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diff --git a/42933.txt b/42933.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 01fd593..0000000 --- a/42933.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20698 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4, by Plotinos (Plotinus) - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4 - In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods - -Author: Plotinos (Plotinus) - -Translator: Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie - -Release Date: June 13, 2013 [EBook #42933] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ASCII - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLOTINOS: COMPLETE WORKS, V. 4 *** - - - - -Produced by Charlene Taylor, Joe C, Charlie Howard, and -the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images -generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian -Libraries) - - - - - - - - - -VOLUME IV. - -WORKS OF PLOTINOS. - - - - - PLOTINOS - Complete Works - - In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods; - - With - BIOGRAPHY by PORPHYRY, EUNAPIUS, & SUIDAS, - COMMENTARY by PORPHYRY, - ILLUSTRATIONS by JAMBLICHUS & AMMONIUS, - STUDIES in Sources, Development, Influence; - INDEX of Subjects, Thoughts and Words. - - by - KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE, - - Professor in Extension, University of the South, Sewanee; - A.M., Sewanee, and Harvard; Ph.D., Tulane, and Columbia. - M.D., Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia. - - VOL. IV - - Eustochian Books, 46-54; Comment. - - COMPARATIVE LITERATURE PRESS - - P.O. Box 42, ALPINE, N.J., U.S.A. - - - - - Copyright, 1918, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie. - All Rights, including that of Translation, Reserved. - - Entered at Stationers' Hall, by - George Bell and Sons, Portugal Street, Lincoln's Inn, London. - - - - -FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR. - -Whether Animals May Be Termed Happy.[1] - - -DEFINITIONS OF HAPPINESS. - -1. The (Aristotelian) ideal of living well and happiness are -(practically) identical. Should we, on that account, grant even to -animals the privilege of achieving happiness? Why might we not say -that they live well, if it be granted them, in their lives, to follow -the course of nature, without obstacles? For if to live well consist -either in pleasure (pleasant passions, as the Epicureans taught), or in -realizing one's own individual aim (the Stoic ideal), then this living -well is, in either case, possible for animals, who can both enjoy -pleasure, and accomplish their peculiar aim. Thus singing birds live a -life desirable for them, if they enjoy pleasure, and sing conformably -to their nature. If further we should define happiness as achieving -the supreme purpose towards which nature aspires (the Stoic ideal), we -should, even in this case, admit that animals share in happiness when -they accomplish this supreme purpose. Then nature arouses in them no -further desires, because their whole career is completed, and their -life is filled from beginning to end. - - -WHETHER PLANTS MAY BE TERMED HAPPY. - -There are no doubt some who may object to our admitting to happiness -living beings other than man. They might even point out that on this -basis happiness could not be refused to even the lowest beings, such -as plants: for they also live, their life also has a purpose, by -which they seek to fulfil their development. However, it would seem -rather unreasonable to say, that living beings other than humans -cannot possess happiness by this mere reason that to us they seem -pitiable. Besides, it would be quite possible to deny to plants what -may be predicated of other living beings, on the grounds that plants -lack emotion. Some might hold they are capable of happiness, on the -strength of their possessing life, for a being that lives can live -well or badly; and in this way we could say that they possess or -lack well-being, and bear, or do not bear fruits. If (as Aristippus -thought), pleasure is the goal of man, and if to live well is -constituted by enjoying it, it would be absurd to claim that no living -beings other than man could live well. The same argument applies if we -define happiness as (a state of imperturbable tranquility, by Epicurus -called) ataraxy;[2] or as (the Stoic ideal,[3] of) living conformably -to nature. - - -LIVING WELL NEED NOT BE EXTENDED EVEN TO ALL ANIMALS. - -2. Those who deny the privilege of living well to plants, because these -lack sensation, are not on that account obliged to grant it to all -animals. For, if sensation consist in the knowledge of the experienced -affection, this affection must already be good before the occurrence of -the knowledge. For instance, the being must be in a state conformable -to nature even though ignorant thereof. He must fulfil his proper -function even when he does not know it. He must possess pleasure before -perceiving it. Thus if, by the possession of this pleasure, the being -already possesses the Good, he thereby possesses even well-being. What -need then is there to join thereto sensation, unless indeed well-being -be defined as sensation and knowledge (of an affection or state of the -soul) rather than in the latter affection and state of the soul itself? - - -EVEN THEY WHO DEFINE HAPPINESS AS SENSATION SEEK HIGHER HAPPINESS. - -The Good would thus be reduced to no more than sensation, or the -actualization of the sense-life. In this case, to possess it, it is -sufficient to perceive irrespective of the content of that perception. -Other persons might assert that goodness results from the union of -these two things: of the state of the soul, and of the knowledge -the soul has of it. If then the Good consist in the perception of -some particular state, we shall have to ask how elements which, by -themselves, are indifferent could, by their union, constitute the -good. Other theories are that the Good consists in some particular -state, or in possession of some particular disposition, and conscious -enjoyment of the presence of the Good. These would, however, still have -to answer the question whether, for good living, it be sufficient that -the being knows he possesses this state; or must he know not only that -this state is pleasant, but also that it is the Good? If then it be -necessary to realize that it is the Good, the matter is one no longer -of the function of sensation, but of a faculty higher than the senses. -To live well, in this case, it will no longer be sufficient to possess -pleasure, but we shall have to know that pleasure is the Good. The -cause of happiness will not be the presence of pleasure itself, but -the power of judging that pleasure is a good. Now judgment is superior -to affection; it is reason or intelligence, while pleasure is only an -affection, and what is irrational could not be superior to reason. How -would reason forget itself to recognize as superior what is posited -in a genus opposed to it? These men who deny happiness to plants, -who explain it as some form of sensation, seems to us, in spite of -themselves, to be really seeking happiness of a higher nature, and to -consider it as this better thing which is found only in a completer -life. - - -NOT EVEN REASON IS A SUFFICIENT EXPLANATION OF LIVING WELL. - -There is a greater chance of being right in the opinion that happiness -consists in the reasonable life, instead of mere life, even though -united to sensation. Still even this theory must explain why happiness -should be the privilege of the reasonable animal. Should we add to -the idea of an animal the quality of being reasonable, because reason -is more sagacious, more skilful in discovering, and in procuring the -objects necessary to satisfy the first needs of nature? Would you -esteem reason just as highly if it were incapable of discovering, -or procuring these objects? If we value reason only for the objects -it aids us in getting, happiness might very well belong to the very -irrational beings, if they are, without reason, able to procure -themselves the things necessary to the satisfaction of the first -needs of their nature. In this case, reason will be nothing more than -an instrument. It will not be worth seeking out for itself, and its -perfection, in which virtue has been shown to consist, will be of -little importance. The opposite theory would be that reason does not -owe its value to its ability to procure for us objects necessary to -the satisfaction of the first needs of nature, but that it deserves -to be sought out for itself. But even here we would have to explain -its function, its nature, and set forth how it becomes perfect. If it -were to be improvable, it must not be defined as the contemplation -of sense-objects, for its perfection and essence (being) consist in -a different (and higher) function. It is not among the first needs -of nature, nor among the objects necessary to the satisfaction of its -needs; it has nothing to do with them, being far superior. Otherwise, -these philosophers would be hard pressed to explain its value. Until -they discover some nature far superior to the class of objects with -which they at present remain, they will have to remain where it suits -them to be, ignorant of what good living is, and both how to reach that -goal, and to what beings it is possible. - - -HAPPINESS DEPENDS EXCLUSIVELY ON INTERIOR CHARACTERISTICS. - -3. Dismissing these theories, we return to our own definition of -happiness. We do not necessarily make life synonymous with happiness -by attributing happiness to a living being. Otherwise, we would be -implying that all living beings can achieve it, and we would be -admitting to real complete enjoyment thereof all those who possessed -that union and identity which all living beings are naturally capable -of possessing. Finally, it would be difficult to grant this privilege -to the reasonable being, while refusing it to the brute; for both -equally possess life. They should, therefore, be capable of achieving -happiness--for, on this hypothesis, happiness could be no more than a -kind of life. Consequently, the philosophers who make it consist in the -rational life, not in the life common to all beings, do not perceive -that they implicitly suppose that happiness is something different -from life. They are then obliged to say that happiness resides in a -pure quality, in the rational faculty. But the subject (to which they -should refer happiness) is the rational life, since happiness can -belong only to the totality (of life joined to reason). They therefore, -really limit the life they speak of to a certain kind of life; not -that they have the right to consider these two kinds of life (life in -general, and rational life) as being ranked alike, as both members of -a single division would be, but another kind of distinction might be -established between them, such as when we say that one thing is prior, -and the other posterior. Since "life" may be understood in different -senses, and as it possesses different degrees, and since by mere verbal -similarity life may be equally predicated of plants and of irrational -animals, and since its differences consist in being more or less -complete, analogy demands a similar treatment of "living well." If, by -its life, a being be the image of some other being, by its happiness -it will also be the image of the happiness of this other being. If -happiness be the privilege of complete life, the being that possesses a -complete life will also alone possess happiness; for it possesses what -is best since, in the order of these existences, the best is possession -of the essence (being) and perfection of life. Consequently, the Good -is not anything incidental, for no subject could owe its good to a -quality that would be derived from elsewhere. What indeed could be -added to complete life, to render it excellent? - - -THE GOOD CONSISTS IN INTELLIGENCE. - -Our own definition of the Good, interested as we are not in its cause, -but in its essence, is that the perfect life, that is genuine and real, -consists in intelligence. The other kinds of life are imperfect. They -offer no more than the image of life. They are not Life in its fulness -and purity. As we have often said they are not life, rather than its -contrary. In one word, since all living beings are derived from one -and the same Principle, and since they do not possess an equal degree -of life, this principle must necessarily be the primary Life, and -perfectness. - - -HAPPINESS MUST BE SOMETHING HUMAN. - -4. If man be capable of possessing perfect Life, he is happy as soon as -he possesses it. If it were otherwise, if the perfect life pertained -to the divinities alone, to them alone also would happiness belong. -But since we attribute happiness to men, we shall have to set forth -in what that which procures it consists. I repeat, what results from -our former considerations, namely, that man has perfect Life when, -besides the sense-life, he possesses reason and true intelligence. -But is man as such stranger to the perfect Life, and does he possess -it as something alien (to his essential being)? No, for no man lacks -happiness entirely, either actually or even potentially. But shall we -consider happiness as a part of the man, and that he in himself is the -perfect form of life? We had better think that he who is a stranger to -the perfect Life possesses only a part of happiness, as he possesses -happiness only potentially; but that he who possesses the perfect Life -in actuality, and he who has succeeded in identifying himself with it, -alone is happy. All the other things, no more than envelope him (as -the Stoics would say), and could not be considered as parts of him, -since they surround him in spite of himself. They would belong to him -as parts of himself, if they were joined to him by the result of his -will. What is the Good for a man who finds himself in this condition? -By the perfect life which he possesses, he himself is his own good. The -principle (the Good in itself) which is superior (to the perfect Life) -is the cause of the good which is in him; for we must not confuse the -Good in itself--and the good in man. - - -WE KNOW WE HAVE REACHED HAPPINESS WHEN WE NO MORE DESIRE ANYTHING. - -That the man who has achieved perfect Life possesses happiness is -proved by his no longer desiring anything. What more could he desire? -He could not desire anything inferior; he is united to the best; he, -therefore, has fulness of life. If he be virtuous he is fully happy, -and fully possesses the Good, for no good thing escapes him. What he -seeks is sought only by necessity, less for him than for some of the -things which belong to him. He seeks it for the body that is united to -him; and though this body be endowed with life, what relates to his -needs is not characteristic of the real man. The latter knows it, and -what he grants to his body, he grants without in any way departing -from his own characteristic life. His happiness will, therefore, not -be diminished in adversity, because he continues to possess veritable -life. If he lose relatives or friends, he knows the nature of death, -and besides those whom it strikes down know it also if they were -virtuous. Though he may allow himself to be afflicted by the fate of -these relatives or friends, the affliction will not reach the intimate -part of his nature; the affliction will be felt only by that part of -the soul which lacks reason, and whose suffering the man will not share. - - -MEN MUST SEEK THEIR HAPPINESS IN THAT OF EACH OF THE PARTS OF THEIR -NATURE. - -5. It has often been objected that we should reckon with the bodily -pains, the diseases, the obstacles which may hinder action, cases of -unconsciousness, which might result from certain philtres and diseases -(as the Peripatetics objected[4]). Under these conditions, they say, -the sage could not live well, and be happy--without either mentioning -poverty and lack of recognition. All these evils, not forgetting the -famous misfortunes of Priam,[5] justify serious objections. Indeed, -even if the sage endured all these evils (as indeed he easily does), -they would none the less be contrary to his will; and happy life must -necessarily be one that conforms to our will. The sage is not only -a soul endowed with particular dispositions; the body also must be -comprised within his personality (as also thought the Pythagorean -Archytas[6]). This assertion seems reasonable so far as the passions -of the body are felt by the man himself, and as they suggest desires -and aversions to him. If then pleasure be an element of happiness, how -could the man afflicted by the blows of fate and by pains still be -happy, even if he were virtuous? To be happy, the divinities need only -to enjoy perfect life; but men, having their soul united to a lower -part, must seek their happiness in the life of each of these two parts -that compose him, and not exclusively in one of the two, even though -it were the higher. Indeed, as soon as one of them suffers, the other -one, in spite of its superiority, finds its actions hindered. Otherwise -we shall have to regard neither the body, nor the sensations that flow -from it; and to seek only what by itself could suffice to procure -happiness, independently of the body. - - -NECESSARY THINGS ARE THOSE WHOSE POSSESSION IS UNCONSCIOUS. - -6. If our exposition of the subject had defined happiness as exemption -from pain, sickness, reverses, and great misfortunes, (we would -have implied that) it would be impossible for us to taste happiness -while exposed to one of those evils. But if happiness consist in the -possession of the real good, why should we forget this good to consider -its accessories? Why, in the appreciation of this good, should we -seek things which are not among the number of its elements? If it -consisted in a union of the true goods with those things which alone -are necessary to our needs, or which are so called, even without being -such, we should have to strive to possess the latter also. But as the -goal of man must be single and not manifold--for otherwise it would -be usual to say that he seeks his ends, rather than the more common -expression, his end--we shall have to seek only what is most high and -precious, what the soul somehow wishes to include. Her inclination and -will cannot aspire to anything which is not the sovereign good. Reason -only avoids certain evils, and seeks certain advantages, because it -is provoked by their presence; but it is not so led by nature. The -principal tendency of the soul is directed towards what is best; when -she possesses it, she is satisfied, and stops; only then does she enjoy -a life really conformable to her will. Speaking of will strictly,[7] -and not with unjustifiable license, the task of the will is not to -procure things necessary to our needs (?) Of course we judge that it is -suitable to procure things that are necessary, as we in general avoid -evils. But the avoiding of them is no aim desirable in itself; such -would rather be not to need to avoid them. This, for instance, occurs -when one possesses health and is exempt from suffering. Which of these -advantages most attracts us? So long as we enjoy health, so long as we -do not suffer, it is little valued. Now advantages which, when present, -have no attraction for the soul, and add nothing to her happiness, and -which, when absent, are sought as causes of the suffering arising from -the presence of their contraries, should reasonably be called necessity -rather than goods, and not be reckoned among the elements of our goal. -When they are absent and replaced by their contraries, our goal remains -just what it was. - - -EVILS WHICH THE WISE MAN CAN SUPPORT WITHOUT DISTURBANCE OF HIS -HAPPINESS. - -7. Why then does the happy man desire to enjoy the presence of -these advantages, and the absence of their contraries? It must be -because they contribute, not to his happiness, but to his existence; -because their contraries tend to make him lose existence, hindering -the enjoyment of the good, without however removing it. Besides, -he who possesses what is best wishes to possess it purely, without -any mixture. Nevertheless, when a foreign obstacle occurs, the good -still persists even in spite of this obstacle. In short, if some -accident happen to the happy man against his will, his happiness -is in no way affected thereby. Otherwise, he would change and lose -his happiness daily; as if, for instance, he had to mourn a son, or -if he lost some of his possessions. Many events may occur against -his wish without disturbing him in the enjoyment of the good he has -attained. It may be objected that it is the great misfortunes, and -not trifling accidents (which can disturb the happiness of the wise -man). Nevertheless, in human things, is there any great enough not to -be scorned by him who has climbed to a principle superior to all, and -who no longer depends on lower things? Such a man will not be able to -see anything great in the favors of fortune, whatever they be, as in -being king, in commanding towns, or peoples; in founding or building -cities, even though he himself should receive that glory; he will -attach no importance to the loss of his power, or even to the ruin -of his fatherland. If he consider all that as a great evil, or even -only as an evil, he will have a ridiculous opinion. He will no longer -be a virtuous man; for, as Jupiter is my witness, he would be highly -valuing mere wood, or stones, birth, or death; while he should insist -on the incontestable truth that death is better than the corporeal -life (as held by Herodotus). Even though he were sacrificed, he would -not consider death any worse merely because it occurred at the feet -of the altars. Being buried is really of small importance, for his -body will rot as well above as below ground (as thought Theodorus of -Cyrene).[8] Neither will he grieve at being buried without pomp and -vulgar ostentation, and to have seemed unworthy of being placed in a -magnificent tomb. That would be smallness of mind. If he were carried -off as a captive, he would still have a road open to leave life, in the -case that he should no longer be allowed to hope for happiness. (Nor -would he be troubled if the members of his family, such as sons (?) and -daughters (and female relatives?) were carried off into captivity. If -he had arrived to the end of his life without seeing such occurrences -(we would indeed be surprised). Would he leave this world supposing -that such things cannot happen? Such an opinion would be absurd. Would -he not have realized that his own kindred were exposed to such dangers? -The opinion that such things could happen will not make him any less -happy. No, he will be happy even with that belief. He would still be so -even should that occur; he will indeed reflect that such is the nature -of this world, that one must undergo such accidents, and submit. Often -perhaps men dragged into captivity will live better (than in liberty); -and besides, if their captivity be insupportable, it is in their power -to release themselves. If they remain, it is either because their -reason so induces them--and then their lot cannot be too hard; or it -is against the dictates of their reason, in which case they have none -but themselves to blame. The wise man, therefore, will not be unhappy -because of the folly of his own people; he will not allow his lot to -depend on the happiness or misfortunes of other people. - - -NO MISFORTUNE IS TOO GREAT TO BE CONQUERED BY VIRTUE. - -8. If the griefs that he himself undergoes are great, he will support -them as well as he can; if they exceed his power of endurance, they -will carry him off (as thought Seneca[9]). In either case, he will -not, in the midst of his sufferings, excite any pity: (ever master -of his reason) he will not allow his own characteristic light to be -extinguished. Thus the flame in the lighthouse continues to shine, in -spite of the raging of the tempest, in spite of the violent blowing -of the winds. (He should not be upset) even by loss of consciousness, -or even if pain becomes so strong that its violence could almost -annihilate him. If pain become more intense, he will decide as to -what to do; for, under these circumstances, freedom of will is not -necessarily lost (for suicide remains possible, as thought Seneca[10]). -Besides, we must realize that these sufferings do not present -themselves to the wise man, under the same light as to the common man; -that all these need not penetrate to the sanctuary of the man's life; -which indeed happens with the greater part of pains, griefs and evils -that we see being suffered by others; it would be proof of weakness to -be affected thereby. A no less manifest mark of weakness is to consider -it an advantage to ignore all these evils, and to esteem ourselves -happy that they happen only after death,[11] without sympathizing with -the fate of others, and thinking only to spare ourselves some grief. -This would be a weakness that we should eliminate in ourselves, not -allowing ourselves to be frightened by the fear of what might happen. -The objection that it is natural to be afflicted at the misfortunes -of those who surround us, meets the answer that, to begin with, it is -not so with every person; then, that it is part of the duty of virtue -to ameliorate the common condition of human nature, and to raise it -to what is more beautiful, rising above the opinions of the common -people. It is indeed beautiful not to yield to what the common people -usually consider to be evils. We should struggle against the blows of -fortune not by affected ignoring (of difficulties, like an ostrich), -but as a skilful athlete who knows that the dangers he is incurring -are feared by certain natures, though a nature such as his bears them -easily, seeing in them nothing terrible, or at least considering them -terrifying only to children. Certainly, the wise man would not have -invited these evils; but on being overtaken by them he opposes to them -the virtue which renders the soul unshakable and impassible. - - -WISDOM IS NONE THE LESS HAPPY FOR BEING UNCONSCIOUS OF ITSELF. - -9. It may further be objected that the wise man might lose -consciousness, if overwhelmed by disease, or the malice of magic. -Would he still remain happy? Either he will remain virtuous, being -only fallen asleep; in which case he might continue to be happy, since -no one claims he must lose happiness because of sleep, inasmuch as -no reckoning of the time spent in this condition is kept, and as he -is none the less considered happy for life. On the other hand, if -unconsciousness be held to terminate virtue, the question at issue is -given up; for, supposing that he continues to be virtuous, the question -at issue was, whether he remain happy so long as he remains virtuous. -It might indeed still be objected that he cannot be happy if he remain -virtuous without feeling it, without acting in conformity with virtue. -Our answer is that a man would not be any less handsome or healthy for -being so unconsciously. Likewise, he would not be any less wise merely -for lack of consciousness thereof. - - -THOUGH HAPPINESS IS ACTUALIZED WISDOM WE DO NOT LOSE IT WHEN -UNCONSCIOUS. WE DO NOT LOSE IT BECAUSE WE OURSELVES ARE ACTUALIZATIONS -OF INTELLIGENCE. - -Once more it may be objected that it is essential to wisdom to be -self-conscious, for happiness resides only in actualized wisdom. This -objection would hold if reason and wisdom were incidentals. But if -the hypostatic substance of wisdom consist in an essence (being), -or rather, in being itself, and if this being do not perish during -sleep, nor during unconsciousness, if consequently the activity of -being continue to subsist in him; if by its very nature this (being) -ceaselessly watch, then the virtuous man must even in this state (of -sleep or unconsciousness), continue to exercise his activity. Besides, -this activity is ignored only by one part of himself, and not by -himself entirely. Thus during the operation of the actualization of -growth,[12] the perception of its activity is not by his sensibility -transmitted to the rest of the man. If our personality were constituted -by this actualization of growth, we would act simultaneously with -it; but we are not this actualization, but that of the intellectual -principle, and that is why we are active simultaneously with this -(divine intellectual activity). - - -INTELLIGENCE IS NOT DEPENDENT ON CONSCIOUSNESS. - -10. The reason that intelligence remains hidden is just because it -is not felt; only by the means of this feeling can this activity be -felt; but why should intelligence cease to act (merely because it -was not felt)? On the other hand, why could the soul not have turned -her activity towards intelligence before having felt or perceived -it? Since (for intelligence) thinking and existence are identical, -perception must have been preceded by some actualization. It seems -impossible for perception to arise except when thought reflects upon -itself, and when the principle whose activity constitutes the life of -the soul, so to speak, turns backwards, and reflects, as the image of -an object placed before a brilliant polished mirror reflects itself -therein. Likewise, if the mirror be placed opposite the object, there -is no more image; and if the mirror be withdrawn or badly adjusted, -there is no more image, though the luminous object continue to act. -Likewise, when that faculty of the soul which represents to us the -images of discursive reason and of intelligence is in a suitable -condition of calm, we get an intuition--that is, a somewhat sensual -perception thereof--with the prior knowledge of the activity of the -intelligence, and of discursive reason. When, however, this image -is troubled by an agitation in the mutual harmony of the organs, -the discursive reason, and the intelligence continue to act without -any image, and the thought does not reflect in the imagination. -Therefore we shall have to insist that thought is accompanied by an -image without, nevertheless, being one itself. While we are awake, -it often happens to us to perform praiseworthy things, to meditate -and to act, without being conscious of these operations at the moment -that we produce them. When for instance we read something, we are not -necessarily self-conscious that we are reading, especially if our -attention be fully centered on what we read. Neither is a brave man -who is performing a courageous deed, self-conscious of his bravery. -There are many other such cases. It would therefore seem that the -consciousness of any deed weakens its energy, and that when the action -is alone (without that consciousness) it is in a purer, livelier and -more vital condition. When virtuous men are in that condition (of -absence of self-consciousness), their life is more intense because it -concentrates in itself instead of mingling with feeling. - - -THE ONLY OBJECT OF THE VIRTUOUS WILL IS THE CONVERSION OF THE SOUL -TOWARDS HERSELF. - -11. It has sometimes been said that a man in such a condition does -not really live. (If such be their honest opinion), they must be told -that he does live, even if they be incapable of understanding his -happiness and his life. If this seem to them incredible, they should -reflect whether their own admission that such a man lives and is -virtuous, does not imply that under those circumstances he is happy. -Neither should they begin by supposing that he is annihilated, only -later to consider whether he be happy. Neither should they confine -themselves to externalities after having admitted that he turns his -whole attention on things that he bears within himself; in short, not -to believe that the goal of his will inheres in external objects. -Indeed, such considering of external objects as the goal of the will of -the virtuous man, would be tantamount to a denial of the very essence -(being) of happiness; likewise, insisting that those are the objects he -desires. His wish would undoubtedly be that all men should be happy, -and that none of them should suffer any evil; but, nevertheless, he is -none the less happy when that does not happen. Other people, again, -would say that it was unreasonable for the virtuous man to form such -an (impossible) wish, since elimination of evils here below is out of -the question.[13] This, however, would constitute an admission of our -belief that the only goal of the virtuous man's will is the conversion -of the soul towards herself.[14] - - -THE PLEASURES CLAIMED FOR THE VIRTUOUS MAN ARE OF A HIGHER KIND. - -12. We grant, however, that the pleasures claimed for the virtuous man -are neither those sought by debauchees, nor those enjoyed by the body. -Those pleasures could not be predicated of him without degrading his -felicity. Nor can we claim for him raptures of delight--for what would -be their use? It is sufficient to suppose that the virtuous man tastes -the pleasures attached to the presence of goods, pleasures which must -consist neither in motions, nor be accidental. He enjoys the presence -of those (higher) goods because he is present to himself; from that -time on he lingers in a state of sweet serenity. The virtuous man, -therefore, is always serene, calm, and satisfied. If he be really -virtuous, his state cannot be troubled by any of the things that we -call evils. Those who in the virtuous life are seeking for pleasures of -another kind are actually seeking something else than the virtuous life. - - -IN THE VIRTUOUS MAN THE PART THAT SUFFERS IS THE HIGHER; THEREFORE HE -REALLY DOES NOT SUFFER AS DO THOSE WHO SUFFER CHIEFLY PHYSICALLY. - -13. The actions of the virtuous man could not be hindered by fortune, -but they may vary with the fluctuations of fortune. All will be equally -beautiful, and, perhaps, so much the more beautiful as the virtuous -man will find himself placed amidst more critical circumstances. Any -acts that concern contemplation, which relate to particular things, -will be such that the wise man will be able to produce them, after -having carefully sought and considered what he is to do. Within -himself he finds the most infallible of the rules of conduct, a rule -that will never fail him, even were he within the oft-discussed bull -of Phalaris. It is useless for the vulgar man to repeat, even twice -or thrice,[15] that such a fate is sweet; for if a man were to utter -those words, they are uttered by that very (animal) part that undergoes -those tortures. On the contrary, in the virtuous man, the part that -suffers is different from that which dwells within itself, and which, -while necessarily residing within itself, is never deprived of the -contemplation of the universal Good. - - -MAN BECOMES WISE BY ESTABLISHING A SPIRITUAL PREPONDERANCE. - -14. Man, and specially the virtuous man, is constituted not by the -composite of soul and body,[16] as is proved by the soul's power to -separate herself from the body,[17] and to scorn what usually are -called "goods." It would be ridiculous to relate happiness to the -animal part of man, since happiness consists in living well, and living -well, being an actualization, belongs to the soul, exclusively. Not -even does it extend to the entire soul, for happiness does not extend -to that part of the soul concerned with growth, having nothing in -common with the body, neither as to its size, nor its possible good -condition. Nor does it depend on the perfection of the senses, because -their development, as well as that of the organs, weights man down, -and makes him earthy. Doing good will be made easier by establishing a -sort of counter-weight, weakening the body, and taming its motions, so -as to show how much the real man differs from the foreign things that -(to speak as do the Stoics), surround him. However much the (earthy) -common man enjoy beauty, greatness, wealth, command over other men, -and earthly luxuries, he should not be envied for the deceptive -pleasure he takes in all these advantages. To begin with, the wise -man will probably not possess them; but if he do possess them, he -will voluntarily diminish them, if he take due care of himself. By -voluntary negligence he will weaken and disfigure the advantages of -his body. He will abdicate from dignities. While preserving the health -of his body, he will not desire to be entirely exempt from disease and -sufferings. If he never experienced these evils, he will wish to make -a trial of them during his youth. But when he has arrived at old age, -he will no longer wish to be troubled either by pains, or pleasures, -or anything sad or agreeable that relates to the body; so as not to be -forced to give it his attention. He will oppose the sufferings he will -have to undergo with a firmness that will never forsake him. He will -not believe that his happiness is increased by pleasures, health or -rest, nor destroyed nor diminished by their contraries. As the former -advantages do not augment his felicity, how could their loss diminish -it? - - -TWO WISE MEN WILL BE EQUALLY HAPPY, IN SPITE OF DIFFERENCES OF FORTUNE. - -15. Let us now imagine two wise men, the first of whom possesses -everything that heart can wish for, while the other is in a contrary -position. Shall they be said to be equally happy? Yes, if they be -equally wise. Even if the one possessed physical beauty, and all -the other advantages that do not relate either to wisdom, virtue, -contemplation of the good, or perfect life; what would be the use of -all that since he who possesses all these advantages is not considered -as really being happier than he who lacks them? Such wealth would -not even help a flute-player to accomplish his object! We, however, -consider the happy man only from the standpoint of the weakness of our -mind, considering as serious and frightful what the really happy man -considers indifferent. For the man could not be wise, nor consequently -happy, so long as he has not succeeded in getting rid of all these -vain ideas, so long as he has not entirely transformed himself, so -long as he does not within himself contain the confidence that he is -sheltered from all evil. Only then will he live without being troubled -by any fear. The only thing that should affect him, would be the fear -that he is not an expert in wisdom, that he is only partly wise. As to -unforeseen fears that might get the better of him before he had had -the time to reflect, during a moment of abstraction of attention, the -wise man will hasten to turn them away, treating that which within -himself becomes agitated as a child that has lost its way through -pain. He will tranquilize it either by reason, or even by a threat, -though uttered without passion. Thus the mere sight of a worthy person -suffices to calm a child. Besides, the wise man will not hold aloof -either from friendship nor gratitude. He will treat his own people as -he treats himself; giving to his friends as much as to his own person; -and he will give himself up to friendship, without ceasing to exercise -intelligence therein. - - -THE WISE MAN REMAINS UNATTACHED. - -16. If the virtuous man were not located in this elevated life of -intelligence; if on the contrary he were supposed to be subject to -the blows of fate, and if we feared that they would overtake him, our -ideal would no longer be that of the virtuous man such as we outline -it; we would be considering a vulgar man, mingled with good and evil, -of whom a life equally mingled with good and evil would be predicated. -Even such a man might not easily be met with, and besides, if we did -meet him, he would not deserve to be called a wise man; for there would -be nothing great about him, neither the dignity of wisdom, nor the -purity of good. Happiness, therefore, is not located in the life of -the common man. Plato rightly says that you have to leave the earth to -ascend to the good, and that to become wise and happy, one should turn -one's look towards the only Good, trying to acquire resemblance to Him, -and to live a life conformable to Him.[18] That indeed must suffice -the wise man to reach his goal. To the remainder he should attach no -more value than to changes of location, none of which can add to his -happiness. If indeed he pay any attention to external things scattered -here and there around him, it is to satisfy the needs of his body so -far as he can. But as he is something entirely different from the -body, he is never disturbed at having to leave it; and he will abandon -it whenever nature will have indicated the time. Besides, he always -reserves to himself the right to deliberate about this (time to leave -the world by suicide).[19] Achievement of happiness will indeed be his -chief goal; nevertheless, he will also act, not only in view of his -ultimate goal, or himself, but on the body to which he is united. He -will care for this body, and will sustain it as long as possible. Thus -a musician uses his lyre so long as he can; but as soon as it is beyond -using, he repairs it, or abandons playing the lyre, because he now can -do without it. Leaving it on the ground, he will look at it almost with -scorn, and will sing without its accompaniment. Nevertheless it will -not have been in vain that this lyre will have been originally given to -him; for he will often have profited by its use. - - - - -THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. - -Of Providence.[20] - - -EPICURUS TAUGHT CHANCE AND THE GNOSTICS AN EVIL CREATOR. - -1. When Epicurus[21] derives the existence and constitution of the -universe from automatism and chance, he commits an absurdity, and -stultifies himself. That is self-evident, though the matter have -elsewhere been thoroughly demonstrated.[22] But (if the world do -not owe its origin to chance) we will be compelled to furnish an -adequate reason for the existence and creation of all these beings. -This (teleological) question deserves the most careful consideration. -Things that seem evil do indeed exist, and they do suggest doubts about -universal Providence; so that some (like Epicurus[23]) insist there -is no providence, while others (like the Gnostics[24]), hold that the -demiurgic creator is evil. The subject, therefore, demands thorough -investigation of its first principles. - - -PARTICULAR AND UNIVERSAL PROVIDENCE ASSUMED AS PREMISES. - -Let us leave aside this individual providence, which consists in -deliberating before an action, and in examining whether we should or -should not do something, or whether we should give or not give it. We -shall also assume the existence of the universal Providence, and from -this principle we shall deduce the consequences. - - -PROVIDENCE IS NOT PARTICULAR BECAUSE THE WORLD HAD NO BEGINNING. - -We would acknowledge the existence of a particular Providence, such as -we mentioned above, if we thought that the world had had a beginning of -existence, and had not existed since all eternity. By this particular -Providence we mean a recognition, in the divinity, of a kind of -prevision and reasoning (similar to the reasoning and prevision of the -artist who, before carrying out a work, deliberates on each of the -parts that compose it[25]). We would suppose that this prevision and -reasoning were necessary to determine how the universe could have been -made, and on what conditions it should have been the best possible. -But as we hold that the world's existence had no beginning, and that -it has existed since all time, we can, in harmony with reason and our -own views, affirm that universal Providence consists in this that -the universe is conformed to Intelligence, and that Intelligence is -prior to the universe, not indeed in time--for the existence of the -Intelligence did not temporarily precede that of the universe--but (in -the order of things), because, by its nature, Intelligence precedes the -world that proceeds from it, of which it is the cause, type[26] and -model, and cause of unchanged perpetual persistence. - - -HOW INTELLIGENCE CONTINUES TO MAKE THE WORLD SUBSIST. - -This is how Intelligence continues to make the world subsist. Pure -Intelligence and Being in itself constitute the genuine (intelligible) -World that is prior to everything, which has no extension, which -is weakened by no division, which has no imperfection, even in its -parts, for none of its parts are separated from its totality. This -world is the universal Life and Intelligence. Its unity is both -living and intelligent. In it each part reproduces the whole, its -totality consists of a perfect harmony, because nothing within it is -separate, independent, or isolated from anything else. Consequently, -even if there were mutual opposition, there would be no struggle. -Being everywhere one and perfect, the intelligible World is permanent -and immutable, for it contains no internal reaction of one opposite -on another. How could such a reaction take place in this world, since -nothing is lacking in it? Why should Reason produce another Reason -within it, and Intelligence produce another Intelligence[27] merely -because it was capable of doing so? If so, it would not, before having -produced, have been in a perfect condition; it would produce and enter -in motion because it contained something inferior.[28] But blissful -beings are satisfied to remain within themselves, persisting within -their essence. A multiple action compromises him who acts by forcing -him to issue from himself. The intelligible World is so blissful that -even while doing nothing it accomplishes great things, and while -remaining within itself it produces important operations. - - -THE SENSE-WORLD CREATED NOT BY REFLECTION, BUT BY SELF-NECESSITY. - -2. The sense-world draws its existence from that intelligible World. -The sense-world, however, is not really unitary; it is indeed multiple, -and divided into a plurality of parts which are separated from each -other, and are mutually foreign. Not love reigns there, but hate, -produced by the separation of things which their state of imperfection -renders mutually inimical. None of its parts suffices to itself. -Preserved by something else, it is none the less an enemy of the -preserving Power. The sense-world has been created, not because the -divinity reflected on the necessity of creating, but because (in the -nature of things) it was unavoidable that there be a nature inferior to -the intelligible World, which, being perfect, could not have been the -last degree of existence.[29] It occupied the first rank, it had great -power, that was universal and capable of creating without deliberation. -If it had had to deliberate, it would not, by itself, have expressed -the power of creation. It would not have possessed it essentially. -It would have resembled an artisan, who, himself, does not have the -power of creating, but who acquires it by learning how to work. By -giving something of itself to matter, Intelligence produced everything -without issuing from its rest or quietness. That which it gives is -Reason, because reason is the emanation of Intelligence, an emanation -that is as durable as the very existence of Intelligence. In a seminal -reason all the parts exist in an united condition, without any of -them struggling with another, without disagreement or hindrance. This -Reason then causes something of itself to pass into the corporeal mass, -where the parts are separated from each other, and hinder each other, -and destroy each other. Likewise, from this unitary Intelligence, -and from the Reason that proceeds thence, issues this universe whose -parts are separate and distinct from each other, some of the parts -being friendly and allied, while some are separate and inimical. They, -therefore, destroy each other, either voluntarily or involuntarily, -and through this destruction their generation is mutually operated. -In such a way did the divinity arrange their actions and experiences -that all concur in the formation of a single harmony,[30] in which -each utters its individual note because, in the whole, the Reason that -dominates them produces order and harmony. The sense-world does not -enjoy the perfection of Intelligence and Reason: it only participates -therein. Consequently, the sense-world needed harmony, because it was -formed by the concurrence of Intelligence and necessity.[31] Necessity -drives the sense-world to evil, and to what is irrational, because -necessity itself is irrational; but Intelligence dominates necessity. -The intelligible World is pure reason; none other could be such. The -world, which is born of it, had to be inferior to it, and be neither -pure reason, nor mere matter; for order would have been impossible -in unmingled matter. The sense-world, therefore, is a mixture of -matter and Reason; those are the elements of which it is composed. The -principle from which this mixture proceeds, and which presides over -the mixture, is the Soul. Neither must we imagine that this presiding -over the mixture constitutes an effort for the Soul; for she easily -administers the universe, by her presence.[32] - - -THE WORLD SHOULD NOT BE BLAMED FOR ITS IMPERFECTIONS. - -3. For not being beautiful this world should not be blamed; neither -for not being the best of corporeal worlds; nor should the Cause, -from which it derives its existence, be accused. To begin with, -this world exists necessarily. It is not the work of a reflecting -determination. It exists because a superior Being naturally begets it -in His own likeness. Even if its creation were the result of reflective -determination, it could not shame its author; for the divinity made the -universe beautiful, complete and harmonious. Between the greater and -lesser parts He introduced a fortunate accord. A person who would blame -the totality of the world from consideration of its parts is therefore -unjust. He should examine the parts in their relation to the totality, -and see whether they be in accord and in harmony with it. Then the -study of the whole should continue down to that of the least details. -Otherwise criticism does not apply to the world as a whole, but only -to some of its parts. For instance, we well know how admirable, as -a whole, is man; yet we grant that there would be justification for -criticism of a separate hair, or toe, or some of the vilest animals, or -Thersites, as a specimen of humanity. - - -THE WORLD'S TESTIMONY TO ITS CREATOR. - -Since the work under consideration is the entire world, we would, were -our intelligence attentively to listen to its voice, hear it exclaim -as follows: "It is a divinity who has made Me, and from the divinity's -hands I issued complete, including all animated beings, entire and -self-sufficient, standing in need of nothing, since everything is -contained within Me; plants, animals, the whole of Nature, the -multitude of the divinities, the troupe of guardians, excellent souls, -and the men who are happy because of virtue. This refers not only -to the earth, which is rich in plants and animals of all kinds; the -power of the Soul extends also to the sea. Nor are the air and entire -heaven inanimate. They are the seat of all the excellent Souls, which -communicate life to the stars, and which preside over the circular -revolution of the heaven, a revolution that is eternal and full of -harmony, which imitates the movement of Intelligence by the eternal and -regular movement of the stars around one and the same centre, because -heaven has no need to seek anything outside of itself. All the beings -I contain aspire to the Good; all achieve Him, each according to its -potentiality. Indeed, from the Good depends the entire heaven,[33] -my whole Soul, the divinities that inhabit my various parts, all the -animals, all the plants, and all my apparently inanimate beings. In -this aggregation of beings some seem to participate only in existence, -others in life, others in sensation, others in intelligence, while -still others seem to participate in all the powers of life at one -time;[34] for we must not expect equal faculties for unequal things, as -for instance sight for the fingers, as it is suitable to the eye; while -the finger needs something else; it needs its own form, and has to -fulfil its function." - - -OPPOSITION AMONG INANIMATE BEINGS. - -4. We should not be surprised at water extinguishing fire, or at -fire destroying some other element. Even this element was introduced -to existence by some other element, and it is not surprising that -it should be destroyed, since it did not produce itself, and was -introduced to existence only by the destruction of some other element -(as thought Heraclitus and the Stoics[35]). Besides, the extinguished -fire is replaced by another active fire. In the incorporeal heaven, -everything is permanent; in the visible heaven, the totality, as well -as the more important and the most essential parts, are eternal. -The souls, on passing through different bodies, (by virtue of their -disposition[36]), themselves change on assuming some particular form; -but, when they can do so, they stand outside of generation, remaining -united to the universal Soul. The bodies are alive by their form, and -by the whole that each of them constitutes (by its union with a soul), -since they are animals, and since they nourish themselves; for in -the sense-world life is mobile, but in the intelligible world it is -immobile. Immobility necessarily begat movement, self-contained life -was compelled to produce other life, and calm being naturally exhaled -vibrating spirit. - - -OPPOSITION AMONG ANIMALS. - -Mutual struggle and destruction among animals is necessary, because -they are not born immortal. Their origin is due to Reason's embracing -all of matter, and because this Reason possessed within itself all the -things that subsist in the intelligible World. From what other source -would they have arisen? - - -OPPOSITION AMONG HUMANS. - -The mutual wrongs of human beings may however very easily all be caused -by the desire of the Good (as had been thought by Democritus[37]). -But, having strayed because of their inability to reach Him, they -turned against each other. They are punished for it by the degradation -these evil actions introduced within their souls, and, after death, -they are driven into a lower place, for none can escape the Order -established by the Law of the universe (or, the law of Adrastea[38]). -Order does not, as some would think, exist because of disorder, nor -law on account of lawlessness; in general, it is not the better that -exists on account of the worse. On the contrary, disorder exists only -on account of order, lawlessness on account of law, irrationality on -account of reason, because order, law and reason, such as they are here -below, are only imitations (or, borrowings). It is not that the better -produced the worse, but that the things which need participation in the -better are hindered therefrom, either by their nature, by accident, -or by some other obstacle (as Chrysippus thought that evils happen -by consequence or concomitance). Indeed, that which succeeds only in -acquiring a borrowed order, may easily fail to achieve it, either -because of some fault inherent in its own nature, or by some foreign -obstacle. Things hinder each other unintentionally, by following -different goals. Animals whose actions are free incline sometimes -towards good, sometimes towards evil (as the two horses in Plato's -Phaedrus).[39] Doubtless, they do not begin by inclining towards evil; -but as soon as there is the least deviation at the origin, the further -the advance in the wrong road, the greater and more serious does the -divergence become. Besides, the soul is united to a body, and from -this union necessarily arises appetite. When something impresses us at -first sight, or unexpectedly, and if we do not immediately repress the -motion which is produced within us, we allow ourselves to be carried -away by the object towards which our inclination drew us. But the -punishment follows the fault, and it is not unjust that the soul that -has contracted some particular nature should undergo the consequences -of her disposition (by passing into a body which conforms thereto). -Happiness need not be expected for those who have done nothing to -deserve it. The good alone obtain it; and that is why the divinities -enjoy it. - - -LACK OF HAPPINESS SHOULD BE BLAMED ON THE SOUL THAT DOES NOT DESERVE IT. - -5. If then, even here below, souls enjoy the faculty of arriving at -happiness, we should not accuse the constitution of the universe -because some souls are not happy; the fault rather lies with their -weakness, which hinders them from struggling courageously enough in -the career where prizes are offered to virtue. Why indeed should we -be astonished that the spirits which have not made themselves divine -should not enjoy divine life? Poverty and diseases are of no importance -to the good, and they are useful to the evil (as thought Theognis).[40] -Besides, we are necessarily subject to diseases, because we have a -body. Then all these accidents are not useless for the order and -existence of the universe. Indeed, when a being is dissolved into its -elements, the Reason of the universe uses it to beget other beings, -for the universal Reason embraces everything within its sphere of -activity. Thus when the body is disorganized, and the soul is softened -by her passions, then the body, overcome by sickness, and the soul, -overcome by vice, are introduced into another series and order. There -are things, like poverty and sickness, which benefit the persons who -undergo them. Even vice contributes to the perfection of the universe, -because it furnishes opportunity for the exercise of the divine -justice. It serves other purposes also; for instance, it increases the -vigilance of souls, and excites the mind and intelligence to avoid the -paths of perdition; it also emphasizes the value of virtue by contrast -with the evils that overtake the wicked. Of course, such utilities -are not the cause of the existence of evils; we only mean that, since -evils exist, the divinity made use of them to accomplish His purposes. -It would be the characteristic of a great power to make even evils -promote the fulfilment of its purposes, to cause formless things to -assist in the production of forms. In short, we assert that evil is -only an omission or failure of good. Now a coming short of good must -necessarily exist in the beings here below, because in them good is -mingled with other things; for this thing to which the good is allied -differs from the good, and thus produces the lack of good. That is why -"it is impossible for evil to be destroyed":[41] because things are -successively inferior, relatively to the nature of the absolute Good; -and because, being different from the Good from which they derive their -existence, they have become what they are by growing more distant from -their principle. - - -IN SPITE OF APPARENT MISFORTUNE TO THE GOOD NO HARM CAN HAPPEN TO THEM. - -6. It is constantly objected that fortune maltreats the good, and -favors the evil in opposition to the agreement that ought to exist -between virtue and happiness. The true answer to this is that no -harm can happen to the righteous man, and no good to the vicious -man.[42] Other objectors ask why one man is exposed to what is contrary -to nature, while the other obtains what conforms thereto. How can -distributive justice be said to obtain in this world? If, however, the -obtaining of what conforms to nature do not increase the happiness of -the virtuous man, and if being exposed to what is contrary to nature -do not diminish the wickedness of the vicious man, of what importance -(as thought Plato[43]), are either of these conditions? Neither will it -matter if the vicious man be handsome, or the virtuous man ugly. - - -THE SLAVERY OF THE GOOD AND VICTORY OF THE EVIL SEEM TO ACCUSE -PROVIDENCE. - -Further objections assert that propriety, order and justice demand the -contrary of the existing state of affairs in the world, and that we -could expect no less from a Providence that was wise. Even if it were -a matter of moment to virtue or vice, it is unsuitable that the wicked -should be the masters, and chiefs of state, and that the good should -be slaves; for a bad prince commits the worst crimes. Moreover, the -wicked conquer in battles, and force their prisoners to undergo the -extremities of torments. How could such facts occur if indeed a divine -Providence be in control? Although indeed in the production of some -work (of art), it be especially the totality that claims attention, -nevertheless, the parts must also obtain their due, especially when -they are animated, living and reasonable; it is just that divine -Providence should extend to everything, especially inasmuch as its -duty is precisely to neglect nothing. In view of these objections we -shall be forced to demonstrate that really everything here below is -good, if we continue to insist that the sense-world depends on supreme -Intelligence, and that its power penetrates everywhere. - - -PERFECTION MUST NOT BE SOUGHT IN THINGS MINGLED WITH MATTER. - -7. To begin with, we must remark that to show that all is good in the -things mingled with matter (and therefore of sense), we must not expect -to find in them the whole perfection of the World which is not soiled -by matter, and is intelligible; nor should we expect to find in that -which holds the second rank characteristics of that which is of the -first. Since the world has a body, we must grant that this body will -have influence on the totality, and expect no more than that Reason -will give it that which this mixed nature was capable of receiving. -For instance, if we were to contemplate the most beautiful man here -below, we would be wrong in believing that he was identical with the -intelligible Man, and inasmuch as he was made of flesh, muscles and -bones, we would have to be satisfied with his having received from -his creator all the perfection that could be communicated to him to -embellish these bones, muscles and flesh, and to make the ("seminal) -reason" in him predominate over the matter within him. - - -EVIL IS ONLY A LOWER FORM OF GOOD. - -Granting these premises, we may start out on an explanation of the -above mentioned difficulties. For in the world we will find remarkable -traces of the Providence and divine Power from which it proceeds. -Let us take first, the actions of souls who do evil voluntarily; the -actions of the wicked who, for instance, harm virtuous men, or other -men equally evil. Providence need not be held responsible for the -wickedness of these souls. The cause should be sought in the voluntary -determinations of those souls themselves. For we have proved that the -souls have characteristic motions, and that while here below they are -not pure, but rather are animals (as would naturally be the case with -souls united to bodies).[44] Now, it is not surprising that, finding -themselves in such a condition, they would live conformably to that -condition.[45] Indeed, it is not the formation of the world that made -them descend here below. Even before the world existed, they were -already disposed to form part of it, to busy themselves with it, to -infuse it with life, to administer it, and in it to exert their power -in a characteristic manner, either by presiding over its (issues), -and by communicating to it something of their power, or by descending -into it, or by acting in respect to the world each in its individual -manner.[46] The latter question, however, does not refer to the subject -we are now considering; here it will be sufficient to show that, -however these circumstances occur, Providence is not to be blamed. - - -IT IS A MATTER OF FAITH THAT PROVIDENCE EMBRACES EVERYTHING HERE BELOW, -EVEN THE MISFORTUNES OF THE JUST. - -But how shall we explain the difference that is observed between the -lot of the good and the evil? How can it occur that the former are -poor, while others are rich, and possess more than necessary to satisfy -their needs, being even powerful, and governing cities and nations? -(The Gnostics and Manicheans) think that the sphere of activity of -Providence does not extend down to the earth.[47] No! For all of the -rest (of this world) conforms to (universal) Reason, inasmuch as -animals and plants participate in Reason, Life and Soul. (The Gnostic) -will answer that if Providence do extend to this earth, it does not -predominate therein. As the world is but a single organism, to advance -such an objection is the part of somebody who would assert that the -head and face of man were produced by Nature, and that reason dominated -therein, while the other members were formed by other causes, such as -chance or necessity, and that they were evil either on this account, or -because of the importance of Nature. Wisdom and piety, however, would -forbid the admission that here below not everything was well, blaming -the operation of Providence. - - -HOW SENSE-OBJECTS ARE NOT EVIL. - -8. It remains for us to explain how sense-objects are good and -participate in the (cosmic) Order; or at least, that they are not -evil. In every animal, the higher parts, such as the face and head, -are the most beautiful, and are not equalled by the middle or lower -parts. Now men occupy the middle and lower region of the universe. In -the higher region we find the heaven containing the divinities; it is -they that fill the greater part of the world, with the vast sphere -where they reside. The earth occupies the centre and seems to be one -of the stars. We are surprised at seeing injustice reigning here below -chiefly because man is regarded as the most venerable and wisest being -in the universe. Nevertheless, this being that is so wise occupies but -the middle place between divinities and animals, at different times -inclining towards the former or the latter. Some men resemble the -divinities, and others resemble animals; but the greater part continue -midway between them. - - -THE GOOD MAY NEGLECT NATURAL LAWS WHICH CARRY REWARDS. - -It is those men who occupy this middle place who are forced to undergo -the rapine and violence of depraved men, who resemble wild beasts. -Though the former are better than those whose violence they suffer, -they are, nevertheless, dominated by them because of inferiority in -other respects, lacking courage, or preparedness.[48] It would be no -more than a laughing matter if children who had strengthened their -bodies by exercise, while leaving their souls inviolate in ignorance, -should in physical struggle conquer those of their companions, who -had exercised neither body nor soul; if they stole their food or soft -clothing. No legislator could hinder the vanquished from bearing the -punishment of their cowardliness and effeminacy, if, neglecting the -gymnastic exercises which had been taught them, they did not, by their -inertia, effeminacy and laziness, fear becoming fattened sheep fit to -be the prey of wolves? They who commit this rapine and violence are -punished therefor first because they thereby become wolves and noxious -beasts, and later because (in this or some subsequent existence) they -necessarily undergo the consequences of their evil actions (as thought -Plato[49]). For men who here below have been evil do not die entirely -(when their soul is separated from their bodies). Now in the things -that are regulated by Nature and Reason, that which follows is always -the result of that which precedes; evil begets evil, just as good -begets good. But the arena of life differs from a gymnasium, where the -struggles are only games. Therefore, the above-mentioned children which -we divided into two classes, after having grown up in ignorance, must -prepare to fight, and take up arms, an display more energy than in the -exercises of the gymnasium. As some, however, are well armed, while the -others are not, the first must inevitably triumph. The divinity must -not fight for the cowardly; for the (cosmic) law decrees that in war -life is saved by valor, and not by prayers.[50] Nor is it by prayers -that the fruits of the earth are obtained; they are produced only by -labor. Nor can one have good health without taking care of it. If -the evil cultivate the earth better, we should not complain of their -reaping a better harvest.[51] Besides, in the ordinary conduct of life, -it is ridiculous to listen only to one's own caprice, doing nothing -that is prescribed by the divinities, limiting oneself exclusively to -demanding one's conservation, without carrying out any of the actions -on which (the divinities) willed that our preservation should depend. - - -DEATH IS BETTER THAN DISHARMONY WITH THE LAWS OF THE UNIVERSE. - -Indeed it would be better to be dead than to live thus in contradiction -with the laws that rule the universe. If, when men are in opposition -to these laws, divine Providence preserved peace in the midst of -all follies and vices, it would deserve the charge of negligence in -allowing the prevalence of evil. The evil rule only because of the -cowardice of those who obey them; this is juster than if it were -otherwise. - - -PROVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO THE POINT OF SUPPRESSING OUR OWN -INITIATIVE. - -9. Nor should the sphere of Providence be extended to the point of -suppressing our own action. For if Providence did everything, and -Providence alone existed, it would thereby be annihilated. To what, -indeed, would it apply? There would be nothing but divinity! It -is indeed incontestable that divinity exists, and that its sphere -extends over other beings--but divinity does not suppress the latter. -For instance, divinity approaches man, and preserves in him what -constitutes humanity; that is, divinity makes him live in conformity -to the law of Providence, and makes him fulfil the commandments of -that law. Now, this law decrees that the life of men who have become -virtuous should be good both here below and after their death; and -that the evil should meet an opposite fate. It would be unreasonable -to expect the existence of men who forget themselves to come and save -the evil, even if the latter addressed prayers to the divinity. Neither -should we expect the divinities to renounce their blissful existence to -come and administer our affairs; nor that the virtuous men, whose life -is holy and superior to human conditions, should be willing to govern -the wicked. The latter never busy themselves with promoting the good -to the governing of other men, and themselves to be good (as thought -Plato[52]). They are even jealous of the man who is good by himself; -there would indeed be more good people if virtuous men were chosen as -chiefs. - - -THOUGH MEN ARE ONLY MEDIOCRE THEY ARE NEVER ABANDONED BY PROVIDENCE. - -Man is therefore not the best being in the universe; according to his -choice he occupies an intermediate rank. In the place he occupies, -however, he is not abandoned by Providence, which ever leads him -back to divine things by the numerous means it possesses to cause -the triumph of virtue. That is the reason why men have never lost -rationality, and why, to some degree, they always participate in -wisdom, intelligence, art, and the justice that regulates their mutual -relations. Even when one wrongs another, he is still given credit -for acting in justice to himself, and he is treated according to his -deserts.[53] Besides, man, as a creature, is handsome, as handsome as -possible, and, by the part he plays in the universe, he is superior to -all the animals that dwell here below. - - -IT IS RIDICULOUS TO COMPLAIN OF THE LOWER NATURE OF ANIMALS. - -No one in his senses would complain of the existence of animals -inferior to man, if, besides, they contribute towards the embellishment -of the universe. Would it not be ridiculous to complain that some -of them bite men, as if the latter had an imprescriptible right to -complete security? The existence of these animals is necessary; it -procures us advantages both evident and still unknown, but which will -be revealed in the course of time. Thus there is nothing useless -in animals, either in respect to themselves, or to man.[54] It is, -besides, ridiculous to complain because many animals are wild, when -there are even men who are such; what should surprise us most is that -many animals are not submissive to man, and defend themselves against -him.[55] - - -IF UNJUST ACTS ARE PRODUCED ASTROLOGICALLY THEN DIVINE REASON IS TO -BLAME. - -10. But if men be evil only in spite of themselves, and involuntarily, -it would be impossible to say that those who commit injustices, and -those who suffer them are responsible (the former for their ferocity, -and the latter for their cowardice.[56] To this we answer that if the -wickedness of the former (as well as the cowardice of the latter) be, -necessarily, produced by the course of the stars, or by the action of -a principle of which it is only the effect, then it is explained by -physical reasons. But if it be the very Reason of the universe that -produces such things, how does it not thereby commit an injustice? - - -EVEN INVOLUNTARINESS DOES NOT AFFECT SPONTANEITY THAT IS RESPONSIBLE. - -Unjust actions are involuntary only in this sense that one does not -have the will to commit a fault; but this circumstance does not hinder -the spontaneity of the action. However, when one acts spontaneously, -one is responsible for the fault; one would avoid responsibility for -the fault only if one were not the author of the action. To say that -the wicked are such necessarily, does not mean that they undergo -an external constraint, but that their character is constituted by -wickedness. The influence of the course of the stars does not destroy -our liberty, for, if every action in us were determined by the exterior -influence of such agents, everything would go on as these agents -desired it; consequently, men would not commit any actions contrary -to the will of these agents. If the divinities alone were the authors -of all our actions, there would be no impious persons; therefore, -impiety is due to men. It is true that, once the cause is given, the -effects will follow, if only the whole series of causes be given. But -man himself is one of these causes; he therefore does good by his own -nature, and he is a free cause. - - -EVEN THE SHADOWS ARE NECESSARY TO THE PERFECTION OF A PICTURE. - -11. Is it true that all things are produced by necessity, and by the -natural concatenation of causes and effects, and that, thus, they are -as good as possible? No! It is the Reason which, governing the world, -produces all things (in this sense that it contains all the "seminal -reasons"), and which decrees that they shall be what they are. It is -Reason that, in conformity with its rational nature, produces what -are called evils, because it does not wish everything to be equally -good. An artist would not cover the body of a pictured animal with -eyes.[57] Likewise, Reason did not limit itself to the creation of -divinities; it produced beneath them guardians, then men, then animals, -not by envy (as Plato remarks[58]); but because its rational essence -contains an intellectual variety (that is, contains the "seminal -reasons" of all different beings). We resemble such men as know little -of painting, and who would blame an artist for having put shadows in -his picture; nevertheless, he has only properly disposed the contrasts -of light. Likewise, well-regulated states are not composed of equal -orders. Further, one would not condemn a tragedy, because it presents -personages other than heroes, such as slaves or peasants who speak -incorrectly.[78] To cut out these inferior personages, and all the -parts in which they appear, would be to injure the beauty of the -composition.[59] - - -IT IS REASONABLE FOR THE REASON TO ASSIGN SOULS TO DIFFERENT RANKS IN -THE UNIVERSE. - -12. Since it is the Reason (of the world) which produced all things -by an alliance with matter, and by preserving its peculiar nature, -which is to be composed of different parts, and to be determined by -the principle from which it proceeds (that is, by Intelligence), the -work produced by Reason under these conditions could not be improved -in beauty. Indeed, the Reason (of the world) could not be composed of -homogeneous and similar parts; it must, therefore, not be accused, -because it is all things, and because all its parts differ from others. -If it had introduced into the world things which it had not previously -contained, as for instance, souls, and had forced them to enter into -the order of the world without considering their nature, and if it -had made many become degraded, Reason would certainly be to blame. -Therefore, we must acknowledge that the souls are parts of Reason, -and that Reason harmonizes them with the world without causing their -degradation, assigning to each that station which is suitable to her. - - -DIVINE JUSTICE EXTENDS ALSO INTO PAST AND FUTURE. - -13. There is a further consideration that should not be overlooked, -namely: that if you desire to discover the exercise of the distributive -Justice of the divinity, it is not sufficient to examine only the -present; the past and future must also be considered. Those who, in a -former life, were slave-owners, if they abused their power, will be -enslaved; and this change would be useful to them. It impoverishes -those who have badly used their wealth; for poverty is of service -even to virtuous people. Likewise, those who kill will in their turn -be killed; he who commits homicide acts unjustly, but he who is its -victim suffers justly. Thus arises a harmony between the disposition -of the man who is maltreated, and the disposition of him who maltreats -him as he deserved. It is not by chance that a man becomes a slave, -is made prisoner, or is dishonored. He (must himself) have committed -the violence which he in turn undergoes. He who kills his mother will -be killed by his son; he who has violated a woman will in turn become -a woman in order to become the victim of a rape. Hence, the divine -Word[80] called Adrastea.[60] The orderly system here mentioned really -is "unescapeable," truly a justice and an admirable wisdom. From the -things that we see in the universe we must conclude that the order -which reigns in it is eternal, that it penetrates everywhere, even -in the smallest thing; and that it reveals an admirable art not only -in the divine things, but also in those that might be supposed to -be beneath the notice of Providence, on account of their minuteness. -Consequently, there is an admirable variety of art in the vilest -animal. It extends even into plants, whose fruits and leaves are so -distinguished by the beauty of form, whose flowers bloom with so much -grace, which grow so easily, and which offer so much variety. These -things were not produced once for all; they are continually produced -with variety, because the stars in their courses do not always exert -the same influence on things here below. What is transformed is not -transformed and metamorphosed by chance, but according to the laws of -beauty, and the rules of suitability observed by divine powers. Every -divine Power acts according to its nature, that is, in conformity with -its essence. Now its essence is to develop justice and beauty in its -actualizations; for if justice and beauty did not exist here, they -could not exist elsewhere. - - -THE CREATOR IS SO WISE THAT ALL COMPLAINTS AMOUNT TO GROTESQUENESS. - -14. The order of the universe conforms to divine Intelligence without -implying that on that account its author needed to go through the -process of reasoning. Nevertheless, this order is so perfect that he -who best knows how to reason would be astonished to see that even with -reasoning one could not discover a plan wiser than that discovered as -realized in particular natures, and that this plan better conforms to -the laws of Intelligence than any that could result from reasoning. -It can never, therefore, be proper to find fault with the Reason -that produces all things because of any (alleged imperfections) of -any natural object, nor to claim, for the beings whose existence has -begun, the perfection of the beings whose existence had no beginning, -and which are eternal, both in the intelligible World, and in this -sense-world. That would amount to wishing that every being should -possess more good than it can carry, and to consider as insufficient -the form it received. It would, for instance, amount to complaining, -that man does not bear horns, and to fail to notice that, if Reason had -to spread abroad everywhere, it was still necessary for something great -to contain something less, that in everything there should be parts, -and that these could not equal the whole without ceasing to be parts. -In the intelligible World every thing is all; but here below each thing -is not all things. The individual man does not have the same properties -as the universal Man. For if the individual beings had something which -was not individual, then they would be universal. We should not expect -an individual being as such to possess the highest perfection; for -then it would no longer be an individual being. Doubtless, the beauty -of the part is not incompatible with that of the whole; for the more -beautiful a part is, the more does it embellish the whole. Now the part -becomes more beautiful on becoming similar to the whole, or imitating -its essence, and in conforming to its order. Thus a ray (of the supreme -Intelligence) descends here below upon man, and shines in him like a -star in the divine sky. To imagine the universe, one should imagine a -colossal statue[79] that were perfectly beautiful, animated or formed -by the art of Vulcan, whose ears, face and breast would be adorned with -shimmering stars disposed with marvelous skill.[62] - - -OBJECTION OF INTERNECINE WAR AMONG ANIMALS AND MEN. - -15. The above considerations suffice for things studied each in itself. -The mutual relation, however, between things already begotten, and -those that are still being begotten from time to time, deserves to -attract attention, and may give rise to some objections, such as the -following: How does it happen that animals devour each other, that -men attack each other mutually, and that they are always in ceaseless -internecine warfare?[62] How could the reason (of the universe) have -constituted such a state of affairs, while still claiming that all is -for the best? - - -RESPONSIBILITY CANNOT BE SHIFTED FROM REASON WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE. - -It does not suffice here to answer:[63] "Everything is for the -best possible. Matter is the cause that things are in a state of -inferiority; evils could not be destroyed." It is true enough, indeed, -that things had to be what they are, for they are good. It is not -matter which has come to dominate the universe; it has been introduced -in it so that the universe might be what it is, or rather, it is caused -by reason (?). The principle of things is, therefore, the Logos, or -Reason[64] (of the universe), which is everything. By it were things -begotten, by it were they co-ordinated in generation. - - -NECESSITY OF INTERNECINE WARFARE. - -What then (will it be objected) is the necessity of this natural -internecine warfare of animals, and also of men? First, animals have to -devour each other in order to renew themselves; they could not, indeed, -last eternally, even if they were not killed. Is there any reason to -complain because, being already condemned to death, as they are, they -should find an end which is useful to other beings? What objection can -there be to their mutually devouring each other, in order to be reborn -under other forms? It is as if on the stage an actor who is thought to -be killed, goes to change his clothing, and returns under another mask. -Is it objected that he was not really dead? Yes indeed, but dying -is no more than a change of bodies, just as the comedian changes his -costume, or if the body were to be entirely despoiled, this is no more -than when an actor, at the end of a drama, lays aside his costume, only -to take it up again when once more the drama begins. Therefore, there -is nothing frightful in the mutual transformation of animals into each -other. Is it not better for them to have lived under this condition, -than never to have lived at all? Life would then be completely absent -from the universe, and life could no longer be communicated to other -beings. But as this universe contains a multiple life, it produces -and varies everything during the course of its existence; as it were -joking with them, it never ceases to beget living beings, remarkable -by beauty and by the proportion of their forms. The combats in which -mortal men continually fight against each other, with a regularity -strongly reminding of the Pyrrhic dances (as thought Plato[65]), -clearly show how all these affairs, that are considered so serious, are -only children's games, and that their death was nothing serious. To die -early in wars and battles is to precede by only a very little time the -unescapable fate of old age, and it is only an earlier departure for -a closer return. We may be comforted for the loss of our possessions -during our lifetime by observing that they have belonged to others -before us, and that, for those who have deprived us thereof, they form -but a very fragile possession, since they, in turn, will be bereft -thereof by others; and that, if they be not despoiled of their riches, -they will lose still more by keeping them.[66] Murders, massacres, the -taking and pillaging of towns should be considered as in the theatre we -consider changes of scene and of personages, the tears and cries of the -actors.[67] - - -ALL THESE CHANGES OF FORTUNE AFFECT ONLY THE OUTER MAN IN ANY CASE. - -In this world, indeed, just as in the theatre, it is not the soul, -the interior man, but his shadow, the exterior man, who gives himself -up to lamentations and groans, who on this earth moves about so much, -and who makes of it the scene of an immense drama with numberless -different acts (?) Such is the characteristic of the actions of a man -who considers exclusively the things placed at his feet, and outside -of him, and who does not know that his tears and serious occupations -are any more than games.[68] The really earnest man occupies himself -seriously only with really serious affairs, while the frivolous man -applies himself to frivolous things. Indeed, frivolous things become -serious for him who does not know really serious occupations, and -who himself is frivolous. If, indeed, one cannot help being mixed up -in this child's play, it is just as well to know that he has fallen -into child's play where one's real personality is not in question. If -Socrates were to mingle in these games, it would only be his exterior -man who would do so. Let us add that tears and groans do not prove that -the evils we are complaining of are very real evils; for often children -weep and lament over imaginary grievances. - - -DOES THIS POINT OF VIEW DESTROY SIN AND JUSTICE? - -16. If the above considerations be true, what about wickedness, -injustice, and sin? For if everything be well, how can there be -agents who are unjust, and who sin? If no one be unjust, or sinful, -how can unhappy men exist? How can we say that certain things conform -to nature, while others are contrary thereto, if everything that is -begotten, or that occurs, conforms to nature? Last, would that point -of view not do away entirely with impiety towards the divinity, if it -be the divinity that makes things such as they are, if the divinity -resemble a poet, who would in his drama introduce a character whose -business it was to ridicule and criticize the author? - - -THIS PROBLEM SOLVED BY REASON BEING DERIVED FROM INTELLIGENCE. - -Let us, therefore, more clearly define the Reason (of the universe), -and let us demonstrate that it should be what it is. To reach our -conclusion more quickly, let us grant the existence of this Reason. -This Reason (of the universe) is not pure, absolute Intelligence. -Neither is it the pure Soul, but it depends therefrom. It is a ray of -light that springs both from Intelligence and from the Soul united to -Intelligence. These two principles beget Reason, that is, a rational -quiet life.[69] Now all life is an actualization, even that which -occupies the lowest rank. But the actualization (which constitutes -the life of Reason) is not similar to the actualization of fire. The -actualization of the life (peculiar to Reason), even without feeling, -is not a blind movement. All things that enjoy the presence of Reason, -and which participate therein in any manner soever, immediately receive -a rational disposition, that is, a form; for the actualization which -constitutes the life (of the Reason) can impart its forms, and for that -actualization motion is to form beings. Its movement, like that of a -dancer, is, therefore, full of art. A dancer, indeed, gives us the -image of that life full of art; it is the art that moves it, because -the art itself is its life. All this is said to explain the nature of -life, whatever it be. - - -THE UNITY OF REASON IS CONSTITUTED BY THE CONTRARIES IT CONTAINS. - -As reason proceeds from Intelligence and Life, which possesses both -fulness and unity, Reason does not possess the unity and fulness of -Intelligence and Life. Consequently, Reason does not communicate the -totality and universality of its essence to the beings to which it -imparts itself. It, therefore, opposes its parts to each other, and -creates them defective; whereby, Reason constitutes and begets war and -struggle. Thus Reason is the universal unity, because it could not be -the absolute unity. Though reason imply struggle, because it consists -of parts, it also implies unity and harmony. It resembles the reason of -a drama, whose unity contains many diversities. In a drama, however, -the harmony of the whole results from its component contraries being -co-ordinated in the unity of action, while, in universal Reason, it is -from unity that the struggle of contraries arises. That is why we may -well compare universal Reason to the harmony formed by contrary sounds, -and to examine why the reasons of the beings also contain contraries. -In a concert, these reasons produce low and high sounds, and, by -virtue of the harmony, that constitutes their essence, they make these -divers sounds contribute to unity, that is, to Harmony[70] itself, -the supreme Reason of which they are only parts.[71] In the same way -we must consider other oppositions in the universe, such as black and -white, heat and cold, winged or walking animals, and reasonable and -irrational beings. All these things are parts of the single universal -Organism. Now if the parts of the universal Organism were often in -mutual disagreement, the universal Organism, nevertheless, remains -in perfect accord with itself because it is universal, and it is -universal by the Reason that inheres in it. The unity of this Reason -must therefore be composed of opposite reasons, because their very -opposition somehow constitutes its essence. If the Reason (of the -world) were not multiple, it would no longer be universal, and would -not even exist any longer. Since it exists, Reason must, therefore, -contain within itself some difference; and the greatest difference is -opposition. Now if Reason contain a difference, and produce different -things, the difference that exists in these things is greater than that -which exists in Reason. Now difference carried to the highest degree is -opposition. Therefore, to be perfect, Reason must from its very essence -produce things not only different, but even opposed. - - -THE WHOLE IS GOOD THOUGH COMPOSED OF GOOD AND EVIL PARTS. - -17. If Reason thus from its essence produce opposed things, the -things it will produce will be so much the more opposed as they are -more separated from each other. The sense-world is less unitary than -its Reason, and consequently, it is more manifold, containing more -oppositions. Thus, in individuals, the love of life has greater force; -selfishness is more powerful in them; and often, by their avidity, -they destroy what they love, when they love what is perishable. The -love which each individual has for himself, makes him appropriate all -he can in his relations with the universe. Thus the good and evil are -led to do opposite things by the Art that governs the universe; just -as a choric ballet would be directed. One part is good, the other -poor; but the whole is good. It might be objected that in this case no -evil person will be left. Still, nothing hinders the existence of the -evil; only they will not be such as they would be taken by themselves. -Besides, this will be a motive of leniency in regard to them, unless -Reason should decide that this leniency be not deserved, thereby making -it impossible.[72] - - -FOUNDED ON THE PUN ON LOGOS, AS CHARACTER, ROLE AND REASON, THE EVILS -ARE SHOWN TO PLAY THEIR PART BADLY IN THE DRAMA OF LIFE. - -Besides, if this world contain both bad and good people, and if the -latter play the greater part in the world, there will take place -that which is seen in dramas where the poet, at times, imposes his -ideas on the actors, and again at others relies on their ingenuity. -The obtaining of the first, second or third rank by an actor does -not depend on the poet. The poet only assigns to each the part he is -capable of filling, and assigns to him a suitable place. Likewise (in -the world), each one occupies his assigned place, and the bad man, as -well as the good one, has the place that suits him. Each one, according -to his nature and character, comes to occupy the place that suits him, -and that he had chosen, and then speaks and acts with piety if he be -good, and impiously, if he be evil. Before the beginning of the drama, -the actors already had their proper characters; they only developed -it. In dramas composed by men, it is the poet who assigns their parts -to the actors; and the latter are responsible only for the efficiency -or inefficiency of their acting; for they have nothing to do but -repeat the words of the poet. But in this drama (of life), of which -men imitate certain parts when their nature is poetic, it is the soul -that is the actor. This actor receives his part from the creator, as -stage-actors receive from the poet their masks, garments, their purple -robe, or their rags. Thus in the drama of the world it is not from -chance that the soul receives her part. - - -LIKE GOOD AND BAD ACTORS, SOULS ARE PUNISHED AND REWARDED BY THE -MANAGER. - -Indeed, the fate of a soul conforms to her character, and, by going -through with her part properly, the soul fulfils her part in the drama -managed by universal Reason. The soul sings her part, that is, she -does that which is in her nature to do. If her voice and features be -beautiful, by themselves, they lend charm to the poem, as would be -natural. Otherwise they introduce a displeasing element, but which -does not alter the nature of the work.[73] The author of the drama -reprimands the bad actor as the latter may deserve it, and thus fulfils -the part of a good judge. He increases the dignity of the good actor, -and, if possible, invites him to play beautiful pieces, while he -relegates the bad actor to inferior pieces. Likewise, the soul which -takes part in the drama of which the world is the theatre, and which -has undertaken a part in it, brings with her a disposition to play well -or badly. At her arrival she is classed with the other actors, and -after having been allotted to all the various gifts of fortune without -any regard for her personality or activities, she is later punished or -rewarded. Such actors have something beyond usual actors; they appear -on a greater scene; the creator of the universe gives them some of his -power, and grants them the freedom to choose between a great number of -places. The punishments and rewards are so determined that the souls -themselves run to meet them, because each soul occupies a place in -conformity with her character, and is thus in harmony with the Reason -of the universe.[74] - - -THE SOUL MUST FIT HERSELF TO HER SPECIAL PART IN THE GREAT SCHEME. - -Every individual, therefore, occupies, according to justice, the -place he deserves, just as each string of the lyre is fixed to the -place assigned to it by the nature of the sounds it is to render. In -the universe everything is good and beautiful if every being occupy -the place he deserves, if, for instance, he utter discordant sounds -when in darkness and Tartarus; for such sounds fit that place. If the -universe is to be beautiful, the individual must not behave "like a -stone" in it; he must contribute to the unity of the universal harmony -by uttering the sound suitable to him (as thought Epictetus[75]). The -sound that the individual utters is the life he leads, a life which is -inferior in greatness, goodness and power (to that of the universe). -The shepherd's pipe utters several sounds, and the weakest of them, -nevertheless, contributes to the total Harmony, because this harmony -is composed of unequal sounds whose totality constitutes a perfect -harmony. Likewise, universal Reason though one, contains unequal parts. -Consequently, the universe contains different places, some better, and -some worse, and their inequality corresponds to the inequality of the -soul. Indeed, as both places and souls are different, the souls that -are different find the places that are unequal, like the unequal parts -of the pipe, or any other musical instrument. They inhabit different -places, and each utters sounds proper to the place where they are, and -to the universe. Thus what is bad for the individual may be good for -the totality; what is against nature in the individual agrees with the -nature in the whole. A sound that is feeble does not change the harmony -of the universe, as--to use another example--one bad citizen does not -change the nature of a well-regulated city; for often there is need of -such a man in a city; he therefore fits it well. - - -UNIVERSAL REASON TRIES TO PATCH UP "GAGS" BY UNDISCIPLINED ACTORS. - -18. The difference that exists between souls in respect to vice and -virtue has several causes; among others, the inequality that exists -between souls from the very beginning. This inequality conforms to the -essence of universal Reason, of which they are unequal parts, because -they differ from each other. We must indeed remember that souls have -three ranks (the intellectual, rational, and sense lives), and that -the same soul does not always exercise the same faculties. But, to -explain our meaning, let us return to our former illustration. Let -us imagine actors who utter words not written by the poet; as if the -drama were incomplete, they themselves supply what is lacking, and fill -omissions made by the poet. They seem less like actors than like parts -of the poet, who foresaw what they were to say, so as to reattach the -remainder so far as it was in his power.[76] In the universe, indeed, -all things that are the consequences and results of bad deeds are -produced by reasons, and conform to the universal Reason. Thus, from -an illicit union, or from a rape, may be born natural children that -may become very distinguished men; likewise, from cities destroyed by -perverse individuals, may rise other flourishing cities. - - -THIS ILLUSTRATION OF DRAMA ALLOWS BOTH GOOD AND EVIL TO BE ASCRIBED TO -REASON. - -It might indeed be objected that it is absurd to introduce into the -world souls some of which do good, and others evil; for when we -absolve universal Reason from the responsibility of evil, we are also -simultaneously taking from it the merit for the good. What, however, -hinders us from considering deeds done by actors as parts of a drama, -in the universe as well as on the stage, and thus to derive from -universal Reason both the good and the evil that are done here below? -For universal Reason exercises its influence on each of the actors -with so much the greater force as the drama is more perfect, and as -everything depends on it.