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diff --git a/42931-0.txt b/42931-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0247138 --- /dev/null +++ b/42931-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11638 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 42931 *** + +VOLUME II. + +WORKS OF PLOTINOS. + + + + + PLOTINOS + Complete Works + + In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods; + + With + BIOGRAPHY by PORPHYRY, EUNAPIUS, & SUIDAS, + COMMENTARY by PORPHYRY, + ILLUSTRATIONS by JAMBLICHUS & AMMONIUS, + STUDIES in Sources, Development, Influence; + INDEX of Subjects, Thoughts and Words. + + by + KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE, + + Professor in Extension, University of the South, Sewanee; + A.M., Sewanee, and Harvard; Ph.D., Tulane, and Columbia. + M.D., Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia. + + VOL. II + Amelio-Porphyrian Books, 22-33. + + COMPARATIVE LITERATURE PRESS + P. O. Box 42, ALPINE, N.J., U.S.A. + + + + + Copyright, 1918, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie. + All Rights, including that of Translation, Reserved. + + Entered at Stationers' Hall, by + George Bell and Sons, Portugal Street, Lincoln's Inn, London. + + + + +SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR. + +The One Identical Essence is Everywhere Entirely Present. + + +WHY THE WORLD-SOUL IS EVERYWHERE ENTIRE IN THE WORLD-BODY. + +1. Is it because the body of the universe is so great that the Soul is +everywhere present in the universe, though being naturally divisible in +(human) bodies? Or it is by herself, that she is everywhere present? In +the latter case, she has not been drawn away everywhere by the body, +but the body found her everywhere in existence before it; thus, in +whatever place it may be, it found the Soul present before it itself +was part of the universe, and the total body of the universe was +located in the Soul that existed already. + + +HOW COULD THE SOUL HAVE NO MAGNITUDE, IF SHE ALREADY FILLED ALL SPACE? + +But if the Soul had such an extension before the body approached +her, if she already filled all space, how can she have no magnitude? +Besides, how could she have been present in the universe when the +latter did not yet exist? Last, being considered indivisible and +non-extended, is she everywhere present without having any magnitude? +If the answer be that she extended herself throughout the body of the +universe without herself being corporeal, the question is not yet +resolved by thus accidentally attributing magnitude to the Soul; for +it would then be reasonable to ask how she grew great by accident. The +Soul could not extend herself in the entire body in the same manner as +quality, as for instance, sweetness or color; for these are passive +modifications of the bodies, so that one must not be astonished to see +a modification spread all over the modified body, being nothing by +itself, inhering in the body, and existing only within it; that is why +the soul necessarily has the same magnitude as the body. Besides, the +whiteness of one part of the body does not share the experience[1] (or, +"passion") experienced by the whiteness of another part; the whiteness +of one part is identical, in respect to species, to the whiteness of +another part; but it is not identical therewith in respect to number; +on the contrary, the part of the soul which is present in the foot is +identical with the portion of the soul present in the hand, as may be +seen in the percepts thereof. Last, what is identical in the qualities +is divisible, while that which is identical in the soul is indivisible; +if it be said to divide, it is in this sense that it is present +everywhere. + + +THE SOUL WAS CAPABLE OF EXTENSION BEFORE THE EXISTENCE OF THE BODY. + +In view of these facts, let us, starting from the very beginning, +explain in a clear and plausible manner, how the soul, being +incorporeal and extended, could, nevertheless, have assumed such an +extension, either before the bodies, or in the bodies. If indeed one +see that she was capable of assuming extension before the bodies +existed, it will be easily understood that she could have done so +within the bodies. + + +DESCRIPTION OF THE UNIVERSAL BEING. + +2. There exists a genuinely universal (Being). The world that we +see is no more than its image. This veritably universal (Being) is +in nothing; for nothing has proceeded from its existence. What is +posterior to this universal (Being) must, to exist, be in it, since it +would depend on it, and without it could neither subsist nor move. Do +not therefore place our world in this genuinely universal (being) as in +a place, if by place you understand the limit of the body containing +so far as it contains, or a space which before had, and which still +has emptiness for nature. Conceive of the foundation on which our +world rests as existing in the (Being) which exists everywhere, and +contains it. Conceive their relation exclusively by the mind, setting +aside all local nomenclature. Indeed, when one speaks of place, it is +only in relation with our visible world; but the universal (being), +being the First, and possessing genuine existence, has no need of +being in a place, nor in anything whatever. Being universal, it could +not fail to support itself, for it fills itself, equals itself, and +is where is the universal because it is this itself. What has been +built on the universal, being other than it, participates in it, and +approaches it, receives strength from it, not by dividing it, but +because it finds it in itself, because it approaches it, since the +universal ("being") is not outside of itself; for it is impossible for +the essence to be in non-essence; on the contrary, it is non-essence +that must subsist in essence, and consequently unite entirely with +the whole essence. We repeat, the universal could not separate itself +from itself; and if we say that it is everywhere, it is only in this +sense that it is in essence, that is, in itself. It is not surprising +that what is everywhere is in essence and in itself; for that which +is everywhere is in the unity. We, however, positing that the (Being) +in question is sense-(existence), believe that it is everywhere here +below; and, as the sense-(existence) is great, we wonder how nature +(that is, the intelligible essence) can extend in that which has so +great a magnitude. In reality, the (Being) which is called great is +small; the (Being) which is regarded as small is great, since the +whole of it penetrates in every part of all; or rather, our world, +by its parts everywhere approaching the universal (Being), finds it +everywhere entire, and greater than itself. Consequently, as it would +receive nothing more by a greater extension (for, if it were possible, +it would thereby exclude itself from the universal Being), it circles +around this Being. Not being able to embrace it, nor to pierce into +its innermost, it contented itself with occupying a place, and with +having a place where it might preserve existence while approaching the +universal (Being), which in one sense is present to it, and in another, +is not present; for the universal (Being) is in itself, even when +something else wishes to unite itself to it. Therefore, approaching it, +the body of the universe finds the universal "Being"; having no need +of going any farther, it turns around the same thing because the thing +around which it turns is the veritably universal (Being), so that in +all its parts it enjoys the presence of this whole entire Being. If +the universal (Being) were in a place, our world should (instead of +having a circular motion), rush towards it in a straight line, touching +different parts of this Being by different parts of its own, and find +itself on one side distant from it, and on the other side near it. But +as the universal (Being) is neither near one place, nor distant from, +another, it is necessarily entirely present as soon as it is at all +present. Consequently, it is entirely present to each of these things +from which it is neither near nor far; it is present to the things that +are able to receive it. + + +THE UNIVERSAL BEING IS INDIVISIBLE. + +3. Is the universal (Being) by itself present everywhere? Or does it +remain within itself, while from its innermost its powers descend on +all things, and is it in this sense that it is regarded as everywhere +present? Yes, doubtless. That is why it is said that souls are the rays +of this universal (Being), that it is built on itself, and that from +it, souls descend into various animals. The things which participate +in its unity, incapable as they are of possessing a complete nature +conformed to its nature, enjoy the presence of the universal (Being) in +this sense that they enjoy the presence of some of its powers. They are +not, however, entirely separated from it, because it is not separated +from the power which it communicates to each of them. If they do not +have more, it is only because they are not capable of receiving more +from the presence of the entire whole (Being). Evidently it is always +entirely present there where its powers are present. It however remains +separated, for if it became the form of any one particular being, it +would cease to be universal, to subsist everywhere in itself, and +it would be the accident of some other "being." Therefore, since it +belongs to none of these things, even of those that aspire to unite +themselves with it, it makes them enjoy its presence when they desire +it, and in the measure in which they are capable thereof; but it +does not belong to any of them in particular. It is not surprising, +therefore, that it should be present in all things, since it is not +present in any in a manner such as to belong to it alone. It is also +reasonable to assert that, if the soul share the passions of the +bodies, it is only by accident, that she dwells in herself, and belongs +neither to matter nor to body, that the whole of her illuminates +the whole world-body. It is not a contradiction to say that the +(Being) which is not present in any place is present to all things +each of which is in a place. What, indeed, would be surprising and +impossible would be that the universal (Being) could, while occupying +a determinate place, be present to things which are in a place, and +could at all be present in the sense in which we have explained it. +Reason forces us, therefore, to admit that the universal (Being) must, +precisely because it does not occupy any place, be entirely present +to the things to which it is present; and, since it is present to the +universe, be entirely present to each thing; otherwise, one part of it +would be here, and another there; consequently, it would be divisible, +it would be body. How otherwise could one divide the ("Being")? Is it +its life that shall within it be divided? If it be the totality of the +(being) that is life, no part of it would be that. Or will somebody +try to divide the Intelligence, so that one of its parts be here, +and the other there? In this case, neither of the two parts would +be intelligence. Or will the (Being) itself be divided? But if the +totality be the (Being), no one part of it would be that. It might be +objected that the parts of the bodies are still bodies themselves. But +that which is divided is not the body (as such), but a certain body +of a certain extent; now each of its parts possesses the form that +causes it to be named body; while the form not only does not have some +particular extension, but even any kind of extension at all. + + +THE UNITY OF BEING DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER BEINGS. + +4. How can there be a plurality of essences, intelligences and soul, +if essence be one? The essence is one everywhere; but its unity does +not exclude the existence of other (beings), which may be said to +conform thereto. It is so also with the unity of the intelligence, and +of the soul, although the Soul of the universe be different from the +particular souls. + + +ESSENCE IS DIVISIBLE IF THEREBY NOT DIMINISHED. + +It would seem as if there were a contradiction between the present +assertions and other statements of ours; and perhaps our demonstration +imposes rather than convinces. It is impossible to believe that the +essence which is one be also everywhere identical; it would seem +preferable to admit that essence, considered in its totality, is +susceptible of division, so long as this division does not diminish +it; or, to use more careful terms, that it begets all things while +remaining with itself; and that the souls that are born of it, and +are its parts, fill up everything. But if it be admitted that the One +essence remains in Himself because it seems incredible that a principle +could everywhere be present entire, the same difficulty would hinder us +in regard to souls; for it will result that each of them will no longer +be entire in the whole body, but will be divided therein, or, if each +individual soul remain entire, that it is by remaining in one part of +the body, that the soul will communicate her power to it. These same +questions about the soul could be raised about the powers of the soul, +and we might ask if they be all entire everywhere. Last, one could be +led to believe that the soul was in one member, while her power was in +another. + + +THE SOUL, AS COMPRISING MANY SOULS, IS INFINITE. + +Let us first explain how there can be a plurality of intelligences, +souls, and essences. If we consider the things that proceed from the +first principles, as they are numbers and not magnitudes, we shall +also have to ask ourselves how they fill the universe. This plurality +which thus arises from the first principles does not in any way help us +to solve our question, since we have granted that essence is multiple +because of the difference (of the beings that proceed from it), and +not by place; for though it be multiple, it is simultaneously entire; +"essence everywhere touches essence,"[2] and it is everywhere entirely +present. Intelligence likewise is manifold by the difference (of +the intelligences that proceed therefrom), and not by space; it is +entire everywhere. It is so also with souls; even their part which is +divisible in the bodies is indivisible by its nature. But the bodies +possess extension because the soul is present with them; or rather, +it is because there are bodies in the sense-world; it is because the +power of the Soul (that is universal) which is in them manifests itself +in all their parts, that the Soul herself seems to have parts. What +proves that she is not divided as they are, and with them, that she +is entirely present everywhere, is that by nature she is essentially +one and indivisible. Thus, the unity of the Soul does not exclude the +plurality of souls, any more than the unity of essence excludes the +plurality of (beings), or that the plurality of intelligibles does +not disagree with the existence of the One. It is not necessary to +admit that the Soul imparts life to the bodies by the plurality of +souls, nor that that plurality derives from the extension of the body +(of the world). Before there ever were any bodies, there was already +one (universal) Soul and several (individual) souls. The individual +souls existed already in the universal Soul, not potentially, but each +in actuality. The unity of the universal Soul does not hinder the +multitude of the individual souls contained within her; the multitude +of the individual souls does not hinder the unity of the universal +Soul. They are distinct without being separated by any interval; they +are present to each other instead of being foreign to each other; for +they are not separated from each other by any limits, any more than +different sciences are within a single soul. The Soul is such that in +her unity she contains all the souls. Such a nature is, therefore, +infinite. + + +THE GREATNESS OF THE SOUL HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SIZE OF THE BODY. + +5. The magnitude of the Soul does not consist in being a corporeal +mass; for every corporeal mass is small, and reduces to nothing, if +it be made to undergo a diminution. As to the magnitude of the Soul, +nothing can be removed from it; and if something were removed, she +would not lose anything. Since, therefore, she cannot lose anything, +why fear that she should be far from something? How could she be far +from something since she loses nothing, since she possesses an eternal +nature, and is subject to no leakage? If she were subject to some +leakage, she would advance till where she could leak; but as she cannot +leak at all (for there is no place where or into which she could leak), +she has embraced the universe, or rather, she herself is the universe, +and she is too great to be judged according to physical magnitude. +We may say that she gives little to the universe; but she gives it +all it can receive. Do not consider the universal Being (Essence) +as being smaller, or as having a smaller mass (than our universe); +otherwise, you would be led to ask yourself how that which is smaller +can unite with that which is greater. Besides, one should not predicate +comparative smallness of the universal Essence, nor compare, in regard +to mass, that which has no mass with that which has; that would be +as if somebody said that the science called medicine is smaller than +the body of the doctor. Neither attribute to the universal Essence an +extent greater (than that of our universe); for it is not in extension +that the soul is greater than the body. What shows the veritable +magnitude of the soul, is that, when the body increases, the same soul +which formerly existed in a smaller mass is present in this whole mass +that has become greater; now it would be ridiculous to suppose that +the soul increases in the same manner as a corporeal mass. + + +THE SOULS WILL DIFFER AS WILL THE SENSATIONS. + +6. Why (if the universal Soul possess the magnitude here attributed +to her), does she not approach some other body (than that which she +animates; that is, some individual body)? It would be this body's +(privilege or duty) to approach the universal Soul, if it be able to +do so; on approaching to her, it receives something, and appropriates +it. But would this body, that would approach the universal Soul, not +already possess her simultaneously with the soul proper to itself, +since these souls (the universal Soul, and the individual soul) do not +appear to differ from each other? The fact is, that as their sensations +differ, so must the passions that they experience likewise differ. The +things are judged to be different, but the judge is the same principle +successively placed in presence of different passions, although it be +not he who experiences them, but the body disposed in some particular +manner. It is as if when some one of us judges both the pleasure +experienced by the finger, and the pain felt by the head. But why does +not our soul perceive judgments made by the universal Soul? Because +this is a judgment, and not a passion. Besides, the faculty that judged +the passion does not say, "I have judged," but it limits itself to +judging. Thus, in ourselves, it is not the sight which communicates its +judgment to the hearing, although both of these senses made separate +judgments; what presides over these two senses is reason, which +constitutes a different faculty. Often reason cognizes the judgment +made by some other (being), while being conscious simultaneously of the +passion it experiences. But this question has been treated elsewhere. + + +HOW CAN THE SAME PRINCIPLE EXIST IN ALL THINGS? + +Let us return to this question: How can the same principle exist +in all things? This question amounts to asking how each of the +sense-objects which form a plurality and which occupy different places, +can, nevertheless, participate in the same principle; for it is not +allowable to divide unity into a multitude of parts; it would be more +fitting to reduce the multitude of parts to unity, which could not +approach them. But when these parts occupy different places, they have +led us to believe that unity likewise is split up, as if the power +which dominates and which contains were divided into as many parts as +that which is contained. The hand itself (though corporeal), may hold +an entire body, such as a piece of wood several feet in length, and +other objects. In this case, the force that holds makes itself felt in +the whole object that is felt, and does not distribute itself in as +many parts as it may contain, though it be circumscribed by the limit +of the reach of the hand. Nevertheless, the hand is limited by its own +extension, and not by that of the body which is held or suspended. Add +to the suspended body some other length, and admitting that the hand +can carry it, its force will hold the entire body without dividing into +as many parts as it may contain. Now suppose that the corporeal mass +of the hand be annihilated, and, nevertheless, allow the force which, +before, existed in the hand and held the weight, to persist; will not +this same force, indivisible in the totality, be equally indivisible in +each of its parts? + + +LIGHT EXISTS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITHIN AND WITHOUT. + +7. Imagine a luminous point which serves as centre, and imagine around +it a transparent sphere, so that the clearness of the luminous point +shines in the whole body that surrounds it without the exterior +receiving any light from elsewhere; you will surely have to acknowledge +that this interior light, by remaining impassible, penetrates the +whole surrounding mass, and that it embraces the whole sphere from +the central point in which it is seen to shine. The truth is that the +light did not emanate from the little body placed in the centre; for +this little body did not glow inasmuch as it was a body, but inasmuch +as it was a luminous body; that means, by virtue of an incorporeal +power. Now in thought annihilate the mass of the little luminous body, +and preserve its luminous power; could you still say that light is +somewhere? Will it not be equally in the interior, and in the whole +exterior sphere? You will no longer perceive where it was fixed before, +and you will no longer say whence it comes, nor where it is; in this +respect you will remain uncertain and astonished; you will see the +light shine simultaneously in the interior and in the exterior sphere. +An example of this is the solar light that shines in the air when +you look at the body of the sun, at the same time that you perceive +everywhere the same light without any division; that is demonstrated +by objects that intercept the light; they reflect it nowhere else +than in the direction from which it came; they do not shatter it into +fragments. But if the sun were an incorporeal power, you could not, +when it would radiate light, tell where the light began, nor from where +it was sent; there would be but a single light, the same everywhere, +having neither point of beginning, nor principle from which it proceeds. + + +UNITY IS IN THE MANIFOLD BY A MANNER OF EXISTENCE. + +8. When light emanates from a body it is easy to tell when it shines, +because the location of that body is known. But if a being be +immaterial, if it have no need of a body, if it be anterior to all +bodies, and be founded on itself, or rather if it have no need, as +has a body, or resting on any foundation--then, a being endowed with +such a nature has no origin from which it is derived, resides in no +place, and depends on no body. How could you then say that one of its +parts is here, and another is there? For thus it would have an origin +from which it had issued, and it would depend from something. We must, +therefore, say that if something participate in this being by the +power of the universe, it participates in this being entirely, without +thereby being changed or divided; for it is a being united to a body +that suffers (although often that happens to it only accidentally), +and in this respect it may be said that it is passive and divisible, +since it is some part of the body, either its passion, or form. As +to the (being) which is united to any body, and to which the body +aspires to be united, it must in no manner share the passions of the +body, as such; for the essential passion of the body, as such, is +to divide itself. If, therefore, the body be by nature inclined to +divide itself, then is the incorporeal, by nature, indivisible. How, +in fact, could one divide that which has no extension? If, therefore, +the extended (being) participate in the (being) which has no extension, +it participates in this (being) without dividing it; otherwise, this +(being) would have extension. Consequently, when you say that the +unity (of the universal essence) is in the manifold, you do not say +that unity has become manifoldness, but you refer to this unity the +manner of existence of the multitude, seeing it in this whole multitude +simultaneously. As to this Unity, it will have to be understood that +it belongs to no individual, nor to the whole multitude, but that it +belongs to itself alone, that it is itself, and that, being itself, +it does not fail to support itself. Nor does it possess a magnitude +such as of our universe, nor, let alone, such as that of one of the +parts of the universe; for it has absolutely no magnitude. How could +it have any magnitude? It is the body that should have such magnitude. +As to the (being) whose nature is entirely different from that of the +body, no magnitude should be ascribed to it. If it have no magnitude, +it is nowhere; it is neither here nor there; for if so, it would be in +several places. If then the local division suits only the (being) of +which one part is here, and the other there, how could the (being) that +is neither here nor there be divided? Consequently, the incorporeal +(being) must remain indivisible in itself, although the multitude of +things aspire to unite itself to it, and succeeds therein. If they +aspire to possess it, they aspire to possess it entire, so that if +they succeed in participating in that (being), they will participate +in that entire (being) so far as their capacity reaches. Nevertheless, +the things that participate in this (being) must participate in it +as if they did not participate in it, in this sense that it does not +belong exclusively to any of them. It is thus that this (being) dwells +entirely in itself, and in the things in which it manifests; if it did +not remain entire, it would no more be itself, and things would no +longer participate in the (being) to which they aspire, but in some +other (being) to which they did not aspire. + + +POTENTIALITIES ARE INSEPARABLE FROM THEIR BEINGS. + +9. If this unity (of the universal Soul) divided itself in a multitude +of parts such that each would resemble the total unity, there would be +a multitude of primary (beings); for each one of these (beings) would +be primary. How then could one distinguish from each other all these +primary (beings), so that they might not all in confusion blend into a +single one? They would not be separated by their bodies, for primary +(beings) could not be forms of bodies; as they would be similar to +the primary (Being) which is their principle. On the other hand, if +the things named parts were potentialities of the universal (Being), +(there would be two results). First, each thing would no longer be +the total unity. Then, one might wonder how these potentialities +separated from the universal (Being), and abandoned it; for if they +abandoned it, it could evidently only be to go somewhere else. There +might also be reason to ask oneself if the potentialities which are +in the sense-world are still or no longer in the universal (Being). +If they be no longer in it, it is absurd to suppose it diminished or +became impotent, by being deprived of the powers it possessed before. +It is equally absurd to suppose that the potentialities would be +separated from the beings to which they belong. On the contrary, if +the potentialities exist simultaneously in the universal (Being) and +elsewhere, they will, here below, be either wholes or parts; if they be +parts, that part of them that will remain on high will also form parts; +if they be wholes, they are here below the same as above; they are not +divided here below in any way, and thus the universal (Being) is still +the same without any division. Or again, the potentialities are the +particularized universal (Being), which has become the multitude of +the things of which each is the total unity; and these potentialities +are mutually similar. In this way, with each being there will be but +a single potentiality, united to Being, and the other things will be +no more than mere potentialities. But it is not easier to conceive of +a being without potentiality, than a potentiality without a being; +for above (among the ideas) the potentiality consists of hypostatic +existence and being; or rather, it is something greater than being. +Here below there are other potentialities, less energetic or lively; +they emanate from the universal (Being) as from a brilliant light would +emanate another less brilliant light; but the beings inhere in these +potentialities, as there could be no potentiality without being. + + +THE UNIVERSAL SOUL IS EVERYWHERE ENTIRE, INCLUDING SOULS SPLIT +INFINITELY. + +Among such potentialities, which are necessarily conformable to each +other, the universal Soul must be the same everywhere, or, if she be +not absolutely everywhere, she must, at least, in every place, be +entire without division, as in one and the same body. In this case, why +could she not also be thus in the whole universe? If we were to suppose +that each particular soul were divided into infinity, the universal +Soul will no longer be entire, and, as a result of this division, +she will become completely impotent. Then, as there will be entirely +different powers in different parts of the world, there will be no +more sympathy among souls. Last, the image, separated from the essence +it represents, and the light, separated from the source of which it +is only a weakened emanation, could no longer subsist; for in general +everything that derives its existence from anything else and its image +could no longer subsist without its model. Likewise, these powers +which radiate from the universal Soul would cease to be if they found +themselves separated from their principle. If so, the Principle which +begets these powers will exist everywhere they are; consequently, from +this standpoint also, the universal (Being) must be everywhere present +as a whole, without undergoing any divisions. + + +THE IMAGE IS BOUND TO ITS MODEL BY RADIATION. + +10. It may be objected that the image need not necessarily be attached +to its model; for there are images that subsist in the absence of their +model from which they are derived. For instance, when the fire ceases, +the heat that proceeds from it does not any the less remain in the +warmed object. The relation between this image and its model should be +understood as follows. Let us consider an image made by a painter. In +this case, it is not the model who made the image, but the painter; +and even so it is not even the real image of the model, even if the +painter had painted his own portrait; for this image did not arise from +the body of the painter, nor from the represented form, nor from the +painter himself, but it is the product of a complex of colors arranged +in a certain manner. We, therefore, do not really here have the +production of an image, such as is furnished by mirrors, waters, and +shadows. Here the image really emanates from the pre-existing model, +and is formed by it, and could not exist without it. It is in this +manner that the inferior potentialities proceed from the superior ones. + + +SOULS ARE AS IMMORTAL AS THE ONE FROM WHOM THEY PROCEED. + +Let us proceed to the objection drawn from the heat that remains +after the withdrawal of the fire. The heat is not the image of the +fire, or at least, we may deny that there is always fire in heat; +but even so heat would not be independent of fire. Besides, when you +withdraw from a body the fire that heats it, this body grows cold, +if not instantaneously, at least gradually. It would, however, be +wrong to say that the powers that descend here below also gradually +grow extinct; for this would amount to stating that only the One is +immortal, while the souls and intelligences are mortal. Besides, it is +not reasonable to admit that even the things that derive from a "being" +that wastes away also gradually exhaust themselves; for even if you +should immobilize the sun, it would still shed the same light in the +same places. If it were objected that it would not be the same light, +the conclusion would be (the absurdity) that the body of the sun is in +a perpetual wastage. Last we have elsewhere demonstrated at length +that what proceeds from the One does not perish, but that all souls and +intelligences are immortal. + + +BEINGS PARTAKE OF THE ONE DIFFERENTLY ACCORDING TO THEIR CAPACITIES. + +11. But if (the intelligible Being) be present everywhere, why do not +all (beings) participate in the intelligible (Being) entire? Why are +there several degrees amidst these (beings), one being the first, the +other the second, and so on? Because the (beings) which are capable of +absorbing (intelligible Being) are counted as present thereto. Essence +exists everywhere in that which is essence, thus never failing itself. +Everything that can be present to it is present in reality, in the +measure of its capacity, not in a local manner, as light is modified by +transparence; for participation takes place differently in an opaque +body. If we distinguish several degrees among beings, we shall surely +have to conceive that the first is separated from the second, and the +second from the third, only by its order, its power, its (individual) +differences, but not by its location. In the intelligible world nothing +hinders different things from subsisting together, such as soul and +intelligence, and all the sciences, superior or inferior. Thus also in +a single apple the eye sees color, the nostril smells perfume, and each +other sense-organ perceives its individual quality. All these things +subsist together and are not separated from each other. + + +THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF PRESENCES. + +Is the intelligible (Being) then so varied and manifold? It is indeed +varied, but it is simultaneously simple; it is both one and manifold; +for reason (which is the essence of the universal Soul), is both one +and manifold. The universal (Being) is also one; though any difference +in it (in this sense, that it contains different essences), results +from its own constitution; the difference inheres in its nature, for +it could not belong to non-being. The constitution of Essence is such +as to be inseparable from unity; unity is present wherever essence is, +and the one Essence subsists in itself. It is indeed possible that an +essence which in a certain respect is separated from another essence, +is, however, entirely present with it. But there are different kinds +of presence; first, when sense-things are present with intelligible +things, at least to those to which they can be present; second, when +intelligible entities are present to each other; likewise, when the +body is present to the soul; another, when a science is present to +the soul; further, when a science is present to another science, and +both coexist in the same intelligence; last, when a body is present to +another body. + + +HOW VARIOUS THINGS CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE SAME PRINCIPLE. + +12. When a sound resounds in the air, and when it constitutes a word, +the ear that is present hears and perceives this sound and this word, +especially if the place be quiet. If another ear should come to be in +this place, the sound and the word approach it likewise, or rather, +this ear will approach the word. Suppose also that several eyes +consider the same object; all are filled with its sight, although +this object occupy a determinate place. Thus the same object will +impress different organs with different perceptions, because the +one is an eye, and the other is an ear. Likewise, all the things +that can participate in the soul do participate therein, but each +receives a different power from one and the same principle. The sound +is everywhere present in the air; it is not a divided unity, but a +unity present everywhere, entirely. Likewise, if the air receive the +form of the visible object, it possesses it without division, for, in +whatever place the eye should place itself, it perceives the form of +the visible object; at, least, according to our opinion, for not all +philosophers agree herewith. We give these examples to explain how +several things may participate in one and the same principle. Besides, +the example of the sound suffices to demonstrate what we here wish to +explain; namely, that the entire form is present in the entire air; +for all men would not hear the same thing, if the word uttered by the +sound were everywhere entire, and if each ear did not likewise hear it +entire. Now if in this case the entire word spread in the entire air, +without some definite part of the word being united to a certain part +of the air, and some other part of the word being united with another +part of the air, how could we refuse to admit that a single Soul +penetrates everywhere without dividing herself with the things, that +she is entirely present everywhere where she is, that she is everywhere +in the world without dividing into parts that correspond to those of +the world? When she has united with the bodies, in whatever kind of +union, she bears an analogy to the word which has been pronounced in +the air, while before uniting with the bodies, she resembles him who +pronounces, or is about to pronounce some word. Nevertheless, even when +she has united to the bodies, she does not really in certain respects +cease resembling him who pronounces a word, and who, while pronouncing +it, possesses it, and gives it at the same time. Doubtless the word +does not have a nature identical with those things that we proposed to +illustrate by this example; nevertheless, there is much analogy between +them. + + +THE BODY'S RELATION TO THE SOUL IS A PASSAGE INTO THE WORLD OF LIFE. + +(Let us study) the relation of the (world) Soul to bodies. As this +relation is of a different kind, it must be understood that the Soul +is not partly in herself and partly in the bodies. Simultaneously she +dwells entirely within herself, and also projects her image into the +multiplicity of the bodies (which reflect her, like mirrors). Suppose +that some definite body approach the Soul to receive life from her; it +obtains life silently, and thus possesses what already was in other +bodies. Indeed, conditions had not been arranged so that a part of the +Soul, located in a certain place, should await a body, so as to enter +into it. But this part of the Soul which enters into a body, so to +speak, existed already in the universe, that is to say, in herself, and +she continued to exist in herself although she seemed to have descended +here below. How indeed should the Soul descend here below? Therefore, +if she did not descend here below, if she only manifested her actual +presence, without awaiting the body which was to participate in her, +evidently the Soul dwells in herself simultaneously with becoming +present to this body. Now, if the Soul dwell in herself at the same +time as she becomes present to this body (for it is not the Soul that +came into this body), it is the body which entered into her; it is +the body which, being till then outside of veritable Essence, entered +into it, and passed into the world of life. Now the world of life was +all in itself, without extension, and, therefore, without division. +The body has, therefore, not entered into it as in something that +possesses extension. It commenced by participating, not in one of the +parts of the world of life, but in this whole world, entirely. If an +additional body should also enter it, it will participate in it in the +same way (entirely). Consequently, if we said that the world of life is +entire in these bodies, it is similarly entire in each of them. It is, +therefore everywhere the same, and numerically one, without dividing, +but always present entire. + + +EXTENSION IS MERELY A SIGN OF PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD OF LIFE. + +13. Whence originates extension in our universe, and in the animals? +The world of life contains no extension. Sensation, whose testimony +hinders us from believing what we are told in this respect, reveals +to us here and there the world of life. But reason tells us that, if +we see it thus, it is not that it is really extended here and there, +but that all that possesses extension has participated in the world of +life, which, however, has no extension. + + +PARTICIPATION CAN BE ONLY IN THE INTELLIGIBLE. + +When a being participates in something, evidently it does not +participate in itself; for thus it would really participate in +nothing, and would remain what it was. The body that participates in +something must, therefore, not participate in corporeal nature, for +it possesses it already. Consequently, the body will not participate +in the corporeal nature, any more than a magnitude would participate +in a magnitude, which it possesses already. Let us even admit that +a magnitude be increased, yet on that account alone it would not +participate in magnitude; for a two-foot object does, not become a +three-foot object, but the object which first had a certain quantity +merely changes to some other quantity; otherwise two would become +three. Thus, since that which has extension and is divided participates +in genus that is different, and even very different, the thing in +which it participates must neither be divided, nor have extension; +but have absolutely no kind of quantity. Consequently, the (being) +which everywhere is present entire must be present, though remaining +indivisible. It is not indivisible merely because it is small, which +would not make it any less divisible; only, it would no more be +proportioned to the universe, it would not spread in the corporeal mass +in the degree that it increases. Neither does it resemble a point, +but it includes an infinity of points; consequently what you might +suppose was a point would include an infinity of (separate) points, +and could not be continuous, nor, consequently, proportion itself to +the universe. If then every corporeal mass possess the (being) which +is present everywhere, it must possess it entire in all the parts that +compose it. + + +NOTHING IN THE UNIVERSAL SOUL IS BEGOTTEN; IT ONLY SEEMS SO. + +14. But if one and the single Soul be in each person, how does each +have his own soul? How then can one soul be good, while the other +is evil? The universal Soul communicates her life to each, for she +contains all the souls and all the intelligences. She possesses +simultaneously unity and infinity; in her breast she contains all +the souls, each distinct from her, but not separated; otherwise how +could the Soul possess the infinite? It might still be objected that +the universal Soul simultaneously contains all things, all lives, all +souls, all the intelligences; that these are not each circumscribed by +limits, and that that is the reason they form a unity. Indeed, there +had to be in the universal Soul a life not only one, but infinite, and +yet single; this one life had to be one so far as it was all lives, +as these did not get confused in this unity, but that they should +originate there, while at the same time they should remain located in +the place from where they had started; or rather, they never left the +womb of the universal Soul, for they have always subsisted in the same +state. Indeed, nothing was begotten in the universal Soul; she did +not really divide herself, she only seems divided in respect to what +receives her; everything within her remains what it has always been. +But that which was begotten (namely, the body) approaches the Soul, +and seems to unite with her, and depends on her. + + +RELATION OF MAN TO THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. + +And what are we? Are we the universal Soul, or are we what approaches +her, and what is begotten in time (that is, the body)? No: (we are not +bodies). Before the generation of the bodies had been accomplished, we +existed already on high; some of us were men, others of us were even +divinities----that is, we were pure souls, intelligences connected with +universal Being; we formed parts of the intelligible world, parts that +were neither circumscribed nor separated, but which belonged to the +entire intelligible world. Even now, indeed, we are not separated from +the intelligible world; but the intelligible Man in us has received, +and is joined by a man who desired to be different from the former +(that is, the sense-man desired to be independent), and finding us, +for we were not outside of the universe, he surrounded us, and added +himself to the intelligible man who then was each one of us. + + +WE ARE NOT ALWAYS BOTH MEN, AS WE SHOULD BE. + +Now suppose a single sound or word; those who listen to it hear it and +receive it, each in his own way; hearing passes into each of them in +the condition of an actualization, and perceives what is acting on it. +We thus became two men at once (the intelligible Man, and the sense-man +who added himself to the former); we are no longer, as before, only one +of the two; or rather, we are sometimes still only one of them, the man +who added himself to the first. This occurs every time that the first +Man slumbers in us, and is not present, in a certain sense (when we +fail to reflect about the conceptions of intelligence). + + +HOW THE BODY APPROACHED THE SOUL. + +15. But how did the body approach the universal Soul? As this body +had an aptitude for participation in the Soul, it received that for +which it was fit; now it was disposed to receive a particular soul; +that is why it did not receive the universal Soul. Although the latter +be present with this body, she does not become entirely suitable to +it; that is why plants and the non-human souls likewise possess only +so much of the universal Soul, as they were able to receive from her. +Likewise, when a voice challenges notice, so some (persons) grasp only +the sound, others grasp also the signification. As soon as the animal +has been begotten, it possesses within itself the presence of a soul +derived from the universal (Being), and by which it remains united with +this (Being) because then it possesses a body that is neither empty nor +inanimate. This body was not before in an inanimate place, and (when +it was begotten), it only further reapproximated itself to the soul by +its aptitude (to receive life); it became not only a body, but also +a living body; thanks to the neighborhood to the soul, it received a +trace (of the soul); and by that I do not mean a part of the soul, but +a kind of heat or light which emanated from the soul, and which, in +the body, begat desires, pleasures, and pains. The body of the thus +begotten animal was, therefore, not a body foreign (to life). The Soul, +that had issued from the divine principle, remained tranquil according +to her own nature, and was subsisting in herself, when that part, which +was troubled by her own weakness, and was spontaneously fluctuating +around when assailed by impulsions from without, first complained +audibly by herself, and then in that part of the animal which is common +to the soul and body, and communicated her disturbance to the entire +living being. Thus when a deliberative assembly calmly examines some +question, a confused mob, driven by hunger or excited by some passion, +may come to spread trouble and disorder in the whole assembly. As long +as such people keep quiet, the voice of the wise man may be heard by +them; and as a result the crowd retains orderliness, its worse part +remaining subordinate; otherwise the worst part dominates, while the +better part remains silent, because the trouble hinders the crowd +from listening to reason. Thus does evil come to reign in a city and +in an assembly. Likewise evil reigns in him who allows himself to be +dominated by this disorderly crowd of fears, desires and passions +that he bears within his breast; and that will last until he reduce +that crowd to obedience, until he become again the man he formerly +was (before descending here below), and until he regulate his life +(according to the better Man); what he then will grant to the body will +be granted as to something foreign. As to him who lives now in one +manner, and now in another, he is a man of mingled good and evil. + + +THIS DOCTRINE EXPLAINS THE MYTHS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. + +16. If the soul could not become evil, and if there be but a single +way for the soul to enter the body, and to remain present within it, +there would be no meaning in the periodical "descents" and "ascents" +of the soul, the "chastisements" she undergoes, and the "migration" +into the bodies other (than human bodies, that is, animal ones). Such +(mythological) teachings have indeed been handed down from the ancient +philosophers who best expounded the soul. Now it will be well to show +that our doctrine harmonizes with that which they have taught, or that +at least there is no contradiction between them. + + +THE SOUL'S DESCENT INTO THE BODY. + +We have just explained that, when the body participates in the soul, +the soul does not somehow go beyond herself to enter into the body, +that it is on the contrary the body which enters into the soul, on +participating in life, or evidently, when the ancient philosophers say +that the soul comes into the body, this means that the body enters +into essence, and participates in the life and the soul; in one word, +to "come" does not here signify passing from one place into another, +but indicates in what way the soul enters into dealings with the body. +Therefore "to descend" means, for the soul, to grow into a body, in +the sense in which we have explained it; that means, to give the body +something of the soul, and not for the soul to become (the property) +of the body. Consequently, the soul's issuing from the body must again +mean that the body ceases to participate in life. + + +PROCEDURE OF THE DESCENT OF THE SOUL. + +This is how this participation takes place for the parts of this +universe (that is, the bodies). Being situated as it were on the +confines of the intelligible world, the soul often gives the body +something of herself; for, by her power (or potentiality), she is the +neighbor of the body; and finding herself close to it, she enters +into dealings therewith by virtue of a law of her nature; but this +intercourse is of evil, and to enfranchise herself from the body is +good. Why? Because if the soul be not the (property or slave) of the +body in this intercourse, she, nevertheless, unites herself to it, and +though she were universal, she becomes individual; for her activity +no longer is exclusively confined to the intelligible world, although +(she still, by nature) belong thereto. It is as if someone, who was an +expert in a whole science, confined himself to a single proposition +thereof; whereas a person who possesses a whole science should +naturally consider its entirety, and not a mere part of it. Likewise +the soul, which belonged entirely to the intelligible world, and which +partially blended her particular essence with the total Essence, +withdrew out of the universal Essence, and became individual essence, +because the body to which she confines her activities is only a part +of this universe. It is as if the fire, endowed with the ability of +burning everything, was reduced to burn out some small object, although +it possessed power of universal scope. Indeed, when the particular +soul is separated from the body, she is no longer particular (in +actualization); on the contrary, when she has separated herself from +the universal Soul, not by passing from one locality to another, but +by applying her activity (to a part of this universe, to a body), she +becomes particular (in actualization), though she remain universal in +another manner (in potentiality); for when the soul presides over no +body she is truly universal, and is particular only in potentiality. + + +WHAT HELL MEANS FOR THE CAREER OF THE SOUL. + +Consequently, when we say that the soul is in hell (Hades), if we mean +by "hades" an invisible place, that means that the soul is separated +from the body; if, on the contrary, we understand hell to mean a lower +locality, we may also offer a reasonable interpretation: for now our +soul is with our body and is located with it. But what is meant by +saying that the soul is in hell after the body no longer exists? If +the soul be not separated from her image, why should she not be where +her image is? If the soul were separated from her image by philosophy, +this image will alone go to the lower locality, while the soul lives +purely in the intelligible world, without any emanation. This is what +we had to teach about the image born of some particular individual. As +to the soul, if she concentrate in her breast the light that radiates +around her, then, turned towards the intelligible world, she entirely +re-enters into this world; she is no longer in actualization. But this +does not cause her to perish (for when she is incarnated in a body, +and is particular, she exists only potentially; while she attains to +actualization when she becomes universal). So much for this point; now +let us return to our subject. + + + + +SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE. + +The One Identical Essence is Everywhere Entirely Present. + + +UNITY MUST BE SOUGHT FOR IN ESSENCE. + +1. It is a common conception of human thought that a principle single +in number and identical is everywhere present in its entirety; for it +is an instinctive and universal truism that the divinity which dwells +within each of us is single and identical in all.[3] It cannot be +expected that the men who will use this expression should be able to +explain how God is present in us, and without subjecting their opinion +to the scrutiny of reason; they will only affirm that such is the state +of the case; and resting in this conception which is the spontaneous +result of their understanding, they will all hold to this something +that is single and only, and will refuse to give up this unity. +That is the most solid principle of all, a principle that our souls +whisper instinctively, and which is not deduced from the observation +of particular things, but which claims our attention far before them, +even before the maxim that everything aspires to the Good. Now this +principle is true if all the beings aspire to unity, form an unity and +tend towards unity. This unity, advancing towards all other things, so +far as it can advance seems to be manifold, and indeed becomes so, in +certain respects, but the ancient nature which is the desire of the +Good, that belongs to itself, really leads to unity; and every nature +aspires to possess this unity by turning towards itself; for the good +of the nature which is One, is to belong to oneself, to be oneself; +that is, to unify oneself. That is why it is reasonably said that +the Good peculiarly belongs to (this nature), and must not be sought +outside of it. How indeed could the Good have fallen outside of the +essence, or be found in non-essence? It must evidently be sought in +essence, since itself is not non-essence. If then the Good be essence, +and may be found in essence, it must be within itself in each of us. We +cannot, therefore, be far from essence, but we are in it. Neither is it +far from us. All (beings), therefore, constitute but a unity. + + +"BEING" IS THE BASIS OF JUDGMENT IN THINGS PARTICIPATING IN BEING. + +2. As the human reason which undertakes to examine the question here +raised is not one, but divided, it makes use of corporeal nature in its +researches, by borrowing its principles. That is why reason, thinking +it intelligible being, similar to bodies, divides it, doubting its +unity. It could not be otherwise, because its investigation was not +founded on the proper immanent principles. We must, therefore, in our +discussion about the one universal Essence, choose principles capable +of enlisting support, principles that would be intellectual, that is, +would connect with intelligible entities, and veritable being. For +since our sense-nature is agitated by continual flux, being subject +to all kinds of changes, trending towards all directions of space; +it should consequently be called not "being," but generation, or +becoming. The eternal Essence, on the contrary, is not divided; it +subsists ever in the same manner and in the same state, neither is +born, nor perishes; occupies neither place nor space; does not reside +in any determinate location; neither enters, nor issues, but remains +in itself. A discussion about the nature of bodies begins with this +(physical) nature, and the things that are related to it, which +(deductively) give rise to probable proofs by the aid of syllogisms +equally probable. But when we deal with intelligible entities, our +starting-point must be the nature of the being considered; principles +have to be legitimately derived therefrom; and then, without +surreptitiously substituting any other nature (inductively), borrow +from the intelligible Being itself the conception formed about it; for +being, or whatness, is everywhere taken as principle; and it is said +that the definition of an object, when well made, sets forth many of +its accidents. Therefore, when we are dealing with things where being +is everything, we must, so much the more, apply our whole attention to +this being; base all our (arguments) thereon, and refer everything to +it. + + +INTELLIGIBLE ESSENCE IS BOTH IN AND OUT OF ITSELF. + +3. If intelligible essence be essential essence; if it be immutable; +if it never evade itself; if it admit of no generation; and be not +in any place, the result is, that by virtue of its nature, it ever +remains within itself, has no parts distant from each other, located +in different places; that it does not issue from itself, which would +lead it to inhere in different subjects, or at least to inhere in one +subject, and, consequently, no longer to dwell in itself, and no longer +to remain impassible; for if it inhered in something different from +itself, it would be exposed to suffering (passion, or, experience). +As, however, this is impossible, it can not inhere in anything other +than itself. Therefore, since it never departs from itself, as it +is never divided, as it exists within several things simultaneously +without undergoing any change, as it exists within itself one and +simultaneously entire, it must, while existing in several things, +remain everywhere identical; that is, be everywhere entire both in +itself, and out of itself. Consequently, it does not (exist) within any +determinate thing, but the other things participate in it, so far as +they are capable of approaching it, and so far as they do approach it +in the measure in which they are capable. + + +THAT ENTIRE BEING IS PRESENT EVERYWHERE IS THE ONLY SOLUTION OF THE +PUZZLE. + +Consequently, it will be necessary either to reject the propositions +set forth above, that is, the principles which have been established, +and deny the existence of the intelligible entities; or, as this is +impossible, to recognize the truth of what has been advanced from the +very beginning (of this discussion): the Essence which is one and +identical is indivisible, and exists as single everywhere. It is not +distant from any of the other things; and, nevertheless, (to be near +them) it has no need of spreading, of letting certain portions of its +essence flow.[4] It remains entire in itself, and though it produce +something inferior, it does not, on that account, abandon itself, and +does not extend itself hither and yon in other things; otherwise, it +would be on one side, while the things it produces would be on the +other, and it would occupy a place, finding itself separated therefrom. +As to these (produced things), each of them is either a whole or a +part. If it be a part, it will not preserve the nature of the all, as +we have already said; if, however, it be all, we shall have to divide +it in as many parts as that in which it subsists--or, it will have to +be granted that the identical essence can simultaneously be everywhere +entire. This is a demonstration drawn from the matter itself, which +contains nothing external to the being that we are examining, and +which does not borrow anything from any other nature. + + +GOD'S PRESENCE EVERYWHERE ENTIRE DESCRIBED AS INFINITE. + +4. Let us, therefore, contemplate this Divinity who is not present +here, and absent there, but who is everywhere. All those who have +any idea of the divinities admit that they, as well as that supreme +Divinity, are present everywhere. Reason compels this admission. Now, +since the Divinity is everywhere, He is not divided; otherwise, He +would not be present everywhere; He would have His parts, one here, +and another there. He would no longer be a unity; He would resemble an +expanse divided into a number of parts; He would be annihilated in this +division, and all His parts would no longer form the whole; in short, +He would have become body. If that be impossible, we shall have to +admit that to which before we refused assent, to which all human nature +testifies, namely, that the Divinity is everywhere simultaneously +present, entire, and identical. If we acknowledge such a nature as +infinite, since it has no limits, this will be granting that it lacks +nothing. Now if it lack nothing, it must be present to every essence; +if it could not be essence, there would be places, where it did not +exist, and it would lack something. The essences which exist beneath +the One exist simultaneously with Him, are posterior to Him, refer +to Him, and reattach themselves to Him as His creatures; so that to +participate in what is posterior to Him is to participate in Himself. +As, in the intelligible world, there is a multitude of beings which +there occupy the first, second, or third ranks, in that they depend +from that only centre of a single sphere; and as they coexist there +without any separating distance between them, the result is that the +essences which occupy the first or second ranks are present there even +where are the beings that occupy the third rank. + + +EXAMPLE OF THE SUN AND THE RAYS. + +5. In order to clear up this point, the following illustration has +been much used. Let us imagine a multitude of rays, which start from +a single centre; and you will succeed in conceiving the multitude +begotten in the intelligible world. But, admitting this proposition, +that things begotten in the intelligible, and which are called +multitude, exist simultaneously, one observation must be added: in the +circle, the rays which are not distinct may be supposed to be distinct, +because the circle is a plane. But there, where there is not even the +extension proper to a plane, where there are only potentialities and +beings without extension, all things must be conceived as centres +united together in a single centre, as might be the rays considered +before their development in space, and considered in their origin, +where, with the centre, they form but a single and same point. If now +you imagine developed rays, they will depend from the points from where +they started, and every point will not be any the less a centre, as +nothing will separate it from the first centre. Thus these centres, +though united to the first centre, will not any the less have their +individual existence, and will form a number equal to the rays of which +they are the origins. As many rays as will come to shine in the first +centre, so many centres will there seem to be; and, nevertheless, all +together will form but a single one. Now if we compare all intelligible +entities to centres, and I mean centres that coincide in a single +centre and unite therein, but which seem multiple because of the +different rays which manifest, without begetting them, such rays could +give us some idea of the things by the contact of which intelligible +being seems to be manifold and present everywhere. + + +THE UNITY OF MANIFOLDNESS. + +6. Intelligible entities, indeed, though they form a manifold, +nevertheless, form an unity. On the other hand, though they form +an unity, yet by virtue of their infinite nature they also form a +manifold. They are the multitude in unity, and unity in multitude; +they all subsist together. They direct their actualization towards +the whole, with the whole, and it is still with the whole, that they +apply themselves to the part. The part receives within itself the first +action, as if it were that of only a part; but, nevertheless, it is +the whole that acts. It is as if a Man-in-himself, on descending into +a certain man, became this man without, however, ceasing being the +Man-in-himself. The material man, proceeding from the ideal Man, who +is single, has produced a multitude of men, who are the same because +one and the same thing has impressed its seal on a multitude. Thus +the Man-in-himself, and every intelligible entity in itself, and then +the whole entire universal Essence is not in the multitude, but the +multitude is in the universal Essence, or rather, refers to it; for +if whiteness be everywhere present in the body, it is not in the same +manner as the soul of an individual is present and identical in all +the organs. It is in this latter manner that the essence is present +everywhere. + + +PARABLE OF THE HEAD WITH FACES ALL AROUND. + +7. Our nature and we ourselves all depend on (cosmic) being; we aspire +to it, we use it as principle, from the very beginning. We think +the intelligible (entities contained in essence) without having +either images or impressions thereof. Consequently, when we think +the intelligible (entities), the truth is that we are these very +intelligible entities themselves. Since we thus participate in the +genuine knowledge, we are the intelligible entities, not because we +receive them in us, but because we are in them. However, as beings +other than we constitute intelligible entities, as well as we, we are +all the intelligibles. We are intelligible entities so far as they +subsist simultaneously with all essences; consequently, all of us +together form but a single unity. When we turn our gaze outside of Him +from whom we depend, we no longer recognize that we are an unity; we +then resemble a multitude of faces which (being disposed in a circle) +would, as seen from the exterior, form a plurality, but which in the +interior would form but a single head. If one of these faces could +turn around, either spontaneously, or by the aid of Minerva, it would +see that itself is the divinity, that it is the universal Essence. No +doubt, it would not at first see itself as universal, but later, not +being able to find any landmarks by which to determine its own limits, +and to determine the distance to which it extends, it would have to +give up the attempt to distinguish itself from the universal (Essence), +and it would become the universal (Essence) without ever changing +location, and by remaining in the very foundation of the universal +(Essence). + + +THIS IS PROVED BY THE PARTICIPATION OF MATTER IN IDEAS. + +8. Whoever will consider the participation of matter in ideas will be +impressed with the above theory, will declare it not impossible, and +express no further doubts. It is necessary to admit the impossibility +of a conception such as the following: on one hand, the ideas +separate from matter; on the other hand, matter at a distance from +them, and then an irradiation from on high descending on matter. +Such a conception would be senseless. What meaning would lie in this +separation of the ideas, and this distance of matter? Would it not +then be very difficult to explain and to understand what is called +the participation of matter in ideas? Only by examples can we make +our meaning clear. Doubtless, when we speak of an irradiation, we do +not, however, mean anything similar to the irradiation of some visible +object. But as the material forms are images, and as they have ideas, +as archetypes, we say that they are "illuminated by the ideas," so as +to convey the idea that that which is illuminated is different from +that which illumines. Now, however, to express ourselves more exactly, +we shall have to enforce that the idea is not locally separated from +matter, and does not reflect itself therein as some object does in +water. On the contrary, matter surrounds the idea on all sides; touches +it somehow without touching it; then, in its entirety, it receives +what, it is capable of receiving from its vicinity (to the idea), +without any intermediary, without the idea penetrating through the +whole of matter, or hovering above it, without ceasing to remain within +itself. + + +THE SOUL, AS ENTIRE, FASHIONED THE WHOLE AND THE INDIVIDUALS. + +Since the idea of fire, for instance, is not in matter, let us imagine +matter serving as subject for the elements. The idea of fire, without +itself descending into matter, will give the form of the fire to the +whole fiery matter, while the fire, first mingled with matter will +constitute a multiple mass. The same conception may be applied to the +other elements. If then the intelligible fire appear in everything as +producing therein an image of itself, it does not produce this image +in matter as if it had separated itself therefrom locally, as would +have occurred in the irradiation of a visible object; otherwise it +would be somewhere, and it would fall under the senses. Since the +universal Fire is multiple, we must conclude that, while its idea +remains in itself outside of all place, it itself has begotten the +localities; otherwise we would have to think that, having become +multiple (by its parts), it would extend, by withdrawing from itself, +to become multiple in this manner, and to participate several times +in the same principle. Now, being indivisible, the idea has not given +a part of its being to matter; nevertheless, in spite of its unity, +it has communicated a form to what was not contained in its unity; it +granted its presence to the universe without fashioning this by one +of its parts, and that by some other part. It was as an entire whole +that it fashioned the whole and the individuals. It would indeed be +ridiculous to suppose that there was a multitude of the ideas of fire, +so that each fire might be formed by its own particular idea; if that +were the case, the ideas would be innumerable. Further, how would we +divide the things that have been generated by the Fire, since it is +single, and continuous? If we augment the material fire by adding to it +another fire, it is evidently the same idea which will produce in this +portion of matter the same things as in the remainder; for it could not +be another idea. + + +THE UNITY OF THE SOUL PROVES THAT OF THE SUPREME. + +9. If all the elements, when begotten, were to be gathered into one +sphere, (there would be an opportunity of observing and comparing them. +The result would be a conclusion that) this sphere does not have a +plurality or a diversity of authors, one of whom would have created +one part, and another author, another. The production of this sphere +will imply a single Author, who created it by acting, as a whole; not +producing one part of creation by one part of Himself, and another part +of creation, by another part of Himself. In the latter case, the sphere +might still have several authors, if the production of the totality +were not traced to a single, indivisible Principle. Though this single +and indivisible Principle be the author of the entire sphere, it does +not interpenetrate the sphere; for it is the entire Sphere which +depends on its author. One only and single Life contains the entire +Sphere, because this is located in a single Life. All the things that +are in the sphere may, therefore, be reduced to a single Life, and all +the souls form a Soul which is single, but which is simultaneously +infinite. That is why certain philosophers have said that the soul is +a number;[5] others, that the number produces increase in the soul, no +doubt meaning by that, that nothing is deficient in soul, that she is +everywhere without ceasing to be herself. As to the expression, "to +produce increase to the soul," this must not be taken literally, but so +as to mean that the soul, in spite of her unity, is absent nowhere; for +the unity of the soul is not a unity that can be measured; that is the +peculiarity of another being which falsely claims unity for itself, and +which succeeds in gaining the appearance of unity only by participating +therein. The Essence which really is one is not a unity composed of +several things; for the withdrawal of one of them would destroy the +total unity. Nor is it separated from the other things by limits; for +if the other things were assimilated thereto, it would become smaller +in the case where these would be greater; either it would split itself +up into fragments by seeking to penetrate all, and instead of being +present to all, as an entirety, it would be reduced to touching their +parts by its own parts. If then this Essence may justly be called one, +if unity may be predicated of its being, it must, in a certain manner, +seem to contain the nature opposed to its own; that is, the manifold; +it must not attract this manifoldness from without, but it must, from +and by itself, possess this manifold; it must veritably be one, and +by its own unity be infinite and manifold. Being such, it seems as +if it were everywhere a Reason (a being), which is single, and which +contains itself. It is itself that which contains; and thus containing +itself, it is no where distant from itself; it is everywhere in itself. +It is not separated from any other being by a local distance; for it +existed before all the things which are in a locality; it had no need +of them; it is they, on the contrary, which need to be founded on it. +Even though they should come to be founded on it, it would not, on that +account, cease resting on itself as a foundation. If this foundation +were to be shaken, immediately all other things would perish, since +they would have lost the base on which they rested. Now this Essence +could not lose reason to the point of dissolving itself by withdrawing +from itself; and to be about to trust itself to the deceptive nature of +space which needs it for preservation. + + +THE BEING LOVES ESSENCE AS ENTIRE. + +10. Animated by wisdom, this Essence dwells in itself, and it could +never inhere in other things. It is these, on the contrary, that come +to depend from it, as if with passion seeking where it may be. That +is the love that watches at the door of the beloved, which remains +ever near the beautiful, agitated with the desire of possessing it, +and esteeming itself happy to share in its gifts. Indeed, the lover of +the celestial beauty does not receive Beauty itself, but, as he stands +near it, he shares in its favors, while the latter remains immovable in +itself. There are, therefore, many beings which love one only and same +thing, who love it entire, and who, when they possess it, possess it +entire in the measure in which they are capable of doing so; for they +desire to possess it entire. Why then should not this Essence suffice +to all by remaining within itself? It suffices precisely because it +remains within itself; it is beautiful because it is present to all as +an entire whole. + + +REASON ALSO IS A WHOLE. + +For us Wisdom also is a whole; it is common to all of us, because it +is not different in different places; it would, indeed, be ridiculous +for it to need existence in some locality. Besides, wisdom does not +resemble whiteness; for (whiteness is the quality of a body, while) +Wisdom does not at all belong to the body. If we really participate +in Wisdom, we necessarily aspire to some thing single and identical, +which exists in itself, as a whole, simultaneously. When we participate +in this Wisdom, we do not receive it in fragments, but entire; and +the Wisdom which you possess entire is not different from that which +I myself possess. We find an image of this unity of Wisdom in the +assemblies and meetings of men, where all those present seem to help in +making up a single Wisdom. It seems that each one, isolated from the +others, would be powerless to find wisdom; but when the same person +is in a meeting, where all the minds agree together, in applying +themselves to a single object, he would produce, or rather discover, +Wisdom. What indeed hinders different minds from being united within +one same and single Intelligence? Although Intelligence be common to +us and to other men, we do not notice this community. It is as if, +touching a single object with several fingers, one should later imagine +having touched several objects; or as if one had struck a single +chord of the lyre without seeing it (and thinking that one had struck +different chords). + + +BY THE INTELLIGIBLE PARTS OF THEIR BEING, ALL MEN SHARE THE SAME +INTELLIGIBLE. + +Let us return to our subject. We were seeking how we might attain the +Good with our souls. The Good that you attain is not different from +the one that I myself attain; it is the same. And when I say that it +is the same, I do not mean that from the Good descended upon us both +different things, so that the Good would remain somewhere on high, +while His gifts descended down here; on the contrary, I mean that He +who gives is present to those who receive, so that these may veritably +receive; I mean besides that He gives His gifts to beings who are +intimately united with Him, and not to beings who might be foreign to +Him; for intellectual gifts cannot be communicated in a local manner. +One even sees different bodies, in spite of the distance that separates +them, receiving the same gifts, because the gift granted, and the +effect produced tend to the same result; much more, all the actions +and passions which produce themselves in the body of the universe are +contained within it, and nothing comes to it from without. Now if a +body, which by its nature as it were scatters itself (because it is +in a perpetual flowing wastage), nevertheless, receives nothing from +without, how would a being that has no extension retain nothing from +without, how would a being that has no extension retain something +from without? Consequently, as all are contained in one and the +same Principle, we see the good, and we altogether touch it by the +intelligible part of our nature. + + +THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD HAS MUCH MORE UNITY THAN THE SENSE-WORLD. + +Besides, the intelligible world has much more unity than the +sense-world; otherwise, there would be two sense-worlds, since the +intelligible sphere would not differ from the sense-sphere if the +former did not have more unity than the latter. In respect to unity, +therefore, the intelligible world would surpass the sense-sphere. It +would indeed be ridiculous to admit that one of the two spheres would +have an extension suitable to its nature; while the other, without any +necessity, would extend, and would withdraw from its centre. Why would +not all things conspire together to unity, in the intelligible world? +There, indeed, no one thing hinders another by impenetrability, any +more than the conception that you have of a notion or of a proposition +in no wise hinders the one that I have in myself, any more than +different notions mutually hinder each other in the same soul. To the +objection that such a union could not take place for (separate) beings, +an affirmative answer may be given, but only if one dare to suppose +that veritable beings are corporeal masses. + + +HOW THE INTELLIGIBLE MAY REMAIN UNMOVED AND YET PENETRATE IN THE WORLD. + +11. How can the intelligible, which has no extension, penetrate into +the whole body of the universe, which has no such extension? How does +it remain single and identical, and how does it not split up? This +question has been raised several times, and we sought to answer it, so +as to leave no uncertainty. We have often demonstrated that the things +are thus; nevertheless, it will be well to give some further convincing +proofs, although we have already given the strongest demonstration, +and the most evident one, by teaching the quality of the nature of the +intelligible, explaining that it is not a vast mass, some enormous +stone which, located in space, might be said to occupy an extension +determined by its own magnitude, and would be incapable of going beyond +its limits; for its mass and its power would be measured by its own +nature, which is that of a stone. (The intelligible Essence, on the +contrary,) being the primary nature, has no extension that is limited +or measured, because it itself is the measure of the sense-nature; and +because it is the universal power without any determinate magnitude. +Nor is it within time, because the time is continually divided into +intervals, while eternity dwells in its own identity, dominating and +surpassing time by its perpetual power, though this seemed to have an +unlimited course. Time may be compared to a line which, while extending +indefinitely, ever depends from a point, and turns around it; so, +that, into whatever place it advances, it always reveals the immovable +point around which it moves in a circle. If, by nature, time be in the +same relation (as is this line with its centre), and if the identical +Essence be infinite by its power as well as by its eternity, by virtue +of its infinite power it will have to produce a nature which would in +some way be parallel to this infinite power, which rises with it, and +depends from it, and which finally, by the movable course of time, +tries to equal this power which remains movable in itself.