diff options
Diffstat (limited to '42933-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | 42933-0.txt | 20301 |
1 files changed, 20301 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/42933-0.txt b/42933-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a76d15a --- /dev/null +++ b/42933-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,20301 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 42933 *** + +VOLUME IV. + +WORKS OF PLOTINOS. + + + + + PLOTINOS + Complete Works + + In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods; + + With + BIOGRAPHY by PORPHYRY, EUNAPIUS, & SUIDAS, + COMMENTARY by PORPHYRY, + ILLUSTRATIONS by JAMBLICHUS & AMMONIUS, + STUDIES in Sources, Development, Influence; + INDEX of Subjects, Thoughts and Words. + + by + KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE, + + Professor in Extension, University of the South, Sewanee; + A.M., Sewanee, and Harvard; Ph.D., Tulane, and Columbia. + M.D., Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia. + + VOL. IV + + Eustochian Books, 46-54; Comment. + + COMPARATIVE LITERATURE PRESS + + P.O. Box 42, ALPINE, N.J., U.S.A. + + + + + Copyright, 1918, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie. + All Rights, including that of Translation, Reserved. + + Entered at Stationers' Hall, by + George Bell and Sons, Portugal Street, Lincoln's Inn, London. + + + + +FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR. + +Whether Animals May Be Termed Happy.[1] + + +DEFINITIONS OF HAPPINESS. + +1. The (Aristotelian) ideal of living well and happiness are +(practically) identical. Should we, on that account, grant even to +animals the privilege of achieving happiness? Why might we not say +that they live well, if it be granted them, in their lives, to follow +the course of nature, without obstacles? For if to live well consist +either in pleasure (pleasant passions, as the Epicureans taught), or in +realizing one's own individual aim (the Stoic ideal), then this living +well is, in either case, possible for animals, who can both enjoy +pleasure, and accomplish their peculiar aim. Thus singing birds live a +life desirable for them, if they enjoy pleasure, and sing conformably +to their nature. If further we should define happiness as achieving +the supreme purpose towards which nature aspires (the Stoic ideal), we +should, even in this case, admit that animals share in happiness when +they accomplish this supreme purpose. Then nature arouses in them no +further desires, because their whole career is completed, and their +life is filled from beginning to end. + + +WHETHER PLANTS MAY BE TERMED HAPPY. + +There are no doubt some who may object to our admitting to happiness +living beings other than man. They might even point out that on this +basis happiness could not be refused to even the lowest beings, such +as plants: for they also live, their life also has a purpose, by +which they seek to fulfil their development. However, it would seem +rather unreasonable to say, that living beings other than humans +cannot possess happiness by this mere reason that to us they seem +pitiable. Besides, it would be quite possible to deny to plants what +may be predicated of other living beings, on the grounds that plants +lack emotion. Some might hold they are capable of happiness, on the +strength of their possessing life, for a being that lives can live +well or badly; and in this way we could say that they possess or +lack well-being, and bear, or do not bear fruits. If (as Aristippus +thought), pleasure is the goal of man, and if to live well is +constituted by enjoying it, it would be absurd to claim that no living +beings other than man could live well. The same argument applies if we +define happiness as (a state of imperturbable tranquility, by Epicurus +called) ataraxy;[2] or as (the Stoic ideal,[3] of) living conformably +to nature. + + +LIVING WELL NEED NOT BE EXTENDED EVEN TO ALL ANIMALS. + +2. Those who deny the privilege of living well to plants, because these +lack sensation, are not on that account obliged to grant it to all +animals. For, if sensation consist in the knowledge of the experienced +affection, this affection must already be good before the occurrence of +the knowledge. For instance, the being must be in a state conformable +to nature even though ignorant thereof. He must fulfil his proper +function even when he does not know it. He must possess pleasure before +perceiving it. Thus if, by the possession of this pleasure, the being +already possesses the Good, he thereby possesses even well-being. What +need then is there to join thereto sensation, unless indeed well-being +be defined as sensation and knowledge (of an affection or state of the +soul) rather than in the latter affection and state of the soul itself? + + +EVEN THEY WHO DEFINE HAPPINESS AS SENSATION SEEK HIGHER HAPPINESS. + +The Good would thus be reduced to no more than sensation, or the +actualization of the sense-life. In this case, to possess it, it is +sufficient to perceive irrespective of the content of that perception. +Other persons might assert that goodness results from the union of +these two things: of the state of the soul, and of the knowledge +the soul has of it. If then the Good consist in the perception of +some particular state, we shall have to ask how elements which, by +themselves, are indifferent could, by their union, constitute the +good. Other theories are that the Good consists in some particular +state, or in possession of some particular disposition, and conscious +enjoyment of the presence of the Good. These would, however, still have +to answer the question whether, for good living, it be sufficient that +the being knows he possesses this state; or must he know not only that +this state is pleasant, but also that it is the Good? If then it be +necessary to realize that it is the Good, the matter is one no longer +of the function of sensation, but of a faculty higher than the senses. +To live well, in this case, it will no longer be sufficient to possess +pleasure, but we shall have to know that pleasure is the Good. The +cause of happiness will not be the presence of pleasure itself, but +the power of judging that pleasure is a good. Now judgment is superior +to affection; it is reason or intelligence, while pleasure is only an +affection, and what is irrational could not be superior to reason. How +would reason forget itself to recognize as superior what is posited +in a genus opposed to it? These men who deny happiness to plants, +who explain it as some form of sensation, seems to us, in spite of +themselves, to be really seeking happiness of a higher nature, and to +consider it as this better thing which is found only in a completer +life. + + +NOT EVEN REASON IS A SUFFICIENT EXPLANATION OF LIVING WELL. + +There is a greater chance of being right in the opinion that happiness +consists in the reasonable life, instead of mere life, even though +united to sensation. Still even this theory must explain why happiness +should be the privilege of the reasonable animal. Should we add to +the idea of an animal the quality of being reasonable, because reason +is more sagacious, more skilful in discovering, and in procuring the +objects necessary to satisfy the first needs of nature? Would you +esteem reason just as highly if it were incapable of discovering, +or procuring these objects? If we value reason only for the objects +it aids us in getting, happiness might very well belong to the very +irrational beings, if they are, without reason, able to procure +themselves the things necessary to the satisfaction of the first +needs of their nature. In this case, reason will be nothing more than +an instrument. It will not be worth seeking out for itself, and its +perfection, in which virtue has been shown to consist, will be of +little importance. The opposite theory would be that reason does not +owe its value to its ability to procure for us objects necessary to +the satisfaction of the first needs of nature, but that it deserves +to be sought out for itself. But even here we would have to explain +its function, its nature, and set forth how it becomes perfect. If it +were to be improvable, it must not be defined as the contemplation +of sense-objects, for its perfection and essence (being) consist in +a different (and higher) function. It is not among the first needs +of nature, nor among the objects necessary to the satisfaction of its +needs; it has nothing to do with them, being far superior. Otherwise, +these philosophers would be hard pressed to explain its value. Until +they discover some nature far superior to the class of objects with +which they at present remain, they will have to remain where it suits +them to be, ignorant of what good living is, and both how to reach that +goal, and to what beings it is possible. + + +HAPPINESS DEPENDS EXCLUSIVELY ON INTERIOR CHARACTERISTICS. + +3. Dismissing these theories, we return to our own definition of +happiness. We do not necessarily make life synonymous with happiness +by attributing happiness to a living being. Otherwise, we would be +implying that all living beings can achieve it, and we would be +admitting to real complete enjoyment thereof all those who possessed +that union and identity which all living beings are naturally capable +of possessing. Finally, it would be difficult to grant this privilege +to the reasonable being, while refusing it to the brute; for both +equally possess life. They should, therefore, be capable of achieving +happiness--for, on this hypothesis, happiness could be no more than a +kind of life. Consequently, the philosophers who make it consist in the +rational life, not in the life common to all beings, do not perceive +that they implicitly suppose that happiness is something different +from life. They are then obliged to say that happiness resides in a +pure quality, in the rational faculty. But the subject (to which they +should refer happiness) is the rational life, since happiness can +belong only to the totality (of life joined to reason). They therefore, +really limit the life they speak of to a certain kind of life; not +that they have the right to consider these two kinds of life (life in +general, and rational life) as being ranked alike, as both members of +a single division would be, but another kind of distinction might be +established between them, such as when we say that one thing is prior, +and the other posterior. Since "life" may be understood in different +senses, and as it possesses different degrees, and since by mere verbal +similarity life may be equally predicated of plants and of irrational +animals, and since its differences consist in being more or less +complete, analogy demands a similar treatment of "living well." If, by +its life, a being be the image of some other being, by its happiness +it will also be the image of the happiness of this other being. If +happiness be the privilege of complete life, the being that possesses a +complete life will also alone possess happiness; for it possesses what +is best since, in the order of these existences, the best is possession +of the essence (being) and perfection of life. Consequently, the Good +is not anything incidental, for no subject could owe its good to a +quality that would be derived from elsewhere. What indeed could be +added to complete life, to render it excellent? + + +THE GOOD CONSISTS IN INTELLIGENCE. + +Our own definition of the Good, interested as we are not in its cause, +but in its essence, is that the perfect life, that is genuine and real, +consists in intelligence. The other kinds of life are imperfect. They +offer no more than the image of life. They are not Life in its fulness +and purity. As we have often said they are not life, rather than its +contrary. In one word, since all living beings are derived from one +and the same Principle, and since they do not possess an equal degree +of life, this principle must necessarily be the primary Life, and +perfectness. + + +HAPPINESS MUST BE SOMETHING HUMAN. + +4. If man be capable of possessing perfect Life, he is happy as soon as +he possesses it. If it were otherwise, if the perfect life pertained +to the divinities alone, to them alone also would happiness belong. +But since we attribute happiness to men, we shall have to set forth +in what that which procures it consists. I repeat, what results from +our former considerations, namely, that man has perfect Life when, +besides the sense-life, he possesses reason and true intelligence. +But is man as such stranger to the perfect Life, and does he possess +it as something alien (to his essential being)? No, for no man lacks +happiness entirely, either actually or even potentially. But shall we +consider happiness as a part of the man, and that he in himself is the +perfect form of life? We had better think that he who is a stranger to +the perfect Life possesses only a part of happiness, as he possesses +happiness only potentially; but that he who possesses the perfect Life +in actuality, and he who has succeeded in identifying himself with it, +alone is happy. All the other things, no more than envelope him (as +the Stoics would say), and could not be considered as parts of him, +since they surround him in spite of himself. They would belong to him +as parts of himself, if they were joined to him by the result of his +will. What is the Good for a man who finds himself in this condition? +By the perfect life which he possesses, he himself is his own good. The +principle (the Good in itself) which is superior (to the perfect Life) +is the cause of the good which is in him; for we must not confuse the +Good in itself--and the good in man. + + +WE KNOW WE HAVE REACHED HAPPINESS WHEN WE NO MORE DESIRE ANYTHING. + +That the man who has achieved perfect Life possesses happiness is +proved by his no longer desiring anything. What more could he desire? +He could not desire anything inferior; he is united to the best; he, +therefore, has fulness of life. If he be virtuous he is fully happy, +and fully possesses the Good, for no good thing escapes him. What he +seeks is sought only by necessity, less for him than for some of the +things which belong to him. He seeks it for the body that is united to +him; and though this body be endowed with life, what relates to his +needs is not characteristic of the real man. The latter knows it, and +what he grants to his body, he grants without in any way departing +from his own characteristic life. His happiness will, therefore, not +be diminished in adversity, because he continues to possess veritable +life. If he lose relatives or friends, he knows the nature of death, +and besides those whom it strikes down know it also if they were +virtuous. Though he may allow himself to be afflicted by the fate of +these relatives or friends, the affliction will not reach the intimate +part of his nature; the affliction will be felt only by that part of +the soul which lacks reason, and whose suffering the man will not share. + + +MEN MUST SEEK THEIR HAPPINESS IN THAT OF EACH OF THE PARTS OF THEIR +NATURE. + +5. It has often been objected that we should reckon with the bodily +pains, the diseases, the obstacles which may hinder action, cases of +unconsciousness, which might result from certain philtres and diseases +(as the Peripatetics objected[4]). Under these conditions, they say, +the sage could not live well, and be happy--without either mentioning +poverty and lack of recognition. All these evils, not forgetting the +famous misfortunes of Priam,[5] justify serious objections. Indeed, +even if the sage endured all these evils (as indeed he easily does), +they would none the less be contrary to his will; and happy life must +necessarily be one that conforms to our will. The sage is not only +a soul endowed with particular dispositions; the body also must be +comprised within his personality (as also thought the Pythagorean +Archytas[6]). This assertion seems reasonable so far as the passions +of the body are felt by the man himself, and as they suggest desires +and aversions to him. If then pleasure be an element of happiness, how +could the man afflicted by the blows of fate and by pains still be +happy, even if he were virtuous? To be happy, the divinities need only +to enjoy perfect life; but men, having their soul united to a lower +part, must seek their happiness in the life of each of these two parts +that compose him, and not exclusively in one of the two, even though +it were the higher. Indeed, as soon as one of them suffers, the other +one, in spite of its superiority, finds its actions hindered. Otherwise +we shall have to regard neither the body, nor the sensations that flow +from it; and to seek only what by itself could suffice to procure +happiness, independently of the body. + + +NECESSARY THINGS ARE THOSE WHOSE POSSESSION IS UNCONSCIOUS. + +6. If our exposition of the subject had defined happiness as exemption +from pain, sickness, reverses, and great misfortunes, (we would +have implied that) it would be impossible for us to taste happiness +while exposed to one of those evils. But if happiness consist in the +possession of the real good, why should we forget this good to consider +its accessories? Why, in the appreciation of this good, should we +seek things which are not among the number of its elements? If it +consisted in a union of the true goods with those things which alone +are necessary to our needs, or which are so called, even without being +such, we should have to strive to possess the latter also. But as the +goal of man must be single and not manifold--for otherwise it would +be usual to say that he seeks his ends, rather than the more common +expression, his end--we shall have to seek only what is most high and +precious, what the soul somehow wishes to include. Her inclination and +will cannot aspire to anything which is not the sovereign good. Reason +only avoids certain evils, and seeks certain advantages, because it +is provoked by their presence; but it is not so led by nature. The +principal tendency of the soul is directed towards what is best; when +she possesses it, she is satisfied, and stops; only then does she enjoy +a life really conformable to her will. Speaking of will strictly,[7] +and not with unjustifiable license, the task of the will is not to +procure things necessary to our needs (?) Of course we judge that it is +suitable to procure things that are necessary, as we in general avoid +evils. But the avoiding of them is no aim desirable in itself; such +would rather be not to need to avoid them. This, for instance, occurs +when one possesses health and is exempt from suffering. Which of these +advantages most attracts us? So long as we enjoy health, so long as we +do not suffer, it is little valued. Now advantages which, when present, +have no attraction for the soul, and add nothing to her happiness, and +which, when absent, are sought as causes of the suffering arising from +the presence of their contraries, should reasonably be called necessity +rather than goods, and not be reckoned among the elements of our goal. +When they are absent and replaced by their contraries, our goal remains +just what it was. + + +EVILS WHICH THE WISE MAN CAN SUPPORT WITHOUT DISTURBANCE OF HIS +HAPPINESS. + +7. Why then does the happy man desire to enjoy the presence of +these advantages, and the absence of their contraries? It must be +because they contribute, not to his happiness, but to his existence; +because their contraries tend to make him lose existence, hindering +the enjoyment of the good, without however removing it. Besides, +he who possesses what is best wishes to possess it purely, without +any mixture. Nevertheless, when a foreign obstacle occurs, the good +still persists even in spite of this obstacle. In short, if some +accident happen to the happy man against his will, his happiness +is in no way affected thereby. Otherwise, he would change and lose +his happiness daily; as if, for instance, he had to mourn a son, or +if he lost some of his possessions. Many events may occur against +his wish without disturbing him in the enjoyment of the good he has +attained. It may be objected that it is the great misfortunes, and +not trifling accidents (which can disturb the happiness of the wise +man). Nevertheless, in human things, is there any great enough not to +be scorned by him who has climbed to a principle superior to all, and +who no longer depends on lower things? Such a man will not be able to +see anything great in the favors of fortune, whatever they be, as in +being king, in commanding towns, or peoples; in founding or building +cities, even though he himself should receive that glory; he will +attach no importance to the loss of his power, or even to the ruin +of his fatherland. If he consider all that as a great evil, or even +only as an evil, he will have a ridiculous opinion. He will no longer +be a virtuous man; for, as Jupiter is my witness, he would be highly +valuing mere wood, or stones, birth, or death; while he should insist +on the incontestable truth that death is better than the corporeal +life (as held by Herodotus). Even though he were sacrificed, he would +not consider death any worse merely because it occurred at the feet +of the altars. Being buried is really of small importance, for his +body will rot as well above as below ground (as thought Theodorus of +Cyrene).[8] Neither will he grieve at being buried without pomp and +vulgar ostentation, and to have seemed unworthy of being placed in a +magnificent tomb. That would be smallness of mind. If he were carried +off as a captive, he would still have a road open to leave life, in the +case that he should no longer be allowed to hope for happiness. (Nor +would he be troubled if the members of his family, such as sons (?) and +daughters (and female relatives?) were carried off into captivity. If +he had arrived to the end of his life without seeing such occurrences +(we would indeed be surprised). Would he leave this world supposing +that such things cannot happen? Such an opinion would be absurd. Would +he not have realized that his own kindred were exposed to such dangers? +The opinion that such things could happen will not make him any less +happy. No, he will be happy even with that belief. He would still be so +even should that occur; he will indeed reflect that such is the nature +of this world, that one must undergo such accidents, and submit. Often +perhaps men dragged into captivity will live better (than in liberty); +and besides, if their captivity be insupportable, it is in their power +to release themselves. If they remain, it is either because their +reason so induces them--and then their lot cannot be too hard; or it +is against the dictates of their reason, in which case they have none +but themselves to blame. The wise man, therefore, will not be unhappy +because of the folly of his own people; he will not allow his lot to +depend on the happiness or misfortunes of other people. + + +NO MISFORTUNE IS TOO GREAT TO BE CONQUERED BY VIRTUE. + +8. If the griefs that he himself undergoes are great, he will support +them as well as he can; if they exceed his power of endurance, they +will carry him off (as thought Seneca[9]). In either case, he will +not, in the midst of his sufferings, excite any pity: (ever master +of his reason) he will not allow his own characteristic light to be +extinguished. Thus the flame in the lighthouse continues to shine, in +spite of the raging of the tempest, in spite of the violent blowing +of the winds. (He should not be upset) even by loss of consciousness, +or even if pain becomes so strong that its violence could almost +annihilate him. If pain become more intense, he will decide as to +what to do; for, under these circumstances, freedom of will is not +necessarily lost (for suicide remains possible, as thought Seneca[10]). +Besides, we must realize that these sufferings do not present +themselves to the wise man, under the same light as to the common man; +that all these need not penetrate to the sanctuary of the man's life; +which indeed happens with the greater part of pains, griefs and evils +that we see being suffered by others; it would be proof of weakness to +be affected thereby. A no less manifest mark of weakness is to consider +it an advantage to ignore all these evils, and to esteem ourselves +happy that they happen only after death,[11] without sympathizing with +the fate of others, and thinking only to spare ourselves some grief. +This would be a weakness that we should eliminate in ourselves, not +allowing ourselves to be frightened by the fear of what might happen. +The objection that it is natural to be afflicted at the misfortunes +of those who surround us, meets the answer that, to begin with, it is +not so with every person; then, that it is part of the duty of virtue +to ameliorate the common condition of human nature, and to raise it +to what is more beautiful, rising above the opinions of the common +people. It is indeed beautiful not to yield to what the common people +usually consider to be evils. We should struggle against the blows of +fortune not by affected ignoring (of difficulties, like an ostrich), +but as a skilful athlete who knows that the dangers he is incurring +are feared by certain natures, though a nature such as his bears them +easily, seeing in them nothing terrible, or at least considering them +terrifying only to children. Certainly, the wise man would not have +invited these evils; but on being overtaken by them he opposes to them +the virtue which renders the soul unshakable and impassible. + + +WISDOM IS NONE THE LESS HAPPY FOR BEING UNCONSCIOUS OF ITSELF. + +9. It may further be objected that the wise man might lose +consciousness, if overwhelmed by disease, or the malice of magic. +Would he still remain happy? Either he will remain virtuous, being +only fallen asleep; in which case he might continue to be happy, since +no one claims he must lose happiness because of sleep, inasmuch as +no reckoning of the time spent in this condition is kept, and as he +is none the less considered happy for life. On the other hand, if +unconsciousness be held to terminate virtue, the question at issue is +given up; for, supposing that he continues to be virtuous, the question +at issue was, whether he remain happy so long as he remains virtuous. +It might indeed still be objected that he cannot be happy if he remain +virtuous without feeling it, without acting in conformity with virtue. +Our answer is that a man would not be any less handsome or healthy for +being so unconsciously. Likewise, he would not be any less wise merely +for lack of consciousness thereof. + + +THOUGH HAPPINESS IS ACTUALIZED WISDOM WE DO NOT LOSE IT WHEN +UNCONSCIOUS. WE DO NOT LOSE IT BECAUSE WE OURSELVES ARE ACTUALIZATIONS +OF INTELLIGENCE. + +Once more it may be objected that it is essential to wisdom to be +self-conscious, for happiness resides only in actualized wisdom. This +objection would hold if reason and wisdom were incidentals. But if +the hypostatic substance of wisdom consist in an essence (being), +or rather, in being itself, and if this being do not perish during +sleep, nor during unconsciousness, if consequently the activity of +being continue to subsist in him; if by its very nature this (being) +ceaselessly watch, then the virtuous man must even in this state (of +sleep or unconsciousness), continue to exercise his activity. Besides, +this activity is ignored only by one part of himself, and not by +himself entirely. Thus during the operation of the actualization of +growth,[12] the perception of its activity is not by his sensibility +transmitted to the rest of the man. If our personality were constituted +by this actualization of growth, we would act simultaneously with +it; but we are not this actualization, but that of the intellectual +principle, and that is why we are active simultaneously with this +(divine intellectual activity). + + +INTELLIGENCE IS NOT DEPENDENT ON CONSCIOUSNESS. + +10. The reason that intelligence remains hidden is just because it +is not felt; only by the means of this feeling can this activity be +felt; but why should intelligence cease to act (merely because it +was not felt)? On the other hand, why could the soul not have turned +her activity towards intelligence before having felt or perceived +it? Since (for intelligence) thinking and existence are identical, +perception must have been preceded by some actualization. It seems +impossible for perception to arise except when thought reflects upon +itself, and when the principle whose activity constitutes the life of +the soul, so to speak, turns backwards, and reflects, as the image of +an object placed before a brilliant polished mirror reflects itself +therein. Likewise, if the mirror be placed opposite the object, there +is no more image; and if the mirror be withdrawn or badly adjusted, +there is no more image, though the luminous object continue to act. +Likewise, when that faculty of the soul which represents to us the +images of discursive reason and of intelligence is in a suitable +condition of calm, we get an intuition--that is, a somewhat sensual +perception thereof--with the prior knowledge of the activity of the +intelligence, and of discursive reason. When, however, this image +is troubled by an agitation in the mutual harmony of the organs, +the discursive reason, and the intelligence continue to act without +any image, and the thought does not reflect in the imagination. +Therefore we shall have to insist that thought is accompanied by an +image without, nevertheless, being one itself. While we are awake, +it often happens to us to perform praiseworthy things, to meditate +and to act, without being conscious of these operations at the moment +that we produce them. When for instance we read something, we are not +necessarily self-conscious that we are reading, especially if our +attention be fully centered on what we read. Neither is a brave man +who is performing a courageous deed, self-conscious of his bravery. +There are many other such cases. It would therefore seem that the +consciousness of any deed weakens its energy, and that when the action +is alone (without that consciousness) it is in a purer, livelier and +more vital condition. When virtuous men are in that condition (of +absence of self-consciousness), their life is more intense because it +concentrates in itself instead of mingling with feeling. + + +THE ONLY OBJECT OF THE VIRTUOUS WILL IS THE CONVERSION OF THE SOUL +TOWARDS HERSELF. + +11. It has sometimes been said that a man in such a condition does +not really live. (If such be their honest opinion), they must be told +that he does live, even if they be incapable of understanding his +happiness and his life. If this seem to them incredible, they should +reflect whether their own admission that such a man lives and is +virtuous, does not imply that under those circumstances he is happy. +Neither should they begin by supposing that he is annihilated, only +later to consider whether he be happy. Neither should they confine +themselves to externalities after having admitted that he turns his +whole attention on things that he bears within himself; in short, not +to believe that the goal of his will inheres in external objects. +Indeed, such considering of external objects as the goal of the will of +the virtuous man, would be tantamount to a denial of the very essence +(being) of happiness; likewise, insisting that those are the objects he +desires. His wish would undoubtedly be that all men should be happy, +and that none of them should suffer any evil; but, nevertheless, he is +none the less happy when that does not happen. Other people, again, +would say that it was unreasonable for the virtuous man to form such +an (impossible) wish, since elimination of evils here below is out of +the question.[13] This, however, would constitute an admission of our +belief that the only goal of the virtuous man's will is the conversion +of the soul towards herself.[14] + + +THE PLEASURES CLAIMED FOR THE VIRTUOUS MAN ARE OF A HIGHER KIND. + +12. We grant, however, that the pleasures claimed for the virtuous man +are neither those sought by debauchees, nor those enjoyed by the body. +Those pleasures could not be predicated of him without degrading his +felicity. Nor can we claim for him raptures of delight--for what would +be their use? It is sufficient to suppose that the virtuous man tastes +the pleasures attached to the presence of goods, pleasures which must +consist neither in motions, nor be accidental. He enjoys the presence +of those (higher) goods because he is present to himself; from that +time on he lingers in a state of sweet serenity. The virtuous man, +therefore, is always serene, calm, and satisfied. If he be really +virtuous, his state cannot be troubled by any of the things that we +call evils. Those who in the virtuous life are seeking for pleasures of +another kind are actually seeking something else than the virtuous life. + + +IN THE VIRTUOUS MAN THE PART THAT SUFFERS IS THE HIGHER; THEREFORE HE +REALLY DOES NOT SUFFER AS DO THOSE WHO SUFFER CHIEFLY PHYSICALLY. + +13. The actions of the virtuous man could not be hindered by fortune, +but they may vary with the fluctuations of fortune. All will be equally +beautiful, and, perhaps, so much the more beautiful as the virtuous +man will find himself placed amidst more critical circumstances. Any +acts that concern contemplation, which relate to particular things, +will be such that the wise man will be able to produce them, after +having carefully sought and considered what he is to do. Within +himself he finds the most infallible of the rules of conduct, a rule +that will never fail him, even were he within the oft-discussed bull +of Phalaris. It is useless for the vulgar man to repeat, even twice +or thrice,[15] that such a fate is sweet; for if a man were to utter +those words, they are uttered by that very (animal) part that undergoes +those tortures. On the contrary, in the virtuous man, the part that +suffers is different from that which dwells within itself, and which, +while necessarily residing within itself, is never deprived of the +contemplation of the universal Good. + + +MAN BECOMES WISE BY ESTABLISHING A SPIRITUAL PREPONDERANCE. + +14. Man, and specially the virtuous man, is constituted not by the +composite of soul and body,[16] as is proved by the soul's power to +separate herself from the body,[17] and to scorn what usually are +called "goods." It would be ridiculous to relate happiness to the +animal part of man, since happiness consists in living well, and living +well, being an actualization, belongs to the soul, exclusively. Not +even does it extend to the entire soul, for happiness does not extend +to that part of the soul concerned with growth, having nothing in +common with the body, neither as to its size, nor its possible good +condition. Nor does it depend on the perfection of the senses, because +their development, as well as that of the organs, weights man down, +and makes him earthy. Doing good will be made easier by establishing a +sort of counter-weight, weakening the body, and taming its motions, so +as to show how much the real man differs from the foreign things that +(to speak as do the Stoics), surround him. However much the (earthy) +common man enjoy beauty, greatness, wealth, command over other men, +and earthly luxuries, he should not be envied for the deceptive +pleasure he takes in all these advantages. To begin with, the wise +man will probably not possess them; but if he do possess them, he +will voluntarily diminish them, if he take due care of himself. By +voluntary negligence he will weaken and disfigure the advantages of +his body. He will abdicate from dignities. While preserving the health +of his body, he will not desire to be entirely exempt from disease and +sufferings. If he never experienced these evils, he will wish to make +a trial of them during his youth. But when he has arrived at old age, +he will no longer wish to be troubled either by pains, or pleasures, +or anything sad or agreeable that relates to the body; so as not to be +forced to give it his attention. He will oppose the sufferings he will +have to undergo with a firmness that will never forsake him. He will +not believe that his happiness is increased by pleasures, health or +rest, nor destroyed nor diminished by their contraries. As the former +advantages do not augment his felicity, how could their loss diminish +it? + + +TWO WISE MEN WILL BE EQUALLY HAPPY, IN SPITE OF DIFFERENCES OF FORTUNE. + +15. Let us now imagine two wise men, the first of whom possesses +everything that heart can wish for, while the other is in a contrary +position. Shall they be said to be equally happy? Yes, if they be +equally wise. Even if the one possessed physical beauty, and all +the other advantages that do not relate either to wisdom, virtue, +contemplation of the good, or perfect life; what would be the use of +all that since he who possesses all these advantages is not considered +as really being happier than he who lacks them? Such wealth would +not even help a flute-player to accomplish his object! We, however, +consider the happy man only from the standpoint of the weakness of our +mind, considering as serious and frightful what the really happy man +considers indifferent. For the man could not be wise, nor consequently +happy, so long as he has not succeeded in getting rid of all these +vain ideas, so long as he has not entirely transformed himself, so +long as he does not within himself contain the confidence that he is +sheltered from all evil. Only then will he live without being troubled +by any fear. The only thing that should affect him, would be the fear +that he is not an expert in wisdom, that he is only partly wise. As to +unforeseen fears that might get the better of him before he had had +the time to reflect, during a moment of abstraction of attention, the +wise man will hasten to turn them away, treating that which within +himself becomes agitated as a child that has lost its way through +pain. He will tranquilize it either by reason, or even by a threat, +though uttered without passion. Thus the mere sight of a worthy person +suffices to calm a child. Besides, the wise man will not hold aloof +either from friendship nor gratitude. He will treat his own people as +he treats himself; giving to his friends as much as to his own person; +and he will give himself up to friendship, without ceasing to exercise +intelligence therein. + + +THE WISE MAN REMAINS UNATTACHED. + +16. If the virtuous man were not located in this elevated life of +intelligence; if on the contrary he were supposed to be subject to +the blows of fate, and if we feared that they would overtake him, our +ideal would no longer be that of the virtuous man such as we outline +it; we would be considering a vulgar man, mingled with good and evil, +of whom a life equally mingled with good and evil would be predicated. +Even such a man might not easily be met with, and besides, if we did +meet him, he would not deserve to be called a wise man; for there would +be nothing great about him, neither the dignity of wisdom, nor the +purity of good. Happiness, therefore, is not located in the life of +the common man. Plato rightly says that you have to leave the earth to +ascend to the good, and that to become wise and happy, one should turn +one's look towards the only Good, trying to acquire resemblance to Him, +and to live a life conformable to Him.[18] That indeed must suffice +the wise man to reach his goal. To the remainder he should attach no +more value than to changes of location, none of which can add to his +happiness. If indeed he pay any attention to external things scattered +here and there around him, it is to satisfy the needs of his body so +far as he can. But as he is something entirely different from the +body, he is never disturbed at having to leave it; and he will abandon +it whenever nature will have indicated the time. Besides, he always +reserves to himself the right to deliberate about this (time to leave +the world by suicide).[19] Achievement of happiness will indeed be his +chief goal; nevertheless, he will also act, not only in view of his +ultimate goal, or himself, but on the body to which he is united. He +will care for this body, and will sustain it as long as possible. Thus +a musician uses his lyre so long as he can; but as soon as it is beyond +using, he repairs it, or abandons playing the lyre, because he now can +do without it. Leaving it on the ground, he will look at it almost with +scorn, and will sing without its accompaniment. Nevertheless it will +not have been in vain that this lyre will have been originally given to +him; for he will often have profited by its use. + + + + +THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. + +Of Providence.[20] + + +EPICURUS TAUGHT CHANCE AND THE GNOSTICS AN EVIL CREATOR. + +1. When Epicurus[21] derives the existence and constitution of the +universe from automatism and chance, he commits an absurdity, and +stultifies himself. That is self-evident, though the matter have +elsewhere been thoroughly demonstrated.[22] But (if the world do +not owe its origin to chance) we will be compelled to furnish an +adequate reason for the existence and creation of all these beings. +This (teleological) question deserves the most careful consideration. +Things that seem evil do indeed exist, and they do suggest doubts about +universal Providence; so that some (like Epicurus[23]) insist there +is no providence, while others (like the Gnostics[24]), hold that the +demiurgic creator is evil. The subject, therefore, demands thorough +investigation of its first principles. + + +PARTICULAR AND UNIVERSAL PROVIDENCE ASSUMED AS PREMISES. + +Let us leave aside this individual providence, which consists in +deliberating before an action, and in examining whether we should or +should not do something, or whether we should give or not give it. We +shall also assume the existence of the universal Providence, and from +this principle we shall deduce the consequences. + + +PROVIDENCE IS NOT PARTICULAR BECAUSE THE WORLD HAD NO BEGINNING. + +We would acknowledge the existence of a particular Providence, such as +we mentioned above, if we thought that the world had had a beginning of +existence, and had not existed since all eternity. By this particular +Providence we mean a recognition, in the divinity, of a kind of +prevision and reasoning (similar to the reasoning and prevision of the +artist who, before carrying out a work, deliberates on each of the +parts that compose it[25]). We would suppose that this prevision and +reasoning were necessary to determine how the universe could have been +made, and on what conditions it should have been the best possible. +But as we hold that the world's existence had no beginning, and that +it has existed since all time, we can, in harmony with reason and our +own views, affirm that universal Providence consists in this that +the universe is conformed to Intelligence, and that Intelligence is +prior to the universe, not indeed in time--for the existence of the +Intelligence did not temporarily precede that of the universe--but (in +the order of things), because, by its nature, Intelligence precedes the +world that proceeds from it, of which it is the cause, type[26] and +model, and cause of unchanged perpetual persistence. + + +HOW INTELLIGENCE CONTINUES TO MAKE THE WORLD SUBSIST. + +This is how Intelligence continues to make the world subsist. Pure +Intelligence and Being in itself constitute the genuine (intelligible) +World that is prior to everything, which has no extension, which +is weakened by no division, which has no imperfection, even in its +parts, for none of its parts are separated from its totality. This +world is the universal Life and Intelligence. Its unity is both +living and intelligent. In it each part reproduces the whole, its +totality consists of a perfect harmony, because nothing within it is +separate, independent, or isolated from anything else. Consequently, +even if there were mutual opposition, there would be no struggle. +Being everywhere one and perfect, the intelligible World is permanent +and immutable, for it contains no internal reaction of one opposite +on another. How could such a reaction take place in this world, since +nothing is lacking in it? Why should Reason produce another Reason +within it, and Intelligence produce another Intelligence[27] merely +because it was capable of doing so? If so, it would not, before having +produced, have been in a perfect condition; it would produce and enter +in motion because it contained something inferior.[28] But blissful +beings are satisfied to remain within themselves, persisting within +their essence. A multiple action compromises him who acts by forcing +him to issue from himself. The intelligible World is so blissful that +even while doing nothing it accomplishes great things, and while +remaining within itself it produces important operations. + + +THE SENSE-WORLD CREATED NOT BY REFLECTION, BUT BY SELF-NECESSITY. + +2. The sense-world draws its existence from that intelligible World. +The sense-world, however, is not really unitary; it is indeed multiple, +and divided into a plurality of parts which are separated from each +other, and are mutually foreign. Not love reigns there, but hate, +produced by the separation of things which their state of imperfection +renders mutually inimical. None of its parts suffices to itself. +Preserved by something else, it is none the less an enemy of the +preserving Power. The sense-world has been created, not because the +divinity reflected on the necessity of creating, but because (in the +nature of things) it was unavoidable that there be a nature inferior to +the intelligible World, which, being perfect, could not have been the +last degree of existence.[29] It occupied the first rank, it had great +power, that was universal and capable of creating without deliberation. +If it had had to deliberate, it would not, by itself, have expressed +the power of creation. It would not have possessed it essentially. +It would have resembled an artisan, who, himself, does not have the +power of creating, but who acquires it by learning how to work. By +giving something of itself to matter, Intelligence produced everything +without issuing from its rest or quietness. That which it gives is +Reason, because reason is the emanation of Intelligence, an emanation +that is as durable as the very existence of Intelligence. In a seminal +reason all the parts exist in an united condition, without any of +them struggling with another, without disagreement or hindrance. This +Reason then causes something of itself to pass into the corporeal mass, +where the parts are separated from each other, and hinder each other, +and destroy each other. Likewise, from this unitary Intelligence, +and from the Reason that proceeds thence, issues this universe whose +parts are separate and distinct from each other, some of the parts +being friendly and allied, while some are separate and inimical. They, +therefore, destroy each other, either voluntarily or involuntarily, +and through this destruction their generation is mutually operated. +In such a way did the divinity arrange their actions and experiences +that all concur in the formation of a single harmony,[30] in which +each utters its individual note because, in the whole, the Reason that +dominates them produces order and harmony. The sense-world does not +enjoy the perfection of Intelligence and Reason: it only participates +therein. Consequently, the sense-world needed harmony, because it was +formed by the concurrence of Intelligence and necessity.[31] Necessity +drives the sense-world to evil, and to what is irrational, because +necessity itself is irrational; but Intelligence dominates necessity. +The intelligible World is pure reason; none other could be such. The +world, which is born of it, had to be inferior to it, and be neither +pure reason, nor mere matter; for order would have been impossible +in unmingled matter. The sense-world, therefore, is a mixture of +matter and Reason; those are the elements of which it is composed. The +principle from which this mixture proceeds, and which presides over +the mixture, is the Soul. Neither must we imagine that this presiding +over the mixture constitutes an effort for the Soul; for she easily +administers the universe, by her presence.[32] + + +THE WORLD SHOULD NOT BE BLAMED FOR ITS IMPERFECTIONS. + +3. For not being beautiful this world should not be blamed; neither +for not being the best of corporeal worlds; nor should the Cause, +from which it derives its existence, be accused. To begin with, +this world exists necessarily. It is not the work of a reflecting +determination. It exists because a superior Being naturally begets it +in His own likeness. Even if its creation were the result of reflective +determination, it could not shame its author; for the divinity made the +universe beautiful, complete and harmonious. Between the greater and +lesser parts He introduced a fortunate accord. A person who would blame +the totality of the world from consideration of its parts is therefore +unjust. He should examine the parts in their relation to the totality, +and see whether they be in accord and in harmony with it. Then the +study of the whole should continue down to that of the least details. +Otherwise criticism does not apply to the world as a whole, but only +to some of its parts. For instance, we well know how admirable, as +a whole, is man; yet we grant that there would be justification for +criticism of a separate hair, or toe, or some of the vilest animals, or +Thersites, as a specimen of humanity. + + +THE WORLD'S TESTIMONY TO ITS CREATOR. + +Since the work under consideration is the entire world, we would, were +our intelligence attentively to listen to its voice, hear it exclaim +as follows: "It is a divinity who has made Me, and from the divinity's +hands I issued complete, including all animated beings, entire and +self-sufficient, standing in need of nothing, since everything is +contained within Me; plants, animals, the whole of Nature, the +multitude of the divinities, the troupe of guardians, excellent souls, +and the men who are happy because of virtue. This refers not only +to the earth, which is rich in plants and animals of all kinds; the +power of the Soul extends also to the sea. Nor are the air and entire +heaven inanimate. They are the seat of all the excellent Souls, which +communicate life to the stars, and which preside over the circular +revolution of the heaven, a revolution that is eternal and full of +harmony, which imitates the movement of Intelligence by the eternal and +regular movement of the stars around one and the same centre, because +heaven has no need to seek anything outside of itself. All the beings +I contain aspire to the Good; all achieve Him, each according to its +potentiality. Indeed, from the Good depends the entire heaven,[33] +my whole Soul, the divinities that inhabit my various parts, all the +animals, all the plants, and all my apparently inanimate beings. In +this aggregation of beings some seem to participate only in existence, +others in life, others in sensation, others in intelligence, while +still others seem to participate in all the powers of life at one +time;[34] for we must not expect equal faculties for unequal things, as +for instance sight for the fingers, as it is suitable to the eye; while +the finger needs something else; it needs its own form, and has to +fulfil its function." + + +OPPOSITION AMONG INANIMATE BEINGS. + +4. We should not be surprised at water extinguishing fire, or at +fire destroying some other element. Even this element was introduced +to existence by some other element, and it is not surprising that +it should be destroyed, since it did not produce itself, and was +introduced to existence only by the destruction of some other element +(as thought Heraclitus and the Stoics[35]). Besides, the extinguished +fire is replaced by another active fire. In the incorporeal heaven, +everything is permanent; in the visible heaven, the totality, as well +as the more important and the most essential parts, are eternal. +The souls, on passing through different bodies, (by virtue of their +disposition[36]), themselves change on assuming some particular form; +but, when they can do so, they stand outside of generation, remaining +united to the universal Soul. The bodies are alive by their form, and +by the whole that each of them constitutes (by its union with a soul), +since they are animals, and since they nourish themselves; for in +the sense-world life is mobile, but in the intelligible world it is +immobile. Immobility necessarily begat movement, self-contained life +was compelled to produce other life, and calm being naturally exhaled +vibrating spirit. + + +OPPOSITION AMONG ANIMALS. + +Mutual struggle and destruction among animals is necessary, because +they are not born immortal. Their origin is due to Reason's embracing +all of matter, and because this Reason possessed within itself all the +things that subsist in the intelligible World. From what other source +would they have arisen? + + +OPPOSITION AMONG HUMANS. + +The mutual wrongs of human beings may however very easily all be caused +by the desire of the Good (as had been thought by Democritus[37]). +But, having strayed because of their inability to reach Him, they +turned against each other. They are punished for it by the degradation +these evil actions introduced within their souls, and, after death, +they are driven into a lower place, for none can escape the Order +established by the Law of the universe (or, the law of Adrastea[38]). +Order does not, as some would think, exist because of disorder, nor +law on account of lawlessness; in general, it is not the better that +exists on account of the worse. On the contrary, disorder exists only +on account of order, lawlessness on account of law, irrationality on +account of reason, because order, law and reason, such as they are here +below, are only imitations (or, borrowings). It is not that the better +produced the worse, but that the things which need participation in the +better are hindered therefrom, either by their nature, by accident, +or by some other obstacle (as Chrysippus thought that evils happen +by consequence or concomitance). Indeed, that which succeeds only in +acquiring a borrowed order, may easily fail to achieve it, either +because of some fault inherent in its own nature, or by some foreign +obstacle. Things hinder each other unintentionally, by following +different goals. Animals whose actions are free incline sometimes +towards good, sometimes towards evil (as the two horses in Plato's +Phaedrus).[39] Doubtless, they do not begin by inclining towards evil; +but as soon as there is the least deviation at the origin, the further +the advance in the wrong road, the greater and more serious does the +divergence become. Besides, the soul is united to a body, and from +this union necessarily arises appetite. When something impresses us at +first sight, or unexpectedly, and if we do not immediately repress the +motion which is produced within us, we allow ourselves to be carried +away by the object towards which our inclination drew us. But the +punishment follows the fault, and it is not unjust that the soul that +has contracted some particular nature should undergo the consequences +of her disposition (by passing into a body which conforms thereto). +Happiness need not be expected for those who have done nothing to +deserve it. The good alone obtain it; and that is why the divinities +enjoy it. + + +LACK OF HAPPINESS SHOULD BE BLAMED ON THE SOUL THAT DOES NOT DESERVE IT. + +5. If then, even here below, souls enjoy the faculty of arriving at +happiness, we should not accuse the constitution of the universe +because some souls are not happy; the fault rather lies with their +weakness, which hinders them from struggling courageously enough in +the career where prizes are offered to virtue. Why indeed should we +be astonished that the spirits which have not made themselves divine +should not enjoy divine life? Poverty and diseases are of no importance +to the good, and they are useful to the evil (as thought Theognis).[40] +Besides, we are necessarily subject to diseases, because we have a +body. Then all these accidents are not useless for the order and +existence of the universe. Indeed, when a being is dissolved into its +elements, the Reason of the universe uses it to beget other beings, +for the universal Reason embraces everything within its sphere of +activity. Thus when the body is disorganized, and the soul is softened +by her passions, then the body, overcome by sickness, and the soul, +overcome by vice, are introduced into another series and order. There +are things, like poverty and sickness, which benefit the persons who +undergo them. Even vice contributes to the perfection of the universe, +because it furnishes opportunity for the exercise of the divine +justice. It serves other purposes also; for instance, it increases the +vigilance of souls, and excites the mind and intelligence to avoid the +paths of perdition; it also emphasizes the value of virtue by contrast +with the evils that overtake the wicked. Of course, such utilities +are not the cause of the existence of evils; we only mean that, since +evils exist, the divinity made use of them to accomplish His purposes. +It would be the characteristic of a great power to make even evils +promote the fulfilment of its purposes, to cause formless things to +assist in the production of forms. In short, we assert that evil is +only an omission or failure of good. Now a coming short of good must +necessarily exist in the beings here below, because in them good is +mingled with other things; for this thing to which the good is allied +differs from the good, and thus produces the lack of good. That is why +"it is impossible for evil to be destroyed":[41] because things are +successively inferior, relatively to the nature of the absolute Good; +and because, being different from the Good from which they derive their +existence, they have become what they are by growing more distant from +their principle. + + +IN SPITE OF APPARENT MISFORTUNE TO THE GOOD NO HARM CAN HAPPEN TO THEM. + +6. It is constantly objected that fortune maltreats the good, and +favors the evil in opposition to the agreement that ought to exist +between virtue and happiness. The true answer to this is that no +harm can happen to the righteous man, and no good to the vicious +man.[42] Other objectors ask why one man is exposed to what is contrary +to nature, while the other obtains what conforms thereto. How can +distributive justice be said to obtain in this world? If, however, the +obtaining of what conforms to nature do not increase the happiness of +the virtuous man, and if being exposed to what is contrary to nature +do not diminish the wickedness of the vicious man, of what importance +(as thought Plato[43]), are either of these conditions? Neither will it +matter if the vicious man be handsome, or the virtuous man ugly. + + +THE SLAVERY OF THE GOOD AND VICTORY OF THE EVIL SEEM TO ACCUSE +PROVIDENCE. + +Further objections assert that propriety, order and justice demand the +contrary of the existing state of affairs in the world, and that we +could expect no less from a Providence that was wise. Even if it were +a matter of moment to virtue or vice, it is unsuitable that the wicked +should be the masters, and chiefs of state, and that the good should +be slaves; for a bad prince commits the worst crimes. Moreover, the +wicked conquer in battles, and force their prisoners to undergo the +extremities of torments. How could such facts occur if indeed a divine +Providence be in control? Although indeed in the production of some +work (of art), it be especially the totality that claims attention, +nevertheless, the parts must also obtain their due, especially when +they are animated, living and reasonable; it is just that divine +Providence should extend to everything, especially inasmuch as its +duty is precisely to neglect nothing. In view of these objections we +shall be forced to demonstrate that really everything here below is +good, if we continue to insist that the sense-world depends on supreme +Intelligence, and that its power penetrates everywhere. + + +PERFECTION MUST NOT BE SOUGHT IN THINGS MINGLED WITH MATTER. + +7. To begin with, we must remark that to show that all is good in the +things mingled with matter (and therefore of sense), we must not expect +to find in them the whole perfection of the World which is not soiled +by matter, and is intelligible; nor should we expect to find in that +which holds the second rank characteristics of that which is of the +first. Since the world has a body, we must grant that this body will +have influence on the totality, and expect no more than that Reason +will give it that which this mixed nature was capable of receiving. +For instance, if we were to contemplate the most beautiful man here +below, we would be wrong in believing that he was identical with the +intelligible Man, and inasmuch as he was made of flesh, muscles and +bones, we would have to be satisfied with his having received from +his creator all the perfection that could be communicated to him to +embellish these bones, muscles and flesh, and to make the ("seminal) +reason" in him predominate over the matter within him. + + +EVIL IS ONLY A LOWER FORM OF GOOD. + +Granting these premises, we may start out on an explanation of the +above mentioned difficulties. For in the world we will find remarkable +traces of the Providence and divine Power from which it proceeds. +Let us take first, the actions of souls who do evil voluntarily; the +actions of the wicked who, for instance, harm virtuous men, or other +men equally evil. Providence need not be held responsible for the +wickedness of these souls. The cause should be sought in the voluntary +determinations of those souls themselves. For we have proved that the +souls have characteristic motions, and that while here below they are +not pure, but rather are animals (as would naturally be the case with +souls united to bodies).[44] Now, it is not surprising that, finding +themselves in such a condition, they would live conformably to that +condition.[45] Indeed, it is not the formation of the world that made +them descend here below. Even before the world existed, they were +already disposed to form part of it, to busy themselves with it, to +infuse it with life, to administer it, and in it to exert their power +in a characteristic manner, either by presiding over its (issues), +and by communicating to it something of their power, or by descending +into it, or by acting in respect to the world each in its individual +manner.[46] The latter question, however, does not refer to the subject +we are now considering; here it will be sufficient to show that, +however these circumstances occur, Providence is not to be blamed. + + +IT IS A MATTER OF FAITH THAT PROVIDENCE EMBRACES EVERYTHING HERE BELOW, +EVEN THE MISFORTUNES OF THE JUST. + +But how shall we explain the difference that is observed between the +lot of the good and the evil? How can it occur that the former are +poor, while others are rich, and possess more than necessary to satisfy +their needs, being even powerful, and governing cities and nations? +(The Gnostics and Manicheans) think that the sphere of activity of +Providence does not extend down to the earth.[47] No! For all of the +rest (of this world) conforms to (universal) Reason, inasmuch as +animals and plants participate in Reason, Life and Soul. (The Gnostic) +will answer that if Providence do extend to this earth, it does not +predominate therein. As the world is but a single organism, to advance +such an objection is the part of somebody who would assert that the +head and face of man were produced by Nature, and that reason dominated +therein, while the other members were formed by other causes, such as +chance or necessity, and that they were evil either on this account, or +because of the importance of Nature. Wisdom and piety, however, would +forbid the admission that here below not everything was well, blaming +the operation of Providence. + + +HOW SENSE-OBJECTS ARE NOT EVIL. + +8. It remains for us to explain how sense-objects are good and +participate in the (cosmic) Order; or at least, that they are not +evil. In every animal, the higher parts, such as the face and head, +are the most beautiful, and are not equalled by the middle or lower +parts. Now men occupy the middle and lower region of the universe. In +the higher region we find the heaven containing the divinities; it is +they that fill the greater part of the world, with the vast sphere +where they reside. The earth occupies the centre and seems to be one +of the stars. We are surprised at seeing injustice reigning here below +chiefly because man is regarded as the most venerable and wisest being +in the universe. Nevertheless, this being that is so wise occupies but +the middle place between divinities and animals, at different times +inclining towards the former or the latter. Some men resemble the +divinities, and others resemble animals; but the greater part continue +midway between them. + + +THE GOOD MAY NEGLECT NATURAL LAWS WHICH CARRY REWARDS. + +It is those men who occupy this middle place who are forced to undergo +the rapine and violence of depraved men, who resemble wild beasts. +Though the former are better than those whose violence they suffer, +they are, nevertheless, dominated by them because of inferiority in +other respects, lacking courage, or preparedness.[48] It would be no +more than a laughing matter if children who had strengthened their +bodies by exercise, while leaving their souls inviolate in ignorance, +should in physical struggle conquer those of their companions, who +had exercised neither body nor soul; if they stole their food or soft +clothing. No legislator could hinder the vanquished from bearing the +punishment of their cowardliness and effeminacy, if, neglecting the +gymnastic exercises which had been taught them, they did not, by their +inertia, effeminacy and laziness, fear becoming fattened sheep fit to +be the prey of wolves? They who commit this rapine and violence are +punished therefor first because they thereby become wolves and noxious +beasts, and later because (in this or some subsequent existence) they +necessarily undergo the consequences of their evil actions (as thought +Plato[49]). For men who here below have been evil do not die entirely +(when their soul is separated from their bodies). Now in the things +that are regulated by Nature and Reason, that which follows is always +the result of that which precedes; evil begets evil, just as good +begets good. But the arena of life differs from a gymnasium, where the +struggles are only games. Therefore, the above-mentioned children which +we divided into two classes, after having grown up in ignorance, must +prepare to fight, and take up arms, an display more energy than in the +exercises of the gymnasium. As some, however, are well armed, while the +others are not, the first must inevitably triumph. The divinity must +not fight for the cowardly; for the (cosmic) law decrees that in war +life is saved by valor, and not by prayers.[50] Nor is it by prayers +that the fruits of the earth are obtained; they are produced only by +labor. Nor can one have good health without taking care of it. If +the evil cultivate the earth better, we should not complain of their +reaping a better harvest.[51] Besides, in the ordinary conduct of life, +it is ridiculous to listen only to one's own caprice, doing nothing +that is prescribed by the divinities, limiting oneself exclusively to +demanding one's conservation, without carrying out any of the actions +on which (the divinities) willed that our preservation should depend. + + +DEATH IS BETTER THAN DISHARMONY WITH THE LAWS OF THE UNIVERSE. + +Indeed it would be better to be dead than to live thus in contradiction +with the laws that rule the universe. If, when men are in opposition +to these laws, divine Providence preserved peace in the midst of +all follies and vices, it would deserve the charge of negligence in +allowing the prevalence of evil. The evil rule only because of the +cowardice of those who obey them; this is juster than if it were +otherwise. + + +PROVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO THE POINT OF SUPPRESSING OUR OWN +INITIATIVE. + +9. Nor should the sphere of Providence be extended to the point of +suppressing our own action. For if Providence did everything, and +Providence alone existed, it would thereby be annihilated. To what, +indeed, would it apply? There would be nothing but divinity! It +is indeed incontestable that divinity exists, and that its sphere +extends over other beings--but divinity does not suppress the latter. +For instance, divinity approaches man, and preserves in him what +constitutes humanity; that is, divinity makes him live in conformity +to the law of Providence, and makes him fulfil the commandments of +that law. Now, this law decrees that the life of men who have become +virtuous should be good both here below and after their death; and +that the evil should meet an opposite fate. It would be unreasonable +to expect the existence of men who forget themselves to come and save +the evil, even if the latter addressed prayers to the divinity. Neither +should we expect the divinities to renounce their blissful existence to +come and administer our affairs; nor that the virtuous men, whose life +is holy and superior to human conditions, should be willing to govern +the wicked. The latter never busy themselves with promoting the good +to the governing of other men, and themselves to be good (as thought +Plato[52]). They are even jealous of the man who is good by himself; +there would indeed be more good people if virtuous men were chosen as +chiefs. + + +THOUGH MEN ARE ONLY MEDIOCRE THEY ARE NEVER ABANDONED BY PROVIDENCE. + +Man is therefore not the best being in the universe; according to his +choice he occupies an intermediate rank. In the place he occupies, +however, he is not abandoned by Providence, which ever leads him +back to divine things by the numerous means it possesses to cause +the triumph of virtue. That is the reason why men have never lost +rationality, and why, to some degree, they always participate in +wisdom, intelligence, art, and the justice that regulates their mutual +relations. Even when one wrongs another, he is still given credit +for acting in justice to himself, and he is treated according to his +deserts.[53] Besides, man, as a creature, is handsome, as handsome as +possible, and, by the part he plays in the universe, he is superior to +all the animals that dwell here below. + + +IT IS RIDICULOUS TO COMPLAIN OF THE LOWER NATURE OF ANIMALS. + +No one in his senses would complain of the existence of animals +inferior to man, if, besides, they contribute towards the embellishment +of the universe. Would it not be ridiculous to complain that some +of them bite men, as if the latter had an imprescriptible right to +complete security? The existence of these animals is necessary; it +procures us advantages both evident and still unknown, but which will +be revealed in the course of time. Thus there is nothing useless +in animals, either in respect to themselves, or to man.[54] It is, +besides, ridiculous to complain because many animals are wild, when +there are even men who are such; what should surprise us most is that +many animals are not submissive to man, and defend themselves against +him.[55] + + +IF UNJUST ACTS ARE PRODUCED ASTROLOGICALLY THEN DIVINE REASON IS TO +BLAME. + +10. But if men be evil only in spite of themselves, and involuntarily, +it would be impossible to say that those who commit injustices, and +those who suffer them are responsible (the former for their ferocity, +and the latter for their cowardice.[56] To this we answer that if the +wickedness of the former (as well as the cowardice of the latter) be, +necessarily, produced by the course of the stars, or by the action of +a principle of which it is only the effect, then it is explained by +physical reasons. But if it be the very Reason of the universe that +produces such things, how does it not thereby commit an injustice? + + +EVEN INVOLUNTARINESS DOES NOT AFFECT SPONTANEITY THAT IS RESPONSIBLE. + +Unjust actions are involuntary only in this sense that one does not +have the will to commit a fault; but this circumstance does not hinder +the spontaneity of the action. However, when one acts spontaneously, +one is responsible for the fault; one would avoid responsibility for +the fault only if one were not the author of the action. To say that +the wicked are such necessarily, does not mean that they undergo +an external constraint, but that their character is constituted by +wickedness. The influence of the course of the stars does not destroy +our liberty, for, if every action in us were determined by the exterior +influence of such agents, everything would go on as these agents +desired it; consequently, men would not commit any actions contrary +to the will of these agents. If the divinities alone were the authors +of all our actions, there would be no impious persons; therefore, +impiety is due to men. It is true that, once the cause is given, the +effects will follow, if only the whole series of causes be given. But +man himself is one of these causes; he therefore does good by his own +nature, and he is a free cause. + + +EVEN THE SHADOWS ARE NECESSARY TO THE PERFECTION OF A PICTURE. + +11. Is it true that all things are produced by necessity, and by the +natural concatenation of causes and effects, and that, thus, they are +as good as possible? No! It is the Reason which, governing the world, +produces all things (in this sense that it contains all the "seminal +reasons"), and which decrees that they shall be what they are. It is +Reason that, in conformity with its rational nature, produces what +are called evils, because it does not wish everything to be equally +good. An artist would not cover the body of a pictured animal with +eyes.[57] Likewise, Reason did not limit itself to the creation of +divinities; it produced beneath them guardians, then men, then animals, +not by envy (as Plato remarks[58]); but because its rational essence +contains an intellectual variety (that is, contains the "seminal +reasons" of all different beings). We resemble such men as know little +of painting, and who would blame an artist for having put shadows in +his picture; nevertheless, he has only properly disposed the contrasts +of light. Likewise, well-regulated states are not composed of equal +orders. Further, one would not condemn a tragedy, because it presents +personages other than heroes, such as slaves or peasants who speak +incorrectly.[78] To cut out these inferior personages, and all the +parts in which they appear, would be to injure the beauty of the +composition.[59] + + +IT IS REASONABLE FOR THE REASON TO ASSIGN SOULS TO DIFFERENT RANKS IN +THE UNIVERSE. + +12. Since it is the Reason (of the world) which produced all things +by an alliance with matter, and by preserving its peculiar nature, +which is to be composed of different parts, and to be determined by +the principle from which it proceeds (that is, by Intelligence), the +work produced by Reason under these conditions could not be improved +in beauty. Indeed, the Reason (of the world) could not be composed of +homogeneous and similar parts; it must, therefore, not be accused, +because it is all things, and because all its parts differ from others. +If it had introduced into the world things which it had not previously +contained, as for instance, souls, and had forced them to enter into +the order of the world without considering their nature, and if it +had made many become degraded, Reason would certainly be to blame. +Therefore, we must acknowledge that the souls are parts of Reason, +and that Reason harmonizes them with the world without causing their +degradation, assigning to each that station which is suitable to her. + + +DIVINE JUSTICE EXTENDS ALSO INTO PAST AND FUTURE. + +13. There is a further consideration that should not be overlooked, +namely: that if you desire to discover the exercise of the distributive +Justice of the divinity, it is not sufficient to examine only the +present; the past and future must also be considered. Those who, in a +former life, were slave-owners, if they abused their power, will be +enslaved; and this change would be useful to them. It impoverishes +those who have badly used their wealth; for poverty is of service +even to virtuous people. Likewise, those who kill will in their turn +be killed; he who commits homicide acts unjustly, but he who is its +victim suffers justly. Thus arises a harmony between the disposition +of the man who is maltreated, and the disposition of him who maltreats +him as he deserved. It is not by chance that a man becomes a slave, +is made prisoner, or is dishonored. He (must himself) have committed +the violence which he in turn undergoes. He who kills his mother will +be killed by his son; he who has violated a woman will in turn become +a woman in order to become the victim of a rape. Hence, the divine +Word[80] called Adrastea.[60] The orderly system here mentioned really +is "unescapeable," truly a justice and an admirable wisdom. From the +things that we see in the universe we must conclude that the order +which reigns in it is eternal, that it penetrates everywhere, even +in the smallest thing; and that it reveals an admirable art not only +in the divine things, but also in those that might be supposed to +be beneath the notice of Providence, on account of their minuteness. +Consequently, there is an admirable variety of art in the vilest +animal. It extends even into plants, whose fruits and leaves are so +distinguished by the beauty of form, whose flowers bloom with so much +grace, which grow so easily, and which offer so much variety. These +things were not produced once for all; they are continually produced +with variety, because the stars in their courses do not always exert +the same influence on things here below. What is transformed is not +transformed and metamorphosed by chance, but according to the laws of +beauty, and the rules of suitability observed by divine powers. Every +divine Power acts according to its nature, that is, in conformity with +its essence. Now its essence is to develop justice and beauty in its +actualizations; for if justice and beauty did not exist here, they +could not exist elsewhere. + + +THE CREATOR IS SO WISE THAT ALL COMPLAINTS AMOUNT TO GROTESQUENESS. + +14. The order of the universe conforms to divine Intelligence without +implying that on that account its author needed to go through the +process of reasoning. Nevertheless, this order is so perfect that he +who best knows how to reason would be astonished to see that even with +reasoning one could not discover a plan wiser than that discovered as +realized in particular natures, and that this plan better conforms to +the laws of Intelligence than any that could result from reasoning. +It can never, therefore, be proper to find fault with the Reason +that produces all things because of any (alleged imperfections) of +any natural object, nor to claim, for the beings whose existence has +begun, the perfection of the beings whose existence had no beginning, +and which are eternal, both in the intelligible World, and in this +sense-world. That would amount to wishing that every being should +possess more good than it can carry, and to consider as insufficient +the form it received. It would, for instance, amount to complaining, +that man does not bear horns, and to fail to notice that, if Reason had +to spread abroad everywhere, it was still necessary for something great +to contain something less, that in everything there should be parts, +and that these could not equal the whole without ceasing to be parts. +In the intelligible World every thing is all; but here below each thing +is not all things. The individual man does not have the same properties +as the universal Man. For if the individual beings had something which +was not individual, then they would be universal. We should not expect +an individual being as such to possess the highest perfection; for +then it would no longer be an individual being. Doubtless, the beauty +of the part is not incompatible with that of the whole; for the more +beautiful a part is, the more does it embellish the whole. Now the part +becomes more beautiful on becoming similar to the whole, or imitating +its essence, and in conforming to its order. Thus a ray (of the supreme +Intelligence) descends here below upon man, and shines in him like a +star in the divine sky. To imagine the universe, one should imagine a +colossal statue[79] that were perfectly beautiful, animated or formed +by the art of Vulcan, whose ears, face and breast would be adorned with +shimmering stars disposed with marvelous skill.[62] + + +OBJECTION OF INTERNECINE WAR AMONG ANIMALS AND MEN. + +15. The above considerations suffice for things studied each in itself. +The mutual relation, however, between things already begotten, and +those that are still being begotten from time to time, deserves to +attract attention, and may give rise to some objections, such as the +following: How does it happen that animals devour each other, that +men attack each other mutually, and that they are always in ceaseless +internecine warfare?[62] How could the reason (of the universe) have +constituted such a state of affairs, while still claiming that all is +for the best? + + +RESPONSIBILITY CANNOT BE SHIFTED FROM REASON WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE. + +It does not suffice here to answer:[63] "Everything is for the +best possible. Matter is the cause that things are in a state of +inferiority; evils could not be destroyed." It is true enough, indeed, +that things had to be what they are, for they are good. It is not +matter which has come to dominate the universe; it has been introduced +in it so that the universe might be what it is, or rather, it is caused +by reason (?). The principle of things is, therefore, the Logos, or +Reason[64] (of the universe), which is everything. By it were things +begotten, by it were they co-ordinated in generation. + + +NECESSITY OF INTERNECINE WARFARE. + +What then (will it be objected) is the necessity of this natural +internecine warfare of animals, and also of men? First, animals have to +devour each other in order to renew themselves; they could not, indeed, +last eternally, even if they were not killed. Is there any reason to +complain because, being already condemned to death, as they are, they +should find an end which is useful to other beings? What objection can +there be to their mutually devouring each other, in order to be reborn +under other forms? It is as if on the stage an actor who is thought to +be killed, goes to change his clothing, and returns under another mask. +Is it objected that he was not really dead? Yes indeed, but dying +is no more than a change of bodies, just as the comedian changes his +costume, or if the body were to be entirely despoiled, this is no more +than when an actor, at the end of a drama, lays aside his costume, only +to take it up again when once more the drama begins. Therefore, there +is nothing frightful in the mutual transformation of animals into each +other. Is it not better for them to have lived under this condition, +than never to have lived at all? Life would then be completely absent +from the universe, and life could no longer be communicated to other +beings. But as this universe contains a multiple life, it produces +and varies everything during the course of its existence; as it were +joking with them, it never ceases to beget living beings, remarkable +by beauty and by the proportion of their forms. The combats in which +mortal men continually fight against each other, with a regularity +strongly reminding of the Pyrrhic dances (as thought Plato[65]), +clearly show how all these affairs, that are considered so serious, are +only children's games, and that their death was nothing serious. To die +early in wars and battles is to precede by only a very little time the +unescapable fate of old age, and it is only an earlier departure for +a closer return. We may be comforted for the loss of our possessions +during our lifetime by observing that they have belonged to others +before us, and that, for those who have deprived us thereof, they form +but a very fragile possession, since they, in turn, will be bereft +thereof by others; and that, if they be not despoiled of their riches, +they will lose still more by keeping them.[66] Murders, massacres, the +taking and pillaging of towns should be considered as in the theatre we +consider changes of scene and of personages, the tears and cries of the +actors.[67] + + +ALL THESE CHANGES OF FORTUNE AFFECT ONLY THE OUTER MAN IN ANY CASE. + +In this world, indeed, just as in the theatre, it is not the soul, +the interior man, but his shadow, the exterior man, who gives himself +up to lamentations and groans, who on this earth moves about so much, +and who makes of it the scene of an immense drama with numberless +different acts (?) Such is the characteristic of the actions of a man +who considers exclusively the things placed at his feet, and outside +of him, and who does not know that his tears and serious occupations +are any more than games.[68] The really earnest man occupies himself +seriously only with really serious affairs, while the frivolous man +applies himself to frivolous things. Indeed, frivolous things become +serious for him who does not know really serious occupations, and +who himself is frivolous. If, indeed, one cannot help being mixed up +in this child's play, it is just as well to know that he has fallen +into child's play where one's real personality is not in question. If +Socrates were to mingle in these games, it would only be his exterior +man who would do so. Let us add that tears and groans do not prove that +the evils we are complaining of are very real evils; for often children +weep and lament over imaginary grievances. + + +DOES THIS POINT OF VIEW DESTROY SIN AND JUSTICE? + +16. If the above considerations be true, what about wickedness, +injustice, and sin? For if everything be well, how can there be +agents who are unjust, and who sin? If no one be unjust, or sinful, +how can unhappy men exist? How can we say that certain things conform +to nature, while others are contrary thereto, if everything that is +begotten, or that occurs, conforms to nature? Last, would that point +of view not do away entirely with impiety towards the divinity, if it +be the divinity that makes things such as they are, if the divinity +resemble a poet, who would in his drama introduce a character whose +business it was to ridicule and criticize the author? + + +THIS PROBLEM SOLVED BY REASON BEING DERIVED FROM INTELLIGENCE. + +Let us, therefore, more clearly define the Reason (of the universe), +and let us demonstrate that it should be what it is. To reach our +conclusion more quickly, let us grant the existence of this Reason. +This Reason (of the universe) is not pure, absolute Intelligence. +Neither is it the pure Soul, but it depends therefrom. It is a ray of +light that springs both from Intelligence and from the Soul united to +Intelligence. These two principles beget Reason, that is, a rational +quiet life.[69] Now all life is an actualization, even that which +occupies the lowest rank. But the actualization (which constitutes +the life of Reason) is not similar to the actualization of fire. The +actualization of the life (peculiar to Reason), even without feeling, +is not a blind movement. All things that enjoy the presence of Reason, +and which participate therein in any manner soever, immediately receive +a rational disposition, that is, a form; for the actualization which +constitutes the life (of the Reason) can impart its forms, and for that +actualization motion is to form beings. Its movement, like that of a +dancer, is, therefore, full of art. A dancer, indeed, gives us the +image of that life full of art; it is the art that moves it, because +the art itself is its life. All this is said to explain the nature of +life, whatever it be. + + +THE UNITY OF REASON IS CONSTITUTED BY THE CONTRARIES IT CONTAINS. + +As reason proceeds from Intelligence and Life, which possesses both +fulness and unity, Reason does not possess the unity and fulness of +Intelligence and Life. Consequently, Reason does not communicate the +totality and universality of its essence to the beings to which it +imparts itself. It, therefore, opposes its parts to each other, and +creates them defective; whereby, Reason constitutes and begets war and +struggle. Thus Reason is the universal unity, because it could not be +the absolute unity. Though reason imply struggle, because it consists +of parts, it also implies unity and harmony. It resembles the reason of +a drama, whose unity contains many diversities. In a drama, however, +the harmony of the whole results from its component contraries being +co-ordinated in the unity of action, while, in universal Reason, it is +from unity that the struggle of contraries arises. That is why we may +well compare universal Reason to the harmony formed by contrary sounds, +and to examine why the reasons of the beings also contain contraries. +In a concert, these reasons produce low and high sounds, and, by +virtue of the harmony, that constitutes their essence, they make these +divers sounds contribute to unity, that is, to Harmony[70] itself, +the supreme Reason of which they are only parts.[71] In the same way +we must consider other oppositions in the universe, such as black and +white, heat and cold, winged or walking animals, and reasonable and +irrational beings. All these things are parts of the single universal +Organism. Now if the parts of the universal Organism were often in +mutual disagreement, the universal Organism, nevertheless, remains +in perfect accord with itself because it is universal, and it is +universal by the Reason that inheres in it. The unity of this Reason +must therefore be composed of opposite reasons, because their very +opposition somehow constitutes its essence. If the Reason (of the +world) were not multiple, it would no longer be universal, and would +not even exist any longer. Since it exists, Reason must, therefore, +contain within itself some difference; and the greatest difference is +opposition. Now if Reason contain a difference, and produce different +things, the difference that exists in these things is greater than that +which exists in Reason. Now difference carried to the highest degree is +opposition. Therefore, to be perfect, Reason must from its very essence +produce things not only different, but even opposed. + + +THE WHOLE IS GOOD THOUGH COMPOSED OF GOOD AND EVIL PARTS. + +17. If Reason thus from its essence produce opposed things, the +things it will produce will be so much the more opposed as they are +more separated from each other. The sense-world is less unitary than +its Reason, and consequently, it is more manifold, containing more +oppositions. Thus, in individuals, the love of life has greater force; +selfishness is more powerful in them; and often, by their avidity, +they destroy what they love, when they love what is perishable. The +love which each individual has for himself, makes him appropriate all +he can in his relations with the universe. Thus the good and evil are +led to do opposite things by the Art that governs the universe; just +as a choric ballet would be directed. One part is good, the other +poor; but the whole is good. It might be objected that in this case no +evil person will be left. Still, nothing hinders the existence of the +evil; only they will not be such as they would be taken by themselves. +Besides, this will be a motive of leniency in regard to them, unless +Reason should decide that this leniency be not deserved, thereby making +it impossible.[72] + + +FOUNDED ON THE PUN ON LOGOS, AS CHARACTER, ROLE AND REASON, THE EVILS +ARE SHOWN TO PLAY THEIR PART BADLY IN THE DRAMA OF LIFE. + +Besides, if this world contain both bad and good people, and if the +latter play the greater part in the world, there will take place +that which is seen in dramas where the poet, at times, imposes his +ideas on the actors, and again at others relies on their ingenuity. +The obtaining of the first, second or third rank by an actor does +not depend on the poet. The poet only assigns to each the part he is +capable of filling, and assigns to him a suitable place. Likewise (in +the world), each one occupies his assigned place, and the bad man, as +well as the good one, has the place that suits him. Each one, according +to his nature and character, comes to occupy the place that suits him, +and that he had chosen, and then speaks and acts with piety if he be +good, and impiously, if he be evil. Before the beginning of the drama, +the actors already had their proper characters; they only developed +it. In dramas composed by men, it is the poet who assigns their parts +to the actors; and the latter are responsible only for the efficiency +or inefficiency of their acting; for they have nothing to do but +repeat the words of the poet. But in this drama (of life), of which +men imitate certain parts when their nature is poetic, it is the soul +that is the actor. This actor receives his part from the creator, as +stage-actors receive from the poet their masks, garments, their purple +robe, or their rags. Thus in the drama of the world it is not from +chance that the soul receives her part. + + +LIKE GOOD AND BAD ACTORS, SOULS ARE PUNISHED AND REWARDED BY THE +MANAGER. + +Indeed, the fate of a soul conforms to her character, and, by going +through with her part properly, the soul fulfils her part in the drama +managed by universal Reason. The soul sings her part, that is, she +does that which is in her nature to do. If her voice and features be +beautiful, by themselves, they lend charm to the poem, as would be +natural. Otherwise they introduce a displeasing element, but which +does not alter the nature of the work.[73] The author of the drama +reprimands the bad actor as the latter may deserve it, and thus fulfils +the part of a good judge. He increases the dignity of the good actor, +and, if possible, invites him to play beautiful pieces, while he +relegates the bad actor to inferior pieces. Likewise, the soul which +takes part in the drama of which the world is the theatre, and which +has undertaken a part in it, brings with her a disposition to play well +or badly. At her arrival she is classed with the other actors, and +after having been allotted to all the various gifts of fortune without +any regard for her personality or activities, she is later punished or +rewarded. Such actors have something beyond usual actors; they appear +on a greater scene; the creator of the universe gives them some of his +power, and grants them the freedom to choose between a great number of +places. The punishments and rewards are so determined that the souls +themselves run to meet them, because each soul occupies a place in +conformity with her character, and is thus in harmony with the Reason +of the universe.[74] + + +THE SOUL MUST FIT HERSELF TO HER SPECIAL PART IN THE GREAT SCHEME. + +Every individual, therefore, occupies, according to justice, the +place he deserves, just as each string of the lyre is fixed to the +place assigned to it by the nature of the sounds it is to render. In +the universe everything is good and beautiful if every being occupy +the place he deserves, if, for instance, he utter discordant sounds +when in darkness and Tartarus; for such sounds fit that place. If the +universe is to be beautiful, the individual must not behave "like a +stone" in it; he must contribute to the unity of the universal harmony +by uttering the sound suitable to him (as thought Epictetus[75]). The +sound that the individual utters is the life he leads, a life which is +inferior in greatness, goodness and power (to that of the universe). +The shepherd's pipe utters several sounds, and the weakest of them, +nevertheless, contributes to the total Harmony, because this harmony +is composed of unequal sounds whose totality constitutes a perfect +harmony. Likewise, universal Reason though one, contains unequal parts. +Consequently, the universe contains different places, some better, and +some worse, and their inequality corresponds to the inequality of the +soul. Indeed, as both places and souls are different, the souls that +are different find the places that are unequal, like the unequal parts +of the pipe, or any other musical instrument. They inhabit different +places, and each utters sounds proper to the place where they are, and +to the universe. Thus what is bad for the individual may be good for +the totality; what is against nature in the individual agrees with the +nature in the whole. A sound that is feeble does not change the harmony +of the universe, as--to use another example--one bad citizen does not +change the nature of a well-regulated city; for often there is need of +such a man in a city; he therefore fits it well. + + +UNIVERSAL REASON TRIES TO PATCH UP "GAGS" BY UNDISCIPLINED ACTORS. + +18. The difference that exists between souls in respect to vice and +virtue has several causes; among others, the inequality that exists +between souls from the very beginning. This inequality conforms to the +essence of universal Reason, of which they are unequal parts, because +they differ from each other. We must indeed remember that souls have +three ranks (the intellectual, rational, and sense lives), and that +the same soul does not always exercise the same faculties. But, to +explain our meaning, let us return to our former illustration. Let +us imagine actors who utter words not written by the poet; as if the +drama were incomplete, they themselves supply what is lacking, and fill +omissions made by the poet. They seem less like actors than like parts +of the poet, who foresaw what they were to say, so as to reattach the +remainder so far as it was in his power.[76] In the universe, indeed, +all things that are the consequences and results of bad deeds are +produced by reasons, and conform to the universal Reason. Thus, from +an illicit union, or from a rape, may be born natural children that +may become very distinguished men; likewise, from cities destroyed by +perverse individuals, may rise other flourishing cities. + + +THIS ILLUSTRATION OF DRAMA ALLOWS BOTH GOOD AND EVIL TO BE ASCRIBED TO +REASON. + +It might indeed be objected that it is absurd to introduce into the +world souls some of which do good, and others evil; for when we +absolve universal Reason from the responsibility of evil, we are also +simultaneously taking from it the merit for the good. What, however, +hinders us from considering deeds done by actors as parts of a drama, +in the universe as well as on the stage, and thus to derive from +universal Reason both the good and the evil that are done here below? +For universal Reason exercises its influence on each of the actors +with so much the greater force as the drama is more perfect, and as +everything depends on it.[77] + + +INTRODUCTION TO THE NEXT BOOK. + +But why should we at all impute evil deeds to universal Reason? The +souls contained in the universe will not be any more divine for that. +They will still remain parts of the universal Reason (and consequently, +remain souls): for we shall have to acknowledge that all reasons are +souls. Otherwise if the Reason of the universe be a Soul, why should +certain "reasons" be souls, and others only ("seminal) reasons"? + + + + +THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK THREE. + +Continuation of That on Providence. + + +SOULS SHOW KINSHIP TO WORLD-SOUL BY FIDELITY TO THEIR OWN NATURE. + +1. The question (why some reasons are souls, while others are reasons +merely, when at the same time universal Reason is a certain Soul), +may be answered as follows. Universal Reason (which proceeds from the +universal Soul) embraces both good and bad things, which equally belong +to its parts; it does not engender them, but exists with them in its +universality. In fact, these "logoses" (or reasons) (or, particular +souls), are the acts of the universal Soul; and these reasons being +parts (of the universal Soul) have parts (of the operations) as their +acts (or energies). Therefore, just as the universal Soul, which +is one, has different parts, so this difference occurs again in +the reasons and in the operations they effect. Just as their works +(harmonize), so do the souls themselves mutually harmonize; they +harmonize in this, that their very diversity, or even opposition, forms +an unity. By a natural necessity does everything proceed from, and +return to unity; thus creatures which are different, or even opposed, +are not any the less co-ordinated in the same system, and that because +they proceed from the same principle. Thus horses or human beings are +subsumed under the unity of the animal species, even though animals of +any kind, such as horses, for example, bite each other, and struggle +against each other with a jealousy which rises to fury; and though +animals of either species, including man, do as much. Likewise, with +inanimate things; they form divers species, and should likewise be +subsumed under the genus of inanimate things; and, if you go further, +to essence, and further still, to super-Essence (the One). Having +thus related or subsumed everything to this principle, let us again +descend, by dividing it. We shall see unity splitting, as it penetrates +and embraces everything simultaneously in a unique (or all-embracing +system). Thus divided, the unity constitutes a multiple organism; each +of its constituent parts acts according to its nature, without ceasing +to form part of the universal Being; thus is it that the fire burns, +the horse behaves as a horse should, and men perform deeds as various +as their characters. In short, every being acts, lives well or badly, +according to its own nature. + + +APPARENT CHANCE REALLY IS THE PLAN OF A DIVINE GENERAL PROVIDENCE. + +2. Circumstances, therefore, are not decisive of human fortune; they +themselves only derive naturally from superior principles, and result +from the mutual concatenation of all things. This concatenation, +however, derives from the (Stoic) "predominant (element in the +universe"), and every being contributes to it according to its nature; +just as, in an army, the general commands, and the soldiers carry out +his orders cooperatively. In the universe, in fact, everything has been +strategically ordered by Providence, like a general, who considers +everything, both actions and experiences,[81] victuals and drink, +weapons and implements, arranging everything so that every detail finds +its suitable location. Thus nothing happens which fails to enter into +the general's plan, although his opponents' doings remain foreign to +his influence, and though he cannot command their army. If indeed, +Providence were[82] "the great Chief over all," to whom the universe +is subordinated, what could have disarranged His plans, and could have +failed to be intimately associated therewith? + + +WE CANNOT QUESTION OUR ORDER IN THE HIERARCHY OF NATURE. + +3. Although I am able to make any desired decision, nevertheless my +decision enters into the plan of the universe, because my nature has +not been introduced into this plan subsequently; but it includes me and +my character. But whence originates my character? This includes two +points: is the cause of any man's character to be located in Him who +formed him, or in that man himself? Must we, on the other hand, give +up seeking its cause? Surely: just as it is hopeless to ask why plants +have no sensation, or why animals are not men; it would be the same as +asking why men are not gods. Why should we complain that men do not +have a more perfect nature, if in the case of plants and animals nobody +questions or accuses either these beings themselves, nor the power +which has made them? (This would be senseless, for two reasons): if we +say that they might have been better, we are either speaking of the +qualities which each of them is capable of acquiring by himself; and +in this case we should blame only him who has not acquired them--or, +we are speaking of those qualities which he should derive not from +himself, but from the Creator, in which case it would be as absurd to +claim for man more qualities than he has received, than it would be to +do so in the case of plants or animals. What we should examine is not +if one being be inferior to another, but if it be complete within its +own sphere; for evidently natural inequalities are unavoidable. This +again depends on conformity to nature, not that inequalities depend on +the will of the principle which has regulated all things. + + +THE CAUSE OF OUR IMPERFECTIONS IS DISTANCE FROM THE SUPREME. + +The Reason of the Universe, indeed, proceeds from the universal Soul; +and the latter, in turn, proceeds from Intelligence. Intelligence, +however, is not a particular being; it consists of all (intelligible +beings),[83] and all the beings form a plurality. Now, a plurality of +being implies mutual differences between them, consisting of first, +second and third ranks. Consequently, the souls of engendered animals +are rather degradations of souls, seeming to have grown weaker by +their procession. The (generating) reason of the animal, indeed, +although it be animated, is a soul other than that from which proceeds +universal Reason. This Reason itself loses excellence in the degree +that it hastens down to enter into matter, and what it produces is +less perfect. Nevertheless, we may well consider how admirable a work +is the creature, although it be so far distant from the creator. We +should, therefore, not attribute to the creator the (imperfections of +the) creature; for any principle is superior to its product. So we may +assert that (the principle even of imperfect things) is perfect; and, +(instead of complaining), we should rather admire His communication of +some traits of His power to beings dependent from Him. We have even +reason to be more than grateful for His having given gifts greater +than they can receive or assimilate; and as the gifts of Providence +are superabundant, we can find the cause (of imperfection) only in the +creatures themselves. + + +DOUBLENESS OF SOUL, REASONS AND PROVIDENCE. + +4. If man were simple--that is, if he were no more than what he had +been created, and if all his actions and passions derived from the +same principle--we would no more exercise our reason to complain for +his behoof than we have to complain for that of other animals. But +we do have something to blame in the man, and that in the perverted +man. We have good grounds for this blame, because man is not only that +which he was created, but has, besides, another principle which is +free (intelligence, with reason). This free principle, however, is not +outside of Providence, and the Reason of the universe, any more than +it would be reasonable to suppose that the things above depended on +the things here below. On the contrary, it is superior things which +shed their radiance on inferior ones, and this is the cause of the +perfection of Providence. As to the Reason of the universe, it itself +is double also; one produces things, while the other unites generated +things to intelligible ones. Thus are constituted two providences: a +superior one, from above (intellectual Reason, the principal power of +the soul[84]), and an inferior one, the (natural and generative power, +called) reason, which derives from the first; and from both results the +concatenation of things, and universal Providence (or, Providence, and +destiny). + + +MEN'S BETTER NATURE IS NOT DOMINANT BECAUSE OF THEIR SUB-CONSCIOUS +NATURE. + +Men (therefore, not being only what they were made) possess another +principle (free intelligence with reason); but not all make use of +all the principles they possess; some make use of the one principle +(their intelligence), while others make use of the other (principle +of reason), or even of the lower principle (of imagination and +sensation).