[77] - - -INTRODUCTION TO THE NEXT BOOK. - -But why should we at all impute evil deeds to universal Reason? The -souls contained in the universe will not be any more divine for that. -They will still remain parts of the universal Reason (and consequently, -remain souls): for we shall have to acknowledge that all reasons are -souls. Otherwise if the Reason of the universe be a Soul, why should -certain "reasons" be souls, and others only ("seminal) reasons"? - - - - -THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK THREE. - -Continuation of That on Providence. - - -SOULS SHOW KINSHIP TO WORLD-SOUL BY FIDELITY TO THEIR OWN NATURE. - -1. The question (why some reasons are souls, while others are reasons -merely, when at the same time universal Reason is a certain Soul), -may be answered as follows. Universal Reason (which proceeds from the -universal Soul) embraces both good and bad things, which equally belong -to its parts; it does not engender them, but exists with them in its -universality. In fact, these "logoses" (or reasons) (or, particular -souls), are the acts of the universal Soul; and these reasons being -parts (of the universal Soul) have parts (of the operations) as their -acts (or energies). Therefore, just as the universal Soul, which -is one, has different parts, so this difference occurs again in -the reasons and in the operations they effect. Just as their works -(harmonize), so do the souls themselves mutually harmonize; they -harmonize in this, that their very diversity, or even opposition, forms -an unity. By a natural necessity does everything proceed from, and -return to unity; thus creatures which are different, or even opposed, -are not any the less co-ordinated in the same system, and that because -they proceed from the same principle. Thus horses or human beings are -subsumed under the unity of the animal species, even though animals of -any kind, such as horses, for example, bite each other, and struggle -against each other with a jealousy which rises to fury; and though -animals of either species, including man, do as much. Likewise, with -inanimate things; they form divers species, and should likewise be -subsumed under the genus of inanimate things; and, if you go further, -to essence, and further still, to super-Essence (the One). Having -thus related or subsumed everything to this principle, let us again -descend, by dividing it. We shall see unity splitting, as it penetrates -and embraces everything simultaneously in a unique (or all-embracing -system). Thus divided, the unity constitutes a multiple organism; each -of its constituent parts acts according to its nature, without ceasing -to form part of the universal Being; thus is it that the fire burns, -the horse behaves as a horse should, and men perform deeds as various -as their characters. In short, every being acts, lives well or badly, -according to its own nature. - - -APPARENT CHANCE REALLY IS THE PLAN OF A DIVINE GENERAL PROVIDENCE. - -2. Circumstances, therefore, are not decisive of human fortune; they -themselves only derive naturally from superior principles, and result -from the mutual concatenation of all things. This concatenation, -however, derives from the (Stoic) "predominant (element in the -universe"), and every being contributes to it according to its nature; -just as, in an army, the general commands, and the soldiers carry out -his orders cooperatively. In the universe, in fact, everything has been -strategically ordered by Providence, like a general, who considers -everything, both actions and experiences,[81] victuals and drink, -weapons and implements, arranging everything so that every detail finds -its suitable location. Thus nothing happens which fails to enter into -the general's plan, although his opponents' doings remain foreign to -his influence, and though he cannot command their army. If indeed, -Providence were[82] "the great Chief over all," to whom the universe -is subordinated, what could have disarranged His plans, and could have -failed to be intimately associated therewith? - - -WE CANNOT QUESTION OUR ORDER IN THE HIERARCHY OF NATURE. - -3. Although I am able to make any desired decision, nevertheless my -decision enters into the plan of the universe, because my nature has -not been introduced into this plan subsequently; but it includes me and -my character. But whence originates my character? This includes two -points: is the cause of any man's character to be located in Him who -formed him, or in that man himself? Must we, on the other hand, give -up seeking its cause? Surely: just as it is hopeless to ask why plants -have no sensation, or why animals are not men; it would be the same as -asking why men are not gods. Why should we complain that men do not -have a more perfect nature, if in the case of plants and animals nobody -questions or accuses either these beings themselves, nor the power -which has made them? (This would be senseless, for two reasons): if we -say that they might have been better, we are either speaking of the -qualities which each of them is capable of acquiring by himself; and -in this case we should blame only him who has not acquired them--or, -we are speaking of those qualities which he should derive not from -himself, but from the Creator, in which case it would be as absurd to -claim for man more qualities than he has received, than it would be to -do so in the case of plants or animals. What we should examine is not -if one being be inferior to another, but if it be complete within its -own sphere; for evidently natural inequalities are unavoidable. This -again depends on conformity to nature, not that inequalities depend on -the will of the principle which has regulated all things. - - -THE CAUSE OF OUR IMPERFECTIONS IS DISTANCE FROM THE SUPREME. - -The Reason of the Universe, indeed, proceeds from the universal Soul; -and the latter, in turn, proceeds from Intelligence. Intelligence, -however, is not a particular being; it consists of all (intelligible -beings),[83] and all the beings form a plurality. Now, a plurality of -being implies mutual differences between them, consisting of first, -second and third ranks. Consequently, the souls of engendered animals -are rather degradations of souls, seeming to have grown weaker by -their procession. The (generating) reason of the animal, indeed, -although it be animated, is a soul other than that from which proceeds -universal Reason. This Reason itself loses excellence in the degree -that it hastens down to enter into matter, and what it produces is -less perfect. Nevertheless, we may well consider how admirable a work -is the creature, although it be so far distant from the creator. We -should, therefore, not attribute to the creator the (imperfections of -the) creature; for any principle is superior to its product. So we may -assert that (the principle even of imperfect things) is perfect; and, -(instead of complaining), we should rather admire His communication of -some traits of His power to beings dependent from Him. We have even -reason to be more than grateful for His having given gifts greater -than they can receive or assimilate; and as the gifts of Providence -are superabundant, we can find the cause (of imperfection) only in the -creatures themselves. - - -DOUBLENESS OF SOUL, REASONS AND PROVIDENCE. - -4. If man were simple--that is, if he were no more than what he had -been created, and if all his actions and passions derived from the -same principle--we would no more exercise our reason to complain for -his behoof than we have to complain for that of other animals. But -we do have something to blame in the man, and that in the perverted -man. We have good grounds for this blame, because man is not only that -which he was created, but has, besides, another principle which is -free (intelligence, with reason). This free principle, however, is not -outside of Providence, and the Reason of the universe, any more than -it would be reasonable to suppose that the things above depended on -the things here below. On the contrary, it is superior things which -shed their radiance on inferior ones, and this is the cause of the -perfection of Providence. As to the Reason of the universe, it itself -is double also; one produces things, while the other unites generated -things to intelligible ones. Thus are constituted two providences: a -superior one, from above (intellectual Reason, the principal power of -the soul[84]), and an inferior one, the (natural and generative power, -called) reason, which derives from the first; and from both results the -concatenation of things, and universal Providence (or, Providence, and -destiny). - - -MEN'S BETTER NATURE IS NOT DOMINANT BECAUSE OF THEIR SUB-CONSCIOUS -NATURE. - -Men (therefore, not being only what they were made) possess another -principle (free intelligence with reason); but not all make use of -all the principles they possess; some make use of the one principle -(their intelligence), while others make use of the other (principle -of reason), or even of the lower principle (of imagination and -sensation).[85] All these principles are present in the man, even -when they do not react on him; and even in this case, they are not -inert; each fulfils its peculiar office; only they do not all act -simultaneously upon him (or, are not perceived by his consciousness). -It may seem difficult to understand how this may be the case with all -of them present, and it might seem easier to consider them absent; -but they are present in us, in the sense that we lack none of them; -although we might consider them absent in the sense that a principle -that does not react on a man might be considered absent from him. It -might be asked why these principles do not react on all men, since -they are part of them? We might, referring chiefly to this (free, -intelligent, reasonable) principle, say that first, it does not belong -to animals; second, it is not even (practiced) by all men. If it be not -present in all men, so much the more is it not alone in them, because -the being in whom this principle alone is present lives according to -this principle, and lives according to other principles only so far as -he is compelled by necessity. The cause (which hinders intelligence -and reason from dominating us) will have to be sought in the (Stoic) -substrate of the man, either because our corporeal constitution -troubles the superior principle (of reason and intelligence), or -because of the predominance of our passions. - -(After all), we have not yet reached any conclusion, because this -substrate of man is composed of two elements: the ("seminal) -reason,"[86] and matter; (and either of them might be the cause). At -first blush, it would seem that the cause (of the predominance of our -lower natures) must be sought in matter, rather than in the ("seminal) -reason"; and that which dominates in us is not ("seminal) reason," but -matter and organized substrate. This, however, is not the case. What -plays the part of substrate in respect of the superior principle (of -free intelligence and reason), is both the ("seminal) reason," and that -which is generated thereby, conforming to that reason; consequently, -the predominant element in us is not matter, any more than our -corporeal constitution. - - -HUMAN CHARACTER MAY BE RESULT OF FORMER LIVES. - -Besides, our individual characters might be derived from -pre-existences. In this case we would say that our ("seminal) reason" -has degenerated as a result of our antecedents, that our soul has lost -her force by irradiating what was below her. Besides, our ("seminal) -reason" contains within itself the very reason of our constituent -matter, a matter which it discovered, or conformed to its own -nature.[87] In fact, the ("seminal) reason" of an ox resides in no -matter other than that of an ox. Thus, as said (Plato[88]), the soul -finds herself destined to pass into the bodies of animals other than -men, because, just like the ("seminal) reason," she has altered, and -has become such as to animate an ox, instead of a man. By this decree -of divine justice she becomes still worse than she was. - - -CAUSES OF DETERIORATION. - -But why did the soul ever lose her way, or deteriorate? We have often -said that not all souls belong to the first rank; some belong to a -second, or even third rank, and who, consequently, are inferior to -those of the first. Further, leaving the right road may be caused -by a trifling divergence. Third, the approximation of two differing -things produces a combination which may be considered a third -somewhat, different from the other two components. (Thus even in -this new element, or "habituation") the being does not lose the -qualities he received with his existence; if he be inferior, he has -been created inferior from the very origin; it is what he was created, -he is inferior by the very virtue of his nature; if he suffer the -consequences thereof, he suffers them justly. Fourth, we must allow for -our anterior existence, because everything that happens to us to-day -results from our antecedents. - - -THIS PROVIDENCE IS THE NORMATIVE, CURATIVE, SANATIVE ELEMENT OF LIFE. - -5. From first to last Providence descends from on high, communicating -its gifts not according to the law of an equality that would be -numeric, but proportionate, varying its operations according to -locality (or occasion). So, in the organization of an animal, from -beginning to end, everything is related; every member has its peculiar -function, superior or inferior, according to the rank it occupies; it -has also its peculiar passions, passions which are in harmony with -its nature, and the place it occupies in the system of things. So, -for instance, a blow excites responses that differ according to the -organ that received it; the vocal organ will produce a sound; another -organ will suffer in silence, or execute a movement resultant from -that passion; now, all sounds, actions and passions form in the animal -the unity of sound, life and existence.[89] The parts, being various, -play different roles; thus there are differing functions for the feet, -the eyes, discursive reason, and intelligence. But all things form -one unity, relating to a single Providence, so that destiny governs -what is below, and providence reigns alone in what is on high. In -fact, all that lies in the intelligible world is either rational or -super-rational, namely: Intelligence and pure Soul. What derives -therefrom constitutes Providence, as far as it derives therefrom, as -it is in pure Soul, and thence passes into the animals. Thence arises -(universal) Reason, which, being distributed in unequal parts, produces -things unequal, such as the members of an animal. As consequences from -Providence are derived the human deeds which are agreeable to the -divinity. All such actions are related (to the plan of Providence); -they are not done by Providence; but when a man, or another animate or -inanimate being performs some deeds, these, if there be any good in -them, enter into the plan of Providence, which everywhere establishes -virtue, and amends or corrects errors. Thus does every animal maintain -its bodily health by the kind of providence within him; on the occasion -of a cut or wound the ("seminal) reason" which administers the body of -this animal immediately draws (the tissues) together, and forms scars -over the flesh, re-establishes health, and invigorates the members that -have suffered. - - -THE PLANS OF PROVIDENCE LIKENED TO THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF A PHYSICIAN. - -Consequently, our evils are the consequences (of our actions); they are -its necessary effects, not that we are carried away by Providence, but -in the sense that we obey an impulsion whose principle is in ourselves. -We ourselves then indeed try to reattach our acts to the plan of -Providence, but we cannot conform their consequences to its will; our -acts, therefore, conform either to our will, or to other things in -the universe, which, acting on us, do not produce in us an affection -conformed to the intentions of Providence. In fact, the same cause does -not act identically on different beings, for the effects experienced -by each differ according to their nature. Thus Helena causes emotions -in Paris which differ from those of Idumeneus.[90] Likewise, the -handsome man produces on a handsome man an effect different from that -of the intemperate man on the intemperate; the handsome and temperate -man acts differently on the handsome and temperate man than on the -intemperate; and than the intemperate on himself. The deed done by -the intemperate man is done neither by Providence, nor according to -Providence.[91] Neither is the deed done by the temperate man done by -Providence; since he does it himself; but it conforms to Providence, -because it conforms to the Reason (of the universe). Thus, when a man -has done something good for his health, it is he himself who has done -it, but he thereby conforms to the reason of the physician; for it is -the physician who teaches him, by means of his art, what things are -healthy or unhealthy; but when a man has done something injurious to -his health, it is he himself who has done it, and he does it against -the providence of the physician. - - -PREDICTION DOES NOT WORK BY PROVIDENCE, BUT BY ANALOGY. - -6. If then (the bad things do not conform to Providence), the diviners -and astrologers predict evil things only by the concatenation which -occurs between contraries, between form and matter, for instance, in a -composite being. Thus in contemplating the form and ("seminal) reason" -one is really contemplating the being which receives the form; for one -does not contemplate in the same way the intelligible animal, and the -composite animal; what one contemplates in the composite animal is the -("seminal) reason" which gives form to what is inferior. Therefore, -since the world is an animal, when one contemplates its occurrences, -one is really contemplating the causes that make them arise, the -Providence which presides over them, and whose action extends in an -orderly manner to all beings and events; that is, to all animals, their -actions and dispositions, which are dominated by Reason and mingled -with necessity. We thus contemplate what has been mingled since the -beginning, and what is still continually mingled. In this mixture, -consequently, it is impossible to distinguish Providence from what -conforms thereto, nor what derives from the substrate (that is, from -matter, and which, consequently, is deformed, and evil). This is not -a human task, not even of a man who might be wise or divine; such a -privilege can be ascribed only to God. - - -FACTS OF LIFE ARE LETTERS THAT CAN BE READ. - -In fact, the function of the diviner is not to distinguish the cause, -but the fact; his art consists in reading the characters traced by -nature, and which invariably indicate the order and concatenation of -facts; or rather, in studying the signs of the universal movement, -which designate the character of each being before its revelation in -himself. All beings, in fact, exercise upon each other a reciprocal -influence, and concur together in the constitution and perpetuity of -the world.[92] To him who studies, analogy reveals the march of events, -because all kinds of divination are founded on its laws; for things -were not to depend on each other, but to have relations founded on -their resemblance.[93] This no doubt is that which[94] is meant by the -expression that "analogy embraces everything." - - -ANALOGY DEMANDED BY THE UNITY OF GOD. - -Now, what is this analogy? It is a relation between the worse and the -worse, the better and the better, one eye and the other, one foot and -the other, virtue and justice, vice and injustice. The analogy which -reigns in the universe is then that which makes divination possible. -The influence which one being exercises on another conforms to the -laws of influence which the members of the universal Organism must -exercise upon each other. The one does not produce the other; for all -are generated together; but each is affected according to its nature, -each in its own manner. This constitutes the unity of the Reason of the -universe. - - -EVIL IS INSEPARABLE FROM THE GOOD. - -7. It is only because there are good things in the world, that there -are worse ones. Granting the conception of variety, how could the -worse exist without the better, or the better without the worse? We -should not, therefore, accuse the better because of the existence of -the worse; but rather we should rejoice in the presence of the better, -because it communicates a little of its perfection to the worse. To -wish to annihilate the worse in the world is tantamount to annihilating -Providence itself;[95] for if we annihilate the worse, to what could -Providence be applied? Neither to itself, nor to the better; for when -we speak of supreme Providence, we call it supreme in contrast with -that which is inferior to it. - - -THE PARABLE OF THE VINE AND THE BRANCHES. - -Indeed, the (supreme) Principle is that to which all other things -relate, that in which they all simultaneously exist, thus constituting -the totality. All things proceed from the Principle, while it remains -wrapt in itself. Thus, from a single root, which remains wrapt in -itself, issue a host of parts, each of which offers the image of their -root under a different form. Some of them touch the root; others -trend away from it, dividing and subdividing down to the branches, -twigs, leaves and fruits; some abide permanently (like the branches); -others swirl in a perpetual flux, like the leaves and fruits. These -latter parts which swirl in a perpetual flux contain within themselves -the ("seminal) reasons" of the parts from which they proceed (and -which abide permanently); they themselves seem disposed to be little -miniature trees; if they engendered before perishing, they would -engender only that which is nearest to them. As to the parts (which -abide permanently), and which are hollow, such as the branches, they -receive from the root the sap which is to fill them; for they have -a nature different (from that of the leaves, flowers, and fruits). -Consequently, it is the branches' extremities that experience -"passions" (or modifications) which they seem to derive only from the -contiguous parts. The parts contiguous to the Root are passive on one -end, and active on the other; but the Principle itself is related to -all. Although all the parts issue from the same Principle,[96] yet they -differ from each other more as they are more distant from the root. -Such would be the mutual relations of two brothers who resemble each -other because they are born from the same parents. - - - - -FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE. - -The Self-Consciousnesses, and What is Above Them.[97] - - -IS KNOWLEDGE DEPENDENT ON THE COMPOSITENESS OF THE KNOWER? - -1. Must thought, and self-consciousness imply being composed of -different parts, and on their mutual contemplation? Must that which is -absolutely simple be unable to turn towards itself, to know itself? ls -it, on the contrary, possible that for that which is not composite to -know itself? Self-consciousness, indeed, does not necessarily result -from a thing's knowing itself because it is composite, and that one of -its parts grasps the other; as, for instance, by sensation we perceive -the form and nature of our body. In this case the whole will not be -known, unless the part that knows the others to which it is united also -knows itself; otherwise, we would find the knowledge of one entity, -through another, instead of one entity through itself. - - -A SIMPLE PRINCIPLE CAN HAVE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. - -While, therefore, asserting that a simple principle does know itself, -we must examine into the possibility of this.[98] Otherwise, we would -have to give up hope of real self-knowledge. But to resign this would -imply many absurdities; for if it be absurd to deny that the soul -possesses self-knowledge, it would be still more absurd to deny it of -intelligence. How could intelligence have knowledge of other beings, -if it did not possess the knowledge and science of itself? Indeed, -exterior things are perceived by sensation, and even, if you insist, by -discursive reason and opinion; but not by intelligence. It is indeed -worth examining whether intelligence does, or does not have knowledge -of such external things. Evidently, intelligible entities are known -by intelligence. Does intelligence limit itself to knowledge of these -entities, or does it, while knowing intelligible entities, also know -itself? In this case, does it know that it knows only intelligible -entities, without being able to know what itself is? While knowing that -it knows what belongs to it, is it unable to know what itself, the -knower, is? Or can it at the same time know what belongs to it, and -also know itself? Then how does this knowledge operate, and how far -does it go? This is what we must examine. - - -THE SENSE-POWER OF THE SOUL DEALS ONLY WITH EXTERIOR THINGS. - -2. Let us begin by a consideration of the soul. Does she possess -self-consciousness? By what faculty? And how does she acquire it? It -is natural for the sense-power to deal only with exterior objects; for -even in the case in which it feels occurrences in the body, it is still -perceiving things that are external to it, since it perceives passions -experienced by the body over which it presides.[99] - - -FUNCTIONS OF THE DISCURSIVE REASON OF THE SOUL. - -Besides the above, the soul possesses the discursive reason, which -judges of sense-representations, combining and dividing them. Under -the form of images, she also considers the conceptions received from -intelligence, and operates on these images as on images furnished by -sensation. Finally, she still is the power of understanding, since -she distinguishes the new images from the old, and harmonizes them by -comparing them; whence, indeed, our reminiscences are derived. - - -CAN DISCURSIVE REASON TURN UPON ITSELF? - -That is the limit of the intellectual power of the soul. Is it, -besides, capable of turning upon itself, and cognizing itself, or -must this knowledge be sought for only within intelligence? If we -assign this knowledge to the intellectual part of the soul; we will -be making an intelligence out of it; and we will then have to study -in what it differs from the superior Intelligence. If again, we -refuse this knowledge to this part of the soul, we will, by reason, -rise to Intelligence, and we will have to examine the nature of -self-consciousness. Further, if we attribute this knowledge both to -the inferior and to the superior intelligences, we shall have to -distinguish self-consciousness according as it belongs to the one -or to the other; for if there were no difference between these two -kinds of intelligence, discursive reason would be identical with pure -Intelligence. Does discursive reason, therefore, turn upon itself? -Or does it limit itself to the comprehension of the types received -from both (sense and intelligence); and, in the latter case, how does -it achieve such comprehension? This latter question is the one to be -examined here. - - -THE HIGHEST PART OF DISCURSIVE REASON RECEIVES IMPRESSIONS FROM -INTELLIGENCE. - -3. Now let us suppose that the senses have perceived a man, and have -furnished an appropriate image thereof to discursive reason. What will -the latter say? It may say nothing, limiting itself to taking notice -of him. However, it may also ask itself who this man is; and, having -already met him, with the aid of memory, decide that he is Socrates. If -then discursive reason develop the image of Socrates, then it divides -what imagination has furnished. If discursive reason add that Socrates -is good, it still deals with things known by the senses; but that which -it asserts thereof, namely, his goodness, it has drawn from itself, -because within itself it possesses the rule of goodness. But how does -it, within itself, possess goodness? Because it conforms to the Good, -and receives the notion of it from the Intelligence that enlightens -itself; for (discursive reason), this part of the soul, is pure, and -receives impressions from Intelligence.[101] - - -WHY DISCURSIVE REASON SHOULD BELONG TO THE SOUL RATHER THAN TO -INTELLIGENCE. - -But why should this whole (soul-) part that is superior to sensation -be assigned to the soul rather than to intelligence? Because the power -of the soul consists in reasoning, and because all these operations -belong to the discursive reason. But why can we not simply assign to -it, in addition, self-consciousness, which would immediately clear -up this inquiry? Because the nature of discursive reason consists in -considering exterior things, and in scrutinizing their diversity, while -to intelligence we attribute the privilege of contemplating itself, and -of contemplating its own contents. But what hinders discursive reason, -by some other faculty of the soul, from considering what belongs to -it? Because, in this case, instead of discursive reason and reasoning, -we would have pure Intelligence. But what then hinders the presence -of pure Intelligence within the soul? Nothing, indeed. Shall we then -have a right to say that pure Intelligence is a part of the soul? No -indeed; but still we would have the right to call it "ours." It is -different from, and higher than discursive reason; and still it is -"ours," although we cannot count it among the parts of the soul. In one -respect it is "ours," and in another, is not "ours;" for at times we -make use of it, and at other times we make use of discursive reason; -consequently, intelligence is "ours" when we make use of it; and it -is not "ours" when we do not make use of it. But what is the meaning -of "making use of intelligence"? Does it mean becoming intelligence, -and speaking in that character, or does it mean speaking in conformity -with intelligence? For we are not intelligence; we speak in conformity -with intelligence by the first part of discursive reason, the part that -receives impressions from Intelligence. We feel through sensation, and -it is we who feel. Is it also we who conceive and who simultaneously -are conceived? Or is it we who reason, and who conceive the -intellectual notions which enlighten discursive reason? We are indeed -essentially constituted by discursive reason. The actualizations of -Intelligence are superior to us, while those of sensation are inferior; -as to us, "we" are the principal part of the soul, the part that forms -a middle power between these two extremes, now lowering ourselves -towards sensation, now rising towards Intelligence.[102] We acknowledge -sensibility to be ours because we are continually feeling. It is not -as evident that intelligence is ours, because we do not make use of it -continuously, and because it is separated, in this sense, that it is -not intelligence that inclines towards us, but rather we who raise our -glances towards intelligence. Sensation is our messenger, Intelligence -is our king.[99] - - -WE CAN THINK IN CONFORMITY WITH INTELLIGENCE IN TWO WAYS. - -4. We ourselves are kings when we think in conformity with -intelligence. This, however, can take place in two ways. Either -we have received from intelligence the impressions and rules which -are, as it were, engraved within us, so that we are, so to speak, -filled with intelligence; or we can have the perception and intuition -of it, because it is present with us. When we see intelligence, we -recognize that by contemplation of it we ourselves are grasping other -intelligible entities. This may occur in two ways; either because, -by the help of this very power, we grasp the power which cognizes -intelligible entities; or because we ourselves become intelligence. -The man who thus knows himself is double. Either he knows discursive -reason, which is characteristic of the soul, or, rising to a superior -condition, he cognizes himself and is united with intelligence. Then, -by intelligence, that man thinks himself; no more indeed as being man, -but as having become superior to man, as having been transported into -the intelligible Reason, and drawing thither with himself the best part -of the soul, the one which alone is capable of taking flight towards -thought, and of receiving the fund of knowledge resulting from his -intuition. But does discursive reason not know that it is discursive -reason, and that its domain is the comprehension of external objects? -Does it not, while doing so, know that it judges? Does it not know that -it is judging by means of the rules derived from intelligence, which -itself contains? Does it not know that above it is a principle which -possesses intelligible entities, instead of seeking (merely) to know -them? But what would this faculty be if it did not know what it is, -and what its functions are? It knows, therefore, that it depends on -intelligence, that it is inferior to intelligence, and that it is the -image of intelligence, that it contains the rules of intelligence as -it were engraved within itself, such as intelligence engraves them, or -rather, has engraved them on it. - - -MAN IS SELF-CONSCIOUS BY BECOMING INTELLIGENCE. - -Will he who thus knows himself content himself therewith? Surely -not. Exercising a further faculty, we will have the intuition of -the intelligence that knows itself; or, seizing it, inasmuch as it -is "ours" and we are "its," we will thus cognize intelligence, and -know ourselves. This is necessary for our knowledge of what, within -intelligence, self-consciousness is. The man becomes intelligence when, -abandoning his other faculties, he by intelligence sees Intelligence, -and he sees himself in the same manner that Intelligence sees itself. - - -INTELLIGENCE IS NOT DIVISIBLE; AND, IN ITS EXISTENCE, IS IDENTICAL WITH -THOUGHT. - -5. Does pure Intelligence know itself by contemplating one of its -parts by means of another part? Then one part will be the subject, and -another part will be the object of contemplation; intelligence will -not know itself. It may be objected that if intelligence be a whole -composed of absolutely similar parts, so that the subject and the -object of contemplation will not differ from each other; then, by the -virtue of this similitude, on seeing one of its parts with which it is -identical, intelligence will see itself; for, in this case, the subject -does not differ from the object. To begin with, it is absurd to suppose -that intelligence is divided into several parts. How, indeed, would -such a division be carried out? Not by chance, surely. Who will carry -it out? Will it be the subject or object? Then, how would the subject -know itself if, in contemplation, it located itself in the object, -since contemplation does not belong to that which is the object? -Will it know itself as object rather than as subject? In that case -it will not know itself completely and in its totality (as subject -and object); for what it sees is the object, and not the subject of -contemplation; it sees not itself, but another. In order to attain -complete knowledge of itself it will, besides, have to see itself -as subject; now, if it see itself as subject, it will, at the same -time, have to see the contemplated things. But is it the (Stoic[104]) -"types" (or impressions) of things, or the things themselves, that -are contained in the actualization of contemplation? If it be these -impressions, we do not possess the things themselves. If we do possess -these things, it is not because we separate ourselves (into subject -and object). Before dividing ourselves in this way, we already saw and -possessed these things. Consequently, contemplation must be identical -with that which is contemplated, and intelligence must be identical -with the intelligible. Without this identity, we will never possess -the truth. Instead of possessing realities, we will never possess any -more than their impressions, which will differ from the realities; -consequently, this will not be the truth. Truth, therefore, must not -differ from its object; it must be what it asserts. - - -THOUGHT IS IDENTICAL WITH THE INTELLIGIBLE WHICH IS AN ACTUALIZATION. - -On one hand, therefore, intelligence, and on the other the intelligible -and existence form but one and the same thing, namely, the primary -existence and primary Intelligence, which possesses realities, or -rather, which is identical with them. But if the thought-object and -the thought together form but a single entity, how will the thinking -object thus be able to think itself? Evidently thought will embrace -the intelligible, or will be identical therewith; but we still do not -see how intelligence is to think itself. Here we are: thought and the -intelligible fuse into one because the intelligible is an actualization -and not a simple power; because life is neither alien nor incidental -to it; because thought is not an accident for it, as it would be for -a brute body, as for instance, for a stone; and, finally, because -the intelligible is primary "being." Now, if the intelligible be an -actualization, it is the primary actualization, the most perfect -thought, or, "substantial thought." Now, as this thought is supremely -true, as it is primary Thought, as it possesses existence in the -highest degree, it is primary Intelligence. It is not, therefore, -mere potential intelligence; there is no need to distinguish within -it the potentiality from the actualization of thought; otherwise, -its substantiality would be merely potential. Now since intelligence -is an actualization, and as its "being" also is an actualization, it -must fuse with its actualization. But existence and the intelligible -also fuse with their actualization. Therefore[105] intelligence, the -intelligible, and thought will form but one and the same entity. -Since the thought of the intelligible is the intelligible, and as the -intelligible is intelligence, intelligence will thus think itself. -Intelligence will think, by the actualization of the thought to which -it is identical, the intelligible to which it also is identical. -It will think itself, so far as it is thought; and in so far as it -is the intelligible which it thinks by the thought to which it is -identical.[106] - - -SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS MORE PERFECT IN INTELLIGENCE THAN IN THE SOUL. - -6. Reason, therefore, demonstrates that there is a principle which must -essentially know itself. But this self-consciousness is more perfect in -intelligence than in the soul. The soul knows herself in so far as she -knows that she depends on another power; while intelligence, by merely -turning towards itself, naturally cognizes its existence and "being." -By contemplating realities, it contemplates itself; this contemplation -is an actualization, and this actualization is intelligence; for -intelligence and thought[107] form but a single entity. The entire -intelligence sees itself entire, instead of seeing one of its parts -by another of its parts. Is it in the nature of intelligence, such as -reason conceives of it, to produce within us a simple conviction? No. -Intelligence necessarily implies (certitude), and not mere persuasion; -for necessity is characteristic of intelligence, while persuasion is -characteristic of the soul. Here below, it is true, we rather seek to -be persuaded, than to see truth by pure Intelligence. When we were in -the superior region, satisfied with intelligence, we used to think, and -to contemplate the intelligible, reducing everything to unity. It was -Intelligence which thought and spoke about itself; the soul rested, and -allowed Intelligence free scope to act. But since we have descended -here below, we seek to produce persuasion in the soul, because we wish -to contemplate the model in its image. - - -THE SOUL MUST BE TAUGHT SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS BY CONVERSION. - -We must, therefore, teach our soul how Intelligence contemplates -itself. This has to be taught to that part of our soul which, -because of its intellectual character, we call reason, or discursive -intelligence, to indicate that it is a kind of intelligence, that -it possesses its power by intelligence, and that it derives it from -intelligence. This part of the soul must, therefore, know that it -knows what it sees, that it knows what it expresses, and that, if it -were identical with what it describes, it would thereby know itself. -But since intelligible entities come to it from the same principle -from which it itself comes, since it is a reason, and as it receives -from intelligence entities that are kindred, by comparing them with -the traces of intelligence it contains, it must know itself. This -image it contains must, therefore, be raised to true Intelligence, -which is identical with the true intelligible entities, that is, to -the primary and really true Beings; for it is impossible that this -intelligence should originate from itself. If then intelligence remain -in itself and with itself, if it be what it is (in its nature) to be, -that is, intelligence--for intelligence can never be unintelligent--it -must contain within it the knowledge of itself, since it does not -issue from itself, and since its function and its "being" (or, true -nature) consist in being no more than intelligence.[106] It is not -an intelligence that devotes itself to practical action, obliged -to consider what is external to it, and to issue from itself to -become cognizant of exterior things; for it is not necessary that an -intelligence which devotes itself to action should know itself. As it -does not give itself to action--for, being pure, it has nothing to -desire--it operates a conversion towards itself, by virtue of which -it is not only probable, but even necessary for it to know itself. -Otherwise, what would its life consist of, inasmuch as it does not -devote itself to action, and as it remains within itself? - - -WHATEVER INTELLIGENCE MAY BE THOUGHT TO DO, IT MUST KNOW ITSELF. - -7. It may be objected that the Intelligence contemplates the divinity. -If, however, it be granted, that the Intelligence knows the divinity, -one is thereby forced to admit that it also knows itself; for it -will know what it derives from the divinity, what it has received -from Him, and what it still may hope to receive from Him. By knowing -this, it will know itself, since it is one of the entities given -by the divinity; or rather, since it is all that is given by the -divinity. If then, it know the divinity, it knows also the powers of -the divinity, it knows that itself proceeds from the divinity, and -that itself derives its powers from the divinity. If Intelligence -cannot have a clear intuition of the divinity, because the subject and -object of an intuition must be the same, this will turn out to be a -reason why Intelligence will know itself, and will see itself, since -seeing is being what is seen. What else indeed could we attribute to -Intelligence? Rest, for instance? For Intelligence, rest does not -consist in being removed from itself, but rather to act without being -disturbed by anything that is alien. The things that are not troubled -by anything alien need only to produce their own actualization, -especially when they are in actualization, and not merely potential. -That which is in actualization, and which cannot be in actualization -for anything foreign, must be in actualization for itself. When -thinking itself, Intelligence remains turned towards itself, referring -its actualization to itself. If anything proceed from it, it is -precisely because it remains turned towards itself that it remains in -itself. It had, indeed, to apply itself to itself, before applying -itself to anything else, or producing something else that resembled it; -thus fire must first be fire in itself, and be fire in actualization, -in order later to impart some traces of its nature to other things. -Intelligence, in itself, therefore, is an actualization. The soul, -on turning herself towards Intelligence, remains within herself; on -issuing from Intelligence, the soul turns towards external things. On -turning towards Intelligence, she becomes similar to the power from -which she proceeds; on issuing from Intelligence, she becomes different -from herself. Nevertheless, she still preserves some resemblance to -Intelligence, both in her activity and productiveness. When active, -the soul still contemplates Intelligence; when productive, the soul -produces forms, which resemble distant thoughts, and are traces of -thought and Intelligence, traces that conform to their archetype; and -which reveal a faithful imitation thereof, or which, at least, still -preserve a weakened image thereof, even if they do occupy only the last -rank of beings. - - -WHAT INTELLIGENCE LOOKS LIKE IN THE INTELLIGIBLE. - -8. What qualities does Intelligence display in the intelligible -world? What qualities does it discover in itself by contemplation? To -begin with, we must not form of Intelligence a conception showing a -figure, or colors, like bodies. Intelligence existed before bodies. -The "seminal reasons" which produce figure and color are not identical -with them; for "seminal reasons" are invisible. So much the more are -intelligible entities invisible; their nature is identical with that -of the principles in which they reside, just as "seminal reasons" are -identical with the soul that contains them. But the soul does not see -the entities she contains, because she has not begotten them; even -she herself, just like the "reasons," is no more than an image (of -Intelligence). The principle from which she comes possesses an evident -existence, that is genuine, and primary; consequently, that principle -exists of and in itself. But this image (which is in the soul) is not -even permanent unless it belong to something else, and reside therein. -Indeed, the characteristic of an image is that it resides in something -else, since it belongs to something else, unless it remain attached to -its principle. Consequently, this image does not contemplate, because -it does not possess a light that is sufficient; and even if it should -contemplate, as it finds its perfection in something else, it would -be contemplating something else, instead of contemplating itself. The -same case does not obtain in Intelligence; there the contemplated -entity and contemplation co-exist, and are identical. Who is it, -therefore, that declares the nature of the intelligible? The power -that contemplates it, namely, Intelligence itself. Here below our eyes -see the light because our vision itself is light, or rather because -it is united to light; for it is the colors that our vision beholds. -On the contrary, Intelligence does not see through something else, -but through itself, because what it sees is not outside of itself. -It sees a light with another light, and not by another light; it, -is therefore, a light that sees another; and, consequently, it sees -itself. This light, on shining in the soul, illuminates her; that is, -intellectualizes her; assimilates her to the superior light (namely, -in Intelligence). If, by the ray with which this light enlightens -the soul, we judge of the nature of this light and conceive of it as -still greater, more beautiful, and more brilliant, we will indeed -be approaching Intelligence and the intelligible world; for, by -enlightening the soul, Intelligence imparts to her a clearer life. This -life is not generative, because Intelligence converts the soul towards -Intelligence; and, instead of allowing the soul to divide, causes the -soul to love the splendor with which she is shining. Neither is this -life one of the senses, for though the senses apply themselves to -what is exterior, they do not, on that account, learn anything beyond -(themselves). He who sees that superior light of the verities sees -much better things that are visible, though in a different manner. -It remains, therefore, that the Intelligence imparts to the soul the -intellectual life, which is a trace of her own life; for Intelligence -possesses the realities. It is in the life and the actualization which -are characteristic of Intelligence that here consists the primary -Light, which from the beginning,[108] illumines itself, which reflects -on itself, because it is simultaneously enlightener and enlightened; it -is also the true intelligible entity, because it is also at the same -time thinker and thought. It sees itself by itself, without having -need of anything else; it sees itself in an absolute manner, because, -within it, the known is identical with the knower. It is not otherwise -in us; it is by Intelligence that we know intelligence. Otherwise, -how could we speak of it? How could we say that it was capable of -clearly grasping itself, and that, by it, we understand ourselves? How -could we, by these reasonings, to Intelligence reduce our soul which -recognizes that it is the image of Intelligence, which considers its -life a faithful imitation of the life of Intelligence, which thinks -that, when it thinks, it assumes an intellectual and divine form? -Should one wish to know which is this Intelligence that is perfect, -universal and primary, which knows itself essentially, the soul has to -be reduced to Intelligence; or, at least, the soul has to recognize -that the actualization by which the soul conceives the entities of -which the soul has the reminiscence is derived from Intelligence. Only -by placing herself in that condition, does the soul become able to -demonstrate that inasmuch as she is the image of Intelligence she, the -soul, can by herself, see it; that is, by those of her powers which -most exactly resemble Intelligence (namely, by pure thought); which -resembles Intelligence in the degree that a part of the soul can be -assimilated to it. - - -WE CAN REACH A CONCEPTION OF INTELLIGENCE BY STRIPPING THE SOUL OF -EVERY FACULTY EXCEPT HER INTELLECTUAL PART. - -9. We must, therefore, contemplate the soul and her divinest part -in order to discover the nature of Intelligence. This is how we may -accomplish it: From man, that is from yourself, strip off the body; -then that power of the soul that fashions the body; then sensation, -appetite, and anger, and all the lower passions that incline you -towards the earth. What then remains of the soul is what we call the -"image of intelligence," an image that radiates from Intelligence, as -from the immense globe of the sun radiates the surrounding luminary -sphere. Of course, we would not say that all the light that radiates -from the sun remains within itself around the sun; only a part of this -light remains around the sun from which it emanates; another part, -spreading by relays, descends to us on the earth. But we consider -light, even that which surrounds the sun, as located in something else, -so as not to be forced to consider the whole space between the sun and -us as empty of all bodies. On the contrary, the soul is a light which -remains attached to Intelligence, and she is not located in any space -because Intelligence itself is not spatially located. While the light -of the sun is in the air, on the contrary the soul, in the state in -which we consider her here, is so pure that she can be seen in herself -by herself, and by any other soul that is in the same condition. -The soul needs to reason, in order to conceive of the nature of -Intelligence according to her own nature; but Intelligence conceives of -itself without reasoning because it is always present to itself. We, on -the contrary, are present both to ourselves and to Intelligence when we -turn towards it, because our life is divided into several lives. On the -contrary, Intelligence has no need of any other life, nor of anything -else; what Intelligence gives is not given to itself, but to other -things; neither does Intelligence have any need of what is inferior -to it; nor could Intelligence give itself anything inferior, since -Intelligence possesses all things; instead of possessing in itself the -primary images of things (as in the case of the soul), Intelligence is -these things themselves. - - -ELEVATION OF THE SOUL MAY BE GRADUAL, IF UNABLE TO ATTAIN IMMEDIATE -ELEVATION. - -If one should find himself unable to rise immediately to pure thought, -which is the highest, or first, part of the soul, he may begin by -opinion, and from it rise to Intelligence. If even opinion be out -of the reach of his ability, he may begin with sensation, which -already represents general forms; for sensation which contains the -forms potentially may possess them even in actualization. If, on the -contrary, the best he can do is to descend, let him descend to the -generative power, and to the things it produces; then, from the last -forms, one may rise again to the higher forms, and so on to the primary -forms. - - -THE TRANSCENDENT FIRST PRINCIPLE HAS NO NEED OF SEEING ITSELF. - -10. But enough of this. If the (forms) contained by Intelligence are -not created forms--otherwise the forms contained in us would no longer, -as they should, occupy the lowest rank--if these forms in intelligence -really be creative and primary, then either these creative forms and -the creative principle fuse into one single entity, or intelligence -needs some other principle. But does the transcendent Principle, that -is superior to Intelligence (the One), itself also need some other -further principle? No, because it is only Intelligence that stands in -need of such an one. Does the Principle superior to Intelligence (the -transcendent One) not see Himself? No. He does not need to see Himself. -This we shall study elsewhere. - - -THE CONTEMPLATION OF INTELLIGENCE DEMANDS A HIGHER TRANSCENDING UNITY. - -Let us now return to our most important problem. Intelligence needs -to contemplate itself, or rather, it continually possesses this -contemplation. It first sees that it is manifold, and then that it -implies a difference, and further, that it needs to contemplate, -to contemplate the intelligible, and that its very essence is to -contemplate. Indeed, every contemplation implies an object; otherwise, -it is empty. To make contemplation possible there must be more than -an unity; contemplation must be applied to an object, and this object -must be manifold; for what is simple has no object on which it could -apply its action, and silently remains withdrawn in its solitude. -Action implies some sort of difference. Otherwise, to what would -action apply itself? What would be its object? The active principle, -must, therefore, direct its action on something else than itself, or -must itself be manifold to direct its action on itself. If, indeed, -it direct its action on nothing, it will be at rest; and if at rest, -it will not be thinking. The thinking principle, therefore, when -thinking, implies duality. Whether the two terms be one exterior -to the other, or united, thought always implies both identity and -difference. In general, intelligible entities must simultaneously be -identical with Intelligence, and different from Intelligence. Besides, -each of them must also contain within itself identity and difference. -Otherwise, if the intelligible does not contain any diversity, what -would be the object of thought? If you insist that each intelligible -entity resembles a ("seminal) reason," it must be manifold. Every -intelligible entity, therefore, knows itself to be a compound, and -many-colored eye. If intelligence applied itself to something single -and absolutely simple, it could not think. What would it say? What -would it understand? If the indivisible asserted itself it ought first -to assert what it is not; and so, in order to be single it would have -to be manifold. If it said, "I am this," and if it did not assert that -"this" was different from itself, it would be uttering untruth. If -it asserted it as an accident of itself, it would assert of itself -a multitude. If it says, "I am; I am; myself; myself;" then neither -these two things will be simple, and each of them will be able to say, -"me;" or there will be manifoldness, and, consequently, a difference; -and, consequently, number and diversity. The thinking subject must, -therefore, contain a difference, just as the object thought must also -reveal a diversity, because it is divided by thought. Otherwise, there -will be no other thought of the intelligible, but a kind of touch, of -unspeakable and inconceivable contact, prior to intelligence, since -intelligence is not yet supposed to exist, and as the possessor of -this contact does not think. The thinking subject, therefore, must -not remain simple, especially, when it thinks itself; it must split -itself, even were the comprehension of itself silent. Last, that which -is simple (the One) has no need of occupying itself with itself. What -would it learn by thinking? Is it not what it is before thinking -itself? Besides, knowledge implies that some one desires, that some -one seeks, and that some one finds. That which does not within itself -contain any difference, when turned towards itself, rests without -seeking anything within itself; but that which develops, is manifold. - - -HOW INTELLIGENCE BECAME MANIFOLD. - -11. Intelligence, therefore, becomes manifold when it wishes to -think the Principle superior to it. By wishing to grasp Him in his -simplicity, it abandons this simplicity, because it continues to -receive within itself this differentiated and multiplied nature. It -was not yet Intelligence when it issued from Unity; it found itself -in the state of sight when not yet actualized. When emanating from -Unity, it contained already what made it manifold. It vaguely aspired -to an object other than itself, while simultaneously containing a -representation of this object. It thus contained something that it -made manifold; for it contained a sort of impress produced by the -contemplation (of the One); otherwise it would not receive the One -within itself. Thus Intelligence, on being born of Unity, became -manifold, and as it possessed knowledge, it contemplated itself. It -then became actualized sight. Intelligence is really intelligence -only when it possesses its object, and when it possesses it as -intelligence. Formerly, it was only an aspiration, only an indistinct -vision. On applying itself to the One, and grasping the One, it becomes -intelligence. Now its receptivity to Unity is continuous, and it is -continuously intelligence, "being," thought, from the very moment it -begins to think. Before that, it is not yet thought, since it does not -possess the intelligible, and is not yet Intelligence, since it does -not think. - - -THE ONE IS THE PRINCIPLE OF ALL WITHOUT BEING LIMITED THEREBY. - -That which is above these things is their principle, without being -inherent in them. The principle from which these things proceed cannot -be inherent in them; that is true only of the elements that constitute -them. The principle from which all things proceed (the One) is not -any of them; it differs from all of them. The One, therefore, is not -any of them; it differs from all of them. The One, therefore, is not -any of the things of the universe: He precedes all these things, and -consequently, He precedes Intelligence, since the latter embraces all -things in its universality. On the other hand, as the things that are -posterior to Unity are universal, and as Unity thus is anterior to -universal things, it cannot be any one of them. Therefore, it should -not be called either intelligence or good, if by "good" you mean any -object comprised within the universe; this name suits it only, if -it indicate that it is anterior to everything. If Intelligence be -intelligence only because it is manifold; if thought, though found -within Intelligence, be similarly manifold, then the First, the -Principle that is absolutely simple, will be above Intelligence; for if -He think, He would be Intelligence; and if He be Intelligence, He would -be manifold. - - -NO MANIFOLDNESS OF ANY KIND CAN EXIST IN THE FIRST. - -12. It may be objected, that nothing would hinder the existence of -manifoldness in the actualization of the First, so long as the "being," -or nature, remain unitary. That principle would not be rendered -composite by any number of actualizations. This is not the case for -two reasons. Either these actualizations are distinct from its nature -("being"), and the First would pass from potentiality to actuality; in -which case, without doubt, the First is not manifold, but His nature -would not become perfect without actualization. Or the nature ("being") -is, within Him identical to His actualization; in which case, as the -actualization is manifold, the nature would be such also. Now we do -indeed grant that Intelligence is manifold, since it thinks itself; -but we could not grant that the Principle of all things should also be -manifold. Unity must exist before the manifold, the reason of whose -existence is found in unity; for unity precedes all number. It may -be objected that this is true enough for numbers which follow unity, -because they are composite; but what is the need of a unitary principle -from which manifoldness should proceed when referring (not to numerals, -but) to beings? This need is that, without the One, all things would be -in a dispersed condition, and their combinations would be no more than -a chaos. - - -PERMANENT ACTUALIZATIONS ARE HYPOSTASES. - -Another objection is, that from an intelligence that is simple, -manifold actualizations can surely proceed. This then admits the -existence of something simple before the actualizations. Later, as -these actualizations become permanent, they form hypostatic forms of -existence. Being such, they will have to differ from the Principle -from which they proceed, since the Principle remains simple, and that -which is born of it must in itself be manifold, and be dependent -thereon. Even if these actualizations exist only because the Principle -acted a single time, this already constitutes manifoldness. Though -these actualizations be the first ones, if they constitute second-rank -(nature), the first rank will belong to the Principle that precedes -these actualizations; this Principle abides in itself, while these -actualizations constitute that which is of second rank, and is composed -of actualizations. The First differs from the actualizations He begets, -because He begets them without activity; otherwise, Intelligence -would not be the first actualization. Nor should we think that the -One first desired to beget Intelligence, and later begat it, so that -this desire was an intermediary between the generating principle and -the generated entity. The One could not have desired anything; for -if He had desired anything, He would have been imperfect, since He -would not yet have possessed what He desired. Nor could we suppose -that the One lacked anything; for there was nothing towards which He -could have moved. Therefore, the hypostatic form of existence which is -beneath Him received existence from Him, without ceasing to persist -in its own condition. Therefore, if there is to be a hypostatic form -of existence beneath Him He must have remained within Himself in -perfect tranquility; otherwise, He would have initiated movement; and -we would have to conceive of a movement before the first movement, -a thought before the first thought, and its first actualization -would be imperfect, consisting in no more than a mere tendency. -But towards what can the first actualization of the One tend, and -attain, if, according to the dictates of reason, we conceive of that -actualization originating from Him as light emanates from the sun? -This actualization, therefore, will have to be considered as a light -that embraces the whole intelligible world; at the summit of which we -shall have to posit, and over whose throne we shall have to conceive -the rule of the immovable One, without separating Him from the Light -that radiates from Him. Otherwise, above this Light we would have to -posit another one, which, while remaining immovable, should enlighten -the intelligible. Indeed the actualization that emanates from the -One, without being separated from Him, nevertheless, differs from -Him. Neither is its nature non-essential, or blind; it, therefore, -contemplates itself, and knows itself; it is, consequently, the first -knowing principle. As the One is above Intelligence, it is also above -consciousness; as it needs nothing, neither has it any need of knowing -anything. Cognition (or, consciousness), therefore, belongs only to the -second-rank nature. Consciousness is only an individual unity, while -the One is absolute unity; indeed individual unity is not absolute -Unity, because the absolute is (or, "in and for itself"), precedes the -("somehow determined," or) individual. - - -THE SUPREME IS ABSOLUTELY INEFFABLE. - -13. This Principle, therefore, is really indescribable. We are -individualizing it in any statement about it. That which is above -everything, even above the venerable Intelligence, really has no name, -and all that we can state about Him is, that He is not anything. Nor -can He be given any name, since we cannot assert anything about Him. -We refer to Him only as best we can. In our uncertainty we say, "What -does He not feel? is He not self-conscious? does He not know Himself?" -Then we must reflect that by speaking thus we are thinking of things, -that are opposed to Him of whom we are now thinking. When we suppose -that He can be known, or that He possesses self-consciousness, we are -already making Him manifold. Were we to attribute to Him thought, it -would appear that He needed this thought. If we imagine thought as -being within Him, thought seems to be superfluous. For of what does -thought consist? Of the consciousness of the totality formed by the two -terms that contribute to the act of thought, and which fuse therein. -That is thinking oneself, and thinking oneself is real thinking; for -each of the two elements of thought is itself an unity to which nothing -is lacking. On the contrary, the thought of objects exterior (to -Intelligence) is not perfect, and is not true thought. That which is -supremely simple and supremely absolute stands in need of nothing. The -absolute that occupies the second rank needs itself, and, consequently, -needs to think itself. Indeed, since Intelligence needs something -relatively to itself, it succeeds in satisfying this need, and -consequently, in being absolute, only by possessing itself entirely. -It suffices itself only by uniting all the elements constituting its -nature ("being"), only by dwelling within itself, only by remaining -turned towards itself while thinking; for consciousness is the -sensation of manifoldness, as is indicated by the etymology of the word -"con-scious-ness," or, "conscience." If supreme Thought occur by the -conversion of Intelligence towards itself, it evidently is manifold. -Even if it said no more than "I am existence," Intelligence would say -it as if making a discovery, and Intelligence would be right, because -existence is manifold. Even though it should apply itself to something -simple, and should say, "I am existence," this would not imply -successful grasp of itself or existence. Indeed, when Intelligence -speaks of existence in conformity with reality, intelligence does not -speak of it as of a stone, but, merely, in a single word expresses -something manifold. The existence that really and essentially deserves -the name of existence, instead of having of it only a trace which -would not be existence, and which would be only an image of it, such -existence is a multiple entity. Will not each one of the elements of -this multiple entity be thought? No doubt you will not be able to think -it if you take it alone and separated from the others; but existence -itself is in itself something manifold. Whatever object you name, it -possesses existence. Consequently, He who is supremely simple cannot -think Himself; if He did, He would be somewhere, (which is not the -case). Therefore He does not think, and He cannot be grasped by thought. - - -WE COME SUFFICIENTLY NEAR TO HIM TO TALK ABOUT HIM. - -14. How then do we speak of Him? Because we can assert something about -Him, though we cannot express Him by speech. We could not know Him, nor -grasp Him by thought. How then do we speak of Him, if we cannot grasp -Him? Because though He does escape our knowledge, He does not escape us -completely. We grasp Him enough to assert something about Him without -expressing Him himself, to say what He is not, without saying what He -is; that is why in speaking of Him we use terms that are suitable to -designate only lower things. Besides we can embrace Him without being -capable of expressing Him, like men who, transported by a divine -enthusiasm, feel that they contain something superior without being -able to account for it. They speak of what agitates them, and they thus -have some feeling of Him who moves them, though they differ therefrom. -Such is our relation with Him; when we rise to Him by using our pure -intelligence, we feel that He is the foundation of our intelligence, -the principle that furnishes "being" and other things of the kind; we -feel that He is better, greater, and more elevated than we, because He -is superior to reason, to intelligence, and to the senses, because He -gives these things without being what they are. - - -RADIATION OF MULTIPLE UNITY. - -15. How does He give them? Is it because He possesses them, or because -He does not possess them? If it be because He does not possess them, -how does He give what He does not possess? If it be because He does -possess them, He is no longer simple. If He give what He does not -possess, how is multiplicity born of Him? It would seem as if only -one single thing could proceed from Him, unity; and even so one might -wonder how anything whatever could be born of that which is absolutely -one. We answer, in the same way as from a light radiates a luminous -sphere (or, fulguration[109]). But how can the manifold be born from -the One? Because the thing that proceeds from Him must not be equal to -Him, and so much the less, superior; for what is superior to unity, -or better than Him? It must, therefore, be inferior to Him, and, -consequently, be less perfect. Now it cannot be less perfect, except -on condition of being less unitary, that is, more manifold. But as it -must aspire to unity, it will be the "manifold one." It is by that -which is single that that which is not single is preserved, and is -what it is; for that which is not one, though composite, cannot receive -the name of existence. If it be possible to say what each thing is, it -is only because it is one and identical. What is not manifold is not -one by participation, but is absolute unity; it does not derive its -unity from any other principle; on the contrary it is the principle to -which other things owe that they are more or less single, according as -they are more or less close to it. Since the characteristic of that -which is nearest to unity is identity, and is posterior to unity, -evidently the manifoldness contained therein, must be the totality of -things that are single. For since manifoldness is therein united with -manifoldness, it does not contain parts separated from each other, -and all subsist together. Each of the things, that proceed therefrom, -are manifold unity, because they cannot be universal unity. Universal -unity is characteristic only of their principle (the intelligible -Being), because itself proceeds from a great Principle which is one, -essentially, and genuinely. That which, by its exuberant fruitfulness, -begets, is all; on the other hand, as this totality participates -in unity, it is single; and, consequently, it is single totality -(universal unity). - - -THE SUPREME PRODUCES MANIFOLDNESS BECAUSE OF ITS CATEGORIES. - -We have seen that existence is "all these things;" now, what are they? -All those of which the One is the principle. But how can the One be -the principle of all things? Because the One preserves their existence -while effecting the individuality of each of them. Is it also because -He gives them existence? And if so, does He do so by possessing them? -In this case, the One would be manifold. No, it is by containing them -without any distinction yet having arisen among them. On the contrary, -in the second principle they are distinguished by reason; that is, -they are logically distinguished, because this second principle is an -actualization, while the first Principle is the power-potentiality[107] -of all things; not in the sense in which we say that matter is -potential in that it receives, or suffers, but in the opposite sense -that the One produces. How then can the One produce what it does not -possess, since unity produces that neither by chance nor by reflection? -We have already said that what proceeds from unity must differ from it; -and, consequently, cannot be absolutely one; that it must be duality, -and, consequently, multitude, since it will contain (the categories, -such as) identity, and difference, quality, and so forth.[110] We have -demonstrated that that which is born of the One is not absolutely one. -It now remains for us to inquire whether it will be manifold, such as -it is seen to be in what proceeds from the One. We shall also have to -consider why it necessarily proceeds from the One. - - -THE GOOD MUST BE SUPERIOR TO INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE. - -16. We have shown elsewhere that something must follow the One, -and that the One is a power, and is inexhaustible; and this is so, -because even the last-rank entities possess the power of begetting. -For the present we may notice that the generation of things reveals -a descending procession, in which, the further we go, the more does -manifoldness increase; and that the principle is always simpler than -the things it produces.[111] Therefore, that which has produced the -sense world is not the sense-world itself, but Intelligence and the -intelligible world; and that which has begotten Intelligence and -the intelligible world is neither Intelligence nor the intelligible -world, but something simpler than them. Manifoldness is not born of -manifoldness, but of something that is not manifold. If That which -was superior to Intelligence were manifold, it would no longer be the -(supreme) Principle, and we would have to ascend further. Everything -must, therefore, be reduced to that which is essentially one, which -is outside of all manifoldness; and whose simplicity is the greatest -possible. But how can manifold and universal Reason be born of the One, -when very evidently the One is not a reason? As it is not a reason, -how can it beget Reason? How can the Good beget a hypostatic form of -existence, which would be good in form? What does this hypostatic form -of existence possess? Is it identity? But what is the relation between -identity and goodness? Because as soon as we possess the Good, we seek -identity and permanence; and because the Good is the principle from -which we must not separate; for if it were not the Good, it would be -better to give it up. We must, therefore, wish to remain united to the -Good. Since that is the most desirable for Intelligence, it need seek -nothing beyond, and its permanence indicates its satisfaction with -the entities it possesses. Enjoying, as it does, their presence in a -manner such that it fuses with them, it must then consider life as the -most precious entity of all. As Intelligence possesses life in its -universality and fulness, this life is the fulness and universality of -the Soul and Intelligence. Intelligence, therefore, is self-sufficient, -and desires nothing; it contains what it would have desired if it had -not already possessed such desirable object. It possesses the good that -consists in life and intelligence, as we have said, or in some one of -the connected entities. If Life and Intelligence were the absolute -Good, there would be nothing above them. But if the absolute Good be -above them, the good of Intelligence is this Life, which relates to -the absolute Good, which connects with it, which receives existence -from it, and rises towards it, because it is its principle. The Good, -therefore, must be superior to Life and Intelligence. On this condition -only does the life of Intelligence, the image of Him from whom all life -proceeds, turn towards Him; on this condition only does Intelligence, -the imitation of the contents of the One, whatever be His nature, turn -towards Him. - - -THE SUPREME AS SUPERESSENTIAL AND SUPEREXISTENT. - -17. What better thing is there then than this supremely wise Life, -exempt from all fault or error? What is there better than the -Intelligence that embraces everything? In one word, what is there -better than universal Life and universal Intelligence? If we answer -that what is better than these things is the Principle that begat -them, if we content ourselves with explaining how it begat them, -and to show that one cannot discover anything better, we shall, -instead of progressing in this discussion, ever remain at the same -point. Nevertheless, we need to rise higher. We are particularly -obliged to do this, when we consider that the principle that we seek -must be considered as the "Self-sufficient supremely independent -of all things;" for no entity is able to be self-sufficient, and -all have participated in the One; and since they have done so, none -of them can be the One. Which then is this principle in which all -participate, which makes Intelligence exist, and is all things? Since -it makes Intelligence exist, and since it is all things, since it -makes its contained manifoldness self-sufficient by the presence of -unity, and since it is thus the creative principle of "being" and -self-sufficiency, it must, instead of being "being," be super-"being" -and super-existence. - - -ECSTASY IS INTELLECTUAL CONTACT WITH SUDDEN LIGHT. - -Have we said enough, and can we stop here? Or does our soul still feel -the pains of parturition? Let her, therefore, produce (activity), -rushing towards the One, driven by the pains that agitate her. No, -let us rather seek to calm her by some magic charm, if any remedy -therefor exist. But to charm the soul, it may perhaps be sufficient to -repeat what we have already said. To what other charm, indeed, would -it suffice to have recourse? Rising above all the truths in which we -participate, this enchantment evanesces the moment we speak, or even -think. For, in order to express something, discursive reason is obliged -to go from one thing to another, and successively to run through every -element of its object. Now what can be successively scrutinized in -that which is absolutely simple? It is, therefore, sufficient to reach -Him by a sort of intellectual contact. Now at the moment of touching -the One, we should neither be able to say anything about Him, nor have -the leisure to speak of Him; only later is it possible to argue about -Him. We should believe that we have seen Him when a sudden light has -enlightened the soul; for this light comes from Him, and is Himself. We -should believe that He is present when, as another (lower) divinity, -He illumines the house of him who calls on this divinity,[112] for it -remains obscure without the illumination of the divinity. The soul, -therefore, is without light when she is deprived of the presence of -this divinity, when illumined by this divinity, she has what she -sought. The true purpose of the soul is to be in contact with this -light, to see this light in the radiance of this light itself, without -the assistance of any foreign light, to see this principle by the -help of which she sees. Indeed, it is the principle by which she is -enlightened that she must contemplate as one gazes at the sun only -through its own light. But how shall we succeed in this? By cutting off -everything else.[113] - - - - -THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE.[114] - -Of Love, or "Eros." - - -LOVE AS GOD, GUARDIAN AND PASSION. - -1. Is Love a divinity, a guardian, or a passion of the human soul? Or -is it all three under different points of view? In this case, what is -it under each of these points of view? These are the questions we are -to consider, consulting the opinions of men, but chiefly those of the -philosophers. The divine Plato, who has written much about love, here -deserves particular attention. He says that it is not only a passion -capable of being born in souls, but he calls it also a guardian, and he -gives many details about its birth and parents.[115] - - -PASSIONAL LOVE IS TWOFOLD. - -To begin with passion, it is a matter of common knowledge that the -passion designated as love is born in the souls which desire to unite -themselves to a beautiful object. But its object may be either a -shameful practice, or one (worthy to be pursued by) temperate men, -who are familiar with beauty. We must, therefore, investigate in a -philosophical manner what is the origin of both kinds of love. - - -LOVE IS RECOGNITION OF HIDDEN AFFINITY. - -The real cause of love is fourfold: the desire of beauty; our soul's -innate notion of beauty; our soul's affinity with beauty, and our -soul's instinctive sentiment of this affinity.[116] (Therefore as -beauty lies at the root of love, so) ugliness is contrary to nature -and divinity. In fact, when Nature wants to create, she contemplates -what is beautiful, determinate, and comprehended within the -(Pythagorean) "sphere" of the Good. On the contrary, the (Pythagorean) -"indeterminate"[115] is ugly, and belongs to the other system.[117] -Besides, Nature herself owes her origin to the Good, and, therefore, -also to the Beautiful. Now, as soon as one is attracted by an object, -because one is united to it by a secret affinity, he experiences for -the images of this object a sentiment of sympathy. We could not explain -its origin, or assign its cause on any other hypothesis, even were we -to limit ourselves to the consideration of physical love. Even this -kind of love is a desire to procreate beauty,[118] for it would be -absurd to insist that that Nature, which aspires to create beautiful -things, should aspire to procreate that which is ugly. - - -EARTHLY BEAUTY IS AN IMAGE OF INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY. - -Of course, those who, here below, desire to procreate are satisfied in -attaining that which is beautiful here below: namely, the beauty which -shines in images and bodies; for they do not possess that intelligible -Beauty which, nevertheless, inspires them with that very love which -they bear to visible beauty. That is the reason why those who ascend -to the reminiscence of intelligible Beauty love that which they behold -here below only because it is an image of the other.[119] As to those -who fail to rise to the reminiscence of the intelligible Beauty, -because they do not know the cause of their passion, they mistake -visible beauty for that veritable Beauty, and they may even love it -chastely, if they be temperate: but to go as far as a carnal union is -an error, in any case. Hence, it happens that only he who is inspired -by a pure love for the beautiful really loves beauty, whether or not he -have aroused his reminiscence of intelligible Beauty. - - -BEAUTY IS IMMORTAL. - -They who join to this passion as much of a desire for immortality -as our mortal nature admits, seek beauty in the perpetuity of the -procreation which renders man imperishable. They determine to -procreate and produce beauty according to nature; procreating because -their object is perpetuity; and procreating beautifully because they -possess affinity with it. In fact, perpetuity does bear affinity to -beauty; perpetual nature is beauty itself; and such also are all its -derivatives. - - -PASSIONAL LOVE MAY BE ELEVATING, THOUGH OPEN TO MISLEADING TEMPTATIONS. - -Thus he who does not desire to procreate seems to aspire to the -possession of the beautiful in a higher degree. He who desires to -procreate does no doubt desire to procreate the beautiful; but his -desire indicates in him the presence of need, and dissatisfaction with -mere possession of beauty; He thinks he will be procreating beauty, -if he begets on that which is beautiful. They who wish to satisfy -physical love against human laws, and nature, no doubt have a natural -inclination as principle of a triple passion; but they lose their -way straying from the right road for lack of knowledge of the end to -which love was impelling them, of the goal of the aspiration (roused -by) the desire of generation, and of the proper use of the image of -beauty.[120] They really do ignore Beauty itself. They who love -beautiful bodies without desiring to unite themselves to them, love -them for their beauty only. Those who love the beauty of women, and -desire union with them, love both beauty and perpetuity, so long as -this object is not lost from sight. Both of these are temperate, but -they who love bodies for their beauty only are the more virtuous. The -former admire sensual beauty, and are content therewith; the latter -recall intelligible beauty, but, without scorning visible beauty, -regard it as an effect and image of the intelligible Beauty.[121] Both, -therefore, love beauty without ever needing to blush. But, as to those -(who violate laws human and divine), love of beauty misleads them to -falling into ugliness; for the desire of good may often mislead to a -fall into evil. Such is love considered as a passion of the soul. - - -THE PLATONIC MYTH OF LOVE. - -2. Now let us speak of the Love which is considered a deity not only -by men in general, but also by the (Orphic) theologians, and by Plato. -The latter often speaks of Love, son of Venus, attributing to him the -mission of being the chief of the beautiful children (or, boys); and -to direct souls to the contemplation of intelligible Beauty, or, if -already present, to intensify the instinct to seek it. In his "Banquet" -Plato says that Love is born (not of Venus, but) of Abundance and -Need,[122] ... on some birthday (?) of Venus. - - -INTERPRETATION OF THE PLATONIC MYTH. - -To explain if Love be born of Venus, or if he were only born -contemporaneously with his mother, we shall have to study something -about Venus. What is Venus? Is she the mother of Love, or only his -contemporary? As answer hereto we shall observe that there are two -Venuses.[123] The second (or Popular Venus) is daughter of Jupiter -and Dione, and she presides over earthly marriages. The first Venus, -the celestial one, daughter of Uranus (by Plato, in his Cratylus, -interpreted to mean "contemplation of things above"), has no mother, -and does not preside over marriages, for the reason that there are none -in heaven. The Celestial Venus, therefore, daughter of Kronos,[124] -that is, of Intelligence, is the divine Soul, which is born pure of -pure Intelligence, and which dwells above.[125] As her nature does not -admit of inclining earthward, she neither can nor will descend here -below. She is, therefore, a form of existence (or, an hypostasis), -separated from matter, not participating in its nature. This is the -significance of the allegory that she had no mother. Rather than a -guardian, therefore, she should be considered a deity, as she is pure -Being unmingled (with matter), and abiding within herself. - - -LOVE, LIKE HIGHER SOUL, OR LIGHT, IS INSEPARABLE FROM ITS SOURCE. - -In fact, that which is immediately born of Intelligence is pure in -itself, because, by its very proximity to Intelligence, it has more -innate force, desiring to unite itself firmly to the principle that -begat it, and which can retain it there on high. The soul which is thus -suspended to Intelligence could not fall down, any more than the light -which shines around the sun could separate from the body from which it -radiates, and to which it is attached. - - -WHO CELESTIAL VENUS IS. - -Celestial Venus (the universal Soul, the third principle or -hypostasis[126]), therefore, attaches herself to Kronos (divine -Intelligence, the second principle), or, if you prefer to Uranos -(the One, the Good, the first Principle), the father of Kronos. Thus -Venus turns towards Uranos, and unites herself to him; and in the -act of loving him, she procreates Love, with which she contemplates -Uranus. Her activity thus effects a hypostasis and being. Both of them -therefore fix their gaze on Uranus, both the mother and the fair child, -whose nature it is to be a hypostasis ever turned towards another -beauty, an intermediary essence between the lover and the beloved -object. In fact, Love is the eye by which the lover sees the beloved -object; anticipating her, so to speak; and before giving her the -faculty of seeing by the organ which he thus constitutes, he himself -is already full of the spectacle offered to his contemplation. Though -he thus anticipates her, he does not contemplate the intelligible in -the same manner as she does, in that he offers her the spectacle of the -intelligible, and that he himself enjoys the vision of the beautiful, -a vision that passes by him (or, that coruscates around him, as an -aureole). - - -LOVE POSSESSES DIVINE BEING. - -3. We are therefore forced to acknowledge that Love is a hypostasis -and is "being," which no doubt is inferior to the Being from which it -(emanates, that is, from celestial Venus, or the celestial Soul), but -which, nevertheless, still possesses "being." In fact, that celestial -Soul is a being born of the activity which is superior to her (the -primary Being), a living Being, emanating from the primary Being, and -attached to the contemplation thereof. In it she discovers the first -object of her contemplation, she fixes her glance on it, as her good; -and finds in this view a source of joy. The seen object attracts her -attention so that, by the joy she feels, by the ardent attention -characterizing her contemplation of its object, she herself begets -something worthy of her and of the spectacle she enjoys. Thus is -Love born from the attention with which the soul applies herself to -the contemplation of its object, and from the very emanation of this -object; and so Love is an eye full of the object it contemplates, a -vision united to the image which it forms. Thus Love (Eros) seems to -owe its name to its deriving its existence from vision.[127] Even when -considered as passion does Love owe its name to the same fact, for -Love-that-is-a-being is anterior to Love-that-is-not-a-being. However -much we may explain passion as love, it is, nevertheless, ever the love -of some object, and is not love in an absolute sense. - - -CELESTIAL LOVE MUST ABIDE IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WITH THE CELESTIAL SOUL. - -Such is the love that characterizes the superior Soul (the celestial -Soul). It contemplates the intelligible world with it, because Love -is the Soul's companion, being born of the Soul, and abiding in the -Soul, and with her enjoys contemplation of the divinities. Now as we -consider the Soul which first radiates its light on heaven as separate -from matter, we must admit that the love which is connected with her, -is likewise separate from matter. If we say that this pure Soul really -resides in heaven, it is in the sense in which we say that that which -is most precious in us (the reasonable soul) resides in our body, and, -nevertheless, is separate from matter. This love must, therefore, -reside only there where resides this pure Soul. - - -THERE IS A LOWER LOVE, CORRESPONDING TO THE WORLD-SOUL. - -But as it was similarly necessary that beneath the celestial Soul there -should exist the world-Soul,[128] there must exist with it another -love, born of her desire, and being her eye.[129] As this Venus belongs -to this world, and as it is not the pure soul, nor soul in an absolute -sense, it has begotten the Love which reigns here below, and which, -with her, presides over marriages. As far as this Love himself feels -the desire for the intelligible, he turns towards the intelligible the -souls of the young people, and he elevates the soul to which he may be -united, as far as it is naturally disposed to have reminiscence of the -intelligible. Every soul, indeed, aspires to the Good, even that soul -that is mingled with matter, and that is the soul of some particular -being; for it is attached to the superior Soul, and proceeds therefrom. - - -ALL SOULS HAVE THEIR LOVE, WHICH IS THEIR GUARDIAN. - -4. Does each soul include such a love in her being, and possess it -as a hypostatic (form of existence)? Since the world-Soul possesses, -as hypostasis (form of existence), the Love which is inherent in her -being, our soul should also similarly possess, as hypostatic (form of -existence), a love equally inherent in our being. Why should the same -not obtain even with animals? This love inherent to the being of every -soul is the guardian considered to be attached to each individual.[130] -It inspires each soul with the desires natural for her to experience; -for, according to her nature, each soul begets a love which harmonizes -with her dignity and being. As the universal Soul possesses universal -Love, so do individual souls each possess her individual love. But as -the individual souls are not separated from the universal Soul, and -are so contained within her that their totality forms but a single -soul,[131] so are individual loves contained within the universal Love. -On the other hand, each individual love is united to an individual -soul, as universal Love is united to the universal Soul. The latter -exists entire everywhere in the universe, and so her unity seems -multiple; she appears anywhere in the universe that she pleases, under -the various forms suitable to her parts, and she reveals herself, at -will, under some visible form. - - -THE HIGHER LOVE IS DEITY, THE LOWER IS A GUARDIAN. - -We shall have to assume also a multiplicity of Venuses, which, born -with Love, occupy the rank of guardians. They originate from the -universal Venus, from which derive all the individual "venuses," with -the loves peculiar to each. In fact, the soul is the mother of love; -now Venus is the Soul, and Love is the Soul's activity in desiring -the Good. The love which leads each soul to the nature of the Good, -and which belongs to her most exalted part, must also be considered -a deity, inasmuch as it unites the soul to the Good. The love which -belongs to the soul mingled (with matter), is to be considered a -Guardian only. - - -IT IS AN ERROR TO CONSIDER THE LOVE AS IDENTICAL WITH THE WORLD. - -5. What is the nature of this Guardian, and what is, in general, the -nature of guardians, according to (Plato's treatment of the subject in) -his "Banquet"? What is the nature of guardians? What is the nature of -the Love born of Need (Penia) and Abundance (Poros), son of Prudence -(Metis), at the birth of Venus?[132] - -(Plutarch)[133] held that Plato, by Love, meant the world. He should -have stated that Love is part of the world, and was born in it. His -opinion is erroneous, as may be demonstrated by several proofs. First, -(Plato) calls the world a blessed deity, that is self-sufficient; -however, he never attributes these characteristics to Love, which -he always calls a needy being. Further, the world is composed of a -body and a Soul, the latter being Venus; consequently, Venus would -be the directing part of Love; or, if we take the world to mean -the world-Soul, just as we often say "man" when we mean the human -soul,[134] Love would be identical with Venus. Third, if Love, which -is a Guardian, is the world, why should not the other Guardians (who -evidently are of the same nature) not also be the world? In this case, -the world would be composed of Guardians. Fourth, how could we apply to -the world that which (Plato) says of Love, that it is the "guardian of -fair children"? Last, Plato describes Love as lacking clothing, shoes, -and lodging. This could not be applied to the world without absurdity -or ridicule. - - -ALL GUARDIANS ARE BORN OF NEED AND ABUNDANCE. - -6. To explain the nature and birth of Love, we shall have to expound -the significance of his mother Need to his father Abundance, and to -show how such parents suit him. We shall also have to show how such -parents suit the other Guardians, for all Guardians, by virtue of their -being Guardians, must have the same nature, unless, indeed, Guardians -have only that name in common. - - -DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DEITIES AND GUARDIANS. - -First, we shall have to consider the difference between deities and -guardians. Although it be common to call Guardians deities, we are here -using the word in that sense it bears when one says that Guardians and -deities belong to different species. The deities are impassible, while -the Guardians, though eternal, can experience passions; placed beneath -the deities, but next to us, they occupy the middle place between -deities and men.[135] - - -A GUARDIAN IS THE VESTIGE OF A SOUL DESCENDED INTO THE WORLD. - -But how did the Guardians not remain impassible? How did they -descend to an inferior nature? This surely is a question deserving -consideration. We should also inquire whether there be any Guardian in -the intelligible world, whether there be Guardians only here below, -and if deities exist only in the intelligible world. (We shall answer -as follows.) There are deities also here below; and the world is, -as we habitually say, a deity of the third rank, inasmuch as every -supra-lunar being is a divinity. Next, it would be better not to call -any being belonging to the intelligible world a Guardian; and if we -locate the chief Guardian (the Guardian himself) in the intelligible -world, we had better consider him a deity. In the world of sense, all -the visible supra-lunar deities should be called second-rank deities, -in that they are placed below the intelligible deities, and depend -on them as the rays of light from the star from which they radiate. -Last, a Guardian should be defined as the vestige of a soul that had -descended into the world. The latter condition is necessary because -every pure soul begets a deity, and we have already said[136] that the -love of such a soul is a deity. - - -WHY ALL GUARDIANS ARE NOT LOVES. - -But why are not all the Guardians Loves? Further, why are they not -completely pure from all matter? Among Guardians, those are Loves, -which owe their existence to a soul's desire for the good and the -beautiful; therefore, all souls that have entered into this world each -generate a Love of this kind. As to the other Guardians, which are -not born of human souls, they are engendered by the different powers -of the universal Soul, for the utility of the All; they complete and -administer all things for the general good. The universal Soul, in -fact, was bound to meet the needs of the universe by begetting Guardian -powers which would suit the All of which she is the soul. - - -WHY THE GUARDIANS ARE NOT FREE FROM MATTER. - -How do Guardians participate in matter, and of what matter are they -formed? This their matter is not corporeal, otherwise they would be -animals with sensation. In fact, whether they have aerial or fire-like -bodies,[137] they must have had a nature primitively different (from -pure Intelligence) to have ultimately united each with his own body, -for that which is entirely pure could not have immediately united -with a body, although many philosophers think that the being of every -Guardian, as guardian, is united to an air-like or fire-like body. But -why is the being of every Guardian mingled with a body, while the being -of every deity is pure, unless in the first case there be a cause which -produces the mingling (with matter)? This cause must be the existence -of an intelligible matter,[138] so that whatever participates in it -might, by its means, come to unite with sense-matter. - - -SOUL IS A MIXTURE OF REASON AND INDETERMINATION. - -7. Plato's account of the birth of Love[132] is that Abundance -intoxicated himself with nectar, this happening before the day of -wine, which implies that Love was born before the sense-world's -existence. Then Need, the mother of Love, must have participated in -the intelligible nature itself, and not in a simple image of the -intelligible nature; she, therefore, approached (the intelligible -nature) and found herself to be a mixture of form and indeterminateness -(or, intelligible matter).[139] The soul, in fact, containing a -certain indeterminateness before she had reached the Good, but -feeling a premonition of her existence, formed for herself a confused -and indeterminate image, which became the very hypostasis (or, -form of existence) of Love. Thus, as here, reason mingles with the -unreasonable, with an indeterminate desire, with an indistinct (faint -or obscure) hypostatic (form of existence). What was born was neither -perfect nor complete; it was something needy, because it was born from -an indeterminate desire, and a complete reason. As to (Love, which is) -the thus begotten reason, it is not pure, since it contains a desire -that is indeterminate, unreasonable, indefinite; nor will it ever be -satisfied so long as it contains the nature of indetermination. It -depends on the soul, which is its generating principle; it is a mixture -effected by a reason which, instead of remaining within itself, is -mingled with indetermination. Besides, it is not Reason itself, but its -emanation which mingles with indetermination. - - -LOVE IS A GADFLY. - -Love, therefore, is similar to a gad-fly;[140] needy by nature, -it still remains needy, whatever it may obtain; it could never be -satisfied, for this would be impossible for a being that is a mixture; -no being could ever be fully satisfied if by its nature it be incapable -of attaining fulness; even were it satisfied for a moment, it could -not retain anything if its nature made it continue to desire. -Consequently, on one side, Love is deprived of all resources[141] -because of its neediness; and on the other, it possesses the faculty of -acquisition, because of the reason that enters into its constitution. - - -GUARDIANS, AS WELL AS MEN, ARE URGED BY DIVINE DISCONTENT. - -All other Guardians have a similar constitution. Each of them desires, -and causes the acquisition of the good he is destined to procure; that -is the characteristic they have in common with Love. Neither could they -ever attain satisfaction; they still desire some particular good. The -result of this is that the men who here below are good are inspired -by the love of the true, absolute Good, and not by the love of such -and such a particular good.[142] Those who are subordinated to divers -Guardians are successively subordinated to such or such a Guardian; -they let the simple and pure love of the absolute Good rest within -themselves, while they see to it that their actions are presided over -by another Guardian, that is, another power of their soul, which is -immediately superior to that which directs them, or is active within -them.[143] As to the men who, driven by evil impulses, desire evil -things, they seem to have chained down all the loves in their souls, -just as, by false opinions, they darken the right reason which is -innate within them. Thus all the loves implanted in us by nature, -and which conform to nature, are all good; those that belong to the -inferior part of the soul are inferior in rank and power; those that -belong to the superior part are superior; all belong to the being of -the soul. As to the loves which are contrary to nature, they are the -passions of strayed souls, having nothing essential or substantial; for -they are not engendered by the pure Soul; they are the fruits of the -faults of the soul which produces them according to her vicious habits -and dispositions. - - -RIGHT THOUGHTS POSSESS REAL EXISTENCE. - -In general, we might admit that the true goods which are possessed by -the soul when she acts conformably to her nature, by applying herself -to things determined (by reason), constitute real being; that the -others, on the contrary, are not engendered by the very action of -the soul, and are only passions.[144] Likewise, false intellections -lack real being, such as belongs to true intellections, which are -eternal and determinate, possessing simultaneously the intellectual -act, the intelligible existence and essence; and this latter not -only in general, but in each real intelligible being (manifesting?) -Intelligence in each idea. As to us, we must acknowledge that we -possess only intellection and the intelligible; we do not possess them -together (or completely), but only in general; and hence comes our love -for generalities. Our conceptions, indeed, usually trend towards the -general. It is only by accident that we conceive something particular; -when, for instance, we conceive that some particular triangle's angles -amount to two right angles, it is only as a result of first having -conceived that the triangle in general possesses this property. - - -JUPITER, THE GREAT CHIEF, OR THIRD GOD, IS THE SOUL, OR VENUS. - -8. Finally, who is this Jupiter into whose gardens (Plato said that) -Abundance entered? What are these gardens? As we have already agreed, -Venus is the Soul, and Abundance is the Reason of all things. We still -have to explain the significance of Jupiter and his gardens. - -Jupiter cannot well signify anything else than the soul, since we -have already admitted that the soul was Venus. We must here consider -Jupiter as that deity which Plato, in his Phaedrus, calls the Great -Chief;[145] and, elsewhere, as I think, the Third God. He explains -himself more clearly in this respect in the Philebus,[146] where he -says that Jupiter "has a royal soul, a royal intelligence." Since -Jupiter is, therefore, both an intelligence and a soul, since he -forms part of the order of causes, since we must assign him his -rank according to what is best in him; and for several reasons, -chiefly because he is a cause, a royal and directing cause, he must -be considered as the Intelligence. Venus (that is, Aphrodite) which -belongs to him, which proceeds from him, and accompanies him, occupies -the rank of a soul, for she represents in the soul that which is -beautiful, brilliant, pure, and delicate ("abron"); and that is why she -is called "Aphrodite."[147] In fact, if we refer the male deities to -the intellect, and if we consider the female deities as souls--because -a soul is attached to each intelligence--we shall have one more reason -to relate Venus to Jupiter. Our views upon this point are confirmed by -the teachings of the priests and the (Orphic) Theologians, who always -identify Venus and Juno, and who call the evening star, or Star of -Venus, the Star of Juno.[148] - - -JUPITER'S GARDEN IS THE FRUITFUL REASON THAT BEGETS EVERY OBJECT. - -9. Abundance, being the reason of the things that exist in Intelligence -and in the intelligible world--I mean the reason which pours itself -out and develops--trends towards the soul, and exists therein. Indeed, -the (Being) which remains united in Intelligence does not emanate -from a foreign principle, while the intoxication of Abundance is only -a factitious fulness. But what is that which is intoxicated with -nectar? It is Reason that descends from the superior principle to the -inferior; the Soul receives it from Intelligence at the moment of -the birth of Venus; that is why it is said that the nectar flows in -the garden of Jupiter. This whole garden is the glory and splendor -of the wealth (of Intelligence);[149] this glory originates in the -reason of Jupiter; this splendor is the light which the intelligence -of this Deity sheds on the soul. What else but the beauties and -splendors of this deity could the "gardens of Jupiter" signify? On -the other hand, what else can the beauties and splendors of Jupiter -be, if not the reasons[150] that emanate from him? At the same time, -these reasons are called Abundance (Poros, or "euporia"), the wealth -of the beauties which manifest; that is the nectar which intoxicates -Abundance.[151] For indeed what else is the nectar among the deities, -but that which each of them receives? Now Reason is that which is -received from Intelligence by its next inferior principle. Intelligence -possesses itself fully; yet this self-possession does not intoxicate -it, as it possesses nothing foreign thereto. On the contrary, Reason -is engendered by Intelligence. As it exists beneath Intelligence, and -does not, as Intelligence does, belong to itself, it exists in another -principle; consequently, we say that Abundance is lying down in the -garden of Jupiter, and that at the very moment when Venus, being born, -takes her place among living beings. - - -THE OBJECT OF MYTHS IS TO ANALYSE; AND TO DISTINGUISH. - -10. If myths are to earn their name (of something "reserved," or -"silent") they must necessarily develop their stories under the -category of time, and present as separate many things, that are -simultaneous, though different in rank or power. That is the reason -they so often mention the generation of ungenerated things, and that -they so often separate simultaneous things.