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diff --git a/4320-h/4320-h.htm b/4320-h/4320-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2ba4e75 --- /dev/null +++ b/4320-h/4320-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,5878 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html lang="en"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" + content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> +<title> + An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, + by David Hume +</title> + +<style type="text/css"> + <!-- + body { text-align:justify} + P { margin:15%; + margin-top: .75em; + margin-bottom: .75em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; } + hr.full { width: 100%; } + .foot { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; text-indent: -3em; font-size: 90%; } + .play { margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; text-align: justify; font-size: 100%; } + img {border: 0;} + HR { width: 33%; text-align: center; } + blockquote {font-size: 97%; margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%;} + .pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ + /* visibility: hidden; */ + position: absolute; + left: 1%; + font-size: smaller; + text-align: left; + color: gray; + } /* page numbers */ + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 10%; margin-left: 1%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; + margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 5%; margin-bottom: .75em; font-size: 110%;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 5%;} + .indent {font-style: italic; font-size: 100%; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + CENTER { padding: 10px;} + PRE { font-family: Times; font-style: italic; font-size: 100%; margin-left: 25%;} + --> +</style> + +</head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of +Morals, by David Hume + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals + +Author: David Hume + +Release Date: January 12, 2010 [EBook #4320] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PRINCIPLES OF MORALS *** + + + + +Produced by John Mamoun, Charles Franks and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<br> + +<h1> + AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING<br>THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS +</h1><br> + +<h2> +By David Hume +</h2><br> + +<center> +A 1912 Reprint Of The Edition Of 1777 +</center> + +<br> +<br> +<hr> +<br> +<br> + +<div class="mynote"> + +<p> +Information About This E-Text Edition +</p> +<p> +The following is an e-text of a 1912 reprint of the 1777 edition of +David Hume's An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Each page +was cut out of the original book with an X-acto knife and fed into an +Automatic Document Feeder Scanner to make this e-text, so the original +book was disbinded in order to save it. +</p> +<p> +Some adaptations from the original text were made while formatting it +for an e-text. Italics in the original book are capitalized in +this e-text. The original spellings of words are preserved, such as +"connexion" for "connection," "labour" for "labor," etc. Original +footnotes are put in brackets at the points where they are cited in +the text. +</p> +<br> +</div> + + + +<br> +<br> +<hr> +<br> +<br> + + + +<h2>Contents</h2> + + +<center> +<table summary=""> +<tr><td> + +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_APPE"> +APPENDIX. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_4_0003"> +AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_SECT1"> +SECTION I. OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_SECT2"> +SECTION II. OF BENEVOLENCE. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_PART21"> +PART I. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_PART22"> +PART II. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_SECT3"> +SECTION III. OF JUSTICE. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_PART31"> +PART I. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_PART32"> +PART II. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_SECT4"> +SECTION IV. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_SECT5"> +SECTION V. WHY UTILITY PLEASES. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_PART51"> +PART I. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_PART52"> +PART II. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_SECT6"> +SECTION VI. OF QUALITIES USEFUL TO OURSELVES. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_PART61"> +PART I. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_PART62"> +PART II. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_SECT7"> +SECTION VII. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_SECT8"> +SECTION VIII. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_SECT9"> +SECTION IX. CONCLUSION. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_PART91"> +PART I. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_PART92"> +PART II. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_APPE1"> +APPENDIX I. CONCERNING MORAL SENTIMENT +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_APPE2"> +APPENDIX II. OF SELF-LOVE. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_APPE3"> +APPENDIX III. SOME FARTHER CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD TO JUSTICE. +</a></p> +<p class="toc"><a href="#2H_APPE4"> +APPENDIX IV. OF SOME VERBAL DISPUTES. +</a></p> + + +</td></tr> +</table> +</center> + + +<br> +<br> +<hr> +<br> +<br> + +<center> +AUTHOR'S ADVERTISEMENT. +</center> +<p> +Most of the principles, and reasonings, contained in this volume, +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: Volume II. of the posthumous edition of Hume's works +published in 1777 and containing, besides the present ENQUIRY, +A DISSERTATION ON THE PASSIONS, and AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN +UNDERSTANDING. A reprint of this latter treatise has already appeared in +The Religion of Science Library (NO. 45)] +</pre> +<p> +were published in a work in three volumes, called A TREATISE OF HUMAN +NATURE: A work which the Author had projected before he left College, +and which he wrote and published not long after. But not finding it +successful, he was sensible of his error in going to the press too +early, and he cast the whole anew in the following pieces, where some +negligences in his former reasoning and more in the expression, are, +he hopes, corrected. Yet several writers who have honoured the Author's +Philosophy with answers, have taken care to direct all their batteries +against that juvenile work, which the author never acknowledged, and +have affected to triumph in any advantages, which, they imagined, they +had obtained over it: A practice very contrary to all rules of candour +and fair-dealing, and a strong instance of those polemical artifices +which a bigotted zeal thinks itself authorized to employ. Henceforth, +the Author desires, that the following Pieces may alone be regarded as +containing his philosophical sentiments and principles. +</p> +<a name="2H_CONT"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + CONTENTS PAGE +</h2> +<pre> + I. Of the General Principles of Morals + II. Of Benevolence + III. Of Justice + IV. Of Political Society + V. Why Utility Pleases + VI. Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves + VII. Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Ourselves + VIII. Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Others + IX. Conclusion +</pre> +<a name="2H_APPE"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + APPENDIX. +</h2> +<pre> + I. Concerning Moral Sentiment + II. Of Self-love + III. Some Farther Considerations with Regard to Justice + IV. Of Some Verbal Disputes +</pre> +<a name="2H_4_0003"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS +</h2> +<a name="2H_SECT1"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + SECTION I. OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. +</h2> +<p> +DISPUTES with men, pertinaciously obstinate in their principles, are, +of all others, the most irksome; except, perhaps, those with persons, +entirely disingenuous, who really do not believe the opinions they +defend, but engage in the controversy, from affectation, from a spirit +of opposition, or from a desire of showing wit and ingenuity, superior +to the rest of mankind. The same blind adherence to their own arguments +is to be expected in both; the same contempt of their antagonists; and +the same passionate vehemence, in inforcing sophistry and falsehood. +And as reasoning is not the source, whence either disputant derives his +tenets; it is in vain to expect, that any logic, which speaks not to the +affections, will ever engage him to embrace sounder principles. +</p> +<p> +Those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions, may be ranked +among the disingenuous disputants; nor is it conceivable, that any human +creature could ever seriously believe, that all characters and actions +were alike entitled to the affection and regard of everyone. The +difference, which nature has placed between one man and another, is +so wide, and this difference is still so much farther widened, by +education, example, and habit, that, where the opposite extremes come at +once under our apprehension, there is no scepticism so scrupulous, +and scarce any assurance so determined, as absolutely to deny all +distinction between them. Let a man's insensibility be ever so great, +he must often be touched with the images of Right and Wrong; and let +his prejudices be ever so obstinate, he must observe, that others are +susceptible of like impressions. The only way, therefore, of converting +an antagonist of this kind, is to leave him to himself. For, finding +that nobody keeps up the controversy with him, it is probable he will, +at last, of himself, from mere weariness, come over to the side of +common sense and reason. +</p> +<p> +There has been a controversy started of late, much better worth +examination, concerning the general foundation of Morals; whether +they be derived from Reason, or from Sentiment; whether we attain +the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an +immediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all sound +judgement of truth and falsehood, they should be the same to every +rational intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beauty +and deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and +constitution of the human species. +</p> +<p> +The ancient philosophers, though they often affirm, that virtue is +nothing but conformity to reason, yet, in general, seem to consider +morals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment. On the +other hand, our modern enquirers, though they also talk much of the +beauty of virtue, and deformity of vice, yet have commonly endeavoured +to account for these distinctions by metaphysical reasonings, and by +deductions from the most abstract principles of the understanding. Such +confusion reigned in these subjects, that an opposition of the greatest +consequence could prevail between one system and another, and even in +the parts of almost each individual system; and yet nobody, till very +lately, was ever sensible of it. The elegant Lord Shaftesbury, who first +gave occasion to remark this distinction, and who, in general, adhered +to the principles of the ancients, is not, himself, entirely free from +the same confusion. +</p> +<p> +It must be acknowledged, that both sides of the question are susceptible +of specious arguments. Moral distinctions, it may be said, are +discernible by pure reason: else, whence the many disputes that reign in +common life, as well as in philosophy, with regard to this subject: the +long chain of proofs often produced on both sides; the examples cited, +the authorities appealed to, the analogies employed, the fallacies +detected, the inferences drawn, and the several conclusions adjusted to +their proper principles. Truth is disputable; not taste: what exists +in the nature of things is the standard of our judgement; what each +man feels within himself is the standard of sentiment. Propositions in +geometry may be proved, systems in physics may be controverted; but the +harmony of verse, the tenderness of passion, the brilliancy of wit, must +give immediate pleasure. No man reasons concerning another's beauty; but +frequently concerning the justice or injustice of his actions. In every +criminal trial the first object of the prisoner is to disprove the facts +alleged, and deny the actions imputed to him: the second to prove, that, +even if these actions were real, they might be justified, as innocent +and lawful. It is confessedly by deductions of the understanding, that +the first point is ascertained: how can we suppose that a different +faculty of the mind is employed in fixing the other? On the other hand, +those who would resolve all moral determinations into sentiment, +may endeavour to show, that it is impossible for reason ever to draw +conclusions of this nature. To virtue, say they, it belongs to be +amiable, and vice odious. This forms their very nature or essence. But +can reason or argumentation distribute these different epithets to any +subjects, and pronounce beforehand, that this must produce love, +and that hatred? Or what other reason can we ever assign for these +affections, but the original fabric and formation of the human mind, +which is naturally adapted to receive them? +</p> +<p> +The end of all moral speculations is to teach us our duty; and, by +proper representations of the deformity of vice and beauty of virtue, +beget correspondent habits, and engage us to avoid the one, and +embrace the other. But is this ever to be expected from inferences and +conclusions of the understanding, which of themselves have no hold of +the affections or set in motion the active powers of men? They discover +truths: but where the truths which they discover are indifferent, and +beget no desire or aversion, they can have no influence on conduct and +behaviour. What is honourable, what is fair, what is becoming, what is +noble, what is generous, takes possession of the heart, and animates us +to embrace and maintain it. What is intelligible, what is evident, +what is probable, what is true, procures only the cool assent of the +understanding; and gratifying a speculative curiosity, puts an end to +our researches. +</p> +<p> +Extinguish all the warm feelings and prepossessions in favour of virtue, +and all disgust or aversion to vice: render men totally indifferent +towards these distinctions; and morality is no longer a practical study, +nor has any tendency to regulate our lives and actions. +</p> +<p> +These arguments on each side (and many more might be produced) are so +plausible, that I am apt to suspect, they may, the one as well as the +other, be solid and satisfactory, and that reason and sentiment concur +in almost all moral determinations and conclusions. The final sentence, +it is probable, which pronounces characters and actions amiable or +odious, praise-worthy or blameable; that which stamps on them the mark +of honour or infamy, approbation or censure; that which renders morality +an active principle and constitutes virtue our happiness, and vice our +misery; it is probable, I say, that this final sentence depends on some +internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole +species. For what else can have an influence of this nature? But +in order to pave the way for such a sentiment, and give a proper +discernment of its object, it is often necessary, we find, that +much reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just +conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relations +examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained. Some species of +beauty, especially the natural kinds, on their first appearance, command +our affection and approbation; and where they fail of this effect, it is +impossible for any reasoning to redress their influence, or adapt +them better to our taste and sentiment. But in many orders of beauty, +particularly those of the finer arts, it is requisite to employ much +reasoning, in order to feel the proper sentiment; and a false relish +may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection. There are just +grounds to conclude, that moral beauty partakes much of this latter +species, and demands the assistance of our intellectual faculties, in +order to give it a suitable influence on the human mind. +</p> +<p> +But though this question, concerning the general principles of morals, +be curious and important, it is needless for us, at present, to employ +farther care in our researches concerning it. For if we can be so happy, +in the course of this enquiry, as to discover the true origin of morals, +it will then easily appear how far either sentiment or reason enters +into all determinations of this nature [Footnote: See Appendix I]. In +order to attain this purpose, we shall endeavour to follow a very simple +method: we shall analyse that complication of mental qualities, which +form what, in common life, we call Personal Merit: we shall consider +every attribute of the mind, which renders a man an object either +of esteem and affection, or of hatred and contempt; every habit or +sentiment or faculty, which, if ascribed to any person, implies either +praise or blame, and may enter into any panegyric or satire of his +character and manners. The quick sensibility, which, on this head, is so +universal among mankind, gives a philosopher sufficient assurance, that +he can never be considerably mistaken in framing the catalogue, or incur +any danger of misplacing the objects of his contemplation: he needs only +enter into his own breast for a moment, and consider whether or not he +should desire to have this or that quality ascribed to him, and whether +such or such an imputation would proceed from a friend or an enemy. +The very nature of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a +judgement of this nature; and as every tongue possesses one set of words +which are taken in a good sense, and another in the opposite, the least +acquaintance with the idiom suffices, without any reasoning, to direct +us in collecting and arranging the estimable or blameable qualities of +men. The only object of reasoning is to discover the circumstances +on both sides, which are common to these qualities; to observe that +particular in which the estimable qualities agree on the one hand, +and the blameable on the other; and thence to reach the foundation of +ethics, and find those universal principles, from which all censure or +approbation is ultimately derived. As this is a question of fact, not +of abstract science, we can only expect success, by following the +experimental method, and deducing general maxims from a comparison +of particular instances. The other scientific method, where a general +abstract principle is first established, and is afterwards branched out +into a variety of inferences and conclusions, may be more perfect in +itself, but suits less the imperfection of human nature, and is a common +source of illusion and mistake in this as well as in other subjects. +Men are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in natural +philosophy, and will hearken to no arguments but those which are derived +from experience. It is full time they should attempt a like reformation +in all moral disquisitions; and reject every system of ethics, however +subtle or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and observation. +</p> +<p> +We shall begin our enquiry on this head by the consideration of the +social virtues, Benevolence and Justice. The explication of them will +probably give us an opening by which the others may be accounted for. +</p> +<a name="2H_SECT2"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + SECTION II. OF BENEVOLENCE. +</h2> +<a name="2H_PART21"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + PART I. +</h2> +<p> +It may be esteemed, perhaps, a superfluous task to prove, that the +benevolent or softer affections are estimable; and wherever they appear, +engage the approbation and good-will of mankind. The epithets +SOCIABLE, GOOD-NATURED, HUMANE, MERCIFUL, GRATEFUL, FRIENDLY, GENEROUS, +BENEFICENT, or their equivalents, are known in all languages, and +universally express the highest merit, which HUMAN NATURE is capable +of attaining. Where these amiable qualities are attended with birth +and power and eminent abilities, and display themselves in the good +government or useful instruction of mankind, they seem even to raise +the possessors of them above the rank of HUMAN NATURE, and make them +approach in some measure to the divine. Exalted capacity, undaunted +courage, prosperous success; these may only expose a hero or politician +to the envy and ill-will of the public: but as soon as the praises are +added of humane and beneficent; when instances are displayed of lenity, +tenderness or friendship; envy itself is silent, or joins the general +voice of approbation and applause. +</p> +<p> +When Pericles, the great Athenian statesman and general, was on his +death-bed, his surrounding friends, deeming him now insensible, began to +indulge their sorrow for their expiring patron, by enumerating his great +qualities and successes, his conquests and victories, the unusual length +of his administration, and his nine trophies erected over the enemies of +the republic. YOU FORGET, cries the dying hero, who had heard all, YOU +FORGET THE MOST EMINENT OF MY PRAISES, WHILE YOU DWELL SO MUCH ON THOSE +VULGAR ADVANTAGES, IN WHICH FORTUNE HAD A PRINCIPAL SHARE. YOU HAVE +NOT OBSERVED THAT NO CITIZEN HAS EVER YET WORNE MOURNING ON MY ACCOUNT. +[Plut. in Pericle] +</p> +<p> +In men of more ordinary talents and capacity, the social virtues become, +if possible, still more essentially requisite; there being nothing +eminent, in that case, to compensate for the want of them, or preserve +the person from our severest hatred, as well as contempt. A high +ambition, an elevated courage, is apt, says Cicero, in less perfect +characters, to degenerate into a turbulent ferocity. The more social and +softer virtues are there chiefly to be regarded. These are always good +and amiable [Cic. de Officiis, lib. I]. +</p> +<p> +The principal advantage, which Juvenal discovers in the extensive +capacity of the human species, is that it renders our benevolence also +more extensive, and gives us larger opportunities of spreading our +kindly influence than what are indulged to the inferior creation [Sat. +XV. 139 and seq.]. It must, indeed, be confessed, that by doing good +only, can a man truly enjoy the advantages of being eminent. His exalted +station, of itself but the more exposes him to danger and tempest. +His sole prerogative is to afford shelter to inferiors, who repose +themselves under his cover and protection. +</p> +<p> +But I forget, that it is not my present business to recommend generosity +and benevolence, or to paint, in their true colours, all the genuine +charms of the social virtues. These, indeed, sufficiently engage every +heart, on the first apprehension of them; and it is difficult to abstain +from some sally of panegyric, as often as they occur in discourse or +reasoning. But our object here being more the speculative, than the +practical part of morals, it will suffice to remark, (what will readily, +I believe, be allowed) that no qualities are more intitled to the +general good-will and approbation of mankind than beneficence and +humanity, friendship and gratitude, natural affection and public spirit, +or whatever proceeds from a tender sympathy with others, and a generous +concern for our kind and species. These wherever they appear seem to +transfuse themselves, in a manner, into each beholder, and to call +forth, in their own behalf, the same favourable and affectionate +sentiments, which they exert on all around. +</p> +<a name="2H_PART22"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + PART II. +</h2> +<p> +We may observe that, in displaying the praises of any humane, beneficent +man, there is one circumstance which never fails to be amply insisted +on, namely, the happiness and satisfaction, derived to society from +his intercourse and good offices. To his parents, we are apt to say, he +endears himself by his pious attachment and duteous care still more than +by the connexions of nature. His children never feel his authority, +but when employed for their advantage. With him, the ties of love are +consolidated by beneficence and friendship. The ties of friendship +approach, in a fond observance of each obliging office, to those of +love and inclination. His domestics and dependants have in him a sure +resource; and no longer dread the power of fortune, but so far as she +exercises it over him. From him the hungry receive food, the naked +clothing, the ignorant and slothful skill and industry. Like the sun, an +inferior minister of providence he cheers, invigorates, and sustains the +surrounding world. +</p> +<p> +If confined to private life, the sphere of his activity is narrower; +but his influence is all benign and gentle. If exalted into a higher +station, mankind and posterity reap the fruit of his labours. +</p> +<p> +As these topics of praise never fail to be employed, and with success, +where we would inspire esteem for any one; may it not thence be +concluded, that the utility, resulting from the social virtues, forms, +at least, a PART of their merit, and is one source of that approbation +and regard so universally paid to them? +</p> +<p> +When we recommend even an animal or a plant as USEFUL and BENEFICIAL, we +give it an applause and recommendation suited to its nature. As, on the +other hand, reflection on the baneful influence of any of these inferior +beings always inspires us with the sentiment of aversion. The eye is +pleased with the prospect of corn-fields and loaded vine-yards; +horses grazing, and flocks pasturing: but flies the view of briars and +brambles, affording shelter to wolves and serpents. +</p> +<p> +A machine, a piece of furniture, a vestment, a house well contrived +for use and conveniency, is so far beautiful, and is contemplated with +pleasure and approbation. An experienced eye is here sensible to many +excellencies, which escape persons ignorant and uninstructed. +</p> +<p> +Can anything stronger be said in praise of a profession, such as +merchandize or manufacture, than to observe the advantages which it +procures to society; and is not a monk and inquisitor enraged when we +treat his order as useless or pernicious to mankind? +</p> +<p> +The historian exults in displaying the benefit arising from his labours. +The writer of romance alleviates or denies the bad consequences ascribed +to his manner of composition. +</p> +<p> +In general, what praise is implied in the simple epithet USEFUL! What +reproach in the contrary! +</p> +<p> +Your Gods, says Cicero [De Nat. Deor. lib. i.], in opposition to the +Epicureans, cannot justly claim any worship or adoration, with whatever +imaginary perfections you may suppose them endowed. They are totally +useless and inactive. Even the Egyptians, whom you so much ridicule, +never consecrated any animal but on account of its utility. +</p> +<p> +The sceptics assert [Sext. Emp. adrersus Math. lib. viii.], though +absurdly, that the origin of all religious worship was derived from the +utility of inanimate objects, as the sun and moon, to the support +and well-being of mankind. This is also the common reason assigned by +historians, for the deification of eminent heroes and legislators [Diod. +Sic. passim.]. +</p> +<p> +To plant a tree, to cultivate a field, to beget children; meritorious +acts, according to the religion of Zoroaster. +</p> +<p> +In all determinations of morality, this circumstance of public utility +is ever principally in view; and wherever disputes arise, either in +philosophy or common life, concerning the bounds of duty, the question +cannot, by any means, be decided with greater certainty, than by +ascertaining, on any side, the true interests of mankind. If any false +opinion, embraced from appearances, has been found to prevail; as soon +as farther experience and sounder reasoning have given us juster notions +of human affairs, we retract our first sentiment, and adjust anew the +boundaries of moral good and evil. +</p> +<p> +Giving alms to common beggars is naturally praised; because it seems +to carry relief to the distressed and indigent: but when we observe the +encouragement thence arising to idleness and debauchery, we regard that +species of charity rather as a weakness than a virtue. +</p> +<p> +Tyrannicide, or the assassination of usurpers and oppressive princes, +was highly extolled in ancient times; because it both freed mankind from +many of these monsters, and seemed to keep the others in awe, whom the +sword or poniard could not reach. But history and experience having +since convinced us, that this practice increases the jealousy and +cruelty of princes, a Timoleon and a Brutus, though treated with +indulgence on account of the prejudices of their times, are now +considered as very improper models for imitation. +</p> +<p> +Liberality in princes is regarded as a mark of beneficence, but when +it occurs, that the homely bread of the honest and industrious is often +thereby converted into delicious cates for the idle and the prodigal, we +soon retract our heedless praises. The regrets of a prince, for having +lost a day, were noble and generous: but had he intended to have spent +it in acts of generosity to his greedy courtiers, it was better lost +than misemployed after that manner. +</p> +<p> +Luxury, or a refinement on the pleasures and conveniences of life, had +not long been supposed the source of every corruption in government, and +the immediate cause of faction, sedition, civil wars, and the total loss +of liberty. It was, therefore, universally regarded as a vice, and was +an object of declamation to all satirists, and severe moralists. Those, +who prove, or attempt to prove, that such refinements rather tend to the +increase of industry, civility, and arts regulate anew our MORAL as well +as POLITICAL sentiments, and represent, as laudable or innocent, what +had formerly been regarded as pernicious and blameable. +</p> +<p> +Upon the whole, then, it seems undeniable, THAT nothing can bestow more +merit on any human creature than the sentiment of benevolence in an +eminent degree; and THAT a PART, at least, of its merit arises from its +tendency to promote the interests of our species, and bestow happiness +on human society. We carry our view into the salutary consequences +of such a character and disposition; and whatever has so benign an +influence, and forwards so desirable an end, is beheld with complacency +and pleasure. The social virtues are never regarded without their +beneficial tendencies, nor viewed as barren and unfruitful. The +happiness of mankind, the order of society, the harmony of families, the +mutual support of friends, are always considered as the result of their +gentle dominion over the breasts of men. +</p> +<p> +How considerable a PART of their merit we ought to ascribe to their +utility, will better appear from future disquisitions; [Footnote: Sect. +III. and IV.] as well as the reason, why this circumstance has such a +command over our esteem and approbation. [Footnote: Sect. V.] +</p> +<a name="2H_SECT3"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + SECTION III. OF JUSTICE. +</h2> +<a name="2H_PART31"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + PART I. +</h2> +<p> +THAT Justice is useful to society, and consequently that PART of its +merit, at least, must arise from that consideration, it would be a +superfluous undertaking to prove. That public utility is the SOLE origin +of justice, and that reflections on the beneficial consequences of this +virtue are the SOLE foundation of its merit; this proposition, being +more curious and important, will better deserve our examination and +enquiry. +</p> +<p> +Let us suppose that nature has bestowed on the human race such profuse +ABUNDANCE of all EXTERNAL conveniencies, that, without any uncertainty +in the event, without any care or industry on our part, every individual +finds himself fully provided with whatever his most voracious appetites +can want, or luxurious imagination wish or desire. His natural beauty, +we shall suppose, surpasses all acquired ornaments: the perpetual +clemency of the seasons renders useless all clothes or covering: the +raw herbage affords him the most delicious fare; the clear fountain, +the richest beverage. No laborious occupation required: no tillage: no +navigation. Music, poetry, and contemplation form his sole business: +conversation, mirth, and friendship his sole amusement. It seems evident +that, in such a happy state, every other social virtue would flourish, +and receive tenfold increase; but the cautious, jealous virtue of +justice would never once have been dreamed of. For what purpose make a +partition of goods, where every one has already more than enough? Why +give rise to property, where there cannot possibly be any injury? Why +call this object MINE, when upon the seizing of it by another, I need +but stretch out my hand to possess myself to what is equally valuable? +Justice, in that case, being totally useless, would be an idle +ceremonial, and could never possibly have place in the catalogue of +virtues. +</p> +<p> +We see, even in the present necessitous condition of mankind, that, +wherever any benefit is bestowed by nature in an unlimited abundance, +we leave it always in common among the whole human race, and make no +subdivisions of right and property. Water and air, though the most +necessary of all objects, are not challenged as the property of +individuals; nor can any man commit injustice by the most lavish use and +enjoyment of these blessings. In fertile extensive countries, with few +inhabitants, land is regarded on the same footing. And no topic is so +much insisted on by those, who defend the liberty of the seas, as the +unexhausted use of them in navigation. Were the advantages, procured +by navigation, as inexhaustible, these reasoners had never had any +adversaries to refute; nor had any claims ever been advanced of a +separate, exclusive dominion over the ocean. +</p> +<p> +It may happen, in some countries, at some periods, that there be +established a property in water, none in land [Footnote: Genesis, chaps. +xiii. and xxi.]; if the latter be in greater abundance than can be used +by the inhabitants, and the former be found, with difficulty, and in +very small quantities. +</p> +<p> +Again; suppose, that, though the necessities of human race continue the +same as at present, yet the mind is so enlarged, and so replete with +friendship and generosity, that every man has the utmost tenderness for +every man, and feels no more concern for his own interest than for that +of his fellows; it seems evident, that the use of justice would, in +this case, be suspended by such an extensive benevolence, nor would the +divisions and barriers of property and obligation have ever been thought +of. Why should I bind another, by a deed or promise, to do me any +good office, when I know that he is already prompted, by the strongest +inclination, to seek my happiness, and would, of himself, perform the +desired service; except the hurt, he thereby receives, be greater than +the benefit accruing to me? in which case, he knows, that, from my +innate humanity and friendship, I should be the first to oppose myself +to his imprudent generosity. Why raise landmarks between my neighbour's +field and mine, when my heart has made no division between our +interests; but shares all his joys and sorrows with the same force and +vivacity as if originally my own? Every man, upon this supposition, +being a second self to another, would trust all his interests to the +discretion of every man; without jealousy, without partition, without +distinction. And the whole human race would form only one family; where +all would lie in common, and be used freely, without regard to property; +but cautiously too, with as entire regard to the necessities of each +individual, as if our own interests were most intimately concerned. +</p> +<p> +In the present disposition of the human heart, it would, perhaps, be +difficult to find complete instances of such enlarged affections; but +still we may observe, that the case of families approaches towards it; +and the stronger the mutual benevolence is among the individuals, the +nearer it approaches; till all distinction of property be, in a great +measure, lost and confounded among them. Between married persons, the +cement of friendship is by the laws supposed so strong as to abolish all +division of possessions; and has often, in reality, the force ascribed +to it. And it is observable, that, during the ardour of new enthusiasms, +when every principle is inflamed into extravagance, the community of +goods has frequently been attempted; and nothing but experience of its +inconveniencies, from the returning or disguised selfishness of men, +could make the imprudent fanatics adopt anew the ideas of justice and of +separate property. So true is it, that this virtue derives its existence +entirely from its necessary USE to the intercourse and social state of +mankind. +</p> +<p> +To make this truth more evident, let us reverse the foregoing +suppositions; and carrying everything to the opposite extreme, consider +what would be the effect of these new situations. Suppose a society to +fall into such want of all common necessaries, that the utmost frugality +and industry cannot preserve the greater number from perishing, and the +whole from extreme misery; it will readily, I believe, be admitted, that +the strict laws of justice are suspended, in such a pressing +emergence, and give place to the stronger motives of necessity and +self-preservation. Is it any crime, after a shipwreck, to seize whatever +means or instrument of safety one can lay hold of, without regard to +former limitations of property? Or if a city besieged were perishing +with hunger; can we imagine, that