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diff --git a/42931.txt b/42931.txt deleted file mode 100644 index b0c908d..0000000 --- a/42931.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12035 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2, by Plotinos (Plotinus) - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2 - In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods - -Author: Plotinos (Plotinus) - -Translator: Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie - -Release Date: June 13, 2013 [EBook #42931] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ASCII - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLOTINOS: COMPLETE WORKS, V. 2 *** - - - - -Produced by Charlene Taylor, Joe C, Charlie Howard, and -the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images -generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian -Libraries) - - - - - - - - - -VOLUME II. - -WORKS OF PLOTINOS. - - - - - PLOTINOS - Complete Works - - In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods; - - With - BIOGRAPHY by PORPHYRY, EUNAPIUS, & SUIDAS, - COMMENTARY by PORPHYRY, - ILLUSTRATIONS by JAMBLICHUS & AMMONIUS, - STUDIES in Sources, Development, Influence; - INDEX of Subjects, Thoughts and Words. - - by - KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE, - - Professor in Extension, University of the South, Sewanee; - A.M., Sewanee, and Harvard; Ph.D., Tulane, and Columbia. - M.D., Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia. - - VOL. II - Amelio-Porphyrian Books, 22-33. - - COMPARATIVE LITERATURE PRESS - P. O. Box 42, ALPINE, N.J., U.S.A. - - - - - Copyright, 1918, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie. - All Rights, including that of Translation, Reserved. - - Entered at Stationers' Hall, by - George Bell and Sons, Portugal Street, Lincoln's Inn, London. - - - - -SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR. - -The One Identical Essence is Everywhere Entirely Present. - - -WHY THE WORLD-SOUL IS EVERYWHERE ENTIRE IN THE WORLD-BODY. - -1. Is it because the body of the universe is so great that the Soul is -everywhere present in the universe, though being naturally divisible in -(human) bodies? Or it is by herself, that she is everywhere present? In -the latter case, she has not been drawn away everywhere by the body, -but the body found her everywhere in existence before it; thus, in -whatever place it may be, it found the Soul present before it itself -was part of the universe, and the total body of the universe was -located in the Soul that existed already. - - -HOW COULD THE SOUL HAVE NO MAGNITUDE, IF SHE ALREADY FILLED ALL SPACE? - -But if the Soul had such an extension before the body approached -her, if she already filled all space, how can she have no magnitude? -Besides, how could she have been present in the universe when the -latter did not yet exist? Last, being considered indivisible and -non-extended, is she everywhere present without having any magnitude? -If the answer be that she extended herself throughout the body of the -universe without herself being corporeal, the question is not yet -resolved by thus accidentally attributing magnitude to the Soul; for -it would then be reasonable to ask how she grew great by accident. The -Soul could not extend herself in the entire body in the same manner as -quality, as for instance, sweetness or color; for these are passive -modifications of the bodies, so that one must not be astonished to see -a modification spread all over the modified body, being nothing by -itself, inhering in the body, and existing only within it; that is why -the soul necessarily has the same magnitude as the body. Besides, the -whiteness of one part of the body does not share the experience[1] (or, -"passion") experienced by the whiteness of another part; the whiteness -of one part is identical, in respect to species, to the whiteness of -another part; but it is not identical therewith in respect to number; -on the contrary, the part of the soul which is present in the foot is -identical with the portion of the soul present in the hand, as may be -seen in the percepts thereof. Last, what is identical in the qualities -is divisible, while that which is identical in the soul is indivisible; -if it be said to divide, it is in this sense that it is present -everywhere. - - -THE SOUL WAS CAPABLE OF EXTENSION BEFORE THE EXISTENCE OF THE BODY. - -In view of these facts, let us, starting from the very beginning, -explain in a clear and plausible manner, how the soul, being -incorporeal and extended, could, nevertheless, have assumed such an -extension, either before the bodies, or in the bodies. If indeed one -see that she was capable of assuming extension before the bodies -existed, it will be easily understood that she could have done so -within the bodies. - - -DESCRIPTION OF THE UNIVERSAL BEING. - -2. There exists a genuinely universal (Being). The world that we -see is no more than its image. This veritably universal (Being) is -in nothing; for nothing has proceeded from its existence. What is -posterior to this universal (Being) must, to exist, be in it, since it -would depend on it, and without it could neither subsist nor move. Do -not therefore place our world in this genuinely universal (being) as in -a place, if by place you understand the limit of the body containing -so far as it contains, or a space which before had, and which still -has emptiness for nature. Conceive of the foundation on which our -world rests as existing in the (Being) which exists everywhere, and -contains it. Conceive their relation exclusively by the mind, setting -aside all local nomenclature. Indeed, when one speaks of place, it is -only in relation with our visible world; but the universal (being), -being the First, and possessing genuine existence, has no need of -being in a place, nor in anything whatever. Being universal, it could -not fail to support itself, for it fills itself, equals itself, and -is where is the universal because it is this itself. What has been -built on the universal, being other than it, participates in it, and -approaches it, receives strength from it, not by dividing it, but -because it finds it in itself, because it approaches it, since the -universal ("being") is not outside of itself; for it is impossible for -the essence to be in non-essence; on the contrary, it is non-essence -that must subsist in essence, and consequently unite entirely with -the whole essence. We repeat, the universal could not separate itself -from itself; and if we say that it is everywhere, it is only in this -sense that it is in essence, that is, in itself. It is not surprising -that what is everywhere is in essence and in itself; for that which -is everywhere is in the unity. We, however, positing that the (Being) -in question is sense-(existence), believe that it is everywhere here -below; and, as the sense-(existence) is great, we wonder how nature -(that is, the intelligible essence) can extend in that which has so -great a magnitude. In reality, the (Being) which is called great is -small; the (Being) which is regarded as small is great, since the -whole of it penetrates in every part of all; or rather, our world, -by its parts everywhere approaching the universal (Being), finds it -everywhere entire, and greater than itself. Consequently, as it would -receive nothing more by a greater extension (for, if it were possible, -it would thereby exclude itself from the universal Being), it circles -around this Being. Not being able to embrace it, nor to pierce into -its innermost, it contented itself with occupying a place, and with -having a place where it might preserve existence while approaching the -universal (Being), which in one sense is present to it, and in another, -is not present; for the universal (Being) is in itself, even when -something else wishes to unite itself to it. Therefore, approaching it, -the body of the universe finds the universal "Being"; having no need -of going any farther, it turns around the same thing because the thing -around which it turns is the veritably universal (Being), so that in -all its parts it enjoys the presence of this whole entire Being. If -the universal (Being) were in a place, our world should (instead of -having a circular motion), rush towards it in a straight line, touching -different parts of this Being by different parts of its own, and find -itself on one side distant from it, and on the other side near it. But -as the universal (Being) is neither near one place, nor distant from, -another, it is necessarily entirely present as soon as it is at all -present. Consequently, it is entirely present to each of these things -from which it is neither near nor far; it is present to the things that -are able to receive it. - - -THE UNIVERSAL BEING IS INDIVISIBLE. - -3. Is the universal (Being) by itself present everywhere? Or does it -remain within itself, while from its innermost its powers descend on -all things, and is it in this sense that it is regarded as everywhere -present? Yes, doubtless. That is why it is said that souls are the rays -of this universal (Being), that it is built on itself, and that from -it, souls descend into various animals. The things which participate -in its unity, incapable as they are of possessing a complete nature -conformed to its nature, enjoy the presence of the universal (Being) in -this sense that they enjoy the presence of some of its powers. They are -not, however, entirely separated from it, because it is not separated -from the power which it communicates to each of them. If they do not -have more, it is only because they are not capable of receiving more -from the presence of the entire whole (Being). Evidently it is always -entirely present there where its powers are present. It however remains -separated, for if it became the form of any one particular being, it -would cease to be universal, to subsist everywhere in itself, and -it would be the accident of some other "being." Therefore, since it -belongs to none of these things, even of those that aspire to unite -themselves with it, it makes them enjoy its presence when they desire -it, and in the measure in which they are capable thereof; but it -does not belong to any of them in particular. It is not surprising, -therefore, that it should be present in all things, since it is not -present in any in a manner such as to belong to it alone. It is also -reasonable to assert that, if the soul share the passions of the -bodies, it is only by accident, that she dwells in herself, and belongs -neither to matter nor to body, that the whole of her illuminates -the whole world-body. It is not a contradiction to say that the -(Being) which is not present in any place is present to all things -each of which is in a place. What, indeed, would be surprising and -impossible would be that the universal (Being) could, while occupying -a determinate place, be present to things which are in a place, and -could at all be present in the sense in which we have explained it. -Reason forces us, therefore, to admit that the universal (Being) must, -precisely because it does not occupy any place, be entirely present -to the things to which it is present; and, since it is present to the -universe, be entirely present to each thing; otherwise, one part of it -would be here, and another there; consequently, it would be divisible, -it would be body. How otherwise could one divide the ("Being")? Is it -its life that shall within it be divided? If it be the totality of the -(being) that is life, no part of it would be that. Or will somebody -try to divide the Intelligence, so that one of its parts be here, -and the other there? In this case, neither of the two parts would -be intelligence. Or will the (Being) itself be divided? But if the -totality be the (Being), no one part of it would be that. It might be -objected that the parts of the bodies are still bodies themselves. But -that which is divided is not the body (as such), but a certain body -of a certain extent; now each of its parts possesses the form that -causes it to be named body; while the form not only does not have some -particular extension, but even any kind of extension at all. - - -THE UNITY OF BEING DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER BEINGS. - -4. How can there be a plurality of essences, intelligences and soul, -if essence be one? The essence is one everywhere; but its unity does -not exclude the existence of other (beings), which may be said to -conform thereto. It is so also with the unity of the intelligence, and -of the soul, although the Soul of the universe be different from the -particular souls. - - -ESSENCE IS DIVISIBLE IF THEREBY NOT DIMINISHED. - -It would seem as if there were a contradiction between the present -assertions and other statements of ours; and perhaps our demonstration -imposes rather than convinces. It is impossible to believe that the -essence which is one be also everywhere identical; it would seem -preferable to admit that essence, considered in its totality, is -susceptible of division, so long as this division does not diminish -it; or, to use more careful terms, that it begets all things while -remaining with itself; and that the souls that are born of it, and -are its parts, fill up everything. But if it be admitted that the One -essence remains in Himself because it seems incredible that a principle -could everywhere be present entire, the same difficulty would hinder us -in regard to souls; for it will result that each of them will no longer -be entire in the whole body, but will be divided therein, or, if each -individual soul remain entire, that it is by remaining in one part of -the body, that the soul will communicate her power to it. These same -questions about the soul could be raised about the powers of the soul, -and we might ask if they be all entire everywhere. Last, one could be -led to believe that the soul was in one member, while her power was in -another. - - -THE SOUL, AS COMPRISING MANY SOULS, IS INFINITE. - -Let us first explain how there can be a plurality of intelligences, -souls, and essences. If we consider the things that proceed from the -first principles, as they are numbers and not magnitudes, we shall -also have to ask ourselves how they fill the universe. This plurality -which thus arises from the first principles does not in any way help us -to solve our question, since we have granted that essence is multiple -because of the difference (of the beings that proceed from it), and -not by place; for though it be multiple, it is simultaneously entire; -"essence everywhere touches essence,"[2] and it is everywhere entirely -present. Intelligence likewise is manifold by the difference (of -the intelligences that proceed therefrom), and not by space; it is -entire everywhere. It is so also with souls; even their part which is -divisible in the bodies is indivisible by its nature. But the bodies -possess extension because the soul is present with them; or rather, -it is because there are bodies in the sense-world; it is because the -power of the Soul (that is universal) which is in them manifests itself -in all their parts, that the Soul herself seems to have parts. What -proves that she is not divided as they are, and with them, that she -is entirely present everywhere, is that by nature she is essentially -one and indivisible. Thus, the unity of the Soul does not exclude the -plurality of souls, any more than the unity of essence excludes the -plurality of (beings), or that the plurality of intelligibles does -not disagree with the existence of the One. It is not necessary to -admit that the Soul imparts life to the bodies by the plurality of -souls, nor that that plurality derives from the extension of the body -(of the world). Before there ever were any bodies, there was already -one (universal) Soul and several (individual) souls. The individual -souls existed already in the universal Soul, not potentially, but each -in actuality. The unity of the universal Soul does not hinder the -multitude of the individual souls contained within her; the multitude -of the individual souls does not hinder the unity of the universal -Soul. They are distinct without being separated by any interval; they -are present to each other instead of being foreign to each other; for -they are not separated from each other by any limits, any more than -different sciences are within a single soul. The Soul is such that in -her unity she contains all the souls. Such a nature is, therefore, -infinite. - - -THE GREATNESS OF THE SOUL HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SIZE OF THE BODY. - -5. The magnitude of the Soul does not consist in being a corporeal -mass; for every corporeal mass is small, and reduces to nothing, if -it be made to undergo a diminution. As to the magnitude of the Soul, -nothing can be removed from it; and if something were removed, she -would not lose anything. Since, therefore, she cannot lose anything, -why fear that she should be far from something? How could she be far -from something since she loses nothing, since she possesses an eternal -nature, and is subject to no leakage? If she were subject to some -leakage, she would advance till where she could leak; but as she cannot -leak at all (for there is no place where or into which she could leak), -she has embraced the universe, or rather, she herself is the universe, -and she is too great to be judged according to physical magnitude. -We may say that she gives little to the universe; but she gives it -all it can receive. Do not consider the universal Being (Essence) -as being smaller, or as having a smaller mass (than our universe); -otherwise, you would be led to ask yourself how that which is smaller -can unite with that which is greater. Besides, one should not predicate -comparative smallness of the universal Essence, nor compare, in regard -to mass, that which has no mass with that which has; that would be -as if somebody said that the science called medicine is smaller than -the body of the doctor. Neither attribute to the universal Essence an -extent greater (than that of our universe); for it is not in extension -that the soul is greater than the body. What shows the veritable -magnitude of the soul, is that, when the body increases, the same soul -which formerly existed in a smaller mass is present in this whole mass -that has become greater; now it would be ridiculous to suppose that -the soul increases in the same manner as a corporeal mass. - - -THE SOULS WILL DIFFER AS WILL THE SENSATIONS. - -6. Why (if the universal Soul possess the magnitude here attributed -to her), does she not approach some other body (than that which she -animates; that is, some individual body)? It would be this body's -(privilege or duty) to approach the universal Soul, if it be able to -do so; on approaching to her, it receives something, and appropriates -it. But would this body, that would approach the universal Soul, not -already possess her simultaneously with the soul proper to itself, -since these souls (the universal Soul, and the individual soul) do not -appear to differ from each other? The fact is, that as their sensations -differ, so must the passions that they experience likewise differ. The -things are judged to be different, but the judge is the same principle -successively placed in presence of different passions, although it be -not he who experiences them, but the body disposed in some particular -manner. It is as if when some one of us judges both the pleasure -experienced by the finger, and the pain felt by the head. But why does -not our soul perceive judgments made by the universal Soul? Because -this is a judgment, and not a passion. Besides, the faculty that judged -the passion does not say, "I have judged," but it limits itself to -judging. Thus, in ourselves, it is not the sight which communicates its -judgment to the hearing, although both of these senses made separate -judgments; what presides over these two senses is reason, which -constitutes a different faculty. Often reason cognizes the judgment -made by some other (being), while being conscious simultaneously of the -passion it experiences. But this question has been treated elsewhere. - - -HOW CAN THE SAME PRINCIPLE EXIST IN ALL THINGS? - -Let us return to this question: How can the same principle exist -in all things? This question amounts to asking how each of the -sense-objects which form a plurality and which occupy different places, -can, nevertheless, participate in the same principle; for it is not -allowable to divide unity into a multitude of parts; it would be more -fitting to reduce the multitude of parts to unity, which could not -approach them. But when these parts occupy different places, they have -led us to believe that unity likewise is split up, as if the power -which dominates and which contains were divided into as many parts as -that which is contained. The hand itself (though corporeal), may hold -an entire body, such as a piece of wood several feet in length, and -other objects. In this case, the force that holds makes itself felt in -the whole object that is felt, and does not distribute itself in as -many parts as it may contain, though it be circumscribed by the limit -of the reach of the hand. Nevertheless, the hand is limited by its own -extension, and not by that of the body which is held or suspended. Add -to the suspended body some other length, and admitting that the hand -can carry it, its force will hold the entire body without dividing into -as many parts as it may contain. Now suppose that the corporeal mass -of the hand be annihilated, and, nevertheless, allow the force which, -before, existed in the hand and held the weight, to persist; will not -this same force, indivisible in the totality, be equally indivisible in -each of its parts? - - -LIGHT EXISTS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITHIN AND WITHOUT. - -7. Imagine a luminous point which serves as centre, and imagine around -it a transparent sphere, so that the clearness of the luminous point -shines in the whole body that surrounds it without the exterior -receiving any light from elsewhere; you will surely have to acknowledge -that this interior light, by remaining impassible, penetrates the -whole surrounding mass, and that it embraces the whole sphere from -the central point in which it is seen to shine. The truth is that the -light did not emanate from the little body placed in the centre; for -this little body did not glow inasmuch as it was a body, but inasmuch -as it was a luminous body; that means, by virtue of an incorporeal -power. Now in thought annihilate the mass of the little luminous body, -and preserve its luminous power; could you still say that light is -somewhere? Will it not be equally in the interior, and in the whole -exterior sphere? You will no longer perceive where it was fixed before, -and you will no longer say whence it comes, nor where it is; in this -respect you will remain uncertain and astonished; you will see the -light shine simultaneously in the interior and in the exterior sphere. -An example of this is the solar light that shines in the air when -you look at the body of the sun, at the same time that you perceive -everywhere the same light without any division; that is demonstrated -by objects that intercept the light; they reflect it nowhere else -than in the direction from which it came; they do not shatter it into -fragments. But if the sun were an incorporeal power, you could not, -when it would radiate light, tell where the light began, nor from where -it was sent; there would be but a single light, the same everywhere, -having neither point of beginning, nor principle from which it proceeds. - - -UNITY IS IN THE MANIFOLD BY A MANNER OF EXISTENCE. - -8. When light emanates from a body it is easy to tell when it shines, -because the location of that body is known. But if a being be -immaterial, if it have no need of a body, if it be anterior to all -bodies, and be founded on itself, or rather if it have no need, as -has a body, or resting on any foundation--then, a being endowed with -such a nature has no origin from which it is derived, resides in no -place, and depends on no body. How could you then say that one of its -parts is here, and another is there? For thus it would have an origin -from which it had issued, and it would depend from something. We must, -therefore, say that if something participate in this being by the -power of the universe, it participates in this being entirely, without -thereby being changed or divided; for it is a being united to a body -that suffers (although often that happens to it only accidentally), -and in this respect it may be said that it is passive and divisible, -since it is some part of the body, either its passion, or form. As -to the (being) which is united to any body, and to which the body -aspires to be united, it must in no manner share the passions of the -body, as such; for the essential passion of the body, as such, is -to divide itself. If, therefore, the body be by nature inclined to -divide itself, then is the incorporeal, by nature, indivisible. How, -in fact, could one divide that which has no extension? If, therefore, -the extended (being) participate in the (being) which has no extension, -it participates in this (being) without dividing it; otherwise, this -(being) would have extension. Consequently, when you say that the -unity (of the universal essence) is in the manifold, you do not say -that unity has become manifoldness, but you refer to this unity the -manner of existence of the multitude, seeing it in this whole multitude -simultaneously. As to this Unity, it will have to be understood that -it belongs to no individual, nor to the whole multitude, but that it -belongs to itself alone, that it is itself, and that, being itself, -it does not fail to support itself. Nor does it possess a magnitude -such as of our universe, nor, let alone, such as that of one of the -parts of the universe; for it has absolutely no magnitude. How could -it have any magnitude? It is the body that should have such magnitude. -As to the (being) whose nature is entirely different from that of the -body, no magnitude should be ascribed to it. If it have no magnitude, -it is nowhere; it is neither here nor there; for if so, it would be in -several places. If then the local division suits only the (being) of -which one part is here, and the other there, how could the (being) that -is neither here nor there be divided? Consequently, the incorporeal -(being) must remain indivisible in itself, although the multitude of -things aspire to unite itself to it, and succeeds therein. If they -aspire to possess it, they aspire to possess it entire, so that if -they succeed in participating in that (being), they will participate -in that entire (being) so far as their capacity reaches. Nevertheless, -the things that participate in this (being) must participate in it -as if they did not participate in it, in this sense that it does not -belong exclusively to any of them. It is thus that this (being) dwells -entirely in itself, and in the things in which it manifests; if it did -not remain entire, it would no more be itself, and things would no -longer participate in the (being) to which they aspire, but in some -other (being) to which they did not aspire. - - -POTENTIALITIES ARE INSEPARABLE FROM THEIR BEINGS. - -9. If this unity (of the universal Soul) divided itself in a multitude -of parts such that each would resemble the total unity, there would be -a multitude of primary (beings); for each one of these (beings) would -be primary. How then could one distinguish from each other all these -primary (beings), so that they might not all in confusion blend into a -single one? They would not be separated by their bodies, for primary -(beings) could not be forms of bodies; as they would be similar to -the primary (Being) which is their principle. On the other hand, if -the things named parts were potentialities of the universal (Being), -(there would be two results). First, each thing would no longer be -the total unity. Then, one might wonder how these potentialities -separated from the universal (Being), and abandoned it; for if they -abandoned it, it could evidently only be to go somewhere else. There -might also be reason to ask oneself if the potentialities which are -in the sense-world are still or no longer in the universal (Being). -If they be no longer in it, it is absurd to suppose it diminished or -became impotent, by being deprived of the powers it possessed before. -It is equally absurd to suppose that the potentialities would be -separated from the beings to which they belong. On the contrary, if -the potentialities exist simultaneously in the universal (Being) and -elsewhere, they will, here below, be either wholes or parts; if they be -parts, that part of them that will remain on high will also form parts; -if they be wholes, they are here below the same as above; they are not -divided here below in any way, and thus the universal (Being) is still -the same without any division. Or again, the potentialities are the -particularized universal (Being), which has become the multitude of -the things of which each is the total unity; and these potentialities -are mutually similar. In this way, with each being there will be but -a single potentiality, united to Being, and the other things will be -no more than mere potentialities. But it is not easier to conceive of -a being without potentiality, than a potentiality without a being; -for above (among the ideas) the potentiality consists of hypostatic -existence and being; or rather, it is something greater than being. -Here below there are other potentialities, less energetic or lively; -they emanate from the universal (Being) as from a brilliant light would -emanate another less brilliant light; but the beings inhere in these -potentialities, as there could be no potentiality without being. - - -THE UNIVERSAL SOUL IS EVERYWHERE ENTIRE, INCLUDING SOULS SPLIT -INFINITELY. - -Among such potentialities, which are necessarily conformable to each -other, the universal Soul must be the same everywhere, or, if she be -not absolutely everywhere, she must, at least, in every place, be -entire without division, as in one and the same body. In this case, why -could she not also be thus in the whole universe? If we were to suppose -that each particular soul were divided into infinity, the universal -Soul will no longer be entire, and, as a result of this division, -she will become completely impotent. Then, as there will be entirely -different powers in different parts of the world, there will be no -more sympathy among souls. Last, the image, separated from the essence -it represents, and the light, separated from the source of which it -is only a weakened emanation, could no longer subsist; for in general -everything that derives its existence from anything else and its image -could no longer subsist without its model. Likewise, these powers -which radiate from the universal Soul would cease to be if they found -themselves separated from their principle. If so, the Principle which -begets these powers will exist everywhere they are; consequently, from -this standpoint also, the universal (Being) must be everywhere present -as a whole, without undergoing any divisions. - - -THE IMAGE IS BOUND TO ITS MODEL BY RADIATION. - -10. It may be objected that the image need not necessarily be attached -to its model; for there are images that subsist in the absence of their -model from which they are derived. For instance, when the fire ceases, -the heat that proceeds from it does not any the less remain in the -warmed object. The relation between this image and its model should be -understood as follows. Let us consider an image made by a painter. In -this case, it is not the model who made the image, but the painter; -and even so it is not even the real image of the model, even if the -painter had painted his own portrait; for this image did not arise from -the body of the painter, nor from the represented form, nor from the -painter himself, but it is the product of a complex of colors arranged -in a certain manner. We, therefore, do not really here have the -production of an image, such as is furnished by mirrors, waters, and -shadows. Here the image really emanates from the pre-existing model, -and is formed by it, and could not exist without it. It is in this -manner that the inferior potentialities proceed from the superior ones. - - -SOULS ARE AS IMMORTAL AS THE ONE FROM WHOM THEY PROCEED. - -Let us proceed to the objection drawn from the heat that remains -after the withdrawal of the fire. The heat is not the image of the -fire, or at least, we may deny that there is always fire in heat; -but even so heat would not be independent of fire. Besides, when you -withdraw from a body the fire that heats it, this body grows cold, -if not instantaneously, at least gradually. It would, however, be -wrong to say that the powers that descend here below also gradually -grow extinct; for this would amount to stating that only the One is -immortal, while the souls and intelligences are mortal. Besides, it is -not reasonable to admit that even the things that derive from a "being" -that wastes away also gradually exhaust themselves; for even if you -should immobilize the sun, it would still shed the same light in the -same places. If it were objected that it would not be the same light, -the conclusion would be (the absurdity) that the body of the sun is in -a perpetual wastage. Last we have elsewhere demonstrated at length -that what proceeds from the One does not perish, but that all souls and -intelligences are immortal. - - -BEINGS PARTAKE OF THE ONE DIFFERENTLY ACCORDING TO THEIR CAPACITIES. - -11. But if (the intelligible Being) be present everywhere, why do not -all (beings) participate in the intelligible (Being) entire? Why are -there several degrees amidst these (beings), one being the first, the -other the second, and so on? Because the (beings) which are capable of -absorbing (intelligible Being) are counted as present thereto. Essence -exists everywhere in that which is essence, thus never failing itself. -Everything that can be present to it is present in reality, in the -measure of its capacity, not in a local manner, as light is modified by -transparence; for participation takes place differently in an opaque -body. If we distinguish several degrees among beings, we shall surely -have to conceive that the first is separated from the second, and the -second from the third, only by its order, its power, its (individual) -differences, but not by its location. In the intelligible world nothing -hinders different things from subsisting together, such as soul and -intelligence, and all the sciences, superior or inferior. Thus also in -a single apple the eye sees color, the nostril smells perfume, and each -other sense-organ perceives its individual quality. All these things -subsist together and are not separated from each other. - - -THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF PRESENCES. - -Is the intelligible (Being) then so varied and manifold? It is indeed -varied, but it is simultaneously simple; it is both one and manifold; -for reason (which is the essence of the universal Soul), is both one -and manifold. The universal (Being) is also one; though any difference -in it (in this sense, that it contains different essences), results -from its own constitution; the difference inheres in its nature, for -it could not belong to non-being. The constitution of Essence is such -as to be inseparable from unity; unity is present wherever essence is, -and the one Essence subsists in itself. It is indeed possible that an -essence which in a certain respect is separated from another essence, -is, however, entirely present with it. But there are different kinds -of presence; first, when sense-things are present with intelligible -things, at least to those to which they can be present; second, when -intelligible entities are present to each other; likewise, when the -body is present to the soul; another, when a science is present to -the soul; further, when a science is present to another science, and -both coexist in the same intelligence; last, when a body is present to -another body. - - -HOW VARIOUS THINGS CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE SAME PRINCIPLE. - -12. When a sound resounds in the air, and when it constitutes a word, -the ear that is present hears and perceives this sound and this word, -especially if the place be quiet. If another ear should come to be in -this place, the sound and the word approach it likewise, or rather, -this ear will approach the word. Suppose also that several eyes -consider the same object; all are filled with its sight, although -this object occupy a determinate place. Thus the same object will -impress different organs with different perceptions, because the -one is an eye, and the other is an ear. Likewise, all the things -that can participate in the soul do participate therein, but each -receives a different power from one and the same principle. The sound -is everywhere present in the air; it is not a divided unity, but a -unity present everywhere, entirely. Likewise, if the air receive the -form of the visible object, it possesses it without division, for, in -whatever place the eye should place itself, it perceives the form of -the visible object; at, least, according to our opinion, for not all -philosophers agree herewith. We give these examples to explain how -several things may participate in one and the same principle. Besides, -the example of the sound suffices to demonstrate what we here wish to -explain; namely, that the entire form is present in the entire air; -for all men would not hear the same thing, if the word uttered by the -sound were everywhere entire, and if each ear did not likewise hear it -entire. Now if in this case the entire word spread in the entire air, -without some definite part of the word being united to a certain part -of the air, and some other part of the word being united with another -part of the air, how could we refuse to admit that a single Soul -penetrates everywhere without dividing herself with the things, that -she is entirely present everywhere where she is, that she is everywhere -in the world without dividing into parts that correspond to those of -the world? When she has united with the bodies, in whatever kind of -union, she bears an analogy to the word which has been pronounced in -the air, while before uniting with the bodies, she resembles him who -pronounces, or is about to pronounce some word. Nevertheless, even when -she has united to the bodies, she does not really in certain respects -cease resembling him who pronounces a word, and who, while pronouncing -it, possesses it, and gives it at the same time. Doubtless the word -does not have a nature identical with those things that we proposed to -illustrate by this example; nevertheless, there is much analogy between -them. - - -THE BODY'S RELATION TO THE SOUL IS A PASSAGE INTO THE WORLD OF LIFE. - -(Let us study) the relation of the (world) Soul to bodies. As this -relation is of a different kind, it must be understood that the Soul -is not partly in herself and partly in the bodies. Simultaneously she -dwells entirely within herself, and also projects her image into the -multiplicity of the bodies (which reflect her, like mirrors). Suppose -that some definite body approach the Soul to receive life from her; it -obtains life silently, and thus possesses what already was in other -bodies. Indeed, conditions had not been arranged so that a part of the -Soul, located in a certain place, should await a body, so as to enter -into it. But this part of the Soul which enters into a body, so to -speak, existed already in the universe, that is to say, in herself, and -she continued to exist in herself although she seemed to have descended -here below. How indeed should the Soul descend here below? Therefore, -if she did not descend here below, if she only manifested her actual -presence, without awaiting the body which was to participate in her, -evidently the Soul dwells in herself simultaneously with becoming -present to this body. Now, if the Soul dwell in herself at the same -time as she becomes present to this body (for it is not the Soul that -came into this body), it is the body which entered into her; it is -the body which, being till then outside of veritable Essence, entered -into it, and passed into the world of life. Now the world of life was -all in itself, without extension, and, therefore, without division. -The body has, therefore, not entered into it as in something that -possesses extension. It commenced by participating, not in one of the -parts of the world of life, but in this whole world, entirely. If an -additional body should also enter it, it will participate in it in the -same way (entirely). Consequently, if we said that the world of life is -entire in these bodies, it is similarly entire in each of them. It is, -therefore everywhere the same, and numerically one, without dividing, -but always present entire. - - -EXTENSION IS MERELY A SIGN OF PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD OF LIFE. - -13. Whence originates extension in our universe, and in the animals? -The world of life contains no extension. Sensation, whose testimony -hinders us from believing what we are told in this respect, reveals -to us here and there the world of life. But reason tells us that, if -we see it thus, it is not that it is really extended here and there, -but that all that possesses extension has participated in the world of -life, which, however, has no extension. - - -PARTICIPATION CAN BE ONLY IN THE INTELLIGIBLE. - -When a being participates in something, evidently it does not -participate in itself; for thus it would really participate in -nothing, and would remain what it was. The body that participates in -something must, therefore, not participate in corporeal nature, for -it possesses it already. Consequently, the body will not participate -in the corporeal nature, any more than a magnitude would participate -in a magnitude, which it possesses already. Let us even admit that -a magnitude be increased, yet on that account alone it would not -participate in magnitude; for a two-foot object does, not become a -three-foot object, but the object which first had a certain quantity -merely changes to some other quantity; otherwise two would become -three. Thus, since that which has extension and is divided participates -in genus that is different, and even very different, the thing in -which it participates must neither be divided, nor have extension; -but have absolutely no kind of quantity. Consequently, the (being) -which everywhere is present entire must be present, though remaining -indivisible. It is not indivisible merely because it is small, which -would not make it any less divisible; only, it would no more be -proportioned to the universe, it would not spread in the corporeal mass -in the degree that it increases. Neither does it resemble a point, -but it includes an infinity of points; consequently what you might -suppose was a point would include an infinity of (separate) points, -and could not be continuous, nor, consequently, proportion itself to -the universe. If then every corporeal mass possess the (being) which -is present everywhere, it must possess it entire in all the parts that -compose it. - - -NOTHING IN THE UNIVERSAL SOUL IS BEGOTTEN; IT ONLY SEEMS SO. - -14. But if one and the single Soul be in each person, how does each -have his own soul? How then can one soul be good, while the other -is evil? The universal Soul communicates her life to each, for she -contains all the souls and all the intelligences. She possesses -simultaneously unity and infinity; in her breast she contains all -the souls, each distinct from her, but not separated; otherwise how -could the Soul possess the infinite? It might still be objected that -the universal Soul simultaneously contains all things, all lives, all -souls, all the intelligences; that these are not each circumscribed by -limits, and that that is the reason they form a unity. Indeed, there -had to be in the universal Soul a life not only one, but infinite, and -yet single; this one life had to be one so far as it was all lives, -as these did not get confused in this unity, but that they should -originate there, while at the same time they should remain located in -the place from where they had started; or rather, they never left the -womb of the universal Soul, for they have always subsisted in the same -state. Indeed, nothing was begotten in the universal Soul; she did -not really divide herself, she only seems divided in respect to what -receives her; everything within her remains what it has always been. -But that which was begotten (namely, the body) approaches the Soul, -and seems to unite with her, and depends on her. - - -RELATION OF MAN TO THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. - -And what are we? Are we the universal Soul, or are we what approaches -her, and what is begotten in time (that is, the body)? No: (we are not -bodies). Before the generation of the bodies had been accomplished, we -existed already on high; some of us were men, others of us were even -divinities----that is, we were pure souls, intelligences connected with -universal Being; we formed parts of the intelligible world, parts that -were neither circumscribed nor separated, but which belonged to the -entire intelligible world. Even now, indeed, we are not separated from -the intelligible world; but the intelligible Man in us has received, -and is joined by a man who desired to be different from the former -(that is, the sense-man desired to be independent), and finding us, -for we were not outside of the universe, he surrounded us, and added -himself to the intelligible man who then was each one of us. - - -WE ARE NOT ALWAYS BOTH MEN, AS WE SHOULD BE. - -Now suppose a single sound or word; those who listen to it hear it and -receive it, each in his own way; hearing passes into each of them in -the condition of an actualization, and perceives what is acting on it. -We thus became two men at once (the intelligible Man, and the sense-man -who added himself to the former); we are no longer, as before, only one -of the two; or rather, we are sometimes still only one of them, the man -who added himself to the first. This occurs every time that the first -Man slumbers in us, and is not present, in a certain sense (when we -fail to reflect about the conceptions of intelligence). - - -HOW THE BODY APPROACHED THE SOUL. - -15. But how did the body approach the universal Soul? As this body -had an aptitude for participation in the Soul, it received that for -which it was fit; now it was disposed to receive a particular soul; -that is why it did not receive the universal Soul. Although the latter -be present with this body, she does not become entirely suitable to -it; that is why plants and the non-human souls likewise possess only -so much of the universal Soul, as they were able to receive from her. -Likewise, when a voice challenges notice, so some (persons) grasp only -the sound, others grasp also the signification. As soon as the animal -has been begotten, it possesses within itself the presence of a soul -derived from the universal (Being), and by which it remains united with -this (Being) because then it possesses a body that is neither empty nor -inanimate. This body was not before in an inanimate place, and (when -it was begotten), it only further reapproximated itself to the soul by -its aptitude (to receive life); it became not only a body, but also -a living body; thanks to the neighborhood to the soul, it received a -trace (of the soul); and by that I do not mean a part of the soul, but -a kind of heat or light which emanated from the soul, and which, in -the body, begat desires, pleasures, and pains. The body of the thus -begotten animal was, therefore, not a body foreign (to life). The Soul, -that had issued from the divine principle, remained tranquil according -to her own nature, and was subsisting in herself, when that part, which -was troubled by her own weakness, and was spontaneously fluctuating -around when assailed by impulsions from without, first complained -audibly by herself, and then in that part of the animal which is common -to the soul and body, and communicated her disturbance to the entire -living being. Thus when a deliberative assembly calmly examines some -question, a confused mob, driven by hunger or excited by some passion, -may come to spread trouble and disorder in the whole assembly. As long -as such people keep quiet, the voice of the wise man may be heard by -them; and as a result the crowd retains orderliness, its worse part -remaining subordinate; otherwise the worst part dominates, while the -better part remains silent, because the trouble hinders the crowd -from listening to reason. Thus does evil come to reign in a city and -in an assembly. Likewise evil reigns in him who allows himself to be -dominated by this disorderly crowd of fears, desires and passions -that he bears within his breast; and that will last until he reduce -that crowd to obedience, until he become again the man he formerly -was (before descending here below), and until he regulate his life -(according to the better Man); what he then will grant to the body will -be granted as to something foreign. As to him who lives now in one -manner, and now in another, he is a man of mingled good and evil. - - -THIS DOCTRINE EXPLAINS THE MYTHS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. - -16. If the soul could not become evil, and if there be but a single -way for the soul to enter the body, and to remain present within it, -there would be no meaning in the periodical "descents" and "ascents" -of the soul, the "chastisements" she undergoes, and the "migration" -into the bodies other (than human bodies, that is, animal ones). Such -(mythological) teachings have indeed been handed down from the ancient -philosophers who best expounded the soul. Now it will be well to show -that our doctrine harmonizes with that which they have taught, or that -at least there is no contradiction between them. - - -THE SOUL'S DESCENT INTO THE BODY. - -We have just explained that, when the body participates in the soul, -the soul does not somehow go beyond herself to enter into the body, -that it is on the contrary the body which enters into the soul, on -participating in life, or evidently, when the ancient philosophers say -that the soul comes into the body, this means that the body enters -into essence, and participates in the life and the soul; in one word, -to "come" does not here signify passing from one place into another, -but indicates in what way the soul enters into dealings with the body. -Therefore "to descend" means, for the soul, to grow into a body, in -the sense in which we have explained it; that means, to give the body -something of the soul, and not for the soul to become (the property) -of the body. Consequently, the soul's issuing from the body must again -mean that the body ceases to participate in life. - - -PROCEDURE OF THE DESCENT OF THE SOUL. - -This is how this participation takes place for the parts of this -universe (that is, the bodies). Being situated as it were on the -confines of the intelligible world, the soul often gives the body -something of herself; for, by her power (or potentiality), she is the -neighbor of the body; and finding herself close to it, she enters -into dealings therewith by virtue of a law of her nature; but this -intercourse is of evil, and to enfranchise herself from the body is -good. Why? Because if the soul be not the (property or slave) of the -body in this intercourse, she, nevertheless, unites herself to it, and -though she were universal, she becomes individual; for her activity -no longer is exclusively confined to the intelligible world, although -(she still, by nature) belong thereto. It is as if someone, who was an -expert in a whole science, confined himself to a single proposition -thereof; whereas a person who possesses a whole science should -naturally consider its entirety, and not a mere part of it. Likewise -the soul, which belonged entirely to the intelligible world, and which -partially blended her particular essence with the total Essence, -withdrew out of the universal Essence, and became individual essence, -because the body to which she confines her activities is only a part -of this universe. It is as if the fire, endowed with the ability of -burning everything, was reduced to burn out some small object, although -it possessed power of universal scope. Indeed, when the particular -soul is separated from the body, she is no longer particular (in -actualization); on the contrary, when she has separated herself from -the universal Soul, not by passing from one locality to another, but -by applying her activity (to a part of this universe, to a body), she -becomes particular (in actualization), though she remain universal in -another manner (in potentiality); for when the soul presides over no -body she is truly universal, and is particular only in potentiality. - - -WHAT HELL MEANS FOR THE CAREER OF THE SOUL. - -Consequently, when we say that the soul is in hell (Hades), if we mean -by "hades" an invisible place, that means that the soul is separated -from the body; if, on the contrary, we understand hell to mean a lower -locality, we may also offer a reasonable interpretation: for now our -soul is with our body and is located with it. But what is meant by -saying that the soul is in hell after the body no longer exists? If -the soul be not separated from her image, why should she not be where -her image is? If the soul were separated from her image by philosophy, -this image will alone go to the lower locality, while the soul lives -purely in the intelligible world, without any emanation. This is what -we had to teach about the image born of some particular individual. As -to the soul, if she concentrate in her breast the light that radiates -around her, then, turned towards the intelligible world, she entirely -re-enters into this world; she is no longer in actualization. But this -does not cause her to perish (for when she is incarnated in a body, -and is particular, she exists only potentially; while she attains to -actualization when she becomes universal). So much for this point; now -let us return to our subject. - - - - -SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE. - -The One Identical Essence is Everywhere Entirely Present. - - -UNITY MUST BE SOUGHT FOR IN ESSENCE. - -1. It is a common conception of human thought that a principle single -in number and identical is everywhere present in its entirety; for it -is an instinctive and universal truism that the divinity which dwells -within each of us is single and identical in all.[3] It cannot be -expected that the men who will use this expression should be able to -explain how God is present in us, and without subjecting their opinion -to the scrutiny of reason; they will only affirm that such is the state -of the case; and resting in this conception which is the spontaneous -result of their understanding, they will all hold to this something -that is single and only, and will refuse to give up this unity. -That is the most solid principle of all, a principle that our souls -whisper instinctively, and which is not deduced from the observation -of particular things, but which claims our attention far before them, -even before the maxim that everything aspires to the Good. Now this -principle is true if all the beings aspire to unity, form an unity and -tend towards unity. This unity, advancing towards all other things, so -far as it can advance seems to be manifold, and indeed becomes so, in -certain respects, but the ancient nature which is the desire of the -Good, that belongs to itself, really leads to unity; and every nature -aspires to possess this unity by turning towards itself; for the good -of the nature which is One, is to belong to oneself, to be oneself; -that is, to unify oneself. That is why it is reasonably said that -the Good peculiarly belongs to (this nature), and must not be sought -outside of it. How indeed could the Good have fallen outside of the -essence, or be found in non-essence? It must evidently be sought in -essence, since itself is not non-essence. If then the Good be essence, -and may be found in essence, it must be within itself in each of us. We -cannot, therefore, be far from essence, but we are in it. Neither is it -far from us. All (beings), therefore, constitute but a unity. - - -"BEING" IS THE BASIS OF JUDGMENT IN THINGS PARTICIPATING IN BEING. - -2. As the human reason which undertakes to examine the question here -raised is not one, but divided, it makes use of corporeal nature in its -researches, by borrowing its principles. That is why reason, thinking -it intelligible being, similar to bodies, divides it, doubting its -unity. It could not be otherwise, because its investigation was not -founded on the proper immanent principles. We must, therefore, in our -discussion about the one universal Essence, choose principles capable -of enlisting support, principles that would be intellectual, that is, -would connect with intelligible entities, and veritable being. For -since our sense-nature is agitated by continual flux, being subject -to all kinds of changes, trending towards all directions of space; -it should consequently be called not "being," but generation, or -becoming. The eternal Essence, on the contrary, is not divided; it -subsists ever in the same manner and in the same state, neither is -born, nor perishes; occupies neither place nor space; does not reside -in any determinate location; neither enters, nor issues, but remains -in itself. A discussion about the nature of bodies begins with this -(physical) nature, and the things that are related to it, which -(deductively) give rise to probable proofs by the aid of syllogisms -equally probable. But when we deal with intelligible entities, our -starting-point must be the nature of the being considered; principles -have to be legitimately derived therefrom; and then, without -surreptitiously substituting any other nature (inductively), borrow -from the intelligible Being itself the conception formed about it; for -being, or whatness, is everywhere taken as principle; and it is said -that the definition of an object, when well made, sets forth many of -its accidents. Therefore, when we are dealing with things where being -is everything, we must, so much the more, apply our whole attention to -this being; base all our (arguments) thereon, and refer everything to -it. - - -INTELLIGIBLE ESSENCE IS BOTH IN AND OUT OF ITSELF. - -3. If intelligible essence be essential essence; if it be immutable; -if it never evade itself; if it admit of no generation; and be not -in any place, the result is, that by virtue of its nature, it ever -remains within itself, has no parts distant from each other, located -in different places; that it does not issue from itself, which would -lead it to inhere in different subjects, or at least to inhere in one -subject, and, consequently, no longer to dwell in itself, and no longer -to remain impassible; for if it inhered in something different from -itself, it would be exposed to suffering (passion, or, experience). -As, however, this is impossible, it can not inhere in anything other -than itself. Therefore, since it never departs from itself, as it -is never divided, as it exists within several things simultaneously -without undergoing any change, as it exists within itself one and -simultaneously entire, it must, while existing in several things, -remain everywhere identical; that is, be everywhere entire both in -itself, and out of itself. Consequently, it does not (exist) within any -determinate thing, but the other things participate in it, so far as -they are capable of approaching it, and so far as they do approach it -in the measure in which they are capable. - - -THAT ENTIRE BEING IS PRESENT EVERYWHERE IS THE ONLY SOLUTION OF THE -PUZZLE. - -Consequently, it will be necessary either to reject the propositions -set forth above, that is, the principles which have been established, -and deny the existence of the intelligible entities; or, as this is -impossible, to recognize the truth of what has been advanced from the -very beginning (of this discussion): the Essence which is one and -identical is indivisible, and exists as single everywhere. It is not -distant from any of the other things; and, nevertheless, (to be near -them) it has no need of spreading, of letting certain portions of its -essence flow.[4] It remains entire in itself, and though it produce -something inferior, it does not, on that account, abandon itself, and -does not extend itself hither and yon in other things; otherwise, it -would be on one side, while the things it produces would be on the -other, and it would occupy a place, finding itself separated therefrom. -As to these (produced things), each of them is either a whole or a -part. If it be a part, it will not preserve the nature of the all, as -we have already said; if, however, it be all, we shall have to divide -it in as many parts as that in which it subsists--or, it will have to -be granted that the identical essence can simultaneously be everywhere -entire. This is a demonstration drawn from the matter itself, which -contains nothing external to the being that we are examining, and -which does not borrow anything from any other nature. - - -GOD'S PRESENCE EVERYWHERE ENTIRE DESCRIBED AS INFINITE. - -4. Let us, therefore, contemplate this Divinity who is not present -here, and absent there, but who is everywhere. All those who have -any idea of the divinities admit that they, as well as that supreme -Divinity, are present everywhere. Reason compels this admission. Now, -since the Divinity is everywhere, He is not divided; otherwise, He -would not be present everywhere; He would have His parts, one here, -and another there. He would no longer be a unity; He would resemble an -expanse divided into a number of parts; He would be annihilated in this -division, and all His parts would no longer form the whole; in short, -He would have become body. If that be impossible, we shall have to -admit that to which before we refused assent, to which all human nature -testifies, namely, that the Divinity is everywhere simultaneously -present, entire, and identical. If we acknowledge such a nature as -infinite, since it has no limits, this will be granting that it lacks -nothing. Now if it lack nothing, it must be present to every essence; -if it could not be essence, there would be places, where it did not -exist, and it would lack something. The essences which exist beneath -the One exist simultaneously with Him, are posterior to Him, refer -to Him, and reattach themselves to Him as His creatures; so that to -participate in what is posterior to Him is to participate in Himself. -As, in the intelligible world, there is a multitude of beings which -there occupy the first, second, or third ranks, in that they depend -from that only centre of a single sphere; and as they coexist there -without any separating distance between them, the result is that the -essences which occupy the first or second ranks are present there even -where are the beings that occupy the third rank. - - -EXAMPLE OF THE SUN AND THE RAYS. - -5. In order to clear up this point, the following illustration has -been much used. Let us imagine a multitude of rays, which start from -a single centre; and you will succeed in conceiving the multitude -begotten in the intelligible world. But, admitting this proposition, -that things begotten in the intelligible, and which are called -multitude, exist simultaneously, one observation must be added: in the -circle, the rays which are not distinct may be supposed to be distinct, -because the circle is a plane. But there, where there is not even the -extension proper to a plane, where there are only potentialities and -beings without extension, all things must be conceived as centres -united together in a single centre, as might be the rays considered -before their development in space, and considered in their origin, -where, with the centre, they form but a single and same point. If now -you imagine developed rays, they will depend from the points from where -they started, and every point will not be any the less a centre, as -nothing will separate it from the first centre. Thus these centres, -though united to the first centre, will not any the less have their -individual existence, and will form a number equal to the rays of which -they are the origins. As many rays as will come to shine in the first -centre, so many centres will there seem to be; and, nevertheless, all -together will form but a single one. Now if we compare all intelligible -entities to centres, and I mean centres that coincide in a single -centre and unite therein, but which seem multiple because of the -different rays which manifest, without begetting them, such rays could -give us some idea of the things by the contact of which intelligible -being seems to be manifold and present everywhere. - - -THE UNITY OF MANIFOLDNESS. - -6. Intelligible entities, indeed, though they form a manifold, -nevertheless, form an unity. On the other hand, though they form -an unity, yet by virtue of their infinite nature they also form a -manifold. They are the multitude in unity, and unity in multitude; -they all subsist together. They direct their actualization towards -the whole, with the whole, and it is still with the whole, that they -apply themselves to the part. The part receives within itself the first -action, as if it were that of only a part; but, nevertheless, it is -the whole that acts. It is as if a Man-in-himself, on descending into -a certain man, became this man without, however, ceasing being the -Man-in-himself. The material man, proceeding from the ideal Man, who -is single, has produced a multitude of men, who are the same because -one and the same thing has impressed its seal on a multitude. Thus -the Man-in-himself, and every intelligible entity in itself, and then -the whole entire universal Essence is not in the multitude, but the -multitude is in the universal Essence, or rather, refers to it; for -if whiteness be everywhere present in the body, it is not in the same -manner as the soul of an individual is present and identical in all -the organs. It is in this latter manner that the essence is present -everywhere. - - -PARABLE OF THE HEAD WITH FACES ALL AROUND. - -7. Our nature and we ourselves all depend on (cosmic) being; we aspire -to it, we use it as principle, from the very beginning. We think -the intelligible (entities contained in essence) without having -either images or impressions thereof. Consequently, when we think -the intelligible (entities), the truth is that we are these very -intelligible entities themselves. Since we thus participate in the -genuine knowledge, we are the intelligible entities, not because we -receive them in us, but because we are in them. However, as beings -other than we constitute intelligible entities, as well as we, we are -all the intelligibles. We are intelligible entities so far as they -subsist simultaneously with all essences; consequently, all of us -together form but a single unity. When we turn our gaze outside of Him -from whom we depend, we no longer recognize that we are an unity; we -then resemble a multitude of faces which (being disposed in a circle) -would, as seen from the exterior, form a plurality, but which in the -interior would form but a single head. If one of these faces could -turn around, either spontaneously, or by the aid of Minerva, it would -see that itself is the divinity, that it is the universal Essence. No -doubt, it would not at first see itself as universal, but later, not -being able to find any landmarks by which to determine its own limits, -and to determine the distance to which it extends, it would have to -give up the attempt to distinguish itself from the universal (Essence), -and it would become the universal (Essence) without ever changing -location, and by remaining in the very foundation of the universal -(Essence). - - -THIS IS PROVED BY THE PARTICIPATION OF MATTER IN IDEAS. - -8. Whoever will consider the participation of matter in ideas will be -impressed with the above theory, will declare it not impossible, and -express no further doubts. It is necessary to admit the impossibility -of a conception such as the following: on one hand, the ideas -separate from matter; on the other hand, matter at a distance from -them, and then an irradiation from on high descending on matter. -Such a conception would be senseless. What meaning would lie in this -separation of the ideas, and this distance of matter? Would it not -then be very difficult to explain and to understand what is called -the participation of matter in ideas? Only by examples can we make -our meaning clear. Doubtless, when we speak of an irradiation, we do -not, however, mean anything similar to the irradiation of some visible -object. But as the material forms are images, and as they have ideas, -as archetypes, we say that they are "illuminated by the ideas," so as -to convey the idea that that which is illuminated is different from -that which illumines. Now, however, to express ourselves more exactly, -we shall have to enforce that the idea is not locally separated from -matter, and does not reflect itself therein as some object does in -water. On the contrary, matter surrounds the idea on all sides; touches -it somehow without touching it; then, in its entirety, it receives -what, it is capable of receiving from its vicinity (to the idea), -without any intermediary, without the idea penetrating through the -whole of matter, or hovering above it, without ceasing to remain within -itself. - - -THE SOUL, AS ENTIRE, FASHIONED THE WHOLE AND THE INDIVIDUALS. - -Since the idea of fire, for instance, is not in matter, let us imagine -matter serving as subject for the elements. The idea of fire, without -itself descending into matter, will give the form of the fire to the -whole fiery matter, while the fire, first mingled with matter will -constitute a multiple mass. The same conception may be applied to the -other elements. If then the intelligible fire appear in everything as -producing therein an image of itself, it does not produce this image -in matter as if it had separated itself therefrom locally, as would -have occurred in the irradiation of a visible object; otherwise it -would be somewhere, and it would fall under the senses. Since the -universal Fire is multiple, we must conclude that, while its idea -remains in itself outside of all place, it itself has begotten the -localities; otherwise we would have to think that, having become -multiple (by its parts), it would extend, by withdrawing from itself, -to become multiple in this manner, and to participate several times -in the same principle. Now, being indivisible, the idea has not given -a part of its being to matter; nevertheless, in spite of its unity, -it has communicated a form to what was not contained in its unity; it -granted its presence to the universe without fashioning this by one -of its parts, and that by some other part. It was as an entire whole -that it fashioned the whole and the individuals. It would indeed be -ridiculous to suppose that there was a multitude of the ideas of fire, -so that each fire might be formed by its own particular idea; if that -were the case, the ideas would be innumerable. Further, how would we -divide the things that have been generated by the Fire, since it is -single, and continuous? If we augment the material fire by adding to it -another fire, it is evidently the same idea which will produce in this -portion of matter the same things as in the remainder; for it could not -be another idea. - - -THE UNITY OF THE SOUL PROVES THAT OF THE SUPREME. - -9. If all the elements, when begotten, were to be gathered into one -sphere, (there would be an opportunity of observing and comparing them. -The result would be a conclusion that) this sphere does not have a -plurality or a diversity of authors, one of whom would have created -one part, and another author, another. The production of this sphere -will imply a single Author, who created it by acting, as a whole; not -producing one part of creation by one part of Himself, and another part -of creation, by another part of Himself. In the latter case, the sphere -might still have several authors, if the production of the totality -were not traced to a single, indivisible Principle. Though this single -and indivisible Principle be the author of the entire sphere, it does -not interpenetrate the sphere; for it is the entire Sphere which -depends on its author. One only and single Life contains the entire -Sphere, because this is located in a single Life. All the things that -are in the sphere may, therefore, be reduced to a single Life, and all -the souls form a Soul which is single, but which is simultaneously -infinite. That is why certain philosophers have said that the soul is -a number;[5] others, that the number produces increase in the soul, no -doubt meaning by that, that nothing is deficient in soul, that she is -everywhere without ceasing to be herself. As to the expression, "to -produce increase to the soul," this must not be taken literally, but so -as to mean that the soul, in spite of her unity, is absent nowhere; for -the unity of the soul is not a unity that can be measured; that is the -peculiarity of another being which falsely claims unity for itself, and -which succeeds in gaining the appearance of unity only by participating -therein. The Essence which really is one is not a unity composed of -several things; for the withdrawal of one of them would destroy the -total unity. Nor is it separated from the other things by limits; for -if the other things were assimilated thereto, it would become smaller -in the case where these would be greater; either it would split itself -up into fragments by seeking to penetrate all, and instead of being -present to all, as an entirety, it would be reduced to touching their -parts by its own parts. If then this Essence may justly be called one, -if unity may be predicated of its being, it must, in a certain manner, -seem to contain the nature opposed to its own; that is, the manifold; -it must not attract this manifoldness from without, but it must, from -and by itself, possess this manifold; it must veritably be one, and -by its own unity be infinite and manifold. Being such, it seems as -if it were everywhere a Reason (a being), which is single, and which -contains itself. It is itself that which contains; and thus containing -itself, it is no where distant from itself; it is everywhere in itself. -It is not separated from any other being by a local distance; for it -existed before all the things which are in a locality; it had no need -of them; it is they, on the contrary, which need to be founded on it. -Even though they should come to be founded on it, it would not, on that -account, cease resting on itself as a foundation. If this foundation -were to be shaken, immediately all other things would perish, since -they would have lost the base on which they rested. Now this Essence -could not lose reason to the point of dissolving itself by withdrawing -from itself; and to be about to trust itself to the deceptive nature of -space which needs it for preservation. - - -THE BEING LOVES ESSENCE AS ENTIRE. - -10. Animated by wisdom, this Essence dwells in itself, and it could -never inhere in other things. It is these, on the contrary, that come -to depend from it, as if with passion seeking where it may be. That -is the love that watches at the door of the beloved, which remains -ever near the beautiful, agitated with the desire of possessing it, -and esteeming itself happy to share in its gifts. Indeed, the lover of -the celestial beauty does not receive Beauty itself, but, as he stands -near it, he shares in its favors, while the latter remains immovable in -itself. There are, therefore, many beings which love one only and same -thing, who love it entire, and who, when they possess it, possess it -entire in the measure in which they are capable of doing so; for they -desire to possess it entire. Why then should not this Essence suffice -to all by remaining within itself? It suffices precisely because it -remains within itself; it is beautiful because it is present to all as -an entire whole. - - -REASON ALSO IS A WHOLE. - -For us Wisdom also is a whole; it is common to all of us, because it -is not different in different places; it would, indeed, be ridiculous -for it to need existence in some locality. Besides, wisdom does not -resemble whiteness; for (whiteness is the quality of a body, while) -Wisdom does not at all belong to the body. If we really participate -in Wisdom, we necessarily aspire to some thing single and identical, -which exists in itself, as a whole, simultaneously. When we participate -in this Wisdom, we do not receive it in fragments, but entire; and -the Wisdom which you possess entire is not different from that which -I myself possess. We find an image of this unity of Wisdom in the -assemblies and meetings of men, where all those present seem to help in -making up a single Wisdom. It seems that each one, isolated from the -others, would be powerless to find wisdom; but when the same person -is in a meeting, where all the minds agree together, in applying -themselves to a single object, he would produce, or rather discover, -Wisdom. What indeed hinders different minds from being united within -one same and single Intelligence? Although Intelligence be common to -us and to other men, we do not notice this community. It is as if, -touching a single object with several fingers, one should later imagine -having touched several objects; or as if one had struck a single -chord of the lyre without seeing it (and thinking that one had struck -different chords). - - -BY THE INTELLIGIBLE PARTS OF THEIR BEING, ALL MEN SHARE THE SAME -INTELLIGIBLE. - -Let us return to our subject. We were seeking how we might attain the -Good with our souls. The Good that you attain is not different from -the one that I myself attain; it is the same. And when I say that it -is the same, I do not mean that from the Good descended upon us both -different things, so that the Good would remain somewhere on high, -while His gifts descended down here; on the contrary, I mean that He -who gives is present to those who receive, so that these may veritably -receive; I mean besides that He gives His gifts to beings who are -intimately united with Him, and not to beings who might be foreign to -Him; for intellectual gifts cannot be communicated in a local manner. -One even sees different bodies, in spite of the distance that separates -them, receiving the same gifts, because the gift granted, and the -effect produced tend to the same result; much more, all the actions -and passions which produce themselves in the body of the universe are -contained within it, and nothing comes to it from without. Now if a -body, which by its nature as it were scatters itself (because it is -in a perpetual flowing wastage), nevertheless, receives nothing from -without, how would a being that has no extension retain nothing from -without, how would a being that has no extension retain something -from without? Consequently, as all are contained in one and the -same Principle, we see the good, and we altogether touch it by the -intelligible part of our nature. - - -THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD HAS MUCH MORE UNITY THAN THE SENSE-WORLD. - -Besides, the intelligible world has much more unity than the -sense-world; otherwise, there would be two sense-worlds, since the -intelligible sphere would not differ from the sense-sphere if the -former did not have more unity than the latter. In respect to unity, -therefore, the intelligible world would surpass the sense-sphere. It -would indeed be ridiculous to admit that one of the two spheres would -have an extension suitable to its nature; while the other, without any -necessity, would extend, and would withdraw from its centre. Why would -not all things conspire together to unity, in the intelligible world? -There, indeed, no one thing hinders another by impenetrability, any -more than the conception that you have of a notion or of a proposition -in no wise hinders the one that I have in myself, any more than -different notions mutually hinder each other in the same soul. To the -objection that such a union could not take place for (separate) beings, -an affirmative answer may be given, but only if one dare to suppose -that veritable beings are corporeal masses. - - -HOW THE INTELLIGIBLE MAY REMAIN UNMOVED AND YET PENETRATE IN THE WORLD. - -11. How can the intelligible, which has no extension, penetrate into -the whole body of the universe, which has no such extension? How does -it remain single and identical, and how does it not split up? This -question has been raised several times, and we sought to answer it, so -as to leave no uncertainty. We have often demonstrated that the things -are thus; nevertheless, it will be well to give some further convincing -proofs, although we have already given the strongest demonstration, -and the most evident one, by teaching the quality of the nature of the -intelligible, explaining that it is not a vast mass, some enormous -stone which, located in space, might be said to occupy an extension -determined by its own magnitude, and would be incapable of going beyond -its limits; for its mass and its power would be measured by its own -nature, which is that of a stone. (The intelligible Essence, on the -contrary,) being the primary nature, has no extension that is limited -or measured, because it itself is the measure of the sense-nature; and -because it is the universal power without any determinate magnitude. -Nor is it within time, because the time is continually divided into -intervals, while eternity dwells in its own identity, dominating and -surpassing time by its perpetual power, though this seemed to have an -unlimited course. Time may be compared to a line which, while extending -indefinitely, ever depends from a point, and turns around it; so, -that, into whatever place it advances, it always reveals the immovable -point around which it moves in a circle. If, by nature, time be in the -same relation (as is this line with its centre), and if the identical -Essence be infinite by its power as well as by its eternity, by virtue -of its infinite power it will have to produce a nature which would in -some way be parallel to this infinite power, which rises with it, and -depends from it, and which finally, by the movable course of time, -tries to equal this power which remains movable in itself.