[152] But after having thus -(by this analysis) yielded us all the instruction possible to them, -these myths leave it to the reader to make a synthesis thereof. Ours is -the following: - - -SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PLATONIC MYTH OF THE GARDEN OF JUPITER. - -Venus is the Soul which coexists with Intelligence, and subsists by -Intelligence. She receives from Intelligence the reasons[150] which -fill her,[153] and embellishes her, and whose abundance makes us see -in the Soul the splendor and image of all beauties. The reasons which -subsist in the Soul are Abundance[154] of the nectar which flows down -from above. Their splendors which shine in the Soul, as in life, -represent the Garden of Jupiter. Abundance falls asleep in this garden, -because he is weighted down by the fulness contained within him. As -life manifests and ever exists in the order of beings, (Plato) says -that the deities are seated at a feast, because they ever enjoy this -beatitude. - - -SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PLATONIC MYTH OF THE BIRTH OF LOVE. - -Since the Soul herself exists, Love also must necessarily exist, and -it owes its existence to the desire of the Soul which aspires to the -better and the Good. Love is a mixed being: it participates in need, -because it needs satisfaction; it also participates in abundance, -because it struggles to acquire good which it yet lacks, inasmuch as -only that which lacked good entirely would cease to seek it. It is, -therefore, correct to call Love the son of Abundance and Need, which -are constituted by lack, desire, and reminiscence of the reasons--or -ideas--which, reunited in the soul, have therein engendered that -aspiration towards the good which constitutes love. Its mother is -Need, because desire belongs only to need, and "need" signifies matter, -which is entire need.[155] Even indetermination, which characterizes -the desire of the good, makes the being which desires the Good play -the part of matter--since such a being would have neither form nor -reason, considered only from its desiring. It is a form only inasmuch -as it remains within itself. As soon as it desires to attain a new -perfection, it is matter relatively to the being from whom it desires -to receive somewhat. - - -LOVE IS BOTH MATERIAL AND A GUARDIAN. - -That is why Love is both a being which participates in matter, and is -also a Guardian born of the soul; it is the former, inasmuch as it -does not completely possess the good; it is the latter, inasmuch as it -desires the Good from the very moment of its birth. - - - - -FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT. - -Of the Nature and Origin of Evils.[156] - - -QUESTIONS TO BE DISCUSSED. - -1. Studying the origin of evils that might affect all beings in -general, or some one class in particular, it is reasonable to begin by -defining evil, from a consideration of its nature. That would be the -best way to discover whence it arises, where it resides, to whom it may -happen, and in general to decide if it be something real. Which one of -our faculties then can inform us of the nature of evil? This question -is not easy to solve, because there must be an analogy between the -knower and the known.[157] The Intelligence and the Soul may indeed -cognize forms and fix their desires on them, because they themselves -are forms; but evil, which consists in the absence of all goods, could -not be described as a form.[158] But inasmuch as there can be but one -single science, to embrace even contraries, and as the evil is the -contrary of the good, knowledge of the good implies that of evil. -Therefore, to determine the nature of evil, we shall first have to -determine that of good, for the higher things must precede the lower, -as some are forms and others are not, being rather a privation of the -good. Just in what sense evil is the contrary of the good must also be -determined; as for instance, if the One be the first, and matter the -last;[159] or whether the One be form, and matter be its absence. Of -this further.[160] - - -A. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIL. - - -A DEFINITION OF EVIL BY CONTRAST WITH THE GOOD. - -2. Let us now determine the nature of the Good, at least so far as is -demanded by the present discussion. The Good is the principle on which -all depends, to which everything aspires, from which everything issues, -and of which everything has need. As to Him, He suffices to himself, -being complete, so He stands in need of nothing; He is the measure[161] -and the end of all things; and from Him spring intelligence, being, -soul, life, and intellectual contemplation. - - -NATURE OF DIVINE INTELLIGENCE. - -All these beautiful things exist as far as He does; but He is the -one Principle that possesses supreme beauty, a principle that is -superior to the things that are best. He reigns royally,[162] in -the intelligible world, being Intelligence itself, very differently -from what we call human intelligences. The latter indeed are all -occupied with propositions, discussions about the meanings of words, -reasonings, examinations of the validity of conclusions, observing -the concatenation of causes, being incapable of possessing truth "a -priori," and though they be intelligences, being devoid of all ideas -before having been instructed by experience; though they, nevertheless, -were intelligences. Such is not the primary Intelligence. On the -contrary, it possesses all things. Though remaining within itself, it -is all things; it possesses all things, without possessing them (in -the usual acceptation of that term); the things that subsist in it not -differing from it, and not being separated from each other. Each one of -them is all the others,[163] is everything and everywhere, although not -confounded with other things, and remaining distinct therefrom. - - -NATURE OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. - -The power which participates in Intelligence (the universal Soul) does -not participate in it in a manner such as to be equal to it, but only -in the measure of her ability to participate therein. She is the first -actualization of Intelligence, the first being that Intelligence, -though remaining within itself, begets. She directs her whole activity -towards supreme Intelligence, and lives exclusively thereby. Moving -from outside Intelligence, and around it, according to the laws -of harmony,[164] the universal Soul fixes her glance upon it. By -contemplation penetrating into its inmost depths, through Intelligence -she sees the divinity Himself. Such is the nature of the serene and -blissful existence of the divinities, a life where evil has no place. - - -EVIL EXISTS AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE DERIVATIVE GOODS OF THE THIRD RANK. - -If everything stopped there (and if there were nothing beyond the three -principles here described), evil would not exist (and there would be -nothing but goods). But there are goods of the first, second and third -ranks. Though all relate to the King of all things,[165] who is their -author, and from whom they derive their goodness, yet the goods of the -second rank relate more specially to the second principle; and to the -third principle, the goods of the third rank. - - -NATURE OF EVIL. - -3. As these are real beings, and as the first Principle is their -superior, evil could not exist in such beings, and still less in Him, -who is superior to them; for all these things are good. Evil then must -be located in non-being, and must, so to speak, be its form, referring -to the things that mingle with it, or have some community with it. This -"non-being," however, is not absolute non-being.[166] Its difference -from being resembles the difference between being and movement or -rest; but only as its image, or something still more distant from -reality. Within this non-being are comprised all sense-objects, and -all their passive modifications; or, evil may be something still more -inferior, like their accident or principle, or one of the things that -contribute to its constitution. To gain some conception of evil it may -be represented by the contrast between measure and incommensurability; -between indetermination and its goal; between lack of form and the -creating principle of form; between lack and self-sufficiency; as the -perpetual unlimited and changeableness; as passivity, insatiableness, -and absolute poverty.[167] Those are not the mere accidents of evil, -but its very essence; all of that can be discovered when any part of -evil is examined. The other objects, when they participate in the evil -and resemble it, become evil without however being absolute Evil. - - -EVIL POSSESSES A LOWER FORM OF BEING. - -All these things participate in a being; they do not differ from it, -they are identical with it, and constitute it. For if evil be an -accident in something, then evil, though not being a real being, must -be something by itself. Just as, for the good, there is the Good in -itself, and the good considered as an attribute of a foreign subject, -likewise, for evil, one may distinguish Evil in itself, and evil as -accident. - - -EVIL AS INFINITE AND FORMLESSNESS IN ITSELF. - -It might be objected that it is impossible to conceive of -indetermination outside of the indeterminate, any more than -determination outside of the determinate; or measure outside of -the measured. (We shall have to answer that) just as determination -does not reside in the determined (or measure in the measured), so -indetermination cannot exist within the indeterminate. If it can exist -in something other than itself, it will be either in the indeterminate, -or in the determinate. If in the indeterminate, it is evident that it -itself is indeterminate, and needs no indetermination to become such. -If, on the other hand (it be claimed that indetermination exist), in -the determinate, (it is evident that) the determinate cannot admit -indetermination. This, therefore, demands the existence of something -infinite in itself, and formless in itself, which would combine all the -characteristics mentioned above as the characteristics of evil.[168] As -to evil things, they are such because evil is mingled with them, either -because they contemplate evil, or because they fulfil it. - - -THE PRIMARY EVIL IS EVIL IN ITSELF. - -Reason, therefore, forces us to recognize as the primary evil, Evil -in itself.[169] (This is matter which is) the subject of figure, -form, determination, and limitation; which owes its ornaments to -others, which has nothing good in itself, which is but a vain image by -comparison with the real beings--in other word, the essence of evil, if -such an essence can exist. - - -MATTER AS THE SECONDARY EVIL. - -4. So far as the nature of bodies participates in matter, it is an -evil; yet it could not be the primary Evil, for it has a certain form. -Nevertheless, this form possesses no reality, and is, besides, deprived -of life (?); for bodies corrupt each other mutually. Being agitated -by an unregulated movement, they hinder the soul from carrying out -her proper movement. They are in a perpetual flux, contrary to the -immutable nature of essences; therefore, they constitute the secondary -evil. - - -THE SOUL IS NOT EVIL BY HERSELF, BUT MAY DEGENERATE BY LOOKING AT -DARKNESS. - -By herself, the soul is not evil, and not every soul is evil. What -soul deserves to be so considered? That of the man who, according to -the expression of Plato,[170] is a slave to the body. In this man it -is natural for the soul to be evil. It is indeed the irrational part -of the soul which harbors all that constitutes evil: indetermination, -excess, and need, from which are derived intemperance, cowardliness, -and all the vices of the soul, the involuntary passions, mothers -of false opinions, which lead us to consider the things we seek or -avoid as goods or evils. But what produces this evil? How shall -we make a cause or a principle of it? To begin with, the soul is -neither independent of matter, nor, by herself, perverse. By virtue -of her union with the body, which is material, she is mingled with -indetermination, and so, to a certain point, deprived of the form which -embellishes and which supplies measure. Further, that reason should be -hindered in its operations, and cannot see well, must be due to the -soul's being hindered by passions, and obscured by the darkness with -which matter surrounds her. The soul inclines[171] towards matter. -Thus the soul fixes her glance, not on what is essence, but on what -is simple generation.[172] Now the principle of generation is matter, -whose nature is so bad that matter communicates it to the beings -which, even without being united thereto, merely look at it. Being -the privation of good, matter contains none of it, and assimilates to -itself all that touches it. Therefore, the perfect Soul, being turned -towards ever pure Intelligence, repels matter, indeterminateness, the -lack of measure, and in short, evil. The perfect Soul does not approach -to it, does not lower her looks; she remains pure and determined by -Intelligence. The soul which does not remain in this state, and which -issues from herself (to unite with the body), not being determined by -the First, the Perfect, is no more than an image of the perfect Soul -because she lacks (good), and is filled with indetermination. The soul -sees nothing but darkness. The soul already contains matter because she -looks at what she cannot see; or, in the every-day expression, because -the soul looks at darkness.[173] - - -PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIL FOR THE SOUL. - -5. Since the lack of good is the cause that the soul looks at darkness, -and mingles therewith, the lack of good and darkness is primary Evil -for the soul. The secondary evil will be the darkness, and the nature -of evil, considered not in matter, but before matter. Evil consists -not in the lack of any particular thing, but of everything in general. -Nothing is evil merely because it lacks a little of being good; its -nature might still be perfect. But what, like matter, lacks good -entirely, is essentially evil, and possesses nothing good? Nature, -indeed, does not possess essence, or it would participate in the good; -only by verbal similarity can we say that matter "is," while we can -truly say that matter "is" absolute "nonentity." A mere lack (of good) -therefore, may be characterized as not being good; but complete lack is -evil; while a lack of medium intensity consists in the possibility of -falling into evil, and is already an evil. Evil, therefore, is not any -particular evil, as injustice, or any special vice; evil is that which -is not yet anything of that, being nothing definite. Injustice and the -other vices must be considered as kinds of evil, distinguished from -each other by mere accidents; as for instance, what occurs by malice. -Besides, the different kinds of evil differ among each other either by -the matter in which evil resides, or by the parts of the soul to which -it refers, as sight, desire, and passion. - - -RELATION BETWEEN EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL EVIL. - -If we grant the existence of evils external to the soul, we shall -be forced to decide about their relation to sickness, ugliness, or -poverty. Sickness has been explained as a lack or excess of material -bodies which fail to support order or measure. The cause of ugliness, -also, has been given as deficient adjustment of matter to form. Poverty -has been described as the need or lack of objects necessary to life as -a result of our union with matter, whose nature is (the Heraclitian and -Stoic) "indigence." From such definitions it would follow that we are -not the principle of evil, and are not evil in ourselves, for these -evils existed before us. Only in spite of themselves would men yield -to vice. The evils of the soul are avoidable, but not all men possess -the necessary firmness. Evil, therefore, is caused by the presence -of matter in sense-objects, and is not identical with the wickedness -of men. For wickedness does not exist in all men; some triumph over -wickedness, while they who do not even need to triumph over it, are -still better. In all cases men triumph over evil by those of their -faculties that are not engaged in matter. - - -IN WHAT SENSE EVILS ARE UNIVERSAL AND UNAVOIDABLE. - -6. Let us examine the significance of the doctrine[174] that evils -cannot be destroyed, that they are necessary, that they do not exist -among the divinities, but that they ever besiege our mortal nature, and -the place in which we dwell.[175] Surely heaven is free from all evil -because it moves eternally with regularity, in perfect order; because -in the stars is neither injustice nor any other kind of evil, because -they do not conflict with each other in their courses; and because -their revolutions are presided over by the most beautiful harmony.[164] -On the contrary, the earth reveals injustice and disorder, (chiefly) -because our nature is mortal, and we dwell in a lower place. But when -Plato,[176] says, that we must flee from here below, he does not mean -that we should leave the earth, but, while remaining therein, practice -justice, piety, and wisdom. It is wickedness that must be fled from, -because wickedness and its consequences are the evil of man. - - -EVIL IS NOT GOOD'S QUALITATIVE, BUT ONLY FIGURATIVE ANTAGONIST. - -When[176] (Theodor) tells (Socrates) that evils would be annihilated -if men practised (Socrates') teachings, the latter answers that that -is impossible, for evil is necessary even if only as the contrary of -good. But how then can wickedness, which is the evil of man, be the -contrary of good? Because it is the contrary of virtue. Now virtue, -without being Good in itself, is still a good, a good which makes us -dominate matter. But how can Good in itself, which is not a quality, -have a contrary? Besides, why need the existence of one thing imply -its contrary? Though we may grant that there is a possibility of the -existence of the contrary of some things--as for instance, that a man -in good health might become sick--there is no such necessity. Nor does -Plato assert that the existence of each thing of this kind necessarily -implies that of its contrary; he makes this statement exclusively of -the Good. But how can there be a contrary to good, if the good be -"being," let alone "above being"?[177] Evidently, in reference to -particular beings, there can be nothing contrary to "being." This is -proved by induction; but the proposition has not been demonstrated -as regards universal Being. What then is the contrary of universal -Being, and first principles in general? The contrary of "being" must -be nonentity; the contrary of the nature of the Good is the nature -and principle of Evil. These two natures are indeed respectively the -principles of goods and of evils. All their elements are mutually -opposed, so that both these natures, considered in their totality, -are still more opposed than the other contraries. The latter, indeed, -belong to the same form, to the same kind, and they have something in -common in whatever subjects they may be. As to the Contraries that are -essentially distinguished from each other, whose nature is constituted -of elements opposed to the constitutive elements of the other, those -Contraries are absolutely opposed to each other, since the connotation -of that word implies things as opposite to each other as possible. -Measure, determination, and the other characteristics of the divine -nature[178] are the opposites of incommensurability, indefiniteness, -and the other contrary things that constitute the nature of evil. Each -one of these wholes, therefore, is the contrary of the other. The being -of the one is that which is essentially and absolutely false; that of -the other is genuine Being; the falseness of the one is, therefore, the -contrary of the truth of the other. Likewise what pertains to the being -of the one is the contrary of what belongs to the being of the other. -We also see that it is not always true to say that there is no contrary -to "being," for we acknowledge that water and fire are contraries, even -if they did not contain the common element of matter, of which heat and -cold, humidity and dryness, are accidents. If they existed alone by -themselves, if their being were complete without any common subject, -there would still be an opposition, and an opposition of "being." -Therefore the things that are completely separate, which have nothing -in common, which are as distant as possible, are by nature contrary. -This is not an opposition of quality, nor of any kinds of beings; it is -an opposition resulting from extreme distance, and from being composed -of contraries, thereby communicating this characteristic to their -elements. - - -GOOD IMPLIES EVIL BECAUSE MATTER IS NECESSARY TO THE WORLD. - -7. Why is the existence of both good and evil necessary? Because -matter is necessary to the existence of the world. The latter is -necessarily composed of contraries, and, consequently, it could not -exist without matter. In this case the nature of this world is a -mixture of intelligence and necessity.[179] What it receives from -divinity are goods; its evils derive from the primordial nature,[180] -the term used (by Plato) to designate matter as a simple substance yet -unadorned by a divinity. But what does he mean by "mortal nature?" -When he says that "evils besiege this region here below," he means the -universe, as appears from the following quotations[181]: "Since you -are born, you are not immortal, but by my help you shall not perish." -In this case it is right to say that evils cannot be annihilated. How -then can one flee from them?[182] Not by changing one's locality, (as -Plato) says, but by acquiring virtue, and by separating from the body, -which, simultaneously, is separation from matter; for being attached -to the body is also attachment to matter. It is in the same sense that -(Plato) explains being separated from the body, or not being separated -from it. By dwelling with the divinities he means being united to the -intelligible objects; for it is in them that inheres immortality. - - -EXISTENCE OF EVIL IS NECESSARY AS LAST MATERIAL DEGREE OF BEING. - -Here follows still another demonstration of the necessity of evil. -Since good does not remain alone, evil must necessarily exist by -issuing from the good.[183] We might express this differently, as -the degradation and exhaustion (of the divine power, which, in the -whole hierarchic series of successive emanations weakens from degree -to degree). There must, therefore, be a last degree of being, beyond -which nothing further can be begotten, and that is evil. Just as the -existence of something after a first (Good) is necessary, so must also -a last degree (of being) be necessary. Now the last degree is matter, -and contains nothing more of the First; (and, as matter and evil are -identical,) the existence of evil is necessary. - - -MATTER IS CAUSE OF EVIL, EVEN IF CORPOREAL. - -8. It may still be objected that it is not matter that makes us wicked; -for it is not matter that produces ignorance and perverted appetites. -If, indeed, these appetites mislead us to evil as a result of the -perversity of the body, we must seek its cause, not in matter, but in -form (in the qualities of the bodies). These, for instance, are heat, -cold, bitterness, pungency, and the other qualities of the bodily -secretions; or, the atonic condition or inflammation of certain organs; -or, certain dispositions which produce the difference of appetites; -and, if you please, false opinions. Evil, therefore, is form rather -than matter. Even under this (mistaken) hypothesis we are none the -less driven to acknowledge that matter is the evil. A quality does not -always produce the same results within or outside of matter; thus the -form of the axe without iron does not cut. The forms that inhere in -matter are not always what they would be if they were outside of it. -The ("seminal) reasons" when inhering in matter are by it corrupted -and filled with its nature. As fire, when separate from matter, does -not burn; so form, when remaining by itself, effects what it would if -it were in matter. Matter dominates any principle that appears within -it, alters it, and corrupts it by imparting thereto its own nature, -which is contrary to the Good. It does not indeed substitute cold -for heat, but it adds to the form--as, for instance, to the form of -fire--its formless substance; to figure adding its shapelessness; to -measure, its excess and lack, proceeding thus until it has degraded -things, transubstantiating them into its own nature. That is the reason -that, in the nutrition of animals, what has been ingested does not -remain what it was before. The foods that enter into the body of a dog, -for instance, are by assimilation transformed into blood and canine -secretions, and, in general, are transformed according to the animal -that receives them. Thus even under the hypothesis that evils are -referred to the body, matter is the cause of evils. - - -MASTERY OF THESE CORPOREAL DISPOSITIONS IS NOT EASY. - -It may be objected that one ought to master these dispositions of the -body. But the principle that could triumph over them is pure only if it -flee from here below. The appetites which exercise the greatest force -come from a certain complexion of the body, and differ according to -its nature. Consequently, it is not easy to master them. There are men -who have no judgment, because they are cold and heavy on account of -their bad constitution. On the contrary, there are others who, because -of their temperament, are light and inconstant. This is proved by the -difference of our own successive dispositions. When we are gorged, we -have appetites and thoughts that differ from those we experience when -starved; and our dispositions vary even according to the degrees of -satiety. - - -DEFINITION OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIL. - -In short, the primary Evil is that which by itself lacks measure. The -secondary evil is that which accidentally becomes formless, either by -assimilation or participation. In the front rank is the darkness; in -the second that which has become obscured. Thus vice, being in the soul -the result of ignorance and formlessness, is of secondary rank. It is -not absolute Evil, because, on its side, virtue is not absolute Good; -it is good only by its assimilation and participation with the Good. - - -B. BY WHAT PART OF OUR NATURE WE COME TO KNOW EVIL. - - -HOW THE SOUL COMES TO KNOW VICE.[184] - -9. How do we get to know vice and virtue? As to virtue, we know it -by the very intelligence and by wisdom; for wisdom knows itself. -But how can we know vice? Just as we observe that an object is not -in itself straight, by applying a rule, so we discern vice by this -characteristic, that it does not comport itself with virtue. But do -we, or do we not have direct intuition thereof? We do not have the -intuition of absolute vice, because it is indeterminate. We know it, -therefore, by a kind of abstraction, observing that virtue is entirely -lacking. We cognize relative vice by noticing that it lacks some part -of virtue. We see a part of virtue, and, by this part, judging what is -lacking in order completely to constitute the form (of virtue), we -call vice what is lacking to it; defining as the indeterminate (evil) -what is deprived of virtue. Similarly with matter. If, for instance, -we notice a figure that is ugly because its ("seminal) reason," being -unable to dominate matter, has been unable to hide its deformity, we -notice ugliness by what is lacking to form. - - -HOW TO SEE MATTER: BY DIALECTIC ABSTRACTION. - -But how do we know that which is absolutely formless (matter)? We make -abstraction of all kinds of form, and what remains we call matter. We -allow ourselves to be penetrated by a kind of shapelessness by the -mere fact that we make abstraction of all shape in order to be able -to represent matter (by a "bastard reasoning").[185] Consequently, -intelligence becomes altered, and ceases to be genuine intelligence -when it dares in this way to look at what does not belong to its -domain.[186] It resembles the eye, which withdraws from light to see -darkness, and which on that very account does not see. Thus, in not -seeing, the eye sees darkness so far as it is naturally capable of -seeing it. Thus intelligence which hides light within itself, and -which, so to speak, issues from itself, by advancing towards things -alien to its nature, without bringing along its own light, places -itself in a state contrary to its being to cognize a nature contrary to -its own.[165] But enough of this. - - -MATTER IS BOTH WITHOUT QUALITIES AND EVIL. - -10. It may well be asked (by Stoics) how matter can be evil, as it is -without quality?[187] That matter possesses no qualities can be said -in the sense that by itself it has none of the qualities it is to -receive, or to which matter is to serve as substrate; but cannot be -said in the sense that it will possess no nature. Now, if it have a -nature, what hinders this nature from being bad, without this being bad -being a quality? Nothing indeed is a quality but what serves to qualify -something different from itself; a quality is, therefore, an accident; -a quality is that which can be mentioned as the attribute of a subject -other than itself.[188] But matter is not the attribute of something -alien; it is the subject to which accidents are related. Therefore, -since every quality is an accident, matter, whose nature is not to be -an accident, is without quality.[189] If, besides, quality (taken in -general), itself be without quality, how could one say of matter, so -far as it has not yet received any quality, that it is in some manner -qualified? It is, therefore, possible to assert of matter that, it both -has no quality, and yet is evil. Matter is not evil because it has a -quality, but just because it has none. If, indeed, matter possessed a -form, it might indeed be bad; but it would not be a nature contrary to -all form. - - -MATTER AS DEPRIVATION IS STILL WITHOUT QUALITIES. - -11. It may be further objected that nature, independent of all form, is -deprivation. Now deprivation is always the attribute of some hypostatic -substance, instead of itself being substance. If then evil consist in -privation, it is the attribute of the substrate deprived of form; and -on that account it could not exist by itself. If it be in the soul -that we consider evil, privation in the soul will constitute vice and -wickedness, and there will be no need to have recourse to anything -external to explain it. - - -MATTER MAY EXIST AND YET BE EVIL. - -Elsewhere[190] it is objected that matter does not exist; here the -attempt is to show that matter is not evil in so far as it exists. (If -this were the case), we should not seek the origin of evil outside of -the soul, but it would be located within the soul herself; there evil -consists in the absence of good. But, evidently, the soul would have -nothing good on the hypothesis that privation of form is an accident -of the being, which desires to receive form; that, consequently, the -privation of good is an accident of the soul; and that the latter -produces within herself wickedness by her ("seminal) reason." Another -result would be that the soul would have no life, and be inanimate; -which would lead to the absurdity that the soul is no soul. - - -THE SOUL CANNOT POSSESS EVIL WITHIN HERSELF. - -We are thus forced to assert, that the soul possesses life by virtue -of her ("seminal) reason," so that she does not, by herself, possess -privation of good. Then she must from intelligence derive a trace of -good, and have the form of good. The soul, therefore, cannot by herself -be evil. Consequently, she is not the first Evil, nor does she contain -it as an accident, since she is not absolutely deprived of good. - - -RELATIVE PRIVATION IS IMPOSSIBLE. - -12. To the objection that in the soul wickedness and evil are not an -absolute privation, but only a relative privation of good, it may -be answered that in this case, if the soul simultaneously, contain -possession and privation of the good, she will have possessed a feeling -mingled of good and evil, and not of unmingled evil. We will still -not have found the first evil, the absolute Evil. The good of the -soul will reside in her essence (being); evil will only be an accident -thereof. - - -EVIL AS AN OBSTACLE TO THE SOUL. - -13. Another hypothesis is that evil owes its character only to its -being an obstacle for the soul, as certain objects are bad for the -eye, because they hinder it from seeing. In this case, the evil of the -soul would be the cause that produces the evil, and it would produce -it without being absolute Evil. If, then, vice be an obstacle for the -soul, it will not be absolute Evil, but the cause of evil, as virtue is -not the good, and only contributes to acquiring it. If virtue be not -good, and vice be not evil, the result is that since virtue is neither -absolute beauty nor goodness, vice is neither absolute ugliness nor -evil. We hold that virtue is neither absolute beauty, nor absolute -goodness, because above and before it is absolute Beauty and Goodness. -Only because the soul participates in these, is virtue or beauty -considered a good. Now as the soul, by rising above virtue, meets -absolute Beauty and Goodness, thus in descending below wickedness the -soul discovers absolute Evil. To arrive at the intuition of evil the -soul, therefore, starts from wickedness, if indeed an intuition of evil -be at all possible. Finally, when the soul descends, she participates -in evil. She rushes completely into the region of diversity,[191] -and, plunging downwards she falls into a murky mire. If she fell into -absolute wickedness, her characteristic would no longer be wickedness, -and she would exchange it for a still lower nature. Even though mingled -with a contrary nature, wickedness, indeed, still retains something -human. The vicious man, therefore, dies so far as a soul can die. Now -when, in connection with the soul, we speak of dying, we mean that -while she is engaged in the body, she penetrates (further) into matter, -and becomes saturated with it. Then, when the soul has left the body, -she once more falls into the same mud until she have managed to return -into the intelligible world, and weaned her glance from this mire. So -long as she remains therein, she may be said to have descended into -hell, and to be slumbering there.[192] - - -WEAKNESS OF THE SOUL AS AN EXPLANATION OF EVIL. - -14. Wickedness is by some explained as weakness of the soul, because -the wicked soul is impressionable, mobile, easy to lead to evil, -disposed to listen to her passions, and equally likely to become angry, -and to be reconciled; she yields inconsiderately to vain ideas, like -the weakest works of art and of nature, which are easily destroyed by -winds and storms. This theory (is attractive, but implies a totally -new conception, that of "weakness" of soul, and it would have) to -explain this "weakness," and whence it is derived; for weakness in a -soul is very different from weakness in a body, but just as in the -body weakness consists in inability to fulfil a function, in being -too impressionable, the same fault in the soul might, by analogy, be -called by the same name, unless matter be equally the cause of both -weaknesses. Reason, however, will have to explore the problem further, -and seek the cause of the soul-fault here called weakness. - - -WEAKNESS OF THE SOUL OCCURS CHIEFLY IN SOULS FALLEN INTO MATTER. - -In the soul weakness does not derive from an excess of density or -rarefaction of leanness or stoutness, nor of any sickness such as -fever. It must be met in souls which are either entirely separated from -matter, or in those joined to matter, or in both simultaneously. Now, -as it does not occur in souls separated from matter, which are entirely -pure, and "winged,"[193] and which, as perfect, carry out their -functions without any obstacle; it remains, that this weakness occurs -in fallen souls, which are neither pure nor purified. For them weakness -consists not in the privation of anything, but in the presence of -something alien, just as, for instance, weakness of the body consists -in the presence of slime or bile. We shall, therefore, be able to -understand clearly the weakness of the soul by ferreting out the cause -of the "fall" of the soul. - - -THE FALL OF THE SOUL AS DESCENT INTO MATTER. - -Just as much as the soul, matter is included within the order of -beings. For both, so to speak, there is but a single locality; for it -would be an error to imagine two different localities, one for matter, -and the other for the soul; such as, for instance, earth might be for -matter, and air for the soul. The expression that "soul occupies a -locality different from matter" means only that the soul is not in -matter; that is, that the soul is not united to matter; that the soul -does not together with matter constitute something unitary; and that -for the soul matter is not a substrate that could contain the soul. -That is how the soul is separated from matter. But the soul possesses -several powers, since she contains the principle (intelligence), the -medium (the discursive reason), and the goal (the power of sensation) -(united to the generative and growing powers). Now, just like the -beggar who presents himself at the door of the banquet-hall, and with -importunity asks to be admitted,[194] matter tries to penetrate into -the place occupied by the soul. But every place is sacred, because -nothing in it is deprived of the presence of the soul. Matter, on -exposing itself to its rays is illuminated by it, but it cannot harbor -the principle that illuminates her (the soul). The latter indeed, does -not sustain matter,[195] although she be present, and does not even see -it, because it is evil. Matter obscures, weakens the light that shines -down upon her, by mingling its darkness with her. To the soul, matter -affords the opportunity of producing generation, by clearing free -access towards matter; for if matter were not present, the soul would -not approach it. The fall of the soul is, therefore, a descent into -matter; hence comes her "weakness," which means, that not all of the -soul's faculties are exercised; because matter hinders their action, -intruding on the place occupied by the soul and forcing her, so to -speak, to retrench. Until the soul can manage to accomplish her return -into the intelligible world, matter degrades what it has succeeded in -abstracting from the soul. For the soul, therefore, matter is a cause -of weakness and vice. Therefore, by herself, the soul is primitively -evil, and is the first evil. By its presence, matter is the cause -of the soul's exerting her generative powers, and being thus led to -suffering; it is matter that causes the soul to enter into dealings -with matter, and thus to become evil. The soul, indeed, would never -have approached matter unless the latter's presence had not afforded -the soul an opportunity to produce generation. - - -NO MORE THAN THE EXISTENCE OF THE GOOD CAN THAT OF MATTER BE DENIED. - -15. Those who claim that matter does not exist, will have to be -referred to our extended discussion[196] where we have demonstrated -the necessity of its hypostatic existence. Those who would assert that -evil does not belong among beings would, if logical, thereby also -deny the existence of the good, and of anything that was desirable; -thereby annihilating desire, as well as aversion, and even thought; -for everybody shares desire for the good, and aversion for the evil. -Thought and knowledge, simultaneously, apply to good and evil; thought -itself is a good. - - -EXPLANATION OF THE EVIL OF THE SOUL. - -We must, therefore, acknowledge the existence first of Good, -unmixed, and then the nature mingled of good and evil; but what most -participates in evil thereby trends towards absolute Evil; and what -participates in it to a less degree thereby trends towards good. For -what is evil to soul? It is being in contact with inferior nature; -otherwise the soul would not have any appetite, pain, or fear. Indeed -fear is felt by us only for the composite (of soul and body), fearing -its dissolution, which thus is the cause of our pains and sufferings. -The end of every appetite is to put aside what troubles it, or to -forestall what might do so. As to sense-representations (fancy[197]), -it is the impression made by an exterior object on the irrational part -of the soul, a part which can receive this impression only because it -is not indivisible. False opinion rises within the soul because it is -no longer within truth, and this occurs because the soul is no longer -pure. On the contrary, the desire of the intelligible leads the soul -to unite intimately with intelligence, as she should, and there remain -solidly entrenched, without declining towards anything inferior. It is -only because of the nature and power of the Good that evil does not -remain pure Evil. (Matter, which is synonymous with evil) is like a -captive which beauty covers with golden chains, so that the divinities -might not see its nakedness, and that men might not be intruded on by -it; or that men, if they must see it, shall be reminded of beauty on -observing an even weakened image thereof. - - - - -SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK THREE. - -Whether Astrology is of any Value.[198] - - -OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE STARS. - -1. It has been said[199] that the course of the stars indicates what is -to happen to each being; though, it does not, as many persons think, -cause every event. To the supporting proofs hereof we are to add now -more precise demonstrations, and new considerations, for the opinion -held about this matter is no trifle. - - -VARIOUS PRETENSIONS OF ASTROLOGY. - -Some people hold that, by their movements, the planets produce not only -poverty and wealth, health and sickness, but even beauty and ugliness; -and, what is more, vices and virtues. At every moment the stars, as if -they were irritated against men, (are said to) force them to commit -actions concerning which no blame attaches to the men who commit them, -since they are compelled thereto by the influence of the planets. It -is even believed that the cause of the planets' doing us evil or good -is not that they love or hate us; but that their dispositions towards -us is good or evil according to the localities through which they -travel. Towards us they change their disposition according as they are -on the cardinal points or in declination therefrom. It is even held -that while certain stars are maleficent, others are beneficent, and -that, nevertheless, the former frequently grant us benefits, while the -latter often become harmful. Their effects differ according to their -being in opposition,[200] just as if they were not self-sufficient, -and as if their quality depended on whether or not they looked at each -other. Thus a star's (influence) may be good so long as it regards -another, and evil when it does so no longer. A star may even consider -another in different manners,[201] when it is in such or such an -aspect.[202] Moreover, the totality of the stars exercises a mingled -influence which differs from the individual influences, just as several -liquors may form a compound possessing qualities differing from either -of the component elements. As these and similar assertions are freely -made, it becomes important to examine each one separately. This would -form a proper beginning for our investigation. - - -ARE STARS INANIMATE? - -2. Should we consider the stars to be animated, or not? If they be -inanimate, they will be able to communicate only cold and heat; that -is, if[203] we grant the existence of cold influences. In this case, -they will limit themselves to modifying the nature of our body, -exercising on us a merely corporeal influence. They will not produce a -great diversity among the bodies, since each of them exercises the same -influence, and since, on the earth, their diverse actions are blended -into a single one, which varies only by the diversity of locality, or -by the proximity or distance of the objects. The same argument would -hold on the hypothesis that the stars spread cold. But I could not -understand how they could render some learned, others ignorant, making -of some grammarians, others orators, musicians or experts in various -arts. How could they exercise an action which would have no relation -to the constitution of the bodies, such as giving us a father, a -brother, a son, or a wife of such or such characteristics, or to make -us successful, or make of us generals or kings?[204] - - -ARE STARS ANIMATED? - -On the contrary hypothesis, that the stars are animated, and act with -reflection, what have we done to them that they should desire to harm -us? Are they not dwellers of a divine region? Are they not themselves -divine? Nor are they subjected to the influences that make men good -or evil, nor could they experience good or evil as a result of our -prosperity or our misfortunes. - - -COULD "CARDINAL POINTS" OR "DECLINATIONS" POSSESS ANY INFLUENCE? - -3. In case, however, that the stars injure us only involuntarily, they -are constrained thereunto by the aspects,[205] and their localities. If -so, they should, all of them, produce the same effects when they find -themselves in the same localities or aspects. But what difference can -occur in a planet according to its location in the zodiac? What does -the zodiac itself experience? In fact, the planets are not located in -the zodiac itself, but above or below it, at great distances. Besides, -in whatever location they are, they all are ever in the heaven. Now it -would be ridiculous to pretend that their effects differed according to -their location in the heaven, and that they have an action differing -according as they rise, culminate, or decline. It would be incredible -that such a planet would feel joy when it culminates, sadness or -feebleness when declining, anger at the rising of some other planet, -or satisfaction at the latter's setting. Can a star be better when -it declines? Now a star culminates for some simultaneously with its -declination for others; and it could not at the same time experience -joy and sadness, anger and benevolence. It is sheer absurdity to -assert that a star feels joy at its rising, while another feels the -same at its setting; for this would really mean that the stars felt -simultaneous joy and sadness. Besides, why should their sadness injure -us? Nor can we admit that they are in turn joyous and sad, for they -ever remain tranquil, content with the goods they enjoy, and the -objects of their contemplation. Each of them lives for itself, finding -its welfare in its own activity, without entering into relations with -us. As they have no dealing with us, the stars exert their influence on -us only incidentally, not as their chief purpose; rather, they bear no -relation whatever to us; they announce the future only by coincidence, -as birds announce it to the augurs. - - -ABSURDITY OF "ASPECTS," AND "HOUSES." - -4. Nor is it any more reasonable to assert that the aspect of one -planet makes one joyous, or the other sad. What animosity could obtain -betwixt the stars? What could be its reason? Why should their condition -be different when they are in trine aspect, or in opposition, or in -quadrature? What reason have we to suppose that one star regards the -other when it is in some particular aspect to it, or that it no more -regards it when it is in the next zodiacal sign, though thus really -closer to it? - -Besides, what is the manner in which the planets exert the influence -attributed to them? How does each exercise its own particular -influence? How do they all, in combination, exert an influence that -differs from this (particular influence)? In fact, they do not hold -deliberations to carry out their decisions on us, each of them yielding -a little of its individual influence. The one does not violently hinder -the action of the other, nor does it condescendingly make concessions -to it. To say that the one is joyous when it is in the "house" of the -other, and that the latter is sad when it is in "house" of the former, -amounts to saying that two men are united by mutual friendship, though -the former love the latter, while the latter hate the former. - - -THE RELATIONS OF SATURN AND MARS QUITE ILLOGICAL. - -5. The cold planet (Saturn) is said to be more beneficent for us when -it is distant, because the evil that it produces on us is said to -consist of its cold effluence; in which case our good should consist -in the zodiacal signs opposite to us. It is also asserted that when -the cold planet (Saturn) is in opposition to the warm planet (Mars), -both become harmful; yet it would seem that their influences should -neutralize each other. Besides, it is held that (Saturn) likes the day, -whose heat renders it favorable to men, while (Mars) likes the night, -because it is fiery, as if in heaven there did not reign a perpetual -day, that is, a continual light; or as if a star could be plunged into -the shadow (projected by the earth) when it is very distant from the -earth. - - -FABULOUS INFLUENCES OF THE MOON. - -It is said that the moon, in conjunction with (Saturn) is favorable -when full, but harmful when otherwise. The opposite, however, ought -to be the truth if the moon possess any influence. In fact, when it -presents a full face, it presents its dark face to the planet above it -(Saturn or Mars); when its disk decreases on our side, it increases on -the other; therefore, it ought to exert a contrary influence when it -decreases on our side, and when it increases on the side of the planet -above it. These phases are of no importance for the moon, inasmuch as -one of its sides is always lit. Nothing can result from it but for -the planet which receives heat from it (Saturn); now this one will be -heated whenever the moon turns towards us its dark side. Therefore, -the moon is good for this planet when it is full towards it, but dark -towards us. Besides, this obscurity of the moon for us can be of -importance only for terrestrial things, not for the celestial[203] ... -(?)[206] ... but if, because of its distance, it does not support the -moon, then it must be in a worse predicament; when the moon is full, it -is sufficient for terrestrial things, even when the moon is distant.... -Finally, when the moon presents its obscure side to the fiery planet -(Mars), it seems beneficent towards us; for the power of this planet, -more fiery than (Saturn), is then sufficient by itself. - - -JUPITER, VENUS, AND MERCURY ALSO CONSIDERED ASTROLOGICALLY. - -Besides, the bodies of the animated beings which move in the heaven may -be of different degrees of heat; none of them is cold, as is witnessed -to by their location. The planet named Jupiter is a suitable mixture of -fire; likewise with Venus. That is why they seem to move harmoniously. -As to the fiery planet Mars, it contributes its share to the mixture -(of the general action of the stars). As to Saturn, its case is -different, because of its distance. Mercury is indifferent, because it -assimilates itself easily to all. - - -THE UNIVERSE AS A SINGLE HARMONY.[207] - -All these planets contribute to the Whole. Their mutual relation, -therefore, is one suitable to the universe, just as the organs of an -animal are shaped to take part in the organism they constitute.[208] -Take, for instance, a part of the body, such as the bile, which serves -both the whole animal that contains it, and its special organ, inasmuch -as it was necessary to arouse courage, and to oppose the injury of -both the whole body, and its special organ. There had to be something -similar (to bile) in the universe; that something sweet should soften -it, that there be parts that would play the role of eyes, and that all -things should possess mutual sympathy by their irrational life.[209] -Thus only is the universe one, and thus only is it constituted by a -single harmony. How then could it be denied that all these things might -be signs, resulting from the laws of analogy? - - -ABSURDITY OF VARIOUS ASTROLOGICAL THEORIES. - -6. Is it not unreasonable to assert that Mars, or Venus, in a certain -position, should produce adulteries? Such a statement attributes to -them incontinence such as occurs only among man, and human passion -to satisfy unworthy impulses. Or again, how could we believe that -the aspects of planets is favorable when they regard each other in -a certain manner? How can we avoid believing that their nature is -determinate? What sort of an existence would be led by the planets -if they occupied themselves with each single one of the innumerable -ever-arising and passing beings, giving them each glory, wealth, -poverty, or incontinence, and impelling all their actions? How could -the single planets effect so many simultaneous results? Nor is it any -more rational to suppose that the planets' actions await the ascensions -of the signs, nor to say that the ascension of a sign contains as many -years as there are degrees of ascension in it. Absurd also is the -theory that the planets calculate, as it were on their fingers, the -period of time when they are to accomplish something, which before was -forbidden. Besides, it is an error not to trace to a single principle -the government of the universe, attributing everything to the stars, -as if there were not a single Chief from which depends the universe, -and who distributes to every being a part and functions suitable to -its nature. To fail to recognize Him, is to destroy the order of -which we form a part, it is to ignore the nature of the world, which -presupposes a primary cause, a principle by whose activity everything -is interpenetrated.[211] - - -THE STARS ARE CHANGING SIGNS BETRAYING THE UNIVERSAL CONSPIRACY OF -PURPOSE. - -7. In fact, we would still have to ask ourselves for the cause of the -events (in our world) even if the stars, like many other things, really -prognosticated future events. We would still have to wonder at the -maintenance of the order without which no events could be prefigured. -We might, therefore, liken the stars to letters, at every moment flung -along the heavens, and which, after having been displayed, continued -in ceaseless motion, so that, while exercising another function in -the universe, they would still possess significance.[212] Thus in -a being animated by a single principle it is possible to judge one -part by another; as it is possible, by the study of the eyes or some -other organ of an individual, to conclude as to his characters, to the -dangers to which he is exposed, and how he may escape them. Just as -our members are parts of our bodies, so are we ourselves parts of the -universe. Things, therefore, are made for each other. Everything is -significant, and the wise man can conclude from one thing to another. -Indeed many habitual occurrences are foreseen by men generally. In -the universe everything is reduced to a single system.[213] To this -co-ordination is due the possibility of birds furnishing us with omens, -and other animals furnishing us with presages. All things mutually -depend from each other. Everything conspires to a single purpose,[214] -not only in each individual, whose parts are perfectly related; but -also in the universe, and that in a higher degree, and far earlier. -This multiple being could be turned into a single universal Living -organism only by a single principle. As in the human body every organ -has its individual function, likewise in the universe each being plays -its individual part; so much the more that they not only form part -of the universe, but that they themselves also form universes not -without importance.[215] All things, therefore, proceed from a single -principle, each plays its individual part, and lends each other mutual -assistance. Neither are they separate from the universe, but they act -and react on each other, each assisting or hindering the other. But -their progress is not fortuitous, nor is it the result of chance. They -form a series, where each, by a natural bond, is the effect of the -preceding one, and the cause of the following one.[216] - - -THERE IS A NATURAL LAW WHICH DIRECTS THE SOUL. - -8. When the soul applies herself to carry out her proper -function[217]--for the soul effects everything, as far as she plays -the part of a principle--she follows the straight road;[218] when she -loses her way[219] the divine justice subjugates her to the physical -order which reigns in the universe,[220] unless the soul succeed in -liberating herself. The divine justice[221] reigns ever, because -the universe is directed by the order and power of the dominating -principle (the universal Soul).[222] To this is joined the co-operation -of the planets which are important parts of the heaven, either by -embellishing it, or by serving as signs. Now they serve as signs for -all things that occur in the sense-world. As to their potency, they -should be credited only with what they effect indisputably. - - -WEALTH, POVERTY, AND VICES ARE THE RESULT OF EXTERNAL CIRCUMSTANCES. - -As to us, we fill the functions of the soul in accordance with nature -when we do not stray into the multiplicity contained in the universe. -When we do stray therein, we are punished for it both by the straying -itself, and by a less happy fate thereafter. Wealth and poverty, -therefore, happen to us as effects of the operation of exterior things. -As to the virtues and vices, virtues are derived from the primitive -nature of the soul, while the vices result from dealings of the soul -with exterior things. But this has been treated of elsewhere.[223] - - -SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SPINDLE OF THE FATES. - -9. This brings us to a consideration of the spindle, which, according -to the ancients, is turned by the Fates, and by which Plato -signifies[224] that which, in the evolution of the world, moves, and -that which is immovable. According to (Plato), it is the Fates, and -their mother Necessity, which turn this spindle, and which impress it -with a rotary motion in the generation of each being. It is by this -motion that begotten beings arrive at generation. In the Timaeus[225] -the (Intelligence, or) divinity which has created the universe gives -the (immortal) principle of the soul, (the reasonable soul), and the -deities which revolve in the heaven add (to the immortal principle of -the soul) the violent passions which subject us to Necessity, namely, -angers, desires, sufferings, and pleasures; in short, they furnish us -with that other kind of soul (the animal nature, or vegetable soul) -from which they derive these passions. Plato thus seems to subject us -to the stars, by hinting that we receive from them our souls,[227] -subordinating to the sway of Necessity when we descend here below, -both ourselves and our morals, and through these, the "actions" and -"passions"[228] which are derived from the passional habit[215] of the -soul (the animal nature).[229] - - -WHICH OF OUR TWO SOULS IS THE GENUINE INDIVIDUALITY? - -Our genuine selves are what is essentially "us"; we are the principle -to which Nature has given the power to triumph over the passions. For, -if we be surrounded by evils because of the body, nevertheless, the -divinity has given us virtue, which "knows of no master"[223] (is not -subject to any compulsion). Indeed we need virtue not so much when we -are in a calm state, but when its absence exposes us to evils. We must, -therefore, flee from here below;[230] we must divorce ourselves from -the body added to us in generation, and apply ourselves to the effort -to cease being this animal, this composite in which the predominant -element is the nature of the body, a nature which is only a trace of -the soul, and which causes animal life[231] to pertain chiefly to the -body. Indeed, all that relates to this life is corporeal. The other -soul (the reasonable soul, which is superior to the vegetative soul), -is not in the body; she rises to the beautiful, to the divine, and to -all the intelligible things, which depend on nothing else. She then -seeks to identify herself with them, and lives conformably to the -divinity when retired within herself (in contemplation). Whoever is -deprived of this soul (that is, whoever does not exercise the faculties -of the reasonable soul), lives in subjection to fatality.[222] Then -the actions of such a being are not only indicated by the stars, but -he himself becomes a part of the world, and he depends on the world of -which he forms a part. Every man is double,[232] for every man contains -both the composite (organism), and the real man (which constitutes the -reasonable soul). - - -NUMENIAN DOUBLENESS, MIXTURE, AND DIVISIBLE SOUL. - -Likewise the universe is a compound of a body and of a Soul intimately -united to it, and of the universal Soul, which is not in the Body, and -which irradiates the Soul united to the Body.[233] There is a similar -doubleness in the sun and the other stars, (having a soul united to -their body, and a soul independent thereof). They do nothing that is -shameful for the pure soul. The things they produce are parts of the -universe, inasmuch as they themselves are parts of the universe, and -inasmuch as they have a body, and a soul united to this body; but their -will and their real soul apply themselves to the contemplation of the -good Principle. It is from this Principle, or rather from that which -surrounds it, that other things depend, just as the fire radiates its -heat in all directions, and as the superior Soul (of the universe) -infuses somewhat of her potency into the lower connected soul. The evil -things here below originate in the mixture inhering in the nature of -this world. After separating the universal Soul out of the universe, -the remainder would be worthless. Therefore, the universe is a deity if -the Soul that is separable from it be included within its substance. -The remainder constitutes the guardian which (Plato) names the Great -Guardian,[234] and which, besides, possesses all the passions proper to -guardians. - - -STARS ANNOUNCE EVENTS BECAUSE OF THE SOUL'S MANY IMPERFECTIONS, AND -ACCIDENTS. - -10. Under these circumstances, we must acknowledge that events are, by -the stars, announced, though not produced, not even by their (lower) -corporeal soul. By their lower part, their body,[235] they produce only -the things which are passions of the universe. Besides, we shall have -to acknowledge, that the soul, even before entering into generation, -while descending here below, brings something which she has by herself; -for she would not enter into a body unless she had a great disposition -to suffer.[236] We must also admit that while passing into a body the -soul is exposed to accidents, inasmuch as she is subjected to the -course of the universe, and as this very course contributes to the -production of what the universe is to accomplish; for the things which -are comprised in the course of the universe act as its parts. - - -THE INFLUENCES OF THE STARS DEGENERATE AS THEY REACH US. - -11. We must also reflect that the impressions which we derive from -the stars do not reach us in the same condition in which they leave -them. Just as fire in us is much degenerated from that in the heaven, -so sympathy, degenerating within the receiving person, begets an -unworthy affection. Courage produces in those who do not possess it in -the proper proportions, either violence or cowardliness. Love of the -beautiful and good thus becomes the search for what only appears so. -Discernment, in undergoing this degradation, becomes the trickiness -which seeks to equal it, without succeeding in doing so. Thus all these -qualities become evil in us, without being such in the stars. All the -impressions we receive thereof are in us not such as they are in the -stars; besides they are still further degraded by mingling with the -bodies, with matter, and with each other.[237] - - -MINGLED STAR ACTION ONLY PROMOTES OR RETARDS PROCESSES ALREADY NATURAL. - -12. The influences proceeding from the stars commingle; and this -mixture modifies all generated things, determining their nature and -qualities.[238] It is not the celestial influence which produces the -horse, it is limited to exercising an influence upon him; for,[239] -the horse is begotten from horse, man from man; the sun can only -contribute to their formation. Man is born from the (seminal logos), or -reason of man; but the circumstances may be favorable or unfavorable -to him. In fact, a son resembles the father, though he may be formed -better or worse; but never does he entirely detach himself from matter. -Sometimes, however, the matter so prevails over nature that the being -is imperfect because the form does not dominate.[240] - - -DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT IS AND WHAT IS NOT PRODUCED BY THE STARS. - -13. We must now distinguish, decide and express the origin of various -things, inasmuch as there are some things that are produced by the -course of the stars, and others that are not. Our principle is that the -Soul governs the universe by Reason, just as each animal is governed by -the principle (the reason) which fashions his organs, and harmonizes -them with the whole of which they are parts;[241] now the All contains -everything, while the parts contain only what is individual to them. As -to exterior influences, some assist, while others oppose the tendency -of nature. All things are subordinated to the All because they are -parts of it; by their co-operation, each with its own nature and their -particular tendencies they form the total life of the universe.[242] -The inanimate beings serve as instruments for the others that set them -in motion by a mechanical impulse. Irrational animated beings move -indeterminately; such as horses attached to a chariot before the driver -indicates which direction they are to follow; for they need the whip to -be directed. The nature of the reasonable animal contains the directing -driver;[243] if the driver be skilful, it follows the straight road, -instead of going blindly at chance, as often happens. Beings gifted -with reason and those that lack it are both contained within the -universe, and contribute to the formation of the whole. Those which are -more powerful, and which occupy a more elevated rank do many important -things, and co-operate in the life of the universe where their part is -active, rather than passive. The passive ones act but little. Those of -intermediary rank are passive in regard to some, and often active in -regard to others, because they themselves possess the power of action -and production (the stars, the brutes, and men.[244]). - - -THE STARS AS THE FOLLOWERS OF THE UNIVERSAL KING. - -The universe leads an universal and perfect life, because the good -principles (the star-Souls) produce excellency, that is, the more -excellent part in every object.[245] These principles are subordinate -to the Soul that governs the universe, as soldiers are to their -general; consequently, (Plato) describes this by the figure of -the attendants of Jupiter (the universal Soul) advancing to the -contemplation of the intelligible world. - - -MEN AS SOULS OF THE SECOND RANK. - -The beings which possess a nature inferior to the star-Souls, that -is, men, occupy the second rank in the universe, and play in it the -same part played in us by the second power of the soul (the discursive -reason). The other beings, that is, the animals, occupy about the same -rank occupied in us by the lowest (or vegetative) power of the soul; -for all these powers in us are not of equal rank.[246] Consequently, -all the beings which are in the heaven, or which are distributed in -the universe are animated beings, and derive their life from the total -Reason of the universe (because it contains the "seminal reasons" -of all living beings). None of the parts of the universe, whatever -be its greatness, possesses the power of altering the reasons, nor -the beings engendered with the co-operation of these reasons. It may -improve or degrade these beings, but cannot deprive them of their -individual nature. It degrades them by injuring either their body or -their soul; which occurs when an accident becomes a cause of vice for -the soul which partakes of the passions of the body (the sensitive and -vegetative soul) and which is given over to the inferior principle (to -the animal) by the superior principle (the reasonable soul); or when -the body, by its poor organization, hinders the actions in which the -soul needs its co-operation; then it resembles a badly attuned lyre, -which is incapable of producing sounds which could form a perfect -harmony.[247] - - -ANY OCCURRENCE MAY BE DUE TO MANY DIFFERENT CAUSES. - -14. Poverty, wealth, glory, and authoritative positions may have -many different causes. If a man derive his wealth from his parents, -the stars have only announced that he would be rich; and they would -have only announced his nobility if he owed his wealth to his birth. -If a man acquire wealth by his merit, in some way in which his body -contributed thereto, the causes of his bodily vigor co-operated in his -fortune; first his parents, then his fatherland, if it be possessed of -a good climate, and last the fertility of the soil.[248] If this man -owe his wealth to virtue, this source should be considered exclusive; -and likewise with the transitory advantages he may by divine favor -possess. Even if his wealth be derived from virtuous persons, still, -in another way, his fortune is due to virtue. If his wealth were -derived from evil men, though by a just means, yet the wealth proceeds -from a good principle which was active in them. Finally, if a man who -has amassed wealth be evil, the cause of his fortune is this very -wickedness, and the principle from which it derives; even those who may -have given him money must be included in the order of its causes. If a -man owe his wealth to labor, such as agricultural work, the causes of -the wealth include the care of the ploughman and the co-operation of -exterior circumstances. Even if he found a treasure, it is something -in the universe which contributed thereto. Besides, this discovery may -have been foretold; for all things concatenate with everything else, -and, consequently, announce each other. If a man scatter his wealth, -he is the cause of their loss; if his wealth be taken from him, the -cause is the man who takes it. Many are the contributory causes of a -shipwreck. Glory may be acquired justly or unjustly. Just glory is due -to services rendered, or to the esteem of other people. Unjust glory -is caused by the injustice of those who glorify that man. Deserved -power is due to the good sense of the electors, or to the activity of -the man who acquired it by the co-operation of his friends, or to -any other circumstance. A marriage is determined by a preference, or -by some accidental circumstance, or by the co-operation of several -circumstances. The procreation of children is one of its consequences; -it occurs in accordance with the ("seminal) reason," in case it meet no -obstacle; if it be defective, there must be some interior defect in the -pregnant mother, or the fault lies in the impotence of the father. - - -A SOUL'S DESTINY DEPENDS ON THE CONDITION OF THE UNIVERSE AT BIRTH. - -15. Plato[249] speaks of the lots, and conditions chosen by one turn -of the spindle (of Clotho); he speaks also of a guardian who helps -each man to fulfil his destiny. These conditions are the disposition -of the universe at the time of the soul's entrance into the body, the -nature of their body, parents and fatherland; in short, the aggregate -of external circumstances. Evidently all these things, in detail as -well as in totality, are simultaneously produced and related by one -of the Fates, namely Clotho. Lachesis then presents the conditions -to the souls. Finally Atropos renders the accomplishment of all the -circumstances of each destiny irrevocable. - - -HOW SOME MEN MAY MASTER THEIR FATE: BY SELF-VICTORY. - -Some men, fascinated by the universe and exterior objects, completely -or partially abdicate their freedom.[250] Others, dominating their -environment, raise their head to the sky, and freeing themselves from -exterior circumstances, release that better part of their souls which -forms their primitive being. As to the latter point, it would be wrong -to think that the nature of the soul was determined by the passions -aroused in her by external objects, and that she did not possess her -own individual nature. On the contrary, as she plays the part of a -principle, she possesses, much more than other things, faculties -suitable to accomplish actions suitable to her nature. Since she is -a being, the soul necessarily possesses appetites, active faculties, -and the power of living well.[251] The aggregate (of the soul and -body, the organism) depends on the nature which formed it, and from -it receives its qualities and actions. If the soul separate from the -body, she produces actions which are suitable to her nature, and which -do not depend from the body; she does not appropriate the credit for -the passions of the body, because she recognizes the difference of her -nature.[252] - - -EXACT PSYCHOLOGY AT THE ROOT OF PHILOSOPHY. - -16. What is the mingled, and what is the pure part of the soul? What -part of the soul is separable? What part is not separable so long as -the soul is in a body? What is the animal? This subject will have to be -studied elsewhere,[253] for there is practically no agreement on the -subject. For the present, let us explain in which sense we above said -that the soul governs the universe by Reason. - - -IS THE UNIVERSAL SOUL CREATIVE, BUT NOT PRESERVATIVE? - -Does the universal Soul form all the beings successively, first man, -then the horse, then some other animal, and last the wild beasts?[254] -Does she begin by producing earth and fire; then, seeing the -co-operation of all these things which mutually destroy or assist each -other, does she consider only their totality and their connections, -without regarding the accidents which occur to them later? Does she -limit herself to the reproduction of preceding generations of animals, -and does she leave these exposed to the passions with which they -inspire each other? - - -DETERMINISM IMPLIES DEGENERATION OF RACES. - -Does the "reason" of each individual contain both his "actions" and -"reactions"[215] in a way such that these are neither accidental nor -fortuitous, but necessary?[255] Are these produced by the reasons? Or -do the reasons know them, without producing them? Or does the soul, -which contains the generative "reasons,"[256] know the effects of all -her works by reasoning according to the following principle, that the -concourse of the same circumstances must evidently produce the same -effects? If so, the soul, understanding or foreseeing the effects of -her works, by them determines and concatenates all the events that -are to happen. She, therefore, considers all the antecedents and -consequents, and foresees what is to follow from what precedes.[257] -It is (because the beings thus proceed from each other) that the -races continually degenerate. For instance, men degenerate because in -departing continually and unavoidably (from the primitive type) the -("seminal) reasons" yield to the "passions" of matter.[258] - - -THE SOUL DOES NOT CAUSE PASSIONS, WHICH ARISE FROM THE SEMINAL REASONS. - -Is the soul the cause of these passions, because she begets the beings -that produce them? Does the soul then consider the whole sequence -of events, and does she pass her existence watching the "passions" -experienced by her works? Does she never cease thinking of the latter, -does she never put on them the finishing touch, regulating them so that -they should always go well?[259] Does she resemble some farmer who, -instead of limiting himself to sowing and planting, should ceaselessly -labor to repair the damage caused by the rains, the winds, and the -storms? Unless this hypothesis be absurd, it must be admitted that -the soul knows in advance, or even that the ("seminal)[260] reasons" -contain accidents which happen to begotten beings, that is, their -destruction and all the effects of their faults.[261] In this case, -we are obliged to say that the faults are derived from the ("seminal) -reasons", although the arts and their reasons contain neither error, -fault, nor destruction of a work of art.[262] - - -THE UNIVERSE IS HARMONY,[207] IN SPITE OF THE FAULTS IN THE DETAILS. - -It might here be objected that there could not be in the universe -anything bad or contrary to nature; and it must be acknowledged that -even what seems less good still has its utility. If this seem to -admit that things that are less good contribute to the perfection -of the universe, and that there is no necessity that all things be -beautiful,[263] it is only because the very contraries contribute -to the perfection of the universe, and so the world could not exist -without them. It is likewise with all living beings. The ("seminal) -reason" necessarily produces and forms what is better; what is -less good is contained in the "potentiality" of the "reasons," and -"actualized" in the begotten beings. The (universal) Soul has, -therefore, no need to busy herself therewith, nor to cause the -"reasons" to become active. For the "reasons" successfully subdue -matter to what is better (the forms), even though matter alters what it -receives by imparting a shock to the "reasons" that proceed from the -higher principles. All things, therefore, form a harmonious totality -because they simultaneously proceed from matter, and the "reasons" -which beget them. - - -THE METHOD OF CREATION. - -17. Let us examine if the "reasons" contained in the Soul are -thoughts. How could the Soul produce by thoughts? It is the Reason -which produces in matter; but the principle that produces naturally is -neither a thought nor an intuition, but a power that fashions matter -unconsciously, just as a circle gives water a circular figure and -impression. Indeed, the natural generative power has the function of -production; but it needs the co-operation of the governing (principle) -of the Soul, which forms and which causes the activity of the -generative soul engaged in matter. If the governing power of the Soul -form the generative soul by reasoning, it will be considering either -another object, or what it possesses in herself. If the latter be the -case, she has no need of reasoning,[264] for it is not by reasoning -that the Soul fashions matter, but by the power which contains the -reasons, the power which alone is effective, and capable of production. -The Soul, therefore, produces by the forms. The forms she transmits -are by her received from the Intelligence. This Intelligence, however, -gives the forms to the universal Soul which is located immediately -below her, and the universal Soul transmits them to the inferior soul -(the natural generative power), fashioning and illuminating her. The -inferior soul then produces, at one time without meeting any obstacles, -at others, when doing so, although, in the latter case, she produces -things less perfect. As she has received the power of production, and -as she contains the reasons which are not the first (the "seminal -reasons," which are inferior to the Ideas) not only does she, by virtue -of what she has received, produce, but she also draws from herself -something which is evidently inferior (matter).[265] It doubtless -produces a living being (the universe), but a living being which is -less perfect, and which enjoys life much less, because it occupies -the last rank, because it is coarse and hard to manage, because -the matter which composes it is, as it were, the bitterness or the -superior principles, because it spreads its bitterness around her, and -communicates some of it to the universe. - - -EVILS ARE NECESSARY TO THE PERFECTION OF THE UNIVERSE. - -18. Must the evils in the universe be considered as necessary,[266] -because they are the consequences of the superior principles? Yes, -for without them the universe would be imperfect. The greater number -of evils, if not all of them, are useful to the universe; such as -the venomous animals; though they often ignore their real utility. -Even wickedness is useful in certain respects, and can produce many -beautiful things; for example, it leads to fine inventions, it forces -men to prudence, and does not let them fall asleep in an indolent -security.[267] - - -PICTURE OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNIVERSE. - -Under these circumstances, it is plain that the universal Soul ever -contemplates the better principles, because it is turned towards the -intelligible world, and towards the divinity. As she fills herself with -God, and is filled with God, she, as it were, overflows over her image, -namely, the power which holds the last rank (the natural generative -power), and which, consequently, is the last creative power. Above -this creative power is the power of the Soul which immediately receives -the forms from the Intelligence. Above all is the Intelligence, the -Demiurge, who gives the forms to the universal Soul, and the latter -impresses its traces on the third-rank power (the natural generative -power).[268] This world, therefore, is veritably a picture which -perpetually pictures itself. The two first principles are immovable; -the third is also immovable (in essence); but it is engaged in matter, -and becomes immovable (only) by accident. As long as the Intelligence -and the Soul subsist, the "reasons" flow down into this image of the -Soul (the natural generative power); likewise, so long as the sun -subsists, all light emanates therefrom.[269] - - - - -FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK ONE. - -The Organism and the Self.[270] - - -PSYCHOLOGIC DISTINCTIONS IN SOUL. - -1. To what part of our nature do pleasure and grief, fear and -boldness desire and aversion, and, last, pain, belong? Is it to -the soul (herself),[271] or to the soul when she uses the body as an -instrument,[272] or to some third (combination) of both? Even the -latter might be conceived of in a double sense: it might be either -the simple mixture of the soul and the body,[273] or some different -product resulting therefrom.[274] The same uncertainty obtains -about the products of the above mentioned experiences: namely, -passions,[275] actions, and opinions. For example, we may ask whether -ratiocination[276] and opinion both, belong to the same principle as -the passions; or whether only one of them does; in which case the -other would belong to some other principle. We should also inquire -concerning the nature and classification of thought.[277] Last we -should study the principle that undertakes this inquiry and which comes -to some conclusion about it. But, first of all, who is the agent, who -feels? This is the real starting point: for even passions are modes of -feeling, or at least they do not exist without it.[278] - - -THE SOUL AS A COMPOSITE AGGREGATE. - -2. Let us first examine the soul (herself). Is there any difference -between the soul and the soul-essence? If there be a difference, -the soul must be a composite aggregate: and it should no longer be a -matter of surprise that both she and her essence, at least so far as -she admits thereof, together experience the above mentioned passions, -and in general the habits, and better or worse dispositions. But, on -the contrary, if, soul and soul-essence be identical, then the soul -should be a form which would be unreceptive for all these energies of -essence, which on the contrary she imparts to other things, possessing -in herself a connate energy which our reason reveals in her. In this -case we must acknowledge that she is immortal, inasmuch as the immortal -and undecaying must be impassible, giving to others without receiving -anything in return from them; or at least, deriving nothing but from -the superior (or anterior) principles, from which she is not cut off, -inasmuch as they are better. - - -THE SOUL IS NOT ESSENCE. - -A being that were so unreceptive to anything external would have no -ground for fear of anything external. Fear might indeed be natural -to something. Neither would she be bold, for this sentiment, implies -shelter from what is terrifying. As to such desires which are satisfied -by the emptying or filling of the body, they belong only to some nature -foreign enough to be emptied or filled. How could she participate in a -mixture, inasmuch as the essential is unmingled? Further she would not -wish to have anything introduced (in herself), for this would imply -striving to become something foreign to herself. She would also be far -from suffering, for how could she grieve, and about what? For that -which is of simple being is self-sufficient, in that she remains in her -own being. Neither will she rejoice at any increase, as not even the -good could happen to her. What she is, she ever will be. Nor could we -attribute to the pure soul sensation, ratiocination or opinion; for -sensation is the perception, of a form or of an impassible body; and -besides ratiocination and opinion (depend) on sensation. We shall, -however, have to examine whether or no we should attribute to the -soul thought; also, whether pure pleasure can affect a soul while she -remains alone.[279] - - -THE SOUL USES THE BODY AS TOOL. - -3. Whether the soul, according to her being, be located in the body, -above or within this latter, the soul forms with the body an entity -called (a "living being" or) organism.[280] In this case, the soul -using the body as a tool is not forced to participate in its passions, -any more than workmen participate in the experiences of their tools. As -to sensations, of course, the soul must perceive them, since in order -to use her instrument, the soul must, by means of sensation, cognize -the modifications that this instrument may receive from without. Thus -seeing consists of using the eyes; and the soul at the same time feels -the evils which may affect the sight. Similar is the case with griefs, -pains and any corporeal exigency; also with the desires which arise -from the soul's need to take recourse to the ministry of the body. But -how do passions from the body penetrate into the soul? For a body could -communicate her own properties to some other body; but how could she do -so to a soul? - - -SEPARATION OF SOUL FROM BODY. - -Such a process would imply that one individual suffers when an entirely -different individual is affected. There must be a distinction between -them so long as we consider the former the user, and the latter the -used; and it is philosophy,[281] that produces this separation by -giving to the soul the power of using the body as a tool. - - -PRIMITIVE RELATION BETWEEN SOUL AND BODY. - -But what was the condition of the soul before her separation from the -body by philosophy? Was she mingled with the body? If she were mingled -with it, she must either have been formed[282] by mixing;[271] or she -was spread all over the body; or she was[283] a form interwoven with -the body; or she was a form governing the body[284] as a pilot governs -the ship;[285] or[286] was partly mingled with, and partly separated -from, the body. (In the latter case) I would call the independent -part that which uses the body as a tool, while the mingled part is -that which lowers itself to the classification or rank of instrument. -Now philosophy raises the latter to the rank of the former; and the -detached part turns her away, as far as our needs allow, from the body -she uses, so that she may not always have to use the body. - - -CONSEQUENCES OF MIXTURE OF SOUL AND BODY. - -4. Now let us suppose the soul is mingled with the body. In this -mixture, the worse part, or body, will gain, while the soul will lose. -The body will improve by participation with the soul; and the soul will -deteriorate by association with death and irrationality. Well, does -the soul, in somewhat losing life, gain the accession of sensation? -On the other hand, would not the body, by participation in life, gain -sensation and its derived passions? It is the latter, then, which will -desire, inasmuch as it will enjoy the desired objects, and will feel -fear about them. It is the latter which may be exposed to the escape of -the objects of its desire, and to decay.[287] - - -MIXTURE OF SOUL AND BODY. - -We will set aside as impossible the mixture of two incommensurables, -such as a line and the color called white. A mixture of the soul -and body, which must imply their commensurability, would demand -explanation. Even if the soul interpenetrate the body, the soul -need not share the body's passions, for the interpenetrating medium -may remain impassible; as light, which remains such in spite of its -diffusion.[288] Thus the soul might remain a stranger to the body's -passions, though diffused through it, and need not necessarily undergo -its passions. - - -ARISTOTELIAN HYPOTHESIS CONSIDERED. - -Should we say that the soul is in the body, as form in matter? In this -case, she is "being," and she would be a separable form. If then[289] -she be in the body as, in the case of the axe, the schematic figure is -in the iron, so as by her own proper virtue, to form the power of doing -what iron thus formed accomplishes, we will have all the more reason to -attribute the common passions to the body, which is[290] an organized -physical tool possessing potential life. For if as (Plato) says[291] -it be absurd to suppose that it is the soul that weaves, it is not -any more reasonable to attribute the desires and griefs to the soul; -rather, by far, to the living organism. - - -THE LIVING ORGANISM. - -5. The "living organism" must mean either the thus organized body, -or the common mixture of soul and body, or some third thing which -proceeds from the two first. In either of these three cases the soul -will have to be considered impassible, while the power of experiencing -passions will inhere in something else; or the soul will have to share -the body's passions, in which case the soul will have to experience -passions either identical or analogous to those of the body, so that to -a desire of the animal there will correspond an act or a passion of the -concupiscible appetite. - - -REFUTATION OF THE (JAMES-LANGE) THEORY OF EMOTIONS. - -We shall later on consider the organized body; here we must find how -the conjunction of soul and body could experience suffering. The -theory that the affection of the body modifies it so as to produce a -sensation which itself would end in the soul, leaves unexplained the -origin of sensation. To the theory that suffering has its principle in -this opinion or judgment, that a misfortune is happening to ourselves -or some one related to us, whence results disagreeable emotion first -in the body, and then in the whole living organism,[292] there is this -objection, that it is yet uncertain to which opinion belongs; to the -soul, or to the conjunction of soul and body. Besides, the opinion -of the presence of an evil does not always entail suffering; it is -possible that, in spite of such an opinion, one feels no affliction; -as, for instance, one may not become irritated at believing oneself -scorned; or in experiencing no desire even in the expectation of some -good. - - -NOT ALL AFFECTIONS COMMON TO SOUL AND BODY. - -How then arise these affections common to the soul and the body? Shall -we then say that desire derives from the desire-appetite,[293] anger -from the anger-appetite, or in short, every emotion or affliction from -the corresponding appetite? But even so, they will not be common, and -they will belong exclusively to the soul, or to the body. There are -some whose origin needs the excitation of blood and bile, and that the -body be in some certain state which excites desire, as in physical -love. On the contrary, however, the desire of goodness is no common -affection; it is an affection peculiar to the soul, as are several -others. Reason, therefore, does not allow us to consider all affections -as common to soul and body. - - -DESIRE, NOT SIMULTANEOUS WITH APPETITE. - -Is it possible, however, that for example, in physical love, the -man[294] may experience a desire simultaneously with the corresponding -appetite? This is impossible, for two reasons. If we say that the man -begins to experience the desire, while the corresponding appetite -continues it, it is plain the man cannot experience a desire without -the activity of the appetite. If on the other hand it be the appetite -that begins, it is clear that it cannot begin being excited unless the -body first find itself in suitable circumstances, which is unreasonable. - - -SOUL AND BODY, BY UNITING, FORM AN INDIVIDUAL AGGREGATE. - -6. It would, however, probably be better to put the matter thus: by -their presence, the faculties of the soul cause reaction in the organs -which possess them, so that while they themselves remain unmoved, they -give them the power to enter into movement.[295] In this case, however, -when the living organism experiences suffering, the life-imparting -cause must itself remain impassible, while the passions and energies -belong wholly to that which receives life. In this case, therefore, the -life will not belong exclusively to the soul, but to the conjunction -of the soul and body; or, at least, the latter's life will not be -identical with the soul's, nor will it be the faculty of sensation, -which will feel, but the being in whom that faculty inheres. - - -SENSATION IMPLIES FEELING SOUL. - -If, however, sensation, which is no more than a corporeal emotion, -finds its term in the soul, the soul must surely feel sensation; -therefore it does not occur as an effect of the presence of the faculty -of sensation, for this ignores the feeling agent back of it. Nor is it -the conjunction of soul and body, for unless the faculty of sensation -operate, that aggregate could not feel, and it would then no longer -include as elements either the soul, or the faculty of sensation. - - -SOUL-LIGHT FORMS ANIMAL NATURE. - -7. The aggregate results from the presence of the soul, not indeed that -the soul enters into the aggregate, or constitutes one of its elements. -Out of this organized body, and of a kind of light furnished by -herself, the soul forms the animal nature, which differs both from soul -and body, and to which belongs sensation, as well as all the passions -attributed to the animal.[296] - - -RELATION OF ANIMAL TO HUMAN NATURE. - -If now we should be asked how it happened that "we" feel, we answer: -We are not separated from the organism, although within us exist -principles[297] of a higher kind which concur in forming the manifold -complex of human nature. - - -EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SENSATION. - -As to the faculty of sensation which is peculiar to the soul, it cannot -be the power of perceiving the sense-objects themselves, but only -their typical forms, impressed on the animal by sensation. These have -already somewhat of the intelligible nature; the exterior sensation -peculiar to the animal is only the image of the sensation peculiar to -the soul; which, by its very essence is truer and more real, since it -consists only in contemplating images while remaining impassible.[298] -Ratiocination, opinion and thought, which principally constitute -us,[299] deal exclusively with these images, by which the soul has the -power of directing the organism. - - -DISTINCTION IN THE WHOLE ORGANISM. - -No doubt these faculties are "ours," but "we" are the superior -principle which, from above, directs the organising but in this whole -we shall have to distinguish an inferior part, mingled with the body, -and a superior part, which is the true man. The former (irrational -soul) constitutes the beast, as for instance, the lion; the latter is -the rational soul, which constitutes man. In every ratiocination, it is -"we" who reason, because ratiocination is the peculiar activity (or, -energy) of the soul.[300] - - -INDIVIDUAL RELATION WITH COSMIC INTELLECT. - -8. What is our relation with the Intelligence? I mean not the -habit imparted to the soul by the intellect, but the absolute -Intelligence;[301] which, though above us, is also common to all men, -or peculiar to each of them; in other words, is simultaneously common -and individual. Common because it is indivisible, one and everywhere -the same; particular because each soul possesses it entirely in the -first or rational soul. Likewise, we possess the ideas in a double -manner; in the soul they appear developed and separate; in the -intelligence they exist all together.[302] - - -INDIVIDUAL RELATION WITH GOD AND COSMIC SOUL. - -What is our relation with God? He hovers over the intelligible nature, -and real being; while we, being on the third rank as counted from -thence, are of the undivided universal Soul, which[303] is indivisible -because she forms part of the upper world, while she is divisible in -regard to the bodies. She is indeed divisible in regard to the bodies, -since she permeates each of them as far as they live; but at the same -time she is indivisible because she is one in the universe. - - -SOUL GIVES LIFE TO PSYCHOLOGIC ELEMENTS. - -She seems to be present in the bodies, and illuminates them, making -living beings out of them. This occurs not as a mixture of herself and -bodies, but by remaining individual, giving out images of herself,[304] -just as a single face in several mirrors. Of these, the first is -sensation, which resides in the common part, the organism; then come -all the other forms of the soul--forms which successively derive each -from the other, down to the faculties of generation and increase, -and generally, the power of producing and fashioning that which is -different from self--which indeed the soul does as soon as she turns -towards the object she fashions.[305] - - -ORIGIN OF EVILS, SINS, AND ERRORS. - -9. In this conception of the soul, she will be foreign to the cause of -the evils which the man does and suffers. These refer to the organism, -that common part, understood as above. Although opinion be deceptive, -and makes us commit much evil, and although opinion and ratiocination -both belong to the soul, yet the soul may be sinless, inasmuch as we -are only mastered by the worse part of our nature.[306] Often, indeed, -we yield to appetite, to anger, and we are the dupes of some imperfect -image. The conception of false things, the imagination[307] does not -await the judgment of discursive reason. There are still other cases -where we yield to the lower part of ourselves; in sensation, for -instance, we see things that do not exist, because we rely on the -common sensation of soul and body, before having discerned its objects -by discursive reason. - - -INTELLECT DID NOT GRASP THE OBJECT ITSELF. - -In this case did the intellect grasp the object itself? Certainly -not; and, therefore, it is not the intellect that is responsible -for the error. We say as much for the "we," according as we will or -will not have perceived the object, either in the intellect, or in -ourselves;--for it is possible to possess an object without having it -actually present. - - -TRUE CONCEPTION ACT OF INTUITION. - -We have distinguished from things common to soul and body, those -peculiar to the soul. The former are corporeal, and cannot be produced -without the organs, while the latter's occurrence is independent of -the body. Ratiocination[276] is the essential and constitutive faculty -of the real soul, because it determines the typical forms derived from -sensation, it looks, it somehow feels the images, and really is the -dominating part of the soul. The conception of true things is the act -of intuitive thoughts. - - -MODIFICATIONS DERIVE FROM FOREIGN SOURCES. - -There is often a resemblance and community between exterior and -interior things; in this case the soul will not any the less exercise -herself on herself, will not any the less remain within herself, -without feeling any passive modification. As to the modifications and -troubles which may arise in us, they derive from foreign elements, -attached to the soul, as well as from passions experienced by the above -described common part. - - -DISTINCTIONS IN "WE" AND THE "REAL MAN." - -10. But if "we" are the "soul," we must admit that when we experience -passions, the soul experiences them also; that when we act, the soul -acts. We may even say that the common part is also "ours," especially -before philosophy separated the soul from the body;[308] in fact, we -even say "we" suffer, when our body suffers. "We" is, therefore, taken -in a double sense: either the soul with the animal part, or living -body; or simply the upper part; while the vivified body is a wild -beast. - - -REAL MAN DIFFERS FROM BODY. - -The real Man differs from the body; pure from every passion, he -possesses the intellectual virtues, virtues which reside in the soul, -either when she is separated from the body, or when she is--as usually -here below--only separable by philosophy; for even when she seems to -us entirely separated, the soul is, in this life, ever accompanied -by a lower[309] sensitive part, or part of growth, which she -illuminates.[310] - - -FUNCTION OF THE COMMON PART. - -As to the virtues which consist not in wisdom, but in ethical habits -and austerities, they belong to the common part. To it alone, also, -are vices to be imputed, inasmuch as it exclusively experiences envy, -jealousy and cowardly pity. Friendships, however, should be referred -some to the common part, and others to the pure Soul or inner Man. In -childhood, the faculties of the composite common part are exercised, -but rarely is it illuminated from above. When this superior principle -seems inactive in relation to us, it is actively engaged towards the -upper intelligible world; and it only begins to be active towards us -when it advances as far as[311] (fancy or representation), the middle -part of our being. - - -THE SUPERIOR PRINCIPLE NOT ALWAYS UTILIZED. - -But is the superior principle not "ours" also? Surely, but only when we -are conscious thereof; for we do not always utilize our possessions. -This utilization, however, takes place when we direct this middle -part of our being towards either the upper or lower worlds, and when -we actualize into energies what before was only an (Aristotelian) -"potentiality" or a (Stoic) "habit." - - -THE ANIMATING PRINCIPLE OF ANIMALS. - -We might define the animating principle of animals. If it be true, -according to common opinion, that animal bodies contain human souls -that have sinned, the separable part of these souls does not properly -belong to these bodies; although these souls assist these bodies, the -souls are not actually present to them.