[6] But then +even this power of the intelligible Essence remains superior to the +universe, because the former determines the extension of the latter. + + +HOW THE INFERIOR NATURE CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE INTELLIGIBLE. + +How could then the inferior nature participate in the intelligible, +at least to the extent of its capacity? Because the intelligible is +everywhere present in its entirety, although, by the impotence of the +things that receive it, it be not perceived in its entirety in each of +these things. The identical essence is present everywhere, not indeed +as the material triangle, which is multiple in respect to number in +several subjects, although it be identical therein in respect to being; +but as the immaterial triangle from which depend material triangles. + +Why then is the material triangle not everywhere, like the immaterial +triangle? Because matter does not entirely participate in the +immaterial triangle, as it also receives other forms, and since it does +not apply itself entirely to every intelligible entity. Indeed, the +primary Nature does not give itself as an entirety to every thing; but +it communicates itself first to the primary genera (of essences;) then, +through these, it communicates itself to the other essences; besides, +it is not any the less from the very beginning present to the entire +universe. + + +LIFE INTERPENETRATES ALL; AND KNOWS NO LIMITS. + +12. But how does this (primary Nature) make itself present to the whole +universe? It is present to the universe because it is the one Life. +Indeed, in the world considered as a living being, the life does not +extend to certain limits, beyond which it cannot spread; for it is +present everywhere. + +But how can it be everywhere? Remember, the power of life is not a +determinate quantity; if, by thought, it be infinitely divided, still +it never alters its fundamental characteristic of infinity. This +Life does not contain any matter; consequently, it cannot be split +up like a mass, and end in being reduced to nothing. When you have +succeeded in gaining a conception of the inexhaustible and infinite +power of the intelligent Essence; of its nature that is unceasing, +indefatigable; that suffices itself completely, to the point that its +life, so to speak, overflows, whatever be the place on which you fix +your gaze, or direct your attention; where will you find absence of +that intelligible Essence? On the contrary, you can neither surpass +its greatness, nor arrive at anything infinitely small, as if the +intelligible Essence had nothing further to give, and as if it were +gradually becoming exhausted. + + +IF YOU SEE ANYTHING BEYOND IT, YOU DEPART FROM IT. + +When, therefore, you will have embraced the universal Essence and +will be resting within it, you must not seek anything beyond it. +Otherwise, you will be withdrawing from it; and, directing your +glance on something foreign, you will fail to see what is near you. +If, on the contrary, you seek nothing beyond it, you will be similar +to a universal Essence. How? You will be entirely united to it, you +will not be held back by any of its parts, and you will not even be +saying, "This is what I am!" By forgetting the particular being that +you are, you will be becoming the universal Being. You had, indeed, +already been the universal Essence, but you were something besides; +you were inferior by that very circumstance; because that which you +possessed beyond the universal Essence did not proceed from the +universal Essence, for nothing can be added thereto; but rather had +come from that which is not universal. When you become a determined +being, because you borrow something from non-essence, you cease being +universal. But if you abandon non-essence, you will be increasing +yourself. It is by setting aside all the rest that the universal +Essence may be discovered; for essence does not reveal itself so long +as one remains with the rest. It does not approach you to make you +enjoy its presence; it is you who are straying from it, when it ceases +to be present. Besides, when you stray away, you are not actually +straying away from it, as it continues to be present; you are not +distant from it, but, though being near Essence, you have turned away +from it. Thus even the other divinities, though they be present to many +human beings, often reveal themselves only to some one person, because +he alone is able (or, knows how) to contemplate them. These divinities +(according to Homer),[7] assume many different forms, and haunt the +cities. But it is to the supreme Divinity that all the cities, all the +earth, and all the heavens turn; for the universe subsists by Him, and +in Him. From Him also do all real essences derive their existence; +it is from Him that all depend, even the (universal) Soul, and the +universal Life; it is to His infinite unity that they all turn as to +their goal; a unity which is infinite precisely because it has no +extension. + + + + +FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK SIXTH. + +The Superessential Principle Does Not Think; Which is the First +Thinking Principle, and Which is the Second? + + +BY THINKING, INTELLIGENCE PASSES FROM UNITY TO DUALITY. + +1. One may think oneself, or some other object. What thinks itself +falls least into the duality (inherent to thought). That which thinks +some other object approaches identity less; for though it contain what +it contemplates, it nevertheless differs therefrom (by its nature). On +the contrary, the principle that thinks itself is not, by its nature, +separated from the object thought. It contemplates itself, because it +is intimately united to itself; the thinking subject, and the object +thought form but a single being within it,[8] or, it thus becomes +two, while it is only one. It thinks in a superior manner, because +it possesses what it thinks; it occupies the first rank as thinking +principle, because the thinking principle must simultaneously be unity +and duality. If it were not unity, it would think some object other +than itself; it would no longer be the first thinking principle. +Indeed, that which thinks an object other than itself could not be the +first thinking principle, since it does not think the object of its +thought as belonging to its essence; and, consequently, it does not +think itself. If, on the contrary, the thinking principle possess the +object, if it be thought as belonging to its "being" (or nature), +then the two terms of the thought (the object and the subject), will +be identical. The thinking principle, therefore, implies unity and +duality simultaneously; for unless it join duality to unity, it will +have nothing to think, and, consequently, it will not think. It must, +therefore, be simple, and not simple simultaneously.[9] We better +understand the necessity of this double condition when, starting +from the Soul, we rise to intelligence, for within the latter it is +easier to distinguish the subject from the object, and to grasp its +duality.[10] We may imagine two lights of which the one, the soul +herself, is less brilliant, and we may then posit as equal the light +that sees and the light that is seen. Both of them, having nothing +further that distinguishes them, will form but a single thing, which +thinks by virtue of its duality, and which sees by virtue of its unity. +Here by reason (which is the characteristic faculty of the soul), we +have passed from duality to unity. But, while thinking, intelligence +passes from unity to duality; it becomes, or rather is, duality, +because it thinks; and is one, because it thinks itself. + + +A SUPRA-THINKING PRINCIPLE IS NECESSARY TO THE WORKING OF INTELLIGENCE. + +2. Since we have distinguished two principles, the one which is the +first thinking principle (the Intelligence), and the other which is +the second (the Soul), the Principle superior to the first thinking +principle must itself not think. In order to think, it would have to +be Intelligence; to be Intelligence, it would have to think an object; +to be the first thinking principle, it would have to contain this +object. Now it is not necessary that every intelligible entity should +possess intelligence, and should think; otherwise it would not only be +intelligible, but even Intelligence; being thus dual, it would not be +the first. On the other hand, intelligence cannot subsist, if there be +not a purely intelligible nature ("being"), which is intelligible for +Intelligence, but which in itself should be neither intelligence nor +intelligible. Indeed, that which is intelligible must be intelligible +for something else. As to Intelligence, its power is quite vain, if it +does not perceive and does not grasp the intelligible that it thinks; +for it cannot think, if it have no object to think; and it is perfect +only when it possesses this. Now, before thinking, it must by itself +be perfect by nature ("being"). Therefore, the principle through which +intelligence is perfect must itself be what it is before it thinks; +consequently, it has no need to think, since, before thinking, it +suffices to itself. It will, therefore, not think.[11] + + +THE FIRST THINKING PRINCIPLE IS THE SECOND PRINCIPLE. + +Therefore, the First principle (the One) does not think; the second +(Intelligence) is the first thinking principle; the third (the Soul) is +the second thinking principle. If the first Principle thought, it would +possess an attribute; consequently, instead of occupying the first +rank, it would occupy only the second; instead of being One, it would +be manifold, and would be all the things that it thought; for it would +already be manifold, even if it limited itself to thinking itself. + + +THE FIRST MUST BE ONE EXCLUSIVELY, WHICH WOULD MAKE THOUGHT IMPOSSIBLE. + +3. It might be objected that nothing (in all this) would hinder the +first Principle from being both single and manifold. We will answer +that the manifold needs a single subject. The manifold cannot exist +without the One from which it comes, and in which it is; without the +One which is counted the first outside of other things, and which must +be considered only in itself. Even on the supposition that it co-exists +with other things, it must, none the less, while being taken with the +other things with which it is supposed to co-exist, be considered +as different from them. Consequently, it must not be considered as +co-existing with other things, but be considered as their subject (or, +substrate), and as existing in itself, instead of co-existing with the +other things of which it is the subject. + + +WITHOUT SOMETHING SIMPLE, NOTHING MANIFOLD COULD EXIST. + +Indeed, that which is identical in things other than the One, may no +doubt be similar to the One, but cannot be the One. The One must exist +alone in itself, thus to be grasped in other things, unless we should +claim that its (nature) consists in subsisting with other things. +Under this hypothesis, there will not exist either anything absolutely +simple, nor anything composite. Nothing absolutely simple will exist, +since that which is simple could not subsist by itself; neither could +anything composite exist, since nothing simple will exist. For if no +simple thing possess existence, if there be no simple unity, subsisting +by itself, which could serve as support to the composite, if none of +these things be capable of existing by itself, let alone communicating +to others, since it does not exist; we must conclude that that which, +of all these things, is composite, could not exist, since it would be +made up out of elements that do not exist, and which are absolutely +nothing. Therefore, if we insist on the existence of the manifold, we +are implying the existence of the One before the manifold. Now since +that which thinks is multiple, the principle that is not manifold will +not think. But as this Principle is the first, then Intelligence and +thought are entities later than the first. + + +GOOD, INTELLIGENCE AND SOUL ARE LIKE LIGHT, SUN AND MOON. + +4. As the Good must be simple, and self-sufficient, it has no need +to think. Now that which it does not need could not be within it, +since nothing (that is different from it) exists in it; consequently, +thought does not exist in it (because it is essentially simple[12]). +Besides, the Good is one thing, and Intelligence another; by thinking, +Intelligence takes on the form of Good. Besides, when in two objects +unity is joined to something other than itself, it is not possible that +this unity, which is joined to something else, should be Unity itself. +Unity in itself should exist in itself before this unity was joined +to anything else. For the same reason, unity joined to something else +presupposes absolutely simple Unity, which subsists in itself, and has +nothing of what is found in unity joined to other things. How could +one thing subsist in another if the principle, from which this other +thing is derived, did not have an existence that was independent, and +prior to the rest? What is simple cannot derive anything from any other +source; but what is manifold, or at least indicates plurality, is of +derivative (nature). The Good may be compared to light, Intelligence +to the sun, and the Soul to the moon that derives her light from the +sun. The Soul's intelligence is only borrowed, which intellectualizes +her by coloring her with its light. On the contrary, Intelligence, +in itself, possesses its own light; it is not only light, but it is +essentially luminous. The Principle that illuminates Intelligence and +which is nothing but light, is absolutely simple light, and supplies +Intelligence with the power to be what it is. How could it need +anything else? It is not similar to what exists in anything else; +for what subsists in itself is very different from what subsists in +something else. + + +AS THOUGHT IS INSPIRATION TO THE GOOD, INTELLIGENCE IMPLIES THE LATTER. + +5. What is manifold needs to seek itself, and naturally desires +to embrace itself, and to grasp itself by self-consciousness. But +that which is absolutely One could not reflect on itself, and need +self-consciousness. The absolutely identical principle is superior +to consciousness and thought. Intelligence is not the first; it is +not the first either by its essence, nor by the majestic value of its +existence. It occupies only the second rank. It existed only when the +Good already existed; and as soon as it existed, it turned towards the +Good. In turning towards the Good, Intelligence cognized the latter; +for thought consists of conversion towards the Good, and aspiration +thereto. Aspiration towards the Good, therefore, produced thought, +which identifies itself with the Good; for vision presupposes the +desire to see. The Good, therefore, cannot think; for it has no good +other than itself. Besides, when something other than the Good thinks +the Good, it thinks the Good because it takes the form of the Good, and +resembles the Good. It thinks, because itself becomes for itself a good +and desirable object, and because it possesses an image of the Good. If +this thing always remain in the same disposition, it will always retain +this image of the Good. By thinking itself, Intelligence simultaneously +thinks the Good; for it does not think itself as being actualized; yet +every actualization has the Good as its goal. + + +THE GOOD AS SUPRA-COGITATIVE IS ALSO SUPRA-ACTIVE. + +6. If the above arguments be worth while, the Good has no place for +thought. What thinks must have its good outside of itself. The +Good, therefore, is not active; for what need to actualize would +actualization have? To say that actualization actualizes, is tautology. +Even if we may be allowed to attribute something to actualizations +which relate to some principle other than themselves, at least the +first actualization to which all other actualizations refer, must be +simply what it is. This actualization is not thought; it has nothing to +think, as it is the First. Besides, that which thinks is not thought, +but what possesses thought. Thus there is duality in what thinks; but +there is no duality in the First. + + +PRIMARY EXISTENCE WILL CONTAIN THOUGHT, EXISTENCE AND LIFE. + +This may be seen still more clearly by considering how this double +nature shows itself in all that thinks in a clearer manner. We assert +that all essences, as such, that all things that are by themselves, and +that possess true existence, are located in the intelligible world. +This happens not only because they always remain the same, while +sense-objects are in a perpetual flow and change[13]--although, indeed, +there are sense-objects (such as the stars[14]), that remain the +same--but rather because they, by themselves, possess the perfection +of their existence. The so-called primary "being" must possess an +existence which is more than an adumbration of existence, and which is +complete existence. Now existence is complete when its form is thought +and life. Primary "being," therefore, will simultaneously contain +thought, existence and life. Thus the existence of essence will imply +that of intelligence; and that of intelligence, that of essence; so +that thought is inseparable from existence, and is manifold instead of +being one. That which is not manifold (the One), cannot, therefore, +think. In the intelligible world, we find Man, and the thought of +man, Horse and the thought of horse, the Just Man and the thought of +the just man; everything in it is duality; even the unity within it +is duality, and in it duality passes into unity. The First is neither +all things that imply duality, nor any of them; it contains no duality +whatever. + + +THE FIRST, THEREFORE, BEING SUPRA-COGITATIVE, DOES NOT KNOW ITSELF. + +Elsewhere we shall study how duality issues from unity. Here we merely +insist that as the One is superior to "being," it must also be superior +to thought. It is, therefore, reasonable to insist that it does not +know itself, that it does not contain anything to be known, because it +is simple. Still less will it know other beings. It supplies them with +something greater and more precious than knowledge of beings, since it +is the Good of all beings; from it they derive what is more important +(than mere cogitation), the faculty of identifying themselves with it +so far as possible. + + + + +SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE. + +Of the Aristotelian Distinction Between Actuality and Potentiality. + + +QUESTIONS TO BE DISCUSSED. + +1. (Aristotle) spoke of (things) existing "potentially," and +"actually"; and actuality is spoken of as a "being." We shall, however, +have to examine this potential and actual existence; and whether +this actual existence be the same as actuality, and whether this +potential existence be identical with potentiality; also, whether these +conceptions differ so that what exists actually be not necessarily +actuality. It is evident that among sense-objects there exist things +potentially. Are there also such among the intelligibles? This then is +the problem: whether the intelligibles exist only actually; and on the +hypothesis of the existence among intelligibles of something existing +potentially, whether, because of its eternity, this always remains +there in potentiality; and, because it is outside of time, never +arrives to actuality. + + +DEFINITION OF POTENTIALITY. + +Let us first define potentiality. When a thing is said to exist +potentially, this means that it does not exist absolutely. Necessarily, +what exists potentially is potential only in relation to something +else; for example, metal is the statue potentially. Of course, if +nothing were to be done with this thing, or within it, if it were not +to become something beyond itself, if there were no possibility of +its becoming anything else, it would only be what it was already. How +could it then become something different from what it was? It did not, +therefore, exist potentially. Consequently, if, on considering what is +a thing that exists potentially, and one that exists actually, we say +that it exists potentially, we must mean that it might become different +from what it is, whether, after having produced this different thing, +it remain what it is, or whether, on becoming this different thing, +which it is potentially, it ceases being what it is itself. Indeed, if +metal be a statue potentially, this is a relation different from water +being metal potentially, as air is potentially fire.[15] + + +DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXISTING POTENTIALITY AND POTENTIALITY. + +Shall we say that what thus exists potentially is potentiality in +respect of what is to be; as, for instance, that the metal is the +potentiality of a statue? Not so, if we refer to the producing +potentiality; for the producing potentiality cannot be said to exist +potentially. If, then, we identified existing potentially not only with +existing actually, but also with actuality, then potentiality would +coincide with potential existence. It would be better and clearer, +therefore, to contrast potential existence with actual existence, and +potentiality with actuality. The thing which thus exists potentially is +the substance underlying the reactions, shapes and forms which it is +naturally fitted to receive, to which it aspires for their betterment +or deterioration, and for the destruction of those whose actualization +constitutes differentiation. + + +MATTER IS NOTHING ACTUALLY. + +2. As to matter, we shall have to examine whether it be something +actually, while simultaneously it potentially is the shapes it +receives; or whether it be nothing at all actually. Everything else of +which we predicate potentiality passes on to actuality on receiving its +form, and remaining the same. We may call a statue an actual statue, +thus contrasting with it a potential statue; but an actual statue will +not be implied by the metal which we called the potential statue. +Consequently, what exists potentially does not become what exists +actually; but from what was previously a potential (statue) proceeds +what later is an actual (statue). Indeed, what exists actually is the +compound, and not the matter; it is the form added to matter; this +occurs when there is produced another being; when, for example, from +the metal is made a statue; for the statue exists by this very being +something other than the metal; namely, the compound.[17] + + +IN PERMANENT THINGS, POTENTIALITY AND ACTUALITY MAY COINCIDE. + +In non-permanent things, what exists potentially is evidently something +quite different (from what is said to exist actually). But when the +potential grammarian becomes an actual grammarian, why should not the +potential and actual coincide? The potential wise Socrates is the +same as the actual Socrates. Is the ignorant man, who was potentially +learned, the same as the learned? No: only accident makes of the +ignorant man a learned one; for it was not his ignorance that made him +potentially wise; with him, ignorance was only an accident; but his +soul, being by herself disposed (to be actually learned), still remains +potentially learned, in so far as she was actually so, and still keeps +what is called potential existence; thus the actual grammarian does +not cease being a potential grammarian.[18] Nothing hinders these two +different things (of being a potential and actual grammarian) from +coinciding; in the first case, the man is no more than a potential +grammarian; in the latter, the man is still a potential grammarian, +but this potentiality has acquired its form (that is, has become +actual[19]). + + +DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GENERAL AND PARTICULAR ACTUALITY. + +If however what is potential be the substrate, while the actual is +both (potential and actual) at the same time, as in the (complete) +statue, what then shall we call the form in the metal? We might well +call the actuality by which some object exists actually, and not merely +potentially, the form and shape; therefore not merely actuality, but +the actuality of this individual thing. + + +THE FORM ADDED TO MATTER IS THE SPECIFIC ACTUALITY. + +The name actuality would better suit the (general) actuality rather +(than the actuality of some one thing); the actuality corresponding +to the potentiality which brings a thing to actuality. Indeed, when +that which was potential arrives at actuality, it owes the latter to +something else.[20] + + +WHAT IN THE BODY IS A PASSIVE CAPACITY, IN THE SOUL IS AN ACTIVE +FACULTY. + +As to the potentiality which by itself produces that of which it is +potentiality, that is, which produces the actuality (corresponding to +this potentiality), it is a (Stoic) "habituation;" while the actuality +(which corresponds to this habituation) owes its name thereto; for +instance, the "habituation" is courageousness; while the actuality is +being brave.[21] But enough of this! + + +INTELLIGIBLE MATTER IS NOT POTENTIAL. + +3. The purpose of the preceding considerations was to determine the +meaning of the statement that intelligibles are actual; to decide +whether every intelligible exist only actually, or whether it be only +an actuality; and third, how even up there in the intelligible, where +all things are actualities, there can also exist something potentially. +If, then, in the intelligible world, there be no matter which might +be called potential, if no being is to become something which it not +yet is, nor transform itself, nor, while remaining what it is, beget +something else, nor by altering, cause any substitution, then there +could not be anything potential in this World of eternal essence +outside of time. Let us now address the following question to those +who admit the existence of matter, even in intelligible things: "How +can we speak of matter in the intelligible world, if by virtue of this +matter nothing exists potentially? For even if in the intelligible +world matter existed otherwise than it does in the sense-world, still +in every being would be the matter, the form and the compound which +constitutes it." They would answer that in intelligible things, what +plays the part of matter is a form, and that the soul, by herself, +is form; but, in relation to something else, is matter. Is the soul +then potential in respect of this other thing? Hardly, for the soul +possesses the form, and possesses it at present, without regard to the +future, and she is divisible in form and matter only for reason; if she +contain matter, it is only because thought conceives of her as double +(by distinguishing form and matter in her). But these two things form +a single nature, as Aristotle also says that his "quintessence" is +immaterial. + + +THE SOUL IS THE PRODUCING POTENTIALITY; NOT THE POTENTIALITY OF +BECOMING. + +What shall we say? Potentially, she is the animal, when it is unborn, +though to be born. Potentially she is the music, and all the things +that become, because they are transient. Thus in the intelligible world +there are things which exist, or do not exist potentially. But the soul +is the potentiality of these things.[22] + + +IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD EVERYTHING IS ACTUAL. + +How might one apply actual existence to intelligible things? Each +of them exists actually because it has received form, as the statue +(the compound) exists actually, or rather, because it is a form, and +because its essence is a perfect form. The intelligence does not pass +from the potentiality of thinking to the actuality of thinking.[23] +Otherwise, it would imply an anterior intelligence which would not +pass from potentiality to actuality, which would possess everything by +itself; for what exists potentially implies another principle whose +intervention brings it to actuality, so as to be something existing +actually. A being is an actuality when it always is what it is, by +itself. Therefore, all first principles are actualities; for they +possess all they should possess by themselves, eternally. Such is the +state of the soul which is not in matter, but in the intelligible +world. The soul which is in matter is another actuality; she is, for +instance, the vegetative soul; for she is in actuality what she is. +We shall, therefore, have to admit that (in the intelligible world) +everything exists actually, and that thus everything is actuality, +because it has rightly been said[24] that intelligible nature is always +awake, that it is a life, an excellent life, and that there on high +all actualities are perfect. Therefore, in the intelligible world, +everything exists actually, and everything is actuality and life. The +place of intelligible things is the place of life, the principle and +source of the veritable soul, and of intelligence. + + +MATTER IS NON-BEING, AND CAN NOT BE ANYTHING ACTUAL. + +4. All the other objects (the sense-objects), which are something +potentially, are also actually something else, which, in regard to +the First, may be said to be potential existence. As to matter, which +exists potentially in all beings, how could it actually be some +of these beings? Evidently, it would then no longer be all beings +potentially. If matter be none of the beings, it necessarily is not a +being. If it be none of the beings, how could it actually be something? +Consequently, matter is none of the beings that in it "become." But +might it not be something else, since all things are not in matter? If +matter be none of the beings which are therein, and if these really +are beings, matter must be non-being. Since, by imagination, it is +conceived as something formless, it could not be a form; as being, it +could not be counted among the forms; which is an additional reason +why it should be considered as non-being. As matter, therefore, is no +"being" neither in respect of beings, nor of forms, matter is non-being +in the highest degree. Since matter does not possess the nature of +veritable beings, and since it cannot even claim a place among the +objects falsely called beings (for not even like these is matter an +image of reason), in what kind of being could matter be included? If it +cannot be included in any, it can evidently not be something actually. + + +ARISTOTLE SAID, MATTER IS NOTHING REAL ACTUALLY, BUT ONLY POTENTIALLY. + +5. If this be so, what opinion shall we form of matter? How can it +be the matter of beings? Because matter potentially constitutes the +beings. But, since matter already exists potentially, may we not +already say that it exists, when we consider what it is to be? The +being of matter is only what is to be; it consists of what is going to +be; therefore matter exists potentially; but it is potentially not any +determinate thing, but all things. Therefore, being nothing by itself, +and being what it is, namely, matter, it is nothing actually. If it +were something actually, what it would actually be would not be matter; +consequently, matter would no longer be absolutely matter; it would be +matter only relatively, like metal. Matter is, therefore, non-being; it +is not something which merely differs from being, like movement, which +relates to matter because it proceeds from matter, and operates in it. +Matter is denuded and despoiled of all properties; it can not transform +itself, it remains ever what it was at the beginning, non-being. From +the very being it actually was no being, since it had withdrawn from +all beings, and had never even become any of them; for never was it +able to keep a reflection of the beings whose forms it ever aspired to +assume. Its permanent condition is to trend towards something else, +to exist potentially in respect of the things that are to follow. As +it appears where ends the order of intelligible beings, and as it is +contained by the sense-beings which are begotten after it, it is their +last degree. Being contained in both intelligible and sense-things, +it does not actually exist in respect of either of these classes +of beings. It exists only potentially; it limits itself to being a +feeble and obscure image, which can not assume any form. May we not +thence conclude that matter is the image actually; and consequently, +is actually deception? Yes, it truly is deception, that is, it is +essentially non-being. If then matter actually be non-being, it is the +highest degree of non-being, and thus again essentially is non-being. +Since non-being is its real nature, it is, therefore, far removed from +actually being any kind of a being. If it must at all be, it must +actually be non-being, so that, far from real-being, its "being" (so +to speak) consists in non-being. To remove the deception of deceptive +beings, is to remove their "being." To introduce actuality in the +things which possess being and essence potentially, is to annihilate +their reason for being, because their being consists in existing +potentially. + + +ETERNAL MATTER EXISTS ONLY POTENTIALLY. + +Therefore, if matter were to be retained as unchangeable, it would be +first necessary to retain it as matter; evidently, it will be necessary +to insist that it exists only potentially, so that it may remain +what it essentially is; the only alternative would be to refute the +arguments we have advanced. + + + + +THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK SIXTH. + +Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal Entities (Soul and and Matter). + + +A. OF THE SOUL. + + +QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PASSIBILITY OF JUDGMENT AND THE SOUL. + +1. Sensations are not affections,[25] but actualizations, and +judgments, relative to passions. The affections occur in what is other +(than the soul); that is, in the organized body, and the judgment +in the soul. For if the judgment were an affection, it would itself +presuppose another judgment, and so on to infinity.[26] Though +accepting this statement, we must, nevertheless, examine whether +the judgment itself, as such, in nowise participates in the nature +of its object; for if it receive the impression thereof,[27] it is +passive. Besides, the "images derived from the senses"--to use the +popular language--are formed in a manner entirely different from what +is generally believed. They are in the same case as the intellectual +conceptions, which are actualizations, and through which, without being +affected, we know objects. In general, neither our reason nor our will +permit us, in any way, to attribute to the soul modifications and +changes such as the heating or cooling of bodies. Further, we have to +consider whether that part of the soul, that is called the passive (or +affective, or irrational), must also be be considered as unalterable, +or as being affectible. But we will take up this question later; we +must begin by solving our earlier problems. + + +HOW CAN THE SOUL REMAIN IMPASSIBLE, THOUGH GIVEN UP TO EMOTION? + +How could that part of the soul that is superior to sensation and +passion remain unalterable, while admitting vice, false opinions, and +ignorance (or folly); when it has desires or aversions; when it yields +itself to joy or pain, to hate, jealousy, and appetite; when, in one +word, it never remains calm, but when all the things that happen to it +agitate it, and produce changes within it? + + +ON THE STOIC HYPOTHESIS OF CORPOREITY THE SOUL CANNOT REMAIN +IMPASSIBLE; AS IT IS IMPASSIBLE ALL TERMS TO THE CONTRARY ARE ONLY +FIGURATIVE. + +If, (on the Stoic hypothesis) the soul were extended, and corporeal, it +would be difficult, or rather impossible for her to remain impassible +and unalterable when the above-mentioned occurrences take place within +her. If, on the contrary, she be a "being" that is unextended, and +incorruptible, we must take care not to attribute to her affections +that might imply that she is perishable. If, on the contrary, her +"being" be a number[28] or a reason,[29] as we usually say, how could +an affection occur within a number or a reason? We must therefore +attribute to the soul only irrational reasons, passions without +passivity; that is, we must consider these terms as no more than +metaphors drawn from the nature of bodies, taking them in an opposite +sense, seeing in them no more than mere analogies, so that we may say +that the soul experiences them without experiencing them, and that +she is passive without really being such (as are the bodies). Let us +examine how all this occurs. + + +VIRTUE AS A HARMONY; VICE AS A DISHARMONY. + +2. What occurs in the soul when she contains a vice? We ask this +because it is usual to say, "to snatch a vice from the soul;" "to +introduce virtue into her," "to adorn her," "to replace ugliness by +beauty in her." Let us also premiss, following the opinions of the +ancients,[30] that virtue is a harmony, and wickedness the opposite. +That is the best means to solve the problem at issue. Indeed, when the +parts of the soul (the rational part, the irascible part, and the part +of appetite), harmonize with each other, we shall have virtue;[31] and, +in the contrary case, vice. Still, in both cases, nothing foreign to +the soul enters into her; each of her parts remain what they are, while +contributing to harmony. On the other hand, when there is dissonance, +they could not play the same parts as the personnel of a choric ballet, +who dance and sing in harmony, though not all of them fill the same +functions; though one sings while the remainder are silent; and though +each sings his own part; for it does not suffice that they all sing +in tune, they must each properly sing his own part. In the soul we +therefore have harmony when each part fulfils its functions. Still each +must have its own virtue before the existence of a harmony; or its +vice, before there is disharmony. What then is the thing whose presence +makes each part of the soul good or evil? Evidently the presence of +virtue or vice. The mere statement that, for the rational part (of +the soul) vice consists in ignorance,[32] is no more than a simple +negation, and predicates nothing positive about reason. + + +THIS DEFINITION SUFFICES TO EXPLAIN THE FACTS OF EVIL IN THE SOUL. + +But when the soul contains some of those false opinions which are +the principal cause of vice, must we not acknowledge that something +positive occurs in her, and that one of her parts undergoes an +alteration? Is not the disposition of the soul's irascible part +different according to its courage or cowardliness? And the soul's +appetitive-part, according to whether it be temperate or intemperate? +We answer that a part of the soul is virtuous, when it acts in +conformity with its "being," or when it obeys reason; for reason +commands all the parts of the soul, and herself is subjected to +intelligence. Now to obey reason is to see; it is not to receive +an impression, but to have an intuition, to carry out the act of +vision.[33] Sight is of the same (nature) when in potentiality, or +in actualization; it is not altered in passing from potentiality to +actualization,[34] she only applies herself to do what it is her +(nature) to do, to see and know, without being affected. Her rational +part is in the same relation with intelligence; she has the intuition +thereof.[35] The nature of intelligence is not to receive an impression +similar to that made by a seal, but in one sense to possess what it +sees, and not to possess it in another; intelligence possesses it by +cognizing it; but intelligence does not possess it in this sense that +while seeing it intelligence does not receive from it a shape similar +to that impressed on wax by a seal. Again, we must not forget that +memory does not consist in keeping impressions, but is the soul's +faculty of recalling and representing to herself the things that are +not present to her. Some objector might say that the soul is different +before reawakening a memory, and after having reawakened it. She may +indeed be different, but she is not altered, unless indeed, we call the +passing from potentiality to actualization an alteration. In any case, +nothing extraneous enters into her, she only acts according to her own +nature. + + +ONLY THE PHYSICAL ORGANS, NOT THE IMMATERIAL NATURES, COULD BE AFFECTED. + +In general, the actualizations of immaterial (natures) do not in any +way imply that these (natures) were altered--which would imply their +destruction--but, on the contrary, they remain what they were. Only +material things are affected, while active. If an immaterial principle +were exposed to undergo affections, it would no longer remain what it +is. Thus in the act of vision, the sight acts, but it is the eye that +is affected. As to opinions, they are actualizations analogous to sight. + + +PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF ANGER-PART'S COURAGE OR COWARDLINESS. + +But how can the soul's irascible-part[36] be at one time courageous, +and at the other cowardly? When it is cowardly, it does not consider +reason, or considers reason as having already become evil; or because +the deficiency of its instruments, that is, the lack of weakness of its +organs, hinders it from acting, or feeling emotion, or being irritated. +In the contrary condition it is courageous. In either case, the soul +undergoes no alteration, nor is affected. + + +PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF VIRTUE OR VICE OF APPETITE. + +Further, the soul's appetite is intemperate when it alone is active; +for then, in the absence of the principles that ought to command or +direct her, it alone does everything. Besides, the rational part, +whose function it is to see (by considering the notions it receives +from intelligence), is occupied with something else, for it does not +do everything simultaneously, being busy with some other action; it +considers other than corporeal things, so far as it can.[37] Perhaps +also the virtue or vice of the appetite depend considerably on the +good or evil condition of the organs; so that, in either case, nothing +is added to the soul. + + +THE SOUL ORIGINATES MOVEMENTS, BUT IS NOT ALTERED (AGAINST STOICS). +POLEMIC AGAINST THE STOIC THEORY OF PASSIONS. + +3. There are desires and aversions in the soul, which demand +consideration. It is impossible to deny that pain, anger, joy, appetite +and fear are changes and affections which occur in the soul, and that +move her.[38] We must here draw a distinction, for it would be denying +the evidence to insist that there are in us no changes or perception +of these changes. We cannot attribute them to the soul, which would +amount to the admission[39] that she blushes, or grows pale, without +reflecting that these "passions," though produced by the soul, occur +in a different substance. For the soul, shame consists in the opinion +that something is improper; and, as the soul contains the body, or, +to speak more exactly, as the body is a dependency of the animating +soul, the blood, which is very mobile, rushes to the face. Likewise, +the principle of fear is in the soul; paleness occurs in the body +because the blood concentrates within the interior parts. In joy, the +noticeable dilation belongs to the body also; what the body feels is +not a "passion." Likewise with pain and appetite; their principle is +in the soul, where it remains in a latent condition; what proceeds +therefrom is perceived by sensation. When we call desires, opinions +and reasonings "movements of the soul," we do not mean that the soul +becomes excited in the production of these movements,[40] but that they +originate within her. When we call life a movement, we do not by this +word mean an alteration; for to act according to one's nature is the +simple and indivisible life of each part of the soul. + + +VIRTUE AND VICE AFFECT THE SOUL DIFFERENTLY FROM ALL THE OTHER PASSIONS. + +In short, we insist that action, life and desire are not alterations, +that memories are not forms impressed on the soul, and that +actualizations of the imagination are not impressions similar to those +of a seal on wax.[41] Consequently in all that we call "passions" or +"movements," the soul undergoes no change in her substance (substrate) +or "being" (nature); virtue and vice in the soul are not similar +to what heat, cold, whiteness or blackness are in bodies; and the +soul's relation to vice and virtue is entirely different, as has been +explained. + + +PASSIONAL CHANGES OCCUR IN THE BODY, NOT EVEN TO THE PASSIONAL PART OF +THE SOUL. + +4. Let us now pass to that part of the soul that is called the +"passional" (or, affective). We have already mentioned it,[42] when +treating of all the "passions" (that is, affections), which were +related to the irascible-part and appetitive part of the soul; but we +are going to return to a study of this part, and explain its name, the +"passional" (or, affective) part. It is so called because it seems +to be the part affected by the "passions;"[43] that is, experiences +accompanied by pleasure or pain.[44] Amidst these affections, some are +born of opinion; thus, we feel fear or joy, according as we expect +to die, or as we hope to attain some good; then the "opinion" is in +the soul, and the "affection" in the body. On the contrary, other +passions, occurring in an unforeseen way, give rise to opinion in that +part of the soul to which this function belongs, but do not cause any +alteration within her, as we have already explained. Nevertheless, if, +on examining unexpected fear, we follow it up higher, we discover that +it still contains opinion as its origin, implying some apprehension in +that part of the soul that experiences fear, as a result of which occur +the trouble and stupor which accompany the expectation of evil. Now it +is to the soul that belongs imagination, both the primary imagination +that we call opinion, and the (secondary) imagination that proceeds +from the former; for the latter is no longer genuine opinion, but +an inferior power, an obscure opinion, a confused imagination which +resembles the action characteristic of nature, and by which this power +produces each thing, as we say, unimaginatively.[45] Its resulting +sense-agitation occurs within the body. To it relate trembling, +palpitation, paleness, and inability to speak. Such modifications, +indeed, could not be referred to any part of the soul; otherwise, such +part of the soul would be physical. Further, if such part of the soul +underwent such affections these modifications would not reach the body; +for that affected part of the soul would no longer be able to exercise +its functions, being dominated by passion, and thus incapacitated. + + +THE SOUL'S AFFECTIVE PART MAY BE THE CAUSE OF AFFECTIONS; BUT IS +INCORPOREAL. + +The affective part of the soul, therefore, is not corporeal; it is a +form indeed, but a form engaged in matter, such as the appetite, the +power of growth, both nutritive and generative, a power which is the +root and principle of appetite, and the affective part of the soul. +Now a form cannot undergo an affection or a passion, but must remain +what it is. It is the matter (of a body) which is capable of being +affected by a "passion" (an affection), when this affection is produced +by the presence of the power which is its principle. Indeed it is +neither the power of growth that grows, nor the nutritive power that +is fed; in general, the principle that produces a motion is not itself +moved by the movement it produces; in case it were moved in any way, +its movement and action would be of an entirely different nature.[46] +Now the nature of a form is an actualization, by its mere presence +producing (something), just as if the harmony alone could cause the +vibration of the strings of a lyre. Thus the affective part (of the +soul, without itself being affected) is the cause of the affections, +whether the movement proceed from it, that is, from sense-imagination, +or whether they occur without (distinct) imagination. + + +THE AFFECTIONS OF THE SOUL COMPARED TO A MUSICIAN PLAYING THE LYRE. + +We might further consider whether, inasmuch as opinion originates +in a higher principle (of the soul), this principle does not remain +immovable because it is the form of harmony, while the cause of the +movement plays the role of the musician, and the parts caused to +vibrate by the affection, that of the strings; for it is not the +harmony, but the string that experiences the affection; and even if +the musician desired it, the string would not vibrate unless it were +prescribed by the harmony. + + +PASSIONS ARE PRODUCED BY EXTERNAL IMAGES; AND THEIR AVOIDANCE IS THE +TASK OF PHILOSOPHY. + +5. If then, from the very start, the soul undergo no affections, +what then is the use of trying to render her impassible by means of +philosophy? The reason is that when an image is produced in the soul +by the affective part, there results in the body an affection and a +movement; and to this agitation is related the image of the evil which +is foreseen by opinion. It is this affection that reason commands us to +annihilate, and whose occurrence even we are to forestall, because when +this affection occurs, the soul is sick, and healthy when it does no +occur. In the latter case, none of these images, which are the causes +of affections, form within the soul. That is why, to free oneself +from the images that obsess one during dreams, the soul that occupies +herself therewith is to be wakened.[47] Again, that is why we can say +that affections are produced by representations of exterior entities, +considering these representations as affections of the soul. + + +PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESS INVOLVED IN PURIFYING THE SOUL, AND SEPARATING +SOUL FROM BODY. + +But what do we mean by "purifying the soul," inasmuch as she could not +possibly be stained? What do we mean by separating (or, weaning) the +soul from the body? To purify the soul is to isolate her, preventing +her from attaching herself to other things, from considering them, from +receiving opinions alien to her, whatever these (alien) opinions or +affections might be, as we have said; it consequently means hindering +her from consideration of these phantoms, and from the production of +their related affections. To "purify the soul," therefore, consists in +raising her from the things here below to intelligible entities; also, +it is to wean her from the body; for, in that case, she is no longer +sufficiently attached to the body to be enslaved to it, resembling a +light which is not absorbed in the whirlwind (of matter[48]), though +even in this case that part of the soul which is submerged does not, +on that account alone, cease being impassible. To purify the affective +part of the soul is to turn her from a vision of deceitful images; to +separate her from the body, is to hinder her from inclining towards +lower things, or from representing their images to herself; it means +annihilating the things from which she thus is separated, so that she +is no longer choked by the whirlwind of the spirit which breaks loose +whenever the body is allowed to grow too strong; the latter must be +weakened so as to govern it more easily. + + +B. OF MATTER. + + +INTRODUCTION TO THE ESCOREAL NUMENIAN FRAGMENT. + +6. We have sufficiently demonstrated the impassibility of intelligible +"being" which is entirely comprised within the genus of form. But as +matter also, though in another manner, is an incorporeal entity, we +must examine its nature also. We must see whether it may be affected, +and undergo every kind of modification, as is the common opinion; or +whether, on the contrary, it be impassible; and in this case, what is +the nature of its impassibility. + + +NONENTITY WILL HAVE INTELLIGENT LIFE ONLY AS BENEATH "BEING." + +Since we are thus led to treat of the nature of matter, we must first +premiss that the nature of existence, "being" and essence[49] are not +what they are thought to be by people generally. Existence is; it "is" +in the genuine meaning of that word; that is, it "is" essentially; it +is absolutely, lacking nothing of existence. Fully being existence, its +existence and preservation are not dependent on anything else; so much +the more, if other things seem to be, they owe this thereto. If this +be true, existence must possess life, perfect life--for otherwise it +would not be existence any more than non-existence. Now perfect life +is intelligence and perfect wisdom. Existence therefore is determinate +and definite. Nothing outside of it exists even potentially; otherwise +it would not fully satisfy itself. It is therefore eternal, immutable, +incapable of receiving anything, or of adding anything to itself; for +what it would receive would have to be foreign to it, and consequently +be nonentity. In order to exist by itself, existence must therefore +possess all things within itself; it must be all things simultaneously, +it must at the same time be one and all, since this is of what we +consider existence to consist; otherwise instead of emanating from +existence, intelligence and life would be incidental thereto. Therefore +they could not originate from nonentity; and, on its side, existence +could not be deprived of intelligence and life. True nonentity, +therefore, will have intelligence and life only as they must exist in +objects inferior and posterior to existence. The principle superior to +existence (the One), on the other hand, gives intelligence and life to +existence, without itself needing to possess them.[50] + + +MATERIALISTS CANNOT UNDERSTAND HOW SOLID EARTH IS NEAREST NONENTITY; +AND WHY GREATEST EXISTENCE IS LEAST MATERIAL. + +If such be the nature of existence, it could be neither body, nor the +substrate of bodies; for their existence is nonentity. (Materialists, +however, object), How could we refuse to attribute "being" to the +nature of bodies, such as these cliffs and rocks, to the solid earth, +and in short, to all these impenetrable objects? When I am struck, +am I not by the shock forced to acknowledge that these objects +exist as (real) "being"? On the other hand, how does it happen that +entities that are not impenetrable, which can neither shock others +nor be shocked by them, which are completely invisible, like soul +and intelligence, are genuine beings?[51] Our answer is that the +earth, which possesses corporeal nature in the highest degree, is +inert; the element that is less gross (the air) is already more +mobile, and resides in a higher region; while fire withdraws still +more from corporeal nature. The things which best suffice themselves +least agitate and trouble the others; those that are heavier and more +terrestrial, by the mere fact that they are incomplete, subject to +falling, and incapable of rising, fall by weakness, and shock the +others by virtue of their inertia, and their weight. Thus inanimate +bodies fall more heavily, and shock and wound others more powerfully. +On the contrary, animated bodies, by the mere fact of greater +participation in existence, strike with less harshness. That is why +movement, which is a kind of life, or at least an image of life, exists +in a higher degree in things that are less corporeal. + + +CORPOREITY IS NONENTITY BECAUSE OF LACK OF UNITY. + +It is therefore an "eclipse of existence" which renders an object +more corporeal. While studying those psychoses called affections, we +discover that the more corporeal an object is, the more is it likely +to be affected; the earth is more so than other elements, and so on. +Indeed, when other elements are divided, they immediately reunite their +parts, unless there be some opposition; but when we separate parts +of earth, they do not come together again. They thus seem to have no +natural earth; since, after a light blow, they remain in the state +where they are left by the blow that struck or broke them. Therefore +the more corporeal a thing is, the more it approaches nonentity, +returning to unity with the greater difficulty. The heavy and violent +blows by which bodies act on each other are followed by destruction. +When even a weak thing falls on something weak, it may still be +relatively powerful; as is nonentity hitting nonentity. + + +SENSATION AS THE DREAM OF THE SOUL FROM WHICH WE MUST WAKE. + +Such are the objections that may be raised against those who consider +all beings as corporeal; who wish to judge of their existence only by +impressions they receive therefrom, and who try to found the certitude +of truth on the images of sensation.[73] They resemble sleeping men +who take as realities the visions they have in their dreams. Sensation +is the dream of the soul;[52] so long as the soul is in the body, she +dreams; the real awakening of the soul consists in genuine separation +from the body, and not in rising along with the body. To rise with +the body is to pass from one sleep into another kind; from one bed +to another; really to awake is to separate oneself completely from +the body. The body, whose nature is contrary to that of the soul, +consequently has a nature contrary to that of "being." This is proved +by the generation, flux, and decay of bodies, all processes contrary to +the nature of "being." + + +MATTER COMPARED TO A MIRROR WHICH REFLECTS EVERYTHING THOUGH REALLY +EMPTY. + +7. Let us return to matter as a substrate, and then to what is said +to exist within it. This will lead us to see that it consists of +nonentity, and that it is impassible. Matter is incorporeal because +the body exists only as posterior thereto, because it is a composite +of which it constitutes an element. It is called incorporeal because +existence and matter are two things equally distinct from the body. Not +being soul, matter is neither intelligence, nor life, nor ("seminal) +reason," nor limit. It is a kind of infinity.[53] Neither is it an +(active) power;[54] for what could it produce? Since matter is none +of the above-mentioned things, it could not be called existence. It +deserves only the name "nonentity" yet not even in the sense in which +we may say that movement or rest are not existence;[55] matter is real +nonentity. It is an image and phantom of extension, it is aspiration to +a form of hypostatic existence. Its perseverance is not in rest (but in +change). By itself, it is invisible, it escapes whoever wishes to see +it. It is present when you do not look at it, it escapes the eye that +seeks it. It seems to contain all the contraries: the large and small, +the more and the less, the lack and excess.[56] It is a phantom equally +incapable of remaining or escaping; for matter does not even have +the strength of avoiding (form), because it has received no strength +from intelligence, and it is the lack of all existence. Consequently, +all its appearances are deceptions. If we represent matter as being +greatness, it immediately appears as smallness; if we represent it as +the more, we are forced to recognize it as the less. When we try to +conceive of its existence, it appears as nonentity; like all the things +it contains, it is a fugitive shadow, and a fleeting game, an image +within an image. It resembles a mirror, in which one might see the +reflections of objects external to it; the mirror seems to be filled, +and to possess everything, though really containing nothing. + + +AS OBJECTS ARE MERELY REFLECTIONS IN A MIRROR, MATTER IS NO MORE +AFFECTED BY THEM THAN WOULD BE A MIRROR. + +Thus matter is a shapeless image, into which enter, and out of which +issue the images of beings. These appear in it precisely because +matter has no shape, though they seem to produce something in it, they +really produce nothing in it.[57] They have no consistence, strength, +nor solidity; as matter has none either, they enter into it without +dividing it, as if they would penetrate water, or as shapes might move +in emptiness. If the images that appear in matter had the same nature +as the objects they represent and from which they emanate, then, if +we attribute to the images a little of the power of the objects that +project them, we might be right in considering them able to affect +matter. But as the things that we see in matter do not have the same +nature as the objects of which they are the images, it is not true +that matter suffers when receiving them; they are no more than false +appearances without any resemblance to what produces them. Feeble and +false by themselves, they enter into a thing that is equally false.[58] +They must therefore leave it as impassible as a mirror, or water; +producing on it no more effect than does a dream on the soul. These +comparisons, however, are yet imperfect, because in these cases there +is still some resemblance between the images and the objects. + + +SINCE MATTER CANNOT BE DESTROYED, IT CANNOT BE AFFECTED. + +8. (According to Aristotle[59]), it is absolutely necessary that what +can be affected must have powers and qualities opposed to the things +that approach it, and affect it. Thus, it is the cold that alters the +heat of an object, and humidity that alters its dryness, and we say +that the substrate is altered, when it ceases being hot, and grows +cold; and ceasing to be dry, becomes humid. Another proof of this truth +is the destruction of the fire that, by changing, becomes another +element. Then we say that it is the fire, but not the matter that has +been destroyed. What is affected is therefore that which is destroyed; +for it is always a passive modification that occasions destruction. +Consequently being destroyed and being affected are inseparable +notions. Now it is impossible for matter to be destroyed; for how +could it be destroyed, and in what would it change? + + +OBJECTION THAT MATTER MUST BE PASSIBLE IF ITS QUALITIES CHANGE AS THEY +DO. + +It may be objected that matter receives heat, cold, and numerous, or +even innumerable qualities; it is characterized by them, it possesses +them as somehow inherent in its nature, and mingled with each other, as +they do not exist in isolated condition. How could nature avoid being +affected along with them,[60] serving as it does as a medium for the +mutual action of these qualities by their mixture?[61] If matter is +to be considered impassible, we shall have to consider it as somehow +outside of these qualities. But every quality which is present in a +subject cannot be present in it without communicating to it something +of itself. + + +DIFFERENT SENSES OF "PARTICIPATION" WILL ALLOW FOR MATTER TO REMAIN +IMPASSIBLE. + +9. It must be noticed that the expressions: "such a thing is present to +such a thing" and "such a thing is in such other thing" have several +meanings. Sometimes one thing improves or deteriorates some other +thing by its presence, making it undergo a change; as may be seen in +bodies, especially those of living beings. Again, one thing improves +or deteriorates another without affecting it; this occurs with the +soul, as we have already seen.[62] Again, it is as when one impresses +a figure on a piece of wax; the presence of the figure adds nothing to +the (nature) of the wax, and its destruction makes it lose nothing. +Likewise, light does not change the figure of the object which it +enlightens with its rays. A cooled stone participates a little in +the nature characteristic of the thing that cools it; but none the +less remains stone. What suffering can light inflict on a line or +a surface?[63] One might perhaps say that in this case corporeal +substance is affected; but how can it suffer (or be affected) by the +action of light? Suffering, in fact, is not to enjoy the presence +of something, nor to receive something. Mirrors, and, in general, +transparent things, do not suffer (or are not affected) by the effect +of images that form in them, and they offer a striking example of the +truth we are here presenting. Indeed, qualities inhere in matter like +simple images, and matter itself is more impassible than a mirror. +Heat and cold occur in it without warming or cooling it; for heating +and cooling consist in that one quality of the substrate gives place +to another. In passing, we might notice that it would not be without +interest to examine whether cold is not merely absence of heat. On +entering into matter, qualities mostly react on each other only when +they are opposite. What action, indeed, could be exercised by a smell +on a sweet taste? By a color on a figure? How, in general, could things +that belong to one genus act on another? This shows how one quality can +give place to another in a same subject, or how one thing can be in +another, without its presence causing any modification in the subject +for which or in which it is present. Just as a thing is not altered +by the first comer, likewise that which is affected and which changes +does not receive a passive modification, or change, from any kind of an +object. Qualities are affected only by the action of contraries. Things +which are simply different cause no change in each other. Those which +have no contraries could evidently not be modified by the action of any +contrary. That which is affected, therefore, can not be matter; it must +be a composite (of form and matter), or something multiple. But that +which is isolated or separated from the rest, what is quite simple must +remain impassible in respect of all things, and remain as a kind of +medium in which other things may act on each other. Likewise, within +a house, several objects can shock each other without the house itself +or the air within it being affected. It is therefore qualities gathered +in matter that act on each other, so far as it belongs to their nature. +Matter itself, however, is still far more impassible than the qualities +are among each other, when they do not find themselves opposite. + + +IF FORM BE UNCHANGEABLE, SO IS MATTER. + +10. If matter could be affected, it would have to preserve some of +the affection, retaining either the affection itself, or remain in a +state different from the one in which it was before it was affected. +But when one quality appears after another quality, it is no longer +matter that receives it, but matter as determined by a quality. If even +this quality should evanesce, though leaving some trace of itself by +the action it has exercised, the substrate will still more be altered; +proceeding thus it will come to be something entirely different from +pure matter, it will be something multiple by its forms and by its +manners of existence. It will no longer be the common receptacle of all +things, since it will contain an obstacle to many things that could +happen to it; matter would no longer subsist within it, and would no +longer be incorruptible. Now if, by definition, matter always remains +what it was since its origin, namely "matter," then, if we insist +that it be altered, it is evident that matter no longer remains such. +Moreover, if everything that is altered must remain unchanged in kind, +so as not to be changed in itself, though changed in accidents; in one +word, if that which is changed must be permanent, and if that which is +permanent be not that which is affected, we come to a dilemma; either +matter is altered, and abandons its nature; or it does not abandon its +nature, and is not changed. If we say that matter is changed, but not +in so far as it is matter, it will, to begin with, be impossible to +state in what it is changed; and further, we would thereby be forced +to insist it was not changed. Indeed, just as other things, which are +forms, cannot be changed in their "being" (or, nature), because it is +this very unalterability which constitutes their "being" (or, nature), +likewise, as the "being" (or, nature) of matter is to exist in so far +as it is matter, it cannot be altered in so far as it is matter, and +it must necessarily be permanent in this respect. Therefore if form be +unalterable, matter must be equally unalterable. + + +MATTER PARTICIPATES IN THE INTELLIGIBLE ONLY BY APPEARANCE. + +11. This was no doubt the thought present to Plato when[64] he rightly +said, "These imitations of the eternal beings which enter into matter, +and which issue therefrom." Not without good reason did he employ the +terms "enter" and "issue"; he wanted us carefully to scrutinize the +manner in which matter participates in ideas. When Plato thus tries +to clear up how matter participates in ideas, his object is to show, +not how ideas enter into matter, as before so many have believed, but +their condition within it. Doubtless, it does seem astonishing that +matter remains impassible in respect to the ideas that are present +therein, while the things that enter in it are affected by each other. +We nevertheless have to acknowledge that the things which enter into +matter expel their predecessors, and that it is only the composite that +is affected. Nevertheless it is not every kind of composite that is +affected, but only that composite that happens to need the thing that +was introduced or expelled, so that its constitution becomes defective +by the absence of that (quality), or more complete by its presence. +Nothing is added to the nature of matter, however, by the introduction +of anything; the presence of that thing does not make matter what it +is, and matter loses nothing by its absence; matter remains what it was +since its origin. To be ornamented is to the interest of something that +admits of order or ornament; it can receive that ornament without being +changed, when it only puts it on, so to speak. But if this ornament +penetrate into it as something that forms part of its nature, it then +cannot receive it without being altered, without ceasing to be what it +was before, as for instance, ceasing to be ugly; without, by that very +fact, changing; without, for instance, becoming beautiful, though ugly +before. Therefore if matter become beautiful, though before ugly, it +ceases to be what it was before; namely, ugly; so that on being adorned +it loses its nature, so much the more as it was ugly only accidentally. +Being ugly enough to be ugliness itself, it could not participate in +beauty; being bad enough to be badness itself, it could not participate +in goodness. Therefore matter participates in the ideas without being +affected; and consequently, this participation must operate in another +manner; and, for instance, consist in appearance.[65] This kind of +participation solves the problem we had set ourselves; it enables us +to understand how, while being evil, matter can aspire to the Good +without ceasing to be what it was, in spite of its participation in the +Good. Indeed if this participation operate in a manner such that matter +remains without alteration, as we say, and if it always continue to be +what it was, there is no reason to be surprised if, though being evil, +it can participate in the Good; it does not swerve from its manner of +existence. On one hand, as for her, this participation is unavoidable, +it participates as long as it endures; on the other hand, as matter +continues to be what it is, by virtue of the kind of participation +which does not interfere with its nature, it undergoes no alteration +on the part of the principle which gives it something; it always +remains as bad as it was, because its nature persists. If matter really +participated in the Good, if matter were really modified thereby, its +nature would no longer be evil. Therefore, the statement that matter is +evil is true enough if it be considered to imply that it is impassible +in respect to Good; and this really amounts to saying that it is +entirely impassible. + + +SENSE-OBJECTS ARE UNREAL AND ARE CHIEFLY MADE UP OF APPEARANCE. + +12. Plato[66] agreed with this, and being persuaded that, by +participation, matter does not receive form and shape, as would some +substrate that should constitute a composite of things intimately +united by their transformation, their mixture, and their common +affections; in order to demonstrate the opposite, namely, that matter +remains impassible while receiving forms, invented a most apposite +illustration of a participation that operates without anything being +affected (namely, that engravers, before using dies on the soft wax, +clean them carefully). Almost any other kind of illustration would +fail to explain how the substrate can remain the same in the presence +of forms. While trying to achieve his purpose, Plato has raised +many questions; he has besides applied himself to demonstrate that +sense-objects are devoid of reality, and that a large part of their +hypostatic substance is constituted by appearance. Plato demonstrates +the permanence and identity of matter by showing that it is by the +figures with which it is endued that matter affects animated bodies, +without itself suffering any of their affections. He wishes to convince +us that in being endued with these figures, matter undergoes neither +affection nor alteration. Indeed, in the bodies that successively +assume different figures, we may, relying on analogy, call the change +of figures an alteration; but since matter has neither figure nor +existence,[67] how could we, even by analogy, call the presence of a +figure an alteration? The only sure way of avoiding a misunderstanding +in expression is to say that the substrate possesses nothing in the +manner it is usually supposed to possess it. How then could it possess +the things it contains, unless as a figure? Plato's illustration means +that matter is impassible, and that it contains the apparent presence +of images which are not really present therein. + + +PLATO'S FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE MIGHT LEAD TO ERRORS ABOUT HIS REAL +OPINIONS. + +We must still further preliminarily insist on the impassibility of +matter; for by using the usual terms we might be misled into wrongly +thinking that matter could be affected. Thus Plato speaks[68] of matter +being set on fire, being wetted, and so forth, as if it received +the shapes of air or water. However, Plato modifies the statement +that "matter receives the shapes of air and water" by the statement +that matter "is set on fire and wetted," and he demonstrates that by +receiving these shapes it nevertheless has none of its own, and that +forms do not more than enter into it. This expression "matter is set on +fire" must not be taken literally; it means only that matter becomes +fire. Now to become fire is not the same thing as being set on fire; to +be set on fire can achieve no more than what is different from fire, +than what can be affected; for that which itself is a part of fire +could not be set on fire. To insist on the opposite would amount to +saying that metal itself formed a statue, or that fire itself spread +into matter and set it on fire. The theory that a ("seminal) reason" +had approached matter, forces us to question how this reason could have +set matter on fire. The theory that a figure had approached matter +would imply that that which is set on fire is already composed of +two things (matter and a figure), and that these two entities form a +single one. Although these two things would form a single one, they +would not affect each other, and would act only on other entities. Nor +would they even in this case act jointly; for one would effect no more +than to hinder the other from avoiding (form). The theory that when +the body is divided matter also must be divided, would have to answer +the question, How could matter on being divided, escape the affection +undergone by the composite (of form and matter)? On such a theory, one +might even assert that matter was destroyed, and ask, Since the body is +destroyed, why should not matter also be destroyed? What is affected +and divided must be a quantity or magnitude. What is not a magnitude +cannot experience the same modifications as a body. Therefore those who +consider matter affectible would be forced to call it a body. + + +MATTER AS THE ETERNAL LOCATION OR RESIDENCE OF GENERATION. + +13. They would further have to explain in what sense they say that +matter seeks to elude form. How can it be said to seek to elude +the stones and the solid objects which contain it? For it would be +irrational to say that it seeks to elude form at certain times, but not +at others. If matter seeks to elude form voluntarily, why does it not +elude form continuously? If necessity keep matter (within form), there +can be no moment when it would not inhere in some form or other. The +reason why matter is not always contained by the same form must not +be sought for within matter, but in the forms that matter receives. +In what sense then could it be said that matter eludes form? Does it +always and essentially elude form? This would amount to saying that +matter, never ceasing being itself, has form without ever having it. +Otherwise, the statement would be meaningless.[69] (Plato) says that +matter is the "nurse and residence of generation." If then matter be +the nurse and residence of generation, it is evidently distinct from +the latter. Only that which can be affected is within the domain of +generation. Now as matter, being the nurse and residence of generation, +exists before the latter, it must also exist before any alteration. +Therefore to say that matter is the nurse and residence of generation +is tantamount to saying that matter is impassible. The same meaning +attaches to such other statements as that matter is that in which +begotten things appear, and from which they issue,[70] that matter is +the (eternal) location, and place (of all generation).