[6] But then -even this power of the intelligible Essence remains superior to the -universe, because the former determines the extension of the latter. - - -HOW THE INFERIOR NATURE CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE INTELLIGIBLE. - -How could then the inferior nature participate in the intelligible, -at least to the extent of its capacity? Because the intelligible is -everywhere present in its entirety, although, by the impotence of the -things that receive it, it be not perceived in its entirety in each of -these things. The identical essence is present everywhere, not indeed -as the material triangle, which is multiple in respect to number in -several subjects, although it be identical therein in respect to being; -but as the immaterial triangle from which depend material triangles. - -Why then is the material triangle not everywhere, like the immaterial -triangle? Because matter does not entirely participate in the -immaterial triangle, as it also receives other forms, and since it does -not apply itself entirely to every intelligible entity. Indeed, the -primary Nature does not give itself as an entirety to every thing; but -it communicates itself first to the primary genera (of essences;) then, -through these, it communicates itself to the other essences; besides, -it is not any the less from the very beginning present to the entire -universe. - - -LIFE INTERPENETRATES ALL; AND KNOWS NO LIMITS. - -12. But how does this (primary Nature) make itself present to the whole -universe? It is present to the universe because it is the one Life. -Indeed, in the world considered as a living being, the life does not -extend to certain limits, beyond which it cannot spread; for it is -present everywhere. - -But how can it be everywhere? Remember, the power of life is not a -determinate quantity; if, by thought, it be infinitely divided, still -it never alters its fundamental characteristic of infinity. This -Life does not contain any matter; consequently, it cannot be split -up like a mass, and end in being reduced to nothing. When you have -succeeded in gaining a conception of the inexhaustible and infinite -power of the intelligent Essence; of its nature that is unceasing, -indefatigable; that suffices itself completely, to the point that its -life, so to speak, overflows, whatever be the place on which you fix -your gaze, or direct your attention; where will you find absence of -that intelligible Essence? On the contrary, you can neither surpass -its greatness, nor arrive at anything infinitely small, as if the -intelligible Essence had nothing further to give, and as if it were -gradually becoming exhausted. - - -IF YOU SEE ANYTHING BEYOND IT, YOU DEPART FROM IT. - -When, therefore, you will have embraced the universal Essence and -will be resting within it, you must not seek anything beyond it. -Otherwise, you will be withdrawing from it; and, directing your -glance on something foreign, you will fail to see what is near you. -If, on the contrary, you seek nothing beyond it, you will be similar -to a universal Essence. How? You will be entirely united to it, you -will not be held back by any of its parts, and you will not even be -saying, "This is what I am!" By forgetting the particular being that -you are, you will be becoming the universal Being. You had, indeed, -already been the universal Essence, but you were something besides; -you were inferior by that very circumstance; because that which you -possessed beyond the universal Essence did not proceed from the -universal Essence, for nothing can be added thereto; but rather had -come from that which is not universal. When you become a determined -being, because you borrow something from non-essence, you cease being -universal. But if you abandon non-essence, you will be increasing -yourself. It is by setting aside all the rest that the universal -Essence may be discovered; for essence does not reveal itself so long -as one remains with the rest. It does not approach you to make you -enjoy its presence; it is you who are straying from it, when it ceases -to be present. Besides, when you stray away, you are not actually -straying away from it, as it continues to be present; you are not -distant from it, but, though being near Essence, you have turned away -from it. Thus even the other divinities, though they be present to many -human beings, often reveal themselves only to some one person, because -he alone is able (or, knows how) to contemplate them. These divinities -(according to Homer),[7] assume many different forms, and haunt the -cities. But it is to the supreme Divinity that all the cities, all the -earth, and all the heavens turn; for the universe subsists by Him, and -in Him. From Him also do all real essences derive their existence; -it is from Him that all depend, even the (universal) Soul, and the -universal Life; it is to His infinite unity that they all turn as to -their goal; a unity which is infinite precisely because it has no -extension. - - - - -FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK SIXTH. - -The Superessential Principle Does Not Think; Which is the First -Thinking Principle, and Which is the Second? - - -BY THINKING, INTELLIGENCE PASSES FROM UNITY TO DUALITY. - -1. One may think oneself, or some other object. What thinks itself -falls least into the duality (inherent to thought). That which thinks -some other object approaches identity less; for though it contain what -it contemplates, it nevertheless differs therefrom (by its nature). On -the contrary, the principle that thinks itself is not, by its nature, -separated from the object thought. It contemplates itself, because it -is intimately united to itself; the thinking subject, and the object -thought form but a single being within it,[8] or, it thus becomes -two, while it is only one. It thinks in a superior manner, because -it possesses what it thinks; it occupies the first rank as thinking -principle, because the thinking principle must simultaneously be unity -and duality. If it were not unity, it would think some object other -than itself; it would no longer be the first thinking principle. -Indeed, that which thinks an object other than itself could not be the -first thinking principle, since it does not think the object of its -thought as belonging to its essence; and, consequently, it does not -think itself. If, on the contrary, the thinking principle possess the -object, if it be thought as belonging to its "being" (or nature), -then the two terms of the thought (the object and the subject), will -be identical. The thinking principle, therefore, implies unity and -duality simultaneously; for unless it join duality to unity, it will -have nothing to think, and, consequently, it will not think. It must, -therefore, be simple, and not simple simultaneously.[9] We better -understand the necessity of this double condition when, starting -from the Soul, we rise to intelligence, for within the latter it is -easier to distinguish the subject from the object, and to grasp its -duality.[10] We may imagine two lights of which the one, the soul -herself, is less brilliant, and we may then posit as equal the light -that sees and the light that is seen. Both of them, having nothing -further that distinguishes them, will form but a single thing, which -thinks by virtue of its duality, and which sees by virtue of its unity. -Here by reason (which is the characteristic faculty of the soul), we -have passed from duality to unity. But, while thinking, intelligence -passes from unity to duality; it becomes, or rather is, duality, -because it thinks; and is one, because it thinks itself. - - -A SUPRA-THINKING PRINCIPLE IS NECESSARY TO THE WORKING OF INTELLIGENCE. - -2. Since we have distinguished two principles, the one which is the -first thinking principle (the Intelligence), and the other which is -the second (the Soul), the Principle superior to the first thinking -principle must itself not think. In order to think, it would have to -be Intelligence; to be Intelligence, it would have to think an object; -to be the first thinking principle, it would have to contain this -object. Now it is not necessary that every intelligible entity should -possess intelligence, and should think; otherwise it would not only be -intelligible, but even Intelligence; being thus dual, it would not be -the first. On the other hand, intelligence cannot subsist, if there be -not a purely intelligible nature ("being"), which is intelligible for -Intelligence, but which in itself should be neither intelligence nor -intelligible. Indeed, that which is intelligible must be intelligible -for something else. As to Intelligence, its power is quite vain, if it -does not perceive and does not grasp the intelligible that it thinks; -for it cannot think, if it have no object to think; and it is perfect -only when it possesses this. Now, before thinking, it must by itself -be perfect by nature ("being"). Therefore, the principle through which -intelligence is perfect must itself be what it is before it thinks; -consequently, it has no need to think, since, before thinking, it -suffices to itself. It will, therefore, not think.[11] - - -THE FIRST THINKING PRINCIPLE IS THE SECOND PRINCIPLE. - -Therefore, the First principle (the One) does not think; the second -(Intelligence) is the first thinking principle; the third (the Soul) is -the second thinking principle. If the first Principle thought, it would -possess an attribute; consequently, instead of occupying the first -rank, it would occupy only the second; instead of being One, it would -be manifold, and would be all the things that it thought; for it would -already be manifold, even if it limited itself to thinking itself. - - -THE FIRST MUST BE ONE EXCLUSIVELY, WHICH WOULD MAKE THOUGHT IMPOSSIBLE. - -3. It might be objected that nothing (in all this) would hinder the -first Principle from being both single and manifold. We will answer -that the manifold needs a single subject. The manifold cannot exist -without the One from which it comes, and in which it is; without the -One which is counted the first outside of other things, and which must -be considered only in itself. Even on the supposition that it co-exists -with other things, it must, none the less, while being taken with the -other things with which it is supposed to co-exist, be considered -as different from them. Consequently, it must not be considered as -co-existing with other things, but be considered as their subject (or, -substrate), and as existing in itself, instead of co-existing with the -other things of which it is the subject. - - -WITHOUT SOMETHING SIMPLE, NOTHING MANIFOLD COULD EXIST. - -Indeed, that which is identical in things other than the One, may no -doubt be similar to the One, but cannot be the One. The One must exist -alone in itself, thus to be grasped in other things, unless we should -claim that its (nature) consists in subsisting with other things. -Under this hypothesis, there will not exist either anything absolutely -simple, nor anything composite. Nothing absolutely simple will exist, -since that which is simple could not subsist by itself; neither could -anything composite exist, since nothing simple will exist. For if no -simple thing possess existence, if there be no simple unity, subsisting -by itself, which could serve as support to the composite, if none of -these things be capable of existing by itself, let alone communicating -to others, since it does not exist; we must conclude that that which, -of all these things, is composite, could not exist, since it would be -made up out of elements that do not exist, and which are absolutely -nothing. Therefore, if we insist on the existence of the manifold, we -are implying the existence of the One before the manifold. Now since -that which thinks is multiple, the principle that is not manifold will -not think. But as this Principle is the first, then Intelligence and -thought are entities later than the first. - - -GOOD, INTELLIGENCE AND SOUL ARE LIKE LIGHT, SUN AND MOON. - -4. As the Good must be simple, and self-sufficient, it has no need -to think. Now that which it does not need could not be within it, -since nothing (that is different from it) exists in it; consequently, -thought does not exist in it (because it is essentially simple[12]). -Besides, the Good is one thing, and Intelligence another; by thinking, -Intelligence takes on the form of Good. Besides, when in two objects -unity is joined to something other than itself, it is not possible that -this unity, which is joined to something else, should be Unity itself. -Unity in itself should exist in itself before this unity was joined -to anything else. For the same reason, unity joined to something else -presupposes absolutely simple Unity, which subsists in itself, and has -nothing of what is found in unity joined to other things. How could -one thing subsist in another if the principle, from which this other -thing is derived, did not have an existence that was independent, and -prior to the rest? What is simple cannot derive anything from any other -source; but what is manifold, or at least indicates plurality, is of -derivative (nature). The Good may be compared to light, Intelligence -to the sun, and the Soul to the moon that derives her light from the -sun. The Soul's intelligence is only borrowed, which intellectualizes -her by coloring her with its light. On the contrary, Intelligence, -in itself, possesses its own light; it is not only light, but it is -essentially luminous. The Principle that illuminates Intelligence and -which is nothing but light, is absolutely simple light, and supplies -Intelligence with the power to be what it is. How could it need -anything else? It is not similar to what exists in anything else; -for what subsists in itself is very different from what subsists in -something else. - - -AS THOUGHT IS INSPIRATION TO THE GOOD, INTELLIGENCE IMPLIES THE LATTER. - -5. What is manifold needs to seek itself, and naturally desires -to embrace itself, and to grasp itself by self-consciousness. But -that which is absolutely One could not reflect on itself, and need -self-consciousness. The absolutely identical principle is superior -to consciousness and thought. Intelligence is not the first; it is -not the first either by its essence, nor by the majestic value of its -existence. It occupies only the second rank. It existed only when the -Good already existed; and as soon as it existed, it turned towards the -Good. In turning towards the Good, Intelligence cognized the latter; -for thought consists of conversion towards the Good, and aspiration -thereto. Aspiration towards the Good, therefore, produced thought, -which identifies itself with the Good; for vision presupposes the -desire to see. The Good, therefore, cannot think; for it has no good -other than itself. Besides, when something other than the Good thinks -the Good, it thinks the Good because it takes the form of the Good, and -resembles the Good. It thinks, because itself becomes for itself a good -and desirable object, and because it possesses an image of the Good. If -this thing always remain in the same disposition, it will always retain -this image of the Good. By thinking itself, Intelligence simultaneously -thinks the Good; for it does not think itself as being actualized; yet -every actualization has the Good as its goal. - - -THE GOOD AS SUPRA-COGITATIVE IS ALSO SUPRA-ACTIVE. - -6. If the above arguments be worth while, the Good has no place for -thought. What thinks must have its good outside of itself. The -Good, therefore, is not active; for what need to actualize would -actualization have? To say that actualization actualizes, is tautology. -Even if we may be allowed to attribute something to actualizations -which relate to some principle other than themselves, at least the -first actualization to which all other actualizations refer, must be -simply what it is. This actualization is not thought; it has nothing to -think, as it is the First. Besides, that which thinks is not thought, -but what possesses thought. Thus there is duality in what thinks; but -there is no duality in the First. - - -PRIMARY EXISTENCE WILL CONTAIN THOUGHT, EXISTENCE AND LIFE. - -This may be seen still more clearly by considering how this double -nature shows itself in all that thinks in a clearer manner. We assert -that all essences, as such, that all things that are by themselves, and -that possess true existence, are located in the intelligible world. -This happens not only because they always remain the same, while -sense-objects are in a perpetual flow and change[13]--although, indeed, -there are sense-objects (such as the stars[14]), that remain the -same--but rather because they, by themselves, possess the perfection -of their existence. The so-called primary "being" must possess an -existence which is more than an adumbration of existence, and which is -complete existence. Now existence is complete when its form is thought -and life. Primary "being," therefore, will simultaneously contain -thought, existence and life. Thus the existence of essence will imply -that of intelligence; and that of intelligence, that of essence; so -that thought is inseparable from existence, and is manifold instead of -being one. That which is not manifold (the One), cannot, therefore, -think. In the intelligible world, we find Man, and the thought of -man, Horse and the thought of horse, the Just Man and the thought of -the just man; everything in it is duality; even the unity within it -is duality, and in it duality passes into unity. The First is neither -all things that imply duality, nor any of them; it contains no duality -whatever. - - -THE FIRST, THEREFORE, BEING SUPRA-COGITATIVE, DOES NOT KNOW ITSELF. - -Elsewhere we shall study how duality issues from unity. Here we merely -insist that as the One is superior to "being," it must also be superior -to thought. It is, therefore, reasonable to insist that it does not -know itself, that it does not contain anything to be known, because it -is simple. Still less will it know other beings. It supplies them with -something greater and more precious than knowledge of beings, since it -is the Good of all beings; from it they derive what is more important -(than mere cogitation), the faculty of identifying themselves with it -so far as possible. - - - - -SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE. - -Of the Aristotelian Distinction Between Actuality and Potentiality. - - -QUESTIONS TO BE DISCUSSED. - -1. (Aristotle) spoke of (things) existing "potentially," and -"actually"; and actuality is spoken of as a "being." We shall, however, -have to examine this potential and actual existence; and whether -this actual existence be the same as actuality, and whether this -potential existence be identical with potentiality; also, whether these -conceptions differ so that what exists actually be not necessarily -actuality. It is evident that among sense-objects there exist things -potentially. Are there also such among the intelligibles? This then is -the problem: whether the intelligibles exist only actually; and on the -hypothesis of the existence among intelligibles of something existing -potentially, whether, because of its eternity, this always remains -there in potentiality; and, because it is outside of time, never -arrives to actuality. - - -DEFINITION OF POTENTIALITY. - -Let us first define potentiality. When a thing is said to exist -potentially, this means that it does not exist absolutely. Necessarily, -what exists potentially is potential only in relation to something -else; for example, metal is the statue potentially. Of course, if -nothing were to be done with this thing, or within it, if it were not -to become something beyond itself, if there were no possibility of -its becoming anything else, it would only be what it was already. How -could it then become something different from what it was? It did not, -therefore, exist potentially. Consequently, if, on considering what is -a thing that exists potentially, and one that exists actually, we say -that it exists potentially, we must mean that it might become different -from what it is, whether, after having produced this different thing, -it remain what it is, or whether, on becoming this different thing, -which it is potentially, it ceases being what it is itself. Indeed, if -metal be a statue potentially, this is a relation different from water -being metal potentially, as air is potentially fire.[15] - - -DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXISTING POTENTIALITY AND POTENTIALITY. - -Shall we say that what thus exists potentially is potentiality in -respect of what is to be; as, for instance, that the metal is the -potentiality of a statue? Not so, if we refer to the producing -potentiality; for the producing potentiality cannot be said to exist -potentially. If, then, we identified existing potentially not only with -existing actually, but also with actuality, then potentiality would -coincide with potential existence. It would be better and clearer, -therefore, to contrast potential existence with actual existence, and -potentiality with actuality. The thing which thus exists potentially is -the substance underlying the reactions, shapes and forms which it is -naturally fitted to receive, to which it aspires for their betterment -or deterioration, and for the destruction of those whose actualization -constitutes differentiation. - - -MATTER IS NOTHING ACTUALLY. - -2. As to matter, we shall have to examine whether it be something -actually, while simultaneously it potentially is the shapes it -receives; or whether it be nothing at all actually. Everything else of -which we predicate potentiality passes on to actuality on receiving its -form, and remaining the same. We may call a statue an actual statue, -thus contrasting with it a potential statue; but an actual statue will -not be implied by the metal which we called the potential statue. -Consequently, what exists potentially does not become what exists -actually; but from what was previously a potential (statue) proceeds -what later is an actual (statue). Indeed, what exists actually is the -compound, and not the matter; it is the form added to matter; this -occurs when there is produced another being; when, for example, from -the metal is made a statue; for the statue exists by this very being -something other than the metal; namely, the compound.[17] - - -IN PERMANENT THINGS, POTENTIALITY AND ACTUALITY MAY COINCIDE. - -In non-permanent things, what exists potentially is evidently something -quite different (from what is said to exist actually). But when the -potential grammarian becomes an actual grammarian, why should not the -potential and actual coincide? The potential wise Socrates is the -same as the actual Socrates. Is the ignorant man, who was potentially -learned, the same as the learned? No: only accident makes of the -ignorant man a learned one; for it was not his ignorance that made him -potentially wise; with him, ignorance was only an accident; but his -soul, being by herself disposed (to be actually learned), still remains -potentially learned, in so far as she was actually so, and still keeps -what is called potential existence; thus the actual grammarian does -not cease being a potential grammarian.[18] Nothing hinders these two -different things (of being a potential and actual grammarian) from -coinciding; in the first case, the man is no more than a potential -grammarian; in the latter, the man is still a potential grammarian, -but this potentiality has acquired its form (that is, has become -actual[19]). - - -DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GENERAL AND PARTICULAR ACTUALITY. - -If however what is potential be the substrate, while the actual is -both (potential and actual) at the same time, as in the (complete) -statue, what then shall we call the form in the metal? We might well -call the actuality by which some object exists actually, and not merely -potentially, the form and shape; therefore not merely actuality, but -the actuality of this individual thing. - - -THE FORM ADDED TO MATTER IS THE SPECIFIC ACTUALITY. - -The name actuality would better suit the (general) actuality rather -(than the actuality of some one thing); the actuality corresponding -to the potentiality which brings a thing to actuality. Indeed, when -that which was potential arrives at actuality, it owes the latter to -something else.[20] - - -WHAT IN THE BODY IS A PASSIVE CAPACITY, IN THE SOUL IS AN ACTIVE -FACULTY. - -As to the potentiality which by itself produces that of which it is -potentiality, that is, which produces the actuality (corresponding to -this potentiality), it is a (Stoic) "habituation;" while the actuality -(which corresponds to this habituation) owes its name thereto; for -instance, the "habituation" is courageousness; while the actuality is -being brave.[21] But enough of this! - - -INTELLIGIBLE MATTER IS NOT POTENTIAL. - -3. The purpose of the preceding considerations was to determine the -meaning of the statement that intelligibles are actual; to decide -whether every intelligible exist only actually, or whether it be only -an actuality; and third, how even up there in the intelligible, where -all things are actualities, there can also exist something potentially. -If, then, in the intelligible world, there be no matter which might -be called potential, if no being is to become something which it not -yet is, nor transform itself, nor, while remaining what it is, beget -something else, nor by altering, cause any substitution, then there -could not be anything potential in this World of eternal essence -outside of time. Let us now address the following question to those -who admit the existence of matter, even in intelligible things: "How -can we speak of matter in the intelligible world, if by virtue of this -matter nothing exists potentially? For even if in the intelligible -world matter existed otherwise than it does in the sense-world, still -in every being would be the matter, the form and the compound which -constitutes it." They would answer that in intelligible things, what -plays the part of matter is a form, and that the soul, by herself, -is form; but, in relation to something else, is matter. Is the soul -then potential in respect of this other thing? Hardly, for the soul -possesses the form, and possesses it at present, without regard to the -future, and she is divisible in form and matter only for reason; if she -contain matter, it is only because thought conceives of her as double -(by distinguishing form and matter in her). But these two things form -a single nature, as Aristotle also says that his "quintessence" is -immaterial. - - -THE SOUL IS THE PRODUCING POTENTIALITY; NOT THE POTENTIALITY OF -BECOMING. - -What shall we say? Potentially, she is the animal, when it is unborn, -though to be born. Potentially she is the music, and all the things -that become, because they are transient. Thus in the intelligible world -there are things which exist, or do not exist potentially. But the soul -is the potentiality of these things.[22] - - -IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD EVERYTHING IS ACTUAL. - -How might one apply actual existence to intelligible things? Each -of them exists actually because it has received form, as the statue -(the compound) exists actually, or rather, because it is a form, and -because its essence is a perfect form. The intelligence does not pass -from the potentiality of thinking to the actuality of thinking.[23] -Otherwise, it would imply an anterior intelligence which would not -pass from potentiality to actuality, which would possess everything by -itself; for what exists potentially implies another principle whose -intervention brings it to actuality, so as to be something existing -actually. A being is an actuality when it always is what it is, by -itself. Therefore, all first principles are actualities; for they -possess all they should possess by themselves, eternally. Such is the -state of the soul which is not in matter, but in the intelligible -world. The soul which is in matter is another actuality; she is, for -instance, the vegetative soul; for she is in actuality what she is. -We shall, therefore, have to admit that (in the intelligible world) -everything exists actually, and that thus everything is actuality, -because it has rightly been said[24] that intelligible nature is always -awake, that it is a life, an excellent life, and that there on high -all actualities are perfect. Therefore, in the intelligible world, -everything exists actually, and everything is actuality and life. The -place of intelligible things is the place of life, the principle and -source of the veritable soul, and of intelligence. - - -MATTER IS NON-BEING, AND CAN NOT BE ANYTHING ACTUAL. - -4. All the other objects (the sense-objects), which are something -potentially, are also actually something else, which, in regard to -the First, may be said to be potential existence. As to matter, which -exists potentially in all beings, how could it actually be some -of these beings? Evidently, it would then no longer be all beings -potentially. If matter be none of the beings, it necessarily is not a -being. If it be none of the beings, how could it actually be something? -Consequently, matter is none of the beings that in it "become." But -might it not be something else, since all things are not in matter? If -matter be none of the beings which are therein, and if these really -are beings, matter must be non-being. Since, by imagination, it is -conceived as something formless, it could not be a form; as being, it -could not be counted among the forms; which is an additional reason -why it should be considered as non-being. As matter, therefore, is no -"being" neither in respect of beings, nor of forms, matter is non-being -in the highest degree. Since matter does not possess the nature of -veritable beings, and since it cannot even claim a place among the -objects falsely called beings (for not even like these is matter an -image of reason), in what kind of being could matter be included? If it -cannot be included in any, it can evidently not be something actually. - - -ARISTOTLE SAID, MATTER IS NOTHING REAL ACTUALLY, BUT ONLY POTENTIALLY. - -5. If this be so, what opinion shall we form of matter? How can it -be the matter of beings? Because matter potentially constitutes the -beings. But, since matter already exists potentially, may we not -already say that it exists, when we consider what it is to be? The -being of matter is only what is to be; it consists of what is going to -be; therefore matter exists potentially; but it is potentially not any -determinate thing, but all things. Therefore, being nothing by itself, -and being what it is, namely, matter, it is nothing actually. If it -were something actually, what it would actually be would not be matter; -consequently, matter would no longer be absolutely matter; it would be -matter only relatively, like metal. Matter is, therefore, non-being; it -is not something which merely differs from being, like movement, which -relates to matter because it proceeds from matter, and operates in it. -Matter is denuded and despoiled of all properties; it can not transform -itself, it remains ever what it was at the beginning, non-being. From -the very being it actually was no being, since it had withdrawn from -all beings, and had never even become any of them; for never was it -able to keep a reflection of the beings whose forms it ever aspired to -assume. Its permanent condition is to trend towards something else, -to exist potentially in respect of the things that are to follow. As -it appears where ends the order of intelligible beings, and as it is -contained by the sense-beings which are begotten after it, it is their -last degree. Being contained in both intelligible and sense-things, -it does not actually exist in respect of either of these classes -of beings. It exists only potentially; it limits itself to being a -feeble and obscure image, which can not assume any form. May we not -thence conclude that matter is the image actually; and consequently, -is actually deception? Yes, it truly is deception, that is, it is -essentially non-being. If then matter actually be non-being, it is the -highest degree of non-being, and thus again essentially is non-being. -Since non-being is its real nature, it is, therefore, far removed from -actually being any kind of a being. If it must at all be, it must -actually be non-being, so that, far from real-being, its "being" (so -to speak) consists in non-being. To remove the deception of deceptive -beings, is to remove their "being." To introduce actuality in the -things which possess being and essence potentially, is to annihilate -their reason for being, because their being consists in existing -potentially. - - -ETERNAL MATTER EXISTS ONLY POTENTIALLY. - -Therefore, if matter were to be retained as unchangeable, it would be -first necessary to retain it as matter; evidently, it will be necessary -to insist that it exists only potentially, so that it may remain -what it essentially is; the only alternative would be to refute the -arguments we have advanced. - - - - -THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK SIXTH. - -Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal Entities (Soul and and Matter). - - -A. OF THE SOUL. - - -QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PASSIBILITY OF JUDGMENT AND THE SOUL. - -1. Sensations are not affections,[25] but actualizations, and -judgments, relative to passions. The affections occur in what is other -(than the soul); that is, in the organized body, and the judgment -in the soul. For if the judgment were an affection, it would itself -presuppose another judgment, and so on to infinity.[26] Though -accepting this statement, we must, nevertheless, examine whether -the judgment itself, as such, in nowise participates in the nature -of its object; for if it receive the impression thereof,[27] it is -passive. Besides, the "images derived from the senses"--to use the -popular language--are formed in a manner entirely different from what -is generally believed. They are in the same case as the intellectual -conceptions, which are actualizations, and through which, without being -affected, we know objects. In general, neither our reason nor our will -permit us, in any way, to attribute to the soul modifications and -changes such as the heating or cooling of bodies. Further, we have to -consider whether that part of the soul, that is called the passive (or -affective, or irrational), must also be be considered as unalterable, -or as being affectible. But we will take up this question later; we -must begin by solving our earlier problems. - - -HOW CAN THE SOUL REMAIN IMPASSIBLE, THOUGH GIVEN UP TO EMOTION? - -How could that part of the soul that is superior to sensation and -passion remain unalterable, while admitting vice, false opinions, and -ignorance (or folly); when it has desires or aversions; when it yields -itself to joy or pain, to hate, jealousy, and appetite; when, in one -word, it never remains calm, but when all the things that happen to it -agitate it, and produce changes within it? - - -ON THE STOIC HYPOTHESIS OF CORPOREITY THE SOUL CANNOT REMAIN -IMPASSIBLE; AS IT IS IMPASSIBLE ALL TERMS TO THE CONTRARY ARE ONLY -FIGURATIVE. - -If, (on the Stoic hypothesis) the soul were extended, and corporeal, it -would be difficult, or rather impossible for her to remain impassible -and unalterable when the above-mentioned occurrences take place within -her. If, on the contrary, she be a "being" that is unextended, and -incorruptible, we must take care not to attribute to her affections -that might imply that she is perishable. If, on the contrary, her -"being" be a number[28] or a reason,[29] as we usually say, how could -an affection occur within a number or a reason? We must therefore -attribute to the soul only irrational reasons, passions without -passivity; that is, we must consider these terms as no more than -metaphors drawn from the nature of bodies, taking them in an opposite -sense, seeing in them no more than mere analogies, so that we may say -that the soul experiences them without experiencing them, and that -she is passive without really being such (as are the bodies). Let us -examine how all this occurs. - - -VIRTUE AS A HARMONY; VICE AS A DISHARMONY. - -2. What occurs in the soul when she contains a vice? We ask this -because it is usual to say, "to snatch a vice from the soul;" "to -introduce virtue into her," "to adorn her," "to replace ugliness by -beauty in her." Let us also premiss, following the opinions of the -ancients,[30] that virtue is a harmony, and wickedness the opposite. -That is the best means to solve the problem at issue. Indeed, when the -parts of the soul (the rational part, the irascible part, and the part -of appetite), harmonize with each other, we shall have virtue;[31] and, -in the contrary case, vice. Still, in both cases, nothing foreign to -the soul enters into her; each of her parts remain what they are, while -contributing to harmony. On the other hand, when there is dissonance, -they could not play the same parts as the personnel of a choric ballet, -who dance and sing in harmony, though not all of them fill the same -functions; though one sings while the remainder are silent; and though -each sings his own part; for it does not suffice that they all sing -in tune, they must each properly sing his own part. In the soul we -therefore have harmony when each part fulfils its functions. Still each -must have its own virtue before the existence of a harmony; or its -vice, before there is disharmony. What then is the thing whose presence -makes each part of the soul good or evil? Evidently the presence of -virtue or vice. The mere statement that, for the rational part (of -the soul) vice consists in ignorance,[32] is no more than a simple -negation, and predicates nothing positive about reason. - - -THIS DEFINITION SUFFICES TO EXPLAIN THE FACTS OF EVIL IN THE SOUL. - -But when the soul contains some of those false opinions which are -the principal cause of vice, must we not acknowledge that something -positive occurs in her, and that one of her parts undergoes an -alteration? Is not the disposition of the soul's irascible part -different according to its courage or cowardliness? And the soul's -appetitive-part, according to whether it be temperate or intemperate? -We answer that a part of the soul is virtuous, when it acts in -conformity with its "being," or when it obeys reason; for reason -commands all the parts of the soul, and herself is subjected to -intelligence. Now to obey reason is to see; it is not to receive -an impression, but to have an intuition, to carry out the act of -vision.[33] Sight is of the same (nature) when in potentiality, or -in actualization; it is not altered in passing from potentiality to -actualization,[34] she only applies herself to do what it is her -(nature) to do, to see and know, without being affected. Her rational -part is in the same relation with intelligence; she has the intuition -thereof.[35] The nature of intelligence is not to receive an impression -similar to that made by a seal, but in one sense to possess what it -sees, and not to possess it in another; intelligence possesses it by -cognizing it; but intelligence does not possess it in this sense that -while seeing it intelligence does not receive from it a shape similar -to that impressed on wax by a seal. Again, we must not forget that -memory does not consist in keeping impressions, but is the soul's -faculty of recalling and representing to herself the things that are -not present to her. Some objector might say that the soul is different -before reawakening a memory, and after having reawakened it. She may -indeed be different, but she is not altered, unless indeed, we call the -passing from potentiality to actualization an alteration. In any case, -nothing extraneous enters into her, she only acts according to her own -nature. - - -ONLY THE PHYSICAL ORGANS, NOT THE IMMATERIAL NATURES, COULD BE AFFECTED. - -In general, the actualizations of immaterial (natures) do not in any -way imply that these (natures) were altered--which would imply their -destruction--but, on the contrary, they remain what they were. Only -material things are affected, while active. If an immaterial principle -were exposed to undergo affections, it would no longer remain what it -is. Thus in the act of vision, the sight acts, but it is the eye that -is affected. As to opinions, they are actualizations analogous to sight. - - -PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF ANGER-PART'S COURAGE OR COWARDLINESS. - -But how can the soul's irascible-part[36] be at one time courageous, -and at the other cowardly? When it is cowardly, it does not consider -reason, or considers reason as having already become evil; or because -the deficiency of its instruments, that is, the lack of weakness of its -organs, hinders it from acting, or feeling emotion, or being irritated. -In the contrary condition it is courageous. In either case, the soul -undergoes no alteration, nor is affected. - - -PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF VIRTUE OR VICE OF APPETITE. - -Further, the soul's appetite is intemperate when it alone is active; -for then, in the absence of the principles that ought to command or -direct her, it alone does everything. Besides, the rational part, -whose function it is to see (by considering the notions it receives -from intelligence), is occupied with something else, for it does not -do everything simultaneously, being busy with some other action; it -considers other than corporeal things, so far as it can.[37] Perhaps -also the virtue or vice of the appetite depend considerably on the -good or evil condition of the organs; so that, in either case, nothing -is added to the soul. - - -THE SOUL ORIGINATES MOVEMENTS, BUT IS NOT ALTERED (AGAINST STOICS). -POLEMIC AGAINST THE STOIC THEORY OF PASSIONS. - -3. There are desires and aversions in the soul, which demand -consideration. It is impossible to deny that pain, anger, joy, appetite -and fear are changes and affections which occur in the soul, and that -move her.[38] We must here draw a distinction, for it would be denying -the evidence to insist that there are in us no changes or perception -of these changes. We cannot attribute them to the soul, which would -amount to the admission[39] that she blushes, or grows pale, without -reflecting that these "passions," though produced by the soul, occur -in a different substance. For the soul, shame consists in the opinion -that something is improper; and, as the soul contains the body, or, -to speak more exactly, as the body is a dependency of the animating -soul, the blood, which is very mobile, rushes to the face. Likewise, -the principle of fear is in the soul; paleness occurs in the body -because the blood concentrates within the interior parts. In joy, the -noticeable dilation belongs to the body also; what the body feels is -not a "passion." Likewise with pain and appetite; their principle is -in the soul, where it remains in a latent condition; what proceeds -therefrom is perceived by sensation. When we call desires, opinions -and reasonings "movements of the soul," we do not mean that the soul -becomes excited in the production of these movements,[40] but that they -originate within her. When we call life a movement, we do not by this -word mean an alteration; for to act according to one's nature is the -simple and indivisible life of each part of the soul. - - -VIRTUE AND VICE AFFECT THE SOUL DIFFERENTLY FROM ALL THE OTHER PASSIONS. - -In short, we insist that action, life and desire are not alterations, -that memories are not forms impressed on the soul, and that -actualizations of the imagination are not impressions similar to those -of a seal on wax.[41] Consequently in all that we call "passions" or -"movements," the soul undergoes no change in her substance (substrate) -or "being" (nature); virtue and vice in the soul are not similar -to what heat, cold, whiteness or blackness are in bodies; and the -soul's relation to vice and virtue is entirely different, as has been -explained. - - -PASSIONAL CHANGES OCCUR IN THE BODY, NOT EVEN TO THE PASSIONAL PART OF -THE SOUL. - -4. Let us now pass to that part of the soul that is called the -"passional" (or, affective). We have already mentioned it,[42] when -treating of all the "passions" (that is, affections), which were -related to the irascible-part and appetitive part of the soul; but we -are going to return to a study of this part, and explain its name, the -"passional" (or, affective) part. It is so called because it seems -to be the part affected by the "passions;"[43] that is, experiences -accompanied by pleasure or pain.[44] Amidst these affections, some are -born of opinion; thus, we feel fear or joy, according as we expect -to die, or as we hope to attain some good; then the "opinion" is in -the soul, and the "affection" in the body. On the contrary, other -passions, occurring in an unforeseen way, give rise to opinion in that -part of the soul to which this function belongs, but do not cause any -alteration within her, as we have already explained. Nevertheless, if, -on examining unexpected fear, we follow it up higher, we discover that -it still contains opinion as its origin, implying some apprehension in -that part of the soul that experiences fear, as a result of which occur -the trouble and stupor which accompany the expectation of evil. Now it -is to the soul that belongs imagination, both the primary imagination -that we call opinion, and the (secondary) imagination that proceeds -from the former; for the latter is no longer genuine opinion, but -an inferior power, an obscure opinion, a confused imagination which -resembles the action characteristic of nature, and by which this power -produces each thing, as we say, unimaginatively.[45] Its resulting -sense-agitation occurs within the body. To it relate trembling, -palpitation, paleness, and inability to speak. Such modifications, -indeed, could not be referred to any part of the soul; otherwise, such -part of the soul would be physical. Further, if such part of the soul -underwent such affections these modifications would not reach the body; -for that affected part of the soul would no longer be able to exercise -its functions, being dominated by passion, and thus incapacitated. - - -THE SOUL'S AFFECTIVE PART MAY BE THE CAUSE OF AFFECTIONS; BUT IS -INCORPOREAL. - -The affective part of the soul, therefore, is not corporeal; it is a -form indeed, but a form engaged in matter, such as the appetite, the -power of growth, both nutritive and generative, a power which is the -root and principle of appetite, and the affective part of the soul. -Now a form cannot undergo an affection or a passion, but must remain -what it is. It is the matter (of a body) which is capable of being -affected by a "passion" (an affection), when this affection is produced -by the presence of the power which is its principle. Indeed it is -neither the power of growth that grows, nor the nutritive power that -is fed; in general, the principle that produces a motion is not itself -moved by the movement it produces; in case it were moved in any way, -its movement and action would be of an entirely different nature.[46] -Now the nature of a form is an actualization, by its mere presence -producing (something), just as if the harmony alone could cause the -vibration of the strings of a lyre. Thus the affective part (of the -soul, without itself being affected) is the cause of the affections, -whether the movement proceed from it, that is, from sense-imagination, -or whether they occur without (distinct) imagination. - - -THE AFFECTIONS OF THE SOUL COMPARED TO A MUSICIAN PLAYING THE LYRE. - -We might further consider whether, inasmuch as opinion originates -in a higher principle (of the soul), this principle does not remain -immovable because it is the form of harmony, while the cause of the -movement plays the role of the musician, and the parts caused to -vibrate by the affection, that of the strings; for it is not the -harmony, but the string that experiences the affection; and even if -the musician desired it, the string would not vibrate unless it were -prescribed by the harmony. - - -PASSIONS ARE PRODUCED BY EXTERNAL IMAGES; AND THEIR AVOIDANCE IS THE -TASK OF PHILOSOPHY. - -5. If then, from the very start, the soul undergo no affections, -what then is the use of trying to render her impassible by means of -philosophy? The reason is that when an image is produced in the soul -by the affective part, there results in the body an affection and a -movement; and to this agitation is related the image of the evil which -is foreseen by opinion. It is this affection that reason commands us to -annihilate, and whose occurrence even we are to forestall, because when -this affection occurs, the soul is sick, and healthy when it does no -occur. In the latter case, none of these images, which are the causes -of affections, form within the soul. That is why, to free oneself -from the images that obsess one during dreams, the soul that occupies -herself therewith is to be wakened.[47] Again, that is why we can say -that affections are produced by representations of exterior entities, -considering these representations as affections of the soul. - - -PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESS INVOLVED IN PURIFYING THE SOUL, AND SEPARATING -SOUL FROM BODY. - -But what do we mean by "purifying the soul," inasmuch as she could not -possibly be stained? What do we mean by separating (or, weaning) the -soul from the body? To purify the soul is to isolate her, preventing -her from attaching herself to other things, from considering them, from -receiving opinions alien to her, whatever these (alien) opinions or -affections might be, as we have said; it consequently means hindering -her from consideration of these phantoms, and from the production of -their related affections. To "purify the soul," therefore, consists in -raising her from the things here below to intelligible entities; also, -it is to wean her from the body; for, in that case, she is no longer -sufficiently attached to the body to be enslaved to it, resembling a -light which is not absorbed in the whirlwind (of matter[48]), though -even in this case that part of the soul which is submerged does not, -on that account alone, cease being impassible. To purify the affective -part of the soul is to turn her from a vision of deceitful images; to -separate her from the body, is to hinder her from inclining towards -lower things, or from representing their images to herself; it means -annihilating the things from which she thus is separated, so that she -is no longer choked by the whirlwind of the spirit which breaks loose -whenever the body is allowed to grow too strong; the latter must be -weakened so as to govern it more easily. - - -B. OF MATTER. - - -INTRODUCTION TO THE ESCOREAL NUMENIAN FRAGMENT. - -6. We have sufficiently demonstrated the impassibility of intelligible -"being" which is entirely comprised within the genus of form. But as -matter also, though in another manner, is an incorporeal entity, we -must examine its nature also. We must see whether it may be affected, -and undergo every kind of modification, as is the common opinion; or -whether, on the contrary, it be impassible; and in this case, what is -the nature of its impassibility. - - -NONENTITY WILL HAVE INTELLIGENT LIFE ONLY AS BENEATH "BEING." - -Since we are thus led to treat of the nature of matter, we must first -premiss that the nature of existence, "being" and essence[49] are not -what they are thought to be by people generally. Existence is; it "is" -in the genuine meaning of that word; that is, it "is" essentially; it -is absolutely, lacking nothing of existence. Fully being existence, its -existence and preservation are not dependent on anything else; so much -the more, if other things seem to be, they owe this thereto. If this -be true, existence must possess life, perfect life--for otherwise it -would not be existence any more than non-existence. Now perfect life -is intelligence and perfect wisdom. Existence therefore is determinate -and definite. Nothing outside of it exists even potentially; otherwise -it would not fully satisfy itself. It is therefore eternal, immutable, -incapable of receiving anything, or of adding anything to itself; for -what it would receive would have to be foreign to it, and consequently -be nonentity. In order to exist by itself, existence must therefore -possess all things within itself; it must be all things simultaneously, -it must at the same time be one and all, since this is of what we -consider existence to consist; otherwise instead of emanating from -existence, intelligence and life would be incidental thereto. Therefore -they could not originate from nonentity; and, on its side, existence -could not be deprived of intelligence and life. True nonentity, -therefore, will have intelligence and life only as they must exist in -objects inferior and posterior to existence. The principle superior to -existence (the One), on the other hand, gives intelligence and life to -existence, without itself needing to possess them.[50] - - -MATERIALISTS CANNOT UNDERSTAND HOW SOLID EARTH IS NEAREST NONENTITY; -AND WHY GREATEST EXISTENCE IS LEAST MATERIAL. - -If such be the nature of existence, it could be neither body, nor the -substrate of bodies; for their existence is nonentity. (Materialists, -however, object), How could we refuse to attribute "being" to the -nature of bodies, such as these cliffs and rocks, to the solid earth, -and in short, to all these impenetrable objects? When I am struck, -am I not by the shock forced to acknowledge that these objects -exist as (real) "being"? On the other hand, how does it happen that -entities that are not impenetrable, which can neither shock others -nor be shocked by them, which are completely invisible, like soul -and intelligence, are genuine beings?[51] Our answer is that the -earth, which possesses corporeal nature in the highest degree, is -inert; the element that is less gross (the air) is already more -mobile, and resides in a higher region; while fire withdraws still -more from corporeal nature. The things which best suffice themselves -least agitate and trouble the others; those that are heavier and more -terrestrial, by the mere fact that they are incomplete, subject to -falling, and incapable of rising, fall by weakness, and shock the -others by virtue of their inertia, and their weight. Thus inanimate -bodies fall more heavily, and shock and wound others more powerfully. -On the contrary, animated bodies, by the mere fact of greater -participation in existence, strike with less harshness. That is why -movement, which is a kind of life, or at least an image of life, exists -in a higher degree in things that are less corporeal. - - -CORPOREITY IS NONENTITY BECAUSE OF LACK OF UNITY. - -It is therefore an "eclipse of existence" which renders an object -more corporeal. While studying those psychoses called affections, we -discover that the more corporeal an object is, the more is it likely -to be affected; the earth is more so than other elements, and so on. -Indeed, when other elements are divided, they immediately reunite their -parts, unless there be some opposition; but when we separate parts -of earth, they do not come together again. They thus seem to have no -natural earth; since, after a light blow, they remain in the state -where they are left by the blow that struck or broke them. Therefore -the more corporeal a thing is, the more it approaches nonentity, -returning to unity with the greater difficulty. The heavy and violent -blows by which bodies act on each other are followed by destruction. -When even a weak thing falls on something weak, it may still be -relatively powerful; as is nonentity hitting nonentity. - - -SENSATION AS THE DREAM OF THE SOUL FROM WHICH WE MUST WAKE. - -Such are the objections that may be raised against those who consider -all beings as corporeal; who wish to judge of their existence only by -impressions they receive therefrom, and who try to found the certitude -of truth on the images of sensation.[73] They resemble sleeping men -who take as realities the visions they have in their dreams. Sensation -is the dream of the soul;[52] so long as the soul is in the body, she -dreams; the real awakening of the soul consists in genuine separation -from the body, and not in rising along with the body. To rise with -the body is to pass from one sleep into another kind; from one bed -to another; really to awake is to separate oneself completely from -the body. The body, whose nature is contrary to that of the soul, -consequently has a nature contrary to that of "being." This is proved -by the generation, flux, and decay of bodies, all processes contrary to -the nature of "being." - - -MATTER COMPARED TO A MIRROR WHICH REFLECTS EVERYTHING THOUGH REALLY -EMPTY. - -7. Let us return to matter as a substrate, and then to what is said -to exist within it. This will lead us to see that it consists of -nonentity, and that it is impassible. Matter is incorporeal because -the body exists only as posterior thereto, because it is a composite -of which it constitutes an element. It is called incorporeal because -existence and matter are two things equally distinct from the body. Not -being soul, matter is neither intelligence, nor life, nor ("seminal) -reason," nor limit. It is a kind of infinity.[53] Neither is it an -(active) power;[54] for what could it produce? Since matter is none -of the above-mentioned things, it could not be called existence. It -deserves only the name "nonentity" yet not even in the sense in which -we may say that movement or rest are not existence;[55] matter is real -nonentity. It is an image and phantom of extension, it is aspiration to -a form of hypostatic existence. Its perseverance is not in rest (but in -change). By itself, it is invisible, it escapes whoever wishes to see -it. It is present when you do not look at it, it escapes the eye that -seeks it. It seems to contain all the contraries: the large and small, -the more and the less, the lack and excess.[56] It is a phantom equally -incapable of remaining or escaping; for matter does not even have -the strength of avoiding (form), because it has received no strength -from intelligence, and it is the lack of all existence. Consequently, -all its appearances are deceptions. If we represent matter as being -greatness, it immediately appears as smallness; if we represent it as -the more, we are forced to recognize it as the less. When we try to -conceive of its existence, it appears as nonentity; like all the things -it contains, it is a fugitive shadow, and a fleeting game, an image -within an image. It resembles a mirror, in which one might see the -reflections of objects external to it; the mirror seems to be filled, -and to possess everything, though really containing nothing. - - -AS OBJECTS ARE MERELY REFLECTIONS IN A MIRROR, MATTER IS NO MORE -AFFECTED BY THEM THAN WOULD BE A MIRROR. - -Thus matter is a shapeless image, into which enter, and out of which -issue the images of beings. These appear in it precisely because -matter has no shape, though they seem to produce something in it, they -really produce nothing in it.[57] They have no consistence, strength, -nor solidity; as matter has none either, they enter into it without -dividing it, as if they would penetrate water, or as shapes might move -in emptiness. If the images that appear in matter had the same nature -as the objects they represent and from which they emanate, then, if -we attribute to the images a little of the power of the objects that -project them, we might be right in considering them able to affect -matter. But as the things that we see in matter do not have the same -nature as the objects of which they are the images, it is not true -that matter suffers when receiving them; they are no more than false -appearances without any resemblance to what produces them. Feeble and -false by themselves, they enter into a thing that is equally false.[58] -They must therefore leave it as impassible as a mirror, or water; -producing on it no more effect than does a dream on the soul. These -comparisons, however, are yet imperfect, because in these cases there -is still some resemblance between the images and the objects. - - -SINCE MATTER CANNOT BE DESTROYED, IT CANNOT BE AFFECTED. - -8. (According to Aristotle[59]), it is absolutely necessary that what -can be affected must have powers and qualities opposed to the things -that approach it, and affect it. Thus, it is the cold that alters the -heat of an object, and humidity that alters its dryness, and we say -that the substrate is altered, when it ceases being hot, and grows -cold; and ceasing to be dry, becomes humid. Another proof of this truth -is the destruction of the fire that, by changing, becomes another -element. Then we say that it is the fire, but not the matter that has -been destroyed. What is affected is therefore that which is destroyed; -for it is always a passive modification that occasions destruction. -Consequently being destroyed and being affected are inseparable -notions. Now it is impossible for matter to be destroyed; for how -could it be destroyed, and in what would it change? - - -OBJECTION THAT MATTER MUST BE PASSIBLE IF ITS QUALITIES CHANGE AS THEY -DO. - -It may be objected that matter receives heat, cold, and numerous, or -even innumerable qualities; it is characterized by them, it possesses -them as somehow inherent in its nature, and mingled with each other, as -they do not exist in isolated condition. How could nature avoid being -affected along with them,[60] serving as it does as a medium for the -mutual action of these qualities by their mixture?[61] If matter is -to be considered impassible, we shall have to consider it as somehow -outside of these qualities. But every quality which is present in a -subject cannot be present in it without communicating to it something -of itself. - - -DIFFERENT SENSES OF "PARTICIPATION" WILL ALLOW FOR MATTER TO REMAIN -IMPASSIBLE. - -9. It must be noticed that the expressions: "such a thing is present to -such a thing" and "such a thing is in such other thing" have several -meanings. Sometimes one thing improves or deteriorates some other -thing by its presence, making it undergo a change; as may be seen in -bodies, especially those of living beings. Again, one thing improves -or deteriorates another without affecting it; this occurs with the -soul, as we have already seen.[62] Again, it is as when one impresses -a figure on a piece of wax; the presence of the figure adds nothing to -the (nature) of the wax, and its destruction makes it lose nothing. -Likewise, light does not change the figure of the object which it -enlightens with its rays. A cooled stone participates a little in -the nature characteristic of the thing that cools it; but none the -less remains stone. What suffering can light inflict on a line or -a surface?[63] One might perhaps say that in this case corporeal -substance is affected; but how can it suffer (or be affected) by the -action of light? Suffering, in fact, is not to enjoy the presence -of something, nor to receive something. Mirrors, and, in general, -transparent things, do not suffer (or are not affected) by the effect -of images that form in them, and they offer a striking example of the -truth we are here presenting. Indeed, qualities inhere in matter like -simple images, and matter itself is more impassible than a mirror. -Heat and cold occur in it without warming or cooling it; for heating -and cooling consist in that one quality of the substrate gives place -to another. In passing, we might notice that it would not be without -interest to examine whether cold is not merely absence of heat. On -entering into matter, qualities mostly react on each other only when -they are opposite. What action, indeed, could be exercised by a smell -on a sweet taste? By a color on a figure? How, in general, could things -that belong to one genus act on another? This shows how one quality can -give place to another in a same subject, or how one thing can be in -another, without its presence causing any modification in the subject -for which or in which it is present. Just as a thing is not altered -by the first comer, likewise that which is affected and which changes -does not receive a passive modification, or change, from any kind of an -object. Qualities are affected only by the action of contraries. Things -which are simply different cause no change in each other. Those which -have no contraries could evidently not be modified by the action of any -contrary. That which is affected, therefore, can not be matter; it must -be a composite (of form and matter), or something multiple. But that -which is isolated or separated from the rest, what is quite simple must -remain impassible in respect of all things, and remain as a kind of -medium in which other things may act on each other. Likewise, within -a house, several objects can shock each other without the house itself -or the air within it being affected. It is therefore qualities gathered -in matter that act on each other, so far as it belongs to their nature. -Matter itself, however, is still far more impassible than the qualities -are among each other, when they do not find themselves opposite. - - -IF FORM BE UNCHANGEABLE, SO IS MATTER. - -10. If matter could be affected, it would have to preserve some of -the affection, retaining either the affection itself, or remain in a -state different from the one in which it was before it was affected. -But when one quality appears after another quality, it is no longer -matter that receives it, but matter as determined by a quality. If even -this quality should evanesce, though leaving some trace of itself by -the action it has exercised, the substrate will still more be altered; -proceeding thus it will come to be something entirely different from -pure matter, it will be something multiple by its forms and by its -manners of existence. It will no longer be the common receptacle of all -things, since it will contain an obstacle to many things that could -happen to it; matter would no longer subsist within it, and would no -longer be incorruptible. Now if, by definition, matter always remains -what it was since its origin, namely "matter," then, if we insist -that it be altered, it is evident that matter no longer remains such. -Moreover, if everything that is altered must remain unchanged in kind, -so as not to be changed in itself, though changed in accidents; in one -word, if that which is changed must be permanent, and if that which is -permanent be not that which is affected, we come to a dilemma; either -matter is altered, and abandons its nature; or it does not abandon its -nature, and is not changed. If we say that matter is changed, but not -in so far as it is matter, it will, to begin with, be impossible to -state in what it is changed; and further, we would thereby be forced -to insist it was not changed. Indeed, just as other things, which are -forms, cannot be changed in their "being" (or, nature), because it is -this very unalterability which constitutes their "being" (or, nature), -likewise, as the "being" (or, nature) of matter is to exist in so far -as it is matter, it cannot be altered in so far as it is matter, and -it must necessarily be permanent in this respect. Therefore if form be -unalterable, matter must be equally unalterable. - - -MATTER PARTICIPATES IN THE INTELLIGIBLE ONLY BY APPEARANCE. - -11. This was no doubt the thought present to Plato when[64] he rightly -said, "These imitations of the eternal beings which enter into matter, -and which issue therefrom." Not without good reason did he employ the -terms "enter" and "issue"; he wanted us carefully to scrutinize the -manner in which matter participates in ideas. When Plato thus tries -to clear up how matter participates in ideas, his object is to show, -not how ideas enter into matter, as before so many have believed, but -their condition within it. Doubtless, it does seem astonishing that -matter remains impassible in respect to the ideas that are present -therein, while the things that enter in it are affected by each other. -We nevertheless have to acknowledge that the things which enter into -matter expel their predecessors, and that it is only the composite that -is affected. Nevertheless it is not every kind of composite that is -affected, but only that composite that happens to need the thing that -was introduced or expelled, so that its constitution becomes defective -by the absence of that (quality), or more complete by its presence. -Nothing is added to the nature of matter, however, by the introduction -of anything; the presence of that thing does not make matter what it -is, and matter loses nothing by its absence; matter remains what it was -since its origin. To be ornamented is to the interest of something that -admits of order or ornament; it can receive that ornament without being -changed, when it only puts it on, so to speak. But if this ornament -penetrate into it as something that forms part of its nature, it then -cannot receive it without being altered, without ceasing to be what it -was before, as for instance, ceasing to be ugly; without, by that very -fact, changing; without, for instance, becoming beautiful, though ugly -before. Therefore if matter become beautiful, though before ugly, it -ceases to be what it was before; namely, ugly; so that on being adorned -it loses its nature, so much the more as it was ugly only accidentally. -Being ugly enough to be ugliness itself, it could not participate in -beauty; being bad enough to be badness itself, it could not participate -in goodness. Therefore matter participates in the ideas without being -affected; and consequently, this participation must operate in another -manner; and, for instance, consist in appearance.[65] This kind of -participation solves the problem we had set ourselves; it enables us -to understand how, while being evil, matter can aspire to the Good -without ceasing to be what it was, in spite of its participation in the -Good. Indeed if this participation operate in a manner such that matter -remains without alteration, as we say, and if it always continue to be -what it was, there is no reason to be surprised if, though being evil, -it can participate in the Good; it does not swerve from its manner of -existence. On one hand, as for her, this participation is unavoidable, -it participates as long as it endures; on the other hand, as matter -continues to be what it is, by virtue of the kind of participation -which does not interfere with its nature, it undergoes no alteration -on the part of the principle which gives it something; it always -remains as bad as it was, because its nature persists. If matter really -participated in the Good, if matter were really modified thereby, its -nature would no longer be evil. Therefore, the statement that matter is -evil is true enough if it be considered to imply that it is impassible -in respect to Good; and this really amounts to saying that it is -entirely impassible. - - -SENSE-OBJECTS ARE UNREAL AND ARE CHIEFLY MADE UP OF APPEARANCE. - -12. Plato[66] agreed with this, and being persuaded that, by -participation, matter does not receive form and shape, as would some -substrate that should constitute a composite of things intimately -united by their transformation, their mixture, and their common -affections; in order to demonstrate the opposite, namely, that matter -remains impassible while receiving forms, invented a most apposite -illustration of a participation that operates without anything being -affected (namely, that engravers, before using dies on the soft wax, -clean them carefully). Almost any other kind of illustration would -fail to explain how the substrate can remain the same in the presence -of forms. While trying to achieve his purpose, Plato has raised -many questions; he has besides applied himself to demonstrate that -sense-objects are devoid of reality, and that a large part of their -hypostatic substance is constituted by appearance. Plato demonstrates -the permanence and identity of matter by showing that it is by the -figures with which it is endued that matter affects animated bodies, -without itself suffering any of their affections. He wishes to convince -us that in being endued with these figures, matter undergoes neither -affection nor alteration. Indeed, in the bodies that successively -assume different figures, we may, relying on analogy, call the change -of figures an alteration; but since matter has neither figure nor -existence,[67] how could we, even by analogy, call the presence of a -figure an alteration? The only sure way of avoiding a misunderstanding -in expression is to say that the substrate possesses nothing in the -manner it is usually supposed to possess it. How then could it possess -the things it contains, unless as a figure? Plato's illustration means -that matter is impassible, and that it contains the apparent presence -of images which are not really present therein. - - -PLATO'S FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE MIGHT LEAD TO ERRORS ABOUT HIS REAL -OPINIONS. - -We must still further preliminarily insist on the impassibility of -matter; for by using the usual terms we might be misled into wrongly -thinking that matter could be affected. Thus Plato speaks[68] of matter -being set on fire, being wetted, and so forth, as if it received -the shapes of air or water. However, Plato modifies the statement -that "matter receives the shapes of air and water" by the statement -that matter "is set on fire and wetted," and he demonstrates that by -receiving these shapes it nevertheless has none of its own, and that -forms do not more than enter into it. This expression "matter is set on -fire" must not be taken literally; it means only that matter becomes -fire. Now to become fire is not the same thing as being set on fire; to -be set on fire can achieve no more than what is different from fire, -than what can be affected; for that which itself is a part of fire -could not be set on fire. To insist on the opposite would amount to -saying that metal itself formed a statue, or that fire itself spread -into matter and set it on fire. The theory that a ("seminal) reason" -had approached matter, forces us to question how this reason could have -set matter on fire. The theory that a figure had approached matter -would imply that that which is set on fire is already composed of -two things (matter and a figure), and that these two entities form a -single one. Although these two things would form a single one, they -would not affect each other, and would act only on other entities. Nor -would they even in this case act jointly; for one would effect no more -than to hinder the other from avoiding (form). The theory that when -the body is divided matter also must be divided, would have to answer -the question, How could matter on being divided, escape the affection -undergone by the composite (of form and matter)? On such a theory, one -might even assert that matter was destroyed, and ask, Since the body is -destroyed, why should not matter also be destroyed? What is affected -and divided must be a quantity or magnitude. What is not a magnitude -cannot experience the same modifications as a body. Therefore those who -consider matter affectible would be forced to call it a body. - - -MATTER AS THE ETERNAL LOCATION OR RESIDENCE OF GENERATION. - -13. They would further have to explain in what sense they say that -matter seeks to elude form. How can it be said to seek to elude -the stones and the solid objects which contain it? For it would be -irrational to say that it seeks to elude form at certain times, but not -at others. If matter seeks to elude form voluntarily, why does it not -elude form continuously? If necessity keep matter (within form), there -can be no moment when it would not inhere in some form or other. The -reason why matter is not always contained by the same form must not -be sought for within matter, but in the forms that matter receives. -In what sense then could it be said that matter eludes form? Does it -always and essentially elude form? This would amount to saying that -matter, never ceasing being itself, has form without ever having it. -Otherwise, the statement would be meaningless.[69] (Plato) says that -matter is the "nurse and residence of generation." If then matter be -the nurse and residence of generation, it is evidently distinct from -the latter. Only that which can be affected is within the domain of -generation. Now as matter, being the nurse and residence of generation, -exists before the latter, it must also exist before any alteration. -Therefore to say that matter is the nurse and residence of generation -is tantamount to saying that matter is impassible. The same meaning -attaches to such other statements as that matter is that in which -begotten things appear, and from which they issue,[70] that matter is -the (eternal) location, and place (of all generation).