policy of +sympathetic gush. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Bordeaux, Feb. 16, 1870. + + Your telegrams announcing that you have adjourned the Conference, + and that I may recognize the new Government immediately have been a + great satisfaction to me. I hope we shall bring French feeling round + to its old cordial state, if we can give them a little patent + sympathy in their misfortunes. The Commercial Treaty will be a + trouble hereafter, but it was in great danger even before the fall + of the Empire, and I hope will be let remain quiet until the time + approaches for giving the notice next February. + + I had a confidential conversation with Thiers last night. He seems + to have taken already _de facto_ the direction of affairs, and will + probably be given it _de jure_ by the Assembly to-morrow. He is very + anxious to keep the three fractions of the Chamber who are for order + at home and for a reasonable policy about peace together, in order + to resist the Reds. He means therefore to take moderate Republicans, + Legitimists and Orleanists into his Ministry. Jules Favre is to be + his Minister for Foreign Affairs, and there will of course be + moderate Orleanists and Legitimists. If Thiers can succeed in + getting the united support of Orleanists, Legitimists, and moderate + Republicans, he expects to have a working majority of nearly + three-quarters of the Assembly. I suppose his difficulty will arise + from the impatience of the Orleanists, who are believed to have + nearly half the seats in the Assembly, and who are impatient and + hungry after their long deprivation of the sweets of power. + + Thiers told me that he should take great pains to select men of + station and ability for his diplomatic appointments. In furtherance + of his policy of conciliating all parties, he supports M. Grévy, a + moderate Republican, for the Presidency of the Assembly. + + I like Jules Favre and have a good opinion of his character, but I + don't think that he has hitherto shown himself to be skilful as a + diplomatist or a negotiator. Thiers says however that he now gets on + extremely well with Bismarck. There is however a very general + opinion that Thiers means to go himself to Versailles to negotiate + the Peace. He did not give me to understand that he intended to do + so, and there are serious inconveniences in the head of the + Government's being away from the Assembly and the centre of affairs, + to say nothing of the ordinary objections to the chief of a + Government conducting negotiations in his own person. + + The feeling in the Assembly yesterday when Alsace and Lorraine were + mentioned was strong and universal, and gives reason to doubt + whether they will even now be brought to vote a cession of + territory. In that case I suppose the only remedy would be a + plébiscite, if a cession of territory is absolutely insisted upon. + The Assembly might refer the question to the people, and I suppose + that, in their present mood, the great majority of the population + voting secretly, would vote Peace and not War, and that the vote + might be taken in a very short time. I don't know however what the + Germans would say to the notion, and I don't think such a plan of + throwing off the responsibility worthy of the Assembly, or a happy + precedent for Parliamentary Government. + + Of what Thiers means to do respecting the definitive government of + the country, he gave me no hint. His present policy is to try and + get France out of her present straits by the united help of all the + reasonable parties, and not to give any indication as to the future + which might have the effect of alienating any of them. + +As had been expected, Thiers proceeded himself to Versailles to +negotiate the Peace preliminaries. He was obviously the person best +fitted to do so, for he was at once the most moderate and capable +amongst Frenchmen, the least unwilling to make terms in conformity with +the exigencies of the situation, and the only man in a position to carry +his way in the Assembly. + +On February 26, the preliminaries of Peace were signed and contained +even harsher conditions than had been anticipated, but the military +position of France was so absolutely hopeless that resistance to them +was impracticable. The war indemnity was reduced from six milliards to +five, but this constituted the sole success of the French negotiators, +unless the formal entry of the German troops into Paris might be taken +as a somewhat barren substitute for the restoration of Belfort; certain +matters of detail, chiefly connected with finance, were postponed for +future consideration at Frankfort. + +In view of what has already been written respecting the secret +negotiations which took place during the campaign, it is impossible not +to be struck with the heroic folly displayed by the French in the latter +stages of the war. If it is true that their gallant struggle under the +stimulus of Gambetta and the Government of National Defence inspired the +admiration of the world, it is equally obvious that human life and +treasure were ruthlessly wasted in a hopeless cause. Bismarck, it is +well known, was strongly opposed to any accession of territory, beyond +what was absolutely necessary, and would have much preferred a pecuniary +compensation. If, instead of following the lead of Gambetta, the +counsels of Thiers had been adopted, peace would have been made long +before the fall of Paris became imminent; millions of money would have +been saved, thousands of lives would not have been uselessly sacrificed, +and Lorraine would have remained French instead of becoming the chief +contributory cause towards undying hatred of the German people. + +Thiers returned to Bordeaux upon the accomplishment of his melancholy +mission, and a debate took place in the Assembly on the question of the +ratification of the Peace preliminaries. The discussion gave opportunity +for much recrimination and for much display of emotion, especially on +the part of Victor Hugo, but Thiers's success was a foregone conclusion +and the Peace preliminaries were accepted by 546 votes to 107. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Bordeaux, March 2, 1871. + + I suppose we may say peace at last. I hear that the discoveries made + by the Committees on the Military Forces and on the Finances were so + overwhelming, as to convince every member that defence was + absolutely impossible. This reduced the debate yesterday to mere + idle vapouring on the part of the Opposition. One speech was simply + absurd--that of Victor Hugo. The rest were perhaps fair speeches, + but there was no eloquence worthy of the occasion, and there was an + evident unreality about the Opposition. The majority had determined + not to speak. Thiers's few words were very telling; no one but + Thiers could have got so many to vote; the fear was that a great + number would abstain from voting, and so the Ratification would + either not be carried at all, or be carried by too small a majority + to pledge the country. + + Chaudordy did not vote, he hankered to the last after an appeal to + the Neutral Powers. Even supposing the Germans would have given time + by prolonging the Armistice, which they certainly would not, I don't + think France would have gained anything by the appeal. Either + Bismarck would have peremptorily refused to let the Neutrals have + anything to say; or, if, _par impossible_, he had made some + concessions, he would in return of course have required them to + acquiesce explicitly in his other terms; and this, I think, would + have been as bad for France, and worse for the dignity of the + Neutrals themselves, than the present state of things. At least we + are free from any sort of sign of approval of the monstrous + conditions Prussia has imposed by sheer force. + + How France is to be governed, and how the milliards are to be paid, + are hard questions. The majority of the Assembly, which is decidedly + anti-republican, hardly expects to establish a Government to its + taste, without some actual fighting with the Reds in Paris and other + large towns. It therefore does not at all like the idea of moving + the Assembly to Paris. Thiers, I think, wishes to go to Paris, or at + least to move the Assembly to some place near enough to enable the + Executive Government to be carried on in Paris. The inconveniences + of the present roving system are manifold; and I cannot help + thinking that the sooner the Government settles in the Capital, and + has its fight (if fight there really must be) with the Mob over, the + better. + + As to what the New Government is to be, there would, with the + present Assembly in its present mood, be, one would think, little + difficulty in getting a large majority for a Monarchy, if the fusion + between the Legitimists and the Orleanists were once decidedly and + irrevocably made, and I suppose the Moderate Republicans would not + hold aloof from such a Government, provided it was _bonâ fide_ + parliamentary. Thiers, I believe, still thinks that for the present + a Moderate Republic is the best compromise between all opinions, and + the form of Government which least disunites Frenchmen. He has now + immense influence, but the claimants of the throne and their + supporters in the Assembly seem to be already impatient; and Thiers + will have nothing but painful measures to bring forward, and will be + accused of desiring to perpetuate his own power. + + I am afraid our Commercial Treaty is in the greatest danger. With + Thiers as head of the Government and as Minister of Finance, and the + popular feeling hostile to free trade and not in good humour with + England, it will be strange if we hold our own about the Treaty, or + a liberal tariff in France. It was indeed very doubtful whether the + Treaty could be maintained even under the Constitutional Empire. + + Grant's Message has for the moment turned the wrath of the French + from the Neutrals to the Americans. It is strange that the + Americans, who are so abominably thin skinned themselves, never show + the least consideration for the national feelings of other Peoples. + The French are, of course, peculiarly sensitive at this moment, and + prone to resent anything like a demonstration of disregard for them. + I am truly thankful that you stopped Walker's entering Paris with + the Germans. + + I have not been able to speak to Thiers since he came back, but I am + going to present my letters of Credence to him this evening. + +The harshness of the peace conditions shocked Lord Granville, who +thought them not only intolerable to France, but a dangerous menace to +the sacred idol of free trade. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._ + + Foreign Office, March 1, 1871. + + _Vae Victis_ indeed! How hard the conquerors have been, and what a + mistake in a great country like Germany to give up all direction of + its affairs to one bold unscrupulous man! + + We do not believe in France being able to bear the burden which has + been put upon her. + + I presume one of the results will be to put protectionist duties on + all imported articles. I do not think we should complain much. We + shall lose to a certain degree, but infinitesimally as compared with + France. You had better, in conversation with Thiers, and others, say + that you shall regret it on French account. They want money, which + is to be chiefly got in England. Here, rightly or wrongly, we + believe that protective duties are most injurious to the revenue to + which money-lenders look for their interest. If it is known that + Thiers means to go in for large armaments and for protection, + self-interest will shut up the hoards here. + +Peace having now at length been assured, there arose the question of +where the new Assembly was to establish itself, and as there was an only +too well-founded suspicion that Paris was no place for a conservative +chamber with a hankering after a monarchy, Versailles was eventually +selected. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Bordeaux, March 6, 1871. + + Thiers asked me yesterday whether I thought it would be advisable + for him to bring the state of affairs between France and Germany + before the Conference in London. + + I did not very well see what there was to submit to the Conference, + as the preliminaries of peace were signed and could not be altered. + I thought it however better to avoid any discussion on this point, + and to say decidedly that in my opinion it would be very unadvisable + to do anything of the kind. I told him that I thought it would be a + particularly bad opportunity to take, if he wished to consult the + European Powers; that the German Plenipotentiary would say, and say + with reason, that his Government had entered into a Conference for a + specific purpose and was not to be entrapped into an extraneous + discussion, that in this view he would no doubt be strongly + supported by the Russian, and that probably none of the + Plenipotentiaries would approve of a proceeding, which would + certainly retard the business for which the Conference had met, and + might very likely break it off altogether. + + I think Thiers rather asked my opinion pour 'l'acquit de sa + conscience,' than from having himself any strong desire to attempt + to bring his affairs before the Conference. At any rate he gave a + very conclusive argument against doing so himself, for he said that + it might have the effect of delaying the Prussian evacuation of the + neighbourhood of Paris. + + He hopes to get the half milliard necessary to get the Prussians out + of the forts on the North side of the Seine, before the end of the + month. He speaks altogether more hopefully of the financial + prospects than any one else whom I have heard. He says Bismarck was + extremely hard about the money, and that the negociation was nearly + broken off altogether on the question of Belfort. On this question + he believes Bismarck was with him, and had a tremendous fight to + obtain leave from the Emperor and Moltke to make the concession. + Strange as it may appear Thiers seems really to have a sort of + liking for Bismarck personally, and to believe that if he had been + let have his own way by the _militaires_, he would have been much + kinder to France. + + It has been generally supposed that the Assembly will adjourn to + Versailles, and St. Germain has also been mentioned; but Thiers told + me yesterday that he should himself propose Fontainebleau. He would + like himself to take it to Paris, as soon as the Prussians are out + of the forts, but the majority will not hear of putting themselves + so near the Belleville mob. I think it will be a great mistake not + to go to Paris, and I hope Thiers will pluck up a spirit, and carry + his point. He said something about being glad to have me near him at + Fontainebleau, but I do not know that it was more than a compliment. + At any rate I am myself strongly of opinion that the best thing for + me to do is to go to Paris as soon as possible, and re-establish the + Embassy there on the normal footing. If there should be (which I + doubt) any necessity for my going to Thiers or Fontainebleau or + elsewhere for more than a few hours at a time I should still propose + to have the headquarters of the Embassy in the Faubourg St. Honoré + and to treat my own occasional absence as accidental. In fact to act + as I did when invited to Compiègne in the Emperor's time. I hope to + be in Paris by the end of this week, or at latest, the beginning of + next. + +The Ambassador and his staff returned to Paris on March 14, finding the +Embassy quite uninjured, no traces of the siege in the neighbourhood, +and the town merely looking a little duller than usual. They were +enchanted to be back, and little suspected that in three or four days +they would again be driven out. + +Previous attempts on the part of the Red Republicans to overthrow the +Government of National Defence during the siege had met with failure, +but Favre's stipulation that the National Guards should be permitted to +retain their arms gave the Revolutionary Party its opportunity. The new +Government was obviously afraid to act, and matters came to a crisis +when an ineffectual and half-hearted attempt was made to remove some +guns which had been seized by National Guards. Regular troops brought up +against the latter refused to fight and fraternized with their +opponents; two generals were shot under circumstances of great +brutality, a Revolutionary Central Committee took possession of the +Hotel de Ville and proclaimed the Commune, and the Government withdrew +such regular troops as remained faithful to Versailles. On March 18, the +insurgents were completely masters of the right bank of the Seine, and +on the following day an emissary from the French Foreign Office appeared +at the Embassy with the information that the Government had been forced +to retire to Versailles, and that as it was no longer able to protect +the Diplomatic Body at Paris, it was hoped that the Representatives of +Foreign Powers would also repair to Versailles with the least possible +delay. Nearly all of these did so at once, but Lord Lyons with his +pronounced sedentary tastes had had quite enough of moving about and +decided to wait for instructions. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Paris, March 20, 1871. + + We are in a strange state indeed. How it will end, who shall say. + The Prussians may be glad of a chance to wipe away the absurdity of + their three days' occupation by a more serious entrance, and it may + suit their rulers to put down Belleville, with a view to checking + the progress of Republicanism. I should think however it would be + wiser of them with their hatred of France, to leave the Parisians to + accomplish their own ruin. + + A good many National Guards have gone out towards Versailles, + whether with the view of making a serious attack on the Government + and the Assembly remains to be seen. It seems to be doubtful whether + there are _any_ troops, except perhaps the Papal Zouaves on + whom the Government can depend. + + The proclamations of the Central Committee in the _Journal + Officiel_, which I send you officially, are worth reading. They seem + to me to be in form much more calm, dignified and sensible than the + proclamations of the Government of National Defence used to be. In + substance they are not specimens of political knowledge and wisdom. + + It is to be hoped that the Assembly will not make matters worse by + violent and ill-considered resolutions. I suppose it will be furious + with Thiers for having brought it to Versailles, and it is on the + cards that it may be really attacked there to-day by the Parisians. + Any way, I should not be at all surprised if the Assembly + transferred itself to some dismal French provincial town. + +Instructions, however, were shortly received to proceed to Versailles, +and he betook himself there on the 21st, taking with him Wodehouse and +Sheffield, and leaving Malet, Colonel Claremont, Lascelles,[27] and +Saumarez[28] at the Embassy. + +At Versailles complete ignorance appeared to prevail as to the actual +situation; Jules Favre knew nothing, and either the Government had no +plan or was not prepared to disclose it; but, as, at all events, during +the early stage of the conflict, railway communication with Versailles +was not interrupted, it was possible to come up to Paris occasionally at +the risk of being seized by the Communists as a spy, and see how matters +were progressing. + +Thiers, in the early days of the Civil War affected to believe that the +revolt would speedily be