[85] All these principles are present in the man, even +when they do not react on him; and even in this case, they are not +inert; each fulfils its peculiar office; only they do not all act +simultaneously upon him (or, are not perceived by his consciousness). +It may seem difficult to understand how this may be the case with all +of them present, and it might seem easier to consider them absent; +but they are present in us, in the sense that we lack none of them; +although we might consider them absent in the sense that a principle +that does not react on a man might be considered absent from him. It +might be asked why these principles do not react on all men, since +they are part of them? We might, referring chiefly to this (free, +intelligent, reasonable) principle, say that first, it does not belong +to animals; second, it is not even (practiced) by all men. If it be not +present in all men, so much the more is it not alone in them, because +the being in whom this principle alone is present lives according to +this principle, and lives according to other principles only so far as +he is compelled by necessity. The cause (which hinders intelligence +and reason from dominating us) will have to be sought in the (Stoic) +substrate of the man, either because our corporeal constitution +troubles the superior principle (of reason and intelligence), or +because of the predominance of our passions. + +(After all), we have not yet reached any conclusion, because this +substrate of man is composed of two elements: the ("seminal) +reason,"[86] and matter; (and either of them might be the cause). At +first blush, it would seem that the cause (of the predominance of our +lower natures) must be sought in matter, rather than in the ("seminal) +reason"; and that which dominates in us is not ("seminal) reason," but +matter and organized substrate. This, however, is not the case. What +plays the part of substrate in respect of the superior principle (of +free intelligence and reason), is both the ("seminal) reason," and that +which is generated thereby, conforming to that reason; consequently, +the predominant element in us is not matter, any more than our +corporeal constitution. + + +HUMAN CHARACTER MAY BE RESULT OF FORMER LIVES. + +Besides, our individual characters might be derived from +pre-existences. In this case we would say that our ("seminal) reason" +has degenerated as a result of our antecedents, that our soul has lost +her force by irradiating what was below her. Besides, our ("seminal) +reason" contains within itself the very reason of our constituent +matter, a matter which it discovered, or conformed to its own +nature.[87] In fact, the ("seminal) reason" of an ox resides in no +matter other than that of an ox. Thus, as said (Plato[88]), the soul +finds herself destined to pass into the bodies of animals other than +men, because, just like the ("seminal) reason," she has altered, and +has become such as to animate an ox, instead of a man. By this decree +of divine justice she becomes still worse than she was. + + +CAUSES OF DETERIORATION. + +But why did the soul ever lose her way, or deteriorate? We have often +said that not all souls belong to the first rank; some belong to a +second, or even third rank, and who, consequently, are inferior to +those of the first. Further, leaving the right road may be caused +by a trifling divergence. Third, the approximation of two differing +things produces a combination which may be considered a third +somewhat, different from the other two components. (Thus even in +this new element, or "habituation") the being does not lose the +qualities he received with his existence; if he be inferior, he has +been created inferior from the very origin; it is what he was created, +he is inferior by the very virtue of his nature; if he suffer the +consequences thereof, he suffers them justly. Fourth, we must allow for +our anterior existence, because everything that happens to us to-day +results from our antecedents. + + +THIS PROVIDENCE IS THE NORMATIVE, CURATIVE, SANATIVE ELEMENT OF LIFE. + +5. From first to last Providence descends from on high, communicating +its gifts not according to the law of an equality that would be +numeric, but proportionate, varying its operations according to +locality (or occasion). So, in the organization of an animal, from +beginning to end, everything is related; every member has its peculiar +function, superior or inferior, according to the rank it occupies; it +has also its peculiar passions, passions which are in harmony with +its nature, and the place it occupies in the system of things. So, +for instance, a blow excites responses that differ according to the +organ that received it; the vocal organ will produce a sound; another +organ will suffer in silence, or execute a movement resultant from +that passion; now, all sounds, actions and passions form in the animal +the unity of sound, life and existence.[89] The parts, being various, +play different roles; thus there are differing functions for the feet, +the eyes, discursive reason, and intelligence. But all things form +one unity, relating to a single Providence, so that destiny governs +what is below, and providence reigns alone in what is on high. In +fact, all that lies in the intelligible world is either rational or +super-rational, namely: Intelligence and pure Soul. What derives +therefrom constitutes Providence, as far as it derives therefrom, as +it is in pure Soul, and thence passes into the animals. Thence arises +(universal) Reason, which, being distributed in unequal parts, produces +things unequal, such as the members of an animal. As consequences from +Providence are derived the human deeds which are agreeable to the +divinity. All such actions are related (to the plan of Providence); +they are not done by Providence; but when a man, or another animate or +inanimate being performs some deeds, these, if there be any good in +them, enter into the plan of Providence, which everywhere establishes +virtue, and amends or corrects errors. Thus does every animal maintain +its bodily health by the kind of providence within him; on the occasion +of a cut or wound the ("seminal) reason" which administers the body of +this animal immediately draws (the tissues) together, and forms scars +over the flesh, re-establishes health, and invigorates the members that +have suffered. + + +THE PLANS OF PROVIDENCE LIKENED TO THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF A PHYSICIAN. + +Consequently, our evils are the consequences (of our actions); they are +its necessary effects, not that we are carried away by Providence, but +in the sense that we obey an impulsion whose principle is in ourselves. +We ourselves then indeed try to reattach our acts to the plan of +Providence, but we cannot conform their consequences to its will; our +acts, therefore, conform either to our will, or to other things in +the universe, which, acting on us, do not produce in us an affection +conformed to the intentions of Providence. In fact, the same cause does +not act identically on different beings, for the effects experienced +by each differ according to their nature. Thus Helena causes emotions +in Paris which differ from those of Idumeneus.[90] Likewise, the +handsome man produces on a handsome man an effect different from that +of the intemperate man on the intemperate; the handsome and temperate +man acts differently on the handsome and temperate man than on the +intemperate; and than the intemperate on himself. The deed done by +the intemperate man is done neither by Providence, nor according to +Providence.[91] Neither is the deed done by the temperate man done by +Providence; since he does it himself; but it conforms to Providence, +because it conforms to the Reason (of the universe). Thus, when a man +has done something good for his health, it is he himself who has done +it, but he thereby conforms to the reason of the physician; for it is +the physician who teaches him, by means of his art, what things are +healthy or unhealthy; but when a man has done something injurious to +his health, it is he himself who has done it, and he does it against +the providence of the physician. + + +PREDICTION DOES NOT WORK BY PROVIDENCE, BUT BY ANALOGY. + +6. If then (the bad things do not conform to Providence), the diviners +and astrologers predict evil things only by the concatenation which +occurs between contraries, between form and matter, for instance, in a +composite being. Thus in contemplating the form and ("seminal) reason" +one is really contemplating the being which receives the form; for one +does not contemplate in the same way the intelligible animal, and the +composite animal; what one contemplates in the composite animal is the +("seminal) reason" which gives form to what is inferior. Therefore, +since the world is an animal, when one contemplates its occurrences, +one is really contemplating the causes that make them arise, the +Providence which presides over them, and whose action extends in an +orderly manner to all beings and events; that is, to all animals, their +actions and dispositions, which are dominated by Reason and mingled +with necessity. We thus contemplate what has been mingled since the +beginning, and what is still continually mingled. In this mixture, +consequently, it is impossible to distinguish Providence from what +conforms thereto, nor what derives from the substrate (that is, from +matter, and which, consequently, is deformed, and evil). This is not +a human task, not even of a man who might be wise or divine; such a +privilege can be ascribed only to God. + + +FACTS OF LIFE ARE LETTERS THAT CAN BE READ. + +In fact, the function of the diviner is not to distinguish the cause, +but the fact; his art consists in reading the characters traced by +nature, and which invariably indicate the order and concatenation of +facts; or rather, in studying the signs of the universal movement, +which designate the character of each being before its revelation in +himself. All beings, in fact, exercise upon each other a reciprocal +influence, and concur together in the constitution and perpetuity of +the world.[92] To him who studies, analogy reveals the march of events, +because all kinds of divination are founded on its laws; for things +were not to depend on each other, but to have relations founded on +their resemblance.[93] This no doubt is that which[94] is meant by the +expression that "analogy embraces everything." + + +ANALOGY DEMANDED BY THE UNITY OF GOD. + +Now, what is this analogy? It is a relation between the worse and the +worse, the better and the better, one eye and the other, one foot and +the other, virtue and justice, vice and injustice. The analogy which +reigns in the universe is then that which makes divination possible. +The influence which one being exercises on another conforms to the +laws of influence which the members of the universal Organism must +exercise upon each other. The one does not produce the other; for all +are generated together; but each is affected according to its nature, +each in its own manner. This constitutes the unity of the Reason of the +universe. + + +EVIL IS INSEPARABLE FROM THE GOOD. + +7. It is only because there are good things in the world, that there +are worse ones. Granting the conception of variety, how could the +worse exist without the better, or the better without the worse? We +should not, therefore, accuse the better because of the existence of +the worse; but rather we should rejoice in the presence of the better, +because it communicates a little of its perfection to the worse. To +wish to annihilate the worse in the world is tantamount to annihilating +Providence itself;[95] for if we annihilate the worse, to what could +Providence be applied? Neither to itself, nor to the better; for when +we speak of supreme Providence, we call it supreme in contrast with +that which is inferior to it. + + +THE PARABLE OF THE VINE AND THE BRANCHES. + +Indeed, the (supreme) Principle is that to which all other things +relate, that in which they all simultaneously exist, thus constituting +the totality. All things proceed from the Principle, while it remains +wrapt in itself. Thus, from a single root, which remains wrapt in +itself, issue a host of parts, each of which offers the image of their +root under a different form. Some of them touch the root; others +trend away from it, dividing and subdividing down to the branches, +twigs, leaves and fruits; some abide permanently (like the branches); +others swirl in a perpetual flux, like the leaves and fruits. These +latter parts which swirl in a perpetual flux contain within themselves +the ("seminal) reasons" of the parts from which they proceed (and +which abide permanently); they themselves seem disposed to be little +miniature trees; if they engendered before perishing, they would +engender only that which is nearest to them. As to the parts (which +abide permanently), and which are hollow, such as the branches, they +receive from the root the sap which is to fill them; for they have +a nature different (from that of the leaves, flowers, and fruits). +Consequently, it is the branches' extremities that experience +"passions" (or modifications) which they seem to derive only from the +contiguous parts. The parts contiguous to the Root are passive on one +end, and active on the other; but the Principle itself is related to +all. Although all the parts issue from the same Principle,[96] yet they +differ from each other more as they are more distant from the root. +Such would be the mutual relations of two brothers who resemble each +other because they are born from the same parents. + + + + +FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE. + +The Self-Consciousnesses, and What is Above Them.[97] + + +IS KNOWLEDGE DEPENDENT ON THE COMPOSITENESS OF THE KNOWER? + +1. Must thought, and self-consciousness imply being composed of +different parts, and on their mutual contemplation? Must that which is +absolutely simple be unable to turn towards itself, to know itself? ls +it, on the contrary, possible that for that which is not composite to +know itself? Self-consciousness, indeed, does not necessarily result +from a thing's knowing itself because it is composite, and that one of +its parts grasps the other; as, for instance, by sensation we perceive +the form and nature of our body. In this case the whole will not be +known, unless the part that knows the others to which it is united also +knows itself; otherwise, we would find the knowledge of one entity, +through another, instead of one entity through itself. + + +A SIMPLE PRINCIPLE CAN HAVE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. + +While, therefore, asserting that a simple principle does know itself, +we must examine into the possibility of this.[98] Otherwise, we would +have to give up hope of real self-knowledge. But to resign this would +imply many absurdities; for if it be absurd to deny that the soul +possesses self-knowledge, it would be still more absurd to deny it of +intelligence. How could intelligence have knowledge of other beings, +if it did not possess the knowledge and science of itself? Indeed, +exterior things are perceived by sensation, and even, if you insist, by +discursive reason and opinion; but not by intelligence. It is indeed +worth examining whether intelligence does, or does not have knowledge +of such external things. Evidently, intelligible entities are known +by intelligence. Does intelligence limit itself to knowledge of these +entities, or does it, while knowing intelligible entities, also know +itself? In this case, does it know that it knows only intelligible +entities, without being able to know what itself is? While knowing that +it knows what belongs to it, is it unable to know what itself, the +knower, is? Or can it at the same time know what belongs to it, and +also know itself? Then how does this knowledge operate, and how far +does it go? This is what we must examine. + + +THE SENSE-POWER OF THE SOUL DEALS ONLY WITH EXTERIOR THINGS. + +2. Let us begin by a consideration of the soul. Does she possess +self-consciousness? By what faculty? And how does she acquire it? It +is natural for the sense-power to deal only with exterior objects; for +even in the case in which it feels occurrences in the body, it is still +perceiving things that are external to it, since it perceives passions +experienced by the body over which it presides.[99] + + +FUNCTIONS OF THE DISCURSIVE REASON OF THE SOUL. + +Besides the above, the soul possesses the discursive reason, which +judges of sense-representations, combining and dividing them. Under +the form of images, she also considers the conceptions received from +intelligence, and operates on these images as on images furnished by +sensation. Finally, she still is the power of understanding, since +she distinguishes the new images from the old, and harmonizes them by +comparing them; whence, indeed, our reminiscences are derived. + + +CAN DISCURSIVE REASON TURN UPON ITSELF? + +That is the limit of the intellectual power of the soul. Is it, +besides, capable of turning upon itself, and cognizing itself, or +must this knowledge be sought for only within intelligence? If we +assign this knowledge to the intellectual part of the soul; we will +be making an intelligence out of it; and we will then have to study +in what it differs from the superior Intelligence. If again, we +refuse this knowledge to this part of the soul, we will, by reason, +rise to Intelligence, and we will have to examine the nature of +self-consciousness. Further, if we attribute this knowledge both to +the inferior and to the superior intelligences, we shall have to +distinguish self-consciousness according as it belongs to the one +or to the other; for if there were no difference between these two +kinds of intelligence, discursive reason would be identical with pure +Intelligence. Does discursive reason, therefore, turn upon itself? +Or does it limit itself to the comprehension of the types received +from both (sense and intelligence); and, in the latter case, how does +it achieve such comprehension? This latter question is the one to be +examined here. + + +THE HIGHEST PART OF DISCURSIVE REASON RECEIVES IMPRESSIONS FROM +INTELLIGENCE. + +3. Now let us suppose that the senses have perceived a man, and have +furnished an appropriate image thereof to discursive reason. What will +the latter say? It may say nothing, limiting itself to taking notice +of him. However, it may also ask itself who this man is; and, having +already met him, with the aid of memory, decide that he is Socrates. If +then discursive reason develop the image of Socrates, then it divides +what imagination has furnished. If discursive reason add that Socrates +is good, it still deals with things known by the senses; but that which +it asserts thereof, namely, his goodness, it has drawn from itself, +because within itself it possesses the rule of goodness. But how does +it, within itself, possess goodness? Because it conforms to the Good, +and receives the notion of it from the Intelligence that enlightens +itself; for (discursive reason), this part of the soul, is pure, and +receives impressions from Intelligence.[101] + + +WHY DISCURSIVE REASON SHOULD BELONG TO THE SOUL RATHER THAN TO +INTELLIGENCE. + +But why should this whole (soul-) part that is superior to sensation +be assigned to the soul rather than to intelligence? Because the power +of the soul consists in reasoning, and because all these operations +belong to the discursive reason. But why can we not simply assign to +it, in addition, self-consciousness, which would immediately clear +up this inquiry? Because the nature of discursive reason consists in +considering exterior things, and in scrutinizing their diversity, while +to intelligence we attribute the privilege of contemplating itself, and +of contemplating its own contents. But what hinders discursive reason, +by some other faculty of the soul, from considering what belongs to +it? Because, in this case, instead of discursive reason and reasoning, +we would have pure Intelligence. But what then hinders the presence +of pure Intelligence within the soul? Nothing, indeed. Shall we then +have a right to say that pure Intelligence is a part of the soul? No +indeed; but still we would have the right to call it "ours." It is +different from, and higher than discursive reason; and still it is +"ours," although we cannot count it among the parts of the soul. In one +respect it is "ours," and in another, is not "ours;" for at times we +make use of it, and at other times we make use of discursive reason; +consequently, intelligence is "ours" when we make use of it; and it +is not "ours" when we do not make use of it. But what is the meaning +of "making use of intelligence"? Does it mean becoming intelligence, +and speaking in that character, or does it mean speaking in conformity +with intelligence? For we are not intelligence; we speak in conformity +with intelligence by the first part of discursive reason, the part that +receives impressions from Intelligence. We feel through sensation, and +it is we who feel. Is it also we who conceive and who simultaneously +are conceived? Or is it we who reason, and who conceive the +intellectual notions which enlighten discursive reason? We are indeed +essentially constituted by discursive reason. The actualizations of +Intelligence are superior to us, while those of sensation are inferior; +as to us, "we" are the principal part of the soul, the part that forms +a middle power between these two extremes, now lowering ourselves +towards sensation, now rising towards Intelligence.[102] We acknowledge +sensibility to be ours because we are continually feeling. It is not +as evident that intelligence is ours, because we do not make use of it +continuously, and because it is separated, in this sense, that it is +not intelligence that inclines towards us, but rather we who raise our +glances towards intelligence. Sensation is our messenger, Intelligence +is our king.[99] + + +WE CAN THINK IN CONFORMITY WITH INTELLIGENCE IN TWO WAYS. + +4. We ourselves are kings when we think in conformity with +intelligence. This, however, can take place in two ways. Either +we have received from intelligence the impressions and rules which +are, as it were, engraved within us, so that we are, so to speak, +filled with intelligence; or we can have the perception and intuition +of it, because it is present with us. When we see intelligence, we +recognize that by contemplation of it we ourselves are grasping other +intelligible entities. This may occur in two ways; either because, +by the help of this very power, we grasp the power which cognizes +intelligible entities; or because we ourselves become intelligence. +The man who thus knows himself is double. Either he knows discursive +reason, which is characteristic of the soul, or, rising to a superior +condition, he cognizes himself and is united with intelligence. Then, +by intelligence, that man thinks himself; no more indeed as being man, +but as having become superior to man, as having been transported into +the intelligible Reason, and drawing thither with himself the best part +of the soul, the one which alone is capable of taking flight towards +thought, and of receiving the fund of knowledge resulting from his +intuition. But does discursive reason not know that it is discursive +reason, and that its domain is the comprehension of external objects? +Does it not, while doing so, know that it judges? Does it not know that +it is judging by means of the rules derived from intelligence, which +itself contains? Does it not know that above it is a principle which +possesses intelligible entities, instead of seeking (merely) to know +them? But what would this faculty be if it did not know what it is, +and what its functions are? It knows, therefore, that it depends on +intelligence, that it is inferior to intelligence, and that it is the +image of intelligence, that it contains the rules of intelligence as +it were engraved within itself, such as intelligence engraves them, or +rather, has engraved them on it. + + +MAN IS SELF-CONSCIOUS BY BECOMING INTELLIGENCE. + +Will he who thus knows himself content himself therewith? Surely +not. Exercising a further faculty, we will have the intuition of +the intelligence that knows itself; or, seizing it, inasmuch as it +is "ours" and we are "its," we will thus cognize intelligence, and +know ourselves. This is necessary for our knowledge of what, within +intelligence, self-consciousness is. The man becomes intelligence when, +abandoning his other faculties, he by intelligence sees Intelligence, +and he sees himself in the same manner that Intelligence sees itself. + + +INTELLIGENCE IS NOT DIVISIBLE; AND, IN ITS EXISTENCE, IS IDENTICAL WITH +THOUGHT. + +5. Does pure Intelligence know itself by contemplating one of its +parts by means of another part? Then one part will be the subject, and +another part will be the object of contemplation; intelligence will +not know itself. It may be objected that if intelligence be a whole +composed of absolutely similar parts, so that the subject and the +object of contemplation will not differ from each other; then, by the +virtue of this similitude, on seeing one of its parts with which it is +identical, intelligence will see itself; for, in this case, the subject +does not differ from the object. To begin with, it is absurd to suppose +that intelligence is divided into several parts. How, indeed, would +such a division be carried out? Not by chance, surely. Who will carry +it out? Will it be the subject or object? Then, how would the subject +know itself if, in contemplation, it located itself in the object, +since contemplation does not belong to that which is the object? +Will it know itself as object rather than as subject? In that case +it will not know itself completely and in its totality (as subject +and object); for what it sees is the object, and not the subject of +contemplation; it sees not itself, but another. In order to attain +complete knowledge of itself it will, besides, have to see itself +as subject; now, if it see itself as subject, it will, at the same +time, have to see the contemplated things. But is it the (Stoic[104]) +"types" (or impressions) of things, or the things themselves, that +are contained in the actualization of contemplation? If it be these +impressions, we do not possess the things themselves. If we do possess +these things, it is not because we separate ourselves (into subject +and object). Before dividing ourselves in this way, we already saw and +possessed these things. Consequently, contemplation must be identical +with that which is contemplated, and intelligence must be identical +with the intelligible. Without this identity, we will never possess +the truth. Instead of possessing realities, we will never possess any +more than their impressions, which will differ from the realities; +consequently, this will not be the truth. Truth, therefore, must not +differ from its object; it must be what it asserts. + + +THOUGHT IS IDENTICAL WITH THE INTELLIGIBLE WHICH IS AN ACTUALIZATION. + +On one hand, therefore, intelligence, and on the other the intelligible +and existence form but one and the same thing, namely, the primary +existence and primary Intelligence, which possesses realities, or +rather, which is identical with them. But if the thought-object and +the thought together form but a single entity, how will the thinking +object thus be able to think itself? Evidently thought will embrace +the intelligible, or will be identical therewith; but we still do not +see how intelligence is to think itself. Here we are: thought and the +intelligible fuse into one because the intelligible is an actualization +and not a simple power; because life is neither alien nor incidental +to it; because thought is not an accident for it, as it would be for +a brute body, as for instance, for a stone; and, finally, because +the intelligible is primary "being." Now, if the intelligible be an +actualization, it is the primary actualization, the most perfect +thought, or, "substantial thought." Now, as this thought is supremely +true, as it is primary Thought, as it possesses existence in the +highest degree, it is primary Intelligence. It is not, therefore, +mere potential intelligence; there is no need to distinguish within +it the potentiality from the actualization of thought; otherwise, +its substantiality would be merely potential. Now since intelligence +is an actualization, and as its "being" also is an actualization, it +must fuse with its actualization. But existence and the intelligible +also fuse with their actualization. Therefore[105] intelligence, the +intelligible, and thought will form but one and the same entity. +Since the thought of the intelligible is the intelligible, and as the +intelligible is intelligence, intelligence will thus think itself. +Intelligence will think, by the actualization of the thought to which +it is identical, the intelligible to which it also is identical. +It will think itself, so far as it is thought; and in so far as it +is the intelligible which it thinks by the thought to which it is +identical.[106] + + +SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS MORE PERFECT IN INTELLIGENCE THAN IN THE SOUL. + +6. Reason, therefore, demonstrates that there is a principle which must +essentially know itself. But this self-consciousness is more perfect in +intelligence than in the soul. The soul knows herself in so far as she +knows that she depends on another power; while intelligence, by merely +turning towards itself, naturally cognizes its existence and "being." +By contemplating realities, it contemplates itself; this contemplation +is an actualization, and this actualization is intelligence; for +intelligence and thought[107] form but a single entity. The entire +intelligence sees itself entire, instead of seeing one of its parts +by another of its parts. Is it in the nature of intelligence, such as +reason conceives of it, to produce within us a simple conviction? No. +Intelligence necessarily implies (certitude), and not mere persuasion; +for necessity is characteristic of intelligence, while persuasion is +characteristic of the soul. Here below, it is true, we rather seek to +be persuaded, than to see truth by pure Intelligence. When we were in +the superior region, satisfied with intelligence, we used to think, and +to contemplate the intelligible, reducing everything to unity. It was +Intelligence which thought and spoke about itself; the soul rested, and +allowed Intelligence free scope to act. But since we have descended +here below, we seek to produce persuasion in the soul, because we wish +to contemplate the model in its image. + + +THE SOUL MUST BE TAUGHT SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS BY CONVERSION. + +We must, therefore, teach our soul how Intelligence contemplates +itself. This has to be taught to that part of our soul which, +because of its intellectual character, we call reason, or discursive +intelligence, to indicate that it is a kind of intelligence, that +it possesses its power by intelligence, and that it derives it from +intelligence. This part of the soul must, therefore, know that it +knows what it sees, that it knows what it expresses, and that, if it +were identical with what it describes, it would thereby know itself. +But since intelligible entities come to it from the same principle +from which it itself comes, since it is a reason, and as it receives +from intelligence entities that are kindred, by comparing them with +the traces of intelligence it contains, it must know itself. This +image it contains must, therefore, be raised to true Intelligence, +which is identical with the true intelligible entities, that is, to +the primary and really true Beings; for it is impossible that this +intelligence should originate from itself. If then intelligence remain +in itself and with itself, if it be what it is (in its nature) to be, +that is, intelligence--for intelligence can never be unintelligent--it +must contain within it the knowledge of itself, since it does not +issue from itself, and since its function and its "being" (or, true +nature) consist in being no more than intelligence.[106] It is not +an intelligence that devotes itself to practical action, obliged +to consider what is external to it, and to issue from itself to +become cognizant of exterior things; for it is not necessary that an +intelligence which devotes itself to action should know itself. As it +does not give itself to action--for, being pure, it has nothing to +desire--it operates a conversion towards itself, by virtue of which +it is not only probable, but even necessary for it to know itself. +Otherwise, what would its life consist of, inasmuch as it does not +devote itself to action, and as it remains within itself? + + +WHATEVER INTELLIGENCE MAY BE THOUGHT TO DO, IT MUST KNOW ITSELF. + +7. It may be objected that the Intelligence contemplates the divinity. +If, however, it be granted, that the Intelligence knows the divinity, +one is thereby forced to admit that it also knows itself; for it +will know what it derives from the divinity, what it has received +from Him, and what it still may hope to receive from Him. By knowing +this, it will know itself, since it is one of the entities given +by the divinity; or rather, since it is all that is given by the +divinity. If then, it know the divinity, it knows also the powers of +the divinity, it knows that itself proceeds from the divinity, and +that itself derives its powers from the divinity. If Intelligence +cannot have a clear intuition of the divinity, because the subject and +object of an intuition must be the same, this will turn out to be a +reason why Intelligence will know itself, and will see itself, since +seeing is being what is seen. What else indeed could we attribute to +Intelligence? Rest, for instance? For Intelligence, rest does not +consist in being removed from itself, but rather to act without being +disturbed by anything that is alien. The things that are not troubled +by anything alien need only to produce their own actualization, +especially when they are in actualization, and not merely potential. +That which is in actualization, and which cannot be in actualization +for anything foreign, must be in actualization for itself. When +thinking itself, Intelligence remains turned towards itself, referring +its actualization to itself. If anything proceed from it, it is +precisely because it remains turned towards itself that it remains in +itself. It had, indeed, to apply itself to itself, before applying +itself to anything else, or producing something else that resembled it; +thus fire must first be fire in itself, and be fire in actualization, +in order later to impart some traces of its nature to other things. +Intelligence, in itself, therefore, is an actualization. The soul, +on turning herself towards Intelligence, remains within herself; on +issuing from Intelligence, the soul turns towards external things. On +turning towards Intelligence, she becomes similar to the power from +which she proceeds; on issuing from Intelligence, she becomes different +from herself. Nevertheless, she still preserves some resemblance to +Intelligence, both in her activity and productiveness. When active, +the soul still contemplates Intelligence; when productive, the soul +produces forms, which resemble distant thoughts, and are traces of +thought and Intelligence, traces that conform to their archetype; and +which reveal a faithful imitation thereof, or which, at least, still +preserve a weakened image thereof, even if they do occupy only the last +rank of beings. + + +WHAT INTELLIGENCE LOOKS LIKE IN THE INTELLIGIBLE. + +8. What qualities does Intelligence display in the intelligible +world? What qualities does it discover in itself by contemplation? To +begin with, we must not form of Intelligence a conception showing a +figure, or colors, like bodies. Intelligence existed before bodies. +The "seminal reasons" which produce figure and color are not identical +with them; for "seminal reasons" are invisible. So much the more are +intelligible entities invisible; their nature is identical with that +of the principles in which they reside, just as "seminal reasons" are +identical with the soul that contains them. But the soul does not see +the entities she contains, because she has not begotten them; even +she herself, just like the "reasons," is no more than an image (of +Intelligence). The principle from which she comes possesses an evident +existence, that is genuine, and primary; consequently, that principle +exists of and in itself. But this image (which is in the soul) is not +even permanent unless it belong to something else, and reside therein. +Indeed, the characteristic of an image is that it resides in something +else, since it belongs to something else, unless it remain attached to +its principle. Consequently, this image does not contemplate, because +it does not possess a light that is sufficient; and even if it should +contemplate, as it finds its perfection in something else, it would +be contemplating something else, instead of contemplating itself. The +same case does not obtain in Intelligence; there the contemplated +entity and contemplation co-exist, and are identical. Who is it, +therefore, that declares the nature of the intelligible? The power +that contemplates it, namely, Intelligence itself. Here below our eyes +see the light because our vision itself is light, or rather because +it is united to light; for it is the colors that our vision beholds. +On the contrary, Intelligence does not see through something else, +but through itself, because what it sees is not outside of itself. +It sees a light with another light, and not by another light; it, +is therefore, a light that sees another; and, consequently, it sees +itself. This light, on shining in the soul, illuminates her; that is, +intellectualizes her; assimilates her to the superior light (namely, +in Intelligence). If, by the ray with which this light enlightens +the soul, we judge of the nature of this light and conceive of it as +still greater, more beautiful, and more brilliant, we will indeed +be approaching Intelligence and the intelligible world; for, by +enlightening the soul, Intelligence imparts to her a clearer life. This +life is not generative, because Intelligence converts the soul towards +Intelligence; and, instead of allowing the soul to divide, causes the +soul to love the splendor with which she is shining. Neither is this +life one of the senses, for though the senses apply themselves to +what is exterior, they do not, on that account, learn anything beyond +(themselves). He who sees that superior light of the verities sees +much better things that are visible, though in a different manner. +It remains, therefore, that the Intelligence imparts to the soul the +intellectual life, which is a trace of her own life; for Intelligence +possesses the realities. It is in the life and the actualization which +are characteristic of Intelligence that here consists the primary +Light, which from the beginning,[108] illumines itself, which reflects +on itself, because it is simultaneously enlightener and enlightened; it +is also the true intelligible entity, because it is also at the same +time thinker and thought. It sees itself by itself, without having +need of anything else; it sees itself in an absolute manner, because, +within it, the known is identical with the knower. It is not otherwise +in us; it is by Intelligence that we know intelligence. Otherwise, +how could we speak of it? How could we say that it was capable of +clearly grasping itself, and that, by it, we understand ourselves? How +could we, by these reasonings, to Intelligence reduce our soul which +recognizes that it is the image of Intelligence, which considers its +life a faithful imitation of the life of Intelligence, which thinks +that, when it thinks, it assumes an intellectual and divine form? +Should one wish to know which is this Intelligence that is perfect, +universal and primary, which knows itself essentially, the soul has to +be reduced to Intelligence; or, at least, the soul has to recognize +that the actualization by which the soul conceives the entities of +which the soul has the reminiscence is derived from Intelligence. Only +by placing herself in that condition, does the soul become able to +demonstrate that inasmuch as she is the image of Intelligence she, the +soul, can by herself, see it; that is, by those of her powers which +most exactly resemble Intelligence (namely, by pure thought); which +resembles Intelligence in the degree that a part of the soul can be +assimilated to it. + + +WE CAN REACH A CONCEPTION OF INTELLIGENCE BY STRIPPING THE SOUL OF +EVERY FACULTY EXCEPT HER INTELLECTUAL PART. + +9. We must, therefore, contemplate the soul and her divinest part +in order to discover the nature of Intelligence. This is how we may +accomplish it: From man, that is from yourself, strip off the body; +then that power of the soul that fashions the body; then sensation, +appetite, and anger, and all the lower passions that incline you +towards the earth. What then remains of the soul is what we call the +"image of intelligence," an image that radiates from Intelligence, as +from the immense globe of the sun radiates the surrounding luminary +sphere. Of course, we would not say that all the light that radiates +from the sun remains within itself around the sun; only a part of this +light remains around the sun from which it emanates; another part, +spreading by relays, descends to us on the earth. But we consider +light, even that which surrounds the sun, as located in something else, +so as not to be forced to consider the whole space between the sun and +us as empty of all bodies. On the contrary, the soul is a light which +remains attached to Intelligence, and she is not located in any space +because Intelligence itself is not spatially located. While the light +of the sun is in the air, on the contrary the soul, in the state in +which we consider her here, is so pure that she can be seen in herself +by herself, and by any other soul that is in the same condition. +The soul needs to reason, in order to conceive of the nature of +Intelligence according to her own nature; but Intelligence conceives of +itself without reasoning because it is always present to itself. We, on +the contrary, are present both to ourselves and to Intelligence when we +turn towards it, because our life is divided into several lives. On the +contrary, Intelligence has no need of any other life, nor of anything +else; what Intelligence gives is not given to itself, but to other +things; neither does Intelligence have any need of what is inferior +to it; nor could Intelligence give itself anything inferior, since +Intelligence possesses all things; instead of possessing in itself the +primary images of things (as in the case of the soul), Intelligence is +these things themselves. + + +ELEVATION OF THE SOUL MAY BE GRADUAL, IF UNABLE TO ATTAIN IMMEDIATE +ELEVATION. + +If one should find himself unable to rise immediately to pure thought, +which is the highest, or first, part of the soul, he may begin by +opinion, and from it rise to Intelligence. If even opinion be out +of the reach of his ability, he may begin with sensation, which +already represents general forms; for sensation which contains the +forms potentially may possess them even in actualization. If, on the +contrary, the best he can do is to descend, let him descend to the +generative power, and to the things it produces; then, from the last +forms, one may rise again to the higher forms, and so on to the primary +forms. + + +THE TRANSCENDENT FIRST PRINCIPLE HAS NO NEED OF SEEING ITSELF. + +10. But enough of this. If the (forms) contained by Intelligence are +not created forms--otherwise the forms contained in us would no longer, +as they should, occupy the lowest rank--if these forms in intelligence +really be creative and primary, then either these creative forms and +the creative principle fuse into one single entity, or intelligence +needs some other principle. But does the transcendent Principle, that +is superior to Intelligence (the One), itself also need some other +further principle? No, because it is only Intelligence that stands in +need of such an one. Does the Principle superior to Intelligence (the +transcendent One) not see Himself? No. He does not need to see Himself. +This we shall study elsewhere. + + +THE CONTEMPLATION OF INTELLIGENCE DEMANDS A HIGHER TRANSCENDING UNITY. + +Let us now return to our most important problem. Intelligence needs +to contemplate itself, or rather, it continually possesses this +contemplation. It first sees that it is manifold, and then that it +implies a difference, and further, that it needs to contemplate, +to contemplate the intelligible, and that its very essence is to +contemplate. Indeed, every contemplation implies an object; otherwise, +it is empty. To make contemplation possible there must be more than +an unity; contemplation must be applied to an object, and this object +must be manifold; for what is simple has no object on which it could +apply its action, and silently remains withdrawn in its solitude. +Action implies some sort of difference. Otherwise, to what would +action apply itself? What would be its object? The active principle, +must, therefore, direct its action on something else than itself, or +must itself be manifold to direct its action on itself. If, indeed, +it direct its action on nothing, it will be at rest; and if at rest, +it will not be thinking. The thinking principle, therefore, when +thinking, implies duality. Whether the two terms be one exterior +to the other, or united, thought always implies both identity and +difference. In general, intelligible entities must simultaneously be +identical with Intelligence, and different from Intelligence. Besides, +each of them must also contain within itself identity and difference. +Otherwise, if the intelligible does not contain any diversity, what +would be the object of thought? If you insist that each intelligible +entity resembles a ("seminal) reason," it must be manifold. Every +intelligible entity, therefore, knows itself to be a compound, and +many-colored eye. If intelligence applied itself to something single +and absolutely simple, it could not think. What would it say? What +would it understand? If the indivisible asserted itself it ought first +to assert what it is not; and so, in order to be single it would have +to be manifold. If it said, "I am this," and if it did not assert that +"this" was different from itself, it would be uttering untruth. If +it asserted it as an accident of itself, it would assert of itself +a multitude. If it says, "I am; I am; myself; myself;" then neither +these two things will be simple, and each of them will be able to say, +"me;" or there will be manifoldness, and, consequently, a difference; +and, consequently, number and diversity. The thinking subject must, +therefore, contain a difference, just as the object thought must also +reveal a diversity, because it is divided by thought. Otherwise, there +will be no other thought of the intelligible, but a kind of touch, of +unspeakable and inconceivable contact, prior to intelligence, since +intelligence is not yet supposed to exist, and as the possessor of +this contact does not think. The thinking subject, therefore, must +not remain simple, especially, when it thinks itself; it must split +itself, even were the comprehension of itself silent. Last, that which +is simple (the One) has no need of occupying itself with itself. What +would it learn by thinking? Is it not what it is before thinking +itself? Besides, knowledge implies that some one desires, that some +one seeks, and that some one finds. That which does not within itself +contain any difference, when turned towards itself, rests without +seeking anything within itself; but that which develops, is manifold. + + +HOW INTELLIGENCE BECAME MANIFOLD. + +11. Intelligence, therefore, becomes manifold when it wishes to +think the Principle superior to it. By wishing to grasp Him in his +simplicity, it abandons this simplicity, because it continues to +receive within itself this differentiated and multiplied nature. It +was not yet Intelligence when it issued from Unity; it found itself +in the state of sight when not yet actualized. When emanating from +Unity, it contained already what made it manifold. It vaguely aspired +to an object other than itself, while simultaneously containing a +representation of this object. It thus contained something that it +made manifold; for it contained a sort of impress produced by the +contemplation (of the One); otherwise it would not receive the One +within itself. Thus Intelligence, on being born of Unity, became +manifold, and as it possessed knowledge, it contemplated itself. It +then became actualized sight. Intelligence is really intelligence +only when it possesses its object, and when it possesses it as +intelligence. Formerly, it was only an aspiration, only an indistinct +vision. On applying itself to the One, and grasping the One, it becomes +intelligence. Now its receptivity to Unity is continuous, and it is +continuously intelligence, "being," thought, from the very moment it +begins to think. Before that, it is not yet thought, since it does not +possess the intelligible, and is not yet Intelligence, since it does +not think. + + +THE ONE IS THE PRINCIPLE OF ALL WITHOUT BEING LIMITED THEREBY. + +That which is above these things is their principle, without being +inherent in them. The principle from which these things proceed cannot +be inherent in them; that is true only of the elements that constitute +them. The principle from which all things proceed (the One) is not +any of them; it differs from all of them. The One, therefore, is not +any of them; it differs from all of them. The One, therefore, is not +any of the things of the universe: He precedes all these things, and +consequently, He precedes Intelligence, since the latter embraces all +things in its universality. On the other hand, as the things that are +posterior to Unity are universal, and as Unity thus is anterior to +universal things, it cannot be any one of them. Therefore, it should +not be called either intelligence or good, if by "good" you mean any +object comprised within the universe; this name suits it only, if +it indicate that it is anterior to everything. If Intelligence be +intelligence only because it is manifold; if thought, though found +within Intelligence, be similarly manifold, then the First, the +Principle that is absolutely simple, will be above Intelligence; for if +He think, He would be Intelligence; and if He be Intelligence, He would +be manifold. + + +NO MANIFOLDNESS OF ANY KIND CAN EXIST IN THE FIRST. + +12. It may be objected, that nothing would hinder the existence of +manifoldness in the actualization of the First, so long as the "being," +or nature, remain unitary. That principle would not be rendered +composite by any number of actualizations. This is not the case for +two reasons. Either these actualizations are distinct from its nature +("being"), and the First would pass from potentiality to actuality; in +which case, without doubt, the First is not manifold, but His nature +would not become perfect without actualization. Or the nature ("being") +is, within Him identical to His actualization; in which case, as the +actualization is manifold, the nature would be such also. Now we do +indeed grant that Intelligence is manifold, since it thinks itself; +but we could not grant that the Principle of all things should also be +manifold. Unity must exist before the manifold, the reason of whose +existence is found in unity; for unity precedes all number. It may +be objected that this is true enough for numbers which follow unity, +because they are composite; but what is the need of a unitary principle +from which manifoldness should proceed when referring (not to numerals, +but) to beings? This need is that, without the One, all things would be +in a dispersed condition, and their combinations would be no more than +a chaos. + + +PERMANENT ACTUALIZATIONS ARE HYPOSTASES. + +Another objection is, that from an intelligence that is simple, +manifold actualizations can surely proceed. This then admits the +existence of something simple before the actualizations. Later, as +these actualizations become permanent, they form hypostatic forms of +existence. Being such, they will have to differ from the Principle +from which they proceed, since the Principle remains simple, and that +which is born of it must in itself be manifold, and be dependent +thereon. Even if these actualizations exist only because the Principle +acted a single time, this already constitutes manifoldness. Though +these actualizations be the first ones, if they constitute second-rank +(nature), the first rank will belong to the Principle that precedes +these actualizations; this Principle abides in itself, while these +actualizations constitute that which is of second rank, and is composed +of actualizations. The First differs from the actualizations He begets, +because He begets them without activity; otherwise, Intelligence +would not be the first actualization. Nor should we think that the +One first desired to beget Intelligence, and later begat it, so that +this desire was an intermediary between the generating principle and +the generated entity. The One could not have desired anything; for +if He had desired anything, He would have been imperfect, since He +would not yet have possessed what He desired. Nor could we suppose +that the One lacked anything; for there was nothing towards which He +could have moved. Therefore, the hypostatic form of existence which is +beneath Him received existence from Him, without ceasing to persist +in its own condition. Therefore, if there is to be a hypostatic form +of existence beneath Him He must have remained within Himself in +perfect tranquility; otherwise, He would have initiated movement; and +we would have to conceive of a movement before the first movement, +a thought before the first thought, and its first actualization +would be imperfect, consisting in no more than a mere tendency. +But towards what can the first actualization of the One tend, and +attain, if, according to the dictates of reason, we conceive of that +actualization originating from Him as light emanates from the sun? +This actualization, therefore, will have to be considered as a light +that embraces the whole intelligible world; at the summit of which we +shall have to posit, and over whose throne we shall have to conceive +the rule of the immovable One, without separating Him from the Light +that radiates from Him. Otherwise, above this Light we would have to +posit another one, which, while remaining immovable, should enlighten +the intelligible. Indeed the actualization that emanates from the +One, without being separated from Him, nevertheless, differs from +Him. Neither is its nature non-essential, or blind; it, therefore, +contemplates itself, and knows itself; it is, consequently, the first +knowing principle. As the One is above Intelligence, it is also above +consciousness; as it needs nothing, neither has it any need of knowing +anything. Cognition (or, consciousness), therefore, belongs only to the +second-rank nature. Consciousness is only an individual unity, while +the One is absolute unity; indeed individual unity is not absolute +Unity, because the absolute is (or, "in and for itself"), precedes the +("somehow determined," or) individual. + + +THE SUPREME IS ABSOLUTELY INEFFABLE. + +13. This Principle, therefore, is really indescribable. We are +individualizing it in any statement about it. That which is above +everything, even above the venerable Intelligence, really has no name, +and all that we can state about Him is, that He is not anything. Nor +can He be given any name, since we cannot assert anything about Him. +We refer to Him only as best we can. In our uncertainty we say, "What +does He not feel? is He not self-conscious? does He not know Himself?" +Then we must reflect that by speaking thus we are thinking of things, +that are opposed to Him of whom we are now thinking. When we suppose +that He can be known, or that He possesses self-consciousness, we are +already making Him manifold. Were we to attribute to Him thought, it +would appear that He needed this thought. If we imagine thought as +being within Him, thought seems to be superfluous. For of what does +thought consist? Of the consciousness of the totality formed by the two +terms that contribute to the act of thought, and which fuse therein. +That is thinking oneself, and thinking oneself is real thinking; for +each of the two elements of thought is itself an unity to which nothing +is lacking. On the contrary, the thought of objects exterior (to +Intelligence) is not perfect, and is not true thought. That which is +supremely simple and supremely absolute stands in need of nothing. The +absolute that occupies the second rank needs itself, and, consequently, +needs to think itself. Indeed, since Intelligence needs something +relatively to itself, it succeeds in satisfying this need, and +consequently, in being absolute, only by possessing itself entirely. +It suffices itself only by uniting all the elements constituting its +nature ("being"), only by dwelling within itself, only by remaining +turned towards itself while thinking; for consciousness is the +sensation of manifoldness, as is indicated by the etymology of the word +"con-scious-ness," or, "conscience." If supreme Thought occur by the +conversion of Intelligence towards itself, it evidently is manifold. +Even if it said no more than "I am existence," Intelligence would say +it as if making a discovery, and Intelligence would be right, because +existence is manifold. Even though it should apply itself to something +simple, and should say, "I am existence," this would not imply +successful grasp of itself or existence. Indeed, when Intelligence +speaks of existence in conformity with reality, intelligence does not +speak of it as of a stone, but, merely, in a single word expresses +something manifold. The existence that really and essentially deserves +the name of existence, instead of having of it only a trace which +would not be existence, and which would be only an image of it, such +existence is a multiple entity. Will not each one of the elements of +this multiple entity be thought? No doubt you will not be able to think +it if you take it alone and separated from the others; but existence +itself is in itself something manifold. Whatever object you name, it +possesses existence. Consequently, He who is supremely simple cannot +think Himself; if He did, He would be somewhere, (which is not the +case). Therefore He does not think, and He cannot be grasped by thought. + + +WE COME SUFFICIENTLY NEAR TO HIM TO TALK ABOUT HIM. + +14. How then do we speak of Him? Because we can assert something about +Him, though we cannot express Him by speech. We could not know Him, nor +grasp Him by thought. How then do we speak of Him, if we cannot grasp +Him? Because though He does escape our knowledge, He does not escape us +completely. We grasp Him enough to assert something about Him without +expressing Him himself, to say what He is not, without saying what He +is; that is why in speaking of Him we use terms that are suitable to +designate only lower things. Besides we can embrace Him without being +capable of expressing Him, like men who, transported by a divine +enthusiasm, feel that they contain something superior without being +able to account for it. They speak of what agitates them, and they thus +have some feeling of Him who moves them, though they differ therefrom. +Such is our relation with Him; when we rise to Him by using our pure +intelligence, we feel that He is the foundation of our intelligence, +the principle that furnishes "being" and other things of the kind; we +feel that He is better, greater, and more elevated than we, because He +is superior to reason, to intelligence, and to the senses, because He +gives these things without being what they are. + + +RADIATION OF MULTIPLE UNITY. + +15. How does He give them? Is it because He possesses them, or because +He does not possess them? If it be because He does not possess them, +how does He give what He does not possess? If it be because He does +possess them, He is no longer simple. If He give what He does not +possess, how is multiplicity born of Him? It would seem as if only +one single thing could proceed from Him, unity; and even so one might +wonder how anything whatever could be born of that which is absolutely +one. We answer, in the same way as from a light radiates a luminous +sphere (or, fulguration[109]). But how can the manifold be born from +the One? Because the thing that proceeds from Him must not be equal to +Him, and so much the less, superior; for what is superior to unity, +or better than Him? It must, therefore, be inferior to Him, and, +consequently, be less perfect. Now it cannot be less perfect, except +on condition of being less unitary, that is, more manifold. But as it +must aspire to unity, it will be the "manifold one." It is by that +which is single that that which is not single is preserved, and is +what it is; for that which is not one, though composite, cannot receive +the name of existence. If it be possible to say what each thing is, it +is only because it is one and identical. What is not manifold is not +one by participation, but is absolute unity; it does not derive its +unity from any other principle; on the contrary it is the principle to +which other things owe that they are more or less single, according as +they are more or less close to it. Since the characteristic of that +which is nearest to unity is identity, and is posterior to unity, +evidently the manifoldness contained therein, must be the totality of +things that are single. For since manifoldness is therein united with +manifoldness, it does not contain parts separated from each other, +and all subsist together. Each of the things, that proceed therefrom, +are manifold unity, because they cannot be universal unity. Universal +unity is characteristic only of their principle (the intelligible +Being), because itself proceeds from a great Principle which is one, +essentially, and genuinely. That which, by its exuberant fruitfulness, +begets, is all; on the other hand, as this totality participates +in unity, it is single; and, consequently, it is single totality +(universal unity). + + +THE SUPREME PRODUCES MANIFOLDNESS BECAUSE OF ITS CATEGORIES. + +We have seen that existence is "all these things;" now, what are they? +All those of which the One is the principle. But how can the One be +the principle of all things? Because the One preserves their existence +while effecting the individuality of each of them. Is it also because +He gives them existence? And if so, does He do so by possessing them? +In this case, the One would be manifold. No, it is by containing them +without any distinction yet having arisen among them. On the contrary, +in the second principle they are distinguished by reason; that is, +they are logically distinguished, because this second principle is an +actualization, while the first Principle is the power-potentiality[107] +of all things; not in the sense in which we say that matter is +potential in that it receives, or suffers, but in the opposite sense +that the One produces. How then can the One produce what it does not +possess, since unity produces that neither by chance nor by reflection? +We have already said that what proceeds from unity must differ from it; +and, consequently, cannot be absolutely one; that it must be duality, +and, consequently, multitude, since it will contain (the categories, +such as) identity, and difference, quality, and so forth.[110] We have +demonstrated that that which is born of the One is not absolutely one. +It now remains for us to inquire whether it will be manifold, such as +it is seen to be in what proceeds from the One. We shall also have to +consider why it necessarily proceeds from the One. + + +THE GOOD MUST BE SUPERIOR TO INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE. + +16. We have shown elsewhere that something must follow the One, +and that the One is a power, and is inexhaustible; and this is so, +because even the last-rank entities possess the power of begetting. +For the present we may notice that the generation of things reveals +a descending procession, in which, the further we go, the more does +manifoldness increase; and that the principle is always simpler than +the things it produces.[111] Therefore, that which has produced the +sense world is not the sense-world itself, but Intelligence and the +intelligible world; and that which has begotten Intelligence and +the intelligible world is neither Intelligence nor the intelligible +world, but something simpler than them. Manifoldness is not born of +manifoldness, but of something that is not manifold. If That which +was superior to Intelligence were manifold, it would no longer be the +(supreme) Principle, and we would have to ascend further. Everything +must, therefore, be reduced to that which is essentially one, which +is outside of all manifoldness; and whose simplicity is the greatest +possible. But how can manifold and universal Reason be born of the One, +when very evidently the One is not a reason? As it is not a reason, +how can it beget Reason? How can the Good beget a hypostatic form of +existence, which would be good in form? What does this hypostatic form +of existence possess? Is it identity? But what is the relation between +identity and goodness? Because as soon as we possess the Good, we seek +identity and permanence; and because the Good is the principle from +which we must not separate; for if it were not the Good, it would be +better to give it up. We must, therefore, wish to remain united to the +Good. Since that is the most desirable for Intelligence, it need seek +nothing beyond, and its permanence indicates its satisfaction with +the entities it possesses. Enjoying, as it does, their presence in a +manner such that it fuses with them, it must then consider life as the +most precious entity of all. As Intelligence possesses life in its +universality and fulness, this life is the fulness and universality of +the Soul and Intelligence. Intelligence, therefore, is self-sufficient, +and desires nothing; it contains what it would have desired if it had +not already possessed such desirable object. It possesses the good that +consists in life and intelligence, as we have said, or in some one of +the connected entities. If Life and Intelligence were the absolute +Good, there would be nothing above them. But if the absolute Good be +above them, the good of Intelligence is this Life, which relates to +the absolute Good, which connects with it, which receives existence +from it, and rises towards it, because it is its principle. The Good, +therefore, must be superior to Life and Intelligence. On this condition +only does the life of Intelligence, the image of Him from whom all life +proceeds, turn towards Him; on this condition only does Intelligence, +the imitation of the contents of the One, whatever be His nature, turn +towards Him. + + +THE SUPREME AS SUPERESSENTIAL AND SUPEREXISTENT. + +17. What better thing is there then than this supremely wise Life, +exempt from all fault or error? What is there better than the +Intelligence that embraces everything? In one word, what is there +better than universal Life and universal Intelligence? If we answer +that what is better than these things is the Principle that begat +them, if we content ourselves with explaining how it begat them, +and to show that one cannot discover anything better, we shall, +instead of progressing in this discussion, ever remain at the same +point. Nevertheless, we need to rise higher. We are particularly +obliged to do this, when we consider that the principle that we seek +must be considered as the "Self-sufficient supremely independent +of all things;" for no entity is able to be self-sufficient, and +all have participated in the One; and since they have done so, none +of them can be the One. Which then is this principle in which all +participate, which makes Intelligence exist, and is all things? Since +it makes Intelligence exist, and since it is all things, since it +makes its contained manifoldness self-sufficient by the presence of +unity, and since it is thus the creative principle of "being" and +self-sufficiency, it must, instead of being "being," be super-"being" +and super-existence. + + +ECSTASY IS INTELLECTUAL CONTACT WITH SUDDEN LIGHT. + +Have we said enough, and can we stop here? Or does our soul still feel +the pains of parturition? Let her, therefore, produce (activity), +rushing towards the One, driven by the pains that agitate her. No, +let us rather seek to calm her by some magic charm, if any remedy +therefor exist. But to charm the soul, it may perhaps be sufficient to +repeat what we have already said. To what other charm, indeed, would +it suffice to have recourse? Rising above all the truths in which we +participate, this enchantment evanesces the moment we speak, or even +think. For, in order to express something, discursive reason is obliged +to go from one thing to another, and successively to run through every +element of its object. Now what can be successively scrutinized in +that which is absolutely simple? It is, therefore, sufficient to reach +Him by a sort of intellectual contact. Now at the moment of touching +the One, we should neither be able to say anything about Him, nor have +the leisure to speak of Him; only later is it possible to argue about +Him. We should believe that we have seen Him when a sudden light has +enlightened the soul; for this light comes from Him, and is Himself. We +should believe that He is present when, as another (lower) divinity, +He illumines the house of him who calls on this divinity,[112] for it +remains obscure without the illumination of the divinity. The soul, +therefore, is without light when she is deprived of the presence of +this divinity, when illumined by this divinity, she has what she +sought. The true purpose of the soul is to be in contact with this +light, to see this light in the radiance of this light itself, without +the assistance of any foreign light, to see this principle by the +help of which she sees. Indeed, it is the principle by which she is +enlightened that she must contemplate as one gazes at the sun only +through its own light. But how shall we succeed in this? By cutting off +everything else.[113] + + + + +THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE.[114] + +Of Love, or "Eros." + + +LOVE AS GOD, GUARDIAN AND PASSION. + +1. Is Love a divinity, a guardian, or a passion of the human soul? Or +is it all three under different points of view? In this case, what is +it under each of these points of view? These are the questions we are +to consider, consulting the opinions of men, but chiefly those of the +philosophers. The divine Plato, who has written much about love, here +deserves particular attention. He says that it is not only a passion +capable of being born in souls, but he calls it also a guardian, and he +gives many details about its birth and parents.[115] + + +PASSIONAL LOVE IS TWOFOLD. + +To begin with passion, it is a matter of common knowledge that the +passion designated as love is born in the souls which desire to unite +themselves to a beautiful object. But its object may be either a +shameful practice, or one (worthy to be pursued by) temperate men, +who are familiar with beauty. We must, therefore, investigate in a +philosophical manner what is the origin of both kinds of love. + + +LOVE IS RECOGNITION OF HIDDEN AFFINITY. + +The real cause of love is fourfold: the desire of beauty; our soul's +innate notion of beauty; our soul's affinity with beauty, and our +soul's instinctive sentiment of this affinity.[116] (Therefore as +beauty lies at the root of love, so) ugliness is contrary to nature +and divinity. In fact, when Nature wants to create, she contemplates +what is beautiful, determinate, and comprehended within the +(Pythagorean) "sphere" of the Good. On the contrary, the (Pythagorean) +"indeterminate"[115] is ugly, and belongs to the other system.[117] +Besides, Nature herself owes her origin to the Good, and, therefore, +also to the Beautiful. Now, as soon as one is attracted by an object, +because one is united to it by a secret affinity, he experiences for +the images of this object a sentiment of sympathy. We could not explain +its origin, or assign its cause on any other hypothesis, even were we +to limit ourselves to the consideration of physical love. Even this +kind of love is a desire to procreate beauty,[118] for it would be +absurd to insist that that Nature, which aspires to create beautiful +things, should aspire to procreate that which is ugly. + + +EARTHLY BEAUTY IS AN IMAGE OF INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY. + +Of course, those who, here below, desire to procreate are satisfied in +attaining that which is beautiful here below: namely, the beauty which +shines in images and bodies; for they do not possess that intelligible +Beauty which, nevertheless, inspires them with that very love which +they bear to visible beauty. That is the reason why those who ascend +to the reminiscence of intelligible Beauty love that which they behold +here below only because it is an image of the other.[119] As to those +who fail to rise to the reminiscence of the intelligible Beauty, +because they do not know the cause of their passion, they mistake +visible beauty for that veritable Beauty, and they may even love it +chastely, if they be temperate: but to go as far as a carnal union is +an error, in any case. Hence, it happens that only he who is inspired +by a pure love for the beautiful really loves beauty, whether or not he +have aroused his reminiscence of intelligible Beauty. + + +BEAUTY IS IMMORTAL. + +They who join to this passion as much of a desire for immortality +as our mortal nature admits, seek beauty in the perpetuity of the +procreation which renders man imperishable. They determine to +procreate and produce beauty according to nature; procreating because +their object is perpetuity; and procreating beautifully because they +possess affinity with it. In fact, perpetuity does bear affinity to +beauty; perpetual nature is beauty itself; and such also are all its +derivatives. + + +PASSIONAL LOVE MAY BE ELEVATING, THOUGH OPEN TO MISLEADING TEMPTATIONS. + +Thus he who does not desire to procreate seems to aspire to the +possession of the beautiful in a higher degree. He who desires to +procreate does no doubt desire to procreate the beautiful; but his +desire indicates in him the presence of need, and dissatisfaction with +mere possession of beauty; He thinks he will be procreating beauty, +if he begets on that which is beautiful. They who wish to satisfy +physical love against human laws, and nature, no doubt have a natural +inclination as principle of a triple passion; but they lose their +way straying from the right road for lack of knowledge of the end to +which love was impelling them, of the goal of the aspiration (roused +by) the desire of generation, and of the proper use of the image of +beauty.[120] They really do ignore Beauty itself. They who love +beautiful bodies without desiring to unite themselves to them, love +them for their beauty only. Those who love the beauty of women, and +desire union with them, love both beauty and perpetuity, so long as +this object is not lost from sight. Both of these are temperate, but +they who love bodies for their beauty only are the more virtuous. The +former admire sensual beauty, and are content therewith; the latter +recall intelligible beauty, but, without scorning visible beauty, +regard it as an effect and image of the intelligible Beauty.[121] Both, +therefore, love beauty without ever needing to blush. But, as to those +(who violate laws human and divine), love of beauty misleads them to +falling into ugliness; for the desire of good may often mislead to a +fall into evil. Such is love considered as a passion of the soul. + + +THE PLATONIC MYTH OF LOVE. + +2. Now let us speak of the Love which is considered a deity not only +by men in general, but also by the (Orphic) theologians, and by Plato. +The latter often speaks of Love, son of Venus, attributing to him the +mission of being the chief of the beautiful children (or, boys); and +to direct souls to the contemplation of intelligible Beauty, or, if +already present, to intensify the instinct to seek it. In his "Banquet" +Plato says that Love is born (not of Venus, but) of Abundance and +Need,[122] ... on some birthday (?) of Venus. + + +INTERPRETATION OF THE PLATONIC MYTH. + +To explain if Love be born of Venus, or if he were only born +contemporaneously with his mother, we shall have to study something +about Venus. What is Venus? Is she the mother of Love, or only his +contemporary? As answer hereto we shall observe that there are two +Venuses.[123] The second (or Popular Venus) is daughter of Jupiter +and Dione, and she presides over earthly marriages. The first Venus, +the celestial one, daughter of Uranus (by Plato, in his Cratylus, +interpreted to mean "contemplation of things above"), has no mother, +and does not preside over marriages, for the reason that there are none +in heaven. The Celestial Venus, therefore, daughter of Kronos,[124] +that is, of Intelligence, is the divine Soul, which is born pure of +pure Intelligence, and which dwells above.[125] As her nature does not +admit of inclining earthward, she neither can nor will descend here +below. She is, therefore, a form of existence (or, an hypostasis), +separated from matter, not participating in its nature. This is the +significance of the allegory that she had no mother. Rather than a +guardian, therefore, she should be considered a deity, as she is pure +Being unmingled (with matter), and abiding within herself. + + +LOVE, LIKE HIGHER SOUL, OR LIGHT, IS INSEPARABLE FROM ITS SOURCE. + +In fact, that which is immediately born of Intelligence is pure in +itself, because, by its very proximity to Intelligence, it has more +innate force, desiring to unite itself firmly to the principle that +begat it, and which can retain it there on high. The soul which is thus +suspended to Intelligence could not fall down, any more than the light +which shines around the sun could separate from the body from which it +radiates, and to which it is attached. + + +WHO CELESTIAL VENUS IS. + +Celestial Venus (the universal Soul, the third principle or +hypostasis[126]), therefore, attaches herself to Kronos (divine +Intelligence, the second principle), or, if you prefer to Uranos +(the One, the Good, the first Principle), the father of Kronos. Thus +Venus turns towards Uranos, and unites herself to him; and in the +act of loving him, she procreates Love, with which she contemplates +Uranus. Her activity thus effects a hypostasis and being. Both of them +therefore fix their gaze on Uranus, both the mother and the fair child, +whose nature it is to be a hypostasis ever turned towards another +beauty, an intermediary essence between the lover and the beloved +object. In fact, Love is the eye by which the lover sees the beloved +object; anticipating her, so to speak; and before giving her the +faculty of seeing by the organ which he thus constitutes, he himself +is already full of the spectacle offered to his contemplation. Though +he thus anticipates her, he does not contemplate the intelligible in +the same manner as she does, in that he offers her the spectacle of the +intelligible, and that he himself enjoys the vision of the beautiful, +a vision that passes by him (or, that coruscates around him, as an +aureole). + + +LOVE POSSESSES DIVINE BEING. + +3. We are therefore forced to acknowledge that Love is a hypostasis +and is "being," which no doubt is inferior to the Being from which it +(emanates, that is, from celestial Venus, or the celestial Soul), but +which, nevertheless, still possesses "being." In fact, that celestial +Soul is a being born of the activity which is superior to her (the +primary Being), a living Being, emanating from the primary Being, and +attached to the contemplation thereof. In it she discovers the first +object of her contemplation, she fixes her glance on it, as her good; +and finds in this view a source of joy. The seen object attracts her +attention so that, by the joy she feels, by the ardent attention +characterizing her contemplation of its object, she herself begets +something worthy of her and of the spectacle she enjoys. Thus is +Love born from the attention with which the soul applies herself to +the contemplation of its object, and from the very emanation of this +object; and so Love is an eye full of the object it contemplates, a +vision united to the image which it forms. Thus Love (Eros) seems to +owe its name to its deriving its existence from vision.[127] Even when +considered as passion does Love owe its name to the same fact, for +Love-that-is-a-being is anterior to Love-that-is-not-a-being. However +much we may explain passion as love, it is, nevertheless, ever the love +of some object, and is not love in an absolute sense. + + +CELESTIAL LOVE MUST ABIDE IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WITH THE CELESTIAL SOUL. + +Such is the love that characterizes the superior Soul (the celestial +Soul). It contemplates the intelligible world with it, because Love +is the Soul's companion, being born of the Soul, and abiding in the +Soul, and with her enjoys contemplation of the divinities. Now as we +consider the Soul which first radiates its light on heaven as separate +from matter, we must admit that the love which is connected with her, +is likewise separate from matter. If we say that this pure Soul really +resides in heaven, it is in the sense in which we say that that which +is most precious in us (the reasonable soul) resides in our body, and, +nevertheless, is separate from matter. This love must, therefore, +reside only there where resides this pure Soul. + + +THERE IS A LOWER LOVE, CORRESPONDING TO THE WORLD-SOUL. + +But as it was similarly necessary that beneath the celestial Soul there +should exist the world-Soul,[128] there must exist with it another +love, born of her desire, and being her eye.[129] As this Venus belongs +to this world, and as it is not the pure soul, nor soul in an absolute +sense, it has begotten the Love which reigns here below, and which, +with her, presides over marriages. As far as this Love himself feels +the desire for the intelligible, he turns towards the intelligible the +souls of the young people, and he elevates the soul to which he may be +united, as far as it is naturally disposed to have reminiscence of the +intelligible. Every soul, indeed, aspires to the Good, even that soul +that is mingled with matter, and that is the soul of some particular +being; for it is attached to the superior Soul, and proceeds therefrom. + + +ALL SOULS HAVE THEIR LOVE, WHICH IS THEIR GUARDIAN. + +4. Does each soul include such a love in her being, and possess it +as a hypostatic (form of existence)? Since the world-Soul possesses, +as hypostasis (form of existence), the Love which is inherent in her +being, our soul should also similarly possess, as hypostatic (form of +existence), a love equally inherent in our being. Why should the same +not obtain even with animals? This love inherent to the being of every +soul is the guardian considered to be attached to each individual.[130] +It inspires each soul with the desires natural for her to experience; +for, according to her nature, each soul begets a love which harmonizes +with her dignity and being. As the universal Soul possesses universal +Love, so do individual souls each possess her individual love. But as +the individual souls are not separated from the universal Soul, and +are so contained within her that their totality forms but a single +soul,[131] so are individual loves contained within the universal Love. +On the other hand, each individual love is united to an individual +soul, as universal Love is united to the universal Soul. The latter +exists entire everywhere in the universe, and so her unity seems +multiple; she appears anywhere in the universe that she pleases, under +the various forms suitable to her parts, and she reveals herself, at +will, under some visible form. + + +THE HIGHER LOVE IS DEITY, THE LOWER IS A GUARDIAN. + +We shall have to assume also a multiplicity of Venuses, which, born +with Love, occupy the rank of guardians. They originate from the +universal Venus, from which derive all the individual "venuses," with +the loves peculiar to each. In fact, the soul is the mother of love; +now Venus is the Soul, and Love is the Soul's activity in desiring +the Good. The love which leads each soul to the nature of the Good, +and which belongs to her most exalted part, must also be considered +a deity, inasmuch as it unites the soul to the Good. The love which +belongs to the soul mingled (with matter), is to be considered a +Guardian only. + + +IT IS AN ERROR TO CONSIDER THE LOVE AS IDENTICAL WITH THE WORLD. + +5. What is the nature of this Guardian, and what is, in general, the +nature of guardians, according to (Plato's treatment of the subject in) +his "Banquet"? What is the nature of guardians? What is the nature of +the Love born of Need (Penia) and Abundance (Poros), son of Prudence +(Metis), at the birth of Venus?[132] + +(Plutarch)[133] held that Plato, by Love, meant the world. He should +have stated that Love is part of the world, and was born in it. His +opinion is erroneous, as may be demonstrated by several proofs. First, +(Plato) calls the world a blessed deity, that is self-sufficient; +however, he never attributes these characteristics to Love, which +he always calls a needy being. Further, the world is composed of a +body and a Soul, the latter being Venus; consequently, Venus would +be the directing part of Love; or, if we take the world to mean +the world-Soul, just as we often say "man" when we mean the human +soul,[134] Love would be identical with Venus. Third, if Love, which +is a Guardian, is the world, why should not the other Guardians (who +evidently are of the same nature) not also be the world? In this case, +the world would be composed of Guardians. Fourth, how could we apply to +the world that which (Plato) says of Love, that it is the "guardian of +fair children"? Last, Plato describes Love as lacking clothing, shoes, +and lodging. This could not be applied to the world without absurdity +or ridicule. + + +ALL GUARDIANS ARE BORN OF NEED AND ABUNDANCE. + +6. To explain the nature and birth of Love, we shall have to expound +the significance of his mother Need to his father Abundance, and to +show how such parents suit him. We shall also have to show how such +parents suit the other Guardians, for all Guardians, by virtue of their +being Guardians, must have the same nature, unless, indeed, Guardians +have only that name in common. + + +DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DEITIES AND GUARDIANS. + +First, we shall have to consider the difference between deities and +guardians. Although it be common to call Guardians deities, we are here +using the word in that sense it bears when one says that Guardians and +deities belong to different species. The deities are impassible, while +the Guardians, though eternal, can experience passions; placed beneath +the deities, but next to us, they occupy the middle place between +deities and men.[135] + + +A GUARDIAN IS THE VESTIGE OF A SOUL DESCENDED INTO THE WORLD. + +But how did the Guardians not remain impassible? How did they +descend to an inferior nature? This surely is a question deserving +consideration. We should also inquire whether there be any Guardian in +the intelligible world, whether there be Guardians only here below, +and if deities exist only in the intelligible world. (We shall answer +as follows.) There are deities also here below; and the world is, +as we habitually say, a deity of the third rank, inasmuch as every +supra-lunar being is a divinity. Next, it would be better not to call +any being belonging to the intelligible world a Guardian; and if we +locate the chief Guardian (the Guardian himself) in the intelligible +world, we had better consider him a deity. In the world of sense, all +the visible supra-lunar deities should be called second-rank deities, +in that they are placed below the intelligible deities, and depend +on them as the rays of light from the star from which they radiate. +Last, a Guardian should be defined as the vestige of a soul that had +descended into the world. The latter condition is necessary because +every pure soul begets a deity, and we have already said[136] that the +love of such a soul is a deity. + + +WHY ALL GUARDIANS ARE NOT LOVES. + +But why are not all the Guardians Loves? Further, why are they not +completely pure from all matter? Among Guardians, those are Loves, +which owe their existence to a soul's desire for the good and the +beautiful; therefore, all souls that have entered into this world each +generate a Love of this kind. As to the other Guardians, which are +not born of human souls, they are engendered by the different powers +of the universal Soul, for the utility of the All; they complete and +administer all things for the general good. The universal Soul, in +fact, was bound to meet the needs of the universe by begetting Guardian +powers which would suit the All of which she is the soul. + + +WHY THE GUARDIANS ARE NOT FREE FROM MATTER. + +How do Guardians participate in matter, and of what matter are they +formed? This their matter is not corporeal, otherwise they would be +animals with sensation. In fact, whether they have aerial or fire-like +bodies,[137] they must have had a nature primitively different (from +pure Intelligence) to have ultimately united each with his own body, +for that which is entirely pure could not have immediately united +with a body, although many philosophers think that the being of every +Guardian, as guardian, is united to an air-like or fire-like body. But +why is the being of every Guardian mingled with a body, while the being +of every deity is pure, unless in the first case there be a cause which +produces the mingling (with matter)? This cause must be the existence +of an intelligible matter,[138] so that whatever participates in it +might, by its means, come to unite with sense-matter. + + +SOUL IS A MIXTURE OF REASON AND INDETERMINATION. + +7. Plato's account of the birth of Love[132] is that Abundance +intoxicated himself with nectar, this happening before the day of +wine, which implies that Love was born before the sense-world's +existence. Then Need, the mother of Love, must have participated in +the intelligible nature itself, and not in a simple image of the +intelligible nature; she, therefore, approached (the intelligible +nature) and found herself to be a mixture of form and indeterminateness +(or, intelligible matter).[139] The soul, in fact, containing a +certain indeterminateness before she had reached the Good, but +feeling a premonition of her existence, formed for herself a confused +and indeterminate image, which became the very hypostasis (or, +form of existence) of Love. Thus, as here, reason mingles with the +unreasonable, with an indeterminate desire, with an indistinct (faint +or obscure) hypostatic (form of existence). What was born was neither +perfect nor complete; it was something needy, because it was born from +an indeterminate desire, and a complete reason. As to (Love, which is) +the thus begotten reason, it is not pure, since it contains a desire +that is indeterminate, unreasonable, indefinite; nor will it ever be +satisfied so long as it contains the nature of indetermination. It +depends on the soul, which is its generating principle; it is a mixture +effected by a reason which, instead of remaining within itself, is +mingled with indetermination. Besides, it is not Reason itself, but its +emanation which mingles with indetermination. + + +LOVE IS A GADFLY. + +Love, therefore, is similar to a gad-fly;[140] needy by nature, +it still remains needy, whatever it may obtain; it could never be +satisfied, for this would be impossible for a being that is a mixture; +no being could ever be fully satisfied if by its nature it be incapable +of attaining fulness; even were it satisfied for a moment, it could +not retain anything if its nature made it continue to desire. +Consequently, on one side, Love is deprived of all resources[141] +because of its neediness; and on the other, it possesses the faculty of +acquisition, because of the reason that enters into its constitution. + + +GUARDIANS, AS WELL AS MEN, ARE URGED BY DIVINE DISCONTENT. + +All other Guardians have a similar constitution. Each of them desires, +and causes the acquisition of the good he is destined to procure; that +is the characteristic they have in common with Love. Neither could they +ever attain satisfaction; they still desire some particular good. The +result of this is that the men who here below are good are inspired +by the love of the true, absolute Good, and not by the love of such +and such a particular good.[142] Those who are subordinated to divers +Guardians are successively subordinated to such or such a Guardian; +they let the simple and pure love of the absolute Good rest within +themselves, while they see to it that their actions are presided over +by another Guardian, that is, another power of their soul, which is +immediately superior to that which directs them, or is active within +them.[143] As to the men who, driven by evil impulses, desire evil +things, they seem to have chained down all the loves in their souls, +just as, by false opinions, they darken the right reason which is +innate within them. Thus all the loves implanted in us by nature, +and which conform to nature, are all good; those that belong to the +inferior part of the soul are inferior in rank and power; those that +belong to the superior part are superior; all belong to the being of +the soul. As to the loves which are contrary to nature, they are the +passions of strayed souls, having nothing essential or substantial; for +they are not engendered by the pure Soul; they are the fruits of the +faults of the soul which produces them according to her vicious habits +and dispositions. + + +RIGHT THOUGHTS POSSESS REAL EXISTENCE. + +In general, we might admit that the true goods which are possessed by +the soul when she acts conformably to her nature, by applying herself +to things determined (by reason), constitute real being; that the +others, on the contrary, are not engendered by the very action of +the soul, and are only passions.[144] Likewise, false intellections +lack real being, such as belongs to true intellections, which are +eternal and determinate, possessing simultaneously the intellectual +act, the intelligible existence and essence; and this latter not +only in general, but in each real intelligible being (manifesting?) +Intelligence in each idea. As to us, we must acknowledge that we +possess only intellection and the intelligible; we do not possess them +together (or completely), but only in general; and hence comes our love +for generalities. Our conceptions, indeed, usually trend towards the +general. It is only by accident that we conceive something particular; +when, for instance, we conceive that some particular triangle's angles +amount to two right angles, it is only as a result of first having +conceived that the triangle in general possesses this property. + + +JUPITER, THE GREAT CHIEF, OR THIRD GOD, IS THE SOUL, OR VENUS. + +8. Finally, who is this Jupiter into whose gardens (Plato said that) +Abundance entered? What are these gardens? As we have already agreed, +Venus is the Soul, and Abundance is the Reason of all things. We still +have to explain the significance of Jupiter and his gardens. + +Jupiter cannot well signify anything else than the soul, since we +have already admitted that the soul was Venus. We must here consider +Jupiter as that deity which Plato, in his Phaedrus, calls the Great +Chief;[145] and, elsewhere, as I think, the Third God. He explains +himself more clearly in this respect in the Philebus,[146] where he +says that Jupiter "has a royal soul, a royal intelligence." Since +Jupiter is, therefore, both an intelligence and a soul, since he +forms part of the order of causes, since we must assign him his +rank according to what is best in him; and for several reasons, +chiefly because he is a cause, a royal and directing cause, he must +be considered as the Intelligence. Venus (that is, Aphrodite) which +belongs to him, which proceeds from him, and accompanies him, occupies +the rank of a soul, for she represents in the soul that which is +beautiful, brilliant, pure, and delicate ("abron"); and that is why she +is called "Aphrodite."[147] In fact, if we refer the male deities to +the intellect, and if we consider the female deities as souls--because +a soul is attached to each intelligence--we shall have one more reason +to relate Venus to Jupiter. Our views upon this point are confirmed by +the teachings of the priests and the (Orphic) Theologians, who always +identify Venus and Juno, and who call the evening star, or Star of +Venus, the Star of Juno.[148] + + +JUPITER'S GARDEN IS THE FRUITFUL REASON THAT BEGETS EVERY OBJECT. + +9. Abundance, being the reason of the things that exist in Intelligence +and in the intelligible world--I mean the reason which pours itself +out and develops--trends towards the soul, and exists therein. Indeed, +the (Being) which remains united in Intelligence does not emanate +from a foreign principle, while the intoxication of Abundance is only +a factitious fulness. But what is that which is intoxicated with +nectar? It is Reason that descends from the superior principle to the +inferior; the Soul receives it from Intelligence at the moment of +the birth of Venus; that is why it is said that the nectar flows in +the garden of Jupiter. This whole garden is the glory and splendor +of the wealth (of Intelligence);[149] this glory originates in the +reason of Jupiter; this splendor is the light which the intelligence +of this Deity sheds on the soul. What else but the beauties and +splendors of this deity could the "gardens of Jupiter" signify? On +the other hand, what else can the beauties and splendors of Jupiter +be, if not the reasons[150] that emanate from him? At the same time, +these reasons are called Abundance (Poros, or "euporia"), the wealth +of the beauties which manifest; that is the nectar which intoxicates +Abundance.[151] For indeed what else is the nectar among the deities, +but that which each of them receives? Now Reason is that which is +received from Intelligence by its next inferior principle. Intelligence +possesses itself fully; yet this self-possession does not intoxicate +it, as it possesses nothing foreign thereto. On the contrary, Reason +is engendered by Intelligence. As it exists beneath Intelligence, and +does not, as Intelligence does, belong to itself, it exists in another +principle; consequently, we say that Abundance is lying down in the +garden of Jupiter, and that at the very moment when Venus, being born, +takes her place among living beings. + + +THE OBJECT OF MYTHS IS TO ANALYSE; AND TO DISTINGUISH. + +10. If myths are to earn their name (of something "reserved," or +"silent") they must necessarily develop their stories under the +category of time, and present as separate many things, that are +simultaneous, though different in rank or power. That is the reason +they so often mention the generation of ungenerated things, and that +they so often separate simultaneous things.