[71] - - -MATTER AS LOCATION OF FORMS REMAINS IMPASSIBLE. - -When Plato, rightfully, calls matter "the location of forms," he is -not thereby attributing any passion to matter; he only indicates that -matters go on in a different manner. How? Since matter, however, by -its nature, cannot be any of the beings, and as it must flee from -the "being" of all beings, and be entirely different from them--for -("seminal) reasons" are genuine beings--it must necessarily preserve -its nature by virtue of this very difference. It must not only contain -all beings, but also not appropriate what is their image; for this is -that by which matter differs from all beings. Otherwise, if the images -that fill a mirror were not transient, and if the mirror remained -invisible, evidently we would believe that the things the mirror -presents to us existed really. If then there be something in a mirror, -that is that which sense-forms are in matter. If in a mirror there be -nothing but appearance, then there is nothing in matter but appearance, -recognizing that this appearance is the cause of the existence of -beings, an existence in which the things that exist always really -participate, and in which the things which do not really exist do not -participate; for they could not be in the condition where they would be -if they existed without the existence of existence in itself. - - -THE MYTH OF POVERTY AND ABUNDANCE. - -14. What! Would nothing exist (in the sense-world) if matter did not -exist? Nothing! It is as with a mirror; remove it, and the images -disappear. Indeed, that which by its nature is destined to exist in -something else could not exist in that thing; now the nature of every -image is to exist in something else. If the image were an emanation -of the causes themselves, it could exist without being in anything -else; but as these causes reside in themselves, so that their image -may reflect itself elsewhere, there must be something else destined -to serve as location for that which does not really enter into it; -something which by its presence, its audacity, its solicitations, and -by its indigence, should as it were forcibly obtain (what it desires), -but which is deceived because it does not really obtain anything; -so that it preserves its indigence, and continues to solicitate -(satisfaction[72]). As soon as Poverty exists, it ceaselessly "begs," -as a (well-known Platonic) myth tells us;[97] that shows clearly enough -that it is naturally denuded of all good. It does not ask to obtain all -that the giver possesses; it is satisfied with the possession of some -of it, thus revealing to us how much the images that appear in matter -are different from real beings. Even the very name of Poverty, which is -given to matter, indicates that it is insatiable. When Poverty is said -to unite with Abundance, we do not mean that it unites with Existence -or Fulness, but with a work of wonderful skill, namely, a thing that -is nothing but specious appearance.[74],[98] - - -THE MIRACLE IS THAT MATTER PARTICIPATES IN EXISTENCE WITHOUT -PARTICIPATING IN IT. - -It is indeed impossible that that which is outside of existence should -be completely deprived of it; for the nature of existence is to produce -beings. On the other hand, absolute nonentity cannot mingle with -existence. The result is something miraculous: matter participates in -existence without really participating in it, and by approaching to -it obtains something, though by its nature matter cannot unite with -existence. It therefore reflects what it receives from an alien nature -as echo reflects sound in places that are symmetrical and continuous. -That is how things that do not reside in matter seem to reside in it, -and to come from it. - - -GENERATION ILLUSTRATED BY LIGHTING FIRE BY REFRACTION. - -If matter participated in the existence of genuine beings and received -them within itself, as might easily be thought, that which would enter -into it would penetrate deeply into matter; but evidently matter is -not penetrated thereby, remaining unreceptive of any of it. On the -contrary, matter arrests their "procession," as echo arrests and -reflects sound-waves, matter being only the "residence" (or, "jar" or -vase) of the things that enter within it, and there mingle with each -other. Everything takes place there as in the case of persons who, -wishing to light fire from the rays of the sun, should place in front -of these rays polished jars filled with water, so that the flame, -arrested by the obstacles met within, should not be able to penetrate, -and should concentrate on their outside. That is how matter becomes -the cause of generation; that is how things occur within it. - - -THE RELATION OF MATTER TO REASON ILLUSTRATED BY THAT OF OPINION AND -IMAGINATION. - -15. The objects that concentrate the rays of the sun, are themselves -visible, by receiving from the fire of sensation what takes fire in -their hearth. They appear because the images that form themselves are -around and near them, and touch each other, and finally because there -are two limits in these objects. But when the ("seminal) reason" is -in matter, it remains exterior to matter in an entirely different -manner; it has a different nature. Here it is not necessary that -there be two limits; matter and reason are strangers to each other by -difference of nature, and by the difference between their natures that -makes any mixture of them impossible. The cause that each remains in -itself is that what enters into matter does not possess it, any more -than matter possesses what enters into it. That is how opinion and -imagination do not mingle in our soul,[75] and each remains what it -was, without entailing or leaving anything, because no mingling can -occur. These powers are foreign to each other, not in that there is a -mere juxtaposition, but because between them obtains a difference that -is grasped by reason, instead of being seen by sight. Here imagination -is a kind of phantom, though the soul herself be no phantom, and though -she seem to accomplish, and though she really accomplish many deeds as -she desires to accomplish them. - -Thus imagination stands to the soul in about the same lation as (form) -with matter. Nevertheless (imagination) does not hide the soul, whose -operations often disarrange and disturb it. Never could imagination -hide the soul entirely, even if imagination should penetrate the soul -entirely, and should seem to veil it completely. Indeed, the soul -contains operations and reasons contrary (to imagination), by which -she succeeds in putting aside the phantoms that besiege her.[76] But -matter, being infinitely feebler than the soul, possesses none of the -beings, either of the true or false, which characteristically belong -to it. Matter has nothing that could show it off, being absolutely -denuded of all things. It is no more than a cause of appearance for -other things; it could never say, "I am here, or there!" If, starting -from other beings,[77] profound reasoning should succeed in discovering -matter, it ultimately declares that matter is something completely -abandoned by true beings; but as the things that are posterior to true -beings themselves seem to exist, matter might, so to speak, be said to -be extended in all these things, seeming both to follow them, and not -to follow them. - - -THE MAGNITUDE OF MATTER IS REALLY DERIVED FROM THE SEMINAL REASON. - -16. The ("seminal) reason," on approaching matter, and giving it the -extension it desired, made of it a magnitude. The "reason" drew from -itself the magnitude to give it to the matter, which did not possess -it, and which did not, merely on that account, acquire size; otherwise -the magnitude occurring within it would be magnitude itself. If we -remove form from matter, the substrate that then remains neither seems -nor is large (since magnitude is part of form). If what is produced -in matter be a certain magnitude, as for instance a man or a horse, -the magnitude characteristic of the horse disappears with the form of -the horse.[78] If we say that a horse cannot be produced except in a -mass of determined size, and that this magnitude remained (when the -form of the horse disappeared), we would answer that what would then -remain would not be the magnitude characteristic of the horse, but -the magnitude of mass. Besides, if this mass were fire or earth, when -the form of fire or that of earth disappeared, the magnitude of the -fire or of the earth would simultaneously disappear. Matter therefore -possesses neither figure nor quantity; otherwise, it would not have -ceased being fire to become something else, but, remaining fire, would -never "become" fire.[79] Now that it seems to have become as great as -this universe, if the heavens, with all they contain were annihilated, -all quantity would simultaneously disappear out of matter, and with -quantity also the other inseparable qualities will disappear. Matter -would then remain what it originally was by itself; it would keep -none of the things that exist within it. Indeed, the objects that can -be affected by the presence of contrary objects can, when the latter -withdraw, keep some trace of them; but that which is impassible retains -nothing; for instance, the air, when penetrated by the light, retains -none of it when it disappears. That that which has no magnitude can -become great is not any more surprising than that which has no heat -can become hot. Indeed, for matter to be matter is something entirely -different from its being magnitude; magnitude is as immaterial as -figure. Of matter such as it really is we should say that it is all -things by participation. Now magnitude forms part of what we call all -things. As the bodies are composite, magnitude is there among the -other qualities, without however being determinate therein. Indeed, -the "reason" of the body also contains magnitude.[80] On the contrary, -matter does not even contain indeterminate magnitude, because it is not -a body. - - -MAGNITUDE IS AN IMAGE FORMED BY THE UNIVERSAL REFLECTION OF UNIVERSAL -BEINGS. - -17. Neither is matter magnitude itself; for magnitude is a form, and -not a residence; it exists by itself[81] (for matter cannot even -appropriate the images of beings). Not even in this respect, therefore, -is matter magnitude. But as that which exists in intelligence or in -the soul desired to acquire magnitude, it imparted to the things that -desired to imitate magnitude by their aspiration or movement, the power -to impress on some other object a modification analogous to their -own. Thus magnitude, by developing in the procession of imagination, -dragged along with itself the smallness of matter, made it seem large -by extending it along with itself, without becoming filled by that -extension. The magnitude of matter is a false magnitude, since matter -does not by itself possess magnitude, and by extending itself along -with magnitude, has shared the extension of the latter. Indeed as all -intelligible beings are reflected, either in other things in general, -or in one of them in particular, as each of them was large, the -totality also is, in this manner, great (?). Thus the magnitude of each -reason constituted a particular magnitude, as, for instance, a horse, -or some other being.[82] The image formed by the universal reflection -of intelligible beings became a magnitude, because it was illuminated -by magnitude itself. Every part of it became a special magnitude; and -all things together seemed great by virtue of the universal form to -which magnitude belongs. Thus occurred the extension of each thing -towards each of the others, and towards their totality. The amount of -this extension in form and in mass necessarily depended on the power, -that transformed what in reality was nothing to an appearance of being -all things. In the same manner color, that arose out of what is not -color, and quality, that arose out of what is not quality, here below -were referred to by the same name as the intelligible entities (of -which they are the images). The case is similar for magnitude, which -arose out of that which has none, or at least out of that magnitude -that bears the same name (as intelligible magnitude). - - -SENSE-OBJECTS APPEAR, AND ARE INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN FORM AND MATTER. - -Sense-objects, therefore, occupy a rank intermediary between matter -and form itself.[83] They no doubt appear, because they are derived -from intelligible entities; but they are deceptive, because the matter -in which they appear does not really exist.[84] Each of them becomes -a magnitude, because it is extended through the power of the entities -that appear here below, and which locate themselves here. Thus we -have, in every direction, the production of an extension; and that -without matter undergoing any violence, because (potentially) it is all -things. Everything produces its own extension by the power it derives -from the intelligible entities. What imparts magnitude to matter is -the appearance of magnitude, and it is this appearance that forms our -earthly magnitude. Matter yields itself everywhere entirely to the -extension it thus, by the universal appearance of magnitude, is forced -to take on. Indeed, by its nature, matter is the matter of everything, -and consequently is nothing determinate. Now that which is nothing -determinate by itself could become its opposite (of what it is), and -even after thus having become its own opposite, it is not yet really -this opposite; otherwise this opposite would be its nature.[85] - - -MAGNITUDE IS ONLY APPEARANCE. - -18. Let us now suppose that a conception of magnitude were possessed -by some being which would have the power not only to be in itself, but -also to produce itself externally; and that it should meet a nature -(such as matter) that was incapable of existing within intelligence, -of having a form, of revealing any trace of real magnitude, or any -quality. What would such a being do with such a power? It would create -neither a horse nor an ox; for other causes (the "seminal) reasons" -would produce them.[86] Indeed, that which proceeds from magnitude -itself cannot be real magnitude; it must therefore be apparent -magnitude.[87] Thus, since matter has not received real magnitude, -all it can do is to be as great as its nature will permit; that is, -to seem great. To accomplish that, it must not fail anywhere; and, if -it be extended, it cannot be a discrete quantity, but all its parts -must be united, and absent in no place. Indeed, it was impossible for -a small mass to contain an image of magnitude that would equal the -real magnitude, since it is only an image of magnitude; but, carried -away with the hope of achieving the magnitude to which it aspired, -this image extended to its limit, along with matter, which shared its -extension because matter could not follow it. That is how this image of -magnitude magnified what was not great, without however making it seem -really great, and produced the magnitude that appears in its mass. None -the less does matter preserve its nature, though it be veiled by this -apparent magnitude, as if by a garment with which it covered itself -when it followed the magnitude that involved it in its extension. -If matter ever happened to be stripped of this garment, it would -nevertheless remain what itself was before; for it possesses magnitude -only in so far as form by its presence makes it great.[88] - - -IF MATTER WERE A PRIMARY PRINCIPLE, IT WOULD BE THE FORM OF THE -UNIVERSE, SUCH AS SOUL IS. - -As the soul possesses the forms of beings, and as she herself is a -form, she possesses all things simultaneously.[89] Containing all the -forms, and besides seeing the forms of sense-objects turning towards -her, and approaching her, she is not willing to accept them, along with -their manifoldness. She considers them only after making abstractions -of their mass; for the soul could not become other than she is.[90] -But as matter does not have the strength to resist, possessing as it -does no special characteristic activity, and being no more than an -adumbration, matter yields to everything that active power proposes to -inflict on it. Besides, that which proceeds from intelligible (nature) -possesses already a trace of what is to be produced in matter. That is -how discursive reason which moves within the sphere of representative -imagination, or the movement produced by reason, implies division; for -if reason remained within unity and identity, it would not move, but -remain at rest. Besides, not as the soul does, can matter receive all -forms simultaneously; otherwise it would be a form. As it must contain -all things, without however containing them in an indivisible manner, -it is necessary that, serving as it does as location for all things, -it should extend towards all of them, everywhere offering itself to -all of them, avoiding no part of space, because it is not restricted -within any boundary of space, and because it is always ready to receive -what is to be. How then does it happen that one thing, on entering into -matter, does not hinder the entrance of other things, which, however, -cannot co-exist with the former thing? The reason is that matter is -not a first principle. Otherwise, it would be the very form of the -universe. Such a form, indeed, would be both all things simultaneously, -and each thing in particular. Indeed the matter of the living being is -divided as are the very parts of the living being; otherwise nothing -but reason[91] would exist. - - -MATTER AS MOTHER, NURSE, RESIDENCE, AND "OTHER" NATURE. - -19. When things enter into the matter that plays the part of mother -to them, they neither hurt it, nor give it pleasure. Their blows -are not felt by matter; they direct their blows only against each -other, because the powers act upon their opposites, and not on their -substrates, unless indeed we consider the substrates as united to -the things they contain. Heat makes cold disappear,[92] as whiteness -affects blackness; or, if they mingle, they produce a new quality by -their mixture.[93] What is affected is the things that mingle, and -their being affected consists in ceasing to be what they were. Among -animate beings, it is the body that is affected by the alteration -of the qualities, and of the forces possessed. When the qualities -constitutive of these beings are destroyed, or when they combine, or -when they undergo some change contrary to their nature, the affections -relate to the body, as the perceptions do to the soul. The latter -indeed knows all the affections that produce a lively impression. -Matter, however, remains what it is; it could not be affected when it -ceases to contain heat or cold, since neither of these qualities is -either characteristic or foreign. The name that best characterizes -matter, therefore, is nurse or residence.[94] But in what sense could -matter, that begets nothing, be called "mother"? Those who call it -such consider a mother as playing the part of mere matter, towards her -child, merely receiving the germ, without contributing anything of -itself, because the body of the child owes its growth to nourishment. -If however the mother does contribute anything (to the formation of the -child) she then plays the part of form, and does not restrict herself -to the part of matter. Indeed, the form alone is fruitful, while the -"other nature" (that is, matter), is unfruitful. - - -THE MYTH OF THE ITHYPHALLIC HERMES. - -That no doubt was the meaning of those ancient sages who in mysteries -and initiations symbolically represented the "ancient Hermes"[95] with -the generative organ in erection, to teach that it is intelligible -reason that begets sense-objects. On the other hand, these same sages -signify the sterility of matter, condemned to perpetual self-identity, -by the eunuchs who surround Rhea,[96] making of it the mother of all -things, to use the expression they employ in designating the principle -that plays the part of substrate. - - -THE STERILITY OF NATURE INDICATED BY CASTRATION. - -That name indicates the difference between matter and a mother. To -those who, refusing to be satisfied with superficialities, insist on -thoroughness, they thus signified in as precise a manner as possible -(without lifting the veil of) obscurity, that matter was sterile, -although feminine also to extent at least that matter receives, without -contributing to, the act of generation. They indicated it by this, that -the (Galli) who surround Cybele are not women, but neither are they -men, possessing no power of generation; for by castration they have -lost a faculty that is characteristic only of a man whose virility is -intact. - - - - -FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE. - -Psychological Questions. - - -A. ARE NOT ALL SOULS PARTS OR EMANATIONS OF A SINGLE SOUL?[99] - - -PSYCHOLOGY OBEYS THE PRECEPT "KNOW THYSELF," AND SHOWS HOW WE ARE -TEMPLES OF THE DIVINITY. - -1. Among the questions raised about the soul, we purpose to solve -here not only such as may be solved with some degree of assurance, -but also such as may be considered matters of doubt, considering our -researches rewarded by even only a definition of this doubt. This -should prove an interesting study. What indeed better deserves careful -examination and close scrutiny than what refers to the soul? Among -other advantages, the study of the soul has that of making known to us -two order of things, those of which she is the principle, and those -from which she herself proceeds. This examination will be in line with -the divine precept to "know ourselves."[100] Before seeking to discover -and understand the remainder, it is no more than right first to apply -ourselves to finding out the nature of the principle that embarks in -these researches[101]; and as we are seeking what is lovable, we will -do well to contemplate the most beautiful of spectacles (that of our -own intellectual nature); for if there be a duality, in the universal -(Soul), so much more likely will there be a duality in individual -intelligences. We should also examine the sense in which it may be said -that souls are sanctuaries of the divinity; but this question will not -admit of solution till after we have determined how the soul descends -into the body. - - -ARE INDIVIDUAL SOULS EMANATIONS OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL? - -Now we must consider whether our souls themselves are (emanations) from -the universal Soul. It may be insisted that, to demonstrate that our -souls are not particles of the universal Soul, it does not suffice to -show that our souls go as far (in their procession) as the universal -Soul, nor that they resemble (the universal Soul) in their intellectual -faculties, granting indeed that such a resemblance be admitted; for -we might say that parts conform to the whole they compose. We might -invoke Plato's authority, and insist that he teaches this opinion in -that (part of the Philebus[102]) where he affirms that the universe is -animate: "As our body is a part of the universe, our soul is a part of -the Soul of the universe." We might add that (Plato) states and clearly -demonstrates that we follow the circular movement of heaven, that -from it we receive, our moral habits and condition; that as we were -begotten in the universe, our soul must be derived from the surrounding -universe[103]; and as each part of us participates in our soul, we -ourselves should participate in the Soul of the universe, of which we -are parts in the same way as our members are parts of ourselves. Last, -we might quote the following words: "The universal Soul takes care of -all that is inanimate." This sentence seems to mean that there is no -soul outside of the universal Soul; for it is the latter that cares for -all that is inanimate. - - -CONFORMITY TO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL IMPLIES THAT THEY ARE NOT PARTS OF HER. - -2. Consider the following answers. To begin with, the assertion that -souls conform (to each other), because they attain the same objects, -and the reduction of them to a single kind, implicitly denies that -they are parts (of the universal Soul). We might better say that the -universal Soul is one and identical, and that each soul is universal -(that is, that she conforms to the universal Soul, because she -possesses all the latter's powers). Now, assertion of the unity of -the universal Soul defines her as being something different (from -individual souls); namely, a principle which, specially belonging -neither to one nor the other, neither to an individual, nor to a -world, nor to anything else, itself carries out what is carried out by -the world and every living being. It is right enough to say that the -universal Soul does not belong to any individual being, inasmuch as she -is (pure) being; it is right enough that there should be a Soul which -is not owned by any being, and that only individual souls should belong -to individual beings. - - -LIMITATIONS TO THE USE OF THE TERM "PARTS," IN PHYSICAL THINGS. - -But we shall have to explain more clearly the sense in which the word -"parts" must here be taken. To begin with, there is here no question of -parts of a body, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous. We shall make -but a single observation, namely, that when treating of homogeneous -bodies, parts refer to mass, and not to form. For instance, take -whiteness. The whiteness of one part of the milk, is not a part of the -whiteness of all the milk in existence; it is the whiteness of a part, -and not the part of whiteness; for, taken in general, whiteness has -neither size nor quantity. Only with these restrictions can we say that -there are parts in the forms suitable to corporeal things. - - -WHEN APPLIED TO INCORPOREAL THINGS, "PARTS" HAVE DIFFERENT SENSES. - -Further, treating of incorporeal things, "parts" is taken in several -senses. Speaking of numbers, we may say that two is a part of ten -(referring exclusively to abstract numbers). We may also say that a -certain extension is a part of a circle or line. Further, a notion is -said to be a part of science. - - -SUCH MATHEMATICAL SENSES CANNOT BE APPLIED TO THE SOUL. - -When dealing with numbers and geometrical figures, as well as with -bodies, it is evident that the whole is necessarily diminished by its -division into parts, and that each part is smaller than the whole. -Rightly, these things should be susceptible to increase or diminution, -as their nature is that of definite quantities, not quantity in itself. -It is surely not in this sense that, when referring to the soul, we -speak of quantities. The soul is not a quantity such as a "dozen," -which forms a whole divisible into unities; otherwise, we would end in -a host of absurdities, since a group of ten is not a genuine unity. -Either each one of the unities would have to be soul, or the Soul -herself result from a sum of inanimate unities. - - -ACTUAL DIVISION INTO PARTS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO A DENIAL OF THE WHOLE. - -Besides, our opponents have granted that every part of the universal -Soul conforms to the whole. Now, in continuous quantities, it is by -no means necessary that the part should resemble the whole. Thus, -in the circle and the quadrilateral (the parts are not circles or -quadrilaterals). All the parts of the divided object (from which a part -is taken) are not even similar to each other, but vary in manifold -ways, such as the different triangles of which a single triangle might -be composed. Our opponents also acknowledge that the universal Soul is -composed of parts that conform to the whole. Now, in a line, one part -might also be a line, while differing from the whole in magnitude. -But when we speak of the soul, if the difference of the part from -the whole consisted in a difference of size, the soul would be a -magnitude and a body; for then she would differentiate in quantity by -psychic characteristics. But this would be impossible if all souls be -considered similar and universal. It is evident that the soul cannot, -like magnitudes, be further divided; and even our opponents would not -claim that the universal Soul is thus divided into parts. This would -amount to destroying the universal Soul, and reducing her to a mere -name, if indeed in this system a prior universal (Soul) can at all be -said to exist. This would place her in the position of wine, which -might be distributed in several jars, saying that the part of the wine -contained in each of them is a portion of the whole.[104] - - -NOR IS THE SOUL A PART IN THE SENSE THAT ONE PROPOSITION IS A PART OF A -SCIENCE. - -Nor should we (apply to the soul) the word "part" in the sense that -some single proposition is a part of the total science. In this -case the total science does not remain any less the same (when it -is divided), and its division is only as it were the production and -actualization of each of its component parts. Here each proposition -potentially contains the total science, and (in spite of its division), -the total science remains whole. - - -THE DIFFERENCE OF FUNCTIONS OF THE WORLD-SOUL AND INDIVIDUAL SOULS -MAKES ENTIRE DIVISION BETWEEN THEM IMPOSSIBLE. - -If such be the relation of the universal Soul to the other souls, the -universal Soul, whose parts are such, will not belong to any particular -being, but will subsist in herself. No longer will she be the soul -of the world. She will even rank with the number of souls considered -parts. As all souls would conform to each other, they would, on the -same grounds, be parts of the Soul that is single and identical. Then -it would be inexplicable that some one soul should be Soul of the -world, while some other soul should be one of the parts of the world. - - -ARE INDIVIDUAL SOULS PART OF THE WORLD-SOUL AS IS THE LOCAL -CONSCIOUSNESS OF SOME PART OF THE BODY TO THE WHOLE CONSCIOUSNESS? - -3. Are individual souls parts of the universal Soul as, in any living -organism, the soul that animates (or vivifies) the finger is a part of -the entire soul back of the whole animal? This hypothesis would force -us to the conclusion either that there is no soul outside of the body, -or that the whole universal Soul exists entire, not in a body, but -outside of the body of the world. This question deserves consideration. -Let us do so by an illustration. - - -STUDY OF THE QUESTION BY OBSERVATION OF THE HUMAN ORGANISM. - -If the universal Soul communicate herself to all individual animals, -and if it be in this sense that each soul is a part of the universal -Soul--for as soon as she would be divided, the universal Soul -could not communicate herself to every part--the universal must be -entire everywhere, and she must simultaneously be one and the same -in different beings. Now this hypothesis no longer permits us to -distinguish on one hand the universal Soul, and on the other the parts -of this soul, so much the more as these parts have the same power (as -the universal Soul); for even for organs whose functions are different, -as the eyes and ears, it will not be claimed that there is one part of -the soul in the eyes, and another in the ears--such a division would -suit only things that have no relation with the soul. We should insist -that it is the same part of the soul which animates these two different -organs, exercising in each of them a different faculty. Indeed, all -the powers of the soul are present in these two senses (of sight and -hearing), and the only cause of the difference of their perceptions is -the differences of the organs. Nevertheless all perceptions belong to -forms (that is, to faculties of the soul), and reduce to a form (the -soul) which can become all things (?).[153] This is further proved by -the fact that the impressions are forced to come and centre in an only -centre. Doubtless the organs by means of which we perceive cannot make -us perceive all things, and consequently the impressions differ with -the organs. Nevertheless the judgment of these impressions belongs to -one and the same principle, which resembles a judge attentive to the -words and acts submitted to his consideration.[105] We have, however, -said above that it is one and the same principle which produces acts -belonging to different functions (as are sight and hearing). If these -functions be like the senses, it is not possible that each of them -should think; for the universal alone would be capable of this. If -thought be a special independent function, every intelligence subsists -by itself. Further, when the soul is reasonable, and when she is so in -a way such as to be called reasonable in her entirety, that which is -called a part conforms to the whole, and consequently is not a part of -the whole. - - -INTELLECTUAL DIFFICULTY OF THE SOUL BEING ONE AND YET IN ALL BEINGS. - -4. If the universal Soul be one in this manner, what about consequences -of this (conception)? Might we not well doubt the possibility of the -universal Soul's simultaneously being one, yet present in all beings? -How does it happen that some souls are in a body, while others are -discarnate? It would seem more logical to admit that every soul is -always in some body, especially the universal Soul. For it is not -claimed, for the universal Soul, as it is for ours, that she ever -abandons her body, and though it be by some asserted that the universal -Soul may one day leave her body, it is never claimed that she would -ever be outside of any body. Even admitting that some day she should -be divided from all body, how does it happen that a soul could thus -separate, while some other could not, if at bottom both are of the same -nature? As to Intelligence, such a question would be impossible; the -parts into which it is divided are not distinguished from each other by -their individual difference, and they all exist together eternally, for -Intelligence is not divisible. On the contrary, as the universal Soul -is divisible within the bodies, as has been said, it is difficult to -understand how all the souls proceed from the unitary (pure) Being. - - -THE HEALTHY SOUL CAN WORK, THE SICK SOUL IS DEVOTED TO HER BODY. - -This question may be answered as follows. The unitary Being (that -is Intelligence), subsists in itself without descending into the -bodies. From unitary Being proceed the universal Soul and the other -souls, which, up to a certain point, exist all together, and form -but a single soul so far as they do not belong to any particular -individual (contained in the sense-world). If, however, by their -superior extremities they attach themselves to Unity, if within it -they coincide, they later diverge (by their actualization), just as -on the earth light is divided between the various dwellings of men, -nevertheless remaining one and indivisible. In this case, the universal -Soul is ever elevated above the others because she is not capable of -descending, of falling, of inclining towards the sense-world. Our -souls, on the contrary, descend here below, because special place -is assigned to them in this world, and they are obliged to occupy -themselves with a body which demands sustained attention. By her -lower part, the universal Soul resembles the vital principle which -animates a great plant, and which there manages everything peaceably -and noiselessly. By their lower part our souls are similar to those -animalculae born of the decaying parts of plants. That is the image -of the living body of the universe. The higher part of our soul, -which is similar to the higher part of the universal Soul, might be -compared to a farmer who, having noticed the worms by which the plant -is being devoured, should apply himself to destroying them, and should -solicitously care for the plant. So we might say that the man in good -health, and surrounded by healthy people, is entirely devoted to his -duties or studies; the sick man, on the contrary, is entirely devoted -to his body, and becomes dependent thereon. - - -SOULS RETAIN BOTH THEIR UNITY AND DIFFERENCES ON DIFFERENT LEVELS. - -5. How could the universal Soul simultaneously be the soul of yourself -and of other persons? Might she be the soul of one person by her lower -strata, and that of somebody else by her higher strata? To teach such -a doctrine would be equivalent to asserting that the soul of Socrates -would be alive while being in a certain body, while she would be -annihilated (by losing herself within the universal Soul) at the very -moment when (as a result of separation of the body) she had come into -what was best (in the intelligible world). No, none of the true beings -perishes. Not even the intelligences lose themselves up there (in the -divine Intelligence), because they are not divided as are bodies, -and each subsists in her own characteristics, to their differences -joining that identity which constitutes "being." Being located below -the individual intelligences to which they are attached, individual -souls are the "reasons" (born) of the intelligences, or more developed -intelligences; from being but slightly manifold, they become very much -so, while remaining in communion with the slightly manifold beings. -As however they tend to introduce separation in these less divisible -beings (that is, intelligences), and as nevertheless they cannot attain -the last limits of division, they simultaneously preserve both their -identity and difference. Each one remains single, and all together form -a unity. - - -SOULS DEVELOP MANIFOLDNESS JUST AS INTELLIGENCE DOES. - -We have thus succeeded in establishing the most important point of -the discussion, namely, that all souls proceed from a single Soul, -that from being one they become manifold, as is the case with the -intelligences, divided in the same way, and similarly undivided. -The Soul that dwells in the intelligible world is the one and -indivisible reason (born) of intelligence, and from this Soul proceed -the particular immaterial "reasons," in the same manner as on high -(the individual intelligences proceed from the one and absolute -Intelligence). - - -WHY SHOULD CREATION BE PREDICATED OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL AND NOT OF THE -HUMAN? - -6. If there be similarity between the universal Soul and the individual -souls, how does it happen that the former created the world, while -the others did not do so, though each of them also contain all things -within herself, and since we have already shown that the productive -power can exist simultaneously in several beings? By explaining its -"reason" we can thus examine and discover how the same nature ("being") -can act or experience, or act and experience, in a different manner in -different beings. - - -THE WORLD-SOUL ALONE CREATES BECAUSE SHE REMAINS NEAREST THE -INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. - -How and why did the universal Soul make the universe, while the -individual souls only manage a part thereof? That is not more -surprising than to see, among men who possess the same knowledge, some -command a greater number, and others a lesser. This is the case because -there is a great difference between souls. Some, instead of separating -from the universal Soul, have remained in the intelligible world, -and still contain the body (of the universal), while others, when -the body (of the universe) already existed, and while the universal -Soul, their sister, governed it, accepted destinies assigned them by -fate, as if (the universal Soul) had prepared for them dwellings to -receive them.[106] Besides, the universal Soul contemplates universal -Intelligence, and the individual souls rather contemplate individual -intelligences. These souls might indeed possibly have also been capable -of making the universe; but that is no longer possible to them now that -the universal Soul has already done it, and has preceded them. Besides, -the very same question would have arisen even if an entirely different -soul had first made the universe. Perhaps it is better to state that if -the universal Soul has created the universe, it is chiefly because she -is more closely related to intelligible entities, for the souls that -are nearest thereto are the most powerful. Maintaining themselves in -this quiet region, they act with greater facility; for to act without -suffering is the sign of a greater power. Thus the power depending on -the intelligible world abides within itself, and by abiding within -itself, produces. The other souls, descending towards the body, -withdraw from the intelligible world, and fall into the abyss (of -matter). Perhaps also the element of manifoldness within them, finding -itself drawn towards the lower regions, along with it dragged the -conceptions of those souls, and made them descend hither. Indeed the -distinction of the second or third rank for souls must be understood in -this sense that some are nearer, and some further from the intelligible -world. Likewise, among us, all souls are not equally disposed in regard -to this world. Some succeed in uniting with it, others approach it by -their aspirations; others do not quite succeed, because they do not all -use the same faculties, and some use the first, others the second, and -some the third, though they all equally possess all faculties. - - -DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL SOULS. - -7. That is what seems true to us. As to the Philebus passage (quoted -in the first section), it might mean that all souls were parts of the -universal Soul. That, however, is not its true meaning, as held by -some. It only means what Plato desired to assert in this place, namely, -that heaven is animate. Plato proves this by saying that it would be -absurd to insist that heaven has no soul, when our body, which is only -a part of the body of the universe, nevertheless has a soul; but how -could a part be animate, unless the whole was so also? It is especially -in the Timaeus[107] that Plato clearly expresses his thought. After -having described the birth of the universal Soul, he shows the other -souls born later from the mixture made in the same vase from which -the universal Soul was drawn. He asserts that they are similar to the -universal Soul, and that their difference consists in that they occupy -the second or third rank. That is further confirmed by this passage of -the Phaedrus[108]: "The universal Soul cares for what is inanimate." -Outside of the Soul, indeed, what power would manage, fashion, ordain -and produce the body? It would be nonsense to attribute this power -to one soul, and not to another. (Plato) adds (in substance): "The -Perfect Soul, the Soul of the universe, hovering in the ethereal -region, acts on the earth without entering into it, being borne above -him as in a chariot. The other souls that are perfect share with it -the administration of the world." When Plato speaks of the soul as -having lost her wings, he is evidently distinguishing individual souls -from the universal Soul. One might also conclude that our souls are -part of the universal Soul from his statement that the souls follow -the circular movement of the universe, that from it they derive their -characteristics, and that they undergo its influence. Indeed, they -might very easily undergo the influence exercised by the nature of -the special localities, of the waters and the air of the towns they -inhabit, and the temperament of the bodies to which they are joined. -We have indeed acknowledged that, being contained in the universe, we -possess something of the life-characteristic of the universal Soul, and -that we undergo the influence of the circular movement of the heavens. -But we have also shown that there is within us another (rational) soul, -which is capable of resistance to these influences, and which manifests -its different character precisely by the resistance she offers them. -The objection that we are begotten within the universe may be answered -by the fact that the child is likewise begotten within its mother's -womb, and that nevertheless the soul that enters into its body is -distinct from that of its mother. Such is our solution of the problem. - - -SYMPATHY BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL SOUL COMES FROM COMMON SOURCE. - -8. The sympathy existing between souls forms no objection. For this -sympathy might be explained by the fact that all souls are derived from -the same principle from which the universal Soul also is derived. We -have already shown that there is one Soul (the universal) and several -souls (human souls); and we have also defined the difference between -the parts and the whole. Last, we have also spoken of the difference -existing between souls. Let us now return to the latter point. - - -DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOULS. - -This difference between souls is caused principally by the constitution -of the bodies they animate; also by the moral habits, the activities, -the thoughts and behavior of these souls in earlier existence. -According to Plato[109] the choice of the souls' condition depends on -their anterior existence. On observing the nature of souls in general, -we find that Plato recognizes differences between them by saying that -some souls occupy the second or third ranks.[110] Now we have said that -all souls are (potentially) all things,[111] that each is characterized -by the faculty principally exercised thereby, that is, that some souls -unite with the intelligible world by actualization, while others do so -in thought or desire.[112] Souls, thus contemplating different objects, -are and become all that they contemplate. Fulness and perfection -also belong to soul, but in this respect they are not all identical, -because variety is the law that directs their co-ordination. Indeed, -the universal[113] reason is on the one hand manifold, and on the other -varied, like a being that is animate, and which possesses manifold -forms.[114] In this case, there is co-ordination; beings are not -entirely separated from each other, and there is no place for chance -either in real beings, nor in bodies; consequently the number of beings -is definite. To be individual, beings must first be stable, then they -must remain identical, and last, they must numerically be one in order -to achieve individuality. Bodies which by nature perpetually ooze away, -because for them form is something incidental, never possess formal -existence but by their participation in (and imitation of), genuine -"Beings." On the contrary, for the latter, that are not composite, -existence consists in each of them being numerically single, in -possessing this unity which dates from the beginning, which does not -become what it was not, and which will never cease being what it is. -If indeed they cannot exist without some producing principle, that -principle will not derive them from matter. It will have to add to -them something from its own being. But if intelligible entities thus -have at times more, and at times less, perfection, they will change; -which would contradict their (nature, or) "being," which is to remain -identical. Why indeed should they become such as they are now, and why -should they not always have been such as they now are? Further, if -they be at times more or less perfect, if they "become," they are not -eternal. But it is granted that the Soul (as an intelligible being) is -eternal. - - -LIKE THE DIVINITY, THE SOUL IS ALWAYS ONE. - -(It might still be asked) whether what is stable can be called -infinite? That which is stable is potentially infinite, because its -power is infinite without being also infinitely divided; for the -divinity too is infinite.[115] Thus each soul is what the divinity's -nature is, without receiving from any other either limit or determinate -quantity. The soul extends as far as she wishes. She is never forced -to go further, but everywhere she descends towards bodies and -penetrates into them, according to her nature. Besides, she never -separates from herself, though present in finger or in foot. Not -otherwise is it with the universe: wherever the Soul penetrates, she -ever remains indivisible, as when she penetrates into the different -parts of a plant. Then, if you cut a certain part, the principle which -communicates life to it remains present both in the plant and in the -part detached therefrom. The body of the universe is single, and the -Soul is everywhere in her unity. - - -SOUL POWERS REMAIN THE SAME THROUGHOUT ALL CHANGES OF BODY. - -When numberless vermin arise out of the putrefaction of a body, they do -not derive their life from the soul of the entire animal; the latter -has abandoned the body of the animal, and, being dead, no longer dwells -in the body. But the matter derived from putrefaction, being well -suited for the generation of vermin, each receives a different soul, -because the (universal) Soul is not lacking anywhere. Nevertheless, -as one part of the body is capable of receiving her, while another is -not, the parts that thus become animated do not increase the number of -souls; for each of these little beings depends, as far as she remains -one, on the single Soul (that is, on the universal Soul). This state -of affairs resembles that in us. When some parts of our bodies are cut -off, and when others grow in their place, our soul abandons the former, -and unites with the latter, in so far as she remains one. Now the Soul -of the universe ever remains one; and though amidst things contained -within this universe, some are animate, while others are inanimate, the -soul-powers nevertheless remain the same. - - -B. WHY AND HOW DO SOULS DESCEND INTO BODIES? - - -TWO KINDS OF TRANSMIGRATION. - -9. Let us now examine how it happens that the soul descends into -the body, and in what manner this occurs; for it is sufficiently -astonishing and remarkable. For a soul, there are two kinds of entrance -into a body. The first occurs when the soul, already dwelling in a -body, undergoes a transmigration; that is, passes from an aerial or -igneous body into a terrestrial body. This is not usually called a -transmigration, because the condition from which the soul comes is not -visible. The other kind occurs when the soul passes from an incorporeal -condition into any kind of a body, and thus for the first time enters -into relations with a body.[116] - - -STUDY OF FIRST INCARNATION. - -We must here examine what, in the latter case, is experienced by the -soul which, till then pure from all dealings with the body, for the -first time surrounds herself with that kind of a substance. Besides, it -is not only just but even necessary for us to begin by a consideration -of (this event in) the universal Soul. To say that the Soul enters -the body of the universe and comes to animate it, is no more than a -statement made to clarify our thoughts; for the succession in her -actions thus established is purely verbal. There never was a moment -when the universe was not animated, when its body existed without the -Soul, or when matter existed without form.[117] But these things can be -separated in thought and speech, since as soon as an object is formed, -it is always possible to analyse it by thought and speech. That is the -truth. - - -HOW THE UNIVERSE IS ANIMATED BY THE WORLD SOUL. - -If there were no body, the soul could not have any procession, since -the body is the natural locality of her development. As the soul must -extend, she will beget a receiving locality, and will, consequently, -produce the body. The soul's rest is based, and depends for growth on -(the intellectual category of) rest itself. The soul thus resembles -an immense light which weakens as it becomes more distant from its -source, so that at the extremity of its radiation, it has become no -more than an adumbration. However, the soul evidently gave a form to -this adumbration from the very beginning of things. It was, indeed, -by no means suitable that what approached the soul should in no -way participate in reason[118]; consequently there came to be an -adumbration of reason in (matter), this adumbration being the soul. -The universe thus became a beautiful and varied dwelling, which was -not deprived of the presence[119] of the universal Soul by her not -totally incorporating within it. She judged that the whole universe was -worthy of her care, and she thus gave it as much "being" and beauty as -it was able to receive, without herself losing any of it, because she -manages the world while herself remaining above it in the intelligible -sphere. By so animating it, she thus grants it her presence, without -becoming its property; she dominates it, and possesses it, without -being, thereby, dominated or possessed. The universe, indeed, is in the -containing Soul, and participates therein entirely. (The universe is in -the Soul as is) a net in the sea, on all sides penetrated and enveloped -by life, without ever being able to appropriate it. So far as it can, -this net extends along with the sea, for none of its parts could be -elsewhere than it is. By nature the universal Soul is immense, because -her magnitude is not definite; so that by one and the same power she -embraces the entire body of the world, and is present throughout the -whole extension. Without it, the world-Soul would make no effort to -proceed into extension, for by herself she is all that it is her nature -to be. The magnitude of the universe therefore is determined by that -of the location of the Soul; and the limits of its extent are those -of the space within which it is animated by her. The extension of the -adumbration of the Soul is therefore determined by that of the "reason" -which radiates from this focus of light; and on the other hand, this -"reason" was to produce such an extension as its nature urged it to -produce.[120] - - -THE WORLD-SOUL PROGRESSIVELY INFORMS ALL THINGS. - -10. Now let us return to that which has always been what it is. Let -us, in thought, embrace all beings: air, light, sun, and moon. Let us -then consider the sun, the light, and so forth, as being all things, -without ever forgetting that there are things that occupy the first -rank, others the second, or the third. Let us, at the summit of -this series of beings, conceive of the universal Soul as subsisting -eternally. Let us then posit that which holds the first rank after her, -and thus continue till we arrive at the things that occupy the last -rank, and which, as it were, are the last glimmerings of the light shed -by the soul. Let us represent these things as an extension first dark, -and then later illuminated by the form which comes to impress itself -on an originally dark background. This background is embellished by -reason in virtue of the entire universal Soul's independent power of -embellishing matter by means of reasons, just as the "seminal reasons" -themselves fashion and form animals as microcosms. According to its -nature, the Soul gives a form to everything she touches. She produces -without casual conception, without the delays of deliberation, or of -those of voluntary determination. Otherwise, she would not be acting -according to her nature, but according to the precepts of a borrowed -art. Art, indeed, is posterior to nature. Art imitates by producing -obscure and feeble imitations of nature's works, toys without value or -merit; and besides, art makes use of a great battery of apparatus to -produce these images. On the contrary, the universal Soul, dominating -bodies by virtue of her nature ("being") makes them become and be what -she desires; for the things themselves that exist since the beginning -cannot raise resistance to her will. In inferior things, as the result -of mutual obstruction, matter does not receive the exact form that the -("seminal) reason" contains in germ. But as the universal Soul produces -the universal form, and as all things are therein co-ordinated, the -work is beautiful because it is realized without trouble or obstacle. -In the universe there are temples for the divinities, houses for men, -and other objects adapted to the needs of other beings. What indeed -could the Soul create if not what she has the power to create? As -fire warms, as snow cools, the soul acts now within herself, and then -outside of herself, and on other objects. The action which inanimate -beings elicit from themselves slumbers, as it were, within them; and -that which they exert on others consists in assimilating to themselves -that which is capable of an experience. To render the rest similar to -itself, is indeed the common characteristic of every being. The soul's -power of acting on herself and on others is a vigilant faculty. It -communicates life to beings who do not have it in themselves, and the -life communicated to them is similar to the life of the soul herself. -Now as the soul lives in reason, she imparts a reason to the body, -which reason is an image of the one she herself possesses. Indeed, what -she communicates to the bodies is an image of life. She also imparts to -them the shapes whose reasons she contains. Now as she possesses the -reasons of all things, even of the divinities, the world contains all -things. - - -THE UNIVERSAL SOUL AS MODEL OF REASON, AS INTERMEDIARY AND INTERPRETER. - -11. The ancient sages, who wished to materialize the divinities by -making statues of them, seem to me to have well judged the nature of -the universe. They understood that the being of the universal Soul was -easy to attract anywhere, that her presence can easily be summoned -in everything suited to receive her action, and thus to participate -somewhat in her power. Now anything is suited to undergo the action of -the soul when it lends itself like a mirror to the reflection of any -kind of an image. In the universe nature most artistically forms all -beings in the image of the reasons it contains. In each of (nature's) -works the ("seminal) reason" that is united to matter, being the image -of the reason superior to the matter (of the idea), reattaches itself -to divinity (to Intelligence), according to which it was begotten, -and which the universal Soul contemplated while creating.[121] It was -therefore equally impossible that there should be here below anything -which did not participate in the divinity, and which the latter brought -down here below; for (the divinity) is Intelligence, the sun that -shines there on high. Let us consider (the universal Soul) as the -model of reason. Below the Intelligence is the Soul, which depends -on it, which subsists by and with it. The Soul holds to this sun (of -Intelligence); the Soul is the intermediary by which the beings here -below are reattached to intelligible beings; she is the interpreter of -things which descend from the intelligible world into the sense-world, -and of the things of the sense-world which return into the intelligible -world. Indeed, intelligible things are not separated from each other; -they are distinguished only by their difference and their constitution. -Each of them remains within itself, without any relation to locality; -they are simultaneously united and separate. The beings that we call -divinities deserve to be considered such because they never swerve -from intelligible entities, because they depend on the universal Soul -considered in her principle, at the very moment of the Soul's issuing -from Intelligence. Thus these beings are divinities by virtue of the -very principle to which they owe their existence, and because they -devote themselves to the contemplation of Intelligence, from which the -universal Soul herself does not distract her gaze. - - -SOULS ARE NOT CUT OFF FROM INTELLIGENCE DURING THEIR DESCENT AND ASCENT. - -12. Human souls rush down here below because they have gazed at their -images (in matter) as in the mirror of Bacchus. Nevertheless, they are -not separated from their principle, Intelligence. Their intelligence -does not descend along with them, so that even if by their feet they -touch the earth, their head rises above the sky.[122] They descend -all the lower as the body, over which their intermediary part is to -watch, has more need of care. But their father Jupiter, pitying their -troubles, made their bonds mortal. At certain intervals, he grants them -rest, delivering them from the body, so that they may return to inhabit -the region where the universal Soul ever dwells, without inclining -towards things here below.[123] Indeed what the universe at present -possesses suffices it both now and in the future, since its duration -is regulated by eternal and immutable reasons, and because, when one -period is finished, it again begins to run through another where all -the lives are determined in accordance with the ideas.[124] In that -way all things here below are subjected to intelligible things, and -similarly all is subordinated to a single reason, either in the descent -or in the ascension of souls, or in their activities in general. -This is proved by the agreement between the universal order and the -movements of the souls which by descending here below, conform to -this order without depending on it; and perfectly harmonize with the -circular movement of heaven. Thus the actions, fortunes and destinies -ever are prefigured in the figures formed by the stars.[125] That is -the symphony whose sound is so melodious that the ancients expressed -it symbolically by musical harmony.[126] Now this could not be the -case unless all the actions and experiences of the universe were (well) -regulated by reasons which determine its periods, the ranks of souls, -their existences, the careers that they accomplish in the intelligible -world, or in heaven, or on the earth. The universal Intelligence -ever remains above the heaven, and dwelling there entirely, without -ever issuing from itself; it radiates into the sense-world by the -intermediation of the Soul which, placed beside it, receives the -impression of the idea, and transmits it to inferior things, now -immutably, and then changeably, but nevertheless in a regulated manner. - - -WHY SOULS TAKE ON DIFFERENT KINDS OF BODIES. - -Souls do not always descend equally; they descend sometimes lower, -sometimes less low, but always in the same kind of beings (among living -beings). Each soul enters into the body prepared to receive her, which -corresponds to the nature to which the soul has become assimilated by -its disposition; for, according as the soul has become similar to the -nature of a man or of a brute, she enters into a corresponding body. - - -HOW SOULS COME TO DESCEND. - -13. What is called inevitable necessity and divine justice consists -in the sway of nature which causes each soul to proceed in an orderly -manner into the bodily image which has become the object of her -affection, and of her predominating disposition. Consequently the -soul, by her form, entirely approaches the object towards which her -interior disposition bears her. Thus she is led and introduced where -she is to go; not that she is forced to descend at any particular -moment into any particular body; but, at a fixed moment, she descends -as it were spontaneously where she ought to enter. Each (soul) has her -own hour. When this hour arrives, the soul descends as if a herald -was calling her, and she penetrates into the body prepared to receive -her, as if she had been mastered and set in motion by forces and -powerful attractions exerted by magic.[127] Similarly in an animal, -nature administers all the organs, solves or begets everything in its -own time, grows the beard or the horns, gives special inclinations -and powers to the being, whenever they become necessary. Similarly, -in plants, (nature) produces flowers or fruits at the proper season. -The descent of souls into the bodies is neither voluntary nor forced; -it is not voluntary, since it is not chosen or consented to by -souls. It is not compulsory, in the sense that the latter obey only -a natural impulsion, just as one might be led to marriage, or to the -accomplishment of various honest actions, rather by instinct than by -reasoning. Nevertheless, there is always something fatal for each soul. -One accomplishes her destiny at some one moment; the other soul at some -other moment. Likewise, the intelligence that is superior to the world -also has something fatal in its existence, since itself has its own -destiny, which is to dwell in the intelligible world, and to make its -light radiate therefrom. Thus individuals come here below by virtue of -the common law to which they are subjected. Each one, indeed, bears -within himself this common law, a law which does not derive its power -from outside, but which depends on the nature of those who are subject -to it, because it is innate in them. Consequently all voluntarily -carry out its decrees at the predestined time, because this law impels -them to their goal; and because, deriving its force from those whom it -commands, it presses and stimulates them and inspires them with the -desire to go whither their interior vocation calls them. - - -BY A PUN ON "WORLD" AND "ADORNMENT," PLOTINOS SHOWS MEN ADD TO THE -BEAUTY OF THE WORLD. - -14. That is how this world, which already contains many lights, and -which is illuminated by souls, finds itself still further adorned -by the various beauties derived from different beings. It receives -beauties from the intelligible divinities and from the other -intelligences which furnish it with souls. This is probably the -allegorical intent of the following myth. - - -BY A PUN ON "PROMETHEUS" AND "PROVIDENCE," PLOTINOS EMPLOYS THE MYTH OF -PANDORA. - -(Following both Hesiod and the Gnostics, Plotinos relates that) a woman -was formed by Prometheus, and adorned by the other divinities. This -piece of clay, after having been kneaded with water, was endowed with -a human voice, and received a form similar to the deities. Then Venus, -the Graces and the other deities each gave her a gift. That is why this -woman was called Pandora, because (as her name implies, in Greek) she -had received gifts, which had been given by all the divinities. All, in -fact, made some present to this piece of clay already fashioned by some -kind of providence ("Prometheia," or "Prometheus"). When Epimetheus -rejects the gift of Prometheus, it only indicates that it is better to -live in the intelligible world.[128] The creator of Pandora, however, -is bound because he seems attached to his work. But this bond is -entirely exterior, and it is broken by Hercules, because the latter -possesses a liberating power. Whatever other interpretation the myth of -Pandora may receive, it must still signify gifts received by the world, -and its import must agree with our teaching. - - -WHY MANY SOULS SUCCUMB TO THE LAW OF THE ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE. - -15. On descending from the intelligible world, souls first come into -heaven, and they there take a body by means of which they pass even -into terrestrial bodies, according as they more or less advance -(outside of the intelligible world). There are some who issue from -heaven into the bodies of an inferior nature; there are some also who -pass from one body into another. The latter no longer have the power to -reascend into the intelligible world because they have forgotten; they -are weighted down by the burden they carry along with themselves. Now -souls differ either by the bodies to which they are united, or by their -different destinies, or by their kind of life, or by their primitive -nature. Thus differing from each other in all these relations, or -in only some, the souls here below either succumb to fate, or are -alternately subjected to it, and liberated; or, while supporting what -is necessary, preserve the liberty of devoting themselves to actions -that are characteristic of them, and live according to some other law, -following the order that rules the whole universe. This order embraces -all the ("seminal) reasons," and all the causes, the movements of the -souls, and the divine laws. It agrees with these laws, it borrows -from them its principles, and relates thereto all things that are its -consequences. It preserves in an imperishable condition all the beings -which are able to preserve themselves conformably to the constitution -of the intelligible world. It leads the other beings whither their -nature calls them, so that whithersoever they may descend, there is a -cause which assigns to them some particular position or condition. - - -THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MISFORTUNES AND PUNISHMENTS. - -16. The punishments which justly overtake the evil must therefore be -derived from that Order which rules all things with propriety. The -unjust evils, accidents, misery and diseases which seem to overwhelm -the good, may all be said to be consequences of anterior faults. -These evils are intimately related to the course of events, and are -even represented therein by their signs, so that they seem to happen -according to the Reason (of the universe). We must however acknowledge -that they are not produced by natural "reasons," that they are not -within the purview of Providence, and that they are only its accidental -consequences. Thus when a house happens to fall, it buries anybody -below it, whoever he may happen to be; or again, whether some regular -movement drives on some one thing, or even several things, it breaks -or crushes anything that happens to lie in its path. These accidents -which seem unjust, are not evils for those who suffer them, if you -consider how they take their place within the legitimate order of the -universe; perhaps even they constitute just chastisements and are the -expiations of earlier faults. It would be incredible that one series -of beings in the universe should obey its order, while another series -should be subject to chance or caprice. If everything happen through -causes and natural consequences, in conformity with a single "reason," -and to a single order, the smallest things must form part of that -order, and agree with it. Injustice practiced against somebody else -is an injustice for him who commits it, and must attract a punishment -to him; but by the place which it holds in the universal order, it is -not an injustice, even for him who suffers it. It had to be thus. If -the victim of this injustice was an honest man, for him it can have -only a happy ending. This universal order must not be accused of being -undivine and unjust, but we should insist that distributive justice -exercises itself with perfect propriety. If certain things seem worthy -of blame, it is because they are due to secret causes that escape our -knowledge. - - -FROM THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD, SOULS FIRST GO INTO HEAVEN. - -17. From the intelligible world souls first descend into the heaven. -For if the heaven is the best part of the sense-world, it must be -nearest to the limits of the intelligible world. The celestial bodies -are therefore the first that receive the souls, being most fitted to -receive them. The terrestrial body is animated the last, and it is -suited to the reception of an inferior soul only, because it is more -distant from the incorporeal nature. All souls first illuminate the -sky, and radiate from it their first and purest rays; the remainder is -lit up by inferior powers. There are souls which, descending lower, -illuminate inferior things; but they do not gain anything in getting so -far from their origin. - - -THE DESCENDING GRADUATIONS OF EXISTENCE. - -We must imagine a centre, and around this centre a luminous sphere -that radiates from (Intelligence). Then, around this sphere, lies a -second one that also is luminous, but only as a light lit from another -light (the universal Soul). Then, beyond and outside of these spheres -lies a further one, which no more is light, but which is illuminated -only by an alien light, for lack of a light peculiar to (this world -of ours). Outside of those two spheres there is indeed a rhomboid, or -rather another sphere, that receives its light from the second sphere, -and which receives it the more intensely, the closer it is thereto. -The great light (Intelligence) sheds its light though remaining within -itself, and the brilliancy that radiates around it (on to the soul) -is "reason." Other souls radiate also, some by remaining united to -the universal Soul, others by descending lower in order better to -illuminate the bodies to which they devote their care; but these cares -are troublous. As the pilot who steers his ship over the troubled -waves forgets himself in the effort of his work,[129] to the point -of forgetting that he exposes himself to perish with the ship in the -shipwreck, likewise souls are dragged down (into the abyss of matter) -by the attention they devote to the bodies that they govern. Then they -are chained to their destiny, as if fascinated by a magic attraction, -but really retained by the potent bonds of nature. If every body were -as perfect as the universe, it would completely suffice itself, it -would have no danger to fear, and the soul that is present within it, -instead of this, could communicate life to it without leaving the -intelligible world. - - -C. DOES THE SOUL EMPLOY DISCURSIVE REASON WHILE DISCARNATE? - -THE SOUL DOES NOT USE DISCURSIVE REASON EXCEPT WHILE HINDERED BY THE -OBSTACLES OF THE BODY. - -18. Does the soul ratiocinate before entering upon the body, and after -having left it? No: she reasons only while in a body, because she is -uncertain, embarrassed and weakened. To need to reason in order to -arrive at complete knowledge always betrays weakening of intellect. In -the arts reasoning occurs only when the artist hesitates before some -obstacle. Where there is no difficulty in the matter, art masters it, -and produces its work instantly. - - -THE SOUL CAN REASON INTUITIONALLY WITHOUT RATIOCINATION. - -(It might be objected) that if the souls on high do not reason, -they will no longer be reasonable. They remain reasonable, however, -because they are well able to penetrate into the essence of something, -whenever the occasion demands it. Ratiocination should be considered -as follows. If it consist in a disposition that is always derived -from Intelligence, in an immanent act, a reflection of this power in -souls, these must also reason in the intelligible world; but then they -have no further need of language. Likewise, when they inhabit heaven, -neither do they need to take recourse to speech, as do the souls here -below, as a result of their needs and uncertainties. They act in an -orderly manner, and in conformity with nature, without premeditation -or deliberation. They know each other by a simple intuition, as even -here below we know our like without their talking to us, by a mere -glance. On high every body is pure and transparent. Each person there, -is, as it were, an eye. Nothing is hidden or simulated. Before you have -spoken, your thought is already known. It is probable that speech is -used by the guardians and other living inhabitants of the air, for they -are living beings. - - -D. HOW CAN THE SOUL SIMULTANEOUSLY BE DIVISIBLE AND INDIVISIBLE? - -A DECISION WILL DEPEND ON THE MEANING OF THE TERMS. - -19. Must we consider that (in the soul), the indivisible and the -divisible are identical, as if they were mingled together? Or should -we consider the distinction between the indivisible and the divisible -from some other point of view? Should the first be considered as the -higher part of the soul, and the latter as the lower, just exactly as -we say that one part of the soul is rational, and the other part is -irrational? Such questions can be answered only by a close scrutiny of -the nature of the divisibility and indivisibility of the soul. - - -THE BODY NEEDS THE SOUL FOR LIFE. - -When Plato[130] says that the soul is indivisible, he speaks -absolutely. When he insists that she is divisible, it is always -relatively (to the body). He does indeed say that she becomes divisible -in the bodies, but not that she has become such. Let us now examine -how, by her nature, the body needs the soul to live, and what necessity -there is for the soul to be present in the entire body. - - -SENSE, GROWTH AND EMOTION TEND TOWARDS DIVISIBILITY. - -By the mere fact that it feels by means of the entire body, every -sense-power undergoes division. Since it is present everywhere, it may -be said to be divided. But as, on the other hand, it manifests itself -everywhere as a whole, it cannot really be considered as divided. We -cannot go further than the statement that it becomes divisible in -bodies. Some might object that it was divided only in the sense of -touch. It is however also divided in the other senses, since it is -always the same body that receives it, but only less so. The case is -the same with the power of growth and nutrition; and if appetite have -its seat in the liver, and anger in the heart, these appetites must -be subject to the same conditions. Besides, it is possible that the -body does not receive those appetites in a mixture, or that it receives -them in some other manner, so that they result from some of the -things that the body derives from the soul by participations. Reason -and intelligence, however, are not communicated to the body because -they stand in no need of any organs to fulfil their functions. On the -contrary, they find in them only an obstacle to their operations. - - -THE SOUL AS A WHOLE OF TWO DISTINCT DIVISIBLE AND INDIVISIBLE PARTS. - -Thus the indivisible and the divisible are in the soul two distinct -parts, and not two things mingled together so as to constitute but a -single one. They form a single whole composed of two parts, each of -which is pure and separable from the other by its characteristic power. -If then the part which in the body becomes divisible receives from the -superior part the power of being indivisible, this same part might -simultaneously be divisible and indivisible, as a mixture of divisible -nature and of the (indivisible) power received by it from the higher -part. - - -E. RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUL AND BODY. - - -IF FUNCTIONS ARE NOT LOCALIZED THE SOUL WILL NOT SEEM ENTIRELY WITHIN -US. - -20. Are the above-mentioned and other parts of the soul localized -in the body, or are some localized, and others not? This must be -considered, because if none of the parts of the soul are localized, and -if we assert that they are nowhere either in or out of the body, the -latter will remain inanimate, and we will not be able to explain the -manner of the operations occurring by help of the organs. If, on the -other hand, we assign a location in the body to certain parts of the -soul, without localizing other parts, the unlocalized parts will seem -not to be within us, and consequently not the whole of our soul will -seem to be in the body. - - -SPACE IS CORPOREAL; THE BODY IS WITHIN THE SOUL. - -Of the soul neither a part nor the whole is in the body as a locality. -The property of space is to contain some body. Where everything is -divided it is impossible for the whole to be in every part. But the -soul is not body, and the soul contains the body rather than the body -contains the soul. - - -NOR IS THE BODY A VASE, FOR PROXIMATE TRANSMISSION OF THE SOUL. - -Nor is the soul in the body as in a vase. In this case, the body would -be inanimate, and would contain the soul as in a vase or locality. If -the soul be considered as concentrated in herself and as communicating -to the body something of herself by "close transmission" (as the Stoics -would say), that which the soul will transmit to this vase would for -her become something lost. - - -MANY METAPHYSICAL OBJECTIONS TO THE CONCEPTION OF SOUL AS LOCALIZED. - -Considering location in the strict sense of the word, it is -incorporeal, and consequently cannot be a body. It would no longer need -the soul. Besides (if the soul be in the body as if in a locality) the -body will approach the soul by its surface, and not by itself. Many -other objections can be raised to the theory that localizes the soul in -the body. Under this hypothesis, indeed, place would have to be carried -around along with the thing in which it will locate. But that which -would carry place around with it (would be a monstrosity). Moreover, -if the body be defined as being an interval, it will be still less true -to say that the soul is in the body as a locality; for an interval -should be empty; but the body is not empty, being within emptiness. - - -NOR IS THE SOUL IN THE BODY AS A QUALITY IN A SUBSTRATE. - -Nor will the soul be in the body as (a quality) is in a substrate. The -attribute of being a substrate is a mere affection, like a color, or a -figure; but the soul is separable from the body. - - -NOR IS THE SOUL IN THE BODY AS A PART IN THE WHOLE. - -Nor will the soul be in the body as a part in the whole; for the soul -is not a part of the body. Nor is it a part of the living whole; for -this would still demand explanation of the manner of this being within -it. She will not be within it as wine in a jar, or as one jar in -another, nor as one thing is within itself (as the Manicheans thought). - - -NOR IS THE SOUL IN THE BODY AS A WHOLE IN A PART. - -Nor will the soul be in the body as a whole is in its parts; for it -would be ridiculous to call the soul a whole, and the body the parts of -that whole. - - -NOR WILL THE SOUL BE IN THE BODY AS FORM IN MATTER. - -Nor will the soul be in the body as form is in matter; for the form -that is engaged in matter is not separable. Moreover, that form -descends upon matter implies the preliminary existence of matter; but -it is the soul that produces form in matter; and therefore the soul -must be distinct from form. Though the soul be not form begotten in -matter, the soul might be a separable form; but this theory would still -have to explain how this form inheres in the body, since the soul is -separable from the body. - - -THE SOUL IS SAID TO BE IN THE BODY BECAUSE THE BODY ALONE IS VISIBLE. - -All men say that the soul is in the body, however, because the soul is -not visible, while the body is. Observing the body, and judging that it -is animated because it moves and feels, we say that it has a soul, and -we are thereby led to suppose that the soul is in the body. But if we -could see and feel the soul, and if we could realize that she surrounds -the whole body by the life she possesses, and that she extends around -it equally on all sides till the extremities, we would say that the -soul is in no way in the body, but that on the contrary the accessory -is within its principle, the contained within the container, what flows -within the immovable. - - -THIS LEAVES THE QUESTION OF THE MANNER OF THE SOUL'S PRESENCE. - -21. How would we answer a person who, without himself making any -statements in regard to the matter, should ask us how the soul is -present to the body; whether the whole soul is present to the body in -the same manner, or whether one of her parts is present in one way, and -another in some other way? - -THE SOUL IN A BODY AS A PILOT IN A SHIP. - -Since none of the comparisons that we have formerly examined seems -to express the relation of the soul to the body, properly we might -say that the soul is in the body as the pilot is in the ship.