men will see any means of preservation +before them, and lose their lives, from a scrupulous regard to what, in +other situations, would be the rules of equity and justice? The use +and tendency of that virtue is to procure happiness and security, by +preserving order in society: but where the society is ready to perish +from extreme necessity, no greater evil can be dreaded from violence and +injustice; and every man may now provide for himself by all the means, +which prudence can dictate, or humanity permit. The public, even in less +urgent necessities, opens granaries, without the consent of proprietors; +as justly supposing, that the authority of magistracy may, consistent +with equity, extend so far: but were any number of men to assemble, +without the tie of laws or civil jurisdiction; would an equal partition +of bread in a famine, though effected by power and even violence, be +regarded as criminal or injurious? +</p> +<p> +Suppose likewise, that it should be a virtuous man's fate to fall +into the society of ruffians, remote from the protection of laws and +government; what conduct must he embrace in that melancholy situation? +He sees such a desperate rapaciousness prevail; such a disregard +to equity, such contempt of order, such stupid blindness to future +consequences, as must immediately have the most tragical conclusion, +and must terminate in destruction to the greater number, and in a total +dissolution of society to the rest. He, meanwhile, can have no other +expedient than to arm himself, to whomever the sword he seizes, or +the buckler, may belong: To make provision of all means of defence and +security: And his particular regard to justice being no longer of use +to his own safety or that of others, he must consult the dictates of +self-preservation alone, without concern for those who no longer merit +his care and attention. +</p> +<p> +When any man, even in political society, renders himself by his crimes, +obnoxious to the public, he is punished by the laws in his goods and +person; that is, the ordinary rules of justice are, with regard to him, +suspended for a moment, and it becomes equitable to inflict on him, for +the BENEFIT of society, what otherwise he could not suffer without wrong +or injury. +</p> +<p> +The rage and violence of public war; what is it but a suspension of +justice among the warring parties, who perceive, that this virtue is now +no longer of any USE or advantage to them? The laws of war, which then +succeed to those of equity and justice, are rules calculated for the +ADVANTAGE and UTILITY of that particular state, in which men are +now placed. And were a civilized nation engaged with barbarians, who +observed no rules even of war, the former must also suspend their +observance of them, where they no longer serve to any purpose; and must +render every action or recounter as bloody and pernicious as possible to +the first aggressors. +</p> +<p> +Thus, the rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the particular +state and condition in which men are placed, and owe their origin and +existence to that utility, which results to the public from their strict +and regular observance. Reverse, in any considerable circumstance, +the condition of men: Produce extreme abundance or extreme necessity: +Implant in the human breast perfect moderation and humanity, or perfect +rapaciousness and malice: By rendering justice totally USELESS, you +thereby totally destroy its essence, and suspend its obligation upon +mankind. The common situation of society is a medium amidst all these +extremes. We are naturally partial to ourselves, and to our friends; but +are capable of learning the advantage resulting from a more equitable +conduct. Few enjoyments are given us from the open and liberal hand of +nature; but by art, labour, and industry, we can extract them in great +abundance. Hence the ideas of property become necessary in all civil +society: Hence justice derives its usefulness to the public: And hence +alone arises its merit and moral obligation. +</p> +<p> +These conclusions are so natural and obvious, that they have not escaped +even the poets, in their descriptions of the felicity attending the +golden age or the reign of Saturn. The seasons, in that first period of +nature, were so temperate, if we credit these agreeable fictions, that +there was no necessity for men to provide themselves with clothes and +houses, as a security against the violence of heat and cold: The +rivers flowed with wine and milk: The oaks yielded honey; and nature +spontaneously produced her greatest delicacies. Nor were these the +chief advantages of that happy age. Tempests were not alone removed from +nature; but those more furious tempests were unknown to human breasts, +which now cause such uproar, and engender such confusion. Avarice, +ambition, cruelty, selfishness, were never heard of: Cordial affection, +compassion, sympathy, were the only movements with which the mind was +yet acquainted. Even the punctilious distinction of MINE and THINE was +banished from among the happy race of mortals, and carried with it the +very notion of property and obligation, justice and injustice. +</p> +<p> +This POETICAL fiction of the GOLDEN AGE, is in some respects, of a piece +with the PHILOSOPHICAL fiction of the STATE OF NATURE; only that the +former is represented as the most charming and most peaceable condition, +which can possibly be imagined; whereas the latter is painted out as +a state of mutual war and violence, attended with the most extreme +necessity. On the first origin of mankind, we are told, their ignorance +and savage nature were so prevalent, that they could give no mutual +trust, but must each depend upon himself and his own force or cunning +for protection and security. No law was heard of: No rule of justice +known: No distinction of property regarded: Power was the only measure +of right; and a perpetual war of all against all was the result of men's +untamed selfishness and barbarity. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: This fiction of a state of nature, as a state of war, +was not first started by Mr. Hobbes, as is commonly imagined. Plato +endeavours to refute an hypothesis very like it in the second, third, +and fourth books de republica. Cicero, on the contrary, supposes it +certain and universally acknowledged in the following passage. 'Quis +enim vestrum, judices, ignorat, ita naturam rerum tulisse, ut quodam +tempore homines, nondum neque naturali neque civili jure descripto, +fusi per agros ac dispersi vagarentur tantumque haberent quantum manu ac +viribus, per caedem ac vulnera, aut eripere aut retinere potuissent? +Qui igitur primi virtute & consilio praestanti extiterunt, ii perspecto +genere humanae docilitatis atque ingenii, dissipatos unum in locum +congregarunt, eosque ex feritate illa ad justitiam ac mansuetudinem +transduxerunt. Tum res ad communem utilitatem, quas publicas appellamus, +tum conventicula hominum, quae postea civitates nominatae sunt, tum +domicilia conjuncta, quas urbes dicamus, invento & divino & humano jure +moenibus sepserunt. Atque inter hanc vitam, perpolitam humanitate, & +llam immanem, nihil tam interest quam JUS atque VIS. Horum utro uti +nolimus, altero est utendum. Vim volumus extingui. Jus valeat necesse +est, idi est, judicia, quibus omne jus continetur. Judicia displicent, +ant nulla sunt. Vis dominetur necesse est. Haec vident omnes.' Pro Sext. +sec. 42.] +</pre> +<p> +Whether such a condition of human nature could ever exist, or if it +did, could continue so long as to merit the appellation of a STATE, +may justly be doubted. Men are necessarily born in a family-society, at +least; and are trained up by their parents to some rule of conduct and +behaviour. But this must be admitted, that, if such a state of mutual +war and violence was ever real, the suspension of all laws of +justice, from their absolute inutility, is a necessary and infallible +consequence. +</p> +<p> +The more we vary our views of human life, and the newer and more unusual +the lights are in which we survey it, the more shall we be convinced, +that the origin here assigned for the virtue of justice is real and +satisfactory. +</p> +<p> +Were there a species of creatures intermingled with men, which, though +rational, were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and +mind, that they were incapable of all resistance, and could never, upon +the highest provocation, make us feel the effects of their resentment; +the necessary consequence, I think, is that we should be bound by the +laws of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures, but should +not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard +to them, nor could they possess any right or property, exclusive of such +arbitrary lords. Our intercourse with them could not be called society, +which supposes a degree of equality; but absolute command on the one +side, and servile obedience on the other. Whatever we covet, they must +instantly resign: Our permission is the only tenure, by which they hold +their possessions: Our compassion and kindness the only check, by which +they curb our lawless will: And as no inconvenience ever results from +the exercise of a power, so firmly established in nature, the restraints +of justice and property, being totally USELESS, would never have place +in so unequal a confederacy. +</p> +<p> +This is plainly the situation of men, with regard to animals; and +how far these may be said to possess reason, I leave it to others to +determine. The great superiority of civilized Europeans above barbarous +Indians, tempted us to imagine ourselves on the same footing with regard +to them, and made us throw off all restraints of justice, and even of +humanity, in our treatment of them. In many nations, the female sex are +reduced to like slavery, and are rendered incapable of all property, in +opposition to their lordly masters. But though the males, when united, +have in all countries bodily force sufficient to maintain this severe +tyranny, yet such are the insinuation, address, and charms of their fair +companions, that women are commonly able to break the confederacy, and +share with the other sex in all the rights and privileges of society. +</p> +<p> +Were the human species so framed by nature as that each individual +possessed within himself every faculty, requisite both for his own +preservation and for the propagation of his kind: Were all society and +intercourse cut off between man and man, by the primary intention of the +supreme Creator: It seems evident, that so solitary a being would be +as much incapable of justice, as of social discourse and conversation. +Where mutual regards and forbearance serve to no manner of purpose, +they would never direct the conduct of any reasonable man. The headlong +course of the passions would be checked by no reflection on future +consequences. And as each man is here supposed to love himself alone, +and to depend only on himself and his own activity for safety and +happiness, he would, on every occasion, to the utmost of his power, +challenge the preference above every other being, to none of which he +is bound by any ties, either of nature or of interest. But suppose +the conjunction of the sexes to be established in nature, a family +immediately arises; and particular rules being found requisite for +its subsistence, these are immediately embraced; though without +comprehending the rest of mankind within their prescriptions. Suppose +that several families unite together into one society, which is totally +disjoined from all others, the rules, which preserve peace and order, +enlarge themselves to the utmost extent of that society; but becoming +then entirely useless, lose their force when carried one step farther. +But again suppose, that several distinct societies maintain a kind of +intercourse for mutual convenience and advantage, the boundaries of +justice still grow larger, in proportion to the largeness of men's +views, and the force of their mutual connexions. History, experience, +reason sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of human +sentiments, and in the gradual enlargement of our regards to justice, +in proportion as we become acquainted with the extensive utility of that +virtue. +</p> +<a name="2H_PART32"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + PART II. +</h2> +<p> +If we examine the PARTICULAR laws, by which justice is directed, +and property determined; we shall still be presented with the same +conclusion. The good of mankind is the only object of all these laws +and regulations. Not only is it requisite, for the peace and interest +of society, that men's possessions should be separated; but the rules, +which we follow, in making the separation, are such as can best be +contrived to serve farther the interests of society. +</p> +<p> +We shall suppose that a creature, possessed of reason, but unacquainted +with human nature, deliberates with himself what rules of justice or +property would best promote public interest, and establish peace and +security among mankind: His most obvious thought would be, to assign the +largest possessions to the most extensive virtue, and give every one +the power of doing good, proportioned to his inclination. In a perfect +theocracy, where a being, infinitely intelligent, governs by particular +volitions, this rule would certainly have place, and might serve to the +wisest purposes: But were mankind to execute such a law; so great is +the uncertainty of merit, both from its natural obscurity, and from the +self-conceit of each individual, that no determinate rule of conduct +would ever result from it; and the total dissolution of society must +be the immediate consequence. Fanatics may suppose, THAT DOMINION IS +FOUNDED ON GRACE, and THAT SAINTS ALONE INHERIT THE EARTH; but the civil +magistrate very justly puts these sublime theorists on the same footing +with common robbers, and teaches them by the severest discipline, that a +rule, which, in speculation, may seem the most advantageous to society, +may yet be found, in practice, totally pernicious and destructive. +</p> +<p> +That there were RELIGIOUS fanatics of this kind in England, during +the civil wars, we learn from history; though it is probable, that the +obvious TENDENCY of these principles excited such horror in mankind, as +soon obliged the dangerous enthusiasts to renounce, or at least conceal +their tenets. Perhaps the LEVELLERS, who claimed an equal distribution +of property, were a kind of POLITICAL fanatics, which arose from the +religious species, and more openly avowed their pretensions; as carrying +a more plausible appearance, of being practicable in themselves, as well +as useful to human society. It must, indeed, be confessed, that nature +is so liberal to mankind, that, were all her presents equally divided +among the species, and improved by art and industry, every individual +would enjoy all the necessaries, and even most of the comforts of life; +nor would ever be liable to any ills but such as might accidentally +arise from the sickly frame and constitution of his body. It must also +be confessed, that, wherever we depart from this equality, we rob the +poor of more satisfaction than we add to the rich, and that the slight +gratification of a frivolous vanity, in one individual, frequently costs +more than bread to many families, and even provinces. It may appear +withal, that the rule of equality, as it would be highly USEFUL, is not +altogether IMPRACTICABLE; but has taken place, at least in an imperfect +degree, in some republics; particularly that of Sparta; where it was +attended, it is said, with the most beneficial consequences. Not to +mention that the Agrarian laws, so frequently claimed in Rome, and +carried into execution in many Greek cities, proceeded, all of them, +from a general idea of the utility of this principle. +</p> +<p> +But historians, and even common sense, may inform us, that, however +specious these ideas of PERFECT equality may seem, they are really, +at bottom, IMPRACTICABLE; and were they not so, would be extremely +PERNICIOUS to human society. Render possessions ever so equal, men's +different degrees of art, care, and industry will immediately break that +equality. Or if you check these virtues, you reduce society to the most +extreme indigence; and instead of preventing want and beggary in a +few, render it unavoidable to the whole community. The most rigorous +inquisition too is requisite to watch every inequality on its first +appearance; and the most severe jurisdiction, to punish and redress it. +But besides, that so much authority must soon degenerate into tyranny, +and be exerted with great partialities; who can possibly be possessed +of it, in such a situation as is here supposed? Perfect equality +of possessions, destroying all subordination, weakens extremely the +authority of magistracy, and must reduce all power nearly to a level, as +well as property. +</p> +<p> +We may conclude, therefore, that, in order to establish laws for the +regulation of property, we must be acquainted with the nature and +situation of man; must reject appearances, which may be false, though +specious; and must search for those rules, which are, on the whole, most +USEFUL and BENEFICIAL. Vulgar sense and slight experience are sufficient +for this purpose; where men give not way to too selfish avidity, or too +extensive enthusiasm. +</p> +<p> +Who sees not, for instance, that whatever is produced or improved by a +man's art or industry ought, for ever, to be secured to him, in order to +give encouragement to such USEFUL habits and accomplishments? That the +property ought also to descend to children and relations, for the same +USEFUL purpose? That it may be alienated by consent, in order to beget +that commerce and intercourse, which is so BENEFICIAL to human society? +And that all contracts and promises ought carefully to be fulfilled, +in order to secure mutual trust and confidence, by which the general +INTEREST of mankind is so much promoted? +</p> +<p> +Examine the writers on the laws of nature; and you will always find, +that, whatever principles they set out with, they are sure to terminate +here at last, and to assign, as the ultimate reason for every rule which +they establish, the convenience and necessities of mankind. A concession +thus extorted, in opposition to systems, has more authority than if it +had been made in prosecution of them. +</p> +<p> +What other reason, indeed, could writers ever give, why this must be +MINE and that YOURS; since uninstructed nature surely never made any +such distinction? The objects which receive those appellations are, of +themselves, foreign to us; they are totally disjoined and separated +from us; and nothing but the general interests of society can form the +connexion. +</p> +<p> +Sometimes the interests of society may require a rule of justice in +a particular case; but may not determine any particular rule, among +several, which are all equally beneficial. In that case, the slightest +analogies are laid hold of, in order to prevent that indifference and +ambiguity, which would be the source of perpetual dissension. Thus +possession alone, and first possession, is supposed to convey property, +where no body else has any preceding claim and pretension. Many of the +reasonings of lawyers are of this analogical nature, and depend on very +slight connexions of the imagination. +</p> +<p> +Does any one scruple, in extraordinary cases, to violate all regard to +the private property of individuals, and sacrifice to public interest +a distinction which had been established for the sake of that interest? +The safety of the people is the supreme law: All other particular laws +are subordinate to it, and dependent on it: And if, in the COMMON course +of things, they be followed and regarded; it is only because the +public safety and interest COMMONLY demand so equal and impartial an +administration. +</p> +<p> +Sometimes both UTILITY and ANALOGY fail, and leave the laws of justice +in total uncertainty. Thus, it is highly requisite, that prescription +or long possession should convey property; but what number of days or +months or years should be sufficient for that purpose, it is impossible +for reason alone to determine. CIVIL LAWS here supply the place of the +natural CODE, and assign different terms for prescription, according to +the different UTILITIES, proposed by the legislator. Bills of exchange +and promissory notes, by the laws of most countries, prescribe sooner +than bonds, and mortgages, and contracts of a more formal nature. +</p> +<p> +In general we may observe that all questions of property are subordinate +to the authority of civil laws, which extend, restrain, modify, +and alter the rules of natural justice, according to the particular +CONVENIENCE of each community. The laws have, or ought to have, a +constant reference to the constitution of government, the manners, the +climate, the religion, the commerce, the situation of each society. A +late author of genius, as well as learning, has prosecuted this subject +at large, and has established, from these principles, a system of +political knowledge, which abounds in ingenious and brilliant thoughts, +and is not wanting in solidity. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: The author of L'ESPRIT DES LOIX, This illustrious + writer, however, sets out with a different theory, and + supposes all right to be founded on certain RAPPORTS or + relations; which is a system, that, in my opinion, never + will be reconciled with true philosophy. Father Malebranche, + as far as I can learn, was the first that started this + abstract theory of morals, which was afterwards adopted by + Cudworth, Clarke, and others; and as it excludes all + sentiment, and pretends to found everything on reason, it + has not wanted followers in this philosophic age. See + Section I, Appendix I. With regard to justice, the virtue + here treated of, the inference against this theory seems + short and conclusive. Property is allowed to be dependent on + civil laws; civil laws are allowed to have no other object, + but the interest of society: This therefore must be allowed + to be the sole foundation of property and justice. Not to + mention, that our obligation itself to obey the magistrate + and his laws is founded on nothing but the interests of + society. If the ideas of justice, sometimes, do not follow + the dispositions of civil law; we shall find, that these + cases, instead of objections, are confirmations of the + theory delivered above. Where a civil law is so perverse as + to cross all the interests of society, it loses all its + authority, and men judge by the ideas of natural justice, + which are conformable to those interests. Sometimes also + civil laws, for useful purposes, require a ceremony or form + to any deed; and where that is wanting, their decrees run + contrary to the usual tenour of justice; but one who takes + advantage of such chicanes, is not commonly regarded as an + honest man. Thus, the interests of society require, that + contracts be fulfilled; and there is not a more material + article either of natural or civil justice: But the omission + of a trifling circumstance will often, by law, invalidate a + contract, in foro humano, but not in foro conscientiae, as + divines express themselves. In these cases, the magistrate + is supposed only to withdraw his power of enforcing the + right, not to have altered the right. Where his intention + extends to the right, and is conformable to the interests of + society; it never fails to alter the right; a clear proof of + the origin of justice and of property, as assigned above.] +</pre> +<p> +WHAT IS A MAN'S PROPERTY? Anything which it is lawful for him, and for +him alone, to use. BUT WHAT RULE HAVE WE, BY WHICH WE CAN DISTINGUISH +THESE OBJECTS? Here we must have recourse to statutes, customs, +precedents, analogies, and a hundred other circumstances; some of +which are constant and inflexible, some variable and arbitrary. But the +ultimate point, in which they all professedly terminate, is the +interest and happiness of human society. Where this enters not into +consideration, nothing can appear more whimsical, unnatural, and even +superstitious, than all or most of the laws of justice and of property. +</p> +<p> +Those who ridicule vulgar superstitions, and expose the folly of +particular regards to meats, days, places, postures, apparel, have an +easy task; while they consider all the qualities and relations of the +objects, and discover no adequate cause for that affection or antipathy, +veneration or horror, which have so mighty an influence over a +considerable part of mankind. A Syrian would have starved rather than +taste pigeon; an Egyptian would not have approached bacon: But if these +species of food be examined by the senses of sight, smell, or taste, +or scrutinized by the sciences of chemistry, medicine, or physics, no +difference is ever found between them and any other species, nor +can that precise circumstance be pitched on, which may afford a just +foundation for the religious passion. A fowl on Thursday is lawful +food; on Friday abominable: Eggs in this house and in this diocese, +are permitted during Lent; a hundred paces farther, to eat them is a +damnable sin. This earth or building, yesterday was profane; to-day, +by the muttering of certain words, it has become holy and sacred. Such +reflections as these, in the mouth of a philosopher, one may safely +say, are too obvious to have any influence; because they must always, +to every man, occur at first sight; and where they prevail not, of +themselves, they are surely obstructed by education, prejudice, and +passion, not by ignorance or mistake. +</p> +<p> +It may appear to a careless view, or rather a too abstracted reflection, +that there enters a like superstition into all the sentiments of +justice; and that, if a man expose its object, or what we call property, +to the same scrutiny of sense and science, he will not, by the most +accurate enquiry, find any foundation for the difference made by moral +sentiment. I may lawfully nourish myself from this tree; but the fruit +of another of the same species, ten paces off, it is criminal for me to +touch. Had I worn this apparel an hour ago, I had merited the severest +punishment; but a man, by pronouncing a few magical syllables, has now +rendered it fit for my use and service. Were this house placed in the +neighbouring territory, it had been immoral for me to dwell in it; +but being built on this side the river, it is subject to a different +municipal law, and by its becoming mine I incur no blame or censure. +The same species of reasoning it may be thought, which so successfully +exposes superstition, is also applicable to justice; nor is it possible, +in the one case more than in the other, to point out, in the object, +that precise quality or circumstance, which is the foundation of the +sentiment. +</p> +<p> +But there is this material difference between SUPERSTITION and JUSTICE, +that the former is frivolous, useless, and burdensome; the latter is +absolutely requisite to the well-being of mankind and existence of +society. When we abstract from this circumstance (for it is too apparent +ever to be overlooked) it must be confessed, that all regards to right +and property, seem entirely without foundation, as much as the grossest +and most vulgar superstition. Were the interests of society nowise +concerned, it is as unintelligible why another's articulating certain +sounds implying consent, should change the nature of my actions with +regard to a particular object, as why the reciting of a liturgy by a +priest, in a certain habit and posture, should dedicate a heap of brick +and timber, and render it, thenceforth and for ever, sacred. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: It is evident, that the will or consent alone never +transfers property, nor causes the obligation of a promise (for the same +reasoning extends to both), but the will must be expressed by words or +signs, in order to impose a tie upon any man. The expression being once +brought in as subservient to the will, soon becomes the principal part +of the promise; nor will a man be less bound by his word, though he +secretly give a different direction to his intention, and withhold the +assent of his mind. But though the expression makes, on most occasions, +the whole of the promise, yet it does not always so; and one who should +make use of any expression, of which he knows not the meaning, and which +he uses without any sense of the consequences, would not certainly be +bound by it. Nay, though he know its meaning, yet if he use it in jest +only, and with such signs as evidently show, that he has no serious +intention of binding himself, he would not lie under any obligation of +performance; but it is necessary, that the words be a perfect expression +of the will, without any contrary signs. Nay, even this we must +not carry so far as to imagine, that one, whom, by our quickness of +understanding, we conjecture, from certain signs, to have an intention +of deceiving us, is not bound by his expression or verbal promise, if +we accept of it; but must limit this conclusion to those cases where +the signs are of a different nature from those of deceit. All these +contradictions are easily accounted for, if justice arise entirely from +its usefulness to society; but will never be explained on any other +hypothesis. + + It is remarkable that the moral decisions of the JESUITS and other +relaxed casuists, were commonly formed in prosecution of some such +subtilties of reasoning as are here pointed out, and proceed as much +from the habit of scholastic refinement as from any corruption of +the heart, if we may follow the authority of Mons. Bayle. See his +Dictionary, article Loyola. And why has the indignation of mankind risen +so high against these casuists; but because every one perceived, that +human society could not subsist were such practices authorized, and that +morals must always be handled with a view to public interest, more than +philosophical regularity? If the secret direction of the intention, said +every man of sense, could invalidate a contract; where is our security? +And yet a metaphysical schoolman might think, that, where an intention +was supposed to be requisite, if that intention really had not place, +no consequence ought to follow, and no obligation be imposed. The +casuistical subtilties may not be greater than the snbtilties of +lawyers, hinted at above; but as the former are PERNICIOUS, and the +latter INNOCENT and even NECESSARY, this is the reason of the very +different reception they meet with from the world. + + It is a doctrine of the Church of Rome, that the priest, by a secret +direction of his intention, can invalidate any sacrament. This position +is derived from a strict and regular prosecution of the obvious truth, +that empty words alone, without any meaning or intention in the speaker, +can never be attended with any effect. If the same conclusion be not +admitted in reasonings concerning civil contracts, where the affair is +allowed to be of so much less consequence than the eternal salvation +of thousands, it proceeds entirely from men's sense of the danger and +inconvenience of the doctrine in the former case: And we may +thence observe, that however positive, arrogant, and dogmatical any +superstition may appear, it never can convey any thorough persuasion +of the reality of its objects, or put them, in any degree, on a balance +with the common incidents of life, which we learn from daily observation +and experimental reasoning.] +</pre> +<p> +These reflections are far from weakening the obligations of justice, or +diminishing anything from the most sacred attention to property. On +the contrary, such sentiments must acquire new force from the present +reasoning. For what stronger foundation can be desired or conceived for +any duty, than to observe, that human society, or even human nature, +could not subsist without the establishment of it; and will still arrive +at greater degrees of happiness and perfection, the more inviolable the +regard is, which is paid to that duty? +</p> +<p> +The dilemma seems obvious: As justice evidently tends to promote public +utility and to support civil society, the sentiment of justice is either +derived from our reflecting on that tendency, or like hunger, thirst, +and other appetites, resentment, love of life, attachment to offspring, +and other passions, arises from a simple original instinct in the human +breast, which nature has implanted for like salutary purposes. If the +latter be the case, it follows, that property, which is the object of +justice, is also distinguished by a simple original instinct, and is not +ascertained by any argument or reflection. But who is there that ever +heard of such an instinct? Or is this a subject in which new discoveries +can be made? We may as well expect to discover, in the body, new senses, +which had before escaped the observation of all mankind. +</p> +<p> +But farther, though it seems a very simple proposition to say, that +nature, by an instinctive sentiment, distinguishes property, yet in +reality we shall find, that there are required for that purpose ten +thousand different instincts, and these employed about objects of the +greatest intricacy and nicest discernment. For when a definition of +PROPERTY is required, that relation is found to resolve itself into +any possession acquired by occupation, by industry, by prescription, by +inheritance, by contract, &c. Can we think that nature, by an original +instinct, instructs us in all these methods of acquisition? +</p> +<p> +These words too, inheritance and contract, stand for ideas infinitely +complicated; and to define them exactly, a hundred volumes of laws, and +a thousand volumes of commentators, have not been found sufficient. Does +nature, whose instincts in men are all simple, embrace such complicated +and artificial objects, and create a rational creature, without trusting +anything to the operation of his reason? +</p> +<p> +But even though all this were admitted, it would not be satisfactory. +Positive laws can certainly transfer property. It is by another original +instinct, that we recognize the authority of kings and senates, and mark +all the boundaries of their jurisdiction? Judges too, even though their +sentence be erroneous and illegal, must be allowed, for the sake of +peace and order, to have decisive authority, and ultimately to determine +property. Have we original innate ideas of praetors and chancellors and +juries? Who sees not, that all these institutions arise merely from the +necessities of human society? +</p> +<p> +All birds of the same species in every age and country, built their +nests alike: In this we see the force of instinct. Men, in different +times and places, frame their houses differently: Here we perceive +the influence of reason and custom. A like inference may be drawn from +comparing the instinct of generation and the institution of property. +</p> +<p> +How great soever the variety of municipal laws, it must be confessed, +that their chief outlines pretty regularly concur; because the purposes, +to which they tend, are everywhere exactly similar. In like manner, all +houses have a roof and walls, windows and chimneys; though diversified +in their shape, figure, and materials. The purposes of the latter, +directed to the conveniencies of human life, discover not more plainly +their origin from reason and reflection, than do those of the former, +which point all to a like end. +</p> +<p> +I need not mention the variations, which all the rules of property +receive from the finer turns and connexions of the imagination, and from +the subtilties and abstractions of law-topics and reasonings. There is +no possibility of reconciling this observation to the notion of original +instincts. +</p> +<p> +What alone will beget a doubt concerning the theory, on which I insist, +is the influence of education and acquired habits, by which we are +so accustomed to blame injustice, that we are not, in every instance, +conscious of any immediate reflection on the pernicious consequences of +it. The views the most familiar to us are apt, for that very reason, +to escape us; and what we have very frequently performed from certain +motives, we are apt likewise to continue mechanically, without +recalling, on every occasion, the reflections, which first determined +us. The convenience, or rather necessity, which leads to justice is so +universal, and everywhere points so much to the same rules, that the +habit takes place in all societies; and it is not without some scrutiny, +that we are able to ascertain its true origin. The matter, however, +is not so obscure, but that even in common life we have every moment +recourse to the principle of public utility, and ask, WHAT MUST BECOME +OF THE WORLD, IF SUCH PRACTICES PREVAIL? HOW COULD SOCIETY SUBSIST +UNDER SUCH DISORDERS? Were the distinction or separation of possessions +entirely useless, can any one conceive, that it ever should have +obtained in society? +</p> +<p> +Thus we seem, upon the whole, to have attained a knowledge of the force +of that principle here insisted on, and can determine what degree +of esteem or moral approbation may result from reflections on public +interest and utility. The necessity of justice to the support of society +is the sole foundation of that virtue; and since no moral excellence +is more highly esteemed, we may conclude that this circumstance of +usefulness has, in general, the strongest energy, and most entire +command over our sentiments. It must, therefore, be the source of +a considerable part of the merit ascribed to humanity, benevolence, +friendship, public spirit, and other social virtues of that stamp; as it +is the sole source of the moral approbation paid to fidelity, justice, +veracity, integrity, and those other estimable and useful qualities and +principles. It is entirely agreeable to the rules of philosophy, and +even of common reason; where any principle has been found to have a +great force and energy in one instance, to ascribe to it a like +energy in all similar instances. This indeed is Newton's chief rule of +philosophizing [Footnote: Principia. Lib. iii.]