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diff --git a/43062.txt b/43062.txt deleted file mode 100644 index a13c75f..0000000 --- a/43062.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6990 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook, Theoretical Ethics, by Milton Valentine - - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - - - - -Title: Theoretical Ethics - - -Author: Milton Valentine - - - -Release Date: June 29, 2013 [eBook #43062] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) - - -***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THEORETICAL ETHICS*** - - -E-text prepared by Juliet Sutherland, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) - - - -Transcriber's note: - - Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). - - Text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face (=bold=). - - Sidenotes have been moved to precede their facing - paragraphs, and are indicated by double equal signs: - ==sidenote text==. - - Greek words are shown in English transliterations that - are indicated by [Greek: ] and were added by the - transcribers. - - - - - -THEORETICAL ETHICS - -by - -MILTON VALENTINE, D.D., LL. D. - -Ex-President of Pennsylvania College, and Professor of Theology -in the Lutheran Theological Seminary, Gettysburg, Pa., -Author of "Natural Theology or Rational Theism." - - - - - - - -Chicago -Scott, Foresman & Co. -1900 - -Copyright, 1897, by -Scott, Foresman & Co. - -Press of -The Henry O. Shepard Co. -Chicago - - - - -PREFACE. - - -Ethical Theory has felt the full force of recent scientific and -philosophical agitation. The earlier systems have been subject to -earnest and continued discussion. The severest tests available by -the progress of knowledge have been applied to both their premises -and their conclusions. New theories, based on changed conceptions -of man and the world, have been variously elaborated, presenting -greatly altered views of the whole phenomenon of morality. While not -overthrowing old views these have given instructive suggestions. The -ethical field has thus been largely re-surveyed, and whatever light -modern science and speculation have furnished has been thrown upon -this great and unceasingly important subject. In some respects the -agitation has brought confusion and uncertainty. The clash of theories -has been disturbing. But on the whole ethical philosophy has been -the gainer. The discussions have certified the immovable foundations -and essential features of the moral system. The fresh light from the -advance of knowledge has proved, as it always does, not destructive, -but corrective and confirmatory. The abiding truth has been shown and -vindicated by the ordeal through which it has passed. - -This volume is largely the outcome of the author's many years of -class-room lecturing on the subject. Its object is to furnish for -students and general readers a compendious view of the ethical facts -and principles as the author believes them to be established by the -best accredited knowledge and thought of our times. There seems to be -room for such a work. The method is believed to give proper recognition -to both the empirical and metaphysical sides of the subject. Starting -from the universal phenomenon of moral distinctions in life, it -determines the conscience psychologically, as a rationally intuitive -power discerning the moral distinction and the reality and authority -of moral law. The implications of conscience and moral law necessarily -become theistic. The metaphysical examination finds for the real -phenomena of the subjective faculty the objective and abiding reality -of the ethical law which the faculty discerns, and the right or morally -good itself so perceived as consisting proximately in a conformity of -conduct with the relations of life in which moral requirement meets -human freedom, and as ultimately grounded in the absolute and perfect -source of the moral constitution of the universe. The movement carries -to the conclusion of eternal and immutable moral law. The disclosures -of revelation confirm the ethical law of the natural reason, completing -the moral view and supplying, in the divine forces of Christianity, the -proper dynamic for the realization of the ethical life. - -The volume is humbly sent forth in the hope that it may contribute -somewhat to the cause of truth and prove quickening to the life of duty -and righteousness. - -GETTYSBURG, Dec. 1, 1896. - - - - -CONTENTS. - - - CHAPTER I. - - DEFINITION AND GENERAL DIVISIONS. - - PAGES - - 1. Definition and Statement of the Subject-matter 15-17 - - 2. Historical Glance at the Beginning and Progress of the - Science 17-20 - - 3. Theoretical and Practical 20-23 - - 4. Relations to Psychology, Natural Theology, and Christian - Theology 23-27 - - - CHAPTER II. - - THE FACT OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS. - - 1. Revealed in Personal Consciousness 28-29 - - 2. Incorporated in the Social Organism 29 - - 3. Witnessed to in History 29-31 - - 4. Shown in the Religious World 31-33 - - 5. Pervades Literature 33-34 - - 6. Ethnic and Anthropological Information 34-35 - - 7. Unaffected by Theories of its Cause or Significance 35-36 - - - CHAPTER III. - - FACULTY OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS--THE EXISTENCE OF CONSCIENCE. - - 1. The Importance of this Question 37-39 - - 2. Proofs of its Existence 39-55 - - 1. The Moral Distinctions in Personal Consciousness - and the World 39-40 - - 2. The Peculiar Character of its Perceptions 40-44 - - 3. Special Feelings from its Perceptions 44-47 - - 4. Objection from Diversity of Moral Judgments Noticed 47-53 - - 5. These Proofs Independent of the Mode of the Origin - of the Power 53-55 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - THE FACULTY OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS--THE NATURE OF CONSCIENCE. - - 1. The Importance of Determining its Nature 56-59 - - 1. For Scientific Accuracy 56-57 - - 2. As Involving the Authority of Conscience 57-59 - - 2. A Psychological Question 59 - - 3. Conscience in place only in the Total Complex of Man's - Psychical Powers 59-62 - - 4. Specific Psychology of Conscience 62-76 - - 1. Perception of the Ethical Distinction 62-64 - - 2. Perception of Obligation 64-67 - - 3. Identification of the Moral Quality in Acts 67-68 - - 4. Perception of Merit and Demerit 68-72 - - 5. Emotions Arising from these Perceptions 72-76 - - 5. Special Characteristics Disclosed 76-80 - - 1. Conscience Fundamentally Intellectual 76-77 - - 2. Moral Quality its Sole Percept 77-78 - - 3. Its Action Marked by Necessity 78-80 - - 6. Relation of Phenomenalistic Philosophy to this View 80-83 - - 7. Effect of Theistic Evolution Theory 83-85 - - - CHAPTER V. - - THE SUPREMACY OF CONSCIENCE. - - 1. Involved in the Sphere of its Judgments 86-87 - - 2. Shown by the Nature of its Action 87-88 - - 3. The Absurdity of a Possible Supremacy in any other - Faculty 88-92 - - 4. Difficulties Considered 92-99 - - - CHAPTER VI. - - MORAL AGENCY. - - 1. Rational Intelligence 102-104 - - 2. The Conscience 104-105 - - 3. Free Will 105-115 - - 4. Powers of Sensibility and Action 115-118 - - - CHAPTER VII. - - THE REALITY OF RIGHT AND WRONG. - - 1. The Source of Doubt the Relativity of Knowledge 120-125 - - 2. Positive Statement of the Reality 125-129 - - 1. The Moral Distinctions and Qualities not merely - Subjective Phenomena but Objectively Real for - Perception 125-126 - - 2. Independent of the Mental Organization of the Race 127 - - 3. Immutable and Eternal 127-129 - - 3. The Importance of this Truth 129-130 - - 4. Marks of the Dividing Line between True and False Moral - Philosophies 130-132 - - 5. The Relation of Evolutionism to this Reality 132-137 - - 1. Theistic Evolution 132-133 - - 2. Atheistic and Materialistic Evolution 133-137 - - - CHAPTER VIII. - - THE GROUND OF RIGHT. - - 1. The Question Defined 138-139 - - 2. Leading Views and Theories: - The Egyptian Teaching--Chinese--Indian--Persian-- - Greek--Roman--Divine Absolutism--Civil - Authority--Utilitarianism--Evolutionary - Utilitarianism--Failure of Utilitarianism-- - Plausible Side of Utilitarian Theory-- - Theory of Conformity to Relations--Spiritual - Excellence Theory--Theory of an Imperative in - its Own Right 140-167 - - - CHAPTER IX. - - THE GROUND OF RIGHT--CONTINUED. - - 1. Statement of Proximate Ground 168-178 - - 1. Sustained by the Moral Consciousness in Constant - Experience 171-172 - - 2. Implied in the Logical Pre-suppositions to - Responsibility 172-175 - - 3. Verified in the Character of the Various Virtues - and their Opposite Immoralities 175-176 - - 4. Supported by Analogy of Organic and Instinctive - Action 176-177 - - 5. Assumed in the Conceptions and Language of Common - Life 178 - - 2. The Ultimate Ground 178-181 - - - CHAPTER X. - - THE OBJECTS OF THE MORAL JUDGMENT. - - 1. Personal Actions 182-187 - - 2. The Various Feelings, Passions, and Desires 187-190 - - 3. Intentions 190-191 - - 4. The Activities and Uses of the Intellect 191-192 - - 5. Acts of the Will 192-195 - - - CHAPTER XI - - THE ETHICAL VIEW UNDER CHRISTIAN TEACHING. - - 1. Christianity Recognizes the Truths and Principles - Established in True Ethical Science 196-197 - - 2. It Contributes Immensely to the Ethical View 197-200 - - 3. The Two Sources of the Christian View 200-205 - - 1. Primarily, the Sacred Scriptures 201-204 - - 2. Secondarily, the Christian Moral Consciousness 204-205 - - 4. Particular Features of the Christian View 205-216 - - 1. Known Duties Made More Distinct and Definite 205-206 - - 2. Human Relations Better Disclosed 206-208 - - 3. Moral Obligations Disclosed as Duties to God 208-210 - - 4. Guilt of Offending against Moral Law 210-213 - - 5. The Universalism of the Moral Law 213-215 - - 6. Fulfilment Requires Regeneration 215-216 - - - CHAPTER XII. - - THE ETHICAL TASK UNDER CHRISTIANITY. - - 1. Helped by the Completion of the Ethical View 219-220 - - 2. Quickened by Assurance of Success 220-222 - - 3. The Religious Interest Brought to Reinforce the Moral 222-224 - - 4. The Enlightening and Enforcing Power of the Holy Spirit 224-225 - - 5. Through Spiritual Regeneration 225-227 - - - - -THEORETICAL ETHICS. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -DEFINITION AND DIVISIONS. - - -==Ethics Defined.== - -=1.= Ethics is the science of rectitude and duty. It treats of the -right and its obligations. Its subject is morality. Its sphere is -the sphere of virtuous conduct. It covers a double range of inquiry, -as the subject-matter lies within or without the human constitution. -On the one side it investigates and sets forth the facts and laws of -man's moral constitution; on the other, the nature and grounds of the -distinction of right and wrong. In the light of the whole investigation -into these fundamental verities, it determines the principles and -rules of duty in the various relations of life. It thus discovers -and elucidates the underlying pre-suppositions and principles upon -which the phenomena of moral discernment and obligation rest, and on -which man rises into the possibility and reality of character, as -his supreme distinction among the orders of existence on earth. The -inquiry throughout is conducted according to the scientific method of -careful observation and analysis of the unquestionable facts concerned, -and an orderly presentation of their necessary logical implications -and conclusions. Hence the product of the investigation, as the -systematized view of the facts, with their underlying principles, may -justly be called, as it usually is called, moral science. - -The term Ethics, which we thus use to designate this branch of study, -with its systematized truth, is not employed with etymological -strictness. For it comes from the Greek [Greek: ethos], moral -character, which, according to Aristotle is derived from [Greek: -ethos] custom, under the notion that moral virtue is a product of -repeated acts of voluntary preference.[1] Taken strictly this would -build rectitude or the ethically right on the mere habits or usages -of a people. But this conception of the basis of virtue must not be -included and carried into the scientific use of the word, or be at all -allowed to prejudice the final decision of this great question of the -foundation of right, in the end, in the light of all the facts in the -case.[2] - -The Latin equivalent for [Greek: ethos] was _mos_, with similar -suggestion as to the nature of rectitude, and human duty was treated -under the head of De Moribus. Cicero says: "_Quia pertinet ad mores, -quod [Greek: ethos] illi vocant, nos eam partem philosophiae De Moribus -appellare solemus; sed decet augentem linguam Latinam nominare -Moralem._"[3] This suggestion of Cicero has given the common English -designation Morals or Moral Philosophy. Recent usage, however, speaks -of the study rather as moral science, in harmony with the prevailing -preference for the term science in all investigations conducted under -the inductive method. It is, nevertheless, as will appear, largely -a metaphysical and philosophical investigation, and, if classed as -science, must be counted as pre-eminently a philosophical science. - - -==Historical Glance.== - -=2.= The beginning of the movement to give a systematic view of ethical -truth may be traced to Socrates. The pre-Socratic philosophy failed to -produce anything that can be called a system in this connection. The -difficulty in the way was not only the want of a scientific spirit at -that period, but especially the inadequate and false light in which -human beings were viewed. Outside of the Hebrew people there was -little or no recognition of the freedom of man, as man. Such freedom -was denied both in thought and in life. Everywhere, in India, China, -and Egypt, as well as in Greece and Rome, the immense mass of the -population were in a condition of abject slavery, regarded as chattels, -not amenable to the responsibilities of moral life. Only the free -citizens were viewed as capable of virtue. Slavery was a part of the -very conception of the State. The essential characteristics and rights -of humanity were not thought of as belonging to all men. But moral -life, as will appear, can exist only in the sphere of liberty. Even the -most advanced philosophers of the ancient world extended the conception -of moral manhood only to the free citizen, the status of the rest not -bringing them within the possibility of even civic virtue. And even -the so-called free citizen existed almost absolutely for the State. -His sacred selfhood disappeared under ownership by the Government, by -which he was held and used as a machine for military service. Even -long after Socrates opened the way, within this limited range, toward -some connected view of ethical life, these disabling causes continued -to distort and impede all efforts to systematize the principles which -underlie and determine it. Plato, Aristotle, and the philosophers -generally, continued to know nothing of a morality for all human -beings.[4] - -It is to be remembered, too, that this tardy appearance of effort in -scientific ethics is part of the wider fact, that in that period of -human history even the most advanced tribes and nations had not risen -to science at all. All knowledge was in the non-scientific form, or -only fragmentarily and inchoately adjusted. The moral consciousness and -personal virtues, however, of course existed, as part of the normal -constitution and practical activities of human life. The various -peoples had collections of moral precepts and rules for right living, -often bright with gems of ethical truth and beauty, usually in close -connection with religious beliefs and convictions; but these were not -based and unified on any underlying principles bringing them logically -into compact and consistent system. Just as the facts and practices of -religion existed, in even rich luxuriance, anterior to the appearance -of speculative theologies, and the phenomena of nature for long -centuries preceded the formation of the natural sciences, so the moral -constitution of the race and practical morality existed long in advance -of the explanations and systemization that create the science of ethics. - -The history of the science does not come within the purpose of this -work. The greatness of the speculative and practical questions involved -in the subject, clearly and impressively apparent when once brought -forward, could not fail to awaken and hold the most earnest interest -of the human mind. They concerned the powers and possibilities of man -in the crowning endowments of his nature, and in the highest ascent -of their evident intention and adaptation. They touched the great -problems of personal and social welfare in the most vital relations -and decisive interests. So the old sages became moralists and their -great themes were the themes of virtue and duty. Not very deeply, -however, did they, for centuries, succeed in penetrating the rational -principles of the moral life and the authority of the moral judgments. -Yet clear gems of thought and deep suggestion mark the pathway of -their thinking. In passing on, and over from pagan into Christian -development, the treatment was mostly in connection with religious -truths, and as involved in theological doctrine. In the light of the -Christian Scriptures the whole subject came under a new illumination. -The various duties, however, in the different relations of life, -were permitted to rest, without much theorizing, on the warrant of -supernatural revelation and divine precept. Down through the early -Christian period, and the centuries of mediaeval scholasticism, and on -through the Renaissance and the Reformation and the subsequent dogmatic -period of Protestant theology, ethics continued to be treated simply as -a division of theology, based almost wholly on the Sacred Scriptures, -with but little inclusion of any effort to determine its natural basis -and significance. But with the age of modern philosophy and science a -new interest and direction came to ethical inquiry. Explanation began -to be sought for the unique authority of the ethical judgments, and -concerning the place of the moral power in the essential constitution -of the human soul. Special emphasis was given to the fact that, even -apart from the precepts of revelation, man is bound to rectitude by -an imperative within him, which is not of his choice, but claims the -right to dominate his choices. And since the seventeenth century -the ethical constitution of humanity, together with the nature and -grounds of right, has been made, apart from theology, the distinct -and separate theme of scientific and philosophical investigation and -discussion. It has been among the leading subjects of rational inquiry -and constructive effort. Especially in Great Britain and in our own -country has the inquiry been conducted on this basis, and directed to -the exhibition of the natural foundation and character of the ethical -distinctions and judgments, and to a systemization of the ethical -realities and laws thus determinable. The work thus done has created an -immense literature, and established a body of securely authenticated -scientific results. - - -=3.= Ethics, in its comprehensive sense, is naturally divided into two -leading parts--Theoretical Ethics, and Practical or Applied Ethics. - -==Theoretical Ethics.== - -(1) Theoretical Ethics deals with the essential realities and -principles which form the fundamental basis and source of obligation -and moral law, in the constitution of man and of the world. It is a -speculative study, seeking a rational account of the foundations of -morality and behests of duty. It secures a theory from and of the -facts. It has, however, a double range of investigation, as it seeks to -determine the truth with respect to the two great essential factors in -the aggregate inquiry. - -In the one range it examines and ascertains the facts and laws of man's -moral nature. It investigates the constitution of the moral agent, in -whose conscious experience, in the presence of the concrete world, the -moral phenomena arise. In this part, the inquiry is psychological, and -its results are scientific. - -In the other range it investigates the nature and ground of right, or -the morally good. In this the search is not for what is discoverable -within the moral agent, or the phenomena of the moral perceptions and -emotions, but for that which is without him and to which his moral -life is, at least apparently, required to be adjusted. Here the work -is metaphysical, passing on from what is phenomenal within man, and -looking for the super-phenomenal realities implied. The process and -results here are philosophical. - -It thus appears that the one range of investigation moves subjectively, -the other objectively. The first discovers what man is--at least so far -as his constitution embraces those powers, perceptions, judgments and -feelings in which he becomes and recognizes himself a moral being; the -second seeks to know what rectitude is, or what is that to which the -moral perceptions and discriminations refer and bind. When the truth on -both these sides is discovered and brought together, the whole view, -with the particulars logically correlated, will present the aggregate -theory of duty, or the rationale of obligation. - -==Practical Ethics.== - -(2) Practical Ethics sets forth the proper application of these -fundamental principles of right and duty, as developed and justified in -theoretical ethics, to the varied relations of men, personally, in the -Family, in Society, and in the State. It passes on from the philosophy -of moral obligations to a settlement of particular duties in the -different spheres of human life and activity. - -The connection between theoretical and practical ethics is very -close and vital. Theory and practice always affect each other. They -cannot be held wholly apart. They act and react on each other, in -ceaseless influences. It is so in every department of thought and life. -Theoretical error in physical science, in art, in trade, in political -economy, can hardly fail to appear in faulty or misdirected practice. -Every failure to grasp first principles correctly and firmly is sure -to mean failure also to grasp and maintain the true order and beauty -of right living. False views as to the reality and grounds of moral -obligation weaken, vitiate and corrupt life. They become, often, the -fountain of far-flowing streams of evil and blight. At best they lack -power for the true and right life. A correct theory of ethical truth -is, therefore, demanded by all the high interests in the moral life of -man and the order of the world. - -It is apparent, however, that it is only the theoretical part that -constitutes the science of ethics. It alone settles the systematic -view of it, revealing its underlying pre-suppositions and principles, -exhibiting its reasons and determining its laws. Practical ethics, as -simply pointing out how these bear upon men's temper and conduct in -actual life, is apart from the scientific investigation. Though this -has usually constituted a large portion of formal treatises on the -subject, we, for the reason thus given, omit it from this discussion. - - -=4.= A few of the relations of ethical science are properly called to -mind here. Its place will thus be more clearly seen. It sustains very -close relations to three other great branches of study. - -==Relation to Psychology.== - -(1) To psychology. It is organically related to this. In that part of -its work which determines the reality and nature of moral obligation -from the constitution and action of the human mind, moral science joins -with psychology in the investigation of man's mental capacities and -powers. Ever since the days of Aristotle ethics has been seen to have -real psychological basis and pre-suppositions.[5] Yet, as a result of -the later general subsuming of ethics under religious and theological -precepts, this basis received but little distinct investigation till -the time of Shaftesbury who, though failing to give adequate or -correct account of it, brought it prominently forward. Mental science -is essentially conditional for moral science. The behests of duty are -provided for and sanctioned in human nature. The moral discriminations -and convictions emerge as psychical phenomena. "To understand what man -ought to do, it is necessary to know what he is." In the very structure -and adjustment of his powers, it becomes apparent that he has been made -for duty and organized under obligations. - -But while psychology and ethics both study the powers and functions of -the soul, they do so with different aims. The one has no aim beyond -a knowledge of the phenomena and laws of the mind as mind. The other -studies it with a view to the light which this knowledge sheds on -the problems of virtue and duty. There are, indeed, some questions -in ethics that transcend the province of psychology, and belong to -the further realm of metaphysics--as, for instance, the validity and -ground of the distinction between right and wrong--yet, so far as it is -the science of conscience or of man's moral nature, it is thoroughly -psychological. And well would it have been for moral science if, -instead of speculatively and arbitrarily theorizing on the subject, it -had more critically, fully, and exactly searched out the real facts -in actual psychology and moved forward always toward the conclusions -necessitated by these fundamental and abiding realities. - -==Relation to Natural Theology.== - -(2) To Natural Theology. As Natural Theology seeks to determine the -existence, character and will of God as Creator and Moral Governor -of the world, and the consequent relations and responsibilities of -men, it covers, to some extent, the same ground as a system of ethics -constructed simply upon the basis of reason and the data found in -man's nature and place. Both, if properly drawn out, bring to view the -reality of "a power that makes for righteousness"[6] in the natural -constitution of the world, and exhibit the laws of obligation that -bind men under the action of conscience. Both treat of the fact and -authentications of human duty. A science of ethics, as well as a -theology, may be constructed, apart from supernatural revelation, -from the data of reason and nature alone. The possibility of this is -implied in Rom. 2:14, 15. This would be a system of natural ethics. -There is still, however, a large difference--though theology and ethics -be kept apart from the teachings of special revelation. For Natural -Theology keeps more prominently and controllingly in view the being and -character of God, and aims more distinctly to produce the religious -sentiments, while authenticating the reality and action of the moral -law. Ethics, on the other hand, puts the facts of human nature and -life into the front and includes the religious element only as a -consequential, though necessary, inclusion. - -==Relation to Christian Theology.== - -(3) To Christian Theology, or revealed religion. As this is the fullest -disclosure of the duty of man, in all his relations, to God, to his -fellow-men, and to his own end, it is not surprising that for so many -centuries, the treatment of morals was made simply a part of general -theology, and merely distinguished as Moral Theology. In the modern -separation of ethics from theology and treatment of it as a science, it -is not meant to deny the close affinity between the two investigations -or the rich illumination that duty receives from supernatural -revelation, but only to trace out more distinctly and fully, in -independent and scientific form, the deep and immovable foundations of -the principles of duty in the very constitution of man and the world. -This exhibition of the natural basis of ethical law and obligation -becomes an independent and generic enforcement of the principles of -righteousness. It gives a philosophic vindication of one of the first -assumptions of Christianity--the supremacy of the law of rectitude for -human life. And Christianity is vindicated and exalted when it comes -recognizing and confirming all the principles and duties discoverable -in our moral nature, and adding a supernatural disclosure of the way in -which righteousness may be established in our lives, and men may attain -their right character and destiny. - -Christianity, while much more than this, appears as a divine -re-publication of the ethical truth which from the first has been -incorporated in the organization of humanity. In it the light of -conscience is supplemented and made clear. The ethics of human reason -and those of revelation thus cover, to a great extent, the same ground. -When correctly read they are never in conflict, but in harmony. Both -show man to be under moral law--and under broken law, that is, under -sin. But the light of the Scriptures is broader and fuller. For in -addition to their confirmation of a natural ethic for man, they -disclose a scheme of redemption, with otherwise undiscoverable moral -relations and obligations, introducing new and vital elements into the -science of ethics. The inclusion of these elements and truths turns -pagan or natural ethics into Christian. - -Whatever interpretation may be given by different Christians to -the redemption thus disclosed, the ethical teaching of the Sacred -Scriptures, by universal consent, surpasses, in clearness, elevation -and completeness, every other ethical view or system in the world. The -loftiest philosophical thought has reached no higher summit--and has -climbed to its best only in the light which Christianity has supplied. -No system of morals is now worthy of the name that fails to avail -itself of its ethical teaching. Only when this is properly included, -illuminating natural ethics with its supernatural light, can we have -the whole view of human duty. He who refuses the Christian grade and -completeness of moral view goes back from the full daylight into the -obscure dawn before the morning. Nevertheless the natural basis of -ethical laws needs to be clearly apprehended and distinctly borne in -mind. In these days when the foundations of all truths are put to -scrutinizing tests, it is of fundamental importance that, through the -verifying processes of careful science, we shall recognize the ethical -verities and responsibilities, affirmed by revelation, as primarily and -immutably a part of the very nature of man and the constitution of the -world. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -THE FACT OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS. - - -==Moral Distinctions.== - -The primary fact underlying the science of ethics is the great -phenomenon of moral distinctions in the world. Scarcely anything -in human life has been more conspicuous and indubitable than the -existence of ideas of right and wrong and their application to human -conduct. This has characterized mankind everywhere and in all ages. -Its prevalence is as broad as humanity. A phenomenon so universal and -permanent must necessarily be regarded as in some way organic in the -human constitution. It calls for examination and justifies scientific -inquiry into its cause and implications. - -The certainty and largeness of the phenomenon become deeply impressive -when it is traced out and fairly considered. - - -==Revealed in Personal Consciousness.== - -=1.= The distinction between right and wrong appears in every man's -personal consciousness. Each one is directly and fully aware of it in -his own case. He approves and condemns on this basis, and in doing so -finds himself in harmony with a principle marking the sentiments of -others around him. He passes quick, spontaneous judgments on his own -conduct and on that of his fellow-men. The distinction, to greater -or less degree, shapes itself into a sense of obligation and a law of -duty. Nothing can wipe it out from his knowledge and feelings. - - -==Incorporated in Social Organism.== - -=2.= It is found incorporated into the social organism. What each man -is conscious of doing in his own inner life, society, in its solidarity -or constitutional unity, is found doing and enforcing. Organic humanity -reveals the presence of the ethical conception and sure lines of its -action everywhere. However diverse may be its judgments, there is -such a thing as a public conscience that holds up conduct to favor -or reprobation, not simply as beneficial or injurious but as being -intrinsically right or wrong. - -The social constitution is in fact framed together under the human -capacity and necessity of perceiving and fulfilling the duties that -arise in the inter-relations of associated life. For, the very laws and -administrations on which the social order and welfare are dependent, -and through which they are in a measure secured, are the embodiment -of the ethical ideas and judgments of the people. No adjustment of -relations is possible except upon this foundation. The obliteration of -these ideas would mean social anarchy. "Society," says Prof. Borden P. -Bowne, "in its organized form, is a moral institution with moral ends. -However selfish individuals may be, they cannot live together without a -social order which rests on moral ideas."[7] - - -==Witnessed in History.== - -=3.= The great volume of history is witness to the universal -phenomenon. Its records testify to the presence and action of the -moral distinctions everywhere and in all the ages of the world. Whether -these records present the customs and habits of early tribes, the rise -and fall of nations, the reigns of princes and emperors, the exploits -of generals and conquerors, the march and overthrow of armies, the -relentless cruelty of tyrants or the noble service of patriots and -benefactors, the establishment of just institutions or the miseries of -the people where the oppressor's millstones grind on, all the pages -are replete with evidence that men, around all the globe and through -all the centuries, have been wont either to accuse or excuse the -conduct and motives of one another according to some standard of moral -judgment or sentiments of right and wrong. It is true that from some -pages of history the moral sense seems darkened out of sight. They -bring before us thousands of men, often the most conspicuous in the -ever-changing drama of public life, from whose thinking the notions -of right and wrong seem to have been wanting or obliterated, acting -only from selfishness, avarice, or ambition, monsters of injustice, -heartlessness, cruelty and blood. Many of its chapters are but the -sickening stories of tribal and national feuds and wars, of crime, -plunder and devastation, of hate, scheming and treachery, of thirst -for power, fame and treasure, of moving armies and fields of carnage -and fire-swept lands, seeming to report that the moral sense had -no place or force whatever in the men who were the actors in those -scenes. But these chapters of lurid crime and wrong, like the records -of crime to-day, do not represent all the thought of the humanity -of such times. They tell of the men and deeds that most completely -defied the moral ideas that belonged to their own nature, and whose -remorseless wrong-doing evoked the deep, indignant reprobation of the -thousands and millions of innocent and injured sufferers. And when -the pen of history, with eye on the relations of cause and effect -and the unfolding issues of such flagrant violation of right and -justice, has traced the steps of a divine Nemesis, a stern Avenger, -following the guilty, age after age, the record proves to be, all the -more emphatically, a ceaseless testimony to the great fact of moral -distinctions as a world-wide and ceaseless phenomenon of human life. - - -==Shown in All Religions.== - -=4.= The religions of the world all show the same fact. While these -present a Godward side and express the perpetual human need of union -and fellowship with the infinite divine Source of all Good, they at -the same time testify to a distinctively moral constitution and action -of human life. The sense of obligation, duty and guilt appears in the -warp and woof of religion everywhere. While with a singular breach -with reason religious rites and practices here and there have shown -a wide departure from correct moral principles, yet the religious -consciousness of the race has been almost a synonym for the action -of the moral sense. In all lands and all ages this consciousness has -carried with it, in greater or less clearness and force, a conviction -that the Power above men not themselves is a Power that makes for -righteousness, establishing and enforcing principles of duty among -men. And the various religions of mankind, especially those of -monotheistic teaching and more distinct development, present clear and -emphatic codes of moral principles and requirement. Some of them are -resolvable largely into philosophies of life, with ethical directions -for the regulation of conduct. In the Egyptian Book of the Dead, which -belongs to the age of the pyramid builders, from 2000 to 3000 B. C., we -find set forth a morality marked by surprising breadth and purity.[8] -In all the wide-spread religions of Asia, some of them emerging out -of the darkness of prehistoric times, the Akkadian and Babylonian, -Zoroastrianism, Brahmanism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Shintoism, -and Mohammedanism, with their countless millions of followers, -everywhere the constitution of man and social life is recognized as -laid in laws of moral obligation and order, and religious life, in -greater or less degree, is called to aspire to that which is judged to -be right and good. Ancient Druidism was strongly marked by its emphatic -moral tone. No Christian needs to be reminded with what sublime -distinctness Christianity, with its redemption economy, declares the -eternal distinction between moral good and evil, and calls men to peace -and blessedness through faith and righteousness. - -Religion, it is to be remembered, is in the broadest sense a fact of -humanity. The distinguished anthropologist Quatrefages is sustained -by the fullest evidence when he asserts that man is essentially a -religious being. It appears in every tribe on earth. Moral conceptions -and sentiments, however faint and faultily applied, are a part of this -omnipresent religious mind of the race. - - -==Pervades Literature.== - -=5.= Such moral conceptions pervade the general literature of the -world. Wherever a people has progressed in culture sufficiently to -create and preserve a literature, it is found to be many-tongued -witness to a recognized difference between right and wrong. In its -pages these discriminations appear as a never-ceasing characteristic -of human thought. They come to us out of the remotest past and from -regions untaught by the decalogue of Sinai. They illuminate, as -already implied, the sacred books of India, China, Egypt, Persia and -Babylonia, as well as the classic writings of ancient Greece and -Rome and the Saga writing of Northern Europe. They not only form the -body of the moral disquisitions of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cato, -Cicero, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius and many others, but color and shape -the drama and lyric poetry in which the thought and sentiment of the -race have been embalmed. To see illustrations of this we need only -read the tragedies of Sophocles, for instance OEdipus Tyrannus, lines -863-871, or Antigone, lines 449-460, or listen to the verse of Horace, -Book III, Ode 3, tracing the supremacy and triumph of a consciousness -of right over all other authority and power. With the advance of -humanity as the centuries have passed away literature is more and -more the representation of human sentiment and life under the action -and reaction of these ethical discriminations in the ever-changing -conditions of the world. Philosophy and science and fiction and -poetry and politics and jurisprudence are occupied in dealing with -the principles and questions thus raised, and our modern libraries -are largely the accumulated treasures of the thinking world on the -significance and application of these principles. - - -==Anthropological Confirmation.== - -=6.= The ethnic and anthropological information of the present day -reports no people or tribe, even the rudest, altogether without moral -ideas and some measure of application of them to conduct. Enthusiastic -scientists, travelers and missionaries, traversing the earth, have -thoroughly established this point. Often, indeed, has the universality -here asserted been disputed. Reports were brought of tribes discovered -altogether destitute of the ethical sense. But closer inspection of -the tribal and personal life has corrected the first impression, -and evidences of the disputed fact have become indubitable. A low -and confused manifestation had been mistaken as none whatever. In -degraded and besotted conditions of human life, it is altogether -reasonable to believe that the particular discrimination in question -would appear only in the crude and uncertain forms in keeping with -the undeveloped grade of all the functions of thought and sentiment. -The sunken humanity has carried down and buried its proper and normal -manifestations almost out of sight. As soon as uplift comes to a -tribe, the powers of moral discernment and knowledge, whose action -was scarcely discoverable before, emerge in unmistakable certainty and -force. And no phenomenon that science is seeking to investigate to-day -can be more justly regarded as universally human than the fact under -consideration. - - -==Not Affected by Explanations.== - -=7.= It needs to be distinctly fixed in mind that this great fact -is not at all affected by any offered theory of its cause and -significance. It stands independent of any particular explanation -of it, and indeed of all solutions. If, for instance, the origin of -these moral judgments should be traced back and accounted for, as is -done by Herbert Spencer, as the result of accumulated experiences of -utility, gradually organized and inherited as spontaneous approval -and disapproval, the theory still recognizes the fact of ethical -judgments while endeavoring to account for them. Or, when the older -utilitarianism seeks to explain them as resolvable into the pleasure -or satisfaction men feel toward certain forms of conduct or principles -of behavior that are found to be useful and promotive of happiness, -the fact still remains that judgments of right and wrong are actually -established and dominate the thought and life of men. The very attempt -to identify the virtues of life with its utilities, while making the -virtues only its utilities, concedes that the obligation to them is -part of the recognized reality of human life. Or, further, should a -bolder and more radical view allege that these notions of right and -wrong are mere matters of taste and prejudice, a fictitious product of -adventitious circumstances and education, without verity or validity -at bottom, the offered explanation would be simply a denial, but no -disproof of the fact concerned. For it would amount to a claim that -in the absolute sense one thing is essentially as good as another, -and would thus disregard the real affirmation as it stands in the -moral judgment of mankind. Such a claim, it has been well said, no -theorist of the present day would pretend to maintain outside of his -closet.[9] Not in any race or people has the ethical sense allowed that -essentially and at bottom all acts are equally right. This is the very -point of the great phenomenon presented. Whatever may be the final -explanation of it, somehow or other the reason, sentiment and practical -sense of mankind insist on a real difference, and look upon all denial -of the distinction as a manifest and intolerable absurdity. - -The universal recognition of this distinction, revealed in every -man's consciousness, involved in the organic relations of society, -testified to everywhere in the pages of history, embodied essentially -in the religious nature and sentiments of mankind, woven into general -literature, found to-day unmistakably in the thinking, laws and customs -of all races and tribes, and acknowledged in the philosophical view -of humanity wherever man is studied, irreducible as a fact by any -account of its genesis or explanation of its significance, presents the -occasion and primary materials of ethical science. The great phenomenon -calls for investigation. We want to know the reasons for it and the -import of it. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - -FACULTY OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS--THE EXISTENCE OF CONSCIENCE. - - -==The Moral Faculty.