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diff --git a/42930-0.txt b/42930-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf5462b --- /dev/null +++ b/42930-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,9727 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 42930 *** + + PLOTINOS + Complete Works + + In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods; + + With + BIOGRAPHY by PORPHYRY, EUNAPIUS, & SUIDAS, + COMMENTARY by PORPHYRY, + ILLUSTRATIONS by JAMBLICHUS & AMMONIUS, + STUDIES in Sources, Development, Influence; + INDEX of Subjects, Thoughts and Words. + + by + KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE, + + Professor in Extension, University of the South, Sewanee; + A.M., Sewanee, and Harvard; Ph.D., Tulane, and Columbia. + M.D., Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia. + + COMPARATIVE LITERATURE PRESS + P. O. Box 42, ALPINE, N.J., U.S.A. + + + + + Copyright, 1918, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie. + All Rights, including that of Translation, Reserved. + + Entered at Stationers' Hall, by + George Bell and Sons, Portugal Street, Lincoln's Inn, London. + + + + + PLOTINOS + Complete Works + + In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods; + + With + BIOGRAPHY by PORPHYRY, EUNAPIUS, & SUIDAS, + COMMENTARY by PORPHYRY, + ILLUSTRATIONS by JAMBLICHUS & AMMONIUS, + STUDIES in Sources, Development, Influence; + INDEX of Subjects, Thoughts and Words. + + by + KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE, + + Professor in Extension, University of the South, Sewanee; + A.M., Sewanee, and Harvard; Ph.D., Tulane, and Columbia. + M.D., Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia. + + VOL. I + Biographies; Amelian Books, 1-21. + + COMPARATIVE LITERATURE PRESS + P. O. Box 42, ALPINE, N.J., U.S.A. + + + + +FOREWORD + + +It is only with mixed feelings that such a work can be published. +Overshadowing all is the supreme duty to the English-speaking world, +and secondarily to the rest of humanity to restore to them in an +accessible form their, till now, unexploited spiritual heritage, with +its flood of light on the origins of their favorite philosophy. And +then comes the contrast--the pitiful accomplishment. Nor could it +be otherwise; for there are passages that never can be interpreted +perfectly; moreover, the writer would gladly have devoted to it every +other leisure moment of his life--but that was impossible. As a matter +of fact, he would have made this translation at the beginning of his +life, instead of at its end, had it not been for a mistaken sense of +modesty; but as no one offered to do it, he had to do it himself. If he +had done it earlier, his "Philosophy of Plotinos" would have been a far +better work. + +Indeed, if it was not for the difficulty and expense of putting it +out, the writer would now add to the text an entirely new summary of +Plotinos's views. The fairly complete concordance, however, should +be of service to the student, and help to rectify the latest German +summary of Plotinos, that by Drews, which in its effort to furnish a +foundation for Hartmann's philosophy of the unconscious, neglected both +origins and spiritual aspects. However, the present genetic insight of +Plotinos's development should make forever impossible that theory of +cast-iron coherence, which is neither historical nor human. + +The writer, having no thesis such as Drews' to justify, will +welcome all corrections and suggestions. He regrets the inevitable +uncertainties of capitalization (as between the supreme One, +Intelligence World-Soul and Daemon or guardian, and the lower +one, intelligence, soul and demon or guardian); and any other +inconsistencies of which he may have been guilty; and he beseeches the +mantle of charity in view of the stupendousness of the undertaking, +in which he practically could get no assistance of any kind, and also +in view of the almost insuperable difficulties of his own career. He, +however, begs to assure the reader that he did everything "ad majorem +Dei gloriam." + + + + +INDEX. + + + PLOTINOS' COMPLETE WORKS. + + Preface 1 + + Concordance of Enneads and Chronological Numbers 2 + + Concordance of Chronological Numbers and Enneads 3 + + Biography of Plotinos, by Porphyry 5 + + Biographies by Eunapius and Suidas 39 + + Amelian Books, 1-21 40 + + Amelio-Porphyrian Books, 22-23 283 + + Porphyrian Books, 34-45 641 + + Eustochian Books, 46-54 1017 + + + PLOTINIC STUDIES + + IN SOURCES, DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCE. + + 1. Development in the Teachings of Plotinos 1269 + + 2. Platonism: Significance, Progress, and Results 1288 + + 3. Plotinos' View of Matter 1296 + + 4. Plotinos' Creation of the Trinity 1300 + + 5. Resemblances to Christianity 1307 + + 6. Indebtedness to Numenius 1313 + + 7. Value of Plotinos 1327 + + Concordance to Plotinos i + +An outline of the doctrines of Plotinos is published under the title +"The Message of Plotinos." + + + + +CONCORDANCE OF ENNEADS AND CHRONOLOGICAL NUMBERS + + + i.1 53 iii.1 3 v.1 10 + + i.2 19 iii.2 47 v.2 11 + + i.3 20 iii.3 48 v.3 49 + + i.4 46 iii.4 15 v.4 7 + + i.5 36 iii.5 50 v.5 32 + + i.6 1 iii.6 26 v.6 24 + + i.7 54 iii.7 45 v.7 18 + + i.8 51 iii.8 30 v.8 31 + + i.9 16 iii.9 13 v.9 5 + + ii.1 40 iv.1 4 vi.1 42 + + ii.2 14 iv.2 21 vi.2 43 + + ii.3 52 iv.3 27 vi.3 44 + + ii.4 12 iv.4 28 vi.4 22 + + ii.5 25 iv.5 29 vi.5 23 + + ii.6 17 iv.6 41 vi.6 34 + + ii.7 37 iv.7 2 vi.7 38 + + ii.8 35 iv.8 6 vi.8 39 + + ii.9 33 iv.9 8 vi.9 9 + + +CONCORDANCE OF CHRONOLOGICAL NUMBERS AND ENNEADS + + 1 i.6 19 i.2 37 ii.7 + + 2 iv.7 20 i.3 38 vi.7 + + 3 iii.1 21 iv.2 39 vi.8 + + 4 iv.1 22 vi.4 40 ii.1 + + 5 v.9 23 vi.5 41 iv.6 + + 6 iv.8 24 v.6 42 vi.1 + + 7 v.4 25 ii.5 43 vi.2 + + 8 iv.9 26 iii.6 44 vi.3 + + 9 vi.9 27 iv.3 45 iii.7 + + 10 v.1 28 iv.4 46 i.4 + + 11 v.2 29 iv.5 47 iii.2 + + 12 ii.4 30 iii.8 48 iii.3 + + 13 iii.9 31 v.8 49 v.3 + + 14 ii.2 32 v.5 50 iii.5 + + 15 iii.4 33 ii.9 51 i.8 + + 16 i.9 34 vi.6 52 ii.3 + + 17 ii.6 35 ii.8 53 i.1 + + 18 v.7 36 i.5 54 i.7 + + + + +Life of Plotinos And Order of his Writings + +By PORPHYRY. (_Written when about 70 years of age, see 23._) + + + I. PLOTINOS, LIKE PORPHYRY, DESPISED HIS PHYSICAL NATURE, BUT A + PICTURE OF HIM WAS SECURED. + +Plotinos the philosopher, who lived recently, seemed ashamed of having +a body. Consequently he never spoke of his family or home (Lycopolis, +now Syout, in the Thebaid, in Egypt). He never would permit anybody +to perpetuate him in a portrait or statue. One day that Amelius[1] +begged him to allow a painting to be made of him, he said, "Is it not +enough for me to have to carry around this image[2], in which nature +has enclosed us? Must I besides transmit to posterity the image of this +image as worthy of attention?" As Amelius never succeeded in getting +Plotinos to reconsider his refusal, and to consent to give a sitting, +Amelius begged his friend Carterius, the most famous painter of those +times, to attend Plotinos's lectures, which were free to all. By dint +of gazing at Plotinos, Carterius so filled his own imagination with +Plotinos's features that he succeeded in painting them from memory. +By his advice, Amelius directed Carterius in these labors, so that +this portrait was a very good likeness. All this occurred without the +knowledge of Plotinos. + + +II. SICKNESS AND DEATH OF PLOTINOS; HIS BIRTHDAY UNKNOWN. + +Plotinos was subject to chronic digestive disorders; nevertheless, +he never was willing to take any remedies, on the plea that it was +unworthy of a man of his age to relieve himself by such means. Neither +did he ever take any of the then popular "wild animal remedy," because, +said he, he did not even eat the flesh of domestic animals, let alone +that of savage ones. He never bathed, contenting himself, with daily +massage at home. But when at the period of the plague, which was most +virulent,[3] the man who rubbed him died of it, he gave up the massage. +This interruption in his habits brought on him a chronic quinsy, which +never became very noticeable, so long as I remained with him; but after +I left him, it became aggravated to the point that his voice, formerly +sonorous and powerful, became permanently hoarse; besides, his vision +became disturbed, and ulcers appeared on his hands and feet. All this +I learned on my return, from my friend Eustochius, who remained with +him until his end. These inconveniences hindered his friends from +seeing him as often as they used to do, though he persisted in his +former custom of speaking to each one individually. The only solution +of this difficulty was for him to leave Rome. He retired into Campania, +on an estate that had belonged to Zethus, one of his friends who had +died earlier. All he needed was furnished by the estate itself, or +was brought to him from the estate at Minturnae, owned by Castricius +(author of a Commentary on Plato's Parmenides, to whom Porphyry +dedicated his treatise on Vegetarianism). Eustochius himself told me +that he happened to be at Puzzoli at the time of Plotinos's death, +and that he was slow in reaching the bedside of Plotinos. The latter +then said to him, "I have been waiting for you; I am trying to unite +what is divine in us[4] to that which is divine in the universe." Then +a serpent, who happened to be under Plotinos's death-bed slipped into +a hole in the wall (as happened at the death of Scipio Africanus, +Pliny, Hist. Nat. xv. 44), and Plotinos breathed his last. At that +time Plotinos was 66 years old (in 270, born in 205), according to the +account of Eustochius. The emperor Claudius II was then finishing the +second year of his reign. I was at Lilybaeum; Amelius was at Apamaea +in Syria, Castricius in Rome, and Eustochius alone was with Plotinos. +If we start from the second year of Claudius II and go back 66 years, +we will find that Plotinos's birth falls in the 18th year of Septimus +Severus (205). He never would tell the month or day of his birth, +because he did not approve of celebrating his birth-day either by +sacrifices, or banquets. Still he himself performed a sacrifice, and +entertained his friends on the birth-days of Plato and Socrates; and on +those days those who could do it had to write essays and read them to +the assembled company. + + +III. PLOTINOS'S EARLY EDUCATION. + +This is as much as we learned about him during various interviews +with him. At eight years of age he was already under instruction by a +grammarian, though the habit of uncovering his nurse's breast to suck +her milk, with avidity, still clung to him. One day, however, she so +complained of his importunity that he became ashamed of himself, and +ceased doing so. At 28 years of age he devoted himself entirely to +philosophy. He was introduced to the teachers who at that time were +the most famous in Alexandria. He would return from their lectures +sad and discouraged. He communicated the cause of this grief to one +of his friends, who led him to Ammonius, with whom Plotinos was not +acquainted. As soon as he heard this philosopher, he said to his +friend, "This is the man I was looking for!" From that day forwards +he remained close to Ammonius. So great a taste for philosophy did he +develop, that he made up his mind to study that which was being taught +among the Persians, and among the Hindus. When emperor Gordian prepared +himself for his expedition against the Persians, Plotinos, then 39 +years old, followed in the wake of the army. He had spent between 10 +to 11 years near Ammonius. After Gordian was killed in Mesopotamia, +Plotinos had considerable trouble saving himself at Antioch. He reached +Rome while Philip was emperor, and when he himself was 50 years of age. + + +THE SCHOOL OF AMMONIUS. + +Herennius, (the pagan) Origen, and Plotinos had agreed to keep secret +the teachings they had received from Ammonius. Plotinos carried out his +agreement. Herennius was the first one to break it, and Origen followed +his example. The latter limited himself to writing a book entitled, +"Of Daemons;" and, under the reign of Gallienus, he wrote another one +to prove that "The Emperor alone is the Only Poet" (if the book was +a flattery; which is not likely. Therefore it probably meant: "The +King (of the universe, that is, the divine Intelligence), is the only +'demiurgic' Creator.") + + +PLOTINOS AN UNSYSTEMATIC TEACHER. + +For a long period Plotinos did not write anything. He contented himself +with teaching orally what he had learned from Ammonius. He thus passed +ten whole years teaching a few pupils, without committing anything to +writing. However, as he allowed his pupils to question him, it often +happened that his school was disorderly, and that there were useless +discussions, as I later heard from Amelius. + + +AMELIUS, PLOTINOS'S FIRST SECRETARY. + +Amelius enrolled himself among the pupils of Plotinos during the third +year of Plotinos's stay in Rome, which also was the third year of the +reign of Claudius II, that is, 24 years. Amelius originally had been +a disciple of the Stoic philosopher Lysimachus.[5] Amelius surpassed +all his fellow-pupils by his systematic methods of study. He had +copied, gathered, and almost knew by heart all the works of Numenius. +He composed a hundred copy-books of notes taken at the courses of +Plotinos, and he gave them as a present to his adopted son, Hostilianus +Hesychius, of Apamea. (Fragments of Amelius's writings are found +scattered in those of Proclus, Stobaeus, Olympiodorus, Damascius, and +many of the Church Fathers.) + + +IV. HOW PORPHYRY CAME TO PLOTINOS FOR THE FIRST TIME, IN 253. + +In the tenth year of the reign of Gallienus, I (then being twenty +years of age), left Greece and went to Rome with Antonius of Rhodes. +I found there Amelius, who had been following the courses of Plotinos +for eighteen years. He had not yet dared to write anything, except a +few books of notes, of which there were not yet as many as a hundred. +In this tenth year of the reign of Gallienus, Plotinos was fifty-nine +years old. When I (for the second, and more important time) joined +him, I was thirty years of age. During the first year of Gallienus, +Plotinos began to write upon some topics of passing interest, and in +the tenth year of Gallienus, when I visited him for the first time, he +had written twenty-one books, which had been circulated only among a +very small number of friends. They were not given out freely, and it +was not easy to go through them. They were communicated to students +only under precautionary measures, and after the judgment of those who +received them had been carefully tested. + + +PLOTINOS'S BOOKS OF THE FIRST PERIOD (THE AMELIAN PERIOD). + +I shall mention the books that Plotinos had already written at that +time. As he had prefixed no titles to them, several persons gave them +different ones. Here are those that have asserted themselves: + + 1. Of the Beautiful. i. 6. + + 2. Of the Immortality of the Soul. iv. 7. + + 3. Of Fate. iii. 1. + + 4. Of the Nature of the Soul. iv. 1. + + 5. Of Intelligence, of Ideas, and of Existence. v. 9. + + 6. Of the Descent of the Soul into the Body. iv. 8. + + 7. How does that which is Posterior to the First + Proceed from Him? Of the One. v. 4. + + 8. Do all the Souls form but a Single Soul? iv. 9. + + 9. Of the Good, or of the One. vi. 9. + + 10. Of the Three Principal Hypostatic Forms of + Existence, v. 1. + + 11. Of Generation, and of the Order of Things + after the First, v. 2. + + 12. (Of the Two) Matters, (the Sensible and + Intelligible). ii. 4. + + 13. Various Considerations, iii. 9. + + 14. Of the (Circular) Motion of the Heavens. ii. 2. + + 15. Of the Daemon Allotted to Us, iii. 4. + + 16. Of (Reasonable) Suicide, i. 9. + + 17. Of Quality, ii. 6. + + 18. Are there Ideas of Individuals? v. 7. + + 19. Of Virtues. i. 2. + + 20. Of Dialectics. i. 3. + + 21. (How does the Soul keep the Mean between + Indivisible Nature and Divisible Nature?) iv. 2. + +These twenty-one books were already written when I visited Plotinos; he +was then in the fifty-ninth year of his age. + + +V. HOW PORPHYRY CAME TO PLOTINOS FOR THE SECOND TIME (A. D. 263-269). + +I remained with him this year, and the five following ones. I had +already visited Rome ten years previously; but at that time Plotinos +spent his summers in vacation, and contented himself with instructing +his visitors orally. + +During the above-mentioned six years, as several questions had been +cleared up in the lectures of Plotinos, and at the urgent request of +Amelius and myself that he write them down, he wrote two books to prove +that + + +PLOTINOS'S BOOKS OF THE SECOND PERIOD (THE PORPHYRIAN PERIOD). + + 22. The One and Identical Existence is Everywhere + Entire, I, vi. 4. + + 23. Second Part Thereof. vi. 5. + +Then he wrote the book entitled: + + 24. The Superessential Transcendent Principle + Does Not Think. Which is the First Thinking + Principle? And Which is the Second? v. 6. + +He also wrote the following books: + + 25. Of Potentiality and Actualization. ii. 5. + + 26. Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal + Entities. iii. 6. + + 27. Of the Soul, First Part. iv. 3. + + 28. Of the Soul, Second Part. iv. 4. + + 29. (Of the Soul, Third; or, How do We See?) iv. 5. + + 30. Of Contemplation. iii. 8. + + 31. Of Intelligible Beauty. v. 8. + + 32. The Intelligible Entities are not Outside of + Intelligence. Of Intelligence and of Soul. v. 5. + + 33. Against the Gnostics. ii. 9. + + 34. Of Numbers. vi. 6. + + 35. Why do Distant Objects Seem Small? ii. 8. + + 36. Does Happiness (Consist in Duration?) i. 5. + + 37. Of the Mixture with Total Penetration. ii. 7. + + 38. Of the Multitude of Ideas; Of the Good. vi. 7. + + 39. Of the Will. vi. 8. + + 40. (Of the World). ii. 1. + + 41. Of Sensation, and of Memory. iv. 6. + + 42. Of the Kinds of Existence, First. vi. 1. + + 43. Of the Kinds of Existence, Second. vi. 2. + + 44. Of the Kinds of Existence, Third. vi. 3. + + 45. Of Eternity and Time. iii. 7. + +Plotinos wrote these twenty-four books during the six years I spent +with him; as subjects he would take the problems that happened to come +up, and which we have indicated by the titles of these books. These +twenty-four books, joined to the twenty-one Plotinos had written before +I came to him, make forty-five. + + +VI. PLOTINOS'S BOOKS OF THE THIRD PERIOD (THE EUSTOCHIAN PERIOD). + +While I was in Sicily, where I went in the fifteenth year of the reign +of Gallienus, he wrote five new books that he sent me: + + 46. Of Happiness. i. 4. + + 47. Of Providence, First. iii. 2. + + 48. Of Providence, Second. iii. 3. + + 49. Of the Hypostases that Act as Means of + Knowledge, and of the Transcendent. v. 3. + + 50. Of Love. iii. 5. + +These books he sent me in the last year of the reign of Claudius II, +and at the beginning of the second. + +Shortly before dying, he sent me the following four books: + + 51. Of the Nature of Evils. i. 8. + + 52. Of the Influence of the Stars. ii. 3. + + 53. What is the Animal? What is Man? i. 1. + + 54. Of the First Good (or, of Happiness). i. 7. + +These nine books, with the forty-five previously written, make in all +fifty-four. + +Some were composed during the youth of the author, others when in +his bloom, and finally the last, when his body was already seriously +weakened; and they betray his condition while writing them. The +twenty-one first books seem to indicate a spirit which does not yet +possess all its vigor and firmness. Those that he wrote during the +middle of his life, show that his genius was then in its full form. +These twenty-four books may be considered to be perfect, with the +exception of a few passages. The last nine are less powerful than the +others; and of these nine, the last four are the weakest. + + +VII. VARIOUS DISCIPLES OF PLOTINOS. + +Plotinos had a great number of auditors and disciples, who were +attracted to his courses by love of philosophy. + +Among this number was Amelius of Etruria, whose true name was +Gentilianus. He did indeed insist that in his name the letter "l" +should be replaced by "r," so that his name should read "Amerius," from +"ameria" (meaning indivisibility, though Suidas states that it was +derived from the town of Ameria, in the province of Umbria), and not +Amelius, from "amellia" (negligence). + +A very zealous disciple of Plotinos was a physician from Scythopolis +(or, Bethshean, in Palestine), named Paulinus, whose mind was full of +ill-digested information and whom Amelius used to call Mikkalos (the +tiny). + +Eustochius of Alexandria, also a physician, knew Plotinos at the end +of his life, and remained with him until his death, to care for him. +Exclusively occupied with the teachings of Plotinos, he himself became +a genuine philosopher. + +Zoticus, also, attached himself to Plotinos. He was both critic and +poet; he corrected the works of Antimachus, and beautifully versified +the fable of the Atlantidae. His sight gave out, however, and he died +shortly before Plotinos. Paulinus also, died before Plotinos. + +Zethus was one of the disciples of Plotinos. He was a native of Arabia, +and had married the daughter of Theodosius, friend of Ammonius. He was +a physician, and much beloved by Plotinos, who sought to lead him to +withdraw from public affairs, for which he had considerable aptitude; +and with which he occupied himself with zeal. Plotinos lived in very +close relations with him; he even retired to the country estate of +Zethus, distant six miles from Minturnae. + +Castricius, surnamed Firmus, had once owned this estate. Nobody, in our +times, loved virtue more than Firmus. He held Plotinos in the deepest +veneration. He rendered Amelius the same services that might have been +rendered by a good servant, he displayed for me the attentions natural +towards a brother. Nevertheless this man, who was so attached to +Plotinos, remained engaged in public affairs. + +Several senators, also, came to listen to Plotinos. Marcellus, +Orontius, Sabinillus and Rogatianus applied themselves, under Plotinos, +to the study of philosophy. + +The latter, who also was a member of the senate, had so detached +himself from the affairs of life, that he had abandoned all his +possessions, dismissed all his attendants, and renounced all his +dignities. On being appointed praetor, at the moment of being +inaugurated, while the lictors were already waiting for him, he refused +to sally forth, and carry out any of the functions of this dignity. +He even failed to dwell in his own house (to avoid needless pomp); he +visited his friends, boarding and sleeping there; he took food only +every other day; and by this dieting, after having been afflicted +with gout to the point of having to be carried around in a litter, he +recovered his strength, and stretched out his hands as easily as any +artisan, though formerly his hands had been incapacitated. Plotinos was +very partial to him; he used to praise him publicly, and pointed him +out as a model to all who desired to become philosophers. + +Another disciple of Plotinos was Serapion of Alexandria. At first he +had been a rhetorician, and only later applied himself to philosophy. +Nevertheless he never was able to cure himself of fondness for riches, +or usury. + +Me also, Porphyry, a native of Tyre, Plotinos admitted to the circle of +his intimate friends, and he charged me to give the final revision to +his works. + + +VIII. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PLOTINOS. + +Once Plotinos had written something, he could neither retouch, nor even +re-read what he had done, because his weak eyesight made any reading +very painful. His penmanship was poor. He did not separate words, and +his spelling was defective; he was chiefly occupied with ideas. Until +his death he continuously persisted in this habit, which was for us +all a subject of surprise. When he had finished composing something in +his head, and when he then wrote what he had meditated on, it seemed +as if he copied a book. Neither in conversation nor in discussion did +he allow himself to be distracted from the purpose of his thoughts, +so that he was able at the same time to attend to the needs of +conversation, while pursuing the meditation of the subject which busied +him. When the person who had been talking with him went away, he did +not re-read what he had written before the interruption, which, as has +been mentioned above, was to save his eyesight; he could, later on, +take up the thread of his composition as if the conversation had been +no obstacle to his attention. He therefore was able simultaneously to +live with others and with himself. He never seemed to need recuperation +from this interior attention, which hardly ceased during his slumbers, +which, however, were troubled both by the insufficiency of food, +for sometimes he did not even eat bread, and by this continuous +concentration of his mind. + + +IX. PLOTINOS AS GUARDIAN AND ARBITRATOR. + +There were women who were very much attached to him. There was his +boarding house keeper Gemina, and her daughter, also called Gemina; +there was also Amphiclea, wife of Aristo, son of Jamblichus, all +three of whom were very fond of philosophy. Several men and women +of substance, being on the point of death, entrusted him with their +boys and girls, and all their possessions, as being an irreproachable +trustee; and the result was that his house was filled with young boys +and girls. Among these was Polemo, whom Plotinos educated carefully; +and Plotinos enjoyed hearing Polemo recite original verses (?). +He used to go through the accounts of the managers with care, and +saw to their economy; he used to say that until these young people +devoted themselves entirely to philosophy, their possessions should +be preserved intact, and see that they enjoyed their full incomes. +The obligation of attending to the needs of so many wards did not, +however, hinder him from devoting to intellectual concerns a continuous +attention during the nights. His disposition was gentle, and he was +very approachable by all who dwelt with him. Consequently, although he +dwelt full twenty-six years in Rome, and though he was often chosen as +arbitrator in disputes, never did he offend any public personage. + + +X. HOW PLOTINOS TREATED HIS ADVERSARY, OLYMPIUS. + +Among those who pretended to be philosophers, there was a certain man +named Olympius. He lived in Alexandria, and for some time had been a +disciple of Ammonius. As he desired to succeed better than Plotinos, +he treated Plotinos with scorn, and developed sufficient personal +animosity against Plotinos to try to bewitch him by magical operations. +However, Olympius noticed that this enterprise was really turning +against himself, and he acknowledged to his friends that the soul of +Plotinos must be very powerful, since it was able to throw back upon +his enemies the evil practices directed against him. The first time +that Olympius attempted to harm him, Plotinos having noticed it, said, +"At this very moment the body of Olympius is undergoing convulsions, +and is contracting like a purse." As Olympius several times felt +himself undergoing the very ills he was trying to get Plotinos to +undergo, he finally ceased his practices. + + +HOMAGE TO PLOTINOS FROM A VISITING EGYPTIAN PRIEST. + +Plotinos showed a natural superiority to other men. An Egyptian priest, +visiting Rome, was introduced to him by a mutual friend. Having decided +to show some samples of his mystic attainments, he begged Plotinos to +come and witness the apparition of a familiar spirit who obeyed him on +being evoked. The evocation was to occur in a chapel of Isis, as the +Egyptian claimed that he had not been able to discover any other place +pure enough in Rome. He therefore evoked Plotinos's guardian spirit. +But instead of the spirit appeared a divinity of an order superior to +that of guardians, which event led the Egyptian to say to Plotinos, +"You are indeed fortunate, O Plotinos, that your guardian spirit is +a divinity, instead of a being of a lower order." The divinity that +appeared could not be questioned or seen for as long a period as they +would have liked, as a friend who was watching over the sacrificed +birds choked them, either out of jealousy, or fear. + + +PLOTINOS'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PUBLIC MYSTERIES. + +As Plotinos's guardian spirit was a divinity, Plotinos kept the eyes of +his own spirit directed on that divine guardian. That was the motive of +his writing his book[6] that bears the title "Of the Guardian Allotted +to Us." In it he tries to explain the differences between the various +spirits that watch over mankind. Aurelius, who was very scrupulous +in his sacrifices, and who carefully celebrated the Festivals of the +New Moon (as Numenius used to do?) (on the Calends of each month), +one day besought Plotinos to come and take part in a function of that +kind. Plotinos, however, answered him, "It is the business of those +divinities to come and visit me, and not mine to attend on them." We +could not understand why he should make an utterance that revealed so +much pride, but we dared not question the matter. + + +XI. PLOTINOS AS DETECTIVE AND AS PROPHET; PORPHYRY SAVED FROM SUICIDE. + +So perfectly did he understand the character of men, and their methods +of thought, that he could discover stolen objects, and foresaw what +those who resided with him should some day become. A magnificent +necklace had been stolen from Chione, an estimable widow, who resided +with him and the children (as matron?). All the slaves were summoned, +and Plotinos examined them all. Then, pointing out one of them, he +said, "This is the culprit." He was put to the torture. For a long +while, he denied the deed; but later acknowledged it, and returned the +necklace. Plotinos used to predict what each of the young people who +were in touch with him was to become. He insisted that Polemo would +be disposed to amorous relations, and would not live long; which also +occurred. As to me, he noticed that I was meditating suicide. He came +and sought me, in his house, where I was staying. He told me that this +project indicated an unsound mind, and that it was the result of a +melancholy disposition. He advised me to travel. I obeyed him. I went +to Sicily,[7] to study under Probus, a celebrated philosopher, who +dwelt in Lilybaeum. I was thus cured of the desire to die; but I was +deprived of the happiness of residing with Plotinos until his death. + + +XII. THE PROJECT OF A PLATONOPOLIS COMES TO NAUGHT. + +The emperor Gallienus and the empress Salonina, his wife, held Plotinos +in high regard. Counting on their good will, he besought them to have a +ruined town in Campania rebuilt, to give it with all its territory to +him, that its inhabitants might be ruled by the laws of Plato. Plotinos +intended to have it named Platonopolis, and to go and reside there +with his disciples. This request would easily have been granted but +that some of the emperor's courtiers opposed this project, either from +spite, jealousy, or other unworthy motive. + + +XIII. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PLOTINOS'S DELIVERY. + +In his lectures his delivery was very good; he knew how to make +immediate apposite replies. Nevertheless, his language was not correct. +For instance, he used to say "anamnemisketai" for "anamimnesketai"; +and he made similar blunders in writing. But when he would speak, his +intelligence seemed to shine in his face, and to illuminate it with +its rays. He grew especially handsome in discussions; a light dew of +perspiration appeared on his forehead, gentleness radiated in his +countenance, he answered kindly, but satisfactorily. For three days I +had to question him, to learn from him his opinions about the union +of the body with the soul; he spent all that time in explaining to me +what I wanted to know.[8] A certain Thaumasius, who had entered into +the school, said that he wanted to take down the arguments of the +discussion in writing, and hear Plotinos himself speak; but that he +would not stand Porphyry's answering and questioning. "Nevertheless," +answered Plotinos, "if Porphyry does not, by his questions, bring up +the difficulties that we should solve (notice, in the course of the +Enneads, the continual objections), we would have nothing to write." + + +XIV. PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIONS OF PLOTINOS. + +The style of Plotinos is vigorous and substantial, containing more +thoughts than words, and is often full of enthusiasm and emotion. +He follows his own inspirations rather than ideas transmitted by +tradition. The teachings of the Stoics and Peripatetics are secretly +mingled among his works; the whole of Aristotle's Metaphysics is +therein condensed. Plotinos was fully up to the times in geometry, +arithmetic, mechanics, optics and music, although he did not take an +over-weening interest in these sciences. At his lectures were read +the Commentaries of Severus, of Cronius;[9] of Numenius,[10] of Gaius +and Atticus (Platonic Philosophers, the latter, setting forth the +differences between Plato and Aristotle);[11] there were also readings +of the works of the Peripatetics, of Aspasius, of Alexander (of +Aphrodisia, whose theory of Mixture in the Universe Plotinos studies +several times), of Adrastus, and other philosophers of the day. None of +them, however, was exclusively admired by Plotinos. In his speculations +he revealed an original and independent disposition. In all his +researches he displayed the spirit of Ammonius. He could readily +assimilate (what he read); then, in a few words, he summarized the +ideas aroused in him by profound meditation thereon. One day Longinus's +book "On the Principles," and his "On Antiquarians" were read. Plotinos +said, "Longinus is a literary man, but not a philosopher." Origen (the +Pagan[12]) once came among his audience; Plotinos blushed, and started +to rise. Origen, however, besought him to continue. Plotinos, however, +answered that it was only natural for lecturers to cease talking when +they were aware of the presence, in the audience, of people who already +knew what was to be said. Then, after having spoken a little longer, he +rose. + + +XV. PORPHYRY EARNED RECOGNITION AT THE SCHOOL OF PLOTINOS. + +At a celebration of Plato's birthday I was reading a poem about the +"Mystic Marriage" (of the Soul) when somebody doubted my sanity, +because it contained both enthusiasm and mysticism. Plotinos spoke +up, and said to me, loud enough to be heard by everybody, "You have +just proved to us that you are at the same time poet, philosopher, and +hierophant." On this occasion the rhetorician Diophanes read an apology +on the utterances of Alcibiades in Plato's "Banquet," and he sought to +prove that a disciple who seeks to exercise himself in virtue should +show unlimited "complaisance" for his teacher, even in case the latter +were in love with him. Plotinos rose several times, as if he wanted to +leave the assembly; nevertheless, he restrained himself, and after the +audience had dispersed, he asked me to refute the paper. As Diophanes +would not communicate it to me, I recalled his arguments, and refuted +them; and then I read my paper before the same auditors as those who +had heard what had been said by Diophanes. I pleased Plotinos so much, +that several times he interrupted me by the words, "Strike that way, +and you will become the light of men!" When Eubulus, who was teaching +Platonism at Athens, sent to Plotinos some papers on Platonic subjects, +Plotinos had them given to me to examine them and report to him about +them. He also studied the laws of astronomy, but not as a mathematician +would have done; he carefully studied astrology; but realizing that no +confidence could be placed in its predictions, he took the trouble to +refute them several times, in his work.[13] + + +XVI. PLOTINOS'S POLEMIC AGAINST THE GNOSTICS. + +At that time there were many Christians, among whom were prominent +sectarians who had given up the ancient philosophy (of Plato and +Pythagoras), such as Adelphius and Aquilinus. They esteemed and +possessed the greater part of the works of Alexander of Lybia, +of Philocomus, of Demostrates and of Lydus. They advertised the +Revelations of Zoroaster, of Zostrian, of Nicotheus, of Allogenes, of +Mesus, and of several others. These sectarians deceived a great number +of people, and even deceived themselves, insisting that Plato had not +exhausted the depths of intelligible "being," or essence. That is why +Plotinos refuted them at length in his lectures, and wrote the book +that we have named "Against the Gnostics." The rest (of their books) +he left me to investigate. Amelius wrote as much as forty books to +refute the work of Zostrian; and as to me, I demonstrated by numerous +proofs that this alleged Zoroastrian book was apocryphal, and had only +recently been written by those of that ilk who wished to make people +believe that their doctrines had been taught by Zoroaster. + + +XVII. START OF THE AMELIO-PORPHYRIAN CONTROVERSY, OVER NUMENIUS. + +The Greeks insisted that Plotinos had appropriated the teachings of +Numenius. Trypho, who was both a Stoic and a Platonist, insisted +on this to Amelius, who wrote a book that we have entitled, "On +the Difference Between the Teachings of Plotinos and Numenius." He +dedicated it to me under the title, "To Basil" (the King, recently used +as a name, "Royal"). That was my name before I was called "Porphyry," +the "Purple One." In my own home language (Phoenician) I used to be +called "Malchus"; that was my father's name, and in Greek "Malchus" +is translated by "Basileus" (Basil, or King). Indeed, Longinus, who +dedicated his book "On Instinct" to Cleodamus, and me jointly, there +calls me "Malchus"; and Amelius has translated this name in Greek, just +as Numenius translated "Maximus" (from Latin into Greek by) "Megaos" +(the great one). (I will quote the letter in full). + +"Greetings from Amelius to Basil (Royal, or Purple One): + +"You may be sure that I did not have the least inclination even +to mention some otherwise respectable people who, to the point of +deafening you, insist that the doctrines of our friend (Plotinos) are +none other than those of Numenius of Apamea. It is evident enough that +these reproaches are entirely due to their desire to advertise their +oratorical abilities. Possessed with the desire to rend Plotinos to +pieces, they dare to go as far as to assert that he is no more than a +babbler, a forger, and that his opinions are impossible. But since you +think that it would be well for us to seize the occasion to recall +to the public the teachings of which we approve (in Plotinos's system +of philosophy), and in order to honor so great a man as our friend +Plotinos by spreading his teachings--although this really is needless, +inasmuch as they have long since become celebrated--I comply with your +request, and, in accordance with my promise, I am hereby inscribing to +you this work which, as you well know, I threw together in three days. +You will not find in it that system and judiciousness natural to a book +composed with care; they are only reflections suggested by the lectures +(received from Plotinos), and arranged as they happened to come to +mind. I, therefore, throw myself on your indulgence, especially as the +thought of (Plotinos, that) philosopher whom some people are slandering +to us, is not easy to grasp, because he expresses the same ideas in +different manners in accordance with the exigencies of the occasion. +I am sure you will have the goodness to correct me, if I happen to +stray from the opinions of Plotinos. As the tragic poet says somewhere, +being overwhelmed with the pressure of duties, I find myself compelled +to submit to criticism and correction if I am discovered in altering +the doctrines of our leader. You see how anxious I am to please you. +Farewell!" + + +XVIII. POLEMIC BETWEEN AMELIUS AND PORPHYRY; AMELIUS TEACHES PORPHYRY. + +I have quoted this letter in full to show that, even in the times +of Plotinos himself, it was claimed that Plotinos had borrowed and +advertised as his own teachings of Numenius; also that he was called +a trifler, and in short that he was scorned--which happened chiefly +because he was not understood. Plotinos was far from the display and +vanity of the Sophists. When lecturing, he seemed to be holding a +conversation with his pupils. He did not try to convince you by a +formal argument. This I realized from the first, when attending his +courses. I wished to make him explain himself more clearly by writing +against him a work to prove that the intelligible entities subsist +outside of intelligence.[14] Plotinos had Amelius read it to him; and +after the reading he laughingly said to him, "It would be well for you +to solve these difficulties that Porphyry has advanced against me, +because he does not clearly understand my teachings." Amelius indeed +wrote a rather voluminous work to answer my objections.[15] In turn, +I responded. Amelius wrote again. This third work at last made me +understand, but not without difficulty, the thought of Plotinos; and I +changed my views, reading my retraction at a meeting. Since that time, +I have had complete confidence in the teachings of Plotinos. I begged +him to polish his writings, and to explain his system to me more at +length. I also prevailed upon Amelius to write some works. + + +XIX. HOW THE WORKS OF PLOTINOS WERE PUT INTO SHAPE. + +You may judge of the high opinion of Plotinos held by Longinus, from a +part of a letter he addressed to me. I was in Sicily; he wished me to +visit him in Phoenicia, and desired me to bring him a copy of the works +of that philosopher. This is what he wrote to me about the matter: + +"Please send me the works; or rather, bring them with you; for I shall +never cease begging you to travel in this one of all other countries, +were it only because of our ancient friendship, and of the sweetness of +the air, which would so well suit your ruined health;[16] for you must +not expect to find any new knowledge here when you visit us. Whatever +your expectations may be, do not expect to find anything new here, +nor even the ancient works (of myself, Longinus?) that you say are +lost. There is such a scarcity of copyists here, that since I have been +here I have hardly been able to get what I lacked of Plotinos here, by +inducing my copyist to abandon his usual occupations to devote himself +exclusively to this work. Now that I have those works of Plotinos you +sent me, I think I have them all; but these that I have are imperfect, +being full of errors. I had supposed that our friend Amelius had +corrected the errors of the copyist; but his occupations have been too +pressing to allow of his attending to this. However passionately I +desire to examine what Plotinos has written about the soul, and about +existence, I do not know what use to make of his writings; these are +precisely those of his works that have been most mis-written by the +copyists. That is why I wish you would send them to me transcribed +exactly; I would compare the copies and return them promptly. I repeat +that I beg you not to send them, but to bring them yourself with the +other works of Plotinos, which might have escaped Amelius. All those he +brought here I have had transcribed exactly; for why should I not most +zealously seek works so precious? I have often told you, both when we +were together, and apart, and when you were at Tyre, that Plotinos's +works contained reasonings of which I did not approve, but that I +liked and admired his method of writing; his concise and forceful +style, and the genuinely philosophical arrangement of his discussions. +I am persuaded that those who seek the truth must place the works of +Plotinos among the most learned." + + +XX. OPINION OF LONGINUS, THE GREAT CRITIC, ABOUT PLOTINOS. + +I have made this rather long quotation only to show what was thought +of Plotinos by the greatest critic of our days, the man who had +examined all the works of his time. At first Longinus had scorned +Plotinos, because he had relied on the reports of people ignorant (of +philosophy). Moreover, Longinus supposed that the copy of the works of +Plotinos he had received from Amelius was defective, because he was not +yet accustomed to the style of Plotinos. Nevertheless, if any one had +the works of Plotinos in their purity, it was certainly Amelius, who +possessed a copy made upon the originals themselves. I will further add +what was written by Longinus about Plotinos, Amelius, and the other +philosophers of his time, so that the reader may better appreciate +this great critic's high opinion of them. This book, directed against +Plotinos and Gentilianus Amelius, is entitled "Of the Limit (of Good +and Evil?)" and begins as follows: + +"There were, O Marcellus Orontius[17] many philosophers in our +time, and especially in the first years of our childhood--for it +is useless to complain of their rarity at the present; but when I +was still a youth, there were still a rather goodly number of men +celebrated as philosophers. I was fortunate enough to get acquainted +with all of them, because I traveled early with our parents in many +countries. Visiting many nations and towns, I entered into personal +relations with such of these men as were still alive. Among these +philosophers, some committed their teachings to writings, with the +purpose of being useful to posterity, while others thought that it +was sufficient for them to explain their opinions to their disciples. +Among the former are the Platonists Euclides, Democritus (who wrote +Commentaries on the Alcibiades, on the Phaedo, and on the Metaphysics +of Aristotle), Proclinus, who dwelt in the Troad, Plotinos and his +disciple Gentilianus Amelius, who are at present teaching at Rome; +the Stoics Themistocles, Phebion, and both Annius and Medius, who +were much talked of only recently, and the Peripatetician Heliodorus +of Alexandria. Among those who did not write their teachings are the +Platonists Ammonius (Saccas) and (the pagan) Origen,[18] who lived +with him for a long while, and who excelled among the philosophers +of that period; also Theodotus and Eubulus, who taught at Athens. Of +course, they did write a little; Origen, for instance, wrote about "The +Guardian Spirits"; and Eubulus wrote Commentaries on the Philebus, +and on the Gorgias, and "Observations on Aristotle's Objections +against Plato's Republic." However, these works are not considerable +enough to rank their authors among those who have seriously treated +of philosophy; for these little works were by them written only +incidentally, and they did not make writing their principal occupation. +The Stoics Herminus, Lysimachus,[19] Athenaeus and Musonius (author +of "Memorable Events," translated in Greek by Claudius Pollio), +who lived at Athens. The Peripateticians Ammonius and Ptolemy, who +were the most learned of their contemporaries, especially Ammonius, +whose erudition was unequalled, none of these philosophers wrote any +important work; they limited themselves to writing poems, or festal +orations, which have been preserved in spite of them. I doubt very +much that they wished to be known by posterity merely by books so +small (and unrepresentative), since they had neglected to acquaint us +with their teachings in more significant works. Among those who have +left written works, some have done no more than gather or transcribe +what has been left to us from the ancient (philosophers); among these +are Euclides, Democritus and Proclinus. Others limited themselves to +recalling some details extracted from ancient histories, and they +tried to compose books with the same materials as their predecessors, +as did Annius, Medius, and Phebio; the latter one trying to make +himself famous by style, rather than by thought. To these we might +add Heliodorus, who has put in his writings nothing that had not been +said by the ancients, without adding any philosophical explanation. +But Plotinos and Gentilianus Amelius, have shown that they really made +a profession of being writers, both by the great number of questions +they treated, and by the originality of their doctrines. Plotinos +explained the principles of Pythagoras and Plato more clearly than his +predecessors; for neither Numenius, nor Cronius, nor Moderatus,[20] nor +Thrasyllus,[21] come anywhere near the precision of Plotinos when they +touch on the same topics. Amelius tried to follow in his footsteps, +and adopted the greater part of his ideas; but differs from him in +the verbosity of his demonstrations, and the diffusion of his style. +The writings of these two men alone deserve special consideration; +for what is the use of criticizing the works of imitators; had we +not better study the authors whose works they copied, without any +additions, either in essential points, or in argumentation, doing no +more than choosing out the best? This has been our method of procedure +in our controversy with Gentilianus Amelius's strictures on justice, +in Plato's works; and in my examination of Plotinos's books on the +Ideas.[22] So when our mutual friends Basil of Tyre, (Porphyry[23]), +who has written much on the lines of Plotinos, having even preferred +the teachings of Plotinos to my own (as he had been my pupil), +undertook to demonstrate that Plotinos's views about the Ideas were +better than my own, I have fully refuted his contentions, proving that +he was wrong in changing his views on the subject.[24] Besides, I have +criticized several opinions of Gentilianus Amelius and Plotinos, +as for instance in the "Letter to Amelius" which is long enough to +form a whole book. I wrote it to answer a letter sent me from Rome by +Amelius, which was entitled "The Characteristics of the Philosophy of +Plotinos."[25] I, however, limited myself to entitling my little work, +"A Letter to Amelius." + + +XXI. RESULTS OF LONGINUS'S CRITICISM AND VINDICATION OF PLOTINOS'S +ORIGINALITY. + +From the above it will be seen that Plotinos and Amelius are superior +to all their contemporaries by the great number of questions they +consider, and by the originality of their system; that Plotinos had +not appropriated the opinions of Numenius, and that he did not even +follow them; that he had really profited by the opinions of the +Pythagoreans (and of Plato); further, that he was more precise than +Numenius, Cronius, and Thrasyllus. After having said that Amelius +followed in the footsteps of Plotinos, but that he was prolix and +diffuse in his expositions, which characteristic forms the difference +between their styles, he speaks of me, who at that time had known +Plotinos for only a short time, and says, "Our mutual friends, Basil +(King) of Tyre (Porphyry), who has written much, taking Plotinos +as his model." By that he means that I have avoided the rather +unphilosophical diffuseness of Amelius, and have imitated the (concise) +style of Plotinos. The quotation of the judgment of this famous man, +the first critic of his day, should decide of the reverence due to +our philosopher, Plotinos. If I had been able to visit Longinus when +he begged me to do so, he would not have undertaken the refutation he +wrote, before having clearly understood Plotinos's system. + + +XXII. THE APOLLONIAN ORACLE ABOUT PLOTINOS. + +(But when I have a long oracle of Apollo to quote, why should I delay +over a letter of Longinus's, or, in the words of the proverb, quoted in +Iliad xxii. 126 and Hesiod Theogony 35), "Why should I dally near the +oak-trees, or the rock?" If the testimony of the wise is to be adduced, +who is wiser than Apollo, a deity who said of himself, "I know the +number of the grains of sand, and the extent of the ocean; I understand +the dust, and I hear him who does not speak!" This was the divinity who +had said that Socrates was the wisest of men; and on being consulted by +Amelius to discover what had become of the soul of Plotinos, said: + + "Let me sing an immortal hymn to my dear friend! + Drawing my golden bow, I will elicit melodious sounds from + my lyre. + I also invoke the symphonic voice of the choir of Muses, + Whose harmonious power raises exultant paeans, + As they once sang in chorus in praise of Achilles, + A Homeric song in divine inspiration. + Sacred choir of Muses, let us together celebrate this man, + For long-haired Apollo is among you! + "O Deity, who formerly wert a man, but now approachest + The divine host of guardian spirits, delivered from the + narrowing bonds of necessity + That enchains man (while in the body), and from the tumult + caused by the + Confusing whirlwind of the passions of the body, + Sustained by the vigor of thy mind, thou hastenest to swim + (And like the sage Ulysses in Phaeacia), to land on a shore + not submerged by the waves, + With vigorous stroke, far from the impious crowds. + Persistently following the straightening path of the + purified soul, + Where the splendor of the divinity surrounds you, the home + of justice, + Far from contamination, in the holy sanctuary of initiation, + When in the past you struggled to escape the bitter + waves,[26] + When blood-stained life eddied around you with repulsive + currents, + In the midst of the waters dazed by frightening tumult, + Even then the divinities often showed you your end;[27] + And often, when your spirit was about to stray from the + right path, + The immortals beckoned you back to the real end; the eternal + path, + Enlightening your eyes with radiant beams in the midst of + gloomy darkness. + No deep slumber closed your eyelids, and when shaken by the + eddies (of matter), + You sought to withdraw your eyes from the night that pressed + down upon them; + You beheld beauties hidden from any who devote themselves to + the study of wisdom. + "Now that you have discarded your cloak of mortality, and + ascended + Climbing out from the tombs of your angelic soul, + You have entered the choir of divinities, where breathes a + gentle zephyr. + There dwell friendship, and delightful desire, ever + accompanied by pure joy; + There may one quench one's thirst with divine ambrosia; + There bound by the ties of love, one breathes a gentle air, + under a tranquil sky. + There dwell the sons of Jupiter, who lived in the golden age; + The brothers Minos and Rhadamanthus, the just Aeacus, + The divine Plato, the virtuous Pythagoras, + And all those who formed the band of immortal love, + And who by birth belong to the most blessed of divinities. + Their soul tastes continual joy amidst perpetual feasts! + And you, blessed man, after having fought many a valiant + fight, + In the midst of chaste angels, you have achieved eternal + Felicity. + "Here, O Muses, let us close this hymn in honor of Plotinos; + Cease the mazes of the dancing of the graceful choir; + This is what my golden lyre had to say of this eternally + blessed man!" + + +XXIII. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PLOTINOS; THE ECSTATIC TRANCES. + +This oracle (pieced out of numerous quotations) says (in some now lost +lines, perhaps) that Plotinos was kindly, affable, indulgent, gentle, +such as, indeed we knew him in personal intercourse. It also mentions +that this philosopher slept little, that his soul was pure, ever +aspiring to the divinity that he loved whole-heartedly, and that he did +his utmost to liberate himself (from terrestrial domination) "to escape +the bitter waves of this cruel life." + +That is how this divine man, who by his thoughts often aspired to the +first (principle), to the divinity superior (to intelligence), climbing +the degrees indicated by Plato (in his Banquet), beheld the vision +of the formless divinity, which is not merely an idea, being founded +on intelligence and the whole intelligible world. I, myself, had the +blessed privilege of approaching this divinity, uniting myself to him, +when I was about sixty-eight years of age. + +That is how "the goal (that Plotinos sought to achieve) seemed to +him located near him." Indeed, his goal, his purpose, his end was to +approach the supreme divinity, and to unite himself with the divinity. +While I dwelt with him, he had four times the bliss of reaching that +goal, not merely potentially, but by a real and unspeakable experience. +The oracle adds that the divinities frequently restored Plotinos to the +right path when he strayed from it, "enlightening his eyes by radiant +splendor." That is why it may truthfully be said that Plotinos composed +his works while in contemplation of the divinities, and enjoying that +vision. "Thanks to this sight that your 'vigilant' eyes had of both +interior and exterior things, you have," in the words of the oracle, +"gazed at many beauties that would hardly be granted to many of those +who study philosophy." Indeed, the contemplation of men may be superior +to human contemplation; but, compared to divine knowledge, if it be of +any value whatever, it, nevertheless, could not penetrate the depths +reached by the glances of the divinities. + +Till here the oracle had limited itself to indicating what Plotinos +had accomplished while enclosed in the vesture of the body. It then +proceeds to say that he arrived at the assembly of the divinities where +dwell friendship, delightful desire, joy, and love communing with the +divinity, where the sons of God, Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus are +established as the judges of souls. Plotinos joined them, not to be +judged, but to enjoy their intimacy, as did the higher divinities. +There indeed dwell Plato, Pythagoras, and the other sages who formed +the choir of immortal love. Reunited with their families, the blessed +angels spend their life "in continued festivals and joys," enjoying the +perpetual beatitude granted them by divine goodness. + + +XXIV. CONTENTS OF THE VARIOUS ENNEADS. + +This is what I have to relate of the life of Plotinos. He had, however, +asked me to arrange and revise his works. I promised both him and his +friends to work on them. I did not judge it wise to arrange them in +confusion chronologically. So I imitated Apollodorus of Athens, and +Andronicus the Peripatetician, the former collecting in ten volumes +the comedies of Epicharmus, and the latter dividing into treatises the +works of Aristotle and Theophrastus, gathering together the writings +that referred to the same subject. Likewise, I grouped the fifty-four +books of Plotinos into six groups of nine (Enneads), in honor of the +perfect numbers six and nine. Into each Ennead I have gathered the +books that treat of the same matter, in each case prefixing the most +important ones. + +The First Ennead contains the writings that treat of Morals. They are: + + 1. What is an Animal? What is a Man? 53. + 2. Of the Virtues, 19. + 3. Of Dialectics, 20. + 4. Of Happiness, 46. + 5. Does Happiness (consist in Duration)? 36. + 6. Of Beauty, 1. + 7. Of the First Good, and of the Other Goods, 54. + 8. Of the Origin of Evils, 51. + 9. Of (Reasonable) Suicide, 16. + +Such are the topics considered in the First Ennead; which thus contains +what relates to morals. + +In the Second Ennead are grouped the writings that treat of Physics, of +the World, and of all that it contains. They are: + + 1. (Of the World), 40. + 2. Of the (Circular) Motion (of the Heavens), 14. + 3. Of the Influence of the Stars, 52. + 4. (Of both Matters) (Sensible and Intelligible), 12. + 5. Of Potentiality and Actuality, 25. + 6. Of Quality (and of Form), 17. + 7. Of Mixture, Where there is Total Penetratration, 37. + 8. Of Vision. Why do Distant Objects Seem Smaller? 35. + 9. (Against Those Who say that the Demiurgic + Creator is Evil, as well as The World Itself), + Against the Gnostics, 33. + +The Third Ennead, which also relates to the world, contains the +different speculations referring thereto. Here are its component +writings: + + 1. Of Destiny, 3. + 2. Of Providence, the First, 47. + 3. Of Providence, the Second, 48. + 4. Of the Guardian Spirit who was Allotted to Us, 15. + 5. Of Love, 50. + 6. Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal Things, 26. + 7. Of Eternity of Time, 45. + 8. Of Nature, of Contemplation, and of the One, 30. + 9. Different Speculations, 13. + +We have gathered these three Enneads into one single body. We have +assigned the book on the Guardian Spirit Who has been Allotted to Us, +in the Third Ennead, because this is treated in a general manner, and +because it refers to the examination of conditions characteristic +of the production of man. For the same reason the book on Love was +assigned to the First Ennead. The same place has been assigned to the +book on Eternity and Time, because of the observations which, in this +Ennead, refer to their nature. Because of its title, we have put in the +same group the book on Nature, Contemplation, and the One. + +After the books that treat of the world, the Fourth Ennead contains +those that refer to the soul. They are: + + 1. Of the Nature of the Soul, the First, 4. + 2. Of the Nature of the Soul, the Second, 21. + 3. Problems about the Soul, the First, 27. + 4. Problems about the Soul, the Second, 28. + 5. (Problems about the Soul, the Third, or) Of + Vision, 29. + 6. Of Sensation, of Memory, 41. + 7. Of the Immortality of the Soul, 2. + 8. Of the Descent of the Soul into the Body, 6. + 9. Do not all Souls form a Single Soul? 8. + +The Fourth Ennead, therefore, contains all that relates to Psychology. + +The Fifth Ennead treats of Intelligence. Each book in it also contains +something about the principle superior to intelligence, and also about +the intelligence characteristic of the soul, and about Ideas. + + 1. About the three Principal Hypostatic Forms of + Existence, 10. + 2. Of Generation, and of the Order of Things + Posterior to the First, 11. + 3. Of the Hypostatic Forms of Existence that Transmit + Knowledge, and of the Superior Principle, 49. + 4. How that which is Posterior to the First Proceeds + from it? Of the One, 7. + 5. The Intelligibles are not Outside of Intelligence. + Of the Good, 32. + 6. The Super-essential Principle Does Not Think. + Which is the First Thinking Principle? + Which is the Second? 