[152] But after having thus +(by this analysis) yielded us all the instruction possible to them, +these myths leave it to the reader to make a synthesis thereof. Ours is +the following: + + +SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PLATONIC MYTH OF THE GARDEN OF JUPITER. + +Venus is the Soul which coexists with Intelligence, and subsists by +Intelligence. She receives from Intelligence the reasons[150] which +fill her,[153] and embellishes her, and whose abundance makes us see +in the Soul the splendor and image of all beauties. The reasons which +subsist in the Soul are Abundance[154] of the nectar which flows down +from above. Their splendors which shine in the Soul, as in life, +represent the Garden of Jupiter. Abundance falls asleep in this garden, +because he is weighted down by the fulness contained within him. As +life manifests and ever exists in the order of beings, (Plato) says +that the deities are seated at a feast, because they ever enjoy this +beatitude. + + +SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PLATONIC MYTH OF THE BIRTH OF LOVE. + +Since the Soul herself exists, Love also must necessarily exist, and +it owes its existence to the desire of the Soul which aspires to the +better and the Good. Love is a mixed being: it participates in need, +because it needs satisfaction; it also participates in abundance, +because it struggles to acquire good which it yet lacks, inasmuch as +only that which lacked good entirely would cease to seek it. It is, +therefore, correct to call Love the son of Abundance and Need, which +are constituted by lack, desire, and reminiscence of the reasons--or +ideas--which, reunited in the soul, have therein engendered that +aspiration towards the good which constitutes love. Its mother is +Need, because desire belongs only to need, and "need" signifies matter, +which is entire need.[155] Even indetermination, which characterizes +the desire of the good, makes the being which desires the Good play +the part of matter--since such a being would have neither form nor +reason, considered only from its desiring. It is a form only inasmuch +as it remains within itself. As soon as it desires to attain a new +perfection, it is matter relatively to the being from whom it desires +to receive somewhat. + + +LOVE IS BOTH MATERIAL AND A GUARDIAN. + +That is why Love is both a being which participates in matter, and is +also a Guardian born of the soul; it is the former, inasmuch as it +does not completely possess the good; it is the latter, inasmuch as it +desires the Good from the very moment of its birth. + + + + +FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT. + +Of the Nature and Origin of Evils.[156] + + +QUESTIONS TO BE DISCUSSED. + +1. Studying the origin of evils that might affect all beings in +general, or some one class in particular, it is reasonable to begin by +defining evil, from a consideration of its nature. That would be the +best way to discover whence it arises, where it resides, to whom it may +happen, and in general to decide if it be something real. Which one of +our faculties then can inform us of the nature of evil? This question +is not easy to solve, because there must be an analogy between the +knower and the known.[157] The Intelligence and the Soul may indeed +cognize forms and fix their desires on them, because they themselves +are forms; but evil, which consists in the absence of all goods, could +not be described as a form.[158] But inasmuch as there can be but one +single science, to embrace even contraries, and as the evil is the +contrary of the good, knowledge of the good implies that of evil. +Therefore, to determine the nature of evil, we shall first have to +determine that of good, for the higher things must precede the lower, +as some are forms and others are not, being rather a privation of the +good. Just in what sense evil is the contrary of the good must also be +determined; as for instance, if the One be the first, and matter the +last;[159] or whether the One be form, and matter be its absence. Of +this further.[160] + + +A. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIL. + + +A DEFINITION OF EVIL BY CONTRAST WITH THE GOOD. + +2. Let us now determine the nature of the Good, at least so far as is +demanded by the present discussion. The Good is the principle on which +all depends, to which everything aspires, from which everything issues, +and of which everything has need. As to Him, He suffices to himself, +being complete, so He stands in need of nothing; He is the measure[161] +and the end of all things; and from Him spring intelligence, being, +soul, life, and intellectual contemplation. + + +NATURE OF DIVINE INTELLIGENCE. + +All these beautiful things exist as far as He does; but He is the +one Principle that possesses supreme beauty, a principle that is +superior to the things that are best. He reigns royally,[162] in +the intelligible world, being Intelligence itself, very differently +from what we call human intelligences. The latter indeed are all +occupied with propositions, discussions about the meanings of words, +reasonings, examinations of the validity of conclusions, observing +the concatenation of causes, being incapable of possessing truth "a +priori," and though they be intelligences, being devoid of all ideas +before having been instructed by experience; though they, nevertheless, +were intelligences. Such is not the primary Intelligence. On the +contrary, it possesses all things. Though remaining within itself, it +is all things; it possesses all things, without possessing them (in +the usual acceptation of that term); the things that subsist in it not +differing from it, and not being separated from each other. Each one of +them is all the others,[163] is everything and everywhere, although not +confounded with other things, and remaining distinct therefrom. + + +NATURE OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. + +The power which participates in Intelligence (the universal Soul) does +not participate in it in a manner such as to be equal to it, but only +in the measure of her ability to participate therein. She is the first +actualization of Intelligence, the first being that Intelligence, +though remaining within itself, begets. She directs her whole activity +towards supreme Intelligence, and lives exclusively thereby. Moving +from outside Intelligence, and around it, according to the laws +of harmony,[164] the universal Soul fixes her glance upon it. By +contemplation penetrating into its inmost depths, through Intelligence +she sees the divinity Himself. Such is the nature of the serene and +blissful existence of the divinities, a life where evil has no place. + + +EVIL EXISTS AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE DERIVATIVE GOODS OF THE THIRD RANK. + +If everything stopped there (and if there were nothing beyond the three +principles here described), evil would not exist (and there would be +nothing but goods). But there are goods of the first, second and third +ranks. Though all relate to the King of all things,[165] who is their +author, and from whom they derive their goodness, yet the goods of the +second rank relate more specially to the second principle; and to the +third principle, the goods of the third rank. + + +NATURE OF EVIL. + +3. As these are real beings, and as the first Principle is their +superior, evil could not exist in such beings, and still less in Him, +who is superior to them; for all these things are good. Evil then must +be located in non-being, and must, so to speak, be its form, referring +to the things that mingle with it, or have some community with it. This +"non-being," however, is not absolute non-being.[166] Its difference +from being resembles the difference between being and movement or +rest; but only as its image, or something still more distant from +reality. Within this non-being are comprised all sense-objects, and +all their passive modifications; or, evil may be something still more +inferior, like their accident or principle, or one of the things that +contribute to its constitution. To gain some conception of evil it may +be represented by the contrast between measure and incommensurability; +between indetermination and its goal; between lack of form and the +creating principle of form; between lack and self-sufficiency; as the +perpetual unlimited and changeableness; as passivity, insatiableness, +and absolute poverty.[167] Those are not the mere accidents of evil, +but its very essence; all of that can be discovered when any part of +evil is examined. The other objects, when they participate in the evil +and resemble it, become evil without however being absolute Evil. + + +EVIL POSSESSES A LOWER FORM OF BEING. + +All these things participate in a being; they do not differ from it, +they are identical with it, and constitute it. For if evil be an +accident in something, then evil, though not being a real being, must +be something by itself. Just as, for the good, there is the Good in +itself, and the good considered as an attribute of a foreign subject, +likewise, for evil, one may distinguish Evil in itself, and evil as +accident. + + +EVIL AS INFINITE AND FORMLESSNESS IN ITSELF. + +It might be objected that it is impossible to conceive of +indetermination outside of the indeterminate, any more than +determination outside of the determinate; or measure outside of +the measured. (We shall have to answer that) just as determination +does not reside in the determined (or measure in the measured), so +indetermination cannot exist within the indeterminate. If it can exist +in something other than itself, it will be either in the indeterminate, +or in the determinate. If in the indeterminate, it is evident that it +itself is indeterminate, and needs no indetermination to become such. +If, on the other hand (it be claimed that indetermination exist), in +the determinate, (it is evident that) the determinate cannot admit +indetermination. This, therefore, demands the existence of something +infinite in itself, and formless in itself, which would combine all the +characteristics mentioned above as the characteristics of evil.[168] As +to evil things, they are such because evil is mingled with them, either +because they contemplate evil, or because they fulfil it. + + +THE PRIMARY EVIL IS EVIL IN ITSELF. + +Reason, therefore, forces us to recognize as the primary evil, Evil +in itself.[169] (This is matter which is) the subject of figure, +form, determination, and limitation; which owes its ornaments to +others, which has nothing good in itself, which is but a vain image by +comparison with the real beings--in other word, the essence of evil, if +such an essence can exist. + + +MATTER AS THE SECONDARY EVIL. + +4. So far as the nature of bodies participates in matter, it is an +evil; yet it could not be the primary Evil, for it has a certain form. +Nevertheless, this form possesses no reality, and is, besides, deprived +of life (?); for bodies corrupt each other mutually. Being agitated +by an unregulated movement, they hinder the soul from carrying out +her proper movement. They are in a perpetual flux, contrary to the +immutable nature of essences; therefore, they constitute the secondary +evil. + + +THE SOUL IS NOT EVIL BY HERSELF, BUT MAY DEGENERATE BY LOOKING AT +DARKNESS. + +By herself, the soul is not evil, and not every soul is evil. What +soul deserves to be so considered? That of the man who, according to +the expression of Plato,[170] is a slave to the body. In this man it +is natural for the soul to be evil. It is indeed the irrational part +of the soul which harbors all that constitutes evil: indetermination, +excess, and need, from which are derived intemperance, cowardliness, +and all the vices of the soul, the involuntary passions, mothers +of false opinions, which lead us to consider the things we seek or +avoid as goods or evils. But what produces this evil? How shall +we make a cause or a principle of it? To begin with, the soul is +neither independent of matter, nor, by herself, perverse. By virtue +of her union with the body, which is material, she is mingled with +indetermination, and so, to a certain point, deprived of the form which +embellishes and which supplies measure. Further, that reason should be +hindered in its operations, and cannot see well, must be due to the +soul's being hindered by passions, and obscured by the darkness with +which matter surrounds her. The soul inclines[171] towards matter. +Thus the soul fixes her glance, not on what is essence, but on what +is simple generation.[172] Now the principle of generation is matter, +whose nature is so bad that matter communicates it to the beings +which, even without being united thereto, merely look at it. Being +the privation of good, matter contains none of it, and assimilates to +itself all that touches it. Therefore, the perfect Soul, being turned +towards ever pure Intelligence, repels matter, indeterminateness, the +lack of measure, and in short, evil. The perfect Soul does not approach +to it, does not lower her looks; she remains pure and determined by +Intelligence. The soul which does not remain in this state, and which +issues from herself (to unite with the body), not being determined by +the First, the Perfect, is no more than an image of the perfect Soul +because she lacks (good), and is filled with indetermination. The soul +sees nothing but darkness. The soul already contains matter because she +looks at what she cannot see; or, in the every-day expression, because +the soul looks at darkness.[173] + + +PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIL FOR THE SOUL. + +5. Since the lack of good is the cause that the soul looks at darkness, +and mingles therewith, the lack of good and darkness is primary Evil +for the soul. The secondary evil will be the darkness, and the nature +of evil, considered not in matter, but before matter. Evil consists +not in the lack of any particular thing, but of everything in general. +Nothing is evil merely because it lacks a little of being good; its +nature might still be perfect. But what, like matter, lacks good +entirely, is essentially evil, and possesses nothing good? Nature, +indeed, does not possess essence, or it would participate in the good; +only by verbal similarity can we say that matter "is," while we can +truly say that matter "is" absolute "nonentity." A mere lack (of good) +therefore, may be characterized as not being good; but complete lack is +evil; while a lack of medium intensity consists in the possibility of +falling into evil, and is already an evil. Evil, therefore, is not any +particular evil, as injustice, or any special vice; evil is that which +is not yet anything of that, being nothing definite. Injustice and the +other vices must be considered as kinds of evil, distinguished from +each other by mere accidents; as for instance, what occurs by malice. +Besides, the different kinds of evil differ among each other either by +the matter in which evil resides, or by the parts of the soul to which +it refers, as sight, desire, and passion. + + +RELATION BETWEEN EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL EVIL. + +If we grant the existence of evils external to the soul, we shall +be forced to decide about their relation to sickness, ugliness, or +poverty. Sickness has been explained as a lack or excess of material +bodies which fail to support order or measure. The cause of ugliness, +also, has been given as deficient adjustment of matter to form. Poverty +has been described as the need or lack of objects necessary to life as +a result of our union with matter, whose nature is (the Heraclitian and +Stoic) "indigence." From such definitions it would follow that we are +not the principle of evil, and are not evil in ourselves, for these +evils existed before us. Only in spite of themselves would men yield +to vice. The evils of the soul are avoidable, but not all men possess +the necessary firmness. Evil, therefore, is caused by the presence +of matter in sense-objects, and is not identical with the wickedness +of men. For wickedness does not exist in all men; some triumph over +wickedness, while they who do not even need to triumph over it, are +still better. In all cases men triumph over evil by those of their +faculties that are not engaged in matter. + + +IN WHAT SENSE EVILS ARE UNIVERSAL AND UNAVOIDABLE. + +6. Let us examine the significance of the doctrine[174] that evils +cannot be destroyed, that they are necessary, that they do not exist +among the divinities, but that they ever besiege our mortal nature, and +the place in which we dwell.[175] Surely heaven is free from all evil +because it moves eternally with regularity, in perfect order; because +in the stars is neither injustice nor any other kind of evil, because +they do not conflict with each other in their courses; and because +their revolutions are presided over by the most beautiful harmony.[164] +On the contrary, the earth reveals injustice and disorder, (chiefly) +because our nature is mortal, and we dwell in a lower place. But when +Plato,[176] says, that we must flee from here below, he does not mean +that we should leave the earth, but, while remaining therein, practice +justice, piety, and wisdom. It is wickedness that must be fled from, +because wickedness and its consequences are the evil of man. + + +EVIL IS NOT GOOD'S QUALITATIVE, BUT ONLY FIGURATIVE ANTAGONIST. + +When[176] (Theodor) tells (Socrates) that evils would be annihilated +if men practised (Socrates') teachings, the latter answers that that +is impossible, for evil is necessary even if only as the contrary of +good. But how then can wickedness, which is the evil of man, be the +contrary of good? Because it is the contrary of virtue. Now virtue, +without being Good in itself, is still a good, a good which makes us +dominate matter. But how can Good in itself, which is not a quality, +have a contrary? Besides, why need the existence of one thing imply +its contrary? Though we may grant that there is a possibility of the +existence of the contrary of some things--as for instance, that a man +in good health might become sick--there is no such necessity. Nor does +Plato assert that the existence of each thing of this kind necessarily +implies that of its contrary; he makes this statement exclusively of +the Good. But how can there be a contrary to good, if the good be +"being," let alone "above being"?[177] Evidently, in reference to +particular beings, there can be nothing contrary to "being." This is +proved by induction; but the proposition has not been demonstrated +as regards universal Being. What then is the contrary of universal +Being, and first principles in general? The contrary of "being" must +be nonentity; the contrary of the nature of the Good is the nature +and principle of Evil. These two natures are indeed respectively the +principles of goods and of evils. All their elements are mutually +opposed, so that both these natures, considered in their totality, +are still more opposed than the other contraries. The latter, indeed, +belong to the same form, to the same kind, and they have something in +common in whatever subjects they may be. As to the Contraries that are +essentially distinguished from each other, whose nature is constituted +of elements opposed to the constitutive elements of the other, those +Contraries are absolutely opposed to each other, since the connotation +of that word implies things as opposite to each other as possible. +Measure, determination, and the other characteristics of the divine +nature[178] are the opposites of incommensurability, indefiniteness, +and the other contrary things that constitute the nature of evil. Each +one of these wholes, therefore, is the contrary of the other. The being +of the one is that which is essentially and absolutely false; that of +the other is genuine Being; the falseness of the one is, therefore, the +contrary of the truth of the other. Likewise what pertains to the being +of the one is the contrary of what belongs to the being of the other. +We also see that it is not always true to say that there is no contrary +to "being," for we acknowledge that water and fire are contraries, even +if they did not contain the common element of matter, of which heat and +cold, humidity and dryness, are accidents. If they existed alone by +themselves, if their being were complete without any common subject, +there would still be an opposition, and an opposition of "being." +Therefore the things that are completely separate, which have nothing +in common, which are as distant as possible, are by nature contrary. +This is not an opposition of quality, nor of any kinds of beings; it is +an opposition resulting from extreme distance, and from being composed +of contraries, thereby communicating this characteristic to their +elements. + + +GOOD IMPLIES EVIL BECAUSE MATTER IS NECESSARY TO THE WORLD. + +7. Why is the existence of both good and evil necessary? Because +matter is necessary to the existence of the world. The latter is +necessarily composed of contraries, and, consequently, it could not +exist without matter. In this case the nature of this world is a +mixture of intelligence and necessity.[179] What it receives from +divinity are goods; its evils derive from the primordial nature,[180] +the term used (by Plato) to designate matter as a simple substance yet +unadorned by a divinity. But what does he mean by "mortal nature?" +When he says that "evils besiege this region here below," he means the +universe, as appears from the following quotations[181]: "Since you +are born, you are not immortal, but by my help you shall not perish." +In this case it is right to say that evils cannot be annihilated. How +then can one flee from them?[182] Not by changing one's locality, (as +Plato) says, but by acquiring virtue, and by separating from the body, +which, simultaneously, is separation from matter; for being attached +to the body is also attachment to matter. It is in the same sense that +(Plato) explains being separated from the body, or not being separated +from it. By dwelling with the divinities he means being united to the +intelligible objects; for it is in them that inheres immortality. + + +EXISTENCE OF EVIL IS NECESSARY AS LAST MATERIAL DEGREE OF BEING. + +Here follows still another demonstration of the necessity of evil. +Since good does not remain alone, evil must necessarily exist by +issuing from the good.[183] We might express this differently, as +the degradation and exhaustion (of the divine power, which, in the +whole hierarchic series of successive emanations weakens from degree +to degree). There must, therefore, be a last degree of being, beyond +which nothing further can be begotten, and that is evil. Just as the +existence of something after a first (Good) is necessary, so must also +a last degree (of being) be necessary. Now the last degree is matter, +and contains nothing more of the First; (and, as matter and evil are +identical,) the existence of evil is necessary. + + +MATTER IS CAUSE OF EVIL, EVEN IF CORPOREAL. + +8. It may still be objected that it is not matter that makes us wicked; +for it is not matter that produces ignorance and perverted appetites. +If, indeed, these appetites mislead us to evil as a result of the +perversity of the body, we must seek its cause, not in matter, but in +form (in the qualities of the bodies). These, for instance, are heat, +cold, bitterness, pungency, and the other qualities of the bodily +secretions; or, the atonic condition or inflammation of certain organs; +or, certain dispositions which produce the difference of appetites; +and, if you please, false opinions. Evil, therefore, is form rather +than matter. Even under this (mistaken) hypothesis we are none the +less driven to acknowledge that matter is the evil. A quality does not +always produce the same results within or outside of matter; thus the +form of the axe without iron does not cut. The forms that inhere in +matter are not always what they would be if they were outside of it. +The ("seminal) reasons" when inhering in matter are by it corrupted +and filled with its nature. As fire, when separate from matter, does +not burn; so form, when remaining by itself, effects what it would if +it were in matter. Matter dominates any principle that appears within +it, alters it, and corrupts it by imparting thereto its own nature, +which is contrary to the Good. It does not indeed substitute cold +for heat, but it adds to the form--as, for instance, to the form of +fire--its formless substance; to figure adding its shapelessness; to +measure, its excess and lack, proceeding thus until it has degraded +things, transubstantiating them into its own nature. That is the reason +that, in the nutrition of animals, what has been ingested does not +remain what it was before. The foods that enter into the body of a dog, +for instance, are by assimilation transformed into blood and canine +secretions, and, in general, are transformed according to the animal +that receives them. Thus even under the hypothesis that evils are +referred to the body, matter is the cause of evils. + + +MASTERY OF THESE CORPOREAL DISPOSITIONS IS NOT EASY. + +It may be objected that one ought to master these dispositions of the +body. But the principle that could triumph over them is pure only if it +flee from here below. The appetites which exercise the greatest force +come from a certain complexion of the body, and differ according to +its nature. Consequently, it is not easy to master them. There are men +who have no judgment, because they are cold and heavy on account of +their bad constitution. On the contrary, there are others who, because +of their temperament, are light and inconstant. This is proved by the +difference of our own successive dispositions. When we are gorged, we +have appetites and thoughts that differ from those we experience when +starved; and our dispositions vary even according to the degrees of +satiety. + + +DEFINITION OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIL. + +In short, the primary Evil is that which by itself lacks measure. The +secondary evil is that which accidentally becomes formless, either by +assimilation or participation. In the front rank is the darkness; in +the second that which has become obscured. Thus vice, being in the soul +the result of ignorance and formlessness, is of secondary rank. It is +not absolute Evil, because, on its side, virtue is not absolute Good; +it is good only by its assimilation and participation with the Good. + + +B. BY WHAT PART OF OUR NATURE WE COME TO KNOW EVIL. + + +HOW THE SOUL COMES TO KNOW VICE.[184] + +9. How do we get to know vice and virtue? As to virtue, we know it +by the very intelligence and by wisdom; for wisdom knows itself. +But how can we know vice? Just as we observe that an object is not +in itself straight, by applying a rule, so we discern vice by this +characteristic, that it does not comport itself with virtue. But do +we, or do we not have direct intuition thereof? We do not have the +intuition of absolute vice, because it is indeterminate. We know it, +therefore, by a kind of abstraction, observing that virtue is entirely +lacking. We cognize relative vice by noticing that it lacks some part +of virtue. We see a part of virtue, and, by this part, judging what is +lacking in order completely to constitute the form (of virtue), we +call vice what is lacking to it; defining as the indeterminate (evil) +what is deprived of virtue. Similarly with matter. If, for instance, +we notice a figure that is ugly because its ("seminal) reason," being +unable to dominate matter, has been unable to hide its deformity, we +notice ugliness by what is lacking to form. + + +HOW TO SEE MATTER: BY DIALECTIC ABSTRACTION. + +But how do we know that which is absolutely formless (matter)? We make +abstraction of all kinds of form, and what remains we call matter. We +allow ourselves to be penetrated by a kind of shapelessness by the +mere fact that we make abstraction of all shape in order to be able +to represent matter (by a "bastard reasoning").[185] Consequently, +intelligence becomes altered, and ceases to be genuine intelligence +when it dares in this way to look at what does not belong to its +domain.[186] It resembles the eye, which withdraws from light to see +darkness, and which on that very account does not see. Thus, in not +seeing, the eye sees darkness so far as it is naturally capable of +seeing it. Thus intelligence which hides light within itself, and +which, so to speak, issues from itself, by advancing towards things +alien to its nature, without bringing along its own light, places +itself in a state contrary to its being to cognize a nature contrary to +its own.[165] But enough of this. + + +MATTER IS BOTH WITHOUT QUALITIES AND EVIL. + +10. It may well be asked (by Stoics) how matter can be evil, as it is +without quality?[187] That matter possesses no qualities can be said +in the sense that by itself it has none of the qualities it is to +receive, or to which matter is to serve as substrate; but cannot be +said in the sense that it will possess no nature. Now, if it have a +nature, what hinders this nature from being bad, without this being bad +being a quality? Nothing indeed is a quality but what serves to qualify +something different from itself; a quality is, therefore, an accident; +a quality is that which can be mentioned as the attribute of a subject +other than itself.[188] But matter is not the attribute of something +alien; it is the subject to which accidents are related. Therefore, +since every quality is an accident, matter, whose nature is not to be +an accident, is without quality.[189] If, besides, quality (taken in +general), itself be without quality, how could one say of matter, so +far as it has not yet received any quality, that it is in some manner +qualified? It is, therefore, possible to assert of matter that, it both +has no quality, and yet is evil. Matter is not evil because it has a +quality, but just because it has none. If, indeed, matter possessed a +form, it might indeed be bad; but it would not be a nature contrary to +all form. + + +MATTER AS DEPRIVATION IS STILL WITHOUT QUALITIES. + +11. It may be further objected that nature, independent of all form, is +deprivation. Now deprivation is always the attribute of some hypostatic +substance, instead of itself being substance. If then evil consist in +privation, it is the attribute of the substrate deprived of form; and +on that account it could not exist by itself. If it be in the soul +that we consider evil, privation in the soul will constitute vice and +wickedness, and there will be no need to have recourse to anything +external to explain it. + + +MATTER MAY EXIST AND YET BE EVIL. + +Elsewhere[190] it is objected that matter does not exist; here the +attempt is to show that matter is not evil in so far as it exists. (If +this were the case), we should not seek the origin of evil outside of +the soul, but it would be located within the soul herself; there evil +consists in the absence of good. But, evidently, the soul would have +nothing good on the hypothesis that privation of form is an accident +of the being, which desires to receive form; that, consequently, the +privation of good is an accident of the soul; and that the latter +produces within herself wickedness by her ("seminal) reason." Another +result would be that the soul would have no life, and be inanimate; +which would lead to the absurdity that the soul is no soul. + + +THE SOUL CANNOT POSSESS EVIL WITHIN HERSELF. + +We are thus forced to assert, that the soul possesses life by virtue +of her ("seminal) reason," so that she does not, by herself, possess +privation of good. Then she must from intelligence derive a trace of +good, and have the form of good. The soul, therefore, cannot by herself +be evil. Consequently, she is not the first Evil, nor does she contain +it as an accident, since she is not absolutely deprived of good. + + +RELATIVE PRIVATION IS IMPOSSIBLE. + +12. To the objection that in the soul wickedness and evil are not an +absolute privation, but only a relative privation of good, it may +be answered that in this case, if the soul simultaneously, contain +possession and privation of the good, she will have possessed a feeling +mingled of good and evil, and not of unmingled evil. We will still +not have found the first evil, the absolute Evil. The good of the +soul will reside in her essence (being); evil will only be an accident +thereof. + + +EVIL AS AN OBSTACLE TO THE SOUL. + +13. Another hypothesis is that evil owes its character only to its +being an obstacle for the soul, as certain objects are bad for the +eye, because they hinder it from seeing. In this case, the evil of the +soul would be the cause that produces the evil, and it would produce +it without being absolute Evil. If, then, vice be an obstacle for the +soul, it will not be absolute Evil, but the cause of evil, as virtue is +not the good, and only contributes to acquiring it. If virtue be not +good, and vice be not evil, the result is that since virtue is neither +absolute beauty nor goodness, vice is neither absolute ugliness nor +evil. We hold that virtue is neither absolute beauty, nor absolute +goodness, because above and before it is absolute Beauty and Goodness. +Only because the soul participates in these, is virtue or beauty +considered a good. Now as the soul, by rising above virtue, meets +absolute Beauty and Goodness, thus in descending below wickedness the +soul discovers absolute Evil. To arrive at the intuition of evil the +soul, therefore, starts from wickedness, if indeed an intuition of evil +be at all possible. Finally, when the soul descends, she participates +in evil. She rushes completely into the region of diversity,[191] +and, plunging downwards she falls into a murky mire. If she fell into +absolute wickedness, her characteristic would no longer be wickedness, +and she would exchange it for a still lower nature. Even though mingled +with a contrary nature, wickedness, indeed, still retains something +human. The vicious man, therefore, dies so far as a soul can die. Now +when, in connection with the soul, we speak of dying, we mean that +while she is engaged in the body, she penetrates (further) into matter, +and becomes saturated with it. Then, when the soul has left the body, +she once more falls into the same mud until she have managed to return +into the intelligible world, and weaned her glance from this mire. So +long as she remains therein, she may be said to have descended into +hell, and to be slumbering there.[192] + + +WEAKNESS OF THE SOUL AS AN EXPLANATION OF EVIL. + +14. Wickedness is by some explained as weakness of the soul, because +the wicked soul is impressionable, mobile, easy to lead to evil, +disposed to listen to her passions, and equally likely to become angry, +and to be reconciled; she yields inconsiderately to vain ideas, like +the weakest works of art and of nature, which are easily destroyed by +winds and storms. This theory (is attractive, but implies a totally +new conception, that of "weakness" of soul, and it would have) to +explain this "weakness," and whence it is derived; for weakness in a +soul is very different from weakness in a body, but just as in the +body weakness consists in inability to fulfil a function, in being +too impressionable, the same fault in the soul might, by analogy, be +called by the same name, unless matter be equally the cause of both +weaknesses. Reason, however, will have to explore the problem further, +and seek the cause of the soul-fault here called weakness. + + +WEAKNESS OF THE SOUL OCCURS CHIEFLY IN SOULS FALLEN INTO MATTER. + +In the soul weakness does not derive from an excess of density or +rarefaction of leanness or stoutness, nor of any sickness such as +fever. It must be met in souls which are either entirely separated from +matter, or in those joined to matter, or in both simultaneously. Now, +as it does not occur in souls separated from matter, which are entirely +pure, and "winged,"[193] and which, as perfect, carry out their +functions without any obstacle; it remains, that this weakness occurs +in fallen souls, which are neither pure nor purified. For them weakness +consists not in the privation of anything, but in the presence of +something alien, just as, for instance, weakness of the body consists +in the presence of slime or bile. We shall, therefore, be able to +understand clearly the weakness of the soul by ferreting out the cause +of the "fall" of the soul. + + +THE FALL OF THE SOUL AS DESCENT INTO MATTER. + +Just as much as the soul, matter is included within the order of +beings. For both, so to speak, there is but a single locality; for it +would be an error to imagine two different localities, one for matter, +and the other for the soul; such as, for instance, earth might be for +matter, and air for the soul. The expression that "soul occupies a +locality different from matter" means only that the soul is not in +matter; that is, that the soul is not united to matter; that the soul +does not together with matter constitute something unitary; and that +for the soul matter is not a substrate that could contain the soul. +That is how the soul is separated from matter. But the soul possesses +several powers, since she contains the principle (intelligence), the +medium (the discursive reason), and the goal (the power of sensation) +(united to the generative and growing powers). Now, just like the +beggar who presents himself at the door of the banquet-hall, and with +importunity asks to be admitted,[194] matter tries to penetrate into +the place occupied by the soul. But every place is sacred, because +nothing in it is deprived of the presence of the soul. Matter, on +exposing itself to its rays is illuminated by it, but it cannot harbor +the principle that illuminates her (the soul). The latter indeed, does +not sustain matter,[195] although she be present, and does not even see +it, because it is evil. Matter obscures, weakens the light that shines +down upon her, by mingling its darkness with her. To the soul, matter +affords the opportunity of producing generation, by clearing free +access towards matter; for if matter were not present, the soul would +not approach it. The fall of the soul is, therefore, a descent into +matter; hence comes her "weakness," which means, that not all of the +soul's faculties are exercised; because matter hinders their action, +intruding on the place occupied by the soul and forcing her, so to +speak, to retrench. Until the soul can manage to accomplish her return +into the intelligible world, matter degrades what it has succeeded in +abstracting from the soul. For the soul, therefore, matter is a cause +of weakness and vice. Therefore, by herself, the soul is primitively +evil, and is the first evil. By its presence, matter is the cause +of the soul's exerting her generative powers, and being thus led to +suffering; it is matter that causes the soul to enter into dealings +with matter, and thus to become evil. The soul, indeed, would never +have approached matter unless the latter's presence had not afforded +the soul an opportunity to produce generation. + + +NO MORE THAN THE EXISTENCE OF THE GOOD CAN THAT OF MATTER BE DENIED. + +15. Those who claim that matter does not exist, will have to be +referred to our extended discussion[196] where we have demonstrated +the necessity of its hypostatic existence. Those who would assert that +evil does not belong among beings would, if logical, thereby also +deny the existence of the good, and of anything that was desirable; +thereby annihilating desire, as well as aversion, and even thought; +for everybody shares desire for the good, and aversion for the evil. +Thought and knowledge, simultaneously, apply to good and evil; thought +itself is a good. + + +EXPLANATION OF THE EVIL OF THE SOUL. + +We must, therefore, acknowledge the existence first of Good, +unmixed, and then the nature mingled of good and evil; but what most +participates in evil thereby trends towards absolute Evil; and what +participates in it to a less degree thereby trends towards good. For +what is evil to soul? It is being in contact with inferior nature; +otherwise the soul would not have any appetite, pain, or fear. Indeed +fear is felt by us only for the composite (of soul and body), fearing +its dissolution, which thus is the cause of our pains and sufferings. +The end of every appetite is to put aside what troubles it, or to +forestall what might do so. As to sense-representations (fancy[197]), +it is the impression made by an exterior object on the irrational part +of the soul, a part which can receive this impression only because it +is not indivisible. False opinion rises within the soul because it is +no longer within truth, and this occurs because the soul is no longer +pure. On the contrary, the desire of the intelligible leads the soul +to unite intimately with intelligence, as she should, and there remain +solidly entrenched, without declining towards anything inferior. It is +only because of the nature and power of the Good that evil does not +remain pure Evil. (Matter, which is synonymous with evil) is like a +captive which beauty covers with golden chains, so that the divinities +might not see its nakedness, and that men might not be intruded on by +it; or that men, if they must see it, shall be reminded of beauty on +observing an even weakened image thereof. + + + + +SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK THREE. + +Whether Astrology is of any Value.[198] + + +OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE STARS. + +1. It has been said[199] that the course of the stars indicates what is +to happen to each being; though, it does not, as many persons think, +cause every event. To the supporting proofs hereof we are to add now +more precise demonstrations, and new considerations, for the opinion +held about this matter is no trifle. + + +VARIOUS PRETENSIONS OF ASTROLOGY. + +Some people hold that, by their movements, the planets produce not only +poverty and wealth, health and sickness, but even beauty and ugliness; +and, what is more, vices and virtues. At every moment the stars, as if +they were irritated against men, (are said to) force them to commit +actions concerning which no blame attaches to the men who commit them, +since they are compelled thereto by the influence of the planets. It +is even believed that the cause of the planets' doing us evil or good +is not that they love or hate us; but that their dispositions towards +us is good or evil according to the localities through which they +travel. Towards us they change their disposition according as they are +on the cardinal points or in declination therefrom. It is even held +that while certain stars are maleficent, others are beneficent, and +that, nevertheless, the former frequently grant us benefits, while the +latter often become harmful. Their effects differ according to their +being in opposition,[200] just as if they were not self-sufficient, +and as if their quality depended on whether or not they looked at each +other. Thus a star's (influence) may be good so long as it regards +another, and evil when it does so no longer. A star may even consider +another in different manners,[201] when it is in such or such an +aspect.[202] Moreover, the totality of the stars exercises a mingled +influence which differs from the individual influences, just as several +liquors may form a compound possessing qualities differing from either +of the component elements. As these and similar assertions are freely +made, it becomes important to examine each one separately. This would +form a proper beginning for our investigation. + + +ARE STARS INANIMATE? + +2. Should we consider the stars to be animated, or not? If they be +inanimate, they will be able to communicate only cold and heat; that +is, if[203] we grant the existence of cold influences. In this case, +they will limit themselves to modifying the nature of our body, +exercising on us a merely corporeal influence. They will not produce a +great diversity among the bodies, since each of them exercises the same +influence, and since, on the earth, their diverse actions are blended +into a single one, which varies only by the diversity of locality, or +by the proximity or distance of the objects. The same argument would +hold on the hypothesis that the stars spread cold. But I could not +understand how they could render some learned, others ignorant, making +of some grammarians, others orators, musicians or experts in various +arts. How could they exercise an action which would have no relation +to the constitution of the bodies, such as giving us a father, a +brother, a son, or a wife of such or such characteristics, or to make +us successful, or make of us generals or kings?[204] + + +ARE STARS ANIMATED? + +On the contrary hypothesis, that the stars are animated, and act with +reflection, what have we done to them that they should desire to harm +us? Are they not dwellers of a divine region? Are they not themselves +divine? Nor are they subjected to the influences that make men good +or evil, nor could they experience good or evil as a result of our +prosperity or our misfortunes. + + +COULD "CARDINAL POINTS" OR "DECLINATIONS" POSSESS ANY INFLUENCE? + +3. In case, however, that the stars injure us only involuntarily, they +are constrained thereunto by the aspects,[205] and their localities. If +so, they should, all of them, produce the same effects when they find +themselves in the same localities or aspects. But what difference can +occur in a planet according to its location in the zodiac? What does +the zodiac itself experience? In fact, the planets are not located in +the zodiac itself, but above or below it, at great distances. Besides, +in whatever location they are, they all are ever in the heaven. Now it +would be ridiculous to pretend that their effects differed according to +their location in the heaven, and that they have an action differing +according as they rise, culminate, or decline. It would be incredible +that such a planet would feel joy when it culminates, sadness or +feebleness when declining, anger at the rising of some other planet, +or satisfaction at the latter's setting. Can a star be better when +it declines? Now a star culminates for some simultaneously with its +declination for others; and it could not at the same time experience +joy and sadness, anger and benevolence. It is sheer absurdity to +assert that a star feels joy at its rising, while another feels the +same at its setting; for this would really mean that the stars felt +simultaneous joy and sadness. Besides, why should their sadness injure +us? Nor can we admit that they are in turn joyous and sad, for they +ever remain tranquil, content with the goods they enjoy, and the +objects of their contemplation. Each of them lives for itself, finding +its welfare in its own activity, without entering into relations with +us. As they have no dealing with us, the stars exert their influence on +us only incidentally, not as their chief purpose; rather, they bear no +relation whatever to us; they announce the future only by coincidence, +as birds announce it to the augurs. + + +ABSURDITY OF "ASPECTS," AND "HOUSES." + +4. Nor is it any more reasonable to assert that the aspect of one +planet makes one joyous, or the other sad. What animosity could obtain +betwixt the stars? What could be its reason? Why should their condition +be different when they are in trine aspect, or in opposition, or in +quadrature? What reason have we to suppose that one star regards the +other when it is in some particular aspect to it, or that it no more +regards it when it is in the next zodiacal sign, though thus really +closer to it? + +Besides, what is the manner in which the planets exert the influence +attributed to them? How does each exercise its own particular +influence? How do they all, in combination, exert an influence that +differs from this (particular influence)? In fact, they do not hold +deliberations to carry out their decisions on us, each of them yielding +a little of its individual influence. The one does not violently hinder +the action of the other, nor does it condescendingly make concessions +to it. To say that the one is joyous when it is in the "house" of the +other, and that the latter is sad when it is in "house" of the former, +amounts to saying that two men are united by mutual friendship, though +the former love the latter, while the latter hate the former. + + +THE RELATIONS OF SATURN AND MARS QUITE ILLOGICAL. + +5. The cold planet (Saturn) is said to be more beneficent for us when +it is distant, because the evil that it produces on us is said to +consist of its cold effluence; in which case our good should consist +in the zodiacal signs opposite to us. It is also asserted that when +the cold planet (Saturn) is in opposition to the warm planet (Mars), +both become harmful; yet it would seem that their influences should +neutralize each other. Besides, it is held that (Saturn) likes the day, +whose heat renders it favorable to men, while (Mars) likes the night, +because it is fiery, as if in heaven there did not reign a perpetual +day, that is, a continual light; or as if a star could be plunged into +the shadow (projected by the earth) when it is very distant from the +earth. + + +FABULOUS INFLUENCES OF THE MOON. + +It is said that the moon, in conjunction with (Saturn) is favorable +when full, but harmful when otherwise. The opposite, however, ought +to be the truth if the moon possess any influence. In fact, when it +presents a full face, it presents its dark face to the planet above it +(Saturn or Mars); when its disk decreases on our side, it increases on +the other; therefore, it ought to exert a contrary influence when it +decreases on our side, and when it increases on the side of the planet +above it. These phases are of no importance for the moon, inasmuch as +one of its sides is always lit. Nothing can result from it but for +the planet which receives heat from it (Saturn); now this one will be +heated whenever the moon turns towards us its dark side. Therefore, +the moon is good for this planet when it is full towards it, but dark +towards us. Besides, this obscurity of the moon for us can be of +importance only for terrestrial things, not for the celestial[203] ... +(?)[206] ... but if, because of its distance, it does not support the +moon, then it must be in a worse predicament; when the moon is full, it +is sufficient for terrestrial things, even when the moon is distant.... +Finally, when the moon presents its obscure side to the fiery planet +(Mars), it seems beneficent towards us; for the power of this planet, +more fiery than (Saturn), is then sufficient by itself. + + +JUPITER, VENUS, AND MERCURY ALSO CONSIDERED ASTROLOGICALLY. + +Besides, the bodies of the animated beings which move in the heaven may +be of different degrees of heat; none of them is cold, as is witnessed +to by their location. The planet named Jupiter is a suitable mixture of +fire; likewise with Venus. That is why they seem to move harmoniously. +As to the fiery planet Mars, it contributes its share to the mixture +(of the general action of the stars). As to Saturn, its case is +different, because of its distance. Mercury is indifferent, because it +assimilates itself easily to all. + + +THE UNIVERSE AS A SINGLE HARMONY.[207] + +All these planets contribute to the Whole. Their mutual relation, +therefore, is one suitable to the universe, just as the organs of an +animal are shaped to take part in the organism they constitute.[208] +Take, for instance, a part of the body, such as the bile, which serves +both the whole animal that contains it, and its special organ, inasmuch +as it was necessary to arouse courage, and to oppose the injury of +both the whole body, and its special organ. There had to be something +similar (to bile) in the universe; that something sweet should soften +it, that there be parts that would play the role of eyes, and that all +things should possess mutual sympathy by their irrational life.[209] +Thus only is the universe one, and thus only is it constituted by a +single harmony. How then could it be denied that all these things might +be signs, resulting from the laws of analogy? + + +ABSURDITY OF VARIOUS ASTROLOGICAL THEORIES. + +6. Is it not unreasonable to assert that Mars, or Venus, in a certain +position, should produce adulteries? Such a statement attributes to +them incontinence such as occurs only among man, and human passion +to satisfy unworthy impulses. Or again, how could we believe that +the aspects of planets is favorable when they regard each other in +a certain manner? How can we avoid believing that their nature is +determinate? What sort of an existence would be led by the planets +if they occupied themselves with each single one of the innumerable +ever-arising and passing beings, giving them each glory, wealth, +poverty, or incontinence, and impelling all their actions? How could +the single planets effect so many simultaneous results? Nor is it any +more rational to suppose that the planets' actions await the ascensions +of the signs, nor to say that the ascension of a sign contains as many +years as there are degrees of ascension in it. Absurd also is the +theory that the planets calculate, as it were on their fingers, the +period of time when they are to accomplish something, which before was +forbidden. Besides, it is an error not to trace to a single principle +the government of the universe, attributing everything to the stars, +as if there were not a single Chief from which depends the universe, +and who distributes to every being a part and functions suitable to +its nature. To fail to recognize Him, is to destroy the order of +which we form a part, it is to ignore the nature of the world, which +presupposes a primary cause, a principle by whose activity everything +is interpenetrated.[211] + + +THE STARS ARE CHANGING SIGNS BETRAYING THE UNIVERSAL CONSPIRACY OF +PURPOSE. + +7. In fact, we would still have to ask ourselves for the cause of the +events (in our world) even if the stars, like many other things, really +prognosticated future events. We would still have to wonder at the +maintenance of the order without which no events could be prefigured. +We might, therefore, liken the stars to letters, at every moment flung +along the heavens, and which, after having been displayed, continued +in ceaseless motion, so that, while exercising another function in +the universe, they would still possess significance.[212] Thus in +a being animated by a single principle it is possible to judge one +part by another; as it is possible, by the study of the eyes or some +other organ of an individual, to conclude as to his characters, to the +dangers to which he is exposed, and how he may escape them. Just as +our members are parts of our bodies, so are we ourselves parts of the +universe. Things, therefore, are made for each other. Everything is +significant, and the wise man can conclude from one thing to another. +Indeed many habitual occurrences are foreseen by men generally. In +the universe everything is reduced to a single system.[213] To this +co-ordination is due the possibility of birds furnishing us with omens, +and other animals furnishing us with presages. All things mutually +depend from each other. Everything conspires to a single purpose,[214] +not only in each individual, whose parts are perfectly related; but +also in the universe, and that in a higher degree, and far earlier. +This multiple being could be turned into a single universal Living +organism only by a single principle. As in the human body every organ +has its individual function, likewise in the universe each being plays +its individual part; so much the more that they not only form part +of the universe, but that they themselves also form universes not +without importance.[215] All things, therefore, proceed from a single +principle, each plays its individual part, and lends each other mutual +assistance. Neither are they separate from the universe, but they act +and react on each other, each assisting or hindering the other. But +their progress is not fortuitous, nor is it the result of chance. They +form a series, where each, by a natural bond, is the effect of the +preceding one, and the cause of the following one.[216] + + +THERE IS A NATURAL LAW WHICH DIRECTS THE SOUL. + +8. When the soul applies herself to carry out her proper +function[217]--for the soul effects everything, as far as she plays +the part of a principle--she follows the straight road;[218] when she +loses her way[219] the divine justice subjugates her to the physical +order which reigns in the universe,[220] unless the soul succeed in +liberating herself. The divine justice[221] reigns ever, because +the universe is directed by the order and power of the dominating +principle (the universal Soul).[222] To this is joined the co-operation +of the planets which are important parts of the heaven, either by +embellishing it, or by serving as signs. Now they serve as signs for +all things that occur in the sense-world. As to their potency, they +should be credited only with what they effect indisputably. + + +WEALTH, POVERTY, AND VICES ARE THE RESULT OF EXTERNAL CIRCUMSTANCES. + +As to us, we fill the functions of the soul in accordance with nature +when we do not stray into the multiplicity contained in the universe. +When we do stray therein, we are punished for it both by the straying +itself, and by a less happy fate thereafter. Wealth and poverty, +therefore, happen to us as effects of the operation of exterior things. +As to the virtues and vices, virtues are derived from the primitive +nature of the soul, while the vices result from dealings of the soul +with exterior things. But this has been treated of elsewhere.[223] + + +SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SPINDLE OF THE FATES. + +9. This brings us to a consideration of the spindle, which, according +to the ancients, is turned by the Fates, and by which Plato +signifies[224] that which, in the evolution of the world, moves, and +that which is immovable. According to (Plato), it is the Fates, and +their mother Necessity, which turn this spindle, and which impress it +with a rotary motion in the generation of each being. It is by this +motion that begotten beings arrive at generation. In the Timaeus[225] +the (Intelligence, or) divinity which has created the universe gives +the (immortal) principle of the soul, (the reasonable soul), and the +deities which revolve in the heaven add (to the immortal principle of +the soul) the violent passions which subject us to Necessity, namely, +angers, desires, sufferings, and pleasures; in short, they furnish us +with that other kind of soul (the animal nature, or vegetable soul) +from which they derive these passions. Plato thus seems to subject us +to the stars, by hinting that we receive from them our souls,[227] +subordinating to the sway of Necessity when we descend here below, +both ourselves and our morals, and through these, the "actions" and +"passions"[228] which are derived from the passional habit[215] of the +soul (the animal nature).[229] + + +WHICH OF OUR TWO SOULS IS THE GENUINE INDIVIDUALITY? + +Our genuine selves are what is essentially "us"; we are the principle +to which Nature has given the power to triumph over the passions. For, +if we be surrounded by evils because of the body, nevertheless, the +divinity has given us virtue, which "knows of no master"[223] (is not +subject to any compulsion). Indeed we need virtue not so much when we +are in a calm state, but when its absence exposes us to evils. We must, +therefore, flee from here below;[230] we must divorce ourselves from +the body added to us in generation, and apply ourselves to the effort +to cease being this animal, this composite in which the predominant +element is the nature of the body, a nature which is only a trace of +the soul, and which causes animal life[231] to pertain chiefly to the +body. Indeed, all that relates to this life is corporeal. The other +soul (the reasonable soul, which is superior to the vegetative soul), +is not in the body; she rises to the beautiful, to the divine, and to +all the intelligible things, which depend on nothing else. She then +seeks to identify herself with them, and lives conformably to the +divinity when retired within herself (in contemplation). Whoever is +deprived of this soul (that is, whoever does not exercise the faculties +of the reasonable soul), lives in subjection to fatality.[222] Then +the actions of such a being are not only indicated by the stars, but +he himself becomes a part of the world, and he depends on the world of +which he forms a part. Every man is double,[232] for every man contains +both the composite (organism), and the real man (which constitutes the +reasonable soul). + + +NUMENIAN DOUBLENESS, MIXTURE, AND DIVISIBLE SOUL. + +Likewise the universe is a compound of a body and of a Soul intimately +united to it, and of the universal Soul, which is not in the Body, and +which irradiates the Soul united to the Body.[233] There is a similar +doubleness in the sun and the other stars, (having a soul united to +their body, and a soul independent thereof). They do nothing that is +shameful for the pure soul. The things they produce are parts of the +universe, inasmuch as they themselves are parts of the universe, and +inasmuch as they have a body, and a soul united to this body; but their +will and their real soul apply themselves to the contemplation of the +good Principle. It is from this Principle, or rather from that which +surrounds it, that other things depend, just as the fire radiates its +heat in all directions, and as the superior Soul (of the universe) +infuses somewhat of her potency into the lower connected soul. The evil +things here below originate in the mixture inhering in the nature of +this world. After separating the universal Soul out of the universe, +the remainder would be worthless. Therefore, the universe is a deity if +the Soul that is separable from it be included within its substance. +The remainder constitutes the guardian which (Plato) names the Great +Guardian,[234] and which, besides, possesses all the passions proper to +guardians. + + +STARS ANNOUNCE EVENTS BECAUSE OF THE SOUL'S MANY IMPERFECTIONS, AND +ACCIDENTS. + +10. Under these circumstances, we must acknowledge that events are, by +the stars, announced, though not produced, not even by their (lower) +corporeal soul. By their lower part, their body,[235] they produce only +the things which are passions of the universe. Besides, we shall have +to acknowledge, that the soul, even before entering into generation, +while descending here below, brings something which she has by herself; +for she would not enter into a body unless she had a great disposition +to suffer.[236] We must also admit that while passing into a body the +soul is exposed to accidents, inasmuch as she is subjected to the +course of the universe, and as this very course contributes to the +production of what the universe is to accomplish; for the things which +are comprised in the course of the universe act as its parts. + + +THE INFLUENCES OF THE STARS DEGENERATE AS THEY REACH US. + +11. We must also reflect that the impressions which we derive from +the stars do not reach us in the same condition in which they leave +them. Just as fire in us is much degenerated from that in the heaven, +so sympathy, degenerating within the receiving person, begets an +unworthy affection. Courage produces in those who do not possess it in +the proper proportions, either violence or cowardliness. Love of the +beautiful and good thus becomes the search for what only appears so. +Discernment, in undergoing this degradation, becomes the trickiness +which seeks to equal it, without succeeding in doing so. Thus all these +qualities become evil in us, without being such in the stars. All the +impressions we receive thereof are in us not such as they are in the +stars; besides they are still further degraded by mingling with the +bodies, with matter, and with each other.[237] + + +MINGLED STAR ACTION ONLY PROMOTES OR RETARDS PROCESSES ALREADY NATURAL. + +12. The influences proceeding from the stars commingle; and this +mixture modifies all generated things, determining their nature and +qualities.[238] It is not the celestial influence which produces the +horse, it is limited to exercising an influence upon him; for,[239] +the horse is begotten from horse, man from man; the sun can only +contribute to their formation. Man is born from the (seminal logos), or +reason of man; but the circumstances may be favorable or unfavorable +to him. In fact, a son resembles the father, though he may be formed +better or worse; but never does he entirely detach himself from matter. +Sometimes, however, the matter so prevails over nature that the being +is imperfect because the form does not dominate.[240] + + +DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT IS AND WHAT IS NOT PRODUCED BY THE STARS. + +13. We must now distinguish, decide and express the origin of various +things, inasmuch as there are some things that are produced by the +course of the stars, and others that are not. Our principle is that the +Soul governs the universe by Reason, just as each animal is governed by +the principle (the reason) which fashions his organs, and harmonizes +them with the whole of which they are parts;[241] now the All contains +everything, while the parts contain only what is individual to them. As +to exterior influences, some assist, while others oppose the tendency +of nature. All things are subordinated to the All because they are +parts of it; by their co-operation, each with its own nature and their +particular tendencies they form the total life of the universe.[242] +The inanimate beings serve as instruments for the others that set them +in motion by a mechanical impulse. Irrational animated beings move +indeterminately; such as horses attached to a chariot before the driver +indicates which direction they are to follow; for they need the whip to +be directed. The nature of the reasonable animal contains the directing +driver;[243] if the driver be skilful, it follows the straight road, +instead of going blindly at chance, as often happens. Beings gifted +with reason and those that lack it are both contained within the +universe, and contribute to the formation of the whole. Those which are +more powerful, and which occupy a more elevated rank do many important +things, and co-operate in the life of the universe where their part is +active, rather than passive. The passive ones act but little. Those of +intermediary rank are passive in regard to some, and often active in +regard to others, because they themselves possess the power of action +and production (the stars, the brutes, and men.[244]). + + +THE STARS AS THE FOLLOWERS OF THE UNIVERSAL KING. + +The universe leads an universal and perfect life, because the good +principles (the star-Souls) produce excellency, that is, the more +excellent part in every object.[245] These principles are subordinate +to the Soul that governs the universe, as soldiers are to their +general; consequently, (Plato) describes this by the figure of +the attendants of Jupiter (the universal Soul) advancing to the +contemplation of the intelligible world. + + +MEN AS SOULS OF THE SECOND RANK. + +The beings which possess a nature inferior to the star-Souls, that +is, men, occupy the second rank in the universe, and play in it the +same part played in us by the second power of the soul (the discursive +reason). The other beings, that is, the animals, occupy about the same +rank occupied in us by the lowest (or vegetative) power of the soul; +for all these powers in us are not of equal rank.[246] Consequently, +all the beings which are in the heaven, or which are distributed in +the universe are animated beings, and derive their life from the total +Reason of the universe (because it contains the "seminal reasons" +of all living beings). None of the parts of the universe, whatever +be its greatness, possesses the power of altering the reasons, nor +the beings engendered with the co-operation of these reasons. It may +improve or degrade these beings, but cannot deprive them of their +individual nature. It degrades them by injuring either their body or +their soul; which occurs when an accident becomes a cause of vice for +the soul which partakes of the passions of the body (the sensitive and +vegetative soul) and which is given over to the inferior principle (to +the animal) by the superior principle (the reasonable soul); or when +the body, by its poor organization, hinders the actions in which the +soul needs its co-operation; then it resembles a badly attuned lyre, +which is incapable of producing sounds which could form a perfect +harmony.[247] + + +ANY OCCURRENCE MAY BE DUE TO MANY DIFFERENT CAUSES. + +14. Poverty, wealth, glory, and authoritative positions may have +many different causes. If a man derive his wealth from his parents, +the stars have only announced that he would be rich; and they would +have only announced his nobility if he owed his wealth to his birth. +If a man acquire wealth by his merit, in some way in which his body +contributed thereto, the causes of his bodily vigor co-operated in his +fortune; first his parents, then his fatherland, if it be possessed of +a good climate, and last the fertility of the soil.[248] If this man +owe his wealth to virtue, this source should be considered exclusive; +and likewise with the transitory advantages he may by divine favor +possess. Even if his wealth be derived from virtuous persons, still, +in another way, his fortune is due to virtue. If his wealth were +derived from evil men, though by a just means, yet the wealth proceeds +from a good principle which was active in them. Finally, if a man who +has amassed wealth be evil, the cause of his fortune is this very +wickedness, and the principle from which it derives; even those who may +have given him money must be included in the order of its causes. If a +man owe his wealth to labor, such as agricultural work, the causes of +the wealth include the care of the ploughman and the co-operation of +exterior circumstances. Even if he found a treasure, it is something +in the universe which contributed thereto. Besides, this discovery may +have been foretold; for all things concatenate with everything else, +and, consequently, announce each other. If a man scatter his wealth, +he is the cause of their loss; if his wealth be taken from him, the +cause is the man who takes it. Many are the contributory causes of a +shipwreck. Glory may be acquired justly or unjustly. Just glory is due +to services rendered, or to the esteem of other people. Unjust glory +is caused by the injustice of those who glorify that man. Deserved +power is due to the good sense of the electors, or to the activity of +the man who acquired it by the co-operation of his friends, or to +any other circumstance. A marriage is determined by a preference, or +by some accidental circumstance, or by the co-operation of several +circumstances. The procreation of children is one of its consequences; +it occurs in accordance with the ("seminal) reason," in case it meet no +obstacle; if it be defective, there must be some interior defect in the +pregnant mother, or the fault lies in the impotence of the father. + + +A SOUL'S DESTINY DEPENDS ON THE CONDITION OF THE UNIVERSE AT BIRTH. + +15. Plato[249] speaks of the lots, and conditions chosen by one turn +of the spindle (of Clotho); he speaks also of a guardian who helps +each man to fulfil his destiny. These conditions are the disposition +of the universe at the time of the soul's entrance into the body, the +nature of their body, parents and fatherland; in short, the aggregate +of external circumstances. Evidently all these things, in detail as +well as in totality, are simultaneously produced and related by one +of the Fates, namely Clotho. Lachesis then presents the conditions +to the souls. Finally Atropos renders the accomplishment of all the +circumstances of each destiny irrevocable. + + +HOW SOME MEN MAY MASTER THEIR FATE: BY SELF-VICTORY. + +Some men, fascinated by the universe and exterior objects, completely +or partially abdicate their freedom.[250] Others, dominating their +environment, raise their head to the sky, and freeing themselves from +exterior circumstances, release that better part of their souls which +forms their primitive being. As to the latter point, it would be wrong +to think that the nature of the soul was determined by the passions +aroused in her by external objects, and that she did not possess her +own individual nature. On the contrary, as she plays the part of a +principle, she possesses, much more than other things, faculties +suitable to accomplish actions suitable to her nature. Since she is +a being, the soul necessarily possesses appetites, active faculties, +and the power of living well.[251] The aggregate (of the soul and +body, the organism) depends on the nature which formed it, and from +it receives its qualities and actions. If the soul separate from the +body, she produces actions which are suitable to her nature, and which +do not depend from the body; she does not appropriate the credit for +the passions of the body, because she recognizes the difference of her +nature.[252] + + +EXACT PSYCHOLOGY AT THE ROOT OF PHILOSOPHY. + +16. What is the mingled, and what is the pure part of the soul? What +part of the soul is separable? What part is not separable so long as +the soul is in a body? What is the animal? This subject will have to be +studied elsewhere,[253] for there is practically no agreement on the +subject. For the present, let us explain in which sense we above said +that the soul governs the universe by Reason. + + +IS THE UNIVERSAL SOUL CREATIVE, BUT NOT PRESERVATIVE? + +Does the universal Soul form all the beings successively, first man, +then the horse, then some other animal, and last the wild beasts?[254] +Does she begin by producing earth and fire; then, seeing the +co-operation of all these things which mutually destroy or assist each +other, does she consider only their totality and their connections, +without regarding the accidents which occur to them later? Does she +limit herself to the reproduction of preceding generations of animals, +and does she leave these exposed to the passions with which they +inspire each other? + + +DETERMINISM IMPLIES DEGENERATION OF RACES. + +Does the "reason" of each individual contain both his "actions" and +"reactions"[215] in a way such that these are neither accidental nor +fortuitous, but necessary?[255] Are these produced by the reasons? Or +do the reasons know them, without producing them? Or does the soul, +which contains the generative "reasons,"[256] know the effects of all +her works by reasoning according to the following principle, that the +concourse of the same circumstances must evidently produce the same +effects? If so, the soul, understanding or foreseeing the effects of +her works, by them determines and concatenates all the events that +are to happen. She, therefore, considers all the antecedents and +consequents, and foresees what is to follow from what precedes.[257] +It is (because the beings thus proceed from each other) that the +races continually degenerate. For instance, men degenerate because in +departing continually and unavoidably (from the primitive type) the +("seminal) reasons" yield to the "passions" of matter.[258] + + +THE SOUL DOES NOT CAUSE PASSIONS, WHICH ARISE FROM THE SEMINAL REASONS. + +Is the soul the cause of these passions, because she begets the beings +that produce them? Does the soul then consider the whole sequence +of events, and does she pass her existence watching the "passions" +experienced by her works? Does she never cease thinking of the latter, +does she never put on them the finishing touch, regulating them so that +they should always go well?[259] Does she resemble some farmer who, +instead of limiting himself to sowing and planting, should ceaselessly +labor to repair the damage caused by the rains, the winds, and the +storms? Unless this hypothesis be absurd, it must be admitted that +the soul knows in advance, or even that the ("seminal)[260] reasons" +contain accidents which happen to begotten beings, that is, their +destruction and all the effects of their faults.[261] In this case, +we are obliged to say that the faults are derived from the ("seminal) +reasons", although the arts and their reasons contain neither error, +fault, nor destruction of a work of art.[262] + + +THE UNIVERSE IS HARMONY,[207] IN SPITE OF THE FAULTS IN THE DETAILS. + +It might here be objected that there could not be in the universe +anything bad or contrary to nature; and it must be acknowledged that +even what seems less good still has its utility. If this seem to +admit that things that are less good contribute to the perfection +of the universe, and that there is no necessity that all things be +beautiful,[263] it is only because the very contraries contribute +to the perfection of the universe, and so the world could not exist +without them. It is likewise with all living beings. The ("seminal) +reason" necessarily produces and forms what is better; what is +less good is contained in the "potentiality" of the "reasons," and +"actualized" in the begotten beings. The (universal) Soul has, +therefore, no need to busy herself therewith, nor to cause the +"reasons" to become active. For the "reasons" successfully subdue +matter to what is better (the forms), even though matter alters what it +receives by imparting a shock to the "reasons" that proceed from the +higher principles. All things, therefore, form a harmonious totality +because they simultaneously proceed from matter, and the "reasons" +which beget them. + + +THE METHOD OF CREATION. + +17. Let us examine if the "reasons" contained in the Soul are +thoughts. How could the Soul produce by thoughts? It is the Reason +which produces in matter; but the principle that produces naturally is +neither a thought nor an intuition, but a power that fashions matter +unconsciously, just as a circle gives water a circular figure and +impression. Indeed, the natural generative power has the function of +production; but it needs the co-operation of the governing (principle) +of the Soul, which forms and which causes the activity of the +generative soul engaged in matter. If the governing power of the Soul +form the generative soul by reasoning, it will be considering either +another object, or what it possesses in herself. If the latter be the +case, she has no need of reasoning,[264] for it is not by reasoning +that the Soul fashions matter, but by the power which contains the +reasons, the power which alone is effective, and capable of production. +The Soul, therefore, produces by the forms. The forms she transmits +are by her received from the Intelligence. This Intelligence, however, +gives the forms to the universal Soul which is located immediately +below her, and the universal Soul transmits them to the inferior soul +(the natural generative power), fashioning and illuminating her. The +inferior soul then produces, at one time without meeting any obstacles, +at others, when doing so, although, in the latter case, she produces +things less perfect. As she has received the power of production, and +as she contains the reasons which are not the first (the "seminal +reasons," which are inferior to the Ideas) not only does she, by virtue +of what she has received, produce, but she also draws from herself +something which is evidently inferior (matter).[265] It doubtless +produces a living being (the universe), but a living being which is +less perfect, and which enjoys life much less, because it occupies +the last rank, because it is coarse and hard to manage, because +the matter which composes it is, as it were, the bitterness or the +superior principles, because it spreads its bitterness around her, and +communicates some of it to the universe. + + +EVILS ARE NECESSARY TO THE PERFECTION OF THE UNIVERSE. + +18. Must the evils in the universe be considered as necessary,[266] +because they are the consequences of the superior principles? Yes, +for without them the universe would be imperfect. The greater number +of evils, if not all of them, are useful to the universe; such as +the venomous animals; though they often ignore their real utility. +Even wickedness is useful in certain respects, and can produce many +beautiful things; for example, it leads to fine inventions, it forces +men to prudence, and does not let them fall asleep in an indolent +security.[267] + + +PICTURE OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNIVERSE. + +Under these circumstances, it is plain that the universal Soul ever +contemplates the better principles, because it is turned towards the +intelligible world, and towards the divinity. As she fills herself with +God, and is filled with God, she, as it were, overflows over her image, +namely, the power which holds the last rank (the natural generative +power), and which, consequently, is the last creative power. Above +this creative power is the power of the Soul which immediately receives +the forms from the Intelligence. Above all is the Intelligence, the +Demiurge, who gives the forms to the universal Soul, and the latter +impresses its traces on the third-rank power (the natural generative +power).[268] This world, therefore, is veritably a picture which +perpetually pictures itself. The two first principles are immovable; +the third is also immovable (in essence); but it is engaged in matter, +and becomes immovable (only) by accident. As long as the Intelligence +and the Soul subsist, the "reasons" flow down into this image of the +Soul (the natural generative power); likewise, so long as the sun +subsists, all light emanates therefrom.[269] + + + + +FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK ONE. + +The Organism and the Self.[270] + + +PSYCHOLOGIC DISTINCTIONS IN SOUL. + +1. To what part of our nature do pleasure and grief, fear and +boldness desire and aversion, and, last, pain, belong? Is it to +the soul (herself),[271] or to the soul when she uses the body as an +instrument,[272] or to some third (combination) of both? Even the +latter might be conceived of in a double sense: it might be either +the simple mixture of the soul and the body,[273] or some different +product resulting therefrom.[274] The same uncertainty obtains +about the products of the above mentioned experiences: namely, +passions,[275] actions, and opinions. For example, we may ask whether +ratiocination[276] and opinion both, belong to the same principle as +the passions; or whether only one of them does; in which case the +other would belong to some other principle. We should also inquire +concerning the nature and classification of thought.[277] Last we +should study the principle that undertakes this inquiry and which comes +to some conclusion about it. But, first of all, who is the agent, who +feels? This is the real starting point: for even passions are modes of +feeling, or at least they do not exist without it.[278] + + +THE SOUL AS A COMPOSITE AGGREGATE. + +2. Let us first examine the soul (herself). Is there any difference +between the soul and the soul-essence? If there be a difference, +the soul must be a composite aggregate: and it should no longer be a +matter of surprise that both she and her essence, at least so far as +she admits thereof, together experience the above mentioned passions, +and in general the habits, and better or worse dispositions. But, on +the contrary, if, soul and soul-essence be identical, then the soul +should be a form which would be unreceptive for all these energies of +essence, which on the contrary she imparts to other things, possessing +in herself a connate energy which our reason reveals in her. In this +case we must acknowledge that she is immortal, inasmuch as the immortal +and undecaying must be impassible, giving to others without receiving +anything in return from them; or at least, deriving nothing but from +the superior (or anterior) principles, from which she is not cut off, +inasmuch as they are better. + + +THE SOUL IS NOT ESSENCE. + +A being that were so unreceptive to anything external would have no +ground for fear of anything external. Fear might indeed be natural +to something. Neither would she be bold, for this sentiment, implies +shelter from what is terrifying. As to such desires which are satisfied +by the emptying or filling of the body, they belong only to some nature +foreign enough to be emptied or filled. How could she participate in a +mixture, inasmuch as the essential is unmingled? Further she would not +wish to have anything introduced (in herself), for this would imply +striving to become something foreign to herself. She would also be far +from suffering, for how could she grieve, and about what? For that +which is of simple being is self-sufficient, in that she remains in her +own being. Neither will she rejoice at any increase, as not even the +good could happen to her. What she is, she ever will be. Nor could we +attribute to the pure soul sensation, ratiocination or opinion; for +sensation is the perception, of a form or of an impassible body; and +besides ratiocination and opinion (depend) on sensation. We shall, +however, have to examine whether or no we should attribute to the +soul thought; also, whether pure pleasure can affect a soul while she +remains alone.[279] + + +THE SOUL USES THE BODY AS TOOL. + +3. Whether the soul, according to her being, be located in the body, +above or within this latter, the soul forms with the body an entity +called (a "living being" or) organism.[280] In this case, the soul +using the body as a tool is not forced to participate in its passions, +any more than workmen participate in the experiences of their tools. As +to sensations, of course, the soul must perceive them, since in order +to use her instrument, the soul must, by means of sensation, cognize +the modifications that this instrument may receive from without. Thus +seeing consists of using the eyes; and the soul at the same time feels +the evils which may affect the sight. Similar is the case with griefs, +pains and any corporeal exigency; also with the desires which arise +from the soul's need to take recourse to the ministry of the body. But +how do passions from the body penetrate into the soul? For a body could +communicate her own properties to some other body; but how could she do +so to a soul? + + +SEPARATION OF SOUL FROM BODY. + +Such a process would imply that one individual suffers when an entirely +different individual is affected. There must be a distinction between +them so long as we consider the former the user, and the latter the +used; and it is philosophy,[281] that produces this separation by +giving to the soul the power of using the body as a tool. + + +PRIMITIVE RELATION BETWEEN SOUL AND BODY. + +But what was the condition of the soul before her separation from the +body by philosophy? Was she mingled with the body? If she were mingled +with it, she must either have been formed[282] by mixing;[271] or she +was spread all over the body; or she was[283] a form interwoven with +the body; or she was a form governing the body[284] as a pilot governs +the ship;[285] or[286] was partly mingled with, and partly separated +from, the body. (In the latter case) I would call the independent +part that which uses the body as a tool, while the mingled part is +that which lowers itself to the classification or rank of instrument. +Now philosophy raises the latter to the rank of the former; and the +detached part turns her away, as far as our needs allow, from the body +she uses, so that she may not always have to use the body. + + +CONSEQUENCES OF MIXTURE OF SOUL AND BODY. + +4. Now let us suppose the soul is mingled with the body. In this +mixture, the worse part, or body, will gain, while the soul will lose. +The body will improve by participation with the soul; and the soul will +deteriorate by association with death and irrationality. Well, does +the soul, in somewhat losing life, gain the accession of sensation? +On the other hand, would not the body, by participation in life, gain +sensation and its derived passions? It is the latter, then, which will +desire, inasmuch as it will enjoy the desired objects, and will feel +fear about them. It is the latter which may be exposed to the escape of +the objects of its desire, and to decay.[287] + + +MIXTURE OF SOUL AND BODY. + +We will set aside as impossible the mixture of two incommensurables, +such as a line and the color called white. A mixture of the soul +and body, which must imply their commensurability, would demand +explanation. Even if the soul interpenetrate the body, the soul +need not share the body's passions, for the interpenetrating medium +may remain impassible; as light, which remains such in spite of its +diffusion.[288] Thus the soul might remain a stranger to the body's +passions, though diffused through it, and need not necessarily undergo +its passions. + + +ARISTOTELIAN HYPOTHESIS CONSIDERED. + +Should we say that the soul is in the body, as form in matter? In this +case, she is "being," and she would be a separable form. If then[289] +she be in the body as, in the case of the axe, the schematic figure is +in the iron, so as by her own proper virtue, to form the power of doing +what iron thus formed accomplishes, we will have all the more reason to +attribute the common passions to the body, which is[290] an organized +physical tool possessing potential life. For if as (Plato) says[291] +it be absurd to suppose that it is the soul that weaves, it is not +any more reasonable to attribute the desires and griefs to the soul; +rather, by far, to the living organism. + + +THE LIVING ORGANISM. + +5. The "living organism" must mean either the thus organized body, +or the common mixture of soul and body, or some third thing which +proceeds from the two first. In either of these three cases the soul +will have to be considered impassible, while the power of experiencing +passions will inhere in something else; or the soul will have to share +the body's passions, in which case the soul will have to experience +passions either identical or analogous to those of the body, so that to +a desire of the animal there will correspond an act or a passion of the +concupiscible appetite. + + +REFUTATION OF THE (JAMES-LANGE) THEORY OF EMOTIONS. + +We shall later on consider the organized body; here we must find how +the conjunction of soul and body could experience suffering. The +theory that the affection of the body modifies it so as to produce a +sensation which itself would end in the soul, leaves unexplained the +origin of sensation. To the theory that suffering has its principle in +this opinion or judgment, that a misfortune is happening to ourselves +or some one related to us, whence results disagreeable emotion first +in the body, and then in the whole living organism,[292] there is this +objection, that it is yet uncertain to which opinion belongs; to the +soul, or to the conjunction of soul and body. Besides, the opinion +of the presence of an evil does not always entail suffering; it is +possible that, in spite of such an opinion, one feels no affliction; +as, for instance, one may not become irritated at believing oneself +scorned; or in experiencing no desire even in the expectation of some +good. + + +NOT ALL AFFECTIONS COMMON TO SOUL AND BODY. + +How then arise these affections common to the soul and the body? Shall +we then say that desire derives from the desire-appetite,[293] anger +from the anger-appetite, or in short, every emotion or affliction from +the corresponding appetite? But even so, they will not be common, and +they will belong exclusively to the soul, or to the body. There are +some whose origin needs the excitation of blood and bile, and that the +body be in some certain state which excites desire, as in physical +love. On the contrary, however, the desire of goodness is no common +affection; it is an affection peculiar to the soul, as are several +others. Reason, therefore, does not allow us to consider all affections +as common to soul and body. + + +DESIRE, NOT SIMULTANEOUS WITH APPETITE. + +Is it possible, however, that for example, in physical love, the +man[294] may experience a desire simultaneously with the corresponding +appetite? This is impossible, for two reasons. If we say that the man +begins to experience the desire, while the corresponding appetite +continues it, it is plain the man cannot experience a desire without +the activity of the appetite. If on the other hand it be the appetite +that begins, it is clear that it cannot begin being excited unless the +body first find itself in suitable circumstances, which is unreasonable. + + +SOUL AND BODY, BY UNITING, FORM AN INDIVIDUAL AGGREGATE. + +6. It would, however, probably be better to put the matter thus: by +their presence, the faculties of the soul cause reaction in the organs +which possess them, so that while they themselves remain unmoved, they +give them the power to enter into movement.[295] In this case, however, +when the living organism experiences suffering, the life-imparting +cause must itself remain impassible, while the passions and energies +belong wholly to that which receives life. In this case, therefore, the +life will not belong exclusively to the soul, but to the conjunction +of the soul and body; or, at least, the latter's life will not be +identical with the soul's, nor will it be the faculty of sensation, +which will feel, but the being in whom that faculty inheres. + + +SENSATION IMPLIES FEELING SOUL. + +If, however, sensation, which is no more than a corporeal emotion, +finds its term in the soul, the soul must surely feel sensation; +therefore it does not occur as an effect of the presence of the faculty +of sensation, for this ignores the feeling agent back of it. Nor is it +the conjunction of soul and body, for unless the faculty of sensation +operate, that aggregate could not feel, and it would then no longer +include as elements either the soul, or the faculty of sensation. + + +SOUL-LIGHT FORMS ANIMAL NATURE. + +7. The aggregate results from the presence of the soul, not indeed that +the soul enters into the aggregate, or constitutes one of its elements. +Out of this organized body, and of a kind of light furnished by +herself, the soul forms the animal nature, which differs both from soul +and body, and to which belongs sensation, as well as all the passions +attributed to the animal.[296] + + +RELATION OF ANIMAL TO HUMAN NATURE. + +If now we should be asked how it happened that "we" feel, we answer: +We are not separated from the organism, although within us exist +principles[297] of a higher kind which concur in forming the manifold +complex of human nature. + + +EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SENSATION. + +As to the faculty of sensation which is peculiar to the soul, it cannot +be the power of perceiving the sense-objects themselves, but only +their typical forms, impressed on the animal by sensation. These have +already somewhat of the intelligible nature; the exterior sensation +peculiar to the animal is only the image of the sensation peculiar to +the soul; which, by its very essence is truer and more real, since it +consists only in contemplating images while remaining impassible.[298] +Ratiocination, opinion and thought, which principally constitute +us,[299] deal exclusively with these images, by which the soul has the +power of directing the organism. + + +DISTINCTION IN THE WHOLE ORGANISM. + +No doubt these faculties are "ours," but "we" are the superior +principle which, from above, directs the organising but in this whole +we shall have to distinguish an inferior part, mingled with the body, +and a superior part, which is the true man. The former (irrational +soul) constitutes the beast, as for instance, the lion; the latter is +the rational soul, which constitutes man. In every ratiocination, it is +"we" who reason, because ratiocination is the peculiar activity (or, +energy) of the soul.[300] + + +INDIVIDUAL RELATION WITH COSMIC INTELLECT. + +8. What is our relation with the Intelligence? I mean not the +habit imparted to the soul by the intellect, but the absolute +Intelligence;[301] which, though above us, is also common to all men, +or peculiar to each of them; in other words, is simultaneously common +and individual. Common because it is indivisible, one and everywhere +the same; particular because each soul possesses it entirely in the +first or rational soul. Likewise, we possess the ideas in a double +manner; in the soul they appear developed and separate; in the +intelligence they exist all together.[302] + + +INDIVIDUAL RELATION WITH GOD AND COSMIC SOUL. + +What is our relation with God? He hovers over the intelligible nature, +and real being; while we, being on the third rank as counted from +thence, are of the undivided universal Soul, which[303] is indivisible +because she forms part of the upper world, while she is divisible in +regard to the bodies. She is indeed divisible in regard to the bodies, +since she permeates each of them as far as they live; but at the same +time she is indivisible because she is one in the universe. + + +SOUL GIVES LIFE TO PSYCHOLOGIC ELEMENTS. + +She seems to be present in the bodies, and illuminates them, making +living beings out of them. This occurs not as a mixture of herself and +bodies, but by remaining individual, giving out images of herself,[304] +just as a single face in several mirrors. Of these, the first is +sensation, which resides in the common part, the organism; then come +all the other forms of the soul--forms which successively derive each +from the other, down to the faculties of generation and increase, +and generally, the power of producing and fashioning that which is +different from self--which indeed the soul does as soon as she turns +towards the object she fashions.[305] + + +ORIGIN OF EVILS, SINS, AND ERRORS. + +9. In this conception of the soul, she will be foreign to the cause of +the evils which the man does and suffers. These refer to the organism, +that common part, understood as above. Although opinion be deceptive, +and makes us commit much evil, and although opinion and ratiocination +both belong to the soul, yet the soul may be sinless, inasmuch as we +are only mastered by the worse part of our nature.[306] Often, indeed, +we yield to appetite, to anger, and we are the dupes of some imperfect +image. The conception of false things, the imagination[307] does not +await the judgment of discursive reason. There are still other cases +where we yield to the lower part of ourselves; in sensation, for +instance, we see things that do not exist, because we rely on the +common sensation of soul and body, before having discerned its objects +by discursive reason. + + +INTELLECT DID NOT GRASP THE OBJECT ITSELF. + +In this case did the intellect grasp the object itself? Certainly +not; and, therefore, it is not the intellect that is responsible +for the error. We say as much for the "we," according as we will or +will not have perceived the object, either in the intellect, or in +ourselves;--for it is possible to possess an object without having it +actually present. + + +TRUE CONCEPTION ACT OF INTUITION. + +We have distinguished from things common to soul and body, those +peculiar to the soul. The former are corporeal, and cannot be produced +without the organs, while the latter's occurrence is independent of +the body. Ratiocination[276] is the essential and constitutive faculty +of the real soul, because it determines the typical forms derived from +sensation, it looks, it somehow feels the images, and really is the +dominating part of the soul. The conception of true things is the act +of intuitive thoughts. + + +MODIFICATIONS DERIVE FROM FOREIGN SOURCES. + +There is often a resemblance and community between exterior and +interior things; in this case the soul will not any the less exercise +herself on herself, will not any the less remain within herself, +without feeling any passive modification. As to the modifications and +troubles which may arise in us, they derive from foreign elements, +attached to the soul, as well as from passions experienced by the above +described common part. + + +DISTINCTIONS IN "WE" AND THE "REAL MAN." + +10. But if "we" are the "soul," we must admit that when we experience +passions, the soul experiences them also; that when we act, the soul +acts. We may even say that the common part is also "ours," especially +before philosophy separated the soul from the body;[308] in fact, we +even say "we" suffer, when our body suffers. "We" is, therefore, taken +in a double sense: either the soul with the animal part, or living +body; or simply the upper part; while the vivified body is a wild +beast. + + +REAL MAN DIFFERS FROM BODY. + +The real Man differs from the body; pure from every passion, he +possesses the intellectual virtues, virtues which reside in the soul, +either when she is separated from the body, or when she is--as usually +here below--only separable by philosophy; for even when she seems to +us entirely separated, the soul is, in this life, ever accompanied +by a lower[309] sensitive part, or part of growth, which she +illuminates.[310] + + +FUNCTION OF THE COMMON PART. + +As to the virtues which consist not in wisdom, but in ethical habits +and austerities, they belong to the common part. To it alone, also, +are vices to be imputed, inasmuch as it exclusively experiences envy, +jealousy and cowardly pity. Friendships, however, should be referred +some to the common part, and others to the pure Soul or inner Man. In +childhood, the faculties of the composite common part are exercised, +but rarely is it illuminated from above. When this superior principle +seems inactive in relation to us, it is actively engaged towards the +upper intelligible world; and it only begins to be active towards us +when it advances as far as[311] (fancy or representation), the middle +part of our being. + + +THE SUPERIOR PRINCIPLE NOT ALWAYS UTILIZED. + +But is the superior principle not "ours" also? Surely, but only when we +are conscious thereof; for we do not always utilize our possessions. +This utilization, however, takes place when we direct this middle +part of our being towards either the upper or lower worlds, and when +we actualize into energies what before was only an (Aristotelian) +"potentiality" or a (Stoic) "habit." + + +THE ANIMATING PRINCIPLE OF ANIMALS. + +We might define the animating principle of animals. If it be true, +according to common opinion, that animal bodies contain human souls +that have sinned, the separable part of these souls does not properly +belong to these bodies; although these souls assist these bodies, the +souls are not actually present to them.