brought to a satisfactory termination, and the +knowledge that he personally was largely responsible for the existing +situation doubtless prompted him to minimise the danger as much as +possible. By withdrawing the regular troops to Versailles, he had left +the well-disposed inhabitants of Paris at the mercy of an armed +revolutionary mob, and if a renewed bombardment or fresh Prussian +occupation of the town was the result, the fault would have been largely +his. The Assembly too found itself in a ridiculous position; it had been +brought to Versailles because it had been represented that the +Administration could not be carried on away from the capital, and no +sooner did it arrive at Versailles than the whole Government was driven +out of Paris. + +The optimism with which Thiers viewed the progress of events in Paris +was not shared by onlookers at Versailles. They could not help seeing +that the members of the Central Committee were continually gaining +ground, and had now obtained control of the whole or very nearly the +whole of the city: that the slaughter of the 'Men of Order' in the Rue +de la Paix on March 22, had left the Red Republicans the masters of the +day, and that the communal elections on March 26, had given a semblance +of regular authority to the revolutionaries. Thiers, who had taken the +whole management of the affair into his own hands, and was still +unwilling to use force, now endeavoured to conciliate the Communists by +a proclamation conceding complete recognition of the municipal +franchise, the right to elect all officers of the National Guard, +including the Commander-in-Chief; a modification of the law on the +maturity of bills of exchange, and a prohibition to house owners and +lodging-house keepers to give their lodgers notice to quit. These +concessions to blackmail were, however, considered insufficient by the +implacable revolutionary leaders, and negotiations broke down when it +was demanded that the Communal Council should supersede the Assembly +whenever the two bodies might come into collision, and that the control +of finance should be vested in the former. It was evident that civil war +could no longer be avoided, and in view of the doubts which existed +respecting the reliability of the army at Versailles, the gravest +apprehensions were felt as to the result of the struggle. Lord Granville +was convinced that the Prussians would re-enter Paris and restore the +Empire, although the Emperor, while praising the Prussians in the course +of a conversation with the Duke of Cambridge, had recently stated that +no one could remain in France who was brought there by the enemy. + +On March 28, the Commune was proclaimed with much pomp and emblematic +ceremony in which Phrygian caps were conspicuous, and a series of +decrees appeared shortly in the _Journal Officiel_, which announced the +abolition of conscription, but the compulsory enrolment of all +able-bodied men in the National Guard; a remission of lodger's rents; +the suspension of the sale of all articles deposited in pawn; and the +supersession of the Government at Versailles. A vast number of persons +quitted the city before the end of the month, and of those who remained, +there were probably many, who, apart from their political sentiments, +heartily welcomed so convenient a release from embarrassing liabilities. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Versailles, March 30, 1871. + + The Commune are going ahead in Paris. The great comfort the + Government and the Assembly here have, is that the similar movements + in other great towns have failed, and that thus it is plainly Paris + against all France. Their great hope appears to be that the members + of the Commune will quarrel among themselves, and that their social + measures may be so thoroughly socialist, as to rouse resistance + among the Parisians. In the meantime however the delay seems + dangerous; the working classes are said to be going over more and + more completely to the Commune, and the effect of a completely + successful revolution in Paris on the other towns may yet be + serious. Bismarck is said to have given Thiers a limited time (a + fortnight or three weeks) to set things straight, and to have + declared that, when that time is up, the Germans must step in. + +As a matter of fact, the conduct of the Germans does not seem to have +left anything to be desired. They allowed the numbers of the French +troops, which had been fixed under the armistice at 40,000, to be +indefinitely increased: they gave facilities for the return of the +prisoners in Germany, and even gave the French Government to understand +that the assistance of German troops might be counted upon if necessary. +Tact is not generally supposed to be a marked German characteristic, but +Thiers admitted to Lord Lyons that the 'offer had been made with so much +tact and delicacy, that, while of course it could not be accepted, the +Government had been able to pass it by, without appearing to understand +it.' + +In the meanwhile, in spite of much dissatisfaction, Thiers was determined +not to be hurried, and both he and Jules Favre declined to believe +either that there was any danger of excesses being committed at Paris, +or that the Commune was gaining strength in consequence of the delay. +These opinions were not in the least shared by the public at large; the +general impression being that each day's delay added to the strength of +the Commune, discouraged the party of order and increased the +exasperation of that party against the Government and the National +Assembly; it was believed too that if excesses were committed they would +inspire the well-disposed citizens with terror rather than with a spirit +of resistance. + +Fortunately for the cause of order, the Communists soon afforded an +opportunity for testing the temper of the Versailles troops. On April 2, +the National Guards came into collision with the regulars at Courbevoic, +were heavily worsted, and such prisoners as were taken were summarily +shot. The engagement showed that the army could be depended upon, and +that there need be no further fears with regard to a policy of resolute +repression; nevertheless there was little sign on the part of Thiers of +following up the success that had been gained, and he made the +remarkable excuse that the military ignorance of the insurgents and the +eccentricity of their movements rendered military operations against +them correspondingly difficult. Little progress had been made towards +the end of April, although righteous retribution had overtaken Thiers in +the invasion of his house in the Place St. Georges, and in the violation +by National Guards of the sanctity of the apartment of his +mother-in-law. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Versailles, April 21, 1871. + + I suppose we shall get back to Paris, or to the ruins of it, some + day; and certainly the affairs of the Commune are looking more + gloomy than they did, but I must leave to Thiers the responsibility + of the perpetually renewed declaration that we shall be there in a + few days. The sooner it comes the better, for the delay is very + dangerous for Thiers himself and for the country. The great towns in + the south will hardly be kept under if Paris remains in rebellion + much longer, and Thiers will find it very difficult to hold back the + monarchical majority in the Assembly. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Versailles, April 25, 1871. + + I don't hear any guns, but I suppose after what Thiers said to me + last night, that the grand attack upon Fort Issy is going on. I + shall go or send to some safe point of view, as soon as I get the + Messenger off. + + It was high time to begin, for the apparent weakness of the + Government is producing lamentable effects. Colonel Playfair's + reports of the spread of a very serious insurrection in Algeria are + confirmed by recent telegrams, and there is said to be rather an + alarming movement in Savoy, not with a view to reunion with Italy, + but rather to a junction with Switzerland. + + I do not trouble you with any of the programmes for the attack on + Paris which are in everybody's mouth here. The favourite notion is + that, with or without getting their half milliard, the Germans are + to give up the forts, or all of them except St. Denis, to the + French; who are then either to attack Paris on the north, or to + complete the investment of it. Military big-wigs say that Thiers has + not men enough to carry out such a plan. Financial authorities say + that he has no chance of obtaining the money till he is already + master of Paris; and Jules Favre says positively that Paris will not + be bombarded or blockaded. The value to be given to this affirmation + of Jules Favre cannot go beyond there being no _present_ intentions + to make a regular general bombardment or to reduce the place by + famine. I urge him and Thiers to give warning in time to enable + foreigners to withdraw, but I doubt the foreigners getting any + warning beyond that which Malet has given already, and I doubt the + English being persuaded to go; but I shall do all I can about it. + +The bombardment, in spite of Jules Favre's assurance, took place +shortly, and did infinitely more harm than that of the Germans. Amongst +other buildings which suffered was the Embassy, but until the closing +days of the struggle in May, those members of the staff who had been +left there, appear to have suffered no inconvenience; and the relations +of Malet with the self-constituted officials of the Commune were +perfectly amicable, as far as can be judged. Malet, whose management of +a trying situation was marked by much good sense and tact, found no +difficulty in getting on with Paschal Grousset, the Délègué aux Affaires +Etrangères (also described by his