[312] In them the sensation is -common to the image of the soul and to the body;--but to the latter -only in so far as it is organized and fashioned by the image of the -soul. As to the animals into whose bodies no human soul entered, they -are produced by an illumination of the universal Soul. - - -THE SOUL BOTH IMPASSIBLE AND PUNISHABLE. - -12. There is a contradiction between our own former opinion that the -soul cannot sin, and the universally admitted belief that the soul -commits sins, expiates them, undergoes punishments in Hades, and that -she passes into new bodies. Although we seem to be in a dilemma, -forcing us to choose between them, it might be possible to show they -are not incompatible. - - -PHILOSOPHIC SEPARATION REFERS NOT ONLY TO BODY, BUT TO PASSIBLE -ACCRETIONS. - -When we attribute infallibility to the soul, we are supposing her to be -one and simple, identifying the soul with soul essence. When, however, -we consider her capable of sin, we are looking at her as a complex, of -her essence and of another kind of soul which can experience brutal -passions. The soul, thus, is a combination of various elements; and it -is not the pure soul, but this combination, which experiences passions, -commits sins, and undergoes punishments. It was this conception of the -soul Plato was referring to when he said:[313] "We see the soul as we -see Glaucus, the marine deity," and he adds, "He who would know the -nature of the soul herself should, after stripping her of all that is -foreign to her, in her, especially consider her philosophic love for -truth; and see to what things she attaches herself, and by virtue of -whose affinities she is what she is." We must, therefore, differentiate -the soul's life acts from that which is punished, and when we speak of -philosophy's separation of the soul, we mean a detaching not only from -the body, but also from what has been added to the soul. - - -HOW THE ANIMAL NATURE IS GENERATED. - -This addition occurs during her generation, or rather in the generation -of another ideal form of soul, the "animal nature." Elsewhere[314] this -generation has been explained thus. When the soul descends, at the very -moment when she inclines towards the body, she produces an image of -herself. The soul, however, must not be blamed for sending this image -into the body. For the soul to incline towards the body is for the -soul to shed light on what is below her; and this is no more sinful -than to produce a shadow. That which is blamable is the illuminated -object; for if it did not exist, there would be nothing to illuminate. -The descent of the soul, or her inclination to the body, means only -that she communicates life to what she illuminates. She drives away her -image, or lets it vanish, if nothing receptive is in its vicinity; the -soul lets the image vanish, not because she is separated--for to speak -accurately, she is not separated from the body--but because she is no -longer here below; and she is no longer below when she is entirely -occupied in contemplating the intelligible world. - - -THE DOUBLE HERCULES SYMBOLIZES THE SOUL. - -(Homer) seems to admit this distinction in speaking of Hercules, when -he sends the image of this hero into Hades, and still he locates him -within the abode of the deities[315];--it is at least the idea implied -in this double assertion that Hercules is in Hades and that he is in -Olympus. The poet, therefore, distinguished in him two elements. We -might perhaps expound the passage as follows: Hercules had an active -virtue, and because of his great qualities was judged worthy of being -classified with the deities, but as he possessed only the active -virtue, and not the contemplative virtue, he could not be admitted into -Heaven entirely; while he is in heaven, there is something of him in -Hades.[316] - - -RELATION OF THE "WE" AND THE "SOUL." - -13. Is it "we" or the "soul" which makes these researches? It is we, by -means of the soul. The cause of this is, not we who consider the soul -because we possess her, but that the soul considers herself. This need -not imply motion, as it is generally understood, but a motion entirely -different from that of the bodies, and which is its own life. - - -INTELLIGENCE NOT OURS, BUT WE. - -Intelligence[277] also is ours, but only in the sense that the soul is -intelligent; for us, the (higher) life consists in a better thinking. -The soul enjoys this life either when she thinks intelligible objects, -or when the intellect is both a part of ourselves, and something -superior towards which we ascend. - - - - -FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN. - -Of the First Good, and of the Other Goods.[317] - - -THE SUPREME GOOD AS END OF ALL OTHER GOODS. - -1. Could any one say that there was, for any being, any good but the -activity of "living according to nature?"[318] For a being composed -of several parts, however, the good will consist in the activity of -its best part, an action which is peculiar, natural, and unfailing. -Further: as the soul is an excellent being, and directs her activity -towards something excellent, this excellent aim is not merely excellent -relatively to the soul, but is the absolute Good. If then there be a -principle which does not direct its action towards any other thing, -because it is the best of beings, being above them all, it can be this -only because all other beings trend towards it. This then, evidently, -is the absolute Good by virtue of which all other beings participate -therein. - - -PARTICIPATION IN GOOD. TWO METHODS. - -Now there are two methods of participation in the Good: the first, is -to become similar to it; the second is to direct one's activity towards -it. If then the direction of one's desire and one's action towards the -better principle be a good, then can the absolute good itself neither -regard nor desire any other thing, remaining in abiding rest, being the -source and principle of all actions conforming to nature, giving to -other things the form of the Good, without acting on them, as they, on -the contrary, direct their actions thereto. - - -PERMANENCE THE CHIEF NOTE OF ABSOLUTE GOOD. - -Only by permanence--not by action, nor even by thought--is this -principle the Good. For if it be super-Being, it must also be -super-Activity, super-Intelligence, and Thought. The principle from -which everything depends, while itself depending on nothing else, must, -therefore, be recognized as the Good. (This divinity) must, therefore, -persist in His condition, while everything turns towards Him, just as, -in a circle, all the radii meet in the centre. An example of this is -the sun, which is a centre of the light that is, as it were, suspended -from that planet. The light accompanies the sun everywhere, and never -parts from it; and even if you wished to separate it on one side, it -would not any the less remain concentrated around it. - - -ALL THINGS DEPEND ON THE GOOD BY UNITY, ESSENCE, AND QUALITY. - -2. Let us study the dependence of everything on the Good. The inanimate -trends toward the Soul, while the animate Soul trends towards the Good -through Intelligence. As far as anything possesses unity, essence or -form, it participates in the Good. By its participation in unity, -essence and form each being participates in the Good, even though the -latter be only an image, for the things in which it participates are -only images of unity, essence, and form. For the (first) Soul[319] -as she approaches Intelligence, she acquires a life which approaches -closer to truth; and she owes this to Intelligence; thus (by virtue -of Intelligence) she possesses the form of the Good. To possess the -latter, all she needs to do is to turn her looks towards it; for -Intelligence is the next after the Good. Therefore, to those to whom -it is granted to live, life is the good. Likewise, for those who -participate in intelligence, Intelligence is the good. Consequently, -such (a being as) joins intelligence to life possesses a double good. - - -THERE IS NO UNALLOYED EVIL FOR THE LIVING BEING. - -3. Though life be a good, it does not belong to all beings. Life -is incomplete for the evil person, as for an eye that does not see -distinctly; neither accomplish their purpose. If, for us, life, though -mingled as it is, be a good, even if an imperfect one, how shall we -continue to assert that death is not an evil? But for whom would it be -an evil? This we must ask because evil must necessarily be an attribute -of somebody. Now there is no more evil for a being which, though -even existing, is deprived of life, any more than for a stone (as -they say). But if, after death, the being still live, if it be still -animate, it will possess good, and so much the more as it exercises -its faculties without the body. If it be united to the universal Soul, -evidently there can be no evil for it, any more than for the gods who -possess good unmingled with evil. Similar is the case of the soul which -preserves her purity, inasmuch as he who loses her finds that life, and -not death, is the real Evil. If there be chastisements in Hades, again -is life an evil for the soul, because she is not pure. If, further, we -define life as the union of the soul with the body, and death as their -separation, the soul can pass through both these conditions (without, -on that account, being unhappy, or losing her hold on the Good). - - -BY VIRTUE, LIFE CHANGES FROM AN EVIL TO A GOOD. - -How is death not an evil, if life be a good? Certainly life is a good -for such as possess the Good, (it is a good) not because the soul is -united to the body, but because she repels evil by virtue. (Without -the latter) death would rather be a good (because it delivers us from -the body[320]). To resume: by itself, life in a body is evil; but, by -virtue, the soul locates herself in the good, not by perpetuating the -existing corporeal union, but by separating herself from the body. - - - - -PORPHYRY, COMMENTARIES OR OUTLINES OF THE ENNEADS OF PLOTINOS. - -PSYCHOLOGICAL FRAGMENTS BY PORPHYRY, JAMBLICHUS, NEMESIUS, AND AMMONIUS -SACCAS. - - - - -CONCORDANCE OF THE NUMBERS OF THE 44 PARAGRAPHS OF PORPHYRY'S -PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF INTELLIGIBLES IN THE EDITIONS OF BOUILLET, -CREUZER, AND HOLSTENIUS - - - Bouillet. Creuzer. Holstenius. - =1= 34 34 - =2= 8 8 - =3= 9 9 - =4= 27 28 - =5= 20 20 - =6= 18 18 - =7= 24 25 - =8= 19 19 - =9= 7 7 - =11= 22 23 - =12= 10 10 - =13= 12 12 - =14= 26 27 - =15= 1 1 - =16= 2 2 - =17= 3 3 - =18= 4 4 - =19= 5 5 - =20= 6 6 - =21= 28 29 - =22= 29 30 - =23= 22 23 - =24= 17 17 - =25= 16 16 - =26= 11 11 - =27= 25 26 - =28= 14 14 - =29= 13 13 - =30= 30 31 - =31= 42 43 - =32= 44 45 - =33= 15 15 - =34= 23 24 - =35= 43 44 - =36= 35 35 - =37= 36 37 - =38= 37 38 - =39= 39 40 - =40= 40 41 - =41= 33 36 - =42= 38 39 - =43= 31 32 - =44= 41 42 - -The order of Bouillet has been left, because the other orders differ -anyway, and because this is the one that Porphyry introduced into the -works of Plotinos. It must, therefore, have been of most significance -to him. - - - - -PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF THE INTELLIGIBLES, BY PORPHYRY.[321] - - -FIRST ENNEAD,[322] BOOK TWO. - -Of Virtues. - -I.--There is a difference between the virtues of the citizen, those -of the man who essays to rise to contemplation, and who, on this -account, is said to possess a contemplative mind; those of him who -contemplates intelligence; and finally those of pure Intelligence, -which is completely separated from the soul. - -1. The civil virtues consist of moderation in passions, and in -letting one's actions follow the rational laws of duty. The object -of these virtues being to make us benevolent in our dealings with -our fellow-human beings, they are called civil virtues because they -mutually unite citizens. "Prudence refers to the rational part of our -soul; courage, to that part of the soul subject to anger; temperance -consists in the agreement and harmony of appetite and reason; finally -justice, consists in the accomplishment, by all these faculties, of the -function proper to each of them, either to command, or to obey." - -2. The virtues of the man who tries to rise to contemplation consist in -detaching oneself from things here below; that is why they are called -"purifications."[323] They command us to abstain from activities which -innervate the organs, and which excite the affections that relate to -the body. The object of these virtues is to raise the soul to genuine -existence. While the civil virtues are the ornament of mortal life, -and prepare the soul for the purificatory virtues, the latter direct -the man whom they adorn to abstain from activities in which the body -predominates. Thus, in the purificatory virtues, "prudence consists -in not forming opinions in harmony with the body, but in acting by -oneself, which is the work of pure thought. Temperance consists in not -sharing the passions of the body; courage, in not fearing separation -therefrom, as if death drove man into emptiness and annihilation; while -justice exacts that reason and intelligence command and be obeyed." -The civil virtues moderate the passions; their object is to teach us -to live in conformity with the laws of human nature. The contemplative -virtues obliterate the passions from the soul; their object is to -assimilate man to the divinity. - -There is a difference between purifying oneself, and being pure. -Consequently the purificatory virtues may, like purification itself, -be considered in two lights; they purify the soul, and they adorn the -purified soul, because the object of purification is purity. But "since -purification and purity consist in being separated from every foreign -entity, the good is something different from the soul that purifies -itself. If the soul that purifies herself had possessed the good before -losing her purity, it would be sufficient for the soul to purify -herself; but in this very case, what would remain to her after the -purification would be the good, but not the purification. But the soul -is not the good; she can only participate therein, and have its form; -otherwise the soul would not have fallen into evil. For the soul, good -consists in being united to her author, and her evil is to unite with -lower things."[324] - -Of evil, there are two kinds; the one, is to unite with lower things; -the other is to abandon oneself to the passions. The civil virtues -owe their name of virtues and their value to their releasing the soul -from one of these two kinds of evil (of the passions). The purificatory -virtues are superior to the former, in that they free the soul from -her characteristic form of evil (that is, union with lower things). -Therefore, when the soul is pure, she must be united to her author; her -virtue, after her "conversion," consists in her knowledge and science -of veritable existence; not that the soul lacks this knowledge, but -because without her superior principle, without intelligence, she does -not see what she possesses.[325] - -3. There is a third kind of virtues, which are superior to the civil -and purificatory virtues, the "virtues of the soul that contemplates -intelligence." "Here prudence and wisdom consist in contemplating -the "beings" or essences contained by intelligence; justice consists -in the soul's fulfilling of her characteristic function; that is, in -attaching herself to intelligence and to direct her activity thither. -Temperance is the intimate conversion of the soul towards Intelligence, -while courage is the impassibility by which the soul becomes -assimilated to what she contemplates, since the soul's nature is to be -impassible.[326] These virtues are as intimately concatenated as the -other (lower forms)." - -4. There is a fourth kind of virtues, the "exemplary virtues," which -reside within intelligence. Their superiority to the virtues of the -soul is the same as that of the type to the image; for intelligence -contains simultaneously all the "beings" or essences which are the -types of lower things. "Within intelligence, prudence is the science; -wisdom is the thought, temperance is the conversion towards oneself; -justice is the accomplishment of one's characteristic function; -courage is the identity of intelligence, its perseverance in purity, -concentrated within itself, in virtue of its superiority."[327] - -We thus have four kinds of virtues: 1, the exemplary virtues, -characteristic of intelligence, and of the "being" or nature to which -they belong; 2, the virtues of the soul turned towards intelligence, -and filled with her contemplation; 3, the virtues of the soul that -purifies herself, or which has purified herself from the brutal -passions characteristic of the body; 4, the virtues that adorn the -man by restraining within narrow limits the action of the irrational -part, and by moderating the passions. "He who possesses the virtues of -the superior order necessarily (potentially) possesses the inferior -virtues. But the converse does not occur."[328] "He who possesses -the superior virtues will not prefer to practice the lower virtues -because of the mere possession thereof; he will practice them only -when circumstances will invite (it). The objects, indeed, differ with -the kind of virtues. The object of the civil virtues is to moderate -our passions so as to conform our conduct to the laws of human nature. -That of the purificatory virtues is to detach the soul completely from -the passions. That of the contemplative virtues is to apply the soul -to intellectual operations, even to the extent of no longer having to -think of the need of freeing oneself from the passions. Last, that of -the exemplary virtues is similar to that of the other virtues. Thus -the practical virtues make man virtuous; the purificatory virtues -make man divine, or make of the good man, a protecting deity; the -contemplative virtues deify; while the exemplary virtues make a man -the parent of divinities. We should specially apply ourselves to -purificatory virtues believing that we can acquire them even in this -life; and that possession of them leads to superior virtues. We must -push purification as far as possible, as it consists in separating (the -soul) from the body, and in freeing oneself from any passional movement -of the irrational part. But how can one purify the soul? To what limit -may purification be pushed? These are two questions that demand -examination. - -To begin with, the foundation of purification is to know oneself, to -realize that he is a soul bound to a foreign being, of a different -nature (or, "being"). - -Further, when one is convinced of this truth, one should gather -oneself together within himself, detaching himself from the body, -and freeing himself entirely from the passions. He who makes use -of his senses too often, though it be done without devotion or -pleasure, is, nevertheless, distracted by the care of the body, and -is chained thereto by sensation. The pains and the pleasures produced -by sense-objects exercise a great influence on the soul, and inspire -the soul with an inclination for the body. It is important to remove -such a disposition from the soul. "To achieve this purpose, the soul -will allow the body only necessary pleasures, that serve to cure her -of her sufferings, to refresh her from her exhaustions, to hinder her -from being importunate. The soul will free herself from pains;[327] -if this be beyond her powers, the soul will support them patiently, -and will diminish them, while refusing to share them. The soul will -appease anger so far as possible; she will even try to suppress them -entirely; at least, if that be impossible, she will not voluntarily -participate therein, leaving the non-reflective excitement to another -(animal) nature, reducing the involuntary motions as far as possible. -The soul will be inaccessible to fear--having nothing further to -risk; even so, she will restrain every sudden movement; she will pay -attention to fear only insofar as it may be nature's warning at the -approach of danger. Absolutely nothing shameful will be desired; in -eating and drinking, she will seek only the satisfaction of a need, -while remaining essentially alien thereto. The pleasures of love will -not even involuntarily be tasted, at least, she will not allow herself -to be drawn beyond the flights of fancy that occur in dreams. In the -purified man, the intellectual part of the soul will be pure of all -these passions. She will even desire that the part that experiences -the irrational passions of the body should take notice of them without -being agitated thereby, and without yielding to them. In this way, if -the irrational part should itself happen to experience emotions, the -latter will be promptly calmed by the presence of reason. Struggles -will have been left behind before any headway will have been made -to purification. The presence of reason will suffice; the inferior -principle, indeed, will respect the higher one to the extent of being -angry with itself, and reproaching itself for weakness, in case it -feels any agitation that disturbs its master's rest." So long as the -soul experiences even moderate passions, the soul's progress towards -impassibility remains in need of improvement. The soul is impassible -only when she has entirely ceased to participate in the passions of the -body. Indeed, that which permitted the passions to rule was that reason -relaxed the reins as a result of her own inclination. - - -FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK NINE. - -Of Suicide. - -OF THE SEPARATION OF THE SOUL AND BODY. - -2. Nature releases what nature has bound. The soul releases what the -soul has bound. Nature binds the body to the soul, but it is the soul -herself that has bound herself to the body. It, therefore, belongs to -nature to detach the body from the soul, while it is the soul herself -that detaches herself from the body. - -3. There is a double death. One, known by all men, consists in the -separation of the body with the soul; the other, characteristic of -philosophers, results in the separation of the soul from the body. The -latter is consequence of the former. - - -SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR. - -Of Matter. - -OF THE CONCEPTION OF MATTER (10). - -4. While separating ourselves from existence we by thought beget -nonentity (matter). While remaining united with existence, we also -conceive of nonentity (the one). Consequently, when we separate -ourselves from existence, we do not conceive of the nonentity which is -above existence (the one), but we beget by thought something that is -deceptive, and we put ourselves in the condition (of indetermination) -in which one is when outside of oneself. Just as each one can really, -and by himself, raise himself to the non-existence which is above -existence (the One); so (by separating oneself from existence by -thought), we may reach the nonentity beneath existence. - - -THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK SIX. - -Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal Things. - -OF THE INCORPOREAL (3). - -5. The name "incorporeal" does not designate one and the same genus, -as does the word "body." Incorporeal entities derive their name from -the fact that they are conceived of by abstraction from the body. -Consequently, some of them (like intelligence and discursive reason) -are genuine beings, existing as well without as within the body, -subsisting by themselves, by themselves being actualizations and -lives; other beings (such as matter, sense-form without matter, place, -time, and so forth), do not constitute real beings, but are united to -the body, and depend therefrom, live through others, possess only a -relative life, and exist only through certain actualizations. Indeed, -when we apply to them the name of incorporeal entities (it is merely a -negative designation), indicating only what they are not, but not what -they are. - - -OF THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THE SOUL. - -6. (1) The soul is a "being" or essence, without extension, immaterial -and incorruptible; her nature consists in a life which is life in -itself. - -7. (3, end) When the existence of some being is life itself, and when -the passions are lives, its death consists in a life of a certain -nature, and not in entire privation of life; for the "passion" -experienced by this "being" or essence, does not force it into complete -loss of life. - -8. (2, 3) There is a difference between the affections of the bodies, -and those of incorporeal things. The affection of bodies consists in -change. On the contrary, the affections and experiences characteristic -of the soul are actualizations that have nothing in common with the -cooling or heating up of the bodies. Consequently if, for bodies, -an affection ever implies a change, we may say that all incorporeal -(beings) are impassible. Indeed, immaterial and incorporeal beings -are always identical in their actualization; but those that impinge -on matter and bodies, though in themselves impassible, allow the -subjects in which they reside to be affected. So when an animal feels, -the soul resembles a harmony separated from its instrument, which -itself causes the vibration of the strings that have been tuned to -unison herewith; while the body resembles a harmony inseparable from -the strings. The reason why the soul moves the living being is that -the latter is animated. We, therefore, find an analogy between the -soul and the musician who causes his instrument to produce sounds -because he himself contains a harmonic power. The body, struck by a -sense-impression, resembles strings tuned in unison. In the production -of sound, it is not the harmony itself but the string that is affected. -The musician causes it to resound because he contains a harmonic power. -Nevertheless, in spite of the will of the musician, the instrument -would produce no harmonies that conformed to the laws of music, unless -harmony itself dictated them. - -9. (5) The soul binds herself to the body by a conversion toward the -affections experienced by the body. She detaches herself from the body -by "apathy," (turning away from the body's affections.) - - -OF THE IMPASSIBILITY OF MATTER. - -10. (7) According to the ancient (sages) such are the properties of -matter. "Matter is incorporeal because it differs from bodies. Matter -is not lifeless, because it is neither intelligence, nor soul, nor -anything that lives by itself. It is formless, variable, infinite, -impotent; consequently, matter cannot be existence, but nonentity. Of -course it is not nonentity in the same way that movement is nonentity; -matter is nonentity really. It is an image and a phantom of extension, -because it is the primary substrate of extension. It is impotence, and -the desire for existence. The only reason that it persists is not rest -(but change); it always seems to contain contraries, the great and -small, the less and more, lack and excess. It is always "becoming," -without ever persisting in its condition, or being able to come out of -it. Matter is the lack of all existence; and, consequently, what matter -seems to be is a deception. If, for instance, matter seems to be large, -it really is small; like a mere phantom, it escapes and evanesces into -nonentity, not by any change of place, but by its lack of reality. -Consequently, the substrate of the images in matter consists of a lower -image. That in which objects present appearances that differ according -to their positions is a mirror, a mirror that seems crowded, though it -possesses nothing, and which yet seems to be everything." - - -OF THE PASSIBILITY OF THE BODY (8-19). - -11. Passions (or, affections) refer to something destructible; for it -is passion that leads to destruction; it is the same sort of being -that can be affected, and can be destroyed. Incorporeal entities, -however, are not subject to destruction; they either exist or not; in -either case they are non-affectible. That which can be affected need -not have this impassible nature, but must be subject to alteration or -destruction by the qualities of things that enter into it and affect -it; for that which in it subsists is not altered by the first chance -entity. Consequently, matter is impassible, as by itself it possesses -no quality. The forms that enter into and issue from matter (as a -substrate) are equally impassible. That which is affected is the -composite of form and matter, whose existence consists in the union -of these two elements; for it is evidently subject to the action of -contrary powers, and of the qualities of things which enter into it, -and affect it. That is why the beings that derive their existence from -something else, instead of possessing it by themselves, can likewise -by virtue of their passivity, either live or not. On the contrary, -the beings whose existence consists in an impassible life necessarily -live permanently; likewise the things that do not live are equally -impassible inasmuch as they do not live. Consequently, being changed -and being affected refer only to the composite of form and matter, to -the body, and not to matter. Likewise, to receive life and to lose -it, to feel passions that are its consequence, can refer only to the -composite of soul and body. Nothing similar could happen to the soul; -for she is not something compounded out of life and lifelessness; -she is life itself, because her "being" or nature is simple, and is -automatic. - - -THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT. - -Of Nature, Contemplation, and of the One. - -OF THOUGHT. - -12. (1) Thought is not the same everywhere; it differs according to the -nature of every "being." In intelligence, it is intellectual; in the -soul it is rational; in the plant it is seminal; last, it is superior -to intelligence and existence in the principle that surpasses all these. - - -OF LIFE. - -13. (7) The word "body" is not the only one that may be taken in -different senses; such is also the case with "life." There is a -difference between the life of the plant, of the animal, of the soul, -of intelligence, and of super-intelligence. Indeed, intelligible -entities are alive though the things that proceed therefrom do not -possess a life similar to theirs. - - -OF THE ONE. - -14. (8) By (using one's) intelligence one may say many things about the -super-intellectual (principle). But it can be much better viewed by an -absence of thought, than by thought. This is very much the same case as -that of sleep, of which one can speak, up to a certain point, during -the condition of wakefulness; but of which no knowledge of perception -can be acquired except by sleeping. Indeed, like is known only by like; -the condition of all knowledge is for the subject to be assimilated to -the subject.[330] - - -FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. - -Of the Nature of the Soul. - -15. (1) Every body is in a place; the incorporeal in itself is not in a -place, any more than the things which have the same nature as it. - -16. (1) The incorporeal in itself, by the mere fact of its being -superior to every body and to every place, is present everywhere -without occupying extension, in an indivisible manner. - -17. (1) The incorporeal in itself, not being present to the body in a -local manner, is present to the body whenever it pleases, that is, by -inclining towards it so far as it is within its nature to do so. Not -being present to the body in a local manner, it is present to the body -by its disposition. - -18. (1) The incorporeal in itself does not become present to the body -in "being" nor in hypostatic form of existence. It does not mingle with -the body. Nevertheless, by its inclination to the body, it begets and -communicates to it a potentiality capable of uniting with the body. -Indeed the inclination of the incorporeal constitutes a second nature -(the irrational soul), which unites with the body. - -19. (1) The soul has a nature intermediary between the "being" that is -indivisible, and the "being" that is divisible by its union with the -bodies. Intelligence is a "being" absolutely indivisible; the bodies -alone are divisible; but the qualities and the forms engaged in matter -are divisible by their union with the bodies. - -20. (2) The things that act upon others do not act by approximation and -by contact. It is only accidentally when this occurs (that they act by -proximity and contact). - - -FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE. - -Problems About the Soul. - -UNION OF THE SOUL AND THE BODY. - -21. (20) The hypostatic substance of the body does not hinder the -incorporeal in itself from being where and as it wishes; for just as -that which is non-extended cannot be contained by the body, so also -that which has extension forms no obstacle for the incorporeal, and -in relation to it is as nonentity. The incorporeal does not transport -itself where it wishes by a change of place; for only extended -substance occupies a place. Neither is the incorporeal compressed -by the body; for only that which is extended can be compressed and -displaced. That which has neither extension nor magnitude, could not -be hindered by that which has extension, nor be exposed to a change -of place. Being everywhere and nowhere, the incorporeal, wherever -it happens to be, betrays its presence only by a certain kind of -disposition. It is by this disposition that it rises above heaven, or -descends into a corner of the world. Not even this residence makes it -visible to our eyes. It is only by its works that it manifests its -presence. - -22. (21-24) If the incorporeal be contained within the body, it is -not contained within it like an animal in a zooelogical garden; for -it can neither be included within, nor embraced by the body. Nor -is it, compressed like water or air in a bag of skins. It produces -potentialities which from within its unity (?) radiate outwards; it is -by them that it descends into the body and penetrates it.[331] It is by -this indescribable extension of itself that it enters into the body, -and shuts itself up within it. Except itself nothing retains it. It is -not the body that releases the incorporeal as result of a lesion, or of -its decay; it is the incorporeal that detaches itself by turning away -from the passions of the body. - - -OF THE DESCENT OF THE SOUL INTO THE BODY, AND OF THE SPIRIT. - -23. (9) Just as "being on the earth," for the soul, is not to tread -on the ground, as does the body, but only to preside over the body -that treads on the ground; likewise, "to be in hell" for the soul, -is to preside over an image whose nature is to be in a place, and -to have an obscure hypostatic form of existence. That is why if the -subterranean hell be a dark place, the soul, without separating from -existence, descends into hell when she attaches herself to some -image. Indeed, when the soul abandons the solid body over which she -presided she remains united to the spirit which she has received from -the celestial spheres. Since, as a result of her affection for matter, -she has developed particular faculties by virtue of which she had a -sympathetic habit for some particular body during life, as a result -of this disposition, she impresses a form on the spirit by the power -of her imagination, and thus she acquires an image. The soul is said -to be in hell because the spirit that surrounds her also happens to -have a formless and obscure nature; and as the heavy and moistened -spirit descends down into subterranean localities, the soul is said -to descend underground. Not indeed that the very "being" of the soul -changes place, or is in a locality, but because she contracts the -habits of the bodies whose nature it is to change location, and to be -located somewhere. That is why the soul according to her disposition, -acquires some one body rather than some other; for the rank and the -special characteristics of the body into which she enters depend on her -disposition. - -Therefore, when in a condition of superior purity, she unites with a -body that is close to immaterial nature, that is, an ethereal body. -When she descends from the development of reason to that of the -imagination, she receives a solar body. If she becomes effeminate, and -falls in love with forms, she puts on a lunar body. Finally, when she -falls into the terrestrial bodies, which, resembling her shapeless -character, are composed of moist vapors, there results for her a -complete ignorance of existence, a sort of eclipse, and a veritable -childhood. When the soul leaves an earthly body, having her spirit -still troubled by these moist vapors, she develops a shadow that -weights her down; for a spirit of this kind naturally tends to descend -into the depths of the earth, unless it be held up and raised by a -higher cause. Just as the soul is attached to the earth by her earthly -vesture, so the moist spirit(ual body) to which the soul is united -makes her drag after her an image which weights down the soul. The soul -surrounds herself with moist vapors when she mingles with a nature that -in its operations is moist or subterranean. But if the soul separate -from this nature, immediately around her shines a dry light, without -shade or shadow. In fact it is humidity which forms clouds in the air; -the dryness of the atmosphere produces a dry and serene clearness. - - -FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK SIX. - -Of Sensation and Memory. - -OF SENSATION. - -24. (3) The soul contains the reasons of all things. The soul operates -according to these reasons, whether incited to activity by some -exterior object, or whether the soul be turned towards these reasons -by folding back on herself. When the soul is incited to this activity -by some exterior object, she applies her senses thereto; when she -folds back on herself, she applies herself to thoughts. It might be -objected that the result is that there is neither sensation nor thought -without imagination; for just as in the animal part, no sensation -occurs without an impression produced on the organs of sense; likewise -there is no thought without imagination. Certainly, an analogy obtains -between both cases. Just as the sense-image (type) results from the -impression experienced by sensation, likewise the intellectual image -(phantasm) results from thought. - - -OF MEMORY. - -25. (2) Memory does not consist in preserving images. It is the faculty -of reproducing the conceptions with which our soul has been occupied. - - -FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. - -Of Generation and of the Order of Things that Follow the First. - -OF THE PROCESSION OF BEINGS. - -26. When incorporeal hypostatic substances descend, they split up -and multiply, their power weakening as they apply themselves to the -individual. When, on the contrary, they rise, they simplify, unite, and -their power intensifies. - -27. In the life of incorporeal entities, the procession operates in a -manner such that the superior principle remains firm and substantial -in its nature, imparting its existence to what is below it, without -losing anything, or transforming itself into anything. Thus that which -receives existence does not receive existence with decay or alteration; -it is not begotten like generation (that is, the being of sense), which -participates in decay and change. It is, therefore, non-begotten and -incorruptible, because it is produced without generation or corruption. - -28. Every begotten thing derives the cause of its generation from some -other (being); for nothing is begotten causelessly. But, among begotten -things, those which owe their being to a union of elements are on -that very account perishable. As to those which, not being composite, -owe their being to the simplicity of their hypostatic substances, -they are imperishable, inasmuch as they are indissoluble. When we say -that they are begotten, we do not mean that they are composite, but -only that they depend on some cause. Thus bodies are begotten doubly, -first because they depend on a cause, and then because they are -composite. Souls and intelligence, indeed, are begotten in the respect -that they depend on a cause; but not in the respect that they are -composite. Therefore, bodies, being doubly begotten, are dissoluble and -perishable. The Soul and Intelligence, being unbegotten in the sense -that they are not composite, are indissoluble and imperishable; for -they are begotten only in the sense that they depend on a cause. - -29. Every principle that generates, by virtue of its "being," is -superior to the product it generates. Every generated being naturally -turns towards its generating principle. Of the generating principles, -some (the universal and perfect substances) do not turn towards their -product; while others (the substances that are individual, and subject -to conversion towards the manifold) partly turn towards their product, -and remain partly turned towards themselves; while others entirely turn -towards their product, and do not turn at all towards themselves. - - -OF THE RETURN OF BEINGS TO THE FIRST. - -30. Of the universal and perfect hypostatic substances, none turns -towards its product. All perfect hypostatic substances return to the -principles that generated them. The very body of the world, by the -mere fact of its perfection, is converted to the intelligent Soul, and -that is the cause of its motion being circular. The Soul of the world -is converted to Intelligence, and this to the First.[332] All beings, -therefore, aspire to the First, each in the measure of its ability, -from the very lowest in the ranks of the universe up. This anagogical -return of beings to the First is necessary, whether it be mediate or -immediate. So we may say that beings not only aspire to the First, -but that each being enjoys the First according to its capacity.[333] -The individual hypostatic substances, however, that are subject to -declining towards manifoldness, naturally turn not only towards their -author, but also towards their product. That is the cause of (any -subsequent) fall and unfaithfulness. Matter perverts them because they -possess the possibility of inclining towards it, though they are also -able to turn towards the divinity. That is how perfection makes second -rank beings be born of the first principles, and then be converted -towards them. It is, on the contrary, the result of imperfection, to -turn higher entities to lower things, inspiring them with love for that -which, before them, withdrew from the first principles (in favor of -matter). - - -FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE. - -Of the Hypostases that Mediate Knowledge, and of the Superior Principle. - -INTELLIGENCE KNOWS ITSELF BY A CONVERSION TO HERSELF. - -31. (1) When one being subsists by dependence on any other, and not -by self-dependence and withdrawal from any other, it could not turn -itself towards itself to know itself by separating from (the substrate) -by which it subsists. By withdrawing from its own existence it would -alter and perish. But when one being cognizes itself by withdrawal -from that to which it is united, when it grasps itself as independent -of that being, and succeeds in doing so without exposing itself -to destruction, it evidently does not derive its "being" or nature -from the being from which it can, without perishing, withdraw, to -face itself, and know itself independently. If sight, and in general -all sensation do not feel itself, nor perceive itself on separating -from the body, and do not subsist by itself; if, on the contrary, -intelligence think better by separating from the body, and can be -converted to itself without perishing, evidently sense-faculties are -actualized only by help of the body, while intelligence actualizes and -exists by itself, and not by the body. - - -THE ACTUALIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE IS ETERNAL AND INDIVISIBLE. - -32. (3, 5-7) There is a difference between intelligence and the -intelligible, between sensation and that which can be sensed. The -intelligible is united to intelligence as that which can be sensed is -connected with sensation. But sensation cannot perceive itself.... -As the intelligible is united to Intelligence, it is grasped by -intelligence and not by sensation. But intelligence is intelligible for -intelligence. Since then intelligence is intelligible for intelligence, -intelligence is its own object. If intelligence be intelligible, but -not "sensible," it is an intelligible object. Being intelligible -by intelligence, but not by sensation, it will be intelligent. -Intelligence, therefore, is simultaneously thinker and thought, all -that thinks and all that is thought. Its operation, besides, is not -that of an object that rubs and is rubbed: "It is not a subject in some -one part of itself, and in some other, object of thought; it is simple, -it is entirely intelligible for itself as a whole."[334] The whole of -intelligence excludes any idea of unintelligence. It does not contain -one part that thinks, while another would not think; for then, in so -far as it would not think, "it would be unintelligent." It does not -abandon one object to think of another; for it would cease to think the -object it abandoned. If, therefore, intelligence do not successively -pass from one object to another, it thinks simultaneously; it does not -think first one (thought) and then another; it thinks everything as in -the present, and as always.... - -If intelligence think everything as at present, if it know no past nor -future, its thought is a simple actualization, which excludes every -interval of time. It, therefore, contains everything together, in -respect to time. Intelligence, therefore, thinks, all things according -to unity, and in unity, without anything falling in in time or in -space. If so, intelligence is not discursive, and is not (like the -soul) in motion; it is an actualization, which is according to unity, -and in unity, which shuns all chance development and every discursive -operation.[335] If, in intelligence, manifoldness be reduced to unity, -and if the intellectual actualization be indivisible, and fall not -within time, we shall have to attribute to such a "being" eternal -existence in unity. Now that happens to be "aeonial" or everlasting -existence.[336] Therefore, eternity constitutes the very "being" (or -nature) of intelligence. The other kind of intelligence, that does -not think according to unity, and in unity, which falls into change, -and into movement, which abandons one object to think another, which -divides, and gives itself up to a discursive action, has time as -"being" (or nature). - -The distinction of past and future suits its action. When passing from -one object to another, the soul changes thoughts; not indeed that -the former perish, or that the latter suddenly issue from some other -source; but the former, while seeming to have disappeared, remain in -the soul; and the latter, while seeming to come from somewhere else, do -not really do so, but are born from within the soul, which moves only -from one object to another, and which successively directs her gaze -from one to another part of what she possesses. She resembles a spring -which, instead of flowing outside, flows back into itself in a circle. -It is this (circular) movement of the soul that constitutes time, just -as the permanence of intelligence in itself constitutes (aeonial) -eternity. Intelligence is not separated from eternity, any more than -the soul is from time. Intelligence and eternity form but a single -hypostatic form of existence. That which moves simulates eternity by -the indefinite perpetuity of its movement, and that which remains -immovable, simulates time by seeming to multiply its continual present, -in the measure that time passes. That is why some have believed that -time manifested in rest as well as in movement, and that eternity was -no more than the infinity of time. To each of these two (different -things) the attributes of the other were mistakenly attributed. The -reason of this is that anything that ever persists in an identical -movement gives a good illustration of eternity by the continuousness of -its movement; while that which persists in an identical actualization -represents time by the permanence of its actualization. Besides, in -sense-objects, duration differs according to each of them. There is a -difference between the duration of the course of the sun, and that of -the moon, as well as that of Venus, and so on. There is a difference -between the solar year, and the year of each of these stars. Different, -further, is the year that embraces all the other years, and which -conforms to the movement of the soul, according to which the stars -regulate their movements. As the movement of the soul differs from the -movement of the stars, so also does its time differ from that of the -stars; for the divisions of this latter kind of time correspond to -the spaces travelled by each star, and by its successive passages in -different places. - - -INTELLIGENCE IS MANIFOLD. - -33. (10-12) Intelligence is not the principle of all things; for it -is manifold. Now the manifold presupposes the One. Evidently, it is -intelligence that is manifold; the intelligibles that it thinks do -not form unity, but manifoldness, and they are identical therewith. -Therefore, since intelligence and the intelligible entities are -identical, and as the intelligible entities form a manifoldness, -intelligence itself is manifold. - -The identity of intelligence and of intelligible entities may be -demonstrated as follows. The object that intelligence contemplates -must be in it, or exist outside of itself. It is, besides, evident, -that intelligence contemplates; since, for intelligence, to think is -to be intelligence,[337] therefore, to abstract its thought would be -to deprive it of its "being." This being granted, we must determine in -what manner intelligence contemplates its object. We shall accomplish -this by examining the different faculties by which we acquire various -kinds of knowledge, namely, sensation, imagination and intelligence. - -The principle which makes use of the senses contemplates only by -grasping exterior things, and far from uniting itself to the objects -of its contemplation, from this perception it gathers no more than -an image. Therefore when the eye sees the visible object, it cannot -identify itself with this object; for it would not see it, unless it -were at a certain distance therefrom. Likewise if the object of touch -confused itself with the organ that touches it, it would disappear. -Therefore the senses, and the principle that makes use of the -senses, apply themselves to what is outside of them to perceive this -sense-object. - -Likewise imagination applies its attention to what is outside of it to -form for itself an image of it; it is by this very attention to what -is outside of it that it represents to itself the object of which it -forms an image as exterior. - -That is how sensation and imagination perceive their objects. Neither -of these two faculties folds itself back on itself, nor concentrates -on itself, whether the object of their perception be a corporeal or -incorporeal form. - -Not in this manner is intelligence perceived; this can occur only by -turning towards itself, and by contemplating itself. If it left the -contemplation of its own actualizations, if it ceased to be their -contemplation (or, intuition), it would no longer think anything. -Intelligence perceives the intelligible entity as sensation perceives -the sense-object, by intuition. But in order to contemplate the -sense-object, sensation applies to what is outside of it, because -its object is material. On the contrary, in order to contemplate the -intelligible entity, intelligence concentrates in itself, instead of -applying itself to what is outside of it. That is why some philosophers -have thought that there was only a nominal difference between -intelligence and imagination; for they believed that intelligence -was the imagination of the reasonable animal; as they insisted that -everything should depend on matter and on corporeal nature, they -naturally had to make intelligence also depend therefrom. But our -intelligence contemplates natures (or, "beings"). Therefore, (according -to the hypothesis of these philosophers) our intelligence will -contemplate these natures as located in some place. But these natures -are outside of matter; consequently, they could not be located in any -place. It is therefore evident that the intelligible entities had to be -posited as within intelligence. - -If the intelligible entities be within intelligence, intelligence will -contemplate intelligible entities and will contemplate itself while -contemplating them; by understanding itself, it will think, because it -will understand intelligible entities. Now intelligible entities form -a multitude, for[338] intelligence thinks a multitude of intelligible -entities, and not a unity; therefore, intelligence is manifold. But -manifoldness presupposes unity; consequently, above intelligence, the -existence of unity will be necessary. - -34. (5) Intellectual being is composed of similar parts, so that -existing beings exist both in individual intelligence, and in universal -Intelligence. But, in universal Intelligence, individual (entities) are -themselves conceived universally; while in individual intelligence, -universal beings as well as individual beings are conceived -individually. - - -SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR. - -The One and Identical Being Is Everywhere Present As a Whole. - -OF THE INCORPOREAL. - -35. The incorporeal is that which is conceived of by abstraction -of the body; that is the derivation of its name. To this genus, -according to ancient sages, belong matter, sense-form, when conceived -of apart from matter, natures, faculties, place, time, and surface. -All these entities, indeed, are called incorporeal because they are -not bodies. There are other things that are called incorporeal by a -wrong use of the word, not because they are not bodies, but because -they cannot beget bodies. Thus the incorporeal first mentioned above -subsists within the body, while the incorporeal of the second kind -is completely separated from the body, and from the incorporeal that -subsists within the body. The body, indeed, occupies a place, and the -surface does not exist outside of the body. But intelligence and -intellectual reason (discursive reason), do not occupy any place, do -not subsist in the body, do not constitute any body, and do not depend -on the body, nor on any of the things that are called incorporeal by -abstraction of the body. On the other hand, if we conceive of the void -as incorporeal, intelligence cannot exist within the void. The void, -indeed, may receive a body, but it cannot contain the actualization of -intelligence, nor serve as location for that actualization. Of the two -kinds of the incorporeal of which we have just spoken, the followers of -Zeno reject the one (the incorporeal that exists outside of the body) -and insist on the other (the incorporeal that is separated from the -body by abstraction, and which has no existence outside of the body); -not seeing that the first kind of incorporeality is not similar to -the second, they refuse all reality to the former, though they ought, -nevertheless, to acknowledge that the incorporeal (which subsists -outside of the body), is of another kind (than the incorporeal that -does not subsist outside of the body), and not to believe that, because -one kind of incorporeality has no reality, neither can the other have -any. - - -RELATION BETWEEN THE INCORPOREAL AND THE CORPOREAL. - -34. (2, 3, 4) Everything, if it be somewhere, is there in some manner -that conforms to its nature. For a body that is composed of matter, -and possesses volume, to be somewhere, means that it is located in -some place. On the contrary, the intelligible world, and in general -the existence that is immaterial, and incorporeal in itself, does not -occupy any place, so that the ubiquity of the incorporeal is not a -local presence. "It does not have one part here, and another there;" -for, if so, it would not be outside of all place, nor be without -extension; "wherever it is, it is entire; it is not present here -and absent there;" for in this way it would be contained in some one -place, and excluded from some other. "Nor is it nearer one place, and -further from some other," for only things that occupy place stand -in relations of distance. Consequently, the sense-world is present -to the intelligible in space; but the intelligible is present to -the sense-world in space; but the intelligible is present to the -sense-world without having any parts, nor being in space. When the -indivisible is present in the divisible, "it is entire in each part," -identically and numerically one. "If simple and indivisible existence -become extended and manifold, it is not in respect to the extended -and manifold existence which possesses it, not such as it really is, -but in the manner in which (simple existence) can possess (manifold -existence)." Extended and manifold existence has to become unextended -and simple in its relation with naturally extended and simple -existence, to enjoy its presence. In other terms, it is conformable to -its nature, without dividing, nor multiplying, nor occupying space, -that intelligible existence is present to existence that is naturally -divisible, manifold, and contained within a locality; but it is in -a manifold, divisible and local manner that a located existence is -present to "the existence that has no relation to space." In our -speculations on corporeal and incorporeal existence, therefore, we must -not confuse their characteristics, preserving the respective nature of -each, taking good care not to let our imagination or opinion attribute -to the incorporeal certain corporeal qualities. Nobody attributes to -bodies incorporeal characteristics, because everybody lives in daily -touch with bodies; but as it is so difficult to cognize incorporeal -natures ("beings"), only vague conceptions are formed of it, and they -cannot be grasped so long as one lets oneself be guided by imagination. -One has to say to oneself, a being known by the senses is located -in space, and is outside of itself because it has a volume; "the -intelligible being is not located in space, but in itself," because -it has no volume. The one is a copy, the other is an archetype; the -one derives its existence from the intelligible, the other finds it in -itself; for every image is an image of intelligence. The properties of -the corporeal and the incorporeal must be clearly kept in mind so as to -avoid surprise at their difference, in spite of their union, if indeed -it be permissible to apply the term "union" to their mutual relation; -for we must not think of the union of corporeal substances, but of -the union of substances whose properties are completely incompatible, -according to the individuality of their hypostatic form of existence. -Such union differs entirely from that of "homoousian" substances of -the same nature; consequently, it is neither a blend, nor a mixture, -nor a real union, nor a mere collocation. The relation between the -corporeal and the incorporeal is established in a different manner, -which manifests in the communication of "homoousian" substances of the -sense nature, of which, however, no corporeal operation can give any -idea. The incorporeal being is wholly without extension in all the -parts of the extended being, even though the number of these parts were -infinite. "It is present in an indivisible manner, without establishing -a correspondence between each of its parts with the parts of the -extended being;" it does not become manifold merely because, in a -manifold manner, it is present to a multitude of parts. The whole of it -is entire in all the parts of the extended being, in each of them, and -in the whole mass, without dividing or becoming manifold to enter into -relations with the manifold, preserving its numerical identity.[339] It -is only to beings whose power is dispersed that it belongs to possess -the intelligible by parts and by fractions. Often these beings, on -changing from their nature, imitate intelligible beings by a deceptive -appearance, and we are in doubt about their nature ("being"), for they -seem to have exchanged it for that of incorporeal "being," or essence. - - -THE INCORPOREAL HAS NO EXTENSION. - -37. (5) That which really exists has neither great nor small. Greatness -and smallness are attributes of corporeal mass. By its identity and -numerical unity, real existence is neither great nor small, neither -very large nor very small, though it cause even greatest and smallest -to participate in its nature. It must not, therefore, be represented -as great, for in that case we could not conceive how it could be -located in the smallest space without being diminished or condensed. -Nor should it be represented as small, which conception of it would -hinder our understanding how it could be present in a whole large body -without being increased or extended. We must try to gain a simultaneous -conception of both that which is very large and very small, and realize -real existence as preserving its identity and its indwelling in itself -in any chance body whatever, along with an infinity of other bodies of -different sizes. It is united to the extension of the world, without -extending itself, or uniting, and it exceeds the extension of the world -as well as that of its parts, by embracing them within its unity. -Likewise, the world unites with real existence by all its parts, so far -as its nature allows it to do so, though it cannot, however, embrace -it entirely, nor contain its whole power. Real existence is infinite -and incomprehensible for the world because, among other attributes, it -possesses that of having no extension. - -38. Great[340] magnitude is a hindrance for a body, if, instead of -comparing it to things of the same kind, it is considered in relation -with things of a different nature; for volume is, as it were, a kind -of procession of existence outside of itself, and a breaking up of -its power. That which possesses a superior power is alien to all -extension; for potentiality does not succeed in realizing its fulness -until it concentrates within itself; it needs to fortify itself to -acquire all its energy. Consequently the body, by extending into -space, loses its energy, and withdraws from the potency that belongs -to real and incorporeal existence; but real existence does not weaken -in extension, because, having no extension, it preserves the greatness -of its potency. Just as, in relation to the body, real existence has -neither extension nor volume, likewise corporeal existence, in relation -to real existence, is weak and impotent. The existence that possesses -the greatest power does not occupy any extension. Consequently, though -the world fill space, though it be everywhere united to real extension, -it could not, nevertheless, embrace the greatness of its potency. It -is united to real existence, not by parts, but in an indivisible and -indefinite manner. Therefore, the incorporeal is present to the body, -not in a local manner, but by assimilation, so far as the body is -capable of being assimilated to the incorporeal, and as the incorporeal -can manifest in it. The incorporeal is not present to the material, -in so far as the material is incapable of being assimilated to a -completely immaterial principle; however, the incorporeal is present to -the corporeal in so far as the corporeal can be assimilated thereto. -Nor is the incorporeal present to the material by receptivity (in -the sense that one of these two substances would receive something -from the other); otherwise the material and the immaterial would be -altered; the former, on receiving the immaterial, into which it would -be transformed, and the latter, on becoming material. Therefore, when -a relation is established between two substances that are as different -as the corporeal and the incorporeal, an assimilation and participation -that is reciprocal to the power of the one, and the impotence of -the other, occurs. That is why the world always remains very distant -from the power of real existence, and the latter from the impotence -of material nature. But that which occupies the middle, that which -simultaneously assimilates and is assimilated, that which unites the -extremes, becomes a cause of error in respect to them, because the -substances it brings together by assimilation are very different. - - -RELATION OF INDIVIDUAL SOULS TO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. - -39. "It[341] would be wrong to suppose that the manifoldness of souls -was derived from the manifoldness of bodies. The individual souls, -as well as the universal Soul, subsist independently of the bodies, -without the unity of the universal Soul absorbing the manifoldness of -individual souls, and without the manifoldness of the latter splitting -up the unity of the universal Soul." Individual souls are distinct -without being separated from each other, and without dividing the -universal Soul into a number of parts; they are united to each other -without becoming confused, and without making the universal Soul a -mere total; "for they are not separated by limits," and they are not -confused with each other; "they are as distinct from each other as -different sciences in a single soul." Further, individual souls are -not contained in the universal Soul as if they were bodies, that -is, like really different substances (?), for they are qualitative -actualizations of the soul. Indeed, "the power of the universal Soul -is infinite," and all that participates in her is soul; all the souls -form the universal Soul, and, nevertheless, the universal Soul exists -independently of all individual souls. Just as one does not arrive -at the incorporeal by infinite division of bodies, seeing that such -a division would modify them only in respect to magnitude, likewise, -on infinitely dividing the soul, which is a living form, we reach -nothing but species (not individuals); for the Soul contains specific -differences, and she exists entire with them as well as without -them. Indeed, though the Soul should be divided within herself, her -diversity does not destroy her identity. If the unity of bodies, in -which manifoldness prevails over identity, is not broken up by their -union with an incorporeal principle; if, on the contrary, all of them -possess the unity of "being" or substance, and are divided only by -qualities and other forms; what shall we say or think of the species -of incorporeal life, where identity prevails over manifoldness, and -where there is no substrate alien to form, and from which bodies might -derive their unity? The unity of the Soul could not be split up by -her union with a body, though the body often hinder her operations. -Being identical, the Soul discovers everything by herself, because her -actualizations are species, however far the division be carried. When -the Soul is separated from bodies, each of her parts possesses all -the powers possessed by the Soul herself, just as an individual seed -has the same properties as the universal Seed (seminal reason). As -an individual seed, being united to matter, preserves the properties -of the universal Seed (seminal reason), and as, on the other hand, -universal Seed possesses all the properties of the individual seeds -dispersed within matter, thus the parts which we conceive of in the -(universal) Soul that is separated from matter, possess all the powers -of the universal Soul.[342] The individual soul, which declines towards -matter, is bound to the matter by the form which her disposition has -made her choose; but she preserves the powers of the universal Soul, -and she unites with her when the (individual soul) turns away from the -body, to concentrate within herself. - -Now as in the course of her declination towards matter, the soul is -stripped entirely bare by the total exhaustion of her own faculties; -and as, on the contrary, on rising towards intelligence, she recovers -the fulness of the powers of the universal Soul,[343] the ancient -philosophers were right, in their mystic phrasing, to describe these -two opposite conditions of the Soul by the names of Penia and Poros, -(Wealth and Poverty).[344] - - -SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE. - -The One and Identical Being is Everywhere Present In Its Entirety.[345] - -THE INCORPOREAL BEING IS ENTIRE IN EVERYTHING. - -40. Better[346] to express the special nature of incorporeal existence -the ancient philosophers, particularly Parmenides,[347] do not content -themselves with saying "it is one," but they also add "and all," just -as a sense-object is a whole. But as this unity of the sense-object -contains a diversity (for in the sense-object the total unity is not -all things in so far as it is one, and as all things constitute the -total unity). The ancient philosophers also add, "in so far as it is -one." This was to prevent people from imagining a collective whole -and to indicate that the real being is all, only by virtue of its -indivisible unity. After having said, "it is everywhere," they add, "it -is nowhere." Then, after having said, "it is in all," that is, in all -individual things whose disposition enables them to receive it, they -still add, as an entire whole. They represent it thus simultaneously -under the most opposite attributes, so as to eliminate all the false -imaginations which are drawn from the natures of the bodies, and which -will only obscure the genuine idea of real existence. - - -DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE INTELLIGIBLE BEING, AND THE BEING OF SENSATION. - -41. Such[348] are the genuine characteristics of the sensual and -material; it is extended, mutable, always different from what it -was, and composite; it does not subsist by itself, it is located in -a place, and has volume, and so forth. On the contrary, the real -being that is self-subsisting, is founded on itself, and is always -identical; its nature ("being") is identity, it is essentially -immutable, simple, indissoluble, without extension, and outside of all -place; it is neither born, nor does it perish. So let us define these -characteristics of the sensual and veritable existence, and let us put -aside all other attributes. - -42. Real[349] existence is said to be manifold, without its really -being different in space, volume, number, figure, or extension of -parts; its division is a diversity without matter, volume, or real -manifoldness. Consequently, the real being is one. Its unity does not -resemble that of a body, of a place, of a volume, of a multitude. It -possesses diversity in unity. Its diversity implies both division -and union; for it is neither exterior nor incidental; real existence -is not manifold by participation in some other (nature), but by -itself. It remains one by exercising all its powers, because it holds -its diversity from its very identity, and not by an assemblage of -heterogeneous parts, such as bodies. The latter possess unity in -diversity; for, in them, it is diversity that dominates, the unity -being exterior and incidental. In real existence, on the contrary, -it is unity that dominates with identity; diversity is born of the -development of the power of unity. Consequently, real existence -preserves its indivisibility by multiplying itself; while the body -preserves its volume and multiplicity by unifying itself. Real -existence is founded on itself, because it is one by itself. The -body is never founded upon itself, because it subsists only by its -extension. Real existence is, therefore, a fruitful unity, and the body -is a unified multitude. We must, therefore, exactly determine how real -existence is both one and manifold, how the body is both manifold and -one, and we must guard from confusing the attributes of either. - - -THE DIVINITY IS EVERYWHERE AND NOWHERE. - -43. The divinity[350] is everywhere because it is nowhere. So also with -intelligence and the soul. But it is in relation to all beings that it -surpasses, that the divinity is everywhere and nowhere; its presence -and its absence depend entirely on its nature and its will.[351] -Intelligence is in the divinity, but it is only in relation to the -things that are subordinated to it, that intelligence is everywhere and -nowhere (?). The body is within the soul and in divinity. All things -that possess or do not possess existence proceed from divinity, and are -within divinity; but the divinity is none of them, nor in any of them. -If the divinity were only present everywhere, it would be all things, -and in all things; but, on the other hand, it is nowhere; everything, -therefore, is begotten in it and by it, because it is everywhere, but -nothing becomes confused with it, because it is nowhere. Likewise if -intelligence be the principle of the souls and of the things that come -after the souls, it is because it is everywhere and nowhere; because -it is neither soul, nor any of the things that come after the soul, -nor in any of them; it is because it is not only everywhere, but also -nowhere in respect to the beings that are inferior to it. Similarly -the soul is neither a body, nor in the body, but is only the cause of -the body, because she is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere in the -body. So there is procession in the universe (from what is everywhere -and nowhere), down to what can neither simultaneously be everywhere -and nowhere, and which limits itself to participating in this double -property. - - -THE HUMAN SOUL IS UNITED TO UNIVERSAL BEING BY ITS NATURE. - -44. "When[352] you have conceived of the inexhaustible and infinite -power of existence in itself, and when you begin to realize its -incessant and indefatigable nature, which completely suffices itself," -which has the privilege of being the purest life, of possessing itself -fully, of being founded upon itself, of neither desiring nor seeking -anything outside of itself, "you should not attribute to it any -special determination," or any relation; for when you limit yourself -by some consideration of space or relation, you doubtlessly do not -limit existence in itself, but you turn away from it, extending the -veil of imagination over your thought. "You can neither transgress, -nor fix, nor determine, nor condense within narrow limits, the -nature of existence in itself, as if it had nothing further to give -beyond (certain limits), exhausting itself gradually." It is the -most inexhaustible spring of which you can form a notion. "When you -will have achieved (?) that nature, and when you will have become -assimilated to eternal existence, seek nothing beyond." Otherwise, -you will be going away from it, you will be directing your glances on -something else. "If you do not seek anything beyond," if you shrink -within yourself and into your own nature, "you will become assimilated -to universal Existence, and you will not halt at anything inferior -to it. Do not say, That is what I am. Forgetting what you are (?), -you will become universal Existence. You were already universal -Existence, but you had something besides; by that mere fact you were -inferior, because that possession of yours that was beyond universal -Existence was derived from nonentity. Nothing can be added to universal -Existence." When we add to it something derived from nonentity, we -fall into poverty and into complete deprivation. "Therefore, abandon -nonentity, and you will fully possess yourself, (in that you will -acquire universal existence by putting all else aside; for, so long as -one remains with the remainder, existence does not manifest; and does -not grant its presence)." Existence is discovered by putting aside -everything that degrades and diminishes it, ceasing to confuse it with -inferior objects, and ceasing to form a false idea of it. Otherwise -one departs both from existence and from oneself. Indeed, when one -is present to oneself, he possesses the existence that is present -everywhere; when one departs from himself, he also departs from it. So -important is it for the soul to acquaint herself with what is in her, -and to withdraw from what is outside of her; for existence is within -us, and nonentity is outside of us. Now existence is present within us, -when we are not distracted from it by other things. "It does not come -near us to make us enjoy its presence. It is we who withdraw from it, -when it is not present with us." Is there anything surprising in this? -To be near existence, you do not need to withdraw from yourselves; for -"you are both far from existence and near it, in this sense that it is -you who come near to it, and you who withdraw from it, when, instead of -considering yourselves, you consider that which is foreign to you." If -then you are near existence while being far from it; if, by the mere -fact of your being ignorant of yourselves, you know all things to which -you are present, and which are distant from you, rather than yourself -who is naturally near you, is there anything surprising in that, that -which is not near you should remain foreign to you, since you withdraw -from it when you withdraw from yourself? Though you should always be -near yourself, and though you cannot withdraw from it, you must be -present with yourself to enjoy the presence of the being from which -you are so substantially inseparable as from yourself. In that way it -is given you to know what exists near existence, and what is distant -from it, though itself be present everywhere and nowhere. He who by -thought can penetrate within his own substance, and can thus acquire -knowledge of it, finds himself in this actualization of knowledge and -consciousness, where the substrate that knows is identical with the -object that is known. Now when a man thus possesses himself, he also -possesses existence. He who goes out of himself to attach himself to -external objects, withdraws also from existence, when withdrawing -also from himself. It is natural to us to establish ourselves within -ourselves, where we enjoy the whole wealth of our own resources, and -not to turn ourselves away from ourselves towards what is foreign to -ourselves, and where we find nothing but the most complete poverty. -Otherwise, we are withdrawing from existence, though it be near us; for -it is neither space, nor "being" (substance), nor any obstacle that -separates us from existence; it is our reversion towards nonentity. Our -alienation from ourselves, and our ignorance are thus a just punishment -of our withdrawal from existence. On the contrary, the love that the -soul has for herself leads her to self-knowledge and communion with the -divinity. Consequently, it has rightly been said that man here below is -in a prison, because he has fled from heaven[353] ... and because he -tries to break his bonds; for, when he turns towards things here below, -he has abandoned himself, and has withdrawn from his divine origin. -It is, (as Empedocles says), "a fugitive who has deserted his heavenly -fatherland."[354] That is why the life of a vicious man is a life that -is servile, impious, and unjust, and his spirit is full of impiety and -injustice.[355] On the contrary, justice, as has been rightly said, -consists in each one fulfilling his function (?). To distribute to each -person his due is genuine justice. - - - - -PSYCHOLOGICAL FRAGMENTS. - - -A. On the Faculties of the Soul, by Porphyry.[356] - - -OBJECT OF THE BOOK. - -We propose to describe the faculties of the soul, and to set forth -the various opinions on the subject held by both ancient and modern -thinkers. - - -DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SENSATION AND INTELLIGENCE. - -Aristo (there were two philosophers by this name, one a Stoic, the -other an Aristotelian) attributes to the soul a perceptive faculty, -which he divides into two parts. According to him, the first, called -sensibility, the principle and origin of sensations, is usually kept -active by some one of the sense-organs. The other, which subsists -by itself, and without organs, does not bear any special name in -beings devoid of reason, in whom reason does not manifest, or at -least manifests only in a feeble or obscure manner; however, it is -called intelligence in beings endowed with reason, among whom alone -it manifests clearly. Aristo holds that sensibility acts only with -the help of the sense-organs, and that intelligence does not need -them to enter into activity. Why then does he subordinate both of -these to a single genus, called the perceptive faculty? Both doubtless -perceive, but the one perceives the sense-form of beings, while the -other perceives their essence. Indeed, sensibility does not perceive -the essence, but the sense-form, and the figure; it is intelligence -that perceives whether the object be a man or a horse. There are, -therefore, two kinds of perception that are very different from each -other; sense-perception receives an impression, and applies itself to -an exterior object; on the contrary, intellectual perception does not -receive any impression. - -There have been philosophers who separated these two parts; they called -intelligence or discursive reason the understanding which is exercised -without imagination and sensation; and opinion, the understanding -which is exercised with imagination and sensation. Others, on the -contrary, considered rational "being," or nature, a simple essence, -and attributed to it operations whose nature is entirely different. -Now it is unreasonable to refer to the same essence faculties which -differ completely in nature; for thought and sensation could not depend -on the same essential principle; and if we were to call the operation -of intelligence a perception, we would only be juggling with words. -We must, therefore, establish a perfectly clear distinction between -these two entities, intelligence and sensibility. On the one hand, -intelligence possesses a quite peculiar nature, as is also the case -with discursive reason, which is next below it. The function of the -former is intuitive thought, while that of the latter is discursive -thought. On the other hand, sensibility differs entirely from -intelligence, acting with or without the help of organs; in the former -case, it is called sensation; in the latter, imagination. Nevertheless, -sensation and imagination belong to the same genus. In understanding, -intuitive intelligence is superior to opinion, which applies to -sensation or imagination; this latter kind of thought, whether called -discursive thought, or anything else (such as opinion), is superior to -sensation and imagination, but inferior to intuitive thought. - - -OF ASSENT. - -Numenius, who teaches that the faculty of assent (or, combining -faculty) is capable of producing various operations, says that -representation (fancy) is an accessory of this faculty, that it does -not, however, constitute either an operation or function of it, but -a consequence of it. The Stoics, on the contrary, not only make -sensation consist in representation, but even reduce representation -to (combining) assent. According to them sense-imagination (or -sense-fancy) is assent, or the sensation of the determination of -assent. Longinus, however, does not acknowledge any faculty of assent. -The philosophers of the ancient Academy (the Platonists) believe -that sensation does not comprise sense-representation, and that, -consequently, it does not have any original property, since it does -not participate in assent. If sense representation consisted of assent -added to sensation, sensation, by itself, will have no virtue, since it -is not the assent given to the things we possess. - - -OF THE PARTS OF THE SOUL. - -It is not only about the faculties that the ancient philosophers -disagree.... They are besides in radical disagreement about the -following questions: What are the parts of the soul; what is a part; -what is a faculty; what difference is there between a part and a -faculty? - -The Stoics divide the soul into eight parts: the five senses, speech, -sex-power, and the directing (predominating) principle, which is served -by the other faculties, so that the soul is composed of a faculty that -commands, and faculties that obey. - -In their writing about ethics, Plato and Aristotle divide the soul into -three parts. This division has been adopted by the greater part of -later philosophers; but these have not understood that the object of -this definition was to classify and define the virtues (Plato: reason, -anger and appetite; Aristotle: locomotion, appetite and understanding). -Indeed, if this classification be carefully scrutinized, it will be -seen that it fails to account for all the faculties of the soul; it -neglects imagination, sensibility, intelligence, and the natural -faculties (the generative and nutritive powers). - -Other philosophers, such as Numenius, do not teach one soul in three -parts, like the preceding, nor in two, such as the rational and -irrational parts. They believe that we have two souls, one rational, -the other irrational. Some among them attribute immortality to both of -the souls; others attribute it only to the rational soul, and think -that death not only suspends the exercise of the faculties that belong -to the irrational soul, but even dissolves its "being" or essence. -Last, there are some that believe, that by virtue of the union of the -two souls, their movements are double, because each of them feels the -passions of the other. - - -OF THE DIFFERENCE OF THE PARTS, AND OF THE FACULTIES OF THE SOUL. - -We shall now explain the difference obtaining between a part -and a faculty of the soul. One part differs from another by the -characteristics of its genus (or, kind); while different faculties may -relate to a common genus. That is why Aristotle did not allow that the -soul contained parts, though granting that it contained faculties. -Indeed, the introduction of a new part changes the nature of the -subject, while the diversity of faculties does not alter its unity. -Longinus did not allow in the animal (or, living being) for several -parts, but only for several faculties. In this respect, he followed the -doctrine of Plato, according to whom the soul, in herself indivisible, -is divided within bodies. Besides, that the soul does not have several -parts does not necessarily imply that she has only a single faculty; -for that which has no parts may still possess several faculties. - -To conclude this confused discussion, we shall have to lay down a -principle of definition which will help to determine the essential -differences and resemblances that exist either between the parts of a -same subject, or between its faculties, or between its parts and its -faculties. This will clearly reveal whether in the organism the soul -really has several parts, or merely several faculties, and what opinion -about them should be adopted. (For there are two special types of -these.) The one attributes to man a single soul, genuinely composed of -several parts, either by itself, or in relation to the body. The other -one sees in man a union of several souls, looking on the man as on a -choir, the harmony of whose parts constitutes its unity, so that we -find several essentially different parts contributing to the formation -of a single being. - -First we shall have to study within the soul the differentials between -the part, the faculty and the disposition. A part always differs from -another by the substrate, genus, and function. A disposition in a -special aptitude of some one part to carry out the part assigned to it -by nature. A faculty is the habit of a disposition, the power inherent -in some part to do the thing for which it has a disposition. There -was no great inconvenience in confusing faculty and disposition; but -there is an essential difference between part and faculty. Whatever -the number of faculties, they can exist within a single "being," or -nature, without occupying any particular point in the extension of the -substrate, while the parts somewhat participate in its extension, -occupying therein a particular point. Thus all the properties of an -apple are gathered within a single substrate, but the different parts -that compose it are separate from each other. The notion of a part -implies the idea of quantity in respect to the totality of the subject. -On the contrary, the notion of a faculty implies the idea of totality. -That is why the faculties remain indivisible, because they penetrate -the whole substrate, while the parts are separate from each other -because they have a quantity. - -How then may we say that a soul is indivisible, while having three -parts? For when we hear it asserted that she contains three parts -in respect to quantity, it is reasonable to ask how the soul can -simultaneously be indivisible, and yet have three parts. This -difficulty may be solved as follows: the soul is indivisible in so far -as she is considered within her "being," and in herself; and that she -has three parts in so far as she is united to a divisible body, and -that she exercises her different faculties in the different parts of -the body. Indeed, it is not the same faculty that resides in the head, -in the breast, or in the liver;[357] (the seats of reason, of anger -and appetite). Therefore, when the soul has been divided into several -parts, it is in this sense that her different functions are exercised -within different parts of the body. - -Nicholas (of Damascus[358]), in his book "On the Soul," used to say -that the division of the soul was not founded on quantity, but on -quality, like the division of an art or a science. Indeed, when we -consider an extension, we see that the whole is a sum of its parts, -and that it increases or diminishes according as a part is added or -subtracted. Now it is not in this sense that we attribute parts to -the soul; she is not the sum of her parts, because she is neither an -extension nor a multitude. The parts of the soul resemble those of an -art. There is, however, this difference, that an art is incomplete -or imperfect if it lack some part, while every soul is perfect, and -while every organism that has not achieved the goal of its nature is an -imperfect being. - -Thus by parts of the soul Nicholas means the different faculties of -the organism. Indeed, the organism, and, in general, the animated -being, by the mere fact of possessing a soul, possesses several -faculties, such as life, feeling, movement, thought, desire, and the -cause and principle of all of them is the soul. Those, therefore, who -distinguish parts in the soul thereby mean the faculties by which the -animated being can produce actualizations, or experience affections. -While the soul herself is said to be indivisible, nothing hinders her -functions from being divided. The organism, therefore, is divisible, -if we introduce within the notion of the soul that of the body; for -the vital functions by the soul communicated to the body must thereby -necessarily be divided by the diversity of the organs, and it is this -division of vital functions that has caused parts to be ascribed to -the soul herself. As the soul can be conceived of in two different -conditions, according as she lives within herself, or as she declines -towards the body,[359] it is only when she declines towards the body -that she splits up into parts. When a seed of corn is sowed, and -produces an ear, we see in this ear of corn the appearance of parts, -though the whole it forms be indivisible,[360] and these indivisible -parts themselves later return to an indivisible unity; likewise, when -the soul, which by herself is indivisible, finds herself united to the -body, parts are seen to appear. - -We must still examine which are the faculties that the soul develops -by herself (intelligence and discursive reason), and which the soul -develops by the animal (sensation). This will be the true means of -illustrating the difference between these two natures ("beings"), and -the necessity of reducing to the soul herself those parts of her -"being" which have been enclosed within the parts of the body.[361] - - -B. Jamblichus.[362] - -Plato, Archytas, and the other Pythagoreans divide the soul into three -parts, reason, anger, and appetite, which they consider to be necessary -to form the ground-work for the virtues. They assign to the soul as -faculties the natural (generative) power, sensibility, imagination, -locomotion, love of the good and beautiful, and last, intelligence. - - -C. Nemesius.[363] - -Aristotle says, in his Physics,[364] that the soul has five -faculties, the power of growth, sensation, locomotion, appetite, -and understanding. But, in his Ethics, he divides the soul into two -principal parts, which are rational part, and the irrational part; -then Aristotle subdivides the latter into the part that is subject to -reason, and the part not subject to reason. - - -D. Jamblichus.[365] - -The Platonists hold different opinions. Some, like Plotinos and -Porphyry, reduce to a single order and idea the different functions and -faculties of life; others, like Numenius, imagine them to be opposed, -as if in a struggle; while others, like Atticus and Plutarch, bring -harmony out of the struggle. - - -E. Ammonius Saccas. - -A. FROM NEMESIUS.[366] - -ON THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL. - -It will suffice to oppose the arguments of Ammonius, teacher of -Plotinos, and those of Numenius the Pythagorean, to that of all those -who claim that the soul is material. These are the reasons: "Bodies, -containing nothing unchangeable, are naturally subject to change, to -dissolution, and to infinite divisions. They inevitably need some -principle that may contain them, that may bind and strengthen their -parts; this is the unifying principle that we call soul. But if the -soul also be material, however subtle be the matter of which she may be -composed, what could contain the soul herself, since we have just seen -that all matter needs some principle to contain it? The same process -will go on continuously to infinity until we arrive at an immaterial -substance." - -UNION OF THE SOUL AND THE BODY. - -Ammonius, teacher of Plotinos, thus explained the present problem (the -union of soul and body): "The intelligible is of a nature such that it -unites with whatever is able to receive it, as intimately as the union -of things, that mutually alter each other in uniting, though, at the -same time, it remains pure and incorruptible, as do things that merely -coexist.[367] Indeed, in the case of bodies, union alters the parts -that meet, since they form new bodies; that is how elements change into -composite bodies, food into blood, blood into flesh, and other parts -of the body. But, as to the intelligible, the union occurs without any -alteration; for it is repugnant to the nature of the intelligible to -undergo an alteration in its essential nature. It disappears, or it -ceases to be, but it is not susceptible of change. Now the intelligible -cannot be annihilated; otherwise it would not be immortal; and as -the soul is life, if it changed in its union with the body, it would -become something different, and would no longer be life. What would -the soul afford to the body, if not life? In her union (with the body, -therefore), the soul undergoes no alteration. - -Since it has been demonstrated that, in its essential nature, the -intelligible is immutable, the necessary result must be that it does -not alter at the same time as the entities to which it is united. The -soul, therefore, is united to the body, but she does not form a mixture -with it.[368] The sympathy that exists between them shows that they are -united; for the entirely animated being is a whole that is sympathetic -to itself, and that is consequently really one.[369] - -What proves that the soul does not form a mixture with the body, is the -soul's power to separate from the body during sleep; leaving the body -as it were inanimate, with only a breath of life, to keep it from dying -entirely; using her own activity only in dreams, to foresee the future, -and to live in the intelligible world. - -This appears again when the soul gathers herself together to devote -herself to her thoughts; for then she separates from the body so far as -she can, and retires within herself better to be able to apply herself -to the consideration of intelligible things. Indeed, being incorporeal, -she unites with the body as closely as the union of things which by -combining together perish because of each other, (thus giving birth to -a mixture); at the same time, she remains without alteration, as two -things that are only placed by each others' side; and she preserves -her unity. Thus, according to her own life, she modifies that to which -she is united, but she is not modified thereby. Just as the sun, by -its presence, makes the air luminous, without itself changing in any -way, and thus, so to speak, mingles itself therewith, without mingling -itself (in reality), so the soul, though united with the body, remains -quite distinct therefrom. But there is this difference, that the sun, -being a body, and consequently being circumscribed within a certain -space, is not everywhere where is its light; just as the fire dwells -in the wood, or in the wick of the lamp, as if enclosed within a -locality; but the soul, being incorporeal, and not being subjected to -any local limitation, exists as a whole everywhere where her light -is; and there is no part of the body that is illuminated by the soul -in which the soul is not entirely present. It is not the body that -commands the soul; it is the soul, on the contrary, that commands the -body. She is not in the body as if in a vase or a gourd; it is rather -the body that is in the soul.[370] - -The intelligible, therefore, is not imprisoned within the body; it -spreads in all the body's parts, it penetrates them, it goes through -them, and could not be enclosed in any place; for by virtue of its -nature, it resides in the intelligible world; it has no locality other -than itself, or than an intelligible situated still higher. Thus the -soul is within herself when she reasons, and in intelligence when she -yields herself to contemplation. When it is asserted that the soul is -in the body, it is not meant that the soul is in it as in a locality; -it is only meant that the soul is in a habitual relation with the body; -and that the soul is present there, as we say that God is in us. For -we think that the soul is united to the body, not in a corporeal and -local manner, but by the soul's habitual relations, her inclination and -disposition, as a lover is attached to his beloved. Besides, as the -affection of the soul has neither extension, nor weight, nor parts, -she could not be circumscribed by local limitations. Within what place -could that which has no parts be contained? For place and corporeal -extension are inseparable; the place is limited space in which the -container contains the contained. But if we were to say, "My soul is -then in Alexandria, in Rome, and everywhere else;" we would be still -speaking of space carelessly, since being in Alexandria, or in general, -being somewhere, is being in a place; now the soul is absolutely in -no place; she can only be in some relation with some place, since it -has been demonstrated that she could not be contained within a place. -If then an intelligible entity "be in relation with a place, or with -something located in a place, we say, in a figurative manner, that -this intelligible entity is in this place, because it tends thither by -its activity; and we take the location for the inclination or for the -activity which leads it thither. If we were to say, That is where the -soul acts, we would be saying, "The soul is there." - - -B. NOTICE OF AMMONIUS BY HIEROCLES.[371] - -Then shone the wisdom of Ammonius, who is famous under the name of -"Inspired by the Divinity." It was he, in fact, who, purifying the -opinions of the ancient philosophers, and dissipating the fancies woven -here and there, established harmony between the teaching of Plato, and -that of Aristotle, in that which was most essential and fundamental.... -It was Ammonius of Alexandria, the "Inspired by the Divinity," who, -devoting himself enthusiastically to the truth in philosophy, and -rising above the popular notions that made of philosophy an object -of scorn, clearly understood the doctrine of Plato and of Aristotle, -gathered them into a single ideal, and thus peacefully handed -philosophy down to his disciples Plotinos, the (pagan) Origen, and -their successors. - - - - -PLOTINIC STUDIES IN SOURCES, DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCE. - - - - -I. DEVELOPMENT IN THE TEACHINGS OF PLOTINOS. - - -It was only through long hard work that the writer arrived at -conclusions which the reader may be disposed to accept as very -natural, under the circumstances. It is possible that the reader may, -nevertheless, be interested in the manner in which the suggestion here -advanced was reached. - -The writer had for several years been working at the premier edition -of the fragments of Numenius, in reasonably complete form, with -translation and outline. After ransacking the accessible sources of -fragments, there remained yet an alleged treatise of Numenius on -Matter, in the library of the Escoreal, near Madrid. This had been -known to savants in Germany for many years; and Prof. Uzener, of -Bonn, in his criticism of Thedinga's partial collection of fragments, -had expressed a strong desire that it be investigated; it had also -been noticed by Zeller, and Bouillet, as well as Chaignet. If then I -hoped to publish a comparatively reliable collection of the fragments -of Numenius, it was my duty, though hailing from far America, and -though no European had shown enough interest therein to send for a -photographic copy, to go there, and get one, which I did in July, 1913. -I bore the precious fragment to Rostock and Prof. Thedinga in Hagen, -where, however, we discovered that it was no more than a section of -Plotinos's Enneads, iii. 6.6 to end. The manuscript did, indeed, show -an erasure of the name of Plotinos, and the substitution of that of -Numenius. After the first disappointment, it became unavoidable to ask -the question why the monk should have done that. Had he any reason -to suppose that this represented Numenian doctrine, even if it was -not written by Numenius? Having no external data to go by, it became -necessary to resort to internal criticism, to compare this Plotinian -treatment of matter with other Plotinian treatments, in other portions -of the Enneads. - -This then inevitably led to a close scrutiny of Plotinos's various -treatments of the subject, with results that were very much unlooked -for. This part that we might well have had reason to ascribe to -Numenian influence, on the contrary, turned out to be by far -more Plotinian than other sections that we would at first have -unhesitatingly considered Plotinian, and, as will be seen elsewhere, -the really doubtful portions occur in the very last works of Plotinos's -life, where it would have been more natural to expect the most genuine. -However, the result was a demonstration of a progress in doctrines in -the career of Plotinos, and after a careful study thereof, the reader -will agree that we have in this case every element of probability in -favor of such a development; indeed, it will seem so natural that the -unbiased reader will ask himself why this idea has not before this been -the general view of the matter. - - * * * * * - -First a few words about the distinction of periods in general. -Among unreflecting people, for centuries, it has been customary -to settle disputes by appeals to the Bible as a whole. This was -always satisfactory, until somebody else came along who held totally -different views, which he supported just as satisfactorily from the -same authority. The result was the century-long bloody wars of the -Reformation, everywhere leaving in that particular place, as the -orthodox, the stronger. Since thirty years, however, the situation has -changed. The contradictions of the Bible, so long the ammunition of -scoffers of the type of Ingersoll, became the pathfinders of the Higher -Criticism, which has solved the otherwise insoluble difficulties by -showing them to rest on parallel documents, and different authors. It -is no longer sufficient to appeal to Isaiah; we must now specify which -Isaiah we mean; and we may no longer refer to the book of Genesis, but -to the Jehovistic or Elohistic documents. - -This method of criticism is slowly gaining ground with other works. The -writer, for instance, applied it with success to the Gathas, or hymns -of Zoroaster. These appear in the Yasnas in two sections which have -ever given the editors much trouble. Either they were printed in the -meaningless traditional order, or they were mixed confusedly according -to the editor's fancy, resulting of course in a fancy picture. The -writer, however, discovered they were duplicate lives of Zoroaster, and -printing them on opposite pages, he has shown parallel development, -reducing the age-long difficulties to perfectly reasonable, and -mutually confirming order. - -Another case is that of Plato. It is still considered allowable to -quote the authority of Plato, as such; but in scientific matters we -must always state which period of Plato's activities, the Plato of the -Republic, or the more conservative Plato of the Laws, and the evil -World-soul, is meant. - -Another philosopher in the same case is Schelling, among whose views -the text-books distinguish as many as five different periods. This -is no indication of mental instability, but rather a proof that he -remained awake as long as he lived. No man can indeed continue to think -with genuineness without changing his views; and only men as great as -Bacon or Emerson have had the temerity to discredit consistency when -it is no more than mental inertia. - -There are many other famous men who changed their views. Prominent -among them is Goethe, whose Second Faust, finished in old age, strongly -contrasted with the First Part. What then would be inherently unlikely -in Plotinos's changing his views during the course of half a century -of philosophical activity? On the contrary, it would be a much greater -marvel had he not done so; and the burden of proof really lies with the -partisans of unchanging opinions. - -For example: in ii. 4 we find Plotinos discussing the doctrine of two -matters, the physical and the intelligible. In the very next book, -of the same Ennead, in ii. 5.3, we find him discrediting this same -intelligible matter. Moreover, in i. 8.7, he approves of the world as -mixture; in ii. 4.7 he disapproves of it. What do these contradictions -mean? That Plotinos was unreliable? That he was mentally incoherent? -No, something much simpler. By consulting the tables of Porphyry, we -discover of the first two, that the first statement was made during -the Amelian period, and the latter during the Porphyrian. Another case -of such contradiction is his assertion of positive evil (i. 8) and -his denial thereof (ii. 9). The latter assertion is of the Porphyrian -period, the former is Eustochian; while of the latter two, the first -was Eustochian; and the second Amelian. It is simply a case of -development of doctrines at different periods of his life. - - * * * * * - -Let us now examine Plotinos's various treatments of the subject of -matter. - -The first treatment of matter occurs in the first Ennead, and it may -be described as thoroughly Numenian, being treated in conjunction with -the subject of evil. First, we have the expression of the Supreme -hovering over Being.