[312] In them the sensation is +common to the image of the soul and to the body;--but to the latter +only in so far as it is organized and fashioned by the image of the +soul. As to the animals into whose bodies no human soul entered, they +are produced by an illumination of the universal Soul. + + +THE SOUL BOTH IMPASSIBLE AND PUNISHABLE. + +12. There is a contradiction between our own former opinion that the +soul cannot sin, and the universally admitted belief that the soul +commits sins, expiates them, undergoes punishments in Hades, and that +she passes into new bodies. Although we seem to be in a dilemma, +forcing us to choose between them, it might be possible to show they +are not incompatible. + + +PHILOSOPHIC SEPARATION REFERS NOT ONLY TO BODY, BUT TO PASSIBLE +ACCRETIONS. + +When we attribute infallibility to the soul, we are supposing her to be +one and simple, identifying the soul with soul essence. When, however, +we consider her capable of sin, we are looking at her as a complex, of +her essence and of another kind of soul which can experience brutal +passions. The soul, thus, is a combination of various elements; and it +is not the pure soul, but this combination, which experiences passions, +commits sins, and undergoes punishments. It was this conception of the +soul Plato was referring to when he said:[313] "We see the soul as we +see Glaucus, the marine deity," and he adds, "He who would know the +nature of the soul herself should, after stripping her of all that is +foreign to her, in her, especially consider her philosophic love for +truth; and see to what things she attaches herself, and by virtue of +whose affinities she is what she is." We must, therefore, differentiate +the soul's life acts from that which is punished, and when we speak of +philosophy's separation of the soul, we mean a detaching not only from +the body, but also from what has been added to the soul. + + +HOW THE ANIMAL NATURE IS GENERATED. + +This addition occurs during her generation, or rather in the generation +of another ideal form of soul, the "animal nature." Elsewhere[314] this +generation has been explained thus. When the soul descends, at the very +moment when she inclines towards the body, she produces an image of +herself. The soul, however, must not be blamed for sending this image +into the body. For the soul to incline towards the body is for the +soul to shed light on what is below her; and this is no more sinful +than to produce a shadow. That which is blamable is the illuminated +object; for if it did not exist, there would be nothing to illuminate. +The descent of the soul, or her inclination to the body, means only +that she communicates life to what she illuminates. She drives away her +image, or lets it vanish, if nothing receptive is in its vicinity; the +soul lets the image vanish, not because she is separated--for to speak +accurately, she is not separated from the body--but because she is no +longer here below; and she is no longer below when she is entirely +occupied in contemplating the intelligible world. + + +THE DOUBLE HERCULES SYMBOLIZES THE SOUL. + +(Homer) seems to admit this distinction in speaking of Hercules, when +he sends the image of this hero into Hades, and still he locates him +within the abode of the deities[315];--it is at least the idea implied +in this double assertion that Hercules is in Hades and that he is in +Olympus. The poet, therefore, distinguished in him two elements. We +might perhaps expound the passage as follows: Hercules had an active +virtue, and because of his great qualities was judged worthy of being +classified with the deities, but as he possessed only the active +virtue, and not the contemplative virtue, he could not be admitted into +Heaven entirely; while he is in heaven, there is something of him in +Hades.[316] + + +RELATION OF THE "WE" AND THE "SOUL." + +13. Is it "we" or the "soul" which makes these researches? It is we, by +means of the soul. The cause of this is, not we who consider the soul +because we possess her, but that the soul considers herself. This need +not imply motion, as it is generally understood, but a motion entirely +different from that of the bodies, and which is its own life. + + +INTELLIGENCE NOT OURS, BUT WE. + +Intelligence[277] also is ours, but only in the sense that the soul is +intelligent; for us, the (higher) life consists in a better thinking. +The soul enjoys this life either when she thinks intelligible objects, +or when the intellect is both a part of ourselves, and something +superior towards which we ascend. + + + + +FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN. + +Of the First Good, and of the Other Goods.[317] + + +THE SUPREME GOOD AS END OF ALL OTHER GOODS. + +1. Could any one say that there was, for any being, any good but the +activity of "living according to nature?"[318] For a being composed +of several parts, however, the good will consist in the activity of +its best part, an action which is peculiar, natural, and unfailing. +Further: as the soul is an excellent being, and directs her activity +towards something excellent, this excellent aim is not merely excellent +relatively to the soul, but is the absolute Good. If then there be a +principle which does not direct its action towards any other thing, +because it is the best of beings, being above them all, it can be this +only because all other beings trend towards it. This then, evidently, +is the absolute Good by virtue of which all other beings participate +therein. + + +PARTICIPATION IN GOOD. TWO METHODS. + +Now there are two methods of participation in the Good: the first, is +to become similar to it; the second is to direct one's activity towards +it. If then the direction of one's desire and one's action towards the +better principle be a good, then can the absolute good itself neither +regard nor desire any other thing, remaining in abiding rest, being the +source and principle of all actions conforming to nature, giving to +other things the form of the Good, without acting on them, as they, on +the contrary, direct their actions thereto. + + +PERMANENCE THE CHIEF NOTE OF ABSOLUTE GOOD. + +Only by permanence--not by action, nor even by thought--is this +principle the Good. For if it be super-Being, it must also be +super-Activity, super-Intelligence, and Thought. The principle from +which everything depends, while itself depending on nothing else, must, +therefore, be recognized as the Good. (This divinity) must, therefore, +persist in His condition, while everything turns towards Him, just as, +in a circle, all the radii meet in the centre. An example of this is +the sun, which is a centre of the light that is, as it were, suspended +from that planet. The light accompanies the sun everywhere, and never +parts from it; and even if you wished to separate it on one side, it +would not any the less remain concentrated around it. + + +ALL THINGS DEPEND ON THE GOOD BY UNITY, ESSENCE, AND QUALITY. + +2. Let us study the dependence of everything on the Good. The inanimate +trends toward the Soul, while the animate Soul trends towards the Good +through Intelligence. As far as anything possesses unity, essence or +form, it participates in the Good. By its participation in unity, +essence and form each being participates in the Good, even though the +latter be only an image, for the things in which it participates are +only images of unity, essence, and form. For the (first) Soul[319] +as she approaches Intelligence, she acquires a life which approaches +closer to truth; and she owes this to Intelligence; thus (by virtue +of Intelligence) she possesses the form of the Good. To possess the +latter, all she needs to do is to turn her looks towards it; for +Intelligence is the next after the Good. Therefore, to those to whom +it is granted to live, life is the good. Likewise, for those who +participate in intelligence, Intelligence is the good. Consequently, +such (a being as) joins intelligence to life possesses a double good. + + +THERE IS NO UNALLOYED EVIL FOR THE LIVING BEING. + +3. Though life be a good, it does not belong to all beings. Life +is incomplete for the evil person, as for an eye that does not see +distinctly; neither accomplish their purpose. If, for us, life, though +mingled as it is, be a good, even if an imperfect one, how shall we +continue to assert that death is not an evil? But for whom would it be +an evil? This we must ask because evil must necessarily be an attribute +of somebody. Now there is no more evil for a being which, though +even existing, is deprived of life, any more than for a stone (as +they say). But if, after death, the being still live, if it be still +animate, it will possess good, and so much the more as it exercises +its faculties without the body. If it be united to the universal Soul, +evidently there can be no evil for it, any more than for the gods who +possess good unmingled with evil. Similar is the case of the soul which +preserves her purity, inasmuch as he who loses her finds that life, and +not death, is the real Evil. If there be chastisements in Hades, again +is life an evil for the soul, because she is not pure. If, further, we +define life as the union of the soul with the body, and death as their +separation, the soul can pass through both these conditions (without, +on that account, being unhappy, or losing her hold on the Good). + + +BY VIRTUE, LIFE CHANGES FROM AN EVIL TO A GOOD. + +How is death not an evil, if life be a good? Certainly life is a good +for such as possess the Good, (it is a good) not because the soul is +united to the body, but because she repels evil by virtue. (Without +the latter) death would rather be a good (because it delivers us from +the body[320]). To resume: by itself, life in a body is evil; but, by +virtue, the soul locates herself in the good, not by perpetuating the +existing corporeal union, but by separating herself from the body. + + + + +PORPHYRY, COMMENTARIES OR OUTLINES OF THE ENNEADS OF PLOTINOS. + +PSYCHOLOGICAL FRAGMENTS BY PORPHYRY, JAMBLICHUS, NEMESIUS, AND AMMONIUS +SACCAS. + + + + +CONCORDANCE OF THE NUMBERS OF THE 44 PARAGRAPHS OF PORPHYRY'S +PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF INTELLIGIBLES IN THE EDITIONS OF BOUILLET, +CREUZER, AND HOLSTENIUS + + + Bouillet. Creuzer. Holstenius. + =1= 34 34 + =2= 8 8 + =3= 9 9 + =4= 27 28 + =5= 20 20 + =6= 18 18 + =7= 24 25 + =8= 19 19 + =9= 7 7 + =11= 22 23 + =12= 10 10 + =13= 12 12 + =14= 26 27 + =15= 1 1 + =16= 2 2 + =17= 3 3 + =18= 4 4 + =19= 5 5 + =20= 6 6 + =21= 28 29 + =22= 29 30 + =23= 22 23 + =24= 17 17 + =25= 16 16 + =26= 11 11 + =27= 25 26 + =28= 14 14 + =29= 13 13 + =30= 30 31 + =31= 42 43 + =32= 44 45 + =33= 15 15 + =34= 23 24 + =35= 43 44 + =36= 35 35 + =37= 36 37 + =38= 37 38 + =39= 39 40 + =40= 40 41 + =41= 33 36 + =42= 38 39 + =43= 31 32 + =44= 41 42 + +The order of Bouillet has been left, because the other orders differ +anyway, and because this is the one that Porphyry introduced into the +works of Plotinos. It must, therefore, have been of most significance +to him. + + + + +PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF THE INTELLIGIBLES, BY PORPHYRY.[321] + + +FIRST ENNEAD,[322] BOOK TWO. + +Of Virtues. + +I.--There is a difference between the virtues of the citizen, those +of the man who essays to rise to contemplation, and who, on this +account, is said to possess a contemplative mind; those of him who +contemplates intelligence; and finally those of pure Intelligence, +which is completely separated from the soul. + +1. The civil virtues consist of moderation in passions, and in +letting one's actions follow the rational laws of duty. The object +of these virtues being to make us benevolent in our dealings with +our fellow-human beings, they are called civil virtues because they +mutually unite citizens. "Prudence refers to the rational part of our +soul; courage, to that part of the soul subject to anger; temperance +consists in the agreement and harmony of appetite and reason; finally +justice, consists in the accomplishment, by all these faculties, of the +function proper to each of them, either to command, or to obey." + +2. The virtues of the man who tries to rise to contemplation consist in +detaching oneself from things here below; that is why they are called +"purifications."[323] They command us to abstain from activities which +innervate the organs, and which excite the affections that relate to +the body. The object of these virtues is to raise the soul to genuine +existence. While the civil virtues are the ornament of mortal life, +and prepare the soul for the purificatory virtues, the latter direct +the man whom they adorn to abstain from activities in which the body +predominates. Thus, in the purificatory virtues, "prudence consists +in not forming opinions in harmony with the body, but in acting by +oneself, which is the work of pure thought. Temperance consists in not +sharing the passions of the body; courage, in not fearing separation +therefrom, as if death drove man into emptiness and annihilation; while +justice exacts that reason and intelligence command and be obeyed." +The civil virtues moderate the passions; their object is to teach us +to live in conformity with the laws of human nature. The contemplative +virtues obliterate the passions from the soul; their object is to +assimilate man to the divinity. + +There is a difference between purifying oneself, and being pure. +Consequently the purificatory virtues may, like purification itself, +be considered in two lights; they purify the soul, and they adorn the +purified soul, because the object of purification is purity. But "since +purification and purity consist in being separated from every foreign +entity, the good is something different from the soul that purifies +itself. If the soul that purifies herself had possessed the good before +losing her purity, it would be sufficient for the soul to purify +herself; but in this very case, what would remain to her after the +purification would be the good, but not the purification. But the soul +is not the good; she can only participate therein, and have its form; +otherwise the soul would not have fallen into evil. For the soul, good +consists in being united to her author, and her evil is to unite with +lower things."[324] + +Of evil, there are two kinds; the one, is to unite with lower things; +the other is to abandon oneself to the passions. The civil virtues +owe their name of virtues and their value to their releasing the soul +from one of these two kinds of evil (of the passions). The purificatory +virtues are superior to the former, in that they free the soul from +her characteristic form of evil (that is, union with lower things). +Therefore, when the soul is pure, she must be united to her author; her +virtue, after her "conversion," consists in her knowledge and science +of veritable existence; not that the soul lacks this knowledge, but +because without her superior principle, without intelligence, she does +not see what she possesses.[325] + +3. There is a third kind of virtues, which are superior to the civil +and purificatory virtues, the "virtues of the soul that contemplates +intelligence." "Here prudence and wisdom consist in contemplating +the "beings" or essences contained by intelligence; justice consists +in the soul's fulfilling of her characteristic function; that is, in +attaching herself to intelligence and to direct her activity thither. +Temperance is the intimate conversion of the soul towards Intelligence, +while courage is the impassibility by which the soul becomes +assimilated to what she contemplates, since the soul's nature is to be +impassible.[326] These virtues are as intimately concatenated as the +other (lower forms)." + +4. There is a fourth kind of virtues, the "exemplary virtues," which +reside within intelligence. Their superiority to the virtues of the +soul is the same as that of the type to the image; for intelligence +contains simultaneously all the "beings" or essences which are the +types of lower things. "Within intelligence, prudence is the science; +wisdom is the thought, temperance is the conversion towards oneself; +justice is the accomplishment of one's characteristic function; +courage is the identity of intelligence, its perseverance in purity, +concentrated within itself, in virtue of its superiority."[327] + +We thus have four kinds of virtues: 1, the exemplary virtues, +characteristic of intelligence, and of the "being" or nature to which +they belong; 2, the virtues of the soul turned towards intelligence, +and filled with her contemplation; 3, the virtues of the soul that +purifies herself, or which has purified herself from the brutal +passions characteristic of the body; 4, the virtues that adorn the +man by restraining within narrow limits the action of the irrational +part, and by moderating the passions. "He who possesses the virtues of +the superior order necessarily (potentially) possesses the inferior +virtues. But the converse does not occur."[328] "He who possesses +the superior virtues will not prefer to practice the lower virtues +because of the mere possession thereof; he will practice them only +when circumstances will invite (it). The objects, indeed, differ with +the kind of virtues. The object of the civil virtues is to moderate +our passions so as to conform our conduct to the laws of human nature. +That of the purificatory virtues is to detach the soul completely from +the passions. That of the contemplative virtues is to apply the soul +to intellectual operations, even to the extent of no longer having to +think of the need of freeing oneself from the passions. Last, that of +the exemplary virtues is similar to that of the other virtues. Thus +the practical virtues make man virtuous; the purificatory virtues +make man divine, or make of the good man, a protecting deity; the +contemplative virtues deify; while the exemplary virtues make a man +the parent of divinities. We should specially apply ourselves to +purificatory virtues believing that we can acquire them even in this +life; and that possession of them leads to superior virtues. We must +push purification as far as possible, as it consists in separating (the +soul) from the body, and in freeing oneself from any passional movement +of the irrational part. But how can one purify the soul? To what limit +may purification be pushed? These are two questions that demand +examination. + +To begin with, the foundation of purification is to know oneself, to +realize that he is a soul bound to a foreign being, of a different +nature (or, "being"). + +Further, when one is convinced of this truth, one should gather +oneself together within himself, detaching himself from the body, +and freeing himself entirely from the passions. He who makes use +of his senses too often, though it be done without devotion or +pleasure, is, nevertheless, distracted by the care of the body, and +is chained thereto by sensation. The pains and the pleasures produced +by sense-objects exercise a great influence on the soul, and inspire +the soul with an inclination for the body. It is important to remove +such a disposition from the soul. "To achieve this purpose, the soul +will allow the body only necessary pleasures, that serve to cure her +of her sufferings, to refresh her from her exhaustions, to hinder her +from being importunate. The soul will free herself from pains;[327] +if this be beyond her powers, the soul will support them patiently, +and will diminish them, while refusing to share them. The soul will +appease anger so far as possible; she will even try to suppress them +entirely; at least, if that be impossible, she will not voluntarily +participate therein, leaving the non-reflective excitement to another +(animal) nature, reducing the involuntary motions as far as possible. +The soul will be inaccessible to fear--having nothing further to +risk; even so, she will restrain every sudden movement; she will pay +attention to fear only insofar as it may be nature's warning at the +approach of danger. Absolutely nothing shameful will be desired; in +eating and drinking, she will seek only the satisfaction of a need, +while remaining essentially alien thereto. The pleasures of love will +not even involuntarily be tasted, at least, she will not allow herself +to be drawn beyond the flights of fancy that occur in dreams. In the +purified man, the intellectual part of the soul will be pure of all +these passions. She will even desire that the part that experiences +the irrational passions of the body should take notice of them without +being agitated thereby, and without yielding to them. In this way, if +the irrational part should itself happen to experience emotions, the +latter will be promptly calmed by the presence of reason. Struggles +will have been left behind before any headway will have been made +to purification. The presence of reason will suffice; the inferior +principle, indeed, will respect the higher one to the extent of being +angry with itself, and reproaching itself for weakness, in case it +feels any agitation that disturbs its master's rest." So long as the +soul experiences even moderate passions, the soul's progress towards +impassibility remains in need of improvement. The soul is impassible +only when she has entirely ceased to participate in the passions of the +body. Indeed, that which permitted the passions to rule was that reason +relaxed the reins as a result of her own inclination. + + +FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK NINE. + +Of Suicide. + +OF THE SEPARATION OF THE SOUL AND BODY. + +2. Nature releases what nature has bound. The soul releases what the +soul has bound. Nature binds the body to the soul, but it is the soul +herself that has bound herself to the body. It, therefore, belongs to +nature to detach the body from the soul, while it is the soul herself +that detaches herself from the body. + +3. There is a double death. One, known by all men, consists in the +separation of the body with the soul; the other, characteristic of +philosophers, results in the separation of the soul from the body. The +latter is consequence of the former. + + +SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR. + +Of Matter. + +OF THE CONCEPTION OF MATTER (10). + +4. While separating ourselves from existence we by thought beget +nonentity (matter). While remaining united with existence, we also +conceive of nonentity (the one). Consequently, when we separate +ourselves from existence, we do not conceive of the nonentity which is +above existence (the one), but we beget by thought something that is +deceptive, and we put ourselves in the condition (of indetermination) +in which one is when outside of oneself. Just as each one can really, +and by himself, raise himself to the non-existence which is above +existence (the One); so (by separating oneself from existence by +thought), we may reach the nonentity beneath existence. + + +THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK SIX. + +Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal Things. + +OF THE INCORPOREAL (3). + +5. The name "incorporeal" does not designate one and the same genus, +as does the word "body." Incorporeal entities derive their name from +the fact that they are conceived of by abstraction from the body. +Consequently, some of them (like intelligence and discursive reason) +are genuine beings, existing as well without as within the body, +subsisting by themselves, by themselves being actualizations and +lives; other beings (such as matter, sense-form without matter, place, +time, and so forth), do not constitute real beings, but are united to +the body, and depend therefrom, live through others, possess only a +relative life, and exist only through certain actualizations. Indeed, +when we apply to them the name of incorporeal entities (it is merely a +negative designation), indicating only what they are not, but not what +they are. + + +OF THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THE SOUL. + +6. (1) The soul is a "being" or essence, without extension, immaterial +and incorruptible; her nature consists in a life which is life in +itself. + +7. (3, end) When the existence of some being is life itself, and when +the passions are lives, its death consists in a life of a certain +nature, and not in entire privation of life; for the "passion" +experienced by this "being" or essence, does not force it into complete +loss of life. + +8. (2, 3) There is a difference between the affections of the bodies, +and those of incorporeal things. The affection of bodies consists in +change. On the contrary, the affections and experiences characteristic +of the soul are actualizations that have nothing in common with the +cooling or heating up of the bodies. Consequently if, for bodies, +an affection ever implies a change, we may say that all incorporeal +(beings) are impassible. Indeed, immaterial and incorporeal beings +are always identical in their actualization; but those that impinge +on matter and bodies, though in themselves impassible, allow the +subjects in which they reside to be affected. So when an animal feels, +the soul resembles a harmony separated from its instrument, which +itself causes the vibration of the strings that have been tuned to +unison herewith; while the body resembles a harmony inseparable from +the strings. The reason why the soul moves the living being is that +the latter is animated. We, therefore, find an analogy between the +soul and the musician who causes his instrument to produce sounds +because he himself contains a harmonic power. The body, struck by a +sense-impression, resembles strings tuned in unison. In the production +of sound, it is not the harmony itself but the string that is affected. +The musician causes it to resound because he contains a harmonic power. +Nevertheless, in spite of the will of the musician, the instrument +would produce no harmonies that conformed to the laws of music, unless +harmony itself dictated them. + +9. (5) The soul binds herself to the body by a conversion toward the +affections experienced by the body. She detaches herself from the body +by "apathy," (turning away from the body's affections.) + + +OF THE IMPASSIBILITY OF MATTER. + +10. (7) According to the ancient (sages) such are the properties of +matter. "Matter is incorporeal because it differs from bodies. Matter +is not lifeless, because it is neither intelligence, nor soul, nor +anything that lives by itself. It is formless, variable, infinite, +impotent; consequently, matter cannot be existence, but nonentity. Of +course it is not nonentity in the same way that movement is nonentity; +matter is nonentity really. It is an image and a phantom of extension, +because it is the primary substrate of extension. It is impotence, and +the desire for existence. The only reason that it persists is not rest +(but change); it always seems to contain contraries, the great and +small, the less and more, lack and excess. It is always "becoming," +without ever persisting in its condition, or being able to come out of +it. Matter is the lack of all existence; and, consequently, what matter +seems to be is a deception. If, for instance, matter seems to be large, +it really is small; like a mere phantom, it escapes and evanesces into +nonentity, not by any change of place, but by its lack of reality. +Consequently, the substrate of the images in matter consists of a lower +image. That in which objects present appearances that differ according +to their positions is a mirror, a mirror that seems crowded, though it +possesses nothing, and which yet seems to be everything." + + +OF THE PASSIBILITY OF THE BODY (8-19). + +11. Passions (or, affections) refer to something destructible; for it +is passion that leads to destruction; it is the same sort of being +that can be affected, and can be destroyed. Incorporeal entities, +however, are not subject to destruction; they either exist or not; in +either case they are non-affectible. That which can be affected need +not have this impassible nature, but must be subject to alteration or +destruction by the qualities of things that enter into it and affect +it; for that which in it subsists is not altered by the first chance +entity. Consequently, matter is impassible, as by itself it possesses +no quality. The forms that enter into and issue from matter (as a +substrate) are equally impassible. That which is affected is the +composite of form and matter, whose existence consists in the union +of these two elements; for it is evidently subject to the action of +contrary powers, and of the qualities of things which enter into it, +and affect it. That is why the beings that derive their existence from +something else, instead of possessing it by themselves, can likewise +by virtue of their passivity, either live or not. On the contrary, +the beings whose existence consists in an impassible life necessarily +live permanently; likewise the things that do not live are equally +impassible inasmuch as they do not live. Consequently, being changed +and being affected refer only to the composite of form and matter, to +the body, and not to matter. Likewise, to receive life and to lose +it, to feel passions that are its consequence, can refer only to the +composite of soul and body. Nothing similar could happen to the soul; +for she is not something compounded out of life and lifelessness; +she is life itself, because her "being" or nature is simple, and is +automatic. + + +THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT. + +Of Nature, Contemplation, and of the One. + +OF THOUGHT. + +12. (1) Thought is not the same everywhere; it differs according to the +nature of every "being." In intelligence, it is intellectual; in the +soul it is rational; in the plant it is seminal; last, it is superior +to intelligence and existence in the principle that surpasses all these. + + +OF LIFE. + +13. (7) The word "body" is not the only one that may be taken in +different senses; such is also the case with "life." There is a +difference between the life of the plant, of the animal, of the soul, +of intelligence, and of super-intelligence. Indeed, intelligible +entities are alive though the things that proceed therefrom do not +possess a life similar to theirs. + + +OF THE ONE. + +14. (8) By (using one's) intelligence one may say many things about the +super-intellectual (principle). But it can be much better viewed by an +absence of thought, than by thought. This is very much the same case as +that of sleep, of which one can speak, up to a certain point, during +the condition of wakefulness; but of which no knowledge of perception +can be acquired except by sleeping. Indeed, like is known only by like; +the condition of all knowledge is for the subject to be assimilated to +the subject.[330] + + +FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. + +Of the Nature of the Soul. + +15. (1) Every body is in a place; the incorporeal in itself is not in a +place, any more than the things which have the same nature as it. + +16. (1) The incorporeal in itself, by the mere fact of its being +superior to every body and to every place, is present everywhere +without occupying extension, in an indivisible manner. + +17. (1) The incorporeal in itself, not being present to the body in a +local manner, is present to the body whenever it pleases, that is, by +inclining towards it so far as it is within its nature to do so. Not +being present to the body in a local manner, it is present to the body +by its disposition. + +18. (1) The incorporeal in itself does not become present to the body +in "being" nor in hypostatic form of existence. It does not mingle with +the body. Nevertheless, by its inclination to the body, it begets and +communicates to it a potentiality capable of uniting with the body. +Indeed the inclination of the incorporeal constitutes a second nature +(the irrational soul), which unites with the body. + +19. (1) The soul has a nature intermediary between the "being" that is +indivisible, and the "being" that is divisible by its union with the +bodies. Intelligence is a "being" absolutely indivisible; the bodies +alone are divisible; but the qualities and the forms engaged in matter +are divisible by their union with the bodies. + +20. (2) The things that act upon others do not act by approximation and +by contact. It is only accidentally when this occurs (that they act by +proximity and contact). + + +FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE. + +Problems About the Soul. + +UNION OF THE SOUL AND THE BODY. + +21. (20) The hypostatic substance of the body does not hinder the +incorporeal in itself from being where and as it wishes; for just as +that which is non-extended cannot be contained by the body, so also +that which has extension forms no obstacle for the incorporeal, and +in relation to it is as nonentity. The incorporeal does not transport +itself where it wishes by a change of place; for only extended +substance occupies a place. Neither is the incorporeal compressed +by the body; for only that which is extended can be compressed and +displaced. That which has neither extension nor magnitude, could not +be hindered by that which has extension, nor be exposed to a change +of place. Being everywhere and nowhere, the incorporeal, wherever +it happens to be, betrays its presence only by a certain kind of +disposition. It is by this disposition that it rises above heaven, or +descends into a corner of the world. Not even this residence makes it +visible to our eyes. It is only by its works that it manifests its +presence. + +22. (21-24) If the incorporeal be contained within the body, it is +not contained within it like an animal in a zoölogical garden; for +it can neither be included within, nor embraced by the body. Nor +is it, compressed like water or air in a bag of skins. It produces +potentialities which from within its unity (?) radiate outwards; it is +by them that it descends into the body and penetrates it.[331] It is by +this indescribable extension of itself that it enters into the body, +and shuts itself up within it. Except itself nothing retains it. It is +not the body that releases the incorporeal as result of a lesion, or of +its decay; it is the incorporeal that detaches itself by turning away +from the passions of the body. + + +OF THE DESCENT OF THE SOUL INTO THE BODY, AND OF THE SPIRIT. + +23. (9) Just as "being on the earth," for the soul, is not to tread +on the ground, as does the body, but only to preside over the body +that treads on the ground; likewise, "to be in hell" for the soul, +is to preside over an image whose nature is to be in a place, and +to have an obscure hypostatic form of existence. That is why if the +subterranean hell be a dark place, the soul, without separating from +existence, descends into hell when she attaches herself to some +image. Indeed, when the soul abandons the solid body over which she +presided she remains united to the spirit which she has received from +the celestial spheres. Since, as a result of her affection for matter, +she has developed particular faculties by virtue of which she had a +sympathetic habit for some particular body during life, as a result +of this disposition, she impresses a form on the spirit by the power +of her imagination, and thus she acquires an image. The soul is said +to be in hell because the spirit that surrounds her also happens to +have a formless and obscure nature; and as the heavy and moistened +spirit descends down into subterranean localities, the soul is said +to descend underground. Not indeed that the very "being" of the soul +changes place, or is in a locality, but because she contracts the +habits of the bodies whose nature it is to change location, and to be +located somewhere. That is why the soul according to her disposition, +acquires some one body rather than some other; for the rank and the +special characteristics of the body into which she enters depend on her +disposition. + +Therefore, when in a condition of superior purity, she unites with a +body that is close to immaterial nature, that is, an ethereal body. +When she descends from the development of reason to that of the +imagination, she receives a solar body. If she becomes effeminate, and +falls in love with forms, she puts on a lunar body. Finally, when she +falls into the terrestrial bodies, which, resembling her shapeless +character, are composed of moist vapors, there results for her a +complete ignorance of existence, a sort of eclipse, and a veritable +childhood. When the soul leaves an earthly body, having her spirit +still troubled by these moist vapors, she develops a shadow that +weights her down; for a spirit of this kind naturally tends to descend +into the depths of the earth, unless it be held up and raised by a +higher cause. Just as the soul is attached to the earth by her earthly +vesture, so the moist spirit(ual body) to which the soul is united +makes her drag after her an image which weights down the soul. The soul +surrounds herself with moist vapors when she mingles with a nature that +in its operations is moist or subterranean. But if the soul separate +from this nature, immediately around her shines a dry light, without +shade or shadow. In fact it is humidity which forms clouds in the air; +the dryness of the atmosphere produces a dry and serene clearness. + + +FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK SIX. + +Of Sensation and Memory. + +OF SENSATION. + +24. (3) The soul contains the reasons of all things. The soul operates +according to these reasons, whether incited to activity by some +exterior object, or whether the soul be turned towards these reasons +by folding back on herself. When the soul is incited to this activity +by some exterior object, she applies her senses thereto; when she +folds back on herself, she applies herself to thoughts. It might be +objected that the result is that there is neither sensation nor thought +without imagination; for just as in the animal part, no sensation +occurs without an impression produced on the organs of sense; likewise +there is no thought without imagination. Certainly, an analogy obtains +between both cases. Just as the sense-image (type) results from the +impression experienced by sensation, likewise the intellectual image +(phantasm) results from thought. + + +OF MEMORY. + +25. (2) Memory does not consist in preserving images. It is the faculty +of reproducing the conceptions with which our soul has been occupied. + + +FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. + +Of Generation and of the Order of Things that Follow the First. + +OF THE PROCESSION OF BEINGS. + +26. When incorporeal hypostatic substances descend, they split up +and multiply, their power weakening as they apply themselves to the +individual. When, on the contrary, they rise, they simplify, unite, and +their power intensifies. + +27. In the life of incorporeal entities, the procession operates in a +manner such that the superior principle remains firm and substantial +in its nature, imparting its existence to what is below it, without +losing anything, or transforming itself into anything. Thus that which +receives existence does not receive existence with decay or alteration; +it is not begotten like generation (that is, the being of sense), which +participates in decay and change. It is, therefore, non-begotten and +incorruptible, because it is produced without generation or corruption. + +28. Every begotten thing derives the cause of its generation from some +other (being); for nothing is begotten causelessly. But, among begotten +things, those which owe their being to a union of elements are on +that very account perishable. As to those which, not being composite, +owe their being to the simplicity of their hypostatic substances, +they are imperishable, inasmuch as they are indissoluble. When we say +that they are begotten, we do not mean that they are composite, but +only that they depend on some cause. Thus bodies are begotten doubly, +first because they depend on a cause, and then because they are +composite. Souls and intelligence, indeed, are begotten in the respect +that they depend on a cause; but not in the respect that they are +composite. Therefore, bodies, being doubly begotten, are dissoluble and +perishable. The Soul and Intelligence, being unbegotten in the sense +that they are not composite, are indissoluble and imperishable; for +they are begotten only in the sense that they depend on a cause. + +29. Every principle that generates, by virtue of its "being," is +superior to the product it generates. Every generated being naturally +turns towards its generating principle. Of the generating principles, +some (the universal and perfect substances) do not turn towards their +product; while others (the substances that are individual, and subject +to conversion towards the manifold) partly turn towards their product, +and remain partly turned towards themselves; while others entirely turn +towards their product, and do not turn at all towards themselves. + + +OF THE RETURN OF BEINGS TO THE FIRST. + +30. Of the universal and perfect hypostatic substances, none turns +towards its product. All perfect hypostatic substances return to the +principles that generated them. The very body of the world, by the +mere fact of its perfection, is converted to the intelligent Soul, and +that is the cause of its motion being circular. The Soul of the world +is converted to Intelligence, and this to the First.[332] All beings, +therefore, aspire to the First, each in the measure of its ability, +from the very lowest in the ranks of the universe up. This anagogical +return of beings to the First is necessary, whether it be mediate or +immediate. So we may say that beings not only aspire to the First, +but that each being enjoys the First according to its capacity.[333] +The individual hypostatic substances, however, that are subject to +declining towards manifoldness, naturally turn not only towards their +author, but also towards their product. That is the cause of (any +subsequent) fall and unfaithfulness. Matter perverts them because they +possess the possibility of inclining towards it, though they are also +able to turn towards the divinity. That is how perfection makes second +rank beings be born of the first principles, and then be converted +towards them. It is, on the contrary, the result of imperfection, to +turn higher entities to lower things, inspiring them with love for that +which, before them, withdrew from the first principles (in favor of +matter). + + +FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE. + +Of the Hypostases that Mediate Knowledge, and of the Superior Principle. + +INTELLIGENCE KNOWS ITSELF BY A CONVERSION TO HERSELF. + +31. (1) When one being subsists by dependence on any other, and not +by self-dependence and withdrawal from any other, it could not turn +itself towards itself to know itself by separating from (the substrate) +by which it subsists. By withdrawing from its own existence it would +alter and perish. But when one being cognizes itself by withdrawal +from that to which it is united, when it grasps itself as independent +of that being, and succeeds in doing so without exposing itself +to destruction, it evidently does not derive its "being" or nature +from the being from which it can, without perishing, withdraw, to +face itself, and know itself independently. If sight, and in general +all sensation do not feel itself, nor perceive itself on separating +from the body, and do not subsist by itself; if, on the contrary, +intelligence think better by separating from the body, and can be +converted to itself without perishing, evidently sense-faculties are +actualized only by help of the body, while intelligence actualizes and +exists by itself, and not by the body. + + +THE ACTUALIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE IS ETERNAL AND INDIVISIBLE. + +32. (3, 5-7) There is a difference between intelligence and the +intelligible, between sensation and that which can be sensed. The +intelligible is united to intelligence as that which can be sensed is +connected with sensation. But sensation cannot perceive itself.... +As the intelligible is united to Intelligence, it is grasped by +intelligence and not by sensation. But intelligence is intelligible for +intelligence. Since then intelligence is intelligible for intelligence, +intelligence is its own object. If intelligence be intelligible, but +not "sensible," it is an intelligible object. Being intelligible +by intelligence, but not by sensation, it will be intelligent. +Intelligence, therefore, is simultaneously thinker and thought, all +that thinks and all that is thought. Its operation, besides, is not +that of an object that rubs and is rubbed: "It is not a subject in some +one part of itself, and in some other, object of thought; it is simple, +it is entirely intelligible for itself as a whole."[334] The whole of +intelligence excludes any idea of unintelligence. It does not contain +one part that thinks, while another would not think; for then, in so +far as it would not think, "it would be unintelligent." It does not +abandon one object to think of another; for it would cease to think the +object it abandoned. If, therefore, intelligence do not successively +pass from one object to another, it thinks simultaneously; it does not +think first one (thought) and then another; it thinks everything as in +the present, and as always.... + +If intelligence think everything as at present, if it know no past nor +future, its thought is a simple actualization, which excludes every +interval of time. It, therefore, contains everything together, in +respect to time. Intelligence, therefore, thinks, all things according +to unity, and in unity, without anything falling in in time or in +space. If so, intelligence is not discursive, and is not (like the +soul) in motion; it is an actualization, which is according to unity, +and in unity, which shuns all chance development and every discursive +operation.[335] If, in intelligence, manifoldness be reduced to unity, +and if the intellectual actualization be indivisible, and fall not +within time, we shall have to attribute to such a "being" eternal +existence in unity. Now that happens to be "aeonial" or everlasting +existence.[336] Therefore, eternity constitutes the very "being" (or +nature) of intelligence. The other kind of intelligence, that does +not think according to unity, and in unity, which falls into change, +and into movement, which abandons one object to think another, which +divides, and gives itself up to a discursive action, has time as +"being" (or nature). + +The distinction of past and future suits its action. When passing from +one object to another, the soul changes thoughts; not indeed that +the former perish, or that the latter suddenly issue from some other +source; but the former, while seeming to have disappeared, remain in +the soul; and the latter, while seeming to come from somewhere else, do +not really do so, but are born from within the soul, which moves only +from one object to another, and which successively directs her gaze +from one to another part of what she possesses. She resembles a spring +which, instead of flowing outside, flows back into itself in a circle. +It is this (circular) movement of the soul that constitutes time, just +as the permanence of intelligence in itself constitutes (aeonial) +eternity. Intelligence is not separated from eternity, any more than +the soul is from time. Intelligence and eternity form but a single +hypostatic form of existence. That which moves simulates eternity by +the indefinite perpetuity of its movement, and that which remains +immovable, simulates time by seeming to multiply its continual present, +in the measure that time passes. That is why some have believed that +time manifested in rest as well as in movement, and that eternity was +no more than the infinity of time. To each of these two (different +things) the attributes of the other were mistakenly attributed. The +reason of this is that anything that ever persists in an identical +movement gives a good illustration of eternity by the continuousness of +its movement; while that which persists in an identical actualization +represents time by the permanence of its actualization. Besides, in +sense-objects, duration differs according to each of them. There is a +difference between the duration of the course of the sun, and that of +the moon, as well as that of Venus, and so on. There is a difference +between the solar year, and the year of each of these stars. Different, +further, is the year that embraces all the other years, and which +conforms to the movement of the soul, according to which the stars +regulate their movements. As the movement of the soul differs from the +movement of the stars, so also does its time differ from that of the +stars; for the divisions of this latter kind of time correspond to +the spaces travelled by each star, and by its successive passages in +different places. + + +INTELLIGENCE IS MANIFOLD. + +33. (10-12) Intelligence is not the principle of all things; for it +is manifold. Now the manifold presupposes the One. Evidently, it is +intelligence that is manifold; the intelligibles that it thinks do +not form unity, but manifoldness, and they are identical therewith. +Therefore, since intelligence and the intelligible entities are +identical, and as the intelligible entities form a manifoldness, +intelligence itself is manifold. + +The identity of intelligence and of intelligible entities may be +demonstrated as follows. The object that intelligence contemplates +must be in it, or exist outside of itself. It is, besides, evident, +that intelligence contemplates; since, for intelligence, to think is +to be intelligence,[337] therefore, to abstract its thought would be +to deprive it of its "being." This being granted, we must determine in +what manner intelligence contemplates its object. We shall accomplish +this by examining the different faculties by which we acquire various +kinds of knowledge, namely, sensation, imagination and intelligence. + +The principle which makes use of the senses contemplates only by +grasping exterior things, and far from uniting itself to the objects +of its contemplation, from this perception it gathers no more than +an image. Therefore when the eye sees the visible object, it cannot +identify itself with this object; for it would not see it, unless it +were at a certain distance therefrom. Likewise if the object of touch +confused itself with the organ that touches it, it would disappear. +Therefore the senses, and the principle that makes use of the +senses, apply themselves to what is outside of them to perceive this +sense-object. + +Likewise imagination applies its attention to what is outside of it to +form for itself an image of it; it is by this very attention to what +is outside of it that it represents to itself the object of which it +forms an image as exterior. + +That is how sensation and imagination perceive their objects. Neither +of these two faculties folds itself back on itself, nor concentrates +on itself, whether the object of their perception be a corporeal or +incorporeal form. + +Not in this manner is intelligence perceived; this can occur only by +turning towards itself, and by contemplating itself. If it left the +contemplation of its own actualizations, if it ceased to be their +contemplation (or, intuition), it would no longer think anything. +Intelligence perceives the intelligible entity as sensation perceives +the sense-object, by intuition. But in order to contemplate the +sense-object, sensation applies to what is outside of it, because +its object is material. On the contrary, in order to contemplate the +intelligible entity, intelligence concentrates in itself, instead of +applying itself to what is outside of it. That is why some philosophers +have thought that there was only a nominal difference between +intelligence and imagination; for they believed that intelligence +was the imagination of the reasonable animal; as they insisted that +everything should depend on matter and on corporeal nature, they +naturally had to make intelligence also depend therefrom. But our +intelligence contemplates natures (or, "beings"). Therefore, (according +to the hypothesis of these philosophers) our intelligence will +contemplate these natures as located in some place. But these natures +are outside of matter; consequently, they could not be located in any +place. It is therefore evident that the intelligible entities had to be +posited as within intelligence. + +If the intelligible entities be within intelligence, intelligence will +contemplate intelligible entities and will contemplate itself while +contemplating them; by understanding itself, it will think, because it +will understand intelligible entities. Now intelligible entities form +a multitude, for[338] intelligence thinks a multitude of intelligible +entities, and not a unity; therefore, intelligence is manifold. But +manifoldness presupposes unity; consequently, above intelligence, the +existence of unity will be necessary. + +34. (5) Intellectual being is composed of similar parts, so that +existing beings exist both in individual intelligence, and in universal +Intelligence. But, in universal Intelligence, individual (entities) are +themselves conceived universally; while in individual intelligence, +universal beings as well as individual beings are conceived +individually. + + +SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR. + +The One and Identical Being Is Everywhere Present As a Whole. + +OF THE INCORPOREAL. + +35. The incorporeal is that which is conceived of by abstraction +of the body; that is the derivation of its name. To this genus, +according to ancient sages, belong matter, sense-form, when conceived +of apart from matter, natures, faculties, place, time, and surface. +All these entities, indeed, are called incorporeal because they are +not bodies. There are other things that are called incorporeal by a +wrong use of the word, not because they are not bodies, but because +they cannot beget bodies. Thus the incorporeal first mentioned above +subsists within the body, while the incorporeal of the second kind +is completely separated from the body, and from the incorporeal that +subsists within the body. The body, indeed, occupies a place, and the +surface does not exist outside of the body. But intelligence and +intellectual reason (discursive reason), do not occupy any place, do +not subsist in the body, do not constitute any body, and do not depend +on the body, nor on any of the things that are called incorporeal by +abstraction of the body. On the other hand, if we conceive of the void +as incorporeal, intelligence cannot exist within the void. The void, +indeed, may receive a body, but it cannot contain the actualization of +intelligence, nor serve as location for that actualization. Of the two +kinds of the incorporeal of which we have just spoken, the followers of +Zeno reject the one (the incorporeal that exists outside of the body) +and insist on the other (the incorporeal that is separated from the +body by abstraction, and which has no existence outside of the body); +not seeing that the first kind of incorporeality is not similar to +the second, they refuse all reality to the former, though they ought, +nevertheless, to acknowledge that the incorporeal (which subsists +outside of the body), is of another kind (than the incorporeal that +does not subsist outside of the body), and not to believe that, because +one kind of incorporeality has no reality, neither can the other have +any. + + +RELATION BETWEEN THE INCORPOREAL AND THE CORPOREAL. + +34. (2, 3, 4) Everything, if it be somewhere, is there in some manner +that conforms to its nature. For a body that is composed of matter, +and possesses volume, to be somewhere, means that it is located in +some place. On the contrary, the intelligible world, and in general +the existence that is immaterial, and incorporeal in itself, does not +occupy any place, so that the ubiquity of the incorporeal is not a +local presence. "It does not have one part here, and another there;" +for, if so, it would not be outside of all place, nor be without +extension; "wherever it is, it is entire; it is not present here +and absent there;" for in this way it would be contained in some one +place, and excluded from some other. "Nor is it nearer one place, and +further from some other," for only things that occupy place stand +in relations of distance. Consequently, the sense-world is present +to the intelligible in space; but the intelligible is present to +the sense-world in space; but the intelligible is present to the +sense-world without having any parts, nor being in space. When the +indivisible is present in the divisible, "it is entire in each part," +identically and numerically one. "If simple and indivisible existence +become extended and manifold, it is not in respect to the extended +and manifold existence which possesses it, not such as it really is, +but in the manner in which (simple existence) can possess (manifold +existence)." Extended and manifold existence has to become unextended +and simple in its relation with naturally extended and simple +existence, to enjoy its presence. In other terms, it is conformable to +its nature, without dividing, nor multiplying, nor occupying space, +that intelligible existence is present to existence that is naturally +divisible, manifold, and contained within a locality; but it is in +a manifold, divisible and local manner that a located existence is +present to "the existence that has no relation to space." In our +speculations on corporeal and incorporeal existence, therefore, we must +not confuse their characteristics, preserving the respective nature of +each, taking good care not to let our imagination or opinion attribute +to the incorporeal certain corporeal qualities. Nobody attributes to +bodies incorporeal characteristics, because everybody lives in daily +touch with bodies; but as it is so difficult to cognize incorporeal +natures ("beings"), only vague conceptions are formed of it, and they +cannot be grasped so long as one lets oneself be guided by imagination. +One has to say to oneself, a being known by the senses is located +in space, and is outside of itself because it has a volume; "the +intelligible being is not located in space, but in itself," because +it has no volume. The one is a copy, the other is an archetype; the +one derives its existence from the intelligible, the other finds it in +itself; for every image is an image of intelligence. The properties of +the corporeal and the incorporeal must be clearly kept in mind so as to +avoid surprise at their difference, in spite of their union, if indeed +it be permissible to apply the term "union" to their mutual relation; +for we must not think of the union of corporeal substances, but of +the union of substances whose properties are completely incompatible, +according to the individuality of their hypostatic form of existence. +Such union differs entirely from that of "homoousian" substances of +the same nature; consequently, it is neither a blend, nor a mixture, +nor a real union, nor a mere collocation. The relation between the +corporeal and the incorporeal is established in a different manner, +which manifests in the communication of "homoousian" substances of the +sense nature, of which, however, no corporeal operation can give any +idea. The incorporeal being is wholly without extension in all the +parts of the extended being, even though the number of these parts were +infinite. "It is present in an indivisible manner, without establishing +a correspondence between each of its parts with the parts of the +extended being;" it does not become manifold merely because, in a +manifold manner, it is present to a multitude of parts. The whole of it +is entire in all the parts of the extended being, in each of them, and +in the whole mass, without dividing or becoming manifold to enter into +relations with the manifold, preserving its numerical identity.[339] It +is only to beings whose power is dispersed that it belongs to possess +the intelligible by parts and by fractions. Often these beings, on +changing from their nature, imitate intelligible beings by a deceptive +appearance, and we are in doubt about their nature ("being"), for they +seem to have exchanged it for that of incorporeal "being," or essence. + + +THE INCORPOREAL HAS NO EXTENSION. + +37. (5) That which really exists has neither great nor small. Greatness +and smallness are attributes of corporeal mass. By its identity and +numerical unity, real existence is neither great nor small, neither +very large nor very small, though it cause even greatest and smallest +to participate in its nature. It must not, therefore, be represented +as great, for in that case we could not conceive how it could be +located in the smallest space without being diminished or condensed. +Nor should it be represented as small, which conception of it would +hinder our understanding how it could be present in a whole large body +without being increased or extended. We must try to gain a simultaneous +conception of both that which is very large and very small, and realize +real existence as preserving its identity and its indwelling in itself +in any chance body whatever, along with an infinity of other bodies of +different sizes. It is united to the extension of the world, without +extending itself, or uniting, and it exceeds the extension of the world +as well as that of its parts, by embracing them within its unity. +Likewise, the world unites with real existence by all its parts, so far +as its nature allows it to do so, though it cannot, however, embrace +it entirely, nor contain its whole power. Real existence is infinite +and incomprehensible for the world because, among other attributes, it +possesses that of having no extension. + +38. Great[340] magnitude is a hindrance for a body, if, instead of +comparing it to things of the same kind, it is considered in relation +with things of a different nature; for volume is, as it were, a kind +of procession of existence outside of itself, and a breaking up of +its power. That which possesses a superior power is alien to all +extension; for potentiality does not succeed in realizing its fulness +until it concentrates within itself; it needs to fortify itself to +acquire all its energy. Consequently the body, by extending into +space, loses its energy, and withdraws from the potency that belongs +to real and incorporeal existence; but real existence does not weaken +in extension, because, having no extension, it preserves the greatness +of its potency. Just as, in relation to the body, real existence has +neither extension nor volume, likewise corporeal existence, in relation +to real existence, is weak and impotent. The existence that possesses +the greatest power does not occupy any extension. Consequently, though +the world fill space, though it be everywhere united to real extension, +it could not, nevertheless, embrace the greatness of its potency. It +is united to real existence, not by parts, but in an indivisible and +indefinite manner. Therefore, the incorporeal is present to the body, +not in a local manner, but by assimilation, so far as the body is +capable of being assimilated to the incorporeal, and as the incorporeal +can manifest in it. The incorporeal is not present to the material, +in so far as the material is incapable of being assimilated to a +completely immaterial principle; however, the incorporeal is present to +the corporeal in so far as the corporeal can be assimilated thereto. +Nor is the incorporeal present to the material by receptivity (in +the sense that one of these two substances would receive something +from the other); otherwise the material and the immaterial would be +altered; the former, on receiving the immaterial, into which it would +be transformed, and the latter, on becoming material. Therefore, when +a relation is established between two substances that are as different +as the corporeal and the incorporeal, an assimilation and participation +that is reciprocal to the power of the one, and the impotence of +the other, occurs. That is why the world always remains very distant +from the power of real existence, and the latter from the impotence +of material nature. But that which occupies the middle, that which +simultaneously assimilates and is assimilated, that which unites the +extremes, becomes a cause of error in respect to them, because the +substances it brings together by assimilation are very different. + + +RELATION OF INDIVIDUAL SOULS TO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. + +39. "It[341] would be wrong to suppose that the manifoldness of souls +was derived from the manifoldness of bodies. The individual souls, +as well as the universal Soul, subsist independently of the bodies, +without the unity of the universal Soul absorbing the manifoldness of +individual souls, and without the manifoldness of the latter splitting +up the unity of the universal Soul." Individual souls are distinct +without being separated from each other, and without dividing the +universal Soul into a number of parts; they are united to each other +without becoming confused, and without making the universal Soul a +mere total; "for they are not separated by limits," and they are not +confused with each other; "they are as distinct from each other as +different sciences in a single soul." Further, individual souls are +not contained in the universal Soul as if they were bodies, that +is, like really different substances (?), for they are qualitative +actualizations of the soul. Indeed, "the power of the universal Soul +is infinite," and all that participates in her is soul; all the souls +form the universal Soul, and, nevertheless, the universal Soul exists +independently of all individual souls. Just as one does not arrive +at the incorporeal by infinite division of bodies, seeing that such +a division would modify them only in respect to magnitude, likewise, +on infinitely dividing the soul, which is a living form, we reach +nothing but species (not individuals); for the Soul contains specific +differences, and she exists entire with them as well as without +them. Indeed, though the Soul should be divided within herself, her +diversity does not destroy her identity. If the unity of bodies, in +which manifoldness prevails over identity, is not broken up by their +union with an incorporeal principle; if, on the contrary, all of them +possess the unity of "being" or substance, and are divided only by +qualities and other forms; what shall we say or think of the species +of incorporeal life, where identity prevails over manifoldness, and +where there is no substrate alien to form, and from which bodies might +derive their unity? The unity of the Soul could not be split up by +her union with a body, though the body often hinder her operations. +Being identical, the Soul discovers everything by herself, because her +actualizations are species, however far the division be carried. When +the Soul is separated from bodies, each of her parts possesses all +the powers possessed by the Soul herself, just as an individual seed +has the same properties as the universal Seed (seminal reason). As +an individual seed, being united to matter, preserves the properties +of the universal Seed (seminal reason), and as, on the other hand, +universal Seed possesses all the properties of the individual seeds +dispersed within matter, thus the parts which we conceive of in the +(universal) Soul that is separated from matter, possess all the powers +of the universal Soul.[342] The individual soul, which declines towards +matter, is bound to the matter by the form which her disposition has +made her choose; but she preserves the powers of the universal Soul, +and she unites with her when the (individual soul) turns away from the +body, to concentrate within herself. + +Now as in the course of her declination towards matter, the soul is +stripped entirely bare by the total exhaustion of her own faculties; +and as, on the contrary, on rising towards intelligence, she recovers +the fulness of the powers of the universal Soul,[343] the ancient +philosophers were right, in their mystic phrasing, to describe these +two opposite conditions of the Soul by the names of Penia and Poros, +(Wealth and Poverty).[344] + + +SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE. + +The One and Identical Being is Everywhere Present In Its Entirety.[345] + +THE INCORPOREAL BEING IS ENTIRE IN EVERYTHING. + +40. Better[346] to express the special nature of incorporeal existence +the ancient philosophers, particularly Parmenides,[347] do not content +themselves with saying "it is one," but they also add "and all," just +as a sense-object is a whole. But as this unity of the sense-object +contains a diversity (for in the sense-object the total unity is not +all things in so far as it is one, and as all things constitute the +total unity). The ancient philosophers also add, "in so far as it is +one." This was to prevent people from imagining a collective whole +and to indicate that the real being is all, only by virtue of its +indivisible unity. After having said, "it is everywhere," they add, "it +is nowhere." Then, after having said, "it is in all," that is, in all +individual things whose disposition enables them to receive it, they +still add, as an entire whole. They represent it thus simultaneously +under the most opposite attributes, so as to eliminate all the false +imaginations which are drawn from the natures of the bodies, and which +will only obscure the genuine idea of real existence. + + +DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE INTELLIGIBLE BEING, AND THE BEING OF SENSATION. + +41. Such[348] are the genuine characteristics of the sensual and +material; it is extended, mutable, always different from what it +was, and composite; it does not subsist by itself, it is located in +a place, and has volume, and so forth. On the contrary, the real +being that is self-subsisting, is founded on itself, and is always +identical; its nature ("being") is identity, it is essentially +immutable, simple, indissoluble, without extension, and outside of all +place; it is neither born, nor does it perish. So let us define these +characteristics of the sensual and veritable existence, and let us put +aside all other attributes. + +42. Real[349] existence is said to be manifold, without its really +being different in space, volume, number, figure, or extension of +parts; its division is a diversity without matter, volume, or real +manifoldness. Consequently, the real being is one. Its unity does not +resemble that of a body, of a place, of a volume, of a multitude. It +possesses diversity in unity. Its diversity implies both division +and union; for it is neither exterior nor incidental; real existence +is not manifold by participation in some other (nature), but by +itself. It remains one by exercising all its powers, because it holds +its diversity from its very identity, and not by an assemblage of +heterogeneous parts, such as bodies. The latter possess unity in +diversity; for, in them, it is diversity that dominates, the unity +being exterior and incidental. In real existence, on the contrary, +it is unity that dominates with identity; diversity is born of the +development of the power of unity. Consequently, real existence +preserves its indivisibility by multiplying itself; while the body +preserves its volume and multiplicity by unifying itself. Real +existence is founded on itself, because it is one by itself. The +body is never founded upon itself, because it subsists only by its +extension. Real existence is, therefore, a fruitful unity, and the body +is a unified multitude. We must, therefore, exactly determine how real +existence is both one and manifold, how the body is both manifold and +one, and we must guard from confusing the attributes of either. + + +THE DIVINITY IS EVERYWHERE AND NOWHERE. + +43. The divinity[350] is everywhere because it is nowhere. So also with +intelligence and the soul. But it is in relation to all beings that it +surpasses, that the divinity is everywhere and nowhere; its presence +and its absence depend entirely on its nature and its will.[351] +Intelligence is in the divinity, but it is only in relation to the +things that are subordinated to it, that intelligence is everywhere and +nowhere (?). The body is within the soul and in divinity. All things +that possess or do not possess existence proceed from divinity, and are +within divinity; but the divinity is none of them, nor in any of them. +If the divinity were only present everywhere, it would be all things, +and in all things; but, on the other hand, it is nowhere; everything, +therefore, is begotten in it and by it, because it is everywhere, but +nothing becomes confused with it, because it is nowhere. Likewise if +intelligence be the principle of the souls and of the things that come +after the souls, it is because it is everywhere and nowhere; because +it is neither soul, nor any of the things that come after the soul, +nor in any of them; it is because it is not only everywhere, but also +nowhere in respect to the beings that are inferior to it. Similarly +the soul is neither a body, nor in the body, but is only the cause of +the body, because she is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere in the +body. So there is procession in the universe (from what is everywhere +and nowhere), down to what can neither simultaneously be everywhere +and nowhere, and which limits itself to participating in this double +property. + + +THE HUMAN SOUL IS UNITED TO UNIVERSAL BEING BY ITS NATURE. + +44. "When[352] you have conceived of the inexhaustible and infinite +power of existence in itself, and when you begin to realize its +incessant and indefatigable nature, which completely suffices itself," +which has the privilege of being the purest life, of possessing itself +fully, of being founded upon itself, of neither desiring nor seeking +anything outside of itself, "you should not attribute to it any +special determination," or any relation; for when you limit yourself +by some consideration of space or relation, you doubtlessly do not +limit existence in itself, but you turn away from it, extending the +veil of imagination over your thought. "You can neither transgress, +nor fix, nor determine, nor condense within narrow limits, the +nature of existence in itself, as if it had nothing further to give +beyond (certain limits), exhausting itself gradually." It is the +most inexhaustible spring of which you can form a notion. "When you +will have achieved (?) that nature, and when you will have become +assimilated to eternal existence, seek nothing beyond." Otherwise, +you will be going away from it, you will be directing your glances on +something else. "If you do not seek anything beyond," if you shrink +within yourself and into your own nature, "you will become assimilated +to universal Existence, and you will not halt at anything inferior +to it. Do not say, That is what I am. Forgetting what you are (?), +you will become universal Existence. You were already universal +Existence, but you had something besides; by that mere fact you were +inferior, because that possession of yours that was beyond universal +Existence was derived from nonentity. Nothing can be added to universal +Existence." When we add to it something derived from nonentity, we +fall into poverty and into complete deprivation. "Therefore, abandon +nonentity, and you will fully possess yourself, (in that you will +acquire universal existence by putting all else aside; for, so long as +one remains with the remainder, existence does not manifest; and does +not grant its presence)." Existence is discovered by putting aside +everything that degrades and diminishes it, ceasing to confuse it with +inferior objects, and ceasing to form a false idea of it. Otherwise +one departs both from existence and from oneself. Indeed, when one +is present to oneself, he possesses the existence that is present +everywhere; when one departs from himself, he also departs from it. So +important is it for the soul to acquaint herself with what is in her, +and to withdraw from what is outside of her; for existence is within +us, and nonentity is outside of us. Now existence is present within us, +when we are not distracted from it by other things. "It does not come +near us to make us enjoy its presence. It is we who withdraw from it, +when it is not present with us." Is there anything surprising in this? +To be near existence, you do not need to withdraw from yourselves; for +"you are both far from existence and near it, in this sense that it is +you who come near to it, and you who withdraw from it, when, instead of +considering yourselves, you consider that which is foreign to you." If +then you are near existence while being far from it; if, by the mere +fact of your being ignorant of yourselves, you know all things to which +you are present, and which are distant from you, rather than yourself +who is naturally near you, is there anything surprising in that, that +which is not near you should remain foreign to you, since you withdraw +from it when you withdraw from yourself? Though you should always be +near yourself, and though you cannot withdraw from it, you must be +present with yourself to enjoy the presence of the being from which +you are so substantially inseparable as from yourself. In that way it +is given you to know what exists near existence, and what is distant +from it, though itself be present everywhere and nowhere. He who by +thought can penetrate within his own substance, and can thus acquire +knowledge of it, finds himself in this actualization of knowledge and +consciousness, where the substrate that knows is identical with the +object that is known. Now when a man thus possesses himself, he also +possesses existence. He who goes out of himself to attach himself to +external objects, withdraws also from existence, when withdrawing +also from himself. It is natural to us to establish ourselves within +ourselves, where we enjoy the whole wealth of our own resources, and +not to turn ourselves away from ourselves towards what is foreign to +ourselves, and where we find nothing but the most complete poverty. +Otherwise, we are withdrawing from existence, though it be near us; for +it is neither space, nor "being" (substance), nor any obstacle that +separates us from existence; it is our reversion towards nonentity. Our +alienation from ourselves, and our ignorance are thus a just punishment +of our withdrawal from existence. On the contrary, the love that the +soul has for herself leads her to self-knowledge and communion with the +divinity. Consequently, it has rightly been said that man here below is +in a prison, because he has fled from heaven[353] ... and because he +tries to break his bonds; for, when he turns towards things here below, +he has abandoned himself, and has withdrawn from his divine origin. +It is, (as Empedocles says), "a fugitive who has deserted his heavenly +fatherland."[354] That is why the life of a vicious man is a life that +is servile, impious, and unjust, and his spirit is full of impiety and +injustice.[355] On the contrary, justice, as has been rightly said, +consists in each one fulfilling his function (?). To distribute to each +person his due is genuine justice. + + + + +PSYCHOLOGICAL FRAGMENTS. + + +A. On the Faculties of the Soul, by Porphyry.[356] + + +OBJECT OF THE BOOK. + +We propose to describe the faculties of the soul, and to set forth +the various opinions on the subject held by both ancient and modern +thinkers. + + +DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SENSATION AND INTELLIGENCE. + +Aristo (there were two philosophers by this name, one a Stoic, the +other an Aristotelian) attributes to the soul a perceptive faculty, +which he divides into two parts. According to him, the first, called +sensibility, the principle and origin of sensations, is usually kept +active by some one of the sense-organs. The other, which subsists +by itself, and without organs, does not bear any special name in +beings devoid of reason, in whom reason does not manifest, or at +least manifests only in a feeble or obscure manner; however, it is +called intelligence in beings endowed with reason, among whom alone +it manifests clearly. Aristo holds that sensibility acts only with +the help of the sense-organs, and that intelligence does not need +them to enter into activity. Why then does he subordinate both of +these to a single genus, called the perceptive faculty? Both doubtless +perceive, but the one perceives the sense-form of beings, while the +other perceives their essence. Indeed, sensibility does not perceive +the essence, but the sense-form, and the figure; it is intelligence +that perceives whether the object be a man or a horse. There are, +therefore, two kinds of perception that are very different from each +other; sense-perception receives an impression, and applies itself to +an exterior object; on the contrary, intellectual perception does not +receive any impression. + +There have been philosophers who separated these two parts; they called +intelligence or discursive reason the understanding which is exercised +without imagination and sensation; and opinion, the understanding +which is exercised with imagination and sensation. Others, on the +contrary, considered rational "being," or nature, a simple essence, +and attributed to it operations whose nature is entirely different. +Now it is unreasonable to refer to the same essence faculties which +differ completely in nature; for thought and sensation could not depend +on the same essential principle; and if we were to call the operation +of intelligence a perception, we would only be juggling with words. +We must, therefore, establish a perfectly clear distinction between +these two entities, intelligence and sensibility. On the one hand, +intelligence possesses a quite peculiar nature, as is also the case +with discursive reason, which is next below it. The function of the +former is intuitive thought, while that of the latter is discursive +thought. On the other hand, sensibility differs entirely from +intelligence, acting with or without the help of organs; in the former +case, it is called sensation; in the latter, imagination. Nevertheless, +sensation and imagination belong to the same genus. In understanding, +intuitive intelligence is superior to opinion, which applies to +sensation or imagination; this latter kind of thought, whether called +discursive thought, or anything else (such as opinion), is superior to +sensation and imagination, but inferior to intuitive thought. + + +OF ASSENT. + +Numenius, who teaches that the faculty of assent (or, combining +faculty) is capable of producing various operations, says that +representation (fancy) is an accessory of this faculty, that it does +not, however, constitute either an operation or function of it, but +a consequence of it. The Stoics, on the contrary, not only make +sensation consist in representation, but even reduce representation +to (combining) assent. According to them sense-imagination (or +sense-fancy) is assent, or the sensation of the determination of +assent. Longinus, however, does not acknowledge any faculty of assent. +The philosophers of the ancient Academy (the Platonists) believe +that sensation does not comprise sense-representation, and that, +consequently, it does not have any original property, since it does +not participate in assent. If sense representation consisted of assent +added to sensation, sensation, by itself, will have no virtue, since it +is not the assent given to the things we possess. + + +OF THE PARTS OF THE SOUL. + +It is not only about the faculties that the ancient philosophers +disagree.... They are besides in radical disagreement about the +following questions: What are the parts of the soul; what is a part; +what is a faculty; what difference is there between a part and a +faculty? + +The Stoics divide the soul into eight parts: the five senses, speech, +sex-power, and the directing (predominating) principle, which is served +by the other faculties, so that the soul is composed of a faculty that +commands, and faculties that obey. + +In their writing about ethics, Plato and Aristotle divide the soul into +three parts. This division has been adopted by the greater part of +later philosophers; but these have not understood that the object of +this definition was to classify and define the virtues (Plato: reason, +anger and appetite; Aristotle: locomotion, appetite and understanding). +Indeed, if this classification be carefully scrutinized, it will be +seen that it fails to account for all the faculties of the soul; it +neglects imagination, sensibility, intelligence, and the natural +faculties (the generative and nutritive powers). + +Other philosophers, such as Numenius, do not teach one soul in three +parts, like the preceding, nor in two, such as the rational and +irrational parts. They believe that we have two souls, one rational, +the other irrational. Some among them attribute immortality to both of +the souls; others attribute it only to the rational soul, and think +that death not only suspends the exercise of the faculties that belong +to the irrational soul, but even dissolves its "being" or essence. +Last, there are some that believe, that by virtue of the union of the +two souls, their movements are double, because each of them feels the +passions of the other. + + +OF THE DIFFERENCE OF THE PARTS, AND OF THE FACULTIES OF THE SOUL. + +We shall now explain the difference obtaining between a part +and a faculty of the soul. One part differs from another by the +characteristics of its genus (or, kind); while different faculties may +relate to a common genus. That is why Aristotle did not allow that the +soul contained parts, though granting that it contained faculties. +Indeed, the introduction of a new part changes the nature of the +subject, while the diversity of faculties does not alter its unity. +Longinus did not allow in the animal (or, living being) for several +parts, but only for several faculties. In this respect, he followed the +doctrine of Plato, according to whom the soul, in herself indivisible, +is divided within bodies. Besides, that the soul does not have several +parts does not necessarily imply that she has only a single faculty; +for that which has no parts may still possess several faculties. + +To conclude this confused discussion, we shall have to lay down a +principle of definition which will help to determine the essential +differences and resemblances that exist either between the parts of a +same subject, or between its faculties, or between its parts and its +faculties. This will clearly reveal whether in the organism the soul +really has several parts, or merely several faculties, and what opinion +about them should be adopted. (For there are two special types of +these.) The one attributes to man a single soul, genuinely composed of +several parts, either by itself, or in relation to the body. The other +one sees in man a union of several souls, looking on the man as on a +choir, the harmony of whose parts constitutes its unity, so that we +find several essentially different parts contributing to the formation +of a single being. + +First we shall have to study within the soul the differentials between +the part, the faculty and the disposition. A part always differs from +another by the substrate, genus, and function. A disposition in a +special aptitude of some one part to carry out the part assigned to it +by nature. A faculty is the habit of a disposition, the power inherent +in some part to do the thing for which it has a disposition. There +was no great inconvenience in confusing faculty and disposition; but +there is an essential difference between part and faculty. Whatever +the number of faculties, they can exist within a single "being," or +nature, without occupying any particular point in the extension of the +substrate, while the parts somewhat participate in its extension, +occupying therein a particular point. Thus all the properties of an +apple are gathered within a single substrate, but the different parts +that compose it are separate from each other. The notion of a part +implies the idea of quantity in respect to the totality of the subject. +On the contrary, the notion of a faculty implies the idea of totality. +That is why the faculties remain indivisible, because they penetrate +the whole substrate, while the parts are separate from each other +because they have a quantity. + +How then may we say that a soul is indivisible, while having three +parts? For when we hear it asserted that she contains three parts +in respect to quantity, it is reasonable to ask how the soul can +simultaneously be indivisible, and yet have three parts. This +difficulty may be solved as follows: the soul is indivisible in so far +as she is considered within her "being," and in herself; and that she +has three parts in so far as she is united to a divisible body, and +that she exercises her different faculties in the different parts of +the body. Indeed, it is not the same faculty that resides in the head, +in the breast, or in the liver;[357] (the seats of reason, of anger +and appetite). Therefore, when the soul has been divided into several +parts, it is in this sense that her different functions are exercised +within different parts of the body. + +Nicholas (of Damascus[358]), in his book "On the Soul," used to say +that the division of the soul was not founded on quantity, but on +quality, like the division of an art or a science. Indeed, when we +consider an extension, we see that the whole is a sum of its parts, +and that it increases or diminishes according as a part is added or +subtracted. Now it is not in this sense that we attribute parts to +the soul; she is not the sum of her parts, because she is neither an +extension nor a multitude. The parts of the soul resemble those of an +art. There is, however, this difference, that an art is incomplete +or imperfect if it lack some part, while every soul is perfect, and +while every organism that has not achieved the goal of its nature is an +imperfect being. + +Thus by parts of the soul Nicholas means the different faculties of +the organism. Indeed, the organism, and, in general, the animated +being, by the mere fact of possessing a soul, possesses several +faculties, such as life, feeling, movement, thought, desire, and the +cause and principle of all of them is the soul. Those, therefore, who +distinguish parts in the soul thereby mean the faculties by which the +animated being can produce actualizations, or experience affections. +While the soul herself is said to be indivisible, nothing hinders her +functions from being divided. The organism, therefore, is divisible, +if we introduce within the notion of the soul that of the body; for +the vital functions by the soul communicated to the body must thereby +necessarily be divided by the diversity of the organs, and it is this +division of vital functions that has caused parts to be ascribed to +the soul herself. As the soul can be conceived of in two different +conditions, according as she lives within herself, or as she declines +towards the body,[359] it is only when she declines towards the body +that she splits up into parts. When a seed of corn is sowed, and +produces an ear, we see in this ear of corn the appearance of parts, +though the whole it forms be indivisible,[360] and these indivisible +parts themselves later return to an indivisible unity; likewise, when +the soul, which by herself is indivisible, finds herself united to the +body, parts are seen to appear. + +We must still examine which are the faculties that the soul develops +by herself (intelligence and discursive reason), and which the soul +develops by the animal (sensation). This will be the true means of +illustrating the difference between these two natures ("beings"), and +the necessity of reducing to the soul herself those parts of her +"being" which have been enclosed within the parts of the body.[361] + + +B. Jamblichus.[362] + +Plato, Archytas, and the other Pythagoreans divide the soul into three +parts, reason, anger, and appetite, which they consider to be necessary +to form the ground-work for the virtues. They assign to the soul as +faculties the natural (generative) power, sensibility, imagination, +locomotion, love of the good and beautiful, and last, intelligence. + + +C. Nemesius.[363] + +Aristotle says, in his Physics,[364] that the soul has five +faculties, the power of growth, sensation, locomotion, appetite, +and understanding. But, in his Ethics, he divides the soul into two +principal parts, which are rational part, and the irrational part; +then Aristotle subdivides the latter into the part that is subject to +reason, and the part not subject to reason. + + +D. Jamblichus.[365] + +The Platonists hold different opinions. Some, like Plotinos and +Porphyry, reduce to a single order and idea the different functions and +faculties of life; others, like Numenius, imagine them to be opposed, +as if in a struggle; while others, like Atticus and Plutarch, bring +harmony out of the struggle. + + +E. Ammonius Saccas. + +A. FROM NEMESIUS.[366] + +ON THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL. + +It will suffice to oppose the arguments of Ammonius, teacher of +Plotinos, and those of Numenius the Pythagorean, to that of all those +who claim that the soul is material. These are the reasons: "Bodies, +containing nothing unchangeable, are naturally subject to change, to +dissolution, and to infinite divisions. They inevitably need some +principle that may contain them, that may bind and strengthen their +parts; this is the unifying principle that we call soul. But if the +soul also be material, however subtle be the matter of which she may be +composed, what could contain the soul herself, since we have just seen +that all matter needs some principle to contain it? The same process +will go on continuously to infinity until we arrive at an immaterial +substance." + +UNION OF THE SOUL AND THE BODY. + +Ammonius, teacher of Plotinos, thus explained the present problem (the +union of soul and body): "The intelligible is of a nature such that it +unites with whatever is able to receive it, as intimately as the union +of things, that mutually alter each other in uniting, though, at the +same time, it remains pure and incorruptible, as do things that merely +coexist.[367] Indeed, in the case of bodies, union alters the parts +that meet, since they form new bodies; that is how elements change into +composite bodies, food into blood, blood into flesh, and other parts +of the body. But, as to the intelligible, the union occurs without any +alteration; for it is repugnant to the nature of the intelligible to +undergo an alteration in its essential nature. It disappears, or it +ceases to be, but it is not susceptible of change. Now the intelligible +cannot be annihilated; otherwise it would not be immortal; and as +the soul is life, if it changed in its union with the body, it would +become something different, and would no longer be life. What would +the soul afford to the body, if not life? In her union (with the body, +therefore), the soul undergoes no alteration. + +Since it has been demonstrated that, in its essential nature, the +intelligible is immutable, the necessary result must be that it does +not alter at the same time as the entities to which it is united. The +soul, therefore, is united to the body, but she does not form a mixture +with it.[368] The sympathy that exists between them shows that they are +united; for the entirely animated being is a whole that is sympathetic +to itself, and that is consequently really one.[369] + +What proves that the soul does not form a mixture with the body, is the +soul's power to separate from the body during sleep; leaving the body +as it were inanimate, with only a breath of life, to keep it from dying +entirely; using her own activity only in dreams, to foresee the future, +and to live in the intelligible world. + +This appears again when the soul gathers herself together to devote +herself to her thoughts; for then she separates from the body so far as +she can, and retires within herself better to be able to apply herself +to the consideration of intelligible things. Indeed, being incorporeal, +she unites with the body as closely as the union of things which by +combining together perish because of each other, (thus giving birth to +a mixture); at the same time, she remains without alteration, as two +things that are only placed by each others' side; and she preserves +her unity. Thus, according to her own life, she modifies that to which +she is united, but she is not modified thereby. Just as the sun, by +its presence, makes the air luminous, without itself changing in any +way, and thus, so to speak, mingles itself therewith, without mingling +itself (in reality), so the soul, though united with the body, remains +quite distinct therefrom. But there is this difference, that the sun, +being a body, and consequently being circumscribed within a certain +space, is not everywhere where is its light; just as the fire dwells +in the wood, or in the wick of the lamp, as if enclosed within a +locality; but the soul, being incorporeal, and not being subjected to +any local limitation, exists as a whole everywhere where her light +is; and there is no part of the body that is illuminated by the soul +in which the soul is not entirely present. It is not the body that +commands the soul; it is the soul, on the contrary, that commands the +body. She is not in the body as if in a vase or a gourd; it is rather +the body that is in the soul.[370] + +The intelligible, therefore, is not imprisoned within the body; it +spreads in all the body's parts, it penetrates them, it goes through +them, and could not be enclosed in any place; for by virtue of its +nature, it resides in the intelligible world; it has no locality other +than itself, or than an intelligible situated still higher. Thus the +soul is within herself when she reasons, and in intelligence when she +yields herself to contemplation. When it is asserted that the soul is +in the body, it is not meant that the soul is in it as in a locality; +it is only meant that the soul is in a habitual relation with the body; +and that the soul is present there, as we say that God is in us. For +we think that the soul is united to the body, not in a corporeal and +local manner, but by the soul's habitual relations, her inclination and +disposition, as a lover is attached to his beloved. Besides, as the +affection of the soul has neither extension, nor weight, nor parts, +she could not be circumscribed by local limitations. Within what place +could that which has no parts be contained? For place and corporeal +extension are inseparable; the place is limited space in which the +container contains the contained. But if we were to say, "My soul is +then in Alexandria, in Rome, and everywhere else;" we would be still +speaking of space carelessly, since being in Alexandria, or in general, +being somewhere, is being in a place; now the soul is absolutely in +no place; she can only be in some relation with some place, since it +has been demonstrated that she could not be contained within a place. +If then an intelligible entity "be in relation with a place, or with +something located in a place, we say, in a figurative manner, that +this intelligible entity is in this place, because it tends thither by +its activity; and we take the location for the inclination or for the +activity which leads it thither. If we were to say, That is where the +soul acts, we would be saying, "The soul is there." + + +B. NOTICE OF AMMONIUS BY HIEROCLES.[371] + +Then shone the wisdom of Ammonius, who is famous under the name of +"Inspired by the Divinity." It was he, in fact, who, purifying the +opinions of the ancient philosophers, and dissipating the fancies woven +here and there, established harmony between the teaching of Plato, and +that of Aristotle, in that which was most essential and fundamental.... +It was Ammonius of Alexandria, the "Inspired by the Divinity," who, +devoting himself enthusiastically to the truth in philosophy, and +rising above the popular notions that made of philosophy an object +of scorn, clearly understood the doctrine of Plato and of Aristotle, +gathered them into a single ideal, and thus peacefully handed +philosophy down to his disciples Plotinos, the (pagan) Origen, and +their successors. + + + + +PLOTINIC STUDIES IN SOURCES, DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCE. + + + + +I. DEVELOPMENT IN THE TEACHINGS OF PLOTINOS. + + +It was only through long hard work that the writer arrived at +conclusions which the reader may be disposed to accept as very +natural, under the circumstances. It is possible that the reader may, +nevertheless, be interested in the manner in which the suggestion here +advanced was reached. + +The writer had for several years been working at the premier edition +of the fragments of Numenius, in reasonably complete form, with +translation and outline. After ransacking the accessible sources of +fragments, there remained yet an alleged treatise of Numenius on +Matter, in the library of the Escoreal, near Madrid. This had been +known to savants in Germany for many years; and Prof. Uzener, of +Bonn, in his criticism of Thedinga's partial collection of fragments, +had expressed a strong desire that it be investigated; it had also +been noticed by Zeller, and Bouillet, as well as Chaignet. If then I +hoped to publish a comparatively reliable collection of the fragments +of Numenius, it was my duty, though hailing from far America, and +though no European had shown enough interest therein to send for a +photographic copy, to go there, and get one, which I did in July, 1913. +I bore the precious fragment to Rostock and Prof. Thedinga in Hagen, +where, however, we discovered that it was no more than a section of +Plotinos's Enneads, iii. 6.6 to end. The manuscript did, indeed, show +an erasure of the name of Plotinos, and the substitution of that of +Numenius. After the first disappointment, it became unavoidable to ask +the question why the monk should have done that. Had he any reason +to suppose that this represented Numenian doctrine, even if it was +not written by Numenius? Having no external data to go by, it became +necessary to resort to internal criticism, to compare this Plotinian +treatment of matter with other Plotinian treatments, in other portions +of the Enneads. + +This then inevitably led to a close scrutiny of Plotinos's various +treatments of the subject, with results that were very much unlooked +for. This part that we might well have had reason to ascribe to +Numenian influence, on the contrary, turned out to be by far +more Plotinian than other sections that we would at first have +unhesitatingly considered Plotinian, and, as will be seen elsewhere, +the really doubtful portions occur in the very last works of Plotinos's +life, where it would have been more natural to expect the most genuine. +However, the result was a demonstration of a progress in doctrines in +the career of Plotinos, and after a careful study thereof, the reader +will agree that we have in this case every element of probability in +favor of such a development; indeed, it will seem so natural that the +unbiased reader will ask himself why this idea has not before this been +the general view of the matter. + + * * * * * + +First a few words about the distinction of periods in general. +Among unreflecting people, for centuries, it has been customary +to settle disputes by appeals to the Bible as a whole. This was +always satisfactory, until somebody else came along who held totally +different views, which he supported just as satisfactorily from the +same authority. The result was the century-long bloody wars of the +Reformation, everywhere leaving in that particular place, as the +orthodox, the stronger. Since thirty years, however, the situation has +changed. The contradictions of the Bible, so long the ammunition of +scoffers of the type of Ingersoll, became the pathfinders of the Higher +Criticism, which has solved the otherwise insoluble difficulties by +showing them to rest on parallel documents, and different authors. It +is no longer sufficient to appeal to Isaiah; we must now specify which +Isaiah we mean; and we may no longer refer to the book of Genesis, but +to the Jehovistic or Elohistic documents. + +This method of criticism is slowly gaining ground with other works. The +writer, for instance, applied it with success to the Gathas, or hymns +of Zoroaster. These appear in the Yasnas in two sections which have +ever given the editors much trouble. Either they were printed in the +meaningless traditional order, or they were mixed confusedly according +to the editor's fancy, resulting of course in a fancy picture. The +writer, however, discovered they were duplicate lives of Zoroaster, and +printing them on opposite pages, he has shown parallel development, +reducing the age-long difficulties to perfectly reasonable, and +mutually confirming order. + +Another case is that of Plato. It is still considered allowable to +quote the authority of Plato, as such; but in scientific matters we +must always state which period of Plato's activities, the Plato of the +Republic, or the more conservative Plato of the Laws, and the evil +World-soul, is meant. + +Another philosopher in the same case is Schelling, among whose views +the text-books distinguish as many as five different periods. This +is no indication of mental instability, but rather a proof that he +remained awake as long as he lived. No man can indeed continue to think +with genuineness without changing his views; and only men as great as +Bacon or Emerson have had the temerity to discredit consistency when +it is no more than mental inertia. + +There are many other famous men who changed their views. Prominent +among them is Goethe, whose Second Faust, finished in old age, strongly +contrasted with the First Part. What then would be inherently unlikely +in Plotinos's changing his views during the course of half a century +of philosophical activity? On the contrary, it would be a much greater +marvel had he not done so; and the burden of proof really lies with the +partisans of unchanging opinions. + +For example: in ii. 4 we find Plotinos discussing the doctrine of two +matters, the physical and the intelligible. In the very next book, +of the same Ennead, in ii. 5.3, we find him discrediting this same +intelligible matter. Moreover, in i. 8.7, he approves of the world as +mixture; in ii. 4.7 he disapproves of it. What do these contradictions +mean? That Plotinos was unreliable? That he was mentally incoherent? +No, something much simpler. By consulting the tables of Porphyry, we +discover of the first two, that the first statement was made during +the Amelian period, and the latter during the Porphyrian. Another case +of such contradiction is his assertion of positive evil (i. 8) and +his denial thereof (ii. 9). The latter assertion is of the Porphyrian +period, the former is Eustochian; while of the latter two, the first +was Eustochian; and the second Amelian. It is simply a case of +development of doctrines at different periods of his life. + + * * * * * + +Let us now examine Plotinos's various treatments of the subject of +matter. + +The first treatment of matter occurs in the first Ennead, and it may +be described as thoroughly Numenian, being treated in conjunction with +the subject of evil. First, we have the expression of the Supreme +hovering over Being.