adversaries as _Etranger aux +Affaires_), and his relations with this important personage were no +doubt greatly facilitated by a brother who acted as private secretary: +'a very pleasant little fellow, willing to put his brother's signature +to anything.' Paschal Grousset had good reason to congratulate himself +subsequently upon the pains which he had taken to ensure the safety of +foreigners in Paris and for the friendly disposition which he had shown. +When the Versailles troops obtained possession of the city, he was +captured and would in all probability have been shot in company with +other Communist leaders if unofficial representations in his favour had +not been made by Lord Lyons. He was transported, but subsequently +returned to Paris under an amnesty, and, years after, was the cause of a +comic incident at the house of a lady formerly connected with the +British Embassy. This lady, hearing a terrific uproar in her anteroom, +came out to see what was the matter and found Paschal Grousset engaged +in a violent altercation with her _maître d'hôtel_. It turned out that +the latter, who was an ex-gendarme, had been in charge of Paschal +Grousset when the latter was seized by the Versailles Government, and +that he now strongly resented his former prisoner appearing in the +character of an ordinary visitor. + +One of the most abominable acts of the Commune had been the seizure of +the Archbishop of Paris, together with a number of priests, and the +holding of them as hostages for the good treatment of Communist +prisoners. No secret was made of the fact that under certain +circumstances they would be shot, and efforts were set on foot by +various parties--the American Minister, the British Government, and the +German authorities--to prevent so horrible a catastrophe. The +intervention of the American Minister, Mr. Washburne, only caused +irritation. 'They are very angry here with Mr. Washburne,' wrote Lord +Lyons on April 28, 'for interfering about the Archbishop, and they are +still more displeased with him for being so much in Paris. In fact, +although he has a room here he is much more in Paris than at Versailles. +Thiers observed to me last night that my American colleague had a +_conduite très singulière_. They would not stand this in a European +representative, but they allow a great latitude to the American, partly +because he and his Government have nothing to say to European politics, +and partly because they cannot well help it.' An attempt made by +direction of Lord Granville met with no better success, for the +Versailles Government firmly refused to make the exchange of the +revolutionary leader Blanqui, asked for by the Commune, and would only +go so far as to promise in private, that the latter's life should be +spared under certain circumstances. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Versailles, May 16, 1871. + + The poor Archbishop has been constantly in my thoughts, both before + I received your letter of the 13th and since. The state of the case + is simply this. The Commune will not release him on any other terms + than the release of Blanqui; and the Government positively refuses + to give up Blanqui. Every one agrees that intervention with the + Commune is worse than useless; in fact does harm. You will see from + my Confidential Despatch of to-day, that I have gone as far as + possible with Thiers on the subject, but without success. I cannot + hope that I have done any good, but I have certainly done no harm. + Thiers spoke to me freely and confidentially, but absolutely refused + (or rather said positively that it was impossible) to give up + Blanqui. I perhaps went rather far in speaking to M. Thiers even in + the way I did, but I think it will be a comfort to remember that we + did all that could be done. + + I understand that the Archbishop does not suffer any positive + hardship or privation beyond being kept a close prisoner, but I fear + his health is giving way in some degree under the pressure of + anxiety and confinement. + + Perhaps the most painful feature in the whole matter has been the + conduct of the Vicar General, the Abbé Lagarde, who was sent to + Versailles on parole to negociate the release of the Archbishop. + Notwithstanding the entreaties of the Archbishop himself, and the + exhortations of everyone here, he declined to redeem his promise and + has thereby materially injured the Archbishop's position, and given + force to the Communist pretext that no trust can be put in priests. + I am afraid he is still out of Paris. + +Jules Favre was also approached on the subject, but nothing could be got +out of him, and the only chance of success seemed to depend upon a +peremptory demand of the Germans for his release, the Commune being +completely at their mercy. This action the German authorities found +themselves unable to take, and in spite of the frequently expressed +opinions of Thiers and others that the lives of the hostages were in no +real danger, they were all massacred in cold blood during the final days +of the street fighting. + +By the middle of May, most people were of opinion that there was nothing +to prevent the troops entering Paris whenever they pleased, and that the +sooner they did so, the less resistance they would encounter. Thiers, +however, still refused to run any risks, and it was not until nearly the +close of the month that the insurrection was completely suppressed, +amidst scenes almost unprecedented in modern times. + + * * * * * + + _Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._ + + Versailles, May 26, 1871. + + The state of Paris is heart-breaking. The night I spent there (24th) + was calculated to give one an idea of the infernal regions. Fires in + all directions, the air oppressive with smoke and unpleasant odours, + the incessant roar of cannon and musketry and all kinds of strange + sounds. For the 48 hours before my arrival, the members of the + Embassy and all in the house were in imminent danger; a fire raging + in the next street but one, shells falling on the roof which might + set fire to the house at any moment, and shot flying so fast on both + sides that escape in case of fire would have been hardly possible. + It is a great satisfaction to me that every one in the house behaved + well. Of the members of the Embassy I was quite sure, and all the + men servants appeared to have shown pluck and alacrity in rushing to + the places where the shells fell, in order to extinguish the fire in + case of need. Malet has a first-rate head, and directed everything + with his usual coolness and self-possession. + + One bit of a shell is said to have fallen in the garden yesterday + morning, but it certainly did no mischief, and there was no + appearance of danger while I was there. I cannot, however, feel + quite comfortable so long as the insurgents hold the Buttes de + Chaumont. They must, I should hope, be on the point of being driven + out at the moment I write. Little or no intelligence of what was + going on in the town could be obtained. The least inconvenience on + leaving one's own house was to be seized upon to form a chain to + hand buckets. Sentries stopped our progress in almost every + direction: arrests were frequent and summary executions the order of + the day. I hope it will really all be over by to-night. Sad as it + all is, I felt a satisfaction in finding myself in the old house + again, and am impatient to return to it for good. I hope to do so + directly I can without cutting myself off from uninterrupted + communication with you. + + The fate of the hostages is what makes me the most anxious now. All + the accounts we do receive are hopeful, but we have no positive + assurance of their being safe. The Nuncio came back from his + expedition to the Crown Prince of Saxony much pleased with himself + for having undertaken it, and very grateful to me for having + suggested it. He was referred by the Crown Prince to General + Fabrice, who told him, that by order of Prince Bismarck, he was + doing all that could be done to save the Archbishop. He even hinted + that he had tried offers of money. + + Thiers is trying the patience of the Assembly by keeping in office + Jules Favre, Picard and Jules Simon, who were members of the + Government of National Defence and of the violent Republican + opposition under the Empire. The contempt and disgust of the + Parisians of every shade of opinion for the Government of National + Defence appears unbounded. They consider it to have been a + Government which had neither courage nor capacity, and was equally + inefficient in defending the city against the enemy, and maintaining + order and authority inside. By the country at large, and still more, + by the monarchical representatives in the Assembly, the members of + that Government, by their conduct before and after the 4th September + are held to have been the cause of all the present horrors. + + Notwithstanding all this, Thiers seems to rule the Assembly + completely, however much the members may grumble in private. His + troubles with them will begin when Paris is at last subdued. + + I went to Favre with the offer of the firemen directly the telegram + was decyphered. He took it up to Thiers who immediately accepted it. + +The Commune, which terminated in an orgy of blood, flame, and insensate +fury, had lasted for rather more than two months. Amongst those who +originated the movement were some who honestly believed that they were +merely advocating municipal freedom, and others who thought that the +existence of the Republic was threatened by a reactionary Assembly; but +the control eventually fell into the hands of revolutionaries whose aim +it was to destroy the foundations of society. It showed human nature at +its worst, and the ferocity of the reprisals on the part of the +Government created almost as much repulsion as the outrages which had +provoked them. Now, however, with the restoration of order, a new era +was about to dawn; the ceaseless disasters which had overwhelmed the +country since the end of July, 1870, had come to an end, and within an +almost incredibly short period, France recovered that place amongst the +great nations of the world, which seemed at one time to have been +irretrievably lost. + + +FOOTNOTES: + + [23] Representative at Tours of the French Foreign Office. + + [24] 'Memoirs of Sir Robert Morier.' + + [25] Minister at Madrid; subsequently Ambassador at Constantinople. + + [26] Col. the Honble. Percy Fielding. + + [27] Now Sir Frank Lascelles, G.C.B. + + [28] Now Lord de Saumarez. + + +END OF VOL. I. + +PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND BECCLES + +Telegrams: "Scholarly, London." + +Telephone: No. 1883 Mayfair. + +41 and 43 Maddox Street, Bond Street, London, W. _September, 1913_. + + + + +Mr. Edward Arnold's + +AUTUMN ANNOUNCEMENTS, 1913. + + * * * * * + +LORD LYONS. + +A Record of British Diplomacy. + +By the Right Hon. LORD NEWTON. + +_With Portraits. In Two Volumes._ =30s. net.