[372] Then we have the soul double,[373] reminding -us of Numenius's view of the double Second Divinity[374] and the double -soul.[375] Then we have positive evil occurring in the absence of -good.[376] Plotinos[377] opposes the Stoic denial of evil, for he says, -"if this were all," there were no evil. We find a threefold division -of the universe without the Stoic term hypostasis, which occurs in the -treatment of the same topic elsewhere.[378] Similar to Numenius is the -King of all,[379] the blissful life of the divinities around him,[380] -and the division of the universe into three.[381] Plotinos[382] -acknowledges evil things in the world, something denied by the -Stoics,[383] but taught by Numenius, as is also original, primary -existence of evil, in itself. Evil is here said to be a hypostasis in -itself, and imparts evil qualities to other things. It is an image of -being, and a genuine nature of evil. Plotinos describes[384] matter -as flowing eternally, which reminds us unmistakably of Numenius's -image[385] of matter as a swiftly flowing stream, unlimited and -infinite in depth, breadth, and length. Evil inheres in the material -part of the body,[386] and is seen as actual, positive, darkness, -which is Numenian, as far as it means a definite principle.[387] -Plotinos also[388] insists on the ineradicability of evil, in almost -the same terms as Numenius,[389] who calls on Heraclitus and Homer as -supporters. Plotinos[390] as reason for this assigns the fact that the -world is a mixture, which is the very proof advanced by Numenius in 12. -Plotinos, moreover,[391] defines matter as that which remains after all -qualities are abstracted; this is thoroughly Numenian.[392] - -In the fourth book of the Second Ennead the treatment of matter is -original, and is based on comparative studies. Evil has disappeared -from the horizon; and the long treatment of the controversy with the -Gnostics[393] is devoted to explaining away evil as misunderstood -good. Although he begins by finding fault with Stoic materialism,[394] -he asserts two matters, the intelligible and the physical. Intelligible -matter[395] is eternal, and possesses essence. Plotinos goes on[396] -to argue for the necessity of an intelligible, as well as a physical -substrate (hypokeimenon). In the next paragraph[397] Plotinos seems -to undertake a historical polemic, against three traditional teachers -(Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus) under whose names he was -surely finding fault with their disciples: the Stoics, Numenius, and -possibly such thinkers as Lucretius. Empedocles is held responsible -for the view that elements are material, evidently a Stoical view. -Anaxagoras is held responsible for three views, which are distinctly -Numenian: that the world is a mixture,[398] that it is all in all,[399] -and that it is infinite.[400] We might, in passing, notice another -Plotinian contradiction in here condemning the world as mixture, -approved in the former passage.[401] As to the atomism of Democritus, -it is not clear with which contemporaries he was finding fault. -Intelligible matter reappears[402] where we also find again the idea -of doubleness of everything. As to the terms used by the way, we find -the Stoic categories of Otherness or Variety[403] and Motion; the -conceptual seminal logoi, and the "Koine ousia" of matter; but in -his psychology he uses "logos" and "noesis," instead of "nous" and -"phronesis," which are found in the Escorial section, and which are -more Stoical. We also find the Aristotelian category of energy, or -potentiality. - -In the very next book of the same Ennead,[404] we find another -treatment of matter, on an entirely different basis, accented by a -rejection of intelligible matter.[405] Here the whole basis of the -treatment of matter is the Aristotelian category of "energeia" and -"dunamis," or potentiality and actuality, Although we find the Stoic -term hypostasis, the book seems to be more Numenian, for matter is -again a positive lie, and the divinity is described by the Numenian -double name[406] of Being and Essence ("ousia" and "to on"). - -We now come to the Escorial section.[407] This is by far the most -extensive treatment of matter, and as we are chiefly interested in it -in connection with its bearing the name of Numenius at the Escorial, -we shall analyze it for and against this Numenian authorship, merely -noting that the chief purpose is to describe the impassibility of -matter, a Stoic idea. - -For Numenius as author we note: - -a. A great anxiety to preserve agreement with Plato, even to the point -of stretching definitions.[408] - -b. Plato's idea of participation, useless to monistic Stoics, is -repeatedly used.[409] Numenius had gone so far as to assert a -participation, even in the intelligibles.[410] - -c. Matter appears as the curse of all existent objects.[411] It also -appears as mother.[412] - -d. Try as he may, the author of this section cannot escape the dualism -so prominent in Numenius;[413] the acrobatic nature of his efforts in -this direction are pointed out elsewhere. We find here a thoroughgoing -distinction between soul and body, which is quite Numenian, and -dualistic.[414] - -e. Matter is passive, possessing no resiliency.[415] - -f. We find an argument directed[416] against those who "posit being in -matter." These must be the Stoics, with whom Numenius is ever in feud. - -g. Of Numenian terms, we find "soteria,"[417] God the Father.[418] Also -the double Numenian name for the Divinity, Being and Essence.[419] - -Against Numenius as author, we note: - -a. The general form of the section, which is that of the Enneads, not -the dialogue of Numenius's Treatise on the Good. We find also the usual -Plotinic interjected questions. - -b. Un-Numenian, at least, is matter as a mirror,[420] and evil as -merely negative, merely unaffectability to good.[421] While Numenius -speaks of matter as nurse and feeder, here we read nurse and receptacle. - -c. Stoic, is the chief subject of the section, namely the affectibility -of matter. Also, the allegoric interpretation of the myths, of the -ithyphallic Hermes, and the Universal Mother, which are like the other -Plotinic myths, of the double Hercules, Poros, Penia, and Koros. We -find[422] the Stoic idea of passibility and impassibility, although not -exactly that of passion and action. We find[423] connected the terms -"nous" and "phronesis," also "anastasis." The term hypostasis, though -used undogmatically, as mere explanation of thought, is found.[424] -Frequent[425] are the conceptual logoi of the divine Mind (the seminal -logoi) which enter into matter to clothe themselves with it, to produce -objects. We also have the Stoic category "heterotes,"[426] and the -application of sex as explanation of the differences of the world.[427] - -d. Aristotelian, are the "energeia" and "dunamis."[428] - -e. Plotinic, are the latter ideas, for they are used in the same -connection.[429] Also the myths of Poros, Penia and Koros, which are -found elsewhere in similar relations.[430] - -On the whole, therefore, the Plotinic authorship is much more strongly -indicated than the Numenian. - -The next treatment of matter in the Fourth Ennead, is -semi-stoical.[431] The opposite aspects of the Universe appear -again as "phronesis" and "phusis." We find here the Stoic doing and -suffering, and[432] hypostasis. Nevertheless, the chief process -illustrated is still the Platonic image reproduced less and less -clearly in successively more degraded spheres of being. Plotinos seems -to put himself out of the Numenian sphere of thought, referring to -it in abstract historical manner, as belonging to the successors of -Pythagoras and Pherecydes, who treated of matter as the element that -distinguished objects in the intelligible world. - -The last treatment of matter[433] seems to have reached the extreme -distance of Numenianism. Instead of a dualism, with matter an original, -positive principle, Plotinos closes his discussion by stating that -perhaps form and matter may not come from the same origin, as there is -some difference between them. He has just said that Being is common -to both form and matter, as to quality, though not as to quantity. A -little above this he insists that matter is not something original, as -it is later than many earthly, and than all intelligible objects. As -to the Numenian double name of the Divinity, Being and Essence, he had -taken from Aristotelianism the conceptions of "energeia" and "dunamis," -and added them as the supreme hypostasis, so as to form in theological -dialect the triad he, following Numenius and Plato, had always asserted -cosmologically (good, intellect, and soul): "The developed energy[434] -assumes hypostasis, as if from a great, nay, as from the greatest -hypostasis of all; and so it joins Essence and Being." - -Reviewing these various treatments of matter we might call the -first[435] Numenian; the next[436] Platonic (as most independent, and -historically treated); the next[437] as Aristotelian; the Escorial -Section as semi-Stoic;[438] as also another short notice.[439] The last -treatment of matter, in vi. 3.7, is fully Stoic, in its denial of the -evil of matter. - -How then shall we explain these differences? Chiefly by studying the -periods in which they are written, and which they therefore explain. - - * * * * * - -When we try to study the periods in Plotinos's thought, as shown in -his books, we are met with great difficulties, which are chiefly -due to Porphyry. Exactly following the contemporary methods of the -compilers of the Bible, he undiscerningly confused the writings of -the various periods, so as to make up an anthology, grouped by six -groups of nine books each, according to subjects, consisting first -of ethical disquisitions; second, of physical questions; third, -of cosmic considerations; fourth, of psychological discussions; -fifth, of transcendental lucubrations; and sixth, of metaphysics and -theology.[440] As the reader might guess from the oversymmetrical -grouping, and this pretty classification, the apparent order is only -illusory, as he may have concluded from the fact that the discussions -of matter analyzed above are scattered throughout the whole range of -this anthology. The result of this Procrustean arrangement was the same -as with the Bible: a confusion of mosaic, out of which pretty nearly -anything could be proved, and into which almost everything has been -read. Compare the outlines of the doctrines of Plotinos by Ritter, -Zeller, Ueberweg, Chaignet, Mead, Guthrie, and Drews, and it will be -seen that there is very little agreement between them, while none of -them allow for the difference between the various parts of the Enneads. - -How fearful the confusion is, will best be realized from the following -two tables, made up from the indications given in Porphyry's Life of -Plotinos. - -Porphyry gives three lists of the works of the various periods. -Identifying these in the present Ennead arrangement, they are to be -found as follows: - -The works of the Amelian period are now i. 6; iv. 7; iii. 1; iv. 2; v. -9; iv. 8; iv. 4; iv. 9; vi. 9; v. 1; v. 2; ii. 4; iii. 9; ii. 2; iii. -4; i. 9; ii. 6; v. 7; i. 2; i. 3; i. 8. - -The works of the Porphyrian period are now vi. 5, 6; v. 6; ii. 5; iii. -6; iv. 3-5; iii. 8; v. 8; v. 5; ii. 9; vi. 6; ii. 8; i. 5; ii. 7; vi. -7; vi. 8; ii. 1; iv. 6; vi. 1-3; iii. 7. - -The works of the latest or Eustochian period are: i. 4; iii. 2, 3; v. -3; iii. 5; i. 8; ii. 3; i. 1; i. 7. (For Eustochius, see Scholion to -Enn. iv. 4.29, ii. 7.86, Creuz. 1, 301 Kirchhof.) - -A more convenient table will be the converse arrangement. Following -the present normal order of the books in Enneads, we will describe -its period by a letter, referring to the Amelian period by A, to the -Porphyrian by P, and the Eustochian by E. I: EAAEPAEAA. II: PAEAPAPPP. -III: AEEAEAPPA. IV: AAPPPPAAA. V: AAEAPPAPA. VI: PPPPPPPPA. - -This artificial arrangement into Enneads should therefore be abandoned, -and in a new English translation that the writer has in mind, the books -would appear in the order of their periods, while an index would allow -easy reference by the old numbers. Then only will we be able to study -the successive changes of Plotinos's thought, in their normal mutual -relation; and it is not difficult to prophesy that important results -would follow. - - * * * * * - -Having thus achieved internal proof of development of doctrines in -Plotinos, by examination of his views about Matter, we may with some -confidence state that the externally known facts of the life of no -philosopher lend themselves to such a progress of opinions more readily -than that of Plotinos. His biographer, Porphyry, as we have seen, had -already given us a list of the works of three easily characterized -periods in Plotinos's life: the period before Porphyry came to him, -the period while Porphyry staid with him, and the later period when -Plotinos was alone, and Porphyry was in retirement (or banishment?) in -Sicily. - -An external division into periods is therefore openly acknowledged; but -it remains for us to recall its significance. - -In the first place, the reader will ask himself, how does it come about -that Plotinos is so dependent on Porphyry, and before him, on Amelius? -The answer is that Plotinos himself was evidently somewhat deficient -in the details of elementary education, however much proficiency -in more general philosophical studies, and in independent thought, -and personal magnetic touch with pupils he may have achieved. His -pronunciation was defective, and in writing he was careless, so much so -that he usually failed to affix proper headings or notice of definite -authorship.[441] These peculiarities would to some extent put him in -the power, and under the influence of his editors, and this explains -why he was dependent on Porphyry later, and Amelius earlier.[442] These -editors might easily have exerted potent, even if unconscious or merely -suggestive influence; but we know that Porphyry did not scruple to add -glosses of his own,[443] not to speak of hidden Stoic and Aristotelian -pieces,[444] for he relied on Aristotle's "Metaphysics." Besides, -Plotinos was so generally accused of pluming himself on writings of -Numenius, falsely passed off as his own, that it became necessary -for Amelius to write a book on the differences between Numenius and -Plotinos, and for Porphyry to defend his master, as well as to quote -a letter of Longinus on the subject;[445] but Porphyry does not deny -that among the writings of the Platonists Kronius, Caius, and Attikus, -and the Peripatetics Aspasius, Alexander and Adrastus, the writings of -Numenius also were used as texts in the school of Plotinos (14). - -Having thus shown the influence of the editors of Plotinos, we must -examine who and what they were. Let us however first study the general -trend of the Plotinic career. - -His last period was Stoic practise, for so zealously did he practise -austerities that his death was, at least, hastened thereby.[446] It -is unlikely that he would have followed Stoic precepts without some -sympathy for, or acquaintance with their philosophical doctrines; and -as we saw above, Porphyry acknowledges Plotinos's writings contain -hidden Stoic pieces.[447] Then, Plotinos spent the last period of his -life in Rome, where ruled, in philosophical circles, the traditions of -Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. - -That these Stoic practices became fatal to him is significant when -we remember that this occurred during the final absence of Porphyry, -who may, during his presence, have exerted a friendly restraint on -the zealous master. At any rate, it was during Porphyry's regime that -the chief works of Plotinos were written, including a bitter diatribe -against the Gnostics, who remained the chief protagonists of dualism -and belief in positive evil. Prophyry's work, "De Abstinentia," proves -clearly enough his Stoic sympathies. - -Such aggressive enmity is too positive to be accounted for by the mere -removal to Rome from Alexandria, and suggests a break of some sort -with former friends. Indications of such a break do exist, namely, -the permanent departure to his earlier home, Apamea, of his former -editor, Amelius. We hear[448] of an incident in which Amelius invited -Plotinos to come and take part in the New Moon celebrations[449] of -the mysteries. Plotinos, however, refused, on the grounds that "They -must come to me, not I go to them." Then we hear[450] of bad blood -between this Amelius and Porphyry, a long, bitter controversy, patched -up, indeed, but which cannot have failed to leave its mark. Then this -Amelius writes a book on the Differences between Plotinos and Numenius, -which, in a long letter, he inscribes to Porphyry,[451] as if the -latter were the chief one interested in these distinctions. Later, -Amelius, who before this seems to have been the chief disciple and -editor of Plotinos, departs, never to return, his place being taken by -Porphyry. It is not necessary to possess a vivid imagination to read -between the lines, especially when Plotinos, in the last work of this -period, against the Gnostics, section 10, seems to refer to friends of -his who still held to other doctrines. - -Now in order to understand the nature of the period when Amelius was -the chief disciple of Plotinos, we must recall who Amelius was. In -the first place, he hailed from the home-town of Numenius, Apamea in -Syria. He had adopted as son Hostilianus-Hesychius, who also hailed -from Apamea. And it was to Apamea that Amelius withdrew, after he -left Plotinos. We are therefore not surprised to learn that he had -written out almost all the books of Numenius, that he had gathered them -together, and learned most of them by heart.[452] Then we learn from -Proclus (see Zeller's account) that Amelius taught the trine division -of the divine creator, exactly as did Numenius. Is it any wonder, then, -that he wrote a book on the differences between Plotinos and Numenius -at a later date, when Porphyry had started a polemic with him? During -his period as disciple of Plotinos, twenty-four years in duration, -Plotinos would naturally have been under Numenian influence of some -kind, and we cannot be very far wrong in thinking that this change of -editors must have left some sort of impress on the dreamy thinker, -Plotinos, ever seeking to experience an ecstasy. - - * * * * * - -In this account of the matter we have restrained ourselves from -mentioning one of the strangest coincidences in literature, which would -have emphasized the nature of the break of Amelius with Plotinos, for -the reason that it may be no more than a chance pun; but that even as -such it must have been present to the actors in that drama, there is no -doubt. We read above that Amelius invited Plotinos to accompany him to -attend personally the mystery-celebrations at the "noumenia," a time -sacred to such celebrations.[453] But this was practically the name of -Numenius, and the text might well have been translated that Amelius -invited him to visit the celebrations as Numenius would have done; and -indeed, from all we know of Numenius, with his initiation at Eleusis -and in Egypt, that is just of what we might have supposed he would have -approved. In other words, we would discover Amelius in the painful act -of choice between the two great influences of his life, Numenius, and -Plotinos. Moreover, that the incident was important is revealed by -Porphyry's calling Plotinos's answer a "great word," which was much -commented on, and long remembered. - - * * * * * - -In thus dividing the career of Plotinos in the Amelian, the Porphyrian, -and Eustochian (98) we meet however one very interesting difficulty. -The Plotinic writings by Porphyry assigned to the last or Eustochian -period are those which internal criticism would lead us to assign to -his very earliest philosophising; and in our study of the development -of the Plotinic views about Matter, we have taken the liberty of -considering them as the earliest. We are however consoled in our -regret at having to be so radical, by noticing that Porphyry, to whom -we are indebted for our knowledge of the periods of the works, has -done the same thing. He says that he has assigned the earliest place -in each Ennead to the easier and simpler discussions;[454] yet these -latest-issued works of Plotinos are assigned to the very beginning of -each Ennead, four going to the First Ennead, one to the Second, three -to the Third, and one only to the Fifth. If these had been the crowning -works of the Master's life, especially the treatise on the First God -and Happiness, it would have been by him placed at the very end of -all, and not at the beginning. Porphyry must therefore have possessed -some external knowledge which would agree with the conclusions of our -internal criticism, which follows. - -These Eustochian works make the least use of Stoic, or even -Aristotelian terms, most closely following even the actual words of -Numenius. For instance, we may glance at the very first book of the -First Ennead, which though of the latest period, is thoroughly Numenian. - -The first important point is the First Divinity "hovering over" -Being,[455] using the same word as Numenius.[456] This was suggested by -Prof. Thedinga. However, he applied the words "he says" to Numenius; -but this cannot be the case, as a Platonic quotation immediately. - -The whole subject of the Book is the composite soul, and this is -thoroughly Numenian.[457] - -Then we have the giving without return.[458] - -Then we find the pilot-simile as illustration for the relation of soul -to body,[459] although in Numenius it appears of the Logos and the -world. - -We find the animal divided in two souls, the irrational and the -rational,[460] which reminds us of Numenius's division into two -souls.[461] - -The soul consists of a peculiar kind of motion, which however is -entirely different from that of other bodies, which is its own -life.[462] This reminds us of Numenius's still-standing of the Supreme, -which however is simultaneously innate motion.[463] - -Referring to the problem, discussed elsewhere, that these Plotinic -works of the latest or Eustochian period, are the most Numenian, which -we would be most likely to attribute to his early or formative stage, -rather than to the last or perfected period, it is interesting to -notice that these works seem to imply other works of the Amelian or -Porphyrian periods, by the words,[464] "It has been said," or treated -of, referring evidently to several passages.[465] Still this need not -necessarily refer to this later work, it may even refer to Plato, or -even to Numenius's allegory of the Cave of the Nymphs,[470] where the -descent of the souls is most definitely studied. Or it might even refer -to Num. 35a, where birth or genesis is referred to as the wetting of -the souls in the matter of bodies. - -Moreover, they contain an acknowledgment, and a study of positive evil, -something which would be very unlikely after his elaborate explaining -away of evil in his treatise against the Gnostics, of the Porphyrian -period, and his last treatment of Matter, where he is even willing to -grant the possibility of matter possessing Being. The natural process -for any thinker must ever be to begin with comparative imitation of his -master, and then to progress to independent treatment of the subject. -But for the process to be reversed is hardly likely. - -Moreover, when we examine these Eustochian works in detail, they -hardly seem to be such as would be the expressions of the last years -of an ecstatic, suffering intense agony at times, his interest already -directed heavenwards. The discussion of astrology must date from the -earliest association with Gnostics, in Alexandria, who also might have -inspired or demanded a special treatment of the nature of evil, which -later he consistently denied. Then there is an amateurish treatment of -anthropology in general, which the cumulatively-arranging Porphyry puts -at the very beginning of the First Book. The treatise on the First Good -and Happiness, is not unlike a beginner's first attempt at writing out -his body of divinity, as George Herbert said, and Porphyry also puts it -at the beginning. The Eros-article is only an amplification of Platonic -myths, indeed making subtler distinctions, still not rising to the -heights of pure, subjective speculation. - -These general considerations may be supplemented by a few more definite -indications. It is in the Eros-article that we find the Platonic -myth of Poros and Penia. Yet these reappear in the earliest Amelian -treatment of matter (ii. 4), as a sort of echo, mentioned only by the -way, as if they had been earlier thoroughly threshed out. Here also we -find only a stray, incidental use of the term "hypostasis," whereas the -Stoic language in other Amelian and Porphyrian treatises has already -been pointed out. - -We are therefore driven to the following, very human and natural -conclusion. Plotinos's first attempts at philosophical writing had -consisted of chiefly Numenian disquisitions, which would be natural in -Alexandria, where Numenius had probably resided, and had left friends -and successors among the Gnostics. When Plotinos went to Rome, he -took these writings with him, but was too absorbed in new original -Amelian treatises to resurrect his youthful Numenian attempts, which he -probably did not value highly, as being the least original, and because -they taught doctrines he had left behind in his Aristotelian and Stoic -progress. He laid them aside. Only when Porphyry had left him, and he -felt the increasing feebleness due to old age and Stoic austerities, -did his attendant Eustochius urge him to preserve these early works. -Plotinos was willing, and sent them to Sicily where Porphyry had -retired. And so it happened with Plotinos, as it has happened with many -another writer, that the last things became first, and the first became -last. - - * * * * * - -The idea of classifying the works of Plotinos chronologically, -therefore, has so much external proof, as well as internal indications, -to support it, that, no doubt, in the future no reference will be -made to Plotinos without specifying to which period it refers; and we -may expect that future editions of his works will undo the grievous -confusion introduced by Porphyry, and thus render Plotinos's works -comparatively accessible to rational study. - -There are besides many other minor proofs of the chronological order -of the writings of Plotinos, most of which are noticed at the heading -of each succeeding book; but the most startling human references are -those to Amelius's departure as a false friend;[466] to Porphyry's -desire to suicide at his departure,[467] and to his own impending -dissolution,[468] each of these occurring at the exact time of the -event chronologically, but certainly not according to the traditional -order. - - - - -II. PLATONISM: SIGNIFICANCE, PROGRESS AND RESULTS. - - -Of all fetishes which have misled humanity, perhaps none is responsible -for more error than that of originality. As if anything could be new -that was true, or true that was new! The only possible lines along -which novelty or progress can lie are our reports, combinations, and -expressions. Some people think they have done for a poet if they have -shown that he made use of suitable materials in the construction of -his poem! So Shakespeare has been shown to have used whole scenes from -earlier writers. So Virgil, by Macrobius, has been shown to have laid -under contribution every writer then known to be worth ransacking. -Dante has also been shown to have re-edited contemporary apocalypses. -So Homer, even, has been shown to re-tell stories gathered from many -sources. The result is that people generally consider Shakespeare, -Virgil, or Homer great in spite of their borrowings, when, on the -contrary, the statement should be that they were great because of their -rootage in the best of their period. In other words, they are great not -because of their own personality (which in many cases has dropped out -of the ken of history), but because they more faithfully, completely, -and harmoniously represent their periods than other now forgotten -writers. Therein alone lay their cosmic value, and their assurance of -immortality. They are the voices of their ages, and we are interested -in the significance of their age, not in them personally. - -It is from this standpoint that we must approach Plato. Of his -personality what details are known are of no soteriologic significance; -and the reason why the world has not been able to get away from him, -and probably never will, is that he sums up prior Greek philosophy in -as coherent a form as is possible without doing too great Procrustean -violence to the elements in question. This means that Plato did not -fuse them all into one absolutely, rigid, coherent, consistent system, -in which case his utility would have been very much curtailed. The very -form of his writings, the dialogue, left each element in the natural -living condition to survive on its merits, not as an authoritative -oracle, or Platonic pronunciamento, or creed. - -For details, the reader is referred to Zeller's fuller account of -these pre-Platonic elements.[471] But we may summarize as follows: -the physical elements to which the Hylicists had in turn attributed -finality Plato united into Pythagorean matter, which remained as -an element of Dualism. The world of nature became the becoming of -Heraclitus. Above that he placed the Being of Parmenides, in which the -concepts of Socrates found place as ideas. These he identified with -the numbers and harmonies of Pythagoras, and united them in an Eleatic -unity of many, as an intelligible world, or reason, which he owed to -Anaxagoras. The chief idea, that of the Good, was Megaro-Socratic. His -cosmology was that of Timaeus. His psychology was based on Anaxagoras, -as mind; on Pythagoras, as immortal. His ethics are Socratic, his -politics are Pythagorean. Who therefore would flout Plato, has all -earlier Greek philosophy to combat; and whoever recognizes the -achievements of the Hellenic mind will find something to praise in -Plato. When, therefore, we are studying Platonism, we are only studying -a blending of the rays of Greece, and we are chiefly interested in -Greece as one of the latest, clearest, and most kindred expressions of -human thought. - -If however we should seek some one special Platonic element, it -would be that genuineness of reflection, that sincerity of thought, -that makes of his dialogues no cut and dried literary figments, but -soul-tragedies, with living, breathing, interest and emotion. Plato -thus practised his doctrine of the double self,[472] the higher and -the lower selves, of which the higher might be described as "superior -to oneself." In his later period, that of the Laws, he applied this -double psychology to cosmology, thereby producing doubleness in -the world-Soul: besides the good one, appears the evil one, which -introduces even into heaven things that are not good. - -It was only a step from this to the logical deduction of Xenocrates -that these things in heaven were "spirits" or "guardians," both good -and evil, assisting in the administration of human affairs.[473] Such -is the result of doubleness introduced into anthropology; introduced -into cosmology, it establishes Pythagorean indefinite duality as the -principle opposing the unity of goodness. - -The next step was taken by Plutarch. The evil demons, had, in Stoic -phraseology, been called "physical;" and so, in regard to matter, -they came to stand in the relation of soul to body. Original matter, -therefore, became two-fold; matter itself, and its moving principle, -"the soul of matter." This was identified with the worse World-soul -by a development, or historical event, which was the ordering of the -cosmos, or, creation. - -This then was the state of affairs at the advent of Numenius. -Although his chief interest lay in practical comparative religion, he -tried, philosophically, to return to a mythical "original" Platonism -or Pythagoreanism. What Plato did for earlier Greek speculation, -Numenius did for post-Platonic development. He harked back to -the latter Platonic stage, which taught the evil world-Soul. He -included the achievements of Plutarch, the "soul of matter," and the -trine division of a separate principle, such as Providence. To the -achievement of Xenocrates he was drawn by two powerful interests, the -Egyptian, Hermetic, Serapistic, in connection with the evil demons; -and the Pythagorean, in connection with the Indefinite-duality. Thus -Numenius's History of the Platonic Succession is not a delusion; -Numenius really did sum up the positive Platonic progress, not -omitting even Maximus of Tyre's philosophical hierarchic explanation -of the emanative or participative streaming forth of the Divine. But -Numenius was not merely a philosopher: of this gathering of Platonic -achievements he made a religion. In this he was also following the -footsteps of Pythagoras, who limited his doctrines to a group of -students. But Numenius did not merely copy Pythagoras. Numenius -modernized him, connecting up the Platonic doctrinal aggregate with -the mystery-rites current in his own day. Nor did Numenius shirk any -unpleasant responsibilities of a restorer of Platonism: he continued -the traditional Academico-Stoical feud. Strange to say, the last great -Stoic philosopher, Posidonius (A.D. 135-151) hailed from Numenius's -home-town, Apamea, so that this Stoic feud may have been forced on -Numenius from home personalities or conditions. It would seem that in -Numenius and Posidonius we have a re-enactment of the tragedy of Greek -philosophy on a Syrian theatre, where dogmatic Stoicism died, and -Platonism admitted Oriental ideas. - -Apamea, however, had not yet ended its role in the development of -thought. Numenius's pupil, Amelius, had gathered, copied, and learned -by heart his master's works. It was in Apamea that he adopted as son -Hostilianius-Hesychius. After a twenty-four years' sojourn in Rome he -returned to Apamea, and was dwelling there still at the time of the -death of Plotinos, with whom he had spent that quarter of a century. -Here then we have a historical basis for a connection between Numenius -and Plotinos, which we have elsewhere endeavored to demonstrate from -inner grounds. - -It was however by Amelius that philosophy is drawn into the maelstrom -of the world-city. Plotinos, in his early periods a Numenian -Platonist, will later go over to Stoicism, and conduct a polemic -with the Gnostics, the Alexandrian heirs of Platonic dualism, -under the influence of the Stoic Porphyry. However, Plotinos will -not publicly abandon Platonism; he will fuse the two streams of -thought, and interpret in Stoic terms the fundamentals of Platonism, -producing something which, when translated into Latin, he will leave -as inheritance to all the ages. Not in vain, therefore, did Amelius -transport the torch of philosophy to the Capital. - - * * * * * - -Let us in a few words dispose of the general outlines of the fate of -the Platonic movement. - -Plotinos was no religious leader; he was before everything else a -philosopher, even if he centred his efforts on the practical aspects -of the ecstatic union with God. Indeed, Porphyry relates to us the -incident in which this matter was objectively exemplified. At the -New Moon, Amelius invited him to join in a visit to the mystery -celebrations. Plotinos refused, saying that "they would have to come to -him, not he go over to them." This then is the chief difference between -Numenius and Plotinos, and the result would be a recrudescence of pure -philosophic contentions, as those of Plotinos against the Gnostics. - -As to the general significance of Plotinos, we must here resume what we -have elsewhere detailed: that with the change of editors, from Amelius -to Porphyry, Plotinos changed from Numenian or Pythagorean dualism -to Stoic monism, in which the philosophic feud was no longer with the -Stoics, but with the Alexandrian descendants of Numenian dualism, the -Gnostics. Even though Plotinos showed practical religious aspects in -his studying and experiencing the ecstasy, there is no record of any of -his pupils being encouraged to do so, and therefore Plotinos remains -chiefly a philosopher. - -The successors of Plotinos could not remain on this purely philosophic -standpoint. Instead of practising the ecstasy, they followed the -Gnostics in theorizing about practical religious reality in their -cosmology and theology, which took on, more or less, the shape of -magic, not inconsiderably aided by Stoic allegoric interpretations of -myths, as in Porphyry's "Cave of the Nymphs." - -What Plato did for early Greek philosophy, what Numenius did for -post-Platonic thought, that Proclus Diadochus, the "Successor," did -for Plotinos and his followers. For the first time since Numenius we -find again a comparative method. By this time religion and philosophy -have fused in magic, and so, instead of a comparative religion, we have -a comparative philosophy. Proclus was the first genuine commentator, -quoting authorities on all sides. He was sufficient of a philosopher -to grasp Neoplatonism as a school of thought; and far from paying -any attention to Ammonius, as recent philosophy has done, as source -of Neoplatonism, he traces the movement as far as Plutarch, calling -him the "father of us all," inasmuch as he introduced the conception -of "hypostasis." Evidently, Proclus looked upon this as the centre -of Neoplatonic development, and therefore we shall be justified in a -closer study of this conception; and we may even say that its historic -destiny was a continuation of the main stream of creative Greek -philosophy; or, if you prefer, of Platonism, or Noumenianism, or even -Plotinian thought. - -Did Greek philosophy die with Proclus? The political changes of the -time forced alteration of dialect and position; but the accumulations -of mental achievements could not perish. This again we owe to Proclus. -Besides being the first great commentator he precipitated his most -valuable achievements in logical form, in analytic arrangement, in -the form of crystal-clear propositions, theorems, demonstrations, and -corollaries. Such a highly abstract form was inevitable, inasmuch as -Numenius had turned away from Aristotelian observation of nature. Just -like the Hebrew thinkers, who finally became commentators and abstract -theorizers, nothing else was left for a philosophy without connection -with experiment, when whittled down by the keenest intellects of the -times. - -This abstract method, still familiarly used by geometry, reappeared -among the School-men, notably in Thomas Aquinas. Later it persisted -with Spinoza and Descartes. However, rising experimentalism has -gradually terminated it, its last form appearing in Kant and Hegel. -Kant's "Ding in sich," reached after abstracting all qualities, is only -a re-statement of Numenius and Plotinos's "subject," or, definition of -matter; and Hegel's dialectic, beginning with Being and Not-being, more -definitely proclaimed by Plotinos, goes as far back as the Eleatics -and Heraclitus, not to mention Plato. However, Kant and Hegel are the -great masters of modern thought; and although at one time the rising -tide of materialism and cruder forms of evolution threatened to obscure -it, Karl Pearson's "Grammar of Science," generous as it is in invective -against Kant and Hegel, in modern terms clinches Berkeley's and Kant's -demonstration of the reality of the super-sensual, thus vindicating -Plotinos, and, before him, Numenius. - -It must not be supposed that in thus tracing the springs of our modern -thought we necessarily approve of all the thought of Plotinos, Numenius -or Plato. On the contrary, they were far more likely to have committed -logical errors than we are, because they were hypnotized by the glamor -of the terms they used, which to us are mere laboratory tools. The -best way to prove this will be to appraise at its logical value for us -Plotinos's discussion of Matter, elsewhere studied in its value for us. - - - - -III. PLOTINOS'S VIEW OF MATTER. - - -We have elsewhere pointed out the hopelessness of escaping either -aspect of the problem of the One and the Many; and that the attempt -of the Stoics to avoid the Platonic dualism by a materialistic monism -was merely a change of names, the substance of the dualism remaining -as the opposition of the contraries, such as active and passive, -male and female, the predominant elements,[474] etc. Plotinos, in -his abandonment of Numenian dualism, and championing of Stoicism, -undertaking the feud with the Gnostics, the successors of Numenius, -must therefore have inherited the same difficulties of thought, and we -shall see how in spite of his mental agility he is caught in the same -traditional meshes, and that these irreducible difficulties occur in -each one of his three periods of life, the Eustochian, the Amelian, and -the Porphyrian. - -In the Amelian, he teaches two matters, the physical and the -intelligible, by which device he seeks to avoid the difficulties of -dualism, crediting to intelligible matter any necessary form of Being, -thus pushing physical matter into the outer darkness of non-being. -So intelligible matter is still a form of Being, and we still hold -to monism; as intelligible matter may participate in the good; while -matter physical remains evil, being a deprivation of good, not -possessing it. This, of course is dualism; and he thus has a convenient -pun on the word matter, by which he can be monist or dualist, as -the fancy takes him, or as exigencies demand. This participation, -therefore, does not eliminate the dualism, while formally professing -monism. Therefore Plotinos tries to choose between monism and dualism -by surreptitiously accepting both. - -In the Porphyrian period, he rejected the idea of intelligible -matter.[475] Forced to fashion entirely new arguments, he seizes as -tool the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality, -or energy as dynamic accomplishment.[476] But no logical device can -help a man to pull himself up by his boot-straps. If by Being you -mean existence, then its opposite must be negative, and to speak of -real non-being, as something that shares being, is an evasion. To say -that matter remains non-being, while having the possibility of future -Being, which however can never be actualized, is mere juggling with -words. Even if matter is no more than a weak, confused image, it is -not non-being. If it is a positive lie, it is not non-being. To talk -of a higher degree of Non-being, that is real non-being, is simply to -confuse the actuality intended with the thought of non-being, which -of course is a thought as actually existing as any other. Moreover if -matter is imperishable, it cannot be non-being; and if it possesses -Being potentially, it certainly is not non-existence. The Aristotelian -potentiality could help to create this evasion, but did not remove its -real nature; it merely supplied Plotinos with an intellectual device -to characterize something that would not be actually existing as still -having the possibility of existence; but this is not non-existence. In -another writing[477] of this period Plotinos continues his evasions -about the origin and nature of matter. First, he grants that it is -something that is not original, being later than many earthly, and all -intelligible objects; although, if he had returned to the conception -of intelligible matter, he would have been at liberty to assert the -originality of the latter. Then he holds that Being is common to both -form and matter, as to quality, but not as to quantity. Last, he -closes the paragraph by saying that perhaps form and matter do not come -from the same origin, as there is a difference between them. - -In Plotinos's third, or Eustochian period, the same evasions occur. -For instance[478] he limits Being to goodness. Then he acknowledges -the existence of evil things, and derives their evil quality from a -primary evil, the "image of essence," the Being of evil. That he is -conscious of having strained a point is evident from the fact that he -adds the clause, "if there can be a Being of evil." Likewise,[479] -while discussing evil, which is generally recognized because in our -daily lives there is positive pain, and sensations of pain, he defines -evil as lack of qualities. To say that evil is not such as to form, -but as to nature is opposite to form is nonsense, inasmuch as life is -full of positive evils, as Numenius brought out in 16, and Plotinos -acknowledged even in spite of his polemic against the Gnostics. - -Finally Plotinos takes refuge in a miracle[480] as explanation of -"unparticipating participation." This is commentary enough; it shows -he realized the futility of any arguments. But Plotinos was not alone -in despairing of establishing an ironclad system; before him Numenius -had, just as pathetically, despaired of a logical dualism, and he -acknowledged in fragment 16 that Pythagoras's arguments, however true, -were "wonderful and opposed to the belief of a majority of humanity." - -In other words, monism is as unsatisfactory to reason as dualism. This -was the chief point of agreement between Pythagoras and the Stoics; and -Pragmatism has in modern times attempted to show a way out by a higher -sanction of another kind. - -Perhaps the reader may be interested in a side-light on this subject. -Drews is interested in Plotinos only because Plotinos's super-rational -divinity furnishes a historical foundation for Edouard Hartmann's -philosophy of the Unconscious. It would seem, however, to be a mistake -to use the latter term, for it is true only as a doubtful corollary. -If the Supreme is super-conscious, it is possible to describe this -logically as unconscious. But generally, however, unconsciousness is a -term used to denote the sub-conscious, rather than the super-conscious, -and the use of that term must inevitably entail misunderstandings. It -would be better then to follow Pragmatism into the super-conscious, -rather than to sink with Hartmann into the sub-conscious. It was -directly from Plotinos[481] that Hartmann took his expression "beyond -good and evil." - -Having watched Numenius, for Platonic dualism; and Plotinos for Stoic -monism, both appeal to a miracle as court of last resort, we may now -return to that result of Platonism which has left the most vital -impress on our civilization, its conception of the divine. - - - - -IV. PLOTINOS'S CREATION OF THE TRINITY. - - -Elsewhere we have seen how Numenius waged the traditional Academic feud -with the Stoics bravely, but uselessly, inasmuch as it was chiefly -a difference of dialects that separated them. In the course of this -struggle, Numenius had made certain distinctions within the divinity, -which were followed by Amelius, but are difficult to trace in Plotinos -because, as a matter of principle, Plotinos[482] was averse to thus -"dividing the divinity." Why so? Because he was waging a struggle -with the Gnostics, who had followed in the footsteps of the Hermetic -writings (with their Demiurge and Seven Governors); Philo Judaeus (with -his five Subordinate Powers); Numenius and Amelius (with their triply -divided First and Second gods);--after which we come to Basilides (with -his seven Powers); Saturninus (with his Seven Angels); and Valentinus -(with his 33 Aeons). - -This new feud between Plotinos and the Gnostics is however just as -illusory as the earlier one between Numenius and the Stoics. It was -merely a matter of dialects. Plotinos indeed found fault with the -Gnostics for making divisions within the Divinity; but wherever he -himself is considering the divinity minutely, he, just as much as the -Gnostics, is compelled to draw distinctions, even though he avoided -acknowledged divisions by borrowing from Plutarch a new, non-Platonic, -non-Numenian, but Aristotelian, Stoic (Cornutus and Sextus) and still -Alexandrian (Philo, Septuagint, Lucian) term "hypostasis." - -The difference he pretended to find between the Gnostic distinctions -within the Divinity and his new term hypostasis was that the former -introduced manifoldness into the divinity, by splitting Him,[483] thus -allowing the influence of matter to pervade the pure realm of Being. -Hypostasis, on the contrary, wholly existed within the realm of pure -Being, and was no more than a trend, a direction, a characterization, -a function, a face, or orientation of activity of the unaffected unity -of Being. Thus the divinity retained its unity, and still could be -active in several directions, without admixture of what philosophy had -till then recognized as constituting manifoldness. But reflection shows -that this is a mere quibble, an evasion, a paralogism, a quaternio -terminorum, a pun. How it came about we shall attempt to show below. - -In thus achieving a manifoldness in the divinity without divisions, -Plotinos did indeed keep out of the divinity the splitting influence -of matter, which it was now possible to banish to the realm of -unreality, as a negation, and a lie. Monism was thus achieved ... but -at the cost of two errors: denial of the common-sense reality of the -phenomenal world,[484] and that quibble about three hypostases without -manifoldness, genuinely a "distinction without a difference." - -This intellectual dishonesty must not however be foisted on -Aristotle[485] or Plutarch. The latter, for instance,[486] adopted -this term only to denote the primary and original characteristics -(or distinctions within) existing things, from a comparative study -of Aristotle's "de Anima," and Plato's "Phaedo."[487] These five -hypostases were the divinity, mind, soul, forms immanent in inorganic -nature, "hexis," in Stoic dialect, and to matter, as apart from these -forms. - -So important to Neoplatonism did this term seem to Proclus, that he -did not hesitate to say that Plutarch, by the use thereof, became "our -first forefather." He therefore develops it further. Among the hidden -and intelligible gods are three hypostases. The first is characterized -by the Good; it thinks the Good itself, and dwells with the paternal -Monad. The second is characterized by knowledge, and resides in the -first thought; while the third is characterized by beauty, and dwells -with the most beautiful of the intelligible. They are the causes from -which proceed three monads which are self-existent but under the form -of a unity, and as in a germ, in their cause. Where they manifest, they -take a distinct form: faith, truth, and love (Cousin's title: "Du Vrai, -du Beau, et du Bien"). This trinity pervades all the divine worlds. - -In order to understand the attitude of Plotinos on the subject, we must -try to put ourselves in his position. In the first place, on Porphyry's -own admission, he had added to Platonism Peripatetic and Stoic views. -From Aristotle his chief borrowings were the categories of form and -matter, and the distinction between potentiality and actuality,[488] -as well as the Aristotelian psychology of various souls. To the Stoics -he was drawn by their monism, which led him to drop the traditional -Academico-Stoic feud, or rather to take the side of the Stoics against -Numenius the Platonist dualist and the dualistic successors, the -Gnostics. But there was a difference between the Stoics and Plotinos. -The Stoics assimilated spirit to matter, while Plotinos, reminiscent of -Plato, preferred to assimilate matter to spirit. Still, he used their -terminology, and categories, including the conception of a hypostasis, -or form of existence. With this equipment, he held to the traditional -Platonic trinity of the "Letters," the King, the intellect, and the -soul. Philosophically, however, he had received from Numenius the -inheritance of a double name of the Divinity, Being and Essence. As a -thinker, he was therefore forced to accommodate Numenius to Plato, and -by adding to Numenius's name of the divinity, to complete Numenius's -theology by Numenius's own cosmology. This then he did by adding as -third hypostasis the Aristotelian dynamic energy. - -But as Intellect is permanent, how can Energy arise therefrom? Here -this eternal puzzle is solved by distinguishing energy into indwelling -and out-flowing. As indwelling, Energy constitutes Intellect; but its -energetic nature could not be demonstrated except by out-flowing, which -produces a distinction. - -Similarly, there are two kinds of heat, that of the fire itself, -and that emitted by the fire, so that the fire may remain itself -while exerting its influence without. It is thus also there: in that -it remains itself in its inmost being, and from its own inherent -perfection, and energy, the developed energy assumes hypostasis, as -if from a Dynamis that is great, nay, greatest; and so it joins the -Essence and the Being. For that was beyond all Being, and that was the -Dynamis of all things, and already was all things. If then it is all, -it must be above all; consequently also above Being. "And if this is -all, then the One is before all; not of an essence equal to all, and -this must be above Being, as this is above intellect; for there is -something above intellect."[489] - -This is the most definite statement of Plotinos's solution of the -problem; other references thereto are abundant. So we have a trinity of -energy, being and essence,[490] and each of us, like the world-Soul has -an Eros which is essence and hypostasis.[491] Reason is a hypostasis -after the nous, and Aphrodite gains an hypostasis in the Ousia.[492] -The One is intellect, the intelligible, and ousia; or, energy, being, -and the intelligible (essence).[493] The soul is activity.[494] The -soul is the third God,[495] we are the third rank proceeding from the -upper undivided Nature,[496] the whole being God, nous, and essence. -The Nous is activity, and the First essence. There are three stages of -the Good: the King, the nous, and the soul.[497] We find energy,[498] -thinking and being, then[499] the soul, the nous, and the One. We find -Providence threefold (as in Plutarch)[500] and three ranks of Gods, -demons and world-life.[501] Elsewhere, untheologically, or, rather, -merely philosophically, he speaks of the hypostasis of wisdom.[502] - -Chaignet's summary of this is[503] that[504] Plotinos holds that every -force in the intelligible is both Being and Substance simultaneously; -and reciprocally that no Being, could be conceived without hypostasis, -or directed force. Again,[505] the world, the universe of things, -contains three natures or divine hypostases, soul, mind and unity; -which indeed are found in our own nature, and of which the divinest is -unity or divinity. - -Let us now try to understand the matter. Why should the word -hypostasis, which unquestionably in earlier times meant "substance," -have later come to mean "distinctions" within the divinity? For -"substance," on the contrary, represents to our mind an unity, the -underlying unity, and not individual forms of existence. How did the -change occur? - -Now Plotinos, as we remember, found fault with the Gnostics in that -they taught distinctions within the divinity.[506] He would therefore -be disposed to remove from within the divinity those distinctions of -Plotinic, Plutarchian, Numenian, or Gnostic theology; although he -himself in early times did not scruple to speak of a hypostasis of -wisdom, or of Eros, or other matter he might be considering. Such terms -of Numenius or Amelius as he seems to ignore are the various Demiurges; -the three Plutarchian Providences he himself still uses. Still, all -these terms he would be disposed to eradicate from within the divinity. - -As a constructive metaphysician, however, he could not well get along -without some titles for the different phases of the divinity; and even -if he dispensed with the old names, there would still remain as their -underlying support the reality or substance of the distinction. So he -removed the offensive, aggressive, historically known and recognized -terms, while leaving their underlying substances, or supports. Now -"substance" had become "substances," and to differentiate these it was -necessary to interpret them as differing forms of existence. The change -was most definitely made by Athanasius, who at a synod in Alexandria, -in A.D. 362,[507] fastened on the church, as synonymous with hypostasis -the popular term "prosopon" or "face." That this was an innovation -appears from the fact that the Nicene Council had stated that it -was heretical to say that Christ was of a hypostasis different from -that of the Father, in which case the word evidently meant still the -original underlying (singular) substance. With this official definition -in vogue, the original (singular) substance became forgotten, and it -became possible to speak in the plural, of three faces, as indeed -Plotinos had done. - -In other words, so necessary were distinctions in the divinity, -that the popular mind supplied other individual names to designate -the distinctions Plotinos had successfully banished, for Demiurges -and Providences no longer return. Thus more manifold differences -re-entered into the divinity, than Plotinos had ever emptied out of -it, although under a name which the poverty of the Latin language -rendered as "persons," which represents to us individual consciousness -of a far more distinctive kind than was ever implied in three phases -of Providence, or of the Demiurge. Thus the translation into Latin -clinched the illicit linguistic process, and the result of Plotinos's -attempt to distinguish in the Divinity phases so subtle as not to -demand or allow of manifoldness, resulted in the most pronounced -differences of personality. This was finally clinched by Plotinos's -illustration of the three faces around a single head,[508] which -established the idea of three "persons" (masks, from "per-sonare") in -one God. - -Not only in the abstract realm of Metaphysics, therefore, is the world -indebted to Greek thought; but even in the realm of religion a Stoic -reinterpretation of Platonism, itself reinterpreted in a different -language has given a lasting inheritance to the spiritual aspirations -of the ages. - - - - -V. RESEMBLANCES TO CHRISTIANITY. - - -TRINITARIAN SIGNIFICANCE OF PLOTINOS. - -Plotinos's date being about A.D. 262, he stands midway between the -Christian writings of the New Testament, and the Council of Nicaea, -A.D. 325. As a philosopher dealing with the kindred topics--the soul -and its salvation,--and deriving terminology and inspiration from -the same sources, Platonism and Stoicism, we would expect extensive -parallelism and correspondence. Though Plotinos does not mention any -contemporaneous writings, we will surely be able to detect indirect -references to Old and New Testaments. But what will be of most -vital interest will be his anticipations of Nicene formulations, or -reflection of current expressions of Christian philosophic comment. -While we cannot positively assert this Christian development was -exclusively Plotinian, we are justified in saying that the development -of Christian philosophy was not due exclusively to the Alexandrian -catechetical school; that what later appears as Christian theology was -only earlier current Neoplatonic metaphysics, without any exclusive -dogmatic connection with the distinctively Christian biography. This -avoids the flat assertion of Drews that the Christian doctrine of -the Trinity was dependent on Plotinos, although it admits Bouillet's -more cautious statement that Plotinos was the rationalizer of the -doctrine of the Trinity.[509] This much is certain, that no other -contemporaneous discussion of the trinity has survived, if any ever -existed; and we must remember that it was not until the council of -Constantinople in A.D. 381, that the Nicene Creed, by the addition of -the Filioque clause, became trinitarian in a thoroughgoing way; and -not until fifty years later that Augustine, again in the West, fully -expressed a philosophy and psychology of the trinity. - -To Plotinos therefore is due the historical position of protagonist of -trinitarian philosophy. - - -NON-CHRISTIAN ORIGIN OF PARALELLISMS TO CHRISTIANITY. - -Christian parallelisms in Plotinos have a historical origin in -Christian parallelisms in his sources, namely, Stoicism, Numenius and -Plato. - -To Christian origins in Plato never has justice been done, not even by -Bigg. His suggestion of the crucifixion of the just man, his reference -to the son of God are only common-places, to which should be added many -minor references. - -The Christian origins in Numenius are quite explicit; mention of the -Hebrews as among the races whose scriptures are important, of Moses -among the great religious teachers, of the Spirit hovering over the -waters, of the names of the Egyptian magicians which, together with -Pliny, he hands down to posterity. He also was said to have told many -stories about Jesus, in an allegorical manner. - -The Christian origins in Stoicism have been widely discussed; -for instance, by Chaignet. But it is likely that this influence -affected Christianity indirectly through Plotinos, along with the -other Christian ideas we shall later find. At any rate Plotinos is -the philosopher who uses the term "spiritual body" most like the -Christians.[510] The soul is a slave to the body,[511] and has a -celestial body[512] as well as a spiritual body.[513] Within us are two -men opposing each other,[514] the better part often being mastered by -the worse part, as thought St. Paul,[515] in the struggle between the -inner and outer man.[516] - -With Plotinos the idea of "procession" is not only cosmic but -psychological. In other words, when Plotinos speaks of the "procession" -of the God-head, he is not, as in Christian doctrine, depicting -something unique, which has no connection with the world. He is only -referring to the cosmic aspect of an evolution which, in the soul, -appears as educational development.[517] As the opposite of the soul's -procession upwards, there is the soul's descent into hell,[518] or, in -other words, the soul's descent and ascension.[519] This double aspect -of man's fate upward or downward is referred to by Plotinos in the -regular Christian term "sin," as consisting in missing one's aim.[520] -The soul repents,[521] and its duty is conversion.[522] As a result of -this conversion comes forgiveness.[523] - - -OLD TESTAMENT REFERENCES. - -The famous "terrors of Jeremiah"[524] might have come mediately -through the Gnostics, who indeed may have been the persons referred -to as Christians.[525] More direct no doubt was God admiring his -handiwork[526] and the soul breathing the spirit of life into -animals.[527] God is called both the "I am what I am"[528] and "He is -what He ought to be."[528] He sits above the world,[529] as the king of -kings.[530] - - -NEW TESTAMENT REFERENCES. - -Plotinos says that it would be a poor artist who would conceive of -an animal as all covered with eyes. There is hardly such a reference -outside of Revelations,[531] to which we must also look for a new -heaven and a new earth.[532] Then we have practically a quotation of -the Johannine prologue "In the beginning was the Logos," and by him -were all things made.[533] Light was in the beginning.[534] We are told -not to leave the world, but not to be of it.[535] The divinity prepares -mansions in heaven for good souls.[536] - -Pauline references seem to be that sin exists because of the law.[537] -God is above all height or depth.[538] The vulgar who attend -mystery-banquets only to gorge are condemned.[539] There are several -heavens.[540] The beggarly principles and elements towards which some -turn, are mentioned.[541] The genealogies of the Gnostics are held up -to ridicule.[542] General references are numerous. Diseases are caused -by evil spirits.[543] We must cut off any offending member.[544] Thus -we are saved.[545] In him we breathe and move and have our being.[546] -The higher divinity begets a Son, one among many brethren.[547] As the -father of intelligence, God is the father of lights.[548] - -However, the most interesting incident is that scriptural text which, -to the reflecting, is always so much of a puzzle: "If the light that -is in them be darkness," etc.[549] This is explained by the Platonic -theory[550] that we see because of a special light that is within the -eye. - - -THEOLOGICAL REFERENCES. - -General theological references may be grouped under three heads: the -soul's salvation, the procession of the divinity, and the trinity. - -As to the soul's salvation, God is the opposite of the evil of -beings,[551] which, when created in honor of the divinity[552] is the -image of the Word, the interpreter of the One,[553] and is composed of -several elements;[554] but it is a fall from God,[555] and its fate is -connected with the "parousia."[556] - -This going forth of the soul from God, when considered cosmically, -becomes the "procession of the soul."[557] This is the "eternal -generation,"[558] whereby the Son is begotten from eternity,[559] so -that there could be no (Arian) "en hote ouk en," or, "time when he was -not."[560] This is expressed as "light of light,"[561] and explained by -the Athanasian light and ray simile.[562] We find even the Johannine -and Philonic distinction between God and the Good.[563] The world is -the first-begotten,[564] and the Intelligence is the logos of the first -God,[565] as the hypostasis of wisdom is "ousia," or "being,"[566] and -it is the "universal reason."[567] - -As to the trinity, Plotinos is the first and chief rationalizer -of the cosmic trinity, which he continuously and at length -discusses.[568] God is father and son,[569] and they are "homoousian," -or "consubstantial."[570] The human soul (as image of the cosmic -divinity), is one nature in three powers.[571] Elsewhere we have -discussed the history of the term "persons," but we may understand the -result of that process best by Plotinos's simile of the trinity as -one head with three faces,[572] in which the "persons" bear out their -original meaning of masks, "personare." Henceforward the trinity was an -objective idea. - - -NOTE - -Although mentioned above, special attention should be given to the -parable of the vine and the branches (iii. 3.7.--48, 1088 with Jno. -xv. 1-8), and the divinity's begetting a Son (v. 8.12--31, 571). The -significant aspect of this is that it is represented as being the -content of the supreme ecstatic vision; what you might call the crown -of Plotinos' message. "He tells us that he has seen the divinity -beget an offspring of an incomparable beauty, producing everything -in Himself, and without pain preserving within Himself what He has -begotten.... His Son has manifested Himself externally. By Him, as by -an image (Col. i. 15), you may judge of the greatness of His Father ... -enjoying the privilege of being the image of His eternity." - - -VII. PLOTINOS'S INDEBTEDNESS TO NUMENIUS. - - -1. HISTORICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NUMENIUS AND PLOTINOS. - -We have, elsewhere, pointed out the historic connections between -Numenius and Plotinos. Here, it may be sufficient to recall that -Amelius, native of Numenius's home-town of Apamea, and who had -copied and learned by heart all the works of Numenius, and who later -returned to Apamea to spend his declining days, bequeathing his copy -of Numenius's works to his adopted son Gentilianus Hesychius, was the -companion and friend of Plotinos during his earliest period, editing -all Plotinos's books, until displaced by Porphyry. We remember also -that Porphyry was Amelius's disciple, before his spectacular quarrel -with Amelius, later supplanting him as editor of the works of Plotinos. -Plotinos also came from Alexandria, where Numenius had been carefully -studied and quoted by Origen and Clement of Alexandria. Further, -Porphyry records twice that accusations were popularly made against -Plotinos, that he had plagiarized from Numenius. In view of all this -historical background, we have the prima-facie right to consider -Plotinos chiefly as a later re-stater of the views of Numenius, at -least during his earlier or Amelian period. Such a conception of the -state of affairs must have been in the mind of that monk who, in the -Escoreal manuscript, substituted the name of Numenius for that of -Plotinos on that fragment[573] about matter, which begins directly -with Numenius's name of the divinity, "being and essence."[574] - - -2. NUMENIUS AS FATHER OF NEO-PLATONISM. - -Let us compare with this historical evidence, that which supports the -universally admitted dependence of Plotinos on his teacher Ammonius. -We have only two witnesses: Hierocles and Nemesius; and the latter -attributes the argument for the immateriality of the soul to Ammonius -and Numenius jointly. No doubt, Ammonius may have taught Plotinos in -his youth; but so no doubt did other teachers; and of Ammonius the only -survivals are a few pages preserved by Nemesius. The testimony for -Plotinos's dependence on Numenius is therefore much more historical, as -well as significant, in view of Numenius having left written records -that were widely quoted. The title of "Father of Neo-platonism," -therefore, if it must at all be awarded, should go to Numenius, who had -written a "History of the Platonic Succession," wherein he attempts -to restore "original" Platonism. This fits the title "Neo-platonism," -whereas the philosophy of Ammonius, would be better described as an -eclectic synthesis of Platonism and Aristotelianism. - - -3. CONTRAST BETWEEN THEM. - -Of course we shall admit that there are differences between Plotinos -and Numenius, at least during his Porphyrian period; this was -inevitable while dismissing his Numenian secretary Amelius,[575] a -friend "who had become imbued with" such doctrines before becoming the -friend of Plotinos, who persevered in them, and wrote in justification -thereof. We find that the book chronologically preceding this one is v. -5, on the very subject at issue between Amelius and Porphyry. Plotinos -took his stand with the latter, and therefore against the former, -and through him, against Numenius; and indeed we find him opposing -several Gnostic opinions which can be substantiated in Numenius: the -creation by illumination or emanation,[576] the threefoldness of the -creator,[577] and the pilot's forgetting himself in his work.[578] - -But, after all, these points are not as important as they might seem; -for in a very little while we find Plotinos himself admitting the -substance of all of these ideas, except the verbiage; he himself -uses the light and ray simile, the "light of light;"[579] he himself -distinguishes various phases of the allegedly single intelligence,[580] -and the soul, as pilot of the body incarnates by the very forgetfulness -by which the creator created.[581] - -Further, as we shall show, during his last or Eustochian period after -Porphyry had taken a trip to Sicily to avoid suicide, he himself was -to return to Numenian standpoints. This may be shown in a general way -as follows. Of the nine Eustochian essays[582] only two[583] betray no -similarities to Numenian ideas, while seven[584] do. On the contrary, -in the Amelio-Porphyrian period,[585] written immediately on Amelius's -dismissal, only six[586] are Numenian, and six[587] are non-Numenian. -In the succeeding wholly Porphyrian period,[588] we have the same equal -number of Numenian[589] and non-Numenian[590] books. An explanation of -this reversion to Numenian ideas has been attempted in the study of the -development in Plotinos's views. On the whole, therefore, Plotinos's -opposition to Numenius may be considered no more than episodic. - - -4. DIRECT INDEBTEDNESS OF PLOTINOS TO NUMENIUS. - -As Plotinos was in the habit of not even putting his name to his own -notes; as even in the times of Porphyry the actual authorship of much -that he wrote was already disputed; as even Porphyry acknowledges -principles and quotations were borrowed, we must discover Numenian -passages by their content, rather than by any external indications. -As the great majority of Numenius's works are irretrievably lost, -we may never hope to arrive at a final solution of the matter; and -we shall have to restrict ourselves to that which, in Plotinos, may -be identified by what Numenian fragments remain. What little we can -thus trace definitely will give us a right to draw the conclusion -to much more, and to the opinion that, especially in his Amelian -period, Plotinos was chiefly indebted to Numenian inspiration. We -can consider[591] the mention of Pythagoreans who had treated of the -intelligible as applying to Numenius, whose chief work was "On the -Good," and on the "Immateriality of the Soul." - -The first class of passages will be such as bear explicit reference to -quotation from an ancient source. Of such we have five: "That is why -the Pythagoreans were, among each other, accustomed to refer to this -principle in a symbolic manner, calling him 'A-pollo,' which name means -a denial of manifoldness."[592] "That is the reason of the saying, 'The -ideas and numbers are born from the indefinite doubleness, and the -One;' for this is intelligence."[593] "That is why the ancients said -that ideas are essences and beings."[594] "Let us examine the (general) -view that evils cannot be destroyed, but are necessary."[595] "The -Divinity is above being."[596] - -A sixth case is, "How manifoldness is derived from the First."[597] -A seventh case is the whole passage on the triunity of the divinity, -including the term "Father."[598] - -Among doctrines said to be handed down from the ancient -philosophers[599] are the ascents and descents of souls[600] and the -migrations of souls into bodies other than human.[601] The soul is a -number.[602] - -Moreover, Plotinos wrote a book on the Incorruptibility of the -soul,[603] as Numenius had done;[604] and both authors discuss the -incorporeity of qualities.[605] - -Besides these passages where there is a definite expression of -dependence on earlier sources, there are two in which the verbal -similarity[606] is striking enough to justify their being considered -references: "Besides, no body could subsist without the power of the -universal Soul." "Because bodies, according to their own nature, -are changeable, inconstant, and infinitely divisible, and nothing -unchangeable remains in them, there is evidently need of a principle -that would lead them, gather them, and bind them fast together; and -this we name soul."[607] This similarity is so striking that it had -already been observed and noted by Bouillet. Compare "We consider that -all things called essences are composite, and that not a single one -of them is simple," with "Numenius, who believes that everything is -thoroughly mingled together, and that nothing is simple."[608] - - -5. UNCERTAIN INDEBTEDNESS OF PLOTINOS. - -As Plotinos does not give exact quotations and references, it is -difficult always to give their undoubted source. As probably Platonic -we may mention the passage about the universal Soul taking care of all -that is inanimate;[609] and "When one has arrived at individuals, they -must be abandoned to infinity."[610] Also other quotations.[611] The -line "It might be said that virtues are actualizations,"[612] might -be Aristotelian. We also find:[613] "Thus, according to the ancient -maxim, 'Courage, temperance, all the virtues, even prudence, are but -purifications.'" "That is the reason that it is right to say that -the 'soul's welfare and beauty lie in assimilating herself to the -divinity.'" This sounds Platonic, but might be Numenian. - -In this connection it might not be uninteresting to note passages -in Numenius which are attributed to Plato, but which are not to be -identified: "O Men, the Mind which you dimly perceive is not the -First Mind; but before this Mind is another one, which is older and -diviner." "That the Good is One."[614] - -We turn now to thoughts found identically in Plotinos and Numenius, -although no textual identity is to be noted. We may group these -according to the subject, the universe, and the soul. - - -6. PARTICULAR SIMILARITIES. - -God is supreme king.[615] Eternity is now, but neither past nor -future.[616] The King in heaven is surrounded by leisure.[617] The Good -is above Being;[618] the divinity is the unity above the "Being and -Essence;[619] and connected with this is the unitary interpretation -of the name A-pollo,[620] following in the footsteps of Plutarch. -Nevertheless, the inferior divinity traverses the heavens,[621] in -a circular motion.[622] While Numenius does not specify this motion -as circular,[623] it is implied, inasmuch as the creator's passing -through the heavens must have followed their circular course. With -this perfect motion is connected the peculiar Numenian doctrine of -inexhaustible giving,[624] which gave a philosophical basis for the old -simile of radiation of light,[625] so that irradiation is the method -of creation,[626] and this is not far removed from emanationism. This -process consists of the descent of the intelligible into the material, -or, as Numenius puts it, that both the intelligible and the perceptible -participate in the ideas.[627] Thus intelligence is the uniting -principle that holds together the bodies whose tendency is to split -up, and scatter,[628] making a leakage or waste,[629] which process -invades even the divinity.[630] This uniting of scattering elements -produces a mixture or mingling,[608] of matter and reason,[631] which, -however, is limited to the energies of the existent, not to the -existent itself.[632] All things are in a flow,[633] and the whole all -is in all.[634] The divinity creates by glancing at the intelligence -above,[635] as a pilot.[636] The divinity is split by over-attention to -its charges.[637] - -This leads us over to consideration of the soul. The chief effort -of Numenius is a polemic against the materialism of the Stoics, -and to it Plotinos devotes a whole book.[638] All souls, even the -lowest, are immortal.[639] Even qualities are incorporeal.[640] -The soul, therefore, remains incorporeal.[641] The soul, however, -is divisible.[642] This explains the report that Numenius taught -not various parts of the soul,[643] but two souls, which would be -opposed by Plotinos in his polemic against the Stoics,[644] but -taught in another place.[645] Such divisibility is indeed implied -in the formation of presentation as a by-product,[646] or a "common -part."[647] Moreover, the soul has to choose its own demon, or guardian -divinity.[648] Salvation as a goal appears in Numenius,[649] but not -in Plotinos, who opposes the Gnostic idea of the "saved souls,"[650] -though elsewhere he speaks of the paths of the musician,[651] -lover[652] and philosopher[653] in reaching ecstasy.[654] Still both -Gnostics and Plotinos insisted on the need of a savior.[655] Memory -is actualization of the soul.[656] In the highest ecstasy the soul is -alone with the alone.[657] - - -7. SIMILARITIES APPLIED DIFFERENTLY. - -This comparison of philosophy would have been much stronger had we -added thereto the following points in which we find similar terms and -ideas, but which are applied differently. The soul is indissolubly -united to intelligence according to Plotinos, but to its source with -Numenius.[658] Plotinos makes discord the result of their fall, while -with Numenius it is its cause.[659] Guilt is the cause of the fall of -souls, with Plotinos,[660] but with Numenius it is impulsive passion. -The great evolution or world-process is by Plotinos called the "eternal -procession," while with Numenius it is progress.[661] The simile of -the pilot is by Plotinos applied to the soul within the body; while -with Numenius, it refers to the logos, or creator in the universe,[662] -while in both cases the cause,--of creation for the creator,[663] and -incarnation for the soul[664]--is forgetfulness. There is practically -no difference here, however. Doubleness is, by Plotinos, predicated -of the sun and stars, but by Numenius, of the demiurge himself,[665] -which Plotinos opposes as a Gnostic teaching.[666] The Philonic term -"legislator" is, by Plotinos, applied to intelligence, while Numenius -applies it to the third divinity, and not the second.[667] Plotinos -extends immortality to animals, but Numenius even to the inorganic -realm, including everything.[668] While Numenius seems to believe in -the Serapistic and Gnostic demons,[669] Plotinos opposes them,[670] -although in his biography[671] he is represented as taking part in the -evocation of his guardian spirit in a temple of Isis. - -We thus find a tolerably complete body of philosophy shared by Plotinos -and Numenius, out of the few fragments of the latter that have come -down to us. It would therefore be reasonable to suppose that if -Numenius's complete works had survived we could make out a still far -stronger case for Plotinos's dependence on Numenius. At any rate, the -Dominican scribe at the Escoreal who inserted the name of Numenius in -the place of that of Plotinos in the heading of[672] the fragment about -matter, must have felt a strong confusion between the two authors. - - -8. PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NUMENIUS AND PLOTINOS. - -To begin with, we have the controversy with the Stoics, which, -though it appears in the works of both, bears in each a different -significance. While with Numenius it absorbed his chief controversial -efforts,[673] with Plotinos[674] it occupied only one of his many -spheres of interest; and indeed, he had borrowed from them many -terms, such as "pneuma," the spiritual body, and others, set forth -elsewhere. Notable, however, was the term "hexis," habituation, -or form of inorganic objects,[675] and the "phantasia," or -sense-presentation.[676] Like, them, the name A-pollo is interpreted as -a denial of manifoldness.[677] - -Next in importance, as a landmark, is Numenius's chief secret, the name -of the divinity, as "being and essence," which reappears in Plotinos in -numberless places.[678] Connected with this is the idea that essence is -intelligence.[679] - - -9. PYTHAGOREAN SIMILARITIES. - -It is a common-place that Numenius was a Pythagorean, or at least -was known as such, for though he reverenced Pythagoras, he conceived -of himself as a restorer of true Platonism. It will, therefore, be -all the more interesting to observe what part numbers play in their -system, especially in that of Plotinos, who made no special claim to -be a Pythagorean disciple. First, we find that numbers and the divine -ideas are closely related.[680] Numbers actually split the unity of the -divinity.[681] The soul also is considered as a number,[682] and in -connection with this we find the Pythagorean sacred "tetraktys."[683] -Thus numbers split up the divinity,[684] though it is no more than fair -to add that elsewhere Plotinos contradicts this, and states that the -multiplicity of the divinity is not attained by division;[685] still, -this is not the only case in which we will be forced to array Plotinos -against himself. - -The first effect of the splitting influence of numbers will be -doubleness,[686] which, though present in intelligence,[687] -nevertheless chiefly appears in matter,[688] as the Pythagorean -"indefinite dyad."[689] Still, even the Supreme is double.[690] So -we must not be surprised if He is constituted by a trinity,[691] in -connection with which the Supreme appears as grandfather.[692] - -If then both Numenius and Plotinos are really under the spell of -Pythagoras, it is pretty sure they will not be materialist, they will -believe in the incorporeality of the divinity,[693] of qualities;[694] -and of the soul[695] which will be invisible[696] and possess no -extension.[697] A result of this will be that the soul will not be -located in the body, or in space, but rather the body in the soul.[698] - -From this incorporeal existence,[699] there is only a short step to -unchangeable existence,[700] or eternity.[701] This, to the soul, means -immortality,[702] one theory of which is reincarnation.[703] To the -universe, however, this means harmony.[704] - -There are still other Pythagorean traces in common between Numenius -and Plotinos. The cause that the indeterminate dyad split off from the -divinity is "tolma," rashness, or boldness.[705] Everything outside -of the divinity is in a continual state of flux.[706] Evil is then -that which is opposed to good.[707] It also is therefore unavoidable, -inasmuch as suppression of its cosmic function would entail cosmic -collapse.[708] The world stands thus as an inseparable combination of -intelligence and necessity, or chance.[709] - - -10. PLATONIC TRACES. - -Platonic traces, there would naturally be; but it will be noticed that -they are far less numerous than the Pythagorean. To begin with, we -find the reverent spirit towards the divinities, which prays for their -blessing at the inception of all tasks.[710] To us who live in these -latter days, such a prayer seems out of place in philosophy; but that -is only because we have divorced philosophy from theology; in other -words, because our theology has left the realm of living thought, -and, being fixed once for all, we are allowed to pursue any theory -of existence we please as if it had nothing whatever to do with any -reality; in other words, we are deceiving ourselves. On the contrary, -in those days, every philosophical speculation was a genuine adventure -in the spiritual world, a magical operation that might unexpectedly -lead to the threshold of the cosmic sanctuary. Wise, indeed, therefore, -was he who began it by prayer. - -Of other technical Platonic terms there are quite a few. The lower is -always the image of the higher.[711] So the world might be considered -the statue of the Divinity.[712] The ideas are in a realm above the -world.[713] The soul here below is as in a prison.[714] There is a -divinity higher than the one generally known.[715] The divinity is in -a stability resultant of firmness and perfect motion.[716] The perfect -movement, therefore, is circular.[717] This inter-communion of the -universe therefore results in matter appearing in the intelligible -world as "intelligible matter."[718] By dialectics, also called -"bastard reasoning,"[719] we abstract everything[720] till we reach the -thing-in-itself,[721] or, in other words, matter as a substrate of the -world.[722] Thus we metaphysically reach ineffable solitude.[723] - -The same goal is reached psychologically, however, in the ecstasy.[724] -This idea occurred in Plato only as a poetic expression of metaphysical -attainment; and in the case of Plotinos at least may have been used as -a practical experience chiefly to explain his epileptic attacks; and -this would be all the more likely as this disease was generally called -the "sacred disease." Whether Numenius also was an epileptic, we are -not told; it is more likely he took the idea from Philo, or Philo's -oriental sources; at least Numenius seems to claim no personal ecstatic -experiences such as those of Plotinos. - -We have entered the realm of psychology; and this teaches us that that -in which Numenius and Plotinos differ from Plato and Philo is chiefly -their psychological or experimental application of pure philosophy. No -body could subsist without the soul to keep it together.[725] Various -attempts are made to describe the nature of the soul; it is the extent -or relation of circumference to circle.[726] Or it is like a line and -its divergence.[727] In any case, the divinity and the soul move around -the heavens,[728] and this may explain the otherwise problematical -progress or evolution ("prosodos" or "stolos") of ours.[729] - - -11. VARIOUS SIMILARITIES. - -There are many other unclassifiable Numenian traces in Plotinos. Two of -them, however, are comparatively important. First, is a reaffirmation -of the ancient Greek connection between generation, fertility of birth -of souls and wetness,[730] which is later reaffirmed by Porphyry in -his "Cave of the Nymphs." Plotinos, however, later denies this.[731] -Then we come to a genuine innovation of Numenius's; his theory of -divine or intelligible giving. Plato had, of course, in his genial, -casual way, sketched out a whole organic system of divine creation -and administration of this world. The conceptions he needed he had -cheerfully borrowed from earlier Greek philosophy without any rigid -systematization, so that he never noticed that the hinge on which all -was supposed to turn was merely the makeshift of an assumption. This -capital error was noticed by Numenius, who sought to supply it by a -psychological observation, namely, that knowledge may be imparted -without diminution. Plotinos, with his winning way of dispensing with -quotation-marks, appropriated this,[732] as also the idea that life -streams out upon the world in the glance of the divinity, and as -quickly leaves it, when the Divinity turns away His glance.[733] - -Other less important points of contact are: the Egyptian ship of -souls;[734] the Philonic distinction between "the" God as supreme, and -"god" as subordinate;[735] the hoary equivocation on "kosmos;"[736] and -the illustration of the divine Logos as the pilot of the world.[737] - - - - -VALUE OF PLOTINOS. - - -IMPORTANCE IN THE PAST. - -We must focus our observations on Plotinos as a philosopher. To -begin with, we should review his successors, Porphyry, Jamblichus, -Sallust, Proclus, Hierocles, Simplicius;[738] Macrobius;[739] Priscus; -Olympicdorus and John Philoponus.[740] - -Among the Arabian philosophers that follow in his steps are Maimonides -and Ibn Gebirol.[741] - -Of the Christian fathers we first have two who paraphrased, rather than -quoted him. - -St. Augustine by name quotes i. 6; iii. 2; iv. 3, and v. 1; he -paraphrases parts of i. 2; ii. 1; iii. 6, 7; iv. 2, 7; vi. 5, 6.[742] -St. Basil so closely paraphrases parts of Plotinos in his treatise on -the Holy Spirit,[743] his letter on the Monastic Life,[744] and his -Hexameron,[745] that Bouillet prints the passage in question in deadly -parallel. - -Other Christian Plotonic students were Gregory of Nyssa, Synesius, -Dionysius the Areopagite, Theodorus, Aeneas of Gaza, Gennadius;[746] -Victorinus;[747] Nicephorus Chumnus;[748] and Cassiodorus.[749] - -Thomas Aquinas also was much indebted to Plotinos; and after him came -Boethius, Fenelon, Bossnet and Leibnitz (all quoted in Bouillet's work). - -We have frequently pointed out that Plotinos' "bastard reasoning" -process of reaching the intelligible was practically paraphrased by -Kant's dialectical path to the "thing-in-itself." This dialetic, of -course, was capitalized by Hegel. - -Drews has shown that Edouard von Hartmann used Plotinos' -semi-devotional ecstasy as a metaphysical basis for his philosophy of -the Unconscious. - -It is, of course, among mystics that Plotinos has been accorded the -greater honor. His practical influence descended through the visions -and ecstasies of the saints down to Swedenborg, who attempted to write -the theology of the ecstasy; and the relation between these two, -Swedenborg and Plotinos should prove a fertile field for investigation. - - -CULTURAL IMPORTANCE. - -Summarizing, he formed a bridge between the pagan world, with its -Greco-Roman civilization, and the modern world, in three departments: -Christianity, philosophy, and mysticism. So long as the traditional -Platonico-Stoical feud persisted there was no hope of progress; because -it kept apart two elements that were to fuse into the Christian -philosophy. Numenius was the last Platonist, as Posidonius was the last -Stoic combatant. However, if reports are to be trusted, Ammonius was an -eclecticist, who prided himself on combining Plato with Aristotle. If -Plotinos was indeed his disciple, it was the theory eclecticism that -he took from his reputed teacher. Practically he was to accomplish it -by his dependence on the Numenian Amelius, the Stoic Porphyry, and -the negative Eustochius. It will be seen therefore that his chief -importance was not in spite of his weakness, but most because of it. -By repeatedly "boxing the compass" he thoroughly assimilated the best -of the conflicting schools, and became of interest to a sufficiency -of different groups (Christian, philosophical and mystical) to insure -preservation, study and quotation. His habit of omitting credit to -any but ancient thinkers left his own work, to the uninformed--who -constituted all but a minimal number--as a body of original thought. -Thus he remains to us the last light of Greece, speaking a language -with which we are familiar, and leaving us quotations that are -imperishable. - - -PERSONAL VALUE. - -While therefore providentially Plotinos has ever been of great -importance theologically, philosophically and mystically, we cannot -leave him without honestly facing the question of his value as an -original thinker. It is evident that his success was in inverse ratio -to originality; but we can also see that he could not have held -together those three spheres of interest without the momentum of a -wonderful personality. This will be evident at a glance to any reader -of his biography. But after all we are here concerned not so much -with his personality as with his value as an original thinker. This -question is mooted by, and cannot be laid aside because of its decisive -influence on the problem of his dependence of Numenius. The greater -part of the latter's works being irretrievably lost, we can judge only -from what we have; and as to the rest, we must ask ourselves, was -Plotinos the kind of a man who would have depended on some other man's -thoughts? Is he likely to have sketched out a great scheme and filled -it in; or rather, was he likely to depend on personal suggestion, -and embroider on it, so to speak. Elsewhere we have demonstrated a -development of his opinions, for instance, about matter. Was this due -to progressiveness, or to indefiniteness? The reader must judge for -himself. - - -PERSONAL LIMITATIONS. - -His epilepsy naturally created an opportunity for, and need of a -doctrine of ecstasy; which for normal people should be no more than -a doctrine, or at least be limited to conscious experiences. Even -his admirer, Porphyry, acknowledges that he spelled and pronounced -incorrectly.[750] He acknowledged that without Porphyry's objections he -would have nothing to say. He refrained from quoting his authorities, -and Porphyry acknowledged that his writings contained many Stoic -and Aristotelian doctrines. It was generally bruited around that his -doctrines were borrowed from Numenius,[751] to the extent that his -disciples held controversies, and wrote books on the subject. His style -is enigmatic, and the difficulty of understanding him was discussed -even in his own day. He was dependent on secretaries or editors; first -on Amelius, later on Porphyry, who does not scruple to acknowledge -he added many explanations.[752] Later, Plotinos sent his books to -Porphyry in Sicily to edit. No doubt the defectiveness of his eyesight -made both reading and writing difficult, and explains his failure -to put titles to his works; though, as in the case of Virgil, such -hesitation may have been the result of a secret consciousness of his -indebtedness to others. - - -RELIANCE ON PUNNING. - -Punning has of course a hoary antiquity, and even the revered Plato -was an adept at it--as we see in his Cratylos. Moreover, not till a -man's work is translated can we uncover all the unconscious cases -of "undistributed middle." Nevertheless, in an inquiry as to the -permanent objective validity of a train of reasoning, we are compelled -to note extent and scope of his tendency. So he puns on aeons;[753] -on science and knowledge;[754] on "agalmata";[755] on Aphrodite, -as "delicate";[756] on Being;[757] on "koros," as creation or -adornment";[758] on difference in others;[759] on idea;[760] on heaven, -world, universe, animal and all;[761] on Vesta, and standing;[762] on -Hexis;[763] on inclination;[764] on doxa;[765] on love and vision;[766] -on "einai" and "henos;"[767] on "mous," "noesis," and to "noefon";[768] -on paschein;[769] on Poros;[770] on Prometheus and Providence;[771] -on reason and characteristic;[772] on "schesis" and "schema";[773] -and "soma" and "sozesthai";"[774] on suffering;[775] on thinking, -thinkable, and intellection;[776] on "timely" and "sovereign."[777] -It will be noted that these puns refer to some of the most important -conceptions, and are found in all periods of his life. We must -therefore conclude that his was not a clear thinking ability; that he -depended on accidental circumstances, and may not always have been -fully conscious how far he was following others. This popular judgment -that he was revamping Numenius's work may then not have been entirely -unfounded, as we indeed have shown. - -Nevertheless, he achieved some permanent work, that will never be -forgotten; for instance: - -1. His description of the ecstatic state. - -2. His polemic against the Aristotelian and Stoic categories. - -3. His establishment of his own categories. - -4. His allegoric treatment of the birth of love, the several Eroses, -Poros and Penia, and other myths. - -5. His building of a Trinitarian philosophy. - -6. His threefold spheres of existence, underlying Swedenborgian -interpretation. - -7. His aesthetic theories. - -8. His ethical studies of virtues and happiness. - -9. His restatement of Numenius's arguments for the immateriality of the -soul. - - -SELECTED MAXIMS - -The reader may be interested in a few maxims selected from Plotinos' -works which may be of general interest. - -1. We develop toward ecstasy by simplification of Soul. - -2. We rise by the flight of the Single to the Single, face to face. - -3. We contain something of the Supreme. - -4. The Soul becomes what she remembers and sees. - -5. Everything has a secret power. - -6. The best men are those who have most intimacy with themselves. - -7. The touch of the good man is the greatest thing in the world. - -8. Every being is its best, not when great or numerous, but when it -belongs to itself. - -9. There are two men in us, the better and the worse. - -10. The secret of life is to live simultaneously with others and -yourself. - -11. God is the author of liberty. - -12. Concerning what would it be most worth while to speak, except the -Soul? Let us therefore know ourselves. - -13. Without virtue, God is but a name. - -14. The object of virtue is to separate the soul from the body. - -15. We can never become perfect, because he who thinks himself so has -already forgotten the supreme divinity towards which he must hasten. - -16. The world was created by a concurrence of intelligence and -necessity. - -17. The Soul is the image, word, and interpreter of the One. - -18. The divinities though present to many human beings often reveal -themselves only to some one person, because he alone is able to -contemplate them. - -19. To act without suffering is the sign of a great power. - -20. Only virtue is independent. - -21. We are beautiful when we know ourselves. - -22. The Soul is the child of the universal Father. - -23. True happiness is being wise, and exercising this within oneself. - -24. To become again what one was originally is to live in the Superior -world. - -25. The desired goal is not to cease failing, but to grow divine. - -26. Virtue demands preliminary purification. - -27. Our effort at assimilation should be directed not at mere -respectability, but at the gods themselves. - -28. One should study mathematics in order to accustom oneself to think -of incorporeal things, and to believe in their existence. - -29. Soul is not in body, but body in Soul. - -30. The Soul's higher part remains in heaven. - -31. We should not leave the earth, but not be of it. - -32. The object of life is not to avoid evil, or copy the good, but to -become good. - -33. Dying, to Eustochius: "I am awaiting you, in order to draw the -divine in me to the divine in all." - - - - -FOOTNOTES: - - -[1] It is significant that the subject of the first treatise of -Plotinos, after the departure of Porphyry, should treat of happiness -as the object of life. These may have been the arguments he advanced -to persuade Porphyry to abstain from suicide (to which he refers in -sections 8, 16), and, rather, to take a trip to Sicily, the land of -natural beauty. He also speaks of losing friends, in section 8. The -next book, on Providence, may also have been inspired by reflections -on this untoward and unexpected circumstance. We see also a change -from abstract speculation to his more youthful fancy and comparative -learning and culture. - -[2] Diog. Laert. x.; Cicero, de Fin. i. 14, 46. - -[3] Cicero, de Fin. 11, 26. - -[4] See Arist. Nic. Eth. vii. 13; Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyp. Pyrrhon, -iii. 180; Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. - -[5] Arist. Nic. Eth. i. 10, 14. - -[6] Stob. Floril. i. 76. - -[7] See vi. 8. - -[8] In Plutarch, of Wickedness, and in Seneca, de Tranquil, Animi, 14. - -[9] De Providentia, 3. - -[10] De Provid. 