[131] -This illustration is satisfactory in that it emphasizes the soul's -being separable from the body; but it does not properly indicate the -presence of the soul in the body. If the soul be present in the body -as a passenger in a ship, it would be there only by accident, and the -illustration is not yet satisfactory if changed to the pilot's presence -in the ship he is steering; for the pilot is not present to the whole -of the ship as the whole soul is in the body.[132] One might illustrate -the soul's presence in the body as an art inheres in its instruments; -as, for instance, in the helm, which might be supposed to be alive, -containing the power of steering the ship skilfully. This is still -unsatisfactory, because such an art comes from without. The soul might -indeed be compared to a pilot who should be incarnated in his helm; and -the soul might be in the body as in some natural instrument,[133] so -that the soul would move it at pleasure. This however might still fail -to explain the manner in which the soul would exist in her instrument. -Therefore, though the latter illustration is an improvement on the -former, we must still seek one which closer approaches reality. - - -THE SOUL PRESENT IN THE BODY AS LIGHT IN AIR. - -22. This is the better illustration: the soul is present in the body -as light is present in air. Light is indeed present in air without -being present to it; that is, light is present to the whole air without -mingling with it, and light remains within itself while the air -escapes. When the air, within which light radiates, withdraws from the -light, the air keeps none of the light; but it is illuminated so long -as the air remains subject to the action of light. Air, therefore, is -in light, rather than light is in air. While explaining the generation -of the universe,[134] therefore, Plato properly locates the body -(of the world) in the soul, and not the soul in the body.[135] He -also states that there is a part of the soul that contains the body, -and another in which there is no body, in this sense, that there are -soul-powers of which the body has no need. The case is similar with the -other souls. Their powers in general are not present to bodies, and -only those powers of which the body stands in need are present to it. -These however are present to the body without being built up either on -the members, or upon the body as a whole. For sensation, the faculty of -feeling is entirely present to the whole organ which is feeling (as, -for instance, to the whole brain); likewise for the other functions, -the different faculties are each present to a different organ. I shall -explain myself. - - -WHILE THE SOUL-POWER IS EVERYWHERE, THE PRINCIPLE OF ACTION IS -LOCALIZED IN THE SPECIAL ORGAN. - -23. Since, for the body, being animated amounts to being penetrated by -the light shed by the soul, every part of the body participates therein -in some particular manner. Each organ, according to its fitness, -receives the power suitable to the function it fulfils. Thus we may say -that the power of sight resides in the eyes; that of hearing in the -ears; that of taste in the tongue; that of smell in the nose; that of -touch in the whole body, since, for the latter sense, the whole body -is the organ of the soul. Now as the instruments for touch are the -first nerves, which also possess the power of moving the organism, as -they are the seat of this power; as, besides, the nerves originate in -the brain, in the brain has been localized the principle of sensation -and appetite--in short, the principle of the whole organism; no doubt -because it was thought that the power which uses the organs is present -in that part of the body where are the origins of these organs. It -would have been better to say that it is the action of the power that -makes use of the organs that originates in the brain; for that part of -the body from which starts the movement impressed on the organ had to -serve somewhat as a foundation for the power of the workman, a power -whose nature is in harmony with that of the organ (it sets in motion); -or rather, this part of the body does not serve as foundation for this -power, for this power is everywhere, but the principle of the action is -in that part of the body in which is the very principle of that organ. - - -REASON IS IN THE HEAD, BUT NOT IN THE BRAIN, WHICH IS THE SEAT OF THE -INTERMEDIARY, THE POWER OF SENSATION. - -On the other hand, as the power of sensation and the power of appetite, -which belong to the sensible and imaginative soul, are beneath -reason, because they are related to what is inferior, while reason is -above,[136] the result was that the ancients localized reason in the -highest part of the animal, in the head; not that reason is in the -brain,[137] but because reason is seated in the sense-power, by the -intermediation of which, only, reason may be said to reside in the -brain. The sense-power, surely, had to be attributed to the body, and, -within the body, to the organs most capable of lending themselves to -its action. Reason, which has no (direct) dealing with the body, had -however to be in relation with the sense-power, which is a form of -the soul, and can participate in reason. The sense-power, does, to -a certain extent, judge; and the power of imagination has something -intellectual. Last, the appetite, and the desire somehow connect with -imagination and reason. Reason, therefore, is in the head, not as in -a locality, but because it is in relation with the sense-power which -resides in that organ, as has been shown above. - - -GROWTH IS LOCALIZED IN THE LIVER, ANGER IN THE HEART. - -As the power of growth, nutrition, and generation operates all through -the entire body; and as it is by the blood that the body is nourished; -as the blood is contained in the veins; and as the veins, as well as -the blood, originate in the liver; this organ has been assigned as the -seat of that part of the soul called appetite; for appetite is involved -in the power of begetting, of feeding and increasing the body. Further -as the blood (purified by respiration) is subtle, light, mobile and -pure, the heart becomes a suitable instrument for the power of anger, -for the blood that possesses these qualities starts from the heart. -Therefore, with good reason, the heart is assigned as the seat of the -turbulent convulsions of the power of anger. - - -F. WHERE GOES THE SOUL AFTER DEATH? - -THE SOUL AFTER DEATH GOES TO THE PLACE SUITED TO IT BY RETRIBUTION. - -24. Whither will the soul pass when she shall have left the body? -She will not go where there is nothing suitable to receive her. She -could not pass into what is not naturally disposed to receive her, -unless there be something that would attract a soul that had lost her -prudence. In this case, the soul remains in whatever is capable of -receiving her, and follows it whither that (receptive matter) can exist -and beget. Now as there are different places, it is necessary that -the difference (of the dwellings in which the souls come to dwell) -should be derived from the disposition of each soul, and of justice -which reigns above beings. No one indeed could escape the punishment -which unjust actions deserve. The divine law[138] is inevitable, -and possesses the power of carrying out the judgments (according to -its decrees). The man who is destined to undergo a punishment is, -in spite of himself, dragged towards that punishment, and is driven -around[139] by a movement that never stops. Then, as if wearied of -struggling against things to which he desired to offer resistance, he -betakes himself to the place that is suitable to him, and thus by a -voluntary movement undergoes involuntary suffering. The law prescribes -the greatness and duration of the punishment. Later, as a result of -the harmony that directs everything in the universe, the end of the -punishment endured by the soul coincides with the soul's receiving -strength to leave those places. - - -PURE INCORPOREAL SOULS DWELL WITHIN INTELLIGENCE IN DIVINITY. - -The souls that have a body thereby feel the corporeal punishments they -are undergoing. Pure souls, however, that do not carry along with them -anything corporeal, necessarily enjoy the privilege of abiding in the -incorporeal. Being free from having to dwell in anything corporeal as -they have no bodies, they reside where is being and essence, and the -divine; that is, in the divinity. There, in the divinity, with the -intelligible beings, dwells the pure Soul. If you wish to locate the -Soul still more exactly, go to where are the intelligible entities; and -if you are looking for them, do not look for them with the eyes, as if -they were (physical) bodies. - - -G. WHAT ARE THE CONDITIONS OF THE OPERATION OF MEMORY AND IMAGINATION? - -COSMIC QUESTIONS ABOUT MEMORY DEPEND ON EXACT DEFINITION OF WHAT MEMORY -IS. - -25. Memory raises the following questions. Does memory generally remain -with the bodies that have issued from here below? Does it subsist only -in some of them? In this case is memory general or special, durable or -transitory? These questions cannot be answered until we define that -interior principle in us to which memory belongs. That is, we shall -have to determine, not what is memory, but in what kind of beings it -must exist by virtue of its nature, for elsewhere we have often defined -and treated of memory itself. We must therefore exactly define that -principle within us to which memory is natural.[140] - - -MEMORY INAPPLICABLE EXCEPT TO BEINGS SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS OF TIME. - -As memory presupposes a knowledge or casual experience, memory -cannot be attributed to beings that are impassible, and outside of -the limitations of time. Memory is therefore inapplicable to the -Divinity, to Essence, and to Intelligence, all of whom exist outside -of time, as eternal and immutable, without a conception of priority -or subsequentness, who ever abide in the same condition, without -ever experiencing any change. How could that which is identical and -immutable make use of memory, since it could neither acquire nor keep -a disposition differing from the preceding one, nor have successive -thoughts of which the one would be present, while the other had passed -into the condition of being remembered? - -THERE IS A TIMELESS MEMORY CONSISTING OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. - -It (may be objected) that nothing hinders Intelligence from knowing -the changes of other beings, such as, for instance, the periodical -revolutions of the world, without itself undergoing any change. But -then it would have to follow the changes of the moving object, as -it would think first of one thing, and then of another. Besides, -thought is something else than memory, and we must not apply to -self-consciousness the name of memory. Indeed, intelligence does not -busy itself with retaining its thoughts, and with hindering them -from escaping; otherwise it might also fear lest it lose its own -nature ("Being"). For the soul herself, remembering is not the same -as recalling innate notions. When the soul has descended here below, -she may possess these notions without thinking of them, especially if -it be only recently that she entered into the body.[141] The ancient -philosophers seem to have applied the terms memory and reminiscence -to the actualization by which the soul thinks of the entities she -possesses; that (however) is a quite special kind of memory, entirely -independent of time.[142] - - -DEFINITION OF MEMORY DEPENDS ON WHETHER IT BELONGS TO THE SOUL OR -ORGANISM. - -But perhaps our solution seems superficial, and appears to rest on an -insufficient analysis. It might indeed be asked whether memory and -reminiscence, instead of belonging to the rational soul, might not -characterize the lower soul, or the composite of soul and body that -we call the organism? If indeed they belong to the lower soul, from -where does the latter derive them, and how does she possess them? -The same question may further be asked in the case of the organism. -To answer all this, we shall, as said above, have to study our own -interior principle to which memory belongs. If it be the soul that -possesses memory, we shall have to ask what faculty or part thereof -is constituted by memory. If, as has been urged by some, it be the -organism to which memory belongs, and considering the organism as the -sentient principle, how could this faculty operate within it? Besides, -what is it that we should call the organism? Further, is it the same -power that perceives sense-objects, and intelligible entities, or are -there two distinct powers? - -THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SENSATION. - -26. If the two elements which compose the animal share in the act of -sensation, the sensation is common to the soul and the body, such as -the acts of piercing or weaving.[143] Thus, in sensation, the soul -plays the part of the workman, and the body that of his tool; the body -undergoes the experience, and serves as messenger to the soul; the soul -perceives the impression produced in the body, or by the body; or she -forms a judgment about the experience she has undergone. Consequently -sensation is an operation common to the soul and body. - - -IN ANY CASE MEMORY IS PECULIAR TO THE SOUL AND BODY. - -This could not be the state of affairs with memory, by which the soul, -having already through sensation perceived the impression produced -in the body, preserves it, or dismisses it. It might be claimed that -memory also is common to the soul and body, because its efficiency -depends on the adjustments of the bodies. No doubt the body can hinder -or promote the exercise of memory, without this faculty ceasing to be -peculiar to the soul. How shall we try to prove that the memory of -knowledge acquired by study, belongs to the compound, and not to the -soul alone? If the organism be the composite of soul and body, in the -sense that it is some third object begotten by their union, it will be -absurd to say that it is neither soul nor body. Indeed, it could not be -anything different from the soul and body, neither if the soul and body -were transformed into the composite of which they are the elements, -nor if they formed a mixture, so that the soul would be no more than -potentially in the organism. Even in this case, it is still the soul, -and the soul alone, that would remember. Thus in a mixture of honey and -wine, it is the honey alone that should be credited with any sweetness -that may be tasted. - - -THAT THE SOUL IS INCARNATE IS NOT THE CAUSE OF HER POSSESSING MEMORY. - -It may again be objected that it is indeed the soul that remembers; but -only because she is resident in the body, and is not pure; she must be -affected in some particular manner to be able to impress the body with -the forms of sense-objects; her seat must be in the body to receive -these forms, and to preserve them. But to begin with, these forms -could not have any extension; then they could not be either (Stoic) -seal-imprints, or impressions; for in the soul there is no impulsion, -nor any imprint similar to that of a seal on wax, and the operation -itself by which it perceives sense-objects is a kind of thought -(or intellection). Indeed, it would be impossible to speak of an -impression in the act of thought. Thought has no need of the body or a -corporeal quality. It is besides necessary for the soul to remember her -movements, as for instance, her desires which have not been satisfied, -and whose object the body has not attained; for what could the body -tell us of an object which the body has not yet reached?[144] (Speaking -of thoughts), how could the soul, conjointly with the body, remember -things which the body, by its very nature, could absolutely not know? - -MEMORY BELONGS TO THE SOUL ALONE. - -Doubtless we will have to acknowledge that there are affections which -pass from the body into the soul; but there are also affections which -belong exclusively to the soul, because the soul is a real being, with -characteristic nature and activities. In this case, the soul must have -desires, and recall them, remembering that they have, or have not -been satisfied; because, by her nature, she does not form part of the -things which are (as Heraclitus said) in a perpetual flow. Otherwise, -we could not attribute to the soul coenesthesia (or, common feeling), -conscience, reflection, or the intuition of herself. If she did not -possess them by her nature, she would not acquire them by union with -the body. Doubtless there are activities which the soul cannot carry -out without the assistance of the organs; but she herself possesses the -faculties (or "powers") from which these activities are outgrowths. -Besides, she, by herself, possesses other faculties, whose operations -are derived from her alone. Among these is memory, whose exercise -is only hindered by the body. Indeed, when the soul unites with the -body, she forgets; when she separates from the body, and purifies -herself, she often recovers memory. Since the soul possesses memory -when she is alone, the body, with its changeable nature, that is ever -subject to a perpetual flow, is a cause of forgetfulness, and not of -memory; the body therefore is, for the soul, the stream of Lethe (or -forgetfulness). To the soul alone, therefore, belongs memory. - - -MEMORY BELONGS BOTH TO THE DIVINE SOUL, AND TO THAT DERIVED FROM THE -WORLD-SOUL. - -27. To which soul, however, does memory belong? To the soul whose -nature is more divine, and which constitutes us more essentially, or -to the soul that we receive from the universal Soul (the rational -and irrational souls)? Memory belongs to both; but in one case it is -general, and in the other particular. When both souls are united, they -together possess both kinds of memory; if they both remain separate, -each remembers longer what concerns herself, and remembers less long -what concerns the other. That is the reason people talk of the image -of Hercules being in the hells.[145] Now this image remembers all the -deeds committed in this life; for this life particularly falls to her -lot. The other souls which (by uniting within themselves the rational -part to the irrational) together possess both kinds of memory. They yet -cannot remember anything but the things that concern this life, and -which they have known here below, or even the actions which have some -relation with justice. - - -WHAT THE RATIONAL SOUL, IF SEPARATED, WOULD REMEMBER OF LIFE. - -We must still clear up what would be said by Hercules (that is, the -man himself), alone, and separated from his image. What then would -the rational soul, if separated and isolated, say? The soul which has -been attracted by the body knows everything that the man (speaking -strictly), has done or experienced here below. In course of time, at -death, the memories of earlier existences are reproduced; but the soul, -out of scorn, allows some to escape her. Having indeed purified herself -from the body, she will remember the things that were not present to -her during this life.[146] If, after having entered into another body, -she happen to consider the past, she will speak of this life which -will become foreign to her, of what she has recently abandoned, and -of many other earlier facts. The circumstances which happen during a -long period will always remain buried in oblivion. But we have not yet -discovered what the soul, when isolated from the body will remember. To -solve this question, we shall be forced to decide to which power of the -soul memory belongs. - - -MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO APPETITE, BECAUSE IT MAY BE REDUCED TO -SENSATION. - -28. Does memory belong to the powers by which we feel and know? Is -it by appetite that we remember the things that excite our desires, -and by anger that we remember the things that irritate us? Some will -think so. It is indeed the same faculty which feels pleasure, and -retains remembrance thereof. Thus when, for instance, appetite meets -an object which has already made it experience pleasure, it remembers -this pleasure on seeing this object. Why indeed should appetite not -be similarly moved by some other object? Why is it not moved in some -manner by the same object? Why should we not thus attribute to it the -sensation of things of this kind? Further, why should appetite itself -not be reduced to the power of sensation, and not do likewise for -everything, naming each thing, by what predominates therein? - -WHAT APPETITE KEEPS IS AN AFFECTION, BUT NOT A MEMORY. - -Must we attribute sensation to each power, but in a different manner? -In this case, for instance, it will be sight, and not appetite, which -will perceive sense-objects; but appetite will be later wakened by -sensation which will be "relayed," (as the Stoics would say); and -though it does not judge of sensation, it will unconsciously feel the -characteristic affection. The same state of affairs will obtain with -anger. It will be sight which will show us an injustice, but it will -be anger which will resent it. Just so, when a shepherd notices a wolf -near his flock, the dog, though he have not yet observed anything, will -be excited by the smell or noise of the wolf. It certainly is appetite -which experiences pleasure, and which keeps a trace of it; but this -trace constitutes an affection or disposition, and not a memory. It -is another power which observes the enjoyment of pleasure, and which -remembers what occurred. This is proved by the fact that memory is -often ignorant of the things in which appetite has participated, though -appetite still preserve traces thereof. - - -MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO THE FACULTY OF SENSATION. - -29. Can memory be referred to sensibility? Is the faculty that feels -also the one that remembers? But if the image of the soul (the -irrational soul) possess the memory, as we said above,[147] there -would be in us two faculties that will feel. Further, if sensibility -be capable of grasping notions, it will also have to perceive the -conceptions of discursive reason, or it will be another faculty that -will perceive both. - - -MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG EXCLUSIVELY TO THE POWER OF PERCEPTION. - -Is the power of perception common to the reasonable soul and to the -irrational soul, and will we grant that it possesses the memory of -sense-objects and of intelligible things? To recognize that it is one -and the same power which equally perceives both kinds of things, is -already to take one step towards the solution of the problem. But if we -divide this power into two, there will nevertheless still be two kinds -of memory; further, if we allow two kinds of memory to each of the two -souls (the rational and the irrational), there will be four kinds of -memory. - - -MEMORY IS NOT IDENTICAL WITH FEELING OR REASONING. - -Are we compelled to remember sensations by sensibility, whether it be -the same power which feels sensation, and which remembers sensation, -or is it also discursive reason which conceives and remembers -conceptions. But the men who reason the best are not those who also -remember the best; and those who have equally delicate senses, do not -all, on that account, have an equally good memory. On the contrary, -some have delicate senses, while others have a good memory, without -however being capable of perceiving equally well. On the other hand, if -feeling and remembering be mutually independent, there will be (outside -of sensibility) another power which will remember things formerly -perceived by sensation, and this power will have to feel what it is to -remember.[148] - - -MEMORY BELONGS TO IMAGINATION. - -(To solve all these difficulties) it may be stated that nothing -hinders the admission that the actualization of the sensation produces -in memory an image, and that the imagination, which differs (from -sensation), possesses the power of preserving and recalling these -images. It is indeed imagination in which sensation culminates; and -when sensation ceases, imagination preserves its representation. -If then this power preserve the image of the absent object, it -constitutes memory.[149] According as the image remains for a longer -or shorter time, memory is or is not faithful; and our memories -last, or are effaced. Memory of sense-objects therefore belongs to -the imagination. If this faculty of memory be possessed by different -persons in unequal degrees, this difference depends either on the -difference of forces, or on practice (or exercise), or on the absence -or presence of certain bodily dispositions which may or may not -influence memory, or disturb it.[150] But elsewhere we shall study the -question further. - - -INTELLECTUAL CONCEPTIONS ARE NOT ENTIRELY PRESERVED BY IMAGINATION. - -30. What about intellectual conceptions? Are they also preserved by -imagination? If imagination accompany every thought, and if later it, -as it were, preserves its image, we should thus have the memory of the -known object; otherwise some other solution will have to be sought. -Perhaps reason, whose actualization always accompanies thought, has the -function of receiving it and transmitting it to imagination. Indeed, -thought is indivisible, and so long as it is not evoked from the -depths of intelligence, it remains as it were hidden within it. Reason -develops it, and making it pass from the state of thought to that of -image, spreads it out as it were in a mirror, for our imagination.[151] -That is why we grasp (the thought) only when the soul, which always -desires rational thought, has achieved a thought. There is a difference -between thought and the perception of thought. We are always thinking, -but we do not always perceive our thought. That comes from the fact -that the principle that perceives the thoughts also perceives the -sensations, and occupies itself with both in turn. - - -THE TWO KINDS OF MEMORY IMPLY TWO KINDS OF IMAGINATION. - -31. If theory belong to imagination, and if both the rational and -irrational souls possess memory, we will have two kinds of imagination -(intellectual and sensual); and if both souls are separate, each of -them will possess one kind of imagination. The theory of two kinds -of imagination within us in the same principle would not account for -there being two kinds of imagination; and it would leave unsolved -the question to which of them memory belongs. If memory belong -to both kinds of imagination, there will always be two kinds of -imagination--for it cannot be said that the memory of intelligible -things belongs to the one, and that of sense-things to the other; -otherwise we would have two animate beings with nothing in common. If -then memory equally belong to both imaginations, what difference is -there between them? Besides, why do we not notice this difference? Here -is the cause. - - -OF THE TWO IMAGINATIONS ONE ALWAYS PREDOMINATES OR OVERSHADOWS THE -OTHER. - -When both kinds of imagination harmonize, they co-operate (in the -production of a single act). The most powerful dominates, and only a -single image is produced within us. The weaker follows the stronger, -as the feeble reflection of a powerful light. On the contrary, when -both kinds of imagination disagree and struggle, then only one of them -manifests, and the other is entirely ignored, just as we always ignore -that we have two souls[152]; for both souls are melted into a single -one, and the one serves as vehicle for the other. The one sees all, but -preserves only certain memories when she leaves the body, and leaves in -oblivion greater part of the things that relate to the other. Likewise, -after we have established relations with friends of an inferior order, -we may acquire more distinguished friendships, and we remember the -former but very little, though we remember the latter very distinctly. - - -PARTITION OF THE FUND OF MEMORY BETWEEN THE TWO SOULS. - -What about (the memory) of friends, of parents, of a wife, of the -fatherland, and of all that a virtuous man may properly remember? -In the image of the soul (the irrational soul) these memories will -be accompanied by a passive affection; but in the man (the rational -soul) they will not be so accompanied. The affections exist since the -beginning in the inferior soul; in the superior soul, as a result of -her dealings with the other, there are also some affections, but only -proper affections. The inferior soul may well seek to remember the -actions of the superior soul, especially when she herself has been -properly cultivated; for she can become better from her very principle -up, and through the education she receives from the other. The higher -soul must willingly forget what comes to her from the inferior -soul. When she is good, she can, besides, by her power contain the -subordinate soul. The more she desires to approach the intelligible -world, the more she must forget the things from here below, unless the -whole life she has led here below be such that she has entrusted to her -memory none but praiseworthy things. Even in our own world, indeed, -it is a fine thing to release oneself from human preoccupations. It -would therefore be still finer to forget them all. In this sense we -might well say that the virtuous soul should be forgetful. She thus -escapes manifoldness, reduces manifoldness to unity, and abandons the -indeterminate. She therefore ceases to live with manifoldness, lightens -her burdens, and lives for herself. Indeed, while remaining here below, -she desires to live in the intelligible world, and neglects all that is -foreign to her nature. She therefore retains but few earthly things -when she has arrived to the intelligible world; she has more of them -when she inhabits the heavens. Hercules (in heaven) may well vaunt his -valor; but even this valor seems to him trifling when he has arrived at -a region still holier than heaven, when he dwells in the intelligible -world, when he has risen over Hercules himself by the force manifested -in those struggles which are characteristic of veritable sages. - - - - -FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR. - -Questions About the Soul. - -(Second Part.) - - -SPEECH OF SOUL IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. - -1. When the soul will have risen to the intelligible world, what will -she say, and what will she remember? She will contemplate the beings -to which she will be united and she will apply her whole attention -thereto; otherwise, she would not be in the intelligible world. - - -MEMORY OF SOUL IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. - -Will she have no memory of things here below? Will she not, for -instance, remember that she devoted herself to philosophy; and that, -during her residence on the earth, she contemplated the intelligible -world? No: for an intelligence entirely devoted to the object of its -thought, cannot simultaneously contemplate the intelligible and think -something else. The act of thought does not imply the memory of having -thought. - - -IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD ALL THINGS ARE SIMULTANEOUS; HENCE NOT -REMEMBERED. - -But this memory is posterior to thought! In this case, the mind in -which it occurs has changed condition. It is therefore impossible -that he who is entirely devoted to the pure contemplation of the -intelligible should simultaneously remember the things that formerly -happened to him here below. If, as it seems, thought is outside of -time, because all the intelligible essences, being eternal, have no -relation with time, it is evidently impossible that the intelligence -which has raised itself to the intelligible world should have any -memory of the things here below, or even have absolutely any memory -whatever; for each (of the essences of the intelligible world) are -always present to the intelligence which is not obliged to go through -them successively, passing from one to the other. - - -INTELLIGENCE UNITES AS IT RISES TO THE INTELLIGIBLE. - -Will not the intelligence divide itself in descending (from the genera) -to the species (or forms)? No: for she reascends to the universal and -the superior Principle. - - -NOT EVEN THE ASCENDED SOUL NEED BE DIVIDED. - -Granting then that there is no division in the intelligence which -possesses everything simultaneously; will there not at least be -division in the soul which has risen to the intelligible world? Nothing -however forbids that the totality of the united intelligibles be -grasped by an intuition equally unitary and total. - - -THE UNITY OF APPERCEPTION IS MANIFOLD. - -Is this intuition similar to the intuition of an object grasped in its -entirety by a single glance, or does it contain all the thoughts of -the intelligibles contemplated simultaneously? Since the intelligibles -offer a varied spectacle, the thought which grasps them must evidently -be equally multiple and varied, comprehending several thoughts, like -the perception of a single sense-object, as for instance that of a face -comprehends several perceptions because the eye, on perceiving the -face, simultaneously sees the nose and the other features. - - -IN THE INTELLIGIBLE ANTERIORITY REFERS TO ORDER, NOT TO TIME. - -It may be objected that it may happen that the soul will divide and -develop something which was unitary. This thing must then already -have been divided in intelligence, but such a division is more like -an impression. As anteriority or posteriority in ideas does not -refer to time, so also will the mental conception of anteriority and -posteriority not be subject to temporal conditions, but refer to order -(which presides over intelligible things). For instance, on considering -a tree's order that extends from the roots to the tree-top, priority -and posteriority exists only under the relation of order, inasmuch as -the whole plant is perceived at one single glance. - - -INTELLIGENCE IS NOT A UNITY; BUT ITS MANIFOLD IS PRODUCED BY A UNITY. - -How can things be prior or posterior, if the soul that contemplates the -One embrace all things? The potentiality which is One is one in such a -manner that it is multiple when it is contemplated by another principle -(Intelligence), because then it is not simultaneously all things in one -single thought. Indeed, the actualizations (of Intelligence) are not -a unity; but they are all produced by an ever permanent potentiality; -they therefore become multiple in the other principles (the -intelligibles); for Intelligence, not being unity itself, can receive -within its breast the nature of the multiple which did not formerly -exist (in the One). - - -THE SOUL DOES NOT EVEN REMEMBER HERSELF. - -2. Granted. But does the soul remember herself? Probably not. He -who contemplates the intelligible world does not remember who he -is; that, for instance, he is Socrates, that he is a soul or an -intelligence. How indeed would he remember it? Entirely devoted to the -contemplation of the intelligible world, he does not by thought reflect -back upon himself; he possesses himself, but he applies himself to -the intelligible, and becomes the intelligible, in respect to which -he plays the part of matter. He assumes the form of the object he is -contemplating, and he then is himself only potentially. Actually, he is -himself only when he thinks the intelligible. When he is himself only, -he is empty of all things, because he does not think the intelligible; -but if by nature he is such that he is all things, in thinking himself, -he thinks all things. In this state, seeing himself actually by the -glance he throws on himself, he embraces all things in this intuition; -on the other hand, by the glance he throws on all things, he embraces -himself in the intuition of all things. - - -IN THE INTELLIGIBLE SELF-DIRECTION OF THOUGHT IS NOT CHANGEABLENESS. - -Under the above circumstances, the soul changes thoughts--something -that we above refused to admit. Intelligence is indeed immutable; -but the soul, situated on the extremities of the intelligible world, -may undergo some change when she reflects upon herself. Indeed, what -applies to the immutable necessarily undergoes some change in respect -to it, because it does not always remain applied to it. To speak -exactly, there is no change when the soul detaches herself from the -things that belong to her to turn towards herself, and conversely; -for the soul is all things, and the soul forms but one thing with -the intelligible. But when the soul is in the intelligible world, -she becomes estranged from herself and from all that belongs to her; -then, living purely in the intelligible world, she participates in -its immutability, and she becomes all that it is; for, as soon as -she has raised herself to this superior region, she must necessarily -unite herself to Intelligence, towards which she has turned, and -from which she is no longer separated by an intermediary. On rising -towards intelligence, the soul attunes herself to it, and consequently -unites herself with it durably, in a manner such that both are -simultaneously single and double. In this state the soul cannot change; -she is immutably devoted to thought, and she simultaneously has -self-consciousness, because she forms a unity with the intelligible -world. - - -THE SOUL BECOMES WHAT SHE REMEMBERS. - -3. When the soul departs from the intelligible world; when instead of -continuing to form a unity with it, she wishes to become independent, -to become distinct, and to belong to herself; when she inclines -towards the things here below, then she remembers herself. The memory -of intelligible things hinders her from falling, that of terrestrial -things makes her descend here below, and that of celestial things makes -her dwell in heaven. In general, the soul is and becomes what she -remembers. Indeed, to remember is to think or imagine; now, to imagine -is not indeed to possess a thing, but to see it and to conform to it. -If the soul see sense-things, by the very act of looking at them she -somehow acquires some extension. As she is things other than herself -only secondarily, she is none of them perfectly. Placed and established -on the confines of the sense and intelligible worlds, she may equally -move towards either. - - -MEMORY IS NOT AS HIGH AS UNREFLECTIVE IDENTIFICATION. - -4. In the intelligible world, the soul sees the Good by intelligence; -for intelligence does not hinder her from arriving to the Good. -Between the soul and the Good, the intermediary is not the body, which -could be no more than an obstacle; for if the bodies can ever serve -as intermediaries, it would only be in the process of descending -from the first principles to third rank entities. When the soul -occupies herself with inferior objects, she possesses what she wished -to possess conformably to her memory and imagination. Consequently -memory, even should it apply itself to the very best things, is not -the best thing possible; for it consists not only in feeling that one -remembers, but also in finding oneself in a disposition conformable to -the affections, to the earlier intuitions which are remembered. Now -it may happen that a soul possesses something unconsciously, so that -she possesses it better than if she were conscious thereof. In fact, -when she is conscious thereof, she possesses it like something foreign -to her, and from which she is keeping herself distinct; when, on the -contrary, she is unconscious of it she becomes what she possesses; and -it is especially this latter kind of memory which can most thoroughly -effect her degradation (when she conforms herself to sense-objects, by -applying her imagination thereto). - - -INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES ARE NOT MERELY IMAGES, BUT POTENTIALITIES FOR -MEMORY. - -That the soul, on leaving the intelligible world, brings away with her -memories thereof, implies that even in the (intelligible) world she -to a certain degree already possessed memory; but this potentiality -was eclipsed by the thought of the intelligible entities. It would -be absurd to insist that the latter existed in the soul in the -condition of simple images; on the contrary, they there constituted an -(intellectual) potentiality which later passed into the condition of -actualization. Whenever the soul happens to cease applying herself to -the contemplation of intelligible entities she no longer sees what she -formerly saw (that is, sense-objects). - - -INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES RETURN, NOT BY MEMORY, BUT BY FURTHER VISION. - -5. Are our notions of intellectual entities actualized by the -potentiality which constitutes memory? If these notions be not -intuitions, it is by memory that they become actualized; if they are -intuitions, it is by the potentiality which has given them to us on -high. This power awakes in us every time that we rise to intelligible -things, in it is that which sees what we later talk about. We do not -perceive intelligible entities by imagination or reasoning, which -itself is forced to draw its principles from elsewhere; it is by our -faculty of contemplation, which alone enables us to speak of them -while we are here below. We see them by awaking in ourselves here -below the same potentiality which we are to arouse when we are in the -intelligible world. We resemble a man who, climbing the peak of a rock, -should, by his glance, discover objects invisible for those who have -not climbed with him. - - -WHEN SOULS DESCEND FROM THE INTELLIGIBLE TO THE HEAVENS, THEY RECOGNIZE -EACH OTHER. - -Reasonable arguments therefore clearly demonstrate that memory -manifests in the soul only when she has descended from the intelligible -world into the (earthly) heavens. Likewise, it would not surprise us -if, when she had risen from here below to the heavens, and had dwelt -there, she should remember a great number of things from here below, -of which we have already spoken, and that she would recognize many -souls which she had known earlier, since these latter must necessarily -be joined to bodies with similar countenances. Even though the souls -should change the shapes of their bodies, making them spherical, they -would still be recognizable by their habits and individual character. -There is nothing incredible in this, for in admitting that these souls -have purified themselves from all these passions, nothing hinders them -from preserving their character. Besides, if they can converse with -each other, they have this as an additional means of recognizing each -other. - - -TRAINING HERE BELOW WILL HELP THE SOULS TO REMEMBER WHEN BEYOND. - -What happens when souls descend from the intelligible world into the -(earthly) heavens? They then recover memory, but they possess it in a -degree less than the souls who have always occupied themselves with the -same objects. Besides, they have many other things to remember, and a -long space of time has made them forget many actions. - - -FALL INTO GENERATION MAY BE PARTIAL; AND MAY BE RECOVERED FROM, BEFORE -RUIN. - -But if, after having descended into the sense-world they fall (from -the heavens) into generation, what will be the time when they will -remember? It is not necessary that the souls (which depart from the -intelligible world) should fall into the lowest regions. It is possible -that, after having descended only a little from the intelligible world -their movement may be arrested, and nothing hinders them from returning -on high before they have become degraded in the lower regions of -generation. - - -MEMORY IS LIMITED TO SOULS THAT CHANGE THEIR CONDITION. - -6. It may therefore be fearlessly affirmed that the souls which -exercise their discursive reason, and which change condition, -remember; for memory is the characteristic of things that were, but no -more are. - - -DO THE WORLD-SOUL AND THE STAR-SOULS EXERCISE MEMORY? - -But evidently the souls which dwell in the same state could not -exercise memory; for what would they have to remember? If (ignoring -our arguments above) human reason should wish to attribute memory to -the souls of all the stars, especially to that of the moon and the -sun, there is nothing to hinder it from doing the same with regard to -the universal Soul, and it would dare to attribute even to Jupiter -memories which would occupy him with a thousand different things. As -soon as it will have entered into this order of ideas, reason would -proceed to speculate about the conceptions and ratiocinations of the -star-souls--that is, granting that they reason at all. (But that is a -gratuitous assumption); for if these souls have nothing to discover, -if they do not doubt, if they have no need of anything, if they do not -learn things that they have ignored before, what use would they make of -reasoning, of arguments, or of the conceptions of discursive reason? -They have no need of seeking mechanical means of governing human -affairs and events; for they enforce order in the universe in a totally -different manner. - - -THESE SOULS DO NOT REMEMBER GOD; FOR THEY CONTINUE TO SEE HIM. - -7. Will these souls not even remember that they have seen the divinity? -(They have no need of doing so, for) they see Him all the time; as long -as they continue to see Him they cannot say that they have seen Him, -because such a statement would imply that they see Him no more. - - -MEMORY IS IMPOSSIBLE TO THESE SOULS, FOR TO THEM THERE IS NO TIME, BUT -ONE SINGLE DAY. - -Will they not even remember that they performed their revolution -yesterday, or the year before, that they lived yesterday, and since -have lived a long while? They still live continuously; now, what -remains the same, is one. To try to distinguish yesterday and last year -in the movement of the stars, is to do like a man who would divide into -several parts the movement which forms one step, who would wish to -reduce unity to multiplicity. Indeed, the movement of the stars is one, -although it is by us subjected to a measure, as if it were multiple; -so we count the days different one from the other because the nights -separate them from each other. But since there is but one single day in -the heavens, how could one count several? How could there be a "last -year"? - - -BUT WHY COULD THE STAR-SOULS NOT BE CONSCIOUS OF OUR CHANGES? - -It may be objected that the space transversed (by planets) is not a -unity, but contains several parts, as notably in the zodiac. Why then -could the celestial Soul not say, "I have passed this part, I have now -arrived at another"? Besides, if the star-souls consider human things, -how would they not see that there are changes here below, that the -men existing to-day have succeeded others? If so, they must know that -other men have already existed, that there have been other facts. They -therefore possess memory. - - -MANY NEW THINGS ARE UNNOTICED; NOTHING FORCES THE PERCEPTION OF NEW -THINGS. - -8. It is not necessary to remember all one sees, nor by imagination to -represent to oneself all the things that follow fortuitously. Besides, -when the mind possesses a knowledge and a clear conception of certain -objects which later come to offer themselves to his senses, nothing -forces him to abandon the knowledge he has acquired by intelligence, to -look at the particular sense-object which is in front of him, unless he -be charged to administer some of the particular things contained in the -notion of the all. - - -MEMORY IS NOT COMPULSORY. - -Now, to enter into details, let us first say that one does not -necessarily retain all one has seen. When something is neither -interesting nor important, the senses, impressed by the diversity of -objects without our voluntary direction of consciousness, are alone -affected; the soul does not perceive the impressions because there is -no utility in them for her. When the soul is turned towards herself, or -towards other objects, and when she applies herself to them entirely, -she could not remember these indifferent things, for she does not even -perceive them when they are present. Neither is it necessary that the -imagination should represent to itself what is accidental; nor, if it -does represent them to itself, that it should retain them faithfully. -It is easy to be convinced that a sense-impression of this kind is not -perceived, on the ground of the following arguments. In the act of -walking we divide, or rather traverse the air, without any conscious -purpose; consequently we neither notice it, nor think of it, while we -press forward. Likewise, if we had not decided to take some particular -road, and unless we could fly through the air, we would not think of -the region of the earth where we are, nor of the distance we have -traveled. This is proved by the fact that when the mind possesses -the general knowledge of what occurs, and is sure that the things -will occur as planned, a man no longer attends to details. Besides, -if a person continues to do the same thing, it would be useless to -continue to observe the similar details. Consequently if the stars, -while following their courses, carry out their duties without attending -to the occurrence of what goes on; and unless their chief duty is to -observe occurrences or the occurrence itself; and if their progress is -nothing more than accidental, while their attention is held by other -and greater objects; and if they regularly continue to pass through -the same orbit without considering the calculation of time, even if it -had already been divided (under these four conditions); there is no -need to suppose that these stars would have a memory of the places they -pass by, or of their periods. Their life would be uniform; because they -always travel through the same places, so that their movement is, so to -speak, more vital than local, because it is produced by a single living -being (the universe), which, realizing it within itself, is exteriorly -at rest and interiorly in motion by its eternal life. - - -STAR-MOTIONS COMPARED TO A BALLET-CHORUS. - -The movement of the stars might be compared to that of a choric ballet. -Let us suppose that it had but a limited duration; its motion would be -considered perfect, if viewed as a totality, from beginning to end; -but if considered in its parts only, it would be imperfect. Now if we -suppose that it exists always; then will it always be perfect. If it -be always perfect, there will be neither time nor place where it is -becoming perfect; consequently, it will not even have any desire, and -it will measure nothing, neither by time nor place; and therefore will -not remember either. - - -STARS HAVE NO MEMORY BECAUSE THEY ARE UNIFORMLY BLISSFUL. - -Besides, the stars enjoy a blissful life because they contemplate the -real life in their own souls; because they all aspire to the One, and, -radiating into the entire heavens, like cords that vibrate in unison, -they produce a kind of symphony by their natural harmony. Last, the -entire heavens revolve; so also do their parts, which, in spite of -the diversity of their motions, and of their positions, all gravitate -towards a same centre. Now all these facts support the theory we have -advanced, since they show that the life of the universe is one system, -and is uniform. - - -QUESTION: DOES JUPITER'S ROYAL ADMINISTRATION IMPLY A USE OF MEMORY? - -9. Jupiter, who governs the world, and endues it with order and beauty, -possesses from all eternity[154] a royal soul and intelligence; he -produces things by his providence, and regulates them by his power; -in an orderly manner he disposes everything in the development and -achievement of the numerous periods of the stars. Do not such acts on -Jupiter's part imply use of memory by which he may know what periods -have already been accomplished, and busy himself with the preparation -of others by his combinations, his calculations, and reasonings? His -being the most skilful administrator in the world would seem to imply -that he uses memory. - - -THE INFINITY OF JUPITER'S LIFE OPPOSES HIS USE OF MEMORY. - -We might well, in respect to the memory of these periods, examine the -number of these periods, and whether it is known to Jupiter; for if it -be a finite number, the universe will have had a commencement within -time; but if it be infinite, Jupiter will not have been able to know -how many things he has done. (To solve this problem) we must admit -that Jupiter ever enjoys knowledge, in a single and unitary life. It -is in this sense that he must be infinite and possess unity, not by -a knowledge come to him from without, but interiorly, by his very -nature, because the infinite ever remains entire in him, is inherent -in him, is contemplated by him, and is not, for him, simply the object -of an accidental knowledge. Indeed, while knowing the infinity of his -life, Jupiter simultaneously knows that the influence he exercises on -the universe is single; but his knowledge thereof is not due to his -exercising it on the universe. - - -JUPITER MAY BE TAKEN IN A DOUBLE SENSE. - -10. The principle which presides over the order of the universe -is double; from one point of view he is the demiurge; from the -other, the universal Soul. By the name of Jupiter, therefore, we -designate both the demiurge, and the "Governor of the universe." As -to the demiurge, we must dismiss all notions of past or future, and -attribute to him nothing but a life that is uniform, immutable, and -independent, of time. But the life of the governor of the universe -(which is the universal Soul), raises the question whether she be -also free from any necessity of reasoning, and of planning what is -to be done? Surely, for the order which is to rule has already been -devised and decided, and that without having been ordered; for that -which is in order was that which became, and the process of becoming -eventuates in order. The latter is the activity of the Soul which -depends from an abiding wisdom, a wisdom whose image is the order -existing within the soul. As the wisdom contemplated by the soul does -not change, neither does its action. Indeed, the Soul contemplates -wisdom perpetually; if she ceased, she would lapse into incertitude, -for the soul is as unitary as her work. This unitary principle that -governs the world dominates perpetually, and not only occasionally; -for whence should there be several powers, to struggle among each -other, or get into uncertainties? The principle that administers the -universe is therefore unitary, and ever wills the same. Why, indeed, -should she desire now one thing, and then another, and thus involve -herself in uncertainties? Still, even if she altered herself under -unitary conditions, she would not be involved in difficulties. That -the universe contains a great number and kinds of parts opposed to -each other is no reason that the Soul does not with certainty know how -to arrange them. She does not begin by objects of lowest rank, nor by -parts; she directs by the principles. Starting from these, she easily -succeeds in putting everything in order. She dominates because she -persists in a single and identical function. What would induce her -to wish first one thing, and then another? Besides, in such a state -of affairs, she would hesitate about what she ought to do, and her -action would be weakened, and this would result in a weakness of her -activities, while deliberating about still undecided plans. - - -RATIOCINATION HAS NO PLACE IN THE WORLD-SOUL. - -11. The world is administered like a living being, namely, partly from -the outside, and from the resulting members, and partly from within, -and from the principle. The art of the physician works from outside -in, deciding which organ is at fault, operating only with hesitation -and after groping around experimentally. Nature, however, starting -within from the principle, has no need to deliberate. The power which -administers the universe proceeds not like the physician, but like -nature. It preserves its simplicity so much the better as it comprises -everything in its breast, inasmuch as all things are parts of the -living being which is one. Indeed, nature, which is unitary, dominates -all individual natures; these proceed from it, but remain attached -thereto, like branches of an immense tree, which is the universe. -What would be the utility of reasoning, calculation, and memory in a -principle that possesses an ever present and active wisdom, and which, -by this wisdom, dominates the world and administers it in an immutable -manner? That its works are varied and changeful, does not imply that -this principle must itself participate in their mutability. It remains -immutable even while producing different things. Are not several -stages produced successively in each animal, according to its various -ages? Are not certain parts born and increased at determinate periods, -such as the horns, the beard, and the breasts? Does one not see each -being begetting others? Thus, without the degeneration of the earlier -("seminal) reasons," others develop in their turn. This is proved by -the ("seminal) reason" subsisting identical and entire within the same -living being. - - -THIS UNIVERSAL WISDOM IS PERMANENT BECAUSE TIMELESS. - -We are therefore justified in asserting the rule of one and the same -wisdom. This wisdom is universal; it is the permanent wisdom of the -world; it is multiple and varied, and at the same time it is one, -because it is the wisdom of the living Being which is one, and is the -greatest of all. It is invariable, in spite of the multiplicity of -its works; it constitutes the Reason which is one, and still is all -things simultaneously. If it were not all things, it would, instead of -being the wisdom of the universe, be the wisdom of only the latter and -individual things. - - -WISDOM, IN THE WORLD-SOUL DOES NOT IMPLY REASONING AND MEMORY. - -12. It may perhaps be objected that this might be true of nature, but -that whereas the Soul-of-the-universe contains wisdom, this implies -also reasoning and memory. This objection could be raised only by -persons who by "wisdom" understand that which is its absence, and -mistake the search for wisdom for reasonable thinking. For what can -reasoning be but the quest of wisdom, the real reason, the intelligence -of the real essence? He who exercises reason resembles a man who plays -the lyre to exercise himself, to acquire the habit of playing it, and, -in general, to a man who learns in order to know. He seeks indeed to -acquire science, whose possession is the distinguishing characteristic -of a sage. Wisdom consists therefore in a stable condition. This is -seen even in the conduct of the reasoner; as soon as he has found what -he sought, he ceases to reason, and rests in the possession of wisdom. - - -OMNISCIENT INTUITION MAKES MEMORY AND REASONING SUPERFLUOUS. - -Therefore, if the governing Power of the world seems to resemble -those who learn, it will be necessary to attribute to it reasoning, -reflection, and memory, so that it may compare the past with the -present or the future. But if, on the contrary, its knowledge be such -as to have nothing more to learn, and to remain in a perfectly stable -condition, it evidently possesses wisdom by itself. If it know future -things--a privilege that could not be denied it under penalty of -absurdity--why would it not also know how they are to occur? Knowing -all this, it would have no further need of comparing the past with -the present. Besides, this knowledge of its future will not resemble -the prevision of the foretellers, but to the certitude entertained by -makers about their handiwork. This certitude admits no hesitation, -no ambiguity; it is absolute; as soon as it has obtained assent, it -remains immutable. Consequently, the wisdom about the future is the -same as about the present, because it is immutable; that is, without -ratiocination. If, however, it did not know the future things it -was to produce, it would not know how to produce them, and it would -produce them without rule, accidentally, by chance. In its production, -it remains immutable; consequently, it produces without changing, at -least as far as permitted by the model borne within it. Its action is -therefore uniform, ever the same; otherwise, the soul might err. If -its work was to contain differences, it does not derive these from -itself, but from the ("seminal) reasons" which themselves proceed -from the creating principle. Thus the created things depend from the -series of reasons, and the creating principle has no need to hesitate, -to deliberate, neither to support a painful work, as was thought by -some philosophers who considered the task of regulating the universe -wearisome. It would indeed be a tiresome task to handle a strange -matter, that is, one which is unmanageable. But when a power by itself -dominates (what it forms), it cannot have need of anything but itself -and its counsel; that is, its wisdom, for in such a power the counsel -is identical with wisdom. It therefore needs nothing for creation, -since the wisdom it possesses is not a borrowed wisdom. It needs -nothing (extraneous or) adventitious; consequently, neither reasoning -nor memory, which faculties yield us nothing but what is adventitious. - - -IN THE WORLD-SOUL WISDOM IS THE HIGHEST AND NATURE THE LOWEST. - -13. How would such a wisdom differ from so-called nature? (In the Soul) -wisdom occupies the first rank, and nature the last. Nature is only -the image of wisdom; now, if nature occupy no more than the last rank, -she must also have only the last degree of the reason that enlightens -the Soul. As illustration, take a piece of wax, on which the figure -impressed on one side penetrates to the other; and whose well-marked -traits on the upper face appear on the lower face only in a confused -manner. Such is the condition of nature. She does not know, she only -produces, blindly she transmits to matter the form she possesses, just -as some warm object transmits to another, but in a lesser degree, the -heat it itself possesses. Nature does not even imagine: for the act -of imagining, inferior as it is to that of thinking, is nevertheless -superior to that of impressing a form, as nature does it. Nature -can neither grasp nor understand anything; while imagination seizes -the adventitious object and permits the one who is imaging to know -what he has experienced. As to nature, all it knows is to beget; it -is the actualization of the active potentiality (of the universal -Soul). Consequently, Intelligence possesses intelligible forms; the -(universal) Soul has received them, and ceaselessly receives them from -her; that is what her life consists of; the clearness which shines in -her is the consciousness she has of her thought. The reflection which -(the Soul herself projects on matter is nature, which terminates the -series of essences, and occupies the last rank in the intelligible -world; after her, there is nothing but imitations (of beings). Nature, -while acting on matter is passive in respect (to the Soul). The (Soul), -superior to nature, acts without suffering. Finally, the supreme -(Intelligence) does not (itself) act on the bodies or on matter. - - -THERE IS CONTINUITY BETWEEN NATURE AND THE ELEMENTS. - -14. The bodies begotten by nature are the elements. As to the animals -and the plants, do they possess nature as the air possesses the light -which when retiring does not injure the air, because it never mingled -with the air, and remained separate from it? Or is nature's relation to -animals and plants the same as that of the fire with a heated body, to -which, on retiring, it leaves a warmth which is different from the heat -characteristic of the fire, and which constitutes a modification of the -heated body? Surely this. To the essence which it moulds, nature gives -a shape, which is different from the form proper to nature herself. We -might however still consider whether there be any intermediary between -nature and the essence which she moulds. However, we have sufficiently -determined the difference that exists between nature and the wisdom -which presides over the universe. - - -HOW CAN TIME BE DIVIDED WITHOUT IMPLYING DIVISION OF THE SOUL'S ACTION? - -15. We still have to solve one question bearing on the above -discussion. If eternity relate to Intelligence, and time to the -Soul--for we have stated that the existence of time is related to -the actualization of the Soul, and depends therefrom--how can time -be divided, and have a past, without the Soul's action itself being -divided, without her reflection on the past constituting memory in -her? Indeed, eternity implies identity, and time implies diversity; -otherwise, if we suppose there is no change in the actualizations of -the Soul, time will have nothing to distinguish it from eternity. Shall -we say that our souls, being subject to change and imperfection, are in -time, while the universal Soul begets time without herself being in it? - - -IN TIME ARE ACTIONS AND REACTIONS OF THE SOUL; BUT NOT THE SOUL HERSELF. - -Let us admit that the universal Soul is not in time; why should she -beget time rather than eternity? Because the things she begets are -comprised within time, instead of being eternal. Neither are the -other souls within time; nothing of them, except their "actions and -reactions" (Stoic terms). Indeed, the souls themselves are eternal; -and therefore time is subsequent to them. On the other hand, what is in -time is less than time, since time must embrace all that is within it, -as Plato says, that time embraces all that is in number and place. - - -QUESTION: EVEN THE PRIORITY OF ORDER IMPLIES A TEMPORAL CONCEPTION. - -16. It may however be objected that if the (universal Soul) contain -things in the order in which they were successively produced, she -thereby contains them as earlier and later. Then, if she produce them -within time, she inclines towards the future, and consequently, also -conversely to the past. - - -EARLIER AND LATER EXIST ONLY IN WHAT IS BEGOTTEN; NOT IN THEIR SEMINAL -REASON. - -It may be answered that the conceptions of earlier and later apply only -to things which are becoming; in the Soul, on the contrary, there is no -past; all the ("seminal) reasons" are simultaneously present to her, as -has already been said. On the contrary, in begotten things, the parts -do not exist simultaneously, because they do not all exist together, -although they all exist together within the ("seminal) reasons." For -instance, the feet or the hands exist together in the ("seminal) -reasons," but in the body they are separate. Nevertheless, these parts -are equally separated, but in a different manner, in the ("seminal) -reason," as they are equally anterior to each other in a different -manner. If however they be thus separate in the ("seminal) reason," -they then differ in nature. - - -THINGS WHICH ARE ANTERIOR CAN BE ONLY IN LOWER PRINCIPLES. - -But how are they anterior to each other? It must be because here he -who commands is identical with him who is commanded. Now in commanding -he expresses one thing after another; for why are all things not -together? (Not so). If the command and he who commands were separate -entities, the things would have been produced in the same manner -as they have been expressed (by speech); but as the commander is -himself the first command, he does not express things (by speech), -he only produces them one after the other. If he were (by speech) -to express what he actually does, he would have to consider the -order; consequently, he would have to be separate from it. Is it -asked, how can the commander be identical with the command? He is not -simultaneously form and matter, but form alone (that is, the totality -of the reasons which are simultaneously present to him). Thus, the Soul -is both the potentiality and the actualization which occupy the second -rank after Intelligence. To have parts some of which are prior to -others suits only such objects as cannot be everything simultaneously. - - -DIAGRAM OF THE UNIVERSE. - -The Soul, such as we are considering her here, is something venerable; -she resembles a circle which is united to the centre, and which -develops without leaving (its base of operations, the centre), thus -forming an undivided extension. To gain a conception of the order of -the three principles, the Good may be considered as a centre, the -Intelligence as an immovable circle, and the Soul as an external -movable circle impelled by desire. - - -CIRCULAR MOVEMENT OF THE SOUL. - -Indeed, intelligence possesses and embraces the Good immediately; -while the Soul can only aspire to (the Good), which is located above -the Intelligence. The whole world-sphere possessing the Soul which -thus aspires (to the Good), is moved by the promptings of its natural -aspirations. Its natural aspiration, however, is to rise in bodily -aspiration to the principle on the outside of which it is; namely, to -extend around it, to turn, and consequently to move in a circle. - - -THE INTELLECTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE WORLD-SOUL, AND SOULS OF -STARS, EARTH AND MEN. - -17. Why are the thoughts and rational aspirations in us different (from -what they are in the universal Soul)? Why is there in us posteriority -in respect to time (as we conceive things in a successive manner, -while the universal Soul conceives them simultaneously)? Why do we -have to question ourselves (about this)? Is it because several forces -are active in us, and contend for mastery, and there is no single -one which alone commands? Is it because we successively need various -things to satisfy our needs, because our present is not determined by -itself, but refers to things which vary continually, and which are -outside of ourselves? Yes, that is the reason why our determinations -change according to the present occasion and need. Various things come -from the outside to offer themselves to us successively. Besides, -as several forces dominate in us, our imagination necessarily has -representations that are various, transient, modified by each other, -and hindering the movements and actions characteristic of each power -of the soul. Thus, when lust arises in us, imagination represents to -us the desired object, warns us, and instructs us about the passion -born of lust, and at the same time begs of us to listen to it, and to -satisfy it. In this state, the soul floats in uncertainty, whether it -grant to the appetite the desired satisfaction, or whether she refuse -it. Anger, for instance, excites us to vengeance, and thereby produces -the same uncertainty. The needs and passions of the body also suggest -to us varying actions and opinions; as do also the ignorance of the -true goods, the soul's inability to give a certain judgment, while in -this hesitating condition, and the consequences which result from the -mingling of the things we have just mentioned. Still our own highest -part makes judgments more certain than those reached by the part common -(to the soul and to the body), a part that is very uncertain, being a -prey to diversity of opinions. - - -SOULS, ACCORDING TO MORALIZATION, RESEMBLE VARIOUS FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. - -Right reason, on descending from the higher realms of the soul into the -common part, is by this mingling weakened, although it is not naturally -weak; thus, in the tumult of a numerous assembly, it is not the wisest -counsellor whose word carries weight; but on the contrary, that of the -most turbulent and quarrelsome, and the tumult they make forces the -wise man to stay seated, powerless and vanquished, by the noise. In -the perverse man, it is the animal part that rules; the diversity of -influences which overcome this man represents the worst of governments -(the rule of the mob). In the commonplace man, things happen as in -a republic where some good element dominates the remainder, which -does not refuse to obey. In the virtuous man, there is a life which -resembles the aristocracy, because he manages to withdraw from the -influence of the commonplace part, and because he listens to what is -best in himself. Finally, in the best man, completely separated from -the common part, reigns one single principle from which proceeds the -order to which the remainder is subject. It would seem therefore that -there were two cities, the one superior, and the other inferior, which -latter derives its order from the former. We saw that the universal -Soul was a single identical principle which commands uniformly; -but other souls, as we have just explained, are in a very different -condition. Enough of this. - - -THE BODY IS NOT US, BUT OURS. - -18. Does the body, thanks to the presence of the soul that vivifies it, -possess something which becomes characteristically its own, or is its -possession nothing more than its nature, and is this the only thing -added to the body? Evidently, the body which enjoys the presence of the -soul, and of nature, would not resemble a corpse. It will be in the -condition of the air, not when the air is penetrated by the sun-light -(for then it really receives nothing), but when it participates in -the heat. Therefore, plant and animal bodies that possess "a nature," -find that it consists of the shadow of a soul. It is to this body, -thus vivified by nature, that sufferings and pleasures relate; but -it is for us to experience these sufferings and pleasures without -ourselves suffering. By us is here meant the reasonable soul, from -which the body is distinct, without however being foreign to it, since -it is ours (since it belongs to us). Only because of this, that it is -ours, do we care for it. We are not the body; but we are not entirely -separated from it; it is associated with us, it depends on us. When we -say "we," we mean by this word what constitutes the principal part of -our being; the body also is "ours": but in another sense. Therefore its -sufferings and pleasures are not indifferent to us; the weaker we are, -the more we occupy ourselves with it. In it, so to speak, is plunged -the most precious part of ourselves, which essentially constitutes the -personality, the man. - - -THE SOUL AND BODY TOGETHER FORM A FUSION OF BOTH. - -The passions do not really belong to the soul, but to the living body, -which is the common part, or the fusion (of both, or the compound). -The body and soul, each taken separately, are self-sufficient. Isolated -and inanimate, the body does not suffer. It is not the body that is -dissolved, it is the unification of its parts. Isolated, the soul is -impassible, indivisible, and by her condition escapes all affections. -But the unification of two things is sure to be more or less unstable, -and on its occurrence, it often happens that it is tested; hence the -pain. I say, "two things," not indeed two bodies, because two bodies -have the same nature; the present is a case where one kind of being -is to be united to one of a different kind, where the inferior being -receives something from the superior being, but receives only a trace -of that something, because of its inability to receive her entirely. -Then the whole comprises two elements, but nevertheless forms only a -unity; which, becoming something intermediary between what it was, and -what it has not been able to become, becomes seriously embarrassed, -because it has formed an unfortunate alliance, not very solid, always -drawn into opposite directions by contrary influences. Thus it is at -one time elated, and at another, dejected; when it is dejected, it -manifests its suffering; when it is elated, it aspires to communion -between the body and the soul. - - -THE SOUL FEELS THE PASSIONS WITHOUT EXPERIENCING THEM. - -19. That is why there is pleasure and pain. That is why grief is said -to be a perception of dissolution, when the body is threatened with -the loss of the image of the soul (of being disorganized by losing the -irrational soul). That is why it is said that pleasure is a perception -produced in the animal when the image of the soul reassumes its sway -over the body. It is the body which undergoes passion; but it is -the sense-potentiality of the soul which perceives the passion by -its relation with the organs; it is she to which all the sensations -ultimately report themselves. The body alone is injured and suffers; -for example, when one member is cut, it is the mass of the body which -is cut; the soul feels pain not merely as a mass, but as a living -mass. It is likewise with a burn: the soul feels it, because the -sense-potentiality as it were receives its reaction by its relations -with the organs. The soul entire feels the passion produced in the body -without however herself experiencing it. - - -UNLESS THE SOUL WERE IMPASSIBLE SHE COULD NOT LOCALIZE AND MANAGE PAIN. - -Indeed, as the whole soul feels, she localizes the passion in the -organ which has received the blow, and which suffers. If she herself -experienced the suffering, as the whole of her is present in the whole -body, she could not localize the suffering in one organ; the whole of -her would feel the suffering; she would not relate it to any one part -of the body, but to all in general: for she is present everywhere in -the body. The finger suffers, and the man feels this suffering, because -it is his finger. It is generally said that the man suffers in his -finger, just as it is said that he is blond, because his eyes are blue. -It is therefore the same entity that undergoes passion' and suffering, -unless the word "suffering' should not here designate both the passion, -and the sensation which follows it; in this case no more is meant than -that the state of suffering is accompanied by sensation. The sensation -itself is not the suffering, but the knowledge of the suffering. The -potentiality which knows must be impassible to know well, and well to -indicate what is perceived. For if the faculty which is to indicate the -passions itself suffer, it will either not indicate them, or it will -indicate them badly. - - -THE APPETITES ARE LOCATED NEITHER IN BODY NOR SOUL, BUT IN THEIR -COMBINATION. - -20. Consequently, it may be said that the origin of the desires should -be located in