diff options
Diffstat (limited to '42127.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | 42127.txt | 3327 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 3327 deletions
diff --git a/42127.txt b/42127.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 40e99a6..0000000 --- a/42127.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3327 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The German War, by Arthur Conan Doyle - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: The German War - Some Sidelights and Reflections - -Author: Arthur Conan Doyle - -Release Date: February 18, 2013 [EBook #42127] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ASCII - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE GERMAN WAR *** - - - - -Produced by Richard Hulse, Suzanne Shell and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - - - - - - - - - - -THE GERMAN WAR - - - - -THE GERMAN WAR - - - -BY - -ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE - -AUTHOR OF "THE GREAT BOER WAR," ETC. - - - -HODDER AND STOUGHTON - -LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO - -MCMXIV - - - - -_Printed in Great Britain by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld.,_ - -_London and Aylesbury_ - - - - -PREFACE - - -These essays, upon different phases of the wonderful world-drama -which has made our lifetime memorable, would be unworthy of -republication were it not that at such a time every smallest thing -which may help to clear up a doubt, to elucidate the justice of our -cause, or to accentuate the desperate need of national effort, -should be thrown into the scale. The longest essay appeared in _The -Fortnightly Review_ and the shorter ones for the most part in _The -Daily Chronicle_. I have left them as written at the time, even -where after-events have caused some modification of my views. - - ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE. - WINDLESHAM, CROWBOROUGH, - _November 1914._ - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGE - I. THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 1 - - II. THE WORLD-WAR CONSPIRACY 32 - - III. THE DEVIL'S DOCTRINE 41 - - IV. THE GREAT GERMAN PLOT 55 - - V. THE "CONTEMPTIBLE LITTLE ARMY" 65 - - VI. A POLICY OF MURDER 79 - - VII. MADNESS 89 - - VIII. GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NEXT WAR 99 - - IX. AFTERTHOUGHTS 144 - - - * * * * * - - - - -I - -THE CAUSES OF THE WAR - - - This article, stating the British case, was issued as a - recruiting pamphlet in Great Britain, but was used abroad - as a simple explanation which would enable neutrals to - understand the true facts. It was published in full by - fifty leading journals in the United States, and was - translated into Dutch and Danish, 25,000 copies being - distributed in each country. - -The causes of the war are only of moment to us, at this stage, in -that we gain more strength in our arms and more iron in our souls by -a knowledge that it is for all that is honourable and sacred for -which we fight. What really concerns us is that we are in a fight -for our national life, that we must fight through to the end, and -that each and all of us must help, in his own fashion, to the last -ounce of his strength, that this end may be victory. That is the -essence of the situation. It is not words and phrases that we need, -but men, men--and always more men. If words can bring the men, then -they are of avail. If not, they may well wait for the times to mend. -But if there is a doubt in the mind of any man as to the justice of -his country's quarrel, then even a writer may find work ready to his -hand. - -Let us cast our minds back upon the events which have led up to this -conflict. They may be divided into two separate classes--those which -prepared the general situation, and those which caused the special -quarrel. Each of these I will treat in its turn. - -It is a matter of common knowledge, one which a man must be blind -and deaf not to understand, that for many years Germany, intoxicated -by her success in war and by her increase of wealth, has regarded -the British Empire with eyes of jealousy and hatred. It has never -been alleged by those who gave expression to this almost universal -national passion that Great Britain had in any way, either -historically or commercially, done Germany a mischief. Even our most -bitter traducers, when asked to give any definite historical reasons -for their dislike, were compelled to put forward such ludicrous -excuses as that the British had abandoned the Prussian King in the -year 1761, quite oblivious of the fact that the same Prussian King -had abandoned his own allies in the same war under far more damaging -circumstances, acting up to his own motto that no promises are -binding where the vital interests of a State are in question. With -all their malevolence they could give no examples of any ill turn -done by us until their deliberate policy had forced us into -antagonism. On the other hand, a long list of occasions could very -easily be compiled on which we had helped them in some common cause -from the days of Marlborough to those of Bluecher. Until the -twentieth century had turned they had no possible cause for -political hatred against us. In commerce our record was even more -clear. Never in any way had we interfered with that great -development of trade which has turned them from one of the poorest -to one of the richest of European States. Our markets were open to -them untaxed, whilst our own manufactures paid 20 per cent. in -Germany. The markets of India, of Egypt, and of every portion of -the Empire which had no self-appointed tariff, were as open to -German goods as to British ones. Nothing could possibly have been -more generous than our commercial treatment. No doubt there was some -grumbling when cheap imitations of our own goods were occasionally -found to oust the originals from their markets. Such a feeling was -but natural and human. But in all matters of commerce, as in all -matters political before the dawn of this century, they have no -shadow of a grievance against us. - -And yet they hated us with a most bitter hatred, a hatred which long -antedates the days when we were compelled to take a definite stand -against them. In all sorts of ways this hatred showed itself--in the -diatribes of professors, in the pages of books, in the columns of -the Press. Usually it was a sullen, silent dislike. Sometimes it -would flame up suddenly into bitter utterance, as at the time of the -unseemly dispute around the deathbed of the Emperor's father, or on -the occasion of the Jameson Raid. And yet this bitter antagonism was -in no way reciprocated in this country. If a poll had been taken at -any time up to the end of the century as to which European country -was our natural ally, the vote would have gone overwhelmingly for -Germany. "America first and then Germany" would have been the -verdict of nine men out of ten. But then occurred two events which -steadied the easy-going Briton, and made him look more intently and -with a more questioning gaze at his distant cousin over the water. -Those two events were the Boer War and the building of the German -fleet. The first showed us, to our amazement, the bitter desire -which Germany had to do us some mischief, the second made us realise -that she was forging a weapon with which that desire might be -fulfilled. - -We are most of us old enough to remember the torrent of calumny and -insult which was showered upon us in the day of our temporary -distress by the nation to whom we had so often been a friend and an -ally. It is true that other nations treated us little better, and -yet their treatment hurt us less. The difference as it struck men at -the time may be summarised in this passage from a British writer of -the period. - -"But it was very different with Germany," he says. "Again and again -in the world's history we have been the friends and the allies of -these people. It was so in the days of Marlborough, in those of the -Great Frederick, and in those of Napoleon. When we could not help -them with men we helped them with money. Our fleet has crushed their -enemies. And now, for the first time in history, we have had a -chance of seeing who were our friends in Europe, and nowhere have we -met more hatred and more slander than from the German Press and the -German people. Their most respectable journals have not hesitated to -represent the British troops--troops every bit as humane and as -highly disciplined as their own--not only as committing outrages on -person and property, but even as murdering women and children. - -"At first this unexpected phenomenon merely surprised the British -people, then it pained them, and finally, after two years of it, it -has roused a deep, enduring anger in their minds." - -He goes on to say, "The continued attacks upon us have left an -enduring feeling of resentment, which will not and should not die -away in this generation. It is not too much to say that five years -ago a complete defeat of Germany in a European war would have -certainly caused British intervention. Public sentiment and racial -affinity would never have allowed us to see her really go to the -wall. And now it is certain that in our lifetime no British guinea -and no soldier's life would under any circumstances be spent for -such an end. That is one strange result of the Boer War, and in the -long run it is possible that it may prove not the least important." - -Such was the prevailing mood of the nation when they perceived -Germany, under the lead of her Emperor, following up her expressions -of enmity by starting with restless energy to build up a formidable -fleet, adding programme to programme, out of all possible proportion -to the German commerce to be defended or to the German coastline -exposed to attack. Already vainglorious boasts were made that -Germany was the successor to Britain upon the seas. "The Admiral of -the Atlantic greets the Admiral of the Pacific," said the Kaiser in -a message to the Czar. What was Britain to do under this growing -menace? So long as she was isolated the diplomacy of Germany might -form some naval coalition against her. She took the steps which were -necessary for her own safety, and without forming an alliance she -composed her differences with France and Russia and drew closer the -friendship which united her with her old rival across the Channel. -The first-fruit of the new German fleet was the _entente cordiale_. -We had found our enemy. It was necessary that we should find our -friends. Thus we were driven into our present combination. - -And now we had to justify our friendship. For the first time we were -compelled to openly oppose Germany in the deep and dangerous game of -world politics. They wished to see if our understanding was a -reality or a sham. Could they drive a wedge between us by showing -that we were a fair-weather friend whom any stress would alienate. -Twice they tried it, once in 1906 when they bullied France into a -conference at Algeciras, but found that Britain was firm at her -side, and again in 1911 when in a time of profound peace they -stirred up trouble by sending a gunboat to Agadir, and pushed -matters to the very edge of war. But no threats induced Britain to -be false to her mutual insurance with France. Now for the third and -most fatal time they have demanded that we forswear ourselves and -break our own bond lest a worse thing befall us. Blind and foolish, -did they not know by past experience that we would keep our promise -given? In their madness they have wrought an irremediable evil to -themselves, to us, and to all Europe. - -I have shown that we have in very truth never injured nor desired to -injure Germany in commerce, nor have we opposed her politically -until her own deliberate actions drove us into the camp of her -opponents. But it may well be asked why then did they dislike us, -and why did they weave hostile plots against us? It was that, as it -seemed to them, and as indeed it actually may have been, we -independently of our own wills stood between Germany and that world -empire of which she dreamed. This was caused by circumstances over -which we had no control and which we could not modify if we had -wished to do so. Britain, through her maritime power and the energy -of her merchants and people, had become a great world power when -Germany was still unformed. Thus, when she had grown to her full -stature she found that the choice places of the world and those most -fitted for the spread of a transplanted European race were already -filled up. It was not a matter which we could help, nor could we -alter it, since Canada, Australia, and South Africa would not, even -if we could be imagined to have wished it, be transferred to German -rule. And yet the Germans chafed, and if we can put ourselves in -their places we may admit that it was galling that the surplus of -their manhood should go to build up the strength of an alien and -possibly a rival State. So far we could see their grievance, or -rather their misfortune, since no one was in truth to blame in the -matter. Had their needs been openly and reasonably expressed, and -had the two States moved in concord in the matter, it is difficult -to think that no helpful solution of any kind could have been -found. - -But the German method of approaching the problem has never been to -ask sympathy and co-operation, but to picture us as a degenerate -race from whom anything might be gained by playing upon our imagined -weakness and cowardice. A nation which attends quietly to its own -sober business must, according to their mediaeval notions, be a -nation of decadent poltroons. If we fight our battles by means of -free volunteers instead of enforced conscripts, then the military -spirit must be dead amongst us. Perhaps, even in this short -campaign, they have added this delusion also to the dust-bin of -their many errors. But such was their absurd self-deception about -the most virile of European races. Did we propose disarmament, then -it was not humanitarianism but cowardice that prompted us, and their -answer was to enlarge their programme. Did we suggest a -navy-building holiday, it was but a cloak for our weakness, and an -incitement that they should redouble their efforts. Our decay had -become a part of their national faith. At first the wish may have -been the father to the thought, but soon under the reiterated -assertions of their crazy professors the proposition became -indisputable. Bernhardi in his book upon the next war cannot conceal -the contempt in which he has learned to hold us. Niebuhr long ago -had prophesied the coming fall of Britain, and every year was -believed to bring it nearer and to make it more certain. To these -jaundiced eyes all seemed yellow, when the yellowness lay only in -themselves. Our army, our navy, our Colonies, all were equally -rotten. "Old England, old, indeed, and corrupt, rotten through and -through." One blow and the vast sham would fly to pieces, and from -those pieces the victor could choose his reward. Listen to Professor -Treitschke, a man who, above all others, has been the evil genius of -his country, and has done most to push it towards this abyss: "A -thing that is wholly a sham," he cried, in allusion to our Empire, -"cannot, in this universe of ours, endure for ever. It may endure -for a day, but its doom is certain." Were ever words more true when -applied to the narrow bureaucracy and swaggering Junkerdom of -Prussia, the most artificial and ossified sham that ever our days -have seen? See which will crack first, our democracy or this, now -that both have been plunged into the furnace together. The day of -God's testing has come, and we shall see which can best abide it. - -I have tried to show that we are in no way to blame for the -hostility which has grown up between us. So far as it had any solid -cause at all it has arisen from fixed factors, which could no more -be changed by us than the geographical position which has laid us -right across their exit to the oceans of the world. That this -deeply-rooted national sentiment, which for ever regarded us as the -Carthage to which they were destined to play the part of Rome, -would, sooner or later, have brought about war between us, is, in