. +</p> +<a name="2H_SECT4"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + SECTION IV. +</h2> +<h3> + OF POLITICAL SOCIETY. +</h3> +<p> +Had every man sufficient SAGACITY to perceive, at all times, the strong +interest which binds him to the observance of justice and equity, and +STRENGTH OF MIND sufficient to persevere in a steady adherence to a +general and a distant interest, in opposition to the allurements of +present pleasure and advantage; there had never, in that case, been any +such thing as government or political society, but each man, following +his natural liberty, had lived in entire peace and harmony with all +others. What need of positive law where natural justice is, of itself, +a sufficient restraint? Why create magistrates, where there never arises +any disorder or iniquity? Why abridge our native freedom, when, in every +instance, the utmost exertion of it is found innocent and beneficial? +It is evident, that, if government were totally useless, it never could +have place, and that the sole foundation of the duty of allegiance is +the ADVANTAGE, which it procures to society, by preserving peace and +order among mankind. +</p> +<p> +When a number of political societies are erected, and maintain a great +intercourse together, a new set of rules are immediately discovered to +be USEFUL in that particular situation; and accordingly take place under +the title of Laws of Nations. Of this kind are, the sacredness of the +person of ambassadors, abstaining from poisoned arms, quarter in war, +with others of that kind, which are plainly calculated for the ADVANTAGE +of states and kingdoms in their intercourse with each other. +</p> +<p> +The rules of justice, such as prevail among individuals, are not +entirely suspended among political societies. All princes pretend a +regard to the rights of other princes; and some, no doubt, without +hypocrisy. Alliances and treaties are every day made between independent +states, which would only be so much waste of parchment, if they were not +found by experience to have SOME influence and authority. But here is +the difference between kingdoms and individuals. Human nature cannot +by any means subsist, without the association of individuals; and that +association never could have place, were no regard paid to the laws of +equity and justice. Disorder, confusion, the war of all against all, are +the necessary consequences of such a licentious conduct. But nations +can subsist without intercourse. They may even subsist, in some degree, +under a general war. The observance of justice, though useful among +them, is not guarded by so strong a necessity as among individuals; +and the moral obligation holds proportion with the USEFULNESS. All +politicians will allow, and most philosophers, that reasons of state +may, in particular emergencies, dispense with the rules of justice, and +invalidate any treaty or alliance, where the strict observance of +it would be prejudicial, in a considerable degree, to either of the +contracting parties. But nothing less than the most extreme necessity, +it is confessed, can justify individuals in a breach of promise, or an +invasion of the properties of others. +</p> +<p> +In a confederated commonwealth, such as the Achaean republic of old, or +the Swiss Cantons and United Provinces in modern times; as the league +has here a peculiar UTILITY, the conditions of union have a peculiar +sacredness and authority, and a violation of them would be regarded as +no less, or even as more criminal, than any private injury or injustice. +</p> +<p> +The long and helpless infancy of man requires the combination of parents +for the subsistence of their young; and that combination requires the +virtue of chastity or fidelity to the marriage bed. Without such a +UTILITY, it will readily be owned, that such a virtue would never have +been thought of. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: The only solution, which Plato gives to all the +objections that might be raised against the community of women, +established in his imaginary commonwealth, is, [Greek quotation here]. +Scite enim istud et dicitur et dicetur, Id quod utile sit honestum esse, +quod autem inutile sit turpe esse. [De Rep lib v p 457 ex edit Ser]. And +this maxim will admit of no doubt, where public utility is concerned, +which is Plato's meaning. And indeed to what other purpose do all the +ideas of chastity and modesty serve? "Nisi utile est quod facimus, +frustra est gloria," says Phaedrus. [Greek quotation here], says +Plutarch, de vitioso pudore. "Nihil eorum quae damnosa sunt, pulchrum +est." The same was the opinion of the Stoics [Greek quotation here; from +Sept. Emp lib III cap 20]. +</pre> +<p> +An infidelity of this nature is much more PERNICIOUS in WOMEN than in +MEN. Hence the laws of chastity are much stricter over the one sex than +over the other. +</p> +<p> +These rules have all a reference to generation; and yet women past +child-bearing are no more supposed to be exempted from them than +those in the flower of their youth and beauty. GENERAL RULES are often +extended beyond the principle whence they first arise; and this in all +matters of taste and sentiment. It is a vulgar story at Paris, that, +during the rage of the Mississippi, a hump-backed fellow went every +day into the Rue de Quincempoix, where the stock-jobbers met in great +crowds, and was well paid for allowing them to make use of his hump as a +desk, in order to sign their contracts upon it. Would the fortune, which +he raised by this expedient, make him a handsome fellow; though it be +confessed, that personal beauty arises very much from ideas of utility? +The imagination is influenced by associations of ideas; which, though +they arise at first from the judgement, are not easily altered by every +particular exception that occurs to us. To which we may add, in +the present case of chastity, that the example of the old would be +pernicious to the young; and that women, continually foreseeing that a +certain time would bring them the liberty of indulgence, would naturally +advance that period, and think more lightly of this whole duty, so +requisite to society. +</p> +<p> +Those who live in the same family have such frequent opportunities of +licence of this kind, that nothing could prevent purity of manners, were +marriage allowed, among the nearest relations, or any intercourse of +love between them ratified by law and custom. Incest, therefore, being +PERNICIOUS in a superior degree, has also a superior turpitude and moral +deformity annexed to it. +</p> +<p> +What is the reason, why, by the Athenian laws, one might marry a +half-sister by the father, but not by the mother? Plainly this: +The manners of the Athenians were so reserved, that a man was never +permitted to approach the women's apartment, even in the same family, +unless where he visited his own mother. His step-mother and her children +were as much shut up from him as the woman of any other family, and +there was as little danger of any criminal correspondence between them. +Uncles and nieces, for a like reason, might marry at Athens; but neither +these, nor half-brothers and sisters, could contract that alliance at +Rome, where the intercourse was more open between the sexes. Public +utility is the cause of all these variations. +</p> +<p> +To repeat, to a man's prejudice, anything that escaped him in private +conversation, or to make any such use of his private letters, is highly +blamed. The free and social intercourse of minds must be extremely +checked, where no such rules of fidelity are established. +</p> +<p> +Even in repeating stories, whence we can foresee no ill consequences +to result, the giving of one's author is regarded as a piece of +indiscretion, if not of immorality. These stories, in passing from hand +to hand, and receiving all the usual variations, frequently come about +to the persons concerned, and produce animosities and quarrels among +people, whose intentions are the most innocent and inoffensive. +</p> +<p> +To pry into secrets, to open or even read the letters of others, to +play the spy upon their words and looks and actions; what habits more +inconvenient in society? What habits, of consequence, more blameable? +</p> +<p> +This principle is also the foundation of most of the laws of good +manners; a kind of lesser morality, calculated for the ease of company +and conversation. Too much or too little ceremony are both blamed, and +everything, which promotes ease, without an indecent familiarity, is +useful and laudable. +</p> +<p> +Constancy in friendships, attachments, and familiarities, is +commendable, and is requisite to support trust and good correspondence +in society. But in places of general, though casual concourse, where +the pursuit of health and pleasure brings people promiscuously together, +public conveniency has dispensed with this maxim; and custom there +promotes an unreserved conversation for the time, by indulging the +privilege of dropping afterwards every indifferent acquaintance, without +breach of civility or good manners. +</p> +<p> +Even in societies, which are established on principles the most immoral, +and the most destructive to the interests of the general society, there +are required certain rules, which a species of false honour, as well as +private interest, engages the members to observe. Robbers and pirates, +it has often been remarked, could not maintain their pernicious +confederacy, did they not establish a pew distributive justice among +themselves, and recall those laws of equity, which they have violated +with the rest of mankind. +</p> +<p> +I hate a drinking companion, says the Greek proverb, who never forgets. +The follies of the last debauch should be buried in eternal oblivion, in +order to give full scope to the follies of the next. +</p> +<p> +Among nations, where an immoral gallantry, if covered with a thin veil +of mystery, is, in some degree, authorized by custom, there immediately +arise a set of rules, calculated for the conveniency of that attachment. +The famous court or parliament of love in Provence formerly decided all +difficult cases of this nature. +</p> +<p> +In societies for play, there are laws required for the conduct of the +game; and these laws are different in each game. The foundation, I own, +of such societies is frivolous; and the laws are, in a great measure, +though not altogether, capricious and arbitrary. So far is there a +material difference between them and the rules of justice, fidelity, and +loyalty. The general societies of men are absolutely requisite for the +subsistence of the species; and the public conveniency, which regulates +morals, is inviolably established in the nature of man, and of the +world, in which he lives. The comparison, therefore, in these respects, +is very imperfect. We may only learn from it the necessity of rules, +wherever men have any intercourse with each other. +</p> +<p> +They cannot even pass each other on the road without rules. Waggoners, +coachmen, and postilions have principles, by which they give the way; +and these are chiefly founded on mutual ease and convenience. Sometimes +also they are arbitrary, at least dependent on a kind of capricious +analogy like many of the reasonings of lawyers. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: That the lighter machine yield to the heavier, and, in +machines of the same kind, that the empty yield to the loaded; this rule +is founded on convenience. That those who are going to the capital take +place of those who are coming from it; this seems to be founded on some +idea of dignity of the great city, and of the preference of the future +to the past. From like reasons, among foot-walkers, the right-hand +entitles a man to the wall, and prevents jostling, which peaceable +people find very disagreeable and inconvenient.] +</pre> +<p> +To carry the matter farther, we may observe, that it is impossible for +men so much as to murder each other without statutes, and maxims, and an +idea of justice and honour. War has its laws as well as peace; and +even that sportive kind of war, carried on among wrestlers, boxers, +cudgel-players, gladiators, is regulated by fixed principles. Common +interest and utility beget infallibly a standard of right and wrong +among the parties concerned. +</p> +<a name="2H_SECT5"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + SECTION V. WHY UTILITY PLEASES. +</h2> +<a name="2H_PART51"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + PART I. +</h2> +<p> +It seems so natural a thought to ascribe to their utility the praise, +which we bestow on the social virtues, that one would expect to meet +with this principle everywhere in moral writers, as the chief foundation +of their reasoning and enquiry. In common life, we may observe, that the +circumstance of utility is always appealed to; nor is it supposed, that +a greater eulogy can be given to any man, than to display his usefulness +to the public, and enumerate the services, which he has performed to +mankind and society. What praise, even of an inanimate form, if the +regularity and elegance of its parts destroy not its fitness for any +useful purpose! And how satisfactory an apology for any disproportion +or seeming deformity, if we can show the necessity of that particular +construction for the use intended! A ship appears more beautiful to an +artist, or one moderately skilled in navigation, where its prow is wide +and swelling beyond its poop, than if it were framed with a precise +geometrical regularity, in contradiction to all the laws of mechanics. A +building, whose doors and windows were exact squares, would hurt the +eye by that very proportion; as ill adapted to the figure of a human +creature, for whose service the fabric was intended. +</p> +<p> +What wonder then, that a man, whose habits and conduct are hurtful to +society, and dangerous or pernicious to every one who has an intercourse +with him, should, on that account, be an object of disapprobation, and +communicate to every spectator the strongest sentiment of disgust and +hatred. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: We ought not to imagine, because an inanimate object +may be useful as well as a man, that therefore it ought also, according +to this system, to merit he appellation of VIRTUOUS. The sentiments, +excited by utility, are, in the two cases, very different; and the one +is mixed with affection, esteem, approbation, &c., and not the other. In +like manner, an inanimate object may have good colour and proportions +as well as a human figure. But can we ever be in love with the former? +There are a numerous set of passions and sentiments, of which thinking +rational beings are, by the original constitution of nature, the only +proper objects: and though the very same qualities be transferred to an +insensible, inanimate being, they will not excite the same sentiments. +The beneficial qualities of herbs and minerals are, indeed, sometimes +called their VIRTUES; but this is an effect of the caprice of language, +which out not to be regarded in reasoning. For though there be a species +of approbation attending even inanimate objects, when beneficial, yet +this sentiment is so weak, and so different from that which is directed +to beneficent magistrates or statesman; that they ought not to be ranked +under the same class or appellation. + + A very small variation of the object, even where the same qualities are +preserved, will destroy a sentiment. Thus, the same beauty, transferred +to a different sex, excites no amorous passion, where nature is not +extremely perverted.] +</pre> +<p> +But perhaps the difficulty of accounting for these effects of +usefulness, or its contrary, has kept philosophers from admitting them +into their systems of ethics, and has induced them rather to employ any +other principle, in explaining the origin of moral good and evil. But it +is no just reason for rejecting any principle, confirmed by experience, +that we cannot give a satisfactory account of its origin, nor are able +to resolve it into other more general principles. And if we would +employ a little thought on the present subject, we need be at no loss to +account for the influence of utility, and to deduce it from principles, +the most known and avowed in human nature. +</p> +<p> +From the apparent usefulness of the social virtues, it has readily +been inferred by sceptics, both ancient and modern, that all moral +distinctions arise from education, and were, at first, invented, and +afterwards encouraged, by the art of politicians, in order to render +men tractable, and subdue their natural ferocity and selfishness, which +incapacitated them for society. This principle, indeed, of precept and +education, must so far be owned to have a powerful influence, that it +may frequently increase or diminish, beyond their natural standard, +the sentiments of approbation or dislike; and may even, in particular +instances, create, without any natural principle, a new sentiment of +this kind; as is evident in all superstitious practices and observances: +But that ALL moral affection or dislike arises from this origin, will +never surely be allowed by any judicious enquirer. Had nature made no +such distinction, founded on the original constitution of the mind, the +words, HONOURABLE and SHAMEFUL, LOVELY and ODIOUS, NOBLE and DESPICABLE, +had never had place in any language; nor could politicians, had they +invented these terms, ever have been able to render them intelligible, +or make them convey any idea to the audience. So that nothing can be +more superficial than this paradox of the sceptics; and it were well, +if, in the abstruser studies of logic and metaphysics, we could as +easily obviate the cavils of that sect, as in the practical and more +intelligible sciences of politics and morals. +</p> +<p> +The social virtues must, therefore, be allowed to have a natural +beauty and amiableness, which, at first, antecedent to all precept or +education, recommends them to the esteem of uninstructed mankind, and +engages their affections. And as the public utility of these virtues is +the chief circumstance, whence they derive their merit, it follows, +that the end, which they have a tendency to promote, must be some +way agreeable to us, and take hold of some natural affection. It must +please, either from considerations of self-interest, or from more +generous motives and regards. +</p> +<p> +It has often been asserted, that, as every man has a strong connexion +with society, and perceives the impossibility of his solitary +subsistence, he becomes, on that account, favourable to all those habits +or principles, which promote order in society, and insure to him the +quiet possession of so inestimable a blessing, As much as we value +our own happiness and welfare, as much must we applaud the practice +of justice and humanity, by which alone the social confederacy can +be maintained, and every man reap the fruits of mutual protection and +assistance. +</p> +<p> +This deduction of morals from self-love, or a regard to private +interest, is an obvious thought, and has not arisen wholly from the +wanton sallies and sportive assaults of the sceptics. To mention no +others, Polybius, one of the gravest and most judicious, as well as most +moral writers of antiquity, has assigned this selfish origin to all our +sentiments of virtue. [Footnote: Undutifulness to parents is disapproved +of by mankind, [Greek quotation inserted here]. Ingratitude for a like +reason (though he seems there to mix a more generous regard) [Greek +quotation inserted here] Lib. vi cap. 4. (Ed. Gronorius.) Perhaps the +historian only meant, that our sympathy and humanity was more enlivened, +by our considering the similarity of our case with that of the person +suffering; which is a just sentiment.] But though the solid practical +sense of that author, and his aversion to all vain subtilties, render +his authority on the present subject very considerable; yet is not +this an affair to be decided by authority, and the voice of nature and +experience seems plainly to oppose the selfish theory. +</p> +<p> +We frequently bestow praise on virtuous actions, performed in very +distant ages and remote countries; where the utmost subtilty of +imagination would not discover any appearance of self-interest, or +find any connexion of our present happiness and security with events so +widely separated from us. +</p> +<p> +A generous, a brave, a noble deed, performed by an adversary, commands +our approbation; while in its consequences it may be acknowledged +prejudicial to our particular interest. +</p> +<p> +Where private advantage concurs with general affection for virtue, we +readily perceive and avow the mixture of these distinct sentiments, +which have a very different feeling and influence on the mind. We +praise, perhaps, with more alacrity, where the generous humane action +contributes to our particular interest: But the topics of praise, which +we insist on, are very wide of this circumstance. And we may attempt to +bring over others to our sentiments, without endeavouring to convince +them, that they reap any advantage from the actions which we recommend +to their approbation and applause. +</p> +<p> +Frame the model of a praiseworthy character, consisting of all the most +amiable moral virtues: Give instances, in which these display themselves +after an eminent and extraordinary manner: You readily engage the esteem +and approbation of all your audience, who never so much as enquire +in what age and country the person lived, who possessed these noble +qualities: A circumstance, however, of all others, the most material +to self-love, or a concern for our own individual happiness. Once on a +time, a statesman, in the shock and contest of parties, prevailed so far +as to procure, by his eloquence, the banishment of an able adversary; +whom he secretly followed, offering him money for his support during his +exile, and soothing him with topics of consolation in his misfortunes. +ALAS! cries the banished statesman, WITH WHAT REGRET MUST I LEAVE MY +FRIENDS IN THIS CITY, WHERE EVEN ENEMIES ARE SO GENEROUS! Virtue, though +in an enemy, here pleased him: And we also give it the just tribute +of praise and approbation; nor do we retract these sentiments, when we +hear, that the action passed at Athens, about two thousand years ago, +and that the persons' names were Eschines and Demosthenes. +</p> +<p> +WHAT IS THAT TO ME? There are few occasions, when this question is not +pertinent: And had it that universal, infallible influence supposed, +it would turn into ridicule every composition, and almost every +conversation, which contain any praise or censure of men and manners. +</p> +<p> +It is but a weak subterfuge, when pressed by these facts and arguments, +to say, that we transport ourselves, by the force of imagination, into +distant ages and countries, and consider the advantage, which we should +have reaped from these characters, had we been contemporaries, and +had any commerce with the persons. It is not conceivable, how a REAL +sentiment or passion can ever arise from a known IMAGINARY interest; +especially when our REAL interest is still kept in view, and is often +acknowledged to be entirely distinct from the imaginary, and even +sometimes opposite to it. +</p> +<p> +A man, brought to the brink of a precipice, cannot look down without +trembling; and the sentiment of IMAGINARY danger actuates him, in +opposition to the opinion and belief of REAL safety. But the imagination +is here assisted by the presence of a striking object; and yet prevails +not, except it be also aided by novelty, and the unusual appearance of +the object. Custom soon reconciles us to heights and precipices, and +wears off these false and delusive terrors. The reverse is observable in +the estimates which we form of characters and manners; and the more we +habituate ourselves to an accurate scrutiny of morals, the more delicate +feeling do we acquire of the most minute distinctions between vice and +virtue. Such frequent occasion, indeed, have we, in common life, to +pronounce all kinds of moral determinations, that no object of this kind +can be new or unusual to us; nor could any FALSE views or prepossessions +maintain their ground against an experience, so common and familiar. +Experience being chiefly what forms the associations of ideas, it is +impossible that any association could establish and support itself, in +direct opposition to that principle. +</p> +<p> +Usefulness is agreeable, and engages our approbation. This is a matter +of fact, confirmed by daily observation. But, USEFUL? For what? For +somebody's interest, surely. Whose interest then? Not our own only: For +our approbation frequently extends farther. It must, therefore, be the +interest of those, who are served by the character or action approved +of; and these we may conclude, however remote, are not totally +indifferent to us. By opening up this principle, we shall discover one +great source of moral distinctions. +</p> +<a name="2H_PART52"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + PART II. +</h2> +<p> +Self-love is a principle in human nature of such extensive energy, and +the interest of each individual is, in general, so closely connected +with that of the community, that those philosophers were excusable, who +fancied that all our concern for the public might be resolved into a +concern for our own happiness and preservation. They saw every moment, +instances of approbation or blame, satisfaction or displeasure +towards characters and actions; they denominated the objects of these +sentiments, VIRTUES, or VICES; they observed, that the former had +a tendency to increase the happiness, and the latter the misery of +mankind; they asked, whether it were possible that we could have any +general concern for society, or any disinterested resentment of the +welfare or injury of others; they found it simpler to consider all +these sentiments as modifications of self-love; and they discovered a +pretence, at least, for this unity of principle, in that close union of +interest, which is so observable between the public and each individual. +</p> +<p> +But notwithstanding this frequent confusion of interests, it is easy +to attain what natural philosophers, after Lord Bacon, have affected to +call the experimentum crucis, or that experiment which points out the +right way in any doubt or ambiguity. We have found instances, in +which private interest was separate from public; in which it was +even contrary: And yet we observed the moral sentiment to continue, +notwithstanding this disjunction of interests. And wherever these +distinct interests sensibly concurred, we always found a sensible +increase of the sentiment, and a more warm affection to virtue, and +detestation of vice, or what we properly call, GRATITUDE and REVENGE. +Compelled by these instances, we must renounce the theory, which +accounts for every moral sentiment by the principle of self-love. We +must adopt a more public affection, and allow, that the interests of +society are not, even on their own account, entirely indifferent to +us. Usefulness is only a tendency to a certain end; and it is a +contradiction in terms, that anything pleases as means to an end, where +the end itself no wise affects us. If usefulness, therefore, be a source +of moral sentiment, and if this usefulness be not always considered with +a reference to self; it follows, that everything, which contributes to +the happiness of society, recommends itself directly to our approbation +and good-will. Here is a principle, which accounts, in great part, for +the origin of morality: And what need we seek for abstruse and remote +systems, when there occurs one so obvious and natural? +</p> +<p> +[FOOTNOTE: It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why +we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others. It is sufficient, +that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature. We must stop +somewhere in our examination of causes; and there are, in every science, +some general principles, beyond which we cannot hope to find any +principle more general. No man is absolutely indifferent to the +happiness and misery of others. The first has a natural tendency to give +pleasure; the second, pain. This every one may find in himself. It is +not probable, that these principles can be resolved into principles +more simple and universal, whatever attempts may have been made to that +purpose. But if it were possible, it belongs not to the present subject; +and we may here safely consider these principles as original; happy, if +we can render all the consequences sufficiently plain and perspicuous!] +</p> +<p> +Have we any difficulty to comprehend the force of humanity and +benevolence? Or to conceive, that the very aspect of happiness, +joy, prosperity, gives pleasure; that of pain, suffering, sorrow, +communicates uneasiness? The human countenance, says Horace ['Uti +ridentibus arrident, ita flentibus adflent Humani vultus,'—Hor.], +borrows smiles or tears from the human countenance. Reduce a person to +solitude, and he loses all enjoyment, except either of the sensual or +speculative kind; and that because the movements of his heart are not +forwarded by correspondent movements in his fellow-creatures. The signs +of sorrow and mourning, though arbitrary, affect us with melancholy; but +the natural symptoms, tears and cries and groans, never fail to infuse +compassion and uneasiness. And if the effects of misery touch us in so +lively a manner; can we be supposed altogether insensible or indifferent +towards its causes; when a malicious or treacherous character and +behaviour are presented to us? +</p> +<p> +We enter, I shall suppose, into a convenient, warm, well-contrived +apartment: We necessarily receive a pleasure from its very survey; +because it presents us with the pleasing ideas of ease, satisfaction, +and enjoyment. The hospitable, good-humoured, humane landlord appears. +This circumstance surely must embellish the whole; nor can we easily +forbear reflecting, with pleasure, on the satisfaction which results to +every one from his intercourse and good-offices. +</p> +<p> +His whole family, by the freedom, ease, confidence, and calm enjoyment, +diffused over their countenances, sufficiently express their happiness. +I have a pleasing sympathy in the prospect of so much joy, and can never +consider the source of it, without the most agreeable emotions. +</p> +<p> +He tells me, that an oppressive and powerful neighbour had attempted +to dispossess him of his inheritance, and had long disturbed all his +innocent and social pleasures. I feel an immediate indignation arise in +me against such violence and injury. +</p> +<p> +But it is no wonder, he adds, that a private wrong should proceed from a +man, who had enslaved provinces, depopulated cities, and made the field +and scaffold stream with human blood. I am struck with horror at the +prospect of so much misery, and am actuated by the strongest antipathy +against its author. +</p> +<p> +In general, it is certain, that, wherever we go, whatever we reflect on +or converse about, everything still presents us with the view of human +happiness or misery, and excites in our breast a sympathetic movement +of pleasure or uneasiness. In our serious occupations, in our careless +amusements, this principle still exerts its active energy. +</p> +<p> +A man who enters the theatre, is immediately struck with the view of +so great a multitude, participating of one common amusement; and +experiences, from their very aspect, a superior sensibility or +disposition of being affected with every sentiment, which he shares with +his fellow-creatures. +</p> +<p> +He observes the actors to be animated by the appearance of a full +audience, and raised to a degree of enthusiasm, which they cannot +command in any solitary or calm moment. +</p> +<p> +Every movement of the theatre, by a skilful poet, is communicated, as +it were by magic, to the spectators; who weep, tremble, resent, rejoice, +and are inflamed with all the variety of passions, which actuate the +several personages of the drama. +</p> +<p> +Where any event crosses our wishes, and interrupts the happiness of the +favourite characters, we feel a sensible anxiety and concern. But where +their sufferings proceed from the treachery, cruelty, or tyranny of an +enemy, our breasts are affected with the liveliest resentment against +the author of these calamities. It is here esteemed contrary to the +rules of art to represent anything cool and indifferent. A distant +friend, or a confident, who has no immediate interest in the +catastrophe, ought, if possible, to be avoided by the poet; as +communicating a like indifference to the audience, and checking the +progress of the passions. +</p> +<p> +Few species of poetry are more entertaining than PASTORAL; and every +one is sensible, that the chief source of its pleasure arises from those +images of a gentle and tender tranquillity, which it represents in its +personages, and of which it communicates a like sentiment to the reader. +Sannazarius, who transferred the scene to the sea-shore, though he +presented the most magnificent object in nature, is confessed to have +erred in his choice. The idea of toil, labour, and danger, suffered by +the fishermen, is painful; by an unavoidable sympathy, which attends +every conception of human happiness or misery. +</p> +<p> +When I was twenty, says a French poet, Ovid was my favourite: Now I am +forty, I declare for Horace. We enter, to be sure, more readily into +sentiments, which resemble those we feel every day: But no passion, when +well represented, can be entirely indifferent to us; because there is +none, of which every man has not, within him, at least the seeds and +first principles. It is the business of poetry to bring every affection +near to us by lively imagery and representation, and make it look like +truth and reality: A certain proof, that, wherever that reality is +found, our minds are disposed to be strongly affected by it. +</p> +<p> +Any recent event or piece of news, by which the fate of states, +provinces, or many individuals is affected, is extremely interesting +even to those whose welfare is not immediately engaged. Such +intelligence is propagated with celerity, heard with avidity, and +enquired into with attention and concern. The interest of society +appears, on this occasion, to be in some degree the interest of each +individual. The imagination is sure to be affected; though the passions +excited may not always be so strong and steady as to have great +influence on the conduct and behaviour. +</p> +<p> +The perusal of a history seems a calm entertainment; but would be +no entertainment at all, did not our hearts beat with correspondent +movements to those which are described by the historian. +</p> +<p> +Thucydides and Guicciardin support with difficulty our attention; while +the former describes the trivial encounters of the small cities of +Greece, and the latter the harmless wars of Pisa. The few persons +interested and the small interest fill not the imagination, and engage +not the affections. The deep distress of the numerous Athenian army +before Syracuse; the danger which so nearly threatens Venice; these +excite compassion; these move terror and anxiety. +</p> +<p> +The indifferent, uninteresting style of Suetonius, equally with the +masterly pencil of Tacitus, may convince us of the cruel depravity of +Nero or Tiberius: But what a difference of sentiment! While the former +coldly relates the facts; and the latter sets before our eyes the +venerable figures of a Soranus and a Thrasea, intrepid in their fate, +and only moved by the melting sorrows of their friends and kindred. What +sympathy then touches every human heart! What indignation against the +tyrant, whose causeless fear or unprovoked malice gave rise to such +detestable barbarity! +</p> +<p> +If we bring these subjects nearer: If we remove all suspicion of fiction +and deceit: What powerful concern is excited, and how much superior, +in many instances, to the narrow attachments of self-love and private +interest! Popular sedition, party zeal, a devoted obedience to factious +leaders; these are some of the most visible, though less laudable +effects of this social sympathy in human nature. +</p> +<p> +The frivolousness of the subject too, we may observe, is not able to +detach us entirely from what carries an image of human sentiment and +affection. +</p> +<p> +When a person stutters, and pronounces with difficulty, we even +sympathize with this trivial uneasiness, and suffer for him. And it is a +rule in criticism, that every combination of syllables or letters, which +gives pain to the organs of speech in the recital, appears also from a +species of sympathy harsh and disagreeable to the ear. Nay, when we +run over a book with our eye, we are sensible of such unharmonious +composition; because we still imagine, that a person recites it to us, +and suffers from the pronunciation of these jarring sounds. So delicate +is our sympathy! +</p> +<p> +Easy and unconstrained postures and motions are always beautiful: An +air of health and vigour is agreeable: Clothes which warm, without +burthening the body; which cover, without imprisoning the limbs, are +well-fashioned. In every judgement of beauty, the feelings of the person +affected enter into consideration, and communicate to the spectator +similar touches of pain or pleasure. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: 'Decentior equus cujus astricta suntilia; sed idem +velocior. Pulcher aspectu sit athleta, cujus lacertos execitatio +expressit; idem certamini paratior nunquam enim SPECIES ab UTILITATE +dividitur. Sed hoc quidem discernere modici judicii est.'—Quintilian, +Inst. lib. viii. cap. 3.] +</pre> +<p> +What wonder, then, if we can pronounce no judgement concerning the +character and conduct of men, without considering the tendencies of +their actions, and the happiness or misery which thence arises to +society? What association of ideas would ever operate, were that +principle here totally unactive. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: In proportion to the station which a man possesses, +according to the relations in which he is placed; we always expect from +him a greater or less degree of good, and when disappointed, blame his +inutility; and much more do we blame him, if any ill or prejudice +arise from his conduct and behaviour. When the interests of one country +interfere with those of another, we estimate the merits of a statesman +by the good or ill, which results to his own country from his measures +and councils, without regard to the prejudice which he brings on its +enemies and rivals. His fellow-citizens are the objects, which lie +nearest the eye, while we determine his character. And as nature has +implanted in every one a superior affection to his own country, we never +expect any regard to distant nations, where a competition arises. Not to +mention, that, while every man consults the good of his own community, +we are sensible, that the general interest of mankind is better +promoted, than any loose indeterminate views to the good of a species, +whence no beneficial action could ever result, for want of a duly +limited object, on which they could exert themselves.] +</pre> +<p> +If any man from a cold insensibility, or narrow selfishness of temper, +is unaffected with the images of human happiness or misery, he must be +equally indifferent to the images of vice and virtue: As, on the other +hand, it is always found, that a warm concern for the interests of our +species is attended with a delicate feeling of all moral distinctions; +a strong resentment of injury done to men; a lively approbation of their +welfare. In this particular, though great superiority is observable +of one man above another; yet none are so entirely indifferent to the +interest of their fellow-creatures, as to perceive no distinctions +of moral good and evil, in consequence of the different tendencies of +actions and principles. How, indeed, can we suppose it possible in any +one, who wears a human heart, that if there be subjected to his censure, +one character or system of conduct, which is beneficial, and another +which is pernicious to his species or community, he will not so much +as give a cool preference to the former, or ascribe to it the smallest +merit or regard? Let us suppose such a person ever so selfish; let +private interest have ingrossed ever so much his attention; yet in +instances, where that is not concerned, he must unavoidably feel SOME +propensity to the good of mankind, and make it an object of choice, if +everything else be equal. Would any man, who is walking along, tread as +willingly on another's gouty toes, whom he has no quarrel with, as on +the hard flint and pavement? There is here surely a difference in the +case. We surely take into consideration the happiness and misery of +others, in weighing the several motives of action, and incline to the +former, where no private regards draw us to seek our own promotion or +advantage by the injury of our fellow-creatures. And if the principles +of humanity are capable, in many instances, of influencing our actions, +they must, at all times, have some authority over our sentiments, and +give us a general approbation of what is useful to society, and blame of +what is dangerous or pernicious. The degrees of these sentiments may +be the subject of controversy; but the reality of their existence, one +should think, must be admitted in every theory or system. +</p> +<p> +A creature, absolutely malicious and spiteful, were there any such in +nature, must be worse than indifferent to the images of vice and virtue. +All his sentiments must be inverted, and directly opposite to those, +which prevail in the human species. Whatever contributes to the good of +mankind, as it crosses the constant bent of his wishes and desires, must +produce uneasiness and disapprobation; and on the contrary, whatever is +the source of disorder and misery in society, must, for the same reason, +be regarded with pleasure and complacency. Timon, who probably from +his affected spleen more than an inveterate malice, was denominated the +manhater, embraced Alcibiades with great fondness. GO ON, MY BOY! cried +he, ACQUIRE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE: YOU WILL ONE DAY, I FORESEE, +BE THE CAUSE OF GREAT CALAMITIES TO THEM [Footnote: Plutarch fit vita +Ale.]. Could we admit the two principles of the Manicheans, it is an +infallible consequence, that their sentiments of human actions, as well +as of everything else, must be totally opposite, and that every instance +of justice and humanity, from its necessary tendency, must please the +one deity and displease the other. All mankind so far resemble the good +principle, that, where interest or revenge or envy perverts not our +disposition, we are always inclined, from our natural philanthropy, to +give the preference to the happiness of society, and consequently to +virtue above its opposite. Absolute, unprovoked, disinterested malice +has never perhaps place in any human breast; or if it had, must there +pervert all the sentiments of morals, as well as the feelings of +humanity. If the cruelty of Nero be allowed entirely voluntary, and not +rather the effect of constant fear and resentment; it is evident that +Tigellinus, preferably to Seneca or Burrhus, must have possessed his +steady and uniform approbation. +</p> +<p> +A statesman or patriot, who serves our own country in our own time, has +always a more passionate regard paid to him, than one whose beneficial +influence operated on distant ages or remote nations; where the good, +resulting from his generous humanity, being less connected with us, +seems more obscure, and affects us with a less lively sympathy. We may +own the merit to be equally great, though our sentiments are not raised +to an equal height, in both cases. The judgement here corrects the +inequalities of our internal emotions and perceptions; in like manner, +as it preserves us from error, in the several variations of images, +presented to our external senses. The same object, at a double distance, +really throws on the eye a picture of but half the bulk; yet we imagine +that it appears of the same size in both situations; because we know +that on our approach to it, its image would expand on the eye, and that +the difference consists not in the object itself, but in our +position with regard to it. And, indeed, without such a correction of +appearances, both in internal and external sentiment, men could +never think or talk steadily on any subject; while their fluctuating +situations produce a continual variation on objects, and throw them into +such different and contrary lights and positions. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: For a little reason, the tendencies of actions and +characters, not their real accidental consequences, are alone regarded +in our more determinations or general judgements; though in our real +feeling or sentiment, we cannot help paying greater regard to one whose +station, joined to virtue, renders him really useful to society, then +to one, who exerts the social virtues only in good intentions and +benevolent affections. Separating the character from the furtone, by an +easy and necessary effort of thought, we pronounce these persons alike, +and give them the appearance: But is not able entirely to prevail our +sentiment. + + Why is this peach-tree said to be better than that other; but because +it produces more or better fruit? And would not the same praise be given +it, though snails or vermin had destroyed the peaches, before they came +to full maturity? In morals too, is not THE TREE KNOWN BY THE FRUIT? +And cannot we easily distinguish between nature and accident, in the one +case as well as in the other?] +</pre> +<p> +The more we converse with mankind, and the greater social intercourse we +maintain, the more shall we be familiarized to these general preferences +and distinctions, without which our conversation and discourse could +scarcely be rendered intelligible to each other. Every man's interest +is peculiar to himself, and the aversions and desires, which result +from it, cannot be supposed to affect others in a like degree. General +language, therefore, being formed for general use, must be moulded on +some more general views, and must affix the epithets of praise or blame, +in conformity to sentiments, which arise from the general interests of +the community. And if these sentiments, in most men, be not so strong as +those, which have a reference to private good; yet still they must make +some distinction, even in persons the most depraved and selfish; and +must attach the notion of good to a beneficent conduct, and of evil to +the contrary. Sympathy, we shall allow, is much fainter than our concern +for ourselves, and sympathy with persons remote from us much fainter +than that with persons near and contiguous; but for this very reason it +is necessary for us, in our calm judgements and discourse concerning +the characters of men, to neglect all these differences, and render +our sentiments more public and social. Besides, that we ourselves often +change our situation in this particular, we every day meet with persons +who are in a situation different from us, and who could never converse +with us were we to remain constantly in that position and point of +view, which is peculiar to ourselves. The intercourse of sentiments, +therefore, in society and conversation, makes us form some general +unalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of +characters and manners. And though the heart takes not part entirely +with those general notions, nor regulates all its love and hatred by +the universal abstract differences of vice and virtue, without regard +to self, or the persons with whom we are more intimately connected; +yet have these moral differences a considerable influence, and being +sufficient, at least for discourse, serve all our purposes in company, +in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: It is wisely ordained by nature, that private +connexions should commonly prevail over univeral views and +considerations; otherwise our affections and actions would be dissopated +and lost, for want of a proper limited object. Thus a small benefit done +to ourselves, or our near friends, excites more lively sentiments +of love and approbation than a great benefit done to a distant +commonwealth: But still we know here, as in all the senses, to correct +these inequalities by reflection, and retain a general standard of vice +and virtue, founded chiefly on a general usefulness.] +</pre> +<p> +Thus, in whatever light we take this subject, the merit, ascribed to +the social virtues, appears still uniform, and arises chiefly from that +regard, which the natural sentiment of benevolence engages us to pay to +the interests of mankind and society. If we consider the principles of +the human make, such as they appear to daily experience and observation, +we must, A PRIORI, conclude it impossible for such a creature as man to +be totally indifferent to the well or ill-being of his fellow-creatures, +and not readily, of himself, to pronounce, where nothing gives him any +particular bias, that what promotes their happiness is good, what tends +to their misery is evil, without any farther regard or consideration. +Here then are the faint rudiments, at least, or outlines, of a GENERAL +distinction between actions; and in proportion as the humanity of the +person is supposed to increase, his connexion with those who are injured +or benefited, and his lively conception of their misery or happiness; +his consequent censure or approbation acquires proportionable vigour. +There is no necessity, that a generous action, barely mentioned in an +old history or remote gazette, should communicate any strong feelings +of applause and admiration. Virtue, placed at such a distance, is like a +fixed star, which, though to the eye of reason it may appear as luminous +as the sun in his meridian, is so infinitely removed as to affect the +senses, neither with light nor heat. Bring this virtue nearer, by our +acquaintance or connexion with the persons, or even by an eloquent +recital of the case; our hearts are immediately caught, our sympathy +enlivened, and our cool approbation converted into the warmest +sentiments of friendship and regard. These seem necessary and infallible +consequences of the general principles of human nature, as discovered in +common life and practice. +</p> +<p> +Again; reverse these views and reasonings: Consider the matter a +posteriori; and weighing the consequences, enquire if the merit of +social virtue be not, in a great measure, derived from the feelings of +humanity, with which it affects the spectators. It appears to be matter +of fact, that the circumstance of UTILITY, in all subjects, is a source +of praise and approbation: That it is constantly appealed to in all +moral decisions concerning the merit and demerit of actions: That it is +the SOLE source of that high regard paid to justice, fidelity, honour, +allegiance, and chastity: That it is inseparable from all the other +social virtues, humanity, generosity, charity, affability, lenity, +mercy, and moderation: And, in a word, that it is a foundation of +the chief part of morals, which has a reference to mankind and our +fellow-creatures. +</p> +<p> +It appears also, that, in our general approbation of characters and +manners, the useful tendency of the social virtues moves us not by any +regards to self-interest, but has an influence much more universal +and extensive. It appears that a tendency to public good, and to the +promoting of peace, harmony, and order in society, does always, by +affecting the benevolent principles of our frame, engage us on the side +of the social virtues. And it appears, as an additional confirmation, +that these principles of humanity and sympathy enter so deeply into all +our sentiments, and have so powerful an influence, as may enable them +to excite the strongest censure and applause. The present theory is the +simple result of all these inferences, each of which seems founded on +uniform experience and observation. +</p> +<p> +Were it doubtful, whether there were any such principle in our nature +as humanity or a concern for others, yet when we see, in numberless +instances, that whatever has a tendency to promote the interests of +society, is so highly approved of, we ought thence to learn the force of +the benevolent principle; since it is impossible for anything to please +as means to an end, where the end is totally indifferent. On the other +hand, were it doubtful, whether there were, implanted in our nature, any +general principle of moral blame and approbation, yet when we see, in +numberless instances, the influence of humanity, we ought thence to +conclude, that it is impossible, but that everything which promotes the +interest of society must communicate pleasure, and what is pernicious +give uneasiness. But when these different reflections and observations +concur in establishing the same conclusion, must they not bestow an +undisputed evidence upon it? +</p> +<p> +It is however hoped, that the progress of this argument will bring a +farther confirmation of the present theory, by showing the rise of other +sentiments of esteem and regard from the same or like principles. +</p> +<a name="2H_SECT6"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + SECTION VI. OF QUALITIES USEFUL TO OURSELVES. +</h2> +<a name="2H_PART61"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + PART I. +</h2> +<p> +IT seems evident, that where a quality or habit is subjected to our +examination, if it appear in any respect prejudicial to the person +possessed of it, or such as incapacitates him for business and action, +it is instantly blamed, and ranked among his faults and imperfections. +Indolence, negligence, want of order and method, obstinacy, fickleness, +rashness, credulity; these qualities were never esteemed by any one +indifferent to a character; much less, extolled as accomplishments or +virtues. The prejudice, resulting from them, immediately strikes our +eye, and gives us the sentiment of pain and disapprobation. +</p> +<p> +No quality, it is allowed, is absolutely either blameable or +praiseworthy. It is all according to its degree. A due medium, says +the Peripatetics, is the characteristic of virtue. But this medium is +chiefly determined by utility. A proper celerity, for instance, and +dispatch in business, is commendable. When defective, no progress is +ever made in the execution of any purpose: When excessive, it engages +us in precipitate and ill-concerted measures and enterprises: By such +reasonings, we fix the proper and commendable mediocrity in all moral +and prudential disquisitions; and never lose view of the advantages, +which result from any character or habit. Now as these advantages +are enjoyed by the person possessed of the character, it can never +be SELF-LOVE which renders the prospect of them agreeable to us, +the spectators, and prompts our esteem and approbation. No force of +imagination can convert us into another person, and make us fancy, that +we, being that person, reap benefit from those valuable qualities, +which belong to him. Or if it did, no celerity of imagination could +immediately transport us back, into ourselves, and make us love and +esteem the person, as different from us. Views and sentiments, so +opposite to known truth and to each other, could never have place, at +the same time, in the same person. All suspicion, therefore, of selfish +regards, is here totally excluded. It is a quite different principle, +which actuates our bosom, and interests us in the felicity of the person +whom we contemplate. Where his natural talents and acquired abilities +give us the prospect of elevation, advancement, a figure in life, +prosperous success, a steady command over fortune, and the execution of +great or advantageous undertakings; we are struck with such agreeable +images, and feel a complacency and regard immediately arise towards him. +The ideas of happiness, joy, triumph, prosperity, are connected with +every circumstance of his character, and diffuse over our minds a +pleasing sentiment of sympathy and humanity. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: One may venture to affirm, that there is no human +nature, to whom the appearance of happiness (where envy or revenge has +no place) does not give pleasure, that of misery, uneasiness. This +seems inseparable from our make and constitution. But they are only more +generous minds, that are thence prompted to seek zealously the good of +others, and to have a real passion for their welfare. With men of narrow +and ungenerous spirits, this sympathy goes not beyond a slight +feeling of the imagination, which serves only to excite sentiments +of complacency or ensure, and makes them apply to the object either +honorable or dishonorable appellations. A griping miser, for instance, +praises extremely INDUSTRY and FRUGALITY even in others, and sets them, +in his estimation, above all the other virtues. He knows the good that +results from them, and feels that species of happiness with a more +lively sympathy, than any other you could represent to him; though +perhaps he would not part with a shilling to make the fortune of the +industrious man, whom he praises so highly.] +</pre> +<p> +Let us suppose a person originally framed so as to have no manner of +concern for his fellow-creatures, but to regard the happiness and +misery of all sensible beings with greater indifference than even two +contiguous shades of the same colour. Let us suppose, if the prosperity +of nations were laid on the one hand, and their ruin on the other, and +he were desired to choose; that he would stand like the schoolman's ass, +irresolute and undetermined, between equal motives; or rather, like the +same ass between two pieces of wood or marble, without any inclination +or propensity to either side. The consequence, I believe, must be +allowed just, that such a person, being absolutely unconcerned, either +for the public good of a community or the private utility of others, +would look on every quality, however pernicious, or however beneficial, +to society, or to its possessor, with the same indifference as on the +most common and uninteresting object. +</p> +<p> +But if, instead of this fancied monster, we suppose a MAN to form +a judgement or determination in the case, there is to him a plain +foundation of preference, where everything else is equal; and however +cool his choice may be, if his heart be selfish, or if the persons +interested be remote from him; there must still be a choice or +distinction between what is useful, and what is pernicious. Now this +distinction is the same in all its parts, with the MORAL DISTINCTION, +whose foundation has been so often, and so much in vain, enquired after. +The same endowments of the mind, in every circumstance, are agreeable +to the sentiment of morals and to that of humanity; the same temper is +susceptible of high degrees of the one sentiment and of the other; +and the same alteration in the objects, by their nearer approach or +by connexions, enlivens the one and the other. By all the rules of +philosophy, therefore, we must conclude, that these sentiments are +originally the same; since, in each particular, even the most minute, +they are governed by the same laws, and are moved by the same objects. +</p> +<p> +Why do philosophers infer, with the greatest certainty, that the moon is +kept in its orbit by the same force of gravity, that makes bodies fall +near the surface of the earth, but because these effects are, upon +computation, found similar and equal? And must not this argument bring +as strong conviction, in moral as in natural disquisitions? +</p> +<p> +To prove, by any long detail, that all the qualities, useful to +the possessor, are approved of, and the contrary censured, would be +superfluous. The least reflection on what is every day experienced in +life, will be sufficient. We shall only mention a few instances, in +order to remove, if possible, all doubt and hesitation. +</p> +<p> +The quality, the most necessary for the execution of any useful +enterprise, is discretion; by which we carry on a safe intercourse with +others, give due attention to our own and to their character, weigh each +circumstance of the business which we undertake, and employ the +surest and safest means for the attainment of any end or purpose. To a +Cromwell, perhaps, or a De Retz, discretion may appear an alderman-like +virtue, as Dr. Swift calls it; and being incompatible with those vast +designs, to which their courage and ambition prompted them, it might +really, in them, be a fault or imperfection. But in the conduct of +ordinary life, no virtue is more requisite, not only to obtain success, +but to avoid the most fatal miscarriages and disappointments. The +greatest parts without it, as observed by an elegant writer, may be +fatal to their owner; as Polyphemus, deprived of his eye, was only the +more exposed, on account of his enormous strength and stature. +</p> +<p> +The best character, indeed, were it not rather too perfect for +human nature, is that which is not swayed by temper of any kind; but +alternately employs enterprise and caution, as each is useful to the +particular purpose intended. Such is the excellence which St. Evremond +ascribes to Mareschal Turenne, who displayed every campaign, as he grew +older, more temerity in his military enterprises; and being now, from +long experience, perfectly acquainted with every incident in war, he +advanced with greater firmness and security, in a road so well known to +him. Fabius, says Machiavel, was cautious; Scipio enterprising: And +both succeeded, because the situation of the Roman affairs, during the +command of each, was peculiarly adapted to his genius; but both would +have failed, had these situations been reversed. He is happy, whose +circumstances suit his temper; but he is more excellent, who can suit +his temper to any circumstances. +</p> +<p> +What need is there to display the praises of industry, and to extol its +advantages, in the acquisition of power and riches, or in raising what +we call a FORTUNE in the world? The tortoise, according to the fable, by +his perseverance, gained the race of the hare, though possessed of +much superior swiftness. A man's time, when well husbanded, is like a +cultivated field, of which a few acres produce more of what is useful to +life, than extensive provinces, even of the richest soil, when over-run +with weeds and brambles. +</p> +<p> +But all prospect of success in life, or even of tolerable subsistence, +must fail, where a reasonable frugality is wanting. The heap, instead +of increasing, diminishes daily, and leaves its possessor so much more +unhappy, as, not having been able to confine his expences to a large +revenue, he will still less be able to live contentedly on a small one. +The souls of men, according to Plato [Footnote: Phaedo.], inflamed with +impure appetites, and losing the body, which alone afforded means of +satisfaction, hover about the earth, and haunt the places, where their +bodies are deposited; possessed with a longing desire to recover the +lost organs of sensation. So may we see worthless prodigals, having +consumed their fortune in wild debauches, thrusting themselves into +every plentiful table, and every party of pleasure, hated even by the +vicious, and despised even by fools. +</p> +<p> +The one extreme of frugality is avarice, which, as it both deprives a +man of all use of his riches, and checks hospitality and every social +enjoyment, is justly censured on a double account. PRODIGALITY, the +other extreme, is commonly more hurtful to a man himself; and each of +these extremes is blamed above the other, according to the temper of the +person who censures, and according to his greater or less sensibility to +pleasure, either social or sensual. +</p> +<p> +Qualities often derive their merit from complicated sources. Honesty, +fidelity, truth, are praised for their immediate tendency to promote the +interests of society; but after those virtues are once established upon +this foundation, they are also considered as advantageous to the person +himself, and as the source of that trust and confidence, which can alone +give a man any consideration in life. One becomes contemptible, no less +than odious, when he forgets the duty, which, in this particular, he +owes to himself as well as to society. +</p> +<p> +Perhaps, this consideration is one CHIEF source of the high blame, which +is thrown on any instance of failure among women in point of CHASTITY. +The greatest regard, which can be acquired by that sex, is derived from +their fidelity; and a woman becomes cheap and vulgar, loses her rank, +and is exposed to every insult, who is deficient in this particular. The +smallest failure is here sufficient to blast her character. A female +has so many opportunities of secretly indulging these appetites, that +nothing can give us security but her absolute modesty and reserve; and +where a breach is once made, it can scarcely ever be fully repaired. +If a man behave with cowardice on one occasion, a contrary conduct +reinstates him in his character. But by what action can a woman, whose +behaviour has once been dissolute, be able to assure us, that she has +formed better resolutions, and has self-command enough to carry them +into execution? +</p> +<p> +All men, it is allowed, are equally desirous of happiness; but few +are successful in the pursuit: One considerable cause is the want of +strength of mind, which might enable them to resist the temptation of +present ease or pleasure, and carry them forward in the search of more +distant profit and enjoyment. Our affections, on a general prospect of +their objects, form certain rules of conduct, and certain measures of +preference of one above another: and these decisions, though really +the result of our calm passions and propensities, (for what else can +pronounce any object eligible or the contrary?) are yet said, by a +natural abuse of terms, to be the determinations of pure REASON and +reflection. But when some of these objects approach nearer to us, or +acquire the advantages of favourable lights and positions, which +catch the heart or imagination; our general resolutions are frequently +confounded, a small enjoyment preferred, and lasting shame and sorrow +entailed upon us. And however poets may employ their wit and eloquence, +in celebrating present pleasure, and rejecting all distant views to +fame, health, or fortune; it is obvious, that this practice is the +source of all dissoluteness and disorder, repentance and misery. A man +of a strong and determined temper adheres tenaciously to his general +resolutions, and is neither seduced by the allurements of pleasure, nor +terrified by the menaces of pain; but keeps still in view those distant +pursuits, by which he, at once, ensures his happiness and his honour. +</p> +<p> +Self-satisfaction, at least in some degree, is an advantage, which +equally attends the fool and the wise man: But it is the only one; nor +is there any other circumstance in the conduct of life, where they are +upon an equal footing. Business, books, conversation; for all of these, +a fool is totally incapacitated, and except condemned by his station +to the coarsest drudgery, remains a useless burthen upon the earth. +Accordingly, it is found, that men are extremely jealous of their +character in this particular; and many instances are seen of profligacy +and treachery, the most avowed and unreserved; none of bearing patiently +the imputation of ignorance and stupidity. Dicaearchus, the Macedonian +general, who, as Polybius tells us [Footnote: Lib. xvi. Cap. 35.], +openly erected one altar to impiety, another to injustice, in order to +bid defiance to mankind; even he, I am well assured, would have started +at the epithet of FOOL, and have meditated revenge for so injurious an +appellation. Except the affection of parents, the strongest and most +indissoluble bond in nature, no connexion has strength sufficient to +support the disgust arising from this character. Love itself, which +can subsist under treachery, ingratitude, malice, and infidelity, is +immediately extinguished by it, when perceived and acknowledged; nor +are deformity and old age more fatal to the dominion of that passion. +So dreadful are the ideas of an utter incapacity for any purpose or +undertaking, and of continued error and misconduct in life! +</p> +<p> +When it is asked, whether a quick or a slow apprehension be most +valuable? Whether one, that, at first view, penetrates far into a +subject, but can perform nothing upon study; or a contrary character, +which must work out everything by dint of application? Whether a +clear head or a copious invention? Whether a profound genius or a sure +judgement? In short, what character, or peculiar turn of understanding, +is more excellent than another? It is evident, that we can answer +none of these questions, without considering which of those qualities +capacitates a man best for the world, and carries him farthest in any +undertaking. +</p> +<p> +If refined sense and exalted sense be not so USEFUL as common sense, +their rarity, their novelty, and the nobleness of their objects make +some compensation, and render them the admiration of mankind: As gold, +though less serviceable than iron, acquires from its scarcity a value +which is much superior. +</p> +<p> +The defects of judgement can be supplied by no art or invention; but +those of memory frequently may, both in business and in study, by method +and industry, and by diligence in committing everything to writing; +and we scarcely ever hear a short memory given as a reason for a man's +failure in any undertaking. But in ancient times, when no man could make +a figure without the talent of speaking, and when the audience were too +delicate to bear such crude, undigested harangues as our extemporary +orators offer to public assemblies; the faculty of memory was then of +the utmost consequence, and was accordingly much more valued than at +present. Scarce any great genius is mentioned in antiquity, who is not +celebrated for this talent; and Cicero enumerates it among the other +sublime qualities of Caesar himself. [Footnote: Fruit in Illo Ingenium, +ratio, memoria, literae, cura, cogitatio, diligentia &c. Phillip. 2.]