[71] + + +MATTER AS LOCATION OF FORMS REMAINS IMPASSIBLE. + +When Plato, rightfully, calls matter "the location of forms," he is +not thereby attributing any passion to matter; he only indicates that +matters go on in a different manner. How? Since matter, however, by +its nature, cannot be any of the beings, and as it must flee from +the "being" of all beings, and be entirely different from them--for +("seminal) reasons" are genuine beings--it must necessarily preserve +its nature by virtue of this very difference. It must not only contain +all beings, but also not appropriate what is their image; for this is +that by which matter differs from all beings. Otherwise, if the images +that fill a mirror were not transient, and if the mirror remained +invisible, evidently we would believe that the things the mirror +presents to us existed really. If then there be something in a mirror, +that is that which sense-forms are in matter. If in a mirror there be +nothing but appearance, then there is nothing in matter but appearance, +recognizing that this appearance is the cause of the existence of +beings, an existence in which the things that exist always really +participate, and in which the things which do not really exist do not +participate; for they could not be in the condition where they would be +if they existed without the existence of existence in itself. + + +THE MYTH OF POVERTY AND ABUNDANCE. + +14. What! Would nothing exist (in the sense-world) if matter did not +exist? Nothing! It is as with a mirror; remove it, and the images +disappear. Indeed, that which by its nature is destined to exist in +something else could not exist in that thing; now the nature of every +image is to exist in something else. If the image were an emanation +of the causes themselves, it could exist without being in anything +else; but as these causes reside in themselves, so that their image +may reflect itself elsewhere, there must be something else destined +to serve as location for that which does not really enter into it; +something which by its presence, its audacity, its solicitations, and +by its indigence, should as it were forcibly obtain (what it desires), +but which is deceived because it does not really obtain anything; +so that it preserves its indigence, and continues to solicitate +(satisfaction[72]). As soon as Poverty exists, it ceaselessly "begs," +as a (well-known Platonic) myth tells us;[97] that shows clearly enough +that it is naturally denuded of all good. It does not ask to obtain all +that the giver possesses; it is satisfied with the possession of some +of it, thus revealing to us how much the images that appear in matter +are different from real beings. Even the very name of Poverty, which is +given to matter, indicates that it is insatiable. When Poverty is said +to unite with Abundance, we do not mean that it unites with Existence +or Fulness, but with a work of wonderful skill, namely, a thing that +is nothing but specious appearance.[74],[98] + + +THE MIRACLE IS THAT MATTER PARTICIPATES IN EXISTENCE WITHOUT +PARTICIPATING IN IT. + +It is indeed impossible that that which is outside of existence should +be completely deprived of it; for the nature of existence is to produce +beings. On the other hand, absolute nonentity cannot mingle with +existence. The result is something miraculous: matter participates in +existence without really participating in it, and by approaching to +it obtains something, though by its nature matter cannot unite with +existence. It therefore reflects what it receives from an alien nature +as echo reflects sound in places that are symmetrical and continuous. +That is how things that do not reside in matter seem to reside in it, +and to come from it. + + +GENERATION ILLUSTRATED BY LIGHTING FIRE BY REFRACTION. + +If matter participated in the existence of genuine beings and received +them within itself, as might easily be thought, that which would enter +into it would penetrate deeply into matter; but evidently matter is +not penetrated thereby, remaining unreceptive of any of it. On the +contrary, matter arrests their "procession," as echo arrests and +reflects sound-waves, matter being only the "residence" (or, "jar" or +vase) of the things that enter within it, and there mingle with each +other. Everything takes place there as in the case of persons who, +wishing to light fire from the rays of the sun, should place in front +of these rays polished jars filled with water, so that the flame, +arrested by the obstacles met within, should not be able to penetrate, +and should concentrate on their outside. That is how matter becomes +the cause of generation; that is how things occur within it. + + +THE RELATION OF MATTER TO REASON ILLUSTRATED BY THAT OF OPINION AND +IMAGINATION. + +15. The objects that concentrate the rays of the sun, are themselves +visible, by receiving from the fire of sensation what takes fire in +their hearth. They appear because the images that form themselves are +around and near them, and touch each other, and finally because there +are two limits in these objects. But when the ("seminal) reason" is +in matter, it remains exterior to matter in an entirely different +manner; it has a different nature. Here it is not necessary that +there be two limits; matter and reason are strangers to each other by +difference of nature, and by the difference between their natures that +makes any mixture of them impossible. The cause that each remains in +itself is that what enters into matter does not possess it, any more +than matter possesses what enters into it. That is how opinion and +imagination do not mingle in our soul,[75] and each remains what it +was, without entailing or leaving anything, because no mingling can +occur. These powers are foreign to each other, not in that there is a +mere juxtaposition, but because between them obtains a difference that +is grasped by reason, instead of being seen by sight. Here imagination +is a kind of phantom, though the soul herself be no phantom, and though +she seem to accomplish, and though she really accomplish many deeds as +she desires to accomplish them. + +Thus imagination stands to the soul in about the same lation as (form) +with matter. Nevertheless (imagination) does not hide the soul, whose +operations often disarrange and disturb it. Never could imagination +hide the soul entirely, even if imagination should penetrate the soul +entirely, and should seem to veil it completely. Indeed, the soul +contains operations and reasons contrary (to imagination), by which +she succeeds in putting aside the phantoms that besiege her.[76] But +matter, being infinitely feebler than the soul, possesses none of the +beings, either of the true or false, which characteristically belong +to it. Matter has nothing that could show it off, being absolutely +denuded of all things. It is no more than a cause of appearance for +other things; it could never say, "I am here, or there!" If, starting +from other beings,[77] profound reasoning should succeed in discovering +matter, it ultimately declares that matter is something completely +abandoned by true beings; but as the things that are posterior to true +beings themselves seem to exist, matter might, so to speak, be said to +be extended in all these things, seeming both to follow them, and not +to follow them. + + +THE MAGNITUDE OF MATTER IS REALLY DERIVED FROM THE SEMINAL REASON. + +16. The ("seminal) reason," on approaching matter, and giving it the +extension it desired, made of it a magnitude. The "reason" drew from +itself the magnitude to give it to the matter, which did not possess +it, and which did not, merely on that account, acquire size; otherwise +the magnitude occurring within it would be magnitude itself. If we +remove form from matter, the substrate that then remains neither seems +nor is large (since magnitude is part of form). If what is produced +in matter be a certain magnitude, as for instance a man or a horse, +the magnitude characteristic of the horse disappears with the form of +the horse.[78] If we say that a horse cannot be produced except in a +mass of determined size, and that this magnitude remained (when the +form of the horse disappeared), we would answer that what would then +remain would not be the magnitude characteristic of the horse, but +the magnitude of mass. Besides, if this mass were fire or earth, when +the form of fire or that of earth disappeared, the magnitude of the +fire or of the earth would simultaneously disappear. Matter therefore +possesses neither figure nor quantity; otherwise, it would not have +ceased being fire to become something else, but, remaining fire, would +never "become" fire.[79] Now that it seems to have become as great as +this universe, if the heavens, with all they contain were annihilated, +all quantity would simultaneously disappear out of matter, and with +quantity also the other inseparable qualities will disappear. Matter +would then remain what it originally was by itself; it would keep +none of the things that exist within it. Indeed, the objects that can +be affected by the presence of contrary objects can, when the latter +withdraw, keep some trace of them; but that which is impassible retains +nothing; for instance, the air, when penetrated by the light, retains +none of it when it disappears. That that which has no magnitude can +become great is not any more surprising than that which has no heat +can become hot. Indeed, for matter to be matter is something entirely +different from its being magnitude; magnitude is as immaterial as +figure. Of matter such as it really is we should say that it is all +things by participation. Now magnitude forms part of what we call all +things. As the bodies are composite, magnitude is there among the +other qualities, without however being determinate therein. Indeed, +the "reason" of the body also contains magnitude.[80] On the contrary, +matter does not even contain indeterminate magnitude, because it is not +a body. + + +MAGNITUDE IS AN IMAGE FORMED BY THE UNIVERSAL REFLECTION OF UNIVERSAL +BEINGS. + +17. Neither is matter magnitude itself; for magnitude is a form, and +not a residence; it exists by itself[81] (for matter cannot even +appropriate the images of beings). Not even in this respect, therefore, +is matter magnitude. But as that which exists in intelligence or in +the soul desired to acquire magnitude, it imparted to the things that +desired to imitate magnitude by their aspiration or movement, the power +to impress on some other object a modification analogous to their +own. Thus magnitude, by developing in the procession of imagination, +dragged along with itself the smallness of matter, made it seem large +by extending it along with itself, without becoming filled by that +extension. The magnitude of matter is a false magnitude, since matter +does not by itself possess magnitude, and by extending itself along +with magnitude, has shared the extension of the latter. Indeed as all +intelligible beings are reflected, either in other things in general, +or in one of them in particular, as each of them was large, the +totality also is, in this manner, great (?). Thus the magnitude of each +reason constituted a particular magnitude, as, for instance, a horse, +or some other being.[82] The image formed by the universal reflection +of intelligible beings became a magnitude, because it was illuminated +by magnitude itself. Every part of it became a special magnitude; and +all things together seemed great by virtue of the universal form to +which magnitude belongs. Thus occurred the extension of each thing +towards each of the others, and towards their totality. The amount of +this extension in form and in mass necessarily depended on the power, +that transformed what in reality was nothing to an appearance of being +all things. In the same manner color, that arose out of what is not +color, and quality, that arose out of what is not quality, here below +were referred to by the same name as the intelligible entities (of +which they are the images). The case is similar for magnitude, which +arose out of that which has none, or at least out of that magnitude +that bears the same name (as intelligible magnitude). + + +SENSE-OBJECTS APPEAR, AND ARE INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN FORM AND MATTER. + +Sense-objects, therefore, occupy a rank intermediary between matter +and form itself.[83] They no doubt appear, because they are derived +from intelligible entities; but they are deceptive, because the matter +in which they appear does not really exist.[84] Each of them becomes +a magnitude, because it is extended through the power of the entities +that appear here below, and which locate themselves here. Thus we +have, in every direction, the production of an extension; and that +without matter undergoing any violence, because (potentially) it is all +things. Everything produces its own extension by the power it derives +from the intelligible entities. What imparts magnitude to matter is +the appearance of magnitude, and it is this appearance that forms our +earthly magnitude. Matter yields itself everywhere entirely to the +extension it thus, by the universal appearance of magnitude, is forced +to take on. Indeed, by its nature, matter is the matter of everything, +and consequently is nothing determinate. Now that which is nothing +determinate by itself could become its opposite (of what it is), and +even after thus having become its own opposite, it is not yet really +this opposite; otherwise this opposite would be its nature.[85] + + +MAGNITUDE IS ONLY APPEARANCE. + +18. Let us now suppose that a conception of magnitude were possessed +by some being which would have the power not only to be in itself, but +also to produce itself externally; and that it should meet a nature +(such as matter) that was incapable of existing within intelligence, +of having a form, of revealing any trace of real magnitude, or any +quality. What would such a being do with such a power? It would create +neither a horse nor an ox; for other causes (the "seminal) reasons" +would produce them.[86] Indeed, that which proceeds from magnitude +itself cannot be real magnitude; it must therefore be apparent +magnitude.[87] Thus, since matter has not received real magnitude, +all it can do is to be as great as its nature will permit; that is, +to seem great. To accomplish that, it must not fail anywhere; and, if +it be extended, it cannot be a discrete quantity, but all its parts +must be united, and absent in no place. Indeed, it was impossible for +a small mass to contain an image of magnitude that would equal the +real magnitude, since it is only an image of magnitude; but, carried +away with the hope of achieving the magnitude to which it aspired, +this image extended to its limit, along with matter, which shared its +extension because matter could not follow it. That is how this image of +magnitude magnified what was not great, without however making it seem +really great, and produced the magnitude that appears in its mass. None +the less does matter preserve its nature, though it be veiled by this +apparent magnitude, as if by a garment with which it covered itself +when it followed the magnitude that involved it in its extension. +If matter ever happened to be stripped of this garment, it would +nevertheless remain what itself was before; for it possesses magnitude +only in so far as form by its presence makes it great.[88] + + +IF MATTER WERE A PRIMARY PRINCIPLE, IT WOULD BE THE FORM OF THE +UNIVERSE, SUCH AS SOUL IS. + +As the soul possesses the forms of beings, and as she herself is a +form, she possesses all things simultaneously.[89] Containing all the +forms, and besides seeing the forms of sense-objects turning towards +her, and approaching her, she is not willing to accept them, along with +their manifoldness. She considers them only after making abstractions +of their mass; for the soul could not become other than she is.[90] +But as matter does not have the strength to resist, possessing as it +does no special characteristic activity, and being no more than an +adumbration, matter yields to everything that active power proposes to +inflict on it. Besides, that which proceeds from intelligible (nature) +possesses already a trace of what is to be produced in matter. That is +how discursive reason which moves within the sphere of representative +imagination, or the movement produced by reason, implies division; for +if reason remained within unity and identity, it would not move, but +remain at rest. Besides, not as the soul does, can matter receive all +forms simultaneously; otherwise it would be a form. As it must contain +all things, without however containing them in an indivisible manner, +it is necessary that, serving as it does as location for all things, +it should extend towards all of them, everywhere offering itself to +all of them, avoiding no part of space, because it is not restricted +within any boundary of space, and because it is always ready to receive +what is to be. How then does it happen that one thing, on entering into +matter, does not hinder the entrance of other things, which, however, +cannot co-exist with the former thing? The reason is that matter is +not a first principle. Otherwise, it would be the very form of the +universe. Such a form, indeed, would be both all things simultaneously, +and each thing in particular. Indeed the matter of the living being is +divided as are the very parts of the living being; otherwise nothing +but reason[91] would exist. + + +MATTER AS MOTHER, NURSE, RESIDENCE, AND "OTHER" NATURE. + +19. When things enter into the matter that plays the part of mother +to them, they neither hurt it, nor give it pleasure. Their blows +are not felt by matter; they direct their blows only against each +other, because the powers act upon their opposites, and not on their +substrates, unless indeed we consider the substrates as united to +the things they contain. Heat makes cold disappear,[92] as whiteness +affects blackness; or, if they mingle, they produce a new quality by +their mixture.[93] What is affected is the things that mingle, and +their being affected consists in ceasing to be what they were. Among +animate beings, it is the body that is affected by the alteration +of the qualities, and of the forces possessed. When the qualities +constitutive of these beings are destroyed, or when they combine, or +when they undergo some change contrary to their nature, the affections +relate to the body, as the perceptions do to the soul. The latter +indeed knows all the affections that produce a lively impression. +Matter, however, remains what it is; it could not be affected when it +ceases to contain heat or cold, since neither of these qualities is +either characteristic or foreign. The name that best characterizes +matter, therefore, is nurse or residence.[94] But in what sense could +matter, that begets nothing, be called "mother"? Those who call it +such consider a mother as playing the part of mere matter, towards her +child, merely receiving the germ, without contributing anything of +itself, because the body of the child owes its growth to nourishment. +If however the mother does contribute anything (to the formation of the +child) she then plays the part of form, and does not restrict herself +to the part of matter. Indeed, the form alone is fruitful, while the +"other nature" (that is, matter), is unfruitful. + + +THE MYTH OF THE ITHYPHALLIC HERMES. + +That no doubt was the meaning of those ancient sages who in mysteries +and initiations symbolically represented the "ancient Hermes"[95] with +the generative organ in erection, to teach that it is intelligible +reason that begets sense-objects. On the other hand, these same sages +signify the sterility of matter, condemned to perpetual self-identity, +by the eunuchs who surround Rhea,[96] making of it the mother of all +things, to use the expression they employ in designating the principle +that plays the part of substrate. + + +THE STERILITY OF NATURE INDICATED BY CASTRATION. + +That name indicates the difference between matter and a mother. To +those who, refusing to be satisfied with superficialities, insist on +thoroughness, they thus signified in as precise a manner as possible +(without lifting the veil of) obscurity, that matter was sterile, +although feminine also to extent at least that matter receives, without +contributing to, the act of generation. They indicated it by this, that +the (Galli) who surround Cybele are not women, but neither are they +men, possessing no power of generation; for by castration they have +lost a faculty that is characteristic only of a man whose virility is +intact. + + + + +FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE. + +Psychological Questions. + + +A. ARE NOT ALL SOULS PARTS OR EMANATIONS OF A SINGLE SOUL?[99] + + +PSYCHOLOGY OBEYS THE PRECEPT "KNOW THYSELF," AND SHOWS HOW WE ARE +TEMPLES OF THE DIVINITY. + +1. Among the questions raised about the soul, we purpose to solve +here not only such as may be solved with some degree of assurance, +but also such as may be considered matters of doubt, considering our +researches rewarded by even only a definition of this doubt. This +should prove an interesting study. What indeed better deserves careful +examination and close scrutiny than what refers to the soul? Among +other advantages, the study of the soul has that of making known to us +two order of things, those of which she is the principle, and those +from which she herself proceeds. This examination will be in line with +the divine precept to "know ourselves."[100] Before seeking to discover +and understand the remainder, it is no more than right first to apply +ourselves to finding out the nature of the principle that embarks in +these researches[101]; and as we are seeking what is lovable, we will +do well to contemplate the most beautiful of spectacles (that of our +own intellectual nature); for if there be a duality, in the universal +(Soul), so much more likely will there be a duality in individual +intelligences. We should also examine the sense in which it may be said +that souls are sanctuaries of the divinity; but this question will not +admit of solution till after we have determined how the soul descends +into the body. + + +ARE INDIVIDUAL SOULS EMANATIONS OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL? + +Now we must consider whether our souls themselves are (emanations) from +the universal Soul. It may be insisted that, to demonstrate that our +souls are not particles of the universal Soul, it does not suffice to +show that our souls go as far (in their procession) as the universal +Soul, nor that they resemble (the universal Soul) in their intellectual +faculties, granting indeed that such a resemblance be admitted; for +we might say that parts conform to the whole they compose. We might +invoke Plato's authority, and insist that he teaches this opinion in +that (part of the Philebus[102]) where he affirms that the universe is +animate: "As our body is a part of the universe, our soul is a part of +the Soul of the universe." We might add that (Plato) states and clearly +demonstrates that we follow the circular movement of heaven, that +from it we receive, our moral habits and condition; that as we were +begotten in the universe, our soul must be derived from the surrounding +universe[103]; and as each part of us participates in our soul, we +ourselves should participate in the Soul of the universe, of which we +are parts in the same way as our members are parts of ourselves. Last, +we might quote the following words: "The universal Soul takes care of +all that is inanimate." This sentence seems to mean that there is no +soul outside of the universal Soul; for it is the latter that cares for +all that is inanimate. + + +CONFORMITY TO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL IMPLIES THAT THEY ARE NOT PARTS OF HER. + +2. Consider the following answers. To begin with, the assertion that +souls conform (to each other), because they attain the same objects, +and the reduction of them to a single kind, implicitly denies that +they are parts (of the universal Soul). We might better say that the +universal Soul is one and identical, and that each soul is universal +(that is, that she conforms to the universal Soul, because she +possesses all the latter's powers). Now, assertion of the unity of +the universal Soul defines her as being something different (from +individual souls); namely, a principle which, specially belonging +neither to one nor the other, neither to an individual, nor to a +world, nor to anything else, itself carries out what is carried out by +the world and every living being. It is right enough to say that the +universal Soul does not belong to any individual being, inasmuch as she +is (pure) being; it is right enough that there should be a Soul which +is not owned by any being, and that only individual souls should belong +to individual beings. + + +LIMITATIONS TO THE USE OF THE TERM "PARTS," IN PHYSICAL THINGS. + +But we shall have to explain more clearly the sense in which the word +"parts" must here be taken. To begin with, there is here no question of +parts of a body, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous. We shall make +but a single observation, namely, that when treating of homogeneous +bodies, parts refer to mass, and not to form. For instance, take +whiteness. The whiteness of one part of the milk, is not a part of the +whiteness of all the milk in existence; it is the whiteness of a part, +and not the part of whiteness; for, taken in general, whiteness has +neither size nor quantity. Only with these restrictions can we say that +there are parts in the forms suitable to corporeal things. + + +WHEN APPLIED TO INCORPOREAL THINGS, "PARTS" HAVE DIFFERENT SENSES. + +Further, treating of incorporeal things, "parts" is taken in several +senses. Speaking of numbers, we may say that two is a part of ten +(referring exclusively to abstract numbers). We may also say that a +certain extension is a part of a circle or line. Further, a notion is +said to be a part of science. + + +SUCH MATHEMATICAL SENSES CANNOT BE APPLIED TO THE SOUL. + +When dealing with numbers and geometrical figures, as well as with +bodies, it is evident that the whole is necessarily diminished by its +division into parts, and that each part is smaller than the whole. +Rightly, these things should be susceptible to increase or diminution, +as their nature is that of definite quantities, not quantity in itself. +It is surely not in this sense that, when referring to the soul, we +speak of quantities. The soul is not a quantity such as a "dozen," +which forms a whole divisible into unities; otherwise, we would end in +a host of absurdities, since a group of ten is not a genuine unity. +Either each one of the unities would have to be soul, or the Soul +herself result from a sum of inanimate unities. + + +ACTUAL DIVISION INTO PARTS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO A DENIAL OF THE WHOLE. + +Besides, our opponents have granted that every part of the universal +Soul conforms to the whole. Now, in continuous quantities, it is by +no means necessary that the part should resemble the whole. Thus, +in the circle and the quadrilateral (the parts are not circles or +quadrilaterals). All the parts of the divided object (from which a part +is taken) are not even similar to each other, but vary in manifold +ways, such as the different triangles of which a single triangle might +be composed. Our opponents also acknowledge that the universal Soul is +composed of parts that conform to the whole. Now, in a line, one part +might also be a line, while differing from the whole in magnitude. +But when we speak of the soul, if the difference of the part from +the whole consisted in a difference of size, the soul would be a +magnitude and a body; for then she would differentiate in quantity by +psychic characteristics. But this would be impossible if all souls be +considered similar and universal. It is evident that the soul cannot, +like magnitudes, be further divided; and even our opponents would not +claim that the universal Soul is thus divided into parts. This would +amount to destroying the universal Soul, and reducing her to a mere +name, if indeed in this system a prior universal (Soul) can at all be +said to exist. This would place her in the position of wine, which +might be distributed in several jars, saying that the part of the wine +contained in each of them is a portion of the whole.[104] + + +NOR IS THE SOUL A PART IN THE SENSE THAT ONE PROPOSITION IS A PART OF A +SCIENCE. + +Nor should we (apply to the soul) the word "part" in the sense that +some single proposition is a part of the total science. In this +case the total science does not remain any less the same (when it +is divided), and its division is only as it were the production and +actualization of each of its component parts. Here each proposition +potentially contains the total science, and (in spite of its division), +the total science remains whole. + + +THE DIFFERENCE OF FUNCTIONS OF THE WORLD-SOUL AND INDIVIDUAL SOULS +MAKES ENTIRE DIVISION BETWEEN THEM IMPOSSIBLE. + +If such be the relation of the universal Soul to the other souls, the +universal Soul, whose parts are such, will not belong to any particular +being, but will subsist in herself. No longer will she be the soul +of the world. She will even rank with the number of souls considered +parts. As all souls would conform to each other, they would, on the +same grounds, be parts of the Soul that is single and identical. Then +it would be inexplicable that some one soul should be Soul of the +world, while some other soul should be one of the parts of the world. + + +ARE INDIVIDUAL SOULS PART OF THE WORLD-SOUL AS IS THE LOCAL +CONSCIOUSNESS OF SOME PART OF THE BODY TO THE WHOLE CONSCIOUSNESS? + +3. Are individual souls parts of the universal Soul as, in any living +organism, the soul that animates (or vivifies) the finger is a part of +the entire soul back of the whole animal? This hypothesis would force +us to the conclusion either that there is no soul outside of the body, +or that the whole universal Soul exists entire, not in a body, but +outside of the body of the world. This question deserves consideration. +Let us do so by an illustration. + + +STUDY OF THE QUESTION BY OBSERVATION OF THE HUMAN ORGANISM. + +If the universal Soul communicate herself to all individual animals, +and if it be in this sense that each soul is a part of the universal +Soul--for as soon as she would be divided, the universal Soul +could not communicate herself to every part--the universal must be +entire everywhere, and she must simultaneously be one and the same +in different beings. Now this hypothesis no longer permits us to +distinguish on one hand the universal Soul, and on the other the parts +of this soul, so much the more as these parts have the same power (as +the universal Soul); for even for organs whose functions are different, +as the eyes and ears, it will not be claimed that there is one part of +the soul in the eyes, and another in the ears--such a division would +suit only things that have no relation with the soul. We should insist +that it is the same part of the soul which animates these two different +organs, exercising in each of them a different faculty. Indeed, all +the powers of the soul are present in these two senses (of sight and +hearing), and the only cause of the difference of their perceptions is +the differences of the organs. Nevertheless all perceptions belong to +forms (that is, to faculties of the soul), and reduce to a form (the +soul) which can become all things (?).[153] This is further proved by +the fact that the impressions are forced to come and centre in an only +centre. Doubtless the organs by means of which we perceive cannot make +us perceive all things, and consequently the impressions differ with +the organs. Nevertheless the judgment of these impressions belongs to +one and the same principle, which resembles a judge attentive to the +words and acts submitted to his consideration.[105] We have, however, +said above that it is one and the same principle which produces acts +belonging to different functions (as are sight and hearing). If these +functions be like the senses, it is not possible that each of them +should think; for the universal alone would be capable of this. If +thought be a special independent function, every intelligence subsists +by itself. Further, when the soul is reasonable, and when she is so in +a way such as to be called reasonable in her entirety, that which is +called a part conforms to the whole, and consequently is not a part of +the whole. + + +INTELLECTUAL DIFFICULTY OF THE SOUL BEING ONE AND YET IN ALL BEINGS. + +4. If the universal Soul be one in this manner, what about consequences +of this (conception)? Might we not well doubt the possibility of the +universal Soul's simultaneously being one, yet present in all beings? +How does it happen that some souls are in a body, while others are +discarnate? It would seem more logical to admit that every soul is +always in some body, especially the universal Soul. For it is not +claimed, for the universal Soul, as it is for ours, that she ever +abandons her body, and though it be by some asserted that the universal +Soul may one day leave her body, it is never claimed that she would +ever be outside of any body. Even admitting that some day she should +be divided from all body, how does it happen that a soul could thus +separate, while some other could not, if at bottom both are of the same +nature? As to Intelligence, such a question would be impossible; the +parts into which it is divided are not distinguished from each other by +their individual difference, and they all exist together eternally, for +Intelligence is not divisible. On the contrary, as the universal Soul +is divisible within the bodies, as has been said, it is difficult to +understand how all the souls proceed from the unitary (pure) Being. + + +THE HEALTHY SOUL CAN WORK, THE SICK SOUL IS DEVOTED TO HER BODY. + +This question may be answered as follows. The unitary Being (that +is Intelligence), subsists in itself without descending into the +bodies. From unitary Being proceed the universal Soul and the other +souls, which, up to a certain point, exist all together, and form +but a single soul so far as they do not belong to any particular +individual (contained in the sense-world). If, however, by their +superior extremities they attach themselves to Unity, if within it +they coincide, they later diverge (by their actualization), just as +on the earth light is divided between the various dwellings of men, +nevertheless remaining one and indivisible. In this case, the universal +Soul is ever elevated above the others because she is not capable of +descending, of falling, of inclining towards the sense-world. Our +souls, on the contrary, descend here below, because special place +is assigned to them in this world, and they are obliged to occupy +themselves with a body which demands sustained attention. By her +lower part, the universal Soul resembles the vital principle which +animates a great plant, and which there manages everything peaceably +and noiselessly. By their lower part our souls are similar to those +animalculæ born of the decaying parts of plants. That is the image +of the living body of the universe. The higher part of our soul, +which is similar to the higher part of the universal Soul, might be +compared to a farmer who, having noticed the worms by which the plant +is being devoured, should apply himself to destroying them, and should +solicitously care for the plant. So we might say that the man in good +health, and surrounded by healthy people, is entirely devoted to his +duties or studies; the sick man, on the contrary, is entirely devoted +to his body, and becomes dependent thereon. + + +SOULS RETAIN BOTH THEIR UNITY AND DIFFERENCES ON DIFFERENT LEVELS. + +5. How could the universal Soul simultaneously be the soul of yourself +and of other persons? Might she be the soul of one person by her lower +strata, and that of somebody else by her higher strata? To teach such +a doctrine would be equivalent to asserting that the soul of Socrates +would be alive while being in a certain body, while she would be +annihilated (by losing herself within the universal Soul) at the very +moment when (as a result of separation of the body) she had come into +what was best (in the intelligible world). No, none of the true beings +perishes. Not even the intelligences lose themselves up there (in the +divine Intelligence), because they are not divided as are bodies, +and each subsists in her own characteristics, to their differences +joining that identity which constitutes "being." Being located below +the individual intelligences to which they are attached, individual +souls are the "reasons" (born) of the intelligences, or more developed +intelligences; from being but slightly manifold, they become very much +so, while remaining in communion with the slightly manifold beings. +As however they tend to introduce separation in these less divisible +beings (that is, intelligences), and as nevertheless they cannot attain +the last limits of division, they simultaneously preserve both their +identity and difference. Each one remains single, and all together form +a unity. + + +SOULS DEVELOP MANIFOLDNESS JUST AS INTELLIGENCE DOES. + +We have thus succeeded in establishing the most important point of +the discussion, namely, that all souls proceed from a single Soul, +that from being one they become manifold, as is the case with the +intelligences, divided in the same way, and similarly undivided. +The Soul that dwells in the intelligible world is the one and +indivisible reason (born) of intelligence, and from this Soul proceed +the particular immaterial "reasons," in the same manner as on high +(the individual intelligences proceed from the one and absolute +Intelligence). + + +WHY SHOULD CREATION BE PREDICATED OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL AND NOT OF THE +HUMAN? + +6. If there be similarity between the universal Soul and the individual +souls, how does it happen that the former created the world, while +the others did not do so, though each of them also contain all things +within herself, and since we have already shown that the productive +power can exist simultaneously in several beings? By explaining its +"reason" we can thus examine and discover how the same nature ("being") +can act or experience, or act and experience, in a different manner in +different beings. + + +THE WORLD-SOUL ALONE CREATES BECAUSE SHE REMAINS NEAREST THE +INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. + +How and why did the universal Soul make the universe, while the +individual souls only manage a part thereof? That is not more +surprising than to see, among men who possess the same knowledge, some +command a greater number, and others a lesser. This is the case because +there is a great difference between souls. Some, instead of separating +from the universal Soul, have remained in the intelligible world, +and still contain the body (of the universal), while others, when +the body (of the universe) already existed, and while the universal +Soul, their sister, governed it, accepted destinies assigned them by +fate, as if (the universal Soul) had prepared for them dwellings to +receive them.[106] Besides, the universal Soul contemplates universal +Intelligence, and the individual souls rather contemplate individual +intelligences. These souls might indeed possibly have also been capable +of making the universe; but that is no longer possible to them now that +the universal Soul has already done it, and has preceded them. Besides, +the very same question would have arisen even if an entirely different +soul had first made the universe. Perhaps it is better to state that if +the universal Soul has created the universe, it is chiefly because she +is more closely related to intelligible entities, for the souls that +are nearest thereto are the most powerful. Maintaining themselves in +this quiet region, they act with greater facility; for to act without +suffering is the sign of a greater power. Thus the power depending on +the intelligible world abides within itself, and by abiding within +itself, produces. The other souls, descending towards the body, +withdraw from the intelligible world, and fall into the abyss (of +matter). Perhaps also the element of manifoldness within them, finding +itself drawn towards the lower regions, along with it dragged the +conceptions of those souls, and made them descend hither. Indeed the +distinction of the second or third rank for souls must be understood in +this sense that some are nearer, and some further from the intelligible +world. Likewise, among us, all souls are not equally disposed in regard +to this world. Some succeed in uniting with it, others approach it by +their aspirations; others do not quite succeed, because they do not all +use the same faculties, and some use the first, others the second, and +some the third, though they all equally possess all faculties. + + +DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL SOULS. + +7. That is what seems true to us. As to the Philebus passage (quoted +in the first section), it might mean that all souls were parts of the +universal Soul. That, however, is not its true meaning, as held by +some. It only means what Plato desired to assert in this place, namely, +that heaven is animate. Plato proves this by saying that it would be +absurd to insist that heaven has no soul, when our body, which is only +a part of the body of the universe, nevertheless has a soul; but how +could a part be animate, unless the whole was so also? It is especially +in the Timaeus[107] that Plato clearly expresses his thought. After +having described the birth of the universal Soul, he shows the other +souls born later from the mixture made in the same vase from which +the universal Soul was drawn. He asserts that they are similar to the +universal Soul, and that their difference consists in that they occupy +the second or third rank. That is further confirmed by this passage of +the Phaedrus[108]: "The universal Soul cares for what is inanimate." +Outside of the Soul, indeed, what power would manage, fashion, ordain +and produce the body? It would be nonsense to attribute this power +to one soul, and not to another. (Plato) adds (in substance): "The +Perfect Soul, the Soul of the universe, hovering in the ethereal +region, acts on the earth without entering into it, being borne above +him as in a chariot. The other souls that are perfect share with it +the administration of the world." When Plato speaks of the soul as +having lost her wings, he is evidently distinguishing individual souls +from the universal Soul. One might also conclude that our souls are +part of the universal Soul from his statement that the souls follow +the circular movement of the universe, that from it they derive their +characteristics, and that they undergo its influence. Indeed, they +might very easily undergo the influence exercised by the nature of +the special localities, of the waters and the air of the towns they +inhabit, and the temperament of the bodies to which they are joined. +We have indeed acknowledged that, being contained in the universe, we +possess something of the life-characteristic of the universal Soul, and +that we undergo the influence of the circular movement of the heavens. +But we have also shown that there is within us another (rational) soul, +which is capable of resistance to these influences, and which manifests +its different character precisely by the resistance she offers them. +The objection that we are begotten within the universe may be answered +by the fact that the child is likewise begotten within its mother's +womb, and that nevertheless the soul that enters into its body is +distinct from that of its mother. Such is our solution of the problem. + + +SYMPATHY BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL SOUL COMES FROM COMMON SOURCE. + +8. The sympathy existing between souls forms no objection. For this +sympathy might be explained by the fact that all souls are derived from +the same principle from which the universal Soul also is derived. We +have already shown that there is one Soul (the universal) and several +souls (human souls); and we have also defined the difference between +the parts and the whole. Last, we have also spoken of the difference +existing between souls. Let us now return to the latter point. + + +DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOULS. + +This difference between souls is caused principally by the constitution +of the bodies they animate; also by the moral habits, the activities, +the thoughts and behavior of these souls in earlier existence. +According to Plato[109] the choice of the souls' condition depends on +their anterior existence. On observing the nature of souls in general, +we find that Plato recognizes differences between them by saying that +some souls occupy the second or third ranks.[110] Now we have said that +all souls are (potentially) all things,[111] that each is characterized +by the faculty principally exercised thereby, that is, that some souls +unite with the intelligible world by actualization, while others do so +in thought or desire.[112] Souls, thus contemplating different objects, +are and become all that they contemplate. Fulness and perfection +also belong to soul, but in this respect they are not all identical, +because variety is the law that directs their co-ordination. Indeed, +the universal[113] reason is on the one hand manifold, and on the other +varied, like a being that is animate, and which possesses manifold +forms.[114] In this case, there is co-ordination; beings are not +entirely separated from each other, and there is no place for chance +either in real beings, nor in bodies; consequently the number of beings +is definite. To be individual, beings must first be stable, then they +must remain identical, and last, they must numerically be one in order +to achieve individuality. Bodies which by nature perpetually ooze away, +because for them form is something incidental, never possess formal +existence but by their participation in (and imitation of), genuine +"Beings." On the contrary, for the latter, that are not composite, +existence consists in each of them being numerically single, in +possessing this unity which dates from the beginning, which does not +become what it was not, and which will never cease being what it is. +If indeed they cannot exist without some producing principle, that +principle will not derive them from matter. It will have to add to +them something from its own being. But if intelligible entities thus +have at times more, and at times less, perfection, they will change; +which would contradict their (nature, or) "being," which is to remain +identical. Why indeed should they become such as they are now, and why +should they not always have been such as they now are? Further, if +they be at times more or less perfect, if they "become," they are not +eternal. But it is granted that the Soul (as an intelligible being) is +eternal. + + +LIKE THE DIVINITY, THE SOUL IS ALWAYS ONE. + +(It might still be asked) whether what is stable can be called +infinite? That which is stable is potentially infinite, because its +power is infinite without being also infinitely divided; for the +divinity too is infinite.[115] Thus each soul is what the divinity's +nature is, without receiving from any other either limit or determinate +quantity. The soul extends as far as she wishes. She is never forced +to go further, but everywhere she descends towards bodies and +penetrates into them, according to her nature. Besides, she never +separates from herself, though present in finger or in foot. Not +otherwise is it with the universe: wherever the Soul penetrates, she +ever remains indivisible, as when she penetrates into the different +parts of a plant. Then, if you cut a certain part, the principle which +communicates life to it remains present both in the plant and in the +part detached therefrom. The body of the universe is single, and the +Soul is everywhere in her unity. + + +SOUL POWERS REMAIN THE SAME THROUGHOUT ALL CHANGES OF BODY. + +When numberless vermin arise out of the putrefaction of a body, they do +not derive their life from the soul of the entire animal; the latter +has abandoned the body of the animal, and, being dead, no longer dwells +in the body. But the matter derived from putrefaction, being well +suited for the generation of vermin, each receives a different soul, +because the (universal) Soul is not lacking anywhere. Nevertheless, +as one part of the body is capable of receiving her, while another is +not, the parts that thus become animated do not increase the number of +souls; for each of these little beings depends, as far as she remains +one, on the single Soul (that is, on the universal Soul). This state +of affairs resembles that in us. When some parts of our bodies are cut +off, and when others grow in their place, our soul abandons the former, +and unites with the latter, in so far as she remains one. Now the Soul +of the universe ever remains one; and though amidst things contained +within this universe, some are animate, while others are inanimate, the +soul-powers nevertheless remain the same. + + +B. WHY AND HOW DO SOULS DESCEND INTO BODIES? + + +TWO KINDS OF TRANSMIGRATION. + +9. Let us now examine how it happens that the soul descends into +the body, and in what manner this occurs; for it is sufficiently +astonishing and remarkable. For a soul, there are two kinds of entrance +into a body. The first occurs when the soul, already dwelling in a +body, undergoes a transmigration; that is, passes from an aerial or +igneous body into a terrestrial body. This is not usually called a +transmigration, because the condition from which the soul comes is not +visible. The other kind occurs when the soul passes from an incorporeal +condition into any kind of a body, and thus for the first time enters +into relations with a body.[116] + + +STUDY OF FIRST INCARNATION. + +We must here examine what, in the latter case, is experienced by the +soul which, till then pure from all dealings with the body, for the +first time surrounds herself with that kind of a substance. Besides, it +is not only just but even necessary for us to begin by a consideration +of (this event in) the universal Soul. To say that the Soul enters +the body of the universe and comes to animate it, is no more than a +statement made to clarify our thoughts; for the succession in her +actions thus established is purely verbal. There never was a moment +when the universe was not animated, when its body existed without the +Soul, or when matter existed without form.[117] But these things can be +separated in thought and speech, since as soon as an object is formed, +it is always possible to analyse it by thought and speech. That is the +truth. + + +HOW THE UNIVERSE IS ANIMATED BY THE WORLD SOUL. + +If there were no body, the soul could not have any procession, since +the body is the natural locality of her development. As the soul must +extend, she will beget a receiving locality, and will, consequently, +produce the body. The soul's rest is based, and depends for growth on +(the intellectual category of) rest itself. The soul thus resembles +an immense light which weakens as it becomes more distant from its +source, so that at the extremity of its radiation, it has become no +more than an adumbration. However, the soul evidently gave a form to +this adumbration from the very beginning of things. It was, indeed, +by no means suitable that what approached the soul should in no +way participate in reason[118]; consequently there came to be an +adumbration of reason in (matter), this adumbration being the soul. +The universe thus became a beautiful and varied dwelling, which was +not deprived of the presence[119] of the universal Soul by her not +totally incorporating within it. She judged that the whole universe was +worthy of her care, and she thus gave it as much "being" and beauty as +it was able to receive, without herself losing any of it, because she +manages the world while herself remaining above it in the intelligible +sphere. By so animating it, she thus grants it her presence, without +becoming its property; she dominates it, and possesses it, without +being, thereby, dominated or possessed. The universe, indeed, is in the +containing Soul, and participates therein entirely. (The universe is in +the Soul as is) a net in the sea, on all sides penetrated and enveloped +by life, without ever being able to appropriate it. So far as it can, +this net extends along with the sea, for none of its parts could be +elsewhere than it is. By nature the universal Soul is immense, because +her magnitude is not definite; so that by one and the same power she +embraces the entire body of the world, and is present throughout the +whole extension. Without it, the world-Soul would make no effort to +proceed into extension, for by herself she is all that it is her nature +to be. The magnitude of the universe therefore is determined by that +of the location of the Soul; and the limits of its extent are those +of the space within which it is animated by her. The extension of the +adumbration of the Soul is therefore determined by that of the "reason" +which radiates from this focus of light; and on the other hand, this +"reason" was to produce such an extension as its nature urged it to +produce.[120] + + +THE WORLD-SOUL PROGRESSIVELY INFORMS ALL THINGS. + +10. Now let us return to that which has always been what it is. Let +us, in thought, embrace all beings: air, light, sun, and moon. Let us +then consider the sun, the light, and so forth, as being all things, +without ever forgetting that there are things that occupy the first +rank, others the second, or the third. Let us, at the summit of +this series of beings, conceive of the universal Soul as subsisting +eternally. Let us then posit that which holds the first rank after her, +and thus continue till we arrive at the things that occupy the last +rank, and which, as it were, are the last glimmerings of the light shed +by the soul. Let us represent these things as an extension first dark, +and then later illuminated by the form which comes to impress itself +on an originally dark background. This background is embellished by +reason in virtue of the entire universal Soul's independent power of +embellishing matter by means of reasons, just as the "seminal reasons" +themselves fashion and form animals as microcosms. According to its +nature, the Soul gives a form to everything she touches. She produces +without casual conception, without the delays of deliberation, or of +those of voluntary determination. Otherwise, she would not be acting +according to her nature, but according to the precepts of a borrowed +art. Art, indeed, is posterior to nature. Art imitates by producing +obscure and feeble imitations of nature's works, toys without value or +merit; and besides, art makes use of a great battery of apparatus to +produce these images. On the contrary, the universal Soul, dominating +bodies by virtue of her nature ("being") makes them become and be what +she desires; for the things themselves that exist since the beginning +cannot raise resistance to her will. In inferior things, as the result +of mutual obstruction, matter does not receive the exact form that the +("seminal) reason" contains in germ. But as the universal Soul produces +the universal form, and as all things are therein co-ordinated, the +work is beautiful because it is realized without trouble or obstacle. +In the universe there are temples for the divinities, houses for men, +and other objects adapted to the needs of other beings. What indeed +could the Soul create if not what she has the power to create? As +fire warms, as snow cools, the soul acts now within herself, and then +outside of herself, and on other objects. The action which inanimate +beings elicit from themselves slumbers, as it were, within them; and +that which they exert on others consists in assimilating to themselves +that which is capable of an experience. To render the rest similar to +itself, is indeed the common characteristic of every being. The soul's +power of acting on herself and on others is a vigilant faculty. It +communicates life to beings who do not have it in themselves, and the +life communicated to them is similar to the life of the soul herself. +Now as the soul lives in reason, she imparts a reason to the body, +which reason is an image of the one she herself possesses. Indeed, what +she communicates to the bodies is an image of life. She also imparts to +them the shapes whose reasons she contains. Now as she possesses the +reasons of all things, even of the divinities, the world contains all +things. + + +THE UNIVERSAL SOUL AS MODEL OF REASON, AS INTERMEDIARY AND INTERPRETER. + +11. The ancient sages, who wished to materialize the divinities by +making statues of them, seem to me to have well judged the nature of +the universe. They understood that the being of the universal Soul was +easy to attract anywhere, that her presence can easily be summoned +in everything suited to receive her action, and thus to participate +somewhat in her power. Now anything is suited to undergo the action of +the soul when it lends itself like a mirror to the reflection of any +kind of an image. In the universe nature most artistically forms all +beings in the image of the reasons it contains. In each of (nature's) +works the ("seminal) reason" that is united to matter, being the image +of the reason superior to the matter (of the idea), reattaches itself +to divinity (to Intelligence), according to which it was begotten, +and which the universal Soul contemplated while creating.[121] It was +therefore equally impossible that there should be here below anything +which did not participate in the divinity, and which the latter brought +down here below; for (the divinity) is Intelligence, the sun that +shines there on high. Let us consider (the universal Soul) as the +model of reason. Below the Intelligence is the Soul, which depends +on it, which subsists by and with it. The Soul holds to this sun (of +Intelligence); the Soul is the intermediary by which the beings here +below are reattached to intelligible beings; she is the interpreter of +things which descend from the intelligible world into the sense-world, +and of the things of the sense-world which return into the intelligible +world. Indeed, intelligible things are not separated from each other; +they are distinguished only by their difference and their constitution. +Each of them remains within itself, without any relation to locality; +they are simultaneously united and separate. The beings that we call +divinities deserve to be considered such because they never swerve +from intelligible entities, because they depend on the universal Soul +considered in her principle, at the very moment of the Soul's issuing +from Intelligence. Thus these beings are divinities by virtue of the +very principle to which they owe their existence, and because they +devote themselves to the contemplation of Intelligence, from which the +universal Soul herself does not distract her gaze. + + +SOULS ARE NOT CUT OFF FROM INTELLIGENCE DURING THEIR DESCENT AND ASCENT. + +12. Human souls rush down here below because they have gazed at their +images (in matter) as in the mirror of Bacchus. Nevertheless, they are +not separated from their principle, Intelligence. Their intelligence +does not descend along with them, so that even if by their feet they +touch the earth, their head rises above the sky.[122] They descend +all the lower as the body, over which their intermediary part is to +watch, has more need of care. But their father Jupiter, pitying their +troubles, made their bonds mortal. At certain intervals, he grants them +rest, delivering them from the body, so that they may return to inhabit +the region where the universal Soul ever dwells, without inclining +towards things here below.[123] Indeed what the universe at present +possesses suffices it both now and in the future, since its duration +is regulated by eternal and immutable reasons, and because, when one +period is finished, it again begins to run through another where all +the lives are determined in accordance with the ideas.[124] In that +way all things here below are subjected to intelligible things, and +similarly all is subordinated to a single reason, either in the descent +or in the ascension of souls, or in their activities in general. +This is proved by the agreement between the universal order and the +movements of the souls which by descending here below, conform to +this order without depending on it; and perfectly harmonize with the +circular movement of heaven. Thus the actions, fortunes and destinies +ever are prefigured in the figures formed by the stars.[125] That is +the symphony whose sound is so melodious that the ancients expressed +it symbolically by musical harmony.[126] Now this could not be the +case unless all the actions and experiences of the universe were (well) +regulated by reasons which determine its periods, the ranks of souls, +their existences, the careers that they accomplish in the intelligible +world, or in heaven, or on the earth. The universal Intelligence +ever remains above the heaven, and dwelling there entirely, without +ever issuing from itself; it radiates into the sense-world by the +intermediation of the Soul which, placed beside it, receives the +impression of the idea, and transmits it to inferior things, now +immutably, and then changeably, but nevertheless in a regulated manner. + + +WHY SOULS TAKE ON DIFFERENT KINDS OF BODIES. + +Souls do not always descend equally; they descend sometimes lower, +sometimes less low, but always in the same kind of beings (among living +beings). Each soul enters into the body prepared to receive her, which +corresponds to the nature to which the soul has become assimilated by +its disposition; for, according as the soul has become similar to the +nature of a man or of a brute, she enters into a corresponding body. + + +HOW SOULS COME TO DESCEND. + +13. What is called inevitable necessity and divine justice consists +in the sway of nature which causes each soul to proceed in an orderly +manner into the bodily image which has become the object of her +affection, and of her predominating disposition. Consequently the +soul, by her form, entirely approaches the object towards which her +interior disposition bears her. Thus she is led and introduced where +she is to go; not that she is forced to descend at any particular +moment into any particular body; but, at a fixed moment, she descends +as it were spontaneously where she ought to enter. Each (soul) has her +own hour. When this hour arrives, the soul descends as if a herald +was calling her, and she penetrates into the body prepared to receive +her, as if she had been mastered and set in motion by forces and +powerful attractions exerted by magic.[127] Similarly in an animal, +nature administers all the organs, solves or begets everything in its +own time, grows the beard or the horns, gives special inclinations +and powers to the being, whenever they become necessary. Similarly, +in plants, (nature) produces flowers or fruits at the proper season. +The descent of souls into the bodies is neither voluntary nor forced; +it is not voluntary, since it is not chosen or consented to by +souls. It is not compulsory, in the sense that the latter obey only +a natural impulsion, just as one might be led to marriage, or to the +accomplishment of various honest actions, rather by instinct than by +reasoning. Nevertheless, there is always something fatal for each soul. +One accomplishes her destiny at some one moment; the other soul at some +other moment. Likewise, the intelligence that is superior to the world +also has something fatal in its existence, since itself has its own +destiny, which is to dwell in the intelligible world, and to make its +light radiate therefrom. Thus individuals come here below by virtue of +the common law to which they are subjected. Each one, indeed, bears +within himself this common law, a law which does not derive its power +from outside, but which depends on the nature of those who are subject +to it, because it is innate in them. Consequently all voluntarily +carry out its decrees at the predestined time, because this law impels +them to their goal; and because, deriving its force from those whom it +commands, it presses and stimulates them and inspires them with the +desire to go whither their interior vocation calls them. + + +BY A PUN ON "WORLD" AND "ADORNMENT," PLOTINOS SHOWS MEN ADD TO THE +BEAUTY OF THE WORLD. + +14. That is how this world, which already contains many lights, and +which is illuminated by souls, finds itself still further adorned +by the various beauties derived from different beings. It receives +beauties from the intelligible divinities and from the other +intelligences which furnish it with souls. This is probably the +allegorical intent of the following myth. + + +BY A PUN ON "PROMETHEUS" AND "PROVIDENCE," PLOTINOS EMPLOYS THE MYTH OF +PANDORA. + +(Following both Hesiod and the Gnostics, Plotinos relates that) a woman +was formed by Prometheus, and adorned by the other divinities. This +piece of clay, after having been kneaded with water, was endowed with +a human voice, and received a form similar to the deities. Then Venus, +the Graces and the other deities each gave her a gift. That is why this +woman was called Pandora, because (as her name implies, in Greek) she +had received gifts, which had been given by all the divinities. All, in +fact, made some present to this piece of clay already fashioned by some +kind of providence ("Prometheia," or "Prometheus"). When Epimetheus +rejects the gift of Prometheus, it only indicates that it is better to +live in the intelligible world.[128] The creator of Pandora, however, +is bound because he seems attached to his work. But this bond is +entirely exterior, and it is broken by Hercules, because the latter +possesses a liberating power. Whatever other interpretation the myth of +Pandora may receive, it must still signify gifts received by the world, +and its import must agree with our teaching. + + +WHY MANY SOULS SUCCUMB TO THE LAW OF THE ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE. + +15. On descending from the intelligible world, souls first come into +heaven, and they there take a body by means of which they pass even +into terrestrial bodies, according as they more or less advance +(outside of the intelligible world). There are some who issue from +heaven into the bodies of an inferior nature; there are some also who +pass from one body into another. The latter no longer have the power to +reascend into the intelligible world because they have forgotten; they +are weighted down by the burden they carry along with themselves. Now +souls differ either by the bodies to which they are united, or by their +different destinies, or by their kind of life, or by their primitive +nature. Thus differing from each other in all these relations, or +in only some, the souls here below either succumb to fate, or are +alternately subjected to it, and liberated; or, while supporting what +is necessary, preserve the liberty of devoting themselves to actions +that are characteristic of them, and live according to some other law, +following the order that rules the whole universe. This order embraces +all the ("seminal) reasons," and all the causes, the movements of the +souls, and the divine laws. It agrees with these laws, it borrows +from them its principles, and relates thereto all things that are its +consequences. It preserves in an imperishable condition all the beings +which are able to preserve themselves conformably to the constitution +of the intelligible world. It leads the other beings whither their +nature calls them, so that whithersoever they may descend, there is a +cause which assigns to them some particular position or condition. + + +THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MISFORTUNES AND PUNISHMENTS. + +16. The punishments which justly overtake the evil must therefore be +derived from that Order which rules all things with propriety. The +unjust evils, accidents, misery and diseases which seem to overwhelm +the good, may all be said to be consequences of anterior faults. +These evils are intimately related to the course of events, and are +even represented therein by their signs, so that they seem to happen +according to the Reason (of the universe). We must however acknowledge +that they are not produced by natural "reasons," that they are not +within the purview of Providence, and that they are only its accidental +consequences. Thus when a house happens to fall, it buries anybody +below it, whoever he may happen to be; or again, whether some regular +movement drives on some one thing, or even several things, it breaks +or crushes anything that happens to lie in its path. These accidents +which seem unjust, are not evils for those who suffer them, if you +consider how they take their place within the legitimate order of the +universe; perhaps even they constitute just chastisements and are the +expiations of earlier faults. It would be incredible that one series +of beings in the universe should obey its order, while another series +should be subject to chance or caprice. If everything happen through +causes and natural consequences, in conformity with a single "reason," +and to a single order, the smallest things must form part of that +order, and agree with it. Injustice practiced against somebody else +is an injustice for him who commits it, and must attract a punishment +to him; but by the place which it holds in the universal order, it is +not an injustice, even for him who suffers it. It had to be thus. If +the victim of this injustice was an honest man, for him it can have +only a happy ending. This universal order must not be accused of being +undivine and unjust, but we should insist that distributive justice +exercises itself with perfect propriety. If certain things seem worthy +of blame, it is because they are due to secret causes that escape our +knowledge. + + +FROM THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD, SOULS FIRST GO INTO HEAVEN. + +17. From the intelligible world souls first descend into the heaven. +For if the heaven is the best part of the sense-world, it must be +nearest to the limits of the intelligible world. The celestial bodies +are therefore the first that receive the souls, being most fitted to +receive them. The terrestrial body is animated the last, and it is +suited to the reception of an inferior soul only, because it is more +distant from the incorporeal nature. All souls first illuminate the +sky, and radiate from it their first and purest rays; the remainder is +lit up by inferior powers. There are souls which, descending lower, +illuminate inferior things; but they do not gain anything in getting so +far from their origin. + + +THE DESCENDING GRADUATIONS OF EXISTENCE. + +We must imagine a centre, and around this centre a luminous sphere +that radiates from (Intelligence). Then, around this sphere, lies a +second one that also is luminous, but only as a light lit from another +light (the universal Soul). Then, beyond and outside of these spheres +lies a further one, which no more is light, but which is illuminated +only by an alien light, for lack of a light peculiar to (this world +of ours). Outside of those two spheres there is indeed a rhomboid, or +rather another sphere, that receives its light from the second sphere, +and which receives it the more intensely, the closer it is thereto. +The great light (Intelligence) sheds its light though remaining within +itself, and the brilliancy that radiates around it (on to the soul) +is "reason." Other souls radiate also, some by remaining united to +the universal Soul, others by descending lower in order better to +illuminate the bodies to which they devote their care; but these cares +are troublous. As the pilot who steers his ship over the troubled +waves forgets himself in the effort of his work,[129] to the point +of forgetting that he exposes himself to perish with the ship in the +shipwreck, likewise souls are dragged down (into the abyss of matter) +by the attention they devote to the bodies that they govern. Then they +are chained to their destiny, as if fascinated by a magic attraction, +but really retained by the potent bonds of nature. If every body were +as perfect as the universe, it would completely suffice itself, it +would have no danger to fear, and the soul that is present within it, +instead of this, could communicate life to it without leaving the +intelligible world. + + +C. DOES THE SOUL EMPLOY DISCURSIVE REASON WHILE DISCARNATE? + +THE SOUL DOES NOT USE DISCURSIVE REASON EXCEPT WHILE HINDERED BY THE +OBSTACLES OF THE BODY. + +18. Does the soul ratiocinate before entering upon the body, and after +having left it? No: she reasons only while in a body, because she is +uncertain, embarrassed and weakened. To need to reason in order to +arrive at complete knowledge always betrays weakening of intellect. In +the arts reasoning occurs only when the artist hesitates before some +obstacle. Where there is no difficulty in the matter, art masters it, +and produces its work instantly. + + +THE SOUL CAN REASON INTUITIONALLY WITHOUT RATIOCINATION. + +(It might be objected) that if the souls on high do not reason, +they will no longer be reasonable. They remain reasonable, however, +because they are well able to penetrate into the essence of something, +whenever the occasion demands it. Ratiocination should be considered +as follows. If it consist in a disposition that is always derived +from Intelligence, in an immanent act, a reflection of this power in +souls, these must also reason in the intelligible world; but then they +have no further need of language. Likewise, when they inhabit heaven, +neither do they need to take recourse to speech, as do the souls here +below, as a result of their needs and uncertainties. They act in an +orderly manner, and in conformity with nature, without premeditation +or deliberation. They know each other by a simple intuition, as even +here below we know our like without their talking to us, by a mere +glance. On high every body is pure and transparent. Each person there, +is, as it were, an eye. Nothing is hidden or simulated. Before you have +spoken, your thought is already known. It is probable that speech is +used by the guardians and other living inhabitants of the air, for they +are living beings. + + +D. HOW CAN THE SOUL SIMULTANEOUSLY BE DIVISIBLE AND INDIVISIBLE? + +A DECISION WILL DEPEND ON THE MEANING OF THE TERMS. + +19. Must we consider that (in the soul), the indivisible and the +divisible are identical, as if they were mingled together? Or should +we consider the distinction between the indivisible and the divisible +from some other point of view? Should the first be considered as the +higher part of the soul, and the latter as the lower, just exactly as +we say that one part of the soul is rational, and the other part is +irrational? Such questions can be answered only by a close scrutiny of +the nature of the divisibility and indivisibility of the soul. + + +THE BODY NEEDS THE SOUL FOR LIFE. + +When Plato[130] says that the soul is indivisible, he speaks +absolutely. When he insists that she is divisible, it is always +relatively (to the body). He does indeed say that she becomes divisible +in the bodies, but not that she has become such. Let us now examine +how, by her nature, the body needs the soul to live, and what necessity +there is for the soul to be present in the entire body. + + +SENSE, GROWTH AND EMOTION TEND TOWARDS DIVISIBILITY. + +By the mere fact that it feels by means of the entire body, every +sense-power undergoes division. Since it is present everywhere, it may +be said to be divided. But as, on the other hand, it manifests itself +everywhere as a whole, it cannot really be considered as divided. We +cannot go further than the statement that it becomes divisible in +bodies. Some might object that it was divided only in the sense of +touch. It is however also divided in the other senses, since it is +always the same body that receives it, but only less so. The case is +the same with the power of growth and nutrition; and if appetite have +its seat in the liver, and anger in the heart, these appetites must +be subject to the same conditions. Besides, it is possible that the +body does not receive those appetites in a mixture, or that it receives +them in some other manner, so that they result from some of the +things that the body derives from the soul by participations. Reason +and intelligence, however, are not communicated to the body because +they stand in no need of any organs to fulfil their functions. On the +contrary, they find in them only an obstacle to their operations. + + +THE SOUL AS A WHOLE OF TWO DISTINCT DIVISIBLE AND INDIVISIBLE PARTS. + +Thus the indivisible and the divisible are in the soul two distinct +parts, and not two things mingled together so as to constitute but a +single one. They form a single whole composed of two parts, each of +which is pure and separable from the other by its characteristic power. +If then the part which in the body becomes divisible receives from the +superior part the power of being indivisible, this same part might +simultaneously be divisible and indivisible, as a mixture of divisible +nature and of the (indivisible) power received by it from the higher +part. + + +E. RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUL AND BODY. + + +IF FUNCTIONS ARE NOT LOCALIZED THE SOUL WILL NOT SEEM ENTIRELY WITHIN +US. + +20. Are the above-mentioned and other parts of the soul localized +in the body, or are some localized, and others not? This must be +considered, because if none of the parts of the soul are localized, and +if we assert that they are nowhere either in or out of the body, the +latter will remain inanimate, and we will not be able to explain the +manner of the operations occurring by help of the organs. If, on the +other hand, we assign a location in the body to certain parts of the +soul, without localizing other parts, the unlocalized parts will seem +not to be within us, and consequently not the whole of our soul will +seem to be in the body. + + +SPACE IS CORPOREAL; THE BODY IS WITHIN THE SOUL. + +Of the soul neither a part nor the whole is in the body as a locality. +The property of space is to contain some body. Where everything is +divided it is impossible for the whole to be in every part. But the +soul is not body, and the soul contains the body rather than the body +contains the soul. + + +NOR IS THE BODY A VASE, FOR PROXIMATE TRANSMISSION OF THE SOUL. + +Nor is the soul in the body as in a vase. In this case, the body would +be inanimate, and would contain the soul as in a vase or locality. If +the soul be considered as concentrated in herself and as communicating +to the body something of herself by "close transmission" (as the Stoics +would say), that which the soul will transmit to this vase would for +her become something lost. + + +MANY METAPHYSICAL OBJECTIONS TO THE CONCEPTION OF SOUL AS LOCALIZED. + +Considering location in the strict sense of the word, it is +incorporeal, and consequently cannot be a body. It would no longer need +the soul. Besides (if the soul be in the body as if in a locality) the +body will approach the soul by its surface, and not by itself. Many +other objections can be raised to the theory that localizes the soul in +the body. Under this hypothesis, indeed, place would have to be carried +around along with the thing in which it will locate. But that which +would carry place around with it (would be a monstrosity). Moreover, +if the body be defined as being an interval, it will be still less true +to say that the soul is in the body as a locality; for an interval +should be empty; but the body is not empty, being within emptiness. + + +NOR IS THE SOUL IN THE BODY AS A QUALITY IN A SUBSTRATE. + +Nor will the soul be in the body as (a quality) is in a substrate. The +attribute of being a substrate is a mere affection, like a color, or a +figure; but the soul is separable from the body. + + +NOR IS THE SOUL IN THE BODY AS A PART IN THE WHOLE. + +Nor will the soul be in the body as a part in the whole; for the soul +is not a part of the body. Nor is it a part of the living whole; for +this would still demand explanation of the manner of this being within +it. She will not be within it as wine in a jar, or as one jar in +another, nor as one thing is within itself (as the Manicheans thought). + + +NOR IS THE SOUL IN THE BODY AS A WHOLE IN A PART. + +Nor will the soul be in the body as a whole is in its parts; for it +would be ridiculous to call the soul a whole, and the body the parts of +that whole. + + +NOR WILL THE SOUL BE IN THE BODY AS FORM IN MATTER. + +Nor will the soul be in the body as form is in matter; for the form +that is engaged in matter is not separable. Moreover, that form +descends upon matter implies the preliminary existence of matter; but +it is the soul that produces form in matter; and therefore the soul +must be distinct from form. Though the soul be not form begotten in +matter, the soul might be a separable form; but this theory would still +have to explain how this form inheres in the body, since the soul is +separable from the body. + + +THE SOUL IS SAID TO BE IN THE BODY BECAUSE THE BODY ALONE IS VISIBLE. + +All men say that the soul is in the body, however, because the soul is +not visible, while the body is. Observing the body, and judging that it +is animated because it moves and feels, we say that it has a soul, and +we are thereby led to suppose that the soul is in the body. But if we +could see and feel the soul, and if we could realize that she surrounds +the whole body by the life she possesses, and that she extends around +it equally on all sides till the extremities, we would say that the +soul is in no way in the body, but that on the contrary the accessory +is within its principle, the contained within the container, what flows +within the immovable. + + +THIS LEAVES THE QUESTION OF THE MANNER OF THE SOUL'S PRESENCE. + +21. How would we answer a person who, without himself making any +statements in regard to the matter, should ask us how the soul is +present to the body; whether the whole soul is present to the body in +the same manner, or whether one of her parts is present in one way, and +another in some other way? + +THE SOUL IN A BODY AS A PILOT IN A SHIP. + +Since none of the comparisons that we have formerly examined seems +to express the relation of the soul to the body, properly we might +say that the soul is in the body as the pilot is in the ship.