my -opinion, beyond all doubt. But it was planned to come at the moment -which was least favourable for Britain. "Even English attempts at a -_rapprochement_ must not blind us to the real situation," says -Bernhardi. "We may, at most, use them to delay the necessary and -inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of -success." A more shameless sentence was never penned, and one -stands marvelling which is the more grotesque--the cynicism of the -sentiment, or the folly which gave such a warning to the victim. For -be it remembered that Bernhardi's words are to be taken very -seriously, for they are not the ravings of some Pan-German -monomaniac, but the considered views of the foremost military writer -of Germany, one who is in touch with those inner circles whose -opinions are the springs of national policy. "Our last and greatest -reckoning is to be with Great Britain," said the bitter Treitschke. -Sooner or later the shock was to come. Germany sat brooding over the -chessboard of the world waiting for the opening which should assure -a winning game. - -It was clear that she should take her enemies separately rather than -together. If Britain were attacked, it was almost certain that -France and Russia would stand by her side. But if, on the contrary, -the quarrel could be made with these two Powers, and especially with -Russia, in the first instance, then it was by no means so certain -that Great Britain would be drawn into the struggle. Public opinion -has to be strongly moved before our country can fight, and public -opinion under a Liberal Government might well be divided upon the -subject of Russia. Therefore, if the quarrel could be so arranged as -to seem to be entirely one between Teuton and Slav there was a good -chance that Britain would remain undecided until the swift German -sword had done its work. Then, with the grim acquiescence of our -deserted Allies, the still bloody sword would be turned upon -ourselves, and that great final reckoning would have come. - -Such was the plan, and fortune favoured it. A brutal murder had, not -for the first time, put Servia into a position where a State may be -blamed for the sins of individuals. An ultimatum was launched so -phrased that it was impossible for any State to accept it as it -stood and yet remain an independent State. At the first sign of -argument or remonstrance the Austrian army marched upon Belgrade. -Russia, which had been already humiliated in 1908 by the forcible -annexation of Bosnia, could not possibly submit a second time to the -Caudine Forks. She laid her hand upon her sword-hilt. Germany -sprang to the side of her Ally. France ranged herself with Russia. -Like a thunderclap the war of the nations had begun. - -So far all had worked well for German plans. Those of the British -public who were familiar with the past and could look into the future -might be well aware that our interests were firmly bound with those -of France, and that if our faggots were not tied together they would -assuredly be snapped each in its turn. But the unsavoury -assassination which had been so cleverly chosen as the starting-point -of the war bulked large in the eyes of our people, and, setting -self-interest to one side, the greater part of the public might well -have hesitated to enter into a quarrel where the cause seemed remote -and the issues ill-defined. What was it to us if a Slav or a Teuton -collected the harbour dues of Salonica! So the question might have -presented itself to the average man who in the long run is the ruler -of this country and the autocrat of its destinies. In spite of all -the wisdom of our statesmen, it is doubtful if on such a quarrel we -could have gained that national momentum which might carry us to -victory. But at that very moment Germany took a step which removed -the last doubt from the most cautious of us and left us in a position -where we must either draw our sword or stand for ever dishonoured and -humiliated before the world. The action demanded of us was such a -compound of cowardice and treachery that we ask ourselves in dismay -what can we ever have done that could make others for one instant -imagine us to be capable of so dastardly a course? Yet that it was -really supposed that we could do it, and that it was not merely put -forward as an excuse for drawing us into war, is shown by the anger -and consternation of the Kaiser and his Chancellor when we drew back -from what the British Prime Minister has described as "an infamous -proposal." One has only to read our Ambassador's description of his -interview with the German Chancellor after our decision was -announced, "so evidently overcome by the news of our action," to see -that through some extraordinary mental aberration the German rulers -did actually believe that a vital treaty with Britain's signature -upon it could be regarded by this country as a mere "scrap of paper." - -What was this treaty which it was proposed so lightly to set aside? -It was the guarantee of the neutrality of Belgium signed in 1839 -(confirmed verbally and in writing by Bismarck in 1870), by Prussia, -France, and Britain, each of whom pledged their word to observe and -to enforce it. On the strength of it Belgium had relied for her -security amidst her formidable neighbours. On the strength of it -also France had lavished all her defences upon her eastern frontier, -and left her northern exposed to attack. Britain had guaranteed the -treaty, and Britain could be relied upon. Now, on the first occasion -of testing the value of her word it was supposed that she would -regard the treaty as a worthless scrap of paper, and stand by -unmoved while the little State which had trusted her was flooded by -the armies of the invader. It was unthinkable, and yet the wisest -brains of Germany seem to have persuaded themselves that we had sunk -to such depths of cowardly indolence that even this might go -through. Surely they also have been hypnotised by those foolish -dreams of Britain's degeneration, from which they will have so -terrible an awakening. - -As a matter of fact, the General Staff had got ahead of the -diplomatists, and the German columns were already over the border -while the point was being debated at Berlin. There was no retreat -from the position which had been taken up. "It is to us a vital -matter of strategy and is beyond argument," said the German soldier. -"It is to us a vital matter of honour and is beyond argument," -answered the British statesman. The die was cast. No compromise was -possible. Would Britain keep her word or would she not? That was the -sole question at issue. And what answer save one could any Briton -give to it? "I do not believe," said our Prime Minister, "that any -nation ever entered into a great controversy with a clearer -conscience and stronger conviction that she is fighting, not for -aggression, not for the maintenance of her own selfish interest, but -in defence of principles the maintenance of which is vital to the -civilisation of the world." So he spoke, and History will endorse -his words, for we surely have our quarrel just. - -So much for the events which have led us to war. Now for a moment -let us glance at what we may have to hope for, what we may have to -fear, and above all what we must each of us do that we win through -to a lasting peace. - -What have we to gain if we win? That we have nothing material to -gain, no colonies which we covet, no possessions of any sort that we -desire, is the final proof that the war has not been provoked by us. -No nation would deliberately go out of its way to wage so hazardous -and costly a struggle when there is no prize for victory. But one -enormous indirect benefit we will gain if we can make Germany a -peaceful and harmless State. We will surely break her naval power -and take such steps that it shall not be a menace to us any more. It -was this naval power, with its rapid increase, and the need that we -should ever, as Mr. Churchill has so well expressed it, be ready at -our average moment to meet an attack at their chosen moment--it was -this which has piled up our war estimates during the last ten years -until they have bowed us down. With such enormous sums spent upon -ships and guns, great masses of capital were diverted from the -ordinary channels of trade, while an even more serious result was -that our programmes of social reform had to be curtailed from want -of the money which could finance them. Let the menace of that -lurking fleet be withdrawn--the nightmare of those thousand hammers -working day and night in forging engines for our destruction, and -our estimates will once again be those of a civilised Christian -country, while our vast capital will be turned from measures of -self-protection to those of self-improvement. Should our victory be -complete, there is little which Germany can yield to us save the -removal of that shadow which has darkened us so long. But our -children and our children's children will never, if we do our work -well now, look across the North Sea with the sombre thoughts which -have so long been ours, while their lives will be brightened and -elevated by money which we, in our darker days, have had to spend -upon our ships and our guns. - -Consider, on the other hand, what we should suffer if we were to -lose. All the troubles of the last ten years would be with us still, -but in a greatly exaggerated form. A larger and stronger Germany -would dominate Europe and would overshadow our lives. Her coast-line -would be increased, her ports would face our own, her coaling -stations would be in every sea, and her great army, greater then -than ever, would be within striking distance of our shores. To avoid -sinking for ever into the condition of a dependant, we should be -compelled to have recourse to rigid compulsory service, and our -diminished revenues would be all turned to the needs of -self-defence. Such would be the miserable condition in which we -should hand on to our children that free and glorious empire which -we inherited in all the fulness of its richness and its splendour -from those strong fathers who have built it up. What peace of mind, -what self-respect could be left for us in the remainder of our -lives? The weight of dishonour would lie always upon our hearts. And -yet this will be surely our fate and our future if we do not nerve -our souls and brace our arms for victory. No regrets will avail, no -excuses will help, no after-thoughts can profit us. It is -now--_now_--even in these weeks and months that are passing that the -final reckoning is being taken, and when once the sum is made up no -further effort can change it. What are our lives or our labours, our -fortunes or even our families, when compared with the life or death -of the great mother of us all? We are but the leaves of the tree. -What matter if we flutter down to-day or to-morrow, so long as the -great trunk stands and the burrowing roots are firm? Happy the man -who can die with the thought that in this greatest crisis of all he -has served his country to the uttermost; but who would bear the -thoughts of him who lives on with the memory that he has shirked his -duty and failed his country at the moment of her need? - -There is a settled and assured future if we win. There is darkness -and trouble if we lose. But if we take a broader sweep and trace the -meanings of this contest as they affect others than ourselves, then -ever greater, more glorious are the issues for which we fight. For -the whole world stands at a turning-point of its history, and one or -other of two opposite principles, the rule of the soldier or the -rule of the citizen, must now prevail. In this sense we fight for -the masses of the German people, as some day they will understand, -to free them from that formidable military caste which has used and -abused them, spending their bodies in an unjust war and poisoning -their minds by every device which could inflame them against those -who wish nothing save to live at peace with them. We fight for the -strong, deep Germany of old, the Germany of music and of philosophy, -against this monstrous modern aberration the Germany of blood and of -iron, the Germany from which, instead of the old things of beauty, -there come to us only the rant of scolding professors with their -final reckonings, their Welt-politik, and their Godless theories of -the Superman who stands above morality and to whom all humanity -shall be subservient. Instead of the world-inspiring phrases of a -Goethe or a Schiller, what are the words in the last decade which -have been quoted across the sea? Are they not always the -ever-recurring words of wrath from one ill-balanced man? "Strike -them with the mailed fist." "Leave such a name behind you as Attila -and his Huns." "Turn your weapons even upon your own flesh and blood -at my command." These are the messages which have come from this -perversion of a nation's soul. - -But the matter lies deep. The Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs have -used their peoples as a great landowner might use the serfs upon his -estate. It was, and is, their openly expressed theory that they were -in their position by the grace of God, that they owed no reckoning -to any man, and that kingdom and folk were committed for better or -worse to their charge. Round this theory of the dark ages there -gathered all the forces of the many Courts of the Empire, all the -nobility who make so huge a class in Germanic countries, all the -vast army to whom strict discipline and obedience were the breath of -life, all the office-holders of the State, all the purveyors of -warlike stores. These and their like were the natural setting to -such a central idea. Court influence largely controlled the -teaching at schools and universities, and so the growing twig could -be bent. But all these forces together could not have upheld so -dangerous and unnatural a theory had it not been for the influence -of a servile Press. - -How that Press was managed, how the thoughts of the people could be -turned to the right or the left with the same precision as a platoon -of Grenadiers, has been shown clearly enough in the Memoirs of -Bismarck. Public opinion was poisoned at its very roots. The average -citizen lived in a false atmosphere where everything was distorted -to his vision. He saw his Kaiser, not as an essentially weak and -impetuous man with a dangerous entourage who were ever at his ear, -but as Germany personified, an angel with a flaming sword, beating -back envious assailants from the beloved Fatherland. He saw his -neighbours not as peaceful nations who had no possible desire to -attack him, but, on the contrary, lived in constant fear of him, but -as a band of envious and truculent conspirators who could only be -kept in order by the sudden stamp of the jackboot and the menacing -clatter of the sabre. He insensibly imbibed the Nietzsche doctrine -that the immorality of the Superman may be as colossal as his -strength and that the slave-evangel of Christianity was superseded -by a sterner law. Thus when he saw acts which his reason must have -told him were indefensible, he was still narcotised by this -conception of some new standard of right. He saw his Kaiser at the -time of a petty humiliation to Great Britain sending a telegram of -congratulation to the man who had inflicted this rebuff. Could that -be approved by reason? At a time when all Europe was shuddering over -the Armenian massacres he saw this same Kaiser paying a -complimentary visit to the Sultan whose hands were still wet with -the blood of murdered Christians. Could that be reconciled with what -is right? A little later he saw the Kaiser once again pushing -himself into Mediterranean politics, where no direct German interest -lay, and endeavouring to tangle up the French developments in -Northern Africa by provocative personal appearances at Morocco, and, -later, by sending a gunboat to intrude upon a scene of action which -had already by the Treaty of Algeciras been allotted to France. - -How could an honest German whose mind was undebauched by a -controlled Press justify such an interference as that? He is or -should be aware that in annexing Bosnia, Austria was tearing up a -treaty without the consent of the other signatories, and