== - -The great fact of moral distinctions, found to be universal in human -thought and life, must be traced back to the particular power of -the mind which discerns and feels these distinctions. Back of the -phenomenon must be recognized the psychical capacity and action out of -which the discriminations arise. The moral faculty answers to and in -part accounts for the moral fact. In modern general literature it is -usually called the conscience. Ethical science properly accepts the -designation. It is sometimes called the moral consciousness, or the -moral sense. It expresses a power of the personal _ego_ or self to -make the moral discrimination and discern the obligation to rectitude. -Without such power, as an adequate capacity for the ideas, it is -plain that the ethical judgments could not arise. The very idea of -obligation, the ethical "ought," would be wanting. The whole realm of -what this science considers would be a blank. In the moral faculty or -conscience itself, as the immediate source of the ethical distinctions -and laws of duty, we are furnished with additional material for this -study. - -No particular stress is here laid on the term "faculty," as a -designation of the moral power. There is, indeed, no validity in the -claim of some recent psychologists that the term must be abandoned -on the ground that psychology discovers only mental acts, without a -psychic subject with distinct faculties back of the acts. Yet the term -faculty has often been used and understood in a way inconsistent with -the essential and conscious unity of the personal _ego_ or self, making -the soul seem a bundle of independent and separately acting parts of a -psychical organism. The perfect oneness of the personal self must be -maintained, and the term faculty, when used for any form of psychical -ability, must be understood simply as expressing the soul's capacity -or power to do any specific form of work, or to act in any particular -and distinctively definable way, as, for instance, to know, to feel, to -will, to remember, to compare. In this sense the use of the term stands -fully justified in psychological usage and propriety. But the reason -for abating from the claim of strict exactness in the term in this -connection is that the conscience, in its full conception and action, -as will hereafter appear, while exhibiting a specific and simple power -as its central reality, will be found to include also subordinately -the conjoint action of several other forms of psychical power. It -stands for a complex of capacities and powers. This will appear when we -reach its analysis. But the question of the absolute simplicity of the -faculty does not affect the substance of our inquiry into its existence -nor the propriety of employing the term for the power in its totality. -For, as naming the central and decisive reality in the conscience, it -is justly spoken of as a special faculty. Even when it is viewed as -standing for a complex of powers converging, in their functions, to -the discernment of moral distinctions and the reality of duty, it has -sufficient individuality to be rightly and scientifically designated -in this way. The question to be considered, and upon which the logical -conclusions of the science will depend, is not its absolute simplicity, -but the fact of such a power as a normal part in the soul's essential -constitution of powers. If the power be found integral and normal in -the soul's actual capacities, we have all that is essential for the -foundation of ethics. - -The existence of the conscience as a specific and natural faculty of -discernment of right and duty may seem to the student or reader to need -no formal proof, as something substantially everywhere acknowledged. -But as various theories undertake to question its existence, in the -sense thus explained, and resolve the affirmations of right and duty -into pseudo-products developed in a roundabout way, or by some illusive -transformation of ideas or sentiments given by the other faculties of -the soul, ideas or sentiments which in fact are really unethical, it -becomes necessary to vindicate the asserted existence of this moral -faculty. - - -==Moral Distinctions Prove Conscience.== - -=1.= The primary and fundamental evidence is the great fact, already -set forth, of the moral distinctions which arise out of its action -and fill personal consciousness and the life of the world with their -attesting presence. The known object implies a power by which it -is known. Without the faculty, in the sense of a power to know, the -knowledge here in question could not exist. Its existence is proof -of the reality and action of the faculty perceptive of it. The only -alternative to this would be a total denial of the ethical distinction, -even as a genuine phenomenon, and an assertion that the supposed -knowledge of it is, and always has been, illusory and unreal. And -this would be equivalent to a claim that men may and should abandon -the ethical distinction and believe that there is absolutely no moral -difference between justice and injustice, between kindness and hatred, -between truth and lying, between friendship and treachery, between -charity and murder. And this again would mean that we are to repudiate, -as without validity, the whole notion which the ages, especially the -most intelligent and best ages, have cherished, that man is capable -of character, as good or bad, excellent or blameworthy. But this -whole alternative becomes impossible, by reason of the necessary -and invincible contrary judgment by which the moral distinctions -are affirmed as actual and valid for human life. The faculty of -moral discernment proves its existence by making the contrary of its -discernment an impossible conception. - - -==The Moral Perceptions Peculiar.== - -=2.= Its existence is further proved by the unique and peculiar -character of its data or perceptions. These are unlike any other, _sui -generis_. They are original and cannot be deduced from other data. The -ethical percept is something that can be understood only in terms -of itself. It cannot be described or expressed in the terms of the -percepts or knowledge given by the other faculties of the soul, either -general or special, either separately or in combination. Hence we must, -according to all sound psychological procedure, postulate a special -faculty, as distinctive and normal as is the percept, for this original -and irresolvable ethical idea. - -A little explanation will help to show this. Let us make search for -the ethical idea or perception among the well-known data of the other -faculties. Manifestly it is not given by the "sense-perception," for -it presents none of the physical properties which this makes known. -Clearly, too, it is not created by the "consciousness," which presents -simply the states or acts of the mind, with the personal self as -their subject, but which does not itself originate the states or acts -it reveals--any more than does the light of the morning create the -objects of the landscape which it discloses. Further, it is evidently -not given by the power of "representation," for this merely reproduces -and re-knows what was before known through the "sense-perception" -and revealed in "consciousness," revived in the form of memory or -rearranged and recombined in the forms of the constructive imagination. -It supplies no original data. It, further still, cannot be the product -of the "logical" faculty, as the power or function of discursive -reasoning, because this originates no new material, but only reconnects -and judges of relations in the material already known, simply dealing -with ideas furnished to it. Nor can the ethical percept, as an -intuition to the obligation to rectitude, be at all identified with -the _a priori_ ideas of time and space, or the categories of substance -and attribute, identity and difference, means and end, or the law of -causation. And yet it stands out in an originality as positive and -distinct as do any of the unquestionable data or percepts of the soul's -acknowledged specific faculties. - -Just as little can the ethical idea, as the discrimination of right and -wrong, be referred to the "sensibility," as the pleasure or dislike -with which we regard what is found useful and conducive to enjoyment -or the reverse. For, though a certain pleasure is connected with the -ethically right, this specific feeling follows, and is dependent on -no other perception than of the right. It is a satisfaction which -the ethically good thus awakens. But the knowledge which experience -gives of what is useful and conducive to enjoyment is generically -different from the moral idea and its sense of obligation. Utility and -the ethical discrimination are not the same conception. They belong -to two diverse realms of thought and knowledge. Whatever relations -may be traced between them, they cannot be identified or held as -convertible percepts. The autonomous imperative of the ethical idea -often positively prohibits the very things men judge to be profitable -and pleasurable. It is a remarkable fact that the testimonies from -literature and life to the phenomenon of moral distinctions everywhere -maintain the difference between the idea of right and that of the -pleasurable or profitable. What is right is one thing; what is -agreeable is another thing. The two conceptions are not identical, but -are often placed in immediate and irreducible antithesis. Those who do -right, choosing it and heroically loyal to it despite the appeals of -ambition, the temptations of avarice, the enticements of ease, and the -favor or the wrath of the wicked, are approved and honored. To such the -gates of the divine favor and recompense are pictured as ever standing -open. - -There is another consideration in this connection which shows beyond -question that this ethical faculty, whose action is everywhere -traceable, is not to be confounded with mere intellectuality or -the action of simply the general intellectual powers. It exhibits -itself in a distinct line of working and results, like a particular -current in the common sea, and often in open contrast. It is a -peculiar and significant fact, often observed by historians, that -as the civilizations of antiquity, of Assyria, Egypt, Phenicia, -Greece and Rome, advanced in intellect they declined in morals. -Intellectualism may be at its height while the moral side of life -may suffer a submergence beneath the floods of luxury and refined -social vices. Buckle confesses that intellect and morals are not -only distinguishable, but separable.[10] Herbert Spencer says: "The -belief in the moralizing effects of intellectual culture, flatly -contradicted by facts, is absurd _a priori_."[11] Lord Wolseley makes -a statement not flattering to the boasted advantage claimed for simple -intellectualism: "The virtue of the Zulu women was superior to that -of any civilized people I know of."[12] The function of the conscience -in human nature and life stands clearly distinguishable from the -common data and powers of mere intellectualism. The world will not -be ethically saved by intellect alone. The conscience must dominate -mere intellectual results and forces. And the high distinctive place -and peculiar character of the conscience-perception is seen when it -is thus observed that the perception is not of something that is, -but of what ought to be, in the sphere of conduct and character. Its -object is apprehended as lying in the ideal realm of obligation. The -reality perceived is transcendent, as what should be in life, in order -that life may accord with a super-sensible reality in the realm of -righteousness. It as truly reaches beyond sense as do the intuitions -of time and space or the law of causation; and, as truly as they, it -calls for the recognition of a special and original psychical faculty -or provision, among the powers of the soul, for its perception. The -conscience, - - "Deep-seated in our mystic frame," - -discerns a law of righteous obligation, which is not the dictate of -mere desire or pleasure or self-advantage, but a law established -at once over us and in us not dependent on our will or choice but -demanding conformity of will and choice to itself. - - -==Feelings from Conscience Perceptions.== - -=3.= The existence of the conscience as an integral power of the -human constitution is evidenced also by the special feelings which -attend its perceptions. They are distinctively peculiar. This is -illustrated in the sense of obligation arising from the idea of right -and the perception of duty. It is even more clearly illustrated in the -satisfaction which attends and follows duty done, and the remorse which -follows wrong or crime committed. - -The sense of obligation, _i. e._ the emotion awakened by the perception -of obligation, is unique among the emotions of the sensibility. In the -presence of recognized right or wrong men feel bound to correspondent -action as they feel bound under no other perceptions. The conscience, -indeed, uses no compulsion, but it presents the right or wrong and -correspondent obligation. Freedom is not annulled, but appealed to. -The feeling, as the sensibility excited, is the feeling of ought or -ought not, added to the perception of it. Nothing like this appears -in connection with any of the other perceptions. We may perceive -truth, but if the truth is not the particular truth of obligation -itself, there is only the pleasure, gratification or admiration in -its discovery and attainment. We may perceive beauty, but if the -beauty be apart from that of ethical excellence, the feeling is simply -aesthetic and different from the obligatory feeling: "I ought." We may -perceive utility or understand what is simply profitable, but the -feeling awakened is but desire. All these and like simply intellectual -perceptions awaken no sense of obligation to cherish any special -sentiments or perform any special acts. But as soon as men, in pure -and normal state of their rational and emotional nature, perceive -the right as over against the wrong, the sensibility which always in -greater or less degree responds to every act of knowledge, presents a -form of feeling, in the ethical "ought," generically different from -the feelings that arise out of all other kinds of knowledge. This -feeling is itself a part and parcel of the aggregate or complex of the -conscience. But its presence marks the conscience as a special power -normally constituent of human nature. - -The other moral emotions named, viz.: satisfaction in duty done -and remorse or compunction for wrong, bring us to the same conclusion. -These feelings are _sui generis_. They are distinctively characteristic, -and are never called forth but in connection with the moral intuitions. -These peculiar satisfactions or compunctions never appear upon -perception of a truth of mathematics or a fact in chemistry or a gem of -art. Such knowledge evokes no sense of duty and is followed by no -feeling of remorse or rush of compunction, flooding the soul with -self-condemnation. A sense of loss, in failing to gain a possible -advantage, is incapable of being confounded with the feeling of having -done wrong. Some of the highest elevations of ethical satisfaction are -felt when men have maintained their fidelity to the right in face of -the most enormous losses and of the most desolating sufferings. The -deepest remorse the human soul ever knows may spring up in view of ways -and acts which have given men all the things they have coveted and -judged to be the most useful and enjoyable. There must surely be a -special power whose peculiar discernments call the sensibilities into -such unique and peculiar forms of feeling. - - -==Conflict of Moral Judgements.== - -=4.= This conclusion is not weakened, as has sometimes been supposed, -by the diversity and seeming conflict of moral judgments among men. -This diversity seems, in the view of many persons, inconsistent with -the supposition of a conscience, in the sense given. The fact of such -diversity is freely conceded. The progress of history shows many -changes in moral judgments. An advance is clearly traceable, in which -once accepted rules of conduct have been superseded by different -requirements. Things approved in one land and tribe are condemned in -another. Pascal has said that conscience is one thing north of the -Pyrenees and another south. In every community what some look upon as -right others declare wrong. Infanticide, which under our civilization -is punished as murder, on the banks of the Ganges has been esteemed a -high religious duty. Polygamy, which our government is trying to wipe -out as an immorality and foul blot, is held by the Mormons as a sacred -right. Slavery is still regarded by some as right though condemned by -the convictions of the nation as morally indefensible. Most startling -diversities and contrasts are continually appearing. Hence it has often -been said that our moral judgments rest, in fact, on no original and -permanent principles discerned by a distinct and universal faculty of -the soul, but are a purely adventitious and accidental product, shaped -in ideas that come of circumstances, education or the shifting spirit -of the age.[13] The law of morality is reduced to the dictates of -expediency or to sentiment and caprice born of our changeful desires. -This virtually denies both the validity of the ethical behests and the -reality of an ethical faculty provided for perception of rectitude and -duty. But the difficulty from this diversity and apparent contradiction -loses its force when carefully considered. It disappears when we recall -the following indubitable facts: - -==Ethical Sense Persists.== - -First, that in the midst of this variety and conflict in the moral -judgments, the ethical sense still persists in maintaining its -function. If convicted of acting inconsistently, it still acts. Though -it is found judging differently, it still judges, asserting its place -and office, and imposing its decisions as obligatory in conduct. Under -the view alleged in the objection, the sense of obligation ought to -disappear, its supposed authority having been explained away. The -person finds that in very truth the moral behest, though in him is not -of him, is not of his will or choice, but arises out of the necessary -action of a power that he cannot displace by refusal to obey it. The -faculty or power does not consent, so to speak, to omit or withdraw its -ethical distinction and assertion of duty. It does not abdicate, when -men allege the illegitimacy of its authority. - -==Agreement in Judgments.== - -Secondly, that while there is diversity as to many points, there is -none in its judgments as to the great body of virtues and vices of -human life. As to all the leading qualities of character and conduct -there is full and universal agreement. With respect to all the cardinal -virtues, such as justice, kindness, veracity, love, courage, fidelity, -generosity, the moral judgments approve them as the magnet owns its -pole, in all the multi-form relations and offices of life. On the other -hand, injustice, falsehood, enmity, treachery, cruelty, adultery, -theft, murder and similar dispositions and acts in their thousand forms -of unmistakable manifestation, are universally condemned. There is no -question anywhere around our globe that one who deliberately kills his -mother or mangles his father, or tortures the innocent or defrauds his -friend, is a wrong-doer, of abhorrent guilt. Over almost the entire -broad field of moral obligation there is a consentient, clear and -consistent judgment by the moral sense of man in all ages and places. -It is only along dividing lines, wider or narrower as they may be, -that, by reason of the fainter presence of the moral element or the -complexity of the relations concerned, the moral judgments exhibit this -diversity or act with less assured and certain accuracy. The perplexity -and difference find place only in limited degree and on remoter points, -where the distinctions are so subtle as to require the nicest balancing -of all the complex relations and elements which develop the ethical -obligations. - -If, indeed, the conscience reported entirely different codes -throughout, from bottom to top and from center to circumference, or -codes with contradictions as to the cardinal virtues and vices, then -we might well question the existence and action of a real, original -and normal faculty as actually perceiving a real moral distinction and -principle of duty. But if such diversities are found only in limited -degree, on marginal ground and in complex situations, we are simply in -the presence of a fact of great similarity of the conscience with all -the rest of the finite and fallible faculties of the human mind. Upon -a hundred points of practical morals the intelligent conscience would -be likely to agree quite as well as the judgments of men in any other -sphere of practical knowledge and life. - -==Agreement in Principles.== - -Thirdly, that even with respect to the cases in which there is the most -startling diversity, there is often an underlying agreement, overlooked -by superficial thought. Take, for instance, the Hindu mother's act of -infanticide. Underneath her act and guiding it, is one or the other, -or possibly both, of these principles: 1. Whatever sacrifice God calls -for ought to be made; or, 2. Whatever is best for the child ought to -be done. Falsely taught to believe that God calls for the sacrifice of -her child, or that this surrender of it to him is the best thing for -it, the mother makes the offering. Essentially as to the principles -from which she acts her conscience and the Christian conscience are at -one. But she has been misled as to the will of God. Her understanding -is without correct information as to matters of fact, and she applies -mistakenly the principles of duty which are in her moral nature. -Take, again, the crimes of religious intolerance and persecution. The -religious zealot believes that every man is to be, without weakness or -shadow or turning, faithful to the truth. So also does the dissenter -from the creed which the persecutor defends. They agree as to the -underlying principle of action. Each feels bound by the same ethical -law of "fidelity to the truth," but the persecutor is in grievous error -in understanding that this fidelity binds him to coerce the mind of his -dissenting brother. - -==Difference of Perceptions.== - -Fourthly, the difference must be clearly kept in view between the -essential ethical perception, viz.: the distinction of right and -wrong with the involved obligation, and the application of that -perception--between the primary and secondary moral judgment. The -primary is the intuition of the law of right, the secondary affirms -the quality of right or wrong with respect to particular actions. In -the one case the moral sense perceives that justice, love, veracity, -kindness, etc., are right, and injustice, hatred, falsehood and -cruelty are wrong; in the other the judgment is concerned with the -further question whether this, that, or the other act comes under one -or the other of these categories. The fundamental ethical distinction -and obligation, with approval of justice, truth, etc., are generic, -and altogether irrespective of any particular actions or instances. -The secondary judgments apply the distinction to particular modes of -conduct or forms of temper and feeling. The latter are only in part -moral judgments, _i. e._ only so far as the particular feeling or deed -exhibits to the conscience the presence of the ethical quality. It is -an unquestionable fact that in many of the activities of life there -are open alternatives of choice where the question of moral quality is -not raised at all. As, for instance, between taking one path or another -to a certain point, or in writing a letter with a pen or typewriter, -the choice is morally indifferent. The decision involves no ethical -judgment. But in most contemplated action there are relations that -raise the question of right or wrong--in some cases only by remote -implication, in others in clear and burning emphasis. There are degrees -in this respect, all the way from the faintest glimmering of ethical -quality to the boldest and most transparent certainty. We are by no -means entitled to doubt the existence of conscience, because in all -these unequal conditions, with imperfect knowledge of the relations -of particular actions and feelings, it fails to apply its unchanging -affirmations of generic duty, with equal or unmistaken certainty and -exactness, to all the varied motives, feelings and deeds of men. It is -clear how differing moral judgments may occur, without any impeachment -whatever of either the ethical reality or the existence of the faculty -for its discernment. - -==Infallibility Not Involved.== - -Fifthly, we must add that the reality of this faculty, as an essential -endowment of the human soul, by no means involves infallibility in its -action. No one of the human faculties is, in all its range and the -application of its data, absolutely infallible, incapable of error or -of being misled. The sense-perceptions, the memory, the logical power, -the power of applying the notions of time and space, are all liable to -error. Yet these are all original, constitutional and normal faculties -of man, divinely-given guides for his self-direction and suited to the -ends for which they exist. The reality of a faculty is not disproved by -its fallibility. Finiteness, limitation and consequent incompetence to -exclude mistake or only partial discernment, are no reason for denying -the existence of any faculty within the range of its given action and -real discriminations. The very errors that appear in its action are at -once evidence of its existence and proof of limitations which harmonize -it with the aggregate human psychology. The objection against the -conscience from its fallibility, which is but another name for this -diversity in its applicatory judgments, if applied to all the psychical -faculties, would discredit the reality of the aggregate complex of the -psychical powers and overthrow the basis of all our knowledge, even of -that which is employed to effect such overthrow. No diversity occurs -in the primary judgment of distinction between moral good and evil. As -already explained, it is easy to see how differences, varied and great, -should appear in the application of the distinction to the complicated, -obscure and ever-changing aspects and relations of human conduct. - - -==Proofs Independent of Origin.== - -=5.= These proofs of conscience as a distinct endowment of the -human mind are independent of the whole question of the mode of its -origin. For they consist of facts, as clear, peculiar, indisputable -and irreducible as are the facts that guarantee any particular -science whatever. They are capable of verification under perpetual -tests, as they have been verified in the consentient experience of -mankind in all its normally developed conditions. And the logic -of the facts is altogether irrespective of any theory of the mode -of the origin of conscience. It is needful that this point should -be clearly fixed in mind, especially in view of the wide favor at -present shown to the hypothesis of an evolutionary genesis of man. -Except in the materialistic and atheistic form of the hypothesis the -theory distinctly presents evolution not as the cause, but only as -the mode of the creation of man with all his now given endowments. -It is, of course, incumbent on the supporters of the hypothesis, in -any form whatever, in order to vindicate its scientific claims, to -show its competency to account for the existence and action of the -moral faculty with its ethical discernment and law. An hypothesis -that fails to solve any of the involved phenomena discredits itself, -not the facts. So far as the materialistic, non-teleological form of -evolutionism is concerned, which proposes matter and force as the full -cause and account of man, it is condemned by its own utter inadequacy -to explain the genesis of conscience with its moral law, as well as -of the other great psychical realities in the nature and life of -man. It is helpless before the task. Its only resource is to seek to -resolve both the ethical fact and the ethical faculty into illusion. -With respect to theistic evolutionism, which stands simply as an -hypothesis of the mode of creation by God, the existence of the moral -faculty may still be admitted, as having its all-sufficient cause in -the divine creative power as the source of all things. If, instead of -an immediate creation of man, the idea of his gradual creation from -the inferior animal orders be maintained as the actual method of the -divine work, then the law of evolution must be regarded as having been -adjusted and used for the production of man with the faculty of moral -discernment. The teleological principle, everywhere illuminating the -structure of organisms and the constitution of life, must, from the -first, have guided the development for this enthronement of right in -the human personality. Asserting its method of a progressive genesis of -conscience, this kind of evolutionism confesses its existence. Whether -or not its account is satisfactory is another question, to be decided -according to the evidence furnished. It is more than doubtful if it has -yet succeeded in making clear the possibility of its origin under the -hypothesis. Some serious difficulties have still to be overcome.[14] If -it ever does succeed it must be, not by denial of the conscience, but -by showing the evolutionary movement in some way or other competent to -its creation. - -This lengthened presentation of the evidence of the existence of the -conscience as an essential endowment and part of human nature, may -seem to the reader to have been unnecessary or beyond the importance -of the question involved. But, as will appear hereafter, the firm -establishment of this point is vitally needful, in order to exclude -various forms of erroneous teaching and secure a firm and immovable -foundation for a just ethical system. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -THE FACULTY OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS--THE NATURE OF CONSCIENCE. - - -==Right View Necessary.== - -In close connection with the indubitable fact of conscience, as an -essential faculty of the human soul, follows a more careful inquiry -into the nature of this faculty. It is necessary to ascertain -precisely, if possible, what it is as a peculiar psychical power, as -revealed and defined in and by its own action. - - -=1.= The importance of determining, at this place, the exact nature of -the conscience is apparent from two considerations. - -==Scientific Accuracy.== - -(1) Scientific accuracy in the whole ethical view is possible only -through a true and thoroughly accurate understanding of the power that -gives rise to the whole phenomenon of obligation. The final theoretical -view is dependent on finding the truth at this point. Mistake or -inexactness here must inevitably introduce, or at least allow, -confusion or error in all the dependent questions of the science. A -false conception of the conscience will at once mislead. Even an only -partial or obscure view of it will fail to afford sufficient light -for the subsequent steps of the investigation. A conception of it, -with true and false elements combined, must necessarily introduce -perplexity or contradiction and weaken or distort the conclusion. - -Such differing views have in fact introduced the utmost confusion into -the problems of this science. The conscience has sometimes been spoken -of as an "instinct," which identifies it with the non-intelligent, -blind action in the bee which builds cells after geometrical -principles, or in birds or fishes which migrate with the changing -seasons. Often it has been represented as but a special "feeling" or -"sentiment" that arises inexplicably, if not fortuitously, prior to -perception of any ethical quality, itself the basis of judgments of -duty.[15] Again it has been made to stand simply for accumulated or -established approbative judgments from experiences of pleasure or -advantage, transformed and fixed as rules of conduct.[16] Sometimes it -has been regarded as an immediate, almost supernatural "voice of God" -within men, with its inexplicable direct imperative of duty. It is -plain that these and other differing notions of conscience must always -affect, as they always have affected, the whole theory of ethics. - -==Condition of Authority.== - -(2) A right view of its nature is necessary to a correct conception of -its authority. This makes the question more than simply speculative -or important for correct ethical theory. It involves the interests of -practical morality. The right of the conscience to rule us is sustained -or denied according as one or another conception of its nature is -entertained. - -It is natural that we should feel prompted to examine the nature of a -part of our constitution that is constantly obtruding its distinctions -and asserting a ruling authority over us. As it has its place within us -irrespective of our will and presents laws of duty to the will, we want -to see on what ground its asserted authority can be justified. But not -all views of its nature afford equal explanation of this peculiarity -in its action. For instance, if the conscience be nothing but a -blind, irrational "instinct," or a "feeling" without any perception -of reality to give rise or right to the feeling, or if it be but a -standard judgment of prudence or utility from experiences of what has -been helpful or hurtful, perhaps slowly accumulated and hereditarily -transmitted, a clear and rational ground of ethical authority cannot -be made out. Such a power may indicate what is useful, but can, if -this be all, impose on us no obligation. It may tell us what is -pleasurable or desirable, but cannot speak to us concerning the other -question: What is right? It cannot hold us guilty because we may choose -to forego personal advantage or enjoyment. If, however, examination -can show that the conscience is a faculty of actual perception, -discerning a fundamental distinction between right and wrong and an -immutable obligation to apply it in the constituted relations of -life, its rightful authority is at once vindicated. It is seen to be -an authoritative guide in its sphere of perception, as are the other -cognitive powers, each in its own sphere of real knowledge. When it -becomes clear that the moral faculty, in the presence of the existing -conditions and relations of life, perceives what ought to be done, and -what men are obligated to do, and what they cannot disregard without -demerit, ill-desert or guilt, then the right of conscience to direct -conduct is justified. - -At any rate, whether the examination may confirm or discredit this -claim of rightful rulership, the inquiry into the nature of the -conscience is essential to a correct settlement of the great question -of its authority and the grounds of it. - - -==Question of Psychology.== - -=2.= The primary and proper source of information to settle the -question of the nature of this faculty is to be found, not in -speculative theorizing or arbitrary assumptions, but in the actual -working of the human mind. It is a psychological question, and must be -settled, as all psychological questions must, by the facts as they are -discovered in experience and consciousness. The method of inductive -inquiry is here the true and essential one. The full phenomena of -action must be carefully examined, analyzed and traced to their -psychical genesis. Such examination can leave but little doubt in the -conclusion. In the facts of consciousness, as found in connection with -the operations of our minds in the sphere of moral self-determination -and action, the entire movement can be observed, marked and recorded. - - -==Place of Conscience.== - -=3.= In a preliminary way, it must be noted and remembered that the -power and action of conscience can have place only in connection with -the total complex of man's psychical powers. It is not an isolated, -independent faculty in the midst of the different powers of the -soul. This truth will require fuller consideration in another place, -but it is necessary to note it here so far as to show the essential -psychological conditions of conscience. - -The very possibility of such a faculty or power is conditioned in -all the human faculties of intelligence, sensibility and choice, in -which man becomes a moral agent. While the soul or self is a unit, -its powers act under a law of inter-dependence, exhibiting a striking -and beautiful order of conditioning and being conditioned, from the -primary and fundamental forms of activity to those that are highest -and crown all the rest. At the very base and beginning of its action -are sense-perception and consciousness--these furnishing knowledge -of the outer and inner worlds, of the realities and relations in the -system of things in the midst of which man finds himself. Dependent -upon the percepts by the senses and the states of consciousness thus -furnished comes the further capacity of "representative knowledge" in -the forms of memory and the imagination. Only as the original acts of -perception and consciousness have supplied their data, is the memory -or the imagination possible. But the representative power and action -are then necessary to the action of the higher powers. Without memory -the logical power, the discursive function in comparison, judgment -and conclusion, in analysis, synthesis and systemization, would have -no materials and could do no work. The mind could not do this advance -work except upon the basis of work of a different kind done before. -And then, too, the reason, as the power of intuitive or _a priori_ -truths, would be without a knowledge of the phenomenal world, in the -midst of which, or on occasion of the experiences of which, these -_a priori_ truths appear and are seen to be necessary. The various -kinds of knowing exercised by the undivided and indivisible self are -plainly arranged in an ascending order, till at their summit they are -crowned with the intuitional power which we may term, as we here do, -the reason--the power of discerning necessary universal truths. But it -is equally clear that of the powers below the reason--sense-perception -and consciousness furnishing facts objective and subjective, memory -restoring them before the mental eye, and the logical power rushing -to necessary conclusions--none, either singly or together, can stand -for the conscience. Sense and consciousness can give us only what is, -not what ethically ought to be. The memory can but renew to mental -view what was before known. The sense of logical necessity is clearly -different from the perception of moral rightness and obligation. -But the action of these antecedent powers or faculties supplies the -conditions for the existence and action of the conscience--gives -knowledge of the personal self and the relations of life, in the midst -of which moral right and wrong and obligation and duty are developed -and are seen to arise. Upon this knowledge, in which man knows himself -and his relations to the world of which he forms a part, the soul -rises to an outlook in the clear atmosphere of which the reality of -ethical distinctions, duty and responsibility become visible. And -to the crowning power of the reason, as rational insight, must be -assigned the central function of this ethical perception of right and -obligation--somewhat as to it belong, in another field of view, also -the intuitions into the realities of time and space and the categories -of substance, attribute, and causality. - -This position of the conscience as, in its fundamental action, a form -of rational intuition, among the summit forms of the mind's powers, -makes evident its relation of dependence on the entire complex of -psychical faculties which furnish the conditions for its discernments -and imperative. But there is something more. As we shall yet see, its -total function, in guiding the moral life, includes the action of many -of the common functions of both intellect and sensibility. - - -=4.= The specific psychology of the conscience itself, under close and -complete analysis, will disclose the following clearly distinguishable -elements in its action. They reveal the nature of the conscience-power -in its total complex reality. These elements are not separable in fact, -but are distinguishable in the analytic thinking that examines them. - -==Ethical Distinctions.== - -(1) The primary element is a simple irreducible perception of the -distinction between right and wrong. This is the first and fundamental -ethical idea. In it we have the initial point in the moral action -of the mind. "The universal ethical fact is the recognition of a -distinction between right and wrong in conduct."[17] This distinction -appears among the necessary ideas of the human mind. It is a phenomenon -in the psychology of the race. It is developed, in the presence of -the facts and relations of life, as something provided for in the -normal and necessary action of the rational self-conscious _ego_. It -must be viewed as an "intuition" of the reason. It can not otherwise -be accounted for. In its nature it is not a feeling, though it gives -rise to feeling. It is not a volition, for it comes irrespective of -choice and asserts its own rights before the will. It is not a mere -experience, though it arises on occasion of experience. The idea stands -for something beyond experience--experience being limited to the -profitable, the enjoyable or the painful. We experience the useful and -the agreeable, but the right, the ethical idea, must be perceived or -rationally seen, as a super-sensible reality in the ideal realm of the -demands of duty. It is not a perception of relations themselves, but -of a distinction as to something due in human relations and life. - -If we describe this primary and fundamental distinction, as it appears -in the action of the conscience, it will be found marked by the -following characteristics. First, the distinction is perceived--a datum -of the cognitive intellect. As discerned by the knowing faculty, its -object, viz.: the distinction, exists. For knowing always involves that -the thing known is. The distinction between right and wrong is real -in the sphere of moral relations. Second, it is universal, marking -the human mind's action everywhere and in all ages. Third, it cannot -be obliterated. Through all questions about it and objections to its -validity, it remains undestroyed and seemingly indestructible. It -disappears only with the wreck of rationality itself. Fourth, it is -unique and simple, an original perception, incapable of being resolved -into more elementary ideas or deduced from them. Fifth, it is the first -of its kind of discernments, _i. e._ of ethical perceptions. - -==Obligation Perceived.== - -(2) Along with, though dependent on, the perception of the moral -distinction between right and wrong, there is also a perception of -obligation with respect to right and wrong--to do or not to do. This -is an essential part of the aggregate conscience-discernment. The -perception of the right is thus the discovery also of law for conduct. - -The soul, it must be specially noted, perceives this obligation as -truly as it does the ethical distinction itself. The term "obligation" -may express also a feeling, but the _ego_, or personal self, perceives -the obligation before it feels it. For in all cases rational emotion or -feeling can arise in the mind only as the mind discerns something to -awaken it. - -==Belongs to the Agent.== - -It is to be particularly observed, further, that the obligation, thus -perceived and then felt, is perceived and felt as due by the moral -agent with respect to right and wrong. The ethical quality of rightness -belongs to the act or principle of action. The motive, the intention, -the conduct of men, is in itself morally right or wrong, good or evil. -But the obligation appears as what is owed by the moral agent to what -is right. The relation between right and obligation corresponds to -that between right and duty. Right is in the conduct; duty is for -the responsible person. The terms express two sides in the ethical -reality, the first the objective side, the second the subjective. The -two imply and call for each other. The right in the contemplated action -means obligation or duty in the person. To the right there is always a -corresponding duty; for duty in fact expresses what is due to the right -forever by all persons.