. +</p> +<p> +Particular customs and manners alter the usefulness of qualities: they +also alter their merit. Particular situations and accidents have, in +some degree, the same influence. He will always be more esteemed, who +possesses those talents and accomplishments, which suit his station and +profession, than he whom fortune has misplaced in the part which she has +assigned him. The private or selfish virtues are, in this respect, +more arbitrary than the public and social. In other respects they are, +perhaps, less liable to doubt and controversy. +</p> +<p> +In this kingdom, such continued ostentation, of late years, has +prevailed among men in ACTIVE life with regard to PUBLIC SPIRIT, and +among those in SPECULATIVE with regard to BENEVOLENCE; and so many false +pretensions to each have been, no doubt, detected, that men of the world +are apt, without any bad intention, to discover a sullen incredulity +on the head of those moral endowments, and even sometimes absolutely to +deny their existence and reality. In like manner I find, that, of old, +the perpetual cant of the STOICS and CYNICS concerning VIRTUE, their +magnificent professions and slender performances, bred a disgust in +mankind; and Lucian, who, though licentious with regard to pleasure, +is yet in other respects a very moral writer, cannot sometimes talk of +virtue, so much boasted without betraying symptoms of spleen and irony. +But surely this peevish delicacy, whence-ever it arises can never be +carried so far as to make us deny the existence of every species of +merit, and all distinction of manners and behaviour. Besides DISCRETION, +CAUTION, ENTERPRISE, INDUSTRY, ASSIDUITY, FRUGALITY, ECONOMY, +GOOD-SENSE, PRUDENCE, DISCERNMENT; besides these endowments, I say, +whose very names force an avowal of their merit, there are many others, +to which the most determined scepticism cannot for a moment refuse +the tribute of praise and approbation. TEMPERANCE, SOBRIETY, PATIENCE, +CONSTANCY, PERSEVERANCE, FORETHOUGHT, CONSIDERATENESS, SECRECY, ORDER, +INSINUATION, ADDRESS, PRESENCE OF MIND, QUICKNESS OF CONCEPTION, +FACILITY OF EXPRESSION, these, and a thousand more of the same kind, no +man will ever deny to be excellencies and perfections. As their merit +consists in their tendency to serve the person, possessed of them, +without any magnificent claim to public and social desert, we are the +less jealous of their pretensions, and readily admit them into the +catalogue of laudable qualities. We are not sensible that, by this +concession, we have paved the way for all the other moral excellencies, +and cannot consistently hesitate any longer, with regard to +disinterested benevolence, patriotism, and humanity. +</p> +<p> +It seems, indeed, certain, that first appearances are here, as usual, +extremely deceitful, and that it is more difficult, in a speculative +way, to resolve into self-love the merit which we ascribe to the selfish +virtues above mentioned, than that even of the social virtues, justice +and beneficence. For this latter purpose, we need but say, that whatever +conduct promotes the good of the community is loved, praised, and +esteemed by the community, on account of that utility and interest, of +which every one partakes; and though this affection and regard be, +in reality, gratitude, not self-love, yet a distinction, even of this +obvious nature, may not readily be made by superficial reasoners; and +there is room, at least, to support the cavil and dispute for a moment. +But as qualities, which tend only to the utility of their possessor, +without any reference to us, or to the community, are yet esteemed and +valued; by what theory or system can we account for this sentiment from +self-love, or deduce it from that favourite origin? There seems here a +necessity for confessing that the happiness and misery of others are not +spectacles entirely indifferent to us; but that the view of the former, +whether in its causes or effects, like sunshine or the prospect +of well-cultivated plains (to carry our pretensions no higher), +communicates a secret joy and satisfaction; the appearance of the +latter, like a lowering cloud or barren landscape, throws a melancholy +damp over the imagination. And this concession being once made, the +difficulty is over; and a natural unforced interpretation of the +phenomena of human life will afterwards, we may hope, prevail among all +speculative enquirers. +</p> +<a name="2H_PART62"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + PART II. +</h2> +<p> +It may not be improper, in this place, to examine the influence of +bodily endowments, and of the goods of fortune, over our sentiments of +regard and esteem, and to consider whether these phenomena fortify +or weaken the present theory. It will naturally be expected, that the +beauty of the body, as is supposed by all ancient moralists, will be +similar, in some respects, to that of the mind; and that every kind +of esteem, which is paid to a man, will have something similar in +its origin, whether it arise from his mental endowments, or from the +situation of his exterior circumstances. +</p> +<p> +It is evident, that one considerable source of BEAUTY in all animals +is the advantage which they reap from the particular structure of their +limbs and members, suitably to the particular manner of life, to which +they are by nature destined. The just proportions of a horse, described +by Xenophon and Virgil, are the same that are received at this day by +our modern jockeys; because the foundation of them is the same, namely, +experience of what is detrimental or useful in the animal. +</p> +<p> +Broad shoulders, a lank belly, firm joints, taper legs; all these are +beautiful in our species, because signs of force and vigour. Ideas of +utility and its contrary, though they do not entirely determine what is +handsome or deformed, are evidently the source of a considerable part of +approbation or dislike. +</p> +<p> +In ancient times, bodily strength and dexterity, being of greater USE +and importance in war, was also much more esteemed and valued, than +at present. Not to insist on Homer and the poets, we may observe, +that historians scruple not to mention FORCE OF BODY among the other +accomplishments even of Epaminondas, whom they acknowledge to be the +greatest hero, statesman, and general of all the Greeks. [Footnote: CUM +ALACRIBUS, SALTU; CUMM VELOCIBUS, CURSU; CUM VALIDIS RECTE CERTABATA. +Sallust apud Veget.] A like praise is given to Pompey, one of the +greatest of the Romans. [Footnote: Diodorus Siculus, lib. xv. It may +be improper to give the character of Epaminondas, as drawn by the +historian, in order to show the idea of perfect merit, which prevailed +in those ages. In other illustrious men, say he, you will observe, that +each possessed some one shining quality, which was the foundation of his +fame: In Epaminondas all the VIRTUES are found united; force of body. +eloquence of expression, vigour of mind, contempt of riches, gentleness +of disposition, and what is chiefly to be regarded, courage and conduct +of war.] This instance is similar to what we observed above with regard +to memory. +</p> +<p> +What derision and contempt, with both sexes, attend IMPOTENCE; while the +unhappy object is regarded as one deprived of so capital a pleasure in +life, and at the same time, as disabled from communicating it to others. +BARRENNESS in women, being also a species of INUTILITY, is a reproach, +but not in the same degree: of which the reason is very obvious, +according to the present theory. +</p> +<p> +There is no rule in painting or statuary more indispensible than that of +balancing the figures, and placing them with the greatest exactness on +their proper centre of gravity. A figure, which is not justly balanced, +is ugly; because it conveys the disagreeable ideas of fall, harm, and +pain. +</p> +<pre> +[Footenote: All men are equally liable to pain and disease and sickness; +and may again recover health and ease. These circumstances, as they make +no distinction between one man and another, are no source of pride or +humility, regard or contempt. But comparing our own species to superior +ones, it is a very mortifying consideration, that we should all be so +liable to diseases and infirmities; and divines accordingly employ this +topic, in order to depress self-conceit and vanity. They would have more +success, if the common bent of our thoughts were not perpetually turned +to compare ourselves with others. + + The infirmities of old age are mortifying; because a comparison with +the young may take place. The king's evil is industriously concealed, +because it affects others, and is often transmitted to posterity. The +case is nearly the same with such diseases as convey any nauseous or +frightful images; the epilepsy, for instance, ulcers, sores, scabs, &c.] +</pre> +<p> +A disposition or turn of mind, which qualifies a man to rise in the +world and advance his fortune, is entitled to esteem and regard, as has +already been explained. It may, therefore, naturally be supposed, that +the actual possession of riches and authority will have a considerable +influence over these sentiments. +</p> +<p> +Let us examine any hypothesis by which we can account for the regard +paid to the rich and powerful; we shall find none satisfactory, but that +which derives it from the enjoyment communicated to the spectator by +the images of prosperity, happiness, ease, plenty, authority, and the +gratification of every appetite. Self-love, for instance, which some +affect so much to consider as the source of every sentiment, is plainly +insufficient for this purpose. Where no good-will or friendship appears, +it is difficult to conceive on what we can found our hope of advantage +from the riches of others; though we naturally respect the rich, even +before they discover any such favourable disposition towards us. +</p> +<p> +We are affected with the same sentiments, when we lie so much out of the +sphere of their activity, that they cannot even be supposed to possess +the power of serving us. A prisoner of war, in all civilized nations, +is treated with a regard suited to his condition; and riches, it is +evident, go far towards fixing the condition of any person. If birth +and quality enter for a share, this still affords us an argument to our +present purpose. For what is it we call a man of birth, but one who is +descended from a long succession of rich and powerful ancestors, and who +acquires our esteem by his connexion with persons whom we esteem? His +ancestors, therefore, though dead, are respected, in some measure, +on account of their riches; and consequently, without any kind of +expectation. +</p> +<p> +But not to go so far as prisoners of war or the dead, to find instances +of this disinterested regard for riches; we may only observe, with +a little attention, those phenomena which occur in common life and +conversation. A man, who is himself, we shall suppose, of a competent +fortune, and of no profession, being introduced to a company of +strangers, naturally treats them with different degrees of respect, as +he is informed of their different fortunes and conditions; though it +is impossible that he can so suddenly propose, and perhaps he would +not accept of, any pecuniary advantage from them. A traveller is always +admitted into company, and meets with civility, in proportion as his +train and equipage speak him a man of great or moderate fortune. In +short, the different ranks of men are, in a great measure, regulated +by riches; and that with regard to superiors as well as inferiors, +strangers as well as acquaintance. +</p> +<p> +What remains, therefore, but to conclude, that, as riches are desired +for ourselves only as the means of gratifying our appetites, either at +present or in some imaginary future period, they beget esteem in others +merely from their having that influence. This indeed is their very +nature or offence: they have a direct reference to the commodities, +conveniences, and pleasures of life. The bill of a banker, who is broke, +or gold in a desert island, would otherwise be full as valuable. When we +approach a man who is, as we say, at his ease, we are presented with the +pleasing ideas of plenty, satisfaction, cleanliness, warmth; a cheerful +house, elegant furniture, ready service, and whatever is desirable in +meat, drink, or apparel. On the contrary, when a poor man appears, +the disagreeable images of want, penury, hard labour, dirty furniture, +coarse or ragged clothes, nauseous meat and distasteful liquor, +immediately strike our fancy. What else do we mean by saying that one +is rich, the other poor? And as regard or contempt is the natural +consequence of those different situations in life, it is easily seen +what additional light and evidence this throws on our preceding theory, +with regard to all moral distinctions. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: There is something extraordinary, and seemingly +unaccountable in the operation of our passions, when we consider the +fortune and situation of others. Very often another's advancement and +prosperity produces envy, which has a strong mixture of hatred, and +arises chiefly from the comparison of ourselves with the person. At the +very same time, or at least in very short intervals, we may feel the +passion of respect, which is a species of affection or good-will, with +a mixture of humility. On the other hand, the misfortunes of our fellows +often cause pity, which has in it a strong mixture of good-will. This +sentiment of pity is nearly allied to contempt, which is a species of +dislike, with a mixture of pride. I only point out these phenomena, as +a subject of speculation to such as are curious with regard to moral +enquiries. It is sufficient for the present purpose to observe in +general, that power and riches commonly cause respect, poverty and +meanness contempt, though particular views and incidents may sometimes +raise the passions of envy and of pity.] +</pre> +<p> +A man who has cured himself of all ridiculous pre-possessions, and is +fully, sincerely, and steadily convinced, from experience as well as +philosophy, that the difference of fortune makes less difference in +happiness than is vulgarly imagined; such a one does not measure out +degrees of esteem according to the rent-rolls of his acquaintance. He +may, indeed, externally pay a superior deference to the great lord above +the vassal; because riches are the most convenient, being the most fixed +and determinate, source of distinction. But his internal sentiments are +more regulated by the personal characters of men, than by the accidental +and capricious favours of fortune. +</p> +<p> +In most countries of Europe, family, that is, hereditary riches, marked +with titles and symbols from the sovereign, is the chief source of +distinction. In England, more regard is paid to present opulence and +plenty. Each practice has its advantages and disadvantages. Where birth +is respected, unactive, spiritless minds remain in haughty indolence, +and dream of nothing but pedigrees and genealogies: the generous and +ambitious seek honour and authority, and reputation and favour. Where +riches are the chief idol, corruption, venality, rapine prevail: arts, +manufactures, commerce, agriculture flourish. The former prejudice, +being favourable to military virtue, is more suited to monarchies. +The latter, being the chief spur to industry, agrees better with a +republican government. And we accordingly find that each of these forms +of government, by varying the utility of those customs, has commonly a +proportionable effect on the sentiments of mankind. +</p> +<a name="2H_SECT7"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + SECTION VII. +</h2> +<h3> + OF QUALITIES IMMEDIATELY AGREEABLE TO OURSELVES. +</h3> +<p> +Whoever has passed an evening with serious melancholy people, and +has observed how suddenly the conversation was animated, and what +sprightliness diffused itself over the countenance, discourse, and +behaviour of every one, on the accession of a good-humoured, lively +companion; such a one will easily allow that cheerfulness carries great +merit with it, and naturally conciliates the good-will of mankind. No +quality, indeed, more readily communicates itself to all around; because +no one has a greater propensity to display itself, in jovial talk and +pleasant entertainment. The flame spreads through the whole circle; and +the most sullen and morose are often caught by it. That the melancholy +hate the merry, even though Horace says it, I have some difficulty +to allow; because I have always observed that, where the jollity is +moderate and decent, serious people are so much the more delighted, +as it dissipates the gloom with which they are commonly oppressed, and +gives them an unusual enjoyment. +</p> +<p> +From this influence of cheerfulness, both to communicate itself and to +engage approbation, we may perceive that there is another set of mental +qualities, which, without any utility or any tendency to farther good, +either of the community or of the possessor, diffuse a satisfaction +on the beholders, and procure friendship and regard. Their immediate +sensation, to the person possessed of them, is agreeable. Others enter +into the same humour, and catch the sentiment, by a contagion or natural +sympathy; and as we cannot forbear loving whatever pleases, a kindly +emotion arises towards the person who communicates so much satisfaction. +He is a more animating spectacle; his presence diffuses over us more +serene complacency and enjoyment; our imagination, entering into his +feelings and disposition, is affected in a more agreeable manner than +if a melancholy, dejected, sullen, anxious temper were presented to us. +Hence the affection and probation which attend the former: the aversion +and disgust with which we regard the latter. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: There is no man, who, on particular occasions, is not +affected with all the disagreeable passions, fear, anger, dejection, +grief, melancholy, anxiety, &c. But these, so far as they are natural, +and universal, make no difference between one man and another, and can +never be the object of blame. It is only when the disposition gives a +PROPENSITY to any of these disagreeable passions, that they disfigure +the character, and by giving uneasiness, convey the sentiment of +disapprobation to the spectator.] +</pre> +<p> +Few men would envy the character which Caesar gives of Cassius: +</p> +<pre> + He loves no play, + As thou do'st, Anthony: he hears no music: + Seldom he smiles; and smiles in such a sort, + As if he mock'd himself, and scorn'd his spirit + That could be mov'd to smile at any thing. +</pre> +<p> +Not only such men, as Caesar adds, are commonly DANGEROUS, but also, +having little enjoyment within themselves, they can never become +agreeable to others, or contribute to social entertainment. In all +polite nations and ages, a relish for pleasure, if accompanied with +temperance and decency, is esteemed a considerable merit, even in the +greatest men; and becomes still more requisite in those of inferior rank +and character. It is an agreeable representation, which a French writer +gives of the situation of his own mind in this particular, VIRTUE I +LOVE, says he, WITHOUT AUSTERITY: PLEASURE WITHOUT EFFEMINACY: AND LIFE, +WITHOUT FEARING ITS END. [Footnote: 'J'aime la vertu, sans rudesse; +J'aime le plaisir, sans molesse; J'aime la vie, et n'en crains point la +fin.'-ST. EVREMONT.] +</p> +<p> +Who is not struck with any signal instance of greatness of mind or +dignity of character; with elevation of sentiment, disdain of slavery, +and with that noble pride and spirit, which arises from conscious +virtue? The sublime, says Longinus, is often nothing but the echo or +image of magnanimity; and where this quality appears in any one, +even though a syllable be not uttered, it excites our applause and +admiration; as may be observed of the famous silence of Ajax in the +Odyssey, which expresses more noble disdain and resolute indignation +than any language can convey [Footnote: Cap. 9.]. +</p> +<p> +WERE I Alexander, said Parmenio, I WOULD ACCEPT OF THESE OFFERS MADE BY +DARIUS. SO WOULD I TOO, replied Alexander, WERE I PARMENIO. This saying +is admirable, says Longinus, from a like principle. [Footnote: Idem.] +</p> +<p> +GO! cries the same hero to his soldiers, when they refused to follow +him to the Indies, GO TELL YOUR COUNTRYMEN, THAT YOU LEFT Alexander +COMPLETING THE CONQUEST OF THE WORLD. 'Alexander,' said the Prince of +Conde, who always admired this passage, 'abandoned by his soldiers, +among barbarians, not yet fully subdued, felt in himself such a dignity +and right of empire, that he could not believe it possible that any one +would refuse to obey him. Whether in Europe or in Asia, among Greeks or +Persians, all was indifferent to him: wherever he found men, he fancied +he should find subjects.' +</p> +<p> +The confident of Medea in the tragedy recommends caution and submission; +and enumerating all the distresses of that unfortunate heroine, asks +her, what she has to support her against her numerous and implacable +enemies. MYSELF, replies she; MYSELF I SAY, AND IT IS ENOUGH. Boileau +justly recommends this passage as an instance of true sublime [Footnote: +Reflexion 10 sur Longin.]. +</p> +<p> +When Phocion, the modest, the gentle Phocion, was led to execution, he +turned to one of his fellow-sufferers, who was lamenting his own +hard fate, IS IT NOT GLORY ENOUGH FOR YOU, says he, THAT YOU DIE WITH +PHOCION? [Footnote: Plutarch in Phoc.] +</p> +<p> +Place in opposition the picture which Tacitus draws of Vitellius, fallen +from empire, prolonging his ignominy from a wretched love of life, +delivered over to the merciless rabble; tossed, buffeted, and kicked +about; constrained, by their holding a poniard under his chin, to raise +his head, and expose himself to every contumely. What abject infamy! +What low humiliation! Yet even here, says the historian, he discovered +some symptoms of a mind not wholly degenerate. To a tribune, who +insulted him, he replied, I AM STILL YOUR EMPEROR. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: Tacit. hist. lib. iii. The author entering upon the +narration, says, LANIATA VESTE, FOEDUM SPECACULUM DUCEBATUR, MULTIS +INCREPANTIBUS, NULLO INLACRIMANTE: deformatitas exitus misericordiam +abstulerat. To enter thoroughly into this method of thinking, we must +make allowance for the ancient maxims, that no one ought to prolong his +life after it became dishonourable; but, as he had always a right to +dispose of it, it then became a duty to part with it.] +</pre> +<p> +We never excuse the absolute want of spirit and dignity of character, or +a proper sense of what is due to one's self, in society and the common +intercourse of life. This vice constitutes what we properly call +MEANNESS; when a man can submit to the basest slavery, in order to +gain his ends; fawn upon those who abuse him; and degrade himself by +intimacies and familiarities with undeserving inferiors. A certain +degree of generous pride or self-value is so requisite, that the absence +of it in the mind displeases, after the same manner as the want of a +nose, eye, or any of the most material feature of the face or member of +the body. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: The absence of virtue may often be a vice; and that of +the highest kind; as in the instance of ingratitude, as well as +meanness. Where we expect a beauty, the disappointment gives an uneasy +sensation, and produces a real deformity. An abjectness of character, +likewise, is disgustful and contemptible in another view. Where a man +has no sense of value in himself, we are not likely to have any higher +esteem of him. And if the same person, who crouches to his superiors, +is insolent to his inferiors (as often happens), this contrariety +of behaviour, instead of correcting the former vice, aggravates it +extremely by the addition of a vice still more odious. See Sect. VIII.] +</pre> +<p> +The utility of courage, both to the public and to the person possessed +of it, is an obvious foundation of merit. But to any one who duly +considers of the matter, it will appear that this quality has a peculiar +lustre, which it derives wholly from itself, and from that noble +elevation inseparable from it. Its figure, drawn by painters and by +poets, displays, in each feature, a sublimity and daring confidence; +which catches the eye, engages the affections, and diffuses, by +sympathy, a like sublimity of sentiment over every spectator. +</p> +<p> +Under what shining colours does Demosthenes [Footnote: De +Corona.] represent Philip; where the orator apologizes for his own +administration, and justifies that pertinacious love of liberty, with +which he had inspired the Athenians. 'I beheld Philip,' says he, 'he +with whom was your contest, resolutely, while in pursuit of empire +and dominion, exposing himself to every wound; his eye gored, his neck +wrested, his arm, his thigh pierced, what ever part of his body fortune +should seize on, that cheerfully relinquishing; provided that, with what +remained, he might live in honour and renown. And shall it be said +that he, born in Pella, a place heretofore mean and ignoble, should +be inspired with so high an ambition and thirst of fame: while you, +Athenians, &c.' These praises excite the most lively admiration; but +the views presented by the orator, carry us not, we see, beyond the hero +himself, nor ever regard the future advantageous consequences of his +valour. +</p> +<p> +The material temper of the Romans, inflamed by continual wars, had +raised their esteem of courage so high, that, in their language, it was +called VIRTUE, by way of excellence and of distinction from all other +moral qualities. THE Suevi, in the opinion of Tacitus, tus, [Footnote: +De moribus Germ.] DRESSED THEIR HAIR WITH A LAUDIBLE INTENT: NOT +FOR THE PURPOSE OF LOVING OR BEING LOVES; THEY DORNED THEMSELVES ONLY +FOR THEIR ENEMIES, AND IN ORDER TO APPEAR MORE TERRIBLE. A sentiment +of the historian, which would sound a little oddly in other nations and +other ages. +</p> +<p> +The Scythians, according to Herodotus, [Footnote: Lib. iv.] after +scalping their enemies, dressed the skin like leather, and used it as a +towel; and whoever had the most of those towels was most esteemed among +them. So much had martial bravery, in that nation, as well as in many +others, destroyed the sentiments of humanity; a virtue surely much more +useful and engaging. +</p> +<p> +It is indeed observable, that, among all uncultivated nations, who have +not as yet had full experience of the advantages attending beneficence, +justice, and the social virtues, courage is the predominant excellence; +what is most celebrated by poets, recommended by parents and +instructors, and admired by the public in general. The ethics of Homer +are, in this particular, very different from those of Fenelon, his +elegant imitator; and such as were well suited to an age, when one hero, +as remarked by Thucydides [Lib.i.], could ask another, without offence, +whether he were a robber or not. Such also very lately was the system +of ethics which prevailed in many barbarous parts of Ireland; if we may +credit Spencer, in his judicious account of the state of that kingdom. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote from Spencer: It is a common use, says he, amongst +their gentlemen's sons, that, as soon as they are able to use their +weapons, they strait gather to themselves three or four stragglers or +kern, with whom wandering a while up and down idly the country, taking +only meat, he at last falleth into some bad occasion, that shall be +offered; which being once made known, he is thenceforth counted a man of +worth, in whom there is courage.] +</pre> +<p> +Of the same class of virtues with courage is that undisturbed +philosophical tranquillity, superior to pain, sorrow, anxiety, and +each assault of adverse fortune. Conscious of his own virtue, say the +philosophers, the sage elevates himself above every accident of life; +and securely placed in the temple of wisdom, looks down on inferior +mortals engaged in pursuit of honours, riches, reputation, and every +frivolous enjoyment. These pretentious, no doubt, when stretched to +the utmost, are by far too magnificent for human nature. They carry, +however, a grandeur with them, which seizes the spectator, and strikes +him with admiration. And the nearer we can approach in practice to this +sublime tranquillity and indifference (for we must distinguish it from a +stupid insensibility), the more secure enjoyment shall we attain within +ourselves, and the more greatness of mind shall we discover to the +world. The philosophical tranquillity may, indeed, be considered only as +a branch of magnanimity. +</p> +<p> +Who admires not Socrates; his perpetual serenity and contentment, amidst +the greatest poverty and domestic vexations; his resolute contempt of +riches, and his magnanimous care of preserving liberty, while he refused +all assistance from his friends and disciples, and avoided even the +dependence of an obligation? Epictetus had not so much as a door to his +little house or hovel; and therefore, soon lost his iron lamp, the only +furniture which he had worth taking. But resolving to disappoint all +robbers for the future, he supplied its place with an earthen lamp, of +which he very peacefully kept possession ever after. +</p> +<p> +Among the ancients, the heroes in philosophy, as well as those in war +and patriotism, have a grandeur and force of sentiment, which +astonishes our narrow souls, and is rashly rejected as extravagant and +supernatural. They, in their turn, I allow, would have had equal +reason to consider as romantic and incredible, the degree of humanity, +clemency, order, tranquillity, and other social virtues, to which, in +the administration of government, we have attained in modern times, had +any one been then able to have made a fair representation of them. Such +is the compensation, which nature, or rather education, has made in the +distribution of excellencies and virtues, in those different ages. +</p> +<p> +The merit of benevolence, arising from its utility, and its tendency +to promote the good of mankind has been already explained, and is, no +doubt, the source of a CONSIDERABLE part of that esteem, which is so +universally paid to it. But it will also be allowed, that the very +softness and tenderness of the sentiment, its engaging endearments, its +fond expressions, its delicate attentions, and all that flow of mutual +confidence and regard, which enters into a warm attachment of love +and friendship: it will be allowed, I say, that these feelings, +being delightful in themselves, are necessarily communicated to the +spectators, and melt them into the same fondness and delicacy. The tear +naturally starts in our eye on the apprehension of a warm sentiment of +this nature: our breast heaves, our heart is agitated, and every humane +tender principle of our frame is set in motion, and gives us the purest +and most satisfactory enjoyment. +</p> +<p> +When poets form descriptions of Elysian fields, where the blessed +inhabitants stand in no need of each other's assistance, they yet +represent them as maintaining a constant intercourse of love and +friendship, and sooth our fancy with the pleasing image of these soft +and gentle passions. The idea of tender tranquillity in a pastoral +Arcadia is agreeable from a like principle, as has been observed above. +[Footnote: Sect. v. Part 2.] +</p> +<p> +Who would live amidst perpetual wrangling, and scolding, and mutual +reproaches? The roughness and harshness of these emotions disturb and +displease us: we suffer by contagion and sympathy; nor can we remain +indifferent spectators, even though certain that no pernicious +consequences would ever follow from such angry passions. +</p> +<p> +As a certain proof that the whole merit of benevolence is not derived +from its usefulness, we may observe, that in a kind way of blame, we +say, a person is TOO GOOD; when he exceeds his part in society, and +carries his attention for others beyond the proper bounds. In +like manner, we say, a man is too HIGH-SPIRITED, TOO INTREPID, TOO +INDIFFERENT ABOUT FORTUNE: reproaches, which really, at bottom, imply +more esteem than many panegyrics. Being accustomed to rate the merit and +demerit of characters chiefly by their useful or pernicious tendencies, +we cannot forbear applying the epithet of blame, when we discover a +sentiment, which rises to a degree, that is hurtful; but it may happen, +at the same time, that its noble elevation, or its engaging tenderness +so seizes the heart, as rather to increase our friendship and concern +for the person. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: Cheerfulness could scarce admit of blame from its +excess, were it not that dissolute mirth, without a proper cause or +subject, is a sure symptom and characteristic of folly, and on that +account disgustful.] +</pre> +<p> +The amours and attachments of Harry the IVth of France, during the civil +wars of the league, frequently hurt his interest and his cause; but all +the young, at least, and amorous, who can sympathize with the tender +passions, will allow that this very weakness, for they will readily call +it such, chiefly endears that hero, and interests them in his fortunes. +</p> +<p> +The excessive bravery and resolute inflexibility of Charles the XIIth +ruined his own country, and infested all his neighbours; but have +such splendour and greatness in their appearance, as strikes us with +admiration; and they might, in some degree, be even approved of, if they +betrayed not sometimes too evident symptoms of madness and disorder. +</p> +<p> +The Athenians pretended to the first invention of agriculture and of +laws: and always valued themselves extremely on the benefit thereby +procured to the whole race of mankind. They also boasted, and with +reason, of their war like enterprises; particularly against those +innumerable fleets and armies of Persians, which invaded Greece during +the reigns of Darius and Xerxes. But though there be no comparison in +point of utility, between these peaceful and military honours; yet we +find, that the orators, who have writ such elaborate panegyrics on +that famous city, have chiefly triumphed in displaying the warlike +achievements. Lysias, Thucydides, Plato, and Isocrates discover, all of +them, the same partiality; which, though condemned by calm reason and +reflection, appears so natural in the mind of man. +</p> +<p> +It is observable, that the great charm of poetry consists in lively +pictures of the sublime passions, magnanimity, courage, disdain of +fortune; or those of the tender affections, love and friendship; which +warm the heart, and diffuse over it similar sentiments and emotions. And +though all kinds of passion, even the most disagreeable, such as +grief and anger, are observed, when excited by poetry, to convey a +satisfaction, from a mechanism of nature, not easy to be explained: Yet +those more elevated or softer affections have a peculiar influence, and +please from more than one cause or principle. Not to mention that +they alone interest us in the fortune of the persons represented, or +communicate any esteem and affection for their character. +</p> +<p> +And can it possibly be doubted, that this talent itself of poets, to +move the passions, this pathetic and sublime of sentiment, is a very +considerable merit; and being enhanced by its extreme rarity, may exalt +the person possessed of it, above every character of the age in which +he lives? The prudence, address, steadiness, and benign government of +Augustus, adorned with all the splendour of his noble birth and imperial +crown, render him but an unequal competitor for fame with Virgil, who +lays nothing into the opposite scale but the divine beauties of his +poetical genius. +</p> +<p> +The very sensibility to these beauties, or a delicacy of taste, is +itself a beauty in any character; as conveying the purest, the most +durable, and most innocent of all enjoyments. +</p> +<p> +These are some instances of the several species of merit, that are +valued for the immediate pleasure which they communicate to the +person possessed of them. No views of utility or of future beneficial +consequences enter into this sentiment of approbation; yet is it of +a kind similar to that other sentiment, which arises from views of a +public or private utility. The same social sympathy, we may observe, or +fellow-feeling with human happiness or misery, gives rise to both; and +this analogy, in all the parts of the present theory, may justly be +regarded as a confirmation of it. +</p> +<a name="2H_SECT8"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + SECTION VIII. +</h2> +<h3> + OF QUALITIES IMMEDIATELY AGREEABLE TO OTHERS. +</h3> +<pre> + [Footnote: It is the nature and, indeed, the definition of +virtue, that it is A QUALITY OF THE MIND AGREEABLE TO OR APPROVED OF BY +EVERY ONE WHO CONSIDERS OR CONTEMPLATES IT. But some qualities produce +pleasure, because they are useful to society, or useful or agreeable +to the person himself; others produce it more immediately, which is the +case with the class of virtues here considered.] +</pre> +<p> +AS the mutual shocks, in SOCIETY, and the oppositions of interest and +self-love have constrained mankind to establish the laws of JUSTICE, in +order to preserve the advantages of mutual assistance and protection: in +like manner, the eternal contrarieties, in COMPANY, of men's pride and +self-conceit, have introduced the rules of Good Manners or Politeness, +in order to facilitate the intercourse of minds, and an undisturbed +commerce and conversation. Among well-bred people, a mutual deference is +affected; contempt of others disguised; authority concealed; attention +given to each in his turn; and an easy stream of conversation +maintained, without vehemence, without interruption, without eagerness +for victory, and without any airs of superiority. These attentions +and regards are immediately AGREEABLE to others, abstracted from any +consideration of utility or beneficial tendencies: they conciliate +affection, promote esteem, and extremely enhance the merit of the person +who regulates his behaviour by them. +</p> +<p> +Many of the forms of breeding are arbitrary and casual; but the thing +expressed by them is still the same. A Spaniard goes out of his own +house before his guest, to signify that he leaves him master of all. +In other countries, the landlord walks out last, as a common mark of +deference and regard. +</p> +<p> +But, in order to render a man perfect GOOD COMPANY, he must have Wit and +Ingenuity as well as good manners. What wit is, it may not be easy +to define; but it is easy surely to determine that it is a quality +immediately AGREEABLE to others, and communicating, on its first +appearance, a lively joy and satisfaction to every one who has any +comprehension of it. The most profound metaphysics, indeed, might be +employed in explaining the various kinds and species of wit; and many +classes of it, which are now received on the sole testimony of taste and +sentiment, might, perhaps, be resolved into more general principles. But +this is sufficient for our present purpose, that it does affect taste +and sentiment, and bestowing an immediate enjoyment, is a sure source of +approbation and affection. +</p> +<p> +In countries where men pass most of their time in conversation, and +visits, and assemblies, these COMPANIONABLE qualities, so to speak, +are of high estimation, and form a chief part of personal merit. In +countries where men live a more domestic life, and either are employed +in business, or amuse themselves in a narrower circle of acquaintance, +the more solid qualities are chiefly regarded. Thus, I have often +observed, that, among the French, the first questions with regard to a +stranger are, IS HE POLITE? HAS HE WIT? In our own country, the chief +praise bestowed is always that of a GOOD-NATURED, SENSIBLE FELLOW. +</p> +<p> +In conversation, the lively spirit of dialogue is AGREEABLE, even to +those who desire not to have any share in the discourse: hence the +teller of long stories, or the pompous declaimer, is very little +approved of. But most men desire likewise their turn in the +conversation, and regard, with a very evil eye, that LOQUACITY which +deprives them of a right they are naturally so jealous of. +</p> +<p> +There is a sort of harmless LIARS, frequently to be met with in company, +who deal much in the marvellous. Their usual intention is to please and +entertain; but as men are most delighted with what they conceive to be +truth, these people mistake extremely the means of pleasing, and incur +universal blame. Some indulgence, however, to lying or fiction is +given in HUMOROUS stories; because it is there really agreeable and +entertaining, and truth is not of any importance. +</p> +<p> +Eloquence, genius of all kinds, even good sense, and sound reasoning, +when it rises to an eminent degree, and is employed upon subjects of +any considerable dignity and nice discernment; all these endowments seem +immediately agreeable, and have a merit distinct from their usefulness. +Rarity, likewise, which so much enhances the price of every thing, must +set an additional value on these noble talents of the human mind. +</p> +<p> +Modesty may be understood in different senses, even abstracted from +chastity, which has been already treated of. It sometimes means that +tenderness and nicety of honour, that apprehension of blame, that dread +of intrusion or injury towards others, that Pudor, which is the proper +guardian of every kind of virtue, and a sure preservative against vice +and corruption. But its most usual meaning is when it is opposed +to IMPUDENCE and ARROGANCE, and expresses a diffidence of our own +judgement, and a due attention and regard for others. In young men +chiefly, this quality is a sure sign of good sense; and is also the +certain means of augmenting that endowment, by preserving their ears +open to instruction, and making them still grasp after new attainments. +But it has a further charm to every spectator; by flattering every man's +vanity, and presenting the appearance of a docile pupil, who receives, +with proper attention and respect, every word they utter. +</p> +<p> +Men have, in general, a much greater propensity to overvalue than +undervalue themselves; notwithstanding the opinion of Aristotle +[Footnote: Ethic. ad Nicomachum.]