5. - -[11] Aeschylus, Seven Against Thebes, 327. - -[12] The vegetative soul, the power that presides over the nutrition -and growth of the body; see iv. 3.23. - -[13] See i. 8; also Numenius, 16. - -[14] i. 2.4. - -[15] Cicero, Tusculans. ii. 7. - -[16] The animal; see i. 1.10. - -[17] See i. 1.8, 10. - -[18] See the Theataetus, p. 176. Carv. 84; the Phaedo. p. 69, Cary, 37; -the Republic, vi. p. 509; Cary, 19; x. p. 613, Cary, 12; the Laws, iv. -p. 716, Cary, 8; also Plotinos i. 2.1. - -[19] See i. 9. - -[20] A Stoic confutation of Epicurus and the Gnostics. As soon as -Porphyry has left him, Plotinos harks back to Amelius, on whose -leaving he had written against the Gnostics. He also returns to -Numenian thoughts. Bouillet notices that here Plotinos founded himself -on Chrysippus, Marcus Aurelius, and Epictetus, and was followed -by Nemesius. This new foundation enabled him to assume a rather -independent attitude. Against Plato, he taught that matter derived -existence from God, and that the union of the soul and body is not -necessarily evil. Against Aristotle, he taught that God is not only -the final, but also the efficient cause of the universe. Against -the Stoics, he taught that the human soul is free, and is a cause, -independent of the World Soul from which she proceeded. Against the -Gnostics, he insisted that the creator is good, the world is the best -possible, and Providence extends to mundane affairs. Against the -Manicheans, he taught that the evil is not positive, but negative, and -is no efficient cause, so that there is no dualism. - -[21] Diog. Laert. x. 133. - -[22] See iv. 2.4; vi. 7; see Plato, Philebus, p. 30, Cary, 56; Philo, -Leg. Alleg, vi. 7. - -[23] Lactantius, de Ira Dei, 13. - -[24] Ireneus, Ref. Her. ii. 3. - -[25] As in vi. 7.1. - -[26] Philo, de Creatione Mundi, 6. - -[27] As the Gnostics taught; see ii. 9.1. - -[28] As was held by the Gnostics, who within the divinity distinguished -potentiality and actuality, as we see in ii. 9.1. - -[29] See ii. 9.3. 8. - -[30] Numenius, 32. - -[31] Plato, Timaeus, p. 48, Cary, 21. Statesman, p. 273, Cary, 16; -Laws, x. p. 904, Cary, 12. - -[32] See ii. 9.2. - -[33] From Aristotle, de Anima, 2. - -[34] This is the Aristotelian psychological scheme. - -[35] Clem. Al.; Strom. v. p. 712; Stobaeus, Ecl. Phys. i. p. 372, 446. - -[36] iv. 8.12; Plato, Tim. p. 41. 69; Cary, 16, 44. - -[37] Stob. Ecl. Eth. ii. 7. - -[38] iii. 2.13. - -[39] p. 253; Cary, 74. - -[40] Sen. 526. - -[41] According to Plato's Theaetetus, p. 176, Cary, 83; Numenius,16. - -[42] Seneca, de Provid. 2. - -[43] In his Republic, ix. p. 585, Cary, 10. - -[44] See iii. 1.9. - -[45] See iv. 3.12. - -[46] See iv. 3.5. - -[47] Gregory of Nyssa, Catech. Orat. 7. - -[48] As thought Sallust, Consp. Cat. 52. - -[49] Republic x. p. 620; Cary, 16; Numenius, 57. - -[50] As said Sallust, Conspiration of Catiline, 52. - -[51] As thought Epictetus, Manual, 31. - -[52] In his Republic, vi. p. 488; Cary, 4. - -[53] Marcus Aurelius. Thoughts, xi. 18. - -[54] As thought Cicero, de Nat. Deor. iii. 63. 64. - -[55] As thought Philo, de Prov. in Eus. Prep. Ev. viii. 14. - -[56] According to Plato, in the Sophist and Protagoras, and the Stoics, -as in Marcus Aurelius. Meditations, vii. 63. - -[57] As did the writer of Revelation, iv. 6. - -[58] In his Timaeus, p. 29e, Cary, 10. - -[59] As said Chrysippus in Plutarch, de Comm. Not. adv. Stoicos, 13. - -[60] Mentioned by Plato in his Phaedrus, p. 248, Cary, 59; Republ. v. -p. 451, Cary, 2; and in the famous hymn of Cleanthes, Stobaeus Ecl. -Phys. i. 3. - -[61] Like the figure of the angel Mithra; see Franck, LaKabbale, p. 366. - -[62] As Hierocles wondered, de Prov. p. 82, London Ed. - -[63] In the words of Plato's Timaeus p. 48; Cary, 21; and Theaetetus, -p. 176; Cary, 84; Numenius, 16. - -[64] Almost the words of John i. 1. - -[65] In the Laws, vii. p. 796, Cary, 6; p. 815, Cary, 18; and Philo, de -Prov. in Eus. Prep. Ev. viii. 14. - -[66] As thought Epictetus in his Manual, 2, 6. - -[67] In his Philebus, p. 48, Cary, 106. - -[68] As thought Epictetus in his Manual. 8. - -[69] See iii. 8. - -[70] Numenius, 32. - -[71] Plato, Banquet, p. 187, Cary, 14. - -[72] Marcus Aurelius, Medit. ii. 13. - -[73] As thought Marcus Aurelius, in his Thoughts, xii. 42. - -[74] See iv. 3.24. - -[75] In his Manual, 37. - -[76] See iv. 1.9-12. - -[77] Marcus Aurelius, Medit. vii. 9; Seneca, Epist. 94. - -[78] Numenius, iii. 7. - -[79] This image was later adopted by Swedenborg in his "celestial man." - -[80] In close proximity to note 45, another distinctly Johannine -expression. - -[81] Stoic ideas. - -[82] As Plato said in his Phaedrus, p. 247, Cary, 56. - -[83] See i. 8.2. - -[84] See ii. 3.17. - -[85] See ii. 3.13. Ficinus's translation. - -[86] A Stoic term. - -[87] Plato, Timaeus, p. 42, Cary, 17; see also Enn. ii. 3.10. 11, 15, -16. - -[88] Timaeus, p. 42, 91, Cary, 17, 72, 73. - -[89] See ii. 3.13. - -[90] Alcinous, de Doctrina Platonica, 26. - -[91] Gregory of Nyssa, Catech. Oratio, 7; Dionysius Areopagite, Divine -Names, 4. - -[92] See ii. 3.7. - -[93] See iii. 2.6. - -[94] Plato, Timaeus, p. 31c, Cary, 11. - -[95] See Numenius. 14. - -[96] Clem. Al. Strom. v. 689. - -[97] In this book we no longer find detailed study of Plato, Aristotle -and the Epicureans, as we did in the works of the Porphyrian period. -Well indeed did Plotinos say that without Porphyry's objections he -might have had little to say. - -[98] Porphyry, Principles of the theory of the Intelligibles, 31. - -[99] Olympiodorus, in Phaedonem, Cousin, Fragments, p. 404. - -[100] Ib., p. 432. - -[101] Ib., p. 418. - -[102] Ib., p. 431. - -[103] John Philoponus, Comm. in Arist., de Anima, i. 1. - -[104] See iii. 6.1. - -[105] By a triple pun, on "nous," "noesis," and "to noeton." - -[106] Porphyry, Principles, 32. - -[107] By a pun. - -[108] See John i. 4, 9. - -[109] This anticipates Athanasius's explanations of the divine process. - -[110] See v. 1.4. - -[111] Porphyry, Principles, 26. - -[112] The Eleusynian Mysteries, Hymn to Ceres, 279; see vi. 9.11. - -[113] See v. 3.14. - -[114] In this book Plotinos harks back to the first book he had -written, i. 6, to Plato's Banquet and Cratylos. Porphyry later agreed -with some of it. Like St. John, Plotinos returns to God as love, in -his old age. His former book had also been a re-statement of earlier -thoughts. - -[115] See iii. 5.6. - -[116] See i. 6.2, 3. - -[117] See i. 6.3, 7. - -[118] Plato, Banquet, p. 206-208, Cary, 31, 32. - -[119] Plato, Banquet, p. 210, Cary, 34, sqq. - -[120] Porphyry, Biography of Plotinos, 15. - -[121] See i. 3.2. - -[122] See sect. 5, 6. - -[123] Plato, Banquet, p. 185, Cary, 12, 13. - -[124] By Plato, in his Cratylus, p. 396, Cary, 29, 30; interpreted to -mean "pure Intelligence." - -[125] This is the principal power of the soul; see ii. 3.17. - -[126] See v. 8.12, 13. - -[127] Plotinos thus derives "eros" from "orasis," which, however -far-fetched a derivation, is less so than that of Plato, from "esros," -meaning to "flow into," Cratylos, p. 420, Cary, 79, 80. - -[128] For this distinction, see ii. 3.17, 18. - -[129] For the two Loves, see v. 8.13, and vi. 9.9. - -[130] See iii. 4. - -[131] See iv. 9. - -[132] Plato, Banq. 203: Cary, 29. - -[133] In his Isis and Osiris, p. 372, 374. - -[134] See i. 1. - -[135] Plato, Banquet, p. 202, Cary, 27, 28; Porphyry, de Abst. ii. 37, -sqq. - -[136] In section 4. - -[137] Plato, Epinomis, p. 984, Cary, 8; Porphyry, de Abst. ii. 37-42. - -[138] See ii. 4.3. - -[139] See ii. 4.3. - -[140] An expression often used by the Platonists; see the Lexicon -Platonicum, by the grammarian Timaeus, sub voce "oistra." - -[141] See Plato, Banquet, p. 203, Cary, 29. - -[142] See iii. 4.6. - -[143] See iii. 4.3. - -[144] A Stoic distinction. - -[145] P. 246, Cary, 56. - -[146] P. 28, Cary, 50. - -[147] Didymus, Etym. Magn. p. 179, Heidelb. p. 162, Lips. - -[148] Timaeus Locrius, of the Soul of the World, p. 550, ed. Gale, -Cary, 4. - -[149] Origen, c. Cels., iv. p. 533. - -[150] "logoi." - -[151] Proclus, Theology of Plato, vi. 23. - -[152] As the generation of the world, in Plato's Timaeus, p. 28, 29, -Cary, 9; and the erecting into separate Gods various powers of the same -divinity, as Proclus said, in his commentary thereon, in Parm. i. 30. - -[153] ii. 3.17; ii. 9.2. - -[154] Pun on "Poros" and "euporia." - -[155] See ii. 4.16. - -[156] See books ii. 3; ii. 9; iii. 1, 2, 3, 4, for the foundations -on which this summary of Plotinos's doctrine of evil is contained. -To do this, he was compelled to return to Plato, whose Theaetetus, -Statesman, Timaeus and Laws he consulted. Aristotle seems to have been -more interested in natural phenomena and human virtue than in the -root-questions of the destiny of the universe, and the nature of the -divinity; so Plotinos studies him little here. But it will be seen that -here Plotinos entirely returns to the later Plato, through Numenius. - -[157] As thought Empedocles, 318-320. - -[158] i. 6.2. - -[159] i. 8.7. - -[160] i. 8.3. - -[161] As thought Plato in his Laws, iv. p. 716; Cary, 7, 8. - -[162] As thought Plato in his Philebus, p. 28; Cary 49, 50. - -[163] See v. 1; vi. 9.2. - -[164] Numenius, fr. 32. - -[165] As said Plato, in his second Letter, 2.312. - -[166] See iii. 8.9; iv. 7.14; vi. 4.2; vi. 9.2. - -[167] As held by Plato in the Parmenides and First Alcibiades. - -[168] See ii. 4.8-16. - -[169] It is noteworthy that Plotinos in his old age here finally -recognizes Evil in itself, just as Plato in his later work, the Laws -(x. p. 897; Cary, 8) adds to the good World-soul, an evil one. This, -for Plotinos, was harking back to Numenius's evil world-soul, fr. 16. - -[170] In his First Alcibiades, p. 122; Cary, 37. - -[171] See i. 1.12. - -[172] This means created things, which are contingent and perishable; -see ii. 4.5, 6. - -[173] See ii. 4.10-12. This idea of irradiation is practically -emanationism; and besides Plotinos's interest in orientalism (Porphyry -Biography, 3), it harks back to Numenius, fr. 26.3; 27a.10. - -[174] Held by Plato in his Theaetetus, p. 176; Cary, 84, 85; and -Republic, ii. 279; Cary, 18, and of Numenius, fr. 16. - -[175] See i. 2.1. - -[176] In the Theaetetus, p. 176; Cary, 84, 85. - -[177] Numenius, fr. 10; Plato, Rep. vi. p. 509b; Cary, 19. - -[178] As Plato suggested in his Philebus, p. 23; Cary, 35-37. - -[179] Numenius, fr. 17. - -[180] Mentioned by Plato in the Timaeus, pp. 28, 30, 38; Cary, 9, 10, -14. - -[181] From the Timaeus, p. 41; Cary, 16, 17. - -[182] See i. 2.1; i. 6.8. - -[183] That is, the relative inferiority of beings which, proceeding -from each other, become more and more distant from the good; see ii. -5.5; ii. 9.8, 13; v. 1; Philo, Leg. Alleg. ii. p. 74. - -[184] See i. 8.1. - -[185] ii. 4.12. - -[186] Numenius, fr. 26.3. - -[187] Diog. Laertes vii. - -[188] See ii. 6. - -[189] ii. 4.13. - -[190] i. 8.15. - -[191] As thought Plato in his Banquet, p. 211; Cary, 35. - -[192] As said Plato, Republic, vii. p. 534; Cary, 14. - -[193] As Plato says in his Phaedrus, p. 246; Cary, 54, 56. - -[194] As wrote Plato in his Banquet, p. 203; Cary, 28, 29, and see iii. -7.14 and iii. 5.9 as well as iii. 6.14. - -[195] According to the interpretation of Ficinus. - -[196] See ii. 4. This is an added confirmation of the chronological -order; in the Enneadic order this book is later, not earlier. - -[197] Again a term discussed by Numenius, fr. ii. 8, 13; and iii; see -i. 1.9; iv. 3.3, 30, 31; i. 4.10. - -[198] We notice how these latter studies of Plotinos do not take -up any new problems, chiefly reviewing subjects touched on before. -This accounts for Porphyry's attempt to group the Plotinic writings, -systematically. This reminds us of the suggestion in the Biography, -that except for the objections of Porphyry, Plotinos would have nothing -to write. Notice also the system of the last Porphyrian treatises, -contrasted with the more literary treatment of the later. All this -supports Porphyry's table of chronological arrangement of the studies -of Plotinos. This book is closely connected with the preceding studies -of Fate and Providence, iii. 1-3; for he is here really opposing not -the Gnostics he antagonized when dismissing Amelius, but the Stoic -theories on Providence and Fate. - -[199] See iii. 1.5, 6; iii. 6; iv. 4.30-44. - -[200] Macrobins. In Somn. Scipionis. - -[201] Cicero, de Divinatione, i. 39. - -[202] Julius Firmicus Maternus, Astrol. ii. 23. - -[203] With Ptolemy's Tetrabiblion, i. p. 17. - -[204] See iv. 4.31. - -[205] Discussed in par. 4. - -[206] This incomprehensibility was no doubt due to Plotinos's advancing -blindness and renal affection. - -[207] Numenius, fr. 32. - -[208] Cicero, de Nat. Deorum, ii. 46. - -[209] See iv. 4.32. - -[210] According to the Stoics: Alex. Aphrod. de Mixtione, p. 141; -Cicero, de Nat. Deorum, ii. 32. - -[211] See iii. 1.4, 7-10. - -[212] See iii. 1.6. - -[213] See iv. 4.33. - -[214] See iv. 4.35; according to the Stoics, see Diogenes Laertes. vii. -140. - -[215] See iv. 4.32. - -[216] Seneca, Quest. Nat. i. 1. - -[217] See iii. 4.2, 4. - -[218] See ii. 3.13. - -[219] See iii. 4.3. - -[220] See iii. 1.8-10. - -[221] The law of Adrastea; see iii. 4.2; iv. 4.4, 5. - -[222] Plato, Phaedrus, p. 244-251; Cary, 47-66. - -[223] See i. 8; ii. 11; iii. 1; vi. 8. - -[224] Plato, Rep. x. p. 617; Cary, 14. - -[225] p. 41-42; Cary, 16, 17. - -[226] See i. 1.7-10. - -[227] See ii. 1.5. - -[228] Stoic terms. - -[229] See ii. 1.8-10. - -[230] See i. 2.1; vi. 8. - -[231] See i. 1.7-12; iv. 3.19-23. - -[232] This is the exact doctrine of Numenius, fr. 53; it logically -agrees with the doubleness of matter, Num. 14; of the Creator, Num. 36; -and the world-Soul, fr. 16. See note 71. - -[233] See par. 18. - -[234] Plato, Banquet, p. 202; Cary, 28; Timaeus, p. 90; Cary, 71. - -[235] See iii. 1.2. - -[236] That is, to share the passions of the bodies: see iii. 1.2. - -[237] See iv. 4.38-40. - -[238] Seneca, Nat. Quest. ii. 32. - -[239] According to Aristotle, Met. xii. 3. - -[240] See iii. 1.6. - -[241] See Cicero, de Nat. Deor. ii. 34. - -[242] See iv. 4.39, 40. - -[243] Plato, Phaedrus, p. 248; Cary, 59.60. - -[244] See iii. 1.8-10. - -[245] See iv. 4.39. - -[246] See iii. 4.3. - -[247] See iii. 1.10. - -[248] See iii. 1.5. - -[249] Rep. x. p. 616; Cary, 14; Enn. iii. 4. - -[250] See iv. 4.30, 40, 43, 44. - -[251] See i. 4. - -[252] See i. 2.5. - -[253] In i. 1; proof of the chronological order. - -[254] See ii. 9.12; iv. 3.9, 10; negatively. - -[255] See iii. 3.1, 2; see Seneca, de Provid. 5. - -[256] See ii. 3.17; iii. 8. - -[257] See iv. 4.9-12. - -[258] See ii. 4; Seneca, de Provid. 5. - -[259] See ii. 9.2; iii. 2, 3. Seneca, de Provid. 5. - -[260] Or generative reasons, a Stoic term, Seneca, Quest. Nat. iii. 29; -see iii. 3.1, 2, 7. - -[261] Plotinos is here harking back to his very earliest writing, 1.6, -where, before his monistic adventure with Porphyry, he had, under -the Numenian influence of Amelius, constructed his system out of a -combination of the doctrines of Plato (about the ideas), Aristotle (the -distinctions of form and matter and of potentiality and actualization), -and the Stoic (the "reasons," "seminal reasons," action and passions, -and "hexis," or "habit," the inorganic informing principle). Of these, -Numenius seems to have lacked the Aristotelian doctrines, although he -left Plato's single triple-functioned soul for Aristotle's combination -of souls of various degrees (fr. 53). Plotinos, therefore, seems to -have distinguished in every object two elements, matter and form (ii. -4.1; ii. 5.2). Matter inheres potentially in all beings (ii. 5.3, 4) -and therefore is non-being, ugliness, and evil (i. 6.6). Form is the -actualization (K. Steinhart's Melemata Plotiniana, p. 31; ii. 5.2); -that is, the essence and power (vi. 4.9), which are inseparable. Form -alone possesses real existence, beauty and goodness. Form has four -degrees: idea, reason, nature and habit; which degrees are the same -as those of thought and life (Porphyry, Principles 12, 13, 14). The -idea is distinguished into "idea" or intelligible Form, or "eidos," -principle of human intellectual life. Reason is 1, divine (theios -logos, i. 6, 2; the reason that comes from the universal Soul, iv. -3.10), 2, human (principle of the rational life, see Ficinus on ii. -6.2); 3, the seminal or generative reason (principle of the life -of sensation, which imparts to the body the sense-form, "morphe," -3.12-end; Bouillet, i. 365). Now reasons reside in the soul (ii. 4.12), -and are simultaneously essences and powers (vi. 4.9), and as powers -produce the nature, and as essences, the habits. Now nature ("physis") -is the principle of the vegetative life, and habit, "hexis," Numenius, -fr. 55, see ii. 4.16, is the principle of unity of inorganic things. - -[262] As thought Aristotle, Met. xii, 3. - -[263] See ii. 9.13. - -[264] See iv. 4.9-13. - -[265] See iii. 4.1. - -[266] This is Numenius' doctrine, fr. 16. - -[267] See iii. 3.5, 11. - -[268] Plotinos here makes in the world-Soul a distinction analogous to -that obtaining in the human one (where there is a reasonable soul, and -its image, the vegetative soul, see i. 1.8-12; iv. 4. 13, 14). Here -he asserts that there are two souls; the superior soul (the principal -power of the soul, which receives the forms from Intelligence (see iv. -4.9-12, 35), and the inferior soul (nature, or the generative power), -which transmits them to matter, so as to fashion it by seminal reasons -(see iii. 4.13, 14, 22, 27). Bouillet, no doubt remembering Plotinos's -own earlier invectives against those who divided the world-soul (ii. -9.6), evidently directed against Amelius and the Numenian influence, -which till then he had followed--tries to minimize it, claiming that -this does not mean two different hypostases, but only two functions -of one and the same hypostasis. But he acknowledges that this gave -the foundation for Plotinos's successors' distinction between the -supermundane and the mundane souls (hyperkosmios, and egkosmios). -Plotinos was therefore returning to Numenius's two world-souls (fr. -16), which was a necessary logical consequence of his belief in two -human souls (fr. 53), as he himself had taught in iii. 8.5. Plotinos -objectifies this doubleness of the soul in the myth of the two -Hercules, in the next book, i. 1.12. - -[269] See ii. 9.2. - -[270] The subject announced in the preceding book, ii. 3.16; another -proof of the chronological order. This is a very obscure book, -depending on iv. 3 and 4: and vi. 7; on the theory of the three divine -hypostases, on his psychology, the soul's relation to, and separation -from the body, and metempsychosis. His doctrines of "self" and of the -emotions are strikingly modern. - -[271] See sect. 2. - -[272] See sect. 3. - -[273] See sect. 4. - -[274] See sect. 7, 11. - -[275] This most direct translation of "pathos," is defective in that -it means rather an experience, a passive state, or modification of the -soul. It is a Stoic term. - -[276] "Dianoia" is derived from "dia nou," and indicates that the -discursive thought is exercised "by means of the intelligence," -receiving its notions, and developing them by ratiocination, see v. -3.3. It is the actualization of discursive reason "to dianoetikon," or -of the reasonable soul ("psyche logike"), which conceives, judges, and -reasons (dianoei, krinei, logizetai). - -[277] "Noesis" means intuitive thought, the actualization of -intelligence. - -[278] See sect. 7. - -[279] See Porphyry, Faculties of the Soul, and Ficinus, commentary on -this book. - -[280] In Greek, "to zoon," "to syntheton," "to synamphoteron," "to -koinon," "to eidolon." - -[281] See i. 2.5. - -[282] According to the Stoics. - -[283] According to Alexander of Aphrodisia. - -[284] As thought Aristotle, de Anima 2.1; see 4.3.21, and Numenius, 32. - -[285] A famous comparison, found in Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 1; Plato, -Laws, x. p. 906; Cary, 14; and especially Numenius, 32. - -[286] As Plotinos thinks. - -[287] iv. 4.20. - -[288] iv. 3.20. - -[289] Arist., de Anim. 2.1. - -[290] According to Aristotle. - -[291] Phaedo, p. 87; Cary, 82. - -[292] Similar to the modern James-Lange theory of bodily emotions. - -[293] See iv. 4.20, 28. - -[294] See sect. 7, 9, 10. - -[295] See iv. 3.22, 23. - -[296] Porphyry and Ammonius in Bouillet, i. Intr. p. 60, 63, 64, 75, -79, 93, 96, 98, and note on p. 362 to 377. - -[297] Namely, intelligence and the reasonable soul. - -[298] See Bouillet, i. p. 325, 332. - -[299] Bouillet, Intr. p. lxxviii. - -[300] See Bouillet, i., note, p. 327, 341. - -[301] One of the three hypostases. - -[302] See Bouillet, i. p. lxxiii. 344-352. - -[303] Plato, Timaeus, p. 35; Cary, 12. - -[304] These images of the universal Soul are the faculties of the soul, -sense-power, vegetative power, generative power or nature; see iv. -4.13, 14. - -[305] "Turning" means here to incline. - -[306] See St. Paul, Rom. for phantasy, or imagination; vii. 7-25. - -[307] See iv. 3.29-31, also i. 1.9; Numenius, fr. ii. 8, 19; iii. See -section 10. - -[308] See i. 2.5. - -[309] iv. 3.19, 23. - -[310] See ii. 9.3, 4, 11, 12. - -[311] Fancy or representation, i. 4.10; iv. 3.3, 30, 31. - -[312] See 4.3.19, 23; 6.7.6.7. - -[313] Plato, Rep. x. p. 611; Cary, 11. - -[314] For this see 4.3.12, 18; 4.8. - -[315] Odyss. xi. 602, 5; see 4.3.27. - -[316] We find here a reassertion of Numenius's doctrine of two souls in -man, fr. 53. - -[317] Bouillet observes that this book is only a feeble outline of -some of the ideas developed in vi. 7, 8, and 9. The biographical -significance of this might be as follows. As in the immediately -preceding books Plotinos was harking back to Numenius's doctrines, he -may have wished to reconcile the two divergent periods, the Porphyrian -monism of vi. 7 and 8, with the earlier Amelian dualism of vi. 9. -This was nothing derogatory to him; for it is well known that there -was a difference between the eclectic monism of the young Plato of -the Republic, and the more logical dualism of the older Plato of -the Laws. This latter was represented by Numenius and Amelius; the -former--combined with Aristotelian and Stoic elements--by Porphyry. -Where Plato could not decide, why should we expect Plotinos to do -so? And, as a matter of fact, the world also has never been able to -decide, so long as it remained sincere, and did not deceive itself with -sophistries, as did Hegel. Kant also had his "thing-in-itself"--indeed, -he did little more than to develop the work of Plotinos. - -[318] As the Stoics would say. - -[319] Which is one of the three hypostases, ii. 9.1 and v. 1. - -[320] We see here Plotinos feeling the approach of this impending -dissolution. - -[321] Arranged by Bouillet in the order of the Enneads they summarize. - -[322] Passages in quotation marks are from the text of Plotinos. - -[323] See i. 2.3. - -[324] See i. 2.4. - -[325] See i. 2.4. - -[326] See i. 2.6. - -[327] See i. 2.7. - -[328] See i. 2.7. - -[329] See i. 2.5. - -[330] See i. 8.1. - -[331] See 36.38. - -[332] These are the three divine hypostases, i. 8.2; ii. 9.1. - -[333] See ii. 2.2. - -[334] See v. 3.6. - -[335] See iii. 7.2. - -[336] See iii. 7.2. - -[337] A pun on "noein" and "nous." - -[338] See v. 3.10-12. - -[339] See v. 6.11, 12, 13. - -[340] See v. 4.3, 2, 12. - -[341] See v. 4.4, 9. - -[342] See vi. 4.9. - -[343] See vi. 4.16. - -[344] See iii. 5.7-9. from Plato. - -[345] See vi. 2; vi. 5. - -[346] See vi. 5.1. - -[347] See vi. 4.4. - -[348] See vi. 5.2. - -[349] See vi. 5.3, 6. - -[350] See vi. 5.4. - -[351] See vi. 8.4. - -[352] See vi. 5.12. - -[353] See iv. 8.1. - -[354] See iv. 8.1. - -[355] See 23. - -[356] Stobaeus, Ecl. Phys., i. 52, ed. Heeren. - -[357] See iv. 3.23. - -[358] In his book "On the Soul." - -[359] See i. 1.12. - -[360] See ii. 6.1. - -[361] See Ennead, i. 1. - -[362] Stobaeus, Ecl. Physicae, i. 52, p. 878. - -[363] Of Human Nature, xv. - -[364] de Anima, ii. 3. - -[365] Stobaeus, Eclogae Physicae, i. 52. p. 894. - -[366] On Human Nature, 2. - -[367] See Plotinos, ii. 7.1; Porphyry, Principles, 17, 18, 21, 22, 36, -38. - -[368] See iv. 3.20. - -[369] See ii. 3.5. - -[370] See iv. 3.20. - -[371] In his treatise on Providence; Photius, Biblioteca, 127, 461. - -[372] i. 1.8; Num. 10. - -[373] i. 1.10. - -[374] 25.4.a. - -[375] 38; 53. - -[376] i. 8.1; Num. 16. - -[377] i. 8.2. - -[378] in v. 5.1. - -[379] Num. 27.a.8. - -[380] 27.b.10. - -[381] Num. 36,a. - -[382] In i. 8.3. - -[383] Num. 16. - -[384] i. 8.4. - -[385] 11. - -[386] Num. 16. - -[387] Num. 15.16. - -[388] i. 8.6. - -[389] 16. - -[390] i. 8.7. - -[391] 1.8.10. - -[392] 18. - -[393] ii. 9. - -[394] ii. 4.1. - -[395] ii. 4.5. - -[396] ii. 4.6. - -[397] ii. 4.7. - -[398] Num. 32, 18. - -[399] Num. 48. - -[400] Num. 14. - -[401] i. 8.7, with ii. 4.7. - -[402] In ii. 4.15, 16. - -[403] heterotes. - -[404] ii. 5. - -[405] In ii. 5.3. - -[406] Num. 20. - -[407] iii. 6.6 to end. - -[408] iii. 6.12. - -[409] iii. 6.11, 12. - -[410] 33. - -[411] iii. 8.13. - -[412] iii. 6.19. - -[413] iii. 6.11. - -[414] iii. 6.9. - -[415] iii. 6.7, 18; with Num. 12, 15, 17. - -[416] iii. 6.6. - -[417] iii. 6.13; Num. 12; 30. - -[418] iii. 6.18; v. 1.1, etc. - -[419] iii. 6.6, 13; see ii. 5.3, 5. - -[420] iii. 6.14. - -[421] iii. 6.11, as against Num. 14, 16. - -[422] In iii. 6.6, 8, 10. - -[423] In iii. 6.6. - -[424] iii. 6.7, 13; see ii. 5.5. - -[425] iii. 6.13, 6, 16, 17, 18. - -[426] iii. 6.15. - -[427] iii. 6.19. - -[428] iii. 6.15. - -[429] In ii. 5.5. - -[430] v. 1.7; iii. 5.6. - -[431] iv. 4.13. - -[432] In iv. 4.15. - -[433] vi. 3.7. - -[434] v. 1.7. - -[435] i. 8. - -[436] ii. 4. - -[437] ii. 5. - -[438] iii. 6. - -[439] In iv. 4.13. - -[440] Life of Plotinos, 24, 25. - -[441] Vit. Plot. 4, 5, 13, 17. - -[442] Ib. 6. - -[443] 26. - -[444] 14. - -[445] 17, 18, 21. - -[446] 1, 2, 7. - -[447] 14. - -[448] 10. - -[449] See Daremberg, s. v. - -[450] 18. - -[451] 17. - -[452] 3. - -[453] As may be seen in Daremberg's Dictionary of Antiquities, s. v. - -[454] Ib. 24. - -[455] In c. 8. - -[456] c. 10. - -[457] 48. Plot. i. 1.2, 12, etc. - -[458] Enn. i. 1.2; Num. 29; i. 1.7. - -[459] i. 1.3; see Num. 32. - -[460] i. 1.7, 12. - -[461] 53. - -[462] i. 1.13. - -[463] 30.21. - -[464] i. 1.12. - -[465] iv. 8, or even iv. 3.12-18. - -[466] 2.9.10. - -[467] 1.4.8, 16. - -[468] 1.7.3. - -[469] Porphyry, Biography 2. - -[470] Cave of the Nymphs, 54. - -[471] Plato, p. 147. - -[472] Rep. iv. 9. - -[473] Plut. Def. Or. 17. - -[474] To hegemonikon. Enn. ii. 4.2. - -[475] ii. 5.3. - -[476] ii. 5.5. - -[477] vi. 3.7. - -[478] In i. 8.3. - -[479] In i. 8.10. - -[480] 3.6, 14. - -[481] 1.8, 13. - -[482] 2.9.2. - -[483] Num. 26. - -[484] Enn. iii. 6.6, 7. - -[485] de Mund. iv. 21. - -[486] Chaignet, H. Ps. d. G., v. 138. - -[487] Proclus, in Parm. vi. 27. - -[488] Energeia and dynamis. - -[489] 5.1.7, 19. - -[490] iii. 5.3. - -[491] Ib. 4.7. - -[492] Ib. 9. - -[493] v. 3.5. - -[494] i. 4.14. - -[495] iii. 5.6. - -[496] 1.1.8. - -[497] i. 8.2. - -[498] In i. 4.10. - -[499] In ii. 9.1. - -[500] iii. 3.4. - -[501] iii. 2.11. - -[502] i. 4.9. - -[503] H. Ps. d. Gr. iv. 244. - -[504] Enn. vi. 4.9. - -[505] Chaignet, ib., iv. 337; Enn. v. 1.7, 10. - -[506] ii. 9.1, 2. - -[507] See McClintock and Strong, B. T. & E. Encyclopedia, s. v. - -[508] Enn. vi, 5.7. - -[509] vi. 2.8, 9. - -[510] See iv. 4.26; vi. 7.12, 13. - -[511] See i. 8.4. - -[512] See iv. 2.15. - -[513] See iv. 3.9. - -[514] See vi. 4.14; vi. 5.6; i. 1.9. - -[515] Rom. vii. 7.25. - -[516] See v. 1.10. - -[517] See iv. 8.5, 6, and iv. 7.13, 14, and iii. 6.14. - -[518] See i. 8.13 - -[519] iv. 3.11. - -[520] vi. 1.10. - -[521] ii. 1.4. - -[522] v. 1.1, v. 4.2, v. 8.11, i. 4.11, v. 1.7, vi. 8.4, iv. 8.4. - -[523] i. 1.9 and 12. - -[524] x. 2, Enn. ii. 9.13. - -[525] Biography, 16. - -[526] See v. 8.8. - -[527] See viii. 5.12. - -[528] See vi. 8.9. - -[529] See vi. 7.17. - -[530] See v. 5.3. - -[531] Rev. iv. 6; see iii. 2.11. - -[532] See ii. 9.5; Rev. xxi. 1. - -[533] See iii. 2.15. - -[534] See v. 3.8. - -[535] See i. 8.6. - -[536] See iv. 3.6; Jno. xiv. 2. - -[537] See iii. 2.4, and Rom. iii. 20. - -[538] See vi. 8.15, and Rom. viii. 39. - -[539] See v. 5.11, and 1 Cor. xi. 22. - -[540] See ii. 1.4, and 2 Cor. xii. 2. - -[541] See vi. 2, and Gal. iv. 9. - -[542] See ii. 9.6, and i. Tim. 1.4. - -[543] See ii. 9.14, and Mark vi. 7. - -[544] See v. 3.17, and Mk. ix. 43, 45. - -[545] See v. 9.5, and Mt. xxiv. 13. - -[546] See vi. 9.9; vi. 5.12, and Acts xvii. 28. - -[547] See v. 8.12, and Heb. ii. 11-17 - -[548] See vi. 7.29, and Jas. i. 17. - -[549] Luke xi. 13. - -[550] See i. 6.9; ii. 4.5. - -[551] v. 5.13. - -[552] ii. 9.4. - -[553] iv. 3.11. - -[554] ii. 9.5. - -[555] iv. 8.9. - -[556] v. 9.4. - -[557] See iii. 8.4; iv. 2.1; vi. 7.8. - -[558] See ii. 4.5; v. 7.3; vi. 8.20. - -[559] See vi. 6.11. - -[560] See vi. 8.20. - -[561] See iv. 3.17; vi. 4.9. - -[562] See v. 3.15. - -[563] See vi. 7.1. - -[564] See v. 2.1. - -[565] See v. 1.6. - -[566] See i. 4.9. - -[567] See iii. 8.3. - -[568] See vi. 2.8, 9. - -[569] See iii. 8.10; ii. 9.2. - -[570] See iv. 7.10; v. 1.4; vi. 7.2. - -[571] See ii. 9.2. - -[572] See vi. 5.7. - -[573] iii. 6.6 to end. - -[574] N. 20.6. - -[575] ii. 9.10. - -[576] i. 8.4; ii. 9.2, 10; vi. 7.5, with N. 26.3. - -[577] ii. 9.6, with N. 36. - -[578] iv. 3.17, with N. 26.3. - -[579] v. 3.9; v. 5.7; vi. 5.5. - -[580] ii. 9.1; but see ii. 9.8; iv. 8.3, etc. - -[581] iv. 3.17. - -[582] 46-54. - -[583] 49, 50; or, 22%. - -[584] 46-48, 51-54; or, 88%. - -[585] 22-33, 12 books. - -[586] 23, 26, 27, 31, 32, 33; or, 50%. - -[587] 22, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30; or, 50%. - -[588] 33-45, 12 books. - -[589] 34, 37, 38, 39, 43, 44. - -[590] 35, 36, 40, 41, 42, 45. - -[591] v. 1.9. - -[592] v. 5.6; N. 42, 67. - -[593] v. 4.2 and N. 15-17. - -[594] v. 8.5; v. 9.3; vi. 6.9; and N. 20. - -[595] i. 8.6; i. 4.11; iii. 3.7; and N. 16, 17. - -[596] vi. 8.19; and N. 10; 32. - -[597] v. 1.6; with N. 14. - -[598] v. 1.9; with N. 36, 39. - -[599] vi. 4.16; iv. 3.11. - -[600] N. 54. - -[601] N. 49a. - -[602] vi. 5.9; and N. 46. - -[603] iii. 6. - -[604] N. 44. - -[605] ii. 7.2; vi. 1.29; and N. 44. - -[606] In meaning at least. - -[607] iv. 7.2, 3; and N. 44. - -[608] iv. 7.2, 3; v. 9.3; N. 40. - -[609] Philebus, in iv. 3.1. - -[610] vi. 2.21. - -[611] i. 2.6; v. 3.17; iii. 4. - -[612] vi. 3.16. - -[613] i. 6.6. - -[614] N. 31.22; 33.8. - -[615] iv. 8.2; i. 8.2; v. 5.3; vi. 7.42; and N. 27a. 8. - -[616] v. 1.4, and N. 19. - -[617] v. 8.3; ii. 9.3, 8. - -[618] i. 8.6 and N. 10. - -[619] vi. 2.2 and N. 14. - -[620] vi. 5.6 and N. 42, 67. - -[621] v. 8.3; iii. 4.2; N. 27a. 8. - -[622] iii. 8.8; iv. 3.1, 8; vi. 8.7; and N. 27b. 9. - -[623] Still, see 30. - -[624] iv. 8.2; vi. 9.9; N. 29. - -[625] iii. 2.4; v. 1.6; v. 5.7; and N. 29.18. - -[626] i. 8.4; ii. 9.2, 10; vi. 7.5 and N. 26.3; 27a. 10. - -[627] vi. 5.6; and N. 37, 63. - -[628] iv. 7.1; vi. 5.10; and N. 12.8. - -[629] vi. 4.10; vi. 5.3; ii. 9.7; with N. 12, 22. - -[630] v. 8.13; and N. 26.3. - -[631] iii. 2.2; with N. 16, 17. - -[632] iii. 1.22; iv. 2.1, 2; iv. 7.2; and N. 38. - -[633] ii. 9.7; v. 6.6; vi. 5.3; and N. 12, 15, 22, 26.3. - -[634] iv. 3.8; vi. 7.3; and N. 48. - -[635] iv. 3.11; with N. 32. - -[636] iv. 3.17, 21; with N. 32. - -[637] iv. 3.17; with N. 26.3. - -[638] iv. 7; and N. 44. - -[639] N. 55. - -[640] ii. 7.2; vi. 1.29; and N. 44. - -[641] iv. 7.3; vi. 3.16; and N. 44. - -[642] ii. 3.9; iii. 4.6; and N. 46, 52, 56. - -[643] Still, see i. 1.9; iv. 3.31; vi. 4.15; and N. 53. - -[644] i. 1.12; ii. 3.9; ii. 9.2; iv. 3.31; iv. 2.2; and N. 53. - -[645] iv. 3.31; with N. 32. - -[646] N. 52. - -[647] i. 1.10; iv. 7.8; v. 8.3. - -[648] iii. 4.4; and N. 15. - -[649] N. 15. - -[650] ii. 9.5. - -[651] i. 3.1. - -[652] i. 3.2. - -[653] i. 3.3. - -[654] v. 9.1. - -[655] iv. 4.10; with N. 12. - -[656] iv. 3.25; with N. 25. - -[657] ii. 9.11; i. 6.7; vi. 7.34; vi. 9.11; with N. 10. - -[658] iv. 8.8; and N. 51. - -[659] iv. 8.1; and N. 62a. - -[660] iv. 8.1; quoting Empedocles; N. 43. - -[661] iv. 2.2; and N. 27b. - -[662] iv. 3.21; and N. 32, 36, 16. - -[663] N. 26. - -[664] iv. 3.17. - -[665] ii. 3.8; iii. 3.4; N. 36, 53. - -[666] ii. 9.6. - -[667] v. 9.5; and N. 28. - -[668] iv. 7.14; and N. 55, 56. - -[669] 61, 62a. - -[670] ii. 9.14. - -[671] 10. - -[672] iii. 6.6 to end. - -[673] 14, 15, 16, 17, 44. - -[674] vi. 1, and passim. - -[675] ii. 3.16; ii. 4.16; ii. 5.2; and N. 55. - -[676] i. 8.15; i. 1.9; i. 4.10; iv. 3.3, 30.31; vi. 8.3; iv. 7.8; and -N. 2, 3, 4.7 and 24. - -[677] vi. 5.6; and N. 42, 67. - -[678] All of ii. 6; iii. 6.6; iii. 7.5; iii. 8.9; iv. 3.9; iv. 3.24; v. -3.6, 15, 17; v. 4.1, 2; v. 5.10, 13, 55; v. 8.5, 6; v. 9.3; vi. 2.2, 5, -6, 8, 9, 13; vi. 3.6, 16; vi. 6.10, 13, 16; vi. 7.41; vi. 9.2, 3. - -[679] v. 9.3; and N. 21, 22. - -[680] v. 4.2; and N. 10; vi. 6.9; and N. 34. - -[681] vi. 6.9; N. 10, 21. - -[682] v. 1.5; vi. 5.9; vi. 6.16; and N. 46. - -[683] vi. 6.16; and N. 60. - -[684] vi. 2.9; and N. 26. - -[685] vi. 4.2. - -[686] ii. 4.5; iv. 8.7; v. 5.4; and N. 36b. - -[687] iv. 3.1; v. 4.2; and N. 36c? - -[688] ii. 5.3; and N. 14, 16, 26. - -[689] v. 4.2; v. 5.4; and N. 14. - -[690] ii. 9.1; and N. 25. - -[691] iii. 8.9; iii. 9.1; v. 1.8; and N. 36, 39. - -[692] v. 5.3; and N. 36, 39. - -[693] i. 3.4; and N. 10, 13. - -[694] ii. 4.9; ii. 7.2; vi. 1.29; vi. 3.16; and N. 44. - -[695] iv. 9.4; and N. 44. - -[696] iii. 4.1; and N. 44. - -[697] iv. 6.7; and N. 44. - -[698] iv. 3.20; and N. 12, 44. - -[699] N. 20. - -[700] N. 21. - -[701] iii. 7.3, 5; and N. 19. - -[702] N. 55, 56; 57. - -[703] iii. 4.2; and N. 57. - -[704] i. 8.2; iii. 2.16; iv. 7.14; vi. 6.16; vi. 7.6; and N. 32. - -[705] v. 1.1; and N. 17, 26. - -[706] vi. 5.3; vi. 7.31; and N. 11, 15, 16, 17, 12.7, 22, 26. - -[707] i. 8.3; v. 5.13; and N. 15, 16, 49b. - -[708] i. 4.11; i. 8.6, 7; ii. 3.18; iii. 2.5, 15; iii. 8.9; and N. 16, -17, 18. - -[709] i. 8.7; iii. 2.2, N. 15, 17. Alexander of Aphrodisia taught this -world was a mixture; ii. 7.1; iv. 7.13. - -[710] iv. 9.4; v. 16; and N. 26. - -[711] Plotinos passim; N. 25. - -[712] vi. 1.23; and N. 18. Also vi. 9.10, 11. - -[713] Passim; N. 10, 37, 63. - -[714] v. 8.1; and N. 43. - -[715] iii. 9.3; and N. 31. - -[716] vi. 2.7; vi. 3.27; and N. 19.4, 20; 27a; 30. - -[717] iii. 7.3; iv. 4.33; and N. 30. - -[718] ii. 4.2-5; ii. 5.3; v. 4.2; and N. 26. - -[719] ii. 4.12; etc. - -[720] ii. 4.6; and N. 11, 18. - -[721] ii. 6.2; and N. 12.8; 18. - -[722] ii. 4.10; and N. 12, 16, 17. - -[723] v. 1.6; vi. 9.10, 11; and N. 10. - -[724] vi. 4.2; vi. 9.3; and N. 10. - -[725] iv. 7.3; and N. 13, 27, 44. - -[726] iv. 4.16; and N. 46. - -[727] Might it mean an angle, and one of its sides? - -[728] iii. 4.2; and N. 27. - -[729] iv. 8.5, 6; and N. 27b. - -[730] v. 9.6; and N. 23. - -[731] v. 1.5. - -[732] vi. 7.17, 36; vi. 9.9; and N. 29. - -[733] iii. 4.2; iv. 3.11; v. 8.3; v. 1.2; and N. 27b. - -[734] iii. 4.6; and N. 35a. - -[735] vi. 7.1; and N. 27a, b. - -[736] Creation or adornment, ii. 4.4, 6; iv. 3.14; and N. 14, 18. - -[737] i. 1.3; iv. 3.17, 21; and N 32. - -[738] Bouillet ii. 520. - -[739] ib. ii. 584. - -[740] ib. ii. 607. - -[741] ib. ii. 597. - -[742] ib. ii. 561. - -[743] B. iii. 638-650. - -[744] ib. 651-653. - -[745] ib. 654-656. - -[746] Bouillet ii. 520. - -[747] ib. ii. 562. - -[748] ib. ii. 585. - -[749] ib. ii. 588. - -[750] Biog. 8, 13. - -[751] Biog. 17, 18. - -[752] Biog. 24. - -[753] iii. 7.1, 4. - -[754] v. 8.4. - -[755] v. 8.5, 6. - -[756] iii. 5.8. - -[757] vi. 3.8. - -[758] i. 8.7; ii. 4.4; iii. 8.11; iv. 8.13; v. 9.8. 4.4; iii. 8.11; v. -8.13; v. 9.8. 1.11. - -[762] v. 5.5. - -[763] vi. 1.23. - -[764] ii. 9.4. - -[765] v. 5.1. - -[766] iii. 5.3. - -[767] v. 5.5. - -[768] v. 3.5, 6. - -[769] vi. 1.15. - -[770] iii. 5.9, 10. - -[771] iv. 3.14. - -[772] iv. 7.4; ii. 6.2; iii. 2.17. - -[773] iv. 4.29. - -[774] v. 9.5. - -[775] iv. 9.3. - -[776] vi. 1.18. - -[777] vi. 8.18. - - - - -CONCORDANCE TO PLOTINOS. - -Of the two numbers in the parenthesis, the first is the chronological -book number, the second is the reference's page in this translation. - - - A - - Abandonment by Providence, even of the mediocre, impossible, iii. 2.9 - (47-1058). - - Ability or desire is the limit of man's union with the divinity, v. - 8.11 (31-569). - - Absolute Beauty is a formless shape, vi. 7.33 (38-754). - - Absolute Evil is the goal of the degenerate soul, i. 8.15 (51-1163). - - Absolute Existent is preceded by contingent, vi. 1.26 (42-881). - - Abstraction is method of reaching divinity, vi. 8.21 (39-811). - - Abstraction of qualities ends in thing-in-itself, ii. 4.10 (12-207). - - Abstraction of the form produces thought of infinite, vi. 6.3 - (34-646). - - Abundance and Need, myth of, iii. 6.14 (26-375). - - Abundance (Poros), myth of, iii. 5.2-10 (50-1125 to 1140). - - Academy, vi. 1.14, 30 (42-863, 888). - - Accidents are received by the soul from matter, v. 9.14 (5-117). - - Accidents, is the fifth physical category of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 - (44-937). - - Accomplishments are only temporary crutches for development, i. 4.16 - (46-1040). - - Accretion, foreign, is the nature of ugliness, i. 6.5 (1-48). - - Accretions to soul, and body, are removed from soul by philosophic - "separation," i. 1.12 (53-1204). - - Action and experience does not include prediction with its - responsiveness, and is underlayed by transmission, reception, and - relation, vi. 1.22 (42-874). - - Action and experiencing, Aristotelian category, vi. 1.15 (42-863). - - Action and passion iii. 3.2 (48-1078). - - Action and reaction form but a single genus, vi. 1.19 (42-870). - - Action and suffering cannot be separate categories, but are subsumed - under movement, vi. 1.17 (42-866). - - Action does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.16 (43-920). - - Action is natural on both wholes and parts, iv. 4.31 (28-487). - - Action, uniform, is exerted by body and varied by the soul, iv. 7.4 - (2-62). - - Actions, some appear imperfect when not joined to time, vi. 1.19 - (42-868). - - Actions do not control freedom of will and virtue, vi. 8.5 (39-779). - - Active life predisposes to subjection to enchantments, iv. 4.43 - (28-507). - - Activity of soul is triple: thought, self-preservation and creation, - iv. 8.3 (6-125). - - Actors good and bad, are rewarded by the manager: so are souls, iii. - 2.17 (47-1072). - - Actual, everything is actual in the intelligible world, ii. 5.3 - (25-346). - - Actual matter cannot be anything, as it is non-being, ii. 5.2, 4 - (25-343 to 347). - - Actuality and potentiality, iii. 9.8 (13-225). - - Actuality and potentiality are inapplicable to the divinity, ii. 9.1 - (33-600). - - Actualization, continuous, constitutes Intelligence, iv. 7.13 (18), - (2-84); iv. 8.6, 7 (6-129, 130). - - Actualization is a far better category than doing or acting, vi. 1.15 - (42-863). - - Actualization is prior to potentiality (devolution), iv. 7.8 (11), - (2-74). - - Actualization of soul in life, is the sole use of its existence, iv. - 8.5 (6-127). - - Actualization, single and simple, iv. 7.12 (17), (2-83). - - Actualization when appearing is harmonized to its seminal reason, vi. - 3.16 (44-960). - - Actualizations are none of bodies that enter into a mixture, iv. 7.8 - (10), (2-72). - - Actualizations are the condition of Intelligence, because its thought - is identical with its essence, v. 9.3 (5-104). - - Actualizations, permanent, form the hypostasis, v. 3.12 (49-1111). - - Actualizations, relative, are sensations, not experiences, iv. 6.2 - (41-831). - - Acuteness may destroy excessive ecstatic vision, v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Administration by Jupiter does not imply memory, iv. 4.9 (28-453). - - Admiration of his handiwork, by the Creator, refers to the - world-model, v. 8.8 (31-564). - - Admiration of the world, by Plato, supplements his hatred of the - body, ii. 9.17 (33-633). - - Adrastea, law of, is justice, ii. 3.8 (52-1173); iii. 2.4, 13 - (47-1049 to 1062). - - Adulteries not produced by planet-positions, ii. 3.6 (52-1171). - - Adumbrations of superior principles, i. 6.8 (1-52). - - Advantages resulting from ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Aeon Jesus, is unaccountable, ii. 9.1 (33-601). - - Aeon, see eternity, throughout, iii. 7.1 sqq (45-985). - - Aesthetic sense appreciates beauty, i. 6.2 (1-42). - - Affection and weaknesses of man subject him to magic, iv. 4.44 - (28-508). - - "Affection of matter," definition of soul; if such, whence is she? - iv. 7.3.d (2-59). - - Affections are common to soul and body; not all are such, i. 1.5 - (53-1197). - - Affections caused by incorporeal's affective part, iii. 6.4 (26-357). - - Affections, derivation of qualities from them is of no importance, - vi. 1.11 (42-857). - - Affections of soul, like a musician playing a lyre, iii. 6.4 (26-358). - - Affections produced by "tension" in lyre-strings, iv. 7.8 (2-75). - - Age, pun on "aeons," iii. 7.4 (45-992). - - Aggregate, composite, see "combination," i. 1.1 (53-1191). - - Aggregate individual, formed by uniting of soul and body, i. 1.6 - (53-1197). - - Aggregate of molecules could not possess life and intelligence, iv. - 7.2, 3 (2-57). - - Agriculture, v. 9.11 (5-114). - - Aid to magnitude-perception, is color-difference, ii. 8.1 (35-681). - - Air and fire, action of, not needed by Heaven, ii. 1.8 (40-826). - - Air contained in intelligible world, vi. 7.11 (38-720). - - Air not necessary, even for hearing, iv. 5.5 (29-523). - - Air, relation to light, iv. 5.6 (29-524). - - Air, useless as transmitting medium, iv. 5.3 (29-519). - - Alexander of Aphrodisia's theory of mixture, iv. 7.2, 8 (2-58, 72); - iii. 1.7 (3-96). - - Alienation, v. 1.10 (10-190). - - All in all, iii. 8.8 (30-543); iv. 3.8 (27-402). - - All is intelligence, vi. 7.17 (38-729). - - All things are united by a common source, vi. 7.12 (38-721). - - All things, how the same principle can exist in them, vi. 4.6 - (22-295). - - All things, is the soul, iii. 4.3 (15-236). - - All things, transcended by their principle, v. 2.1 (11-193). - - Alone with the alone, i. 6.7 (1-50); vi. 7.34 (38-757); vi. 9.11 - (9-172). - - Aloneness of Supreme, v. 1.6 (10-182). - - Alteration, definition of, vi. 3.22 (44-973). - - Alteration, not constituted by composition and decomposition, vi. - 3.25 (44-978). - - Alteration of soul, Stoic conception, opposed, iii. 6.3 (26-355). - - Alternate living in Intelligence and world, by soul, iv. 8.4 (6-126). - - Alternate rising and falling of soul when in body, iii. 1.8 (3-97). - - Amphibians, souls are, iv. 8.48 (6-126). - - Analogy explains prediction, iii. 3.6 (48-1086). - - Analogy only allows us to attribute physical qualities to the - Supreme, vi. 8.8 (39-785). - - Analysis, contingency is eliminated in, vi. 8.14 (39-798). - - Analyze, object of myths, iii. 5.10 (50-1138). - - Anger localized in the heart, iv. 3.23 (27-426); iv. 4.28 (28-481). - - Anger-part of earth, iv. 4.28 (28-482). - - Anger-part of soul explained, iii. 6.2 (26-354). - - Anger-power, does not originate in body, iv. 4.28 (28-481). - - Anger-trace of the soul, originates in growth and generative power, - iv. 4.28 (28-481). - - Animal, existing is intelligence (Plato) iii. 9.1 (13-220). - - Animal nature formed by light of soul, i. 1-7 (53-1198). - - Animal nature, how it is generated, i. 1.12,(53-1205). - - Animal, relation of, to human nature, i. 1.7 (53-1199). - - Animal, the living, i. 1.5 (53-1196). - - Animal, what is it, i. 1.1 (53-1191). - - Animals, all are born from essence, vi. 2.21 (43-929). - - Animals, are they happy? i. 4.1 (46-1019). - - Animals, distinction to the whole, i. 1.7 (53-1199). - - Animals, do they possess right to living well, i. 4.2 (46-1020). - - Animals, four kinds, seen in intelligence, iii. 9.1 (13-221). - - Animals, individual and universal, exist later than number, vi. 6.15 - (34-668). - - Animals, irrational, must exist within intelligence, vi. 7.8 (38-713). - - Animals, lower nature of, ridiculous to complain of, iii. 2.9 - (47-1059). - - Animals, many are not so irrational as different, vi. 7.9 (38-714). - - Animals, their animating principle, i. 1.10 (53-1204). - - Animated, universe was always, iv. 3.9 (27-404). - - Animating principle of animals, i. 1.11 (53-1204). - - Answers, how they come to prayers, iv. 4.41 (28-505). - - Antechamber of good is intelligence, v. 9.2 (5-104). - - Anterior things can be only in lower principles, iv. 4.16 (28-461). - - Anteriority in intelligible, is order not time, iv. 4.1 (28-443). - - Anxiety absent from rule of world by soul, iv. 8.2 (6-122). - - Aphrodite, see Venus, pun on, iii. 5.8 (50-1137). - - Apollo, name of Supreme, v. 5.6 (32-584). - - Apostasy of soul from God, v. 1.1 (10-173). - - Appearance, by it only does matter participate in the intelligible, - iii. 6.11 (26-369). - - Appearance, magnitude is only, iii. 6.18 (26-381). - - Appearance, makes up unreal sense objects, iii. 6.12 (26-371). - - Appearance of intelligence in the intelligible, v. 3.8 (49-1102). - - Apperception-unity, iv. 4.1 (28-442). - - Appetite is the actualization of lustful desire, iv. 8.8 (6-132). - - Appetite keeps an affection, not memory, iv. 3.28 (27-435). - - Appetite located in combination of body and soul, iv. 4.20 (28-468). - - Appetite not simultaneous with desire, i. 1.5 (53-1197). - - Appetite noticed only when perceived by reason or interior sense, iv. - 8.8 (6-132). - - Appetite, when swaying soul, leaves it passive, iii. 1.9 (3-98). - - Apportionment of spirit, iv. 7.8 (2-68). - - Appreciation of self, v. 1.1 (10-174). - - Approach, how the body approaches the soul, vi. 4.15 (22-309). - - Approach impossible in connection with non-spatial intelligible - light, v. 5.8 (32-587). - - Approach of soul to good, by simplification, i. 6.6 (1-50). - - Approach to Supreme is sufficient talk of Him, v. 3.14 (49-1114). - - Approach to the First, manner of, v. 5.10 (32-591). - - Approach to the soul, which is lowest divine, v. 1.7 (10-186). - - Approaching of soul's rejection of form, proves formlessness of the - Supreme, vi. 7.34 (38-756). - - Archetype of the world, the intelligible is, v. 1.4 (10-178). - - Archetype, universal, contained by intelligence, v. 9.9 (5-112). - - Archetypes, vi. 5.8 (23-322). - - Aristotelian category of When? vi. 1.13 (42-860). - - Aristotelian distinction, actuality and potentiality, ii. 5.1 - (25-341). - - Aristotle was wrong in considering rough, rare and dense qualities, - vi. 1.11 (42-857). - - Art intelligible, creates the artist and later nature, v. 8.1 - (31-552). - - Art makes a statue out of rough marble, v. 8.1 (31-552). - - Artificial movements, vi. 3.26 (44-980). - - Artist of the universe is the soul, iv. 7.13 (2-84). - - Arts, auxiliary, which help the progress of nature, v. 9.11 (5-115). - - Arts, dependent on the soul, v. 9.14 (5-118). - - Arts, most achieve their own ends, iv. 4.31 (28-488). - - Arts, some, merely earthly, others more intelligible, v. 9.11 (5-114). - - Ascended soul, not even, need be divided, iv. 4.1 (28-442). - - Ascension of sign, absurd, ii. 3.6 (52-1171). - - Ascension of soul in ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170). - - Ascension to Divinity, iv. 7.10 (2-79). - - Ascension towards divinity, process of life, i. 6.7 (1-50). - - Ascent cannot stop with the soul, why? v. 9.4 (5-106). - - Ascent of life witnessed to disappearance of contingency, vi. 8.15 - (39-801). - - Ascent of the soul psychologically explained, vi. 4.16 (22-310). - - Aspects and houses, absurdity, ii. 3.4 (52-1168). - - Assimilation depends on taking a superior model, i. 2.7 (19-267). - - Assimilation of matter, not complete in earthly defects, v. 9.12 - (5-115). - - Assimilation to divine, key of vision to ecstasy, i. 6.9 (1-53). - - Assimilation to divinity, is flight from world, i. 2.5 (19-263). - - Assimilation to divinity, is soul's welfare and beauty. i. 6.6 (1-49). - - Assimilation to divinity results only in higher virtues, i. 2.1 - (19-256). - - Assimilation to Supreme, by homely virtues, indirectly, i. 2.3 - (19-260). - - Astrologers make cosmic deductions from prognostication, iii. 1.2 - (3-89). - - Astrological influence is merely an indication, iv. 4.34 (28-494). - - Astrological influence, partly action, partly significance, iv. 4.34 - (28-495). - - Astrological power not due to physical soul, iv. 4.38 (28-501). - - Astrological system of fate, iii. 1.5 (3-92). - - Astrological theories absurd, ii. 3.6 (52-1171). - - Astrological views of Venus, Jupiter and Mercury, ii. 3.5 (52-1169). - - Astrologically, divine would be blamed for unjust acts, iii. 2.10 - (47-1059). - - Astrology confuted, leaves influence of world-soul, iv. 4.32 (28-490). - - Astrology replaced by natural production of souls, iv. 4.38 (28-501). - - Astrology replaced by radiation of good and characteristic figures, - iv. 4.35 (28-498). - - Astrology reveals teleology, ii 3.7 (52-1172). - - Astrology, signs only concatenations from universal reason, iv. 4.3 - (28-502). - - Astrology, truth of, judgement of one part by another, ii. 3.7 - (52-1173). - - Athens, vi. 1.14 (42-863). - - Atomism, does not demand a medium for vision, iv. 5.2 (29-516). - - Atoms, iii. 1.2 (3-88). - - Atoms do not explain matter, ii. 4.7 (12-204). - - Atropos, ii. 3.15 (52-1182). - - Attachment to centre constitutes divinity, vi. 9.8 (9-163). - - Attention, condition of perception, v. 1.12 (10-191). - - Attracting all things, does the power and beauty of essence, vi. 6.18 - (34-678). - - Attribute, fourth physical category of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 (44-937). - - Attributing qualities to good, would degrade it, v. 5.13 (32-595). - - Audacity not in higher soul, see boldness, i. 1.2 (53-1192). - - Audacity the cause of human apostasy, v. 1.1 (10-173); v. 2.2 - (11-195). - - Author of this perfection must be above it, vi. 7.32 (38-752). - - Autocracy of divinity, vi. 8.21 (39-810). - - Aversion for ugliness, explains love of beauty, i. 6.5 (1-47). - - Avoid magic enchantments, how to, iv. 4.44 (28-510). - - Avoidance of passions, is task of philosophy, iii. 6.5 (26-358). - - - Bacchus, mirror of, iv. 3.12 (27-409). - - Ballet, vi. 9.8 (9-165); vi. 2.11 (43-912). - - Ballet dancer, iii. 2.17 (47-1071). - - Bastard, reason goes beyond corporeity, ii. 4.12 (12-212). - - Bastard reasoning, is abstraction reaching thing in itself, ii. 4.10, - 12 (12-207, 212); i. 8.9, 10 (51-1156); vi. 8.8 (39-786). - - Bath-tub, simile of, vi 9.8 (9-163). - - Beauties, moral, more delightful than sense-beauties, i. 6.4 (1-46). - - Beautification, by descent upon object of reason from divine, i. 6.2 - (1-43). - - Beautiful, inferior to good, v. 5.12 (32-593). - - Beautiful, most things, such only by participation, i. 6.2 (1-43). - - Beautiful, nothing more could be imagined than the world, ii. 9.4 - (33-606). - - Beautiful, the Supreme, of three ranks of existence, vi. 7.42 - (38-770). - - Beautiful, what is its principle, i. 6.1 (1-41). - - Beauty, v. 1.11 (10-189). - - Beauty absolute, is a formless shape, vi. 7.33 (38-754). - - Beauty and good, identical, i. 6.6 (1-51). - - Beauty and power of essence attracts all things, vi. 6.18 (34-678). - - Beauty appreciated by an aesthetic sense, i. 6.3 (1-43). - - Beauty belongs to men, when they belong to and know themselves, v. - 8.13 (31-574). - - Beauty classified along with the relatives, vi. 3.11 (44-952). - - Beauty comes from form imparted by originator, v. 8.2 (31-553). - - Beauty consists in kinship to the soul, i. 6.2 (1-42). - - Beauty consists in participation in a form, i. 6.2 (1-43). - - Beauty does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-920). - - Beauty does not possess extension, iv. 7.8 (2-69). - - Beauty, emotions of, caused by invincible soul, i. 6.5 (1-46). - - Beauty essential is Supreme, the shapeless shaper, and the - transcendent, vi. 7.33 (38-754). - - Beauty external, appreciation of, depends on cognition of interior - beauty, v. 8.2 (31-554). - - Beauty external, partial, does not mar beauty of universe, ii. 9.17 - (33-634). - - Beauty, highest conceivable, is the model, v. 8.8 (31-564). - - Beauty, if it is a genus, must be one of the posterior ones, vi. 2.18 - (43-923). - - Beauty inferior to good, i. 6.9 (1-54). - - Beauty in last analysis is intelligible, v. 8.3 (31-555). - - Beauty in nothing if not in God v. 8.8 (31-564). - - Beauty intelligible, v. 8 (31). - - Beauty intelligible, does not shine merely on surface, v. 8.10 - (31-568). - - Beauty interior, could not be appreciated, without interior model, i. - 6.4 (1-45). - - Beauty is creating principle of primary reason, v. 8.3 (31-555). - - Beauty is immortal, iii. 5.1 (50-1124). - - Beauty is inherent wisdom, v. 8.2 (31-554). - - Beauty is symmetry, acc. to Stoics, opposed, i. 6.1 (1-41). - - Beauty is unseen, in supreme fusion, v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Beauty, love for, explained by aversion for opposite, i. 6.5 (1-47). - - Beauty makes being desirable, v. 8.9 (31-565). - - Beauty model, is intelligence, hence very beautiful, v. 8.13 (31-573). - - Beauty not in physical characters, but in color form, v. 8.2 (31-553). - - Beauty of body need not imply attachment thereto, ii. 9.17 (33-634). - - Beauty of daily life reviewed, in sight, sound, science and morals, - i. 6.1 (1-40). - - Beauty of soul is as the matter to the soul, v. 8.3 (31-555); 6.6 - (1-43). - - Beauty of world, even added to, iv. 3.14 (27-412). - - Beauty primary, chiefly revealed in virtuous soul, v. 8.3 (31-555). - - Beauty, shining, highest appearance of vision of intelligible wisdom, - v. 8.10 (31-568). - - Beauty that is perceivable is a form, beneath super beautiful, v. 8.8 - (31-564). - - Beauty transition from sense to intellectual, i. 6.2 (1-43). - - Beauty visible, is effect and image of the intelligible, iii. 5.1 - (50-1122). - - Becoming, v. 1.9 (10-187). - - Begetter of intelligence must be simpler than it, iii. 8.8 (30-542). - - Begetter of intelligence reached by intuition, not reason, iii. 8.8 - (30-543). - - Begetting, eternal, is the world, ii. 9.3 (33-604). - - Begetting, lower forms of, due to seminal reasons, iii. 8.7 (30-541). - - Begetting Son, by Supreme, result of ecstasy, v. 8.12 (31-572). - - Beginning, Heaven has none, proves its immortality, ii. 1.4 (40-818). - - Begotten, nothing is in universal soul, vi. 4.14 (22-307). - - Begotten what is, not seminal reason, contains order, iv. 4.16 - (28-461). - - Being, v. 1.5, 8 (10-181 and 186). - - Being, above intelligent life, iii. 6.6 (25-360). - - Being, actualized, less perfect than essence, ii. 6.1 (17-245). - - Being and actualization, constitute self-existent principle, vi. 8.7 - (39-784). - - Being and essence identical with unity, vi. 9.2 (9-149). - - Being and quiddity earlier than suchness, ii. 6.2 (17-248). - - Being cannot be ascribed to matter, vi. 3.7 (44-944). - - Being cannot precede such being, ii. 6.2 (17-248). - - Being contains its cause, vi. 7.3 (38-704). - - Being desirable because beautiful, v. 8.9 (31-566). - - Being distinguished into four senses, vi. 1.2 (42-839). - - Being, every one, is a specialized organ of the universe, iv. 4.45 - (28-510). - - Being in the intelligible is generation in the sense-world, vi. 3.1 - (44-933). - - Being is very wisdom, v. 8.4, 5 (31-559). - - Being loves essence as entire, vi. 5.10 (23-325). - - Being lower form of, possessed by evil, i. 8.3 (51-1145). - - Being of a soul, iv. 1. (4-100). - - Being of a thing displayed by its energy, iii. 1.1 (3-87). - - Being physical, is that which is not in a subject, vi. 3.5 (44-941). - - Being physical, principle of all other things, vi. 3.4 (44-940). - - Being present everywhere entire, only solution of a puzzle, vi. 5.3 - (23-317). - - Being primary and secondary, divided by no substantial differences, - vi. 3.9 (44-949). - - Being supra lunar, is deity, in intelligible, iii. 5.6 (50-1132). - - Being supreme, not dependent on it, therefore above it, vi. 8.19 - (39-807). - - Being the basis of judgment, in things participating in being, vi. - 5.2 (23-315). - - Being universal, description of, vi. 4.2 (23-286). - - Being, universal, is undividable, vi. 4.3 (22-288). - - Beings, all are contemplation, iii. 8.7 (30-542). - - Beings, all contained by intelligence generatively, v. 9.6 (5-109). - - Benefits are granted to men through the world-soul's mediation, iv. - 4.30 (28-486). - - Better nature of man, not dominant because of subconscious nature, - iii. 3.4 (48-1081). - - Bewitched, gnostics imagine intelligible entities can be, ii. 9.14 - (33-627). - - Beyond first, impossible to go, vi. 8.11 (39-791). - - Bile, fulfils unique role in universe, ii. 3.5 (52-1171). - - Birds, overweighted like sensual men, v. 9.1 (5-102). - - Birth of subordinate deities, inhering in Supreme, v. 8.9 (31-566). - - Birth of subordinate divinities does not affect power of Supreme, v. - 8.9 (31-565). - - Birth of time reveals nature, iii. 7.10 (45-1005). - - Blamed for its imperfections, the world should not be, iii. 2.3 - (47-1046). - - Blank, mental, differs from impression of shapeless, ii. 4.10 - (12-208). - - Boast of kinship with divinities, while not being able to leave body, - ridiculous, ii. 9.18 (33-637). - - Bodies added, introduce conflicting motions, ii. 2.2 (14-231). - - Bodies, classification of, vi. 3.9 (44-948). - - Bodies classified, not only by forms and qualities and specific - forms, vi. 3.10 (44-950). - - Bodies could not subsist with power of universal Soul iv. 7.3 (2-60). - - Bodies, different kinds of, why souls take on, iv. 3.12 (27-410). - - Bodies, even simple, analyzed into form and matter, iv. 7.1 (2-56). - - Bodies, human, more difficult to manage than world-body iv. 8.2 - (6-121). - - Bodies of souls, may be related differently, iv. 4.29 (28-485). - - Bodies simple, could not exist, without world-soul iv. 7.3 (2-60). - - Bodies, souls descend into, why and how? iv. 3.8 (27-401). - - Body, activated only by incorporeal powers, iv. 7.8 (2-70). - - Body alone visible, reason why soul is said to be in it, iv. 3.20 - (27-419). - - Body and soul, consequences of mixture, i. 1.4 (53-1194). - - Body and soul forms fusion, iv. 4.18 (28-465). - - Body and soul mixture impossible, i. 1.4 (53-1195). - - Body and soul primitive relation between, i. 1.3 (53-1194). - - Body and soul relation between iv. 3.19 (27-418). - - Body, anger-power, does not originate in it, iv. 4.28 (28-480). - - Body as rationalized matter, ii. 7.3 (37-696). - - Body can lose parts, not the soul, iv. 7.5 (2-63). - - Body cannot possess virtue, iv. 7.8 (2-69). - - Body cannot think, iv. 7.8 (2-68). - - Body contains one kind of desires, iv. 4.20 (28-468). - - Body cosmic, perfect and self-sufficient, iv. 8.2 (6-122). - - Body could not have sensation, if soul were corporeal, iv. 7.6 (2-65). - - Body differs from real man, i. 1.10 (53-1202). - - Body, does the anger-power originate in it? iv. 4.28 (28-480). - - Body, even simple, composed of form and matter, iv. 7.1 (2-56). - - Body exerts a uniform action; soul a varied one, iv. 7.4 (2-62). - - Body, eyes of, to close them, method to achieve, i. 6.8 (1-52). - - Body grows a little after departure of soul, iv. 4.29 (28-485). - - Body has single motion, soul different ones, iv. 7.5 (2-62). - - Body, how it approaches the soul, vi. 4.15 (22-309). - - Body in soul, not soul in body, iii, 9.3 (13-222); iv. 3.22 (27-423). - - Body is composite, therefore perishable, iv. 7.1 (2-56). - - Body is instrument of the soul, iv. 7.1 (2-56). - - Body is not us but ours, iv. 4.18 (28-465). - - Body part of ourselves, i. 1.10 (53-1203); iv. 7.1 (2-56). - - Body is proximate transition of the soul, iv. 3.20 (27-420). - - Body is tool and matter of soul, iv. 7.1 (2-56). - - Body is within soul, iv. 3.20 (27-419). - - Body managed by reasoning hence imperfectly, iv. 8.8 (6-132). - - Body management, only one phase of excursion of procession, iv. 8.7 - (6-131). - - Body needs soul for life, iv. 3.19 (27-418). - - Body never entirely entered by the soul, iv. 8.8 (6-132). - - Body not a vase for the soul, iv. 3.20 (27-420). - - Body not constituted by matter exclusively, iv. 7.3 (2-60). - - Body of demons is air or fire-like, iii. 5.6 (50-1133); ii. 1.6 - (40-823). - - Body of elements, common ground of, makes them kindred, ii. 1.7 - (40-824). - - Body penetrated by soul, but not by another body, iv. 7.8 (2-72). - - Body relation to soul, is passage into world of life, vi. 4.12 - (22-304); - - Body, separation of soul from it, i. 1.3 (53-1193). - - Body sick, soul devoted to it, iv. 3.4 (27-395). - - Body, superior and inferior of soul, related in three ways, iv. 4.29 - (28-485). - - Body, the soul uses as tool, i. 1.3 (53-1193). - - Body throughout all changes, soul powers remain the same, iv. 3.8 - (27-402). - - Body used for perception makes feeling, iv. 4.23 (28-475); iv. 7.8 - (2-68). - - Body, will of stars, do not sway earthly events, iv. 4.34 (28-494). - - Body's composition demands the substrate, ii. 4.11 (12-209). - - Body's elements cannot harmonize themselves, iv. 7.8 (2-75). - - Body's size nothing to do with greatness of soul, vi. 4.5 (22-293). - - Boldness, see Audacity; i. 1.2 (53-1192). - - Bond of the universe is number, vi. 6.15 (34-670). - - Born philosophers alone, reach the higher region, v. 9.2 (5-103). - - Both men, we always should be, but are not, vi. 4.14 (22-308). - - Boundary of intelligible, location of soul, iv. 8.7 (6-131). - - Brains, seat of sensation, iv. 3.23 (27-425). - - Brothers of Jupiter unissued yet, v. 8.12 (31-572). - - Brutalization or divinization is fate of three men in us, vi. 7.6 - (38-708). - - - Calypso, i. 6.8 (1-53). - - Capacity, limits participation in the one, vi. 4.11 (22-302). - - Care divine, exemption from certain classes, heartless, ii. 9.16 - (33-631). - - Care for individual things, draws soul into incarnation, iv. 8.4 - (6-124). - - Career of the soul, what hell means for it, vi. 4.16 (22-312); - - Castration indicates sterility of unitary nature, iii. 6.19 (26-385). - v. 8.13 (31-573). - - Categories, v. 1.4 (10-180); v. 3.15 (49-1116). - - Categories, Aristotelian and Stoic, vi. 1.1 (42-837). - - Categories, Aristotelian neglect intelligible world, vi. 1.1 (42-831). - - Categories cannot contain both power and lack of power, vi. 1.10 - (42-852). - - Categories cause one to produce manifoldness, v. 3.15 (49-1116). - - Categories, four of Stoics, evaporate, leaving matter as basis, vi. - 1.29 (42-885). - - Categories, if where and place are different categories, many more - may be added, vi. 1.14 (42-862). - - Categories, movement and difference applied to intelligence, ii. 4.5 - (12-202). - - Categories of Plotinos do not together form quality, vi. 2-14 - (43-918). - - Categories of Plotinos, five, why none were added, vi. 2.9 (43-907). - - Categories of Plotinos, six, ii. 4.5 (12-202); ii. 6.2 (17-248); v. - 1.4 (10-180); vi. 2.1, 8, 9 (43-891, 904). - - Categories of quality, various derivatives of, vi. 3.19 (44-967). - - Categories of Stoics enumerated, vi. 1.25 (42-878). - - Categories, physical, fourth and fifth, refer to the first three, vi. - 3.6 (44-943). - - Categories, physical, of Plotinos, enumerated, vi. 3.3 (44-937). - - Categories, separate, action and suffering cannot be, vi. 1.17 - (42-866). - - Categories, single, could not include intelligible and sense being, - vi. 1.2 (42-839). - - Categories, six, from which all things are derived, v. 1.4 (10-180). - - Categories, sources of characteristics, in intelligible, v. 9.10 - (5-113). - - Categories, unity is not one, arguments against, vi. 2.10 (43-910). - - Categories far better than doing or acting actualization, vi. 1.15 - (42-863). - - Categories, having cannot be, because too various, vi. 1.23 (42-876). - - Categories of something common is absurd, vi. 1.25 (42-878). - - Categories, why movement is, vi. 3.21 (44-971). - - Cause absent, in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563). - - Cause coincides with nature in intelligible, vi. 7.19 (38-735). - - Cause, everything has, iii. 1.1 (3-86). - - Cause, is Supreme, of Heraclitus, iii. 1.2 (3-88). - - Cause, of affections, though corporeal, iii. 6.4 (26-356). - - Cause of procession of world from unity, v. 2.1 (11-193). - - Cause, suitability of, puts Supreme beyond chance, vi. 8.18 (39-806). - - Cause ultimate, is nature, iii 1.1 (3-87). - - Cause why souls are divine, v. 1.2 (10-175). - - Causeless origin, really is determinism, iii. 1.1 (3-86). - - Causes, any thing due to several, ii. 3.14 (52-1180). - - Causes for incarnation are twofold, iv. 8.1, 5 (6-119, 128). - - Causes of deterioration, iii. 3.4 (48-1083). - - Causes of things in the world, possible theories, iii. 1.1 (3-86). - - Causes proximate are unsatisfactory, demanding the ultimate, iii. 1.2 - (3-88). - - Causes ulterior always sought by sages, iii. 1.2 (3-88). - - Cave, Platonic simile of world, iv. 8.1, 4 (6-120, 126). - - Celestial divinities, difference from inferior, v. 8.3 (31-556). - - Celestial light not exposed to any wastage, ii. 1.8 (40-827). - - Celestial things last longer than terrestrial things, ii. 1.5 - (40-819). - - Centre is father of the circumference and radii, vi. 8.18 (39-804). - - Centre of soul and body, difference between, ii. 2.2 (14-230). - - Ceres, myth of soul of earth, iv. 4.27 (28-480). - - Certain, conception limiting objects, vi. 6.13 (34-663). - - Chains bind soul in incarnation, iv. 8.4 (6-126). - - Chains, golden, on captive, as beauty is on matter, i. 8.15 (51-1163). - - Chains that hold down Saturn, v. 8.13 (31-573). - - Chance, apparent, is really Providence, iii. 3.2 (48-1078). - - Chance banished by form, limit and shape, vi. 8.10 (39-789). - - Chance, cause of suitability and opportunity, puts them beyond it, - vi. 8.17 (39-804). - - Chance could not cause the centre of circular of intelligence, vi. - 8.18 (39-804). - - Chance does not produce supreme being, vi. 8.11 (39-792). - - Chance is not the cause of the good being free, vi. 8.7 (39-783). - - Chance, men escape by interior isolation, vi. 8.15 (39-800). - - Chance, no room for in Supreme, assisted by intelligence, vi. 8.17 - (39-804). - - Chance, Supreme could not possibly be called by any one who had seen - it, vi. 8.19 (39-807). - - Change, how can it be out of time, if movement is in time, vi. 1.16 - (42-864). - - Change, is it anterior to movement? vi. 3.21 (44-972). - - Change must inevitably exist in Heaven, ii. 1.1 (40-813). - - Changeable, desires are, iv. 4.2 (28-469). - - Changeableness, self-direction of thought is not, iv. 4.2 (28-444). - - Changes of fortune, affect only the outer man, iii. 2.15 (47-1067). - - Changes of the body, do not change soul powers, iv. 3.8 (27-402). - - Changes, ours, world-souls unconscious of, iv. 4.7 (28-450). - - Chaos, usual starting point, causes puzzle of origin of God, vi. 8.11 - (39-792). - - Character, human, result of former lives, iii. 3.4 (48-1083). - - "Characteristic, certain," a spiritualization of terms, ii. 4.1 - (12-197); v. 1.4 (10-180). - - Characteristic, if anything at all, is a reason spiritual, v. 1.4 - (10-180). - - Chariot, God traverses heaven in one, iv. 3.7 (27-399). - - Chastisement of souls psychologically explained, vi. 4.16 (22-310). - - Chemical mixture described, iv. 7.8 (2-72). - - Chief, the great Jupiter, third God, iii. 5.8 (50-1136). - - Choir of virtues (Stoic), vi. 9.11 (9-170). - - Choosing is essence of consciousness, iv. 4.37 (28-500). - - Chorus, see Ballet, vi. 9.8 (9-165). - - Circe, i. 6.8 (1-53). - - Circle, iii. 8.7 (30-543); v. 1.7, 11 (10-184, 191). - - Circular movement is that of soul, vi. 9.8 (9-162, 164); ii. 2.1 - (14-227); iv. 4.16 (28-462). - - Circular movement of heavens, ii. 2.2 (14-230). - - Circulating around heavens, iii. 4.2 (15-234). - - Cities haunted by divinities, vi. 5.12 (23-332). - - Classification of purification, result of virtue, i. 2.4 (19-260). - - Climate, a legitimate governing cause, iii. 1.5 (3-93). - - Close eyes of body, method to achieve ecstasy, i. 6.8 (1-52). - - Closeness to divinity, permanent result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Clotho, ii. 3.15 (52-1182). - - Coelus, (Uranus), v. 8.13 (31-573). - - Co-existence of unity and multiplicity demands organization in - system, vi. 7.10 (38-716). - - Cognition, how it operates, v. 5.1 (32-575). - - Cognition of intelligible objects, admits no impression, iv. 6.2 - (41-832). - - Cold is not method of transforming breath into soul, iv. 7.8 (2-68). - - Collective nouns prove independent existence, vi. 6.16 (34-672). - - Combination begotten by the soul, its nature, vi. 7.5 (38-708). - - Combination contains one kind of desires, iv. 4.20 (28-468). - - Combination is a physical category, vi. 3.3 (44-937). - - Combination of body and soul, appetites located in, iv. 4.20 (28-468). - - Combination of soul and body as mixture, or as resulting product, i. - 1.1 (53-1191). - - Combination, see Aggregate, 1.11. - - Combination, third physical category (53-1191). of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 - (44-937). - - Commands himself, Supreme does, vi. 8.20 (39-809). - - Common element, growth in increase and generation, vi. 3.22 (44-975). - - Common ground of the elements make them kindred, ii. 1.7 (40-824). - - Common part, function of, i. 1.10 (53-1203). - - Common to soul and body, not all affections are, i. 1.5 (53-1197). - - Communion of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170). - - Communion with the divine, as of Minos with Jupiter, vi. 9.7 (9-162). - - Comparative method of studying time, iii. 7.6 (45-996). - - Complaining of the world, instead of fit yourself to it, ii. 9.13 - (33-625). - - Complaint, grotesque to wisdom of creator, iii. 2.14 (47-1063). - - Complaint of lower nature of animals ridiculous, iii. 2.9 (47-1059). - - Complement of being called quality only by courtesy, vi. 2.14 - (43-918). - - Composite aggregate, see combination, i. 1.2 (53-1191). - - Composite is body, therefore perishable, iv. 7.1 (2-56). - - Composite of form and matter is everything, v. 9.3 (5-104). - - Compositeness not denied by simplicity of the intelligent, vi. 7.13 - (38-722). - - Compositeness of knower not necessarily implied by knowledge, v. 3.1 - (49-1090). - - Composition and decomposition are not alterations, vi. 3.25 (44-979). - - Composition and decomposition, explanation of, vi. 3.25 (44-978). - - Comprising many souls makes soul infinite, vi. 4.4 (22-291). - - Compulsory, memory is not, iv. 4.8 (28-451). - - Concatenation from universal reason are astrological signs, iv. 4.38 - (28-501). - - Concatenation in all things is the universe, v. 2.2 (11-196). - - Concatenation of causes is Chrysippus's fate, iii. 1.2, 7 (3-89, 96). - - Conceiving principle is the world-soul, iii. 9.1 (13-221). - - Concentricity of all existing things, v. 3.7 (49-1101); v. 5.9 - (32-587). - - Conception, true, is act of intuition, i. 1.9 (53-1202). - - Conformity to the universal soul, implied they do not form part of - her, iv. 3.2 (27-389). - - Connection between sense and intelligible worlds is triple nature of - man, vi. 7.7 (38-711). - - Connection with infinite is Chrysippus's fate, iii. 1.2 (3-89). - - Consciousness, iii. 9.9 (13-226). - - Consciousness, constituted by timeless memory, iv. 3.25 (27-429). - - Consciousness depends on choosing, iv. 4.37 (28-500). - - Consciousness, etymologically, is sensation of manifoldness, v. 3.13 - (49-1113). - - Consciousness is not a pre-requisite of happiness or virtue and - intelligence, i. 4.9, 10 (46-1033). - - Consciousness is unitary, though containing the thinker, ii. 9.1 - (33-601). - - Consciousness, local and whole, relation between not applicable to - soul, iv. 3.3 (27-392). - - Consciousness of higher soul-part dimmed by predominance or - disturbance of lower, iv. 8.8 (6-132). - - Consciousness of self, lost in ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569). - - Consciousness, unity limits principles to three, ii. 9.2 (33-602). - - Consciousness would be withdrawn by differentiating reason, ii. 9.1 - (33-602). - - Contemplating intelligence, is horizon of divine approach, v. 5.7 - (32-587). - - Contemplating the divinity, a Gnostic precept, ii. 9.15 (33-630). - - Contemplation, v. 1.2, 3 (10-175, 177); v. 3.10 (49-1106). - - Contemplation, aspired to, by even plants, iii. 8.1 (30-531). - - Contemplation, everything is, iii. 8 (30). - - Contemplation, goal of all beings, iii. 8.7 (30-540). - - Contemplation, immovable results in nature and reason, iii. 8.2 - (30-533). - - Contemplation includes nature and reason, iii. 8.2 (30-533). - - Consequence of derivative goods of third rank, i. 8.2 (51-1144). - - Consequences of mixture of soul and body, i. 1.4 (53-1194). - - Constitution, of universe, hierarchical, vi. 2.1 (13-892). - - Consubstantial, v. 1.4 (10-180). - - Contemplation, constitution of even lower forms, iii. 8.1 (30-531). - - Contemplation of intelligence, demands a higher transcending unity, - v. 3.10 (49-1106). - - Contemplation of itself made essence intelligence, v. 2.1 (11-193). - - Contemplation only one phase of excursion of procession, iv. 8.7 - (6-131). - - Contemplation the goal of all kinds and grades of existence, iii. 8.6 - (30-540). - - Contemplation's preparation is practice, iii. 8.5 (30-538). - - Contemporaneous is life of intelligence, iii. 7.2 (45-989). - - Contemporary are matter and the informing principles, ii. 4.8 - (12-206). - - Contingence applicable to Supreme, under new definition only, vi. 8.8 - (39-785). - - Contingence not even applies to essence, let alone super-essence, vi. - 8.9 (39-787). - - Contingency, disappearance of, witnessed to by ascent of life, vi. - 8.15 (39-801). - - Contingency illuminated in analysis, vi. 8.14 (39-798). - - Contingent existence, precedes absolute, vi. 1.26 (42-881). - - Continuance need not interfere with fluctuation, ii. 1.3 (40-816). - - Continuity between nature and elements, there is none, iv. 4.14 - (28-459). - - Continuous procession, necessary to Supreme, iv. 8.6 (6-129). - - Contraries, are those things that lack resentments, vi. 3.20 (44-968). - - Contraries passing into each other, Heraclitus, iv. 8.1 (6-119). - - Contraries teach appreciation, iv. 8.7 (6-131). - - Contrariness is not the greatest possible difference, vi. 3.20 - (44-968). - - Contrary contained in reason, constitute its unity, iii. 2.16 - (47-1069). - - Conversion effected by depreciation of the external and appreciation - of herself, v. 1.1 (10-174); see v. 1.7. - - Conversion of soul towards herself, only object of virtue, i. 4.11 - (46-1035). - - Conversion of souls, iv. 3.6, 7 (27-397, 399); iv. 8.4 (6-126). - - Conversion of super-abundance, back towards one, v. 2.1 (11-194). - - Conversion produced by purification, i. 2.4 (10-261). - - Conversion to good and being in itself depends on intelligence, vi. - 8.4 (39-778). - - Conversion towards divinity, result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Co-ordination of universe, truth of astrology, ii. 3.7 (52-1173). - - Corporeal, if soul is, body could not possess sensation, iv. 7.6 - (2-65). - - Corporeity is nonentity because of lack of unity, iii. 6.6 (26-362). - - Corporeity not in matter of thing itself, ii. 4.12 (12-212). - - Correspondence of sense-beauty, with its idea, i. 6.2 (1-43). - - Cosmic intellect, relation with individual, i. 1.7 (53-1199). - - Counterfeit implied by true good, vi. 7.26 (38-743). - - Courage is no longer to fear death, i. 6.6 (1-49). - - Courage of soul's anger part explained, iii. 6.2 (26-354). - - Creation by divinity glancing at intelligence above, iv. 3.11 - (27-408). - - Creation by foresight, not result of reasoning, vi. 7.1 (38-699). - - Creation by mere illumination, gnostic, opposed, ii. 9.11 (33-621). - - Creation drama, the world-soul could not have gone through, ii. 9.4 - (33-605). - - Creation is effusion of super-abundance, v. 2.1 (11-194). - - Creation limited to world-soul because nearest to intelligible world, - iv. 3.6 (27-397). - - Creation of sense-world, not by reflection, but self-necessity, iii. - 2.2 (47-1044). - - Creation of world, how it took place, v. 8.7 (31-562). - - Creation, why denied human souls, iv. 3.6 (27-397). - - Creative is the universal soul, not preservative, ii. 3.16 (52-1183). - - Creative motives, ii. 9.4 (33-605). - - Creator admires his handiwork, v. 8.8 (31-564). - - Creator and preserver, is the good, vi. 7.23 (38-740). - - Creator and world, are not evil, ii. 9 (33). - - Creator is outside of time, iii. 7.5 (45-994). - - Creator so wise that all complaints are grotesque, iii. 2.14 - (47-1063). - - Creator testified to, by the world, iii. 2.3 (47-1047). - - Creator's universality, overcame all obstacles, v. 8.7 (31-562). - - Creator's wisdom makes complaints grotesque, iii. 2.14 (47-1063). - - Credence of intelligence in itself, v. 5.2 (32-578). - - Crimes should not be attributed to the influence of sublunary - divinities, iv. 4.31 (28-489). - - Criticism of world is wrong, v. 8.8 (31-565). - - Culmination, ii. 3.3 (52-1165). - - Cup, cosmic, in Plato, iv. 8.4 (6-127). - - Cupid and Psyche, vi. 9.9 (9-166). - - Curative, the, is a prominent element of life, iii. 3.5 (48-1084). - - Cutting off every thing else, is means of ecstasy, v. 3.7 (49-1121). - - Cybele, iii. 6.19 (26-385). - - - Daemon helps to carry out chosen destiny, iii. 4.5 (15-239). - - Daemon is next higher faculty of soul, iii. 4.3 (15-235). - - Daemon is the love that unites a soul to matter, iii. 5.4 (50-1130). - - Daemon may remain after death or be changed to Daemon superior to - predominating power, iii. 4.6 (15-239). - - Daemon of souls is their love, iii. 5.4 (50-1130). - - Daemon's all, born of Need and Abundance, iii. 5.6 (50-1131). - - Daemons and deities, difference between, iii. 5.6 (50-1131). - - Daemons are individual, iii. 4 (15). - - Daemons both related and independent of us, iii. 4.5 (15-239). - - Daemons even in souls entering animal bodies, iii. 4.6 (15-240). - - Daemons follow Supreme, v. 8.10 (31-567). - - Daemon's guidance does not hinder responsibility, iii. 4.5 (15-238). - - Daemons in charge of punishment of soul, iv. 8.5 (6-128). - - Dance, prearranged, simile of star's motion, iv. 4.33 (28-492). - - Darkness, existence of, must be related to the soul, ii. 9.12 - (33-624). - - Darkness, looking at, cause of evil of soul, i. 8.4 (51-1147). - - Death, after, colleagues in government of world, iv. 8.4 (6-125). - - Death, after, discursive reason not used, iv. 3.18 (27-416). - - Death, after, judgment and expiation, iii. 4.6 (15-240). - - Death, after, man becomes what he has lived, iii. 4.2 (15-234). - - Death, after, memory may last, if trained, iii. 4.2 (15-234); iv. 4.5 - (28-448). - - Death, after, rank depends on state of death, i. 9 (16). - - Death, after, recognition and memory, iv. 4.5 (28-447). - - Death, after, soul goes to retribution, iii. 2.8 (47-1056). - - Death, after, where does the soul go, iii. 4.6 (15-240); iii. 2.8 - (47-1056). - - Death, at, memories of former existences are reproduced, iv. 3.27 - (27-433). - - Death better than disharmony, iii. 2.8 (47-1057). - - Death, how the soul splits up, iii. 4.6 (15-241). - - Death is only separation of soul from body, i. 6.6 (1-50). - - Declination, ii. 3.3 (52-1165). - - Decomposible, soul is not, merely because it has three parts, iv. - 7.14 (2-84). - - Decomposition and composition are not alteration, vi. 3.25 (44-979). - - Decomposition and composition, explanation of, vi. 3.25 (44-978). - - Defects, not in intelligible world, v. 9.14 (5-117). - - Defects such as limping, do not proceed from intelligence, v. 9.10 - (5-113). - - Degeneration of races, implied by determinism, ii. 3.16 (52-1184). - - Degeneration of soul is promoted by looking at darkness, i. 8.4 - (51-1147). - - Degrees, admitted of, by quality, vi. 3.20 (44-970). - - Degrees, different, of the same reality, are intelligence and life, - vi. 7.18 (38-732). - - Degrees of ecstasy, vi. 7.36 (38-760). - - Deities and demons, difference between, iii. 5.6 (50-1131). - - Deities, second rank, are all visible super-lunar deities, iii. 5.6 - (50-1132). - - Deliberating before making sense-man intelligence did not, vi. 7.1 - (38-698). - - Deliberation in creating of world, gnostic opposed, v. 8.7, 12 - (31-561, 571). - - Delphi, at middle of earth, vi. 1.14 (42-862). - - Demiurge, how the gnostic created it, ii. 9.12 (33-623). - - Demon, chief, in intelligible world is deity, iii. 5.6 (50-1132). - - Demon is any being in intelligible world, iii. 5.6 (50-1133). - - Demon is vestige of a soul descended into the world, iii. 5.6 - (50-1132). - - Demon, the great, Platonic, ii. 3.9 (52-1176). - - Demoniacal possession, as explanation of disease wrong, ii. 9.14 - (33-627). - - Demons, among them, those are loves that exist by a soul's desire for - good, iii. 5.6 (50-1132). - - Demons have bodies of fire, ii. 1.6 (40-823); iii. 5.6 (50-1133). - - Demons have no memories, and grant no prayers; in war life is saved - by valor, not by prayers, iv. 4.30 (28-486). - - Demons, no crimes should be attributed to, iv. 4.31 (28-489). - - Demons not born of souls, generated by world-soul powers, iii. 5.6 - (50-1133). - - Demons, psychology of, iv. 4.43 (28-507). - - Demons, why not all of them are loves, iii. 5.6 (50-1132). - - Demons, why they are not free from matter, iii. 5.6 (50-1133). - - Demonstration absent in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563). - - Demonstration of divinity defies, i. 3.1 (20-269). - - Depart from life by seeking beyond it, vi. 5.12 (23-331). - - Deprivation, in soul, is evil, i. 8.11 (51-1158). - - Deprivation is matter, and is without qualities, i. 8.11 (51-1158). - - Derivatives of category of quality, vi. 3.19 (44-967). - - Descartes, "Cogito, ergo sum," from Parmenides, v. 9.5 (5-108). - - Descend, how souls come to, iv. 3.13 (27-410). - - Descend, intelligible does not, sense-world rises, iii. 4.4 (15-237). - - Descent from intelligible into heaven by souls leads to recognition, - iv. 4.5 (28-447). - - Descent from the intelligible world enables us to study time, iii. - 7.6 (45-995). - - Descent into body, does not injure eternity of soul, iv. 7.13 (2-83). - - Descent of soul, causes, as given by Plato, iv. 8.1 (6-121). - - Descent of soul into body, iii. 9.3 (13-222); iv. 8.1 (6-120). - - Descent of the soul, is fall into matter, i. 8.14 (51-1161). - - Descent of the soul, procedure, vi. 4.16 (22-311). - - Descent of the soul, psychologically explained, vi. 4.16 (22-311). - - Descent, souls not isolated from intelligence, during, iv. 3.12 - (27-409). - - Description of intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-557). - - Description of universal being, vi. 4.2 (22-286). - - Desirability of being in its beauty v. 8.10 (31-568). - - Desirable in itself, is the good. vi. 8.7 (39-783). - - Desire not simultaneous with appetite, i. 1.5 (53-1197). - - Desire of soul, liver seat of, iv. 4.28 (28-480). - - Desire or ability, only limit of union with divinity, v. 8.11 - (31-570). - - Desire to live, satisfaction of, is not happiness, i. 5.2 (36-684). - - Desires are physical, because changeable with harmony of body, iv. - 4.21 (28-469). - - Desires, double, of body and of combination, iv. 4.20 (28-468). - - Desires, function, relation of, to the vegetative power, iv. 4.22 - (28-470). - - Destiny chosen, helped by Daemon, iii. 4.5 (15-239). - - Destiny conformed to character of soul, iii. 4.5 (15-238). - - Destiny of man, gnostic, is demoralizing, ii. 9.15 (33-629). - - Destiny of souls, depend on condition of birth of universe, ii. 3.15 - (52-1182). - - Destroyed would be the universe, if unity passed into the manifold, - iii. 8.10 (30-547). - - Destruction of soul elements, does it imply disappearance? iv. 4.29 - (28-484). - - Detachment as simplification of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170). - - Detachment of soul at death, how arranged naturally, i. 9 (16). - - Detachment of soul by death voluntary, forbidden, i. 9 (16). - - Detailed fate not swayed by stars, iv. 4.31 (28-488). - - Details, fault in, cannot change harmony in universe, ii. 3.16 - (52-1185). - - Determinate form, v. 1.7 (10-184); v. 5.6 (32-584). - - Determinateness, impossible of one, v. 5.6 (32-584). - - Determination demands a motive, iii. 1.1 (3-86). - - Determination of future implied by prediction, iii. 1.3 (3-90). - - Determinism implies degeneration of races, ii. 3.16 (52-1184). - - Determinism, really, under causeless origin, iii. 1.1 (3-86). - - Determinism supported by materialists, iii. 1.2 (3-88). - - Deterioration, causes of, iii. 3.4 (48-1083). - - Development natural of essence to create a soul, iv. 8.6 (6-129). - - Deviltry confuted, leaves influence of world-soul, iv. 4.32 (28-490). - - Devolution (Platonic world scheme, intelligence, soul, nature), iv. - 7.8 (2-69). - - Diagram of universe, iv. 4.16 (28-462). - - Dialectics, i. 3 (20-269); ii, 4.10 (12-206); vi. 3.1 (44-934); i. - 3.4 (20-272); i. 8.9 (51-1156). - - Dialectics, crown of various branches of philosophy, i. 3.5 (20-273). - - Dialectics, how to conceive infinite, vi. 6.2 (34-644). - - Dialectics is concatenation of the world, i. 3.4 (20-272). - - Dialectics neglects opinion and sense opinions, i. 3.4 (20-272). - - Dialectics not merely instrument for philosophy (Aristotle), i. 3.5 - (20-273). - - Dialectics not speculation and abstract rules (Epicurean), i. 3.5 - (20-273). - - Dialectics science of (judging values, or) discovery, amount of real - being in things, i. 3.4 (20-273). - - Dialectics staying in intelligible, v. 1.1 (10-173). - - Dialectics three paths, philosopher, musician and lover, i. 3.1 - (20-269). - - Dialectics two fold, first ascent to intelligible and then how to - remain, i. 3.1 (20-269). - - Dialectics without it, lower knowledge would be imperfect, i. 3.6 - (20-274). - - Differ, souls do, as the sensations, vi. 4.6 (22-294). - - Difference and identity, implied by triune process of categories, vi. - 2.8 (43-905). - - Difference between celestial and inferior divinities, v. 8.3 (31-556). - - Difference between human and cosmic incarnation, iv. 8.3 (6-123). - - Difference, greatest possible, is not contrariness, vi. 3.20 (44-968). - - Difference of Supreme from second, is profound, v. 5.3 (32-580). - - Difference, or category, v. 1.4 (10-180). - - Differences, minor, derived from matter, v. 9.12 (5-115). - - Differences of color, aid to discriminate magnitudes, ii. 8.1 - (35-681). - - Differences of soul, retained on different levels, iv. 3.5 (27-396). - - Differences of things, depend on their seminal reasons, v. 7.1 - (18-252). - - Differences, some are not qualities, vi. 3.18 (44-965). - - Differentials of beings, are not genuine qualities, vi. 1.16 (42-853). - - Difficulties of understanding, clear to intelligence, iv. 9.5 (8-146). - - Dimension and number are so different as to suggest different - classifications, vi. 2.13 (43-916). - - Diminished, essence is not, though divisible, vi. 4.4 (22-290). - - Dione, iii. 5.2 (50-1126). - - Disappearance of form, implies that of size, ii. 8.1 (35-682). - - Disappearance of soul parts, does it imply destruction, iv. 4.29 - (28-484). - - Discontent, divine, and transforms virtues, homely into higher, i. - 2.7 (19-267). - - Discontent, divine, supplement of homely virtues, i. 2.7 (19-267). - - Discord, cause of incarnation, iv. 8.1 (6-119). - - Discursive reason, v. 1.10, 11 (10-189); v. 3.14 (49-1115); v. 5.1 - (32-575); v. 9.4 (5-106). - - Discursive reason cannot turn upon itself, v. 3.2 (49-1091). - - Discursive reason, its function, v. 3.1 (49-1090). - - Discursive reason, why it belongs to soul, not to intelligence, v. - 3.3 (49-1093). - - Discursive reason's highest part, receives impressions from its - intelligence, v. 3.3 (49-1092). - - Disease, as demoniacal possession wrong, ii. 9.14 (33-627). - - Disharmony, vice is, iii. 6.2 (26-352). - - Disharmony with laws of universe, worse than death, iii. 2.8 - (47-1057). - - Displacement, movement is single, vi. 3.24 (44-977). - - Disposition, difficulty of mastering these corporeal dispositions, i. - 8.8 (51-1154). - - Distance from a unity is multitude and an evil, vi. 6.1 (34-643). - - Distance from the Supreme, imperfection, iii. 3.3 (48-1080). - - Distinction between spiritual, psychic and material, due to ignorance - of other people's attainments, ii. 9.18 (33-637). - - Distinction in intelligibles, (good above beauty), i. 6.9 (1-53). - - Distinguish, object of myths, iii. 5.10 (50-1138). - - Distinction, Philonic, between the God, and God, vi. 7.1 (38-697). - - Distinguishing of being, quality and differences absurd, vi. 3.18 - (44-965). - - Distraction by sensation, makes us unconscious of higher part, iv. - 8.8 (6-132). - - Divergence from Plato, forces Plotinos to demonstrate categories, vi. - 2.1 (43-891). - - Diversity from same parents depends on manner of generation, v. 7.2 - (18-253). - - Diversity of relations of all things connected with the first, v. 5.9 - (32-589). - - Divided, not even the ascended soul need be, iv. 4.1 (28-442). - - Divided, time cannot be without soul's action, iv. 4.15 (28-460). - - Divine sphere, limited by soul, downwards, v. 1.7 (10-186). - - Diviner, duty of, is to read letter traced by nature, iii. 3.6 - (48-1087). - - Divinities begotten by actualization of intelligence, vi. 9.9 (9-168). - - Divinities begotten by silent intercourse with the one, vi. 9.9 - (9-166). - - Divinities celestial and inferior, difference between, v. 8.3 - (31-556). - - Divinities contained in Supreme, dynamically, by birth, v. 8.9 - (31-566). - - Divinities haunt the cities, vi. 5.12 (23-332). - - Divinities hidden and visible, v. 1.4 (10-178). - - Divinity absent only, for non-successful in avoiding distraction, vi. - 9.7 (9-161). - - Divinity and also the soul is always one, iv. 3.8 (27-400). - - Divinity constituted by attachment to centre, vi. 9.8 (9-163). - - Divinity distinguished Philonically, the God, and God, vi. 7.1 - (18-251). - - Divinity, resemblance to, in soul's welfare, i. 6.6 (1-49). - - Divinity within us, single and identical in all, vi. 5.1 (23-314). - - Divinization, as Cupid and Psyche, vi. 9.9 (9-166). - - Divinization of brutalization, is fate of three men in us, vi. 7.6 - (38-708). - - Divisible, all bodies are fully, iv. 7.8 (2-68). - - Divisible and indivisible can soul be simultaneously, iv. 3.19 - (27-417). - - Divisible and indivisible is soul, iv. 2.2 (21-279). - - Divisible beings, existence of, iv. 2.1 (21-276). - - Divisible intelligence is not, v. 3.5 (49-1096). - - Divisible is essence though not diminished, vi. 4.4 (22-290). - - Divisible of soul, mixture and double, ii. 3.9 (52-1176). - - Divisible soul is not unifying manifold, sensation, iv. 7.6 (2-65). - - Divisibility, v. 1.7 (10-184). - - Divisibility, goal of sense, growth and emotion, iv. 3.19 (27-418). - - Divisibility of soul in vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 - (31-567). - - Division, between universal soul and souls impossible, iv. 3.2 - (27-390). - - Division, characteristic of bodies not of soul, iv. 2.8 (21-276). - - Dominant, better nature is not, because of sub-consciousness, iii. - 3.4 (48-1081). - - Double cause of incarnation, motive and deeds, iv. 8.4 (6-125). - - Double, Hercules symbolizes the soul, i. 1.12 (53-1206). - - Doubleness of everything, including man, vi. 3.4 (44-938). - - Doubleness of soul, reasons and Providence, iv. 6.2 (41-832); iii. - 3.4 (48-1081). - - Doubleness of souls, suns, stars, ii. 3.9 (52-1175). - - Doubleness of wisdom, i. 2.6 (19-265). - - Doubleness of world soul, ii. 2.3 (14-233). - - Doubleness, see "pair", or "dyad", of every man, ii. 3.9 (52-1176). - - Doubt of existence of divinity, like dreamers who awake, to slumber - again, v. 5.11 (32-592). - - Drama as a whole, iii. 2.17 (47-1071). - - Drama of life, parts played badly by the evil, iii. 2.17 (47-1072). - - Drama, simile of, allows for good and evil within reason, iii. 2.17 - (47-1070). - - Dream of the good is form, vi. 7.28 (38-745). - - Dream of the soul is sensation, from which we must wake, iii. 6.6 - (26-363). - - Dreamers who wake, only to return to dreams like doubters of - divinity, v. 5.11 (32-593). - - Driver and horses, simile of, Platonic, ii. 3.13 (52-1179). - - Dualism breaks down just like monism, vi. 1.27 (42-883). - - Duality (form and matter) in all things, iv. 7.1 (2-56). - - Duality of every body, ii. 4.5 (12-200). - - Duration has nothing to do with happiness, i. 5.1 (36-684). - - Duration increases unhappiness, why not happiness? i. 5.6 (36-686). - - Duration of happiness does not affect its quality, i. 5.5 (36-685). - - Duration of time, as opportunity, is of importance to virtue, i. 5.10 - (36-689). - - Dyad, or doubleness, v. 5.4 (32-581). - - Dyad, see "pair," vi. 2.11 (43-914). - - - Earth and fire contained in the stars, ii. 1.6 (40-822). - - Earth can feel as well as the stars, iv. 4.22 (28-471). - - Earth contains all the other elements, ii. 1.6 (40-823). - - Earth exists in the intelligible, vi. 7.11 (38-718). - - Earth feels and directs by sympathetic harmony, iv. 4.26 (28-477). - - Earth, model of the new, gnostic, unreasonable, ii. 9.5 (33-608). - - Earth, postulated by Plato, as being basis of life, ii. 1.7 (40-823). - - Earth senses may be different from ours, iv. 4.26 (28-478). - - Earth, what passions suitable to it, iv. 4.22 (28-471). - - Earthly events, not to be attributed to stars, body or will, iv. 4.35 - (28-495). - - Earth's psychology, iv. 4.27 (28-479). - - Ecliptic's inclination to equator, v. 8.7 (31-563). - - Ecstasy as divine spectacle, vi. 9.11 (9-169). - - Ecstasy as intellectual contact with sudden light, v. 3.17 (49-1120). - - Ecstasy described, iv. 8.1 (6-119). - - Ecstasy ends in a report of seeing God beget a Son, v. 8.12 (31-571). - - Ecstasy ends in fusion with divinity, and becoming own object of - contemplation, v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Ecstasy ends in "rest" and "Saturnian realm," v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Ecstasy ends in vision which is not chance, vi. 8.21 (39-807). - - Ecstasy, experience of, i. 6.7 (1-50). - - Ecstasy has two advantages following, self-consciousness and - possession of all things, v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Ecstasy illustrated by secrecy of mystery-rites, vi. 9.11 (9-169). - - Ecstasy in soul does not think God, because she doesn't think, vi. - 7.35 (38-759). - - Ecstasy is possession by divinity, v. 8.10 (31-567). - - Ecstasy, land-marks on path to, i. 6.9 (1-54). - - Ecstasy, mechanism of, v. 8.11 (31-569). - - Ecstasy, permanent results, v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Ecstasy results in begotten son forming a new world, v. 8.12 (31-571). - - Ecstasy, simplification, super beauty and virtue, vi. 9.11 (9-170). - - Ecstasy, the degrees leading to God, vi. 736 (38-760). - - Ecstasy trance (enthusiasm), vi. 9.11 (9-169). - - Ecstasy, trap on way to, v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Ecstasy, way to approach, first principle, v. 5.10, 11 (32-591). - - Ecstasy, when experienced, leads to questions, iv. 8.1 (6-119). - - Ecstasy's last stage, vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 (31-568). - - Ecstasy's method, is to close eyes of body, i. 6.8 (1-52). - - Ecstatic vision of God, chief purpose of life, i. 6.7 (1-51). - - Ecstatic, subsequent experiences, vi. 9.11 (9-190). - - Education and training, memory needs, iv. 6.3 (41-835). - - Effusion of super-abundance is reation, v. 2.1 (11-194). - - Effects, differences in, limited to intelligibles, vi. 3.17 (44-964). - - Egyptian hieroglyphics, v. 8.6 (31-560). - - Elemental intermediary soul, also inadmissible, ii. 9.5 (33-607). - - Elemental process demands substrate, ii, 4.6 (12-203). - - Elements and nature, there is continuity between, iv. 4.14 (28-459). - - Elements are also individual, ii. 1.6 (40-823). - - Elements are kindred, through their common ground, the universe body, - ii. 1.7 (40-824). - - Elements, earth contains all, ii. 1.6 (40-821). - - Elements, principles of physicists, iii. 1.3 (3-89). - - Elements of body cannot harmonize themselves, iv. 7.8 (2-74). - - Elements of essence can be said to be one only figuratively, vi. 2.10 - (43-909). - - Elements of universe, simultaneously principles and general, vi. 2.2 - (43-893). - - Elements terrestrial, do not degrade the heaven, ii. 1.6 (40-823). - - Elevation of soul gradual, v. 3.9 (49-1106). - - Eliminated, is contingency in analysis, vi. 8.14 (39-798). - - Emanations of a single soul, are all souls, iv. 3 (27). - - Emanations of light from sun, v. 3.12 (49-1112). - - Emanations of universal soul, are individual souls, iv. 3.1 (27-388). - - Emanations, sense and growth tend towards divisibility, iv. 3.19 - (27-418). - - Emigration of soul should not be forced, i. 9 (10). - - Emotion at seeing God, sign of unification, vi. 9.4 (9-155). - - Emotions, James Lange, theory of refuted, i. 1.5 (53-1196). - - Emotions of beauty caused by invisible soul, i. 6.5 (1-46). - - Enchantments, an active life, predisposes to subjection to, iv. 4.43 - (28-507). - - Enchantments, magic, how to avoid them, iv. 4.44 (28-509). - - Enchantments, wise men escape all, iv. 4.43 (28-507). - - End and principle, simultaneous in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563). - - End of all other goods is the Supreme, i. 7.1 (54-1209). - - Entelechy, soul is not, iv. 2.1; iv. 7.8 (21-276, 2-74-77). - - Energy, displayed, constitutes a thing's being, iii. 1.1 (3-86). - - Ennobled and intellectualized is soul, scorning even thought, vi. - 7.35 (38-757). - - Enthusiasm of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-169). - - Entire essence loved by being, vi. 5.10 (23-325). - - Entire everywhere is universal soul, vi. 4.9 (22-300). - - Entire soul, fashioned whole and individuals, vi. 5.8 (23-322). - - Entire soul is everywhere, iv. 7.5 (2-63). - - Entities earthly, not all have ideas corresponding, v. 9.14 (5-117). - - Entities incorporeal, impassibility, iii. 6.1 (26-351). - - Enumeration of divine principles, vi. 7.25 (38-742). - - Enumeration, successive, inevitable in describing the eternal, iv. - 8.4 (6-127). - - Epicurus, iv. 5.2 (29-516). - - Epimetheus, iv. 3.14 (27-412). - - Equator to Ecliptic, inclination, v. 8.7 (31-563). - - Erechtheus, iv. 4.43 (28-508). - - Eros, Platonic myth interpretation of, iii. 5.2 (50-1125). - - Eros, son of Venus, iii. 5.2 (50-1125). - - Escape all enchantments, how the wise men do, iv. 4.43 (28-507). - - Escape, how to, from this world, i. 6.8 (1-52). - - Escoreal fragment, introduction to, iii. 6.6 (26-360). - - Essence alone, possesses self existence, vi. 6.18 (34-678). - - Essence and being, distinction between, ii. 6.1 (17-245). - - Essence and stability, distinction between. vi. 2.7 (43-903). - - Essence and unity, genuine relations between, vi. 2.11 (43-911). - - Essence, by it all things depend on the good, i. 7.2 (54-1209). - - Essence cannot become a genus so long as it remains one, vi. 2.9 - (43-909). - - Essence derives its difference from other co-ordinate categories, vi. - 2.19 (43-923). - - Essence divisible if not thereby diminished, vi. 4.4 (22-290). - - Essence elements can be said to be one only figuratively, vi. 2.10 - (43-909). - - Essence entire loved by being, vi. 5.10 (23-325). - - Essence, ideas and intelligence, v. 9 (5-102). - - Essence, indivisible and divisible mediated between by soul, iv. 2 - (21-276). - - Essence indivisible becomes divisible within bodies, iv. 2.1 (21-277). - - Essence indivisible, description of, iv. 2.1 (21-277). - - Essence intelligible, is both in and out of itself, vi. 5.3 (23-316). - - Essence is not contingent let alone super-essence, vi. 8.9 (39-788). - - Essence is the origin of all animals, vi. 2.21 (43-928). - - Essence, location for the things yet to be produced, vi. 6.10 - (34-657). - - Essence made intelligible by addition of eternity, vi. 2.1 (43-892). - - Essence more perfect than actualized being, ii. 6.1 (17-247). - - Essence must be second in order to exist in ground of first, v. 2.1 - (11-193). - - Essence not stable though immovable, vi. 9.3 (9-153). - - Essence not synonymous with unity, vi. 2.9 (43-908). - - Essence, number follows and proceeds from, vi. 6.9 (34-655). - - Essence of soul derives from its being, adding life to essence, vi. - 2.6 (43-900). - - Essence one and identical is everywhere, entirely present, vi. 4 - (22-285). - - Essence relation to being, v. 5.5 (32-583). - - Essence unity must be sought for in it, vi. 5.1 (23-314). - - Essence's power and beauty, is to attract all things, vi. 6.18 - (34-678). - - Essential number, vi. 6.9 (34-657). - - Eternal being, cares not for inequality of riches. ii, 9.9 (33-616). - - Eternal generation, iv. 8.4 (6-127); vi. 7.3 (38-703); vi. 8.20 - (39-809). - - Eternal must have been the necessity to illuminate darkness, ii. 9.12 - (33-624). - - Eternal revealed by sense objects, iv. 8.6 (6-130). - - Eternally begotten, is the world, ii. 9.3 (33-603). - - Eternity added to essence makes intelligible essence, vi. 2.1 - (43-892). - - Eternity and perpetuity, difference between, iii. 7.4 (45-991). - - Eternity and time, iii. 7 (45-985). - - Eternity as union of the five categories, iii, 7.2 (45-988). - - Eternity at rest, error in this, iii. 7.1 (45-987). - - Eternity exists perpetually, iii. 7. introd. (45-985). - - Eternity, from, is providence the plan of the universe, vi. 8.17 - (39-803). - - Eternity has no future or past, v. 1.4 (10-179); iii. 7.4 (45-992). - - Eternity is immutable in unity, iii. 7.5 (45-993). - - Eternity is infinite, universal life, that cannot lose anything, iii, - 7.4 (45-992). - - Eternity is sempiternal existence, iii. 7.5 (45-993). - - Eternity is the model of its image, time, iii. 7. introd. (45-985). - - Eternity is to existence, as time is interior to the soul, iii. 7.10 - (45-1008). - - Eternity is to intelligence, what time is to the world-soul. iii. - 7.10 (45-1007). - - Eternity kin to beauty, iii. 5.1 (50-1124). - - Eternity not an accident of the intelligible, but an intimate part of - its nature, iii. 7.3 (45-989). - - Eternity of soul, not affected by descent into body, iv. 7.13 (2-83). - - Eternity of soul proved by thinking the eternal, iv. 7.10 (2-81). - - Eternity, relation of, to intelligible being, iii. 7.1 (45-986). - - Eternity replaces time, in intelligible world, v. 9.10 (5-113). - - Eternity, see Aeon and pun on Aeon, iii. 7.1 (45-986). - - Evaporation, explains a theory of mixture, ii. 7.2 (37-694). - - Evaporation, both Stoic and Aristotelian refuted, ii, 7.2 (37-695). - - Everything is composite of form and matter, v. 9.3 (5-105). - - Everywhere and nowhere is Supreme, inclination and imminence, vi. - 8.16 (39-801). - - Evil, absolute, goal of degeneration of the soul, i. 8.15 (51-1163). - - Evil, an evil is life without virtue, i. 7.3 (54-1210). - - Evil are doers, who play their parts badly in drama of life, iii. - 2.17 (47-1071). - - Evil as an obstacle to the soul, i. 8.12 (51-1159). - - Evil as infinite and formlessness as itself, i. 8.3 (51-1145). - - Evil cannot be possessed within the soul, i. 8.11 (51-1158). - - Evil constituted by indetermination, success and lack, i. 8.4 - (51-1147). - - Evil creator and world are not, ii. 9 (33-599). - - Evil effects of suicide on soul itself, i. 9 (16-243). - - Evil even is a multitude, vi. 6.1 (34-643). - - Evil external and internal, relation between, i. 8.5 (51-1149). - - Evil, how sense-objects are not, iii. 2.8 (47-1055). - - Evil implied by good, because matter is necessary to the world, i. - 8.7 (51-1152). - - Evil in itself, i. 6.6 (1-49). - - Evil in itself is the primary evil, i. 8.3 (51-1146). - - Evil in the soul, explained by virtue as a harmony, iii. 6.2 (26-352). - - Evil inseparable from good, iii. 3.7 (48-1088). - - Evil is consequence of derivative goods of third rank, i. 8.2 - (51-1144). - - Evil is no one vice in particular, i. 8.5 (51-1148). - - Evil is soul's rushing into region of diversity, i. 8.13 (51-1161). - - Evil is the absence of good in the soul, i. 8.11 (51-1157). - - Evil is weakness of the soul, i. 8.14 (51-1160). - - Evil, its nature depends on that of good, i. 8.2 (51-1143). - - Evil, lower form of good, iii. 2.7 (47-1053); vi. 7.10 (38-716). - - Evil, nature of, i. 8.3 (51-1144). - - Evil, necessary, is lowest degree of being, i. 8.7 (51-1152). - - Evil, neutral, is matter, vi, 7.28 (38-746). - - Evil, none unalloyed for the living people, i. 7.3 (54-1210). - - Evil of the soul, explanation, i. 8.15 (51-1163). - - Evil only figurative and antagonist of good, i. 8.6 (51-1150). - - Evil possesses a lower form of being, i. 8.3 (51-1145). - - Evil primary and secondary defined, i. 8.8 (51-1155). - - Evil, primary and secondary, of soul, i. 8.5 (51-1148). - - Evil primary, is evil in itself, i. 8.3 (51-1146). - - Evil primary is lack of measure, (darkness), i. 8.8 (51-1154). - - Evil secondary, is accidental formlessness (something obscured), i. - 8.8 (51-1155). - - Evil secondary, is matter, i. 8.4 (51-1146). - - Evil triumphed over, in faculties not