[18] - -This perception of obligation, with its attendant feeling of it, is -the central reality of the conscience. It is the very core of it. For -in this the moral faculty carries and asserts its "imperative" for the -regulation of conduct. On the basis of the idea of right, it affirms -duty, and brings mankind under the reality and behests of moral law. -The distinction of right and wrong, if conceived of as unattended with -this further discernment of obligation, would manifestly fall short of -establishing the principle of duty or fixing in the soul a conscious -bond to righteousness. But in this further discernment is revealed the -nexus that binds together perceived right and man's responsibility to -it. Hence, this is the cardinal thing in the conscience, for which the -ethical idea prepares, and upon which the moral life rests. It is the -point at which humanity is organized under a moral constitution and the -behests of moral law. It is the sublime endowment in which man's nature -is capacitated for its position, as standing face to face with the -sublimer reality of the divine government over the world. - -It is to be distinctly observed, however, that the "imperative" -disclosed in this perceived obligation, does not mean compulsion. The -idea of "obligation" can have no place where there can be no choice as -to accepting it. The whole sphere of morals, as we have already seen -and shall need often to be reminded, exists, and can exist only in -connection with personality or intelligent free agency. Its realm is -that of freedom. Law in ethics is something in clear contrast with law -in the processes of physical nature. The perception of it is not the -perception of what must be or will be, or shall be, but what ought to -be. Its appeal is to our freedom, and the duty is ideated before it is -performed. - -Further, it is well to observe here again how distinctly peculiar -is this percept of obligation among the data of our cognitive -faculties. The sense-perception notifies us of what is. So does the -consciousness. Memory renews to consciousness a knowledge of what -was. The logical processes reveal abstract relations. That two and -two make four, or that a straight line is the shortest between two -points, or that oxygen and hydrogen united in certain proportions form -water, are truths distinctly known when the mind is directed to these -subjects; but the perception of these truths is without the unique -idea of obligation or the duty of cherishing any particular feeling -or of conforming to a standard of righteousness. Only through the -discernments of right and wrong by the conscience, is there given this -peculiar intuition of the reality of obligation. - -==Moral Quality Identified.== - -(3) A third thing to be marked in this psychological analysis of the -action of conscience, and revealing its nature, is the affirmation of -right or wrong to particular acts or principles of conduct. In this -the function of conscience passes from its fundamental idea into the -form of an applicatory judgment. The ideas of right and obligation -are applied to the actual affairs and activities of life. The quality -of right or wrong is connected with particular actions, feelings or -purposes, and these are affirmed to be right or wrong according as -they have or have not such moral quality. This application is both a -perception and a judgment--a perception in that it sees the ethical -quality in the deed or motive, and a judgment in that it affirms the -connection. These judgments take the forms of approval or disapproval, -as the conduct is discerned to be morally good or bad. It is plain -that such judgments of application would be impossible were there not -in the mind the fundamental ethical distinctions already explained. - -Manifestly these judgments of application belong to the general judging -power of the mind. All knowing may be said to be judging, or at least -tends to take the form of judgment. They are specific here, only with -respect to the material they take account of. They are the acts of the -judging faculty in the sphere of applying the ethical distinctions and -obligations. As a basis for the judgments, not only must the ethical -distinction exist in the mind, but the action or conduct to be judged -must be seen or understood in all its essential relations and motives. -As duties are developed by relations, the moral character of the -contemplated conduct or deed cannot be determined apart from a correct -knowledge of those relations. The judging capacity will err without the -light of true and full information concerning the place and purposes -of the action. And its insights and affirmations will vary in their -approximation to entire correctness according to the degree in which -all the elements entering into the particular conduct are understood -and considered. - -==Merit and Demerit Perceived.== - -(4) The action of the conscience includes also perception of merit -and demerit in connection with conduct. The meaning of these terms -needs to be carefully defined and limited. They express something more -than the simple approval or disapproval already noted in connection -with the discernment of the rightness or wrongness of an action. The -terms stand for a step of discernment and judgment beyond these, and -denote the ethical reality of good-desert or ill-desert for the moral -agent who conforms to rightness, or offends against its claims. He who -conforms deserves well; he that offends deserves ill. They, therefore, -mark distinctly and definitely the point in the psychology of the -conscience where the faculty discerns that those who do right ought to -receive favor and those who do wrong ought to experience disfavor. They -express a principle of just consequences. The principle is, that for -right conduct good is due, for wrong done evil is due. The wrong-doer -is guilty, _i. e._ justly subject to punitive action. His deed deserves -it for him. On the other hand doing right is worthy of reward, or of -the good that befits the good done. The conscience discerns and affirms -this reality of good and evil-desert. - -Here is reached the psychological source of the great fact of -responsibility in the world. It emerges into consciousness and into -actual force in human life from this point in the disclosures and -affirmations of the moral sense. Hence arises the unspeakably varied -but ever persistent human necessity under which men are compelled -to regard themselves and others as justly amenable to the law of -moral consequences. Its application is seen in every sphere of life, -personal, domestic, social, and national. A moral administration is -seen in the world only as the administration is found to be conformed -to and carrying out the principle of distributing good according to -moral desert. Any failure in the adjustment of recompense or given good -under this idea is felt to be a lapse from justice and proper order. It -stands as something abnormal and monstrous. So firmly does the decision -of conscience establish this principle of happy consequences as due to -right conduct and punitive effects to wrong-doing, so strongly does it -fix the conviction that the divine administration must on the whole -adjust award and happiness on this basis, that thoughtful philosophers -have ever been wont to find here one of the most assuring guarantees of -a future life in which the fragmentary justice of this world will be -filled out in fully given recompense. - -It must be noted, as is apparent, that this merit or demerit does not -belong to men's acts, but to themselves as the moral agents. To action -and conduct pertain the moral qualities of rightness and wrongness, but -what is done is itself altogether impersonal and not responsible for -its own occurrence. The doer of the deed deserves whatever good or evil -is due in connection with it. - -The practical application of this principle of moral desert is found -to be almost infinitely varied, both with respect to the import of -the principle and the measure of merit and demerit. With respect -to its _import_, good desert may mean simply that he who chooses -the morally right is entitled to his own self-approbation and the -approval of others and the moral excellence which he thus prefers. -Or it may signify various degrees and kinds of more positive reward -which the divine constitution and moral administration of the -world may be adjusted to give in the way of happiness and the best -external conditions of existence. On the other hand, the demerit of -the wrong-doer may mean anything he deserves, from the simple loss of -the moral good which he does not choose, to the extremest penalties, -objective and subjective, which a righteous divine government may have -to employ for the repression of wickedness. In its import, both merit -and demerit may refer to endlessly varied experiences and forms of -good and evil. With respect to the _measure_ of merit and demerit and -the adjustment of due recompense, a similar wide range of difference -must be recognized when we come to the application of the principle -to human acts and conduct. Conformity to right and offense against it -are exhibited in myriad degrees under conditions as varied as are the -positions and relations and inner state of all the individuals of the -race. The very nature of different persons is in unequal adjustment -to virtue and vice. Environment, too, brings stronger temptations to -some than to others. Hereditary forces and early training strengthen -or weaken the moral perceptions and forces. Thousands of differences -perplex the attempt to equate the measure of moral desert to men. It -can be determined only in full and perfect view of all the conditions -within and the relations surrounding the moral agent; and the -apportionment of the due award, it would seem, can be perfectly made -only by a being of infinite knowledge and justice. - -The measurement of merit and demerit is, however, but another form -of judgments of application, in which the moral sense can act in only -approximate determinations. Here variation and uncertainty find place. -But there can be none as to the fact of good desert and guilt where -right and wrong are done. - -==Emotions Awakened.== - -(5) Emotions or feelings, awakened by the perceptions of right -and wrong, obligation, merit and demerit, complete the action of -conscience. These feelings are peculiar and original, unlike the -feelings springing from any other perceptions and incapable of being -resolved into or deduced from others. Psychologically, it is to be -remembered, feeling is in no case a part of perception or cognition, -but an additional psychical action of a different kind. "A purely -cognitive intelligence might have perfect knowledge of things and -their relations to itself; it might know that things, or courses of -action, would destroy its own existence; it might even know that its -own existence was about to be destroyed; but this knowledge alone -would imply no feeling. Such intellect would be like a mirror; it -would accurately reflect all that passed before it; but it would be as -indifferent as the mirror."[19] But knowing is followed by feeling, a -different kind of action of the soul. This is not its action in the -form of intellect, but in the form of sensibility. It is action of -another order--not itself a cognition, but arising out of cognition. -This is the place and relation of these moral feelings. They are -awakened in the soul by and through the ethical perceptions. They are -determined by these, and form the final element in the total action of -the conscience. - -These moral feelings, while they form one class, as having their origin -in the ethical discriminations, exhibit distinguishing differences. -These differences develop in a twofold way, presenting special forms of -feeling. They must be noted as they differ by these two conditions of -their development. - -==Correspondent to Right or Wrong.== - -First, according as the moral quality, the perception of which awakens -them, is good or evil. The soul cannot discern the great distinctions -between right and wrong without correspondent emotional awakening. The -sensibility is moved by the perception, and takes the form of a feeling -of approval for the morally good, and a feeling of reprobation for -the wrong. Our language furnishes no single term to designate either -of these feelings, but this phraseology is sufficiently descriptive -to point them out. The feeling toward the right may be denoted as -moral love; that toward wrong as moral aversion. When the quality -of rightness or wrongness is exhibited in specially intense degree -in particular conduct, the feelings may take the form of ethical -admiration or of abhorrence. - -==Before and After Action.== - -Secondly, as arising before or after the moral action. If the feeling -is awakened in view of action proposed to be done, it may be described, -in the absence of a more specific designation, as a sense of obligation -to do or not to do the deed--this feeling of obligation being based on -a perception of the obligation. From the intellectual discernment the -emotional sensibility springs as a sentiment which forms part of the -impelling force of conscience. When the feeling arises with respect -to an act already done, it takes the nature of ethical satisfaction, -a peculiar pleasure in which are blended a sense of self-approbation -and of joy, if the deed be right; of self-reproach and remorse, if -wrong. Remorse--"a gnawing sense of guilt," whether the feeling be -the slightest disquiet of emotion or of agonizing and unsolaceable -compunction--appears to be the aptest term to express this state of -mind. - -==Differences of Degree.== - -Besides the differences thus arising, there are differences in the -degree or intensity of these moral feelings. Innumerable causes may -affect the differences in this respect. Personal temperament, acquired -character, or external conditions may make the feeling greater or less. -The mental organization of some persons is more emotional. Education -may have given a peculiar development. Temporary circumstances may -heighten the excitation. But other things being equal the degree of -positiveness in the moral emotions is generally dependent on two -things: (_a_) the clearness with which the moral distinction and -the consequent obligation is discerned, and (_b_) the pureness and -tenderness of the person's moral nature. If the ethical idea and -obligation are unclearly seen or hardly seen at all, the impression in -the feelings must be comparatively slight. But if seen under strong -light and with their supreme import, the intuition impresses with -greater force. So, too, the state of the whole moral nature is a -reason of higher or lower moral sensibility. The more unblighted is the -condition of personal life, the more is it responsive to the ethical -discernment. Habitual refusal of duty, easy and indifferent familiarity -with wrong-doing, or any continued enslavement of the higher nature to -the lower, necessarily blunts the delicateness of the sensibilities and -lowers the strength of the moral feelings. The process of injury may -go on until a condition of callousness is reached which fulfils the -striking description: "Seared as with a hot iron." - -==Motive Power.== - -It is through these feelings that the conscience becomes a motive power -for moral life. The perception of duty alone, as purely intellectual, -would be, as said, "like a mirror accurately reflecting the ethical -reality passing before it, but as indifferent as the mirror." But upon -the perception the emotional nature springs into action. Knowledge, if -at all, always goes into effect mediately through the sensibilities -in which the soul is stirred by affections and desires. These may be -toward moral good as truly as toward sensuous good. We may love the -true and the beautiful and the right. We may love the right as right. -According to our choices we make the ethically good our own and mould -our life into its excellence and blessedness, or the contrary. These -feelings are motive powers, bringing occasions for choices. - -It is proper to take note, however, that it is only the feelings in -view of the right or wrong of an act yet to be done, that are directly -moral motives. For it is only through these that we are face to face -with the question of choosing or refusing the right in the proposed -conduct. The feelings that arise, as satisfaction or remorse after -wrong acts, have no existence till the conduct is in retrospect, -and can have no motive force for it. And when memory brings these -experiences as motives for subsequent conduct, they stand mainly, if -not wholly, as considerations for enjoyment. They are not feelings of -pure obligation to rightness, but remembrances of pleasure or pain -influential as prompting or dissuading on the lower ground of comfort. -There is a generic and indelible difference between the feeling of -duty, under the pure behests of right, and the natural desire to gain -the enjoyment or avoid the misery which we have learned to anticipate -from experiences in conduct. In the one case it presents love of the -right as right; in the other a love of the more agreeable consequences -of right. Unquestionably, indeed, a desire of the better consequences -is a proper motive for choices. In these consequences virtue is proving -its adaptation to bring its own reward. But the merit of virtue is not -in seeking the reward, but in seeking virtue itself. The mercenary -spirit is not the love of righteousness, nor as high as it. - - -=5.= This analysis makes clear the following characteristics of the -conscience. - -==Conscience is Intellectual.== - -First, it is primarily and fundamentally intellectual. It is a power -of rational perception. It perceives, in direct or intuitive way, the -primary ethical distinction between right and wrong, perceives the -quality of rightness or wrongness in particular acts or conduct, -perceives the obligation of the moral agent with respect to right and -wrong, as also the merit or demerit of the moral agent. But along with -and blended in inseparable concurrence, moves the function of the -sensibility, in feelings of approval and obligation, satisfaction or -remorse. Both the intellectual and emotional action of the soul are, -therefore, included in what is named the conscience--the perceptive -action, here as everywhere else, being primary and conditional for the -emotional. If there were no ethical distinction perceived, none would -be felt. The conscience, taken in its totality, thus includes both -sides of the human psychology, the intellect and the sensibility, and -it addresses its behests of duty to the will in its own peculiar way of -moral law for conduct. - -The strife between intuitional theories and sentimental theories of -conscience is, therefore, composed by the concurrence of both knowing -and feeling in the action of this power. But the intellectual part -is necessarily logically prior to the emotional, and conditional for -it. To make a feeling of obligation the basal fact in the psychology -of conscience would be an inversion of the whole order of dependence -revealed in consciousness. And, surely, the feelings here developed -are rational, not physiological sensations. They cannot, for a moment, -be identified with the physical sensations which condition the -sense-perceptions. Their true place is among the rational emotions. - -==Sole Percept Moral Quality.== - -Secondly, the sole object of perception by the conscience is moral -quality--the quality of rightness or wrongness, together with the -correspondent obligation. It is something supersensible and ideal; not -actions themselves as known by sense, but their quality as morally good -or evil as discovered by the ethical reason. The thing discerned by the -conscience is generically different from the things discerned by the -sense-perception or consciousness. Through our senses we know the whole -world of objective existences, events and their relations; through -consciousness the states, acts and experiences of the subjective -personal self are given. But the conscience does not furnish us with -a knowledge of any of the substances, events or relations which -constitute the world about us or the world within us, but solely of the -moral quality of conduct and sentiment, as duty is developed in these -relations. It takes notice of the ethical character of the actions and -motives of intelligent and responsible beings. - -==Conscience Acts of Necessity.== - -Thirdly, the action of the conscience is marked by necessity. And by -this we are to understand something more than the simple uniformity in -which all the psychical activity, except that of the choices of the -will, is held under "fixed laws of thought and feeling." The necessity -here affirmed is that unique necessity which distinguishes and marks -intuitive or _a priori_ cognition, as of time, space, and causality. -"Necessity" is justly conceded to be one of the criteria of these and -other intuitional "first truths." It is not at the option of the human -mind whether it will think the world under the relations of time and -space, or events as occurring under the principle of causation. These -are "forms of knowledge," knowledge of super-sensible realities, that -come not at our choice but by an unavoidable insight. The primary and -fundamental ethical distinction belongs to such rational intuition, -and is marked by the peculiar necessity of intuitional action. As -on occasion of knowing material bodies with three dimensions, or of -changes in consciousness or in the outer world, with the fact of -co-existence or succession and duration, the phenomenal sphere is -necessarily transcended and time and space are necessarily discerned, -so when we understand the manifold relations in which our lives are to -be lived, in which we may use our personal powers, either in harmony -with or in violation of our given adaptations, and with either great -injury or rich good to others, in the same necessary way the conscience -must discern the distinction of right and wrong and the reality of duty. - -The great implication in this necessity, as we shall hereafter see in -examining the nature of virtue, is that the principle of righteousness -or the law of duty is something that belongs to the objective order -of the world as constituted by God, a divine reality permanent and -immutable, not produced but perceived by the conscience. It is not -made by man but finds him--finds him through the intelligence by which -he is informed of the realities to which he must adjust his life. -Moral law stands for a reality that rays itself into view in the human -reason whether men will or not. The intuitions of it do not come at -the call, or desire, or even at the consent of man. The law revealed -stands independent of the individual's personality or choices and -asserts itself over him. While this is true of the law revealed, the -perception of the law becomes a necessity with the moral agent that is -normally endowed and developed. Man does not furnish the moral law to -himself. He is not the giver of it, but the recipient. The conscience, -therefore, is an open window of our being, through which the objective -law of righteousness to which the Creator has adjusted our nature and -the constitution of the universe may be discerned by us, a sphere -of reality enfolding us, with which our freedom is to harmonize our -conduct. Francis Newman has admirably marked the position of this -conscience-power in our constitution: - - "This energy of life within is ours, yet it is not we. - It is in us, belongs to us, yet we cannot control it, - It acts without our bidding, and when we do not think of it, - Nor will it cease its acting at our command, or otherwise obey - us, - But while it recalls from evil, and reproaches us for evil, - And is not silenced by our effort, surely it is not _we_; - Yet it pervades mankind, as one life pervades the trees."[20] - -The reason of these intuitions of the conscience is that back of it -and around it and above it is a realm of moral obligations which must, -without contingency, be made known to us, that we may order our lives -aright. - - -==Erroneous Theory.== - -=6.= It is proper at this place to express dissent from some forms of -theory which are at variance with the truth thus brought to light. -Almost all of them are the outcome of the philosophical phenomenalism -of which Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is the best illustration. It -discredits the competency of our cognitive faculties to reach knowledge -of things as they really are. We can know, it is said, only phenomena, -while the noumena or things in themselves are incognizable; and -doubt is raised whether there is a reality corresponding to what our -faculties report. It is suggested that the data of these faculties, -especially in the forms of intuition and universal judgments, may -be mere "forms of thought," forms of knowing but not of real being, -created within as well as by the mind itself, and projected thence in -connection with apprehended phenomena. They may be mental fictions -in whole or in part, in which the ideal must not be held as standing -for actual being. Thus while time and space are necessary "forms of -thought" under which all bodies and events must be known, yet time -and space, it is alleged, may be but subjective forms given to the -phenomena by and in the cognitive action. We are obliged, indeed, -it is conceded, in practical life to follow the guidance of our -necessary forms of thought. But the knowledge is merely regulative -for present activity; and being a product created and shaped largely -by the particular organization of our minds, this merely relative and -regulative perception of truth may be different in other minds or be -hereafter so changed as to present changed phenomena, superseding -the judgments now given by other judgments under other views. When -the adherents of the Positive Philosophy proceed to define matter -as merely "a permanent possibility of sensations,"[21] faith in the -reliability of our knowledge of the realities about us, as true for -those realities, is thoroughly undermined. This tendency toward an -invalidating of our knowledge as real for objective truth, has been -fostered by recent physiological psychology which, under materialistic -implications, magnifies the effect of the physical organization and -condition upon the mental products. In these ways extreme idealism and -positive materialism join hands in effort to reduce to uncertainty -or illusion what our cognitive faculties perceive of reality and -truth in both the material and moral systems about us. But ethical -science, in harmony with the soundest and best sustained philosophy of -the Christian centuries, rejects these agnostic suggestions, as not -only unproved but untenable. They form a theory of our intellectual -faculties which cuts away the foundations of all knowledge, even -of that which is most clear, fixed, necessary and unchangeable -in the intelligence of the race. The theory becomes intellectual -suicide, as it nullifies the real validity of all the fundamental -perceptions of both sense and reason, on which its own conclusion -rests. Its suggestions discredit themselves by confessing that their -own foundation is but a part of the illusory, phantasmal action of -faculties which, instead of perceiving what is, present but forms which -they produce. While it is conceded that, even on this agnostic basis, -the conscience would still possess "regulative" authority--as it still -asserts its imperative "ought" for life--yet rational ethics, like -self-respecting philosophy, must not vacate for our cognitive faculties -the great function of knowing while attempting to exercise it, nor -fail to maintain that they have been organized for real knowledge, -within the sphere and measure opened to them, of the genuine realities -with which we have to do, in both the material and moral worlds. The -conscience, therefore, must be held, not as formative of its peculiar -phenomena, but perceptive of the ethical realities of right and -obligation. - - -==Consistent with Theistic Evolution.== - -=7.= It is proper also to point out here that this view of the -nature of the conscience is not necessarily affected by the question -of its evolutionary origin. Should the theory of man's derivative -origin, under some form of theistic and teleological evolution, ever -pass from its position as an hypothesis into that of scientific -truth, this would not require us essentially to alter our account -of the nature of this faculty. For the nature of the faculty has -not been found in considerations of the mode of its origin, but -from analysis of the elemental facts in its action. The adherents -of the evolution hypothesis have, indeed, found one of their most -formidable difficulties in attempting a satisfactory explanation of a -possible origination of this faculty in the assumed forces and laws -of evolutionary action. Keeping in view the fact that the very center -of the conscience-function appears in regulation and often in denial -of inherited feelings and habits, the difficulty of attributing its -creation to hereditary action is clearly seen and deeply felt. It -has been well pointed out that "the injunctions of conscience do not -run with the stream of our hereditary tendencies, but rather against -them."[22] That a law of the work and victory of hereditary forces -should issue in organizing an endowment for control and repression of -hereditary tendencies, seems to involve too much of a contradiction -to be accepted. That the survival of the strongest in the battle of -individual existence, the reign of "tooth and talon," should gradually -create a faculty for asserting the obligation and law of love and -kindness to the weak, fails to come properly under our conception of -the working of cause and effect.[23] Even in the theistic form of -the theory, in which evolution offers itself as presenting not the -cause but only the mode of creation, it is hard to conceive of the -adaptation of such a process for the production of such a result--a -result standing apart from the means by a total difference in both -their nature and direction. It is as if the flow of the stream should -create the principle of repression of flowing. The actual attempts of -evolutionist writers to construct an ethical view which shall explain -the phenomena of conscience and justify its authority, has added -further evidence of the difficulty on this point. No such attempts -have thus far been satisfactory. But the nature of the conscience, as -has already been shown, is properly settled, not by the mode of its -origin, but by an examination of its actual psychology and intrinsic -powers. If this makes it clear, as it unquestionably does, that it is -primarily intellectual and percipient in its function, then any failure -of evolution or any other theory to explain its origin must much -rather discredit the theory than disprove the nature of the endowment -which stands as a fact. But an origin of the conscience by evolution, -should it ever be proved, would introduce no trouble at this point in -the science of ethics. For the faculty is competent for its office in -virtue of what it is, and not by the mode through which the divine -creative power worked in its formation. The necessity in the case would -be met should the evolutionary mode be shown to be capable of evolving -an intellectual endowment high enough in perceptive power to discern -the ethical distinctions and bind their obligations on men. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -THE SUPREMACY OF CONSCIENCE. - - -By the supremacy of conscience is meant its right to exercise moral -control. It expresses its proper authority. This authority is not -to be thought of as original or independent, but as resting on and -revealing the absolute authority of God, who has constituted the moral -relations of the world and has set the conscience, with its discerning -and regulative function, in the human soul. The question involved is -not the right of one merely subjective faculty to impose obligation on -another faculty or on all the human capacities and powers--one part -of the personal self playing the role of sovereign over the other -parts. This would be a shallow and misleading notion of this authority. -The whole conception of the conscience is theistic, and implies, as -it also testifies to, an absolute law of righteousness over all the -world, established by Him who is creator and sovereign of all. It is -in the discernment of this principle of rightness, with its demand -for obedience to it, that the conscience comes into its position of -authority and its authority becomes _de jure_ supreme. - - -=1.= But the proof that such authority rightly belongs to it needs to -be more fully exhibited. It is explained and made unquestionable in the -following facts: - -==Its Sphere of Judgments.== - -(1) It is involved in the very sphere of its discernments. This sphere -is the sphere of right and duty, which, by very conception, subordinate -everything else. Its primary perception is of "the right," as having -claim on every rational free agent--and then of obligation which -immediately presses its moral requirement into the presence of our -capacity for conformity to it. There is, indeed, a degree of authority -belonging to each and all the psychical faculties, in the functions -they fulfil for the direction and welfare of life. But the peculiarity -of the conscience is that the realm of its functions and direction -is higher than that of the other powers, the realm in which manhood -reaches its supreme purpose and worth. Moral goodness, excellence -of character, is the summit of the ascent to which human nature is -adapted. In this our nature reaches the "supreme" and all-inclusive -"good," compared with which all things else are of inferior claim -and merit. The authority of the conscience, as a faculty, is thus -identified with the supremacy which belongs to the idea of the morally -right, of obligation, duty, the irrepealable "ought" for the conduct of -life. - -==Shown by Nature of Action.== - -(2) This is more distinctly apparent when we recall the nature of its -action. Psychologically, the conscience does not stand as a thing of -our own personal will, or as in any way making the obligation which it -presents. When we examine it, as it appears in our consciousness, its -movement is in the form of a necessary perception of an obligation -that is upon us irrespective of our will, a law of duty not of our -own framing, but imposing itself on us and demanding the homage of -our will. It possesses its authority, therefore, in the fact that it -is the discernment of something higher than our will or ourselves, a -principle transcending our personality and appearing as supreme law for -our life and conduct. And the law connotes a lawgiver and a judge. The -conscience thus puts us in the presence of One who has sovereign and -absolute right to rule in us and over us. It thus becomes authoritative -by its being the power or faculty through which is made known to us the -principle or law of righteousness which God has established for the -moral order of the world.[24] - -==The Contrary is Absurd.== - -(3) These facts, at once psychologically and metaphysically well -certified, would themselves be sufficient to explain and vindicate the -peculiar right of supremacy almost universally conceded to belong to -the moral sense. But the proof, thus given, is confirmed by the fact -that the contrary conclusion involves a manifest absurdity. - -In the first place, it is incredible to suppose that man, as an -intelligent, rational, free agent, capable of character, should have no -provision in his mental make-up, no faculty of knowledge, furnishing a -principle of guidance for meeting the responsibilities of life. For, -such an absence of endowment for this purpose, would necessarily mean, -either that responsibility is an illusion, a conclusion belied by the -hard fact that the organization of human life inexorably treats and -exacts it as real, or that man's nature is constructed in a falsehood, -being bound to a high task for which it contains no endowment. -Somewhere, therefore, among the human faculties, must appear a power -or complex of powers whose disclosures or impulses shall furnish -a rightful principle of control. To say that there is no rightful -principle--that the morally good has no more right than the morally -bad--would be not only absurd to reason, but fly in the face of the -spontaneous and ineradicable sense of mankind, which makes the moral -distinction. - -Further: While the authority for self-control, to meet the ethical task -and responsibilities of life, must thus be found somewhere in man's -constitution, careful consideration makes it also clear that the right -of supremacy cannot be attributed to any other capacity, function or -impulse of our nature. The well-known _argumentum ad absurdum_ is fully -applicable here. - -Besides the conscience itself, the only other motive-forces for conduct -are the physiological appetites, the desires for enjoyment, and the -benevolent affections. The right of supreme control cannot be supposed -to belong to the physical appetites and passions. The supremacy of -these would be subversive of character and deadly to personal and -social welfare. This is not simply the judgment of reason, but a fact -attested by the most melancholy experiences in which blight and woe -have fallen on men. Nor can the right of ruling authority belong to -the desire of enjoyment. When this dominates it becomes the reign of -selfishness, which, according to the consent of mankind, is utterly -inconsistent with the development of noble character, or the discharge -of those inter-human duties on which both individual and social -well-being depends. It forms the soul of anarchy, in which the family, -society, and the state would be dissolved. The true excellence and -happiness of man would be impossible. The rulership of this class of -motive forces is thus inconsistent with the highest and best ends to -which his nature has been correlated. - -Nor can the supremacy belong to the benevolent affections. These, -summed up in the word love, are indeed very high and must be regarded -as among the worthiest and best elements of character and principles -of action. "God is love," and so near does love come to being the -very essence of virtue, that it is declared to be "the fulfilling -of the law." But the "love" that God is said to be is not alone in -His character, nor does it rule without regard to holiness, justice, -purity, or righteousness. It cannot be conceived as subordinating these -to a desire to make creatures happy. On the other hand we are obliged -to think of love as able to confer its favors only in accordance with -the principle of righteousness. Even in its supreme exhibition, in the -salvation of men, in giving its gifts, it could only act through a -way that declared the divine righteousness while granting forgiveness -to those that repent and forsake wrong. In human life, the love that -in its own degree and order helps to the fulfillment of the law is -not alone, or unregulated, or superior to the principle of duty, of -truth, purity and holiness. It cannot get above these, but is itself -right only when it holds its ends, of making its objects happy, in -subordination to what is morally good. We must remind ourselves exactly -what the supremacy of the benevolent affections would mean. Unless -guided in the action through which they reach their object, they -would subject everything to their own ends and take no account of the -character of the ways and means, as right or wrong. As unregulated love -they would lack an essential element for the office of moral control. -If it be true, as it unquestionably is, that some things are wrong, -no matter how lovingly they may be done, the benevolent affections -cannot be the supreme guide for even the loving activities of life. -Blind affection may run, as it does in thousands of relations and -instances, into the widest departures from good character and into -gross vices. However high the benevolent feeling may be as a motive, -all its purposes and the activities through which these purposes are -accomplished need the guidance of the law of righteousness, if they -are to be maintained in harmony with essential virtue, holy character -and human welfare. Their function must therefore be held subordinate -to the authority of conscience as the capacity through which the -law of rectitude, with its obligation, is presented and kept before -the mental view. This conclusion does not remove love from its high -position, at the very summit of things that are right and good and -essential for character. It allows it to stand, as it does all other -springs of action, in its full rights and value among human motives and -virtues in determining duty in conduct. But it is the conscience, and -not love itself, that judges and decides the obligation to it and the -high rank that ought to be given it as an element of character. Thus -the regulative function, even for benevolence, belongs to the ethical -sense, through perception of what sentiments and acts are right in -conduct. And so the peculiar business of the conscience is to watch all -the forces of our nature and keep each in its place. - -The view which gives the right of moral control to the conscience is -thus vindicated by the plain fact that there is no other faculty or -spring of action in the human constitution adapted to this function, so -unquestionably requisite for the order and welfare of life. - - -==Difficulties.== - -=2.= An apparent difficulty, however, arises in connection with this -conclusion. It calls for a brief consideration, lest it should be -thought to form a refutation of the correctness of our view: - -It comes from the acknowledged fallibility of the conscience. This -seems, at first sight, inconsistent with a right to such ruling -authority. If its discernment of duty in particular relations may -not be fully clear and is liable to be misled, how can it be justly -regarded as having this authoritative office? If its applicatory -judgments are often found erroneous and need to be revised and -superseded by better judgments, can we fairly hold it as charged -with such regulative function? In different men, as already stated, -it exhibits differing and even conflicting directions. In different -nations and times its indications of duty fail to agree. Advance -in civilization, knowledge and culture is marked by higher ethical -standards, modifying, if not reversing, former judgments. But this -large fact, so unquestionable and, apparently, so formidable, becomes, -when analyzed, easily reconcilable with the position of authority -given to the conscience-discernments and imperatives. For a faculty -may be highest in human nature, and yet, like every other capacity, -limited. Its functional action may be comparatively undeveloped, or -may be strengthened and clarified. In its applicatory judgments, for -fixing the ethical law of right in all the varied and complex relations -and conditions of human life, it is dependent on all the subordinate -faculties for the requisite light. Whatever limitations may rest on -its ability, whatever partialness may mark its development, whatever -complications may perplex it in adjusting duty to all the actual -situations in human life, it yet remains the faculty through which -the law of duty is disclosed to view, and if duty is not indicated -through it, it is not indicated through any human insight at all. But -no faculty loses its own particular special authority in its own place -by its natural limitations and liability to error. Authority must not -be confounded with infallibility. Despite its fallibility every faculty -of the soul carries the authority for its own psychical office--the -intellect for knowledge, the sensibility for feeling, the will for -choices. The sense-perception has decisive authority for phenomena -about us, the logical faculty for just conclusions from given data, -the memory for recall of past experiences, the intuitional reason for -axiomatic truths and first principles. If the liability to error in -the psychic functions and their application to the myriad conditions -in which their immediate data are used, does not vacate their place of -authority in their spheres, no more does the similar liability vacate -the unique authority of the conscience, which it has by its action in -the supreme realm of the right and of moral obligation. Its position -of authority in its sphere remains, and remains supreme, because the -sphere of its action and discernments is, as pointed out, the supreme -sphere of eternal righteousness and obligation. - -But a further question arises at this point. If it is sometimes in -error and, like an imperfect watch, gives an incorrect indication, -should the conscience always be followed? Does not this fact, if it -does not wholly take away its right to supremacy, at least modify the -positiveness of our duty to follow its dictates? This has sometimes -been a perplexing casuistic question. But the perplexity arises from -failure to keep in mind the precise points involved in the problem, and -to take account of the whole process through which particular duties -become apparent and obligatory. Since the decision of the conscience, -when rightly and fully reached, is, at the time it is given and as to -the point it decides, the soul's conviction as to what is right and -duty, to violate or disregard it becomes necessarily the very essence -of the immoral spirit and conduct. To go contrary to what the soul -sees as duty, through the only capacity it has for knowing it, is -essentially moral rottenness. Whewell's statement: "To disobey the -commands and prohibitions of conscience, under any circumstances, is -utterly immoral: it is the very essence of immorality,"[25] is hardly -too emphatic. To some writers this has seemed extravagant, in view -of the fact that some of the greatest wrongs and foulest crimes of -history, such as the burning of Latimer and Ridley, the St. Bartholomew -massacre, the gun-powder plot, might be palliated or even justified -under the plea of conscientiousness in the perpetrators.