. This makes us more jealous of the +excess on the former side, and causes us to regard, with a peculiar +indulgence, all tendency to modesty and self-diffidence; as esteeming +the danger less of falling into any vicious extreme of that nature. It +is thus in countries where men's bodies are apt to exceed in corpulency, +personal beauty is placed in a much greater degree of slenderness, than +in countries where that is the most usual defect. Being so often struck +with instances of one species of deformity, men think they can never +keep at too great a distance from it, and wish always to have a +leaning to the opposite side. In like manner, were the door opened to +self-praise, and were Montaigne's maxim observed, that one should say as +frankly, I HAVE SENSE, I HAVE LEARNING, I HAVE COURAGE, BEAUTY, OR WIT, +as it is sure we often think so; were this the case, I say, every one +is sensible that such a flood of impertinence would break in upon us, +as would render society wholly intolerable. For this reason custom +has established it as a rule, in common societies, that men should not +indulge themselves in self-praise, or even speak much of themselves; +and it is only among intimate friends or people of very manly behaviour, +that one is allowed to do himself justice. Nobody finds fault with +Maurice, Prince of Orange, for his reply to one who asked him, whom he +esteemed the first general of the age, THE MARQUIS OF SPINOLA, said he, +IS THE SECOND. Though it is observable, that the self-praise implied is +here better implied, than if it had been directly expressed, without any +cover or disguise. +</p> +<p> +He must be a very superficial thinker, who imagines that all instances +of mutual deference are to be understood in earnest, and that a man +would be more esteemable for being ignorant of his own merits and +accomplishments. A small bias towards modesty, even in the internal +sentiment, is favourably regarded, especially in young people; and a +strong bias is required in the outward behaviour; but this excludes not +a noble pride and spirit, which may openly display itself in its full +extent, when one lies under calumny or oppression of any kind. The +generous contumacy of Socrates, as Cicero calls it, has been highly +celebrated in all ages; and when joined to the usual modesty of his +behaviour, forms a shining character. Iphicrates, the Athenian, being +accused of betraying the interests of his country, asked his accuser, +WOULD YOU, says he, HAVE, ON A LIKE OCCASION, BEEN GUILTY OF THAT CRIME? +BY NO MEANS, replied the other. AND CAN YOU THEN IMAGINE, cried the +hero, that Iphicrates WOULD BE GUILTY? [Footnote: Quinctil. lib. v. cap. +12.]—In short, a generous spirit and self-value, well founded, decently +disguised, and courageously supported under distress and calumny, is a +great excellency, and seems to derive its merit from the noble elevation +of its sentiment, or its immediate agreeableness to its possessor. In +ordinary characters, we approve of a bias towards modesty, which is +a quality immediately agreeable to others: the vicious excess of +the former virtue, namely, insolence or haughtiness, is immediately +disagreeable to others; the excess of the latter is so to the possessor. +Thus are the boundaries of these duties adjusted. +</p> +<p> +A desire of fame, reputation, or a character with others, is so far +from being blameable, that it seems inseparable from virtue, genius, +capacity, and a generous or noble disposition. An attention even to +trivial matters, in order to please, is also expected and demanded by +society; and no one is surprised, if he find a man in company to observe +a greater elegance of dress and more pleasant flow of conversation, than +when he passes his time at home, and with his own family. Wherein, then, +consists Vanity, which is so justly regarded as a fault or imperfection. +It seems to consist chiefly in such an intemperate display of our +advantages, honours, and accomplishments; in such an importunate and +open demand of praise and admiration, as is offensive to others, and +encroaches too far on their secret vanity and ambition. It is besides a +sure symptom of the want of true dignity and elevation of mind, which is +so great an ornament in any character. For why that impatient desire +of applause; as if you were not justly entitled to it, and might not +reasonably expect that it would for ever at tend you? Why so anxious to +inform us of the great company which you have kept; the obliging things +which were said to you; the honours, the distinctions which you met +with; as if these were not things of course, and what we could readily, +of ourselves, have imagined, without being told of them? +</p> +<p> +Decency, or a proper regard to age, sex, character, and station in the +world, may be ranked among the qualities which are immediately agreeable +to others, and which, by that means, acquire praise and approbation. An +effeminate behaviour in a man, a rough manner in a woman; these are ugly +because unsuitable to each character, and different from the qualities +which we expect in the sexes. It is as if a tragedy abounded in comic +beauties, or a comedy in tragic. The disproportions hurt the eye, and +convey a disagreeable sentiment to the spectators, the source of blame +and disapprobation. This is that INDECORUM, which is explained so much +at large by Cicero in his Offices. +</p> +<p> +Among the other virtues, we may also give Cleanliness a place; since +it naturally renders us agreeable to others, and is no inconsiderable +source of love and affection. No one will deny, that a negligence in +this particular is a fault; and as faults are nothing but smaller vices, +and this fault can have no other origin than the uneasy sensation which +it excites in others; we may, in this instance, seemingly so trivial, +clearly discover the origin of moral distinctions, about which the +learned have involved themselves in such mazes of perplexity and error. +</p> +<p> +But besides all the AGREEABLE qualities, the origin of whose beauty +we can, in some degree, explain and account for, there still remains +something mysterious and inexplicable, which conveys an immediate +satisfaction to the spectator, but how, or why, or for what reason, +he cannot pretend to determine. There is a manner, a grace, an ease, a +genteelness, an I-know-not-what, which some men possess above others, +which is very different from external beauty and comeliness, and which, +however, catches our affection almost as suddenly and powerfully. And +though this MANNER be chiefly talked of in the passion between the +sexes, where the concealed magic is easily explained, yet surely much +of it prevails in all our estimation of characters, and forms no +inconsiderable part of personal merit. This class of accomplishments, +therefore, must be trusted entirely to the blind, but sure testimony of +taste and sentiment; and must be considered as a part of ethics, left by +nature to baffle all the pride of philosophy, and make her sensible of +her narrow boundaries and slender acquisitions. +</p> +<p> +We approve of another, because of his wit, politeness, modesty, decency, +or any agreeable quality which he possesses; although he be not of our +acquaintance, nor has ever given us any entertainment, by means of +these accomplishments. The idea, which we form of their effect on his +acquaintance, has an agreeable influence on our imagination, and gives +us the sentiment of approbation. This principle enters into all the +judgements which we form concerning manners and characters. +</p> +<a name="2H_SECT9"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + SECTION IX. CONCLUSION. +</h2> +<a name="2H_PART91"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + PART I. +</h2> +<p> +IT may justly appear surprising that any man in so late an age, should +find it requisite to prove, by elaborate reasoning, that Personal Merit +consists altogether in the possession of mental qualities, USEFUL or +AGREEABLE to the PERSON HIMSELF or to OTHERS. It might be expected that +this principle would have occurred even to the first rude, unpractised +enquirers concerning morals, and been received from its own evidence, +without any argument or disputation. Whatever is valuable in any kind, +so naturally classes itself under the division of USEFUL or AGREEABLE, +the UTILE or the DULCE, that it is not easy to imagine why we should +ever seek further, or consider the question as a matter of nice research +or inquiry. And as every thing useful or agreeable must possess these +qualities with regard either to the PERSON HIMSELF or to OTHERS, the +complete delineation or description of merit seems to be performed as +naturally as a shadow is cast by the sun, or an image is reflected upon +water. If the ground, on which the shadow is cast, be not broken and +uneven; nor the surface from which the image is reflected, disturbed +and confused; a just figure is immediately presented, without any art +or attention. And it seems a reasonable presumption, that systems and +hypotheses have perverted our natural understanding, when a theory, +so simple and obvious, could so long have escaped the most elaborate +examination. +</p> +<p> +But however the case may have fared with philosophy, in common life +these principles are still implicitly maintained; nor is any other topic +of praise or blame ever recurred to, when we employ any panegyric or +satire, any applause or censure of human action and behaviour. If we +observe men, in every intercourse of business or pleasure, in every +discourse and conversation, we shall find them nowhere, except the +schools, at any loss upon this subject. What so natural, for instance, +as the following dialogue? You are very happy, we shall suppose one to +say, addressing himself to another, that you have given your daughter +to Cleanthes. He is a man of honour and humanity. Every one, who has +any intercourse with him, is sure of FAIR and KIND treatment. [Footnote: +Qualities useful to others.] I congratulate you too, says another, +on the promising expectations of this son-in-law; whose assiduous +application to the study of the laws, whose quick penetration and early +knowledge both of men and business, prognosticate the greatest honours +and advancement. [Footnote: Qualities useful to the person himself.] +You surprise me, replies a third, when you talk of Cleanthes as a man +of business and application. I met him lately in a circle of the gayest +company, and he was the very life and soul of our conversation: so much +wit with good manners; so much gallantry without affectation; so much +ingenious knowledge so genteelly delivered, I have never before observed +in any one. [Footnote: Qualities immediately agreeable to others,] +You would admire him still more, says a fourth, if you knew him more +familiarly. That cheerfulness, which you might remark in him, is not a +sudden flash struck out by company: it runs through the whole tenor of +his life, and preserves a perpetual serenity on his countenance, and +tranquillity in his soul. He has met with severe trials, misfortunes as +well as dangers; and by his greatness of mind, was still superior to +all of them [Footnote: Qualities immediately agreeable to the person +himself]. The image, gentlemen, which you have here delineated of +Cleanthes, cried I, is that of accomplished merit. Each of you has given +a stroke of the pencil to his figure; and you have unawares exceeded all +the pictures drawn by Gratian or Castiglione. A philosopher might select +this character as a model of perfect virtue. +</p> +<p> +And as every quality which is useful or agreeable to ourselves or others +is, in common life, allowed to be a part of personal merit; so no other +will ever be received, where men judge of things by their natural, +unprejudiced reason, without the delusive glosses of superstition and +false religion. Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, +humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues; for +what reason are they everywhere rejected by men of sense, but because +they serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man's fortune in +the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither +qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor increase his power of +self-enjoyment? We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all these +desirable ends; stupify the understanding and harden the heart, obscure +the fancy and sour the temper. We justly, therefore, transfer them to +the opposite column, and place them in the catalogue of vices; nor has +any superstition force sufficient among men of the world, to pervert +entirely these natural sentiments. A gloomy, hair-brained enthusiast, +after his death, may have a place in the calendar; but will scarcely +ever be admitted, when alive, into intimacy and society, except by those +who are as delirious and dismal as himself. +</p> +<p> +It seems a happiness in the present theory, that it enters not into that +vulgar dispute concerning the DEGREES of benevolence or self-love, which +prevail in human nature; a dispute which is never likely to have any +issue, both because men, who have taken part, are not easily convinced, +and because the phenomena, which can be produced on either side, are so +dispersed, so uncertain, and subject to so many interpretations, that it +is scarcely possible accurately to compare them, or draw from them any +determinate inference or conclusion. It is sufficient for our present +purpose, if it be allowed, what surely, without the greatest absurdity +cannot be disputed, that there is some benevolence, however small, +infused into our bosom; some spark of friendship for human kind; some +particle of the dove kneaded into our frame, along with the elements of +the wolf and serpent. Let these generous sentiments be supposed ever +so weak; let them be insufficient to move even a hand or finger of our +body, they must still direct the determinations of our mind, and where +everything else is equal, produce a cool preference of what is useful +and serviceable to mankind, above what is pernicious and dangerous. A +MORAL DISTINCTION, therefore, immediately arises; a general sentiment of +blame and approbation; a tendency, however faint, to the objects of the +one, and a proportionable aversion to those of the other. Nor will those +reasoners, who so earnestly maintain the predominant selfishness of +human kind, be any wise scandalized at hearing of the weak sentiments of +virtue implanted in our nature. On the contrary, they are found as ready +to maintain the one tenet as the other; and their spirit of satire (for +such it appears, rather than of corruption) naturally gives rise to +both opinions; which have, indeed, a great and almost an indissoluble +connexion together. +</p> +<p> +Avarice, ambition, vanity, and all passions vulgarly, though improperly, +comprised under the denomination of SELF-LOVE, are here excluded from +our theory concerning the origin of morals, not because they are too +weak, but because they have not a proper direction for that purpose. +The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind, which +recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes every man, +or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it. It +also implies some sentiment, so universal and comprehensive as to extend +to all mankind, and render the actions and conduct, even of the persons +the most remote, an object of applause or censure, according as they +agree or disagree with that rule of right which is established. These +two requisite circumstances belong alone to the sentiment of humanity +here insisted on. The other passions produce in every breast, many +strong sentiments of desire and aversion, affection and hatred; but +these neither are felt so much in common, nor are so comprehensive, as +to be the foundation of any general system and established theory of +blame or approbation. +</p> +<p> +When a man denominates another his ENEMY, his RIVAL, his ANTAGONIST, his +ADVERSARY, he is understood to speak the language of self-love, and to +express sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular +circumstances and situation. But when he bestows on any man the epithets +of VICIOUS or ODIOUS or DEPRAVED, he then speaks another language, and +expresses sentiments, in which he expects all his audience are to +concur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from his private and +particular situation, and must choose a point of view, common to him +with others; he must move some universal principle of the human frame, +and touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and symphony. If +he mean, therefore, to express that this man possesses qualities, whose +tendency is pernicious to society, he has chosen this common point of +view, and has touched the principle of humanity, in which every man, in +some degree, concurs. While the human heart is compounded of the same +elements as at present, it will never be wholly indifferent to public +good, nor entirely unaffected with the tendency of characters and +manners. And though this affection of humanity may not generally be +esteemed so strong as vanity or ambition, yet, being common to all men, +it can alone be the foundation of morals, or of any-general system of +blame or praise. One man's ambition is not another's ambition, nor will +the same event or object satisfy both; but the humanity of one man is +the humanity of every one, and the same object touches this passion in +all human creatures. +</p> +<p> +But the sentiments, which arise from humanity, are not only the same in +all human creatures, and produce the same approbation or censure; but +they also comprehend all human creatures; nor is there any one whose +conduct or character is not, by their means, an object to every one of +censure or approbation. On the contrary, those other passions, +commonly denominated selfish, both produce different sentiments in each +individual, according to his particular situation; and also contemplate +the greater part of mankind with the utmost indifference and unconcern. +Whoever has a high regard and esteem for me flatters my vanity; whoever +expresses contempt mortifies and displeases me; but as my name is known +but to a small part of mankind, there are few who come within the sphere +of this passion, or excite, on its account, either my affection or +disgust. But if you represent a tyrannical, insolent, or barbarous +behaviour, in any country or in any age of the world, I soon carry my +eye to the pernicious tendency of such a conduct, and feel the sentiment +of repugnance and displeasure towards it. No character can be so remote +as to be, in this light, wholly indifferent to me. What is beneficial +to society or to the person himself must still be preferred. And every +quality or action, of every human being, must, by this means, be ranked +under some class or denomination, expressive of general censure or +applause. +</p> +<p> +What more, therefore, can we ask to distinguish the sentiments, +dependent on humanity, from those connected with any other passion, or +to satisfy us, why the former are the origin of morals, not the latter? +Whatever conduct gains my approbation, by touching my humanity, procures +also the applause of all mankind, by affecting the same principle in +them; but what serves my avarice or ambition pleases these passions +in me alone, and affects not the avarice and ambition of the rest of +mankind. There is no circumstance of conduct in any man, provided +it have a beneficial tendency, that is not agreeable to my humanity, +however remote the person; but every man, so far removed as neither +to cross nor serve my avarice and ambition, is regarded as wholly +indifferent by those passions. The distinction, therefore, between these +species of sentiment being so great and evident, language must soon be +moulded upon it, and must invent a peculiar set of terms, in order to +express those universal sentiments of censure or approbation, which +arise from humanity, or from views of general usefulness and its +contrary. Virtue and Vice become then known; morals are recognized; +certain general ideas are framed of human conduct and behaviour; such +measures are expected from men in such situations. This action is +determined to be conformable to our abstract rule; that other, contrary. +And by such universal principles are the particular sentiments of +self-love frequently controlled and limited. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: It seems certain, both from reason and experience, +that a rude, untaught savage regulates chiefly his love and hatred by +the ideas of private utility and injury, and has but faint conceptions +of a general rule or system of behaviour. The man who stands opposite +to him in battle, he hates heartedly, not only for the present moment, +which is almost unavoidable, but for ever after; nor is he satisfied +without the most extreme punishment and vengeance. But we, accustomed +to society, and to more enlarged reflections, consider, that this man +is serving his own country and community; that any man, in the same +situation, would do the same; that we ourselves, in like circumstances, +observe a like conduct; that; in general, human society is best +supported on such maxims: and by these suppositions and views, we +correct, in some measure, our ruder and narrower positions. And though +much of our friendship and enemity be still regulated by private +considerations of benefit and harm, we pay, at least, this homage to +general rules, which we are accustomed to respect, that we commonly +perver our adversary's conduct, by imputing malice or injustice to him, +in order to give vent to those passions, which arise from self-love +and private interest. When the heart is full of rage, it never wants +pretences of this nature; though sometimes as frivolous, as those from +which Horace, being almost crushed by the fall of a tree, effects to +accuse of parricide the first planter of it.] +</pre> +<p> +From instances of popular tumults, seditions, factions, panics, and +of all passions, which are shared with a multitude, we may learn the +influence of society in exciting and supporting any emotion; while the +most ungovernable disorders are raised, we find, by that means, from the +slightest and most frivolous occasions. Solon was no very cruel, though, +perhaps, an unjust legislator, who punished neuters in civil wars; and +few, I believe, would, in such cases, incur the penalty, were their +affection and discourse allowed sufficient to absolve them. No +selfishness, and scarce any philosophy, have there force sufficient to +support a total coolness and indifference; and he must be more or less +than man, who kindles not in the common blaze. What wonder then, that +moral sentiments are found of such influence in life; though springing +from principles, which may appear, at first sight, somewhat small +and delicate? But these principles, we must remark, are social and +universal; they form, in a manner, the PARTY of humankind against vice +or disorder, its common enemy. And as the benevolent concern for others +is diffused, in a greater or less degree, over all men, and is the same +in all, it occurs more frequently in discourse, is cherished by society +and conversation, and the blame and approbation, consequent on it, are +thereby roused from that lethargy into which they are probably lulled, +in solitary and uncultivated nature. Other passions, though perhaps +originally stronger, yet being selfish and private, are often +overpowered by its force, and yield the dominion of our breast to those +social and public principles. +</p> +<p> +Another spring of our constitution, that brings a great addition of +force to moral sentiments, is the love of fame; which rules, with such +uncontrolled authority, in all generous minds, and is often the grand +object of all their designs and undertakings. By our continual and +earnest pursuit of a character, a name, a reputation in the world, we +bring our own deportment and conduct frequently in review, and consider +how they appear in the eyes of those who approach and regard us. This +constant habit of surveying ourselves, as it were, in reflection, +keeps alive all the sentiments of right and wrong, and begets, in noble +natures, a certain reverence for themselves as well as others, which +is the surest guardian of every virtue. The animal conveniencies and +pleasures sink gradually in their value; while every inward beauty and +moral grace is studiously acquired, and the mind is accomplished in +every perfection, which can adorn or embellish a rational creature. +</p> +<p> +Here is the most perfect morality with which we are acquainted: here is +displayed the force of many sympathies. Our moral sentiment is itself +a feeling chiefly of that nature, and our regard to a character with +others seems to arise only from a care of preserving a character with +ourselves; and in order to attain this end, we find it necessary to prop +our tottering judgement on the correspondent approbation of mankind. +</p> +<p> +But, that we may accommodate matters, and remove if possible every +difficulty, let us allow all these reasonings to be false. Let us allow +that, when we resolve the pleasure, which arises from views of utility, +into the sentiments of humanity and sympathy, we have embraced a wrong +hypothesis. Let us confess it necessary to find some other explication +of that applause, which is paid to objects, whether inanimate, animate, +or rational, if they have a tendency to promote the welfare and +advantage of mankind. However difficult it be to conceive that an object +is approved of on account of its tendency to a certain end, while the +end itself is totally indifferent: let us swallow this absurdity, +and consider what are the consequences. The preceding delineation +or definition of Personal Merit must still retain its evidence and +authority: it must still be allowed that every quality of the mind, +which is USEFUL or AGREEABLE to the PERSON HIMSELF or to OTHERS, +communicates a pleasure to the spectator, engages his esteem, and is +admitted under the honourable denomination of virtue or merit. Are not +justice, fidelity, honour, veracity, allegiance, chastity, esteemed +solely on account of their tendency to promote the good of society? +Is not that tendency inseparable from humanity, benevolence, lenity, +generosity, gratitude, moderation, tenderness, friendship, and all +the other social virtues? Can it possibly be doubted that industry, +discretion, frugality, secrecy, order, perseverance, forethought, +judgement, and this whole class of virtues and accomplishments, of which +many pages would not contain the catalogue; can it be doubted, I +say, that the tendency of these qualities to promote the interest and +happiness of their possessor, is the sole foundation of their merit? +Who can dispute that a mind, which supports a perpetual serenity and +cheerfulness, a noble dignity and undaunted spirit, a tender affection +and good-will to all around; as it has more enjoyment within itself, +is also a more animating and rejoicing spectacle, than if dejected with +melancholy, tormented with anxiety, irritated with rage, or sunk into +the most abject baseness and degeneracy? And as to the qualities, +immediately AGREEABLE to OTHERS, they speak sufficiently for themselves; +and he must be unhappy, indeed, either in his own temper, or in his +situation and company, who has never perceived the charms of a facetious +wit or flowing affability, of a delicate modesty or decent genteelness +of address and manner. +</p> +<p> +I am sensible, that nothing can be more unphilosophical than to be +positive or dogmatical on any subject; and that, even if excessive +scepticism could be maintained, it would not be more destructive to all +just reasoning and inquiry. I am convinced that, where men are the most +sure and arrogant, they are commonly the most mistaken, and have there +given reins to passion, without that proper deliberation and suspense, +which can alone secure them from the grossest absurdities. Yet, I must +confess, that this enumeration puts the matter in so strong a light, +that I cannot, at PRESENT, be more assured of any truth, which I learn +from reasoning and argument, than that personal merit consists entirely +in the usefulness or agreeableness of qualities to the person himself +possessed of them, or to others, who have any intercourse with him. But +when I reflect that, though the bulk and figure of the earth have been +measured and delineated, though the motions of the tides have been +accounted for, the order and economy of the heavenly bodies subjected to +their proper laws, and Infinite itself reduced to calculation; yet men +still dispute concerning the foundation of their moral duties. When I +reflect on this, I say, I fall back into diffidence and scepticism, and +suspect that an hypothesis, so obvious, had it been a true one, would, +long ere now, have been received by the unanimous suffrage and consent +of mankind. +</p> +<a name="2H_PART92"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + PART II. +</h2> +<p> +Having explained the moral APPROBATION attending merit or virtue, there +remains nothing but briefly to consider our interested OBLIGATION to +it, and to inquire whether every man, who has any regard to his own +happiness and welfare, will not best find his account in the practice of +every moral duty. If this can be clearly ascertained from the foregoing +theory, we shall have the satisfaction to reflect, that we have +advanced principles, which not only, it is hoped, will stand the test +of reasoning and inquiry, but may contribute to the amendment of men's +lives, and their improvement in morality and social virtue. And though +the philosophical truth of any proposition by no means depends on its +tendency to promote the interests of society; yet a man has but a bad +grace, who delivers a theory, however true, which, he must confess, +leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious. Why rake into those +corners of nature which spread a nuisance all around? Why dig up the +pestilence from the pit in which it is buried? The ingenuity of your +researches may be admired, but your systems will be detested; and +mankind will agree, if they cannot refute them, to sink them, at least, +in eternal silence and oblivion. Truths which are pernicious to society, +if any such there be, will yield to errors which are salutary and +ADVANTAGEOUS. +</p> +<p> +But what philosophical truths can be more advantageous to society, than +those here delivered, which represent virtue in all her genuine and most +engaging charms, and makes us approach her with ease, familiarity, and +affection? The dismal dress falls off, with which many divines, and +some philosophers, have covered her; and nothing appears but gentleness, +humanity, beneficence, affability; nay, even at proper intervals, play, +frolic, and gaiety. She talks not of useless austerities and rigours, +suffering and self-denial. She declares that her sole purpose is to make +her votaries and all mankind, during every instant of their existence, +if possible, cheerful and happy; nor does she ever willingly part with +any pleasure but in hopes of ample compensation in some other period +of their lives. The sole trouble which she demands, is that of just +calculation, and a steady preference of the greater happiness. And if +any austere pretenders approach her, enemies to joy and pleasure, she +either rejects them as hypocrites and deceivers; or, if she admit them +in her train, they are ranked, however, among the least favoured of her +votaries. +</p> +<p> +And, indeed, to drop all figurative expression, what hopes can we +ever have of engaging mankind to a practice which we confess full of +austerity and rigour? Or what theory of morals can ever serve any useful +purpose, unless it can show, by a particular detail, that all the duties +which it recommends, are also the true interest of each individual? +The peculiar advantage of the foregoing system seems to be, that it +furnishes proper mediums for that purpose. +</p> +<p> +That the virtues which are immediately USEFUL or AGREEABLE to the person +possessed of them, are desirable in a view to self-interest, it would +surely be superfluous to prove. Moralists, indeed, may spare themselves +all the pains which they often take in recommending these duties. +To what purpose collect arguments to evince that temperance is +advantageous, and the excesses of pleasure hurtful, when it appears that +these excesses are only denominated such, because they are hurtful; +and that, if the unlimited use of strong liquors, for instance, no more +impaired health or the faculties of mind and body than the use of air or +water, it would not be a whit more vicious or blameable? +</p> +<p> +It seems equally superfluous to prove, that the COMPANIONABLE virtues of +good manners and wit, decency and genteelness, are more desirable than +the contrary qualities. Vanity alone, without any other consideration, +is a sufficient motive to make us wish for the possession of these +accomplishments. No man was ever willingly deficient in this particular. +All our failures here proceed from bad education, want of capacity, or a +perverse and unpliable disposition. Would you have your company coveted, +admired, followed; rather than hated, despised, avoided? Can any one +seriously deliberate in the case? As no enjoyment is sincere, without +some reference to company and society; so no society can be agreeable, +or even tolerable, where a man feels his presence unwelcome, and +discovers all around him symptoms of disgust and aversion. +</p> +<p> +But why, in the greater society or confederacy of mankind, should not +the case be the same as in particular clubs and companies? Why is +it more doubtful, that the enlarged virtues of humanity, generosity, +beneficence, are desirable with a view of happiness and self-interest, +than the limited endowments of ingenuity and politeness? Are we +apprehensive lest those social affections interfere, in a greater and +more immediate degree than any other pursuits, with private utility, +and cannot be gratified, without some important sacrifice of honour and +advantage? If so, we are but ill-instructed in the nature of the human +passions, and are more influenced by verbal distinctions than by real +differences. +</p> +<p> +Whatever contradiction may vulgarly be supposed between the SELFISH and +SOCIAL sentiments or dispositions, they are really no more opposite than +selfish and ambitious, selfish and revengeful, selfish and vain. It is +requisite that there be an original propensity of some kind, in order +to be a basis to self-love, by giving a relish to the objects of +its pursuit; and none more fit for this purpose than benevolence +or humanity. The goods of fortune are spent in one gratification or +another: the miser who accumulates his annual income, and lends it out +at interest, has really spent it in the gratification of his avarice. +And it would be difficult to show why a man is more a loser by a +generous action, than by any other method of expense; since the utmost +which he can attain by the most elaborate selfishness, is the indulgence +of some affection. +</p> +<p> +Now if life, without passion, must be altogether insipid and tiresome; +let a man suppose that he has full power of modelling his own +disposition, and let him deliberate what appetite or desire he would +choose for the foundation of his happiness and enjoyment. Every +affection, he would observe, when gratified by success, gives a +satisfaction proportioned to its force and violence; but besides this +advantage, common to all, the immediate feeling of benevolence and +friendship, humanity and kindness, is sweet, smooth, tender, and +agreeable, independent of all fortune and accidents. These virtues are +besides attended with a pleasing consciousness or remembrance, and keep +us in humour with ourselves as well as others; while we retain the +agreeable reflection of having done our part towards mankind and +society. And though all men show a jealousy of our success in the +pursuits of avarice and ambition; yet are we almost sure of their +good-will and good wishes, so long as we persevere in the paths of +virtue, and employ ourselves in the execution of generous plans and +purposes. What other passion is there where we shall find so many +advantages united; an agreeable sentiment, a pleasing consciousness, a +good reputation? But of these truths, we may observe, men are, of +themselves, pretty much convinced; nor are they deficient in their duty +to society, because they would not wish to be generous, friendly, and +humane; but because they do not feel themselves such. +</p> +<p> +Treating vice with the greatest candour, and making it all possible +concessions, we must acknowledge that there is not, in any instance, the +smallest pretext for giving it the preference above virtue, with a view +of self-interest; except, perhaps, in the case of justice, where a man, +taking things in a certain light, may often seem to be a loser by his +integrity. And though it is allowed that, without a regard to property, +no society could subsist; yet according to the imperfect way in which +human affairs are conducted, a sensible knave, in particular incidents, +may think that an act of iniquity or infidelity will make a considerable +addition to his fortune, without causing any considerable breach in the +social union and confederacy. That HONESTY IS THE BEST POLICY, may be +a good general rule, but is liable to many exceptions; and he, it may +perhaps be thought, conducts himself with most wisdom, who observes the +general rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions. I must confess +that, if a man think that this reasoning much requires an answer, +it would be a little difficult to find any which will to him appear +satisfactory and convincing. If his heart rebel not against such +pernicious maxims, if he feel no reluctance to the thoughts of villainy +or baseness, he has indeed lost a considerable motive to virtue; and we +may expect that this practice will be answerable to his speculation. But +in all ingenuous natures, the antipathy to treachery and roguery is +too strong to be counter-balanced by any views of profit or pecuniary +advantage. Inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity, a +satisfactory review of our own conduct; these are circumstances, very +requisite to happiness, and will be cherished and cultivated by every +honest man, who feels the importance of them. +</p> +<p> +Such a one has, besides, the frequent satisfaction of seeing knaves, +with all their pretended cunning and abilities, betrayed by their own +maxims; and while they purpose to cheat with moderation and secrecy, a +tempting incident occurs, nature is frail, and they give into the snare; +whence they can never extricate themselves, without a total loss of +reputation, and the forfeiture of all future trust and confidence with +mankind. +</p> +<p> +But were they ever so secret and successful, the honest man, if he has +any tincture of philosophy, or even common observation and reflection, +will discover that they themselves are, in the end, the greatest dupes, +and have sacrificed the invaluable enjoyment of a character, with +themselves at least, for the acquisition of worthless toys and gewgaws. +How little is requisite to supply the necessities of nature? And in a +view to pleasure, what comparison between the unbought satisfaction of +conversation, society, study, even health and the common beauties of +nature, but above all the peaceful reflection on one's own conduct; what +comparison, I say, between these and the feverish, empty amusements of +luxury and expense? These natural pleasures, indeed, are really without +price; both because they are below all price in their attainment, and +above it in their enjoyment. +</p> +<a name="2H_APPE1"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + APPENDIX I. CONCERNING MORAL SENTIMENT +</h2> +<p> +IF the foregoing hypothesis be received, it will now be easy for us to +determine the question first started, [FOOTNOTE: Sect. 1.] concerning +the general principles of morals; and though we postponed the +decision of that question, lest it should then involve us in intricate +speculations, which are unfit for moral discourses, we may resume it at +present, and examine how far either REASON or SENTIMENT enters into all +decisions of praise or censure. +</p> +<p> +One principal foundation of moral praise being supposed to lie in the +usefulness of any quality or action, it is evident that REASON must +enter for a considerable share in all decisions of this kind; since +nothing but that faculty can instruct us in the tendency of qualities +and actions, and point out their beneficial consequences to society +and to their possessor. In many cases this is an affair liable to great +controversy: doubts may arise; opposite interests may occur; and a +preference must be given to one side, from very nice views, and a small +overbalance of utility. This is particularly remarkable in questions +with regard to justice; as is, indeed, natural to suppose, from that +species of utility which attends this virtue [Footnote: See App. II.]