[131] +This illustration is satisfactory in that it emphasizes the soul's +being separable from the body; but it does not properly indicate the +presence of the soul in the body. If the soul be present in the body +as a passenger in a ship, it would be there only by accident, and the +illustration is not yet satisfactory if changed to the pilot's presence +in the ship he is steering; for the pilot is not present to the whole +of the ship as the whole soul is in the body.[132] One might illustrate +the soul's presence in the body as an art inheres in its instruments; +as, for instance, in the helm, which might be supposed to be alive, +containing the power of steering the ship skilfully. This is still +unsatisfactory, because such an art comes from without. The soul might +indeed be compared to a pilot who should be incarnated in his helm; and +the soul might be in the body as in some natural instrument,[133] so +that the soul would move it at pleasure. This however might still fail +to explain the manner in which the soul would exist in her instrument. +Therefore, though the latter illustration is an improvement on the +former, we must still seek one which closer approaches reality. + + +THE SOUL PRESENT IN THE BODY AS LIGHT IN AIR. + +22. This is the better illustration: the soul is present in the body +as light is present in air. Light is indeed present in air without +being present to it; that is, light is present to the whole air without +mingling with it, and light remains within itself while the air +escapes. When the air, within which light radiates, withdraws from the +light, the air keeps none of the light; but it is illuminated so long +as the air remains subject to the action of light. Air, therefore, is +in light, rather than light is in air. While explaining the generation +of the universe,[134] therefore, Plato properly locates the body +(of the world) in the soul, and not the soul in the body.[135] He +also states that there is a part of the soul that contains the body, +and another in which there is no body, in this sense, that there are +soul-powers of which the body has no need. The case is similar with the +other souls. Their powers in general are not present to bodies, and +only those powers of which the body stands in need are present to it. +These however are present to the body without being built up either on +the members, or upon the body as a whole. For sensation, the faculty of +feeling is entirely present to the whole organ which is feeling (as, +for instance, to the whole brain); likewise for the other functions, +the different faculties are each present to a different organ. I shall +explain myself. + + +WHILE THE SOUL-POWER IS EVERYWHERE, THE PRINCIPLE OF ACTION IS +LOCALIZED IN THE SPECIAL ORGAN. + +23. Since, for the body, being animated amounts to being penetrated by +the light shed by the soul, every part of the body participates therein +in some particular manner. Each organ, according to its fitness, +receives the power suitable to the function it fulfils. Thus we may say +that the power of sight resides in the eyes; that of hearing in the +ears; that of taste in the tongue; that of smell in the nose; that of +touch in the whole body, since, for the latter sense, the whole body +is the organ of the soul. Now as the instruments for touch are the +first nerves, which also possess the power of moving the organism, as +they are the seat of this power; as, besides, the nerves originate in +the brain, in the brain has been localized the principle of sensation +and appetite--in short, the principle of the whole organism; no doubt +because it was thought that the power which uses the organs is present +in that part of the body where are the origins of these organs. It +would have been better to say that it is the action of the power that +makes use of the organs that originates in the brain; for that part of +the body from which starts the movement impressed on the organ had to +serve somewhat as a foundation for the power of the workman, a power +whose nature is in harmony with that of the organ (it sets in motion); +or rather, this part of the body does not serve as foundation for this +power, for this power is everywhere, but the principle of the action is +in that part of the body in which is the very principle of that organ. + + +REASON IS IN THE HEAD, BUT NOT IN THE BRAIN, WHICH IS THE SEAT OF THE +INTERMEDIARY, THE POWER OF SENSATION. + +On the other hand, as the power of sensation and the power of appetite, +which belong to the sensible and imaginative soul, are beneath +reason, because they are related to what is inferior, while reason is +above,[136] the result was that the ancients localized reason in the +highest part of the animal, in the head; not that reason is in the +brain,[137] but because reason is seated in the sense-power, by the +intermediation of which, only, reason may be said to reside in the +brain. The sense-power, surely, had to be attributed to the body, and, +within the body, to the organs most capable of lending themselves to +its action. Reason, which has no (direct) dealing with the body, had +however to be in relation with the sense-power, which is a form of +the soul, and can participate in reason. The sense-power, does, to +a certain extent, judge; and the power of imagination has something +intellectual. Last, the appetite, and the desire somehow connect with +imagination and reason. Reason, therefore, is in the head, not as in +a locality, but because it is in relation with the sense-power which +resides in that organ, as has been shown above. + + +GROWTH IS LOCALIZED IN THE LIVER, ANGER IN THE HEART. + +As the power of growth, nutrition, and generation operates all through +the entire body; and as it is by the blood that the body is nourished; +as the blood is contained in the veins; and as the veins, as well as +the blood, originate in the liver; this organ has been assigned as the +seat of that part of the soul called appetite; for appetite is involved +in the power of begetting, of feeding and increasing the body. Further +as the blood (purified by respiration) is subtle, light, mobile and +pure, the heart becomes a suitable instrument for the power of anger, +for the blood that possesses these qualities starts from the heart. +Therefore, with good reason, the heart is assigned as the seat of the +turbulent convulsions of the power of anger. + + +F. WHERE GOES THE SOUL AFTER DEATH? + +THE SOUL AFTER DEATH GOES TO THE PLACE SUITED TO IT BY RETRIBUTION. + +24. Whither will the soul pass when she shall have left the body? +She will not go where there is nothing suitable to receive her. She +could not pass into what is not naturally disposed to receive her, +unless there be something that would attract a soul that had lost her +prudence. In this case, the soul remains in whatever is capable of +receiving her, and follows it whither that (receptive matter) can exist +and beget. Now as there are different places, it is necessary that +the difference (of the dwellings in which the souls come to dwell) +should be derived from the disposition of each soul, and of justice +which reigns above beings. No one indeed could escape the punishment +which unjust actions deserve. The divine law[138] is inevitable, +and possesses the power of carrying out the judgments (according to +its decrees). The man who is destined to undergo a punishment is, +in spite of himself, dragged towards that punishment, and is driven +around[139] by a movement that never stops. Then, as if wearied of +struggling against things to which he desired to offer resistance, he +betakes himself to the place that is suitable to him, and thus by a +voluntary movement undergoes involuntary suffering. The law prescribes +the greatness and duration of the punishment. Later, as a result of +the harmony that directs everything in the universe, the end of the +punishment endured by the soul coincides with the soul's receiving +strength to leave those places. + + +PURE INCORPOREAL SOULS DWELL WITHIN INTELLIGENCE IN DIVINITY. + +The souls that have a body thereby feel the corporeal punishments they +are undergoing. Pure souls, however, that do not carry along with them +anything corporeal, necessarily enjoy the privilege of abiding in the +incorporeal. Being free from having to dwell in anything corporeal as +they have no bodies, they reside where is being and essence, and the +divine; that is, in the divinity. There, in the divinity, with the +intelligible beings, dwells the pure Soul. If you wish to locate the +Soul still more exactly, go to where are the intelligible entities; and +if you are looking for them, do not look for them with the eyes, as if +they were (physical) bodies. + + +G. WHAT ARE THE CONDITIONS OF THE OPERATION OF MEMORY AND IMAGINATION? + +COSMIC QUESTIONS ABOUT MEMORY DEPEND ON EXACT DEFINITION OF WHAT MEMORY +IS. + +25. Memory raises the following questions. Does memory generally remain +with the bodies that have issued from here below? Does it subsist only +in some of them? In this case is memory general or special, durable or +transitory? These questions cannot be answered until we define that +interior principle in us to which memory belongs. That is, we shall +have to determine, not what is memory, but in what kind of beings it +must exist by virtue of its nature, for elsewhere we have often defined +and treated of memory itself. We must therefore exactly define that +principle within us to which memory is natural.[140] + + +MEMORY INAPPLICABLE EXCEPT TO BEINGS SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS OF TIME. + +As memory presupposes a knowledge or casual experience, memory +cannot be attributed to beings that are impassible, and outside of +the limitations of time. Memory is therefore inapplicable to the +Divinity, to Essence, and to Intelligence, all of whom exist outside +of time, as eternal and immutable, without a conception of priority +or subsequentness, who ever abide in the same condition, without +ever experiencing any change. How could that which is identical and +immutable make use of memory, since it could neither acquire nor keep +a disposition differing from the preceding one, nor have successive +thoughts of which the one would be present, while the other had passed +into the condition of being remembered? + +THERE IS A TIMELESS MEMORY CONSISTING OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. + +It (may be objected) that nothing hinders Intelligence from knowing +the changes of other beings, such as, for instance, the periodical +revolutions of the world, without itself undergoing any change. But +then it would have to follow the changes of the moving object, as +it would think first of one thing, and then of another. Besides, +thought is something else than memory, and we must not apply to +self-consciousness the name of memory. Indeed, intelligence does not +busy itself with retaining its thoughts, and with hindering them +from escaping; otherwise it might also fear lest it lose its own +nature ("Being"). For the soul herself, remembering is not the same +as recalling innate notions. When the soul has descended here below, +she may possess these notions without thinking of them, especially if +it be only recently that she entered into the body.[141] The ancient +philosophers seem to have applied the terms memory and reminiscence +to the actualization by which the soul thinks of the entities she +possesses; that (however) is a quite special kind of memory, entirely +independent of time.[142] + + +DEFINITION OF MEMORY DEPENDS ON WHETHER IT BELONGS TO THE SOUL OR +ORGANISM. + +But perhaps our solution seems superficial, and appears to rest on an +insufficient analysis. It might indeed be asked whether memory and +reminiscence, instead of belonging to the rational soul, might not +characterize the lower soul, or the composite of soul and body that +we call the organism? If indeed they belong to the lower soul, from +where does the latter derive them, and how does she possess them? +The same question may further be asked in the case of the organism. +To answer all this, we shall, as said above, have to study our own +interior principle to which memory belongs. If it be the soul that +possesses memory, we shall have to ask what faculty or part thereof +is constituted by memory. If, as has been urged by some, it be the +organism to which memory belongs, and considering the organism as the +sentient principle, how could this faculty operate within it? Besides, +what is it that we should call the organism? Further, is it the same +power that perceives sense-objects, and intelligible entities, or are +there two distinct powers? + +THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SENSATION. + +26. If the two elements which compose the animal share in the act of +sensation, the sensation is common to the soul and the body, such as +the acts of piercing or weaving.[143] Thus, in sensation, the soul +plays the part of the workman, and the body that of his tool; the body +undergoes the experience, and serves as messenger to the soul; the soul +perceives the impression produced in the body, or by the body; or she +forms a judgment about the experience she has undergone. Consequently +sensation is an operation common to the soul and body. + + +IN ANY CASE MEMORY IS PECULIAR TO THE SOUL AND BODY. + +This could not be the state of affairs with memory, by which the soul, +having already through sensation perceived the impression produced +in the body, preserves it, or dismisses it. It might be claimed that +memory also is common to the soul and body, because its efficiency +depends on the adjustments of the bodies. No doubt the body can hinder +or promote the exercise of memory, without this faculty ceasing to be +peculiar to the soul. How shall we try to prove that the memory of +knowledge acquired by study, belongs to the compound, and not to the +soul alone? If the organism be the composite of soul and body, in the +sense that it is some third object begotten by their union, it will be +absurd to say that it is neither soul nor body. Indeed, it could not be +anything different from the soul and body, neither if the soul and body +were transformed into the composite of which they are the elements, +nor if they formed a mixture, so that the soul would be no more than +potentially in the organism. Even in this case, it is still the soul, +and the soul alone, that would remember. Thus in a mixture of honey and +wine, it is the honey alone that should be credited with any sweetness +that may be tasted. + + +THAT THE SOUL IS INCARNATE IS NOT THE CAUSE OF HER POSSESSING MEMORY. + +It may again be objected that it is indeed the soul that remembers; but +only because she is resident in the body, and is not pure; she must be +affected in some particular manner to be able to impress the body with +the forms of sense-objects; her seat must be in the body to receive +these forms, and to preserve them. But to begin with, these forms +could not have any extension; then they could not be either (Stoic) +seal-imprints, or impressions; for in the soul there is no impulsion, +nor any imprint similar to that of a seal on wax, and the operation +itself by which it perceives sense-objects is a kind of thought +(or intellection). Indeed, it would be impossible to speak of an +impression in the act of thought. Thought has no need of the body or a +corporeal quality. It is besides necessary for the soul to remember her +movements, as for instance, her desires which have not been satisfied, +and whose object the body has not attained; for what could the body +tell us of an object which the body has not yet reached?[144] (Speaking +of thoughts), how could the soul, conjointly with the body, remember +things which the body, by its very nature, could absolutely not know? + +MEMORY BELONGS TO THE SOUL ALONE. + +Doubtless we will have to acknowledge that there are affections which +pass from the body into the soul; but there are also affections which +belong exclusively to the soul, because the soul is a real being, with +characteristic nature and activities. In this case, the soul must have +desires, and recall them, remembering that they have, or have not +been satisfied; because, by her nature, she does not form part of the +things which are (as Heraclitus said) in a perpetual flow. Otherwise, +we could not attribute to the soul coenesthesia (or, common feeling), +conscience, reflection, or the intuition of herself. If she did not +possess them by her nature, she would not acquire them by union with +the body. Doubtless there are activities which the soul cannot carry +out without the assistance of the organs; but she herself possesses the +faculties (or "powers") from which these activities are outgrowths. +Besides, she, by herself, possesses other faculties, whose operations +are derived from her alone. Among these is memory, whose exercise +is only hindered by the body. Indeed, when the soul unites with the +body, she forgets; when she separates from the body, and purifies +herself, she often recovers memory. Since the soul possesses memory +when she is alone, the body, with its changeable nature, that is ever +subject to a perpetual flow, is a cause of forgetfulness, and not of +memory; the body therefore is, for the soul, the stream of Lethe (or +forgetfulness). To the soul alone, therefore, belongs memory. + + +MEMORY BELONGS BOTH TO THE DIVINE SOUL, AND TO THAT DERIVED FROM THE +WORLD-SOUL. + +27. To which soul, however, does memory belong? To the soul whose +nature is more divine, and which constitutes us more essentially, or +to the soul that we receive from the universal Soul (the rational +and irrational souls)? Memory belongs to both; but in one case it is +general, and in the other particular. When both souls are united, they +together possess both kinds of memory; if they both remain separate, +each remembers longer what concerns herself, and remembers less long +what concerns the other. That is the reason people talk of the image +of Hercules being in the hells.[145] Now this image remembers all the +deeds committed in this life; for this life particularly falls to her +lot. The other souls which (by uniting within themselves the rational +part to the irrational) together possess both kinds of memory. They yet +cannot remember anything but the things that concern this life, and +which they have known here below, or even the actions which have some +relation with justice. + + +WHAT THE RATIONAL SOUL, IF SEPARATED, WOULD REMEMBER OF LIFE. + +We must still clear up what would be said by Hercules (that is, the +man himself), alone, and separated from his image. What then would +the rational soul, if separated and isolated, say? The soul which has +been attracted by the body knows everything that the man (speaking +strictly), has done or experienced here below. In course of time, at +death, the memories of earlier existences are reproduced; but the soul, +out of scorn, allows some to escape her. Having indeed purified herself +from the body, she will remember the things that were not present to +her during this life.[146] If, after having entered into another body, +she happen to consider the past, she will speak of this life which +will become foreign to her, of what she has recently abandoned, and +of many other earlier facts. The circumstances which happen during a +long period will always remain buried in oblivion. But we have not yet +discovered what the soul, when isolated from the body will remember. To +solve this question, we shall be forced to decide to which power of the +soul memory belongs. + + +MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO APPETITE, BECAUSE IT MAY BE REDUCED TO +SENSATION. + +28. Does memory belong to the powers by which we feel and know? Is +it by appetite that we remember the things that excite our desires, +and by anger that we remember the things that irritate us? Some will +think so. It is indeed the same faculty which feels pleasure, and +retains remembrance thereof. Thus when, for instance, appetite meets +an object which has already made it experience pleasure, it remembers +this pleasure on seeing this object. Why indeed should appetite not +be similarly moved by some other object? Why is it not moved in some +manner by the same object? Why should we not thus attribute to it the +sensation of things of this kind? Further, why should appetite itself +not be reduced to the power of sensation, and not do likewise for +everything, naming each thing, by what predominates therein? + +WHAT APPETITE KEEPS IS AN AFFECTION, BUT NOT A MEMORY. + +Must we attribute sensation to each power, but in a different manner? +In this case, for instance, it will be sight, and not appetite, which +will perceive sense-objects; but appetite will be later wakened by +sensation which will be "relayed," (as the Stoics would say); and +though it does not judge of sensation, it will unconsciously feel the +characteristic affection. The same state of affairs will obtain with +anger. It will be sight which will show us an injustice, but it will +be anger which will resent it. Just so, when a shepherd notices a wolf +near his flock, the dog, though he have not yet observed anything, will +be excited by the smell or noise of the wolf. It certainly is appetite +which experiences pleasure, and which keeps a trace of it; but this +trace constitutes an affection or disposition, and not a memory. It +is another power which observes the enjoyment of pleasure, and which +remembers what occurred. This is proved by the fact that memory is +often ignorant of the things in which appetite has participated, though +appetite still preserve traces thereof. + + +MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO THE FACULTY OF SENSATION. + +29. Can memory be referred to sensibility? Is the faculty that feels +also the one that remembers? But if the image of the soul (the +irrational soul) possess the memory, as we said above,[147] there +would be in us two faculties that will feel. Further, if sensibility +be capable of grasping notions, it will also have to perceive the +conceptions of discursive reason, or it will be another faculty that +will perceive both. + + +MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG EXCLUSIVELY TO THE POWER OF PERCEPTION. + +Is the power of perception common to the reasonable soul and to the +irrational soul, and will we grant that it possesses the memory of +sense-objects and of intelligible things? To recognize that it is one +and the same power which equally perceives both kinds of things, is +already to take one step towards the solution of the problem. But if we +divide this power into two, there will nevertheless still be two kinds +of memory; further, if we allow two kinds of memory to each of the two +souls (the rational and the irrational), there will be four kinds of +memory. + + +MEMORY IS NOT IDENTICAL WITH FEELING OR REASONING. + +Are we compelled to remember sensations by sensibility, whether it be +the same power which feels sensation, and which remembers sensation, +or is it also discursive reason which conceives and remembers +conceptions. But the men who reason the best are not those who also +remember the best; and those who have equally delicate senses, do not +all, on that account, have an equally good memory. On the contrary, +some have delicate senses, while others have a good memory, without +however being capable of perceiving equally well. On the other hand, if +feeling and remembering be mutually independent, there will be (outside +of sensibility) another power which will remember things formerly +perceived by sensation, and this power will have to feel what it is to +remember.[148] + + +MEMORY BELONGS TO IMAGINATION. + +(To solve all these difficulties) it may be stated that nothing +hinders the admission that the actualization of the sensation produces +in memory an image, and that the imagination, which differs (from +sensation), possesses the power of preserving and recalling these +images. It is indeed imagination in which sensation culminates; and +when sensation ceases, imagination preserves its representation. +If then this power preserve the image of the absent object, it +constitutes memory.[149] According as the image remains for a longer +or shorter time, memory is or is not faithful; and our memories +last, or are effaced. Memory of sense-objects therefore belongs to +the imagination. If this faculty of memory be possessed by different +persons in unequal degrees, this difference depends either on the +difference of forces, or on practice (or exercise), or on the absence +or presence of certain bodily dispositions which may or may not +influence memory, or disturb it.[150] But elsewhere we shall study the +question further. + + +INTELLECTUAL CONCEPTIONS ARE NOT ENTIRELY PRESERVED BY IMAGINATION. + +30. What about intellectual conceptions? Are they also preserved by +imagination? If imagination accompany every thought, and if later it, +as it were, preserves its image, we should thus have the memory of the +known object; otherwise some other solution will have to be sought. +Perhaps reason, whose actualization always accompanies thought, has the +function of receiving it and transmitting it to imagination. Indeed, +thought is indivisible, and so long as it is not evoked from the +depths of intelligence, it remains as it were hidden within it. Reason +develops it, and making it pass from the state of thought to that of +image, spreads it out as it were in a mirror, for our imagination.[151] +That is why we grasp (the thought) only when the soul, which always +desires rational thought, has achieved a thought. There is a difference +between thought and the perception of thought. We are always thinking, +but we do not always perceive our thought. That comes from the fact +that the principle that perceives the thoughts also perceives the +sensations, and occupies itself with both in turn. + + +THE TWO KINDS OF MEMORY IMPLY TWO KINDS OF IMAGINATION. + +31. If theory belong to imagination, and if both the rational and +irrational souls possess memory, we will have two kinds of imagination +(intellectual and sensual); and if both souls are separate, each of +them will possess one kind of imagination. The theory of two kinds +of imagination within us in the same principle would not account for +there being two kinds of imagination; and it would leave unsolved +the question to which of them memory belongs. If memory belong +to both kinds of imagination, there will always be two kinds of +imagination--for it cannot be said that the memory of intelligible +things belongs to the one, and that of sense-things to the other; +otherwise we would have two animate beings with nothing in common. If +then memory equally belong to both imaginations, what difference is +there between them? Besides, why do we not notice this difference? Here +is the cause. + + +OF THE TWO IMAGINATIONS ONE ALWAYS PREDOMINATES OR OVERSHADOWS THE +OTHER. + +When both kinds of imagination harmonize, they co-operate (in the +production of a single act). The most powerful dominates, and only a +single image is produced within us. The weaker follows the stronger, +as the feeble reflection of a powerful light. On the contrary, when +both kinds of imagination disagree and struggle, then only one of them +manifests, and the other is entirely ignored, just as we always ignore +that we have two souls[152]; for both souls are melted into a single +one, and the one serves as vehicle for the other. The one sees all, but +preserves only certain memories when she leaves the body, and leaves in +oblivion greater part of the things that relate to the other. Likewise, +after we have established relations with friends of an inferior order, +we may acquire more distinguished friendships, and we remember the +former but very little, though we remember the latter very distinctly. + + +PARTITION OF THE FUND OF MEMORY BETWEEN THE TWO SOULS. + +What about (the memory) of friends, of parents, of a wife, of the +fatherland, and of all that a virtuous man may properly remember? +In the image of the soul (the irrational soul) these memories will +be accompanied by a passive affection; but in the man (the rational +soul) they will not be so accompanied. The affections exist since the +beginning in the inferior soul; in the superior soul, as a result of +her dealings with the other, there are also some affections, but only +proper affections. The inferior soul may well seek to remember the +actions of the superior soul, especially when she herself has been +properly cultivated; for she can become better from her very principle +up, and through the education she receives from the other. The higher +soul must willingly forget what comes to her from the inferior +soul. When she is good, she can, besides, by her power contain the +subordinate soul. The more she desires to approach the intelligible +world, the more she must forget the things from here below, unless the +whole life she has led here below be such that she has entrusted to her +memory none but praiseworthy things. Even in our own world, indeed, +it is a fine thing to release oneself from human preoccupations. It +would therefore be still finer to forget them all. In this sense we +might well say that the virtuous soul should be forgetful. She thus +escapes manifoldness, reduces manifoldness to unity, and abandons the +indeterminate. She therefore ceases to live with manifoldness, lightens +her burdens, and lives for herself. Indeed, while remaining here below, +she desires to live in the intelligible world, and neglects all that is +foreign to her nature. She therefore retains but few earthly things +when she has arrived to the intelligible world; she has more of them +when she inhabits the heavens. Hercules (in heaven) may well vaunt his +valor; but even this valor seems to him trifling when he has arrived at +a region still holier than heaven, when he dwells in the intelligible +world, when he has risen over Hercules himself by the force manifested +in those struggles which are characteristic of veritable sages. + + + + +FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR. + +Questions About the Soul. + +(Second Part.) + + +SPEECH OF SOUL IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. + +1. When the soul will have risen to the intelligible world, what will +she say, and what will she remember? She will contemplate the beings +to which she will be united and she will apply her whole attention +thereto; otherwise, she would not be in the intelligible world. + + +MEMORY OF SOUL IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. + +Will she have no memory of things here below? Will she not, for +instance, remember that she devoted herself to philosophy; and that, +during her residence on the earth, she contemplated the intelligible +world? No: for an intelligence entirely devoted to the object of its +thought, cannot simultaneously contemplate the intelligible and think +something else. The act of thought does not imply the memory of having +thought. + + +IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD ALL THINGS ARE SIMULTANEOUS; HENCE NOT +REMEMBERED. + +But this memory is posterior to thought! In this case, the mind in +which it occurs has changed condition. It is therefore impossible +that he who is entirely devoted to the pure contemplation of the +intelligible should simultaneously remember the things that formerly +happened to him here below. If, as it seems, thought is outside of +time, because all the intelligible essences, being eternal, have no +relation with time, it is evidently impossible that the intelligence +which has raised itself to the intelligible world should have any +memory of the things here below, or even have absolutely any memory +whatever; for each (of the essences of the intelligible world) are +always present to the intelligence which is not obliged to go through +them successively, passing from one to the other. + + +INTELLIGENCE UNITES AS IT RISES TO THE INTELLIGIBLE. + +Will not the intelligence divide itself in descending (from the genera) +to the species (or forms)? No: for she reascends to the universal and +the superior Principle. + + +NOT EVEN THE ASCENDED SOUL NEED BE DIVIDED. + +Granting then that there is no division in the intelligence which +possesses everything simultaneously; will there not at least be +division in the soul which has risen to the intelligible world? Nothing +however forbids that the totality of the united intelligibles be +grasped by an intuition equally unitary and total. + + +THE UNITY OF APPERCEPTION IS MANIFOLD. + +Is this intuition similar to the intuition of an object grasped in its +entirety by a single glance, or does it contain all the thoughts of +the intelligibles contemplated simultaneously? Since the intelligibles +offer a varied spectacle, the thought which grasps them must evidently +be equally multiple and varied, comprehending several thoughts, like +the perception of a single sense-object, as for instance that of a face +comprehends several perceptions because the eye, on perceiving the +face, simultaneously sees the nose and the other features. + + +IN THE INTELLIGIBLE ANTERIORITY REFERS TO ORDER, NOT TO TIME. + +It may be objected that it may happen that the soul will divide and +develop something which was unitary. This thing must then already +have been divided in intelligence, but such a division is more like +an impression. As anteriority or posteriority in ideas does not +refer to time, so also will the mental conception of anteriority and +posteriority not be subject to temporal conditions, but refer to order +(which presides over intelligible things). For instance, on considering +a tree's order that extends from the roots to the tree-top, priority +and posteriority exists only under the relation of order, inasmuch as +the whole plant is perceived at one single glance. + + +INTELLIGENCE IS NOT A UNITY; BUT ITS MANIFOLD IS PRODUCED BY A UNITY. + +How can things be prior or posterior, if the soul that contemplates the +One embrace all things? The potentiality which is One is one in such a +manner that it is multiple when it is contemplated by another principle +(Intelligence), because then it is not simultaneously all things in one +single thought. Indeed, the actualizations (of Intelligence) are not +a unity; but they are all produced by an ever permanent potentiality; +they therefore become multiple in the other principles (the +intelligibles); for Intelligence, not being unity itself, can receive +within its breast the nature of the multiple which did not formerly +exist (in the One). + + +THE SOUL DOES NOT EVEN REMEMBER HERSELF. + +2. Granted. But does the soul remember herself? Probably not. He +who contemplates the intelligible world does not remember who he +is; that, for instance, he is Socrates, that he is a soul or an +intelligence. How indeed would he remember it? Entirely devoted to the +contemplation of the intelligible world, he does not by thought reflect +back upon himself; he possesses himself, but he applies himself to +the intelligible, and becomes the intelligible, in respect to which +he plays the part of matter. He assumes the form of the object he is +contemplating, and he then is himself only potentially. Actually, he is +himself only when he thinks the intelligible. When he is himself only, +he is empty of all things, because he does not think the intelligible; +but if by nature he is such that he is all things, in thinking himself, +he thinks all things. In this state, seeing himself actually by the +glance he throws on himself, he embraces all things in this intuition; +on the other hand, by the glance he throws on all things, he embraces +himself in the intuition of all things. + + +IN THE INTELLIGIBLE SELF-DIRECTION OF THOUGHT IS NOT CHANGEABLENESS. + +Under the above circumstances, the soul changes thoughts--something +that we above refused to admit. Intelligence is indeed immutable; +but the soul, situated on the extremities of the intelligible world, +may undergo some change when she reflects upon herself. Indeed, what +applies to the immutable necessarily undergoes some change in respect +to it, because it does not always remain applied to it. To speak +exactly, there is no change when the soul detaches herself from the +things that belong to her to turn towards herself, and conversely; +for the soul is all things, and the soul forms but one thing with +the intelligible. But when the soul is in the intelligible world, +she becomes estranged from herself and from all that belongs to her; +then, living purely in the intelligible world, she participates in +its immutability, and she becomes all that it is; for, as soon as +she has raised herself to this superior region, she must necessarily +unite herself to Intelligence, towards which she has turned, and +from which she is no longer separated by an intermediary. On rising +towards intelligence, the soul attunes herself to it, and consequently +unites herself with it durably, in a manner such that both are +simultaneously single and double. In this state the soul cannot change; +she is immutably devoted to thought, and she simultaneously has +self-consciousness, because she forms a unity with the intelligible +world. + + +THE SOUL BECOMES WHAT SHE REMEMBERS. + +3. When the soul departs from the intelligible world; when instead of +continuing to form a unity with it, she wishes to become independent, +to become distinct, and to belong to herself; when she inclines +towards the things here below, then she remembers herself. The memory +of intelligible things hinders her from falling, that of terrestrial +things makes her descend here below, and that of celestial things makes +her dwell in heaven. In general, the soul is and becomes what she +remembers. Indeed, to remember is to think or imagine; now, to imagine +is not indeed to possess a thing, but to see it and to conform to it. +If the soul see sense-things, by the very act of looking at them she +somehow acquires some extension. As she is things other than herself +only secondarily, she is none of them perfectly. Placed and established +on the confines of the sense and intelligible worlds, she may equally +move towards either. + + +MEMORY IS NOT AS HIGH AS UNREFLECTIVE IDENTIFICATION. + +4. In the intelligible world, the soul sees the Good by intelligence; +for intelligence does not hinder her from arriving to the Good. +Between the soul and the Good, the intermediary is not the body, which +could be no more than an obstacle; for if the bodies can ever serve +as intermediaries, it would only be in the process of descending +from the first principles to third rank entities. When the soul +occupies herself with inferior objects, she possesses what she wished +to possess conformably to her memory and imagination. Consequently +memory, even should it apply itself to the very best things, is not +the best thing possible; for it consists not only in feeling that one +remembers, but also in finding oneself in a disposition conformable to +the affections, to the earlier intuitions which are remembered. Now +it may happen that a soul possesses something unconsciously, so that +she possesses it better than if she were conscious thereof. In fact, +when she is conscious thereof, she possesses it like something foreign +to her, and from which she is keeping herself distinct; when, on the +contrary, she is unconscious of it she becomes what she possesses; and +it is especially this latter kind of memory which can most thoroughly +effect her degradation (when she conforms herself to sense-objects, by +applying her imagination thereto). + + +INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES ARE NOT MERELY IMAGES, BUT POTENTIALITIES FOR +MEMORY. + +That the soul, on leaving the intelligible world, brings away with her +memories thereof, implies that even in the (intelligible) world she +to a certain degree already possessed memory; but this potentiality +was eclipsed by the thought of the intelligible entities. It would +be absurd to insist that the latter existed in the soul in the +condition of simple images; on the contrary, they there constituted an +(intellectual) potentiality which later passed into the condition of +actualization. Whenever the soul happens to cease applying herself to +the contemplation of intelligible entities she no longer sees what she +formerly saw (that is, sense-objects). + + +INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES RETURN, NOT BY MEMORY, BUT BY FURTHER VISION. + +5. Are our notions of intellectual entities actualized by the +potentiality which constitutes memory? If these notions be not +intuitions, it is by memory that they become actualized; if they are +intuitions, it is by the potentiality which has given them to us on +high. This power awakes in us every time that we rise to intelligible +things, in it is that which sees what we later talk about. We do not +perceive intelligible entities by imagination or reasoning, which +itself is forced to draw its principles from elsewhere; it is by our +faculty of contemplation, which alone enables us to speak of them +while we are here below. We see them by awaking in ourselves here +below the same potentiality which we are to arouse when we are in the +intelligible world. We resemble a man who, climbing the peak of a rock, +should, by his glance, discover objects invisible for those who have +not climbed with him. + + +WHEN SOULS DESCEND FROM THE INTELLIGIBLE TO THE HEAVENS, THEY RECOGNIZE +EACH OTHER. + +Reasonable arguments therefore clearly demonstrate that memory +manifests in the soul only when she has descended from the intelligible +world into the (earthly) heavens. Likewise, it would not surprise us +if, when she had risen from here below to the heavens, and had dwelt +there, she should remember a great number of things from here below, +of which we have already spoken, and that she would recognize many +souls which she had known earlier, since these latter must necessarily +be joined to bodies with similar countenances. Even though the souls +should change the shapes of their bodies, making them spherical, they +would still be recognizable by their habits and individual character. +There is nothing incredible in this, for in admitting that these souls +have purified themselves from all these passions, nothing hinders them +from preserving their character. Besides, if they can converse with +each other, they have this as an additional means of recognizing each +other. + + +TRAINING HERE BELOW WILL HELP THE SOULS TO REMEMBER WHEN BEYOND. + +What happens when souls descend from the intelligible world into the +(earthly) heavens? They then recover memory, but they possess it in a +degree less than the souls who have always occupied themselves with the +same objects. Besides, they have many other things to remember, and a +long space of time has made them forget many actions. + + +FALL INTO GENERATION MAY BE PARTIAL; AND MAY BE RECOVERED FROM, BEFORE +RUIN. + +But if, after having descended into the sense-world they fall (from +the heavens) into generation, what will be the time when they will +remember? It is not necessary that the souls (which depart from the +intelligible world) should fall into the lowest regions. It is possible +that, after having descended only a little from the intelligible world +their movement may be arrested, and nothing hinders them from returning +on high before they have become degraded in the lower regions of +generation. + + +MEMORY IS LIMITED TO SOULS THAT CHANGE THEIR CONDITION. + +6. It may therefore be fearlessly affirmed that the souls which +exercise their discursive reason, and which change condition, +remember; for memory is the characteristic of things that were, but no +more are. + + +DO THE WORLD-SOUL AND THE STAR-SOULS EXERCISE MEMORY? + +But evidently the souls which dwell in the same state could not +exercise memory; for what would they have to remember? If (ignoring +our arguments above) human reason should wish to attribute memory to +the souls of all the stars, especially to that of the moon and the +sun, there is nothing to hinder it from doing the same with regard to +the universal Soul, and it would dare to attribute even to Jupiter +memories which would occupy him with a thousand different things. As +soon as it will have entered into this order of ideas, reason would +proceed to speculate about the conceptions and ratiocinations of the +star-souls--that is, granting that they reason at all. (But that is a +gratuitous assumption); for if these souls have nothing to discover, +if they do not doubt, if they have no need of anything, if they do not +learn things that they have ignored before, what use would they make of +reasoning, of arguments, or of the conceptions of discursive reason? +They have no need of seeking mechanical means of governing human +affairs and events; for they enforce order in the universe in a totally +different manner. + + +THESE SOULS DO NOT REMEMBER GOD; FOR THEY CONTINUE TO SEE HIM. + +7. Will these souls not even remember that they have seen the divinity? +(They have no need of doing so, for) they see Him all the time; as long +as they continue to see Him they cannot say that they have seen Him, +because such a statement would imply that they see Him no more. + + +MEMORY IS IMPOSSIBLE TO THESE SOULS, FOR TO THEM THERE IS NO TIME, BUT +ONE SINGLE DAY. + +Will they not even remember that they performed their revolution +yesterday, or the year before, that they lived yesterday, and since +have lived a long while? They still live continuously; now, what +remains the same, is one. To try to distinguish yesterday and last year +in the movement of the stars, is to do like a man who would divide into +several parts the movement which forms one step, who would wish to +reduce unity to multiplicity. Indeed, the movement of the stars is one, +although it is by us subjected to a measure, as if it were multiple; +so we count the days different one from the other because the nights +separate them from each other. But since there is but one single day in +the heavens, how could one count several? How could there be a "last +year"? + + +BUT WHY COULD THE STAR-SOULS NOT BE CONSCIOUS OF OUR CHANGES? + +It may be objected that the space transversed (by planets) is not a +unity, but contains several parts, as notably in the zodiac. Why then +could the celestial Soul not say, "I have passed this part, I have now +arrived at another"? Besides, if the star-souls consider human things, +how would they not see that there are changes here below, that the +men existing to-day have succeeded others? If so, they must know that +other men have already existed, that there have been other facts. They +therefore possess memory. + + +MANY NEW THINGS ARE UNNOTICED; NOTHING FORCES THE PERCEPTION OF NEW +THINGS. + +8. It is not necessary to remember all one sees, nor by imagination to +represent to oneself all the things that follow fortuitously. Besides, +when the mind possesses a knowledge and a clear conception of certain +objects which later come to offer themselves to his senses, nothing +forces him to abandon the knowledge he has acquired by intelligence, to +look at the particular sense-object which is in front of him, unless he +be charged to administer some of the particular things contained in the +notion of the all. + + +MEMORY IS NOT COMPULSORY. + +Now, to enter into details, let us first say that one does not +necessarily retain all one has seen. When something is neither +interesting nor important, the senses, impressed by the diversity of +objects without our voluntary direction of consciousness, are alone +affected; the soul does not perceive the impressions because there is +no utility in them for her. When the soul is turned towards herself, or +towards other objects, and when she applies herself to them entirely, +she could not remember these indifferent things, for she does not even +perceive them when they are present. Neither is it necessary that the +imagination should represent to itself what is accidental; nor, if it +does represent them to itself, that it should retain them faithfully. +It is easy to be convinced that a sense-impression of this kind is not +perceived, on the ground of the following arguments. In the act of +walking we divide, or rather traverse the air, without any conscious +purpose; consequently we neither notice it, nor think of it, while we +press forward. Likewise, if we had not decided to take some particular +road, and unless we could fly through the air, we would not think of +the region of the earth where we are, nor of the distance we have +traveled. This is proved by the fact that when the mind possesses +the general knowledge of what occurs, and is sure that the things +will occur as planned, a man no longer attends to details. Besides, +if a person continues to do the same thing, it would be useless to +continue to observe the similar details. Consequently if the stars, +while following their courses, carry out their duties without attending +to the occurrence of what goes on; and unless their chief duty is to +observe occurrences or the occurrence itself; and if their progress is +nothing more than accidental, while their attention is held by other +and greater objects; and if they regularly continue to pass through +the same orbit without considering the calculation of time, even if it +had already been divided (under these four conditions); there is no +need to suppose that these stars would have a memory of the places they +pass by, or of their periods. Their life would be uniform; because they +always travel through the same places, so that their movement is, so to +speak, more vital than local, because it is produced by a single living +being (the universe), which, realizing it within itself, is exteriorly +at rest and interiorly in motion by its eternal life. + + +STAR-MOTIONS COMPARED TO A BALLET-CHORUS. + +The movement of the stars might be compared to that of a choric ballet. +Let us suppose that it had but a limited duration; its motion would be +considered perfect, if viewed as a totality, from beginning to end; +but if considered in its parts only, it would be imperfect. Now if we +suppose that it exists always; then will it always be perfect. If it +be always perfect, there will be neither time nor place where it is +becoming perfect; consequently, it will not even have any desire, and +it will measure nothing, neither by time nor place; and therefore will +not remember either. + + +STARS HAVE NO MEMORY BECAUSE THEY ARE UNIFORMLY BLISSFUL. + +Besides, the stars enjoy a blissful life because they contemplate the +real life in their own souls; because they all aspire to the One, and, +radiating into the entire heavens, like cords that vibrate in unison, +they produce a kind of symphony by their natural harmony. Last, the +entire heavens revolve; so also do their parts, which, in spite of +the diversity of their motions, and of their positions, all gravitate +towards a same centre. Now all these facts support the theory we have +advanced, since they show that the life of the universe is one system, +and is uniform. + + +QUESTION: DOES JUPITER'S ROYAL ADMINISTRATION IMPLY A USE OF MEMORY? + +9. Jupiter, who governs the world, and endues it with order and beauty, +possesses from all eternity[154] a royal soul and intelligence; he +produces things by his providence, and regulates them by his power; +in an orderly manner he disposes everything in the development and +achievement of the numerous periods of the stars. Do not such acts on +Jupiter's part imply use of memory by which he may know what periods +have already been accomplished, and busy himself with the preparation +of others by his combinations, his calculations, and reasonings? His +being the most skilful administrator in the world would seem to imply +that he uses memory. + + +THE INFINITY OF JUPITER'S LIFE OPPOSES HIS USE OF MEMORY. + +We might well, in respect to the memory of these periods, examine the +number of these periods, and whether it is known to Jupiter; for if it +be a finite number, the universe will have had a commencement within +time; but if it be infinite, Jupiter will not have been able to know +how many things he has done. (To solve this problem) we must admit +that Jupiter ever enjoys knowledge, in a single and unitary life. It +is in this sense that he must be infinite and possess unity, not by +a knowledge come to him from without, but interiorly, by his very +nature, because the infinite ever remains entire in him, is inherent +in him, is contemplated by him, and is not, for him, simply the object +of an accidental knowledge. Indeed, while knowing the infinity of his +life, Jupiter simultaneously knows that the influence he exercises on +the universe is single; but his knowledge thereof is not due to his +exercising it on the universe. + + +JUPITER MAY BE TAKEN IN A DOUBLE SENSE. + +10. The principle which presides over the order of the universe +is double; from one point of view he is the demiurge; from the +other, the universal Soul. By the name of Jupiter, therefore, we +designate both the demiurge, and the "Governor of the universe." As +to the demiurge, we must dismiss all notions of past or future, and +attribute to him nothing but a life that is uniform, immutable, and +independent, of time. But the life of the governor of the universe +(which is the universal Soul), raises the question whether she be +also free from any necessity of reasoning, and of planning what is +to be done? Surely, for the order which is to rule has already been +devised and decided, and that without having been ordered; for that +which is in order was that which became, and the process of becoming +eventuates in order. The latter is the activity of the Soul which +depends from an abiding wisdom, a wisdom whose image is the order +existing within the soul. As the wisdom contemplated by the soul does +not change, neither does its action. Indeed, the Soul contemplates +wisdom perpetually; if she ceased, she would lapse into incertitude, +for the soul is as unitary as her work. This unitary principle that +governs the world dominates perpetually, and not only occasionally; +for whence should there be several powers, to struggle among each +other, or get into uncertainties? The principle that administers the +universe is therefore unitary, and ever wills the same. Why, indeed, +should she desire now one thing, and then another, and thus involve +herself in uncertainties? Still, even if she altered herself under +unitary conditions, she would not be involved in difficulties. That +the universe contains a great number and kinds of parts opposed to +each other is no reason that the Soul does not with certainty know how +to arrange them. She does not begin by objects of lowest rank, nor by +parts; she directs by the principles. Starting from these, she easily +succeeds in putting everything in order. She dominates because she +persists in a single and identical function. What would induce her +to wish first one thing, and then another? Besides, in such a state +of affairs, she would hesitate about what she ought to do, and her +action would be weakened, and this would result in a weakness of her +activities, while deliberating about still undecided plans. + + +RATIOCINATION HAS NO PLACE IN THE WORLD-SOUL. + +11. The world is administered like a living being, namely, partly from +the outside, and from the resulting members, and partly from within, +and from the principle. The art of the physician works from outside +in, deciding which organ is at fault, operating only with hesitation +and after groping around experimentally. Nature, however, starting +within from the principle, has no need to deliberate. The power which +administers the universe proceeds not like the physician, but like +nature. It preserves its simplicity so much the better as it comprises +everything in its breast, inasmuch as all things are parts of the +living being which is one. Indeed, nature, which is unitary, dominates +all individual natures; these proceed from it, but remain attached +thereto, like branches of an immense tree, which is the universe. +What would be the utility of reasoning, calculation, and memory in a +principle that possesses an ever present and active wisdom, and which, +by this wisdom, dominates the world and administers it in an immutable +manner? That its works are varied and changeful, does not imply that +this principle must itself participate in their mutability. It remains +immutable even while producing different things. Are not several +stages produced successively in each animal, according to its various +ages? Are not certain parts born and increased at determinate periods, +such as the horns, the beard, and the breasts? Does one not see each +being begetting others? Thus, without the degeneration of the earlier +("seminal) reasons," others develop in their turn. This is proved by +the ("seminal) reason" subsisting identical and entire within the same +living being. + + +THIS UNIVERSAL WISDOM IS PERMANENT BECAUSE TIMELESS. + +We are therefore justified in asserting the rule of one and the same +wisdom. This wisdom is universal; it is the permanent wisdom of the +world; it is multiple and varied, and at the same time it is one, +because it is the wisdom of the living Being which is one, and is the +greatest of all. It is invariable, in spite of the multiplicity of +its works; it constitutes the Reason which is one, and still is all +things simultaneously. If it were not all things, it would, instead of +being the wisdom of the universe, be the wisdom of only the latter and +individual things. + + +WISDOM, IN THE WORLD-SOUL DOES NOT IMPLY REASONING AND MEMORY. + +12. It may perhaps be objected that this might be true of nature, but +that whereas the Soul-of-the-universe contains wisdom, this implies +also reasoning and memory. This objection could be raised only by +persons who by "wisdom" understand that which is its absence, and +mistake the search for wisdom for reasonable thinking. For what can +reasoning be but the quest of wisdom, the real reason, the intelligence +of the real essence? He who exercises reason resembles a man who plays +the lyre to exercise himself, to acquire the habit of playing it, and, +in general, to a man who learns in order to know. He seeks indeed to +acquire science, whose possession is the distinguishing characteristic +of a sage. Wisdom consists therefore in a stable condition. This is +seen even in the conduct of the reasoner; as soon as he has found what +he sought, he ceases to reason, and rests in the possession of wisdom. + + +OMNISCIENT INTUITION MAKES MEMORY AND REASONING SUPERFLUOUS. + +Therefore, if the governing Power of the world seems to resemble +those who learn, it will be necessary to attribute to it reasoning, +reflection, and memory, so that it may compare the past with the +present or the future. But if, on the contrary, its knowledge be such +as to have nothing more to learn, and to remain in a perfectly stable +condition, it evidently possesses wisdom by itself. If it know future +things--a privilege that could not be denied it under penalty of +absurdity--why would it not also know how they are to occur? Knowing +all this, it would have no further need of comparing the past with +the present. Besides, this knowledge of its future will not resemble +the prevision of the foretellers, but to the certitude entertained by +makers about their handiwork. This certitude admits no hesitation, +no ambiguity; it is absolute; as soon as it has obtained assent, it +remains immutable. Consequently, the wisdom about the future is the +same as about the present, because it is immutable; that is, without +ratiocination. If, however, it did not know the future things it +was to produce, it would not know how to produce them, and it would +produce them without rule, accidentally, by chance. In its production, +it remains immutable; consequently, it produces without changing, at +least as far as permitted by the model borne within it. Its action is +therefore uniform, ever the same; otherwise, the soul might err. If +its work was to contain differences, it does not derive these from +itself, but from the ("seminal) reasons" which themselves proceed +from the creating principle. Thus the created things depend from the +series of reasons, and the creating principle has no need to hesitate, +to deliberate, neither to support a painful work, as was thought by +some philosophers who considered the task of regulating the universe +wearisome. It would indeed be a tiresome task to handle a strange +matter, that is, one which is unmanageable. But when a power by itself +dominates (what it forms), it cannot have need of anything but itself +and its counsel; that is, its wisdom, for in such a power the counsel +is identical with wisdom. It therefore needs nothing for creation, +since the wisdom it possesses is not a borrowed wisdom. It needs +nothing (extraneous or) adventitious; consequently, neither reasoning +nor memory, which faculties yield us nothing but what is adventitious. + + +IN THE WORLD-SOUL WISDOM IS THE HIGHEST AND NATURE THE LOWEST. + +13. How would such a wisdom differ from so-called nature? (In the Soul) +wisdom occupies the first rank, and nature the last. Nature is only +the image of wisdom; now, if nature occupy no more than the last rank, +she must also have only the last degree of the reason that enlightens +the Soul. As illustration, take a piece of wax, on which the figure +impressed on one side penetrates to the other; and whose well-marked +traits on the upper face appear on the lower face only in a confused +manner. Such is the condition of nature. She does not know, she only +produces, blindly she transmits to matter the form she possesses, just +as some warm object transmits to another, but in a lesser degree, the +heat it itself possesses. Nature does not even imagine: for the act +of imagining, inferior as it is to that of thinking, is nevertheless +superior to that of impressing a form, as nature does it. Nature +can neither grasp nor understand anything; while imagination seizes +the adventitious object and permits the one who is imaging to know +what he has experienced. As to nature, all it knows is to beget; it +is the actualization of the active potentiality (of the universal +Soul). Consequently, Intelligence possesses intelligible forms; the +(universal) Soul has received them, and ceaselessly receives them from +her; that is what her life consists of; the clearness which shines in +her is the consciousness she has of her thought. The reflection which +(the Soul herself projects on matter is nature, which terminates the +series of essences, and occupies the last rank in the intelligible +world; after her, there is nothing but imitations (of beings). Nature, +while acting on matter is passive in respect (to the Soul). The (Soul), +superior to nature, acts without suffering. Finally, the supreme +(Intelligence) does not (itself) act on the bodies or on matter. + + +THERE IS CONTINUITY BETWEEN NATURE AND THE ELEMENTS. + +14. The bodies begotten by nature are the elements. As to the animals +and the plants, do they possess nature as the air possesses the light +which when retiring does not injure the air, because it never mingled +with the air, and remained separate from it? Or is nature's relation to +animals and plants the same as that of the fire with a heated body, to +which, on retiring, it leaves a warmth which is different from the heat +characteristic of the fire, and which constitutes a modification of the +heated body? Surely this. To the essence which it moulds, nature gives +a shape, which is different from the form proper to nature herself. We +might however still consider whether there be any intermediary between +nature and the essence which she moulds. However, we have sufficiently +determined the difference that exists between nature and the wisdom +which presides over the universe. + + +HOW CAN TIME BE DIVIDED WITHOUT IMPLYING DIVISION OF THE SOUL'S ACTION? + +15. We still have to solve one question bearing on the above +discussion. If eternity relate to Intelligence, and time to the +Soul--for we have stated that the existence of time is related to +the actualization of the Soul, and depends therefrom--how can time +be divided, and have a past, without the Soul's action itself being +divided, without her reflection on the past constituting memory in +her? Indeed, eternity implies identity, and time implies diversity; +otherwise, if we suppose there is no change in the actualizations of +the Soul, time will have nothing to distinguish it from eternity. Shall +we say that our souls, being subject to change and imperfection, are in +time, while the universal Soul begets time without herself being in it? + + +IN TIME ARE ACTIONS AND REACTIONS OF THE SOUL; BUT NOT THE SOUL HERSELF. + +Let us admit that the universal Soul is not in time; why should she +beget time rather than eternity? Because the things she begets are +comprised within time, instead of being eternal. Neither are the +other souls within time; nothing of them, except their "actions and +reactions" (Stoic terms). Indeed, the souls themselves are eternal; +and therefore time is subsequent to them. On the other hand, what is in +time is less than time, since time must embrace all that is within it, +as Plato says, that time embraces all that is in number and place. + + +QUESTION: EVEN THE PRIORITY OF ORDER IMPLIES A TEMPORAL CONCEPTION. + +16. It may however be objected that if the (universal Soul) contain +things in the order in which they were successively produced, she +thereby contains them as earlier and later. Then, if she produce them +within time, she inclines towards the future, and consequently, also +conversely to the past. + + +EARLIER AND LATER EXIST ONLY IN WHAT IS BEGOTTEN; NOT IN THEIR SEMINAL +REASON. + +It may be answered that the conceptions of earlier and later apply only +to things which are becoming; in the Soul, on the contrary, there is no +past; all the ("seminal) reasons" are simultaneously present to her, as +has already been said. On the contrary, in begotten things, the parts +do not exist simultaneously, because they do not all exist together, +although they all exist together within the ("seminal) reasons." For +instance, the feet or the hands exist together in the ("seminal) +reasons," but in the body they are separate. Nevertheless, these parts +are equally separated, but in a different manner, in the ("seminal) +reason," as they are equally anterior to each other in a different +manner. If however they be thus separate in the ("seminal) reason," +they then differ in nature. + + +THINGS WHICH ARE ANTERIOR CAN BE ONLY IN LOWER PRINCIPLES. + +But how are they anterior to each other? It must be because here he +who commands is identical with him who is commanded. Now in commanding +he expresses one thing after another; for why are all things not +together? (Not so). If the command and he who commands were separate +entities, the things would have been produced in the same manner +as they have been expressed (by speech); but as the commander is +himself the first command, he does not express things (by speech), +he only produces them one after the other. If he were (by speech) +to express what he actually does, he would have to consider the +order; consequently, he would have to be separate from it. Is it +asked, how can the commander be identical with the command? He is not +simultaneously form and matter, but form alone (that is, the totality +of the reasons which are simultaneously present to him). Thus, the Soul +is both the potentiality and the actualization which occupy the second +rank after Intelligence. To have parts some of which are prior to +others suits only such objects as cannot be everything simultaneously. + + +DIAGRAM OF THE UNIVERSE. + +The Soul, such as we are considering her here, is something venerable; +she resembles a circle which is united to the centre, and which +develops without leaving (its base of operations, the centre), thus +forming an undivided extension. To gain a conception of the order of +the three principles, the Good may be considered as a centre, the +Intelligence as an immovable circle, and the Soul as an external +movable circle impelled by desire. + + +CIRCULAR MOVEMENT OF THE SOUL. + +Indeed, intelligence possesses and embraces the Good immediately; +while the Soul can only aspire to (the Good), which is located above +the Intelligence. The whole world-sphere possessing the Soul which +thus aspires (to the Good), is moved by the promptings of its natural +aspirations. Its natural aspiration, however, is to rise in bodily +aspiration to the principle on the outside of which it is; namely, to +extend around it, to turn, and consequently to move in a circle. + + +THE INTELLECTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE WORLD-SOUL, AND SOULS OF +STARS, EARTH AND MEN. + +17. Why are the thoughts and rational aspirations in us different (from +what they are in the universal Soul)? Why is there in us posteriority +in respect to time (as we conceive things in a successive manner, +while the universal Soul conceives them simultaneously)? Why do we +have to question ourselves (about this)? Is it because several forces +are active in us, and contend for mastery, and there is no single +one which alone commands? Is it because we successively need various +things to satisfy our needs, because our present is not determined by +itself, but refers to things which vary continually, and which are +outside of ourselves? Yes, that is the reason why our determinations +change according to the present occasion and need. Various things come +from the outside to offer themselves to us successively. Besides, +as several forces dominate in us, our imagination necessarily has +representations that are various, transient, modified by each other, +and hindering the movements and actions characteristic of each power +of the soul. Thus, when lust arises in us, imagination represents to +us the desired object, warns us, and instructs us about the passion +born of lust, and at the same time begs of us to listen to it, and to +satisfy it. In this state, the soul floats in uncertainty, whether it +grant to the appetite the desired satisfaction, or whether she refuse +it. Anger, for instance, excites us to vengeance, and thereby produces +the same uncertainty. The needs and passions of the body also suggest +to us varying actions and opinions; as do also the ignorance of the +true goods, the soul's inability to give a certain judgment, while in +this hesitating condition, and the consequences which result from the +mingling of the things we have just mentioned. Still our own highest +part makes judgments more certain than those reached by the part common +(to the soul and to the body), a part that is very uncertain, being a +prey to diversity of opinions. + + +SOULS, ACCORDING TO MORALIZATION, RESEMBLE VARIOUS FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. + +Right reason, on descending from the higher realms of the soul into the +common part, is by this mingling weakened, although it is not naturally +weak; thus, in the tumult of a numerous assembly, it is not the wisest +counsellor whose word carries weight; but on the contrary, that of the +most turbulent and quarrelsome, and the tumult they make forces the +wise man to stay seated, powerless and vanquished, by the noise. In +the perverse man, it is the animal part that rules; the diversity of +influences which overcome this man represents the worst of governments +(the rule of the mob). In the commonplace man, things happen as in +a republic where some good element dominates the remainder, which +does not refuse to obey. In the virtuous man, there is a life which +resembles the aristocracy, because he manages to withdraw from the +influence of the commonplace part, and because he listens to what is +best in himself. Finally, in the best man, completely separated from +the common part, reigns one single principle from which proceeds the +order to which the remainder is subject. It would seem therefore that +there were two cities, the one superior, and the other inferior, which +latter derives its order from the former. We saw that the universal +Soul was a single identical principle which commands uniformly; +but other souls, as we have just explained, are in a very different +condition. Enough of this. + + +THE BODY IS NOT US, BUT OURS. + +18. Does the body, thanks to the presence of the soul that vivifies it, +possess something which becomes characteristically its own, or is its +possession nothing more than its nature, and is this the only thing +added to the body? Evidently, the body which enjoys the presence of the +soul, and of nature, would not resemble a corpse. It will be in the +condition of the air, not when the air is penetrated by the sun-light +(for then it really receives nothing), but when it participates in +the heat. Therefore, plant and animal bodies that possess "a nature," +find that it consists of the shadow of a soul. It is to this body, +thus vivified by nature, that sufferings and pleasures relate; but +it is for us to experience these sufferings and pleasures without +ourselves suffering. By us is here meant the reasonable soul, from +which the body is distinct, without however being foreign to it, since +it is ours (since it belongs to us). Only because of this, that it is +ours, do we care for it. We are not the body; but we are not entirely +separated from it; it is associated with us, it depends on us. When we +say "we," we mean by this word what constitutes the principal part of +our being; the body also is "ours": but in another sense. Therefore its +sufferings and pleasures are not indifferent to us; the weaker we are, +the more we occupy ourselves with it. In it, so to speak, is plunged +the most precious part of ourselves, which essentially constitutes the +personality, the man. + + +THE SOUL AND BODY TOGETHER FORM A FUSION OF BOTH. + +The passions do not really belong to the soul, but to the living body, +which is the common part, or the fusion (of both, or the compound). +The body and soul, each taken separately, are self-sufficient. Isolated +and inanimate, the body does not suffer. It is not the body that is +dissolved, it is the unification of its parts. Isolated, the soul is +impassible, indivisible, and by her condition escapes all affections. +But the unification of two things is sure to be more or less unstable, +and on its occurrence, it often happens that it is tested; hence the +pain. I say, "two things," not indeed two bodies, because two bodies +have the same nature; the present is a case where one kind of being +is to be united to one of a different kind, where the inferior being +receives something from the superior being, but receives only a trace +of that something, because of its inability to receive her entirely. +Then the whole comprises two elements, but nevertheless forms only a +unity; which, becoming something intermediary between what it was, and +what it has not been able to become, becomes seriously embarrassed, +because it has formed an unfortunate alliance, not very solid, always +drawn into opposite directions by contrary influences. Thus it is at +one time elated, and at another, dejected; when it is dejected, it +manifests its suffering; when it is elated, it aspires to communion +between the body and the soul. + + +THE SOUL FEELS THE PASSIONS WITHOUT EXPERIENCING THEM. + +19. That is why there is pleasure and pain. That is why grief is said +to be a perception of dissolution, when the body is threatened with +the loss of the image of the soul (of being disorganized by losing the +irrational soul). That is why it is said that pleasure is a perception +produced in the animal when the image of the soul reassumes its sway +over the body. It is the body which undergoes passion; but it is +the sense-potentiality of the soul which perceives the passion by +its relation with the organs; it is she to which all the sensations +ultimately report themselves. The body alone is injured and suffers; +for example, when one member is cut, it is the mass of the body which +is cut; the soul feels pain not merely as a mass, but as a living +mass. It is likewise with a burn: the soul feels it, because the +sense-potentiality as it were receives its reaction by its relations +with the organs. The soul entire feels the passion produced in the body +without however herself experiencing it. + + +UNLESS THE SOUL WERE IMPASSIBLE SHE COULD NOT LOCALIZE AND MANAGE PAIN. + +Indeed, as the whole soul feels, she localizes the passion in the +organ which has received the blow, and which suffers. If she herself +experienced the suffering, as the whole of her is present in the whole +body, she could not localize the suffering in one organ; the whole of +her would feel the suffering; she would not relate it to any one part +of the body, but to all in general: for she is present everywhere in +the body. The finger suffers, and the man feels this suffering, because +it is his finger. It is generally said that the man suffers in his +finger, just as it is said that he is blond, because his eyes are blue. +It is therefore the same entity that undergoes passion' and suffering, +unless the word "suffering' should not here designate both the passion, +and the sensation which follows it; in this case no more is meant than +that the state of suffering is accompanied by sensation. The sensation +itself is not the suffering, but the knowledge of the suffering. The +potentiality which knows must be impassible to know well, and well to +indicate what is perceived. For if the faculty which is to indicate the +passions itself suffer, it will either not indicate them, or it will +indicate them badly. + + +THE APPETITES ARE LOCATED NEITHER IN BODY NOR SOUL, BUT IN THEIR +COMBINATION. + +20. Consequently, it may be said that the origin of the desires should +be located in the common (combination) and in the physical nature. To +desire and seek something would not be characteristic of a body in any +state whatever (which would not be alive). On the other hand, it is not +the soul which seeks after sweet or bitter flavors, but the body. Now +the body, by the very fact that it is not simply a body (that it is a +living body), moves much more than the soul, and is obliged to seek +out a thousand objects to satisfy its