the common (combination) and in the physical nature. To -desire and seek something would not be characteristic of a body in any -state whatever (which would not be alive). On the other hand, it is not -the soul which seeks after sweet or bitter flavors, but the body. Now -the body, by the very fact that it is not simply a body (that it is a -living body), moves much more than the soul, and is obliged to seek -out a thousand objects to satisfy its needs: at times it needs sweet -flavors, at others, bitter flavors; again humidity, and later, heat; -all of them being things about which it would not care, were it alone. -As the suffering is accompanied by knowledge, the soul, to avoid the -object which causes the suffering, makes an effort which constitutes -flight, because she perceives the passion experienced by the organ, -that contracts to escape the harmful object. Thus everything that -occurs in the body is known by sensation, and by that part of the soul -called nature, and which gives the body a trace of the soul. On one -hand, desire, which has its origin in the body, and reaches its highest -degree in nature, attaches itself thereto. On the other hand, sensation -begets imagination, as a consequence of which the soul satisfies her -need, or abstains, and restrains herself; without listening to the -body which gave birth to desire, nor the faculty which later felt its -reaction. - - -TWO KINDS OF DESIRES: OF THE BODY; AND OF THE COMBINATION, OR NATURE. - -Why therefore should we recognize two kinds of desires, instead of -acknowledging only one kind in the living body? Because nature differs -from the body to which it gives life. Nature is anterior to the body -because it is nature that organizes the body by moulding it, and -shaping it; consequently, the origin of desire is not in nature, but -in the passions of the living body. If the latter suffer, it aspires -to possess things contrary to those that make it suffer, to make -pleasure succeed pain, and satisfaction succeed need. Nature, like a -mother, guesses the desires of the body that has suffered, tries to -direct it, and to lure it back. While thus trying to satisfy it, she -thereby shares in its desires, and she proposes to accomplish the same -ends. It might be said that the body, by itself, possesses desires and -inclinations; that nature has some only as a result of the body, and -because of it; that, finally the soul is an independent power which -grants or refuses what is desired by the organism. - - -DESIRES ARE PHYSICAL, BECAUSE CHANGEABLE IN HARMONY WITH THE BODY. - -21. The observation of the different ages shows that it is indeed -the organism which is the origin of desires. Indeed, these change -according as the man is a child or a youth, sick or well. Nevertheless -that part of the soul which is the seat of desires ever remains the -same. Consequently the variations of desire must be traced back to the -variations of the organism. But this desiring faculty of the soul is -not always entirely wakened by the excitation of the body, although -this subsists to the end. Often even before having deliberated, the -soul will forbid the body to drink or eat, although the organism -desires it as keenly as possible. Nature herself also often forbids the -satisfaction of the bodily desire, because such desire may not seem to -it natural, and because she alone has the right to decide what things -are harmonious to or contrary to nature. The theory that the body, by -its different states suggests different desires to the soul's faculty -of desire, does not explain how the different states of the body can -inspire different desires in the soul's faculty of desire, since then -it is not itself that it seeks to satisfy. For it is not for itself, -but for the organism, that the soul's faculty of desire seeks foods, -humidity or heat, motion, agitation, or the satisfaction of hunger. - - -RELATION OF DESIRE-FUNCTION TO THE VEGETATIVE POWERS. - -22. It is possible, even in plant-life, to distinguish something which -is the characteristic property of their bodies, and a power that -imparts it to them. What in us in the soul's faculty of desire, is in -plant-life the natural element (or, vegetative power). - - -PLATO IS IN DOUBT ABOUT THE EARTH'S SOUL; WHETHER SHE IS LIKE THOSE OF -STARS. - -The earth also possesses a soul; and therefore also such a -potentiality; and it is from the earth that the plants derive their -vegetative potentiality. One might reasonably first ask which is this -soul that resides in the earth. Does she proceed from the sphere of -the universe (to which alone Plato seems to attribute a soul from the -very first), so as to make of her an irradiation of this sphere upon -the earth? Or should we on the contrary, attribute to the earth a soul -similar to that of the stars, as Plato does when he calls the earth the -first and most ancient of the divinities contained within the interior -of the heavens? Could it, in this case, be a divinity, if it did not -have a soul? It is therefore difficult to determine the exact state of -affairs, and the very words of Plato here instead of diminishing our -embarrassment, only increase it. - -At first, how will we manage to form a reasonable opinion on this -subject? Judging from what the earth causes to grow, one might -conjecture that it possesses the vegetative potentiality. As many -living beings are seen to grow from the earth, why would it itself -not be a living being? Being besides a great living being, and a -considerable part of the world, why should the earth not possess -intelligence, and be a divinity? Since we consider every star as a -living being, why would we not similarly consider the earth, which is -a part of the universal living being? It would, indeed, be impossible -to admit that it was exteriorly contained by a foreign soul, and -that interiorly it would have no soul, as if it were the only being -incapable of having an individual soul. Why should we grant animation -to the (starry) bodies of fire, while not to the earthly body of our -earth? Indeed, bodies could as easily be of earth as of fire. Not -in the stars, any more than in the earth, is there any nose, flesh, -blood, or humours, although the earth is more varied than the stars, -and although it be composed of all the other living bodies. As to its -inability to move, this can be said only in reference to local motion. -(For it is capable of motion in the respect that it can feel.) - - -THE EARTH CAN FEEL AS WELL AS ANY OF THE STARS. - -It will be asked, But how can the earth feel? We shall answer in -turn, How can stars feel? It is not the flesh that feels; a soul is -not dependent for feeling on a body; but the body is dependent on the -soul for self-preservation. As the soul possesses judgment, she should -be able to judge the passions of the body whenever she applies her -attention thereto. - - -QUESTION: WHAT PASSIONS WOULD BE SUITABLE TO THE EARTH? - -It may however still be asked, What are the passions characteristic -of the earth, and which may be objects of judgment for the soul? It -may besides be objected that the plants, considered in the terrestrial -element that constitutes them, do not feel. - - -SENSATION WILL FIRST HAVE TO BE EXAMINED. - -Let us now examine to what beings sensation belongs, and whereby it -operates. Let us see whether sensation can take place even without -organs. Of what use to the earth could sensation be? For it does not -serve the earth as means of knowledge; the knowledge which consists -in wisdom suffices for the beings to whom sensation is of no use. -This consideration might however be denied, for the knowledge of -sense-objects offers, besides utility, some of the charms of the Muses. -Such is, for example, the knowledge of the sun and the other stars, -whose contemplation itself is agreeable. This problem will therefore -demand solution. - - -RESTATEMENT OF PROBLEMS INVOLVED. - -We must therefore first investigate if the earth possess senses, to -what animals sensation naturally belongs, and how sensation operates. -It will be necessary to begin by discussing the doubtful points -that we have indicated, and to examine in general if sensation can -operate without organs, and if the senses have been given for utility, -admitting even that they can procure some other advantage. - - -CONCEPTIVE THOUGHT DEMANDS THE INTERMEDIARY PROCESS OF SENSATION. - -23. Conception of sense-objects occurs when the soul or the living -being experiences perceptions by grasping the bodies' inherent -qualities, and by representing their forms to itself. The soul must -therefore perceive sense-objects either with or without the body. How -could the soul do so alone? Pure and isolated, she can conceive only -what she has within herself; she can only think. But for conception -of objects other than herself, she must previously have grasped them, -either by becoming assimilated to them, or by finding herself united to -something which may have become similar to them. - - -THE PURE SOUL WOULD REMAIN ISOLATED. - -It is impossible for the soul to become similar to sense-objects (in -order to grasp them), by remaining pure. How indeed could a point -become similar to a line? The intelligible line itself could not become -conformed to the sense-line, any more than intelligible fire to the -sense-fire, or the intelligible man to the sense-man. Nature herself -which begets man could not be identical with the begotten man. The -isolated soul, even if she could grasp sense-objects, will finish by -applying herself to the intuition of intelligible objects, because, -having nothing by which to grasp the former, she will let them escape. -Indeed, when the soul perceives from far a visible object, although -only the form reaches her, nevertheless what first began by being for -her indivisible, finally constitutes a subject, whether it be color or -a figure, whose size is determined by the soul. - - -SENSATION DEPENDS ON THE SENSE-SHAPE, WHICH, LIKE TOOLS, IS -INTERMEDIATE. - -The soul and the exterior object do not therefore suffice (to explain -sensation); for there would be nothing that suffers. There must -therefore be a third term that suffers, that is, which receives the -sense-form, or, shape. This third term must "sympathize," or, share -the passion of the exterior object, it must also experience the same -passion, and it must be of the same matter; and, on the other hand, -its passion must be known by another principle; last, passion must -keep something of the object which produces it, without however being -identical with it. The organ which suffers must therefore be of a -nature intermediary between the object which produces the passion -and the soul, between the sensible and the intelligible, and thus -play the part of a term intermediary between the two extremes, being -receptive on one side, making announcements on the other, and becoming -equally similar to both. The organ that is to become the instrument of -knowledge must be identical neither with the subject that knows, nor -with the object that is known. It must become similar to both of them; -to the exterior object because it suffers, and to the cognizing soul -because the passion which it experiences becomes a form. Speaking more -accurately, the sensations operate by the organs. This results from -the principle asserted above, that the soul isolated from the body can -grasp nothing in the sense-world. As used here, the word "organ" either -refers to the whole body, or to some part of the body fitted to fulfil -some particular function; as in the case of touch or sight. Likewise, -it is easy to see that tools of artisans play a part intermediary -between the mind which judges, and the object which is judged; and that -they serve to discover the properties of substances. For instance, a -(foot) rule, which is equally conformed to the idea of straightness -in the mind, and to the property of straightness in the wood, serves -the artisan's mind as intermediary to judge if the wood he works be -straight. - - -EXCLUSION OF OTHER SIDE ISSUES. - -We have just demonstrated that sensation belongs exclusively to an -embodied soul, and that this implies organs. But we have nothing to -do with the question whether the perceived object must be in contact -with the organ, or whether the sensation can take place at a distance -from the sense-object, by means of an intermediary; as the case of -the fire which is located at a distance from our body, without the -intermediary's suffering in any manner. It happens again where, empty -space serving as intermediary between the eye and the color, one may -well ask whether, to see, it suffice to possess the potentiality proper -to that organ. But it is sure that sensation is some activity of the -soul in a body, or through a body. - - -ARE THE SENSES GIVEN US ONLY FOR THE SAKE OF UTILITY? - -24. Whether the senses were given us for the sake of utility must be -examined as follows. If the soul were separated from the body, she -would not feel; she feels only when united to a body; therefore she -feels by and for the body. It is from the soul's intimacy with the -body that sensation results, either because all passions, when keen -enough, reach the soul; or whether the senses were made for us to -take care that no object approaches too near us, or exercises on our -organs an action strong enough to destroy them. If so, the senses -were given us for the sake of utility. Even if the senses do serve to -acquire knowledge and information, they would be of no use to a being -who possesses knowledge, but only to one who needs to learn he has the -misfortune of being ignorant, or who needs to remember, because he is -subject to forgetfulness. They are therefore not found in the being who -has no need to learn, and who does not forget. - - -ARE SENSES GIVEN THE STARS FOR UTILITY? - -Let us consider what consequences may be drawn therefrom for the earth, -the stars, and especially for the heavens and the whole world. From -what we have seen, the parts of the world which suffer may possess -sensation in their relation with other parts. But is the entire world, -capable of feeling, as it is entirely impassible in its relations -with itself? If sensation demand on one hand an organ, and on the -other the sense-object, the world which includes everything, can have -neither organ to perceive, nor exterior object to be perceived. We may -therefore ascribe to the world a sort of intimate sensation, such as -we ourselves possess, and deny to it the perception of other objects. -When we feel something unusual in our bodies, we perceive it as being -external. Now as we perceive not only exterior objects, but even some -part of our body through some other part of the body itself, similarly -the world might very well perceive the sphere of the planets by means -of the sphere of the fixed stars; and perceive the earth with all the -objects it contains by means of the sphere of the planets? If these -beings (the stars and the planets) do not feel the passions felt -by other beings, why might they not also possess different senses? -Might not the sphere of the planets not only by itself possess sight -by itself, but in addition be the eye destined to transmit what it -sees to the universal Soul? Since she is luminous and animated, she -might see as does an eye, supposing that she did not feel the other -passions.[155] (Plato), however, said, "that the heavens have no need -of eyes." Doubtless the heavens have nothing outside of themselves to -see; and consequently, they may not have need of eyes, as we have; but -they contain something to contemplate, namely, themselves. If it should -be objected that it is useless for them to see themselves, it may be -answered that they were not made principally for this purpose, and that -if they see themselves, it is only a necessary consequence of their -natural constitution. Nothing therefore hinders them from seeing, as -their body is diaphanous. - - -IF SENSATION IS A SOUL-DISTRACTION, THE STARS A WOULD NOT INDULGE -THEREIN. - -25. It would seem that in order to see, and in general to feel, mere -possession of the necessary organs by the soul, is not enough; the -soul must also be disposed to direct her attention to things of sense. -But it is usual for the (universal) Soul to be ever applied to the -contemplation of intelligible things; and mere possession of the -faculty of sensation would not necessarily imply its exercise, because -it would be entirely devoted to objects of a higher nature. So when -we apply ourselves to the contemplation of intelligible things, we -notice neither the sensation of sight, nor those of other senses; and, -in general, the attention that we give to one thing hinders us from -seeing the others. Even among us human beings, to wish to perceive one -of our members through another, as, for instance, looking at ourselves, -is both superfluous and vain, unless this has some very good purpose. -Moreover, it is a characteristic of an imperfect and fallible being to -contemplate some external thing, merely because it is beautiful. It may -therefore well be said that if to feel, hear and taste are distractions -of a soul that attaches herself to outer objects, the sun and the other -stars cannot see or hear, except accidentally. It would however not be -unreasonable to admit that they turn towards us through the exercise of -the senses of sight or hearing. Now, if they turn towards us, they must -be mindful of human affairs. It would be absurd that they should not -remember the men to whom they do so much good; how indeed would they do -good, if they had no memory? - - -THE EARTH FEELS AND DIRECTS BY THE LAWS OF SYMPATHETIC HARMONY. - -26. The stars know our desires through the agreement and sympathy -established between them and us by the harmony reigning in the -universe. Our desires are granted by the same method. Likewise, magic -is founded on the harmony of the universe; it acts by means of the -forces which are interconnected by sympathy. If so, why should we -not attribute to the earth the faculty of sensation? Granting this, -what sort of sensations would we attribute to it? To begin with, why -should we not attribute to it touch, whether by one part feeling the -condition of another, and by the transmission of the sensation to the -governing power, or by the whole earth feeling the fire, and other -similar things; for if the terrestrial element is inert, it certainly -is not insensible. The earth will therefore feel the great things, -and not those of minor importance. Why should it feel? Surely if the -earth have a soul, she will not ignore the strongest motions therein. -The earth must also be supposed to feel, in order to dispose all that -depends on her for the benefit of humanity. All these things she will -suitably dispose by the laws of harmony. She can hear and grant the -prayers addressed to her, but in a manner other than we ourselves -would do. Besides, she might exercise other senses in her relations, -either with herself, or with foreign things; as, for example, to have -the sensations of taste and smell perceived by other beings. Perhaps -even she has need to perceive the odors of the liquids to fulfil her -providential functions in respect to animals, and to take care of her -own body. - - -THE EARTH'S SENSES MAY BE DIFFERENT FROM OURS. - -We must however not insist on her organs being the same as ours. Not -even in all animals are the senses similar. Thus, for instance, not all -have similar ears, and even those who have no ears at all nevertheless -will perceive sounds. How could the earth see, if light be necessary -for her vision? Nor must we claim for her the necessity of having -eyes. We have already above granted that she possesses the vegetative -power; we should therefore thence draw the deduction that this power -is primitively by its essence a sort of spirit. What objection then -could there be to assume that this spirit might be resplendent and -transparent? Arguing merely from its nature of being a spirit, we -should (potentially at least) conclude that it is transparent; and that -it is actually transparent because it is illuminated by the celestial -sphere. It is therefore neither impossible nor incredible that the soul -of the earth should possess sight. Besides, we must remember that this -soul is not that of a vile body, and that consequently, she must be a -goddess. In any case, this soul must be eternally good. - - -ANALYSIS OF THE EARTH'S PSYCHOLOGY. - -27. If the earth communicate to plant-life the power of begetting and -growing, it possesses this power within itself, and gives only a trace -of it to the plants which derive from it all their fruitfulness, and -as it were are the living flesh of its body. It gives to them what -is best in them; this can be seen in the difference between a plant -growing in the soil, and of a branch cut from it; the former is a real -plant, the latter is only a piece of wood. What is communicated to the -body of the earth by the Soul which presides over it? To see this it is -sufficient to notice the difference between some earth resting within -the soil, and a piece that is detached therefrom. It is likewise easy -to recognize that stones increase in size as long as they are in the -bosom of the earth, while they remain in the same state when they have -been plucked out therefrom. Everything therefore bears within itself a -trace of the universal vegetative (power) shed abroad over the whole -earth, and belonging particularly to no one of its parts. As to the -earth's power of sensation, it is not (like its vegetative power) -mingled with the body of the earth; it only hovers above and guides -it. Moreover, the earth possesses also, higher than the above powers, -a soul and an intelligence. They bear respectively the names of Ceres -and Vesta, according to the revelations of men of prophetic nature, who -allow themselves to be inspired by the divine. - - -DOES THE IRASCIBLE POWER ALSO ORIGINATE IN THE BODY? - -28. Enough of this. Let us return to the question from which we -digressed. We granted that the desires, pains and pleasures (considered -not only as sentiments, but as passions), originate in the constitution -of the organized and living body. Must the same origin be assigned to -the irascible (power)? Were this so, we would have several questions to -ask: Does anger belong to the entire organism, or only to a particular -organ, such as the heart when so disposed, or to the bile, as long as -it is part of a living body? Is anger different from the principle -which gives the body a trace of the soul, or is it an individual power, -which depends on no other power, whether irascible or sensitive? - - -THE LIVER IS THE SEAT OF THE SOUL'S FACULTY OF DESIRE. - -The vegetative power present in the whole body communicates to every -part thereof a trace of the soul. It is therefore to the entire body -that we must refer suffering, pleasure, and the desire of food. Though -nothing definite is ascertained about the seat of sexual desire, let us -grant that their seat is in the organs destined to its satisfaction. -Further, be it granted that the liver is the seat of the soul's faculty -of desire, because that organ is particularly the theatre of the -activities of the vegetative power which impresses a trace of the soul -on the body; and further, because it is from the liver that the action -it exercises starts. - - -THE HEART IS THE SEAT OF ANGER. - -As to anger, we shall have to examine its nature, what power of the -soul it constitutes, whether it be anger that imparts to the heart -a trace of its own power; if there exist another force capable of -producing the movement revealed in the animal; and finally, if it be -not a trace of anger, but anger itself which resides in the heart. - - -ANGER ORIGINATES IN THE VEGETATIVE AND GENERATIVE POWER, AS TRACE OF -THE SOUL. - -First, what is the nature of anger? We grow irritated at maltreatment -of ourselves or of a person dear to us; in general, when we witness -some outrage. Therefore anger implies a certain degree of sensation, -or even intelligence, and we should have to suppose that anger -originates in some principle other than the vegetative power. Certain -bodily conditions, however, predispose us to anger; such as being -of a fiery disposition, and being bilious; for people are far less -disposed to anger if of a cold-blooded nature. Besides, animals grow -irritated especially by the excitement of this particular part, and -by threats of harm to their bodily condition. Consequently we would -once more be led to refer anger to the condition of the body and -to the principle which presides over the constitution of organism. -Since men are more irritable when sick than when well, when they are -hungry, more than when well satisfied, anger or its principle should -evidently be referred to the organized and living body; evidently, -attacks of anger are excited by the blood or the bile, which are living -parts of the animal. As soon as the body suffers, the blood as well -as the bile boils, and there arises a sensation which arouses the -imagination; the latter then instructs the soul of the state of the -organism, and disposes the soul to attack what causes this suffering. -On the other hand, when the reasonable soul judges that we have been -injured, she grows excited, even if there were no disposition to anger -in the body. This affection seems therefore to have been given to us -by nature to make us, according to the dictates of our reasons, repel -and threatens us. (There are then two possible states of affairs.) -Either the irascible power first is moved in us without the aid of -reason, and later communicates its disposition to reason by means of -the imagination; or, reason first enters into action, and then reason -communicates its impulse to that part of our being which is disposed to -anger. In either case, anger arises in the vegetative and generative -power, which, in organizing the body, has rendered it capable to -seek out what is agreeable, and to avoid what is painful; diffusing -the bitter bile through the organism, imparting to it a trace of the -soul, thus communicating to it the faculty of growing irritated in the -presence of harmful objects, and, after having been harmed, of harming -other things, and to render them similar to itself. Anger is a trace of -the soul, of the same nature as the soul's faculty of desire, because -those least seek objects agreeable to the body, and who even scorn the -body, are least likely to abandon themselves to the blind transports -of anger. Although plant-life possesses the vegetative power, it does -not possess the faculty of anger because it has neither blood nor bile. -These are the two things which, in the absence of sensation, leads -one to boil with indignation. When however sensation joins these two -elements, there arises an impulse to fight against the harmful object. -If the irrational part of the soul were to be divided into the faculty -of desire, and that of anger, and if the former were to be considered -the vegetative power, and the other, on the contrary, as a trace of -the vegetative power, residing in either the heart or blood, or in -both; this division would not consist of opposed members, because the -second would proceed from the first. But there is an alternative: both -members of this division, the faculties of desire and anger, might be -considered two powers derived from one and the same principle (the -vegetative power). Indeed, when the appetites are divided, it is their -nature, and not the being from which they depend, that is considered. -This essence itself, however, is not the appetite, but completes it, -harmonizing with it the actions proceeding from the appetite. It is -also reasonable to assign the heart as seat of the trace of the soul -which constitutes anger; for the heart is not the seat of the soul, but -the source of the (arterially) circulating blood. - - -WHEN THE SOUL LEAVES THE BODY, SHE LEAVES A TRACE OF LIFE. - -29. If the body resemble an object warmed rather than illuminated, why -does nothing vital remain after the reasonable soul has abandoned it? -It does preserve some vital element, but only for a short time; this -trace soon disappears, as vanishes the heat of an object when it is -removed from the fire. After death, some trace of life still remains. -This is proved by the growth of hair and nails on corpses; and it is -well known that animals, even after being cut in pieces, still move -for some time. Besides, the disappearance of the (vegetative) life -simultaneously with the reasonable soul, does not prove their identity, -and that they (the reasonable soul, and the vegetative soul) are not -different. When the sun disappears, it causes the disappearance not -only of the light that surrounds it immediately, and as it were depends -from it, but also of the brilliance which these objects receive from -this light, and which completely differs from it. - - -DOES THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THESE THINGS NECESSARILY IMPLY THEIR -DESTRUCTION? - -But does that which disappears merely depart, or does it perish? Such -is the question which applies both to the light which inheres in the -illuminated objects (and colors them), as well as to the life inherent -in the body, and which we call the characteristically bodily life. -Evidently, there remains no light left in the objects which were -illuminated. But the question is to decide whether the light that -inhered in them returns to its source, or is annihilated. Annihilation -is impossible if anteriorly it was something real. What was it really? -So-called color must depend on the very bodies from which light also -emanates; and when these bodies perish, their coloring perishes with -them; nobody indeed asks after the fate of the color of the fire that -has gone out any more than one troubles oneself about what has become -of its appearance. It may be objected that the appearance is only a -condition,[156] such as holding the hand open or closed, while the -color, on the contrary, is the same sort of a quality as sweetness. -Now, is there nothing to hinder the sweet or the fragrant body from -perishing, without affecting the existence of the sweetness and -fragrance? Could they subsist in other bodies without being felt, -because the bodies which participate in the qualities, are such as not -to allow the qualities they possess to be felt? What would hinder the -unaffected existence of the light after the destruction of the body -it colored, if it merely ceased to be reflected, unless one's mind -should see that those qualities subsist in no subject? If we were to -admit this opinion, we would also be obliged to admit that qualities -are indestructible, that they are not produced in the constitution -of the bodies, that their colors are not produced by the reasons in -seed; that, as happens with the changing plumage of certain birds, -the ("seminal) reasons" not only gather or produce the colors of the -objects, but they besides make use of those that still fill the air, -and that they remain in the air without being such as they appear to us -when in bodies. Enough of this. - - -THREE POSSIBLE INTERRELATIONS OF THE SOUL'S SUPERIOR AND INFERIOR -BODIES. - -It may still be asked whether, if while the bodies subsist, the -light that colors them remains united to them, and does not separate -from them, why then would not both it, together with its immediate -emanations, move along with the body in which it inheres, although it -cannot be seen going away any more than it is seen approaching? We -shall therefore have to examine elsewhere if the second-rank powers -of the soul always remain attached to the higher ones, and so on; or -if each of them subsist by itself, and can continue to subsist in -itself when it is separated from the higher ones; or if, inasmuch as no -part of the soul can be separated from the others, all together form -a soul which is simultaneously one and manifold, but in some still -undetermined manner. - - -CAN THE PHYSICAL LIFE EXIST WITHOUT THE SOUL? - -What becomes of this trace of life that the soul impresses on the body, -and that the latter appropriates? If it belong to the soul, it will -follow the latter, since it is not separated from the being of the -soul. If it be the life of the body, it must be subject to the same -conditions as the luminous color of the bodies (and perish with them). -Indeed, it will be well to examine if the life can subsist without the -soul, or if, on the contrary, the life exists no earlier than the soul -is present, and acts on the body. - - -STARS, AS WELL AS THE SUN, HAVE PRAYERS ADDRESSED TO THEM. - -30. We have shown that memory is useless to the stars; we have agreed -that they have senses, namely, sight and hearing, and the power to -hear the prayers addressed to the sun, and also those by many people -addressed to the other stars, because these people are persuaded that -they receive from them many benefits; they think even that they will -obtain them so easily that these men ask the stars to co-operate -in actions not only such as are just, but even such as are unjust. -Questions raised by the latter point must still be considered. - - -BENEFITS ARE GRANTED TO MEN THROUGH THE WORLD-SOUL'S MEDIATION. - -Here arise important questions which have been frequently considered -especially by such as will not allow the divinities to be regarded as -the accomplices or authors of shameful deeds, such as love-adventures -and adulteries. For this reason, as well as on account of what was -said above about the memory of the stars, we shall have to examine -the nature of the influence they exercise. Indeed, if they grant our -petitions, though not immediately, and give us what we ask after a time -that sometimes is very long, they must necessarily exercise memory of -the prayers addressed to them; now, we have above denied that they -could have memory. As to the benefits that they grant to men, it has -been said that it seemed as if they had been granted by Vesta, that is, -the earth, unless indeed it should be insisted that the earth alone -granted benefits to men. - - -STATEMENT OF THREE QUESTIONS. - -We have therefore two points to examine: we first have to explain -that if we do attribute memory to the stars, it is only in a sense -agreeing with our former statements, and not for the reason advanced -by other people; we shall later have to show that it is a mistake to -attribute evil actions to them. In view of this, we shall try, as is -the duty of the philosopher, to refute the complaints formed against -the divinities which reside in the heavens, and against the universe -which is equally accused, in the case that any credence whatever is to -be attached to such as pretend that heaven can be magically swayed by -the arts of audacious men; last, we shall explain the administration of -the ministry of guardians, unless the latter point have been explained -incidentally to the solution of the former problems. - - -NATURAL ACTIONS ARE BOTH ON WHOLES AND ON PARTS. - -31. Let us in general consider the actions and reactions produced in -the universe either by nature or by art. In the works of nature, there -is an action of the whole on the parts, of the parts on the whole, -and of the parts on the parts. In the works of art, art either alone -accomplishes what it has undertaken, or depends on natural forces to -effect certain natural operations. We may call actions of the universe, -all that the total circular expanse affects on itself or its part. For -in fact, the heavens by moving themselves, somehow effect themselves -and their parts, both those in its own revolutions, or on the earth. -The mutual reactions and passions of the parts of the universe are -easy to recognize, such as the positions taken up by the sun, and -the influence the sun exercises on the other stars, and especially -in regard to the earth; further, the processes in its own elements, -as well as in those of the other constellations, and of objects on -earth--all of which deserve separate consideration. - - -MOST OF THE ARTS ACHIEVE THEIR OWN ENDS. - -Architecture and the fine arts, fulfil themselves in such an object. -Medicine, agriculture and similar professions, however, are auxiliary -arts, and obey the laws of nature, assisting their efficient production -so as to make them as natural as possible. As to rhetoric, music, -and other arts of refinement, which serve the education of souls in -improving or degrading men, it remains an open question how many there -are of them, and what power they possess. In all these things, we will -have to examine what may be of use to us for the questions we are -treating, and we will have to discover the cause of the facts, as far -as possible. - - -ABSURDITY OF PTOLEMEAN ASTROLOGY. - -It is evident that the revolution of the stars exercises an influence -first by disposing them in different arrangement; then the things -contained within its spheres; then terrestrial beings, not only -in body, but in soul; further, each part of the heavens exercises -influence on terrestrial and inferior things. We shall indeed inquire -whether the lower things in turn exercise some influence on the -superior ones. For the present, however, granting that the facts -admitted by all, or at least a majority, are what they seem to be, -we shall have to try to explain how they are produced, by following -them up to their origins. We must indeed not say that all things are -caused exclusively by heat or cold, with possibly the other qualities -named the "primary qualities of the elements," or with those that -derive from their mixture[157]; neither should we assert that the sun -produces everything by the heat, or some other star (like Saturn), by -cold. For indeed what would cold amount to in the heavens, which are a -fiery body, or in fire, which has no humidity? Moreover, in this manner -it would be impossible to recognize the difference of the stars. Then -there are many facts that could not be traced to their influence. If -the influence of the stars is to be made to account for the differences -of human character, which are supposed to correspond to mixtures of -corporeal elements, producing a temperament in which there is an excess -of cold or heat, to which such causes would one trace hate, envy, and -malice? Granting even that this were possible, how would one then by -the same causes explain good and bad fortune, poverty and wealth, -nobility of fathers and children, and the discovery of treasures? A -thousand facts equally as foreign to the influence exercised by the -physical qualities of the elements on the bodies or souls of animals, -could be cited. - - -NO CRIMES SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE INFLUENCE OF SUBLUNARY DIVINITIES. - -Neither should the things which happen to sublunary beings be -attributed to either a voluntary decision, or to deliberations of -the universe, or the stars. It is not permissible to imagine that -the divinities sway events in a manner such that some should become -thieves, others should enslave their fellow-beings, or capture cities, -or commit sacrilege in temples, or be cowards, effeminate in their -conduct, or infamous in their morals. To favor such crimes would be -unworthy of men of the most commonplace virtue, let alone divinities. -Besides, what beings would be likely to busy themselves favoring vices -and outrages from which they were not to reap any advantage? - - -HAVING CONFUTED ASTROLOGY AND DEVILTRY, WORLD INFLUENCE IS ATTRIBUTED -TO THE WORLD-SOUL. - -32. Since the influence exteriorly exercised by the heavens on us, on -animals, and on human affairs generally has been excluded from physical -causes (of astrology) and from voluntary decisions of divinities, -it remains for us to find some cause to which it may reasonably be -attributed. First, we will have to admit that this universe is a -single living being, which contains within its own organism all living -beings; and that it contains a single Soul, which is communicated to -all its parts; namely, to all beings that form part of the universe. -Now every being that is contained in the sense-world is a part of the -universe. First, and unrestrictedly, it is a part of the universe by -its body. Then, it is again part of the universe by its soul, but only -so far as it participates (in the natural and vegetative power) of the -universal Soul. The beings which only participate in (the natural and -vegetative power) of the universal Soul are completely parts of the -universe. Those who participate in another soul (the superior power of -the universal Soul), are not completely parts of the universe (because -they are independent by their rational souls); but they experience -passions by the actions of the other beings, as far as they have -something of the universe (so far as by their irrational souls, they -participate in the natural and vegetative power of the universe), and -in the proportion in which they possess some part of the universe. This -universe is therefore a single living being that is self-sympathetic. -The parts that seem distant are not any the less near, as, in each -animal, the horns, nails, fingers, the organs at distance from each -other, feel, in spite of the interval which separates them, the -affection experienced by any other one of them. In fact, as soon as -the parts are similar, even when they are separated by an interval -instead of being placed by each others' side, they sympathize by virtue -of this their similarity, and the action of the distant one is felt by -all the others. Now in this universe which is a single living being, -and which forms a single organism, there is nothing distant enough in -place not to be near because of the nature of this being whose unity -makes it self-sympathetic. When the suffering being resembles the -acting one, it experiences a passion conformable to its nature; when -on the contrary it differs, it experiences a passion that is foreign -to its nature, and painful. It is therefore not surprising that though -the universe be single, one of its parts can exert on another a harmful -influence, since it often happens to ourselves that one of our parts -wounds another by its action; as for instance, that the bile, setting -anger in motion, should crush and tear some other part of the body. -Now something analogous to this bile which excites anger, and to other -parts that form the human body, is discovered in the universe. Even in -plants there are certain things which form obstacles to others, and -even destroy them. Now the world forms not only a single animal, but -also a plurality of animals; each of them, as far as it has a share -in the singleness of the universe, is preserved thereby; but, in so -far as this animal enters into the multiplicity of some other animal, -he can wound it, or be wounded by it, make use of it, or feed on it, -because it differs from itself as much as it resembles itself; because -the natural desire of self-preservation leads us to appropriate what is -suitable to itself, and in its own interest to destroy what is contrary -thereto. Finally, each being, fulfilling its part in the universe, is -useful to those that can profit by its action, and wounds or destroys -those who cannot support it; thus plants are scorched by the passage -of fire, and the little animals are dragged along or trampled by -the greater. This generation and this corruption, this betterment -and deterioration of things render easy and natural the life of the -universe considered as a single living being. Indeed, it would not -otherwise have been possible that the particular beings it contains -should have lived as if they were alone, should possess their ends in -themselves, and should live only for themselves; since they are only -parts, they must, as such, concur in the ends of the whole of which -they are parts; and, so far as they are different, they could not -each preserve its own life, because they are contained in the unity -of the universal life; neither could they entirely remain in the same -state, because the universe must possess permanence, and because of the -universe, permanence consists in ever remaining in motion. - - -THE STARS' MOTIONS COMPARED TO A PREARRANGED DANCE. - -33. As the circular movement of the world has nothing fortuitous, -inasmuch as it is produced conformably to the reason of this great -animal, a perfect symphonic (co-operation) between what "acts" and -what "reacts" must exist within it; and there must also have been an -order which would co-ordinate things one with another, so that at -each of the phases of the circular movement of the world there might -be a correspondence between the various beings subject to it, as if, -in a varied choric ballet the dancers formed a single figure. As to -our own modern dances, it is easy to explain the eternal things which -contribute thereto, and which differ for every motion, like the sounds -of the flute, the songs, and the other circumstances which are thereto -related. It is not however as easy to conceive the motions of a person -who conforms himself strictly to each figure, who accompanies, who -raises one limb, or lowers another, who moves this limb, or holds -the other limb motionless in a different attitude. The dancer's eyes -are doubtless fixed on some further aim while his limbs are still -responding to the motions inspired by the music, by co-operating in -expressing them, and in completing them symmetrically. Likewise, a man -learned in the art of dancing could explain the reason that, in such a -figure, such a limb is raised, such a limb is bent, while others are -hidden or lowered; not indeed that the dancer deliberates about these -different attitudes, but because in the general movement of his body he -considers such a posture suitable to such a limb to fulfil its proper -part in the dance. Likewise do the stars produce certain facts, and -announce other ones. The entire world realizes its universal life by -causing the motion of the greater parts it comprises, by ceaselessly -changing the figures, so that the different positions of the parts, -and their mutual relations may determine the rest, and that things may -occur as in a movement executed by a single moving living organism. -Thus such a state is produced by such an attitude, such positions, -such figures; while some other state is produced by some other kind -of figures, and so forth. Consequently, the real authors of what is -occurring do not seem to be those who carry out the figures, but He who -commands them; and He who plans the figures does not do one thing while -busying Himself with another, because He is not acting on something -different from Himself; He himself is all the things that are done; -He here is the figures (formed by the universal movement), He himself -there is the resultant passions in the animal so moved and constituted -by nature, simultaneously "active" and "passive" as the result of -necessary laws. - - -THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNIVERSE SHOULD BE PARTIAL ONLY. - -34. Granting that men are influenced by the universe through one of the -elements of their being, it must be by (their body), that which forms -part of the body of the universe, not by all those of which they are -constituted. Consequently, the surrounding universe should exercise -on them only a limited influence. In this respect they resemble wise -servants who know how to carry out the orders of their masters without -interfering with their own liberty, so that they are treated in a -manner less despotic, because they are not slaves, and do not entirely -cease to belong to themselves. - - -ASTROLOGICAL INFLUENCE MERELY INDICATION. - -As to the difference found in the figures formed by the stars, it -could not be other than it is, because the stars do not advance in -their course with equal swiftness. As they move according to the laws -of reason, and as their relative positions constitute the different -attitudes of this great organism (which is the world), and as all the -things that occur here below are, by the laws of sympathy related -to those that occur on high, it would be proper to inquire whether -terrestrial things are the consequences of the celestial things to -which they are similar, or whether the figures possess an efficacious -power; and in the latter case, whether all figures possess this power, -or if figures are formed by stars only; for the same figure does not -bear the same significance, and does not exert the same action in -different things, because each being seems to have its own proper -nature. It may be said that the configuration of certain things -amounts to no more than the mere disposition of things; and that the -configuration of other things is the same disposition with another -figure. If so, influence should be attributed not to the figures, but -to the prefigured realities; or rather, to things identical by their -essence, and different by their figures; a different influence will -also have to be attributed to the object which differs from the others -only by the place it occupies. - - -ASTROLOGICAL INFLUENCE MAY BE PARTLY ACTION; PARTLY MERE SIGNIFICANCE. - -But of what does this influence consist? In significance, or in -(genuine effective) action? In many cases, the combination, or thing -figured, may be said to have both an action, and a significance; in -other cases, however, a significance merely. In second place, both -the figures and the things figured should be credited with the powers -suitable to each; as with dancers, the hand exerts an influence similar -to that of the other members; and, returning to figures, these would -exert an influence far greater than a hand in dancing. Last, the third -(or lowest) degree of power pertains to those things which follow -the lead of the figures, carrying out (their significance); just as, -returning to the dance-illustrations, the dancer's limbs, and the parts -of those limbs, ultimately do follow the dance-figures; or (taking a -more physiological example), as when the nerves and veins of the hand -are contracted by the hand's motions, and participate therein. - - -EARTHLY EVENTS SHOULD NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE STARS' BODY OR WILL. - -35. How then do these powers exert themselves?--for we have to retrace -our steps to give a clear explanation. What difference is exhibited by -the comparison of one triangle with another? What action does the one -exert on another, how is it exerted, and how far does it go? Such are -the questions we have to study, since we do not refer the production -of things here below to the stars, neither to their body, nor to their -will; not to their bodies, because the things which happen are not -simple physical effects; nor to their will, because it is absurd that -divinities should by their will produce absurd things. - - -THE INFLUENCE OF THE STARS CONSISTS IN THEIR CONTEMPLATION OF THE -INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. - -Let us now recall what has already been established. The universe is -a single living being by virtue of its unity being sympathetic with -itself. The course of its life is regulated by reason; it is entirely -in agreement with itself; it has nothing fortuitous, it offers a single -order, and a single harmony. Besides, all the (star) figures are each -conformed to a reason and to a determinate number. The parts of the -universal living beings which constitute this kind of a dance--we mean -the figures produced in it, of the parts figured therein, as well -as the things derived therefrom--are the very actualization of the -universe. Thus the universe lives in the manner we have determined, -and its powers contribute to this state according to the nature they -have received from the reason that has produced them. The figures are, -in some way, the reasons of the universal Living being, the intervals -or contrasts (of the parts) of the Living being, the attitudes they -take according to the laws of rhythm, and according to the reason of -the universe. The beings which by their relative distances produce -these figures are the divers members of this living being. The -different powers of this living being act without deliberation, as its -members, because deliberation is a process foreign to the nature of -themselves or to this living being. Aspiration to a single aim is the -characteristic of the single living being; but it includes manifold -powers. All these different wills aspire to the same end as the single -will of the organism, for each part desires some one of the different -objects that it contains. Each wishes to possess something of the -other's possessions, and to obtain what it lacks; each experiences -a feeling of anger against another, when it is excited against that -other; each increases at the expense of another, and begets another. -The universe produces all these actions in its parts, but at the same -time it seeks the Good, or rather, it contemplates it. It is always the -Good that is sought by the right will, which is above passions, and -thus accords with the will of the universe. Similarly, servants ascribe -many of their actions to the orders received from their master; but -the desire of the Good carries them where their own master is carried. -Consequently, the sun and the other stars exert what influence they do -exert on things here below through contemplation of the intelligible -world. - - -STAR INFLUENCE IS EXPLAINED BY THEIR NATURAL RADIATION OF GOOD. - -We shall limit ourselves to the above illustration, which may easily -be applied to the rest. The sun does not limit itself to warming -terrestrial beings. It makes them also participate in its soul, as -far as possible; for it possesses a powerful physical soul. Likewise, -the other stars, involuntarily, by a kind of irradiation, transmit to -inferior beings somewhat of the (natural) power they possess. Although -therefore all things (in the universe) form but a single thing of a -particular figure, they offer manifold different dispositions; which -different figures themselves each have a characteristic power; for each -disposition results in appropriate action. - - -SPECIAL FIGURES HAVE INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS, DUE TO THEIR CHARACTERISTICS. - -Things which appear as a figure themselves possess a characteristic -influence, which changes according to the people with which they are -brought in contact. Examples of this may be seen daily. Why do certain -figures or appearances inspire us with terror, although they have -never done us any harm, while others do not produce the same effect on -us? Why are some people frightened by certain figures or appearances, -while others are frightened by different ones? Because the former's -constitution specially acts on the former people, and the latter on -the latter; they could only produce effects in harmony with their -nature. One object attracts attention by a particular appearance, -and would yet attract attention by a different constitution. If it -was its beauty that exerted the power of arousing emotion, why then -would this beautiful object move one man, while the other object would -move another, if there be no potency in the difference of figure or -appearance? It would be unreasonable to admit that colors have a -characteristic influence and action, yet deny the same power to figures -or appearances. It would, besides, be absurd, to admit the existence of -something, but to refuse it all potency. Every being, because of his -mere existence, must "act" or "suffer." Some indeed "act" exclusively, -while others both "act" and "suffer." Substances contain influences -independent of their figure or appearance. Terrestrial beings also -possess many forces which are derived neither from heat nor cold. The -reason is that these beings are endowed with different qualities, that -they receive their forms from ("seminal) reasons," and participate in -the powers of nature; such are the peculiar virtues of natural stones, -and the surprising effects produced by plants. - - -NOTHING IN THE UNIVERSE IS ENTIRELY INANIMATE. - -36. The universe is full of variety; it contains all the "reasons," and -an infinite number of different powers. So, in the human body, the eye, -the bones, and the other organs each have their characteristic power; -as, the bone in the hand does not have the same strength as the bone -in the foot; and in general, each part has a power different from that -possessed by every other part. But unless we observe very carefully, -this diversity escapes us in the case of (natural) objects. Much more -would it escape us in the world; for the forces that we see in it are -(but) the traces of those that exist in the superior region. There -must then be in the world an inconceivable and admirable variety of -powers, especially in the stars that wander through the heavens. The -universe is not a great and vast edifice, inanimate, and composed of -things of which it would be easy to catalogue the different kinds, such -as stones, lumber, and ornamental structures; it is a wakeful being, -living in all its parts, though differently so in each; in short, it -includes all that can ever be. This solves the problem, how inanimate -matter can exist within an animated living being. Our discussions -have therefore taught us that in the universe (nothing is inanimate; -that, on the contrary) everything it contains is alive; but each in a -different manner. We deny that there is life in objects that we do not -see moving; but nevertheless they do live, though only with a latent -life. Those whose life is visible are composed of those whose life is -invisible, but which nevertheless contribute to the life of this animal -by furnishing it with admirable powers. It would therefore be equally -impossible that the universe should be alive unless each of the things -it contained lived with its own life. Nevertheless the acts of the -universe do not depend on choice; it acts without needing to choose, -because it precedes any choice. Thus many things obey its forces. - - -CONSCIOUSNESS DEPENDS ON CHOOSING; EVERYTHING HAS POWERS, THOUGH HIDDEN. - -37. The universe therefore (contains all that it needs), and rejects -(or wastes) nothing. Study, therefore, the fire, and all the other -things considered capable of action. Satisfactory investigation -of their action would demand recognition that these things derive -their power from the universe, and a similar admission for all that -belongs to the domain of experience. But we do not usually examine the -objects to which we are accustomed, nor raise questions about them. -We investigate the nature of a power only when it seems unusual, when -its novelty excites our astonishment. Nevertheless we would not be any -less astonished at the objects that we see so often if their power -were explained to us at a time when we were not yet so thoroughly -accustomed to it. Our conclusion therefore is that every thing has -a secret (sub-conscious) power inasmuch as it is moulded by, and -receives a shape in the universe; participating in the Soul of the -universe, being embraced by her, as being a part of this animated All; -for there is nothing in this All which is not a part thereof. It is -true that there are parts, both on the earth and in the heavens, that -act more efficiently than do others; the heavenly things are more -potent because they enjoy a better developed nature. These powers -produce many things devoid of choice, even in beings that seem to act -(purposively); though they are also active in beings that lack that -ability to choose. (Even these powers themselves act unconsciously): -they do not even turn (towards themselves) while communicating power, -when some part of their own soul is emanating (to that which they are -begetting). Similarly animals beget other animals without implying an -act of choice, without any weakening on the part of the generator, and -even without self-consciousness. Otherwise, if this act was voluntary, -it would consist of a choice, or the choice would not be effective. -If then an animal lack the faculty of choice, much less will it have -self-consciousness. - - -PRODUCTION IS DUE TO SOME PHYSICAL SOUL, NOT TO ANY ASTROLOGICAL POWER. - -38. Things which arise from the universe without the incitation of -somebody are generally caused by the vegetative life of the universe. -As to the things whose production is due to somebody, either by simple -wishes, or by cunning enchantments, they should be ascribed not to -some star, but to the very nature of that which is produced. 1. Of -course, the necessaries of life, or what serves some other use, should -be attributed to the goodness of the stars; it is a gift made by a -stronger part to a weaker one. Any harmful effect on the generation -of animals exercised by the stars must depend on their substance's -inability to receive what has been given them; for the effect is not -produced absolutely, but relatively to some subject or condition, for -that which "suffers" or is to "suffer" must have a determinate nature. -2. Mixtures also exert a great influence, because each being furnishes -something useful to life. Moreover, something good might happen to a -person without the assistance of beings which by nature would seem -useful. 3. The co-ordination of the universe does not always give to -each person what he desires. 4. Besides, we ourselves add much to what -has been given to us. 5. All things are not any the less embraced in a -same unity; they form an admirable harmony; besides, they are derived -from each other, though originating from contraries; for indeed all -things are parts of a single animal. If any one of these begotten -things is imperfect because it is not completely formed, the fact is -that matter not being entirely subdued, the begotten thing degenerates -and falls into deformity. Thus some things are produced by the stars, -others are derived from the nature of substance, while others are added -by the beings themselves. - - -ASTROLOGICAL SIGNS ARE ONLY CONCATENATIONS FROM UNIVERSAL REASON. - -39. Since all things are always co-ordinated in the universe, and -since all trend to one single and identical aim, it is not surprising -that all (events) are indicated by (astrological) signs. "Virtue has -no master," as Plato said[158]; "she attaches herself to all who -honor her, and abandons those who neglect her; God is innocent."[159] -Nevertheless, her works are bound up with the universal order; for all -that is here below depends on a divine and superior principle, and -even the universe participates therein. Thus all that happens in the -universe is caused not only by the ("seminal) reasons," but by reasons -of a higher order, far superior to those (that is, the ideas). Indeed, -the seminal reasons contain the reasons of nothing produced outside of -seminal reasons, neither of what is derived from matter, nor from the -actions of begotten things exercised on each other. The Reason of the -universe resembles a legislator who should establish order in a city. -The latter, knowing the probable actions of the citizens, and what -motives they would probably obey, regulates his institutions thereupon, -intimately connects his laws with the conduct of the individuals -subject to them, establishes rewards and punishments for their deeds, -so that automatically all things conspire in mutual harmony by an -inerrant current. Each therefore is indicated by (astrological) signs, -without this indication being an essential purpose of nature; it is -only the result of their concatenation. As all these things form but a -single one, each of them is known by another, the cause by the effect, -the consequent by the antecedent, the compound by its elements. - - -THE GODS CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR OUR ILLS. - -The above consideration would clear up the problem set above. The gods -(that is, the stars), cannot be held responsible for our ills because, -1. things produced by the gods do not result from a free choice, but -from a natural necessity; because, as parts of the universe, the gods -act on other parts of the universe, and contribute to the life of the -universal organism. 2. Terrestrial beings themselves add very much to -the things that are derived from the stars; 3. the things given us by -the stars are not evil, but are altered by being mingled; 4. the life -of the universe is not regulated (in advance) for the individual, but -only for the totality; 5. matter does not experience modifications -completely corresponding to the impressions it receives, and cannot -entirely submit to the form given to it. - - -MAGIC OCCURS BY LOVE WORKING AS SYMPATHY. - -40. But how shall we explain the enchantments of magic? By the sympathy -that things have for each other, the accord of those that are similar, -the struggle of those that are contrary, the variety of the powers -of the various beings which contribute to the formation of a single -organism; for many things are attracted towards each other and are -mutually enchanted, without the intervention of a magician. The real -magic is the Love that reigns in the universe, with its contrary of -Hate. The first magician, him whom men consult to act by the means of -his philtres and enchantments, is Love; for it is from the natural -mutual love of all things, and from the natural power they have to -compel each others' love, that is derived the efficaciousness of -the art of inspiring love by employing enchantments. By this art, -magicians bring together the natures which have an innate love for -each other; they unite one soul to another as one cross-fertilizes -distant plants; by employing (symbolic) figures which possess special -virtues; by themselves taking certain attitudes, they noiselessly -attract the powers of other beings, and induce them to conspire to -unity so much the easier as they themselves are in unity. A being -of the same disposition, but located outside of the universe, could -neither by magic attractions fascinate, nor by his influence enchain -any of the things contained in the world; on the contrary, from the -moment that he is not a stranger to the world, he can attract towards -himself other beings, knowing their mutual relations and attractions -within the universal organism. There are indeed invocations, songs, -words, (symbolic) figures, and, for instance, certain sad attitudes -and plaintive tones which exert a natural attraction. Their influence -extends even to the soul--I mean, the irrational soul; for neither -the will nor the reason permit themselves to be subdued by the charms -of music. This magic of music does not arouse any astonishment; -nevertheless those who play or sing, charm and inspire love -unintentionally. Nor does the virtue of prayers depend on their being -heard by Beings that make free decisions; for these invocations do not -address themselves to free-will. Thus[160] when a man is fascinated -by a serpent, he neither feels nor understands the influence exerted -on him; he perceives what he has felt only after having experienced -it--the governing part of the soul cannot anyway experience anything of -the kind. Consequently when an invocation is addressed to a Being, some -thing results; either for him who makes this invocation, or for some -other person. - - -HOW PRAYERS ARE ANSWERED. - -41. Neither the sun, nor any other star hears the prayers addressed -to it. If they are granted, it is only by the sympathy felt by each -part of the universe for every other; just as all parts of a cord are -caused to vibrate by excitation of any one part; or, just as causing -one string of a lyre to vibrate would cause all the others to vibrate -in unison, because they all belong to the same system of harmony. If -sympathy can go as far as making one lyre respond to the harmonies -of another, so much the more must this sympathy be the law of the -universe, where reigns one single harmony, although its register -contains contraries, as well as similar and analogous parts. The things -which harm men, like anger, which, together with the bile, relate to -the liver, were not created for the purpose of harming men. It is as if -a person, in the act of taking fire from a hearth accidentally wounded -another. This person is doubtless the author of the wound because he -transferred the fire from one place to another; but the wound occurred -only because the fire could not be contained by the being to whom it -had been transmitted. - - -AS THE STARS ANSWER PRAYERS UNCONSCIOUSLY, THEY DO NOT NEED MEMORIES -THEREFOR. - -42. The stars therefore have no need of memory to remember our prayers, -nor senses to receive them; thus is solved the problem considered -above. Nor even, if our prayers are answered, is this due, as some -think, to any free will on their part. Whether or not we address -prayers to them, they exercise over us a certain influence by the mere -fact that, along with us, they form part of the universe. - - -THE PRAYERS OF EVEN THE EVIL ARE ANSWERED, IF MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH -NATURAL LAW. - -There are many forces that are exercised involuntarily, either -automatically, without any invitation, or with the assistance of -skill. Thus, in an animal, one part is naturally favorable or harmful -to another; that is why both physician and magician, each by his -characteristic arts, force one thing to communicate its power to -another. Likewise, the universe communicates to its parts something of -its own power, either automatically, or as a result of the attraction -exercised by the individual. This is a natural process, since he who -asks is not foreign to it. Neither should we be astonished if even an -evil individual obtains his requests; for do not the evil drink from -the same streams as do the good? In this case, the granting is done -unconsciously; it grants simply, and what is granted harmonizes with -the order of the universe. Consequently, if an evil individual asks and -obtains what is within reach of all, there is no reason why he should -be punished. - - -THE WORLD-SOUL AND STARS ARE IMPASSIBLE. - -It is therefore wrong to hold that the universe is subject to -experiencing passions. In the first place, the governing Soul is -entirely impassible; then, if there be any passions in her, they are -experienced only by her parts; as to her, being unable to experience -anything contrary to her nature, she herself remains impassible. To -experience passions seems suitable to stars considered as parts of the -universe; but, considered in themselves, they are impassible, because -their wills are impassible, and their bodies remain as unalterable -as their nature, because their soul loses nothing, and their bodies -remain the same, even if, by their soul, they communicate something of -themselves to inferior beings. If something issues from them, they do -not notice it; if some increase happens, they pay no attention. - - -HOW THE WISE MAN ESCAPES ALL ENCHANTMENTS. - -43. How will the worthy man be able to escape the action of the -enchantments and the philtres employed by magic? His soul escapes -them entirely; his reason is impassible, and cannot be led to change -opinions. The worthy man, therefore, can suffer only through the -irrational part that he receives from the universe; this part alone -"suffers." Nor will he be subdued by the loves inspired by philtres, -because love presupposes a soul's inclination to experience what -another soul experiences. As enchantments act on the irrational part -of the soul, their power will be destroyed by fighting them; and by -resisting them by other enchantments. As a result of enchantments, -therefore, it is possible to experience sicknesses, and even death; -and, in general, all the affections relative to the body. Every part of -the universe is subject to experiencing an affection caused in it by -another part or by the universe itself (with the exception of the wise -man, who remains impassible); without there being anything contrary to -nature it can also feel this affection only at the end of some time. - - -THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GUARDIANS. - -The guardians themselves can "suffer" through their irrational part. -They must have memory and senses, by nature they must be susceptible to -enchantments, of being induced to commit certain acts, and to hear the -prayers addressed to them. The guardians subjected to this influence -are those who approach men, and they are the more subdued thereby as -they approach to men closer. - - -AN ACTIVE LIFE MAKES MEN MORE LIABLE TO ENCHANTMENTS. - -Every being that has some relation with another can be bewitched by -him; he is bewitched and attracted by the being with whom he is in -relations. Only the being concentrated in himself (by the contemplation -of the intelligible world) cannot be bewitched. Magic exercises its -influence on every action, and on every active life; for active -life trends towards the things which charm it. Hence the (Platonic) -expression, "The subjects of the magnanimous Erechtheus are remarkable -by the beauty of their countenances." What indeed does one being feel -in his relations with another? He is drawn towards him, not by the art -of magic, but by the seduction exerted by nature, which harmonizes and -unites two beings joining them one to the other, not by locality, but -by the power of the philtres employed. - - -MAGIC HAS POWER OVER MAN BY HIS AFFECTIONS AND WEAKNESSES. - -44. Only the man devoted to contemplation can defy enchantments, -inasmuch as none can be bewitched by himself. The man who contemplates -has become unified; he has become what he contemplates, his reason is -sheltered from all seductive influences. He does what he ought to do, -he accomplishes his life and his proper function. As to the remainder -of humanity, the soul does not fulfil her characteristic function, -nor does reason determine its action; the irrational soul becomes the -principle of action, and the passions furnish men with directions. -The influence of a magic attraction manifests in the disposition to -marriage, in the care we take of our children, and, in general, in all -that the bait of pleasure leads us to do. Amidst our actions there -are some that are provoked by an irrational power, either by anger, -or the general faculty of desire of the soul. Other actions relate to -political life, like the desire of obtaining office, and they spring -from a desire to command. Those actions in which we propose to avoid -some evil, are inspired by fear; while those actions in relating to the -desire to possess more than others, are inspired by cupidity. Last, -those actions relating to utility, and to the satisfaction of our -needs, show with what force nature has attached us to life. - - -HONESTY ESCAPES MAGIC ONLY BECAUSE IT RESULTS FROM CONTEMPLATION OF THE -INTELLIGIBLE. - -It may perhaps be said that the actions whose aim is noble and honest -escape the influences of magic; otherwise contemplation itself would -be subject thereto. This is true, that the man who performs deeds of -honesty as being inevitable, with his eyes fixed on true Beauty, could -never be bewitched. He knows duty, and the aim of his life (which would -limit his efforts) is not anything on earth or in the (universe). It -may indeed be objected that he is bewitched and attached here below by -the magic force of human nature, which binds him to the lives of others -and of himself. It would even be reasonable to say that we should not -separate ourselves from the body because of the attachment for him -inspired by some magic charm. As to the man who (to contemplation) -prefers practical activity, and who contents himself with the beauty -discovered therein, he is evidently misled by the deceptive traces of -the Beautiful, since he seeks beauty in inferior things. Every activity -unfolded in the domain of what has nothing but the appearance of -truth, every inclination for this kind of thing supposes that the soul -is deceived by what attracts it. That is the way in which the magic -power of nature is exercised. - - -HOW TO AVOID MAGIC ENCHANTMENTS. - -Indeed, to follow what is not Good as if it was the Good, to let -oneself be misled by its appearance, and by irrational inclinations, -that is the characteristic of a man who in spite of himself is led -whither he does not wish to go. Now does this not really amount to -yielding to a magic charm? He alone escapes every magic charm who, -though he be carried away by the lower faculties of his soul, considers -good none of the objects that seem such to these faculties, who calls -good only what he by himself knows to be such, without being misled by -any deceptive appearance; and who regards as good not what he has to -seek, but what he possesses veritably. Then only could he in no way be -misled by any magic charm. - - -EVERY BEING THEREFORE IS A SPECIALIZED ORGAN OF THE UNIVERSE. - -45. This discussion teaches us that each one of the beings contained -in the universe contributes to the purpose of the universe by its -"actions" and "passions" according to its nature and dispositions, as, -in an organism, each organ contributes to the final purpose of the -entire body, by fulfilling the function assigned to it by its nature -and constitution. From this each organ derives its place and role, and -besides communicates something else to the other organs, and from them -receives all that its nature would allow. Somehow, all the organs feel -what is going on in the others, and if each of them became an organism, -it would be quite ready to fulfil the function of an organism, which -function differs from that of being merely an organ. - - -HUMAN NATURE IS INTERMEDIATE, SUFFERING WITH THE WHOLE, BUT ALSO ACTING -ON IT. - -We are thus shown our condition. On the one hand, we exercise a certain -action on the whole; on the other, we not only experience the passions -that it is natural for our body to experience in its relations with -other bodies, but we also introduce into these relations the soul -which constitutes us, bound as we are to the kindred things which -surround us by our natural resemblance to them. Indeed, by our souls -and dispositions we become, or rather, we already are similar on one -hand to the inferior beings of the demonic world, and on the other, to -the superior beings of the intelligible world. Our nature cannot be -ignored, therefore. Not all of us receive, not all of us give the same -thing. How indeed could we communicate to others the good, if we do not -possess it? or receive it, if our nature was not capable of it? - - -BY A SECRET ROAD EACH ONE IS LED TO DIVINE RETRIBUTION. - -Thus the evil man shows what he is, and he is by his nature impelled -towards what already dominates him, both while he is here below, or -after he has left this place; when he passes into the place towards -which his inclinations draw him. The virtuous man, on the contrary, -has, in all these respects, a different fate. Each one is thus driven -by his nature, as by some occult force, towards the place whither he is -to go. In this universe, therefore, there obtains an admirable power -and order, since, by a secret, and hidden path, each one is led to -the unescapable condition assigned to him by divine justice. The evil -man does not know this, and is, in spite of himself, conducted to the -place in the universe which he is to occupy. The wise man knows it, -and himself proceeds to his destined abode. Before leaving this life, -he knows what residence inevitably awaits him, and the hope of dwelling -there some day in company with the divinities fills his life with -happiness. - - -EXISTENCE OF HEAVEN; HELL'S TORMENTS ARE REFORMATORY. - -The parts of each small organism undergo changes and sympathetic -affections which are not much felt, because these parts are not -individual organisms (and they exist only for some time, and in some -kinds of organisms). But in the universal organism, where the parts -are separated by so great distances, where each one follows its own -inclinations, where there is a multitude of different animals, the -movements and change of place must be more considerable. Thus the sun, -the moon and the other stars are seen successively to occupy different -places, and to revolve regularly. It is not unreasonable therefore to -suppose that souls would change location, as they change character, and -that they would dwell in a place suitable to their dispositions. They -would thus contribute to the order of the universe by occupying some, -a place analogous to the head in the human body; and others, a place -analogous to the human feet; for the universe admits of place for all -degrees of perfection. When a soul does not choose the best (actions), -and yet does not attach herself to what is worst, she would naturally -pass into some other place, which is indeed pure, but yet proportioned -to the mediocrity she has chosen. As to the punishments, they resemble -the remedies applied by physicians to sickly organs. On some the -physician lays certain substances; in some he makes incisions, or he -changes the condition of some others, to reestablish the health of the -whole system, by giving to each organ the special treatment suitable -to it. Likewise, the health of the universe demands that the one (soul) -be changed; that another be taken away from the locality where she -languishes, and be located where she would recover from the disease. - - - - -FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE. - -Psychological Questions--III. - -About the Process of Vision and Hearing. - - -IT IS UNCERTAIN WHETHER AN INTERMEDIARY BODY BE IMPLIED BY VISION. - -1. Above[161] we suggested the question whether it be possible to see -without some medium such as the air or a diaphanous body[162]; we -shall now try to consider it. It has already been asserted that in -general the soul cannot see or feel without the intermediation of some -body; for, when completely separated from the body (the soul dwells -in the intelligible world). But, as touch consists of perception, -not indeed of intelligible entities, but only of sense-objects, the -soul cannot see or feel without the intermediation of some body; for -when completely separated from some body, the soul dwells in the -intelligible world. But, as touch consists of perception, not indeed -of intelligible entities, but only of sense-object, the soul in order -to come in contact with these sense-objects, must enter into cognitive -or affective relation with them by the means of intermediaries which -must possess an analogous nature; and that is why the knowledge of -bodies must be acquired by the means of corporeal organs. Through these -organs which are so interrelated as to form a sort of unity, the soul -approaches sense-objects in a manner such as to establish effective -communion. That contact between the organ and the cognized object must -be established is evident enough for tangible objects, but is doubtful -for visible objects. Whether contact be necessary for hearing is a -question we shall have to discuss later.