engaged in matter, i. 8.5 - (51-1149). - - Evil universal and unavoidable, i. 8.6 (51-1150). - - Evil, victory of, accuses Providence, iii. 2.6 (47-1052). - - Evils are necessary to the perfection of the universe, ii. 3.18 - (52-1187). - - Evils even if corporeal, caused by matter, i. 8.8 (51-1153). - - Evil, nature and origin of, i. 8 (51-1142). - - Evils, origin of, i. 1.9 (53-1201). - - Evils, that the sage can support without disturbing happiness, i. 4.7 - (46-1029). - - Evolution impossible (from imperfect to perfect), iv. 7.8 (2-73). - - Examination, for it only are parts of a manifold unity apart, vi. 2.3 - (43-897). - - Examination of self, i, 6.9 (1-54). - - Examination of soul, body must first be dissociated, vi. 3.1 (44-934). - - Excursion down and up, is procession of intelligence, iv. 8.7 (6-131). - - Excursion yields the soul's two duties, body management and - contemplation, iv. 8.7 (6-131). - - Exemption of certain classes from divine care, heartless, ii. 9.16 - (33-631). - - Exile, gnostic idea of, opposed, ii. 9.6 (33-609). - - Existence absolute precedes contingent, vi. 1.26 (42-881). - - Existence, all kinds and grades of, aim at contemplation, iii. 8.6 - (30-538). - - Existence, category, v. 1.4 (10-180). - - Existence, descending, graduations of, iv. 3.17 (27-415). - - Existence, how infinite arrived to it, vi. 6.3 (34-645). - - Existence in intelligible, before application to multiple beings, is - reason, vi. 6.11 (34-659). - - Existence of darkness may be related to the soul ii. 9.12 (33-625). - - Existence of divisible things, iv. 2.1 (21-276). - - Existence of first, necessary. v. 4.1 (7-134). - - Existence of intelligence, proved, v. 9.3 (5-104). - - Existence of manifoldness impossible, without something simple, ii. - 4.3 (12-198). - - Existence of memory alter death, and of heaven, iv. 4.5 (28-447). - - Existence of matter is sure as that of good, i. 8.15 (51-1162). - - Existence of object implies a previous model, vi. 6.10 (34-658). - - Existence of other things not precluded by unity, vi. 4.4 (22-290). - - Existence, primary, will contain thought, existence and life, ii. 4.6 - (12-203); v. 6.6 (24-339). - - Existence real possessed by right thoughts, iii. 5.7 (50-1136). - - Existence sempiternal is eternity, iii. 7.5 (45-993). - - Existence the first being supra-cogitative, does not know itself, v. - 6.6 (24-340). - - Existence thought and life contained in primary existence, v. 6.6 - (24-338). - - Existing animal of Plato differs from intelligence, iii. 9.1 (13-220). - - Experience and action, underlying transmission, reception, and - relation, vi. 1.22 (42-875). - - Experience does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.16 (43-920). - - Experience necessary to souls not strong enough to do without it, iv. - 8.7 (6-131). - - Experience of ecstasy leads to questions, iv. 8.1 (6-119). - - Experience of evil yields knowledge of good, iv. 8.7 (6-131). - - Experiences, sensations are not, but relative actualizations, iv. 6.2 - (41-831). - - Experiment proposed, ii. 9.17 (33-633). - - Expiation is condition of soul in world, iv. 8.5 (6-128). - - Expiations, time of, between incarnations, iii. 4.6 (15-240). - - Extension is merely a sign of participation into the word of life, - vi. 4.13 (22-306). - - Extension, none in beauty or justice, iv. 7.8 (2-69). - - Extension, none in soul or reason, iv. 7.5 (2-63). - - Extensions, soul was capable of, before the existence of the body, - vi. 4.1 (22-285). - - External and internal relation of evil, i. 8.5 (51-1149). - - External circumstances cause wealth, poverty and vice, ii. 3.8 - (52-1174). - - Exuberant fruitfulness of one, (see super-abundance), v. 3.15 - (49-1116). - - Eyes implanted in man by divine foresight, vi. 7.1 (38-697). - - Eyes impure can see nothing, i. 6.9 (1-53). - - Eyes of body, close them, is method to achieve ecstasy, i. 6.8 (1-52). - - - Face to face, vision of God, i. 6.7 (1-50). - - Faces all around the head, simile of, vi. 5.7 (23-320). - - Faculty, reawakening of, is the memory, not an image, iv. 6.3 - (41-833). - - Faith absent in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563). - - Faith in intelligible, how achieved, vi. 9.5 (9-156). - - Faith teaches Providence rules the world, iii. 2.7 (47-1054). - - Fall into generation, due to division into number, iv. 8.4 (6-126). - - Fall into generation may be partial and recovery from, possible, iv. - 4.5 (28-448). - - Fall not voluntary, but punishment of conduct, iv. 8.5 (6-127). - - Fall of the soul as descent into matter, i. 8.14 (51-1161). - - Fall of the soul due to both will and necessity, iv. 8.5 (6-128). - - Fall of the soul due to guilt, (Pythagorean), iv. 8.1 (6-120). - - Fate, according to Stoic Chrysippus, iii. 1.2 (3-89). - - Fate detailed, does not sway stars, iv. 4.31 (28-489). - - Fate, Heraclitian, constituted by action and passion, iii. 1.4 (3-91). - - Fate is unpredictable circumstances, altering life currents, iii. 4.6 - (15-242). - - Fate, mastery of, victory over self, ii. 3.15 (52-1182). - - Fate, may be mastered, ii. 3.15 (52-1182). - - Fate, obeyed by the soul only when evil, iii, 1.10 (3-98). - - Fate of the divisible human soul, iii. 4.6 (15-241). - - Fate of three men in us, is brutalization or divinization. vi. 7.6 - (38-708). - - Fate, possible theories about it, iii. 1.1 (3-86). - - Fate spindle, significance of, ii. 3.9 (52-1171). - - Fate, the Heraclitian principle, iii. 1.2 (3-88). - - Father, v. 1.8 (10-186); v. 5.3 (32-580). - - Father, dwells in heaven, i. 6.8 (1-53). - - Father of intelligence, name of first, v. 8.1 (31-551). - - Fatherland, heaven, i. 6.8 (1-53). - - Faults are reason's failure to dominate matter, v. 9.10 (5-113). - - Faults come not from intelligence, but from the generation process, - v. 9.10 (5-113). - - Faults in the details cannot change harmony in universe, ii. 3.16 - (52-1185). - - Faults of the definition, that eternity is at rest while time is in - motion, iii. 7.1 (45-987). - - Faults of the soul, two possible, motive and deeds, iv. 8.5 (6-128). - - Fear of death, overcoming of, is courage, i. 6.6 (1-49). - - Feast, divinities seated at, meaning, iii. 5.10 (50-1139). - - Feeler, the soul implied by sensation i. 1.6 (53-1198). - - Feeler, who is the, v. 1.1 (53-1191). - - Feeling is perception by use of body, iv. 4.23 (28-475). - - Feelings, modes of passions, i. 1.1 (53-1191). - - Fidelity, kinship to one's own nature, iii. 3.1 (48-1077). - - Field of truth, intelligence evolves over, vi. 7.13 (38-723). - - Figurative expressions, reasoning and foresight are only, vi. 7.1 - (37-699). - - Figure, spherical and intelligible is the primitive one, vi. 6.17 - (34-675). - - Figures have characteristic effects, iv. 4.35 (28-498). - - Figures pre-exist in the intelligible, vi. 6.17 (34-675). - - Fire and air, action of, not needed by heaven, ii. 1.8 (40-826). - - Fire and earth contained in the stars, ii. 1.6 (40-821). - - Fire, and light celestial, nature, ii. 1.7 (40-825). - - Fire contained in intelligible world, vi. 7.11 (38-719). - - Fire image of, latent and radiant, v. 1.3 (10-177). - - Fire, though an apparent exception, conforms to this, ii. 1.3 - (40-817). - - First and other goods, 1.7 (54-1208). - - First does not contain any thing to be known, v. 6.6 (24-339). - - First does not know itself, being supra-cogitative, v. 6.6 (24-339). - - First, existence of, necessary, v. 4.1 (7-134). - - First impossible to go beyond it, vi. 8.11 (39-791). - - First must be one exclusively, making the one supra-thinking, v. 6.3 - (24-340). - - First principle has no need of seeing itself, v. 3.10 (49-1106). - - First principle has no principle, vi. 7.37 (38-762). - - First principle has no thought, the first actualization of a - hypostasis, vi. 7.40 (38-766). - - First principle is above thought, v. 6.26 (24-338). - - First principle may not even be said to exist, is super-existence, - vi. 7.38 (38-763). - - Fit itself, the soul must to its part in the skein, iii. 2.17 - (47-1072). - - Fit yourself and understand the world, instead of complaining of it, - ii. 9.13 (33-625). - - Five physical categories of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 (44-937). - - Five Plotinic categories, why none more can be added, vi. 2.9 - (43-907). - - Fleeing from intelligence, rather than intelligence from soul, v. - 5.10 (32-591). - - Flight from evil, not by locality but virtue, i. 8.7 (51-1152). - - Flight from here below, i. 2.6 (51-1150); ii. 3.9 (52-1175); i. 6.8 - (1-52); iv. 8.5 (6-128). - - Flight from here below, if prompt, leaves soul unharmed, iv. 8.5 - (6-128). - - Flight from world is assimilation to divinity, i. 2.5 (19-263). - - Flight is simplification or detachment of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170). - - Fluctuation need not interfere with continuance, ii. 1.3 (40-816). - - Flux, heaven though in, perpetuates itself by form, ii. 1.1 (40-813). - - Flux of all beauties here below, vi. 7.31 (38-751). - - Followers of the king are universal stars, ii. 3.13 (52-1179). - - Foreign accretion is ugliness, i. 6.5 (1-48). - - Foreign sources, derived from modification, i. 1.9 (53-1202). - - Foreknowledge of physician like plans of Providence, iii. 3.5 - (48-1085). - - Foresight and reasoning are only figurative expressions, vi. 7.1 - (38-699). - - Foresight by God of misfortunes, not cause of senses in man, vi. 7.1 - (38-697). - - Foresight, eyes implanted in man by it, vi. 7.1 (38-697). - - Foresight of creation, not result of reason, vi. 7.1 (38-698). - - Form and light, two methods of sight, v. 5.7 (32-586). - - Form and matter in all things, iv. 7.1 (2-56). - - Form and matter intermediary between, is sense-object, iii. 6.17 - (26-381). - - Form as model, for producing principle, v. 8.7 (31-562). - - Form being unchangeable, so is matter, iii. 6.10 (26-368). - - Form difference of matter, due to that of their intelligible sources, - vi. 3.8 (44-946). - - Form, disappearance of, implies that of size, ii. 8.2 (35-682). - - Form exterior is the overshadowed, inactive parts of the soul, iii. - 4.2 (15-235). - - Form improves matter, vi. 7.28 (38-745). - - Form in itself, none in the good, vi. 7.28 (38-746). - - Form is not quality but a reason, ii. 6.2 (17-248). - - Form is second physical category of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 (44-937). - - Form is the dream of the good, vi. 7.28 (38-745). - - Form of a thing is its good, vi. 7.27 (38-744). - - Form of a thing is its whyness, vi. 7.2 (38-702). - - Form of forms, vi. 7.17 (38-731). - - Form of good borne by life, intelligence and idea, vi. 7.2 (38-732). - - Form of good may exist at varying degrees, vi. 7.2 (38-732). - - Form of the body is the soul, iv. 7.1, 2 (2-57). - - Form of unity, is principle of numbers, v. 5.5 (32-583). - - Form of universe, as soul is, would be matter, if a primary - principle, iii. 6.18 (26-382). - - Form only in the sense-world, proceeds from intelligence, v. 9.10 - (5-113). - - Form substantial, the soul must be as she is not simple matter, iv. - 7.4 (2-61). - - Former lives cause present character, iii. 3.4 (48-1083). - - Formless shape is absolute beauty, vi. 7.33 (38-754). - - Formlessness in itself and infinite is evil, i. 8.3 (51-1145). - - Formlessness of one, v. 5.6 (32-584). - - Formlessness of the Supreme shown by approaching soul's rejection of - form, vi. 7.34 (38-756). - - Forms of governments, various, soul resembles, iv. 4.17 (28-464). - - Forms rational sense and vegetative, iii. 4.2 (15-234). - - Forms, though last degree of existence, are faint images, v. 3.7 - (49-1102). - - Fortune, changes of, affect only the outer man, iii. 2.15 (47-1067). - - Freedom, for the soul, lies in following reason, iii. 1.9 (3-97). - - Freedom of will, and virtue, are independent of actions, vi. 8.5 - (39-775). - - Freedom of will, on which psychological faculty is it based? vi. 8.2 - (39-775). - - Friends of Plotinos, formerly gnostic, ii. 9.10 (33-620). - - Functions, if not localized, soul will not seem within us, iv. 3.20 - (27-419). - - Functions, none in the first principle, vi. 7.37 (38-762). - - Fund of memory, partitioned between both souls, iv. 3.31 (27-439). - - Fusion forms body and soul, iv. 4.18 (28-465). - - Fusion with the divinity, result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569). - - Future determined, according to prediction, iii. 1.3 (3-90). - - Future necessary to begotten things not to the intelligible, iii. 7.3 - (45-990). - - - Gad-fly, love is, iii. 5.7 (50-1134). - - Galli, iii. 6.19 (26-385). - - Garden of Jupiter is the reason that begets everything, iii. 5.9 - (50-1137). - - Garden of Jupiter, meaning of, iii. 5.10 (50-1138). - - Genera and individuals are distinct, as being actualizations, vi. 2.2 - (43-894). - - Genera exist both in subordinate objects, and in themselves, vi. 2.12 - (43-915). - - Genera, first two, are being and movement, vi. 2.7 (43-902). - - Genera of essence decided about by "one and many" puzzle, vi. 2.4 - (43-898). - - Genera of the physical are different from those of the intelligible, - vi. 3.1 (44-933). - - Genera, Plotinic five, are primary because nothing can be affirmed of - them, vi. 2.9 (43-906). - - General, simile of Providence, iii. 3.2 (48-1078). - - Generation, common element with growth and increase, vi. 3.22 - (44-975). - - Generation eternal, iv. 8.4 (6-127); vi. 7.3 (38-703); vi. 8.20 - (39-809). - - Generation falling into, causes trouble, iii. 4.6 (15-241). - - Generation in the sense-world, is what being is in the intelligible, - vi. 3.2 (44-935). - - Generation is like lighting fire from refraction, iii. 6.14 (26-376). - - Generation is radiation of an image, v. 1.6 (10-182). - - Generation of everything is regulated by a number, vi. 6.15 (34-670). - - Generation of matter, consequences of anterior principles, iv. 4.16 - (28-461). - - Generation of the ungenerated, iii. 5.10 (50-1138). - - Generation, from the good, is intelligence, v. 1.8 (10-186). - - Generation's eternal residence is matter, iii. 6.13 (26-373). - - Generatively, all things contained by intelligence, v. 9.6 (5-109). - - Gentleness, sign of naturalness as of health and unconsciousness of - ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Genus, another, is stability, vi. 2.7 (43-903). - - Genus divides in certain animals, iv. 7.5 (2-63). - - Genus, there is more than one, vi. 2.2 (43-895) - - Geometry, an intelligible art, v. 9.11 (5-115). - - Geometry studies quantities, not qualities, vi. 3.15 (44-958). - - Giving without loss (a Numenian idea), vi. 9.9 (9-165). - - Gluttonous people who gorge themselves at the ceremonies and leave - without mysteries, v. 5.1 (32-592). - - Gnostic planning of the world by God, refuted, v. 8.7, 12 (31-561, - 572). - - God cannot be responsible for our ills, iv. 4.39 (28-503). - - God not remembered by world-soul continuing to be seen, iv. 4.7 - (28-449). - - God's planning of the world (gnosticism) refuted, v. 8.7 (31-561). - - God relation with individual and soul, i. 1.8 (53-1200). - - Golden face of Justice, i. 6.4 (1-45). - - Good absolute, permanence chief characteristic, i. 7.1 (54-1209). - - Good, all things depend on by unity, essence and quality, i. 7.1 - (54-1209). - - Good and beauty identical, i. 6.6 (1-50). - - Good and one, vi. 9 (9-147). - - Good as consisting in intelligence, i. 4.3 (46-1024). - - Good, as everything tends toward it, it tends toward the one, vi. - 2.12 (43-914). - - Good, as supra-cogitative, is also supra-active, v. 6.6 (24-340). - - Good as supreme, neither needs nor possesses intellection, iii. 8.10 - (30-548). - - Good cannot be a desire of the soul, vi. 7.19 (38-734). - - Good cannot be pleasure, which is changeable and restless, vi. 7.27 - (38-754). - - Good consists in illumination by the Supreme, vi. 7.22 (38-737). - - Good contains no thought, vi. 7.40 (38-766). - - Good does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-922). - - Good, even if it thought, there would be need of something superior, - vi. 7.40 (38-767). - - Good, form of, borne by life, intelligence and idea, vi. 7.18 - (38-731). - - Good for the individual is illumination, vi. 7.24 (38-740). - - Good has no need of beauty, while beauty has of the good, v. 5.12 - (32-594). - - Good, if it is a genus, must be one of the posterior ones, vi. 2.17 - (43-921). - - Good, implied by scorn of life, vi. 7.29 (38-748). - - Good implies evil because matter is necessary to the world, i. 8.7 - (51-1152). - - Good, in what does it consist, iv. 1. - - Good, inseparable from evil, iii. 3.7 (48-1088). - - Good, intelligence and soul, are like light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 - (24-337). - - Good is a nature that possesses no kind of form in itself, vi. 7.28 - (38-746). - - Good is a simple perception of itself; a touch, vi. 7.39 (38-764). - - Good is creator and preserver, vi. 7.23 (38-740). - - Good is free, but not merely by chance, vi. 8.7 (39-783). - - Good is not for itself, but for the natures below it, vi. 7.41 - (38-769). - - Good is intelligence and primary life, vi. 7.21 (38-737). - - Good, is it a common label or a common quality? vi. 7.18 (38-733). - - Good is not only cause, but intuition of being, vi. 7.16 (38-728). - - Good is such, just because it has no attributes worthy of it, v. 5.13 - (32-595). - - Good is superior to all its possessions, as result of its being - supreme, v. 5.12 (32-595). - - Good is superior to beautiful and is cognized by mind, v. 5.12 - (32-594). - - Good is super-thinking, v. 6.5 (24-338). - - Good is super-thought, iii. 9.9 (13-225). - - Good is supreme, because of its supremacy, vi. 7.23 (38-739). - - Good is desirable in itself, vi. 8.8 (39-783). - - Good is the whole, though containing evil parts, iii. 2.17 (47-1070). - - Good is lower form of evil, iii. 2.7 (47-1053). - - Good leaves the soul serene, beauty troubles it, v. 5.12 (32-594). - - Good may accompany the pleasure, but it is independent of it, vi. - 7.27 (38-745). - - Good may neglect natural laws that carry revolts, iii, 2.9 (47-1057). - - Good, multitude of ideas of, vi. 7 (38-697). - - Good must be superior to intelligence and life, v. 3.16 (49-1117). - - Good not to be explained by Aristotelian intelligence, vi. 7.20 - (38-736). - - Good not to be explained by Pythagorean oppositions, vi. 7.20 - (38-735). - - Good not to be explained by Stoic characteristic virtue, vi. 7.20 - (38-736). - - Good of a thing is its intimacy with itself, vi. 7.27 (38-744). - - Good only antagonistic and figurative of evil, i. 8.6 (51-1150). - - Good, Platonic discussed, vi. 7.25 (38-741). - - Good related to intelligence and soul as light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 - (24-337). - - Good, self-sufficient, does not need self consciousness, vi. 7.38 - (38-763). - - Good, slavery of, accuses Providence, iii. 2.6 (47-1052). - - Good, study, vi. 7.15 sqq., (38-726). - - Good superior to beauty, i. 6.9 (1-55). - - Good supreme, Aristotelian, vi. 7.25 (38-742). - - Good the first and other goods, i. 7 (54-1208). - - Good, therefore also supra-active, v. 6.5 (24-338). - - Good, true, implies counterfeit, vi. 7.26 (38-743). - - Goods, all, can be described as a form, i. 8.1 (51-1142); i. 6.2 - (1-43). - - Goods, independence from pleasure is temperate man, vi. 7.29 (38-747). - - Goods of three ranks, i. 8.2 (51-1144). - - Goods, Plato's opinion interpreted in two ways, vi. 7.30 (38-749). - - Goods, supreme as end of all other ones, i. 7.1 (54-1208). - - Gorge with food, v. 5.11 (32-592). - - Governing principle, Stoic, iii. 1.2, 4 (3-89, 91). - - Governments, soul resembles all forms of, iv. 4.17 (28-464). - - Gradations, descending of existence, iv. 3.7 (27-415). - - Grades of thought and life, iii. 8.7 (30-540). - - Grand Father supreme, v. 5.3 (32-581). - - Grasp more perfect, increases happiness, i. 5.3 (36-685). - - Gravitation, iv. 5.2 (29-517). - - Greatness of soul, nothing to do with size of body, vi. 4.5 (22-293). - - Grotto, Empedoclean simile of world, iv. 8.1 (6-120). - - Group, v. 5.4 (32-581). - - Group unites, all lower, adjusted to supreme unity, vi. 6.11 (34-660). - - Groups-of-four, or tens, Pythagorean, vi. 6.5 (34-649). - - Growth, common elements with increase and generation, vi. 3.22 - (44-975). - - Growth, localized in liver, iv. 3.23 (27-426). - - Growth power, relation of to the desire function, iv. 4.22 (28-470). - - Growth, sense and emotions, tend towards divisibility, iv. 3.19 - (27-418). - - Growth-soul derived from world-soul, not ours, iv. 9.3 (8-143). - - Guidance of Daemon does not interfere with responsibility, iii. 4.5 - (15-238). - - Guilt cause of fall of souls, (Pythagorean), iv. 8.1 (6-120). - - Guilt not incurred by soul in toleration, iii. 1.8 (3-97). - - Gymnastics, v. 9.11 (5-114). - - - Habit intellectualizing, that liberates the soul, is virtue, vi. 8.5 - (39-780). - - Habit, Stoic, ii. 4.16 (12-218); iv. 7.8 (2-73). - - Habit, Stoic, as start of evolution to soul, impossible, iv. 7.8 - (2-73). - - Habituation, ii. 5.2 (25-345). - - Habituation, active, immediate, and remote, distinction between, vi. - 1.8 (42-849), - - Habituation or substantial act is hypostasis, vi. 1.6 (42-845). - - Habituation, Stoic, must be posterior to reasons as archetypes, v. - 9.5 (5-108). - - Habituations are reasons which participate in form, vi. 1.9 (42-850). - - Hades, chastisements, i. 7.3 (54-1210). - - Hades, what it means for the career of the soul, vi. 4.16 (22-312). - - Happiness according to Aristotle, i. 4.1 (46-1019). - - Happiness as sensation, does not hinder search for higher, i. 4.2 - (1021). - - Happiness defined, i. 4.1, 3 (46-1019, 1023). - - Happiness dependent upon interior characteristics, i. 4.3 (46-1023). - - Happiness, does it increase with duration of time? 1.5 (36-684). - - Happiness has nothing to do with duration, i. 5.1, 5 (36-684, 685). - - Happiness has nothing to do with pleasure, i. 5.4 (36-685). - - Happiness in goal of each part of their natures, i. 4.5 (46-1026). - - Happiness increased would result only from more grasp, i. 5.3 - (36-685). - - Happiness is actualized wisdom, i. 4.9 (46-1033). - - Happiness is desiring nothing further, i. 4.4 (46-1026). - - Happiness is human (must be something), i. 4.4 (46-1025). - - Happiness is not the satisfaction of desire to live, i. 5.2 (36-684). - - Happiness, lack of blame on a soul that does not deserve it, iii. 2.5 - (47-1050). - - Happiness not increased by memories of the past, i. 5.9 (36-689). - - Happiness of animals, i. 4.2 (46-1020). - - Happiness of plants, i. 4.1 (46-1019). - - Happiness of sage not diminished in adversity, i. 4.4 (46-1026). - - Happiness, one should not consider oneself alone capable of achieving - it, ii. 9.10 (33-619). - - Harm, none can happen to the good, iii. 2.6 (47-1051). - - Harmony as a single universe, ii. 3.5 (52-1170). - - Harmony cannot be reproduced from badly tuned lyre, ii. 3.13 - (52-1180). - - Harmony is universe in spite of the faults in the details, ii. 3.16 - (52-1185). - - Harmony posterior to body, iv. 7.8 (2-74). - - Harmony presupposes producing soul, iv. 7.8 (2-75). - - Harmony (Pythagorean), soul is not, iv. 7.8 (2-74). - - Harmony sympathetic, earth feels and directs by it, iv. 4.26 (28-477). - - Hate of the body by Plato, supplemented by admiration of the world, - ii. 9.17 (33-633). - - Hate, virtue is a, iii. 6.2 (26-352). - - Having as Aristotelian category, vi. 1.23 (42-876). - - Having is too indefinite and various to be a category, vi. 1.23 - (42-876). - - Head, seat of reason, iv. 3.23 (27-425). - - Head, with faces all round, simile of, vi. 5.7 (23-320). - - Health is tempermanent of corporeal principles, iv. 7.8 (2-71). - - Hearing and vision, process of, iv. 5 (29-514). - - Heart, seat of anger, iv. 3.23 (27-426). - - Heaven, ii. 1 (40-813). - - Heaven, according to Heraclitus, opposed, ii. 1.2 (40-815). - - Heaven, existence of, iv. 4.45 (28-512). - - Heaven needs not the action of air or fire, ii. 1.8 (40-826). - - Heaven possesses soul and body and supports Plotinos's view, ii. 1.2 - (40-815). - - Heaven, souls first go into it in intelligible, iv. 3.17 (27-415). - - Heaven, there must inevitably be change, ii. 1.1 (40-813). - - Heaven, though influx perpetuates itself by form, ii. 1.1 (40-813). - - Heavens after death, is star harmonizing with their predominant moral - power, iii. 4.6 (15-239). - - Heavens do not remain still, ii. 1.1 (40-814). - - Heaven's immortality also due to universal soul's spontaneous motion, - ii. 1.4 (40-818). - - Heaven's immortality due to its residence, ii. 1.4 (40-817). - - Heaven's immortality proved by having no beginning, ii. 1.4 (40-819). - - Helen, iii. 3.5 (48-1085). - - Helena's beauty, whence it came, v. 8.2 (31-553). - - Hell, descent into, by souls, i. 8.13 (51-1160). - - Hell in mystery teachings, i. 6.6 (1-49). - - Hell, what it means for the career of the soul, vi. 4.16 (22-312). - - Hells, Platonic interincarnational judgment and expiation, iii. 4.6 - (15-240). - - Hell's torments are reformatory, iv. 4.45 (28-512). - - Help for sub-divine natures is thought, vi. 7.41 (38-768). - - Help from divinity, sought to solve difficulties, v. 1.6 (10-182). - - Heraclidae, vi. 1.3 (42-840). - - Hercules as double, symbolizes soul, i. 1.13 (53-1206). - - Hercules, symbol of man, in the hells, i. 1.12 (53-1206); iv. 3.27, - 31 (27-433, 440). - - Heredity a legitimate cause, iii. 1.6 (3-94). - - Heredity more important than star influence, iii. 1.6 (3-94). - - Hermaphrodite, or castrated, iii. 6.19 (26-385); v. 8.13 (31-573). - - Hermes, ithyphallic, iii. 6.19 (26-385). - - Hierarchy in universe (see concatenation), v. 4.1 (7-135). - - "Higher," or "somewhat," a particle that is prefixed to any Statement - about the Supreme, vi. 8.13 (39-797). - - Higher part of soul sees vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 - (31-569). - - Higher region, reached only by born philosophers, v. 9.2 (5-103). - - Higher stages of love, v. 9.2 (5-103). - - Higher things from them the lower proceed, i. 8.1 (51-1142). - - Highest, by it souls are united, vi 7.15 (38-726). - - Highest self of soul is memory's basis, iv. 6.3 (41-832). - - Homely virtues are the civil, Platonic four, i. 2.1 (19-257). - - "Homonyms," or "labels," see references to puns; also, vi. 1.2, 10, - 11, 23, 26; vi. 2.10; vi. 3.1, 5. - - Honesty escapes magic, iv. 4.44 (28-509). - - Honesty results from contemplation of the intelligible, iv. 4.44 - (28-509). - - Horizon of divine approach is contemplating intelligence, v. 5.8 - (32-586); v. 8.10 (31-567). - - Horoscopes do not account for simultaneous differences, iii. 1.5 - (3-93). - - Houses and aspects, absurdity of, ii. 3.4 (52-1168). - - How to detach the soul from the body naturally, 1.9 (16-243). - - Human beings add to the beauty of the world, iv. 3.14 (27-412). - - Human life contains happiness, i. 4.4 (46-1025). - - Human nature intermediate, iv. 4.45 (28-511). - - Human nature relation to animal, i. 1.7 (53-1199). - - Human organism studied to explain soul relation, iv. 3.3 (27-393). - - Human soul and world-soul differences between, ii. 9.7 (33-611). - - Hypostases that transmit knowledge (see the new title), v. 3 - (49-1090). - - Hypostasis, v. 1.4, 6 (10-180 to 184). - - Hypostasis are permanent actualizations, v. 3.12 (49-1111). - - Hypostasis as substantial act, iii. 4.1 (15-233). - - Hypostasis is a substantial act or habituation, vi. 1.6 (42-845). - - Hypostasis not in loves contrary to nature, iii. 5.7 (50-1134). - - Hypostasis of love, iii. 5.2, 3, 7 (50-1125, 1127, 1133). - - Hypostasis of ousia, v. 5.3 (32-581). - - Hypostasis the first actualization of first principle has no thought, - vi. 7.40 (38-766). - - Hypostatic existence, vi. 6.9, 12 (34-655, 661); vi. 8.10, 12 - (39-790, 793). - - Hypostatic existence of matter proved, i. 8.15 (51-1162); ii. 4 - (12-197). - - - Idea named existence and intelligence, v. 1.8 (10-186). - - Ideas and numbers, identification of, vi. 6.9 (34-656). - - Ideas, descent of, into individuals, vi. 5.6 (23-320). - - Ideas, different, for twins, brothers or work of art, v. 7.1 (18-252). - - Ideas imply form and substrate, ii. 4.4 (12-199). - - Ideas, intelligence and essence, v. 9 (5-102). - - Ideas, multitude of, of the good, vi. 7 (38-697). - - Ideas not for all earthly entities, v. 9.14 (5-117). - - Ideas of individuals, do they exist v. 7.1 (18-251). - - Ideas of individuals, two possible hypotheses, v. 7.1 (18-251). - - Ideas or reasons possessed by intellectual life, vi. 2.21 (43-927). - - Ideas participated in by matter, vi. 5.8 (23-321). - - Identification, unreflective, memory not as high, iv. 4.4 (28-445). - - Identity and difference implied by triune process of categories, vi. - 2.8 (43-905). - - Identity, category, v. 1.4 (10-180). - - Identity of thought and existence makes actualizations of - intelligence, v. 9.5 (5-107). - - Identity, substantial, inconsistent with logical distinctness, ii. - 4.14 (12-214). - - Ignorance of divinity, v. 1.1 (10-173). - - Ignorance illusory because overnatural gentleness, v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Ignores everything, does God, being above thought, vi. 7.38 (38-763). - - Illumination, creation by mere gnostic, opposed, ii. 9.11 (33-622). - - Illumination of darkness must have been eternal, ii. 9.12 (33-624). - - Illumination, the good is, for the individual, vi. 7.24 (38-740). - - Illustrations, see "Simile." - - Image, v. 5.1 (10-174); v. 8.8 (31-564). - - Image bound to model by radiation, vi. 4.10 (22-300). - - Image formed by the universal beings, is magnitude, iii. 6.17 - (26-380). - - Image in mirror, iv. 5.7 (29-528). - - Image of archetype is Jupiter, begotten by ecstasy, v. 8.12 (31-572). - - Image of intelligence is only a sample that must be purified, v. 3.3 - (31-555). - - Image of its model eternity is time, iii. 1, introd. (45-985). - - Image of one intelligence, v. 1.7 (10-184). - - Images do not reach eye by influx, iv. 5.2 (29-516). - - Images external produce passions, iii. 6.5 (26-358). - - Imagination, iv. 3.25 (27-428). - - Imagination, both kinds, implied by both kinds of memory, iv. 3.31 - (27-483). - - Imagination does not entirely preserve intellectual conceptions, iv. - 3.30 (27-437). - - Imagination is related to opinion, as matter to reason, iii. 6.15 - (26-377). - - Imagination, memory belongs to it, iv. 3.29 (27-436). - - Imagination, of the two, one always overshadows the other, iv. 3.3 - (27-438). - - Imitation of the first, v. 4.1 (7-135). - - Immaterial natures could not be affected, iii. 6.2 (26-354). - - Immanence and inclination is the Supreme, vi. 8.16 (39-801). - - Immortal, are we, all of us, or only parts? iv. 7.1 (2-56). - - Immortal as the One from whom they proceed, are souls, vi. 4.10 - (22-301). - - Immortal soul, even on Stoic hypothesis, iv. 7.10 (2-80). - - Immortality does not extend to sublunar sphere, ii. 1.5. - - Immortality in souls of animals and plants, iv. 7.14 (2-84). - - Immortality of heaven also due to universal soul's spontaneous - motion, ii. 1.4 (40-818). - - Immortality of heaven due to its residence there, ii. 1.4 (40-817). - - Immortality of heaven proved by having no beginning, ii. 1.4 (40-819). - - Immortality of soul, iv. 7 (2-56). - - Immortality of soul proved historically, iv. 7.15 (2-85). - - Immovability of Intelligence necessary to make it act as horizon, v. - 5.7 (32-586). - - Impassible, and punishable, soul is both, i. 1.12 (53-1204). - - Impassible are world soul and stars, iv. 4.42 (28-506). - - Impassible as the soul is, everything contrary is figurative, iii. - 6.1 (26-351). - - Impassible, how can the soul remain, though given up to emotion, iii. - 6.1 (26-351). - - Impassibility of incorporeal entities, iii. 6.1 (26-351). - - Impassibility of matter depends on different senses of participation, - iii. 6.9 (26-366). - - Impassibility of the soul, iii. 6.1 (26-350). - - Imperfection, cause of distance from the Supreme, iii. 3.3 (48-1080). - - Imperfections are only lower forms of perfections, vi. 7.10 (38-716). - - Imperfections of world should not be blamed on it, iii. 2.3 (47-1046). - - Imperishable is world, so long as archetype subsists, v. 8.12 - (31-572). - - Imperishable, no way the soul could perish, iv. 7.12 (2-82). - - Imperishable soul, even by infinite division, iv. 7.12 (2-83). - - Importance to virtue, not, duration of time, i. 5.10 (36-689). - - Impossible to go beyond First, vi. 8.11 (39-791). - - Impression admits no cognition of intelligible objects, iv. 6.3 - (41-832). - - Impressions on seal of wax, sensations, iv. 7.6 (2-66). - - Improvement of the low, destiny to become souls, iv. 8.7 (6-131). - - Improvement of what is below her, one object of incarnation, iv. 8.5 - (6-128). - - Impure eye can see nothing, i. 6.9 (1-53). - - Inadequacy of philosophical language, vi. 8.13 (39-797). - - Inanimate entirely, nothing in universe is, iv. 4.36 (28-499). - - Incarnation, difference between human and cosmic, iv. 8.3 (6-123). - - Incarnation of soul; its object is perfection of universe, iv. 8.5 - (6-129). - - Incarnation of soul manner, iii. 9.3 (13-222). - - Incarnation of soul not cause of possessing memory, iv. 3.26 (27-431). - - Incarnation, study of, iv. 3.9 (27-403). - - Incarnation unlikely, unless souls have disposition to suffer, ii. - 3.10 (52-1177). - - Incarnations, between, hell's judgment and expiation, iii. 4.6 - (15-240). - - Incarnation's purpose is, self-development and improvement, iv. 8.5 - (6-127). - - Inclination and immanence is the Supreme, vi. 8.16 (39-801). - - Inclination of equator to ecliptic, v. 8.7 (31-563). - - Incomprehensible unity approached only by a presence, vi. 9.4 (9-154). - - Incorporeal entities alone activate body, iv. 7.8 (2-70). - - Incorporeal entities, impossibility of, iii. 6.1 (26-350). - - Incorporeal matter, ii. 4.2 (12-198). - - Incorporeal objects limited to highest thoughts, iv. 7.8 (2-78). - - Incorporeal, the soul remains, vi. 3.16 (44-962). - - Incorporeal qualities, ii. 7.2 (37-695); vi. 1.29 (42-885). - - Incorporeality of divinity, vi. 1.26 (42-880). - - Incorporeality of intelligible entities, iv. 7.8 (2-78). - - Incorporeality of matter and quantity, ii. 4.9 (12-206). - - Incorporeality of soul must be studied, iv. 7.2, 8 (2-57, 68). - - Incorporeality of soul proved by its penetrating body, iv. 7.8 (2-72). - - Incorporeality of soul proved by kinship with Divine, iv. 7.10 (2-79). - - Incorporeality of soul proved by priority of actualization, iv. 7.8 - (2-71). - - Incorporeality of virtue, not perishable, iv. 7.8 (2-69). - - Incorruptible matter exists only potentially, ii. 5.5 (25-348). - - Increase, common element, with growth and generation, vi. 3.22 - (44-975). - - Increased happiness would result only from more grasp, i. 5.3 - (36-685). - - Independent existence proved, by the use of collective nouns, vi. - 6.16 (34-672). - - Independent good from pleasure is temperate man, vi. 7.29 (38-747). - - Independent principle, the human soul, iii. 1.8 (3-97). - - Indeterminateness of soul not yet reached the good, iii. 5.7 - (50-1133). - - Indetermination of space leads to its measuring movement, iii. 7.12 - (45-1011). - - Indigence is necessarily evil, ii. 4.16 (12-218). - - Indigence of soul from connection with matter, i. 8.14 (51-1160). - - Indiscernibles, Leitnitz's doctrine of, v. 7.1 (18-254). - - Individual aggregate formed by uniting soul and body, i. 1.6 - (53-1197). - - Individual relation with cosmic intellect, i. 1.8 (53-1200). - - Individual relation with God and soul, i. 1.8 (53-1200). - - Individuality in contemplation weakens soul, iv. 8.4 (6-125). - - Individuality possessed by rational soul, iv. 8.3 (6-124). - - Individuality, to which soul does it belong? ii. 3.9 (52-1175). - - Individuals, descent of ideas into, vi. 5.6 (23-320). - - Individuals distinct as being actualizations, vi. 2.2, (43-894). - - Indivisible, v. 3.10 (49-1107). - - Indivisible and divisible is the soul, iv. 2.2 (21-279). - - Indivisible essence becomes divisible within bodies, iv. 2.1 (21-277). - - Indivisible essence, description of, iv. 2.1 (21-277). - - Indivisible is the universal being, vi. 4.3 (22-288). - - Indivisibility, v. 1.7 (10-184). - - Indumeneus, iii. 3.5 (48-1085). - - Ineffable is the Supreme, v. 3.13 (49-1112). - - Inequality of riches, no moment to an eternal being, ii. 9.9 (33-616). - - Inertia of matter aired by influx of world soul, v. 1.2 (10-175). - - Inexhaustible are stars, and need no refreshment, ii. 1.8 (40-827). - - Inferior divinities, difference from celestial, v. 8.3 (31-556). - - Inferior nature, how it can participate in the intelligible, vi. 5.11 - (23-329). - - Inferior natures are helped by souls descending to them, iv. 8.5 - (6-127). - - Inferiority of world to its model, highest criticism we may pass, v. - 8.8 (31-565). - - Influence of stars is their natural radiation of good, iv. 4.3 - (28-497). - - Influence of universe should be partial only, iv. 4.34 (28-494). - - Influx movement as, vi. 3.26 (44-980). - - Influx of world-soul, v. 1.2 (10-175). - - Infinite and formlessness in itself is evil, i. 8.3, (51-1145). - - Infinite contained by intelligence as simultaneous of one and many, - vi. 7.14 (38-725). - - Infinite explained as God entirely present everywhere, vi. 5.4 - (23-318). - - Infinite, how a number can be said to be, vi. 6.16 (34-673). - - Infinite, how it arrived to existence, vi. 6.2, 3 (34-644, 645). - - Infinite is conceived by the thoughts making abstraction of the firm, - vi. 6.3 (34-646). - - Infinite is soul, as comprising many souls, vi. 4.4 (22-291). - - Infinite may be ideal or real, ii. 4.15 (12-217). - - Infinite, what is its number, vi. 6.2 (34-644). - - Infinity, how it can subsist in the intelligible world, vi. 6.2 - (34-645). - - Infinity of number, due to impossibility of increasing the greatest, - vs. 6.18 (34-676). - - Infinity of parts of the Supreme, v. 8.9 (31-566). - - Infra-celestial vault of Theodore of Asine ("invisible place") v. - 8.10 (31-567); ii. 4.1 (12-198). - - Inhering in Supreme, is root of power of divinities, v. 8.9 (31-566). - - Initiative should not be overshadowed by Providence, iii. 2.9 - (47-1057). - - Insanity even, does not justify suicide, i. 9 (16). - - Inseparable from their beings are potentialities, vi. 4.9 (22-298). - - Instances of correspondence of sense beauty with its idea, i. 6.3 - (1-44). - - Instrument of soul is body, iv. 7.1 (2-56). - - Intellect, cosmic relation with individual, i. 1.8 (53-1200). - - Intellect did not grasp object itself, i. 1.9 (53-1201). - - Intellection neither needed nor possessed by good, iii. 8.11 (30-549). - - Intellection would be movement or actualization on Aristotelian - principles, vi. 1.18 (42-867). - - Intellectual differences between world-soul and star-soul, iv. 4.17 - (28-463). - - Intellectualized, and ennobled is soul, scorning even thought, vi. - 7.35 (38-757). - - Intellectualizing habit that liberates the soul is virtue, vi. 8.5 - (39-780). - - Intellectual life possesses the reasons or ideas, vi. 2.21 (43-927). - - Intelligence, always double as thinking subject and object thought, - v. 3.5, 6 (49-1096); v. 4.2 (7-136); v. 6.1 (24-334). - - Intelligence and life mus be transcended by good, v. 3.16 (49-1117). - - Intelligence and life only different degrees of the same reality, vi. - 7.18 (38-732). - - Intelligence and soul contained in intelligible world, besides ideas, - v. 9.13 (5-116). - - Intelligence as a composite, is posterior to the categories, vi. 2.19 - (43-924). - - Intelligence as demiurgic creator, v. 1.8 (10-186). - - Intelligence as matter of intelligible entities, v. 4.2 (7-136). - - Intelligence as vision of one, v. 1.7 (10-185). - - Intelligence assisting Supreme, has no room for chance, vi. 8.17 - (39-804). - - Intelligence begets world-souls and individual souls, vi. 2.22 - (43-929). - - Intelligence cannot be first, v. 4.1 (7-135). - - Intelligence category, v. 1.4 (10-180). - - Intelligence conceived of by stripping the soul of every - non-intellectual part, v. 3.9 (49-1104). - - Intelligence consists of intelligence and love, vi. 7.35 (38-758). - - Intelligence contains all beings, generatively, v. 9.6 (5-109). - - Intelligence contains all intelligible entities, by its very notion, - v. 5.2 (32-578). - - Intelligence contains all things conformed to the good, vi. 7.16 - (38-727). - - Intelligence contains the infinite as friendship, vi. 7.14 (38-725). - - Intelligence contains the infinite as simultaneous of one and many, - vi. 7.14 (38-725). - - Intelligence contains the universal archetype, v. 9.9 (5-112). - - Intelligence contains the whyness of its forms, vi. 7.2 (38-732). - - Intelligence contemplating, is horizon of divine approach, v. 5.7 - (32-586). - - Intelligence could not have been the last degree of existence, ii. - 9.8 (33-614). - - Intelligence destroyed by theory that truth is external to it, v. 5.1 - (32-576). - - Intelligence develops manifoldness just like soul, iv. 3.5 (27-396). - - Intelligence did not deliberate before making sense-man, vi. 7.1 - (38-698). - - Intelligence differentiated into universal and individual, vi. 7.17 - (38-729). - - Intelligence, divine nature of, i. 8.2 (51-1143). - - Intelligence does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-921). - - Intelligence dwelt in by pure incorporeal souls, iv. 3.24 (27-427). - - Intelligence evolves over the field of truth, vi. 7.13 (38-723). - - Intelligence, good and soul related by light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 - (24-337). - - Intelligence has conversion to good and being in itself, vi. 8.4 - (39-778). - - Intelligence, how it makes the world subsist, iii. 2.1 (47-1043). - - Intelligence, how though one, produces particular things, vi. 2.21 - (43-926). - - Intelligence, ideas and essence, v. 9 (5-102). - - Intelligence identical with thought, as far as existence, v. 3.5 - (49-1096). - - Intelligence, image of one, v. 1.7 (10-185). - - Intelligence implies aspiration, as thought is aspiration to the - good, iii. 8.11 (30-548). - - Intelligence implies good, as thought is aspiration thereto, v. 6.5 - (24-338). - - Intelligence in actualization, because its thought is identical with - its essence, v. 9.5 (5-107). - - Intelligence in relation to good. i. 4.3 (46-1024). - - Intelligence is all, vi. 7.17 (38-729). - - Intelligence is goal of purification, i. 2.5 (19-263). - - Intelligence is matter of intelligible entities, v. 4.2 (7-136). - - Intelligence is the potentiality of the intelligences which are its - actualizations, vi. 2.20 (43-925). - - Intelligence itself is the substrate of the intelligible world, ii. - 4.4 (12-199). - - Intelligence, life of, is ever contemporaneous, iii. 7.2 (45-989). - - Intelligence, like circle, is inseparably one and many, iii. 8.8 - (30-543). - - Intelligence may be denied liberty, if granted super-liberty, vi. 8.6 - (39-782). - - Intelligence, multiplicity of, implies their mutual differences, vi. - 7.17 (38-730). - - Intelligence must remain immovable to act as horizon, v. 5.7 (32-586). - - Intelligence not a unity, but its manifold produced by a unity, iv. - 4.1 (28-443). - - Intelligence not constituted by things in it, v. 2.2 (11-196). - - Intelligence not ours, but we, i. 1.13 (53-1206). - - Intelligence passes from unity to duality by thinking, v. 6.1 - (24-333). - - Intelligence potential and actualized in the soul, vi. 6.15 (34-669). - - Intelligence primary knows itself, v. 3.6 (49-1099). - - Intelligence proof of its existence and nature, v. 9.3 (5-104). - - Intelligence ranks all else, v. 4.2 (7-136). - - Intelligence relation to intelligible, iii. 9.1 (13-220). - - Intelligence's existence proved by identity of its thought and - essence, v. 9.3 (5-104). - - Intelligence shines down from the peak formed by united souls, vi. - 7.15 (38-726). - - Intelligence supreme, is king of kings, v. 5.3 (32-579). - - Intelligence's working demands a supra-thinking principle, v. 6.2 - (24-334). - - Intelligence that aspires to form of good is not the supreme, iii. - 8.11 (30-548). - - Intelligence thinks things, because it possesses them, vi. 6.7 - (34-653). - - Intelligence unites, as it rises to the intelligible, iv. 4.1 - (28-442). - - Intelligence, which is free by itself, endows soul with liberty, vi. - 8.7 (39-983). - - Intelligence world, in it each being is accompanied by its whyness, - vi. 7.2 (38-702). - - Intelligent life beneath being, iii. 6.6 (26-361). - - Intelligent animals are distinct from the creating image of them, vi. - 7.8 (38-712). - - Intelligible animals are pre-existing, vi. 7.8 (38-712). - - Intelligible animals do not incline towards the sense-world, vi. 7.8 - (38-712). - - Intelligible beauty, v. 8 (31-551). - - Intelligible believed in by those rising to the soul, vi. 9.5 (9-156). - - Intelligible contains the earth, vi. 7.11 (38-718). - - Intelligible does not descend; sense-world rises, iii. 4.4 (15-237). - - Intelligible entities are not outside of the good, v. 5 (32-575). - - Intelligible entities are veritable numbers, vi. 6.14 (34-668). - - Intelligible entities contained by very motion of intelligence, v. - 5.2 (32-578). - - Intelligible entities do not exist apart from their matter, - intelligence, v. 4.2 (7-138). - - Intelligible entities eternal and immutable, not corporeal, iv. 7.8 - (2-69). - - Intelligible entities, gnostics think they can be bewitched, ii. 9.14 - (33-627). - - Intelligible entities higher and lower, first and second, v. 4.2 - (7-135). - - Intelligible entities must be both, identical with and different from - intelligence, v. 3.10 (49-1108). - - Intelligible entities not merely images, but potentialities for - memory, iv. 4.4 (28-446). - - Intelligible entities presence implied by knowledge of them, v. 5.1 - (32-575). - - Intelligible entities return not by memory, but by further vision, - iv. 4.5 (28-447). - - Intelligible entity what, and how it is it, vi. 6.8 (34-654). - - Intelligible essence, both in and out of itself, vi. 5.3 (23-316). - - Intelligible essence formed by adding eternity to essence, vi. 2.1 - (43-892). - - Intelligible eternity in not an accident of, but an intimate part of - its nature, iii. 7.3 (45-989). - - Intelligible has eternity as world-soul is to time, iii. 7.10 - (45-1007). - - Intelligible, how participated in by inferior nature, vi. 5.11 - (23-329). - - Intelligible in it, cause coincides with nature, vi. 7.19 (38-735). - - Intelligible in it, stability does not imply stillness, vi. 3.27 - (44-982). - - Intelligible line exists in the intelligible, vi. 6.17 (34-674). - - Intelligible line posterior to number, vi. 6.17 (34-674). - - Intelligible man, scrutiny of, demanded by philosophy, vi. 7.4 - (38-705). - - Intelligible matter, ii. 4.1 2 (12-197, 198); iii., 8.11 (30-548). - - Intelligible matter composite of form and matter, ii. 4.4 (12-200). - - Intelligible matter is not potential, ii, 5.3 (25-345). - - Intelligible matter is not shapeless, ii. 4.3 (12-198). - - Intelligible matter is shaped real being, ii. 4.5 (12-201). - - Intelligible matter, why it must be accepted, iii. 5.6 (50-1132). - - Intelligible number infinite because unmeasured, vi. 6.18 (34-676). - - Intelligible numbers, vi. 6.6 (34-651). - - Intelligible parts of men unite in the intelligible, vi. 5.10 - (23-327). - - Intelligible Pythagorean numbers discussed, vi. 6.5 (34-649). - - Intelligible relation to intelligence, iii. 9.1 (13-220). - - Intelligible remains unmoved, yet penetrates the world, vi. 5.11 - (23-328). - - Intelligible, shared by highest parts of all men, vi. 7.15 (38-726). - - Intelligible, spherical figure the primitive one, vi. 6.17 (34-675). - - Intelligible terms, only verbal similarity to physical, vi. 3.5 - (44-941). - - Intelligible, to them is limited difference in effects, vi. 3.17 - (44-964). - - Intelligible unity and decad exist before all numbers, vi. 6.5 - (34-650). - - Intelligible, what is being in it is generation in the sense-world, - vi. 3.2 (44-935). - - Intelligible world and sense-world, connection between man's triple - nature, vi. 7.7 (38-711). - - Intelligible world archetype of ours, v. 1.4 (10-178). - - Intelligible world contains air, vi. 7.11 (38-720). - - Intelligible world contains beside ideas, soul and intelligence, v. - 9.13 (5-116). - - Intelligible world contains earth, vi. 7.11 (38-718). - - Intelligible world contains fire, vi. 7.11 (38-719). - - Intelligible world contains water, vi. 7.11 (38-720). - - Intelligible world, could it contain vegetables or metals, vi. 7.11 - (38-717). - - Intelligible world is model of this universe, vi. 7.12 (38-720). - - Intelligible world, description of, v. 8.4 (31-557). - - Intelligible world has more unity than sense-world, vi. 5.10 (23-327). - - Intelligible world, how infinity can subsist in, vi. 6.3 (34-645). - - Intelligible world, in it everything is actual, ii. 5.3 (25-346). - - Intelligible world is complete model of this universe, vi. 7.12 - (38-720). - - Intelligible world, man relation to, vi. 4.14 (22-308). - - Intelligible world, stars influence is from contemplation of, iv. - 4.35 (28-496). - - Intelligible world, we must descend from it to study time, iii. 7.6 - (45-995). - - Interior characteristics necessary to happiness, i. 4.3 (46-1023). - - Interior life, rather than exterior, is field of liberty, vi. 8.6 - (39-781). - - Interior man, v. 1.10 (10-189). - - Interior model, cause of appreciation of interior beauty, i. 6.2 - (1-45). - - Interior vision, how trained, i. 6.9 (1-53). - - Intermediary between form and matter, are sense-objects, iii. 6.17 - (26-381). - - Intermediary body not necessary for vision, iv. 5.1 (29-514, 515). - - Intermediary elemental soul, also inadmissible, ii. 9.5 (33-607). - - Intermediary of reason is the world-soul, iv. 3.11 (27-407). - - Intermediary position of Saturn, between Uranus and Jupiter, v. 8.13 - (31-573). - - Intermediary sensation, demanded by conceptive thoughts, iv. 4.23 - (28-472). - - Intermediate is human nature, suffering with whole, but acting on it, - iv. 4.45 (28-511). - - Intermediate is the soul's nature, iv. 8.7 (6-130). - - Intermediate sense shape on which depends sensation, iv. 4.23 - (28-473). - - Internal and external evil, relation between, i. 8.5 (51-1149). - - Internecine war is objection to Providence, iii. 2.15 (47-1065). - - Internecine warfare necessary, iii. 2.15 (47-1065). - - Interpenetration of everything in intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-557). - - Interpreter of reason is the world-soul, iv. 3.11 (27-407). - - Interrelation of supreme and subordinate divinities dynamic (birth) - or mere relation of parts and whole dynamic? v. 8.9 (31-566). - - Intimacy of itself is the good of a thing, vi. 7.27 (38-744). - - Intuition, omniscient, supersedes memory and reasonings, iv. 4.12 - (28-457). - - Intuitionally, the soul can reason, iv. 3.18 (27-417). - - Intuition's act is true conception, i. 1.9 (53-1202). - - Involuntariness to blame spontaneity, iii. 2.10 (47-1060). - - Irascible part of earth, iv. 4.28 (28-481). - - Irrational claims of astrologers, iii. 1.6 (3-95). - - Isolated, pure soul would remain, iv. 4.23 (28-473). - - - James-Lange theory of emotions refuted, i. 1.5 (53-1196). - - James-Lange theory taught, iv. 4.28 (28-480, 481). - - Jar, residence or location of generation is matter, ii. 4.1 (12-197); - iii. 6.14 (26-376); iv. 3.20 (27-420). - - Jealousy does not exist in divine nature, iv. 8.6 (6-129). - - Judgment and soul, passibility of, iii. 6.1 (26-350). - - Judgment, mental, reduces multitude to unity, vi. 6.13 (34-664). - - Judgment of one part by another, truth of astrology, ii. 3.7 (52-1172). - - Judgment of soul and other things in purest condition only, iv. 7.10 - (2-80). - - Judgment of soul condemns her to reincarnation, iv. 8.5 (6-128). - - Judgment, time of, between incarnations, iii. 4.6 (15-240). - - Jupiter, v. 1.7 (10-185); v. 8.1 (31-552); v. 8.10 (31-568); iii. 5.2 - (50-1126); v. 5.3 (32-580); v. 8.4 (31-558); iv. 3.12 (27-409); vi. - 9.7 (9-162). - - Jupiter, as demiurge, as world-soul, and as governor, iv. 4.10 - (28-454). - - Jupiter life's infinity destroys memory, iv. 4.9 (28-453). - - Jupiter the greatest chief, or third God, is the soul, iii. 5.8 - (50-1136). - - Jupiter, two-fold, celestial and earthly, iii. 5.2 (50-1126). - - Jupiter, Venus and Mercury, also considered astrologically, ii. 3.5 - (52-1170). - - Jupiter's administration above memory, iv. 4.9 (28-453). - - Jupiter's garden is the reason begets everything, iii. 5.9 (50-1137). - - Jupiter, two-fold, celestial and earthly, iii. 5.2 (50-1126). - - Justice, v. 1.11 (10-190); v. 8.4, 10 (31-557, 567); i. 6.4 (1-61). - - Justice, absolute, is indivisible, i. 2.6 (19-265). - - Justice does not possess extension, iv. 7.8 (2-69). - - Justice extends into past and future, iii. 2.13 (47-1062). - - Justice, golden face of, vi. 6.6 (34-652); i, 6.4 (1-61). - - Justice incarnate, is individual, i. 2.6 (19-265). - - Justice is no true category, vi. 2.18 (41-923). - - Justice, like intellectual statue, was born of itself, vi. 6.6 - (34-652). - - Justice not destroyed by superficiality of punishments, iii. 2.15 - (47-1066). - - Justice of God vindicated by philosophy, iv. 4.30, 37 (28-486, 500). - - Justice seated beside Jupiter, v. 8.4 (31-558). - - Juxtaposition, ii. 7.1 (37-691); iv. 7.3 (2-59). - - - Kinds of men, three, v. 9.1 (5-102). - - King of kings, v. 5.3 (32-579). - - Kings, men are, v. 3.4 (49-1094). - - King, universal, stars followers of, ii. 3.13 (52-1179). - - Kinship divine, recognition of, depends on self-knowledge, vi. 9.7 - (9-161). - - Kinship of human soul with divine, v. 1.1 (10-173). - - Kinship to world-soul shown by fidelity to one's own nature, iii. 3.1 - (48-1077). - - Kinship with beautiful world scorned by gnostics, ii. 9.18 (33-635). - - Kinship with depraved men accepted, ii. 9.18 (33-636). - - Know thyself, iv. 3.1 (27-387); vi. 7.41 (38-769). - - Knowledge of better things, cleared up by purification, iv. 7.10 - (2-80). - - Knowledge of good attained experience of evil, iv. 8.7 (6-131). - - Knowledge of intelligible entities implies their presence, v. 5.1 - (32-575). - - Knowledge, true, shown not by unification, not revelation of divine - power, ii. 9.9 (33-617). - - Kronos, of Uranus, iii. 5.2 (50-1126). - - - Label, is good, a common quality or a common label, vi. 7.18 (38-733). - - Lachesis, ii. 3.15 (52-1182). - - Land marks on path to ecstasy, i. 6.9 (1-54). - - Last degree of existence could not have been existence, ii. 9.8 - (33-614). - - Last stage of soul-elevation, is vision of intelligible wisdom, v. - 8.10 (31-567). - - Law, natural directs soul. ii. 3.8 (52-1173). - - Law of the order of the universe, why souls succumb to it, iv. 3.15 - (27-413). - - Laws, natural, which carry rewards, may be neglected by good, iii. - 2.8 (47-1055). - - Leakage (flow of or escape), ii. 1.6, 8 (40-822); v. 1.6 (10-182); - vi. 5.10 (23-327); v. 1.6 (10-182). - - Leakage, none in radiation of soul (see wastage), vi. 4.5, 10 - (22-293, 301); vi. 5.3 (23-317). - - Leakage, none with celestial light, ii. 1.8 (40-784). - - Leave not world, but be not of it, i. 8.6 (51-1150). - - Leibnitz, theory of indiscernibles, v. 7.2 (18-254). - - Legislator, intelligence, v. 9.5 (5-108). - - Leisure in life of celestial Gods, v. 8.3 (31-556). - - Lethe, iv. 3.26 (27-432). - - Letters in which to read nature, iii. 3.6 (48-1087). - - Letters in which to read nature, are stars, ii. 3.7 (52-1172); iii. - 1.6 (3-95). - - Liberation of soul effected by virtue as intellectualizing habit, vi. - 8.5 (39-779). - - Liberty, vi. 8 (39-773). - - Liberty depends on intelligence, vi. 8.3 (39-777). - - Liberty, does it belong to God only, or to all others also? vi. 8.1 - (39-773). - - Liberty lies in following reason, iii. 1.9, 10 (3-97, 98). - - Liberty may be denied to intelligence, if granted super-liberty, vi. - 8.6 (39-781). - - Liberty must be for men, if it is for the divinities, vi. 8.1 - (39-782). - - Liberty not for the depraved who follow images, vi. 8.3 (39-777). - - Liberty refers to the interior life, rather than to the exterior, vi. - 8.6 (39-781). - - Liberty would be destroyed by astrology. iii. 1.7 (3-96). - - Life and intelligence could not inhere in molecules, iv. 7.2 (2-58). - - Life and thought, different grades of, iii 8.7 (30-540). - - Life changed from an evil to a by virtue, i. 7.1 (54-1208). - - Life, drama of, roles played badly by evil, iii. 2.17 (47-1071). - - Life interpenetrates all, and knows no limits, vi. 5.12 (23-330). - - Life is actualization of intelligence, vi. 9.9 (9-165). - - Life is below good, iii. 9.9 (13-225). - - Life is perfect when intelligible, i. 4.3 (46-1024). - - Life is presence with divinity, vi. 9.9 (9-165). - - Life of intelligence is ever contemporaneous, iii. 7.2 (45-989). - - Life, thought and existence, contained in primary existence, ii. 4.6 - (12-203); v. 6.6 (24-339). - - Life's ascent, witness to, is disappearance of contingency, vi. 8.15 - (39-801). - - Light abandoned by source does not perish, but is no more there, iv. - 4.29 (28-484); iv. 5.7 (29-526). - - Light and fire celestial, nature of, ii. 1.7 (40-825). - - Light and form, two methods of sight, v. 5.7 (32-586). - - Light as actualization is incorporeal, iv. 5.7 (29-527). - - Light celestial, not exposed to any wastage, ii. 1.8 (40-826). - - Light emanates from sun, v. 3.12 (49-1112). - - Light emitted by the soul forms animal nature, i. 1.7 (53-1198). - - Light exists simultaneously within and without, vi. 4.7 (22-295). - - Light from sun exists everywhere, vi. 4.6 (22-296). - - Light in eye, v.7 (32-586); v. 6.1 (24-334); iv. 5.4 (29-500). - - Light intelligible, v. 5.8 (32-587). - - Light intelligible is not spatial, has no relation to place, v. 5.8 - (32-587). - - Light intermediary is unnecessary, being a hindrance, iv. 5.4 - (29-521). - - Light is composite of light in eye and light outside, v. 6.1 (24-334). - - Light, is it destroyed when its source is withdrawn or does it follow - it? iv. 5.7 (29-526). - - Light, objective and visual, mutual relation of, iv. 5.4 (29-520). - - Light, objective, does not transmit by relays, iv. 5.4 (29-522). - - Light, relation to air, iv. 4.5, 6 (29-524). - - Light, visual, not a medium, iv. 5.4 (29-522). - - Lighting fire, from refraction, generation illustrates, iii. 6.14 - (26-376). - - Limit lower, of divine things, the soul, v. 1.7 (10-186). - - Limit of union with divinity, desire or ability, v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Limitless is supreme, vi. 7.32 (38-753). - - Limits, none known by life, vi. 5.12 (23-330). - - Line intelligible, posterior to number, vi. 6.17 (34-674). - - Liver, location of growth, iv. 3.23 (27-426). - - Liver, seat of soul's desire, iv. 4.28 (28-480). - - Lives, former, cause human character, iii. 3.4 (48-1083). - - Living being, no evil is unalloyed for it, i. 7.3 (54-1210). - - Living well not explainable by reason, i. 4.2 (46-1022). - - Living well not extended to all animals, i. 4.2 (46-1020). - - Localization of soul open to metaphysical objections, iv. 3.20 - (27-419). - - Location does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.16 (43-919). - - Location for the things yet to be produced is essence, vi. 6.10 - (34-657). - - Location of form (see residence), iii, 6.14 (26-376). - - Location of soul is principle that is everywhere and nowhere, v. 2.2 - (11-195). - - Location of world is in soul and not soul in body, iv, 3.9 (27-405). - - Logos, intermediary, also unaccountable, ii. 9.1 (33-601). - - Logos, form of, character, role and reason, iii. 2.17 (47-1071). - - Lost wings, has soul, in incarnation, i. 8.14 (51-1161). - - Love as God, demon and passion, iii. 5.1 (50-1122). - - Love as recognition of hidden affinity, iii. 5.1 (50-1122). - - Love based on unity and sympathy of all things, iv. 9.3 (8-142). - - Love causes, four, divine, innate notion, affinity and sentiment of - beauty, iii. 5.1 (50-1123). - - Love, celestial, must abide in intelligible with celestial soul, iii. - 5.3 (50-1128). - - Love, higher, is celestial, iii. 5.3 (50-1128). - - Love, how transformed into progressively higher stages, v. 9.2 - (5-103). - - Love is a gad-fly, iii. 5.7 (50-1134). - - Love is both material and a demon, iii. 5.10 (50-1140). - - Love is both needy and acquisitive, iii. 5.7 (50-1134). - - Love is not identical with the world, iii. 5.5 (50-1130). - - Love, like higher soul, inseparable from its source, iii. 5.2 - (50-1126). - - Love, lower, beauty, celestial, v. 8.13 (31-573). - - Love, lower, corresponding to world-soul, iii. 5.3 (50-1128). - - Love must exist because the soul does, iii. 5.10 (50-1139). - - Love, myth of birth, significance, iii. 5.10 (50-1139). - - Love of beauty explained by aversion for ugliness, i. 6.5 (1-47). - - Love possesses divine being, iii. 5.3 (50-1127). - - Love, working as sympathy, affects magic, iv. 4.40 (28-503). - - Love or Eros, iii. 5 (50-1122). - - Love that unites soul to good is deity, iii. 5.4 (50-1130). - - Love that unites soul to matter is demon only, iii. 5.4 (50-1130). - - Lover, divine, waits at the door, vi. 5.10 (23-325). - - Lover, how he develops, v. 9.2 (5-103). - - Lover, how he is attracted by beauty of single body, i. 3.2 (20-271). - - Lover, how he uses to intelligible world, i. 3.2 (20-271). - - Lover, simile of, in seeing God, vi. 9.4 (9-155). - - Lovers are those who feel sentiments most keenly, i, 6.4 (1-46). - - Lover's beauty in virtues transformed to intellectual, i. 3.2 - (20-271). - - Lover's beauty transformed into artistic and spiritual virtues, i. - 3.2 (20-271). - - Loves contrary to nature are passions of strayed souls, iii. 5.7 - (50-1135). - - Loves implanted by nature are all good, iii. 5.7 (50-1136). - - Loves in the evil charged down by false opinions, iii. 5.7 (50-1136). - - Lower form of being possessed by evil, i. 8.3 (51-1145). - - Lower forms of contemplation, iii. 8.1 (30-531). - - Lower natures, good is for them, not for itself, vi. 7.4 (38-706). - - Lower things follow higher, i. 8.1 (51-1142). - - Lowest degree of being is evil, hence necessary, i. 8.7 (51-1146). - - Lyceum, vi. 1.14, 30 (42-862, 888). - - Lynceus, whose keen eyes pierce all, symbol of intelligible world, v. - 8.4 (31-558). - - Lyre, badly tuned, cannot produce harmony, vi. 3.13 (44-961); ii. - 3.13 (52-1180). - - Lyre played by musician, like affections of the soul, iii. 6.4 - (26-358). - - Lyre, simile of striking single cord, vi, 5.10 (23-326). - - - Made himself, divinity has, does not cause priority, vi. 8.20 - (39-808). - - Magic, based on sympathy, iv. 9.3 (8-142). - - Magic enchantments described, iv. 9.3 (8-142). - - Magic, escaped by honesty, iv. 4.44 (28-509). - - Magic occurs by love, working as sympathy, iv. 4.40 (28-503). - - Magic power over honesty, iv. 4.44 (28-509). - - Magic power over man by its affections and weakness, iv. 4.44 - (28-508). - - Magnanimity interpreted as purifications, i. 6.6 (1-49). - - Magnitude an aid to differences of color, ii. 8.1 (35-681). - - Magnitude is an image formed by reflection of universal beings, iii. - 6.17 (26-380). - - Magnitude is only appearance, iii. 6.18 (26-381). - - Magnitude of matter derived from seminal reasons, iii. 6.15 (26-377). - - Magnitude, why could the soul have none, if it filled all space, vi. - 4.1 (22-285). - - Magnitudes and numbers are of different kind of quality, vi. 1.4 - (42-843). - - Man as soul subsisting in a special reason, vi. 7.5 (38-707). - - Man in himself, vi. 7.4 (38-706). - - Man is defined as reasonable soul, vi. 7.4 (38-706). - - Man is perfected through his evils, ii. 3.18 (52-1187). - - Man produces seminal reason, ii. 3.12 (52-1178). - - Man, relation of, to the intelligible world, vi. 4.14 (22-308). - - Man's triple nature is connection between sense and intelligible - world, vi. 7.7 (38-711). - - Management of body by reasoning, of world by intelligence, iv. 8.8 - (6-132). - - Manager, rewards and punishes, good and bad actors, iii. 2.17 - (47-1071). - - Managing part of soul, discredited, iv. 2.2 (21-280). - - Manicheans, wine divided in jars theory of reflected, iv. 3.2, 20 - (27-390). - - Manifold contains unity of manner of existence, vi. 4.8 (22-296). - - Manifold could not exist without something simple, v. 6.3 (24-336). - - Manifold, how intelligence became, v. 3.11 (49-1108). - - Manifold, how it arises from the one Intelligence, vi. 2.21 (43-926). - - Manifold, if it passed into unity, would destroy universe, iii. 8.10 - (30-547). - - Manifold is unity of apperception, iv. 4.1 (28-442). - - Manifold not explained by supreme unity, v. 9.14 (5-1116). - - Manifold, nothing, could exist without something simple, v. 6.3 - (12-336). - - Manifold of intelligence produced by unity, iv. 4.1 (28-443). - - Manifold unity, only for examination are its parts apart, vi. 2.3 - (43-897). - - Manifoldness, v. 3.16 (49-1118). - - Manifoldness contained by universal essence, vi. 9.2 (9-149). - - Manifoldness developed by soul, as by intelligence, iv. 3.6 (27-398). - - Manifoldness must pre-exist, vi. 2.2 (43-894). - - Manifoldness of any kind cannot exist within the first, v. 3.12 - (49-1110). - - Manifoldness of unity, vi. 5.6 (23-321). - - Manifoldness produced by one because of categories, v. 3.15 (49-1116). - - Manifoldness, why it proceeded from unity, v. 2.1 (11-193). - - Manner of existence determines how unity is manifold, vi. 4.8 - (22-296). - - Many and one inseparably, is intelligence, iii. 8.8 (30-543). - - Many and one, puzzle of decides genera of essence, vi. 2.4 (43-898). - - Marriages, presided over by lower love, iii. 5.3 (50-1129). - - Mars, relations to Saturn illogical, ii. 3.5 (52-1169). - - Mass is source of ugliness, v. 8.2 (31-554). - - Master, even beyond it, is the Supreme, vi. 8.12 (39-793). - - Master of himself power is the Supreme, vi. 8.10 (39-790). - - Masters of ourselves are even we, how much more Supreme, vi. 8.12 - (39-793). - - Mastery of these corporeal dispositions is not easy, i. 8.8 (51-1154). - - Material, gnostic distinction of men, ii. 9.18 (33-637). - - Materialism, polemic against, iv. 7 (2-56). - - Materialists cannot understand solid things near nonentity, iii. 6.6 - (26-361). - - Materialists support determination, iii. 1.2 (3-88). - - Mathematical parts not applicable to soul. iv. 3.2 (27-389). - - Matter acc. to Empedocles and Anaximander, ii. 4.7 (12-204). - - Matter alone could not endow itself with life, iv. 7.3 (2-60). - - Matter an empty mirror that reflects everything, iii. 6.7 (26-363). - - Matter and form in all things, iv. 7.1 (2-56). - - Matter and form intermediary between is sense object, iii. 6.17 - (26-381). - - Matter as deprivation still without qualities, i. 8.11 (51-1157). - - Matter as mirror, not affected by the object reflected, iii. 6.7 - (26-363). - - Matter as mother, nurse, residence and other nature, iii. 6.19 - (26-384). - - Matter as residence of generation. iii. 6.13 (26-373). - - Matter as substrate and residence of forms, ii. 4.1 (12-197). - - Matter as the infinite in itself, ii. 4.15 (12-216). - - Matter, born of world-soul, shapeless, begetting principle, iii. 4.1 - (15-233). - - Matter, both kinds, relation of, to essence, ii. 4.16 (12-219). - - Matter cannot be affected, as cannot be destroyed, iii. 6.8 (26-365). - - Matter cannot be credited with being, vi. 3.7 (44-944). - - Matter cannot be the primary principle, vi. 1.26 (42-881). - - Matter contained in the soul from her looking at darkness, i. 8.4 - (51-1147). - - Matter contemporarily with the informing principle, ii. 4.8 (12-206). - - Matter, corporeal and incorporeal, ii. 4.1 (12-198). - - Matter, cult of implies ignoring soul and intelligence, vi. 1.29 - (42-887). - - Matter derives its being from intelligibles, vi. 3.7 (44-944). - - Matter, descent into, is fall of the soul, i. 8.14 (51-1161). - - Matter, difference from form, due to that of intelligible sources, - vi. 3.8 (44-946). - - Matter existed from all eternity, iv. 8.6 (6-130). - - Matter, first physical category of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 (44-937). - - Matter, how to see the formless, a thing of itself, i. 8.9 (51-1156). - - Matter (hypostatic), existence as undeniable as that of good, i. 8.15 - (51-1162). - - Matter, if primary, would be form of the universe, iii. 6.18 (26-382). - - Matter, impassible, because of different senses of participation, - iii. 6.9 (26-366). - - Matter, incorporeal (Pyth. Plato, Arist.), ii. 4.1 (12-198). - - Matter, incorruptible, exists only potentially, ii. 5.5 (25-348). - - Matter, intelligible, ii. 4.3 (12-198); ii. 5.3 (25-345); iii. 5.7 - (50-1134). - - Matter, intelligible, entities to reach sense-matter, iii. 5.7 - (50-1154). - - Matter, intelligible, is not potential, ii. 5.3 (25-345). - - Matter, intelligible, why it must be accepted, iii. 5.6, 7 (50-1133). - - Matter is born shapeless, receives form while turning to, ii. 4.3 - (12-198). - - Matter is both without qualities and evil, i. 8.10 (51-1156). - - Matter is bottom of everything, ii. 4.5 (12-201). - - Matter is cause of evils, even if corporeal, i. 8.8 (51-1153). - - Matter is disposition to become something else, ii. 4.13 (12-214). - - Matter is improved by form, vi. 7.28 (38-745). - - Matter is incorporeal, ii. 4.9 (12-206). - - Matter is nonentity, i. 8.5 (51-1148). - - Matter is non-essential otherness, ii. 4.16 (12-218). - - Matter is not a body without quality, but with magnitude, vi. 1.26 - (42-880). - - Matter is not being and cannot be anything actual, ii. 5.4 (25-347). - - Matter is not composite, but simple in one, ii. 4.8 (12-205). - - Matter is not wickedness, but neutral evil, vi. 7.28 (38-746). - - Matter is nothing actually, ii. 5.2 (25-343). - - Matter is physical category, vi. 3.3 (44-937). - - Matter is real potentially, ii. 5.5 (25-348). - - Matter is relative darkness, ii. 4.5 (12-201). - - Matter is secondary evil, i. 8.4 (51-1155). - - Matter is unchangeable because form is such, iii. 6.10 (26-368). - - Matter left alone as basis after Stoic categories evaporate, vi. 1.29 - (42-886). - - Matter magnitude derived from seminal reason, iii. 6.15 (26-377). - - Matter may exist yet be evil, i. 8.11 (51-1158). - - Matter, modified, is Stoic God, vi. 12.7 (42-881). - - Matter must be possible because its qualities change, iii. 6.8 - (26-366). - - Matter necessary to the world; hence good implies evil, i. 8.7 - (51-1152). - - Matter not in intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-557). - - Matter nothing real actually, ii. 5.4 (25-347). - - Matter of demons is not corporeal, iii. 5.7 (50-1135). - - Matter participates in existence, without participating it, iii. 6.14 - (26-376) - - Matter participates in the intelligible, by appearance, iii. 6.11 - (26-369). - - Matter, participation of, in ideas, vi. 5.8 (23-321) - - Matter possesses no quality, ii. 4.8 (12-205); iv. 7.3 (2-59). - - Matter qualified as seminal reasons, vi. 1.29 - - Matter rationalized is body, ii. 7.3 (37-696). - - Matter received forms until hidden by them, v. 8.7 (31-562). - - Matter, relation of, to reason, illustrates that of opinion to - imagination, iii. 6.15 (26-377). - - Matter, since cannot be destroyed, cannot be affected, iii. 6.8 - (26-365). - - Matter things mingled, contain no perfection, iii. 2.7 (47-1053). - - Matter's generation, consequence of anterior principles, iv. 8.6 - (6-130). - - Matter's primitive impotence before generation, iv. 8.6 (6-130). - - Mechanism of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569). - - Medicine, v. 9.11 (5-114). - - Mediocre, evil men even, never abandoned by Providence, iii. 2.9 - (47-1058). - - Mediation of soul between indivisible and divisible essence, iv. 2 - (21-276). - - Mediation of world-souls, through it, benefits are granted to men, - vi. 4.12, 30 (28-457, 486). - - Medium cosmologically necessary, but affects sight only slightly, iv. - 5.2 (29-517). - - Medium needed in Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, iv. 5.2 - (29-516). - - Medium not needed in Atomism and Epicurianism, iv. 5.2 (29-516). - - Medium of sight, Aristotle's unnecessary iv. 5.1 (29-515). - - Medium, though possible, hinders organs of sight, iv. 5.1 (29-514). - - Medium, untroubled, is the world-soul, iv. 8.7 (6-130). - - Medium's absence would only destroy sympathy, iv. 5.3 (29-519). - - Medium's affection does not interfere with vision, iv. 5.3 (29-520). - - Memories not needed, unconscious prayer answered by Stars, iv. 4.42 - (28-505). - - Memories of the past do not increase happiness, i. 5.9 (36-689). - - Memory, iv. (27-428). - - Memory and reasoning, not implied by world-soul's wisdom, iv. 4.12 - (28-457). - - Memory and reasoning suspended by omniscient intuition, iv. 4.12 - (28-457). - - Memory and sensation iv. 6 (41-829). - - Memory and sensation, Stoic doctrines of, hang together, iv. 6.1 - (41-829). - - Memory acts through the sympathy of the soul's highest self, iv. 6.3 - (41-832). - - Memory, actualization of the soul, iv. 3.25 (27-429). - - Memory belongs to divine soul, and to that derived from world-soul, - iv. 3.27 (27-433). - - Memory belongs to imagination, iv. 3.29 (27-433). - - Memory belongs to the soul alone, iv. 3.26 (27-432). - - Memory, both kinds, implies both kinds of imagination, iv. 3.31 - (27-438). - - Memory definition depends on whether it is animal or human, iv. 3.25 - (27-429). - - Memory does not belong to appetite, iv. 3.28 (27-434). - - Memory does not belong to the power of perception, iv. 3.29 (27-435). - - Memory does not belongs to the stars, iv. 4.30 (28-441). - - Memory impossible to world-souls to whom there is no time but a - single day, iv. 4.7 (28-450). - - Memory inapplicable to any but time limited beings, iv. 3.25 (27-428). - - Memory is not identical with feeling or reasoning, iv. 3.29 (27-436). - - Memory limited to souls that change their condition, iv. 4.6 (28-448). - - Memory may be reduced to sensation, iv. 3.28 (27-434). - - Memory needs training and education, iv. 6.3 (41-835). - - Memory, none in stars, because uniformly blissful, iv. 4.8 (28-452). - - Memory not an image but a reawakening of a faculty, iv. 6.3 (41-833). - - Memory not as high as unreflective identification, iv. 4.4 (28-445). - - Memory not, but an affection, is kept by appetite, iv. 3.28 (27-434). - - Memory not compulsory, iv. 4.8 (28-451). - - Memory not exercised by world-souls and stars' souls, iv. 4.6 - (28-449). - - Memory not intelligible because of simultaneity, iv. 4.1 (28-441). - - Memory of soul in intelligible world, iv. 4.1 (28-441). - - Memory peculiar to soul and body, iv. 3.2 (27-430). - - Memory, possession of, not caused by incarnation of soul, iv. 3.26 - (27-431). - - Memory problems depend on definition, iv. 3.25 (27-429). - - Memory, timeless, constitutes self-consciousness, iv. 3.25 (27-429). - - Memory when beyond, helped by training here below, iv. 4.5 (28-447). - - Memory would be hindered if soul's impressions were corporeal, iv. - 7.6 (2-66). - - Men are kings, v. 3.4 (49-1094). - - Men both, we are not always as we should be, vi. 4.14 (22-308). - - Men escape chance by interior isolation, vi. 8.15 (39-800). - - Men non-virtuous, do good when not hindered by passions, iii. 1.10 - (3-98). - - Men of three kinds, sensual, moral and spiritual, v. 9.1 (5-102). - - Men seek action when too weak for contemplation, iii. 8.4 (30-536). - - Men sense and intelligible, difference between, vi. 7.4 (38-705). - - Men, three in each of us, vi. 7.6 (38-708). - - Men, three in us, fate of them is, brutalization or divinization, vi. - 7.6 (38-709). - - Men, three kinds of, v. 9.1 (5-102). - - Mercury, Jupiter and Venus, also considered astrologically, ii. 3.5 - (52-1169). - - Metal is to statue as body to soul, iv. 7.8 (2-76). - - Messengers of divinities are souls incarnated, iv. 3.12, 13 (27-409); - iv. 8.5 (6-127). - - Metaphorical is all language about the Supreme, vi. 8.13 (39-795). - - Method of creation, ii. 3.17 (52-1186). - - Method of ecstasy is to close eyes of body, i. 6.8 (1-52). - - Methods of dialectic differ with individuals, i. 3.1 (20-269). - - Methods of participation in good, i. 7.1 (54-1208). - - Metis or prudence (myth of), iii. 5.5 (50-1130). - - Microcosm, iv. 3.10 (27-406). - - Migrating of soul psychologically explained, vi. 4.16 (22-310). - - Minerva, vi. 5.7 (23-321). - - Minos, vi. 9.7 (9-162). - - Miracle, matter participates in existence, while not participating in - it, iii. 6.14 (26-376). - - Mire, unruly, soul falls into, when plunging down, i. 8.13 (51-1160). - - Mirror, iv. 3.30 (27-437); iv. 5.7 (29-528). - - Mirror empty, reflects everything like matter, iii. 6.7 (26-363). - - Mirror, simile of, i. 4.10 (46-1034). - - Misfortune and punishment, significance of, iv. 3.16 (27-414). - - Misfortune, experience of, does not give senses to man, vi. 7.1 - (38-697). - - Misfortune foreseen by God, not cause of human senses, vi. 7.1 - (38-697). - - Misfortune none too great to be conquered by virtues, i. 4.8 - (46-1031). - - Misfortune to the good only apparent, iii. 2.6 (47-1051). - - Mithra, simile of, used, iii. 2.14 (47-1064). - - Mixture, consequences of soul and body, i. 1.4 (53-1195). - - Mixture, elements are not, but arise from a common system, ii. 1.7 - (40-824). - - Mixture explained by evaporation (Stoic), ii. 7.2 (37-694). - - Mixture limited to energies of the existent, iv. 7.2, 8 (2-58, 68). - - Mixture of intelligence and necessity, i. 8.7 (51-1152). - - Mixture of soul and body impossible, i. 1.4 (53-1194). - - Mixture of soul divisible, ii. 3.9 (52-1176). - - Mixture of unequal qualities, ii. 7.1 (37-693). - - Mixture that occupies more space than elements, ii. 7.1 (37-693). - - Mixture, theory of, of Alexander of Aphrodisia, ii. 7.1 (37-691); iv. - 7.2 (2-58). - - Mixture to the point of total penetration, ii. 7 (37-691). - - Modality, should not occupy even third rank of existence, vi. 1.30 - (42-887). - - Model, v. 8.8 (31-564). - - Model for producing principle, is form, v. 8.7 (31-561). - - Model, image bound to it by radiation, vi. 4.10 (22-300). - - Model, interior, cause of appreciation of interior beauties, i. 6.4 - (1-45). - - Model of reason, is the universal soul, iv. 3.11 (27-407). - - Model of the old earth, gnostic, ii. 9.5 (33-607). - - Model of the universe is intelligible world, vi. 7.12 (38-720). - - Model, previous, object's existence implies, vi. 6.10 (34-658). - - Model, superior, method of producing assimilation, i. 2.7 (19-267, - 268). - - Modesty is part of goodness, ii. 9.9. (33-616). - - Modification derived from foreign sources, i. 1.9 (53-1202). - - Modified matter, is Stoic God, vi. 1.27 (42-881). - - Molecules could not possess life and intelligence, iv. 7.2 (2-57). - - Monism of the Stoics breaks down just like dualism, v. 1.27 (42-883). - - Moon, limit of world-sphere, ii. 1.5 (40-820). - - Moon, sun and light universe like, v. 6.4 (24-337). - - Moral beauties, more delightful than sense-beauties, i. 6.4 (1-45). - - Moral men, v. 9.1 (5-102). - - Moral men become superficial, v. 9.1 (2-102). - - Moralization, iv. 4.17 (28-464). - - Moralization decides government of soul, iv. 4.17 (28-464). - - Mortal, either whole or part of us, iv. 7.1 (2-56). - - Mother, nurse, residence and other nature is matter, iii. 6.18 - (26-384). - - Motion, how imparted to lower existences, ii. 2.2 (14-231). - - Motion is below the One, iii. 9.7 (13-225). - - Motion of fire, is straight, ii. 2.1 (14-228). - - Motion of soul is circular, ii. 2.1 (14-229). - - Motion, single, effected by body, and different ones by soul, iv. 7.4 - (2-62). - - Motion spontaneous, of universal soul, immortalizes heaven, ii. 1.4 - (40-818). - - Motions, conflicting, due to presence of bodies, ii. 2.2 (14-231). - - Motions, different, caused by soul, iv. 7.5 (2-62). - - Motive, essential to determination, iii. 1.1 (3-87). - - Motives of creation ii. 9.4 (33-605). - - Movement, v. 1.4 (10-180). - - Movement and rest, destruction also inapplicable, ii. 9.1 (33-600). - - Movement and stability exist because thought by intelligence, vi. 2.8 - (43-904). - - Movement another kind of stability, vi. 2.7 (43-903). - - Movement cannot be reduced to any higher genus, vi. 3.21 (44-971). - - Movement, circular of the soul, iv. 4.16 (28-462). - - Movement divided in natural, artificial and voluntary, vi. 3.26 - (44-980). - - Movement does not beget time, but indicates it, iii. 7.11 (45-1009). - - Movement for sense objects, vi. 3.23 (44-976). - - Movement, how can it be in time if changes are out of time, vi. 1.16 - (42-864). - - Movement is a form of power, vi. 3.22 (44-973). - - Movement is active for, and is the cause of other forms, vi. 3.22 - (44-974). - - Movement, is change anterior to it? vi. 3.21 (44-972). - - Movement measured by space because of its indetermination, iii. 7.11 - (45-1011). - - Movement measures time, and is measured by it, iii. 7.12 (45-1011). - - Movement of combination, vi. 3.25 (44-978). - - Movement of displacement is single, vi. 3.24 (44-927). - - Movement, of its image time, is eternity, iii. 7, int. (45-985). - - Movement of the heavens, ii. 2 (14-227). - - Movement of the soul is attributed to the primary movement, iii. 7.12 - (45-985). - - Movement, persistent, and its interval, are not time, but are within - it, iii. 7.7 (45-999). - - Movement, three kinds, ii. 2.1 (14-227). - - Movement, under it, action and suffering may be subsumed, vi. 1.17 - (42-866). - - Movement, why it is a category, vi. 3.20 (44-971). - - Multiple unity, iv. 9.1 (8-139). - - Multiple unity, radiation of, v. 3.15 (49-1115). - - Multiplicity could not be contained in the first, vi. 7.17 (38-729). - - Multiplicity demands organization in system, vi. 7.10 (38-716). - - Multiplicity of intelligences implies their natural differences, vi. - 7.17 (38-730). - - Multitude, how it precedes from the One, v. 9.14 (5-116); vi. 7 - (38-697). - - Multitude is distance from an unity, and is an evil, vi. 6.1 (34-643). - - Multitude of ideas of the good, vi. 7 (38-697). - - Muses, v. 8.10 (31-569); iii. 7.10 (45-1005). - - Music makes the musician, v. 8.1 (31-552). - - Musician educated by recognizing truths he already possesses, i. 3.1 - (20-270). - - Musician, how he rises to intelligible world, i. 3.1 (20-270). - - Musician led up by beauty, i. 3.1 (20-270). - - Mutilation of Saturn typifies splitting of unity, v. 8.13 (31-573). - - Mysteries, v. 3.17 (49-1120). - - Mysteries, ancient, their spiritual truth, vi. 9.11 (9-169). - - Mysteries purify and lead to nakedness in sanctuary, i. 6.6 (1-50). - - Mystery of derivation of Second from First, v. 1.6 (10-181). - - Mystery rites explain secrecy of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-169). - - Mystery teachings of hell, i. 6.6 (1-49). - - Myths explained by body's approach to the soul, iii. 5.10 (50-1138). - - Myths, object of, is to analyze and distinguish, iii. 5.10 (50-1139). - - Myths of ithyphallic Hermes, iii. 6.19 (26-385). - - Myths of Need and Abundance, iii. 6.14 (26-375). - - Myths, see Abundance, Need of, iii. 6.14 (26-375). - - - Nakedness follows purification in mysteries, i. 6.6 (1-50). - - Names of Supreme approximations, v. 5.6 (32-584). - - Narcissus, i. 6.8 (1-52); v. 8.2 (31-554). - - Narcissus followed vain shapes, i. 6.8 (1-52). - - Natural characteristics, derived from categories in intelligible, v. - 9.10 (5-113). - - Natural law, by it all prayers are answered, even of evil, iv. 4.42 - (28-505). - - Natural movements, vi. 3.26 (44-980). - - Nature and elements, there is continuity between, iv. 4.14 (28-459). - - Nature, and origin of evils, i. 8 (51-1142). - - Nature as weaker contemplation, iii. 8.4 (30-535). - - Nature betrayed, but not affected by stars, iii. 1.6 (3-95). - - Nature, capable of perfection as much as we, ii. 9.5 (33-607). - - Nature, cause coincides with it in intelligible, vi. 7.19 (38-735). - - Nature contemplation in unity, iii. 8 (30-542). - - Nature, contrary to loves, are passions of strayed souls, iii. 5.7 - (50-1135). - - Nature dominates in plants, but not in man, iii. 4.1 (15-233). - - Nature first actualization of universal soul, v. 2.1 (11-194). - - Nature is immovable as a fall, but not as compound of matter and - form, iii. 8.2 (30-533). - - Nature is ultimate cause, iii. 1.1 (3-87). - - Nature law directs soul, ii. 3.8 (52-1173). - - Nature, lowest in the world-soul's wisdom, iv. 4.13 (28-458). - - Nature of divine intelligence, i. 8.2 (51-1143). - - Nature of evil, i. 8.3 (51-1144). - - Nature of intelligence proved, v. 9.3 (5-104). - - Nature of soul is intermediate, iv. 8.7 (6-130). - - Nature of Supreme, i. 8.2 (51-1144). - - Nature of universal soul, i. 8.2 (51-1144). - - Nature posterior to intelligence, iv. 7.8 (2-78). - - Nature reason is result of immovable contemplation, iii. 8.2 (30-533). - - Nature, relation of animal to human, i. 1.7 (53-1199). - - Nature sterility indicated by castration, iii. 6.19 (26-384). - - Nature, Stoic name for generative power in seeds, v. 9.6 (5-110). - - Nature, to what part belongs emotions? i. 1.1 (53-1191). - - Nature's mother is universal reason and father the formal reasons, - iii. 8.4 (30-535). - - Nature's progress aided by auxiliary arts, v. 9.11 (5-114). - - Necessary, begetting of Second by First, v. 4.1 (7-135). - - Necessary things are those whose possession is unconscious, i. 4.6 - (46-1027). - - Necessity, characteristic of intelligence, v. 3.6 (49-1100). - - Necessity does not include voluntariness, iv. 8.5 (6-127). - - Necessity, Heraclitian, iii. 1.4 (3-91). - - Necessity mingled with reason, iii. 3.6 (48-1080). - - Necessity of continuous procession to Supreme, iv. 8.5 (6-129). - - Necessity of existence of the First, v. 4.1 (7-134). - - Necessity of illumination of darkness must have been eternal, ii. - 9.12 (33-623). - - Necessity, spindle of, Platonic, iii. 4.6 (15-242); ii. 3.9 (52-1171). - - Nectar, iii. 5.7 (50-1133). - - Nectar is memory of vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 (31-569). - - Need and Abundance, myth of, iii. 6.14 (26-375). - - Need, or Poros, iii. 5.2, 5, 6, 7, 10 (50-1125 to 1135). - - Negative necessary to a definition, v. 5.6 (32-584). - - Neutral evil is matter, vi. 7.28 (38-746). - - New things, unnoticed, their perception not forced, iv. 4.8 (28-450). - - New world arises out of Jupiter begotten by result of ecstasy, v. - 8.12 (31-572). - - Night objects prove uselessness of sight medium, iv. 5.3 (29-519). - - Non-being is matter, cannot be anything actual, ii. 5.4 (25-347). - - Nonentity has intelligent life beneath being, iii. 6.6 (26-360). - - Nonentity is matter, i. 8.5 (51-1150). - - Normative element of life, is Providence, iii. 3.5 (48-1084). - - Noses, pug, and Roman, due to matter, v. 9.12 (5-115). - - Nothing is contained in One; reason why everything can issue from it, - v. 2.1 (11-193). - - Notions, scientific, are both prior and posterior, v. 9.7 (5-110). - - Nowhere and everywhere is Supreme, inclination and imminence, vi. - 8.16 (39-801). - - Number and unity proceed from the One and many beings, vi. 6.10 - (34-659). - - Number as universal bond of universe, vi. 6.15 (34-670). - - Number can be said to be infinite, vi. 6.19 (34-674). - - Number, category, v. 1.4 (10-180). - - Number exists for every animal and the universal animal, vi. 6.15 - (34-668). - - Number follows and proceeds from essence, vi. 6.9 (34-655). - - Number is not in quantity, vi. 1.4 (42-842). - - Number, posterior to, is intelligible line, vi. 6.17 (34-674). - - Number, what is it to infinite? vi. 6.2 (34-644). - - Number within is the number, constituted with our being, vi. 6.16 - (34-673). - - Numbers, vi. 6 (34-651). - - Numbers and dimensions are so different as to demand different - classification, vi. 2.13 (43-916). - - Numbers and ideas, identification of, vi. 6.9 (34-656). - - Numbers and magnitudes, are of different kinds of quantity, vi. 1.4 - (42-843). - - Numbers are not quantity in themselves, vi. 1.4 (42-842). - - Numbers form part of the intelligible world, vi. 6.4 (34-647). - - Numbers, intelligible, are identical with thought, v. 5.4 (32-582). - - Numbers intelligible, difficulties connected with, vi. 6.16 (34-671). - - Numbers must exist in the primary essence, vi. 6.8 (34-654). - - Numbers participated in by objects, vi. 6.14 (34-667). - - Numbers, principle is unity's form, v. 5.5 (32-583). - - Numbers, Pythagorean, intelligible discussed, vi. 6.5 (34-649). - - Numbers, quantitative, v. 5.4 (32-583). - - Numbers, regulated generation of everything, vi. 6.15 (34-670). - - Numbers, soul as v. 1.5 (10-187); vi. 5.9 (23-324). - - Numbers split the unity into plurality, vi. 6.9 (34-656). - - Numbers, two kinds, essential and unitary, vi. 6.9 (34-657). - - Numbers, veritable, are intelligible entities, vi. 6.14 (34-668). - - Numenian name of Divinity, Essence and Being, v. 9.3 (5-104); v. 8.5 - (31-560); vi. 6.9 (34-656). - - Numerals, veritable, of the man in himself, are essential, vi. 6.16 - (34-672). - - Nurse, mother, residence and other nature is matter, iii. 6.19 - (26-384). - - - Object itself did not grasp intellect, i. 1.9 (53-1201). - - Objective justice and beauty to which we are united, v. 1.11 (10-190). - - Objective world subsists even when we are distracted, v. 1.12 - (10-191). - - Objects existence implies a previous model, vi. 6.10 (34-658). - - Objects outside have unitary existence, vi. 6.12 (34-662). - - Objects participate in numbers, vi. 6.14 (34-667). - - Obstacle to divinity is failure to abstract from Him, vi. 8.21 - (39-811). - - Obstacle to the soul is evil, i. 8.12 (51-1159). - - Obstacles lacking to creator, because of his universality, v. 8.7 - (31-562). - - Omnipresence explained by possession of all things, without being - possessed by them, v. 5.9 (32-589). - - One, v. 4; v. 4.2 (7-134, 136). - - One and Good, vi. 9 (1-47). - - One and many, like circle, is intelligence, iii. 8.8 (30-543). - - One and many, puzzle of, decides genera of essence, vi. 2.4 (43-898). - - One for Supreme, is mere negation of manifold, v. 5.6 (32-585). - - One, independent of the one outside, vi. 6.12 (34-661). - - One is all things, but none of them, v. 2.1 (11-193). - - One is everywhere by its power, iii. 9.4 (13-224). - - One is formless, v. 5.6 (32-585). - - One is nowhere, iii. 9.4 (13-224). - - One is super-rest and super-motion, iii. 9.7 (13-225). - - One not absolute, but essentially related to one examined, vi. 2.3 - (43-896). - - One not thinker, but thought, itself, vi. 9.6 (9-160). - - One present without approach, everywhere though nowhere, v. 5.8 - (32-587). - - One related in some genera, but not in others, vi. 2.3 (43-896). - - One so far above genera is not to be counted, vi. 2.3 (43-895). - - One, the soul, like divinity, always is, iv. 3.8 (27-402). - - One within us, independent of the one outside, vi, 6.12 (34-661). - - Opinion as sensation, v. 5.1 (32-576). - - Opinion, in relation to imagination, illustrates that of matter to - reason, iii. 6.15 (26-377). - - Opinions, false, are daughters of involuntary passions, i. 8.4 - (51-1147). - - Opportunity and suitability, cause of, put them beyond change, vi. - 8.18 (39-806). - - Opposition, ii. 3.4 (52-1168). - - Opposition among inanimate beings (animals and matter), iii. 2.4 - (47-1048), - - Optimism right, v. 5.2 (32-579). - - Order, cosmic, is natural, iv. 3.9 (27-404). - - Order exists only in begotten, not in seminal reason, iv. 4.16 - (28-461). - - Order in the hierarchy of nature, ours cannot be questioned, iii. 3.3 - (48-1079). - - Order is anteriority in the intelligible, iv. 4.1 (28-443). - - Order, priority of, implies conception of time, iv. 4.16 (28-461). - - Organ, the universe, every being is, iv. 4.45 (28-510). - - Organs alone, could be affected, iii. 6.2 (26-354). - - Origin and nature of evils, i. 8 (51-1142). - - Origin, causeless, really is determinism, iii. 1.1 (3-86). - - Origin of God, puzzling, by our starting from chaos, vi. 8.11 - (39-792). - - Origins of evil, sins and errors, i. 1.9 (53-1201). - - Otherness is characteristic of matter, ii. 4.13 (12-214). - - Ours is not intelligence, but we, i. 1.13 (53-1206). - - Ours, why discursive reason is, v. 3.3 (49-1093). - - Outer man, only, affected by changes of fortune, iii 2.15 (47-1067). - - - Pair, vi. 7.8; vi. 2.11; v. 1.5; vi. 7.39. - - Pair or dyad, v. 5.4 (32-582). - - Pandora, iii. 6.14 (26-375); iv. 3.14 (27-412). - - Panegyrists, who degrade what they wrongly praise, v. 5.13 (32-596). - - Pangs of childbirth, v. 5.6 (32-585). - - Paris, iii. 3.5 (48-1085). - - Part in scheme, soul must fit itself to, iii, 2.17 (47-1071). - - Partake of the one according to their capacities, vi. 4.11 (22-302). - - Partial only should be the influence of universe, iv. 4.34 (28-494). - - Participation by matter in the intelligible, only by appearance, iii. - 6.11 (26-369). - - Participation can be only in the intelligible, vi. 4.13 (22-306). - - Participation in good, two methods of, i. 7.1 (54-1208). - - Participation in sense-objects by unity is intelligible, vi. 6.13 - (34-664). - - Participation in the world of life is merely a sign of extension, vi. - 4.13 (22-306). - - Participation, method of, inferior in intelligible, vi. 5.12 (23-329). - - Participation of matter in existence and opposite, iii. 6.4 (26-357). - - Participation of matter in ideas, proves simile of head with faces, - vi. 5.8 (23-321). - - Participations, difference of senses of, allows matter to remain - impassible, iii. 6.9 (26-366). - - Partition of fund of memory between the two souls, iv. 3.31 (27-439). - - Parts, actual division in, would be denial of the whole, iv. 3.12 - (27-390). - - Parts can be lost by body, not by soul, iv. 7.5 (2-63). - - Parts divisible and indivisible, in the whole of a soul, iv. 3.19 - (27-419). - - Parts, in incorporeal things, have several senses, iv. 3.2 (27-390). - - Parts, as wine in jars, Manichean theory, rejected, iv. 3.20 (27-421). - - Parts, mathematical, not applicable as a soul, iv. 3.2 (27-390). - - Parts of a manifold unity are a part only, for examination, vi. 2.3 - (43-897). - - Parts of Supreme, mere, subordinate divinities, denied, v. 8.9 - (31-566). - - Parts, physical, term limited, iv. 3.2 (27-389). - - Passage into world of life is body's relation to the soul, vi. 4.12 - (22-304). - - Passibility of judgment and of soul, iii. 6.1 (26-350). - - Passing of intelligence from unity to duality, by thinking, v. 6.1 - (24-333). - - Passion as category (see action), vi. 1.17 (42-866). - - Passional changes in body, not in passional part of soul, iii. 6.3 - (26-356). - - Passional love elevating, though open to misleading temptations, iii. - 5.1 (50-1124). - - Passionate love twofold, sensual and beautiful, iii. 5.1 (50-1122). - - Passions affect soul differently from virtue and vice, iii. 6.3 - (26-356). - - Passions arise from seminal reasons, ii. 3.16 (52-1184). - - Passions felt by soul, without experiencing them, iv. 4.19 (28-466). - - Passions, how they penetrate from the body into the soul, i. 1.3 - (53-1194). - - Passions involuntary are mothers of false opinions, i. 8.4 (51-1147). - - Passions, modes of feeling, i. 1.1 (53-1191). - - Passions not caused by soul, ii. 3.16 (52-1184). - - Passions of strayed souls are loves contrary to nature, iii. 5.7 - (50-1135). - - Passions of universe produced by body of stars, ii. 3.10 (52-1177). - - Passions reduced external images, iii. 6.5 (26-358). - - Passions, Stoic theory of, opposed, iii. 6.3 (26-355) - - Passions, their avoidance, task of philosophy, iii. 6.5 (26-358). - - Passions, what suitable to earth, iv. 4.22 (28-471). - - Passive, really, is soul, when swayed by appetites, iii. 1.9 (3-98). - - Path of simplification to unity, vi. 9.3 (9-152). - - Path to ecstasy, land marks, i. 6.9 (1-54) - - Penetration into inner sanctuary, yields possession of all things, v. - 8.11 (31-570). - - Penetration of body by soul, but not by another body, iv. 7.8 (2-72). - - Penetration of body by soul proves the latter's incorporeality, iv. - 7.8 (2-72). - - Penetration, total, impossible in mixture of bodies, iv. 7.8 (2-72). - - Penetration, total, mixture, to the point of, ii. 7 (37-691). - - Penia, or need, myth of, iii. 5.25 (50-1130) - - Perception of new things, not forced, iv. 4.8 (28-450). - - Perception of the Supreme, its manner, v. 5.10 (32-591). - - Perfect happiness attained when nothing more is desired, i. 4.4 - (46-1026). - - Perfect is primary nature (Plotinic); not goal of evolution (Stoic), - iv. 7.8 (2-73). - - Perfect life consists in intelligence, i. 4.3 (46-1024). - - Perfect life, its possession, i. 4.6 (46-1027). - - Perfection not to be sought in, material things, iii. 2.7 (47-1053). - - Perfection of a picture make shadows necessary, iii. 2.11 (47-1060). - - Perfection of the universe, evils are necessary, ii. 3.18 (52-1187). - - Perfection of universe, object of incarnation, iv. 8.5 (6-128). - - Perfection's author must be above it, vi. 7.32 (38-752). - - Perishable is body, because composite, iv. 7.1 (2-56). - - Permanence, the characteristic of absolute good, i. 7.1 (54-1209). - - Perpetuates itself by form, does heaven, through influx, ii. 1.1 - (40-813). - - Perpetuity and eternity, difference between, iii. 7.4 (45-991). - - Persistence of changeable, iv. 7.9 (2-78). - - Perspective, ii. 8 (35-680). - - Perspective, various theories of, ii. 8.1 (35-680). - - Persuasion, characteristic of soul, v. 3.6 (49-1099). - - Perversity of soul induces judgment and punishment, iv. 8.5 (6-128) - - Pessimism wrong, v. 5.2 (32-579). - - Phidias sculpts Jupiter not from sense imitation, v. 8.1 (31-552). - - Philonic distinction between God, and the God, vi. 7.1 (38-697). - - Philosopher, being already virtuous, needs only promotion, i. 3.3 - (20-272). - - Philosopher, how he rises to intelligible world, i. 3.3 (20-271). - - Philosopher is already disengaged and needs only a guide, i. 3.3 - (20-271). - - Philosophers born, alone reach the higher region, v. 9.2 (5-103). - - Philosophers, how they develop, v. 9.2 (5-103). - - Philosophers justify justice of God, iv. 4.30 (28-486). - - Philosopher's mathematics followed by pure dialectics as method of - progress, i. 3.3 (20-272). - - Philosopher's method of disengagement is mathematics as incorporeal - science, i. 3.3 (20-271). - - Philosopher's opinions about time to be studied, iii. 7.6 (45-995). - - Philosophy contains physics, ethics, i. 3.5 (20-273). - - Philosophy exact root of psychology, ii. 3.16 (52-1183). - - Philosophy lower part of dialectic, i. 3.5 (20-273). - - Philosophy separates soul from her image, vi. 4.16 (22-310). - - Philosophy's task is avoidance of passions, iii. 6.5 (26-358). - - Phoebus inspires men to interior vision, v. 8.10 (31-569). - - Physical categories are matter, form, combination, attributes and - accidents, vi. 3.3 (44-938). - - Physical categories of Plotinos, vi. 3 (44-933). - - Physical genera of, are different from those of the intelligible, iv. - 3.1 (27-387). - - Physical life, can it exist without the soul? iv. 4.29 (28-485). - - Physical, not mental being, affected by stars, iii. 1.6 (3-95). - - Physical powers do not form a secondary quality, vi. 1.11 (42-856). - - Physical qualities applied to Supreme only by analogy, vi. 8.8 - (39-785). - - Physical soul, production due to, not astrological power, iv. 4.38 - (28-501). - - Physical souls, various, how they affect production, iv. 4.37 - (28-500). - - Physical terms, only verbal similarity to intelligible, vi. 3.5 - (44-941). - - Physical theories, absurd, iii. 1.3 (3-89). - - Physically begun, spiritual becomes love, vi. 7.33 (38-755). - - Physician's fore-knowledge, simile of Providence, iii. 3.5 (48-1085). - - Picture of the structure of the universe, ii. 3.18 (52-1187). - - Picture, perfection of, demands shadow, iii. 2.11 (47-1060). - - Picture that pictures itself is universe, ii. 3.18 (52-1188). - - Pilgrim soul is in the world, ii. 9.18 (33-635). - - Pilot governs the ship, relation of soul to body, i. 1.3 (53-1194); - iv. 3.21 (27-422). - - Place has no contrary, vi. 3.12 (44-954). - - Place or time do not figure among true categories, vi. 2.16 (43-919). - - Place or where is Aristotelian category, vi. 1.14 (42-862). - - Planet calculations, ii. 3.6 (52-1171). - - Plant positions producing adulteries, absurd, ii. 3.6 (52-1171). - - Planning of the world by God, refuted, v. 8.7 (31-561, 563). - - Plants, do they admit of happiness, i. 4.1, 2 (46-1019 to 1021). - - Plants even aspire to contemplation, iii. 8.1 (30-531). - - Plato departed from, in categories, vi. 2.1 (43-891). - - Plato not only hates body, but admires world, ii. 9.17 (33-633). - - Plato uncertain about time, iii. 7.12 (45-1012). - - Platonic basis of anti-gnostic controversy, v. 8.7 (31-561). - - Plato's authority, restored, v. 1.8 (10-186). - - Plato's language doubtful, iii. 6.12 (26-372); vi. 7.30 (38-749). - - Pleasure an accessory to all goods of the soul, vi. 7.30 (38-749). - - Pleasure, because changeable and restless, cannot be the good, vi. - 7.27 (38-745) - - Pleasure, good's independence from, is temperate man, vi. 7.29 - (38-747). - - Pleasure may accompany the good, but is independent thereof, vi. 7.27 - (38-745). - - Pleasure strictly, has nothing to do with happiness, i. 5.4 (36-685). - - Pleasures of virtuous men are of higher kinds, i. 4.12 (46-1036). - - Plotinos forced to demonstration of categories by divergence from - Plato, vi. 2.1 (43-891). - - Plotinos's genera of sensual existence, iv. 3 (27-387). - - Poros or Abundance, myth of, iii. 5.2, 5 (50-1125 to 1131). - - Possession by divinity is last stage of ecstasy, v. 8.10 (31-569). - - Possession of perfect life, i. 4.4 (46-1026). - - Possession of things causes intelligence to think them, vi. 6.7 - (34-653). - - Potential, intelligible matter is not, ii. 5.3 (25-345). - - Potentialities are inseparable from their beings, vi. 4.9 (22-298). - - Potentiality and actuality not applicable to divinity, ii. 9.1 - (33-599). - - Potentiality, definition of, ii. 5.1 (25-341). - - Potentiality exists only in corruptable matter, ii. 5.5 (25-348). - - Potentiality explains miracle of seeds containing manifolds, iv. 9.5 - (8-146). - - Potentiality producing, not becoming, is the soul, ii. 5.3 (25-345). - - Poverty caused by external circumstances, ii. 3.8 (52-1174). - - Power and beauty of essence attracts all things, vi. 6.18 (34-678). - - Power, lack of, cannot fall under same categories as power, vi. 1.10 - (42-852). - - Power, master of himself, really is the Supreme, vi. 8.10 (39-788). - - Power of divinities lies in their inhering in the Supreme, v. 8.9 - (31-565). - - Powers though secret, in everything, iv. 4.37 (28-500). - - Practice is only a preparation for contemplation, iii. 8.6 (30-538). - - Prayed to, sun as well as stars may be, iv. 4.30 (28-486). - - Prayers, all made in accordance with natural law, answered, iv. 4.42 - (28-506). - - Prayers answered by stars unconsciously, iv. 4.42 (28-505). - - Prayers, how they are answered, iv. 4.41 (28-505). - - Prayers of even the evil are answered, iv. 4.42 (28-506). - - Predict, stars do, because of souls imperfection, ii. 3.10 (52-1177). - - Prediction implies that future is determined, iii. 1.3 (3-90). - - Prediction, not by works, but by analogy, iii. 3.6 (48-1080). - - Prediction, with its responsiveness, do not fall under action and - experience, vi. 1.22 (42-875). - - Predisposition of active life subjection to enchantments, iv. 4.43 - (28-508). - - Predisposition to magic by affections and weaknesses, iv. 4.44 - (28-508). - - Predominant soul part active while others sleep and (see managing - soul) appear exterior, iv. 2.2 (21-279); iii. 4.2 (15-234). - - Predominating part, Stoic, iii. 3.2 (48-1078). - - Predominating principle directs universe, ii. 3.8 (52-1173). - - Preparation for contemplation is practice, iii. 8.6 (30-538). - - Preponderance spiritual method of becoming wise, i. 4.14 (46-1037). - - Presence of God, everywhere entire, explained as infinite, vi. 5.4 - (23-318). - - Presence of intelligible entities implied by knowledge of them, v. - 5.1 (32-575). - - Presence the one identical essence everywhere, entirely, vi. 4 - (22-285). - - Presences, different kinds of, vi. 4.11 (22-302). - - Present, eternal, v. 1.4 (10-179). - - Preservative not, is universal soul, but creative. ii. 3.16 (52-1183). - - Preserver and creator is the good, vi. 7.23 (38-740). - - Preserving, begotten Son, as result of ecstasy, v. 8.12 (31-571). - - Priam, misfortunes of, i. 4.5 (46-1027). - - Pride is folly, ii. 9.9 (33-618). - - Primary essence, numbers must exist in it, vi. 6.8 (34-654). - - Primary evil is evil in itself, i. 8.3 (51-1146). - - Primary evil is lack