24. + 7. Are there Ideas of Individuals? 18. + 8. Of Intelligible Beauty, 31. + 9. Of Intelligence, of Ideas, and of Existence, 5. + +We have gathered the Fourth and Fifth Ennead into a single volume. Of +the Sixth Ennead, we have formed a separate volume, so that all the +writings of Plotinos might be divided into three parts, of which the +first contains three Enneads, the second two; and the third, a single +Ennead. + +Here are the books that belong to the Sixth Ennead, and to the Third +Volume. + + 1. Of the Kinds of Existence, the First, 42. + 2. Of the Kinds of Existence, the Second, 43. + 3. Of the Kinds of Existence, the Third, 44. + 4. The One Single Existence is everywhere Present + in its Entirety, First, 22. + 5. The One Single Existence is everywhere Present + in its Entirety, Second, 23. + 6. Of Numbers, 34. + 7. Of the Multitude of Ideas. Of the Good, 38. + 8. Of the Will, and of the Liberty of the One, 39. + 9. Of the Good, or of the One, 9. + +This is how we have distributed into six Enneads the fifty-four books +of Plotinos. We have added to several of them, Commentaries, without +following any regular order, to satisfy our friends who desired to have +explanations of several points. We have also made headings of each +book, following the chronological order, with the exception of the book +on The Beautiful, whose date of composition we do not know. Besides, +we have not only written up separate summaries for each book, but also +Arguments, which are contained among the summaries.[28] + +Now we shall try to punctuate each book, and to correct the mistakes. +Whatever else we may have to do besides, will easily be recognized by a +reading of these books. + + + + +LIFE OF PLOTINOS, BY EUNAPIUS. + +The philosopher Plotinos came from Egypt; to be accurate, I will add +that his home was Lycopolis. This fact was not set down by the divine +Porphyry, though he himself, as he reports, was a student of Plotinos, +and had spent a great part of his life near him. + +The altars dedicated to Plotinos are not yet cold; and not only are his +books read by the learned more than are even those of Plato, but even +the multitude, though incapable of clearly understanding his doctrine, +nevertheless conforms its conduct of life to his suggestions. + +Porphyry has set down all the details of the life of this philosopher, +so that little can be added thereto; besides Porphyry seems to have +clearly expounded many of Plotinos's writings. + + + + +LIFE OF PLOTINOS, BY SUIDAS. + +Plotinos of Lycopolis, philosopher, disciple of that Ammonius who +had once been a porter, was the teacher of Amelius, who himself had +Porphyry as pupil; the latter formed Jamblichus, and Jamblichus +Sopater. Plotinos prolonged his life till the seventh year of the reign +of Gallienus. He composed fifty-four books, which are grouped in six +enneads. His constitution was weakened by the effects of the sacred +disease (epilepsy). He wrote besides other works. + + + + +FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK SIXTH. + +Of Beauty. + + +REVIEW OF BEAUTY OF DAILY LIFE. + +1. Beauty chiefly affects the sense of sight. Still, the ear perceives +it also, both in the harmony of words, and in the different kinds of +music; for songs and verses are equally beautiful. On rising from the +domain of the senses to a superior region, we also discover beauty +in occupations, actions, habits, sciences and virtues. Whether there +exists a type of beauty still higher, will have to be ascertained by +discussion. + + +PROBLEMS CONCERNING HIGHER BEAUTY. + +What is the cause that certain bodies seem beautiful, that our ears +listen with pleasure to rhythms judged beautiful, and that we love the +purely moral beauties? Does the beauty of all these objects derive +from some unique, immutable principle, or will we recognize some one +principle of beauty for the body, and some other for something else? +What then are these principles, if there are several? Or which is this +principle, if there is but one? + + +WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE BY PARTICIPATION IN WHICH THE BODY IS BEAUTIFUL? + +First, there are certain objects, such as bodies, whose beauty exists +only by participation, instead of being inherent in the very essence +of the subject. Such are beautiful in themselves, as is, for example, +virtue. Indeed, the same bodies seem beautiful at one time, while at +another they lack beauty; consequently, there is a great difference +between being a body and being beautiful. What then is the principle +whose presence in a body produces beauty therein? What is that element +in the bodies which moves the spectator, and which attracts, fixes and +charms his glances? This is the first problem to solve; for, on finding +this principle, we shall use it as a means to resolve other questions. + + +POLEMIC AGAINST SYMMETRY, THE STOIC DEFINITION OF BEAUTY. + +(The Stoics), like almost everybody, insist that visual beauty consists +in the proportion of the parts relatively to each other and to the +whole, joined to the grace of colors. If then, as in this case, +the beauty of bodies in general consists in the symmetry and just +proportion of their parts, beauty could not consist of anything simple, +and necessarily could not appear in anything but what was compound. +Only the totality will be beautiful; the parts by themselves will +possess no beauty; they will be beautiful only by their relation with +the totality. Nevertheless, if the totality is beautiful, it would seem +also necessary that the parts be beautiful; for indeed beauty could +never result from the assemblage of ugly things. Beauty must therefore +be spread among all the parts. According to the same doctrine, the +colors which, like sunlight, are beautiful, are beautiful but simple, +and those whose beauty is not derived from proportion, will also be +excluded from the domain of beauty. According to this hypothesis, how +will gold be beautiful? The brilliant lightning in the night, even +the stars, would not be beautiful to contemplate. In the sphere of +sounds, also, it would be necessary to insist that what is simple +possesses no beauty. Still, in a beautiful harmony, every sound, even +when isolated, is beautiful. While preserving the same proportions, the +same countenance seems at one time beautiful, and at another ugly. +Evidently, there is but one conclusion: namely, that proportion is +not beauty itself, but that it derives its beauty from some superior +principle. (This will appear more clearly from further examples). Let +us examine occupations and utterances. If also their beauty depended on +proportion, what would be the function of proportion when considering +occupations, laws, studies and sciences? Relations of proportion could +not obtain in scientific speculations; no, nor even in the mutual +agreement of these speculations. On the other hand, even bad things may +show a certain mutual agreement and harmony; as, for instance, were we +to assert that wisdom is softening of the brain, and that justice is a +generous folly. Here we have two revoltingly absurd statements, which +agree perfectly, and harmonize mutually. Further, every virtue is a +soul-beauty far truer than any that we have till now examined; yet it +could not admit of proportion, as it involves neither size nor number. +Again, granting that the soul is divided into several faculties, who +will undertake to decide which combination of these faculties, or of +the speculations to which the soul devotes itself, will produce beauty? +Moreover (if beauty is but proportion), what beauty could be predicated +of pure intelligence? + + +BEAUTY CONSISTS IN KINSHIP TO THE SOUL. + +2. Returning to our first consideration, we shall examine the nature +of the element of beauty in bodies. It is something perceivable at the +very first glance, something which the soul recognizes as kindred, and +sympathetic to her own nature, which she welcomes and assimilates. +But as soon as she meets an ugly object, she recoils, repudiates it, +and rejects it as something foreign, towards which her real nature +feels antipathy. That is the reason why the soul, being such as it is, +namely, of an essence superior to all other beings, when she perceives +an object kindred to her own nature, or which reveals only some traces +of it, rejoices, is transported, compares this object with her own +nature, thinks of herself, and of her intimate being as it would be +impossible to fail to perceive this resemblance. + + +BEAUTY CONSISTS IN PARTICIPATION IN A FORM. + +How can both sensible and intelligible objects be beautiful? Because, +as we said, sensible objects participate in a form. While a shapeless +object, by nature capable of receiving shape (physical) and form +(intelligible), remains without reason or form, it is ugly. That which +remains completely foreign to all divine reason (a reason proceeding +from the universal Soul), is absolute ugliness. Any object should be +considered ugly which is not entirely molded by informing reason, +the matter, not being able to receive perfectly the form (which the +Soul gives it). On joining matter, form co-ordinates the different +parts which are to compose unity, combines them, and by their harmony +produces something which is a unit. Since (form) is one, that which it +fashions will also have to be one, as far as a composite object can +be one. When such an object has arrived at unity, beauty resides in +it, and it communicates itself to the parts as well as to the whole. +When it meets a whole, the parts of which are perfectly similar, it +interpenetrates it evenly. Thus it would show itself now in an entire +building, then in a single stone, later in art-products as well as in +the works of nature. Thus bodies become beautiful by communion with +(or, participation in) a reason descending upon it from the divine +(universal Soul). + + +THE SOUL APPRECIATES THE BEAUTIFUL BY AN AESTHETIC SENSE. + +3. The soul appreciates beauty by an especially ordered faculty, whose +sole function it is to appreciate all that concerns beauty, even +when the other faculties take part in this judgment. Often the soul +makes her (aesthetic) decisions by comparison with the form of the +beautiful which is within her, using this form as a standard by which +to judge. But what agreement can anything corporeal have with what +is incorporeal? For example, how can an architect judge a building +placed before him as beautiful, by comparing it with the Idea which he +has within himself? The only explanation can be that, on abstracting +the stones, the exterior object is nothing but the interior form, no +doubt divided within the extent of the matter, but still one, though +manifested in the manifold? When the senses perceive in an object the +form which combines, unites and dominates a substance which lacks +shape, and therefore is of a contrary nature; and if they also perceive +a shape which distinguishes itself from the other shapes by its +elegance, then the soul, uniting these multiple elements, fuses them, +comparing them to the indivisible form which she bears within herself, +then she pronounces their agreement, kinship and harmony with that +interior type. + + +INSTANCES OF CORRESPONDENCE OF OUTER SENSE BEAUTY WITH ITS IDEA. + +Thus a worthy man, perceiving in a youth the character of virtue, is +agreeably impressed, because he observes that the youth harmonizes +with the true type of virtue which he bears within himself. Thus also +the beauty of color, though simple in form, reduces under its sway +that obscurity of matter, by the presence of the light, which is +something incorporeal, a reason, and a form. Likewise, fire surpasses +all other bodies in beauty, because it stands to all other elements +in the relation of a form; it occupies the highest regions;[29] it is +the subtlest of bodies because it most approaches the incorporeal +beings; without permitting itself to be penetrated by other bodies, it +penetrates them all; without itself cooling, it communicates to them +its heat; by its own essence it possesses color, and communicates it +to others; it shines and coruscates, because it is a form. The body +in which it does not dominate, shows but a discolored hue, and ceases +being beautiful, merely because it does not participate in the whole +form of color. Once more, thus do the hidden harmonies of sound produce +audible harmonies, and also yield to the soul the idea of beauty, +though showing it in another order of things. Audible harmonies can be +expressed in numbers; not indeed in any kind of numbers, but only in +such as can serve to produce form, and to make it dominate. + + +TRANSITION FROM SENSE BEAUTY TO INTELLECTUAL BEAUTY. + +So much then for sense-beauties which, descending on matter like images +and shadows, beautify it and thereby compel our admiration. 4. Now we +shall leave the senses in their lower sphere, and we shall rise to the +contemplation of the beauties of a superior order, of which the senses +have no intuition, but which the soul perceives and expresses. + + +INTERIOR BEAUTIES COULD NOT BE APPRECIATED WITHOUT AN INTERIOR MODEL. + +Just as we could not have spoken of sense-beauties if we had never +seen them, nor recognized them as such, if, in respect to them, we had +been similar to persons born blind, likewise we would not know enough +to say anything about the beauty either of the arts or sciences, or of +anything of the kind, if we were not already in possession of this kind +of beauty; nor of the splendor of virtue, if we had not contemplated +the ("golden) face of Justice," and of temperance, before whose +splendor the morning and evening stars grow pale. + + +MORAL BEAUTIES MORE DELIGHTFUL THAN SENSE-BEAUTIES. + +To see these beauties, they must be contemplated by the faculty our +soul has received; then, while contemplating them, we shall experience +far more pleasure, astonishment and admiration, than in contemplation +of the sense-beauties, because we will have the intuition of veritable +beauties. The sentiments inspired by beauty are admiration, a gentle +charm, desire, love, and a pleasurable impulse. + + +THEY WHO FEEL THESE SENTIMENTS MOST KEENLY ARE CALLED LOVERS. + +Such are the sentiments for invisible beauties which should be felt, +and indeed are experienced by all souls, but especially by the most +loving. In the presence of beautiful bodies, all indeed see them; but +not all are equally moved. Those who are most moved are designated +"lovers."[30] + + +THE CAUSE OF THESE EMOTIONS IS THE INVISIBLE SOUL. + +5. Let us now propound a question about experiences to these men who +feel love for incorporeal beauties. What do you feel in presence of the +noble occupations, the good morals, the habits of temperance, and in +general of virtuous acts and sentiments, and of all that constitutes +the beauty of souls? What do you feel when you contemplate your inner +beauty? What is the source of your ecstasies, or your enthusiasms? +Whence come your desires to unite yourselves to your real selves, and +to refresh yourselves by retirement from your bodies? Such indeed are +the experiences of those who love genuinely. What then is the object +which causes these, your emotions? It is neither a figure, nor a color, +nor any size; it is that (colorless) invisible soul, which possesses +a wisdom equally invisible; this soul in which may be seen shining +the splendor of all the virtues, when one discovers in oneself, or +contemplates in others, the greatness of character, the justice of the +heart, the pure temperance, the imposing countenance of valor, dignity +and modesty, proceeding alone firmly, calmly, and imperturbably; and +above all, intelligence, resembling the divinity, by its brilliant +light. What is the reason that we declare these objects to be +beautiful, when we are transported with admiration and love for them? +They exist, they manifest themselves, and whoever beholds them will +never be able to restrain himself from confessing them to be veritable +beings. Now what are these genuine beings? They are beautiful. + + +LOVE OF BEAUTY EXPLAINED BY AVERSION FOR OPPOSITE. + +But reason is not yet satisfied; reason wonders why these veritable +beings give the soul which experiences them the property of exciting +love, from which proceeds this halo of light which, so to speak, +crowns all virtues. Consider the things contrary to these beautiful +objects, and with them compare what may be ugly in the soul. If we +can discover of what ugliness consists, and what is its cause, we +shall have achieved an important element of the solution we are +seeking. Let us picture to ourselves an ugly soul; she will be given +up to intemperance; and be unjust, abandoned to a host of passions, +troubled, full of fears caused by her cowardliness, and of envy by her +degradation; she will be longing only for vile and perishable things; +she will be entirely depraved, will love nothing but impure wishes, +will have no life but the sensual, and will take pleasure in her +turpitude. Would we not explain such a state by saying that under the +very mask of beauty turpitude had invaded this soul, brutalized her, +soiled her with all kinds of vices, rendering her incapable of a pure +life, and pure sentiments, and had reduced her to an existence obscure, +infected with evil, poisoned by lethal germs; that it had hindered her +from contemplating anything she should, forcing her to remain solitary, +because it misled her out from herself towards inferior and gloomy +regions? The soul fallen into this state of impurity, seized with an +irresistible inclination towards the things of sense, absorbed by her +intercourse with the body, sunk into matter, and having even received +it within herself, has changed form by her admixture with an inferior +nature. Not otherwise would be a man fallen into slimy mud, who no +longer would present to view his primitive beauty, and would exhibit +only the appearance of the mud that had defiled him; his ugliness +would be derived from something foreign; and to recover his pristine +beauty he would have to wash off his defilement, and by purification be +restored to what he once was. + + +UGLINESS IS ONLY A FOREIGN ACCRETION. + +We have the right to say that the soul becomes ugly by mingling with +the body, confusing herself with it, by inclining herself towards it. +For a soul, ugliness consists in being impure, no longer unmingled, +like gold tarnished by particles of earth. As soon as this dross is +removed, and nothing but gold remains, then again it is beautiful, +because separated from every foreign body, and is restored to its +unique nature. Likewise the soul, released from the passions begotten +by her intercourse with the body when she yields herself too much to +it, delivered from exterior impressions, purified from the blemishes +contracted from her alliance with the body--that is, reduced to +herself, she lays aside that ugliness which is derived from a nature +foreign to her. + + +VIRTUES ARE ONLY PURIFICATIONS. + +6. Thus, according to the ancient (Platonic or Empedoclean) maxim, +"courage, temperance, all the virtues, nay, even prudence, are but +purifications." The mysteries were therefore wise in teaching that the +man who has not been purified will, in hell, dwell at the bottom of a +swamp; for everything that is not pure, because of its very perversity, +delights in mud, just as we see the impure swine wallow in the mud +with delight. And indeed, what would real temperance consist of, if it +be not to avoid attaching oneself to the pleasures of the body, and +to flee from them as impure, and as only proper for an impure being? +What else is courage, unless no longer to fear death, which is mere +separation of the soul from the body? Whoever therefore is willing to +withdraw from the body could surely not fear death. Magnanimity is +nothing but scorn of things here below. Last, prudence is the thought +which, detached from the earth, raises the soul to the intelligible +world. The purified soul, therefore, becomes a form, a reason, an +incorporeal and intellectual essence; she belongs entirely to the +divinity, in whom resides the source of the beautiful, and of all the +qualities which have affinity with it. + + +THE SOUL'S WELFARE IS TO RESEMBLE THE DIVINITY. + +Restored to intelligence, the soul sees her own beauty increase; +indeed, her own beauty consists of the intelligence with its ideas; +only when united to intelligence is the soul really isolated from all +the remainder. That is the reason that it is right to say that "the +soul's welfare and beauty lie in assimilating herself to the divinity," +because it is the principle of beauty and of the essences; or rather, +being is beauty, while the other nature (non-being, matter), is +ugliness. This is the First Evil, evil in itself, just as that one (the +First Principle) is the good and the beautiful; for good and beauty +are identical. Consequently, beauty or good, and evil or ugliness, are +to be studied by the same methods. The first rank is to be assigned to +beauty, which is identical with the good, and from which is derived +the intelligence which is beautiful by itself. The soul is beautiful +by intelligence, then, the other things, like actions, and studies, +are beautiful by the soul which gives them a form. It is still the +soul which beautifies the bodies to which is ascribed this perfection; +being a divine essence, and participating in beauty, when she seizes an +object, or subjects it to her dominion, she gives to it the beauty that +the nature of this object enables it to receive. + + +APPROACH TO THE GOOD CONSISTS IN SIMPLIFICATION. + +We must still ascend to the Good to which every soul aspires. Whoever +has seen it knows what I still have to say, and knows the beauty of +the Good. Indeed, the Good is desirable for its own sake; it is the +goal of our desires. To attain it, we have to ascend to the higher +regions, turn towards them, and lay aside the garment which we put on +when descending here below; just as, in the (Eleusynian, or Isiac) +mysteries, those who are admitted to penetrate into the recesses of the +sanctuary, after having purified themselves, lay aside every garment, +and advance stark naked. + + +THE SUPREME PURPOSE OF LIFE IS THE ECSTATICAL VISION OF GOD. + +7. Thus, in her ascension towards divinity, the soul advances until, +having risen above everything that is foreign to her, she alone with +Him who is alone, beholds, in all His simplicity and purity, Him from +whom all depends, to whom all aspires, from whom everything draws +its existence, life and thought. He who beholds him is overwhelmed +with love; with ardor desiring to unite himself with Him, entranced +with ecstasy. Men who have not yet seen Him desire Him as the Good; +those who have, admire Him as sovereign beauty, struck simultaneously +with stupor and pleasure, thrilling in a painless orgasm, loving +with a genuine emotion, with an ardor without equal, scorning all +other affections, and disdaining those things which formerly they +characterized as beautiful. This is the experience of those to whom +divinities and guardians have appeared; they reck no longer of the +beauty of other bodies. Imagine, if you can, the experiences of those +who behold Beauty itself, the pure Beauty, which, because of its +very purity, is fleshless and bodiless, outside of earth and heaven. +All these things, indeed are contingent and composite, they are not +principles, they are derived from Him. What beauty could one still wish +to see after having arrived at vision of Him who gives perfection to +all beings, though himself remains unmoved, without receiving anything; +after finding rest in this contemplation, and enjoying it by becoming +assimilated to Him? Being supreme beauty, and the first beauty, He +beautifies those who love Him, and thereby they become worthy of love. +This is the great, the supreme goal of souls; this is the goal which +arouses all their efforts, if they do not wish to be disinherited of +that sublime contemplation the enjoyment of which confers blessedness, +and privation of which is the greatest of earthly misfortunes. Real +misfortune is not to lack beautiful colors, nor beautiful bodies, +nor power, nor domination, nor royalty. It is quite sufficient to +see oneself excluded from no more than possession of beauty. This +possession is precious enough to render worthless domination of +a kingdom, if not of the whole earth, of the sea, or even of the +heavens--if indeed it were possible, while abandoning and scorning all +that (natural beauty), to succeed in contemplating beauty face to face. + + +THE METHOD TO ACHIEVE ECSTASY IS TO CLOSE THE EYES OF THE BODY. + +8. How shall we start, and later arrive at the contemplation of this +ineffable beauty which, like the divinity in the mysteries, remains +hidden in the recesses of a sanctuary, and does not show itself +outside, where it might be perceived by the profane? We must advance +into this sanctuary, penetrating into it, if we have the strength to do +so, closing our eyes to the spectacle of terrestrial things, without +throwing a backward glance on the bodies whose graces formerly charmed +us. If we do still see corporeal beauties, we must no longer rush at +them, but, knowing that they are only images, traces and adumbrations +of a superior principle, we will flee from them, to approach Him +of whom they are merely the reflections. Whoever would let himself +be misled by the pursuit of those vain shadows, mistaking them for +realities, would grasp only an image as fugitive as the fluctuating +form reflected by the waters, and would resemble that senseless +(Narcissus) who, wishing to grasp that image himself, according to the +fable, disappeared, carried away by the current. Likewise he would wish +to embrace corporeal beauties, and not release them, would plunge, +not his body, but his soul into the gloomy abysses, so repugnant to +intelligence; he would be condemned to total blindness; and on this +earth, as well as in hell, he would see naught but mendacious shades. + + +HOW TO FLY TO OUR FATHERLAND. + +This indeed is the occasion to quote (from Homer) with peculiar force, +"Let us fly unto our dear fatherland!" But how shall we fly? How escape +from here? is the question Ulysses asks himself in that allegory +which represents him trying to escape from the magic sway of Circe +or Calypso, where neither the pleasure of the eyes, nor the view of +fleshly beauty were able to hold him in those enchanted places. Our +fatherland is the region whence we descend here below. It is there that +dwells our Father. But how shall we return thither? What means shall +be employed to return us thither? Not our feet, indeed; all they could +do would be to move us from one place of the earth to another. Neither +is it a chariot, nor ship which need be prepared. All these vain helps +must be left aside, and not even considered. We must close the eyes of +the body, to open another vision, which indeed all possess, but very +few employ. + + +HOW TO TRAIN THIS INTERIOR VISION. + +9. But how shall we train this interior vision? At the moment of +its (first) awakening, it cannot contemplate beauties too dazzling. +Your soul must then first be accustomed to contemplate the noblest +occupations of man, and then the beautiful deeds, not indeed those +performed by artists, but those (good deeds) done by virtuous men. +Later contemplate the souls of those who perform these beautiful +actions. Nevertheless, how will you discover the beauty which their +excellent soul possesses? Withdraw within yourself, and examine +yourself. If you do not yet therein discover beauty, do as the artist, +who cuts off, polishes, purifies until he has adorned his statue +with all the marks of beauty. Remove from your soul, therefore, all +that is superfluous, straighten out all that is crooked, purify and +illuminate what is obscure, and do not cease perfecting your statue +until the divine resplendence of virtue shines forth upon your sight, +until you see temperance in its holy purity seated in your breast. +When you shall have acquired this perfection; when you will see it in +yourself; when you will purely dwell within yourself; when you will +cease to meet within yourself any obstacle to unity; when nothing +foreign will any more, by its admixture, alter the simplicity of your +interior essence; when within your whole being you will be a veritable +light, immeasurable in size, uncircumscribed by any figure within +narrow boundaries, unincreasable because reaching out to infinity, +and entirely incommensurable because it transcends all measure and +quantity; when you shall have become such, then, having become sight +itself, you may have confidence in yourself, for you will no longer +need any guide. Then must you observe carefully, for it is only by the +eye that then will open itself within you that you will be able to +perceive supreme Beauty. But if you try to fix on it an eye soiled by +vice, an eye that is impure, or weak, so as not to be able to support +the splendor of so brilliant an object, that eye will see nothing, not +even if it were shown a sight easy to grasp. The organ of vision will +first have to be rendered analogous and similar to the object it is to +contemplate. Never would the eye have seen the sun unless first it had +assumed its form; likewise, the soul could never see beauty, unless she +herself first became beautiful. To obtain the view of the beautiful, +and of the divinity, every man must begin by rendering himself +beautiful and divine. + + +THE LANDMARKS OF THE PATH TO ECSTASY. + +Thus he will first rise to intelligence, and he will there contemplate +beauty, and declare that all this beauty resides in the Ideas. Indeed, +in them everything is beautiful, because they are the daughters and the +very essence of Intelligence. + +Above intelligence, he will meet Him whom we call the nature of the +Good, and who causes beauty to radiate around Him; so that, to repeat, +the first thing that is met is beauty. If a distinction is to be +established among the intelligibles, we might say that intelligible +beauty is the locus of ideas, and that the Good, which is located above +the Beautiful, is its source and principle. If, however, we desire to +locate the Good and the Beautiful within one single principle, we might +regard this one principle first as Good, and only afterwards, as Beauty. + + +REFERENCES. + +Page 40, line 4, Equally Beautiful, Phaedrus p. 250, Cary 63-65; +Hippias Major, 295, Cary 44; Philebus p. 17, Cary 20, 21. + +Page 41, line 11, Stoic definition, Cicero, Tusculans, iv. 13. + +Page 44, line 30, Obscurity of Matter, Timaeus, p. 31, Cary 11; +Philebus, p. 29, Cary 52. + +Page 45, line 22, Superior Order, Banquet 210, Cary 34; Timaeus, p. 31, +Cary 11. + +Page 45, line 35, Golden Face of Justice, Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae, +xii. 546. + +Page 46, line 10, Pleasurable Impulse, Banquet, p. 191, Cary 17, 18; +Cratylos, p. 420, Cary 78-80. + +Page 47, line 5, Justice of the Heart, Banquet, p. 209, Cary 33; +Republic, iii. 402, Cary 12. + +Page 48, line 23, Ugliness, Banquet, p. 215-217, Cary 39, 40; Philebus, +p. 66, Cary 158, 159. + +Page 49, line 4, Purifications, Phaedo, p. 69, Cary 37. + +Page 49, line 32, Assimilating to Divinity, Republic x. p. 613, Cary 12. + +Page 50, line 1, Good and Beautiful, Timaeus, p. 35, Cary 12. + +Page 50, line 5, Identical with Good, Philebus, p. 64, Cary 153-155; +First Alcibiades, p. 115, Cary 23, 24. + +Page 51, line 1, 2, He who Beholds, Phaedrus, p. 278, Cary 145. + +Page 51, line 8, Ardor without Equal; line 15, Very Purity; Banquet, p. +210, 211; Cary 34, 35. + +Page 51, line 29, Confers Blessedness, Phaedrus, p. 250, Cary 64. + +Page 53, line 16, Interior Vision, Republic, x., p. 533, Cary 13. + +Page 53, line 34, Temperance Seated, Phaedrus, p. 279, Cary 147. + +Page 54, line 19, Organ of Vision, Timaeus, p. 45, Cary 19. + +Page 54, line 23, Assumed its form, Republic, vi., p. 508, Cary 19. + +Page 54, line 29, Rise to Intelligence, Philebus, p. 64, Cary 153-155. + + + + +FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN. + +Of the Immortality of the Soul: Polemic Against Materialism. + + +IS THE SOUL IMMORTAL? + +1. Are we immortal, or does all of us die? (Another possibility would +be that) of the two parts of which we are composed, the one might be +fated to be dissolved and perish, while the other, that constitutes our +very personality, might subsist perpetually. These problems must be +solved by a study of our nature. + + +THE BODY AS THE INSTRUMENT OF THE SOUL. + +Man is not a simple being; he contains a soul and a body, which is +united to this soul, either as tool, or in some other manner.[31] This +is how we must distinguish the soul from the body, and determine the +nature and manner of existence ("being") of each of them. + + +THE BODY IS COMPOSITE, AND THEREFORE PERISHABLE. + +As the nature of the body is composite, reason convinces us that it +cannot last perpetually, and our senses show it to us dissolved, +destroyed, and decayed, because the elements that compose it return +to join the elements of the same nature, altering, destroying them +and each other, especially when this chaos is abandoned to the soul, +which alone keeps her parts combined. Even if a body were taken alone, +it would not be a unity; it may be analyzed into form and matter, +principles that are necessary to the constitution of all bodies, even +of those that are simple.[32] Besides, as they contain extension, +the bodies can be cut, divided into infinitely small parts, and thus +perish.[33] Therefore if our body is a part of ourselves,[34] not all +of us is immortal; if the body is only the instrument of the soul, as +the body is given to the soul only for a definite period, it still is +by nature perishable. + + +THE SOUL IS THE INDIVIDUALITY, AS ITS FORM, AND AS A SKILLED WORKMAN. + +The soul, which is the principal part of man, and which constitutes man +himself,[35] should bear to the body the relation of form to matter, or +of a workman to his tool;[36] in both cases the soul is the man himself. + + +IF THE SOUL IS INCORPOREAL, WE MUST STUDY INCORPOREALITY. + +2. What then is the nature of the soul? If she is a body, she can be +decomposed, as every body is a composite. If, on the contrary, she is +not a body, if hers is a different nature, the latter must be examined; +either in the same way that we have examined the body, or in some other +way. + + +A.--THE SOUL IS NOT CORPOREAL (AS THE STOICS THOUGHT). + +(a.) (Neither a material molecule, nor a material aggregation of +material atoms could possess life and intelligence.) First, let +us consider the nature of this alleged soul-body. As every soul +necessarily possesses life, and as the body, considered as being the +soul, must obtain at least two molecules, if not more (there are three +possibilities): either only one of them possesses life, or all of +them possess it, or none of them. If one molecule alone possesses +life, it alone will be the soul. Of what nature will be that molecule +supposed to possess life by itself? Will it be water (Hippo), air +(Anaximenes, Archelaus, and Diogenes), earth, or fire (Heraclitus, +Stobaeus?[37]) But those are elements that are inanimate by themselves, +and which, even when they are animated, possess but a borrowed life. +Still there is no other kind of body. Even those (philosophers, like +the Pythagoreans) who posited elements other (than water, air, earth +and fire) still considered them to be bodies, and not souls, not even +attributing souls to them. The theory that life results from the union +of molecules of which, nevertheless, none by itself possesses life, is +an absurd hypothesis. If further any molecule possesses life, then a +single one would be sufficient. + + +NEITHER MIXTURE NOR ITS PRINCIPLE WILL EXPLAIN LIFE AS A BODY. + +The most irrational theory of all is that an aggregation of molecules +should produce life, that elements without intelligence should beget +intelligence. Others (like Alexander of Aphrodisia) insist that to +produce life these elements must be mingled in a certain manner. That +would, however, imply (as thought Gallen and Hippocrates[38]) the +existence of a principle which produces order, and which should be the +cause of mixture or, temperament,[39] and that should alone deserve +being considered as soul. No simple bodies could exist, much less +composite bodies, unless there was a soul in the universe; for it is +(seminal) reason which, in, adding itself to matter, produces body.[40] +But surely a (seminal) reason could proceed from nowhere except a soul. + + +NO ATOMIC AGGREGATION COULD PRODUCE A SELF-HARMONIZING UNITY. + +3. (b.) (No aggregation of atoms could form a whole that would be one +and sympathetic with itself.) Others, on the contrary, insist that the +soul is constituted by the union of atoms or indivisibles (as thought +Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus.[41]) To refute this error, we have +to examine the nature of sympathy (or community of affection, a Stoic +characteristic of a living being,[42]) and juxtaposition.[43] On the +one hand an aggregation of corporeal molecules which are incapable of +being united, and which do not feel cannot form a single sympathetic +whole such as is the soul, which is sympathetic with herself. On +the other hand, how could a body or extension be constituted by (a +juxtaposition of) atoms? + + +SOUL IS A SIMPLE SUBSTANCE, WHILE EVERY BODY IS COMPOSED OF MATTER AND +FORM. + +(c.) (Every body is a composite of matter and form, while the soul is +a simple substance.) Inasmuch as matter possesses no quality,[44] the +matter of no simple body will be said to possess life in itself. That +which imparts life to it must then be its form. If form is a "being," +the soul cannot simultaneously be matter and form; it will be only +matter or form. Consequently, the soul will not be the body, since +the body is not constituted by matter exclusively, as could be proved +analytically, if necessary. + + +IF SOUL IS ONLY AN AFFECTION OF MATTER, WHENCE THAT AFFECTION? + +(d.) (The soul is not a simple manner of being of matter, because +matter could not give itself a form.) Some Stoics might deny that form +was a "being," asserting the soul to be a mere affection (or, manner +of being) of matter.[45] From whence then did matter acquire this +affection and animating life? Surely matter itself could not endow +itself with a form and a soul. That which endows matter or any body +with life must then be some principle alien and superior to corporeal +nature. + + +NO BODY COULD SUBSIST WITHOUT THE POWER OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. + +(e.) (No body could subsist without the power of the universal soul.) +Besides no body could subsist without the power of the universal Soul +(from Numenius[46]). Every body, indeed, is in a perpetual flow and +movement (as thought Heraclitus, in Plato, Cratylus[47]), and the world +would soon perish if it contained nothing but bodies, even if some one +of them were to be called soul; for such a soul, being composed of +the same matter as the other bodies, would undergo the same fate that +they do; or rather, there would not even be any body, everything would +remain in the condition of shapeless matter, since there would exist +no principle to fashion it. Why, there would not even be any matter, +and the universe would be annihilated to nothingness, if the care of +keeping its parts united were entrusted to some body which would have +nothing but the name of soul, as for instance, to air, or a breath +without cohesion,[48] which could not be one, by itself. As all bodies +are divisible, if the universe depended on a body, it would be deprived +of intelligence and given up to chance. How, indeed, could there be +any order in a spirit which itself would need to receive order from a +soul? How could this spirit contain reason and intelligence? On the +hypothesis of the existence of the soul, all these elements serve to +constitute the body of the world, and of every animal, because all +different bodies together work for the end of all; but without the +soul, there is no order, and even nothing exists any more. + + +IF THE SOUL IS NOT SIMPLE MATTER, SHE MUST BE A SUBSTANTIAL FORM. + +4. (f) (If the soul is anything but simple matter, she must be +constituted by a substantial form.) Those who claim that the soul +is a body are, by the very force of the truth, forced to recognize +the existence, before and above them, of a form proper to the soul; +for they acknowledge the existence of an intelligent spirit, and an +intellectual fire (as do the Stoics, following in the footsteps of +Heraclitus, Stobaeus[49]). According to them, it seems that, without +spirit or fire, there cannot be any superior nature in the order of +beings, and that the soul needs a location where she may be built +up. On the contrary, it is bodies alone that need to be built up on +something, and indeed, they are founded on the powers of the soul. +If really we do believe that the soul and life are no more than a +spirit, why add the qualification "of a certain characteristic,"[50] +a meaningless term employed when forced to admit an active nature +superior to that of bodies. As there are thousands of inanimate +spirits, not every spirit is a soul. If only that spirit is a +soul which possesses that "special characteristic," this "special +characteristic" and this "manner of being" will either be something +real, or will be nothing. If they are nothing, there will be nothing +real but spirit, and this alleged "manner of being" is nothing more +than a word. In that system, therefore, nothing but matter really +exists. God, the soul, and all other things are no more than a word; +the body alone really subsists. If, on the contrary, that "manner of +being" is something real, if it is anything else than substrate or +matter, if it resides in matter without being material or composed of +matter, it must then be a nature different from the body, namely, a +reason (by a pun).[51] + + +THE BODY EXERTS A UNIFORM ACTION, WHILE THE SOUL EXERTS A VARIED ONE. + +(g.) (The body exerts an uniform action, while the soul exerts a very +diverse action.) The following considerations further demonstrate the +impossibility of the soul being a body. A body must be hot or cold, +hard or soft, liquid or solid, black or white, or qualities differing +according to its nature. If it is only hot or cold, light or heavy, +black or white, it communicates its only quality to what comes close +to it; for fire could not cool, nor ice heat. Nevertheless, the soul +produces not only different effects in different animals, but contrary +effects even in the same being; she makes certain things solid, dense, +black, light, and certain others liquid, sparse, white, or heavy. +According to the different quality of the body, and according to its +color, she should produce but a single effect; nevertheless, she exerts +a very diverse action. + + +THREE MORE PROOFS OF THE INCORPOREITY OF THE SOUL. + +5. (h.) (The body has but a single kind of motion while the soul has +different ones.) If the soul is a body, how does it happen that she +has different kinds of motion instead of a single one, as is the +case with the body? Will these movements be explained by voluntary +determinations, and by (seminal) reasons? In this case neither the +voluntary determinations, nor these reasons, which differ from each +other, can belong to a single and simple body; such a body does not +participate in any particular reason except by the principle that made +it hot or cold. + + +BODIES CAN LOSE PARTS, NOT SO THE SOUL. + +(i.) (Souls cannot, as do bodies, lose or gain parts, ever remaining +identical.) The body has the faculty of making its organs grow within +a definite time and in fixed proportions. From where could the soul +derive them? Its function is to grow, not to cause growth, unless +the principle of growth be comprehended within its material mass. If +the soul that makes the body grow was herself a body, she should, on +uniting with molecules of a nature similar to hers, develop a growth +proportional to that of the organs. In this case, the molecules that +will come to add themselves to the soul will be either animate or +inanimate; if they are animate, how could they have become such, and +from whom will they have received that characteristic? If they are not +animate, how will they become such, and how will agreement between +them and the first soul arise? How will they form but a single unity +with her, and how will they agree with her? Will they not constitute a +soul that will remain foreign to the former, who will not possess her +requirements of knowledge? This aggregation of molecules that would +thus be called soul will resemble the aggregation of molecules that +form our body. She would lose parts, she would acquire new ones; she +will not be identical. But if we had a soul that was not identical, +memory and self-consciousness of our own faculties would be impossible. + + +THE SOUL IS EVERYWHERE ENTIRE; THAT IS NOT THE CASE WITH THE BODY. + +(j.) (The soul, being one and simple, is everywhere entire, and has +parts that are identical to the whole; this is not the case with +the body.) If the soul is a body, she will have parts that are not +identical with the whole, as every body is by nature divisible. If then +the soul has a definite magnitude of which she cannot lose anything +without ceasing to be a soul, she will by losing her parts, change her +nature, as happens to every quantity. If, on losing some part of its +magnitude, a body, notwithstanding, remains identical in respect to +quality, it does not nevertheless become different from what it was, +in respect to quantity, and it remains identical only in respect to +quality, which differs from quantity. What shall we answer to those who +insist that the soul is a body? Will they say that, in the same body, +each part possesses the same quality as the total soul, and that the +case is similar with the part of a part? Then quantity is no longer +essential to the nature of the soul; which contradicts the hypothesis +that the soul needed to possess a definite magnitude. Besides the soul +is everywhere entire; now it is impossible for a body to be entire in +several places simultaneously, or have parts identical to the whole. +If we refuse the name of soul to each part, the soul is then composed +of inanimate parts. Besides, if the soul is a definite magnitude, she +cannot increase or diminish without ceasing to be a soul; but it often +happens that from a single conception or from a single germ are born +two or more beings, as is seen in certain animals in whom the germs +divide;[52] in this case, each part is equal to the whole. However +superficially considered, this fact demonstrates that the principle +in which the part is equal to the whole is essentially superior to +quantity, and must necessarily lack any kind of quantity. On this +condition alone can the soul remain identical when the body loses its +quantity, because she has need of no mass, no quantity, and because her +essence is of an entirely different nature. The soul and the (seminal) +reasons therefore possess no extension. + + +THE BODY COULD NOT POSSESS SENSATION. + +6. (k.) (The body could not possess either sensation, thought, or +virtue.) If the soul were a body, she would not possess either +sensation, thought, science, virtue, nor any of the perfections that +render her more beautiful. Here follows the proof. + + +IMPOSSIBILITY FOR THE BODY TO HAVE SENSATION. + +The subject that perceives a sense-object must itself be single, and +grasp this object in its totality, by one and the same power. This +happens when by several organs we perceive several qualities of a +single object, or when, by a single organ, we embrace a single complex +object in its totality, as, for instance, a face. It is not one +principle that sees the face, and another one that sees the eyes; it +is the "same principle" which embraces everything at once. Doubtless +we do receive a sense-impression by the eyes, and another by the ears; +but both of them must end in some single principle. How, indeed, could +any decision be reached about the difference of sense-impressions +unless they all converged toward the same principle? The latter is +like a centre, and the individual sensations are like radii which +from the circumference radiate towards the centre of a circle. This +central principle is essentially single. If it was divisible, and if +sense-impressions were directed towards two points at a distance from +each other, such as the extremities of the same line, they would either +still converge towards one and the same point, as, for instance, the +middle (of the line), or one part would feel one thing, and another +something else. It would be absolutely as if I felt one thing, and you +felt another, when placed in the presence of one and the same thing (as +thought Aristotle, de Anima[53]). Facts, therefore, demonstrate that +sensations centre in one and the same principle; as visible images are +centred in the pupil of the eye; otherwise how could we, through the +pupil, see the greatest objects? So much the more, therefore, must +the sensations that centre in the (Stoic) "directing principle"[54] +resemble indivisible intuitions and be perceived by an indivisible +principle. If the latter possessed extension, it could, like the +sense-object, be divided; each of its parts would thus perceive one +of the parts of the sense-object, and nothing within us would grasp +the object in its totality. The subject that perceives must then be +entirely one; otherwise, how could it be divided? In that case it could +not be made to coincide with the sense-object, as two equal figures +superimposed on each other, because the directing principle does not +have an extension equal to that of the sense-object. How then will we +carry out the division? Must the subject that feels contain as many +parts as there are in the sense-object? Will each part of the soul, in +its turn, feel by its own parts, or will (we decide that) the parts of +parts will not feel? Neither is that likely. If, on the other hand, +each part feels the entire object, and if each magnitude is divisible +to infinity, the result is that, for a single object, there will be an +infinity of sensations in each part of the soul; and, so much the more, +an infinity of images in the principle that directs us. (This, however, +is the opposite of the actual state of affairs.) + + +AGAINST THE STOICS, SENSATIONS ARE NOT IMPRESSIONS OF A SEAL ON WAX. + +Besides, if the principle that feels were corporeal, it could feel only +so long as exterior objects produced in the blood or in the air some +impression similar to that of a seal on wax.[55] If they impressed +their images on wet substances, as is no doubt supposed, these +impressions would become confused as images in water, and memory would +not occur. If, however, these impressions persisted, they would either +form an obstacle to subsequent ones, and no further sensation would +occur; or they would be effaced by the new ones, which would destroy +memory. If then the soul is capable of recalling earlier sensations, +and having new ones, to which the former would form no obstacle, it is +because she is not corporeal. + + +SENSATION CANNOT BE RELAYED FROM SENSE-ORGAN TO DIRECTING PRINCIPLE. + +7. The same reflections may be made about pain, and one's feeling of +it. When a man's finger is said to give him pain, this, no doubt, +is a recognition that the seat of the pain is in the finger, and +that the feeling of pain is experienced by the directing principle. +Consequently, when a part of the spirit suffers, this suffering is felt +by the directing principle, and shared by the whole soul.[56] How can +this sympathy be explained? By relay transmission, (the Stoic) will +answer; the sense-impression is felt first by the animal spirit that +is in the finger, and then transmitted to the neighboring part, and +so on till it reaches the directing part. Necessarily, if the pain is +felt by the first part that experiences it, it will also be felt by the +second part to which it is transmitted; then by the third, and so on, +until the one pain would have caused an infinite number of sensations. +Last the directing principle will perceive all these sensations, adding +thereto its own sensation. Speaking strictly, however, each of these +sensations will not transmit the suffering of the finger, but the +suffering of one of the intermediate parts. For instance, the second +sensation will relay the suffering of the hand. The third, that of +the arm, and so on, until there will be an infinity of sensations. +The directing principle, for its part, will not feel the pain of the +finger, but its own; it will know none but that, it will pay no +attention to the rest, because it will ignore the pain suffered by the +finger. Therefore, relayed sensation is an impossibility, nor could +one part of the body perceive the suffering felt by another part; for +the body has extension, and, in every extension, parts are foreign to +each other (the opposite of the opinion of Cleanthes, Nemesius).[57] +Consequently, the principle that feels must everywhere be identical +with itself; and among all beings, the body is that which is least +suitable to this identity. + + +THE BODY CANNOT THINK. + +8. If, in any sense whatever, the soul were a body, we could not think. +Here is the proof. If feeling[58] is explained as the soul's laying +hold of perceptible things by making use of the body, thinking cannot +also of making use of the body. Otherwise, thinking and feeling would +be identical. Thus, thinking must consist in perceiving without the +help of the body (as thought Aristotle[59]). So much the more, the +thinking principle cannot be corporeal. Since it is sensation that +grasps sense-objects, it must likewise be thought, or intellection, +that grasps intelligible objects. Though this should be denied, it will +be admitted that we think certain intelligibles entities, and that we +perceive entities that have no extension. How could an entity that +had extension think one that had no extension? Or a divisible entity, +think an indivisible one? Could this take place by an indivisible part? +In this case, the thinking subject will not be corporeal; for there +is no need that the whole subject be in contact with the object; it +would suffice if one of its parts reached the object (as Aristotle said +against Plato).[60] If then this truth be granted, that the highest +thoughts must have incorporeal objects, the latter can be cognized only +by a thinking principle that either is, or becomes independent of body. +Even the objection that the object of thought is constituted by the +forms inherent in matter, implies that these forces cannot be thought +unless, by intelligence, they are separated from matter. It is not by +means of the carnal mass of the body, nor generally by matter, that +we can effect the abstraction of triangle, circle, line or point. To +succeed in this abstraction, the soul must separate from the body, and +consequently, the soul cannot be corporeal. + + +THE BODY CANNOT POSSESS VIRTUE. + +Neither do beauty or justice possess extension, I suppose; and their +conception must be similar. These things can be cognized or retained +only by the indivisible part of the soul. If the latter were corporeal, +where indeed could virtues, prudence, justice and courage exist? In +this case, virtues (as Critias thought),[61] would be no more than +a certain disposition of the spirit, or blood (as Empedocles also +thought).[62] For instance, courage and temperance would respectively +be no more than a certain irritability, and a fortunate temperament of +the spirit; beauty would consist in the agreeable shape of outlines, +which cause persons, in whom they occur, to be called elegant and +handsome. Under this hypothesis, indeed, the types of spirit might +possess vigor and beauty. But what need would it have of temperance? +On the contrary, the spirit would seek to be agreeably affected by the +things it touches and embraces, to enjoy a moderate heat, a gentle +coolness, and to be in contact only with sweet, tender, and smooth +entities. What incentive would the spirit have to apportion rewards to +those who had deserved them? + + +IF VIRTUE WERE CORPOREAL IT WOULD BE PERISHABLE. + +Are the notions of virtue, and other intelligible entities by the soul +thought eternal, or does virtue arise and perish? If so, by what being, +and how will it be formed? It is the same problem that remains to be +solved. Intelligible entities must therefore be eternal and immutable, +like geometrical notions, and consequently cannot be corporeal. +Further, the subject in whom they exist must be of a nature similar to +theirs, and therefore not be corporeal; for the nature of body is not +to remain immutable, but to be in a perpetual flow. + + +BODIES ARE ACTIVE ONLY BY MEANS OF INCORPOREAL POWERS. + +(9.) There are men who locate the soul in the body, so as to give her +a foundation in some sphere of activity, to account for the various +phenomena in the body, such as getting hot or cold, pushing on or +stopping, (and the like). They evidently do not realize that bodies +produce these effects only through incorporeal powers, and that those +are not the powers that we attribute to the soul, which are thought, +sensation, reasoning, desire, judiciousness, propriety and wisdom, all +of them entities that cannot possible be attributes of a corporeal +entity. Consequently, those (materialists) attribute to the body all +the faculties of incorporeal essences, and leave nothing for the latter. + + +WHY BODIES ARE ACTIVATED BY INCORPOREAL POWERS. + +The proof that bodies are activated only by incorporeal faculties may +be proved as follows: Quantity and quality are two different things. +Every body has a quantity, but not always a quality, as in the case of +matter, (according to the Stoic definition, that it was a body without +quality, but possessing magnitude[63]). Granting this, (you Stoic) will +also be forced to admit that as quality is something different from +quantity, it must consequently be different from the body. Since then +every body has a quantity, how could quality, which is no quantity, be +a body? Besides, as we said above,[64] every body and mass is altered +by division; nevertheless, when a body is cut into pieces, every +part preserves the entire quality without undergoing alteration. For +instance, every molecule of honey, possesses the quality of sweetness +as much as all the molecules taken together; consequently that +sweetness cannot be corporeal; and other qualities must be in a similar +case. Moreover, if the active powers were corporeal, they would have to +have a material mass proportional to their strength or weakness. Now +there are great masses that have little force, and small ones that have +great force; demonstrating that power does not depend on extension, and +should be attributed to some (substance) without extension. Finally, +you may say that matter is identical with body, and produces different +beings only by receiving different qualities (the Stoics considering +that even the divinity was no more than modified matter, their two +principles being matter and quality;[65] the latter, however, was also +considered as body). How do you (Stoics) not see that qualities thus +added to matter are reasons, that are primary and immaterial? Do not +object that when the spirit (breath) and blood abandon animals, they +cease to live; for if these things are necessary to life, there are +for our life many other necessities, even during the presence of the +soul (as thought Nemesius).[66] Besides, neither spirit nor blood are +distributed to every part of the body. + + +THE SOUL CAN PENETRATE THE BODY; BUT TWO BODIES CANNOT PENETRATE EACH +OTHER. + +(10). The soul penetrates the whole body, while an entire body cannot +penetrate another entire body. Further, if the soul is corporeal, and +pervades the whole body, she will, with the body, form (as Alexander +of Aphrodisia pointed out) a mixture,[67] similar to the other bodies +(that are constituted by a mixture of matter and quality, as the Stoics +taught). Now as none of the bodies that enter into a mixture is in +actualization[68] the soul, instead of being in actualization in the +bodies, would be in them only potentially; consequently, she would +cease to be a soul, as the sweet ceases to be sweet when mingled with +the bitter; we would, therefore, have no soul left. If, when one body +forms a mixture with another body, total penetration occurs, so that +each molecule contains equal parts of two bodies and that each body +be distributed equally in the whole space occupied by the mass of the +other, without any increase of volume, nothing that is not divided will +remain. Indeed, mixture operates not only between the larger parts +(which would be no more than a simple juxtaposition); but the two +bodies must penetrate each other mutually, even if smaller--it would +indeed be impossible for the smaller to equal the greater; still, when +the smaller penetrates the larger it must divide it entirely. If the +mixture operates in this manner in every part, and if no undivided +part of the mass remain, the body must be divided into points, which +is impossible. Indeed, were this division pushed to infinity, since +every body is fully divisible, bodies will have to be infinite not only +potentially, but also in actuality. It is therefore impossible for +one entire body to penetrate another in its entirety. Now as the soul +penetrates the entire body, the soul must be incorporeal (as thought +Nemesius).