[26] But the -reconciliation of this seeming conflict between conscience and real -duty is made plain by remembering two things: - -First, that the conscience, being a complex faculty or power, its -particular judgments of duty in particular cases, being judgments -of application of the principle of rightness, are reached often -through very complex processes, in which the obscuration of imperfect -information, or misconception of the relations involved, or the -misleading effect of prejudice created by wrong training, or some -falsely imagined divine authority, may leave not only a state of doubt -as to duty, but throw the decision into error. Examples of the process -occur in daily experience. A question of duty is presented. We come to -it with sincere, honest mind, and study it by taking into consideration -all the facts and relations concerned. We get all the light we can, -and we decide what the moral principle requires of us. This is the -course that fair dealing with ourselves and duty requires us to pursue. -But suppose that, after all this, in the fallibility of the applicatory -judgments, we are thus led to do the very thing that "ought not" to be -done, and violate instead of fulfil the duty which the actual relations -call for from us. The following of conscience may thus have put "wrong" -conduct, objectively viewed, in place of the "right" conduct which was -due from us in the case. The deed, in its external form and bearing, -may have been unfitting and one that ought not to have been done. But -this is not the whole view or full account of the matter. For though, -while in obeying our fallible conscience, we have thus failed to bring -our whole outward action in the case into harmony with full duty, or -have even done what to others about us or to God above us was wrong, -we have maintained our own subjective personal moral integrity, in -maintaining that which is the fundamental and essential element of -all morality, the right intention and effort. This is the prime and -the grandest element of all moral character, and is itself more than -"four-fifths of conduct." There is such a thing as being innocent -even when we have done what, viewed objectively, ought not to have -been done. The aim, in genuine integrity of moral purpose, was to do -right. The deed was a mistake. The moral status in which we may thus be -placed as a result of following our conscience, is, ethically, at the -opposite pole from that which we make ours when we disregard duty as -fixed for us in and by our own moral judgments. This is disobedience to -obligations as perceived and felt--an attitude in its nature immoral. - -Secondly, the crimes and wrongs often attributed to obeying the -conscience are, probably, not fairly credited to the action of -conscience at all. We must distinguish what men, even conscientious -men, have done or do in the name of conscience, and what the moral -judgment itself has pointed out and urged as duty. It is safe to -affirm that nearly all these crimes have come not by the light and -dictates of the conscience, but by its suppression. There are, as all -history, observation and experience testify, many other strong and -bad motive-forces in human nature. The appetites and passions, the -lusts of ambition, the desire of wealth and power, the striving for -place and fame, the willfulness of selfishness and prejudice, are -forever suggesting their objects, filling the soul with their varied -and plausible pleadings, until life is driven hither and thither under -the restless forces. In some men these forces hardly allow any place -for the conscience to act. Not from the intuition of the moral sense -or the force of conscience, but from the suggestion and direction of -other motives, come the crimes that are credited to zeal inspired by -conscience. Conscience is not at the helm in this business. The wrongs -are a result of failure to consult its dictates--of the force and -direction of other elements and tendencies of action in human nature. -It was not conscience that burnt Latimer and Ridley, but intolerant -fanatical hate, hot passion ruling the hour. It was not conscience -that made St. Bartholomew's day full of cruelty, blood and horror, -but prejudice, hatred, the unreasoning rush of excited passions. It -may, indeed, seem plausible to say "that day was made by the Church's -conscience asserting the duty of repressing or overthrowing heresy." -And it is conceivable that that conscience should testify against -the evil of heresy, and the duty of endeavoring to overcome it. But -the suggestion of torture, blood and slaughter as the means of such -repression, was not the work of conscience. Its guidance was thrust -aside in that conduct. For this use of violence, cruelty and murder, -with all their repulsive horrors, conscience did not give the command, -even as God did not. - -The truth with respect to the authority of conscience may be summed -up as its right to control our lives in all things involving moral -quality or character. Specifically: (1) In the regulation of our -physical appetencies; (2) In the use to which we put our intellectual -endowments and capacities; (3) In the direction and relations in which -we use our emotional and affectional capacities, embracing our natural -disposition, desires and aims; (4) In deciding our choices or the way -we use our power of free self-determination, covering our intentions -and aims; and (5) In the use we make of our capacities for physical -action by which thought, feeling and the preferences of choice are -turned into conduct which either fulfils or violates the duties which -are evolved by our relations to being around us or above us. - -The authority of conscience touches at each and all of these different -points, because at each and all human life is taking shape in moral -character, as either conformed to duty or variant from it. Our personal -life is, in its deepest reality, a single self-conscious unit, and -the action of all its capacities and powers needs to be rhythmically -adjusted to the morally good. But the imperative of the conscience -addresses itself pre-eminently and peculiarly to the will, or the -personal self as free in choosing, and thus capable of directing and -using all the personal capacities and functions. It is upon the self -as free-will, as the self-determining and directive power, that the -responsibility for the conduct of life is thrown, and through it, if at -all, the responsibility is to be met. - -And this authority becomes supreme not by any arbitrary right of one -subjective faculty over another or over all the rest, but from the fact -of the supremacy of what the conscience discerns and discloses, the -authority of right over wrong, the obligation to eternal righteousness. -Righteousness is king. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -MORAL AGENCY. - - -Our consideration of the great truth of the distinction between right -and wrong which marks human life in all ages and places, and of the -existence and nature of the moral faculty discerning and enforcing -this distinction, leads up to an inquiry into the aggregate complex of -endowments which are essential to moral agency. The great fact of moral -agency is implied and made certain in what has already been brought -into view. But the pre-supposition of such moral agency is manifestly -the moral agent, with all the requisite endowments for the sublime -reality of ethical life. What are the constituents of the moral nature, -in which man rises to the lofty grade of moral agency? - -There are two special reasons for examining and fixing the truth on -this point. First, it is needful in order to complete the scientific -ethical view. Such view must be comprehensive enough to include the -sum total of the powers or faculties concerned in living the moral -life. The view remains faulty if any parts or features of the actual -constitution are omitted or their relations to each other and to the -whole are misconceived. Secondly, false and confusing representations -have often been made on this point. For instance, because all the moral -life moves so closely about the conscience there has been a tendency -to think of the conscience and the moral nature as the same. In the -eighth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Dr. Alexander taught: -"The moral nature of man is summed up in the word conscience. Moral -nature and conscience are two names for the same thing. An analysis of -conscience, therefore, will unfold man's moral nature." This resolves -the whole of our moral nature into this one particular faculty. A -full and correct statement must make it embrace much more. Though the -conscience may be the culminating thing, it is by no means all that -is requisite to endow a being with the capacities necessary for moral -agency. - -The truth of this is easily made clear. It is self-evident that all -the essentials for moral action must be embraced in the moral nature. -Some of these, manifestly, are not identical with the faculty of -conscience, however closely allied to it they may be. For example, -the general function of knowing is not the same as the conscience, -yet it is necessary to moral action. The faculty of choice is not -itself conscience or a part of conscience. Still moral action is -impossible without it. Some of these essential elemental functions may -in themselves possess no moral character whatever. For instance, "to -know" is not itself a moral act, yet it is necessary for moral agency. -The faculty of feeling is not _per se_ moral. The emotions arise -necessarily or at least spontaneously from acts of knowledge, and may -be neither meritorious nor blameworthy. Yet the emotional function, -through which thought passes into action and conduct, is involved in -meeting the obligations of life. Thus it becomes plainly evident that -besides the conscience by which the ethical quality and obligation -are perceived, other powers by which conduct may be conformed to -this obligation are requisite to fit beings for the responsibilities -of moral agency. In other words, our moral nature is not only the -conscience by which we approve and condemn, but also all the other -endowments by which we originate or work out what is approvable or -condemnable. Illustrations of this appear in our lives every day. -Conscience does not love, yet love of what is good is a moral act or -temper. Conscience does not care for the sick or feed the hungry, yet -such charities are acts of the moral life. - -We must, therefore, mark the constituents which together form man's -moral constitution. - - -==Rational Intelligence.== - -=1.= The first and fundamental thing, unquestionably, is his rational -intelligence. A being incapable of knowledge is incapable of the -idea or sense of duty. In a world in which creative production -should present no creature able to know or think, there could be no -moral agency whatever. Between rocks and trees and irrational living -organisms no moral relations can exist nor duties be developed. -Rational intelligence, which is the basal reality of personality, is -the first essential for moral agency. And this must be understood to -mean the whole intellectual endowment, embracing self-consciousness, -perception, memory, imagination, intuitional insight, and the varied -powers of reflection and the discursive understanding. Since, as will -hereafter appear (Chapter IX), duties are developed by the relations in -which men stand in the system of which they are made to form a part, a -knowledge of themselves and of their relations is clearly essential to -a discharge of these duties. Their very constitution carries also an -adaptation to an end which they must know, in order to meet their duty -to themselves and others. - -This dependence of ethical life upon knowledge makes itself -impressively clear in the experiences and course of common life and -the lessons of history. While the absence of rational intelligence, -as in the case of idiocy, annuls all possibility of character and -responsibility, the lower the grade of men and races in mental -development, the poorer is their equipment for the demands of the full -ethical standard of conduct. It is almost axiomatic that we should not -look for as high grade of moral ideals and rules among ignorant people -and savage tribes as in the life of intelligent civilizations. Though -the principle of duty is not always turned into character in proportion -to the measure of mental development and secular culture, yet -experience and history affirm a clear tendency in increased knowledge -to bring better sense of obligation and more prevalent rectitude of -life. So well established is the recognition of this relation between -intelligence and conduct, that the advocates of the evolutionist origin -of man with one consent represent the emergence of intelligence as -conditional for the appearance of moral agency. A knowledge of one's -self and of his relations to the world around him and God above him, -and the destiny to which his powers appoint him, is thus fundamental in -the constitution of a nature for the sphere and reality of moral life. - - -==The Conscience.== - -=2.= The conscience--resting in the general rational intelligence and -rising into the peculiar discernments and judgments which mark it--is -another constituent. This is universally conceded by moral philosophy. -There is, therefore, need here only to recall the place and relations -of this special power in the total organism of psychical powers. The -conscience, in its essential perceptions and judgments, as appears from -the analysis already given, is part of the rational intelligence. It -designates the power and function of the intelligent _ego_, or personal -self, for discernment in the sphere of right and duty--for insight -into the reality of ethical law and obligation which belong to good -conduct among rational, self-directing beings. It expresses, therefore, -the highest ascent of the rational intelligence, where, overlooking -the whole realm of existence and relations known in other forms of -knowledge, it sees, and through the emotional nature, feels, how to -live as life ought to be lived. - -Further, while thus the summit point in the rational intelligence, -the conscience employs for its perceptions and judgments the data of -all the other functions of the mind. Its discernments are made in the -light of all the truth which in any way illuminates the understanding. -This explains why and how the conscience is educable. It is dependent -on all the other intellectual powers for a knowledge of the relations -of life which develop duties and in view of which every duty is to -be determined and judged. The very position of the conscience, as -highest of all the powers of the intelligence, makes it, not the most -independent, but the most dependent of all. All knowledge should -supply light for the right conduct of life. The clearer the light, -other things being equal, the clearer and more correct will be the -ethical judgments. Ignorance is a darkened atmosphere to see duty in. -The advance of general civilization, the progress of knowledge, the -widening of the realm of science, the supernatural information given by -special divine revelation, are all, therefore, if used as they should -be, factors in developing the faculty of conscience into its best -ability for insight into duty and for practical morality. - - -==Free Will.== - -=3.= Free-will. The only truly satisfactory psychological account of -the will is that which presents it as the soul's power of causation -for choices. It is the capacity of the personal _ego_ or self for -real choosing or free election. As in intellectual action the soul -is causal for knowing or thinking, and in the sensibility it is -causal for feeling or really feels, so in will the _ego_ or rational -self is acting as the cause of the choices which it makes. Using the -term for this capacity of the personal self to choose, the will is -self-determining. It originates movement. It is creative of its own -acts. It is causal of its volutions. Morality consists in deliberate -self-submission to the law of rectitude. Duty must be freely chosen; -and the autonomy of the will, _i. e._ of the personal self, is -involved in the very conception of virtue. Freedom must, therefore, -be a prime characteristic of a moral nature. The whole fabric of -obligation and responsibility is built upon it. It is this, as well -as rational intelligence, that lifts man above the order and ongoing -of material nature and makes him amenable to the claims of right and -duty. It is essential to personality and its presence or absence -makes and marks the deepest difference between persons and "things." -We can imagine intellectual automatism; but the most brilliant -intellectuality, a corruscation of mental mechanism, without reaching -up into a capacity for free choice and voluntary action, would, -manifestly, not make a free agent or exalt into the high realm of -ethical life. The idea of duty is inapplicable except in the sphere of -freedom. Moral responsibility is inconceivable without it. - -In this, more than in anything else, the whole aggregation of -human endowments comes to its crown. In it man becomes, in a real -sense, a supra-natural being, endowed with the lofty distinction of -self-direction, self-dominion and self-rulership in the presence of -the great realities of right and obligation. He becomes capable of -character and answerable for his conduct, as he shapes that character -and determines that conduct. - -And this freedom cannot be merely the freedom of simple spontaneity or -voluntariness. It must be the capacity of alternative choice.[27] There -could not be real choice without capacity and room to elect between -different possibilities. It is a well known definition: "Free will is -possessed when, the conditions of doing something being given, one can -either do or not do it."[28] A capacity simply to act, even though it -should be through intelligence and consciousness, in a way that can -have no alternative and allows no choice or option, could not open a -field of personal virtue or responsibility. Where only one thing is -really made possible in action, and that one possible thing is already -somehow necessitated, there can be no place for choice. It presents -no sphere for the exercise of election--even though the faculty of -election should exist. A field of choice and the faculty of choice -imply and call for each other. Both are necessary for the freedom -implied in responsibility. Human responsibility rests on the possession -of a real capacity to make decision between real alternatives. Without -these there could be no more place for morality among men than there is -among the atoms or molecules of the chemical elements in their behavior -in the laboratory. - -The proof of free-will, in this sense, might be left to rest upon the -fact that it is a necessary pre-supposition to the very conception of -morality and of actual accountability. This accountability, recognized -in conscience and exacted by the constitution of the world, is an -omnipresent and inerasable reality. So must free-will also be. Freedom -is part of the moral idea, and the idea falls apart and lapses into -contradiction and confusion without it. The same necessity that obliges -us to accept the truth of morality itself, obliges us to assert -free-will as an attribute of a moral nature and a condition of moral -agency. - -But the truth of freedom is sustained by other proofs. It is proper to -recall and fix clearly in mind several of these. - -(1) The testimony of consciousness. This is clear and explicit. We -are directly conscious of free choice. And there can be no evidence -more immediate and authoritative than that of consciousness. It is the -form of evidence in which all psychical facts, activities, powers, and -laws, are made known and stand certified in our knowledge. It is the -certifying element for both the form and reality of all our knowing. It -is that in which we "know that we know," and without which there can be -no knowledge. It is, therefore, the foundation certitude. Our systems -of science, our conclusions in philosophy, our intuitions into first -truths and laws, and all the confidence with which we accept truth in -all these great realms of mental life, rest back on the observations, -reasonings and conclusions for whose reality and order consciousness -is our most fundamental voucher. To its tests and verifications all -the processes of knowing must submit. No truth is even visible except -in the light in which consciousness holds all our acts and forms -of intelligence. No form of our knowing can be surer than this. -To discredit it is to discredit that without whose help not a step -in knowledge can be taken. Upon this fundamental and unsurpassable -evidence rests the great fact of free-will. No person, in the simple -light of his unperverted and unperplexed consciousness, doubts his -free-will. He finds himself in exercise and use of it every day and -every hour. He knows himself to be perpetually making decisions within -his own liberty, if he knows anything. The witness to it is direct, and -he holds himself, and others hold him, responsible for his choices and -the deeds he does in carrying them out. He deliberately and consciously -elects his way through clearly seen open alternative possibilities. If -he is to believe that in reality he does not do so, he must believe -that his consciousness is a perpetual fraud upon him. But thus the -authority for the reality of all his psychical capacities and acts is -overthrown, and he does not "know that he knows" in any of his knowing. - -It is not a sufficient answer to all this, when it is said that in -this way of proof we are making the testimony of consciousness reach -further than it actually does. Some psychologies undertake to limit -consciousness to a disclosure of simply the actual volition, or other -psychical acts, and not of acts or volitions which we imagine might -have been but were not. Thus, it is said, the proof of another possible -choice, as an alternative to that of the actual volition, fails to be -covered by the consciousness. The supposed act is outside of its reach -of purview and testimony. But such a psychology is untrue to the full -deliverance of the consciousness. A just and full account of it, as -is clearly seen in our experience, must hold it as covering not only -the act of choice, but the _power to choose_. The human consciousness -is a self-consciousness, and in it we truly know the personal self -as the power for the various forms of activity which it reveals. Not -more truly are we conscious of the power really to think or feel than -really to choose, among diverse possibilities. We have direct knowledge -of the power of electing in the very act of election. And thus, not -only the untutored consciousness, but one trained to the sharpest and -deepest self-inspection, will be found a full witness to free-will as a -capacity of alternative choice. - -(2) The implications of the natural constitution of the world. Mankind -are in fact framed into and held under the principle of freedom. The -whole system of which man forms a part answers to the testimony of -consciousness. Bishop Butler, in his immortal Analogy, has shown with -resistless clearness and force that in the constitutional organism -of society and the experiences of actual life free-will is assumed -for human nature.[29] Both by natural and moral law men are governed -as free agents. The physical order of the earth, as a place where -bodily and moral welfare are conditioned on obedience to discoverable -relations and principles, pre-supposes human intelligence and -liberty. Nature in her ongoings requires every individual to adjust -himself carefully to its laws of health, safety and happiness. There -is an incessant appeal to him to use his intelligence and liberty -in accordance with the demands of his ever-changing conditions and -relations in life. The idea that everything takes place by necessity is -not only at variance with his sense of freedom, but is found utterly -inapplicable in practical living. A youth, if such a case be supposed, -trained under the notion that he must not be held responsible for -his acts, since they take place by necessity, would soon find his -dream of irresponsibility disturbed and disallowed. At every turn he -would find the inexorable forces of nature and society refusing to -recognize his claim. Government, law, administration, all the various -functions through which human affairs are held together in orderly -movement, assume the individual's power and obligation to determine -his conduct and hold him chargeable with consequences. Though supposed -speculatively true, the doctrine proves false in practice. It is in -fact untrue to the constitution of human life. "The thing here insisted -on," says Butler, "is that under the present natural government of the -world we find ourselves treated and dealt with as if we were free, -prior to all consideration whether we are or not. Were this opinion, -therefore, of necessity admitted to be ever so true, yet such is in -fact our condition and the natural course of things, that whenever we -apply it to life and practice, this application of it always misleads -us, and cannot but mislead us, in a most dreadful manner, with -regard to our present interests." Beyond all question, as is evident -to every thoughtful person, mankind deal one with another on the -pre-supposition and principle of freedom, and of the responsibility -which is ethically unthinkable except on that freedom. Personal, -social, and governmental relations are framed upon this principle, -and are a perpetual expression of it. Men universally treat each -other--and under the actual inter-relations of life cannot but treat -each other--as free beings. The inference is direct and necessary that -they are such, unless we concede that human life is organized into a -necessary order of living that is false to their real nature and unjust -in its penalties. - -(3) It is to be further noted that while freedom rests thus on the -direct and positive evidence of consciousness and the actual order of -life, the contrary doctrine of necessity or determinism arises only -from assumptions or implications of speculative thought. This is a fact -that needs to be clearly and fully fixed in mind. Necessitarianism -is without any direct witness of consciousness, and is not forced or -even suggested by the natural sense of mankind. It is not required as -a working theory for the business or natural conduct of life. It is -only a product of speculation or ideal theorizing. It is constructed -from different standpoints of thought. In some speculation it rests -simply on certain ontological assumptions, sometimes pantheistic as in -Spinozism, sometimes materialistic as in non-theistic evolutionism. -In both these cases freedom disappears in the absoluteness with -which the substance of the universe unfolds into all its products -and manifestations.[30] In some other speculations it appears as a -conclusion from certain metaphysical views of the law of causation and -its supposed application in the realm of psychical activity. In this -form of theory every volition is viewed as standing in the relation -of a mere effect to a cause which determines the will to it, in fixed -connection and force of antecedence and consequence. The volition -comes, it is represented, as the necessary result--not as a real choice -by self-determining personality, but produced by environment, mental -structure, and disposition. Not the _ego_ or personal self, as free -spirit endowed with capacity for real election, but the environment, -motives, and disposition decide and fix the volition for the person, -which by an illusion of consciousness appears as done by himself. In -still other speculation necessitarianism comes as an inference from -conceptions formed as to the divine sovereignty and the absoluteness -with which it must direct creature movement. The doctrine thus has its -plausibility, not from the conscious working of the human mind or the -natural order of conduct and welfare, but as theoretical conclusions -from certain forms of speculative thinking. It is therefore the product -of metaphysical theorizing. It is not a datum of pure psychology. It -is not taught by life. It is not known as a fact. It is not called -for by the practical needs of daily self-direction. It has only -secondary forms of suggestion and support--the precarious evidence -from special theorizing in ontology and metaphysics. And it introduces -more difficulties than it shuts off, while it collides with the moral -consciousness of mankind and its sense of responsibility for conduct -and the formation of character. In the light of these truths it ought -not to be regarded as having any validity. It is surely incredible that -the doctrine of necessity should be true when the actual constitution -of human life, in all its personal, social, and governmental relations, -requires us to treat it as false, being practically inapplicable. -Utterly beyond belief is it that while the inexorable necessities of -daily behavior bind us to the principle of freedom and responsibility, -there should be in the real constitution of the world no actual freedom -in deciding on choices or determining our conduct.[31] Moral agency -must be free agency, in open alternatives of choice. It involves both -the subjective capacity to choose and a realm for its exercise in -diverse possibilities. - - -==Sensibility and Actions.== - -=4.= Powers of sensibility and action, by which the dictates of -conscience may be turned into actual conduct and character, complete -the moral constitution. - -(1) It has already been seen (pages 44-47) that in the complex action -of the conscience itself the sensibility awakened in the form of -emotion, as a feeling of obligation arising from a perception of -obligation. This has already shown the sensibility to be a part of the -moral organization. Conscience itself includes emotion. Duty perceived -becomes duty felt, if the moral life is normal; and the feeling is -motive-force for the choice and the fulfillment of duty. Emotional -powers are thus constituent in the structure of man's moral nature. The -moral emotions are occasions for ethical choices and deeds. - -(2) But, further, the movements of the sensibilities are themselves -either morally good or evil, and form a sphere of personal life -to which moral quality belongs. Man's affections and desires, his -loves and hatreds, his enjoyments and aversions, constitute a domain -where the ethical distinctions are to be applied. They hold and -exhibit elements of character. We may not, indeed, say that a being -of pure intellect, void of all emotion, would be utterly incapable -of character and irresponsible, but we are compelled to think that -the moral life in such case would be without what forms the highest -ethical excellence and glory of character, viz.: love, benevolence, -delight in righteousness and joy in pure affection. The regulation of -the affections and passions, the purification of the inmost "thoughts" -of what the sacred scriptures call "the heart" is vital to right -character. The capacity to love is an equipment for the moral life. It -is virtuous to love what ought to be loved. The capacity to hate is -also such an equipment--the obligation being to hate what ought to be -hated as morally wrong. Benevolence may not be, as some have contended -it is, the essence or ground of all virtue, but, unquestionably, it -is a virtue of highest rank, and the capacity for it is a prominent -element in man's moral organization. The same is true of the whole -emotional and affectional capacity in the human soul. It is part of the -constitution for true character and life. - -(3) Still further, man's powers of action, in which the ethical -distinctions and choices are wrought out into their proper deeds, are -part of his organization for the true moralities of life. However -deeply the foundations of ethics may be laid in personal individuality, -the ethical life concerns more than self, and finds its largest -field in inter-human relations. Human solidarity is as real as human -individuality. Humanity is an organism, in which each person has his -place and mission. The individual's sphere of duty is not simply his -own soul, but the broad reach of all his relations to the world about -him, in which duties are developed and right conduct is required. In -all this wide sphere obligation can be met only through his endowment -with power to carry into effect, in action, his moral judgments and -convictions of right. Moral science must consider man not merely as a -knower and contemplator or lover of the right, but also as a doer of it -in righteous deeds. Hence man's moral nature, as his endowment for the -moral life, is not all brought under review until it is seen to include -the realm of his feelings and those executive powers which turn the -ethical discriminations and choices into righteous conduct. - -We thus sum up the constituents of man's moral nature: intelligence, -the conscience, free-will, and capacities for affection and doing. -Where these are united the subject is organized for knowing duty -and fulfilling it. But a final fact, of profound import, needs yet -to be added, not as a further faculty, but rather as a consequence -resultant from the union and co-action of these endowments, viz.: -that this organism of faculties presents not simply a capacity as a -possibility of the moral life, but a positive, vital motive adjustment -and organic pre-disposition toward it. It is not simply framed to it -as an articulation of dead timber, but is adapted to it as a complex -of living forces for normal movement. The moral constitution, if not -disordered or wrecked, carries thus a living trend or impulse toward -knowing duty and doing it. This impulse, seemingly pervading, if -not standing behind, the whole mental activity, as a sub-conscious -pre-disposition, appears as an original aptitude or incorporated -purpose in the total human psychical organization. Hence human nature, -if normal, is not indifferent to right and wrong. Its true life is -one of positive affinity for the good. If, under internal disorder -or particular circumstances, counter-tendencies appear and prevail, -this does not disprove the fundamental and normal set of humanity for -the moral life. Man is made for the right as he is made for God. This -conception of the positiveness of his total moral organization is -necessary to complete the view of man as a moral agent.[32] - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - -THE REALITY OF RIGHT AND WRONG. - - -In this chapter we pass the dividing line between the two great -parts of ethics. Thus far we have considered only the facts and -manifestations of our moral nature. We have traced the unquestionable -phenomena of moral distinctions and obligation in human thinking, -feeling, and conviction. We have found the explanation of these -phenomena in the action of a faculty or complex of faculties of the -human soul, that discerns and affirms these distinctions. We have -studied this power and marked its data from its initial perception of -the ethical distinction through its further discernments, emotions and -judgments to its full assertion of moral responsibility. We have seen -its unique authority explained by the supremacy of the law of right -and duty which it reveals, and have noted the aggregate of endowments -belonging to man's moral agency. - -But the mere registry of these moral phenomena is not the full -explanation of them. We must examine yet what they imply. From the -faculty that perceives we must turn to look at the nature of that which -is perceived. We may call the part already traversed the science of -ethics, as dealing with and systematizing the facts of experience. -The part that remains takes us into the metaphysics of ethics, as -exhibiting the abiding verities so perceived and to which we find -ourselves so responsibly related--not what is in us, but what is above -and over us to which our moral consciousness corresponds. Having -visited "the moral consciousness in its own home" and listened to its -story of "right" and "duty" and "responsibility," we must go forth -and explore the realm that answers to that story. This realm is the -objective moral system to which human conduct is to be adjusted. - -The precise question of this chapter is whether the distinction -of right or wrong, subjectively and psychologically made, is also -objectively true and real, marking an actual qualitative difference in -the deeds and intentions of men, or is a mere appearance, a fiction -and illusion of our own minds. Is the principle of duty a reality for -right life, as something belonging to the constitution of the world, or -only an idea which our minds have manufactured--only our own thought -reflected back upon us, as is our face that seems so real in the mirror? - -It would seem that the very asking of this question should be itself -a sufficient answer. But doubt has been raised by speculative -metaphysics. Hence we must examine it. - - -==Source of Doubt.== - -=1.= The doubt comes from misleading representations of the relativity -of knowledge. Unquestionably there is a sense in which our knowledge -may justly be said to be "relative." It is not absolute, unconditioned -or unlimited. We can know only as we have facilities for knowing, -and under the conditions and aspects in which objects are presented -to them. We are restricted to the modes and degrees of our given -capacities. There are probably many realities about us of which we can -know nothing. We have no organs for their perception. Even the things -that we do know reach off into transcendent relations. Philosophy -has long confessed the relative character of our knowledge. Even the -percepts of sense-experience, say for instance, of sight or hearing, -when analyzed in physical science are found to be, in their objective -cause or material conditions, somewhat different from the simple -report of the organ of sense--color being the subjective sensation -of light-rays on the retina of the eye, and sound the effect of -vibrations of the atmosphere upon the sensorium. But in recent times -various theories have represented our knowing faculties as largely -untrustworthy and their data as invalid in spheres where their -functions appear most certain and explicit. Locke gave basis for a -movement in this direction by teaching that the immediate objects of -the mind are not things, but "ideas." Berkeley's idealism repudiated -the sufficiency of sense-perception to prove the objective existence -of the material world. Hume questioned the substantial existence of -both matter and mind. In the view of Kant human knowledge reaches only -to "phenomena," the appearance of things, while the things as they are -"in themselves" can not be known. The mind projects and imposes its own -subjective forms of thought upon the universe. Sir Wm. Hamilton, Dean -Mansel, J. S. Mill, Alexander Bain and Herbert Spencer have developed -theories, variously modified but agreeing in this, that even our -necessary forms of rational perception are not to be held as standing -for more than relative truth, _i. e._ subjective impressions in our -minds in the presence of environment. Doubt is cast upon the point -whether what is true to our necessary or actual thought is also really -true for the objective world. - -The teaching will be best understood by several quotations. Sir Wm. -Hamilton, though a natural realist, influenced by the speculations of -Kant, while acknowledging an underlying reality for phenomena, taught -that we can never know them except "under modifications determined by -our own faculties."[33] - -J. S. Mill, going further, says: "Our knowledge of objects, and even -our fancies about objects, consist in nothing but the sensations -they excite, or which we imagine them exciting in ourselves.... This -knowledge is merely phenomenal.... The object is known to us only in -one special relation, namely, as that which produces, or is capable of -producing certain impressions on our senses; and all that we really -know is these impressions."[34] - -Herbert Spencer asserts the relativity of all knowledge, and says: -"Clearly as we seem to know it, our apparent knowledge proves on -examination to be utterly irreconcilable with itself. Ultimate -religious ideas and ultimate scientific ideas, alike turn out to be -merely symbols of the actual, not cognitions of it."[35] - -Plainly these theories do not make our knowledge a genuine apprehension -of reality, but merely internal and unreliable mental states. It is -only a subjective phenomenon. We cannot know that it stands for the -real truth of things. Rather, we are told, it does not. It is but an -effect within the mind, determined, it may be, by things without, but -modified, if not created, by the constitution and action of the mind -itself. The receiving mind, like the receiving lens, determines the -shape and color of the apprehended phenomenon. If there be any reality -behind it and correspondent to it, we can never assure ourselves -of it. The theory thoroughly discredits the trustworthiness of our -faculties, both of sense-perception and of reason. They do not report -the things of the world as they really are, but merely as they affect -us. Our necessary conceptions, such as time, space, beauty, cause, -moral law, cannot be proved to be anything else than phenomena within -us. The conclusion is well stated in the language of Mr. Grote in his -explanation of the views of the Greek sophists: "As things appear to -me, so they are to me; as they appear to you, so they are to you."[36] -It is altogether a subjective matter. We can have only a relative -morality--not conformed to an objective and universal standard, but to -the particular impressions we find within us. - -Evidently this doctrine of relativity lands us in universal -intellectual skepticism. It gives us agnosticism. Nothing is sure in a -single department of knowledge. If our minds are forever presenting to -us internal "forms of thought" that stand not really for the "forms -of being" in the real world, if they are actually creating or painting -for us what we seem to perceive and what appear to be realities -objective to our faculties and existing independently of them, there -is no possibility of reaching truth of any kind. But in the domain of -morals this theory would prove peculiarly destructive. If the qualities -of right and wrong be not in very truth real, if they be not verities -of conduct in the constituted relations of human life, if the ideas -answer not to a true distinction set before us for our recognition -and conformity, then virtue is a dream, obligation an illusion, and -conscience a fraud. - -Over against this false we must place the true conception of the -relativity of knowledge. We must hold, as the spontaneous sense of -mankind and the best sustained psychology and philosophy of the -centuries affirm, that our cognitive powers are genuine faculties -for discerning the truth of things, that, while not infallible nor -unlimited, they give us substantially correct knowledge, as far as it -goes, of the realities of the natural and moral world in which we are -placed. These powers of intelligence are not set to act delusively and -imprison us in phantasmagoria or a factitious system false to that -which actually exists. The correct theory, the only one that is really -rational and can be lived out, must ever be that, as far as we have -faculties to know at all and use them loyally, we know what is and -because it is. The true reason of our knowing is the real existence of -knowable realities.[37] Instead of knowing only appearances, we know -the very things that appear--not perfectly, or without possibility -of mistake, but yet truly. The end of knowledge is not to give us a -phantasmagorical world for endless illusion, but the actual world, with -its divine constitution and movement, in which we are to live, and with -whose facts and laws, physical and moral, we are to harmonize our lives. - - -=2.