of measure, i. 8.8 (51-1155). - - Primary evil of soul, i. 8.5 (51-1148). - - Primary existence will contain thought, existence and life, ii. 4.6 - (12-203); v. 6.6 (24-339). - - Primary movement said to underlie movement of soul, iii. 7.12 - (45-1013). - - Primitive one is a spherical figure and intelligible, vi. 6.17 - (34-675). - - Primitive relation between soul and body, i. 1.3 (53-1194). - - Principle, a supra-thinking, necessary to the working of - intelligence, v. 6.2 (24-334). - - Principle and end simultaneous in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563). - - Principle, independent, is human soul, iii. 1.8 (3-97). - - Principle of all, though not limited thereby, is the one, v. 3.11 - (49-1109). - - Principle of beauty, what is it? i. 6.1 (1-40). - - Principle one self-existent constituted by being an actualization, - vi. 8.7 (39-784). - - Principle, primary, matter cannot be, vi. 1.26 (42-879.) - - Principle, simultaneous, above intelligence and existence, iii. 7.2 - (45-989). - - Principle, super-essential, does not think, v. 6.1 (24-333). - - Principle, the first, must be one exclusively, which would make - thought impossible, v. 6.1 (24-335). - - Principle, the first, thinking, is the second principle, v. 6.1 - (24-335). - - Principle, the second, the first thinking principle, is, v. 6.1 - (24-335). - - Principles, divine, enumerated, vi. 7.25 (38-741). - - Principles limited to three, ii. 9.2 (33-602). - - Principles, lower, contain only anterior things, iv. 4.16 (28-461). - - Principles, single, of universe, ii. 3.6 (52-1171). - - Priority not applied in the divinity because he made himself, vi. - 8.20 (39-808). - - Prison of soul, is body, iv. 8.11 (6-120). - - Priority of soul to body, iv. 7.2 (2-58). - - Privation is nonentity, adds no conceit, ii. 4.14 (12-215). - - Privation of form of matter, ii. 4.13 (12-213). - - Privation of qualities; not a quality, ii. 4.13 (12-213). - - Privation relative is impossible, i. 8.12 (51-1158). - - Process, vi. 3.1 (44-933); iv. 8.6 (6-129). - - Process from unity to duality, v. 6.1 (24-338). - - Process, natural, only affected by starvation, ii. 3.12 (52-1178). - - Process of purification of soul and its separation from body, iii. - 6.5 (26-359). - - Process of soul elevation, v. 3.9 (49-1106). - - Process of unification, v. 5.4 (32-581). - - Process of vision and hearing, iv. 5 (29-514). - - Process of wakening to reality, v. 5.11 (32-592). - - Process, triune, also implies identity and difference, vi. 9.8 - (43-905). - - Processes of ecstasy by purification, i. 6.6, 8, 9 (1-49). - - Procession by it, soul connects indivisible and divisible essence, - iv. 2.1 (21-276). - - Procession, continuous, necessary to the Supreme, iv. 8.6 (6-129). - - Procession from one of what is after it, v. 4 (7-134). - - Procession is effusion of super-abundance, v. 2.1 (11-194). - - Procession is universal, from first to last, v. 2.2 (11-195). - - Procession of intelligence is an excursion down and up, iv. 8.7 - (6-131). - - Procession of soul, iv. 8.5 (6-128). - - Procession of the world-soul, iii. 8.5 (30-537). - - Procession of world from unity, cause. v. 2.1 (11-193). - - Procreation, he not desiring it, aspires to higher beauty, iii. 5.1 - (50-1123). - - Procreativeness inherent (see radiation, exuberant, super-abundant), - v. 4.1 (7-135). - - Prodigal, return, i. 6.8 (1-53). - - Prodigal son, v. 1.1 (10-173). - - Produced by stars, which is and what is not, ii. 3.13 (52-1178). - - Producing potentiality, not becoming, is the soul, ii. 5.3 (25-346). - - Production due to some physical soul not astrological power, iv. 4.38 - (28-501). - - Production of the things located is essence, vi. 6.10 (34-657). - - Progress possible, argument against suicide, i. 9 (16-243). - - Progressively higher stages of love, v. 9.2 (5-103). - - Progressively, world-soul informs all things, iv. 3.10 (27-406). - - Prometheus, iv. 3.14 (27-412). - - Prometheus of flight leaves soul unharmed from incarnation, iv. 8.5 - (6-128). - - Proofs for existence and nature of intelligence, v. 9.3 (5-104). - - Proportion, Stoic principle of beauty, not ultimate, but derivative, - i. 6.1 (1-41). - - Providence accused by slavery of good and victory of evil, iii. 2.6 - (47-1052). - - Providence, chief of all, iii. 3.2 (48-1079). - - Providence consists of appointed times in life, should be observed, - i. 9 (16-243). - - Providence does not abandon even the mediocre, iii. 2.9 (47-1058). - - Providence does not explain prediction but analogy, iii. 3.6 - (48-1086). - - Providence, double, particular and universal, iii. 3.4 (48-1081). - - Providence embraces everything below, iii. 2.7 (47-1054). - - Providence, fore knowledge of, like unto a physician, iii. 3.5 - (48-1085). - - Providence is normative element of life, iii. 3.5 (48-1084). - - Providence is not particular, because world had no beginning, iii. - 2.1 (47-1043). - - Providence is prevision and reasoning, iii, 2.1 (47-1042). - - Providence is unpredictable circumstance changing life, iii. 4.6 - (15-242). - - Providence may appear as chance, iii. 3.2 (48-1078). - - Providence, objection to by internecine war, iii. 2.15 (47-1064). - - Providence problems solved by derivation of reason from intelligence, - iii. 2.16 (47-1068). - - Providence should not overshadow initiative, iii. 2.9 (47-1057). - - Providence, the plan of the universe is from eternity, vi. 8.17 - (39-803). - - Providence, twofold, exerted by twofold soul, iv. 8.2 (6-122). - - Prudence interpreted as purification, i. 6.6 (1-49). - - Prudence or Metis, myth of, iii. 5.5 (50-1130). - - Psychic, gnostic distinction of men, ii. 9.18 (33-635). - - Psychologic elements, sensation, faculties of generation and - increase, and creative power, i. 1.8 (53-1200). - - Psychologic elements, soul gives life to, i. 1.8 (53-1200). - - Psychological effect of vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 - (31-568). - - Psychological faculty, on which is the freedom of will based, vi. 8.2 - (39-775). - - Psychological questions, iv. 3 (27-387). - - Psychological study of, outline, iv. 2.1 (21-276). - - Psychological theory of quality, vi. 1.12 (42-858). - - Psychology, common part, its function, i. 1.10 (53-1203). - - Psychology, does ratiocination belong to same principles as passions, - i. 1.1 (53-1191). - - Psychology (every man double), composite animal, real man or - reasonable soul, ii. 3.9 (52-1176). - - Psychology, exact root of philosophy, ii. 3.16 (52-1183). - - Psychology, explanation of anger parts, courage, iii. 6.2 (26-354). - - Psychology, inquiring principle, i. 1.1 (53-1191). - - Psychology obeys the precept "Know thyself," iv, 3.1 (27-387). - - Psychology of demons, iv. 4.43 (28-507). - - Psychology of earth, iv. 4.27 (28-479). - - Psychology of sensation, iv. 3.26 (27-430). - - Psychology of vegetative part of soul, iv. 4.28 (28-481). - - Psychology thought, its nature and classification, i. 1.1 (53-1191). - - Pun between science and knowledge, v. 8.4 (31-559). - - Pun on aeon, as age or eternity, iii. 7.1 (45-986). - - Pun on "agalmata," v. 8.5, 6 (31-560). - - Pun on Aphrodite, as delicate, iii. 5.8 (50-1137). - - Pun on being, intelligible, vi. 3.8 (44-947). - - Pun on creation and adornment, ii. 4.4 (12-214); i. 8.7 (51-1152). - - Pun on difference in others, ii. 4.13 (12-214). - - Pun on "dii" and "diken," v. 8.4 (31-558). - - Pun on "doxa," v. 5.1 (32-578). - - Pun on Egyptian hieroglyphics and statues (see "agalmata"). - - Pun on "eidos" and "idea," v. 9.8 (5-111); vi 9.2 (9-149). - - Pun on "einai" and "henos," v. 5.5 (32-584). - - Pun on forms and statues, v. 8.5 (31-560). - - Pun on heaven, world, universe, animal and all, ii. 1.1 (40-814). - - Pun on Hestia, and standing, v. 5.5 (32-584). - - Pun on Hesis, vi. 1.23 (42-877). - - Pun on "idea" and "eidos," see "eidos." - - Pun on inclination, ii. 9.4 (33-605). - - Pun on "koros," iii. 8.11 (30-550); v. 8.13 (31-573); v. 9.8 (5-111); - iv. 3.14 (27-412); i. 8.7 (51-1152). - - Pun on love and vision, iii. 5.3 (50-1128). - - Pun on "nous," "noesis," and "to noeton," v. 3.5 (49-1096 to 1099). - - Pun on "paschein," experiencing, suffering, reacting, and passion, - vi. 1.15 (42-864). - - Pun on Poros, iii. 5.9, 10 (50-1140). - - Pun on Prometheus and Providence, iv. 3.14 (27-412). - - Pun on reason and characteristic, iii. 6.2 (17-248); iv. 7.4 (2-61). - - Pun on "schesis" and "schema," iv. 4.29 (28-484). - - Pun on "Soma" and "sozesthai," v. 9.5 (5-109). - - Pun on suffering, iv. 9.3 (8-143). - - Pun on thinking, thinkable and intellection, vi. 1.18 (42-868). - - Pun on timely and sovereign, vi. 8.18 (39-806). - - Pun on unadorned and created, see "koros," i. 8.7 (51-1152). - - Pun on Vesta and Hestia, v. 5.5 (32-584). - - Punishable and impassible, soul is both. i. 1.12 (53-1204). - - Punishment follows perversity of soul, iv. 8.5 (6-128). - - Punishments and misfortunes, significance of, iv. 3.15 (27-414). - - Pure thoughts is that part of the soul which most resembles - intelligence, v. 3.8 (49-1102). - - Purification clears up mental knowledge, iv. 7.10 (2-80). - - Purification, content of virtues, i. 6.6 (1-49). - - Purification in mysteries, leads to nakedness, i. 6.6 (1-50). - - Purification of soul like man washing off mud, i. 6.5 (1-48). - - Purification produces conversion, and is used by virtue, i. 2.4 - (19-261). - - Purification of soul process involved, iii. 6.5 (26-359). - - Purification's goal is second divinity intelligence, i. 2.6 (19-264). - - Purification limit is that of the soul self-control, i. 2.5 (19-263). - - Purity, condition of remaining in unity with the divinity, v. 8.11 - (31-570). - - Purpose of life, supreme, vision of God, i. 6.7 (1-50). - - Puzzle of one and many decides of the genera of essence, vi. 2.4 - (43-898). - - Puzzle of origin of God due to chaos being starting point, vi. 8.11 - (39-792). - - Puzzle of soul being one, yet in all, iv. 3.4 (27-394). - - - Quadrature, ii. 3.4 (52-1168). - - Qualities, sqq. vi. 1.10 (42-852). - - Qualities admit of degrees, vi. 3.20 (44-970). - - Qualities are accidental shapes of being, ii. 6.3 (17-250). - - Qualities are acts of being, ii. 6.2 (17-249). - - Qualities are incorporeal, vi. 1.29 (42-885). - - Qualities, because they change, matter must be passible, iii. 6.8 - (26-366). - - Qualities classified as body and of soul, vi. 3.17 (44-963). - - Qualities, distinction between qualities and complements of being, - ii. 6.1 (17-245). - - Qualities, genuine, are not differential beings, vi. 1.10 (42-853). - - Qualities, modal and essential, distinctions between, ii. 6.1 - (17-246). - - Qualities more essential than quantity, ii. 8.1 (35-680). - - Qualities not all are reasons, vi. 1.10 (42-854). - - Qualities not formed by union of four Plotinic categories, vi. 2.15 - (43-918). - - Qualities of sense, among them belong many other conceptions, vi. - 3.16 (44-961). - - Qualities, some are differences, vi. 3.18 (44-965). - - Qualities, some differences are not, vi. 3.18 (44-966). - - Qualities, their derivation from affection is of no importance, vi. - 1.11 (42-857). - - Qualities, ugly, are imperfect reasons, vi. 1.10 (42-855). - - Quality, ii. 6 (17-245); iv. 7.5, 9, 10 (2-62 to 80). - - Quality and matter form body, according to Stoics, iv. 7.3 (2-59). - - Quality and thing qualified, relation between, vi. 1.12 (42-858). - - Quality, by it all things depend on the good, i. 7.2 (54-1209). - - Quality, by it, being differences are distinguished, vi. 3.17 - (44-963). - - Quality, category, various derivatives of, vi. 3.19 (44-967). - - Quality consists of a non-essential character, vi. 1.10 (42-855). - - Quality differences cannot be distinguished by sensation, vi. 3.17 - (44-963). - - Quality, intelligible and sense, difference between, ii. 6.3 (17-249). - - Quality is good, a common label or common quality, vi. 7.18 (38-733). - - Quality is not a power but disposition, form and character, vi. 1.10 - (42-854). - - Quality is only figurative name for complement of being, vi. 2.14 - (43-918). - - Quality none in matter, ii. 4.7 (12-204); iv. 7.3 (2-59). - - Quality none in matter which is deprivation, i. 8.11 (51-1157). - - Quality not a primary genus, because posterior to being, vi. 2.14 - (43-917). - - Quality not in matter is an accident, i. 8.10 (51-1157). - - Quality, one, partaken of by capacity and disposition, vi. 1.11 - (42-856). - - Quality, physical need of supreme only by analogy, vi. 9.8 (9-164). - - Quality, psychological theory of, vi. 1.12 (42-858). - - Quality, secondary, not formed by physical powers, vi. 1.11 (42-856). - - Quality, shape is not, vi. 1.11 (42-857). - - Quality, according to the Stoics, vi. 1.29 (42-885). - - Quality, there is only one kind, vi. 1.11 (42-856). - - Quality, various terms expressing it, vi. 3.16 (44-960). - - Quality, whether it alone can be called similar or dissimilar, vi. - 3.15 (44-959). - - Quality-less thing in itself, reached by abstraction, ii. 4.10 - (12-207). - - Quantity, vi. 1.4 (42-841). - - Quantity a secondary genus, therefore not a first, vi. 2.13 (43-915). - - Quantity admits of contraries, vi. 3.11 (44-953). - - Quantity, Aristotelian criticized, vi. 1.4 (42-841). - - Quantity, as equal and unequal, does not refer to the objects, vi. - 1.5 (42-845). - - Quantity category, v. 1.4 (10-180). - - Quantity, continuous and definite, have nothing in common. vi. 1.4 - (42-841). - - Quantity, definition of, includes large and small, vi. 3.11 (44-952). - - Quantity, different kinds of, in magnitudes and numbers, vi. 1.4 - (42-843). - - Quantity, discrete, different from continuous, vi. 3.13 (44-955). - - Quantity, elements of continuous, vi. 3.14 (44-955). - - Quantity, if time is, why a separate category, vi. 1.13 (42-861). - - Quantity in number, but not number in quantity, vi. 1.4 (42-842). - - Quantity in quantative number, v. 5.4 (32-582). - - Quantity is incorporeal, ii. 4.9 (12-207). - - Quantity is speech, 1.5 (42-844). - - Quantity less essential than quality, ii. 8.1 (35-680). - - Quantity not qualities studied by geometry, vi. 3.15 (44-958). - - Quantity, time is not, vi. 1-5 (42-844). - - Question, not to be asked by our order in nature, iii. 3.3 (48-1079). - - Quiddity and being earlier than suchness, ii. 6.2 (17-248). - - Quintessence, ii. 1.2 (40-815); ii. 5.3 (25-346). - - - Radiation joins image to its model, vi. 4.10 (22-300). - - Radiation of an image is generation, v. 1.6 (10-182). - - Radiation of good is creative power, vi. 7.37 (38-761). - - Radiation of light, v. 5.7 (32-586). - - Radiation of multiple unity, v. 3.15 (49-1115). - - Radiation of stars for good, explains their influence, iv. 4.35 - (28-497). - - Radii centering, to explain, soul unifying sensations, iv. 7.6 (2-65). - - Rank, v. 4.2 (7-136); v. 5.4 (32-581). - - Rank after death, depends on state at death, hence progress must be - achieved, i. 9 (16-243). - - Rank of souls, iv. 3.6 (27-397). - - Rank, souls of the second, universal rank, are men, ii. 3.13 - (52-1180). - - Rank third, of existence, should not be occupied by modality, vi. - 1.30 (42-887). - - Rank third of souls, ii. 1.8 (55-1200). - - Ranks in the Universe reasonable for souls to be assigned thereto, - iii. 2.12 (47-1061). - - Ranks of existence, three, ii. 9.13 (33-626); iii. 3.3 (48-1079); - iii. 5.9 (50-1138); vi. 4.11 (22-302); vi. 5.4 (23-318). - - Ranks of existence beneath the beautiful, vi. 7.42 (38-770). - - Ratiocination, has no place even in the world-soul, iv. 4.11 (28-455). - - Ratiocination, souls can reason intuitionally without, iv. 3.18 - (27-416). - - Rationalized matter, body as, ii. 7.3 (37-696). - - Reaction or suffering, definition of, vi. 1.21 (43-872). - - Reactions, need not be passive, but may be active, vi. 1.21 (42-870). - - Real man and we, distinctions between, i. 1.10 (53-1202). - - Real man differs from body, i. 1.10 (53-1203). - - Reality, same different degrees of, are intelligence and life, vi. - 7.18 (38-732). - - Reason and form possessed by everything, ii. 7.3 (37-696). - - Reason as a whole, vi. 5.10 (23-326). - - Reason as derived from intelligence, iii. 2.16 (47-1068). - - Reason cannot be deduced from atoms, iii. 1.2 (3-88). - - Reason, differentiated, would deprive the soul of consciousness, ii. - 9.1 (33-602). - - Reason discursive is not used during discarnation, iv. 3.18 (27-416). - - Reason divine is to blame, iv. 2.10 (47-1059). - - Reason followed, is secret of freedom, iii. 1.9 (3-97). - - Reason has no extension, iv. 7.5 (2-64). - - Reason in head, not in brain, iv. 3.23 (27-425). - - Reason, its influence is only suggestive, i. 2.5 (19-264). - - Reason no explanation of living well, i. 4.2 (46-1022). - - Reason not resulted in foresight of creation, vi. 7.1 (38-697). - - Reason not sufficient explanation of living well, i. 4.2 (46-1022). - - Reason or ideas possessed by intellectual life, vi. 2.21 (43-927). - - Reason, seminal iv. 7.2 (2-58). - - Reason, seminal, produces man, ii. 3.12 (52-1178). - - Reason that begets everything is Jupiter's garden, iii. 5.9 (50-1137). - - Reason, total of the universe, ii. 3.13 (52-1178). - - Reason unites the soul divided by bodies, iv. 9.3 (8-142). - - Reason, universal, is both soul and nature, iii. 8.3 (30-533). - - Reason used only while hindered by obstacles of body, iv. 3.18 - (27-416). - - Reasonable for souls to be assigned to different ranks, iii. 2.12 - (47-1061). - - Reasoning absent in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563). - - Reasoning and foresight are only figurative expressions, vi. 7.1 - (38-699). - - Reasoning and memory not implied by world-soul, wisdom, iv. 4-12 - (28-457). - - Reasoning and memory superseded by world-soul's wisdom, iv. 4.12 - (28-456). - - Reasons are the actualization of the soul that begets the animal, vi. - 7.5 (38-707). - - Reasons, double, iii. 3.4 (48-1081). - - Reasons, not all are qualities, vi. 1.10 (42-854). - - Reasons, unity constituted by contained contraries, iii. 2.16 - (47-1069). - - Reception, transmission, relation, underlies action and experience, - vi. 1.22 (42-874). - - Receptivity accounts for divinity's seeing by individuals, vi. 5.12 - (23-330). - - Receptivity determines participation in the one, vi. 4.11 (22-331). - - Receptivity is limit of participation in divine, iv. 8.6 (6-129). - - Reciprocal nature of all things, iii. 3.6 (48-1080). - - Recognition of divine kinship depends of self knowledge, vi. 9.7 - (9-163). - - Recognition of each other by souls, descending from intelligibles - into heaven, iv. 4.5 (28-447). - - Redemption of world by world-soul, v. 1.2 (10-175). - - Reduction to unity, v. 3.6 (49-1099). - - Reflection, not, but self-necessity, cause of creation of - sense-world, iii. 2.2 (47-1044). - - Reflects everything, does the empty mirror of matter, iii. 6.7 - (26-363). - - Reformatory, are hell's torments, iv. 4.45 (28-511). - - Refraction, lighting fire from, illustrates generation, iii. 6.14 - (26-376). - - Refreshment not needed by stars, which are inexhaustible, ii. 1.8 - (40-827). - - Refutation of James Lange theory, i. 1.5 (53-1196). - - Reincarnation is result of soul-judgments, iv. 8.5 (6-128). - - Rejection of form of approaching souls proves formlessness of the - Supreme, vi. 7.34 (38-756). - - Relation, vi. 1.6 (42-845). - - Relation between external and internal, i. 8.5 (51-1149). - - Relation is a habit or manner of being, vi. 3.27 (44-981). - - Relation is an appendage existing only among definite objects, vi. - 2.16 (43-919). - - Relation of good, intelligence and soul like light, sun and moon, v. - 6.4 (24-337). - - Relation primitive between soul and body, i. 1.3 (53-1194). - - Relation, Stoic, category confuses the new with the anterior, vi. - 1.31 (42-888). - - Relations are simultaneous existences, vi. 1.7 (42-848). - - Relations, are they subjective of objective? vi. 1.7 (42-847). - - Relay of sensation from organ to directing principle, impossible, iv. - 7.7 (2-67). - - Relay transmission, iv. 2.2 (21-280); iv. 5.4 (29-522). - - Relays in spreading light, v. 3.9 (49-1105). - - Remember itself, the soul does not even, iv. 4.2 (28-443). - - Remembers, soul becomes that which she does, iv. 4.3 (28-445). - - Reminiscences of intelligible entities, v. 9.5 (5-107). - - Repentances of gnostics, opposed, ii. 9.6 (33-608). - - Repugnance natural to study of unity, vi. 9.3 (9-15). - - Resemblance lacking, makes contraries, vi. 3.20 (44-970). - - Resemblance of intelligible to earthly based on the converse - (Platonic), v. 8.6 (31-561). - - Resemblance to divinity is soul's welfare, i. 6.6 (1-49). - - Resemblance to divinity, result of homely virtues, i. 2.1 (19-257). - - Resemblance, two kinds, effect and cause or simultaneous effects, i. - 2.2 (19-258). - - Residence and substrate of forms to matter, ii. 4.1 (12-197). - - Residence demanded by forms, against Moderatus of Gades, ii. 4.12 - (12-211). - - Residence, mother, nurse or other nature is matter, iii. 6.18 - (26-382). - - Residence of eternal generation is matter, iii. 6.13 (26-373). - - Residence of form is matter as image of extension, ii. 4.11 (12-210). - - Residence of universal soul is heaven, immortalizing it, ii. 1.4 - (40-817). - - Responsible for our ills, Gods are not, iv. 4.37 (28-500). - - Responsible, spontaneity not affected by involuntariness, iii. 2.10 - (47-1060). - - Responsibility depends solely on involuntariness, vi. 8.1 (39-774). - - Responsibility not injured by guidance of Daemon, iii. 4.5 (15-238). - - Responsibility not to be shifted from responsible reason, iii. 2.15 - (47-1065). - - Rest, v. 1.4 (10-178); v. 3.7 (49-1101). - - Rest and motion below one, iii. 9.7 (13-225). - - Rest and movement distinction also inapplicable, ii. 9.1 (33-600). - - Rest, as category, iii. 7.1 (45-987); vi. 2.7 (43-903). - - Rest consists of change, iv. 8.1 (6-119). - - Rest, intelligible, the form by which all consists, v. 1.7 (10-184). - - Rest of Heraclitus, description of ecstatic goal, vi. 9.8 (9-165); - vi. 9.11 (9-170). - - Resultance of causes is anything, ii. 3.14 (52-1181). - - Results of ecstasy, remaining close to divinity, v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Retirement of soul is to superior power, v. 2.2 (11-195). - - Retribution divine, all are led to it by secret road, iv. 4.45 - (28-511). - - Return of prodigal, i. 6.8 (1-52). - - Return of soul to intelligible by three paths, i. 3.1 (20-270). - - Return of soul to its principle on destruction of body, v. 2.2 - (11-195). - - Revealers of the eternal, are sense-objects, iv. 8.6 (6-130). - - Revelation of divine power expresses true knowledge, ii. 9.9 (33-617). - - Rewards may be neglected by good, iii. 2.8 (47-1055). - - Rhea, iii. 6.19 (26-385); v. 1.7 (10-185). - - Riches, inequality of no moment to an eternal being, ii. 9.9 (33-616). - - Ridiculous to complain of lower nature of animals, iii. 2.9 (47-1059). - - Ridiculous to expect perfections, but deny it to nature, ii. 9.5 - (33-607). - - Right of leaving world reserved by wise men, i. 4.16 (46-1039). - - Rises to the good, does the soul, by scorning all things below, vi. - 7.31 (38-750). - - Roads, secret, leads all to retribution, iv. 4.45 (27-511). - - Rocks have greatest nonentity, iii. 6.6 (26-361). - - Rush of soul towards the one, v. 3.17 (49-1120). - - - Same principle, how can it exist in all things? vi. 4.6 (22-295). - - Same principle, how various things can participate, vi. 4.12 (22-303). - - Same thing not seen in the Supreme by different persons, v. 8.12 - (31-571). - - Sample is only thing we can examine, v. 8.3 (33-555). - - Sample that must be purified, is image of intelligence, v. 8.3 - (31-555). - - Sanative element of life, is Providence, iii. 3.5 (48-1084). - - Sanctuary, inner, penetrations into, resulting advantage of ecstasy, - v. 8.11 (31-569). - - Sanctuary of ecstasy, i. 6.8 (1-52); i. 8.7 (51-1152); v. 8.4 - (31-557); vi. 9.11 (9-169). - - Sanctuary of mysteries, i. 6.6 (1-50). - - Satiety does not produce scorn, in the intelligible, v. 8.4 (31-558). - - Satisfaction of desire to live is not happiness, i. 5.2 (36-684). - - Saturn, v. 1.7 (10-185); v. 8.13 (31-573); iv. 4.31 (28-489). - - Saturn and Mars, relations are quite illogical, ii 3.5 (52-1169). - - Saturn held down by chains, v. 8.13 (31-573). - - Saturnian realm, vi. 1.4 (10-178). - - Scheme, part in it soul must fit itself to, iii. 2.17 (47-1071). - - Science does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-920). - - Science is either a movement or something composite, vi. 2.18 - (43-923). - - Science is present in the whole, potentially at least, v. 9.8 (5-111). - - Science is the actualization of the notions that are potential - science, vi. 2.20 (43-925). - - Science, part and whole in it not applicable to soul, iv. 3.2 - (27-390). - - Science's, greatest is touched with the good, vi. 7.3 (38-760). - - Scorn not produced by satiety in the intelligible world, v. 8.4 - (31-558). - - Scorn of life implies good, vi. 7.29 (38-748). - - Scorn of this world no guarantee of goodness, ii. 9.16 (33-630). - - Scorning all things below, soul rises to the good, vi. 7.31 (38-750). - - Sculptor, v. 9.3 (5-104). - - Seal of wax, impressions on, are sensations, iv. 7.6 (2-66). - - Second must be perfect, v. 4.1 (7-136). - - Second necessarily begotten by first, v. 4.1 (7-135). - - Second rank of universe, souls of men, ii. 3.13 (52-1180). - - Secondary evil is accidental formlessness, i. 8.8 (51-1154). - - Secondary evil is matter, i. 8.4 (51-1146). - - Secondary evil of soul, i. 8.5 (51-1148). - - Secrecy of mystery-rites explains ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-171). - - Secret powers in everything, iv. 4.37 (28-500). - - Secret road, leads all to divine retribution, iv. 4.45 (28-511). - - Seeing God without emotion, sign of lack of unification, vi. 9.4 - (9-155). - - Seeking anything beyond life, departs from it, vi. 5.12 (23-331). - - Seeming to be beautiful satisfies, but only being good satisfies, v. - 5.12 (32-594). - - Seems as if the begotten was a universal soul, vi. 4.14 (22-307). - - Seen the Supreme, no one who has calls him chance, vi. 8.19 (39-807). - - Self autocracy, vi. 8.21 (39-807). - - Self-consciousness can exist in a simple principle, v. 3.1 (49-1090). - - Self-consciousness consists of becoming intelligence, v. 3.4 - (49-1096). - - Self-consciousness is not needed by self-sufficient good, vi. 7.38 - (38-763). - - Self-consciousness is more perfect in intelligence than in the soul, - v. 3.6 (49-1098). - - Self-consciousness result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Self-control is assimilation to divinity, i. 2.5 (19-263). - - Self-control limited by soul's purification, v. 2.5 (19-263). - - Self-development, one object of incarnation, v. 8.5 (31-559). - - Self-esteem, proper, v. 1.1 (10-173). - - Self-existence possessed by essence, vi. 6.18 (34-678). - - Self-glorified, image of a trap on way to ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569). - - Self is the soul, iv. 7.1 (2-57). - - Self-luminous statues in intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-558). - - Self-sufficiency of supreme, v. 3.17 (49-1120). - - Self-victory over, mastery of fate, ii. 3.15 (52-1182). - - Seminal reason, ii. 6.1 (17-246); iii. 1.8 (3-97). - - Seminal reason does not contain order, iv. 4.16 (28-461). - - Seminal reason harmonizes with its appearing actualization, vi. 3.16 - (44-960). - - Seminal reason produces man, ii. 3.12 (52-1178). - - Seminal reasons, v. 8.2 (31-553); v. 7.1 (18-252). - - Seminal reasons, as qualified matter would be composite and - secondary, vi. 1.29 (42-886). - - Seminal reasons, cause of difference of things, v. 7.1 (18-251). - - Seminal reasons cause the soul, ii. 3.16 (52-1184). - - Seminal reasons may be contrary to soul's nature, but not to soul, - vi. 7.7 (38-710). - - Sensation, v. 1.7 (10-184). - - Sensation and memory, iv. 6 (41-829). - - Sensation and memory, Stoic doctrines of, hang together, iv. 6.1 - (41-829). - - Sensation as dream of the soul, from which we must wake, iii. 6.6 - (26-363). - - Sensation cannot distinguish quality differences, vi. 3.17 (44-963). - - Sensation cannot reach truth, v. 5.1 (32-576). - - Sensations cause of emotion, iv. 4.28 (28-482). - - Sensation equivalent to good, i. 4.2 (46-1021). - - Sensation depends on sense-shape, iv. 4.23 (28-473). - - Sensation, external and internal, i. 1-7 (53-1199). - - Sensation implies the feeling soul, i. 1.6 (53-1198). - - Sensation, intermediary, demands conceptive thought, iv. 4.23 - (28-472). - - Sensation is limited to the common integral parts of the universe, - iv. 5.8 (29-529). - - Sensation must first be examined, iv. 4.22 (28-472). - - Sensation not a soul distraction, iv. 4.25 (28-477). - - Sensation not in head, but in brain, iv. 3.23 (27-425). - - Sensation, psychology of, iv. 3.26 (27-430). - - Sensation relayed from organ to directing principle impossible, iv. - 7.7 (2-67). - - Sensation taken as their guide, Stoic's fault, vi. 1.28 (42-884). - - Sensations are actualizations, not only in sight, but in all senses, - iv. 6.3 (41-835). - - Sensations are not experiences but relative actualizations, iv. 6.2 - (41-831). - - Sensations as impressions on seal of wax, iv. 7.5 (2-66). - - Sensations distract from thought, iv. 8.8 (6-132). - - Sense beauties, less delightful than moral, i. 6.4 (1-44). - - Sense beauty, transition to intellectual, i. 6.3 (1-45). - - Sense being, common element, in matter form and combination, vi. 3.4 - (44-940). - - Sense growth and emotions lead to divisibility, iv. 3.19 (27-418). - - Sense objects are intermediate between form and matter, iii. 6.17 - (26-381). - - Sense objects, how are not evil, iii. 2.8 (47-1055). - - Sense objects, men, v. 9.1 (9-148). - - Sense objects, motion for, vi. 3.23 (44-976). - - Sense objects reveal eternal, iv. 8.6 (6-130). - - Sense objects unreal, made up of appearance, iii. 6.12 (26-371). - - Sense organs, sense better without medium however passible, iv. 5.1 - (29-515). - - Sense power of soul deals only with external things, v. 3.2 (49-1091). - - Sense qualities, many other conceptions belong among them, vi. 3.16 - (44-961). - - Sense shape, like tools, is intermediate, iv. 4.23 (28-473). - - Sense world created not by reflection but self-necessity, iii. 2.2 - (47-1044). - - Sense world has less unity than intelligible world, vi. 5.10 (23-322). - - Sense world, the generation in it, is what being is in the - intelligible, iv. 3.3 (27-392). - - Senses, not given only for utility, iv. 4.24 (28-475). - - Senses not given to man, from experience of misfortune, vi. 7.1 - (38-697). - - Senses of earth may be different from ours, iv. 4.26 (28-478). - - Sentiments, most keenly felt, constitute people lovers, i. 6.4 (1-46). - - Separation of soul from body, enables soul to use it, i. 1.3 - (53-1193). - - Separation of soul from body is death, i. 6.6 (1-49). - - Separation of soul from body, process involved, iii. 6.5 (26-359). - - Separation refers not only to body but accretions, i. 1.12 (53-1204). - - Sex alone would not account for differences of things, v. 7.2 - (18-252). - - Shadows necessary to the perfection of a picture, iii. 2.11 (47-1060). - - Shape is not a quality, but a specific appearance of reason, vi. 1.11 - (42-857). - - Shape is the actualization, thought the form of being, v. 9.8 (5-111). - - Shape received from elsewhere, v. 9.5 (5-107). - - Shapeless impressions of, differ from mental blank, ii. 4.10 (12-207). - - Shapeless shaper, essential beauty and the transcendent to Supreme, - vi. 7.33 (38-754). - - Sight, ii. 8 (35-680). - - Sight, actualize as thought, v. 1.5 (10-181). - - Sight and thought form but one, v. 1.5 (10-181). - - Sight, sense of, does not possess the image seen within it, iv. 6.1 - (41-829). - - Sight, two methods of, form and light, v. 5.7 (32-586). - - Significance of punishments and misfortunes, iv. 3.16 (27-414). - - Silence, v. 1.2 (10-175). - - Simile from lighting fire from refraction, iii. 6.14 (26-376). - - Simile of abstraction, triangles, circles, iv. 7.8 (2-69). - - Simile of badly tuned lyre cannot produce harmony, ii. 3.13 (52-1180). - - Simile of captive in golden chains--matter, i. 8.15 (51-1163). - - Simile of cave and grotto, iv. 8.1 (6-120). - - Simile of center and circular intelligence, vi. 8.18 (39-804). - - Simile of choral ballet, vi. 9.8 (9-165). - - Simile of circles, v. 8.7 (31-563); iv. 4.16 (28-462). - - Simile of clear gold, admitting its real nature, iv. 7.10 (2-81). - - Simile of cosmic choric ballet, vi. 9.8 (9-165). - - Simile of Cupid and Psyche, vi. 9.9 (9-167). - - Simile of drama of life, allows for good and bad, iii. 2.18 (47-1072). - - Simile of face in several mirrors, i. 1.8 (53-1200). - - Simile of foreknowledge of physician to explain Providence, iii. 3.5 - (48-1085). - - Simile of guest and architect of house, ii. 9.18 (33-635). - - Simile of head with three faces all round, vi. 5.7 (23-320). - - Simile of light in air, as soul is present in body, iv. 3.22 (27-423). - - Simile of light remaining on high, while shining down, iv. 8.3 - (6-124). - - Simile of light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 (24-337). - - Simile of love that watches at door of the beloved, vi. 5.10 (23-325). - - Simile of man fallen in mud, needing washing, i. 6.5 (1-48). - - Simile of man with feet in bath tub, vi. 9.8 (9-163). - - Simile of mirror, i. 4.10 (46-1034). - - Simile of mob in assembly, vi. 4.15 (22-310). - - Simile of net in the sea for universe in soul, iv. 3.9 (27-405). - - Simile of opinion and imagination illustrates relation between matter - and reason, iii. 6.15 (26-377). - - Simile of overweighted birds, sensual man, v. 9.1 (5-102). - - Simile of peak, formed by uniting of souls, vi. 7.15 (38-726). - - Simile of pilot governing the ship, i. 1.3 (53-1194). - - Simile of platonic vision theory to explain simultaneity of unity and - duality, v. 6.1 (24-333). - - Simile of prearranged dance as star's motion, iv. 4.33 (28-492). - - Simile of radii around centre, iv. 2.1 (21-277). - - Simile of radii centering, to explain unifying sensations, iv. 7.4 - (2-277). - - Simile of radii meeting in centre, i. 7.1 (54-1209). - - Simile of ray from centre to circumference, iv. 1 (4-100). - - Simile of science explains whole and part, iii. 9.3 (13-222); iv. 9.5 - (8-145). - - Simile of seal on wax, iv. 9.4 (8-144). - - Simile of seed to explain unity of essence in many souls, iv. 9.5 - (8-145). - - Simile of spring of water, iii. 8.1 (30-547). - - Simile of striking cord of a lyre, vi. 5.10 (23-326). - - Simile of sun and light, vi. 5.5 (23-319). - - Simile of the sun's rays, vi. 5.5 (23-319). - - Simile of the tree of the universe, iii. 8.10 (30-547). - - Simile of vine and branches, v. 3.7 (48-1088). - - Simile, Platonic, of drivers of horses, ii. 3.13 (52-1179). - - Simple and not compound is the Supreme, ii. 9.1 (33-599). - - Simple bodies, their existence demands that of world-soul, iv. 7.2 - (2-57). - - Simple is the soul; composite the body, iv. 7.3 (2-59). - - Simple nothing is, v. 9.3 (5-104). - - Simple, without something simple nothing manifold could exist, ii. - 4.3 (12-199). - - Simple's existence necessary to that of one, v. 6.3 (24-336). - - Simplification, approach of soul to good, i. 6.6 (1-50). - - Simplification as path to unity, vi. 9.3 (9-152). - - Simplification of ecstasy, super beauty and super virtue, vi. 9.11 - (9-170). - - Simplicity of principle, insures its freedom of action, vi. 8.4 - (39-779). - - Simplicity the intelligent, does not deny compositeness, vi. 7.13 - (38-722). - - Simplicity the intelligible, implies height of source, vi. 7.13 - (38-722). - - Simultaneity of end and principle in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563). - - Simultaneity of everything in the intelligible world, iv. 4.1 - (28-441). - - Simultaneity of the intelligible permits no memory, iv. 4.1 (28-441). - - Simultaneous giving and receiving by world-soul, iv. 8.7 (6-132). - - Simultaneous of one and many, intelligence contains the infinite as - vi. 7.14 (38-725). - - Simultaneous unity and duality of thought, v. 6.1 (24-333). - - Simultaneous within and without is vi. 4.7 (22-295). - - Sin and justice, not destroyed by superficiality of misfortunes, iii. - 2.16 (47-1067). - - Sister beneficent, is world-soul to our soul, ii. 9.17 (33-633). - - Situation, as Aristotelian category, vi. 1.24 (42-877). - - Slavery of good, accuses Providence, iii. 2.6 (47-1062). - - Socrates, i. 8.7; iii. 2.15; iv. 3.5; ii. 5.2; vi. 2.1; vi. 3.6, 15. - - Socrates (as representative man), v. 1.4 (10-179); v. 7.1 (18-251). - - Solid things, nearest nonentity, iii. 6.6 (26-361). - - Solution of puzzle is that being is everywhere present, vi. 5.3 - (23-317). - - "Somewhat," a particle to modify, any statement about the supreme, - vi. 8.13 (39-797). - - Son, begotten by supreme, report of ecstasy, see pun on "koros," iii. - 8.11 (30-550); v. 8.12 (31-571). - - Soul, after reaching yonder does not stay; reasons why, vi. 9.10 - (9-168). - - Soul alone possesses memory, iv. 3.26 (7-432). - - Soul and body consequences of mixture, i. 1.4 (53-1194). - - Soul and body form fusion, iv. 4.18 (28-465). - - Soul and body mixture impossible, i. 1.4 (53-1195). - - Soul and body, primitive relation between, i. 1.3 (53-1194). - - Soul and body, relation between, vi. 3.19 (27-418). - - Soul and intelligence, besides ideas, contained in intelligible - world, v. 9.13 (5-116). - - Soul and judgment, passibility of, iii. 6.1 (26-350). - - Soul and relation with God and individual, i. 1.8 (53-1200). - - Soul and soul essence, distinction between, i. 1.2 (53-1192). - - Soul and we, the relation between, i. 1.13 (53-1206). - - Soul as divisible and indivisible, iv. 2.2 (21-279). - - Soul as hypostatic actualization of intelligence, v. 1.3 (10-177). - - Soul as number, v. 1.5 (10-180). - - Soul becomes what she remembers, iv. 4.3 (28-445). - - Soul begets her combination, its nature, vi. 7.5 (38-708). - - Soul begets many because incorporeal, iv. 7.4 (8-144). - - Soul being impassable, everything contrary is figurative, iii. 6.2 - (26-354). - - Soul both divisible and indivisible, iv. 1 (4-100). - - Soul can penetrate body, iv. 7.8 (2-72). - - Soul cannot be corporeal, iv. 7.8 (2-70). - - Soul cannot be entirely dragged down, ii. 9.2 (33-603). - - Soul cannot lose parts, ii. 7.5 (2-63). - - Soul cannot possess evil within herself, i. 8.11 (51-1158). - - Soul capable of extension, vi. 4.1 (22-286). - - Soul celestial of world, iii. 5.3 (50-1128). - - Soul, circular movement of, iv. 4.16 (28-462). - - Soul, combination as mixture or resultant product, i, 1.1 (53-1191). - - Soul conforms destiny to her character, iii. 4.5 (15-238). - - Soul contains body, iv. 8.20 (27-421). - - Soul-difference between individual universal, iv. 3.7 (27-399). - - Soul directed by natural law, ii. 3.8 (52-1173). - - Soul divisible, mixed and double, ii. 3.9 (52-1176). - - Soul does not entirely enter into body, iv. 8.8 (6-132). - - Soul does not even remember herself, iv. 4.2 (28-443). - - Soul double, iii. 3.4 (48-1081); iv. 3.31 (27-438). - - Soul descended into world vestige of, is Daemon, iii. 5.6 (50-1132). - - Soul distraction, sensation is not, iv. 4.25 (28-477); iii. 4.6 - (15-241). - - Soul divisible, how she divides at death, iv. 1 (4-100). - - Soul entire, fashioned whole and individuals, vi. 5.8 (23-322). - - Soul essence derives from her being, vi. 2.6 (43-900). - - Soul exerts a varied action, iv. 7.4 (2-62). - - Soul feeling implied by sensation, i. 1.6 (53-1198). - - Soul feels passions without experiencing them, iv. 4.19 (28-466). - - Soul gives life to psychologic elements, i. 1.8 (53-1200). - - Soul, good and intelligence related to light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 - (24-337). - - Soul governs body as pilot the ship, i. 1.3 (53-1194). - - Soul, greatness of, nothing to do with size of body, vi. 4.5 (22-293). - - Soul has double aspect, to body and to intelligence, iv. 8.7 (6-131). - - Soul has no corporeal possibility, hence incorporeal, iv. 7.2 (2-57). - - Soul has to exist in twofold sphere, iv. 8.7 (6-130). - - Soul has various motions, iv. 7.5 (2-62). - - Soul, healthy, can work, iv. 3.4 (27-395). - - Soul, herself, body-user and combination of both, i. 1.1 (53-1191). - - Soul, how can she remain impassible, though given up to emotion, iii. - 6.1 (26-350). - - Soul, how she comes to know vice, i. 8.9 (51-1155). - - Soul human, as independent principle, iii. 1.8 (3-97). - - Soul human, when in body, has possibilities up or down, iv. 8.7 - (6-131). - - Soul, if she were corporeal body, would have no sensation, iv. 7.6 - (2-64). - - Soul, immortal, i. 1.2 (53-1192). - - Soul, impassibility of, iii. 6.1 (26-350). - - Soul imperishable, iv. 7.12 (2-82). - - Soul in body as form is in matter, iv. 3.20 (27-421). - - Soul in body as whole in a part, iv. 3.20 (27-421). - - Soul in the body as light in the air, iv. 3.22 (27-423). - - Soul, individual, born of intelligence, vi. 2.22 (43-929). - - Soul intelligence, good are like light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 (24-337). - - Soul, intermediary elemental, also inadmissible, ii. 9.5 (33-607). - - Soul invisible, cause of these emotions, i. 6.5 (1-46). - - Soul is a definite essence, as particular being, vi. 2.5 (43-900). - - Soul is a number, vi. 5.9 (23-324); v. 1.5 (10-180). - - Soul is a simple actualization, whose essence is life, iv. 7.12 - (2-83). - - Soul is a simple (substance) the man himself, iv. 7.3 (2-59). - - Soul is a whole of distinct divisible and indivisible parts, iv. 3.19 - (27-419). - - Soul is all things, iii. 4.3 (15-236). - - Soul is artist of the universe, iv. 7.13 (2-84). - - Soul is both being and life, vi. 2.6 (43-901). - - Soul is both punishable and impassible, i. 1.12 (53-1204). - - Soul is double (see Hercules), iv. 3.31 (27-438). - - Soul is everywhere entire, iv. 7.5 (2-63). - - Soul is free by intelligence, which is free by itself, vi. 8.7 - (39-783). - - Soul is formed governing the body (Aristotle), i. 1.4 (53-1195). - - Soul is formed inseparable from body (Alexander of Aphrodisia), i. - 1.4 (53-1195). - - Soul is in body as pilot is in ship, iv. 3.21 (27-422); i. 1.3 - (53-1194). - - Soul is individuality, and is form and workman of body, iv. 7.1 - (2-57). - - Soul is infinite as comprising many souls, vi. 4.4 (22-296). - - Soul is located, not in body, but body in soul, iv. 3.20 (27-423). - - Soul is matter of intelligence (form), v. 1.3 (10-178). - - Soul is neither harmony nor entelechy, iv. 7.8 (2-74). - - Soul is partly mingled and separated from body, i. 1.3 (53-1193). - - Soul is prior to body, iv. 7.8 (2-74). - - Soul is substantial from one being, simple matter, iv. 7.4 (2-61). - - Soul is the potentiality of producing, not of becoming, ii. 5.3 - (25-346). - - Soul, its being, iv. 1 (4-100). - - Soul leaving body, leaves trace of life, iv. 4.29 (28-483). - - Soul light forms animal nature, i. 1.7 (53-1198). - - Soul, like divinity, is always one, iv. 3.8 (27-402). - - Soul like face in several mirrors, i. 1.8 (53-1200). - - Soul may be said to come and go, iii. 9.3 (13-223). - - Soul may have two faults, iv. 8.5 (6-128). - - Soul must be one and manifold, even on Stoic hypotheses, iv. 2.2 - (21-281). - - Soul must be stripped of form to shine in primary nature, vi. 9.7 - (9-161). - - Soul must first be dissected from body to examine her, vi. 3.1 - (44-934). - - Soul must fit herself to her part in the scheme, iii. 2.1, 7 - (47-1071). - - Soul necessary to unify manifold sensations, iv. 7.6 (2-65). - - Soul needed by body for life, iv. 3.19 (27-418). - - Soul not decomposable, iv. 7.1, 4 (2-84). - - Soul not evil by herself but by degeneration, i. 8.4 (51). - - Soul not in body as part in a whole, iv. 3.20 (27-421). - - Soul not in body as quality in a substrate, iii. 9.3 (13-222). - - Soul not in body, but body in soul, iv. 4.15 (28-460). - - Soul not in time, though her actions and reactions are, v. 9.4 - (5-106). - - Soul not the limit of one ascent, why? v. 9.4 (5-106). - - Soul obeys fate only when evil, iii. 1.10 (47-1060). - - Soul of the unity, proves that of the Supreme, vi. 5.9 (23-323). - - Soul originates movements, but is not altered, iii. 6.3 (26-355). - - Soul power everywhere, localized in special organ, iv. 3.23 (27-424). - - Soul power revealed in simultaneity of control over world, v. 1.2 - (10-176). - - Soul powers remain the same throughout all changes of body, iv. 3.8 - (27-402). - - Soul pristine, precious, v. 1.2 (10-176). - - Soul, psychological distinctions in, i. 1.1 (53-1191). - - Soul pure, would remain isolated, iv. 4.23 (28-473). - - Soul puzzle of her being one, yet in all, iv. 3.4 (27-394). - - Soul, rational, if separated what would she remember? iv. 3.27 - (27-433). - - Soul receives her form from intelligence, iii. 9.5 (15-224). - - Soul related to it might have been darkness, ii. 9.12 (33-625). - - Soul remains incorporeal, vi. 7.31 (38-750). - - Soul rises to the good by scorning all things below, iv. 3.20 - (27-422). - - Soul said to be in body because body alone is visible, vi. 7.35 - (38-757). - - Soul scorns even thought, she is intellectualized and ennobled, iv. - 3.4 (27-395). - - Soul, sick, devoted to her body, iv. 4.1 (28-441). - - Soul, speech in the intelligible world, ii. 9.2 (33-603). - - Soul split into three, intelligible, intermediary and sense-world. - - Soul symbolizes double Hercules, i. 1.13 (53-1206). - - Soul, the two between them, partition the fund of memory, iv. 3.31 - (27-439). - - Soul, three principles, reason, imagination and sensation, ii. 3.9 - (52-1175). - - Soul, to which of ours does individuality belong, ii. 9.2 (33-603). - - Soul, triune, one nature for three powers, iv. 9.5 (51-1163). - - Soul unharmed, if her flight from here below is prompt enough, i. - 7.26 (1-50). - - Soul unity does not resemble reason unity, as it includes plurality, - vi. 2.6 (43-901). - - Soul, universal, is everywhere entire, vi. 4.9 (22-300). - - Soul uses the body as tool, i. 1.3 (53-1193). - - Soul unconscious of her higher part, if distracted by sense, iv. 8.8 - (6-132). - - Soul will not seem entirely within us, if functions are not - localized, iv. 3.20 (27-419). - - Soul's action divided by division of time, iv. 4.15 (28-460). - - Soul's activity is triple: thinking, self-preservation and creation, - iv. 8.3 (6-125). - - Soul's affection compared to lyre, iii. 6.4 (26-357). - - Souls all are one in the world soul, but are different, iv. 9.1 - (8-139). - - Souls all have their demon which is their love. iii. 5.4 (50-1129). - - Souls are as immortal as the one from whom they proceed, vi. 4.10 - (22-301). - - Souls are plural unity of seminal reasons, vi. 2.5 (43-899). - - Souls are united by their highest, vi. 9.15 (38-726). - - Souls as amphibious, iv. 8.4 (6-126). - - Soul's ascension to eligible world, ii. 9.2 (13-222). - - Soul's bodies may be related differently, iv. 4.29 (28-485). - - Souls can reason intuitionally without ratiocination, iv. 3.18 - (27-417). - - Souls cannot lose parts, iv. 7.5 (2-63). - - Soul's condition in higher regions, iii. 4.6 (15-240). - - Soul conforms destiny to her character, iii. 4.5 (15-238). - - Soul's conformity to universal, proves they are not parts of her, iv. - 3.2 (27-389). - - Soul's descent into body, iii. 9.3 (13-222). - - Soul's desire, liver seat of, iv. 4.28 (28-480). - - Soul's destiny depends on condition of birth of universe, ii. 3.14 - (52-1181). - - Souls develop manifoldness as intelligence does, iv. 3.5 (27-396). - - Souls differ as do the sensations, vi. 4.6 (22-294). - - Souls, difference between, iv. 3.8 (27-400). - - Souls, do all form a single one, iv. 9 (8-139). - - Soul's dream is sensation, iii. 6.6 (26-363). - - Souls first go in Heaven in the intelligible world, iv. 3.17 (27-415). - - Souls form a genetic but not numeric unity, iv. 9.1 (8-146). - - Souls that enter into this world generate a love demon, iii. 5.6 - (50-1132). - - Soul's highest part always remains above body. v. 2.1 (11-194). - - Soul's highest part, even whole, sees vision of intelligible wisdom, - v. 8.10 (31-568). - - Souls, how they come to descend, iv. 3.13 (27-410). - - Soul's immortality, iv. 7 (2-56). - - Soul's incarnation is for perfection of universe, iv. 8.5 (6-127). - - Souls incorporeal dwell within intelligence, iv. 3.24 (27-427). - - Souls, individual, are the emanations of the universal, iv. 3.1 - (27-388). - - Soul's instrument is the body, iv. 7.1 (2-56). - - Soul's lower part, in sense world, fashions body, v. 1.10 (10-190). - - Souls may be unified without being identical, iv. 9.2 (8-140). - - Soul's mediation between indivisible and divisible essence, iv. 2 - (21-279). - - Soul's memory in intelligible world, iv. 4.1 (28-441). - - Soul's mixture of reason and indetermination, iii. 5.7 (50-1133). - - Soul's multiplicity, based on their unity, iv. 9.4 (7-843). - - Soul's nature is intermediate, iv. 8.7 (6-130). - - Souls not isolated from intelligence during descent, iv. 3.12 - (27-409). - - Souls of stars and incarnate humans govern worlds untroubledly, iv. - 8.2 (6-123). - - Souls of the second universal rank are men, ii. 3.13 (52-1180). - - Soul's powers differ and thence do not act everywhere, iv. 9.3 - (8-143). - - Soul's primary and secondary evil, iii. 8.5 (30-538). - - Souls prognosticate but do not cause event, ii. 3.6 (52-1171). - - Soul's purification and separation, iii. 6.5 (26-359). - - Soul's relation to body is that of statue and metal, iv. 7.8 (2-176). - - Soul's relation to intelligence is that of matter to form, v. 1.3 - (10-178). - - Souls resemble various forms of governments, iv. 4.17 (28-464). - - Souls retain unity and differences, on different levels, iv. 3.5 - (27-396). - - Soul's separation from body enables her to use the body as tool, i. - 1.3 (53-1193). - - Souls show kinship to world by fidelity to their own nature, iii. 3.1 - (48-1077). - - Soul's superior and inferior bodies related in three ways, iv. 4.29 - (28-485). - - Souls that change their condition alone have memory, iv. 4.6 (28-448). - - Souls united, intelligence shined down from the peak formed by them, - vi. 7.15 (38-726). - - Souls united to world-souls by functions, iv. 3.2 (27-392). - - Souls weakened by individual contemplation, iv. 8.4 (6-125). - - Soul's welfare is resemblance to divinity, i. 6.6 (1-49). - - Souls, why they take different kinds of bodies, iv. 3.12 (27-410). - - Source, common, by it all things are united, vi. 7.12 (38-721). - - Source, height of, implied by simplicity of the intelligible, vi. - 7.13 (38-722). - - Sowing of soul in stars and matter, iv. 8.45 (6-127). - - Space, 5.1, 10. - - Space, corporeal, iv. 3.20 (27-420). - - Space has nothing to do with intelligible light, which is - non-spatial, v. 5.7 (29-526). - - Space, result of procession of the universal soul, iii. 7.10 - (45-1006). - - Space said to measure movement because of its determination, iii. - 7.11 (45-1011). - - Species destroyed by fundamental unity, vi. 2.2 (43-894). - - Spectacle Divine in ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170). - - Spectator of vision becomes participator, v. 8.10 (31-569). - - Speech is a quantity, vi. 3.12 (44-954). - - Speech is a quantity, classification of, vi. 3.12 (44-954). - - Speech of soul in the intelligible world, iv. 4.1 (28-441). - - Spherical figure, intelligible is the primitive one, vi. 6.17 - (34-675). - - Spindle of fate (significance), ii. 3.9 (52-1174); iii. 4.6 (15-242). - - Spirit and its apportionment, iv. 7.8 (2-69). - - Spirits inanimate, i. 4.7 (2-56). - - Spiritual becomes love, begun physically, vi. 7.33 (38-755). - - Spiritual body, ii. 2.2 (14-231). - - Spiritual gnostic distinction of men, ii. 9.18 (33-637). - - Spiritual men, v. 9.1 (5-102). - - Splendor, last view of revelation, v. 8.10 (31-567). - - Splitting of intelligible principle, ii. 4.5 (12-202). - - Splitting of unity typified by mutilation of Saturn, v. 8.13 (31-573). - - Splitting up of soul at death, iii. 4.6 (15-241). - - Spontaneity not affected by irresponsible, iii. 2.10 (47-1060). - - Stability and essence, distinction between, vi. 2.7 (43-903). - - Stability and movement exist because thought by intelligence, vi. 2.8 - (43-904). - - Stability another kind of movement, vi. 2.7 (43-903). - - Stability, distinction from, vi. 3.27 (44-980). - - Stability does not imply stillness in the intelligible, vi. 3.27 - (44-982). - - Stability of essence only accidental, vi. 9.3 (9-153). - - Standard human cannot measure world soul, ii. 9.7 (33-612). - - Star action mingled only affects already natural process, ii. 3.12 - (52-1166). - - Star-soul and world-soul intellectual differences, iv. 4.17 (28-463). - - Stars affect physical, not essential being, iii. 1.6 (3-95). - - Stars and world-soul are impassable, iv. 4.42 (28-506). - - Stars answer prayers unconsciously, iv. 4.42 (28-505). - - Stars are inexhaustible and need no refreshment, ii. 1.8 (40-827). - - Stars are they animate? - - Stars are they inanimate? - - Stars, as well as sun, may be prayed to, iv. 4.30 (28-486). - - Stars, body or will do not sway earthly events, iv. 4.35 (28-495). - - Stars by their body produce only passions of universe, ii. 3.10 - (52-1177). - - Stars contain not only fire but earth, ii. 1.6 (40-821). - - Stars do not need memories to answer prayers, iv. 4.42 (28-505). - - Stars follow the universal kind, ii. 3.13 (52-1179). - - Stars have no memory, because uniformly blissful, iv. 4.42 (28-505). - - Stars influence is from contemplation of intelligible world, iv. 4.35 - (28-496). - - Stars motion compared to a prearranged dance, iv. 4.33 (28-492). - - Stars natural radiation of good, explains their influence, iv. 4.35 - (28-497). - - Stars predict because of soul's accidents, ii. 3.10 (52-1177). - - Stars serve as letters in which to read nature, iii. 1.6 (3-95). - - Stars, souls govern worlds untroubled by, iv. 8.2 (6-123). - - Stars sway general but not detailed fate, iv. 4.31 (28-487). - - Stars, what is and what is not produced by them, ii. 3.13 (52-1178). - - Statue, art makes out of rough marble, v. 8.1 (31-551). - - Statue, composite of form and matter, v. 9.3 (5-504). - - Statue, essential beings as statues, v. 8.4 (31-558). - - Statue, heating of statue by metal only indirect, vi. 1.21 (42-874). - - Statue, justice as self born intellectual statue, vi. 6 (34-653). - - Statue, metal is not potentiality of statue, ii. 5.1 (25-342). - - Statue, purified cleans within herself divine statues, v. 7.10 (2-81). - - Statue, shining in front rank is unity, v. 1.6 (10-182). - - Statue, soul is to body as metal is to statue, iv. 7.8 (2-76). - - Statues at entrance of temples left behind, vi. 9.9 (9-170). - - Statues of palace of divinity, vi. 7.35 (38-758). - - Sterility of nature indicated by castration, iii. 6.19 (26-385). - - Still, why the heavens do not remain, ii. 9.1 (40-814). - - Stillness, not implied by stability in the intelligible, vi. 3.27 - (44-980). - - Stoic explanation of beauty, symmetry, opposed, i. 6.1 (1-41). - - Stoic four categories evaporate, leaving matter as basis, vi. 1.29 - (42-886). - - Stoic God is only modified matter, vi. 1.27 (45-881). - - Stoic relation category confuses new with anterior, vi. 1.31 (42-888). - - Stoics, v. 9.4 (5-106). - - Stoics' fault is to have taken sensation as their guide, vi. 1.28 - (42-884). - - Stones growing while in earth, iv. 4.27 (28-479); vi. 7.11 (38-718). - - Straight line represents sensation, while the soul is like a circle, - v. 1.7 (10-184). - - Straight movement, vi. 4.2 (22-288); ii. 2.12 (14-231). - - Studied world must be just as one would analyze the voice, vi. 3.1 - (44-933). - - Study of time makes us descend from the intelligible, iii. 7.6 - (45-995). - - Sub-conscious nature hinders dominance of better-self, iii. 3.4 - (48-1081). - - Subdivision infinite of bodies, leads to destruction, iv. 7.1 (2-56). - - Subject, one's notion does not come from subject itself, vi. 6.13 - (34-663). - - Sublunar sphere, immortality does not extend to it, ii. 1.5 (40-820). - - Sublunary divinities, crimes should not be attributed to, iv. 4.31 - (28-489). - - Substance as Stoic category would be split up, vi. 1.25 (42-878). - - Substantial act or habitation is hypostasis, vi. 1.6 (42-845). - - Substrate, iii. 3.6 (48-1087). - - Substrate and residence of forms, is matter, ii. 4.1 (12-197). - - Substrate demanded by process of elements, ii. 4.6 (12-203). - - Substrate needed by composition of the body, ii. 4.11 (12-209). - - Substrate not common to all elements, being indeterminate, ii. 4.13 - (12-213). - - Subsumed under being in essence not everything can, vi. 2.2 (43-893). - - Successive enumeration inevitable in describing the eternal, iv. 8.6 - (6-129). - - Succumb to the law of the universe, why many souls do, iv. 3.15 - (27-413). - - Suchness, ii. 7.2 (37-701). (Whatness.) - - Suchness later than being and quiddity, ii. 6.2 (17-248). - - Suffering and action cannot be separate categories, vi. 1.17 (42-866). - - Suffering of most men physical, virtuous man suffers least because - most suffering is physical, i. 4.13 (46-1036). - - Suffering part of virtuous man is the higher, i. 4.13 (46-1036). - - Suggestive is influence of reason, i. 2.5 (19-264). - - Suicide, i. 9 (16-243). - - Suicide breaks up the appointed time of life, i. 9 (16-244). - - Suicide unavailable even to avoid insanity, i. 9 (16-244). - - Suitability and opportunity, cause of, puts them beyond chance, vi. - 8.18 (39-806). - - Sun and ray, simile of, v. 5.7 (32-587); v. 3.9 (49-1105). - - Sun as well as stars, may be prayed to, iv. 4.30 (28-486). - - Sunlight exists everywhere, vi. 4.7 (22-296). - - Sunrise only image for divine approach, v. 5.8 (32-588). - - Superabundance, manner in which all things issue from one, v. 2.1 - (11-194). - - Super-beauty and super-virtue, vi. 9.11 (9-170). - - Super-beauty of the Supreme, v. 8.8 (31-564). - - Super-being achieved in ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170). - - Super-essential principle does not think, v. 6.1 (24-333). - - Super-essentiality and super-existence of Supreme, v. 3.17 (49-1119). - - Super-existence and super-essentiality of Supreme, v. 3.17 (49-1119); - v. 4.2 (7-137). - - Super-existence of first principle, vi. 7.38 (38-763). - - Super-form is uniform unity, vi. 9.3 (9-152). - - Super-goodness is Supreme, vi. 9.6 (9-160). - - Superior principle not always utilized, i. 1.10 (53-1203). - - Superior would be needed if the good thought, vi. 7.40 (38-767). - - Super-liberty may be attributed to intelligence, vi. 8.6 (39-782). - - Super-master of himself is the Supreme, vi. 8.10 (39-790). - - Super-rest, super-motion, super-thought is the one - super-consciousness and super-life, iii. 9.7, 9 (13-226). - - Super-virtue, soul meets absolute beauty, vi. 9.11 (9-170). - - Supra active, the good is, as supra-cogitative, v. 6.6 (24-338). - - Supra cogitative, the good as, is also supra-active, v. 6.6 (24-338). - - Supra-thinking principle does not think, necessary to working of - intelligence, v. 6.2 (24-334). - - Supremacy is the cause of the good, vi. 7.23 (38-739). - - Supremacy of good implies its supremacy over all its possessions, v. - 5.13 (32-595). - - Supreme admits of no reasoning, demonstration, faith or cause, v. 8.7 - (31-563). - - Supreme, all language about it is metaphorical, vi. 8.13 (39-795). - - Supreme as a spring of water, iii. 8.10 (30-547). - - Supreme as being as being and essence, v. 3.17 (49-1119); v. 9.2 - (7-149); v. 4.2 (7-138); v. 5.5 (32-584); v. 5.5 (32-585). - - Supreme, assisted by intelligence would have no room for chance, vi. - 8.17 (39-804). - - Supreme banishes all chance, vi. 8.10 (39-789). - - Supreme being not produced by chance, vi. 8.11 (39-793). - - Supreme beyond chance because of suitability, vi. 8.17 (39-806). - - Supreme can be approached sufficiently to be spoken of, v. 3.14 - (49-1114). - - Supreme can be attributed contingence only under new definition, vi. - 8.9 (39-787). - - Supreme can be attributed physical qualities only by analogy, vi. 8.8 - (39-785). - - Supreme cannot aspire higher, being super-goodness, vi. 9.6 (9-159). - - Supreme commands himself, vi. 8.20 (39-809). - - Supreme consists with himself, vi. 8.15 (39-800). - - Supreme could not be called chance by any one who had seen him, vi. - 8.19 (39-807). - - Supreme, every term should be limited by some what or higher, vi. - 8.13 (39-797). - - Supreme formlessness shown by approaching soul's rejection of form, - vi. 7.34 (38-756). - - Supreme inevitable for intelligence that is intelligible, iii. 8.9 - (30-544). - - Supreme intelligence is king of kings, v. 15.3 (32-580). - - Supreme intelligence, nature of, i. 8.2. (51-1144). - - Supreme is both being and whyness, ii. 7.2 (37-707). - - Supreme is entirely one, does not explain origin of manifold, v. 9.14 - (5-116). - - Supreme is essential beauty, the shapeless shaper and the - transcendent, vi. 7.33 (38-754). - - Supreme is everywhere and nowhere, is inclination and imminence, vi. - 8.16 (39-801). - - Supreme is ineffable, v. 3.13 (49-1113). - - Supreme is limitless, v. 7.32 (38-753). - - Supreme is potentiality of all things, above all actualization, iii. - 8.10 (30-546). - - Supreme is super-being, because not dependent on it, vi. 8.19 - (39-807). - - Supreme is the good, because of its supremacy, vi. 7.23 (38-739). - - Supreme is the power, really master of himself, vi. 8.9 (39-788); vi. - 8.10 (39-790). - - Supreme is will being and actualization, vi. 8.13 (39-795). - - Supreme must be free, as chance is escaped by interior isolation, vi. - 8.13 (39-795); vi. 8.15 (39-800). - - Supreme must be simple and not compound, ii. 9.1 (33-599). - - Supreme named Apollo, v. 5.6 (32-584). - - Supreme not intelligence that aspires to form of good, iii. 8.10 - (30-548). - - Supreme of three ranks of existence is the beautiful, vi. 7.42 - (38-770). - - Supreme one only figuratively, vi. 9.5 (9-157). - - Supreme principles must then be unity, intelligence and soul, ii. 9.1 - (33-600). - - Supreme, proven by the unity of the soul, vi. 5.9 (23-323). - - Supreme super-master of himself, vi. 8.12 (39-793). - - Supreme unity adjusts all lower group unities, vi. 6.11 (34-660). - - Supreme would wish to be what he is, is such as he would wish to be, - vi. 8.13 (39-796); vi. 8.15 (39-800). - - Swine, simile of the impure, i. 6.6 (1-49). - - Sympathy between individual and universal soul due to common origin, - iv. 3.8 (48-1088); v. 8.12 (31-571). - - Syllables a quantity, vi. 3.12 (44-954). - - Symmetry, earthly, contemplates universal symmetry, v. 9.11 (5-114). - - Symmetry, Stoic definition of beauty, opposed, i. 6.1 (1-41). - - Sympathetic harmony, earth feels and directs by it, iv. 4.26 (28-477). - - Sympathy, cosmic, ii. 1.7 (40-824). - - Sympathy, does not force identity of sensation, iv. 9.3 (8-142). - - Sympathy implies unity of all beings in lower magic enchantment, iv. - 9.3 (8-152). - - Sympathy, love working as, effects magic, iv. 4.40 (28-503). - - Sympathy of soul and body, iv. 4.23 (28-473). - - Sympathy of soul's highest self, basis of memory, iv. 6.3 (41-832). - - Sympathy or community of affection, Stoic, iv. 7.3 (2-59). - - System, co-existence of unity and multiplicity, demands organization - in, vi. 7.10 (38-716). - - - Taming of body, i. 4.14 (46-1037). - - Theology revealed by astrology, ii. 3.7 (52-1172). - - Telescoping, of intelligible entities, v. 9.10 (5-113). - - Temperament of corporeal principles, is health, iv. 7.8 (2-71). - - Temperament, soul as mixture, iv. 7.2 (2-58). - - Temperance, gate of ecstasy, i. 6.9 (1-53). - - Temperance interpreted as purification, i. 6.6 (1-49). - - Temperance is not real category, vi. 2.18 (43-923). - - Temperate man is good's independence from pleasure, vi. 7.29 (38-747). - - Temples of divinity, explained by psychology, iv. 3.1 (27-387). - - Temporal conceptions implied by priority of order, iv. 4.16 (28-461). - - Tending towards the good, all things tend towards the one, vi. 2.12 - (43-914). - - Tension, Stoic, iv. 7.13 (2-83); iv. 5.4 (29-522). - - Terrestrial things do not last so long as celestial ones, ii. 1.5 - (40-819). - - Testimony, to its creator by world, iii. 2.3 (47-1047). - - The living animal, i. 1.5 (53-1126). - - Theodore, from P1ato's Theatetus, i. 8.6 (51-1150). - - Theodore of Asine, his infra celestial vault (invisible place), v. - 8.10 (31-567); ii. 4.1 (12-198). - - Theory of happiness consisting in reasonable life, i. 4.2 (46-1022). - - Thing in itself, differs from nonentity, ii. 4.10 (12-207). - - Thing in itself, qualityless, found by abstraction, ii. 4.10 (12-207). - - Things good is their form, vi. 7.27 (38-744). - - Think, body cannot, iv. 7.8 (2-68). - - Thinking in conformity with intelligence, two ways, v. 3.4 (49-1094). - - Thinking is perception without help of the body, iv. 7.8 (2-68). - - Thinking ourselves, is thinking an intellectual nature, iii. 9.6 - (13-224). - - Thinking principle, the first, is the general second, v. 6.2 (24-335). - - Thinking principles--which is the first, and which is the second? v. - 6.1 (24-335). - - Third principle is soul, iii. 9.1 (13-221). - - Third rank of existence should not be occupied by modality, vi. 1.30 - (42-887). - - Thought and life, different grades of, iii. 8.7 (30-540). - - Thought actualization of light, v. 1.5 (10-181). - - Thought as first actualization of a hypostasis is not in first - principle, vi 7.40 (38-766). - - Thought as touch of the good leads to ecstasy, vi. 7.36 (38-760). - - Thought below one and Supreme, iii. 9.7, 9 (13-226). - - Thought beneath the super essential principle, v. 6 (24-339). - - Thought distracted from by sensation, iv. 8.8 (6-132). - - Thought implies simultaneous unity and duality, v. 6.1 (24-333). - - Thought in first principle would imply attributes, and that - manifoldness, v. 6.2 (24-336). - - Thought is actualized intelligence, v. 3.5 (49-1097). - - Thought is beneath the first so intelligence implies the latter, v. - 6.5 (24-338); v. 6.2, 6 (24-339). - - Thought is inspiration for good, v. 6.5 (24-338). - - Thought is integral part of intelligence, v. 5.2 (32-579). - - Thought is seeing the intelligible, v. 4.2 (7-138). - - Thought is the form; shape the actualization of being, v. 9.8 (5-111). - - Thought, life and existence, contained in primary existence, v. 6.6 - (24-339). - - Thought made impossible only by the first principle being one - exclusively, v. 6.3 (24-335). - - Thought, one with sight, v. 1.5 (10-181). - - Thought, self direction of, is not changeableness, iv. 4.2 (28-444). - - Thought, the means by which intelligence passes from unity to - duality, v. 6.1 (24-333). - - Thoughts, conceptive, demand intermediary sensation, iv. 4.23 - (28-472). - - Thoughts, contrary to rights, possess real existence, iii. 5.7 - (50-1136). - - Thoughts, highest, have incorporeal objects, iv. 7.8 (2-68). - - Three kinds of men, v. 9.1 (5-102). - - Three men in each of us, vi. 7.6 (38-708). - - Three principles, v. 6.2 (24-334 to 337); v. 1.10 (10-189). - - Three ranks of existence, vi. 4.11 (22-302); v. 1.10 (10-189); v. - 6.2 (24-335); iii. 3.3 (48-1077); iii. 5.9 (50-1138); vi. 1.30 - (43-887); vi. 7.6 (38-708). - - Three spheres, v. 1.8 (10-186). - - Threefold activity of soul, thought, self-preservation and creation, - iv. 8.3 (6-125). - - Time and eternity, iii. 7 (45-985). - - Time arose as measurement of the activity of the universal soul, iii. - 7.10 (45-1005). - - Time as motion, errors in, iii. 7.1 (45-987). - - Time becomes, iii. 7, int. (45-985). - - Time can be increased, why not happiness, i. 5.7 (36-687). - - Time cannot be divided without implying soul's action, iv. 4.15 - (28-460). - - Time, considered as motion, as moveable or as something of motion, - iii. 7.6 (45-996). - - Time, if it is a quantity, why a separate category? vi. 1.13 (42-861). - - Time included action and reaction of soul, not soul itself, iv. 4.15 - (28-460). - - Time is also within us, iii. 7.12 (45-1014). - - Time is as interior to the soul as eternity is to existence, iii. - 7.10 (45-1008). - - Time is measured by movement and is measure of movement, iii. 7.12 - (45-1011). - - Time is no interval of movement (Stoic Zeno), iii. 7.7 (45-999). - - Time is not a numbered number (Aristotle), iii. 7.8 (45-1000). - - Time is not a quantity, vi. 1.5 (42-844). - - Time is not an accident or consequence of movement, iii. 7.9 - (45-1004). - - Time is not begotten by movement but only indicated thereby, iii. - 7.11 (45-1009). - - Time is not motion and rest (Strato), iii. 7.7 (45-1000). - - Time is not movement, iii. 7.7 (45-997). - - Time is not the number and measure of movement (Aristotle), iii. 7.8 - (45-1000). - - Time is present everywhere, as against Antiphanes and Critolaus, iii. - 7.12 (45-1013). - - Time is the length of the life of the universal soul, iii. 7.11 - (45-1008). - - Time is the life of the soul, considered in the movement by which she - passes from one actualization to another, iii. 7.10 (45-1005). - - Time is the model of its image eternity, iii. 7 int. (45-985). - - Time is the universe, iii. 7.1 (45-986). - - Time is to the world-soul, what eternity is to intelligence, iii. - 7.10 (45-1007). - - Time joined to actions to make them perfect, vi. 1.19 (42-868). - - Time must be studied comparatively among the philosophers, iii. 7.6 - (45-996). - - Time none, only a single day for world-souls, iv. 4.7 (28-450). - - Time or place do not figure among the categories, vi. 2.16 (43-919). - - Time, Plato uncertain about it, iii. 7.12 (45-1012). - - Time replaced by eternity in intelligible world, v. 9.10 (5-113). - - Time's nature will be revealed by its birth, iii. 7.10 (45-1005). - - Toleration by soul, without guilt, iii. 1.8 (3-97). - - Tomb of soul is body, iv. 8.1, 4 (6-126). - - Tool, body uses the soul as, i. 1.2 (55-1194); iv. 7.1 (2-57). - - Tools are intermediate, like sense shape, iv. 4.23 (28-473). - - Torments of hell are reformatory, iv. 4.45 (28-448). - - Total reason of universe, ii. 3.13 (52-1179). - - Touch, the good is a simple perception of itself, vi. 7.39 (38-764). - - Touched with the good is the greatest of sciences, vi. 7.36 (38-760). - - Trace of life, left by soul when leaving body, iv. 4.29 (28-483). - - Trace of the One, is the being of souls, v. v. 5 (32-583). - - Traditions of divinity contained by the world, ii. 9.9 (33-616). - - Training and education, memory needs, iv. 6.3 (41-835). - - Training here below help souls to remember when beyond, iv. 4.5 - (28-448). - - Training of interior vision, i. 6.9 (1-53). - - Trance of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-169). - - Transcendence of good over intelligence and life, v. 3.16 (49-1117). - - Transcendent, v. 3 (49-1090). - - Transcendent shapeless shaper and essential beauty is supreme, vi. - 7.33 (38-754). - - Transcending unity demanded by contemplation of intelligence, v. 3.10 - (49-1106). - - Transition of sense-beauty to intellectual, i. 6.3 (1-45). - - Transmigration, animals into animals, plants, birds, eagles and - soaring birds and bee, iii. 4.2 (15-235). - - Transmigration, two kinds, into human or animal bodies, iv. 3.9 - (27-403). - - Transmission, reception, relation underlies action and experience, - vi. 1.22 (42-874). - - Transparency of everything in intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-558). - - Trap on way to ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569). - - Traverse heaven, without leaving rest (celestial divinities), v. 8.3 - (31-556). - - Tree of the universe, simile of, iii. 8.10 (30-547). - - Triad is limit of differentiation, ii. 9.2 (33-602). - - Triangles equal to two, iii. 5.7 (50-1136). - - Triangles, material and immaterial, explain trine relations, vi. 5.11 - (23-330). - - Trinity, compared to light, sun and moon, i. 8.2 (51-1144); vi. 7.6 - (38-708); vi. 7.7 (38-711); iv. 8.4 (6-125); vi. 7.42 (38-770); vi. - 2.8 (43-905); iv. 7.13 (2-84); iii. 4.2 (15-234). - - Triune, v. 6.4 (24-337). - - Triune, soul, one nature in three powers, ii. 3.4 (52); v. 1 - (10-173); ii. 9.2 (33-602). - - Triune play implies also identity and difference, vi. 2.8 (43-905). - - True good, implies counterfeit, vi. 7.26 (38-743). - - Truth external to intelligence, a theory that destroys intelligence, - v. 5.1 (32-576). - - Truth, field of, intelligence evolves, vi. 7.13 (38-723). - - Truth self-probative; nothing truer, v. 5.2 (32-579). - - Two-fold soul exerts two-fold providence, iv. 8.2 (6-122). - - Two-fold sphere in which soul has to exist, iv. 8.7 (6-130). - - Two, not addition to one, but a change, vi. 6.14 (34-666). - - Ugliness, aversion for, explains love for beauty, i. 6.5 (1-47). - - Ugliness consists of formlessness, i. 6.2 (1-43). - - Ugliness is a foreign accretion, i. 6.5 (1-48). - - Ugliness is form's failure to dominate matter, i. 8.9 (51-1156). - - Ugliness is predominance of matter, v. 7.2 (18-253). - - Ugliness of men due to lowering themselves to lower natures, and - ignoring themselves, v. 8.13 (31-574). - - Ulysses, i. 6.8 (1-52). - - Unalloyed is no evil for the living people, i. 7.3 (54-1210). - - Unattached, condition o wise man, i. 4.1, 7 (46-1029). - - Unavoidable and universal evils are, i. 8.6 (51-1149). - - Uncertainty in location of good and beauty, i. 6.9 (1-53). - - Unchangeableness of form and matter, iii. 6.10 (26-368). - - Unconsciously do stars answer prayers, iv. 4.4 (28-505); iv. 4.2 - (28-505). - - Unconsciousness does not hinder virtue, handsomeness or health, i. - 4.9 (46-1033). - - Unconsciousness of oneself in ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Unconsciousness of soul intelligence and one does not detract from - their existence, v. 1.12 (10-191). - - Undefinability of unity (referred to by feelings), vi. 9.3 (9-151). - - Understand and fit yourself to the world instead of complaining of - it, ii. 9.13 (33-625). - - Undisturbed is the world-soul by the things of sense, iv. 8.7 (6-131). - - Unhappiness increased by duration, why not happiness? i. 5.6 (36-686). - - Unharmed is the soul by incarnation, if prompt in flight, iv. 8.5 - (6-128). - - Unification does not reveal true knowledge, ii. 9.9 (33-617). - - Unification process, v. 1.5 (10-180); v. 5.4 (32-581). - - Unification with divinity result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Uniform action, exerted by body, iv. 7.4 (2-62). - - Uniform in itself is unity and super-form, vi. 9.3 (9-152). - - Unincarnate souls govern world untroubledly, iv. 8.2 (6-123). - - Unique (Monad), v. 5.4 (32-581); v. 5.13 (32-595). - - Unissued brothers of Jupiter, vi. 8.12 (31-572). - - Unitary are intelligibles, but not absolute unity, vi. 5.4 (32-581). - - Unitary is consciousness, though containing thinker, ii. 9.1 (33-601). - - Unitary number, vi. 6.9 (34-656). - - United are all things by a common source, vi. 7.12 (38-721). - - United are souls, by their highest, vi. 7.15 (38-726). - - United souls, intelligence shines down from the peak formed by them, - vi. 7.15 (38-726). - - Unities, different kinds of, v. 5.4 (32-582). - - Uniting of highest parts of men in intelligible, vi. 5.10 (23-327). - - Uniting of intelligence, as it rises to the intelligible, iv. 4.1 - (28-442). - - Uniting soul and body forms individual aggregate, i. 1.6 (53-1197). - - Unity, v. 1.6 (10-182); v. 5.4 (32-581). - - Unity above all; intelligence and essence. vi. 9.2 (9-149). - - Unity absolute, is first, while intelligence is not, vi. 9.2 (9-150). - - Unity, abstruse, because soul has repugnances to such researches, vi. - 9.3 (9-151). - - Unity an accident amongst sense things, something more in the - intelligible, vi. 6.14 (34-666). - - Unity and essence, genuine relations between, vi. 2.11 (43-911). - - Unity and number precede the one and many beings, vi. 6.10 (34-659). - - Unity as indivisible and infinite, vi. 9.6 (9-158). - - Unity is the self-uniform and formless super form, vi. 9.3 (9-152). - - Unity, by it all things depend on the good, i. 7.2 (54-1209). - - Unity, by thinking intelligence passes to duality, v. 6.1 (24-333). - - Unity, co-existence of, demands organization in system, vi. 7.10 - (38-716). - - Unity, contained in sense objects, is not unity itself, vi. 6.16 - (34-671). - - Unity, contemplation in nature, iii. 8 (30-531). - - Unity does not even need itself, vi. 9.6 (9-159). - - Unity, everything tends toward it as it tends toward the good, vi. - 2.12 (43-914). - - Unity, fundamental of genera, would destroy species, vi. 2.2 (43-894). - - Unity, greater in intelligible than in physical world, vi. 5.10 - (23-327). - - Unity, if passed into the manifold, would destroy universe, iii. 8.10 - (30-547). - - Unity, imparted by soul is not pure, vi. 9.1 (9-147). - - Unity, incomprehensible, vi. 9.4 (9-154). - - Unity in manifoldness, vi. 5.6 (23-320). - - Unity into plurality split by numbers, vi. 6.9 (34-656). - - Unity is in the manifold by a manner of existence, vi. 4.8 (22-296). - - Unity is intelligible, though participated in by sense-objects, vi. - 6.13 (34-664). - - Unity is not intelligence, its manifold produced by a unity, iv. 4.1 - (28-443). - - Unity, lack of, causes corporeity to be nonentity, iii. 6.6 (26-362). - - Unity, multiple, radiation of, v. 3.15 (49-1115). - - Unity must be sought for in essence, vi. 5.1 (23-342). - - Unity must exist in the intelligible before being applied to mutable - beings, vi. 6.11 (34-659). - - Unity necessary to existence of all beings, especially collective - nouns, vi. 9.1 (9-147). - - Unity not category, are arguments against, vi. 2.10 (43-910). - - Unity not mere numbering, but existence, vi. 9.2 (9-149). - - Unity not synonymous with essence, vi. 2.9 (43-908). - - Unity of apperception, iv. 4.1 (28-442). - - Unity of being does not exclude unity of other beings, vi. 4.4 - (22-290). - - Unity of reason constituted by contained contraries, iii. 2.16 - (47-1069). - - Unity of soul, does not resemble reason unity because it includes - plurality, vi. 2.6 (43-901). - - Unity of soul not effected by plurality of powers, iv. 9.4 (8-143). - - Unity of soul retained on different levels, iv. 3.5 (27-396). - - Unity of souls based on their multiplicity, iv. 9.4 (8-143). - - Unity of Supreme entailed by its being a principle, v. 4.1 (7-134). - - Unity of Supreme only figurative, vi. 9.5 (9-157). - - Unity of the soul proves that of the Supreme, vi. 5.9 (23-323). - - Unity of will, being an actualization, is the Supreme, vi. 8.13 - (39-795). - - Unity only for its examination are its parts apart, vi. 2.3 (43-897). - - Unity passing into manifold would destroy universe, iii. 8.10 - (30-547). - - Unity reigns still more in the good, vi. 2.11 (43-912). - - Unity self-sufficient, needing no establishment, vi, 9.6 (9-159). - - Unity indefinable, referred to by feeling, vi. 9.3 (9-154). - - Unity, why world proceeded from it, v. 2.1 (11-193). - - Unity's form is principle of numbers, v. 5.5 (32-583). - - Universal and unavoidable evils are, i. 8.6 (51-1149). - - Universal being, description of, vi. 4.2 (22-286). - - Universal being is indivisible, vi. 4.3 (22-288). - - Universal being, stars followers of, ii. 3.13 (52-1179). - - Universal, second rank, souls of men, ii. 3.13 (52-1180). - - Universal soul, first actualization of essence and intelligence, v. - 2.2 (11-194). - - Universal soul is everywhere entire, vi. 4.9 (22-300). - - Universal soul may not be judged by human standards, ii. 9.7 (33-611). - - Universal soul's motion, immortalized heaven, ii. 1.4 (40-817). - - Universality of creator overcame all obstacles, v. 8.7 (31-562). - - Universe, ii. 1 (40-813). - - Universe and deity if include separable soul, ii. 3.9 (52-1176). - - Universe animated by world-soul, iv. 3.9 (27-404). - - Universe as a single harmony, ii. 3.5 (52-1170). - - Universe, birth of, destiny of souls depend on, ii. 3.15 (52-1182). - - Universe depends on single principle, ii. 3.7 (52-1117). - - Universe, diagram of, iv. 4.16 (28-462). - - Universe, hierarchical constitution, vi. 2.2 (43-892). - - Universe is harmony in spite of the faults in the details, ii. 3.16 - (52-1185). - - Universe like light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 (24-337). - - Universe moves in circle, and stands still simultaneously, ii. 2.3 - (14-230). - - Universe, nothing in it inanimate, iv. 4.36 (28-499). - - Universe passions produced by body of stars, ii. 3.13 (52-1178). - - Universe, perfection of, evils are necessary, ii. 3.18 (52-1187). - - Universe picture, that pictures itself, ii. 3.18 (52-1188). - - Universe, plan of, is from eternity, Providence, vi. 8.17 (39-803). - - Universe specialized, organ of, every being is, iv. 4.45 (28-510). - - Universe would be destroyed if unity passed into the manifold, iii. - 8.10 (30-547). - - Universe's influence should be partial only, iv. 4.34 (28-494). - - Universe's total reason, ii. 3.13 (52-1178). - - Unjust acts unastrological theory blame divine reason, iii. 2.10 - (47-1059). - - Unmeasured, is intelligible number infinite, vi. 6.18 (34-676). - - Unnoticed are many new things, iv. 4.8 (28-450). - - Unreflective identification not as high as memory, iv. 4.4 (28-445). - - Unseen is beauty in supreme fusion, v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Uranus, see Kronos, iii. 5.2 (50-1127). - - Uranus (Coleus), v. 8.13 (31-573). - - Utility not the only deciding factor with the senses, iv. 4.24 - (28-475). - - Utilized, superior principle not always, i. 1.10 (53-1203). - - - Varied action, exerted by soul, iv. 7.4 (2-62). - - Variety may depend on latency of part of seminal reason, v. 7.1 - (18-253). - - Variety of world-soul's life makes variety of time, iii. 7.10 - (45-1005). - - Vase for form, see residence, see jar, iv. 3.20 (27-420). - - Vase is the body, iv. 3.7 (27-399). - - Vase of creation of Timaeus, iv. 3.7 (27-399). - - Vault, Theodore of Asine's infra celestial, ii. 4.1 (12-198); v. 8.10 - (31-567). - - Vegetables not irrational and rooted in the intelligible, vi. 7.11 - (38-717). - - Venus, iv. 3.14 (27-412); iii. 5.18 (50-1136); ii. 3.5, 6 (52-1170). - - Venus as subordinate nature of world-soul, v. 8.13 (31-573). - - Venus beauty, whence it came, v. 8.2 (31-553). - - Venus is world-soul, iii. 5.5 (50-1131). - - Venus, Jupiter and Mercury also considered astrologically, ii. 3.5 - (52-1170). - - Venus, mother of Eros, iii. 5.2 (50-1125). - - Venus, or the soul is the individual of Jupiter, iii. 5.8 (50-1137). - - Venus Urania, vi. 9.9 (9-167). - - Vesta, pun on, represents intelligence, v. 5.5 (32-583). - - Vesta represents earth, iv. 4.27 (28-480). - - Vestige of soul descended into world is demon, iii. 5.6 (50-1132). - - Vice as disharmony, iii. 6.2 (26-352). - - Vice caused by external circumstances, i. 8.8 (51-1154); ii. 3.8 - (52-1174); iii. 1 (3-86); vi. 8 (39-773). - - Vice, how soul comes to know it, i. 8.9 (51-1155). - - Vice is deprivation in soul, i. 8.11 (51-1157). - - Vice not absolute but derived evil, i. 8.8 (51-1155). - - Vices, intemperance and cowardliness comes from matter, i. 8.4 - (51-1147). - - Victory over self is mastery of fate, ii. 3.15 (52-1182). - - Vindication, God's justice by philosophy, iv. 4.30 (28-487). - - Vine and branches, simile of, iii. 3.7 (48-1088). - - Violence, proof of, unnaturalness, as of sickness, v. 8.11 (31-570). - - Virtue affects the soul differently from other passions, iii. 6.3 - (26-356). - - Virtue an intellectualizing habit that liberates the soul, vi. 8.5 - (39-780). - - Virtue as a harmony, iii. 6.2 (26-352). - - Virtue as harmony explains evil in soul, iii. 6.2 (26-352). - - Virtue belongs to soul, not to intelligence of super-intelligence, i. - 2.2 (19-259). - - Virtue can conquer any misfortune, i. 4.8 (46-1031). - - Virtue changes life from evil to good, i. 7.3 (54-1210). - - Virtue considered a good, because participation in good, i. 8.12 - (51-1158). - - Virtue consists not in conversion but in its result, i. 2.4 (19-261). - - Virtue consists of doing good when not under trials, iii. 1.10 (3-98). - - Virtue derived from primitive nature of soul, ii. 3.8 (52-1174). - - Virtue does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-920). - - Virtue independent of action, vi. 8.5 (39-779). - - Virtue is good, not absolute, but participating, i. 8.8 (51-1155). - - Virtue is soul's tendency to unity of faculties, vi. 9.1 (9-1147). - - Virtue not corporeal, iv. 7.8 (2-69). - - Virtue not possessed by body, iv. 7.8 (2-69). - - Virtue of appetite explained, iii. 6.2 (26-354). - - Virtue the road to escape evils, i. 2.1 (19-256). - - Virtue, without which, God is a mere word ignored by gnostics, ii. - 9.15 (33-629). - - Virtues, i. 2. - - Virtue's achievement makes this the best of all possible worlds, ii. - 9.8 (33-615). - - Virtues are only purifications, i. 6.6 (1-49). - - Virtues are symmetrical in development, i. 2.7 (19-267). - - Virtues, Aristotelian, rational, i. 3.6 (20-274). - - Virtues, by shaping man, increase divine element in him, i. 2.2 - (19-259). - - Virtues cannot be ascribed to divinity, i. 2.1 (19-256). - - Virtue, choir of, Stoic, vi. 9.11 (9-170). - - Virtues, discussion of, is characteristic of genuine philosophy, ii. - 9.15 (33-621). - - Virtues exist through incorporeality of soul, iv. 7.8 (2-70). - - Virtues, higher, are continuations upward of the homely, i. 2.6 - (19-265). - - Virtues, higher, imply lower but not conversely, i. 3.7 (19-266). - - Virtues, higher, merge into wisdom, i. 2.6 (19-265). - - Virtues, homely, assimilate us to divinity only partially, i. 2.3 - (19-260). - - Virtues, homely (civil, prudence, courage, temperance, justice), i. - 2.1 (19-257). - - Virtues, homely, produce in man a measure and proportion, i. 2.2 - (19-259). - - Virtues, homely, to be supplemented by divine discontent, i. 2.7 - (19-267). - - Virtues, homely, yield resemblance to divinity, i. 2.1 (19-256). - - Virtues, how they purify, i. 2.4 (19-261). - - Virtues, lower, are mutually related, i. 2.7 (19-266). - - Virtues must be supplemented by divine discontent, i. 2.7 (19-267). - - Virtues, natural, yield only to perfect views, need correction of - philosophy, i. 3.6 (20-275). - - Virtues, Platonic, homely and higher, distinguished, i. 2.3 (19-260). - - Virtuous actions derived from self, are free, iii. 1.10 (3-99). - - Virtuous man can suffer only in the lower part, i. 4.13 (46-1023). - - Virtuous man is fully happy, i. 4.4 (46-1026). - - Virtuous man is he whose highest principle is active, iii. 4.6 - (15-239). - - Virtuous men do right at all times, even under trials, iii. 1.10 - (3-99). - - Virtuous will only object conversion of soul towards herself, i. 4.11 - (46-1035). - - Vision and hearing, process of, iv. 5 (29-523). - - Vision does not need intermediary body, iv. 5.1 (29-514). - - Vision further, recall intelligible entities not memory, iv. 4.5 - (28-447). - - Vision interior, how trained, i. 6.9 (1-53). - - Vision not dependent on medium's vision, iv. 5.3 (29-520). - - Vision of God, ecstatic supreme purpose of life, i. 6.6 (1-49). - - Vision of intelligible wisdom, last stage of soul progress, v. 8.10 - (31-568). - - Vision, theory of, ii. 8 (35-680); iv. 7.6 (2-65); v. 5.7 (32-586); - v. 6.1 (24-334); vi. 1.20 (42-872). - - Visual angle theory of Aristotle refuted, ii. 8.2 (35-682). - - Voice as one would analyze it, so must the world be studied, vi. 3.1 - (44-933). - - Voice used by demons and other inhabitants of air, iv. 3.18 (27-417). - - Voluntariness not excluded by necessity, iv. 8.5 (6-127). - - Voluntariness, the basis of responsibility, vi. 8.1 (39-774). - - Voluntary movements, vi. 3.26 (44-980). - - Voluntary soul detachment forbidden, i. 9 (16-245). - - Vulcan, iii. 2.14 (47-1064). - - - Wakening to true reality content of approach to Him, v. 5.11 (32-592). - - Warfare, internecine, necessary, iii. 2.1, 5 (47-1064). - - Washing of man fallen in mud, simile of purification, i. 6.5 (1-48). - - Wastage, none in heaven, ii. 1.4 (40-818). - - Wastage of physical body, and matter, ii. 1.4 (40-819). - - Wastage, see leakage, vi. 5.10 (23-327). - - Wastage, see leakage, none in celestial light, ii. 1.8 (40-826). - - Water, contained in the intelligible world, vi. 7.11 (38-720). - - Way to conceive of first principle, v. 5.10, 11 (32-592). - - Wax seal, impressions are sensations, Stoic, iv. 7.6 (2-66); iii. 6.9 - (26-366); iv. 6.1 (41-829). - - We and ours, psychological names of soul, v. 3.3 (49-1094). - - We and ours, psychological terms, i. 1.7 (53-1199). - - We and the real man, distinctions between, i. 1.10 (53-1202). - - We and the soul, relation between, ii. 1.3 (53-1194). - - We, not ours, is intelligible, i. 1.7 (53-1199). - - Weakening of incarnate souls due to individual contemplation, iv. 8.4 - (6-125). - - Weakness and affection of man, subject him to magic, iv. 4.44 - (28-509). - - Weakness of soul consists of falling into matter, i. 8.14 (51-1160). - - Weakness of soul is evil, i. 8.4 (51-1147). - - Wealth caused by external circumstances, ii. 3.8 (52-1174). - - Weaning of the soul from the body, iii. 6.5 (26-359). - - Welfare of soul is resemblance to divinity, i. 6.6 (1-49). - - Whatness, vi. 7.19 (38-735). - - Whatness and affections (quiddity) of being distinguishes between, - ii. 6.2 (17-248). - - Where or place is Aristotelian category, vi. 1.1, 4 (42-862). - - Whole and individuals fashioned by entire soul, vi. 5.8 (23-322). - - Whole is good, though continued mingled parts, iii. 2.17 (47-1070). - - Whole of divisible and indivisible parts, human soul is, iv. 3.19 - (27-419). - - Whole, reason is a, vi. 5.10 (23-326). - - Whyness is form, vi. 7.19 (38-735); vi. 7.2 (38-732). - - Whyness of its forms contained by its intelligence, ii. 7.2 (38-732). - - Will be, not are in one, all things, v. 2.1 (11-193). - - Will, freedom of, on what is it based, vi. 8.2 (39-775). - - Will of the one, vi. 8 (39-773). - - Wings of souls lost, iv. 3.7 (27-399). - - Wings, souls lose them when falling, iv. 8.1 (6-120); i. 8.14 - (51-1161). - - Wisdom and prudence, first are types; become virtues by contemplation - of soul, i. 2.7 (19-267). - - Wisdom derived from intelligence, and ultimately from good, v. 9.2 - (5-104). - - Wisdom does not imply reasoning and memory, iv. 4.12 (28-456). - - Wisdom, established by spiritual preponderance, i. 4.14 (46-1037). - - Wisdom, highest, nature lowest in world-soul's wisdom, iv. 4.12 - (28-458). - - Wisdom, intelligible, last stage of soul-progress, v. 8.10 (31-567). - - Wisdom is very being, v. 8.5 (31-559). - - Wisdom none the less happy for being unconscious, i. 4.9 (46-1032). - - Wisdom of creator makes complaints grotesque, iii. 2.14 (47-1063). - - Wisdom of soul alone has virtue, i. 2.6 (19-265). - - Wisdom seen in divine, v. 8.10 (31-568). - - Wisdom, two kinds, of soul and of intelligence, i. 2.6 (19-265). - - Wisdom universal, permanent because timeless, iv. 4.11 (28-456). - - Wise man, description of his methods, i. 4.14 (46-1137). - - Wise man, how he escapes all enchantments, iv. 4.43 (28-507). - - Wise man remains unattached, i. 4.16 (46-1039). - - Wise man uses instruments only as temporary means of development, i. - 4.16 (46-1040). - - Wise men, two will be equally happy though in different fortunes, i. - 4.15 (46-1038). - - Withdrawal within yourself, i. 6.9 (1-54). - - Wonderful is relation of one (qv.) to us, v. 5.8 (32-588). - - Word prophoric and innate, v. 1.3 (10-177). - - Word, soul as and actualization of intelligence, v. 1.3 (10-177). - - Workman of the body, instrument is the soul, iv. 7.1 (2-56). - - World and creator are not evil, ii. 9 (33-599). - - World as eternally begotten, ii. 9.2 (33-603). - - World body, why the world-soul is everywhere present in it, vi. 4.1 - (22-285). - - World contains traditions of divinity, ii. 9.9 (33-616). - - World imperishable, so long as archetype subsists, v. 8.12 (31-572). - - World intelligible, everything is actual, ii. 5.3 (25-346). - - World is deity of third rank, iii. 5.6 (50-1132). - - World must be studied, just as one would analyze the voice, vi. 3.1 - (44-933). - - World not evil because of our sufferings, ii. 9.4 (33-606). - - World not to be blamed for imperfections, iii. 2.3 (47-1046). - - World, nothing more beautiful could be imagined, ii. 9.4 (33-606). - - World, objective, subsists, even when we are distracted, v. 1.12 - (10-191). - - World, outside our world would not be visible, iv. 5.8 (29-529). - - World penetrating by intelligence that remains unmoved, vi. 5.11 - (23-328). - - World planned by God, refuted, v. 8.7 (31-561). - - World sense and intelligible, are they separate or classifiable - together, vi. 1.12 (42-860). - - World-soul activity, when measured is time, iii. 7.10 (45-1005). - - World-soul and human soul, differences between, ii. 9.7 (33-612). - - World-soul and individual souls born from intelligence, vi. 2.22 - (43-929). - - World-soul and star soul, intellectual differences, iv. 4.17 (28-463). - - World-soul and stars are impassible, iv. 4.42 (28-506). - - World-soul animated by universe, iv. 3.9 (27-404). - - World-soul basis of existence of bodies, iv. 7.3 (2-60). - - World-soul begotten from intelligence by unity and universality, v. - 1.2 (10-175). - - World-soul creates, because nearest the intelligible, iv. 3.6 - (27-397). - - World-soul creative, not preservative, ii. 3.16 (52-1183). - - World-soul contains universe as sea the net, iv. 3.9 (27-405). - - World-soul could not have gone through creation drama, ii. 9.4 - (33-605). - - World-soul does not remember God, continuing to see him, iv. 4.7 - (28-449). - - World-soul, earth can feel as well as stars, iv. 4.22 (28-471). - - World-soul exerts influence apart from astrology and deviltry, iv. - 4.32 (28-490). - - World-soul glorifies man as life transfigures matter, v. 1.2 (10-176). - - World-soul has no ratiocination, iv. 4.11 (28-455). - - World-soul, how idea of it is reached, ii. 9.17 (33-633). - - World-soul, in it, wisdom is the lowest and nature the highest, iv. - 4.12 (28-458). - - World-soul inferior, ii. 2.3 (14-233). - - World-soul informs all things progressively, iv. 3.10 (27-406). - - World-soul is to time what intelligence is to eternity, iii. 7.10 - (45-1007). - - World-soul, length of its life is time, iii. 7.11 (45-1008). - - World-soul mediation, through it are benefits granted to men, iv. - 4.30 (28-486). - - World-soul, nature of, i. 8.2 (51-1144). - - World-soul participates to create world only by contemplation, and is - undisturbed thereby, iv. 8.7 (6-131). - - World-soul, Plato is in doubt about its being like the stars, iv. - 4.22 (28-470). - - World-soul procession, iii. 8.5 (30-537). - - World-soul procession results in space, iii. 7.10 (45-1006). - - World-soul remains in the intelligible, iii. 9.3 (13-223). - - World-soul simultaneously gives and receives as untroubled medium, - iv. 8.7 (6-131). - - World-soul unconscious of our changes, iv. 4.7 (28-450). - - World-soul unconscious of what goes on in it, iii. 4.4 (15-237). - - World-soul, why it is everywhere entirely in the world body, vi. 4 - (22-285). - - World-souls and individual souls inseparable, because of functions, - iv. 3.2 (27-392). - - World-soul's creation of world is cause of divinity of souls, v. 1.2 - (10-175). - - World-soul's existence, basis of that of simple bodies, iv. 7.2 - (2-57). - - World, this is the best of all possible, because we can achieve - virtue, ii. 9.8 (33-615). - - World, to be in it but not of it, i. 8.6 (51-1150). - - World's testimony to its creator, iii. 2.3 (47-1047). - - - Zodiac, ii. 3.3 (52-1165). - - - - -Plotinos, his Life, Times and Philosophy - -By _Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie_, _A. M._, Harvard, _Ph. D._, Tulane. - - -This is a lucid, scholarly systematization of the views of Plotinos, -giving translation of important and useful passages. It is preceded by -a careful indication and exposition of his formative influences, and a -full biography dealing with his supposed obligations to Christianity. -Accurate references are given for every statement and quotation. The -exposition of, and references on Hermetic philosophy are by themselves -worth the price of the book. - -Dr _Harris_, U.S. Commissioner of Education has written about it in the -highest terms. Dr. _Paul Carus_, Editor of the _Open Court_, devoted -half a page of the July 1897 issue to an appreciative and commendatory -Review of it. Among the many other strong commendations of the work are -the following: - - From _G. R. S. Mead_, Editor _The Theosophical Review_, London: - - It may be stated, on the basis of a fairly wide knowledge of - the subject, that the summary of our anonymous author is the - CLEAREST and MOST INTELLIGENT which has as yet appeared. The - writer bases himself upon the original text, and his happy - phrasing of Platonic terms and his deep sympathy with Platonic - thought proclaim the presence of a capable translator of - Plotinos amongst us.... - - To make so lucid and capable a compendium of the works of - so great a giant of philosophy as Plotinos, the author must - have spent much time in analysing the text and satisfying - himself as to the meaning of many obscure passages; to test - his absolute accuracy would require the verification of every - reference among the hundreds given in the tables at the end - of the pamphlet, and we have only had time to verify one or - two of the more striking. These are as accurate as anything - in a digest can rightly be expected to be. In addition to - the detailed chapters on the seven realms of the Plotinic - philosophy, on reincarnation, ethics, and aesthetics, we have - introductory chapters on Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, - and Emanationism, and on the relationship of Plotinos to - Christianity and Paganism. - - Those who desire to enter into the Plotinian precincts of the - temple of Greek philosophy by the most expeditious path CANNOT - do BETTER than take this little pamphlet for their guide; it - is of course not perfect, but it is undeniably THE BEST which - has yet appeared. We have recommended the T.P.S. to procure - a supply of this pamphlet, for to our Platonic friends and - colleagues we say not only YOU SHOULD, but YOU MUST read it. - - HUMAN BROTHERHOOD, NOV. 1897, in a very extended and most - commendatory review, says: TOO GREAT PRAISE COULD HARDLY - BE BESTOWED upon this scholarly contribution to Platonic - literature. - -_Net price, cloth bound, post-paid, $1.31._ - - - - -Transcriber's Notes: - - -Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant -preference was found in this four-volume set; otherwise they were not -changed. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected. Inconsistent capitalization -has not been changed. - -Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. - -Infrequent spelling of "Plotinus" changed to the predominant "Plotinos." - -Several opening or closing parentheses and quotation marks are -unmatched; Transcriber has not attempted to determine where they belong. - -Page 1030: The opening parenthesis in "(Nor would he be troubled if the -members" either has no match or shares one with a subordinate phrase. -Such "sharing" occurs elsewhere in this four-volume set. - -Page 1059: "(the former for their ferocity," has no matching closing -parenthesis. - -Page 1188, footnote 268 (originally 71): The opening parenthesis in -"(the principal power of the soul," has no match, or shares one with a -subordinate phrase. - -Page 1218: The opening quotation mark just before 'He who possesses the -virtues' has no matching closing quotation mark. - -Page 1262: The opening quotation mark just before 'The intelligible is -of a nature' has no matching closing quotation mark. - -Page 1265: The opening quotation mark just before 'be in relation with -a place,' has no matching closing quotation mark. - -Page 1318: The opening quotation mark just before 'Being and Essence;' -has no matching closing quotation mark. - -Page 1327: The first few lines were misprinted, with the sub-heading -"IMPORTANCE IN THE PAST." in the middle of the first paragraph and part -of a word missing from that paragraph. This eBook attempts to correct -that. - - -Concordance Issues: - -Entries in the Concordance have not been systematically checked for -accuracy; some errors have been corrected, but others probably remain. -Detected errors are noted below. - -Page ii: "Alone with the alone... 1-550" corrected to 1-50. - -Page v: "Beauty consists in kinship to the soul... 1.42." corrected to -1-42. - -Page vi: "Being and actualization... 30-784" corrected to 39-784. - -Page viii: "Castration", second reference, "v. 8.13 (31-573)." does not -belong here. - -Page xvii: "Effusion", last word "reation" could be "reaction" or -"reason". - -Page xxix: "Incorporeality of soul proved by its... 2.72." corrected to -2-72. - -Page xxxii: "Intelligence's existence proved... 50-104." corrected to -5-104. - -Page xxxiv: "Judgment of one part by another... 52-472." corrected to -52-1172. - -Page lviii: ""Somewhat," a particle to modify... 31-797" corrected to -39-797. - -Page lviii: "Soul and relation with God", reference to "i." was -misprinted as "ii." - -Page lviii: "Soul conforms destiny to her character... 53-238." -corrected to 15-238. - -Page lx: "Soul split into three" has no reference. - -Page lxii: "Spectator of vision becomes participator... 34-569" -corrected to 31-569. - -Page lxii: "Stars are they animate?" has no reference. - -Page lxii: "Stars are they inanimate?" has no reference. - -Page lxiv: "Supreme intelligence, nature of... 51-144." corrected to -51-1144. - -Page lxviii: "Unity, contained in sense objects... 24-671" corrected to -34-671. - -Page lxxii: "We and ours, psychological names of soul" was missing part -of reference; reconstructed by Transcriber based on page reference. - - -Footnote Issues: - -In these notes, "anchor" means the reference to a footnote, and -"footnote" means the information to which the anchor refers. Anchors -occur within the main text, while footnotes are grouped in sequence at -the end of this eBook. The structure of the original book required some -exceptions to this, as explained below. - -The original text used chapter endnotes. In this eBook, they have been -combined into a single, ascending sequence based on the sequence in -which the footnotes (not the anchors) occurred in the original book, -and placed at the end of the main text, just before the Concordance. - -Four kinds of irregularities occurred in the footnotes: - -1. Some footnotes are referenced by more than one anchor, so two or -more anchors may refer to the same footnote. - -2. Some anchors were out of sequence, apparently because they were -added afterwards or because they are share a footnote with another -anchor. They have been renumbered to match the numbers of the footnotes -to which they refer. - -3. Some footnotes have no anchors. These are noted below. - -4. One footnote was misprinted beyond repair, and the next three -footnotes were missing. These are noted below. - -Page 1076: Footnote 61 (originally 42) has no anchor; the missing -anchor would be in page range 1062-1064. - -Page 1121: Footnote 100 (originally 4) has no anchor; the missing -anchor would be in page range 1091-1093. - -Page 1121: Footnote 103 (originally 7) has no anchor; the missing -anchor would be in page range 1094-1097. Anchor 99 (originally 3) on -page 1094 could be the missing anchor, as that number also is used on -page 1091. - -Page 1188: Footnote 210 (originally 13) has no anchor; the missing -anchor would be on page 1171 or 1172. - -Page 1189: Footnote 226 (originally 29) has no anchor; the missing -anchor would be on page 1174 or 1175. - -Page 1253: Footnote 329 (originally 9) has no anchor; the missing -anchor would be in page range 1219-1226. - -Page 1287: Footnote 469 (originally 98) has no anchor; the missing -anchor would be on page 1287. - -Page 1313: Chapter number is "VII." but there is no earlier "VI." - -Page 1333: Footnote 758 (originally 21) appears to be misprinted, and -the next three footnotes 759-761 (originally 22-24) are missing. - - - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4, by -Plotinos (Plotinus) - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLOTINOS: COMPLETE WORKS, V. 4 *** - -***** This file should be named 42933.txt or 42933.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/2/9/3/42933/ - -Produced by Charlene Taylor, Joe C, Charlie Howard, and -the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images -generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian -Libraries) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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