[69] + + +THE STOIC DEVELOPMENT FROM HABIT TO SOUL AND INTELLIGENCE WOULD MAKE +THE PERFECT ARISE FROM THE IMPERFECT, AN IMPOSSIBILITY. + +(11). (If, as Stoics claim, man first was a certain nature called +habit,[70] then a soul, and last an intelligence, the perfect would +have arisen from the imperfect, which is impossible). To say that +the first nature of the soul is to be a spirit, and that this spirit +became soul only after having been exposed to cold, and as it were +became soaked by its contact, because the cold subtilized it;[71] this +is an absurd hypothesis. Many animals are born in warm places, and do +not have their soul exposed to action of cold. Under this hypothesis, +the primary nature of the soul would have been made dependent on the +concourse of exterior circumstances. The Stoics, therefore, posit as +principle that which is less perfect (the soul), and trace it to a +still less perfect earlier thing called habit (or form of inorganic +things).[72] Intelligence, therefore, is posited in the last rank +since it is alleged to be born of the soul, while, on the contrary, +the first rank should be assigned to intelligence, the second to the +soul, the third to nature, and, following natural order, consider +that which is less perfect as the posterior element. In this system +the divinity, by the mere fact of his possessing intelligence, is +posterior and begotten, possessing only an incidental intelligence. +The result would, therefore, be that there was neither soul, nor +intelligence, nor divinity; for never can that which is potential pass +to the condition of actualization, without the prior existence of some +actualized principle. If what is potential were to transform itself +into actualization--which is absurd--its passage into actualization +will have to involve at the very least a contemplation of something +which is not merely potential, but actualized. Nevertheless, on the +hypothesis that what is potential can permanently remain identical, it +will of itself pass into actualization, and will be superior to the +being which is potential only because it will be the object of the +aspiration of such a being. We must, therefore, assign the first rank +to the being that has a perfect and incorporeal nature, which is always +in actualization. Thus intelligence and soul are prior to nature; the +soul, therefore, is not a spirit, and consequently no body. Other +reasons for the incorporeality of the soul have been advanced; but the +above suffices (as thought Aristotle).[73] + + +II. THE SOUL IS NEITHER THE HARMONY NOR ENTELECHY OF THE BODY--THE SOUL +IS THE HARMONY OF THE BODY; AGAINST THE PYTHAGOREANS. + +(12). a. Since the soul is not corporeal, its real nature must be +ascertained. Shall we assert that she is something distinct from the +body, but dependent thereon, as, for instance, a harmony? Pythagoras, +indeed, used this word in a technical sense; and after him the harmony +of the body has been thought to be something similar to the harmony +of a lyre. As tension produces in the lyre-strings an affection +(or, manner of being, or state) that is called harmony, likewise, +as contrary elements are mingled in our body, an individual mixture +produces life and soul, which, therefore, is only an individual +affection of this mixture. + + +WHY THE SOUL IS NOT A HARMONY. + +As has already been said above[74] this hypothesis is inadmissible for +several reasons. To begin with, the soul is prior (to the body), and +the harmony is posterior thereto. Then the soul dominates the body, +governs it, and often even resists it, which would be impossible if +the soul were only a harmony. The soul, indeed, is a "being," which +harmony is not. When the corporeal principles of which we are composed +are mingled in just proportions, their temperament constitutes health +(but not a "being," such as the soul). Besides, every part of the body +being mingled in a different manner should form (a different harmony, +and consequently) a different soul, so that there would be several +of them. The decisive argument, however, is that this soul (that +constitutes a harmony) presupposes another soul which would produce +this harmony, as a lyre needs a musician who would produce harmonic +vibrations in the strings, because he possesses within himself the +reason according to which he produces the harmony. The strings of the +lyre do not vibrate of themselves, and the elements of our body cannot +harmonize themselves. Nevertheless, under this hypothesis, animated and +orderly "being" would have been made up out of inanimate and disordered +entities; and these orderly "beings" would owe their order and +existence to chance. That is as impossible for parts as for the whole. +The soul, therefore, is no harmony. + + +THE SOUL IS NOT THE ENTELECHY OF THE BODY (POLEMIC AGAINST ARISTOTLE). +ARISTOTLE'S STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.[75] + +(13). b. Now let us examine the opinion of those who call the soul an +entelechy. They say that, in the composite, the soul plays the part of +form in respect to matter, in the body the soul animates. The soul, +however, is not said to be the form of any body, nor of the body as +such; but of the natural body, that is organized, and which possesses +life potentially.[76] + + +IF THE SOUL IS AN ENTELECHY, SHE IS A DIFFERENT ONE THAN ARISTOTLE'S. + +If the soul's relation to the body is the same as that of the statue +to the metal, the soul will be divided with the body, and on cutting +a member a portion of the soul would be cut along with it. According +to this teaching, the soul separates from the body only during sleep, +since she must inhere in the body of which she is the entelechy, in +which case sleep would become entirely inexplicable. If the soul be an +entelechy, the struggle of reason against the passions would become +entirely impossible. The entire human being will experience but one +single sentiment, and never be in disagreement with itself. If the +soul be an entelechy, there will perhaps still be sensations, but mere +sensations; pure thoughts will have become impossible. Consequently +the Peripateticians themselves are obliged to introduce (into human +nature) another soul, namely, the pure intelligence, which they +consider immortal.[77] The rational soul, therefore, would have to be +an entelechy in a manner different from their definition thereof, if +indeed this name is at all to be used. + + +IF AN ENTELECHY BE GRANTED, IT IS INSEPARABLE FROM THE BODY. + +The sense-soul, which preserves the forms of sense-objects previously +perceived, must preserve them without the body. Otherwise, these forms +would inhere in the body like figures and corporeal shapes. Now, if +the forms inhered in the sense-soul in this manner, they could not +be received therein otherwise (than as corporeal impressions). That +is why, if we do grant the existence of an entelechy, it must be +inseparable from the body. Even the faculty of appetite, not indeed +that which makes us feel the need of eating and drinking, but that +which desires things that are independent of the body, could not either +be an entelechy.[78] + + +NEITHER COULD THE SOUL OF GROWTH BE AN ENTELECHY. + +The soul's faculty of growth remains to be considered. This at least +might be thought an inseparable entelechy. But neither does that suit +her nature. For if the principle of every plant is in its root, and if +growth takes place around and beneath it,[79] as occurs in many plants, +it is evident that the soul's faculty of growth, abandoning all the +other parts, has concentrated in the root alone; it, therefore, was not +distributed all around the soul, like an inseparable entelechy. Add +that this soul, before the plant grows, is already contained in the +small body (of the seed). If then, after having vivified a great plant, +the soul's faculty of growth can condense into a small space, and if +later it can, from this small space, again spread over a whole plant, +it is evidently entirely separable from the (plant's) matter. + + +THE ENTELECHY IS NOT A FORM OF THE BODY, AS THE SOUL TRANSMIGRATES. + +Besides, as the soul is indivisible, the entelechy of the divisible +body could not become divisible as is the body. Besides, the same soul +passes from the body of one animal into the body of some other. How +could the soul of the first become that of the second, if she were only +the entelechy of a single one? The example of animals that metamorphose +demonstrates the impossibility of this theory. The soul, therefore, is +not the simple form of a body; she is a genuine "being," which does +not owe its existence merely to her being founded on the body, but +which, on the contrary, exists before having become the soul of some +individual animal. It is, therefore, not the body that begets the soul. + + +THE SOUL IS AN INCORPOREAL AND IMMORTAL ESSENCE. THE SOUL BEING NONE OF +CORPOREAL POSSIBILITIES, MUST BE INCORPOREAL. + +c. What then can be the nature of the soul, if she is neither a +body, nor a corporeal affection, while, nevertheless, all the active +force, the productive power and the other faculties reside in her, or +come from her? What sort of a "being," indeed, is this (soul) that +has an existence independent of the body? She must evidently be a +veritable "being." Indeed, everything corporeal must be classified as +generated, and excluded from genuine "being," because it is born, and +perishes, never really exists, and owes its salvation exclusively to +participation in the genuine existence, and that only in the measure of +its participation therein. + + +THE PERSISTENCE OF THE CHANGEABLE IMPLIES THE ETERNAL IN THE +BACKGROUND.[80] + +9. (14). It is absolutely necessary to postulate the existence of +a nature different from bodies, by itself fully possessing genuine +existence, which can neither be born nor perish. Otherwise, all other +things would hopelessly disappear, as a result of the destruction of +the existence which preserves both the individuals and the universe, +as their beauty and salvation. The soul, indeed, is the principle of +movement (as Plato thought, in the Phaedrus); it is the soul that +imparts movement to everything else; the soul moves herself. She +imparts life to the body she animates; but alone she possesses life, +without ever being subject to losing it, because she possesses it by +herself. All beings, indeed, live only by a borrowed life; otherwise, +we would have to proceed from cause to cause unto infinity. There +must, therefore, exist a nature that is primarily alive, necessarily +incorruptible and immortal because it is the principle of life for +everything else. It is thereon that must be founded all that is divine +and blessed, that lives and exists by itself, that lives and exists +supremely, which is immutable in its essence, and which can neither +be born nor perish. How indeed could existence be born or perish? If +the name of "existence" really suited it, it must exist forever, just +as whiteness is not alternately black and white. If whiteness were +existence itself, it would, with its "being" (or nature) (which is, to +be whiteness), possess an eternal existence; but, in reality, it is no +more than whiteness. Therefore, the principle that possesses existence +in itself and in a supreme degree will always exist. Now this primary +and eternal existence can not be anything dead like a stone, or a piece +of wood. It must live, and live with a pure life, as long as it exists +within itself. If something of it mingles with what is inferior, this +part meets obstacles in its aspiration to the good; but it does not +lose its nature, and resumes its former condition on returning to a +suitable condition (as thought Plato, in his Phaedo[81]). + + +THE SOUL IS INCORPOREAL BECAUSE OF HER KINSHIP WITH THE DIVINE. + +10. (15). The soul has affinities with the divine and eternal nature. +This is evident, because, as we have demonstrated it, she is not a +body, has neither figure nor color, and is impalpable. Consider the +following demonstration. It is generally granted that everything that +is divine and that possesses genuine existence enjoys a happy and wise +life. Now let us consider the nature of our soul, in connection with +that of the divine. Let us take a soul, not one inside of a body, which +is undergoing the irrational motions of appetite and anger, and the +other affections born of the body, but a soul that has eliminated all +that, and which, so far as possible, had no intercourse with the body. +Such a soul would show us that vices are something foreign to the +nature of the soul, and come to her from elsewhere, and that, inasmuch +as she is purified, she in her own right possesses the most eminent +qualities, wisdom, and the other virtues (as thought Plato[82]). If +the soul, when re-entering into herself, is such, how could she not +participate in this nature that we have acknowledged to be suitable +to every thing that is eternal and divine? As wisdom and real virtue +are divine things, they could not dwell in a vile and mortal entity; +the existence that receives them is necessarily divine, since it +participates in divine things by their mutual affinity and community. +Anyone who thus possesses wisdom and virtue in his soul differs little +from the superior beings; he is inferior to them only by the fact of +his having a body. If all men, or at least, if many of them held their +soul in this disposition, no one would be sceptic enough to refuse to +believe that the soul is immortal. But as we consider the soul in her +present condition of being soiled by vices, no one imagines that her +nature is divine and immortal. + + +THE SOUL, LIKE OTHER THINGS, SHOULD BE JUDGED IN HER PUREST CONDITION. + +Now when we consider the nature of some being, it should be studied +in its rarest condition, since extraneous additions hinder it from +being rightly judged. The soul must be therefore considered only after +abstraction of foreign things, or rather, he who makes this abstraction +should observe himself in that condition. He then will not doubt that +he is immortal, when he sees himself in the pure world of intelligence. +He will see his intelligence occupied, not in the observation of some +sense-object that is mortal, but in thinking the eternal by an equally +eternal faculty.[83] He will see all the entities in the intelligible +world, and he will see himself become intelligible, radiant, and +illuminated by the truth emanating from the Good, which sheds the light +of truth on all intelligible entities.[84] Then (like Empedocles, in +Diog. Laertes[85]), he will have the right to say: + +"Farewell, I am now an immortal divinity." + +For he has ascended to the divinity, and has become assimilated +thereto. As purification permits one to know the better things, so the +notions we have within us, and which constitute real science, are made +clear. Indeed, it is not by an excursion among external objects that +the soul attains the intuition of wisdom and virtue, but by re-entering +into herself, in thinking herself in her primitive condition. Then she +clears up and recognizes in herself the divine statues, soiled by the +rust of time. Likewise, if a piece of gold were animated and released +itself from the earth by which it was covered, after first having been +ignorant of its real nature because it did not see its own splendor, +it would admire itself when considering itself in its purity; it would +find that it had no need of a borrowed beauty, and would consider +itself happy to remain isolated from everything else.[86] + + +EVEN ON THE STOIC HYPOTHESIS THE SOUL MUST BE IMMORTAL. + +11. (16). What sensible man, after having thus considered the nature +of the soul, could still doubt of the immortality of a principle which +derives life from naught but itself, and which cannot lose it? How +could the soul lose life, since she did not borrow it from elsewhere, +and since she does not possess it as fire possesses heat? For, without +being an accident of fire, the heat, nevertheless, is an accident +of its matter; for fire can perish. But, in the soul, life is not an +accident that comes to add itself to a material subject to constitute a +soul. In fact, there is here an alternative: either life is a genuine +"being," which is alive by itself; in which case this "being" is +the soul that we are seeking to discover, and immortality cannot be +refused her; or the soul is a composite, and she must be decomposed +until we arrive at something immortal which moves by itself; and such +a principle could not be subject to death. Further, when (Stoics) +say that life is only an accidental modification of matter, they are +thereby forced to acknowledge that the principle that imparted this +modification to matter is immortal, and incapable of admitting anything +contrary to what it communicates (that is, life, as said Plato, in his +Phaedo[87]), but there is only a single nature that possesses life in +actualization. + + +THERE IS NO CONCEIVABLE WAY IN WHICH SOUL COULD PERISH. + +12. (17). (The Stoics), indeed, claim that every soul is perishable. +In this case, everything should long since have been destroyed. Others +might say that our soul were mortal, while the universal Soul were +immortal. On them, however, is the burden of proof of a difference +between the individual and universal souls. Both of them, indeed, +are a principle of movement; both live by themselves; both grasp +the same object by the same faculty, either by thinking the things +contained in heaven, or by considering the nature ("being") of each +being, ascending unto the first principle. Since our soul thinks +absolute essences either by the notions she finds within herself, or by +reminiscence, she evidently is prior to the body. Possessing knowledge +of eternal entities, she herself must be eternal. All that dissolves, +existing only by its compositeness, can naturally dissolve in the +same manner that it became composite. But the soul is a single, simple +actualization, whose essence is life; not in this manner therefore +can the soul perish. Neither could the soul perish by division into +a number of parts; for, as we have shown, the soul is neither a mass +nor a quantity. As little could the soul perish by alteration; for +when alteration destroys anything, it may remove its form, but leaves +its matter; alteration, therefore, is a characteristic of something +composite. Consequently as the soul cannot perish in any of these ways, +she is imperishable. + + +DESCENT INTO THE BODY NEED NOT CONFLICT WITH THE ETERNITY OF SOUL. + +13. (18). If intelligible entities are separated from sense objects, +how does it happen that the soul descends into a body?[88] So long as +the soul is a pure and impassible intelligence, so long as she enjoys +a purely intellectual life like the other intelligible beings, she +dwells among them; for she has neither appetite nor desire. But that +part which is inferior to intelligence and which is capable of desires, +follows their impulsion, "proceeds" and withdraws from the intelligible +world. Wishing to ornament matter on the model of the Ideas she +contemplated in Intelligence, in haste to exhibit her fruitfulness, +and to manifest the germs she bears within her (as said Plato, in the +Banquet[89]), the soul applies herself to produce and create, and, as +result of this application, she is, as it were, orientated (or, in +"tension") towards sense-objects. With the universal Soul, the human +soul shares the administration of the whole world, without, however, +entering it; then, desiring to administer some portion of the world +on her own responsibility, she separates from the universal Soul, and +passes into a body. But even when she is present with the body, the +soul does not devote herself entirely to it, as some part of her +always remains outside of it; that is how her intelligence remains +impassible.[90] + + +THE SOUL AS THE ARTIST OF THE UNIVERSE. + +The soul is present in the body at some times, and at other times, +is outside of it. When, indeed, following her own inclination, she +descends from first-rank entities (that is, intelligible entities) to +third-rank entities (that is, earthly entities), she "proceeds" by +virtue of the actualization of intelligence, which, remaining within +herself, embellishes everything by the ministration of the soul, and +which, itself being immortal, ordains everything with immortal power; +for intelligence exists continuously by a continuous actualization.[91] + + +ALL SOULS HAVE IMMORTALITY, EVEN IF SUNK INTO ANIMALS OR PLANTS. + +14. (19). What about the souls of animals inferior to man? The +(rational) souls that have strayed so far as to descend into the bodies +of animals are nevertheless still immortal.[92] Souls of a kind other +(than rational souls), cannot proceed from anything else than the +living nature (of the universal Soul); and they necessarily are the +principles of life for all animals. The case is the same with the souls +that inhere in plants. Indeed, all souls have issued from the same +principle (the universal Soul), all have an individual life, and are +indivisible and incorporeal essences ("beings"). + + +EVEN IF THE SOUL HAS DIFFERENT PARTS, THE ORIGINAL PARTS SURVIVE. + +To the objection that the human soul must decompose because she +contains three parts, it may be answered that, when souls issue from +here below, those that are purified leave what had been added to them +in generation (the irrational soul,[93]) while the other non-purified +souls do free themselves therefrom with time. Besides, this lower +part of the soul does not itself perish, for it exists as long as +the principle from which it proceeds. Indeed, nothing that exists is +annihilated. + + +THE HISTORIC EVIDENCE FOR IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. + +15. (20). This, then, is our answer to those who seek a philosophical +demonstration. Those who are satisfied with the testimony of faith and +sense, may be referred to those extracts from history which furnish +numerous proofs thereof.[94] We may also refer to the oracles given by +the divinities who order an appeasement of the souls who were victims +of some injustice, and to honor the dead,[95] and to the rites observed +by all towards those who live no more;[96] which presupposes that their +souls are still conscious beyond. Even after leaving their bodies, +many souls who lived on the earth have continued to grant benefits to +men.[97] By revelation of the future;[98] and rendering other services, +they themselves prove that the other souls cannot have perished. + + As the first book was evidently Platonic, the second seems + Numenian, reminding us of the latter's book on the Immortality + of the Soul, one of the arguments from which we find in 3 E. + + + + +THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK FIRST. + +Concerning Fate. + + +POSSIBLE THEORIES ABOUT FATE. + +1. The first possibility is that there is a cause both for the things +that become, and those that are; the cause of the former being their +becoming, and that of the latter, their existence. Again, neither of +them may have a cause. Or, in both cases, some may have a cause, and +some not. Further, those that become might have a cause, while, of +these that exist, some might partly have a cause. Contrariwise, all +things that exist may have a cause, while of those that become, parts +may have a cause, and part not. Last, none of the things that become +might have any cause. + + +EXCEPT THE FIRST, ALL THINGS ARE CAUSED. + +Speaking of eternal things, the first cannot be derived from other +causes, just because they are first. Things dependent from the first, +however, may indeed thence derive their being. To each thing we should +also attribute the resultant action; for a thing's being is constituted +by its displayed energy. + + +STOIC AND EPICUREAN CAUSELESS ORIGIN REALLY THE UTMOST DETERMINISM. + +Now among the things that become, or among those that although +perpetually existent do not always result in the same actions, it may +be boldly asserted that everything has a cause. We should not admit +(the Stoic contention[99]) that something happens without a cause, +nor accept the (Epicurean[100]) arbitrary convergence of the atoms, +nor believe that any body initiates a movement suddenly and without +determining reason, nor suppose (with Epicurus again[101]) that the +soul undertakes some action by a blind impulse, without any motive. +Thus to suppose that a thing does not belong to itself, that it could +be carried away by involuntary movements, and act without motive, would +be to subject it to the most crushing determinism. The will must be +excited, or the desire awakened by some interior or exterior stimulus. +No determination (is possible) without motive. + + +EVERY GOOD THING HAS SOME CAUSE; NATURE BEING THE ULTIMATE CAUSE. + +If everything that happens has a cause, it is possible to discover +such fact's proximate causes, and to them refer this fact. People go +downtown, for example, to see a person, or collect a bill. In all cases +it is a matter of choice, followed by decision, and the determination +to carry it out. There are, indeed, certain facts usually derived +from the arts; as for instance the re-establishment of health may be +referred to medicine and the physician. Again, when a man has become +rich, this is due to his finding some treasure, or receiving some +donation, to working, or exercising some lucrative profession. The +birth of a child depends on its father, and the concourse of exterior +circumstances, which, by the concatenation of causes and effects, +favored his procreation; for example, right food, or even a still more +distant cause, the fertility of the mother, or, still more generally, +of nature (or, in general, it is usual to assign natural causes). + + +PROXIMATE CAUSES ARE UNSATISFACTORY; WE MUST SEEK THE ULTIMATE ONES. + +2. To stop, on arriving at these causes, and to refuse further +analysis, is to exhibit superficiality. This is against the advice of +the sages, who advise ascending to the primary causes, to the supreme +principles. For example, why, during the full moon, should the one man +steal, and the other one not steal? Or, why, under the same influence +of the heavens, has the one, and not the other, been sick? Why, by use +of the same means, has the one become rich, and the other poor? The +difference of dispositions, characters, and fortunes force us to seek +ulterior causes, as indeed the sages have always done. + + +MATERIALISTS SUPPORT DETERMINISM. + +Those sages who (like Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus) assumed +material principles such as the atoms, and who explain everything by +their motion, their shock and combinations, pretend that everything +existent and occurring is caused by the agency of these atoms, their +"actions and reactions." This includes, according to them, our +appetites and dispositions. The necessity residing in the nature of +these principles, and in their effects, is therefore, by these sages, +extended to everything that exists. As to the (Ionic Hylicists), who +assume other physical (ultimate) principles, referring everything to +them, they thus also subject all beings to necessity. + + +HERACLITUS, THOUGH MORE SPIRITUAL, IS ALSO DETERMINIST. + +There are others (such as Heraclitus[102]), who, seeking the (supreme) +principle of the universe, refer everything to it; saying that this +principle penetrates, moves, and produces everything. This they +call Fate, and the Supreme Cause. From it they derive everything; +its motions are said to give rise not only to the things that are +occurring, but even our thought. That is how the members of an animal +do not move themselves, but receive the stimulus from the "governing +principle" within them. + + +THE ASTROLOGERS MAKE COSMIC DEDUCTIONS FROM PROGNOSTICATION. + +Some (of the astrologers) explain everything by the circular motion of +the heavens, by the relative positions of the planets and stars, and by +their mutual aspects (or, relations). They base this (principle) on the +prevalent habit of deducing therefrom conjectures about futurity. + + +THE STOIC DETERMINISM IS BASED ON VARIOUS THEORIES. + +Others (like the Stoic Chrysippus[103]) define Fate otherwise: it +is "the concatenation of causes" in "their connection towards the +infinite," by which every posterior fact is the consequence of an +anterior one. Thus the things that follow relate to the things that +precede, and, as their effects, necessarily depend thereupon. Amidst +these (Stoic) philosophers there are two conceptions of Fate: some +consider that everything depends from a single principle, while others +do not. These views we shall study later. + +We shall first examine the system with which we began; later we shall +review the others. + + +THE PHYSICAL THEORIES ARE ABSURD. + +3. To refer everything to physical causes, whether you call them +atoms or elements, and from their disordered motion to deduce order, +reason and the soul that directs (the body), is absurd and impossible; +nevertheless, to deduce everything from atoms, is, if possible, still +more impossible; and consequently many valid objections have been +raised against this theory. + + +THE STOIC POLEMIC AGAINST THE EPICUREANS. + +To begin with, even if we do admit such atomic principles, their +existence does not in any way inevitably lead to either the necessity +of all things, or fatality. Let us, indeed, grant the existence of +atoms; now some will move downwards--that is, if there is an up +and down in the universe--others obliquely, by chance, in various +directions. As there will be no order, there will be nothing +determinate. Only what will be born of the atoms will be determinate. +It will therefore be impossible to guess or predict events, whether by +art--and indeed, how could there be any art in the midst of orderless +things?--or by enthusiasm, or divine inspiration; for prediction +implies that the future is determined. True, bodies will obey the +impulses necessarily communicated to them by the atoms; but how could +you explain the operations and affections of the soul by movements of +atoms? How could atomic shock, whether vertical or oblique, produce +in the soul these our reasonings, or appetites, whether necessarily, +or in any other way? What explanation could they give of the soul's +resistance to the impulsions of the body? By what concourse of atoms +will one man become a geometrician, another become a mathematician +and astronomer, and the other a philosopher? For, according to that +doctrine we no longer produce any act for which we are responsible, we +are even no longer living beings, since we undergo the impulsion of +bodies that affect us just as they do inanimate things. + + +APPLICATION OF THIS POLEMIC TO THE PHYSICISTS. + +The same objections apply to the doctrine of the philosophers who +explain everything by other physical causes (such as "elements"). +Principles of inferior nature might well warm us, cool us, or even make +us perish; but they could not beget any of the operations which the +soul produces; these have an entirely different cause. + + +RESTATEMENT OF HERACLITUS'S POSITION. + +4. But might (Heraclitus) suppose that a single Soul interpenetrating +the universe produces everything, and by supplying the universe with +motion supplies it simultaneously to all its constituent beings, so +that from this primary cause, would necessarily flow all secondary +causes, whose sequence and connection would constitute Fate? Similarly, +in a plant, for instance, the plant's fate might be constituted by the +("governing") principle which, from the root, administers its other +parts, and which organizes into a single system their "actions" and +"reactions."[104] + + +THIS WOULD INTERFERE WITH SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND RESPONSIBILITY. + +To begin with, this Necessity and Fate would by their excess destroy +themselves, and render impossible the sequence and concatenation of +the causes. It is, indeed, absurd to insist that our members are moved +by Fate when they are set in motion, or innervated, by the "governing +principle." It is a mistake to suppose that there is a part which +imparts motion, and on the other hand, a part which receives it from +the former; it is the governing principle that moves the leg, as it +would any other part. Likewise, if in the universe exists but a single +principle which "acts and reacts," if things derive from each other +by a series of causes each of which refers to the preceding one, it +will no longer be possible to say truly that all things arise through +causes, for their totality will constitute but a single being. In that +case, we are no longer ourselves; actions are no longer ours; it is no +longer we who reason; it is a foreign principle which reasons, wills, +and acts in us, just as it is not our feet that walk, but we who walk +by the agency of our feet. On the contrary, common sense admits that +every person lives, thinks, and acts by his own individual, proper +life, thought and action; to each must be left the responsibility of +his actions, good or evil, and not attribute shameful deeds to the +universal cause. + + +RESTATEMENT OF THE ASTROLOGICAL THEORY OF FATE. + +5. Others, again, insist that this is not the state of affairs. Their +disposition depends on the circular movement of the heaven which +governs everything, on the course of the stars, of their mutual +relative position at the time of their rising, of their setting, of +their zenith, or of their conjunction. Indeed, such are the signs +on which are founded prognostications and predictions of what is to +happen, not only to the universe, but also to each individual, both as +to his fortunes and his thought. It is noticed that the other animals +and vegetables increase or decrease according to the kind of sympathy +existing between them and the stars, that all other things experience +their influence, that various regions of the earth differ according to +their adjustment with the stars, and especially the sun; that from the +nature of these regions depend not only the character of the plants +and animals, but also human forms, size, color, affections, passions, +tastes, and customs. In this system, therefore, the course of the stars +is the absolute cause of everything. + + +REFUTATION OF THE ASTROLOGICAL SYSTEM. + +To this we answer that our astrologer attributes indirectly to the +stars all our characteristics: will, passions, vices and appetites; +he allows us no rôle other than to turn like mills, instead of +responsibility, as befits men, producing actions that suit our nature. +On the contrary, we should be left in possession of what belongs to us +by the observation that the universe limits itself to exercising some +influence on what we possess already thanks to ourselves, and which +is really characteristic of us. Moreover, one should distinguish the +deeds in which we are "active," from those in which we are necessarily +"passive," and not deduce everything from the stars. Nobody, indeed, +doubts that the differences of place and climate exert an influence +over us, imparting to us, for instance, a cool or warm-hearted +disposition. Heredity also should be considered; for children usually +resemble their parents by their features, form, and some affections of +the irrational soul. Nevertheless, even though they resemble them by +their facial features, because they are born in the same place, they +may differ in habits and thoughts, because these things depend on an +entirely different principle. In addition, we can adduce to the support +of this truth the resistance which the soul offers to the temperament +and to the appetites. As to the claim that the stars are the causes of +everything, because one can predict what is to happen to each man from +a consideration of their positions, it would be just as reasonable to +assert that the birds and the other beings which the augurs consult as +omens produce the events of which they are the signs. + + +HOROSCOPES QUESTIONED; THEY DO NOT ACCOUNT FOR SIMULTANEOUS DIFFERENCES. + +This leads us to consider, more in detail, what sort of facts may be +predicted according to the inspection of the positions occupied by the +stars presiding over the birth of a man. They who, from the assertion +that the stars indicate a man's future, draw the consequence that the +stars produce them, are in error. In some person's horoscope which +indicates birth from noble parents, on either maternal or paternal +side, this nobility of birth cannot be attributed to the stars, as +this nobility subsisted already in the parents before the stars had +taken the position according to which the horoscope is cast. Besides, +astrologers pretend they can discover the parent's fortune from the +birth of their children, and from the condition of the parents the +disposition and fate of the unborn offspring. From a child's horoscope, +they announce his brother's death; and from a woman's horoscope, the +fortunes of her husband, and conversely. It is unreasonable to refer to +the stars things which evidently are necessary consequences of parental +conditions. We then reach a dilemma: the cause lies either in these +antecedent conditions, or in the stars. The beauty and ugliness of +children, when they resemble their parents, must evidently be derived +from them, and not from the course of the stars. Moreover, it is +probable that at any one moment are born a crowd of human and animal +young; now, inasmuch as they are born under the same star, they all +ought to have the same nature. How does it then happen that, in the +same positions, stars produce men and other beings simultaneously (as +Cicero asks[105])? + + +HEREDITY MORE IMPORTANT THAN STAR-INFLUENCE; CONTINUATION. + +6. Each being derives his character from his nature. One being is a +horse because he is born from a mare, while another is human, because +born from a human mother; and more: he is that particular horse, and +that particular man because he is born from such and such a horse, or +woman. Doubtless, the course of the stars may modify the result, but +the greatest part of the influence must be allowed to heredity. + + +STARS AFFECT THE PHYSICAL, NOT THE MENTAL BEING. + +The stars act on the body only in a physical way, and thus impart +to them heat, cold, and the variety of temperament which results +therefrom. But how could they endow the man with habits, tastes, and +inclinations which do not seem to depend on the temperament, such as +the avocation of a surveyor, a grammarian, a gambler, or an inventor? + + +IRRATIONAL CLAIMS OF ASTROLOGERS. + +Besides, nobody would admit that perversity could come from beings who +are divinities. How could one believe that they are the authors of the +evils attributed to them, and that they themselves become evil because +they set or pass under the earth, as if they could possibly be affected +by the fact that, in regard to us, they seem to set; as if they did not +continue to wander around the heavenly sphere, and remained in the same +relation to the earth? Besides it is incredible that because a star +is in such or such a position in respect of another star, it becomes +better or worse, and that it affects us with goodness when it is well +disposed, and evil in the contrary case. + + +STARS SERVE AS LETTERS IN WHICH TO READ NATURE. + +We grant that by their movement the stars co-operate in the +conservation of the universe, and that they simultaneously play in it +another part. They serve as letters for those skilled in deciphering +this kind of writing; and who, by the observation of the figures formed +by the stars, read into them future events according to the laws of +analogy, as for instance, if one presaged high deeds from seeing a bird +fly high. + + +RESTATEMENT OF THE STOIC DOCTRINE, AND THE HERACLITIAN. + +7. There remains to be considered the (Stoic) doctrine which, +concatenating and interrelating all things among each other, +establishes "a single cause which produces everything through seminal +reasons." This doctrine reattaches itself to (Heraclitus's) which +deduces from the action of the universal Soul the constitution and the +movements of the individuals as well as those of the universe. + + +ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIA'S POLEMIC AGAINST THE STOICS. + +In this case, even if we possessed the power of doing something by +ourselves, we would not be any the less than the remainder of the +universe subjected to necessity, because Fate, containing the whole +series of causes, necessarily determines each event. Now since Fate +includes all causes, there is nothing which could hinder the occurrence +of that event, or alter it. If then everything obeys the impulsion of +a single principle, nothing is left to us but to follow it. Indeed, +in this case, the fancies of our imagination would result from +anterior facts, and would in turn determine our appetites; our liberty +would then have become a mere word; nor would we gain any advantage +from obeying our appetites, since our appetites themselves will be +determined by anterior facts. We would have no more liberty than the +other animals, than children, or the insane, who run hither and yon, +driven by blind appetites; for they also obey their appetites, as fire +would do, and as all the things which fatally follow the dispositions +of their nature. These objections will be decisive for those capable of +apprehending them; and in the search for other causes of our appetites +they will not content themselves with the principles which we have +examined. + + +THE HUMAN SOUL AS AN INDEPENDENT PRINCIPLE. + +8. What other cause, besides the preceding, will we have to invoke +so as to let nothing occur without a cause, to maintain order and +interdependence of things in the world, and in order to preserve the +possibility of predictions and omens without destroying our personality? + +We shall have to introduce among the number of beings another +principle, namely: the soul; and not only the World-soul, but even the +individual soul of every person. In the universal concatenation of +causes and effects, this soul is a principle of no little importance, +because, instead of, like all other things, being born of a "seminal +reason," it constitutes a "primary cause." Outside of a body, she +remains absolute mistress of herself, free and independent of the +cause which administers the world. As soon as she has descended into +a body, she is no longer so independent, for she then forms part of +the order to which all things are subjected. Now, inasmuch as the +accidents of fortune, that is to say, the surrounding circumstances, +determine many events, the soul alternately yields to the influence +of external circumstances, and then again she dominates them, and +does what she pleases. This she does more or less, according as she +is good or evil. When she yields to the corporeal temperament, she is +necessarily subjected to desire or anger, discouraged in poverty, or +proud in prosperity, as well as tyrannical in the exercise of power. +But she can resist all these evil tendencies if her disposition is +good; she modifies her surroundings more than she is affected by them; +some things she changes, others she tolerates without herself incurring +guilt. + + +THE SOUL IS FREE WHEN FOLLOWING REASON. + +9. All things therefore, which result either from a choice by the soul, +or from exterior circumstances, are "necessary," or determined by a +cause. Could anything, indeed, be found outside of these causes? If we +gather into one glance all the causes we admit, we find the principles +that produce everything, provided we count, amidst external causes, +the influence exercised by the course of the stars. When a soul makes +a decision, and carries it out because she is impelled thereto by +external things, and yields to a blind impulse, we should not consider +her determination and action to be free. The soul is not free when, +perverting herself, she does not make decisions which direct her in the +straight path. On the contrary, when she follows her own guide, pure +and impassible reason, her determination is really voluntary, free and +independent, and the deed she performs is really her own work, and not +the consequence of an exterior impulse; she derives it from her inner +power, her pure being, from the primary and sovereign principle which +directs her, being deceived by no ignorance, nor vanquished by the +power of appetites; for when the appetites invade the soul, and subdue +her, they drag her with them by their violence, and she is rather +"passive" than "active" in what she does. + + +THE SOUL OBEYS FATE ONLY WHEN EVIL. + +10. The conclusion of our discussion is that while everything is +indicated and produced by causes, these are of two kinds: First the +human soul, and then only exterior circumstances. When the soul acts +"conformably to right reason" she acts freely. Otherwise, she is +tangled up in her deeds, and she is rather "passive" than "active." +Therefore, whenever she lacks prudence, the exterior circumstances are +the causes of her actions; one then has good reason to say that she +obeys Fate, especially if Fate is here considered as an exterior cause. +On the contrary, virtuous actions are derived from ourselves; for, when +we are independent, it is natural for us to produce them. Virtuous +men act, and do good freely. Others do good only in breathing-spells +left them in between by their passions. If, during these intervals, +they practice the precepts of wisdom, it is not because they receive +them from some other being, it is merely because their passions do not +hinder them from listening to the voice of reason. + + As the first book seemed Platonic, and the second Numenian, so + this third one seems called forth by the practical opposition + of astrologers or Gnostics. Later in life, his thirty-third + book, ii. 9, was to take up again this polemic in more extended + form. This chronologic arrangement of Plotinos's first three + books reveals his three chief sources of interest--devotion to + Plato, reliance on Numenius, and opposition to the Gnostics and + astrologers. + + + + +FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIRST. + +Of the Being of the Soul. + + +It is in the intelligible world that dwells veritable being. +Intelligence is the best that there is on high; but there are also +souls; for it is thence that they descended thither. Only, souls have +no bodies, while here below they inhabit bodies and are divided there. +On high, all the intelligences exist together, without separation or +division; all the souls exist equally together in that world which +is one, and there is no local distance between them. Intelligence +therefore ever remains inseparable and indivisible; but the soul, +inseparable so long as she resides on high, nevertheless possesses a +divisible nature. For her "dividing herself" consists in departing +from the intelligible world, and uniting herself to bodies; it might +therefore be reasonably said that she becomes divisible in passing +into bodies, since she thus separates from the intelligible world, +and divides herself somewhat. In what way is she also indivisible? +In that she does not separate herself entirely from the intelligible +world, ever residing there by her highest part, whose nature it is to +be indivisible. To say then that the soul is composed of indivisible +(essence) and of (essence) divisible in bodies means then no more +than that the soul has an (essence) which dwells partly in the +intelligible world, and partly descends into the sense-world, which +is suspended from the first and extends downwards to the second, as +the ray goes from the centre to the circumference. When the soul +descended here below, it is by her superior part that she contemplates +the intelligible world, as it is thereby that she preserves the nature +of the all (of the universal Soul). For here below she is not only +divisible, but also indivisible; her divisible part is divided in a +somewhat indivisible manner; she is indeed entirely present in the +whole body in an indivisible manner, and nevertheless she is said to +divide herself because she spreads out entirely in the whole body. + + + + +FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK NINE. + +Of Intelligence, Ideas and Essence. + + +THE SENSUAL MAN, THE MORAL, AND THE SPIRITUAL. + +1. From their birth, men exercise their senses, earlier than their +intelligence,[106] and they are by necessity forced to direct their +attention to sense-objects. Some stop there, and spend their life +without progressing further. They consider suffering as evil, and +pleasure as the good, judging it to be their business to avoid the one +and encompass the other. That is the content of wisdom for those of +them that pride themselves on being reasonable; like those heavy birds +who, having weighted themselves down by picking up too much from the +earth, cannot take flight, though by nature provided with wings. There +are others who have raised themselves a little above earthly objects +because their soul, endowed with a better nature, withdraws from +pleasures to seek something higher;[107] but as they are not capable +of arriving at contemplation of the intelligible, and as, after having +left our lower region here, they do not know where to lodge, they +return to a conception of morality which considers virtue to consist +in these common-place actions and occupations whose narrow sphere they +had at first attempted to leave behind. Finally a third kind is that +of those divine men who are endowed with a piercing vision, and whose +penetrating glance contemplates the splendor of the intelligible world, +and rise unto it, taking their flight above the clouds and darkness of +this world. Then, full of scorn for terrestrial things, they remain up +there, and reside in their true fatherland with the unspeakable bliss +of the man who, after long journeys, is at last repatriated. + + +THE HIGHER REGION REACHED ONLY BY THOSE WHO ARE BORN PHILOSOPHERS. + +2. Which is this higher region? What must be done to reach it? One must +be naturally disposed to love, and be really a born philosopher.[108] +In the presence of beauty, the lover feels something similar to the +pains of childbirth; but far from halting at bodily beauty, he rises +to that aroused in the soul by virtue, duties, science and laws. Then +he follows them up to the cause of their beauty, and in this ascending +progress stops only when he has reached the Principle that occupies +the first rank, that which is beautiful in itself.[109] Then only does +he cease being driven by this torment that we compare to the pains of +childbirth. + + +LOVE IS TRANSFORMED INTO PROGRESSIVELY HIGHER STAGES. + +But how does he rise up thither? How does he have the power to do +so? How does he learn to love? Here it is. The beauty seen in bodies +is incidental; it consists in the shapes of which the bodies are +the matter.[110] Consequently the substance changes, and it is seen +changing from beauty to ugliness. The body has only a borrowed beauty. +Who imparted that beauty to the body? On the one hand, the presence of +beauty; on the other, the actualization of the soul which fashioned the +body, and which gave it the shape it possesses. But is the soul, by +herself, absolute beauty? No, since some souls are wise and beautiful, +while some others are foolish and ugly. It is therefore only by wisdom +that the soul is beautiful. But from what is her wisdom derived? +Necessarily from intelligence; not from the intelligence that is +intelligent at some time, though not at others, but from the genuine +Intelligence, which is beautiful on that very account.[111] Shall we +stop at Intelligence, as a first principle? Or shall we on the contrary +still rise above it? Surely so, for Intelligence presents itself to us +before the first Principle only because it is, so to speak, located in +the antechamber of the Good.[112] It bears all things within itself, +and manifests them, so that it displays the image of the Good in +manifoldness, while the Good itself remains in an absolute simple unity. + + +PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE. + +3. Let us now consider the Intelligence which reason tells us is +absolute essence and genuine "being," and whose existence we have +already established in a different manner. It would seem ridiculous +to inquire whether Intelligence form part of the scale of beings; but +there are men who doubt it, or who at least are disposed to ask for a +demonstration that Intelligence possesses the nature we predicate of +it, that it is separated (from matter), that it is identical with the +essences, and that it contains the ideas. This is our task. + + +IN THE HUMAN WORLD EVERYTHING IS A COMPOSITE OF FORM AND MATTER. + +All things that we consider to be essences are composites; nothing +is simple or single, either in works of art, or in the products of +nature.[113] Works of art, indeed, contain metal, wood, stone, and are +derived from these substances only by the labor of the artist, who, by +giving matter its form makes of it a statue, or bed, or house. Among +the products of nature, those that are compounds or mixtures may be +analyzed into the form impressed on the elements of the compound; so, +for instance, we may in a man, distinguish a soul and body, and in the +body four elements. Since the very matter of the elements, taken in +itself, has no form, every object seems composed of matter and of some +principle that supplies it with form.[114] So we are led to ask whence +matter derives its form, and to seek whether the soul is simple, or +whether it contains two parts, one of which plays the parts of matter, +and the other of form,[115] so that the first part would be similar +to the form received by the metal of a statue, and the latter to the +principle which produces the form itself. + + +THE WORLD-SOUL ALSO IS A COMPOUND OF FORM AND MATTER. + +Applying this conception to the universe, we rise to Intelligence, +recognizing therein the demiurgic creator of the world. It was +in receiving from it its shapes by the intermediation of another +principle, the universal Soul, that the (material) substances became +water, air, earth and fire. On the one hand, the Soul shapes the +four elements of the world;[116] on the other, she receives from +Intelligence the (seminal) reasons,[117] as the souls of the artists +themselves receive from the arts the reasons which they work out.[118] +In Intelligence, therefore, there is a part which is the form of the +soul; it is intelligence considered, as shape. There is another which +imparts shape, like the sculptor who gives the metal the shape of +the statue, and which in itself possesses all it gives.[119] Now the +(shapes) which the Intelligence imparts to the soul connect with the +truth as closely as possible, while those which the soul imparts to the +body are only images and appearances.[120] + + +WHY OUR ASCENT CANNOT STOP WITH THE SOUL. + +4. Why should we not, on arriving at the Soul, stop there, and consider +her the first principle? Because Intelligence is a power different +from the Soul, and better than the Soul; and what is better must, by +its very nature, precede (the worst). The Stoics[121] are wrong in +thinking that it is the Soul which, on reaching her perfection, begets +Intelligence. How could that which is potential pass into actualization +unless there were some principle that effected that transition? If +this transition were due to chance, it could not have occurred at +all. The first rank must therefore be assigned to that which is in +actualization, which needs nothing, which is perfect, while imperfect +things must be assigned to the second rank. These may be perfected +by the principles that begat them, which, in respect to them, play a +paternal part, perfecting what they had originally produced that was +imperfect. What is thus produced is matter, as regards the creating +principle, and then becomes perfect, on receiving its form from it. +Besides, the Soul is (often) affected; and we need to discover some +thing that is impassible, without which everything is dissolved by +time; therefore there is need of some principle prior to the soul. +Further, the Soul is in the world; now there must be something that +resides outside of the world, and which consequently would be superior +to the Soul; for since that which inheres in the world resides within +the body, or matter, if nothing existed outside of the world, nothing +would remain permanent. In this case, the (seminal) reason of man, +and all the other reasons could be neither permanent nor eternal. The +result of all these considerations, as well as of many others that +we could add thereto, is the necessary assertion of the existence of +Intelligence beyond the Soul. + + +INTELLIGENCE IS IN ACTUALIZATION BECAUSE ITS THOUGHT IS IDENTICAL WITH +ITS ESSENCE OR EXISTENCE. + +5. Taking it in its genuine sense, Intelligence is not only +potential, arriving at being intelligent after having been +unintelligent--for otherwise, we would be forced to seek out some +still higher principle--but is in actualization, and is eternal. As +it is intelligent by itself, it is by itself that it thinks what it +thinks, and that it possesses what is possesses. Now since it thinks +of itself and by itself, it itself is what it thinks. If we could +distinguish between its existence and its thought, its "being" would be +unintelligent; it would be potential, not in actualization. Thought, +therefore, must not be separated from its object, although, from +sense-objects, we have become accustomed to conceive of intelligible +entities as distinct from each other. + + +REASONS, AS ARCHETYPES, MUST HAVE EXISTED BEFORE STOIC "HABIT," NATURE +OR SOUL. + +Which then is the principle that acts, that thinks, and what is the +actualization and thought of Intelligence, necessary to justify the +assertion that it is what it thinks? Evidently Intelligence, by its +mere real existence, thinks beings, and makes them exist; it therefore +is the beings. Indeed, the beings will either exist outside of it, or +within it; and in the latter case they would have to be identical with +it. That they should exist outside of Intelligence, is unthinkable; +for where would they be located? They must therefore exist within +it, and be identical with it. They could not be in sense-objects, as +common people think, because sense-objects could not be the first +in any genus. The form which inheres in their matter is only the +representation of existence; now a form which exists in anything +other than itself is put in it by a superior principle, and is its +image. Further, if Intelligence must be the creative power of the +universe, it could not, while creating the universe, think beings as +existent in what does not yet exist. Intelligible entities, therefore, +must exist before the world, and cannot be images of sense-objects, +being on the contrary, their archetypes, and constituting the "being" +of Intelligence. It might be objected that the (seminal) reasons +might suffice. These reasons are, no doubt, eternal; and, if they be +eternal and impassible, they must exist within the Intelligence whose +characteristics we have described, the Intelligence which precedes +the "habit,"[122] nature,[123] and the soul,[124] because here these +entities are potential.[125] + + +INTELLIGENCE IS POSTULATED BY THE GENERAL NECESSITIES OF THE WORLD. + +Intelligence, therefore, essentially constitutes all beings; and when +Intelligence thinks them, they are not outside of Intelligence, and +neither precede nor follow it. Intelligence is the first legislator, +or rather, it is the very law of existence. Parmenides[126] therefore +was right in saying, "Thought is identical with existence." The +knowledge of immaterial things is therefore identical with those things +themselves. That is why I recognize myself as a being, and why I have +reminiscences of intelligible entities. Indeed, none of those beings is +outside of Intelligence, nor is contained in any location; all of them +subsist in themselves as immutable and indestructible. That is why they +really are beings. If they were born, or perished, they would possess +existence only in an incidental manner, they would no longer be beings; +it would be the existence they possessed which would be essence. It +is only by participation that sense-things are what they are said to +be; the nature that constitutes their substance derives its shape from +elsewhere, as the metal receives its shape from the sculptor, and wood +from the carpenter; while the image of art penetrates into the matter, +the art itself remains in its identity, and within itself possesses +the genuine existence of the statue or of the bed. That is how the +bodies' general necessity of participating in images shows that they +are different from the beings; for they change, while the entities are +immutable, possess within themselves their own foundation, and have +no need of existing in any location, since they have no extension, +and since they subsist in an intellectual and absolute existence. +Again,[127] the existence of the bodies needs to be guarded[128] by +some other principle, while intelligence, which furnishes the existence +for objects in themselves perishable, has need of nothing to make +itself subsist. + + +INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS ALL BEINGS GENERATIVELY. + +6. Thus Intelligence actually constitutes all beings; it contains them +all, but not locally; it contains them as it possesses itself; it is +identical with them. All entities are simultaneously contained within +it, and in it remain distinct, as many kinds of knowledge may exist +within the soul without their number causing any confusion; each of +them appears when needed, without involving the others. If in the soul +each thought be an actualization independent of other thoughts, so much +the more must Intelligence be all things simultaneously, with this +restriction, however, that each of them is a special power. Considered +in its universality, Intelligence contains all entities as the genus +contains all species, as the whole contains all parts. Even the seminal +powers bear the impress of this universality. Each one, considered in +its totality, is a centre which contains all the parts of the organism +in an undivided condition; nevertheless in it the reason of the eyes +differs from that of the hands, and this diversity is manifested by +that of the organs begotten (therefrom).