= + + +The late Lord Lyons was not only the most prominent but the most trusted +English diplomatist of his day, and so great was the confidence felt in +his ability that he was paid the unique compliment of being offered the +post of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. + +Lord Newton, who has now undertaken the task of preparing a memoir of +him, enjoys the advantage of having served under him for five years at +the Paris Embassy. The interest of this work lies, however, less in the +personality of the Ambassador than in the highly important events in +which he played so prominent a part. + +Lord Lyons was the British representative at Washington during the +period of the Civil War; subsequently he was Ambassador at +Constantinople for two years; and finally he spent twenty years--from +1867 to 1887--as Ambassador at Paris. During the whole of this eventful +period his advice was constantly sought by the Home Government upon +every foreign question of importance, and his correspondence throws +fresh light upon obscure passages in diplomatic history. + +In this book will be found hitherto unpublished information relating to +such matters as the critical relations between England and the United +States during the course of the Civil War; the political situation in +France during the closing years of the Second Empire; the secret attempt +made by the British Foreign Secretary to avert the Franco-German War, +and the explanation of its failure; the internal and external policy of +France during the early years of the Third Republic; the War Scare of +1875; the Congress of Berlin; the Egyptian Expedition; Anglo-French +political relations, and many other matters of interest. + +The method selected by the writer has been to reproduce all important +correspondence verbatim, and it may be confidently asserted that the +student of foreign politics will find in this work a valuable record of +modern diplomatic history. + + * * * * * + +LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD. 41 & 43 MADDOX STREET W. + + + + +THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE WILLIAM FREDERICK, FOURTH EARL OF +CLARENDON. + +By the Right Hon. Sir HERBERT MAXWELL, Bart. + +_In Two Volumes, With Portraits. Demy 8vo._ =30s. net.= + + +Born in the year 1800 and dying in 1870, Lord Clarendon lived through a +period of social, political, and economic change more rapid probably +than had been witnessed in any similar space of time in the previous +history of mankind. It was his lot, moreover, to wield considerable +influence over the course of affairs, inasmuch as his public service, +extending over fifty years, caused him to be employed in a succession of +highly responsible, and even critical, situations. British Minister at +Madrid at the outbreak and during the course of the Carlist Civil War +from 1833 to 1839, he was admitted into Lord Melbourne's Cabinet +immediately upon returning to England in the latter year. He was Lord +Lieutenant of Ireland throughout the memorable famine years, 1847-1852. +Relieved of that arduous post, Lord Clarendon entered Lord Aberdeen's +government in 1852 as Foreign Secretary, which office he retained +through the Crimean War, and became responsible for the terms of the +Treaty of Paris in 1856. On Lord Palmerston's death in 1865, he returned +to the Foreign Office, and had to deal with the settlement of the +"Alabama" claims. + +The annals of the first half of Queen Victoria's reign having been +pretty thoroughly explored and dealt with by many competent writers, the +chief interest in these pages will be found in Lord Clarendon's private +correspondence, which has been well preserved, and has been entrusted to +Sir Herbert Maxwell for the purpose of this memoir. Lord Clarendon was +a fluent and diligent correspondent; Charles Greville and others among +his contemporaries frequently expressed a hope that his letters should +some day find their way into literature. Sir Arthur Helps, for instance, +wrote as follows in _Macmillan's Magazine_: "Lord Clarendon was a man +who indulged, notwithstanding his public labours, in an immense private +correspondence. There were some persons to whom, I believe, he wrote +daily, and perhaps in after years we shall be favoured--those of us who +live to see it--with a correspondence which will enlighten us as to many +of the principal topics of our own period." It is upon this +correspondence that Sir Herbert Maxwell has chiefly relied in tracing +the motives, principles, and conduct of one of the last Whig statesmen. +Among the letters dealt with, and now published for the first time, are +those from Lord Melbourne, Lord Palmerston, Lord Aberdeen, Lord Derby, +M. Thiers, M. Guizot, the Emperor Louis Napoleon, etc., and many ladies. + + + + +WILLIAM AUGUSTUS, DUKE OF CUMBERLAND, HIS EARLY LIFE AND TIMES, 1721-1748. + +By the Hon. EVAN CHARTERIS, + +AUTHOR OF "AFFAIRS OF SCOTLAND, 1744-1746." + +_With Plans and Illustrations._ =12s. 6d. net.= [_In preparation._ + + +Mr. Charteris has a good subject in "Butcher" Cumberland, not only on +account of the historical and romantic interest of his background, but +also by reason of the Duke's baneful reputation. + +In the present volume the author has carried the career of the Duke of +Cumberland down to the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. The period includes the +Duke's campaigns in Flanders against Marshal Saxe, the Battle of +Culloden, and the measures taken for the suppression of the Jacobites in +Scotland. Mr. Charteris has had the exceptional advantage of studying +the Cumberland Papers at Windsor Castle, and it is largely by the aid of +hitherto unpublished documents that he is now able to throw fresh light +on a character which has been the subject of so much malevolent +criticism. At the same time the volume deals with the social and +political conditions among which Cumberland was called on to play so +important a part in the life of the nation. These have been treated by +the author with some fulness of detail. Cumberland, in spite of his +foreign origin, was remarkably typical of the characteristics of the +earlier Georgian period, and an endeavour has been made in the present +volume to establish the link between the Duke and the politics, the +morals, the aims, and the pursuits of the age in which he lived. + + + + +MY ART AND MY FRIENDS. + +THE REMINISCENCES OF SIR F. H. COWEN. + +_With Portrait. Demy 8vo._ =10s. 6d. net.= + + +In the course of a long and distinguished musical career, Sir Frederic +Cowen has had opportunities of visiting many parts of the world, of +meeting all the most eminent artists of the last half-century, and of +amassing material for an extremely diverting volume of personal +recollections. As a child he enjoyed the privilege of being embraced by +the great Piccolomini; as a young man he toured with Trebelli, and +became acquainted with the famous Rubinstein, with Bülow, and with +Joachim. In later life he numbered such well-known musicians as +Pachmann, Paderewski, Sir Arthur Sullivan, and the de Reszkes, among his +friends. Nor was the circle of his intimates entirely confined to the +world of music; he was on terms of the closest friendship with Corney +Grain, with George Grossmith and Arthur Cecil; he capped the puns of +Henry J. Byron and Sir Francis Burnand; he laughed at the practical +jokes of Toole, at the caricatures which Phil May drew for him of his +friends. To the public Sir Frederick Cowen is well known as the +conductor of Covent Garden Promenade and Philharmonic Concerts, as the +composer of such celebrated songs as "The Better Land" and "The Promise +of Life," of "The Corsair" and "The Butterfly's Ball." In these pages he +shows himself to be a keen but kindly student of human nature, who can +describe the various experiences of his past life with a genial but +humorous pen. The inexhaustible fund of anecdote from which he draws +tends still further to enliven an amusing and lively volume. + + + + +A CIVIL SERVANT IN BURMA. + +By Sir HERBERT THIRKELL WHITE, K.C.I.E. + +_With 16 Pages of Illustrations. Demy 8vo._ =12s. 6d. net.