[372] Then we have the soul double,[373] reminding +us of Numenius's view of the double Second Divinity[374] and the double +soul.[375] Then we have positive evil occurring in the absence of +good.[376] Plotinos[377] opposes the Stoic denial of evil, for he says, +"if this were all," there were no evil. We find a threefold division +of the universe without the Stoic term hypostasis, which occurs in the +treatment of the same topic elsewhere.[378] Similar to Numenius is the +King of all,[379] the blissful life of the divinities around him,[380] +and the division of the universe into three.[381] Plotinos[382] +acknowledges evil things in the world, something denied by the +Stoics,[383] but taught by Numenius, as is also original, primary +existence of evil, in itself. Evil is here said to be a hypostasis in +itself, and imparts evil qualities to other things. It is an image of +being, and a genuine nature of evil. Plotinos describes[384] matter +as flowing eternally, which reminds us unmistakably of Numenius's +image[385] of matter as a swiftly flowing stream, unlimited and +infinite in depth, breadth, and length. Evil inheres in the material +part of the body,[386] and is seen as actual, positive, darkness, +which is Numenian, as far as it means a definite principle.[387] +Plotinos also[388] insists on the ineradicability of evil, in almost +the same terms as Numenius,[389] who calls on Heraclitus and Homer as +supporters. Plotinos[390] as reason for this assigns the fact that the +world is a mixture, which is the very proof advanced by Numenius in 12. +Plotinos, moreover,[391] defines matter as that which remains after all +qualities are abstracted; this is thoroughly Numenian.[392] + +In the fourth book of the Second Ennead the treatment of matter is +original, and is based on comparative studies. Evil has disappeared +from the horizon; and the long treatment of the controversy with the +Gnostics[393] is devoted to explaining away evil as misunderstood +good. Although he begins by finding fault with Stoic materialism,[394] +he asserts two matters, the intelligible and the physical. Intelligible +matter[395] is eternal, and possesses essence. Plotinos goes on[396] +to argue for the necessity of an intelligible, as well as a physical +substrate (hypokeimenon). In the next paragraph[397] Plotinos seems +to undertake a historical polemic, against three traditional teachers +(Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus) under whose names he was +surely finding fault with their disciples: the Stoics, Numenius, and +possibly such thinkers as Lucretius. Empedocles is held responsible +for the view that elements are material, evidently a Stoical view. +Anaxagoras is held responsible for three views, which are distinctly +Numenian: that the world is a mixture,[398] that it is all in all,[399] +and that it is infinite.[400] We might, in passing, notice another +Plotinian contradiction in here condemning the world as mixture, +approved in the former passage.[401] As to the atomism of Democritus, +it is not clear with which contemporaries he was finding fault. +Intelligible matter reappears[402] where we also find again the idea +of doubleness of everything. As to the terms used by the way, we find +the Stoic categories of Otherness or Variety[403] and Motion; the +conceptual seminal logoi, and the "Koinê ousia" of matter; but in +his psychology he uses "logos" and "noêsis," instead of "nous" and +"phronesis," which are found in the Escorial section, and which are +more Stoical. We also find the Aristotelian category of energy, or +potentiality. + +In the very next book of the same Ennead,[404] we find another +treatment of matter, on an entirely different basis, accented by a +rejection of intelligible matter.[405] Here the whole basis of the +treatment of matter is the Aristotelian category of "energeia" and +"dunamis," or potentiality and actuality, Although we find the Stoic +term hypostasis, the book seems to be more Numenian, for matter is +again a positive lie, and the divinity is described by the Numenian +double name[406] of Being and Essence ("ousia" and "to on"). + +We now come to the Escorial section.[407] This is by far the most +extensive treatment of matter, and as we are chiefly interested in it +in connection with its bearing the name of Numenius at the Escorial, +we shall analyze it for and against this Numenian authorship, merely +noting that the chief purpose is to describe the impassibility of +matter, a Stoic idea. + +For Numenius as author we note: + +a. A great anxiety to preserve agreement with Plato, even to the point +of stretching definitions.[408] + +b. Plato's idea of participation, useless to monistic Stoics, is +repeatedly used.[409] Numenius had gone so far as to assert a +participation, even in the intelligibles.[410] + +c. Matter appears as the curse of all existent objects.[411] It also +appears as mother.[412] + +d. Try as he may, the author of this section cannot escape the dualism +so prominent in Numenius;[413] the acrobatic nature of his efforts in +this direction are pointed out elsewhere. We find here a thoroughgoing +distinction between soul and body, which is quite Numenian, and +dualistic.[414] + +e. Matter is passive, possessing no resiliency.[415] + +f. We find an argument directed[416] against those who "posit being in +matter." These must be the Stoics, with whom Numenius is ever in feud. + +g. Of Numenian terms, we find "sôteria,"[417] God the Father.[418] Also +the double Numenian name for the Divinity, Being and Essence.[419] + +Against Numenius as author, we note: + +a. The general form of the section, which is that of the Enneads, not +the dialogue of Numenius's Treatise on the Good. We find also the usual +Plotinic interjected questions. + +b. Un-Numenian, at least, is matter as a mirror,[420] and evil as +merely negative, merely unaffectability to good.[421] While Numenius +speaks of matter as nurse and feeder, here we read nurse and receptacle. + +c. Stoic, is the chief subject of the section, namely the affectibility +of matter. Also, the allegoric interpretation of the myths, of the +ithyphallic Hermes, and the Universal Mother, which are like the other +Plotinic myths, of the double Hercules, Poros, Penia, and Koros. We +find[422] the Stoic idea of passibility and impassibility, although not +exactly that of passion and action. We find[423] connected the terms +"nous" and "phronêsis," also "anastasis." The term hypostasis, though +used undogmatically, as mere explanation of thought, is found.[424] +Frequent[425] are the conceptual logoi of the divine Mind (the seminal +logoi) which enter into matter to clothe themselves with it, to produce +objects. We also have the Stoic category "heterotês,"[426] and the +application of sex as explanation of the differences of the world.[427] + +d. Aristotelian, are the "energeia" and "dunamis."[428] + +e. Plotinic, are the latter ideas, for they are used in the same +connection.[429] Also the myths of Poros, Penia and Koros, which are +found elsewhere in similar relations.[430] + +On the whole, therefore, the Plotinic authorship is much more strongly +indicated than the Numenian. + +The next treatment of matter in the Fourth Ennead, is +semi-stoical.[431] The opposite aspects of the Universe appear +again as "phronesis" and "phusis." We find here the Stoic doing and +suffering, and[432] hypostasis. Nevertheless, the chief process +illustrated is still the Platonic image reproduced less and less +clearly in successively more degraded spheres of being. Plotinos seems +to put himself out of the Numenian sphere of thought, referring to +it in abstract historical manner, as belonging to the successors of +Pythagoras and Pherecydes, who treated of matter as the element that +distinguished objects in the intelligible world. + +The last treatment of matter[433] seems to have reached the extreme +distance of Numenianism. Instead of a dualism, with matter an original, +positive principle, Plotinos closes his discussion by stating that +perhaps form and matter may not come from the same origin, as there is +some difference between them. He has just said that Being is common +to both form and matter, as to quality, though not as to quantity. A +little above this he insists that matter is not something original, as +it is later than many earthly, and than all intelligible objects. As +to the Numenian double name of the Divinity, Being and Essence, he had +taken from Aristotelianism the conceptions of "energeia" and "dunamis," +and added them as the supreme hypostasis, so as to form in theological +dialect the triad he, following Numenius and Plato, had always asserted +cosmologically (good, intellect, and soul): "The developed energy[434] +assumes hypostasis, as if from a great, nay, as from the greatest +hypostasis of all; and so it joins Essence and Being." + +Reviewing these various treatments of matter we might call the +first[435] Numenian; the next[436] Platonic (as most independent, and +historically treated); the next[437] as Aristotelian; the Escorial +Section as semi-Stoic;[438] as also another short notice.[439] The last +treatment of matter, in vi. 3.7, is fully Stoic, in its denial of the +evil of matter. + +How then shall we explain these differences? Chiefly by studying the +periods in which they are written, and which they therefore explain. + + * * * * * + +When we try to study the periods in Plotinos's thought, as shown in +his books, we are met with great difficulties, which are chiefly +due to Porphyry. Exactly following the contemporary methods of the +compilers of the Bible, he undiscerningly confused the writings of +the various periods, so as to make up an anthology, grouped by six +groups of nine books each, according to subjects, consisting first +of ethical disquisitions; second, of physical questions; third, +of cosmic considerations; fourth, of psychological discussions; +fifth, of transcendental lucubrations; and sixth, of metaphysics and +theology.[440] As the reader might guess from the oversymmetrical +grouping, and this pretty classification, the apparent order is only +illusory, as he may have concluded from the fact that the discussions +of matter analyzed above are scattered throughout the whole range of +this anthology. The result of this Procrustean arrangement was the same +as with the Bible: a confusion of mosaic, out of which pretty nearly +anything could be proved, and into which almost everything has been +read. Compare the outlines of the doctrines of Plotinos by Ritter, +Zeller, Ueberweg, Chaignet, Mead, Guthrie, and Drews, and it will be +seen that there is very little agreement between them, while none of +them allow for the difference between the various parts of the Enneads. + +How fearful the confusion is, will best be realized from the following +two tables, made up from the indications given in Porphyry's Life of +Plotinos. + +Porphyry gives three lists of the works of the various periods. +Identifying these in the present Ennead arrangement, they are to be +found as follows: + +The works of the Amelian period are now i. 6; iv. 7; iii. 1; iv. 2; v. +9; iv. 8; iv. 4; iv. 9; vi. 9; v. 1; v. 2; ii. 4; iii. 9; ii. 2; iii. +4; i. 9; ii. 6; v. 7; i. 2; i. 3; i. 8. + +The works of the Porphyrian period are now vi. 5, 6; v. 6; ii. 5; iii. +6; iv. 3-5; iii. 8; v. 8; v. 5; ii. 9; vi. 6; ii. 8; i. 5; ii. 7; vi. +7; vi. 8; ii. 1; iv. 6; vi. 1-3; iii. 7. + +The works of the latest or Eustochian period are: i. 4; iii. 2, 3; v. +3; iii. 5; i. 8; ii. 3; i. 1; i. 7. (For Eustochius, see Scholion to +Enn. iv. 4.29, ii. 7.86, Creuz. 1, 301 Kirchhof.) + +A more convenient table will be the converse arrangement. Following +the present normal order of the books in Enneads, we will describe +its period by a letter, referring to the Amelian period by A, to the +Porphyrian by P, and the Eustochian by E. I: EAAEPAEAA. II: PAEAPAPPP. +III: AEEAEAPPA. IV: AAPPPPAAA. V: AAEAPPAPA. VI: PPPPPPPPA. + +This artificial arrangement into Enneads should therefore be abandoned, +and in a new English translation that the writer has in mind, the books +would appear in the order of their periods, while an index would allow +easy reference by the old numbers. Then only will we be able to study +the successive changes of Plotinos's thought, in their normal mutual +relation; and it is not difficult to prophesy that important results +would follow. + + * * * * * + +Having thus achieved internal proof of development of doctrines in +Plotinos, by examination of his views about Matter, we may with some +confidence state that the externally known facts of the life of no +philosopher lend themselves to such a progress of opinions more readily +than that of Plotinos. His biographer, Porphyry, as we have seen, had +already given us a list of the works of three easily characterized +periods in Plotinos's life: the period before Porphyry came to him, +the period while Porphyry staid with him, and the later period when +Plotinos was alone, and Porphyry was in retirement (or banishment?) in +Sicily. + +An external division into periods is therefore openly acknowledged; but +it remains for us to recall its significance. + +In the first place, the reader will ask himself, how does it come about +that Plotinos is so dependent on Porphyry, and before him, on Amelius? +The answer is that Plotinos himself was evidently somewhat deficient +in the details of elementary education, however much proficiency +in more general philosophical studies, and in independent thought, +and personal magnetic touch with pupils he may have achieved. His +pronunciation was defective, and in writing he was careless, so much so +that he usually failed to affix proper headings or notice of definite +authorship.[441] These peculiarities would to some extent put him in +the power, and under the influence of his editors, and this explains +why he was dependent on Porphyry later, and Amelius earlier.[442] These +editors might easily have exerted potent, even if unconscious or merely +suggestive influence; but we know that Porphyry did not scruple to add +glosses of his own,[443] not to speak of hidden Stoic and Aristotelian +pieces,[444] for he relied on Aristotle's "Metaphysics." Besides, +Plotinos was so generally accused of pluming himself on writings of +Numenius, falsely passed off as his own, that it became necessary +for Amelius to write a book on the differences between Numenius and +Plotinos, and for Porphyry to defend his master, as well as to quote +a letter of Longinus on the subject;[445] but Porphyry does not deny +that among the writings of the Platonists Kronius, Caius, and Attikus, +and the Peripatetics Aspasius, Alexander and Adrastus, the writings of +Numenius also were used as texts in the school of Plotinos (14). + +Having thus shown the influence of the editors of Plotinos, we must +examine who and what they were. Let us however first study the general +trend of the Plotinic career. + +His last period was Stoic practise, for so zealously did he practise +austerities that his death was, at least, hastened thereby.[446] It +is unlikely that he would have followed Stoic precepts without some +sympathy for, or acquaintance with their philosophical doctrines; and +as we saw above, Porphyry acknowledges Plotinos's writings contain +hidden Stoic pieces.[447] Then, Plotinos spent the last period of his +life in Rome, where ruled, in philosophical circles, the traditions of +Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. + +That these Stoic practices became fatal to him is significant when +we remember that this occurred during the final absence of Porphyry, +who may, during his presence, have exerted a friendly restraint on +the zealous master. At any rate, it was during Porphyry's regime that +the chief works of Plotinos were written, including a bitter diatribe +against the Gnostics, who remained the chief protagonists of dualism +and belief in positive evil. Prophyry's work, "De Abstinentia," proves +clearly enough his Stoic sympathies. + +Such aggressive enmity is too positive to be accounted for by the mere +removal to Rome from Alexandria, and suggests a break of some sort +with former friends. Indications of such a break do exist, namely, +the permanent departure to his earlier home, Apamea, of his former +editor, Amelius. We hear[448] of an incident in which Amelius invited +Plotinos to come and take part in the New Moon celebrations[449] of +the mysteries. Plotinos, however, refused, on the grounds that "They +must come to me, not I go to them." Then we hear[450] of bad blood +between this Amelius and Porphyry, a long, bitter controversy, patched +up, indeed, but which cannot have failed to leave its mark. Then this +Amelius writes a book on the Differences between Plotinos and Numenius, +which, in a long letter, he inscribes to Porphyry,[451] as if the +latter were the chief one interested in these distinctions. Later, +Amelius, who before this seems to have been the chief disciple and +editor of Plotinos, departs, never to return, his place being taken by +Porphyry. It is not necessary to possess a vivid imagination to read +between the lines, especially when Plotinos, in the last work of this +period, against the Gnostics, section 10, seems to refer to friends of +his who still held to other doctrines. + +Now in order to understand the nature of the period when Amelius was +the chief disciple of Plotinos, we must recall who Amelius was. In +the first place, he hailed from the home-town of Numenius, Apamea in +Syria. He had adopted as son Hostilianus-Hesychius, who also hailed +from Apamea. And it was to Apamea that Amelius withdrew, after he +left Plotinos. We are therefore not surprised to learn that he had +written out almost all the books of Numenius, that he had gathered them +together, and learned most of them by heart.[452] Then we learn from +Proclus (see Zeller's account) that Amelius taught the trine division +of the divine creator, exactly as did Numenius. Is it any wonder, then, +that he wrote a book on the differences between Plotinos and Numenius +at a later date, when Porphyry had started a polemic with him? During +his period as disciple of Plotinos, twenty-four years in duration, +Plotinos would naturally have been under Numenian influence of some +kind, and we cannot be very far wrong in thinking that this change of +editors must have left some sort of impress on the dreamy thinker, +Plotinos, ever seeking to experience an ecstasy. + + * * * * * + +In this account of the matter we have restrained ourselves from +mentioning one of the strangest coincidences in literature, which would +have emphasized the nature of the break of Amelius with Plotinos, for +the reason that it may be no more than a chance pun; but that even as +such it must have been present to the actors in that drama, there is no +doubt. We read above that Amelius invited Plotinos to accompany him to +attend personally the mystery-celebrations at the "noumênia," a time +sacred to such celebrations.[453] But this was practically the name of +Numenius, and the text might well have been translated that Amelius +invited him to visit the celebrations as Numenius would have done; and +indeed, from all we know of Numenius, with his initiation at Eleusis +and in Egypt, that is just of what we might have supposed he would have +approved. In other words, we would discover Amelius in the painful act +of choice between the two great influences of his life, Numenius, and +Plotinos. Moreover, that the incident was important is revealed by +Porphyry's calling Plotinos's answer a "great word," which was much +commented on, and long remembered. + + * * * * * + +In thus dividing the career of Plotinos in the Amelian, the Porphyrian, +and Eustochian (98) we meet however one very interesting difficulty. +The Plotinic writings by Porphyry assigned to the last or Eustochian +period are those which internal criticism would lead us to assign to +his very earliest philosophising; and in our study of the development +of the Plotinic views about Matter, we have taken the liberty of +considering them as the earliest. We are however consoled in our +regret at having to be so radical, by noticing that Porphyry, to whom +we are indebted for our knowledge of the periods of the works, has +done the same thing. He says that he has assigned the earliest place +in each Ennead to the easier and simpler discussions;[454] yet these +latest-issued works of Plotinos are assigned to the very beginning of +each Ennead, four going to the First Ennead, one to the Second, three +to the Third, and one only to the Fifth. If these had been the crowning +works of the Master's life, especially the treatise on the First God +and Happiness, it would have been by him placed at the very end of +all, and not at the beginning. Porphyry must therefore have possessed +some external knowledge which would agree with the conclusions of our +internal criticism, which follows. + +These Eustochian works make the least use of Stoic, or even +Aristotelian terms, most closely following even the actual words of +Numenius. For instance, we may glance at the very first book of the +First Ennead, which though of the latest period, is thoroughly Numenian. + +The first important point is the First Divinity "hovering over" +Being,[455] using the same word as Numenius.[456] This was suggested by +Prof. Thedinga. However, he applied the words "he says" to Numenius; +but this cannot be the case, as a Platonic quotation immediately. + +The whole subject of the Book is the composite soul, and this is +thoroughly Numenian.[457] + +Then we have the giving without return.[458] + +Then we find the pilot-simile as illustration for the relation of soul +to body,[459] although in Numenius it appears of the Logos and the +world. + +We find the animal divided in two souls, the irrational and the +rational,[460] which reminds us of Numenius's division into two +souls.[461] + +The soul consists of a peculiar kind of motion, which however is +entirely different from that of other bodies, which is its own +life.[462] This reminds us of Numenius's still-standing of the Supreme, +which however is simultaneously innate motion.[463] + +Referring to the problem, discussed elsewhere, that these Plotinic +works of the latest or Eustochian period, are the most Numenian, which +we would be most likely to attribute to his early or formative stage, +rather than to the last or perfected period, it is interesting to +notice that these works seem to imply other works of the Amelian or +Porphyrian periods, by the words,[464] "It has been said," or treated +of, referring evidently to several passages.[465] Still this need not +necessarily refer to this later work, it may even refer to Plato, or +even to Numenius's allegory of the Cave of the Nymphs,[470] where the +descent of the souls is most definitely studied. Or it might even refer +to Num. 35a, where birth or genesis is referred to as the wetting of +the souls in the matter of bodies. + +Moreover, they contain an acknowledgment, and a study of positive evil, +something which would be very unlikely after his elaborate explaining +away of evil in his treatise against the Gnostics, of the Porphyrian +period, and his last treatment of Matter, where he is even willing to +grant the possibility of matter possessing Being. The natural process +for any thinker must ever be to begin with comparative imitation of his +master, and then to progress to independent treatment of the subject. +But for the process to be reversed is hardly likely. + +Moreover, when we examine these Eustochian works in detail, they +hardly seem to be such as would be the expressions of the last years +of an ecstatic, suffering intense agony at times, his interest already +directed heavenwards. The discussion of astrology must date from the +earliest association with Gnostics, in Alexandria, who also might have +inspired or demanded a special treatment of the nature of evil, which +later he consistently denied. Then there is an amateurish treatment of +anthropology in general, which the cumulatively-arranging Porphyry puts +at the very beginning of the First Book. The treatise on the First Good +and Happiness, is not unlike a beginner's first attempt at writing out +his body of divinity, as George Herbert said, and Porphyry also puts it +at the beginning. The Eros-article is only an amplification of Platonic +myths, indeed making subtler distinctions, still not rising to the +heights of pure, subjective speculation. + +These general considerations may be supplemented by a few more definite +indications. It is in the Eros-article that we find the Platonic +myth of Poros and Penia. Yet these reappear in the earliest Amelian +treatment of matter (ii. 4), as a sort of echo, mentioned only by the +way, as if they had been earlier thoroughly threshed out. Here also we +find only a stray, incidental use of the term "hypostasis," whereas the +Stoic language in other Amelian and Porphyrian treatises has already +been pointed out. + +We are therefore driven to the following, very human and natural +conclusion. Plotinos's first attempts at philosophical writing had +consisted of chiefly Numenian disquisitions, which would be natural in +Alexandria, where Numenius had probably resided, and had left friends +and successors among the Gnostics. When Plotinos went to Rome, he +took these writings with him, but was too absorbed in new original +Amelian treatises to resurrect his youthful Numenian attempts, which he +probably did not value highly, as being the least original, and because +they taught doctrines he had left behind in his Aristotelian and Stoic +progress. He laid them aside. Only when Porphyry had left him, and he +felt the increasing feebleness due to old age and Stoic austerities, +did his attendant Eustochius urge him to preserve these early works. +Plotinos was willing, and sent them to Sicily where Porphyry had +retired. And so it happened with Plotinos, as it has happened with many +another writer, that the last things became first, and the first became +last. + + * * * * * + +The idea of classifying the works of Plotinos chronologically, +therefore, has so much external proof, as well as internal indications, +to support it, that, no doubt, in the future no reference will be +made to Plotinos without specifying to which period it refers; and we +may expect that future editions of his works will undo the grievous +confusion introduced by Porphyry, and thus render Plotinos's works +comparatively accessible to rational study. + +There are besides many other minor proofs of the chronological order +of the writings of Plotinos, most of which are noticed at the heading +of each succeeding book; but the most startling human references are +those to Amelius's departure as a false friend;[466] to Porphyry's +desire to suicide at his departure,[467] and to his own impending +dissolution,[468] each of these occurring at the exact time of the +event chronologically, but certainly not according to the traditional +order. + + + + +II. PLATONISM: SIGNIFICANCE, PROGRESS AND RESULTS. + + +Of all fetishes which have misled humanity, perhaps none is responsible +for more error than that of originality. As if anything could be new +that was true, or true that was new! The only possible lines along +which novelty or progress can lie are our reports, combinations, and +expressions. Some people think they have done for a poet if they have +shown that he made use of suitable materials in the construction of +his poem! So Shakespeare has been shown to have used whole scenes from +earlier writers. So Virgil, by Macrobius, has been shown to have laid +under contribution every writer then known to be worth ransacking. +Dante has also been shown to have re-edited contemporary apocalypses. +So Homer, even, has been shown to re-tell stories gathered from many +sources. The result is that people generally consider Shakespeare, +Virgil, or Homer great in spite of their borrowings, when, on the +contrary, the statement should be that they were great because of their +rootage in the best of their period. In other words, they are great not +because of their own personality (which in many cases has dropped out +of the ken of history), but because they more faithfully, completely, +and harmoniously represent their periods than other now forgotten +writers. Therein alone lay their cosmic value, and their assurance of +immortality. They are the voices of their ages, and we are interested +in the significance of their age, not in them personally. + +It is from this standpoint that we must approach Plato. Of his +personality what details are known are of no soteriologic significance; +and the reason why the world has not been able to get away from him, +and probably never will, is that he sums up prior Greek philosophy in +as coherent a form as is possible without doing too great Procrustean +violence to the elements in question. This means that Plato did not +fuse them all into one absolutely, rigid, coherent, consistent system, +in which case his utility would have been very much curtailed. The very +form of his writings, the dialogue, left each element in the natural +living condition to survive on its merits, not as an authoritative +oracle, or Platonic pronunciamento, or creed. + +For details, the reader is referred to Zeller's fuller account of +these pre-Platonic elements.[471] But we may summarize as follows: +the physical elements to which the Hylicists had in turn attributed +finality Plato united into Pythagorean matter, which remained as +an element of Dualism. The world of nature became the becoming of +Heraclitus. Above that he placed the Being of Parmenides, in which the +concepts of Socrates found place as ideas. These he identified with +the numbers and harmonies of Pythagoras, and united them in an Eleatic +unity of many, as an intelligible world, or reason, which he owed to +Anaxagoras. The chief idea, that of the Good, was Megaro-Socratic. His +cosmology was that of Timaeus. His psychology was based on Anaxagoras, +as mind; on Pythagoras, as immortal. His ethics are Socratic, his +politics are Pythagorean. Who therefore would flout Plato, has all +earlier Greek philosophy to combat; and whoever recognizes the +achievements of the Hellenic mind will find something to praise in +Plato. When, therefore, we are studying Platonism, we are only studying +a blending of the rays of Greece, and we are chiefly interested in +Greece as one of the latest, clearest, and most kindred expressions of +human thought. + +If however we should seek some one special Platonic element, it +would be that genuineness of reflection, that sincerity of thought, +that makes of his dialogues no cut and dried literary figments, but +soul-tragedies, with living, breathing, interest and emotion. Plato +thus practised his doctrine of the double self,[472] the higher and +the lower selves, of which the higher might be described as "superior +to oneself." In his later period, that of the Laws, he applied this +double psychology to cosmology, thereby producing doubleness in +the world-Soul: besides the good one, appears the evil one, which +introduces even into heaven things that are not good. + +It was only a step from this to the logical deduction of Xenocrates +that these things in heaven were "spirits" or "guardians," both good +and evil, assisting in the administration of human affairs.[473] Such +is the result of doubleness introduced into anthropology; introduced +into cosmology, it establishes Pythagorean indefinite duality as the +principle opposing the unity of goodness. + +The next step was taken by Plutarch. The evil demons, had, in Stoic +phraseology, been called "physical;" and so, in regard to matter, +they came to stand in the relation of soul to body. Original matter, +therefore, became two-fold; matter itself, and its moving principle, +"the soul of matter." This was identified with the worse World-soul +by a development, or historical event, which was the ordering of the +cosmos, or, creation. + +This then was the state of affairs at the advent of Numenius. +Although his chief interest lay in practical comparative religion, he +tried, philosophically, to return to a mythical "original" Platonism +or Pythagoreanism. What Plato did for earlier Greek speculation, +Numenius did for post-Platonic development. He harked back to +the latter Platonic stage, which taught the evil world-Soul. He +included the achievements of Plutarch, the "soul of matter," and the +trine division of a separate principle, such as Providence. To the +achievement of Xenocrates he was drawn by two powerful interests, the +Egyptian, Hermetic, Serapistic, in connection with the evil demons; +and the Pythagorean, in connection with the Indefinite-duality. Thus +Numenius's History of the Platonic Succession is not a delusion; +Numenius really did sum up the positive Platonic progress, not +omitting even Maximus of Tyre's philosophical hierarchic explanation +of the emanative or participative streaming forth of the Divine. But +Numenius was not merely a philosopher: of this gathering of Platonic +achievements he made a religion. In this he was also following the +footsteps of Pythagoras, who limited his doctrines to a group of +students. But Numenius did not merely copy Pythagoras. Numenius +modernized him, connecting up the Platonic doctrinal aggregate with +the mystery-rites current in his own day. Nor did Numenius shirk any +unpleasant responsibilities of a restorer of Platonism: he continued +the traditional Academico-Stoical feud. Strange to say, the last great +Stoic philosopher, Posidonius (A.D. 135-151) hailed from Numenius's +home-town, Apamea, so that this Stoic feud may have been forced on +Numenius from home personalities or conditions. It would seem that in +Numenius and Posidonius we have a re-enactment of the tragedy of Greek +philosophy on a Syrian theatre, where dogmatic Stoicism died, and +Platonism admitted Oriental ideas. + +Apamea, however, had not yet ended its role in the development of +thought. Numenius's pupil, Amelius, had gathered, copied, and learned +by heart his master's works. It was in Apamea that he adopted as son +Hostilianius-Hesychius. After a twenty-four years' sojourn in Rome he +returned to Apamea, and was dwelling there still at the time of the +death of Plotinos, with whom he had spent that quarter of a century. +Here then we have a historical basis for a connection between Numenius +and Plotinos, which we have elsewhere endeavored to demonstrate from +inner grounds. + +It was however by Amelius that philosophy is drawn into the maelstrom +of the world-city. Plotinos, in his early periods a Numenian +Platonist, will later go over to Stoicism, and conduct a polemic +with the Gnostics, the Alexandrian heirs of Platonic dualism, +under the influence of the Stoic Porphyry. However, Plotinos will +not publicly abandon Platonism; he will fuse the two streams of +thought, and interpret in Stoic terms the fundamentals of Platonism, +producing something which, when translated into Latin, he will leave +as inheritance to all the ages. Not in vain, therefore, did Amelius +transport the torch of philosophy to the Capital. + + * * * * * + +Let us in a few words dispose of the general outlines of the fate of +the Platonic movement. + +Plotinos was no religious leader; he was before everything else a +philosopher, even if he centred his efforts on the practical aspects +of the ecstatic union with God. Indeed, Porphyry relates to us the +incident in which this matter was objectively exemplified. At the +New Moon, Amelius invited him to join in a visit to the mystery +celebrations. Plotinos refused, saying that "they would have to come to +him, not he go over to them." This then is the chief difference between +Numenius and Plotinos, and the result would be a recrudescence of pure +philosophic contentions, as those of Plotinos against the Gnostics. + +As to the general significance of Plotinos, we must here resume what we +have elsewhere detailed: that with the change of editors, from Amelius +to Porphyry, Plotinos changed from Numenian or Pythagorean dualism +to Stoic monism, in which the philosophic feud was no longer with the +Stoics, but with the Alexandrian descendants of Numenian dualism, the +Gnostics. Even though Plotinos showed practical religious aspects in +his studying and experiencing the ecstasy, there is no record of any of +his pupils being encouraged to do so, and therefore Plotinos remains +chiefly a philosopher. + +The successors of Plotinos could not remain on this purely philosophic +standpoint. Instead of practising the ecstasy, they followed the +Gnostics in theorizing about practical religious reality in their +cosmology and theology, which took on, more or less, the shape of +magic, not inconsiderably aided by Stoic allegoric interpretations of +myths, as in Porphyry's "Cave of the Nymphs." + +What Plato did for early Greek philosophy, what Numenius did for +post-Platonic thought, that Proclus Diadochus, the "Successor," did +for Plotinos and his followers. For the first time since Numenius we +find again a comparative method. By this time religion and philosophy +have fused in magic, and so, instead of a comparative religion, we have +a comparative philosophy. Proclus was the first genuine commentator, +quoting authorities on all sides. He was sufficient of a philosopher +to grasp Neoplatonism as a school of thought; and far from paying +any attention to Ammonius, as recent philosophy has done, as source +of Neoplatonism, he traces the movement as far as Plutarch, calling +him the "father of us all," inasmuch as he introduced the conception +of "hypostasis." Evidently, Proclus looked upon this as the centre +of Neoplatonic development, and therefore we shall be justified in a +closer study of this conception; and we may even say that its historic +destiny was a continuation of the main stream of creative Greek +philosophy; or, if you prefer, of Platonism, or Noumenianism, or even +Plotinian thought. + +Did Greek philosophy die with Proclus? The political changes of the +time forced alteration of dialect and position; but the accumulations +of mental achievements could not perish. This again we owe to Proclus. +Besides being the first great commentator he precipitated his most +valuable achievements in logical form, in analytic arrangement, in +the form of crystal-clear propositions, theorems, demonstrations, and +corollaries. Such a highly abstract form was inevitable, inasmuch as +Numenius had turned away from Aristotelian observation of nature. Just +like the Hebrew thinkers, who finally became commentators and abstract +theorizers, nothing else was left for a philosophy without connection +with experiment, when whittled down by the keenest intellects of the +times. + +This abstract method, still familiarly used by geometry, reappeared +among the School-men, notably in Thomas Aquinas. Later it persisted +with Spinoza and Descartes. However, rising experimentalism has +gradually terminated it, its last form appearing in Kant and Hegel. +Kant's "Ding in sich," reached after abstracting all qualities, is only +a re-statement of Numenius and Plotinos's "subject," or, definition of +matter; and Hegel's dialectic, beginning with Being and Not-being, more +definitely proclaimed by Plotinos, goes as far back as the Eleatics +and Heraclitus, not to mention Plato. However, Kant and Hegel are the +great masters of modern thought; and although at one time the rising +tide of materialism and cruder forms of evolution threatened to obscure +it, Karl Pearson's "Grammar of Science," generous as it is in invective +against Kant and Hegel, in modern terms clinches Berkeley's and Kant's +demonstration of the reality of the super-sensual, thus vindicating +Plotinos, and, before him, Numenius. + +It must not be supposed that in thus tracing the springs of our modern +thought we necessarily approve of all the thought of Plotinos, Numenius +or Plato. On the contrary, they were far more likely to have committed +logical errors than we are, because they were hypnotized by the glamor +of the terms they used, which to us are mere laboratory tools. The +best way to prove this will be to appraise at its logical value for us +Plotinos's discussion of Matter, elsewhere studied in its value for us. + + + + +III. PLOTINOS'S VIEW OF MATTER. + + +We have elsewhere pointed out the hopelessness of escaping either +aspect of the problem of the One and the Many; and that the attempt +of the Stoics to avoid the Platonic dualism by a materialistic monism +was merely a change of names, the substance of the dualism remaining +as the opposition of the contraries, such as active and passive, +male and female, the predominant elements,[474] etc. Plotinos, in +his abandonment of Numenian dualism, and championing of Stoicism, +undertaking the feud with the Gnostics, the successors of Numenius, +must therefore have inherited the same difficulties of thought, and we +shall see how in spite of his mental agility he is caught in the same +traditional meshes, and that these irreducible difficulties occur in +each one of his three periods of life, the Eustochian, the Amelian, and +the Porphyrian. + +In the Amelian, he teaches two matters, the physical and the +intelligible, by which device he seeks to avoid the difficulties of +dualism, crediting to intelligible matter any necessary form of Being, +thus pushing physical matter into the outer darkness of non-being. +So intelligible matter is still a form of Being, and we still hold +to monism; as intelligible matter may participate in the good; while +matter physical remains evil, being a deprivation of good, not +possessing it. This, of course is dualism; and he thus has a convenient +pun on the word matter, by which he can be monist or dualist, as +the fancy takes him, or as exigencies demand. This participation, +therefore, does not eliminate the dualism, while formally professing +monism. Therefore Plotinos tries to choose between monism and dualism +by surreptitiously accepting both. + +In the Porphyrian period, he rejected the idea of intelligible +matter.[475] Forced to fashion entirely new arguments, he seizes as +tool the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality, +or energy as dynamic accomplishment.[476] But no logical device can +help a man to pull himself up by his boot-straps. If by Being you +mean existence, then its opposite must be negative, and to speak of +real non-being, as something that shares being, is an evasion. To say +that matter remains non-being, while having the possibility of future +Being, which however can never be actualized, is mere juggling with +words. Even if matter is no more than a weak, confused image, it is +not non-being. If it is a positive lie, it is not non-being. To talk +of a higher degree of Non-being, that is real non-being, is simply to +confuse the actuality intended with the thought of non-being, which +of course is a thought as actually existing as any other. Moreover if +matter is imperishable, it cannot be non-being; and if it possesses +Being potentially, it certainly is not non-existence. The Aristotelian +potentiality could help to create this evasion, but did not remove its +real nature; it merely supplied Plotinos with an intellectual device +to characterize something that would not be actually existing as still +having the possibility of existence; but this is not non-existence. In +another writing[477] of this period Plotinos continues his evasions +about the origin and nature of matter. First, he grants that it is +something that is not original, being later than many earthly, and all +intelligible objects; although, if he had returned to the conception +of intelligible matter, he would have been at liberty to assert the +originality of the latter. Then he holds that Being is common to both +form and matter, as to quality, but not as to quantity. Last, he +closes the paragraph by saying that perhaps form and matter do not come +from the same origin, as there is a difference between them. + +In Plotinos's third, or Eustochian period, the same evasions occur. +For instance[478] he limits Being to goodness. Then he acknowledges +the existence of evil things, and derives their evil quality from a +primary evil, the "image of essence," the Being of evil. That he is +conscious of having strained a point is evident from the fact that he +adds the clause, "if there can be a Being of evil." Likewise,[479] +while discussing evil, which is generally recognized because in our +daily lives there is positive pain, and sensations of pain, he defines +evil as lack of qualities. To say that evil is not such as to form, +but as to nature is opposite to form is nonsense, inasmuch as life is +full of positive evils, as Numenius brought out in 16, and Plotinos +acknowledged even in spite of his polemic against the Gnostics. + +Finally Plotinos takes refuge in a miracle[480] as explanation of +"unparticipating participation." This is commentary enough; it shows +he realized the futility of any arguments. But Plotinos was not alone +in despairing of establishing an ironclad system; before him Numenius +had, just as pathetically, despaired of a logical dualism, and he +acknowledged in fragment 16 that Pythagoras's arguments, however true, +were "wonderful and opposed to the belief of a majority of humanity." + +In other words, monism is as unsatisfactory to reason as dualism. This +was the chief point of agreement between Pythagoras and the Stoics; and +Pragmatism has in modern times attempted to show a way out by a higher +sanction of another kind. + +Perhaps the reader may be interested in a side-light on this subject. +Drews is interested in Plotinos only because Plotinos's super-rational +divinity furnishes a historical foundation for Edouard Hartmann's +philosophy of the Unconscious. It would seem, however, to be a mistake +to use the latter term, for it is true only as a doubtful corollary. +If the Supreme is super-conscious, it is possible to describe this +logically as unconscious. But generally, however, unconsciousness is a +term used to denote the sub-conscious, rather than the super-conscious, +and the use of that term must inevitably entail misunderstandings. It +would be better then to follow Pragmatism into the super-conscious, +rather than to sink with Hartmann into the sub-conscious. It was +directly from Plotinos[481] that Hartmann took his expression "beyond +good and evil." + +Having watched Numenius, for Platonic dualism; and Plotinos for Stoic +monism, both appeal to a miracle as court of last resort, we may now +return to that result of Platonism which has left the most vital +impress on our civilization, its conception of the divine. + + + + +IV. PLOTINOS'S CREATION OF THE TRINITY. + + +Elsewhere we have seen how Numenius waged the traditional Academic feud +with the Stoics bravely, but uselessly, inasmuch as it was chiefly +a difference of dialects that separated them. In the course of this +struggle, Numenius had made certain distinctions within the divinity, +which were followed by Amelius, but are difficult to trace in Plotinos +because, as a matter of principle, Plotinos[482] was averse to thus +"dividing the divinity." Why so? Because he was waging a struggle +with the Gnostics, who had followed in the footsteps of the Hermetic +writings (with their Demiurge and Seven Governors); Philo Judaeus (with +his five Subordinate Powers); Numenius and Amelius (with their triply +divided First and Second gods);--after which we come to Basilides (with +his seven Powers); Saturninus (with his Seven Angels); and Valentinus +(with his 33 Aeons). + +This new feud between Plotinos and the Gnostics is however just as +illusory as the earlier one between Numenius and the Stoics. It was +merely a matter of dialects. Plotinos indeed found fault with the +Gnostics for making divisions within the Divinity; but wherever he +himself is considering the divinity minutely, he, just as much as the +Gnostics, is compelled to draw distinctions, even though he avoided +acknowledged divisions by borrowing from Plutarch a new, non-Platonic, +non-Numenian, but Aristotelian, Stoic (Cornutus and Sextus) and still +Alexandrian (Philo, Septuagint, Lucian) term "hypostasis." + +The difference he pretended to find between the Gnostic distinctions +within the Divinity and his new term hypostasis was that the former +introduced manifoldness into the divinity, by splitting Him,[483] thus +allowing the influence of matter to pervade the pure realm of Being. +Hypostasis, on the contrary, wholly existed within the realm of pure +Being, and was no more than a trend, a direction, a characterization, +a function, a face, or orientation of activity of the unaffected unity +of Being. Thus the divinity retained its unity, and still could be +active in several directions, without admixture of what philosophy had +till then recognized as constituting manifoldness. But reflection shows +that this is a mere quibble, an evasion, a paralogism, a quaternio +terminorum, a pun. How it came about we shall attempt to show below. + +In thus achieving a manifoldness in the divinity without divisions, +Plotinos did indeed keep out of the divinity the splitting influence +of matter, which it was now possible to banish to the realm of +unreality, as a negation, and a lie. Monism was thus achieved ... but +at the cost of two errors: denial of the common-sense reality of the +phenomenal world,[484] and that quibble about three hypostases without +manifoldness, genuinely a "distinction without a difference." + +This intellectual dishonesty must not however be foisted on +Aristotle[485] or Plutarch. The latter, for instance,[486] adopted +this term only to denote the primary and original characteristics +(or distinctions within) existing things, from a comparative study +of Aristotle's "de Anima," and Plato's "Phaedo."[487] These five +hypostases were the divinity, mind, soul, forms immanent in inorganic +nature, "hexis," in Stoic dialect, and to matter, as apart from these +forms. + +So important to Neoplatonism did this term seem to Proclus, that he +did not hesitate to say that Plutarch, by the use thereof, became "our +first forefather." He therefore develops it further. Among the hidden +and intelligible gods are three hypostases. The first is characterized +by the Good; it thinks the Good itself, and dwells with the paternal +Monad. The second is characterized by knowledge, and resides in the +first thought; while the third is characterized by beauty, and dwells +with the most beautiful of the intelligible. They are the causes from +which proceed three monads which are self-existent but under the form +of a unity, and as in a germ, in their cause. Where they manifest, they +take a distinct form: faith, truth, and love (Cousin's title: "Du Vrai, +du Beau, et du Bien"). This trinity pervades all the divine worlds. + +In order to understand the attitude of Plotinos on the subject, we must +try to put ourselves in his position. In the first place, on Porphyry's +own admission, he had added to Platonism Peripatetic and Stoic views. +From Aristotle his chief borrowings were the categories of form and +matter, and the distinction between potentiality and actuality,[488] +as well as the Aristotelian psychology of various souls. To the Stoics +he was drawn by their monism, which led him to drop the traditional +Academico-Stoic feud, or rather to take the side of the Stoics against +Numenius the Platonist dualist and the dualistic successors, the +Gnostics. But there was a difference between the Stoics and Plotinos. +The Stoics assimilated spirit to matter, while Plotinos, reminiscent of +Plato, preferred to assimilate matter to spirit. Still, he used their +terminology, and categories, including the conception of a hypostasis, +or form of existence. With this equipment, he held to the traditional +Platonic trinity of the "Letters," the King, the intellect, and the +soul. Philosophically, however, he had received from Numenius the +inheritance of a double name of the Divinity, Being and Essence. As a +thinker, he was therefore forced to accommodate Numenius to Plato, and +by adding to Numenius's name of the divinity, to complete Numenius's +theology by Numenius's own cosmology. This then he did by adding as +third hypostasis the Aristotelian dynamic energy. + +But as Intellect is permanent, how can Energy arise therefrom? Here +this eternal puzzle is solved by distinguishing energy into indwelling +and out-flowing. As indwelling, Energy constitutes Intellect; but its +energetic nature could not be demonstrated except by out-flowing, which +produces a distinction. + +Similarly, there are two kinds of heat, that of the fire itself, +and that emitted by the fire, so that the fire may remain itself +while exerting its influence without. It is thus also there: in that +it remains itself in its inmost being, and from its own inherent +perfection, and energy, the developed energy assumes hypostasis, as +if from a Dynamis that is great, nay, greatest; and so it joins the +Essence and the Being. For that was beyond all Being, and that was the +Dynamis of all things, and already was all things. If then it is all, +it must be above all; consequently also above Being. "And if this is +all, then the One is before all; not of an essence equal to all, and +this must be above Being, as this is above intellect; for there is +something above intellect."[489] + +This is the most definite statement of Plotinos's solution of the +problem; other references thereto are abundant. So we have a trinity of +energy, being and essence,[490] and each of us, like the world-Soul has +an Eros which is essence and hypostasis.[491] Reason is a hypostasis +after the nous, and Aphrodite gains an hypostasis in the Ousia.[492] +The One is intellect, the intelligible, and ousia; or, energy, being, +and the intelligible (essence).[493] The soul is activity.[494] The +soul is the third God,[495] we are the third rank proceeding from the +upper undivided Nature,[496] the whole being God, nous, and essence. +The Nous is activity, and the First essence. There are three stages of +the Good: the King, the nous, and the soul.[497] We find energy,[498] +thinking and being, then[499] the soul, the nous, and the One. We find +Providence threefold (as in Plutarch)[500] and three ranks of Gods, +demons and world-life.[501] Elsewhere, untheologically, or, rather, +merely philosophically, he speaks of the hypostasis of wisdom.[502] + +Chaignet's summary of this is[503] that[504] Plotinos holds that every +force in the intelligible is both Being and Substance simultaneously; +and reciprocally that no Being, could be conceived without hypostasis, +or directed force. Again,[505] the world, the universe of things, +contains three natures or divine hypostases, soul, mind and unity; +which indeed are found in our own nature, and of which the divinest is +unity or divinity. + +Let us now try to understand the matter. Why should the word +hypostasis, which unquestionably in earlier times meant "substance," +have later come to mean "distinctions" within the divinity? For +"substance," on the contrary, represents to our mind an unity, the +underlying unity, and not individual forms of existence. How did the +change occur? + +Now Plotinos, as we remember, found fault with the Gnostics in that +they taught distinctions within the divinity.[506] He would therefore +be disposed to remove from within the divinity those distinctions of +Plotinic, Plutarchian, Numenian, or Gnostic theology; although he +himself in early times did not scruple to speak of a hypostasis of +wisdom, or of Eros, or other matter he might be considering. Such terms +of Numenius or Amelius as he seems to ignore are the various Demiurges; +the three Plutarchian Providences he himself still uses. Still, all +these terms he would be disposed to eradicate from within the divinity. + +As a constructive metaphysician, however, he could not well get along +without some titles for the different phases of the divinity; and even +if he dispensed with the old names, there would still remain as their +underlying support the reality or substance of the distinction. So he +removed the offensive, aggressive, historically known and recognized +terms, while leaving their underlying substances, or supports. Now +"substance" had become "substances," and to differentiate these it was +necessary to interpret them as differing forms of existence. The change +was most definitely made by Athanasius, who at a synod in Alexandria, +in A.D. 362,[507] fastened on the church, as synonymous with hypostasis +the popular term "prosopon" or "face." That this was an innovation +appears from the fact that the Nicene Council had stated that it +was heretical to say that Christ was of a hypostasis different from +that of the Father, in which case the word evidently meant still the +original underlying (singular) substance. With this official definition +in vogue, the original (singular) substance became forgotten, and it +became possible to speak in the plural, of three faces, as indeed +Plotinos had done. + +In other words, so necessary were distinctions in the divinity, +that the popular mind supplied other individual names to designate +the distinctions Plotinos had successfully banished, for Demiurges +and Providences no longer return. Thus more manifold differences +re-entered into the divinity, than Plotinos had ever emptied out of +it, although under a name which the poverty of the Latin language +rendered as "persons," which represents to us individual consciousness +of a far more distinctive kind than was ever implied in three phases +of Providence, or of the Demiurge. Thus the translation into Latin +clinched the illicit linguistic process, and the result of Plotinos's +attempt to distinguish in the Divinity phases so subtle as not to +demand or allow of manifoldness, resulted in the most pronounced +differences of personality. This was finally clinched by Plotinos's +illustration of the three faces around a single head,[508] which +established the idea of three "persons" (masks, from "per-sonare") in +one God. + +Not only in the abstract realm of Metaphysics, therefore, is the world +indebted to Greek thought; but even in the realm of religion a Stoic +reinterpretation of Platonism, itself reinterpreted in a different +language has given a lasting inheritance to the spiritual aspirations +of the ages. + + + + +V. RESEMBLANCES TO CHRISTIANITY. + + +TRINITARIAN SIGNIFICANCE OF PLOTINOS. + +Plotinos's date being about A.D. 262, he stands midway between the +Christian writings of the New Testament, and the Council of Nicaea, +A.D. 325. As a philosopher dealing with the kindred topics--the soul +and its salvation,--and deriving terminology and inspiration from +the same sources, Platonism and Stoicism, we would expect extensive +parallelism and correspondence. Though Plotinos does not mention any +contemporaneous writings, we will surely be able to detect indirect +references to Old and New Testaments. But what will be of most +vital interest will be his anticipations of Nicene formulations, or +reflection of current expressions of Christian philosophic comment. +While we cannot positively assert this Christian development was +exclusively Plotinian, we are justified in saying that the development +of Christian philosophy was not due exclusively to the Alexandrian +catechetical school; that what later appears as Christian theology was +only earlier current Neoplatonic metaphysics, without any exclusive +dogmatic connection with the distinctively Christian biography. This +avoids the flat assertion of Drews that the Christian doctrine of +the Trinity was dependent on Plotinos, although it admits Bouillet's +more cautious statement that Plotinos was the rationalizer of the +doctrine of the Trinity.[509] This much is certain, that no other +contemporaneous discussion of the trinity has survived, if any ever +existed; and we must remember that it was not until the council of +Constantinople in A.D. 381, that the Nicene Creed, by the addition of +the Filioque clause, became trinitarian in a thoroughgoing way; and +not until fifty years later that Augustine, again in the West, fully +expressed a philosophy and psychology of the trinity. + +To Plotinos therefore is due the historical position of protagonist of +trinitarian philosophy. + + +NON-CHRISTIAN ORIGIN OF PARALELLISMS TO CHRISTIANITY. + +Christian parallelisms in Plotinos have a historical origin in +Christian parallelisms in his sources, namely, Stoicism, Numenius and +Plato. + +To Christian origins in Plato never has justice been done, not even by +Bigg. His suggestion of the crucifixion of the just man, his reference +to the son of God are only common-places, to which should be added many +minor references. + +The Christian origins in Numenius are quite explicit; mention of the +Hebrews as among the races whose scriptures are important, of Moses +among the great religious teachers, of the Spirit hovering over the +waters, of the names of the Egyptian magicians which, together with +Pliny, he hands down to posterity. He also was said to have told many +stories about Jesus, in an allegorical manner. + +The Christian origins in Stoicism have been widely discussed; +for instance, by Chaignet. But it is likely that this influence +affected Christianity indirectly through Plotinos, along with the +other Christian ideas we shall later find. At any rate Plotinos is +the philosopher who uses the term "spiritual body" most like the +Christians.[510] The soul is a slave to the body,[511] and has a +celestial body[512] as well as a spiritual body.[513] Within us are two +men opposing each other,[514] the better part often being mastered by +the worse part, as thought St. Paul,[515] in the struggle between the +inner and outer man.[516] + +With Plotinos the idea of "procession" is not only cosmic but +psychological. In other words, when Plotinos speaks of the "procession" +of the God-head, he is not, as in Christian doctrine, depicting +something unique, which has no connection with the world. He is only +referring to the cosmic aspect of an evolution which, in the soul, +appears as educational development.[517] As the opposite of the soul's +procession upwards, there is the soul's descent into hell,[518] or, in +other words, the soul's descent and ascension.[519] This double aspect +of man's fate upward or downward is referred to by Plotinos in the +regular Christian term "sin," as consisting in missing one's aim.[520] +The soul repents,[521] and its duty is conversion.[522] As a result of +this conversion comes forgiveness.[523] + + +OLD TESTAMENT REFERENCES. + +The famous "terrors of Jeremiah"[524] might have come mediately +through the Gnostics, who indeed may have been the persons referred +to as Christians.[525] More direct no doubt was God admiring his +handiwork[526] and the soul breathing the spirit of life into +animals.[527] God is called both the "I am what I am"[528] and "He is +what He ought to be."[528] He sits above the world,[529] as the king of +kings.[530] + + +NEW TESTAMENT REFERENCES. + +Plotinos says that it would be a poor artist who would conceive of +an animal as all covered with eyes. There is hardly such a reference +outside of Revelations,[531] to which we must also look for a new +heaven and a new earth.[532] Then we have practically a quotation of +the Johannine prologue "In the beginning was the Logos," and by him +were all things made.[533] Light was in the beginning.[534] We are told +not to leave the world, but not to be of it.[535] The divinity prepares +mansions in heaven for good souls.[536] + +Pauline references seem to be that sin exists because of the law.[537] +God is above all height or depth.[538] The vulgar who attend +mystery-banquets only to gorge are condemned.[539] There are several +heavens.[540] The beggarly principles and elements towards which some +turn, are mentioned.[541] The genealogies of the Gnostics are held up +to ridicule.[542] General references are numerous. Diseases are caused +by evil spirits.[543] We must cut off any offending member.[544] Thus +we are saved.[545] In him we breathe and move and have our being.[546] +The higher divinity begets a Son, one among many brethren.[547] As the +father of intelligence, God is the father of lights.[548] + +However, the most interesting incident is that scriptural text which, +to the reflecting, is always so much of a puzzle: "If the light that +is in them be darkness," etc.[549] This is explained by the Platonic +theory[550] that we see because of a special light that is within the +eye. + + +THEOLOGICAL REFERENCES. + +General theological references may be grouped under three heads: the +soul's salvation, the procession of the divinity, and the trinity. + +As to the soul's salvation, God is the opposite of the evil of +beings,[551] which, when created in honor of the divinity[552] is the +image of the Word, the interpreter of the One,[553] and is composed of +several elements;[554] but it is a fall from God,[555] and its fate is +connected with the "parousia."[556] + +This going forth of the soul from God, when considered cosmically, +becomes the "procession of the soul."[557] This is the "eternal +generation,"[558] whereby the Son is begotten from eternity,[559] so +that there could be no (Arian) "ên hote ouk ên," or, "time when he was +not."[560] This is expressed as "light of light,"[561] and explained by +the Athanasian light and ray simile.[562] We find even the Johannine +and Philonic distinction between God and the Good.[563] The world is +the first-begotten,[564] and the Intelligence is the logos of the first +God,[565] as the hypostasis of wisdom is "ousia," or "being,"[566] and +it is the "universal reason."[567] + +As to the trinity, Plotinos is the first and chief rationalizer +of the cosmic trinity, which he continuously and at length +discusses.[568] God is father and son,[569] and they are "homoousian," +or "consubstantial."[570] The human soul (as image of the cosmic +divinity), is one nature in three powers.[571] Elsewhere we have +discussed the history of the term "persons," but we may understand the +result of that process best by Plotinos's simile of the trinity as +one head with three faces,[572] in which the "persons" bear out their +original meaning of masks, "personare." Henceforward the trinity was an +objective idea. + + +NOTE + +Although mentioned above, special attention should be given to the +parable of the vine and the branches (iii. 3.7.--48, 1088 with Jno. +xv. 1-8), and the divinity's begetting a Son (v. 8.12--31, 571). The +significant aspect of this is that it is represented as being the +content of the supreme ecstatic vision; what you might call the crown +of Plotinos' message. "He tells us that he has seen the divinity +beget an offspring of an incomparable beauty, producing everything +in Himself, and without pain preserving within Himself what He has +begotten.... His Son has manifested Himself externally. By Him, as by +an image (Col. i. 15), you may judge of the greatness of His Father ... +enjoying the privilege of being the image of His eternity." + + +VII. PLOTINOS'S INDEBTEDNESS TO NUMENIUS. + + +1. HISTORICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NUMENIUS AND PLOTINOS. + +We have, elsewhere, pointed out the historic connections between +Numenius and Plotinos. Here, it may be sufficient to recall that +Amelius, native of Numenius's home-town of Apamea, and who had +copied and learned by heart all the works of Numenius, and who later +returned to Apamea to spend his declining days, bequeathing his copy +of Numenius's works to his adopted son Gentilianus Hesychius, was the +companion and friend of Plotinos during his earliest period, editing +all Plotinos's books, until displaced by Porphyry. We remember also +that Porphyry was Amelius's disciple, before his spectacular quarrel +with Amelius, later supplanting him as editor of the works of Plotinos. +Plotinos also came from Alexandria, where Numenius had been carefully +studied and quoted by Origen and Clement of Alexandria. Further, +Porphyry records twice that accusations were popularly made against +Plotinos, that he had plagiarized from Numenius. In view of all this +historical background, we have the prima-facie right to consider +Plotinos chiefly as a later re-stater of the views of Numenius, at +least during his earlier or Amelian period. Such a conception of the +state of affairs must have been in the mind of that monk who, in the +Escoreal manuscript, substituted the name of Numenius for that of +Plotinos on that fragment[573] about matter, which begins directly +with Numenius's name of the divinity, "being and essence."[574] + + +2. NUMENIUS AS FATHER OF NEO-PLATONISM. + +Let us compare with this historical evidence, that which supports the +universally admitted dependence of Plotinos on his teacher Ammonius. +We have only two witnesses: Hierocles and Nemesius; and the latter +attributes the argument for the immateriality of the soul to Ammonius +and Numenius jointly. No doubt, Ammonius may have taught Plotinos in +his youth; but so no doubt did other teachers; and of Ammonius the only +survivals are a few pages preserved by Nemesius. The testimony for +Plotinos's dependence on Numenius is therefore much more historical, as +well as significant, in view of Numenius having left written records +that were widely quoted. The title of "Father of Neo-platonism," +therefore, if it must at all be awarded, should go to Numenius, who had +written a "History of the Platonic Succession," wherein he attempts +to restore "original" Platonism. This fits the title "Neo-platonism," +whereas the philosophy of Ammonius, would be better described as an +eclectic synthesis of Platonism and Aristotelianism. + + +3. CONTRAST BETWEEN THEM. + +Of course we shall admit that there are differences between Plotinos +and Numenius, at least during his Porphyrian period; this was +inevitable while dismissing his Numenian secretary Amelius,[575] a +friend "who had become imbued with" such doctrines before becoming the +friend of Plotinos, who persevered in them, and wrote in justification +thereof. We find that the book chronologically preceding this one is v. +5, on the very subject at issue between Amelius and Porphyry. Plotinos +took his stand with the latter, and therefore against the former, +and through him, against Numenius; and indeed we find him opposing +several Gnostic opinions which can be substantiated in Numenius: the +creation by illumination or emanation,[576] the threefoldness of the +creator,[577] and the pilot's forgetting himself in his work.[578] + +But, after all, these points are not as important as they might seem; +for in a very little while we find Plotinos himself admitting the +substance of all of these ideas, except the verbiage; he himself +uses the light and ray simile, the "light of light;"[579] he himself +distinguishes various phases of the allegedly single intelligence,[580] +and the soul, as pilot of the body incarnates by the very forgetfulness +by which the creator created.[581] + +Further, as we shall show, during his last or Eustochian period after +Porphyry had taken a trip to Sicily to avoid suicide, he himself was +to return to Numenian standpoints. This may be shown in a general way +as follows. Of the nine Eustochian essays[582] only two[583] betray no +similarities to Numenian ideas, while seven[584] do. On the contrary, +in the Amelio-Porphyrian period,[585] written immediately on Amelius's +dismissal, only six[586] are Numenian, and six[587] are non-Numenian. +In the succeeding wholly Porphyrian period,[588] we have the same equal +number of Numenian[589] and non-Numenian[590] books. An explanation of +this reversion to Numenian ideas has been attempted in the study of the +development in Plotinos's views. On the whole, therefore, Plotinos's +opposition to Numenius may be considered no more than episodic. + + +4. DIRECT INDEBTEDNESS OF PLOTINOS TO NUMENIUS. + +As Plotinos was in the habit of not even putting his name to his own +notes; as even in the times of Porphyry the actual authorship of much +that he wrote was already disputed; as even Porphyry acknowledges +principles and quotations were borrowed, we must discover Numenian +passages by their content, rather than by any external indications. +As the great majority of Numenius's works are irretrievably lost, +we may never hope to arrive at a final solution of the matter; and +we shall have to restrict ourselves to that which, in Plotinos, may +be identified by what Numenian fragments remain. What little we can +thus trace definitely will give us a right to draw the conclusion +to much more, and to the opinion that, especially in his Amelian +period, Plotinos was chiefly indebted to Numenian inspiration. We +can consider[591] the mention of Pythagoreans who had treated of the +intelligible as applying to Numenius, whose chief work was "On the +Good," and on the "Immateriality of the Soul." + +The first class of passages will be such as bear explicit reference to +quotation from an ancient source. Of such we have five: "That is why +the Pythagoreans were, among each other, accustomed to refer to this +principle in a symbolic manner, calling him 'A-pollo,' which name means +a denial of manifoldness."[592] "That is the reason of the saying, 'The +ideas and numbers are born from the indefinite doubleness, and the +One;' for this is intelligence."[593] "That is why the ancients said +that ideas are essences and beings."[594] "Let us examine the (general) +view that evils cannot be destroyed, but are necessary."[595] "The +Divinity is above being."[596] + +A sixth case is, "How manifoldness is derived from the First."[597] +A seventh case is the whole passage on the triunity of the divinity, +including the term "Father."[598] + +Among doctrines said to be handed down from the ancient +philosophers[599] are the ascents and descents of souls[600] and the +migrations of souls into bodies other than human.[601] The soul is a +number.[602] + +Moreover, Plotinos wrote a book on the Incorruptibility of the +soul,[603] as Numenius had done;[604] and both authors discuss the +incorporeity of qualities.[605] + +Besides these passages where there is a definite expression of +dependence on earlier sources, there are two in which the verbal +similarity[606] is striking enough to justify their being considered +references: "Besides, no body could subsist without the power of the +universal Soul." "Because bodies, according to their own nature, +are changeable, inconstant, and infinitely divisible, and nothing +unchangeable remains in them, there is evidently need of a principle +that would lead them, gather them, and bind them fast together; and +this we name soul."[607] This similarity is so striking that it had +already been observed and noted by Bouillet. Compare "We consider that +all things called essences are composite, and that not a single one +of them is simple," with "Numenius, who believes that everything is +thoroughly mingled together, and that nothing is simple."[608] + + +5. UNCERTAIN INDEBTEDNESS OF PLOTINOS. + +As Plotinos does not give exact quotations and references, it is +difficult always to give their undoubted source. As probably Platonic +we may mention the passage about the universal Soul taking care of all +that is inanimate;[609] and "When one has arrived at individuals, they +must be abandoned to infinity."[610] Also other quotations.[611] The +line "It might be said that virtues are actualizations,"[612] might +be Aristotelian. We also find:[613] "Thus, according to the ancient +maxim, 'Courage, temperance, all the virtues, even prudence, are but +purifications.'" "That is the reason that it is right to say that +the 'soul's welfare and beauty lie in assimilating herself to the +divinity.'" This sounds Platonic, but might be Numenian. + +In this connection it might not be uninteresting to note passages +in Numenius which are attributed to Plato, but which are not to be +identified: "O Men, the Mind which you dimly perceive is not the +First Mind; but before this Mind is another one, which is older and +diviner." "That the Good is One."[614] + +We turn now to thoughts found identically in Plotinos and Numenius, +although no textual identity is to be noted. We may group these +according to the subject, the universe, and the soul. + + +6. PARTICULAR SIMILARITIES. + +God is supreme king.[615] Eternity is now, but neither past nor +future.[616] The King in heaven is surrounded by leisure.[617] The Good +is above Being;[618] the divinity is the unity above the "Being and +Essence;[619] and connected with this is the unitary interpretation +of the name A-pollo,[620] following in the footsteps of Plutarch. +Nevertheless, the inferior divinity traverses the heavens,[621] in +a circular motion.[622] While Numenius does not specify this motion +as circular,[623] it is implied, inasmuch as the creator's passing +through the heavens must have followed their circular course. With +this perfect motion is connected the peculiar Numenian doctrine of +inexhaustible giving,[624] which gave a philosophical basis for the old +simile of radiation of light,[625] so that irradiation is the method +of creation,[626] and this is not far removed from emanationism. This +process consists of the descent of the intelligible into the material, +or, as Numenius puts it, that both the intelligible and the perceptible +participate in the ideas.[627] Thus intelligence is the uniting +principle that holds together the bodies whose tendency is to split +up, and scatter,[628] making a leakage or waste,[629] which process +invades even the divinity.[630] This uniting of scattering elements +produces a mixture or mingling,[608] of matter and reason,[631] which, +however, is limited to the energies of the existent, not to the +existent itself.[632] All things are in a flow,[633] and the whole all +is in all.[634] The divinity creates by glancing at the intelligence +above,[635] as a pilot.[636] The divinity is split by over-attention to +its charges.[637] + +This leads us over to consideration of the soul. The chief effort +of Numenius is a polemic against the materialism of the Stoics, +and to it Plotinos devotes a whole book.[638] All souls, even the +lowest, are immortal.[639] Even qualities are incorporeal.[640] +The soul, therefore, remains incorporeal.[641] The soul, however, +is divisible.[642] This explains the report that Numenius taught +not various parts of the soul,[643] but two souls, which would be +opposed by Plotinos in his polemic against the Stoics,[644] but +taught in another place.[645] Such divisibility is indeed implied +in the formation of presentation as a by-product,[646] or a "common +part."[647] Moreover, the soul has to choose its own demon, or guardian +divinity.[648] Salvation as a goal appears in Numenius,[649] but not +in Plotinos, who opposes the Gnostic idea of the "saved souls,"[650] +though elsewhere he speaks of the paths of the musician,[651] +lover[652] and philosopher[653] in reaching ecstasy.[654] Still both +Gnostics and Plotinos insisted on the need of a savior.[655] Memory +is actualization of the soul.[656] In the highest ecstasy the soul is +alone with the alone.[657] + + +7. SIMILARITIES APPLIED DIFFERENTLY. + +This comparison of philosophy would have been much stronger had we +added thereto the following points in which we find similar terms and +ideas, but which are applied differently. The soul is indissolubly +united to intelligence according to Plotinos, but to its source with +Numenius.[658] Plotinos makes discord the result of their fall, while +with Numenius it is its cause.[659] Guilt is the cause of the fall of +souls, with Plotinos,[660] but with Numenius it is impulsive passion. +The great evolution or world-process is by Plotinos called the "eternal +procession," while with Numenius it is progress.[661] The simile of +the pilot is by Plotinos applied to the soul within the body; while +with Numenius, it refers to the logos, or creator in the universe,[662] +while in both cases the cause,--of creation for the creator,[663] and +incarnation for the soul[664]--is forgetfulness. There is practically +no difference here, however. Doubleness is, by Plotinos, predicated +of the sun and stars, but by Numenius, of the demiurge himself,[665] +which Plotinos opposes as a Gnostic teaching.[666] The Philonic term +"legislator" is, by Plotinos, applied to intelligence, while Numenius +applies it to the third divinity, and not the second.[667] Plotinos +extends immortality to animals, but Numenius even to the inorganic +realm, including everything.[668] While Numenius seems to believe in +the Serapistic and Gnostic demons,[669] Plotinos opposes them,[670] +although in his biography[671] he is represented as taking part in the +evocation of his guardian spirit in a temple of Isis. + +We thus find a tolerably complete body of philosophy shared by Plotinos +and Numenius, out of the few fragments of the latter that have come +down to us. It would therefore be reasonable to suppose that if +Numenius's complete works had survived we could make out a still far +stronger case for Plotinos's dependence on Numenius. At any rate, the +Dominican scribe at the Escoreal who inserted the name of Numenius in +the place of that of Plotinos in the heading of[672] the fragment about +matter, must have felt a strong confusion between the two authors. + + +8. PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NUMENIUS AND PLOTINOS. + +To begin with, we have the controversy with the Stoics, which, +though it appears in the works of both, bears in each a different +significance. While with Numenius it absorbed his chief controversial +efforts,[673] with Plotinos[674] it occupied only one of his many +spheres of interest; and indeed, he had borrowed from them many +terms, such as "pneuma," the spiritual body, and others, set forth +elsewhere. Notable, however, was the term "hexis," habituation, +or form of inorganic objects,[675] and the "phantasia," or +sense-presentation.[676] Like, them, the name A-pollo is interpreted as +a denial of manifoldness.[677] + +Next in importance, as a landmark, is Numenius's chief secret, the name +of the divinity, as "being and essence," which reappears in Plotinos in +numberless places.[678] Connected with this is the idea that essence is +intelligence.[679] + + +9. PYTHAGOREAN SIMILARITIES. + +It is a common-place that Numenius was a Pythagorean, or at least +was known as such, for though he reverenced Pythagoras, he conceived +of himself as a restorer of true Platonism. It will, therefore, be +all the more interesting to observe what part numbers play in their +system, especially in that of Plotinos, who made no special claim to +be a Pythagorean disciple. First, we find that numbers and the divine +ideas are closely related.[680] Numbers actually split the unity of the +divinity.[681] The soul also is considered as a number,[682] and in +connection with this we find the Pythagorean sacred "tetraktys."[683] +Thus numbers split up the divinity,[684] though it is no more than fair +to add that elsewhere Plotinos contradicts this, and states that the +multiplicity of the divinity is not attained by division;[685] still, +this is not the only case in which we will be forced to array Plotinos +against himself. + +The first effect of the splitting influence of numbers will be +doubleness,[686] which, though present in intelligence,[687] +nevertheless chiefly appears in matter,[688] as the Pythagorean +"indefinite dyad."[689] Still, even the Supreme is double.[690] So +we must not be surprised if He is constituted by a trinity,[691] in +connection with which the Supreme appears as grandfather.[692] + +If then both Numenius and Plotinos are really under the spell of +Pythagoras, it is pretty sure they will not be materialist, they will +believe in the incorporeality of the divinity,[693] of qualities;[694] +and of the soul[695] which will be invisible[696] and possess no +extension.[697] A result of this will be that the soul will not be +located in the body, or in space, but rather the body in the soul.[698] + +From this incorporeal existence,[699] there is only a short step to +unchangeable existence,[700] or eternity.[701] This, to the soul, means +immortality,[702] one theory of which is reincarnation.[703] To the +universe, however, this means harmony.[704] + +There are still other Pythagorean traces in common between Numenius +and Plotinos. The cause that the indeterminate dyad split off from the +divinity is "tolma," rashness, or boldness.[705] Everything outside +of the divinity is in a continual state of flux.[706] Evil is then +that which is opposed to good.[707] It also is therefore unavoidable, +inasmuch as suppression of its cosmic function would entail cosmic +collapse.[708] The world stands thus as an inseparable combination of +intelligence and necessity, or chance.[709] + + +10. PLATONIC TRACES. + +Platonic traces, there would naturally be; but it will be noticed that +they are far less numerous than the Pythagorean. To begin with, we +find the reverent spirit towards the divinities, which prays for their +blessing at the inception of all tasks.[710] To us who live in these +latter days, such a prayer seems out of place in philosophy; but that +is only because we have divorced philosophy from theology; in other +words, because our theology has left the realm of living thought, +and, being fixed once for all, we are allowed to pursue any theory +of existence we please as if it had nothing whatever to do with any +reality; in other words, we are deceiving ourselves. On the contrary, +in those days, every philosophical speculation was a genuine adventure +in the spiritual world, a magical operation that might unexpectedly +lead to the threshold of the cosmic sanctuary. Wise, indeed, therefore, +was he who began it by prayer. + +Of other technical Platonic terms there are quite a few. The lower is +always the image of the higher.[711] So the world might be considered +the statue of the Divinity.[712] The ideas are in a realm above the +world.[713] The soul here below is as in a prison.[714] There is a +divinity higher than the one generally known.[715] The divinity is in +a stability resultant of firmness and perfect motion.[716] The perfect +movement, therefore, is circular.[717] This inter-communion of the +universe therefore results in matter appearing in the intelligible +world as "intelligible matter."[718] By dialectics, also called +"bastard reasoning,"[719] we abstract everything[720] till we reach the +thing-in-itself,[721] or, in other words, matter as a substrate of the +world.[722] Thus we metaphysically reach ineffable solitude.[723] + +The same goal is reached psychologically, however, in the ecstasy.[724] +This idea occurred in Plato only as a poetic expression of metaphysical +attainment; and in the case of Plotinos at least may have been used as +a practical experience chiefly to explain his epileptic attacks; and +this would be all the more likely as this disease was generally called +the "sacred disease." Whether Numenius also was an epileptic, we are +not told; it is more likely he took the idea from Philo, or Philo's +oriental sources; at least Numenius seems to claim no personal ecstatic +experiences such as those of Plotinos. + +We have entered the realm of psychology; and this teaches us that that +in which Numenius and Plotinos differ from Plato and Philo is chiefly +their psychological or experimental application of pure philosophy. No +body could subsist without the soul to keep it together.[725] Various +attempts are made to describe the nature of the soul; it is the extent +or relation of circumference to circle.[726] Or it is like a line and +its divergence.[727] In any case, the divinity and the soul move around +the heavens,[728] and this may explain the otherwise problematical +progress or evolution ("prosodos" or "stolos") of ours.[729] + + +11. VARIOUS SIMILARITIES. + +There are many other unclassifiable Numenian traces in Plotinos. Two of +them, however, are comparatively important. First, is a reaffirmation +of the ancient Greek connection between generation, fertility of birth +of souls and wetness,[730] which is later reaffirmed by Porphyry in +his "Cave of the Nymphs." Plotinos, however, later denies this.[731] +Then we come to a genuine innovation of Numenius's; his theory of +divine or intelligible giving. Plato had, of course, in his genial, +casual way, sketched out a whole organic system of divine creation +and administration of this world. The conceptions he needed he had +cheerfully borrowed from earlier Greek philosophy without any rigid +systematization, so that he never noticed that the hinge on which all +was supposed to turn was merely the makeshift of an assumption. This +capital error was noticed by Numenius, who sought to supply it by a +psychological observation, namely, that knowledge may be imparted +without diminution. Plotinos, with his winning way of dispensing with +quotation-marks, appropriated this,[732] as also the idea that life +streams out upon the world in the glance of the divinity, and as +quickly leaves it, when the Divinity turns away His glance.[733] + +Other less important points of contact are: the Egyptian ship of +souls;[734] the Philonic distinction between "the" God as supreme, and +"god" as subordinate;[735] the hoary equivocation on "kosmos;"[736] and +the illustration of the divine Logos as the pilot of the world.[737] + + + + +VALUE OF PLOTINOS. + + +IMPORTANCE IN THE PAST. + +We must focus our observations on Plotinos as a philosopher. To +begin with, we should review his successors, Porphyry, Jamblichus, +Sallust, Proclus, Hierocles, Simplicius;[738] Macrobius;[739] Priscus; +Olympicdorus and John Philoponus.[740] + +Among the Arabian philosophers that follow in his steps are Maimonides +and Ibn Gebirol.[741] + +Of the Christian fathers we first have two who paraphrased, rather than +quoted him. + +St. Augustine by name quotes i. 6; iii. 2; iv. 3, and v. 1; he +paraphrases parts of i. 2; ii. 1; iii. 6, 7; iv. 2, 7; vi. 5, 6.[742] +St. Basil so closely paraphrases parts of Plotinos in his treatise on +the Holy Spirit,[743] his letter on the Monastic Life,[744] and his +Hexameron,[745] that Bouillet prints the passage in question in deadly +parallel. + +Other Christian Plotonic students were Gregory of Nyssa, Synesius, +Dionysius the Areopagite, Theodorus, Aeneas of Gaza, Gennadius;[746] +Victorinus;[747] Nicephorus Chumnus;[748] and Cassiodorus.[749] + +Thomas Aquinas also was much indebted to Plotinos; and after him came +Boethius, Fénélon, Bossnet and Leibnitz (all quoted in Bouillet's work). + +We have frequently pointed out that Plotinos' "bastard reasoning" +process of reaching the intelligible was practically paraphrased by +Kant's dialectical path to the "thing-in-itself." This dialetic, of +course, was capitalized by Hegel. + +Drews has shown that Edouard von Hartmann used Plotinos' +semi-devotional ecstasy as a metaphysical basis for his philosophy of +the Unconscious. + +It is, of course, among mystics that Plotinos has been accorded the +greater honor. His practical influence descended through the visions +and ecstasies of the saints down to Swedenborg, who attempted to write +the theology of the ecstasy; and the relation between these two, +Swedenborg and Plotinos should prove a fertile field for investigation. + + +CULTURAL IMPORTANCE. + +Summarizing, he formed a bridge between the pagan world, with its +Greco-Roman civilization, and the modern world, in three departments: +Christianity, philosophy, and mysticism. So long as the traditional +Platonico-Stoical feud persisted there was no hope of progress; because +it kept apart two elements that were to fuse into the Christian +philosophy. Numenius was the last Platonist, as Posidonius was the last +Stoic combatant. However, if reports are to be trusted, Ammonius was an +eclecticist, who prided himself on combining Plato with Aristotle. If +Plotinos was indeed his disciple, it was the theory eclecticism that +he took from his reputed teacher. Practically he was to accomplish it +by his dependence on the Numenian Amelius, the Stoic Porphyry, and +the negative Eustochius. It will be seen therefore that his chief +importance was not in spite of his weakness, but most because of it. +By repeatedly "boxing the compass" he thoroughly assimilated the best +of the conflicting schools, and became of interest to a sufficiency +of different groups (Christian, philosophical and mystical) to insure +preservation, study and quotation. His habit of omitting credit to +any but ancient thinkers left his own work, to the uninformed--who +constituted all but a minimal number--as a body of original thought. +Thus he remains to us the last light of Greece, speaking a language +with which we are familiar, and leaving us quotations that are +imperishable. + + +PERSONAL VALUE. + +While therefore providentially Plotinos has ever been of great +importance theologically, philosophically and mystically, we cannot +leave him without honestly facing the question of his value as an +original thinker. It is evident that his success was in inverse ratio +to originality; but we can also see that he could not have held +together those three spheres of interest without the momentum of a +wonderful personality. This will be evident at a glance to any reader +of his biography. But after all we are here concerned not so much +with his personality as with his value as an original thinker. This +question is mooted by, and cannot be laid aside because of its decisive +influence on the problem of his dependence of Numenius. The greater +part of the latter's works being irretrievably lost, we can judge only +from what we have; and as to the rest, we must ask ourselves, was +Plotinos the kind of a man who would have depended on some other man's +thoughts? Is he likely to have sketched out a great scheme and filled +it in; or rather, was he likely to depend on personal suggestion, +and embroider on it, so to speak. Elsewhere we have demonstrated a +development of his opinions, for instance, about matter. Was this due +to progressiveness, or to indefiniteness? The reader must judge for +himself. + + +PERSONAL LIMITATIONS. + +His epilepsy naturally created an opportunity for, and need of a +doctrine of ecstasy; which for normal people should be no more than +a doctrine, or at least be limited to conscious experiences. Even +his admirer, Porphyry, acknowledges that he spelled and pronounced +incorrectly.[750] He acknowledged that without Porphyry's objections he +would have nothing to say. He refrained from quoting his authorities, +and Porphyry acknowledged that his writings contained many Stoic +and Aristotelian doctrines. It was generally bruited around that his +doctrines were borrowed from Numenius,[751] to the extent that his +disciples held controversies, and wrote books on the subject. His style +is enigmatic, and the difficulty of understanding him was discussed +even in his own day. He was dependent on secretaries or editors; first +on Amelius, later on Porphyry, who does not scruple to acknowledge +he added many explanations.[752] Later, Plotinos sent his books to +Porphyry in Sicily to edit. No doubt the defectiveness of his eyesight +made both reading and writing difficult, and explains his failure +to put titles to his works; though, as in the case of Virgil, such +hesitation may have been the result of a secret consciousness of his +indebtedness to others. + + +RELIANCE ON PUNNING. + +Punning has of course a hoary antiquity, and even the revered Plato +was an adept at it--as we see in his Cratylos. Moreover, not till a +man's work is translated can we uncover all the unconscious cases +of "undistributed middle." Nevertheless, in an inquiry as to the +permanent objective validity of a train of reasoning, we are compelled +to note extent and scope of his tendency. So he puns on aeons;[753] +on science and knowledge;[754] on "agalmata";[755] on Aphrodite, +as "delicate";[756] on Being;[757] on "koros," as creation or +adornment";[758] on difference in others;[759] on idea;[760] on heaven, +world, universe, animal and all;[761] on Vesta, and standing;[762] on +Hexis;[763] on inclination;[764] on doxa;[765] on love and vision;[766] +on "einai" and "henos;"[767] on "mous," "noêsis," and to "noêfon";[768] +on paschein;[769] on Poros;[770] on Prometheus and Providence;[771] +on reason and characteristic;[772] on "schesis" and "schema";[773] +and "soma" and "sozesthai";"[774] on suffering;[775] on thinking, +thinkable, and intellection;[776] on "timely" and "sovereign."[777] +It will be noted that these puns refer to some of the most important +conceptions, and are found in all periods of his life. We must +therefore conclude that his was not a clear thinking ability; that he +depended on accidental circumstances, and may not always have been +fully conscious how far he was following others. This popular judgment +that he was revamping Numenius's work may then not have been entirely +unfounded, as we indeed have shown. + +Nevertheless, he achieved some permanent work, that will never be +forgotten; for instance: + +1. His description of the ecstatic state. + +2. His polemic against the Aristotelian and Stoic categories. + +3. His establishment of his own categories. + +4. His allegoric treatment of the birth of love, the several Eroses, +Poros and Penia, and other myths. + +5. His building of a Trinitarian philosophy. + +6. His threefold spheres of existence, underlying Swedenborgian +interpretation. + +7. His aesthetic theories. + +8. His ethical studies of virtues and happiness. + +9. His restatement of Numenius's arguments for the immateriality of the +soul. + + +SELECTED MAXIMS + +The reader may be interested in a few maxims selected from Plotinos' +works which may be of general interest. + +1. We develop toward ecstasy by simplification of Soul. + +2. We rise by the flight of the Single to the Single, face to face. + +3. We contain something of the Supreme. + +4. The Soul becomes what she remembers and sees. + +5. Everything has a secret power. + +6. The best men are those who have most intimacy with themselves. + +7. The touch of the good man is the greatest thing in the world. + +8. Every being is its best, not when great or numerous, but when it +belongs to itself. + +9. There are two men in us, the better and the worse. + +10. The secret of life is to live simultaneously with others and +yourself. + +11. God is the author of liberty. + +12. Concerning what would it be most worth while to speak, except the +Soul? Let us therefore know ourselves. + +13. Without virtue, God is but a name. + +14. The object of virtue is to separate the soul from the body. + +15. We can never become perfect, because he who thinks himself so has +already forgotten the supreme divinity towards which he must hasten. + +16. The world was created by a concurrence of intelligence and +necessity. + +17. The Soul is the image, word, and interpreter of the One. + +18. The divinities though present to many human beings often reveal +themselves only to some one person, because he alone is able to +contemplate them. + +19. To act without suffering is the sign of a great power. + +20. Only virtue is independent. + +21. We are beautiful when we know ourselves. + +22. The Soul is the child of the universal Father. + +23. True happiness is being wise, and exercising this within oneself. + +24. To become again what one was originally is to live in the Superior +world. + +25. The desired goal is not to cease failing, but to grow divine. + +26. Virtue demands preliminary purification. + +27. Our effort at assimilation should be directed not at mere +respectability, but at the gods themselves. + +28. One should study mathematics in order to accustom oneself to think +of incorporeal things, and to believe in their existence. + +29. Soul is not in body, but body in Soul. + +30. The Soul's higher part remains in heaven. + +31. We should not leave the earth, but not be of it. + +32. The object of life is not to avoid evil, or copy the good, but to +become good. + +33. Dying, to Eustochius: "I am awaiting you, in order to draw the +divine in me to the divine in all." + + + + +FOOTNOTES: + + +[1] It is significant that the subject of the first treatise of +Plotinos, after the departure of Porphyry, should treat of happiness +as the object of life. These may have been the arguments he advanced +to persuade Porphyry to abstain from suicide (to which he refers in +sections 8, 16), and, rather, to take a trip to Sicily, the land of +natural beauty. He also speaks of losing friends, in section 8. The +next book, on Providence, may also have been inspired by reflections +on this untoward and unexpected circumstance. We see also a change +from abstract speculation to his more youthful fancy and comparative +learning and culture. + +[2] Diog. Laert. x.; Cicero, de Fin. i. 14, 46. + +[3] Cicero, de Fin. 11, 26. + +[4] See Arist. Nic. Eth. vii. 13; Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyp. Pyrrhon, +iii. 180; Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. + +[5] Arist. Nic. Eth. i. 10, 14. + +[6] Stob. Floril. i. 76. + +[7] See vi. 8. + +[8] In Plutarch, of Wickedness, and in Seneca, de Tranquil, Animi, 14. + +[9] De Providentia, 3. + +[10] De Provid. 