= The false conception of the relativity of knowledge being thus -set aside, and the psychological law, that the correlate of knowing -is reality, being recognized, we are prepared to see the truth on the -point of inquiry in this chapter, as follows: - -==Objective Reality.== - -(1) The qualities of right and wrong, involved in the ethical -distinction, are not merely subjective impressions or appearances, -imposed on conduct by the human mind, but are objective, belonging to -the external world of relations and action, real for apprehension and -conformity. They are without us as well as within us. And they come -within us because they are realities without us for us to know and -observe. The moral qualities, as real features of required behavior -of free beings in their given relations to each other, belong to the -constitution of the world as well as to the faculties of the human -mind. They are real qualities of action and motives to action whether -men perceive or take note of them or not. As truly as the starry sky -is above us, before we open our eyes to see it, so the principle -of righteousness is established for life before we enter it or our -faculties awake to discover it. The principle of moral law is framed -into the constitution of the world and human life. It is back of -the discernment of it, imbedded in the demand which the constituted -relations of nature make for proper behavior of free, intelligent -beings. The law of duty is fixed in these relations. It abides there to -be recognized and fulfilled by all beings endowed with moral perception -and freedom. Moral law is a profounder and broader thing than a -simple uncertain mental fiction in personal thinking. It belongs to -the immense, almost infinite realm of creature inter-relations of the -universe. - -The reality, however, is not to be thought of as a material entity or -substantive essence, but solely as a quality of the intentions and -conduct demanded by and in the relations sustained by men and other -moral beings. It is the reality of an established obligation. It -belongs to character. - -The right, as moral law, has ever been venerated as something -supersensible, absolute, and divine. The early Egyptian teaching -represented its home as in Deity. Buddhistic philosophy conceives of -it as an imperishable dominion over gods and men. Christianity has -enforced it as based in the very nature of God, and as a principle of -order ordained for the whole universe of personal life and behavior. -Not more real are the solid rocks of the mountain or the strong -waves of the sea. Not more real for the material realm is the law of -gravitation than is the law of ethical righteousness for the spiritual -realm, the realm of free conduct. And the latter is superior and of -higher value than the former. This truth speaks in the old apothegm: -"_fiat justitia, ruat coelum_." - -==Not Dependent on Organization.== - -(2) The qualities of right and wrong in conduct are not dependent -on the peculiar mental organization or temperament of the race. -This results from the objectivity of the law of obligation. Only -the perception of them is so dependent, while the moral qualities -are abidingly real for all beings high enough in the scale of being -to discern them. Just as we must believe that the sun exists as an -extended body independently of our eyes or minds, and would have to -be so apprehended by any inhabitant of Neptune or Jupiter endowed -with capacity to perceive it as it is, so we must believe that truth -and love and kindness are right, and falsehood, injustice, malignity -and ingratitude are wrong, not as made so by our peculiar personal -constitution, but _per se_, in any inhabited world of the stellar -heavens; and that the only subjective condition for their so appearing -is the possession of the faculty for perception of moral quality. - -There may, indeed, be a doubt among finite moral agents, with limited -knowledge, how far a certain thing may be true or false, kind or -malignant, just or unjust, but the quality of truth or falsehood, -kindness or malignity, justice or injustice being perceived in it, -it is impossible that such truth, kindness and justice should not -be judged right and their opposites wrong. The ethical distinction, -objectively viewed, is an ethical difference, perceived as such, if -perceived at all. - -==Immutable and Eternal.== - -(3) The moral distinctions, with the moral qualities involved, being -thus objective, and not the product of a special temporary organization -of the percipient, are immutable and eternal. This is involved in the -very nature of the qualities themselves. By eternal necessity of what -they are, justice and love must be unchangeably and forever right. They -are not thus right because we think or feel them so, but we think and -feel them so because they are so, because of the immutable and enduring -nature of justice and love themselves. They hold and carry the kind of -motive and action that ought to prevail in the relations of intelligent -personal life, everywhere and in all time. So malignity, injustice, -falsehood, and cruelty are wrong by the very nature of the qualities -that make and mark them; and the personal intentions and conduct that -hold them can never be right any more than a thing can be itself and -yet other than itself. - -Men's judgments as to whether particular conduct is fair or just or -kind or honest, may change and do change. Different nations and ages -class certain acts and ways of men very differently. But these are only -judgments of application, and so only secondary ethical judgments. This -has already been pointed out in Chap. IV, pp. 67-68. They depend on the -degree to which the moral qualities of the conduct may be discerned -amid the complicated relations and obscurities that often perplex a -right understanding of it. But while men change their judgments of -the justice, benevolence, or truth of particular forms of behavior, -they do not change their judgments that justice, love and truth are -right--necessarily and immutably so. The behests of duty are imbedded -in the necessary relations of intelligent free beings. Virtue is no -shifting subjective illusion, shaped by our inner mental mould. No -change of the percipient's intellectual constitution can change the -realities of right and wrong. No removal from world to world can change -them. No distant age in eternity can reverse them, and discover virtue -to be wrong or sin right, or either as without moral quality. The -distinction is eternal, and no future can arrest our responsibility -with respect to it. God calls us to identify ourselves with what -is right and shun all wrong, as realities with which we stand in -immutable, unending relation, for good or evil. - - -==Grandeur of Moral Law.== - -=3.= The truth thus reached on this point is one of exceeding -importance. It brings to view the grandeur of the moral law. It shows -this law to be truly transcendental, belonging not to transient -material forms or physiological structure, nor to special psychical -constitutions of men or races, nor organized instinct, nor subjective -mental illusion, nor peculiar hereditary experience, nor transformed -sense of realized or supposed utility, nor any local adventitious -circumstances and training, but to the supreme super-sensible realm -of universal and necessary ideas and truth, in which the universe of -rational thought and divine order lives and moves and has its being and -welfare. In this truth, therefore, the moral law begins to appear in -its true greatness and value, in its universal dominion and infinite -importance. It comes down upon us with a mighty impression. It thrills -us into enthusiasm. As long as the moral idea is accounted a mere -product of environment and biological evolution or experienced utility, -a blind hereditary instinct, an organized impulse, a fiction of -education, or a temporary behest of individual or racial organization, -it is a thing of but little dignity and of limited moment. It is worthy -of no more reverence than a form of protoplasm or a passing mental -impression. Not reflecting an objective reality of universal, supreme -and permanent validity, but only a special phenomenon of the human -organization and this transient life, it can inspire but small respect. -Only in the truth here reached does the authority of the moral law -stand out in its majesty and illimitable range and sweep. Only in it -can that law be rightly effective for the good conduct of men and the -safe formation of character in the mould of immortal excellence. - - -==Reality is Dividing Line.== - -=4.= The recognition of the objective validity of the moral -distinctions marks one of the chief dividing lines between true and -false theories of moral philosophy. A failure to recognize this point -not only leaves the point itself a blank, but usually means error -both in the conception of the nature and function of conscience -and of the grounds and claims of right and virtue. With respect to -conscience the failure reduces it from a power of true discernment -of what is, into an instinct acting blindly or a make-believe of -obligation through judgments indistinguishable from those of utility, -pleasure or advantage, or into a passing product of racial experience -or education. So instead of explaining the unique authority of the -conscience it undermine and dissolves that authority into non-moral -elements. Obligation itself becomes but a synonym for an impulse toward -certain forms of pleasure or advantage. As to the grounds and claims -of right, these are thus caused to disappear in the non-moral elements -into which right and wrong are dissolved. The ethical distinctions, the -great moral phenomena of the ages, with all the interests of practical -morality, instead of being explained and justified, are explained -away. If, therefore, ethical theory is to exhibit the metaphysical -validity of the moral consciousness of men, no view can reasonably -be regarded as correct that dissipates the very reality which the -conscience assumes to see and without which the moral judgments lose -their rational foundations. For if the objective and transcendent -character of the ethical distinction be denied, morality necessarily -drops down into, at best, a temporary biological provision for the -utilities of this ephemeral life, or, at worst, into a deep fraud of -our faculties, estopping the use of our freedom by a phantom bugbear -of moral distinctions. If, therefore, virtue is not to be disrobed of -its honor, if righteousness is not to be cast down from the supreme -place which the reason of mankind has ever accorded it, if the idea of -duty is not to be belittled, invalidated and overthrown, ethical theory -must recognize and emphasize the objective and permanent reality of the -moral law as an unchanging law of obligation and responsibility for -the conduct of free agents. Otherwise the so-called ethical theory is -not a theory of the ethical reality, but one that sinks the supposed -ethical reality into non-moral elements and illusion. To vindicate the -authority of conscience, the immutable foundations of righteousness -must be maintained, not dissolved. - - -==Relation to Evolution.== - -=5.= The relation of this truth to the wide-spread hypothesis of -the evolutionary origin of man dare not be ignored at this place. -Frank admission has already been made that this hypothesis, as -setting forth a mere mode of creation by God, does not appear to be -necessarily inconsistent with the existence of conscience. Any mode -that can produce a faculty of mental power capable of perceiving -or making the ethical distinction, suffices on that point--though -grave difficulties stand in the way of accounting for it under any -evolutionist explanation thus far given. But how is it with respect to -the supersensible reality of the moral law, as the reality perceived by -the conscience? Can evolution account for it, or even allow any place -for it? - -==Theistic Evolution.== - -To these questions, the answer must be, first, that evolution, in the -theistic conception, if supposed capable of developing the faculty of -conscience, must also be regarded as consistent with existence and -place of the moral law. The infinite intelligence and purpose back of -the creative evolution, and through it originating a power for ethical -perception, must be conceded to be equally capable, in that method of -forming the universe, of establishing the principle and law of duty in -the relations in which rational and self-determining creatures are to -live. Provided only that a rational first cause be assumed and the -plan of the world be viewed as laid in aims of divine order, a moral -system as well as moral agents may, surely, be created by slow advance -of life no less completely than by instantaneous fiat of power. The -theistic theory of evolution, assuming the cosmic system to be grounded -in the will and power of God and filled with his ever-working presence -does not necessarily bring any trouble into the question of fixed moral -law. The moral law, resting in the same divine source whence arise the -laws that are revealed in physical nature, comes into play as soon as -moral agents are created in relations which call for right sentiments -and conduct. The rational purpose which ordained physical laws, in -necessity, for material order, ordains moral law for order of personal -agents acting in freedom. The question, therefore, with respect to this -kind of evolution need not embarrass the question of the reality of -immutable moral law--at least when the theory of evolution is so shaped -as to give its fundamental assumptions full and consistent place and -force. - -==Atheistic Evolution.== - -But, secondly, on the other hand, answer must be made, that under no -theory of atheistic and merely materialistic and naturalistic evolution -can the objective existence of moral law be logically or rationally -maintained. This kind of evolutionism is not only helpless before the -task of accounting for it, but logically excludes the possibility of -it. For any theory that presents the cosmos as a pure naturalism of -matter, or is agnostic as to an intelligent author of nature, furnishes -no realm or materials for moral law. This becomes evident, beyond -doubt, from the following considerations: - -(1) According to the hypothesis "the potency of all things" is in -matter with its energy and modes of motion. This is the "all and the -one" ([Greek: to pan kai hen]) of the universe, at once the only -essence and ground of its existence and ongoing. No intelligent -first cause is assumed, no creative reason to begin or determine the -evolution. There is no ordering mind or purpose in it--for its origin, -in the process, or as to its end. It is avowedly a purely mechanical -theory of the universe--matter and force acting in self-contained -energy without design. All rational, purposive, or teleological idea -is wanting. Now it is evident that this pure mechanism of matter -and energy must be not only without any moral element whatever, but -necessarily incapable of evolving the moral. It is an infinite and -endless automatism. Though it should run on aeon after aeon it is still -only a mechanism of atoms in eternally unfree material movement. The -unmoral elements can never produce moral law; and, _ex hypothesi_, -there is no intelligent free moral being behind or in the movement to -create or establish moral law through it. - -(2) Further, this form of evolutionism, returning, as it does, to the -ancient notion of the universe as a perpetual flux, even if imagined to -be able to evolve the moral out of non-moral elements, could present -no permanent and stable ethical law. In such evolution, without -beginning and without end, all things are only a continual becoming, -"an eternal process moving on." There is and can be nothing fixed, -whether of forms or relations, but only a shifting, necessitated, -everlasting scene of aimless beginnings and disappearances. Could we -even conceive--which we cannot, because the concept is possible only -in connection with purpose and ideal order--that the ethical "ought" -should momentarily appear, it would soon be broken up and passed by, -like the bubble on a stream, - - "A moment here, then gone forever." - -Manifestly, this perpetual motion, forever changing and superseding its -own forms and products, cannot be considered father to even a rational -stable conscience, much less a sure abiding moral law for its steady -recognition and eternally reverent regard. "The child of contingency -remains contingent." And so the advocates of this empirical, -materialistic, and atheistic evolutionism consistently maintain that -there is no absolute moral law, and that what seems so is only shifting -hereditary judgments generated by experience and utility or some -instinct formed by biological processes. - -(3) But further. In this merely naturalistic evolution all the -essential presuppositions of moral law are wanting and excluded. This -is easily seen. (_a_) It has already been pointed out that the action -of conscience is theistic, its authority arising from its perception -of a law of duty imposed on it and representing a moral law-giver (See -Chap. IV, pp. 79-80; Chap. V, pp. 87-88). So moral law, as a rule of -ethical righteousness, is necessarily theistic. It is thinkable only -as a requirement made by rational intelligence for fitting conduct -among personal agents. It rests in a world-system of rational ends -and ideal requirements. The standard is established by intelligence. -Should it be objected, that we may regard the standard as made by the -mind of men only, and altogether a human and subjective thing, it is -enough to remind the reader that according to the hypothesis, there is -no human mind as a different entity from matter, the only "mentality" -left being merely particular effects of molecular or brain activity, -and therefore only successive passive products, simply revealing what, -if it exists at all, must exist as the molecular matter behind them. -The autocratic moral law which the conscience finds, but does not -make, is conceivable therefore, only as part of intelligent ordering -in a rational world-system. But according to the hypothesis no moral -reason has framed or regulates the order of the physical forces that -create the relations of life. (_b_) Moral law, with responsibility, is -inconceivable except in connection with personal freedom in the subject -of it. But in this kind of evolutionism, everything is reduced to the -mechanism of matter; and its supporters agree that our personal freedom -is an illusion. There can be no more morality in the thoughts, aims and -conduct of men than in the digestion of food or the growth and decay of -a tree. - -While, therefore, theistic evolution does not present anything -inconsistent with the reality and recognition of moral law, every -hypothesis which exhibits the world, in its ground and processes, -as the mere mechanism of material forces, stands in logical and -irreconcilable antagonism. This antagonism, however, is not to be -taken as overthrowing or even weakening the truth set forth in this -chapter. Rather, the antagonistic hypothesis, which fails in so many -other respects to meet the necessities of a rational or scientific -account of the phenomena of the universe, discredits itself still -further by its incongruity on this great point. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - -THE GROUND OF RIGHT. - - -This topic carries the inquiry concerning moral law one step further -than that determined in the last chapter. It being settled that that -law is objectively and permanently real, for the recognition of -conscience, we must yet seek some explanation of the basis of the -reality. Why are some things right and others wrong? What is the reason -of the difference? On what is the law of right grounded? We seek the -explanation of its existence and the obligation it imposes. - -It must be remembered that even those who hold the moral behests -to be merely subjective, products in some way of the psychological -constitution, nevertheless endeavor to account for them in some -relations or forces back of themselves. These accounts, as will -appear, are exceedingly varied. Inasmuch, therefore, as nearly all the -differing ethical theories seek to give some explanation and ground -for moral obligation, the inquiry now before us presents the point -about which the chief contests of moral philosophy have been waged. -The different answers have been the main determinants of the different -systems. - -Our examination must include three things: a clear definition of the -point of inquiry; some notice of the leading theories; and a positive -statement of the ground as demanded by reason and the interests of -moral life. - -==The Question Defined.== - -I. Definition. This is necessary because it has sometimes been -confounded with the question: What is the ground of obligation?[38] -We must distinguish between the "ground of right" and the "ground of -obligation." The point before us is not why we are under obligation -to do a right act, but why the act is right. Manifestly the rightness -of the proposed action is the ground of the obligation to do it; that -is, the obligation is grounded on the right. The exact inquiry is--and -must be, in order to reach the real and abiding moral foundations--on -what is the right, whose perception obligates, grounded? A quest after -the ground of the "obligation" simply, might satisfy those who reduce -conscience to a mere instinct or sentiment, and the moral standard to -a mere internal product of association, education or of biological -organization. To them it might seem enough to give an explanation of -the felt obligation. In such case they might plausibly, as they often -do, affirm that the moral bond, being thus organically insured and -fixed in the moral consciousness, must remain the same, no matter -what theories, even though purely materialistic, may be formed of its -genesis and nature. But so soon as the ethical reality is seen in its -cosmic place and transcendental character we want an explanation not -only of the ground of obligation to right conduct, but also of the -ground of the right which evokes the sense of obligation. - -==Various Theories.== - -II. Leading Theories. We must include, in this review, both the -theories which offer only an explanation of the phenomenon of -obligation and those that seek an elucidation of the principle of -righteousness as objective moral law. In the long continued discussion -of the subject these theories have been immensely varied and modified, -but the differences thus noted divide all explanations into two -classes, viz., those which make the moral stand in something subjective -and those that find it objective. In the cursory rehearsal of them, -here needed, we will present them in chronological order, irrespective -of their belonging to one class or the other, noting, however, their -relation to this distinction which divides them. Such historical glance -will give an outline of the development of thought on the subject, and -help us to reach and appreciate the true conclusion. - - -==Egyptian Teaching.== - -=1.= Egypt's golden age was in the morning of the world's historical -period, and we must look far back for its best ethical thought. -With the Egyptians morality and religion were closely identified. -The ethical view was united with the theological and determined by -it. They, however, dealt with the subject of duty only in separate -maxims and precepts, without framing a theory of obligation. But the -purity and elevation of these precepts have been a wonder to many in -our modern days. It is, however, easily explained. Their religion -was monotheistic. God was a good and righteous Being, with power and -rulership, the source of all things for man. The Egyptians connected -all that was pure and good with God and recognized their dependence -on Him and their duty to live according to His will. Thus their moral -consciousness rose above the function of a mere subjective instinct -or a feeling of responsibility to their fellow-men, and included a -sense of direct amenability to divine authority. The goal of the moral -endeavor, ever overcoming evil, was regarded as attained, not in this, -but in a future life of blessedness under the divine approval. Their -view grounded all duty objectively, and practically identified it with -piety.[39] - - -==Chinese Teaching.== - -=2.= Chinese teaching, too, was theological. The theology was -essentially monotheistic, but overgrown with superstitions and -idolatrous practices. It taught that man is the creature of God, and -was endowed by heaven with a nature for the practice of good, a nature -that, if followed properly--_i. e._ in the "golden mean"--invariably -leads men aright. The path indicated by nature is the will of God -concerning duty. "What heaven has conferred is called the nature; an -accordance with this nature is called the path of duty; the regulation -of this path is called instruction."[40] The chief contribution to -the Chinese teaching by the sage Confucius (B. C. 551-478) was his -proclamation of the principle of "reciprocity," _i. e._ doing as we -would have others do to us. Though the elements of the moral problem -were thus included fairly well for ordinary conduct, they were not -framed into a distinct philosophy of the ground of right. - - -==Views in India.== - -=3.= India's sacred books abound in moral maxims and counsels. -Brahmanism is substantially a philosophy of life rather than a -religion. But its pantheism and doctrine of the pre-existence and -transmigration of souls have distorted and misdirected the moral idea. -Its pantheism confounds the human with the divine, both in its origin -and destination. Its belief in transmigration, with its perpetual -succession of rebirths into conditions of woeful individual life unless -the soul's unhappy agitations and unrest should be composed by virtue, -shapes the moral task mainly, not only into restraint of the appetites -and passions, but into such austerity and stern self-abnegation as -may prepare the soul, on the death of the body, to attain the perfect -repose of Nirvana the complete extinction of human passions, or, -as Buddhism represents, annihilation of conscious individuality in -reabsorption into the absolute existence. In this system the aim -of morality is not "the right," but the desired good of tranquil -happiness, or the final goal of merging self-conscious personality back -again into the Great All from which it arose. The ground of the moral -striving--it can hardly be called obligation--is the adaptedness of it -to secure this result.[41] - - -==Persian Teaching.== - -=4.= Zoroastrianism (Mazdaeism), from about B. C. 1500-1000, confessedly -presents an ethical teaching that, among oriental views, is second -only to that of the Hebrews. Its theological dualism, which seems -to have encroached upon an earlier purer monotheism, of two eternal -principles or powers, Ormuzed (Ahura Mazda) the good power, and Ahriman -(Angra Mainyou) the evil power, manifestly arose from the effort to -solve the dread problem of evil in the world. Zoroastrian teaching -represents Ormuzed as the all-knowing and the holy creator of the -world. He cannot create evil. He is the source of all purity, order and -righteousness. Wrong and misery have come into the world from Ahriman, -the opposite contending power in the universe. Zoroastrianism thus -gives the world-system a moral foundation and law of order. The moral -life is a holy conflict with the forces of evil within human nature and -assailing it. The supreme end of life is to increase the ascendency -of righteousness and establish its everlasting reign of truth and -goodness. The goal of it comes in a future life of blessedness. The -ground of righteousness is thus placed in the nature and will of the -eternal creator, to whom obedience is due, against the influences of -the malign power of evil.[42] - - -==Greek Theories.== - -=5.= Among the Greeks ethical philosophy began with Socrates. Their -earlier writers dealt with the subject of duty but little in a -speculative way. When the philosophy of it came to be sought the -theories mainly connected it closely with "the good" or "the highest -good," the _summum bonum_ of life. This designation was ambiguous. -"The good" ([Greek: to agathon], [Greek: ta agatha]) might be conceived -of as either intellectual or sensuous good, as consisting in one's -intrinsic state or in outward condition, as either happiness or -personal well-being. And because this method failed to distinguish -clearly and fully between this indefinite "good"--having at best no -more authority than "the beautiful"--and "the right" which forms the -true essence of the ethical principle, their explanations failed to -become clear, and stopped short of being actual explanations of the -ground of right. Hence their theories, though not always consistently -exhibited, and variously interpreted by expounders of them, were -substantially _eudaemonistic_[43] and _utilitarian_. Specifically: - -(1) Socrates made all virtue consist in knowledge, especially self -knowledge or wisdom, leading men to proper self-regulation and -happiness. He put emphasis upon man's rational nature as essentially -good, and to this rational nature belonged the office of self-mastery -and control of all appetites, dispositions, and passions. The life -in knowledge became the good and happy life. Though this great sage -maintained that the world is governed by a supreme intelligence, he -failed to connect clearly and closely the moral law with this high -source, and rested the moral life simply subjectively. - -(2) Plato developed his view substantially on the basis of that of -Socrates. He identified the highest good with the intellect rather than -the sensibility, and looked upon all virtues as united in _knowledge_, -not only as guiding the soul in acting out its proper destination, -but, according to some statements, even as in itself all-sufficing. -Though Plato's speculative view of the universe contains the elements -for the construction of a sublime immutable ethical standard, and he -even suggests God-likeness as the goal of man's moral life,[44] the -implications of his view are not consistently carried out; and when he -comes to apply his ideas to life in his ideal Republic he lapses into -what seems a caricature of his better thought, and is content to rest -morality simply on the authority and laws of the state.[45] - -(3) Aristotle, in whom Plato's theistic view of the world receded into -the background, made the "chief good" consist in happiness or felt -well-being, which depends on man's living according to his rational -nature. Such living includes both the activities of the mind and -habitual conduct. The reason must not only develop its own energies, -but rule the lower powers and passions. On this double requirement -he founded two kinds of virtue, the intellectual (dianoetic) and the -practical. The one consists in "knowledge" or "wisdom," the other in -formed "habits" or "character." The moral life, therefore, consists -in the true use, without abuse, of our rational nature. The rule -for it, as taught by Aristotle, is to avoid extremes and pursue the -golden mean. The theory thus rests morality wholly on subjective good -and identifies it with the calculations of prudence. It is simply -secularistic, without religious element or appeal.[46] - -(4) In Epicurus (B. C. 341-270) and his followers eudaemonism descended -into hedonism. The supreme good is happiness in the sense of personal -enjoyment, pleasure. The universe, without theistic ground, was -regarded as eternal, forever evolving in fortuitous concourse of atoms. -It is without rational order, design, or government. The human soul is -material, and at death men cease to be. The good of life consists in -the avoidance of pain and the securing of pleasure. The pleasure may -be intellectual or sensuous and gross, as men may prefer. The pursuit -of it is the highest virtue and best wisdom. Enjoyment is the end of -life. The whole question of ethics thus came to be a calculation and -balancing of pains and pleasures, and the cardinal virtue prudent -selfishness. It was complete subjectivism. - -(5) In Stoicism (founded by Zeno of Citium, about 308 B. C.) we have -a view that, in its principal features, was in strong contrast with -Epicureanism. It arose in close relation to the teaching of Socrates. -But it taught that "happiness" was not necessary, and should never be -made the end of endeavor. Virtue itself was the highest good, and to -be sought for its own sake. Itself was sufficient for happiness--not -because it could make men insensible to pain or pleasure, but because -it made them superior to it. Virtue was immutably excellent in itself, -a permanent reality for man's realization, and subordinated everything -else. It consisted essentially in living "according to nature,"[47] -_i. e._ not simply in harmony with one's self, but with the nature of -the universe, with the whole constitution of the world as ordained and -ruled by God, of which a man's own nature forms a part. The stress was -not at all to be laid on self, but upon the great total of being. Man -exists for society, and virtue is impossible apart from the social -state. So Stoic teaching inculcated subordination of self to more -general interests--to family, country, mankind. It taught that all -creatures are "children of one father,"[48] and duty was owed to all. -We may hardly, however, speak of this as "altruism," in the sense of -unselfish benevolence or self-sacrificing goodness; since, in the -general Stoic philosophy, not the sentiment of sympathetic helpfulness, -but of victorious superiority to pain, was the temper fostered. Love -was almost submerged in the stern spirit of duty. The blessedness of -virtue was to stand independent of the sufferings which befell men. -In fact the dreadful inexorableness of fate ([Greek: heimarmene]), -conceived by the Stoic philosophy as eternally embracing the life of -both God and nature, gave to virtue, not so much the temper of free, -loving obedience to either God or righteousness, as the sternness of a -proud intellectual resoluteness in yielding, for virtue's sake, to the -inevitable in the fate-bound universe. Under this conception the Stoic -moral obedience could never rise to the free joyousness that belongs to -the obedient life under the light of the Christian truth that God is -love--eternal love, ruling in absolute freedom and desiring to exalt -His children to the perfect holiness to which alone happiness forever -belongs. - -All these Greek theories, except the Stoic, are thus seen to have been -marked by two features. First, they dissolved "the right," which alone -has direct authority and forms moral law, into "the good," which is -simply something offered to us as an object of desire, but which has -no "imperative" for the conscience, and may be innocently foregone. -Secondly, despite the clear better implications supplied to them in -their accepted theistic conceptions of the world, they failed to define -distinctly any grounding of the moral law on anything higher or more -permanent than the subjective elements of the human constitution. For, -even Plato's objective basing of it, for citizen duty, on the law of -the state, assumed only a subjective basis in the person of the ruler -himself. The Stoic theory, however, had glimpses of some higher and -broader ground, though it failed to see it truly. - - -==Roman Teaching.== - -=6.= The Roman moralists adopted substantially the doctrine of the -Greek Stoics. This was finely exhibited and commended, especially by -Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. But we have no new theory among -the Roman philosophers. - -After the establishment of Christianity, whose progress thenceforward -determined and marked the intellectual activity and advancing -philosophy and culture of mankind, the discussion of ethics became -simply a part of theology. And according to the spirit and method of -theology in the early Church and during the middle ages, even down to -modern times, the discussion was not philosophical, but biblical. It -was concerned simply to set forth human duty, especially the duties -of the Christian life, as taught in the scriptures of the Old and New -Testaments. Resting the moral law upon revealed divine authority, it -paid small attention to the question of its metaphysical validation. -But when modern philosophy began its investigations, it of necessity -soon came upon this point, and inquired after the natural basis or -ultimate ground of the great law whose unique authority both the sacred -Scriptures and the moral consciousness of men agreed in asserting. - - -==Divine Absolutism.== - -=7.= Modern theories begin with that of Divine absolutism--making the -moral law, like physical laws, only a product of God's will. It makes -it rest absolutely optional in His sovereignty of choice. It not only -seeks no ulterior reason, or logical _prius_, for his choice, but -distinctly disconnects it from any. God's will is not the expression or -revelation, but the originator, of the moral distinction, constituting -it, with its obligatoriness, as He has done, when He might have -constituted it otherwise, even the very contrary. He determined "the -right" according to no norm, but as creating and establishing a norm. -Whether there should be any moral distinction and what it should be, -was a matter of the divine choice. The view is a one-sided conception -of God's sovereignty. It was set forth by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and -Rene Descartes (1596-1650), and has found prominent advocacy frequently -since. But it collides with both sound theology and an adequate moral -philosophy. - -(1) It fails to recognize any eternal essential moral character in -God Himself. The interests of both morality and religion require -faith in Him as Himself eternally the righteous and holy creator -and moral ruler, in His immutable nature. The morally good can not -be something "contingent," but must be absolute, irrepealable and -irreversible even by God. We need for both religion and character, to -hold fast to the great truth which represents God in His moral will -as choosing righteousness as righteousness, loving the "morally good -as good"[49]--not as by mere will originating the moral distinction -and fixing a code of conduct upon arbitrary ordination. For real moral -character in God we must go even further and regard Him as loving -righteousness, not simply as good in Himself, but as good in itself, -good by the immutable quality of its own nature. For a moral government -we must have a moral governor. And God can be such, not by enforcing -responsibility to an arbitrary code, but by ruling according to -distinctions that are _per se_ supreme in eternal reason--enforcing not -a mere rule of power but of essential rightness. - -(2) Further, the action of the conscience itself, in discerning right -and wrong where it has received no information as to the will of God, -implies that the distinction is rationally based. To discern it is not -always conditioned on such information. Reason itself--the human in the -image of the divine--in some degree reveals the right. So clear is this -discernment, and so independent of all "contingency" does the right -appear, that even pagan writers have been wont to make virtue superior -even to the displeasure of the gods, nobly standing self-approved.[50] - -(3) The true relation between the will of God and the ethically good -must be conceived of as, indeed, involving a profound and indissoluble -identity--what He wills being always and necessarily right, though He -wills it in perfect freedom--but yet as moving in the logical order of -thought, that right is not made right by His willing it, but that He -wills it because it is right. - - -==Civil Authority.== - -=8.= Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), holding the natural state of man as -utterly selfish and a state of war, gave to civil government, as -necessary to the social order, supreme authority, and asserted that the -basis of all moral obligation was positive law issued by the sovereign. -Duty rested on the legal statute, whose direction was final. It knew no -higher law. The theory was a repetition of the travesty of ethics in -Plato's Republic. It has had no following, and needs no confutation. - -But a theory that thus ignored individual conscience and essential -right, reducing morality to civic obedience, with no other foundation -than the positive enactment of a monarch, at once and strongly re-acted -in strengthening the conviction of the necessity and truth of the -intuitional view of the moral faculty, and of the importance of finding -a better basis for the ethical principle, both in the constitution of -mankind and in the author of nature. - - -==The Sympathetic Theory.== - -=9.= The Sympathetic Theory is naturally associated with that -conception of conscience which makes it consist fundamentally, not in -intellect, but in instinct or feeling. Taking the suggestion from Hume, -the theory was elaborated by Adam Smith (1723-1790). It explained moral -obligation as produced by the special action of our nature in which -we spontaneously sympathize with certain intentions or conduct of our -fellow-men--this sympathy taking the form of approval. The bond to duty -was viewed as thus formed by these instinctive sentiments pointing -out what is morally good and obligating to corresponding behavior. Of -course the individual's sympathetic appreciation had to be broadened -and trained by the standard of general sentiment. And the explanation -was helped out by noting the adaptation of this rule of conduct to -promote personal and social happiness. But a theory resting duty on a -basis so thoroughly subjective, and so uncertain and changeful as are -men's unguided feelings, likely often to be in sympathy with evil, -could not commend itself to wide acceptance. It presented neither the -ground of right nor a safe rule. - - -==Utilitarianism.== - -=10.= The theory of Utilitarianism had its prototypes in the teachings -of Socrates, Aristotle, and the Epicureans. Its modern forms have been -greatly varied, but they all agree in founding the morally good in -utility. That which experience shows to be useful, as promotive of -personal or social interests and happiness, becomes thereby right, -or the norm of moral choices and conduct. The theory, in all its -modifications, is a "goods" theory,[51] interpreting obligation as -simply the behest to conform life to the attainment of the various -forms of good, even the chief, as happiness or enjoyment, provided for -in man's nature and condition. Named from the object or objects sought, -it is eudaemonism; named from the way or means of its attainment, it -is utilitarianism. Sometimes the good is simply happiness, sometimes -personal well-being, sometimes social welfare. Sometimes it is purely -selfish, sometimes altruistic or in some sense benevolent. But a -few examples will make plain both its general character and chief -variations. - -(1) William Paley (1743-1805), adopting eudaemonistic principles, rested -all obligation to duty on its tendency to secure everlasting happiness. -He says: "Actions are to be estimated by their tendency. Whatever is -expedient is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone, which -constitutes the obligation to it."