needs: at times it needs sweet +flavors, at others, bitter flavors; again humidity, and later, heat; +all of them being things about which it would not care, were it alone. +As the suffering is accompanied by knowledge, the soul, to avoid the +object which causes the suffering, makes an effort which constitutes +flight, because she perceives the passion experienced by the organ, +that contracts to escape the harmful object. Thus everything that +occurs in the body is known by sensation, and by that part of the soul +called nature, and which gives the body a trace of the soul. On one +hand, desire, which has its origin in the body, and reaches its highest +degree in nature, attaches itself thereto. On the other hand, sensation +begets imagination, as a consequence of which the soul satisfies her +need, or abstains, and restrains herself; without listening to the +body which gave birth to desire, nor the faculty which later felt its +reaction. + + +TWO KINDS OF DESIRES: OF THE BODY; AND OF THE COMBINATION, OR NATURE. + +Why therefore should we recognize two kinds of desires, instead of +acknowledging only one kind in the living body? Because nature differs +from the body to which it gives life. Nature is anterior to the body +because it is nature that organizes the body by moulding it, and +shaping it; consequently, the origin of desire is not in nature, but +in the passions of the living body. If the latter suffer, it aspires +to possess things contrary to those that make it suffer, to make +pleasure succeed pain, and satisfaction succeed need. Nature, like a +mother, guesses the desires of the body that has suffered, tries to +direct it, and to lure it back. While thus trying to satisfy it, she +thereby shares in its desires, and she proposes to accomplish the same +ends. It might be said that the body, by itself, possesses desires and +inclinations; that nature has some only as a result of the body, and +because of it; that, finally the soul is an independent power which +grants or refuses what is desired by the organism. + + +DESIRES ARE PHYSICAL, BECAUSE CHANGEABLE IN HARMONY WITH THE BODY. + +21. The observation of the different ages shows that it is indeed +the organism which is the origin of desires. Indeed, these change +according as the man is a child or a youth, sick or well. Nevertheless +that part of the soul which is the seat of desires ever remains the +same. Consequently the variations of desire must be traced back to the +variations of the organism. But this desiring faculty of the soul is +not always entirely wakened by the excitation of the body, although +this subsists to the end. Often even before having deliberated, the +soul will forbid the body to drink or eat, although the organism +desires it as keenly as possible. Nature herself also often forbids the +satisfaction of the bodily desire, because such desire may not seem to +it natural, and because she alone has the right to decide what things +are harmonious to or contrary to nature. The theory that the body, by +its different states suggests different desires to the soul's faculty +of desire, does not explain how the different states of the body can +inspire different desires in the soul's faculty of desire, since then +it is not itself that it seeks to satisfy. For it is not for itself, +but for the organism, that the soul's faculty of desire seeks foods, +humidity or heat, motion, agitation, or the satisfaction of hunger. + + +RELATION OF DESIRE-FUNCTION TO THE VEGETATIVE POWERS. + +22. It is possible, even in plant-life, to distinguish something which +is the characteristic property of their bodies, and a power that +imparts it to them. What in us in the soul's faculty of desire, is in +plant-life the natural element (or, vegetative power). + + +PLATO IS IN DOUBT ABOUT THE EARTH'S SOUL; WHETHER SHE IS LIKE THOSE OF +STARS. + +The earth also possesses a soul; and therefore also such a +potentiality; and it is from the earth that the plants derive their +vegetative potentiality. One might reasonably first ask which is this +soul that resides in the earth. Does she proceed from the sphere of +the universe (to which alone Plato seems to attribute a soul from the +very first), so as to make of her an irradiation of this sphere upon +the earth? Or should we on the contrary, attribute to the earth a soul +similar to that of the stars, as Plato does when he calls the earth the +first and most ancient of the divinities contained within the interior +of the heavens? Could it, in this case, be a divinity, if it did not +have a soul? It is therefore difficult to determine the exact state of +affairs, and the very words of Plato here instead of diminishing our +embarrassment, only increase it. + +At first, how will we manage to form a reasonable opinion on this +subject? Judging from what the earth causes to grow, one might +conjecture that it possesses the vegetative potentiality. As many +living beings are seen to grow from the earth, why would it itself +not be a living being? Being besides a great living being, and a +considerable part of the world, why should the earth not possess +intelligence, and be a divinity? Since we consider every star as a +living being, why would we not similarly consider the earth, which is +a part of the universal living being? It would, indeed, be impossible +to admit that it was exteriorly contained by a foreign soul, and +that interiorly it would have no soul, as if it were the only being +incapable of having an individual soul. Why should we grant animation +to the (starry) bodies of fire, while not to the earthly body of our +earth? Indeed, bodies could as easily be of earth as of fire. Not +in the stars, any more than in the earth, is there any nose, flesh, +blood, or humours, although the earth is more varied than the stars, +and although it be composed of all the other living bodies. As to its +inability to move, this can be said only in reference to local motion. +(For it is capable of motion in the respect that it can feel.) + + +THE EARTH CAN FEEL AS WELL AS ANY OF THE STARS. + +It will be asked, But how can the earth feel? We shall answer in +turn, How can stars feel? It is not the flesh that feels; a soul is +not dependent for feeling on a body; but the body is dependent on the +soul for self-preservation. As the soul possesses judgment, she should +be able to judge the passions of the body whenever she applies her +attention thereto. + + +QUESTION: WHAT PASSIONS WOULD BE SUITABLE TO THE EARTH? + +It may however still be asked, What are the passions characteristic +of the earth, and which may be objects of judgment for the soul? It +may besides be objected that the plants, considered in the terrestrial +element that constitutes them, do not feel. + + +SENSATION WILL FIRST HAVE TO BE EXAMINED. + +Let us now examine to what beings sensation belongs, and whereby it +operates. Let us see whether sensation can take place even without +organs. Of what use to the earth could sensation be? For it does not +serve the earth as means of knowledge; the knowledge which consists +in wisdom suffices for the beings to whom sensation is of no use. +This consideration might however be denied, for the knowledge of +sense-objects offers, besides utility, some of the charms of the Muses. +Such is, for example, the knowledge of the sun and the other stars, +whose contemplation itself is agreeable. This problem will therefore +demand solution. + + +RESTATEMENT OF PROBLEMS INVOLVED. + +We must therefore first investigate if the earth possess senses, to +what animals sensation naturally belongs, and how sensation operates. +It will be necessary to begin by discussing the doubtful points +that we have indicated, and to examine in general if sensation can +operate without organs, and if the senses have been given for utility, +admitting even that they can procure some other advantage. + + +CONCEPTIVE THOUGHT DEMANDS THE INTERMEDIARY PROCESS OF SENSATION. + +23. Conception of sense-objects occurs when the soul or the living +being experiences perceptions by grasping the bodies' inherent +qualities, and by representing their forms to itself. The soul must +therefore perceive sense-objects either with or without the body. How +could the soul do so alone? Pure and isolated, she can conceive only +what she has within herself; she can only think. But for conception +of objects other than herself, she must previously have grasped them, +either by becoming assimilated to them, or by finding herself united to +something which may have become similar to them. + + +THE PURE SOUL WOULD REMAIN ISOLATED. + +It is impossible for the soul to become similar to sense-objects (in +order to grasp them), by remaining pure. How indeed could a point +become similar to a line? The intelligible line itself could not become +conformed to the sense-line, any more than intelligible fire to the +sense-fire, or the intelligible man to the sense-man. Nature herself +which begets man could not be identical with the begotten man. The +isolated soul, even if she could grasp sense-objects, will finish by +applying herself to the intuition of intelligible objects, because, +having nothing by which to grasp the former, she will let them escape. +Indeed, when the soul perceives from far a visible object, although +only the form reaches her, nevertheless what first began by being for +her indivisible, finally constitutes a subject, whether it be color or +a figure, whose size is determined by the soul. + + +SENSATION DEPENDS ON THE SENSE-SHAPE, WHICH, LIKE TOOLS, IS +INTERMEDIATE. + +The soul and the exterior object do not therefore suffice (to explain +sensation); for there would be nothing that suffers. There must +therefore be a third term that suffers, that is, which receives the +sense-form, or, shape. This third term must "sympathize," or, share +the passion of the exterior object, it must also experience the same +passion, and it must be of the same matter; and, on the other hand, +its passion must be known by another principle; last, passion must +keep something of the object which produces it, without however being +identical with it. The organ which suffers must therefore be of a +nature intermediary between the object which produces the passion +and the soul, between the sensible and the intelligible, and thus +play the part of a term intermediary between the two extremes, being +receptive on one side, making announcements on the other, and becoming +equally similar to both. The organ that is to become the instrument of +knowledge must be identical neither with the subject that knows, nor +with the object that is known. It must become similar to both of them; +to the exterior object because it suffers, and to the cognizing soul +because the passion which it experiences becomes a form. Speaking more +accurately, the sensations operate by the organs. This results from +the principle asserted above, that the soul isolated from the body can +grasp nothing in the sense-world. As used here, the word "organ" either +refers to the whole body, or to some part of the body fitted to fulfil +some particular function; as in the case of touch or sight. Likewise, +it is easy to see that tools of artisans play a part intermediary +between the mind which judges, and the object which is judged; and that +they serve to discover the properties of substances. For instance, a +(foot) rule, which is equally conformed to the idea of straightness +in the mind, and to the property of straightness in the wood, serves +the artisan's mind as intermediary to judge if the wood he works be +straight. + + +EXCLUSION OF OTHER SIDE ISSUES. + +We have just demonstrated that sensation belongs exclusively to an +embodied soul, and that this implies organs. But we have nothing to +do with the question whether the perceived object must be in contact +with the organ, or whether the sensation can take place at a distance +from the sense-object, by means of an intermediary; as the case of +the fire which is located at a distance from our body, without the +intermediary's suffering in any manner. It happens again where, empty +space serving as intermediary between the eye and the color, one may +well ask whether, to see, it suffice to possess the potentiality proper +to that organ. But it is sure that sensation is some activity of the +soul in a body, or through a body. + + +ARE THE SENSES GIVEN US ONLY FOR THE SAKE OF UTILITY? + +24. Whether the senses were given us for the sake of utility must be +examined as follows. If the soul were separated from the body, she +would not feel; she feels only when united to a body; therefore she +feels by and for the body. It is from the soul's intimacy with the +body that sensation results, either because all passions, when keen +enough, reach the soul; or whether the senses were made for us to +take care that no object approaches too near us, or exercises on our +organs an action strong enough to destroy them. If so, the senses +were given us for the sake of utility. Even if the senses do serve to +acquire knowledge and information, they would be of no use to a being +who possesses knowledge, but only to one who needs to learn he has the +misfortune of being ignorant, or who needs to remember, because he is +subject to forgetfulness. They are therefore not found in the being who +has no need to learn, and who does not forget. + + +ARE SENSES GIVEN THE STARS FOR UTILITY? + +Let us consider what consequences may be drawn therefrom for the earth, +the stars, and especially for the heavens and the whole world. From +what we have seen, the parts of the world which suffer may possess +sensation in their relation with other parts. But is the entire world, +capable of feeling, as it is entirely impassible in its relations +with itself? If sensation demand on one hand an organ, and on the +other the sense-object, the world which includes everything, can have +neither organ to perceive, nor exterior object to be perceived. We may +therefore ascribe to the world a sort of intimate sensation, such as +we ourselves possess, and deny to it the perception of other objects. +When we feel something unusual in our bodies, we perceive it as being +external. Now as we perceive not only exterior objects, but even some +part of our body through some other part of the body itself, similarly +the world might very well perceive the sphere of the planets by means +of the sphere of the fixed stars; and perceive the earth with all the +objects it contains by means of the sphere of the planets? If these +beings (the stars and the planets) do not feel the passions felt +by other beings, why might they not also possess different senses? +Might not the sphere of the planets not only by itself possess sight +by itself, but in addition be the eye destined to transmit what it +sees to the universal Soul? Since she is luminous and animated, she +might see as does an eye, supposing that she did not feel the other +passions.[155] (Plato), however, said, "that the heavens have no need +of eyes." Doubtless the heavens have nothing outside of themselves to +see; and consequently, they may not have need of eyes, as we have; but +they contain something to contemplate, namely, themselves. If it should +be objected that it is useless for them to see themselves, it may be +answered that they were not made principally for this purpose, and that +if they see themselves, it is only a necessary consequence of their +natural constitution. Nothing therefore hinders them from seeing, as +their body is diaphanous. + + +IF SENSATION IS A SOUL-DISTRACTION, THE STARS A WOULD NOT INDULGE +THEREIN. + +25. It would seem that in order to see, and in general to feel, mere +possession of the necessary organs by the soul, is not enough; the +soul must also be disposed to direct her attention to things of sense. +But it is usual for the (universal) Soul to be ever applied to the +contemplation of intelligible things; and mere possession of the +faculty of sensation would not necessarily imply its exercise, because +it would be entirely devoted to objects of a higher nature. So when +we apply ourselves to the contemplation of intelligible things, we +notice neither the sensation of sight, nor those of other senses; and, +in general, the attention that we give to one thing hinders us from +seeing the others. Even among us human beings, to wish to perceive one +of our members through another, as, for instance, looking at ourselves, +is both superfluous and vain, unless this has some very good purpose. +Moreover, it is a characteristic of an imperfect and fallible being to +contemplate some external thing, merely because it is beautiful. It may +therefore well be said that if to feel, hear and taste are distractions +of a soul that attaches herself to outer objects, the sun and the other +stars cannot see or hear, except accidentally. It would however not be +unreasonable to admit that they turn towards us through the exercise of +the senses of sight or hearing. Now, if they turn towards us, they must +be mindful of human affairs. It would be absurd that they should not +remember the men to whom they do so much good; how indeed would they do +good, if they had no memory? + + +THE EARTH FEELS AND DIRECTS BY THE LAWS OF SYMPATHETIC HARMONY. + +26. The stars know our desires through the agreement and sympathy +established between them and us by the harmony reigning in the +universe. Our desires are granted by the same method. Likewise, magic +is founded on the harmony of the universe; it acts by means of the +forces which are interconnected by sympathy. If so, why should we +not attribute to the earth the faculty of sensation? Granting this, +what sort of sensations would we attribute to it? To begin with, why +should we not attribute to it touch, whether by one part feeling the +condition of another, and by the transmission of the sensation to the +governing power, or by the whole earth feeling the fire, and other +similar things; for if the terrestrial element is inert, it certainly +is not insensible. The earth will therefore feel the great things, +and not those of minor importance. Why should it feel? Surely if the +earth have a soul, she will not ignore the strongest motions therein. +The earth must also be supposed to feel, in order to dispose all that +depends on her for the benefit of humanity. All these things she will +suitably dispose by the laws of harmony. She can hear and grant the +prayers addressed to her, but in a manner other than we ourselves +would do. Besides, she might exercise other senses in her relations, +either with herself, or with foreign things; as, for example, to have +the sensations of taste and smell perceived by other beings. Perhaps +even she has need to perceive the odors of the liquids to fulfil her +providential functions in respect to animals, and to take care of her +own body. + + +THE EARTH'S SENSES MAY BE DIFFERENT FROM OURS. + +We must however not insist on her organs being the same as ours. Not +even in all animals are the senses similar. Thus, for instance, not all +have similar ears, and even those who have no ears at all nevertheless +will perceive sounds. How could the earth see, if light be necessary +for her vision? Nor must we claim for her the necessity of having +eyes. We have already above granted that she possesses the vegetative +power; we should therefore thence draw the deduction that this power +is primitively by its essence a sort of spirit. What objection then +could there be to assume that this spirit might be resplendent and +transparent? Arguing merely from its nature of being a spirit, we +should (potentially at least) conclude that it is transparent; and that +it is actually transparent because it is illuminated by the celestial +sphere. It is therefore neither impossible nor incredible that the soul +of the earth should possess sight. Besides, we must remember that this +soul is not that of a vile body, and that consequently, she must be a +goddess. In any case, this soul must be eternally good. + + +ANALYSIS OF THE EARTH'S PSYCHOLOGY. + +27. If the earth communicate to plant-life the power of begetting and +growing, it possesses this power within itself, and gives only a trace +of it to the plants which derive from it all their fruitfulness, and +as it were are the living flesh of its body. It gives to them what +is best in them; this can be seen in the difference between a plant +growing in the soil, and of a branch cut from it; the former is a real +plant, the latter is only a piece of wood. What is communicated to the +body of the earth by the Soul which presides over it? To see this it is +sufficient to notice the difference between some earth resting within +the soil, and a piece that is detached therefrom. It is likewise easy +to recognize that stones increase in size as long as they are in the +bosom of the earth, while they remain in the same state when they have +been plucked out therefrom. Everything therefore bears within itself a +trace of the universal vegetative (power) shed abroad over the whole +earth, and belonging particularly to no one of its parts. As to the +earth's power of sensation, it is not (like its vegetative power) +mingled with the body of the earth; it only hovers above and guides +it. Moreover, the earth possesses also, higher than the above powers, +a soul and an intelligence. They bear respectively the names of Ceres +and Vesta, according to the revelations of men of prophetic nature, who +allow themselves to be inspired by the divine. + + +DOES THE IRASCIBLE POWER ALSO ORIGINATE IN THE BODY? + +28. Enough of this. Let us return to the question from which we +digressed. We granted that the desires, pains and pleasures (considered +not only as sentiments, but as passions), originate in the constitution +of the organized and living body. Must the same origin be assigned to +the irascible (power)? Were this so, we would have several questions to +ask: Does anger belong to the entire organism, or only to a particular +organ, such as the heart when so disposed, or to the bile, as long as +it is part of a living body? Is anger different from the principle +which gives the body a trace of the soul, or is it an individual power, +which depends on no other power, whether irascible or sensitive? + + +THE LIVER IS THE SEAT OF THE SOUL'S FACULTY OF DESIRE. + +The vegetative power present in the whole body communicates to every +part thereof a trace of the soul. It is therefore to the entire body +that we must refer suffering, pleasure, and the desire of food. Though +nothing definite is ascertained about the seat of sexual desire, let us +grant that their seat is in the organs destined to its satisfaction. +Further, be it granted that the liver is the seat of the soul's faculty +of desire, because that organ is particularly the theatre of the +activities of the vegetative power which impresses a trace of the soul +on the body; and further, because it is from the liver that the action +it exercises starts. + + +THE HEART IS THE SEAT OF ANGER. + +As to anger, we shall have to examine its nature, what power of the +soul it constitutes, whether it be anger that imparts to the heart +a trace of its own power; if there exist another force capable of +producing the movement revealed in the animal; and finally, if it be +not a trace of anger, but anger itself which resides in the heart. + + +ANGER ORIGINATES IN THE VEGETATIVE AND GENERATIVE POWER, AS TRACE OF +THE SOUL. + +First, what is the nature of anger? We grow irritated at maltreatment +of ourselves or of a person dear to us; in general, when we witness +some outrage. Therefore anger implies a certain degree of sensation, +or even intelligence, and we should have to suppose that anger +originates in some principle other than the vegetative power. Certain +bodily conditions, however, predispose us to anger; such as being +of a fiery disposition, and being bilious; for people are far less +disposed to anger if of a cold-blooded nature. Besides, animals grow +irritated especially by the excitement of this particular part, and +by threats of harm to their bodily condition. Consequently we would +once more be led to refer anger to the condition of the body and +to the principle which presides over the constitution of organism. +Since men are more irritable when sick than when well, when they are +hungry, more than when well satisfied, anger or its principle should +evidently be referred to the organized and living body; evidently, +attacks of anger are excited by the blood or the bile, which are living +parts of the animal. As soon as the body suffers, the blood as well +as the bile boils, and there arises a sensation which arouses the +imagination; the latter then instructs the soul of the state of the +organism, and disposes the soul to attack what causes this suffering. +On the other hand, when the reasonable soul judges that we have been +injured, she grows excited, even if there were no disposition to anger +in the body. This affection seems therefore to have been given to us +by nature to make us, according to the dictates of our reasons, repel +and threatens us. (There are then two possible states of affairs.) +Either the irascible power first is moved in us without the aid of +reason, and later communicates its disposition to reason by means of +the imagination; or, reason first enters into action, and then reason +communicates its impulse to that part of our being which is disposed to +anger. In either case, anger arises in the vegetative and generative +power, which, in organizing the body, has rendered it capable to +seek out what is agreeable, and to avoid what is painful; diffusing +the bitter bile through the organism, imparting to it a trace of the +soul, thus communicating to it the faculty of growing irritated in the +presence of harmful objects, and, after having been harmed, of harming +other things, and to render them similar to itself. Anger is a trace of +the soul, of the same nature as the soul's faculty of desire, because +those least seek objects agreeable to the body, and who even scorn the +body, are least likely to abandon themselves to the blind transports +of anger. Although plant-life possesses the vegetative power, it does +not possess the faculty of anger because it has neither blood nor bile. +These are the two things which, in the absence of sensation, leads +one to boil with indignation. When however sensation joins these two +elements, there arises an impulse to fight against the harmful object. +If the irrational part of the soul were to be divided into the faculty +of desire, and that of anger, and if the former were to be considered +the vegetative power, and the other, on the contrary, as a trace of +the vegetative power, residing in either the heart or blood, or in +both; this division would not consist of opposed members, because the +second would proceed from the first. But there is an alternative: both +members of this division, the faculties of desire and anger, might be +considered two powers derived from one and the same principle (the +vegetative power). Indeed, when the appetites are divided, it is their +nature, and not the being from which they depend, that is considered. +This essence itself, however, is not the appetite, but completes it, +harmonizing with it the actions proceeding from the appetite. It is +also reasonable to assign the heart as seat of the trace of the soul +which constitutes anger; for the heart is not the seat of the soul, but +the source of the (arterially) circulating blood. + + +WHEN THE SOUL LEAVES THE BODY, SHE LEAVES A TRACE OF LIFE. + +29. If the body resemble an object warmed rather than illuminated, why +does nothing vital remain after the reasonable soul has abandoned it? +It does preserve some vital element, but only for a short time; this +trace soon disappears, as vanishes the heat of an object when it is +removed from the fire. After death, some trace of life still remains. +This is proved by the growth of hair and nails on corpses; and it is +well known that animals, even after being cut in pieces, still move +for some time. Besides, the disappearance of the (vegetative) life +simultaneously with the reasonable soul, does not prove their identity, +and that they (the reasonable soul, and the vegetative soul) are not +different. When the sun disappears, it causes the disappearance not +only of the light that surrounds it immediately, and as it were depends +from it, but also of the brilliance which these objects receive from +this light, and which completely differs from it. + + +DOES THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THESE THINGS NECESSARILY IMPLY THEIR +DESTRUCTION? + +But does that which disappears merely depart, or does it perish? Such +is the question which applies both to the light which inheres in the +illuminated objects (and colors them), as well as to the life inherent +in the body, and which we call the characteristically bodily life. +Evidently, there remains no light left in the objects which were +illuminated. But the question is to decide whether the light that +inhered in them returns to its source, or is annihilated. Annihilation +is impossible if anteriorly it was something real. What was it really? +So-called color must depend on the very bodies from which light also +emanates; and when these bodies perish, their coloring perishes with +them; nobody indeed asks after the fate of the color of the fire that +has gone out any more than one troubles oneself about what has become +of its appearance. It may be objected that the appearance is only a +condition,[156] such as holding the hand open or closed, while the +color, on the contrary, is the same sort of a quality as sweetness. +Now, is there nothing to hinder the sweet or the fragrant body from +perishing, without affecting the existence of the sweetness and +fragrance? Could they subsist in other bodies without being felt, +because the bodies which participate in the qualities, are such as not +to allow the qualities they possess to be felt? What would hinder the +unaffected existence of the light after the destruction of the body +it colored, if it merely ceased to be reflected, unless one's mind +should see that those qualities subsist in no subject? If we were to +admit this opinion, we would also be obliged to admit that qualities +are indestructible, that they are not produced in the constitution +of the bodies, that their colors are not produced by the reasons in +seed; that, as happens with the changing plumage of certain birds, +the ("seminal) reasons" not only gather or produce the colors of the +objects, but they besides make use of those that still fill the air, +and that they remain in the air without being such as they appear to us +when in bodies. Enough of this. + + +THREE POSSIBLE INTERRELATIONS OF THE SOUL'S SUPERIOR AND INFERIOR +BODIES. + +It may still be asked whether, if while the bodies subsist, the +light that colors them remains united to them, and does not separate +from them, why then would not both it, together with its immediate +emanations, move along with the body in which it inheres, although it +cannot be seen going away any more than it is seen approaching? We +shall therefore have to examine elsewhere if the second-rank powers +of the soul always remain attached to the higher ones, and so on; or +if each of them subsist by itself, and can continue to subsist in +itself when it is separated from the higher ones; or if, inasmuch as no +part of the soul can be separated from the others, all together form +a soul which is simultaneously one and manifold, but in some still +undetermined manner. + + +CAN THE PHYSICAL LIFE EXIST WITHOUT THE SOUL? + +What becomes of this trace of life that the soul impresses on the body, +and that the latter appropriates? If it belong to the soul, it will +follow the latter, since it is not separated from the being of the +soul. If it be the life of the body, it must be subject to the same +conditions as the luminous color of the bodies (and perish with them). +Indeed, it will be well to examine if the life can subsist without the +soul, or if, on the contrary, the life exists no earlier than the soul +is present, and acts on the body. + + +STARS, AS WELL AS THE SUN, HAVE PRAYERS ADDRESSED TO THEM. + +30. We have shown that memory is useless to the stars; we have agreed +that they have senses, namely, sight and hearing, and the power to +hear the prayers addressed to the sun, and also those by many people +addressed to the other stars, because these people are persuaded that +they receive from them many benefits; they think even that they will +obtain them so easily that these men ask the stars to co-operate +in actions not only such as are just, but even such as are unjust. +Questions raised by the latter point must still be considered. + + +BENEFITS ARE GRANTED TO MEN THROUGH THE WORLD-SOUL'S MEDIATION. + +Here arise important questions which have been frequently considered +especially by such as will not allow the divinities to be regarded as +the accomplices or authors of shameful deeds, such as love-adventures +and adulteries. For this reason, as well as on account of what was +said above about the memory of the stars, we shall have to examine +the nature of the influence they exercise. Indeed, if they grant our +petitions, though not immediately, and give us what we ask after a time +that sometimes is very long, they must necessarily exercise memory of +the prayers addressed to them; now, we have above denied that they +could have memory. As to the benefits that they grant to men, it has +been said that it seemed as if they had been granted by Vesta, that is, +the earth, unless indeed it should be insisted that the earth alone +granted benefits to men. + + +STATEMENT OF THREE QUESTIONS. + +We have therefore two points to examine: we first have to explain +that if we do attribute memory to the stars, it is only in a sense +agreeing with our former statements, and not for the reason advanced +by other people; we shall later have to show that it is a mistake to +attribute evil actions to them. In view of this, we shall try, as is +the duty of the philosopher, to refute the complaints formed against +the divinities which reside in the heavens, and against the universe +which is equally accused, in the case that any credence whatever is to +be attached to such as pretend that heaven can be magically swayed by +the arts of audacious men; last, we shall explain the administration of +the ministry of guardians, unless the latter point have been explained +incidentally to the solution of the former problems. + + +NATURAL ACTIONS ARE BOTH ON WHOLES AND ON PARTS. + +31. Let us in general consider the actions and reactions produced in +the universe either by nature or by art. In the works of nature, there +is an action of the whole on the parts, of the parts on the whole, +and of the parts on the parts. In the works of art, art either alone +accomplishes what it has undertaken, or depends on natural forces to +effect certain natural operations. We may call actions of the universe, +all that the total circular expanse affects on itself or its part. For +in fact, the heavens by moving themselves, somehow effect themselves +and their parts, both those in its own revolutions, or on the earth. +The mutual reactions and passions of the parts of the universe are +easy to recognize, such as the positions taken up by the sun, and +the influence the sun exercises on the other stars, and especially +in regard to the earth; further, the processes in its own elements, +as well as in those of the other constellations, and of objects on +earth--all of which deserve separate consideration. + + +MOST OF THE ARTS ACHIEVE THEIR OWN ENDS. + +Architecture and the fine arts, fulfil themselves in such an object. +Medicine, agriculture and similar professions, however, are auxiliary +arts, and obey the laws of nature, assisting their efficient production +so as to make them as natural as possible. As to rhetoric, music, +and other arts of refinement, which serve the education of souls in +improving or degrading men, it remains an open question how many there +are of them, and what power they possess. In all these things, we will +have to examine what may be of use to us for the questions we are +treating, and we will have to discover the cause of the facts, as far +as possible. + + +ABSURDITY OF PTOLEMEAN ASTROLOGY. + +It is evident that the revolution of the stars exercises an influence +first by disposing them in different arrangement; then the things +contained within its spheres; then terrestrial beings, not only +in body, but in soul; further, each part of the heavens exercises +influence on terrestrial and inferior things. We shall indeed inquire +whether the lower things in turn exercise some influence on the +superior ones. For the present, however, granting that the facts +admitted by all, or at least a majority, are what they seem to be, +we shall have to try to explain how they are produced, by following +them up to their origins. We must indeed not say that all things are +caused exclusively by heat or cold, with possibly the other qualities +named the "primary qualities of the elements," or with those that +derive from their mixture[157]; neither should we assert that the sun +produces everything by the heat, or some other star (like Saturn), by +cold. For indeed what would cold amount to in the heavens, which are a +fiery body, or in fire, which has no humidity? Moreover, in this manner +it would be impossible to recognize the difference of the stars. Then +there are many facts that could not be traced to their influence. If +the influence of the stars is to be made to account for the differences +of human character, which are supposed to correspond to mixtures of +corporeal elements, producing a temperament in which there is an excess +of cold or heat, to which such causes would one trace hate, envy, and +malice? Granting even that this were possible, how would one then by +the same causes explain good and bad fortune, poverty and wealth, +nobility of fathers and children, and the discovery of treasures? A +thousand facts equally as foreign to the influence exercised by the +physical qualities of the elements on the bodies or souls of animals, +could be cited. + + +NO CRIMES SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE INFLUENCE OF SUBLUNARY DIVINITIES. + +Neither should the things which happen to sublunary beings be +attributed to either a voluntary decision, or to deliberations of +the universe, or the stars. It is not permissible to imagine that +the divinities sway events in a manner such that some should become +thieves, others should enslave their fellow-beings, or capture cities, +or commit sacrilege in temples, or be cowards, effeminate in their +conduct, or infamous in their morals. To favor such crimes would be +unworthy of men of the most commonplace virtue, let alone divinities. +Besides, what beings would be likely to busy themselves favoring vices +and outrages from which they were not to reap any advantage? + + +HAVING CONFUTED ASTROLOGY AND DEVILTRY, WORLD INFLUENCE IS ATTRIBUTED +TO THE WORLD-SOUL. + +32. Since the influence exteriorly exercised by the heavens on us, on +animals, and on human affairs generally has been excluded from physical +causes (of astrology) and from voluntary decisions of divinities, +it remains for us to find some cause to which it may reasonably be +attributed. First, we will have to admit that this universe is a +single living being, which contains within its own organism all living +beings; and that it contains a single Soul, which is communicated to +all its parts; namely, to all beings that form part of the universe. +Now every being that is contained in the sense-world is a part of the +universe. First, and unrestrictedly, it is a part of the universe by +its body. Then, it is again part of the universe by its soul, but only +so far as it participates (in the natural and vegetative power) of the +universal Soul. The beings which only participate in (the natural and +vegetative power) of the universal Soul are completely parts of the +universe. Those who participate in another soul (the superior power of +the universal Soul), are not completely parts of the universe (because +they are independent by their rational souls); but they experience +passions by the actions of the other beings, as far as they have +something of the universe (so far as by their irrational souls, they +participate in the natural and vegetative power of the universe), and +in the proportion in which they possess some part of the universe. This +universe is therefore a single living being that is self-sympathetic. +The parts that seem distant are not any the less near, as, in each +animal, the horns, nails, fingers, the organs at distance from each +other, feel, in spite of the interval which separates them, the +affection experienced by any other one of them. In fact, as soon as +the parts are similar, even when they are separated by an interval +instead of being placed by each others' side, they sympathize by virtue +of this their similarity, and the action of the distant one is felt by +all the others. Now in this universe which is a single living being, +and which forms a single organism, there is nothing distant enough in +place not to be near because of the nature of this being whose unity +makes it self-sympathetic. When the suffering being resembles the +acting one, it experiences a passion conformable to its nature; when +on the contrary it differs, it experiences a passion that is foreign +to its nature, and painful. It is therefore not surprising that though +the universe be single, one of its parts can exert on another a harmful +influence, since it often happens to ourselves that one of our parts +wounds another by its action; as for instance, that the bile, setting +anger in motion, should crush and tear some other part of the body. +Now something analogous to this bile which excites anger, and to other +parts that form the human body, is discovered in the universe. Even in +plants there are certain things which form obstacles to others, and +even destroy them. Now the world forms not only a single animal, but +also a plurality of animals; each of them, as far as it has a share +in the singleness of the universe, is preserved thereby; but, in so +far as this animal enters into the multiplicity of some other animal, +he can wound it, or be wounded by it, make use of it, or feed on it, +because it differs from itself as much as it resembles itself; because +the natural desire of self-preservation leads us to appropriate what is +suitable to itself, and in its own interest to destroy what is contrary +thereto. Finally, each being, fulfilling its part in the universe, is +useful to those that can profit by its action, and wounds or destroys +those who cannot support it; thus plants are scorched by the passage +of fire, and the little animals are dragged along or trampled by +the greater. This generation and this corruption, this betterment +and deterioration of things render easy and natural the life of the +universe considered as a single living being. Indeed, it would not +otherwise have been possible that the particular beings it contains +should have lived as if they were alone, should possess their ends in +themselves, and should live only for themselves; since they are only +parts, they must, as such, concur in the ends of the whole of which +they are parts; and, so far as they are different, they could not +each preserve its own life, because they are contained in the unity +of the universal life; neither could they entirely remain in the same +state, because the universe must possess permanence, and because of the +universe, permanence consists in ever remaining in motion. + + +THE STARS' MOTIONS COMPARED TO A PREARRANGED DANCE. + +33. As the circular movement of the world has nothing fortuitous, +inasmuch as it is produced conformably to the reason of this great +animal, a perfect symphonic (co-operation) between what "acts" and +what "reacts" must exist within it; and there must also have been an +order which would co-ordinate things one with another, so that at +each of the phases of the circular movement of the world there might +be a correspondence between the various beings subject to it, as if, +in a varied choric ballet the dancers formed a single figure. As to +our own modern dances, it is easy to explain the eternal things which +contribute thereto, and which differ for every motion, like the sounds +of the flute, the songs, and the other circumstances which are thereto +related. It is not however as easy to conceive the motions of a person +who conforms himself strictly to each figure, who accompanies, who +raises one limb, or lowers another, who moves this limb, or holds +the other limb motionless in a different attitude. The dancer's eyes +are doubtless fixed on some further aim while his limbs are still +responding to the motions inspired by the music, by co-operating in +expressing them, and in completing them symmetrically. Likewise, a man +learned in the art of dancing could explain the reason that, in such a +figure, such a limb is raised, such a limb is bent, while others are +hidden or lowered; not indeed that the dancer deliberates about these +different attitudes, but because in the general movement of his body he +considers such a posture suitable to such a limb to fulfil its proper +part in the dance. Likewise do the stars produce certain facts, and +announce other ones. The entire world realizes its universal life by +causing the motion of the greater parts it comprises, by ceaselessly +changing the figures, so that the different positions of the parts, +and their mutual relations may determine the rest, and that things may +occur as in a movement executed by a single moving living organism. +Thus such a state is produced by such an attitude, such positions, +such figures; while some other state is produced by some other kind +of figures, and so forth. Consequently, the real authors of what is +occurring do not seem to be those who carry out the figures, but He who +commands them; and He who plans the figures does not do one thing while +busying Himself with another, because He is not acting on something +different from Himself; He himself is all the things that are done; +He here is the figures (formed by the universal movement), He himself +there is the resultant passions in the animal so moved and constituted +by nature, simultaneously "active" and "passive" as the result of +necessary laws. + + +THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNIVERSE SHOULD BE PARTIAL ONLY. + +34. Granting that men are influenced by the universe through one of the +elements of their being, it must be by (their body), that which forms +part of the body of the universe, not by all those of which they are +constituted. Consequently, the surrounding universe should exercise +on them only a limited influence. In this respect they resemble wise +servants who know how to carry out the orders of their masters without +interfering with their own liberty, so that they are treated in a +manner less despotic, because they are not slaves, and do not entirely +cease to belong to themselves. + + +ASTROLOGICAL INFLUENCE MERELY INDICATION. + +As to the difference found in the figures formed by the stars, it +could not be other than it is, because the stars do not advance in +their course with equal swiftness. As they move according to the laws +of reason, and as their relative positions constitute the different +attitudes of this great organism (which is the world), and as all the +things that occur here below are, by the laws of sympathy related +to those that occur on high, it would be proper to inquire whether +terrestrial things are the consequences of the celestial things to +which they are similar, or whether the figures possess an efficacious +power; and in the latter case, whether all figures possess this power, +or if figures are formed by stars only; for the same figure does not +bear the same significance, and does not exert the same action in +different things, because each being seems to have its own proper +nature. It may be said that the configuration of certain things +amounts to no more than the mere disposition of things; and that the +configuration of other things is the same disposition with another +figure. If so, influence should be attributed not to the figures, but +to the prefigured realities; or rather, to things identical by their +essence, and different by their figures; a different influence will +also have to be attributed to the object which differs from the others +only by the place it occupies. + + +ASTROLOGICAL INFLUENCE MAY BE PARTLY ACTION; PARTLY MERE SIGNIFICANCE. + +But of what does this influence consist? In significance, or in +(genuine effective) action? In many cases, the combination, or thing +figured, may be said to have both an action, and a significance; in +other cases, however, a significance merely. In second place, both +the figures and the things figured should be credited with the powers +suitable to each; as with dancers, the hand exerts an influence similar +to that of the other members; and, returning to figures, these would +exert an influence far greater than a hand in dancing. Last, the third +(or lowest) degree of power pertains to those things which follow +the lead of the figures, carrying out (their significance); just as, +returning to the dance-illustrations, the dancer's limbs, and the parts +of those limbs, ultimately do follow the dance-figures; or (taking a +more physiological example), as when the nerves and veins of the hand +are contracted by the hand's motions, and participate therein. + + +EARTHLY EVENTS SHOULD NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE STARS' BODY OR WILL. + +35. How then do these powers exert themselves?--for we have to retrace +our steps to give a clear explanation. What difference is exhibited by +the comparison of one triangle with another? What action does the one +exert on another, how is it exerted, and how far does it go? Such are +the questions we have to study, since we do not refer the production +of things here below to the stars, neither to their body, nor to their +will; not to their bodies, because the things which happen are not +simple physical effects; nor to their will, because it is absurd that +divinities should by their will produce absurd things. + + +THE INFLUENCE OF THE STARS CONSISTS IN THEIR CONTEMPLATION OF THE +INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. + +Let us now recall what has already been established. The universe is +a single living being by virtue of its unity being sympathetic with +itself. The course of its life is regulated by reason; it is entirely +in agreement with itself; it has nothing fortuitous, it offers a single +order, and a single harmony. Besides, all the (star) figures are each +conformed to a reason and to a determinate number. The parts of the +universal living beings which constitute this kind of a dance--we mean +the figures produced in it, of the parts figured therein, as well +as the things derived therefrom--are the very actualization of the +universe. Thus the universe lives in the manner we have determined, +and its powers contribute to this state according to the nature they +have received from the reason that has produced them. The figures are, +in some way, the reasons of the universal Living being, the intervals +or contrasts (of the parts) of the Living being, the attitudes they +take according to the laws of rhythm, and according to the reason of +the universe. The beings which by their relative distances produce +these figures are the divers members of this living being. The +different powers of this living being act without deliberation, as its +members, because deliberation is a process foreign to the nature of +themselves or to this living being. Aspiration to a single aim is the +characteristic of the single living being; but it includes manifold +powers. All these different wills aspire to the same end as the single +will of the organism, for each part desires some one of the different +objects that it contains. Each wishes to possess something of the +other's possessions, and to obtain what it lacks; each experiences +a feeling of anger against another, when it is excited against that +other; each increases at the expense of another, and begets another. +The universe produces all these actions in its parts, but at the same +time it seeks the Good, or rather, it contemplates it. It is always the +Good that is sought by the right will, which is above passions, and +thus accords with the will of the universe. Similarly, servants ascribe +many of their actions to the orders received from their master; but +the desire of the Good carries them where their own master is carried. +Consequently, the sun and the other stars exert what influence they do +exert on things here below through contemplation of the intelligible +world. + + +STAR INFLUENCE IS EXPLAINED BY THEIR NATURAL RADIATION OF GOOD. + +We shall limit ourselves to the above illustration, which may easily +be applied to the rest. The sun does not limit itself to warming +terrestrial beings. It makes them also participate in its soul, as +far as possible; for it possesses a powerful physical soul. Likewise, +the other stars, involuntarily, by a kind of irradiation, transmit to +inferior beings somewhat of the (natural) power they possess. Although +therefore all things (in the universe) form but a single thing of a +particular figure, they offer manifold different dispositions; which +different figures themselves each have a characteristic power; for each +disposition results in appropriate action. + + +SPECIAL FIGURES HAVE INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS, DUE TO THEIR CHARACTERISTICS. + +Things which appear as a figure themselves possess a characteristic +influence, which changes according to the people with which they are +brought in contact. Examples of this may be seen daily. Why do certain +figures or appearances inspire us with terror, although they have +never done us any harm, while others do not produce the same effect on +us? Why are some people frightened by certain figures or appearances, +while others are frightened by different ones? Because the former's +constitution specially acts on the former people, and the latter on +the latter; they could only produce effects in harmony with their +nature. One object attracts attention by a particular appearance, +and would yet attract attention by a different constitution. If it +was its beauty that exerted the power of arousing emotion, why then +would this beautiful object move one man, while the other object would +move another, if there be no potency in the difference of figure or +appearance? It would be unreasonable to admit that colors have a +characteristic influence and action, yet deny the same power to figures +or appearances. It would, besides, be absurd, to admit the existence of +something, but to refuse it all potency. Every being, because of his +mere existence, must "act" or "suffer." Some indeed "act" exclusively, +while others both "act" and "suffer." Substances contain influences +independent of their figure or appearance. Terrestrial beings also +possess many forces which are derived neither from heat nor cold. The +reason is that these beings are endowed with different qualities, that +they receive their forms from ("seminal) reasons," and participate in +the powers of nature; such are the peculiar virtues of natural stones, +and the surprising effects produced by plants. + + +NOTHING IN THE UNIVERSE IS ENTIRELY INANIMATE. + +36. The universe is full of variety; it contains all the "reasons," and +an infinite number of different powers. So, in the human body, the eye, +the bones, and the other organs each have their characteristic power; +as, the bone in the hand does not have the same strength as the bone +in the foot; and in general, each part has a power different from that +possessed by every other part. But unless we observe very carefully, +this diversity escapes us in the case of (natural) objects. Much more +would it escape us in the world; for the forces that we see in it are +(but) the traces of those that exist in the superior region. There +must then be in the world an inconceivable and admirable variety of +powers, especially in the stars that wander through the heavens. The +universe is not a great and vast edifice, inanimate, and composed of +things of which it would be easy to catalogue the different kinds, such +as stones, lumber, and ornamental structures; it is a wakeful being, +living in all its parts, though differently so in each; in short, it +includes all that can ever be. This solves the problem, how inanimate +matter can exist within an animated living being. Our discussions +have therefore taught us that in the universe (nothing is inanimate; +that, on the contrary) everything it contains is alive; but each in a +different manner. We deny that there is life in objects that we do not +see moving; but nevertheless they do live, though only with a latent +life. Those whose life is visible are composed of those whose life is +invisible, but which nevertheless contribute to the life of this animal +by furnishing it with admirable powers. It would therefore be equally +impossible that the universe should be alive unless each of the things +it contained lived with its own life. Nevertheless the acts of the +universe do not depend on choice; it acts without needing to choose, +because it precedes any choice. Thus many things obey its forces. + + +CONSCIOUSNESS DEPENDS ON CHOOSING; EVERYTHING HAS POWERS, THOUGH HIDDEN. + +37. The universe therefore (contains all that it needs), and rejects +(or wastes) nothing. Study, therefore, the fire, and all the other +things considered capable of action. Satisfactory investigation +of their action would demand recognition that these things derive +their power from the universe, and a similar admission for all that +belongs to the domain of experience. But we do not usually examine the +objects to which we are accustomed, nor raise questions about them. +We investigate the nature of a power only when it seems unusual, when +its novelty excites our astonishment. Nevertheless we would not be any +less astonished at the objects that we see so often if their power +were explained to us at a time when we were not yet so thoroughly +accustomed to it. Our conclusion therefore is that every thing has +a secret (sub-conscious) power inasmuch as it is moulded by, and +receives a shape in the universe; participating in the Soul of the +universe, being embraced by her, as being a part of this animated All; +for there is nothing in this All which is not a part thereof. It is +true that there are parts, both on the earth and in the heavens, that +act more efficiently than do others; the heavenly things are more +potent because they enjoy a better developed nature. These powers +produce many things devoid of choice, even in beings that seem to act +(purposively); though they are also active in beings that lack that +ability to choose. (Even these powers themselves act unconsciously): +they do not even turn (towards themselves) while communicating power, +when some part of their own soul is emanating (to that which they are +begetting). Similarly animals beget other animals without implying an +act of choice, without any weakening on the part of the generator, and +even without self-consciousness. Otherwise, if this act was voluntary, +it would consist of a choice, or the choice would not be effective. +If then an animal lack the faculty of choice, much less will it have +self-consciousness. + + +PRODUCTION IS DUE TO SOME PHYSICAL SOUL, NOT TO ANY ASTROLOGICAL POWER. + +38. Things which arise from the universe without the incitation of +somebody are generally caused by the vegetative life of the universe. +As to the things whose production is due to somebody, either by simple +wishes, or by cunning enchantments, they should be ascribed not to +some star, but to the very nature of that which is produced. 1. Of +course, the necessaries of life, or what serves some other use, should +be attributed to the goodness of the stars; it is a gift made by a +stronger part to a weaker one. Any harmful effect on the generation +of animals exercised by the stars must depend on their substance's +inability to receive what has been given them; for the effect is not +produced absolutely, but relatively to some subject or condition, for +that which "suffers" or is to "suffer" must have a determinate nature. +2. Mixtures also exert a great influence, because each being furnishes +something useful to life. Moreover, something good might happen to a +person without the assistance of beings which by nature would seem +useful. 3. The co-ordination of the universe does not always give to +each person what he desires. 4. Besides, we ourselves add much to what +has been given to us. 5. All things are not any the less embraced in a +same unity; they form an admirable harmony; besides, they are derived +from each other, though originating from contraries; for indeed all +things are parts of a single animal. If any one of these begotten +things is imperfect because it is not completely formed, the fact is +that matter not being entirely subdued, the begotten thing degenerates +and falls into deformity. Thus some things are produced by the stars, +others are derived from the nature of substance, while others are added +by the beings themselves. + + +ASTROLOGICAL SIGNS ARE ONLY CONCATENATIONS FROM UNIVERSAL REASON. + +39. Since all things are always co-ordinated in the universe, and +since all trend to one single and identical aim, it is not surprising +that all (events) are indicated by (astrological) signs. "Virtue has +no master," as Plato said[158]; "she attaches herself to all who +honor her, and abandons those who neglect her; God is innocent."[159] +Nevertheless, her works are bound up with the universal order; for all +that is here below depends on a divine and superior principle, and +even the universe participates therein. Thus all that happens in the +universe is caused not only by the ("seminal) reasons," but by reasons +of a higher order, far superior to those (that is, the ideas). Indeed, +the seminal reasons contain the reasons of nothing produced outside of +seminal reasons, neither of what is derived from matter, nor from the +actions of begotten things exercised on each other. The Reason of the +universe resembles a legislator who should establish order in a city. +The latter, knowing the probable actions of the citizens, and what +motives they would probably obey, regulates his institutions thereupon, +intimately connects his laws with the conduct of the individuals +subject to them, establishes rewards and punishments for their deeds, +so that automatically all things conspire in mutual harmony by an +inerrant current. Each therefore is indicated by (astrological) signs, +without this indication being an essential purpose of nature; it is +only the result of their concatenation. As all these things form but a +single one, each of them is known by another, the cause by the effect, +the consequent by the antecedent, the compound by its elements. + + +THE GODS CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR OUR ILLS. + +The above consideration would clear up the problem set above. The gods +(that is, the stars), cannot be held responsible for our ills because, +1. things produced by the gods do not result from a free choice, but +from a natural necessity; because, as parts of the universe, the gods +act on other parts of the universe, and contribute to the life of the +universal organism. 2. Terrestrial beings themselves add very much to +the things that are derived from the stars; 3. the things given us by +the stars are not evil, but are altered by being mingled; 4. the life +of the universe is not regulated (in advance) for the individual, but +only for the totality; 5. matter does not experience modifications +completely corresponding to the impressions it receives, and cannot +entirely submit to the form given to it. + + +MAGIC OCCURS BY LOVE WORKING AS SYMPATHY. + +40. But how shall we explain the enchantments of magic? By the sympathy +that things have for each other, the accord of those that are similar, +the struggle of those that are contrary, the variety of the powers +of the various beings which contribute to the formation of a single +organism; for many things are attracted towards each other and are +mutually enchanted, without the intervention of a magician. The real +magic is the Love that reigns in the universe, with its contrary of +Hate. The first magician, him whom men consult to act by the means of +his philtres and enchantments, is Love; for it is from the natural +mutual love of all things, and from the natural power they have to +compel each others' love, that is derived the efficaciousness of +the art of inspiring love by employing enchantments. By this art, +magicians bring together the natures which have an innate love for +each other; they unite one soul to another as one cross-fertilizes +distant plants; by employing (symbolic) figures which possess special +virtues; by themselves taking certain attitudes, they noiselessly +attract the powers of other beings, and induce them to conspire to +unity so much the easier as they themselves are in unity. A being +of the same disposition, but located outside of the universe, could +neither by magic attractions fascinate, nor by his influence enchain +any of the things contained in the world; on the contrary, from the +moment that he is not a stranger to the world, he can attract towards +himself other beings, knowing their mutual relations and attractions +within the universal organism. There are indeed invocations, songs, +words, (symbolic) figures, and, for instance, certain sad attitudes +and plaintive tones which exert a natural attraction. Their influence +extends even to the soul--I mean, the irrational soul; for neither +the will nor the reason permit themselves to be subdued by the charms +of music. This magic of music does not arouse any astonishment; +nevertheless those who play or sing, charm and inspire love +unintentionally. Nor does the virtue of prayers depend on their being +heard by Beings that make free decisions; for these invocations do not +address themselves to free-will. Thus[160] when a man is fascinated +by a serpent, he neither feels nor understands the influence exerted +on him; he perceives what he has felt only after having experienced +it--the governing part of the soul cannot anyway experience anything of +the kind. Consequently when an invocation is addressed to a Being, some +thing results; either for him who makes this invocation, or for some +other person. + + +HOW PRAYERS ARE ANSWERED. + +41. Neither the sun, nor any other star hears the prayers addressed +to it. If they are granted, it is only by the sympathy felt by each +part of the universe for every other; just as all parts of a cord are +caused to vibrate by excitation of any one part; or, just as causing +one string of a lyre to vibrate would cause all the others to vibrate +in unison, because they all belong to the same system of harmony. If +sympathy can go as far as making one lyre respond to the harmonies +of another, so much the more must this sympathy be the law of the +universe, where reigns one single harmony, although its register +contains contraries, as well as similar and analogous parts. The things +which harm men, like anger, which, together with the bile, relate to +the liver, were not created for the purpose of harming men. It is as if +a person, in the act of taking fire from a hearth accidentally wounded +another. This person is doubtless the author of the wound because he +transferred the fire from one place to another; but the wound occurred +only because the fire could not be contained by the being to whom it +had been transmitted. + + +AS THE STARS ANSWER PRAYERS UNCONSCIOUSLY, THEY DO NOT NEED MEMORIES +THEREFOR. + +42. The stars therefore have no need of memory to remember our prayers, +nor senses to receive them; thus is solved the problem considered +above. Nor even, if our prayers are answered, is this due, as some +think, to any free will on their part. Whether or not we address +prayers to them, they exercise over us a certain influence by the mere +fact that, along with us, they form part of the universe. + + +THE PRAYERS OF EVEN THE EVIL ARE ANSWERED, IF MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH +NATURAL LAW. + +There are many forces that are exercised involuntarily, either +automatically, without any invitation, or with the assistance of +skill. Thus, in an animal, one part is naturally favorable or harmful +to another; that is why both physician and magician, each by his +characteristic arts, force one thing to communicate its power to +another. Likewise, the universe communicates to its parts something of +its own power, either automatically, or as a result of the attraction +exercised by the individual. This is a natural process, since he who +asks is not foreign to it. Neither should we be astonished if even an +evil individual obtains his requests; for do not the evil drink from +the same streams as do the good? In this case, the granting is done +unconsciously; it grants simply, and what is granted harmonizes with +the order of the universe. Consequently, if an evil individual asks and +obtains what is within reach of all, there is no reason why he should +be punished. + + +THE WORLD-SOUL AND STARS ARE IMPASSIBLE. + +It is therefore wrong to hold that the universe is subject to +experiencing passions. In the first place, the governing Soul is +entirely impassible; then, if there be any passions in her, they are +experienced only by her parts; as to her, being unable to experience +anything contrary to her nature, she herself remains impassible. To +experience passions seems suitable to stars considered as parts of the +universe; but, considered in themselves, they are impassible, because +their wills are impassible, and their bodies remain as unalterable +as their nature, because their soul loses nothing, and their bodies +remain the same, even if, by their soul, they communicate something of +themselves to inferior beings. If something issues from them, they do +not notice it; if some increase happens, they pay no attention. + + +HOW THE WISE MAN ESCAPES ALL ENCHANTMENTS. + +43. How will the worthy man be able to escape the action of the +enchantments and the philtres employed by magic? His soul escapes +them entirely; his reason is impassible, and cannot be led to change +opinions. The worthy man, therefore, can suffer only through the +irrational part that he receives from the universe; this part alone +"suffers." Nor will he be subdued by the loves inspired by philtres, +because love presupposes a soul's inclination to experience what +another soul experiences. As enchantments act on the irrational part +of the soul, their power will be destroyed by fighting them; and by +resisting them by other enchantments. As a result of enchantments, +therefore, it is possible to experience sicknesses, and even death; +and, in general, all the affections relative to the body. Every part of +the universe is subject to experiencing an affection caused in it by +another part or by the universe itself (with the exception of the wise +man, who remains impassible); without there being anything contrary to +nature it can also feel this affection only at the end of some time. + + +THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GUARDIANS. + +The guardians themselves can "suffer" through their irrational part. +They must have memory and senses, by nature they must be susceptible to +enchantments, of being induced to commit certain acts, and to hear the +prayers addressed to them. The guardians subjected to this influence +are those who approach men, and they are the more subdued thereby as +they approach to men closer. + + +AN ACTIVE LIFE MAKES MEN MORE LIABLE TO ENCHANTMENTS. + +Every being that has some relation with another can be bewitched by +him; he is bewitched and attracted by the being with whom he is in +relations. Only the being concentrated in himself (by the contemplation +of the intelligible world) cannot be bewitched. Magic exercises its +influence on every action, and on every active life; for active +life trends towards the things which charm it. Hence the (Platonic) +expression, "The subjects of the magnanimous Erechtheus are remarkable +by the beauty of their countenances." What indeed does one being feel +in his relations with another? He is drawn towards him, not by the art +of magic, but by the seduction exerted by nature, which harmonizes and +unites two beings joining them one to the other, not by locality, but +by the power of the philtres employed. + + +MAGIC HAS POWER OVER MAN BY HIS AFFECTIONS AND WEAKNESSES. + +44. Only the man devoted to contemplation can defy enchantments, +inasmuch as none can be bewitched by himself. The man who contemplates +has become unified; he has become what he contemplates, his reason is +sheltered from all seductive influences. He does what he ought to do, +he accomplishes his life and his proper function. As to the remainder +of humanity, the soul does not fulfil her characteristic function, +nor does reason determine its action; the irrational soul becomes the +principle of action, and the passions furnish men with directions. +The influence of a magic attraction manifests in the disposition to +marriage, in the care we take of our children, and, in general, in all +that the bait of pleasure leads us to do. Amidst our actions there +are some that are provoked by an irrational power, either by anger, +or the general faculty of desire of the soul. Other actions relate to +political life, like the desire of obtaining office, and they spring +from a desire to command. Those actions in which we propose to avoid +some evil, are inspired by fear; while those actions in relating to the +desire to possess more than others, are inspired by cupidity. Last, +those actions relating to utility, and to the satisfaction of our +needs, show with what force nature has attached us to life. + + +HONESTY ESCAPES MAGIC ONLY BECAUSE IT RESULTS FROM CONTEMPLATION OF THE +INTELLIGIBLE. + +It may perhaps be said that the actions whose aim is noble and honest +escape the influences of magic; otherwise contemplation itself would +be subject thereto. This is true, that the man who performs deeds of +honesty as being inevitable, with his eyes fixed on true Beauty, could +never be bewitched. He knows duty, and the aim of his life (which would +limit his efforts) is not anything on earth or in the (universe). It +may indeed be objected that he is bewitched and attached here below by +the magic force of human nature, which binds him to the lives of others +and of himself. It would even be reasonable to say that we should not +separate ourselves from the body because of the attachment for him +inspired by some magic charm. As to the man who (to contemplation) +prefers practical activity, and who contents himself with the beauty +discovered therein, he is evidently misled by the deceptive traces of +the Beautiful, since he seeks beauty in inferior things. Every activity +unfolded in the domain of what has nothing but the appearance of +truth, every inclination for this kind of thing supposes that the soul +is deceived by what attracts it. That is the way in which the magic +power of nature is exercised. + + +HOW TO AVOID MAGIC ENCHANTMENTS. + +Indeed, to follow what is not Good as if it was the Good, to let +oneself be misled by its appearance, and by irrational inclinations, +that is the characteristic of a man who in spite of himself is led +whither he does not wish to go. Now does this not really amount to +yielding to a magic charm? He alone escapes every magic charm who, +though he be carried away by the lower faculties of his soul, considers +good none of the objects that seem such to these faculties, who calls +good only what he by himself knows to be such, without being misled by +any deceptive appearance; and who regards as good not what he has to +seek, but what he possesses veritably. Then only could he in no way be +misled by any magic charm. + + +EVERY BEING THEREFORE IS A SPECIALIZED ORGAN OF THE UNIVERSE. + +45. This discussion teaches us that each one of the beings contained +in the universe contributes to the purpose of the universe by its +"actions" and "passions" according to its nature and dispositions, as, +in an organism, each organ contributes to the final purpose of the +entire body, by fulfilling the function assigned to it by its nature +and constitution. From this each organ derives its place and role, and +besides communicates something else to the other organs, and from them +receives all that its nature would allow. Somehow, all the organs feel +what is going on in the others, and if each of them became an organism, +it would be quite ready to fulfil the function of an organism, which +function differs from that of being merely an organ. + + +HUMAN NATURE IS INTERMEDIATE, SUFFERING WITH THE WHOLE, BUT ALSO ACTING +ON IT. + +We are thus shown our condition. On the one hand, we exercise a certain +action on the whole; on the other, we not only experience the passions +that it is natural for our body to experience in its relations with +other bodies, but we also introduce into these relations the soul +which constitutes us, bound as we are to the kindred things which +surround us by our natural resemblance to them. Indeed, by our souls +and dispositions we become, or rather, we already are similar on one +hand to the inferior beings of the demonic world, and on the other, to +the superior beings of the intelligible world. Our nature cannot be +ignored, therefore. Not all of us receive, not all of us give the same +thing. How indeed could we communicate to others the good, if we do not +possess it? or receive it, if our nature was not capable of it? + + +BY A SECRET ROAD EACH ONE IS LED TO DIVINE RETRIBUTION. + +Thus the evil man shows what he is, and he is by his nature impelled +towards what already dominates him, both while he is here below, or +after he has left this place; when he passes into the place towards +which his inclinations draw him. The virtuous man, on the contrary, +has, in all these respects, a different fate. Each one is thus driven +by his nature, as by some occult force, towards the place whither he is +to go. In this universe, therefore, there obtains an admirable power +and order, since, by a secret, and hidden path, each one is led to +the unescapable condition assigned to him by divine justice. The evil +man does not know this, and is, in spite of himself, conducted to the +place in the universe which he is to occupy. The wise man knows it, +and himself proceeds to his destined abode. Before leaving this life, +he knows what residence inevitably awaits him, and the hope of dwelling +there some day in company with the divinities fills his life with +happiness. + + +EXISTENCE OF HEAVEN; HELL'S TORMENTS ARE REFORMATORY. + +The parts of each small organism undergo changes and sympathetic +affections which are not much felt, because these parts are not +individual organisms (and they exist only for some time, and in some +kinds of organisms). But in the universal organism, where the parts +are separated by so great distances, where each one follows its own +inclinations, where there is a multitude of different animals, the +movements and change of place must be more considerable. Thus the sun, +the moon and the other stars are seen successively to occupy different +places, and to revolve regularly. It is not unreasonable therefore to +suppose that souls would change location, as they change character, and +that they would dwell in a place suitable to their dispositions. They +would thus contribute to the order of the universe by occupying some, +a place analogous to the head in the human body; and others, a place +analogous to the human feet; for the universe admits of place for all +degrees of perfection. When a soul does not choose the best (actions), +and yet does not attach herself to what is worst, she would naturally +pass into some other place, which is indeed pure, but yet proportioned +to the mediocrity she has chosen. As to the punishments, they resemble +the remedies applied by physicians to sickly organs. On some the +physician lays certain substances; in some he makes incisions, or he +changes the condition of some others, to reestablish the health of the +whole system, by giving to each organ the special treatment suitable +to it. Likewise, the health of the universe demands that the one (soul) +be changed; that another be taken away from the locality where she +languishes, and be located where she would recover from the disease. + + + + +FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE. + +Psychological Questions--III. + +About the Process of Vision and Hearing. + + +IT IS UNCERTAIN WHETHER AN INTERMEDIARY BODY BE IMPLIED BY VISION. + +1. Above[161] we suggested the question whether it be possible to see +without some medium such as the air or a diaphanous body[162]; we +shall now try to consider it. It has already been asserted that in +general the soul cannot see or feel without the intermediation of some +body; for, when completely separated from the body (the soul dwells +in the intelligible world). But, as touch consists of perception, +not indeed of intelligible entities, but only of sense-objects, the +soul cannot see or feel without the intermediation of some body; for +when completely separated from some body, the soul dwells in the +intelligible world. But, as touch consists of perception, not indeed +of intelligible entities, but only of sense-object, the soul in order +to come in contact with these sense-objects, must enter into cognitive +or affective relation with them by the means of intermediaries which +must possess an analogous nature; and that is why the knowledge of +bodies must be acquired by the means of corporeal organs. Through these +organs which are so interrelated as to form a sort of unity, the soul +approaches sense-objects in a manner such as to establish effective +communion. That contact between the organ and the cognized object must +be established is evident enough for tangible objects, but is doubtful +for visible objects. Whether contact be necessary for hearing is a +question we shall have to discuss later.