= + + +Sir Herbert Thirkell White, who has but recently retired from the post +of Lieutenant-Governor of Burma, which he filled with ability and +distinction, has now written what he modestly calls a "plain story" of +more than thirty years of official life in India. In this volume are +narrated the experiences of an Indian Civilian who has devoted the best +part of his existence to the service of the Empire, and is in a position +to speak with assurance of the many complicated problems with which the +white man in India is continually faced. Sir Herbert's acquaintance with +Burma began in 1878; since then he has had every opportunity of judging +the peculiar habits, customs, and characteristics of the native Burmese, +and has been able to compile a valuable record of the impressions they +have made upon his mind. It was his fate to hold official positions of +increasing importance during the Viceroyalties of Lord Ripon, Lord +Dufferin, and Lord Curzon; he was privileged to serve such distinguished +chiefs as Sir Charles Bernard and Sir Charles Crosthwaite, and witnessed +that pacification of Burma which the last-named Chief Commissioner has +described so eloquently in his well-known book on the subject. Sir +Herbert writes clearly and with knowledge of every aspect of Burmese +life and character, and this volume of his recollections should prove +extremely popular among English readers who are interested in the +government of our Indian Empire and the daily routine of the Indian +Civil Servant. + + + + +THIRTY YEARS IN KASHMIR. + +By ARTHUR NEVE, F.R.C.S.E. + +_With Illustrations and a Map. Demy 8vo._ =12s. 6d. net.= + + +The stupendous natural surroundings amidst which they dwell have +inspired sojourners in Kashmir and other Himalayan countries to produce +some of the finest books of travel to be found. Among them will have to +be included in future this book of Dr. Arthur Neve's, so effectively +does the author reveal the wonders of the land of towering peaks and +huge glaciers where he has made his home for the last thirty years. + +Going out to Kashmir in 1882 under the auspices of the Church Missionary +Society, Dr. Neve took over the charge of the Kashmir Mission Hospital +at Srinagur from Dr. Edmund Downes, who was retiring, and has stayed +there ever since. In his earlier chapters he gives some account of the +Punjab and Kashmir in the eighties, and also of the work of the mission. +He then gets to the principal motif of the book--the exploring tours and +mountaineering expeditions to which he has devoted his spare time. Nanga +Parbat, Nun Kun, and many other Himalayan giants, are within hail of +Srinagur, and before he has finished with the book the reader will find +he has acquired the next best thing to a first-hand knowledge of this +magnificent country. Dr. Neve has also a great deal that is interesting +to tell about the people of various races and religions who inhabit the +valleys, and from whom his medical help gained him a warm welcome at all +times. + +A series of rare photographs gives a pictorial support to the +letter-press. + + + + +SPORT AND FOLK-LORE IN THE HIMALAYA. + +By Captain H. L. HAUGHTON. + +(36TH SIKHS.) + +_With Illustrations from the Author's Photographs. One Volume._ + +_Demy 8vo._ =12s. 6d. net.= + + +Captain Haughton has written a book which should prove a welcome +addition to the library of every sportsman, as well as being of supreme +interest to the naturalist and the student of folk-lore. On the subject +of sport the author writes with that thorough insight and sympathy which +are the fruits of many years' practical experience with rod and rifle, +in the jungle, on river-bank or mountain-side. In his agreeable society +the reader may stalk the markhor or the ibex, lightly throw his "Sir +Richard" across some Kashmiri trout-stream, or lie in wait for the +Himalayan black bear on its way to feed; and if the author's description +of his many amusing and exciting adventures and experiences is eminently +readable, the value of his work is still further enhanced by his +intimate knowledge of natural history, and by the introduction of many +of those old Indian legendary tales that he has culled from the lips of +native Shikaris round the camp-fire at night. The book is illustrated +throughout with a series of remarkably interesting photographs taken by +the author in the course of his many sporting expeditions. + + + + +RECOLLECTIONS OF A PENINSULAR VETERAN. + +By the late Lieut.-Colonel JOSEPH ANDERSON, C.B., K.H. + +_With Photogravure Portrait. Demy 8vo._ =10s. 6d. net.= + + +The late Lieut.-Colonel Joseph Anderson was born in 1790, and from the +age of fifteen, when he received a commission as Ensign in the 78th +Regiment, to within a few years of his death in 1877, his career was +almost continuously as adventurous as it was distinguished. In 1806 he +saw active service for the first time, when he took part in the +expedition to Calabria; in the following year he served in the Egyptian +Campaign of that date; and during the Peninsular War he fought at the +battles of Maida, Busaco, Fuentes d'Onoro, was wounded at Talavera, and +accompanied Wellington on the retreat to the lines of Torres Vedras. A +few years later Captain Anderson, now a Captain in the York Chasseurs, +was sent with his regiment to Barbadoes, and was present at the capture +of Guadeloupe in 1815. He was appointed Colonel Commandant of the Penal +Settlement at Norfolk Island in 1834, where his humane endeavours to +reform the prevailing penal system, and his efforts to quell mutinous +convicts, met with marked success. Nine years later Colonel Anderson +went to India to take part in the Mahratta Campaign, and at the Battle +of Punniar (where he commanded a Brigade) was severely wounded when +charging the enemy's guns. After retiring from the Service, Colonel +Anderson settled down in Australia, and it was at his home near +Melbourne that these memories were compiled, during the later years of a +strenuous and active life, for the edification of his family. They are +written in a simple, unaffected style, which renders them peculiarly +readable, and form a most instructive record of the manners and customs, +of the mode of warfare, and the military and social life of a past age, +and a bygone generation. + + + + +MEMORIES OF A SOLDIER'S LIFE. + +By Major-General Sir H. M. BENGOUGH, K.C.B. + +_With Portrait. Demy 8vo._ =8s. 6d. net.= + + +Major-General Sir H. M. Bengough joined the army in 1855, and retired in +1898, after more than forty years of distinguished service in all +quarters of the Empire. His first experience of active warfare dates +from the Crimea; later on he took the field in the Zulu War and the +Burma Expedition of 1885. In days of peace he held various high commands +in India, South Africa, and Jamaica, and finally commanded a brigade of +infantry at Aldershot. In this volume of personal recollections the +author narrates the many varied incidents and experiences of a long +military career and vividly describes the campaigns in which he took +part. He also gives an interesting account of his adventures in the +realm of sport--pig-sticking, tiger-shooting, and pursuing other forms +of game in India and elsewhere; subjects upon which a long experience +enables him to write with expert knowledge. It will be strange indeed if +so interesting an autobiographical volume from the pen of a deservedly +popular soldier and sportsman fails to appeal to a wide public. + + + + +ZACHARY STOYANOFF. + +Pages from the Autobiography of a Bulgarian Insurgent. + +Translated by M. POTTER. + +_One Volume. Demy 8vo._ =10s. 6d. net.= + + +In this volume Zachary Stoyanoff gives us the narrative of his personal +experiences during the Bulgarian outbreaks of 1875 and 1876. Almost by +accident he became an "apostle" of rebellion, and was sent out forthwith +to range the country, stirring up the villagers and forming local +committees. It is an amazing story. With unsurpassable candour he +portrays for us the leaders, their enthusiasm, their incredible +shortsightedness, and the pitiful inadequacy of their preparations. The +bubble burst, and after a miserable attempt at flight, Stoyanoff was +taken prisoner and sent to Philippopolis for trial. There is no attempt +at heroics. With the same Boswellian simplicity he reveals his fears, +his cringing, his mendacity, and incidentally gives us a graphic +picture, not wholly black, of the conquering Turk. The narrative ends +abruptly while he is still in peril of his life. One is glad to know +that, somehow, he escaped. A very human document, and a remarkable +contrast to the startling exhibition of efficiency given to the world by +the Bulgarians in their latest struggle with the Turks. + + + + +SPLENDID FAILURES. + +By HARRY GRAHAM, + +AUTHOR OF "A GROUP OF SCOTTISH WOMEN," "THE MOTHER OF PARLIAMENTS," ETC. + +_With Portraits. Demy 8vo._ =10s. 6d. net.= + + +It is perhaps unlikely that any two individuals will agree as to the +proper definition of the term "A Splendid Failure"--a phrase of which +the origin would appear to be obscure. It may, however, be roughly +stated that the "Splendid Failures" of the past divide themselves +naturally into three classes: those whom their contemporaries invested +with a fictitious or exaggerated splendour which posterity is quite +unable to comprehend or appreciate; those whom the modern world regards +with admiration--but who signally failed in impressing the men of their +own generation; and those who, gifted with genius and inspired with +lofty ideals, never justified the world's high opinion of their talents +or fulfilled the promise of their early days. In this volume of +biographical essays, the author of "A Group of Scottish Women" and other +popular works has dealt with a selection of "splendid failures" of whose +personal history the public knows but little, though well acquainted +with their names. Wolfe Tone, "the first of the Fenians"; Benjamin +Haydon, the "Cockney Raphael"; Toussaint L'Ouverture, the "Napoleon of +San Domingo"; William Betty, the "Infant Roscius"; and "Champagne" +Townshend, the politician of Pitt's day, may be included under this +category. The reader cannot fail to be interested in that account which +the author gives of the ill-fated Archduke Maximilian's attempt to found +a Mexican monarchy; in his careful review of the work and character of +Hartley Coleridge; and in his biographical study of George Smythe, that +friend of Disraeli whom the statesman-novelist took as his model for the +hero of "Coningsby." This book, which should appeal strongly to all +readers of literary essays, is illustrated with eight excellent +portraits. + + + + +THE CORINTHIAN YACHTSMAN'S HANDBOOK. + +By FRANCIS B. COOKE. + +_With 20 Folding Plates of Designs for Yachts, and numerous black and +white Illustrations. Demy 8vo._ =10s. 6d. net.