[52] "The will of God" is accepted -as "the rule of virtue," seemingly not, however, as the direct ground -of it, but rather as the sure guide as to what has the "tendency" to -gain for us "everlasting happiness." For, Paley explains: "Such is the -divine character that what promotes the general happiness is required -by the will of God." This view makes the spirit of duty, even in -religion, supreme selfishness. It places the self-regarding impulses on -the throne. - -(2) Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the chief apostle of modern -utilitarianism, gave it great popularity by making it distinctly -altruistic. Adopting suggestions in this direction by Shaftsbury -(1713), Hutcheson, Butler, and Hume, he measurably lifted its aim above -the individual's care of his own interests, and made the principle of -right authoritative because promotive of "the greatest happiness of the -greatest number." This seemed to subordinate, without excluding, the -individual's advantage to that of the many, and the selfish instinct -to the higher and nobler aims of love. It developed a rule by which -the brotherhood of man could have place, and character could rise and -broaden into magnanimity and worth. It gave an objective standing and -broadly human aim to the principle of obligation. James Mill, J. S. -Mill and Alexander Bain have been conspicuous recent representatives of -this general view, while modifying some particular features of it. - -It must be added, however, that this modern "altruism," when analyzed -to its final view, does not become "disinterested benevolence." For -the greatest general good is viewed as conditioning the best good of -each individual, and the individual is to include it for the sake of -his own share. So this so-called "altruism," after all, is still ruled -by the self-regarding aim, and stands only for the broadest and most -successful utilitarianism. - -(3) Evolutionist Utilitarianism. This is its recent and present -most characteristic form. The variety of types of evolutionism, -however, has prevented the bringing of it, thus far, into a definite -universally accepted formulation. Although, as already stated,[53] -monistic evolutionism, whether materialistic or pantheistic, by -excluding freedom from the universe, leaves no place for moral action -or responsibility, it still continues to speak about obligation and -the reality of personal character. In this case the "obligation" can -be only acquiescence in the fatalistic onward evolution of nature with -its inevitable events. Theistic evolution, however, holding itself as -only the mode of the divine creation, though it has difficulties in -explaining the genesis of an authoritative conscience, maintains both -its existence in some sense and a ground for the obligation which it -urges. Its utilitarianism differs from earlier forms in substituting an -historical and biological explanation of the origin and force of the -moral sentiments for the purely psychological one. These sentiments -are declared to be "the results of accumulated experiences of utility, -gradually organized and inherited."[54] In its better forms of -statement this process of organizing a guiding instinct or intuition is -represented as the divine work of transferring the moral law over us -into our subjective consciousness--a process, however, that moves on -the principle of utility and is always incomplete.[55] - -Against the whole utilitarian theory, as a widely urged explanation -of the ground of right and the sense of obligation, the following -considerations are decisive: - -First, the idea of right is generically distinct and different from -that of happiness or utility. However closely related they refuse -to be identified and must not be confounded. In reference to any -particular act or to any general course of conduct, beyond the question -of pleasure or advantage arises the further question: Is it right? -Every day of their lives men are required to forego enjoyment and the -forwarding of what appears to be their interests, in order to do right -and follow their conscience. Perceived adaptations to happiness are not -the same as the obligation to right. Utilitarianism stands apart from -the moral idea, in a by-play with the idea of profit.[56] - -Secondly, as a matter of fact, clear in our consciousness, we do not, -in deciding the right or wrong of purposes and conduct, go through the -process of first determining the question of utility or adaptedness to -secure the greatest happiness to the greatest number or even our own -greatest happiness. In actual moral experience, the first fact is the -notion of right and duty. Even when pleasure or advantage is making an -appeal, duty is decided by the further question: Is it right? If it be -claimed that the process of calculation has become largely unnecessary -through the experience which has been teaching lessons and training -into judgments so spontaneous as to seem almost intuitive, there are -still cases enough where the right is a distinct issue, irrespective of -advantage, and where it is chosen in the face of loss and suffering. -This fact shows that right is a distinct principle and higher than -pleasure. To do right rather than seek sensitive good is the noblest -exaltation of character. - -It is especially in evolutionist utilitarianism that the absence of -such conscious calculating of advantage in questions of duty, is -supposed to be explained. The enjoyment of the useful is represented as -gradually organized and transformed into moral approbation, and through -hereditary descent appears, as Herbert Spencer says, in "certain -emotions responding to right and wrong, which have no apparent basis in -the individual experiences of utility." But philosophy fails to explain -how the idea of the useful can thus become identical with the idea of -the right, or even explanatory of it. If a lifetime's experience of -utility does not suffice to transmute the idea of one into the other, -why should we think a longer time would do it? If duty does not become -the same as happiness or as the tendency of conduct to promote it, in -the ascending steps of individual evolution, what warrant have we to -assume that it did so in some period far back of the consciousness of -the present individuals of the race? - -Thirdly, utilitarianism is inconsistent with the authority which -belongs to right, as witnessed in the moral consciousness. It is -the distinctive peculiarity of conscience that it reveals a law or -principle of obligation, not of our own making, and which our wills -cannot displace. Manifestly this authority is not of the faculty -itself, but belongs to the law of right which it discloses. It -is right, therefore, that is authoritative, with and through the -conscience, because right is a revelation of that absolute authority -not ourselves which makes for righteousness in the world and the whole -universe. It represents the perfections and will of God. No theory of -obligation is adequate which does not square with this fact of unique -authority in right, as recognized and enforced by the moral imperative. -But neither happiness nor the utilities that tend to promote it, -possess it. They are not obligatory in the peculiar sense in which -the ethical behest binds to righteousness. They are offered to our -enjoyment, as sensitive good, but we may forego them or neglect to seek -them, without direct criminality. Duty may, and often does, require us -not to make them a controlling object of desire. - -Among pleasures, some are higher or larger than others, and appeal to -some persons more strongly than to others. We can innocently choose -between them. To seek the greater instead of the smaller, or indeed -to neglect them all, is a prudential characteristic, not a moral one. -Where a person has simply foregone pleasure, he may regret it as -an error, but not repent of it as a sin. Considered with respect to -the individual alone, and free from relations that may incidentally -involve other points than his own personal pleasure, a man's happiness -may be regarded as his own free concern. If he chooses to neglect its -pursuit, or sacrifice it to other aims, so far as it is only and purely -a question as between greater or less enjoyment, his choice cannot -be challenged as guilty, but only as poor economy. Unquestionably it -ought to be believed that God desires men to be happy, and has provided -the needful conditions for happiness, but its enjoyment is an offer -of His love, and not a requirement of law. Happiness is a thing to be -gratefully appreciated; right is a thing we are bound to. Happiness -is a thing the less likely to be enjoyed the more covetously it is -sought after; right claims our unforgetful and completest loyalty. -Utilitarianism, therefore, assuming to ground right, which has direct -authority in the moral consciousness, upon happiness which in itself -has none, necessarily falls short of being an adequate theory of the -ethical reality. It attempts to deduce the moral from the non-moral. - -This difference between questions of right and questions of utility -easily solves a supposed difficulty in the moral freedom of the -will. If choices were simply between greater or less degrees of -pleasure or advantage, it might easily be imagined that the will -would be necessarily determined by the greater pleasure. As between -inducements of the same kind, the larger would prevail. But the ethical -choices have their place in the presence of motives of different -_kinds_, between right and enjoyment, duty or gain; and here there is -unquestionable room for free ethical choices. The question of freedom -in moral life is at once relieved by taking it out of the utilitarian -view into the clear atmosphere where the profitable is no longer -confounded with the right. - -Fourthly, utilitarianism inverts the true relation between right and -utility. Unquestionably the connection between them is very close. In a -moral system true happiness belongs to righteousness. Man cannot attain -his true welfare in sin. Whatever uncertainties and inequalities the -abuse of free agency may bring temporarily into human enjoyment, in -the long run right in its very nature promotes the happiness which has -been intended for us. But the logical order of relations is, not that -an act is right because it is useful, but useful because right. Under a -moral government happiness, in the highest and fullest sense, comes as -the legitimate fruit of righteousness, as wrong-doing, also, brings its -true consequences in suffering, pain and misery. Right is the quality -of highest rank, and all blessedness comes into unity and harmony under -it. Their rightness gives to actions their quality of usefulness, which -cannot, therefore, ground the right. Utilitarianism inverts the real -relation. - -This true relation explains how it is that the right stands the very -highest in the grade of values, without its becoming right by its -profitableness. It is of supreme worth, the greatest good, but it is so -by what it is in itself. Its good consequences spring from its nature. - -But while utilitarianism is thus utterly inadequate as a statement of -the ground of right, it nevertheless, especially in its altruistic -form, brings to view some genuine and profound principles of the -philosophy of duty. This has given it its plausibility and wide -acceptance. It is proper, therefore, to mark and recognize the truth -that belongs to the theory. - -(1) The tendencies of conduct to promote true happiness, or the -contrary, furnish, in fact, a valuable practical rule in questions -of right and duty. For, by the moral constitution of the world, -right-doing, despite the disorders that temporarily obstruct and -confuse the real law of consequences, is the way of true welfare. -Happiness, in the true, though not hedonistic sense, is an end of our -being, and virtue is conducive to it. "The way of the transgressor -is hard," under the law of natural cause and effect. The utilitarian -theory therefore justly appeals to the great lessons of experienced -utility to show the way of duty and guide conduct into righteousness. -So that while utility does not explain why an act is right, it becomes, -if correctly interpreted, a principle of great value in determining the -right. - -(2) It is unquestionably true that the altruistic principle of "the -greatest good to the greatest number" presents a principle of genuine -moral authority. It opens to view the whole realm of obligation to -beneficent activity and self-sacrifice. It points to deeds that are -noblest in life and highest in ethical character. It even gives a -reason for their obligatoriness. In this form the theory no longer -bases duty simply on one's own personal enjoyment or advantage, -identifying morality with supreme selfishness, but lifts it into the -sphere of benevolence and doing good. For, in altruism individual -enjoyment and interests are necessarily subordinated to the well-being -of the many. And when utility is thus put into the service of love -or good-will, it carries the quality of right into wide ranges of -purpose and conduct. It will be observed, however, that the theory -thus obtains its appearance of explaining the foundation of right and -duty only after "utility" has been itself changed and identified with -the virtue of active good-will or beneficence which, of course, is -right and obligatory to the degree of every man's ability. In other -words, only when it ceases to be purely and really a utilitarian -theory, and stands in the name and rights of benevolence--getting -ethical authority surreptitiously from the quality of love instead of -"profitableness"--does it also get the plausibility that it seems to -possess. - -(3) It is true, too, that a person's opportunities to promote his -own happiness and true interests involve a degree of obligation to -do so, as far as this may be consistent with other duties. A proper -self-regard is right. In general, on the one hand, we may justly make, -as we have done, a distinction between enjoyment, which is offered -to our option, and right, which is required by moral law. Were there -no considerations involved but that of one's own happiness, this -distinction would be unqualified. On the other hand, it must, at -the same time, be confessed that the moral consciousness of mankind -often condemns the conduct of men reckless of their own happiness -or well-being, not simply as "poor economy," but also as morally -wrong. Except in benevolent sacrifice no man can innocently throw away -his own happiness. The explanation of this is easy. There are other -considerations involved than his own happiness. To understand the whole -truth at this point the underlying fact must be borne in mind, that man -is created for two great ends, primarily for excellence of character, -secondarily and consequently for happiness. In moral order the way -to the latter is in and through the former. Character stands as the -irrepealable condition of reaching man's proper and true happiness. -And it is, therefore, true that in throwing away his happiness a man -may be guilty of more than "poor economy," but only in case he does -this by violating the law of right in surrendering his nature to vice. -It is not the consent to surrender enjoyment in itself that involves -guilt. For, one may innocently and virtuously forego this for the sake -of doing right. He may sacrifice pleasure or present happiness to serve -the good of others. In such disregard and sacrifice of enjoyment to do -good, there is no sin against the law of right; for we are not bound to -enjoyment as we are to right. Nor is there in it any sin against the -divine provision for happiness in our own nature; for under the rule of -moral order righteousness and happiness must finally coincide. While, -therefore, there is a sense in which to throw away one's happiness is -morally wrong, as well as bad policy, it is only when it is thrown away -by conduct that is first a violation of the law of right. - -There are two other profound ethical facts which help to explain how -men are bound to regard their own happiness, although right is not -grounded in it. One is, that every man sustains relations to the -welfare of his fellow-men, being a unit in the solidarity of social -humanity, making it impossible to separate his own happiness from -the well-being and rights of others. The other is that he sustains -also relations to an intended possible personal destiny. In the first -of these he is bound in duty to his fellow-men. In the second he is -obligated in duty to God. In the former case, he cannot wantonly trifle -with his own interests without wrong and injury to those to whom he is -bound in the relationships of life. In this way a moral wrong comes -in. In the latter case, as God has rights in His plan for each man's -worthy and happy destiny, it is a sin against Him when men make their -own welfare inferior by failure to observe the moral principle which -conditions true happiness in righteousness. Sacrifice of happiness -by such disregard of moral principle is not to be confounded with -sacrifice of it through loyalty to right and holy self-denial in doing -good. - -It thus, however, becomes evident, even in this discussion and -exhibition of the truth which utilitarianism has in its favor, that the -theory fails to present the real ground of right. For in its primary -and fundamental form, viewing conduct as right because promotive of -our personal interests and happiness, it plainly resolves morality -into mere calculation of selfishness. It presents supreme egoism. And -in its altruistic form it either maintains its selfish character, by -explaining that only by the rule of "the greatest good to the greatest -number" can the common interest, and consequently each man's share be -fully secured, implying that he is to contribute to the common welfare -for the sake of his own larger portion; or by subordinating the idea -of "utility" to that of "good-will" actively seeking the interests of -others, it practically confesses that it must seek some other ground -than mere utility or the consequences of conduct, in which to find -the principle of right. And this good-will, benevolence or love, thus -added, also fails. For since good-will is a virtue, it cannot be -placed as the ground of virtue, both in itself and in all virtues. The -moral law is by no means exhausted in benevolence; it must include -also justice, purity, veracity and many other duties. A benevolence -that would be unaccompanied by condemnation of the evil-doer and his -wrongs, might quickly go astray. It has often been pointed out that -good-will itself throws no light as to the right methods of realizing -even itself. Itself needs a guide as to how it may proceed--the very -principle of right after whose basis we are inquiring. Love, unless -united with reprobation of evil-doing, is as likely to act immorally as -morally. Benevolent endeavor, however excellent in itself, must subject -its methods to the fundamental principles of right. And not until we -find the relations that require both benevolence and its utilities, do -we reach the ground of right and obligation. - - -==Theory of Relations.== - -=11.= The Theory of _Relations_ is variously modified. As expressed by -Dr. Samuel Clarke, right is based on "the fitness of things." Wollaston -grounded it on "the truth of things," wrong action being in all cases -out of harmony with the realities of existence. Jouffroy found it in -the demands of "universal order," the particular good and duty of each -man being elements or parts of an absolute good and universal order -appearing to reason as obligatory. Dr. Wayland makes right rest upon -"conformity of action to the relations which man sustains in life."[57] - -We shall come upon the essential features of this theory in our next -chapter, in our positive account of the development and basis of right. - - -==Spiritual Excellence Theory.== - -=12.= As defined by Dr. Hickok: "The ground in which the ultimate rule -of right is seen, is the intrinsic excellency of spiritual being."... -"Every man has consciously the bond upon him to do that and that only -which is due to his spiritual excellency."[57] But it is a plain matter -of fact that men do not go through a process of correlating their -proposed conduct with the spiritual excellency of their nature, before -deciding on its moral character. And even if they did so, it would give -them but a self-centred rule. Dr. Gregory well says of this attempt to -put one's own spiritual excellency as the principle of right: "It is -only by a self-deification, by making man a god to himself, that it can -be made a supreme end."[58] - -==Theory of Intuitions.== - -=13.= Some writers search for no ground beyond the immediate intuition. -This view forbears to seek for any basis behind the immediate -affirmation of the moral sense. Right is ultimate in its own intuition. -"The intuition creates law." This seems to be the teaching of Cudworth, -Kant, Coleridge, Calderwood, and others. - - - - -CHAPTER IX. - -THE GROUND OF RIGHT--CONTINUED. - - -The review of theories in the last chapter prepares us to apprehend the -real ground of right. All the subjective theories fail, because the -moral quality is objectively real to the percipient conscience. The -endaemonistic and utilitarian explanations are at fault, because they -attempt to deduce the moral from the unmoral and can give no account of -the unique authority which is the characteristic mark of moral law. - -The full ground of right, as the essential elements of the problem have -made clearly apparent, must be regarded as twofold, embracing, first, -the proximate or immediate ground, and secondly, the ultimate ground. - -==Proximate Ground Stated.== - -I. The proximate ground--as becomes easily manifest if we keep our -view close to the witness of consciousness in actual experience--is in -a rational conformity of conduct to the relations which men sustain -to one another and to other beings in the divinely constituted system -of the world. These relations immediately call for fitting conduct. -They create the _ought_ of moral law. The right is found in conforming -to the requirements which they develop and impose. Duty consists in -fulfilling the demands which they involve and express to the moral -reason. - -This, it will be noticed, accords with the fundamental principle -already referred to, that the conception of moral law allies itself -normally only with the theistic view of the world, and the truth that -the constituted human relations have been framed under a rational -ideal of order and welfare. These relations form a rational system -in which intelligent free activity is to actualize a divine plan of -excellence and well-being. They require conduct in accordance with -themselves and with the ends of well-being and happiness to which they -have been adapted. The human reason reads the meaning of the relations, -and the moral discernment recognizes the obligation to correspondent -sentiment and action. Moral conduct thus becomes simply the conduct -that actualizes the ideas of divine order to which the framework of -human relations has been constituted. What is right springs immediately -from the relations, as what is due in ideal moral order. The relations -themselves exhibit a moral constitution as the immediate environment -of the human moral personality. They bring the ethical requirement -which they contain to the recognizing capacity of the reason and the -obedience of the will. - -It is to be noticed, further, that the term "relations" is to be -understood here in its most comprehensive sense and applicability. It -embraces all relations with respect to which the human personality -in its freedom has to determine and harmonize itself--relations -individual, social, and divine. Social relationship has often been -absurdly mistaken as the only sphere of moral obligation; and the -individual, if contemplated as alone and perfectly isolated, has -sometimes been supposed to be entirely without ethical bonds. In what -concerns himself only, he is imagined to be unbound. But this is an -unwarrantable limitation of the term. For the individual, even viewed -utterly apart from his race, yet sustains relations to the adaptations -and intentions in his own nature. As in society he owes something to -the humanity around him, even alone he would still owe something to -the humanity committed to his own keeping. He cannot absolve himself -from the bond that binds him to that--as in fact he cannot from that -which unites him to his fellow-men. Mere pleasures or enjoyments which -are apart from his essential character he may, indeed, disregard, but -not what concerns its intended excellence and honor. It has been well -said: "Robinson Crusoe did not become a non-moral being when thrown on -the desert island; for he still owed respect to his own humanity."[59] -Many a deed is wrong, not as injuring others, but as violative of the -agent's relation to the purposes lodged in his own constitution. This -is as real as are those that connect him with his fellow-men around him -or with God above him. And it is very superficial thought that finds -no relations but those that are objective. Sometimes, strangely, in -popular thinking, man's relation to God is also omitted from a place -in morality, by a relegation of it to the sphere of religion. But this -relation is the most fundamental and vital of all human relations and -most replete with moral obligations and responsibilities. - -This view of the immediate ground of right is fully established by the -following additional considerations: - - -==Sustained by Moral Consciousness.== - -=1.= It is directly sustained by the moral consciousness itself, in -constant experience. As a question of psychological metaphysics the -point must be settled in harmony with the testimony of consciousness. -Appealing to this, there can be no doubt that these relations do -develop and call for the duties which the conscience is constantly -discerning and enforcing. This is simply a fact--a fact which -speculations about the origin of conscience or the education of its -judgments, must not be allowed to obscure. It assures that actual -morality is no abstraction, but concrete conduct rightly answering -to each person's relations in real life. Beyond all question, as -thus witnessed in the universal moral consciousness, these relations -from the most general, that of man to man, down through all special -connections, as between parents and children, husband and wife, -brothers and sisters, friends and neighbors, rulers and citizens, -employer and employe, rich and poor, capable and helpless, and all the -other human interrelations in their thousands of diversified forms, -do determine and impose both general and specific duties. The duties -come into view as developed by the relations, and change as they are -modified and changed. This basing of what is right and obligatory -for men on their relations to one another, to God, and to appointed -ends, is not a mere theory, but an unquestionable reality in their -consciousness. - -And this accords with the best cosmic philosophy. For this holds all -these relations as parts of a rationally designed system of world-order -for universal well-being, and the moral reason as capacitated to -discern, with more or less clearness and fulness, the moral requirement -which they involve and present for observance. We know of no morality -that exists, or can exist, in human life, apart from them. Strike them -all away, and all duties disappear. Take, as illustration, the most -generic virtue of all the virtues recognized by the ethical judgments, -that of good-will or love. The moral reason recognizes this as resting, -according to eternal fitness, in the broadest and most generic of all -relations, that of one intelligent sentient being to another. In the -inter-human connection it is based in the brotherhood of man. And this -generic good-will, thus required in ideal moral right by the generic -relation, becomes differentiated and modified in thousands of special -types and forms by the endlessly diversified particular relations of -life. - - -==Presuppositions in Responsibility.== - -=2.= It is implied in the logical presuppositions to all moral -responsibility. Among such presuppositions, as conceded by all, are -intelligence to know, and freedom to conform to these relations. These -prerequisites are essential to the very conception of moral action and -amenability. It is the universal sense of the race that creatures that -cannot know themselves and the relations they sustain, and are without -free-will to fulfil them, are morally irresponsible and incapable of -virtue or vice. To them the moral realm becomes a blank, and the moral -judgments become impossible. And equally universal is the admission -that the moral insight is helped and responsibility increased by every -increase of light giving larger and truer knowledge of the complex and -intricate connections of human life. With every broadened and clarified -vision of these connections fresh obligations appear. "A defective -apprehension of the relations in which we stand to God and to our -fellow-men, will prevent our seeing our specific duties."[60] This fact -furnishes direct evidence that right conduct must be held as a certain -intelligent adjustment to the relations sustained. - -The value of this point is magnified when we remind ourselves how -it explains and illuminates the sometimes troublesome phenomenon of -different and even conflicting moral judgments in the same case by -different persons, and the fact of progress in moral standards as -civilization and culture advance. Differing apprehension of one or -more of the many elements or factors converging, with confusing force, -into almost every situation which calls for duty, easily accounts -for most of the perplexing diversity. The relations are seen from -different angles, and interpreted in different light. And the advance -of civilizations, with their science and philosophy, brings truer and -completer views of man's place and relations. The moral ideas of the -human reason are, indeed, essentially identical in all men and all -ages, and when human relations are apprehended in the same light, -with equal clearness and fulness, the moral judgments substantially -agree. But the progress of knowledge, throwing increasing light on -these relations, leads the onward civilizations up into truer and -better application of the principles of right in life. The different -codes do not mean a change of primary moral ideas, but merely reflect -and illustrate the changed and advancing apprehension of man's true -relations to which these unchanging ideas are, and are forever to be, -applied. - -Another and kindred fact is explained, adding still further -confirmation of the correctness of this theory. With perfect intentions -men fulfil objective duty only in measure. Duty is only approximately -accomplished, in varying degrees, from very faulty success to high -grades of accuracy and completeness. A correct view of the ground of -right must necessarily allow a consistent explanation of this fact. -Sometimes the fact has been looked upon as inconsistent with any -absolute dividing line between right and wrong, on one or the other -side of which every action must fall. Not all good acts are perfect -or faultless; not all evil ones are equally violations of duty. Of -right actions some measure up better than others toward all that full -duty requires. Dr. Martineau, partly in order to account for this -scope of variety in moral correctness, urges a special definition of -right and wrong: "Every action is right, which, in presence of a lower -principle, follows a higher; every action is wrong, which, in presence -of a higher principle, follows a lower."[61] By the great difference in -the rank of moral motives the reason of men's differing grades in the -ascending or descending scale of character seems to come into view. -But while the definition furnishes a rule frequently serviceable for -guidance in questions of duty, it fails to define the ground of right; -for it leaves unsettled the very point in this question, viz.: why one -principle (as a motive) _is_ morally "higher" or "lower" than another, -or why some intentions or actions are right or wrong in any degree. -And the offered explanation is unnecessary; for the unquestionable -principle of moral requirement developed in relations, and discerned -by the intuitive insight of the conscience fully explains the variety, -when we remember the various degrees of accuracy and fulness with -which these relations are understood and estimated. Every relation -calling for duty is composite and complex, the various parts being -often so connected as to come only partially or one-sidedly into view, -preventing full insight of the moral demand, or accurate adjustment of -sentiment and conduct to it. Rarely is any relation simple and alone. -Often, indeed commonly, conscience has to decide duty as a resultant -obligation out of very complicated and even antagonistic relationships. -All this is amply sufficient to explain the different degrees in which -the conduct meets duty. It is the necessary result of the impossibility -of exactly fitting the moral sentiment or act to the demands of the -moral relations. And the transparent explanation which this theory -furnishes of the fact of such degrees strongly corroborates its -scientific correctness. - - -==Verified in Moral Concepts.== - -=3.= It is verified, further, in the character of the various virtues, -and their opposite immoralities. In their very conceptions these -imply relations. They are moulded by them, and carry the shaping thus -received. Justice, for example, in inter-human affairs, is absolute -equity between man and man--exact reciprocity. Veracity expresses -something that is due from one to another among beings whose welfare -requires them to live according to the truth of things. The duty to -speak the truth answers to the need and right of each one to know it. -Love, or good-will, has already been shown to express the feeling -which, in eternal fitness, is due from one sentient rational being -to another, in the most generic relationship. Honesty means seeking -equality of values in dealings one with another. Sincerity signifies -genuineness in the temper and way we relate ourselves to those about -us. We might run through all the precepts of the Christian decalogue -and note that every one is based on some general or special relation, -either of man to God or of men to their fellow-men. No virtue can get -away from relations. The very concept of every one is moulded by them, -and carries the shaping which they enstamp upon it as the coin does -that of the die. - - -==Supported by Analogy.== - -=4.= It is supported also by the analogy of organic and instinctive -action. In organic action, the physically right is adaptation to -environment, in which each part and movement fills its sphere -and accomplishes its functions in the given place and relations. -In instinctive action, the force is adjusted to the position and -connections in which the animal is placed. For example, that of the -bee is made to move correspondently to its relations to the individuals -of its own kind and to the end of supporting and preserving the -species. The instinct of the beaver adjusts its house to its peculiar -surroundings; that of birds constructs their nests in distinct -adaptation to the conditions that surround them. In animals that -harvest and store their food, it suits the action to the particular -environment and changing seasons. In every case instinct fits the -activity to the given place and relations of its subject. This method -by which organic and instinctive functions are set to secure right -action in their special spheres, is exceedingly significant of the -generic principle of all right action. In the light of the analogy, the -morally right is a continuation of the same principle of harmony with -constituted relations which is seen to be omnipresent in all the lower -domain of nature extending up to human personality, but becoming moral -at this point by being subject to free will and accomplished by it. It -is to be remembered that teleologic plan and adaptation run through the -entire cosmic order, from atoms to worlds and from minutest structures -of body to the loftiest endowments of intelligent beings akin to God. -Automatic action secures accordance in the inferior ranges. The grand -distinction of the moral realm appears when, as the crowning ascent -of life is reached, the principle of ethical harmony with divinely -constituted relations is to be accepted and accomplished by the -intelligence and freedom of man and is made the moral _ought_ under -personal responsibility. - - -==Assumed in Common Life.== - -=5.= It adds confirmation to this explanation, that it is implicitly -assumed in all the conceptions and language of common life. Unbiassed -by speculative theories the every-day thinking and speech of mankind -connect duties with men's personal place and relations--duties -modified and fixed according to the form and specialty of individual -situations. The fact of duty itself is not more certain than this -fact of the way in which spontaneous and unperverted thought grounds -it. This fixing of the world's conceptions and speech in this form -cannot be fairly interpreted as a caprice or accident, but as the true -effect of the actual reality, which stands as its cause or warrant. -And it is significant that speculative theorists who have framed for -themselves some other account, whenever momentarily off their guard -or forgetting to act as watch-dog for their theory, have been wont to -turn unconsciously into forms of expression recognizing this relational -ground for human duties. - -==The Ultimate Ground.== - -II. In thus finding the right grounded directly on conformity to the -relations given men in the constituted order of life, we have not yet -reached the full solution of the great problem. For these relations are -only a part of the aggregate moral constitution, and are not the last -term of moral authority. They do not stand in their own independent -right. Though they do directly create and shape the immediate duties -for which they call, they are not the ultimate reality in which moral -law has its deep foundations. So we must go back to the source and -reason of these relations. The ultimate ground can be found, only in -God himself who, in his underived eternal nature, is the absolute -ground of the whole created universe, with all its interrelations which -develop the reality of moral law. - -The true conception of the divine creative action is that in it the -thought and moral character of God become transitive and appear in the -relations established and the ethical requirements which the relations -impose. The constituted connections and order of life, which involve -an ideal standard of right conduct and duty, reveal the divine mind -or intention and in it the ultimate authority. The proximate basis, -already discovered, in ideal conformity to the moral relations in which -the moral agent is placed, therefore represents God, who, as the first -cause and eternal ground of the creation with all its adaptations and -laws, is the ultimate and unchangeable ground of right and of all moral -law. - -This statement of the ultimate ground means more than a resting of -right simply on the will of God. A reference of it to his will has -often stood for a claim that the moral law stands merely in the option -of God or as only a product of his choice. Many have represented it as -only an effect whose cause is an act of his will--that will originating -or making "the right" rather than observing and declaring it, and the -moral law having no basis other than such enactment of will. But this -would imply that God himself is without moral character, acting from -no norm of essential right, but simply by mere will ordaining what -should pass as right among mankind. Our fundamental ethical conception -of him, however, is that of a moral being and moral ruler. And to be -moral means to love and choose the right as right. We must keep in -mind here the relation between moral law and will, or the choices of -the will. Moral authority does not exist as will, but as right. The -great conception of the right, as witnessed to in universal conscience, -is of something that appeals to will and requires the will to bow to -its claim. Right is superior and authoritative for will, and cannot, -therefore, be simply an effect of it. The right itself is basal for -right willing, even with God himself. He wills according to it. Hence -the moral law is not to be considered a product of his will, but an -expression of his nature. In perfect freedom he wills the good because -he is good, being in his eternal nature the absolute and infinite moral -Perfection. It is a deep conviction in the moral consciousness of -mankind, that God himself is in his very nature righteous and good, a -conviction which utters itself evermore in the spontaneous exclamation: -"Shall not the judge of all the earth do right!" Out of a non-moral -ground the moral could never arise, and only in the very nature of God -himself as perfect, infinite and unchangeable righteousness, do we -reach the ultimate ground both of the constituted relations of human -life and of the sublime and inextinguishable reality of moral law for -the ordering of these relations. The profound meaning of the poet's -couplet: - - "For right is right since God is God, - And right the day must win," - -is to identify God and right as united in the eternal foundation of -the moral system. There is thus, for the universe, what has been often -designated "an eternal and immutable morality" whose authority and -standard rest in the very Ground of the universe itself. - -The conclusion thus apparent is vindicated by the very conception -of the authority which binds men ethically. Mere "might cannot make -right" or be that which has the reverence of the moral nature. Moral -sovereignty does not attach to a simple absolutism of power. The -ethical will bows to the right only. It would be a great contradiction -to think of the power to which the moral submission of the soul is due -as itself anything other than an ethical power, the morally good power, -the morally good Being. - -This ultimate ground of right, thus found, makes plain why ethics, -in its full meaning and issue, is so closely allied to religion. -Religion, in its spirit and aim, means fellowship with God, accordance -of desire, will, and life with him. And ethics, even in the view of -its early student Plato, looks to the same goal, "likeness to God." -The supreme aim of Christianity is ethical, the transformation and -exaltation of human conduct and character into the excellence and -happiness of righteousness. That the moral life of man may, out of his -broken, corrupt and disabled state of sin, thus become again harmonized -with God and the divine constitution of things, redemption comes -with its supernatural powers and help for human nature, enabling and -accomplishing a realization of the ethical law in human character. - - - - -CHAPTER X. - -THE OBJECTS OF MORAL JUDGMENT. - - -A full view of the ethical reality and its meaning for us requires yet -an examination into the question: Of what may we justly affirm moral -quality? Where does the conscience apply the distinctions of right and -wrong? What are properly the objects, and the only objects, of moral -approval or condemnation? Or, to put it in a way possibly more easily -understood, to what human activities or features of life does moral -quality belong? - -It has already been noted in general that only personal beings -can be moral agents or become, in what they are and do, objects -of moral judgment. Apart from personality, no place for virtue or -vice can be found. Of things, whether natural products or products -of human industry, as rock or star or stream, or ship or watch or -engine, we cannot predicate moral character. We may speak of them -as beautiful, useful, or perfect, or as ugly, useless, or faulty, -but all distinctly ethical terms are inapplicable to them. The moral -approbation or condemnation which we feel for the temper, words, and -actions of men is felt toward them as personal phenomena. Detached from -personality they would no more be subjects of praise or blame than -the temperature of the sea, the noise of the wind, or the down-pour -of rain Moral character belongs to them only as the characteristics -and manifestations of the self-conscious and self-directed life of a -moral agent. To the question what activities of a moral agent may have -ethical quality, it ought to be sufficient to say that it belongs to -all his conscious and self-directed conduct. Obligation claims sway -over the whole personality. But for clearness and definiteness, it is -necessary to specify. - - -==Personal Actions.== - -=1.