[163] Here we shall first +discuss whether sight demand a medium between the eye and color. + + +REFUTATION OF ARISTOTLE'S INSISTENCE ON A MEDIUM OF SIGHT. + +If a medium of sight exist, it exists only by accident, and in no way +contributes to sight.[164] Since opaque and earthy bodies hinder sight, +and as we see so much the better as the medium is more subtle, it may +be said, indeed, that mediums contribute to sight, or at least, if they +do not contribute such thereto, they may be hindrances as slight (as +possible); but evidently a medium, however refined, is some sort of an +obstacle, however slight. + + +THOUGH THE MEDIUM EXPERIENCE AFFECTION, THE ORGANS FEEL IT BETTER +WITHOUT THE MEDIUM. + +(There is an opinion that) the medium first receives and then transmits +the affection, and impression. For instance, if some one stand in +front of us, and directs his gaze at some color, he also sees it; +but the color would not reach us unless the medium had experienced +the affection. To this it may be answered that there is no necessity +for the affections to be experienced by the medium, inasmuch as the +affection is already experienced by the eye, whose function consists +precisely in being affected by color; or at least, if the medium be +affected, its affection differs from that of the eye. For instance, a +reed interposed between the hand and the fish called the "torpedo," or +"electric ray," does not feel the same numbness which it nevertheless +communicates to the holding hand; still, the hand would not be affected +with numbness unless the reed formed a communication between the fish +and the hand.[165] However, the matter is not beyond discussion, for +(even without any intermediary, if for instance) the fisher were in +(direct contact) with the "ray" inside of the net, he would also feel +the electric numbness. This communication therefore seems based on +sympathetic affections. That, by virtue of its nature, one being can +be sympathetically affected by some other being, does not necessarily +imply that the medium, if different, shares that affection; at least +(it is certain that) it is not affected in the same manner. In such a +case, the organ destined to experience the affection experiences it +far better when there is no medium, even when the medium itself is +susceptible to some affection. + + +NECESSITY OF A MEDIUM IN THE THEORIES OF VARIOUS PHILOSOPHERS. + +2. If vision[166] presupposes the union of the "light of the eye,"[167] +with the light interposed (between the eye) and the sense-object +itself, the interposed medium is the light, and this medium is +necessary, on this hypothesis. (On the theory of Aristotle) the colored +substance produces a modification in the medium; but nothing here +would hinder this modification from reaching the eye itself, even +when there is no medium. For, in this case, the medium is necessarily +modified before the eye is. (The Platonic philosophers) teach that +vision operates by an effusion of the light of the eye. They have no +need to postulate a medium, unless indeed they should fear that the +ray of the eye should lose its way; but this ray is luminous, and +the light travels in a straight line. (The Stoics) explain vision by +the resistance experienced by the visual ray. They cannot do without +a medium.[168] (The Atomists and) the believers in "images" (such +as Epicurus), insist that these images move in emptiness, thereby +implying the existence of a free space to avoid hindering the images. +Consequently as they will be hindered in a direct ratio to the +existence of a medium, this opinion does not run counter to our own +hypothesis (that there is no medium). + + +A COSMOLOGICAL MEDIUM IS NECESSARY, BUT IT AFFECTS SIGHT ONLY +ACCIDENTALLY. + +Those who (with Plotinos himself) teach that vision operates by +sympathy, assert that vision is poorer through a medium, because this +medium hinders, fetters, and weakens sympathy. In this case, indeed, +the medium necessarily weakens sympathy even though it shared the +same nature (as the eye and the object), and was affected in the same +manner. (It acts like the integument) of some body that is deeply +burned by fire applied to it; the interior parts are less affected +because they are protected by the exterior parts. There is no doubt +that the parts of one and the same animal will be less affected in +experiencing sympathy because of the existence of a medium. The +affection will be weakened according to the nature of the medium, +because such a medium would hinder excess of affection, unless indeed +that which is transmitted (by one part to another) is not such as to +fail to affect the medium. But if the universe sympathize with itself +because it constitutes a single organism, and if we are affected +because we are contained within this single organism, and form part of +it, why should any continuity be necessary for us to feel a distant +object? The single organism, indeed, could not be continuous without +the continuity of some medium; this continuous medium is affected only +by accident; but otherwise we would have to admit that all can be +affected by all. But if these two objects are affected in one manner, +and other two objects are affected in another manner, there might not +always be need of a medium. Whoever asserts the need of a medium for +vision will have to advance a very good argument, inasmuch as that +which traverses the air does not always affect the air, and often +limits itself to dividing the air. Thus when a stone falls the only +thing that happens to the air is that it fails to support the stone. +As falling is part of the stone's nature, it would be unreasonable to +assert that its falling was due to the reaction exerted by the ambient +air. Otherwise we would have to assert that it is this same reaction of +the ambient air that makes fire ascend, which is absurd; because the +fire, by the rapidity of its motion, forestalls this reaction. That, by +the very rapidity of the motion, reaction is accelerated, takes place +only by accident, and has no relation to the upward impulsion; for +trees grow from above without receiving any (upward) impulsion. Even +we, when walking, divide the air without being pushed by the reaction +of the air; the air behind us limits itself to filling the void we have +created. If then the air allow itself to be divided by bodies without +being affected by them, what would hinder the air from permitting free +transit for the images to reach the eye, without being thereby divided? + + +IMAGES DO NOT REACH US BY EFFLUENCE. + +If these images do not reach us by some sort of effluence, why should +the air be affected, and why should we ourselves be affected only as a +result of the affection experienced by the air? If we felt only because +the air had been affected before us, we would attribute the sensation +of sight not to the visible object, but to the air located near us, +as occurs with heat. In the latter case it is not the distant fire, +but the air located near us which, being heated, then warms us; for +the sensation of heat presupposes contact, which does not occur with +vision. We see, not because the sense-object is imposed on the eye (but +because the medium is illuminated); now it is necessary for the medium +to be illuminated because the air by itself is dark. If the air were +not dark, it would have no need of light; for (to effectuate vision) +the obscurity, which forms an obstacle to vision, must be overcome +by light. That is perhaps the reason why an object placed very near +the eye is not seen; for it brings with it the darkness of the air, +together with its own. + + +USELESSNESS OF AIR AS TRANSMITTING MEDIUM PROVED FROM SIGHT OF OBJECTS +AT NIGHT. + +3. A strong proof that the forms of sense-objects are not seen merely +because the air, on being affected, transmits them by relays from point +to point, is that even in darkness the fire, the stars, and their +forms may be seen. In this case no one would claim that the forms of +the objects, being impressed on the obscure air, are transmitted to +the eye; otherwise, there would be no obscurity, as the fire, while +transmitting its form, would illuminate. Indeed, in the profound +obscurity in which the light of the stars is not seen, the fire of +signals and of light-houses may be perceived. Should any one, in +opposition to the testimony of his senses, claim that even in this case +the fire penetrates the air, he should be answered by having it pointed +out to him that in that case human vision should distinguish the +smallest objects which are in the air, instead of being limited to the +perception of the fire. If then we see what is beyond a dark medium, it +would be much better seen without any medium whatever. + + +ABSENCE OF MEDIUM WOULD INTERFERE WITH VISION ONLY BY DESTROYING +SYMPATHY. + +It might indeed be objected that without medium, vision ceases. This +occurs not because of the lack of medium, but because the sympathy of +the (universal) organism is in such a case destroyed since a medium +presupposes that all the parts of this organism together form but a +single being. It would indeed seem to be a general condition necessary +for sensation that the universal organism be sympathetic with itself; +otherwise, no one thing could participate in the power of any other +thing that might happen to be very distant. + + +VISION IS NOT DEPENDENT ON THE AFFECTION OF THE MEDIUM. + +Here is another important (related) question. If there existed another +world and organism which had no relation with our world, and if on +the surface of the sky was an eye that was looking, would it perceive +this other world at a moderate distance, or would it have no relation +thereto? This question will be considered later.[169] Now however we +shall give a further proof that the medium has nothing to do with +vision. If the air were affected, it would experience a material +affection, similar to the figure impressed on wax. In this case, a +certain part of the object would be impressed on a certain part of the +air; and consequently, the part of the air nearest to the eye would +receive a part of the visible object, and this part would be of a +size equal to that of the pupil. Now a visible object is seen in its +entirety, and all those who are in the air equally see it, whether they +behold it from the front, or side, or whether they be one behind the +other, without however forming mutual obstacles. This proves that every +part of the air contains the entire visible object. This cannot be +explained by any corporeal affection, but by higher laws, suitable to +the soul, and to the (universal) organism which everywhere responds to +itself. + + +MUTUAL RELATION OF THE EYE'S LIGHT AND THE OBJECTIVE LIGHT. + +4. What is the mutual relation between the light that emanates from +the eye, and the light which is exterior to the eye, and which extends +between the eye and the object?[170] Light has no need of air as a +medium, unless indeed somebody should undertake to say that there +is no light without air, in which case air would be a medium only +accidentally. Light itself, however, is an unaffected medium, for +there is no necessity here for an affection, but only for a medium; +consequently, if light be not a body, there is no need of a body (to +act as medium). It might be objected that sight has no need either of a +foreign light nor of a medium to see near by, but has need of them for +vision at a distance. Later[171] we shall consider whether or not light +without air be possible. Now let us consider the first point. + + +INTERMEDIARY LIGHT IS UNNECESSARY, PARTLY BEING AN OBSTACLE. + +If the light which is contiguous to the eye should become animated, +and if the soul should, so to speak, interpenetrate it, uniting with +it as she unites with the interior light, there would be no need +of intermediary light for the perception of the visible object. +Sight resembles touch; it operates in light by somehow transferring +itself to the object, without the medium experiencing any affection. +Now consider: does the sight transfer itself to the visible object +because of the existence of an interval between them, or because +of the existence of some body in the interval? In the latter case, +vision would occur by removing this obstacle. If, on the other hand, +it be because of the existence of a mere interval, then the nature +of the visible object must seem inert and entirely inactive. This is +however impossible; not only does touch announce and experience the +neighboring object but, by the affection it experiences, it proclaims +the differences of the tangible object, and even perceives it from +a distance, if nothing oppose it; for we perceive the fire at the +same time as the air that surrounds us, and before this air has been +heated by the fire. A solid body heats better than does the air; and +consequently it receives heat through the air, rather than by the +intermediation of air. If then the visible object have the power to +act, and if the organ have the power of experiencing (or suffering), +why should sight need any intermediary (besides light) to exert its +power? This would really be needing an obstacle! When the light of the +sun reaches us, it does not light up the air before lighting us, but +lights both simultaneously; even before it has reached the eye, while +it is still elsewhere, we have already seen, just as if the air was +not affected at all; that is the case, probably, because the medium +has undergone no modification, and because light has not yet presented +itself to our view. Under this hypothesis (which asserts that the air +receives and transmits an affection) it would be difficult to explain +why during the night we see the stars and, in general, any kind of fire. + + +NOT EVEN THE LIGHT OF THE EYE IS TO BE CONSIDERED AS MEDIUM. + +On the hypothesis that the soul remains within herself, while making +use of the light (emanated from the eye) as a rod to reach the visible +object, a very sharp perception would be caused by the resistance +experienced by the light in its tension[172] and sense-color. In +so far as it is color, the light itself would possess the property +of reflecting light. In this case, the contact would take place by +a medium. But already before this the light has reached the object +without any medium; so that the later contact operated by a medium +would produce cognition by a sort of memory or reasoning--which is not +the case. + + +THE OBJECTIVE LIGHT DOES NOT TRANSMIT THE IMAGE BY RELAYS. + +The hypothesis that the light contiguous to the visible object is +affected, and transmits this affection by relays from point to point +into the eye, is essentially identical with that theory which supposes +that the medium must be preliminarily modified by the visible object; a +hypothesis that has already been discussed above. + + +NEITHER FOR HEARING IS THE AIR NECESSARY AS A MEDIUM. + +5. As to hearing, there are several theories. One is that the air is +first set in motion, and that this motion, being transmitted unaltered +from point to point from the (location of the) sound-producing air +as far as the ear, causes the sound to arrive to the sense. Again, +another theory is that the medium is here affected accidentally, and +only because it happens to be interposed; so that, if the medium were +annihilated, we would feel the sound immediately on its production by +the shock of two bodies. We might think that the air must first be set +in motion, but the medium interposed (between the first moved air and +the ear) plays a different part. The air here seems to be the sovereign +condition of the production of sound; for, at the origin of the sound, +the shock of two bodies would produce no sound if the air, compressed +and struck by their rapid concussion did not transmit the motion from +point to point as far as the ear.[173] But if the production of the +sound depend on the impulsion impressed on the air, the (qualitative) +difference between voices and (instrumental) sounds will challenge +explanation; for there is great difference (of "timbre") between metal +struck by metal of the same kind, or another. These differences are +not merely quantitative, and cannot be attributed to the air which +(everywhere) is the same, nor to the force of the stimulus (which may +be equal in intensity). Another theory (of Aristotle's) is that the +production of voices and sound is due to the air, because the impulsion +impressed on the air is sonorous. (To this it should be answered +that) air, in so far as it is air, is not the cause of sound; for it +resounds only in so far as it resembles some solid body, remaining in +its situation, before it dilates, as if it were something solid.[174] +The (cause of the sound) then is the shock between objects, which forms +the sound that reaches the sense of hearing. This is demonstrated by +the sounds produced in the interior of animals, without the presence +of any air, whenever one part is struck by some other. Such is the +sound produced by certain articulations when they are bent (as, the +knee); or certain bones, when they are struck against each other, or +when they break; in this case air has nothing to do with the production +of the sound. These considerations compel a theory of hearing similar +to our conclusions about sight. The perception of audition, like +that of vision, therefore consists in a repercussion (an affection +sympathetically felt) in the universal organism. + + +THE RELATION OF THE AIR TO THE LIGHT. + +6. Could light exist without air, if the sun illuminated the surface of +bodies, and if there were a void in the interval which is accidentally +illuminated by virtue of its location (between the sun and the bodies)? +It is certain that if the other things were affected because the air +itself was affected, and if light were nothing more than an affection +of the air, that is, its substance; then indeed this affection could +not exist without the experiencing subject (the air). But (in our +view) light is not essentially characteristic of air as such; for all +fiery and brilliant bodies, among which are precious stones, possess +a luminous color. Could that which passes from a brilliant body into +some other body exist without that other body? If light be but a simple +quality of an object, and as every quality implies a subject on which +it depends, light will have to be sought in the body in which it +resides. If, on the contrary, light be only an actualization produced +by some other thing, and if there be no body contiguous to the luminous +object, and it be entirely surrounded by a void, why could light +not exist, and radiate upwards (as well as downwards, and in every +direction)? Since light radiates, why should it not radiate without +hindrance? If its nature be to fall, it will spontaneously descend; for +neither the air nor any illuminated body will make it issue from the +illuminating body, nor can force it to advance, since it is neither +an accident that implies a subject, nor an affection that implies an +affected object. Otherwise, the light would remain (in the illuminated +body) when the object from which it emanates should happen to withdraw; +but since the light withdraws with it, it radiates. In what direction +does light radiate? (Its radiation) demands no more than the existence +of sufficient space; otherwise the body of the sun would lose its +actualization; that is, the light it radiates. In this case light would +not be the quality of a subject, but the actualization that emanates +from a subject, but which does not pass into any other subject (as a +kind of undulation); but if another subject be present, it will suffer +an affection. As life, which constitutes an actualization of the soul, +affects the body if it be present, and does not any the less constitute +an actualization if the body be absent, likewise light constitutes an +actualization subject to the same conditions. It is not the obscurity +of the air that begets light, nor obscurity mingled with the earth +which produces an impure light; otherwise one might produce something +sweet by mingling some thing with what is bitter. The statement that +light is a modification of the air, is incomplete without the addition +that the air must itself be modified by this modification, and that the +obscurity of the air is no longer obscure after having undergone that +change. The air itself, however, remains what it was, just as if it had +not been affected. The affection belongs only to that which has been +affected. Color therefore does not belong to the air, but subsists in +itself; the air's only function is its presence. But enough of this. + + +DOES THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE LUMINOUS SOURCE ABANDON THE LIGHT TO +DESTRUCTION; OR DOES THE LIGHT FOLLOW IT? + +7. It might be asked whether the withdrawal of the object from which +light emanates abandons the light to destruction, or does the light +follow the source into withdrawal? This question is related to the +former one; (and it may be said that) if the light inhere in the +illuminated body in a manner such as to have become characteristic of +it, the light perishes with it. The light is an immanent actualization, +for otherwise it would surround the object from which it emanates, +and remain within it, accumulating there. If this were so, the light +could not vanish so long as the object from which it emanates itself +continues to subsist. If this object pass from one place to another, +light would pass thither also, not because it turns back on itself or +changes locality, but because the actualization of the luminous object +exists and is present as soon as nothing opposes it. If the distance +from the sun to the earth were much more considerable than it really +is, the light of the sun would nevertheless reach us, providing no +obstacle were interposed. On the one hand, there is in the luminous +body an actualization, a kind of superabundant life, a principle +and source of activity; on the other hand, beyond the limits of the +luminous body, exists a second actualization which is the image of the +actualization characteristic of this body, and which never separates +itself from the body. Every being has an actualization which is its +image; so that, as soon as the being exists, its actualization exists +also; and so long as the being subsists, its actualization radiates +nearer or further. Actualizations (differ indeed); some are feeble and +obscure, others are secret or hidden, others are powerful and radiate +afar. When an actualization radiates at a distance it must be admitted +to exist there where it acts, where it exercises and manifests its +power. Consequently one can see light shine from the eyes of animals +whose eyes are naturally brilliant[175]; likewise when the animals +that exert a concentrated interior fire happen to open their eyelids, +they radiate rays of light into the darkness; while, when they close +their eyes, no more light exists outside them. The light therefore does +not perish; only, it is no longer produced exteriorly. It does not +re-enter into the animal but merely ceases to exist exteriorly, for the +visual fire does not pass outside, remaining inside. Is light itself +then within? At least this light remains within; but (when the eye is +closed) the eyelid forms an obstacle to its diffusion. + + +LIGHT AS ACTUALIZATION IS THE BEING OF THE LUMINOUS BODY, AND IS +INCORPOREAL. + +Thus the light that emanates from bodies is the actualization of the +luminous body which is active exteriorly. The light in the bodies whose +original nature is such, is the formal being of the originally luminous +body. When such a body has been mingled with matter, it produces color. +The actualization alone does not suffice to give color; it produces +only the hue, because the actualization is the property of a subject, +and depends on it, so that nothing can be withdrawn from the subject +without simultaneously being withdrawn from its actualization. Light +is entirely incorporeal, though it be the actualization of a body. +It could not therefore properly be said of light that it withdraws +or is present. The true state of affairs is entirely different; for +the light, so far as it is the actualization of the luminous body, +is its very being. The image produced in a mirror is therefore an +actualization of the visible object, which acts on anything that is +passive (that can suffer, or experience), without letting any of its +substance escape by any wastage. If the object be present, the image +appears in the mirror; it is as it were the image of the color that +possesses some particular figure. When the object withdraws, the +diaphanous body no longer possesses what it possessed while the visible +object was acting on the mirror. A similar condition is that of the +soul; her actualization dwells within the (world's) body so long as +this soul herself dwells within it. + + +LIFE AND LIGHT DO NOT PERISH, BUT ARE NO MORE THERE. + +(Curiosity might lead some one to ask about) a force that were not +the actualization of the Soul, but which only proceeded from this +actualization, such as the life which we say is proper to the body. Is +the case of such a force similar to that of the light characteristic +of bodies? We said that the light inheres in colored bodies, so far as +that which produces the colors inheres in the bodies. As to the life +proper to the bodies, we think that the body possesses it so far as the +soul is present; for nothing can be inanimate. When the body perishes, +and when it is no longer assisted by the soul which communicated life +to it, nor by the actualization of this soul, how should life remain in +the body? What! Has this life perished? No: this life itself has not +perished, for it is only the image of an irradiation; it would not be +correct to say more than that it is no more there.[176] + + +A WORLD OUTSIDE OF OUR WORLD WOULD NOT BE VISIBLE. + +8. If there were a body outside of our world, and if an eye observed +it from here without any obstacle, it is doubtful that the eye could +see that body, because the eye would have no affection common to it; +for community of affection is caused by the coherence of the single +organism (that is, the unity of the world). Since this community of +affection (or, sympathy), supposes that sense-objects and that the +senses belong to the single organism, a body located outside of the +world would not be felt, unless it were part of the world. In this +case, it would be felt. If it were not a part of the world, but yet +by its color and other qualities it was conformed to the organ that +was to cognize it, would it be felt? No, it would not be felt, that +is, if such a hypothesis (of a body located outside of the world) +were at all admissible. If however, anyone should refuse to admit +such a hypothesis, he would pretend that it is absurd that the eye +should not see the color located in front of it, and that the other +senses do not perceive the qualities before them. That is the reason +of its absurdity. For we are active or passive only because we are +integral parts of the single organism, and are located within it. Is +anything still left to be considered? If what we have said suffices, +our demonstration is finished; otherwise we shall have to give still +further proofs to support our proposition. + + +SENSATION IS LIMITED TO COMMON INTEGRAL PARTS OF THE UNIVERSE. + +Every organism is coherent (that is, is sympathetic with itself). In +the case of a single organism, our demonstration suffices, and all +things will experience common affections so far as they constitute +parts of the single organism. The plea that a body exterior to the +world could be felt because of its resemblance (is ill-founded because +perception is characteristic of an organism and because it is the +organism that possesses perception. For its organ resembles (the +perceived object); thus sensation would be the perception presented to +the soul by means of organs similar to the perceived objects. If then +the organism feel not only its contents, but also objects resembling +them, it will perceive these things by virtue of its organic nature; +and these things will be perceived not because they are contents +thereof, but by virtue of their resemblance thereto. It seems rather +that perceived objects must be perceived in the measure of their +resemblance, because the soul has familiarized herself with them, and +has assimilated them to herself. If then the soul which has assimilated +these objects to herself differ from them, the things which were +supposed to have become assimilated to her will remain entirely foreign +to her. The absurdity of this consequence shows us that there is a +flaw in the hypothesis; for it affirms simultaneously that the soul +exists, and does not exist, that the things are both conformable and +different, similar and dissimilar. Since then this hypothesis implies +contradictories, it is not admissible; for it supposes that the soul +exists in this world, as a result of the world, both being and not +being universal, both being and not being different, both being and not +being perfect. The above hypothesis must therefore be abandoned; and +since it implies a contradiction, no reasonable consequence could be +deduced therefrom. + + + + +THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT. + +Of Nature, Contemplation and Unity.[177] + +(_These three subjects are discussed in paragraphs 1-4, 5-7, and 8-16. +The plain paragraph numbers are those of the Teubner edition; those in +parenthesis are the Creuzer (Didot) edition._) + + +A. OF NATURE. + + +INTRODUCTION: AS A JOKE, IT MAY BE SAID THAT EVEN PLANTS ASPIRE TO +CONTEMPLATION. + +1. If as a preliminary pleasantry, we said that all beings, not only +reasonable ones, but even the irrational, plants as well as the earth +that begets them, aspire to contemplation, and are directed towards +that end; that, as a result of the difference existing between them, +some really achieve contemplation, while others only accomplish a +reflection or image of it, we would no doubt be told that this was an +absurd paradox. But as we are here engaged in a private study, we may, +as an indulgence, support this paradox. While thus trifling, are we +ourselves not actually engaging in contemplation? Besides, it would be +not only we, but any who thus trifle, who aspire to contemplation. We +might even say that a joking child, as well as a meditating man both +aim at reaching contemplation when the former jokes, and the later +meditates. Indeed, there is not a single action that does not tend +towards contemplation; more or less externalizing it according as it is +carried out strictly or freely. In any case its ultimate aim is always +contemplation; but of this later.[178] + + +ENUMERATION OF THE LOWER FORMS OF CONTEMPLATION. + +(1). Let us begin by explaining what could be the nature of +contemplation (thought) that we attribute to the earth, to the trees, +and to the plants (as we promised), and how the things produced +and begotten by these beings can be reduced to the actuality of +contemplation; how nature, that is usually considered to lack reason +and imagination, nevertheless is quite capable of some kind of +contemplation, thereby producing all its works, although speaking +strictly, it is incapable thereof. + + +NATURE ACTS ON MATTER NOT MECHANICALLY BUT BY ITS POTENCY. + +2. Evidently nature possesses neither hands, nor feet, nor any natural +or artificial instrument. For production its only need is a matter on +which to work, and which it forms. The works of nature exclude all +ideas of mechanical operation; not by any impelling force, nor by +using levers nor machines does it produce varied colors, nor draw the +outlines of objects. Even the workmen who form wax figures, to whose +work the operations of nature are often compared, cannot endue objects +with colors without borrowing them from elsewhere. Besides, we must +observe that these workmen contain a power which remains immutable, and +by the sole means of which they produce their works with their hands. +Likewise, nature contains a power which remains immovable as a whole; +it has no need of some parts that would remain immovable, and others +that move. It is matter alone that undergoes movement, for the forming +power is in no way moved. Were the forming power moved, it would no +longer be the first motor[179]; the first motor would no longer be +nature, but whatever might, in its totality, be immovable. + + +NATURE IS IMMOVABLE AS A FORM, BUT NOT AS COMPOUND OF MATTER AND FORM. + +It may be objected that the ("seminal) reason" may remain immutable, +but that nature is distinct from reason, and is mutable. Considering +the totality of nature, we include reason. Considering only one of +its parts as immutable, this part still will be reason. Nature must +be a form, and not a composite of matter and form. What need would +it have of a matter that might be either cold or hot, since matter, +when subjected to form, either possesses these qualities, or receives +them, or rather undergoes the action of reason before having any +qualities. Indeed, it is not by fire that matter becomes fire, but +by reason. Consequently, in animals and plants, it is the "reasons" +that produce[180]; and nature is a reason that produces other reasons, +imparting some of herself to the substance subjected to her influence, +while remaining within herself. The reason that consists in a visible +shape occupies the last rank; it is dead, and produces nothing. The +living "reason" (which administers the body of the living being), being +sister to the "reason" that produced the visible form (in begetting +the body of the living being), and possessing the same power as this +reason, alone produces within the begotten being.[181] + + +BOTH NATURE AND REASON ARE CONTEMPLATION; WHILE UNIVERSAL REASON IS +BOTH SOUL AND NATURE. + +3. (2). How does nature produce? And how, in producing, does she +arrive at contemplation? Since she produces while remaining immovable +within herself, and as she is a "reason," she is a contemplation +also. Indeed, every action is produced according to a "reason," and +consequently differs from it. Reason assists and presides over action, +and consequently is not an action. Since reason is not an action, +it is a contemplation. In universal Reason, the reason which holds +the last rank itself proceeds from contemplation, and in this sense +still deserves the name of contemplation because it is produced by +the contemplation (of the soul). However universal Reason, which is +superior to the latter reason, may be considered under two points of +view, as soul and as nature. (Let us begin by nature.) + +THE REASON OF NATURE IS THE RESULT OF AN IMMOVABLE CONTEMPLATION. + +Does reason, considered as nature, also derive from contemplation? +Yes, but on condition that it has contemplated itself somewhat; +for it is produced by a contemplation and a principle which was +contemplated. How does it contemplate itself? It does not possess +this mode of contemplation which proceeds from (discursive) reason; +that is to say, which consists in discursively considering what one +has in himself. Being a living "reason" and a productive power, how +could it fail discursively to consider what it contains? Because one +considers discursively only what he does not yet possess. Now as nature +possesses, she produces by the mere fact that she possesses. To be what +she is and to produce what she produces are identical. Because she is +"reason," she simultaneously is contemplation and contemplated object. +As she is all three: contemplation, contemplated object, and "reason," +nature produces by the mere fact that it is in her essence to be these +things. As we have shown, evidently action is a sort of contemplation; +for it is the result of the contemplation that remains immutable, +which does nothing but contemplate, and which produces by its mere +contemplation. + + +NATURE'S CONFESSION THAT HER MOTHER IS UNIVERSAL REASON, AND HER FATHER +THE FORMAL REASONS. + +4. (3). If anybody were to ask nature why she produces, Nature, if +at all willing to listen and answer would say, "You should not have +questioned me; you should have tried to understand, keeping silence, +as I do; for I am not in the habit of speaking. What were you to +understand? Here it is. First, what is produced is the work of my +silent speculation, a contemplation effected by my nature; for, myself +being born of contemplation, mine is a contemplative nature. Besides, +that which in me contemplates, produces a work of contemplation, like +geometricians who, while contemplating, describe figures. For it is +not in describing figures, but in contemplating, that I let drop from +within me the lines which outline the forms of the bodies. I preserve +within me the disposition of my mother (the universal Soul), and that +of the principles that beget me (the formal 'reasons'). The latter, +indeed, are born of contemplation: I was begotten in the same way. +These principles gave birth to me without any action, or the mere +fact that they are more powerful reasons, and that they contemplate +themselves." + +DESCRIPTION OF NATURE AS A WEAKER CONTEMPLATION. + +These words signify that nature is a soul begotten by a superior Soul +that possesses a more potent life, and contains her contemplation +silently within herself, without inclining towards that which is higher +or lower. Abiding within her own essence ("being") that is, within her +own rest and self-consciousness, having discovered, so far as it was +possible for her, what was below her, without going out of her way to +seek it, nature produced an agreeable and brilliant object. If it is +desired to attribute some sort of cognition or sensation to nature, +these will resemble true cognition and sensation only as those of a man +who is awake resemble those of a man who is asleep.[182] For nature +peaceably contemplates her object, which was born in her as effect of +nature's abiding within and with herself, of herself being an object of +contemplation, and herself being a silent, if weak contemplation. There +is, indeed, another power that contemplates more strongly; the nature +which is the image of another contemplation. Consequently, what she has +produced is very weak, because a weakened contemplation can beget a +weak object only. + + +IT IS MEN WHO ARE TOO WEAK FOR CONTEMPLATION THAT SEEK A REFUGE IN +ACTION. + +Likewise it is men too weak for speculation who, in action, seek a +shadow of speculation and reason. Not being capable of rising to +speculation, and because of their soul-weakness not being able to grasp +that which in itself is intelligible, and to fill themselves therewith, +though however desiring to contemplate it, these men seek, by action, +to achieve that which they could not obtain by thought alone. Thus we +find that action is a weakness or result of contemplation, when we act, +or desire to see, or to contemplate, or to grasp the intelligible, +or try to get others to grasp it, or propose to act to the extent of +our ability. It is a weakness, for, after having acted, we possess +nothing of what we have done; and a consequence, because we contemplate +something better than we ourselves have made. What man indeed who +could contemplate truth would go and contemplate its image? This +is the explanation of the taste for manual arts, and for physical +activity[183] (as thought Aristotle). + + +B. CONTEMPLATION. + + +THE PROCESSION OF THE WORLD-SOUL. + +5. (4). After having spoken of nature, and having explained how +generation is a sort of contemplation, let us pass to the Soul that +occupies a rank superior to nature. This is what we have to say about +her. By her contemplative action, by her ardent desire to learn and +to discover, by the fruitfulness of her knowledge, and her resulting +need to produce, the Soul, her totality having become an object of +contemplation, gave birth to some other object; just as science, on +fructifying, by instruction begets a lesser science in the soul of +the young disciple who possesses the images of all things, but only +in the state of obscure theories, of feeble speculations, which are +incapable of self-sufficiency. The higher and rational part of the +Soul ever dwells in the higher region of the intelligible world, and +is, by this intelligible world, ever illuminated and fructified[184]; +while the lower ("natural and generative power") participates in what +the superior part has received, by immediately participating in the +intelligible; for life ever proceeds from life, and its actualization +extends to everything, and is present everywhere. In her procession, +the universal Soul allows her superior part to remain in the +intelligible world; for, if she detached herself from this superior +part, she would no longer be present everywhere; she would subsist +only in her lower extremities. Besides, the part of the Soul that thus +proceeds out of the intelligible world is inferior to what remains +within it. Therefore, if the Soul must be present and must assert her +sphere of activity everywhere, and if that which occupies the superior +rank differs from that which occupies the inferior; if, besides, her +activity proceeds either from contemplation or action---though indeed +originally from contemplation--because contemplation precedes the +action which could not exist without contemplation; in this state +of affairs, though one actualization would be weaker than another, +yet it would ever remain a contemplation, so that the action derived +from contemplation seems to be no more than a weakened contemplation; +for that which is begotten must always remain consubstantial with +its generating principle, though weaker, since of lower rank. All +things therefore silently proceed from the Soul, because they stand +in no need of either contemplation or exterior visible action. Thus +the Soul contemplates, and the contemplating part of the Soul, being +somehow located outside of the superior part, and being different +therefrom, produces what is below it; thus it is that contemplation +begets contemplation.[185] No more than its object is contemplation +limited below; that is why it extends to everything. Where is it not? +Every soul contains the same object of contemplation. This object, +without being circumscribed as a magnitude, does not equally inhere +in all beings; consequently, it is not present in the same way to all +parts of the Soul. That is why Plato[186] says that the charioteer +of the soul communicates to his horses what he has seen. The latter +receive something from him only because they desire to possess what he +has seen; for they have not received the entire intelligible (world). +Though they act because of a desire, they act only in view of what they +desire; that is, in view of contemplation, and of its object. + + +PRACTICE IS ONLY A PREPARATION FOR CONTEMPLATION. + +6. (5). The purpose of action is to contemplate, and to possess +the contemplated object. The object or activity, therefore, is +contemplation. It seeks to achieve indirectly what it is unable to +accomplish directly. It is not otherwise when one has achieved the +object of one's desires. One's real desire is not to possess the +desired object without knowing it, but to know it more thoroughly, to +present it to the sight of the soul, and to be able to contemplate it +therein. Indeed, activity always has in view some good; one desires +to posses it interiorly, to appropriate it, and to possess the result +of one's action. Now as Good can be possessed only by the soul, +activity once more brings us back to contemplation. Since the soul +is a "reason," what she is capable of possessing could be no more +than a silent "reason," being so much the more silent as it is more +a "reason," for perfect "reason" seeks nothing farther; it rests in +the manifestation of that with which it is filled; the completer the +manifestation, the calmer is the contemplation, and the more does it +unite the soul. Speaking seriously, there is identity between knowing +subject and known object in the actualization of knowledge. If they +were not identical, they would be different, being alien to each other, +without any real bond, just as reasons (are foreign to the soul) when +they slumber within her, without being perceived. The reason[187] must +therefore not remain alien to the learning soul, but become united +thereto, and become characteristic of her. Therefore when the soul +has appropriated a "reason," and has familiarized herself therewith, +the soul as it were draws it out of her (breast) to examine it. Thus +she observes the thing that she (unconsciously) possessed, and by +examining it, distinguishes herself therefrom, and by the conception +she forms of it, considers it as something foreign to her; for though +the soul herself be a "reason" and a kind of intelligence, nevertheless +when she considers something, she considers it as something distinct +from herself, because she does not possess the true fulness, and is +defective in respect to her principle (which is intelligence). Besides, +it is with calmness that she observes what she has drawn from within +herself; for she does not draw from within herself anything of which +she did not formerly have even a notion. But she only drew from within +herself that of which her view was incomplete, and which she wished to +know better. In her actualizations (such as sensation), she adapts the +"reasons" she possesses to exterior objects.[188] On one hand, as she +possesses (the intelligible entities) better than does nature, she is +also calmer and more contemplative; on the other hand, as she does not +possess (the intelligible entities) perfectly, more (than intelligence) +she desires to have direct experimental knowledge and contemplation of +the object she contemplates. After having (temporarily) withdrawn from +her own higher part, and having (by discursive reason) run through the +series of differences, she returns to herself, and again gives herself +up to contemplation by her higher part (intelligence) from which she +had withdrawn (to observe the differences); for the higher part does +not deal with differences, as it abides within herself. Consequently +the wise mind is identical with reason, and in itself possesses what it +manifests to others. It contemplates itself; it arrives at unity not +only in respect to exterior objects, but also in respect to itself; it +rests in this unity, and finds all things within itself. + + +THIS CONTEMPLATION IS THE GOAL OF ALL KINDS AND GRADES OF EXISTENCE. + +7. (6). Thus everything (ultimately) derives from contemplation; +everything (really) is contemplation, including the true beings, and +the beings by the former secondarily begotten by giving themselves up +to contemplation, and which themselves are objects of contemplation +either for sensation, or for knowledge or opinion. Actions, and also +desire, result in knowledge. Generation originates in speculation, +and ends in the production of a form, that is: in an object of +contemplation. In general, all beings that are images of generating +principles produce forms and objects of contemplation. Begotten +substances, being imitations of beings, show that the purpose +of generating principles is neither generation nor action, but +the production of works which themselves are to be contemplated. +Contemplation is aimed at by both discursive thought, and beneath +it, by sensation, the end of both of which is knowledge. Further, +beneath discursive thought and sensation is the nature which, bearing +within herself an object of contemplation, that is, a ("seminal) +reason," produces another "reason."[189] Such are the truths that are +self-evident, or that can be demonstrated by reasoning. Besides it +is clear that, since the intelligible objects devote themselves to +contemplation, all other beings must aspire thereto; for the origin of +beings is also their end. + + +EVEN LOWER FORMS OF BEGETTING ARE DUE TO SEMINAL REASONS. + +The begetting of animals is entirely due to the activity within them +of seminal reasons. Generation is an actualization of contemplation; +it results from the need of producing multiple forms, from objects +of contemplation, of filling everything with reasons, of ceaseless +contemplation; begetting is no more than producing a form, and +to spread contemplation everywhere.[190] All the faults met with +in begotten or manufactured things are no more than faults of +contemplation. The poor workman resembles the producer of bad form. +Besides, lovers must be counted among those who study forms, and who +consequently give themselves up to contemplation. But enough of this. + + +C. OF UNITY. + + +THE DIFFERENT GRADES OF THOUGHT AND LIFE. + +8. (7). Since contemplation rises by degrees, from nature to the Soul, +from the Soul to Intelligence; and as within it thought becomes more +and more (intimate or) interior, more and more united to the thinker; +and as in the perfect Soul the things known are identical with the +knower; and because they aspire to Intelligence, the subject must then +evidently within Intelligence be identical with the object; not through +any appropriation thereof, as the perfect Soul does indeed appropriate +it, but because their essence ("being") is identical, because of the +identity between thinking and being ("essence"). Within intelligence no +longer do we have on one side the object, and on the other the subject; +otherwise we would need another principle where this difference would +no longer exist. Within it, then, these two things, the subject and the +object, form but a single (entity). That is a living contemplation, and +no longer an object of contemplation which seems to inhere in something +else; for existence within a living being is not identical with living +by oneself. Therefore if it is to be alive, the object of contemplation +and of thought must be life itself, and not the life of plants, that of +sensation, or psychic life. Those are different thoughts, the one being +the thought of plants, the thought of sensation, and psychic thought. +They are thoughts because they are "reasons." + +"ALL BEINGS ARE CONTEMPLATIONS." + +Every life is a thought which, like life itself, may be more or less +true. The truest thought is also the first life; and the first life is +identical with the first Intelligence. Consequently, the first degree +of life is also the first degree of thought; the second degree of +life is also the second degree of thought; and the third degree of +life is also the third degree of thought. Therefore every life of this +kind is a thought. Nevertheless it is humanly possible to define the +differences of the various degrees of life without being able to set +forth clearly those of thought; men will limit themselves to saying +that some (of these degrees of thought) imply intelligence, while +others exclude it, because they do not seek to penetrate the essence +of life. We may observe that the remainder of the discussion brings us +back to this proposition, that "all beings are contemplations."[191] If +the truest life be the life of thought, if the truest life and the life +of thought be identical, then the truest thought must be alive. This +contemplation is life, the object of this contemplation is a living +being and life, and both form but one. + + +LIKE A CIRCLE, INTELLIGENCE IS INSEPARABLY SINGLE AND MANIFOLD. + +Since both are identical, the unity that they form became manifold +because it does not contemplate unity, or it does not contemplate +unity so far as it is one; otherwise it would not be intelligence. +After having begun by being one, it ceased being one; unconsciously +it became manifold as a result of the fruitful germs it contained. +It developed to become all things, though it would have been better +for it not to have desired this. Indeed, it thus became the second +principle, as a circle which, by developing, becomes a figure and a a +surface, whose circumference, centre, and rays are distinct, occupying +different points. The origin of things is better than their goal. The +origin is not equivalent to the origin and goal, and that which is +both origin and goal is not identical with that which is no more than +origin. In other words, intelligence itself is not the intelligence +of a single thing, but universal intelligence; being universal, +it is the intelligence of all things.[192] If then intelligence be +universal Intelligence, and the intelligence of all things, then +each of its parts must also be universal, also possess all things. +Otherwise, intelligence would contain a part that was not intelligence; +intelligence would be composed of non-intelligences; and it would +resemble a conglomeration of things which would form an intelligence +only by their union. Thus intelligence is infinite. When something +proceeds from it, there is no weakening; neither for the things that +proceed from it, for this is also all things, nor for the intelligence +from which the thing proceeds, because it is not a summation of +parts.[193] + + +TO THE INTELLIGENCE THAT SIMULTANEOUSLY IS THE INTELLIGIBLE THERE MUST +BE A SUPREME. + +9. (8). Such is the nature of Intelligence. Therefore it does not +occupy the first rank. Above it must be a Principle, whose discovery is +the object of this discussion. Indeed, the manifold must be posterior +to unity. Now intelligence is a number; and the principle of number +is unity, and the principle of the number that constitutes unity +is absolute Unity. Intelligence is simultaneously intelligence and +the intelligible; it is therefore two things at once. If then it be +composed of two things, we must seek what is prior to this duality. +Could this principle be Intelligence alone? But Intelligence is always +bound to the intelligible. If the Principle we seek cannot be bound +to the intelligible, neither will it be Intelligence. If then it be +not Intelligence, and transcend duality, it must be superior thereto, +and thus be above Intelligence. Could it be the Intelligence alone? +But we have already seen that the intelligible is inseparable from +Intelligence. If this Principle be neither Intelligence, nor the +intelligible, what can it be? It must be the Principle from which are +derived both Intelligence and its implied intelligible. + + +THE BEGETTER OF INTELLIGENCE MUST BE SIMPLER THAN IT, AND IS REACHED +NOT BY INTELLIGENT REASONING BUT A SIMPLE INTUITION. + +But what is this Principle, and how are we to conceive it? It must be +either intelligent or not intelligent. If it be intelligent, it will +also be Intelligence. If it be not intelligent, it will be unconscious +of itself, and will not be in any way venerable. Though true, it would +not be clear or perspicuous to say that it is the Good itself, since we +do not yet have an object on which we could fasten our thought when we +speak of it. Besides, since the knowledge of the other objects in all +beings who can know something intelligent, occurs through Intelligence +and lies in Intelligence, by what rapid intellection (or intuition) +could we grasp this Principle that is superior to Intelligence? We +may answer, by that part of us which resembles it; for there is in +us something of it; or rather, it is in all things that participate +in Him. Everywhere you approach the Good, that which in you can +participate receives something of it. Take the illustration of a voice +in a desert, and the human ears that may be located there. Wherever +you listen to this voice, you will grasp it entirely in one sense, +and not entirely in another sense. How then would we grasp something +by approximating our intelligence (to the Good)? To see up there the +Principle it seeks, Intelligence must, so to speak, return backwards, +and, forming a duality, it must somehow exceed itself; that means, it +would have to cease being the Intelligence of all intelligible things. +Indeed, intelligence is primary life, and penetration of all things, +not (as the soul does) by a still actualizing movement,[194] but by a +movement which is ever already accomplished and past.[195] Therefore, +if Intelligence be life, which is the penetration of all things, if +it possess all things distinctly, without confusion--for otherwise +it would possess them in an imperfect and incomplete manner--it must +necessarily proceed from a superior Principle which, instead of being +in motion, is the principle of motion (by which Intelligence runs +through all things), of life, of intelligence, and of all things. The +Principle of all things could not be all things, it is only their +origin. Itself is neither all things, nor any particular thing, +because it begets everything; neither is it a multitude, for it is the +principle of multitude. Indeed that which begets is always simpler than +that which is begotten. Therefore if this principle beget Intelligence, +it necessarily is simpler than Intelligence. On the theory that it is +both one and all, we have an alternative, that it is all things because +it is all things at once, or that it is everything individually. On +the one hand, if it be all things at once, it will be posterior to +all things; if on the contrary it be prior to all things, it will be +different from all things. For if the One co-existed with all things, +the One would not be a principle; but the One must be a principle, and +must exist anteriorly to all things, if all things are to originate +from it. On the other hand, if we say that the One is each particular +thing, it will thereby be identical with every particular thing; later +it will be all things at once, without being able to discern anything. +Thus the One is none of these particular things, being prior to all +things. + + +THE SUPREME IS THE POTENTIALITY OF ALL THINGS, ABOVE ALL ACTUALIZATION. + +10. (9). This Principle then is the potentiality of all.[196] Without +it, nothing would exist, not even Intelligence, which is the primary +and universal life. Indeed what is above life is the cause of life. The +actualization of life, being all things, is not the first Principle; it +flows from this Principle as (water) from a spring. + + +THE SUPREME AS A SPRING OF WATER. + +The first Principle may indeed be conceived of as a spring (of water) +which is its own origin, and which pours its water into many streams +without itself becoming exhausted by what it yields, or even without +running low, because the streams that it forms, before flowing away +each in its own direction, and while knowing which direction it is to +follow, yet mingles its waters with the spring. + + +THE SUPREME AS THE TREE OF THE UNIVERSE. + +Again, (the Supreme may be compared to) the life that circulates in a +great tree, without its principle issuing from the root, where is its +seat, but which later divides among the branches. Though spreading +everywhere a manifold life, the Principle still dwells in itself exempt +from all manifoldness, though being only its origin.[197] + + +IF UNITY PASSED INTO THE MANIFOLD, THE UNIVERSE WOULD BE DESTROYED. + +This contains nothing surprising. Why should we be surprised at +manifoldness issuing from Him who is not manifold, or at the +impossibility of the existence of the manifold without the prior +existence of That which is not manifold? The Principle is not +distributed in the universe; far rather, if it were disturbed, the +universe would be annihilated; for it cannot exist except in so far as +its Principle abides within itself, without becoming confused with the +rest. + + +THIS IS THE BASIS OF THE RETURN TO UNITY. + +Consequently, there is everywhere a return to unity--for there is +for everything a unity to which it may be reduced. Consequently, the +universe must be derived from the unity that is superior to it; and as +this unity is not absolutely simple, it must itself be derived from +a still superior unity, and so on until we arrive at the absolutely +simple Unity, which cannot be reduced to any other. Therefore, +considering what is in a tree--that is, its permanent principle--or +what is unitary in an animal, in a soul, or in the universe, you will +everywhere have that which is most powerful and precious. If, at last, +you consider that unity of the things that really exist, that is, their +principle, their source, their (productive) power, can you doubt its +reality, and believe that this principle amounts to nothing? Certainly +this principle is none of the things of which it is the principle; it +is such that nothing could be predicated of it, neither essence, nor +being, nor life, because it is superior to all of it. If you grasp it, +by abstracting from it even being, you will be in ecstasy. By directing +your glance towards it, by reaching it, and resting in it, you will +get a unitary and simple intuition thereof; you will conceive of its +greatness by both itself and its derivatives. + + +THE SUPREME IS NOT INTELLIGENCE, WHICH ASPIRES TO THE FORM OF THE GOOD. + +11. (10). A further consideration. Since intelligence is a sort of +intuition, namely, a seeing (or actualizing) intuition (or vision), it +really consists of a potentiality that has passed into actualization. +It will therefore contain two elements, which will play the parts +of (intelligible) matter,[198] and of form, just like actualized +vision,[199] for actualized vision also implies duality. Therefore +intuition, before being actualized, was unity. Thus unity has become +duality, and duality has become unity. (Sense-) vision receives from +sense-objects its fulness, and its perfection, so to speak. As to +intellectual vision, however, its fulness comes from a principle that +is the Good. Now if intelligence were the Good itself, what would be +the use of its intuition or its actualization? Other beings, indeed, +aspire to the Good, as the goal of their activity; but the Good itself +has need of nothing; and therefore possesses nothing but itself.[200] +After having named it, nothing should be added thereto by thought; +for, to add something, is to suppose that He needs this attribute. +Not even intelligence should be attributed to Him; that would be +introducing therein something alien, distinguishing in Him two things, +Intelligence and the Good. Intelligence needs the Good, but the Good +has no need of Intelligence. On achieving the Good, Intelligence +takes its form, for it derives its form from the Good; and it becomes +perfect, because it assumes the nature (of the Good). The model (or, +archetype) must be judged by the trace it leaves in Intelligence, +conceiving of its true character according to the impression it leaves. +Only by this impression does Intelligence behold and achieve the Good. +That is why Intelligence aspires to the Good; and as Intelligence ever +aspires to the Good, Intelligence ever achieves it. The Good itself, +however, never aspires to anything; for what could He desire? Nor does +He achieve anything, since He desires nothing.[201] Therefore (the +Supreme) is not Intelligence, which ever desires, and aspires to the +form of Good. + + +THE GOOD AS SUPREME NEITHER NEEDS NOR POSSESSES INTELLECTION. + +No doubt Intelligence is beautiful; it is the most beautiful of things, +since it is illuminated by a pure light, since it shines with a pure +splendor, and contains the intelligible beings of which our world, in +spite of its beauty, is but an adumbration and image. The intelligible +world is located in a region resplendent with clearness, where is +nothing either obscure or indefinite, where, within itself, it enjoys a +blissful life. It entrances the human gaze, especially when one knows +how to commune with it. But just as a view of heaven, and the splendor +of the stars leads one to seek and conceive their author, likewise the +contemplation of the intelligible world, and the fascination it exerts +leads (the beholder) to seek its author. The question then arises, Who +is He who has given existence to the intelligible world? Where and how +did He beget this so pure Intellect, this so beautiful son who derives +all of his fulness from his father[202]? This supreme Principle itself +is neither Intelligence nor son, but is superior to Intelligence, which +is His son. Intelligence, His son, succeeds Him, because the son needs +to receive from the father both intellection and fulness, which is +his food; so (the son) holds the first rank after Him who has need of +nothing, not even intellection. Nevertheless Intelligence possesses +fulness and true intellection, because it immediately participates in +the Good. Thus the Good, being above real fulness and intellection, +neither possesses them, nor needs them; otherwise, He would not be the +Good. + + + + +FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT. + +Concerning Intelligible Beauty. + + +ART MAKES A STATUE OUT OF ROUGH MARBLE. + +1. Since he who rises to the contemplation of the intelligible world, +and who conceives the beauty of true intelligence, can also, as we +have pointed out, by intuition grasp the superior Principle,[203] +the Father of Intelligence, let us, so far as our strength allows +us, try to understand and explain to ourselves how it is possible to +contemplate the beauty of Intelligence and of the intelligible world. +Let us imagine two pieces of marble placed side by side, the one rough +and inartistic, the other one fashioned by the sculptor's chisel, who +made of it the statue of a goddess, a grace, or a muse; or that of a +man--but not that of any individual whatever, but that of a (cultured +gentle) man in whom art would have gathered all the traits of beauty +offered by different individuals. After having thus from art received +the beauty of the form, the second marble will appear beautiful, not +by virtue of its essence, which is to be stone--for otherwise the +other block would be as beautiful as this one--but because of the +form received through art. The latter, however, did not exist in the +matter of the statue. It was in the thought of the artist that it +existed before passing into the marble; and it existed therein, not +because it had eyes and hands, but because it participated in art. It +was therefore in art that this superior beauty existed. It could not +have become incorporated in stone. Dwelling within itself, it begat +an inferior form, which, passing into matter, could neither preserve +all its purity, nor completely respond to the will of the artist, +possessing no perfection other than that allowed by matter. As the +nature of art is to produce beauty, if art succeed in producing beauty +which conforms to its constitutive essence, then, by the possession +of the beauty essential to it, art possesses a beauty still greater +and truer than that which passes into exterior objects. As all form +extends by passing into matter, (this objectified form) is weaker than +that which remains one. All that extends abandons its own (nature), +as do force, heat, and in general any property; likewise with beauty. +Every creating principle is always superior to the created thing. It +is not the lack of musical ability, but the music itself that creates +the musician; while it is the intelligible music that creates the sense +music. It has been attempted to degrade the arts by saying that to +create they imitate nature. This may be answered by pointing out that +the natures of beings are themselves the images of other beings (or +essences); besides, the arts do not limit themselves to the imitation +of objects which offer themselves to our view, but that they go as +far back as the (ideal) reasons from which are derived the nature of +objects. Further the arts independently create many things, and to the +perfection of the object they add what is lacking, because they possess +beauty in themselves. Phidias seems to have represented Jupiter without +copying any sense-objects, conceiving him such as he would appear to us +if he ever revealed himself to our eyes.[204] + + +BEAUTY INHERES NOT IN THE ORGANISM'S PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS, BUT IN +ITS COLOR AND FORM. + +2. Now let us turn away from the arts and consider the objects they +imitate, such as natural beauties, namely, rational and irrational +creatures, especially the more perfect, in which the creator was +able to master matter, and endue it with the desired form. What then +constitutes the beauty in these objects? Surely not (the physical +characteristics, such as) blood or menstrual discharges, but the color +and figure, which differ essentially therefrom; otherwise that which +constitutes beauty is something indifferent--either something formless, +or something that contains a simple nature (that is, the "seminal +reason"), as does matter, for instance. + + +BEAUTY COMES FROM THE FORM IMPARTED BY THE ORIGINATOR. + +Whence came the beauty of that Helena about whom so many battles were +fought? Whence comes the beauty of so many women comparable to Venus? +Whence came the beauty of Venus herself? Whence comes the beauty of a +perfect man, or that of one of those divinities who reveal themselves +to our eyes, or who, without showing themselves, nevertheless possess +a visible beauty? Does it not everywhere originate from the creating +principle that passes into the creature, just as, in the art considered +above, the beauty passes from the artist into the work? It would be +unreasonable to assert that the creatures and the ("seminal) reason" +united to matter are beautiful, while denying beauty to the "reason" +which is not united to matter while still residing in the creator in +a primary and incorporeal condition; and to assert that in order to +become beautiful this reason must become united to matter. For if mass, +as such, was beautiful, then the creative reason would be beautiful +only in so far as it was mass. If form, whether in a large or small +object, equally touches and moves the soul of the beholder, evidently +beauty does not depend on the size of the mass. Still another proof of +this is that so long as the form of the object remains exterior to +the soul, and as we do not perceive it, it leaves us insensible; but +as soon as it penetrates into the soul, it moves us. Now form alone +can penetrate into the soul by the eyes; for great objects could not +enter by so narrow a space. In this respect, the size of the object +contrasts, because that which is great is not mass, but form.[205] + + +RECOGNITION OF BEAUTY DEPENDS ON PRELIMINARY INTERIOR BEAUTY. + +Further, the cause of beauty must be either ugly, beautiful or +indifferent. If it were ugly, it could not produce its opposite. If it +were indifferent, it would have no more reason to produce that which is +beautiful, than that which is ugly. Therefore nature which produces so +many beautiful objects must in herself possess a very superior beauty. +But as we do not have the habit of seeing the interior of things, which +remains unknown, we attach ourselves only to their exterior, forgetting +that which moves us hides itself within them; and (in this habit of +ours) we resemble (Narcissus[206]), who, on seeing his image, and not +knowing whence it came, would try to catch it. It is not the mass of +an object that constitutes its attractiveness for us, for it is not in +mass that beauty inheres.[207] This is revealed by the beauty found +in the sciences, in the virtues, and in general in the souls, where +it shines more truly and brilliantly on contemplation and admiration +of its inherent wisdom. Then we do not regard the countenance, which +may be ugly; we leave aside the form of the body, to attach ourselves +exclusively to interior beauty. If, carried away by the emotion that +such a spectacle should cause, you should not proclaim its beauty; and +if, on directing your gaze within yourself, you should not experience +all the charm of beauty,[208] then you search for intelligible beauty, +by such a method, would be vain; for you would seek it only with what +is impure and ugly.[209] That is why these discussions are not intended +for all men. But if you have recognized beauty within yourself they you +may rise to the reminiscence (of intelligible beauty). + + +BEAUTY IS THE CREATING PRINCIPLE OF THE PRIMARY REASON. + +3. The reason of the beauty in nature is the archetype of the beauty +of the (bodily) organism. Nature herself, however (is the image +of the) more beautiful archetypal "reason" which resides in the +(universal) Soul, from which it is derived.[210] This latter shines +more brilliantly in the virtuous soul, whenever it develops therein. +It adorns the soul, and imparts to her a light itself derived from +a still higher Light, that is, primary Beauty. The universal Soul's +beauty thus inhering in the individual soul, explains the reason of the +Beauty superior to it, a reason which is not adventitious, and which +is not posited in any thing other than itself, but which dwells within +itself. Consequently it is not a "reason," but really the creating +principle of the primary Reason, that is, the beauty of the soul, which +in respect to the soul plays the part of matter.[211] It is, in the last +analysis, Intelligence, which is eternal and immutable because it is +not adventitious. + + +OUR IMAGE OF INTELLIGENCE IS ONLY A SAMPLE THAT MUST BE PURIFIED. + +What sort of an image does Intelligence then afford? This is a material +question because we know that any image of Intelligence supplied by +anything else would be imperfect. Therefore this image of itself given +by Intelligence also could not be a genuine image; it can be no more +than what is any stray piece of gold in respect to gold in general, +namely, a sample. But if the gold which falls under our perception be +not pure, we have to purify it either by our labor or by our thought, +observing that it can never be gold in general that we can examine, but +gold in particular, considered in an individual mass.[212] Likewise (in +the subject we are studying) our starting-point must be our purified +intelligence, or, if you prefer, the divinities themselves, considering +the kind of intelligence indwelling in them; for they are all venerable +and unimaginably beautiful. To what do they owe their perfection? To +Intelligence, which acts in them with sufficient force to manifest +them. They do not indeed owe it to the beauty of their body; for +their divinity does not consist in the possession of a body[213]; the +divinities therefore owe their character to their intelligence. Now +all divinities are beautiful, because they are not wise at certain +times, and at other times unwise. They possess wisdom by an impassible +intelligence, that is immutable and pure. They know everything; not +indeed human things, but those which are proper to them, the things +which are divine, and all those that intelligence contemplates.[214] + + +DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CELESTIAL AND INFERIOR DIVINITIES. + +Amidst the divinities, those who reside in the visible heaven, having +much leisure, ever contemplate the things existing in the superior +Heaven, but as it were from a distance, and "by raising their +head."[215] On the contrary, those in the superior Heaven, and who +dwell there, dwell there with their whole personality, because they +reside everywhere. Everything on high, namely, earth, sea, plants, +or animals, forms part of the heaven; now all that forms part of the +heaven is celestial. The divinities that dwell there do not scorn +men, nor any of the other essences up there, because all are divine, +and they traverse the whole celestial region without leaving their +rest.[216] + + +DESCRIPTION OF THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. + +4. That is why the divinities in heaven lead an easy life, truth being +mother, nurse, element and food. So they see everything; not the things +which are subject to generation, but those which have the permanence +of being, so that they see themselves in everything else. In this +intelligible world everything is transparent. No shadow limits vision. +All the essences see each other and interpenetrate each other in the +most intimate depth of their nature. Light everywhere meets light. +Every being contains within itself the entire intelligible world, and +also beholds it entire in any particular being. All things there are +located everywhere. Every thing there is all, and all is each thing; +infinite splendor radiates around. Everything is great, for there even +the small is great. This world has its sun and its stars; each star +is a sun, and all suns are stars. Each of them, while shining with +its own due splendor, reflects the light of the others. There abides +pure movement; for He who produces movement, not being foreign to it, +does not disturb it in its production. Rest is perfect, because it +is not mingled with any principle of disturbance. The beautiful is +completely beautiful there, because it does not dwell in that which is +not beautiful (that is, in matter). Each one of the celestial things, +instead of resting on an alien foundation, has its own especial seat, +its origin, and its principle, in its own being, and does not differ +from the region within which it dwells, because it is Intelligence that +is its substrate, and itself is intelligible. + + +THE INTELLIGIBLE COMPARED TO LYNCEUS WHOSE SIGHT PENETRATED ALL. + +In order to conceive this better, we should imagine that this visible +sky is a pure light which begets all the stars. Here below, doubtless, +no one part could be begotten by any other, for each part has its +own individual existence. On the contrary, in the intelligible world +every part is born from the whole, and is simultaneously the whole +and a part; wherever is a part, the whole reveals itself. The fabled +Lynceus, whose glance penetrated the very bowels of the earth, is only +the symbol of the celestial life. There the eye contemplates without +fatigue, and the desire of contemplating is insatiable, because it +does not imply a void that needs filling, or a need whose satisfaction +might bring on disgust. In the intelligible world, the beings do not, +among each other, differ so as that what is proper to the one would +not be proper to the other. Besides, they are all indestructible. +Their insatiability (in contemplation) is to be understood in the +sense that satiety does not make them scorn what satiates them. +The more that each sees, the better he sees; each one follows its +nature in seeing as infinite both itself and the objects that present +themselves to its view. On high, life, being pure, is not laborious. +How indeed could the best life imply fatigue? This life is wisdom +which, being perfectly complete, demands no research. It is primary +wisdom, which is not derived from any other, which is being, and which +is not an adventitious quality of intelligence; consequently there +is none superior to it. In the intelligible world absolute knowledge +accompanies intelligence, because the former accompanies the latter, as +Justice is enthroned by the side of Jupiter.