= + + +This new handbook covers the sport of yachting in all its branches. The +writer, who has had many years' experience of cruising and racing in +yachts and boats of all types, has treated the subject in a thoroughly +practical manner. The book is divided into six parts. + +In Part I., which deals with the selection of a yacht, the various types +and rigs suitable for Corinthian yachting are discussed. The designing +and building of new craft are also dealt with at some length, and +designs and descriptions of a number of up-to-date small cruisers are +given. + +In Part II. some hints are given as to where to station the yacht. All +available headquarters within easy reach of London are described, and +the advantages and disadvantages of each pointed out. + +Part III. is devoted to the equipment of yachts, and contains a wealth +of information as to the internal arrangement, rigging, and fittings of +small cruisers. + +Part IV. treats of the maintenance of small cruising vessels, with notes +on the cost of upkeep, fitting out and laying up. Other matters dealt +with in this section are the preservation of sails and gear, and +insurance. + +Part V., on seamanship, covers the handling of fore-and-aft vessels +under all conditions of weather, and upon every point of sailing. + +Part VI. covers the racing side of the sport in a comprehensive manner. +An exhaustive exposition of the International Sailing Rules is followed +by hints on racing tactics. The appendix contains, _inter alia_, an +illustrated description of the British Buoyage System. + +Mr. Cooke's well-known handbooks have come to be regarded by yachtsmen +as standard works, and a new and more ambitious work from his pen can +hardly fail to interest them. + + + + +THE FALL OF PROTECTION. + +By BERNARD HOLLAND, C.B., + +AUTHOR OF "IMPERIUM ET LIBERTAS." + +_One Volume. Demy 8vo._ =12s. 6d. net.= + + +This volume is a political-historical study of the great change which +took place in British commercial and financial policy mainly between the +years 1840 and 1850. The writer examines the state of things in these +respects which existed before this revolution, and describes the +previous protective system, navigation system, and colonial system. He +then narrates the process by which those systems were overthrown, +devoting special attention to the character, career, and changes in +opinion of Sir Robert Peel, and to the attitude and action of the Tory, +Whig, and Radical parties, and of their leading men, especially Mr. +Disraeli, Lord John Russell, and Mr. Cobden. He analyses with care the +arguments used on all sides in these controversies, especially with +regard to the Repeal of the Corn Laws, and he shows the extent to which +questions of imperial preference and the relations between the United +Kingdom and the Colonies entered into the issues. One chapter is devoted +to the Bank Act of 1844, and to the consideration of its causes and +results. The author concludes by tracing very briefly the chain of +events which connect the period in question with our own day, in respect +of commercial and fiscal policy, and expresses his own views as to +existing tendencies and future developments. + +Mr. Bernard Holland is known as the author of the Life of the Duke of +Devonshire, and of "Imperium et Libertas." In a sense the present volume +is a continuation of the latter book, or rather is an attempt to deal +more expansively and in detail with certain history and questions +connected with the same theme, for the full treatment of which there was +insufficient space in that book. Mr. Holland having acted for a number +of years as Private Secretary to two successive Secretaries of State for +the Colonies, has been brought into close touch in a practical way with +colonial questions. This book, it is hoped, will be of some service both +to students of economic history and to politicians in active life. + + + + +PAINTING IN THE FAR EAST. + +By LAURENCE BINYON. + + +_A New Edition, thoroughly Revised, with many new and additional +Illustrations. Crown 4to._ =21s. net.= + +Since the first edition of this book was published in 1907, much has +happened, and a quantity of new material has been brought to light. + +Interest in the subject has been immensely widened and strengthened. The +museums of Europe and America are vying with each other to procure fine +specimens of Chinese and Japanese art. The opening this autumn of a new +museum at Cologne, exclusively devoted to the arts of Eastern Asia, is a +symptom of the times. Collections, public and private, both European and +American, have been greatly enriched; and the exhibition in 1910 at +Shepherd's Bush, of treasured masterpieces lent from Japanese +collections, has provided a standard for the student. + +Six years ago, again, scarcely any of the voluminous literature of art +existing in Chinese and Japanese had been translated. On this side, too, +an added store of information has been made accessible, though still in +great part scattered in the pages of learned periodicals. Above all, the +marvellous discoveries made of recent years in China and Chinese +Turkestan have substituted a mass of authentic material for groping +conjectures in the study of the art of the early periods. + +In preparing a new edition of this book and bringing it up to date, Mr. +Binyon has therefore been able to utilize a variety of new sources of +information. The estimates given of the art of some of the most famous +of the older masters have been reconsidered. The sections dealing with +the early art have been in great measure rewritten; and the book has +been revised throughout. In the matter of illustrations it has been +possible to draw on a wider range and make a fuller and more +representative selection. + + + + +PAINTING IN EAST AND WEST. + +By ROBERT DOUGLAS NORTON, + +AUTHOR OF "THE CHOICE." + +_Crown 8vo._ =5s. net.= + + +The art of painting, which in the days of Gothic church-building +contributed so much both to the education and the pleasure of the +community at large, has admittedly come to appeal to ever-narrowing +circles, until to-day it cannot be said to play any part in popular life +at all. This book seeks to discover the causes of its decline in +influence. A brief review of the chief contemporary movements in painting +gives point to a suggestion made by more than one thoughtful critic that +the chief need of Western painting is spirituality. Since this is a +quality which those competent to judge are at one in attributing to +Eastern art, the author, in a chapter on Far Eastern Painting, sets +forth the ideals underlying the great painting of China and Japan, and +contrasts these ideals with those which have inspired painters and +public in the West. This leads to an inquiry into the uses of +imagination and suggestion in art, and to an attempt to find a broad +enough definition for "spirituality" not to exclude many widely +divergent achievements of Western painting. Finally, the possibility of +training the sense of beauty is discussed in the light of successful +instances. + +Incidentally the book touches on many questions which, though of +interest to picture-lovers, often remain unasked; such, for instance, as +what we look for in a picture; how far subject is important; why it may +happen that the interest of one picture, which pleases at first, soon +wanes, while that of another grows steadily stronger; the value of +technique, of different media of expression, of mere resemblance, etc. + +Without going into the technicalities of æsthetics, the author aims at +investigating certain first principles which are overlooked at times by +possessors of even the widest knowledge of individual schools. + + + + +SHAKESPEARE'S STORIES. + +By CONSTANCE MAUD and MARY MAUD. + +AS YOU LIKE IT--THE TEMPEST--KING LEAR--TWELFTH NIGHT--THE MERCHANT +OF VENICE--A MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM--MACBETH--HAMLET--ROMEO AND JULIET. + +_With Illustrations from the famous Boydell prints. Crown 8vo._ + +=5s. net.= + + +Miss Constance Maud is the author of "Wagner's Heroes" and "Wagner's +Heroines," two books on similar lines to these tales which have had a +great vogue among young people of all ages. In the present volume she +tells the charming stories of nine of the most famous of Shakespeare's +Tragedies and Comedies in prose of delightful and unstudied simplicity. +On occasion the actual text has been used for familiar passages and +phrases. These great world-tales, regarded merely as tales, with the +elemental motives and passions displayed in them, appeal strongly to the +imagination, and when narrated by a competent pen there cannot be finer +or more absorbing reading. In addition to this, he must be a dull reader +in whom they do not awaken a desire to make a closer acquaintance with +the plays themselves. + +The book forms a companion volume to Sir A. T. Quiller-Couch's +well-known "Historical Tales from Shakespeare." + + + + +THE MUSE IN MOTLEY. + +By HARRY GRAHAM. + +AUTHOR OF "RUTHLESS RHYMES FOR HEARTLESS HOMES," ETC., ETC. + +_With 24 Illustrations by_ + +LEWIS BAUMER. + +_Fcap. 4vo._ =3s. 6d. net.