that his -own country was supporting and probably inciting her ally to this -public breach of faith. Could he honestly think that this was right? -And, finally, he must know, for his own Chancellor has publicly -proclaimed it, that the Invasion of Belgium was a breach of -international right, and that Germany, or rather, Prussia, had -perjured herself upon the day that the first of her soldiers passed -over the frontier. How can he explain all this to himself save on a -theory that might is right, that no moral law applies to the -Superman, and that so long as one hews one's way through the rest -can matter little? To such a point of degradation have public morals -been brought by the infernal teachings of Prussian military -philosophy, dating back as far as Frederick the Second, but -intensified by the exhortations of Press and professors during our -own times. The mind of the average kindly German citizen has been -debauched and yet again debauched until it needed just such a world -crisis as this to startle him at last from his obsession and show -him his position and that of his country in its true relation with -humanity and progress. - -Thus I say that for the German who stands outside the ruling classes -our victory would bring a lasting relief, and some hope that in the -future his destiny should be controlled by his own judgment and not -by the passions or interests of those against whom he has at present -no appeal. A system which has brought disaster to Germany and chaos -to all Europe can never, one would think, be resumed, and amid the -debris of his Empire the German may pick up that precious jewel of -personal freedom which is above the splendour of foreign conquest. A -Hapsburg or a Hohenzollern may find his true place as the servant -rather than the master of a nation. But apart from Germany, look at -the effects which our victory must have over the whole wide world. -Everywhere it will mean the triumph of reasoned democracy, of -public debate, of ordered freedom in which every man is an active -unit in the system of his own government; whilst our defeat would -stand for a victory to a privileged class, the thrusting down of the -civilian by the arrogance and intolerance of militarism, and the -subjection of all that is human and progressive to all that is -cruel, narrow, and reactionary. - -This is the stake for which we play, and the world will lose or gain -as well as we. You may well come, you democratic over-sea men of our -blood, to rally round us now, for all that you cherish, all that is -bred in your very bones, is that for which we fight. And you, lovers -of Freedom in every land, we claim at least your prayers and your -wishes, for if our sword be broken you will be the poorer. But fear -not, for our sword will not be broken, nor shall it ever drop from -our hands until this matter is for ever set in order. If every ally -we have upon earth were to go down in blood and ruin, still would we -fight through to the appointed end. Defeat shall not daunt us. -Inconclusive victory shall not turn us from our purpose. The grind -of poverty and the weariness of hopes deferred shall not blunt the -edge of our resolve. With God's help we shall go to the end, and -when that goal is reached it is our prayer that a new era shall come -as our reward, an era in which, by common action of State with -State, mutual hatreds and strivings shall be appeased, land shall no -longer be estranged from land, and huge armies and fleets will be -nightmares of the past. Thus, as ever, the throes of evil may give -birth to good. Till then our task stands clear before us--a task -that will ask for all we have in strength and resolution. Have you -who read this played your part to the highest? If not, do it now, or -stand for ever shamed. - - - * * * * * - - - - -II - -THE WORLD-WAR CONSPIRACY - - -It is instructive and interesting now,[1] before fresh great events -and a new situation obliterate the old impressions, to put it on -record how things seemed to some of us before the blow fell. A -mental position often seems incredible when looked back to from some -new standpoint. - - [1] August 20, 1914. - -I am one of those who were obstinate in refusing to recognise -Germany's intentions. I argued, I wrote, I joined the Anglo-German -Friendship Society; I did everything I could for the faith that was -in me. But early last year my views underwent a complete change, and -I realised that I had been wrong, and that the thing which seemed -too crazy and too wicked to be true actually was true. I recorded my -conversion at the time in an article entitled "Great Britain and -the Next War" in the _Fortnightly_ of March, and reading over that -article I find a good deal which fits very closely to the present -situation. Forecasts are dangerous, but there is not much there -which I would wish to withdraw. What brought about my change of view -was reading Bernhardi's book on Germany and the next war. - -Up to then I had imagined that all this sabre-rattling was a sort of -boyish exuberance on the part of a robust young nation which had a -fancy to clank about the world in jackboots. Some of it also came, -as it seemed to me, from a perfectly natural jealousy, and some as -the result of the preaching of those extraordinary professors whose -idiotic diatribes have done so much to poison the minds of Young -Germany. This was clear enough. But I could not believe that there -was a conspiracy hatching for a world-war, in which the command of -the sea would be challenged as well as that of the land. No motive -seemed to me to exist for so monstrous an upheaval, and no prize to -await Germany, if she won, which could at all balance her enormous -risks if she lost. Besides, one imagined that civilisation and -Christianity did stand for something, and that it was inconceivable -that a nation with pretensions to either the one or the other could -at this date of the world's history lend itself to a cold-blooded, -barbarous conspiracy by which it built up its strength for a number -of years with the intention of falling at a fitting moment upon its -neighbours, without any cause of quarrel save a general desire for -aggrandisement. - -All this, I say, I could not bring myself to believe. But I read -Bernhardi's book, and then I could not help believing. I wrote an -article in the hope that others who had been as blind as myself -might also come to see the truth. For who was Bernhardi? He was one -of the most noted officers in the German army. And here was a book -addressed to his own fellow-countrymen, in which these sentiments -were set forth. You could not set such a document aside and treat it -as of no account. As I said at the time, "We should be mad if we did -not take very serious notice of the warning." - -But the strange thing is that there should have been a warning. -There is a quaint simplicity in the German mind, which has shown -itself again and again in the recent events. But this is surely the -supreme example of it. One would imagine that the idea that the book -could be translated and read by his intended victims had never -occurred to the author. As a famous soldier, it is impossible to -believe that he was not in touch with the General Staff, and he -outlines a policy which has some reason, therefore, to be looked -upon as an official one. It is as bright a performance as if some -one on Lord Roberts's staff had written a description of the -Paardeberg flank march and sent it to Cronje some weeks before it -was carried out. And yet it was not an isolated example, for Von -Edelsheim, who actually belongs to this amazing General Staff, -published a shorter sketch, setting forth how his country would deal -with the United States--an essay which is an extraordinary example -of bombastic ignorance. Such indiscretions can only be explained as -manifestations of an inflated national arrogance, which has blown -itself up into a conviction that Germany was so sure of winning -that it mattered little whether her opponents were upon their guard -or not. - -But Bernhardi's programme, as outlined in his book, is actually -being carried through. The whole