[129] Each of the powers of +the seed, therefore, is the total unity of the seminal reason when this +power is united to the others which are implied therein. What in the +seed is corporeal contains matter, as, for instance, humidity; but the +seminal reason is the entire form; it is identical with the generative +power, a power which itself is the image of a superior power of the +soul. This generative power contained in seeds is[130] usually called +"nature." Proceeding from the superior powers as light radiates from +the fire, it tames and fashions matter, imparting thereto the seminal +reason[131] without pushing it, or moving it as by levers. + + +THERE ARE SCIENTIFIC NOTIONS THAT ARE POSTERIOR, BUT SOME THAT ARE +PRIOR. + +7. The scientific notions that the soul forms of sense-objects, by +discursive reason, and which should rather be called opinions,[132] +are posterior to the objects (they deal with); and consequently, +are no more than images of them. But true scientific notions +received from intelligence by discursive reasons do not contain any +sense-conceptions. So far as they are scientific notions, they are +the very things of which they are the conceptions; they reveal the +intimate union of intelligence and thought. Interior Intelligence, +which consists of the primary (natures) possesses itself intimately, +resides within itself since all eternity, and is an actualization. It +does not direct its glances outside of itself, because it possesses +everything within itself; it does not acquire, and does not reason to +discover things that may not be present to them. Those are operations +characteristic of the soul. Intelligence, remaining fixed within +itself, is all things simultaneously. Nevertheless, it is not thought +which makes each of them subsist; it is only because intelligence +thought the divinity or movement, for instance, that the divinity +or movement exists.[133] When we say that thoughts are forms, we +are mistaken if thereby we mean that the intelligible exists only +because Intelligence thinks it. On the contrary, it is only because +the intelligible exists, that Intelligence can think. Otherwise, how +would Intelligence come to think the intelligible? It cannot meet the +intelligible by chance, nor waste itself in fruitless efforts. + + +THOUGHT IS THE FORM, SHAPE THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE BEING. + +8. Since the thought is something essentially one (?), the form, which +is the object of thought, and the idea[134, 134a] are one and the same +thing. Which is this thing? Intelligence and the intellectual "being," +for no idea is foreign to intelligence; each form is intelligence, and +the whole intelligence is all the forms; every particular form is a +particular intelligence. Likewise science, taken in its totality, +is all the notions it embraces; every notion is a part of the total +science; it is not separated from the science locally, and exists +potentially in the whole science.[135] Intelligence resides within +itself, and by possessing itself calmly, is the eternal fulness of +all things. If we conceived it as being prior to essence, we would +have to say that it was the action and thought of Intelligence which +produced and begat all beings. But as, on the contrary, it is certain +that essence is prior to Intelligence, we should, within the thinking +principle, first conceive the beings, then actualization and thought, +just as (the nature) of fire is joined by the actualization of the +fire, so that beings have innate intelligence (?[148]) as their +actualization. Now essence is an actualization; therefore essence and +intelligence are but a single actualization, or rather both of them +fuse.[136] Consequently, they form but a single nature, as beings, +the actualization of essence, and intelligence. In this case the +thought is the form, and the shape is the actualization of the being. +When, however, in thought we separate essence from Intelligence, we +must conceive one of these principles as prior to the other. The +Intelligence which operates this separation is indeed different from +the essence from which it separates;[137] but the Intelligence which +is inseparable from essence and which does not separate thought from +essence is itself essence and all things. + + +INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE UNIVERSAL ARCHETYPE. + +9. What then are the things contained within the unity of Intelligence +which we separate in thinking of them? They must be expressed without +disturbing their rest, and we must contemplate the contents of +Intelligence by a science that somehow remains within unity. Since +this sense-world is an animal which embraces all animals, since it +derives both its general and special existence from a principle +different from itself,[138] a principle which, in turn, is derived +from intelligence, therefore intelligence must itself contain the +universal archetype, and must be that intelligible world of which +Plato[139] (well) says; "Intelligence sees the ideas contained within +the existing animal."[140] Since an animal, whose (seminal) reason +exists with the matter fit to receive it, must of course be begotten, +so the mere existence of a nature that is intellectual, all-powerful, +and unhindered by any obstacle--since nothing can interpose between it +and the (substance) capable of receiving the form--must necessarily be +adorned (or, created) by intelligence, but only in a divided condition +does it reveal the form it receives, so that, for instance, it shows +us on one hand a man, and on the other the sun, while intelligence +possesses everything in unity. + + +IN THE SENSE-WORLD ONLY THOSE THINGS THAT ARE FORMS PROCEED FROM +INTELLIGENCE. + +10. Therefore, in the sense-world, all the things that are forms +proceed from intelligence; those which are not forms do not proceed +therefrom. That is, in the intelligible world we do not find any of +the things that are contrary to nature, any more than we find what is +contrary to the arts in the arts themselves. Thus the seminal reason +does not contain the defects, such as limping would be in a body. +Congenital lameness is due to the reason's failure to dominate matter, +while accidental lameness is due to deterioration of the form (idea?). + + +NATURAL CHARACTERISTICS ARE DERIVED FROM THE CATEGORIES IN THE +INTELLIGIBLE. + +The qualities that are natural, quantities, numbers, magnitudes, +states, actions and natural experiences, movements and recuperations, +either general or particular, are among the contents of the +intelligible world, where time is replaced by eternity,[141] and space +is replaced by the "telescoping" of intelligible entities (that are +within each other). As all entities are together in the intelligible +world, whatever entity you select (by itself) is intellectual and +living "being," identity and difference, movement and rest;[142] it is +what moves, and what is at rest; it is "being," and quality; that is, +it is all. There every essence is in actualization, instead of merely +being in potentiality; consequently it is not separated from quality. + + +THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD FAILS TO CONTAIN EARTHLY IMPERFECTIONS. + +Does the intelligible world contain only what is found in the +sense-world, or does it contain anything additional?... Let us consider +the arts, in this respect. To begin with, the intelligible world +does not contain any imperfection. Evils here below come from lack, +privation, omission; it is a state of matter, or of anything similar to +matter, which failed to be completely assimilated.[143] + + +SOME ARTS ARE PURELY EARTHLY; OTHERS, LIKE MUSIC, INTELLIGIBLE. + +11. Let us therefore consider the arts and their products. Unless as +represented within human reason, we cannot refer to the intelligible +world arts of imitation such as painting, sculpture, dancing, or +acting, because they are born here below, take sense-objects as models, +representing their forms, motions, and visible proportions.[144] If, +however, we possess a faculty which, by studying the beauties offered +by the symmetry of animals, considers the general characteristics of +this symmetry, it must form part of the intellectual power which, on +high, contemplates universal symmetry. Music, however, which studies +rhythm and harmony, is, so far as it studies what is intelligible in +these things, the image of the music that deals with intelligible +rhythm. + + +THERE ARE MANY AUXILIARY ARTS WHICH HELP THE PROGRESS OF NATURE. + +The arts which produce sense-objects, such as architecture and +carpentry, have their principles in the intelligible world, and +participate in wisdom, so far as they make use of certain proportions. +But as they apply these proportions to sense-objects, they cannot +wholly be referred to the intelligible world, unless in so far as +they are contained within human reason. The case is similar with +agriculture, which assists the growth of plants; medicine, which +increases health, and (gymnastics) which supplies the body with +strength as well as vigor,[145] for on high there is another Power, +another Health, from which all living organisms derive their needed +vigor. + + +OTHER ARTS ARE INTELLIGIBLE WHEN APPLIED TO THE INTELLIGIBLE. + +Last, whenever rhetoric, strategy, private and public finance and +politics weave beauty in their deeds, and they glance above, they +(discover) that they have added to their science a contribution from +the intelligible science. + +The science of geometry, however, which deals (wholly) with +intelligible entities, must be referred to the intelligible world. So +also with philosophy, which occupies the first rank among sciences +because it studies essence. This is all we have to say about arts and +their products. + + +THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD CONTAINS ONLY UNIVERSAL IDEAS; PARTICULARITIES +ARE DERIVED FROM MATTER. + +12. If the intelligible world contains the idea of Man, it must also +contain that of the reasonable man, and of the artist; and consequently +the idea of the arts that are begotten by Intelligence. We must +therefore insist that the intelligible world contains the ideas of the +universals, the idea of Man as such, and not, for instance, that of +Socrates. Still we shall have to decide whether the intelligible world +does not also contain the idea of the individual man, that is, of the +man considered with the things that differ in each individual; for one +may have a Roman nose and the other a pug nose. These differences are +indeed implied within the idea of man, just as there are differences +within the idea of animal. But the differences between a Roman or a +snub nose are derived from matter. Likewise, amidst the varieties of +colors, some are contained within the seminal reason, while others are +derived from matter and space. + + +BESIDES IDEAS OF INDIVIDUAL SOULS AND INTELLIGENCE, THE INTELLIGIBLE +WORLD CONTAINS THE SOUL ITSELF AND INTELLIGENCE ITSELF. + +13. It remains for us to study whether the intelligible world contains +only what is in the sense-world, or whether we should distinguish from +the individual soul the Soul itself, from the particular intelligence, +Intelligence itself, as we have above distinguished the particular +man from Man himself. We should not consider all things here below as +images of archetypes, for instance, the soul of a man as the image +of the Soul herself. Only degrees of dignity differentiate souls; +but these souls are not the Soul itself. As the Soul itself exists +really, it must also contain a certain wisdom, justice and science, +which are not images of wisdom, justice, and intelligible science, as +sense-objects are images of intelligible entities, but which are these +very entities located here below in entirely different conditions of +existence; for they are not locally circumscribed. Therefore when the +soul issues from the body, she preserves these things within herself; +for the sense-world exists only in a determinate place, while the +intelligible world exists everywhere; therefore all that the soul +contains here below is also in the intelligible world. Consequently if, +by "sense-objects" we really mean "visible" things, then indeed the +intelligible world contains entities not present in this sense-world. +If, on the contrary, we include within the "sense-world" the soul and +all she implies, then all things that are above are present here below +also. + + +THE SUPREME BEING ENTIRELY ONE DOES NOT EXPLAIN THE ORIGIN OF THE +MANIFOLD. + +14. Can we identify the nature that contains all the intelligibles +(Intelligence) with the supreme Principle? Impossible, because the +supreme Principle must be essentially one, and simple, while essences +form a multitude. But as these essences form a multitude, we are forced +to explain how this multitude, and all these essences can exist. How +can (the single) Intelligence be all these things? Whence does it +proceed? This we shall have to study elsewhere.[146] + + +THE SOUL RECEIVES ACCIDENTS FROM MATTER, BUT DEFECTS ARE NOT IN THE +INTELLIGIBLE. + +It may further be asked whether the intelligible world contains the +ideas of objects which are derived from decay, which are harmful or +disagreeable, such as, for instance, mud or excreta. We answer that +all the things that universal Intelligence receives from the First +are excellent. Among them are not found ideas of those dirty and vile +objects mentioned above; Intelligence does not contain them. But though +receiving from Intelligence ideas, the soul receives from matter +other things, among which may be found the above-mentioned accidents. +Besides, a more thorough answer to this question must be sought for in +our book where we explain "How the Multitude of Ideas Proceeds from the +One."[147] + + +NOT ALL EARTHLY ENTITIES HAVE CORRESPONDING IDEAS. + +In conclusion, the accidental composites in which Intelligence does not +share and which are formed by a fortuitous complex of sense-objects, +have no ideas corresponding to them in the intelligible world. Things +that proceed from decay are produced only because the Soul is unable to +produce anything better in this case; otherwise she would have rather +produced some object more agreeing with nature; she therefore produces +what she can. + + +EVEN THE ARTS ARE DEPENDENT ON THE SOUL. + +All the arts concerned with things natural to man are contained within +the ideas of Man himself. The Art that is universal is prior to the +other arts; but Art is posterior to the Soul herself, or rather, to +the life that is in Intelligence before becoming soul, and which, on +becoming soul, deserves to be called the Soul herself. + + +DIFFICULT PASSAGES. + +(Transcriber's note: see footnotes 134a and 148.) + + + + +FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHTH. + +Of the Descent of the Soul Into the Body.[149] + + +THE EXPERIENCE OF ECSTASY LEADS TO QUESTIONS. + +1. On waking from the slumber of the body to return to myself, and on +turning my attention from exterior things so as to concentrate it on +myself, I often observe an alluring beauty, and I become conscious of +an innate nobility. Then I live out a higher life, and I experience +atonement with the divinity. Fortifying myself within it, I arrive +at that actualization which raises me above the intelligible. But +if, after this sojourn with the divinity, I descend once more from +Intelligence to the exercise of my reasoning powers, I am wont to ask +myself how I ever could actually again descend, and how my soul ever +could have entered into a body, since, although she actually abides +in the body, she still possesses within herself all the perfection I +discover in her. + + +HERACLITUS, THE ORIGINATOR OF THESE QUESTIONS, ANSWERS THEM OBSCURELY. + +Heraclitus, who recommends this research, asserts that "there are +necessary changes of contraries into each other;" he speaks of +"ascenscions" and of a "descent," says that it is "a rest to change, +a fatigue to continue unremittingly in the same kinds of work, and to +be overwrought. He thus reduces us to conjectures because he does not +explain himself definitely; and he would even force us to ask how he +himself came to discover what he propounds. + + +EMPEDOCLES, AS A POET, TELLS OF PYTHAGOREAN MYTHS. + +Empedocles teaches that "it is a law for souls that have sinned to +fall down here below;" and that "he himself, having withdrawn from +the divinity, came down to the earth to become the slave of furious +discord." It would seem that he limited himself to advancing the ideas +that Pythagoras and his followers generally expressed by symbols, both +on this and other subjects. Besides Empedocles is obscure because he +uses the language of poetry. + + +PLATO SAYS MANY CONTRADICTORY THINGS THAT ARE BEAUTIFUL AND TRUE. + +Last, we have the divine Plato, who has said so many beautiful things +about the soul. In his dialogues he often spoke of the descent of +the soul into the body, so that we have the right to expect from him +something clearer. Unfortunately, he is not always sufficiently in +agreement with himself to enable one to follow his thought. In general, +he depreciates corporeal things; he deplores the dealings between the +soul and the body; insists[150] that the soul is chained down to it, +and that she is buried in it as in a tomb. He attaches much importance +to the maxim taught in the mysteries that the soul here below is as +in a prison.[151] What Plato calls the "cavern"[152] and Empedocles +calls the "grotto," means no doubt the sense-world.[153] To break her +chains, and to issue from the cavern, means the soul's[154] rising to +the intelligible world. In the Phaedrus,[155] Plato asserts that the +cause of the fall of the soul is the loss of her wings; that after +having once more ascended on high, she is brought back here below by +the periods;[156] that there are souls sent down into this world by +judgments, fates, conditions, and necessity; still, at the same time, +he finds fault with the "descent" of the soul into the body. But, +speaking of the universe in the Timaeus,[157] he praises the world, and +calls it a blissful divinity. He states that the demiurgic creator, +being good, gave it a soul to make it intelligent, because without the +soul, the universe could not have been as intelligent as it ought to +have been.[158] Consequently, the purpose of the introduction of the +universal Soul into the world, and similarly of each of our souls was +only to achieve the perfection of the world; for it was necessary for +the sense-world to contain animals equal in kind and numbers to those +contained in the intelligible world. + + +QUESTIONS RAISED BY PLATO'S THEORIES. + +2. Plato's theories about the soul lead us to ask how, in general, the +soul has, by her nature, been led to enter into relations with the +body. Other questions arise: What is the nature of the world where the +soul lives thus, either voluntarily or necessarily, or in any other +way? Does the Demiurge[159] act without meeting any obstacle, or is it +with him as with our souls? + + +HUMAN BODIES ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO MANAGE THAN THE WORLD-BODY. + +To begin with, our souls, charged with the administration of bodies +less perfect than the world, had to penetrate within them profoundly in +order to manage them; for the elements of these bodies tend to scatter, +and to return to their original location, while, in the universe, all +things are naturally distributed in their proper places.[160] Besides, +our bodies demand an active and vigilant foresight, because, by the +surrounding objects they are exposed to many accidents; for they +always have a crowd of needs, as they demand continual protection +against the dangers that threaten them.[161] But the body of the world +is complete and perfect. It is self-sufficient; it has nothing to +suffer contrary to its nature; and consequently, it (acts) on a mere +order of the universal Soul. That is why the universal Soul can remain +impassible, feeling no need, remaining in the disposition desired by +her own nature. That is why Plato says that, when our soul dwells with +this perfect Soul, she herself becomes perfect, soaring in the ethereal +region, and governing the whole world.[162] So long as a human soul +does not withdraw from the (universal) Soul to enter into a body, and +to belong to some individual, she easily administers the world, in the +same manner, and together with the universal Soul. Communicating to the +body essence and perfection is therefore, for the soul, not an unmixed +evil; because the providential care granted to an inferior nature does +not hinder him who grants it from himself remaining in a state of +perfection. + + +HOW THE TWO-FOLD SOUL EXERTS A TWO-FOLD PROVIDENCE. + +In the universe there are, indeed, two kinds of providences.[163] +The first Providence regulates everything in a royal manner, without +performing any actions, or observing the details. The second, operating +somewhat like an artisan, adjusts its creative power to the inferior +nature of creatures by getting in contact with them.[164] Now as the +divine Soul (or, the principal power,[165] always administers the +whole world in the first or regal way, dominating the world by her +superiority, and by injecting into the world her lowest power (nature), +we could not accuse the divinity of having given a bad place to the +universal Soul. Indeed, this universal Soul was never deprived of her +natural power, possessing it always, because this power is not contrary +to her being, possessing it uninterruptedly from all eternity. + + +STAR-SOULS, LIKE UNINCARNATE SOULS, GOVERN THE WORLD UNTROUBLEDLY. + +(Plato) further states that the relation of the souls of the stars +to their bodies is the same as that of the universal Soul to the +universe,[166] where he makes the stars participate in the movements +of the universal Soul. He thus grants to those souls the blessedness +which is suitable to them. The intercourse of the soul with the body +is usually blamed for two things: because it hinders the soul from +busying herself with the conceptions of intelligence, and then because +it exposes her to agreeable or painful sensations which fill her with +desires. Now neither of these two results affect the soul that has not +entered into a body, and which does not depend thereon by belonging +to some particular individual. Then, on the contrary, she possesses +the body of the universe, which has no fault, no need, which can cause +her neither fears nor desires, because she has nothing to fear. Thus +no anxiety ever forces her to descend to terrestrial objects, or to +distract herself from her happy and sublime contemplation. Entirely +devoted to divine things, she governs the world by a single power, +whose exercise involves no anxiety. + + +DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HUMAN AND COSMIC INCARNATION. + +3. Consider now the human soul which[167] undergoes numberless ills +while in the body, eking out a miserable existence, a prey to griefs, +desires, fears, sufferings of all kinds, for whom the body is a tomb, +and the sense-world a "cave" or "grotto." This difference of opinions +about the condition of the universal Soul and the human soul is not +contradictory, because these two souls do not have the same reasons +for descent into a body. To begin with, the location of thought, that +we call the intelligible world,[168] contains not only the entire +universal Intelligence, but also the intellectual powers, and the +particular intelligences comprised within the universal Intelligence; +since there is not only a single intelligence, but a simultaneously +single and plural intelligence. Consequently, it must also have +contained a single Soul, and a plurality of souls; and it was from the +single Soul, that the multiple particular and different souls had to be +born, as from one and the same genus are derived species that are both +superior and inferior, and more or less intellectual. Indeed, in the +intelligible world, there is, on one hand, the (universal) Intelligence +which, like some great animal, potentially contains the other +intelligences. On the other hand, are the individual intelligences, +each of which possess in actualization what the former contains +potentially. We may illustrate by a living city that would contain +other living cities. The soul of the universal City would be more +perfect and powerful; but nothing would hinder the souls of the other +cities from being of the same kind. Similarly, in the universal Fire, +there is on one hand a great fire, and on the other small fires, while +the universal Being is the being of the universal Fire, or rather, is +the source from which the being of the universal Fire proceeds. + + +THE RATIONAL SOUL POSSESSES ALSO AN INDIVIDUALITY. + +The function of the rational soul is to think, but she does not limit +herself to thinking. Otherwise there would be no difference between her +and intelligence. Besides her intellectual characteristics, the soul's +characteristic nature, by virtue of which she does not remain mere +intelligence, has a further individual function, such as is possessed +by every other being. By raising her glance to what is superior to her, +she thinks; by bringing them down to herself, she preserves herself; by +lowering them to what is inferior to her, she adorns it, administers +it, and governs it. All these things were not to remain immovable in +the intelligible world, to permit of a successive issue of varied +beings, which no doubt are less perfect than that which preceded them, +but which, nevertheless, exist necessarily during the persistence of +the Principle from which they proceed. + + +INCARNATE SOULS WEAKEN BECAUSE THEY CONTEMPLATE THE INDIVIDUAL. + +4. There are individual souls which, in their conversion[169] towards +the principle from which they proceed, aspire to the intelligible +world, and which also exercise their power on inferior things, just +as light, which does not disdain to throw its rays down to us though +remaining suspended to the sun on high. These souls must remain +sheltered from all suffering so long as in the intelligible world they +remain together with the universal Soul. They must besides, in heaven, +share with it the administration of the world; like kings who, being +colleagues of the great King of the universe, share the government with +Him, without themselves descending from their thrones, without ceasing +to occupy a place as elevated as He. But when they pass from this +state in which they live with the universal Soul to a particular and +independent existence, when they seem weary of dwelling with another, +then each of them returns to what belongs to her individually. Now +when a soul has done that for a long while, when she withdraws from +the universal Soul, and distinguishes herself therefrom, when she +ceases to keep her glances directed towards the intelligible world; +then, isolating herself in her individual existence, she weakens, and +finds herself overwhelmed with a crowd of cares, because she directs +her glance at something individual. Having therefore separated herself +from the universal Soul as well as from the other souls that remain +united thereto, and having attached herself to an individual body, and +concentrating herself exclusively on this object, which is subjected to +the destructive action of all other beings, she ceases to govern the +whole to administer more carefully a part, the care of which forces +her to busy herself, and mingle with external things, to be not only +present in the body, but also to interpenetrate it. + + +THIS PROCESS EXPLAINS THE CLASSIC EXPRESSIONS ABOUT HER CONDITION. + +Thus, in the common expression, she has lost her wings, and is chained +by the bonds of the body, because she gave up the calm existence she +enjoyed when with the universal Soul she shared the administration +of the world; for when she was above she spent a much happier life. +The fallen soul is therefore chained or imprisoned, obliged to +have recourse to the senses because she cannot first make use of +intelligence. She is, as it is said, buried in a tomb, or cavern. But +by her conversion towards thought, she breaks her bonds, she returns +upwards towards higher regions, when, starting from the indications of +reminiscence she rises to the contemplation of the essences;[170] for +even after her fall she always preserves something superior to the body. + + +SOULS AS AMPHIBIANS. + +Souls therefore are necessarily amphibians;[171] since they alternately +live in the intelligible world, and in the sense-world; staying longer +in the intelligible world when they can remain united to supreme +Intelligence more permanently, or staying longer or preponderatingly +here below when nature or destiny imposes on them a contrary fate. That +is the secret meaning of Plato's words[172] to the effect that the +divinity divides the seeds of the souls formed by a second mixture in +the cup, and that He separates them into (two) parts. He also adds that +they must necessarily fall into generation after having been divided +into a definite number. Plato's statement that the divinity sowed the +souls,[173] as well as the divinity's address to the other deities, +must be taken figuratively. For, in reference to the things contained +in the universe, this implies that they are begotten or produced; for +successive enumeration and description implies an eternal begetting, +and that those objects exist eternally in their present state. + + +SOULS DESCENDING TO HELP ARE SENT BY GOD. + +5. Without any inherent contradiction it may therefore be asserted +either,[174] that the souls are sowed into generation, that they descend +here below for the perfection of the universe, or that they are shut up +in a cavern as the result of a divine punishment, that their fall is +simultaneously an effect of their will and of necessity--as necessity +does not exclude voluntariness--and that they are in evil so long as +they are incarnate in bodies. Again, as Empedocles says, they may +have withdrawn from the divinity, and have lost their way, and have +committed some fault that they are expiating; or, as says Heraclitus, +that rest consists in flight (from heaven, and descent here below), +and that the descent of souls is neither entirely voluntary, nor +involuntary. Indeed, no being ever falls voluntarily; but as it is by +his own motion that he descends to lower things, and reaches a less +happy condition, it may be said that he bears the punishment of his +conduct. Besides, as it is by an eternal law of nature that this being +acts and suffers in that manner, we may, without contradiction or +violence to the truth, assert that the being who descends from his rank +to assist some lower thing is sent by the divinity.[175] In spite of +any number of intermediate parts (which separate) a principle from its +lower part, the latter may still be ascribed to the former.[176] + + +THE TWO POSSIBLE FAULTS OF THE SOUL. + +Here there are two possible faults for the soul. The first consists in +the motive that determines her to descend. The second is the evil she +commits after having descended here below. The first fault is expiated +by the very condition of the soul after she has descended here below. +The punishment of the latter fault, if not too serious, is to pass into +other bodies more or less promptly according to the judgment delivered +about her deserts--and we speak of a "judgment" to show that it is the +consequence of the divine law. If however the perversity of the soul +passes all measure, she undergoes, under the charge of guardians in +charge of her chastisement, the severe punishments she has incurred. + + +PROMPT FLIGHT HERE BELOW LEAVES THE SOUL UNHARMED BY HER STAY HERE. + +Thus, although the soul have a divine nature (or "being"), though she +originate in the intelligible world, she enters into a body. Being a +lower divinity, she descends here below by a voluntary inclination, for +the purpose of developing her power, and to adorn what is below her. If +she flee promptly from here below, she does not need to regret having +become acquainted with evil, and knowing the nature of vice,[177] +nor having had the opportunity of manifesting her faculties, and to +manifest her activities and deeds. Indeed, the faculties of the soul +would be useless if they slumbered continuously in incorporeal being +without ever becoming actualized. The soul herself would ignore what +she possesses if her faculties did not manifest by procession, for +everywhere it is the actualization that manifests the potentiality. +Otherwise, the latter would be completely hidden and obscured; or +rather, it would not really exist, and would not possess any reality. +It is the variety of sense-effects which illustrates the greatness of +the intelligible principle, whose nature publishes itself by the beauty +of its works. + + +CONTINUOUS PROCESSION NECESSARY TO THE SUPREME. + +6. Unity was not to exist alone; for if unity remained self-enclosed, +all things would remain hidden in unity without having any form, and no +beings would achieve existence. Consequently, even if constituted by +beings born of unity, plurality would not exist, unless the inferior +natures, by their rank destined to be souls, issued from those beings +by the way of procession. Likewise, it was not sufficient for souls to +exist, they also had to reveal what they were capable of begetting. +It is likewise natural for each essence to produce something beneath +it, to draw it out from itself by a development similar to that of a +seed, a development in which an indivisible principle proceeds to the +production of a sense-object, and where that which precedes remains in +its own place at the same time as it begets that which follows by an +inexpressible power, which is essential to intelligible natures. Now +as this power was not to be stopped or circumscribed in its actions by +jealousy, there was need of a continuous procession until, from degree +to degree, all things had descended to the extreme limits of what was +possible;[178] for it is the characteristic of an inexhaustible power +to communicate all its gifts to everything, and not to permit any of +them to be disinherited, since there is nothing which hinders any of +them from participating in the nature of the Good in the measure that +it is capable of doing so. Since matter has existed from all eternity, +it was impossible that from the time since it existed, it should not +participate in that which communicates goodness to all things according +to their receptivity thereof.[179] If the generation of matter were +the necessary consequence of anterior principles, still it must not +be entirely deprived of the good by its primitive impotence, when +the cause which gratuitously communicated "being" to it remained +self-enclosed. + + +SENSE-OBJECTS ARE NECESSARY AS REVEALERS OF THE ETERNAL. + +The excellence, power and goodness of intelligible (essences) +are therefore revealed by sense-objects; and there is an eternal +connection between intelligible (entities) that are self-existent, and +sense-objects, which eternally derive their existence therefrom by +participation, and which imitate intelligible nature to the extent of +their ability. + + +THE SOUL'S NATURE IS OF AN INTERMEDIATE KIND. + +7. As there are two kinds of being (or, existence), one of sensation, +and the other intelligible, it is preferable for the soul to live in +the intelligible world; nevertheless, as a result of her nature, it +is necessary for her also to participate in sense-affairs.[180] Since +she occupies only an intermediate rank, she must not feel wronged at +not being the best of beings.[181] Though on one hand her condition be +divine, on the other she is located on the limits of the intelligible +world, because of her affinity for sense-nature. She causes this +nature to participate in her powers, and she even receives something +therefrom, when, instead of managing the body without compromising +her own security, she permits herself to be carried away by her own +inclination to penetrate profoundly within it, ceasing her complete +union with the universal Soul. Besides, the soul can rise above the +body after having learned to feel how happy one is to dwell on high, by +the experience of things seen and suffered here below, and after having +appreciated the true Good by the comparison of contraries. Indeed +the knowledge of the good becomes clearer by the experience of evil, +especially among souls which are not strong enough to know evil before +having experienced it.[182] + + +THE PROCESSION OF INTELLIGENCE IS AN EXCURSION DOWNWARDS AND UPWARDS. + +The procession of intelligence consists in descending to things that +occupy the lowest rank, and which have an inferior nature,[183] for +Intelligence could not rise to the superior Nature. Obliged to act +outside of itself, and not being able to remain self-enclosed, by a +necessity and by a law of its nature, intelligence must advance unto +the soul where it stops; then, after having communicated of itself to +that which immediately follows it, intelligence must return to the +intelligible world. Likewise, the soul has a double action in her +double relation with what is below and above her. By her first action, +the soul manages the body to which she is united; by the second, she +contemplates the intelligible entities. These alternatives work out, +for individual souls, with the course of time; and finally there occurs +a conversion which brings them back from the lower to the higher +natures. + + +THE UNIVERSAL SOUL, HOWEVER, IS NOT DISTURBED BY THE URGENCIES BELOW +HER. + +The universal Soul, however, does not need to busy herself with +troublesome functions, and remains out of the reach of evils. She +considers what is below her in a purely contemplative manner, while at +the same time remaining related to what is above her. She is therefore +enabled simultaneously on one side to receive, and on the other to +give, since her nature compels her to relate herself closely with the +objects of sense.[184] + + +THE SOUL DOES NOT ENTIRELY ENTER INTO THE BODY. + +8. Though I should set myself in opposition to popular views, I shall +set down clearly what seems to me the true state of affairs. Not the +whole soul enters into the body. By her higher part, she ever remains +united to the intelligible world; as, by her lower part, she remains +united to the sense-world. If this lower part dominates, or rather, if +it be dominated (by sensation) and troubled, it hinders us from being +conscious of what the higher part of the soul contemplates. Indeed +that which is thought impinges on our consciousness only in case it +descends to us, and is felt. In general, we are conscious of what goes +on in every part of the soul only when it is felt by the entire soul. +For instance, appetite, which is the actualization of lustful desire, +is by us cognized only when we perceive it by the interior sense or by +discursive reason, or by both simultaneously. Every soul has a · lower +part turned towards the body, and a higher part turned towards divine +Intelligence. The universal Soul manages the universe by her lower part +without any kind of trouble, because she governs her body not as we do +by any reasoning, but by intelligence, and consequently in a manner +entirely different from that adopted by art. The individual souls, +each of whom administers a part of the universe,[185] also have a part +that rises above their body; but they are distracted from thought +by sensation, and by a perception of a number of things which are +contrary to nature, and which come to trouble them, and afflict them. +Indeed, the body that they take care of constitutes but a part of the +universe, is incomplete, and is surrounded by exterior objects. That +is why it has so many needs, why it desires luxuriousness, and why it +is deceived thereby. On the contrary, the higher part of the soul is +insensible to the attraction of these transitory pleasures, and leads +an undisturbed life. + + + + +FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR. + +How What is After the First Proceeds Therefrom; of the One. + + +NECESSITY OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST. + +1. Everything that exists after the First is derived therefrom, either +directly or mediately, and constitutes a series of different orders +such that the second can be traced back to the First, the third to the +second, and so forth. Above all beings there must be Something simple +and different from all the rest which would exist in itself, and which, +without ever mingling with anything else, might nevertheless preside +over everything, which might really be the One, and not that deceptive +unity which is only the attribute of essence, and which would be a +principle superior even to being, unreachable by speech, reason, or +science. For if it be not completely simple, foreign to all complexity +and composition, and be not really one, it could not be a principle. It +is sovereignly absolute only because it is simple and first. For what +is not first, is in need of superior things; what is not simple has +need of being constituted by simple things. The Principle of everything +must therefore be one and only. If it were admitted that there was a +second principle of that kind, both would constitute but a single one. +For we do not say that they are bodies, nor that the One and First is a +body; for every body is composite and begotten, and consequently is not +a principle; for a principle cannot be begotten.[186] Therefore, since +the principle of everything cannot be corporeal, because it must be +essentially one, it must be the First. + + +THE FIRST NECESSARILY BEGETS A SECOND, WHICH MUST BE PERFECT. + +If something after the One exist, it is no more the simple One, but +the multiple One. Whence is this derived? Evidently from the First, +for it could not be supposed that it came from chance; that would +be to admit that the First is not the principle of everything. How +then is the multiple One derived from the First? If the First be not +only perfect, but the most perfect, if it be the first Power, it must +surely, in respect to power, be superior to all the rest, and the other +powers must merely imitate it to the limit of their ability. Now we +see that all that arrives to perfection cannot unfruitfully remain in +itself, but begets and produces. Not only do beings capable of choice, +but even those lacking reflection or soul have a tendency to impart +to other beings, what is in them; as, for instance, fire emits heat, +snow emits cold; and plant-juices (dye and soak) into whatever they +happen to touch. All things in nature imitate the First principle by +seeking to achieve immortality by procreation, and by manifestation +of their qualities. How then would He who is sovereignly perfect, who +is the supreme Good, remain absorbed in Himself, as if a sentiment of +jealousy hindered Him from communicating Himself, or as if He were +powerless, though He is the power of everything? How then would He +remain principle of everything? He must therefore beget something, just +as what He begets must in turn beget. There must therefore be something +beneath the First. Now this thing (which is immediately beneath the +First), must be very venerable, first because it begets everything +else, then because it is begotten by the First, and because it must, +as being the Second, rank and surpass everything else. + + +INTELLIGENCE CANNOT BE THE FIRST, AND RANKS ALL ELSE. + +2. If the generating principle were intelligence, what it begot would +have to be inferior to intelligence, and nevertheless approximate +it, and resemble it more than anything else. Now as the generating +principle is superior to intelligence, the first begotten thing is +necessarily intelligence. Why, however, is the generating principle not +intelligence? Because the act of intelligence is thought, and thought +consists in seeing the intelligible; for it is only by its conversion +towards it that intelligence achieves a complete and perfect existence. +In itself, intelligence is only an indeterminate power to see; only by +contemplation of the intelligible does it achieve the state of being +determined. This is the reason of the saying, "The ideas and numbers, +that is, intelligence, are born from the indefinite doubleness, and the +One." Consequently, instead of being simple, intelligence is multiple. +It is composed of several elements; these are doubtless intelligible, +but what intelligence sees is none the less multiple. In any case, +intelligence is simultaneously the object thought, and the thinking +subject; it is therefore already double. + + +THE FIRST AND SECOND AS HIGHER AND LOWER INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES. + +But besides this intelligible (entity, namely, intelligence), there is +another (higher) intelligible (the supreme Intelligible, the First). +In what way does the intelligence, thus determined, proceed from the +(First) Intelligible? The Intelligible abides in itself, and has need +of nothing else, while there is a need of something else in that which +sees and thinks (that is, that which thinks has need of contemplating +the supreme Intelligible). But even while remaining within Himself, the +Intelligible (One) is not devoid of sentiment; all things belong to +Him, are in Him, and with Him. Consequently, He has the conception of +Himself, a conception which implies consciousness, and which consists +in eternal repose, and in a thought, but in a thought different from +that of intelligence. If He begets something while remaining within +Himself, He begets it precisely when He is at the highest point of +individuality. It is therefore by remaining in His own state that +He begets what He begets; He procreates by individualizing. Now as +He remains intelligible, what He begets cannot be anything else +than thought; therefore thought, by existing, and by thinking the +Principle whence it is derived (for it could not think any other +object), becomes simultaneously intelligence and intelligible; but this +second intelligible differs from the first Intelligible from which it +proceeds, and of which it is but the image and the reflection. + + +THE SECOND IS THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE POTENTIALITY OF THE FIRST. + +But how is an actualization begotten from that self-limited +(intelligible)? We shall have to draw a distinction between an +actualization of being, and an actualization out of the being of each +thing (actualized being, and actualization emanating from being). +Actualized being cannot differ from being, for it is being itself. But +the actualization emanating from being--and everything necessarily has +an actualization of this kind--differs from what produces it. It is as +if with fire: there is a difference between the heat which constitutes +its being, and the heat which radiates exteriorly, while the fire +interiorly realizes the actualization which constitutes its being, +and which makes it preserve its nature. Here also, and far more so, +the First remains in His proper state, and yet simultaneously, by His +inherent perfection, by the actualization which resides in Him, has +been begotten the actualization which, deriving its existence from so +great a power, nay, from supreme Power, has arrived at, or achieved +essence and being. As to the First, He was above being; for He was the +potentiality of all things, already being all things. + + +HOW THE FIRST IS ABOVE ALL BEING. + +If this (actualization begotten by the First, this external +actualization) be all things, then that (One) is above all things, +and consequently above being. If then (this external actualization) +be all things, and be before all things, it does not occupy the same +rank as the remainder (of all other things); and must, in this respect +also, be superior to being, and consequently also to intelligence; for +there is Something superior to intelligence. Essence is not, as you +might say, dead; it is not devoid of life or thought; for intelligence +and essence are identical. Intelligible entities do not exist before +the intelligence that thinks them, as sense-objects exist before the +sensation which perceives them. Intelligence itself is the things that +it thinks, since their forms are not introduced to them from without. +From where indeed would intelligence receive these forms? Intelligence +exists with the intelligible things; intelligence is identical with +them, is one with them. Reciprocally, intelligible entities do not +exist without their matter (that is, Intelligence). + + + + +FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK NINE. + +Whether All Souls Form a Single One? + + +IF ALL SOULS BE ONE IN THE WORLD-SOUL, WHY SHOULD THEY NOT TOGETHER +FORM ONE? + +1. Just as the soul of each animal is one, because she is entirely +present in the whole body, and because she is thus really one, because +she does not have one part in one organ, and some other part in +another; and just as the sense-soul is equally one in all the beings +which feel, and just as the vegetative soul is everywhere entirely +one in each part of the growing plants; why then should your soul and +mine not form a single unity? Why should not all souls form but a +single one? Why should not the universal (Soul) which is present in +all beings, be one because she is not divided in the manner of a body, +being everywhere the same? Why indeed should the soul in myself form +but one, and the universal (Soul) likewise not be one, similarly, since +no more than my own is this universal (Soul) either material extension, +or a body? If both my soul and yours proceed from the universal (Soul), +and if the latter be one, then should my soul and yours together form +but a single one. Or again, on the supposition that the universal +(Soul) and mine proceed from a single soul, even on this hypothesis +would all souls form but a single one. We shall have to examine in what +(this Soul which is but) one consists. + + +SOULS MAY NOT FORM A NUMERIC UNITY, BUT MAY FORM A GENERIC UNITY. + +Let us first consider if it may be affirmed that all souls form but one +in the sense in which it is said that the soul of each individual is +one. It seems absurd to pretend that my soul and yours form but one in +this (numerical) sense; for then you would be feeling simultaneously +with my feeling, and you would be virtuous when I was, and you would +have the same desires as I, and not only would we both have the same +sentiments, but even the identical sentiments of the universal (Soul), +so that every sensation felt by me would have been felt by the entire +universe. If in this manner all the souls form but one, why is one soul +reasonable, and the other unreasonable, why is the one in an animal, +and the other in a plant? On the other hand, if we do not admit that +there is a single Soul, we will not be able to explain the unity of the +universe, nor find a single principle for (human) souls. + + +THE UNITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEVERAL SOULS NEED NOT IMPLY THEIR BEING +IDENTICAL. + +2. In the first place, if the souls of myself and of another man form +but one soul, this does not necessarily imply their being identical +with their principle. Granting the existence of different beings, the +same principle need not experience in each the same affections. Thus, +humanity may equally reside in me, who am in motion, as in you, who may +be at rest, although in me it moves, and it rests in you. Nevertheless, +it is neither absurd nor paradoxical to insist that the same principle +is both in you and in me; and this does not necessarily make us feel +the identical affections. Consider a single body: it is not the left +hand which feels what the right one does, but the soul which is present +in the whole body. To make you feel the same as I do, our two bodies +would have to constitute but a single one; then, being thus united, our +souls would perceive the same affections. Consider also that the All +remains deaf to a multitude of impressions experienced by the parts +of a single and same organism, and that so much the more as the body +is larger. This is the state of affairs, for instance, with the large +whales which do not feel the impression received in some one part of +their body, because of the smallness of the movement. + + +SYMPATHY DOES NOT FORCE IDENTITY OF SENSATION. + +It is therefore by no means necessary that when one member of the +universe experiences an affection, the latter be clearly felt by the +All. The existence of sympathy is natural enough, and it could not +be denied; but this does not imply identity of sensation. Nor is it +absurd that our souls, while forming a single one should be virtuous +and vicious, just as it would be possible that the same essence be at +motion in me, but at rest in you. Indeed, the unity that we attribute +to the universal (Soul) does not exclude all multiplicity, such a +unity as befits intelligence. We may however say that (the soul) is +simultaneously unity and plurality, because she participates not only +in divisible essence in the bodies, but also in the indivisible, +which consequently is one. Now, just as the impression perceived by +one of my parts is not necessarily felt all over my body, while that +which happens to the principal organ is felt by all the other parts, +likewise, the impressions that the universe communicates to the +individual are clearer, because usually the parts perceive the same +affections as the All, while it is not evident that the particular +affections that we feel would be also experienced by the Whole. + + +UNITY OF ALL BEINGS IMPLIED BY SYMPATHY, LOVE, AND MAGIC ENCHANTMENT. + +3. On the other hand, observation teaches us that we sympathize with +each other, that we cannot see the suffering of another man without +sharing it, that we are naturally inclined to confide in each other, +and to love; for love is a fact whose origin is connected with the +question that occupies us. Further, if enchantments and magic charms +mutually attract individuals, leading distant persons to sympathize, +these effects can only be explained by the unity of soul. (It is well +known that) words pronounced in a low tone of voice (telepathically?) +affect a distant person, and make him hear what is going on at a great +distance. Hence appears the unity of all beings, which demands the +unity of the Soul. + + +WHAT OF THE DIFFERENCES OF RATIONALITY, IF THE SOUL BE ONE? + +If, however, the Soul be one, why is some one soul reasonable, another +irrational, or some other one merely vegetative? The indivisible part +of the soul consists in reason, which is not divided in the bodies, +while the part of the divisible soul in the bodies (which, though being +one in herself, nevertheless divides herself in the bodies, because +she sheds sentiment everywhere), must be regarded as another power of +the soul (the sensitive power); likewise, the part which fashions and +produces the bodies is still another power (the vegetative power); +nevertheless, this plurality of powers does not destroy the unity of +the soul. For instance, in a grain of seed there are also several +powers; nevertheless this grain of seed is one, and from this unity is +born a multiplicity which forms a unity. + + +THE POWERS OF THE SOUL ARE NOT EXERCISED EVERYWHERE BECAUSE THEY DIFFER. + +But why do not all the powers of the soul act everywhere? Now if we +consider the Soul which is one everywhere, we find that sensation is +not similar in all its parts (that is, in all the individual souls); +that reason is not in all (but in certain souls exclusively); and that +the vegetative power is granted to those beings who do not possess +sensation, and that all these powers return to unity when they separate +from the body. + + +THE BODY'S POWER OF GROWTH IS DERIVED FROM THE WHOLE, AND THE SOUL; BUT +NOT FROM OUR SOUL. + +If, however, the body derive its vegetative power from the Whole and +from this (universal) Soul which is one, why should it not derive it +also from our soul? Because that which is nourished by this power forms +a part of the universe, which possesses sensation only at the price of +"suffering." As to the sense-power which rises as far as the judgment, +and which is united to every intelligence, there was no need for it to +form what had already been formed by the Whole, but it could have given +its forms if these forms were not parts of the Whole which produces +them. + + +THE UNITY OF THE SOULS IS A CONDITION OF THEIR MULTIPLICITY. + +4. Such justifications will preclude surprise at our deriving all +souls from unity. But completeness of treatment demands explanation +how all souls are but a single one. Is this due to their proceeding +from a single Soul, or because they all form a single one? If all +proceed from a single one, did this one divide herself, or did she +remain whole, while begetting the multitude of souls? In this case, how +could an essence beget a multitude like her, while herself remaining +undiminished? We shall invoke the help of the divinity (in solving this +problem); and say that the existence of the one single Soul is the +condition of the existence of the multitude of souls, and that this +multitude must proceed from the Soul that is one. + + +THE SOUL CAN BEGET MANY BECAUSE SHE IS AN INCORPOREAL ESSENCE. + +If the Soul were a body, then would the division of this body +necessarily produce the multitude of souls, and this essence would be +different in its different parts. Nevertheless, as this essence would +be homogeneous, the souls (between which it would divide itself) would +be similar to each other, because they would possess a single identical +form in its totality, but they would differ by their body. If the +essence of these souls consisted in the bodies which would serve them +as subjects, they would be different from each other. If the essence +of these souls consisted in their form, they would, in form, be but +one single form; in other terms, there would be but one same single +soul in a multitude of bodies. Besides, above this soul which would be +one, but which would be spread abroad in the multitude of bodies, there +would be another Soul which would not be spread abroad in the multitude +of bodies; it would be from her that would proceed the soul which +would be the unity in plurality, the multiple image of the single Soul +in a single body, like a single seal, by impressing the same figure +to a multitude of pieces of wax, would be distributing this figure +in a multitude of impressions. In this case (if the essence of the +soul consisted in her form) the soul would be something incorporeal, +and as she would consist in an affection of the body, there would be +nothing astonishing in that a single quality, emanating from a single +principle, might be in a multitude of subjects simultaneously. Last, +if the essence of the soul consisted in being both things (being +simultaneously a part of a homogeneous body and an affection of the +body), there would be nothing surprising (if there were a unity of +essence in a multitude of subjects). We have thus shown that the soul +is incorporeal, and an essence; we must now consider the results of +this view. + + +HOW AN ESSENCE CAN BE ONE IN A MULTITUDE OF SOULS IS ILLUSTRATED BY +SEED. + +5. How can an essence be single in a multitude of souls? Either this +one essence is entire in all souls, or this one and entire essence +begets all souls while remaining (undiminished) in itself. In either +case, the essence is single. It is the unity to which the individual +souls are related; the essence gives itself to this multitude, and yet +simultaneously the essence does not give itself; it can give of itself +to all individual souls, and nevertheless remain single; it is powerful +enough to pass into all simultaneously, and to be separated from none; +thus its essence remains identical, while being present in a multitude +of souls. This is nothing astonishing; all of science is entirely in +each of its parts, and it begets them without itself ceasing to remain +entire within itself. Likewise, a grain of seed is entire in each of +its parts in which it naturally divides itself; each of its parts has +the same properties as the whole seed; nevertheless the seed remains +entire, without diminution; and if the matter (in which the seed +resides) offer it any cause of division, all the parts will not any the +less form a single unity. + + +THIS MIRACLE IS EXPLAINED BY THE USE OF THE CONCEPTION OF POTENTIALITY. + +It may be objected that in science a part is not the total science. +Doubtless, the notion which is actualized, and which is studied to +the exclusion of others, because there is special need of it, is +only partially an actualization. Nevertheless, in a latent manner it +potentially comprises all the other notions it implies. Thus, all the +notions are contained in each part of the science, and in this respect +each part is the total science; for what is only partially actualized +(potentially) comprises all the notions of science. Each notion that +one wishes to render explicit is at one's disposition; and this in +every part of the science that is considered; but if it be compared +with the whole science, it seems to be there only potentially. It +must not, however, be thought that the particular notion does not +contain anything of the other notions; in this case, there would +be nothing systematic or scientific about it; it would be nothing +more than a sterile conception. Being a really scientific notion, it +potentially contains all the notions of the science; and the genuine +scientist knows how to discover all its notions in a single one, and +how to develop its consequences. The geometrical expert shows in his +demonstrations how each theorem contains all the preceding ones, to +which he harks back by analysis, and how each theorem leads to all the +following ones, by deduction. + + +DIFFICULT AS THESE EXPLANATIONS ARE, THEY ARE CLEAR INTELLIGIBLY. + +These truths excite our incredulity, because here below our reason +is weak, and it is confused by the body. In the intelligible world, +however, all the verities are clear, and each is evident, by itself. + + + + +SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK NINE. + +Of the Good and the One. + + +UNITY NECESSARY TO EXISTENCE OF ALL BEINGS. + +1. All beings, both primary, as well as those who are so called on any +pretext soever, are beings only because of their unity. What, indeed +would they be without it? Deprived of their unity, they would cease to +be what they are said to be. No army can exist unless it be one. So +with a choric ballet or a flock. Neither a house nor a ship can exist +without unity; by losing it they would cease to be what they are.