[163] Here we shall first -discuss whether sight demand a medium between the eye and color. - - -REFUTATION OF ARISTOTLE'S INSISTENCE ON A MEDIUM OF SIGHT. - -If a medium of sight exist, it exists only by accident, and in no way -contributes to sight.[164] Since opaque and earthy bodies hinder sight, -and as we see so much the better as the medium is more subtle, it may -be said, indeed, that mediums contribute to sight, or at least, if they -do not contribute such thereto, they may be hindrances as slight (as -possible); but evidently a medium, however refined, is some sort of an -obstacle, however slight. - - -THOUGH THE MEDIUM EXPERIENCE AFFECTION, THE ORGANS FEEL IT BETTER -WITHOUT THE MEDIUM. - -(There is an opinion that) the medium first receives and then transmits -the affection, and impression. For instance, if some one stand in -front of us, and directs his gaze at some color, he also sees it; -but the color would not reach us unless the medium had experienced -the affection. To this it may be answered that there is no necessity -for the affections to be experienced by the medium, inasmuch as the -affection is already experienced by the eye, whose function consists -precisely in being affected by color; or at least, if the medium be -affected, its affection differs from that of the eye. For instance, a -reed interposed between the hand and the fish called the "torpedo," or -"electric ray," does not feel the same numbness which it nevertheless -communicates to the holding hand; still, the hand would not be affected -with numbness unless the reed formed a communication between the fish -and the hand.[165] However, the matter is not beyond discussion, for -(even without any intermediary, if for instance) the fisher were in -(direct contact) with the "ray" inside of the net, he would also feel -the electric numbness. This communication therefore seems based on -sympathetic affections. That, by virtue of its nature, one being can -be sympathetically affected by some other being, does not necessarily -imply that the medium, if different, shares that affection; at least -(it is certain that) it is not affected in the same manner. In such a -case, the organ destined to experience the affection experiences it -far better when there is no medium, even when the medium itself is -susceptible to some affection. - - -NECESSITY OF A MEDIUM IN THE THEORIES OF VARIOUS PHILOSOPHERS. - -2. If vision[166] presupposes the union of the "light of the eye,"[167] -with the light interposed (between the eye) and the sense-object -itself, the interposed medium is the light, and this medium is -necessary, on this hypothesis. (On the theory of Aristotle) the colored -substance produces a modification in the medium; but nothing here -would hinder this modification from reaching the eye itself, even -when there is no medium. For, in this case, the medium is necessarily -modified before the eye is. (The Platonic philosophers) teach that -vision operates by an effusion of the light of the eye. They have no -need to postulate a medium, unless indeed they should fear that the -ray of the eye should lose its way; but this ray is luminous, and -the light travels in a straight line. (The Stoics) explain vision by -the resistance experienced by the visual ray. They cannot do without -a medium.[168] (The Atomists and) the believers in "images" (such -as Epicurus), insist that these images move in emptiness, thereby -implying the existence of a free space to avoid hindering the images. -Consequently as they will be hindered in a direct ratio to the -existence of a medium, this opinion does not run counter to our own -hypothesis (that there is no medium). - - -A COSMOLOGICAL MEDIUM IS NECESSARY, BUT IT AFFECTS SIGHT ONLY -ACCIDENTALLY. - -Those who (with Plotinos himself) teach that vision operates by -sympathy, assert that vision is poorer through a medium, because this -medium hinders, fetters, and weakens sympathy. In this case, indeed, -the medium necessarily weakens sympathy even though it shared the -same nature (as the eye and the object), and was affected in the same -manner. (It acts like the integument) of some body that is deeply -burned by fire applied to it; the interior parts are less affected -because they are protected by the exterior parts. There is no doubt -that the parts of one and the same animal will be less affected in -experiencing sympathy because of the existence of a medium. The -affection will be weakened according to the nature of the medium, -because such a medium would hinder excess of affection, unless indeed -that which is transmitted (by one part to another) is not such as to -fail to affect the medium. But if the universe sympathize with itself -because it constitutes a single organism, and if we are affected -because we are contained within this single organism, and form part of -it, why should any continuity be necessary for us to feel a distant -object? The single organism, indeed, could not be continuous without -the continuity of some medium; this continuous medium is affected only -by accident; but otherwise we would have to admit that all can be -affected by all. But if these two objects are affected in one manner, -and other two objects are affected in another manner, there might not -always be need of a medium. Whoever asserts the need of a medium for -vision will have to advance a very good argument, inasmuch as that -which traverses the air does not always affect the air, and often -limits itself to dividing the air. Thus when a stone falls the only -thing that happens to the air is that it fails to support the stone. -As falling is part of the stone's nature, it would be unreasonable to -assert that its falling was due to the reaction exerted by the ambient -air. Otherwise we would have to assert that it is this same reaction of -the ambient air that makes fire ascend, which is absurd; because the -fire, by the rapidity of its motion, forestalls this reaction. That, by -the very rapidity of the motion, reaction is accelerated, takes place -only by accident, and has no relation to the upward impulsion; for -trees grow from above without receiving any (upward) impulsion. Even -we, when walking, divide the air without being pushed by the reaction -of the air; the air behind us limits itself to filling the void we have -created. If then the air allow itself to be divided by bodies without -being affected by them, what would hinder the air from permitting free -transit for the images to reach the eye, without being thereby divided? - - -IMAGES DO NOT REACH US BY EFFLUENCE. - -If these images do not reach us by some sort of effluence, why should -the air be affected, and why should we ourselves be affected only as a -result of the affection experienced by the air? If we felt only because -the air had been affected before us, we would attribute the sensation -of sight not to the visible object, but to the air located near us, -as occurs with heat. In the latter case it is not the distant fire, -but the air located near us which, being heated, then warms us; for -the sensation of heat presupposes contact, which does not occur with -vision. We see, not because the sense-object is imposed on the eye (but -because the medium is illuminated); now it is necessary for the medium -to be illuminated because the air by itself is dark. If the air were -not dark, it would have no need of light; for (to effectuate vision) -the obscurity, which forms an obstacle to vision, must be overcome -by light. That is perhaps the reason why an object placed very near -the eye is not seen; for it brings with it the darkness of the air, -together with its own. - - -USELESSNESS OF AIR AS TRANSMITTING MEDIUM PROVED FROM SIGHT OF OBJECTS -AT NIGHT. - -3. A strong proof that the forms of sense-objects are not seen merely -because the air, on being affected, transmits them by relays from point -to point, is that even in darkness the fire, the stars, and their -forms may be seen. In this case no one would claim that the forms of -the objects, being impressed on the obscure air, are transmitted to -the eye; otherwise, there would be no obscurity, as the fire, while -transmitting its form, would illuminate. Indeed, in the profound -obscurity in which the light of the stars is not seen, the fire of -signals and of light-houses may be perceived. Should any one, in -opposition to the testimony of his senses, claim that even in this case -the fire penetrates the air, he should be answered by having it pointed -out to him that in that case human vision should distinguish the -smallest objects which are in the air, instead of being limited to the -perception of the fire. If then we see what is beyond a dark medium, it -would be much better seen without any medium whatever. - - -ABSENCE OF MEDIUM WOULD INTERFERE WITH VISION ONLY BY DESTROYING -SYMPATHY. - -It might indeed be objected that without medium, vision ceases. This -occurs not because of the lack of medium, but because the sympathy of -the (universal) organism is in such a case destroyed since a medium -presupposes that all the parts of this organism together form but a -single being. It would indeed seem to be a general condition necessary -for sensation that the universal organism be sympathetic with itself; -otherwise, no one thing could participate in the power of any other -thing that might happen to be very distant. - - -VISION IS NOT DEPENDENT ON THE AFFECTION OF THE MEDIUM. - -Here is another important (related) question. If there existed another -world and organism which had no relation with our world, and if on -the surface of the sky was an eye that was looking, would it perceive -this other world at a moderate distance, or would it have no relation -thereto? This question will be considered later.[169] Now however we -shall give a further proof that the medium has nothing to do with -vision. If the air were affected, it would experience a material -affection, similar to the figure impressed on wax. In this case, a -certain part of the object would be impressed on a certain part of the -air; and consequently, the part of the air nearest to the eye would -receive a part of the visible object, and this part would be of a -size equal to that of the pupil. Now a visible object is seen in its -entirety, and all those who are in the air equally see it, whether they -behold it from the front, or side, or whether they be one behind the -other, without however forming mutual obstacles. This proves that every -part of the air contains the entire visible object. This cannot be -explained by any corporeal affection, but by higher laws, suitable to -the soul, and to the (universal) organism which everywhere responds to -itself. - - -MUTUAL RELATION OF THE EYE'S LIGHT AND THE OBJECTIVE LIGHT. - -4. What is the mutual relation between the light that emanates from -the eye, and the light which is exterior to the eye, and which extends -between the eye and the object?[170] Light has no need of air as a -medium, unless indeed somebody should undertake to say that there -is no light without air, in which case air would be a medium only -accidentally. Light itself, however, is an unaffected medium, for -there is no necessity here for an affection, but only for a medium; -consequently, if light be not a body, there is no need of a body (to -act as medium). It might be objected that sight has no need either of a -foreign light nor of a medium to see near by, but has need of them for -vision at a distance. Later[171] we shall consider whether or not light -without air be possible. Now let us consider the first point. - - -INTERMEDIARY LIGHT IS UNNECESSARY, PARTLY BEING AN OBSTACLE. - -If the light which is contiguous to the eye should become animated, -and if the soul should, so to speak, interpenetrate it, uniting with -it as she unites with the interior light, there would be no need -of intermediary light for the perception of the visible object. -Sight resembles touch; it operates in light by somehow transferring -itself to the object, without the medium experiencing any affection. -Now consider: does the sight transfer itself to the visible object -because of the existence of an interval between them, or because -of the existence of some body in the interval? In the latter case, -vision would occur by removing this obstacle. If, on the other hand, -it be because of the existence of a mere interval, then the nature -of the visible object must seem inert and entirely inactive. This is -however impossible; not only does touch announce and experience the -neighboring object but, by the affection it experiences, it proclaims -the differences of the tangible object, and even perceives it from -a distance, if nothing oppose it; for we perceive the fire at the -same time as the air that surrounds us, and before this air has been -heated by the fire. A solid body heats better than does the air; and -consequently it receives heat through the air, rather than by the -intermediation of air. If then the visible object have the power to -act, and if the organ have the power of experiencing (or suffering), -why should sight need any intermediary (besides light) to exert its -power? This would really be needing an obstacle! When the light of the -sun reaches us, it does not light up the air before lighting us, but -lights both simultaneously; even before it has reached the eye, while -it is still elsewhere, we have already seen, just as if the air was -not affected at all; that is the case, probably, because the medium -has undergone no modification, and because light has not yet presented -itself to our view. Under this hypothesis (which asserts that the air -receives and transmits an affection) it would be difficult to explain -why during the night we see the stars and, in general, any kind of fire. - - -NOT EVEN THE LIGHT OF THE EYE IS TO BE CONSIDERED AS MEDIUM. - -On the hypothesis that the soul remains within herself, while making -use of the light (emanated from the eye) as a rod to reach the visible -object, a very sharp perception would be caused by the resistance -experienced by the light in its tension[172] and sense-color. In -so far as it is color, the light itself would possess the property -of reflecting light. In this case, the contact would take place by -a medium. But already before this the light has reached the object -without any medium; so that the later contact operated by a medium -would produce cognition by a sort of memory or reasoning--which is not -the case. - - -THE OBJECTIVE LIGHT DOES NOT TRANSMIT THE IMAGE BY RELAYS. - -The hypothesis that the light contiguous to the visible object is -affected, and transmits this affection by relays from point to point -into the eye, is essentially identical with that theory which supposes -that the medium must be preliminarily modified by the visible object; a -hypothesis that has already been discussed above. - - -NEITHER FOR HEARING IS THE AIR NECESSARY AS A MEDIUM. - -5. As to hearing, there are several theories. One is that the air is -first set in motion, and that this motion, being transmitted unaltered -from point to point from the (location of the) sound-producing air -as far as the ear, causes the sound to arrive to the sense. Again, -another theory is that the medium is here affected accidentally, and -only because it happens to be interposed; so that, if the medium were -annihilated, we would feel the sound immediately on its production by -the shock of two bodies. We might think that the air must first be set -in motion, but the medium interposed (between the first moved air and -the ear) plays a different part. The air here seems to be the sovereign -condition of the production of sound; for, at the origin of the sound, -the shock of two bodies would produce no sound if the air, compressed -and struck by their rapid concussion did not transmit the motion from -point to point as far as the ear.[173] But if the production of the -sound depend on the impulsion impressed on the air, the (qualitative) -difference between voices and (instrumental) sounds will challenge -explanation; for there is great difference (of "timbre") between metal -struck by metal of the same kind, or another. These differences are -not merely quantitative, and cannot be attributed to the air which -(everywhere) is the same, nor to the force of the stimulus (which may -be equal in intensity). Another theory (of Aristotle's) is that the -production of voices and sound is due to the air, because the impulsion -impressed on the air is sonorous. (To this it should be answered -that) air, in so far as it is air, is not the cause of sound; for it -resounds only in so far as it resembles some solid body, remaining in -its situation, before it dilates, as if it were something solid.[174] -The (cause of the sound) then is the shock between objects, which forms -the sound that reaches the sense of hearing. This is demonstrated by -the sounds produced in the interior of animals, without the presence -of any air, whenever one part is struck by some other. Such is the -sound produced by certain articulations when they are bent (as, the -knee); or certain bones, when they are struck against each other, or -when they break; in this case air has nothing to do with the production -of the sound. These considerations compel a theory of hearing similar -to our conclusions about sight. The perception of audition, like -that of vision, therefore consists in a repercussion (an affection -sympathetically felt) in the universal organism. - - -THE RELATION OF THE AIR TO THE LIGHT. - -6. Could light exist without air, if the sun illuminated the surface of -bodies, and if there were a void in the interval which is accidentally -illuminated by virtue of its location (between the sun and the bodies)? -It is certain that if the other things were affected because the air -itself was affected, and if light were nothing more than an affection -of the air, that is, its substance; then indeed this affection could -not exist without the experiencing subject (the air). But (in our -view) light is not essentially characteristic of air as such; for all -fiery and brilliant bodies, among which are precious stones, possess -a luminous color. Could that which passes from a brilliant body into -some other body exist without that other body? If light be but a simple -quality of an object, and as every quality implies a subject on which -it depends, light will have to be sought in the body in which it -resides. If, on the contrary, light be only an actualization produced -by some other thing, and if there be no body contiguous to the luminous -object, and it be entirely surrounded by a void, why could light -not exist, and radiate upwards (as well as downwards, and in every -direction)? Since light radiates, why should it not radiate without -hindrance? If its nature be to fall, it will spontaneously descend; for -neither the air nor any illuminated body will make it issue from the -illuminating body, nor can force it to advance, since it is neither -an accident that implies a subject, nor an affection that implies an -affected object. Otherwise, the light would remain (in the illuminated -body) when the object from which it emanates should happen to withdraw; -but since the light withdraws with it, it radiates. In what direction -does light radiate? (Its radiation) demands no more than the existence -of sufficient space; otherwise the body of the sun would lose its -actualization; that is, the light it radiates. In this case light would -not be the quality of a subject, but the actualization that emanates -from a subject, but which does not pass into any other subject (as a -kind of undulation); but if another subject be present, it will suffer -an affection. As life, which constitutes an actualization of the soul, -affects the body if it be present, and does not any the less constitute -an actualization if the body be absent, likewise light constitutes an -actualization subject to the same conditions. It is not the obscurity -of the air that begets light, nor obscurity mingled with the earth -which produces an impure light; otherwise one might produce something -sweet by mingling some thing with what is bitter. The statement that -light is a modification of the air, is incomplete without the addition -that the air must itself be modified by this modification, and that the -obscurity of the air is no longer obscure after having undergone that -change. The air itself, however, remains what it was, just as if it had -not been affected. The affection belongs only to that which has been -affected. Color therefore does not belong to the air, but subsists in -itself; the air's only function is its presence. But enough of this. - - -DOES THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE LUMINOUS SOURCE ABANDON THE LIGHT TO -DESTRUCTION; OR DOES THE LIGHT FOLLOW IT? - -7. It might be asked whether the withdrawal of the object from which -light emanates abandons the light to destruction, or does the light -follow the source into withdrawal? This question is related to the -former one; (and it may be said that) if the light inhere in the -illuminated body in a manner such as to have become characteristic of -it, the light perishes with it. The light is an immanent actualization, -for otherwise it would surround the object from which it emanates, -and remain within it, accumulating there. If this were so, the light -could not vanish so long as the object from which it emanates itself -continues to subsist. If this object pass from one place to another, -light would pass thither also, not because it turns back on itself or -changes locality, but because the actualization of the luminous object -exists and is present as soon as nothing opposes it. If the distance -from the sun to the earth were much more considerable than it really -is, the light of the sun would nevertheless reach us, providing no -obstacle were interposed. On the one hand, there is in the luminous -body an actualization, a kind of superabundant life, a principle -and source of activity; on the other hand, beyond the limits of the -luminous body, exists a second actualization which is the image of the -actualization characteristic of this body, and which never separates -itself from the body. Every being has an actualization which is its -image; so that, as soon as the being exists, its actualization exists -also; and so long as the being subsists, its actualization radiates -nearer or further. Actualizations (differ indeed); some are feeble and -obscure, others are secret or hidden, others are powerful and radiate -afar. When an actualization radiates at a distance it must be admitted -to exist there where it acts, where it exercises and manifests its -power. Consequently one can see light shine from the eyes of animals -whose eyes are naturally brilliant[175]; likewise when the animals -that exert a concentrated interior fire happen to open their eyelids, -they radiate rays of light into the darkness; while, when they close -their eyes, no more light exists outside them. The light therefore does -not perish; only, it is no longer produced exteriorly. It does not -re-enter into the animal but merely ceases to exist exteriorly, for the -visual fire does not pass outside, remaining inside. Is light itself -then within? At least this light remains within; but (when the eye is -closed) the eyelid forms an obstacle to its diffusion. - - -LIGHT AS ACTUALIZATION IS THE BEING OF THE LUMINOUS BODY, AND IS -INCORPOREAL. - -Thus the light that emanates from bodies is the actualization of the -luminous body which is active exteriorly. The light in the bodies whose -original nature is such, is the formal being of the originally luminous -body. When such a body has been mingled with matter, it produces color. -The actualization alone does not suffice to give color; it produces -only the hue, because the actualization is the property of a subject, -and depends on it, so that nothing can be withdrawn from the subject -without simultaneously being withdrawn from its actualization. Light -is entirely incorporeal, though it be the actualization of a body. -It could not therefore properly be said of light that it withdraws -or is present. The true state of affairs is entirely different; for -the light, so far as it is the actualization of the luminous body, -is its very being. The image produced in a mirror is therefore an -actualization of the visible object, which acts on anything that is -passive (that can suffer, or experience), without letting any of its -substance escape by any wastage. If the object be present, the image -appears in the mirror; it is as it were the image of the color that -possesses some particular figure. When the object withdraws, the -diaphanous body no longer possesses what it possessed while the visible -object was acting on the mirror. A similar condition is that of the -soul; her actualization dwells within the (world's) body so long as -this soul herself dwells within it. - - -LIFE AND LIGHT DO NOT PERISH, BUT ARE NO MORE THERE. - -(Curiosity might lead some one to ask about) a force that were not -the actualization of the Soul, but which only proceeded from this -actualization, such as the life which we say is proper to the body. Is -the case of such a force similar to that of the light characteristic -of bodies? We said that the light inheres in colored bodies, so far as -that which produces the colors inheres in the bodies. As to the life -proper to the bodies, we think that the body possesses it so far as the -soul is present; for nothing can be inanimate. When the body perishes, -and when it is no longer assisted by the soul which communicated life -to it, nor by the actualization of this soul, how should life remain in -the body? What! Has this life perished? No: this life itself has not -perished, for it is only the image of an irradiation; it would not be -correct to say more than that it is no more there.[176] - - -A WORLD OUTSIDE OF OUR WORLD WOULD NOT BE VISIBLE. - -8. If there were a body outside of our world, and if an eye observed -it from here without any obstacle, it is doubtful that the eye could -see that body, because the eye would have no affection common to it; -for community of affection is caused by the coherence of the single -organism (that is, the unity of the world). Since this community of -affection (or, sympathy), supposes that sense-objects and that the -senses belong to the single organism, a body located outside of the -world would not be felt, unless it were part of the world. In this -case, it would be felt. If it were not a part of the world, but yet -by its color and other qualities it was conformed to the organ that -was to cognize it, would it be felt? No, it would not be felt, that -is, if such a hypothesis (of a body located outside of the world) -were at all admissible. If however, anyone should refuse to admit -such a hypothesis, he would pretend that it is absurd that the eye -should not see the color located in front of it, and that the other -senses do not perceive the qualities before them. That is the reason -of its absurdity. For we are active or passive only because we are -integral parts of the single organism, and are located within it. Is -anything still left to be considered? If what we have said suffices, -our demonstration is finished; otherwise we shall have to give still -further proofs to support our proposition. - - -SENSATION IS LIMITED TO COMMON INTEGRAL PARTS OF THE UNIVERSE. - -Every organism is coherent (that is, is sympathetic with itself). In -the case of a single organism, our demonstration suffices, and all -things will experience common affections so far as they constitute -parts of the single organism. The plea that a body exterior to the -world could be felt because of its resemblance (is ill-founded because -perception is characteristic of an organism and because it is the -organism that possesses perception. For its organ resembles (the -perceived object); thus sensation would be the perception presented to -the soul by means of organs similar to the perceived objects. If then -the organism feel not only its contents, but also objects resembling -them, it will perceive these things by virtue of its organic nature; -and these things will be perceived not because they are contents -thereof, but by virtue of their resemblance thereto. It seems rather -that perceived objects must be perceived in the measure of their -resemblance, because the soul has familiarized herself with them, and -has assimilated them to herself. If then the soul which has assimilated -these objects to herself differ from them, the things which were -supposed to have become assimilated to her will remain entirely foreign -to her. The absurdity of this consequence shows us that there is a -flaw in the hypothesis; for it affirms simultaneously that the soul -exists, and does not exist, that the things are both conformable and -different, similar and dissimilar. Since then this hypothesis implies -contradictories, it is not admissible; for it supposes that the soul -exists in this world, as a result of the world, both being and not -being universal, both being and not being different, both being and not -being perfect. The above hypothesis must therefore be abandoned; and -since it implies a contradiction, no reasonable consequence could be -deduced therefrom. - - - - -THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT. - -Of Nature, Contemplation and Unity.[177] - -(_These three subjects are discussed in paragraphs 1-4, 5-7, and 8-16. -The plain paragraph numbers are those of the Teubner edition; those in -parenthesis are the Creuzer (Didot) edition._) - - -A. OF NATURE. - - -INTRODUCTION: AS A JOKE, IT MAY BE SAID THAT EVEN PLANTS ASPIRE TO -CONTEMPLATION. - -1. If as a preliminary pleasantry, we said that all beings, not only -reasonable ones, but even the irrational, plants as well as the earth -that begets them, aspire to contemplation, and are directed towards -that end; that, as a result of the difference existing between them, -some really achieve contemplation, while others only accomplish a -reflection or image of it, we would no doubt be told that this was an -absurd paradox. But as we are here engaged in a private study, we may, -as an indulgence, support this paradox. While thus trifling, are we -ourselves not actually engaging in contemplation? Besides, it would be -not only we, but any who thus trifle, who aspire to contemplation. We -might even say that a joking child, as well as a meditating man both -aim at reaching contemplation when the former jokes, and the later -meditates. Indeed, there is not a single action that does not tend -towards contemplation; more or less externalizing it according as it is -carried out strictly or freely. In any case its ultimate aim is always -contemplation; but of this later.[178] - - -ENUMERATION OF THE LOWER FORMS OF CONTEMPLATION. - -(1). Let us begin by explaining what could be the nature of -contemplation (thought) that we attribute to the earth, to the trees, -and to the plants (as we promised), and how the things produced -and begotten by these beings can be reduced to the actuality of -contemplation; how nature, that is usually considered to lack reason -and imagination, nevertheless is quite capable of some kind of -contemplation, thereby producing all its works, although speaking -strictly, it is incapable thereof. - - -NATURE ACTS ON MATTER NOT MECHANICALLY BUT BY ITS POTENCY. - -2. Evidently nature possesses neither hands, nor feet, nor any natural -or artificial instrument. For production its only need is a matter on -which to work, and which it forms. The works of nature exclude all -ideas of mechanical operation; not by any impelling force, nor by -using levers nor machines does it produce varied colors, nor draw the -outlines of objects. Even the workmen who form wax figures, to whose -work the operations of nature are often compared, cannot endue objects -with colors without borrowing them from elsewhere. Besides, we must -observe that these workmen contain a power which remains immutable, and -by the sole means of which they produce their works with their hands. -Likewise, nature contains a power which remains immovable as a whole; -it has no need of some parts that would remain immovable, and others -that move. It is matter alone that undergoes movement, for the forming -power is in no way moved. Were the forming power moved, it would no -longer be the first motor[179]; the first motor would no longer be -nature, but whatever might, in its totality, be immovable. - - -NATURE IS IMMOVABLE AS A FORM, BUT NOT AS COMPOUND OF MATTER AND FORM. - -It may be objected that the ("seminal) reason" may remain immutable, -but that nature is distinct from reason, and is mutable. Considering -the totality of nature, we include reason. Considering only one of -its parts as immutable, this part still will be reason. Nature must -be a form, and not a composite of matter and form. What need would -it have of a matter that might be either cold or hot, since matter, -when subjected to form, either possesses these qualities, or receives -them, or rather undergoes the action of reason before having any -qualities. Indeed, it is not by fire that matter becomes fire, but -by reason. Consequently, in animals and plants, it is the "reasons" -that produce[180]; and nature is a reason that produces other reasons, -imparting some of herself to the substance subjected to her influence, -while remaining within herself. The reason that consists in a visible -shape occupies the last rank; it is dead, and produces nothing. The -living "reason" (which administers the body of the living being), being -sister to the "reason" that produced the visible form (in begetting -the body of the living being), and possessing the same power as this -reason, alone produces within the begotten being.[181] - - -BOTH NATURE AND REASON ARE CONTEMPLATION; WHILE UNIVERSAL REASON IS -BOTH SOUL AND NATURE. - -3. (2). How does nature produce? And how, in producing, does she -arrive at contemplation? Since she produces while remaining immovable -within herself, and as she is a "reason," she is a contemplation -also. Indeed, every action is produced according to a "reason," and -consequently differs from it. Reason assists and presides over action, -and consequently is not an action. Since reason is not an action, -it is a contemplation. In universal Reason, the reason which holds -the last rank itself proceeds from contemplation, and in this sense -still deserves the name of contemplation because it is produced by -the contemplation (of the soul). However universal Reason, which is -superior to the latter reason, may be considered under two points of -view, as soul and as nature. (Let us begin by nature.) - -THE REASON OF NATURE IS THE RESULT OF AN IMMOVABLE CONTEMPLATION. - -Does reason, considered as nature, also derive from contemplation? -Yes, but on condition that it has contemplated itself somewhat; -for it is produced by a contemplation and a principle which was -contemplated. How does it contemplate itself? It does not possess -this mode of contemplation which proceeds from (discursive) reason; -that is to say, which consists in discursively considering what one -has in himself. Being a living "reason" and a productive power, how -could it fail discursively to consider what it contains? Because one -considers discursively only what he does not yet possess. Now as nature -possesses, she produces by the mere fact that she possesses. To be what -she is and to produce what she produces are identical. Because she is -"reason," she simultaneously is contemplation and contemplated object. -As she is all three: contemplation, contemplated object, and "reason," -nature produces by the mere fact that it is in her essence to be these -things. As we have shown, evidently action is a sort of contemplation; -for it is the result of the contemplation that remains immutable, -which does nothing but contemplate, and which produces by its mere -contemplation. - - -NATURE'S CONFESSION THAT HER MOTHER IS UNIVERSAL REASON, AND HER FATHER -THE FORMAL REASONS. - -4. (3). If anybody were to ask nature why she produces, Nature, if -at all willing to listen and answer would say, "You should not have -questioned me; you should have tried to understand, keeping silence, -as I do; for I am not in the habit of speaking. What were you to -understand? Here it is. First, what is produced is the work of my -silent speculation, a contemplation effected by my nature; for, myself -being born of contemplation, mine is a contemplative nature. Besides, -that which in me contemplates, produces a work of contemplation, like -geometricians who, while contemplating, describe figures. For it is -not in describing figures, but in contemplating, that I let drop from -within me the lines which outline the forms of the bodies. I preserve -within me the disposition of my mother (the universal Soul), and that -of the principles that beget me (the formal 'reasons'). The latter, -indeed, are born of contemplation: I was begotten in the same way. -These principles gave birth to me without any action, or the mere -fact that they are more powerful reasons, and that they contemplate -themselves." - -DESCRIPTION OF NATURE AS A WEAKER CONTEMPLATION. - -These words signify that nature is a soul begotten by a superior Soul -that possesses a more potent life, and contains her contemplation -silently within herself, without inclining towards that which is higher -or lower. Abiding within her own essence ("being") that is, within her -own rest and self-consciousness, having discovered, so far as it was -possible for her, what was below her, without going out of her way to -seek it, nature produced an agreeable and brilliant object. If it is -desired to attribute some sort of cognition or sensation to nature, -these will resemble true cognition and sensation only as those of a man -who is awake resemble those of a man who is asleep.[182] For nature -peaceably contemplates her object, which was born in her as effect of -nature's abiding within and with herself, of herself being an object of -contemplation, and herself being a silent, if weak contemplation. There -is, indeed, another power that contemplates more strongly; the nature -which is the image of another contemplation. Consequently, what she has -produced is very weak, because a weakened contemplation can beget a -weak object only. - - -IT IS MEN WHO ARE TOO WEAK FOR CONTEMPLATION THAT SEEK A REFUGE IN -ACTION. - -Likewise it is men too weak for speculation who, in action, seek a -shadow of speculation and reason. Not being capable of rising to -speculation, and because of their soul-weakness not being able to grasp -that which in itself is intelligible, and to fill themselves therewith, -though however desiring to contemplate it, these men seek, by action, -to achieve that which they could not obtain by thought alone. Thus we -find that action is a weakness or result of contemplation, when we act, -or desire to see, or to contemplate, or to grasp the intelligible, -or try to get others to grasp it, or propose to act to the extent of -our ability. It is a weakness, for, after having acted, we possess -nothing of what we have done; and a consequence, because we contemplate -something better than we ourselves have made. What man indeed who -could contemplate truth would go and contemplate its image? This -is the explanation of the taste for manual arts, and for physical -activity[183] (as thought Aristotle). - - -B. CONTEMPLATION. - - -THE PROCESSION OF THE WORLD-SOUL. - -5. (4). After having spoken of nature, and having explained how -generation is a sort of contemplation, let us pass to the Soul that -occupies a rank superior to nature. This is what we have to say about -her. By her contemplative action, by her ardent desire to learn and -to discover, by the fruitfulness of her knowledge, and her resulting -need to produce, the Soul, her totality having become an object of -contemplation, gave birth to some other object; just as science, on -fructifying, by instruction begets a lesser science in the soul of -the young disciple who possesses the images of all things, but only -in the state of obscure theories, of feeble speculations, which are -incapable of self-sufficiency. The higher and rational part of the -Soul ever dwells in the higher region of the intelligible world, and -is, by this intelligible world, ever illuminated and fructified[184]; -while the lower ("natural and generative power") participates in what -the superior part has received, by immediately participating in the -intelligible; for life ever proceeds from life, and its actualization -extends to everything, and is present everywhere. In her procession, -the universal Soul allows her superior part to remain in the -intelligible world; for, if she detached herself from this superior -part, she would no longer be present everywhere; she would subsist -only in her lower extremities. Besides, the part of the Soul that thus -proceeds out of the intelligible world is inferior to what remains -within it. Therefore, if the Soul must be present and must assert her -sphere of activity everywhere, and if that which occupies the superior -rank differs from that which occupies the inferior; if, besides, her -activity proceeds either from contemplation or action---though indeed -originally from contemplation--because contemplation precedes the -action which could not exist without contemplation; in this state -of affairs, though one actualization would be weaker than another, -yet it would ever remain a contemplation, so that the action derived -from contemplation seems to be no more than a weakened contemplation; -for that which is begotten must always remain consubstantial with -its generating principle, though weaker, since of lower rank. All -things therefore silently proceed from the Soul, because they stand -in no need of either contemplation or exterior visible action. Thus -the Soul contemplates, and the contemplating part of the Soul, being -somehow located outside of the superior part, and being different -therefrom, produces what is below it; thus it is that contemplation -begets contemplation.[185] No more than its object is contemplation -limited below; that is why it extends to everything. Where is it not? -Every soul contains the same object of contemplation. This object, -without being circumscribed as a magnitude, does not equally inhere -in all beings; consequently, it is not present in the same way to all -parts of the Soul. That is why Plato[186] says that the charioteer -of the soul communicates to his horses what he has seen. The latter -receive something from him only because they desire to possess what he -has seen; for they have not received the entire intelligible (world). -Though they act because of a desire, they act only in view of what they -desire; that is, in view of contemplation, and of its object. - - -PRACTICE IS ONLY A PREPARATION FOR CONTEMPLATION. - -6. (5). The purpose of action is to contemplate, and to possess -the contemplated object. The object or activity, therefore, is -contemplation. It seeks to achieve indirectly what it is unable to -accomplish directly. It is not otherwise when one has achieved the -object of one's desires. One's real desire is not to possess the -desired object without knowing it, but to know it more thoroughly, to -present it to the sight of the soul, and to be able to contemplate it -therein. Indeed, activity always has in view some good; one desires -to posses it interiorly, to appropriate it, and to possess the result -of one's action. Now as Good can be possessed only by the soul, -activity once more brings us back to contemplation. Since the soul -is a "reason," what she is capable of possessing could be no more -than a silent "reason," being so much the more silent as it is more -a "reason," for perfect "reason" seeks nothing farther; it rests in -the manifestation of that with which it is filled; the completer the -manifestation, the calmer is the contemplation, and the more does it -unite the soul. Speaking seriously, there is identity between knowing -subject and known object in the actualization of knowledge. If they -were not identical, they would be different, being alien to each other, -without any real bond, just as reasons (are foreign to the soul) when -they slumber within her, without being perceived. The reason[187] must -therefore not remain alien to the learning soul, but become united -thereto, and become characteristic of her. Therefore when the soul -has appropriated a "reason," and has familiarized herself therewith, -the soul as it were draws it out of her (breast) to examine it. Thus -she observes the thing that she (unconsciously) possessed, and by -examining it, distinguishes herself therefrom, and by the conception -she forms of it, considers it as something foreign to her; for though -the soul herself be a "reason" and a kind of intelligence, nevertheless -when she considers something, she considers it as something distinct -from herself, because she does not possess the true fulness, and is -defective in respect to her principle (which is intelligence). Besides, -it is with calmness that she observes what she has drawn from within -herself; for she does not draw from within herself anything of which -she did not formerly have even a notion. But she only drew from within -herself that of which her view was incomplete, and which she wished to -know better. In her actualizations (such as sensation), she adapts the -"reasons" she possesses to exterior objects.[188] On one hand, as she -possesses (the intelligible entities) better than does nature, she is -also calmer and more contemplative; on the other hand, as she does not -possess (the intelligible entities) perfectly, more (than intelligence) -she desires to have direct experimental knowledge and contemplation of -the object she contemplates. After having (temporarily) withdrawn from -her own higher part, and having (by discursive reason) run through the -series of differences, she returns to herself, and again gives herself -up to contemplation by her higher part (intelligence) from which she -had withdrawn (to observe the differences); for the higher part does -not deal with differences, as it abides within herself. Consequently -the wise mind is identical with reason, and in itself possesses what it -manifests to others. It contemplates itself; it arrives at unity not -only in respect to exterior objects, but also in respect to itself; it -rests in this unity, and finds all things within itself. - - -THIS CONTEMPLATION IS THE GOAL OF ALL KINDS AND GRADES OF EXISTENCE. - -7. (6). Thus everything (ultimately) derives from contemplation; -everything (really) is contemplation, including the true beings, and -the beings by the former secondarily begotten by giving themselves up -to contemplation, and which themselves are objects of contemplation -either for sensation, or for knowledge or opinion. Actions, and also -desire, result in knowledge. Generation originates in speculation, -and ends in the production of a form, that is: in an object of -contemplation. In general, all beings that are images of generating -principles produce forms and objects of contemplation. Begotten -substances, being imitations of beings, show that the purpose -of generating principles is neither generation nor action, but -the production of works which themselves are to be contemplated. -Contemplation is aimed at by both discursive thought, and beneath -it, by sensation, the end of both of which is knowledge. Further, -beneath discursive thought and sensation is the nature which, bearing -within herself an object of contemplation, that is, a ("seminal) -reason," produces another "reason."[189] Such are the truths that are -self-evident, or that can be demonstrated by reasoning. Besides it -is clear that, since the intelligible objects devote themselves to -contemplation, all other beings must aspire thereto; for the origin of -beings is also their end. - - -EVEN LOWER FORMS OF BEGETTING ARE DUE TO SEMINAL REASONS. - -The begetting of animals is entirely due to the activity within them -of seminal reasons. Generation is an actualization of contemplation; -it results from the need of producing multiple forms, from objects -of contemplation, of filling everything with reasons, of ceaseless -contemplation; begetting is no more than producing a form, and -to spread contemplation everywhere.[190] All the faults met with -in begotten or manufactured things are no more than faults of -contemplation. The poor workman resembles the producer of bad form. -Besides, lovers must be counted among those who study forms, and who -consequently give themselves up to contemplation. But enough of this. - - -C. OF UNITY. - - -THE DIFFERENT GRADES OF THOUGHT AND LIFE. - -8. (7). Since contemplation rises by degrees, from nature to the Soul, -from the Soul to Intelligence; and as within it thought becomes more -and more (intimate or) interior, more and more united to the thinker; -and as in the perfect Soul the things known are identical with the -knower; and because they aspire to Intelligence, the subject must then -evidently within Intelligence be identical with the object; not through -any appropriation thereof, as the perfect Soul does indeed appropriate -it, but because their essence ("being") is identical, because of the -identity between thinking and being ("essence"). Within intelligence no -longer do we have on one side the object, and on the other the subject; -otherwise we would need another principle where this difference would -no longer exist. Within it, then, these two things, the subject and the -object, form but a single (entity). That is a living contemplation, and -no longer an object of contemplation which seems to inhere in something -else; for existence within a living being is not identical with living -by oneself. Therefore if it is to be alive, the object of contemplation -and of thought must be life itself, and not the life of plants, that of -sensation, or psychic life. Those are different thoughts, the one being -the thought of plants, the thought of sensation, and psychic thought. -They are thoughts because they are "reasons." - -"ALL BEINGS ARE CONTEMPLATIONS." - -Every life is a thought which, like life itself, may be more or less -true. The truest thought is also the first life; and the first life is -identical with the first Intelligence. Consequently, the first degree -of life is also the first degree of thought; the second degree of -life is also the second degree of thought; and the third degree of -life is also the third degree of thought. Therefore every life of this -kind is a thought. Nevertheless it is humanly possible to define the -differences of the various degrees of life without being able to set -forth clearly those of thought; men will limit themselves to saying -that some (of these degrees of thought) imply intelligence, while -others exclude it, because they do not seek to penetrate the essence -of life. We may observe that the remainder of the discussion brings us -back to this proposition, that "all beings are contemplations."[191] If -the truest life be the life of thought, if the truest life and the life -of thought be identical, then the truest thought must be alive. This -contemplation is life, the object of this contemplation is a living -being and life, and both form but one. - - -LIKE A CIRCLE, INTELLIGENCE IS INSEPARABLY SINGLE AND MANIFOLD. - -Since both are identical, the unity that they form became manifold -because it does not contemplate unity, or it does not contemplate -unity so far as it is one; otherwise it would not be intelligence. -After having begun by being one, it ceased being one; unconsciously -it became manifold as a result of the fruitful germs it contained. -It developed to become all things, though it would have been better -for it not to have desired this. Indeed, it thus became the second -principle, as a circle which, by developing, becomes a figure and a a -surface, whose circumference, centre, and rays are distinct, occupying -different points. The origin of things is better than their goal. The -origin is not equivalent to the origin and goal, and that which is -both origin and goal is not identical with that which is no more than -origin. In other words, intelligence itself is not the intelligence -of a single thing, but universal intelligence; being universal, -it is the intelligence of all things.[192] If then intelligence be -universal Intelligence, and the intelligence of all things, then -each of its parts must also be universal, also possess all things. -Otherwise, intelligence would contain a part that was not intelligence; -intelligence would be composed of non-intelligences; and it would -resemble a conglomeration of things which would form an intelligence -only by their union. Thus intelligence is infinite. When something -proceeds from it, there is no weakening; neither for the things that -proceed from it, for this is also all things, nor for the intelligence -from which the thing proceeds, because it is not a summation of -parts.[193] - - -TO THE INTELLIGENCE THAT SIMULTANEOUSLY IS THE INTELLIGIBLE THERE MUST -BE A SUPREME. - -9. (8). Such is the nature of Intelligence. Therefore it does not -occupy the first rank. Above it must be a Principle, whose discovery is -the object of this discussion. Indeed, the manifold must be posterior -to unity. Now intelligence is a number; and the principle of number -is unity, and the principle of the number that constitutes unity -is absolute Unity. Intelligence is simultaneously intelligence and -the intelligible; it is therefore two things at once. If then it be -composed of two things, we must seek what is prior to this duality. -Could this principle be Intelligence alone? But Intelligence is always -bound to the intelligible. If the Principle we seek cannot be bound -to the intelligible, neither will it be Intelligence. If then it be -not Intelligence, and transcend duality, it must be superior thereto, -and thus be above Intelligence. Could it be the Intelligence alone? -But we have already seen that the intelligible is inseparable from -Intelligence. If this Principle be neither Intelligence, nor the -intelligible, what can it be? It must be the Principle from which are -derived both Intelligence and its implied intelligible. - - -THE BEGETTER OF INTELLIGENCE MUST BE SIMPLER THAN IT, AND IS REACHED -NOT BY INTELLIGENT REASONING BUT A SIMPLE INTUITION. - -But what is this Principle, and how are we to conceive it? It must be -either intelligent or not intelligent. If it be intelligent, it will -also be Intelligence. If it be not intelligent, it will be unconscious -of itself, and will not be in any way venerable. Though true, it would -not be clear or perspicuous to say that it is the Good itself, since we -do not yet have an object on which we could fasten our thought when we -speak of it. Besides, since the knowledge of the other objects in all -beings who can know something intelligent, occurs through Intelligence -and lies in Intelligence, by what rapid intellection (or intuition) -could we grasp this Principle that is superior to Intelligence? We -may answer, by that part of us which resembles it; for there is in -us something of it; or rather, it is in all things that participate -in Him. Everywhere you approach the Good, that which in you can -participate receives something of it. Take the illustration of a voice -in a desert, and the human ears that may be located there. Wherever -you listen to this voice, you will grasp it entirely in one sense, -and not entirely in another sense. How then would we grasp something -by approximating our intelligence (to the Good)? To see up there the -Principle it seeks, Intelligence must, so to speak, return backwards, -and, forming a duality, it must somehow exceed itself; that means, it -would have to cease being the Intelligence of all intelligible things. -Indeed, intelligence is primary life, and penetration of all things, -not (as the soul does) by a still actualizing movement,[194] but by a -movement which is ever already accomplished and past.[195] Therefore, -if Intelligence be life, which is the penetration of all things, if -it possess all things distinctly, without confusion--for otherwise -it would possess them in an imperfect and incomplete manner--it must -necessarily proceed from a superior Principle which, instead of being -in motion, is the principle of motion (by which Intelligence runs -through all things), of life, of intelligence, and of all things. The -Principle of all things could not be all things, it is only their -origin. Itself is neither all things, nor any particular thing, -because it begets everything; neither is it a multitude, for it is the -principle of multitude. Indeed that which begets is always simpler than -that which is begotten. Therefore if this principle beget Intelligence, -it necessarily is simpler than Intelligence. On the theory that it is -both one and all, we have an alternative, that it is all things because -it is all things at once, or that it is everything individually. On -the one hand, if it be all things at once, it will be posterior to -all things; if on the contrary it be prior to all things, it will be -different from all things. For if the One co-existed with all things, -the One would not be a principle; but the One must be a principle, and -must exist anteriorly to all things, if all things are to originate -from it. On the other hand, if we say that the One is each particular -thing, it will thereby be identical with every particular thing; later -it will be all things at once, without being able to discern anything. -Thus the One is none of these particular things, being prior to all -things. - - -THE SUPREME IS THE POTENTIALITY OF ALL THINGS, ABOVE ALL ACTUALIZATION. - -10. (9). This Principle then is the potentiality of all.[196] Without -it, nothing would exist, not even Intelligence, which is the primary -and universal life. Indeed what is above life is the cause of life. The -actualization of life, being all things, is not the first Principle; it -flows from this Principle as (water) from a spring. - - -THE SUPREME AS A SPRING OF WATER. - -The first Principle may indeed be conceived of as a spring (of water) -which is its own origin, and which pours its water into many streams -without itself becoming exhausted by what it yields, or even without -running low, because the streams that it forms, before flowing away -each in its own direction, and while knowing which direction it is to -follow, yet mingles its waters with the spring. - - -THE SUPREME AS THE TREE OF THE UNIVERSE. - -Again, (the Supreme may be compared to) the life that circulates in a -great tree, without its principle issuing from the root, where is its -seat, but which later divides among the branches. Though spreading -everywhere a manifold life, the Principle still dwells in itself exempt -from all manifoldness, though being only its origin.[197] - - -IF UNITY PASSED INTO THE MANIFOLD, THE UNIVERSE WOULD BE DESTROYED. - -This contains nothing surprising. Why should we be surprised at -manifoldness issuing from Him who is not manifold, or at the -impossibility of the existence of the manifold without the prior -existence of That which is not manifold? The Principle is not -distributed in the universe; far rather, if it were disturbed, the -universe would be annihilated; for it cannot exist except in so far as -its Principle abides within itself, without becoming confused with the -rest. - - -THIS IS THE BASIS OF THE RETURN TO UNITY. - -Consequently, there is everywhere a return to unity--for there is -for everything a unity to which it may be reduced. Consequently, the -universe must be derived from the unity that is superior to it; and as -this unity is not absolutely simple, it must itself be derived from -a still superior unity, and so on until we arrive at the absolutely -simple Unity, which cannot be reduced to any other. Therefore, -considering what is in a tree--that is, its permanent principle--or -what is unitary in an animal, in a soul, or in the universe, you will -everywhere have that which is most powerful and precious. If, at last, -you consider that unity of the things that really exist, that is, their -principle, their source, their (productive) power, can you doubt its -reality, and believe that this principle amounts to nothing? Certainly -this principle is none of the things of which it is the principle; it -is such that nothing could be predicated of it, neither essence, nor -being, nor life, because it is superior to all of it. If you grasp it, -by abstracting from it even being, you will be in ecstasy. By directing -your glance towards it, by reaching it, and resting in it, you will -get a unitary and simple intuition thereof; you will conceive of its -greatness by both itself and its derivatives. - - -THE SUPREME IS NOT INTELLIGENCE, WHICH ASPIRES TO THE FORM OF THE GOOD. - -11. (10). A further consideration. Since intelligence is a sort of -intuition, namely, a seeing (or actualizing) intuition (or vision), it -really consists of a potentiality that has passed into actualization. -It will therefore contain two elements, which will play the parts -of (intelligible) matter,[198] and of form, just like actualized -vision,[199] for actualized vision also implies duality. Therefore -intuition, before being actualized, was unity. Thus unity has become -duality, and duality has become unity. (Sense-) vision receives from -sense-objects its fulness, and its perfection, so to speak. As to -intellectual vision, however, its fulness comes from a principle that -is the Good. Now if intelligence were the Good itself, what would be -the use of its intuition or its actualization? Other beings, indeed, -aspire to the Good, as the goal of their activity; but the Good itself -has need of nothing; and therefore possesses nothing but itself.[200] -After having named it, nothing should be added thereto by thought; -for, to add something, is to suppose that He needs this attribute. -Not even intelligence should be attributed to Him; that would be -introducing therein something alien, distinguishing in Him two things, -Intelligence and the Good. Intelligence needs the Good, but the Good -has no need of Intelligence. On achieving the Good, Intelligence -takes its form, for it derives its form from the Good; and it becomes -perfect, because it assumes the nature (of the Good). The model (or, -archetype) must be judged by the trace it leaves in Intelligence, -conceiving of its true character according to the impression it leaves. -Only by this impression does Intelligence behold and achieve the Good. -That is why Intelligence aspires to the Good; and as Intelligence ever -aspires to the Good, Intelligence ever achieves it. The Good itself, -however, never aspires to anything; for what could He desire? Nor does -He achieve anything, since He desires nothing.[201] Therefore (the -Supreme) is not Intelligence, which ever desires, and aspires to the -form of Good. - - -THE GOOD AS SUPREME NEITHER NEEDS NOR POSSESSES INTELLECTION. - -No doubt Intelligence is beautiful; it is the most beautiful of things, -since it is illuminated by a pure light, since it shines with a pure -splendor, and contains the intelligible beings of which our world, in -spite of its beauty, is but an adumbration and image. The intelligible -world is located in a region resplendent with clearness, where is -nothing either obscure or indefinite, where, within itself, it enjoys a -blissful life. It entrances the human gaze, especially when one knows -how to commune with it. But just as a view of heaven, and the splendor -of the stars leads one to seek and conceive their author, likewise the -contemplation of the intelligible world, and the fascination it exerts -leads (the beholder) to seek its author. The question then arises, Who -is He who has given existence to the intelligible world? Where and how -did He beget this so pure Intellect, this so beautiful son who derives -all of his fulness from his father[202]? This supreme Principle itself -is neither Intelligence nor son, but is superior to Intelligence, which -is His son. Intelligence, His son, succeeds Him, because the son needs -to receive from the father both intellection and fulness, which is -his food; so (the son) holds the first rank after Him who has need of -nothing, not even intellection. Nevertheless Intelligence possesses -fulness and true intellection, because it immediately participates in -the Good. Thus the Good, being above real fulness and intellection, -neither possesses them, nor needs them; otherwise, He would not be the -Good. - - - - -FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT. - -Concerning Intelligible Beauty. - - -ART MAKES A STATUE OUT OF ROUGH MARBLE. - -1. Since he who rises to the contemplation of the intelligible world, -and who conceives the beauty of true intelligence, can also, as we -have pointed out, by intuition grasp the superior Principle,[203] -the Father of Intelligence, let us, so far as our strength allows -us, try to understand and explain to ourselves how it is possible to -contemplate the beauty of Intelligence and of the intelligible world. -Let us imagine two pieces of marble placed side by side, the one rough -and inartistic, the other one fashioned by the sculptor's chisel, who -made of it the statue of a goddess, a grace, or a muse; or that of a -man--but not that of any individual whatever, but that of a (cultured -gentle) man in whom art would have gathered all the traits of beauty -offered by different individuals. After having thus from art received -the beauty of the form, the second marble will appear beautiful, not -by virtue of its essence, which is to be stone--for otherwise the -other block would be as beautiful as this one--but because of the -form received through art. The latter, however, did not exist in the -matter of the statue. It was in the thought of the artist that it -existed before passing into the marble; and it existed therein, not -because it had eyes and hands, but because it participated in art. It -was therefore in art that this superior beauty existed. It could not -have become incorporated in stone. Dwelling within itself, it begat -an inferior form, which, passing into matter, could neither preserve -all its purity, nor completely respond to the will of the artist, -possessing no perfection other than that allowed by matter. As the -nature of art is to produce beauty, if art succeed in producing beauty -which conforms to its constitutive essence, then, by the possession -of the beauty essential to it, art possesses a beauty still greater -and truer than that which passes into exterior objects. As all form -extends by passing into matter, (this objectified form) is weaker than -that which remains one. All that extends abandons its own (nature), -as do force, heat, and in general any property; likewise with beauty. -Every creating principle is always superior to the created thing. It -is not the lack of musical ability, but the music itself that creates -the musician; while it is the intelligible music that creates the sense -music. It has been attempted to degrade the arts by saying that to -create they imitate nature. This may be answered by pointing out that -the natures of beings are themselves the images of other beings (or -essences); besides, the arts do not limit themselves to the imitation -of objects which offer themselves to our view, but that they go as -far back as the (ideal) reasons from which are derived the nature of -objects. Further the arts independently create many things, and to the -perfection of the object they add what is lacking, because they possess -beauty in themselves. Phidias seems to have represented Jupiter without -copying any sense-objects, conceiving him such as he would appear to us -if he ever revealed himself to our eyes.[204] - - -BEAUTY INHERES NOT IN THE ORGANISM'S PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS, BUT IN -ITS COLOR AND FORM. - -2. Now let us turn away from the arts and consider the objects they -imitate, such as natural beauties, namely, rational and irrational -creatures, especially the more perfect, in which the creator was -able to master matter, and endue it with the desired form. What then -constitutes the beauty in these objects? Surely not (the physical -characteristics, such as) blood or menstrual discharges, but the color -and figure, which differ essentially therefrom; otherwise that which -constitutes beauty is something indifferent--either something formless, -or something that contains a simple nature (that is, the "seminal -reason"), as does matter, for instance. - - -BEAUTY COMES FROM THE FORM IMPARTED BY THE ORIGINATOR. - -Whence came the beauty of that Helena about whom so many battles were -fought? Whence comes the beauty of so many women comparable to Venus? -Whence came the beauty of Venus herself? Whence comes the beauty of a -perfect man, or that of one of those divinities who reveal themselves -to our eyes, or who, without showing themselves, nevertheless possess -a visible beauty? Does it not everywhere originate from the creating -principle that passes into the creature, just as, in the art considered -above, the beauty passes from the artist into the work? It would be -unreasonable to assert that the creatures and the ("seminal) reason" -united to matter are beautiful, while denying beauty to the "reason" -which is not united to matter while still residing in the creator in -a primary and incorporeal condition; and to assert that in order to -become beautiful this reason must become united to matter. For if mass, -as such, was beautiful, then the creative reason would be beautiful -only in so far as it was mass. If form, whether in a large or small -object, equally touches and moves the soul of the beholder, evidently -beauty does not depend on the size of the mass. Still another proof of -this is that so long as the form of the object remains exterior to -the soul, and as we do not perceive it, it leaves us insensible; but -as soon as it penetrates into the soul, it moves us. Now form alone -can penetrate into the soul by the eyes; for great objects could not -enter by so narrow a space. In this respect, the size of the object -contrasts, because that which is great is not mass, but form.[205] - - -RECOGNITION OF BEAUTY DEPENDS ON PRELIMINARY INTERIOR BEAUTY. - -Further, the cause of beauty must be either ugly, beautiful or -indifferent. If it were ugly, it could not produce its opposite. If it -were indifferent, it would have no more reason to produce that which is -beautiful, than that which is ugly. Therefore nature which produces so -many beautiful objects must in herself possess a very superior beauty. -But as we do not have the habit of seeing the interior of things, which -remains unknown, we attach ourselves only to their exterior, forgetting -that which moves us hides itself within them; and (in this habit of -ours) we resemble (Narcissus[206]), who, on seeing his image, and not -knowing whence it came, would try to catch it. It is not the mass of -an object that constitutes its attractiveness for us, for it is not in -mass that beauty inheres.[207] This is revealed by the beauty found -in the sciences, in the virtues, and in general in the souls, where -it shines more truly and brilliantly on contemplation and admiration -of its inherent wisdom. Then we do not regard the countenance, which -may be ugly; we leave aside the form of the body, to attach ourselves -exclusively to interior beauty. If, carried away by the emotion that -such a spectacle should cause, you should not proclaim its beauty; and -if, on directing your gaze within yourself, you should not experience -all the charm of beauty,[208] then you search for intelligible beauty, -by such a method, would be vain; for you would seek it only with what -is impure and ugly.[209] That is why these discussions are not intended -for all men. But if you have recognized beauty within yourself they you -may rise to the reminiscence (of intelligible beauty). - - -BEAUTY IS THE CREATING PRINCIPLE OF THE PRIMARY REASON. - -3. The reason of the beauty in nature is the archetype of the beauty -of the (bodily) organism. Nature herself, however (is the image -of the) more beautiful archetypal "reason" which resides in the -(universal) Soul, from which it is derived.[210] This latter shines -more brilliantly in the virtuous soul, whenever it develops therein. -It adorns the soul, and imparts to her a light itself derived from -a still higher Light, that is, primary Beauty. The universal Soul's -beauty thus inhering in the individual soul, explains the reason of the -Beauty superior to it, a reason which is not adventitious, and which -is not posited in any thing other than itself, but which dwells within -itself. Consequently it is not a "reason," but really the creating -principle of the primary Reason, that is, the beauty of the soul, which -in respect to the soul plays the part of matter.[211] It is, in the last -analysis, Intelligence, which is eternal and immutable because it is -not adventitious. - - -OUR IMAGE OF INTELLIGENCE IS ONLY A SAMPLE THAT MUST BE PURIFIED. - -What sort of an image does Intelligence then afford? This is a material -question because we know that any image of Intelligence supplied by -anything else would be imperfect. Therefore this image of itself given -by Intelligence also could not be a genuine image; it can be no more -than what is any stray piece of gold in respect to gold in general, -namely, a sample. But if the gold which falls under our perception be -not pure, we have to purify it either by our labor or by our thought, -observing that it can never be gold in general that we can examine, but -gold in particular, considered in an individual mass.[212] Likewise (in -the subject we are studying) our starting-point must be our purified -intelligence, or, if you prefer, the divinities themselves, considering -the kind of intelligence indwelling in them; for they are all venerable -and unimaginably beautiful. To what do they owe their perfection? To -Intelligence, which acts in them with sufficient force to manifest -them. They do not indeed owe it to the beauty of their body; for -their divinity does not consist in the possession of a body[213]; the -divinities therefore owe their character to their intelligence. Now -all divinities are beautiful, because they are not wise at certain -times, and at other times unwise. They possess wisdom by an impassible -intelligence, that is immutable and pure. They know everything; not -indeed human things, but those which are proper to them, the things -which are divine, and all those that intelligence contemplates.[214] - - -DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CELESTIAL AND INFERIOR DIVINITIES. - -Amidst the divinities, those who reside in the visible heaven, having -much leisure, ever contemplate the things existing in the superior -Heaven, but as it were from a distance, and "by raising their -head."[215] On the contrary, those in the superior Heaven, and who -dwell there, dwell there with their whole personality, because they -reside everywhere. Everything on high, namely, earth, sea, plants, -or animals, forms part of the heaven; now all that forms part of the -heaven is celestial. The divinities that dwell there do not scorn -men, nor any of the other essences up there, because all are divine, -and they traverse the whole celestial region without leaving their -rest.[216] - - -DESCRIPTION OF THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. - -4. That is why the divinities in heaven lead an easy life, truth being -mother, nurse, element and food. So they see everything; not the things -which are subject to generation, but those which have the permanence -of being, so that they see themselves in everything else. In this -intelligible world everything is transparent. No shadow limits vision. -All the essences see each other and interpenetrate each other in the -most intimate depth of their nature. Light everywhere meets light. -Every being contains within itself the entire intelligible world, and -also beholds it entire in any particular being. All things there are -located everywhere. Every thing there is all, and all is each thing; -infinite splendor radiates around. Everything is great, for there even -the small is great. This world has its sun and its stars; each star -is a sun, and all suns are stars. Each of them, while shining with -its own due splendor, reflects the light of the others. There abides -pure movement; for He who produces movement, not being foreign to it, -does not disturb it in its production. Rest is perfect, because it -is not mingled with any principle of disturbance. The beautiful is -completely beautiful there, because it does not dwell in that which is -not beautiful (that is, in matter). Each one of the celestial things, -instead of resting on an alien foundation, has its own especial seat, -its origin, and its principle, in its own being, and does not differ -from the region within which it dwells, because it is Intelligence that -is its substrate, and itself is intelligible. - - -THE INTELLIGIBLE COMPARED TO LYNCEUS WHOSE SIGHT PENETRATED ALL. - -In order to conceive this better, we should imagine that this visible -sky is a pure light which begets all the stars. Here below, doubtless, -no one part could be begotten by any other, for each part has its -own individual existence. On the contrary, in the intelligible world -every part is born from the whole, and is simultaneously the whole -and a part; wherever is a part, the whole reveals itself. The fabled -Lynceus, whose glance penetrated the very bowels of the earth, is only -the symbol of the celestial life. There the eye contemplates without -fatigue, and the desire of contemplating is insatiable, because it -does not imply a void that needs filling, or a need whose satisfaction -might bring on disgust. In the intelligible world, the beings do not, -among each other, differ so as that what is proper to the one would -not be proper to the other. Besides, they are all indestructible. -Their insatiability (in contemplation) is to be understood in the -sense that satiety does not make them scorn what satiates them. -The more that each sees, the better he sees; each one follows its -nature in seeing as infinite both itself and the objects that present -themselves to its view. On high, life, being pure, is not laborious. -How indeed could the best life imply fatigue? This life is wisdom -which, being perfectly complete, demands no research. It is primary -wisdom, which is not derived from any other, which is being, and which -is not an adventitious quality of intelligence; consequently there -is none superior to it. In the intelligible world absolute knowledge -accompanies intelligence, because the former accompanies the latter, as -Justice is enthroned by the side of Jupiter.