= The action itself, in its external form, may be right or wrong, as -in conformity to moral relations or incongruous with them. It may be -either the deed that is due to the relations and a fulfilment of the -duty they call for, or it may be one that clashes with their rational -and actual requirement. It may be in itself just the action in which -conduct is rightly adjusted to the actual relations--an act that ought -to appear in them. Or it may be in itself an action whose very form -contradicts the moral demand of the relations, and which ought not to -be done, no matter how good a motive may prompt the deed. For example, -the motive to use them in a worthy charity could never justify a theft -of goods or money, nor could filial care of a helpless parent be in -itself wrong, even should a bad motive inspire it. Moral law repudiates -the first deed; it condemns the wrong motive in the second, but -declares the material of the deed itself to be right and good. - -We must here distinguish between the moral character of the doer and of -the deed. The quality of right and wrong belongs to the action; guilt -or innocence belongs to the person. This is the basis of the well -known fact that in some cases the doer of a wrong act may nevertheless -be held as innocent and even virtuous in it. He may have honestly -meant to do right, and acted from praiseworthy motives, but from not -understanding correctly or fully the situation, may have done what has -violated the moral call of the relations. The action may be condemned, -while he himself may be acquitted of guilt. The full ethical demand, -however, requires such a use of all our faculties of knowledge and -behavior, as not only to maintain a good intention, but to keep our -outward conduct in harmony with objective righteousness. - -Many writers have shown a disposition to deny moral quality to the -external action. Locating it all in the inner sentiment or intention, -their analysis separates the visible part from its source, and -holds up to view the action, so separated, as mere physical motion, -characterizable as useful and expedient or the contrary, but neither -moral nor immoral. Independently of its motive it is resolved into mere -natural movement, as non-ethical as a muscular spasm, sleepwalking, -the dashing of a wave, or the biting of frost. But this is as -misleading as it is plausible. The error becomes clear by the following -considerations: - -(1) The supposed separation of the deed from the inward intention -falsifies the actual facts in the case. The essential element in the -problem is that we are contemplating, not physical movement only, -like spasms or waves, but personal deeds, as acts of moral agents. -Of course, moral quality does not attach to the action of non-moral -beings, as the striking of clocks or the barking of dogs, but to deeds -of self-directing personality. Let it be freely admitted that the inner -sentiment does give quality to conduct. The obligation to the conduct -that shall fulfil duty attaches to the personal agent; the innocence -or guilt also belongs to him. But there is obligation upon him with -respect to conduct only because conduct, in its external forms as well -as inward springs, forms the total material of morality. There could be -no responsibility for conduct if no moral quality belonged to actions. -To separate--after the manner referred to--the action from the personal -moral agent and think of it as physical motion only, makes it no longer -the action about whose character we are inquiring. - -(2) We must bear in mind several just distinctions in the application -of the term right. Along with duty, obligation, merit, innocence, -or guilt, it may be affirmed of the moral agent. We may say, "he is -right," in doing so or so. We may speak of the inner sentiment as -right or wrong. So we may of the external action. For the true and -full extent of moral quality, we must make it cover the agent himself, -and both the inner and outer sides of his personal conduct. Conduct -has an internal and an external part. The motive is only one part. An -action is relatively right, with respect to the agent, when he has the -right will in right motive; it is absolutely right only when it is -also shaped into accordance with the relations so as to realize the -moral demand upon the person. The distinction, often made, between -formal right and material right, throws the point into clear light. It -is well stated by Prof. Bowne: "The former depends upon the attitude -of the agent's will toward his ideal of right, the latter depends on -the harmony of the act with the laws of reality and its resulting -tendency to produce and promote well-being. Conduct which is formally -right may be materially wrong; and conduct which is materially right -may be formally wrong; but no conduct can be even formally right when -the agent does not aim to be materially right. The ideal of conduct -demands both formal and material rightness, and as long as either is -lacking the outcome is imperfect.... If one does 'the best he knows,' -it is often said nothing more can be demanded of him. And yet it is -plain that this formal righteousness is altogether insufficient for -the person's well-being. The reason is that the law of well-being -is independent of our will. If we misconceive that law and act -accordingly, we may be formally right, but because of the misconception -we should be materially wrong. It is, then, by no means sufficient -that one be formally right, that is, true to his convictions of duty; -he must also be materially right, that is, in harmony with reality -and its laws. Formal rightness, of course, is ethically the more -important, as it involves the good will; but material rightness is only -less important, as without it our action is out of harmony with the -universe."[62] - -(3) The moral consciousness, when unperverted by speculative theory, -does in fact judge the actions of men. It steadily holds them as -essentially right or wrong, over and above all question as to the -motives for them. It is found perpetually condemning even well-meant -deeds as traversing duty and righteousness, hardly able to excuse the -blundering ignorance to which they are due. This feeling of reprobation -is genuine, normal, and wholesome. On the other hand the overthrow of -this feeling and the adoption of the claim of a non-ethical character -for actions, tends directly and strongly to consequences which witness -against the validity of the claim. The demoralizing effect has often -been illustrated. The resolving of duty into a mere matter of good -intentions has led off into ways and forms of behavior shocking to -enlightened consciences. It has made quite plausible the illusion -that "the end sanctifies the means," and in the name of religion has -stretched men on the rack and lighted the faggots at the stake. Under a -fancy that purity is simply a thing of the heart, men have been known -to excuse not a little sensualism of life. While ethics must lay stress -on the inner good-will, it must also look after the harmony of the -outward acts with the law of right relations. No amount of good motive -can make blasphemy or murder right or virtuous. - - -==The Feelings, Passions and Desires.== - -=2.= The various feelings, passions, and desires are not only springs -of action that may issue in conduct, but are in themselves either right -or wrong, according as they are exercised in harmony with moral law or -in conflict with it. - -(1) Though our feelings spring spontaneously and immediately out of -our knowledge and fundamental psychical character, they are subject to -training and regulation by the will, and their states and movements -are part of our moral life. And though by natural unperverted -constitution all these primary feelings and affections have right -and good functions, their activities, under noxious stimulation, may -run into forms and in directions thoroughly immoral. Love, which, -in its holiest direction, toward God, and in its purest forms of -benevolence, toward men, is the highest virtue, may take forbidden -directions and corrupt and disorder life. Hate, the reverse of love, -instead of being directed against evil which ought to be hated, often -emits its venom against that which ought to be loved for its goodness. -Self-esteem, as a proper respect for what has been put into a person's -being to be cared for and enjoyed, frequently runs into condemnable -selfishness. Many of the "desires" are apt to be in offense because of -over-development, clashing in anarchic insubordination in the soul, or -rushing toward unlawful objects. Desire for possessions tends to grow -into covetousness, desire for honor into unscrupulous ambition, desire -for pleasure into a ruling passion. Such feelings as malice and envy, -mongrel products of selfishness and ill-will, are at once adjudged to -be sinful. - -(2) Were further proof needed that morality attaches to the affections -and desires, it is found in their relations as motives to conduct. -We have not traced actions completely to their moral source when we -have ascertained the volition from which they proceed. We must go a -step further back and mark the impulses that either rightly or wrongly -influenced the will. We must do as do courts of justice in seeking the -character of an act, and ascertain not only that the act was done in -free-will, but also what feelings influenced the free-will in doing -it. An act of volition may have very different motives behind it. The -immoral character of the volition is not only from the immorally-acting -will itself, but also from the wrong feelings or desires acting on -the will. Indeed, the very will is betrayed into wrong-doing by their -perverting persuasions. It becomes clear, therefore, that if it be at -all true that "actions take moral character from their motives," this -character must be predicable of these motive sensibilities. - -(3) A special question has place here--whether moral quality belongs -even to the personal dispositions, propensities and inclinations -that lie back of the _exercise_ of the feelings, as attitudes or -habitudes of the soul with respect to good and evil? The facts of life -unquestionably show the existence of such propensities or tendencies -derived through heredity and descending from generation to generation. -The scientific theory of evolution recognizes them and draws many of -its conclusions, both psychological and moral, from them. They express -rather a state of the personal constitution than any exercise of its -faculties. They denote so basally the psychical life-condition, that -they characterize rather what the person is than what he does morally. -Since they, as states of the personal agent, constitute his attitude, -among other things, toward good and evil, an attitude either right or -wrong, this question manifestly requires an affirmative answer. - - -==Aims and Intentions.== - -=3.= Intentions. In judging conduct we inquire especially into the aim, -purpose, intention, which directed it. We look at the end sought. And -in a peculiar degree conduct is pronounced right or wrong according to -this. For the intention is pre-eminently the very heart and informing -principle of the moral act. Besides largely shaping the material action -in agreement or conflict with objective duty it is the inner soul of -the total deed. - -It may make an act that in its external form is morally indifferent -thoroughly virtuous or deeply criminal--such as that of handing a sum -of money to another, in one case to relieve suffering, in another to -secure murder. The intention to do what is known to be wrong, even -when the overt deed is prevented, stamps upon the person its own moral -character. - -In intentions we find the teleology of the ethical conduct--the chosen -ends at which men are aiming in their constant endeavor--and they have -a place of importance corresponding to this directive relation. Life -moves as these turn, and the great body of human activity, in its -mighty sweep of purposive conduct, whether rising into its loftiest and -purest virtues or descending to its lowest and most horrid crimes, is -their result. In this teleological position they differ as "motives" -from the motives found in the simple feelings, affections and passions -which act non-voluntarily and unconscious of ends, but are springs of -impulse and incentives from the subjective psychical organization. -Intentions are deliberate voluntary purposes aiming at chosen objects -and adjusting means to ends. For this class of motives, therefore, we -are peculiarly and pre-eminently responsible. - - -==Activities of the Intellect.== - -=4.= The activities and uses of the intellect. Often theorists have -denied any moral element in these, mainly because of a certain -"necessity" in intellect under psychical law, and because its function -is simply "to know." It does nothing, either good or bad; "it only -knows." Its sphere is the sphere of knowledge, not of conduct. But -this is a very inadequate view of its total activity, and of its place -in the moral agent's life. As to the question of "necessity," the -activities of the intellect are as much under the command of the moral -agent as are his sensibilities, his affections, desires, and passions. -It would be difficult to see why he should be amenable for the -direction and regulation of these desires and passions, and not also -for the direction and character of his intellectual work and the use -he makes of these high endowments. As to the question of the non-moral -character of cognitive or thought activities, they are correctly -conceded to be, in very large measure, without any ethical quality. But -it is also true, that there may be activities, as for example, in the -imagination, and in purposive scheming, which are impure and grossly -violative of justice and right. Because the intellect in itself, as -contradistinguished from the will, does not choose and has no choice, -we may not, indeed, say of its activity: "It is guilty," "it is under -obligation," since obligation and guilt pertain not to the act but -to the moral person; but yet we may speak of intellectual activity -or work as morally "right" or "wrong," according as it is in harmony -or in conflict with the true ends for which the intellectual powers -have been framed and the well-being they are designed to serve. It -would be difficult to see why the intellectual activity which plans -out the details of a theft or a murder is not as really immoral, -_i. e._ something morally condemnable, as is the desire or wish to -commit it, or why the person is less blameworthy for the one than the -other. In both cases it is part of his personal activity. And if he is -"blameworthy," it is only because the activity is in itself "wrong." Is -he any less guilty for allowing his intellect to think out the wrong -than his feelings to desire it? The moral sense must condemn this -intellectual work as inconsistent with the relations of the intellect -to human well-being and righteousness. In these days of worship of -intellectual brilliancy, and the large prostitution of the imagination -to activities which flood literature with thoughts that defile and -suggestions that carry moral blight and desolation, producing every -form of vice and crime, it is of prime importance to recognize that -this intellectualism does not stand altogether apart from moral -quality, and that men are under the completest obligation to keep it -all in harmony with righteousness and the ethical ends of life. - - -==Acts of the Will.== - -=5.= Our view of intentions has touched on part of the functions of -the _will_ with respect to moral quality, but its acts in the stricter -sense and more specific forms require further statement. "Intentions" -are, indeed, under the command of the will, yet they are there as -motives, whose force and quality stand specially in the objects desired -and aimed at. They draw their quality rather from the ends sought than -from the working of the will which consents to the ends. We must see -yet whether the conscience judges also the proper and specific acts of -the will. - -Of course that which we name "the will" is simply the soul's power of -choosing, or rather, it is the personal self as causal for choices -and executive action. Its acts are "volitions." Does moral quality -attach to these? There can be no doubt of it. Upon these volitions, -preferential and executive choices, electing between duty and its -opposite, between conduct in harmony or in conflict with moral -requirement, between indulgence of good or wicked feelings, between -virtuous and evil intentions, between higher and lower motives, between -actions materially right or wrong, making the decision for or against -righteousness and goodness and purity, in all the questions of daily -behavior in which life rises into ethical excellence and blessedness -or descends into wrong, vice, crime, and consequent wretchedness, -the moral sense of mankind pours its most unequivocal approvals or -reprobations. It not only judges them as right or wrong in themselves, -but as, among all human activities, most creative or most destructive -of moral character. It is a fundamental postulate in ethical thinking -that moral law binds the will.[63] - -In the action of the will the moral judgment finds its object of -highest approval and of most thorough condemnation. It is to the will, -_i. e._ the personal self, that moral law presents its claims. It is -the point in which personality is summed up in free and responsible -selfhood, and where the great reality of responsibility is pivoted. The -will, as another name for the soul's power of choosing, sustains the -decisive relation between all the motives that precede and the actions -which follow the volitions. The action contemplated may be right or -wrong, the motive may be good or bad, but when the question is brought -by the conscience into the presence of the will, the place of supreme -and final responsibility for virtue or sin is reached. - -This justifies the conclusion that moral character belongs to the -exercise of the will as it does not to any other activity of our -moral nature. For it is the point, and the only point, of freedom -in our whole constitution. Necessity marks the action of each and -every part from the lowest functions up to the will; and beyond this -there stretches on another realm of necessity in the consequences -of volition. For example, necessity rules in the physical nature. -The processes go on under fixed uniform laws, with no freedom or -choice. So in the intellect and the sensibility. We begin to think in -non-optional spontaneity, or we would not think at all. In perception, -representation, in the discursive and intuitive powers, and in the -emotions, affections and desires that arise from the activity of the -intellect, the movement is bound up under laws of cause and effect. -Whatever power of regulation, change or control we possess over these -functions does not belong to the powers themselves, but to the will or -the personal capacity of free choice and self-regulation. It is only -through our will-power that we can handle and direct our thinking or -control the direction and force of our feelings. So, too, the ideas of -right and wrong, the perceptions of duty and the sense of obligation -come into the presence of the will of necessity. All before the will -is of necessity. Thus men see the right and perceive obligation. At -this point all the responsibility of character is thrown upon the will. -If contemplated action appear right or wrong, as action that ought or -ought not to be done, the will must decide whether it shall be done. If -good or bad motives plead for rulership, the will must say which shall -prevail. If feelings are out of harmony with duty and right in the -relations of life, with respect to God or man, it is to be remembered -that the feelings cannot choose, and the will alone can guide them in -virtuous action. To it, therefore, virtue or guilt belongs as nowhere -else. For it not only accepts and makes its own all the right or wrong -that appears elsewhere, but it also remains true or becomes false to -its own supreme duty and obligation to moral law, when, under the -behests of conscience, it directs life and character either up the -heights of moral excellence and happiness, or into the wrong and guilt -and miseries of immorality. Where the will is moral the man is moral; -for the will is the zenith of personality. Where it is immoral the man -is immoral. - - - - -CHAPTER XI. - -THE ETHICAL VIEW UNDER CHRISTIAN TEACHING. - - -These conclusions with respect to the nature and office of conscience, -the ethical distinction, its theistic implications, its transcendental -character and objective validity, its relation to personality and -freedom, the proximate and ultimate ground of right, and the different -parts of human activity to which moral quality belongs, are conclusions -reached by the scientific method and stand on the warrant of reason. -They arise from phenomena of history and life, and form, in their -essential statements, a body of scientific and philosophical knowledge -of equal certainty and authority with the most assured results of -other branches of rational investigation. Ethics, therefore, finds its -fundamental truths in the natural constitution of the world, and is -able to build these truths into a science possessed of all the rights -and force of systematized and established knowledge. - - -==Christianity Recognizes Ethics.== - -=1.= Christianity fully recognizes these truths and all the essential -principles which ethical science formulates and certifies. It does -more. It magnifies their importance by building upon them its own -divine view of moral requirement and the way of its realization. All -that ethical science shows to be true in the moral constitution of man, -in the reality of moral law for the free regulation of his conduct, -and in respect to the source and immutable authority of that law, -abides as fundamental presuppositions in the divine superstructure -of religion and duty presented by Christianity. Redemption starts -and works upon the basal facts of human nature and man's condition, -relations, duties, responsibilities and needs. If Christianity assumes -the existence and rulership of God, a moral constitution of human life, -and the existence of conscience with its perceptions of duty and sense -of obligation; if it assumes man to be a free agent and yet bound in -the exercise of his autonomy by laws of obligation and responsibility; -if it assumes the law of right to be essentially unalterable and -irrepealable, a reality to which God himself conforms, all these are -great truths fully certified in the rational conclusions of ethical -science. - - -==Contributions to Ethical View.== - -=2.= But Christianity contributes immensely to the ethical view. It is, -indeed, a great misconception to think that supernatural revelation -has been given simply to teach morality, or to look on Christianity -as merely a code of ethics. But though its first great object is -redemption, presenting God to our view in redeeming love and activity, -and offering deliverance from the guilt and life of sin, it necessarily -also aims to recover men to personal righteousness. Indeed, both -forgiveness and renewal look to this as the goal to which redemption is -to bring its subjects. While primarily Christianity is a religion and -redemptory, its ultimate aim is the establishment of men in obedience -to God, righteousness, and excellence. The very summit of its purpose, -the Alp that rises above every other Alp, is character and right life. -So the very law of its movement is supremely ethical. Forgiveness of -sin, justification by faith, stands as only the first step in the -application of redemption, and beyond this Christianity pre-eminently -means a life, the increasing recovery and perfection of human nature in -its ethical character and action, enthroning the principles of duty, -love, and righteousness in the conscience and the heart, and bringing -personal conduct into rhythmic harmony with eternal righteousness and -goodness. - -And the science of ethics has not properly completed its view until -it has fully included the distinctive teaching of Christianity. For -beyond all question the data of this teaching have produced the purest -and loftiest moral life that the world has seen, the best product of -the moral history of mankind. Its ideal is confessedly the highest and -the best sustained. Even apart from the question of the well-proved -supernatural claims of Christianity, its ethical work lifts its moral -teachings to the most authoritative place, the supreme court, for the -decisions and formulations of the complete scientific view. - -The total contribution of Christianity to morality comes along two -lines of help: 1. In the way of fuller disclosure of moral principles -and of essential duties; and 2. In the way of furnishing an efficient -dynamic for their fulfilment. The first of these two topics claims -attention in this chapter; the second must be left for the next. - -The need of larger knowledge, than that furnished by simply -naturalistic ethics, for the perfection of moral life, has everywhere -been evident. The debasement of moral thought and the worse debasement -of moral life frequently found among peoples outside of the atmosphere -illuminated by Christian truth, is sad proof how crying this need -of right knowledge may become. The strife of conflicting opinions -as to the root and validity of moral principles, even among many -in Christendom who look at the subject with faces averted from -Christianity, is perpetual remembrancer of the room for more and better -information. And the perplexing phenomenon of wide diversity of moral -judgments in daily life, to which we have had occasion several times -already to refer, resulting from the different degrees of correctness -with which the relations of life are understood and interpreted, -enforces the same truth. The moral power is educable. It sees its -objects in the light, not in darkness, nor fully in dawn. It acts -best when flooded with the fullest knowledge. Men can discern duty -accurately and fully only when they comprehend all their relations to -God above them, their fellow-men around them, their destiny before -them, and the significance and moral demand of these relations. From -the high origin of their nature, "in the image of God," they may -carry some impress of the moral law from God in their hearts, in the -inner order of insight and spiritual vision, and in measure "read -God's thoughts after Him" about love and justice and truth and other -essential virtues. But this rational reading of duty from the law -of right within them and from the moral constitution about them, -is grandly helped when revelation throws its illumination on the -nature and relations of men, the meaning of life and the reach of its -responsibilities. Whatever has been the short-coming of Christianity's -professors in exemplifying its moral teaching, the history of its -work is full proof of its containing the best ethical direction and -power the earth has yet seen. In individuals and communities in which -its teachings have been worthily turned into character and life, it -presents an inspiring suggestion of what it is capable of doing for -human exaltation when its instruction is truly followed. It is the -completing factor for moral guidance, and the scientific view is false -to itself when it fails to include the teachings and the phenomena -of the Christian consciousness and life. Since Christianity has come -and given the world its highest civilizations and elevations, its -grandest progress in philosophy, science, art, literature, invention, -enterprise and prosperity, all the purest and most beautiful amenities -of life, and is still leading the best nations onward and upward, it -is surely worse than idle to think of forcing ethical science back -to a pagan or merely naturalistic standpoint. This would ignore the -greatest moral phenomenon of history and the most impressive facts in -the present condition of the world. "Christian ethics is ethics in the -highest--ethics raised to the highest power--the last and fullest moral -interpretation of the world and its history."[64] - -=3.= The Christian ethical view has its special moral conceptions from -two sources. The one is primary and principal; the other secondary and -auxiliary. - -==Sources of Christian View.== - -(1) The principal source is the Sacred Scriptures of the Old and New -Testaments. Along with their distinctively religious purpose and -teaching, these pages of God's supernatural revelation, from first -to last, look to ethical ends, and are replete with principles, -laws, and precepts for duty and righteousness. As for a knowledge of -Christianity as a religion we must come to these writings as its own -accredited records, presenting its truths and requirements, so also for -a knowledge of its moral teachings. Whatever help may be obtainable -from other sources, say from study of the Christian consciousness or of -the effects of Christianity on personal and social life, the chief and -highest source is these Sacred Scriptures. For the best Christian life -falls short of the ideal standard of conduct there presented. It would -be unfair to study it or judge it only in the partial, fragmentary, -one-sided, imperfect illustrations of it. Every ideal thus gained must -be corrected and greatly up-raised before it can stand for the complete -divine ideal that shines out from the teachings of the Scriptures and -the life of the Christ therein revealed. The perfect image of Christian -ethics has never been fully reflected by either the inward or outward -life of the believer. The Sacred Scriptures, therefore, are the only -infallible normative authority for Christian ethics, as they are for -Christian theology. - -This use of the Scriptures as the determinative authority, however, -must take account of the fact that they present an historical -and progressive revelation. As God's redemptive action advanced -historically, unfolding religious truth and grace gradually and -educationally, so the moral ideal, which Christianity in its fulness -of provision and power should exhibit, is found more and more clearly -revealed till the view is completed. This accounts for the higher -ethical view reached in the New Testament. - -The Old Testament, which is the record of the earlier stages of the -Christian revelation, distinctly preparatory and prophetic, forms a -continual instruction in duty and righteousness. It grounds the moral -life essentially in the religious, but religion must walk in holiness. -Fundamental in it stands the decalogue, a summary of moral law, of -most profound and comprehensive sweep, which is still the great code -of duty for the guidance of human conduct, and so clearly beyond the -mere thinking of Moses or the people he led, as to prove its divine -origin. All the types and symbols of the Old Testament, its sacrifices -of cleansing and expiation, are impressive condemnations of sin and -calls to repentance. The ever-ringing voices of prophecy are thrilling -rebukes to wrong-doing and clarion appeals for righteousness. Its -psalms and music are but echoing praise for the divine grace that -renews the heart and restores the life to the blessedness of obedience -to the moral laws of God. The lofty ethical demands of the Hebrew -Scriptures, along with their revelation of grace, form a unique and -distinguishing feature among ancient literatures. Their ceaseless -voice is: "Keep judgment and do righteousness"; "Cease to do evil and -learn to do well"; "Offer to God the sacrifices of righteousness." -Nowhere else at that day was the moral ideal lifted so high, or with -such imperative authority. The Old Testament ethics was a fit prophecy -and preparation for the full Christian teaching. "If the ethics of the -old dispensation had not passed into the fulfilment of the new, the -Hebrew prophets and poets would still be the world's most inspiring -teachers of high ethical hopes and ideals, and the moral code of Israel -would be the school of righteousness, reverence, and law, to which the -generations should go for the loftiest instruction."[65] - -The New Testament, which completes the authoritative records of -Christianity, completes also Christianity's normative statement of the -truths and principles of duty. These appear in the threefold form of -(1) Christ's recorded teaching, (2) His personal example, and (3) the -inspired interpretations of Christian duty in the apostolic writings. -The teaching of Jesus, all through the gospels, while primarily -religious and religiously spiritual, deals with the great realities of -character and conduct, and, particularly in the Sermon on the Mount, -ascends to the very heights and penetrates to the very depths of the -laws of duty. It carries those laws into a spirituality, solemnity, and -glory before unknown, and forms a representation which stands before -the moral sense of the race as the unsurpassed and the unequalled -ethical ideal. The view is carried up to the goal: "Be ye perfect, even -as your Father in heaven is perfect." This divine teaching is at the -same time reflected from the personal life of Christ. It is presented -in living form. The example is part of the teaching--an example which -is never lowered below the exalted range of the given precepts, and -which has been instructing and inspiring all the centuries since. -In the apostolic writings, under the guiding Spirit of truth, the -teaching and pattern of Christ, together with his redemptive gospel, -are applied to wide and varied ranges of practical life, the apostles -themselves being filled with an ever-increasing appreciation of their -divine import and transcendence. These inspired Scriptures, because of -their unique and supreme authority for Christianity itself, are the -fundamental and decisive standard of Christian ethics. - -(2) But there is a secondary and auxiliary source for formulation -of Christian ethics--in the Christian moral consciousness. In this, -Christianity exhibits its moral principles and meaning as they enter -into the inner experience of men, where they may be studied and -estimated. Christianity is a "life," a "new life," in whose moral -consciousness its principles and forces are acting formatively for -character. Not only of "the life" that in Christ was "the light of -men,"[66] but of all the pure life that is from him, is it true: "the -life is the light of men." The ethicised Christian consciousness -reveals the principles and laws that have come into it. It is a maxim -in theology that only the regenerated and sanctified mind has a clear -interpretative insight into spiritual truth, and can form the true -theologian. The maxim holds, just as truly, with respect to moral -truth. The spiritual and moral are inseparably united, and no man -can judge with unhindered and reliable discrimination in matters -of Christian ethics whose heart is unsympathetic or averse to the -duties of the Christian life. The light shines in the darkness, but -the darkness comprehends it not. Christian ethics, therefore, in -formulating its ideas and completing its theoretical view rightly, -draws upon the Christian consciousness, as that consciousness is -scripturally determined, and interprets, not the Scriptures alone, but -also, in auxiliary relation, the ethicised life of Christian humanity. -While, therefore, it is the science of Biblical morality, it is also -of the whole moral development of Christianized life, both in personal -consciousness and in the observed historical fruitage of Scripture -doctrine. - -=4.= It is necessary to look at some of the particular elements or -features of the clearer and fuller ethical view which comes from these -sources. - -==Duties made More Definite.== - -(1) Most of the duties naturally discerned by the conscience from the -known relations of life are brought into more distinct and definite -view by Christian revelation and experience. The natural discernment is -often unclear, uncertain, partial, and faulty. The blindness, mistakes -and misgivings of the moral sense form a large and perplexing chapter -in the story of non-Christian morality. It has often led to doubt -whether there is such a thing as a fixed, sure, immutable morality. A -remedy for this has been needed. By its immense number of specific -_precepts_ for particular relations and circumstances, revelation gives -correctness, minuteness, and fulness of application to the general -principles of duty asserted by the moral sense. In manifold cases -the conscience would be in the dark, or have only obscure or partial -view, without the instruction and guidance thus supplied. Scarcely -a situation or emergency in life can be named for which precept and -counsel have not been given. When the sun rises the eye sees not -only farther, but more minutely and with more certainty. Myriads of -objects and relations before unseen flash into view. So by the light -of the Scriptures, more of duty is known and better known. By common -consent, even among skeptics as to the Christian religion, the ethical -precepts of Christianity, in their purity and elevation, in their -quickening directness and radical thoroughness, in their explicitness -and universality, form an aggregate moral directory unapproached by the -best codes of pagan sages or human philosophies, and add a grand aid to -the moral judgments. - -==Human Relations.== - -(2) The human _relations_, on which duty rests, have been brought -into broader and fuller view by Christian teaching. Much of the -disability, under which morality has suffered, has always come from a -faulty understanding, if not total ignorance, of the varied relations -which are to be filled out with their exact and full measure of duty. -The idea of God and man's relation to him has often been falsely or -misleadingly conceived. The history of thought as to inter-human -relations, from the closest to the most extended, presents a sad story -of misapprehension, error, ignorance and consequent wrong. When these -great vital relations are themselves misconceived, looked at from a -false or obscuring view-point, one of the prime conditions for correct -moral judgments is absent. Positive misdirection is in play. When our -knowledge has not yet shown us clearly man's place in God's plan of the -world, or the adaptations and purposes in human nature itself; when -neither the great fact of personality nor that of human solidarity is -correctly understood, as for example, when the individual is reduced, -as has often been the case, to mere material for the state or for -possible enslavement by captors, or he is, on the other hand, looked -upon as an isolated and unrelated unit; or when the reality and meaning -of the universal brotherhood of man, under the universal fatherhood of -God, is not seen, the duties and obligations of life must necessarily -be much obscured and unperceived. - -But here the Christian revelation comes in with one of its great -forms of help--a divine disclosure of our moral relations. It reveals -some otherwise undiscoverable relations, opening to view additional -obligations and responsibilities. It sets before us our solemn -relations to God, to his renewing and saving grace, as well as to -his creating and preserving love, to offered blessings, gracious -rewards, and eternal destinies. The whole horizon of life is lifted -and broadened, and the sphere of the moral activity and consequences -extends into a future life. Man becomes a child of immortality and his -home is eternity. The world and human life have a grandly changed -meaning under the gospel. Man's place in the system of things, as to -the past, present, and future is revealed in a light increased and -broadened like that on the landscape when morning rises upon night; -and in this light he sees a thousand new responsibilities on which he -is touching every moment, and which stretch out and on in illimitable -ranges. Conscience is enabled to act in view of all these new relations -as well as the irradiated old ones, and taught to hold the heart -and life, the will and activities to the moral requirements of this -enlarged and illuminated ethical domain. - -==Moral Duties Divine Obligations.== - -(3) Christian teaching has elevated the ethical view in closely -uniting all moral obligation with duty to God. Natural ethics, when -its implications are rationally followed up, is, indeed, theistic, -and finds the seat of moral law in God as the absolute ground of the -whole moral constitution. But from this movement, rising from the -law of right in the conscience and in the moral constitution of the -world, such ethics has yet this limitation, that duty is thought of -from the human side, and not from the standpoint of God, who in his -personal nature and will is both the source and goal of moral law. In -this mode of forming the theory God is apt to be left remote, virtue -is abstractly conceived and remains a reality too much by itself -and separated from any enforcing or helping authority. It becomes -too abstract and simply humanistic. But our view of moral good must -be lifted into closer and more living connection with God. And so, -Christianity, to transfuse the ethical sense with religious light and -motives, teaches us to look upon right and duty from the standpoint -of God. This is in accordance with the very design of Christianity as -a redemptive and saving religion, seeking to bring man into true and -practical fellowship with God. The moral discernment is to be filled -and animated by the religious spirit, so that the moral training may be -carried on and completed together with the development and consummation -of the Christian life. Thus the form of the appeal is: "Be ye holy, for -I am holy." "Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect." -In a high and peculiar emphasis all duty is required to be done as unto -God. "Forasmuch as ye have done it to the least of these, ye have done -it unto me." "We should so fear and love God," as not to offend against -any part of the law or fail in doing good. Through the Christian -revelation alone the ethical conception and relation of God is truly -attained, and with it a right conception of man and the highest spirit -of duty. - -In thus teaching that all duties should be fulfilled as something due -to God, and under inspiration of love to Him, Christian ethics is not -to be understood to mean that rational ethical theory is mistaken when -it claims that men are to "do right because it is right." But it means -to remind us where alone the absolute right is found--only in God. And -it means that both the religious and the ethical life is to upraise and -anchor us to Him, and to eternal righteousness as it is in Him. All -duty is owed finally to God, because He is the one absolute righteous -Being to whom the whole universe owes its very existence and all its -blessings. Thus Christian ethics sets forth fully what rational thought -has often caught a glimpse of and hinted at, but wanted vision to see -clearly, viz.: that the goal of the ethical aim is to be "like God." -Its aim, as is that of religion itself, is to bring our moral life into -living fellowship with Him and His blessedness. This marked feature of -Christian teaching presents the ethical view in its highest elevation, -purification and power. - -==Moral Guilt.== - -(4) In harmony with this close connection of the moral with the -religious life, a further special feature of Christian ethics is a -peculiar emphasis upon the guilt of offence against the moral law. -In pagan ethics, often with no clear perception of the existence of -God, always without just conception of his character, though the moral -distinction was recognized and wrong was regarded as condemnable, yet -because the wrong was viewed as traversing only an abstract principle -or an accredited usage or order of best happiness, it evoked no strong -sense of guilt. Right was always little else than a conforming of one's -self to "nature," or "reason," or "civil authority," or conditions -of "well-being" or "enjoyment," or at best to an ideal conception of -virtue. In the ethical view which materialistic philosophies present, -though the phenomenon of conscience is acknowledged and obedience -to its direction admitted to be necessary for proper right order, -yet the condemnatory judgment on immorality is rather a judgment -of it as unwise, imprudent, and injurious than as guilty and worthy -of punishment. It is at most a non-conformity to an impersonal, -mechanically determined, ongoing nature. The whole utilitarian -conception of morality, which makes it consist essentially in following -the teachings of experience as to what is most advantageous and useful, -may hold disregard of it as a great "evil," economically viewed, but -almost annuls, if it does not completely remove, the idea of guilt, by -substituting that of loss. Even in simply rational _theistic_ ethics, -despite theistic pre-suppositions and conclusions, the view may still -deal too much with abstractions and rest too much on abstract ideas or -impersonal things. Right and wrong are, indeed, developed by natural -relations, to which men are bound to conform, but only because these -relations, by being divinely established, represent God, who in the -perfections of his nature and will, is at once the free Creator and -righteous personal Ruler of the universe. Moral law not only applies -alone to free personality, but has its source and authority in the -Absolute Personality whose holy and beneficent will has constituted the -moral relations and requirements of life. Morality pertains, not to the -relations of mere things to things, or of persons to simply impersonal -nature, but of persons to persons. Inter-human relations create and -exhibit obligations because God's plan and will speak in them, but the -full solemnity of moral obligation appears only when all inter-human -obligations are seen carried up and united in the supreme and -all-embracing obligation to God, to whom all duty is due. When these -inter-human duties are refused, they are refused to God who requires -them and has expressed that requirement to reason through the relations -themselves and through his word. Not only the religious duties, as -faith and love and gratitude and prayer, but all human duties are owed -to Him. Here all religious duties become moral obligations; and all -moral obligations become religious duties. And the guilt of wrong-doing -is heightened by the fact that it is a sin against the just, holy, -supreme authority and will of God, the absolute personal ground of the -right order and blessedness of the universe. In Him the moral authority -is identified with the rights of the Creator to whom every good in -the universe is owed. This emphasis upon the transcendent authority -and sanctity of moral law and consequent guilt of its violation is a -special feature in the Christian ethical view and necessary for the -true force and efficiency of the moral sense. - -Any separation of morality from the position of something due to God -personally, obscures and weakens the ethical view. This has been -the bane not only of pagan, materialistic, atheistic, or grossly -utilitarian theories, but also of many other forms of representation. -Whenever the sense of duty is resolved into an instinct, or blind -feeling, or sympathy, or a product of custom, its true authority is -kept out of sight. The guilt of neglect of it disappears. Though -fervently regarded by many great thinkers as a sublime statement -of the moral principle, even the Kantian "categorical imperative," -an immediate behest of the reason, saying: "Do this, or do that," -giving no account of itself or ground for its authority, but speaking -autocratically in its own right, and as sufficient and final in its -own imperative, under the abstract rule: "Act as if the maxims of thy -action were to become by thy will the law of the universe," holds the -whole moral authority too abstractly and remote from God for complete -theory or effective power. He is not brought clearly into view or made -livingly near, but left in the background--a Being whose existence, -along with freedom and immortality, is only inferred and to be believed -because this ideal "law" requires Him for its maintenance. Sublime as -the "categorical imperative" may often have seemed, this shaping of -the theory of obligation is not suited to fill and vivify the moral -consciousness of men as does a sense of the sublimer reality of the -holy will and supreme authority of God, as present in and speaking -through that moral consciousness. But the Christian view brings us -face to face with this righteous will and authority in every moral -obligation, and teaches us to see in all the established personal -relations of life a divine call to right and duty. - -==Moral Law Universal.