[187] +So also with continuous quantities which would not exist without unity. +On being divided by losing their unity, they simultaneously lose their +nature. Consider farther the bodies of plants and animals, of which +each is a unity. On losing their unity by being broken up into several +parts, they simultaneously lose their nature. They are no more what +they were, they have become new beings, which themselves exist only so +long as they are one. What effects health in us, is that the parts of +our bodies are co-ordinated in unity. Beauty is formed by the unity of +our members. Virtue is our soul's tendency to unity, and becoming one +through the harmony of her faculties. + + +THE SOUL MAY IMPART UNITY, BUT IS NOT UNITY. + +The soul imparts unity to all things when producing them, fashioning +them, and forming them. Should we, therefore, after rising to the +Soul, say that she not only imparts unity, but herself is unity in +itself? Certainly not. The soul that imparts form and figure to +bodies is not identical with form, and figure. Therefore the soul +imparts unity without being unity. She unifies each of her productions +only by contemplation of the One, just as she produces man only +by contemplating Man-in-himself, although adding to that idea the +implied unity. Each of the things that are called "one" have a unity +proportionate to their nature ("being"); so that they participate in +unity more or less according as they share essence[188] (being). Thus +the soul is something different from unity; nevertheless, as she exists +in a degree higher (than the body), she participates more in unity, +without being unity itself; indeed she is one, but the unity in her +is no more than contingent. There is a difference between the soul +and unity, just as between the body and unity. A discrete quantity +such as a company of dancers, or choric ballet, is very far from being +unity; a continuous quantity approximates that further; the soul gets +still nearer to it, and participates therein still more. Thus from the +fact that the soul could not exist without being one, the identity +between the soul and unity is suggested. But this may be answered +in two ways. First, other things also possess individual existence +because they possess unity, and nevertheless are not unity itself; as, +though the body is not identical with unity, it also participates in +unity. Further, the soul is manifold as well as one, though she be not +composed of parts. She possesses several faculties, discursive reason, +desire, and perception--all of them faculties joined together by unity +as a bond. Doubtless the soul imparts unity to something else (the +body), because she herself possesses unity; but this unity is by her +received from some other principle (namely, from unity itself). + + +BEING AND ESSENCE IDENTICAL WITH UNITY. + +2. (Aristotle[189]) suggests that in each of the individual beings +which are one, being is identical with unity. Are not being and essence +identical with unity, in every being and in every essence, in a manner +such that on discovering essence, unity also is discovered? Is not +being in itself unity in itself, so that if being be intelligence, +unity also must be intelligence, as intelligence which, being essence +in the highest degree, is also unity in the first degree, and which, +imparting essence to other things, also imparts unity to them? What +indeed could unity be, apart from essence and being? As "man," and "a +man" are equivalent,[190] essence must be identical with unity; or, +unity is the number of everything considered individually; and as one +object joined to another is spoken of as two, so an object alone is +referred to as one. + + +UNITY IS NOT A NUMBERING DEVICE, BUT IS IDENTICAL WITH EXISTENCE. + +If number belongs to the class of beings, evidently the latter must +include unity also; and we shall have to discover what kind of a being +it is. If unity be no more than a numbering device invented by the +soul, then unity would possess no real existence. But we have above +observed that each object, on losing unity, loses existence also. We +are therefore compelled to investigate whether essence and unity be +identical either when considered in themselves, or in each individual +object. + + +EVEN UNIVERSAL ESSENCE CONTAINS MANIFOLDNESS. + +If the essence of each thing be manifoldness, and as unity cannot be +manifoldness, unity must differ from essence. Now man, being both +animal and rational, contains a manifoldness of elements of which +unity is the bond. There is therefore a difference between man and +unity; man is divisible, while unity is indivisible. Besides, universal +Essence, containing all essences, is still more manifold. Therefore +it differs from unity; though it does possess unity by participation. +Essence possesses life and intelligence, for it cannot be considered +lifeless; it must therefore be manifold. Besides, if essence be +intelligence, it must in this respect also be manifold, and must be +much more so if it contain forms; for the idea[191] is not genuinely +one. Both as individual and general it is rather a number; it is one +only as the world is one. + + +BESIDES, ABSOLUTE UNITY IS THE FIRST, WHICH INTELLIGENCE IS NOT. + +Besides, Unity in itself is the first of all; but intelligence, forms +and essence are not primary. Every form is manifold and composite, and +consequently must be something posterior; for parts are prior to the +composite they constitute. Nor is intelligence primary, as appears from +the following considerations. For intelligence existence is necessarily +thought and the best intelligence which does not contemplate exterior +objects, must think what is above it; for, on turning towards itself, +it turns towards its principle. On the one hand, if intelligence be +both thinker and thought, it implies duality, and is not simple or +unitary. On the other hand, if intelligence contemplate some object +other than itself, this might be nothing more than some object better +than itself, placed above it. Even if intelligence contemplate itself +simultaneously with what is better than it, even so intelligence is +only of secondary rank. We may indeed admit that the intelligence which +has such a nature enjoys the presence of the Good, of the First, and +that intelligence contemplates the First; but nevertheless at the same +time intelligence is present to itself, and thinks itself as being all +things. Containing such a diversity, intelligence is far from unity. + + +UNITY AS ABOVE ALL THINGS, INTELLIGENCE AND ESSENCE. + +Thus Unity is not all things, for if so, it would no longer be unity. +Nor is it Intelligence, for since intelligence is all things, unity +too would be all things. Nor is it essence, since essence also is all +things. + + +UNITY IS DIFFICULT TO ASCERTAIN BECAUSE THE SOUL IS FEARFUL OF SUCH +ABSTRUSE RESEARCHES. + +3. What then is unity? What is its nature? It is not surprising that +it is so difficult to say so, when it is difficult to explain of what +even essence or form consist. But, nevertheless, forms are the basis +of our knowledge. Everything that the soul advances towards what is +formless, not being able to understand it because it is indeterminate, +and so to speak has not received the impression of a distinctive type, +the soul withdraws therefrom, fearing she will meet nonentity. That is +why, in the presence of such things she grows troubled, and descends +with pleasure. Then, withdrawing therefrom, she, so to speak, lets +herself fall till she meets some sense-object, on which she pauses, and +recovers; just as the eye which, fatigued by the contemplation of small +objects, gladly turns back to large ones. When the soul wishes to see +by herself, then seeing only because she is the object that she sees, +and, further, being one because she forms but one with this object, she +imagines that what she sought has escaped, because she herself is not +distinct from the object that she thinks. + + +THE PATH OF SIMPLIFICATION TO UNITY. + +Nevertheless a philosophical study of unity will follow the following +course. Since it is Unity that we seek, since it is the principle +of all things, the Good, the First that we consider, those who will +wish to reach it must not withdraw from that which is of primary rank +to decline to what occupies the last, but they must withdraw their +souls from sense-objects, which occupy the last degree in the scale +of existence, to those entities that occupy the first rank. Such a +man will have to free himself from all evil, since he aspires to +rise to the Good. He will rise to the principle that he possesses +within himself. From the manifold that he was he will again become +one. Only under these conditions will he contemplate the supreme +principle, Unity. Thus having become intelligence, having trusted his +soul to intelligence, educating and establishing her therein, so that +with vigilant attention she may grasp all that intelligence sees, +he will, by intelligence, contemplate unity, without the use of any +senses, without mingling any of their perceptions with the flashes +of intelligence. He will contemplate the purest Principle, through +the highest degree of the purest Intelligence. So when a man applies +himself to the contemplation of such a principle and represents it to +himself as a magnitude, or a figure, or even a form, it is not his +intelligence that guides him in this contemplation for intelligence +is not destined to see such things; it is sensation, or opinion, the +associate of sensation, which is active in him. Intelligence is only +capable of informing us about things within its sphere. + + +UNITY AS THE UNIFORM IN ITSELF AND FORMLESS SUPERFORM. + +Intelligence can see both the things that are above it, those which +belong to it, and the things that proceed from it. The things that +belong to intelligence are pure; but they are still less pure and less +simple than the things that are above Intelligence, or rather than what +is above it; this is not Intelligence, and is superior to Intelligence. +Intelligence indeed is essence, while the principle above it is not +essence, but is superior to all beings. Nor is it essence, for essence +has a special form, that of essence, and the One is shapeless even +intelligible. As Unity is the nature that begets all things, Unity +cannot be any of them. It is therefore neither any particular thing, +nor quantity, nor quality, nor intelligence, nor soul, nor what is +movable, nor what is stable; it is neither in place nor time; but it +is the uniform in itself, or rather it is formless, as it is above all +form, above movement and stability. These are my views about essence +and what makes it manifold.[192] + + +WHY IT IS NOT STABLE, THOUGH IT DOES NOT MOVE. + +But if it does not move, why does it not possess stability? Because +either of these things, or both together, are suitable to nothing but +essence. Besides, that which possesses stability is stable through +stability, and is not identical with stability itself; consequently it +possesses stability only by accident, and would no longer remain simple. + + +BEING A PRIMARY CAUSE, UNITY IS NOTHING CONTINGENT. + +Nor let anybody object that something contingent is attributed to Unity +when we call it the primary cause. It is to ourselves that we are then +attributing contingency, since it is we who are receiving something +from Unity, while Unity remains within itself. + + +UNITY CANNOT BE DEFINED; WE CAN ONLY REFER TO IT BY OUR FEELINGS OF IT. + +Speaking strictly, we should say that the One is this or that (that is, +we should not apply any name to it). We can do no more than turn around +it, so to speak, trying to express what we feel (in regard to it); for +at times we approach Unity, and at times withdraw from it as a result +of our uncertainty about it. + + +WE CANNOT COMPREHEND UNITY, WHICH WE APPROACH ONLY BY A PRESENCE. + +4. The principal cause of our uncertainty is that our comprehension of +the One comes to us neither by scientific knowledge, nor by thought, as +the knowledge of other intelligible things, but by a presence which is +superior to science. When the soul acquires the scientific knowledge +of something, she withdraws from unity and ceases being entirely one; +for science implies discursive reason and discursive reason implies +manifoldness. (To attain Unity) we must therefore rise above science, +and never withdraw from what is essentially One; we must therefore +renounce science, the objects of science, and every other right (except +that of the One); even to that of beauty; for beauty is posterior to +unity, and is derived therefrom, as the day-light comes from the sun. +That is why Plato[193] says of (Unity) that it is unspeakable and +undescribable. Nevertheless we speak of it, we write about it, but only +to excite our souls by our discussions, and to direct them towards this +divine spectacle, just as one might point out the road to somebody who +desired to see some object. Instruction, indeed, goes as far as showing +the road, and guiding us in the way; but to obtain the vision (of the +divinity), is the work suitable to him who has desired to obtain it. + + +THOSE WHO SEE GOD WITHOUT EMOTION HAVE FAILED TO RID THEMSELVES OF +PHYSICAL HINDRANCES, AND HAVE NOT BECOME UNIFIED. + +If your soul does not succeed in enjoying this spectacle, if she does +not have the intuition of the divine light, if she remains cold and +does not, within herself, feel a rapture such as that of a lover who +sees the beloved object, and who rests within it, a rapture felt by him +who has seen the true light, and whose soul has been overwhelmed with +brilliance on approaching this light, then you have tried to rise to +the divinity without having freed yourself from the hindrances which +arrest your progress, and hinder your contemplation. You did not rise +alone, and you retained within yourself something that separated you +from Him; or rather, you were not yet unified. Though He be absent +from all beings, He is absent from none, so that He is present (to +all) without being present (to them). He is present only for those +who are able to receive Him, and who are prepared for Him, and who +are capable of harmonizing themselves with Him, to reach Him, and as +it were to touch Him by virtue of the conformity they have with Him, +and also by virtue of an innate power analogous to that which flows +from Him, when at last their souls find themselves in the state where +they were after having communicated with Him; then they can see Him +so far as his nature is visible. I repeat: if you have not yet risen +so far, the conclusion must be that you are still at a distance from +Him, either by the obstacles of which we spoke above, or by the lack +of such instruction as would have taught you the road to follow, and +which would have imbued you with faith in things divine. In any case, +you have no fault to find with any but yourself; for, to be alone, all +you need to do is to detach yourself from everything. Lack of faith in +arguments about it may be remedied by the following considerations. + + +HOW SUCH AS RISE AS FAR AS THE SOUL MAY ACHIEVE FAITH IN THE +INTELLIGIBLE. + +5. Such as imagine that beings are governed by luck or chance, and +that they depend on material causes are far removed from the divinity, +and from the conception of unity. It is not such men that we are +addressing, but such as admit the existence of a nature different from +the corporeal one, and who at least rise (to an acknowledgment of the +existence of) the Soul. These should apply themselves to the study of +the nature of the soul, learning, among other truths, that she proceeds +from Intelligence, and that she can achieve virtue by participating in +Intelligence through reason. They must then acknowledge the existence +of an Intelligence superior to the intelligence that reasons, namely, +to discursive reason. They must (also realize) that reasonings imply +an interval (between notions), and a movement (by which the soul +bridges this interval). They must be brought to see that scientific +knowledge consists also of reasons of the same nature (namely, rational +notions), reasons suitable to the soul, but which have become clear, +because the soul has received the succession of intelligence which is +the source of scientific knowledge. By intelligence (which belongs to +her), the soul sees the divine Intellect, which to it seems sensual, +in this sense that it is perceptible by intelligence, which dominates +the soul, and is her father;[194] that is, the intelligible world, a +calm intellect which vibrates without issuing from its tranquility, +which contains everything, and which is all. It is both definite and +indefinite manifoldness, for the ideas it contains are not distinct +like the reasons (the rational notions), which are conceived one by +one. Nevertheless, they do not become confused. Each of them becomes +distinct from the others, just as in a science all the notions, +though forming an indivisible whole, yet each has its own separate +individual existence.[195] This multitude of ideas taken together +constitutes the intelligible world. This is the (entity) nearest +to the First. Its existence is inevitably demonstrated by reason, +as much as the necessity of the existence of the Soul herself; but +though the intelligible world is something superior to the Soul, it is +nevertheless not yet the First, because it is neither one, nor simple, +while the one, the principle of all beings, is perfectly simple. + + +THE SUPREME IS ONE ONLY IN A FIGURATIVE SENSE. + +The principle that is superior to what is highest among beings, to +Intelligence (or intellect, or intelligible world) (may well be sought +after). There must indeed be some principle above Intelligence; for +intelligence does indeed aspire to become one, but it is not one, +possessing only the form of unity. Considered in itself, Intelligence +is not divided, but is genuinely present to itself. It does not +dismember itself because it is next to the One, though it dared to +withdraw therefrom. What is above Intelligence is Unity itself, an +incomprehensible miracle, of which it cannot even be said that it +is essence, lest we make of it the attribute of something else, and +to whom no name is really suitable. If however He must be named, we +may indeed call Him in general Unity, but only on the preliminary +understanding that He was not first something else, and then only +later became unity. That is why the One is so difficult to understand +in Himself; He is rather known by His offspring; that is, by Being, +because Intelligence leads up to Being. The nature of the One, indeed, +is the source of excellent things, the power which begets beings, while +remaining within Himself, without undergoing any diminution, without +passing into the beings to which He gives birth.[196] If we call this +principle Unity, it is only for the mutual convenience of rising to +some indivisible conception, and in unifying our soul. But when we say +that this principle is one and indivisible, it is not in the same sense +that we say it of the (geometric) point, and of the (arithmetical unity +called the) monad. What is one in the sense of the unity of the point +or the monad, is a principle of quantity, and would not exist unless +preceded by being and the principle which precedes even that being. It +is not of this kind of unity that we must think; still we believe that +the point and the monad have analogy with the One by their simplicity +as well as by the absence of all manifoldness and of all division. + + +THE ONE MAY BE CONCEIVED OF AS INDIVISIBLE AND INFINITE. + +6. In what sense do we use the name of unity, and how can we conceive +of it? We shall have to insist that the One is a unity much more +perfect than the point of the monad; for in these, abstracting +(geometric) magnitude, and numerical plurality, we do indeed stop +at that which is most minute, and we come to rest in something +indivisible; but this existed already in a divisible being, in a +subject other than itself, while the One is neither in a subject other +than itself, nor in anything divisible. If it be indivisible, neither +is it of the same kind as that which is most minute. On the contrary, +it is that which is greatest, not by (geometric) magnitude, but by +power; possessing no (geometric) magnitude, it is indivisible in its +power; for the beings beneath it are indivisible in their powers, and +not in their mass (since they are incorporeal). We must also insist +that the One is infinite, not as would be a mass of a magnitude which +could be examined serially, but by the incommensurability of its power. +Even though you should conceive of it as of intelligence or divinity, +it is still higher. When by thought you consider it as the most perfect +unity, it is still higher. You try to form for yourself an idea of a +divinity by rising to what in your intelligence is most unitary (and +yet He is still simpler); for He dwells within Himself, and contains +nothing that is contingent. + + +THE ONE IS SELF-SUFFICIENT AND NEEDS NOTHING FOR ESTABLISHMENT. + +His sovereign unity may best be understood by His being +self-sufficient; for the most perfect principle is necessarily that +which best suffices Himself, and which least needs anything else. Now +anything that is not one, but manifold, needs something else. Not +being one, but being composed of multiple elements, its being demands +unification; but as the One is already one, He does not even need +Himself. So much the more, the being that is manifold needs as many +things as it contains; for each of the contained things exists only by +its union with the others, and not in itself, and finds that it needs +the others. Therefore such a being needs others, both for the things +it contains, as for their totality. If then there must be something +that fully suffices itself, it must surely be the One, which alone +needs nothing either relatively to Himself, or to the other things. It +needs nothing either to exist, or to be happy, or to be composed. To +begin with, as He is the cause of the other beings, He does not owe His +existence to them. Further, how could He derive His happiness from +outside Himself? Within Him, happiness is not something contingent, but +is His very nature. Again, as He does not occupy any space, He does not +need any foundation on which to be edified, as if He could not sustain +Himself. All that needs compounding is inanimate; without support it is +no more than a mass ready to fall. (Far from needing any support) the +One is the foundation of the edification of all other things; by giving +them existence, He has at the same time given them a location. However, +that which needs a location is not (necessarily) self-sufficient. + + +THE SUPREME, AS SUPERGOODNESS, COULD NOT ASPIRE TO ANYTHING ELSE. + +A principle has no need of anything beneath it. The Principle of all +things has no need of any of them. Every non-self-sufficient being is +not self-sufficient chiefly because it aspires to its principle. If the +One aspired to anything, His aspiration would evidently tend to destroy +His unity, that is, to annihilate Himself. Anything that aspires +evidently aspires to happiness and preservation. Thus, since for the +One there is no good outside of Himself, there is nothing that He could +wish. He is the super-good; He is the good, not for Himself, but for +other beings, for those that can participate therein. + + +THE ONE IS NOT THINKER BUT THOUGHT ITSELF. + +Within the One, therefore, is no thought, because there can be no +difference within Him; nor could He contain any motion, because the +One is prior to motion, as much as to thought. Besides, what would +He think? Would He think Himself? In this case, He would be ignorant +before thinking, and thought would be necessary to Him, who fully +suffices to Himself. Neither should He be thought to contain ignorance, +because He does not know Himself, and does not think Himself. Ignorance +presupposes a relation, and consists in that one thing does not know +another. But the One, being alone, can neither know nor be ignorant +of anything. Being with Himself, He has no need of self-knowledge. +We should not even predicate of Him presence with Himself, if we are +to conceive of Him Unity in sheer purity. On the contrary, we should +have to leave aside intelligence, consciousness, and knowledge of +self and of other beings. We should not conceive of Him as being that +which thinks, but rather as of thought. Thought does not think; but +is the cause which makes some other being think; now the cause cannot +be identical with that which is caused. So much the more reason is +there then to say that that which is the cause of all these existing +things cannot be any one of them. This Cause, therefore, must not be +considered identical with the good He dispenses, but must be conceived +as the Good in a higher sense, the Good which is above all other goods. + + +THE SOUL MUST BE STRIPPED OF FORM TO BE ILLUMINATED BY PRIMARY NATURE. + +7. Your mind remains in uncertainty because the divinity is none of +these things (that you know). Apply it first to these things, and +later fix it on the divinity. While doing so, do not let yourself +be distracted by anything exterior for the divinity is not in any +definite place, depriving the remainder of its presence, but it is +present wherever there is any person who is capable of entering into +contact therewith. It is absent only for those who cannot succeed +therein. Just as, for other objects, one could not discover what one +seeks by thinking of something else, and as one should not add any +alien thing to the object that is thought if one wishes to identify +oneself therewith; likewise here one must be thoroughly convinced that +it is impossible for any one whose soul contains any alien image to +conceive of the divinity so long as such an image distracts the soul's +attention. It is equally impossible that the soul, at the moment that +she is attentive, and attached to other things, should assume the form +of what is contrary to them. Just as it is said of matter that it must +be absolutely deprived of all qualities to be susceptible of receiving +all forms; likewise, and for a stronger reason, the soul must be +stripped of all form, if she desire to be filled with and illuminated +by the primary nature without any interior hindrance. Thus, having +liberated herself from all exterior things, the soul will entirely +turn to what is most intimate in her; she will not allow herself to be +turned away by any of the surrounding objects and she will put aside +all things, first by the very effect of the state in which she will +find herself, and later by the absence of any conception of form. She +will not even know that she is applying herself to the contemplation of +the One, or that she is united thereto. Then, after having sufficiently +dwelt with it, she will, if she can, come to reveal to others this +heavenly communion. Doubtless it was enjoyment of this communion +that was the basis of the traditional conversation of Minos with +Jupiter.[197] Inspired with the memories of this interview, he made +laws which represented it, because, while he was drawing them up, he +was still under the influence of his union with the divinity. Perhaps +even, in this state, the soul may look down on civil virtues as hardly +worthy of her,[198] inasmuch as she desires to dwell on high; and this +does indeed happen to such as have long contemplated the divinity. + + +ON SELF-KNOWLEDGE DEPENDS RECOGNITION OF DIVINE KINSHIP. + +(In short), the divinity is not outside of any being. On the contrary, +He is present to all beings, though these may be ignorant thereof. +This happens because they are fugitives, wandering outside of Him or +rather, outside of themselves. They cannot reach Him from whom they +are fleeing, nor, having lost themselves, can they find another being. +A son, if angry, and beside himself, is not likely to recognize his +father. But he who will have learnt to know himself will at the same +time discover from where he hails.[199] + + +TO BE ATTACHED TO THE CENTRE CONSTITUTES DIVINITY. + +8. Self-knowledge reveals the fact that the soul's natural movement is +not in a straight line, unless indeed it have undergone some deviation. +On the contrary, it circles around something interior, around a centre. +Now the centre is that from which proceeds the circle, that is, the +soul.[200] The soul will therefore move around the centre, that is, +around the principle from which she proceeds; and, trending towards it, +she will attach herself to it, as indeed all souls should do. The souls +of the divinities ever direct themselves towards it; and that is the +secret of their divinity; for divinity consists in being attached to +the Centre (of all souls). Anyone who withdraws much therefrom is a man +who has remained manifold (that is, who has never become unified), or +who is a brute.[201] + + +THE CELEBRATED SIMILE OF THE MAN WHOSE FEET ARE IN A BATH-TUB. + +Is the centre of the soul then the principle that we are seeking? +Or must we conceive some other principle towards which all centres +radiate? To begin with, it is only by analogy that the words "centre" +and "circle" are used. By saying that the soul is a circle, we do not +mean that she is a geometrical figure, but that in her and around her +subsists primordial nature.[202] (By saying that she has a centre, we +mean that) the soul is suspended from the primary Principle (by the +highest part of her being), especially when she is entirely separated +(from the body). Now, however, as we have a part of our being contained +in the the body, we resemble a man whose feet are plunged in water, +with the rest of his body remaining above it. Raising ourselves above +the body by the whole part which is not immerged, we are by our own +centre reattaching ourselves to the Centre common to all beings, just +in the same way as we make the centres of the great circles coincide +with that of the sphere that surrounds them. If the circles of the +soul were corporeal, the common centre would have to occupy a certain +place for them to coincide with it, and for them to turn around it. But +since the souls are of the order of intelligible (essences), and as +the One is still above Intelligence, we shall have to assert that the +intercourse of the soul with the One operates by means different from +those by which Intelligence unites with the intelligible. This union, +indeed, is much closer than that which is realized between Intelligence +and the intelligible by resemblance or identity; it takes place by the +intimate relationship that unites the soul with unity, without anything +to separate them. Bodies cannot unite mutually;[203] but they could +not hinder the mutual union of incorporeal (essences) because that +which separates them from each other is not a local distance, but their +distinction and difference. When there is no difference between them, +they are present in each other. + + +THE FAMOUS ILLUSTRATION OF THE COSMIC CHORAL BALLET. + +As the One does not contain any difference, He is always present; and +we are ever present to Him as soon as we contain no more difference. +It is not He who is aspiring to us, or who is moving around us; on +the contrary, it is we who are aspiring to Him. Though we always move +around Him, we do not always keep our glance fixed on Him. We resemble +a chorus which always surrounds its leader, but (the members of) which +do not always sing in time because they allow their attention to be +distracted to some exterior object; while, if they turned towards the +leader, they would sing well, and really be with him. Likewise, we +always turn around the One, even when we detach ourselves from Him, and +cease knowing Him. Our glance is not always fixed on the One; but when +we contemplate Him, we attain the purpose of our desires, and enjoy the +rest taught by Heraclitus.[204] Then we disagree no more, and really +form a divine choric ballet around Him. + + +FOLLOWING NUMENIUS, PLOTINOS DESCRIBES THE SUPREME AS GIVER. + +9. In this choric ballet, the soul sees the source of life, the source +of intelligence, the principle of being, the cause of the good, and +the root of love. All these entities are derived from the One without +diminishing Him. He is indeed no corporeal mass; otherwise the things +that are born of Him would be perishable. However, they are eternal, +because their principle ever remains the same, because[205] He does +not divide Himself to produce them, but remains entire. They persist, +just as the light persists so long as the sun remains.[206] Nor are we +separated from the One; we are not distant from Him, though corporeal +nature, by approaching us, has attracted us to it (thus drawing us +away from the One).[207] But it is in the One that we breathe and have +our being.[208] He gave us life not merely at a given moment, only to +leave us later; but His giving is perpetual, so long as He remains what +He is, or rather, so long as we turn towards Him. There it is that +we find happiness, while to withdraw from Him is to fall. It is in +Him that our soul rests; it is by rising to that place free from all +evil that she is delivered from evils; there she really thinks, there +she is impassible, there she really lives. Our present life, in which +we are not united with the divinity, is only a trace or adumbration +of real life. Real life (which is presence with the divinity) is the +actualization of intelligence. It is this actualization of intelligence +which begets the divinities by a sort of silent intercourse with the +One; thereby begetting beauty, justice and virtue. These are begotten +by the soul that is filled with divinity. In Him is her principle +and goal; her principle, because it is from there that she proceeds; +her goal, because there is the good to which she aspires, so that by +returning thither she again becomes what she was. Life here below, in +the midst of sense-objects, is for the soul a degradation, an exile, a +loss of her wings.[209] + + +THE PARABLE OF CUPID AND PSYCHE, LEADING UP TO DIVINIZATION. + +Another proof that our welfare resides up there is the love that is +innate in our souls, as is taught in the descriptions and myths which +represent love as the husband of the soul.[210] In fact, since the +soul, which is different from the divinity, proceeds from Him, she +must necessarily love Him; but when she is on high[211] her love is +celestial; here below, her love is only commonplace; for it is on high +that dwells the celestial Venus (Urania); while here below resides +the vulgar and adulterous Venus.[212] Now every soul is a Venus, as +is indicated by the myth of the birth of Venus and Cupid, who is +supposed to be born simultaneously with her.[213] So long as she +remains faithful to her nature, the soul therefore loves the divinity, +and desires to unite herself to Him, who seems like the noble father +of a bride who has fallen in love with some handsome lover. When +however the soul has descended into generation, deceived by the false +promises of an adulterous lover, she has exchanged her divine love for +a mortal one. Then, at a distance from her father, she yields to all +kinds of excesses. Ultimately, however, she grows ashamed of these +disorders; she purifies herself, she returns to her father, and finds +true happiness with Him. How great her bliss then is can be conceived +by such as have not tasted it only by comparing it somewhat to earthly +love-unions, observing the joy felt by the lover who succeeds in +obtaining her whom he loves. But such mortal and deceptive love is +directed only to phantoms; it soon disappears because the real object +of our love is not these sense-presentations, which are not the good +we are really seeking. On high only is the real object of our love; +the only one with which we could unite or identify ourselves, which we +could intimately possess, because it is not separated from our soul +by the covering of our flesh. This that I say will be acknowledged by +any one who has experienced it; he will know that the soul then lives +another life, that she advances towards the Divinity, that she reaches +Him, possesses Him, and in his condition recognizes the presence of +the Dispenser of the true life. Then she needs nothing more. On the +contrary, she has to renounce everything else to fix herself in the +Divinity alone, to identify herself with Him, and to cut off all that +surrounds Him. We must therefore hasten to issue from here below, +detaching ourselves so far as possible from the body to which we still +have the regret of being chained, making the effort to embrace the +Divinity by our whole being, without leaving in us any part that is not +in contact with Him. Then the soul can see the Divinity and herself, so +far as is possible to her nature. She sees herself shining brilliantly, +filled with intelligible light; or rather, she sees herself as a pure +light, that is subtle and weightless. She becomes divinity, or, rather, +she is divinity. In this condition, the soul is a shining light. If +later she falls back into the sense-world, she is plunged into darkness. + + +WHY DOES THE SOUL AFTER REACHING YONDER NOT STAY THERE? + +10. Why does the soul which has risen on high not stay there? Because +she has not yet entirely detached herself from things here below. But +a time will come when she will uninterruptedly enjoy the vision of the +divinity, that is, when she will no longer be troubled by the passions +of the body. The part of the soul that sees the divinity is not the +one that is troubled (the irrational soul), but the other part (the +rational soul). Now she loses the sight of the divinity when she does +not lose this knowledge which consists in demonstratings, conjectures +and reasonings. In the vision of the divinity, indeed, that which sees +is not the reason, but something prior and superior to reason; if that +which sees be still united to reason, it then is as that which is seen. +When he who sees himself sees, he will see himself as simple, being +united to himself as simple, and will feel himself as simple. We should +not even say that he will see, but only that he will be what he sees, +in case that it would still here be possible to distinguish that which +sees from that which is seen, or to assert that these two things do +not form a single one. This assertion, however, would be rash, for in +this condition he who sees does not, in the strict sense of the word, +see; nor does he imagine two things. He becomes other, he ceases to be +himself, he retains nothing of himself. Absorbed in the divinity, he is +one with it, like a centre that coincides with another centre. While +they coincide, they form but one, though they form two in so far as +they remain distinct. In this sense only do we here say that the soul +is other than the divinity. Consequently this manner of vision is very +difficult to describe. How indeed could we depict as different from +us Him who, while we were contemplating Him, did not seem other than +ourselves, having come into perfect at-one-ment with us? + + +ILLUSTRATION FROM THE SECRECY OF THE MYSTERY-RITES. + +11. That, no doubt, is the meaning of the mystery-rites' injunction not +to reveal their secrets to the uninitiated. As that which is divine is +unspeakable, it is ordered that the initiate should not talk thereof to +any (uninitiated person) who have not had the happiness of beholding it +(the vision). + + +THE TRANCE OR ENTHEASM OF ECSTASY. + +As (this vision of the divinity) did not imply (the existence of) two +things, and as he who was identical to Him whom he saw, so that he +did not see Him, but was united thereto, if anyone could preserve the +memory of what he was while thus absorbed into the Divinity, he would +within himself have a faithful image of the Divinity. Then indeed had +he attained at-one-ment, containing no difference, neither in regard +to himself, nor to other beings. While he was thus transported into +the celestial region, there was within him no activity, no anger, nor +appetite, nor reason, nor even thought. So much the more, if we dare +say so, was he no longer himself, but sunk in trance or enthusiasm, +tranquil and solitary with the divinity, he enjoyed an the calm. +Contained within his own "being," (or, essence), he did not incline to +either side, he did not even turn towards himself, he was indeed in a +state of perfect stability, having thus, so to speak, become stability +itself. + + +ABOVE BEAUTY AND ABOVE VIRTUE THIS ECSTATIC SIMPLIFICATION IS A +COMMUNION. + +In this condition, indeed, the soul busies herself not even with +the beautiful things, for she rises above beauty, and passes beyond +even the (Stoic) "choir of virtues." Thus he who penetrates into +the interior of a sanctuary leaves behind him the statues placed +(at the entrance) of the temple. These indeed are the first objects +that will strike his view on his exit from the sanctuary, after he +shall have enjoyed the interior spectacle, after having entered into +intimate communion, not indeed with an image or statue, which would +be considered only when he comes out, but with the divinity. The very +word "divine spectacle" does not, here, seem sufficient (to express the +contemplation of the soul); it is rather an ecstasy, a simplification, +a self-abandonment, a desire for intercourse, a perfect quietude, and +last, a wish to become indistinguishable from what was contemplated in +the sanctuary.[214] Any one who would seek to see the Divinity in any +other way would be incapable of enjoying His presence. + + +THE SPIRITUAL TRUTH OF THE ANCIENT MYSTERIES. + +By making use of these mysterious figures, wise interpreters wished +to indicate how the divinity might be seen. But the wise hierophant, +penetrating the mystery, may, when he has arrived thither, enjoy +the veritable vision of what is in the sanctuary. If he have not +yet arrived thither, he can at least conceive the invisibility (for +physical sight) of That which is in the sanctuary; he can conceive the +source and principle of everything, and he recognizes it as the one +particular principle worthy of the name. (But when he has succeeded +in entering into the sanctuary) he sees the Principle, enters into +communication with it, unites like to like, leaving aside no divine +thing the soul is capable of acquiring. + + +SUBSEQUENT ECSTATIC EXPERIENCES OF THE SOUL. + +Before obtaining the vision of the divinity, the soul desires what +yet remains to be seen. For him, however, who has risen above all +things, what remains to be seen is He who is above all other things. +Indeed, the nature of the soul will never reach absolute nonentity. +Consequently, when she descends, she will fall into evil, that is, +nonentity, but not into absolute nonentity. Following the contrary +path, she will arrive at something different, namely, herself. From +the fact that she then is not in anything different from herself, +it does not result that she is within anything, for she remains in +herself. That which, without being in essence, remains within itself, +necessarily resides in the divinity. Then it ceases to be "being," +and so far as it comes into communion with the Divinity it grows +superior to "being" (it becomes supra-being). Now he who sees himself +as having become divinity, possesses within himself an image of the +divinity. If he rise above himself, he will achieve the limit of his +ascension, becoming as it were an image that becomes indistinguishable +from its model. Then, when he shall have lost sight of the divinity, +he may still, by arousing the virtue preserved within himself, and +by considering the perfections that adorn his soul, reascend to the +celestial region, by virtue rising to Intelligence, and by wisdom to +the Divinity Himself. + + +THE SOUL'S ULTIMATE FATE IS DETACHMENT AND FLIGHT. + +Such is the life of the divinities; such is also that of divine and +blessed men; detachment from all things here below, scorn of all +earthly pleasures, and flight of the soul towards the Divinity that she +shall see face to face (that is, "alone with the alone," as thought +Numenius).[215] + + + + +FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK ONE. + +The Three Principal Hypostases, or Forms of Existence. + + +AUDACITY THE CAUSE OF HUMAN APOSTASY FROM THE DIVINITY. + +1. How does it happen that souls forget their paternal divinity? Having +a divine nature, and having originated from the divinity, how could +they ever misconceive the divinity or themselves? The origin of their +evil is "audacity,"[216] generation, the primary diversity, and the +desire to belong to none but themselves.[217] As soon as they have +enjoyed the pleasure of an independent life, and by largely making use +of their power of self-direction, they advanced on the road that led +them astray from their principle, and now they have arrived at such an +"apostasy" (distance) from the Divinity, that they are even ignorant +that they derive their life from Him. Like children that were separated +from their family since birth, and that were long educated away from +home finally lose knowledge of their parents and of themselves, so our +souls, no longer seeing either the divinity or themselves, have become +degraded by forgetfulness of their origin, have attached themselves +to other objects, have admired anything rather than themselves, have +like prodigals scattered their esteem and love on exterior objects, +and have, by breaking the bond that united them to the divinities, +disdainfully wandered away from it. Their ignorance of the divinity +is therefore caused by excessive valuation of external objects, and +their scorn of themselves. The mere admiration and quest after +what is foreign implies, on the soul's part, an acknowledgment of +self-depreciation. As soon as a soul thinks that she is worth less than +that which is born and which perishes, and considers herself as more +despicable and perishable than the object she admires, she could no +longer even conceive of the nature and power of the divinity. + + +CONVERSION IS EFFECTED BY DEPRECIATION OF EXTERNALITIES, AND +APPRECIATION OF THE SOUL HERSELF. + +Souls in such conditions may be converted to the Divinity, and raised +to the supreme Principle, to the One, to the First, by being reasoned +with in two ways. First, they may be led to see the worthlessness of +the objects they at present esteem;[218] then they must be reminded of +the origin and dignity of the soul. The demonstration of the latter +point logically precedes that of the former; and if clearly done, +should support it. + + +KINSHIP OF THE HUMAN SOUL WITH THE DIVINE. + +It is the second point, therefore, that we shall here discuss. It is +related to the study of the object we desire to know; for it is the +soul that desires to know that object. Now the soul must first examine +her own nature in order to know whether she possess the faculty of +contemplating the divinity, if this study be suited to her, and if she +may hope for success therein. For indeed if the soul be foreign to +divine things, the soul has no business to ferret out their nature. If +however a close kinship obtains between them, she both can and should +seek to know them. + + +SOULS ARE DIVINE BECAUSE THE WORLD WAS CREATED BY THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. + +2. This is the first reflection of every soul.[219] By an influx of +the spirit of life, the universal Soul produced all the animals upon +earth, in the air and in the sea, as well as the divine stars, the +sun, and the immense heaven. It was the universal Soul that gave form +to the heavens, and which presides over their regular revolutions; +and she effects all that without mingling with the being to whom +she communicates form, movement and life. The universal Soul is far +superior to all created things. While the latter are born or die in +the measure that she imparts to them, or withdraws from them their +life, she herself is "being" and eternal life, because she could not +cease being herself. To understand how life can simultaneously be +imparted to the universe and to each individual, we must contemplate +the universal Soul. To rise to this contemplation, the soul must be +worthy of it by nobility, must have liberated herself from error, and +must have withdrawn from the objects that fascinate the glances of +worldly souls, must have immersed herself in a profound meditation, +and she must have succeeded in effecting the silence not only of the +agitations of the body that enfolds her, and the tumult of sensations, +but also of all that surrounds her. Therefore let silence be kept +by all--namely, earth, air, sea, and even heaven. Then let the soul +represent to herself the great Soul which, from all sides, overflows +into this immovable mass, spreading within it, penetrating into it +intimately, illuminating it as the rays of the sun light and gild a +dark cloud. Thus the universal Soul, by descending into this world +redeemed this great body from the inertia in which it lay, imparting to +it movement, life and immortality. Eternally moved by an intelligent +power, heaven became a being full of life and felicity. The presence +of the Soul made an admirable whole from what before was no more than +in inert corpse, water and earth, or rather, darkness of matter, which, +as Homer[220] says, was an "object of horror for the divinities." + + +SOUL-POWER REVEALED IN THE SIMULTANEITY OF CONTROL OVER THE WORLD. + +The nature and power of the Soul reveal themselves still more +gloriously in the way she embraces and governs the world at will. She +is present in every point of this immense body, she animates all its +parts, great and small. Though these may be located in different parts, +she does not divide as they do, she does not split up to vivify each +individual. She vivifies all things simultaneously, ever remaining +whole and indivisible, resembling the intelligence from which she was +begotten by her unity and universality.[221] It is her power which +contains this world of infinite magnitude and variety within the bonds +of unity. Only because of the presence of the Soul are heaven, sun, and +stars divinities; only because of her are we anything; for "a corpse is +viler than the vilest dung-hill."[222] + + +AS LIFE TRANSFIGURES MATTER, SO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL GLORIFIES US. + +But if the deities owe their divinity to the universal Soul, she +herself must be a divinity still more venerable. Now our soul is +similar to the universal Soul. Strip her of all coverings, consider her +in her pristine purity, and you will see how precious is the nature of +the soul, how superior she is to everything that is body.[223] Without +the soul, no body is anything but earth. Even if you add to earth fire, +water and air, still there is nothing that need claim your veneration. +If it be the Soul that imparts beauty to the body, why should we +forget the souls within ourselves, while prostituting our admiration on +other objects? If it be the soul that you admire in them, why do you +not admire her within yourselves? + + +THE SOUL AS THE HYPOSTATIC ACTUALIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE. + +3. Since the nature of the Soul is so divine and precious, you may +be assured of being able to reach the divinity through her; with her +you can ascend to Him. You will not need to search for Him far from +yourself; nor will there be several intermediaries between yourself and +Him. To reach Him, take as guide the divinest and highest part of the +Soul, the power from which she proceeds, and by which she impinges on +the intelligible world. Indeed, in spite of the divinity which we have +attributed to her, the Soul is no more than an image of Intelligence. +As the exterior word (speech) is the image of the (interior) word (of +thought?) of the soul, the Soul herself is the word and actualization +of Intelligence.[224] She is the life which escapes from Intelligence +to form another hypostatic form of existence, just as the fire contains +the latent heat which constitutes its essence ("being"), and also +the heat that radiates from it outside. Nevertheless, the Soul does +not entirely issue from within Intelligence; she does partly reside +therein, but also forms (a nature) distinct therefrom. As the Soul +proceeds from Intelligence, she is intelligible; and the manifestation +of her intellectual power is discursive reason. From Intelligence +the Soul derives her perfection, as well as her existence; only in +comparison with Intelligence does the Soul seem imperfect. The Soul, +therefore, is the hypostatic substance that proceeds from Intelligence, +and when the Soul contemplates Intelligence the soul is reason +actualized. Indeed, while the soul contemplates Intelligence, the Soul +intimately possesses the things she thinks; from her own resources she +draws the actualizations she produces; these intellectual and pure +actualizations are indeed the Soul's only characteristic activities. +Those of an inferior nature really proceed from a foreign principle; +they are passions. + + +THE SOUL'S RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE IS THAT OF MATTER TO FORM. + +Intelligence therefore, makes the Soul diviner, because Intelligence +(as a father) begets the Soul, and grants its (helpful) presence to +the Soul. Nothing intervenes between them but the distinction between +their natures. The Soul is to Intelligence in the same relation as +that obtaining between form and matter.[225] Now the very matter of +Intelligence is beautiful, because it has an intellectual form, and is +simple. How great then, must Intelligence be, if it be still greater +than the Soul. + + +THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD IS THE ARCHETYPE OF OURS. + +4. The dignity of Intelligence may be appreciated in still another way. +After having admired the magnitude and beauty of the sense-world, the +eternal regularity of its movement, the visible or hidden divinities, +the animals and plants it contains, we may (taking our direction from +all this), rise to this world's archetype, a more real World. There +we may contemplate all the intelligible entities which are as eternal +as the intelligible world, and which there subsist within perfect +knowledge and life. There preside pure intelligence and ineffable +wisdom; there is located the real Saturnian realm,[226] which is +nothing else than pure intelligence. This indeed embraces every +immortal essence, every intelligence, every divinity, every soul; +everything there is eternal and immutable. Since its condition is +blissful, why should Intelligence change? Since it contains everything, +why should it aspire to anything? Since it is sovereignly perfect, +what need of development would it have? Its perfection is so much +completer, since it contains nothing but perfect things, and since +it thinks them; it thinks them, not because it seeks to know them, +but because it possesses them.[227] Its felicity is not in any way +contingent on anything else; itself is true eternity, of which time +furnishes a moving image of the sphere of the soul. Indeed, the soul's +action is successive, and divided by the different objects that attract +its attention. Now it thinks Socrates, and then it thinks a horse; +never does it grasp but one part of reality, while intelligence always +embraces all things simultaneously. Intelligence, therefore, possesses +all things immovable in identity. It is; it never has anything but the +present;[228] it has no future, for it already is all it could ever +later become; it has no past, for no intelligible entity ever passes +away; all of them subsist in an eternal present, all remain identical, +satisfied with their present condition. Each one is both intelligence +and existence; all together, they are universal Intelligence, universal +Existence. + + +ABOVE INTELLIGENCE AND EXISTENCE IS THEIR SIMULTANEOUS PRINCIPLE. + +Intelligence exists (as intelligence) because it thinks existence. +Existence exists (as existence) because, on being thought, it makes +intelligence exist and thinks.[229] There must therefore exist +something else which makes intelligence think, and existence exist, +and which consequently is their common principle. In existence they +are contemporaneous and substantial, and can never fail each other. +As intelligence and existence constitute a duality, their common +principle in this consubstantial unity that they form, and which is +simultaneously existence and intelligence, the thinking subject and +the object thought; intelligence as thinking subject, and existence +as object thought; for thought simultaneously implies difference and +identity. + + +THE SIX CATEGORIES FROM WHICH ALL THINGS ARE DERIVED. + +The first principles, therefore, are existence and intelligence, +identity and difference, movement and rest.[230] Rest is the condition +of identity; movement is the condition of thought, since the latter +presupposes the differences of the thinking subject and of the object +thought, and because it is silent if reduced to unity. The elements +of thought (subject and object) must thus stand in the relation +of differences, but also in that of unity, because they form a +consubstantial unity, and because there is a common element in all that +is derived therefrom. Besides, here difference is nothing else than +distinction. The plurality formed by elements of thought constitutes +quantity and number;[231] and the characteristic of every element, +quality.[232] From these first principles (the categories, that are the +genera of being) all things are derived. + + +THE SOUL AS NUMBER CONNECTED WITH INTELLIGENCE. + +5. Thus the human soul is full of this divinity (of Intelligence); +she is connected therewith by these (categories), unless the soul +(purposely) withdraws from (that intelligence). The Soul approaches +Intelligence, and thus having been unified, the Soul wonders, 'Who +has begotten this unity?' It must be He who is simple, who is prior +to all multiplicity, who imparts to Intelligence its existence and +manifoldness, and who consequently produces number. Number, indeed, +is not something primitive; for the One is prior to the "pair." The +latter ranks only second, being begotten and defined by unity, by +itself being indefinite. As soon as it is defined, it is a number in +so far as it is a "being"; for these are the grounds on which the Soul +also is a number.[233] + + +THOUGHT IS ACTUALIZATION OF SIGHT, AND BOTH FORM BUT ONE THING. + +Besides everything that is a mass or a magnitude could not occupy +the first rank in nature; those gross objects which are by sensation +considered beings must be ranked as inferior. In seeds, it is not the +moist element that should be valued, but the invisible principle, +number, and the (seminal) reason. Number and "pair" are only names +for the reasons (ideas) and intelligence. The "pair" is indeterminate +so far as it plays the part of substrate (in respect to unity). The +number that is derived from the pair, and the one, constitute every +kind of form, so that Intelligence has a shape which is determined by +the ideas[234] begotten within it. Its shape is derived in one respect +from the one, and in another respect, from itself, just like actualized +sight. Thought, indeed, is actualized sight, and both these entities +(the faculty and the actualization) form but one. + + +MYSTERY OR DERIVATION OF SECOND FROM FIRST. + +6. How does Intelligence see, and what does it see? How did the Second +issue from the First, how was it born from the First, so as that the +Second might see the First? For the soul now understands that these +principles must necessarily exist. She seeks to solve the problem often +mooted by ancient philosophers. "If the nature of the One be such as +we have outlined, how does everything derive its hypostatic substance +(or, form of existence), manifoldness, duality, and number from the +First? Why did the First not remain within Himself, why did He allow +the leakage of manifoldness seen in all beings, and which we are +seeking to trace back to the First?" We shall tell it. But we must, to +begin with, invoke the Divinity, not by the utterance of words, but by +raising our souls to Him in prayer. Now the only way to pray is (for +a person), when alone, to advance towards the One, who is entirely +alone. To contemplate Unity, we must retire to our inner sanctuary, +and there remain tranquil above all things (in ecstasy); then we must +observe the statues which as it were are situated outside of (soul and +intelligence), and in front of everything, the statue that shines in +the front rank (Unity), contemplating it in a manner suitable to its +nature (in the mysteries).