[217] All the essences (or, +beings) in the intelligible Being resemble so many statues which are +visible by themselves, and the vision of which imparts an unspeakable +happiness to the spectators. The greatness and power of wisdom is +revealed in its containing all beings, and in its having produced them. +It is their origin; it is identical with them; it fuses with them; +for wisdom is very being. This we do not easily understand because by +sciences[218] we mean groups of demonstrations and propositions, which +is not true even of our sciences. However, if this point be contested, +let us drop this comparison with our sciences, and return to knowledge +itself, of which Plato[219] says that "it does not show itself +different in different objects." How can that be? Plato left that to +be explained by us, that we might show if we deserve to be called +his interpreters.[220] We shall undertake this interpretation by the +following observation. + + +DEMONSTRATION THAT WISDOM IS VERITABLE BEING, AND THE CONVERSE. + +5. All the productions of nature or art are the works of a certain +wisdom which ever presides over their creation. Art is made possible +only by the existence of this wisdom. The talent of the artist is +derived from the wisdom of nature which presides over the production +of every work. This wisdom is not a sequence of demonstrations, as the +whole of it forms a unity; it is not a plurality reduced to unity, +but a unity which is resolved into a plurality. If we admit that this +wisdom is primary Wisdom, there is nothing to be sought beyond it, +since in this case it is independent of every principle, and is located +within itself. If, on the contrary, we say that nature possesses the +("seminal) reason," and is its principle, we shall have to ask whence +nature derives it.[221] If it be called a superior principle, we +still have to ask the derivation of this principle; if it be derived +from nothing, we need not go beyond it (but return to the above +demonstration). If, on the contrary, it be derived from Intelligence, +we shall have to examine whether Intelligence produced wisdom. The +first objection here will be, how could it have done so? For if +Intelligence itself produced it, Intelligence could not have produced +it without itself being Wisdom. True Wisdom is therefore "being" and, +on the other hand, "being" is wisdom, and derives its dignity from +Wisdom; that is why "being" is veritable "Being." Consequently, the +being (essences) which do not possess wisdom are such beings only +because they were created by a certain wisdom; but they are not true +beings (essences), because they do not in themselves possess Wisdom. +It would, therefore, be absurd to state that the divinities, or the +blessed dwellers in the intelligible world, in that world are engaged +in studying demonstrations. The entities that exist there are beautiful +forms,[222] such as are conceived of as existing within the soul of +the wise man; I do not mean painted forms, but existing (substantial) +forms. That is why the ancients[223] said that ideas are essences and +beings. + + +BY A PUN, EGYPTIAN WISDOM IS ADDUCED AS A SYMBOL. + +6. The sages of Egypt seem to me to have shown either a consummate +insight or a marvellous instinct when, in order to reveal to us their +wisdom, they did not, to express words and propositions, make use of +letters representing sounds and expressions, but symbolized objects by +hieroglyphics,[224] and in their mysteries symbolically designated each +of them by a particular emblem. Thus each hieroglyphic sign constituted +a kind of science or wisdom; and without discursive conception or +analysis places the thing under the eyes in a synthetic manner. Later, +this synthetic notion was reproduced by other signs which developed +it[225] expressing it discursively, declaring the causes of the +constitution of things, wherever their beautiful disposition excited +admiration. The wisdom of the Egyptians is best seen in this, that +though they did not possess the causes of (essential) beings, (their +writing) was able to express everything so as to harmonize with the +causes of essential "Being." + + +RESEMBLANCE OF EARTHLY THINGS TO THE INTELLIGIBLE IS THE BASIS OF THE +RESEMBLANCE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE TO THE EARTHLY. + +If therefore all (celestial) entities resemble earthly objects--a +truth[226] which is perhaps impossible to demonstrate, so much the +more must we, before any examination or discussion, premiss that all +(earthly) objects resemble those which exist in the intelligible world. +This truth, which applies to everything, may perhaps best be understood +by an important example. + + +CONTROVERSY AGAINST THE GNOSTIC DIVINE PLANNING OF THE WORLD. + +7. It is then by all of us agreed that the universe proceeds from a +superior Principle which possesses a certain perfection. The (Gnostic) +question then arises whether this Principle, before creating, reflected +that it was necessary first to form the globe, and to suspend it to +the middle of the world; then, to produce the water, and to spread it +over the surface of the earth; later creating successively the other +things contained in the space between the earth and heaven. Further, +did He give birth to all the animals only after having to Himself +represented all their forms, and exterior parts? Did the Creator +undertake the work only after having conceived the plan of the world +in its totality and in its details? Certainly not; He cannot have +submitted to all such considerations.[227] How could He, never having +seen anything such, have been inclined to them? Neither could He have +borrowed the idea of the things He was to produce, and then carried +them out as some workman, by the use of his hands and feet; for hands +and feet are created entities. The only hypothesis left is that all +things were within some one other thing (that is, matter, which is +their substrate). ("Being") was next to this other thing (matter), +and as no interval separated them, He suddenly begot an image or +representation of Himself, either by Himself, or by the intermediation +of the universal Soul, or of some particular soul--which detail does +not matter to our discussion here. + + +HOW CREATION OF THE WORLD TOOK PLACE. + +Therefore, everything here below derives from above there, and is more +beautiful in the superior world; for forms here below are mingled with +matter; on high, they are pure. Thus this universe proceeds from the +intelligible world, and is contained by the forms from beginning to +end. First matter receives the forms of the elements, later receiving +gradual accessions of other forms, so that ultimately matter becomes so +buried under forms that it becomes difficult to recognize. It receives +forms easily, because it (already) possesses a form which holds the +lowest rank. Likewise, the producing Principle uses a form as model, +and easily produces forms because it consists entirely of "being" +and form; as a result, its work has been easy and universal, because +itself was universal. Therefore it met no obstacle, and still exercises +an absolute sovereignty. Even of the things that act as obstacles to +each other, none, even until the present time, form an obstacle to the +demiurgic (Creator), because He preserves His universality. That is why +I am convinced that if even we were simultaneously the models, forms +and essence of things, and if the form which produces here below were +our essence, (that is, being), we would accomplish our work without +trouble, though man, in his present state here below, produces (his +individual body which is) a form different from himself; indeed, on +becoming an individual, man ceased being universal. But on ceasing +to be an individual, man, in the words of Plato,[228] "soars in the +ethereal region, and governs the whole world." For, becoming universal, +he administers the universe. + + +THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE ADMITS OF NO REASONING, DEMONSTRATION, FAITH OR +CAUSE. + +Returning to our subject, you can perhaps explain why the earth is +located in the middle of the world, and why its form is spherical[229]; +you may clear up why the equator is inclined towards the ecliptic; but +you would be wrong in thinking that the divine Intelligence proposed +to achieve these objects because it judged them to be reasonable; +these things are good only because Intelligence is what it is. Its +work resembles the conclusion of a syllogism, whose premises had been +withdrawn, and that was based on the intuition of its causes. In divine +Intelligence nothing is a consequence, nothing depends on a combination +of means; its plan is conceived independently of such considerations. +Reasoning, demonstration, faith--all these are posterior things. The +mere existence of the principle determines here below the existence +and nature of the entities depending from it. Never is one more right +in asserting that the causes of a principle should not be sought, than +when referring to a Principle which is perfect, and is both principle +and end. That which is simultaneously principle and end is all things +at the same time, and consequently leaves nothing to be desired. + + +IF THIS PRINCIPLE IS NOT BEAUTIFUL, NOTHING ELSE COULD BE THAT. + +8. This Principle is sovereignly beautiful; it is beautiful entirely +and throughout, so that not a single one of its parts lacks beauty. +Who could deny that this Principle is beautiful? Only such as do not +entirely possess beauty, possessing it only partially, or even not at +all. If this Principle were not sovereignly beautiful, surely none +other could claim that distinction. As the superior Principle (the one, +superior to Intelligence) is above beauty, that which first presents +itself to our view, because it is a form, and the object of the +contemplation of intelligence, is that whose aspect is amiable.[230] + + +PLATO SYMBOLIZES THIS BY MAKING THE CREATOR ADMIRE HIS HANDIWORK. + +It was to express this idea strikingly that Plato[231] represents the +demiurgic creator as admiring his handiwork, which would lead us also +to admire the beauty both of the model and of the idea. After all, +admiration of a work made to resemble a model amounts to admiration +of the model itself. However there is no reason for astonishment at +persons to whom this idea seems novel, for lovers, and in general all +those who admire visible beauty do not realize that they admire it only +because (it is the image) of the intelligible beauty.[232] That Plato +referred to the model the admiration felt by the demiurgic (creator) +for his work is proved by his adding to the words "he admired his work" +the expression "and he conceived the purpose of rendering it still more +similar to its model." He betrays the beauty of the model by saying +that the work is beautiful, and that it is the image of the model; +for if this model were not sovereignly beautiful, and did not possess +an unspeakable beauty, how could there be anything more beautiful than +this visible world? It is therefore wrong to criticize this world; all +that can be said of it, is that it is inferior to its model.[233] + + +THE POWER OF THE INFERIOR DIVINITIES DEPENDS ON THEIR INHERING IN THE +SUPREME. + +9. (To explain our view we shall propose an experiment[234]). Let us +imagine that in the sense-world every being should remain as it is, +confusing itself with the others in the unity of the whole, to the +extent of its ability; so that all that we see is lost in this unity. +Imagine a transparent sphere exterior to the spectator, by looking +through which one might see all that it contains, first the sun and +the other stars together, then the sea, the earth, and all living +beings. At the moment of picturing to yourself in thought a transparent +sphere that would contain all moving, resting and changeable things, +preserving the form of this sphere, and without diminishing the size +of it, suppress mass, extent, and material conception. Then invoke +the divinity that created this world of which you have made yourself +an image to invest it. His coming down into it may be conceived of as +resulting from two causes. Either the Divinity that is simultaneously +single and manifold will come to adorn this world in the company of the +other inferior divinities which exist within Him. Each of these would +contain all the others that are manifold because of their powers; and +nevertheless they would form a single divinity because their multiple +powers are contained in unity. Or the Divinity will do this because the +only divinity contains all the inferior divinities within His breast. +(Which is the more likely hypothesis?) + + +ALL THE INFERIOR DIVINITIES ARE CONTAINED WITHIN THE SUPREME. + +Indeed, this only Divinity loses none of His power by the birth of all +the divinities contained within Him. All co-exist, and their individual +distinctions obtain without their occupying separate localities or +affecting a sense-form. Otherwise the one would be here, and the other +there; each one would be individual, without simultaneously being +universal in itself. Neither have they any parts that differ in each of +them, or from each other; neither is the whole formed by each of them +a power divided in a multiplicity of parts, a power whose magnitude +would be measured by the number of its parts. Taken in its universality +the intelligible world possesses a universal Power, which penetrates +everything in its infinite development without exhausting its infinite +force. He is so great that even His parts are infinite. There is no +locality that He does not interpenetrate. Even our world is great; it +likewise contains all the powers; but it would be much better, and its +magnitude would be inconceivable if it did not also contain physical +powers, which are essentially small (because limited). Fire and the +other bodies cannot be called great powers because they consist only +of an image of the infinity of the genuine Power by burning, crushing, +destroying, and contributing to the generation of animals. They +destroy only because they themselves are destroyed; they contribute to +generation only because they themselves are generated. + + +BEING IS DESIRABLE BECAUSE BEAUTIFUL. + +The Power which resides in the intelligible world is pure "being," +but perfectly beautiful "being." Without beauty, what would become +of "being"? Without "being," what would become of beauty? "Being" +itself would be annihilated by the beauty of "being." "Being"[211] is +therefore desirable, it is identical with beauty, and beauty is amiable +because it is "being." Seeing that both are of the same nature, it +would be useless to inquire which is the principle of the other. The +deceptive "being" (of bodies) needs to receive the image borrowed from +beauty to appear beautiful; and in general, to exist; it exists only in +so far as it participates in the beauty found in "being"; the greater +its participation, the more perfect is it, because it appropriates this +beautiful being[235] all the more. + + +VISION OF THE SUPERCELESTIAL. + +10. That is why Jupiter, the most ancient of the other divinities, +whose chief he is, leads them in this divine spectacle of the +contemplation of the intelligible world.[236] He is followed by these +divinities, the guardians, and the souls who can support (the glory +of) this vision. From an invisible place,[237] this divine world sheds +light on all. On rising above its sublime horizon, it scatters its +rays everywhere, inundating everything with clearness. It dazzles all +those who are located at the foot of the peak where it shines; and, +like the sun, it often obliges them to turn away their sight, which +cannot sustain its glory. Some however are forced to raise their eyes, +imparting to them strength for this contemplation; others, who are at +a distance, are troubled. On perceiving it, those who can contemplate +Him fix their gaze on it and all its contents. Not every one, however, +sees in it the same thing. One discerns therein the source and being of +justice; another is overwhelmed by the revelation of wisdom, of which +men here below scarcely possess an enfeebled image. Indeed, our vision +is only an imitation of intelligible wisdom. The latter, spreading +over all beings, and as it were embracing immensity, is the last to be +perceived by those who have already long contemplated these brilliant +lights. + + +PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF THIS VISION. + +Such is the vision seen by the divinities, all together, and each +one separately. It is also beheld by the souls that see all the +things contained within the intelligible world. By this sight, souls +themselves become capable of containing, from beginning to end, all the +entities within their intelligible world; they dwell within it by that +part of theirs which is capable of doing so. Often, even, the whole +of them dwells within it, at least so long as they do not withdraw +therefrom. + + +THIS VISION, WHEN TRANSFERRED WITHIN, BECOMES SWEET AS NECTAR. + +This is what is beheld by Jupiter and by all those of us who share His +love for this revelation. The last thing which then appears is the +beauty that shines in its entirety in the essences (that is, beings), +as well as in those who participate therein. In the intelligible world +everything glows, and beautifies itself by shedding splendor on those +who gaze at it. Thus men who have climbed a high mountain on arriving +at the summit suddenly shine with the golden color reflected by the +ground whereon they stand. Now the color that bathes the intelligible +world is the beauty that blooms within its flower; or rather there +everything is color, everything is beauty, in its most intimate depths; +for beauty, in the intelligible world, is not a flower that blooms +only on the surface. Those who do not apprehend the totality of the +view appreciate the beauty of only that which meets their gaze; but +those who, like men intoxicated with this sweet nectar,[238] are, to +the very soul, penetrated by the beauty of the intelligible world, +are no longer mere spectators. No longer are the contemplated objects +and the contemplated soul two things exterior to each other. If the +soul's gaze is piercing enough, she finds the object she contemplates +within herself. Often she possesses it without knowing it. Then indeed +does she contemplate it as she would contemplate some exterior object, +because she seeks to see it in the same manner. Every time that one +looks at something as a spectacle, it is seen outside of oneself. Now +this spectacle of the intelligible world must be transferred within +oneself, and be contemplated as something with which one has fused, to +the point of identity. Thus a man, possessed by a divinity, whether +by Phoebus or by some Muse, would contemplate this divinity within +himself, if he were at all able to contemplate a divinity. + + +MECHANISM OF THE ECSTASY. + +11. (The ecstasy operates as follows.) When a man is entranced by the +divinity, he loses consciousness of himself. Then when he contemplates +the (divine) spectacle which he possesses within himself, he +contemplates himself and sees his image embellished. However beautiful +it be, he must leave it aside, and concentrate upon the unity, without +dividing any of it. Then he becomes simultaneously one and all with +this divinity which grants him His presence silently. Then is the man +united to the divinity to the extent of his desire and ability. If, +while remaining pure, he return to duality, he remains as close as +possible to the divinity, and he enjoys the divine presence as soon as +he turns towards the divinity. + + +BENEFITS OF THIS CONVERSION TOWARDS THE DIVINITY. + +The advantages derived from this conversion towards the divinity are +first self-consciousness, so long as he remains distinct from the +divinity. If he penetrate into his interior sanctuary, he possesses all +things, and renouncing self-consciousness in favor of indistinction +from the divinity, he fuses with it. As soon as he desires to see +something, so to speak, outside of himself, it is he himself that he +considers, even exteriorly. The soul that studies the divinity must +form an idea of him while seeking to know him. Later, knowing how great +is that divinity to which she desires to unite herself, and being +persuaded that she will find beatitude in this union, she plunges +herself into the depths of the divinity until, instead of contenting +herself with contemplating the intelligible world, she herself becomes +an object of contemplation, and shines with the clearness of the +conceptions whose source is on high. + + +HOW THE SOUL MAY BE UNITED TO THE DIVINITY WITHOUT SEEING HIM. + +But how can one be united to beauty, without seeing it? If it be seen +as some thing distinct from oneself, he is not yet fused with it. If +the act of vision imply a relation with an exterior object, we have +no vision; or, at least, this vision consists in the identity of seer +and seen. This vision is a kind of conscience, of self-consciousness; +and if this feeling be too acute, there is even danger of breaking up +this unity. Besides, one must not forget that the sensations of evils +make stronger impressions, and yield feebler knowledge, because the +latter are frittered away by the force of impressions. Thus sickness +strikes sharply (but arouses only an obscure notion); health, on +the contrary, thanks to the calm that characterizes it, yields us a +clearer notion of itself, for it remains quietly within us, because it +is proper to us, and fuses with us. On the contrary, sickness is not +proper to us, but foreign. Consequently it manifests itself vividly, +because it is opposed to our nature; while we, on the contrary, enjoy +but a feeble feeling of ourselves and of what belongs to us. The state +in which we grasp ourselves best is the one in which our consciousness +of ourselves fuses with us. Consequently on high, at the very moment +when our knowledge by intelligence is at its best, we believe that +we are ignorant of it, because we consult sensation, which assures +us that it has seen nothing. Indeed it has not seen anything, and it +never could see anything such (as the intelligible beings). It is +therefore the sensation that doubts; but he who has the ability to +see differs therefrom. Before the seer could doubt, he would have to +cease believing in his very existence; for he could not, so to speak, +externalize himself to consider himself with the eyes of the body. + + +NATURE OF THE OBJECT OF SPIRITUAL VISION. + +12. We have just said that a man can see, either in differing from what +he sees, or in identifying himself with the object seen. Now, when he +has seen, either as being different, or as being identical, what does +he report? He tells us that he has seen the Divinity beget an offspring +of an incomparable beauty, producing everything in Himself, and without +pain preserving within Himself what He has begotten. In fact, charmed +with the things He has begotten, and full of love for his works, +the Divinity retained them within Himself, congratulating Himself +upon their splendor, as much as upon his own. In the midst of these +beauties, nevertheless inferior to those which have remained within the +nature of the Divinity, alone of all these beings, his Son (Jupiter, +the son of Saturn, here representing the universal Soul born of divine +Intelligence) has manifested himself externally. By him, as by an +image, you may judge of the greatness of his Father, and that of his +brothers still unissued from within their Father's nature. Besides, it +is not in vain that Jupiter tells us that he proceeds from his Father; +for he constitutes another world that has become beautiful, because he +is the image of beauty, and because it is impossible that the image of +beauty and being should not itself be beautiful. Jupiter, therefore, +everywhere imitates his archetype. That is why, because he is an image, +he possesses life and constitutes being; and that is why, because he +proceeds from his Father, he also possesses beauty. He likewise enjoys +the privilege of being the image of his eternity. Otherwise he would +at one time reveal the image of his Father, and at other times he +would not; which is impossible, because he is not an artificial image. +Every natural image remains what it was, so long as its archetype +subsists.[239] It is therefore an error to believe that, while the +intelligible world subsists, the visible world could perish, and that +it was begotten in such a manner as that he who had created it, had +done so with deliberation. Whatever indeed might have been the manner +of operation, these men[240] do not wish to conceive and believe that, +so long as the intelligible world shines, other things that proceed +therefrom could not perish; and that they exist ever since (their +model) existed. But the (intelligible world) has ever existed, and will +ever exist; for (in spite of their impropriety), we are obliged to make +use of such terms to express our thought. + + +SATURN IS SON OF COELUS, AND FATHER OF JUPITER. + +13. (Saturn) is always represented as chained, because He remains +immovable in his identity. It is said he gave up to his son, Jupiter, +the government of the universe, because such (an occupation) did not +suit Him, who possesses the fulness[241] of good things,[242] to +distract himself from the government of the intelligible world to +undertake that of an empire younger and less exalted than himself. +Besides, on one hand, (Saturn) fixed within himself, and raised himself +up to his father (Coelus, or Uranus). On the other hand, he likewise +fixed the inferior things which were begotten by his son (Jupiter). +Between both he (Saturn) therefore occupies a rank intermediary between +his Father, who is more perfect and his son, who is less so. On one +hand he mutilates his Father, by splitting primitive unity into two +different elements. On the other, he raises himself above the being +which is inferior to him, disengaging himself from the chains that +might tend to lower him. As (Coelus), the father of (Saturn), is too +great to admit of having beauty attributed to him, (Saturn) occupies +the first rank of beauty. + + +IF THE WORLD-SOUL AND VENUS BE BEAUTIFUL, HOW MUCH MORE THEIR SOURCE? + +The universal Soul is beautiful also; but she is less beautiful than +(Saturn), because she is his image, and because, however beautiful she +may by nature be, she is still more beautiful when contemplating her +principle. Therefore if the universal Soul--to use clearer terms--and +if even Venus (as subordinate to him, Jupiter), possess beauty, what +must be that of Intelligence? If by their nature the universal Soul and +Venus receive their beauty from some other principle, from whom would +they derive the beauty they intrinsically possess, and that which they +acquire? As to us, we are beautiful when we belong to ourselves; and we +are ugly when we lower ourselves to an inferior nature. Again, we are +beautiful when we know ourselves, and ugly when we ignore ourselves. It +is therefore in the intelligible world that beauty shines and radiates. +Are these considerations sufficient for a clear knowledge of the +intelligible world, or must we engage in a further effort to accomplish +this? + + + + +FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE. + +That Intelligible Entities Are Not External to the Intelligence of the +Good. + +(_The subject of the quarrel between Amelius and Porphyry._[243]) + + +KNOWLEDGE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES IMPLIES THEIR PRESENCE. + +1. Surely, nobody could believe that the veritable and real +Intelligence could be deceived, and admit the existence of things that +do not exist? Its very name guarantees its intelligent nature. It +therefore possesses knowledge without being subject to forgetfulness, +and its knowledge is neither conjectural, doubtful, nor borrowed, +nor acquired by demonstration. Even if we did admit that some of its +knowledge was derived from demonstration, no one will deny that it +possesses certain knowledge from within itself. It would be wiser, +however, to be entirely reasonable and say that it derives everything +from within itself.[244] Without this, it would be difficult to +distinguish what knowledge it derived from itself, and what was +derived from outside. Even the certainty of the knowledge derived +from itself would vanish, and it would lose the right to believe that +things really are such as it imagines. Indeed, though the things whose +knowledge we derive from the senses seem capable of producing in us +the highest evidential value, it may still be asked whether their +apparent nature do not derive more from modifications in us than from +the objects themselves. Even so, belief in them demands[245] assent of +the intelligence, or at least of the discursive reason, for though we +admit that things perceived by the senses exist in sensible objects, +it is none the less recognized that what is perceived by sensation +is only a representation of the exterior object, and that sensation +does not reach to this object itself, since it remains exterior to +sensation.[246] But when intelligence cognizes, and is cognizing +intelligibles, intelligence could never even meet them if they are +cognized as lying outside of Intelligence. One explanation would be +that intelligence does not at all meet them, nor cognize them. If it be +by chance that intelligence meets them, the cognition of them will also +be accidental and transient. The explanation that cognition operates by +union of the intelligence with the intelligible depends on explanation +of the bond that unites them. Under this hypothesis, the cognitions of +the intelligible gathered by intelligence will consist of impressions +(or, types[247]) of reality, and will consequently be only accidental +impressions. Such, however, could not exist in Intelligence; for what +would be their form? As they would remain exterior to Intelligence, +their knowledge would resemble sensation. The only distinction of +this knowledge from sensation would be that intelligence cognizes +more tenuous entities. Intelligence would never know that it really +perceives them. It would never really know for certain that a thing +was good, just or beautiful. In this case the good, just and beautiful +would be exterior and foreign to it; Intelligence, in itself, will +not possess any forms to regulate its judgments, and deserve its +confidence; they, just as much as truth, would remain outside of it. + + +INTELLIGENCE IS ANNIHILATED BY THE THEORY THAT TRUTH IS EXTERNAL TO IT. + +On the other hand, the intelligible entities are either deprived of +feeling, life and intelligence, or they are intelligent. If they +be intelligent, they, like truth, fuse with intelligence into the +primary Intelligence. In this case we shall have to inquire into +the mutual relations of intelligence, intelligible entity, and +truth. Do these constitute but one single entity, or two? What in +the world could intelligible entities be, if they be without life +or intelligence? They are surely neither propositions, axioms, nor +words, because in this case they would be enunciating things different +from themselves, and would not be things themselves; thus, when you +say that the good is beautiful, it would be understood that these +two notions are foreign to each other. Nor can we think that the +intelligibles--for instance, beauty and justice--are entities that +are simple, but completely separate from each other; because the +intelligible entity would have lost its unity, and would no longer +dwell within a unitary subject. It would be dispersed into a crowd +of particular entities, and we would be forced to consider into what +localities these divers elements of the intelligible were scattered. +Besides, how could intelligence embrace these elements and follow +them in their vicissitudes? How could intelligence remain permanent? +How could it fix itself on identical objects? What will be the forms +or figures of the intelligibles? Will they be like statues of gold, +or like images and effigies made of some other material? In this +case, the intelligence that would contemplate them would not differ +from sensation. What would be the differentiating cause that would +make of one justice, and of the other something else? Last, and most +important, an assertion that the intelligible entities are external to +Intelligence would imply that in thus contemplating objects exterior +to itself Intelligence will not gain a genuine knowledge of them, +having only a false intuition of them. Since, under this hypothesis, +true realities will remain exterior to Intelligence, the latter, +while contemplating them, will not possess them; and in knowing them +will grasp only their images. Thus reduced to perceiving only images +of truth, instead of possessing truth itself, it will grasp only +deceptions, and will not reach realities. In this case (intelligence +will be in the dilemma) of either acknowledging that it grasps only +deceptions, and thus does not possess truth; or intelligence will be +ignorant of this, being persuaded it possesses truth, when it really +lacks it. By thus doubly deceiving itself, intelligence will by that +very fact be still further from the truth. That is, in my opinion, the +reason why sensation cannot attain the truth. Sensation is reduced +to opinion[248] because it is a receptive[249] power--as indeed is +expressed by the word "opinion"[250];--and because sensation receives +something foreign, since the object, from which sensation receives what +it possesses remains external to sensation. Therefore, to seek truth +outside of intelligence is to deprive intelligence of truth or verity +of intelligence. It would amount to annihilating Intelligence, and the +truth (which was to dwell within it) will no longer subsist anywhere. + + +THE NOTION OF INTELLIGENCE IMPLIES ITS POSSESSION OF ALL INTELLIGIBLES. + +2. Therefore intelligible entities must not be regarded as exterior to +Intelligence, nor as impressions formed in it. Nor must we deny it the +intimate possession of truth. Otherwise, any cognition of intelligibles +is made impossible, and the reality of both them and Intelligence +itself is destroyed. Intimate possession of all its essences is the +only possible condition that will allow knowledge and truth to remain +within Intelligence, that will save the reality of the intelligibles, +that will make possible the knowledge of the essence of every thing, +instead of limiting us to the mere notion of its qualities, a notion +which gives us only the image and vestige of the object, which does +not permit us to possess it, to unite ourselves with it, to become one +with it. On this condition only, can Intelligence know, and know truly +without being exposed to forgetfulness or groping uncertainty; can it +be the location where truth will abide and essences will subsist; can +it live and think--all of which should belong to this blessed nature, +and without which nowhere could be found anything that deserved our +esteem and respect. On this condition only will Intelligence be able to +dispense with credulity or demonstration in believing realities; for +Intelligence itself consists in these very realities, and possesses +a clear self-consciousness. Intelligence sees that which is its +own principle, sees what is below it, and to what it gives birth. +Intelligence knows that in order to know its own nature, it must not +place credence in any testimony except its own; that it essentially is +intelligible reality. It therefore is truth itself, whose very being +it is to conform to no foreign form, but to itself exclusively. Within +Intelligence fuses both being, and that which affirms its existence; +thus reality justifies itself. By whom could Intelligence be convinced +of error? What demonstration thereof would be of any value? Since there +is nothing truer than truth, any proof to the contrary would depend on +some preceding proof, and while seeming to declare something different, +would in reality be begging the question. + + +SUPREME INTELLIGENCE IS DIVINITY AND SUPREME ROYALTY. + +3. Thus Intelligence, with the essences and truth, form but one and +single nature for us. It forms some great divinity; or rather, it is +not some certain divinity, but total (divinity); for Intelligence +judges it worthy of itself to constitute all these entities. Though +this nature be divine, it is nevertheless but the second divinity[252]; +which manifests itself to us before we see the (supreme divinity, +Unity). Intelligence forms the magnificent throne which (the Supreme) +formed for Himself, and whereon He is seated immovably. For it was not +adequate that something inanimate should either develop within the +breast of the divinity, nor support the supreme Divinity when advancing +towards us. + + +ALLEGORY OF THE ROYAL PROCESSION. + +So great a King deserved to have dazzling beauty as the (ostentatious) +van of his (royal) procession. In the course of rising towards Him are +first met the things which by their inferior dignity are classed among +the first ranks of the procession; later those that are greater and +more beautiful; around the king stand those that are truly royal, while +even those that follow Him are of value. Then, after all these things, +suddenly breaks in upon our view the King himself; and we who have +remained behind after the departure of those who were satisfied with a +view of the preliminaries, fall down and worship. A profound difference +distinguishes the great King from all that precedes Him. But it must +not be supposed that He governs them as one man governs another. He +possesses the most just and natural sovereignty. He possesses real +royalty because He is the King of truth. He is the natural master of +all these beings that He has begotten, and which compose His divine +body-guard. He is the king of the king and of the kings,[253] and is +justly called Father of the divinities. Jupiter himself (who is the +universal Soul), imitates Him in this respect that he does not stop at +the contemplation of his father, (who is Intelligence), and he rises to +the actualization of his grandfather,[254] and he penetrates into the +hypostatic substance of His being.[255] + + +THE COURSE UPWARDS IS ONE OF UNIFICATION. + +4. It has already been said that we must rise to the Principle which +is really one, and not one in the same way as are other things, which, +being in themselves multiple, are one only by participation. On the +contrary, that Principle is not one by participation, as are all those +things which (being neutral) would just as lief be multiple as one. +We have also said that Intelligence and the intelligible world, are +more unitary than the remainder, that they approach Unity more than +all other things, but that they are not purely one. To the extent of +our ability we are now going to examine in what the Principle which is +purely one consists, purely and essentially, and not (accidentally) +from without. + + +THE THEORY OF THE UNIQUE; THE PAIR; AND THE GROUP. + +Rising therefore to the One, we must add nothing to Him; we must +rest in Him, and take care not to withdraw from Him, and fall into +the manifold. Without this precaution there will be an occurrence of +duality,[256] which cannot offer us unity, because duality is posterior +to Unity. The One cannot be enumerated along with anything, not +even with uniqueness (the monad), nor with anything else. He cannot +be enumerated in any way; for He is measure, without Himself being +measured; He is not in the same rank with other things, and cannot be +added to other things (being incommensurable). Otherwise, He would +have something in common with the beings along with which He would be +enumerated; consequently, He would be inferior to this common element, +while on the contrary He must have nothing above Him (if He is to be +the one first Being). Neither essential (that is, intelligible) Number, +nor the lower number which refers to quantity, can be predicated of +the unique; I repeat, neither the essential intelligible Number, whose +essence is identical with thought, nor the quantative number, which, +because all number is quantity, constitutes quantity concurrently with, +or independently of other genera.[257] Besides, quantative number, by +imitating the former (essential intelligible) Numbers in their relation +to the Unique, which is their principle, finds its existence in its +relation to real Unity, which it neither shares nor divides. Even +when the dyad (or "pair") is born, (it does not alter) the priority +of the Monad (or Uniqueness). Nor is this Uniqueness either of the +unities that constitute the pair, nor either of them alone; for why +should it be one of them rather than the other? If then the Monad or +Uniqueness be neither of the two unities which constitute the pair, it +must be superior to them, and though abiding within itself, does not +do so. In what then do these unities differ from the Uniqueness (or +Monad)? What is the unity of the "pair"? Is the unity formed by the +"pair" the same as that which is contained in each of the two unities +constituting the "pair"? The unities (which constitute the "pair") +participate in the primary Unity, but differ from it. So far as it is +one, the "pair" also participates in unity, but in different ways; for +there is no similarity between the unity of a house and the unity of +an army. In its relation to continuity, therefore, the "pair" is not +the same so far as it is one, and so far as it is a single quantity. +Are the unities contained in a group of five in a relation to unity +different from that of the unities contained in a group of ten? (To +answer this we must distinguish two kinds of unity.) The unity which +obtains between a small and a great ship, and between one town and +another, and between one army and another, obtains also between these +two groups of five and of ten. A unity which would be denied as between +these various objects would also have to be denied as obtaining between +these two groups. (Enough of this here); further considerations will be +studied later. + + +PUNS ABOUT VESTA, TAKEN FROM THE CRATYLUS OF PLATO. + +5. Returning to our former assertion that the First ever remains +identical, even though giving birth to other beings, the generation of +numbers may be explained by the immanence of Unity, and by the action +of another principle which forms them, as images of unity. So much +the more must the Principle superior to beings be immanent Unity; but +here it is the First himself who begets the beings, and not another +principle who produces beings in the image of the First while this +First would abide within Himself. Likewise the form of unity, which +is the principle of numbers, exists within all in different degrees, +because the numbers posterior to unity participate therein unequally. +Likewise, the beings inferior to the First contain something of His +nature, which something constitutes their form. Numbers derive their +quantity from their participation in unity. Likewise here beings owe +their being to their containing the trace of the One, so that their +being is the trace of the One.[258] Not far from the truth would we +be in holding that essence, which is the (more common or) plainer +nomenclature of being,[259] is derived from the word "hen," which +means one. Indeed essence proceeded immediately from the One,[273] and +has differentiated from Him but very little. Turning towards its own +basis, it has settled, and both became and is the "being" of all. When +a man pronounces essence ("on"), and emphasizes it, he unconsciously +approximates the sound meaning one ("hen"), demonstrating that essence +proceeds from unity, as indeed is indicated, so far as possible, by +the word "on," which means essence. That is why "being" ("ousia") and +essence ("einai"[260]) imitate so far as they can the principle of the +Power from which they have emanated. The human mind, observing these +similarities, and guided by their contemplation,[261] imitated what it +grasped by uttering the words "on,"[262] "einai,"[263] "ousia,"[264] +and "hestia."[265] Indeed, these sounds try to express the nature of +what has been begotten by unity, by means of the very effort made by +the speaker so as to imitate as well as possible the generation of +being. + + +THE SUPREME NAMED APOLLO.[266] + +6. Whatever be the value of these etymologies, as begotten being is a +form--for it would be impossible to give any other designation to that +which has been begotten by the One--as it is, not a particular form, +but all form, without exception, it evidently results that the One +is formless. As it possesses no form, it cannot be "being," for this +must be something individual, or determinate. Now the One could not +be conceived of as something determined; for then He would no longer +be a principle; He would only be the determined thing attributed to +Him. If all things be in that which has been begotten, none of them +could be unity. If the One be none of them, He cannot be what is above +them; consequently, as these things are "essences and essence," the +One must be above essence. Indeed, the mere statement that the One is +above essence, does not imply any determinateness on His part, affirms +nothing concerning Him and does not even undertake to give Him a name. +It merely states that He is not this or that. It does not pretend to +embrace Him, for it would be absurd to attempt to embrace an infinite +nature. Mere attempt to do so would amount to withdrawing from Him, and +losing the slight trace of Him thereby implied. To see intelligible +Being, and to contemplate that which is above the images of the +sense-objects, none of these must remain present to the mind. Likewise, +to contemplate Him who is above the intelligible, even all intelligible +entities must be left aside to contemplate the One. In this manner we +may attain knowledge of His existence, without attempting to determine +what He is. Besides, when we speak of the One, it is not possible to +indicate His nature without expressing its opposite.[267] It would +indeed be impossible to declare what is a principle of which it is +impossible to say that it is this or that. All that we human beings can +do is to have doubts poignant enough to resemble pangs of childbirth. +We do not know how to name this Principle. We merely speak of the +unspeakable, and the name we give Him is merely (for the convenience +of) referring to Him as best we can. The name "One" expresses no more +than negation of the manifold. That is why the Pythagoreans[268] +were accustomed, among each other, to refer to this principle in a +symbolic manner, calling him Apollo,[269] which name means denial of +manifoldness. An attempt to carry out the name of "One" in a positive +manner would only result in a greater obscuration of the name and +object, than if we abstained from considering the name of "One" as the +proper name of the first Principle. The object of the employment of +this name is to induce the mind that seeks the first Principle first +to give heed to that which expresses the greatest simplicity, and +consequently to reject this name which has been proposed as only the +best possible. Indeed, this name is not adequate to designate this +nature, which can neither be grasped by hearing, nor be understood by +any who hears it named. If it could be grasped by any sense, it would +be by sight; though even so there must be no expectation of seeing any +form; for thus one would not attain the first Principle. + + +TWO METHODS OF SIGHT; THE FORM, AND THE LIGHT. + +7. When intelligence is in actualization it can see in two ways, as +does the eye.[274] First, the eye may see the form of the visible +object; second, it may see the light by which this object is seen. +This light itself is visible, but it is different from the form of +the object; it reveals the form and is itself seen with this form, to +which it is united. Consequently it itself is not seen distinctly, +because the eye is entirely devoted to the illuminated object. When +there is nothing but light, it is seen in an intuitive manner, though +it be still united to some other object. For if it were isolated from +every other thing, it could not be perceived. Thus the light of the +sun would escape our eye if its seat were not a solid mass. My meaning +will best appear by considering the whole sun as light. Then light +will not reside in the form of any other visible object, and it will +possess no property except that of being visible; for other visible +objects are not pure light. Likewise in intellectual intuition (sight +of the mind) intelligence sees intelligible objects by means of the +light shed on them by the First; and the Intelligence, while seeing +these objects, really sees intelligible light. But, as Intelligence +directs its attention to the enlightened object, it does not clearly +see the Principle that enlightens them. If, on the contrary, it forget +the objects it sees, in the process of contemplating only the radiance +that renders them visible, it sees both the light itself, and its +Principle. But it is not outside of itself that that Intelligence +contemplates intelligible light. It then resembles the eye which, +without considering an exterior and foreign light, before even +perceiving it, is suddenly struck by a radiance which is proper to it, +or by a ray which radiates of itself, and which appears to it in the +midst of obscurity. The case is still similar when the eye, in order to +see no other objects, closes the eye-lids, so as to draw its light from +itself; or when, pressed by the hand, it perceives the light which it +possesses within itself. Then, without seeing anything exterior the eye +sees, even more than at any other moment, for it sees the light. The +other objects which the eye heretofore saw, though they were luminous, +were not light itself. Likewise, when Intelligence, so to speak, closes +its eye to the other objects, concentrating in itself, and seeing +nothing, it sees not a foreign light that shines in foreign forms, but +its own light which suddenly radiates interiorly, with a clear radiance. + + +INTELLIGIBLE LIGHT, NOT BEING SPATIAL, HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH PLACE. + +8. When intelligence thus perceives this divine light, it is impossible +to discern whence this light comes, from within or from without; for +when it has ceased shining the subject first thinks that it came from +within, and later that it came from without. But it is useless to seek +the source of this light, for no question of location can be mooted +in connection with it. Indeed, it could neither withdraw from us, nor +approach us; it merely appears, or remains hidden. Therefore it cannot +be sought; we must restfully wait till it appears, while preparing +ourselves to contemplate it, just as the eye awaits the rising of +the sun which appears above the horizon, or, as the poets say, which +springs up from the ocean. + + +GOD ARISES ABOVE THE HORIZON OF INTELLIGENCE. + +Whence rises He whose image is our sun? Above what horizon must +He rise, or appear, to enlighten us? He must appear above the +contemplating Intelligence. Thus, Intelligence must remain immovable +in contemplation, concentrated and absorbed in the spectacle of pure +beauty which elevates and invigorates it. Then Intelligence feels +that it is more beautiful and more brilliant, merely because it has +approached the First. The latter does not come, as might be thought; +He comes without really coming, in the proper sense of the word; He +appears without coming from any place, because He is already present +above all things before Intelligence approaches Him. In fact, it +is Intelligence which approaches and withdraws from the First; it +withdraws when it does not know where it should be, or where is +the First. The First is nowhere; and if Intelligence could also be +nowhere--I do not wish to say "in no place," for itself is outside +of all place, that is, absolutely nowhere--it would always perceive +the First; or rather, it would not perceive Him, it would be within +the First, and fusing with Him. By the mere fact that Intelligence +is intelligence, it perceives the First only by that part of itself +which is not intelligence (that is, which is above Intelligence). It +doubtless seems surprising that the One could be present to us without +approaching us; and be everywhere, though being nowhere. This surprise +is based on the weakness of our nature; but the man who knows the +First would much more likely be surprised were the state of affairs +different. It cannot indeed be otherwise. Wonder at it, if you please; +but what has been said nevertheless represents the real state of the +case. + + +OMNIPRESENCE IS EXPLAINED BY POSSESSION OF ALL THINGS WITHOUT BEING +POSSESSED BY THEM. + +9. All that is begotten by anything else resides either in the +begetting Principle, or in some other being, in the case of the +existence of any being after or below the generating principle; for +that which was begotten by something else, and which, to exist, needs +something else, needs something else everywhere, and must consequently +be contained within something else. It is therefore natural that the +things which contain the last rank should be contained in the things +which precede them immediately, and that the superior things should +be contained in those which occupy a still more elevated rank, and +so on till the first Principle. As there is nothing above Him, He +could not be contained within anything. Since He is not contained in +anything, and as each other thing is contained in the one immediately +preceding it, the first Principle contains all the other beings; He +embraces them without sharing Himself with them, and possesses them +without being shared by them. Since He possesses them without being +possessed by them, He is everywhere; for, unless He be present, He +does not possess; on the other hand, if He be not possessed, He is not +present. Consequently He both is, and is not present in this sense +that, not being possessed, He is not present; and that, finding Himself +independent of everything, He is not hindered from being nowhere. If +indeed He were hindered from being somewhere, He would be limited +by some other principle, and the things beneath Him could no longer +participate in Him; consequently the divinity would be limited, He +would no longer exist within Himself, and would depend from inferior +beings. All things contained within anything else are in the principle +from which they depend. It is the contrary with those which are +nowhere; there is no place where they are not. If indeed there be a +place lacking the divinity, evidently this place must be embraced +by some other divinity, and the divinity is in some other; whence, +according to this hypothesis, it is false that the divinity is nowhere. +But as, on the contrary, it is true that the divinity is nowhere, and +false that He is anywhere, because He could not be contained in any +other divinity, the result is that the divinity is not distant from +anything. If then He, being nowhere, be not distant from anything, then +He will in himself be everywhere. One of his parts will not be here, +while another is there; the whole of Him will not be only in one or +another place. The whole of Him will therefore be everywhere; for there +is no one thing which exclusively possesses Him, or does not possess +Him; everything is therefore possessed by Him. Look at the world: as +there is no other world but Him, He is not contained in a world, nor +in any place. No place, indeed, could exist anteriorly to the world. +As to its parts, they depend from it, and are contained within it. The +Soul is not contained in the world; on the contrary, it is the Soul +that contains the world; for the locus of the Soul is not the body, but +Intelligence. The body of the world is therefore in the Soul, the Soul +in Intelligence, and Intelligence itself in some other Principle. But +this Principle Himself could not be (contained) in any other principle, +from which He would depend; He is therefore not within anything, and +consequently He is nowhere. Where then are the other things? They +are in the first Principle. He is therefore not separated from other +things, nor is He in them; there is nothing that possesses Him, on the +contrary, it is He who possesses all. That is why He is the good of all +things, because all things exist by Him, and are related to Him each in +a different manner. That is why there are things which are better, one +than the other; for some exist more intensely than others (in relation +with the Good). + + +THE MANNER OF PERCEIVING THE SUPREME. + +10. Do not seek to see this Principle by the aid of other things; +otherwise, instead of seeing Him himself, you will see no more than His +image. Try rather to conceive the nature of the Principle that must be +grasped in Himself, that is, pure and without any admixture, because +all beings participate in Him, without any of them possessing Him. No +other thing indeed could be such as He; but nevertheless such a Being +must exist. Who indeed could all at once embrace the totality of the +power of this Principle? If a being did so, how could this being differ +from Him? Would the being limit itself to embracing only a part of Him? +You might grasp this Principle by an intuitive, simple intellection, +but you will not be able to represent Him to yourself in His totality. +Otherwise it is you who would be the thinking intelligence, if indeed +you have reached that principle; but He is more likely to flee you, +or more likely still, you will flee from Him. When you consider the +divinity, consider Him in His totality. When you think Him, know that +what you remember of Him is the Good; for He is the cause of the +wise intellectual life, because He is the power from which life and +intelligence proceed. He is the cause of "being" and essence, because +He is one; He is simple and first, because He is principle. It is from +Him that everything proceeds. It is from Him that the first movement +proceeds, without being in Him; it is from Him also that proceeds the +first rest, because He himself has no need of it; He himself is neither +in movement nor rest; for He has nothing in which He could rest or +move. By His relation to what, towards what, or in what could He move +or rest? Neither is He limited, for by what could He be limited? +Neither is He infinite in the manner suggested by an enormous mass; +for whither would He have any need of extending Himself? Would He do +so to get something? But He has need of nothing! It is His power that +is infinite. He could neither change nor lack anything; for the beings +which lack nothing owe this to Him only. + + +PROGRESS TOWARDS HIM IS WAKENING TO TRUE REALITY. + +11. The first Principle is infinite because He is one, and nothing in +Him could be limited by anything whatever. Being one, He is not subject +to measure or number. He is limited neither by others nor by Himself, +since He would thus be double. Since He has neither parts nor form, +He has no figure. Not by mortal eyes therefore must you seek to grasp +this principle such as reason conceives of Him. Do not imagine that He +could be seen in the way that would be imagined by a man who believes +that everything is perceived by the senses, and thus annihilate the +principle which is the supreme reality. The things to which the +common people attribute reality do not possess it; for that which has +extension has less reality (than that which has no extension); now the +First is the principle of existence, and is even superior to "being." +You must therefore admit the contrary of that which is asserted by +those commonplace persons; otherwise, you will be deprived of the +divinity. You would resemble such men as in the sacred festivals gorge +themselves with the foods from which one should abstain on approaching +the divinities, and who, regarding this enjoyment as more certain than +the contemplation of the divinity whose festival is being celebrated, +depart without having participated in the mysteries. Indeed as the +divinity does not reveal Himself in these mysteries, these gross men +doubt His existence, because they consider real only what is visible +by the physical eyes. Thus people who would spend their whole life in +slumber would consider as certain and real the things they would see in +their dreams; if they were to be waked and forced to open their eyes, +they would place no credence in the testimony of their eyes, and would +plunge themselves again into their somnolence. + + +THE GOOD IS SUPERIOR TO THE BEAUTIFUL, AND IS COGNIZED BY THE MIND AS +ITS SENSE. + +12. We should not seek to perceive an object otherwise than by the +faculty that is suitable to cognize it. Thus colors are perceived by +the eyes, sounds by the ears, and other qualities by other senses. +Analogy would assign to intelligence its proper function, so that +thinking should not be identified with seeing and hearing. To act +otherwise would be to resemble a man who would try to perceive colors +by the ears, and who would deny the existence of sounds because he +could not see them. We must never forget that men have forgotten the +Principle which from the beginning until this day has excited their +desires and wishes. Indeed all things aspire to the first Principle, +tend thither by a natural necessity, and seem to divine that they +could not exist without Him. The notion of the beautiful is given only +to souls that are awake, and that already possess some knowledge; +at sight of Him they are simultaneously dazed with His sublimity, +and spurred on by love.[270] From His very origin, on the contrary, +the Good excites in us an innate desire; He is present with us even +in sleep; His view never dazes us with stupor, because He is always +with us. Enjoyment of His presence demands neither reminiscence nor +attention, because one is not deprived thereof even in sleep. When the +love of the beautiful overwhelms us, it causes us anxieties, because +the sight of the beautiful makes us desire it. As the love excited +by the beautiful is only secondary, and as it exists only in such +persons as possess already some knowledge, the beautiful evidently +occupies only the second rank. On the contrary, the desire of the Good +is more original, and demands no preliminary knowledge. That surely +demonstrates that the Good is anterior and superior to the beautiful. +Besides, all men are satisfied as soon as they possess the Good; they +consider that they have reached their goal. But not all think that the +beautiful suffices them; they think that the beautiful is beautiful +for itself, rather than for them; as the beauty of an individual is +an advantage only for himself. Last, the greater number of people are +satisfied with seeming beautiful, even if they are not so in reality; +but they are not satisfied with seeming to possess the Good, which +they desire to possess in reality. Indeed, all desire to have that +which occupies the front rank; but they struggle, they engage in +rivalry about the beautiful in the opinion that it is born just as +they are (from development of circumstances). They resemble a person +who would claim equality with another person who holds the first rank +after the king, because both depend from the king; such a person does +not realize that though both are subject to the king, yet there is a +great difference in hierarchical rank between them[271]; the cause of +this error is that both participate in a same principle, that the One +is superior to both of them, and that lastly the Good has no need of +the beautiful, while the beautiful is in need of the Good.[272] The +Good is sweet, calm, and full of delights; we enjoy it at will. On the +contrary, the beautiful strikes the soul with amazement, agitates it, +and mingles pains with pleasures. In spite of ourselves we are thereby +often separated from the Good, like a beloved object separates a son +from the father. The Good is more ancient than the beautiful, not in +time, but in reality; besides, it exerts superior power, because it is +unlimited. That which is inferior to it, possesses only an inferior and +dependent power, instead of having a limitless power (as belongs to +Intelligence, which is inferior to the Good). The Divinity therefore +is master of the power which is inferior to His own; He has no need of +things that are begotten; for it is from Him that all their contents +are derived. Besides, He had no need of begetting; He still is such as +He was before; nothing would have been changed for Him if He had not +begotten; if it had been possible for other things to receive existence +(independently of Himself) He would not have opposed it through +jealousy. It is now no longer possible for anything to be begotten, +for the divinity has begotten all that He could beget. Nor is He the +universality of things, for thus He would stand in need of them. Raised +above all things, He has been able to beget them, and to permit them to +exist for themselves by dominating all. + + +THE SUPREMACY OF THE GOOD IMPLIES HE IS SUPERIOR TO ALL POSSESSIONS. + +13. Being the Good Himself, and not simply something good, the Divinity +cannot possess anything, not even the quality of being good. If He +possessed anything, this thing would either be good, or not good; +now in the principle which is good in Himself and in the highest +degree, there cannot be anything which is not good. On the other hand, +the statement that the Good possesses the quality of being good is +impossible. Since therefore (the Good) can possess neither the quality +of being good, or of not being good, the result is that He cannot +possess anything; that He is unique, and isolated from everything +else. As all other things either are good without being the Good, or +are not good, and as the Good has neither the quality of being good, +or of not being good, He has nothing, and this is the very thing that +constitutes His goodness. To attribute to Him anything, such as being, +intelligence, or beauty, would be to deprive Him of the privilege of +being the Good. Therefore when we deprive Him of all attributes, when +we affirm nothing about Him, when one does not commit the error of +supposing anything within Him, He is left as simple essence, without +attribution of things He does not possess. Let us not imitate those +ignorant panegyrists who lower the glory of those they praise by +attributing to them qualities inferior to their dignity, because they +do not know how to speak properly of the persons they are trying to +praise. Likewise, we should not attribute to the Divinity any of the +things beneath and after Him; we should recognize Him as their eminent +cause, but without being any of them. The nature of the Good consists +not in being all things in general, nor in being any of them in +particular. In this case, indeed, the Good would form no more than one +with all beings; consequently, He would differ from them only by His +own character; that is, by some difference, or by the addition of some +quality. Instead of being one, He would be two things, of which the +one--namely, what in Him was common with the other beings--would not be +the Good, while the other would be the Good (and would leave all beings +evil). Under this hypothesis, He would be a mixture of good and of not +good; he would no longer be the pure and primary Good. The primary Good +would be that in which the other thing would particularly participate, +a participation by virtue of which it would become the good. This thing +would be the good only by participation, whilst that in which it would +participate would be nothing in particular; which would demonstrate +that the good was nothing in particular. But if, in the principle under +discussion, the good be such--that is, if there be a difference whose +presence gives the character of goodness to the composite--this good +must derive from some other principle which must be the Good uniquely +and simply. Such a composite, therefore, depends on the pure and simple +Good. Thus the First, the absolute Good, dominates all beings, is +uniquely the Good, possesses nothing within Himself, is mingled with +nothing, is superior to all things, and is the cause of all things. The +beautiful and that which is "being" could not derive from evil, or from +indifferent principles; for the cause being more perfect, is always +better than its effects. + + + + +SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK NINE. + +Against the Gnostics; or, That the Creator and the World are Not +Evil.[275] + + +THE SUPREME PRINCIPLES MUST BE SIMPLE AND NOT COMPOUND. + +1. We have already seen[276] that the nature of the Good is simple and +primary, for nothing that is not primary could be simple. We have also +demonstrated that the nature of the Good contains nothing in itself, +but is something unitary, the very nature of the One; for in itself +the One is not some thing to which unity could be added, any more than +the Good in itself is some thing to which goodness could be added. +Consequently, as both the One and the Good are simplicity itself, when +we speak of the One and the Good, these two words express but one and +the same nature; they affirm nothing, and only represent it to us so +far as possible. This nature is called the First, because it is very +simple, and not composite; it is the absolute as self-sufficient, +because it is not composite; otherwise it would depend on the things +of which it was composed. Neither is it predicable of anything (as an +attribute in a subject) for all that is in another thing comes from +something else. If then this nature be not in anything else, nor is +derived from anything else, if it contain nothing composite, it must +not have anything above it. + + +THE ONLY SUPREME PRINCIPLES MUST THEN BE UNITY, INTELLIGENCE AND SOUL. + +Consequently there are no principles other (than the three divine +hypostatic substances); and the first rank will have to be assigned +to Unity, the second to Intelligence, as the first thinking +principle,[277] and the third to the Soul. Such indeed is the natural +order, which admits of no further principles, in the intelligible +world. If less be claimed, it is because of a confusion between the +Soul and Intelligence, or Intelligence with the First; but we have +often pointed out their mutual differences.[278] The only thing left +is to examine if there might not be more than these three hypostatic +substances; and in this case, what their nature might be. + + +THE ARISTOTELIAN DISTINCTION OF POTENTIALITY AND ACTUALITY IS NOT +APPLICABLE TO DIVINITY. + +The Principle of all things, such as we have described it, is the +most simple and elevated possible. The (Gnostics) are wrong in +distinguishing within that (supreme Principle[279]) potentiality +from actualization[280]; for it would be ridiculous to seek to apply +to principles that are immaterial and are actualizations, that +(Aristotelian) distinction, and thus to increase the number (of the +divine hypostatic substances.[281]) + + +THE DISTINCTION OF REST AND MOVEMENT ALSO INAPPLICABLE. + +Neither could we, below the Supreme, distinguish two intelligences, one +at rest, and the other in motion.[282] We should have to define the +resting of the First, and the movement or utterance[283] of the second. +The inaction of the one and the action of the other would be equally +mysterious. By its being (or, nature), Intelligence is eternally and +identically a permanent actualization. To rise to Intelligence and to +move around it is the proper function of the soul. + + +AN INTERMEDIARY LOGOS (OR AEON JESUS), ALSO UNACCOUNTABLE. + +Reason (logos) which descends from Intelligence into the Soul, and +intellectualizes her, does not constitute a nature distinct from the +Soul and Intelligence, and intermediary between them. + + +CONSCIOUSNESS IS UNITARY THOUGH CONTAINING THINKER, OBJECT AND THOUGHT. + +Nor should we admit the existence of several intelligences, merely +because we distinguish a thinker from a consciousness of the thinker. +Though there be a difference between thinking, and thinking that +one thinks, these two nevertheless constitute a single intuitive +consciousness of its actualizations. It would be ridiculous to deny +such a consciousness to veritable Intelligence. It is therefore +the same Intelligence that thinks, and that thinks that it thinks. +Otherwise there would be two principles, of which the one would have +thought, and the other consciousness of thought. The second would +doubtless differ from the first, but would not be the real thinking +principle. A mere logical distinction between thought and consciousness +of thought would not establish the (actual) differences between two +(hypostatic substances). Further, we shall have to consider whether +it be possible to conceive of an Intelligence which would exclusively +think, without any accompanying consciousness of its thought.[284] +If we ourselves who are entirely devoted to practical activity and +discursive reason were in such a condition,[285] we would, even if +otherwise considered sensible, be insane. But as true Intelligence +thinks itself in its thoughts, and as the intelligible, far from +being outside of Intelligence, is Intelligence itself, Intelligence, +by thinking, possesses itself, and necessarily sees itself.[286] When +Intelligence sees itself, it does not see itself as unintelligent, +but as intelligent. Therefore in the first actualization of thought, +Intelligence has the thought and consciousness of thought, two things +that form but a single one; not even logically is this a duality. If +Intelligence always thinks what it is, is there any reason to separate, +even by a simple logical distinction, thought from the consciousness +of thought? The absurdity of the doctrine we are controverting will be +still more evident if we suppose that a third intelligence is conscious +that the second intelligence is conscious of the thought of the first; +we might thus go on to infinity.[287] + + +A DIFFERENTIATED REASON WOULD DEPRIVE THE SOUL OF CONSCIOUSNESS. + +Last, if we suppose that Reason is derived from Intelligence, and then +from reason in the soul derive another reason which would be derived +from Reason in itself, so as to constitute a principle intermediary +between Intelligence and Soul, the Soul would be deprived of the +power of thought. For thus the Soul, instead of receiving reason from +Intelligence, would receive reason from an intermediary principle. +Instead of possessing Reason itself, the Soul would possess only an +adumbration of Reason; the Soul would not know Intelligence, and would +not be able to think.[288] + + +NO MORE THAN THREE PRINCIPLES ADMITTED BECAUSE OF THE UNITY OF +CONSCIOUSNESS. + +2. In the intelligible world, therefore, we shall not recognize more +than three principles (Unity, Intelligence, and Soul), without those +superfluous and incongruous fictions. We shall insist that there is a +single Intelligence that is identical, and immutable, which imitates +its Father so far as it can. Then there is our soul, of which one +part ever remains among the intelligibles, while one part descends to +sense-objects, and another abides in an intermediary region.[289] As +our soul is one nature in several powers, she may at times entirely +rise to the intelligible world, with the best part of herself and of +essence; at other times the soul's lower part allows itself to be +dragged down to the earth, carrying with it the intermediate portion; +for the soul cannot be entirely dragged down.[290] This being dragged +down occurs only because the soul does not abide in the better +region.[291] While dwelling in it, the Soul, which is not a part (of +it) and of which we are not a part,[292] has given to the body of the +universe all the perfections of which she was capable. The Soul governs +it by remaining quiet, without reasoning, without having to correct +anything. With wonderful power she beautifies the universe by the +contemplation of the intelligible world. The more the Soul attaches +herself to contemplation, the more powerful and beautiful she is; what +she receives from above, she communicates to the sense-world, and +illuminates because she herself is always illuminated (by Intelligence). + + +THE WORLD AS ETERNALLY BEGOTTEN--GOD'S NEED TO GIVE. + +3. Thus the Soul, ever being illuminated, in turn herself illuminates +lower things that subsist only through her, like plants that feed on +dew, and which participate in life, each according to its capacity. +Likewise a fire heats the objects that surround it, each in proportion +to its nature. Now if such is the effect of fire whose power is +limited, while intelligible beings exert unlimited powers, how would +it be possible for these beings to exist without causing anything to +participate in their nature? Each of them must therefore communicate +some degree of its perfection to other beings. The Good would no longer +be the good, Intelligence would no longer be intelligence, the Soul +would no longer be soul, if, beneath that which possesses the first +degree of life, there was not some other thing which possessed the +second degree of life, and which subsisted only so long as subsists +He who occupies the first rank. It is therefore unavoidable that all +things (inferior to the First) must always exist in mutual dependence, +and that they be begotten, because they derive their existence from +some other source. They were not begotten at a definite moment. When +we affirm that they are begotten, we should say, they were begotten, +or, they shall be begotten. Nor will they be destroyed, unless they +are composed of elements in which they could be dissolved. Those +that are indissoluble will not perish. It may be objected that they +could be resolved into matter. But why should matter also not be +liable to be destroyed? If it were granted that matter was liable to +destruction, there was no necessity for its existence.[293] It may +be further objected that the existence of matter necessarily results +from the existence of other principles. In this case, this necessity +still subsists. If matter is to be considered as isolated (from the +intelligible world), then the divine principles also, instead of being +present everywhere,[294] will, as it were, be walled up in a limited +place.[295] But if the latter be impossible, then must matter be +illuminated (by the intelligible world). + + +BY A PUN ON INCLINATION, PLOTINOS SHOWS THAT THE WORLD-SOUL COULD +NOT HAVE GONE THROUGH THE DRAMA OF CREATION ATTRIBUTED TO SOPHIA AND +ACHAMOTH. + +4. But in that case, the Soul created only because[296] she had lost +her wings. The universal Soul, however, could not have been subject to +such an accident. Those (Gnostics) who claim that she committed a fault +should explain the nature of that fault.