[217] All the essences (or, -beings) in the intelligible Being resemble so many statues which are -visible by themselves, and the vision of which imparts an unspeakable -happiness to the spectators. The greatness and power of wisdom is -revealed in its containing all beings, and in its having produced them. -It is their origin; it is identical with them; it fuses with them; -for wisdom is very being. This we do not easily understand because by -sciences[218] we mean groups of demonstrations and propositions, which -is not true even of our sciences. However, if this point be contested, -let us drop this comparison with our sciences, and return to knowledge -itself, of which Plato[219] says that "it does not show itself -different in different objects." How can that be? Plato left that to -be explained by us, that we might show if we deserve to be called -his interpreters.[220] We shall undertake this interpretation by the -following observation. - - -DEMONSTRATION THAT WISDOM IS VERITABLE BEING, AND THE CONVERSE. - -5. All the productions of nature or art are the works of a certain -wisdom which ever presides over their creation. Art is made possible -only by the existence of this wisdom. The talent of the artist is -derived from the wisdom of nature which presides over the production -of every work. This wisdom is not a sequence of demonstrations, as the -whole of it forms a unity; it is not a plurality reduced to unity, -but a unity which is resolved into a plurality. If we admit that this -wisdom is primary Wisdom, there is nothing to be sought beyond it, -since in this case it is independent of every principle, and is located -within itself. If, on the contrary, we say that nature possesses the -("seminal) reason," and is its principle, we shall have to ask whence -nature derives it.[221] If it be called a superior principle, we -still have to ask the derivation of this principle; if it be derived -from nothing, we need not go beyond it (but return to the above -demonstration). If, on the contrary, it be derived from Intelligence, -we shall have to examine whether Intelligence produced wisdom. The -first objection here will be, how could it have done so? For if -Intelligence itself produced it, Intelligence could not have produced -it without itself being Wisdom. True Wisdom is therefore "being" and, -on the other hand, "being" is wisdom, and derives its dignity from -Wisdom; that is why "being" is veritable "Being." Consequently, the -being (essences) which do not possess wisdom are such beings only -because they were created by a certain wisdom; but they are not true -beings (essences), because they do not in themselves possess Wisdom. -It would, therefore, be absurd to state that the divinities, or the -blessed dwellers in the intelligible world, in that world are engaged -in studying demonstrations. The entities that exist there are beautiful -forms,[222] such as are conceived of as existing within the soul of -the wise man; I do not mean painted forms, but existing (substantial) -forms. That is why the ancients[223] said that ideas are essences and -beings. - - -BY A PUN, EGYPTIAN WISDOM IS ADDUCED AS A SYMBOL. - -6. The sages of Egypt seem to me to have shown either a consummate -insight or a marvellous instinct when, in order to reveal to us their -wisdom, they did not, to express words and propositions, make use of -letters representing sounds and expressions, but symbolized objects by -hieroglyphics,[224] and in their mysteries symbolically designated each -of them by a particular emblem. Thus each hieroglyphic sign constituted -a kind of science or wisdom; and without discursive conception or -analysis places the thing under the eyes in a synthetic manner. Later, -this synthetic notion was reproduced by other signs which developed -it[225] expressing it discursively, declaring the causes of the -constitution of things, wherever their beautiful disposition excited -admiration. The wisdom of the Egyptians is best seen in this, that -though they did not possess the causes of (essential) beings, (their -writing) was able to express everything so as to harmonize with the -causes of essential "Being." - - -RESEMBLANCE OF EARTHLY THINGS TO THE INTELLIGIBLE IS THE BASIS OF THE -RESEMBLANCE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE TO THE EARTHLY. - -If therefore all (celestial) entities resemble earthly objects--a -truth[226] which is perhaps impossible to demonstrate, so much the -more must we, before any examination or discussion, premiss that all -(earthly) objects resemble those which exist in the intelligible world. -This truth, which applies to everything, may perhaps best be understood -by an important example. - - -CONTROVERSY AGAINST THE GNOSTIC DIVINE PLANNING OF THE WORLD. - -7. It is then by all of us agreed that the universe proceeds from a -superior Principle which possesses a certain perfection. The (Gnostic) -question then arises whether this Principle, before creating, reflected -that it was necessary first to form the globe, and to suspend it to -the middle of the world; then, to produce the water, and to spread it -over the surface of the earth; later creating successively the other -things contained in the space between the earth and heaven. Further, -did He give birth to all the animals only after having to Himself -represented all their forms, and exterior parts? Did the Creator -undertake the work only after having conceived the plan of the world -in its totality and in its details? Certainly not; He cannot have -submitted to all such considerations.[227] How could He, never having -seen anything such, have been inclined to them? Neither could He have -borrowed the idea of the things He was to produce, and then carried -them out as some workman, by the use of his hands and feet; for hands -and feet are created entities. The only hypothesis left is that all -things were within some one other thing (that is, matter, which is -their substrate). ("Being") was next to this other thing (matter), -and as no interval separated them, He suddenly begot an image or -representation of Himself, either by Himself, or by the intermediation -of the universal Soul, or of some particular soul--which detail does -not matter to our discussion here. - - -HOW CREATION OF THE WORLD TOOK PLACE. - -Therefore, everything here below derives from above there, and is more -beautiful in the superior world; for forms here below are mingled with -matter; on high, they are pure. Thus this universe proceeds from the -intelligible world, and is contained by the forms from beginning to -end. First matter receives the forms of the elements, later receiving -gradual accessions of other forms, so that ultimately matter becomes so -buried under forms that it becomes difficult to recognize. It receives -forms easily, because it (already) possesses a form which holds the -lowest rank. Likewise, the producing Principle uses a form as model, -and easily produces forms because it consists entirely of "being" -and form; as a result, its work has been easy and universal, because -itself was universal. Therefore it met no obstacle, and still exercises -an absolute sovereignty. Even of the things that act as obstacles to -each other, none, even until the present time, form an obstacle to the -demiurgic (Creator), because He preserves His universality. That is why -I am convinced that if even we were simultaneously the models, forms -and essence of things, and if the form which produces here below were -our essence, (that is, being), we would accomplish our work without -trouble, though man, in his present state here below, produces (his -individual body which is) a form different from himself; indeed, on -becoming an individual, man ceased being universal. But on ceasing -to be an individual, man, in the words of Plato,[228] "soars in the -ethereal region, and governs the whole world." For, becoming universal, -he administers the universe. - - -THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE ADMITS OF NO REASONING, DEMONSTRATION, FAITH OR -CAUSE. - -Returning to our subject, you can perhaps explain why the earth is -located in the middle of the world, and why its form is spherical[229]; -you may clear up why the equator is inclined towards the ecliptic; but -you would be wrong in thinking that the divine Intelligence proposed -to achieve these objects because it judged them to be reasonable; -these things are good only because Intelligence is what it is. Its -work resembles the conclusion of a syllogism, whose premises had been -withdrawn, and that was based on the intuition of its causes. In divine -Intelligence nothing is a consequence, nothing depends on a combination -of means; its plan is conceived independently of such considerations. -Reasoning, demonstration, faith--all these are posterior things. The -mere existence of the principle determines here below the existence -and nature of the entities depending from it. Never is one more right -in asserting that the causes of a principle should not be sought, than -when referring to a Principle which is perfect, and is both principle -and end. That which is simultaneously principle and end is all things -at the same time, and consequently leaves nothing to be desired. - - -IF THIS PRINCIPLE IS NOT BEAUTIFUL, NOTHING ELSE COULD BE THAT. - -8. This Principle is sovereignly beautiful; it is beautiful entirely -and throughout, so that not a single one of its parts lacks beauty. -Who could deny that this Principle is beautiful? Only such as do not -entirely possess beauty, possessing it only partially, or even not at -all. If this Principle were not sovereignly beautiful, surely none -other could claim that distinction. As the superior Principle (the one, -superior to Intelligence) is above beauty, that which first presents -itself to our view, because it is a form, and the object of the -contemplation of intelligence, is that whose aspect is amiable.[230] - - -PLATO SYMBOLIZES THIS BY MAKING THE CREATOR ADMIRE HIS HANDIWORK. - -It was to express this idea strikingly that Plato[231] represents the -demiurgic creator as admiring his handiwork, which would lead us also -to admire the beauty both of the model and of the idea. After all, -admiration of a work made to resemble a model amounts to admiration -of the model itself. However there is no reason for astonishment at -persons to whom this idea seems novel, for lovers, and in general all -those who admire visible beauty do not realize that they admire it only -because (it is the image) of the intelligible beauty.[232] That Plato -referred to the model the admiration felt by the demiurgic (creator) -for his work is proved by his adding to the words "he admired his work" -the expression "and he conceived the purpose of rendering it still more -similar to its model." He betrays the beauty of the model by saying -that the work is beautiful, and that it is the image of the model; -for if this model were not sovereignly beautiful, and did not possess -an unspeakable beauty, how could there be anything more beautiful than -this visible world? It is therefore wrong to criticize this world; all -that can be said of it, is that it is inferior to its model.[233] - - -THE POWER OF THE INFERIOR DIVINITIES DEPENDS ON THEIR INHERING IN THE -SUPREME. - -9. (To explain our view we shall propose an experiment[234]). Let us -imagine that in the sense-world every being should remain as it is, -confusing itself with the others in the unity of the whole, to the -extent of its ability; so that all that we see is lost in this unity. -Imagine a transparent sphere exterior to the spectator, by looking -through which one might see all that it contains, first the sun and -the other stars together, then the sea, the earth, and all living -beings. At the moment of picturing to yourself in thought a transparent -sphere that would contain all moving, resting and changeable things, -preserving the form of this sphere, and without diminishing the size -of it, suppress mass, extent, and material conception. Then invoke -the divinity that created this world of which you have made yourself -an image to invest it. His coming down into it may be conceived of as -resulting from two causes. Either the Divinity that is simultaneously -single and manifold will come to adorn this world in the company of the -other inferior divinities which exist within Him. Each of these would -contain all the others that are manifold because of their powers; and -nevertheless they would form a single divinity because their multiple -powers are contained in unity. Or the Divinity will do this because the -only divinity contains all the inferior divinities within His breast. -(Which is the more likely hypothesis?) - - -ALL THE INFERIOR DIVINITIES ARE CONTAINED WITHIN THE SUPREME. - -Indeed, this only Divinity loses none of His power by the birth of all -the divinities contained within Him. All co-exist, and their individual -distinctions obtain without their occupying separate localities or -affecting a sense-form. Otherwise the one would be here, and the other -there; each one would be individual, without simultaneously being -universal in itself. Neither have they any parts that differ in each of -them, or from each other; neither is the whole formed by each of them -a power divided in a multiplicity of parts, a power whose magnitude -would be measured by the number of its parts. Taken in its universality -the intelligible world possesses a universal Power, which penetrates -everything in its infinite development without exhausting its infinite -force. He is so great that even His parts are infinite. There is no -locality that He does not interpenetrate. Even our world is great; it -likewise contains all the powers; but it would be much better, and its -magnitude would be inconceivable if it did not also contain physical -powers, which are essentially small (because limited). Fire and the -other bodies cannot be called great powers because they consist only -of an image of the infinity of the genuine Power by burning, crushing, -destroying, and contributing to the generation of animals. They -destroy only because they themselves are destroyed; they contribute to -generation only because they themselves are generated. - - -BEING IS DESIRABLE BECAUSE BEAUTIFUL. - -The Power which resides in the intelligible world is pure "being," -but perfectly beautiful "being." Without beauty, what would become -of "being"? Without "being," what would become of beauty? "Being" -itself would be annihilated by the beauty of "being." "Being"[211] is -therefore desirable, it is identical with beauty, and beauty is amiable -because it is "being." Seeing that both are of the same nature, it -would be useless to inquire which is the principle of the other. The -deceptive "being" (of bodies) needs to receive the image borrowed from -beauty to appear beautiful; and in general, to exist; it exists only in -so far as it participates in the beauty found in "being"; the greater -its participation, the more perfect is it, because it appropriates this -beautiful being[235] all the more. - - -VISION OF THE SUPERCELESTIAL. - -10. That is why Jupiter, the most ancient of the other divinities, -whose chief he is, leads them in this divine spectacle of the -contemplation of the intelligible world.[236] He is followed by these -divinities, the guardians, and the souls who can support (the glory -of) this vision. From an invisible place,[237] this divine world sheds -light on all. On rising above its sublime horizon, it scatters its -rays everywhere, inundating everything with clearness. It dazzles all -those who are located at the foot of the peak where it shines; and, -like the sun, it often obliges them to turn away their sight, which -cannot sustain its glory. Some however are forced to raise their eyes, -imparting to them strength for this contemplation; others, who are at -a distance, are troubled. On perceiving it, those who can contemplate -Him fix their gaze on it and all its contents. Not every one, however, -sees in it the same thing. One discerns therein the source and being of -justice; another is overwhelmed by the revelation of wisdom, of which -men here below scarcely possess an enfeebled image. Indeed, our vision -is only an imitation of intelligible wisdom. The latter, spreading -over all beings, and as it were embracing immensity, is the last to be -perceived by those who have already long contemplated these brilliant -lights. - - -PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF THIS VISION. - -Such is the vision seen by the divinities, all together, and each -one separately. It is also beheld by the souls that see all the -things contained within the intelligible world. By this sight, souls -themselves become capable of containing, from beginning to end, all the -entities within their intelligible world; they dwell within it by that -part of theirs which is capable of doing so. Often, even, the whole -of them dwells within it, at least so long as they do not withdraw -therefrom. - - -THIS VISION, WHEN TRANSFERRED WITHIN, BECOMES SWEET AS NECTAR. - -This is what is beheld by Jupiter and by all those of us who share His -love for this revelation. The last thing which then appears is the -beauty that shines in its entirety in the essences (that is, beings), -as well as in those who participate therein. In the intelligible world -everything glows, and beautifies itself by shedding splendor on those -who gaze at it. Thus men who have climbed a high mountain on arriving -at the summit suddenly shine with the golden color reflected by the -ground whereon they stand. Now the color that bathes the intelligible -world is the beauty that blooms within its flower; or rather there -everything is color, everything is beauty, in its most intimate depths; -for beauty, in the intelligible world, is not a flower that blooms -only on the surface. Those who do not apprehend the totality of the -view appreciate the beauty of only that which meets their gaze; but -those who, like men intoxicated with this sweet nectar,[238] are, to -the very soul, penetrated by the beauty of the intelligible world, -are no longer mere spectators. No longer are the contemplated objects -and the contemplated soul two things exterior to each other. If the -soul's gaze is piercing enough, she finds the object she contemplates -within herself. Often she possesses it without knowing it. Then indeed -does she contemplate it as she would contemplate some exterior object, -because she seeks to see it in the same manner. Every time that one -looks at something as a spectacle, it is seen outside of oneself. Now -this spectacle of the intelligible world must be transferred within -oneself, and be contemplated as something with which one has fused, to -the point of identity. Thus a man, possessed by a divinity, whether -by Phoebus or by some Muse, would contemplate this divinity within -himself, if he were at all able to contemplate a divinity. - - -MECHANISM OF THE ECSTASY. - -11. (The ecstasy operates as follows.) When a man is entranced by the -divinity, he loses consciousness of himself. Then when he contemplates -the (divine) spectacle which he possesses within himself, he -contemplates himself and sees his image embellished. However beautiful -it be, he must leave it aside, and concentrate upon the unity, without -dividing any of it. Then he becomes simultaneously one and all with -this divinity which grants him His presence silently. Then is the man -united to the divinity to the extent of his desire and ability. If, -while remaining pure, he return to duality, he remains as close as -possible to the divinity, and he enjoys the divine presence as soon as -he turns towards the divinity. - - -BENEFITS OF THIS CONVERSION TOWARDS THE DIVINITY. - -The advantages derived from this conversion towards the divinity are -first self-consciousness, so long as he remains distinct from the -divinity. If he penetrate into his interior sanctuary, he possesses all -things, and renouncing self-consciousness in favor of indistinction -from the divinity, he fuses with it. As soon as he desires to see -something, so to speak, outside of himself, it is he himself that he -considers, even exteriorly. The soul that studies the divinity must -form an idea of him while seeking to know him. Later, knowing how great -is that divinity to which she desires to unite herself, and being -persuaded that she will find beatitude in this union, she plunges -herself into the depths of the divinity until, instead of contenting -herself with contemplating the intelligible world, she herself becomes -an object of contemplation, and shines with the clearness of the -conceptions whose source is on high. - - -HOW THE SOUL MAY BE UNITED TO THE DIVINITY WITHOUT SEEING HIM. - -But how can one be united to beauty, without seeing it? If it be seen -as some thing distinct from oneself, he is not yet fused with it. If -the act of vision imply a relation with an exterior object, we have -no vision; or, at least, this vision consists in the identity of seer -and seen. This vision is a kind of conscience, of self-consciousness; -and if this feeling be too acute, there is even danger of breaking up -this unity. Besides, one must not forget that the sensations of evils -make stronger impressions, and yield feebler knowledge, because the -latter are frittered away by the force of impressions. Thus sickness -strikes sharply (but arouses only an obscure notion); health, on -the contrary, thanks to the calm that characterizes it, yields us a -clearer notion of itself, for it remains quietly within us, because it -is proper to us, and fuses with us. On the contrary, sickness is not -proper to us, but foreign. Consequently it manifests itself vividly, -because it is opposed to our nature; while we, on the contrary, enjoy -but a feeble feeling of ourselves and of what belongs to us. The state -in which we grasp ourselves best is the one in which our consciousness -of ourselves fuses with us. Consequently on high, at the very moment -when our knowledge by intelligence is at its best, we believe that -we are ignorant of it, because we consult sensation, which assures -us that it has seen nothing. Indeed it has not seen anything, and it -never could see anything such (as the intelligible beings). It is -therefore the sensation that doubts; but he who has the ability to -see differs therefrom. Before the seer could doubt, he would have to -cease believing in his very existence; for he could not, so to speak, -externalize himself to consider himself with the eyes of the body. - - -NATURE OF THE OBJECT OF SPIRITUAL VISION. - -12. We have just said that a man can see, either in differing from what -he sees, or in identifying himself with the object seen. Now, when he -has seen, either as being different, or as being identical, what does -he report? He tells us that he has seen the Divinity beget an offspring -of an incomparable beauty, producing everything in Himself, and without -pain preserving within Himself what He has begotten. In fact, charmed -with the things He has begotten, and full of love for his works, -the Divinity retained them within Himself, congratulating Himself -upon their splendor, as much as upon his own. In the midst of these -beauties, nevertheless inferior to those which have remained within the -nature of the Divinity, alone of all these beings, his Son (Jupiter, -the son of Saturn, here representing the universal Soul born of divine -Intelligence) has manifested himself externally. By him, as by an -image, you may judge of the greatness of his Father, and that of his -brothers still unissued from within their Father's nature. Besides, it -is not in vain that Jupiter tells us that he proceeds from his Father; -for he constitutes another world that has become beautiful, because he -is the image of beauty, and because it is impossible that the image of -beauty and being should not itself be beautiful. Jupiter, therefore, -everywhere imitates his archetype. That is why, because he is an image, -he possesses life and constitutes being; and that is why, because he -proceeds from his Father, he also possesses beauty. He likewise enjoys -the privilege of being the image of his eternity. Otherwise he would -at one time reveal the image of his Father, and at other times he -would not; which is impossible, because he is not an artificial image. -Every natural image remains what it was, so long as its archetype -subsists.[239] It is therefore an error to believe that, while the -intelligible world subsists, the visible world could perish, and that -it was begotten in such a manner as that he who had created it, had -done so with deliberation. Whatever indeed might have been the manner -of operation, these men[240] do not wish to conceive and believe that, -so long as the intelligible world shines, other things that proceed -therefrom could not perish; and that they exist ever since (their -model) existed. But the (intelligible world) has ever existed, and will -ever exist; for (in spite of their impropriety), we are obliged to make -use of such terms to express our thought. - - -SATURN IS SON OF COELUS, AND FATHER OF JUPITER. - -13. (Saturn) is always represented as chained, because He remains -immovable in his identity. It is said he gave up to his son, Jupiter, -the government of the universe, because such (an occupation) did not -suit Him, who possesses the fulness[241] of good things,[242] to -distract himself from the government of the intelligible world to -undertake that of an empire younger and less exalted than himself. -Besides, on one hand, (Saturn) fixed within himself, and raised himself -up to his father (Coelus, or Uranus). On the other hand, he likewise -fixed the inferior things which were begotten by his son (Jupiter). -Between both he (Saturn) therefore occupies a rank intermediary between -his Father, who is more perfect and his son, who is less so. On one -hand he mutilates his Father, by splitting primitive unity into two -different elements. On the other, he raises himself above the being -which is inferior to him, disengaging himself from the chains that -might tend to lower him. As (Coelus), the father of (Saturn), is too -great to admit of having beauty attributed to him, (Saturn) occupies -the first rank of beauty. - - -IF THE WORLD-SOUL AND VENUS BE BEAUTIFUL, HOW MUCH MORE THEIR SOURCE? - -The universal Soul is beautiful also; but she is less beautiful than -(Saturn), because she is his image, and because, however beautiful she -may by nature be, she is still more beautiful when contemplating her -principle. Therefore if the universal Soul--to use clearer terms--and -if even Venus (as subordinate to him, Jupiter), possess beauty, what -must be that of Intelligence? If by their nature the universal Soul and -Venus receive their beauty from some other principle, from whom would -they derive the beauty they intrinsically possess, and that which they -acquire? As to us, we are beautiful when we belong to ourselves; and we -are ugly when we lower ourselves to an inferior nature. Again, we are -beautiful when we know ourselves, and ugly when we ignore ourselves. It -is therefore in the intelligible world that beauty shines and radiates. -Are these considerations sufficient for a clear knowledge of the -intelligible world, or must we engage in a further effort to accomplish -this? - - - - -FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE. - -That Intelligible Entities Are Not External to the Intelligence of the -Good. - -(_The subject of the quarrel between Amelius and Porphyry._[243]) - - -KNOWLEDGE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES IMPLIES THEIR PRESENCE. - -1. Surely, nobody could believe that the veritable and real -Intelligence could be deceived, and admit the existence of things that -do not exist? Its very name guarantees its intelligent nature. It -therefore possesses knowledge without being subject to forgetfulness, -and its knowledge is neither conjectural, doubtful, nor borrowed, -nor acquired by demonstration. Even if we did admit that some of its -knowledge was derived from demonstration, no one will deny that it -possesses certain knowledge from within itself. It would be wiser, -however, to be entirely reasonable and say that it derives everything -from within itself.[244] Without this, it would be difficult to -distinguish what knowledge it derived from itself, and what was -derived from outside. Even the certainty of the knowledge derived -from itself would vanish, and it would lose the right to believe that -things really are such as it imagines. Indeed, though the things whose -knowledge we derive from the senses seem capable of producing in us -the highest evidential value, it may still be asked whether their -apparent nature do not derive more from modifications in us than from -the objects themselves. Even so, belief in them demands[245] assent of -the intelligence, or at least of the discursive reason, for though we -admit that things perceived by the senses exist in sensible objects, -it is none the less recognized that what is perceived by sensation -is only a representation of the exterior object, and that sensation -does not reach to this object itself, since it remains exterior to -sensation.[246] But when intelligence cognizes, and is cognizing -intelligibles, intelligence could never even meet them if they are -cognized as lying outside of Intelligence. One explanation would be -that intelligence does not at all meet them, nor cognize them. If it be -by chance that intelligence meets them, the cognition of them will also -be accidental and transient. The explanation that cognition operates by -union of the intelligence with the intelligible depends on explanation -of the bond that unites them. Under this hypothesis, the cognitions of -the intelligible gathered by intelligence will consist of impressions -(or, types[247]) of reality, and will consequently be only accidental -impressions. Such, however, could not exist in Intelligence; for what -would be their form? As they would remain exterior to Intelligence, -their knowledge would resemble sensation. The only distinction of -this knowledge from sensation would be that intelligence cognizes -more tenuous entities. Intelligence would never know that it really -perceives them. It would never really know for certain that a thing -was good, just or beautiful. In this case the good, just and beautiful -would be exterior and foreign to it; Intelligence, in itself, will -not possess any forms to regulate its judgments, and deserve its -confidence; they, just as much as truth, would remain outside of it. - - -INTELLIGENCE IS ANNIHILATED BY THE THEORY THAT TRUTH IS EXTERNAL TO IT. - -On the other hand, the intelligible entities are either deprived of -feeling, life and intelligence, or they are intelligent. If they -be intelligent, they, like truth, fuse with intelligence into the -primary Intelligence. In this case we shall have to inquire into -the mutual relations of intelligence, intelligible entity, and -truth. Do these constitute but one single entity, or two? What in -the world could intelligible entities be, if they be without life -or intelligence? They are surely neither propositions, axioms, nor -words, because in this case they would be enunciating things different -from themselves, and would not be things themselves; thus, when you -say that the good is beautiful, it would be understood that these -two notions are foreign to each other. Nor can we think that the -intelligibles--for instance, beauty and justice--are entities that -are simple, but completely separate from each other; because the -intelligible entity would have lost its unity, and would no longer -dwell within a unitary subject. It would be dispersed into a crowd -of particular entities, and we would be forced to consider into what -localities these divers elements of the intelligible were scattered. -Besides, how could intelligence embrace these elements and follow -them in their vicissitudes? How could intelligence remain permanent? -How could it fix itself on identical objects? What will be the forms -or figures of the intelligibles? Will they be like statues of gold, -or like images and effigies made of some other material? In this -case, the intelligence that would contemplate them would not differ -from sensation. What would be the differentiating cause that would -make of one justice, and of the other something else? Last, and most -important, an assertion that the intelligible entities are external to -Intelligence would imply that in thus contemplating objects exterior -to itself Intelligence will not gain a genuine knowledge of them, -having only a false intuition of them. Since, under this hypothesis, -true realities will remain exterior to Intelligence, the latter, -while contemplating them, will not possess them; and in knowing them -will grasp only their images. Thus reduced to perceiving only images -of truth, instead of possessing truth itself, it will grasp only -deceptions, and will not reach realities. In this case (intelligence -will be in the dilemma) of either acknowledging that it grasps only -deceptions, and thus does not possess truth; or intelligence will be -ignorant of this, being persuaded it possesses truth, when it really -lacks it. By thus doubly deceiving itself, intelligence will by that -very fact be still further from the truth. That is, in my opinion, the -reason why sensation cannot attain the truth. Sensation is reduced -to opinion[248] because it is a receptive[249] power--as indeed is -expressed by the word "opinion"[250];--and because sensation receives -something foreign, since the object, from which sensation receives what -it possesses remains external to sensation. Therefore, to seek truth -outside of intelligence is to deprive intelligence of truth or verity -of intelligence. It would amount to annihilating Intelligence, and the -truth (which was to dwell within it) will no longer subsist anywhere. - - -THE NOTION OF INTELLIGENCE IMPLIES ITS POSSESSION OF ALL INTELLIGIBLES. - -2. Therefore intelligible entities must not be regarded as exterior to -Intelligence, nor as impressions formed in it. Nor must we deny it the -intimate possession of truth. Otherwise, any cognition of intelligibles -is made impossible, and the reality of both them and Intelligence -itself is destroyed. Intimate possession of all its essences is the -only possible condition that will allow knowledge and truth to remain -within Intelligence, that will save the reality of the intelligibles, -that will make possible the knowledge of the essence of every thing, -instead of limiting us to the mere notion of its qualities, a notion -which gives us only the image and vestige of the object, which does -not permit us to possess it, to unite ourselves with it, to become one -with it. On this condition only, can Intelligence know, and know truly -without being exposed to forgetfulness or groping uncertainty; can it -be the location where truth will abide and essences will subsist; can -it live and think--all of which should belong to this blessed nature, -and without which nowhere could be found anything that deserved our -esteem and respect. On this condition only will Intelligence be able to -dispense with credulity or demonstration in believing realities; for -Intelligence itself consists in these very realities, and possesses -a clear self-consciousness. Intelligence sees that which is its -own principle, sees what is below it, and to what it gives birth. -Intelligence knows that in order to know its own nature, it must not -place credence in any testimony except its own; that it essentially is -intelligible reality. It therefore is truth itself, whose very being -it is to conform to no foreign form, but to itself exclusively. Within -Intelligence fuses both being, and that which affirms its existence; -thus reality justifies itself. By whom could Intelligence be convinced -of error? What demonstration thereof would be of any value? Since there -is nothing truer than truth, any proof to the contrary would depend on -some preceding proof, and while seeming to declare something different, -would in reality be begging the question. - - -SUPREME INTELLIGENCE IS DIVINITY AND SUPREME ROYALTY. - -3. Thus Intelligence, with the essences and truth, form but one and -single nature for us. It forms some great divinity; or rather, it is -not some certain divinity, but total (divinity); for Intelligence -judges it worthy of itself to constitute all these entities. Though -this nature be divine, it is nevertheless but the second divinity[252]; -which manifests itself to us before we see the (supreme divinity, -Unity). Intelligence forms the magnificent throne which (the Supreme) -formed for Himself, and whereon He is seated immovably. For it was not -adequate that something inanimate should either develop within the -breast of the divinity, nor support the supreme Divinity when advancing -towards us. - - -ALLEGORY OF THE ROYAL PROCESSION. - -So great a King deserved to have dazzling beauty as the (ostentatious) -van of his (royal) procession. In the course of rising towards Him are -first met the things which by their inferior dignity are classed among -the first ranks of the procession; later those that are greater and -more beautiful; around the king stand those that are truly royal, while -even those that follow Him are of value. Then, after all these things, -suddenly breaks in upon our view the King himself; and we who have -remained behind after the departure of those who were satisfied with a -view of the preliminaries, fall down and worship. A profound difference -distinguishes the great King from all that precedes Him. But it must -not be supposed that He governs them as one man governs another. He -possesses the most just and natural sovereignty. He possesses real -royalty because He is the King of truth. He is the natural master of -all these beings that He has begotten, and which compose His divine -body-guard. He is the king of the king and of the kings,[253] and is -justly called Father of the divinities. Jupiter himself (who is the -universal Soul), imitates Him in this respect that he does not stop at -the contemplation of his father, (who is Intelligence), and he rises to -the actualization of his grandfather,[254] and he penetrates into the -hypostatic substance of His being.[255] - - -THE COURSE UPWARDS IS ONE OF UNIFICATION. - -4. It has already been said that we must rise to the Principle which -is really one, and not one in the same way as are other things, which, -being in themselves multiple, are one only by participation. On the -contrary, that Principle is not one by participation, as are all those -things which (being neutral) would just as lief be multiple as one. -We have also said that Intelligence and the intelligible world, are -more unitary than the remainder, that they approach Unity more than -all other things, but that they are not purely one. To the extent of -our ability we are now going to examine in what the Principle which is -purely one consists, purely and essentially, and not (accidentally) -from without. - - -THE THEORY OF THE UNIQUE; THE PAIR; AND THE GROUP. - -Rising therefore to the One, we must add nothing to Him; we must -rest in Him, and take care not to withdraw from Him, and fall into -the manifold. Without this precaution there will be an occurrence of -duality,[256] which cannot offer us unity, because duality is posterior -to Unity. The One cannot be enumerated along with anything, not -even with uniqueness (the monad), nor with anything else. He cannot -be enumerated in any way; for He is measure, without Himself being -measured; He is not in the same rank with other things, and cannot be -added to other things (being incommensurable). Otherwise, He would -have something in common with the beings along with which He would be -enumerated; consequently, He would be inferior to this common element, -while on the contrary He must have nothing above Him (if He is to be -the one first Being). Neither essential (that is, intelligible) Number, -nor the lower number which refers to quantity, can be predicated of -the unique; I repeat, neither the essential intelligible Number, whose -essence is identical with thought, nor the quantative number, which, -because all number is quantity, constitutes quantity concurrently with, -or independently of other genera.[257] Besides, quantative number, by -imitating the former (essential intelligible) Numbers in their relation -to the Unique, which is their principle, finds its existence in its -relation to real Unity, which it neither shares nor divides. Even -when the dyad (or "pair") is born, (it does not alter) the priority -of the Monad (or Uniqueness). Nor is this Uniqueness either of the -unities that constitute the pair, nor either of them alone; for why -should it be one of them rather than the other? If then the Monad or -Uniqueness be neither of the two unities which constitute the pair, it -must be superior to them, and though abiding within itself, does not -do so. In what then do these unities differ from the Uniqueness (or -Monad)? What is the unity of the "pair"? Is the unity formed by the -"pair" the same as that which is contained in each of the two unities -constituting the "pair"? The unities (which constitute the "pair") -participate in the primary Unity, but differ from it. So far as it is -one, the "pair" also participates in unity, but in different ways; for -there is no similarity between the unity of a house and the unity of -an army. In its relation to continuity, therefore, the "pair" is not -the same so far as it is one, and so far as it is a single quantity. -Are the unities contained in a group of five in a relation to unity -different from that of the unities contained in a group of ten? (To -answer this we must distinguish two kinds of unity.) The unity which -obtains between a small and a great ship, and between one town and -another, and between one army and another, obtains also between these -two groups of five and of ten. A unity which would be denied as between -these various objects would also have to be denied as obtaining between -these two groups. (Enough of this here); further considerations will be -studied later. - - -PUNS ABOUT VESTA, TAKEN FROM THE CRATYLUS OF PLATO. - -5. Returning to our former assertion that the First ever remains -identical, even though giving birth to other beings, the generation of -numbers may be explained by the immanence of Unity, and by the action -of another principle which forms them, as images of unity. So much -the more must the Principle superior to beings be immanent Unity; but -here it is the First himself who begets the beings, and not another -principle who produces beings in the image of the First while this -First would abide within Himself. Likewise the form of unity, which -is the principle of numbers, exists within all in different degrees, -because the numbers posterior to unity participate therein unequally. -Likewise, the beings inferior to the First contain something of His -nature, which something constitutes their form. Numbers derive their -quantity from their participation in unity. Likewise here beings owe -their being to their containing the trace of the One, so that their -being is the trace of the One.[258] Not far from the truth would we -be in holding that essence, which is the (more common or) plainer -nomenclature of being,[259] is derived from the word "hen," which -means one. Indeed essence proceeded immediately from the One,[273] and -has differentiated from Him but very little. Turning towards its own -basis, it has settled, and both became and is the "being" of all. When -a man pronounces essence ("on"), and emphasizes it, he unconsciously -approximates the sound meaning one ("hen"), demonstrating that essence -proceeds from unity, as indeed is indicated, so far as possible, by -the word "on," which means essence. That is why "being" ("ousia") and -essence ("einai"[260]) imitate so far as they can the principle of the -Power from which they have emanated. The human mind, observing these -similarities, and guided by their contemplation,[261] imitated what it -grasped by uttering the words "on,"[262] "einai,"[263] "ousia,"[264] -and "hestia."[265] Indeed, these sounds try to express the nature of -what has been begotten by unity, by means of the very effort made by -the speaker so as to imitate as well as possible the generation of -being. - - -THE SUPREME NAMED APOLLO.[266] - -6. Whatever be the value of these etymologies, as begotten being is a -form--for it would be impossible to give any other designation to that -which has been begotten by the One--as it is, not a particular form, -but all form, without exception, it evidently results that the One -is formless. As it possesses no form, it cannot be "being," for this -must be something individual, or determinate. Now the One could not -be conceived of as something determined; for then He would no longer -be a principle; He would only be the determined thing attributed to -Him. If all things be in that which has been begotten, none of them -could be unity. If the One be none of them, He cannot be what is above -them; consequently, as these things are "essences and essence," the -One must be above essence. Indeed, the mere statement that the One is -above essence, does not imply any determinateness on His part, affirms -nothing concerning Him and does not even undertake to give Him a name. -It merely states that He is not this or that. It does not pretend to -embrace Him, for it would be absurd to attempt to embrace an infinite -nature. Mere attempt to do so would amount to withdrawing from Him, and -losing the slight trace of Him thereby implied. To see intelligible -Being, and to contemplate that which is above the images of the -sense-objects, none of these must remain present to the mind. Likewise, -to contemplate Him who is above the intelligible, even all intelligible -entities must be left aside to contemplate the One. In this manner we -may attain knowledge of His existence, without attempting to determine -what He is. Besides, when we speak of the One, it is not possible to -indicate His nature without expressing its opposite.[267] It would -indeed be impossible to declare what is a principle of which it is -impossible to say that it is this or that. All that we human beings can -do is to have doubts poignant enough to resemble pangs of childbirth. -We do not know how to name this Principle. We merely speak of the -unspeakable, and the name we give Him is merely (for the convenience -of) referring to Him as best we can. The name "One" expresses no more -than negation of the manifold. That is why the Pythagoreans[268] -were accustomed, among each other, to refer to this principle in a -symbolic manner, calling him Apollo,[269] which name means denial of -manifoldness. An attempt to carry out the name of "One" in a positive -manner would only result in a greater obscuration of the name and -object, than if we abstained from considering the name of "One" as the -proper name of the first Principle. The object of the employment of -this name is to induce the mind that seeks the first Principle first -to give heed to that which expresses the greatest simplicity, and -consequently to reject this name which has been proposed as only the -best possible. Indeed, this name is not adequate to designate this -nature, which can neither be grasped by hearing, nor be understood by -any who hears it named. If it could be grasped by any sense, it would -be by sight; though even so there must be no expectation of seeing any -form; for thus one would not attain the first Principle. - - -TWO METHODS OF SIGHT; THE FORM, AND THE LIGHT. - -7. When intelligence is in actualization it can see in two ways, as -does the eye.[274] First, the eye may see the form of the visible -object; second, it may see the light by which this object is seen. -This light itself is visible, but it is different from the form of -the object; it reveals the form and is itself seen with this form, to -which it is united. Consequently it itself is not seen distinctly, -because the eye is entirely devoted to the illuminated object. When -there is nothing but light, it is seen in an intuitive manner, though -it be still united to some other object. For if it were isolated from -every other thing, it could not be perceived. Thus the light of the -sun would escape our eye if its seat were not a solid mass. My meaning -will best appear by considering the whole sun as light. Then light -will not reside in the form of any other visible object, and it will -possess no property except that of being visible; for other visible -objects are not pure light. Likewise in intellectual intuition (sight -of the mind) intelligence sees intelligible objects by means of the -light shed on them by the First; and the Intelligence, while seeing -these objects, really sees intelligible light. But, as Intelligence -directs its attention to the enlightened object, it does not clearly -see the Principle that enlightens them. If, on the contrary, it forget -the objects it sees, in the process of contemplating only the radiance -that renders them visible, it sees both the light itself, and its -Principle. But it is not outside of itself that that Intelligence -contemplates intelligible light. It then resembles the eye which, -without considering an exterior and foreign light, before even -perceiving it, is suddenly struck by a radiance which is proper to it, -or by a ray which radiates of itself, and which appears to it in the -midst of obscurity. The case is still similar when the eye, in order to -see no other objects, closes the eye-lids, so as to draw its light from -itself; or when, pressed by the hand, it perceives the light which it -possesses within itself. Then, without seeing anything exterior the eye -sees, even more than at any other moment, for it sees the light. The -other objects which the eye heretofore saw, though they were luminous, -were not light itself. Likewise, when Intelligence, so to speak, closes -its eye to the other objects, concentrating in itself, and seeing -nothing, it sees not a foreign light that shines in foreign forms, but -its own light which suddenly radiates interiorly, with a clear radiance. - - -INTELLIGIBLE LIGHT, NOT BEING SPATIAL, HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH PLACE. - -8. When intelligence thus perceives this divine light, it is impossible -to discern whence this light comes, from within or from without; for -when it has ceased shining the subject first thinks that it came from -within, and later that it came from without. But it is useless to seek -the source of this light, for no question of location can be mooted -in connection with it. Indeed, it could neither withdraw from us, nor -approach us; it merely appears, or remains hidden. Therefore it cannot -be sought; we must restfully wait till it appears, while preparing -ourselves to contemplate it, just as the eye awaits the rising of -the sun which appears above the horizon, or, as the poets say, which -springs up from the ocean. - - -GOD ARISES ABOVE THE HORIZON OF INTELLIGENCE. - -Whence rises He whose image is our sun? Above what horizon must -He rise, or appear, to enlighten us? He must appear above the -contemplating Intelligence. Thus, Intelligence must remain immovable -in contemplation, concentrated and absorbed in the spectacle of pure -beauty which elevates and invigorates it. Then Intelligence feels -that it is more beautiful and more brilliant, merely because it has -approached the First. The latter does not come, as might be thought; -He comes without really coming, in the proper sense of the word; He -appears without coming from any place, because He is already present -above all things before Intelligence approaches Him. In fact, it -is Intelligence which approaches and withdraws from the First; it -withdraws when it does not know where it should be, or where is -the First. The First is nowhere; and if Intelligence could also be -nowhere--I do not wish to say "in no place," for itself is outside -of all place, that is, absolutely nowhere--it would always perceive -the First; or rather, it would not perceive Him, it would be within -the First, and fusing with Him. By the mere fact that Intelligence -is intelligence, it perceives the First only by that part of itself -which is not intelligence (that is, which is above Intelligence). It -doubtless seems surprising that the One could be present to us without -approaching us; and be everywhere, though being nowhere. This surprise -is based on the weakness of our nature; but the man who knows the -First would much more likely be surprised were the state of affairs -different. It cannot indeed be otherwise. Wonder at it, if you please; -but what has been said nevertheless represents the real state of the -case. - - -OMNIPRESENCE IS EXPLAINED BY POSSESSION OF ALL THINGS WITHOUT BEING -POSSESSED BY THEM. - -9. All that is begotten by anything else resides either in the -begetting Principle, or in some other being, in the case of the -existence of any being after or below the generating principle; for -that which was begotten by something else, and which, to exist, needs -something else, needs something else everywhere, and must consequently -be contained within something else. It is therefore natural that the -things which contain the last rank should be contained in the things -which precede them immediately, and that the superior things should -be contained in those which occupy a still more elevated rank, and -so on till the first Principle. As there is nothing above Him, He -could not be contained within anything. Since He is not contained in -anything, and as each other thing is contained in the one immediately -preceding it, the first Principle contains all the other beings; He -embraces them without sharing Himself with them, and possesses them -without being shared by them. Since He possesses them without being -possessed by them, He is everywhere; for, unless He be present, He -does not possess; on the other hand, if He be not possessed, He is not -present. Consequently He both is, and is not present in this sense -that, not being possessed, He is not present; and that, finding Himself -independent of everything, He is not hindered from being nowhere. If -indeed He were hindered from being somewhere, He would be limited -by some other principle, and the things beneath Him could no longer -participate in Him; consequently the divinity would be limited, He -would no longer exist within Himself, and would depend from inferior -beings. All things contained within anything else are in the principle -from which they depend. It is the contrary with those which are -nowhere; there is no place where they are not. If indeed there be a -place lacking the divinity, evidently this place must be embraced -by some other divinity, and the divinity is in some other; whence, -according to this hypothesis, it is false that the divinity is nowhere. -But as, on the contrary, it is true that the divinity is nowhere, and -false that He is anywhere, because He could not be contained in any -other divinity, the result is that the divinity is not distant from -anything. If then He, being nowhere, be not distant from anything, then -He will in himself be everywhere. One of his parts will not be here, -while another is there; the whole of Him will not be only in one or -another place. The whole of Him will therefore be everywhere; for there -is no one thing which exclusively possesses Him, or does not possess -Him; everything is therefore possessed by Him. Look at the world: as -there is no other world but Him, He is not contained in a world, nor -in any place. No place, indeed, could exist anteriorly to the world. -As to its parts, they depend from it, and are contained within it. The -Soul is not contained in the world; on the contrary, it is the Soul -that contains the world; for the locus of the Soul is not the body, but -Intelligence. The body of the world is therefore in the Soul, the Soul -in Intelligence, and Intelligence itself in some other Principle. But -this Principle Himself could not be (contained) in any other principle, -from which He would depend; He is therefore not within anything, and -consequently He is nowhere. Where then are the other things? They -are in the first Principle. He is therefore not separated from other -things, nor is He in them; there is nothing that possesses Him, on the -contrary, it is He who possesses all. That is why He is the good of all -things, because all things exist by Him, and are related to Him each in -a different manner. That is why there are things which are better, one -than the other; for some exist more intensely than others (in relation -with the Good). - - -THE MANNER OF PERCEIVING THE SUPREME. - -10. Do not seek to see this Principle by the aid of other things; -otherwise, instead of seeing Him himself, you will see no more than His -image. Try rather to conceive the nature of the Principle that must be -grasped in Himself, that is, pure and without any admixture, because -all beings participate in Him, without any of them possessing Him. No -other thing indeed could be such as He; but nevertheless such a Being -must exist. Who indeed could all at once embrace the totality of the -power of this Principle? If a being did so, how could this being differ -from Him? Would the being limit itself to embracing only a part of Him? -You might grasp this Principle by an intuitive, simple intellection, -but you will not be able to represent Him to yourself in His totality. -Otherwise it is you who would be the thinking intelligence, if indeed -you have reached that principle; but He is more likely to flee you, -or more likely still, you will flee from Him. When you consider the -divinity, consider Him in His totality. When you think Him, know that -what you remember of Him is the Good; for He is the cause of the -wise intellectual life, because He is the power from which life and -intelligence proceed. He is the cause of "being" and essence, because -He is one; He is simple and first, because He is principle. It is from -Him that everything proceeds. It is from Him that the first movement -proceeds, without being in Him; it is from Him also that proceeds the -first rest, because He himself has no need of it; He himself is neither -in movement nor rest; for He has nothing in which He could rest or -move. By His relation to what, towards what, or in what could He move -or rest? Neither is He limited, for by what could He be limited? -Neither is He infinite in the manner suggested by an enormous mass; -for whither would He have any need of extending Himself? Would He do -so to get something? But He has need of nothing! It is His power that -is infinite. He could neither change nor lack anything; for the beings -which lack nothing owe this to Him only. - - -PROGRESS TOWARDS HIM IS WAKENING TO TRUE REALITY. - -11. The first Principle is infinite because He is one, and nothing in -Him could be limited by anything whatever. Being one, He is not subject -to measure or number. He is limited neither by others nor by Himself, -since He would thus be double. Since He has neither parts nor form, -He has no figure. Not by mortal eyes therefore must you seek to grasp -this principle such as reason conceives of Him. Do not imagine that He -could be seen in the way that would be imagined by a man who believes -that everything is perceived by the senses, and thus annihilate the -principle which is the supreme reality. The things to which the -common people attribute reality do not possess it; for that which has -extension has less reality (than that which has no extension); now the -First is the principle of existence, and is even superior to "being." -You must therefore admit the contrary of that which is asserted by -those commonplace persons; otherwise, you will be deprived of the -divinity. You would resemble such men as in the sacred festivals gorge -themselves with the foods from which one should abstain on approaching -the divinities, and who, regarding this enjoyment as more certain than -the contemplation of the divinity whose festival is being celebrated, -depart without having participated in the mysteries. Indeed as the -divinity does not reveal Himself in these mysteries, these gross men -doubt His existence, because they consider real only what is visible -by the physical eyes. Thus people who would spend their whole life in -slumber would consider as certain and real the things they would see in -their dreams; if they were to be waked and forced to open their eyes, -they would place no credence in the testimony of their eyes, and would -plunge themselves again into their somnolence. - - -THE GOOD IS SUPERIOR TO THE BEAUTIFUL, AND IS COGNIZED BY THE MIND AS -ITS SENSE. - -12. We should not seek to perceive an object otherwise than by the -faculty that is suitable to cognize it. Thus colors are perceived by -the eyes, sounds by the ears, and other qualities by other senses. -Analogy would assign to intelligence its proper function, so that -thinking should not be identified with seeing and hearing. To act -otherwise would be to resemble a man who would try to perceive colors -by the ears, and who would deny the existence of sounds because he -could not see them. We must never forget that men have forgotten the -Principle which from the beginning until this day has excited their -desires and wishes. Indeed all things aspire to the first Principle, -tend thither by a natural necessity, and seem to divine that they -could not exist without Him. The notion of the beautiful is given only -to souls that are awake, and that already possess some knowledge; -at sight of Him they are simultaneously dazed with His sublimity, -and spurred on by love.[270] From His very origin, on the contrary, -the Good excites in us an innate desire; He is present with us even -in sleep; His view never dazes us with stupor, because He is always -with us. Enjoyment of His presence demands neither reminiscence nor -attention, because one is not deprived thereof even in sleep. When the -love of the beautiful overwhelms us, it causes us anxieties, because -the sight of the beautiful makes us desire it. As the love excited -by the beautiful is only secondary, and as it exists only in such -persons as possess already some knowledge, the beautiful evidently -occupies only the second rank. On the contrary, the desire of the Good -is more original, and demands no preliminary knowledge. That surely -demonstrates that the Good is anterior and superior to the beautiful. -Besides, all men are satisfied as soon as they possess the Good; they -consider that they have reached their goal. But not all think that the -beautiful suffices them; they think that the beautiful is beautiful -for itself, rather than for them; as the beauty of an individual is -an advantage only for himself. Last, the greater number of people are -satisfied with seeming beautiful, even if they are not so in reality; -but they are not satisfied with seeming to possess the Good, which -they desire to possess in reality. Indeed, all desire to have that -which occupies the front rank; but they struggle, they engage in -rivalry about the beautiful in the opinion that it is born just as -they are (from development of circumstances). They resemble a person -who would claim equality with another person who holds the first rank -after the king, because both depend from the king; such a person does -not realize that though both are subject to the king, yet there is a -great difference in hierarchical rank between them[271]; the cause of -this error is that both participate in a same principle, that the One -is superior to both of them, and that lastly the Good has no need of -the beautiful, while the beautiful is in need of the Good.[272] The -Good is sweet, calm, and full of delights; we enjoy it at will. On the -contrary, the beautiful strikes the soul with amazement, agitates it, -and mingles pains with pleasures. In spite of ourselves we are thereby -often separated from the Good, like a beloved object separates a son -from the father. The Good is more ancient than the beautiful, not in -time, but in reality; besides, it exerts superior power, because it is -unlimited. That which is inferior to it, possesses only an inferior and -dependent power, instead of having a limitless power (as belongs to -Intelligence, which is inferior to the Good). The Divinity therefore -is master of the power which is inferior to His own; He has no need of -things that are begotten; for it is from Him that all their contents -are derived. Besides, He had no need of begetting; He still is such as -He was before; nothing would have been changed for Him if He had not -begotten; if it had been possible for other things to receive existence -(independently of Himself) He would not have opposed it through -jealousy. It is now no longer possible for anything to be begotten, -for the divinity has begotten all that He could beget. Nor is He the -universality of things, for thus He would stand in need of them. Raised -above all things, He has been able to beget them, and to permit them to -exist for themselves by dominating all. - - -THE SUPREMACY OF THE GOOD IMPLIES HE IS SUPERIOR TO ALL POSSESSIONS. - -13. Being the Good Himself, and not simply something good, the Divinity -cannot possess anything, not even the quality of being good. If He -possessed anything, this thing would either be good, or not good; -now in the principle which is good in Himself and in the highest -degree, there cannot be anything which is not good. On the other hand, -the statement that the Good possesses the quality of being good is -impossible. Since therefore (the Good) can possess neither the quality -of being good, or of not being good, the result is that He cannot -possess anything; that He is unique, and isolated from everything -else. As all other things either are good without being the Good, or -are not good, and as the Good has neither the quality of being good, -or of not being good, He has nothing, and this is the very thing that -constitutes His goodness. To attribute to Him anything, such as being, -intelligence, or beauty, would be to deprive Him of the privilege of -being the Good. Therefore when we deprive Him of all attributes, when -we affirm nothing about Him, when one does not commit the error of -supposing anything within Him, He is left as simple essence, without -attribution of things He does not possess. Let us not imitate those -ignorant panegyrists who lower the glory of those they praise by -attributing to them qualities inferior to their dignity, because they -do not know how to speak properly of the persons they are trying to -praise. Likewise, we should not attribute to the Divinity any of the -things beneath and after Him; we should recognize Him as their eminent -cause, but without being any of them. The nature of the Good consists -not in being all things in general, nor in being any of them in -particular. In this case, indeed, the Good would form no more than one -with all beings; consequently, He would differ from them only by His -own character; that is, by some difference, or by the addition of some -quality. Instead of being one, He would be two things, of which the -one--namely, what in Him was common with the other beings--would not be -the Good, while the other would be the Good (and would leave all beings -evil). Under this hypothesis, He would be a mixture of good and of not -good; he would no longer be the pure and primary Good. The primary Good -would be that in which the other thing would particularly participate, -a participation by virtue of which it would become the good. This thing -would be the good only by participation, whilst that in which it would -participate would be nothing in particular; which would demonstrate -that the good was nothing in particular. But if, in the principle under -discussion, the good be such--that is, if there be a difference whose -presence gives the character of goodness to the composite--this good -must derive from some other principle which must be the Good uniquely -and simply. Such a composite, therefore, depends on the pure and simple -Good. Thus the First, the absolute Good, dominates all beings, is -uniquely the Good, possesses nothing within Himself, is mingled with -nothing, is superior to all things, and is the cause of all things. The -beautiful and that which is "being" could not derive from evil, or from -indifferent principles; for the cause being more perfect, is always -better than its effects. - - - - -SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK NINE. - -Against the Gnostics; or, That the Creator and the World are Not -Evil.[275] - - -THE SUPREME PRINCIPLES MUST BE SIMPLE AND NOT COMPOUND. - -1. We have already seen[276] that the nature of the Good is simple and -primary, for nothing that is not primary could be simple. We have also -demonstrated that the nature of the Good contains nothing in itself, -but is something unitary, the very nature of the One; for in itself -the One is not some thing to which unity could be added, any more than -the Good in itself is some thing to which goodness could be added. -Consequently, as both the One and the Good are simplicity itself, when -we speak of the One and the Good, these two words express but one and -the same nature; they affirm nothing, and only represent it to us so -far as possible. This nature is called the First, because it is very -simple, and not composite; it is the absolute as self-sufficient, -because it is not composite; otherwise it would depend on the things -of which it was composed. Neither is it predicable of anything (as an -attribute in a subject) for all that is in another thing comes from -something else. If then this nature be not in anything else, nor is -derived from anything else, if it contain nothing composite, it must -not have anything above it. - - -THE ONLY SUPREME PRINCIPLES MUST THEN BE UNITY, INTELLIGENCE AND SOUL. - -Consequently there are no principles other (than the three divine -hypostatic substances); and the first rank will have to be assigned -to Unity, the second to Intelligence, as the first thinking -principle,[277] and the third to the Soul. Such indeed is the natural -order, which admits of no further principles, in the intelligible -world. If less be claimed, it is because of a confusion between the -Soul and Intelligence, or Intelligence with the First; but we have -often pointed out their mutual differences.[278] The only thing left -is to examine if there might not be more than these three hypostatic -substances; and in this case, what their nature might be. - - -THE ARISTOTELIAN DISTINCTION OF POTENTIALITY AND ACTUALITY IS NOT -APPLICABLE TO DIVINITY. - -The Principle of all things, such as we have described it, is the -most simple and elevated possible. The (Gnostics) are wrong in -distinguishing within that (supreme Principle[279]) potentiality -from actualization[280]; for it would be ridiculous to seek to apply -to principles that are immaterial and are actualizations, that -(Aristotelian) distinction, and thus to increase the number (of the -divine hypostatic substances.[281]) - - -THE DISTINCTION OF REST AND MOVEMENT ALSO INAPPLICABLE. - -Neither could we, below the Supreme, distinguish two intelligences, one -at rest, and the other in motion.[282] We should have to define the -resting of the First, and the movement or utterance[283] of the second. -The inaction of the one and the action of the other would be equally -mysterious. By its being (or, nature), Intelligence is eternally and -identically a permanent actualization. To rise to Intelligence and to -move around it is the proper function of the soul. - - -AN INTERMEDIARY LOGOS (OR AEON JESUS), ALSO UNACCOUNTABLE. - -Reason (logos) which descends from Intelligence into the Soul, and -intellectualizes her, does not constitute a nature distinct from the -Soul and Intelligence, and intermediary between them. - - -CONSCIOUSNESS IS UNITARY THOUGH CONTAINING THINKER, OBJECT AND THOUGHT. - -Nor should we admit the existence of several intelligences, merely -because we distinguish a thinker from a consciousness of the thinker. -Though there be a difference between thinking, and thinking that -one thinks, these two nevertheless constitute a single intuitive -consciousness of its actualizations. It would be ridiculous to deny -such a consciousness to veritable Intelligence. It is therefore -the same Intelligence that thinks, and that thinks that it thinks. -Otherwise there would be two principles, of which the one would have -thought, and the other consciousness of thought. The second would -doubtless differ from the first, but would not be the real thinking -principle. A mere logical distinction between thought and consciousness -of thought would not establish the (actual) differences between two -(hypostatic substances). Further, we shall have to consider whether -it be possible to conceive of an Intelligence which would exclusively -think, without any accompanying consciousness of its thought.[284] -If we ourselves who are entirely devoted to practical activity and -discursive reason were in such a condition,[285] we would, even if -otherwise considered sensible, be insane. But as true Intelligence -thinks itself in its thoughts, and as the intelligible, far from -being outside of Intelligence, is Intelligence itself, Intelligence, -by thinking, possesses itself, and necessarily sees itself.[286] When -Intelligence sees itself, it does not see itself as unintelligent, -but as intelligent. Therefore in the first actualization of thought, -Intelligence has the thought and consciousness of thought, two things -that form but a single one; not even logically is this a duality. If -Intelligence always thinks what it is, is there any reason to separate, -even by a simple logical distinction, thought from the consciousness -of thought? The absurdity of the doctrine we are controverting will be -still more evident if we suppose that a third intelligence is conscious -that the second intelligence is conscious of the thought of the first; -we might thus go on to infinity.[287] - - -A DIFFERENTIATED REASON WOULD DEPRIVE THE SOUL OF CONSCIOUSNESS. - -Last, if we suppose that Reason is derived from Intelligence, and then -from reason in the soul derive another reason which would be derived -from Reason in itself, so as to constitute a principle intermediary -between Intelligence and Soul, the Soul would be deprived of the -power of thought. For thus the Soul, instead of receiving reason from -Intelligence, would receive reason from an intermediary principle. -Instead of possessing Reason itself, the Soul would possess only an -adumbration of Reason; the Soul would not know Intelligence, and would -not be able to think.[288] - - -NO MORE THAN THREE PRINCIPLES ADMITTED BECAUSE OF THE UNITY OF -CONSCIOUSNESS. - -2. In the intelligible world, therefore, we shall not recognize more -than three principles (Unity, Intelligence, and Soul), without those -superfluous and incongruous fictions. We shall insist that there is a -single Intelligence that is identical, and immutable, which imitates -its Father so far as it can. Then there is our soul, of which one -part ever remains among the intelligibles, while one part descends to -sense-objects, and another abides in an intermediary region.[289] As -our soul is one nature in several powers, she may at times entirely -rise to the intelligible world, with the best part of herself and of -essence; at other times the soul's lower part allows itself to be -dragged down to the earth, carrying with it the intermediate portion; -for the soul cannot be entirely dragged down.[290] This being dragged -down occurs only because the soul does not abide in the better -region.[291] While dwelling in it, the Soul, which is not a part (of -it) and of which we are not a part,[292] has given to the body of the -universe all the perfections of which she was capable. The Soul governs -it by remaining quiet, without reasoning, without having to correct -anything. With wonderful power she beautifies the universe by the -contemplation of the intelligible world. The more the Soul attaches -herself to contemplation, the more powerful and beautiful she is; what -she receives from above, she communicates to the sense-world, and -illuminates because she herself is always illuminated (by Intelligence). - - -THE WORLD AS ETERNALLY BEGOTTEN--GOD'S NEED TO GIVE. - -3. Thus the Soul, ever being illuminated, in turn herself illuminates -lower things that subsist only through her, like plants that feed on -dew, and which participate in life, each according to its capacity. -Likewise a fire heats the objects that surround it, each in proportion -to its nature. Now if such is the effect of fire whose power is -limited, while intelligible beings exert unlimited powers, how would -it be possible for these beings to exist without causing anything to -participate in their nature? Each of them must therefore communicate -some degree of its perfection to other beings. The Good would no longer -be the good, Intelligence would no longer be intelligence, the Soul -would no longer be soul, if, beneath that which possesses the first -degree of life, there was not some other thing which possessed the -second degree of life, and which subsisted only so long as subsists -He who occupies the first rank. It is therefore unavoidable that all -things (inferior to the First) must always exist in mutual dependence, -and that they be begotten, because they derive their existence from -some other source. They were not begotten at a definite moment. When -we affirm that they are begotten, we should say, they were begotten, -or, they shall be begotten. Nor will they be destroyed, unless they -are composed of elements in which they could be dissolved. Those -that are indissoluble will not perish. It may be objected that they -could be resolved into matter. But why should matter also not be -liable to be destroyed? If it were granted that matter was liable to -destruction, there was no necessity for its existence.[293] It may -be further objected that the existence of matter necessarily results -from the existence of other principles. In this case, this necessity -still subsists. If matter is to be considered as isolated (from the -intelligible world), then the divine principles also, instead of being -present everywhere,[294] will, as it were, be walled up in a limited -place.[295] But if the latter be impossible, then must matter be -illuminated (by the intelligible world). - - -BY A PUN ON INCLINATION, PLOTINOS SHOWS THAT THE WORLD-SOUL COULD -NOT HAVE GONE THROUGH THE DRAMA OF CREATION ATTRIBUTED TO SOPHIA AND -ACHAMOTH. - -4. But in that case, the Soul created only because[296] she had lost -her wings. The universal Soul, however, could not have been subject to -such an accident. Those (Gnostics) who claim that she committed a fault -should explain the nature of that fault.