[235] + + +GENERATION IS THE RADIATION OF AN IMAGE. + +All that is moved must have a direction towards which it is moved; we +must therefore conclude that that which has no direction towards which +it is moved must be at a stand-still, and that anything born of this +principle must be born without causing this principle to cease being +turned towards itself. We must, however, remove from our mind the idea +of a generation operated within time, for we are here treating of +eternal things. When we apply to them the conception of generation, +we mean only a relation of causality and effect. What is begotten by +the One must be begotten by Him without any motion on the part of +the One; if He were moved, that which was begotten from Him would, +because of this movement, be ranked third, instead of second.[236] +Therefore, since the One is immovable, He produces the hypostatic +(form of existence) which is ranked second, without volition, consent, +or any kind of movement. What conception are we then to form of this +generation of Intelligence by this immovable Cause? It is a radiation +of light which escapes without disturbing its quietness, like the +splendor which emanates perpetually from the sun, without affecting +its quietness, which surrounds it without leaving it. Thus all things, +in so far as they remain within existence, necessarily draw from +their own essence ("being") and produce externally a certain nature +that depends on their power, and that is the image of the archetype +from which it is derived.[237] Thus does fire radiate heat; thus snow +spreads cold. Perfumes also furnish a striking example of this process; +so long as they last, they emit exhalations in which everything that +surrounds them participates. Everything that has arrived to its point +of perfection begets something. That which is eternally perfect begets +eternally; and that which it begets is eternal though inferior to +the generating principle. What then should we think of Him who is +supremely perfect? Does He not beget? On the contrary, He begets that +which, after Him, is the greatest. Now that which, after Him, is the +most perfect, is the second rank principle, Intelligence. Intelligence +contemplates Unity, and needs none but Him; but the Unity has no need +of Intelligence. That which is begotten by the Principle superior +to Intelligence can be nothing if not Intelligence; for it is the +best after the One, since it is superior to all other beings. The +Soul, indeed, is the word and actualization of Intelligence, just as +Intelligence is word and actualization of the One. But the Soul is an +obscure word. Being an image of Intelligence, she must contemplate +Intelligence, just as the latter, to subsist, must contemplate the +One. Intelligence contemplates the One, not because of any separation +therefrom, but only because it is after the One. There is no +intermediary between the One and Intelligence, any more than between +Intelligence and the Soul. Every begotten being desires to unite +with the principle that begets it, and loves it, especially when the +begetter and the begotten are alone. Now when the begetter is supremely +perfect, the begotten must be so intimately united to Him as to be +separated from Him only in that it is distinct from Him. + + +INTELLIGIBLE REST IS THE DETERMINATION AND FORM BY WHICH THEY SUBSIST. + +7. We call Intelligence the image of the One. Let us explain this. +It is His image because Intelligence is, in a certain respect, +begotten by Unity, because Intelligence possesses much of the nature +of its father, and because Intelligence resembles Him as light +resembles the sun. But the One is not Intelligence; how then can the +hypostatic (form of existence) begotten by the One be Intelligence? +By its conversion towards the One, Intelligence sees Him; now it is +this vision[238] which constitutes Intelligence. Every faculty that +perceives another being is sensation or intelligence; but sensation +is similar to a straight line, while intelligence resembles a +circle.[239] Nevertheless, the circle is divisible, while Intelligence +is indivisible; it is one, but, while being one, it also is the +power of all things. Now thought considers all these things (of +which Intelligence is the power), by separating itself, so to speak, +from this power; otherwise, Intelligence would not exist. Indeed, +Intelligence has a consciousness of the reach of its power, and this +consciousness constitutes its nature. Consequently, Intelligence +determines its own nature by the means of the power it derived from +the One; and at the same time Intelligence sees that its nature +("being") is a part of the entities which belong to the One, and that +proceed from Him. Intelligence sees that it owes all its force to the +One, and that it is due to Him that Intelligence has the privilege of +being a "being" (or, essence). Intelligence sees that, as it itself +is divisible, it derives from the One, which is indivisible, all the +entities it possesses, life and thought; because the One is not any of +these things. Everything indeed is derived from the One, because it is +not contained in a determinate form; it simply is the One, while in the +order of beings Intelligence is all things. Consequently the One is not +any of the things that Intelligence contains; it is only the principle +from which all of them are derived. That is why they are "being," for +they are already determined, and each has a kind of shape. Existence +should be contemplated, not in indetermination, but on the contrary in +determination and rest. Now, for Intelligible entities, rest consists +in determination, and shape by which they subsist. + + +MYTHS OF SATURN, JUPITER AND RHEA. + +The Intelligence that deserves to be called the purest intelligence, +therefore, cannot have been born from any source, other than the first +Principle. It must, from its birth, have begotten all beings, all the +beauty of ideas, all the intelligible deities; for it is full of the +things it has begotten; it devours them in the sense that it itself +retains all of them, that it does not allow them to fall into matter, +nor be born of Rhea.[240] That is the meaning of the mysteries and +myths; "Saturn, the wisest of the divinities, was born before Jupiter, +and devoured his children." Here Saturn represents intelligence, big +with its conceptions, and perfectly pure.[241] They add, "Jupiter, as +soon as he was grown, in his turn begat." As soon as Intelligence is +perfect, it begets the Soul, by the mere fact of its being perfect, +and because so great a power cannot remain sterile. Here again the +begotten being had to be inferior to its principle, had to represent +its image, had, by itself, to be indeterminate, and had later to be +determined and formed by the principle that begat it. What Intelligence +begets is a reason, a hypostatic form of existence whose nature it +is to reason. The latter moves around Intelligence; is the light that +surrounds it, the ray that springs from it. On the one hand it is bound +to Intelligence, fills itself with it; enjoys it, participates in it, +deriving its intellectual operations from it. On the other hand, it is +in contact with inferior things, or rather, begets them. Being thus +begotten by the Soul, these things are necessarily less good than the +Soul, as we shall further explain. The sphere of divine things ends +with the Soul. + + +PLATO TEACHES THREE SPHERES OF EXISTENCE.[242] + +8. This is how Plato establishes three degrees in the hierarchy +of being[243]: "Everything is around the king of all." He is here +speaking of first rank entities. He adds, "What is of the second order +is around the second principle; and what is of the third order is +around the third principle." Plato[244] further says that "God is the +father of the cause." By cause, he means Intelligence; for, in the +system of Plato, it is Intelligence which plays the part of demiurgic +creator. Plato adds that it is this power that forms the Soul in the +cup.[245] As the cause is intelligence, Plato applies the name of +father to the absolute Good, the principle superior to Intelligence and +superior to "Being." In several passages he calls the Idea "existence +and intelligence." He therefore really teaches that Intelligence is +begotten from the Good, and the Soul from Intelligence. This teaching, +indeed, is not new; it has been taught from the most ancient times, but +without being brought out in technical terms. We claim to be no more +than the interpreters of the earlier philosophers, and to show by the +very testimony of Plato that they held the same views as we do. + + +THIS DOCTRINE TAUGHT BY PARMENIDES. + +The first philosopher who taught this was Parmenides, who identified +Existence and Intelligence, and who does not place existence among +sense-objects, "for, thought is the same thing as existence."[246] +He adds[247] that existence is immovable, although being thought. +Parmenides thus denies all corporeal movement in existence, so as that +it might always remain the same. Further, Parmenides[248] compares +existence to a sphere, because it contains everything, drawing thought +not from without, but from within itself. When Parmenides, in his +writings, mentions the One, he means the cause, as if he recognized +that this unity (of the intelligible being) implied manifoldness. +In the dialogue of Plato he speaks with greater accuracy, and +distinguishes three principles: the First, the absolute One; the +second, the manifold one; the third, the one and the manifold. He +therefore, as we do, reaches three natures. + + +ANAXAGORAS TEACHES THE SAME THING. + +9. Anaxagoras, who teaches a pure and unmingled Intelligence[249] +also insists that the first Principle is simple, and that the One is +separated from sense-objects. But, as he lived in times too ancient, he +has not treated this matter in sufficient detail. + + +HERACLITUS ALSO TAUGHT THE SAME THING. + +Heraclitus also taught the eternal and intelligible One; for Heraclitus +holds that bodies are ceaselessly "becoming" (that is, developing), and +that they are in a perpetual state of flux.[250] + + +EMPEDOCLES TAUGHT THE SAME THING. + +In the system of Empedocles, discord divides, and concord unites; now +this second principle is posited as incorporeal, and the elements play +the part of matter.[251] + + +ARISTOTLE TAUGHT THE SAME THING. + +Aristotle, who lived at a later period, says that the First Principle +is separated from (sense-objects), and that it is intelligible.[252] +But when Aristotle says that He thinks himself, Aristotle degrades Him +from the first rank. Aristotle also asserts the existence of other +intelligible entities in a number equal to the celestial spheres, +so that each one of them might have a principle of motion. About +the intelligible entities, therefore, Aristotle advances a teaching +different from that of Plato, and as he has no plausible reason for +this change, he alleges necessity. A well-grounded objection might here +be taken against him. It seems more reasonable to suppose that all the +spheres co-ordinated in a single system should, all of them, stand +in relation to the One and the First. About Aristotle's views this +question also might be raised: do the intelligible entities depend on +the One and First, or are there several principles for the intelligible +entities? If the intelligible entities depend on the One, they will +no doubt be arranged symmetrically, as, in the sense-sphere, are the +spheres, each of which contains another, and of which a single One, +exterior to the others, contains them, and dominates them all. Thus, in +this case, the first intelligible entity will contain all entities up +there, and will be the intelligible world. Just as the spheres are not +empty, as the first is full of stars, and as each of the others also +is full of them, so above their motors will contain many entities, and +everything will have a more real existence. On the other hand, if each +of the intelligible entities is a principle, all will be contingent. +How then will they unite their action, and will they, by agreement, +contribute in producing a single effect, which is the harmony of +heaven? Why should sense-objects, in heaven, equal in number their +intelligible motors? Again, why are there several of these, since they +are incorporeal, and since no matter separates them from each other? + + +WHAT THE PYTHAGOREANS TAUGHT ON THE SUBJECT. + +Among ancient philosophers, those who most faithfully followed the +doctrine of Pythagoras, of his disciples, and of Pherecydes, have +specially dealt with the intelligible.[253] Some of them have committed +their opinions to their written works; others have set them forth only +in discussions that have not been preserved in writing. There are +others of them, also, who have left us nothing on the subject. + + +TO THE THREE PRINCIPLES IN THE UNIVERSE MUST CORRESPOND THREE +PRINCIPLES IN US. + +10. Above existence, therefore, is the One. This has by us been +proved as far as could reasonably be expected, and as far as such +subjects admit of demonstration. In the second rank are Existence and +Intelligence; in the third, the Soul. But if these three principles, +the One, Intelligence, and the Soul, as we have said, obtain in nature, +three principles must also obtain within us. I do not mean that +these three principles are in sense-objects, for they are separate +therefrom; they are outside of the sense-world, as the three divine +principles are outside of the celestial sphere, and, according to +Plato's expression,[254] they constitute the "the interior man." +Our soul, therefore, is something divine; it has a nature different +(from sense-nature), which conforms to that of the universal Soul. +Now the perfect Soul possesses intelligence; but we must distinguish +between the intelligence that reasons (the discursive reason), and +the Intelligence that furnishes the principles of reasoning (pure +intelligence). The discursive reason of the soul has no need, for +operation, of any bodily organ;[255] in its operations, it preserves +all its purity, so that it is capable of reasoning purely. When +separated from the body, it must, without any hesitation, be ranked +with highest intellectual entities. There is no need of locating it +in space; for, if it exist within itself, outside of body, in an +immaterial condition, it is evidently not mingled with the body, and +has none of its nature. Consequently Plato[256] says, "The divinity +has spread the Soul around the world." What he here means is that +a part of the Soul remains in the intelligible world. Speaking of +our soul he also says, "she hides her head in heaven."[257] He also +advises us to wean the soul from the body; and he does not refer to +any local separation, which nature alone could establish. He means +that the soul must not incline towards the body, must not abandon +herself to the phantoms of imagination, and must not, thus, become +alienated from reason. He means that the soul should try to elevate +to the intelligible world her lower part which is established in the +sense-world, and which is occupied in fashioning the body.[258] + + +THERE MUST BE AN OBJECTIVE JUSTICE AND BEAUTY TO WHICH WE ARE +INTIMATELY UNITED. + +11. Since the rational soul makes judgments about what is just or +beautiful, and decides whether some object is beautiful, whether such +an action be just, there must exist an immutable justice and beauty +from which discursive reason draws its principles.[259] Otherwise, how +could such reasonings take place? If the soul at times reasons about +justice and beauty, but at times does not reason about them, we must +possess within ourselves the intelligence which, instead of reasoning, +ever possesses justice and beauty; further, we must within us possess +the cause and Principle of Intelligence, the Divinity, which is not +divisible, which subsists, not in any place, but in Himself; who is +contemplated by a multitude of beings, by each of the beings fitted +to receive Him, but which remains distinct from these beings, just as +the centre subsists within itself, while all the radii come from the +circumference to centre themselves in it.[260] Thus we ourselves, by +one of the parts of ourselves, touch the divinity, unite ourselves with +Him and are, so to speak, suspended from Him; and we are founded upon +Him (we are "edified" by Him) when we turn towards Him. + + +THESE PRINCIPLES LAST EVER; EVEN THOUGH WE ARE DISTRACTED FROM THEM. + +12. How does it happen that we possess principles that are so elevated, +almost in spite of ourselves, and for the most part without busying +ourselves about them? For there are even men who never notice them. +Nevertheless these principles, that is, intelligence, and the principle +superior to intelligence, which ever remains within itself (that is, +the One), these two principles are ever active. The case is similar +with the soul. She is always in motion; but the operations that go +on within her are not always perceived; they reach us only when they +succeed in making themselves felt. When the faculty that is active +within us does not transmit its action to the power that feels, this +action is not communicated to the entire soul; however, we may not be +conscious thereof because, although we possess sensibility, it is not +this power, but the whole soul that constitutes the man.[261] So long +as life lasts, each power of the soul exercises its proper function by +itself; but we know it only when communication and perception occur. In +order to perceive the things within us, we have to turn our perceptive +faculties towards them, so that (our soul) may apply her whole +attention thereto.[262] The person that desires to hear one sound +must neglect all others, and listen carefully on its approach. Thus we +must here close our senses to all the noises that besiege us, unless +necessity force us to hear them, and to preserve our perceptive faculty +pure and ready to listen to the voices that come from above. + + + + +FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. + +Of Generation, and of the Order of things that Rank Next After the +First. + + +WHY FROM UNITY THIS MANIFOLD WORLD WAS ABLE TO COME FORTH. + +1. The One is all things, and is none of these things. The Principle +of all things cannot be all things.[263] It is all things only in the +sense that all things coexist within it. But in it, they "are" not yet, +but only "will be."[264] How then could the manifoldness of all beings +issue from the One, which is simple and identical, which contains no +diversity or duality? It is just because nothing is contained within +it, that everything can issue from it.[265] In order that essence +might exist, the One could not be (merely) essence, but had to be the +'father' of essence, and essence had to be its first-begotten. As the +One is perfect, and acquires nothing, and has no need or desire, He +has, so to speak, superabounded, and this superabundance has produced a +different nature.[266] This different nature of the One turned towards +Him, and by its conversion, arrived at the fulness (of essence). Then +it had the potentiality of contemplating itself, and thus determined +itself as Intelligence. Therefore, by resting near the One, it became +Essence; and by contemplating itself, became Intelligence. Then by +fixing itself within itself to contemplate itself, it simultaneously +became Essence-and-Intelligence. + + +BY SIMILAR EFFUSION OF SUPERABUNDANCE INTELLIGENCE CREATED THE SOUL. + +Just like the One, it was by effusion of its power that Intelligence +begat something similar to itself. Thus from Intelligence emanated an +image, just as Intelligence emanated from the One. The actualization +that proceeds from Essence (and Intelligence) is the universal +Soul. She is born of Intelligence, and determines herself without +Intelligence issuing from itself, just as Intelligence itself proceeded +from the One without the One ceasing from His repose. + + +SIMILARLY THE UNIVERSAL SOUL, BY PROCESSION, BEGETS NATURE. + +Nor does the universal Soul remain at rest, but enters in motion to +beget an image of herself. On the one hand, it is by contemplation of +the principle from which she proceeds that she achieves fulness; on the +other hand, it is by advancing on a path different from, and opposed +to (the contemplation of Intelligence), that she begets an image of +herself, sensation, and the nature of growth.[268] Nevertheless, +nothing is detached or separated from the superior principle which +begets her. Thus the human soul seems to reach down to within that +of (plant) growth.[269] She descends therein inasmuch as the plant +derives growth from her. Nevertheless it is not the whole soul that +passes into the plant. Her presence there is limited to her descent +towards the lower region, and in so far as she produces another +hypostatic substance, by virtue of her procession, which occurs by her +condescension to care for the things below her. But the higher part of +the Soul, that which depends on Intelligence, allows the Intelligence +to remain within itself.... + +What[270] then does the soul which is in the plant do? Does she not +beget anything? She begets the plant in which she resides. This we +shall have to study from another standpoint. + + +PROCESSION IS UNIVERSAL FROM HIGHEST TO LOWEST. + +2. We may say that there is a procession from the First to the last; +and in this procession each occupies its proper place. The begotten +(being) is subordinated to the begetting (being). On the other hand, +it becomes similar to the thing to which it attaches, so long as it +remains attached thereto. When the soul passes into the plant, there +is one of her parts that unites thereto (the power of growth); but +besides, it is only the most audacious[271] and the most senseless +part of her that descends so low. When the soul passes into the brute, +it is because she is drawn thereto by the predominance of the power +of sensation.[272] When she passes into man, it is because she is led +to do so by the exercise of discursive reason, either by the movement +by which she proceeds from Intelligence, because the soul has a +characteristic intellectual power, and consequently has the power to +determine herself to think, and in general, to act. + + +THE SOUL IS NOWHERE BUT IN A PRINCIPLE THAT IS EVERYWHERE AND NOWHERE. + +Now, let us retrace our steps. When we cut the twigs or the branches +of a tree, where goes the plant-soul that was in them? She returns to +her principle,[273] for no local difference separates her therefrom. +If we cut or burn the root, whither goes the power of growth present +therein? It returns to the plant-power of the universal Soul, which +does not change place, and does not cease being where it was. It ceases +to be where it was only when returning to its principle; otherwise, it +passes into another plant; for it is not obliged to contract, or to +retire within itself. If, on the contrary, it retire, it retires within +the superior power.[274] Where, in her turn, does the latter reside? +Within Intelligence, and without changing, location; for the Soul is +not within any location, and Intelligence still less. Thus the Soul is +nowhere; she is in a principle which, being nowhere, is everywhere.[275] + + +THE SOUL MAY REMAIN IN AN INTERMEDIATE LIFE. + +If, while returning to superior regions, the soul stops before reaching +the highest, she leads a life of intermediary nature.[276] + + +ALL THESE THINGS ARE IN INTELLIGENCE, WITHOUT CONSTITUTING IT. + +All these entities (the universal Soul and her images) are +Intelligence, though none of them constitutes Intelligence. They are +Intelligence in this respect, that they proceed therefrom. They are +not Intelligence in this respect that only by dwelling within itself +Intelligence has given birth to them.[277] + + +THE WHOLE UNIVERSE IS ONE IMMENSE CONCATENATION OF ALL THINGS. + +Thus, in the universe, life resembles an immense chain in which every +being occupies a point, begetting the following being, and begotten by +the preceding one, and ever distinct, but not separate from the (upper) +generating Being, and the (lower) begotten being into which it passes +without being absorbed. + + + + +SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR. + +Of Matter. + + +MATTER AS SUBSTRATE AND RESIDENCE OF FORMS. + +1. Matter is a substrate (or subject) underlying nature, as thought +Aristotle,[278] and a residence for forms. Thus much is agreed upon by +all authors who have studied matter, and who have succeeded in forming +a clear idea of this kind of nature; but further than this, there is no +agreement. Opinions differ as to whether matter is an underlying nature +(as thought Aristotle),[279] as to its receptivity, and to what it is +receptive. + + +THE STOIC CONCEPTION OF MATTER. + +(The Stoics, who condensed Aristotle's categories to four, substrate, +quality-mode and relation),[280] who admit the existence of nothing +else than bodies, acknowledge no existence other than that contained +by bodies. They insist that there is but one kind of matter, which +serves as substrate to the elements, and that it constitutes "being"; +that all other things are only affections ("passions") of matter, or +modified matter: as are the elements. The teachers of this doctrine do +not hesitate to introduce this matter into the (very nature of the) +divinities, so that their supreme divinity is no more than modified +matter.[281] Besides, of matter they make a body, calling it a +"quantityless body," still attributing to it magnitude. + + +MATTER ACCORDING TO THE PYTHAGOREANS, PLATONISTS AND ARISTOTELIANS. + +Others (Pythagoreans, Platonists and Aristotelians) insist that matter +is incorporeal. Some even distinguish two kinds of matter, first, the +(Stoic) substrate of bodies, mentioned above; the other matter being of +a superior nature, the substrate of forms and incorporeal beings. + + +THE ARISTOTELIAN INTELLIGIBLE MATTER. + +2. Let us first examine whether this (latter intelligible) matter +exists, how it exists, and what it is. If (the nature) of matter +be something indeterminate, and shapeless, and if in the perfect +(intelligible beings) there must not be anything indeterminate or +shapeless, it seems as if there could not be any matter in the +intelligible world. As every (being) is simple, it could not have any +need of matter which, by uniting with something else, constitutes +something composite. Matter is necessary in begotten beings, which make +one thing arise out of another; for it is such beings that have led to +the conception of matter (as thought Aristotle).[282] It may however be +objected that in unbegotten beings matter would seem useless. Whence +could it have originated to enter in (among intelligible beings), +and remain there? If it were begotten, it must have been so by some +principle; if it be eternal, it must have had several principles; in +which case the beings that occupy the first rank would seem to be +contingent. Further, if (in those beings) form come to join matter, +their union will constitute a body, so that the intelligible (entities) +will be corporeal. + + +INTELLIGIBLE MATTER IS NOT SHAPELESS. + +3. To this it may first be answered that the indeterminate should not +be scorned everywhere, nor that which is conceived of as shapeless, +even if this be the substrate of the higher and better entities; for +we might call even the soul indeterminate, in respect to intelligence +and reason, which give it a better shape and nature. Besides, when +we say that intelligible things are composite (of matter and form), +this is not in the sense in which the word is used of bodies. Even +reasons would thus be called composite, and by their actualization +form another alleged composite, nature, which aspires to form. If, +in the intelligible world, the composite tend toward some other +principle, or depend thereon, the difference between this composite +and bodies is still better marked. Besides, the matter of begotten +things ceaselessly changes form, while the matter of the intelligible +entities ever remains identical. Further, matter here below is subject +to other conditions (than in the intelligible world). Here below, +indeed, matter is all things only partly, and is all things only +successively; consequently, amidst these perpetual changes nothing is +identical, nothing is permanent. Above, on the contrary, matter is all +things simultaneously, and possessing all things, could not transform +itself. Consequently, matter is never shapeless above; for it is not +even shapeless here below. Only the one (intelligible matter) is +situated differently from the other (sense-matter). Whether, however, +(intelligible matter) be begotten, or be eternal, is a question that +cannot be determined until we know what it is. + + +THE NATURE OF IDEAS IMPLIES AN INDIVIDUAL FORM, WHICH AGAIN IMPLIES A +SUBSTRATE. + +4. Granting now the existence of ideas, whose reality has been +demonstrated elsewhere,[283] we must draw their legitimate +consequences. Necessarily ideas have something in common, inasmuch as +they are manifold; and since they differ from each other, they must +also have something individual. Now the individuality of any idea, +the difference that distinguishes it from any other, consists of its +particular shape. But form, to be received, implies a substrate, that +might be determined by the difference. There is therefore always a +matter that receives form, and there is always a substrate (even in +ideas, whose matter is genus, and whose form is its difference). + + +RELYING ON THE PUN BETWEEN WORLD AND ADORNMENT, PLOTINOS CONCLUDES +THAT IF THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD BE THE IMAGE OF THIS, IT MUST ALSO BE A +COMPOSITE OF FORM AND MATTER. + +Besides, our world is an image of the intelligible world. Now as our +world is a composite of matter (and form), there must be matter also on +high (that is, in the intelligible world). Otherwise, how could we call +the intelligible world "kosmos" (that is, either world, or adornment), +unless we see matter (receiving) form therein? How could we find form +there, without (a residence) that should receive it? That world is +indivisible, taken in an absolute sense; but in a relative sense, is it +divisible? Now if its parts be distinct from each other, their division +or distinction is a passive modification of matter; for what can be +divided, must be matter. If the multitude of ideals constitute an +indivisible being, this multitude, which resides in a single being, has +this single being as substrate, that is, as matter and is its shapes. +This single, yet varied substrate conceives of itself as shapeless, +before conceiving of itself as varied. If then by thought you abstract +from it variety, forms, reasons, and intelligible characteristics, that +which is prior is indeterminate and shapeless; then there will remain +in this (subject) none of the things that are in it and with it. + + +THE BOTTOM OF EVERYTHING IS MATTER, WHICH IS RELATIVE DARKNESS. + +5. If, we were to conclude that there were no matter in intelligible +entities, because they were immutable, and because, in them, matter is +always combined with (shape), we would be logically compelled to deny +the existence of matter in bodies; for the matter of bodies always +has a form, and every body is always complete (containing a form +and a matter). Each body, however, is none the less composite, and +intelligence observes its doubleness; for it splits until it arrives to +simplicity, namely, to that which can no longer be decomposed; it does +not stop until it reaches the bottom things. Now the bottom of each +thing is matter. Every matter is dark, because the reason (the form) +is the light, and because intelligence is the reason.[284] When, in an +object, intelligence considers the reason, it considers as dark that +which is below reason, or light. Likewise, the eye, being luminous, +and directing its gaze on light and on the colors which are kinds of +light, considers what is beneath, and hidden by the colors, as dark and +material. + + +INTELLIGIBLE MATTER CONSISTS OF REAL BEING, ESPECIALLY AS SHAPED. + +Besides, there is a great difference between the dark bottom of +intelligible things and that of sense-objects; there is as much +difference between the matter of the former and of the latter as there +is between their form. The divine matter, on receiving the form that +determines it, possesses an intellectual and determinate life. On +the contrary, even when the matter of the bodies becomes something +determinate, it is neither alive nor thinking; it is dead, in spite +of its borrowed beauty.[285] As the shape (of sense-objects) is only +an image, their substrate also is only an image. But as the shape (of +intelligible entities) possesses veritable (reality), their substrate +is of the same nature. We have, therefore, full justification for +calling matter "being," that is, when referring to intelligible +matter; for the substrate of intelligible entities really is "being," +especially if conceived of together with its inherent (form). For +"being" is the luminous totality (or complex of matter and form). +To question the eternity of intelligible matter is tantamount to +questioning that of ideas; indeed, intelligible entities are begotten +in the sense that they have a principle; but they are non-begotten in +the sense that their existence had no beginning, and that, from all +eternity, they derive their existence from their principle. Therefore +they do not resemble the things that are always becoming, as our world; +but, like the intelligible world, they ever exist. + + +THE CATEGORIES OF MOVEMENT AND DIFFERENCE APPLIED TO INTELLIGIBLES. + +The difference that is in the intelligible world ever produces matter; +for, in that world, it is the difference that is the principle of +matter, as well as of primary motion. That is why the latter is also +called difference, because difference and primary motion were born +simultaneously.[286] + +The movement and difference, that proceed from the First (the Good), +are indeterminate, and need it, to be determinate. Now they determine +each other when they turn towards it. Formerly, matter was as +indeterminate as difference; it was not good because it was not yet +illuminated by the radiance of the First. Since the First is the source +of all light, the object that receives light from the First does not +always possess light; this object differs from light, and possesses +light as something alien, because it derives light from some other +source. That is the nature of matter as contained in intelligible +(entities). Perhaps this treatment of the subject is longer than +necessary. + + +SUBSTRATE IS DEMANDED BY TRANSFORMATION OF ELEMENTS, BY THEIR +DESTRUCTION AND DISSOLUTION. + +6. Now let us speak of bodies. The mutual transformation of elements +demonstrates that they must have a substrate. Their transformation is +not a complete destruction; otherwise (a general) "being"[287] would +perish in nonentity. Whereas, what is begotten would have passed +from absolute nonentity to essence; and all change is no more than +the passing of one form into another (as thought Aristotle).[288] It +presupposes the existence of permanent (subject) which would receive +the form of begotten things only after having lost the earlier form. +This is demonstrated by destruction, which affects only something +composite; therefore every dissolved object must have been a composite. +Dissolution proves it also. For instance, where a vase is dissolved, +the result is gold; on being dissolved, gold leaves water; and so +analogy would suggest that the dissolution of water would result in +something else, that is analogous to its nature. Finally, elements +necessarily are either form, or primary matter, or the composites +of form and matter. However, they cannot be form, because, without +matter, they could not possess either mass nor magnitude. Nor can +they be primary matter, because they are subject to destruction. They +must therefore be composites of form and matter; form constituting +their shape and quality, and matter a substrate that is indeterminate, +because it is not a form. + + +THE VIEWS OF EMPEDOCLES AND ANAXAGORAS ON MATTER. + +7. (According to Aristotle),[289] Empedocles thinks matter consists +of elements; but this opinion is refuted by the decay to which they +are exposed. (According to Aristotle),[290] Anaxagoras supposes +that matter is a mixture and, instead of saying that this (mixture) +is capable of becoming all things, he insists that it contains all +things in actualization. Thus he annihilates the intelligence that +he had introduced into the world; for, according to him, it is not +intelligence that endows all the rest with shape and form; it is +contemporaneous with matter, instead of preceding it.[291] Now it is +impossible for intelligence to be the contemporary of matter, for if +mixture participate in essence, then must essence precede it; if, +however, essence itself be the mixture, they will need some third +principle. Therefore if the demiurgic creator necessarily precede, +what need was there for the forms in miniature to exist in matter, +for intelligence to unravel their inextricable confusion, when it is +possible to predicate qualities of matter, because matter had none of +its own, and thus to subject matter entirely to shape? Besides, how +could (the demiurgic creator) then be in all? + + +REFUTATION OF ANAXIMANDER'S VIEWS ABOUT MATTER. + +(Anaximander)[292] had better explain the consistence of the infinity +by which he explains matter. Does he, by infinity, mean immensity? In +reality this would be impossible. Infinity exists neither by itself, +nor in any other nature, as, for instance, the accident of a body. The +infinite does not exist by itself, because each of its parts would +necessarily be infinite. Nor does the infinite exist as an accident, +because that of which it would be an accident would, by itself, be +neither infinite, nor simple; and consequently, would not be matter. + + +REFUTATION OF DEMOCRITUS'S ATOMS AS EXPLANATIONS OF MATTER. + +(According to Aristotle's account of Democritus),[293] neither could +the atoms fulfil the part of matter because they are nothing (as before +thought Cicero).[294] Every body is divisible to infinity. (Against +the system of the atoms) might further be alleged the continuity and +humidity of bodies. Besides nothing can exist without intelligence +and soul, which could not be composed of atoms. Nothing with a nature +different from the atoms could produce anything with the atoms, because +no demiurgic creator could produce something with a matter that lacked +continuity. Many other objections against this system have and can be +made; but further discussion is unnecessary. + + +MATTER IS NOTHING COMPOSITE, BUT BY NATURE SIMPLE AND ONE. + +8. What then is this matter which is one, continuous, and without +qualities? Evidently, it could not be a body, since it has no quality; +if it were a body, it would have a quality. We say that it is the +matter of all sense-objects, and not the matter of some, and the form +of others, just as clay is matter, in respect to the potter, without +being matter absolutely (as thought Aristotle).[295] As we are not +considering the matter of any particular object, but the matter of all +things, we would not attribute to its nature anything of what falls +under our senses--no quality, color, heat, cold, lightness, weight, +density, sparseness, figure or magnitude; for magnitude is something +entirely different from being large, and figure from the figured +object. Matter therefore is not anything composite, but something +simple, and by nature one (according to the views of Plato and +Aristotle combined).[296] Only thus could matter be deprived of all +properties (as it is). + + +MATTER AND THE INFORMING PRINCIPLE MUST BE CONTEMPORARIES TO ACCOUNT +FOR THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS. + +The principle which informs matter will give it form as something +foreign to its nature; it will also introduce magnitude and all the +real properties. Otherwise, it would be enslaved to the magnitude +of matter, and could not decide of the magnitude of matter, and +magnitude would be dependent on the disposition of matter. A theory +of a consultation between it and the magnitude of matter would be +an absurd fiction. On the contrary, if the efficient cause precede +matter, matter will be exactly as desired by the efficient cause, and +be capable of docilely receiving any kind of form, including magnitude. +If matter possessed magnitude, it would also possess figure, and +would thus be rather difficult to fashion. Form therefore enters into +matter by importing into it (what constitutes corporeal being); now +every form contains a magnitude and a quantity which are determined by +reason ("being"), and with reason. That is why in all kinds of beings, +quantity is determined only along with form; for the quantity (the +magnitude) of man is not the quantity of the bird. It would be absurd +to insist on the difference between giving to matter the quantity of a +bird, and impressing its quality on it, that quality is a reason, while +quantity is not a form; for quantity is both measure and number. + + +ANTI-STOIC POLEMIC, AGAINST THE CORPOREITY OF MATTER AND QUANTITY. + +9. It may be objected that it would be impossible to conceive of +something without magnitude. The fact is that not everything is +identical with quantity. Essence is distinct from quantity; for many +other things beside it exist. Consequently no incorporeal nature has +any quantity. Matter, therefore, is incorporeal. Besides, even quantity +itself is not quantative, which characterizes only what participates +in quantity (in general); a further proof that quantity is a form, +as an object becomes white by the presence of whiteness; and as that +which, in the animal, produces whiteness and the different colors, is +not a varied color, but a varied reason; likewise that which produces a +quantity is not a definite quantity, but either quantity in itself, or +quantity as such, or the reason of quantity. Does quantity, on entering +into matter extend matter, so as to give it magnitude? By no means, for +matter had not been condensed. Form therefore imparts to matter the +magnitude which it did not possess, just as form impresses on matter +the quality it lacked.[297] + + +BY ABSTRACTION, THE SOUL CAN FIND AND DESCRY THE QUALITY-LESS +THING-IN-ITSELF: THIS PROCESS IS CALLED "BASTARD REASONING." + +10. (Some objector) might ask how one could conceive of matter without +quantity? This might be answered by a retort. How then do you (as you +do) manage to conceive of it without quality? Do you again object, +by what conception or intelligence could it be reached? By the very +indetermination of the soul. Since that which knows must be similar to +that which is known (as Aristotle[298] quotes from Empedocles), the +indeterminate must be grasped by the indeterminate. Reason, indeed, +may be determined in respect to the indeterminate; but the glance +which reason directs on the indeterminate itself is indeterminate. +If everything were known by reason and by intelligence, reason here +tells us about matter what reason rightly should tell us about it. By +wishing to conceive of matter in an intellectual manner, intelligence +arrives at a state which is the absence of intelligence, or rather, +reason forms of matter a "bastard" or "illegitimate" image, which is +derived from the other, which is not true, and which is composed of the +other (deceptive material called) reason. That is why Plato[299] said +that matter is perceived by a "bastard reasoning." In what does the +indetermination of the soul consist? In an absolute ignorance, or in +a complete absence of all knowledge? No: the indeterminate condition +of the soul implies something positive (besides something negative). +As for the eye, darkness is the matter of all invisible color, so +the soul, by making abstraction in sense-objects of all things that +somehow are luminous, cannot determine what then remains; and likewise, +as the eye, in darkness (becomes assimilated to darkness), the soul +becomes assimilated to what she sees. Does she then see anything else? +Doubtless, she sees something without figure, without color, without +light, or even without magnitude.[300] If this thing had any magnitude, +the soul would lend it a form. + + +DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MENTAL BLANK AND IMPRESSION OF THE SHAPELESS. + +(An objector might ask) whether there be identity of conditions +between the soul's not thinking, and her experience while thinking of +matter? By no means; when the soul is not thinking of anything, she +neither asserts anything, nor experiences anything. When she thinks +of matter, she experiences something, she receives the impression of +the shapeless. When she presents to herself objects that possess shape +and magnitude, she conceives of them as composite; for she sees them +as distinct (or, colored?) and determined by qualities they contain. +She conceives of both the totality and its two constituent elements. +She also has a clear perception, a vivid sensation of properties +inherent (in matter). On the contrary, the soul receives only an +obscure perception of the shapeless subject, for there is no form +there. Therefore, when the soul considers matter in general, in the +composite, with the qualities inherent in this composite, she separates +them, analyzes them, and what is left (after this analysis), the soul +perceives it vaguely, and obscurely, because it is something vague and +obscure; she thinks it, without really thinking it. On the other hand, +as matter does not remain shapeless, as it is always shaped, within +objects, the soul always imposes on matter the form of things, because +only with difficulty does she support the indeterminate, since she +seems to fear to fall out of the order of beings, and to remain long in +nonentity. + + +THE COMPOSITION OF A BODY NEEDS A SUBSTRATE. + +11. (Following the ideas of Aristotle,[301] Plotinos wonders whether +some objector) will ask whether the composition of a body requires +anything beyond extension and all the other qualities? Yes: it demands +a substrate to receive them (as a residence). This substrate is not a +mass; for in this case, it would be an extension. But if this substrate +have no extension, how can it be a residence (for form)? Without +extension, it could be of no service, contributing neither to form +nor qualities, to magnitude nor extension. It seems that extension, +wherever it be, is given to bodies by matter. Just as actions, effects, +times and movements, though they do not imply any matter, nevertheless +are beings, it would seem that the elementary bodies do not necessarily +imply matter (without extension), being individual beings, whose +diverse substance is constituted by the mingling of several forms. +Matter without extension, therefore, seems to be no more than a +meaningless name. + + +MATTER AS THE IMAGE OF EXTENSION, CAN YET BE RESIDENCE OF FORM. + +(Our answer to the above objection is this:) To begin with, not every +residence is necessarily a mass, unless it have already received +extension. The soul, which possesses all things, contains them all +simultaneously. If it possessed extension, it would possess all +things in extension. Consequently matter receives all it contains in +extension, because it is capable thereof. Likewise in animals and +plants there is a correspondence between the growth and diminution of +their magnitude, with that of their quality. It would be wrong to claim +that magnitude is necessary to matter because, in sense-objects, there +exists a previous magnitude, on which is exerted the action of the +forming principle; for the matter of these objects is not pure matter, +but individual matter (as said Aristotle).[302] Matter pure and simple +must receive its extension from some other principle. Therefore the +residence of form could not be a mass; for in receiving extension, it +would also receive the other qualities. Matter therefore, is the image +of extension, because as it is primary matter, it possesses the ability +to become extended. People often imagine matter as empty extension; +consequently several philosophers have claimed that matter is identical +with emptiness. I repeat: matter is the image of extension because the +soul, when considering matter, is unable to determine anything, spreads +into indetermination, without being able to circumscribe or mark +anything; otherwise, matter would determine something. This substrate +could not properly be called big or little; it is simultaneously big +and little (as said Aristotle).[303] It is simultaneously extended +and non-extended, because it is the matter of extension. If it were +enlarged or made smaller, it would somehow move in extension. Its +indetermination is an extension which consists in being the very +residence of extension, but really in being only imaginary extension, +as has been explained above. Other beings, that have no extension, +but which are forms, are each of them determinate, and consequently +imply no other idea of extension. On the contrary, matter, being +indeterminate, and incapable of remaining within itself, being moved to +receive all forms everywhere, ever being docile, by this very docility, +and by the generation (to which it adapts itself), becomes manifold. It +is in this way its nature seems to be extension. + + +POLEMIC AGAINST MODERATUS OF GADES, FORMS DEMAND A RESIDENCE, VASE, or +LOCATION. + +12. Extensions therefore contribute to the constitutions of bodies; +for the forms of bodies are in extensions. These forms produce +themselves not in extension (which is a form), but in the substrate +that has received extension. If they occurred in extension, instead of +occurring in matter, they would nevertheless have neither extension +nor (hypostatic) substance; for they would be no more than reasons. +Now as reasons reside in the soul, there would be no body. Therefore, +in the sense-world, the multiplicity of forms must have a single +substrate which has received extension, and therefore must be other +than extension. All things that mingle form a mixture, because they +contain matter; they have no need of any other substrate, because each +of them brings its matter along with it. But (forms) need a receptacle +(a residence), a "vase" (or stand), a location (this in answer to +the objection at the beginning of the former section). Now location +is posterior to matter and to bodies. Bodies, therefore, presuppose +matter. Bodies are not necessarily immaterial, merely because actions +and operations are. In the occurrence of an action, matter serves as +substrate to the agent; it remains within him without itself entering +into action; for that is not that which is sought by the agent. One +action does not change into another, and consequently has no need +of containing matter; it is the agent who passes from one action to +another, and who, consequently, serves as matter to the actions (as +thought Aristotle).[304] + + +NOT EVEN CORPOREITY INHERES IN MATTER WHICH IS REACHED BY BASTARD +REASONING. + +Matter, therefore, is necessary to quality as well as to quantity, +and consequently, to bodies. In this sense, matter is not an empty +name, but a substrate, though it be neither visible nor extended. +Otherwise, for the same reason, we would be obliged also to deny +qualities and extension; for you might say that each of these things, +taken in itself, is nothing real. If these things possess existence, +though their existence be obscure, so much the more must matter possess +existence, though its existence be neither clear nor evident to the +senses. Indeed, matter cannot be perceived by sight, since it is +colorless; nor by hearing, for it is soundless; nor by smell or taste, +because it is neither volatile nor wet. It is not even perceived by +touch, for it is not a body. Touch cognizes only body, recognizes that +it is dense or sparse, hard or soft, wet or dry; now none of these +attributes is characteristic of matter. The latter therefore can be +perceived only by a reasoning which does not imply the presence of +intelligence, which, on the contrary, implies the complete absence of +matter; which (unintelligent reasoning therefore) deserves the name of +"bastard" (or, illegitimate) reasoning.[305] Corporeity itself,[306] is +not characteristic of matter. If corporeity be a reason (that is, by a +pun, a 'form'), it certainly differs from matter, both being entirely +distinct. If corporeity be considered when it has already modified +matter and mingled with it, it is a body; it is no longer matter pure +and simple. + + +THE SUBSTRATE IS NOT A QUALITY COMMON TO ALL ELEMENTS; FOR THUS IT +WOULD NOT BE INDETERMINATE. + +13. Those who insist that the substrate of things is a quality common +to all elements are bound to explain first the nature of this quality; +then, how a quality could serve as substrate; how an unextended, +immaterial (?) quality could be perceived in something that lacked +extension; further, how, if this quality be determinate, it can be +matter; for if it be something indeterminate, it is no longer a +quality, but matter itself that we seek. + + +EVEN THIS PRIVATION MIGHT BE CONSIDERED A QUALITY; BUT SUCH A USE OF +THE TERM WOULD DESTROY ALL COHERENT REASONING. + +Let us grant that matter has no quality, because, by virtue of its +nature, it does not participate in a quality of any other thing. What, +however, would hinder this property, because it is a qualification in +matter, from participating in some quality? This would be a particular +and distinctive characteristic, which consists of the privation of all +other things (referring to Aristotle)?[307] In man, the privation of +something may be considered a quality; as, for instance, the privation +of sight is blindness. If the privation of certain things inhere in +matter, this privation is also a qualification for matter. If further +the privation in matter extend to all things, absolutely, our objection +is still better grounded, for privation is a qualification. Such an +objection, however, amounts to making qualities and qualified things +of everything. In this case quantity, as well as "being," would be +a quality. Every qualified thing must possess some quality. It is +ridiculous to suppose that something qualified is qualified by what +itself has no quality, being other than quality. + + +BY A PUN BETWEEN "DIFFERENCE" AND "OTHERNESS," PLOTINOS DEFINES THE +CHARACTERISTIC OF MATTER AS BEING A DISPOSITION TO BECOME SOMETHING +ELSE. + +Some one may object that that is possible, because "being something +else" is a quality. We would then have to ask whether the thing that +is other be otherness-in-itself? If it be otherness-in-itself, it +is so not because it is something qualified, because quality is not +something qualified. If this thing be only other, it is not such by +itself, it is so only by otherness, as a thing that is identical +by identity. Privation, therefore, is not a quality, nor anything +qualified, but the absence of quality or of something else, as silence +is the absence of sound. Privation is something negative; qualification +is something positive. The property of matter is not a form; for its +property consists precisely in having neither qualification nor form. +It is absurd to insist that it is qualified, just because it has no +quality; this would be tantamount to saying that it possessed extension +by the very fact of its possessing no extension. The individuality +(or, property) of matter is to be what it is. Its characteristic +is not an attribute; it consists in a disposition to become other +things. Not only are these other things other than matter, but besides +each of them possesses an individual form. The only name that suits +matter is "other," or rather, "others," because the singular is too +determinative, and the plural better expresses indetermination. + + +PRIVATION IS A FORM OF MATTER. + +14. Let us now examine if matter be privation, or if privation be +an attribute of matter. If you insist that privation and matter are +though logically distinct, substantially one and the same thing, you +will have to explain the nature of these two things, for instance, +defining matter without defining privation, and conversely. Either, +neither of these two things implies the other, or they imply each other +reciprocally, or only one of them implies the other. If each of them +can be defined separately, and if neither of them imply the other, +both will form two distinct things, and matter will be different from +privation, though privation be an accident of matter. But neither of +the two must even potentially be present in the definition of the +other. Is their mutual relation the same as that of a stub nose, and +the man with the stub nose (as suggested by Aristotle)?[308] Then each +of these is double, and there are two things. Is their relation that +between fire and heat? Heat is in fire, but fire is not necessarily +contained in heat; thus matter, having privation (as a quality), as +fire has heat (as a quality), privation will be a form of matter, and +has a substrate different from itself, which is matter.[309] Not in +this sense, therefore, is there a unity (between them). + + +PRIVATION IS NONENTITY, AND ADDS NO NEW CONCEPT. + +Are matter and privation substantially identical, yet logically +distinct, in this sense that privation does not signify the presence of +anything, but rather its absence? That it is the negation of beings, +and is synonymous with nonentity? Negation adds no attribute; it limits +itself to the assertion that something is not. In a certain sense, +therefore, privation is nonentity. + + +BEING SUBSTANTIALLY IDENTICAL, BUT LOGICALLY DISTINCT IS NONSENSE. + +If matter be called nonentity in this sense that it is not essence, +but something else than essence, there is still room to draw up two +definitions, of which one would apply to the substrate, and the other +to the privation, merely to explain that it is a disposition to become +something else? It would be better to acknowledge that matter, like the +substrate, should be defined a disposition to become other things. If +the definition of privation shows the indetermination of matter, it can +at least indicate its nature. But we could not admit that matter and +privation are one thing in respect to their substrate, though logically +distinct; for how could there be a logical distinction into two things, +if a thing be identical with matter as soon as it is indeterminate, +indefinite, and lacking quality? + + +MATTER AS THE INFINITE IN ITSELF. + +15. Let us further examine if the indeterminate, or infinite, be an +accident, or an attribute of some other nature; how it comes to be an +accident, and whether privation ever can become an accident. The things +that are numbers and reasons are exempt from all indetermination, +because they are determinations, orders, and principles of order for +the rest. Now these principles do not order objects already ordered, +nor do they order orders. The thing that receives an order is different +from that which gives an order, and the principles from which the order +is derived are determination, limitation and reason. In this case, that +which receives the order and the determination must necessarily be the +infinite (as thought Plato).[310] Now that which receives the order is +matter, with all the things which, without being matter, participate +therein, and play the part of matter. Therefore matter is the infinite +itself.[311] Not accidentally is it the infinite; for the infinite is +no accident. Indeed, every accident must be a reason; now of what being +can the infinite be an accident? Of determination, or of that which is +determined? Now matter is neither of these two. Further, the infinite +could not unite with the determinate without destroying its nature. +The infinite, therefore, is no accident of matter (but is its nature, +or "being"). Matter is the infinite itself. Even in the intelligible +world, matter is the infinite. + + +THE INFINITE MAY BE EITHER IDEAL OR REAL, INFINITE OR INDEFINITE. + +The infinite seems born of the infinity of the One, either of its +power, or eternity; there is no infinity in the One, but the One is +creator of the infinite. How can there be infinity simultaneously above +and below (in the One and in matter)? Because there are two infinities +(the infinite and the indefinite; the infinite in the One, the +indefinite in matter). Between them obtains the same difference as the +archetype and its image.[312] Is the infinite here below less infinite? +On the contrary, it is more so. By the mere fact that the image is +far from veritable "being," it is more infinite. Infinity is greater +in that which is less determinate (as thought Aristotle).