weight of the attack was to be -thrown upon France. Russia was to be held back during her slow -mobilisation, and then the victorious legions from Paris were to -thunder across in their countless troop trains from the western to -the eastern firing-line. Britain was to be cajoled into keeping -aloof until her fate was ripe. Then her fleet was to be whittled -down by submarines, mines, and torpedo-boats until the numbers were -more equal, when the main German fleet, coming from under the forts -of Wilhelmshaven, should strike for the conquest of the sea. Such -were the plans, and dire the fate of the conquered. They were in -accordance with the German semi-official paper, which cried on the -day before the declaration of war: "We shall win--and when we do, -'Vae victis!'" With France it was to be a final account. Our own -fate would be little better. It needs a righteous anger to wage war -to the full, and we can feel it when we think of the long-drawn -plot against us, and of the fate which defeat would bring. - -However favourable the general trend of events, we can hardly hope -to escape some bad hours during this war. The Germans are a great -and brave people, with a fine record in warlike history. They will -not go down without leaving their mark deep upon the Allies. We must -not take the opening successes too seriously, or allow ourselves to -have the edge taken off our resolution by the idea that things will -necessarily go well with us. On land and sea vast efforts and -occasional disappointments will await us. But it will not be long. -It is, as it seems to me, absolutely impossible that it should be -long. The temper of the times will not brook slow measures, nor will -the enormous financial strain upon Germany be tolerated -indefinitely. How dangerous is prophecy, and these very words may -come back to mock me; but I cannot myself see how it can be over in -less than six months, or how it could extend for more than twelve. - -If it should happen that the military affairs of Germany are as -rotten as her diplomacy, then it certainly should not last long. -That, no doubt, is too much to expect, but there are many degrees of -incapacity which are short of that extreme limit. For of that, at -least, there can be no dispute. What has come from all this crazy -science of Real-politik and Welt-politik and the rest of it? Simply -that wherever it was possible to lose the trick Germany and her -partner have done so. An alliance with Italy so loose that it was -useless, a Mediterranean understanding with Austria so vague that it -only operated after it had become of no service to the German -cruisers, the drawing of Servia, Montenegro, and, finally, of -Belgium, into the field against them, the dealing with England in -the one fashion which must unite our ranks and cut the ground from -under the feet of any party which might cause dissension--these are -the results of the Wilhelmstrasse combinations, with Potsdam -embellishments. Was there ever so colossal a muddle? Is there any -one point which could have been worse handled? And then as a -by-product the universal distrust and anger which such policy has -aroused in the neutral countries--yes, it really is a thing -complete. - -But the German soldier may prove himself as good as ever. That he -will be as brave as ever I have no doubt at all. That he will be as -hardy as ever is less likely, as the population of the Fatherland -has drifted largely from fields to factories, and as the standard of -comfort, and even luxury, have greatly increased. The Westphalian -artisan of William is very different material from the Brandenburg -peasant of Frederick, even as the short-service soldier of 1914 is -very different from the ten-year man of 1750. I should expect to see -the German as good, but no better than his neighbours. But the whole -issue of this campaign depends, from his point of view, upon his -being better. He has to win against superior numbers. He must not -only win, but win quickly. If an equilibrium were established, the -strangulation from England must bring victory to the Allies. It is a -great deal that the Kaiser has asked from his men. - -And there is his much-vaunted military organisation. An American -friend of mine, who had means of forming an opinion, remarked to -me, "Yes, it is a huge and smooth-running machine, with delicate -adjustments. Like all such machines, if a few cogwheels stuck the -whole might racket itself to pieces." A cogwheel stuck at Liege, -another may stick before long, and it all depends on how the machine -can adjust itself. The lesson of history is ominous. The Prussians -of Jena and Auerstadt were men who had been swollen up by the -tradition of Frederick's prowess. Yet in a single day their defeat -was so great and their power of recuperation so slight that they -were utterly dispersed, and their country for seven years ceased to -exist as a factor in European politics. They have always been great -winners. They have not always been great in adversity. How will they -now stand this test if it should come their way? - - - * * * * * - - - - -III - -THE DEVIL'S DOCTRINE - - -I have been interesting and exasperating myself, during a most -untimely illness,[2] by working through a part of the literature of -German Imperial Expansion. I know that it is only a part, and yet -when I look at this array--Treitschke and Bernhardi, Schiemann and -Hasse, Bley, Sybel, "Gross-Deutschland" and "Germania Triumphans"--it -represents a considerable body of thought. And it is the literature -of the devil. Not one kindly sentiment, not one generous expression, -is to be found within it. It is informed with passionate cupidity for -the writer's country and unreasoning, indiscriminate hatred and -jealousy towards everything outside it--above all, towards the -British Empire. How could such a literature fail to bring about a -world-coalition against the country which produced it! Were there no -Germans who foresaw so obvious a result? The whole tendency of the -doctrine is that Germany should, artichoke fashion, dismember the -world. Not a word is said as to the world suddenly turning and -dismembering her. But was not that the only protection against such -monstrous teaching as these books contain? - - [2] September 10, 1914. - -You may object that these Imperialists were but a group of -monomaniacs and did not represent the nation. But the evidence is -the other way. They represented that part of the nation which counts -in international politics--they represented the Kaiser and his -circle, Von Tirpitz and the Navy men, Krupp, von Bohlen and the -armour-plated gang, the universities where such doctrines were -openly preached, the Army, the Junkers--all the noisy, aggressive -elements whose voice has sounded of late years as the voice of -Germany. All were infected by the same virus of madness which has -compelled Europe to get them once for all into a strait-jacket. - -The actual policy of State was conducted on the very lines of these -teachings, where the devilish doctrine that war should be for ever -lurking in a statesman's thoughts, that he should be prepared to -pounce upon a neighbour should it be in a state of weakness, and that -no treaty or moral consideration should stay his hand, is repeated -again and again as the very basis of all state-craft. At the time of -the Agadir crisis we have the German Minister of Foreign Affairs -openly admitting that he took the view of the fanatical Pan-Germans. -"I am as good a Pan-German as you," said Kiderlen-Waechter to the -representative of the League. Each was as good or as bad as the -other, for all were filled with the same heady, pernicious stuff -which has brought Europe to chaos. - -Where, now, is that "deep, patient Germany" of which Carlyle wrote? -Was ever a nation's soul so perverted, so fallen from grace! Read -this mass of bombast--learned bombast of professors, vulgar bombast -of Lokal-Anzeigers and the like, but always bombast. Wade through -the prophetic books with their assumption that Britain must perish -and Germany succeed her; consult the scolding articles and -lectures, so narrow, ungenerous, and