== - -(5) The Christian view makes uniquely clear the universalism of -the moral law. In natural theories the reach and identity of the -law has failed rightly to appear. The theory has formed only an -ethics for a race, a nation, a condition or caste. It has been -particularistic, limited by race lines, tribal or national boundaries, -class distinctions, or ancestral traditions. Codes of duty have -been shaped to local and exclusive conditions. So we have a national -ethics created by civil law, or a class ethics, as of free citizens -contra-distinguished from slaves, or of Brahmans as different from -low caste people. Or we have an ethics of individuals, in which the -code of duty of each is determined by his own personal "instincts," -"feelings," swing of "sympathy," preference in "pleasure," development -of "reason," calculations of "utility," ancestral "inheritance," or a -mysterious "categorical imperative." Moral codes have been immensely -and confusingly diversified. A self-identical and common standard -does not appear, nor the clear, sure foundation of any. The moral law -is not exhibited in its universality and permanence. Its grandeur is -unseen by reason of the kaleidoscopic variations presented by the -moving fragmentary theories. Its authority is brought into doubt. The -great want has been a view of morality for man as man, authoritative -everywhere and always, co-extensive with humanity. - -The defect of the theories has been twofold. 1. They have not brought -the whole race of man together in the essential sameness of a universal -humanity, each individual being endowed with the high attributes of a -personality, made in the image of God, and all bound together in one -all-inclusive brotherhood. 2. They have failed clearly to unite this -total humanity, in all its personalities, with God, whose nature and -will is the only and absolute source of the moral law which sweeps -round and through all the world. The Christian Scriptures and the -Christian consciousness supply the needed completion of view by -throwing both these truths into clear light. Christianity invests -human personality with a worth, sacredness, and responsibility never -elsewhere recognized. It is at the point of personality that each -individual is to be united in fellowship with the personal God, who, -as righteousness and love, sits upon the throne. Christianity seeks -to make so real and living the brotherhood of man, that the throb -of love and sympathy may be felt across all national lines and race -distinctions around the earth. And while it thus strengthens the -vitality and sacred force of the relations that thus bind men together, -it teaches that the moral duties to men which these relations require, -are to be done as unto God. Monotheism brings _mono-nomism_. The moral -law, which is absolute, self-identical, eternal and immutable in the -holy nature and will of God, becomes universal and irrepealable not -only for the earth but for all the moral universe. - -==Condition of Fulfillment.== - -(6) A special extension in the Christian ethical view is the truth that -the moral law can be truly fulfilled only in and through a spiritual -regeneration and renovation of the personal life. This is a truth -which simply rational theories fail to formulate, though they are not -without materials to justify the formulation of it. Few facts of life -and history are more conspicuous than the impotence of the ethical -perceptions and motives to get and maintain rightful rulership. Some -hindering and disabling depravity in the human condition prevents -attainment of the moral ideal. Apart from the dreadful sway of vice -and crime and cruel wrong, even with the well-disposed, full duty to -neither God nor man is completely realized. The words put by Ovid in -the mouth of Medea: "_Video meliora, proboque, detereora sequor_" -(I see and approve the better, I follow the worse), voice the moral -weakness felt even in pagan consciousness. This incompetency of the -ethical behests to accomplish the true and required life, Christianity -confirms and emphasizes; and upon its basis unfolds the necessity of a -deep, radical renewal of personal character. - -In Christianity, let it be remembered, the moral law is a diviner and -deeper reality than natural notions of men make it. It looks, with -its divine eye, down into the very depths of the heart, and demands -loyal and full duty through the whole range of personal relations with -respect to both God and man. It spreads the force of moral obligation -over religious duties, joining them in indissoluble union. "The law -of the Lord is perfect," and requires this wholeness of duty and -righteousness. Hence Christianity holds a merely natural morality -always to be faulty, leaving men under the law's condemnation. Without -a divine quickening and spiritual enabling, men can never be brought to -true and full obedience and transformed into moral harmony and likeness -with God. And the proclamation, looking to this part of the redemptive -process, is: "Except a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of -God." Thus it becomes a unique distinction of the Christian ethical -view, that it proposes to bring men to spiritual and moral endeavor -and victory from the starting-point of a conviction and recognition -of their own thorough incompetence for the moral task. It furnishes -a true and adequate ability where it has broken up dependence on an -insufficient one. - -But this brings to us the moral task, which belongs to the next -chapter. - - - - -CHAPTER XII. - -THE ETHICAL TASK UNDER CHRISTIANITY. - - -The ethical task is to fulfil the moral law, to actualize the ethical -ideal in conduct and character. It is to turn obligations into life. -It is not enough to know duty, even in completest theory. It must be -realized. In its most important and final view, ethics is a question of -moral power. - -The impotence of the conscience before the moral task has always been -an impressive fact. The perception of duty has lacked efficiency for -the enforcement of duty. Vision of the right largely fails to secure -conformity to it. Even the clearest intellectual discriminations and -illuminations of the moral law have often been only as the play of -cold light, almost like the aurora of the north quickening nothing -into life or fruitage. Here is found the chief point of failure in -natural ethics. It has power to dictate, but not to move. It wants an -efficient dynamic for overcoming the moral evil that has established -itself in human nature and life--evil so positive and dominant as to -justify an apostle in representing the better ethical will as disabled: -"Ye cannot do the things that ye would." Prof. Flint says: "The wisdom -of the heathen world, at its very best, was utterly inadequate to -the accomplishment of such a task as creating a due abhorrence of -sin, controlling the passions, purifying the heart, and ennobling the -conduct."[67] - -The aim of Christianity is supremely practical. It seeks to save -from sin and bring to righteousness. It wastes no effort for simply -speculative results. It comes "not in word only, but in power." Besides -its service to morals in confirming and extending our needed knowledge -of duty, its greatest ethical service is in supplying the needed -dynamic or efficacious force for the realization of the holy life. How -does it enable the moral task? - - -==Completion of the Ethical View.== - -=1.= In some degree by the completion of the ethical view itself. The -clearer light is forceful and efficacious for a better realization of -the moral task. "Knowledge is power," especially knowledge which throws -into view the most impressive realities and relations, and appeals -with the most cogent motives. By the strong illumination shed upon the -general principles of right and virtue, by the definiteness and detail -of the instruction and precepts for all situations in life, by the -elevation of view in which the moral horizon is widened and extended, -so as to show a living brotherhood of every man with every other -round the world and a range of moral interests and responsibilities -interminable as eternity, by the emphasis with which men are made -amenable to God for all moral duties, even those to men, thus vivifying -the whole moral consciousness with a sense of a close, unescapable -accountability to God the conscience is better enlightened and -quickened for its task, strengthened by the fullest certainty and under -the vigor of a new inspiration. It has more light for direction; it -bears grander motive forces before the will. - - -==Assurance of Success.== - -=2.= By giving assurance of success. In the face of the greatest -hindrances and natural incompetence, it certifies an inspiring goal of -the moral endeavor. Pointing to redemptive grace, it makes manifest -that the administration of this world is not on the side of moral -evil, or indifferent to its wrong and blight, but is working for its -overthrow, the deliverance of its subjects, and their triumph over -it. It proclaims an established and ever-advancing "kingdom," whose -consummation will bring all those who, as its subjects, "hunger and -thirst after righteousness," triumphantly through and beyond the -present militant stage of the moral life into final victory over evil, -"a new earth and a new heaven wherein dwelleth righteousness." In this -divine assurance that the domination of moral evil, with its anarchy -and misery in the soul, is no necessity, that its overthrow is provided -for, and that God's government is so in the interest of righteousness -and love as to guarantee victory to even the feeblest that in faith -appropriate his grace and help, there comes the full inspiration, not -only of hope, but of sure success in the moral endeavor. Moral effort -is not compelled to be - - "Like ships that sailed for sunny isles, - But never came to shore." - -It has the certainty that - - "To him who sides with God - No chance is lost." - -The moral help thus supplied by Christianity is well illustrated by -the contrast which it presents to some other teaching, say as seen in -Buddhism, extolled in poetry as "The Light of Asia." This is known as -one of "the great religions." It is, rather, a philosophy of life, a -directory for conduct. It is an atheistic, or at best a pantheistic -philosophy, recognizing no personal God and emptying the idea of Deity -of practical validity. It had its origin in a deep and oppressive sense -of the evil and misery of life, and aimed at their solution and the -way of deliverance. On the basis of the oriental "metempsychosis," -with its supposed perpetual re-births, on account of earlier sins, -into successive distressful lives, it elaborated, for deliverance, a -code of duty pervaded by the ascetic spirit and demanding the severest -self-discipline. In many of its separate precepts it rises, indeed, -here and there to elevations and beauties of moral idea that seem -almost akin to the finest and purest of New Testament inculcations. -But whether viewed as a philosophy or a religion Buddhism has no -personal God, who loves and values men as his own children made in -his own image, and ready to come to their help. It has heard, and in -its atheistic cosmos, can hear, no voice of redemption, knows of no -manifestation of a loving God for deliverance of his sinful children -from their sins and their exaltation to the dignity and happiness -of fellowship with Himself. In this despair of help from God, in -this dolefully pessimistic view of the world and life, and driven -to depend only on self-help, is it any wonder that the moral task -is directed, not to the development, elevation and joy of personal -life, but to its repression, subjugation, and reduction, so as to -bring it, at its earthly close, to Nirvana, extinction of conscious -individual existence, as the greatest good! By as much as this theory -of despair is suited to atrophy all nerve for the ethical task, and -sink personality from its true intended elevation of divine fellowship -and excellence into the inanity of unconscious being, by so much does -the Christian truth of the assured success and victory of right and -goodness in the advancing kingdom of God's grace and eternal love, -exalting the worth and force of personality to the highest, inspire and -sustain the moral endeavor. "Forasmuch as ye know that your labor is -not in vain in the Lord." - -Much has been written in late years about "the evolution of the moral -life," by writers who seek to account for it through the action of -merely naturalistic forces in the human constitution and in its -physical environment. The above contrast is suggestive of factors in -the problem which many of these writers overlook. - - -==Religious Interest.== - -=3.= By uniting the moral side of life with the religious, and so -bringing all the powers of the religious interest in vital help for -the moral task. The common false diremption between morality and -religion, classifying duties to God as religious, and only duties to -fellow-men or self as moral, each standing in isolation, and largely of -separate accomplishment, allowing men to be "moral" while repudiating -all their duties to God, or "religious" while without a conscience -enforcing duty to men, leaves flabby nerve for moral endeavor. All the -mighty motives from the Godward side are lost. No quickening force for -inter-human duties comes from a consciousness of God and his authority, -or the future life. Any view that severs morality from God and is -bounded by this world and temporal good, must fail to realize the -moral life of man. But the Christian view allows no such separation. -It unites the two as two sides of the same life of duty, out of one -conscience, with vision of both God and men, and one heart true to -the indivisible spirit of right. As religious duties are all moral, -as obligations to God, and all moral duties are religious, as due to -Him, the Christian consciousness of God must re-inforce and vivify with -new efficiency the whole twofold moral endeavor. All the distinctly -religious interests and forces, reverence of Deity, repentance before -God, gratitude, faith, love, hope, spiritual joy, aspiration, desire -of immortality and endless blessedness, thus brought into concurrent -action with the Christianly enlightened natural conscience, bring an -immensely advantageous condition for the actualization of the ethical -life. "To believe in an ever-living and perfect Mind, supreme over -the universe, is to invest moral distinctions with immensity and -eternity, and lift them from the provincial stage of human society to -the imperishable theatre of all being. When planted thus in the very -substance of things, they justify and support the ideal estimates of -the conscience; they deepen every guilty shame; they guarantee every -righteous hope; and they help the will with a Divine casting-vote in -every balance of temptation."[68] - - -==Power of Holy Spirit.== - -=4.= By the enlightening and obligating force of the Holy Spirit. -This reality is assured both in the teaching of the Scriptures and -the testimony of the Christian consciousness. We must distinguish -between the simply natural action of conscience and the quickening and -helping by the divine Spirit. Revelation fully recognizes the natural -conscience and its obligating energy, Rom. 2:15; 1:20. It designates -it by the term [Greek: syneidesis] from [Greek: synoida], _conscius -sum_--a knowing with, _i. e._ a conjoined consciousness of self and -of right, or a knowing with God, whose law it discerns. Its natural -functions of discernment and imperative are not set aside by the -Spirit, but enlightened and re-inforced. His part must not be counted -zero. "When the Spirit is come, He will convince the world of sin, -of righteousness, and of judgment," John 16:8. He works through the -truth, in and through men's natural faculties. While the Christian's -own conscience is acting in its natural functions, it is not acting -alone. It is not alone; for the Holy Spirit is there as a quickening -and helping power. In this is fulfilled the experience expressed by St. -Paul: "My conscience also bearing me witness in the Holy Ghost," Rom. -9:1. This is a Christian conscience, one acting not alone and unaided, -but embraced within and filled by the influence of the Holy Spirit. -This influence has been well expressed as "like the energy of the -sunshine in the fruit." - - -==Spiritual Regeneration.== - -=5.= Through spiritual regeneration and renovation. It is through this -profound reality that Christianity accomplishes its great ethical -result. It places the principle of holiness, of duty to God and men, in -the very heart of human nature and life. It writes the law in the love -of the soul. - -The divine wisdom of Christianity is marked by the stress which it -places upon a purification of the inner life, "the heart," the very -fountain of thought, purpose, and conduct. It points to the immoral -source of the immoralities of conduct: "Out of the heart proceed -murders, adulteries," etc. The remedy must purify the fountain. When -this is secured and the law of holiness is established there, the -ethical life, in its manifoldness and many-sidedness, comes into -realization. - -It is thus that the conscience gains control. Its failures result -from the strength of opposing passions, desires, and perverted -inclination, excited often by temptations without. The affections do -not find their centre and rest in God and righteousness. They are -irregular, often sordid and misleading. The appetites and passions -obscure the moral discernments and resist the moral judgments. There -is a law of "sin in the members." The will, which should bow to the -direction of the conscience, is swayed by wrong motives. The scepter -of the moral faculty is broken by the rebellion of desires at war -with right and duty. The faintest whisper of conscience ought to be -decisive, but against the imperious ascendency of wrong affections -its loudest imperatives prove impotent. But in this moral renovation, -giving its "new heart and right spirit," the affections come into -harmony with God and all that is good. It is the "writing of the law -again in the heart," in the understanding and love. To this new life -in the affections, duty becomes a pleasure. The conscience, no longer -perplexed and overborne by evil desires, becomes able to assert its -rightful authority. The will attains its rightful freedom and power to -control efficiently in the domain of righteousness, and to hold the -life in the harmonies of right and duty. - -Put these different elements of the Christian ethical dynamic together. -They aggregate the final moral power. Christianity completes the -ethical view, flooding all the principles of right and duty with -impressive light. It throws broad and strong illumination over all -the moral relations of men, extending the view into the future life, -and giving certifying precepts for guidance and support. It gives -the inspiring assurance of the triumph of righteousness in the -kingdom which God's love is establishing for it. It unites all moral -duties under the sanctions and solemnities of obligation to God, and -re-inforces them by all the motives and appeals which the religious -sentiments and interests address to men. It supplies an exhaustless -wealth of truths which give nerve to moral endeavor and are directly -convertible into character. And, as expressing the line along which -these elements all pass into full effect, by its regenerative action it -secures for the innermost sources of conduct a transforming influence -which does for the life what making the tree good does for its fruit. -Love of right turns convictions of right into character. The efficiency -of the conscience no longer stands only in the intellectual judgments, -but also in affection for the morally good. With love toward what -is good a feebler conscience could sway the life aright. But under -this deep inward change, we have clearer moral vision and stronger -imperative, together with a transformation of the whole nature into -predominant love of righteousness. As the Christian life advances, -the principles of duty are more and more established in the heart and -conduct as life-forces, and the conscience becomes more and more _de -facto_, as it is _de jure_, sovereign for moral obedience. And thus -Christianity supplies the divine and sufficient dynamic for the full -realization of the ethical life. - - - - -INDEX. - - - Absolutism, Divine, 149-151. - - Actions, objects of moral judgment, 183-187. - - Affections, benevolent, not supreme, 90-92. - - Agnostic tendencies, 81-83, 120-124. - - Aim, ethical, in Christianity, 197-198. - - Altruism, 154, 161. - - Analogy, supports relational theory, 176-177. - - Anthropological testimony, 34. - - Applicatory moral judgments, 51-52, 67-68, 92-97, 128. - - Arnold, Matthew, quoted, 25. - - Aristotle, 16, 18, 33, 152. - - Assyria, 43. - - Assurance of success, quickening to moral endeavor, 220-222. - - Aurelius, Marcus, 33. - - Authority, moral, belongs not to utility or pleasure, 158-160; - nor to "the beautiful," 144; - but to "the right," supremely, 79-80, 87-88, 126-136, 158-159, - 178-191; - to conscience, as discerning the right, 57-58, 86-99, 104. - - - Bain, Alexander, 121, 154. - - Benevolent affections, not supreme, 90-92. - - Bentham, Jeremy, 154. - - Book of the Dead, 33. - - Bowne, Prof. Borden P., 29, 36, 62, 153, 170, 186. - - Brahmanism, 32, 142. - - Buckle, 43. - - Buddhism, 32, 126, 142, 221-222. - - Butler, Bishop, 110-111, 154. - - - Calderwood, 167. - - Cato, 33. - - Christ, personal embodiment of his own teaching, 203-204. - - Christian ethics, completes the ethical view, 198-200; - sources of, 200-205; - special features of, 205-217. - - Christianity, relation of, to rational ethics, 26-27, 196-198; - its distinctive teachings, 205-217; - affords power for the moral task, 218-227. - - Cicero, 16, 33. - - Clarke, Samuel, 166. - - Cocker, B. D., quoted, 173. - - Coleridge, 167. - - Confucianism, 32. - - Confucius, 141. - - Conscience, simple or complex, 37-39; its existence proved, 39-55; - its psychological place, 59-62; - its nature determined, 62-83; - theistic, 79-80, 86-88; - supremacy of, 83-92; - acts of necessity, 78-80; - educable, 104, 199-200; - conceivably formed through theistic evolution, 83-85; - enlightened by Christian teaching, 198-217; - becomes efficient through Christian forces, 218-227. - - Consciousness, testimony as to freedom, 108-110; - Christian, source for formulation of ethics, 204-205. - - Cudworth, 167. - - - Demerit, import and measure of, 70-72. - - Deontology, 16 (note). - - Des Cartes, Rene, 150. - - Dividing line between true and false ethical theories, 130-132. - - Diversity of moral judgments, 48, 173. - - Dorner, Dr., quoted, 150. - - Druidism, 32. - - Duty defined, 65. - - Dynamic, moral, 198, 218-227. - - - Education of conscience, 74, 104. - - Egypt, 43, 126. - - Epictetus, 148. - - Ethics, defined, 15-17; - historically sketched, 17-20; - how divided, 21-23; - relation to psychology, 23; - to natural theology, 24; - to Christian theology, 25; - partly psychological, 21-22, 59; - partly metaphysical, 21-22, 119-120; - relation of evolution to, 54-55, 83-85, 132-137; - illuminated by Christianity, 196-217; - task of, under Christianity, 218-227. - - Eudaemonism, 144-153. - - Evolution, in relation to conscience, 54-55, 83-85, 132; - to objective moral law, 132-137, 154-155. - - - Fact, the primary ethical, 28-36. - - Faculty, as applied to the conscience, 37-38; - psychologically described, 62-80. - - Failure of utilitarianism, 155-160. - - Fallibility of conscience, 52, 92-94, 103-105. - - Fatalism, in Stoic virtue, 147. - - Feelings, moral, a part of conscience, 72-77; - feelings, objects of moral judgment, 187-189. - - Flint, Prof., quoted, 218. - - Freedom, personal, abridged in ancient nations, 17-18. - - Free-will, necessary to moral agency, 66, 105-106; - alternative choice, 106-107, 159; - proof of, 107-112; - excluded by materialism, 112-113. - - - God, existence of required by moral law, 79-80, 87-88, 135; - relation to moral law, 126, 135-136, 149-151, 158, 169, 172, - 178-181, 208-215; - moral duties due to Him, 169-170, 222-223. - - Good, the chief, 143, 145, 146, 148. - - Greece, 17, 43, 143-148. - - Gregory, Dr. D. S., 166. - - Grote, 123. - - Grotius, Hugo, 149-150. - - Ground of right, the point defined, 139; - sometimes confounded with ground of obligation, 138-139; - various theories, 140-167; - Egyptian, 140; - Chinese, 141; - Indian, 142; - Zoroastrian, 142-143; - Greek, 143-148; - Roman, 148; - Divine absolutism, 149-150; - of Hobbes, 151; - sympathetic, 152; - utilitarian, 152-165; - of relations, 165; - spiritual excellence, 166; - direct intuition, 167; - as subjective or objective, 139-140, 168; - proximate ground, 168-178; - ultimate, 178-181; - not in mere "will" of God, 179-180. - - Guilt of wrong-doing, 210-212. - - - Hamilton, Sir William, 121, 122. - - Happiness, an end, but not supreme, 161-163; - idea of, not identical with that of right, 156; - without the moral imperative, 158-160. - - Hedonism, 146. - - Herbert Spencer, on moralizing effects of intellectualism, 43; - on relativity of knowledge, 122; - explanation of the moral sentiments, 35, 155. - - Heredity and conscience, 83-84. - - Hickock, Dr. Laurens P., 166. - - Historical witness to the ethical distinctions, 29-31. - - History of ethics, glance at, 17-20. - - Hobbes, 151. - - Horace, 33. - - Hume, 152, 154. - - Hutcheson, 154. - - - Imperative, the moral, 65-66, 99, 158, 212-213. - - Instinct, not conscience, 57-58. - - Intentions, have moral quality, 190; - teleological motives, 190. - - Intuitional, the conscience perceptions, 60-63, 76, 78-79. - - - Jouffroy, Theo. Simon, 166. - - Judgments, moral, universal, 29; - conflict of, 47; - agreement, 48-51; - primary, 62-67; - secondary, 51, 128; - not infallible, 52. - - - Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 81; - phenomenalism, 121-122; - on the ground of right, 167; - "categorical imperative," 212-213. - - Knowledge, relation of, to moral judgments, 51-52, 59-62, 67-68, - 92-93, 95-96, 102-105, 172-175, 205-209. - - - Lecky, quoted, 157 (note). - - Literature, its testimony to the moral sense, 33. - - - Mansel, Dean, 121. - - Marcus Aurelius, 148. - - Martineau, James, 88, 174, 223-224. - - Merit and demerit, import of, 68-70; - measure of, 71. - - Metaphysics of ethics, 21, 119-195. - - Mill, James, 154. - - Mill, J. Stuart, 82, 121-122, 154. - - Mohammedanism, 32. - - Monism, material, 133-137, 155. - - Moral agency, 100-118, 172, 182. - - Moral distinctions, fact of, 28-36; - faculty of, 37-85; - objectively real, 125-126; - not made by mental organization, 127; - intuitions, 63; - immutable and eternal, 127-128. - - Moral emotions, 44-47. - - Moral Law, perceived obligation, 64-66; - theistic, 79-80, 87-88, 135; - only for free agents, 136; - grandeur of, 129-130; - universal, 213-215. - - Morality, relation of Christianity to, 197-198. - - Moral motives, 73, 75-76. - - Moral qualities, predicable of personal beings, 182; - external acts, 183-187; - feelings, desires, etc., 187-189; - hereditary propensities, 189; - intellectual activities, 191; - intentions, 190; - will, 193-195. - - - Necessitarianism, 112-115. - - Necessity, in the action of conscience, 78; - in intellect and sensibility, 174-175. - - Nemesis, in history, 31. - - Newman, Francis, 80. - - Nirvana, 142, 222. - - - Obligation, perceived, 64; - felt, 64-65; - belongs to moral agent, 65; - central in conscience, 65; - implies objective moral law, 125-137. - - Old Testament ethics, 202-203. - - - Paley, William, 153. - - Pascal, 47. - - Peculiarity of the moral perceptions, 40. - - Persistence of the moral sense, 48, 64. - - Phenicia, 43. - - Phenomenalism, 81, 121-125. - - Philosophical part of ethics, 21. - - Plato, 18, 33, 144, 148, 152. - - Plausibility of utilitarianism, 161-165. - - Positive Philosophy, 82. - - Principles, higher and lower, Dr. Martineau's rules, 174-175. - - Presuppositions to responsibility, 102-103, 105-108, 172. - - Psychology, relation to ethics, 23; - in study of conscience, 59; - shows the place of conscience, 59-62. - - - Quatrefages, 32. - - - Regeneration, to realize the ethical life, 215-217, 225-226. - - Relativity of knowledge, 81, 120-125. - - Religion, witness to the ethical distinctions, 31-33; - becomes moral obligation, 169-170, 222-223. - - Right, rated in value, 160. - - Robinson Crusoe, 170. - - Roman teaching, 148. - - Rome, 43. - - - Seneca, 33, 148. - - Sensibility, the, as related to the conscience, 72-76; - to moral agency, 115. - - Shaftesbury, 154. - - Shintoism, 32. - - Skepticism, intellectual, 123. - - Smith, Adam, 151. - - Smyth, Dr. Newman, quoted, 200, 203. - - Society, ethical constituted, 29, 116. - - Socrates, 17, 143, 144, 153. - - Solidarity of humanity, 164. - - Sophocles, 33. - - Spencer, Herbert, 35, 43, 122, 157. - - Spinozism, 112. - - Stoic ethics, 146-148. - - Supremacy of conscience, 86-99. - - Sympathetic Theory, 151. - - - Taoism, 32. - - Theology, relation to ethics, 24, 25. - - Theoretical and practical ethics distinguished, 21-23. - - - Universalism of moral law, 127-130, 213-215. - - Utilitarianism, 35, 152-164; - error of, 155-160; - measure of truth involved in, 161-165; - evolutionist, 155-156, 159; - Lecky on, 157 (note). - - - Value of the morally good, 160. - - Volitions, objects of moral judgment, 193-196. - - - Wayland, Dr. Francis, 166. - - Whewell, 95. - - Will, free, 106-112; - point of personal responsibility, 194-195. - - Will of God, not itself the absolute ground of right, 179-181. - - Wollaston, 166. - - Wolseley, Lord, 43. - - - Zoroastrianism, 32, 142. - - - - -FOOTNOTES: - - -[1] Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, Chap. I. - -[2] The term Deontology, from [Greek: to deon], what is due or binding, -and [Greek: logos], discourse, has been used by some modern writers -as a fit designation of moral science. Though it has never come -into general use, it is etymologically well adapted to express the -element of obligation involved in the moral sense. See Krauth-Flemming -Vocabulary of the Philosophical Sciences, p. 132. - -[3] De Fato, Cap. I, 1. - -[4] See Wuttke's Christian Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 69-122. - -[5] Wuttke's Christian Ethics, I, p. 95. Int. to Aristotle's Ethics, p. -vi (Bohn's Ed.). - -[6] Matthew Arnold, Literature and Dogma, Chap. I. - -[7] Philosophy of Theism, Harper & Brothers, N. Y., p. 220. - -[8] See The Oldest Book in the World, Bibliotheca Sacra, October, 1882 -(Vol. XLV). Also C. Loring Brace's The Unknown God (A. C. Armstrong & -Son, New York, 1890), pp. 1-40. - -[9] Prof. Borden P. Bowne. Philosophy of Theism, p. 216. - -[10] History of Civilization, p. 125 (D. Appleton & Co., N. Y.). - -[11] Study of Sociology, p. 363. - -[12] Fortnightly Review, December, 1888. - -[13] See, for instance, Paley's Moral Philosophy, Chap. V. - -[14] See Chap. IV, p. 83. - -[15] So Hume, Adam Smith, Thomas Brown. - -[16] Jeremy Bentham, Jas. Mill, J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer. - -[17] Borden P. Bowne, Int. to Psychological Theory (Harper & -Brothers, N. Y., 1887), p. 206. Prof. Bowne thinks, indeed, that this -distinction, traced to its roots, depends on "a feeling of approval or -disapproval in connection with the aims and principles of conduct," -and that the ideal of life and the law of conduct spring out of "this -basal feeling." He asserts that "we can only represent the motives and -actions to ourselves, and wait for the immediate feeling of approval or -disapproval to manifest itself." He maintains that nothing is gained -by regarding the distinction as an intuition of the reason instead of -a feeling, because, he says, "its universality depends on its content, -and not upon its psychological classification." But we may well ask -if it really does make no difference whether this distinction, the -"ethical ideal," comes as a perception of reality, the action of a -knowing power, or as a "feeling" which perceives nothing and to account -for which there is no perceived ethical reality, no discernment of the -elemental ideas of right and wrong, upon which approval or disapproval -can arise and rest. We are entitled to ask: How can there be a feeling -of ethical approval when there is no insight of the distinction between -moral good and evil? The "feeling" that arises from no perception of -anything to approve, or that approves without any perceived principle -or law of approval, is blind. It has no standard or reason for an -ethical approval. Moreover, Prof. Bowne admits: "As long as they [the -aims and principles of conduct] are unrecognized there is no moral -life. As long as they are unclearly perceived, there are only the germs -of a moral life. When they are brought out into clear recognition, the -self-conscious moral life begins." - -[18] See Wuttke's Christian Ethics (Nelson & Phillips, N. Y.), Vol. II, -pp. 139, 140. - -[19] Borden P. Bowne's Int. to Psychological Theory (Harper & Bros., -N.Y., 1887), p. 184. - -[20] Theism, p. 13. Quoted from William Knight's Essays in Philosophy -(Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1890), p. 276. - -[21] J. Stuart Mill. - -[22] "The Crisis in Morals," by Jas. Thomas Bixby, Ph. D. (Boston, -Roberts Brothers, 1891). - -[23] Prof. Huxley, in one of his latest utterances, puts this point -strongly: "The practice of what is ethically best--what we call -goodness or virtue--involves a course of conduct which, in all -respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic -struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion, it demands -self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all -competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, -but shall help his fellows; its influence is directed, not so much to -the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible -to survive." Lecture at Oxford on "Ethics and Evolution." - -[24] See Dr. Martineau's Types of Ethical Theory, II, pp. 5, 99-110. - -[25] W. Whewell, Elements of Morality, Sect. 275. - -[26] The Doctrine of Morality, by Dr. R. B. Fairbairn (Whitaker, N. Y., -1887), pp. 109-113. - -[27] This feature is recognized in what is usually termed "formal -freedom," _i. e._ that psychical capacity of rational choice which -is essentially formative of "personality." To lose this would be the -loss of personality. Whether the power of free choice between good -and evil is impaired in man's corrupt state, being put in bondage or -subserviency to a depraved love of sin, is quite a different question. - -[28] "Liberum arbitrium habetur, quando positis ad agendum requisitis, -potest quis agere vel non agere." Quoted from W. S. Lilly's Right and -Wrong, p. 104, 2d Ed., London, Chapman and Hall. - -[29] Part I, Chap. VI. - -[30] Materialistic evolution, which holds matter as being the energy -and cause of all things, leaves no place for free-will, because in -truth it leaves no place for mind. For "mind" or "soul" as a real -entity or being which thinks, feels and wills, it substitutes mere -"mentality" as an effect of atomic or molecular changes in the brain. -"Mind," as a self-conscious spirit that itself self-knowingly acts, -is repudiated. Nothing is left but a series of sensations, thoughts -and wishes that are as truly physically-produced effects as are the -varied perfumes of flowers, the fall of rain or the waves of the sea. -No selfhood remains in man but the physical organism which, in material -causation, gives out the various forms of products or manifestations -denominated "mental." But this materialistic theory is not science. It -not only stands contradicted by the common judgment of mankind in all -ages, but breaks down utterly in the presence of scientific psychology. -For this finds among its unquestionable and irreducible facts a -real self-conscious subject or self back of the series of thoughts, -emotions and volitions, holding all these psychical experiences in its -unitary consciousness, and, with its memories of the past, carrying -its personal identity through present activity on into the future. -The series of mental experiences, in the theory, are independent of -each other and dependent only on the brain changes which directly -produce them, and thus, by necessity, ignorant of each other. Personal -identity, therefore, is full disproof of the theory. For personal -identity rests in a single abiding consciousness, in which all separate -mental acts are known as its own acts, the materials for memory and -comparison. The truth is, that all moral distinctions arise out of the -conviction that each individual, in the center of his personality, is a -soul, itself determining its rational choices and responsible for the -conduct of life. - -[31] The contradiction thus involved is well put by Prof. E. D. Roe, -of Oberlin, O., in Bibliotheca Sacra, Oct., 1894: "This law (autonomy) -pre-supposes the freedom of the will, for without freedom 'oughtness,' -'responsibility' and 'repentance' would possess no significance. Every -one, as the necessarians admit, acts under the idea of freedom. Their -hypothesis to explain this is, that the subject acts under illusion -(necessary illusion, of course). But here an hypothesis is necessary to -explain the hypothesis. Why, if necessity is the truth, is the subject -necessitated to believe falsity? A very strange truth it is which -necessitates itself to be disbelieved." Pp. 656, 657. - -[32] See Introduction to the Study of Philosophy, by J. H. W. -Stuckenberg, D. D. (Armstrong & Sons, New York, 1888), pp. 321, 322. - -[33] Metaphysics, Lect. VIII. - -[34] See Dr. McCosh's Defense of Fundamental Truth, Chap. X, 3. - -[35] First Principles, Chap. IV, Sec. 22. - -[36] Quoted from Dr. McCosh. Fundamental Truths, Chap. X, 3. - -[37] This is the old apothem: The _ratio cognoscendi_ is grounded in -the _ratio essendi_. - -[38] See A. Alexander's Moral Science, Chap. VII. - -[39] Brace's The Unknown God (A. C. Armstrong & Son, N. Y.), pp. 1-40; -The Oldest Book in the World, in Bibliotheca Sacra, Oct., 1888. - -[40] Quoted by Prof. Jas. Legge, in The Religions of China, from -Confucius's Doctrine of the Mean (Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York), p. -139. - -[41] Wuttke's Christian Ethics, I, pp. 47-52. - -[42] Wuttke's Christian Ethics, I, p. 59; Brace's Unknown God, pp. -182-197; S. D. F. Salmond's The Christian Doctrine of Immortality (F. & -T. Clark, 1895), Chap. VI. - -[43] [Greek: eudaimonia]. - -[44] Republic X, 613a; Theaet., 176. - -[45] See Wuttke's Christian Ethics, Vol. I, Sec. 14, and Martineau's -Types of Ethical Theory, Book I, Branch I. - -[46] See Luthardt's Christian Ethics (T. & T. Clark), Vol. I, p. 9. - -[47] [Greek: homologoumenos te physei zen], Diogenes, L. VII, 87. - -[48] The quotation, Acts 17:28, is probably from the Phaenomena of the -Stoic poet Aratus. - -[49] See Dr. Dorner's System of Christian Doc., II, p. 14. - -[50] See Horace, Book III, Ode III. Sophocles' OEdipus Tyrannus, lines -863-871. Peter Bayne's Testimony of Christ to Christianity, p. 44. - -[51] Prof. Borden P. Bowne designates this teaching as "the goods -ethics." Principles of Ethics (Harper & Bros.), Ch. I. - -[52] Moral and Political Philosophy, Chap. VI. - -[53] See pp. 133-137. - -[54] Herbert Spencer, Data of Ethics, Sec. 45. - -[55] What is Reality? by Francis Howe Johnson (Houghton, Mifflin & Co., -Boston), pp. 475-498. - -[56] Lecky, in History of European Morals, says: "In all nations and -in all ages, the ideas of interest and utility on the one hand and of -virtue on the other, have been regarded by the multitude as perfectly -distinct, and all languages recognize the distinction. The terms -honor, justice, rectitude, or virtue, and their equivalents in every -language, present to the mind ideas essentially and broadly differing -from the terms prudence, sagacity, or interest. The two lines of -conduct may coincide, but they are never confused, and we have not the -slightest difficulty in imagining them antagonistic. When we say a -man is governed by a high sense of honor, or by strong moral feeling, -we do not mean that he is prudently pursuing either his own interests -or the interests of society." ... "There is no fact more conspicuous -in human nature than the broad distinction, both in kind and degree, -drawn between the moral and the other parts of our nature. But this on -utilitarian principles is altogether unaccountable. If the excellence -of virtue consists solely in its utility or tendency to promote the -happiness of men, we should be compelled to canonize a crowd of acts -which are utterly remote from all ordinary motives of morality." Vol. -I, Chap. I. - -[57] Moral Science (Boston, 1867), pp. 39-44. - -[58] Christian Ethics, p. 104. - -[59] Borden P. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, p. 113. - -[60] B. F. Cocker, Theistic Conception of the World, p. 377. - -[61] Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. II, Sec. 15. - -[62] Principles of Ethics, pp. 39-40. For a clear exposition of this -distinction, see Dr. D. S. Gregory's Christian Ethics, Pt. I, Divis. -III, sec. 1. - -[63] Martensen's Christian Ethics (General), Sec. 7. - -[64] Newman Smyth's Christian Ethics (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1892), -p. 3. - -[65] Newman Smyth's Christian Ethics, p. 60. - -[66] John 1:4; 8: 12; 9: 5. - -[67] "Theism," p. 305. - -[68] James Martineau, in Nineteenth Century, Vol. I, quoted by Prof. -Drummond in "Natural Law in the Spiritual World" (J. Pott & Co., New -York), p. 168. - - - - - * * * * * - - - - -Transcriber's note: - -Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant -preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced -quotation marks retained. - -Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. - -Page 9: "62-76" was misprinted as "62-80"; corrected here. - -Page 10: "168-178" was misprinted as "168-170"; corrected here. - -Page 12: "200-205" was printed as "200"; changed here for consistency. - -Page 13: "205-216" was printed as "205"; changed here for consistency. - - - -***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THEORETICAL ETHICS*** - - -******* This file should be named 43062.txt or 43062.zip ******* - - -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: -http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/4/3/0/6/43062 - - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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