5. + +[11] Aeschylus, Seven Against Thebes, 327. + +[12] The vegetative soul, the power that presides over the nutrition +and growth of the body; see iv. 3.23. + +[13] See i. 8; also Numenius, 16. + +[14] i. 2.4. + +[15] Cicero, Tusculans. ii. 7. + +[16] The animal; see i. 1.10. + +[17] See i. 1.8, 10. + +[18] See the Theataetus, p. 176. Carv. 84; the Phaedo. p. 69, Cary, 37; +the Republic, vi. p. 509; Cary, 19; x. p. 613, Cary, 12; the Laws, iv. +p. 716, Cary, 8; also Plotinos i. 2.1. + +[19] See i. 9. + +[20] A Stoic confutation of Epicurus and the Gnostics. As soon as +Porphyry has left him, Plotinos harks back to Amelius, on whose +leaving he had written against the Gnostics. He also returns to +Numenian thoughts. Bouillet notices that here Plotinos founded himself +on Chrysippus, Marcus Aurelius, and Epictetus, and was followed +by Nemesius. This new foundation enabled him to assume a rather +independent attitude. Against Plato, he taught that matter derived +existence from God, and that the union of the soul and body is not +necessarily evil. Against Aristotle, he taught that God is not only +the final, but also the efficient cause of the universe. Against +the Stoics, he taught that the human soul is free, and is a cause, +independent of the World Soul from which she proceeded. Against the +Gnostics, he insisted that the creator is good, the world is the best +possible, and Providence extends to mundane affairs. Against the +Manicheans, he taught that the evil is not positive, but negative, and +is no efficient cause, so that there is no dualism. + +[21] Diog. Laert. x. 133. + +[22] See iv. 2.4; vi. 7; see Plato, Philebus, p. 30, Cary, 56; Philo, +Leg. Alleg, vi. 7. + +[23] Lactantius, de Ira Dei, 13. + +[24] Ireneus, Ref. Her. ii. 3. + +[25] As in vi. 7.1. + +[26] Philo, de Creatione Mundi, 6. + +[27] As the Gnostics taught; see ii. 9.1. + +[28] As was held by the Gnostics, who within the divinity distinguished +potentiality and actuality, as we see in ii. 9.1. + +[29] See ii. 9.3. 8. + +[30] Numenius, 32. + +[31] Plato, Timaeus, p. 48, Cary, 21. Statesman, p. 273, Cary, 16; +Laws, x. p. 904, Cary, 12. + +[32] See ii. 9.2. + +[33] From Aristotle, de Anima, 2. + +[34] This is the Aristotelian psychological scheme. + +[35] Clem. Al.; Strom. v. p. 712; Stobaeus, Ecl. Phys. i. p. 372, 446. + +[36] iv. 8.12; Plato, Tim. p. 41. 69; Cary, 16, 44. + +[37] Stob. Ecl. Eth. ii. 7. + +[38] iii. 2.13. + +[39] p. 253; Cary, 74. + +[40] Sen. 526. + +[41] According to Plato's Theaetetus, p. 176, Cary, 83; Numenius,16. + +[42] Seneca, de Provid. 2. + +[43] In his Republic, ix. p. 585, Cary, 10. + +[44] See iii. 1.9. + +[45] See iv. 3.12. + +[46] See iv. 3.5. + +[47] Gregory of Nyssa, Catech. Orat. 7. + +[48] As thought Sallust, Consp. Cat. 52. + +[49] Republic x. p. 620; Cary, 16; Numenius, 57. + +[50] As said Sallust, Conspiration of Catiline, 52. + +[51] As thought Epictetus, Manual, 31. + +[52] In his Republic, vi. p. 488; Cary, 4. + +[53] Marcus Aurelius. Thoughts, xi. 18. + +[54] As thought Cicero, de Nat. Deor. iii. 63. 64. + +[55] As thought Philo, de Prov. in Eus. Prep. Ev. viii. 14. + +[56] According to Plato, in the Sophist and Protagoras, and the Stoics, +as in Marcus Aurelius. Meditations, vii. 63. + +[57] As did the writer of Revelation, iv. 6. + +[58] In his Timaeus, p. 29e, Cary, 10. + +[59] As said Chrysippus in Plutarch, de Comm. Not. adv. Stoicos, 13. + +[60] Mentioned by Plato in his Phaedrus, p. 248, Cary, 59; Republ. v. +p. 451, Cary, 2; and in the famous hymn of Cleanthes, Stobaeus Ecl. +Phys. i. 3. + +[61] Like the figure of the angel Mithra; see Franck, LaKabbale, p. 366. + +[62] As Hierocles wondered, de Prov. p. 82, London Ed. + +[63] In the words of Plato's Timaeus p. 48; Cary, 21; and Theaetetus, +p. 176; Cary, 84; Numenius, 16. + +[64] Almost the words of John i. 1. + +[65] In the Laws, vii. p. 796, Cary, 6; p. 815, Cary, 18; and Philo, de +Prov. in Eus. Prep. Ev. viii. 14. + +[66] As thought Epictetus in his Manual, 2, 6. + +[67] In his Philebus, p. 48, Cary, 106. + +[68] As thought Epictetus in his Manual. 8. + +[69] See iii. 8. + +[70] Numenius, 32. + +[71] Plato, Banquet, p. 187, Cary, 14. + +[72] Marcus Aurelius, Medit. ii. 13. + +[73] As thought Marcus Aurelius, in his Thoughts, xii. 42. + +[74] See iv. 3.24. + +[75] In his Manual, 37. + +[76] See iv. 1.9-12. + +[77] Marcus Aurelius, Medit. vii. 9; Seneca, Epist. 94. + +[78] Numenius, iii. 7. + +[79] This image was later adopted by Swedenborg in his "celestial man." + +[80] In close proximity to note 45, another distinctly Johannine +expression. + +[81] Stoic ideas. + +[82] As Plato said in his Phaedrus, p. 247, Cary, 56. + +[83] See i. 8.2. + +[84] See ii. 3.17. + +[85] See ii. 3.13. Ficinus's translation. + +[86] A Stoic term. + +[87] Plato, Timaeus, p. 42, Cary, 17; see also Enn. ii. 3.10. 11, 15, +16. + +[88] Timaeus, p. 42, 91, Cary, 17, 72, 73. + +[89] See ii. 3.13. + +[90] Alcinous, de Doctrina Platonica, 26. + +[91] Gregory of Nyssa, Catech. Oratio, 7; Dionysius Areopagite, Divine +Names, 4. + +[92] See ii. 3.7. + +[93] See iii. 2.6. + +[94] Plato, Timaeus, p. 31c, Cary, 11. + +[95] See Numenius. 14. + +[96] Clem. Al. Strom. v. 689. + +[97] In this book we no longer find detailed study of Plato, Aristotle +and the Epicureans, as we did in the works of the Porphyrian period. +Well indeed did Plotinos say that without Porphyry's objections he +might have had little to say. + +[98] Porphyry, Principles of the theory of the Intelligibles, 31. + +[99] Olympiodorus, in Phaedonem, Cousin, Fragments, p. 404. + +[100] Ib., p. 432. + +[101] Ib., p. 418. + +[102] Ib., p. 431. + +[103] John Philoponus, Comm. in Arist., de Anima, i. 1. + +[104] See iii. 6.1. + +[105] By a triple pun, on "nous," "noêsis," and "to noêton." + +[106] Porphyry, Principles, 32. + +[107] By a pun. + +[108] See John i. 4, 9. + +[109] This anticipates Athanasius's explanations of the divine process. + +[110] See v. 1.4. + +[111] Porphyry, Principles, 26. + +[112] The Eleusynian Mysteries, Hymn to Ceres, 279; see vi. 9.11. + +[113] See v. 3.14. + +[114] In this book Plotinos harks back to the first book he had +written, i. 6, to Plato's Banquet and Cratylos. Porphyry later agreed +with some of it. Like St. John, Plotinos returns to God as love, in +his old age. His former book had also been a re-statement of earlier +thoughts. + +[115] See iii. 5.6. + +[116] See i. 6.2, 3. + +[117] See i. 6.3, 7. + +[118] Plato, Banquet, p. 206-208, Cary, 31, 32. + +[119] Plato, Banquet, p. 210, Cary, 34, sqq. + +[120] Porphyry, Biography of Plotinos, 15. + +[121] See i. 3.2. + +[122] See sect. 5, 6. + +[123] Plato, Banquet, p. 185, Cary, 12, 13. + +[124] By Plato, in his Cratylus, p. 396, Cary, 29, 30; interpreted to +mean "pure Intelligence." + +[125] This is the principal power of the soul; see ii. 3.17. + +[126] See v. 8.12, 13. + +[127] Plotinos thus derives "eros" from "orasis," which, however +far-fetched a derivation, is less so than that of Plato, from "esros," +meaning to "flow into," Cratylos, p. 420, Cary, 79, 80. + +[128] For this distinction, see ii. 3.17, 18. + +[129] For the two Loves, see v. 8.13, and vi. 9.9. + +[130] See iii. 4. + +[131] See iv. 9. + +[132] Plato, Banq. 203: Cary, 29. + +[133] In his Isis and Osiris, p. 372, 374. + +[134] See i. 1. + +[135] Plato, Banquet, p. 202, Cary, 27, 28; Porphyry, de Abst. ii. 37, +sqq. + +[136] In section 4. + +[137] Plato, Epinomis, p. 984, Cary, 8; Porphyry, de Abst. ii. 37-42. + +[138] See ii. 4.3. + +[139] See ii. 4.3. + +[140] An expression often used by the Platonists; see the Lexicon +Platonicum, by the grammarian Timaeus, sub voce "oistra." + +[141] See Plato, Banquet, p. 203, Cary, 29. + +[142] See iii. 4.6. + +[143] See iii. 4.3. + +[144] A Stoic distinction. + +[145] P. 246, Cary, 56. + +[146] P. 28, Cary, 50. + +[147] Didymus, Etym. Magn. p. 179, Heidelb. p. 162, Lips. + +[148] Timaeus Locrius, of the Soul of the World, p. 550, ed. Gale, +Cary, 4. + +[149] Origen, c. Cels., iv. p. 533. + +[150] "logoi." + +[151] Proclus, Theology of Plato, vi. 23. + +[152] As the generation of the world, in Plato's Timaeus, p. 28, 29, +Cary, 9; and the erecting into separate Gods various powers of the same +divinity, as Proclus said, in his commentary thereon, in Parm. i. 30. + +[153] ii. 3.17; ii. 9.2. + +[154] Pun on "Poros" and "euporia." + +[155] See ii. 4.16. + +[156] See books ii. 3; ii. 9; iii. 1, 2, 3, 4, for the foundations +on which this summary of Plotinos's doctrine of evil is contained. +To do this, he was compelled to return to Plato, whose Theaetetus, +Statesman, Timaeus and Laws he consulted. Aristotle seems to have been +more interested in natural phenomena and human virtue than in the +root-questions of the destiny of the universe, and the nature of the +divinity; so Plotinos studies him little here. But it will be seen that +here Plotinos entirely returns to the later Plato, through Numenius. + +[157] As thought Empedocles, 318-320. + +[158] i. 6.2. + +[159] i. 8.7. + +[160] i. 8.3. + +[161] As thought Plato in his Laws, iv. p. 716; Cary, 7, 8. + +[162] As thought Plato in his Philebus, p. 28; Cary 49, 50. + +[163] See v. 1; vi. 9.2. + +[164] Numenius, fr. 32. + +[165] As said Plato, in his second Letter, 2.312. + +[166] See iii. 8.9; iv. 7.14; vi. 4.2; vi. 9.2. + +[167] As held by Plato in the Parmenides and First Alcibiades. + +[168] See ii. 4.8-16. + +[169] It is noteworthy that Plotinos in his old age here finally +recognizes Evil in itself, just as Plato in his later work, the Laws +(x. p. 897; Cary, 8) adds to the good World-soul, an evil one. This, +for Plotinos, was harking back to Numenius's evil world-soul, fr. 16. + +[170] In his First Alcibiades, p. 122; Cary, 37. + +[171] See i. 1.12. + +[172] This means created things, which are contingent and perishable; +see ii. 4.5, 6. + +[173] See ii. 4.10-12. This idea of irradiation is practically +emanationism; and besides Plotinos's interest in orientalism (Porphyry +Biography, 3), it harks back to Numenius, fr. 26.3; 27a.10. + +[174] Held by Plato in his Theaetetus, p. 176; Cary, 84, 85; and +Republic, ii. 279; Cary, 18, and of Numenius, fr. 16. + +[175] See i. 2.1. + +[176] In the Theaetetus, p. 176; Cary, 84, 85. + +[177] Numenius, fr. 10; Plato, Rep. vi. p. 509b; Cary, 19. + +[178] As Plato suggested in his Philebus, p. 23; Cary, 35-37. + +[179] Numenius, fr. 17. + +[180] Mentioned by Plato in the Timaeus, pp. 28, 30, 38; Cary, 9, 10, +14. + +[181] From the Timaeus, p. 41; Cary, 16, 17. + +[182] See i. 2.1; i. 6.8. + +[183] That is, the relative inferiority of beings which, proceeding +from each other, become more and more distant from the good; see ii. +5.5; ii. 9.8, 13; v. 1; Philo, Leg. Alleg. ii. p. 74. + +[184] See i. 8.1. + +[185] ii. 4.12. + +[186] Numenius, fr. 26.3. + +[187] Diog. Laertes vii. + +[188] See ii. 6. + +[189] ii. 4.13. + +[190] i. 8.15. + +[191] As thought Plato in his Banquet, p. 211; Cary, 35. + +[192] As said Plato, Republic, vii. p. 534; Cary, 14. + +[193] As Plato says in his Phaedrus, p. 246; Cary, 54, 56. + +[194] As wrote Plato in his Banquet, p. 203; Cary, 28, 29, and see iii. +7.14 and iii. 5.9 as well as iii. 6.14. + +[195] According to the interpretation of Ficinus. + +[196] See ii. 4. This is an added confirmation of the chronological +order; in the Enneadic order this book is later, not earlier. + +[197] Again a term discussed by Numenius, fr. ii. 8, 13; and iii; see +i. 1.9; iv. 3.3, 30, 31; i. 4.10. + +[198] We notice how these latter studies of Plotinos do not take +up any new problems, chiefly reviewing subjects touched on before. +This accounts for Porphyry's attempt to group the Plotinic writings, +systematically. This reminds us of the suggestion in the Biography, +that except for the objections of Porphyry, Plotinos would have nothing +to write. Notice also the system of the last Porphyrian treatises, +contrasted with the more literary treatment of the later. All this +supports Porphyry's table of chronological arrangement of the studies +of Plotinos. This book is closely connected with the preceding studies +of Fate and Providence, iii. 1-3; for he is here really opposing not +the Gnostics he antagonized when dismissing Amelius, but the Stoic +theories on Providence and Fate. + +[199] See iii. 1.5, 6; iii. 6; iv. 4.30-44. + +[200] Macrobins. In Somn. Scipionis. + +[201] Cicero, de Divinatione, i. 39. + +[202] Julius Firmicus Maternus, Astrol. ii. 23. + +[203] With Ptolemy's Tetrabiblion, i. p. 17. + +[204] See iv. 4.31. + +[205] Discussed in par. 4. + +[206] This incomprehensibility was no doubt due to Plotinos's advancing +blindness and renal affection. + +[207] Numenius, fr. 32. + +[208] Cicero, de Nat. Deorum, ii. 46. + +[209] See iv. 4.32. + +[210] According to the Stoics: Alex. Aphrod. de Mixtione, p. 141; +Cicero, de Nat. Deorum, ii. 32. + +[211] See iii. 1.4, 7-10. + +[212] See iii. 1.6. + +[213] See iv. 4.33. + +[214] See iv. 4.35; according to the Stoics, see Diogenes Laertes. vii. +140. + +[215] See iv. 4.32. + +[216] Seneca, Quest. Nat. i. 1. + +[217] See iii. 4.2, 4. + +[218] See ii. 3.13. + +[219] See iii. 4.3. + +[220] See iii. 1.8-10. + +[221] The law of Adrastea; see iii. 4.2; iv. 4.4, 5. + +[222] Plato, Phaedrus, p. 244-251; Cary, 47-66. + +[223] See i. 8; ii. 11; iii. 1; vi. 8. + +[224] Plato, Rep. x. p. 617; Cary, 14. + +[225] p. 41-42; Cary, 16, 17. + +[226] See i. 1.7-10. + +[227] See ii. 1.5. + +[228] Stoic terms. + +[229] See ii. 1.8-10. + +[230] See i. 2.1; vi. 8. + +[231] See i. 1.7-12; iv. 3.19-23. + +[232] This is the exact doctrine of Numenius, fr. 53; it logically +agrees with the doubleness of matter, Num. 14; of the Creator, Num. 36; +and the world-Soul, fr. 16. See note 71. + +[233] See par. 18. + +[234] Plato, Banquet, p. 202; Cary, 28; Timaeus, p. 90; Cary, 71. + +[235] See iii. 1.2. + +[236] That is, to share the passions of the bodies: see iii. 1.2. + +[237] See iv. 4.38-40. + +[238] Seneca, Nat. Quest. ii. 32. + +[239] According to Aristotle, Met. xii. 3. + +[240] See iii. 1.6. + +[241] See Cicero, de Nat. Deor. ii. 34. + +[242] See iv. 4.39, 40. + +[243] Plato, Phaedrus, p. 248; Cary, 59.60. + +[244] See iii. 1.8-10. + +[245] See iv. 4.39. + +[246] See iii. 4.3. + +[247] See iii. 1.10. + +[248] See iii. 1.5. + +[249] Rep. x. p. 616; Cary, 14; Enn. iii. 4. + +[250] See iv. 4.30, 40, 43, 44. + +[251] See i. 4. + +[252] See i. 2.5. + +[253] In i. 1; proof of the chronological order. + +[254] See ii. 9.12; iv. 3.9, 10; negatively. + +[255] See iii. 3.1, 2; see Seneca, de Provid. 5. + +[256] See ii. 3.17; iii. 8. + +[257] See iv. 4.9-12. + +[258] See ii. 4; Seneca, de Provid. 5. + +[259] See ii. 9.2; iii. 2, 3. Seneca, de Provid. 5. + +[260] Or generative reasons, a Stoic term, Seneca, Quest. Nat. iii. 29; +see iii. 3.1, 2, 7. + +[261] Plotinos is here harking back to his very earliest writing, 1.6, +where, before his monistic adventure with Porphyry, he had, under +the Numenian influence of Amelius, constructed his system out of a +combination of the doctrines of Plato (about the ideas), Aristotle (the +distinctions of form and matter and of potentiality and actualization), +and the Stoic (the "reasons," "seminal reasons," action and passions, +and "hexis," or "habit," the inorganic informing principle). Of these, +Numenius seems to have lacked the Aristotelian doctrines, although he +left Plato's single triple-functioned soul for Aristotle's combination +of souls of various degrees (fr. 53). Plotinos, therefore, seems to +have distinguished in every object two elements, matter and form (ii. +4.1; ii. 5.2). Matter inheres potentially in all beings (ii. 5.3, 4) +and therefore is non-being, ugliness, and evil (i. 6.6). Form is the +actualization (K. Steinhart's Melemata Plotiniana, p. 31; ii. 5.2); +that is, the essence and power (vi. 4.9), which are inseparable. Form +alone possesses real existence, beauty and goodness. Form has four +degrees: idea, reason, nature and habit; which degrees are the same +as those of thought and life (Porphyry, Principles 12, 13, 14). The +idea is distinguished into "idea" or intelligible Form, or "eidos," +principle of human intellectual life. Reason is 1, divine (theios +logos, i. 6, 2; the reason that comes from the universal Soul, iv. +3.10), 2, human (principle of the rational life, see Ficinus on ii. +6.2); 3, the seminal or generative reason (principle of the life +of sensation, which imparts to the body the sense-form, "morphé," +3.12-end; Bouillet, i. 365). Now reasons reside in the soul (ii. 4.12), +and are simultaneously essences and powers (vi. 4.9), and as powers +produce the nature, and as essences, the habits. Now nature ("physis") +is the principle of the vegetative life, and habit, "hexis," Numenius, +fr. 55, see ii. 4.16, is the principle of unity of inorganic things. + +[262] As thought Aristotle, Met. xii, 3. + +[263] See ii. 9.13. + +[264] See iv. 4.9-13. + +[265] See iii. 4.1. + +[266] This is Numenius' doctrine, fr. 16. + +[267] See iii. 3.5, 11. + +[268] Plotinos here makes in the world-Soul a distinction analogous to +that obtaining in the human one (where there is a reasonable soul, and +its image, the vegetative soul, see i. 1.8-12; iv. 4. 13, 14). Here +he asserts that there are two souls; the superior soul (the principal +power of the soul, which receives the forms from Intelligence (see iv. +4.9-12, 35), and the inferior soul (nature, or the generative power), +which transmits them to matter, so as to fashion it by seminal reasons +(see iii. 4.13, 14, 22, 27). Bouillet, no doubt remembering Plotinos's +own earlier invectives against those who divided the world-soul (ii. +9.6), evidently directed against Amelius and the Numenian influence, +which till then he had followed--tries to minimize it, claiming that +this does not mean two different hypostases, but only two functions +of one and the same hypostasis. But he acknowledges that this gave +the foundation for Plotinos's successors' distinction between the +supermundane and the mundane souls (hyperkosmios, and egkosmios). +Plotinos was therefore returning to Numenius's two world-souls (fr. +16), which was a necessary logical consequence of his belief in two +human souls (fr. 53), as he himself had taught in iii. 8.5. Plotinos +objectifies this doubleness of the soul in the myth of the two +Hercules, in the next book, i. 1.12. + +[269] See ii. 9.2. + +[270] The subject announced in the preceding book, ii. 3.16; another +proof of the chronological order. This is a very obscure book, +depending on iv. 3 and 4: and vi. 7; on the theory of the three divine +hypostases, on his psychology, the soul's relation to, and separation +from the body, and metempsychosis. His doctrines of "self" and of the +emotions are strikingly modern. + +[271] See sect. 2. + +[272] See sect. 3. + +[273] See sect. 4. + +[274] See sect. 7, 11. + +[275] This most direct translation of "pathos," is defective in that +it means rather an experience, a passive state, or modification of the +soul. It is a Stoic term. + +[276] "Dianoia" is derived from "dia nou," and indicates that the +discursive thought is exercised "by means of the intelligence," +receiving its notions, and developing them by ratiocination, see v. +3.3. It is the actualization of discursive reason "to dianoêtikon," or +of the reasonable soul ("psychê logikê"), which conceives, judges, and +reasons (dianoei, krínei, logizetai). + +[277] "Noêsis" means intuitive thought, the actualization of +intelligence. + +[278] See sect. 7. + +[279] See Porphyry, Faculties of the Soul, and Ficinus, commentary on +this book. + +[280] In Greek, "to zoon," "to syntheton," "to synamphoteron," "to +koinon," "to eidôlon." + +[281] See i. 2.5. + +[282] According to the Stoics. + +[283] According to Alexander of Aphrodisia. + +[284] As thought Aristotle, de Anima 2.1; see 4.3.21, and Numenius, 32. + +[285] A famous comparison, found in Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 1; Plato, +Laws, x. p. 906; Cary, 14; and especially Numenius, 32. + +[286] As Plotinos thinks. + +[287] iv. 4.20. + +[288] iv. 3.20. + +[289] Arist., de Anim. 2.1. + +[290] According to Aristotle. + +[291] Phaedo, p. 87; Cary, 82. + +[292] Similar to the modern James-Lange theory of bodily emotions. + +[293] See iv. 4.20, 28. + +[294] See sect. 7, 9, 10. + +[295] See iv. 3.22, 23. + +[296] Porphyry and Ammonius in Bouillet, i. Intr. p. 60, 63, 64, 75, +79, 93, 96, 98, and note on p. 362 to 377. + +[297] Namely, intelligence and the reasonable soul. + +[298] See Bouillet, i. p. 325, 332. + +[299] Bouillet, Intr. p. lxxviii. + +[300] See Bouillet, i., note, p. 327, 341. + +[301] One of the three hypostases. + +[302] See Bouillet, i. p. lxxiii. 344-352. + +[303] Plato, Timaeus, p. 35; Cary, 12. + +[304] These images of the universal Soul are the faculties of the soul, +sense-power, vegetative power, generative power or nature; see iv. +4.13, 14. + +[305] "Turning" means here to incline. + +[306] See St. Paul, Rom. for phantasy, or imagination; vii. 7-25. + +[307] See iv. 3.29-31, also i. 1.9; Numenius, fr. ii. 8, 19; iii. See +section 10. + +[308] See i. 2.5. + +[309] iv. 3.19, 23. + +[310] See ii. 9.3, 4, 11, 12. + +[311] Fancy or representation, i. 4.10; iv. 3.3, 30, 31. + +[312] See 4.3.19, 23; 6.7.6.7. + +[313] Plato, Rep. x. p. 611; Cary, 11. + +[314] For this see 4.3.12, 18; 4.8. + +[315] Odyss. xi. 602, 5; see 4.3.27. + +[316] We find here a reassertion of Numenius's doctrine of two souls in +man, fr. 53. + +[317] Bouillet observes that this book is only a feeble outline of +some of the ideas developed in vi. 7, 8, and 9. The biographical +significance of this might be as follows. As in the immediately +preceding books Plotinos was harking back to Numenius's doctrines, he +may have wished to reconcile the two divergent periods, the Porphyrian +monism of vi. 7 and 8, with the earlier Amelian dualism of vi. 9. +This was nothing derogatory to him; for it is well known that there +was a difference between the eclectic monism of the young Plato of +the Republic, and the more logical dualism of the older Plato of +the Laws. This latter was represented by Numenius and Amelius; the +former--combined with Aristotelian and Stoic elements--by Porphyry. +Where Plato could not decide, why should we expect Plotinos to do +so? And, as a matter of fact, the world also has never been able to +decide, so long as it remained sincere, and did not deceive itself with +sophistries, as did Hegel. Kant also had his "thing-in-itself"--indeed, +he did little more than to develop the work of Plotinos. + +[318] As the Stoics would say. + +[319] Which is one of the three hypostases, ii. 9.1 and v. 1. + +[320] We see here Plotinos feeling the approach of this impending +dissolution. + +[321] Arranged by Bouillet in the order of the Enneads they summarize. + +[322] Passages in quotation marks are from the text of Plotinos. + +[323] See i. 2.3. + +[324] See i. 2.4. + +[325] See i. 2.4. + +[326] See i. 2.6. + +[327] See i. 2.7. + +[328] See i. 2.7. + +[329] See i. 2.5. + +[330] See i. 8.1. + +[331] See 36.38. + +[332] These are the three divine hypostases, i. 8.2; ii. 9.1. + +[333] See ii. 2.2. + +[334] See v. 3.6. + +[335] See iii. 7.2. + +[336] See iii. 7.2. + +[337] A pun on "noein" and "nous." + +[338] See v. 3.10-12. + +[339] See v. 6.11, 12, 13. + +[340] See v. 4.3, 2, 12. + +[341] See v. 4.4, 9. + +[342] See vi. 4.9. + +[343] See vi. 4.16. + +[344] See iii. 5.7-9. from Plato. + +[345] See vi. 2; vi. 5. + +[346] See vi. 5.1. + +[347] See vi. 4.4. + +[348] See vi. 5.2. + +[349] See vi. 5.3, 6. + +[350] See vi. 5.4. + +[351] See vi. 8.4. + +[352] See vi. 5.12. + +[353] See iv. 8.1. + +[354] See iv. 8.1. + +[355] See 23. + +[356] Stobaeus, Ecl. Phys., i. 52, ed. Heeren. + +[357] See iv. 3.23. + +[358] In his book "On the Soul." + +[359] See i. 1.12. + +[360] See ii. 6.1. + +[361] See Ennead, i. 1. + +[362] Stobaeus, Ecl. Physicae, i. 52, p. 878. + +[363] Of Human Nature, xv. + +[364] de Anima, ii. 3. + +[365] Stobaeus, Eclogae Physicae, i. 52. p. 894. + +[366] On Human Nature, 2. + +[367] See Plotinos, ii. 7.1; Porphyry, Principles, 17, 18, 21, 22, 36, +38. + +[368] See iv. 3.20. + +[369] See ii. 3.5. + +[370] See iv. 3.20. + +[371] In his treatise on Providence; Photius, Biblioteca, 127, 461. + +[372] i. 1.8; Num. 10. + +[373] i. 1.10. + +[374] 25.4.a. + +[375] 38; 53. + +[376] i. 8.1; Num. 16. + +[377] i. 8.2. + +[378] in v. 5.1. + +[379] Num. 27.a.8. + +[380] 27.b.10. + +[381] Num. 36,a. + +[382] In i. 8.3. + +[383] Num. 16. + +[384] i. 8.4. + +[385] 11. + +[386] Num. 16. + +[387] Num. 15.16. + +[388] i. 8.6. + +[389] 16. + +[390] i. 8.7. + +[391] 1.8.10. + +[392] 18. + +[393] ii. 9. + +[394] ii. 4.1. + +[395] ii. 4.5. + +[396] ii. 4.6. + +[397] ii. 4.7. + +[398] Num. 32, 18. + +[399] Num. 48. + +[400] Num. 14. + +[401] i. 8.7, with ii. 4.7. + +[402] In ii. 4.15, 16. + +[403] heterotês. + +[404] ii. 5. + +[405] In ii. 5.3. + +[406] Num. 20. + +[407] iii. 6.6 to end. + +[408] iii. 6.12. + +[409] iii. 6.11, 12. + +[410] 33. + +[411] iii. 8.13. + +[412] iii. 6.19. + +[413] iii. 6.11. + +[414] iii. 6.9. + +[415] iii. 6.7, 18; with Num. 12, 15, 17. + +[416] iii. 6.6. + +[417] iii. 6.13; Num. 12; 30. + +[418] iii. 6.18; v. 1.1, etc. + +[419] iii. 6.6, 13; see ii. 5.3, 5. + +[420] iii. 6.14. + +[421] iii. 6.11, as against Num. 14, 16. + +[422] In iii. 6.6, 8, 10. + +[423] In iii. 6.6. + +[424] iii. 6.7, 13; see ii. 5.5. + +[425] iii. 6.13, 6, 16, 17, 18. + +[426] iii. 6.15. + +[427] iii. 6.19. + +[428] iii. 6.15. + +[429] In ii. 5.5. + +[430] v. 1.7; iii. 5.6. + +[431] iv. 4.13. + +[432] In iv. 4.15. + +[433] vi. 3.7. + +[434] v. 1.7. + +[435] i. 8. + +[436] ii. 4. + +[437] ii. 5. + +[438] iii. 6. + +[439] In iv. 4.13. + +[440] Life of Plotinos, 24, 25. + +[441] Vit. Plot. 4, 5, 13, 17. + +[442] Ib. 6. + +[443] 26. + +[444] 14. + +[445] 17, 18, 21. + +[446] 1, 2, 7. + +[447] 14. + +[448] 10. + +[449] See Daremberg, s. v. + +[450] 18. + +[451] 17. + +[452] 3. + +[453] As may be seen in Daremberg's Dictionary of Antiquities, s. v. + +[454] Ib. 24. + +[455] In c. 8. + +[456] c. 10. + +[457] 48. Plot. i. 1.2, 12, etc. + +[458] Enn. i. 1.2; Num. 29; i. 1.7. + +[459] i. 1.3; see Num. 32. + +[460] i. 1.7, 12. + +[461] 53. + +[462] i. 1.13. + +[463] 30.21. + +[464] i. 1.12. + +[465] iv. 8, or even iv. 3.12-18. + +[466] 2.9.10. + +[467] 1.4.8, 16. + +[468] 1.7.3. + +[469] Porphyry, Biography 2. + +[470] Cave of the Nymphs, 54. + +[471] Plato, p. 147. + +[472] Rep. iv. 9. + +[473] Plut. Def. Or. 17. + +[474] To hegemonikon. Enn. ii. 4.2. + +[475] ii. 5.3. + +[476] ii. 5.5. + +[477] vi. 3.7. + +[478] In i. 8.3. + +[479] In i. 8.10. + +[480] 3.6, 14. + +[481] 1.8, 13. + +[482] 2.9.2. + +[483] Num. 26. + +[484] Enn. iii. 6.6, 7. + +[485] de Mund. iv. 21. + +[486] Chaignet, H. Ps. d. G., v. 138. + +[487] Proclus, in Parm. vi. 27. + +[488] Energeia and dynamis. + +[489] 5.1.7, 19. + +[490] iii. 5.3. + +[491] Ib. 4.7. + +[492] Ib. 9. + +[493] v. 3.5. + +[494] i. 4.14. + +[495] iii. 5.6. + +[496] 1.1.8. + +[497] i. 8.2. + +[498] In i. 4.10. + +[499] In ii. 9.1. + +[500] iii. 3.4. + +[501] iii. 2.11. + +[502] i. 4.9. + +[503] H. Ps. d. Gr. iv. 244. + +[504] Enn. vi. 4.9. + +[505] Chaignet, ib., iv. 337; Enn. v. 1.7, 10. + +[506] ii. 9.1, 2. + +[507] See McClintock and Strong, B. T. & E. Encyclopedia, s. v. + +[508] Enn. vi, 5.7. + +[509] vi. 2.8, 9. + +[510] See iv. 4.26; vi. 7.12, 13. + +[511] See i. 8.4. + +[512] See iv. 2.15. + +[513] See iv. 3.9. + +[514] See vi. 4.14; vi. 5.6; i. 1.9. + +[515] Rom. vii. 7.25. + +[516] See v. 1.10. + +[517] See iv. 8.5, 6, and iv. 7.13, 14, and iii. 6.14. + +[518] See i. 8.13 + +[519] iv. 3.11. + +[520] vi. 1.10. + +[521] ii. 1.4. + +[522] v. 1.1, v. 4.2, v. 8.11, i. 4.11, v. 1.7, vi. 8.4, iv. 8.4. + +[523] i. 1.9 and 12. + +[524] x. 2, Enn. ii. 9.13. + +[525] Biography, 16. + +[526] See v. 8.8. + +[527] See viii. 5.12. + +[528] See vi. 8.9. + +[529] See vi. 7.17. + +[530] See v. 5.3. + +[531] Rev. iv. 6; see iii. 2.11. + +[532] See ii. 9.5; Rev. xxi. 1. + +[533] See iii. 2.15. + +[534] See v. 3.8. + +[535] See i. 8.6. + +[536] See iv. 3.6; Jno. xiv. 2. + +[537] See iii. 2.4, and Rom. iii. 20. + +[538] See vi. 8.15, and Rom. viii. 39. + +[539] See v. 5.11, and 1 Cor. xi. 22. + +[540] See ii. 1.4, and 2 Cor. xii. 2. + +[541] See vi. 2, and Gal. iv. 9. + +[542] See ii. 9.6, and i. Tim. 1.4. + +[543] See ii. 9.14, and Mark vi. 7. + +[544] See v. 3.17, and Mk. ix. 43, 45. + +[545] See v. 9.5, and Mt. xxiv. 13. + +[546] See vi. 9.9; vi. 5.12, and Acts xvii. 28. + +[547] See v. 8.12, and Heb. ii. 11-17 + +[548] See vi. 7.29, and Jas. i. 17. + +[549] Luke xi. 13. + +[550] See i. 6.9; ii. 4.5. + +[551] v. 5.13. + +[552] ii. 9.4. + +[553] iv. 3.11. + +[554] ii. 9.5. + +[555] iv. 8.9. + +[556] v. 9.4. + +[557] See iii. 8.4; iv. 2.1; vi. 7.8. + +[558] See ii. 4.5; v. 7.3; vi. 8.20. + +[559] See vi. 6.11. + +[560] See vi. 8.20. + +[561] See iv. 3.17; vi. 4.9. + +[562] See v. 3.15. + +[563] See vi. 7.1. + +[564] See v. 2.1. + +[565] See v. 1.6. + +[566] See i. 4.9. + +[567] See iii. 8.3. + +[568] See vi. 2.8, 9. + +[569] See iii. 8.10; ii. 9.2. + +[570] See iv. 7.10; v. 1.4; vi. 7.2. + +[571] See ii. 9.2. + +[572] See vi. 5.7. + +[573] iii. 6.6 to end. + +[574] N. 20.6. + +[575] ii. 9.10. + +[576] i. 8.4; ii. 9.2, 10; vi. 7.5, with N. 26.3. + +[577] ii. 9.6, with N. 36. + +[578] iv. 3.17, with N. 26.3. + +[579] v. 3.9; v. 5.7; vi. 5.5. + +[580] ii. 9.1; but see ii. 9.8; iv. 8.3, etc. + +[581] iv. 3.17. + +[582] 46-54. + +[583] 49, 50; or, 22%. + +[584] 46-48, 51-54; or, 88%. + +[585] 22-33, 12 books. + +[586] 23, 26, 27, 31, 32, 33; or, 50%. + +[587] 22, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30; or, 50%. + +[588] 33-45, 12 books. + +[589] 34, 37, 38, 39, 43, 44. + +[590] 35, 36, 40, 41, 42, 45. + +[591] v. 1.9. + +[592] v. 5.6; N. 42, 67. + +[593] v. 4.2 and N. 15-17. + +[594] v. 8.5; v. 9.3; vi. 6.9; and N. 20. + +[595] i. 8.6; i. 4.11; iii. 3.7; and N. 16, 17. + +[596] vi. 8.19; and N. 10; 32. + +[597] v. 1.6; with N. 14. + +[598] v. 1.9; with N. 36, 39. + +[599] vi. 4.16; iv. 3.11. + +[600] N. 54. + +[601] N. 49a. + +[602] vi. 5.9; and N. 46. + +[603] iii. 6. + +[604] N. 44. + +[605] ii. 7.2; vi. 1.29; and N. 44. + +[606] In meaning at least. + +[607] iv. 7.2, 3; and N. 44. + +[608] iv. 7.2, 3; v. 9.3; N. 40. + +[609] Philebus, in iv. 3.1. + +[610] vi. 2.21. + +[611] i. 2.6; v. 3.17; iii. 4. + +[612] vi. 3.16. + +[613] i. 6.6. + +[614] N. 31.22; 33.8. + +[615] iv. 8.2; i. 8.2; v. 5.3; vi. 7.42; and N. 27a. 8. + +[616] v. 1.4, and N. 19. + +[617] v. 8.3; ii. 9.3, 8. + +[618] i. 8.6 and N. 10. + +[619] vi. 2.2 and N. 14. + +[620] vi. 5.6 and N. 42, 67. + +[621] v. 8.3; iii. 4.2; N. 27a. 8. + +[622] iii. 8.8; iv. 3.1, 8; vi. 8.7; and N. 27b. 9. + +[623] Still, see 30. + +[624] iv. 8.2; vi. 9.9; N. 29. + +[625] iii. 2.4; v. 1.6; v. 5.7; and N. 29.18. + +[626] i. 8.4; ii. 9.2, 10; vi. 7.5 and N. 26.3; 27a. 10. + +[627] vi. 5.6; and N. 37, 63. + +[628] iv. 7.1; vi. 5.10; and N. 12.8. + +[629] vi. 4.10; vi. 5.3; ii. 9.7; with N. 12, 22. + +[630] v. 8.13; and N. 26.3. + +[631] iii. 2.2; with N. 16, 17. + +[632] iii. 1.22; iv. 2.1, 2; iv. 7.2; and N. 38. + +[633] ii. 9.7; v. 6.6; vi. 5.3; and N. 12, 15, 22, 26.3. + +[634] iv. 3.8; vi. 7.3; and N. 48. + +[635] iv. 3.11; with N. 32. + +[636] iv. 3.17, 21; with N. 32. + +[637] iv. 3.17; with N. 26.3. + +[638] iv. 7; and N. 44. + +[639] N. 55. + +[640] ii. 7.2; vi. 1.29; and N. 44. + +[641] iv. 7.3; vi. 3.16; and N. 44. + +[642] ii. 3.9; iii. 4.6; and N. 46, 52, 56. + +[643] Still, see i. 1.9; iv. 3.31; vi. 4.15; and N. 53. + +[644] i. 1.12; ii. 3.9; ii. 9.2; iv. 3.31; iv. 2.2; and N. 53. + +[645] iv. 3.31; with N. 32. + +[646] N. 52. + +[647] i. 1.10; iv. 7.8; v. 8.3. + +[648] iii. 4.4; and N. 15. + +[649] N. 15. + +[650] ii. 9.5. + +[651] i. 3.1. + +[652] i. 3.2. + +[653] i. 3.3. + +[654] v. 9.1. + +[655] iv. 4.10; with N. 12. + +[656] iv. 3.25; with N. 25. + +[657] ii. 9.11; i. 6.7; vi. 7.34; vi. 9.11; with N. 10. + +[658] iv. 8.8; and N. 51. + +[659] iv. 8.1; and N. 62a. + +[660] iv. 8.1; quoting Empedocles; N. 43. + +[661] iv. 2.2; and N. 27b. + +[662] iv. 3.21; and N. 32, 36, 16. + +[663] N. 26. + +[664] iv. 3.17. + +[665] ii. 3.8; iii. 3.4; N. 36, 53. + +[666] ii. 9.6. + +[667] v. 9.5; and N. 28. + +[668] iv. 7.14; and N. 55, 56. + +[669] 61, 62a. + +[670] ii. 9.14. + +[671] 10. + +[672] iii. 6.6 to end. + +[673] 14, 15, 16, 17, 44. + +[674] vi. 1, and passim. + +[675] ii. 3.16; ii. 4.16; ii. 5.2; and N. 55. + +[676] i. 8.15; i. 1.9; i. 4.10; iv. 3.3, 30.31; vi. 8.3; iv. 7.8; and +N. 2, 3, 4.7 and 24. + +[677] vi. 5.6; and N. 42, 67. + +[678] All of ii. 6; iii. 6.6; iii. 7.5; iii. 8.9; iv. 3.9; iv. 3.24; v. +3.6, 15, 17; v. 4.1, 2; v. 5.10, 13, 55; v. 8.5, 6; v. 9.3; vi. 2.2, 5, +6, 8, 9, 13; vi. 3.6, 16; vi. 6.10, 13, 16; vi. 7.41; vi. 9.2, 3. + +[679] v. 9.3; and N. 21, 22. + +[680] v. 4.2; and N. 10; vi. 6.9; and N. 34. + +[681] vi. 6.9; N. 10, 21. + +[682] v. 1.5; vi. 5.9; vi. 6.16; and N. 46. + +[683] vi. 6.16; and N. 60. + +[684] vi. 2.9; and N. 26. + +[685] vi. 4.2. + +[686] ii. 4.5; iv. 8.7; v. 5.4; and N. 36b. + +[687] iv. 3.1; v. 4.2; and N. 36c? + +[688] ii. 5.3; and N. 14, 16, 26. + +[689] v. 4.2; v. 5.4; and N. 14. + +[690] ii. 9.1; and N. 25. + +[691] iii. 8.9; iii. 9.1; v. 1.8; and N. 36, 39. + +[692] v. 5.3; and N. 36, 39. + +[693] i. 3.4; and N. 10, 13. + +[694] ii. 4.9; ii. 7.2; vi. 1.29; vi. 3.16; and N. 44. + +[695] iv. 9.4; and N. 44. + +[696] iii. 4.1; and N. 44. + +[697] iv. 6.7; and N. 44. + +[698] iv. 3.20; and N. 12, 44. + +[699] N. 20. + +[700] N. 21. + +[701] iii. 7.3, 5; and N. 19. + +[702] N. 55, 56; 57. + +[703] iii. 4.2; and N. 57. + +[704] i. 8.2; iii. 2.16; iv. 7.14; vi. 6.16; vi. 7.6; and N. 32. + +[705] v. 1.1; and N. 17, 26. + +[706] vi. 5.3; vi. 7.31; and N. 11, 15, 16, 17, 12.7, 22, 26. + +[707] i. 8.3; v. 5.13; and N. 15, 16, 49b. + +[708] i. 4.11; i. 8.6, 7; ii. 3.18; iii. 2.5, 15; iii. 8.9; and N. 16, +17, 18. + +[709] i. 8.7; iii. 2.2, N. 15, 17. Alexander of Aphrodisia taught this +world was a mixture; ii. 7.1; iv. 7.13. + +[710] iv. 9.4; v. 16; and N. 26. + +[711] Plotinos passim; N. 25. + +[712] vi. 1.23; and N. 18. Also vi. 9.10, 11. + +[713] Passim; N. 10, 37, 63. + +[714] v. 8.1; and N. 43. + +[715] iii. 9.3; and N. 31. + +[716] vi. 2.7; vi. 3.27; and N. 19.4, 20; 27a; 30. + +[717] iii. 7.3; iv. 4.33; and N. 30. + +[718] ii. 4.2-5; ii. 5.3; v. 4.2; and N. 26. + +[719] ii. 4.12; etc. + +[720] ii. 4.6; and N. 11, 18. + +[721] ii. 6.2; and N. 12.8; 18. + +[722] ii. 4.10; and N. 12, 16, 17. + +[723] v. 1.6; vi. 9.10, 11; and N. 10. + +[724] vi. 4.2; vi. 9.3; and N. 10. + +[725] iv. 7.3; and N. 13, 27, 44. + +[726] iv. 4.16; and N. 46. + +[727] Might it mean an angle, and one of its sides? + +[728] iii. 4.2; and N. 27. + +[729] iv. 8.5, 6; and N. 27b. + +[730] v. 9.6; and N. 23. + +[731] v. 1.5. + +[732] vi. 7.17, 36; vi. 9.9; and N. 29. + +[733] iii. 4.2; iv. 3.11; v. 8.3; v. 1.2; and N. 27b. + +[734] iii. 4.6; and N. 35a. + +[735] vi. 7.1; and N. 27a, b. + +[736] Creation or adornment, ii. 4.4, 6; iv. 3.14; and N. 14, 18. + +[737] i. 1.3; iv. 3.17, 21; and N 32. + +[738] Bouillet ii. 520. + +[739] ib. ii. 584. + +[740] ib. ii. 607. + +[741] ib. ii. 597. + +[742] ib. ii. 561. + +[743] B. iii. 638-650. + +[744] ib. 651-653. + +[745] ib. 654-656. + +[746] Bouillet ii. 520. + +[747] ib. ii. 562. + +[748] ib. ii. 585. + +[749] ib. ii. 588. + +[750] Biog. 8, 13. + +[751] Biog. 17, 18. + +[752] Biog. 24. + +[753] iii. 7.1, 4. + +[754] v. 8.4. + +[755] v. 8.5, 6. + +[756] iii. 5.8. + +[757] vi. 3.8. + +[758] i. 8.7; ii. 4.4; iii. 8.11; iv. 8.13; v. 9.8. 4.4; iii. 8.11; v. +8.13; v. 9.8. 1.11. + +[762] v. 5.5. + +[763] vi. 1.23. + +[764] ii. 9.4. + +[765] v. 5.1. + +[766] iii. 5.3. + +[767] v. 5.5. + +[768] v. 3.5, 6. + +[769] vi. 1.15. + +[770] iii. 5.9, 10. + +[771] iv. 3.14. + +[772] iv. 7.4; ii. 6.2; iii. 2.17. + +[773] iv. 4.29. + +[774] v. 9.5. + +[775] iv. 9.3. + +[776] vi. 1.18. + +[777] vi. 8.18. + + + + +CONCORDANCE TO PLOTINOS. + +Of the two numbers in the parenthesis, the first is the chronological +book number, the second is the reference's page in this translation. + + + A + + Abandonment by Providence, even of the mediocre, impossible, iii. 2.9 + (47-1058). + + Ability or desire is the limit of man's union with the divinity, v. + 8.11 (31-569). + + Absolute Beauty is a formless shape, vi. 7.33 (38-754). + + Absolute Evil is the goal of the degenerate soul, i. 8.15 (51-1163). + + Absolute Existent is preceded by contingent, vi. 1.26 (42-881). + + Abstraction is method of reaching divinity, vi. 8.21 (39-811). + + Abstraction of qualities ends in thing-in-itself, ii. 4.10 (12-207). + + Abstraction of the form produces thought of infinite, vi. 6.3 + (34-646). + + Abundance and Need, myth of, iii. 6.14 (26-375). + + Abundance (Poros), myth of, iii. 5.2-10 (50-1125 to 1140). + + Academy, vi. 1.14, 30 (42-863, 888). + + Accidents are received by the soul from matter, v. 9.14 (5-117). + + Accidents, is the fifth physical category of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 + (44-937). + + Accomplishments are only temporary crutches for development, i. 4.16 + (46-1040). + + Accretion, foreign, is the nature of ugliness, i. 6.5 (1-48). + + Accretions to soul, and body, are removed from soul by philosophic + "separation," i. 1.12 (53-1204). + + Action and experience does not include prediction with its + responsiveness, and is underlayed by transmission, reception, and + relation, vi. 1.22 (42-874). + + Action and experiencing, Aristotelian category, vi. 1.15 (42-863). + + Action and passion iii. 3.2 (48-1078). + + Action and reaction form but a single genus, vi. 1.19 (42-870). + + Action and suffering cannot be separate categories, but are subsumed + under movement, vi. 1.17 (42-866). + + Action does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.16 (43-920). + + Action is natural on both wholes and parts, iv. 4.31 (28-487). + + Action, uniform, is exerted by body and varied by the soul, iv. 7.4 + (2-62). + + Actions, some appear imperfect when not joined to time, vi. 1.19 + (42-868). + + Actions do not control freedom of will and virtue, vi. 8.5 (39-779). + + Active life predisposes to subjection to enchantments, iv. 4.43 + (28-507). + + Activity of soul is triple: thought, self-preservation and creation, + iv. 8.3 (6-125). + + Actors good and bad, are rewarded by the manager: so are souls, iii. + 2.17 (47-1072). + + Actual, everything is actual in the intelligible world, ii. 5.3 + (25-346). + + Actual matter cannot be anything, as it is non-being, ii. 5.2, 4 + (25-343 to 347). + + Actuality and potentiality, iii. 9.8 (13-225). + + Actuality and potentiality are inapplicable to the divinity, ii. 9.1 + (33-600). + + Actualization, continuous, constitutes Intelligence, iv. 7.13 (18), + (2-84); iv. 8.6, 7 (6-129, 130). + + Actualization is a far better category than doing or acting, vi. 1.15 + (42-863). + + Actualization is prior to potentiality (devolution), iv. 7.8 (11), + (2-74). + + Actualization of soul in life, is the sole use of its existence, iv. + 8.5 (6-127). + + Actualization, single and simple, iv. 7.12 (17), (2-83). + + Actualization when appearing is harmonized to its seminal reason, vi. + 3.16 (44-960). + + Actualizations are none of bodies that enter into a mixture, iv. 7.8 + (10), (2-72). + + Actualizations are the condition of Intelligence, because its thought + is identical with its essence, v. 9.3 (5-104). + + Actualizations, permanent, form the hypostasis, v. 3.12 (49-1111). + + Actualizations, relative, are sensations, not experiences, iv. 6.2 + (41-831). + + Acuteness may destroy excessive ecstatic vision, v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Administration by Jupiter does not imply memory, iv. 4.9 (28-453). + + Admiration of his handiwork, by the Creator, refers to the + world-model, v. 8.8 (31-564). + + Admiration of the world, by Plato, supplements his hatred of the + body, ii. 9.17 (33-633). + + Adrastea, law of, is justice, ii. 3.8 (52-1173); iii. 2.4, 13 + (47-1049 to 1062). + + Adulteries not produced by planet-positions, ii. 3.6 (52-1171). + + Adumbrations of superior principles, i. 6.8 (1-52). + + Advantages resulting from ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Aeon Jesus, is unaccountable, ii. 9.1 (33-601). + + Aeon, see eternity, throughout, iii. 7.1 sqq (45-985). + + Aesthetic sense appreciates beauty, i. 6.2 (1-42). + + Affection and weaknesses of man subject him to magic, iv. 4.44 + (28-508). + + "Affection of matter," definition of soul; if such, whence is she? + iv. 7.3.d (2-59). + + Affections are common to soul and body; not all are such, i. 1.5 + (53-1197). + + Affections caused by incorporeal's affective part, iii. 6.4 (26-357). + + Affections, derivation of qualities from them is of no importance, + vi. 1.11 (42-857). + + Affections of soul, like a musician playing a lyre, iii. 6.4 (26-358). + + Affections produced by "tension" in lyre-strings, iv. 7.8 (2-75). + + Age, pun on "aeons," iii. 7.4 (45-992). + + Aggregate, composite, see "combination," i. 1.1 (53-1191). + + Aggregate individual, formed by uniting of soul and body, i. 1.6 + (53-1197). + + Aggregate of molecules could not possess life and intelligence, iv. + 7.2, 3 (2-57). + + Agriculture, v. 9.11 (5-114). + + Aid to magnitude-perception, is color-difference, ii. 8.1 (35-681). + + Air and fire, action of, not needed by Heaven, ii. 1.8 (40-826). + + Air contained in intelligible world, vi. 7.11 (38-720). + + Air not necessary, even for hearing, iv. 5.5 (29-523). + + Air, relation to light, iv. 5.6 (29-524). + + Air, useless as transmitting medium, iv. 5.3 (29-519). + + Alexander of Aphrodisia's theory of mixture, iv. 7.2, 8 (2-58, 72); + iii. 1.7 (3-96). + + Alienation, v. 1.10 (10-190). + + All in all, iii. 8.8 (30-543); iv. 3.8 (27-402). + + All is intelligence, vi. 7.17 (38-729). + + All things are united by a common source, vi. 7.12 (38-721). + + All things, how the same principle can exist in them, vi. 4.6 + (22-295). + + All things, is the soul, iii. 4.3 (15-236). + + All things, transcended by their principle, v. 2.1 (11-193). + + Alone with the alone, i. 6.7 (1-50); vi. 7.34 (38-757); vi. 9.11 + (9-172). + + Aloneness of Supreme, v. 1.6 (10-182). + + Alteration, definition of, vi. 3.22 (44-973). + + Alteration, not constituted by composition and decomposition, vi. + 3.25 (44-978). + + Alteration of soul, Stoic conception, opposed, iii. 6.3 (26-355). + + Alternate living in Intelligence and world, by soul, iv. 8.4 (6-126). + + Alternate rising and falling of soul when in body, iii. 1.8 (3-97). + + Amphibians, souls are, iv. 8.48 (6-126). + + Analogy explains prediction, iii. 3.6 (48-1086). + + Analogy only allows us to attribute physical qualities to the + Supreme, vi. 8.8 (39-785). + + Analysis, contingency is eliminated in, vi. 8.14 (39-798). + + Analyze, object of myths, iii. 5.10 (50-1138). + + Anger localized in the heart, iv. 3.23 (27-426); iv. 4.28 (28-481). + + Anger-part of earth, iv. 4.28 (28-482). + + Anger-part of soul explained, iii. 6.2 (26-354). + + Anger-power, does not originate in body, iv. 4.28 (28-481). + + Anger-trace of the soul, originates in growth and generative power, + iv. 4.28 (28-481). + + Animal, existing is intelligence (Plato) iii. 9.1 (13-220). + + Animal nature formed by light of soul, i. 1-7 (53-1198). + + Animal nature, how it is generated, i. 1.12,(53-1205). + + Animal, relation of, to human nature, i. 1.7 (53-1199). + + Animal, the living, i. 1.5 (53-1196). + + Animal, what is it, i. 1.1 (53-1191). + + Animals, all are born from essence, vi. 2.21 (43-929). + + Animals, are they happy? i. 4.1 (46-1019). + + Animals, distinction to the whole, i. 1.7 (53-1199). + + Animals, do they possess right to living well, i. 4.2 (46-1020). + + Animals, four kinds, seen in intelligence, iii. 9.1 (13-221). + + Animals, individual and universal, exist later than number, vi. 6.15 + (34-668). + + Animals, irrational, must exist within intelligence, vi. 7.8 (38-713). + + Animals, lower nature of, ridiculous to complain of, iii. 2.9 + (47-1059). + + Animals, many are not so irrational as different, vi. 7.9 (38-714). + + Animals, their animating principle, i. 1.10 (53-1204). + + Animated, universe was always, iv. 3.9 (27-404). + + Animating principle of animals, i. 1.11 (53-1204). + + Answers, how they come to prayers, iv. 4.41 (28-505). + + Antechamber of good is intelligence, v. 9.2 (5-104). + + Anterior things can be only in lower principles, iv. 4.16 (28-461). + + Anteriority in intelligible, is order not time, iv. 4.1 (28-443). + + Anxiety absent from rule of world by soul, iv. 8.2 (6-122). + + Aphrodite, see Venus, pun on, iii. 5.8 (50-1137). + + Apollo, name of Supreme, v. 5.6 (32-584). + + Apostasy of soul from God, v. 1.1 (10-173). + + Appearance, by it only does matter participate in the intelligible, + iii. 6.11 (26-369). + + Appearance, magnitude is only, iii. 6.18 (26-381). + + Appearance, makes up unreal sense objects, iii. 6.12 (26-371). + + Appearance of intelligence in the intelligible, v. 3.8 (49-1102). + + Apperception-unity, iv. 4.1 (28-442). + + Appetite is the actualization of lustful desire, iv. 8.8 (6-132). + + Appetite keeps an affection, not memory, iv. 3.28 (27-435). + + Appetite located in combination of body and soul, iv. 4.20 (28-468). + + Appetite not simultaneous with desire, i. 1.5 (53-1197). + + Appetite noticed only when perceived by reason or interior sense, iv. + 8.8 (6-132). + + Appetite, when swaying soul, leaves it passive, iii. 1.9 (3-98). + + Apportionment of spirit, iv. 7.8 (2-68). + + Appreciation of self, v. 1.1 (10-174). + + Approach, how the body approaches the soul, vi. 4.15 (22-309). + + Approach impossible in connection with non-spatial intelligible + light, v. 5.8 (32-587). + + Approach of soul to good, by simplification, i. 6.6 (1-50). + + Approach to Supreme is sufficient talk of Him, v. 3.14 (49-1114). + + Approach to the First, manner of, v. 5.10 (32-591). + + Approach to the soul, which is lowest divine, v. 1.7 (10-186). + + Approaching of soul's rejection of form, proves formlessness of the + Supreme, vi. 7.34 (38-756). + + Archetype of the world, the intelligible is, v. 1.4 (10-178). + + Archetype, universal, contained by intelligence, v. 9.9 (5-112). + + Archetypes, vi. 5.8 (23-322). + + Aristotelian category of When? vi. 1.13 (42-860). + + Aristotelian distinction, actuality and potentiality, ii. 5.1 + (25-341). + + Aristotle was wrong in considering rough, rare and dense qualities, + vi. 1.11 (42-857). + + Art intelligible, creates the artist and later nature, v. 8.1 + (31-552). + + Art makes a statue out of rough marble, v. 8.1 (31-552). + + Artificial movements, vi. 3.26 (44-980). + + Artist of the universe is the soul, iv. 7.13 (2-84). + + Arts, auxiliary, which help the progress of nature, v. 9.11 (5-115). + + Arts, dependent on the soul, v. 9.14 (5-118). + + Arts, most achieve their own ends, iv. 4.31 (28-488). + + Arts, some, merely earthly, others more intelligible, v. 9.11 (5-114). + + Ascended soul, not even, need be divided, iv. 4.1 (28-442). + + Ascension of sign, absurd, ii. 3.6 (52-1171). + + Ascension of soul in ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170). + + Ascension to Divinity, iv. 7.10 (2-79). + + Ascension towards divinity, process of life, i. 6.7 (1-50). + + Ascent cannot stop with the soul, why? v. 9.4 (5-106). + + Ascent of life witnessed to disappearance of contingency, vi. 8.15 + (39-801). + + Ascent of the soul psychologically explained, vi. 4.16 (22-310). + + Aspects and houses, absurdity, ii. 3.4 (52-1168). + + Assimilation depends on taking a superior model, i. 2.7 (19-267). + + Assimilation of matter, not complete in earthly defects, v. 9.12 + (5-115). + + Assimilation to divine, key of vision to ecstasy, i. 6.9 (1-53). + + Assimilation to divinity, is flight from world, i. 2.5 (19-263). + + Assimilation to divinity, is soul's welfare and beauty. i. 6.6 (1-49). + + Assimilation to divinity results only in higher virtues, i. 2.1 + (19-256). + + Assimilation to Supreme, by homely virtues, indirectly, i. 2.3 + (19-260). + + Astrologers make cosmic deductions from prognostication, iii. 1.2 + (3-89). + + Astrological influence is merely an indication, iv. 4.34 (28-494). + + Astrological influence, partly action, partly significance, iv. 4.34 + (28-495). + + Astrological power not due to physical soul, iv. 4.38 (28-501). + + Astrological system of fate, iii. 1.5 (3-92). + + Astrological theories absurd, ii. 3.6 (52-1171). + + Astrological views of Venus, Jupiter and Mercury, ii. 3.5 (52-1169). + + Astrologically, divine would be blamed for unjust acts, iii. 2.10 + (47-1059). + + Astrology confuted, leaves influence of world-soul, iv. 4.32 (28-490). + + Astrology replaced by natural production of souls, iv. 4.38 (28-501). + + Astrology replaced by radiation of good and characteristic figures, + iv. 4.35 (28-498). + + Astrology reveals teleology, ii 3.7 (52-1172). + + Astrology, signs only concatenations from universal reason, iv. 4.3 + (28-502). + + Astrology, truth of, judgement of one part by another, ii. 3.7 + (52-1173). + + Athens, vi. 1.14 (42-863). + + Atomism, does not demand a medium for vision, iv. 5.2 (29-516). + + Atoms, iii. 1.2 (3-88). + + Atoms do not explain matter, ii. 4.7 (12-204). + + Atropos, ii. 3.15 (52-1182). + + Attachment to centre constitutes divinity, vi. 9.8 (9-163). + + Attention, condition of perception, v. 1.12 (10-191). + + Attracting all things, does the power and beauty of essence, vi. 6.18 + (34-678). + + Attribute, fourth physical category of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 (44-937). + + Attributing qualities to good, would degrade it, v. 5.13 (32-595). + + Audacity not in higher soul, see boldness, i. 1.2 (53-1192). + + Audacity the cause of human apostasy, v. 1.1 (10-173); v. 2.2 + (11-195). + + Author of this perfection must be above it, vi. 7.32 (38-752). + + Autocracy of divinity, vi. 8.21 (39-810). + + Aversion for ugliness, explains love of beauty, i. 6.5 (1-47). + + Avoid magic enchantments, how to, iv. 4.44 (28-510). + + Avoidance of passions, is task of philosophy, iii. 6.5 (26-358). + + + Bacchus, mirror of, iv. 3.12 (27-409). + + Ballet, vi. 9.8 (9-165); vi. 2.11 (43-912). + + Ballet dancer, iii. 2.17 (47-1071). + + Bastard, reason goes beyond corporeity, ii. 4.12 (12-212). + + Bastard reasoning, is abstraction reaching thing in itself, ii. 4.10, + 12 (12-207, 212); i. 8.9, 10 (51-1156); vi. 8.8 (39-786). + + Bath-tub, simile of, vi 9.8 (9-163). + + Beauties, moral, more delightful than sense-beauties, i. 6.4 (1-46). + + Beautification, by descent upon object of reason from divine, i. 6.2 + (1-43). + + Beautiful, inferior to good, v. 5.12 (32-593). + + Beautiful, most things, such only by participation, i. 6.2 (1-43). + + Beautiful, nothing more could be imagined than the world, ii. 9.4 + (33-606). + + Beautiful, the Supreme, of three ranks of existence, vi. 7.42 + (38-770). + + Beautiful, what is its principle, i. 6.1 (1-41). + + Beauty, v. 1.11 (10-189). + + Beauty absolute, is a formless shape, vi. 7.33 (38-754). + + Beauty and good, identical, i. 6.6 (1-51). + + Beauty and power of essence attracts all things, vi. 6.18 (34-678). + + Beauty appreciated by an aesthetic sense, i. 6.3 (1-43). + + Beauty belongs to men, when they belong to and know themselves, v. + 8.13 (31-574). + + Beauty classified along with the relatives, vi. 3.11 (44-952). + + Beauty comes from form imparted by originator, v. 8.2 (31-553). + + Beauty consists in kinship to the soul, i. 6.2 (1-42). + + Beauty consists in participation in a form, i. 6.2 (1-43). + + Beauty does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-920). + + Beauty does not possess extension, iv. 7.8 (2-69). + + Beauty, emotions of, caused by invincible soul, i. 6.5 (1-46). + + Beauty essential is Supreme, the shapeless shaper, and the + transcendent, vi. 7.33 (38-754). + + Beauty external, appreciation of, depends on cognition of interior + beauty, v. 8.2 (31-554). + + Beauty external, partial, does not mar beauty of universe, ii. 9.17 + (33-634). + + Beauty, highest conceivable, is the model, v. 8.8 (31-564). + + Beauty, if it is a genus, must be one of the posterior ones, vi. 2.18 + (43-923). + + Beauty inferior to good, i. 6.9 (1-54). + + Beauty in last analysis is intelligible, v. 8.3 (31-555). + + Beauty in nothing if not in God v. 8.8 (31-564). + + Beauty intelligible, v. 8 (31). + + Beauty intelligible, does not shine merely on surface, v. 8.10 + (31-568). + + Beauty interior, could not be appreciated, without interior model, i. + 6.4 (1-45). + + Beauty is creating principle of primary reason, v. 8.3 (31-555). + + Beauty is immortal, iii. 5.1 (50-1124). + + Beauty is inherent wisdom, v. 8.2 (31-554). + + Beauty is symmetry, acc. to Stoics, opposed, i. 6.1 (1-41). + + Beauty is unseen, in supreme fusion, v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Beauty, love for, explained by aversion for opposite, i. 6.5 (1-47). + + Beauty makes being desirable, v. 8.9 (31-565). + + Beauty model, is intelligence, hence very beautiful, v. 8.13 (31-573). + + Beauty not in physical characters, but in color form, v. 8.2 (31-553). + + Beauty of body need not imply attachment thereto, ii. 9.17 (33-634). + + Beauty of daily life reviewed, in sight, sound, science and morals, + i. 6.1 (1-40). + + Beauty of soul is as the matter to the soul, v. 8.3 (31-555); 6.6 + (1-43). + + Beauty of world, even added to, iv. 3.14 (27-412). + + Beauty primary, chiefly revealed in virtuous soul, v. 8.3 (31-555). + + Beauty, shining, highest appearance of vision of intelligible wisdom, + v. 8.10 (31-568). + + Beauty that is perceivable is a form, beneath super beautiful, v. 8.8 + (31-564). + + Beauty transition from sense to intellectual, i. 6.2 (1-43). + + Beauty visible, is effect and image of the intelligible, iii. 5.1 + (50-1122). + + Becoming, v. 1.9 (10-187). + + Begetter of intelligence must be simpler than it, iii. 8.8 (30-542). + + Begetter of intelligence reached by intuition, not reason, iii. 8.8 + (30-543). + + Begetting, eternal, is the world, ii. 9.3 (33-604). + + Begetting, lower forms of, due to seminal reasons, iii. 8.7 (30-541). + + Begetting Son, by Supreme, result of ecstasy, v. 8.12 (31-572). + + Beginning, Heaven has none, proves its immortality, ii. 1.4 (40-818). + + Begotten, nothing is in universal soul, vi. 4.14 (22-307). + + Begotten what is, not seminal reason, contains order, iv. 4.16 + (28-461). + + Being, v. 1.5, 8 (10-181 and 186). + + Being, above intelligent life, iii. 6.6 (25-360). + + Being, actualized, less perfect than essence, ii. 6.1 (17-245). + + Being and actualization, constitute self-existent principle, vi. 8.7 + (39-784). + + Being and essence identical with unity, vi. 9.2 (9-149). + + Being and quiddity earlier than suchness, ii. 6.2 (17-248). + + Being cannot be ascribed to matter, vi. 3.7 (44-944). + + Being cannot precede such being, ii. 6.2 (17-248). + + Being contains its cause, vi. 7.3 (38-704). + + Being desirable because beautiful, v. 8.9 (31-566). + + Being distinguished into four senses, vi. 1.2 (42-839). + + Being, every one, is a specialized organ of the universe, iv. 4.45 + (28-510). + + Being in the intelligible is generation in the sense-world, vi. 3.1 + (44-933). + + Being is very wisdom, v. 8.4, 5 (31-559). + + Being loves essence as entire, vi. 5.10 (23-325). + + Being lower form of, possessed by evil, i. 8.3 (51-1145). + + Being of a soul, iv. 1. (4-100). + + Being of a thing displayed by its energy, iii. 1.1 (3-87). + + Being physical, is that which is not in a subject, vi. 3.5 (44-941). + + Being physical, principle of all other things, vi. 3.4 (44-940). + + Being present everywhere entire, only solution of a puzzle, vi. 5.3 + (23-317). + + Being primary and secondary, divided by no substantial differences, + vi. 3.9 (44-949). + + Being supra lunar, is deity, in intelligible, iii. 5.6 (50-1132). + + Being supreme, not dependent on it, therefore above it, vi. 8.19 + (39-807). + + Being the basis of judgment, in things participating in being, vi. + 5.2 (23-315). + + Being universal, description of, vi. 4.2 (23-286). + + Being, universal, is undividable, vi. 4.3 (22-288). + + Beings, all are contemplation, iii. 8.7 (30-542). + + Beings, all contained by intelligence generatively, v. 9.6 (5-109). + + Benefits are granted to men through the world-soul's mediation, iv. + 4.30 (28-486). + + Better nature of man, not dominant because of subconscious nature, + iii. 3.4 (48-1081). + + Bewitched, gnostics imagine intelligible entities can be, ii. 9.14 + (33-627). + + Beyond first, impossible to go, vi. 8.11 (39-791). + + Bile, fulfils unique role in universe, ii. 3.5 (52-1171). + + Birds, overweighted like sensual men, v. 9.1 (5-102). + + Birth of subordinate deities, inhering in Supreme, v. 8.9 (31-566). + + Birth of subordinate divinities does not affect power of Supreme, v. + 8.9 (31-565). + + Birth of time reveals nature, iii. 7.10 (45-1005). + + Blamed for its imperfections, the world should not be, iii. 2.3 + (47-1046). + + Blank, mental, differs from impression of shapeless, ii. 4.10 + (12-208). + + Boast of kinship with divinities, while not being able to leave body, + ridiculous, ii. 9.18 (33-637). + + Bodies added, introduce conflicting motions, ii. 2.2 (14-231). + + Bodies, classification of, vi. 3.9 (44-948). + + Bodies classified, not only by forms and qualities and specific + forms, vi. 3.10 (44-950). + + Bodies could not subsist with power of universal Soul iv. 7.3 (2-60). + + Bodies, different kinds of, why souls take on, iv. 3.12 (27-410). + + Bodies, even simple, analyzed into form and matter, iv. 7.1 (2-56). + + Bodies, human, more difficult to manage than world-body iv. 8.2 + (6-121). + + Bodies of souls, may be related differently, iv. 4.29 (28-485). + + Bodies simple, could not exist, without world-soul iv. 7.3 (2-60). + + Bodies, souls descend into, why and how? iv. 3.8 (27-401). + + Body, activated only by incorporeal powers, iv. 7.8 (2-70). + + Body alone visible, reason why soul is said to be in it, iv. 3.20 + (27-419). + + Body and soul, consequences of mixture, i. 1.4 (53-1194). + + Body and soul forms fusion, iv. 4.18 (28-465). + + Body and soul mixture impossible, i. 1.4 (53-1195). + + Body and soul primitive relation between, i. 1.3 (53-1194). + + Body and soul relation between iv. 3.19 (27-418). + + Body, anger-power, does not originate in it, iv. 4.28 (28-480). + + Body as rationalized matter, ii. 7.3 (37-696). + + Body can lose parts, not the soul, iv. 7.5 (2-63). + + Body cannot possess virtue, iv. 7.8 (2-69). + + Body cannot think, iv. 7.8 (2-68). + + Body contains one kind of desires, iv. 4.20 (28-468). + + Body cosmic, perfect and self-sufficient, iv. 8.2 (6-122). + + Body could not have sensation, if soul were corporeal, iv. 7.6 (2-65). + + Body differs from real man, i. 1.10 (53-1202). + + Body, does the anger-power originate in it? iv. 4.28 (28-480). + + Body, even simple, composed of form and matter, iv. 7.1 (2-56). + + Body exerts a uniform action; soul a varied one, iv. 7.4 (2-62). + + Body, eyes of, to close them, method to achieve, i. 6.8 (1-52). + + Body grows a little after departure of soul, iv. 4.29 (28-485). + + Body has single motion, soul different ones, iv. 7.5 (2-62). + + Body, how it approaches the soul, vi. 4.15 (22-309). + + Body in soul, not soul in body, iii, 9.3 (13-222); iv. 3.22 (27-423). + + Body is composite, therefore perishable, iv. 7.1 (2-56). + + Body is instrument of the soul, iv. 7.1 (2-56). + + Body is not us but ours, iv. 4.18 (28-465). + + Body part of ourselves, i. 1.10 (53-1203); iv. 7.1 (2-56). + + Body is proximate transition of the soul, iv. 3.20 (27-420). + + Body is tool and matter of soul, iv. 7.1 (2-56). + + Body is within soul, iv. 3.20 (27-419). + + Body managed by reasoning hence imperfectly, iv. 8.8 (6-132). + + Body management, only one phase of excursion of procession, iv. 8.7 + (6-131). + + Body needs soul for life, iv. 3.19 (27-418). + + Body never entirely entered by the soul, iv. 8.8 (6-132). + + Body not a vase for the soul, iv. 3.20 (27-420). + + Body not constituted by matter exclusively, iv. 7.3 (2-60). + + Body of demons is air or fire-like, iii. 5.6 (50-1133); ii. 1.6 + (40-823). + + Body of elements, common ground of, makes them kindred, ii. 1.7 + (40-824). + + Body penetrated by soul, but not by another body, iv. 7.8 (2-72). + + Body relation to soul, is passage into world of life, vi. 4.12 + (22-304); + + Body, separation of soul from it, i. 1.3 (53-1193). + + Body sick, soul devoted to it, iv. 3.4 (27-395). + + Body, superior and inferior of soul, related in three ways, iv. 4.29 + (28-485). + + Body, the soul uses as tool, i. 1.3 (53-1193). + + Body throughout all changes, soul powers remain the same, iv. 3.8 + (27-402). + + Body used for perception makes feeling, iv. 4.23 (28-475); iv. 7.8 + (2-68). + + Body, will of stars, do not sway earthly events, iv. 4.34 (28-494). + + Body's composition demands the substrate, ii. 4.11 (12-209). + + Body's elements cannot harmonize themselves, iv. 7.8 (2-75). + + Body's size nothing to do with greatness of soul, vi. 4.5 (22-293). + + Boldness, see Audacity; i. 1.2 (53-1192). + + Bond of the universe is number, vi. 6.15 (34-670). + + Born philosophers alone, reach the higher region, v. 9.2 (5-103). + + Both men, we always should be, but are not, vi. 4.14 (22-308). + + Boundary of intelligible, location of soul, iv. 8.7 (6-131). + + Brains, seat of sensation, iv. 3.23 (27-425). + + Brothers of Jupiter unissued yet, v. 8.12 (31-572). + + Brutalization or divinization is fate of three men in us, vi. 7.6 + (38-708). + + + Calypso, i. 6.8 (1-53). + + Capacity, limits participation in the one, vi. 4.11 (22-302). + + Care divine, exemption from certain classes, heartless, ii. 9.16 + (33-631). + + Care for individual things, draws soul into incarnation, iv. 8.4 + (6-124). + + Career of the soul, what hell means for it, vi. 4.16 (22-312); + + Castration indicates sterility of unitary nature, iii. 6.19 (26-385). + v. 8.13 (31-573). + + Categories, v. 1.4 (10-180); v. 3.15 (49-1116). + + Categories, Aristotelian and Stoic, vi. 1.1 (42-837). + + Categories, Aristotelian neglect intelligible world, vi. 1.1 (42-831). + + Categories cannot contain both power and lack of power, vi. 1.10 + (42-852). + + Categories cause one to produce manifoldness, v. 3.15 (49-1116). + + Categories, four of Stoics, evaporate, leaving matter as basis, vi. + 1.29 (42-885). + + Categories, if where and place are different categories, many more + may be added, vi. 1.14 (42-862). + + Categories, movement and difference applied to intelligence, ii. 4.5 + (12-202). + + Categories of Plotinos do not together form quality, vi. 2-14 + (43-918). + + Categories of Plotinos, five, why none were added, vi. 2.9 (43-907). + + Categories of Plotinos, six, ii. 4.5 (12-202); ii. 6.2 (17-248); v. + 1.4 (10-180); vi. 2.1, 8, 9 (43-891, 904). + + Categories of quality, various derivatives of, vi. 3.19 (44-967). + + Categories of Stoics enumerated, vi. 1.25 (42-878). + + Categories, physical, fourth and fifth, refer to the first three, vi. + 3.6 (44-943). + + Categories, physical, of Plotinos, enumerated, vi. 3.3 (44-937). + + Categories, separate, action and suffering cannot be, vi. 1.17 + (42-866). + + Categories, single, could not include intelligible and sense being, + vi. 1.2 (42-839). + + Categories, six, from which all things are derived, v. 1.4 (10-180). + + Categories, sources of characteristics, in intelligible, v. 9.10 + (5-113). + + Categories, unity is not one, arguments against, vi. 2.10 (43-910). + + Categories far better than doing or acting actualization, vi. 1.15 + (42-863). + + Categories, having cannot be, because too various, vi. 1.23 (42-876). + + Categories of something common is absurd, vi. 1.25 (42-878). + + Categories, why movement is, vi. 3.21 (44-971). + + Cause absent, in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563). + + Cause coincides with nature in intelligible, vi. 7.19 (38-735). + + Cause, everything has, iii. 1.1 (3-86). + + Cause, is Supreme, of Heraclitus, iii. 1.2 (3-88). + + Cause, of affections, though corporeal, iii. 6.4 (26-356). + + Cause of procession of world from unity, v. 2.1 (11-193). + + Cause, suitability of, puts Supreme beyond chance, vi. 8.18 (39-806). + + Cause ultimate, is nature, iii 1.1 (3-87). + + Cause why souls are divine, v. 1.2 (10-175). + + Causeless origin, really is determinism, iii. 1.1 (3-86). + + Causes, any thing due to several, ii. 3.14 (52-1180). + + Causes for incarnation are twofold, iv. 8.1, 5 (6-119, 128). + + Causes of deterioration, iii. 3.4 (48-1083). + + Causes of things in the world, possible theories, iii. 1.1 (3-86). + + Causes proximate are unsatisfactory, demanding the ultimate, iii. 1.2 + (3-88). + + Causes ulterior always sought by sages, iii. 1.2 (3-88). + + Cave, Platonic simile of world, iv. 8.1, 4 (6-120, 126). + + Celestial divinities, difference from inferior, v. 8.3 (31-556). + + Celestial light not exposed to any wastage, ii. 1.8 (40-827). + + Celestial things last longer than terrestrial things, ii. 1.5 + (40-819). + + Centre is father of the circumference and radii, vi. 8.18 (39-804). + + Centre of soul and body, difference between, ii. 2.2 (14-230). + + Ceres, myth of soul of earth, iv. 4.27 (28-480). + + Certain, conception limiting objects, vi. 6.13 (34-663). + + Chains bind soul in incarnation, iv. 8.4 (6-126). + + Chains, golden, on captive, as beauty is on matter, i. 8.15 (51-1163). + + Chains that hold down Saturn, v. 8.13 (31-573). + + Chance, apparent, is really Providence, iii. 3.2 (48-1078). + + Chance banished by form, limit and shape, vi. 8.10 (39-789). + + Chance, cause of suitability and opportunity, puts them beyond it, + vi. 8.17 (39-804). + + Chance could not cause the centre of circular of intelligence, vi. + 8.18 (39-804). + + Chance does not produce supreme being, vi. 8.11 (39-792). + + Chance is not the cause of the good being free, vi. 8.7 (39-783). + + Chance, men escape by interior isolation, vi. 8.15 (39-800). + + Chance, no room for in Supreme, assisted by intelligence, vi. 8.17 + (39-804). + + Chance, Supreme could not possibly be called by any one who had seen + it, vi. 8.19 (39-807). + + Change, how can it be out of time, if movement is in time, vi. 1.16 + (42-864). + + Change, is it anterior to movement? vi. 3.21 (44-972). + + Change must inevitably exist in Heaven, ii. 1.1 (40-813). + + Changeable, desires are, iv. 4.2 (28-469). + + Changeableness, self-direction of thought is not, iv. 4.2 (28-444). + + Changes of fortune, affect only the outer man, iii. 2.15 (47-1067). + + Changes of the body, do not change soul powers, iv. 3.8 (27-402). + + Changes, ours, world-souls unconscious of, iv. 4.7 (28-450). + + Chaos, usual starting point, causes puzzle of origin of God, vi. 8.11 + (39-792). + + Character, human, result of former lives, iii. 3.4 (48-1083). + + "Characteristic, certain," a spiritualization of terms, ii. 4.1 + (12-197); v. 1.4 (10-180). + + Characteristic, if anything at all, is a reason spiritual, v. 1.4 + (10-180). + + Chariot, God traverses heaven in one, iv. 3.7 (27-399). + + Chastisement of souls psychologically explained, vi. 4.16 (22-310). + + Chemical mixture described, iv. 7.8 (2-72). + + Chief, the great Jupiter, third God, iii. 5.8 (50-1136). + + Choir of virtues (Stoic), vi. 9.11 (9-170). + + Choosing is essence of consciousness, iv. 4.37 (28-500). + + Chorus, see Ballet, vi. 9.8 (9-165). + + Circe, i. 6.8 (1-53). + + Circle, iii. 8.7 (30-543); v. 1.7, 11 (10-184, 191). + + Circular movement is that of soul, vi. 9.8 (9-162, 164); ii. 2.1 + (14-227); iv. 4.16 (28-462). + + Circular movement of heavens, ii. 2.2 (14-230). + + Circulating around heavens, iii. 4.2 (15-234). + + Cities haunted by divinities, vi. 5.12 (23-332). + + Classification of purification, result of virtue, i. 2.4 (19-260). + + Climate, a legitimate governing cause, iii. 1.5 (3-93). + + Close eyes of body, method to achieve ecstasy, i. 6.8 (1-52). + + Closeness to divinity, permanent result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Clotho, ii. 3.15 (52-1182). + + Coelus, (Uranus), v. 8.13 (31-573). + + Co-existence of unity and multiplicity demands organization in + system, vi. 7.10 (38-716). + + Cognition, how it operates, v. 5.1 (32-575). + + Cognition of intelligible objects, admits no impression, iv. 6.2 + (41-832). + + Cold is not method of transforming breath into soul, iv. 7.8 (2-68). + + Collective nouns prove independent existence, vi. 6.16 (34-672). + + Combination begotten by the soul, its nature, vi. 7.5 (38-708). + + Combination contains one kind of desires, iv. 4.20 (28-468). + + Combination is a physical category, vi. 3.3 (44-937). + + Combination of body and soul, appetites located in, iv. 4.20 (28-468). + + Combination of soul and body as mixture, or as resulting product, i. + 1.1 (53-1191). + + Combination, see Aggregate, 1.11. + + Combination, third physical category (53-1191). of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 + (44-937). + + Commands himself, Supreme does, vi. 8.20 (39-809). + + Common element, growth in increase and generation, vi. 3.22 (44-975). + + Common ground of the elements make them kindred, ii. 1.7 (40-824). + + Common part, function of, i. 1.10 (53-1203). + + Common to soul and body, not all affections are, i. 1.5 (53-1197). + + Communion of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170). + + Communion with the divine, as of Minos with Jupiter, vi. 9.7 (9-162). + + Comparative method of studying time, iii. 7.6 (45-996). + + Complaining of the world, instead of fit yourself to it, ii. 9.13 + (33-625). + + Complaint, grotesque to wisdom of creator, iii. 2.14 (47-1063). + + Complaint of lower nature of animals ridiculous, iii. 2.9 (47-1059). + + Complement of being called quality only by courtesy, vi. 2.14 + (43-918). + + Composite aggregate, see combination, i. 1.2 (53-1191). + + Composite is body, therefore perishable, iv. 7.1 (2-56). + + Composite of form and matter is everything, v. 9.3 (5-104). + + Compositeness not denied by simplicity of the intelligent, vi. 7.13 + (38-722). + + Compositeness of knower not necessarily implied by knowledge, v. 3.1 + (49-1090). + + Composition and decomposition are not alterations, vi. 3.25 (44-979). + + Composition and decomposition, explanation of, vi. 3.25 (44-978). + + Comprising many souls makes soul infinite, vi. 4.4 (22-291). + + Compulsory, memory is not, iv. 4.8 (28-451). + + Concatenation from universal reason are astrological signs, iv. 4.38 + (28-501). + + Concatenation in all things is the universe, v. 2.2 (11-196). + + Concatenation of causes is Chrysippus's fate, iii. 1.2, 7 (3-89, 96). + + Conceiving principle is the world-soul, iii. 9.1 (13-221). + + Concentricity of all existing things, v. 3.7 (49-1101); v. 5.9 + (32-587). + + Conception, true, is act of intuition, i. 1.9 (53-1202). + + Conformity to the universal soul, implied they do not form part of + her, iv. 3.2 (27-389). + + Connection between sense and intelligible worlds is triple nature of + man, vi. 7.7 (38-711). + + Connection with infinite is Chrysippus's fate, iii. 1.2 (3-89). + + Consciousness, iii. 9.9 (13-226). + + Consciousness, constituted by timeless memory, iv. 3.25 (27-429). + + Consciousness depends on choosing, iv. 4.37 (28-500). + + Consciousness, etymologically, is sensation of manifoldness, v. 3.13 + (49-1113). + + Consciousness is not a pre-requisite of happiness or virtue and + intelligence, i. 4.9, 10 (46-1033). + + Consciousness is unitary, though containing the thinker, ii. 9.1 + (33-601). + + Consciousness, local and whole, relation between not applicable to + soul, iv. 3.3 (27-392). + + Consciousness of higher soul-part dimmed by predominance or + disturbance of lower, iv. 8.8 (6-132). + + Consciousness of self, lost in ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569). + + Consciousness, unity limits principles to three, ii. 9.2 (33-602). + + Consciousness would be withdrawn by differentiating reason, ii. 9.1 + (33-602). + + Contemplating intelligence, is horizon of divine approach, v. 5.7 + (32-587). + + Contemplating the divinity, a Gnostic precept, ii. 9.15 (33-630). + + Contemplation, v. 1.2, 3 (10-175, 177); v. 3.10 (49-1106). + + Contemplation, aspired to, by even plants, iii. 8.1 (30-531). + + Contemplation, everything is, iii. 8 (30). + + Contemplation, goal of all beings, iii. 8.7 (30-540). + + Contemplation, immovable results in nature and reason, iii. 8.2 + (30-533). + + Contemplation includes nature and reason, iii. 8.2 (30-533). + + Consequence of derivative goods of third rank, i. 8.2 (51-1144). + + Consequences of mixture of soul and body, i. 1.4 (53-1194). + + Constitution, of universe, hierarchical, vi. 2.1 (13-892). + + Consubstantial, v. 1.4 (10-180). + + Contemplation, constitution of even lower forms, iii. 8.1 (30-531). + + Contemplation of intelligence, demands a higher transcending unity, + v. 3.10 (49-1106). + + Contemplation of itself made essence intelligence, v. 2.1 (11-193). + + Contemplation only one phase of excursion of procession, iv. 8.7 + (6-131). + + Contemplation the goal of all kinds and grades of existence, iii. 8.6 + (30-540). + + Contemplation's preparation is practice, iii. 8.5 (30-538). + + Contemporaneous is life of intelligence, iii. 7.2 (45-989). + + Contemporary are matter and the informing principles, ii. 4.8 + (12-206). + + Contingence applicable to Supreme, under new definition only, vi. 8.8 + (39-785). + + Contingence not even applies to essence, let alone super-essence, vi. + 8.9 (39-787). + + Contingency, disappearance of, witnessed to by ascent of life, vi. + 8.15 (39-801). + + Contingency illuminated in analysis, vi. 8.14 (39-798). + + Contingent existence, precedes absolute, vi. 1.26 (42-881). + + Continuance need not interfere with fluctuation, ii. 1.3 (40-816). + + Continuity between nature and elements, there is none, iv. 4.14 + (28-459). + + Continuous procession, necessary to Supreme, iv. 8.6 (6-129). + + Contraries, are those things that lack resentments, vi. 3.20 (44-968). + + Contraries passing into each other, Heraclitus, iv. 8.1 (6-119). + + Contraries teach appreciation, iv. 8.7 (6-131). + + Contrariness is not the greatest possible difference, vi. 3.20 + (44-968). + + Contrary contained in reason, constitute its unity, iii. 2.16 + (47-1069). + + Conversion effected by depreciation of the external and appreciation + of herself, v. 1.1 (10-174); see v. 1.7. + + Conversion of soul towards herself, only object of virtue, i. 4.11 + (46-1035). + + Conversion of souls, iv. 3.6, 7 (27-397, 399); iv. 8.4 (6-126). + + Conversion of super-abundance, back towards one, v. 2.1 (11-194). + + Conversion produced by purification, i. 2.4 (10-261). + + Conversion to good and being in itself depends on intelligence, vi. + 8.4 (39-778). + + Conversion towards divinity, result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Co-ordination of universe, truth of astrology, ii. 3.7 (52-1173). + + Corporeal, if soul is, body could not possess sensation, iv. 7.6 + (2-65). + + Corporeity is nonentity because of lack of unity, iii. 6.6 (26-362). + + Corporeity not in matter of thing itself, ii. 4.12 (12-212). + + Correspondence of sense-beauty, with its idea, i. 6.2 (1-43). + + Cosmic intellect, relation with individual, i. 1.7 (53-1199). + + Counterfeit implied by true good, vi. 7.26 (38-743). + + Courage is no longer to fear death, i. 6.6 (1-49). + + Courage of soul's anger part explained, iii. 6.2 (26-354). + + Creation by divinity glancing at intelligence above, iv. 3.11 + (27-408). + + Creation by foresight, not result of reasoning, vi. 7.1 (38-699). + + Creation by mere illumination, gnostic, opposed, ii. 9.11 (33-621). + + Creation drama, the world-soul could not have gone through, ii. 9.4 + (33-605). + + Creation is effusion of super-abundance, v. 2.1 (11-194). + + Creation limited to world-soul because nearest to intelligible world, + iv. 3.6 (27-397). + + Creation of sense-world, not by reflection, but self-necessity, iii. + 2.2 (47-1044). + + Creation of world, how it took place, v. 8.7 (31-562). + + Creation, why denied human souls, iv. 3.6 (27-397). + + Creative is the universal soul, not preservative, ii. 3.16 (52-1183). + + Creative motives, ii. 9.4 (33-605). + + Creator admires his handiwork, v. 8.8 (31-564). + + Creator and preserver, is the good, vi. 7.23 (38-740). + + Creator and world, are not evil, ii. 9 (33). + + Creator is outside of time, iii. 7.5 (45-994). + + Creator so wise that all complaints are grotesque, iii. 2.14 + (47-1063). + + Creator testified to, by the world, iii. 2.3 (47-1047). + + Creator's universality, overcame all obstacles, v. 8.7 (31-562). + + Creator's wisdom makes complaints grotesque, iii. 2.14 (47-1063). + + Credence of intelligence in itself, v. 5.2 (32-578). + + Crimes should not be attributed to the influence of sublunary + divinities, iv. 4.31 (28-489). + + Criticism of world is wrong, v. 8.8 (31-565). + + Culmination, ii. 3.3 (52-1165). + + Cup, cosmic, in Plato, iv. 8.4 (6-127). + + Cupid and Psyche, vi. 9.9 (9-166). + + Curative, the, is a prominent element of life, iii. 3.5 (48-1084). + + Cutting off every thing else, is means of ecstasy, v. 3.7 (49-1121). + + Cybele, iii. 6.19 (26-385). + + + Daemon helps to carry out chosen destiny, iii. 4.5 (15-239). + + Daemon is next higher faculty of soul, iii. 4.3 (15-235). + + Daemon is the love that unites a soul to matter, iii. 5.4 (50-1130). + + Daemon may remain after death or be changed to Daemon superior to + predominating power, iii. 4.6 (15-239). + + Daemon of souls is their love, iii. 5.4 (50-1130). + + Daemon's all, born of Need and Abundance, iii. 5.6 (50-1131). + + Daemons and deities, difference between, iii. 5.6 (50-1131). + + Daemons are individual, iii. 4 (15). + + Daemons both related and independent of us, iii. 4.5 (15-239). + + Daemons even in souls entering animal bodies, iii. 4.6 (15-240). + + Daemons follow Supreme, v. 8.10 (31-567). + + Daemon's guidance does not hinder responsibility, iii. 4.5 (15-238). + + Daemons in charge of punishment of soul, iv. 8.5 (6-128). + + Dance, prearranged, simile of star's motion, iv. 4.33 (28-492). + + Darkness, existence of, must be related to the soul, ii. 9.12 + (33-624). + + Darkness, looking at, cause of evil of soul, i. 8.4 (51-1147). + + Death, after, colleagues in government of world, iv. 8.4 (6-125). + + Death, after, discursive reason not used, iv. 3.18 (27-416). + + Death, after, judgment and expiation, iii. 4.6 (15-240). + + Death, after, man becomes what he has lived, iii. 4.2 (15-234). + + Death, after, memory may last, if trained, iii. 4.2 (15-234); iv. 4.5 + (28-448). + + Death, after, rank depends on state of death, i. 9 (16). + + Death, after, recognition and memory, iv. 4.5 (28-447). + + Death, after, soul goes to retribution, iii. 2.8 (47-1056). + + Death, after, where does the soul go, iii. 4.6 (15-240); iii. 2.8 + (47-1056). + + Death, at, memories of former existences are reproduced, iv. 3.27 + (27-433). + + Death better than disharmony, iii. 2.8 (47-1057). + + Death, how the soul splits up, iii. 4.6 (15-241). + + Death is only separation of soul from body, i. 6.6 (1-50). + + Declination, ii. 3.3 (52-1165). + + Decomposible, soul is not, merely because it has three parts, iv. + 7.14 (2-84). + + Decomposition and composition are not alteration, vi. 3.25 (44-979). + + Decomposition and composition, explanation of, vi. 3.25 (44-978). + + Defects, not in intelligible world, v. 9.14 (5-117). + + Defects such as limping, do not proceed from intelligence, v. 9.10 + (5-113). + + Degeneration of races, implied by determinism, ii. 3.16 (52-1184). + + Degeneration of soul is promoted by looking at darkness, i. 8.4 + (51-1147). + + Degrees, admitted of, by quality, vi. 3.20 (44-970). + + Degrees, different, of the same reality, are intelligence and life, + vi. 7.18 (38-732). + + Degrees of ecstasy, vi. 7.36 (38-760). + + Deities and demons, difference between, iii. 5.6 (50-1131). + + Deities, second rank, are all visible super-lunar deities, iii. 5.6 + (50-1132). + + Deliberating before making sense-man intelligence did not, vi. 7.1 + (38-698). + + Deliberation in creating of world, gnostic opposed, v. 8.7, 12 + (31-561, 571). + + Delphi, at middle of earth, vi. 1.14 (42-862). + + Demiurge, how the gnostic created it, ii. 9.12 (33-623). + + Demon, chief, in intelligible world is deity, iii. 5.6 (50-1132). + + Demon is any being in intelligible world, iii. 5.6 (50-1133). + + Demon is vestige of a soul descended into the world, iii. 5.6 + (50-1132). + + Demon, the great, Platonic, ii. 3.9 (52-1176). + + Demoniacal possession, as explanation of disease wrong, ii. 9.14 + (33-627). + + Demons, among them, those are loves that exist by a soul's desire for + good, iii. 5.6 (50-1132). + + Demons have bodies of fire, ii. 1.6 (40-823); iii. 5.6 (50-1133). + + Demons have no memories, and grant no prayers; in war life is saved + by valor, not by prayers, iv. 4.30 (28-486). + + Demons, no crimes should be attributed to, iv. 4.31 (28-489). + + Demons not born of souls, generated by world-soul powers, iii. 5.6 + (50-1133). + + Demons, psychology of, iv. 4.43 (28-507). + + Demons, why not all of them are loves, iii. 5.6 (50-1132). + + Demons, why they are not free from matter, iii. 5.6 (50-1133). + + Demonstration absent in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563). + + Demonstration of divinity defies, i. 3.1 (20-269). + + Depart from life by seeking beyond it, vi. 5.12 (23-331). + + Deprivation, in soul, is evil, i. 8.11 (51-1158). + + Deprivation is matter, and is without qualities, i. 8.11 (51-1158). + + Derivatives of category of quality, vi. 3.19 (44-967). + + Descartes, "Cogito, ergo sum," from Parmenides, v. 9.5 (5-108). + + Descend, how souls come to, iv. 3.13 (27-410). + + Descend, intelligible does not, sense-world rises, iii. 4.4 (15-237). + + Descent from intelligible into heaven by souls leads to recognition, + iv. 4.5 (28-447). + + Descent from the intelligible world enables us to study time, iii. + 7.6 (45-995). + + Descent into body, does not injure eternity of soul, iv. 7.13 (2-83). + + Descent of soul, causes, as given by Plato, iv. 8.1 (6-121). + + Descent of soul into body, iii. 9.3 (13-222); iv. 8.1 (6-120). + + Descent of the soul, is fall into matter, i. 8.14 (51-1161). + + Descent of the soul, procedure, vi. 4.16 (22-311). + + Descent of the soul, psychologically explained, vi. 4.16 (22-311). + + Descent, souls not isolated from intelligence, during, iv. 3.12 + (27-409). + + Description of intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-557). + + Description of universal being, vi. 4.2 (22-286). + + Desirability of being in its beauty v. 8.10 (31-568). + + Desirable in itself, is the good. vi. 8.7 (39-783). + + Desire not simultaneous with appetite, i. 1.5 (53-1197). + + Desire of soul, liver seat of, iv. 4.28 (28-480). + + Desire or ability, only limit of union with divinity, v. 8.11 + (31-570). + + Desire to live, satisfaction of, is not happiness, i. 5.2 (36-684). + + Desires are physical, because changeable with harmony of body, iv. + 4.21 (28-469). + + Desires, double, of body and of combination, iv. 4.20 (28-468). + + Desires, function, relation of, to the vegetative power, iv. 4.22 + (28-470). + + Destiny chosen, helped by Daemon, iii. 4.5 (15-239). + + Destiny conformed to character of soul, iii. 4.5 (15-238). + + Destiny of man, gnostic, is demoralizing, ii. 9.15 (33-629). + + Destiny of souls, depend on condition of birth of universe, ii. 3.15 + (52-1182). + + Destroyed would be the universe, if unity passed into the manifold, + iii. 8.10 (30-547). + + Destruction of soul elements, does it imply disappearance? iv. 4.29 + (28-484). + + Detachment as simplification of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170). + + Detachment of soul at death, how arranged naturally, i. 9 (16). + + Detachment of soul by death voluntary, forbidden, i. 9 (16). + + Detailed fate not swayed by stars, iv. 4.31 (28-488). + + Details, fault in, cannot change harmony in universe, ii. 3.16 + (52-1185). + + Determinate form, v. 1.7 (10-184); v. 5.6 (32-584). + + Determinateness, impossible of one, v. 5.6 (32-584). + + Determination demands a motive, iii. 1.1 (3-86). + + Determination of future implied by prediction, iii. 1.3 (3-90). + + Determinism implies degeneration of races, ii. 3.16 (52-1184). + + Determinism, really, under causeless origin, iii. 1.1 (3-86). + + Determinism supported by materialists, iii. 1.2 (3-88). + + Deterioration, causes of, iii. 3.4 (48-1083). + + Development natural of essence to create a soul, iv. 8.6 (6-129). + + Deviltry confuted, leaves influence of world-soul, iv. 4.32 (28-490). + + Devolution (Platonic world scheme, intelligence, soul, nature), iv. + 7.8 (2-69). + + Diagram of universe, iv. 4.16 (28-462). + + Dialectics, i. 3 (20-269); ii, 4.10 (12-206); vi. 3.1 (44-934); i. + 3.4 (20-272); i. 8.9 (51-1156). + + Dialectics, crown of various branches of philosophy, i. 3.5 (20-273). + + Dialectics, how to conceive infinite, vi. 6.2 (34-644). + + Dialectics is concatenation of the world, i. 3.4 (20-272). + + Dialectics neglects opinion and sense opinions, i. 3.4 (20-272). + + Dialectics not merely instrument for philosophy (Aristotle), i. 3.5 + (20-273). + + Dialectics not speculation and abstract rules (Epicurean), i. 3.5 + (20-273). + + Dialectics science of (judging values, or) discovery, amount of real + being in things, i. 3.4 (20-273). + + Dialectics staying in intelligible, v. 1.1 (10-173). + + Dialectics three paths, philosopher, musician and lover, i. 3.1 + (20-269). + + Dialectics two fold, first ascent to intelligible and then how to + remain, i. 3.1 (20-269). + + Dialectics without it, lower knowledge would be imperfect, i. 3.6 + (20-274). + + Differ, souls do, as the sensations, vi. 4.6 (22-294). + + Difference and identity, implied by triune process of categories, vi. + 2.8 (43-905). + + Difference between celestial and inferior divinities, v. 8.3 (31-556). + + Difference between human and cosmic incarnation, iv. 8.3 (6-123). + + Difference, greatest possible, is not contrariness, vi. 3.20 (44-968). + + Difference of Supreme from second, is profound, v. 5.3 (32-580). + + Difference, or category, v. 1.4 (10-180). + + Differences, minor, derived from matter, v. 9.12 (5-115). + + Differences of color, aid to discriminate magnitudes, ii. 8.1 + (35-681). + + Differences of soul, retained on different levels, iv. 3.5 (27-396). + + Differences of things, depend on their seminal reasons, v. 7.1 + (18-252). + + Differences, some are not qualities, vi. 3.18 (44-965). + + Differentials of beings, are not genuine qualities, vi. 1.16 (42-853). + + Difficulties of understanding, clear to intelligence, iv. 9.5 (8-146). + + Dimension and number are so different as to suggest different + classifications, vi. 2.13 (43-916). + + Diminished, essence is not, though divisible, vi. 4.4 (22-290). + + Dione, iii. 5.2 (50-1126). + + Disappearance of form, implies that of size, ii. 8.1 (35-682). + + Disappearance of soul parts, does it imply destruction, iv. 4.29 + (28-484). + + Discontent, divine, and transforms virtues, homely into higher, i. + 2.7 (19-267). + + Discontent, divine, supplement of homely virtues, i. 2.7 (19-267). + + Discord, cause of incarnation, iv. 8.1 (6-119). + + Discursive reason, v. 1.10, 11 (10-189); v. 3.14 (49-1115); v. 5.1 + (32-575); v. 9.4 (5-106). + + Discursive reason cannot turn upon itself, v. 3.2 (49-1091). + + Discursive reason, its function, v. 3.1 (49-1090). + + Discursive reason, why it belongs to soul, not to intelligence, v. + 3.3 (49-1093). + + Discursive reason's highest part, receives impressions from its + intelligence, v. 3.3 (49-1092). + + Disease, as demoniacal possession wrong, ii. 9.14 (33-627). + + Disharmony, vice is, iii. 6.2 (26-352). + + Disharmony with laws of universe, worse than death, iii. 2.8 + (47-1057). + + Displacement, movement is single, vi. 3.24 (44-977). + + Disposition, difficulty of mastering these corporeal dispositions, i. + 8.8 (51-1154). + + Distance from a unity is multitude and an evil, vi. 6.1 (34-643). + + Distance from the Supreme, imperfection, iii. 3.3 (48-1080). + + Distinction between spiritual, psychic and material, due to ignorance + of other people's attainments, ii. 9.18 (33-637). + + Distinction in intelligibles, (good above beauty), i. 6.9 (1-53). + + Distinguish, object of myths, iii. 5.10 (50-1138). + + Distinction, Philonic, between the God, and God, vi. 7.1 (38-697). + + Distinguishing of being, quality and differences absurd, vi. 3.18 + (44-965). + + Distraction by sensation, makes us unconscious of higher part, iv. + 8.8 (6-132). + + Divergence from Plato, forces Plotinos to demonstrate categories, vi. + 2.1 (43-891). + + Diversity from same parents depends on manner of generation, v. 7.2 + (18-253). + + Diversity of relations of all things connected with the first, v. 5.9 + (32-589). + + Divided, not even the ascended soul need be, iv. 4.1 (28-442). + + Divided, time cannot be without soul's action, iv. 4.15 (28-460). + + Divine sphere, limited by soul, downwards, v. 1.7 (10-186). + + Diviner, duty of, is to read letter traced by nature, iii. 3.6 + (48-1087). + + Divinities begotten by actualization of intelligence, vi. 9.9 (9-168). + + Divinities begotten by silent intercourse with the one, vi. 9.9 + (9-166). + + Divinities celestial and inferior, difference between, v. 8.3 + (31-556). + + Divinities contained in Supreme, dynamically, by birth, v. 8.9 + (31-566). + + Divinities haunt the cities, vi. 5.12 (23-332). + + Divinities hidden and visible, v. 1.4 (10-178). + + Divinity absent only, for non-successful in avoiding distraction, vi. + 9.7 (9-161). + + Divinity and also the soul is always one, iv. 3.8 (27-400). + + Divinity constituted by attachment to centre, vi. 9.8 (9-163). + + Divinity distinguished Philonically, the God, and God, vi. 7.1 + (18-251). + + Divinity, resemblance to, in soul's welfare, i. 6.6 (1-49). + + Divinity within us, single and identical in all, vi. 5.1 (23-314). + + Divinization, as Cupid and Psyche, vi. 9.9 (9-166). + + Divinization of brutalization, is fate of three men in us, vi. 7.6 + (38-708). + + Divisible, all bodies are fully, iv. 7.8 (2-68). + + Divisible and indivisible can soul be simultaneously, iv. 3.19 + (27-417). + + Divisible and indivisible is soul, iv. 2.2 (21-279). + + Divisible beings, existence of, iv. 2.1 (21-276). + + Divisible intelligence is not, v. 3.5 (49-1096). + + Divisible is essence though not diminished, vi. 4.4 (22-290). + + Divisible of soul, mixture and double, ii. 3.9 (52-1176). + + Divisible soul is not unifying manifold, sensation, iv. 7.6 (2-65). + + Divisibility, v. 1.7 (10-184). + + Divisibility, goal of sense, growth and emotion, iv. 3.19 (27-418). + + Divisibility of soul in vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 + (31-567). + + Division, between universal soul and souls impossible, iv. 3.2 + (27-390). + + Division, characteristic of bodies not of soul, iv. 2.8 (21-276). + + Dominant, better nature is not, because of sub-consciousness, iii. + 3.4 (48-1081). + + Double cause of incarnation, motive and deeds, iv. 8.4 (6-125). + + Double, Hercules symbolizes the soul, i. 1.12 (53-1206). + + Doubleness of everything, including man, vi. 3.4 (44-938). + + Doubleness of soul, reasons and Providence, iv. 6.2 (41-832); iii. + 3.4 (48-1081). + + Doubleness of souls, suns, stars, ii. 3.9 (52-1175). + + Doubleness of wisdom, i. 2.6 (19-265). + + Doubleness of world soul, ii. 2.3 (14-233). + + Doubleness, see "pair", or "dyad", of every man, ii. 3.9 (52-1176). + + Doubt of existence of divinity, like dreamers who awake, to slumber + again, v. 5.11 (32-592). + + Drama as a whole, iii. 2.17 (47-1071). + + Drama of life, parts played badly by the evil, iii. 2.17 (47-1072). + + Drama, simile of, allows for good and evil within reason, iii. 2.17 + (47-1070). + + Dream of the good is form, vi. 7.28 (38-745). + + Dream of the soul is sensation, from which we must wake, iii. 6.6 + (26-363). + + Dreamers who wake, only to return to dreams like doubters of + divinity, v. 5.11 (32-593). + + Driver and horses, simile of, Platonic, ii. 3.13 (52-1179). + + Dualism breaks down just like monism, vi. 1.27 (42-883). + + Duality (form and matter) in all things, iv. 7.1 (2-56). + + Duality of every body, ii. 4.5 (12-200). + + Duration has nothing to do with happiness, i. 5.1 (36-684). + + Duration increases unhappiness, why not happiness? i. 5.6 (36-686). + + Duration of happiness does not affect its quality, i. 5.5 (36-685). + + Duration of time, as opportunity, is of importance to virtue, i. 5.10 + (36-689). + + Dyad, or doubleness, v. 5.4 (32-581). + + Dyad, see "pair," vi. 2.11 (43-914). + + + Earth and fire contained in the stars, ii. 1.6 (40-822). + + Earth can feel as well as the stars, iv. 4.22 (28-471). + + Earth contains all the other elements, ii. 1.6 (40-823). + + Earth exists in the intelligible, vi. 7.11 (38-718). + + Earth feels and directs by sympathetic harmony, iv. 4.26 (28-477). + + Earth, model of the new, gnostic, unreasonable, ii. 9.5 (33-608). + + Earth, postulated by Plato, as being basis of life, ii. 1.7 (40-823). + + Earth senses may be different from ours, iv. 4.26 (28-478). + + Earth, what passions suitable to it, iv. 4.22 (28-471). + + Earthly events, not to be attributed to stars, body or will, iv. 4.35 + (28-495). + + Earth's psychology, iv. 4.27 (28-479). + + Ecliptic's inclination to equator, v. 8.7 (31-563). + + Ecstasy as divine spectacle, vi. 9.11 (9-169). + + Ecstasy as intellectual contact with sudden light, v. 3.17 (49-1120). + + Ecstasy described, iv. 8.1 (6-119). + + Ecstasy ends in a report of seeing God beget a Son, v. 8.12 (31-571). + + Ecstasy ends in fusion with divinity, and becoming own object of + contemplation, v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Ecstasy ends in "rest" and "Saturnian realm," v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Ecstasy ends in vision which is not chance, vi. 8.21 (39-807). + + Ecstasy, experience of, i. 6.7 (1-50). + + Ecstasy has two advantages following, self-consciousness and + possession of all things, v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Ecstasy illustrated by secrecy of mystery-rites, vi. 9.11 (9-169). + + Ecstasy in soul does not think God, because she doesn't think, vi. + 7.35 (38-759). + + Ecstasy is possession by divinity, v. 8.10 (31-567). + + Ecstasy, land-marks on path to, i. 6.9 (1-54). + + Ecstasy, mechanism of, v. 8.11 (31-569). + + Ecstasy, permanent results, v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Ecstasy results in begotten son forming a new world, v. 8.12 (31-571). + + Ecstasy, simplification, super beauty and virtue, vi. 9.11 (9-170). + + Ecstasy, the degrees leading to God, vi. 736 (38-760). + + Ecstasy trance (enthusiasm), vi. 9.11 (9-169). + + Ecstasy, trap on way to, v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Ecstasy, way to approach, first principle, v. 5.10, 11 (32-591). + + Ecstasy, when experienced, leads to questions, iv. 8.1 (6-119). + + Ecstasy's last stage, vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 (31-568). + + Ecstasy's method, is to close eyes of body, i. 6.8 (1-52). + + Ecstatic vision of God, chief purpose of life, i. 6.7 (1-51). + + Ecstatic, subsequent experiences, vi. 9.11 (9-190). + + Education and training, memory needs, iv. 6.3 (41-835). + + Effusion of super-abundance is reation, v. 2.1 (11-194). + + Effects, differences in, limited to intelligibles, vi. 3.17 (44-964). + + Egyptian hieroglyphics, v. 8.6 (31-560). + + Elemental intermediary soul, also inadmissible, ii. 9.5 (33-607). + + Elemental process demands substrate, ii, 4.6 (12-203). + + Elements and nature, there is continuity between, iv. 4.14 (28-459). + + Elements are also individual, ii. 1.6 (40-823). + + Elements are kindred, through their common ground, the universe body, + ii. 1.7 (40-824). + + Elements, earth contains all, ii. 1.6 (40-821). + + Elements, principles of physicists, iii. 1.3 (3-89). + + Elements of body cannot harmonize themselves, iv. 7.8 (2-74). + + Elements of essence can be said to be one only figuratively, vi. 2.10 + (43-909). + + Elements of universe, simultaneously principles and general, vi. 2.2 + (43-893). + + Elements terrestrial, do not degrade the heaven, ii. 1.6 (40-823). + + Elevation of soul gradual, v. 3.9 (49-1106). + + Eliminated, is contingency in analysis, vi. 8.14 (39-798). + + Emanations of a single soul, are all souls, iv. 3 (27). + + Emanations of light from sun, v. 3.12 (49-1112). + + Emanations of universal soul, are individual souls, iv. 3.1 (27-388). + + Emanations, sense and growth tend towards divisibility, iv. 3.19 + (27-418). + + Emigration of soul should not be forced, i. 9 (10). + + Emotion at seeing God, sign of unification, vi. 9.4 (9-155). + + Emotions, James Lange, theory of refuted, i. 1.5 (53-1196). + + Emotions of beauty caused by invisible soul, i. 6.5 (1-46). + + Enchantments, an active life, predisposes to subjection to, iv. 4.43 + (28-507). + + Enchantments, magic, how to avoid them, iv. 4.44 (28-509). + + Enchantments, wise men escape all, iv. 4.43 (28-507). + + End and principle, simultaneous in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563). + + End of all other goods is the Supreme, i. 7.1 (54-1209). + + Entelechy, soul is not, iv. 2.1; iv. 7.8 (21-276, 2-74-77). + + Energy, displayed, constitutes a thing's being, iii. 1.1 (3-86). + + Ennobled and intellectualized is soul, scorning even thought, vi. + 7.35 (38-757). + + Enthusiasm of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-169). + + Entire essence loved by being, vi. 5.10 (23-325). + + Entire everywhere is universal soul, vi. 4.9 (22-300). + + Entire soul, fashioned whole and individuals, vi. 5.8 (23-322). + + Entire soul is everywhere, iv. 7.5 (2-63). + + Entities earthly, not all have ideas corresponding, v. 9.14 (5-117). + + Entities incorporeal, impassibility, iii. 6.1 (26-351). + + Enumeration of divine principles, vi. 7.25 (38-742). + + Enumeration, successive, inevitable in describing the eternal, iv. + 8.4 (6-127). + + Epicurus, iv. 5.2 (29-516). + + Epimetheus, iv. 3.14 (27-412). + + Equator to Ecliptic, inclination, v. 8.7 (31-563). + + Erechtheus, iv. 4.43 (28-508). + + Eros, Platonic myth interpretation of, iii. 5.2 (50-1125). + + Eros, son of Venus, iii. 5.2 (50-1125). + + Escape all enchantments, how the wise men do, iv. 4.43 (28-507). + + Escape, how to, from this world, i. 6.8 (1-52). + + Escoreal fragment, introduction to, iii. 6.6 (26-360). + + Essence alone, possesses self existence, vi. 6.18 (34-678). + + Essence and being, distinction between, ii. 6.1 (17-245). + + Essence and stability, distinction between. vi. 2.7 (43-903). + + Essence and unity, genuine relations between, vi. 2.11 (43-911). + + Essence, by it all things depend on the good, i. 7.2 (54-1209). + + Essence cannot become a genus so long as it remains one, vi. 2.9 + (43-909). + + Essence derives its difference from other co-ordinate categories, vi. + 2.19 (43-923). + + Essence divisible if not thereby diminished, vi. 4.4 (22-290). + + Essence elements can be said to be one only figuratively, vi. 2.10 + (43-909). + + Essence entire loved by being, vi. 5.10 (23-325). + + Essence, ideas and intelligence, v. 9 (5-102). + + Essence, indivisible and divisible mediated between by soul, iv. 2 + (21-276). + + Essence indivisible becomes divisible within bodies, iv. 2.1 (21-277). + + Essence indivisible, description of, iv. 2.1 (21-277). + + Essence intelligible, is both in and out of itself, vi. 5.3 (23-316). + + Essence is not contingent let alone super-essence, vi. 8.9 (39-788). + + Essence is the origin of all animals, vi. 2.21 (43-928). + + Essence, location for the things yet to be produced, vi. 6.10 + (34-657). + + Essence made intelligible by addition of eternity, vi. 2.1 (43-892). + + Essence more perfect than actualized being, ii. 6.1 (17-247). + + Essence must be second in order to exist in ground of first, v. 2.1 + (11-193). + + Essence not stable though immovable, vi. 9.3 (9-153). + + Essence not synonymous with unity, vi. 2.9 (43-908). + + Essence, number follows and proceeds from, vi. 6.9 (34-655). + + Essence of soul derives from its being, adding life to essence, vi. + 2.6 (43-900). + + Essence one and identical is everywhere, entirely present, vi. 4 + (22-285). + + Essence relation to being, v. 5.5 (32-583). + + Essence unity must be sought for in it, vi. 5.1 (23-314). + + Essence's power and beauty, is to attract all things, vi. 6.18 + (34-678). + + Essential number, vi. 6.9 (34-657). + + Eternal being, cares not for inequality of riches. ii, 9.9 (33-616). + + Eternal generation, iv. 8.4 (6-127); vi. 7.3 (38-703); vi. 8.20 + (39-809). + + Eternal must have been the necessity to illuminate darkness, ii. 9.12 + (33-624). + + Eternal revealed by sense objects, iv. 8.6 (6-130). + + Eternally begotten, is the world, ii. 9.3 (33-603). + + Eternity added to essence makes intelligible essence, vi. 2.1 + (43-892). + + Eternity and perpetuity, difference between, iii. 7.4 (45-991). + + Eternity and time, iii. 7 (45-985). + + Eternity as union of the five categories, iii, 7.2 (45-988). + + Eternity at rest, error in this, iii. 7.1 (45-987). + + Eternity exists perpetually, iii. 7. introd. (45-985). + + Eternity, from, is providence the plan of the universe, vi. 8.17 + (39-803). + + Eternity has no future or past, v. 1.4 (10-179); iii. 7.4 (45-992). + + Eternity is immutable in unity, iii. 7.5 (45-993). + + Eternity is infinite, universal life, that cannot lose anything, iii, + 7.4 (45-992). + + Eternity is sempiternal existence, iii. 7.5 (45-993). + + Eternity is the model of its image, time, iii. 7. introd. (45-985). + + Eternity is to existence, as time is interior to the soul, iii. 7.10 + (45-1008). + + Eternity is to intelligence, what time is to the world-soul. iii. + 7.10 (45-1007). + + Eternity kin to beauty, iii. 5.1 (50-1124). + + Eternity not an accident of the intelligible, but an intimate part of + its nature, iii. 7.3 (45-989). + + Eternity of soul, not affected by descent into body, iv. 7.13 (2-83). + + Eternity of soul proved by thinking the eternal, iv. 7.10 (2-81). + + Eternity, relation of, to intelligible being, iii. 7.1 (45-986). + + Eternity replaces time, in intelligible world, v. 9.10 (5-113). + + Eternity, see Aeon and pun on Aeon, iii. 7.1 (45-986). + + Evaporation, explains a theory of mixture, ii. 7.2 (37-694). + + Evaporation, both Stoic and Aristotelian refuted, ii, 7.2 (37-695). + + Everything is composite of form and matter, v. 9.3 (5-105). + + Everywhere and nowhere is Supreme, inclination and imminence, vi. + 8.16 (39-801). + + Evil, absolute, goal of degeneration of the soul, i. 8.15 (51-1163). + + Evil, an evil is life without virtue, i. 7.3 (54-1210). + + Evil are doers, who play their parts badly in drama of life, iii. + 2.17 (47-1071). + + Evil as an obstacle to the soul, i. 8.12 (51-1159). + + Evil as infinite and formlessness as itself, i. 8.3 (51-1145). + + Evil cannot be possessed within the soul, i. 8.11 (51-1158). + + Evil constituted by indetermination, success and lack, i. 8.4 + (51-1147). + + Evil creator and world are not, ii. 9 (33-599). + + Evil effects of suicide on soul itself, i. 9 (16-243). + + Evil even is a multitude, vi. 6.1 (34-643). + + Evil external and internal, relation between, i. 8.5 (51-1149). + + Evil, how sense-objects are not, iii. 2.8 (47-1055). + + Evil implied by good, because matter is necessary to the world, i. + 8.7 (51-1152). + + Evil in itself, i. 6.6 (1-49). + + Evil in itself is the primary evil, i. 8.3 (51-1146). + + Evil in the soul, explained by virtue as a harmony, iii. 6.2 (26-352). + + Evil inseparable from good, iii. 3.7 (48-1088). + + Evil is consequence of derivative goods of third rank, i. 8.2 + (51-1144). + + Evil is no one vice in particular, i. 8.5 (51-1148). + + Evil is soul's rushing into region of diversity, i. 8.13 (51-1161). + + Evil is the absence of good in the soul, i. 8.11 (51-1157). + + Evil is weakness of the soul, i. 8.14 (51-1160). + + Evil, its nature depends on that of good, i. 8.2 (51-1143). + + Evil, lower form of good, iii. 2.7 (47-1053); vi. 7.10 (38-716). + + Evil, nature of, i. 8.3 (51-1144). + + Evil, necessary, is lowest degree of being, i. 8.7 (51-1152). + + Evil, neutral, is matter, vi, 7.28 (38-746). + + Evil, none unalloyed for the living people, i. 7.3 (54-1210). + + Evil of the soul, explanation, i. 8.15 (51-1163). + + Evil only figurative and antagonist of good, i. 8.6 (51-1150). + + Evil possesses a lower form of being, i. 8.3 (51-1145). + + Evil primary and secondary defined, i. 8.8 (51-1155). + + Evil, primary and secondary, of soul, i. 8.5 (51-1148). + + Evil primary, is evil in itself, i. 8.3 (51-1146). + + Evil primary is lack