[297] Why did this fall occur? -If she fell from all eternity, she must similarly remain in her fault; -if only at a determinate time, why not earlier? We however believe -that the Soul created the world not by inclining (towards matter), but -rather because she did not incline towards it. Thus to incline towards -matter the Soul would have forgotten the intelligible entities; but if -she had forgotten them, she could not have created the world (using -them as models). From what (models) would the soul have created the -world? She must have formed it according to the intelligible models -she had contemplated above. If she remembered them while creating, she -had not inclined (away from them towards matter). Neither did the Soul -have an obscure notion of the intelligibles; otherwise she would have -inclined herself towards them, to get a clear intuition of them. For if -she kept some memory of the intelligible world, why would she not have -wished to reascend therein? - - -MOST GENERALLY ASSIGNED MOTIVES OF CREATION ARE RIDICULOUS, OR WORSE. - -Besides, what advantage could the (world-Soul) have imagined she -was gaining by creating the world? That she did so in order to be -honored[298] seems unworthy, for it would be attributing to her the -desires of a sculptor. Another theory is that the (world-Soul) created -the world by virtue of a rational conception, and she thus exercised -her power, though creating did not inhere in her nature. If so, how did -she make the world? When will she destroy it? If she repented, what -is she waiting for (before she destroys her handiwork)? If, however, -she has not yet repented, she could not repent after time will have -accustomed her to her work, and will have made her more kindly disposed -thereto. If however she be awaiting individual souls, the latter should -not have returned into generation, since, in the former generation, -they have already experienced evils here below, and consequently, they -should long since have ceased to descend upon this earth. - - -THE WORLD SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED EVIL BECAUSE OF OUR SUFFERINGS; -NOTHING MORE BEAUTIFUL COULD BE IMAGINED. - -Nor should the world be considered badly made, merely because we suffer -so much therein. This idea results from entertaining unjustifiable -expectations of its perfections, and from confusing it with the -intelligible world of which it is an image. Could a more beautiful -image, indeed, be imagined? After the celestial fire could we imagine -a better fire than our own? After the intelligible earth, could we -imagine a better earth than ours? After the actualization by which the -intelligible world embraces itself, could we imagine a sphere more -perfect, more wonderful, or better ordered in its movements[299]? After -the intelligible sun, how could we imagine any sun different from the -one that we see? - - -IT IS CONTRADICTORY TO CONSIDER ONESELF CAPABLE OF PERFECTION, BUT TO -DENY IMPASSIBILITY TO THE BEAUTIFUL WORKS OF NATURE. - -5. Is it not absurd to see those (Gnostics) who, like everybody -else, possess a body, passions, fears, and excitements, holding an -idea of their own powers high enough to make them believe themselves -capable of attaining the intelligible,[300] while to the sun, though -it be immutable and perfect,[301] and though it be impassible power, -refusing a wisdom superior to ours, we who were born only yesterday, -and who find so many obstacles in our search after truth? We certainly -are surprised to see these (Gnostics) considering the souls of both -themselves and of the vilest men immortal and divine, while refusing -immortality to the entire heaven, to all the stars it contains, though -they be composed of elements more beautiful and purer[302] (than we), -though they manifest a marvellous beauty and order, while (these -Gnostics) themselves acknowledge that disorder is observed here below? -According to their theories, however, the immortal Soul would have -picked out the worst part of the world, while giving up the best to -mortal souls.[303] - - -AN INTERMEDIARY ELEMENTAL SOUL IS ALSO INADMISSIBLE. - -It is also absurd to see them introduce into the world, after the -universal Soul, another soul said to be composed of elements. How could -a composition of elements possess life? A mixture of elements does not -produce heat or cold, humidity or dryness, or any combination thereof. -Besides, how could this soul (that is inferior to the universal -Soul), hold in union together the four elements, if she herself were -composed of them, and therefore were posterior to them? We may also -rightfully demand of the (Gnostics) an explanation of their predicating -perception, reflection, and other faculties to this (mythical) soul. - - -THE GNOSTICS' NEW EARTH, THAT IS MODEL OF THE OLD IS UNREASONABLE. - -Besides, as the (Gnostics) have no appreciation of the work of the -demiurgic creator, nor for this earth, they insist that the divinity -has created for them a new earth, which is destined to receive them -when they shall have left here below, and which is the reason of the -world. But what need do they have of inhabiting the model of this world -that they pretend to hate? In any case, from where does this model -come? According to them, the model was created only when its author -inclined towards things here below. But what was the use of the model, -if its creator busied himself considerably with the world to make a -world inferior to the intelligible world which he possessed? If (the -model were created) before the world, what could have been its use? Was -it for the saved souls?[304] Why therefore were those souls not saved -(by remaining within the model)? Under this hypothesis the creation -of the model was useless. If (the model, however, was created) after -this world, its author derived it from this world, stealing the form -away from matter; the experience that the souls had acquired in their -earlier trials sufficed to teach them to seek their salvation.[305] -Last, if the (Gnostics) pretend to have, in their souls, received the -form of the world,[306] we have a new incomprehensible language.[307] - - -EXILES, REPENTANCES, ANTITYPES, AND OTHER GNOSTIC INVENTIONS. - -6. We hardly know what to say of the other new conceptions they have -injected into the universe, such as exiles,[308] antitypes,[309] and -repentances.[310] If by "repentances" and "exiles" they mean certain -states of the Soul (in the normal meaning of the word, where a soul) -yields to repentance; and if by "antitypes" they mean the images of the -intelligible beings that the Soul contemplates before contemplating -the intelligible beings themselves, they are using meaningless words, -invented merely as catchwords and terms for their individual sect; for -they imagine such fictions merely because they have failed clearly to -understand the ancient wisdom of the Greeks. Before them the Greeks, -clearly and simply, had spoken of "ascensions" of souls that issued -from the "cavern," and which insensibly rise to a truer contemplation. -The doctrines of these (Gnostics) are partly stolen from Plato, while -the remainder, which were invented merely to form their own individual -system, are innovations contrary to truth. It is from Plato that they -borrowed their judgments, the rivers of Hades.[311] They do speak of -several intelligible principles, such as essence, intelligence, the -second demiurgic creator or universal Soul; but all that comes from -Plato's Timaeus,[312] which says, "Likewise as the ideas contained in -the existing Organism were seen by Intelligence, so he [the creator of -this universe[313]] thought that the latter should contain similar and -equally numerous (natures)." But, not clearly understanding Plato, the -Gnostics here imagined (three principles), an intelligence at rest, -which contains all (beings), a second intelligence that contemplates -them (as they occur) in the first intelligence, and a third -intelligence that thinks them discursively. They often consider this -discursive intelligence as the creative soul, and they consider this to -be the demiurgic creator mentioned by Plato, because they were entirely -ignorant of the true nature of this demiurgic creator. In general, they -alter entirely the idea of creation, as well as many other doctrines of -Plato, and they give out an entirely erroneous interpretation thereof. -They imagine that they alone have rightly conceived of intelligible -nature, while Plato and many other divine intellects never attained -thereto. By speaking of a multitude of intelligible principles, they -think that they seem to possess an exact knowledge thereof, while -really they degrade them, assimilating them to lower, and sensual -beings, by increasing their number.[314] The principles that exist on -high must be reduced to the smallest number feasible; we must recognize -that the principle below the First contains all (the essences), and -so deny the existence of any intelligible (entities) outside of it, -inasmuch as it contains all beings, by virtue of its being primary -"Being," of primary Intelligence, and of all that is beautiful beneath -the First Himself. The Soul must be assigned to the third rank. The -differences obtaining between souls must further be explained by the -difference of their conditions or nature.[315] - - -THE GNOSTICS MAY WELL BORROW FROM THE GREEKS, BUT SHOULD NOT DEPRECIATE -THEM. - -Instead of besmirching the reputation of divine men,[316] the -(Gnostics) should interpret the doctrines of the ancient sages in a -friendly way, borrowing from them such as they are right in professing, -as, for instance, the immortality of the soul, the existence of the -intelligible world, and of the first Divinity (who is the Good), the -necessity for the soul to flee from intercourse with the body, and -the belief that separation of the soul from body is equivalent to a -return from generation to "being."[317] They do well indeed if they -borrow these ideas from Plato, for the purpose of developing them. They -are even at liberty to express any opinion they please in diverging -from his views; but their own doctrine should not be established in -the minds of their followers by insults and sarcasms against Greek -sages. They could only do so by demonstrating the propriety of their -distinctive tenets, whenever they differ from those of the ancient -philosophers, and by expounding their own tenets with a really -philosophic reserve and equanimity. Even when they controvert a system -they are still bound to consider nothing but the truth, without any -attempt at self-glorification, either by attacking men whose teachings -have long since been approved by worthy philosophers, or by claims of -superiority to the latter. For that which the ancients taught on the -subject of the intelligible world will always be considered as the best -and wisest by all who do not permit themselves to be misled by the -errors that to-day mislead so many.[318] - - -GNOSTIC ADDITIONS TO PLATONISM ARE THEIR POOREST DOCTRINES. - -If from the doctrines of the (Gnostics) we remove what they have -borrowed from the teachings of the ancients, their remaining additions -will be discovered as very unfortunate. Their polemic against -(Greek philosophy) consists of an introduction of a great number of -genealogies,[319] and destructions, blaming the intercourse of the -soul with the body,[320] complaining of the universe, criticising -its administration, identifying the demiurgic creator (that is, -Intelligence) with the universal souls.[321] - - -THE UNIVERSAL SOUL MAY NOT BE JUDGED BY THE HUMAN STANDARD. - -7. Elsewhere we have demonstrated[322] that this world never -began, and will never end; and that it must last as long as the -intelligible entities. We have also shown,[323] and that earlier than -these (Gnostics), that the soul's intercourse with the body is not -advantageous to her. But to judge the universal Soul according to ours -is to resemble a man who would blame the totality of a well governed -city by an examination limited to the workers in earth or metal. - - -DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNIVERSAL SOUL AND THE HUMAN SOUL. - -The differences between the universal Soul and our (human) souls are -very important. To begin with, the universal Soul does not govern -the world in the same manner (as our soul governs the body); for she -governs the world without being bound thereto. Besides many other -differences elsewhere noted,[324] we were bound to the body after the -formation of a primary bond.[325] In the universal Soul the nature -that is bound to the body (of the world) binds all that it embraces; -but the universal Soul herself is not bound by the things she binds. -As she dominates them, she is impassible in respect to them, while we -ourselves do not dominate exterior objects. Besides, that part of the -universal Soul which rises to the intelligible world remains pure and -independent; even that[326] which communicates life to the body (of the -world) receives nothing therefrom. In general what is in another being -necessarily participates in the state of that being; but a principle -which has its own individual life would not receive anything from -any other source.[327] That is why, when one thing is located within -another, it feels the experiences of the latter, but does not any the -less retain its individual life in the event of the destruction of the -latter. For instance, if the fire within yourself be extinguished, -that would not extinguish the universal fire; even if the latter were -extinguished, the universal Soul would not feel it, and only the -constitution of the body (of the world) would be affected thereby. If -a world exclusively composed of the remaining three elements were a -possibility, that would be of no importance to the universal Soul, -because the world does not have a constitution similar that of each -of the contained organisms. On high, the universal Soul soars above -the world, and thereby imposes on it a sort of permanence; here below, -the parts, which as it were flow off, are maintained in their place by -a second bond.[328] As celestial entities have no place (outside of -the world), into which they might ooze out,[329] there is no need of -containing them from the interior, nor of compressing them from without -to force them back within; they subsist in the location where the -universal Soul placed them from the beginning. Those which naturally -move modify the beings which possess no natural motion.[330] They carry -out well arranged revolutions because they are parts of the universe. -Here below there are beings which perish because they cannot conform to -the universal order. For instance, if a tortoise happened to be caught -in the midst of a choric ballet that was dancing in perfect order, it -would be trodden under foot because it could not withdraw from the -effects of the order that regulated the feet of the dancers; on the -contrary, if it conformed to that order, it would suffer no harm. - - -GNOSTIC DEMANDS FOR REASON OF WORLD'S CREATION ARE IDLE, AND INVOLVE -STILL LARGER QUESTIONS. - -8. To ask (as do the Gnostics) why the world was created, amounts -to asking the reason of the existence of the universal Soul, and -of the creation of the demiurgic creator himself. To ask such a -question well characterizes men who first wish to find a principle -of that which (in the world) is eternal, but who later opine that -the demiurgic creator became the creating cause only as a result of -an inclination or alteration.[331] If indeed they be at all willing -to listen to us fairly, we shall have to teach them the nature of -these intelligible principles, to end their habit of scorning (those) -venerable (intelligible) beings, and (to induce them to) pay these a -deserved respect. No one, indeed, has the right to find fault with the -constitution of the world, which reveals the greatness of intelligible -nature. We are forced[332] to recognize that the world is a beautiful -and brilliant statue of the divinities, from the fact that the world -achieved existence without beginning with an obscure life, such as that -of the little organisms it contains, and which the productiveness of -universal life never ceases to bring forth, by day or night; on the -contrary, its life is continuous, clear, manifold, extended everywhere, -and illustrating marvellous wisdom. It would be no more than natural -that the world should not equal the model it imitates; otherwise, it -would no longer be an imitation. It would be an error, however, to -think that the world imitates its model badly; it lacks none of the -things that could be contained by a beautiful and natural image; for it -was necessary for this image to exist, without implying reasoning or -skill.[333] - - -INTELLIGENCE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE LAST DEGREE OF EXISTENCE. - -Intelligence, indeed, could not be (the last degree of existence). It -was necessarily actualization of a double nature, both within itself, -and for other beings.[334] It was inevitable that it should be followed -by other beings, for only the most impotent being would fail to produce -something that should proceed from it,[335] while (it is granted that) -the intelligible possesses a wonderful power[336]; wherefore, it could -not help creating. - - -THIS IS THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS BECAUSE WE CAN ACHIEVE VIRTUE. - -What would be the nature of a world better than the present one, if -it were possible? The present one must be a faithful image of the -intelligible world, if the existence of the world be necessary, and -if there be no better possible world. The whole earth is peopled with -animate and even immortal beings; from here below up to the heaven -(the world) is full of them.[337] Why should the stars in the highest -sphere (the fixed stars), and those in the lower spheres (the planets), -not be divinities, in view of their regular motion, and their carrying -out a magnificent revolution around the world[338]? Why should they -not possess virtue? What obstacle could hinder them from acquiring -it? Not on high are found the things which here below make men evil; -namely, that evil nature which both is troubled, and troubles. With -their perpetual leisure why should not the stars possess intelligence, -and be acquainted with the divinity and all the other intelligible -deities[339]? How should we possess a wisdom greater than theirs? Only -a foolish man would entertain such thoughts. How could our souls be -superior to the stars when at the hands of the universal Soul they -undergo the constraint of descending here below[340]? For the best -part of souls is that which commands.[341] If, on the contrary, the -souls descend here below voluntarily, why should the (Gnostics) find -fault with this sphere whither they came voluntarily, and from which -they can depart whenever it suits them[342]? That everything here -below depends on the intelligible principles is proved by the fact -that the organization of the world is such that, during this life, we -are able to acquire wisdom, and live out a life similar to that of the -divinities.[343] - - -THE INEQUALITY OF RICHES IS OF NO MOMENT TO AN ETERNAL BEING. - -9. No one would complain of poverty and the unequal distribution -of wealth if one realized that the sage does not seek equality in -such things, because he does not consider that the rich man has any -advantage over the poor man, the prince over the subject.[344] The sage -leaves such opinions to commonplace people, for he knows that there are -two kinds of life; that of the virtuous who achieve the supreme degree -(of perfection) and the intelligible world, and that of common earthly -men. Even the latter life is double; for though at times they do think -of virtue, and participate somewhat in the good, at other times they -form only a vile crowd, and are only machines, destined to satisfy -the primary needs of virtuous people.[345] There is no reason to be -surprised at a man committing a murder, or, through weakness, yielding -to his passions, when souls, that behave like young, inexperienced -persons, not indeed like intelligences, daily behave thus. It has been -said[346] that this life is a struggle in which one is either victor or -vanquished. But is not this very condition a proof of good arrangement? -What does it matter if you are wronged, so long as you are immortal? -If you be killed, you achieve the fate that you desired. If you have -reason to complain of how you are treated in some particular city, -you can leave it.[347] Besides, even here below, there evidently are -rewards and punishments. Why then complain of a society within which -distributive justice is exercised, where virtue is honored, and where -vice meets its deserved punishment[348]? - - -MOREOVER THIS WORLD CONTAINS TRADITIONS OF DIVINITY. - -Not only are there here below statues of the divinities, but even the -divinities condescend to look on us, leading everything in an orderly -manner from beginning to end, and they apportion to each the fate that -suits him, and which harmonizes with his antecedents in his successive -existences.[349] This is unknown only to persons who are most vulgarly -ignorant of divine things. Try therefore to become as good as you -can, but do not on that account imagine that you alone are capable of -becoming good[350]; for then you would no longer be good. Other men -(than you) are good; there are most excellent (ministering spirits -called) guardians; further, there are deities who, while inhabiting -this world, contemplate the intelligible world,[351] and are still -better than the guardians. Further still is the blissful (universal) -Soul that manages the universe. Honor therefore the intelligible -divinities, and above all the great King of the intelligible -world,[352] whose greatness is especially manifested in the multitude -of the divinities. - - -TRUE KNOWLEDGE SHOWN NOT BY UNIFICATION, BUT REVELATION OF DIVINE POWER. - -It is not by reducing all things to unity, but by setting forth the -greatness developed by the divinity itself, that one manifests his -knowledge of divine power. The Divinity (manifests His power) when, -though remaining what He is, He produces many divinities which depend -on Him, which proceed from Him, and exist by Him. In this way this -world holds existence from Him, and contemplates Him along with all the -divinities which announce to men the divine decrees, and who reveal to -them whatever pleases them.[353] These stars must not be blamed for not -being what the divinity is, for they only represent their nature. - - -MODESTY IS A PART OF GOODNESS; PRIDE IS FOLLY. - -If, however, you pretend to scorn these (stars that are considered) -divinities, and if you hold yourself in high esteem, on the plea that -you are not far inferior to them, learn first that the best man is he -who is most modest in his relations with divinities and men. In the -second place, learn that one should think of the divinity only within -limits, without insolence, and not to seek to rise to a condition -that is above human possibilities. It is unreasonable to believe that -there is no place by the side of the divinity for all other men, -while impudently proposing alone to aspire to that dignity. This by -itself would deprive the Soul of the possibility of assimilation to -the Divinity to the limit of her receptivity.[354] This the Soul -cannot attain unless guided by Intelligence. To pretend to rise above -Intelligence,[355] is to fall short of it. There are people insane -enough to believe, without reflection, claims such as the following -("By initiation into secret knowledge, or gnosis), you will be better, -not only than all men, but even than all the deities." These people are -swollen with pride[356]; and men who before were modest, simple and -humble, become arrogant on hearing themselves say, "You are a child -of the divinity; the other men that you used to honor are not his -children, any more than the stars who were worshipped by the ancients. -You yourself, without working, are better than heaven itself." Then -companions crowd around him, and applaud his utterance. He resembles -a man who, though not knowing how to count, should, in the midst of a -crowd of men, equally ignorant with him, hear it said by somebody that -he was a thousand feet high while others were only five feet high. -He would not realize what was meant by a thousand feet, but he would -consider this measure very great. - - -OTHER GNOSTIC INCONSISTENCIES. - -(Gnostics) admit that the Divinity interests Himself in men. How then -could He (as they insist), neglect the world that contains them? Could -this be the case because He lacked the leisure to look after it? In -this case He would lack the leisure to look after anything beneath -Him (including men also). On the other hand, if He do care for men, -that care would include the world that surrounds and contains them. -If He ignored what surrounded men, in order to ignore the world, He -would thereby also ignore the men themselves. The objection that men -do need that the Divinity should care for the world (is not true), for -the world does need the care of the Divinity. The Divinity knows the -arrangement of the world, the men it contains, and their condition -therein.[357] The friends of the Divinity support meekly all that -results necessarily therefrom. (They are right), for that which happens -should be considered not only from one's own standpoint, but also from -that of the totality of circumstances. Each (person or thing) should -be considered from his place (in the scale of existence); one should -ever aspire to Him to whom aspire all beings capable of (the Good); -one should be persuaded that many beings, or rather that all beings, -aspire thereto; that those who attain to Him are happy, while the -others achieve a fate suitable to their nature; finally, one should -not imagine oneself alone capable of attaining happiness.[358] Mere -assertion of possession does not suffice for real possession thereof. -There are many men who, though perfectly conscious that they do not -possess some good, nevertheless boast of its possession, or who really -believe they do possess it, when the opposite is the true state of -affairs; or that they exclusively possess it when they are the only -ones who do not possess it. - - -PLOTINOS ADDRESSES HIMSELF TO THOSE OF HIS FRIENDS WHO WERE FORMERLY -GNOSTIC, NOT TO THE LATTER WHO ARE HOPELESS. - -10. On examining many other assertions (of the Gnostics), or rather, -all of their assertions, we find more than enough to come to some -conclusion concerning the details of their doctrines. We cannot, -indeed, help blushing when we see some of our friends, who had imbued -themselves with (Gnostic) doctrines before becoming friends of ours, -somehow or another persevere therein, working zealously to try to -prove that they deserved full confidence, or speaking as if they were -still convinced that they were based on good grounds.[385] We are here -addressing our friends, not the partisans (of the Gnostics). Vainly -indeed would we try to persuade the latter not to let themselves be -deceived by men who furnish no proofs--what proofs indeed could they -furnish?--but who only impose on others by their boastfulness.[359] - - -PLOTINOS HAS NO INTENTION OF WRITING A FULL CONFUTATION. - -Following another kind of discussion, we might write a refutation of -these men who are impudent enough to ridicule the teachings of those -divine men who taught in ancient times, and who conformed entirely to -truth. We shall not however embark on this, for whoever understands -what we have already said will from that (sample) be able to judge of -the remainder. - - -GNOSTIC THEORY OF CREATION BY MERE ILLUMINATION.[386] - -Neither will we controvert an assertion which overtops all their others -in absurdity--we use this term for lack of a stronger. Here it is: -"The Soul and another Wisdom inclined downwards towards things here -below, either because the Soul first inclined downwards spontaneously, -or because she was misled by Wisdom; or because (in Gnostic view), -Soul and Wisdom were identical. The other souls descended here below -together (with the Soul), as well as the "members of Wisdom," and -entered into bodies, probably human. Nevertheless the Soul, on account -of which the other soul descended here below, did not herself descend. -She did not incline, so to speak, but only illuminated the darkness. -From this illumination was born in matter an image (Wisdom, the image -of the Soul). Later was formed (the demiurgic creator, called) an image -of the image, by means of matter or materiality, or of a principle by -(Gnostics) designated by another name (the "Fruit of the fall")--for -they make use of many other names, for the purpose of increasing -obscurity. This is how they derive their demiurgic creator. They also -suppose that this demiurgic creator separated himself from his mother, -Wisdom, and from him they deduce the whole world even to the extremity -of the images." The perpetration of such assertions amounts to a bitter -sarcasm of the power that created the world. - - -THE NUMBERLESS INTELLECTUAL DIFFICULTIES OF SUCH A THEORY. - -11. To begin with, if the Soul did not descend, if she limited herself -to illuminating the darkness (which is synonymous with matter), by -what right could it be asserted that the Soul inclined (downwards)? -If indeed a kind of light issued from the Soul, this does not -justify an inclination of the Soul, unless we admit the existence -of something (darkness) beneath her, that the Soul approached the -darkness by a local movement, and that, on arriving near it, the -Soul illuminated it. On the contrary, if the Soul illuminated it -while remaining self-contained, without doing anything to promote -that illumination,[360] why did the Soul alone illuminate the -darkness? (According to the Gnostics) this occurred only after the -Soul had conceived the Reason of the universe. Then only could the -Soul illuminate the darkness, by virtue of this rational conception. -But then, why did the Soul not create the world at the same time -she illuminated the darkness, instead of waiting for the generation -of ("psychic) images"? Further, why did this Reason of the world, -which (the Gnostics) call the "foreign land," and which was produced -by the superior powers, as they say, not move its authors to that -inclination? Last, why does this illuminated matter produce psychic -images, and not bodies? (Wisdom, or) the image of the Soul does not -seem to stand in need of darkness or matter. If the Soul create, then -her image (Wisdom) should accompany her, and remain attached to her. -Besides, what is this creature of hers? Is it a being, or is it, as -the (Gnostics) say, a conception? If it be a being, what difference is -there between it and its principle? If it be some other kind of a soul, -it must be a "soul of growth and generation," since its principle is a -reasonable soul.[361] If however (this Wisdom) be a "soul of growth and -generation," how could it be said to have created for the purpose of -being honored[362]? In short, how could it have been created by pride, -audacity, and imagination? Still less would we have the right to say -that it had been created by virtue of a rational conception. Besides, -what necessity was there for the mother of the demiurgic creator to -have formed him of matter and of an image? Speaking of conception, it -would be necessary to explain the origin of this term; then, unless a -creative force be predicated of this conception, it would be necessary -to show how a conception can constitute a real being. But what creative -force can be inherent in this imaginary being? The (Gnostics) say that -this image (the demiurgic creator) was produced first, and that only -afterwards other images were created; but they permit themselves to -assert that without any proof. For instance, how could it be said that -fire was produced first (and other things only later)? - - -HOW THE GNOSTIC DEMIURGE CREATED. - -12. How could this newly formed image (the demiurgic creator) have -undertaken to create by memory of the things he knew? As he did not -exist before, he could not have known anything, any more than the -mother (Wisdom) which is attributed to him. Besides, it is quite -surprising that, though the (Gnostics) did not descend upon this world -as images of souls, but as veritable, genuine souls, nevertheless -hardly one or two of them succeeds in detaching themselves from the -(sense) world and by gathering together their memories, to remember -some of the things they previously knew, while this image (the -demiurgical creator), as well as his mother (Wisdom), which is a -material image, was capable of conceiving intelligible entities in a -feeble manner, indeed, as say the Gnostics, but after all from her -very birth. Not only did she conceive intelligible things, and formed -an idea of the sense-world from the intelligible world, but she also -discovered with what elements she was to produce the sense-world. Why -did she first create the fire? Doubtless because she judged she would -begin thereby; for why did she not begin with some other element? If -she could produce fire because she had the conception thereof, why, -as she had the conception of the world--as she must have begun by a -conception of the totality--did she not create the whole at one single -stroke[363]? Indeed, this conception of the world embraced all its -parts. It would also have been more natural, for the demiurgical -creator should not have acted like a workman, as all the arts are -posterior to nature and to the creation of the world. Even to-day, we -do not see the natures[364] when they beget individuals, first produce -the fire, then the other elements successively, and finally mingle -them. On the contrary, the outline and organization of the entire -organism are formed at once in the germ born at the monthly periods in -the womb of the mother. Why then, in creation, should matter not have -been organized at one stroke by the type of the world, a type that -must have contained fire, earth, and all the rest of them? Perhaps the -(Gnostics) would have thus conceived of the creation of the world, if -(instead of an image) they had had in their system a genuine Soul. But -their demiurgic creator could not have proceeded thus. To conceive of -the greatness, and especially of the dimension of the heavens, of the -obliquity of the zodiac, of the course of the stars, the form of the -earth, and to understand the reason of each of these things, would not -have been the work of an image, but rather of a power that proceeded -from the better principles, as the (Gnostics) in spite of themselves -acknowledge. - - -THE NECESSITY OF THE ILLUMINATION OF THE DARKNESS MUST HAVE BEEN -ETERNAL. - -Indeed, if we examine attentively that in which this illumination of -the darkness consists, the (Gnostics) may be led to a recognition -of the true principles of the world. Why was the production of this -illumination of the darkness necessary, if its existence was not -absolutely unavoidable? This necessity (of an illumination of the -darkness) was either in conformity with, or in opposition to nature. If -it conformed thereto, it must have been so from all time; if it were -contrary thereto, something contrary to nature would have happened to -the divine powers, and evil would be prior to the world. Then it would -no longer be the world that was the cause of evil (as the Gnostics -claim), but the divine powers. The world is not the principle of evil -for the soul, but it is the soul that is the principle of evil for the -world. Ascending from cause to cause, reason will relate this world to -the primary principles. - - -EVEN THE EXISTENCE OF THE DARKNESS MUST BE RELATED TO THE SOUL. - -If matter is also said to be the cause of evil, where does it -originate? For the darkness existed already, as say (the Gnostics), -when the soul has seen and illuminated them. From whence (comes -darkness)? If (the Gnostics) answer that it is the soul herself that -created (darkness) by inclining (downwards to matter), then evidently -(the darkness) did not exist before the inclination of the soul. -Darkness therefore is not the cause of this inclination; the cause is -in the nature of the soul. This cause may thus be related to preceding -necessities, and as a result to first principles.[365] - - -INSTEAD OF COMPLAINING OF THE WORLD, UNDERSTAND IT AND FIT YOURSELF TO -IT. - -13. Those who complain of the nature of the world do not know what they -are doing, nor the extent of their audacity. Many men are ignorant of -the close concatenation which unites the entities of the first, second, -and third ranks,[366] and which descends even to those of the lowest -degree. Instead of blaming what is subordinate to first principles, -we should gently submit to the laws of the universe, rise to first -principles, not undergo those tragic terrors,[367] inspired in certain -people by the spheres of the world which exert on us nothing but a -beneficent influence.[368] What is so terrible in them? Why should they -be feared by these men foreign to philosophy and all sound learning? -Though celestial spheres do have fiery bodies, they should not inspire -us with any fear, because they are perfectly harmonious with the -universe and with the earth. We must besides consider the souls of -the stars to which those (Gnostics) consider themselves so superior, -while their bodies, which surpass ours so much in size and beauty, -efficaciously concur in the production of things that are conformed to -the order of nature[369]; for such things could not be born if first -principles alone existed. Finally the stars complete the universe, and -are important members thereof. If even man holds a great superiority -over animals, there must be a far greater superiority in those stars -which exist as ornaments to the universe, and to establish order -therein, and not to exert thereover a tyrannical influence.[370] The -events that are said to flow from the stars are rather signs thereof -than causes.[371] Besides, the events that really do flow from the -stars differ among each other by circumstances. It is not therefore -possible that the same things should happen to all men, separated as -they are by their times of birth, the places of their residence, and -the dispositions of their souls. It is just as unreasonable to expect -that all would be good, nor, because of the impossibility of this, to -go and complain on the grounds that all sense-objects should be similar -to intelligible objects. Moreover,[372] evil is nothing but what is -less complete in respect to wisdom, and less good, in a decreasing -gradation. For instance, nature (that is, the power of growth and -generation) should not be called evil because she is not sensation; nor -sensation be called evil, because it is not reason. Otherwise, we might -be led to think that there was evil in the intelligible world. Indeed, -the Soul is inferior to Intelligence, and Intelligence is inferior to -the One. - - -GNOSTICS WRONGLY IMAGINE INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES CAN BE BEWITCHED.[387] - -14. Another error of the (Gnostics) is their teaching that intelligible -beings are not beyond the reach of being affected by human beings. -When the (Gnostics) utter magic incantations, addressing them to -(intelligible beings), not only to the Soul, but to the Principles -superior thereto, what are they really trying to do? To bewitch them? -To charm them? Or, to influence them[373]? They therefore believe -that divine beings listen to us, and that they obey him who skilfully -pronounces these songs, cries, aspirations and whistlings, to all of -which they ascribe magic power.[374] If they do not really mean this, -if they by sounds only claim to express things which do not fall under -the senses, then, through their effort to make their art more worthy -of respect, they unconsciously rob it of all claim to respect, in our -estimation. - - -THEIR EXPLANATION OF DISEASE AS DEMONIACAL POSSESSION IS WRONG. - -They also pride themselves on expelling diseases. If this were done -through temperance, by a well regulated life, as do the philosophers, -this claim might be respected. But they insist that diseases are -demons, which they can expel by their words, and they boast of this -in order to achieve reputation among the common people, that is -always inclined to stand in awe of magic. They could not persuade -rational individuals that diseases do not have natural causes, such as -fatigue, satiety, lack of food, corruption, or some change depending -on an interior or exterior principle. This is proved by the nature -of diseases. Sometimes a disease is expelled by moving the bowels, -or by the administration of some potion; diet and bleeding are also -often resorted to. Is this because the demon is hungry, or the potion -destroys him? When a person is healed on the spot, the demon either -remains or departs. If he remain, how does his presence not hinder -recovery? If he depart, why? What has happened to him? Was he fed by -the disease? In this case, the disease was something different from -the demon. If he enter without any cause for the disease, why is the -individual into whose body he enters not always sick? If he enter -into a body that contains already a natural cause of disease, how far -does he contribute to the disease? The natural cause is sufficient to -produce the disease. It would be ridiculous to suppose that the disease -would have a cause, but that, as soon as this cause is active there -would be a demon ready to come and assist it. - - -THE GENUINE VALUE OF GNOSTICISM SEEN IN ITS LOW MORAL ASPECTS. - -The reader must now clearly see the kind of assertions given out by -the (Gnostics), and what their purpose must be. What they say about -demons (or guardians) has here been mentioned only as a commentary on -their vain pretenses. Other opinions of the (Gnostics) may best be -judged by a perusal of their books, by each individual for himself. -Remember always that our system of philosophy contains, beside the -other good (reasons), the simplicity of moral habits, the purity of -intelligence, and that instead of vain boasting it recommends the care -of personal dignity, rational self-confidence, prudence, reserve, -and circumspection. The remainder (of Gnostic philosophy) may well -be contrasted with ours. As all that is taught by the Gnostics is -very different (from our teachings), we would have no advantage in a -further detailed contrast; and it would be unworthy of us to pursue the -matter(?). - - -THE GNOSTIC DESTINY OF MAN IS DEMORALIZING. - -15. We should however observe the moral effect produced in the soul -of those who listen to the speeches of these men who teach scorn of -the world and its contents. About the destiny of man there are two -principal doctrines. The one assigns as our end the pleasures of the -body, the other suggests honesty and virtue, the love of which comes -from the divinity, and leads back to the Divinity, as we have shown -elsewhere.[375] Epicurus, who denies divine Providence, advises us to -seek the only thing that remains, the enjoyments of pleasure. Well, the -(Gnostics) hold a still more pernicious doctrine; they blame the manner -in which divine Providence operates, and they accuse Providence itself; -they refuse respect to laws established here below, and the virtue -which has been honored by all centuries. To destroy the last vestiges -of honor, they destroy temperance by joking at it; they attack justice, -whether natural, or acquired by reason or exercise; in one word, they -annihilate everything that could lead to virtue. Nothing remains -but to seek out pleasure, to profess selfishness, to renounce all -social relations with men, to think only of one's personal interest, -unless indeed one's own innate disposition be good enough to resist -their pernicious doctrines. Nothing that we regard as good is by them -esteemed, for they seek entirely different objects. - - -THE GNOSTICS IGNORE VIRTUE WITHOUT WHICH GOD IS A MERE WORD. - -Nevertheless, those who know the Divinity should attach themselves -to Him even here below, and by devoting themselves to His first -principles, correct earthly things by applying their divine nature -thereto. Only a nature that disdains physical pleasure can understand -that of which honor consists; those who have no virtue could never rise -to intelligible entities. Our criticism of the (Gnostics) is justified -by this that they never speak of virtue, never study it, give no -definition of it, do not make out its kinds, and never repeat anything -of the beautiful discussions thereof left to us by the ancient sages. -The (Gnostics) never tell how one could acquire or preserve moral -qualities, how one should cultivate or purify the soul.[376] Their -precept, "Contemplate the divinity,"[377] is useless if one does not -also teach how this contemplation is to take place. One might ask the -(Gnostics) if such contemplation of the divinity would be hindered by -any lust or anger? What would hinder one from repeating the name of the -divinity, while yielding to the domination of the passions, and doing -nothing to repress them? Virtue, when perfected, and by wisdom solidly -established in the soul, is what shows us the divinity. Without real -virtue, God is no more than a name. - - -SCORN OF THIS WORLD IS NO GUARANTEE OF GOODNESS. - -16. One does not become a good man merely by scorning the divinities, -the world, and the beauties it contains. Scorn of the divinities is the -chief characteristic of the evil. Perversity is never complete until -scorn of the divinities is reached; and if a man were not otherwise -perverse, this vice would be sufficient to make him such. The respect -which the (Gnostic) pretend to have for the intelligible divinities -(the aeons) is an illogical accident. For when one loves a being, -he loves all that attaches thereto; he extends to the children the -affection for the parent. Now every soul is a daughter of the heavenly -Father. The souls that preside over the stars are intellectual, good, -and closer to the divinity than ours. How could this sense-world, with -the divinities it contains, be separated from the intelligible world? -We have already shown above the impossibility of such a separation. -Here we insist that when one scorns beings so near to those that hold -the front rank, it can only be that one knows them by name only. - - -TO EXCEPT CERTAIN CLASSES OF BEING FROM DIVINE CARE IS TO SHOW -CALLOUSNESS OF DISPOSITION. - -How could it ever be considered pious to claim that divine Providence -does not extend to sense-objects, or at least interests itself only in -some of them (the spiritual men, not the psychical)? Such an assertion -must surely be illogical. The (Gnostics) claim that divine Providence -interests itself only in them. Was this the case while they were living -on high, or only since they live here below? In the first case, why -did they descend onto this earth? In the second, why do they remain -here below? Besides, why should the Divinity not be present here -below also? Otherwise how could He know that the (Gnostics), who are -here below, have not forgotten Him, and have not become perverse? If -He know those that have not become perverse, He must also know those -who have become perverse, to distinguish the former from the latter. -He must therefore be present to all men, and to the entire world, in -some manner or other. Thus the world will participate in the Divinity. -If the Divinity deprived the world of His presence, He would deprive -you also thereof, and you could not say anything of Him or of the -beings below Him. The world certainly derives its existence from Him -whether the divinity protect you by His providence or His help, and -whatever be the name by which you refer to Him. The world never was -deprived of the Divinity, and never will be. The world has a better -right than any individuals to the attentions of Providence, and to -participation in divine perfections. This is particularly true in -respect to the universal Soul, as is proved by the existence and wise -arrangement of the world. Which of these so proud individuals is as -well arranged, and as wise as the universe, and could even enter into -such a comparison without ridicule or absurdity? Indeed, unless made -merely in the course of a discussion, such a comparison is really an -impiety. To doubt such truths is really the characteristic of a blind -and senseless man, without experience or reason, and who is so far -removed from knowledge of the intelligible world that he does not -even know the sense-world? Could any musician who had once grasped -the intelligible harmonies hear that of sense-sounds without profound -emotion? What skilful geometrician or arithmetician will fail to enjoy -symmetry, order and proportion, in the objects that meet his view? -Though their eyes behold the same objects as common people, experts see -in them different things; when, for instance, with practiced glance, -they examine some picture. When recognizing in sense-objects an image -of intelligible (essence), they are disturbed and reminded of genuine -beauty: that is the origin of love.[378] One rises to the intelligible -by seeing a shining image of beauty glowing in a human face. Heavy and -senseless must be that mind which could contemplate all the visible -beauties, this harmony, and this imposing arrangement, this grand -panoramic view furnished by the stars in spite of their distance, -without being stirred to enthusiasm, and admiration of their splendor -and magnificence. He who can fail to experience such feelings must have -failed to observe sense-objects, or know even less the intelligible -world. - - -GNOSTICS JUSTIFY THEIR HATE OF THE BODY BY PLATO; IN THIS CASE THEY -SHOULD FOLLOW HIM ALSO IN ADMIRATION OF THE WORLD. - -17. Some (Gnostics) object that they hate the body because Plato[379] -complains much of it, as an obstacle to the soul, and as something -far inferior to her. In this case, they should, making abstraction -of the body of the world by thought, consider the rest; that is, -the intelligible sphere which contains within it the form of the -world, and then the incorporeal souls which, in perfect order, -communicate greatness to matter by modeling it in space according to an -intelligible model, so that what is begotten might, so far as possible, -by its greatness, equal the indivisible nature of its model; for the -greatness of sense-mass here below corresponds to the greatness of -intelligible power. Let the (Gnostics) therefore consider the celestial -sphere, whether they conceive of it as set in motion by the divine -power that contains its principle, middle and end, or whether they -imagine it as immovable, and not yet exerting its action on any of the -things it governs by its revolution. In both ways they will attain a -proper idea of the Soul that presides over this universe. Let them then -conceive of this soul as united to a body, though remaining impassible, -and still communicating to this body so far as the latter is capable of -participating therein,[380] some of its perfections, for the divinity -is incapable of jealousy.[381] Then they will form a proper idea of -the world. They will understand how great is the power of the Soul, -since she makes the body participate in her beauty to the limit of -her receptivity. This body has no beauty by nature, but when (it is -beautified by the Soul) it entrances divine souls. - - -GNOSTICS BOAST OF LACK OF APPRECIATION OF BEAUTY ALREADY RECOGNIZED. - -The (Gnostics) pretend that they have no appreciation for the beauty of -the world, and that they make no distinction between beautiful and ugly -bodies. In this case they should not distinguish good from bad taste, -nor recognize beauty in the sciences, in contemplation, nor in the -divinity itself; for sense-beings possess beauty only by participation -in first principles. If they be not beautiful, neither could those -first principles be such. Consequently sense-beings are beautiful, -though less beautiful than intelligible beings. The scorn professed by -(Gnostics) for sense-beauty is praiseworthy enough if it refer only -to the beauty of women and of young boys, and if its only purpose be -to lead to chastity. But you may be sure that they do not boast of -scorning what is ugly, they only boast of scorning what they had at -first recognized and loved as being beautiful. - - -EVEN EXTERIOR OR PARTIAL BEAUTY NEED NOT CONFLICT WITH THE BEAUTY OF -THE UNIVERSE; AND IN ANY CASE THERE WOULD BE NO EVIL IN IT. - -We must further observe that it is not the same beauty that is seen in -the parts and in the whole, in individuals and in the universe; that -there are beauties great enough in sense-objects and in individuals, -for instance, in the guardians, to lead us to admire their creator, -and to prove to us that they indeed are works of his. In this way we -may attain a conception of the unspeakable beauty of the universal -Soul, if we do not attach ourselves to sense-objects, and if, without -scorning them, we know how to rise to intelligible entities. If the -interior of a sense-being be beautiful, we shall judge that it is -in harmony with its exterior beauty. If it be ugly we will consider -that it is inferior to its principle. But it is impossible for a -being really to be beautiful in its exterior while ugly within; for -the exterior is beautiful only in so far as it is dominated by the -interior.[382] Those who are called beautiful, but who are ugly within, -are externally beautiful only deceptively. In contradiction to those -who claim that there are men who possess a beautiful body and an ugly -soul, I insist that such never existed, and that it was a mistake to -consider them beautiful. If such men were ever seen, their interior -ugliness was accidental, and also their soul was, by nature, beautiful; -for we often meet here below obstacles which hinder us from reaching -our goal. But the universe cannot by any obstacle be hindered from -possessing interior beauty in the same way that it possesses exterior -beauty. The beings to whom nature has not, from the beginning, given -perfection, may indeed not attain their goal, and consequently may -become perverted; but the universe never was a child, nor imperfect; -it did not develop, and received no physical increase. Such a physical -increase would have been impossible inasmuch as it already possessed -everything. Nor could we admit that its Soul had ever, in the course -of time, gained any increase. But even if this were granted to the -(Gnostics), this could not constitute any evil. - - -RECOGNITION OF THE BEAUTY OF THE BODY NEED NOT IMPLY ATTACHMENT -THERETO; IT IS COMPATIBLE WITH RESIGNATION. - -18. (Gnostics) however might object that their doctrine inspired -revulsion from, and hate for the body, while (that of Plotinos) really -attached the soul to the body (by recognition of its beauty). Hardly. -We may illustrate by two guests who dwelt together in a beautiful -house. The first guest blamed the disposition of the plan, and the -architect who constructed it, but nevertheless remained within it. -The other guest, instead of blaming the architect, praised his skill, -and awaited the time when he might leave this house, when he should no -longer need it. The first guest would think himself wiser and better -prepared to leave because he had learned to repeat that walls are -composed of lifeless stones and beams, and that this house was far -from truly representing the intelligible house. He would however not -know that the only difference obtaining between him and his companion, -is that he did not know how to support necessary things, while his -companion (who did not blame the house) will be able to leave it -without regret because he loved stone-buildings only very moderately. -So long as we have a body we have to abide in these houses constructed -by the (world) Soul, who is our beneficent sister, and who had the -power to do such great things without any effort.[383] - - -GNOSTICS ACKNOWLEDGE KINSHIP WITH DEPRAVED MEN, BUT REFUSE IT TO THE -BEAUTIFUL UNIVERSE, OF WHICH WE SHOULD BE FAR PROUDER. - -The Gnostics do not hesitate to call the most abandoned men their -"brothers," but refuse this name to the sun, and the other deities -of heaven, and to the very Soul of the world, fools that they are! -Doubtless, to unite ourselves thus to the stars by the bonds of -kindred, we must no longer be perverse, we must have become good, and -instead of being bodies, we must be souls in these bodies; and, so far -as possible, we must dwell within our bodies in the same manner as the -universal Soul dwells within the body of the universe. To do this, one -has to be firm, not allow oneself to be charmed by the pleasures of -sight or hearing, and to remain untroubled by any reverse. The Soul -of the world is not troubled by anything, because she is outside -of the reach of all. We, however, who here below are exposed to the -blows of fortune, must repel them by our virtue, weakening some, and -foiling others by our constancy and greatness of soul.[384] When we -shall thus have approached this power which is out of the reach (of -all exigencies), having approached the Soul of the universe and of -the stars, we shall try to become her image, and even to increase -this resemblance to the assimilation of fusion. Then, having been -well disposed by nature and exercised, we also will contemplate what -these souls have been contemplating since the beginning. We must also -remember that the boast of some men that they alone have the privilege -of contemplating the intelligible world does not mean that they really -contemplate this world any more than any other men. - - -GNOSTICS WHO BOAST SUPERIORITY TO THE DIVINITIES WHO CANNOT LEAVE THEIR -BODIES ARE IN REALITY IGNORANT OF THE TRUE STATE OF AFFAIRS. - -Vainly also do some (Gnostics) boast of having to leave their bodies -when they will have ceased to live, while this is impossible to the -divinities because they always fill the same function in heaven. They -speak thus only because of their ignorance of what it is to be outside -of the body, and of how the universal Soul in her entirety wisely -governs what is inanimate. - - -THE JEALOUS DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SPIRITUAL, PSYCHIC AND MATERIAL IS -DUE CHIEFLY TO IGNORANCE OF OTHER PEOPLE'S ATTAINMENTS. - -We ourselves may very well not love the body, we may become pure, -scorn death, and both recognize and follow spiritual things that are -superior to earthly things. But on this account we should not be -jealous of other men, who are not only capable of following the same -goal, but who do constantly pursue it. Let us not insist that they are -incapable of doing so. Let us not fall into the same error as those -who deny the movement of the stars, because their senses show them to -remain immovable. Let us not act as do the (Gnostics), who believe that -the nature of the stars does not see what is external, because they -themselves do not see that their own souls are outside. - - - - -FOOTNOTES: - - -[1] A Stoic term. - -[2] As says Parmenides, verse 80. - -[3] Cicero, Tusc. i. 16; Nat. Deor. i. 1; Maxim. Tyr. xvii. 5. - -[4] As wastage, see 6.4, 10; as Numenius might have said in 12, 22. - -[5] As said Numenius fr. 46. - -[6] See Plato's Timaeus 37. - -[7] Od. xvii. 486. - -[8] See v. 3.5, 6. - -[9] See v. 3.10. - -[10] See v. 3.8, 9. - -[11] See v. 3.12-17. - -[12] See v. 5.13. - -[13] See ii. 1.2. - -[14] ii 1.1. - -[15] Aristotle, Met. v. 4. - -[16] Aristotle, Met. xii. 2. - -[17] Aristotle, Met. vii. 8. - -[18] Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 5. - -[19] Aristotle, Met. xii. 5. - -[20] Aristotle, Met. ix. 8. - -[21] Aristotle, Met. ix. 5. - -[22] That is, their producing potentiality, and not the potentiality of -becoming these things, as thought Aristotle. Met. ix. 2. - -[23] As thought Aristotle, Soul, iii. 7; Met. xii. - -[24] By Plato in the Timaeus 52. - -[25] See iv. 6. A polemic against Aristotle, de Anima ii. 5, and -the Stoics, Cleanthes, Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math. vii. 288, and -Chrysippus, Diog. Laert. vii. 50. - -[26] As thought Chrysippus, Diog. Laert. vii. 111. - -[27] See iv. 6. - -[28] See vi. 6.16. - -[29] See ii. 6.2. - -[30] Plato, in his Phaedo 127. - -[31] See i. 2.1. - -[32] See i. 2.1, the Socratic definition. - -[33] See i. 1.2.4. - -[34] See ii. 5.2. - -[35] See i. 2.4. - -[36] A term of Stoic psychology. - -[37] See i. 2.4. - -[38] These are the so-called "passions" of the Stoic Chrysippus, Diog. -Laert. vii. 111. - -[39] Of the Stoic contention, Tert. de Anima, 5. - -[40] See i. 1.13. - -[41] As was taught by Cleanthes, Sext. Empir. adv. Math. vii. 288. - -[42] See iii. 6.3. - -[43] Or, "affections," as we shall in the future call them, in English. - -[44] See i. 8.15. - -[45] Or, blindly, see iii. 8.1-3; iv. 4.13, 14. - -[46] See iii. 6.3, and i. 1.13. - -[47] See iii. 6.6. - -[48] See i. 4.8. - -[49] Notice this Numenian name for the divinity used at the beginning -of the Escoreal Numenius fragment. - -[50] See iii. 8.9. - -[51] As Plato asked in his Sophist 246; Cxi. 252. - -[52] As thought Philo in Leg. Alleg. i. - -[53] See ii. 4.15. - -[54] See ii. 5.3-5. - -[55] See vi. 2. - -[56] See ii. 4.11. - -[57] As thought Plato in the Timaeus 49-52. - -[58] See ii. 5.5. - -[59] de Gen. et Corr. ii. 2, 3. - -[60] As objected Aristotle, in de Gen. et Corr. i. 7. - -[61] See ii. 7.1. - -[62] iii. 6.2. - -[63] As asked Aristotle, de Gen. i. 7. - -[64] In his Timaeus 50. - -[65] See iii 6.12, 13. - -[66] In his Timaeus 51. - -[67] See ii. 4.11. - -[68] In his Timaeus 51. - -[69] In his Timaeus 49. - -[70] See iii. 6.11. - -[71] As said Plato, in his Timaeus 52. - -[72] See ii. 8.14. - -[73] See iii. 5.9. - -[74] The myth of Pandora, see iv. 3.14. - -[75] See iii. 6.4. - -[76] See iii. 6.5, 6. - -[77] By a "bastard" reasoning," see ii. 4.10. - -[78] See ii. 4.9-12. - -[79] See iii. 6.12. - -[80] See ii. 7.2. - -[81] See iii. 6.13. - -[82] See ii. 4.8. - -[83] See ii. 6.3. - -[84] See ii. 4.5. - -[85] See iii. 4.6. - -[86] It would create the magnitude that exists in matter; that is, -apparent magnitude. - -[87] ii. 4.11; against Moderatus of Gades. - -[88] See ii. 4.11. - -[89] See iv. 6.3. - -[90] See ii. 4.12. - -[91] That is, intelligible "being." - -[92] See iii. 6.8. - -[93] See ii. 7.1. - -[94] As was suggested by Plato in the Timaeus 49-52. - -[95] As was suggested by Herodotus, ii. 51, and Cicero, de Nat. Deor. -iii. 22. - -[96] That is, Cybele, see v. 1.7. - -[97] The Stoics. - -[98] We have here another internal proof of the rightness of our -present chronological order of Plotinos's Enneads. The myth of Pandora -occurs in iv. 3.14, which follows this book. - -[99] Against the Manicheans. - -[100] See vi. 7.41. - -[101] See i. 1.13. - -[102] In that port of the Philebus, 29; C ii. 345. - -[103] As thought Plato, in the Phaedrus, 246-248. - -[104] As was taught by the Manicheans. - -[105] As thought Cicero, Tusculans, i. 20; and Aristotle, de Anima, -iii. 1-3. - -[106] See ii. 9.18. - -[107] 42; 69. - -[108] 264; C vi. 48. - -[109] Rep. x. C 287. - -[110] See iv. 3.7. - -[111] See iv. 3.6. - -[112] See iv. 3.6. - -[113] Generative. - -[114] See iii. 2.16. - -[115] In the sense that it has no limits. - -[116] See iv. 3.15. - -[117] As thought Xenocrates and Aristotle, de Coelo, i. 10. - -[118] See iv. 3.10. - -[119] Philo, de Sommis, M 648, de Monarchia, M 217. - -[120] See iii. 6.16, 17. - -[121] As said Numenius, fr. 32. - -[122] As did Discord, in Homer's Iliad, iv. 443. - -[123] See ii. 9.7. - -[124] See v. 7.1. - -[125] See ii. 3.7. - -[126] Plato, Rep. x. C 617; C x. 286. - -[127] See iv. 4, 24, 40, 43; iv. 9.3. - -[128] As was taught by Himerius; see also Plutarch and Themistius. - -[129] As Numenius said, fr. 26.3. - -[130] In his Timaeus, 35. - -[131] As said Numenius, fr. 32. - -[132] See Aristotle, Plato's Critias, Numenius, 32, and Proclus. - -[133] As thought Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 1.4. - -[134] In his Timaeus, 34; 30. - -[135] Plato does just the opposite. - -[136] Being the power which directs the animal from above, see i. 1.7. - -[137] As thought Plato in the Timaeus, 73. - -[138] iv. 3.13. - -[139] As thought Plato in the Menexenus, 248. - -[140] As Aristotle asked, de Memoria et Remin. 1. - -[141] See i. 1.11. - -[142] Plato, Philebus, C ii. 359. - -[143] As thought Plato, in the Philebus, C ii. 357. - -[144] As thought Plato in his Philebus, C ii. 363. - -[145] See i. 1.12; iv. 3.32; the irrational soul, which is an image of -the rational soul, is plunged in the darkness of sense-life. - -[146] As thought Plato in his Philebus, C ii. 359. - -[147] In iv. 3.27. - -[148] As thought Aristotle, de Mem. 1. - -[149] As thought Aristotle. - -[150] As thought Aristotle. - -[151] See i. 4.10. - -[152] As Numenius said, fr. 32. - -[153] Another reading is: "All perceptions belong to forms which can -reduce to all things." But this does not connect with the next sentence. - -[154] According to Plato Phaedrus, 246; C vi. 40, and Philebus, 30; C -ii. 347. - -[155] Timaeus, 33. - -[156] A pun on "schema" and "schesis." - -[157] As thought Aristotle, de Gen. et Corr. ii. 2-8. - -[158] Rep. x. 617; C x. 287; see 2.3.9. - -[159] Rep. x. - -[160] According to Aristotle. - -[161] iv. 4.23. - -[162] Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 7. - -[163] See section 5. - -[164] As thought Aristotle, de Anim. ii. 7. - -[165] As Plato pointed out in his Meno, 80. - -[166] As Plato teaches. - -[167] A mistaken notion of Plato's, then common; see Matth. 6.23. - -[168] Diog. Laert. vii. 157. - -[169] Section 8. - -[170] Section 2. - -[171] Section 6. - -[172] This Stoic theory is set forth by Diogenes Laertes in vii. 157. - -[173] As thought Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 8. - -[174] As Aristotle again thought. - -[175] As thought Aristotle, de Gener. Anim. v. 1. - -[176] See iv. 4.29. - -[177] This book sounds more Numenian or Amelian, than the former three, -which seem to have been written to answer questions of Porphyry's. - -[178] See section 1-7. - -[179] As thought Aristotle in his Physics, viii. - -[180] iv. 3.10. - -[181] See ii. 3.13. - -[182] iii. 6.6. - -[183] Children, whose minds are still weak, and cannot understand the -theories of speculative sciences exhibited by Nic. Eth. x. 7. - -[184] This upper part of the universal Soul is the principal power of -the soul; see ii. 3.17. - -[185] See ii. 3.18. - -[186] In his Phaedrus, 272, Cary, 75. - -[187] That is, the essence of the known object, a pun on "reason," as -in ii. 6.2. - -[188] see iv. 6.3. - -[189] Which is the visible form; see iii. 8.1. - -[190] As thought Plato, Banquet, Cary, 31, and Aristotle in Aristotle, -de Anima, ii. 4. - -[191] This sounds as if it were a quotation from Numenius, though it -does not appear in the latter's fragments. - -[192] See i. 8.2. - -[193] See v. 1.4. - -[194] See iii. 7.2. - -[195] See iii. 7.10. - -[196] Notice the connection between this thought and ii. 5, written in -the same period of his life; see vi. 8.18. - -[197] See iii. 3.7 and vi. 8.15. - -[198] That is, the intelligible matter of ii. 4.3. - -[199] As thought Aristotle, in Nic. Eth. i. 7; de Anima, ii. 1. - -[200] See vi. 8.16. - -[201] vi. 8.15. - -[202] A pun on "koros," meaning both fulness and son. - -[203] Another proof of the chronological order; see 3.8.9. - -[204] Cicero, Orator 2; Seneca, Controversiae v. 36. - -[205] ii. 8.1. - -[206] See i. 6.8. - -[207] i. 6.2. - -[208] i. 6.9. - -[209] i. 6.8. - -[210] i. 6.2. - -[211] i. 6.6. - -[212] i. 6.5. - -[213] iii. 5.6. - -[214] As thought Plato, in Phaedrus, Cary, 58. - -[215] Phaedrus, Cary, 59, 62; Numenius, 32. - -[216] See ii. 2.1. - -[217] In Sophocles Oedipus Coloneus, 1375; a pun on "due" and "diken." - -[218] A pun between "science" and "knowledge." - -[219] In his Phaedrus; Cary, 58. - -[220] See v. 1.8. - -[221] See iv. 4.11, 12. - -[222] A pun on the word meaning "forms" and "statues," mentioned above. - -[223] Such as Numenius fr. 20. - -[224] Pun on "agalmata," which has already done duty for "statues" and -"forms." - -[225] Here Plotinos refers to the hieratic writing, which differed from -both the hieroglyphic and demotic. - -[226] See iii. 2 and 3. - -[227] See ii. 9.12; iii. 2.1. - -[228] In his Phaedrus, 246; Cary, 55. - -[229] As was taught by Cleomedes, Meteora viii, and Ptolemy, Almagest -i, Geogr. i. 7; vii. 5. - -[230] See i. 6.9. - -[231] In his Timaeus, 37; Cary, c. 14. - -[232] See i. 3.2; i. 6.8. - -[233] Referring to the Gnostics; see ii. 9.17; this is another proof of -the chronological order. - -[234] As proposed in ii. 9.17. - -[235] See i. 8.15. - -[236] As thought Plato in his Phaedrus; Cary, 56. - -[237] The "infra-celestial vault," of Theodor of Asine. - -[238] As said Plato, in his Phaedrus; Cary, 59. - -[239] See v. 1.6. - -[240] Gnostics. - -[241] Pun on "koros," fulness, or son. - -[242] Or, being satiated with good things. - -[243] See Life of Plotinos, 18. Notice how well the chronological -order works out. The former book (31) and the next (33) treat of the -Gnostics, while this book treats of the philosophical principle of -their practical aspect. Besides, it explains the Amelio-Porphyrian -quarrel. Like all other difficulties of the time, it was about -Gnosticism, and Amelius's dismissal meant that Plotinos rejected -Egyptian Gnosticism, and Numenius's true position as a dualist stands -revealed; but after Porphyry's departure, Plotinos harked back to it. - -[244] We see here an assertion of the standpoint later asserted by -Berkeley, Kant and Hegel that the mind cannot go outside itself, -and that consequently it is the measure of all things. Kant's -"thing-in-itself," a deduction from this, was already discovered by -Plotinos in the result of the "bastard reasoning" process, which Hegel -called "dialectic." - -[245] See iii. 6.1. - -[246] The Kantian "thing-in-itself." See Porphyry, Principles of -Intelligibles, 33. - -[247] See iii. 6.1. - -[248] Here is a pun based on "doxa." - -[249] "Paradechomene." - -[250] "Doxa," which is derived from "dechesthai," to receive. - -[251] We would, in other words, become pessimists. - -[252] This is Philo's secondary divinity, p. 27, Guthrie's "Message of -Philo Judaeus." - -[253] That is, of the Intelligence and of the intelligible entities. - -[254] Who is the Unity; a Numenian conception, fr. 36. - -[255] A term reminiscent of the famous Christian Nicene formulation. - -[256] That is we will form a "pair." Numenius, 14, also taught the -Pythagorean "pair or doubleness." - -[257] See vi. 6.16. - -[258] Pun between essences, "einai," and one, or "henos." - -[259] "Ousia." - -[260] Notice the two words for "essence." Plato Cratylus, 424; Cary, 87. - -[261] As Plato in his Cratylus suggests. - -[262] Or, essence. - -[263] Or, essence, to be. - -[264] Being. - -[265] The goddess Hestia in Greek, or Vesta in Latin; but "hestia" also -meant a "stand." P. 401, Cratylus, Cary, 40. - -[266] See Numenius, 67, 42. - -[267] See ii. 9.1; iii. 9.9. - -[268] Such as Numenius, 42, and Plutarch, de Isis et Osiris, Fr. Tr. -381. - -[269] From "a-polus." - -[270] See i. 6.4; iii. 5.1. - -[271] See v. 5.1. - -[272] See i. 6, end. - -[273] Pun between "on" and "hen." - -[274] See Plato, Rep. vi., Cary, 13. - -[275] Mentioned in Biography of Plotinos, 16. - -[276] See vi. 9. Another proof of the chronological arrangement. - -[277] See v. 6. - -[278] See v. 1, 2, 3, 6; vi. 7, 9. - -[279] Of Bythos. - -[280] Ennoia and Thelesis. - -[281] By distinguishing within each of them potentiality and -actualization, Numenius, 25, multiplied them. - -[282] Nous, and Logos or Achamoth; see ii. 9.6. - -[283] The prophoric logos, see i. 2.3; and Philo. de Mosis Vita 3. - -[284] See v. 3.4. - -[285] See i. 1.7. - -[286] This is a mingling of Platonic and Aristotelic thought, see -Ravaisson, Essay on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, ii. 407. - -[287] Which would be nonsense; the Gnostics (Valentinus) had gone as -far as 33 aeons. - -[288] See ii. 9.11. - -[289] Between the sense-world, and the intelligible world, see iv. -3.5-8; v. 2.3. Plotinos is followed by Jamblichus and Damascius, but -Proclus and Hermias denied that the soul did not entirely enter into -the body, Stobaeus, Ecl. i. 52. - -[290] See iv. 3.18; iv. 4.3. - -[291] The intelligible world. - -[292] See iv. 3.1-8; iv. 9. - -[293] Thus Plotinos opposes the Gnostic belief that the world was -created, and will perish. - -[294] See ii. 9, 9, 16. - -[295] The Gnostic Horos. - -[296] As Plato said Phaedrus, 246; Cary, 55. - -[297] The Gnostic theory of creation by the fall of Sophia and Achamoth. - -[298] See ii. 9.11. Valentinus however said only that Achamoth had -created all things in honor of the aeons; only the later theologians -held this view mentioned by Plotinos. - -[299] See i. 2.1, 2. - -[300] See I. Tim. vi. 20, 21; and ii. 9.9. - -[301] See ii. 3.9. - -[302] See ii. 1.4. - -[303] This, however, is a mistake of Plotinos's, as the Gnostics held -not this, but that the pneumatic or spiritual humans dwell on earth, -and the psychic in heaven, as Bouillet remarks. - -[304] So that they should remain in the model instead of descending -here below? - -[305] By remaining in the model, instead of descending here below. - -[306] That is, the spiritual germs emanating from the "pleroma." - -[307] Plotinos here treats as synonymous "new earth," "reason of the -world," "model of the world," and "form of the world;" but Bouillet -shows that there is reason to believe he was in error in the matter. - -[308] From the pleroma, whose "seeds of election" they were, and which -now become to them a foreign country. - -[309] Of the aeons, from whom souls, as intelligible beings, had -emanated. - -[310] As in the famous drama of Sophia and Achamoth. - -[311] The unseen place; the transmigrations of Basilides, Valentinus, -Carpocrates, and the others. - -[312] P. 39. Cary, 15. - -[313] Added to Plato by Plotinos. - -[314] Plotinos had done so himself (Intelligence, and the intelligible -world); Numenius (25) also did so. - -[315] See iv. 3.8, 15. - -[316] Such as Pythagoras and Plato, Life of Plot. 23. - -[317] See ii. 9.17. - -[318] The doctrine of the Gnostics. - -[319] Or, generations, the "syzygies" of the aeons, see Titus iii. 9. - -[320] ii. 9.17. - -[321] As in the drama of the fall of Sophia and Achamoth. - -[322] See ii. 1.1; iii. 2.1; iv. 3.9. - -[323] See i. 2. - -[324] iv. 3. - -[325] For the descending souls enter bodies already organized by the -universal Soul, see iv. 3.6; ii. 1.5; ii. 3.9; ii. 9.18. - -[326] Lower part, see ii. 1.5; ii. 3.5, 18. - -[327] See ii. 1, 3, 4, 5. - -[328] The first "bond" is nature, the second is the human soul. - -[329] See ii. 1.3. - -[330] That is, the stars, ii. 3.7-13. - -[331] See ii. 9.5. - -[332] With Plato's Timaeus, 29, Cary, 9. - -[333] In the universal Soul, ii. 3.16, 17. - -[334] By existing and creating, see ii. 5.2. - -[335] See i. 8.7, for matter. - -[336] See ii. 9.3. - -[337] See Philo, de Gigant. i. - -[338] See ii. 2.1. - -[339] See ii. 3.9-13. - -[340] See iv. 8. - -[341] See ii. 3.9. - -[342] See i. 4.8. - -[343] See i. 2. - -[344] See i. 4.7. - -[345] See ii. 3.13. - -[346] See i. 4.8. - -[347] See i. 4.14-16. - -[348] See ii. 3.8, 16. - -[349] See ii. 3.9. - -[350] See below. - -[351] The stars, see ii. 3.9. - -[352] That is, Intelligence, see i. 8.2. - -[353] The stars prognosticate events, see ii. 3.9. - -[354] See i. 2. - -[355] To the perfect Father, Bythos, Irenaeus, ii. 18. - -[356] See Irenaeus, iii. 15. - -[357] See ii. 9.16. - -[358] See Irenaeus. i. 21. - -[359] See Irenaeus, iii. 15. - -[360] See i. 1.12. - -[361] Thus identifying the "reasonable soul" with Sophia, and "the soul -of growth and generation" with Achamoth. - -[362] See ii. 9.4. - -[363] ii. 3.16. - -[364] Or "seminal reasons," ii. 3.13. - -[365] See iii. 4.1. - -[366] As wrote Plato in his second Letter, 2, 312, Cary, 482. - -[367] Jeremiah x. 2. - -[368] Pindar, Olymp. i. 43. - -[369] See ii. 3.9. - -[370] See ii. 3.7. - -[371] See ii. 3.7. - -[372] As thought Plato, Laws, x, p. 897, Cviii. 265; Cary, C8, that -evil is only negative. - -[373] See Irenaeus, i. 25. - -[374] See Origen, c. Cels. i. 24. - -[375] See i. 2. - -[376] This is, however, extreme, as Clement of Alexandria hands down -helpful extracts from Valentinus, Strom. iv.; etc. - -[377] See ii. 9.9 - -[378] See i. 6.7. - -[379] In his Phaedo, pp. 66, 67; Cary, 29-32. - -[380] That is, according to its receptivity. - -[381] As thought Plato in the Timaeus, p. 29; C xi. 110, Cary, 10. - -[382] By the soul that gives it form, see i. 6.2. - -[383] See iii. 4.6; v. 1.2-6. - -[384] See i.4.8-14. - -[385] This was evidently a rebuke to Amelius, for his faithfulness to -Numenius; and it is at this time that Amelius left Plotinos. - -[386] This may refer to Numenius's views, see fr. 27 b. 10. - -[387] Compare Numenius, fr. 61, 62a. - - - - -Transcriber's Notes: - - -Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant -preference was found in this four-volume set; otherwise they were not -changed. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected. - -Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. - -Infrequent spelling of "Plotinus" changed to the predominant "Plotinos." - -Several opening or closing parentheses and quotation marks are -unmatched; Transcriber has not attempted to determine where they belong. - -This four-volume set contains fifty-four "Books," each of which -contains several Sections. Some of the "Books" group those Sections -into sub-Chapters whose headings begin with a letter: "A.", "B.", etc. -(see page 387 as an example). In this plain text version of this eBook, -the Sections and the sub-Chapters are preceded by two blank lines. - -Section headings beginning with letter enumerations, such as A. B. C. -were printed larger than normal Section headings. - -Page 377: "lation as (form)" perhaps should be "relation as (form)"; -unchanged here. - -Page 387: "two order of things" perhaps should be "two orders of -things". - -Page 459: "who is imaging to know" probably should be who is "imagining -to know". - -Page 459: the opening parenthesis in "which (the Soul herself" has no -matching closing parenthesis; it probably belongs after "Soul". - -Page 467: incorrect/inconsistent single and double quotation marks in -the following line have not been changed: - - passion' and suffering, unless the word "suffering' - -Page 470: "What in us in the soul's" perhaps should be "What in us is -the soul's". - -Page 494: in the source, the last line, "who assumes the various poses -suggested by the music," was out of place; no suitable place for it was -found, so it has been removed for continuity and now appears only in -this note. - -Page 530: the closing parenthesis after "perceived object" also is -the closing parenthesis for the phrase beginning "is ill-founded". -There are other instances in this four-volume set in which closing -parentheses and quotation marks are shared. - -Page 555: "within yourself they you may" perhaps should be "within -yourself then you may". - -Page 613: "a constitution similar that of each" probably should be "a -constitution similar to that of each". - - -Footnote Issues: - -In these notes, "anchor" means the reference to a footnote, and -"footnote" means the information to which the anchor refers. Anchors -occur within the main text, while footnotes are grouped in sequence at -the end of this eBook. The structure of the original book required two -exceptions to this, as explained below. - -The original text used chapter endnotes. In this eBook, they have been -combined into a single, ascending sequence based on the sequence in -which the footnotes occurred in the original book, and placed at the -end of the eBook. Several irregularities are explained below. - -1. Some footnotes are referenced by more than one anchor, so two or -more anchors may refer to the same footnote. - -2. Some anchors were out of sequence, apparently because they were -added afterwards or because they are share a footnote with another -anchor. 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