[313] Now +that which is more distant from good is further in evil. Therefore the +infinite on high, possessing the more essence, is the ideal infinite; +here below, as the infinite possesses less essence, because it is far +from essence and truth, it degenerates into the image of essence, and +is the truer (indefinite) infinite. + + +MATTER AS THE INFINITE IN ITSELF. + +Is the infinite identical with the essence of the infinite? There is +a distinction between them where there is reason and matter; where +however matter is alone, they must be considered identical; or, better, +we may say absolutely that here below the infinite does not occur; +otherwise it would be a reason, which is contrary to the nature of the +infinite. Therefore matter in itself is the infinite, in opposition +to reason. Just as reason, considered in itself, is called reason, +so matter, which is opposed to reason by its infinity, and which is +nothing else (than matter), must be called infinite. + + +MATTER IS NONESSENTIAL OTHERNESS. + +16. Is there any identity between matter and otherness? Matter is not +identical with otherness itself, but with that part of otherness which +is opposed to real beings, and to reasons. It is in this sense that +one can say of nonentity that it is something, that it is identical +with privation, if only privation be the opposition to things that +exist in reason. Will privation be destroyed by its union with the +thing of which it is an attribute? By no means. That in which a (Stoic) +"habit" occurs is not itself a "habit," but a privation. That in +which determination occurs is neither determination, nor that which +is determined, but the infinite, so far as it is infinite. How could +determination unite with the infinite without destroying its nature, +since this infinite is not such by accident? It would destroy this +infinite, if it were infinite in quantity; but that is not the case. On +the contrary, it preserves its "being" for it, realizes and completes +its nature; as the earth which did not contain seeds (preserves its +nature) when it receives some of them; or the female, when she is +made pregnant by the male. The female, then, does not cease being a +female; on the contrary she is so far more, for she realizes her nature +("being"). + + +INDIGENCE IS NECESSARILY EVIL. + +Does matter continue to be evil when it happens to participate in +the good? Yes, because it was formerly deprived of good, and did not +possess it. That which lacks something, and obtains it, holds the +middle between good and evil, if it be in the middle between the two. +But that which possesses nothing, that which is in indigence, or rather +that which is indigence itself, must necessarily be evil; for it is not +indigence of wealth, but indigence of wisdom, of virtue, of beauty, of +vigor, of shape, of form, of quality. How, indeed, could such a thing +not be shapeless, absolutely ugly and evil? + + +THE RELATION OF BOTH KINDS OF MATTER TO ESSENCE. + +In the intelligible world, matter is essence; for what is above it (the +One), is considered as superior to essence. In the sense-world, on the +contrary, essence is above matter; therefore matter is nonentity, and +thereby is the only thing foreign to the beauty of essence. + + + + +THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK NINE. + +Fragments About the Soul, the Intelligence, and the Good. + + +DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND THE EXISTING ANIMAL. + +1. Plato says, "The intelligence sees the ideas comprised within +the existing animal." He adds, "The demiurge conceived that this +produced animal was to comprise beings similar and equally numerous +to those that the intelligence sees in the existing animal." Does +Plato mean that the ideas are anterior to intelligence, and that they +already exist when intelligence thinks them? We shall first have to +examine whether the animal is identical with intelligence, or is +something different. Now that which observes is intelligence; so +the Animal himself should then be called, not intelligence, but the +intelligible. Shall we therefrom conclude that the things contemplated +by intelligence are outside of it? If so, intelligence possesses only +images, instead of the realities themselves--that is, if we admit that +the realities exist up there; for, according to Plato, the veritable +reality is up there within the essence, in which everything exists in +itself. + + +RELATION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND THE INTELLIGIBLE. + +(This consequence is not necessary). Doubtless Intelligence and the +intelligible are different; they are nevertheless not separated. +Nothing hinders us from saying that both form but one, and that they +are separated only by thought; for essence is one, but it is partly +that which is thought, and partly that which thinks. When Plato says +that intelligence sees the ideas, he means that it contemplates the +ideas, not in another principle, but in itself, because it possesses +the intelligible within itself. The intelligible may also be the +intelligence, but intelligence in the state of repose, of unity, of +calm, while Intelligence, which perceives this Intelligence which has +remained within itself, is the actuality born therefrom, and which +contemplates it. By contemplating the intelligible, intelligence is +assimilated thereto and is its intelligence, because Intelligence +thinks the intelligible it itself becomes intelligible by becoming +assimilated thereto, and on the other hand also something thought. + +It is (intelligence), therefore, which conceived the design in +producing in the universe the four kinds of living beings (or +elements), which it beholds up there. Mysteriously, however, Plato here +seems to present the conceiving-principle as different from the other +two principles, while others think that these three principles, the +animal itself (the universal Soul), Intelligence and the conceiving +principle form but a single thing. Shall we here, as elsewhere, admit +that opinions differ, and that everybody conceives the three principles +in his own manner? + + +THE WORLD-SOUL IS THE CONCEIVING-PRINCIPLE. + +We have already noticed two of these principles (namely, intelligence, +and the intelligible, which is called the Animal-in-itself, or +universal Soul). What is the third? It is he who has resolved to +produce, to form, to divide the ideas that intelligence sees in +the Animal. Is it possible that in one sense intelligence is the +dividing principle, and that in another the dividing principle is not +intelligence? As far as divided things proceed from intelligence, +intelligence is the dividing principle. As far as intelligence itself +remains undivided, and that the things proceeding from it (that is, +the souls) are divided, the universal Soul is the principle of this +division into several souls. That is why Plato says that division is +the work of a third principle, and that it resides in a third principle +that has conceived; now, to conceive is not the proper function of +intelligence; it is that of the Soul which has a dividing action in a +divisible nature. + + +HOW THE SOUL ASCENDS TO THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. THE INTELLIGIBLE IS +POSSESSED BY TOUCHING IT WITH THE BEST PART OF ONESELF. + +2. (As Nicholas of Damascus used to say) the totality of a science +is divided into particular propositions, without, however, thereby +being broken up into fragments, inasmuch as each proposition contains +potentially the whole science, whose principle and goal coincide. +Likewise, we should so manage ourselves that each of the faculties we +possess within ourselves should also become a goal and a totality; and +then so arrange all the faculties that they will be consummated in +what is best in our nature (that is, intelligence). Success in this +constitutes "dwelling on high" (living spiritually); for, when one +possesses the intelligible, one touches it by what is best in oneself. + + +OF THE DESCENT OF THE SOUL INTO THE BODY. THE SOUL IS NOT IN THE BODY; +BUT THE BODY IS IN THE SOUL. + +3. The universal Soul has not come into any place, nor gone into any; +for no such place could have existed. However, the body, which was in +its neighborhood, participated in her, consequently, she is not inside +a body. Plato, indeed, does not say that the soul is in a body; on the +contrary, he locates the body in the soul. + + +INDIVIDUAL SOULS, HOWEVER, MAY BE SAID TO COME AND GO. + +As to individual souls, they come from somewhere, for they proceed from +the universal Soul; they also have a place whither they may descend, +or where they may pass from one body into another; they can likewise +reascend thence to the intelligible world. + + +THE UNIVERSAL SOUL EVER REMAINS IN THE INTELLIGIBLE. + +The universal Soul, on the contrary, ever resides in the elevated +region where her nature retains her; and the universe located below her +participates in her just as the object which receives the sun's rays +participates therein. + + +HOW THE SOUL INCARNATES. + +The individual soul is therefore illuminated when she turns towards +what is above her; for then she meets the essence; on the contrary, +when she turns towards what is below her, she meets non-being. This +is what happens when she turns towards herself; on wishing to belong +to herself, she somehow falls into emptiness, becomes indeterminate, +and produces what is below her, namely, an image of herself which +is non-being (the body). Now the image of this image (matter), is +indeterminate, and quite obscure; for it is entirely unreasonable, +unintelligible, and as far as possible from essence itself. (Between +intelligence and the body) the soul occupies an intermediary region, +which is her own proper domain; when she looks at the inferior region, +throwing a second glance thither, she gives a form to her image (her +body); and, charmed by this image, she enters therein. + + +BY ITS POWER, THE ONE IS EVERYWHERE. + +4. How does manifoldness issue from Unity? Unity is everywhere; for +there is no place where it is not; therefore it fills everything. +By Him exists manifoldness; or rather, it is by Him that all things +exist. If the One were only everywhere, He would simply be all things; +but, as, besides, He is nowhere, all things exist by Him, because He +is everywhere; but simultaneously all things are distinct from Him, +because He is nowhere. Why then is Unity not only everywhere, but also +nowhere? The reason is, that Unity must be above all things, He must +fill everything, and produce everything, without being all that He +produces. + + +THE SOUL RECEIVES HER FORM FROM INTELLIGENCE. + +5. The soul's relation to intelligence is the same as that of sight to +the visible object; but it is the indeterminate sight which, before +seeing, is nevertheless disposed to see and think; that is why the soul +bears to intelligence the relation of matter to form. + + +WE THINK AN INTELLECTUAL NATURE BY THINKING OURSELVES. + +6. When we think, and think ourselves, we see a thinking nature; +otherwise, we would be dupes of an illusion in believing we were +thinking. Consequently, if we think ourselves, we are, by thinking +ourselves, thinking an intellectual nature. This thought presupposes +an anterior thought which implies no movement. Now, as the objects +of thought are being and life, there must be, anterior to this +being, another being; and anterior to this life, another life. +This is well-known to all who are actualized intelligences. If the +intelligences be actualizations which consist in thinking themselves, +we ourselves are the intelligible by the real foundation of our +essence, and the thought that we have of ourselves gives us its image. + + +THE ONE IS SUPERIOR TO REST AND MOTION. + +7. The First (or One) is the potentiality of movement and of rest; +consequently, He is superior to both things. The Second principle +relates to the First by its motion and its rest; it is Intelligence, +because, differing from the First, it directs its thought towards Him, +while the First does not think (because He comprises both the thinking +thing, and the thing thought); He thinks himself, and, by that very +thing, He is defective, because His good consists in thinking, not in +its "hypostasis" (or existence). + + +OF ACTUALITY AND POTENTIALITY. + +8. What passes from potentiality to actuality, and always remains +the same so long as it exists, approaches actuality. It is thus that +the bodies such as fire may possess perfection. But what passes from +potentiality to actuality cannot exist always, because it contains +matter. On the contrary, what exists actually, and what is simple, +exists always. Besides, what is actual may also in certain respects +exist potentially. + + +THE GOOD IS SUPERIOR TO THOUGHT; THE HIGHEST DIVINITIES ARE NOT THE +SUPREME. + +9. The divinities which occupy the highest rank are nevertheless +not the First; for Intelligence (from which proceed the divinities +of the highest rank, that is, the perfect intelligences) is (or, is +constituted by) all the intelligible essences, and, consequently, +comprises both motion and rest. Nothing like this is in the First. +He is related to nothing else, while the other things subsist in Him +in their rest, and direct their motion towards Him. Motion is an +aspiration, and the First aspires to nothing. Towards what would He, +in any case, aspire? He does not think himself; and they who say that +He thinks Himself mean by it only that He possesses Himself. But when +one says that a thing thinks, it is not because it possesses itself, +it is because it contemplates the First; that is the first actuality, +thought itself, the first thought, to which none other can be anterior; +only, it is inferior to the principle from which it derives its +existence, and occupies the second rank after it. Thought is therefore +not the most sacred thing; consequently, not all thought is sacred; the +only sacred thought is that of the Good, and this (Good) is superior to +thought. + + +THE GOOD IS SUPERIOR EVEN TO SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND LIFE. + +Will the Good not be self-conscious? It is claimed by some that the +Good would be good only if it possessed self-consciousness. But if it +be Goodness, it is goodness before having self-consciousness. If the +Good be good only because it has self-consciousness, it was not good +before having self-consciousness; but, on the other hand, if there be +no goodness, no possible consciousness can therefore exist. (Likewise, +someone may ask) does not the First live? He cannot be said to live, +because He Himself gives life. + + +THE SUPREME IS THEREFORE ABOVE THOUGHT. + +Thus the principle which is self-conscious, which thinks itself (that +is, Intelligence), occupies only the second rank. Indeed, if this +principle be self-conscious, it is only to unite itself to itself by +this act of consciousness; but if it study itself, it is the result +of ignoring itself, because its nature is defective, and it becomes +perfect only by thought. Thought should therefore not be attributed to +the First; for, to attribute something to Him would be to imply that He +had been deprived thereof, and needed it. + + + + +SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. + +About the Movement of the Heavens. + + +QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MOVEMENTS OF THE HEAVENS. + +1. Why do the heavens move in a circle? Because they imitate +Intelligence. But to what does this movement belong? To the Soul, or +to the body? Does it occur because the Soul is within the celestial +sphere, which tends to revolve about her? Is the Soul within this +sphere without being touched thereby? Does she cause this sphere to +move by her own motion? Perhaps the Soul which moves this sphere should +not move it in the future, although she did so in the past; that is, +the soul made it remain immovable, instead of ceaselessly imparting +to it a circular movement. Perhaps the Soul herself might remain +immovable; or, if she move at all, it will at least not be a local +movement. + + +THREE KINDS OF MOVEMENT. + +How can the Soul impart to the heavens a local movement, herself +possessing a different kind of motion? Perhaps the circular movement, +when considered by itself, may not seem a local movement. If then it be +a local movement only by accident, what is its own nature, by itself? +It is the reflection upon itself, the movement of consciousness, of +reflection, of life; it withdraws nothing from the world, it changes +the location of nothing, while embracing all. Indeed, the power which +governs the universal Animal (or world) embraces everything, and +unifies everything. If then it remained immovable, it would not embrace +everything either vitally or locally; it would not preserve the life of +the interior parts of the body it possesses, because the bodily life +implies movement. On the contrary, if it be a local movement, the Soul +will possess a movement only such as it admits of. She will move, not +only as soul, but as an animated body, and as an animal; her movement +will partake both of the movement proper to the soul, and proper to the +body. Now the movement proper to the body is to mobilize in a straight +line; the movement proper to the Soul, is to contain; while both of +these movements result in a third, the circular movement which includes +both transportation and permanence. + + +FIRE MOVES STRAIGHT ONLY PRELIMINARILY. + +To the assertion that the circular movement is a corporeal movement, +it might be objected that one can see that every body, even fire, +moves in a straight line. However, the fire moves in a straight line +only till it reaches the place assigned to it by the universal order +(it constitutes the heavens, which are its proper place). By virtue of +this order its nature is permanent, and it moves towards its assigned +location. Why then does the fire as soon as it has arrived there, not +abide there quiescently? Because its very nature is constant movement; +if it went in a straight line, it would dissipate; consequently, it +necessarily possesses a circular motion. That is surely a providential +arrangement. Providence placed fire within itself (because it +constitutes the heavens, which are its location); so that, as soon as +it finds itself in the sky it must spontaneously move in a circle. + + +WHY SOUL ASSUMES A CIRCULAR MOTION. + +We might further say that, if the fire tended to move in a straight +line, it must effect a return upon itself in the only place where it is +possible (in the heavens), inasmuch as there is no place outside of the +world where it could go. In fact there is no further place, beyond the +celestial fire, for itself constitutes the last place in the universe; +it therefore moves in a circle in the place at its disposal; it is its +own place, but not to remain immovable, but to move. In a circle, the +centre is naturally immovable; and were the circumference the same, it +would be only an immense centre. It is therefore better that the fire +should turn around the centre in this living and naturally organized +body. Thus the fire will tend towards the centre, not in stopping, for +it would lose its circular form, but in moving itself around it; thus +only will it be able to satisfy its tendency (towards the universal +Soul). However, if this power effect the movement of the body of the +universe, it does not drag it like a burden, nor give it an impulsion +contrary to its nature. For nature is constituted by nothing else +than the order established by the universal Soul. Besides, as the +whole Soul is everywhere, and is not divided into parts, it endows the +sky with all the ubiquity it can assimilate, which can occur only by +traversing all of it. If the Soul remained immovable in one place, she +would remain immovable as soon as the heavens reached this place; but +as the Soul is everywhere, they would seek to reach her everywhere. +Can the heavens never reach the Soul? On the contrary, they reach her +ceaselessly; for the Soul, in ceaselessly attracting them to herself, +endues them with a continual motion by which she carries them, not +towards some other place, but towards herself, and in the same place, +not in a straight line, but in a circle, and thus permits them to +possess her in all the places which she traverses. + + +WHY THE HEAVENS DO NOT REMAIN STILL. + +The heavens would be immovable if the Soul rested, that is, if she +remained only in the intelligible world, where everything remains +immovable. But because the Soul is in no one determinate place, and +because the whole of her is everywhere, the heavens move through the +whole of space; and as they cannot go out of themselves, they must move +in a circle. + + +HOW OTHER BEINGS MOVE.[314] + +2. How do the other beings move? As none of them is the whole, but +only a part, consequently, each finds itself situated in a particular +place. On the contrary, the heavens are the whole; they constitute the +place which excludes nothing, because it is the universe. As to the law +according to which men move, each of them, considered in his dependence +towards the universe, is a part of all; considered in himself, he is a +whole. + + +WHY THE HEAVENS MOVE IN A CIRCLE. + +Now, if the heavens possess the Soul, wherever they are, what urges +them to move in a circle? Surely because the Soul is not exclusively in +a determinate place (and the world does not exclusively in one place +desire to possess her). Besides, if the power of the Soul revolve +around the centre, it is once more evident that the heavens would move +in a circle. + + +DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CENTRE OF THE SOUL AND THE BODY. + +Besides, when we speak of the Soul, we must not understand the term +"centre" in the same sense as when it is used of the body. For the +Soul, the centre is the focus of (the intelligence) whence radiates a +second life (that is, the Soul); as to the body, it is a locality (the +centre of the world). Since, however, both soul and body need a centre, +we are forced to use this word in an analogous meaning which may suit +both of them. Speaking strictly, however, a centre can exist only for +a spherical body, and the analogy consists in this, that the latter, +like the Soul, effects a reflection upon itself. In this case, the Soul +moves around the divinity, embraces Him, and clings to Him with all +her might; for everything depends from Him. But, as she cannot unite +herself to Him, she moves around Him. + + +THE ADDITION OF OUR BODIES INTRODUCES CONFLICTING MOTIONS. + +Why do not all souls act like the universal Soul? They do act like +her, but do so only in the place where they are. Why do our bodies not +move in a circle, like the heavens? Because they include an element +whose natural motion is rectilinear; because they trend towards other +objects, because the spherical element[315] in us can no longer easily +move in a circle, because it has become terrestrial, while in the +celestial region is was light and movable enough. How indeed could it +remain at rest, while the Soul was in motion, whatever this movement +was? This spirit(ual body) which, within us, is spread around the soul, +does the same thing as do the heavens. Indeed, if the divinity be in +everything, the Soul, which desires to unite herself to Him, must move +around Him, since He resides in no determinate place. Consequently, +Plato attributes to the stars, besides the revolution which they +perform in common with the universe, a particular movement of rotation +around their own centre. Indeed, every star, in whatever place it may +be, is transported with joy while embracing the divinity; and this +occurs not by reason, but by a natural necessity. + + +HOW MOTION IS IMPARTED TO LOWER EXISTENCES. + +3. One more subject remains to be considered. The lowest power of +the universal Soul (the inferior soul),[316] rests on the earth, +and thence radiates abroad throughout the universe. The (higher, or +celestial) power (of the world-Soul) which, by nature, possesses +sensation, opinion, and reasoning, resides in the celestial spheres, +whence it dominates the inferior power, and communicates life to it. +It thereby moves the inferior power, embracing it in a circle; and +it presides over the universe as it returns (from the earth) to the +celestial spheres. The inferior power, being circularly embraced by +the superior power, reflects upon itself, and thus operates on itself +a conversion by which it imparts a movement of rotation to the body +within which it reacts. (This is how motion starts) in a sphere that +is at rest: as soon as a part moves, the movement spreads to the rest +of it, and the sphere begins to revolve. Not otherwise is our body; +when our soul begins to move, as in joy, or in the expectation of +welfare, although this movement be of a kind very different from that +natural to a body, this soul-movement produces local motion in the +body. Likewise the universal Soul, on high, while approaching the Good, +and becoming more sensitive (to its proximity), thereby impresses the +body with the motion proper to it, namely, the local movement. (Our own +human) sense-(faculty), while receiving its good from above, and while +enjoying the pleasures proper to its nature, pursues the Good, and, +inasmuch as the Good is everywhere present, it is borne everywhere. +The intelligence is moved likewise; it is simultaneously at rest and +in motion, reflecting upon itself. Similarly the universe moves in a +circle, though simultaneously standing still. + + + + +THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR. + +Of Our Individual Guardian. + + +OUTLINE OF NATURES IN THE UNIVERSE. + +Other principles remain unmoved while producing and exhibiting +their ("hypostases," substantial acts, or) forms of existence. The +(universal) Soul, however, is in motion while producing and exhibiting +her ("substantial act," or) forms of existence, namely, the functions +of sensation and growth, reaching down as far as (the sphere of the) +plants. In us also does the Soul function, but she does not dominate +us, constituting only a part of our nature. She does, however, +dominate in plants, having as it were remained alone there. Beyond +that sphere, however, nature begets nothing; for beyond it exists no +life, begotten (matter) being lifeless. All that was begotten prior +to this was shapeless, and achieved form only by trending towards its +begetting principle, as to its source of life. Consequently, that +which is begotten cannot be a form of the Soul, being lifeless, but +must be absolute in determination. The things anterior (to matter, +namely, the sense-power and nature), are doubtless indeterminate, +but only so within their form; the are not absolutely indeterminate; +they are indeterminate only in respect of their perfection. On the +contrary, that which exists at present, namely, (matter), is absolutely +indeterminate. When it achieves perfection, it becomes body, on +receiving the form suited to its power. This (form) is the receptacle +of the principle which has begotten it, and which nourishes it. It is +the only trace of the higher things in the body, which occupies the +last rank amidst the things below. + + +AFTER DEATH, MAN BECOMES WHAT HE HAS LIVED. + +2. It is to this (universal) Soul especially that may be applied +these words of Plato:[317] "The general Soul cares for all that is +inanimate." The other (individual) souls are in different conditions. +"The Soul (adds Plato), circulates around the heavens successively +assuming divers forms"; that is, the forms of thought, sense or growth. +The part which dominates in the soul fulfills its proper individual +function; the others remain inactive, and somehow seem exterior to +them. In man, it is not the lower powers of the soul that dominate. +They do indeed co-exist with the others. Neither is it always the +best power (reason), which always dominates; for the inferior powers +equally have their place. Consequently, man (besides being a reasonable +being) is also a sensitive being, because he possesses sense-organs. +In many respects, he is also a vegetative being; for his body feeds +and grows just like a plant. All these powers (reason, sensibility, +growth), therefore act together in the man; but it is the best of them +that characterizes the totality of the man (so that he is called a +"reasonable being"). On leaving the body the soul becomes the power she +had preponderatingly developed. Let us therefore flee from here below, +and let us raise ourselves to the intelligible world, so as not to fall +into the pure sense-life, by allowing ourselves to follow sense-images, +or into the life of growth, by abandoning ourselves to the pleasures +of physical love, and to gormandizing; rather, let us rise to the +intelligible world, to the intelligence, to the divinity! + + +LAWS OF TRANSMIGRATION. + +Those who have exercised their human faculties are re-born as men. +Those who have made use of their senses only, pass into the bodies of +brutes, and particularly into the bodies of wild animals, if they have +yielded themselves to the transports of anger; so that, even in this +case, the difference of the bodies they animate is proportioned to the +difference of their inclinations. Those whose only effort it was to +satisfy their desires and appetites pass into the bodies of lascivious +and gluttonous animals.[318] Last, those who instead of following +their desires or their anger, have rather degraded their senses by +their inertia, are reduced to vegetate in plants; for in their former +existence they exercised nothing but their vegetative power, and they +worked at nothing but to make trees of themselves.[319] Those who +have loved too much the enjoyments of music, and who otherwise lived +purely, pass into the bodies of melodious birds. Those who have reigned +tyrannically, become eagles, if they have no other vice.[320] Last, +those who spoke lightly of celestial things, having kept their glance +directed upwards, are changed into birds which usually fly towards the +high regions of the air.[321] He who has acquired civil virtues again +becomes a man; but if he does not possess them to a sufficient degree, +he is transformed into a sociable animal, such as the bee, or other +animal of the kind. + + +OUR GUARDIAN IS THE NEXT HIGHER FACULTY OF OUR BEING. + +3. What then is our guardian? It is one of the powers of our soul. +What is our divinity? It is also one of the powers of our soul. (Is it +the power which acts principally in us as some people think?) For the +power which acts in us seems to be that which leads us, since it is +the principle which dominates in us. Is that the guardian to which we +have been allotted during the course of our life?[323] No: our guardian +is the power immediately superior to the one that we exercise, for it +presides over our life without itself being active. The power which +is active in us is inferior to the one that presides over our life, +and it is the one which essentially constitutes us. If then we live +on the plane of the sense-life, our guardian is reason; if we live on +the rational plane, our guardian will be the principal superior to +reason (namely, intelligence); it will preside over our life, but it +itself does not act, leaving that to the inferior power. Plato truly +said that "we choose our guardian"; for, by the kind of life that we +prefer, we choose the guardian that presides over our life. Why then +does He direct us? He directs us during the course of our mortal life +(because he is given to us to help us to accomplish our (destiny); but +he can no longer direct us when our destiny is accomplished, because +the power over the exercise of which he presided allows another power +to act in his place (which however is dead, since the life in which it +acted is terminated). This other power wishes to act in its turn, and, +after having established its preponderance, it exercises itself during +the course of a new life, itself having another guardian. If then we +should chance to degrade ourselves by letting an inferior power prevail +in us, we are punished for it. Indeed, the evil man degenerates because +the power which he has developed in his life makes him descend to the +existence of the brute, by assimilating him to it by his morals. If +we could follow the guardian who is superior to him, he himself would +become superior by sharing his life. He would then take as guide a +part of himself superior to the one that governs him, then another +part, still more elevated until he had arrived at the highest. Indeed, +the soul is several things, or rather, the soul is all things; she +is things both inferior and superior; she contains all the degrees +of life. Each of us, in a certain degree, is the intelligible world; +by our inferior part we are related to the sense-world, and by our +superior part, to the intelligible world; we remain there on high by +what constitutes our intelligible essence; we are attached here below +by the powers which occupy the lowest rank in the soul. Thus we cause +an emanation, or rather an actualization which implies no loss to the +intelligible, to pass from the intelligible into the sense-world. + + +THE INTELLIGIBLE DOES NOT DESCEND; IT IS THE SENSE-WORLD THAT RISES. + +4. Is the power which is the act of the soul always united to a body? +No; for when the soul turns towards the superior regions, she raises +this power with her. Does the universal (Soul) also raise with herself +to the intelligible world the inferior power which is her actualization +(nature)? No: for she does not incline towards her low inferior +portion, because she neither came nor descended into the world; but, +while she remains in herself, the body of the world comes to unite with +her, and to offer itself to receive her light's radiation; besides, her +body does not cause her any anxiety, because it is not exposed to any +peril. Does not the world, then, possess any senses? "It has no sight" +(says Plato[324]) "for it has no eyes. Neither has it ears, nostrils, +nor tongue." Does it, then, as we, possess the consciousness of what is +going on within it? As, within the world, all things go on uniformly +according to nature, it is, in this respect, in a kind of repose; +consequently, it does not feel any pleasure. The power of growth +exists within it without being present therein; and so also with the +sense-power. Besides, we shall return to a study of the question. For +the present, we have said all that relates to the question in hand. + + +THE GUIDANCE OF THE GUARDIAN DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH MORAL +RESPONSIBILITY. + +5. But if (before coming on to the earth) the soul chooses her life +and her guardian, how do we still preserve our liberty? Because what +is called "choice" designates in an allegorical manner the character +of the soul, and her general disposition everywhere. Again, it is +objected that if the character of the soul preponderate, if the soul +be dominated by that part which her former life rendered predominantly +active, it is no longer the body which is her cause of evil; for if +the character of the soul be anterior to her union with the body; if +she have the character she has chosen; if, as said (Plato), she do not +change her guardian, it is not here below that a man may become good or +evil. The answer to this is, that potentially man is equally good or +evil. (By his choices) however he may actualize one or the other. + + +THE SOUL HAS THE POWER TO CONFORM TO HER CHARACTER THE DESTINY ALLOTTED +TO HER. + +What then would happen if a virtuous man should have a body of evil +nature, or a vicious man a body of a good nature? The goodness of the +soul has more or less influence on the goodness of the body. Exterior +circumstances cannot thus alter the character chosen by the soul. When +(Plato) says that the lots are spread out before the souls, and that +later the different kinds of conditions are displayed before them, +and that the fortune of each results from the choice made amidst the +different kinds of lives present--a choice evidently made according to +her character--(Plato) evidently attributes to the soul the power of +conforming to her character the condition allotted to her. + + +OUR GUARDIAN IS BOTH RELATED TO US, AND INDEPENDENT OF US. + +Besides, our guardian is not entirely exterior to us; and, on the +other hand, he is not bound to us, and is not active in us; he is +ours, in the sense that he has a certain relation with our soul; he is +not ours, in the sense that we are such men, living such a life under +his supervision. This is the meaning of the terms used (by Plato) in +the Timaeus.[325] If these be taken in the above sense, all explains +itself; if not, Plato contradicts himself. + + +OUR GUARDIAN HELPS US TO CARRY OUT THE DESTINY WE HAVE CHOSEN. + +One can still understand thus why he says that our guardian helps us +to fulfil the destiny we have chosen. In fact, presiding over our +life, he does not permit us to descend very far below the condition we +have chosen. But that which then is active is the principle below the +guardian and which can neither transcend him, nor equal him; for he +could not become different from what he is. + + +THAT MAN IS VIRTUOUS WHOSE HIGHEST PRINCIPLE IS ACTIVE WITHIN HIM. + +6. Who then is the virtuous man? He in whom is active the highest part +of the soul. If his guardian contributed to his actions, he would not +deserve being called virtuous. Now it is the Intelligence which is +active in the virtuous man. It is the latter, then, who is a guardian, +or lives according to one; besides, his guardian is the divinity. +Is this guardian above Intelligence? Yes, if the guardian have, as +guardian, the principle superior to Intelligence (the Good). But why +does the virtuous man not enjoy this privilege since the beginning? +Because of the trouble he felt in falling into generation. Even before +the exercise of reason, he has within him a desire which leads him +to the things which are suitable to him. But does this desire direct +with sovereign influence? No, not with sovereignty; for the soul is so +disposed that, in such circumstances becoming such, she adopts such a +life, and follows such an inclination. + + +BETWEEN INCARNATIONS IS THE TIME OF JUDGMENT AND EXPIATION. + +(Plato) says that the guardian leads the soul to the hells,[326] +and that he does not remain attached to the same soul, unless this +soul should again choose the same condition. What does the guardian +do before this choice? Plato teaches us that he leads the soul to +judgment, that after the generation he assumes again the same form +as before; and then as if another existence were then beginning, +during the time between generations, the guardian presides over the +chastisements of the souls, and this period is for them not so much a +period of life, as a period of expiation. + + +EVEN THE SOULS ENTERING INTO ANIMAL BODIES HAVE A GUARDIAN. + +Do the souls that enter into the bodies of brutes also have a guardian? +Yes, doubtless, but an evil or stupid one. + + +CONDITION OF SOULS IN THE HIGHER REGIONS. + +What is the condition of the souls that have raised themselves on high? +Some are in the sensible world, others are outside of it. The souls +that are in the sense-world dwell in the sun, or in some other planet, +or in the firmament, according as they have more or less developed +their reason. We must, indeed, remember that our soul contains in +herself not only the intelligible world, but also a disposition +conformable to the Soul of the world. Now as the latter is spread out +in the movable spheres and in the immovable sphere by her various +powers, our soul must possess powers conformable to these, each of +which exercise their proper function. The souls which rise from here +below into the heavens go to inhabit the star which harmonizes with +their moral life, and with the power which they have developed; with +their divinity, or their guardian. Then they will have either the same +guardian, or the guardian which is superior to the power which they +exert. This matter will have to be considered more minutely. + + +FATE OF THE DIVISIBLE HUMAN SOUL. + +As to the souls which have left the sense-world, so long as they remain +in the intelligible world, they are above the guardian condition, +and the fatality of generation. Souls bring with them thither that +part of their nature which is desirous of begetting, and which may +reasonably be regarded as the essence which is divisible in the body, +and which multiplies by dividing along with the bodies. Moreover, if +a soul divide herself, it is not in respect to extension; because she +is entirely in all the bodies. On the other hand, the Soul is one; and +from a single animal are ceaselessly born many young. This generative +element splits up like the vegetative nature in plants; for this nature +is divisible in the bodies. When this divisible essence dwells in the +same body, it vivifies the body, just as the vegetative power does for +plants. When it retires, it has already communicated life, as is seen +in cut trees, or in corpses where putrefaction has caused the birth of +several animals from a single one. Besides, the vegetative power of the +human soul is assisted by the vegetative power that is derived from the +universal (Soul), and which here below is the same (as on high). + + +FATE CONSISTS IN THE UNPREDICTABLE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ALTER THE +LIFE-CURRENTS. + +If the soul return here below, she possesses, according to the life +which she is to lead, either the same guardian, or another. With her +guardian she enters into this world as if in a skiff. Then she is +subjected to the power (by Plato) called the Spindle of Necessity;[327] +and, embarking in this world, she takes the place assigned to her by +fortune. Then she is caught by the circular movement of the heavens, +whose action, as if it were the wind, agitates the skiff in which the +soul is seated; or rather, is borne along. Thence are born varied +spectacles, transformations and divers incidents for the soul which +is embarked in this skiff; whether because of the agitation of the +sea which bears it, or because of the conduct of the passenger who is +sailing in the bark, and who preserves her freedom of action therein. +Indeed, not every soul placed in the same circumstances makes the same +movements, wills the same volitions, or performs the same actions. For +different beings, therefore, the differences arise from circumstances +either similar or different, or even the same events may occur to +them under different circumstances. It is this (uncertainty) that +constitutes Providence. + + + + +FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK NINE. + +Of Suicide. + + +EVIL EFFECTS OF SUICIDE ON THE SOUL HERSELF. + +1. (As says pseudo-Zoroaster, in his Magic Oracles), "The soul should +not be expelled from the body by violence, lest she go out (dragging +along with her something foreign," that is, corporeal). In this case, +she will be burdened with this foreign element whithersoever she may +emigrate. By "emigrating," I mean passing into the Beyond. On the +contrary, one should wait until the entire body naturally detaches +itself from the soul; in which case she no longer needs to pass into +any other residence, being completely unburdened of the body. + + +HOW TO DETACH THE SOUL FROM THE BODY NATURALLY. + +How will the body naturally detach itself from the soul? By the +complete rupture of the bonds which keep the soul attached to the body, +by the body's impotence to fetter the soul, on account of the complete +destruction of the harmony which conferred this power on it. + + +VOLUNTARY SOUL-DETACHMENT IS FORBIDDEN. + +One may not voluntarily disengage oneself from the fetters of the body. +When violence is employed, it is not the body which disengages itself +from the soul, it is the soul which makes an effort to snatch herself +from the body, and that by an action which accomplishes itself not in +the state of impassibility (which suits a sage), but as the result of +grief, or suffering, or of anger. Now such an action is forbidden, or +unworthy. + + +SUICIDE UNAVAILABLE EVEN TO AVOID INSANITY. + +May one not forestall delirium or insanity, if one become aware of +their approach? To begin with, insanity does not happen to a sage, and +if it does, this accident should be considered one of those inevitable +things which depend from fatality, and in which case one should direct +one's path less according to his intrinsic quality than according to +circumstances; for perhaps the poison one might select to eject the +soul from the body might do nothing but injure the soul. + + +SUICIDE IS UNADVISABLE, FOR TWO REASONS. + +If there be an appointed time for the life of each of us, it is +not well to forestall the decree of Providence, unless, as we have +said,[328] under absolute compulsion. + +Last, if rank obtained above depend on the state obtaining at the time +of exit from the body, no man should separate himself from it so long +as he might still achieve progress.[329] + + + + +SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK SIX. + +Of Essence and Being. + + +DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENCE AND BEING. + +1. Is "essence" something different from "being"? Does essence indicate +an abstraction of the other (four categories), and is being, on the +contrary, essence with the other (four categories), motion and rest, +identity and difference? Are these the elements of being? Yes: "being" +is the totality of these things, of which one is essence, the other is +motion, and so forth. Motion, therefore, is accidental essence. Is it +also accidental "being?" Or is it being completely? Motion is being, +because all intelligible things are beings. But why is not each of the +sense-things a being? The reason is, that on high all things form only +a single group of totality, while here below they are distinct one from +another because they are images that have been distinguished. Likewise, +in a seminal (reason), all things are together, and each of them is +all the others; the hand is not distinct from the head; while, on the +contrary, in a body all the organs are separate, because they are +images instead of being genuine beings. + + +DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMPLEMENTS OF BEING, AND QUALITIES. + +We may now say that, in the intelligible world, qualities are the +characteristic differences in being or essence. These differences +effect distinction between the beings; in short, they cause them to +be beings. This definition seems reasonable. But it does not suit the +qualities below (in the sense-world); some are differences of being, +as biped, or quadruped (as thought Aristotle);[330] others are not +differences, and on that very account are called qualities. Still, +the same thing may appear a difference when it is a complement of +the being, and again it may not seem a difference when it is not a +complement of the being, but an accident: as, for instance, whiteness +is a complement of being in a swan, or in white lead; but in a human +being like you, it is only an accident (as thought Aristotle).[331] So +long as the whiteness is in the ("seminal) reason," it is a complement +of being, and not a quality; if it be on the surface of a being, it is +a quality. + + +DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENTIAL AND MODAL QUALITIES. + +Two kinds of qualities must be distinguished; the essential quality, +which is a peculiarity of its being, and the mere quality, which +affects the being's classification. The mere quality introduces no +change in the essence, and causes none of its characteristics to +disappear; but, when the being exists already, and is complete, +this quality gives it a certain exterior disposition; and, whether +in the case of a soul or body, adds something to it. Thus visible +whiteness, which is of the very being of white lead, is not of the +being of the swan, because a swan may be of some color other than +white. Whiteness then completes the being of white lead, just as heat +completes the being of fire. If igneousness is said to be the being +of fire, whiteness is also the being of white lead. Nevertheless, +the igneousness of the visible fire is heat, which constitutes the +complement of its being; and whiteness plays the same part with respect +to white lead. Therefore (differing according to the difference of +various beings) the same things will be complements of being, and +will not be qualities, or they will not be complements of being, and +will be qualities; but it would not be reasonable to assert that +these qualities are different according to whether or not they are +complements of being, since their nature is the same. + + +DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHATNESS AND AFFECTIONS OF BEING. + +We must acknowledge that the reasons which produce these things (as +heat, and whiteness) are beings, if taken in their totality; but on +considering their production, we see that what constitutes a whatness +or quiddity (the Aristotelian "what it were to be") in the intelligible +world, becomes a quality in the sense-world. Consequently, we always +err on the subject of the quiddity, when we try to determine it, +mistaking the simple quality for it (as thought Plato),[332] for, when +we perceive a quality, the fire is not what we call fire, but a being. +As to the things which arrest our gaze, we should distinguish them from +the quiddity, and define them by the qualities of sense (objects); for +they do not constitute the being, but the affections of being. + + +ACTUALIZED BEING LESS PERFECT THAN ESSENCE. + +We are thus led to ask how a being can be composed of non-beings? It +has already been pointed out that the things subject to generation +could not be identical with the principles from which they proceed. Let +us now add that they could not be beings. But still, how can one say +that the intelligible being is constituted by a non-being? The reason +is that in the intelligible world since being forms a purer and more +refined essence, being really is somehow constituted by the differences +of essence; or rather, we feel it ought to be called being from +considering it together with its energies (or, actualizations). This +being seems to be a perfecting of essence; but perhaps being is less +perfect when it is thus considered together with its actualizations; +for, being less simple, it veers away from essence. + + +SUCHNESS IS LATER THAN BEING AND QUIDDITY. + +2. Let us now consider what quality in general is; for when we shall +know this, our doubts will cease. First, must it be admitted that one +and the same thing is now a quality, and then a complement of being? +Can one say that quality is the complement of being, or rather of such +a being? The suchness of being implies a previously existing being and +quiddity. + + +BEING CANNOT PRECEDE SUCH BEING. + +Taking the illustration of fire, is it "mere being" before it is "such +being?" In this case, it would be a body. Consequently, the body will +be a being; fire will be a hot body. Body and heat combined will not +constitute being; but heat will exist in the body as in you exists the +property of having a stub nose (as said Aristotle).[333] Consequently, +if we abstract heat, shine and lightness, which seem to be qualities, +and also impenetrability, nothing will remain but tridimensional +extension, and matter will be "being." But this hypothesis does not +seem likely; it is rather form which will be "being." + + +FORM IS NOT A QUALITY; BUT A REASON. + +Is form a quality? No: form is a reason. Now what is constituted by +(material) substance, and reason? (In the warm body) it is neither what +burns, nor what is visible; it is quality. If, however, it be said that +combustion is an act emanating from reason, that being hot and white +are actualities, we could not find anything to explain quality. + + +QUALITIES ARE ACTS OF BEING, PROCEEDING FROM REASONS AND ESSENTIAL +POTENTIALITIES. + +What we call a complement of being should not be termed a quality, +because they are actualizations of being, actualizations which proceed +from the reasons and the essential potentialities. Qualities are +therefore something outside of being; something which does not at times +seem to be, and at other times does not seem not to be qualities; +something which adds to being something that is not necessary; for +example, virtues and vices, ugliness and beauty, health, and individual +resemblance. Though triangle, and tetragon, each considered by itself, +are not qualities; yet being "transformed into triangular appearance" +is a quality; it is not therefore triangularity, but triangular +formation, which is a quality. The same could be said of the arts +and professions. Consequently, quality is a disposition, either +adventitious or original, in already existing beings. Without it, +however, being would exist just as much. It might be said that quality +is either mutable or immutable; for it forms two kinds, according to +whether it be permanent or changeable. + + +DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTELLIGIBLE AND SENSE-QUALITY. + +3. The whiteness that I see in you is not a quality, but an +actualization of the potentiality of whitening. In the intelligible +world all the things that we call qualities are actualizations. +They are called qualities because they are properties, because they +differentiate the beings from each other, because in respect to +themselves they bear a particular character. But since quality in +the sense-world is also an actualization, in what does it differ +from the intelligible quality? The sense-quality does not show the +essential quality of every being, nor the difference or character of +substances, but simply the thing that we properly call quality, and +which is an actualization in the intelligible world. When the property +of something is to be a being, this thing is not a quality. But when +reason separates beings from their properties, when it removes nothing +from them, when it limits itself to conceiving and begetting different +from these beings, it begets quality, which it conceives of as the +superficial part of being. In this case, nothing hinders the heat of +the fire, so far as it is natural to it, from constituting a form, an +actualization, and not a quality of the fire; it is a quality when it +exists in a substance where it no longer constitutes the form of being, +but only a trace, an adumbration, an image of being, because it finds +itself separated from the being whose actualization it is. + + +QUALITIES ARE ACCIDENTAL SHAPES OF BEING. + +Qualities, therefore, are everything that, instead of being +actualizations and forms of beings, are only its accidents, and only +reveal its shapes. We will therefore call qualities the habituations +and the dispositions which are not essential to substances. The +archetypes (or models) of qualities are the actualizations of the +beings, which are the principles of these qualities. It is impossible +for the same thing at one time to be, and at another not to be a +quality. What can be separated from being is quality; what remains +united to being is being, form, and actualization. In fact, nothing can +be the same in itself, and in some other condition where it has ceased +to be form and an actualization. What, instead of being the form of a +being, is always its accident, is purely and exclusively a quality. + + + + +FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN. + +Do Ideas of Individuals Exist? + + +TWO POSSIBLE HYPOTHESES OF IDEAS OF INDIVIDUALS. + +1. Do ideas of individuals (as well as of classes of individuals), +exist? This means that if I, in company with some other man, were to +trace ourselves back to the intelligible world, we would there find +separate individual principles corresponding to each of us. (This might +imply either of two theories.) Either, if the individual named Socrates +be eternal, and if the soul of Socrates be Socrates himself, then the +soul of each individual is contained in the intelligible world. Or +if, on the contrary, the individual named Socrates be not eternal, if +the same soul can belong successively to several individuals, such as +Socrates or Pythagoras, then (as Alcinoous, e. g., and other Platonists +insist), each individual does not have his idea in the intelligible +world. + + +THE FIRST (NON-PLATONIC) HYPOTHESIS ALONE RIGHT. + +If the particular soul of each man contains ("seminal) reasons" of +all the things she does, then each individual corresponds to his idea +in the intelligible world, for we admit that each soul contains as +many ("seminal) reasons" as the entire world. In this case, the soul +would contain not only the ("seminal) reasons" of men but also those +of all animals, the number of these reasons will be infinite, unless +(as the Stoics teach) the world does not re-commence the identical +series of existences in fixed periods; for the only means of limiting +the infinity of reasons, is that the same things should reproduce +themselves. + + +DIFFERENCE OF THINGS DEPEND ON THEIR SEMINAL REASONS. + +But, if produced things may be more numerous than their specimens, +what would be the necessity for the "reasons" and specimens of all +individuals begotten during some one period? It would seem that the +(idea of) the "man himself" to explain the existence of all men, and +that the souls of a finite number of them could successively animate +men of an infinite number. (To this contention we demur: for) it +is impossible for different things to have an identical ("seminal) +reason." The (idea of) the man himself would not, as model, suffice +(to account) for men who differ from each other not only by matter, +but also by specific differences. They cannot be compared to the +images of Socrates which reproduce their model. Only the difference +of the ("seminal) reasons" could give rise to individual differences. +(As Plato said),[334] the entire period contains all the ("seminal) +reasons." When it recommences, the same things rearise through the same +"reasons." We need not fear that, as a consequence, there would be an +infinite (number or variety) of them in the intelligible world; for the +multitude (of the seminal reasons) constitutes an indivisible principle +from which each issues forth whenever active. + + +SEX ALONE WOULD NOT ACCOUNT FOR THIS DIVERSITY. + +2. (First objection): The manner in which the ("seminal) reasons" +of the male and female unite, in the act of generation, suffices to +account for the diversity of individuals, without implying that each +of them possesses its own ("seminal) reason." The generating principle, +the male, for example, will not propagate according to different +("seminal) reasons," since it possesses all of them, but only according +to its own, or those of its father. Since it possesses all of the +("seminal) reasons," nothing would hinder it from begetting according +to different "reasons," only, there are always some which are more +disposed to act than are others. + + +EXPLANATION OF THE DIVERSITY FROM SAME PARENTS + +(Second objection): Please explain how differing individuals are +born from the same parents. This diversity, if it be anything +more than merely apparent, depends on the manner in which the two +generating principles concur in the act of generation; at one time +the male predominates, at other times, the female; again, they may +both act equally. In either case, the ("seminal) reason" is given in +its entirety, and dominates the matter furnished by either of the +generating principles. + + +VARIETY MAY DEPEND ON THE LATENCY OF PART OF SEMINAL REASONS. + +(Third objection): What then is the cause of the difference of the +individuals conceived in some other place (than the womb, as in the +mouth), (as Aristotle[335] and Sextus Empiricus[336] asked)? Would +it arise from matter being penetrated by the ("seminal) reason" in +differing degrees? In this case, all the individuals, except one, would +be beings against nature (which, of course, is absurd). The varieties +of the individuals are a principle of beauty; consequently, form cannot +be one of them; ugliness alone should be attributed to the predominance +of matter. In the intelligible world, the ("seminal) reasons" are +perfect, and they are not given any less entirely for being hidden. + + +LEIBNITZ'S DOCTRINE OF THE INDISCERNIBLES. + +(Fourth objection): Granting that the ("seminal) reasons" of the +individuals are different, why should there be as many as there are +individuals which achieve existence in any one period? It is possible +that identical "reasons" might produce individuals differing in +external appearance; and we have even granted that this may occur +when the ("seminal) reasons" are given entirely. It is asked, is +this possible when the same "reasons" are developed? We teach that +absolutely similar things might be reproduced in different periods; +but, within the same period, there is nothing absolutely identical. + + +THERE ARE DIFFERENT IDEAS FOR TWINS, BRETHREN, OR WORKS OF ART. + +3. (Fifth objection): But how could ("seminal) reasons" be different in +the conception of twins, and in the act of generation in the case of +animals who procreate multiple offspring? Here it would seem that when +the individuals are similar, there could be but one single "reason." +No so; for in that case there would not be so many "reasons" as there +are individuals; and, on the contrary, it will have to be granted that +there are as many as there are individuals that differ by specific +differences, and not by a mere lack of form. Nothing therefore hinders +us from admitting that there are different "reasons," even for animal +offspring which show no difference, if there were such. An artist +who produces similar works cannot produce this resemblance without +introducing in it some difference which depends on reasoning; so that +every work he produces differs from the others, because he adds some +difference to the similarity. In nature, where the difference does not +derive from