of measure, (darkness), i. 8.8 (51-1154). + + Evil secondary, is accidental formlessness (something obscured), i. + 8.8 (51-1155). + + Evil secondary, is matter, i. 8.4 (51-1146). + + Evil triumphed over, in faculties not engaged in matter, i. 8.5 + (51-1149). + + Evil universal and unavoidable, i. 8.6 (51-1150). + + Evil, victory of, accuses Providence, iii. 2.6 (47-1052). + + Evils are necessary to the perfection of the universe, ii. 3.18 + (52-1187). + + Evils even if corporeal, caused by matter, i. 8.8 (51-1153). + + Evil, nature and origin of, i. 8 (51-1142). + + Evils, origin of, i. 1.9 (53-1201). + + Evils, that the sage can support without disturbing happiness, i. 4.7 + (46-1029). + + Evolution impossible (from imperfect to perfect), iv. 7.8 (2-73). + + Examination, for it only are parts of a manifold unity apart, vi. 2.3 + (43-897). + + Examination of self, i, 6.9 (1-54). + + Examination of soul, body must first be dissociated, vi. 3.1 (44-934). + + Excursion down and up, is procession of intelligence, iv. 8.7 (6-131). + + Excursion yields the soul's two duties, body management and + contemplation, iv. 8.7 (6-131). + + Exemption of certain classes from divine care, heartless, ii. 9.16 + (33-631). + + Exile, gnostic idea of, opposed, ii. 9.6 (33-609). + + Existence absolute precedes contingent, vi. 1.26 (42-881). + + Existence, all kinds and grades of, aim at contemplation, iii. 8.6 + (30-538). + + Existence, category, v. 1.4 (10-180). + + Existence, descending, graduations of, iv. 3.17 (27-415). + + Existence, how infinite arrived to it, vi. 6.3 (34-645). + + Existence in intelligible, before application to multiple beings, is + reason, vi. 6.11 (34-659). + + Existence of darkness may be related to the soul ii. 9.12 (33-625). + + Existence of divisible things, iv. 2.1 (21-276). + + Existence of first, necessary. v. 4.1 (7-134). + + Existence of intelligence, proved, v. 9.3 (5-104). + + Existence of manifoldness impossible, without something simple, ii. + 4.3 (12-198). + + Existence of memory alter death, and of heaven, iv. 4.5 (28-447). + + Existence of matter is sure as that of good, i. 8.15 (51-1162). + + Existence of object implies a previous model, vi. 6.10 (34-658). + + Existence of other things not precluded by unity, vi. 4.4 (22-290). + + Existence, primary, will contain thought, existence and life, ii. 4.6 + (12-203); v. 6.6 (24-339). + + Existence real possessed by right thoughts, iii. 5.7 (50-1136). + + Existence sempiternal is eternity, iii. 7.5 (45-993). + + Existence the first being supra-cogitative, does not know itself, v. + 6.6 (24-340). + + Existence thought and life contained in primary existence, v. 6.6 + (24-338). + + Existing animal of Plato differs from intelligence, iii. 9.1 (13-220). + + Experience and action, underlying transmission, reception, and + relation, vi. 1.22 (42-875). + + Experience does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.16 (43-920). + + Experience necessary to souls not strong enough to do without it, iv. + 8.7 (6-131). + + Experience of ecstasy leads to questions, iv. 8.1 (6-119). + + Experience of evil yields knowledge of good, iv. 8.7 (6-131). + + Experiences, sensations are not, but relative actualizations, iv. 6.2 + (41-831). + + Experiment proposed, ii. 9.17 (33-633). + + Expiation is condition of soul in world, iv. 8.5 (6-128). + + Expiations, time of, between incarnations, iii. 4.6 (15-240). + + Extension is merely a sign of participation into the word of life, + vi. 4.13 (22-306). + + Extension, none in beauty or justice, iv. 7.8 (2-69). + + Extension, none in soul or reason, iv. 7.5 (2-63). + + Extensions, soul was capable of, before the existence of the body, + vi. 4.1 (22-285). + + External and internal relation of evil, i. 8.5 (51-1149). + + External circumstances cause wealth, poverty and vice, ii. 3.8 + (52-1174). + + Exuberant fruitfulness of one, (see super-abundance), v. 3.15 + (49-1116). + + Eyes implanted in man by divine foresight, vi. 7.1 (38-697). + + Eyes impure can see nothing, i. 6.9 (1-53). + + Eyes of body, close them, is method to achieve ecstasy, i. 6.8 (1-52). + + + Face to face, vision of God, i. 6.7 (1-50). + + Faces all around the head, simile of, vi. 5.7 (23-320). + + Faculty, reawakening of, is the memory, not an image, iv. 6.3 + (41-833). + + Faith absent in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563). + + Faith in intelligible, how achieved, vi. 9.5 (9-156). + + Faith teaches Providence rules the world, iii. 2.7 (47-1054). + + Fall into generation, due to division into number, iv. 8.4 (6-126). + + Fall into generation may be partial and recovery from, possible, iv. + 4.5 (28-448). + + Fall not voluntary, but punishment of conduct, iv. 8.5 (6-127). + + Fall of the soul as descent into matter, i. 8.14 (51-1161). + + Fall of the soul due to both will and necessity, iv. 8.5 (6-128). + + Fall of the soul due to guilt, (Pythagorean), iv. 8.1 (6-120). + + Fate, according to Stoic Chrysippus, iii. 1.2 (3-89). + + Fate detailed, does not sway stars, iv. 4.31 (28-489). + + Fate, Heraclitian, constituted by action and passion, iii. 1.4 (3-91). + + Fate is unpredictable circumstances, altering life currents, iii. 4.6 + (15-242). + + Fate, mastery of, victory over self, ii. 3.15 (52-1182). + + Fate, may be mastered, ii. 3.15 (52-1182). + + Fate, obeyed by the soul only when evil, iii, 1.10 (3-98). + + Fate of the divisible human soul, iii. 4.6 (15-241). + + Fate of three men in us, is brutalization or divinization. vi. 7.6 + (38-708). + + Fate, possible theories about it, iii. 1.1 (3-86). + + Fate spindle, significance of, ii. 3.9 (52-1171). + + Fate, the Heraclitian principle, iii. 1.2 (3-88). + + Father, v. 1.8 (10-186); v. 5.3 (32-580). + + Father, dwells in heaven, i. 6.8 (1-53). + + Father of intelligence, name of first, v. 8.1 (31-551). + + Fatherland, heaven, i. 6.8 (1-53). + + Faults are reason's failure to dominate matter, v. 9.10 (5-113). + + Faults come not from intelligence, but from the generation process, + v. 9.10 (5-113). + + Faults in the details cannot change harmony in universe, ii. 3.16 + (52-1185). + + Faults of the definition, that eternity is at rest while time is in + motion, iii. 7.1 (45-987). + + Faults of the soul, two possible, motive and deeds, iv. 8.5 (6-128). + + Fear of death, overcoming of, is courage, i. 6.6 (1-49). + + Feast, divinities seated at, meaning, iii. 5.10 (50-1139). + + Feeler, the soul implied by sensation i. 1.6 (53-1198). + + Feeler, who is the, v. 1.1 (53-1191). + + Feeling is perception by use of body, iv. 4.23 (28-475). + + Feelings, modes of passions, i. 1.1 (53-1191). + + Fidelity, kinship to one's own nature, iii. 3.1 (48-1077). + + Field of truth, intelligence evolves over, vi. 7.13 (38-723). + + Figurative expressions, reasoning and foresight are only, vi. 7.1 + (37-699). + + Figure, spherical and intelligible is the primitive one, vi. 6.17 + (34-675). + + Figures have characteristic effects, iv. 4.35 (28-498). + + Figures pre-exist in the intelligible, vi. 6.17 (34-675). + + Fire and air, action of, not needed by heaven, ii. 1.8 (40-826). + + Fire and earth contained in the stars, ii. 1.6 (40-821). + + Fire, and light celestial, nature, ii. 1.7 (40-825). + + Fire contained in intelligible world, vi. 7.11 (38-719). + + Fire image of, latent and radiant, v. 1.3 (10-177). + + Fire, though an apparent exception, conforms to this, ii. 1.3 + (40-817). + + First and other goods, 1.7 (54-1208). + + First does not contain any thing to be known, v. 6.6 (24-339). + + First does not know itself, being supra-cogitative, v. 6.6 (24-339). + + First, existence of, necessary, v. 4.1 (7-134). + + First impossible to go beyond it, vi. 8.11 (39-791). + + First must be one exclusively, making the one supra-thinking, v. 6.3 + (24-340). + + First principle has no need of seeing itself, v. 3.10 (49-1106). + + First principle has no principle, vi. 7.37 (38-762). + + First principle has no thought, the first actualization of a + hypostasis, vi. 7.40 (38-766). + + First principle is above thought, v. 6.26 (24-338). + + First principle may not even be said to exist, is super-existence, + vi. 7.38 (38-763). + + Fit itself, the soul must to its part in the skein, iii. 2.17 + (47-1072). + + Fit yourself and understand the world, instead of complaining of it, + ii. 9.13 (33-625). + + Five physical categories of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 (44-937). + + Five Plotinic categories, why none more can be added, vi. 2.9 + (43-907). + + Fleeing from intelligence, rather than intelligence from soul, v. + 5.10 (32-591). + + Flight from evil, not by locality but virtue, i. 8.7 (51-1152). + + Flight from here below, i. 2.6 (51-1150); ii. 3.9 (52-1175); i. 6.8 + (1-52); iv. 8.5 (6-128). + + Flight from here below, if prompt, leaves soul unharmed, iv. 8.5 + (6-128). + + Flight from world is assimilation to divinity, i. 2.5 (19-263). + + Flight is simplification or detachment of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170). + + Fluctuation need not interfere with continuance, ii. 1.3 (40-816). + + Flux, heaven though in, perpetuates itself by form, ii. 1.1 (40-813). + + Flux of all beauties here below, vi. 7.31 (38-751). + + Followers of the king are universal stars, ii. 3.13 (52-1179). + + Foreign accretion is ugliness, i. 6.5 (1-48). + + Foreign sources, derived from modification, i. 1.9 (53-1202). + + Foreknowledge of physician like plans of Providence, iii. 3.5 + (48-1085). + + Foresight and reasoning are only figurative expressions, vi. 7.1 + (38-699). + + Foresight by God of misfortunes, not cause of senses in man, vi. 7.1 + (38-697). + + Foresight, eyes implanted in man by it, vi. 7.1 (38-697). + + Foresight of creation, not result of reason, vi. 7.1 (38-698). + + Form and light, two methods of sight, v. 5.7 (32-586). + + Form and matter in all things, iv. 7.1 (2-56). + + Form and matter intermediary between, is sense-object, iii. 6.17 + (26-381). + + Form as model, for producing principle, v. 8.7 (31-562). + + Form being unchangeable, so is matter, iii. 6.10 (26-368). + + Form difference of matter, due to that of their intelligible sources, + vi. 3.8 (44-946). + + Form, disappearance of, implies that of size, ii. 8.2 (35-682). + + Form exterior is the overshadowed, inactive parts of the soul, iii. + 4.2 (15-235). + + Form improves matter, vi. 7.28 (38-745). + + Form in itself, none in the good, vi. 7.28 (38-746). + + Form is not quality but a reason, ii. 6.2 (17-248). + + Form is second physical category of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 (44-937). + + Form is the dream of the good, vi. 7.28 (38-745). + + Form of a thing is its good, vi. 7.27 (38-744). + + Form of a thing is its whyness, vi. 7.2 (38-702). + + Form of forms, vi. 7.17 (38-731). + + Form of good borne by life, intelligence and idea, vi. 7.2 (38-732). + + Form of good may exist at varying degrees, vi. 7.2 (38-732). + + Form of the body is the soul, iv. 7.1, 2 (2-57). + + Form of unity, is principle of numbers, v. 5.5 (32-583). + + Form of universe, as soul is, would be matter, if a primary + principle, iii. 6.18 (26-382). + + Form only in the sense-world, proceeds from intelligence, v. 9.10 + (5-113). + + Form substantial, the soul must be as she is not simple matter, iv. + 7.4 (2-61). + + Former lives cause present character, iii. 3.4 (48-1083). + + Formless shape is absolute beauty, vi. 7.33 (38-754). + + Formlessness in itself and infinite is evil, i. 8.3 (51-1145). + + Formlessness of one, v. 5.6 (32-584). + + Formlessness of the Supreme shown by approaching soul's rejection of + form, vi. 7.34 (38-756). + + Forms of governments, various, soul resembles, iv. 4.17 (28-464). + + Forms rational sense and vegetative, iii. 4.2 (15-234). + + Forms, though last degree of existence, are faint images, v. 3.7 + (49-1102). + + Fortune, changes of, affect only the outer man, iii. 2.15 (47-1067). + + Freedom, for the soul, lies in following reason, iii. 1.9 (3-97). + + Freedom of will, and virtue, are independent of actions, vi. 8.5 + (39-775). + + Freedom of will, on which psychological faculty is it based? vi. 8.2 + (39-775). + + Friends of Plotinos, formerly gnostic, ii. 9.10 (33-620). + + Functions, if not localized, soul will not seem within us, iv. 3.20 + (27-419). + + Functions, none in the first principle, vi. 7.37 (38-762). + + Fund of memory, partitioned between both souls, iv. 3.31 (27-439). + + Fusion forms body and soul, iv. 4.18 (28-465). + + Fusion with the divinity, result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569). + + Future determined, according to prediction, iii. 1.3 (3-90). + + Future necessary to begotten things not to the intelligible, iii. 7.3 + (45-990). + + + Gad-fly, love is, iii. 5.7 (50-1134). + + Galli, iii. 6.19 (26-385). + + Garden of Jupiter is the reason that begets everything, iii. 5.9 + (50-1137). + + Garden of Jupiter, meaning of, iii. 5.10 (50-1138). + + Genera and individuals are distinct, as being actualizations, vi. 2.2 + (43-894). + + Genera exist both in subordinate objects, and in themselves, vi. 2.12 + (43-915). + + Genera, first two, are being and movement, vi. 2.7 (43-902). + + Genera of essence decided about by "one and many" puzzle, vi. 2.4 + (43-898). + + Genera of the physical are different from those of the intelligible, + vi. 3.1 (44-933). + + Genera, Plotinic five, are primary because nothing can be affirmed of + them, vi. 2.9 (43-906). + + General, simile of Providence, iii. 3.2 (48-1078). + + Generation, common element with growth and increase, vi. 3.22 + (44-975). + + Generation eternal, iv. 8.4 (6-127); vi. 7.3 (38-703); vi. 8.20 + (39-809). + + Generation falling into, causes trouble, iii. 4.6 (15-241). + + Generation in the sense-world, is what being is in the intelligible, + vi. 3.2 (44-935). + + Generation is like lighting fire from refraction, iii. 6.14 (26-376). + + Generation is radiation of an image, v. 1.6 (10-182). + + Generation of everything is regulated by a number, vi. 6.15 (34-670). + + Generation of matter, consequences of anterior principles, iv. 4.16 + (28-461). + + Generation of the ungenerated, iii. 5.10 (50-1138). + + Generation, from the good, is intelligence, v. 1.8 (10-186). + + Generation's eternal residence is matter, iii. 6.13 (26-373). + + Generatively, all things contained by intelligence, v. 9.6 (5-109). + + Gentleness, sign of naturalness as of health and unconsciousness of + ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Genus, another, is stability, vi. 2.7 (43-903). + + Genus divides in certain animals, iv. 7.5 (2-63). + + Genus, there is more than one, vi. 2.2 (43-895) + + Geometry, an intelligible art, v. 9.11 (5-115). + + Geometry studies quantities, not qualities, vi. 3.15 (44-958). + + Giving without loss (a Numenian idea), vi. 9.9 (9-165). + + Gluttonous people who gorge themselves at the ceremonies and leave + without mysteries, v. 5.1 (32-592). + + Gnostic planning of the world by God, refuted, v. 8.7, 12 (31-561, + 572). + + God cannot be responsible for our ills, iv. 4.39 (28-503). + + God not remembered by world-soul continuing to be seen, iv. 4.7 + (28-449). + + God's planning of the world (gnosticism) refuted, v. 8.7 (31-561). + + God relation with individual and soul, i. 1.8 (53-1200). + + Golden face of Justice, i. 6.4 (1-45). + + Good absolute, permanence chief characteristic, i. 7.1 (54-1209). + + Good, all things depend on by unity, essence and quality, i. 7.1 + (54-1209). + + Good and beauty identical, i. 6.6 (1-50). + + Good and one, vi. 9 (9-147). + + Good as consisting in intelligence, i. 4.3 (46-1024). + + Good, as everything tends toward it, it tends toward the one, vi. + 2.12 (43-914). + + Good, as supra-cogitative, is also supra-active, v. 6.6 (24-340). + + Good as supreme, neither needs nor possesses intellection, iii. 8.10 + (30-548). + + Good cannot be a desire of the soul, vi. 7.19 (38-734). + + Good cannot be pleasure, which is changeable and restless, vi. 7.27 + (38-754). + + Good consists in illumination by the Supreme, vi. 7.22 (38-737). + + Good contains no thought, vi. 7.40 (38-766). + + Good does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-922). + + Good, even if it thought, there would be need of something superior, + vi. 7.40 (38-767). + + Good, form of, borne by life, intelligence and idea, vi. 7.18 + (38-731). + + Good for the individual is illumination, vi. 7.24 (38-740). + + Good has no need of beauty, while beauty has of the good, v. 5.12 + (32-594). + + Good, if it is a genus, must be one of the posterior ones, vi. 2.17 + (43-921). + + Good, implied by scorn of life, vi. 7.29 (38-748). + + Good implies evil because matter is necessary to the world, i. 8.7 + (51-1152). + + Good, in what does it consist, iv. 1. + + Good, inseparable from evil, iii. 3.7 (48-1088). + + Good, intelligence and soul, are like light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 + (24-337). + + Good is a nature that possesses no kind of form in itself, vi. 7.28 + (38-746). + + Good is a simple perception of itself; a touch, vi. 7.39 (38-764). + + Good is creator and preserver, vi. 7.23 (38-740). + + Good is free, but not merely by chance, vi. 8.7 (39-783). + + Good is not for itself, but for the natures below it, vi. 7.41 + (38-769). + + Good is intelligence and primary life, vi. 7.21 (38-737). + + Good, is it a common label or a common quality? vi. 7.18 (38-733). + + Good is not only cause, but intuition of being, vi. 7.16 (38-728). + + Good is such, just because it has no attributes worthy of it, v. 5.13 + (32-595). + + Good is superior to all its possessions, as result of its being + supreme, v. 5.12 (32-595). + + Good is superior to beautiful and is cognized by mind, v. 5.12 + (32-594). + + Good is super-thinking, v. 6.5 (24-338). + + Good is super-thought, iii. 9.9 (13-225). + + Good is supreme, because of its supremacy, vi. 7.23 (38-739). + + Good is desirable in itself, vi. 8.8 (39-783). + + Good is the whole, though containing evil parts, iii. 2.17 (47-1070). + + Good is lower form of evil, iii. 2.7 (47-1053). + + Good leaves the soul serene, beauty troubles it, v. 5.12 (32-594). + + Good may accompany the pleasure, but it is independent of it, vi. + 7.27 (38-745). + + Good may neglect natural laws that carry revolts, iii, 2.9 (47-1057). + + Good, multitude of ideas of, vi. 7 (38-697). + + Good must be superior to intelligence and life, v. 3.16 (49-1117). + + Good not to be explained by Aristotelian intelligence, vi. 7.20 + (38-736). + + Good not to be explained by Pythagorean oppositions, vi. 7.20 + (38-735). + + Good not to be explained by Stoic characteristic virtue, vi. 7.20 + (38-736). + + Good of a thing is its intimacy with itself, vi. 7.27 (38-744). + + Good only antagonistic and figurative of evil, i. 8.6 (51-1150). + + Good, Platonic discussed, vi. 7.25 (38-741). + + Good related to intelligence and soul as light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 + (24-337). + + Good, self-sufficient, does not need self consciousness, vi. 7.38 + (38-763). + + Good, slavery of, accuses Providence, iii. 2.6 (47-1052). + + Good, study, vi. 7.15 sqq., (38-726). + + Good superior to beauty, i. 6.9 (1-55). + + Good supreme, Aristotelian, vi. 7.25 (38-742). + + Good the first and other goods, i. 7 (54-1208). + + Good, therefore also supra-active, v. 6.5 (24-338). + + Good, true, implies counterfeit, vi. 7.26 (38-743). + + Goods, all, can be described as a form, i. 8.1 (51-1142); i. 6.2 + (1-43). + + Goods, independence from pleasure is temperate man, vi. 7.29 (38-747). + + Goods of three ranks, i. 8.2 (51-1144). + + Goods, Plato's opinion interpreted in two ways, vi. 7.30 (38-749). + + Goods, supreme as end of all other ones, i. 7.1 (54-1208). + + Gorge with food, v. 5.11 (32-592). + + Governing principle, Stoic, iii. 1.2, 4 (3-89, 91). + + Governments, soul resembles all forms of, iv. 4.17 (28-464). + + Gradations, descending of existence, iv. 3.7 (27-415). + + Grades of thought and life, iii. 8.7 (30-540). + + Grand Father supreme, v. 5.3 (32-581). + + Grasp more perfect, increases happiness, i. 5.3 (36-685). + + Gravitation, iv. 5.2 (29-517). + + Greatness of soul, nothing to do with size of body, vi. 4.5 (22-293). + + Grotto, Empedoclean simile of world, iv. 8.1 (6-120). + + Group, v. 5.4 (32-581). + + Group unites, all lower, adjusted to supreme unity, vi. 6.11 (34-660). + + Groups-of-four, or tens, Pythagorean, vi. 6.5 (34-649). + + Growth, common elements with increase and generation, vi. 3.22 + (44-975). + + Growth, localized in liver, iv. 3.23 (27-426). + + Growth power, relation of to the desire function, iv. 4.22 (28-470). + + Growth, sense and emotions, tend towards divisibility, iv. 3.19 + (27-418). + + Growth-soul derived from world-soul, not ours, iv. 9.3 (8-143). + + Guidance of Daemon does not interfere with responsibility, iii. 4.5 + (15-238). + + Guilt cause of fall of souls, (Pythagorean), iv. 8.1 (6-120). + + Guilt not incurred by soul in toleration, iii. 1.8 (3-97). + + Gymnastics, v. 9.11 (5-114). + + + Habit intellectualizing, that liberates the soul, is virtue, vi. 8.5 + (39-780). + + Habit, Stoic, ii. 4.16 (12-218); iv. 7.8 (2-73). + + Habit, Stoic, as start of evolution to soul, impossible, iv. 7.8 + (2-73). + + Habituation, ii. 5.2 (25-345). + + Habituation, active, immediate, and remote, distinction between, vi. + 1.8 (42-849), + + Habituation or substantial act is hypostasis, vi. 1.6 (42-845). + + Habituation, Stoic, must be posterior to reasons as archetypes, v. + 9.5 (5-108). + + Habituations are reasons which participate in form, vi. 1.9 (42-850). + + Hades, chastisements, i. 7.3 (54-1210). + + Hades, what it means for the career of the soul, vi. 4.16 (22-312). + + Happiness according to Aristotle, i. 4.1 (46-1019). + + Happiness as sensation, does not hinder search for higher, i. 4.2 + (1021). + + Happiness defined, i. 4.1, 3 (46-1019, 1023). + + Happiness dependent upon interior characteristics, i. 4.3 (46-1023). + + Happiness, does it increase with duration of time? 1.5 (36-684). + + Happiness has nothing to do with duration, i. 5.1, 5 (36-684, 685). + + Happiness has nothing to do with pleasure, i. 5.4 (36-685). + + Happiness in goal of each part of their natures, i. 4.5 (46-1026). + + Happiness increased would result only from more grasp, i. 5.3 + (36-685). + + Happiness is actualized wisdom, i. 4.9 (46-1033). + + Happiness is desiring nothing further, i. 4.4 (46-1026). + + Happiness is human (must be something), i. 4.4 (46-1025). + + Happiness is not the satisfaction of desire to live, i. 5.2 (36-684). + + Happiness, lack of blame on a soul that does not deserve it, iii. 2.5 + (47-1050). + + Happiness not increased by memories of the past, i. 5.9 (36-689). + + Happiness of animals, i. 4.2 (46-1020). + + Happiness of plants, i. 4.1 (46-1019). + + Happiness of sage not diminished in adversity, i. 4.4 (46-1026). + + Happiness, one should not consider oneself alone capable of achieving + it, ii. 9.10 (33-619). + + Harm, none can happen to the good, iii. 2.6 (47-1051). + + Harmony as a single universe, ii. 3.5 (52-1170). + + Harmony cannot be reproduced from badly tuned lyre, ii. 3.13 + (52-1180). + + Harmony is universe in spite of the faults in the details, ii. 3.16 + (52-1185). + + Harmony posterior to body, iv. 7.8 (2-74). + + Harmony presupposes producing soul, iv. 7.8 (2-75). + + Harmony (Pythagorean), soul is not, iv. 7.8 (2-74). + + Harmony sympathetic, earth feels and directs by it, iv. 4.26 (28-477). + + Hate of the body by Plato, supplemented by admiration of the world, + ii. 9.17 (33-633). + + Hate, virtue is a, iii. 6.2 (26-352). + + Having as Aristotelian category, vi. 1.23 (42-876). + + Having is too indefinite and various to be a category, vi. 1.23 + (42-876). + + Head, seat of reason, iv. 3.23 (27-425). + + Head, with faces all round, simile of, vi. 5.7 (23-320). + + Health is tempermanent of corporeal principles, iv. 7.8 (2-71). + + Hearing and vision, process of, iv. 5 (29-514). + + Heart, seat of anger, iv. 3.23 (27-426). + + Heaven, ii. 1 (40-813). + + Heaven, according to Heraclitus, opposed, ii. 1.2 (40-815). + + Heaven, existence of, iv. 4.45 (28-512). + + Heaven needs not the action of air or fire, ii. 1.8 (40-826). + + Heaven possesses soul and body and supports Plotinos's view, ii. 1.2 + (40-815). + + Heaven, souls first go into it in intelligible, iv. 3.17 (27-415). + + Heaven, there must inevitably be change, ii. 1.1 (40-813). + + Heaven, though influx perpetuates itself by form, ii. 1.1 (40-813). + + Heavens after death, is star harmonizing with their predominant moral + power, iii. 4.6 (15-239). + + Heavens do not remain still, ii. 1.1 (40-814). + + Heaven's immortality also due to universal soul's spontaneous motion, + ii. 1.4 (40-818). + + Heaven's immortality due to its residence, ii. 1.4 (40-817). + + Heaven's immortality proved by having no beginning, ii. 1.4 (40-819). + + Helen, iii. 3.5 (48-1085). + + Helena's beauty, whence it came, v. 8.2 (31-553). + + Hell, descent into, by souls, i. 8.13 (51-1160). + + Hell in mystery teachings, i. 6.6 (1-49). + + Hell, what it means for the career of the soul, vi. 4.16 (22-312). + + Hells, Platonic interincarnational judgment and expiation, iii. 4.6 + (15-240). + + Hell's torments are reformatory, iv. 4.45 (28-512). + + Help for sub-divine natures is thought, vi. 7.41 (38-768). + + Help from divinity, sought to solve difficulties, v. 1.6 (10-182). + + Heraclidae, vi. 1.3 (42-840). + + Hercules as double, symbolizes soul, i. 1.13 (53-1206). + + Hercules, symbol of man, in the hells, i. 1.12 (53-1206); iv. 3.27, + 31 (27-433, 440). + + Heredity a legitimate cause, iii. 1.6 (3-94). + + Heredity more important than star influence, iii. 1.6 (3-94). + + Hermaphrodite, or castrated, iii. 6.19 (26-385); v. 8.13 (31-573). + + Hermes, ithyphallic, iii. 6.19 (26-385). + + Hierarchy in universe (see concatenation), v. 4.1 (7-135). + + "Higher," or "somewhat," a particle that is prefixed to any Statement + about the Supreme, vi. 8.13 (39-797). + + Higher part of soul sees vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 + (31-569). + + Higher region, reached only by born philosophers, v. 9.2 (5-103). + + Higher stages of love, v. 9.2 (5-103). + + Higher things from them the lower proceed, i. 8.1 (51-1142). + + Highest, by it souls are united, vi 7.15 (38-726). + + Highest self of soul is memory's basis, iv. 6.3 (41-832). + + Homely virtues are the civil, Platonic four, i. 2.1 (19-257). + + "Homonyms," or "labels," see references to puns; also, vi. 1.2, 10, + 11, 23, 26; vi. 2.10; vi. 3.1, 5. + + Honesty escapes magic, iv. 4.44 (28-509). + + Honesty results from contemplation of the intelligible, iv. 4.44 + (28-509). + + Horizon of divine approach is contemplating intelligence, v. 5.8 + (32-586); v. 8.10 (31-567). + + Horoscopes do not account for simultaneous differences, iii. 1.5 + (3-93). + + Houses and aspects, absurdity of, ii. 3.4 (52-1168). + + How to detach the soul from the body naturally, 1.9 (16-243). + + Human beings add to the beauty of the world, iv. 3.14 (27-412). + + Human life contains happiness, i. 4.4 (46-1025). + + Human nature intermediate, iv. 4.45 (28-511). + + Human nature relation to animal, i. 1.7 (53-1199). + + Human organism studied to explain soul relation, iv. 3.3 (27-393). + + Human soul and world-soul differences between, ii. 9.7 (33-611). + + Hypostases that transmit knowledge (see the new title), v. 3 + (49-1090). + + Hypostasis, v. 1.4, 6 (10-180 to 184). + + Hypostasis are permanent actualizations, v. 3.12 (49-1111). + + Hypostasis as substantial act, iii. 4.1 (15-233). + + Hypostasis is a substantial act or habituation, vi. 1.6 (42-845). + + Hypostasis not in loves contrary to nature, iii. 5.7 (50-1134). + + Hypostasis of love, iii. 5.2, 3, 7 (50-1125, 1127, 1133). + + Hypostasis of ousia, v. 5.3 (32-581). + + Hypostasis the first actualization of first principle has no thought, + vi. 7.40 (38-766). + + Hypostatic existence, vi. 6.9, 12 (34-655, 661); vi. 8.10, 12 + (39-790, 793). + + Hypostatic existence of matter proved, i. 8.15 (51-1162); ii. 4 + (12-197). + + + Idea named existence and intelligence, v. 1.8 (10-186). + + Ideas and numbers, identification of, vi. 6.9 (34-656). + + Ideas, descent of, into individuals, vi. 5.6 (23-320). + + Ideas, different, for twins, brothers or work of art, v. 7.1 (18-252). + + Ideas imply form and substrate, ii. 4.4 (12-199). + + Ideas, intelligence and essence, v. 9 (5-102). + + Ideas, multitude of, of the good, vi. 7 (38-697). + + Ideas not for all earthly entities, v. 9.14 (5-117). + + Ideas of individuals, do they exist v. 7.1 (18-251). + + Ideas of individuals, two possible hypotheses, v. 7.1 (18-251). + + Ideas or reasons possessed by intellectual life, vi. 2.21 (43-927). + + Ideas participated in by matter, vi. 5.8 (23-321). + + Identification, unreflective, memory not as high, iv. 4.4 (28-445). + + Identity and difference implied by triune process of categories, vi. + 2.8 (43-905). + + Identity, category, v. 1.4 (10-180). + + Identity of thought and existence makes actualizations of + intelligence, v. 9.5 (5-107). + + Identity, substantial, inconsistent with logical distinctness, ii. + 4.14 (12-214). + + Ignorance of divinity, v. 1.1 (10-173). + + Ignorance illusory because overnatural gentleness, v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Ignores everything, does God, being above thought, vi. 7.38 (38-763). + + Illumination, creation by mere gnostic, opposed, ii. 9.11 (33-622). + + Illumination of darkness must have been eternal, ii. 9.12 (33-624). + + Illumination, the good is, for the individual, vi. 7.24 (38-740). + + Illustrations, see "Simile." + + Image, v. 5.1 (10-174); v. 8.8 (31-564). + + Image bound to model by radiation, vi. 4.10 (22-300). + + Image formed by the universal beings, is magnitude, iii. 6.17 + (26-380). + + Image in mirror, iv. 5.7 (29-528). + + Image of archetype is Jupiter, begotten by ecstasy, v. 8.12 (31-572). + + Image of intelligence is only a sample that must be purified, v. 3.3 + (31-555). + + Image of its model eternity is time, iii. 1, introd. (45-985). + + Image of one intelligence, v. 1.7 (10-184). + + Images do not reach eye by influx, iv. 5.2 (29-516). + + Images external produce passions, iii. 6.5 (26-358). + + Imagination, iv. 3.25 (27-428). + + Imagination, both kinds, implied by both kinds of memory, iv. 3.31 + (27-483). + + Imagination does not entirely preserve intellectual conceptions, iv. + 3.30 (27-437). + + Imagination is related to opinion, as matter to reason, iii. 6.15 + (26-377). + + Imagination, memory belongs to it, iv. 3.29 (27-436). + + Imagination, of the two, one always overshadows the other, iv. 3.3 + (27-438). + + Imitation of the first, v. 4.1 (7-135). + + Immaterial natures could not be affected, iii. 6.2 (26-354). + + Immanence and inclination is the Supreme, vi. 8.16 (39-801). + + Immortal, are we, all of us, or only parts? iv. 7.1 (2-56). + + Immortal as the One from whom they proceed, are souls, vi. 4.10 + (22-301). + + Immortal soul, even on Stoic hypothesis, iv. 7.10 (2-80). + + Immortality does not extend to sublunar sphere, ii. 1.5. + + Immortality in souls of animals and plants, iv. 7.14 (2-84). + + Immortality of heaven also due to universal soul's spontaneous + motion, ii. 1.4 (40-818). + + Immortality of heaven due to its residence there, ii. 1.4 (40-817). + + Immortality of heaven proved by having no beginning, ii. 1.4 (40-819). + + Immortality of soul, iv. 7 (2-56). + + Immortality of soul proved historically, iv. 7.15 (2-85). + + Immovability of Intelligence necessary to make it act as horizon, v. + 5.7 (32-586). + + Impassible, and punishable, soul is both, i. 1.12 (53-1204). + + Impassible are world soul and stars, iv. 4.42 (28-506). + + Impassible as the soul is, everything contrary is figurative, iii. + 6.1 (26-351). + + Impassible, how can the soul remain, though given up to emotion, iii. + 6.1 (26-351). + + Impassibility of incorporeal entities, iii. 6.1 (26-351). + + Impassibility of matter depends on different senses of participation, + iii. 6.9 (26-366). + + Impassibility of the soul, iii. 6.1 (26-350). + + Imperfection, cause of distance from the Supreme, iii. 3.3 (48-1080). + + Imperfections are only lower forms of perfections, vi. 7.10 (38-716). + + Imperfections of world should not be blamed on it, iii. 2.3 (47-1046). + + Imperishable is world, so long as archetype subsists, v. 8.12 + (31-572). + + Imperishable, no way the soul could perish, iv. 7.12 (2-82). + + Imperishable soul, even by infinite division, iv. 7.12 (2-83). + + Importance to virtue, not, duration of time, i. 5.10 (36-689). + + Impossible to go beyond First, vi. 8.11 (39-791). + + Impression admits no cognition of intelligible objects, iv. 6.3 + (41-832). + + Impressions on seal of wax, sensations, iv. 7.6 (2-66). + + Improvement of the low, destiny to become souls, iv. 8.7 (6-131). + + Improvement of what is below her, one object of incarnation, iv. 8.5 + (6-128). + + Impure eye can see nothing, i. 6.9 (1-53). + + Inadequacy of philosophical language, vi. 8.13 (39-797). + + Inanimate entirely, nothing in universe is, iv. 4.36 (28-499). + + Incarnation, difference between human and cosmic, iv. 8.3 (6-123). + + Incarnation of soul; its object is perfection of universe, iv. 8.5 + (6-129). + + Incarnation of soul manner, iii. 9.3 (13-222). + + Incarnation of soul not cause of possessing memory, iv. 3.26 (27-431). + + Incarnation, study of, iv. 3.9 (27-403). + + Incarnation unlikely, unless souls have disposition to suffer, ii. + 3.10 (52-1177). + + Incarnations, between, hell's judgment and expiation, iii. 4.6 + (15-240). + + Incarnation's purpose is, self-development and improvement, iv. 8.5 + (6-127). + + Inclination and immanence is the Supreme, vi. 8.16 (39-801). + + Inclination of equator to ecliptic, v. 8.7 (31-563). + + Incomprehensible unity approached only by a presence, vi. 9.4 (9-154). + + Incorporeal entities alone activate body, iv. 7.8 (2-70). + + Incorporeal entities, impossibility of, iii. 6.1 (26-350). + + Incorporeal matter, ii. 4.2 (12-198). + + Incorporeal objects limited to highest thoughts, iv. 7.8 (2-78). + + Incorporeal, the soul remains, vi. 3.16 (44-962). + + Incorporeal qualities, ii. 7.2 (37-695); vi. 1.29 (42-885). + + Incorporeality of divinity, vi. 1.26 (42-880). + + Incorporeality of intelligible entities, iv. 7.8 (2-78). + + Incorporeality of matter and quantity, ii. 4.9 (12-206). + + Incorporeality of soul must be studied, iv. 7.2, 8 (2-57, 68). + + Incorporeality of soul proved by its penetrating body, iv. 7.8 (2-72). + + Incorporeality of soul proved by kinship with Divine, iv. 7.10 (2-79). + + Incorporeality of soul proved by priority of actualization, iv. 7.8 + (2-71). + + Incorporeality of virtue, not perishable, iv. 7.8 (2-69). + + Incorruptible matter exists only potentially, ii. 5.5 (25-348). + + Increase, common element, with growth and generation, vi. 3.22 + (44-975). + + Increased happiness would result only from more grasp, i. 5.3 + (36-685). + + Independent existence proved, by the use of collective nouns, vi. + 6.16 (34-672). + + Independent good from pleasure is temperate man, vi. 7.29 (38-747). + + Independent principle, the human soul, iii. 1.8 (3-97). + + Indeterminateness of soul not yet reached the good, iii. 5.7 + (50-1133). + + Indetermination of space leads to its measuring movement, iii. 7.12 + (45-1011). + + Indigence is necessarily evil, ii. 4.16 (12-218). + + Indigence of soul from connection with matter, i. 8.14 (51-1160). + + Indiscernibles, Leitnitz's doctrine of, v. 7.1 (18-254). + + Individual aggregate formed by uniting soul and body, i. 1.6 + (53-1197). + + Individual relation with cosmic intellect, i. 1.8 (53-1200). + + Individual relation with God and soul, i. 1.8 (53-1200). + + Individuality in contemplation weakens soul, iv. 8.4 (6-125). + + Individuality possessed by rational soul, iv. 8.3 (6-124). + + Individuality, to which soul does it belong? ii. 3.9 (52-1175). + + Individuals, descent of ideas into, vi. 5.6 (23-320). + + Individuals distinct as being actualizations, vi. 2.2, (43-894). + + Indivisible, v. 3.10 (49-1107). + + Indivisible and divisible is the soul, iv. 2.2 (21-279). + + Indivisible essence becomes divisible within bodies, iv. 2.1 (21-277). + + Indivisible essence, description of, iv. 2.1 (21-277). + + Indivisible is the universal being, vi. 4.3 (22-288). + + Indivisibility, v. 1.7 (10-184). + + Indumeneus, iii. 3.5 (48-1085). + + Ineffable is the Supreme, v. 3.13 (49-1112). + + Inequality of riches, no moment to an eternal being, ii. 9.9 (33-616). + + Inertia of matter aired by influx of world soul, v. 1.2 (10-175). + + Inexhaustible are stars, and need no refreshment, ii. 1.8 (40-827). + + Inferior divinities, difference from celestial, v. 8.3 (31-556). + + Inferior nature, how it can participate in the intelligible, vi. 5.11 + (23-329). + + Inferior natures are helped by souls descending to them, iv. 8.5 + (6-127). + + Inferiority of world to its model, highest criticism we may pass, v. + 8.8 (31-565). + + Influence of stars is their natural radiation of good, iv. 4.3 + (28-497). + + Influence of universe should be partial only, iv. 4.34 (28-494). + + Influx movement as, vi. 3.26 (44-980). + + Influx of world-soul, v. 1.2 (10-175). + + Infinite and formlessness in itself is evil, i. 8.3, (51-1145). + + Infinite contained by intelligence as simultaneous of one and many, + vi. 7.14 (38-725). + + Infinite explained as God entirely present everywhere, vi. 5.4 + (23-318). + + Infinite, how a number can be said to be, vi. 6.16 (34-673). + + Infinite, how it arrived to existence, vi. 6.2, 3 (34-644, 645). + + Infinite is conceived by the thoughts making abstraction of the firm, + vi. 6.3 (34-646). + + Infinite is soul, as comprising many souls, vi. 4.4 (22-291). + + Infinite may be ideal or real, ii. 4.15 (12-217). + + Infinite, what is its number, vi. 6.2 (34-644). + + Infinity, how it can subsist in the intelligible world, vi. 6.2 + (34-645). + + Infinity of number, due to impossibility of increasing the greatest, + vs. 6.18 (34-676). + + Infinity of parts of the Supreme, v. 8.9 (31-566). + + Infra-celestial vault of Theodore of Asine ("invisible place") v. + 8.10 (31-567); ii. 4.1 (12-198). + + Inhering in Supreme, is root of power of divinities, v. 8.9 (31-566). + + Initiative should not be overshadowed by Providence, iii. 2.9 + (47-1057). + + Insanity even, does not justify suicide, i. 9 (16). + + Inseparable from their beings are potentialities, vi. 4.9 (22-298). + + Instances of correspondence of sense beauty with its idea, i. 6.3 + (1-44). + + Instrument of soul is body, iv. 7.1 (2-56). + + Intellect, cosmic relation with individual, i. 1.8 (53-1200). + + Intellect did not grasp object itself, i. 1.9 (53-1201). + + Intellection neither needed nor possessed by good, iii. 8.11 (30-549). + + Intellection would be movement or actualization on Aristotelian + principles, vi. 1.18 (42-867). + + Intellectual differences between world-soul and star-soul, iv. 4.17 + (28-463). + + Intellectualized, and ennobled is soul, scorning even thought, vi. + 7.35 (38-757). + + Intellectualizing habit that liberates the soul is virtue, vi. 8.5 + (39-780). + + Intellectual life possesses the reasons or ideas, vi. 2.21 (43-927). + + Intelligence, always double as thinking subject and object thought, + v. 3.5, 6 (49-1096); v. 4.2 (7-136); v. 6.1 (24-334). + + Intelligence and life mus be transcended by good, v. 3.16 (49-1117). + + Intelligence and life only different degrees of the same reality, vi. + 7.18 (38-732). + + Intelligence and soul contained in intelligible world, besides ideas, + v. 9.13 (5-116). + + Intelligence as a composite, is posterior to the categories, vi. 2.19 + (43-924). + + Intelligence as demiurgic creator, v. 1.8 (10-186). + + Intelligence as matter of intelligible entities, v. 4.2 (7-136). + + Intelligence as vision of one, v. 1.7 (10-185). + + Intelligence assisting Supreme, has no room for chance, vi. 8.17 + (39-804). + + Intelligence begets world-souls and individual souls, vi. 2.22 + (43-929). + + Intelligence cannot be first, v. 4.1 (7-135). + + Intelligence category, v. 1.4 (10-180). + + Intelligence conceived of by stripping the soul of every + non-intellectual part, v. 3.9 (49-1104). + + Intelligence consists of intelligence and love, vi. 7.35 (38-758). + + Intelligence contains all beings, generatively, v. 9.6 (5-109). + + Intelligence contains all intelligible entities, by its very notion, + v. 5.2 (32-578). + + Intelligence contains all things conformed to the good, vi. 7.16 + (38-727). + + Intelligence contains the infinite as friendship, vi. 7.14 (38-725). + + Intelligence contains the infinite as simultaneous of one and many, + vi. 7.14 (38-725). + + Intelligence contains the universal archetype, v. 9.9 (5-112). + + Intelligence contains the whyness of its forms, vi. 7.2 (38-732). + + Intelligence contemplating, is horizon of divine approach, v. 5.7 + (32-586). + + Intelligence could not have been the last degree of existence, ii. + 9.8 (33-614). + + Intelligence destroyed by theory that truth is external to it, v. 5.1 + (32-576). + + Intelligence develops manifoldness just like soul, iv. 3.5 (27-396). + + Intelligence did not deliberate before making sense-man, vi. 7.1 + (38-698). + + Intelligence differentiated into universal and individual, vi. 7.17 + (38-729). + + Intelligence, divine nature of, i. 8.2 (51-1143). + + Intelligence does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-921). + + Intelligence dwelt in by pure incorporeal souls, iv. 3.24 (27-427). + + Intelligence evolves over the field of truth, vi. 7.13 (38-723). + + Intelligence, good and soul related by light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 + (24-337). + + Intelligence has conversion to good and being in itself, vi. 8.4 + (39-778). + + Intelligence, how it makes the world subsist, iii. 2.1 (47-1043). + + Intelligence, how though one, produces particular things, vi. 2.21 + (43-926). + + Intelligence, ideas and essence, v. 9 (5-102). + + Intelligence identical with thought, as far as existence, v. 3.5 + (49-1096). + + Intelligence, image of one, v. 1.7 (10-185). + + Intelligence implies aspiration, as thought is aspiration to the + good, iii. 8.11 (30-548). + + Intelligence implies good, as thought is aspiration thereto, v. 6.5 + (24-338). + + Intelligence in actualization, because its thought is identical with + its essence, v. 9.5 (5-107). + + Intelligence in relation to good. i. 4.3 (46-1024). + + Intelligence is all, vi. 7.17 (38-729). + + Intelligence is goal of purification, i. 2.5 (19-263). + + Intelligence is matter of intelligible entities, v. 4.2 (7-136). + + Intelligence is the potentiality of the intelligences which are its + actualizations, vi. 2.20 (43-925). + + Intelligence itself is the substrate of the intelligible world, ii. + 4.4 (12-199). + + Intelligence, life of, is ever contemporaneous, iii. 7.2 (45-989). + + Intelligence, like circle, is inseparably one and many, iii. 8.8 + (30-543). + + Intelligence may be denied liberty, if granted super-liberty, vi. 8.6 + (39-782). + + Intelligence, multiplicity of, implies their mutual differences, vi. + 7.17 (38-730). + + Intelligence must remain immovable to act as horizon, v. 5.7 (32-586). + + Intelligence not a unity, but its manifold produced by a unity, iv. + 4.1 (28-443). + + Intelligence not constituted by things in it, v. 2.2 (11-196). + + Intelligence not ours, but we, i. 1.13 (53-1206). + + Intelligence passes from unity to duality by thinking, v. 6.1 + (24-333). + + Intelligence potential and actualized in the soul, vi. 6.15 (34-669). + + Intelligence primary knows itself, v. 3.6 (49-1099). + + Intelligence proof of its existence and nature, v. 9.3 (5-104). + + Intelligence ranks all else, v. 4.2 (7-136). + + Intelligence relation to intelligible, iii. 9.1 (13-220). + + Intelligence's existence proved by identity of its thought and + essence, v. 9.3 (5-104). + + Intelligence shines down from the peak formed by united souls, vi. + 7.15 (38-726). + + Intelligence supreme, is king of kings, v. 5.3 (32-579). + + Intelligence's working demands a supra-thinking principle, v. 6.2 + (24-334). + + Intelligence that aspires to form of good is not the supreme, iii. + 8.11 (30-548). + + Intelligence thinks things, because it possesses them, vi. 6.7 + (34-653). + + Intelligence unites, as it rises to the intelligible, iv. 4.1 + (28-442). + + Intelligence, which is free by itself, endows soul with liberty, vi. + 8.7 (39-983). + + Intelligence world, in it each being is accompanied by its whyness, + vi. 7.2 (38-702). + + Intelligent life beneath being, iii. 6.6 (26-361). + + Intelligent animals are distinct from the creating image of them, vi. + 7.8 (38-712). + + Intelligible animals are pre-existing, vi. 7.8 (38-712). + + Intelligible animals do not incline towards the sense-world, vi. 7.8 + (38-712). + + Intelligible beauty, v. 8 (31-551). + + Intelligible believed in by those rising to the soul, vi. 9.5 (9-156). + + Intelligible contains the earth, vi. 7.11 (38-718). + + Intelligible does not descend; sense-world rises, iii. 4.4 (15-237). + + Intelligible entities are not outside of the good, v. 5 (32-575). + + Intelligible entities are veritable numbers, vi. 6.14 (34-668). + + Intelligible entities contained by very motion of intelligence, v. + 5.2 (32-578). + + Intelligible entities do not exist apart from their matter, + intelligence, v. 4.2 (7-138). + + Intelligible entities eternal and immutable, not corporeal, iv. 7.8 + (2-69). + + Intelligible entities, gnostics think they can be bewitched, ii. 9.14 + (33-627). + + Intelligible entities higher and lower, first and second, v. 4.2 + (7-135). + + Intelligible entities must be both, identical with and different from + intelligence, v. 3.10 (49-1108). + + Intelligible entities not merely images, but potentialities for + memory, iv. 4.4 (28-446). + + Intelligible entities presence implied by knowledge of them, v. 5.1 + (32-575). + + Intelligible entities return not by memory, but by further vision, + iv. 4.5 (28-447). + + Intelligible entity what, and how it is it, vi. 6.8 (34-654). + + Intelligible essence, both in and out of itself, vi. 5.3 (23-316). + + Intelligible essence formed by adding eternity to essence, vi. 2.1 + (43-892). + + Intelligible eternity in not an accident of, but an intimate part of + its nature, iii. 7.3 (45-989). + + Intelligible has eternity as world-soul is to time, iii. 7.10 + (45-1007). + + Intelligible, how participated in by inferior nature, vi. 5.11 + (23-329). + + Intelligible in it, cause coincides with nature, vi. 7.19 (38-735). + + Intelligible in it, stability does not imply stillness, vi. 3.27 + (44-982). + + Intelligible line exists in the intelligible, vi. 6.17 (34-674). + + Intelligible line posterior to number, vi. 6.17 (34-674). + + Intelligible man, scrutiny of, demanded by philosophy, vi. 7.4 + (38-705). + + Intelligible matter, ii. 4.1 2 (12-197, 198); iii., 8.11 (30-548). + + Intelligible matter composite of form and matter, ii. 4.4 (12-200). + + Intelligible matter is not potential, ii, 5.3 (25-345). + + Intelligible matter is not shapeless, ii. 4.3 (12-198). + + Intelligible matter is shaped real being, ii. 4.5 (12-201). + + Intelligible matter, why it must be accepted, iii. 5.6 (50-1132). + + Intelligible number infinite because unmeasured, vi. 6.18 (34-676). + + Intelligible numbers, vi. 6.6 (34-651). + + Intelligible parts of men unite in the intelligible, vi. 5.10 + (23-327). + + Intelligible Pythagorean numbers discussed, vi. 6.5 (34-649). + + Intelligible relation to intelligence, iii. 9.1 (13-220). + + Intelligible remains unmoved, yet penetrates the world, vi. 5.11 + (23-328). + + Intelligible, shared by highest parts of all men, vi. 7.15 (38-726). + + Intelligible, spherical figure the primitive one, vi. 6.17 (34-675). + + Intelligible terms, only verbal similarity to physical, vi. 3.5 + (44-941). + + Intelligible, to them is limited difference in effects, vi. 3.17 + (44-964). + + Intelligible unity and decad exist before all numbers, vi. 6.5 + (34-650). + + Intelligible, what is being in it is generation in the sense-world, + vi. 3.2 (44-935). + + Intelligible world and sense-world, connection between man's triple + nature, vi. 7.7 (38-711). + + Intelligible world archetype of ours, v. 1.4 (10-178). + + Intelligible world contains air, vi. 7.11 (38-720). + + Intelligible world contains beside ideas, soul and intelligence, v. + 9.13 (5-116). + + Intelligible world contains earth, vi. 7.11 (38-718). + + Intelligible world contains fire, vi. 7.11 (38-719). + + Intelligible world contains water, vi. 7.11 (38-720). + + Intelligible world, could it contain vegetables or metals, vi. 7.11 + (38-717). + + Intelligible world is model of this universe, vi. 7.12 (38-720). + + Intelligible world, description of, v. 8.4 (31-557). + + Intelligible world has more unity than sense-world, vi. 5.10 (23-327). + + Intelligible world, how infinity can subsist in, vi. 6.3 (34-645). + + Intelligible world, in it everything is actual, ii. 5.3 (25-346). + + Intelligible world is complete model of this universe, vi. 7.12 + (38-720). + + Intelligible world, man relation to, vi. 4.14 (22-308). + + Intelligible world, stars influence is from contemplation of, iv. + 4.35 (28-496). + + Intelligible world, we must descend from it to study time, iii. 7.6 + (45-995). + + Interior characteristics necessary to happiness, i. 4.3 (46-1023). + + Interior life, rather than exterior, is field of liberty, vi. 8.6 + (39-781). + + Interior man, v. 1.10 (10-189). + + Interior model, cause of appreciation of interior beauty, i. 6.2 + (1-45). + + Interior vision, how trained, i. 6.9 (1-53). + + Intermediary between form and matter, are sense-objects, iii. 6.17 + (26-381). + + Intermediary body not necessary for vision, iv. 5.1 (29-514, 515). + + Intermediary elemental soul, also inadmissible, ii. 9.5 (33-607). + + Intermediary of reason is the world-soul, iv. 3.11 (27-407). + + Intermediary position of Saturn, between Uranus and Jupiter, v. 8.13 + (31-573). + + Intermediary sensation, demanded by conceptive thoughts, iv. 4.23 + (28-472). + + Intermediate is human nature, suffering with whole, but acting on it, + iv. 4.45 (28-511). + + Intermediate is the soul's nature, iv. 8.7 (6-130). + + Intermediate sense shape on which depends sensation, iv. 4.23 + (28-473). + + Internal and external evil, relation between, i. 8.5 (51-1149). + + Internecine war is objection to Providence, iii. 2.15 (47-1065). + + Internecine warfare necessary, iii. 2.15 (47-1065). + + Interpenetration of everything in intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-557). + + Interpreter of reason is the world-soul, iv. 3.11 (27-407). + + Interrelation of supreme and subordinate divinities dynamic (birth) + or mere relation of parts and whole dynamic? v. 8.9 (31-566). + + Intimacy of itself is the good of a thing, vi. 7.27 (38-744). + + Intuition, omniscient, supersedes memory and reasonings, iv. 4.12 + (28-457). + + Intuitionally, the soul can reason, iv. 3.18 (27-417). + + Intuition's act is true conception, i. 1.9 (53-1202). + + Involuntariness to blame spontaneity, iii. 2.10 (47-1060). + + Irascible part of earth, iv. 4.28 (28-481). + + Irrational claims of astrologers, iii. 1.6 (3-95). + + Isolated, pure soul would remain, iv. 4.23 (28-473). + + + James-Lange theory of emotions refuted, i. 1.5 (53-1196). + + James-Lange theory taught, iv. 4.28 (28-480, 481). + + Jar, residence or location of generation is matter, ii. 4.1 (12-197); + iii. 6.14 (26-376); iv. 3.20 (27-420). + + Jealousy does not exist in divine nature, iv. 8.6 (6-129). + + Judgment and soul, passibility of, iii. 6.1 (26-350). + + Judgment, mental, reduces multitude to unity, vi. 6.13 (34-664). + + Judgment of one part by another, truth of astrology, ii. 3.7 (52-1172). + + Judgment of soul and other things in purest condition only, iv. 7.10 + (2-80). + + Judgment of soul condemns her to reincarnation, iv. 8.5 (6-128). + + Judgment, time of, between incarnations, iii. 4.6 (15-240). + + Jupiter, v. 1.7 (10-185); v. 8.1 (31-552); v. 8.10 (31-568); iii. 5.2 + (50-1126); v. 5.3 (32-580); v. 8.4 (31-558); iv. 3.12 (27-409); vi. + 9.7 (9-162). + + Jupiter, as demiurge, as world-soul, and as governor, iv. 4.10 + (28-454). + + Jupiter life's infinity destroys memory, iv. 4.9 (28-453). + + Jupiter the greatest chief, or third God, is the soul, iii. 5.8 + (50-1136). + + Jupiter, two-fold, celestial and earthly, iii. 5.2 (50-1126). + + Jupiter, Venus and Mercury, also considered astrologically, ii. 3.5 + (52-1170). + + Jupiter's administration above memory, iv. 4.9 (28-453). + + Jupiter's garden is the reason begets everything, iii. 5.9 (50-1137). + + Jupiter, two-fold, celestial and earthly, iii. 5.2 (50-1126). + + Justice, v. 1.11 (10-190); v. 8.4, 10 (31-557, 567); i. 6.4 (1-61). + + Justice, absolute, is indivisible, i. 2.6 (19-265). + + Justice does not possess extension, iv. 7.8 (2-69). + + Justice extends into past and future, iii. 2.13 (47-1062). + + Justice, golden face of, vi. 6.6 (34-652); i, 6.4 (1-61). + + Justice incarnate, is individual, i. 2.6 (19-265). + + Justice is no true category, vi. 2.18 (41-923). + + Justice, like intellectual statue, was born of itself, vi. 6.6 + (34-652). + + Justice not destroyed by superficiality of punishments, iii. 2.15 + (47-1066). + + Justice of God vindicated by philosophy, iv. 4.30, 37 (28-486, 500). + + Justice seated beside Jupiter, v. 8.4 (31-558). + + Juxtaposition, ii. 7.1 (37-691); iv. 7.3 (2-59). + + + Kinds of men, three, v. 9.1 (5-102). + + King of kings, v. 5.3 (32-579). + + Kings, men are, v. 3.4 (49-1094). + + King, universal, stars followers of, ii. 3.13 (52-1179). + + Kinship divine, recognition of, depends on self-knowledge, vi. 9.7 + (9-161). + + Kinship of human soul with divine, v. 1.1 (10-173). + + Kinship to world-soul shown by fidelity to one's own nature, iii. 3.1 + (48-1077). + + Kinship with beautiful world scorned by gnostics, ii. 9.18 (33-635). + + Kinship with depraved men accepted, ii. 9.18 (33-636). + + Know thyself, iv. 3.1 (27-387); vi. 7.41 (38-769). + + Knowledge of better things, cleared up by purification, iv. 7.10 + (2-80). + + Knowledge of good attained experience of evil, iv. 8.7 (6-131). + + Knowledge of intelligible entities implies their presence, v. 5.1 + (32-575). + + Knowledge, true, shown not by unification, not revelation of divine + power, ii. 9.9 (33-617). + + Kronos, of Uranus, iii. 5.2 (50-1126). + + + Label, is good, a common quality or a common label, vi. 7.18 (38-733). + + Lachesis, ii. 3.15 (52-1182). + + Land marks on path to ecstasy, i. 6.9 (1-54). + + Last degree of existence could not have been existence, ii. 9.8 + (33-614). + + Last stage of soul-elevation, is vision of intelligible wisdom, v. + 8.10 (31-567). + + Law, natural directs soul. ii. 3.8 (52-1173). + + Law of the order of the universe, why souls succumb to it, iv. 3.15 + (27-413). + + Laws, natural, which carry rewards, may be neglected by good, iii. + 2.8 (47-1055). + + Leakage (flow of or escape), ii. 1.6, 8 (40-822); v. 1.6 (10-182); + vi. 5.10 (23-327); v. 1.6 (10-182). + + Leakage, none in radiation of soul (see wastage), vi. 4.5, 10 + (22-293, 301); vi. 5.3 (23-317). + + Leakage, none with celestial light, ii. 1.8 (40-784). + + Leave not world, but be not of it, i. 8.6 (51-1150). + + Leibnitz, theory of indiscernibles, v. 7.2 (18-254). + + Legislator, intelligence, v. 9.5 (5-108). + + Leisure in life of celestial Gods, v. 8.3 (31-556). + + Lethe, iv. 3.26 (27-432). + + Letters in which to read nature, iii. 3.6 (48-1087). + + Letters in which to read nature, are stars, ii. 3.7 (52-1172); iii. + 1.6 (3-95). + + Liberation of soul effected by virtue as intellectualizing habit, vi. + 8.5 (39-779). + + Liberty, vi. 8 (39-773). + + Liberty depends on intelligence, vi. 8.3 (39-777). + + Liberty, does it belong to God only, or to all others also? vi. 8.1 + (39-773). + + Liberty lies in following reason, iii. 1.9, 10 (3-97, 98). + + Liberty may be denied to intelligence, if granted super-liberty, vi. + 8.6 (39-781). + + Liberty must be for men, if it is for the divinities, vi. 8.1 + (39-782). + + Liberty not for the depraved who follow images, vi. 8.3 (39-777). + + Liberty refers to the interior life, rather than to the exterior, vi. + 8.6 (39-781). + + Liberty would be destroyed by astrology. iii. 1.7 (3-96). + + Life and intelligence could not inhere in molecules, iv. 7.2 (2-58). + + Life and thought, different grades of, iii 8.7 (30-540). + + Life changed from an evil to a by virtue, i. 7.1 (54-1208). + + Life, drama of, roles played badly by evil, iii. 2.17 (47-1071). + + Life interpenetrates all, and knows no limits, vi. 5.12 (23-330). + + Life is actualization of intelligence, vi. 9.9 (9-165). + + Life is below good, iii. 9.9 (13-225). + + Life is perfect when intelligible, i. 4.3 (46-1024). + + Life is presence with divinity, vi. 9.9 (9-165). + + Life of intelligence is ever contemporaneous, iii. 7.2 (45-989). + + Life, thought and existence, contained in primary existence, ii. 4.6 + (12-203); v. 6.6 (24-339). + + Life's ascent, witness to, is disappearance of contingency, vi. 8.15 + (39-801). + + Light abandoned by source does not perish, but is no more there, iv. + 4.29 (28-484); iv. 5.7 (29-526). + + Light and fire celestial, nature of, ii. 1.7 (40-825). + + Light and form, two methods of sight, v. 5.7 (32-586). + + Light as actualization is incorporeal, iv. 5.7 (29-527). + + Light celestial, not exposed to any wastage, ii. 1.8 (40-826). + + Light emanates from sun, v. 3.12 (49-1112). + + Light emitted by the soul forms animal nature, i. 1.7 (53-1198). + + Light exists simultaneously within and without, vi. 4.7 (22-295). + + Light from sun exists everywhere, vi. 4.6 (22-296). + + Light in eye, v.7 (32-586); v. 6.1 (24-334); iv. 5.4 (29-500). + + Light intelligible, v. 5.8 (32-587). + + Light intelligible is not spatial, has no relation to place, v. 5.8 + (32-587). + + Light intermediary is unnecessary, being a hindrance, iv. 5.4 + (29-521). + + Light is composite of light in eye and light outside, v. 6.1 (24-334). + + Light, is it destroyed when its source is withdrawn or does it follow + it? iv. 5.7 (29-526). + + Light, objective and visual, mutual relation of, iv. 5.4 (29-520). + + Light, objective, does not transmit by relays, iv. 5.4 (29-522). + + Light, relation to air, iv. 4.5, 6 (29-524). + + Light, visual, not a medium, iv. 5.4 (29-522). + + Lighting fire, from refraction, generation illustrates, iii. 6.14 + (26-376). + + Limit lower, of divine things, the soul, v. 1.7 (10-186). + + Limit of union with divinity, desire or ability, v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Limitless is supreme, vi. 7.32 (38-753). + + Limits, none known by life, vi. 5.12 (23-330). + + Line intelligible, posterior to number, vi. 6.17 (34-674). + + Liver, location of growth, iv. 3.23 (27-426). + + Liver, seat of soul's desire, iv. 4.28 (28-480). + + Lives, former, cause human character, iii. 3.4 (48-1083). + + Living being, no evil is unalloyed for it, i. 7.3 (54-1210). + + Living well not explainable by reason, i. 4.2 (46-1022). + + Living well not extended to all animals, i. 4.2 (46-1020). + + Localization of soul open to metaphysical objections, iv. 3.20 + (27-419). + + Location does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.16 (43-919). + + Location for the things yet to be produced is essence, vi. 6.10 + (34-657). + + Location of form (see residence), iii, 6.14 (26-376). + + Location of soul is principle that is everywhere and nowhere, v. 2.2 + (11-195). + + Location of world is in soul and not soul in body, iv, 3.9 (27-405). + + Logos, intermediary, also unaccountable, ii. 9.1 (33-601). + + Logos, form of, character, role and reason, iii. 2.17 (47-1071). + + Lost wings, has soul, in incarnation, i. 8.14 (51-1161). + + Love as God, demon and passion, iii. 5.1 (50-1122). + + Love as recognition of hidden affinity, iii. 5.1 (50-1122). + + Love based on unity and sympathy of all things, iv. 9.3 (8-142). + + Love causes, four, divine, innate notion, affinity and sentiment of + beauty, iii. 5.1 (50-1123). + + Love, celestial, must abide in intelligible with celestial soul, iii. + 5.3 (50-1128). + + Love, higher, is celestial, iii. 5.3 (50-1128). + + Love, how transformed into progressively higher stages, v. 9.2 + (5-103). + + Love is a gad-fly, iii. 5.7 (50-1134). + + Love is both material and a demon, iii. 5.10 (50-1140). + + Love is both needy and acquisitive, iii. 5.7 (50-1134). + + Love is not identical with the world, iii. 5.5 (50-1130). + + Love, like higher soul, inseparable from its source, iii. 5.2 + (50-1126). + + Love, lower, beauty, celestial, v. 8.13 (31-573). + + Love, lower, corresponding to world-soul, iii. 5.3 (50-1128). + + Love must exist because the soul does, iii. 5.10 (50-1139). + + Love, myth of birth, significance, iii. 5.10 (50-1139). + + Love of beauty explained by aversion for ugliness, i. 6.5 (1-47). + + Love possesses divine being, iii. 5.3 (50-1127). + + Love, working as sympathy, affects magic, iv. 4.40 (28-503). + + Love or Eros, iii. 5 (50-1122). + + Love that unites soul to good is deity, iii. 5.4 (50-1130). + + Love that unites soul to matter is demon only, iii. 5.4 (50-1130). + + Lover, divine, waits at the door, vi. 5.10 (23-325). + + Lover, how he develops, v. 9.2 (5-103). + + Lover, how he is attracted by beauty of single body, i. 3.2 (20-271). + + Lover, how he uses to intelligible world, i. 3.2 (20-271). + + Lover, simile of, in seeing God, vi. 9.4 (9-155). + + Lovers are those who feel sentiments most keenly, i, 6.4 (1-46). + + Lover's beauty in virtues transformed to intellectual, i. 3.2 + (20-271). + + Lover's beauty transformed into artistic and spiritual virtues, i. + 3.2 (20-271). + + Loves contrary to nature are passions of strayed souls, iii. 5.7 + (50-1135). + + Loves implanted by nature are all good, iii. 5.7 (50-1136). + + Loves in the evil charged down by false opinions, iii. 5.7 (50-1136). + + Lower form of being possessed by evil, i. 8.3 (51-1145). + + Lower forms of contemplation, iii. 8.1 (30-531). + + Lower natures, good is for them, not for itself, vi. 7.4 (38-706). + + Lower things follow higher, i. 8.1 (51-1142). + + Lowest degree of being is evil, hence necessary, i. 8.7 (51-1146). + + Lyceum, vi. 1.14, 30 (42-862, 888). + + Lynceus, whose keen eyes pierce all, symbol of intelligible world, v. + 8.4 (31-558). + + Lyre, badly tuned, cannot produce harmony, vi. 3.13 (44-961); ii. + 3.13 (52-1180). + + Lyre played by musician, like affections of the soul, iii. 6.4 + (26-358). + + Lyre, simile of striking single cord, vi, 5.10 (23-326). + + + Made himself, divinity has, does not cause priority, vi. 8.20 + (39-808). + + Magic, based on sympathy, iv. 9.3 (8-142). + + Magic enchantments described, iv. 9.3 (8-142). + + Magic, escaped by honesty, iv. 4.44 (28-509). + + Magic occurs by love, working as sympathy, iv. 4.40 (28-503). + + Magic power over honesty, iv. 4.44 (28-509). + + Magic power over man by its affections and weakness, iv. 4.44 + (28-508). + + Magnanimity interpreted as purifications, i. 6.6 (1-49). + + Magnitude an aid to differences of color, ii. 8.1 (35-681). + + Magnitude is an image formed by reflection of universal beings, iii. + 6.17 (26-380). + + Magnitude is only appearance, iii. 6.18 (26-381). + + Magnitude of matter derived from seminal reasons, iii. 6.15 (26-377). + + Magnitude, why could the soul have none, if it filled all space, vi. + 4.1 (22-285). + + Magnitudes and numbers are of different kind of quality, vi. 1.4 + (42-843). + + Man as soul subsisting in a special reason, vi. 7.5 (38-707). + + Man in himself, vi. 7.4 (38-706). + + Man is defined as reasonable soul, vi. 7.4 (38-706). + + Man is perfected through his evils, ii. 3.18 (52-1187). + + Man produces seminal reason, ii. 3.12 (52-1178). + + Man, relation of, to the intelligible world, vi. 4.14 (22-308). + + Man's triple nature is connection between sense and intelligible + world, vi. 7.7 (38-711). + + Management of body by reasoning, of world by intelligence, iv. 8.8 + (6-132). + + Manager, rewards and punishes, good and bad actors, iii. 2.17 + (47-1071). + + Managing part of soul, discredited, iv. 2.2 (21-280). + + Manicheans, wine divided in jars theory of reflected, iv. 3.2, 20 + (27-390). + + Manifold contains unity of manner of existence, vi. 4.8 (22-296). + + Manifold could not exist without something simple, v. 6.3 (24-336). + + Manifold, how intelligence became, v. 3.11 (49-1108). + + Manifold, how it arises from the one Intelligence, vi. 2.21 (43-926). + + Manifold, if it passed into unity, would destroy universe, iii. 8.10 + (30-547). + + Manifold is unity of apperception, iv. 4.1 (28-442). + + Manifold not explained by supreme unity, v. 9.14 (5-1116). + + Manifold, nothing, could exist without something simple, v. 6.3 + (12-336). + + Manifold of intelligence produced by unity, iv. 4.1 (28-443). + + Manifold unity, only for examination are its parts apart, vi. 2.3 + (43-897). + + Manifoldness, v. 3.16 (49-1118). + + Manifoldness contained by universal essence, vi. 9.2 (9-149). + + Manifoldness developed by soul, as by intelligence, iv. 3.6 (27-398). + + Manifoldness must pre-exist, vi. 2.2 (43-894). + + Manifoldness of any kind cannot exist within the first, v. 3.12 + (49-1110). + + Manifoldness of unity, vi. 5.6 (23-321). + + Manifoldness produced by one because of categories, v. 3.15 (49-1116). + + Manifoldness, why it proceeded from unity, v. 2.1 (11-193). + + Manner of existence determines how unity is manifold, vi. 4.8 + (22-296). + + Many and one inseparably, is intelligence, iii. 8.8 (30-543). + + Many and one, puzzle of decides genera of essence, vi. 2.4 (43-898). + + Marriages, presided over by lower love, iii. 5.3 (50-1129). + + Mars, relations to Saturn illogical, ii. 3.5 (52-1169). + + Mass is source of ugliness, v. 8.2 (31-554). + + Master, even beyond it, is the Supreme, vi. 8.12 (39-793). + + Master of himself power is the Supreme, vi. 8.10 (39-790). + + Masters of ourselves are even we, how much more Supreme, vi. 8.12 + (39-793). + + Mastery of these corporeal dispositions is not easy, i. 8.8 (51-1154). + + Material, gnostic distinction of men, ii. 9.18 (33-637). + + Materialism, polemic against, iv. 7 (2-56). + + Materialists cannot understand solid things near nonentity, iii. 6.6 + (26-361). + + Materialists support determination, iii. 1.2 (3-88). + + Mathematical parts not applicable to soul. iv. 3.2 (27-389). + + Matter acc. to Empedocles and Anaximander, ii. 4.7 (12-204). + + Matter alone could not endow itself with life, iv. 7.3 (2-60). + + Matter an empty mirror that reflects everything, iii. 6.7 (26-363). + + Matter and form in all things, iv. 7.1 (2-56). + + Matter and form intermediary between is sense object, iii. 6.17 + (26-381). + + Matter as deprivation still without qualities, i. 8.11 (51-1157). + + Matter as mirror, not affected by the object reflected, iii. 6.7 + (26-363). + + Matter as mother, nurse, residence and other nature, iii. 6.19 + (26-384). + + Matter as residence of generation. iii. 6.13 (26-373). + + Matter as substrate and residence of forms, ii. 4.1 (12-197). + + Matter as the infinite in itself, ii. 4.15 (12-216). + + Matter, born of world-soul, shapeless, begetting principle, iii. 4.1 + (15-233). + + Matter, both kinds, relation of, to essence, ii. 4.16 (12-219). + + Matter cannot be affected, as cannot be destroyed, iii. 6.8 (26-365). + + Matter cannot be credited with being, vi. 3.7 (44-944). + + Matter cannot be the primary principle, vi. 1.26 (42-881). + + Matter contained in the soul from her looking at darkness, i. 8.4 + (51-1147). + + Matter contemporarily with the informing principle, ii. 4.8 (12-206). + + Matter, corporeal and incorporeal, ii. 4.1 (12-198). + + Matter, cult of implies ignoring soul and intelligence, vi. 1.29 + (42-887). + + Matter derives its being from intelligibles, vi. 3.7 (44-944). + + Matter, descent into, is fall of the soul, i. 8.14 (51-1161). + + Matter, difference from form, due to that of intelligible sources, + vi. 3.8 (44-946). + + Matter existed from all eternity, iv. 8.6 (6-130). + + Matter, first physical category of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 (44-937). + + Matter, how to see the formless, a thing of itself, i. 8.9 (51-1156). + + Matter (hypostatic), existence as undeniable as that of good, i. 8.15 + (51-1162). + + Matter, if primary, would be form of the universe, iii. 6.18 (26-382). + + Matter, impassible, because of different senses of participation, + iii. 6.9 (26-366). + + Matter, incorporeal (Pyth. Plato, Arist.), ii. 4.1 (12-198). + + Matter, incorruptible, exists only potentially, ii. 5.5 (25-348). + + Matter, intelligible, ii. 4.3 (12-198); ii. 5.3 (25-345); iii. 5.7 + (50-1134). + + Matter, intelligible, entities to reach sense-matter, iii. 5.7 + (50-1154). + + Matter, intelligible, is not potential, ii. 5.3 (25-345). + + Matter, intelligible, why it must be accepted, iii. 5.6, 7 (50-1133). + + Matter is born shapeless, receives form while turning to, ii. 4.3 + (12-198). + + Matter is both without qualities and evil, i. 8.10 (51-1156). + + Matter is bottom of everything, ii. 4.5 (12-201). + + Matter is cause of evils, even if corporeal, i. 8.8 (51-1153). + + Matter is disposition to become something else, ii. 4.13 (12-214). + + Matter is improved by form, vi. 7.28 (38-745). + + Matter is incorporeal, ii. 4.9 (12-206). + + Matter is nonentity, i. 8.5 (51-1148). + + Matter is non-essential otherness, ii. 4.16 (12-218). + + Matter is not a body without quality, but with magnitude, vi. 1.26 + (42-880). + + Matter is not being and cannot be anything actual, ii. 5.4 (25-347). + + Matter is not composite, but simple in one, ii. 4.8 (12-205). + + Matter is not wickedness, but neutral evil, vi. 7.28 (38-746). + + Matter is nothing actually, ii. 5.2 (25-343). + + Matter is physical category, vi. 3.3 (44-937). + + Matter is real potentially, ii. 5.5 (25-348). + + Matter is relative darkness, ii. 4.5 (12-201). + + Matter is secondary evil, i. 8.4 (51-1155). + + Matter is unchangeable because form is such, iii. 6.10 (26-368). + + Matter left alone as basis after Stoic categories evaporate, vi. 1.29 + (42-886). + + Matter magnitude derived from seminal reason, iii. 6.15 (26-377). + + Matter may exist yet be evil, i. 8.11 (51-1158). + + Matter, modified, is Stoic God, vi. 12.7 (42-881). + + Matter must be possible because its qualities change, iii. 6.8 + (26-366). + + Matter necessary to the world; hence good implies evil, i. 8.7 + (51-1152). + + Matter not in intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-557). + + Matter nothing real actually, ii. 5.4 (25-347). + + Matter of demons is not corporeal, iii. 5.7 (50-1135). + + Matter participates in existence, without participating it, iii. 6.14 + (26-376) + + Matter participates in the intelligible, by appearance, iii. 6.11 + (26-369). + + Matter, participation of, in ideas, vi. 5.8 (23-321) + + Matter possesses no quality, ii. 4.8 (12-205); iv. 7.3 (2-59). + + Matter qualified as seminal reasons, vi. 1.29 + + Matter rationalized is body, ii. 7.3 (37-696). + + Matter received forms until hidden by them, v. 8.7 (31-562). + + Matter, relation of, to reason, illustrates that of opinion to + imagination, iii. 6.15 (26-377). + + Matter, since cannot be destroyed, cannot be affected, iii. 6.8 + (26-365). + + Matter things mingled, contain no perfection, iii. 2.7 (47-1053). + + Matter's generation, consequence of anterior principles, iv. 8.6 + (6-130). + + Matter's primitive impotence before generation, iv. 8.6 (6-130). + + Mechanism of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569). + + Medicine, v. 9.11 (5-114). + + Mediocre, evil men even, never abandoned by Providence, iii. 2.9 + (47-1058). + + Mediation of soul between indivisible and divisible essence, iv. 2 + (21-276). + + Mediation of world-souls, through it, benefits are granted to men, + vi. 4.12, 30 (28-457, 486). + + Medium cosmologically necessary, but affects sight only slightly, iv. + 5.2 (29-517). + + Medium needed in Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, iv. 5.2 + (29-516). + + Medium not needed in Atomism and Epicurianism, iv. 5.2 (29-516). + + Medium of sight, Aristotle's unnecessary iv. 5.1 (29-515). + + Medium, though possible, hinders organs of sight, iv. 5.1 (29-514). + + Medium, untroubled, is the world-soul, iv. 8.7 (6-130). + + Medium's absence would only destroy sympathy, iv. 5.3 (29-519). + + Medium's affection does not interfere with vision, iv. 5.3 (29-520). + + Memories not needed, unconscious prayer answered by Stars, iv. 4.42 + (28-505). + + Memories of the past do not increase happiness, i. 5.9 (36-689). + + Memory, iv. (27-428). + + Memory and reasoning, not implied by world-soul's wisdom, iv. 4.12 + (28-457). + + Memory and reasoning suspended by omniscient intuition, iv. 4.12 + (28-457). + + Memory and sensation iv. 6 (41-829). + + Memory and sensation, Stoic doctrines of, hang together, iv. 6.1 + (41-829). + + Memory acts through the sympathy of the soul's highest self, iv. 6.3 + (41-832). + + Memory, actualization of the soul, iv. 3.25 (27-429). + + Memory belongs to divine soul, and to that derived from world-soul, + iv. 3.27 (27-433). + + Memory belongs to imagination, iv. 3.29 (27-433). + + Memory belongs to the soul alone, iv. 3.26 (27-432). + + Memory, both kinds, implies both kinds of imagination, iv. 3.31 + (27-438). + + Memory definition depends on whether it is animal or human, iv. 3.25 + (27-429). + + Memory does not belong to appetite, iv. 3.28 (27-434). + + Memory does not belong to the power of perception, iv. 3.29 (27-435). + + Memory does not belongs to the stars, iv. 4.30 (28-441). + + Memory impossible to world-souls to whom there is no time but a + single day, iv. 4.7 (28-450). + + Memory inapplicable to any but time limited beings, iv. 3.25 (27-428). + + Memory is not identical with feeling or reasoning, iv. 3.29 (27-436). + + Memory limited to souls that change their condition, iv. 4.6 (28-448). + + Memory may be reduced to sensation, iv. 3.28 (27-434). + + Memory needs training and education, iv. 6.3 (41-835). + + Memory, none in stars, because uniformly blissful, iv. 4.8 (28-452). + + Memory not an image but a reawakening of a faculty, iv. 6.3 (41-833). + + Memory not as high as unreflective identification, iv. 4.4 (28-445). + + Memory not, but an affection, is kept by appetite, iv. 3.28 (27-434). + + Memory not compulsory, iv. 4.8 (28-451). + + Memory not exercised by world-souls and stars' souls, iv. 4.6 + (28-449). + + Memory not intelligible because of simultaneity, iv. 4.1 (28-441). + + Memory of soul in intelligible world, iv. 4.1 (28-441). + + Memory peculiar to soul and body, iv. 3.2 (27-430). + + Memory, possession of, not caused by incarnation of soul, iv. 3.26 + (27-431). + + Memory problems depend on definition, iv. 3.25 (27-429). + + Memory, timeless, constitutes self-consciousness, iv. 3.25 (27-429). + + Memory when beyond, helped by training here below, iv. 4.5 (28-447). + + Memory would be hindered if soul's impressions were corporeal, iv. + 7.6 (2-66). + + Men are kings, v. 3.4 (49-1094). + + Men both, we are not always as we should be, vi. 4.14 (22-308). + + Men escape chance by interior isolation, vi. 8.15 (39-800). + + Men non-virtuous, do good when not hindered by passions, iii. 1.10 + (3-98). + + Men of three kinds, sensual, moral and spiritual, v. 9.1 (5-102). + + Men seek action when too weak for contemplation, iii. 8.4 (30-536). + + Men sense and intelligible, difference between, vi. 7.4 (38-705). + + Men, three in each of us, vi. 7.6 (38-708). + + Men, three in us, fate of them is, brutalization or divinization, vi. + 7.6 (38-709). + + Men, three kinds of, v. 9.1 (5-102). + + Mercury, Jupiter and Venus, also considered astrologically, ii. 3.5 + (52-1169). + + Metal is to statue as body to soul, iv. 7.8 (2-76). + + Messengers of divinities are souls incarnated, iv. 3.12, 13 (27-409); + iv. 8.5 (6-127). + + Metaphorical is all language about the Supreme, vi. 8.13 (39-795). + + Method of creation, ii. 3.17 (52-1186). + + Method of ecstasy is to close eyes of body, i. 6.8 (1-52). + + Methods of dialectic differ with individuals, i. 3.1 (20-269). + + Methods of participation in good, i. 7.1 (54-1208). + + Metis or prudence (myth of), iii. 5.5 (50-1130). + + Microcosm, iv. 3.10 (27-406). + + Migrating of soul psychologically explained, vi. 4.16 (22-310). + + Minerva, vi. 5.7 (23-321). + + Minos, vi. 9.7 (9-162). + + Miracle, matter participates in existence, while not participating in + it, iii. 6.14 (26-376). + + Mire, unruly, soul falls into, when plunging down, i. 8.13 (51-1160). + + Mirror, iv. 3.30 (27-437); iv. 5.7 (29-528). + + Mirror empty, reflects everything like matter, iii. 6.7 (26-363). + + Mirror, simile of, i. 4.10 (46-1034). + + Misfortune and punishment, significance of, iv. 3.16 (27-414). + + Misfortune, experience of, does not give senses to man, vi. 7.1 + (38-697). + + Misfortune foreseen by God, not cause of human senses, vi. 7.1 + (38-697). + + Misfortune none too great to be conquered by virtues, i. 4.8 + (46-1031). + + Misfortune to the good only apparent, iii. 2.6 (47-1051). + + Mithra, simile of, used, iii. 2.14 (47-1064). + + Mixture, consequences of soul and body, i. 1.4 (53-1195). + + Mixture, elements are not, but arise from a common system, ii. 1.7 + (40-824). + + Mixture explained by evaporation (Stoic), ii. 7.2 (37-694). + + Mixture limited to energies of the existent, iv. 7.2, 8 (2-58, 68). + + Mixture of intelligence and necessity, i. 8.7 (51-1152). + + Mixture of soul and body impossible, i. 1.4 (53-1194). + + Mixture of soul divisible, ii. 3.9 (52-1176). + + Mixture of unequal qualities, ii. 7.1 (37-693). + + Mixture that occupies more space than elements, ii. 7.1 (37-693). + + Mixture, theory of, of Alexander of Aphrodisia, ii. 7.1 (37-691); iv. + 7.2 (2-58). + + Mixture to the point of total penetration, ii. 7 (37-691). + + Modality, should not occupy even third rank of existence, vi. 1.30 + (42-887). + + Model, v. 8.8 (31-564). + + Model for producing principle, is form, v. 8.7 (31-561). + + Model, image bound to it by radiation, vi. 4.10 (22-300). + + Model, interior, cause of appreciation of interior beauties, i. 6.4 + (1-45). + + Model of reason, is the universal soul, iv. 3.11 (27-407). + + Model of the old earth, gnostic, ii. 9.5 (33-607). + + Model of the universe is intelligible world, vi. 7.12 (38-720). + + Model, previous, object's existence implies, vi. 6.10 (34-658). + + Model, superior, method of producing assimilation, i. 2.7 (19-267, + 268). + + Modesty is part of goodness, ii. 9.9. (33-616). + + Modification derived from foreign sources, i. 1.9 (53-1202). + + Modified matter, is Stoic God, vi. 1.27 (42-881). + + Molecules could not possess life and intelligence, iv. 7.2 (2-57). + + Monism of the Stoics breaks down just like dualism, v. 1.27 (42-883). + + Moon, limit of world-sphere, ii. 1.5 (40-820). + + Moon, sun and light universe like, v. 6.4 (24-337). + + Moral beauties, more delightful than sense-beauties, i. 6.4 (1-45). + + Moral men, v. 9.1 (5-102). + + Moral men become superficial, v. 9.1 (2-102). + + Moralization, iv. 4.17 (28-464). + + Moralization decides government of soul, iv. 4.17 (28-464). + + Mortal, either whole or part of us, iv. 7.1 (2-56). + + Mother, nurse, residence and other nature is matter, iii. 6.18 + (26-384). + + Motion, how imparted to lower existences, ii. 2.2 (14-231). + + Motion is below the One, iii. 9.7 (13-225). + + Motion of fire, is straight, ii. 2.1 (14-228). + + Motion of soul is circular, ii. 2.1 (14-229). + + Motion, single, effected by body, and different ones by soul, iv. 7.4 + (2-62). + + Motion spontaneous, of universal soul, immortalizes heaven, ii. 1.4 + (40-818). + + Motions, conflicting, due to presence of bodies, ii. 2.2 (14-231). + + Motions, different, caused by soul, iv. 7.5 (2-62). + + Motive, essential to determination, iii. 1.1 (3-87). + + Motives of creation ii. 9.4 (33-605). + + Movement, v. 1.4 (10-180). + + Movement and rest, destruction also inapplicable, ii. 9.1 (33-600). + + Movement and stability exist because thought by intelligence, vi. 2.8 + (43-904). + + Movement another kind of stability, vi. 2.7 (43-903). + + Movement cannot be reduced to any higher genus, vi. 3.21 (44-971). + + Movement, circular of the soul, iv. 4.16 (28-462). + + Movement divided in natural, artificial and voluntary, vi. 3.26 + (44-980). + + Movement does not beget time, but indicates it, iii. 7.11 (45-1009). + + Movement for sense objects, vi. 3.23 (44-976). + + Movement, how can it be in time if changes are out of time, vi. 1.16 + (42-864). + + Movement is a form of power, vi. 3.22 (44-973). + + Movement is active for, and is the cause of other forms, vi. 3.22 + (44-974). + + Movement, is change anterior to it? vi. 3.21 (44-972). + + Movement measured by space because of its indetermination, iii. 7.11 + (45-1011). + + Movement measures time, and is measured by it, iii. 7.12 (45-1011). + + Movement of combination, vi. 3.25 (44-978). + + Movement of displacement is single, vi. 3.24 (44-927). + + Movement, of its image time, is eternity, iii. 7, int. (45-985). + + Movement of the heavens, ii. 2 (14-227). + + Movement of the soul is attributed to the primary movement, iii. 7.12 + (45-985). + + Movement, persistent, and its interval, are not time, but are within + it, iii. 7.7 (45-999). + + Movement, three kinds, ii. 2.1 (14-227). + + Movement, under it, action and suffering may be subsumed, vi. 1.17 + (42-866). + + Movement, why it is a category, vi. 3.20 (44-971). + + Multiple unity, iv. 9.1 (8-139). + + Multiple unity, radiation of, v. 3.15 (49-1115). + + Multiplicity could not be contained in the first, vi. 7.17 (38-729). + + Multiplicity demands organization in system, vi. 7.10 (38-716). + + Multiplicity of intelligences implies their natural differences, vi. + 7.17 (38-730). + + Multitude, how it precedes from the One, v. 9.14 (5-116); vi. 7 + (38-697). + + Multitude is distance from an unity, and is an evil, vi. 6.1 (34-643). + + Multitude of ideas of the good, vi. 7 (38-697). + + Muses, v. 8.10 (31-569); iii. 7.10 (45-1005). + + Music makes the musician, v. 8.1 (31-552). + + Musician educated by recognizing truths he already possesses, i. 3.1 + (20-270). + + Musician, how he rises to intelligible world, i. 3.1 (20-270). + + Musician led up by beauty, i. 3.1 (20-270). + + Mutilation of Saturn typifies splitting of unity, v. 8.13 (31-573). + + Mysteries, v. 3.17 (49-1120). + + Mysteries, ancient, their spiritual truth, vi. 9.11 (9-169). + + Mysteries purify and lead to nakedness in sanctuary, i. 6.6 (1-50). + + Mystery of derivation of Second from First, v. 1.6 (10-181). + + Mystery rites explain secrecy of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-169). + + Mystery teachings of hell, i. 6.6 (1-49). + + Myths explained by body's approach to the soul, iii. 5.10 (50-1138). + + Myths, object of, is to analyze and distinguish, iii. 5.10 (50-1139). + + Myths of ithyphallic Hermes, iii. 6.19 (26-385). + + Myths of Need and Abundance, iii. 6.14 (26-375). + + Myths, see Abundance, Need of, iii. 6.14 (26-375). + + + Nakedness follows purification in mysteries, i. 6.6 (1-50). + + Names of Supreme approximations, v. 5.6 (32-584). + + Narcissus, i. 6.8 (1-52); v. 8.2 (31-554). + + Narcissus followed vain shapes, i. 6.8 (1-52). + + Natural characteristics, derived from categories in intelligible, v. + 9.10 (5-113). + + Natural law, by it all prayers are answered, even of evil, iv. 4.42 + (28-505). + + Natural movements, vi. 3.26 (44-980). + + Nature and elements, there is continuity between, iv. 4.14 (28-459). + + Nature, and origin of evils, i. 8 (51-1142). + + Nature as weaker contemplation, iii. 8.4 (30-535). + + Nature betrayed, but not affected by stars, iii. 1.6 (3-95). + + Nature, capable of perfection as much as we, ii. 9.5 (33-607). + + Nature, cause coincides with it in intelligible, vi. 7.19 (38-735). + + Nature contemplation in unity, iii. 8 (30-542). + + Nature, contrary to loves, are passions of strayed souls, iii. 5.7 + (50-1135). + + Nature dominates in plants, but not in man, iii. 4.1 (15-233). + + Nature first actualization of universal soul, v. 2.1 (11-194). + + Nature is immovable as a fall, but not as compound of matter and + form, iii. 8.2 (30-533). + + Nature is ultimate cause, iii. 1.1 (3-87). + + Nature law directs soul, ii. 3.8 (52-1173). + + Nature, lowest in the world-soul's wisdom, iv. 4.13 (28-458). + + Nature of divine intelligence, i. 8.2 (51-1143). + + Nature of evil, i. 8.3 (51-1144). + + Nature of intelligence proved, v. 9.3 (5-104). + + Nature of soul is intermediate, iv. 8.7 (6-130). + + Nature of Supreme, i. 8.2 (51-1144). + + Nature of universal soul, i. 8.2 (51-1144). + + Nature posterior to intelligence, iv. 7.8 (2-78). + + Nature reason is result of immovable contemplation, iii. 8.2 (30-533). + + Nature, relation of animal to human, i. 1.7 (53-1199). + + Nature sterility indicated by castration, iii. 6.19 (26-384). + + Nature, Stoic name for generative power in seeds, v. 9.6 (5-110). + + Nature, to what part belongs emotions? i. 1.1 (53-1191). + + Nature's mother is universal reason and father the formal reasons, + iii. 8.4 (30-535). + + Nature's progress aided by auxiliary arts, v. 9.11 (5-114). + + Necessary, begetting of Second by First, v. 4.1 (7-135). + + Necessary things are those whose possession is unconscious, i. 4.6 + (46-1027). + + Necessity, characteristic of intelligence, v. 3.6 (49-1100). + + Necessity does not include voluntariness, iv. 8.5 (6-127). + + Necessity, Heraclitian, iii. 1.4 (3-91). + + Necessity mingled with reason, iii. 3.6 (48-1080). + + Necessity of continuous procession to Supreme, iv. 8.5 (6-129). + + Necessity of existence of the First, v. 4.1 (7-134). + + Necessity of illumination of darkness must have been eternal, ii. + 9.12 (33-623). + + Necessity, spindle of, Platonic, iii. 4.6 (15-242); ii. 3.9 (52-1171). + + Nectar, iii. 5.7 (50-1133). + + Nectar is memory of vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 (31-569). + + Need and Abundance, myth of, iii. 6.14 (26-375). + + Need, or Poros, iii. 5.2, 5, 6, 7, 10 (50-1125 to 1135). + + Negative necessary to a definition, v. 5.6 (32-584). + + Neutral evil is matter, vi. 7.28 (38-746). + + New things, unnoticed, their perception not forced, iv. 4.8 (28-450). + + New world arises out of Jupiter begotten by result of ecstasy, v. + 8.12 (31-572). + + Night objects prove uselessness of sight medium, iv. 5.3 (29-519). + + Non-being is matter, cannot be anything actual, ii. 5.4 (25-347). + + Nonentity has intelligent life beneath being, iii. 6.6 (26-360). + + Nonentity is matter, i. 8.5 (51-1150). + + Normative element of life, is Providence, iii. 3.5 (48-1084). + + Noses, pug, and Roman, due to matter, v. 9.12 (5-115). + + Nothing is contained in One; reason why everything can issue from it, + v. 2.1 (11-193). + + Notions, scientific, are both prior and posterior, v. 9.7 (5-110). + + Nowhere and everywhere is Supreme, inclination and imminence, vi. + 8.16 (39-801). + + Number and unity proceed from the One and many beings, vi. 6.10 + (34-659). + + Number as universal bond of universe, vi. 6.15 (34-670). + + Number can be said to be infinite, vi. 6.19 (34-674). + + Number, category, v. 1.4 (10-180). + + Number exists for every animal and the universal animal, vi. 6.15 + (34-668). + + Number follows and proceeds from essence, vi. 6.9 (34-655). + + Number is not in quantity, vi. 1.4 (42-842). + + Number, posterior to, is intelligible line, vi. 6.17 (34-674). + + Number, what is it to infinite? vi. 6.2 (34-644). + + Number within is the number, constituted with our being, vi. 6.16 + (34-673). + + Numbers, vi. 6 (34-651). + + Numbers and dimensions are so different as to demand different + classification, vi. 2.13 (43-916). + + Numbers and ideas, identification of, vi. 6.9 (34-656). + + Numbers and magnitudes, are of different kinds of quantity, vi. 1.4 + (42-843). + + Numbers are not quantity in themselves, vi. 1.4 (42-842). + + Numbers form part of the intelligible world, vi. 6.4 (34-647). + + Numbers, intelligible, are identical with thought, v. 5.4 (32-582). + + Numbers intelligible, difficulties connected with, vi. 6.16 (34-671). + + Numbers must exist in the primary essence, vi. 6.8 (34-654). + + Numbers participated in by objects, vi. 6.14 (34-667). + + Numbers, principle is unity's form, v. 5.5 (32-583). + + Numbers, Pythagorean, intelligible discussed, vi. 6.5 (34-649). + + Numbers, quantitative, v. 5.4 (32-583). + + Numbers, regulated generation of everything, vi. 6.15 (34-670). + + Numbers, soul as v. 1.5 (10-187); vi. 5.9 (23-324). + + Numbers split the unity into plurality, vi. 6.9 (34-656). + + Numbers, two kinds, essential and unitary, vi. 6.9 (34-657). + + Numbers, veritable, are intelligible entities, vi. 6.14 (34-668). + + Numenian name of Divinity, Essence and Being, v. 9.3 (5-104); v. 8.5 + (31-560); vi. 6.9 (34-656). + + Numerals, veritable, of the man in himself, are essential, vi. 6.16 + (34-672). + + Nurse, mother, residence and other nature is matter, iii. 6.19 + (26-384). + + + Object itself did not grasp intellect, i. 1.9 (53-1201). + + Objective justice and beauty to which we are united, v. 1.11 (10-190). + + Objective world subsists even when we are distracted, v. 1.12 + (10-191). + + Objects existence implies a previous model, vi. 6.10 (34-658). + + Objects outside have unitary existence, vi. 6.12 (34-662). + + Objects participate in numbers, vi. 6.14 (34-667). + + Obstacle to divinity is failure to abstract from Him, vi. 8.21 + (39-811). + + Obstacle to the soul is evil, i. 8.12 (51-1159). + + Obstacles lacking to creator, because of his universality, v. 8.7 + (31-562). + + Omnipresence explained by possession of all things, without being + possessed by them, v. 5.9 (32-589). + + One, v. 4; v. 4.2 (7-134, 136). + + One and Good, vi. 9 (1-47). + + One and many, like circle, is intelligence, iii. 8.8 (30-543). + + One and many, puzzle of, decides genera of essence, vi. 2.4 (43-898). + + One for Supreme, is mere negation of manifold, v. 5.6 (32-585). + + One, independent of the one outside, vi. 6.12 (34-661). + + One is all things, but none of them, v. 2.1 (11-193). + + One is everywhere by its power, iii. 9.4 (13-224). + + One is formless, v. 5.6 (32-585). + + One is nowhere, iii. 9.4 (13-224). + + One is super-rest and super-motion, iii. 9.7 (13-225). + + One not absolute, but essentially related to one examined, vi. 2.3 + (43-896). + + One not thinker, but thought, itself, vi. 9.6 (9-160). + + One present without approach, everywhere though nowhere, v. 5.8 + (32-587). + + One related in some genera, but not in others, vi. 2.3 (43-896). + + One so far above genera is not to be counted, vi. 2.3 (43-895). + + One, the soul, like divinity, always is, iv. 3.8 (27-402). + + One within us, independent of the one outside, vi, 6.12 (34-661). + + Opinion as sensation, v. 5.1 (32-576). + + Opinion, in relation to imagination, illustrates that of matter to + reason, iii. 6.15 (26-377). + + Opinions, false, are daughters of involuntary passions, i. 8.4 + (51-1147). + + Opportunity and suitability, cause of, put them beyond change, vi. + 8.18 (39-806). + + Opposition, ii. 3.4 (52-1168). + + Opposition among inanimate beings (animals and matter), iii. 2.4 + (47-1048), + + Optimism right, v. 5.2 (32-579). + + Order, cosmic, is natural, iv. 3.9 (27-404). + + Order exists only in begotten, not in seminal reason, iv. 4.16 + (28-461). + + Order in the hierarchy of nature, ours cannot be questioned, iii. 3.3 + (48-1079). + + Order is anteriority in the intelligible, iv. 4.1 (28-443). + + Order, priority of, implies conception of time, iv. 4.16 (28-461). + + Organ, the universe, every being is, iv. 4.45 (28-510). + + Organs alone, could be affected, iii. 6.2 (26-354). + + Origin and nature of evils, i. 8 (51-1142). + + Origin, causeless, really is determinism, iii. 1.1 (3-86). + + Origin of God, puzzling, by our starting from chaos, vi. 8.11 + (39-792). + + Origins of evil, sins and errors, i. 1.9 (53-1201). + + Otherness is characteristic of matter, ii. 4.13 (12-214). + + Ours is not intelligence, but we, i. 1.13 (53-1206). + + Ours, why discursive reason is, v. 3.3 (49-1093). + + Outer man, only, affected by changes of fortune, iii 2.15 (47-1067). + + + Pair, vi. 7.8; vi. 2.11; v. 1.5; vi. 7.39. + + Pair or dyad, v. 5.4 (32-582). + + Pandora, iii. 6.14 (26-375); iv. 3.14 (27-412). + + Panegyrists, who degrade what they wrongly praise, v. 5.13 (32-596). + + Pangs of childbirth, v. 5.6 (32-585). + + Paris, iii. 3.5 (48-1085). + + Part in scheme, soul must fit itself to, iii, 2.17 (47-1071). + + Partake of the one according to their capacities, vi. 4.11 (22-302). + + Partial only should be the influence of universe, iv. 4.34 (28-494). + + Participation by matter in the intelligible, only by appearance, iii. + 6.11 (26-369). + + Participation can be only in the intelligible, vi. 4.13 (22-306). + + Participation in good, two methods of, i. 7.1 (54-1208). + + Participation in sense-objects by unity is intelligible, vi. 6.13 + (34-664). + + Participation in the world of life is merely a sign of extension, vi. + 4.13 (22-306). + + Participation, method of, inferior in intelligible, vi. 5.12 (23-329). + + Participation of matter in existence and opposite, iii. 6.4 (26-357). + + Participation of matter in ideas, proves simile of head with faces, + vi. 5.8 (23-321). + + Participations, difference of senses of, allows matter to remain + impassible, iii. 6.9 (26-366). + + Partition of fund of memory between the two souls, iv. 3.31 (27-439). + + Parts, actual division in, would be denial of the whole, iv. 3.12 + (27-390). + + Parts can be lost by body, not by soul, iv. 7.5 (2-63). + + Parts divisible and indivisible, in the whole of a soul, iv. 3.19 + (27-419). + + Parts, in incorporeal things, have several senses, iv. 3.2 (27-390). + + Parts, as wine in jars, Manichean theory, rejected, iv. 3.20 (27-421). + + Parts, mathematical, not applicable as a soul, iv. 3.2 (27-390). + + Parts of a manifold unity are a part only, for examination, vi. 2.3 + (43-897). + + Parts of Supreme, mere, subordinate divinities, denied, v. 8.9 + (31-566). + + Parts, physical, term limited, iv. 3.2 (27-389). + + Passage into world of life is body's relation to the soul, vi. 4.12 + (22-304). + + Passibility of judgment and of soul, iii. 6.1 (26-350). + + Passing of intelligence from unity to duality, by thinking, v. 6.1 + (24-333). + + Passion as category (see action), vi. 1.17 (42-866). + + Passional changes in body, not in passional part of soul, iii. 6.3 + (26-356). + + Passional love elevating, though open to misleading temptations, iii. + 5.1 (50-1124). + + Passionate love twofold, sensual and beautiful, iii. 5.1 (50-1122). + + Passions affect soul differently from virtue and vice, iii. 6.3 + (26-356). + + Passions arise from seminal reasons, ii. 3.16 (52-1184). + + Passions felt by soul, without experiencing them, iv. 4.19 (28-466). + + Passions, how they penetrate from the body into the soul, i. 1.3 + (53-1194). + + Passions involuntary are mothers of false opinions, i. 8.4 (51-1147). + + Passions, modes of feeling, i. 1.1 (53-1191). + + Passions not caused by soul, ii. 3.16 (52-1184). + + Passions of strayed souls are loves contrary to nature, iii. 5.7 + (50-1135). + + Passions of universe produced by body of stars, ii. 3.10 (52-1177). + + Passions reduced external images, iii. 6.5 (26-358). + + Passions, Stoic theory of, opposed, iii. 6.3 (26-355) + + Passions, their avoidance, task of philosophy, iii. 6.5 (26-358). + + Passions, what suitable to earth, iv. 4.22 (28-471). + + Passive, really, is soul, when swayed by appetites, iii. 1.9 (3-98). + + Path of simplification to unity, vi. 9.3 (9-152). + + Path to ecstasy, land marks, i. 6.9 (1-54) + + Penetration into inner sanctuary, yields possession of all things, v. + 8.11 (31-570). + + Penetration of body by soul, but not by another body, iv. 7.8 (2-72). + + Penetration of body by soul proves the latter's incorporeality, iv. + 7.8 (2-72). + + Penetration, total, impossible in mixture of bodies, iv. 7.8 (2-72). + + Penetration, total, mixture, to the point of, ii. 7 (37-691). + + Penia, or need, myth of, iii. 5.25 (50-1130) + + Perception of new things, not forced, iv. 4.8 (28-450). + + Perception of the Supreme, its manner, v. 5.10 (32-591). + + Perfect happiness attained when nothing more is desired, i. 4.4 + (46-1026). + + Perfect is primary nature (Plotinic); not goal of evolution (Stoic), + iv. 7.8 (2-73). + + Perfect life consists in intelligence, i. 4.3 (46-1024). + + Perfect life, its possession, i. 4.6 (46-1027). + + Perfection not to be sought in, material things, iii. 2.7 (47-1053). + + Perfection of a picture make shadows necessary, iii. 2.11 (47-1060). + + Perfection of the universe, evils are necessary, ii. 3.18 (52-1187). + + Perfection of universe, object of incarnation, iv. 8.5 (6-128). + + Perfection's author must be above it, vi. 7.32 (38-752). + + Perishable is body, because composite, iv. 7.1 (2-56). + + Permanence, the characteristic of absolute good, i. 7.1 (54-1209). + + Perpetuates itself by form, does heaven, through influx, ii. 1.1 + (40-813). + + Perpetuity and eternity, difference between, iii. 7.4 (45-991). + + Persistence of changeable, iv. 7.9 (2-78). + + Perspective, ii. 8 (35-680). + + Perspective, various theories of, ii. 8.1 (35-680). + + Persuasion, characteristic of soul, v. 3.6 (49-1099). + + Perversity of soul induces judgment and punishment, iv. 8.5 (6-128) + + Pessimism wrong, v. 5.2 (32-579). + + Phidias sculpts Jupiter not from sense imitation, v. 8.1 (31-552). + + Philonic distinction between God, and the God, vi. 7.1 (38-697). + + Philosopher, being already virtuous, needs only promotion, i. 3.3 + (20-272). + + Philosopher, how he rises to intelligible world, i. 3.3 (20-271). + + Philosopher is already disengaged and needs only a guide, i. 3.3 + (20-271). + + Philosophers born, alone reach the higher region, v. 9.2 (5-103). + + Philosophers, how they develop, v. 9.2 (5-103). + + Philosophers justify justice of God, iv. 4.30 (28-486). + + Philosopher's mathematics followed by pure dialectics as method of + progress, i. 3.3 (20-272). + + Philosopher's method of disengagement is mathematics as incorporeal + science, i. 3.3 (20-271). + + Philosopher's opinions about time to be studied, iii. 7.6 (45-995). + + Philosophy contains physics, ethics, i. 3.5 (20-273). + + Philosophy exact root of psychology, ii. 3.16 (52-1183). + + Philosophy lower part of dialectic, i. 3.5 (20-273). + + Philosophy separates soul from her image, vi. 4.16 (22-310). + + Philosophy's task is avoidance of passions, iii. 6.5 (26-358). + + Phoebus inspires men to interior vision, v. 8.10 (31-569). + + Physical categories are matter, form, combination, attributes and + accidents, vi. 3.3 (44-938). + + Physical categories of Plotinos, vi. 3 (44-933). + + Physical genera of, are different from those of the intelligible, iv. + 3.1 (27-387). + + Physical life, can it exist without the soul? iv. 4.29 (28-485). + + Physical, not mental being, affected by stars, iii. 1.6 (3-95). + + Physical powers do not form a secondary quality, vi. 1.11 (42-856). + + Physical qualities applied to Supreme only by analogy, vi. 8.8 + (39-785). + + Physical soul, production due to, not astrological power, iv. 4.38 + (28-501). + + Physical souls, various, how they affect production, iv. 4.37 + (28-500). + + Physical terms, only verbal similarity to intelligible, vi. 3.5 + (44-941). + + Physical theories, absurd, iii. 1.3 (3-89). + + Physically begun, spiritual becomes love, vi. 7.33 (38-755). + + Physician's fore-knowledge, simile of Providence, iii. 3.5 (48-1085). + + Picture of the structure of the universe, ii. 3.18 (52-1187). + + Picture, perfection of, demands shadow, iii. 2.11 (47-1060). + + Picture that pictures itself is universe, ii. 3.18 (52-1188). + + Pilgrim soul is in the world, ii. 9.18 (33-635). + + Pilot governs the ship, relation of soul to body, i. 1.3 (53-1194); + iv. 3.21 (27-422). + + Place has no contrary, vi. 3.12 (44-954). + + Place or time do not figure among true categories, vi. 2.16 (43-919). + + Place or where is Aristotelian category, vi. 1.14 (42-862). + + Planet calculations, ii. 3.6 (52-1171). + + Plant positions producing adulteries, absurd, ii. 3.6 (52-1171). + + Planning of the world by God, refuted, v. 8.7 (31-561, 563). + + Plants, do they admit of happiness, i. 4.1, 2 (46-1019 to 1021). + + Plants even aspire to contemplation, iii. 8.1 (30-531). + + Plato departed from, in categories, vi. 2.1 (43-891). + + Plato not only hates body, but admires world, ii. 9.17 (33-633). + + Plato uncertain about time, iii. 7.12 (45-1012). + + Platonic basis of anti-gnostic controversy, v. 8.7 (31-561). + + Plato's authority, restored, v. 1.8 (10-186). + + Plato's language doubtful, iii. 6.12 (26-372); vi. 7.30 (38-749). + + Pleasure an accessory to all goods of the soul, vi. 7.30 (38-749). + + Pleasure, because changeable and restless, cannot be the good, vi. + 7.27 (38-745) + + Pleasure, good's independence from, is temperate man, vi. 7.29 + (38-747). + + Pleasure may accompany the good, but is independent thereof, vi. 7.27 + (38-745). + + Pleasure strictly, has nothing to do with happiness, i. 5.4 (36-685). + + Pleasures of virtuous men are of higher kinds, i. 4.12 (46-1036). + + Plotinos forced to demonstration of categories by divergence from + Plato, vi. 2.1 (43-891). + + Plotinos's genera of sensual existence, iv. 3 (27-387). + + Poros or Abundance, myth of, iii. 5.2, 5 (50-1125 to 1131). + + Possession by divinity is last stage of ecstasy, v. 8.10 (31-569). + + Possession of perfect life, i. 4.4 (46-1026). + + Possession of things causes intelligence to think them, vi. 6.7 + (34-653). + + Potential, intelligible matter is not, ii. 5.3 (25-345). + + Potentialities are inseparable from their beings, vi. 4.9 (22-298). + + Potentiality and actuality not applicable to divinity, ii. 9.1 + (33-599). + + Potentiality, definition of, ii. 5.1 (25-341). + + Potentiality exists only in corruptable matter, ii. 5.5 (25-348). + + Potentiality explains miracle of seeds containing manifolds, iv. 9.5 + (8-146). + + Potentiality producing, not becoming, is the soul, ii. 5.3 (25-345). + + Poverty caused by external circumstances, ii. 3.8 (52-1174). + + Power and beauty of essence attracts all things, vi. 6.18 (34-678). + + Power, lack of, cannot fall under same categories as power, vi. 1.10 + (42-852). + + Power, master of himself, really is the Supreme, vi. 8.10 (39-788). + + Power of divinities lies in their inhering in the Supreme, v. 8.9 + (31-565). + + Powers though secret, in everything, iv. 4.37 (28-500). + + Practice is only a preparation for contemplation, iii. 8.6 (30-538). + + Prayed to, sun as well as stars may be, iv. 4.30 (28-486). + + Prayers, all made in accordance with natural law, answered, iv. 4.42 + (28-506). + + Prayers answered by stars unconsciously, iv. 4.42 (28-505). + + Prayers, how they are answered, iv. 4.41 (28-505). + + Prayers of even the evil are answered, iv. 4.42 (28-506). + + Predict, stars do, because of souls imperfection, ii. 3.10 (52-1177). + + Prediction implies that future is determined, iii. 1.3 (3-90). + + Prediction, not by works, but by analogy, iii. 3.6 (48-1080). + + Prediction, with its responsiveness, do not fall under action and + experience, vi. 1.22 (42-875). + + Predisposition of active life subjection to enchantments, iv. 4.43 + (28-508). + + Predisposition to magic by affections and weaknesses, iv. 4.44 + (28-508). + + Predominant soul part active while others sleep and (see managing + soul) appear exterior, iv. 2.2 (21-279); iii. 4.2 (15-234). + + Predominating part, Stoic, iii. 3.2 (48-1078). + + Predominating principle directs universe, ii. 3.8 (52-1173). + + Preparation for contemplation is practice, iii. 8.6 (30-538). + + Preponderance spiritual method of becoming wise, i. 4.14 (46-1037). + + Presence of God, everywhere entire, explained as infinite, vi. 5.4 + (23-318). + + Presence of intelligible entities implied by knowledge of them, v. + 5.1 (32-575). + + Presence the one identical essence everywhere, entirely, vi. 4 + (22-285). + + Presences, different kinds of, vi. 4.11 (22-302). + + Present, eternal, v. 1.4 (10-179). + + Preservative not, is universal soul, but creative. ii. 3.16 (52-1183). + + Preserver