. +Were every single instance of justice, like that of benevolence, useful +to society; this would be a more simple state of the case, and seldom +liable to great controversy. But as single instances of justice are +often pernicious in their first and immediate tendency, and as the +advantage to society results only from the observance of the general +rule, and from the concurrence and combination of several persons in +the same equitable conduct; the case here becomes more intricate and +involved. The various circumstances of society; the various consequences +of any practice; the various interests which may be proposed; these, +on many occasions, are doubtful, and subject to great discussion and +inquiry. The object of municipal laws is to fix all the questions +with regard to justice: the debates of civilians; the reflections of +politicians; the precedents of history and public records, are all +directed to the same purpose. And a very accurate REASON or JUDGEMENT is +often requisite, to give the true determination, amidst such intricate +doubts arising from obscure or opposite utilities. +</p> +<p> +But though reason, when fully assisted and improved, be sufficient +to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and +actions; it is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or +approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the +end totally indifferent to us, we should feel the same indifference +towards the means. It is requisite a SENTIMENT should here display +itself, in order to give a preference to the useful above the pernicious +tendencies. This SENTIMENT can be no other than a feeling for the +happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery; since these are +the different ends which virtue and vice have a tendency to promote. +Here therefore REASON instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, +and HUMANITY makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and +beneficial. +</p> +<p> +This partition between the faculties of understanding and sentiment, in +all moral decisions, seems clear from the preceding hypothesis. But I +shall suppose that hypothesis false: it will then be requisite to look +out for some other theory that may be satisfactory; and I dare venture +to affirm that none such will ever be found, so long as we suppose +reason to be the sole source of morals. To prove this, it will be proper +t o weigh the five following considerations. +</p> +<p> +I. It is easy for a false hypothesis to maintain some appearance of +truth, while it keeps wholly in generals, makes use of undefined terms, +and employs comparisons, instead of instances. This is particularly +remarkable in that philosophy, which ascribes the discernment of +all moral distinctions to reason alone, without the concurrence of +sentiment. It is impossible that, in any particular instance, this +hypothesis can so much as be rendered intelligible, whatever specious +figure it may make in general declamations and discourses. Examine the +crime of INGRATITUDE, for instance; which has place, wherever we observe +good-will, expressed and known, together with good-offices performed, on +the one side, and a return of ill-will or indifference, with ill-offices +or neglect on the other: anatomize all these circumstances, and examine, +by your reason alone, in what consists the demerit or blame. You never +will come to any issue or conclusion. +</p> +<p> +Reason judges either of MATTER OF FACT or of RELATIONS. Enquire then, +first, where is that matter of fact which we here call crime; point +it out; determine the time of its existence; describe its essence or +nature; explain the sense or faculty to which it discovers itself. It +resides in the mind of the person who is ungrateful. He must, therefore, +feel it, and be conscious of it. But nothing is there, except the +passion of ill-will or absolute indifference. You cannot say that these, +of themselves, always, and in all circumstances, are crimes. No, they +are only crimes when directed towards persons who have before expressed +and displayed good-will towards us. Consequently, we may infer, that the +crime of ingratitude is not any particular individual FACT; but arises +from a complication of circumstances, which, being presented to the +spectator, excites the SENTIMENT of blame, by the particular structure +and fabric of his mind. +</p> +<p> +This representation, you say, is false. Crime, indeed, consists not in +a particular FACT, of whose reality we are assured by reason; but it +consists in certain MORAL RELATIONS, discovered by reason, in the same +manner as we discover by reason the truths of geometry or algebra. +But what are the relations, I ask, of which you here talk? In the case +stated above, I see first good-will and good-offices in one person; +then ill-will and ill-offices in the other. Between these, there is a +relation of CONTRARIETY. Does the crime consist in that relation? But +suppose a person bore me ill-will or did me ill-offices; and I, in +return, were indifferent towards him, or did him good offices. Here is +the same relation of CONTRARIETY; and yet my conduct is often highly +laudable. Twist and turn this matter as much as you will, you can never +rest the morality on relation; but must have recourse to the decisions +of sentiment. +</p> +<p> +When it is affirmed that two and three are equal to the half of ten, +this relation of equality I understand perfectly. I conceive, that if +ten be divided into two parts, of which one has as many units as the +other; and if any of these parts be compared to two added to three, it +will contain as many units as that compound number. But when you draw +thence a comparison to moral relations, I own that I am altogether at a +loss to understand you. A moral action, a crime, such as ingratitude, is +a complicated object. Does the morality consist in the relation of its +parts to each other? How? After what manner? Specify the relation: be +more particular and explicit in your propositions, and you will easily +see their falsehood. +</p> +<p> +No, say you, the morality consists in the relation of actions to the +rule of right; and they are denominated good or ill, according as they +agree or disagree with it. What then is this rule of right? In what does +it consist? How is it determined? By reason, you say, which examines the +moral relations of actions. So that moral relations are determined +by the comparison of action to a rule. And that rule is determined by +considering the moral relations of objects. Is not this fine reasoning? +</p> +<p> +All this is metaphysics, you cry. That is enough; there needs nothing +more to give a strong presumption of falsehood. Yes, reply I, here +are metaphysics surely; but they are all on your side, who advance an +abstruse hypothesis, which can never be made intelligible, nor quadrate +with any particular instance or illustration. The hypothesis which we +embrace is plain. It maintains that morality is determined by sentiment. +It defines virtue to be WHATEVER MENTAL ACTION OR QUALITY GIVES TO A +SPECTATOR THE PLEASING SENTIMENT OF APPROBATION; and vice the contrary. +We then proceed to examine a plain matter of fact, to wit, what actions +have this influence. We consider all the circumstances in which these +actions agree, and thence endeavour to extract some general observations +with regard to these sentiments. If you call this metaphysics, and find +anything abstruse here, you need only conclude that your turn of mind is +not suited to the moral sciences. +</p> +<p> +II. When a man, at any time, deliberates concerning his own conduct (as, +whether he had better, in a particular emergence, assist a brother or +a benefactor), he must consider these separate relations, with all the +circumstances and situations of the persons, in order to determine the +superior duty and obligation; and in order to determine the proportion +of lines in any triangle, it is necessary to examine the nature of that +figure, and the relation which its several parts bear to each other. But +notwithstanding this appearing similarity in the two cases, there is, +at bottom, an extreme difference between them. A speculative reasoner +concerning triangles or circles considers the several known and given +relations of the parts of these figures; and thence infers some unknown +relation, which is dependent on the former. But in moral deliberations +we must be acquainted beforehand with all the objects, and all their +relations to each other; and from a comparison of the whole, fix our +choice or approbation. No new fact to be ascertained; no new relation to +be discovered. All the circumstances of the case are supposed to be laid +before us, ere we can fix any sentence of blame or approbation. If any +material circumstance be yet unknown or doubtful, we must first employ +our inquiry or intellectual faculties to assure us of it; and must +suspend for a time all moral decision or sentiment. While we are +ignorant whether a man were aggressor or not, how can we determine +whether the person who killed him be criminal or innocent? But after +every circumstance, every relation is known, the understanding has no +further room to operate, nor any object on which it could employ itself. +The approbation or blame which then ensues, cannot be the work of the +judgement, but of the heart; and is not a speculative proposition or +affirmation, but an active feeling or sentiment. In the disquisitions of +the understanding, from known circumstances and relations, we infer some +new and unknown. In moral decisions, all the circumstances and relations +must be previously known; and the mind, from the contemplation of the +whole, feels some new impression of affection or disgust, esteem or +contempt, approbation or blame. +</p> +<p> +Hence the great difference between a mistake of FACT and one of RIGHT; +and hence the reason why the one is commonly criminal and not the other. +When Oedipus killed Laius, he was ignorant of the relation, and from +circumstances, innocent and involuntary, formed erroneous opinions +concerning the action which he committed. But when Nero killed +Agrippina, all the relations between himself and the person, and all the +circumstances of the fact, were previously known to him; but the motive +of revenge, or fear, or interest, prevailed in his savage heart over the +sentiments of duty and humanity. And when we express that detestation +against him to which he himself, in a little time, became insensible, +it is not that we see any relations, of which he was ignorant; but that, +for the rectitude of our disposition, we feel sentiments against which +he was hardened from flattery and a long perseverance in the most +enormous crimes. +</p> +<p> +In these sentiments then, not in a discovery of relations of any kind, +do all moral determinations consist. Before we can pretend to form any +decision of this kind, everything must be known and ascertained on the +side of the object or action. Nothing remains but to feel, on our part, +some sentiment of blame or approbation; whence we pronounce the action +criminal or virtuous. +</p> +<p> +III. This doctrine will become still more evident, if we compare moral +beauty with natural, to which in many particulars it bears so near a +resemblance. It is on the proportion, relation, and position of parts, +that all natural beauty depends; but it would be absurd thence to +infer, that the perception of beauty, like that of truth in geometrical +problems, consists wholly in the perception of relations, and was +performed entirely by the understanding or intellectual faculties. In +all the sciences, our mind from the known relations investigates the +unknown. But in all decisions of taste or external beauty, all the +relations are beforehand obvious to the eye; and we thence proceed to +feel a sentiment of complacency or disgust, according to the nature of +the object, and disposition of our organs. +</p> +<p> +Euclid has fully explained all the qualities of the circle; but has not +in any proposition said a word of its beauty. The reason is evident. The +beauty is not a quality of the circle. It lies not in any part of the +line, whose parts are equally distant from a common centre. It is only +the effect which that figure produces upon the mind, whose peculiar +fabric of structure renders it susceptible of such sentiments. In vain +would you look for it in the circle, or seek it, either by your senses +or by mathematical reasoning, in all the properties of that figure. +</p> +<p> +Attend to Palladio and Perrault, while they explain all the parts and +proportions of a pillar. They talk of the cornice, and frieze, and base, +and entablature, and shaft, and architrave; and give the description and +position of each of these members. But should you ask the description +and position of its beauty, they would readily reply, that the beauty +is not in any of the parts or members of a pillar, but results from the +whole, when that complicated figure is presented to an intelligent mind, +susceptible to those finer sensations. Till such a spectator appear, +there is nothing but a figure of such particular dimensions and +proportions: from his sentiments alone arise its elegance and beauty. +</p> +<p> +Again; attend to Cicero, while he paints the crimes of a Verres or a +Catiline. You must acknowledge that the moral turpitude results, in the +same manner, from the contemplation of the whole, when presented to a +being whose organs have such a particular structure and formation. The +orator may paint rage, insolence, barbarity on the one side; meekness, +suffering, sorrow, innocence on the other. But if you feel no +indignation or compassion arise in you from this complication of +circumstances, you would in vain ask him, in what consists the crime or +villainy, which he so vehemently exclaims against? At what time, or +on what subject it first began to exist? And what has a few months +afterwards become of it, when every disposition and thought of all the +actors is totally altered or annihilated? No satisfactory answer can be +given to any of these questions, upon the abstract hypothesis of morals; +and we must at last acknowledge, that the crime or immorality is +no particular fact or relation, which can be the object of the +understanding, but arises entirely from the sentiment of disapprobation, +which, by the structure of human nature, we unavoidably feel on the +apprehension of barbarity or treachery. +</p> +<p> +IV. Inanimate objects may bear to each other all the same relations +which we observe in moral agents; though the former can never be the +object of love or hatred, nor are consequently susceptible of merit or +iniquity. A young tree, which over-tops and destroys its parent, stands +in all the same relations with Nero, when he murdered Agrippina; and +if morality consisted merely in relations, would no doubt be equally +criminal. +</p> +<p> +V. It appears evident that—the ultimate ends of human actions can +never, in any case, be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves +entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any +dependance on the intellectual faculties. Ask a man WHY HE USES +EXERCISE; he will answer, BECAUSE HE DESIRES TO KEEP HIS HEALTH. If +you then enquire, WHY HE DESIRES HEALTH, he will readily reply, BECAUSE +SICKNESS IS PAINFUL. If you push your enquiries farther, and desire a +reason WHY HE HATES PAIN, it is impossible he can ever give any. This is +an ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object. +</p> +<p> +Perhaps to your second question, WHY HE DESIRES HEALTH, he may also +reply, that IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE EXERCISE OF HIS CALLING. If you ask, +WHY HE IS ANXIOUS ON THAT HEAD, he will answer, BECAUSE HE DESIRES TO +GET MONEY. If you demand WHY? IT IS THE INSTRUMENT OF PLEASURE, says he. +And beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason. It is impossible +there can be a progress IN INFINITUM; and that one thing can always be a +reason why another is desired. Something must be desirable on its own +account, and because of its immediate accord or agreement with human +sentiment and affection. +</p> +<p> +Now as virtue is an end, and is desirable on its own account, without +fee and reward, merely for the immediate satisfaction which it conveys; +it is requisite that there should be some sentiment which it touches, +some internal taste or feeling, or whatever you may please to call it, +which distinguishes moral good and evil, and which embraces the one and +rejects the other. +</p> +<p> +Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of REASON and of TASTE are +easily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and +falsehood: the latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice +and virtue. The one discovers objects as they really stand in nature, +without addition and diminution: the other has a productive faculty, and +gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from +internal sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation. Reason being cool +and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulse +received from appetite or inclination, by showing us the means of +attaining happiness or avoiding misery: Taste, as it gives pleasure or +pain, and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive to +action, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition. From +circumstances and relations, known or supposed, the former leads us to +the discovery of the concealed and unknown: after all circumstances and +relations are laid before us, the latter makes us feel from the whole +a new sentiment of blame or approbation. The standard of the one, being +founded on the nature of things, is eternal and inflexible, even by the +will of the Supreme Being: the standard of the other arising from the +eternal frame and constitution of animals, is ultimately derived from +that Supreme Will, which bestowed on each being its peculiar nature, and +arranged the several classes and orders of existence. +</p> +<a name="2H_APPE2"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + APPENDIX II. OF SELF-LOVE. +</h2> +<p> +THERE is a principle, supposed to prevail among many, which is utterly +incompatible with all virtue or moral sentiment; and as it can proceed +from nothing but the most depraved disposition, so in its turn it tends +still further to encourage that depravity. This principle is, that +all BENEVOLENCE is mere hypocrisy, friendship a cheat, public spirit a +farce, fidelity a snare to procure trust and confidence; and that while +all of us, at bottom, pursue only our private interest, we wear these +fair disguises, in order to put others off their guard, and expose them +the more to our wiles and machinations. What heart one must be possessed +of who possesses such principles, and who feels no internal sentiment +that belies so pernicious a theory, it is easy to imagine: and also what +degree of affection and benevolence he can bear to a species whom he +represents under such odious colours, and supposes so little susceptible +of gratitude or any return of affection. Or if we should not ascribe +these principles wholly to a corrupted heart, we must at least account +for them from the most careless and precipitate examination. Superficial +reasoners, indeed, observing many false pretences among mankind, and +feeling, perhaps, no very strong restraint in their own disposition, +might draw a general and a hasty conclusion that all is equally +corrupted, and that men, different from all other animals, and indeed +from all other species of existence, admit of no degrees of good or bad, +but are, in every instance, the same creatures under different disguises +and appearances. +</p> +<p> +There is another principle, somewhat resembling the former; which has +been much insisted on by philosophers, and has been the foundation of +many a system; that, whatever affection one may feel, or imagine he +feels for others, no passion is, or can be disinterested; that the most +generous friendship, however sincere, is a modification of self-love; +and that, even unknown to ourselves, we seek only our own gratification, +while we appear the most deeply engaged in schemes for the liberty +and happiness of mankind. By a turn of imagination, by a refinement of +reflection, by an enthusiasm of passion, we seem to take part in the +interests of others, and imagine ourselves divested of all selfish +considerations: but, at bottom, the most generous patriot and most +niggardly miser, the bravest hero and most abject coward, have, in every +action, an equal regard to their own happiness and welfare. +</p> +<p> +Whoever concludes from the seeming tendency of this opinion, that those, +who make profession of it, cannot possibly feel the true sentiments +of benevolence, or have any regard for genuine virtue, will often find +himself, in practice, very much mistaken. Probity and honour were no +strangers to Epicurus and his sect. Atticus and Horace seem to have +enjoyed from nature, and cultivated by reflection, as generous and +friendly dispositions as any disciple of the austerer schools. And +among the modern, Hobbes and Locke, who maintained the selfish system of +morals, lived irreproachable lives; though the former lay not under any +restraint of religion which might supply the defects of his philosophy. +</p> +<p> +An epicurean or a Hobbist readily allows, that there is such a thing as +a friendship in the world, without hypocrisy or disguise; though he may +attempt, by a philosophical chymistry, to resolve the elements of this +passion, if I may so speak, into those of another, and explain every +affection to be self-love, twisted and moulded, by a particular turn +of imagination, into a variety of appearances. But as the same turn of +imagination prevails not in every man, nor gives the same direction to +the original passion; this is sufficient even according to the selfish +system to make the widest difference in human characters, and denominate +one man virtuous and humane, another vicious and meanly interested. I +esteem the man whose self-love, by whatever means, is so directed as to +give him a concern for others, and render him serviceable to society: +as I hate or despise him, who has no regard to any thing beyond his +own gratifications and enjoyments. In vain would you suggest that these +characters, though seemingly opposite, are at bottom the same, and that +a very inconsiderable turn of thought forms the whole difference between +them. Each character, notwithstanding these inconsiderable differences, +appears to me, in practice, pretty durable and untransmutable. And +I find not in this more than in other subjects, that the natural +sentiments arising from the general appearances of things are easily +destroyed by subtile reflections concerning the minute origin of these +appearances. Does not the lively, cheerful colour of a countenance +inspire me with complacency and pleasure; even though I learn from +philosophy that all difference of complexion arises from the most minute +differences of thickness, in the most minute parts of the skin; by +means of which a superficies is qualified to reflect one of the original +colours of light, and absorb the others? +</p> +<p> +But though the question concerning the universal or partial selfishness +of man be not so material as is usually imagined to morality and +practice, it is certainly of consequence in the speculative science of +human nature, and is a proper object of curiosity and enquiry. It +may not, therefore, be unsuitable, in this place, to bestow a few +reflections upon it. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: Benevolence naturally divides into two kinds, the +GENERAL and the PARTICULAR. The first is, where we have no friendship +or connexion or esteem for the person, but feel only a general sympathy +with him or a compassion for his pains, and a congratulation with his +pleasures. The other species of benevolence is founded on an opinion +of virtue, on services done us, or on some particular connexions. Both +these sentiments must be allowed real in human nature: but whether they +will resolve into some nice considerations of self-love, is a question +more curious than important. The former sentiment, to wit, that of +general benevolence, or humanity, or sympathy, we shall have occasion +frequently to treat of in the course of this inquiry; and I assume it as +real, from general experience, without any other proof.] +</pre> +<p> +The most obvious objection to the selfish hypothesis is, that, as it is +contrary to common feeling and our most unprejudiced notions, there is +required the highest stretch of philosophy to establish so extraordinary +a paradox. To the most careless observer there appear to be such +dispositions as benevolence and generosity; such affections as love, +friendship, compassion, gratitude. These sentiments have their causes, +effects, objects, and operations, marked by common language and +observation, and plainly distinguished from those of the selfish +passions. And as this is the obvious appearance of things, it must +be admitted, till some hypothesis be discovered, which by penetrating +deeper into human nature, may prove the former affections to be nothing +but modifications of the latter. All attempts of this kind have hitherto +proved fruitless, and seem to have proceeded entirely from that love +of SIMPLICITY which has been the source of much false reasoning in +philosophy. I shall not here enter into any detail on the present +subject. Many able philosophers have shown the insufficiency of these +systems. And I shall take for granted what, I believe, the smallest +reflection will make evident to every impartial enquirer. +</p> +<p> +But the nature of the subject furnishes the strongest presumption, that +no better system will ever, for the future, be invented, in order to +account for the origin of the benevolent from the selfish affections, +and reduce all the various emotions of the human mind to a perfect +simplicity. The case is not the same in this species of philosophy as +in physics. Many an hypothesis in nature, contrary to first appearances, +has been found, on more accurate scrutiny, solid and satisfactory. +Instances of this kind are so frequent that a judicious, as well as +witty philosopher, [Footnote: Mons. Fontenelle.] has ventured to affirm, +if there be more than one way in which any phenomenon may be produced, +that there is general presumption for its arising from the causes which +are the least obvious and familiar. But the presumption always lies on +the other side, in all enquiries concerning the origin of our passions, +and of the internal operations of the human mind. The simplest and +most obvious cause which can there be assigned for any phenomenon, is +probably the true one. When a philosopher, in the explication of his +system, is obliged to have recourse to some very intricate and refined +reflections, and to suppose them essential to the production of any +passion or emotion, we have reason to be extremely on our guard against +so fallacious an hypothesis. The affections are not susceptible of any +impression from the refinements of reason or imagination; and it +is always found that a vigorous exertion of the latter faculties, +necessarily, from the narrow capacity of the human mind, destroys all +activity in the former. Our predominant motive or intention is, indeed, +frequently concealed from ourselves when it is mingled and confounded +with other motives which the mind, from vanity or self-conceit, is +desirous of supposing more prevalent: but there is no instance that a +concealment of this nature has ever arisen from the abstruseness and +intricacy of the motive. A man that has lost a friend and patron may +flatter himself that all his grief arises from generous sentiments, +without any mixture of narrow or interested considerations: but a +man that grieves for a valuable friend, who needed his patronage and +protection; how can we suppose, that his passionate tenderness arises +from some metaphysical regards to a self-interest, which has no +foundation or reality? We may as well imagine that minute wheels and +springs, like those of a watch, give motion to a loaded waggon, as +account for the origin of passion from such abstruse reflections. +</p> +<p> +Animals are found susceptible of kindness, both to their own species and +to ours; nor is there, in this case, the least suspicion of disguise or +artifice. Shall we account for all THEIR sentiments, too, from refined +deductions of self-interest? Or if we admit a disinterested benevolence +in the inferior species, by what rule of analogy can we refuse it in the +superior? +</p> +<p> +Love between the sexes begets a complacency and good-will, very distinct +from the gratification of an appetite. Tenderness to their offspring, +in all sensible beings, is commonly able alone to counter-balance the +strongest motives of self-love, and has no manner of dependance on that +affection. What interest can a fond mother have in view, who loses +her health by assiduous attendance on her sick child, and afterwards +languishes and dies of grief, when freed, by its death, from the slavery +of that attendance? +</p> +<p> +Is gratitude no affection of the human breast, or is that a word merely, +without any meaning or reality? Have we no satisfaction in one man's +company above another's, and no desire of the welfare of our friend, +even though absence or death should prevent us from all participation in +it? Or what is it commonly, that gives us any participation in it, even +while alive and present, but our affection and regard to him? +</p> +<p> +These and a thousand other instances are marks of a general benevolence +in human nature, where no REAL interest binds us to the object. And how +an IMAGINARY interest known and avowed for such, can be the origin of +any passion or emotion, seems difficult to explain. No satisfactory +hypothesis of this kind has yet been discovered; nor is there the +smallest probability that the future industry of men will ever be +attended with more favourable success. +</p> +<p> +But farther, if we consider rightly of the matter, we shall find that +the hypothesis which allows of a disinterested benevolence, distinct +from self-love, has really more SIMPLICITY in it, and is more +conformable to the analogy of nature than that which pretends to resolve +all friendship and humanity into this latter principle. There are bodily +wants or appetites acknowledged by every one, which necessarily precede +all sensual enjoyment, and carry us directly to seek possession of the +object. Thus, hunger and thirst have eating and drinking for their end; +and from the gratification of these primary appetites arises a pleasure, +which may become the object of another species of desire or inclination +that is secondary and interested. In the same manner there are mental +passions by which we are impelled immediately to seek particular +objects, such as fame or power, or vengeance without any regard to +interest; and when these objects are attained a pleasing enjoyment +ensues, as the consequence of our indulged affections. Nature must, +by the internal frame and constitution of the mind, give an original +propensity to fame, ere we can reap any pleasure from that acquisition, +or pursue it from motives of self-love, and desire of happiness. If I +have no vanity, I take no delight in praise: if I be void of ambition, +power gives me no enjoyment: if I be not angry, the punishment of an +adversary is totally indifferent to me. In all these cases there is a +passion which points immediately to the object, and constitutes it +our good or happiness; as there are other secondary passions which +afterwards arise, and pursue it as a part of our happiness, when once it +is constituted such by our original affections. Were there no appetite +of any kind antecedent to self-love, that propensity could scarcely ever +exert itself; because we should, in that case, have felt few and slender +pains or pleasures, and have little misery or happiness to avoid or to +pursue. +</p> +<p> +Now where is the difficulty in conceiving, that this may likewise be the +case with benevolence and friendship, and that, from the original frame +of our temper, we may feel a desire of another's happiness or good, +which, by means of that affection, becomes our own good, and is +afterwards pursued, from the combined motives of benevolence and +self-enjoyments? Who sees not that vengeance, from the force alone of +passion, may be so eagerly pursued, as to make us knowingly neglect +every consideration of ease, interest, or safety; and, like some +vindictive animals, infuse our very souls into the wounds we give an +enemy; [Footnote: Animasque in vulnere ponunt. VIRG, Dum alteri noceat, +sui negligens says Seneca of Anger. De Ira, I. i.] and what a malignant +philosophy must it be, that will not allow to humanity and friendship +the same privileges which are undisputably granted to the darker +passions of enmity and resentment; such a philosophy is more like a +satyr than a true delineation or description of human nature; and may +be a good foundation for paradoxical wit and raillery, but is a very bad +one for any serious argument or reasoning. +</p> +<a name="2H_APPE3"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + APPENDIX III. SOME FARTHER CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD TO JUSTICE. +</h2> +<p> +The intention of this Appendix is to give some more particular +explication of the origin and nature of Justice, and to mark some +differences between it and the other virtues. +</p> +<p> +The social virtues of humanity and benevolence exert their influence +immediately by a direct tendency or instinct, which chiefly keeps in +view the simple object, moving the affections, and comprehends not any +scheme or system, nor the consequences resulting from the concurrence, +imitation, or example of others. A parent flies to the relief of his +child; transported by that natural sympathy which actuates him, and +which affords no leisure to reflect on the sentiments or conduct of +the rest of mankind in like circumstances. A generous man cheerfully +embraces an opportunity of serving his friend; because he then feels +himself under the dominion of the beneficent affections, nor is he +concerned whether any other person in the universe were ever before +actuated by such noble motives, or will ever afterwards prove their +influence. In all these cases the social passions have in view a single +individual object, and pursue the safety or happiness alone of the +person loved and esteemed. With this they are satisfied: in this they +acquiesce. And as the good, resulting from their benign influence, is +in itself complete and entire, it also excites the moral sentiment of +approbation, without any reflection on farther consequences, and without +any more enlarged views of the concurrence or imitation of the other +members of society. On the contrary, were the generous friend or +disinterested patriot to stand alone in the practice of beneficence, +this would rather enhance his value in our eyes, and join the praise of +rarity and novelty to his other more exalted merits. +</p> +<p> +The case is not the same with the social virtues of justice and +fidelity. They are highly useful, or indeed absolutely necessary to the +well-being of mankind: but the benefit resulting from them is not the +consequence of every individual single act; but arises from the whole +scheme or system concurred in by the whole, or the greater part of the +society. General peace and order are the attendants of justice or a +general abstinence from the possessions of others; but a particular +regard to the particular right of one individual citizen may frequently, +considered in itself, be productive of pernicious consequences. The +result of the individual acts is here, in many instances, directly +opposite to that of the whole system of actions; and the former may +be extremely hurtful, while the latter is, to the highest degree, +advantageous. Riches, inherited from a parent, are, in a bad man's +hand, the instrument of mischief. The right of succession may, in one +instance, be hurtful. Its benefit arises only from the observance of the +general rule; and it is sufficient, if compensation be thereby made for +all the ills and inconveniences which flow from particular characters +and situations. +</p> +<p> +Cyrus, young and unexperienced, considered only the individual case +before him, and reflected on a limited fitness and convenience, when he +assigned the long coat to the tall boy, and the short coat to the other +of smaller size. His governor instructed him better, while he pointed +out more enlarged views and consequences, and informed his pupil of the +general, inflexible rules, necessary to support general peace and order +in society. +</p> +<p> +The happiness and prosperity of mankind, arising from the social virtue +of benevolence and its subdivisions, may be compared to a wall, built by +many hands, which still rises by each stone that is heaped upon it, +and receives increase proportional to the diligence and care of each +workman. The same happiness, raised by the social virtue of justice and +its subdivisions, may be compared to the building of a vault, where each +individual stone would, of itself, fall to the ground; nor is the whole +fabric supported but by the mutual assistance and combination of its +corresponding parts. +</p> +<p> +All the laws of nature, which regulate property, as well as all civil +laws, are general, and regard alone some essential circumstances of the +case, without taking into consideration the characters, situations, and +connexions of the person concerned, or any particular consequences which +may result from the determination of these laws in any particular case +which offers. They deprive, without scruple, a beneficent man of all his +possessions, if acquired by mistake, without a good title; in order to +bestow them on a selfish miser, who has already heaped up immense stores +of superfluous riches. Public utility requires that property should be +regulated by general inflexible rules; and though such rules are adopted +as best serve the same end of public utility, it is impossible for them +to prevent all particular hardships, or make beneficial consequences +result from every individual case. It is sufficient, if the whole plan +or scheme be necessary to the support of civil society, and if the +balance of good, in the main, do thereby preponderate much above that of +evil. Even the general laws of the universe, though planned by infinite +wisdom, cannot exclude all evil or inconvenience in every particular +operation. +</p> +<p> +It has been asserted by some, that justice arises from Human +Conventions, and proceeds from the voluntary choice, consent, or +combination of mankind. If by CONVENTION be here meant a PROMISE (which +is the most usual sense of the word) nothing can be more absurd than +this position. The observance of promises is itself one of the most +considerable parts of justice, and we are not surely bound to keep our +word because we have given our word to keep it. But if by convention be +meant a sense of common interest, which sense each man feels in his +own breast, which he remarks in his fellows, and which carries him, in +concurrence with others, into a general plan or system of actions, which +tends to public utility; it must be owned, that, in this sense, justice +arises from human conventions. For if it be allowed (what is, indeed, +evident) that the particular consequences of a particular act of justice +may be hurtful to the public as well as to individuals; it follows that +every man, in embracing that virtue, must have an eye to the whole plan +or system, and must expect the concurrence of his fellows in the same +conduct and behaviour. Did all his views terminate in the consequences +of each act of his own, his benevolence and humanity, as well as +his self-love, might often prescribe to him measures of conduct very +different from those which are agreeable to the strict rules of right +and justice. +</p> +<p> +Thus, two men pull the oars of a boat by common convention for common +interest, without any promise or contract; thus gold and silver are made +the measures of exchange; thus speech and words and language are fixed +by human convention and agreement. Whatever is advantageous to two or +more persons, if all perform their part; but what loses all advantage +if only one perform, can arise from no other principle There would +otherwise be no motive for any one of them to enter into that scheme of +conduct. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: This theory concerning the origin of property, and +consequently of justice, is, in the main, the same with that hinted at +and adopted by Grotius, 'Hinc discimus, quae fuerit causa, ob quam a +primaeva communione rerum primo mobilium, deinde et immobilinm discessum +est: nimirum quod cum non contenti homines vesci sponte natis, antra +habitare, corpore aut nudo agere, aut corticibus arborum ferarumve +pellibus vestito, vitae genus exquisitius delegissent, industria opus +fuit, quam singuli rebus singulls adhiberent. Quo minus autem fructus +in commune conferrentur, primum obstitit locorum, in quae homines +discesserunt, distantia, deinde justitiae et amoris defectus, per quem +fiebat, ut nee in labore, nee in consumtione fructuum, quae debebat, +aequalitas servaretur. Simul discimus, quomodo res in proprietatem +iverint; non animi actu solo, neque enim scire alii poterant, quid alil +suum esse vellent, ut eo abstinerent, et idem velle plures poterant; +sed pacto quodam aut expresso, ut per divisionem, aut tacito, ut per +occupationem.' De jure belli et pacis. Lib. ii. cap. 2. sec. 2. art. 4 +and 5.] +</pre> +<p> +The word NATURAL is commonly taken in so many senses and is of so +loose a signification, that it seems vain to dispute whether justice +be natural or not. If self-love, if benevolence be natural to man; if +reason and forethought be also natural; then may the same epithet +be applied to justice, order, fidelity, property, society. Men's +inclination, their necessities, lead them to combine; their +understanding and experience tell them that this combination is +impossible where each governs himself by no rule, and pays no regard +to the possessions of others: and from these passions and reflections +conjoined, as soon as we observe like passions and reflections in +others, the sentiment of justice, throughout all ages, has infallibly +and certainly had place to some degree or other in every individual of +the human species. In so sagacious an animal, what necessarily arises +from the exertion of his intellectual faculties may justly be esteemed +natural. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: Natural may be opposed, either to what is UNUSUAL, +MIRACULOUS or ARTIFICIAL. In the two former senses, justice and property +are undoubtedly natural. But as they suppose reason, forethought, +design, and a social union and confederacy among men, perhaps that +epithet cannot strictly, in the last sense, be applied to them. Had +men lived without society, property had never been known, and neither +justice nor injustice had ever existed. But society among human +creatures had been impossible without reason and forethought. Inferior +animals, that unite, are guided by instinct, which supplies the place +for reason. But all these disputes are merely verbal.] +</pre> +<p> +Among all civilized nations it has been the constant endeavour to remove +everything arbitrary and partial from the decision of property, and to +fix the sentence of judges by such general views and considerations as +may be equal to every member of society. For besides, that nothing +could be more dangerous than to accustom the bench, even in the smallest +instance, to regard private friendship or enmity; it is certain, +that men, where they imagine that there was no other reason for the +preference of their adversary but personal favour, are apt to entertain +the strongest ill-will against the magistrates and judges. When natural +reason, therefore, points out no fixed view of public utility by which +a controversy of property can be decided, positive laws are often +framed to supply its place, and direct the procedure of all courts +of judicature. Where these too fail, as often happens, precedents are +called for; and a former decision, though given itself without any +sufficient reason, justly becomes a sufficient reason for a new +decision. If direct laws and precedents be wanting, imperfect and +indirect ones are brought in aid; and the controverted case is ranged +under them by analogical reasonings and comparisons, and similitudes, +and correspondencies, which are often more fanciful than real. In +general, it may safely be affirmed that jurisprudence is, in this +respect, different from all the sciences; and that in many of its nicer +questions, there cannot properly be said to be truth or falsehood on +either side. If one pleader bring the case under any former law or +precedent, by a refined analogy or comparison; the opposite pleader +is not at a loss to find an opposite analogy or comparison: and the +preference given by the judge is often founded more on taste and +imagination than on any solid argument. Public utility is the general +object of all courts of judicature; and this utility too requires a +stable rule in all controversies: but where several rules, nearly equal +and indifferent, present themselves, it is a very slight turn of thought +which fixes the decision in favour of either party. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: That there be a separation or distinction of + possessions, and that this separation be steady and + constant; this is absolutely required by the interests of + society, and hence the origin of justice and property. What + possessions are assigned to particular persons; this is, + generally speaking, pretty indifferent; and is often + determined by very frivolous views and considerations. We + shall mention a few particulars. + + Were a society formed among several independent members, the + most obvious rule, which could be agreed on, would be to + annex property to PRESENT possession, and leave every one a + right to what he at present enjoys. The relation of + possession, which takes place between the person and the + object, naturally draws on the relation of property. + + For a like reason, occupation or first possession becomes + the foundation of property. + + Where a man bestows labour and industry upon any object, + which before belonged to no body; as in cutting down and + shaping a tree, in cultivating a field, &c., the + alterations, which he produces, causes a relation between + him and the object, and naturally engages us to annex it to + him by the new relation of property. This cause here concurs + with the public utility, which consists in the encouragement + given to industry and labour. + + Perhaps too, private humanity towards the possessor concurs, + in this instance, with the other motives, and engages us to + leave with him what he has acquired by his sweat and labour; + and what he has flattered himself in the constant enjoyment + of. For though private humanity can, by no means, be the + origin of justice; since the latter virtue so often + contradicts the former; yet when the rule of separate and + constant possession is once formed by the indispensable + necessities of society, private humanity, and an aversion to + the doing a hardship to another, may, in a particular + instance, give rise to a particular rule of property. + + I am much inclined to think, that the right succession or + inheritance much depends on those connexions of the + imagination, and that the relation to a former proprietor + begetting a relation to the object, is the cause why the + property is transferred to a man after the death of his + kinsman. It is true; industry is more encouraged by the + transference of possession to children or near relations: + but this consideration will only have place in a cultivated + society; whereas the right of succession is regarded even + among the greatest Barbarians. + + Acquisition of property by accession can be explained no way + but by having recourse to the relations and connexions of + the imaginations. + + The property of rivers, by the laws of most nations, and by + the natural turn of our thoughts, is attributed to the + proprietors of their banks, excepting such vast rivers as + the Rhine or the Danube, which seem too large to follow as + an accession to the property of the neighbouring fields. Yet + even these rivers are considered as the property of that + nation, through whose dominions they run; the idea of a + nation being of a suitable bulk to correspond with them, and + bear them such a relation in the fancy. + + The accessions, which are made to land, bordering upon + rivers, follow the land, say the civilians, provided it be + made by what they call alluvion, that is, insensibly and + imperceptibly; which are circumstances, that assist the + imagination in the conjunction. + + Where there is any considerable portion torn at once from + one bank and added to another, it becomes not his property, + whose land it falls on, till it unite with the land, and + till the trees and plants have spread their roots into both. + Before that, the thought does not sufficiently join them. + + In short, we must ever distinguish between the necessity of + a separation and constancy in men's possession, and the + rules, which assign particular objects to particular + persons. The first necessity is obvious, strong, and + invincible: the latter may depend on a public utility more + light and frivolous, on the sentiment of private humanity + and aversion to private hardship, on positive laws, on + precedents, analogies, and very fine connexions and turns of + the imagination.] +</pre> +<p> +We may just observe, before we conclude this subject, that after the +laws of justice are fixed by views of general utility, the injury, the +hardship, the harm, which result to any individual from a violation of +them, enter very much into consideration, and are a great source of that +universal blame which attends every wrong or iniquity. By the laws of +society, this coat, this horse is mine, and OUGHT to remain perpetually +in my possession: I reckon on the secure enjoyment of it: by depriving +me of it, you disappoint my expectations, and doubly displease me, and +offend every bystander. It is a public wrong, so far as the rules of +equity are violated: it is a private harm, so far as an individual is +injured. And though the second consideration could have no place, were +not the former previously established: for otherwise the distinction of +MINE and THINE would be unknown in society: yet there is no question +but the regard to general good is much enforced by the respect to +particular. What injures the community, without hurting any individual, +is often more lightly thought of. But where the greatest public wrong +is also conjoined with a considerable private one, no wonder the highest +disapprobation attends so iniquitous a behaviour. +</p> +<a name="2H_APPE4"><!-- H2 anchor --></a> + +<div style="height: 4em;"><br><br><br><br></div> + +<h2> + APPENDIX IV. OF SOME VERBAL DISPUTES. +</h2> +<p> +Nothing is more usual than for philosophers to encroach upon the +province of grammarians; and to engage in disputes of words, while they +imagine that they are handling controversies of the deepest importance +and concern. It was in order to avoid altercations, so frivolous and +endless, that I endeavoured to state with the utmost caution the object +of our present enquiry; and proposed simply to collect, on the one hand, +a list of those mental qualities which are the object of love or esteem, +and form a part of personal merit; and on the other hand, a catalogue of +those qualities which are the object of censure or reproach, and which +detract from the character of the person possessed of them; subjoining +some reflections concerning the origin of these sentiments of praise or +blame. On all occasions, where there might arise the least hesitation, +I avoided the terms VIRTUE and VICE; because some of those qualities, +which I classed among the objects of praise, receive, in the English +language, the appellation of TALENTS, rather than of virtues; as some of +the blameable or censurable qualities are often called defects, rather +than vices. It may now, perhaps, be expected that before we conclude +this moral enquiry, we should exactly separate the one from the other; +should mark the precise boundaries of virtues and talents, vices and +defects; and should explain the reason and origin of that distinction. +But in order to excuse myself from this undertaking, which would, +at last, prove only a grammatical enquiry, I shall subjoin the four +following reflections, which shall contain all that I intend to say on +the present subject. +</p> +<p> +First, I do not find that in the English, or any other modern tongue, +the boundaries are exactly fixed between virtues and talents, vices +and defects, or that a precise definition can be given of the one as +contradistinguished from the other. Were we to say, for instance, that +the esteemable qualities alone, which are voluntary, are entitled to +the appellations of virtues; we should soon recollect the qualities of +courage, equanimity, patience, self-command; with many others, which +almost every language classes under this appellation, though they depend +little or not at all on our choice. Should we affirm that the qualities +alone, which prompt us to act our part in society, are entitled to that +honourable distinction; it must immediately occur that these are indeed +the most valuable qualities, and are commonly denominated the SOCIAL +virtues; but that this very epithet supposes that there are also virtues +of another species. Should we lay hold of the distinction between +INTELLECTUAL and MORAL endowments, and affirm the last alone to be the +real and genuine virtues, because they alone lead to action; we should +find that many of those qualities, usually called intellectual virtues, +such as prudence, penetration, discernment, discretion, had also a +considerable influence on conduct. The distinction between the heart and +the head may also be adopted: the qualities of the first may be defined +such as in their immediate exertion are accompanied with a feeling +of sentiment; and these alone may be called the genuine virtues: but +industry, frugality, temperance, secrecy, perseverance, and many other +laudable powers or habits, generally stilled virtues are exerted without +any immediate sentiment in the person possessed of them, and are only +known to him by their effects. It is fortunate, amidst all this seeming +perplexity, that the question, being merely verbal, cannot possibly be +of any importance. A moral, philosophical discourse needs not enter +into all these caprices of language, which are so variable in different +dialects, and in different ages of the same dialect. But on the whole, +it seems to me, that though it is always allowed, that there are virtues +of many different kinds, yet, when a man is called virtuous, or is +denominated a man of virtue, we chiefly regard his social qualities, +which are, indeed, the most valuable. It is, at the same time, certain, +that any remarkable defect in courage, temperance, economy, industry, +understanding, dignity of mind, would bereave even a very good-natured, +honest man of this honourable appellation. Who did ever say, except +by way of irony, that such a one was a man of great virtue, but an +egregious blockhead? +</p> +<p> +But, Secondly, it is no wonder that languages should not be very +precise in marking the boundaries between virtues and talents, vices +and defects; since there is so little distinction made in our internal +estimation of them. It seems indeed certain, that the SENTIMENT of +conscious worth, the self-satisfaction proceeding from a review of a +man's own conduct and character; it seems certain, I say, that this +sentiment, which, though the most common of all others, has no proper +name in our language, +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: The term, pride, is commonly taken in a bad sense; but +this sentiment seems indifferent, and may be either good or bad, +according as it is well or ill founded, and according to the other +circumstances which accompany it. The French express this sentiment by +the term, AMOUR PROPRE, but as they also express self-love as well +as vanity by the same term, there arises thence a great confusion in +Rochefoucault, and many of their moral writers.] +</pre> +<p> +arises from the endowments of courage and capacity, industry and +ingenuity, as well as from any other mental excellencies. Who, on the +other hand, is not deeply mortified with reflecting on his own folly and +dissoluteness, and feels not a secret sting or compunction whenever his +memory presents any past occurrence, where he behaved with stupidity of +ill-manners? No time can efface the cruel ideas of a man's own foolish +conduct, or of affronts, which cowardice or impudence has brought +upon him. They still haunt his solitary hours, damp his most aspiring +thoughts, and show him, even to himself, in the most contemptible and +most odious colours imaginable. +</p> +<p> +What is there too we are more anxious to conceal from others than such +blunders, infirmities, and meannesses, or more dread to have exposed by +raillery and satire? And is not the chief object of vanity, our bravery +or learning, our wit or breeding, our eloquence or address, our taste or +abilities? These we display with care, if not with ostentation; and +we commonly show more ambition of excelling in them, than even in the +social virtues themselves, which are, in reality, of such superior +excellence. Good-nature and honesty, especially the latter, are so +indispensably required, that, though the greatest censure attends +any violation of these duties, no eminent praise follows such common +instances of them, as seem essential to the support of human society. +And hence the reason, in my opinion, why, though men often extol so +liberally the qualities of their heart, they are shy in commending the +endowments of their head: because the latter virtues, being supposed +more rare and extraordinary, are observed to be the more usual objects +of pride and self-conceit; and when boasted of, beget a strong suspicion +of these sentiments. +</p> +<p> +It is hard to tell, whether you hurt a man's character most by calling +him a knave or a coward, and whether a beastly glutton or drunkard be +not as odious and contemptible, as a selfish, ungenerous miser. Give me +my choice, and I would rather, for my own happiness and self-enjoyment, +have a friendly, humane heart, than possess all the other virtues of +Demosthenes and Philip united: but I would rather pass with the world +for one endowed with extensive genius and intrepid courage, and should +thence expect stronger instances of general applause and admiration. The +figure which a man makes in life, the reception which he meets with in +company, the esteem paid him by his acquaintance; all these advantages +depend as much upon his good sense and judgement, as upon any other part +of his character. Had a man the best intentions in the world, and were +the farthest removed from all injustice and violence, he would never +be able to make himself be much regarded, without a moderate share, at +least, of parts and understanding. +</p> +<p> +What is it then we can here dispute about? If sense and courage, +temperance and industry, wisdom and knowledge confessedly form a +considerable part of PERSONAL MERIT: if a man, possessed of these +qualities, is both better satisfied with himself, and better entitled +to the good-will, esteem, and services of others, than one entirely +destitute of them; if, in short, the SENTIMENTS are similar which arise +from these endowments and from the social virtues; is there any reason +for being so extremely scrupulous about a WORD, or disputing whether +they be entitled to the denomination of virtues? It may, indeed, +be pretended, that the sentiment of approbation, which those +accomplishments produce, besides its being INFERIOR, is also somewhat +DIFFERENT from that which attends the virtues of justice and humanity. +But this seems not a sufficient reason for ranking them entirely under +different classes and appellations. The character of Caesar and that of +Cato, as drawn by Sallust, are both of them virtuous, in the strictest +and most limited sense of the word; but in a different way: nor are the +sentiments entirely the same which arise from them. The one produces +love, the other esteem: the one is amiable, the other awful: we should +wish to meet the one character in a friend; the other we should be +ambitious of in ourselves. In like manner the approbation, which attends +temperance or industry or frugality, may be somewhat different from that +which is paid to the social virtues, without making them entirely of a +different species. And, indeed, we may observe, that these endowments, +more than the other virtues, produce not, all of them, the same kind +of approbation. Good sense and genius beget esteem and regard: wit and +humour excite love and affection. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: Love and esteem are nearly the same passion, and arise +from similar causes. The qualities, which produce both, are such as +communicate pleasures. But where this pleasure is severe and serious; +or where its object is great, and makes a strong impression, or where +it produces any degree of humility and awe; in all these cases, the +passion, which arises from the pleasure, is more properly denominated +esteem than love. Benevolence attends both; but is connected with love +in a more eminent degree. There seems to be still a stronger mixture of +pride in contempt than of humility in esteem; and the reason would not +be difficulty to one, who studied accurately the passions. All these +various mixtures and compositions and appearances of sentiment from +a very curious subject of speculation, but are wide for our present +purpose. Throughout this enquiry, we always consider in general, what +qualities are a subject of praise or of censure, without entering +into all the minute differences of sentiment, which they excite. It is +evident, that whatever is contemned, is also disliked, as well as what +is hated; and we here endeavour to take objects, according to their most +simple views and appearances. These sciences are but too apt to appear +abstract to common readers, even with all the precautions which we can +take to clear them from superfluous speculations, and bring them down to +every capacity.] +</pre> +<p> +Most people, I believe, will naturally, without premeditation, assent to +the definition of the elegant and judicious poet: +</p> +<p> +Virtue (for mere good-nature is a fool) Is sense and spirit with +humanity. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: The Art of preserving Health. Book 4] +</pre> +<p> +What pretensions has a man to our generous assistance or good offices, +who has dissipated his wealth in profuse expenses, idle vanities, +chimerical projects, dissolute pleasures or extravagant gaming? These +vices (for we scruple not to call them such) bring misery unpitied, and +contempt on every one addicted to them. +</p> +<p> +Achaeus, a wise and prudent prince, fell into a fatal snare, which cost +him his crown and life, after having used every reasonable precaution to +guard himself against it. On that account, says the historian, he is a +just object of regard and compassion: his betrayers alone of hatred and +contempt [Footnote: Polybius, lib. iii. cap. 2]. +</p> +<p> +The precipitate flight and improvident negligence of Pompey, at the +beginning of the civil wars, appeared such notorious blunders to Cicero, +as quite palled his friendship towards that great man. In the same +manner, says he, as want of cleanliness, decency, or discretion in +a mistress are found to alienate our affections. For so he expresses +himself, where he talks, not in the character of a philosopher, but in +that of a statesman and man of the world, to his friend Atticus. [Lib. +ix. epist. 10]. But the same Cicero, in imitation of all the ancient +moralists, when he reasons as a philosopher, enlarges very much his +ideas of virtue, and comprehends every laudable quality or endowment +of the mind, under that honourable appellation. This leads to the +THIRD reflection, which we proposed to make, to wit, that the ancient +moralists, the best models, made no material distinction among the +different species of mental endowments and defects, but treated +all alike under the appellation of virtues and vices, and made them +indiscriminately the object of their moral reasonings. The prudence +explained in Cicero's Offices [Footnote: Lib. i. cap. 6.] is that +sagacity, which leads to the discovery of truth, and preserves us from +error and mistake. MAGNANIMITY, TEMPERANCE, DECENCY, are there also at +large discoursed of. And as that eloquent moralist followed the common +received division of the four cardinal virtues, our social duties form +but one head, in the general distribution of his subject. +</p> +<pre> + [Footnote: The following passage of Cicero is worth quoting, as +being the most clear and express to our purpose, that any thing can be +imagined, and, in a dispute, which is chiefly verbal, must, on account +of the author, carry an authority, from which there can be no appeal. +</pre> +<p> +'Virtus autem, quae est per se ipsa laudabilis, et sine qua nihil +laudari potest, tamen habet plures partes, quarum alia est alia ad +laudationem aptior. Sunt enim aliae virtutes, quae videntur in moribus +hominum, et quadam comitate ac beneficentia positae: aliae quae +in ingenii aliqua facultate, aut animi magnitudine ac robore. Nam +clementia, justitia, benignitas, fides, fortitudo in periculis +communibus, jucunda est auditu in laudationibus. Omnes enim hae virtutes +non tam ipsis, qui eas in se habent, quam generi hominum fructuosae +putantur. Sapientia et magnitude animi, qua omnes res humanae tenues +et pro nihilo putantur, et in cogitando vis quaedam ingenii, et ipsa +eloquentia admirationis habet non minus, jucunditatis minus. Ipsos enim +magis videntur, quos laudamus, quam illos, apud quos laudamus ornare ac +tueri: sed tamen in laudenda jungenda sunt eliam haec genera virtutum. +Ferunt enim aures bominum, cum ilia quae jucunda et grata, tum etiam +ilia, quae mirabilia sunt in virtute, laudari.' De orat. lib. ii. cap. +84. +</p> +<p> +I suppose, if Cicero were now alive, it would be found difficult to +fetter his moral sentiments by narrow systems; or persuade him, that no +qualities were to be admitted as virtues, or acknowledged to be a part +of PERSONAL MERIT, but what were recommended by The Whole Duty of Man.] +</p> +<p> +We need only peruse the titles of chapters in Aristotle's Ethics to be +convinced that he ranks courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, +modesty, prudence, and a manly openness, among the virtues, as well as +justice and friendship. +</p> +<p> +To SUSTAIN and to ABSTAIN, that is, to be patient and continent, +appeared to some of the ancients a summary comprehension of all morals. +</p> +<p> +Epictetus has scarcely ever mentioned the sentiment of humanity and +compassion, but in order to put his disciples on their guard against it. +The virtue of the Stoics seems to consist chiefly in a firm temper and +a sound understanding. With them, as with Solomon and the eastern +moralists, folly and wisdom are equivalent to vice and virtue. +</p> +<p> +Men will praise thee, says David, [Footnote: Psalm 49th.] when thou dost +well unto thyself. I hate a wise man, says the Greek poet, who is +not wise to himself [Footnote: Here, Hume quotes Euripedes in Greek]. +Plutarch is no more cramped by systems in his philosophy than in his +history. Where he compares the great men of Greece and Rome, he fairly +sets in opposition all their blemishes and accomplishments of whatever +kind, and omits nothing considerable, which can either depress or exalt +their characters. His moral discourses contain the same free and natural +censure of men and manners. +</p> +<p> +The character of Hannibal, as drawn by Livy, [Footnote: Lib. xxi. cap. +4] is esteemed partial, but allows him many eminent virtues. Never +was there a genius, says the historian, more equally fitted for those +opposite offices of commanding and obeying; and it were, therefore, +difficult to determine whether he rendered himself DEARER to the general +or to the army. To none would Hasdrubal entrust more willingly the +conduct of any dangerous enterprize; under none did the soldiers +discover more courage and confidence. Great boldness in facing danger; +great prudence in the midst of it. No labour could fatigue his body or +subdue his mind. Cold and heat were indifferent to him: meat and +drink he sought as supplies to the necessities of nature, not as +gratifications of his voluptuous appetites. Waking or rest he used +indiscriminately, by night or by day.—These great Virtues were balanced +by great Vices; inhuman cruelty; perfidy more than punic; no truth, no +faith, no regard to oaths, promises, or religion. +</p> +<p> +The character of Alexander the Sixth, to be found in Guicciardin, +[Footnote: Lib. i.] is pretty similar, but juster; and is a proof that +even the moderns, where they speak naturally, hold the same language +with the ancients. In this pope, says he, there was a singular capacity +and judgement: admirable prudence; a wonderful talent of persuasion; and +in all momentous enterprizes a diligence and dexterity incredible. But +these VIRTUES were infinitely overbalanced by his VICES; no faith, +no religion, insatiable avarice, exorbitant ambition, and a more than +barbarous cruelty. +</p> +<p> +Polybius, [Footnote: Lib. xii.] reprehending Timaeus for his partiality +against Agathocles, whom he himself allows to be the most cruel and +impious of all tyrants, says: if he took refuge in Syracuse, as asserted +by that historian, flying the dirt and smoke and toil of his former +profession of a potter; and if proceeding from such slender beginnings, +he became master, in a little time, of all Sicily; brought the +Carthaginian state into the utmost danger; and at last died in old age, +and in possession of sovereign dignity: must he not be allowed something +prodigious and extraordinary, and to have possessed great talents and +capacity for business and action? His historian, therefore, ought not to +have alone related what tended to his reproach and infamy; but also what +might redound to his Praise and Honour. +</p> +<p> +In general, we may observe, that the distinction of voluntary or +involuntary was little regarded by the ancients in their moral +reasonings; where they frequently treated the question as very doubtful, +WHETHER VIRTUE COULD BE TAUGHT OR NOT [Vid. Plato in Menone, Seneca de +otio sap. cap. 31. So also Horace, Virtutem doctrina paret, naturane +donet, Epist. lib. I. ep. 18. Aeschines Socraticus, Dial. I.]? They +justly considered that cowardice, meanness, levity, anxiety, impatience, +folly, and many other qualities of the mind, might appear ridiculous and +deformed, contemptible and odious, though independent of the will. Nor +could it be supposed, at all times, in every man's power to attain every +kind of mental more than of exterior beauty. +</p> +<p> +And here there occurs the FOURTH reflection which I purposed to make, +in suggesting the reason why modern philosophers have often followed a +course in their moral enquiries so different from that of the ancients. +In later times, philosophy of all kinds, especially ethics, have been +more closely united with theology than ever they were observed to be +among the heathens; and as this latter science admits of no terms of +composition, but bends every branch of knowledge to its own purpose, +without much regard to the phenomena of nature, or to the unbiassed +sentiments of the mind, hence reasoning, and even language, have been +warped from their natural course, and distinctions have been endeavoured +to be established where the difference of the objects was, in a manner, +imperceptible. Philosophers, or rather divines under that disguise, +treating all morals as on a like footing with civil laws, guarded by the +sanctions of reward and punishment, were necessarily led to render this +circumstance, of VOLUNTARY or INVOLUNTARY, the foundation of their whole +theory. Every one may employ TERMS in what sense he pleases: but +this, in the mean time, must be allowed, that SENTIMENTS are every day +experienced of blame and praise, which have objects beyond the dominion +of the will or choice, and of which it behoves us, if not as moralists, +as speculative philosophers at least, to give some satisfactory theory +and explication. +</p> +<p> +A blemish, a fault, a vice, a crime; these expressions seem to denote +different degrees of censure and disapprobation; which are, however, all +of them, at the bottom, pretty nearly all the same kind of species. The +explication of one will easily lead us into a just conception of the +others; and it is of greater consequence to attend to things than to +verbal appellations. That we owe a duty to ourselves is confessed even +in the most vulgar system of morals; and it must be of consequence to +examine that duty, in order to see whether it bears any affinity to that +which we owe to society. It is probable that the approbation attending +the observance of both is of a similar nature, and arises from similar +principles, whatever appellation we may give to either of these +excellencies. +</p> + + +<div style="height: 6em;"><br><br><br><br><br><br></div> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles +of Morals, by David Hume + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PRINCIPLES OF MORALS *** + +***** This file should be named 4320-h.htm or 4320-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/4/3/2/4320/ + +Produced by John Mamoun, Charles Franks and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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