= + + +All lovers of humorous verse will welcome a fresh volume of lyrics by +the author of "Deportmental Ditties," "Canned Classics," and other +deservedly popular products of the Minor Muse. Readers of Captain +Graham's new collection of light verse will agree with the _Daily +Chronicle_ in describing its author as "a godsend, a treasure trove, a +messenger from Olympus; a man who really does see the ludicrous side of +life, a man who is a genuine humorist." Once again the author of these +amusing poems attempts to "shoot Folly as she flies," and genially +satirizes the foibles of the age in a fashion that will certainly add to +his reputation as a humorist; and his work is rendered still more +delightful by the drawings of Mr. Lewis Baumer, the well-known _Punch_ +artist, with which it is lavishly illustrated. "It is a great and good +thing," as the _Pall Mall Gazette_ remarked with reference to another of +Captain Graham's books, "to have a man among us who is witty all the +time and lets himself go. We ought to be duly thankful. And we are!" + + + + +HANNIBAL ONCE MORE. + +By DOUGLAS W. FRESHFIELD, M.A., + +VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY; TREASURER OF THE +HELLENIC AND ROMAN SOCIETIES; FORMERLY PRESIDENT OF THE ALPINE CLUB. + +_8vo._ =5s. net.= + + +In this little volume Mr. Freshfield has put into final shape the +results of his study of the famous and still-debated question: "By which +Pass did Hannibal cross the Alps?" The literature which has grown up +round this intricate subject is surprisingly extensive, and various +solutions have been propounded and upheld, with remarkable warmth and +tenacity, by a host of scholars, historians, geographers, military men, +and mountaineers. Mr. Freshfield has a solution of his own, which, +however, he puts forward in no dogmatic spirit, but in such a fashion +that his book is practically a lucid review of the whole matter in each +of its many aspects. To an extensive acquaintance with ancient and +modern geographical literature he unites a wide and varied experience as +an alpine climber and a traveller, and a minute topographical knowledge +of the regions under discussion; and these qualifications--in which many +of his predecessors in the same field of inquiry have been conspicuously +lacking--enable him to throw much new light on a perennially fascinating +problem. + + + + +THE PASTORAL TEACHING OF ST. PAUL. + +By the Rev. Canon H. L. GOUDGE, + +PRINCIPAL OF THE THEOLOGICAL COLLEGE, ELY; AUTHOR OF "THE MIND OF ST. +PAUL," ETC. + +_Crown 8vo. Cloth._ =2s. 6d. net.= + + +These lectures were delivered at the end of May, 1913, at the Palace, +Gloucester, to the clergy of the diocese, and are now published in +response to the request of those who heard them. They do not constitute +a detailed commentary on the Pastoral Epistles, though a good deal of +detailed exegesis necessarily finds a place in them. The writer's aim +has been to collect and arrange St. Paul's teaching as to the work of +the Christian pastor, and to point out its applicability to modern +conditions and modern difficulties. The writer has often found, through +his experience in conducting Retreats, that the Pastoral Teaching of St. +Paul is of the greatest value to the clergy to-day, but that this +teaching is often obscured by the unsystematic character of St. Paul's +writing and by the passing controversies with which he has to deal. In +these lectures the First Epistle to Timothy is used as the basis, but +continually illustrated by passages from the other Pastoral Epistles, +and from St. Paul's earlier writings. The first lecture deals with the +pastor's aim, the second with the pastor's character, the third with the +pastor's work, and the fourth with the adaptation of his message to men +and to women, to old and to young, to rich and to poor. The ground +already covered by the writer's earlier book, "The Mind of St. Paul," +has been carefully avoided, but it is hoped that the one book may throw +light upon the other. An index of texts has been added for those who may +wish to use this second book, as far as that is possible, as a +commentary. + + + + +_NEW NOVELS_ + + + + +SOMETHING AFAR. + +By MAXWELL GRAY, + +AUTHOR OF "THE SILENCE OF DEAN MAITLAND," "THE GREAT REFUSAL," ETC. + +_Crown 8vo. Cloth._ =6s.= + + +The scene of Maxwell Gray's new story is laid in London and in Italy, +where the gradual unfolding of an elaborate but absorbing plot holds the +reader's attention until the very last page of the book. This is a tale +of heroism, of self-sacrifice, of romance, full of incident and +adventure, illumined by those tender and imaginative touches, that vivid +portrayal of character, which the public has learnt to expect from the +author of "The Silence of Dean Maitland." From these pages we may learn +that there is "something afar from the sphere of our sorrow," the +highest aspiration of the lover, the artist, the poet and the saint, +which, beautiful beyond all that man's heart can divine, is yet within +the reach of every one of us. + + + + +THE GENTLE LOVER. + +A COMEDY OF MIDDLE AGE. + +By FORREST REID, + +AUTHOR OF "THE BRACKNELLS," "FOLLOWING DARKNESS," ETC. + +_Crown 8vo._ =6s.= + + +This extremely interesting story, of which the title gives a most apt +description, is written in a lighter vein than the author's previous +work. It is a love story, and while the tale itself is enthralling, it +depends in great measure for its charm on the attractiveness of the +characters who figure in the drama and who are all very pleasant +company. The book is essentially human, the note is never forced, yet +the interest goes on increasing right up to the end. It is actual life +with its comedy and tragedy so closely intermingled that it is not +always easy to distinguish one from the other. The scene is laid abroad, +partly in Bruges, and partly in Italy, but the characters are, with one +or two exceptions, natives of that part of Ireland with which the author +is most familiar, and they lose none of their individuality by being +transplanted to those beautiful old-world cities where we follow their +varied fortunes. Mr. Reid's previous novels have already secured for his +work the warm appreciation of some of the best judges of literary +values, and the present novel may be confidently stated to exhibit his +undoubted power as a writer of fiction in an advanced and progressive +stage. + + + + +_NEW SCIENTIFIC WORKS_ + + + + +INDUSTRIAL POISONING + +From Fumes, Gases, and Poisons of Manufacturing Processes. + +By Dr. J. RAMBOUSEK, + + +PROFESSOR OF FACTORY HYGIENE, AND CHIEF STATE HEALTH OFFICER, PRAGUE + +Translated and Edited by Dr. T. M. LEGGE, + +H.M. MEDICAL INSPECTOR OF FACTORIES. + +_Fully Illustrated. Demy 8vo._ =12s. 6d. net.= + + + + +MALINGERING + +And Feigned Sickness. + +By Sir JOHN COLLIE, M.D., J.P., + + +MEDICAL EXAMINER, LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL; CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, +METROPOLITAN WATER BOARD; CONSULTING MEDICAL EXAMINER TO THE SHIPPING +FEDERATION; MEDICAL EXAMINER TO THE SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, CENTRAL +INSURANCE COMPANY, LONDON, LIVERPOOL, AND GLOBE INSURANCE COMPANY, AND +OTHER ACCIDENT OFFICES; LATE HOME OFFICE MED. REF. WORKMEN'S +COMPENSATION ACT. + +Assisted by ARTHUR H. SPICER, M.B., B.S. (Lond.), D.P.H. + +_Illustrated, xii + 340 pp. Demy 8vo._ =10s. 6d. net.= + +In this work Sir John Collie, whose wide experience has eminently fitted +him for the task, has given an interesting and lucid description of the +methods and peculiarities of the malingerer. He describes fully and in +detail the methods of examination for the detection of malingering and +the diseases usually simulated, and discusses the attitude required by +the medical attendant towards unduly prolonged illness. + + + + +OLD AGE: + +Its Care and Treatment in Health and Disease. + +By ROBERT SAUNDBY, M.D., F.R.C.P., L.L.D., J.P., + + +MEMBER GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL: EX-PRESIDENT BRITISH MEDICAL +ASSOCIATION; PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE, UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM; PHYSICIAN +TO THE BIRMINGHAM GENERAL HOSPITAL. + +_320 pp._ =7s. 6d. net.= + +No English writer having recently dealt with this subject, it has been +felt that there is room for a book which should bring together the +various contributions made to it in modern times, including the results +of the author's extensive experience during forty years of medical +practice. The author discusses the principles of health, by due +attention to which healthy old age may be attained. The diseases to +which the aged are especially liable are fully described, their causes +are clearly indicated, and the author shows in a practical way by what +means they may be avoided and how they may be appropriately treated. +Special attention is given to such important subjects as diet, exercise, +etc. Suggestive dietary tables are given, both for use in health and in +particular diseases, while the chapters devoted to methods of exercise +most suitable in advanced age will also prove of value. + + * * * * * + +LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD, 41 & 43 MADDOX STREET, W. + + + +----------------------------------------------------------+ + | | + | Transcriber's notes: | + | | + | P.ix. 'inpressions' changed to 'impressions'. | + | P.27. 'proferred' changed to 'proffered'. | + | P.58. 'on or' changed to 'or on'. | + | P.120. 'inclned' changed to 'inclined'. | + | P.192. 'Russia' changed to 'Prussia'. | + | P.256. 'ne' changed to 'me'. | + | Various punctuation fixed. | + | Italics are displayed as _Illustrated_. | + | Small caps have been replaced with all caps. | + | | + +----------------------------------------------------------+ + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Lord Lyons: A Record of British +Diplomacy, by Thomas Wodehouse Legh Newton + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 43317 *** |