and creator is the good, vi. 7.23 (38-740). + + Preserving, begotten Son, as result of ecstasy, v. 8.12 (31-571). + + Priam, misfortunes of, i. 4.5 (46-1027). + + Pride is folly, ii. 9.9 (33-618). + + Primary essence, numbers must exist in it, vi. 6.8 (34-654). + + Primary evil is evil in itself, i. 8.3 (51-1146). + + Primary evil is lack of measure, i. 8.8 (51-1155). + + Primary evil of soul, i. 8.5 (51-1148). + + Primary existence will contain thought, existence and life, ii. 4.6 + (12-203); v. 6.6 (24-339). + + Primary movement said to underlie movement of soul, iii. 7.12 + (45-1013). + + Primitive one is a spherical figure and intelligible, vi. 6.17 + (34-675). + + Primitive relation between soul and body, i. 1.3 (53-1194). + + Principle, a supra-thinking, necessary to the working of + intelligence, v. 6.2 (24-334). + + Principle and end simultaneous in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563). + + Principle, independent, is human soul, iii. 1.8 (3-97). + + Principle of all, though not limited thereby, is the one, v. 3.11 + (49-1109). + + Principle of beauty, what is it? i. 6.1 (1-40). + + Principle one self-existent constituted by being an actualization, + vi. 8.7 (39-784). + + Principle, primary, matter cannot be, vi. 1.26 (42-879.) + + Principle, simultaneous, above intelligence and existence, iii. 7.2 + (45-989). + + Principle, super-essential, does not think, v. 6.1 (24-333). + + Principle, the first, must be one exclusively, which would make + thought impossible, v. 6.1 (24-335). + + Principle, the first, thinking, is the second principle, v. 6.1 + (24-335). + + Principle, the second, the first thinking principle, is, v. 6.1 + (24-335). + + Principles, divine, enumerated, vi. 7.25 (38-741). + + Principles limited to three, ii. 9.2 (33-602). + + Principles, lower, contain only anterior things, iv. 4.16 (28-461). + + Principles, single, of universe, ii. 3.6 (52-1171). + + Priority not applied in the divinity because he made himself, vi. + 8.20 (39-808). + + Prison of soul, is body, iv. 8.11 (6-120). + + Priority of soul to body, iv. 7.2 (2-58). + + Privation is nonentity, adds no conceit, ii. 4.14 (12-215). + + Privation of form of matter, ii. 4.13 (12-213). + + Privation of qualities; not a quality, ii. 4.13 (12-213). + + Privation relative is impossible, i. 8.12 (51-1158). + + Process, vi. 3.1 (44-933); iv. 8.6 (6-129). + + Process from unity to duality, v. 6.1 (24-338). + + Process, natural, only affected by starvation, ii. 3.12 (52-1178). + + Process of purification of soul and its separation from body, iii. + 6.5 (26-359). + + Process of soul elevation, v. 3.9 (49-1106). + + Process of unification, v. 5.4 (32-581). + + Process of vision and hearing, iv. 5 (29-514). + + Process of wakening to reality, v. 5.11 (32-592). + + Process, triune, also implies identity and difference, vi. 9.8 + (43-905). + + Processes of ecstasy by purification, i. 6.6, 8, 9 (1-49). + + Procession by it, soul connects indivisible and divisible essence, + iv. 2.1 (21-276). + + Procession, continuous, necessary to the Supreme, iv. 8.6 (6-129). + + Procession from one of what is after it, v. 4 (7-134). + + Procession is effusion of super-abundance, v. 2.1 (11-194). + + Procession is universal, from first to last, v. 2.2 (11-195). + + Procession of intelligence is an excursion down and up, iv. 8.7 + (6-131). + + Procession of soul, iv. 8.5 (6-128). + + Procession of the world-soul, iii. 8.5 (30-537). + + Procession of world from unity, cause. v. 2.1 (11-193). + + Procreation, he not desiring it, aspires to higher beauty, iii. 5.1 + (50-1123). + + Procreativeness inherent (see radiation, exuberant, super-abundant), + v. 4.1 (7-135). + + Prodigal, return, i. 6.8 (1-53). + + Prodigal son, v. 1.1 (10-173). + + Produced by stars, which is and what is not, ii. 3.13 (52-1178). + + Producing potentiality, not becoming, is the soul, ii. 5.3 (25-346). + + Production due to some physical soul not astrological power, iv. 4.38 + (28-501). + + Production of the things located is essence, vi. 6.10 (34-657). + + Progress possible, argument against suicide, i. 9 (16-243). + + Progressively higher stages of love, v. 9.2 (5-103). + + Progressively, world-soul informs all things, iv. 3.10 (27-406). + + Prometheus, iv. 3.14 (27-412). + + Prometheus of flight leaves soul unharmed from incarnation, iv. 8.5 + (6-128). + + Proofs for existence and nature of intelligence, v. 9.3 (5-104). + + Proportion, Stoic principle of beauty, not ultimate, but derivative, + i. 6.1 (1-41). + + Providence accused by slavery of good and victory of evil, iii. 2.6 + (47-1052). + + Providence, chief of all, iii. 3.2 (48-1079). + + Providence consists of appointed times in life, should be observed, + i. 9 (16-243). + + Providence does not abandon even the mediocre, iii. 2.9 (47-1058). + + Providence does not explain prediction but analogy, iii. 3.6 + (48-1086). + + Providence, double, particular and universal, iii. 3.4 (48-1081). + + Providence embraces everything below, iii. 2.7 (47-1054). + + Providence, fore knowledge of, like unto a physician, iii. 3.5 + (48-1085). + + Providence is normative element of life, iii. 3.5 (48-1084). + + Providence is not particular, because world had no beginning, iii. + 2.1 (47-1043). + + Providence is prevision and reasoning, iii, 2.1 (47-1042). + + Providence is unpredictable circumstance changing life, iii. 4.6 + (15-242). + + Providence may appear as chance, iii. 3.2 (48-1078). + + Providence, objection to by internecine war, iii. 2.15 (47-1064). + + Providence problems solved by derivation of reason from intelligence, + iii. 2.16 (47-1068). + + Providence should not overshadow initiative, iii. 2.9 (47-1057). + + Providence, the plan of the universe is from eternity, vi. 8.17 + (39-803). + + Providence, twofold, exerted by twofold soul, iv. 8.2 (6-122). + + Prudence interpreted as purification, i. 6.6 (1-49). + + Prudence or Metis, myth of, iii. 5.5 (50-1130). + + Psychic, gnostic distinction of men, ii. 9.18 (33-635). + + Psychologic elements, sensation, faculties of generation and + increase, and creative power, i. 1.8 (53-1200). + + Psychologic elements, soul gives life to, i. 1.8 (53-1200). + + Psychological effect of vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 + (31-568). + + Psychological faculty, on which is the freedom of will based, vi. 8.2 + (39-775). + + Psychological questions, iv. 3 (27-387). + + Psychological study of, outline, iv. 2.1 (21-276). + + Psychological theory of quality, vi. 1.12 (42-858). + + Psychology, common part, its function, i. 1.10 (53-1203). + + Psychology, does ratiocination belong to same principles as passions, + i. 1.1 (53-1191). + + Psychology (every man double), composite animal, real man or + reasonable soul, ii. 3.9 (52-1176). + + Psychology, exact root of philosophy, ii. 3.16 (52-1183). + + Psychology, explanation of anger parts, courage, iii. 6.2 (26-354). + + Psychology, inquiring principle, i. 1.1 (53-1191). + + Psychology obeys the precept "Know thyself," iv, 3.1 (27-387). + + Psychology of demons, iv. 4.43 (28-507). + + Psychology of earth, iv. 4.27 (28-479). + + Psychology of sensation, iv. 3.26 (27-430). + + Psychology of vegetative part of soul, iv. 4.28 (28-481). + + Psychology thought, its nature and classification, i. 1.1 (53-1191). + + Pun between science and knowledge, v. 8.4 (31-559). + + Pun on aeon, as age or eternity, iii. 7.1 (45-986). + + Pun on "agalmata," v. 8.5, 6 (31-560). + + Pun on Aphrodite, as delicate, iii. 5.8 (50-1137). + + Pun on being, intelligible, vi. 3.8 (44-947). + + Pun on creation and adornment, ii. 4.4 (12-214); i. 8.7 (51-1152). + + Pun on difference in others, ii. 4.13 (12-214). + + Pun on "dii" and "diken," v. 8.4 (31-558). + + Pun on "doxa," v. 5.1 (32-578). + + Pun on Egyptian hieroglyphics and statues (see "agalmata"). + + Pun on "eidos" and "idea," v. 9.8 (5-111); vi 9.2 (9-149). + + Pun on "einai" and "henos," v. 5.5 (32-584). + + Pun on forms and statues, v. 8.5 (31-560). + + Pun on heaven, world, universe, animal and all, ii. 1.1 (40-814). + + Pun on Hestia, and standing, v. 5.5 (32-584). + + Pun on Hesis, vi. 1.23 (42-877). + + Pun on "idea" and "eidos," see "eidos." + + Pun on inclination, ii. 9.4 (33-605). + + Pun on "koros," iii. 8.11 (30-550); v. 8.13 (31-573); v. 9.8 (5-111); + iv. 3.14 (27-412); i. 8.7 (51-1152). + + Pun on love and vision, iii. 5.3 (50-1128). + + Pun on "nous," "noesis," and "to noeton," v. 3.5 (49-1096 to 1099). + + Pun on "paschein," experiencing, suffering, reacting, and passion, + vi. 1.15 (42-864). + + Pun on Poros, iii. 5.9, 10 (50-1140). + + Pun on Prometheus and Providence, iv. 3.14 (27-412). + + Pun on reason and characteristic, iii. 6.2 (17-248); iv. 7.4 (2-61). + + Pun on "schesis" and "schema," iv. 4.29 (28-484). + + Pun on "Soma" and "sozesthai," v. 9.5 (5-109). + + Pun on suffering, iv. 9.3 (8-143). + + Pun on thinking, thinkable and intellection, vi. 1.18 (42-868). + + Pun on timely and sovereign, vi. 8.18 (39-806). + + Pun on unadorned and created, see "koros," i. 8.7 (51-1152). + + Pun on Vesta and Hestia, v. 5.5 (32-584). + + Punishable and impassible, soul is both. i. 1.12 (53-1204). + + Punishment follows perversity of soul, iv. 8.5 (6-128). + + Punishments and misfortunes, significance of, iv. 3.15 (27-414). + + Pure thoughts is that part of the soul which most resembles + intelligence, v. 3.8 (49-1102). + + Purification clears up mental knowledge, iv. 7.10 (2-80). + + Purification, content of virtues, i. 6.6 (1-49). + + Purification in mysteries, leads to nakedness, i. 6.6 (1-50). + + Purification of soul like man washing off mud, i. 6.5 (1-48). + + Purification produces conversion, and is used by virtue, i. 2.4 + (19-261). + + Purification of soul process involved, iii. 6.5 (26-359). + + Purification's goal is second divinity intelligence, i. 2.6 (19-264). + + Purification limit is that of the soul self-control, i. 2.5 (19-263). + + Purity, condition of remaining in unity with the divinity, v. 8.11 + (31-570). + + Purpose of life, supreme, vision of God, i. 6.7 (1-50). + + Puzzle of one and many decides of the genera of essence, vi. 2.4 + (43-898). + + Puzzle of origin of God due to chaos being starting point, vi. 8.11 + (39-792). + + Puzzle of soul being one, yet in all, iv. 3.4 (27-394). + + + Quadrature, ii. 3.4 (52-1168). + + Qualities, sqq. vi. 1.10 (42-852). + + Qualities admit of degrees, vi. 3.20 (44-970). + + Qualities are accidental shapes of being, ii. 6.3 (17-250). + + Qualities are acts of being, ii. 6.2 (17-249). + + Qualities are incorporeal, vi. 1.29 (42-885). + + Qualities, because they change, matter must be passible, iii. 6.8 + (26-366). + + Qualities classified as body and of soul, vi. 3.17 (44-963). + + Qualities, distinction between qualities and complements of being, + ii. 6.1 (17-245). + + Qualities, genuine, are not differential beings, vi. 1.10 (42-853). + + Qualities, modal and essential, distinctions between, ii. 6.1 + (17-246). + + Qualities more essential than quantity, ii. 8.1 (35-680). + + Qualities not all are reasons, vi. 1.10 (42-854). + + Qualities not formed by union of four Plotinic categories, vi. 2.15 + (43-918). + + Qualities of sense, among them belong many other conceptions, vi. + 3.16 (44-961). + + Qualities, some are differences, vi. 3.18 (44-965). + + Qualities, some differences are not, vi. 3.18 (44-966). + + Qualities, their derivation from affection is of no importance, vi. + 1.11 (42-857). + + Qualities, ugly, are imperfect reasons, vi. 1.10 (42-855). + + Quality, ii. 6 (17-245); iv. 7.5, 9, 10 (2-62 to 80). + + Quality and matter form body, according to Stoics, iv. 7.3 (2-59). + + Quality and thing qualified, relation between, vi. 1.12 (42-858). + + Quality, by it all things depend on the good, i. 7.2 (54-1209). + + Quality, by it, being differences are distinguished, vi. 3.17 + (44-963). + + Quality, category, various derivatives of, vi. 3.19 (44-967). + + Quality consists of a non-essential character, vi. 1.10 (42-855). + + Quality differences cannot be distinguished by sensation, vi. 3.17 + (44-963). + + Quality, intelligible and sense, difference between, ii. 6.3 (17-249). + + Quality is good, a common label or common quality, vi. 7.18 (38-733). + + Quality is not a power but disposition, form and character, vi. 1.10 + (42-854). + + Quality is only figurative name for complement of being, vi. 2.14 + (43-918). + + Quality none in matter, ii. 4.7 (12-204); iv. 7.3 (2-59). + + Quality none in matter which is deprivation, i. 8.11 (51-1157). + + Quality not a primary genus, because posterior to being, vi. 2.14 + (43-917). + + Quality not in matter is an accident, i. 8.10 (51-1157). + + Quality, one, partaken of by capacity and disposition, vi. 1.11 + (42-856). + + Quality, physical need of supreme only by analogy, vi. 9.8 (9-164). + + Quality, psychological theory of, vi. 1.12 (42-858). + + Quality, secondary, not formed by physical powers, vi. 1.11 (42-856). + + Quality, shape is not, vi. 1.11 (42-857). + + Quality, according to the Stoics, vi. 1.29 (42-885). + + Quality, there is only one kind, vi. 1.11 (42-856). + + Quality, various terms expressing it, vi. 3.16 (44-960). + + Quality, whether it alone can be called similar or dissimilar, vi. + 3.15 (44-959). + + Quality-less thing in itself, reached by abstraction, ii. 4.10 + (12-207). + + Quantity, vi. 1.4 (42-841). + + Quantity a secondary genus, therefore not a first, vi. 2.13 (43-915). + + Quantity admits of contraries, vi. 3.11 (44-953). + + Quantity, Aristotelian criticized, vi. 1.4 (42-841). + + Quantity, as equal and unequal, does not refer to the objects, vi. + 1.5 (42-845). + + Quantity category, v. 1.4 (10-180). + + Quantity, continuous and definite, have nothing in common. vi. 1.4 + (42-841). + + Quantity, definition of, includes large and small, vi. 3.11 (44-952). + + Quantity, different kinds of, in magnitudes and numbers, vi. 1.4 + (42-843). + + Quantity, discrete, different from continuous, vi. 3.13 (44-955). + + Quantity, elements of continuous, vi. 3.14 (44-955). + + Quantity, if time is, why a separate category, vi. 1.13 (42-861). + + Quantity in number, but not number in quantity, vi. 1.4 (42-842). + + Quantity in quantative number, v. 5.4 (32-582). + + Quantity is incorporeal, ii. 4.9 (12-207). + + Quantity is speech, 1.5 (42-844). + + Quantity less essential than quality, ii. 8.1 (35-680). + + Quantity not qualities studied by geometry, vi. 3.15 (44-958). + + Quantity, time is not, vi. 1-5 (42-844). + + Question, not to be asked by our order in nature, iii. 3.3 (48-1079). + + Quiddity and being earlier than suchness, ii. 6.2 (17-248). + + Quintessence, ii. 1.2 (40-815); ii. 5.3 (25-346). + + + Radiation joins image to its model, vi. 4.10 (22-300). + + Radiation of an image is generation, v. 1.6 (10-182). + + Radiation of good is creative power, vi. 7.37 (38-761). + + Radiation of light, v. 5.7 (32-586). + + Radiation of multiple unity, v. 3.15 (49-1115). + + Radiation of stars for good, explains their influence, iv. 4.35 + (28-497). + + Radii centering, to explain, soul unifying sensations, iv. 7.6 (2-65). + + Rank, v. 4.2 (7-136); v. 5.4 (32-581). + + Rank after death, depends on state at death, hence progress must be + achieved, i. 9 (16-243). + + Rank of souls, iv. 3.6 (27-397). + + Rank, souls of the second, universal rank, are men, ii. 3.13 + (52-1180). + + Rank third, of existence, should not be occupied by modality, vi. + 1.30 (42-887). + + Rank third of souls, ii. 1.8 (55-1200). + + Ranks in the Universe reasonable for souls to be assigned thereto, + iii. 2.12 (47-1061). + + Ranks of existence, three, ii. 9.13 (33-626); iii. 3.3 (48-1079); + iii. 5.9 (50-1138); vi. 4.11 (22-302); vi. 5.4 (23-318). + + Ranks of existence beneath the beautiful, vi. 7.42 (38-770). + + Ratiocination, has no place even in the world-soul, iv. 4.11 (28-455). + + Ratiocination, souls can reason intuitionally without, iv. 3.18 + (27-416). + + Rationalized matter, body as, ii. 7.3 (37-696). + + Reaction or suffering, definition of, vi. 1.21 (43-872). + + Reactions, need not be passive, but may be active, vi. 1.21 (42-870). + + Real man and we, distinctions between, i. 1.10 (53-1202). + + Real man differs from body, i. 1.10 (53-1203). + + Reality, same different degrees of, are intelligence and life, vi. + 7.18 (38-732). + + Reason and form possessed by everything, ii. 7.3 (37-696). + + Reason as a whole, vi. 5.10 (23-326). + + Reason as derived from intelligence, iii. 2.16 (47-1068). + + Reason cannot be deduced from atoms, iii. 1.2 (3-88). + + Reason, differentiated, would deprive the soul of consciousness, ii. + 9.1 (33-602). + + Reason discursive is not used during discarnation, iv. 3.18 (27-416). + + Reason divine is to blame, iv. 2.10 (47-1059). + + Reason followed, is secret of freedom, iii. 1.9 (3-97). + + Reason has no extension, iv. 7.5 (2-64). + + Reason in head, not in brain, iv. 3.23 (27-425). + + Reason, its influence is only suggestive, i. 2.5 (19-264). + + Reason no explanation of living well, i. 4.2 (46-1022). + + Reason not resulted in foresight of creation, vi. 7.1 (38-697). + + Reason not sufficient explanation of living well, i. 4.2 (46-1022). + + Reason or ideas possessed by intellectual life, vi. 2.21 (43-927). + + Reason, seminal iv. 7.2 (2-58). + + Reason, seminal, produces man, ii. 3.12 (52-1178). + + Reason that begets everything is Jupiter's garden, iii. 5.9 (50-1137). + + Reason, total of the universe, ii. 3.13 (52-1178). + + Reason unites the soul divided by bodies, iv. 9.3 (8-142). + + Reason, universal, is both soul and nature, iii. 8.3 (30-533). + + Reason used only while hindered by obstacles of body, iv. 3.18 + (27-416). + + Reasonable for souls to be assigned to different ranks, iii. 2.12 + (47-1061). + + Reasoning absent in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563). + + Reasoning and foresight are only figurative expressions, vi. 7.1 + (38-699). + + Reasoning and memory not implied by world-soul, wisdom, iv. 4-12 + (28-457). + + Reasoning and memory superseded by world-soul's wisdom, iv. 4.12 + (28-456). + + Reasons are the actualization of the soul that begets the animal, vi. + 7.5 (38-707). + + Reasons, double, iii. 3.4 (48-1081). + + Reasons, not all are qualities, vi. 1.10 (42-854). + + Reasons, unity constituted by contained contraries, iii. 2.16 + (47-1069). + + Reception, transmission, relation, underlies action and experience, + vi. 1.22 (42-874). + + Receptivity accounts for divinity's seeing by individuals, vi. 5.12 + (23-330). + + Receptivity determines participation in the one, vi. 4.11 (22-331). + + Receptivity is limit of participation in divine, iv. 8.6 (6-129). + + Reciprocal nature of all things, iii. 3.6 (48-1080). + + Recognition of divine kinship depends of self knowledge, vi. 9.7 + (9-163). + + Recognition of each other by souls, descending from intelligibles + into heaven, iv. 4.5 (28-447). + + Redemption of world by world-soul, v. 1.2 (10-175). + + Reduction to unity, v. 3.6 (49-1099). + + Reflection, not, but self-necessity, cause of creation of + sense-world, iii. 2.2 (47-1044). + + Reflects everything, does the empty mirror of matter, iii. 6.7 + (26-363). + + Reformatory, are hell's torments, iv. 4.45 (28-511). + + Refraction, lighting fire from, illustrates generation, iii. 6.14 + (26-376). + + Refreshment not needed by stars, which are inexhaustible, ii. 1.8 + (40-827). + + Refutation of James Lange theory, i. 1.5 (53-1196). + + Reincarnation is result of soul-judgments, iv. 8.5 (6-128). + + Rejection of form of approaching souls proves formlessness of the + Supreme, vi. 7.34 (38-756). + + Relation, vi. 1.6 (42-845). + + Relation between external and internal, i. 8.5 (51-1149). + + Relation is a habit or manner of being, vi. 3.27 (44-981). + + Relation is an appendage existing only among definite objects, vi. + 2.16 (43-919). + + Relation of good, intelligence and soul like light, sun and moon, v. + 6.4 (24-337). + + Relation primitive between soul and body, i. 1.3 (53-1194). + + Relation, Stoic, category confuses the new with the anterior, vi. + 1.31 (42-888). + + Relations are simultaneous existences, vi. 1.7 (42-848). + + Relations, are they subjective of objective? vi. 1.7 (42-847). + + Relay of sensation from organ to directing principle, impossible, iv. + 7.7 (2-67). + + Relay transmission, iv. 2.2 (21-280); iv. 5.4 (29-522). + + Relays in spreading light, v. 3.9 (49-1105). + + Remember itself, the soul does not even, iv. 4.2 (28-443). + + Remembers, soul becomes that which she does, iv. 4.3 (28-445). + + Reminiscences of intelligible entities, v. 9.5 (5-107). + + Repentances of gnostics, opposed, ii. 9.6 (33-608). + + Repugnance natural to study of unity, vi. 9.3 (9-15). + + Resemblance lacking, makes contraries, vi. 3.20 (44-970). + + Resemblance of intelligible to earthly based on the converse + (Platonic), v. 8.6 (31-561). + + Resemblance to divinity is soul's welfare, i. 6.6 (1-49). + + Resemblance to divinity, result of homely virtues, i. 2.1 (19-257). + + Resemblance, two kinds, effect and cause or simultaneous effects, i. + 2.2 (19-258). + + Residence and substrate of forms to matter, ii. 4.1 (12-197). + + Residence demanded by forms, against Moderatus of Gades, ii. 4.12 + (12-211). + + Residence, mother, nurse or other nature is matter, iii. 6.18 + (26-382). + + Residence of eternal generation is matter, iii. 6.13 (26-373). + + Residence of form is matter as image of extension, ii. 4.11 (12-210). + + Residence of universal soul is heaven, immortalizing it, ii. 1.4 + (40-817). + + Responsible for our ills, Gods are not, iv. 4.37 (28-500). + + Responsible, spontaneity not affected by involuntariness, iii. 2.10 + (47-1060). + + Responsibility depends solely on involuntariness, vi. 8.1 (39-774). + + Responsibility not injured by guidance of Daemon, iii. 4.5 (15-238). + + Responsibility not to be shifted from responsible reason, iii. 2.15 + (47-1065). + + Rest, v. 1.4 (10-178); v. 3.7 (49-1101). + + Rest and motion below one, iii. 9.7 (13-225). + + Rest and movement distinction also inapplicable, ii. 9.1 (33-600). + + Rest, as category, iii. 7.1 (45-987); vi. 2.7 (43-903). + + Rest consists of change, iv. 8.1 (6-119). + + Rest, intelligible, the form by which all consists, v. 1.7 (10-184). + + Rest of Heraclitus, description of ecstatic goal, vi. 9.8 (9-165); + vi. 9.11 (9-170). + + Resultance of causes is anything, ii. 3.14 (52-1181). + + Results of ecstasy, remaining close to divinity, v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Retirement of soul is to superior power, v. 2.2 (11-195). + + Retribution divine, all are led to it by secret road, iv. 4.45 + (28-511). + + Return of prodigal, i. 6.8 (1-52). + + Return of soul to intelligible by three paths, i. 3.1 (20-270). + + Return of soul to its principle on destruction of body, v. 2.2 + (11-195). + + Revealers of the eternal, are sense-objects, iv. 8.6 (6-130). + + Revelation of divine power expresses true knowledge, ii. 9.9 (33-617). + + Rewards may be neglected by good, iii. 2.8 (47-1055). + + Rhea, iii. 6.19 (26-385); v. 1.7 (10-185). + + Riches, inequality of no moment to an eternal being, ii. 9.9 (33-616). + + Ridiculous to complain of lower nature of animals, iii. 2.9 (47-1059). + + Ridiculous to expect perfections, but deny it to nature, ii. 9.5 + (33-607). + + Right of leaving world reserved by wise men, i. 4.16 (46-1039). + + Rises to the good, does the soul, by scorning all things below, vi. + 7.31 (38-750). + + Roads, secret, leads all to retribution, iv. 4.45 (27-511). + + Rocks have greatest nonentity, iii. 6.6 (26-361). + + Rush of soul towards the one, v. 3.17 (49-1120). + + + Same principle, how can it exist in all things? vi. 4.6 (22-295). + + Same principle, how various things can participate, vi. 4.12 (22-303). + + Same thing not seen in the Supreme by different persons, v. 8.12 + (31-571). + + Sample is only thing we can examine, v. 8.3 (33-555). + + Sample that must be purified, is image of intelligence, v. 8.3 + (31-555). + + Sanative element of life, is Providence, iii. 3.5 (48-1084). + + Sanctuary, inner, penetrations into, resulting advantage of ecstasy, + v. 8.11 (31-569). + + Sanctuary of ecstasy, i. 6.8 (1-52); i. 8.7 (51-1152); v. 8.4 + (31-557); vi. 9.11 (9-169). + + Sanctuary of mysteries, i. 6.6 (1-50). + + Satiety does not produce scorn, in the intelligible, v. 8.4 (31-558). + + Satisfaction of desire to live is not happiness, i. 5.2 (36-684). + + Saturn, v. 1.7 (10-185); v. 8.13 (31-573); iv. 4.31 (28-489). + + Saturn and Mars, relations are quite illogical, ii 3.5 (52-1169). + + Saturn held down by chains, v. 8.13 (31-573). + + Saturnian realm, vi. 1.4 (10-178). + + Scheme, part in it soul must fit itself to, iii. 2.17 (47-1071). + + Science does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-920). + + Science is either a movement or something composite, vi. 2.18 + (43-923). + + Science is present in the whole, potentially at least, v. 9.8 (5-111). + + Science is the actualization of the notions that are potential + science, vi. 2.20 (43-925). + + Science, part and whole in it not applicable to soul, iv. 3.2 + (27-390). + + Science's, greatest is touched with the good, vi. 7.3 (38-760). + + Scorn not produced by satiety in the intelligible world, v. 8.4 + (31-558). + + Scorn of life implies good, vi. 7.29 (38-748). + + Scorn of this world no guarantee of goodness, ii. 9.16 (33-630). + + Scorning all things below, soul rises to the good, vi. 7.31 (38-750). + + Sculptor, v. 9.3 (5-104). + + Seal of wax, impressions on, are sensations, iv. 7.6 (2-66). + + Second must be perfect, v. 4.1 (7-136). + + Second necessarily begotten by first, v. 4.1 (7-135). + + Second rank of universe, souls of men, ii. 3.13 (52-1180). + + Secondary evil is accidental formlessness, i. 8.8 (51-1154). + + Secondary evil is matter, i. 8.4 (51-1146). + + Secondary evil of soul, i. 8.5 (51-1148). + + Secrecy of mystery-rites explains ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-171). + + Secret powers in everything, iv. 4.37 (28-500). + + Secret road, leads all to divine retribution, iv. 4.45 (28-511). + + Seeing God without emotion, sign of lack of unification, vi. 9.4 + (9-155). + + Seeking anything beyond life, departs from it, vi. 5.12 (23-331). + + Seeming to be beautiful satisfies, but only being good satisfies, v. + 5.12 (32-594). + + Seems as if the begotten was a universal soul, vi. 4.14 (22-307). + + Seen the Supreme, no one who has calls him chance, vi. 8.19 (39-807). + + Self autocracy, vi. 8.21 (39-807). + + Self-consciousness can exist in a simple principle, v. 3.1 (49-1090). + + Self-consciousness consists of becoming intelligence, v. 3.4 + (49-1096). + + Self-consciousness is not needed by self-sufficient good, vi. 7.38 + (38-763). + + Self-consciousness is more perfect in intelligence than in the soul, + v. 3.6 (49-1098). + + Self-consciousness result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Self-control is assimilation to divinity, i. 2.5 (19-263). + + Self-control limited by soul's purification, v. 2.5 (19-263). + + Self-development, one object of incarnation, v. 8.5 (31-559). + + Self-esteem, proper, v. 1.1 (10-173). + + Self-existence possessed by essence, vi. 6.18 (34-678). + + Self-glorified, image of a trap on way to ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569). + + Self is the soul, iv. 7.1 (2-57). + + Self-luminous statues in intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-558). + + Self-sufficiency of supreme, v. 3.17 (49-1120). + + Self-victory over, mastery of fate, ii. 3.15 (52-1182). + + Seminal reason, ii. 6.1 (17-246); iii. 1.8 (3-97). + + Seminal reason does not contain order, iv. 4.16 (28-461). + + Seminal reason harmonizes with its appearing actualization, vi. 3.16 + (44-960). + + Seminal reason produces man, ii. 3.12 (52-1178). + + Seminal reasons, v. 8.2 (31-553); v. 7.1 (18-252). + + Seminal reasons, as qualified matter would be composite and + secondary, vi. 1.29 (42-886). + + Seminal reasons, cause of difference of things, v. 7.1 (18-251). + + Seminal reasons cause the soul, ii. 3.16 (52-1184). + + Seminal reasons may be contrary to soul's nature, but not to soul, + vi. 7.7 (38-710). + + Sensation, v. 1.7 (10-184). + + Sensation and memory, iv. 6 (41-829). + + Sensation and memory, Stoic doctrines of, hang together, iv. 6.1 + (41-829). + + Sensation as dream of the soul, from which we must wake, iii. 6.6 + (26-363). + + Sensation cannot distinguish quality differences, vi. 3.17 (44-963). + + Sensation cannot reach truth, v. 5.1 (32-576). + + Sensations cause of emotion, iv. 4.28 (28-482). + + Sensation equivalent to good, i. 4.2 (46-1021). + + Sensation depends on sense-shape, iv. 4.23 (28-473). + + Sensation, external and internal, i. 1-7 (53-1199). + + Sensation implies the feeling soul, i. 1.6 (53-1198). + + Sensation, intermediary, demands conceptive thought, iv. 4.23 + (28-472). + + Sensation is limited to the common integral parts of the universe, + iv. 5.8 (29-529). + + Sensation must first be examined, iv. 4.22 (28-472). + + Sensation not a soul distraction, iv. 4.25 (28-477). + + Sensation not in head, but in brain, iv. 3.23 (27-425). + + Sensation, psychology of, iv. 3.26 (27-430). + + Sensation relayed from organ to directing principle impossible, iv. + 7.7 (2-67). + + Sensation taken as their guide, Stoic's fault, vi. 1.28 (42-884). + + Sensations are actualizations, not only in sight, but in all senses, + iv. 6.3 (41-835). + + Sensations are not experiences but relative actualizations, iv. 6.2 + (41-831). + + Sensations as impressions on seal of wax, iv. 7.5 (2-66). + + Sensations distract from thought, iv. 8.8 (6-132). + + Sense beauties, less delightful than moral, i. 6.4 (1-44). + + Sense beauty, transition to intellectual, i. 6.3 (1-45). + + Sense being, common element, in matter form and combination, vi. 3.4 + (44-940). + + Sense growth and emotions lead to divisibility, iv. 3.19 (27-418). + + Sense objects are intermediate between form and matter, iii. 6.17 + (26-381). + + Sense objects, how are not evil, iii. 2.8 (47-1055). + + Sense objects, men, v. 9.1 (9-148). + + Sense objects, motion for, vi. 3.23 (44-976). + + Sense objects reveal eternal, iv. 8.6 (6-130). + + Sense objects unreal, made up of appearance, iii. 6.12 (26-371). + + Sense organs, sense better without medium however passible, iv. 5.1 + (29-515). + + Sense power of soul deals only with external things, v. 3.2 (49-1091). + + Sense qualities, many other conceptions belong among them, vi. 3.16 + (44-961). + + Sense shape, like tools, is intermediate, iv. 4.23 (28-473). + + Sense world created not by reflection but self-necessity, iii. 2.2 + (47-1044). + + Sense world has less unity than intelligible world, vi. 5.10 (23-322). + + Sense world, the generation in it, is what being is in the + intelligible, iv. 3.3 (27-392). + + Senses, not given only for utility, iv. 4.24 (28-475). + + Senses not given to man, from experience of misfortune, vi. 7.1 + (38-697). + + Senses of earth may be different from ours, iv. 4.26 (28-478). + + Sentiments, most keenly felt, constitute people lovers, i. 6.4 (1-46). + + Separation of soul from body, enables soul to use it, i. 1.3 + (53-1193). + + Separation of soul from body is death, i. 6.6 (1-49). + + Separation of soul from body, process involved, iii. 6.5 (26-359). + + Separation refers not only to body but accretions, i. 1.12 (53-1204). + + Sex alone would not account for differences of things, v. 7.2 + (18-252). + + Shadows necessary to the perfection of a picture, iii. 2.11 (47-1060). + + Shape is not a quality, but a specific appearance of reason, vi. 1.11 + (42-857). + + Shape is the actualization, thought the form of being, v. 9.8 (5-111). + + Shape received from elsewhere, v. 9.5 (5-107). + + Shapeless impressions of, differ from mental blank, ii. 4.10 (12-207). + + Shapeless shaper, essential beauty and the transcendent to Supreme, + vi. 7.33 (38-754). + + Sight, ii. 8 (35-680). + + Sight, actualize as thought, v. 1.5 (10-181). + + Sight and thought form but one, v. 1.5 (10-181). + + Sight, sense of, does not possess the image seen within it, iv. 6.1 + (41-829). + + Sight, two methods of, form and light, v. 5.7 (32-586). + + Significance of punishments and misfortunes, iv. 3.16 (27-414). + + Silence, v. 1.2 (10-175). + + Simile from lighting fire from refraction, iii. 6.14 (26-376). + + Simile of abstraction, triangles, circles, iv. 7.8 (2-69). + + Simile of badly tuned lyre cannot produce harmony, ii. 3.13 (52-1180). + + Simile of captive in golden chains--matter, i. 8.15 (51-1163). + + Simile of cave and grotto, iv. 8.1 (6-120). + + Simile of center and circular intelligence, vi. 8.18 (39-804). + + Simile of choral ballet, vi. 9.8 (9-165). + + Simile of circles, v. 8.7 (31-563); iv. 4.16 (28-462). + + Simile of clear gold, admitting its real nature, iv. 7.10 (2-81). + + Simile of cosmic choric ballet, vi. 9.8 (9-165). + + Simile of Cupid and Psyche, vi. 9.9 (9-167). + + Simile of drama of life, allows for good and bad, iii. 2.18 (47-1072). + + Simile of face in several mirrors, i. 1.8 (53-1200). + + Simile of foreknowledge of physician to explain Providence, iii. 3.5 + (48-1085). + + Simile of guest and architect of house, ii. 9.18 (33-635). + + Simile of head with three faces all round, vi. 5.7 (23-320). + + Simile of light in air, as soul is present in body, iv. 3.22 (27-423). + + Simile of light remaining on high, while shining down, iv. 8.3 + (6-124). + + Simile of light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 (24-337). + + Simile of love that watches at door of the beloved, vi. 5.10 (23-325). + + Simile of man fallen in mud, needing washing, i. 6.5 (1-48). + + Simile of man with feet in bath tub, vi. 9.8 (9-163). + + Simile of mirror, i. 4.10 (46-1034). + + Simile of mob in assembly, vi. 4.15 (22-310). + + Simile of net in the sea for universe in soul, iv. 3.9 (27-405). + + Simile of opinion and imagination illustrates relation between matter + and reason, iii. 6.15 (26-377). + + Simile of overweighted birds, sensual man, v. 9.1 (5-102). + + Simile of peak, formed by uniting of souls, vi. 7.15 (38-726). + + Simile of pilot governing the ship, i. 1.3 (53-1194). + + Simile of platonic vision theory to explain simultaneity of unity and + duality, v. 6.1 (24-333). + + Simile of prearranged dance as star's motion, iv. 4.33 (28-492). + + Simile of radii around centre, iv. 2.1 (21-277). + + Simile of radii centering, to explain unifying sensations, iv. 7.4 + (2-277). + + Simile of radii meeting in centre, i. 7.1 (54-1209). + + Simile of ray from centre to circumference, iv. 1 (4-100). + + Simile of science explains whole and part, iii. 9.3 (13-222); iv. 9.5 + (8-145). + + Simile of seal on wax, iv. 9.4 (8-144). + + Simile of seed to explain unity of essence in many souls, iv. 9.5 + (8-145). + + Simile of spring of water, iii. 8.1 (30-547). + + Simile of striking cord of a lyre, vi. 5.10 (23-326). + + Simile of sun and light, vi. 5.5 (23-319). + + Simile of the sun's rays, vi. 5.5 (23-319). + + Simile of the tree of the universe, iii. 8.10 (30-547). + + Simile of vine and branches, v. 3.7 (48-1088). + + Simile, Platonic, of drivers of horses, ii. 3.13 (52-1179). + + Simple and not compound is the Supreme, ii. 9.1 (33-599). + + Simple bodies, their existence demands that of world-soul, iv. 7.2 + (2-57). + + Simple is the soul; composite the body, iv. 7.3 (2-59). + + Simple nothing is, v. 9.3 (5-104). + + Simple, without something simple nothing manifold could exist, ii. + 4.3 (12-199). + + Simple's existence necessary to that of one, v. 6.3 (24-336). + + Simplification, approach of soul to good, i. 6.6 (1-50). + + Simplification as path to unity, vi. 9.3 (9-152). + + Simplification of ecstasy, super beauty and super virtue, vi. 9.11 + (9-170). + + Simplicity of principle, insures its freedom of action, vi. 8.4 + (39-779). + + Simplicity the intelligent, does not deny compositeness, vi. 7.13 + (38-722). + + Simplicity the intelligible, implies height of source, vi. 7.13 + (38-722). + + Simultaneity of end and principle in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563). + + Simultaneity of everything in the intelligible world, iv. 4.1 + (28-441). + + Simultaneity of the intelligible permits no memory, iv. 4.1 (28-441). + + Simultaneous giving and receiving by world-soul, iv. 8.7 (6-132). + + Simultaneous of one and many, intelligence contains the infinite as + vi. 7.14 (38-725). + + Simultaneous unity and duality of thought, v. 6.1 (24-333). + + Simultaneous within and without is vi. 4.7 (22-295). + + Sin and justice, not destroyed by superficiality of misfortunes, iii. + 2.16 (47-1067). + + Sister beneficent, is world-soul to our soul, ii. 9.17 (33-633). + + Situation, as Aristotelian category, vi. 1.24 (42-877). + + Slavery of good, accuses Providence, iii. 2.6 (47-1062). + + Socrates, i. 8.7; iii. 2.15; iv. 3.5; ii. 5.2; vi. 2.1; vi. 3.6, 15. + + Socrates (as representative man), v. 1.4 (10-179); v. 7.1 (18-251). + + Solid things, nearest nonentity, iii. 6.6 (26-361). + + Solution of puzzle is that being is everywhere present, vi. 5.3 + (23-317). + + "Somewhat," a particle to modify, any statement about the supreme, + vi. 8.13 (39-797). + + Son, begotten by supreme, report of ecstasy, see pun on "koros," iii. + 8.11 (30-550); v. 8.12 (31-571). + + Soul, after reaching yonder does not stay; reasons why, vi. 9.10 + (9-168). + + Soul alone possesses memory, iv. 3.26 (7-432). + + Soul and body consequences of mixture, i. 1.4 (53-1194). + + Soul and body form fusion, iv. 4.18 (28-465). + + Soul and body mixture impossible, i. 1.4 (53-1195). + + Soul and body, primitive relation between, i. 1.3 (53-1194). + + Soul and body, relation between, vi. 3.19 (27-418). + + Soul and intelligence, besides ideas, contained in intelligible + world, v. 9.13 (5-116). + + Soul and judgment, passibility of, iii. 6.1 (26-350). + + Soul and relation with God and individual, i. 1.8 (53-1200). + + Soul and soul essence, distinction between, i. 1.2 (53-1192). + + Soul and we, the relation between, i. 1.13 (53-1206). + + Soul as divisible and indivisible, iv. 2.2 (21-279). + + Soul as hypostatic actualization of intelligence, v. 1.3 (10-177). + + Soul as number, v. 1.5 (10-180). + + Soul becomes what she remembers, iv. 4.3 (28-445). + + Soul begets her combination, its nature, vi. 7.5 (38-708). + + Soul begets many because incorporeal, iv. 7.4 (8-144). + + Soul being impassable, everything contrary is figurative, iii. 6.2 + (26-354). + + Soul both divisible and indivisible, iv. 1 (4-100). + + Soul can penetrate body, iv. 7.8 (2-72). + + Soul cannot be corporeal, iv. 7.8 (2-70). + + Soul cannot be entirely dragged down, ii. 9.2 (33-603). + + Soul cannot lose parts, ii. 7.5 (2-63). + + Soul cannot possess evil within herself, i. 8.11 (51-1158). + + Soul capable of extension, vi. 4.1 (22-286). + + Soul celestial of world, iii. 5.3 (50-1128). + + Soul, circular movement of, iv. 4.16 (28-462). + + Soul, combination as mixture or resultant product, i, 1.1 (53-1191). + + Soul conforms destiny to her character, iii. 4.5 (15-238). + + Soul contains body, iv. 8.20 (27-421). + + Soul-difference between individual universal, iv. 3.7 (27-399). + + Soul directed by natural law, ii. 3.8 (52-1173). + + Soul divisible, mixed and double, ii. 3.9 (52-1176). + + Soul does not entirely enter into body, iv. 8.8 (6-132). + + Soul does not even remember herself, iv. 4.2 (28-443). + + Soul double, iii. 3.4 (48-1081); iv. 3.31 (27-438). + + Soul descended into world vestige of, is Daemon, iii. 5.6 (50-1132). + + Soul distraction, sensation is not, iv. 4.25 (28-477); iii. 4.6 + (15-241). + + Soul divisible, how she divides at death, iv. 1 (4-100). + + Soul entire, fashioned whole and individuals, vi. 5.8 (23-322). + + Soul essence derives from her being, vi. 2.6 (43-900). + + Soul exerts a varied action, iv. 7.4 (2-62). + + Soul feeling implied by sensation, i. 1.6 (53-1198). + + Soul feels passions without experiencing them, iv. 4.19 (28-466). + + Soul gives life to psychologic elements, i. 1.8 (53-1200). + + Soul, good and intelligence related to light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 + (24-337). + + Soul governs body as pilot the ship, i. 1.3 (53-1194). + + Soul, greatness of, nothing to do with size of body, vi. 4.5 (22-293). + + Soul has double aspect, to body and to intelligence, iv. 8.7 (6-131). + + Soul has no corporeal possibility, hence incorporeal, iv. 7.2 (2-57). + + Soul has to exist in twofold sphere, iv. 8.7 (6-130). + + Soul has various motions, iv. 7.5 (2-62). + + Soul, healthy, can work, iv. 3.4 (27-395). + + Soul, herself, body-user and combination of both, i. 1.1 (53-1191). + + Soul, how can she remain impassible, though given up to emotion, iii. + 6.1 (26-350). + + Soul, how she comes to know vice, i. 8.9 (51-1155). + + Soul human, as independent principle, iii. 1.8 (3-97). + + Soul human, when in body, has possibilities up or down, iv. 8.7 + (6-131). + + Soul, if she were corporeal body, would have no sensation, iv. 7.6 + (2-64). + + Soul, immortal, i. 1.2 (53-1192). + + Soul, impassibility of, iii. 6.1 (26-350). + + Soul imperishable, iv. 7.12 (2-82). + + Soul in body as form is in matter, iv. 3.20 (27-421). + + Soul in body as whole in a part, iv. 3.20 (27-421). + + Soul in the body as light in the air, iv. 3.22 (27-423). + + Soul, individual, born of intelligence, vi. 2.22 (43-929). + + Soul intelligence, good are like light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 (24-337). + + Soul, intermediary elemental, also inadmissible, ii. 9.5 (33-607). + + Soul invisible, cause of these emotions, i. 6.5 (1-46). + + Soul is a definite essence, as particular being, vi. 2.5 (43-900). + + Soul is a number, vi. 5.9 (23-324); v. 1.5 (10-180). + + Soul is a simple actualization, whose essence is life, iv. 7.12 + (2-83). + + Soul is a simple (substance) the man himself, iv. 7.3 (2-59). + + Soul is a whole of distinct divisible and indivisible parts, iv. 3.19 + (27-419). + + Soul is all things, iii. 4.3 (15-236). + + Soul is artist of the universe, iv. 7.13 (2-84). + + Soul is both being and life, vi. 2.6 (43-901). + + Soul is both punishable and impassible, i. 1.12 (53-1204). + + Soul is double (see Hercules), iv. 3.31 (27-438). + + Soul is everywhere entire, iv. 7.5 (2-63). + + Soul is free by intelligence, which is free by itself, vi. 8.7 + (39-783). + + Soul is formed governing the body (Aristotle), i. 1.4 (53-1195). + + Soul is formed inseparable from body (Alexander of Aphrodisia), i. + 1.4 (53-1195). + + Soul is in body as pilot is in ship, iv. 3.21 (27-422); i. 1.3 + (53-1194). + + Soul is individuality, and is form and workman of body, iv. 7.1 + (2-57). + + Soul is infinite as comprising many souls, vi. 4.4 (22-296). + + Soul is located, not in body, but body in soul, iv. 3.20 (27-423). + + Soul is matter of intelligence (form), v. 1.3 (10-178). + + Soul is neither harmony nor entelechy, iv. 7.8 (2-74). + + Soul is partly mingled and separated from body, i. 1.3 (53-1193). + + Soul is prior to body, iv. 7.8 (2-74). + + Soul is substantial from one being, simple matter, iv. 7.4 (2-61). + + Soul is the potentiality of producing, not of becoming, ii. 5.3 + (25-346). + + Soul, its being, iv. 1 (4-100). + + Soul leaving body, leaves trace of life, iv. 4.29 (28-483). + + Soul light forms animal nature, i. 1.7 (53-1198). + + Soul, like divinity, is always one, iv. 3.8 (27-402). + + Soul like face in several mirrors, i. 1.8 (53-1200). + + Soul may be said to come and go, iii. 9.3 (13-223). + + Soul may have two faults, iv. 8.5 (6-128). + + Soul must be one and manifold, even on Stoic hypotheses, iv. 2.2 + (21-281). + + Soul must be stripped of form to shine in primary nature, vi. 9.7 + (9-161). + + Soul must first be dissected from body to examine her, vi. 3.1 + (44-934). + + Soul must fit herself to her part in the scheme, iii. 2.1, 7 + (47-1071). + + Soul necessary to unify manifold sensations, iv. 7.6 (2-65). + + Soul needed by body for life, iv. 3.19 (27-418). + + Soul not decomposable, iv. 7.1, 4 (2-84). + + Soul not evil by herself but by degeneration, i. 8.4 (51). + + Soul not in body as part in a whole, iv. 3.20 (27-421). + + Soul not in body as quality in a substrate, iii. 9.3 (13-222). + + Soul not in body, but body in soul, iv. 4.15 (28-460). + + Soul not in time, though her actions and reactions are, v. 9.4 + (5-106). + + Soul not the limit of one ascent, why? v. 9.4 (5-106). + + Soul obeys fate only when evil, iii. 1.10 (47-1060). + + Soul of the unity, proves that of the Supreme, vi. 5.9 (23-323). + + Soul originates movements, but is not altered, iii. 6.3 (26-355). + + Soul power everywhere, localized in special organ, iv. 3.23 (27-424). + + Soul power revealed in simultaneity of control over world, v. 1.2 + (10-176). + + Soul powers remain the same throughout all changes of body, iv. 3.8 + (27-402). + + Soul pristine, precious, v. 1.2 (10-176). + + Soul, psychological distinctions in, i. 1.1 (53-1191). + + Soul pure, would remain isolated, iv. 4.23 (28-473). + + Soul puzzle of her being one, yet in all, iv. 3.4 (27-394). + + Soul, rational, if separated what would she remember? iv. 3.27 + (27-433). + + Soul receives her form from intelligence, iii. 9.5 (15-224). + + Soul related to it might have been darkness, ii. 9.12 (33-625). + + Soul remains incorporeal, vi. 7.31 (38-750). + + Soul rises to the good by scorning all things below, iv. 3.20 + (27-422). + + Soul said to be in body because body alone is visible, vi. 7.35 + (38-757). + + Soul scorns even thought, she is intellectualized and ennobled, iv. + 3.4 (27-395). + + Soul, sick, devoted to her body, iv. 4.1 (28-441). + + Soul, speech in the intelligible world, ii. 9.2 (33-603). + + Soul split into three, intelligible, intermediary and sense-world. + + Soul symbolizes double Hercules, i. 1.13 (53-1206). + + Soul, the two between them, partition the fund of memory, iv. 3.31 + (27-439). + + Soul, three principles, reason, imagination and sensation, ii. 3.9 + (52-1175). + + Soul, to which of ours does individuality belong, ii. 9.2 (33-603). + + Soul, triune, one nature for three powers, iv. 9.5 (51-1163). + + Soul unharmed, if her flight from here below is prompt enough, i. + 7.26 (1-50). + + Soul unity does not resemble reason unity, as it includes plurality, + vi. 2.6 (43-901). + + Soul, universal, is everywhere entire, vi. 4.9 (22-300). + + Soul uses the body as tool, i. 1.3 (53-1193). + + Soul unconscious of her higher part, if distracted by sense, iv. 8.8 + (6-132). + + Soul will not seem entirely within us, if functions are not + localized, iv. 3.20 (27-419). + + Soul's action divided by division of time, iv. 4.15 (28-460). + + Soul's activity is triple: thinking, self-preservation and creation, + iv. 8.3 (6-125). + + Soul's affection compared to lyre, iii. 6.4 (26-357). + + Souls all are one in the world soul, but are different, iv. 9.1 + (8-139). + + Souls all have their demon which is their love. iii. 5.4 (50-1129). + + Souls are as immortal as the one from whom they proceed, vi. 4.10 + (22-301). + + Souls are plural unity of seminal reasons, vi. 2.5 (43-899). + + Souls are united by their highest, vi. 9.15 (38-726). + + Souls as amphibious, iv. 8.4 (6-126). + + Soul's ascension to eligible world, ii. 9.2 (13-222). + + Soul's bodies may be related differently, iv. 4.29 (28-485). + + Souls can reason intuitionally without ratiocination, iv. 3.18 + (27-417). + + Souls cannot lose parts, iv. 7.5 (2-63). + + Soul's condition in higher regions, iii. 4.6 (15-240). + + Soul conforms destiny to her character, iii. 4.5 (15-238). + + Soul's conformity to universal, proves they are not parts of her, iv. + 3.2 (27-389). + + Soul's descent into body, iii. 9.3 (13-222). + + Soul's desire, liver seat of, iv. 4.28 (28-480). + + Soul's destiny depends on condition of birth of universe, ii. 3.14 + (52-1181). + + Souls develop manifoldness as intelligence does, iv. 3.5 (27-396). + + Souls differ as do the sensations, vi. 4.6 (22-294). + + Souls, difference between, iv. 3.8 (27-400). + + Souls, do all form a single one, iv. 9 (8-139). + + Soul's dream is sensation, iii. 6.6 (26-363). + + Souls first go in Heaven in the intelligible world, iv. 3.17 (27-415). + + Souls form a genetic but not numeric unity, iv. 9.1 (8-146). + + Souls that enter into this world generate a love demon, iii. 5.6 + (50-1132). + + Soul's highest part always remains above body. v. 2.1 (11-194). + + Soul's highest part, even whole, sees vision of intelligible wisdom, + v. 8.10 (31-568). + + Souls, how they come to descend, iv. 3.13 (27-410). + + Soul's immortality, iv. 7 (2-56). + + Soul's incarnation is for perfection of universe, iv. 8.5 (6-127). + + Souls incorporeal dwell within intelligence, iv. 3.24 (27-427). + + Souls, individual, are the emanations of the universal, iv. 3.1 + (27-388). + + Soul's instrument is the body, iv. 7.1 (2-56). + + Soul's lower part, in sense world, fashions body, v. 1.10 (10-190). + + Souls may be unified without being identical, iv. 9.2 (8-140). + + Soul's mediation between indivisible and divisible essence, iv. 2 + (21-279). + + Soul's memory in intelligible world, iv. 4.1 (28-441). + + Soul's mixture of reason and indetermination, iii. 5.7 (50-1133). + + Soul's multiplicity, based on their unity, iv. 9.4 (7-843). + + Soul's nature is intermediate, iv. 8.7 (6-130). + + Souls not isolated from intelligence during descent, iv. 3.12 + (27-409). + + Souls of stars and incarnate humans govern worlds untroubledly, iv. + 8.2 (6-123). + + Souls of the second universal rank are men, ii. 3.13 (52-1180). + + Soul's powers differ and thence do not act everywhere, iv. 9.3 + (8-143). + + Soul's primary and secondary evil, iii. 8.5 (30-538). + + Souls prognosticate but do not cause event, ii. 3.6 (52-1171). + + Soul's purification and separation, iii. 6.5 (26-359). + + Soul's relation to body is that of statue and metal, iv. 7.8 (2-176). + + Soul's relation to intelligence is that of matter to form, v. 1.3 + (10-178). + + Souls resemble various forms of governments, iv. 4.17 (28-464). + + Souls retain unity and differences, on different levels, iv. 3.5 + (27-396). + + Soul's separation from body enables her to use the body as tool, i. + 1.3 (53-1193). + + Souls show kinship to world by fidelity to their own nature, iii. 3.1 + (48-1077). + + Soul's superior and inferior bodies related in three ways, iv. 4.29 + (28-485). + + Souls that change their condition alone have memory, iv. 4.6 (28-448). + + Souls united, intelligence shined down from the peak formed by them, + vi. 7.15 (38-726). + + Souls united to world-souls by functions, iv. 3.2 (27-392). + + Souls weakened by individual contemplation, iv. 8.4 (6-125). + + Soul's welfare is resemblance to divinity, i. 6.6 (1-49). + + Souls, why they take different kinds of bodies, iv. 3.12 (27-410). + + Source, common, by it all things are united, vi. 7.12 (38-721). + + Source, height of, implied by simplicity of the intelligible, vi. + 7.13 (38-722). + + Sowing of soul in stars and matter, iv. 8.45 (6-127). + + Space, 5.1, 10. + + Space, corporeal, iv. 3.20 (27-420). + + Space has nothing to do with intelligible light, which is + non-spatial, v. 5.7 (29-526). + + Space, result of procession of the universal soul, iii. 7.10 + (45-1006). + + Space said to measure movement because of its determination, iii. + 7.11 (45-1011). + + Species destroyed by fundamental unity, vi. 2.2 (43-894). + + Spectacle Divine in ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170). + + Spectator of vision becomes participator, v. 8.10 (31-569). + + Speech is a quantity, vi. 3.12 (44-954). + + Speech is a quantity, classification of, vi. 3.12 (44-954). + + Speech of soul in the intelligible world, iv. 4.1 (28-441). + + Spherical figure, intelligible is the primitive one, vi. 6.17 + (34-675). + + Spindle of fate (significance), ii. 3.9 (52-1174); iii. 4.6 (15-242). + + Spirit and its apportionment, iv. 7.8 (2-69). + + Spirits inanimate, i. 4.7 (2-56). + + Spiritual becomes love, begun physically, vi. 7.33 (38-755). + + Spiritual body, ii. 2.2 (14-231). + + Spiritual gnostic distinction of men, ii. 9.18 (33-637). + + Spiritual men, v. 9.1 (5-102). + + Splendor, last view of revelation, v. 8.10 (31-567). + + Splitting of intelligible principle, ii. 4.5 (12-202). + + Splitting of unity typified by mutilation of Saturn, v. 8.13 (31-573). + + Splitting up of soul at death, iii. 4.6 (15-241). + + Spontaneity not affected by irresponsible, iii. 2.10 (47-1060). + + Stability and essence, distinction between, vi. 2.7 (43-903). + + Stability and movement exist because thought by intelligence, vi. 2.8 + (43-904). + + Stability another kind of movement, vi. 2.7 (43-903). + + Stability, distinction from, vi. 3.27 (44-980). + + Stability does not imply stillness in the intelligible, vi. 3.27 + (44-982). + + Stability of essence only accidental, vi. 9.3 (9-153). + + Standard human cannot measure world soul, ii. 9.7 (33-612). + + Star action mingled only affects already natural process, ii. 3.12 + (52-1166). + + Star-soul and world-soul intellectual differences, iv. 4.17 (28-463). + + Stars affect physical, not essential being, iii. 1.6 (3-95). + + Stars and world-soul are impassable, iv. 4.42 (28-506). + + Stars answer prayers unconsciously, iv. 4.42 (28-505). + + Stars are inexhaustible and need no refreshment, ii. 1.8 (40-827). + + Stars are they animate? + + Stars are they inanimate? + + Stars, as well as sun, may be prayed to, iv. 4.30 (28-486). + + Stars, body or will do not sway earthly events, iv. 4.35 (28-495). + + Stars by their body produce only passions of universe, ii. 3.10 + (52-1177). + + Stars contain not only fire but earth, ii. 1.6 (40-821). + + Stars do not need memories to answer prayers, iv. 4.42 (28-505). + + Stars follow the universal kind, ii. 3.13 (52-1179). + + Stars have no memory, because uniformly blissful, iv. 4.42 (28-505). + + Stars influence is from contemplation of intelligible world, iv. 4.35 + (28-496). + + Stars motion compared to a prearranged dance, iv. 4.33 (28-492). + + Stars natural radiation of good, explains their influence, iv. 4.35 + (28-497). + + Stars predict because of soul's accidents, ii. 3.10 (52-1177). + + Stars serve as letters in which to read nature, iii. 1.6 (3-95). + + Stars, souls govern worlds untroubled by, iv. 8.2 (6-123). + + Stars sway general but not detailed fate, iv. 4.31 (28-487). + + Stars, what is and what is not produced by them, ii. 3.13 (52-1178). + + Statue, art makes out of rough marble, v. 8.1 (31-551). + + Statue, composite of form and matter, v. 9.3 (5-504). + + Statue, essential beings as statues, v. 8.4 (31-558). + + Statue, heating of statue by metal only indirect, vi. 1.21 (42-874). + + Statue, justice as self born intellectual statue, vi. 6 (34-653). + + Statue, metal is not potentiality of statue, ii. 5.1 (25-342). + + Statue, purified cleans within herself divine statues, v. 7.10 (2-81). + + Statue, shining in front rank is unity, v. 1.6 (10-182). + + Statue, soul is to body as metal is to statue, iv. 7.8 (2-76). + + Statues at entrance of temples left behind, vi. 9.9 (9-170). + + Statues of palace of divinity, vi. 7.35 (38-758). + + Sterility of nature indicated by castration, iii. 6.19 (26-385). + + Still, why the heavens do not remain, ii. 9.1 (40-814). + + Stillness, not implied by stability in the intelligible, vi. 3.27 + (44-980). + + Stoic explanation of beauty, symmetry, opposed, i. 6.1 (1-41). + + Stoic four categories evaporate, leaving matter as basis, vi. 1.29 + (42-886). + + Stoic God is only modified matter, vi. 1.27 (45-881). + + Stoic relation category confuses new with anterior, vi. 1.31 (42-888). + + Stoics, v. 9.4 (5-106). + + Stoics' fault is to have taken sensation as their guide, vi. 1.28 + (42-884). + + Stones growing while in earth, iv. 4.27 (28-479); vi. 7.11 (38-718). + + Straight line represents sensation, while the soul is like a circle, + v. 1.7 (10-184). + + Straight movement, vi. 4.2 (22-288); ii. 2.12 (14-231). + + Studied world must be just as one would analyze the voice, vi. 3.1 + (44-933). + + Study of time makes us descend from the intelligible, iii. 7.6 + (45-995). + + Sub-conscious nature hinders dominance of better-self, iii. 3.4 + (48-1081). + + Subdivision infinite of bodies, leads to destruction, iv. 7.1 (2-56). + + Subject, one's notion does not come from subject itself, vi. 6.13 + (34-663). + + Sublunar sphere, immortality does not extend to it, ii. 1.5 (40-820). + + Sublunary divinities, crimes should not be attributed to, iv. 4.31 + (28-489). + + Substance as Stoic category would be split up, vi. 1.25 (42-878). + + Substantial act or habitation is hypostasis, vi. 1.6 (42-845). + + Substrate, iii. 3.6 (48-1087). + + Substrate and residence of forms, is matter, ii. 4.1 (12-197). + + Substrate demanded by process of elements, ii. 4.6 (12-203). + + Substrate needed by composition of the body, ii. 4.11 (12-209). + + Substrate not common to all elements, being indeterminate, ii. 4.13 + (12-213). + + Subsumed under being in essence not everything can, vi. 2.2 (43-893). + + Successive enumeration inevitable in describing the eternal, iv. 8.6 + (6-129). + + Succumb to the law of the universe, why many souls do, iv. 3.15 + (27-413). + + Suchness, ii. 7.2 (37-701). (Whatness.) + + Suchness later than being and quiddity, ii. 6.2 (17-248). + + Suffering and action cannot be separate categories, vi. 1.17 (42-866). + + Suffering of most men physical, virtuous man suffers least because + most suffering is physical, i. 4.13 (46-1036). + + Suffering part of virtuous man is the higher, i. 4.13 (46-1036). + + Suggestive is influence of reason, i. 2.5 (19-264). + + Suicide, i. 9 (16-243). + + Suicide breaks up the appointed time of life, i. 9 (16-244). + + Suicide unavailable even to avoid insanity, i. 9 (16-244). + + Suitability and opportunity, cause of, puts them beyond chance, vi. + 8.18 (39-806). + + Sun and ray, simile of, v. 5.7 (32-587); v. 3.9 (49-1105). + + Sun as well as stars, may be prayed to, iv. 4.30 (28-486). + + Sunlight exists everywhere, vi. 4.7 (22-296). + + Sunrise only image for divine approach, v. 5.8 (32-588). + + Superabundance, manner in which all things issue from one, v. 2.1 + (11-194). + + Super-beauty and super-virtue, vi. 9.11 (9-170). + + Super-beauty of the Supreme, v. 8.8 (31-564). + + Super-being achieved in ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170). + + Super-essential principle does not think, v. 6.1 (24-333). + + Super-essentiality and super-existence of Supreme, v. 3.17 (49-1119). + + Super-existence and super-essentiality of Supreme, v. 3.17 (49-1119); + v. 4.2 (7-137). + + Super-existence of first principle, vi. 7.38 (38-763). + + Super-form is uniform unity, vi. 9.3 (9-152). + + Super-goodness is Supreme, vi. 9.6 (9-160). + + Superior principle not always utilized, i. 1.10 (53-1203). + + Superior would be needed if the good thought, vi. 7.40 (38-767). + + Super-liberty may be attributed to intelligence, vi. 8.6 (39-782). + + Super-master of himself is the Supreme, vi. 8.10 (39-790). + + Super-rest, super-motion, super-thought is the one + super-consciousness and super-life, iii. 9.7, 9 (13-226). + + Super-virtue, soul meets absolute beauty, vi. 9.11 (9-170). + + Supra active, the good is, as supra-cogitative, v. 6.6 (24-338). + + Supra cogitative, the good as, is also supra-active, v. 6.6 (24-338). + + Supra-thinking principle does not think, necessary to working of + intelligence, v. 6.2 (24-334). + + Supremacy is the cause of the good, vi. 7.23 (38-739). + + Supremacy of good implies its supremacy over all its possessions, v. + 5.13 (32-595). + + Supreme admits of no reasoning, demonstration, faith or cause, v. 8.7 + (31-563). + + Supreme, all language about it is metaphorical, vi. 8.13 (39-795). + + Supreme as a spring of water, iii. 8.10 (30-547). + + Supreme as being as being and essence, v. 3.17 (49-1119); v. 9.2 + (7-149); v. 4.2 (7-138); v. 5.5 (32-584); v. 5.5 (32-585). + + Supreme, assisted by intelligence would have no room for chance, vi. + 8.17 (39-804). + + Supreme banishes all chance, vi. 8.10 (39-789). + + Supreme being not produced by chance, vi. 8.11 (39-793). + + Supreme beyond chance because of suitability, vi. 8.17 (39-806). + + Supreme can be approached sufficiently to be spoken of, v. 3.14 + (49-1114). + + Supreme can be attributed contingence only under new definition, vi. + 8.9 (39-787). + + Supreme can be attributed physical qualities only by analogy, vi. 8.8 + (39-785). + + Supreme cannot aspire higher, being super-goodness, vi. 9.6 (9-159). + + Supreme commands himself, vi. 8.20 (39-809). + + Supreme consists with himself, vi. 8.15 (39-800). + + Supreme could not be called chance by any one who had seen him, vi. + 8.19 (39-807). + + Supreme, every term should be limited by some what or higher, vi. + 8.13 (39-797). + + Supreme formlessness shown by approaching soul's rejection of form, + vi. 7.34 (38-756). + + Supreme inevitable for intelligence that is intelligible, iii. 8.9 + (30-544). + + Supreme intelligence is king of kings, v. 15.3 (32-580). + + Supreme intelligence, nature of, i. 8.2. (51-1144). + + Supreme is both being and whyness, ii. 7.2 (37-707). + + Supreme is entirely one, does not explain origin of manifold, v. 9.14 + (5-116). + + Supreme is essential beauty, the shapeless shaper and the + transcendent, vi. 7.33 (38-754). + + Supreme is everywhere and nowhere, is inclination and imminence, vi. + 8.16 (39-801). + + Supreme is ineffable, v. 3.13 (49-1113). + + Supreme is limitless, v. 7.32 (38-753). + + Supreme is potentiality of all things, above all actualization, iii. + 8.10 (30-546). + + Supreme is super-being, because not dependent on it, vi. 8.19 + (39-807). + + Supreme is the good, because of its supremacy, vi. 7.23 (38-739). + + Supreme is the power, really master of himself, vi. 8.9 (39-788); vi. + 8.10 (39-790). + + Supreme is will being and actualization, vi. 8.13 (39-795). + + Supreme must be free, as chance is escaped by interior isolation, vi. + 8.13 (39-795); vi. 8.15 (39-800). + + Supreme must be simple and not compound, ii. 9.1 (33-599). + + Supreme named Apollo, v. 5.6 (32-584). + + Supreme not intelligence that aspires to form of good, iii. 8.10 + (30-548). + + Supreme of three ranks of existence is the beautiful, vi. 7.42 + (38-770). + + Supreme one only figuratively, vi. 9.5 (9-157). + + Supreme principles must then be unity, intelligence and soul, ii. 9.1 + (33-600). + + Supreme, proven by the unity of the soul, vi. 5.9 (23-323). + + Supreme super-master of himself, vi. 8.12 (39-793). + + Supreme unity adjusts all lower group unities, vi. 6.11 (34-660). + + Supreme would wish to be what he is, is such as he would wish to be, + vi. 8.13 (39-796); vi. 8.15 (39-800). + + Swine, simile of the impure, i. 6.6 (1-49). + + Sympathy between individual and universal soul due to common origin, + iv. 3.8 (48-1088); v. 8.12 (31-571). + + Syllables a quantity, vi. 3.12 (44-954). + + Symmetry, earthly, contemplates universal symmetry, v. 9.11 (5-114). + + Symmetry, Stoic definition of beauty, opposed, i. 6.1 (1-41). + + Sympathetic harmony, earth feels and directs by it, iv. 4.26 (28-477). + + Sympathy, cosmic, ii. 1.7 (40-824). + + Sympathy, does not force identity of sensation, iv. 9.3 (8-142). + + Sympathy implies unity of all beings in lower magic enchantment, iv. + 9.3 (8-152). + + Sympathy, love working as, effects magic, iv. 4.40 (28-503). + + Sympathy of soul and body, iv. 4.23 (28-473). + + Sympathy of soul's highest self, basis of memory, iv. 6.3 (41-832). + + Sympathy or community of affection, Stoic, iv. 7.3 (2-59). + + System, co-existence of unity and multiplicity, demands organization + in, vi. 7.10 (38-716). + + + Taming of body, i. 4.14 (46-1037). + + Theology revealed by astrology, ii. 3.7 (52-1172). + + Telescoping, of intelligible entities, v. 9.10 (5-113). + + Temperament of corporeal principles, is health, iv. 7.8 (2-71). + + Temperament, soul as mixture, iv. 7.2 (2-58). + + Temperance, gate of ecstasy, i. 6.9 (1-53). + + Temperance interpreted as purification, i. 6.6 (1-49). + + Temperance is not real category, vi. 2.18 (43-923). + + Temperate man is good's independence from pleasure, vi. 7.29 (38-747). + + Temples of divinity, explained by psychology, iv. 3.1 (27-387). + + Temporal conceptions implied by priority of order, iv. 4.16 (28-461). + + Tending towards the good, all things tend towards the one, vi. 2.12 + (43-914). + + Tension, Stoic, iv. 7.13 (2-83); iv. 5.4 (29-522). + + Terrestrial things do not last so long as celestial ones, ii. 1.5 + (40-819). + + Testimony, to its creator by world, iii. 2.3 (47-1047). + + The living animal, i. 1.5 (53-1126). + + Theodore, from P1ato's Theatetus, i. 8.6 (51-1150). + + Theodore of Asine, his infra celestial vault (invisible place), v. + 8.10 (31-567); ii. 4.1 (12-198). + + Theory of happiness consisting in reasonable life, i. 4.2 (46-1022). + + Thing in itself, differs from nonentity, ii. 4.10 (12-207). + + Thing in itself, qualityless, found by abstraction, ii. 4.10 (12-207). + + Things good is their form, vi. 7.27 (38-744). + + Think, body cannot, iv. 7.8 (2-68). + + Thinking in conformity with intelligence, two ways, v. 3.4 (49-1094). + + Thinking is perception without help of the body, iv. 7.8 (2-68). + + Thinking ourselves, is thinking an intellectual nature, iii. 9.6 + (13-224). + + Thinking principle, the first, is the general second, v. 6.2 (24-335). + + Thinking principles--which is the first, and which is the second? v. + 6.1 (24-335). + + Third principle is soul, iii. 9.1 (13-221). + + Third rank of existence should not be occupied by modality, vi. 1.30 + (42-887). + + Thought and life, different grades of, iii. 8.7 (30-540). + + Thought actualization of light, v. 1.5 (10-181). + + Thought as first actualization of a hypostasis is not in first + principle, vi 7.40 (38-766). + + Thought as touch of the good leads to ecstasy, vi. 7.36 (38-760). + + Thought below one and Supreme, iii. 9.7, 9 (13-226). + + Thought beneath the super essential principle, v. 6 (24-339). + + Thought distracted from by sensation, iv. 8.8 (6-132). + + Thought implies simultaneous unity and duality, v. 6.1 (24-333). + + Thought in first principle would imply attributes, and that + manifoldness, v. 6.2 (24-336). + + Thought is actualized intelligence, v. 3.5 (49-1097). + + Thought is beneath the first so intelligence implies the latter, v. + 6.5 (24-338); v. 6.2, 6 (24-339). + + Thought is inspiration for good, v. 6.5 (24-338). + + Thought is integral part of intelligence, v. 5.2 (32-579). + + Thought is seeing the intelligible, v. 4.2 (7-138). + + Thought is the form; shape the actualization of being, v. 9.8 (5-111). + + Thought, life and existence, contained in primary existence, v. 6.6 + (24-339). + + Thought made impossible only by the first principle being one + exclusively, v. 6.3 (24-335). + + Thought, one with sight, v. 1.5 (10-181). + + Thought, self direction of, is not changeableness, iv. 4.2 (28-444). + + Thought, the means by which intelligence passes from unity to + duality, v. 6.1 (24-333). + + Thoughts, conceptive, demand intermediary sensation, iv. 4.23 + (28-472). + + Thoughts, contrary to rights, possess real existence, iii. 5.7 + (50-1136). + + Thoughts, highest, have incorporeal objects, iv. 7.8 (2-68). + + Three kinds of men, v. 9.1 (5-102). + + Three men in each of us, vi. 7.6 (38-708). + + Three principles, v. 6.2 (24-334 to 337); v. 1.10 (10-189). + + Three ranks of existence, vi. 4.11 (22-302); v. 1.10 (10-189); v. + 6.2 (24-335); iii. 3.3 (48-1077); iii. 5.9 (50-1138); vi. 1.30 + (43-887); vi. 7.6 (38-708). + + Three spheres, v. 1.8 (10-186). + + Threefold activity of soul, thought, self-preservation and creation, + iv. 8.3 (6-125). + + Time and eternity, iii. 7 (45-985). + + Time arose as measurement of the activity of the universal soul, iii. + 7.10 (45-1005). + + Time as motion, errors in, iii. 7.1 (45-987). + + Time becomes, iii. 7, int. (45-985). + + Time can be increased, why not happiness, i. 5.7 (36-687). + + Time cannot be divided without implying soul's action, iv. 4.15 + (28-460). + + Time, considered as motion, as moveable or as something of motion, + iii. 7.6 (45-996). + + Time, if it is a quantity, why a separate category? vi. 1.13 (42-861). + + Time included action and reaction of soul, not soul itself, iv. 4.15 + (28-460). + + Time is also within us, iii. 7.12 (45-1014). + + Time is as interior to the soul as eternity is to existence, iii. + 7.10 (45-1008). + + Time is measured by movement and is measure of movement, iii. 7.12 + (45-1011). + + Time is no interval of movement (Stoic Zeno), iii. 7.7 (45-999). + + Time is not a numbered number (Aristotle), iii. 7.8 (45-1000). + + Time is not a quantity, vi. 1.5 (42-844). + + Time is not an accident or consequence of movement, iii. 7.9 + (45-1004). + + Time is not begotten by movement but only indicated thereby, iii. + 7.11 (45-1009). + + Time is not motion and rest (Strato), iii. 7.7 (45-1000). + + Time is not movement, iii. 7.7 (45-997). + + Time is not the number and measure of movement (Aristotle), iii. 7.8 + (45-1000). + + Time is present everywhere, as against Antiphanes and Critolaus, iii. + 7.12 (45-1013). + + Time is the length of the life of the universal soul, iii. 7.11 + (45-1008). + + Time is the life of the soul, considered in the movement by which she + passes from one actualization to another, iii. 7.10 (45-1005). + + Time is the model of its image eternity, iii. 7 int. (45-985). + + Time is the universe, iii. 7.1 (45-986). + + Time is to the world-soul, what eternity is to intelligence, iii. + 7.10 (45-1007). + + Time joined to actions to make them perfect, vi. 1.19 (42-868). + + Time must be studied comparatively among the philosophers, iii. 7.6 + (45-996). + + Time none, only a single day for world-souls, iv. 4.7 (28-450). + + Time or place do not figure among the categories, vi. 2.16 (43-919). + + Time, Plato uncertain about it, iii. 7.12 (45-1012). + + Time replaced by eternity in intelligible world, v. 9.10 (5-113). + + Time's nature will be revealed by its birth, iii. 7.10 (45-1005). + + Toleration by soul, without guilt, iii. 1.8 (3-97). + + Tomb of soul is body, iv. 8.1, 4 (6-126). + + Tool, body uses the soul as, i. 1.2 (55-1194); iv. 7.1 (2-57). + + Tools are intermediate, like sense shape, iv. 4.23 (28-473). + + Torments of hell are reformatory, iv. 4.45 (28-448). + + Total reason of universe, ii. 3.13 (52-1179). + + Touch, the good is a simple perception of itself, vi. 7.39 (38-764). + + Touched with the good is the greatest of sciences, vi. 7.36 (38-760). + + Trace of life, left by soul when leaving body, iv. 4.29 (28-483). + + Trace of the One, is the being of souls, v. v. 5 (32-583). + + Traditions of divinity contained by the world, ii. 9.9 (33-616). + + Training and education, memory needs, iv. 6.3 (41-835). + + Training here below help souls to remember when beyond, iv. 4.5 + (28-448). + + Training of interior vision, i. 6.9 (1-53). + + Trance of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-169). + + Transcendence of good over intelligence and life, v. 3.16 (49-1117). + + Transcendent, v. 3 (49-1090). + + Transcendent shapeless shaper and essential beauty is supreme, vi. + 7.33 (38-754). + + Transcending unity demanded by contemplation of intelligence, v. 3.10 + (49-1106). + + Transition of sense-beauty to intellectual, i. 6.3 (1-45). + + Transmigration, animals into animals, plants, birds, eagles and + soaring birds and bee, iii. 4.2 (15-235). + + Transmigration, two kinds, into human or animal bodies, iv. 3.9 + (27-403). + + Transmission, reception, relation underlies action and experience, + vi. 1.22 (42-874). + + Transparency of everything in intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-558). + + Trap on way to ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569). + + Traverse heaven, without leaving rest (celestial divinities), v. 8.3 + (31-556). + + Tree of the universe, simile of, iii. 8.10 (30-547). + + Triad is limit of differentiation, ii. 9.2 (33-602). + + Triangles equal to two, iii. 5.7 (50-1136). + + Triangles, material and immaterial, explain trine relations, vi. 5.11 + (23-330). + + Trinity, compared to light, sun and moon, i. 8.2 (51-1144); vi. 7.6 + (38-708); vi. 7.7 (38-711); iv. 8.4 (6-125); vi. 7.42 (38-770); vi. + 2.8 (43-905); iv. 7.13 (2-84); iii. 4.2 (15-234). + + Triune, v. 6.4 (24-337). + + Triune, soul, one nature in three powers, ii. 3.4 (52); v. 1 + (10-173); ii. 9.2 (33-602). + + Triune play implies also identity and difference, vi. 2.8 (43-905). + + True good, implies counterfeit, vi. 7.26 (38-743). + + Truth external to intelligence, a theory that destroys intelligence, + v. 5.1 (32-576). + + Truth, field of, intelligence evolves, vi. 7.13 (38-723). + + Truth self-probative; nothing truer, v. 5.2 (32-579). + + Two-fold soul exerts two-fold providence, iv. 8.2 (6-122). + + Two-fold sphere in which soul has to exist, iv. 8.7 (6-130). + + Two, not addition to one, but a change, vi. 6.14 (34-666). + + Ugliness, aversion for, explains love for beauty, i. 6.5 (1-47). + + Ugliness consists of formlessness, i. 6.2 (1-43). + + Ugliness is a foreign accretion, i. 6.5 (1-48). + + Ugliness is form's failure to dominate matter, i. 8.9 (51-1156). + + Ugliness is predominance of matter, v. 7.2 (18-253). + + Ugliness of men due to lowering themselves to lower natures, and + ignoring themselves, v. 8.13 (31-574). + + Ulysses, i. 6.8 (1-52). + + Unalloyed is no evil for the living people, i. 7.3 (54-1210). + + Unattached, condition o wise man, i. 4.1, 7 (46-1029). + + Unavoidable and universal evils are, i. 8.6 (51-1149). + + Uncertainty in location of good and beauty, i. 6.9 (1-53). + + Unchangeableness of form and matter, iii. 6.10 (26-368). + + Unconsciously do stars answer prayers, iv. 4.4 (28-505); iv. 4.2 + (28-505). + + Unconsciousness does not hinder virtue, handsomeness or health, i. + 4.9 (46-1033). + + Unconsciousness of oneself in ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Unconsciousness of soul intelligence and one does not detract from + their existence, v. 1.12 (10-191). + + Undefinability of unity (referred to by feelings), vi. 9.3 (9-151). + + Understand and fit yourself to the world instead of complaining of + it, ii. 9.13 (33-625). + + Undisturbed is the world-soul by the things of sense, iv. 8.7 (6-131). + + Unhappiness increased by duration, why not happiness? i. 5.6 (36-686). + + Unharmed is the soul by incarnation, if prompt in flight, iv. 8.5 + (6-128). + + Unification does not reveal true knowledge, ii. 9.9 (33-617). + + Unification process, v. 1.5 (10-180); v. 5.4 (32-581). + + Unification with divinity result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Uniform action, exerted by body, iv. 7.4 (2-62). + + Uniform in itself is unity and super-form, vi. 9.3 (9-152). + + Unincarnate souls govern world untroubledly, iv. 8.2 (6-123). + + Unique (Monad), v. 5.4 (32-581); v. 5.13 (32-595). + + Unissued brothers of Jupiter, vi. 8.12 (31-572). + + Unitary are intelligibles, but not absolute unity, vi. 5.4 (32-581). + + Unitary is consciousness, though containing thinker, ii. 9.1 (33-601). + + Unitary number, vi. 6.9 (34-656). + + United are all things by a common source, vi. 7.12 (38-721). + + United are souls, by their highest, vi. 7.15 (38-726). + + United souls, intelligence shines down from the peak formed by them, + vi. 7.15 (38-726). + + Unities, different kinds of, v. 5.4 (32-582). + + Uniting of highest parts of men in intelligible, vi. 5.10 (23-327). + + Uniting of intelligence, as it rises to the intelligible, iv. 4.1 + (28-442). + + Uniting soul and body forms individual aggregate, i. 1.6 (53-1197). + + Unity, v. 1.6 (10-182); v. 5.4 (32-581). + + Unity above all; intelligence and essence. vi. 9.2 (9-149). + + Unity absolute, is first, while intelligence is not, vi. 9.2 (9-150). + + Unity, abstruse, because soul has repugnances to such researches, vi. + 9.3 (9-151). + + Unity an accident amongst sense things, something more in the + intelligible, vi. 6.14 (34-666). + + Unity and essence, genuine relations between, vi. 2.11 (43-911). + + Unity and number precede the one and many beings, vi. 6.10 (34-659). + + Unity as indivisible and infinite, vi. 9.6 (9-158). + + Unity is the self-uniform and formless super form, vi. 9.3 (9-152). + + Unity, by it all things depend on the good, i. 7.2 (54-1209). + + Unity, by thinking intelligence passes to duality, v. 6.1 (24-333). + + Unity, co-existence of, demands organization in system, vi. 7.10 + (38-716). + + Unity, contained in sense objects, is not unity itself, vi. 6.16 + (34-671). + + Unity, contemplation in nature, iii. 8 (30-531). + + Unity does not even need itself, vi. 9.6 (9-159). + + Unity, everything tends toward it as it tends toward the good, vi. + 2.12 (43-914). + + Unity, fundamental of genera, would destroy species, vi. 2.2 (43-894). + + Unity, greater in intelligible than in physical world, vi. 5.10 + (23-327). + + Unity, if passed into the manifold, would destroy universe, iii. 8.10 + (30-547). + + Unity, imparted by soul is not pure, vi. 9.1 (9-147). + + Unity, incomprehensible, vi. 9.4 (9-154). + + Unity in manifoldness, vi. 5.6 (23-320). + + Unity into plurality split by numbers, vi. 6.9 (34-656). + + Unity is in the manifold by a manner of existence, vi. 4.8 (22-296). + + Unity is intelligible, though participated in by sense-objects, vi. + 6.13 (34-664). + + Unity is not intelligence, its manifold produced by a unity, iv. 4.1 + (28-443). + + Unity, lack of, causes corporeity to be nonentity, iii. 6.6 (26-362). + + Unity, multiple, radiation of, v. 3.15 (49-1115). + + Unity must be sought for in essence, vi. 5.1 (23-342). + + Unity must exist in the intelligible before being applied to mutable + beings, vi. 6.11 (34-659). + + Unity necessary to existence of all beings, especially collective + nouns, vi. 9.1 (9-147). + + Unity not category, are arguments against, vi. 2.10 (43-910). + + Unity not mere numbering, but existence, vi. 9.2 (9-149). + + Unity not synonymous with essence, vi. 2.9 (43-908). + + Unity of apperception, iv. 4.1 (28-442). + + Unity of being does not exclude unity of other beings, vi. 4.4 + (22-290). + + Unity of reason constituted by contained contraries, iii. 2.16 + (47-1069). + + Unity of soul, does not resemble reason unity because it includes + plurality, vi. 2.6 (43-901). + + Unity of soul not effected by plurality of powers, iv. 9.4 (8-143). + + Unity of soul retained on different levels, iv. 3.5 (27-396). + + Unity of souls based on their multiplicity, iv. 9.4 (8-143). + + Unity of Supreme entailed by its being a principle, v. 4.1 (7-134). + + Unity of Supreme only figurative, vi. 9.5 (9-157). + + Unity of the soul proves that of the Supreme, vi. 5.9 (23-323). + + Unity of will, being an actualization, is the Supreme, vi. 8.13 + (39-795). + + Unity only for its examination are its parts apart, vi. 2.3 (43-897). + + Unity passing into manifold would destroy universe, iii. 8.10 + (30-547). + + Unity reigns still more in the good, vi. 2.11 (43-912). + + Unity self-sufficient, needing no establishment, vi, 9.6 (9-159). + + Unity indefinable, referred to by feeling, vi. 9.3 (9-154). + + Unity, why world proceeded from it, v. 2.1 (11-193). + + Unity's form is principle of numbers, v. 5.5 (32-583). + + Universal and unavoidable evils are, i. 8.6 (51-1149). + + Universal being, description of, vi. 4.2 (22-286). + + Universal being is indivisible, vi. 4.3 (22-288). + + Universal being, stars followers of, ii. 3.13 (52-1179). + + Universal, second rank, souls of men, ii. 3.13 (52-1180). + + Universal soul, first actualization of essence and intelligence, v. + 2.2 (11-194). + + Universal soul is everywhere entire, vi. 4.9 (22-300). + + Universal soul may not be judged by human standards, ii. 9.7 (33-611). + + Universal soul's motion, immortalized heaven, ii. 1.4 (40-817). + + Universality of creator overcame all obstacles, v. 8.7 (31-562). + + Universe, ii. 1 (40-813). + + Universe and deity if include separable soul, ii. 3.9 (52-1176). + + Universe animated by world-soul, iv. 3.9 (27-404). + + Universe as a single harmony, ii. 3.5 (52-1170). + + Universe, birth of, destiny of souls depend on, ii. 3.15 (52-1182). + + Universe depends on single principle, ii. 3.7 (52-1117). + + Universe, diagram of, iv. 4.16 (28-462). + + Universe, hierarchical constitution, vi. 2.2 (43-892). + + Universe is harmony in spite of the faults in the details, ii. 3.16 + (52-1185). + + Universe like light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 (24-337). + + Universe moves in circle, and stands still simultaneously, ii. 2.3 + (14-230). + + Universe, nothing in it inanimate, iv. 4.36 (28-499). + + Universe passions produced by body of stars, ii. 3.13 (52-1178). + + Universe, perfection of, evils are necessary, ii. 3.18 (52-1187). + + Universe picture, that pictures itself, ii. 3.18 (52-1188). + + Universe, plan of, is from eternity, Providence, vi. 8.17 (39-803). + + Universe specialized, organ of, every being is, iv. 4.45 (28-510). + + Universe would be destroyed if unity passed into the manifold, iii. + 8.10 (30-547). + + Universe's influence should be partial only, iv. 4.34 (28-494). + + Universe's total reason, ii. 3.13 (52-1178). + + Unjust acts unastrological theory blame divine reason, iii. 2.10 + (47-1059). + + Unmeasured, is intelligible number infinite, vi. 6.18 (34-676). + + Unnoticed are many new things, iv. 4.8 (28-450). + + Unreflective identification not as high as memory, iv. 4.4 (28-445). + + Unseen is beauty in supreme fusion, v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Uranus, see Kronos, iii. 5.2 (50-1127). + + Uranus (Coleus), v. 8.13 (31-573). + + Utility not the only deciding factor with the senses, iv. 4.24 + (28-475). + + Utilized, superior principle not always, i. 1.10 (53-1203). + + + Varied action, exerted by soul, iv. 7.4 (2-62). + + Variety may depend on latency of part of seminal reason, v. 7.1 + (18-253). + + Variety of world-soul's life makes variety of time, iii. 7.10 + (45-1005). + + Vase for form, see residence, see jar, iv. 3.20 (27-420). + + Vase is the body, iv. 3.7 (27-399). + + Vase of creation of Timaeus, iv. 3.7 (27-399). + + Vault, Theodore of Asine's infra celestial, ii. 4.1 (12-198); v. 8.10 + (31-567). + + Vegetables not irrational and rooted in the intelligible, vi. 7.11 + (38-717). + + Venus, iv. 3.14 (27-412); iii. 5.18 (50-1136); ii. 3.5, 6 (52-1170). + + Venus as subordinate nature of world-soul, v. 8.13 (31-573). + + Venus beauty, whence it came, v. 8.2 (31-553). + + Venus is world-soul, iii. 5.5 (50-1131). + + Venus, Jupiter and Mercury also considered astrologically, ii. 3.5 + (52-1170). + + Venus, mother of Eros, iii. 5.2 (50-1125). + + Venus, or the soul is the individual of Jupiter, iii. 5.8 (50-1137). + + Venus Urania, vi. 9.9 (9-167). + + Vesta, pun on, represents intelligence, v. 5.5 (32-583). + + Vesta represents earth, iv. 4.27 (28-480). + + Vestige of soul descended into world is demon, iii. 5.6 (50-1132). + + Vice as disharmony, iii. 6.2 (26-352). + + Vice caused by external circumstances, i. 8.8 (51-1154); ii. 3.8 + (52-1174); iii. 1 (3-86); vi. 8 (39-773). + + Vice, how soul comes to know it, i. 8.9 (51-1155). + + Vice is deprivation in soul, i. 8.11 (51-1157). + + Vice not absolute but derived evil, i. 8.8 (51-1155). + + Vices, intemperance and cowardliness comes from matter, i. 8.4 + (51-1147). + + Victory over self is mastery of fate, ii. 3.15 (52-1182). + + Vindication, God's justice by philosophy, iv. 4.30 (28-487). + + Vine and branches, simile of, iii. 3.7 (48-1088). + + Violence, proof of, unnaturalness, as of sickness, v. 8.11 (31-570). + + Virtue affects the soul differently from other passions, iii. 6.3 + (26-356). + + Virtue an intellectualizing habit that liberates the soul, vi. 8.5 + (39-780). + + Virtue as a harmony, iii. 6.2 (26-352). + + Virtue as harmony explains evil in soul, iii. 6.2 (26-352). + + Virtue belongs to soul, not to intelligence of super-intelligence, i. + 2.2 (19-259). + + Virtue can conquer any misfortune, i. 4.8 (46-1031). + + Virtue changes life from evil to good, i. 7.3 (54-1210). + + Virtue considered a good, because participation in good, i. 8.12 + (51-1158). + + Virtue consists not in conversion but in its result, i. 2.4 (19-261). + + Virtue consists of doing good when not under trials, iii. 1.10 (3-98). + + Virtue derived from primitive nature of soul, ii. 3.8 (52-1174). + + Virtue does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-920). + + Virtue independent of action, vi. 8.5 (39-779). + + Virtue is good, not absolute, but participating, i. 8.8 (51-1155). + + Virtue is soul's tendency to unity of faculties, vi. 9.1 (9-1147). + + Virtue not corporeal, iv. 7.8 (2-69). + + Virtue not possessed by body, iv. 7.8 (2-69). + + Virtue of appetite explained, iii. 6.2 (26-354). + + Virtue the road to escape evils, i. 2.1 (19-256). + + Virtue, without which, God is a mere word ignored by gnostics, ii. + 9.15 (33-629). + + Virtues, i. 2. + + Virtue's achievement makes this the best of all possible worlds, ii. + 9.8 (33-615). + + Virtues are only purifications, i. 6.6 (1-49). + + Virtues are symmetrical in development, i. 2.7 (19-267). + + Virtues, Aristotelian, rational, i. 3.6 (20-274). + + Virtues, by shaping man, increase divine element in him, i. 2.2 + (19-259). + + Virtues cannot be ascribed to divinity, i. 2.1 (19-256). + + Virtue, choir of, Stoic, vi. 9.11 (9-170). + + Virtues, discussion of, is characteristic of genuine philosophy, ii. + 9.15 (33-621). + + Virtues exist through incorporeality of soul, iv. 7.8 (2-70). + + Virtues, higher, are continuations upward of the homely, i. 2.6 + (19-265). + + Virtues, higher, imply lower but not conversely, i. 3.7 (19-266). + + Virtues, higher, merge into wisdom, i. 2.6 (19-265). + + Virtues, homely, assimilate us to divinity only partially, i. 2.3 + (19-260). + + Virtues, homely (civil, prudence, courage, temperance, justice), i. + 2.1 (19-257). + + Virtues, homely, produce in man a measure and proportion, i. 2.2 + (19-259). + + Virtues, homely, to be supplemented by divine discontent, i. 2.7 + (19-267). + + Virtues, homely, yield resemblance to divinity, i. 2.1 (19-256). + + Virtues, how they purify, i. 2.4 (19-261). + + Virtues, lower, are mutually related, i. 2.7 (19-266). + + Virtues must be supplemented by divine discontent, i. 2.7 (19-267). + + Virtues, natural, yield only to perfect views, need correction of + philosophy, i. 3.6 (20-275). + + Virtues, Platonic, homely and higher, distinguished, i. 2.3 (19-260). + + Virtuous actions derived from self, are free, iii. 1.10 (3-99). + + Virtuous man can suffer only in the lower part, i. 4.13 (46-1023). + + Virtuous man is fully happy, i. 4.4 (46-1026). + + Virtuous man is he whose highest principle is active, iii. 4.6 + (15-239). + + Virtuous men do right at all times, even under trials, iii. 1.10 + (3-99). + + Virtuous will only object conversion of soul towards herself, i. 4.11 + (46-1035). + + Vision and hearing, process of, iv. 5 (29-523). + + Vision does not need intermediary body, iv. 5.1 (29-514). + + Vision further, recall intelligible entities not memory, iv. 4.5 + (28-447). + + Vision interior, how trained, i. 6.9 (1-53). + + Vision not dependent on medium's vision, iv. 5.3 (29-520). + + Vision of God, ecstatic supreme purpose of life, i. 6.6 (1-49). + + Vision of intelligible wisdom, last stage of soul progress, v. 8.10 + (31-568). + + Vision, theory of, ii. 8 (35-680); iv. 7.6 (2-65); v. 5.7 (32-586); + v. 6.1 (24-334); vi. 1.20 (42-872). + + Visual angle theory of Aristotle refuted, ii. 8.2 (35-682). + + Voice as one would analyze it, so must the world be studied, vi. 3.1 + (44-933). + + Voice used by demons and other inhabitants of air, iv. 3.18 (27-417). + + Voluntariness not excluded by necessity, iv. 8.5 (6-127). + + Voluntariness, the basis of responsibility, vi. 8.1 (39-774). + + Voluntary movements, vi. 3.26 (44-980). + + Voluntary soul detachment forbidden, i. 9 (16-245). + + Vulcan, iii. 2.14 (47-1064). + + + Wakening to true reality content of approach to Him, v. 5.11 (32-592). + + Warfare, internecine, necessary, iii. 2.1, 5 (47-1064). + + Washing of man fallen in mud, simile of purification, i. 6.5 (1-48). + + Wastage, none in heaven, ii. 1.4 (40-818). + + Wastage of physical body, and matter, ii. 1.4 (40-819). + + Wastage, see leakage, vi. 5.10 (23-327). + + Wastage, see leakage, none in celestial light, ii. 1.8 (40-826). + + Water, contained in the intelligible world, vi. 7.11 (38-720). + + Way to conceive of first principle, v. 5.10, 11 (32-592). + + Wax seal, impressions are sensations, Stoic, iv. 7.6 (2-66); iii. 6.9 + (26-366); iv. 6.1 (41-829). + + We and ours, psychological names of soul, v. 3.3 (49-1094). + + We and ours, psychological terms, i. 1.7 (53-1199). + + We and the real man, distinctions between, i. 1.10 (53-1202). + + We and the soul, relation between, ii. 1.3 (53-1194). + + We, not ours, is intelligible, i. 1.7 (53-1199). + + Weakening of incarnate souls due to individual contemplation, iv. 8.4 + (6-125). + + Weakness and affection of man, subject him to magic, iv. 4.44 + (28-509). + + Weakness of soul consists of falling into matter, i. 8.14 (51-1160). + + Weakness of soul is evil, i. 8.4 (51-1147). + + Wealth caused by external circumstances, ii. 3.8 (52-1174). + + Weaning of the soul from the body, iii. 6.5 (26-359). + + Welfare of soul is resemblance to divinity, i. 6.6 (1-49). + + Whatness, vi. 7.19 (38-735). + + Whatness and affections (quiddity) of being distinguishes between, + ii. 6.2 (17-248). + + Where or place is Aristotelian category, vi. 1.1, 4 (42-862). + + Whole and individuals fashioned by entire soul, vi. 5.8 (23-322). + + Whole is good, though continued mingled parts, iii. 2.17 (47-1070). + + Whole of divisible and indivisible parts, human soul is, iv. 3.19 + (27-419). + + Whole, reason is a, vi. 5.10 (23-326). + + Whyness is form, vi. 7.19 (38-735); vi. 7.2 (38-732). + + Whyness of its forms contained by its intelligence, ii. 7.2 (38-732). + + Will be, not are in one, all things, v. 2.1 (11-193). + + Will, freedom of, on what is it based, vi. 8.2 (39-775). + + Will of the one, vi. 8 (39-773). + + Wings of souls lost, iv. 3.7 (27-399). + + Wings, souls lose them when falling, iv. 8.1 (6-120); i. 8.14 + (51-1161). + + Wisdom and prudence, first are types; become virtues by contemplation + of soul, i. 2.7 (19-267). + + Wisdom derived from intelligence, and ultimately from good, v. 9.2 + (5-104). + + Wisdom does not imply reasoning and memory, iv. 4.12 (28-456). + + Wisdom, established by spiritual preponderance, i. 4.14 (46-1037). + + Wisdom, highest, nature lowest in world-soul's wisdom, iv. 4.12 + (28-458). + + Wisdom, intelligible, last stage of soul-progress, v. 8.10 (31-567). + + Wisdom is very being, v. 8.5 (31-559). + + Wisdom none the less happy for being unconscious, i. 4.9 (46-1032). + + Wisdom of creator makes complaints grotesque, iii. 2.14 (47-1063). + + Wisdom of soul alone has virtue, i. 2.6 (19-265). + + Wisdom seen in divine, v. 8.10 (31-568). + + Wisdom, two kinds, of soul and of intelligence, i. 2.6 (19-265). + + Wisdom universal, permanent because timeless, iv. 4.11 (28-456). + + Wise man, description of his methods, i. 4.14 (46-1137). + + Wise man, how he escapes all enchantments, iv. 4.43 (28-507). + + Wise man remains unattached, i. 4.16 (46-1039). + + Wise man uses instruments only as temporary means of development, i. + 4.16 (46-1040). + + Wise men, two will be equally happy though in different fortunes, i. + 4.15 (46-1038). + + Withdrawal within yourself, i. 6.9 (1-54). + + Wonderful is relation of one (qv.) to us, v. 5.8 (32-588). + + Word prophoric and innate, v. 1.3 (10-177). + + Word, soul as and actualization of intelligence, v. 1.3 (10-177). + + Workman of the body, instrument is the soul, iv. 7.1 (2-56). + + World and creator are not evil, ii. 9 (33-599). + + World as eternally begotten, ii. 9.2 (33-603). + + World body, why the world-soul is everywhere present in it, vi. 4.1 + (22-285). + + World contains traditions of divinity, ii. 9.9 (33-616). + + World imperishable, so long as archetype subsists, v. 8.12 (31-572). + + World intelligible, everything is actual, ii. 5.3 (25-346). + + World is deity of third rank, iii. 5.6 (50-1132). + + World must be studied, just as one would analyze the voice, vi. 3.1 + (44-933). + + World not evil because of our sufferings, ii. 9.4 (33-606). + + World not to be blamed for imperfections, iii. 2.3 (47-1046). + + World, nothing more beautiful could be imagined, ii. 9.4 (33-606). + + World, objective, subsists, even when we are distracted, v. 1.12 + (10-191). + + World, outside our world would not be visible, iv. 5.8 (29-529). + + World penetrating by intelligence that remains unmoved, vi. 5.11 + (23-328). + + World planned by God, refuted, v. 8.7 (31-561). + + World sense and intelligible, are they separate or classifiable + together, vi. 1.12 (42-860). + + World-soul activity, when measured is time, iii. 7.10 (45-1005). + + World-soul and human soul, differences between, ii. 9.7 (33-612). + + World-soul and individual souls born from intelligence, vi. 2.22 + (43-929). + + World-soul and star soul, intellectual differences, iv. 4.17 (28-463). + + World-soul and stars are impassible, iv. 4.42 (28-506). + + World-soul animated by universe, iv. 3.9 (27-404). + + World-soul basis of existence of bodies, iv. 7.3 (2-60). + + World-soul begotten from intelligence by unity and universality, v. + 1.2 (10-175). + + World-soul creates, because nearest the intelligible, iv. 3.6 + (27-397). + + World-soul creative, not preservative, ii. 3.16 (52-1183). + + World-soul contains universe as sea the net, iv. 3.9 (27-405). + + World-soul could not have gone through creation drama, ii. 9.4 + (33-605). + + World-soul does not remember God, continuing to see him, iv. 4.7 + (28-449). + + World-soul, earth can feel as well as stars, iv. 4.22 (28-471). + + World-soul exerts influence apart from astrology and deviltry, iv. + 4.32 (28-490). + + World-soul glorifies man as life transfigures matter, v. 1.2 (10-176). + + World-soul has no ratiocination, iv. 4.11 (28-455). + + World-soul, how idea of it is reached, ii. 9.17 (33-633). + + World-soul, in it, wisdom is the lowest and nature the highest, iv. + 4.12 (28-458). + + World-soul inferior, ii. 2.3 (14-233). + + World-soul informs all things progressively, iv. 3.10 (27-406). + + World-soul is to time what intelligence is to eternity, iii. 7.10 + (45-1007). + + World-soul, length of its life is time, iii. 7.11 (45-1008). + + World-soul mediation, through it are benefits granted to men, iv. + 4.30 (28-486). + + World-soul, nature of, i. 8.2 (51-1144). + + World-soul participates to create world only by contemplation, and is + undisturbed thereby, iv. 8.7 (6-131). + + World-soul, Plato is in doubt about its being like the stars, iv. + 4.22 (28-470). + + World-soul procession, iii. 8.5 (30-537). + + World-soul procession results in space, iii. 7.10 (45-1006). + + World-soul remains in the intelligible, iii. 9.3 (13-223). + + World-soul simultaneously gives and receives as untroubled medium, + iv. 8.7 (6-131). + + World-soul unconscious of our changes, iv. 4.7 (28-450). + + World-soul unconscious of what goes on in it, iii. 4.4 (15-237). + + World-soul, why it is everywhere entirely in the world body, vi. 4 + (22-285). + + World-souls and individual souls inseparable, because of functions, + iv. 3.2 (27-392). + + World-soul's creation of world is cause of divinity of souls, v. 1.2 + (10-175). + + World-soul's existence, basis of that of simple bodies, iv. 7.2 + (2-57). + + World, this is the best of all possible, because we can achieve + virtue, ii. 9.8 (33-615). + + World, to be in it but not of it, i. 8.6 (51-1150). + + World's testimony to its creator, iii. 2.3 (47-1047). + + + Zodiac, ii. 3.3 (52-1165). + + + + +Plotinos, his Life, Times and Philosophy + +By _Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie_, _A. M._, Harvard, _Ph. D._, Tulane. + + +This is a lucid, scholarly systematization of the views of Plotinos, +giving translation of important and useful passages. It is preceded by +a careful indication and exposition of his formative influences, and a +full biography dealing with his supposed obligations to Christianity. +Accurate references are given for every statement and quotation. The +exposition of, and references on Hermetic philosophy are by themselves +worth the price of the book. + +Dr _Harris_, U.S. Commissioner of Education has written about it in the +highest terms. Dr. _Paul Carus_, Editor of the _Open Court_, devoted +half a page of the July 1897 issue to an appreciative and commendatory +Review of it. Among the many other strong commendations of the work are +the following: + + From _G. R. S. Mead_, Editor _The Theosophical Review_, London: + + It may be stated, on the basis of a fairly wide knowledge of + the subject, that the summary of our anonymous author is the + CLEAREST and MOST INTELLIGENT which has as yet appeared. The + writer bases himself upon the original text, and his happy + phrasing of Platonic terms and his deep sympathy with Platonic + thought proclaim the presence of a capable translator of + Plotinos amongst us.... + + To make so lucid and capable a compendium of the works of + so great a giant of philosophy as Plotinos, the author must + have spent much time in analysing the text and satisfying + himself as to the meaning of many obscure passages; to test + his absolute accuracy would require the verification of every + reference among the hundreds given in the tables at the end + of the pamphlet, and we have only had time to verify one or + two of the more striking. These are as accurate as anything + in a digest can rightly be expected to be. In addition to + the detailed chapters on the seven realms of the Plotinic + philosophy, on reincarnation, ethics, and æsthetics, we have + introductory chapters on Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, + and Emanationism, and on the relationship of Plotinos to + Christianity and Paganism. + + Those who desire to enter into the Plotinian precincts of the + temple of Greek philosophy by the most expeditious path CANNOT + do BETTER than take this little pamphlet for their guide; it + is of course not perfect, but it is undeniably THE BEST which + has yet appeared. We have recommended the T.P.S. to procure + a supply of this pamphlet, for to our Platonic friends and + colleagues we say not only YOU SHOULD, but YOU MUST read it. + + HUMAN BROTHERHOOD, NOV. 1897, in a very extended and most + commendatory review, says: TOO GREAT PRAISE COULD HARDLY + BE BESTOWED upon this scholarly contribution to Platonic + literature. + +_Net price, cloth bound, post-paid, $1.31._ + + + + +Transcriber's Notes: + + +Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant +preference was found in this four-volume set; otherwise they were not +changed. + +Simple typographical errors were corrected. Inconsistent capitalization +has not been changed. + +Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. + +Infrequent spelling of "Plotinus" changed to the predominant "Plotinos." + +Several opening or closing parentheses and quotation marks are +unmatched; Transcriber has not attempted to determine where they belong. + +Page 1030: The opening parenthesis in "(Nor would he be troubled if the +members" either has no match or shares one with a subordinate phrase. +Such "sharing" occurs elsewhere in this four-volume set. + +Page 1059: "(the former for their ferocity," has no matching closing +parenthesis. + +Page 1188, footnote 268 (originally 71): The opening parenthesis in +"(the principal power of the soul," has no match, or shares one with a +subordinate phrase. + +Page 1218: The opening quotation mark just before 'He who possesses the +virtues' has no matching closing quotation mark. + +Page 1262: The opening quotation mark just before 'The intelligible is +of a nature' has no matching closing quotation mark. + +Page 1265: The opening quotation mark just before 'be in relation with +a place,' has no matching closing quotation mark. + +Page 1318: The opening quotation mark just before 'Being and Essence;' +has no matching closing quotation mark. + +Page 1327: The first few lines were misprinted, with the sub-heading +"IMPORTANCE IN THE PAST." in the middle of the first paragraph and part +of a word missing from that paragraph. This eBook attempts to correct +that. + + +Concordance Issues: + +Entries in the Concordance have not been systematically checked for +accuracy; some errors have been corrected, but others probably remain. +Detected errors are noted below. + +Page ii: "Alone with the alone... 1-550" corrected to 1-50. + +Page v: "Beauty consists in kinship to the soul... 1.42." corrected to +1-42. + +Page vi: "Being and actualization... 30-784" corrected to 39-784. + +Page viii: "Castration", second reference, "v. 8.13 (31-573)." does not +belong here. + +Page xvii: "Effusion", last word "reation" could be "reaction" or +"reason". + +Page xxix: "Incorporeality of soul proved by its... 2.72." corrected to +2-72. + +Page xxxii: "Intelligence's existence proved... 50-104." corrected to +5-104. + +Page xxxiv: "Judgment of one part by another... 52-472." corrected to +52-1172. + +Page lviii: ""Somewhat," a particle to modify... 31-797" corrected to +39-797. + +Page lviii: "Soul and relation with God", reference to "i." was +misprinted as "ii." + +Page lviii: "Soul conforms destiny to her character... 53-238." +corrected to 15-238. + +Page lx: "Soul split into three" has no reference. + +Page lxii: "Spectator of vision becomes participator... 34-569" +corrected to 31-569. + +Page lxii: "Stars are they animate?" has no reference. + +Page lxii: "Stars are they inanimate?" has no reference. + +Page lxiv: "Supreme intelligence, nature of... 51-144." corrected to +51-1144. + +Page lxviii: "Unity, contained in sense objects... 24-671" corrected to +34-671. + +Page lxxii: "We and ours, psychological names of soul" was missing part +of reference; reconstructed by Transcriber based on page reference. + + +Footnote Issues: + +In these notes, "anchor" means the reference to a footnote, and +"footnote" means the information to which the anchor refers. Anchors +occur within the main text, while footnotes are grouped in sequence at +the end of this eBook. The structure of the original book required some +exceptions to this, as explained below. + +The original text used chapter endnotes. In this eBook, they have been +combined into a single, ascending sequence based on the sequence in +which the footnotes (not the anchors) occurred in the original book, +and placed at the end of the main text, just before the Concordance. + +Four kinds of irregularities occurred in the footnotes: + +1. Some footnotes are referenced by more than one anchor, so two or +more anchors may refer to the same footnote. + +2. Some anchors were out of sequence, apparently because they were +added afterwards or because they are share a footnote with another +anchor. They have been renumbered to match the numbers of the footnotes +to which they refer. + +3. Some footnotes have no anchors. These are noted below. + +4. One footnote was misprinted beyond repair, and the next three +footnotes were missing. These are noted below. + +Page 1076: Footnote 61 (originally 42) has no anchor; the missing +anchor would be in page range 1062-1064. + +Page 1121: Footnote 100 (originally 4) has no anchor; the missing +anchor would be in page range 1091-1093. + +Page 1121: Footnote 103 (originally 7) has no anchor; the missing +anchor would be in page range 1094-1097. Anchor 99 (originally 3) on +page 1094 could be the missing anchor, as that number also is used on +page 1091. + +Page 1188: Footnote 210 (originally 13) has no anchor; the missing +anchor would be on page 1171 or 1172. + +Page 1189: Footnote 226 (originally 29) has no anchor; the missing +anchor would be on page 1174 or 1175. + +Page 1253: Footnote 329 (originally 9) has no anchor; the missing +anchor would be in page range 1219-1226. + +Page 1287: Footnote 469 (originally 98) has no anchor; the missing +anchor would be on page 1287. + +Page 1313: Chapter number is "VII." but there is no earlier "VI." + +Page 1333: Footnote 758 (originally 21) appears to be misprinted, and +the next three footnotes 759-761 (originally 22-24) are missing. + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4, by +Plotinos (Plotinus) + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 42933 *** |