[297] Why did this fall occur? +If she fell from all eternity, she must similarly remain in her fault; +if only at a determinate time, why not earlier? We however believe +that the Soul created the world not by inclining (towards matter), but +rather because she did not incline towards it. Thus to incline towards +matter the Soul would have forgotten the intelligible entities; but if +she had forgotten them, she could not have created the world (using +them as models). From what (models) would the soul have created the +world? She must have formed it according to the intelligible models +she had contemplated above. If she remembered them while creating, she +had not inclined (away from them towards matter). Neither did the Soul +have an obscure notion of the intelligibles; otherwise she would have +inclined herself towards them, to get a clear intuition of them. For if +she kept some memory of the intelligible world, why would she not have +wished to reascend therein? + + +MOST GENERALLY ASSIGNED MOTIVES OF CREATION ARE RIDICULOUS, OR WORSE. + +Besides, what advantage could the (world-Soul) have imagined she +was gaining by creating the world? That she did so in order to be +honored[298] seems unworthy, for it would be attributing to her the +desires of a sculptor. Another theory is that the (world-Soul) created +the world by virtue of a rational conception, and she thus exercised +her power, though creating did not inhere in her nature. If so, how did +she make the world? When will she destroy it? If she repented, what +is she waiting for (before she destroys her handiwork)? If, however, +she has not yet repented, she could not repent after time will have +accustomed her to her work, and will have made her more kindly disposed +thereto. If however she be awaiting individual souls, the latter should +not have returned into generation, since, in the former generation, +they have already experienced evils here below, and consequently, they +should long since have ceased to descend upon this earth. + + +THE WORLD SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED EVIL BECAUSE OF OUR SUFFERINGS; +NOTHING MORE BEAUTIFUL COULD BE IMAGINED. + +Nor should the world be considered badly made, merely because we suffer +so much therein. This idea results from entertaining unjustifiable +expectations of its perfections, and from confusing it with the +intelligible world of which it is an image. Could a more beautiful +image, indeed, be imagined? After the celestial fire could we imagine +a better fire than our own? After the intelligible earth, could we +imagine a better earth than ours? After the actualization by which the +intelligible world embraces itself, could we imagine a sphere more +perfect, more wonderful, or better ordered in its movements[299]? After +the intelligible sun, how could we imagine any sun different from the +one that we see? + + +IT IS CONTRADICTORY TO CONSIDER ONESELF CAPABLE OF PERFECTION, BUT TO +DENY IMPASSIBILITY TO THE BEAUTIFUL WORKS OF NATURE. + +5. Is it not absurd to see those (Gnostics) who, like everybody +else, possess a body, passions, fears, and excitements, holding an +idea of their own powers high enough to make them believe themselves +capable of attaining the intelligible,[300] while to the sun, though +it be immutable and perfect,[301] and though it be impassible power, +refusing a wisdom superior to ours, we who were born only yesterday, +and who find so many obstacles in our search after truth? We certainly +are surprised to see these (Gnostics) considering the souls of both +themselves and of the vilest men immortal and divine, while refusing +immortality to the entire heaven, to all the stars it contains, though +they be composed of elements more beautiful and purer[302] (than we), +though they manifest a marvellous beauty and order, while (these +Gnostics) themselves acknowledge that disorder is observed here below? +According to their theories, however, the immortal Soul would have +picked out the worst part of the world, while giving up the best to +mortal souls.[303] + + +AN INTERMEDIARY ELEMENTAL SOUL IS ALSO INADMISSIBLE. + +It is also absurd to see them introduce into the world, after the +universal Soul, another soul said to be composed of elements. How could +a composition of elements possess life? A mixture of elements does not +produce heat or cold, humidity or dryness, or any combination thereof. +Besides, how could this soul (that is inferior to the universal +Soul), hold in union together the four elements, if she herself were +composed of them, and therefore were posterior to them? We may also +rightfully demand of the (Gnostics) an explanation of their predicating +perception, reflection, and other faculties to this (mythical) soul. + + +THE GNOSTICS' NEW EARTH, THAT IS MODEL OF THE OLD IS UNREASONABLE. + +Besides, as the (Gnostics) have no appreciation of the work of the +demiurgic creator, nor for this earth, they insist that the divinity +has created for them a new earth, which is destined to receive them +when they shall have left here below, and which is the reason of the +world. But what need do they have of inhabiting the model of this world +that they pretend to hate? In any case, from where does this model +come? According to them, the model was created only when its author +inclined towards things here below. But what was the use of the model, +if its creator busied himself considerably with the world to make a +world inferior to the intelligible world which he possessed? If (the +model were created) before the world, what could have been its use? Was +it for the saved souls?[304] Why therefore were those souls not saved +(by remaining within the model)? Under this hypothesis the creation +of the model was useless. If (the model, however, was created) after +this world, its author derived it from this world, stealing the form +away from matter; the experience that the souls had acquired in their +earlier trials sufficed to teach them to seek their salvation.[305] +Last, if the (Gnostics) pretend to have, in their souls, received the +form of the world,[306] we have a new incomprehensible language.[307] + + +EXILES, REPENTANCES, ANTITYPES, AND OTHER GNOSTIC INVENTIONS. + +6. We hardly know what to say of the other new conceptions they have +injected into the universe, such as exiles,[308] antitypes,[309] and +repentances.[310] If by "repentances" and "exiles" they mean certain +states of the Soul (in the normal meaning of the word, where a soul) +yields to repentance; and if by "antitypes" they mean the images of the +intelligible beings that the Soul contemplates before contemplating +the intelligible beings themselves, they are using meaningless words, +invented merely as catchwords and terms for their individual sect; for +they imagine such fictions merely because they have failed clearly to +understand the ancient wisdom of the Greeks. Before them the Greeks, +clearly and simply, had spoken of "ascensions" of souls that issued +from the "cavern," and which insensibly rise to a truer contemplation. +The doctrines of these (Gnostics) are partly stolen from Plato, while +the remainder, which were invented merely to form their own individual +system, are innovations contrary to truth. It is from Plato that they +borrowed their judgments, the rivers of Hades.[311] They do speak of +several intelligible principles, such as essence, intelligence, the +second demiurgic creator or universal Soul; but all that comes from +Plato's Timaeus,[312] which says, "Likewise as the ideas contained in +the existing Organism were seen by Intelligence, so he [the creator of +this universe[313]] thought that the latter should contain similar and +equally numerous (natures)." But, not clearly understanding Plato, the +Gnostics here imagined (three principles), an intelligence at rest, +which contains all (beings), a second intelligence that contemplates +them (as they occur) in the first intelligence, and a third +intelligence that thinks them discursively. They often consider this +discursive intelligence as the creative soul, and they consider this to +be the demiurgic creator mentioned by Plato, because they were entirely +ignorant of the true nature of this demiurgic creator. In general, they +alter entirely the idea of creation, as well as many other doctrines of +Plato, and they give out an entirely erroneous interpretation thereof. +They imagine that they alone have rightly conceived of intelligible +nature, while Plato and many other divine intellects never attained +thereto. By speaking of a multitude of intelligible principles, they +think that they seem to possess an exact knowledge thereof, while +really they degrade them, assimilating them to lower, and sensual +beings, by increasing their number.[314] The principles that exist on +high must be reduced to the smallest number feasible; we must recognize +that the principle below the First contains all (the essences), and +so deny the existence of any intelligible (entities) outside of it, +inasmuch as it contains all beings, by virtue of its being primary +"Being," of primary Intelligence, and of all that is beautiful beneath +the First Himself. The Soul must be assigned to the third rank. The +differences obtaining between souls must further be explained by the +difference of their conditions or nature.[315] + + +THE GNOSTICS MAY WELL BORROW FROM THE GREEKS, BUT SHOULD NOT DEPRECIATE +THEM. + +Instead of besmirching the reputation of divine men,[316] the +(Gnostics) should interpret the doctrines of the ancient sages in a +friendly way, borrowing from them such as they are right in professing, +as, for instance, the immortality of the soul, the existence of the +intelligible world, and of the first Divinity (who is the Good), the +necessity for the soul to flee from intercourse with the body, and +the belief that separation of the soul from body is equivalent to a +return from generation to "being."[317] They do well indeed if they +borrow these ideas from Plato, for the purpose of developing them. They +are even at liberty to express any opinion they please in diverging +from his views; but their own doctrine should not be established in +the minds of their followers by insults and sarcasms against Greek +sages. They could only do so by demonstrating the propriety of their +distinctive tenets, whenever they differ from those of the ancient +philosophers, and by expounding their own tenets with a really +philosophic reserve and equanimity. Even when they controvert a system +they are still bound to consider nothing but the truth, without any +attempt at self-glorification, either by attacking men whose teachings +have long since been approved by worthy philosophers, or by claims of +superiority to the latter. For that which the ancients taught on the +subject of the intelligible world will always be considered as the best +and wisest by all who do not permit themselves to be misled by the +errors that to-day mislead so many.[318] + + +GNOSTIC ADDITIONS TO PLATONISM ARE THEIR POOREST DOCTRINES. + +If from the doctrines of the (Gnostics) we remove what they have +borrowed from the teachings of the ancients, their remaining additions +will be discovered as very unfortunate. Their polemic against +(Greek philosophy) consists of an introduction of a great number of +genealogies,[319] and destructions, blaming the intercourse of the +soul with the body,[320] complaining of the universe, criticising +its administration, identifying the demiurgic creator (that is, +Intelligence) with the universal souls.[321] + + +THE UNIVERSAL SOUL MAY NOT BE JUDGED BY THE HUMAN STANDARD. + +7. Elsewhere we have demonstrated[322] that this world never +began, and will never end; and that it must last as long as the +intelligible entities. We have also shown,[323] and that earlier than +these (Gnostics), that the soul's intercourse with the body is not +advantageous to her. But to judge the universal Soul according to ours +is to resemble a man who would blame the totality of a well governed +city by an examination limited to the workers in earth or metal. + + +DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNIVERSAL SOUL AND THE HUMAN SOUL. + +The differences between the universal Soul and our (human) souls are +very important. To begin with, the universal Soul does not govern +the world in the same manner (as our soul governs the body); for she +governs the world without being bound thereto. Besides many other +differences elsewhere noted,[324] we were bound to the body after the +formation of a primary bond.[325] In the universal Soul the nature +that is bound to the body (of the world) binds all that it embraces; +but the universal Soul herself is not bound by the things she binds. +As she dominates them, she is impassible in respect to them, while we +ourselves do not dominate exterior objects. Besides, that part of the +universal Soul which rises to the intelligible world remains pure and +independent; even that[326] which communicates life to the body (of the +world) receives nothing therefrom. In general what is in another being +necessarily participates in the state of that being; but a principle +which has its own individual life would not receive anything from +any other source.[327] That is why, when one thing is located within +another, it feels the experiences of the latter, but does not any the +less retain its individual life in the event of the destruction of the +latter. For instance, if the fire within yourself be extinguished, +that would not extinguish the universal fire; even if the latter were +extinguished, the universal Soul would not feel it, and only the +constitution of the body (of the world) would be affected thereby. If +a world exclusively composed of the remaining three elements were a +possibility, that would be of no importance to the universal Soul, +because the world does not have a constitution similar that of each +of the contained organisms. On high, the universal Soul soars above +the world, and thereby imposes on it a sort of permanence; here below, +the parts, which as it were flow off, are maintained in their place by +a second bond.[328] As celestial entities have no place (outside of +the world), into which they might ooze out,[329] there is no need of +containing them from the interior, nor of compressing them from without +to force them back within; they subsist in the location where the +universal Soul placed them from the beginning. Those which naturally +move modify the beings which possess no natural motion.[330] They carry +out well arranged revolutions because they are parts of the universe. +Here below there are beings which perish because they cannot conform to +the universal order. For instance, if a tortoise happened to be caught +in the midst of a choric ballet that was dancing in perfect order, it +would be trodden under foot because it could not withdraw from the +effects of the order that regulated the feet of the dancers; on the +contrary, if it conformed to that order, it would suffer no harm. + + +GNOSTIC DEMANDS FOR REASON OF WORLD'S CREATION ARE IDLE, AND INVOLVE +STILL LARGER QUESTIONS. + +8. To ask (as do the Gnostics) why the world was created, amounts +to asking the reason of the existence of the universal Soul, and +of the creation of the demiurgic creator himself. To ask such a +question well characterizes men who first wish to find a principle +of that which (in the world) is eternal, but who later opine that +the demiurgic creator became the creating cause only as a result of +an inclination or alteration.[331] If indeed they be at all willing +to listen to us fairly, we shall have to teach them the nature of +these intelligible principles, to end their habit of scorning (those) +venerable (intelligible) beings, and (to induce them to) pay these a +deserved respect. No one, indeed, has the right to find fault with the +constitution of the world, which reveals the greatness of intelligible +nature. We are forced[332] to recognize that the world is a beautiful +and brilliant statue of the divinities, from the fact that the world +achieved existence without beginning with an obscure life, such as that +of the little organisms it contains, and which the productiveness of +universal life never ceases to bring forth, by day or night; on the +contrary, its life is continuous, clear, manifold, extended everywhere, +and illustrating marvellous wisdom. It would be no more than natural +that the world should not equal the model it imitates; otherwise, it +would no longer be an imitation. It would be an error, however, to +think that the world imitates its model badly; it lacks none of the +things that could be contained by a beautiful and natural image; for it +was necessary for this image to exist, without implying reasoning or +skill.[333] + + +INTELLIGENCE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE LAST DEGREE OF EXISTENCE. + +Intelligence, indeed, could not be (the last degree of existence). It +was necessarily actualization of a double nature, both within itself, +and for other beings.[334] It was inevitable that it should be followed +by other beings, for only the most impotent being would fail to produce +something that should proceed from it,[335] while (it is granted that) +the intelligible possesses a wonderful power[336]; wherefore, it could +not help creating. + + +THIS IS THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS BECAUSE WE CAN ACHIEVE VIRTUE. + +What would be the nature of a world better than the present one, if +it were possible? The present one must be a faithful image of the +intelligible world, if the existence of the world be necessary, and +if there be no better possible world. The whole earth is peopled with +animate and even immortal beings; from here below up to the heaven +(the world) is full of them.[337] Why should the stars in the highest +sphere (the fixed stars), and those in the lower spheres (the planets), +not be divinities, in view of their regular motion, and their carrying +out a magnificent revolution around the world[338]? Why should they +not possess virtue? What obstacle could hinder them from acquiring +it? Not on high are found the things which here below make men evil; +namely, that evil nature which both is troubled, and troubles. With +their perpetual leisure why should not the stars possess intelligence, +and be acquainted with the divinity and all the other intelligible +deities[339]? How should we possess a wisdom greater than theirs? Only +a foolish man would entertain such thoughts. How could our souls be +superior to the stars when at the hands of the universal Soul they +undergo the constraint of descending here below[340]? For the best +part of souls is that which commands.[341] If, on the contrary, the +souls descend here below voluntarily, why should the (Gnostics) find +fault with this sphere whither they came voluntarily, and from which +they can depart whenever it suits them[342]? That everything here +below depends on the intelligible principles is proved by the fact +that the organization of the world is such that, during this life, we +are able to acquire wisdom, and live out a life similar to that of the +divinities.[343] + + +THE INEQUALITY OF RICHES IS OF NO MOMENT TO AN ETERNAL BEING. + +9. No one would complain of poverty and the unequal distribution +of wealth if one realized that the sage does not seek equality in +such things, because he does not consider that the rich man has any +advantage over the poor man, the prince over the subject.[344] The sage +leaves such opinions to commonplace people, for he knows that there are +two kinds of life; that of the virtuous who achieve the supreme degree +(of perfection) and the intelligible world, and that of common earthly +men. Even the latter life is double; for though at times they do think +of virtue, and participate somewhat in the good, at other times they +form only a vile crowd, and are only machines, destined to satisfy +the primary needs of virtuous people.[345] There is no reason to be +surprised at a man committing a murder, or, through weakness, yielding +to his passions, when souls, that behave like young, inexperienced +persons, not indeed like intelligences, daily behave thus. It has been +said[346] that this life is a struggle in which one is either victor or +vanquished. But is not this very condition a proof of good arrangement? +What does it matter if you are wronged, so long as you are immortal? +If you be killed, you achieve the fate that you desired. If you have +reason to complain of how you are treated in some particular city, +you can leave it.[347] Besides, even here below, there evidently are +rewards and punishments. Why then complain of a society within which +distributive justice is exercised, where virtue is honored, and where +vice meets its deserved punishment[348]? + + +MOREOVER THIS WORLD CONTAINS TRADITIONS OF DIVINITY. + +Not only are there here below statues of the divinities, but even the +divinities condescend to look on us, leading everything in an orderly +manner from beginning to end, and they apportion to each the fate that +suits him, and which harmonizes with his antecedents in his successive +existences.[349] This is unknown only to persons who are most vulgarly +ignorant of divine things. Try therefore to become as good as you +can, but do not on that account imagine that you alone are capable of +becoming good[350]; for then you would no longer be good. Other men +(than you) are good; there are most excellent (ministering spirits +called) guardians; further, there are deities who, while inhabiting +this world, contemplate the intelligible world,[351] and are still +better than the guardians. Further still is the blissful (universal) +Soul that manages the universe. Honor therefore the intelligible +divinities, and above all the great King of the intelligible +world,[352] whose greatness is especially manifested in the multitude +of the divinities. + + +TRUE KNOWLEDGE SHOWN NOT BY UNIFICATION, BUT REVELATION OF DIVINE POWER. + +It is not by reducing all things to unity, but by setting forth the +greatness developed by the divinity itself, that one manifests his +knowledge of divine power. The Divinity (manifests His power) when, +though remaining what He is, He produces many divinities which depend +on Him, which proceed from Him, and exist by Him. In this way this +world holds existence from Him, and contemplates Him along with all the +divinities which announce to men the divine decrees, and who reveal to +them whatever pleases them.[353] These stars must not be blamed for not +being what the divinity is, for they only represent their nature. + + +MODESTY IS A PART OF GOODNESS; PRIDE IS FOLLY. + +If, however, you pretend to scorn these (stars that are considered) +divinities, and if you hold yourself in high esteem, on the plea that +you are not far inferior to them, learn first that the best man is he +who is most modest in his relations with divinities and men. In the +second place, learn that one should think of the divinity only within +limits, without insolence, and not to seek to rise to a condition +that is above human possibilities. It is unreasonable to believe that +there is no place by the side of the divinity for all other men, +while impudently proposing alone to aspire to that dignity. This by +itself would deprive the Soul of the possibility of assimilation to +the Divinity to the limit of her receptivity.[354] This the Soul +cannot attain unless guided by Intelligence. To pretend to rise above +Intelligence,[355] is to fall short of it. There are people insane +enough to believe, without reflection, claims such as the following +("By initiation into secret knowledge, or gnosis), you will be better, +not only than all men, but even than all the deities." These people are +swollen with pride[356]; and men who before were modest, simple and +humble, become arrogant on hearing themselves say, "You are a child +of the divinity; the other men that you used to honor are not his +children, any more than the stars who were worshipped by the ancients. +You yourself, without working, are better than heaven itself." Then +companions crowd around him, and applaud his utterance. He resembles +a man who, though not knowing how to count, should, in the midst of a +crowd of men, equally ignorant with him, hear it said by somebody that +he was a thousand feet high while others were only five feet high. +He would not realize what was meant by a thousand feet, but he would +consider this measure very great. + + +OTHER GNOSTIC INCONSISTENCIES. + +(Gnostics) admit that the Divinity interests Himself in men. How then +could He (as they insist), neglect the world that contains them? Could +this be the case because He lacked the leisure to look after it? In +this case He would lack the leisure to look after anything beneath +Him (including men also). On the other hand, if He do care for men, +that care would include the world that surrounds and contains them. +If He ignored what surrounded men, in order to ignore the world, He +would thereby also ignore the men themselves. The objection that men +do need that the Divinity should care for the world (is not true), for +the world does need the care of the Divinity. The Divinity knows the +arrangement of the world, the men it contains, and their condition +therein.[357] The friends of the Divinity support meekly all that +results necessarily therefrom. (They are right), for that which happens +should be considered not only from one's own standpoint, but also from +that of the totality of circumstances. Each (person or thing) should +be considered from his place (in the scale of existence); one should +ever aspire to Him to whom aspire all beings capable of (the Good); +one should be persuaded that many beings, or rather that all beings, +aspire thereto; that those who attain to Him are happy, while the +others achieve a fate suitable to their nature; finally, one should +not imagine oneself alone capable of attaining happiness.[358] Mere +assertion of possession does not suffice for real possession thereof. +There are many men who, though perfectly conscious that they do not +possess some good, nevertheless boast of its possession, or who really +believe they do possess it, when the opposite is the true state of +affairs; or that they exclusively possess it when they are the only +ones who do not possess it. + + +PLOTINOS ADDRESSES HIMSELF TO THOSE OF HIS FRIENDS WHO WERE FORMERLY +GNOSTIC, NOT TO THE LATTER WHO ARE HOPELESS. + +10. On examining many other assertions (of the Gnostics), or rather, +all of their assertions, we find more than enough to come to some +conclusion concerning the details of their doctrines. We cannot, +indeed, help blushing when we see some of our friends, who had imbued +themselves with (Gnostic) doctrines before becoming friends of ours, +somehow or another persevere therein, working zealously to try to +prove that they deserved full confidence, or speaking as if they were +still convinced that they were based on good grounds.[385] We are here +addressing our friends, not the partisans (of the Gnostics). Vainly +indeed would we try to persuade the latter not to let themselves be +deceived by men who furnish no proofs--what proofs indeed could they +furnish?--but who only impose on others by their boastfulness.[359] + + +PLOTINOS HAS NO INTENTION OF WRITING A FULL CONFUTATION. + +Following another kind of discussion, we might write a refutation of +these men who are impudent enough to ridicule the teachings of those +divine men who taught in ancient times, and who conformed entirely to +truth. We shall not however embark on this, for whoever understands +what we have already said will from that (sample) be able to judge of +the remainder. + + +GNOSTIC THEORY OF CREATION BY MERE ILLUMINATION.[386] + +Neither will we controvert an assertion which overtops all their others +in absurdity--we use this term for lack of a stronger. Here it is: +"The Soul and another Wisdom inclined downwards towards things here +below, either because the Soul first inclined downwards spontaneously, +or because she was misled by Wisdom; or because (in Gnostic view), +Soul and Wisdom were identical. The other souls descended here below +together (with the Soul), as well as the "members of Wisdom," and +entered into bodies, probably human. Nevertheless the Soul, on account +of which the other soul descended here below, did not herself descend. +She did not incline, so to speak, but only illuminated the darkness. +From this illumination was born in matter an image (Wisdom, the image +of the Soul). Later was formed (the demiurgic creator, called) an image +of the image, by means of matter or materiality, or of a principle by +(Gnostics) designated by another name (the "Fruit of the fall")--for +they make use of many other names, for the purpose of increasing +obscurity. This is how they derive their demiurgic creator. They also +suppose that this demiurgic creator separated himself from his mother, +Wisdom, and from him they deduce the whole world even to the extremity +of the images." The perpetration of such assertions amounts to a bitter +sarcasm of the power that created the world. + + +THE NUMBERLESS INTELLECTUAL DIFFICULTIES OF SUCH A THEORY. + +11. To begin with, if the Soul did not descend, if she limited herself +to illuminating the darkness (which is synonymous with matter), by +what right could it be asserted that the Soul inclined (downwards)? +If indeed a kind of light issued from the Soul, this does not +justify an inclination of the Soul, unless we admit the existence +of something (darkness) beneath her, that the Soul approached the +darkness by a local movement, and that, on arriving near it, the +Soul illuminated it. On the contrary, if the Soul illuminated it +while remaining self-contained, without doing anything to promote +that illumination,[360] why did the Soul alone illuminate the +darkness? (According to the Gnostics) this occurred only after the +Soul had conceived the Reason of the universe. Then only could the +Soul illuminate the darkness, by virtue of this rational conception. +But then, why did the Soul not create the world at the same time +she illuminated the darkness, instead of waiting for the generation +of ("psychic) images"? Further, why did this Reason of the world, +which (the Gnostics) call the "foreign land," and which was produced +by the superior powers, as they say, not move its authors to that +inclination? Last, why does this illuminated matter produce psychic +images, and not bodies? (Wisdom, or) the image of the Soul does not +seem to stand in need of darkness or matter. If the Soul create, then +her image (Wisdom) should accompany her, and remain attached to her. +Besides, what is this creature of hers? Is it a being, or is it, as +the (Gnostics) say, a conception? If it be a being, what difference is +there between it and its principle? If it be some other kind of a soul, +it must be a "soul of growth and generation," since its principle is a +reasonable soul.[361] If however (this Wisdom) be a "soul of growth and +generation," how could it be said to have created for the purpose of +being honored[362]? In short, how could it have been created by pride, +audacity, and imagination? Still less would we have the right to say +that it had been created by virtue of a rational conception. Besides, +what necessity was there for the mother of the demiurgic creator to +have formed him of matter and of an image? Speaking of conception, it +would be necessary to explain the origin of this term; then, unless a +creative force be predicated of this conception, it would be necessary +to show how a conception can constitute a real being. But what creative +force can be inherent in this imaginary being? The (Gnostics) say that +this image (the demiurgic creator) was produced first, and that only +afterwards other images were created; but they permit themselves to +assert that without any proof. For instance, how could it be said that +fire was produced first (and other things only later)? + + +HOW THE GNOSTIC DEMIURGE CREATED. + +12. How could this newly formed image (the demiurgic creator) have +undertaken to create by memory of the things he knew? As he did not +exist before, he could not have known anything, any more than the +mother (Wisdom) which is attributed to him. Besides, it is quite +surprising that, though the (Gnostics) did not descend upon this world +as images of souls, but as veritable, genuine souls, nevertheless +hardly one or two of them succeeds in detaching themselves from the +(sense) world and by gathering together their memories, to remember +some of the things they previously knew, while this image (the +demiurgical creator), as well as his mother (Wisdom), which is a +material image, was capable of conceiving intelligible entities in a +feeble manner, indeed, as say the Gnostics, but after all from her +very birth. Not only did she conceive intelligible things, and formed +an idea of the sense-world from the intelligible world, but she also +discovered with what elements she was to produce the sense-world. Why +did she first create the fire? Doubtless because she judged she would +begin thereby; for why did she not begin with some other element? If +she could produce fire because she had the conception thereof, why, +as she had the conception of the world--as she must have begun by a +conception of the totality--did she not create the whole at one single +stroke[363]? Indeed, this conception of the world embraced all its +parts. It would also have been more natural, for the demiurgical +creator should not have acted like a workman, as all the arts are +posterior to nature and to the creation of the world. Even to-day, we +do not see the natures[364] when they beget individuals, first produce +the fire, then the other elements successively, and finally mingle +them. On the contrary, the outline and organization of the entire +organism are formed at once in the germ born at the monthly periods in +the womb of the mother. Why then, in creation, should matter not have +been organized at one stroke by the type of the world, a type that +must have contained fire, earth, and all the rest of them? Perhaps the +(Gnostics) would have thus conceived of the creation of the world, if +(instead of an image) they had had in their system a genuine Soul. But +their demiurgic creator could not have proceeded thus. To conceive of +the greatness, and especially of the dimension of the heavens, of the +obliquity of the zodiac, of the course of the stars, the form of the +earth, and to understand the reason of each of these things, would not +have been the work of an image, but rather of a power that proceeded +from the better principles, as the (Gnostics) in spite of themselves +acknowledge. + + +THE NECESSITY OF THE ILLUMINATION OF THE DARKNESS MUST HAVE BEEN +ETERNAL. + +Indeed, if we examine attentively that in which this illumination of +the darkness consists, the (Gnostics) may be led to a recognition +of the true principles of the world. Why was the production of this +illumination of the darkness necessary, if its existence was not +absolutely unavoidable? This necessity (of an illumination of the +darkness) was either in conformity with, or in opposition to nature. If +it conformed thereto, it must have been so from all time; if it were +contrary thereto, something contrary to nature would have happened to +the divine powers, and evil would be prior to the world. Then it would +no longer be the world that was the cause of evil (as the Gnostics +claim), but the divine powers. The world is not the principle of evil +for the soul, but it is the soul that is the principle of evil for the +world. Ascending from cause to cause, reason will relate this world to +the primary principles. + + +EVEN THE EXISTENCE OF THE DARKNESS MUST BE RELATED TO THE SOUL. + +If matter is also said to be the cause of evil, where does it +originate? For the darkness existed already, as say (the Gnostics), +when the soul has seen and illuminated them. From whence (comes +darkness)? If (the Gnostics) answer that it is the soul herself that +created (darkness) by inclining (downwards to matter), then evidently +(the darkness) did not exist before the inclination of the soul. +Darkness therefore is not the cause of this inclination; the cause is +in the nature of the soul. This cause may thus be related to preceding +necessities, and as a result to first principles.[365] + + +INSTEAD OF COMPLAINING OF THE WORLD, UNDERSTAND IT AND FIT YOURSELF TO +IT. + +13. Those who complain of the nature of the world do not know what they +are doing, nor the extent of their audacity. Many men are ignorant of +the close concatenation which unites the entities of the first, second, +and third ranks,[366] and which descends even to those of the lowest +degree. Instead of blaming what is subordinate to first principles, +we should gently submit to the laws of the universe, rise to first +principles, not undergo those tragic terrors,[367] inspired in certain +people by the spheres of the world which exert on us nothing but a +beneficent influence.[368] What is so terrible in them? Why should they +be feared by these men foreign to philosophy and all sound learning? +Though celestial spheres do have fiery bodies, they should not inspire +us with any fear, because they are perfectly harmonious with the +universe and with the earth. We must besides consider the souls of +the stars to which those (Gnostics) consider themselves so superior, +while their bodies, which surpass ours so much in size and beauty, +efficaciously concur in the production of things that are conformed to +the order of nature[369]; for such things could not be born if first +principles alone existed. Finally the stars complete the universe, and +are important members thereof. If even man holds a great superiority +over animals, there must be a far greater superiority in those stars +which exist as ornaments to the universe, and to establish order +therein, and not to exert thereover a tyrannical influence.[370] The +events that are said to flow from the stars are rather signs thereof +than causes.[371] Besides, the events that really do flow from the +stars differ among each other by circumstances. It is not therefore +possible that the same things should happen to all men, separated as +they are by their times of birth, the places of their residence, and +the dispositions of their souls. It is just as unreasonable to expect +that all would be good, nor, because of the impossibility of this, to +go and complain on the grounds that all sense-objects should be similar +to intelligible objects. Moreover,[372] evil is nothing but what is +less complete in respect to wisdom, and less good, in a decreasing +gradation. For instance, nature (that is, the power of growth and +generation) should not be called evil because she is not sensation; nor +sensation be called evil, because it is not reason. Otherwise, we might +be led to think that there was evil in the intelligible world. Indeed, +the Soul is inferior to Intelligence, and Intelligence is inferior to +the One. + + +GNOSTICS WRONGLY IMAGINE INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES CAN BE BEWITCHED.[387] + +14. Another error of the (Gnostics) is their teaching that intelligible +beings are not beyond the reach of being affected by human beings. +When the (Gnostics) utter magic incantations, addressing them to +(intelligible beings), not only to the Soul, but to the Principles +superior thereto, what are they really trying to do? To bewitch them? +To charm them? Or, to influence them[373]? They therefore believe +that divine beings listen to us, and that they obey him who skilfully +pronounces these songs, cries, aspirations and whistlings, to all of +which they ascribe magic power.[374] If they do not really mean this, +if they by sounds only claim to express things which do not fall under +the senses, then, through their effort to make their art more worthy +of respect, they unconsciously rob it of all claim to respect, in our +estimation. + + +THEIR EXPLANATION OF DISEASE AS DEMONIACAL POSSESSION IS WRONG. + +They also pride themselves on expelling diseases. If this were done +through temperance, by a well regulated life, as do the philosophers, +this claim might be respected. But they insist that diseases are +demons, which they can expel by their words, and they boast of this +in order to achieve reputation among the common people, that is +always inclined to stand in awe of magic. They could not persuade +rational individuals that diseases do not have natural causes, such as +fatigue, satiety, lack of food, corruption, or some change depending +on an interior or exterior principle. This is proved by the nature +of diseases. Sometimes a disease is expelled by moving the bowels, +or by the administration of some potion; diet and bleeding are also +often resorted to. Is this because the demon is hungry, or the potion +destroys him? When a person is healed on the spot, the demon either +remains or departs. If he remain, how does his presence not hinder +recovery? If he depart, why? What has happened to him? Was he fed by +the disease? In this case, the disease was something different from +the demon. If he enter without any cause for the disease, why is the +individual into whose body he enters not always sick? If he enter +into a body that contains already a natural cause of disease, how far +does he contribute to the disease? The natural cause is sufficient to +produce the disease. It would be ridiculous to suppose that the disease +would have a cause, but that, as soon as this cause is active there +would be a demon ready to come and assist it. + + +THE GENUINE VALUE OF GNOSTICISM SEEN IN ITS LOW MORAL ASPECTS. + +The reader must now clearly see the kind of assertions given out by +the (Gnostics), and what their purpose must be. What they say about +demons (or guardians) has here been mentioned only as a commentary on +their vain pretenses. Other opinions of the (Gnostics) may best be +judged by a perusal of their books, by each individual for himself. +Remember always that our system of philosophy contains, beside the +other good (reasons), the simplicity of moral habits, the purity of +intelligence, and that instead of vain boasting it recommends the care +of personal dignity, rational self-confidence, prudence, reserve, +and circumspection. The remainder (of Gnostic philosophy) may well +be contrasted with ours. As all that is taught by the Gnostics is +very different (from our teachings), we would have no advantage in a +further detailed contrast; and it would be unworthy of us to pursue the +matter(?). + + +THE GNOSTIC DESTINY OF MAN IS DEMORALIZING. + +15. We should however observe the moral effect produced in the soul +of those who listen to the speeches of these men who teach scorn of +the world and its contents. About the destiny of man there are two +principal doctrines. The one assigns as our end the pleasures of the +body, the other suggests honesty and virtue, the love of which comes +from the divinity, and leads back to the Divinity, as we have shown +elsewhere.[375] Epicurus, who denies divine Providence, advises us to +seek the only thing that remains, the enjoyments of pleasure. Well, the +(Gnostics) hold a still more pernicious doctrine; they blame the manner +in which divine Providence operates, and they accuse Providence itself; +they refuse respect to laws established here below, and the virtue +which has been honored by all centuries. To destroy the last vestiges +of honor, they destroy temperance by joking at it; they attack justice, +whether natural, or acquired by reason or exercise; in one word, they +annihilate everything that could lead to virtue. Nothing remains +but to seek out pleasure, to profess selfishness, to renounce all +social relations with men, to think only of one's personal interest, +unless indeed one's own innate disposition be good enough to resist +their pernicious doctrines. Nothing that we regard as good is by them +esteemed, for they seek entirely different objects. + + +THE GNOSTICS IGNORE VIRTUE WITHOUT WHICH GOD IS A MERE WORD. + +Nevertheless, those who know the Divinity should attach themselves +to Him even here below, and by devoting themselves to His first +principles, correct earthly things by applying their divine nature +thereto. Only a nature that disdains physical pleasure can understand +that of which honor consists; those who have no virtue could never rise +to intelligible entities. Our criticism of the (Gnostics) is justified +by this that they never speak of virtue, never study it, give no +definition of it, do not make out its kinds, and never repeat anything +of the beautiful discussions thereof left to us by the ancient sages. +The (Gnostics) never tell how one could acquire or preserve moral +qualities, how one should cultivate or purify the soul.[376] Their +precept, "Contemplate the divinity,"[377] is useless if one does not +also teach how this contemplation is to take place. One might ask the +(Gnostics) if such contemplation of the divinity would be hindered by +any lust or anger? What would hinder one from repeating the name of the +divinity, while yielding to the domination of the passions, and doing +nothing to repress them? Virtue, when perfected, and by wisdom solidly +established in the soul, is what shows us the divinity. Without real +virtue, God is no more than a name. + + +SCORN OF THIS WORLD IS NO GUARANTEE OF GOODNESS. + +16. One does not become a good man merely by scorning the divinities, +the world, and the beauties it contains. Scorn of the divinities is the +chief characteristic of the evil. Perversity is never complete until +scorn of the divinities is reached; and if a man were not otherwise +perverse, this vice would be sufficient to make him such. The respect +which the (Gnostic) pretend to have for the intelligible divinities +(the aeons) is an illogical accident. For when one loves a being, +he loves all that attaches thereto; he extends to the children the +affection for the parent. Now every soul is a daughter of the heavenly +Father. The souls that preside over the stars are intellectual, good, +and closer to the divinity than ours. How could this sense-world, with +the divinities it contains, be separated from the intelligible world? +We have already shown above the impossibility of such a separation. +Here we insist that when one scorns beings so near to those that hold +the front rank, it can only be that one knows them by name only. + + +TO EXCEPT CERTAIN CLASSES OF BEING FROM DIVINE CARE IS TO SHOW +CALLOUSNESS OF DISPOSITION. + +How could it ever be considered pious to claim that divine Providence +does not extend to sense-objects, or at least interests itself only in +some of them (the spiritual men, not the psychical)? Such an assertion +must surely be illogical. The (Gnostics) claim that divine Providence +interests itself only in them. Was this the case while they were living +on high, or only since they live here below? In the first case, why +did they descend onto this earth? In the second, why do they remain +here below? Besides, why should the Divinity not be present here +below also? Otherwise how could He know that the (Gnostics), who are +here below, have not forgotten Him, and have not become perverse? If +He know those that have not become perverse, He must also know those +who have become perverse, to distinguish the former from the latter. +He must therefore be present to all men, and to the entire world, in +some manner or other. Thus the world will participate in the Divinity. +If the Divinity deprived the world of His presence, He would deprive +you also thereof, and you could not say anything of Him or of the +beings below Him. The world certainly derives its existence from Him +whether the divinity protect you by His providence or His help, and +whatever be the name by which you refer to Him. The world never was +deprived of the Divinity, and never will be. The world has a better +right than any individuals to the attentions of Providence, and to +participation in divine perfections. This is particularly true in +respect to the universal Soul, as is proved by the existence and wise +arrangement of the world. Which of these so proud individuals is as +well arranged, and as wise as the universe, and could even enter into +such a comparison without ridicule or absurdity? Indeed, unless made +merely in the course of a discussion, such a comparison is really an +impiety. To doubt such truths is really the characteristic of a blind +and senseless man, without experience or reason, and who is so far +removed from knowledge of the intelligible world that he does not +even know the sense-world? Could any musician who had once grasped +the intelligible harmonies hear that of sense-sounds without profound +emotion? What skilful geometrician or arithmetician will fail to enjoy +symmetry, order and proportion, in the objects that meet his view? +Though their eyes behold the same objects as common people, experts see +in them different things; when, for instance, with practiced glance, +they examine some picture. When recognizing in sense-objects an image +of intelligible (essence), they are disturbed and reminded of genuine +beauty: that is the origin of love.[378] One rises to the intelligible +by seeing a shining image of beauty glowing in a human face. Heavy and +senseless must be that mind which could contemplate all the visible +beauties, this harmony, and this imposing arrangement, this grand +panoramic view furnished by the stars in spite of their distance, +without being stirred to enthusiasm, and admiration of their splendor +and magnificence. He who can fail to experience such feelings must have +failed to observe sense-objects, or know even less the intelligible +world. + + +GNOSTICS JUSTIFY THEIR HATE OF THE BODY BY PLATO; IN THIS CASE THEY +SHOULD FOLLOW HIM ALSO IN ADMIRATION OF THE WORLD. + +17. Some (Gnostics) object that they hate the body because Plato[379] +complains much of it, as an obstacle to the soul, and as something +far inferior to her. In this case, they should, making abstraction +of the body of the world by thought, consider the rest; that is, +the intelligible sphere which contains within it the form of the +world, and then the incorporeal souls which, in perfect order, +communicate greatness to matter by modeling it in space according to an +intelligible model, so that what is begotten might, so far as possible, +by its greatness, equal the indivisible nature of its model; for the +greatness of sense-mass here below corresponds to the greatness of +intelligible power. Let the (Gnostics) therefore consider the celestial +sphere, whether they conceive of it as set in motion by the divine +power that contains its principle, middle and end, or whether they +imagine it as immovable, and not yet exerting its action on any of the +things it governs by its revolution. In both ways they will attain a +proper idea of the Soul that presides over this universe. Let them then +conceive of this soul as united to a body, though remaining impassible, +and still communicating to this body so far as the latter is capable of +participating therein,[380] some of its perfections, for the divinity +is incapable of jealousy.[381] Then they will form a proper idea of +the world. They will understand how great is the power of the Soul, +since she makes the body participate in her beauty to the limit of +her receptivity. This body has no beauty by nature, but when (it is +beautified by the Soul) it entrances divine souls. + + +GNOSTICS BOAST OF LACK OF APPRECIATION OF BEAUTY ALREADY RECOGNIZED. + +The (Gnostics) pretend that they have no appreciation for the beauty of +the world, and that they make no distinction between beautiful and ugly +bodies. In this case they should not distinguish good from bad taste, +nor recognize beauty in the sciences, in contemplation, nor in the +divinity itself; for sense-beings possess beauty only by participation +in first principles. If they be not beautiful, neither could those +first principles be such. Consequently sense-beings are beautiful, +though less beautiful than intelligible beings. The scorn professed by +(Gnostics) for sense-beauty is praiseworthy enough if it refer only +to the beauty of women and of young boys, and if its only purpose be +to lead to chastity. But you may be sure that they do not boast of +scorning what is ugly, they only boast of scorning what they had at +first recognized and loved as being beautiful. + + +EVEN EXTERIOR OR PARTIAL BEAUTY NEED NOT CONFLICT WITH THE BEAUTY OF +THE UNIVERSE; AND IN ANY CASE THERE WOULD BE NO EVIL IN IT. + +We must further observe that it is not the same beauty that is seen in +the parts and in the whole, in individuals and in the universe; that +there are beauties great enough in sense-objects and in individuals, +for instance, in the guardians, to lead us to admire their creator, +and to prove to us that they indeed are works of his. In this way we +may attain a conception of the unspeakable beauty of the universal +Soul, if we do not attach ourselves to sense-objects, and if, without +scorning them, we know how to rise to intelligible entities. If the +interior of a sense-being be beautiful, we shall judge that it is +in harmony with its exterior beauty. If it be ugly we will consider +that it is inferior to its principle. But it is impossible for a +being really to be beautiful in its exterior while ugly within; for +the exterior is beautiful only in so far as it is dominated by the +interior.[382] Those who are called beautiful, but who are ugly within, +are externally beautiful only deceptively. In contradiction to those +who claim that there are men who possess a beautiful body and an ugly +soul, I insist that such never existed, and that it was a mistake to +consider them beautiful. If such men were ever seen, their interior +ugliness was accidental, and also their soul was, by nature, beautiful; +for we often meet here below obstacles which hinder us from reaching +our goal. But the universe cannot by any obstacle be hindered from +possessing interior beauty in the same way that it possesses exterior +beauty. The beings to whom nature has not, from the beginning, given +perfection, may indeed not attain their goal, and consequently may +become perverted; but the universe never was a child, nor imperfect; +it did not develop, and received no physical increase. Such a physical +increase would have been impossible inasmuch as it already possessed +everything. Nor could we admit that its Soul had ever, in the course +of time, gained any increase. But even if this were granted to the +(Gnostics), this could not constitute any evil. + + +RECOGNITION OF THE BEAUTY OF THE BODY NEED NOT IMPLY ATTACHMENT +THERETO; IT IS COMPATIBLE WITH RESIGNATION. + +18. (Gnostics) however might object that their doctrine inspired +revulsion from, and hate for the body, while (that of Plotinos) really +attached the soul to the body (by recognition of its beauty). Hardly. +We may illustrate by two guests who dwelt together in a beautiful +house. The first guest blamed the disposition of the plan, and the +architect who constructed it, but nevertheless remained within it. +The other guest, instead of blaming the architect, praised his skill, +and awaited the time when he might leave this house, when he should no +longer need it. The first guest would think himself wiser and better +prepared to leave because he had learned to repeat that walls are +composed of lifeless stones and beams, and that this house was far +from truly representing the intelligible house. He would however not +know that the only difference obtaining between him and his companion, +is that he did not know how to support necessary things, while his +companion (who did not blame the house) will be able to leave it +without regret because he loved stone-buildings only very moderately. +So long as we have a body we have to abide in these houses constructed +by the (world) Soul, who is our beneficent sister, and who had the +power to do such great things without any effort.[383] + + +GNOSTICS ACKNOWLEDGE KINSHIP WITH DEPRAVED MEN, BUT REFUSE IT TO THE +BEAUTIFUL UNIVERSE, OF WHICH WE SHOULD BE FAR PROUDER. + +The Gnostics do not hesitate to call the most abandoned men their +"brothers," but refuse this name to the sun, and the other deities +of heaven, and to the very Soul of the world, fools that they are! +Doubtless, to unite ourselves thus to the stars by the bonds of +kindred, we must no longer be perverse, we must have become good, and +instead of being bodies, we must be souls in these bodies; and, so far +as possible, we must dwell within our bodies in the same manner as the +universal Soul dwells within the body of the universe. To do this, one +has to be firm, not allow oneself to be charmed by the pleasures of +sight or hearing, and to remain untroubled by any reverse. The Soul +of the world is not troubled by anything, because she is outside +of the reach of all. We, however, who here below are exposed to the +blows of fortune, must repel them by our virtue, weakening some, and +foiling others by our constancy and greatness of soul.[384] When we +shall thus have approached this power which is out of the reach (of +all exigencies), having approached the Soul of the universe and of +the stars, we shall try to become her image, and even to increase +this resemblance to the assimilation of fusion. Then, having been +well disposed by nature and exercised, we also will contemplate what +these souls have been contemplating since the beginning. We must also +remember that the boast of some men that they alone have the privilege +of contemplating the intelligible world does not mean that they really +contemplate this world any more than any other men. + + +GNOSTICS WHO BOAST SUPERIORITY TO THE DIVINITIES WHO CANNOT LEAVE THEIR +BODIES ARE IN REALITY IGNORANT OF THE TRUE STATE OF AFFAIRS. + +Vainly also do some (Gnostics) boast of having to leave their bodies +when they will have ceased to live, while this is impossible to the +divinities because they always fill the same function in heaven. They +speak thus only because of their ignorance of what it is to be outside +of the body, and of how the universal Soul in her entirety wisely +governs what is inanimate. + + +THE JEALOUS DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SPIRITUAL, PSYCHIC AND MATERIAL IS +DUE CHIEFLY TO IGNORANCE OF OTHER PEOPLE'S ATTAINMENTS. + +We ourselves may very well not love the body, we may become pure, +scorn death, and both recognize and follow spiritual things that are +superior to earthly things. But on this account we should not be +jealous of other men, who are not only capable of following the same +goal, but who do constantly pursue it. Let us not insist that they are +incapable of doing so. Let us not fall into the same error as those +who deny the movement of the stars, because their senses show them to +remain immovable. Let us not act as do the (Gnostics), who believe that +the nature of the stars does not see what is external, because they +themselves do not see that their own souls are outside. + + + + +FOOTNOTES: + + +[1] A Stoic term. + +[2] As says Parmenides, verse 80. + +[3] Cicero, Tusc. i. 16; Nat. Deor. i. 1; Maxim. Tyr. xvii. 5. + +[4] As wastage, see 6.4, 10; as Numenius might have said in 12, 22. + +[5] As said Numenius fr. 46. + +[6] See Plato's Timaeus 37. + +[7] Od. xvii. 486. + +[8] See v. 3.5, 6. + +[9] See v. 3.10. + +[10] See v. 3.8, 9. + +[11] See v. 3.12-17. + +[12] See v. 5.13. + +[13] See ii. 1.2. + +[14] ii 1.1. + +[15] Aristotle, Met. v. 4. + +[16] Aristotle, Met. xii. 2. + +[17] Aristotle, Met. vii. 8. + +[18] Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 5. + +[19] Aristotle, Met. xii. 5. + +[20] Aristotle, Met. ix. 8. + +[21] Aristotle, Met. ix. 5. + +[22] That is, their producing potentiality, and not the potentiality of +becoming these things, as thought Aristotle. Met. ix. 2. + +[23] As thought Aristotle, Soul, iii. 7; Met. xii. + +[24] By Plato in the Timaeus 52. + +[25] See iv. 6. A polemic against Aristotle, de Anima ii. 5, and +the Stoics, Cleanthes, Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math. vii. 288, and +Chrysippus, Diog. Laert. vii. 50. + +[26] As thought Chrysippus, Diog. Laert. vii. 111. + +[27] See iv. 6. + +[28] See vi. 6.16. + +[29] See ii. 6.2. + +[30] Plato, in his Phaedo 127. + +[31] See i. 2.1. + +[32] See i. 2.1, the Socratic definition. + +[33] See i. 1.2.4. + +[34] See ii. 5.2. + +[35] See i. 2.4. + +[36] A term of Stoic psychology. + +[37] See i. 2.4. + +[38] These are the so-called "passions" of the Stoic Chrysippus, Diog. +Laert. vii. 111. + +[39] Of the Stoic contention, Tert. de Anima, 5. + +[40] See i. 1.13. + +[41] As was taught by Cleanthes, Sext. Empir. adv. Math. vii. 288. + +[42] See iii. 6.3. + +[43] Or, "affections," as we shall in the future call them, in English. + +[44] See i. 8.15. + +[45] Or, blindly, see iii. 8.1-3; iv. 4.13, 14. + +[46] See iii. 6.3, and i. 1.13. + +[47] See iii. 6.6. + +[48] See i. 4.8. + +[49] Notice this Numenian name for the divinity used at the beginning +of the Escoreal Numenius fragment. + +[50] See iii. 8.9. + +[51] As Plato asked in his Sophist 246; Cxi. 252. + +[52] As thought Philo in Leg. Alleg. i. + +[53] See ii. 4.15. + +[54] See ii. 5.3-5. + +[55] See vi. 2. + +[56] See ii. 4.11. + +[57] As thought Plato in the Timaeus 49-52. + +[58] See ii. 5.5. + +[59] de Gen. et Corr. ii. 2, 3. + +[60] As objected Aristotle, in de Gen. et Corr. i. 7. + +[61] See ii. 7.1. + +[62] iii. 6.2. + +[63] As asked Aristotle, de Gen. i. 7. + +[64] In his Timaeus 50. + +[65] See iii 6.12, 13. + +[66] In his Timaeus 51. + +[67] See ii. 4.11. + +[68] In his Timaeus 51. + +[69] In his Timaeus 49. + +[70] See iii. 6.11. + +[71] As said Plato, in his Timaeus 52. + +[72] See ii. 8.14. + +[73] See iii. 5.9. + +[74] The myth of Pandora, see iv. 3.14. + +[75] See iii. 6.4. + +[76] See iii. 6.5, 6. + +[77] By a "bastard" reasoning," see ii. 4.10. + +[78] See ii. 4.9-12. + +[79] See iii. 6.12. + +[80] See ii. 7.2. + +[81] See iii. 6.13. + +[82] See ii. 4.8. + +[83] See ii. 6.3. + +[84] See ii. 4.5. + +[85] See iii. 4.6. + +[86] It would create the magnitude that exists in matter; that is, +apparent magnitude. + +[87] ii. 4.11; against Moderatus of Gades. + +[88] See ii. 4.11. + +[89] See iv. 6.3. + +[90] See ii. 4.12. + +[91] That is, intelligible "being." + +[92] See iii. 6.8. + +[93] See ii. 7.1. + +[94] As was suggested by Plato in the Timaeus 49-52. + +[95] As was suggested by Herodotus, ii. 51, and Cicero, de Nat. Deor. +iii. 22. + +[96] That is, Cybele, see v. 1.7. + +[97] The Stoics. + +[98] We have here another internal proof of the rightness of our +present chronological order of Plotinos's Enneads. The myth of Pandora +occurs in iv. 3.14, which follows this book. + +[99] Against the Manicheans. + +[100] See vi. 7.41. + +[101] See i. 1.13. + +[102] In that port of the Philebus, 29; C ii. 345. + +[103] As thought Plato, in the Phaedrus, 246-248. + +[104] As was taught by the Manicheans. + +[105] As thought Cicero, Tusculans, i. 20; and Aristotle, de Anima, +iii. 1-3. + +[106] See ii. 9.18. + +[107] 42; 69. + +[108] 264; C vi. 48. + +[109] Rep. x. C 287. + +[110] See iv. 3.7. + +[111] See iv. 3.6. + +[112] See iv. 3.6. + +[113] Generative. + +[114] See iii. 2.16. + +[115] In the sense that it has no limits. + +[116] See iv. 3.15. + +[117] As thought Xenocrates and Aristotle, de Coelo, i. 10. + +[118] See iv. 3.10. + +[119] Philo, de Sommis, M 648, de Monarchia, M 217. + +[120] See iii. 6.16, 17. + +[121] As said Numenius, fr. 32. + +[122] As did Discord, in Homer's Iliad, iv. 443. + +[123] See ii. 9.7. + +[124] See v. 7.1. + +[125] See ii. 3.7. + +[126] Plato, Rep. x. C 617; C x. 286. + +[127] See iv. 4, 24, 40, 43; iv. 9.3. + +[128] As was taught by Himerius; see also Plutarch and Themistius. + +[129] As Numenius said, fr. 26.3. + +[130] In his Timaeus, 35. + +[131] As said Numenius, fr. 32. + +[132] See Aristotle, Plato's Critias, Numenius, 32, and Proclus. + +[133] As thought Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 1.4. + +[134] In his Timaeus, 34; 30. + +[135] Plato does just the opposite. + +[136] Being the power which directs the animal from above, see i. 1.7. + +[137] As thought Plato in the Timaeus, 73. + +[138] iv. 3.13. + +[139] As thought Plato in the Menexenus, 248. + +[140] As Aristotle asked, de Memoria et Remin. 1. + +[141] See i. 1.11. + +[142] Plato, Philebus, C ii. 359. + +[143] As thought Plato, in the Philebus, C ii. 357. + +[144] As thought Plato in his Philebus, C ii. 363. + +[145] See i. 1.12; iv. 3.32; the irrational soul, which is an image of +the rational soul, is plunged in the darkness of sense-life. + +[146] As thought Plato in his Philebus, C ii. 359. + +[147] In iv. 3.27. + +[148] As thought Aristotle, de Mem. 1. + +[149] As thought Aristotle. + +[150] As thought Aristotle. + +[151] See i. 4.10. + +[152] As Numenius said, fr. 32. + +[153] Another reading is: "All perceptions belong to forms which can +reduce to all things." But this does not connect with the next sentence. + +[154] According to Plato Phaedrus, 246; C vi. 40, and Philebus, 30; C +ii. 347. + +[155] Timaeus, 33. + +[156] A pun on "schêma" and "schêsis." + +[157] As thought Aristotle, de Gen. et Corr. ii. 2-8. + +[158] Rep. x. 617; C x. 287; see 2.3.9. + +[159] Rep. x. + +[160] According to Aristotle. + +[161] iv. 4.23. + +[162] Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 7. + +[163] See section 5. + +[164] As thought Aristotle, de Anim. ii. 7. + +[165] As Plato pointed out in his Meno, 80. + +[166] As Plato teaches. + +[167] A mistaken notion of Plato's, then common; see Matth. 6.23. + +[168] Diog. Laert. vii. 157. + +[169] Section 8. + +[170] Section 2. + +[171] Section 6. + +[172] This Stoic theory is set forth by Diogenes Laertes in vii. 157. + +[173] As thought Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 8. + +[174] As Aristotle again thought. + +[175] As thought Aristotle, de Gener. Anim. v. 1. + +[176] See iv. 4.29. + +[177] This book sounds more Numenian or Amelian, than the former three, +which seem to have been written to answer questions of Porphyry's. + +[178] See section 1-7. + +[179] As thought Aristotle in his Physics, viii. + +[180] iv. 3.10. + +[181] See ii. 3.13. + +[182] iii. 6.6. + +[183] Children, whose minds are still weak, and cannot understand the +theories of speculative sciences exhibited by Nic. Eth. x. 7. + +[184] This upper part of the universal Soul is the principal power of +the soul; see ii. 3.17. + +[185] See ii. 3.18. + +[186] In his Phaedrus, 272, Cary, 75. + +[187] That is, the essence of the known object, a pun on "reason," as +in ii. 6.2. + +[188] see iv. 6.3. + +[189] Which is the visible form; see iii. 8.1. + +[190] As thought Plato, Banquet, Cary, 31, and Aristotle in Aristotle, +de Anima, ii. 4. + +[191] This sounds as if it were a quotation from Numenius, though it +does not appear in the latter's fragments. + +[192] See i. 8.2. + +[193] See v. 1.4. + +[194] See iii. 7.2. + +[195] See iii. 7.10. + +[196] Notice the connection between this thought and ii. 5, written in +the same period of his life; see vi. 8.18. + +[197] See iii. 3.7 and vi. 8.15. + +[198] That is, the intelligible matter of ii. 4.3. + +[199] As thought Aristotle, in Nic. Eth. i. 7; de Anima, ii. 1. + +[200] See vi. 8.16. + +[201] vi. 8.15. + +[202] A pun on "koros," meaning both fulness and son. + +[203] Another proof of the chronological order; see 3.8.9. + +[204] Cicero, Orator 2; Seneca, Controversiae v. 36. + +[205] ii. 8.1. + +[206] See i. 6.8. + +[207] i. 6.2. + +[208] i. 6.9. + +[209] i. 6.8. + +[210] i. 6.2. + +[211] i. 6.6. + +[212] i. 6.5. + +[213] iii. 5.6. + +[214] As thought Plato, in Phaedrus, Cary, 58. + +[215] Phaedrus, Cary, 59, 62; Numenius, 32. + +[216] See ii. 2.1. + +[217] In Sophocles Oedipus Coloneus, 1375; a pun on "dü" and "dikên." + +[218] A pun between "science" and "knowledge." + +[219] In his Phaedrus; Cary, 58. + +[220] See v. 1.8. + +[221] See iv. 4.11, 12. + +[222] A pun on the word meaning "forms" and "statues," mentioned above. + +[223] Such as Numenius fr. 20. + +[224] Pun on "agalmata," which has already done duty for "statues" and +"forms." + +[225] Here Plotinos refers to the hieratic writing, which differed from +both the hieroglyphic and demotic. + +[226] See iii. 2 and 3. + +[227] See ii. 9.12; iii. 2.1. + +[228] In his Phaedrus, 246; Cary, 55. + +[229] As was taught by Cleomedes, Meteora viii, and Ptolemy, Almagest +i, Geogr. i. 7; vii. 5. + +[230] See i. 6.9. + +[231] In his Timaeus, 37; Cary, c. 14. + +[232] See i. 3.2; i. 6.8. + +[233] Referring to the Gnostics; see ii. 9.17; this is another proof of +the chronological order. + +[234] As proposed in ii. 9.17. + +[235] See i. 8.15. + +[236] As thought Plato in his Phaedrus; Cary, 56. + +[237] The "infra-celestial vault," of Theodor of Asine. + +[238] As said Plato, in his Phaedrus; Cary, 59. + +[239] See v. 1.6. + +[240] Gnostics. + +[241] Pun on "koros," fulness, or son. + +[242] Or, being satiated with good things. + +[243] See Life of Plotinos, 18. Notice how well the chronological +order works out. The former book (31) and the next (33) treat of the +Gnostics, while this book treats of the philosophical principle of +their practical aspect. Besides, it explains the Amelio-Porphyrian +quarrel. Like all other difficulties of the time, it was about +Gnosticism, and Amelius's dismissal meant that Plotinos rejected +Egyptian Gnosticism, and Numenius's true position as a dualist stands +revealed; but after Porphyry's departure, Plotinos harked back to it. + +[244] We see here an assertion of the standpoint later asserted by +Berkeley, Kant and Hegel that the mind cannot go outside itself, +and that consequently it is the measure of all things. Kant's +"thing-in-itself," a deduction from this, was already discovered by +Plotinos in the result of the "bastard reasoning" process, which Hegel +called "dialectic." + +[245] See iii. 6.1. + +[246] The Kantian "thing-in-itself." See Porphyry, Principles of +Intelligibles, 33. + +[247] See iii. 6.1. + +[248] Here is a pun based on "doxa." + +[249] "Paradechomenê." + +[250] "Doxa," which is derived from "dechesthai," to receive. + +[251] We would, in other words, become pessimists. + +[252] This is Philo's secondary divinity, p. 27, Guthrie's "Message of +Philo Judaeus." + +[253] That is, of the Intelligence and of the intelligible entities. + +[254] Who is the Unity; a Numenian conception, fr. 36. + +[255] A term reminiscent of the famous Christian Nicene formulation. + +[256] That is we will form a "pair." Numenius, 14, also taught the +Pythagorean "pair or doubleness." + +[257] See vi. 6.16. + +[258] Pun between essences, "einai," and one, or "henos." + +[259] "Ousia." + +[260] Notice the two words for "essence." Plato Cratylus, 424; Cary, 87. + +[261] As Plato in his Cratylus suggests. + +[262] Or, essence. + +[263] Or, essence, to be. + +[264] Being. + +[265] The goddess Hestia in Greek, or Vesta in Latin; but "hestia" also +meant a "stand." P. 401, Cratylus, Cary, 40. + +[266] See Numenius, 67, 42. + +[267] See ii. 9.1; iii. 9.9. + +[268] Such as Numenius, 42, and Plutarch, de Isis et Osiris, Fr. Tr. +381. + +[269] From "a-polus." + +[270] See i. 6.4; iii. 5.1. + +[271] See v. 5.1. + +[272] See i. 6, end. + +[273] Pun between "on" and "hen." + +[274] See Plato, Rep. vi., Cary, 13. + +[275] Mentioned in Biography of Plotinos, 16. + +[276] See vi. 9. Another proof of the chronological arrangement. + +[277] See v. 6. + +[278] See v. 1, 2, 3, 6; vi. 7, 9. + +[279] Of Bythos. + +[280] Ennoia and Thelesis. + +[281] By distinguishing within each of them potentiality and +actualization, Numenius, 25, multiplied them. + +[282] Nous, and Logos or Achamoth; see ii. 9.6. + +[283] The prophoric logos, see i. 2.3; and Philo. de Mosis Vita 3. + +[284] See v. 3.4. + +[285] See i. 1.7. + +[286] This is a mingling of Platonic and Aristotelic thought, see +Ravaisson, Essay on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, ii. 407. + +[287] Which would be nonsense; the Gnostics (Valentinus) had gone as +far as 33 aeons. + +[288] See ii. 9.11. + +[289] Between the sense-world, and the intelligible world, see iv. +3.5-8; v. 2.3. Plotinos is followed by Jamblichus and Damascius, but +Proclus and Hermias denied that the soul did not entirely enter into +the body, Stobaeus, Ecl. i. 52. + +[290] See iv. 3.18; iv. 4.3. + +[291] The intelligible world. + +[292] See iv. 3.1-8; iv. 9. + +[293] Thus Plotinos opposes the Gnostic belief that the world was +created, and will perish. + +[294] See ii. 9, 9, 16. + +[295] The Gnostic Horos. + +[296] As Plato said Phaedrus, 246; Cary, 55. + +[297] The Gnostic theory of creation by the fall of Sophia and Achamoth. + +[298] See ii. 9.11. Valentinus however said only that Achamoth had +created all things in honor of the aeons; only the later theologians +held this view mentioned by Plotinos. + +[299] See i. 2.1, 2. + +[300] See I. Tim. vi. 20, 21; and ii. 9.9. + +[301] See ii. 3.9. + +[302] See ii. 1.4. + +[303] This, however, is a mistake of Plotinos's, as the Gnostics held +not this, but that the pneumatic or spiritual humans dwell on earth, +and the psychic in heaven, as Bouillet remarks. + +[304] So that they should remain in the model instead of descending +here below? + +[305] By remaining in the model, instead of descending here below. + +[306] That is, the spiritual germs emanating from the "plerôma." + +[307] Plotinos here treats as synonymous "new earth," "reason of the +world," "model of the world," and "form of the world;" but Bouillet +shows that there is reason to believe he was in error in the matter. + +[308] From the plerôma, whose "seeds of election" they were, and which +now become to them a foreign country. + +[309] Of the aeons, from whom souls, as intelligible beings, had +emanated. + +[310] As in the famous drama of Sophia and Achamoth. + +[311] The unseen place; the transmigrations of Basilides, Valentinus, +Carpocrates, and the others. + +[312] P. 39. Cary, 15. + +[313] Added to Plato by Plotinos. + +[314] Plotinos had done so himself (Intelligence, and the intelligible +world); Numenius (25) also did so. + +[315] See iv. 3.8, 15. + +[316] Such as Pythagoras and Plato, Life of Plot. 23. + +[317] See ii. 9.17. + +[318] The doctrine of the Gnostics. + +[319] Or, generations, the "syzygies" of the aeons, see Titus iii. 9. + +[320] ii. 9.17. + +[321] As in the drama of the fall of Sophia and Achamoth. + +[322] See ii. 1.1; iii. 2.1; iv. 3.9. + +[323] See i. 2. + +[324] iv. 3. + +[325] For the descending souls enter bodies already organized by the +universal Soul, see iv. 3.6; ii. 1.5; ii. 3.9; ii. 9.18. + +[326] Lower part, see ii. 1.5; ii. 3.5, 18. + +[327] See ii. 1, 3, 4, 5. + +[328] The first "bond" is nature, the second is the human soul. + +[329] See ii. 1.3. + +[330] That is, the stars, ii. 3.7-13. + +[331] See ii. 9.5. + +[332] With Plato's Timaeus, 29, Cary, 9. + +[333] In the universal Soul, ii. 3.16, 17. + +[334] By existing and creating, see ii. 5.2. + +[335] See i. 8.7, for matter. + +[336] See ii. 9.3. + +[337] See Philo, de Gigant. i. + +[338] See ii. 2.1. + +[339] See ii. 3.9-13. + +[340] See iv. 8. + +[341] See ii. 3.9. + +[342] See i. 4.8. + +[343] See i. 2. + +[344] See i. 4.7. + +[345] See ii. 3.13. + +[346] See i. 4.8. + +[347] See i. 4.14-16. + +[348] See ii. 3.8, 16. + +[349] See ii. 3.9. + +[350] See below. + +[351] The stars, see ii. 3.9. + +[352] That is, Intelligence, see i. 8.2. + +[353] The stars prognosticate events, see ii. 3.9. + +[354] See i. 2. + +[355] To the perfect Father, Bythos, Irenaeus, ii. 18. + +[356] See Irenaeus, iii. 15. + +[357] See ii. 9.16. + +[358] See Irenaeus. i. 21. + +[359] See Irenaeus, iii. 15. + +[360] See i. 1.12. + +[361] Thus identifying the "reasonable soul" with Sophia, and "the soul +of growth and generation" with Achamoth. + +[362] See ii. 9.4. + +[363] ii. 3.16. + +[364] Or "seminal reasons," ii. 3.13. + +[365] See iii. 4.1. + +[366] As wrote Plato in his second Letter, 2, 312, Cary, 482. + +[367] Jeremiah x. 2. + +[368] Pindar, Olymp. i. 43. + +[369] See ii. 3.9. + +[370] See ii. 3.7. + +[371] See ii. 3.7. + +[372] As thought Plato, Laws, x, p. 897, Cviii. 265; Cary, C8, that +evil is only negative. + +[373] See Irenaeus, i. 25. + +[374] See Origen, c. Cels. i. 24. + +[375] See i. 2. + +[376] This is, however, extreme, as Clement of Alexandria hands down +helpful extracts from Valentinus, Strom. iv.; etc. + +[377] See ii. 9.9 + +[378] See i. 6.7. + +[379] In his Phaedo, pp. 66, 67; Cary, 29-32. + +[380] That is, according to its receptivity. + +[381] As thought Plato in the Timaeus, p. 29; C xi. 110, Cary, 10. + +[382] By the soul that gives it form, see i. 6.2. + +[383] See iii. 4.6; v. 1.2-6. + +[384] See i.4.8-14. + +[385] This was evidently a rebuke to Amelius, for his faithfulness to +Numenius; and it is at this time that Amelius left Plotinos. + +[386] This may refer to Numenius's views, see fr. 27 b. 10. + +[387] Compare Numenius, fr. 61, 62a. + + + + +Transcriber's Notes: + + +Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant +preference was found in this four-volume set; otherwise they were not +changed. + +Simple typographical errors were corrected. + +Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. + +Infrequent spelling of "Plotinus" changed to the predominant "Plotinos." + +Several opening or closing parentheses and quotation marks are +unmatched; Transcriber has not attempted to determine where they belong. + +This four-volume set contains fifty-four "Books," each of which +contains several Sections. Some of the "Books" group those Sections +into sub-Chapters whose headings begin with a letter: "A.", "B.", etc. +(see page 387 as an example). In this plain text version of this eBook, +the Sections and the sub-Chapters are preceded by two blank lines. + +Section headings beginning with letter enumerations, such as A. B. C. +were printed larger than normal Section headings. + +Page 377: "lation as (form)" perhaps should be "relation as (form)"; +unchanged here. + +Page 387: "two order of things" perhaps should be "two orders of +things". + +Page 459: "who is imaging to know" probably should be who is "imagining +to know". + +Page 459: the opening parenthesis in "which (the Soul herself" has no +matching closing parenthesis; it probably belongs after "Soul". + +Page 467: incorrect/inconsistent single and double quotation marks in +the following line have not been changed: + + passion' and suffering, unless the word "suffering' + +Page 470: "What in us in the soul's" perhaps should be "What in us is +the soul's". + +Page 494: in the source, the last line, "who assumes the various poses +suggested by the music," was out of place; no suitable place for it was +found, so it has been removed for continuity and now appears only in +this note. + +Page 530: the closing parenthesis after "perceived object" also is +the closing parenthesis for the phrase beginning "is ill-founded". +There are other instances in this four-volume set in which closing +parentheses and quotation marks are shared. + +Page 555: "within yourself they you may" perhaps should be "within +yourself then you may". + +Page 613: "a constitution similar that of each" probably should be "a +constitution similar to that of each". + + +Footnote Issues: + +In these notes, "anchor" means the reference to a footnote, and +"footnote" means the information to which the anchor refers. Anchors +occur within the main text, while footnotes are grouped in sequence at +the end of this eBook. The structure of the original book required two +exceptions to this, as explained below. + +The original text used chapter endnotes. In this eBook, they have been +combined into a single, ascending sequence based on the sequence in +which the footnotes occurred in the original book, and placed at the +end of the eBook. Several irregularities are explained below. + +1. Some footnotes are referenced by more than one anchor, so two or +more anchors may refer to the same footnote. + +2. Some anchors were out of sequence, apparently because they were +added afterwards or because they are share a footnote with another +anchor. They have been renumbered to match the numbers of the footnotes +to which they refer. + +Page 349: Footnote 16 (originally 2) has no anchor. + +Page 597: Footnote 251 (originally 9) has no anchor. + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2, by +Plotinos (Plotinus) + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 42931 *** |