reasoning, but only from differing ("seminal) reasons" the +(individual) difference will have to be added to the specific form, +even though we may not be able to discern it. The ("seminal) reason" +would be different if generation admitted chance as to quantity (the +number of offspring begotten). But if the number of things to be born +is determinate, the quantity will be limited by the evolution and +development of all the "reasons," so that, when the series of all +things will be finished, another period may recommence. The quantity +suitable to the world, and the number of beings who are to exist +therein, are things regulated and contained in the principle which +contains all the "reasons" (that is, the universal Soul), from the very +beginning. + + + + +FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. + +Concerning Virtue. + + +VIRTUE THE ROAD TO ESCAPE EVILS. + +1. Man must flee from (this world) here below (for two reasons): +because it is the nature of the soul to flee from evil, and because +inevitable evil prevails and dominates this world here below. What +is this flight (and how can we accomplish it)? (Plato),[337] tells +us it consists in "being assimilated to divinity." This then can be +accomplished by judiciously conforming to justice, and holiness; in +short, by virtue. + + +CAN THESE VIRTUES BE ASCRIBED TO THE DIVINITY? + +If then it be by virtue that we are assimilated (to divinity), does +this divinity to whom we are trying to achieve assimilation, Himself +possess virtue? Besides, what divinity is this? Surely it must be He +who must most seem to possess virtue, the world-Soul, together with the +principle predominating in her, whose wisdom is most admirable (supreme +Intelligence)--for it is quite reasonable that we should be assimilated +to Him. Nevertheless, one might, unreflectingly, question whether all +virtues might suit this divinity; whether, for instance, moderation in +his desires, or courage could be predicated of Him; for, as to courage, +nothing can really harm Him, and He therefore has nothing to fear; and +as to moderation, no pleasant object whose presence would excite His +desires, or whose absence would in Him awaken regrets, could possibly +exist. But inasmuch as the divinity, just as we ourselves, aspires to +intelligible things, He is evidently the source of our gracious sanity +and virtues. So we are forced to ask ourselves, "Does the divinity +possess these virtues?" + + +HOMELY VIRTUES ASSIMILATE US TO DIVINITY ONLY PARTIALLY. + +It would not be proper to attribute to Him the homely (or, civil) +virtues, such as prudence, which "relates to the rational part of our +nature"; courage, which "relates to our irascible part"; temperance, +which consists of the harmonious consonance of our desires and our +reason; last, of justice, which "consists in the accomplishment by all +these faculties of the function proper to each of them," "whether to +command, or to obey," (as said Plato[338]). But if we cannot become +assimilated to the divinity by these homely virtues, that process +must demand similarly named virtues of a superior order. However, +these homely virtues would not be entirely useless to achieve that +result, for one cannot say that while practising them one does not at +all resemble the divinity as they who practise them are reputed to be +godlike. These lower virtues do therefore yield some resemblance to the +divinity, but complete assimilation can result only from virtues of a +higher order. + + +THE DIVINE NEED NOT POSSESS THE LOWER VIRTUES BY WHICH WE ARE +ASSIMILATED TO HIM. + +Virtues, even if they be not homely, are therefore ultimately ascribed +(to the divinity). Granting that the divinity does not possess the +homely virtues, we may still become assimilated to Him by other virtues +for with virtues of another order the case might differ. Therefore, +without assimilating ourselves to the divinity by homely virtues we +might nevertheless by means of virtues which still are ours, become +assimilated to the Being which does not possess virtue. + +This may be explained by an illustration. When a body is warmed by the +presence of fire, the fire itself need not be heated by the presence of +another fire. It might be argued that there was heat in the fire, but +a heat that is innate. Reasoning by analogy, the virtue, which in the +soul is only adventitious, is innate in Him from whom the soul derives +it by imitation; (in other words, the cause need not necessarily +possess the same qualities as the effect). + +Our argument from heat might however be questioned, inasmuch as the +divinity really does possess virtue, though it be of a higher nature. +This observation would be correct, if the virtue in which the soul +participates were identical with the principle from which she derives +it. But there is a complete opposition; for when we see a house, the +sense-house is not identical with the intelligible House, though +possessing resemblance thereto. Indeed, the sense-house participates in +order and proportion, though neither order, proportion, nor symmetry +could be attributed to the idea of the House. Likewise, we derived +from the divinity order, proportion and harmony, which, here below, +are conditions of virtue, without thereby implying that the divinity +Himself need possess order, proportion, or harmony. Similarly, it is +not necessary that He possess virtue, although we become assimilated to +Him thereby. + +Such is our demonstration that human assimilation to the divine +Intelligence by virtue does not (necessarily imply) (in the divine +Intelligence itself) possession of virtue. Mere logical demonstration +thereof is not, however, sufficient; we must also convince. + + +THERE ARE TWO KINDS OF RESEMBLANCE. + +2. Let us first examine the virtues by which we are assimilated to +the divinity, and let us study the identity between our soul-image +which constitutes virtue, and supreme Intelligence's principle +which, without being virtue, is its archetype. There are two kinds +of resemblance: the first entails such identity of nature as exists +when both similar things proceed from a same principle; the second is +that of one thing to another which precedes it, as its principle. In +the latter case, there is no reciprocity, and the principle does not +resemble that which is inferior to it; or rather, the resemblance must +be conceived entirely differently. It does not necessitate that the +similar objects be of the same kind; it rather implies that they are of +different kinds, inasmuch as they resemble each other differently. + + +HOW HOMELY VIRTUES MAY ASSIMILATE MAN TO THE SUPREME. + +(It is difficult to define) what is virtue, in general or in +particular. To clear up the matter, let us consider one particular +kind of virtue: then it will be easy to determine the common essence +underlying them all. + +The above-mentioned homely virtues really render our souls gracious, +and improve them, regulating and moderating our appetites, tempering +our passions, delivering us from false opinions, limiting us within +just bounds, and they themselves must be determined by some kind of +measure. This measure given to our souls resembles the form given to +matter, and the proportion of intelligible things; it is as it were +a trace of what is most perfect above. What is unmeasured, being no +more than formless matter, cannot in any way resemble divinity. The +greater the participation in form, the greater the assimilation to the +formless; and the closer we get to form, the greater the participation +therein. Thus our soul, whose nature is nearer to divinity and more +kindred to it than the body is, thereby participates the more in the +divine, and increases that resemblance enough to make it seem that the +divinity is all that she herself is. Thus arises the deception, which +represents her as the divine divinity, as if her quality constituted +that of the divinity. Thus are men of homely virtues assimilated to the +divinity. + + +PLATO DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN THE HOMELY AND THE HIGHER VIRTUES. + +3. We will now, following (Plato),[339] speak of another kind of +assimilation as the privilege of a higher virtue. We will thus better +understand the nature of homely virtues, and the higher virtues, +and the difference between them. Plato is evidently distinguishing +two kinds of virtues when he says that assimilation to the divinity +consists in fleeing from (the world) here below; when he adds the +qualification "homely" to the virtues relating to social life; and when +in another place he asserts[340] that all virtues are processes of +purification; and it is not to the homely virtues that he attributes +the power of assimilating us to the divinity. + + +HOW VIRTUES PURIFY. + +How then do the virtues purify? How does this process of purification +bring us as near as possible to the divinity? So long as the soul is +mingled with the body, sharing its passions and opinions, she is evil. +She becomes better, that is, she acquires virtues, only when, instead +of agreeing with the body, she thinks by herself (this is true thought, +and constitutes prudence); when she ceases to share its passions (in +other words, temperance); when she no longer fears separation from the +body (a state called courage); and last, when reason and intelligence +can enforce their command (or justice). + + +SELF-CONTROL IS ASSIMILATION TO THE DIVINITY. + +We may therefore unhesitatingly state that the resemblance to the +divinity lies in such regulation, in remaining impassible while +thinking intelligible things; for what is pure is divine and the +nature of the divine action is such that whatever imitates it thereby +possesses wisdom. But it is not the divinity that possesses such a +disposition, for dispositions are the property of souls only. Besides, +the soul does not think intelligible objects in the same manner as the +divinity; what is contained in the divinity is contained within us in +a manner entirely different, or even perhaps is not at all contained. +For instance, the divinity's thought is not at all identical with +ours; the divinity's thought is a primary principle from which our +thought is derived and differs. As the vocal word is only the image +of the interior reason[341] of the soul, so also is the word of the +soul only the image of the Word of a superior principle; and as the +exterior word, when compared to the interior reason of the soul, seems +discrete, or divided, so the reason of the soul, which is no more than +the interpreter of the intelligible word, is discrete, in comparison +with the latter. Thus does virtue belong to the soul without belonging +either to absolute Intelligence, nor to the Principle superior to +Intelligence. + + +PURIFICATION PRODUCES CONVERSION; AND VIRTUE MAKES USE OF THIS. + +4. Purification may be either identical with the above-defined virtue, +or virtue may be the result of purification. In this case, does virtue +consist of the actual process of purification, or in the already +purified condition? This is our problem here. + +The process of purification is inferior to the already purified +condition; for purity is the soul's destined goal. (Negative) purity +is mere separation from extraneous things; it is not yet (positive) +possession of its prize. If the soul had possessed goodness before +losing her purity, mere purification would be sufficient; and even in +this case the residuum of the purification would be the goodness, and +not the purification. What is the residuum? Not goodness; otherwise, +the soul would not have fallen into evil. The soul therefore possesses +the form of goodness, without however being able to remain solidly +attached thereto, because her nature permits her to turn either to the +good, or the evil. The good of the soul is to remain united to her +sister intelligence; her evil, is to abandon herself to the contrary +things. After purifying the soul, therefore, she must be united to the +divinity; but this implies turning her towards Him. Now this conversion +does not begin to occur after the purification, but is its very result. +The virtue of the soul, therefore, does not consist in her conversion, +but in that which she thereby obtains. This is the intuition of her +intelligible object; its image produced and realized within herself; an +image similar to that in the eye, an image which represents the things +seen. It is not necessary to conclude that the soul did not possess +this image, nor had any reminiscence thereof; she no doubt possessed +it, but inactively, latently, obscurely. To clarify it, to discover her +possessions, the soul needs to approach the source of all clearness. +As, however, the soul possesses only the images of the intelligibles, +without possessing the intelligibles themselves, she will be compelled +to compare with them her own image of them. Easily does the soul +contemplate the intelligibles, because the intelligence is not foreign +to her; when the soul wishes to enter in relations with them, all the +soul needs to do is to turn her glance towards them. Otherwise, the +intelligence, though present in the soul, will remain foreign to her. +This explains how all our acquisitions of knowledge are foreign to us +(as if non-existent), while we fail to recall them. + + +THE LIMIT OF PURIFICATION IS THAT OF THE SOUL'S SELF-CONTROL. + +5. The limit of purification decides to which (of the three hypostases +of) divinity the soul may hope to assimilate and identify herself; +therefore we shall have to consider that limit. To decide that would +be to examine the limit of the soul's ability to repress anger, +appetites, and passions of all kinds, to triumph over pain and similar +feelings--in short, to separate her from the body. This occurs when, +recollecting herself from the various localities over which she had, as +it were, spread herself, she retires within herself; when she estranges +herself entirely from the passions, when she allows the body only such +pleasures as are necessary or suitable to cure her pains, to recuperate +from its fatigues, and in avoiding its becoming importunate; when she +becomes insensible to sufferings; or, if that be beyond her power, in +supporting them patiently, and in diminishing them by refusing to share +them; when she appeases anger as far as possible, even suppressing +it entirely, if possible; or at least, if that be impossible, not +participating therein; abandoning to the animal nature all unthinking +impulses, and even so reducing to a minimum all reflex movements; +when she is absolutely inaccessible to fear, having nothing left to +risk; and when she represses all sudden movements, except nature's +warning of dangers. Evidently, the purified soul will have to desire +nothing shameful. In eating and drinking, she will seek only the +satisfaction of a need, while remaining foreign to it; nor will she +seek the pleasures of love; or, if she does, she will not go beyond the +exactions of nature, resisting every unconsidered tendency, or even in +remaining within the involuntary flights of fancy. + + +THE INFLUENCE OF REASON IS SUGGESTIVE. + +In short, the soul will be pure from all these passions, and will +even desire to purify our being's irrational part so as to preserve +it from emotions, or at least to moderate their number and intensity, +and to appease them promptly by her presence. So would a man, in the +neighborhood of some sage, profit thereby, either by growing similar +to him, or in refraining from doing anything of which the sage might +disapprove. This (suggestive) influence of reason will exert itself +without any struggle; its mere presence will suffice. The inferior +principle will respect it to the point of growing resentful against +itself, and reproaching itself for its weakness, if it feel any +agitation which might disturb its master's repose. + + +THE GOAL OF PURIFICATION IS SECOND DIVINITY, INTELLIGENCE. + +6. A man who has achieved such a state no longer commits such faults; +for he has become corrected. But his desired goal is not to cease +failing, but to be divine. In case he still allows within himself +the occurrence of some of the above-mentioned unreflecting impulses, +he will be simultaneously divinity and guardian, a double being; or +rather, he will contain a principle of another nature (Intelligence), +whose virtue will likewise differ from his. If, however, he be not +troubled by any of those motions, he will be wholly divine; he will be +one of those divinities "who (as Plato said)[342] form the attending +escort of the First." It is a divinity of such a nature that has +come down from above to dwell in us. To become again what one was +originally, is to live in this superior world. He who has achieved that +height dwells with pure Intelligence, and assimilates himself thereto +as far as possible. Consequently, he feels none of those emotions, nor +does he any more commit any actions, which would be disapproved of by +the superior principle who henceforth is his only master. + + +THE HIGHER VIRTUES MERGE INTO WISDOM. + +For such a being the separate virtues merge. For him, wisdom consists +in contemplating the (essences) possessed by Intelligence, and with +which Intelligence is in contact. There are two kinds of wisdom, one +being proper to intelligence, the other to the soul; only in the latter +may we speak of virtue. In the Intelligence exists only the energy (of +thought), and its essence. The image of this essence, seen here below +in a being of another nature, is the virtue which emanates from it. +In Intelligence, indeed, resides neither absolute justice, nor any of +those genuinely so-called virtues; nothing is left but their type. Its +derivative in the soul is virtue; for virtue is the attribute of an +individual being. On the contrary, the intelligible belongs to itself +only, and is the attribute of no particular being. + + +INCARNATE JUSTICE IS INDIVIDUAL; IF ABSOLUTE, IT IS INDIVISIBLE. + +Must justice ever imply multiplicity if it consist in fulfilling its +proper function? Surely, as long as it inheres in a principle with +several parts (such as a human soul, in which several functions may +be distinguished); but its essence lies in the accomplishment of +the function proper to every being, even when inhering in a unitary +principle (such as Intelligence). Absolute and veritable Justice +consists in the self-directed action of an unitary Principle, in which +no parts can be distinguished. + + +THE HIGHER FORMS OF THE VIRTUES. + +In this higher realm, justice consists in directing the action of the +soul towards intelligence; temperance is the intimate conversion of +the soul towards intelligence; courage is the (suggestive fascination) +or impassibility, by which the soul becomes similar to that which it +contemplates; since it is natural for intelligence to be impassible. +Now the soul derives this impassibility from the virtue which hinders +her from sharing the passions of the lower principle with which she is +associated. + + +EVEN THE LOWER VIRTUES ARE MUTUALLY RELATED. + +7. Within the soul the virtues have the same interconnection obtaining +within Intelligence between the types superior to virtue. For +Intelligence, it is thought that constitutes wisdom and prudence; +conversion towards oneself is temperance; the fulfillment of one's +proper function is justice, and the intelligence's perseverance in +remaining within itself, in maintaining itself pure and separated from +matter, is analogous to courage. To contemplate intelligence will +therefore, for the soul, constitute wisdom and prudence, which then +become virtues, and no longer remain mere intellectual types. For the +soul is not identical with the essences she thinks, as is intelligence. +Similarly, the other soul-virtues will correspond to the superior +types. It is not otherwise with purification, for since every virtue is +a purification, virtue exacts preliminary purification; otherwise, it +would not be perfect. + + +THE HIGHER VIRTUES IMPLY THE LOWER; BUT NOT CONVERSELY. + +The possessor of the higher virtues necessarily possesses the +potentiality for the inferior virtues; but the possessor of the lower +does not, conversely, possess the higher. Such are the characteristics +of the virtuous man. + + +PRUDENCE TO DECIDE WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO POSSESS VIRTUES +UNSYMMETRICALLY? + +(Many interesting questions remain). Is it possible for a man to +possess the higher or lower virtues in accomplished reality, or +otherwise (merely theoretically)? To decide that, we would have +individually to examine each, as, for example, prudence. How could +such a virtue exist merely potentially, borrowing its principles +from elsewhere? What would happen if one virtue advanced naturally +to a certain degree, and another virtue to another? What would you +think of a temperance which would moderate certain (impulses), while +entirely suppressing others? Similar questions might be raised about +other virtues, and the arbiter of the degree to which the virtues have +attained would have to be prudence. + + +THE HOMELY VIRTUES MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED BY DIVINE DISCONTENT. + +No doubt, under certain circumstances, the virtuous man, in his +actions, will make use of some of the lower, or homely virtues; +but even so he will supplement them by standards or ideas derived +from higher virtues. For instance, he will not be satisfied with +a temperance which would consist in mere moderation, but he will +gradually seek to separate himself more and more from matter. Again, he +will supplement the life of a respectable man, exacted by common-sense +homely virtues; he will be continually aspiring higher, to the life of +the divinities; for our effort at assimilation should be directed not +at mere respectability, but to the gods themselves. To seek no more +than to become assimilated to respectable individuals would be like +trying to make an image by limiting oneself to copying another image, +itself modelled after another image (but not copying the original). +The assimilation here recommended results from taking as model a +superior being. + + + + +FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK THREE. + +Of Dialectic, or the Means of Raising the Soul to the Intelligible +World. + + +SEARCH FOR A DEMONSTRATION OF DIVINITY SUCH THAT THE DEMONSTRATION +ITSELF WILL DEIFY. + +1. What method, art or study will lead us to the goal we are to +attain, namely, the Good, the first Principle, the Divinity,[343] by a +demonstration which itself can serve to raise the soul to the superior +world? + + +METHODS DIFFER ACCORDING TO INDIVIDUALS; BUT THERE ARE CHIEFLY TWO. + +He who is to be promoted to that world should know everything, or at +least, as says (Plato),[344] he should be as learned as possible. In +his first generation he should have descended here below to form a +philosopher, a musician, a lover. That is the kind of men whose nature +makes them most suitable to be raised to the intelligible world. But +how are we going to raise them? Does a single method suffice for all? +Does not each of them need a special method? Doubtless. There are two +methods to follow: the one for those who rise to the intelligible world +from here below, and the other for those who have already reached +there. We shall start by the first of these two methods; then comes +that of the men who have already achieved access to the intelligible +world, and who have, so to speak, already taken root there. Even these +must ceaselessly progress till they have reached the summit; for one +must stop only when one has reached the supreme term. + + +RETURN OF THE SOUL OF THE PHILOSOPHER, MUSICIAN AND LOVER. + +The latter road of progress must here be left aside (to be taken up +later),[345] to discuss here fully the first, explaining the operation +of the return of the soul to the intelligible world. Three kinds of men +offer themselves to our examination: the philosopher, the musician, +and the lover. These three must clearly be distinguished, beginning by +determining the nature and character of the musician. + + +HOW THE MUSICIAN RISES TO THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. + +The musician allows himself to be easily moved by beauty, and admires +it greatly; but he is not able by himself to achieve the intuition of +the beautiful. He needs the stimulation of external impressions. Just +as some timorous being is awakened by the least noise, the musician is +sensitive to the beauty of the voice and of harmonies. He avoids all +that seems contrary to the laws of harmony and of unity, and enjoys +rhythm and melodies in instrumental and vocal music. After these purely +sensual intonations, rhythm and tunes, he will surely in them come to +distinguish form from matter, and to contemplate the beauty existing in +their proportions and relations. He will have to be taught that what +excites his admiration in these things, is their intelligible harmony, +the beauty it contains, and, in short, beauty absolute, and not +particular. He will have to be introduced to philosophy by arguments +that will lead him to recognize truths that he ignored, though he +possessed them instinctively. Such arguments will be specified +elsewhere.[346] + + +HOW THE LOVER RISES TO THE INTELLIGIBLE. + +2. The musician can rise to the rank of the lover, and either remain +there, or rise still higher. But the lover has some reminiscence of the +beautiful; but as here below he is separated (from it, he is incapable +of clearly knowing what it is). Charmed with the beautiful objects +that meet his views, he falls into an ecstasy. He must therefore be +taught not to content himself with thus admiring a single body, but, +by reason, to embrace all bodies that reveal beauty; showing him what +is identical in all, informing him that it is something alien to the +bodies, which comes from elsewhere, and which exists even in a higher +degree in the objects of another nature; citing, as examples, noble +occupations, and beautiful laws. He will be shown that beauty is found +in the arts, the sciences, the virtues, all of which are suitable means +of familiarizing the lover with the taste of incorporeal things. He +will then be made to see that beauty is one, and he will be shown the +element which, in every object, constitutes beauty. From virtues he +will be led to progress to intelligence and essence, while from there +he will have nothing else to do but to progress towards the supreme +goal. + + +HOW THE PHILOSOPHER RISES TO THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. + +3. The philosopher is naturally disposed to rise to the intelligible +world. Borne on by light wings, he rushes thither without needing to +learn to disengage himself from sense-objects, as do the preceding men. +His only uncertainty will concern the road to be followed, all he will +need will be a guide. He must therefore be shown the road; he must be +helped to detach himself entirely from sense-objects, himself already +possessing, as he does, the desire, being since a long while already +detached therefrom by his nature. For this purpose he will be invited +to apply himself to mathematics, so as to accustom him to think of +incorporeal things, to believe in their existence. Being desirous +of instruction, he will learn them easily; as, by his nature, he is +already virtuous, he will need no more than promotion to the perfection +of virtue. After mathematics, he will be taught dialectics, which will +perfect him. + + +WHAT DIALECTICS IS. + +4. What then is this dialectics, knowledge of which must be added +to mathematics? It is a science which makes us capable of reasoning +about each thing, to say what it is, in what it differs from the +others, in what it resembles them, where it is, whether it be one of +the beings, to determine how many veritable beings there are, and +which are the objects that contain nonentity instead of veritable +essence. This science treats also of good and evil; of everything that +is subordinated to (being), the Good, and to its contrary; of the +nature of what is eternal, and transitory. It treats of each matter +scientifically, and not according to mere opinion. Instead of wandering +around the sense-world, it establishes itself in the intelligible +world; it concentrates its whole attention on this world, and after +having saved our soul from deceit, dialectics "pastures our soul in the +meadow of truth,"[347] (as thought Plato). Then it makes use of the +Platonic method of division to discern ideas, to define each object, +to rise to the several kinds of essences[348] (as thought Plato); +then, by thought concatenating all that is thence derived, dialectics +continues its deductions until it has gone through the whole domain +of the intelligible. Then, by reversing, dialectics returns to the +very Principle from which first it had started out.[349] Resting +there, because it is only in the intelligible world that it can find +rest, no longer needing to busy itself with a multitude of objects, +because it has arrived at unity, dialectics considers its logic, which +treats of propositions and arguments. This logic is an art subordinate +to dialectics just as writing is subordinate to thought. In logic, +dialectics recognizes some principles as necessary, and others as +constituting preparatory exercises. Then, along with everything else, +subjecting these principles to its criticism, it declares some of them +useful, and others superfluous, or merely technical. + + +DIALECTICS IS THE HIGHEST PART OF PHILOSOPHY. + +5. Whence does this science derive its proper principles? Intelligence +furnishes the soul with the clear principles she is capable of +receiving. Having discovered and achieved these principles, dialectics +puts their consequences in order. Dialectics composes, and divides, +till it has arrived at a perfect intelligence of things; for according +to (Plato),[350] dialectics is the purest application of intelligence +and wisdom. In this case, if dialectics be the noblest exercise of +our faculties, it must exercise itself with essence and the highest +objects. Wisdom studies existence, as intelligence studies that +which is still beyond existence (the One, or the Good). But is not +philosophy also that which is most eminent? Surely. But there is no +confusion between philosophy and dialectics, because dialectics is the +highest part of philosophy. It is not (as Aristotle thought) merely +an instrument for philosophy, nor (as Epicurus thought) made up of +pure speculations and abstract rules. It studies things themselves, +and its matter is the (real) beings. It reaches them by following a +method which yields reality as well as the idea. Only accidentally +does dialectics busy itself with error and sophisms. Dialectics +considers them alien to its mission, and as produced by a foreign +principle. Whenever anything contrary to the rule of truth is advanced, +dialectics recognizes the error by the light of the truths it contains. +Dialectics, however, does not care for propositions, which, to it, +seem only mere groupings of letters. Nevertheless, because it knows +the truth, dialectics also understands propositions, and, in general, +the operations of the soul. Dialectics knows what it is to affirm, to +deny, and how to make contrary or contradictory assertions. Further, +dialectics distinguishes differences from identities, grasping the +truth by an intuition that is as instantaneous as is that of the +senses; but dialectics leaves to another science, that enjoys those +details, the care of treating them with exactness. + + +THE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF PHILOSOPHY CROWNED BY DIALECTICS. + +6. Dialectics, therefore, is only one part of philosophy, but the most +important. Indeed, philosophy has other branches. First, it studies +nature (in physics), therein employing dialectics, as the other arts +employ arithmetic, though philosophy owes far more to dialectics. Then +philosophy treats of morals, and here again it is dialectics that +ascertains the principles; ethics limits itself to building good habits +thereon, and to propose the exercises that shall produce those good +habits. The (Aristotelian) rational virtues also owe to dialectics the +principles which seem to be their characteristics; for they chiefly +deal with material things (because they moderate the passions). The +other virtues[351] also imply the application of reason to the passions +and actions which are characteristic of each of them. However, prudence +applies reason to them in a superior manner. Prudence deals rather +with the universal, considering whether the virtues concatenate, and +whether an action should be done now, or be deferred, or be superseded +by another[352] (as thought Aristotle). Now it is dialectics, or its +resultant science of wisdom which, under a general and immaterial form, +furnishes prudence with all the principles it needs. + + +WITHOUT DIALECTICS LOWER KNOWLEDGE WOULD BE IMPERFECT. + +Could the lower knowledge not be possessed without dialectics or +wisdom? They would, at least, be imperfect and mutilated. On the other +hand, though the dialectician, that is, the true sage, no longer +need these inferior things, he never would have become such without +them; they must precede, and they increase with the progress made in +dialectics. Virtues are in the same case. The possessor of natural +virtues may, with the assistance of wisdom, rise to perfect virtues. +Wisdom, therefore, only follows natural virtues. Then wisdom perfects +the morals. Rather, the already existing natural virtues increase and +grow perfect along with wisdom. Whichever of these two things precedes, +complements the other. Natural virtues, however, yield only imperfect +views and morals; and the best way to perfect them, is philosophic +knowledge of the principles from which they depend. + + + + +FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. + +How the Soul Mediates Between Indivisible and Divisible Essence. + + +OUTLINE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF IV. 7. + +1. While studying the nature ("being") of the soul, we have shown +(against the Stoics) that she is not a body; that, among incorporeal +entities, she is not a "harmony" (against the Pythagoreans); we have +also shown that she is not an "entelechy" (against Aristotle), because +this term, as its very etymology implies, does not express a true idea, +and reveals nothing about the soul's (nature itself); last, we said +that the soul has an intelligible nature, and is of divine condition; +the "being" or nature of the soul we have also, it would seem, clearly +enough set forth. Still, we have to go further. We have formerly +established a distinction between intelligible and sense nature, +assigning the soul to the intelligible world. Granting this, that the +soul forms part of the intelligible world, we must, in another manner, +study what is suitable to her nature. + + +EXISTENCE OF DIVISIBLE BEINGS. + +To begin with, there are (beings) which are quite divisible and +naturally separable. No one part of any one of them is identical with +any other part, nor with the whole, of which each part necessarily is +smaller than the whole. Such are sense-magnitudes, or physical masses, +of which each occupies a place apart, without being able to be in +several places simultaneously. + + +DESCRIPTION OF INDIVISIBLE ESSENCE. + +On the other hand, there exists another kind of essence ("being"), +whose nature differs from the preceding (entirely divisible beings), +which admits of no division, and is neither divided nor divisible. +This has no extension, not even in thought. It does not need to be +in any place, and is not either partially or wholly contained in any +other being. If we dare say so, it hovers simultaneously over all +beings, not that it needs to be built up on them,[353] but because +it is indispensable to the existence of all. It is ever identical +with itself, and is the common support of all that is below it. It is +as in the circle, where the centre, remaining immovable in itself, +nevertheless is the origin of all the radii originating there, and +drawing their existence thence. The radii by thus participating in +the existence of the centre, the radii's principle, depend on what is +indivisible, remaining attached thereto, though separating in every +direction.[354] + + +BETWEEN THEM IS AN INDIVISIBLE ESSENCE WHICH BECOMES DIVISIBLE WITHIN +BODIES. + +Now between entirely indivisible ("Being") which occupies the first +rank amidst intelligible beings, and the (essence) which is entirely +divisible in its sense-objects, there is, above the sense-world, +near it, and within it, a "being" of another nature, which is not, +like bodies, completely divisible, but which, nevertheless, becomes +divisible within bodies. Consequently, when you separate bodies, the +form within them also divides, but in such a way that it remains entire +in each part. This identical (essence), thus becoming manifold, has +parts that are completely separated from each other; for it then is a +divisible form, such as colors, and all the qualities, like any form +which can simultaneously remain entire in several things entirely +separate, at a distance, and foreign to each other because of the +different ways in which they are affected. We must therefore admit that +this form (that resides in bodies) is also divisible. + + +BY PROCESSION THE SOUL CONNECTS THE TWO. + +Thus the absolutely divisible (essence) does not exist alone; there is +another one located immediately beneath it, and derived from it. On +one hand, this inferior (essence) participates in the indivisibility +of its principle; on the other, it descends towards another nature by +its procession. Thereby it occupies a position intermediary between +indivisible and primary (essence), (that is, intelligence), and the +divisible (essence) which is in the bodies. Besides it is not in the +same condition of existence as color and the other qualities; for +though the latter be the same in all corporeal masses, nevertheless the +quality in one body is completely separate from that in another, just +as physical masses themselves are separate from each other. Although +(by its essence) the magnitude of these bodies be one, nevertheless +that which thus is identical in each part does not exert that community +of affection which constitutes sympathy,[355] because to identity is +added difference. This is the case because identity is only a simple +modification of bodies, and not a "being." On the contrary, the nature +that approaches the absolutely indivisible "Being" is a genuine "being" +(such as is the soul). It is true that she unites with the bodies and +consequently divides with them; but that happens to her only when she +communicates herself to the bodies. On the other hand, when she unites +with the bodies, even with the greatest and most extended of all (the +world), she does not cease to be one, although she yield herself up to +it entirely. + + +DIVISION AS THE PROPERTY OF BODIES, BUT NOT THE CHARACTERISTIC OF SOUL. + +In no way does the unity of this essence resemble that of the body; +for the unity of the body consists in the unity of parts, of which +each is different from the others, and occupies a different place. Nor +does the unity of the soul bear any closer resemblance to the unity of +the qualities. Thus this nature that is simultaneously divisible and +indivisible, and that we call soul is not one in the sense of being +continuous (of which each part is external to every other); it is +divisible, because it animates all the parts of the body it occupies, +but is indivisible because it entirely inheres in the whole body, and +in each of its parts.[356] When we thus consider the nature of the +soul, we see her magnitude and power, and we understand how admirable +and divine are these and superior natures. Without any extension, the +soul is present throughout the whole of extension; she is present in a +location, though she be not present therein.[357] She is simultaneously +divided and undivided, or rather, she is never really divided, and she +never really divides; for she remains entire within herself. If she +seem to divide, it is not in relation with the bodies, which, by virtue +of their own divisibility, cannot receive her in an indivisible manner. +Thus division is the property of the body, but not the characteristic +of the soul. + + +SOUL AS BOTH ESSENTIALLY DIVISIBLE AND INDIVISIBLE. + +2. Such then the nature of the soul had to be. She could not be either +purely indivisible, nor purely divisible, but she necessarily had to be +both indivisible and divisible, as has just been set forth. This is +further proved by the following considerations. If the soul, like the +body, have several parts differing from each other, the sensation of +one part would not involve a similar sensation in another part. Each +part of the soul, for instance, that which inheres in the finger, would +feel its individual affections, remaining foreign to all the rest, +while remaining within itself. In short, in each one of us would inhere +several managing souls (as said the Stoics).[358] Likewise, in this +universe, there would be not one single soul (the universal Soul), but +an infinite number of souls, separated from each other. + + +POLEMIC AGAINST THE STOIC PREDOMINATING PART OF THE SOUL. + +Shall we have recourse to the (Stoic) "continuity of parts"[359] +to explain the sympathy which interrelates all the organs? This +hypothesis, however, is useless, unless this continuity eventuate +in unity. For we cannot admit, as do certain (Stoic) philosophers, +who deceive themselves, that sensations focus in the "predominating +principle" by "relayed transmission."[360] To begin with, it is a wild +venture to predicate a "predominating principle" of the soul. How +indeed could we divide the soul and distinguish several parts therein? +By what superiority, quantity or quality are we going to distinguish +the "predominating part" in a single continuous mass? Further, under +this hypothesis, we may ask, Who is going to feel? Will it be the +"predominating part" exclusively, or the other parts with it? If that +part exclusively, it will feel only so long as the received impression +will have been transmitted to itself, in its particular residence; but +if the impression impinge on some other part of the soul, which happens +to be incapable of sensation, this part will not be able to transmit +the impression to the (predominating) part that directs, and sensation +will not occur. Granting further that the impression does reach the +predominating part itself, it might be received in a twofold manner; +either by one of its (subdivided) parts, which, having perceived the +sensation, will not trouble the other parts to feel it, which would be +useless; or, by several parts simultaneously, and then we will have +manifold, or even infinite sensations which will all differ from each +other. For instance, the one might say, "It is I who first received +the impression"; the other one might say, "I received the impression +first received by another"; while each, except the first, will be +in ignorance of the location of the impression; or again, each part +will make a mistake, thinking that the impression occurred where +itself is. Besides, if every part of the soul can feel as well as the +predominating part, why at all speak of a "predominating part?" What +need is there for the sensation to reach through to it? How indeed +would the soul recognize as an unity the result of multiple sensations; +for instance, of such as come from the ears or eyes? + + +THE SOUL HAS TO BE BOTH ONE AND MANIFOLD, EVEN ON THE STOIC HYPOTHESES. + +On the other hand, if the soul were absolutely one, essentially +indivisible and one within herself, if her nature were incompatible +with manifoldness and division, she could not, when penetrating into +the body, animate it in its entirety; she would place herself in its +centre, leaving the rest of the mass of the animal lifeless. The +soul, therefore, must be simultaneously one and manifold, divided and +undivided, and we must not deny, as something impossible, that the +soul, though one and identical, can be in several parts of the body +simultaneously. If this truth be denied, this will destroy the "nature +that contains and administers the universe" (as said the Stoics); which +embraces everything at once, and directs everything with wisdom; a +nature that is both manifold, because all beings are manifold; and +single, because the principle that contains everything must be one. It +is by her manifold unity that she vivifies all parts of the universe, +while it is her indivisible unity that directs everything with wisdom. +In the very things that have no wisdom, the unity that in it plays the +predominating "part," imitates the unity of the universal Soul. That is +what Plato wished to indicate allegorically by these divine words[361]: +"From the "Being" that is indivisible and ever unchanging; and from +the "being" which becomes divisible in the bodies, the divinity formed +a mixture, a third kind of "being." The (universal) Soul, therefore, +is (as we have just said) simultaneously one and manifold; the forms +of the bodies are both manifold and one; the bodies are only manifold; +while the supreme Principle (the One), is exclusively an unity. + +Paragraph 3 of this book (iv. 2,--21) will be found in its logical +position--judging by the subject matter,--on pages 75 to 78, in the +middle of iv. 7,--2. + + + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] See 7. + +[2] See vi. 7, 8. + +[3] A.D. 262. + +[4] See vi. 5, 1. + +[5] See 20. + +[6] iii. 4. + +[7] See above, 6. + +[8] See iv. 2. + +[9] Often quoted by Porphyry in his Cave of the Nymphs. + +[10] See 3. + +[11] Euseb. Prep. Ev. xi. 2; xv. 4-9, 12-13. + +[12] See 3. + +[13] See ii. 3; iii. 1, 2, 4. + +[14] See v. 5. + +[15] This suggests that Suidas was right in claiming that Amelius was +the teacher of Porphyry. + +[16] See 11. + +[17] See 7. + +[18] See 3. + +[19] See 3. + +[20] Mentioned in Porphyry's Life of Pythagoras, 48, living under Nero. + +[21] Living under Tiberius, see Suetonius, Life of Tiberius, 14. + +[22] See vi. 5. + +[23] See 17. + +[24] See 18. + +[25] See 17. + +[26] See ii. 3. 17. + +[27] See 23. + +[28] The fragments of all this are probably the Principles of the +Theory of the Intelligibles, by Porphyry. + +[29] See ii. 1. + +[30] See i. 3. + +[31] As pilot, perhaps, iv. 3. 21. + +[32] See ii., 4. 6. + +[33] See ii. 7. 1. + +[34] See i. 1. 10. + +[35] See i. 9. 8. 10. + +[36] See iv. 3. 20, 21. + +[37] Ecl. Phys., p. 797, Heeren and Aristotle, de Anima, i. 2. + +[38] See Nemesius, de Nat. Hom. 2. + +[39] See ii. 7, 1. + +[40] See ii. 7, 3. + +[41] Stob. Ecl. Phys. 797. + +[42] See ii. 3, 5. + +[43] See ii. 7, 1. + +[44] ii. 4, 7. + +[45] See iv. 7, 8. + +[46] Euseb., Prep. Ev. xv. 17. + +[47] p. 54, Cousin. + +[48] Cicero, Tusculans, i. 9. + +[49] Ecl. Phys. 797, Cicero, de Nat. Deor. iii. 14. + +[50] See ii. 4, 1. 'pôs echon.' of Dikearchus and Aristoxenus. + +[51] See ii. 6, on 'logos.' + +[52] See v. 7, 3. + +[53] iii. 2. + +[54] See iv. 2, 2. + +[55] iv. 2, 1. + +[56] Plutarch, de Placitis Philosoph, iii. 8. The Stoic definition +of sensation being that senses are spirits stretched (by relays with +"tension") from the directing principle to the organs. + +[57] de Nat. Hom. 2. + +[58] See iv. 4, 23. In the words of Zeno, as, for the Stoics, the +principal act of the intelligence was comprehensive vision, "phantasia +kataleptike." + +[59] de Anima, iii. 4, 5. + +[60] de Anima, i. 3. + +[61] de Anim. Arist. i. 2. + +[62] Cicero, Tusculans, i. 9. + +[63] See ii. 4, 1. + +[64] See iv. 7, 5. + +[65] See ii. 4, 1. + +[66] de Nat. Hom. 2. + +[67] See ii. 7. + +[68] See ii. 7, 1. + +[69] Nat. Hom. 2. + +[70] See ii. 4, 16. + +[71] As thought Chrysippus, in Plutarch, de Stoic. Repugnant. + +[72] See ii. 4, 16. + +[73] Met. xii. 6; see ii. 5, 3. + +[74] iv. 7, 3. + +[75] From end of iv. 2, 3. + +[76] Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 1. + +[77] Arist. de Anima, ii. 2; iii. 5. + +[78] See Aristotle, de Anima, i. 5. + +[79] See Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 2. + +[80] Here we resume Ennead IV. Book 7. The bracketed numbers are those +of the Teubner text; the unbracketed those of the Didot edition. + +[81] Page 299, Cousin. + +[82] Quoted in i. 1, 12, in Republic x. + +[83] See i. 1, 11. + +[84] See i. 6, 9. + +[85] See viii. 62. + +[86] See i. 6, 5. + +[87] Page 297, Cousin. + +[88] See iv. 8, 5. + +[89] Pages 206, 312, 313, Cousin. + +[90] See iv. 8, 8. + +[91] See iv. 8, 6, 7. + +[92] See i. 1, 11. + +[93] See iv. 5, 7. + +[94] Cicero, Tusculans, i. 12-16. + +[95] Such as Porphyry's "Philosophy derived from Oracles." + +[96] Plato, in Diog. Laert., iii. 83. + +[97] Cicero, Tusculans, i. 18, 37. + +[98] Cicero, Tusculans, i. 12, 18; de Divinat, i. 58. + +[99] Chrysippus, in Cicero, de Fato, 10. + +[100] Cicero, de Finibus, i. 6. + +[101] Cicero, de Natura Deorum, i. 25. + +[102] Stobeus, Ecl. Phys. i. 6, p. 178. + +[103] Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticæ, vi. 2. + +[104] As thought the Stoics, Cicero, de Nat. Deor. ii. 11. + +[105] Cicero, de Divinatione, ii. 44. + +[106] As thought Plato, in the Phaedo, C81. + +[107] See i. 6.8. + +[108] See i. 3.1. + +[109] See i. 3. + +[110] See i. 6.2. + +[111] See i. 6.6. + +[112] See i. 6.9, and the Philebus of Plato, C64. + +[113] As suggested in the Phaedo of Plato. + +[114] See ii. 4.6. + +[115] The rational soul and intelligence, see iii. 9.5. + +[116] See ii. 9.12; iv. 4.14. + +[117] See ii. 3.17. 18; ii. 9.2, 3; vi. 4.9. + +[118] A pun on "reason," or "logos," i. 6.2; ii. 3.16; ii. 4.3; ii. +6.2; ii. 7.3. + +[119] See iv. 4.1012. + +[120] Far from the truth; see iii. 8.3. 7. + +[121] Stoics, see iv. 7.8. + +[122] Or Stoic form of inorganic objects. + +[123] The form of lower living beings. + +[124] The form of human nature. + +[125] See iv. 7.14. + +[126] Parmenides, see v. 1.8. + +[127] As Plato hints in his Cratylos, C50, by a pun between "soma" and +"sozesthai." + +[128] The later theological "saved." + +[129] See Aristotle, de Gen. i. 18. + +[130] By Stoics. + +[131] See iii. 8.1-3. + +[132] See v. 5.1. + +[133] See v. 1.4. + +[134] In Greek a pun on "eidos" and "idea." + +[134a] This sentence might well be translated as follows: "When +therefore thought (meets) the essentially one, the latter is the form, +and the former the idea." While this version seems more literal, it +makes no connected sense with what follows. + +[135] See iv. 9.5. + +[136] See iii. 9.1. + +[137] See iii. 9.1. + +[138] The universal Soul. + +[139] Timaeus, C39. + +[140] See iii. 9.1. + +[141] See iii. 7.10. + +[142] See ii. 7.2. + +[143] To form, see i. 6.2. + +[144] As thought Plato, in his Republic, x. + +[145] As thought Plato in Gorgias, C464. + +[146] vi. 7. + +[147] vi. 7. + +[148] Or, "so that it may contain the intelligence which is +one, as its own actualization." + +[149] See iv. 3.9-17. + +[150] In the Cratylus, C400. + +[151] As in the Phaedo, C62. + +[152] Republic, vii, C514. + +[153] See Jamblichus, Cave of the Nymphs, 8. + +[154] Procession, or rising. + +[155] C246. + +[156] Of the universe. + +[157] C34. + +[158] Timaeus, C30. + +[159] The Creator, who is the universal Soul. + +[160] See iv. 3.9-11. + +[161] See iv. 3.17. + +[162] As thought Plato in his Phaedrus, C246. + +[163] The First belongs to the principal power of the universal Soul, +the second to its natural and plant power, see iii, 8.1 and iv. 4.13. + +[164] See iv. 4.13. + +[165] See ii. 3.18. + +[166] As in the Timaeus, C42. + +[167] iv. 8.1. + +[168] See iv. 2.2. + +[169] See iv. 3.6.7. + +[170] As thought Plato in his Phaedrus, C249 and Phaedo, C72. + +[171] That lead an alternate or double life. + +[172] In his Timaeus, C42, 69. + +[173] In the stars. + +[174] As does Plato, see iv. 8.1. + +[175] As a messenger, see iv. 3.12.13. + +[176] See ii. 9.2. + +[177] Without having given herself up to it. + +[178] See i. 8.7. + +[179] That is, of form, ii. 4.4. + +[180] See iv. 6.3. + +[181] See iii. 2.8. + +[182] See iv. 8.5. + +[183] See iv. 3.18. + +[184] See ii. 9.2. + +[185] That is, the body to which she is united. + +[186] As thought Plato in his Parmenides, C154. + +[187] See vi. 6.13. + +[188] "Being." It has been found impossible, in order to preserve +good English idiom, to translate "ousia" by "being," and "to on" by +"essence," with uniformity. Where the change has been made, the proper +word has been added in parentheses, as here. + +[189] In his Metaphysics, iv. 2. + +[190] Aristotle, Met. iv. 2. + +[191] Evidently a pun on forms and ideas. + +[192] See vi. 2.7. + +[193] In the Timaeus not accurately quoted. + +[194] As Plato said in the Timaeus, 37. + +[195] See iv. 9.5. + +[196] See vi. 8.11. + +[197] Odyss. xix. 178. + +[198] See i. 2.2. + +[199] See iv. 3.1. + +[200] See ii. 2.2. + +[201] See the beginning of Plato's Republic, ix. + +[202] See i. 8.7. + +[203] Because they do not allow of mutual penetration. + +[204] See iv. 8.5. + +[205] As thought Numenius 29. + +[206] See ii. 3. + +[207] See i. 8.14. + +[208] See Acts, xvii. 25, 27, 28. + +[209] See iv. 3.7, following the Phaedrus of Plato. + +[210] Cupid and Psyche, as interpreted by Apuleius. + +[211] See iii. 5.2. + +[212] See iii. 5.4. + +[213] See iii. 5.7-9. + +[214] See v. 5.11; i. 6.7, 8; v. 8.4; vi. 9.11. It has been contended +that this was a description of the Isiac temple in Rome. + +[215] Num. 10. + +[216] By virtue of which, according to the Pythagoreans, the dyad +"dared" to issue from the unity. + +[217] That is the desire which leads souls to separate themselves +primitively from the divinity, and to unite themselves to bodies. + +[218] We have seen this elsewhere, i. 3.1. + +[219] See ii. 2.3. + +[220] Iliad xx. 65. + +[221] See vi. 4.4. + +[222] As said Heraclitus, Plutarch, Banquet, iv. 4. + +[223] See iv. 7.10. + +[224] See i. 2.3; iv. 3.11. + +[225] See iii. 9.5. + +[226] As thought Plato in his Cratylus, C. xi. 39, and Macrobins, in +his Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, i. 11. + +[227] See i. 8.2; ii. 9.2. + +[228] See iii. 7.2-4. + +[229] See v. 9.2, 7. + +[230] See vi. 2. + +[231] See vi. 8. + +[232] See vi. 3. + +[233] See iii. 6.1. + +[234] Pun on "ideas" and "forms." + +[235] vi. 9. 11. This seems to refer to the Roman temple of Isis in +front of which stood the statues of the divinities, vi. 9.11. + +[236] Would be soul, instead of intelligence. + +[237] See v. 4.1. + +[238] See iii. 8.10. + +[239] As thought Plato, Laws, x.; see ii. 2.3. + +[240] See iii. 6.19. + +[241] As thought Plato, in the Cratylos, C. xi. 39. + +[242] This paragraph is founded on Numenius 36, 39. + +[243] See Plato's Second Letter, 312; in English, Burges, p. 482; i. +8.2. + +[244] In Timaeus, 34. + +[245] In his Timaeus, C43. + +[246] As quoted by Clemens Al. Strom. vi. p. 627. + +[247] In Simplicius, Comm. in Phys. Arist., 9. + +[248] See Plato's Sophists, C244. + +[249] See ii. 7.7. + +[250] See ii. 1.2. + +[251] See ii. 4.7. + +[252] See Metaph. xii. 7.8. + +[253] Referring to Numenius's work on "The Good," and on the +"Immateriality of the Soul." + +[254] In the Acibiades, C36. + +[255] See i. 1.9. + +[256] In his Timaeus, C30. + +[257] In the Phaedrus. + +[258] See iii. 6.5. + +[259] See v. 3.3. + +[260] From the circumference, see iii. 8.7. + +[261] Cicero, Tusculans, i. 22. + +[262] See i. 4.9. + +[263] See iii. 9.9. + +[264] See iii. 8.9. + +[265] iii. 9.4. + +[266] iii. 8.9. + +[267] See v. 1.7. + +[268] See i. 1.8; iv. 9.3. + +[269] See iii. 4.1, 2. + +[270] Fragment belonging here, apparently, but misplaced at end of next +paragraph. + +[271] See v. 1.1. + +[272] See iii. 4.2. + +[273] See iv. 4.29; iv. 5.7. + +[274] That is, in the principal power of the universal soul, see ii. +3.18. + +[275] See vi. 5; that is, within intelligence. + +[276] Between celestial and terrestrial life; see iii. 4.6. + +[277] See iii. 8.7. + +[278] Met. vii. 3. + +[279] Met. v. 8. + +[280] Diog. Laertes vii. 61. + +[281] See Cicero, de Nat. Deor. i. 15. + +[282] Met. viii. 1. + +[283] See vi. 7. + +[284] See i. 8.4. + +[285] See i. 8.15. + +[286] Plotinos's six categories are identity, difference, being, life, +motion and rest. See v. 1; v. 2; vi. 2. + +[287] Not the absolute eternal existence, nor the totality of the +constitutive qualities of a thing, as in ii. 6. + +[288] Met. xii. 2. + +[289] Met. i. 3. + +[290] Met. xi. 6. + +[291] See v. 1.9. + +[292] As reported by Diog. Laert. ii. 2. + +[293] Met. i. 4; vii. 13. + +[294] de Nat. Deor. i. 24. + +[295] Met. viii. 4. + +[296] In the Timaeus, C49-52, Met. vii. 3. + +[297] See ii. 7.3. + +[298] In Met. iii. 4 and de Anima i. 2.5; ii. 5. + +[299] In the Timaeus. + +[300] See i. 8.9; ii. 4.12. + +[301] Met. vii. 3, see iii. 6.7-19. + +[302] Met. viii. 4. + +[303] Met. i. 6. + +[304] Met. vii. 7. + +[305] See ii. 4.10. + +[306] See ii. 7.3. + +[307] Met. xii. 2. + +[308] Met. vi. 1; vii. 5. + +[309] See i. 2.1. + +[310] In the Philebus, 252. + +[311] The same definition is given of "evil" in i. 8.10-14. + +[312] See i. 8.8. + +[313] Physics. iii. 7. + +[314] This paragraph interrupts the argument. + +[315] Plato's spirit in the Timaeus, C79. + +[316] The inferior soul, see ii. 3.18. + +[317] In his Phaedrus, C246. + +[318] Plato, Phaedo, C. i. 242. + +[319] Plato, Tim. C77. + +[320] Plato, Rep. x. p. 291. + +[321] Plato, Tim. 91. + +[322] The text is very difficult. + +[323] Plato, Rep. x. p. 617-620. + +[324] In the Timaeus. + +[325] C90. + +[326] Phaedo, p. 107, c. i. p. 300. + +[327] Rep. x. 616, p. 234. + +[328] In i. 2.8, 16. + +[329] See ii. 9.18. + +[330] As thought Aristotle, Met. v. 14. + +[331] As thought Aristotle, Met. v. 30. + +[332] As thought Plato, Letter 7, 343. + +[333] As said Aristotle, Met. vii. 5. + +[334] Phaedros C1,217. + +[335] de Gen. An. 4.2. + +[336] Adv. Math. 5.102 p. 355. + +[337] Theataetus, C2,132. + +[338] Rep. iv. E3,434. + +[339] Theataetus, 176. + +[340] Plato, Phaedo, 69. + +[341] Pun on the word "logos," which means both reason and word. + +[342] Plato, Phaedrus, 246. + +[343] v. 1.1. + +[344] In his Phaedrus, Et. 266. + +[345] In v. 1.1. + +[346] i. 3. 4, 5, 6; i. 6. + +[347] In his Phaedrus, p. 248. + +[348] In his Politician, p. 262. + +[349] v. 1. + +[350] In his Sophist., p. 253. + +[351] See i. 2.3-6. + +[352] Morals i. 34, 35; Nicom. Eth., vi. 8, 11. + +[353] See iv. 1.22. + +[354] See iii. 8.7. + +[355] See iv. 2.2. + +[356] See iv. 3.19, 22, 23; iv. 4.28. + +[357] See iv. 3.20-22. + +[358] Cicero, de Nat. Deor. ii. 31-33. + +[359] See 4.7.6, 7. + +[360] Plutarch, de Plac. Phil. v. 21; Cicero, de Nat. Deor. ii. 11. The +"predominating principle" had appeared in Plato's Timaeus, p. 41. + +[361] Of the Timaeus, p. 35. + + + + +Transcriber's Notes: + + +Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant +preference was found in this four-volume set; otherwise they were not +changed. + +Simple typographical errors were corrected. Inconsistent capitalization +has not been changed. + +Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. + +Infrequent spelling of "Plotinus" changed to the predominant "Plotinos." + +Several opening or closing parentheses and quotation marks are +unmatched; Transcriber has not attempted to remedy them. + +The "Index" near the beginning of the book actually is a Table of +Contents for the four-volume set. + +Page 11: the last paragraph seems to end abruptly: "to prove that" + +Page 94: "parent's" probably should be "parents'", but is unchanged +here. + +Page 236: the closing parenthesis for "(destiny)" also seems to be +the closing parenthesis for the phrase beginning "(because he is +given ...". There are several instances in this text where a closing +quotation mark is shared in a similar manner. + + +Footnote Issues: + +In these notes, "anchor" means the reference to a footnote, and +"footnote" means the information to which the anchor refers. Anchors +occur within the main text, while footnotes are grouped in sequence at +the end of this eBook. The structure of the original book required two +exceptions to this, as explained below. + +The original text used a combination of footnotes (indicated by +symbols) and endnotes (indicated by numbers). In this eBook, they have +been combined into a single, ascending sequence based on the sequence +in which the footnotes occurred in the original book, and placed at the +end of the eBook. Several irregularities are explained below. + +Footnotes sometimes were printed in a different sequence than their +anchors (as on page 60: third and fourth footnotes were printed in +incorrect sequence). and the symbols used for the anchors sometimes +were in a different sequence than the footnotes (as on page 72, second +and third symbols). Except as noted below, all footnotes have been +resequenced to match the sequence of their anchors. + +Page 85: The last footnote is printed out of sequence and followed by +a paragraph that appears to be a final comment. In this eBook, that +footnote has been repositioned to be in the sequence of its anchor. + +Pages 111 and 118: Anchor 134 (originally 29) originally referred to two +footnotes. In this eBook, they are footnotes 134 and 134a. + +Pages 186 and 192: section "PLATO TEACHES THREE SPHERES OF +EXISTENCE.[242]" (originally 47) used an out-of-sequence endnote number +that matched the last endnote in the chapter; that endnote has been +repositioned to be in the overall footnote sequence. + +Page 196: Footnote 267 (originally 5) has no anchor; the missing anchor +would be on page 193 or 194. + +Page 242: Footnote 322 (originally 6) has no anchor; the missing anchor +would be on page 235. + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1, by +Plotinos (Plotinus) + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 42930 *** |