boastful in their tone, so -utterly wanting in the deeper historical knowledge or true reading -of a rival's character; see the insane Pan-German maps, with their -partitions of Europe for the year 1915 or thereabouts; study the -lectures of the crazy professors, with their absurd assumption of -accurate knowledge and their extraordinary knack of getting every -fact as wrong as it could possibly be--take all this together, and -then say whether any nation has ever in this world been so foolishly -and utterly misled as have the Germans. - -I have alluded to their knack of getting everything wrong. It is -perfectly miraculous. One would not have thought it possible that -people could be _always_ wrong. So blinded have they been by hate -that everything was distorted. Never even by accident did they -stumble upon the truth. Let us take a list of their confident -assertions--things so self-evident that they were taken for granted -by the average journalist: - - "The British Army was worthless; its presence on the Continent, - even if it could come, was immaterial. - - "Britain herself was absolutely decadent. - - "Britain's commerce could be ruined by the German cruisers. - - "The United States would fall upon us if we were in trouble. - - "Canada and Australia were longing to break away from the Empire. - - "India loathed us. - - "The Boers were eager to reconquer South Africa. - - "The Empire was an artificial collection of States which must - fly to pieces at the first shock." - -This was the nonsense which grave Berlin Professors of History -ladled out to their receptive students. The sinister Treitschke, who -is one of half a dozen men who have torn down Imperial Germany just -as surely as Roon, Bismarck, and Moltke built it up, was the -arch-priest of this cult. Like Nietzsche, whose moral teaching was -the supplement to the Pan-German Material doctrine, Treitschke was -not, by extraction, a German at all. Both men were of the magnetic -Slav stock, dreamers of dreams and seers of visions--evil dreams and -dark visions for the land in which they dwelt. With their magic -flutes they have led the whole blind, foolish, conceited nation down -that easy, pleasant path which ends in this abyss. - -Nietzsche was, as his whole life proved, a man upon the edge of -insanity, who at last went obviously mad. Treitschke was a man of -great brain power, who had an _idee fixe_--a monomania about -Britain. So long as he raved in Berlin, Englishmen took no more -notice than they do of an anarchist howling in the park; for it is -the British theory that a man may say and think what he will so long -as he refrains from doing. But Treitschke was always dangerous. He -was magnetic, eloquent, enthusiastic, flashing wondrous visions of -the future before his listeners, varying in beauty, but always alike -in that they were seen across our prostrate body. Those who are in a -position to judge, like the late Professor Cramb, say that his -influence on young Germany could only be compared with that of -Carlyle and Macaulay united in Great Britain. And now, after his -death, his words have all sprung to deeds to the ruin of his own -country and to the deep misfortune of ours. He used to visit -England, this strange and sinister man, but as he was stone deaf his -bodily presence brought him little nearer to us. With useless ears -and jaundiced eyes he moved among us, returning to Berlin for the -new Semester as ignorant as he had left it, to rail against us once -again. He worked to harm us, and he has done so, but Lord! what is -the worst that he has done to us compared with the irretrievable -ruin that he has brought to his own country! He and Von Tirpitz, -Count Bieberstein, Maximilian Harden and a few more, to say nothing -of the head plotter of all--a fine Germany they will leave behind -them! Treitschke is dead, and so is Bieberstein, but a good many of -their dupes may live to see the day when Indian princes ride as -conquerors down Unter den Linden and the shattered remains of the -braggadocio statues of the Sieges Allee, that vulgar monument of -bastard Imperialism, will expiate the honoured ashes of Louvain. - -But the stupidity of it all--that is the consideration which comes -in a wave to submerge every other aspect of the matter. For consider -the situation: as lately as 1897 the European grouping was clear. -The antagonists were already ranged. Russia had definitely taken her -side with France; against them, equally definitely, were Germany and -Austria, whilst Italy clearly was on an orbit by herself. War sooner -or later was a certainty. Unattached, but with a distinct bias to -Germany on racial, religious, and other grounds, lay Great Britain, -the richest Power in the world, the ruler of the seas, and a nation -which was historically tenacious and unconquerable in war. Was it -not clear that the first interest of Germany was to conciliate such -a Power and to make sure that if she were not an ally she would at -least never be an enemy? No proposition could be clearer than that. -And yet cast your minds back and remember the treatment and bearing -of Germany towards Britain since that date--the floods of scorn, the -libels, the bitter attacks, the unconcealed determination to do her -harm. See how it has all ended, and how this atmosphere of hatred -has put a driving force into Great Britain which has astonished -ourselves. This is the end of all the clever Welt-Politik. Truly -_Quos Deus vult perdere_--the gods must have willed it much, for no -nation was ever madder. - -Where were the sane Germans? Why was there no protest from them? -Perhaps there was, but we never heard of it amid the beating of -those great Pan-German drums. Did the whole nation, for example, -really agree in so harebrained a scheme as the Bagdad Railway? Think -of the insanity of such a project as that. Here is a railway -representing very many millions of German capital which is built in -the heart of Asia Minor, as far removed from any sort of German -protection or effective control as if it were in the moon. The next -step, vaguely thought out, was that German settlers were to be -planted along the line of the railroad, but upon that being advanced -the Turks, who had smiled most amiably at the actual railway -construction, put down their slippers in the most emphatic manner. -The net result, therefore, would seem to be that Turkey holds a -hostage of a great many millions of German capital which, so long -as Germany behaves herself, may or may not return some interest; but -if Germany goes against Turkish wishes could at once be confiscated. -Apart from Turkey, Russia in the Caucasus, and England in North-West -India regard with a good deal of interested attention this singular -and helpless German railway which projects out into space. - -There is one phase of their doctrines which has, perhaps, received -less attention than it deserves. It will be found very fully treated -in Professor Usher's book on _Pan-Germanism_, which, coming from an -American authority who seems to have studied his subject very -thoroughly, has the merit of impartiality. This proposition is that -just as a treaty is only a scrap of paper, so also is a bond or -debenture, and that just as the highest interest of a nation may at -any moment override ordinary morality, the same vital urgency may -justify anything in the nature of repudiation of debt. This is not -to be done on account of inability to pay the debt; but through a -deliberate, cold-blooded plot to weaken the creditor by robbing him -of his property. - -Modern Germany has been largely built up by foreign capital. In war, -if Germany is conquered the debt necessarily holds good. But if -Germany wins, part of her reward of victory is the complete -repudiation of all debts. Thus the glorious or inglorious prize of -success would be, that all her vast industrial plant would be freed -from every debenture and start without an encumbrance, a free -present from the enemy. This example, they hope, would lead other -nations to do the same, and so still further ruin the finances of -England and France, which are the great lending nations of the -earth. They frankly admit that such a _coup_ would make it very -difficult for their nation to borrow money again, but on the other -hand, they would have made such an immense profit over the -transaction that they would be able to go on for many years without -any need of more capital. "To secure so stupendous a result as -this," said the American Professor, "is well worth the expenditure -of money for building a fleet. That money, so far as the German -nation is concerned, is merely invested in an enterprise from which -they confidently expect returns perhaps a hundred-fold." - -As to the morality of this transaction, the Professor, who has -certainly no anti-German bias, expresses their views very plainly. -It is the same as Frederick the Great's views as to the morality of -treaties which have descended with such fatal effects upon his -successor on the Prussian throne. Once admit such anti-social -theories and there is no end to their application. Here it is in the -domain of economics just as shameless as in that of politics. "Once -more," says the Professor, "the Germans hear around them our cries -against the morality of this procedure. The Germans refuse to -recognise as moral anything which jeopardises their national -existence." They are to be the judges of what these are, and if -repudiation of debt is considered to be one of them, then all debt -may be repudiated. They will not put their views into practice this -time because they will not be the victors, but when the -reconstruction of Germany begins and she comes once again as a -chastened borrower into the market-place of the world, it would be -well to have some assurance as to how far she retains these views -upon commercial morality. - -But I have visions of a really chastened Germany, of a Germany which -has sloughed all this wicked nonsense, which has found her better -self again, and which is once more that "deep, patient Germany" with -which I began this essay. She never can be now what she could so -easily have been. She could have continued indefinitely to extend -from Poland to the Vosges, one vast community, honoured by all for -industry and for learning, with a huge commerce, a happy, peaceful, -prosperous population, and a Colonial system which, if smaller than -that of nations which were centuries older in the field, would at -least be remarkable for so short a time. None of these things would -the world have grudged her, and in the future as in the past she -would have found in the British Dominions and in Great Britain -herself an entry for her products as free as if she were herself -part of the Empire. - -All this must be changed for the worse, and it is just that she -should suffer for her sins. The work of sixty years will be -destroyed. But will not the spiritual Germany be the stronger and -better? We cannot say. We can but hope and wait and wonder. What is -sure is that the real Germany, of whom Carlyle spoke, can never be -destroyed. Nor would we desire it. Our wrath is not against Germany, -but against that Krupp-Kaiser-Junker combination which has brought -her to such a deadly pass. - - - * * * * * - - - - -IV - -THE GREAT GERMAN PLOT - - -It will be a fascinating task for the historian of the immediate -future to work out the various strands of evidence which seem to be -independent and yet when followed up converge upon the central -purpose of a prearranged war for the late summer of 1914--a war in -which Germany should be the prime mover and instigator and Austria -the dupe and catspaw. - -Of course, there are some great facts patent to all the world. There -is the sudden rapid acceleration of German preparations for the last -two years, the great increase of the army with the colours, and the -special emergency tax which was to bring in fifty millions of money. -Looking back, we can see very clearly that these things were the run -before the jump. Germany at the moment of declaring war had -accumulated by processes extending over years all the money which -by borrowing or taxation she could raise, and she cannot really -expect the rest of the world to believe that it was a mere -coincidence that a crisis came along at that particular and -favourable moment. All the evidence tends to show that the -long-planned outbreak--the "letting-go" as it was called in -Germany--was carefully prepared for that particular date and that -the Bosnian assassinations had nothing whatever to do with the -matter. A pretext could very easily be found, as Bernhardi remarks, -and if the Crown Prince of Austria were still alive and well we -should none the less have found ourselves at death-grips with the -Kaiser over the Belgian infraction. - -There are a number of small indications which will have to be -investigated and collated by the inquiring chronicler. There is, for -example, the reception of guns for a merchant cruiser in a South -American port which must have been sent off not later than July 10, -three weeks before the crisis developed. There is the document of -this same date, July 10, found upon a German officer, which is said -to have censured him for not having answered some mobilisation form -on that day. Then there is the abnormal quantity of grain ordered in -Canada and America in May; and finally there is the receipt of -mobilisation warnings by Austrian reservists in South Africa, -advising them that they should return at a date which must place -their issue from Vienna in the first week of July. All these small -incidents show the absurdity of the German contention that at a -moment of profound peace some sort of surprise was sprung upon them. -There was, indeed, a surprise intended, but they were to be the -surprisers--though, indeed, I think their machinations were too -clumsy to succeed. They had retained the immorality but lost the -ability for that sudden tiger pounce which Frederick, in a moment of -profound peace, made upon Silesia. - -I fancy that every Chancellery in Europe suspected that something -was in the wind. It was surely not a mere coincidence that the grand -Fleet lay ready for action at Spithead and that the First Army Corps -was practising some very useful mobilisation exercises at -Aldershot. After all, our British Administration is not so -simple-minded as it sometimes seems. Indeed, that very simplicity -may at times be its most deadly mask. At one time of my life I was -much bruised in spirit over the ease with which foreigners were -shown over our arsenals and yards. Happening to meet the head of the -Naval Intelligence Department, I confided my trouble to him. It was -at a public banquet where conversation was restricted, but he turned -his head towards me, and his left eyelid flickered for an instant. -Since then I have never needed any reassurance upon the subject. - -But there is another matter which will insist on coming back into -one's thoughts when one reviews the events which preceded the war. I -was in Canada in June, and the country was much disturbed by the -fact that a shipload of Hindus had arrived at Vancouver, and had -endeavoured to land in the face of the anti-Asiatic immigration -laws. It struck me at the time as a most extraordinary incident, for -these Indians were not the usual Bengalee pedlars, but were Sikhs of -a proud and martial race. What could be their object in -endeavouring to land in Canada, when the climate of that country -would make it impossible for them to settle in it? It was a most -unnatural incident, and yet a most painful one, for the British -Government was placed in the terrible dilemma of either supporting -Canada against India or India against Canada. Could anything be -better calculated to start an agitation in one country or the other? -The thing was inexplicable at the time, but now one would wish to -know who paid for that ship and engineered the whole undertaking. I -believe it was one more move on Germany's world-wide board.[3] - - [3] Two months later, according to _The Times_, official - evidence of this was actually forthcoming.--A. C. D. - -In connection with the date at which the long-expected German war -was to break out, it is of interest now to remember some of the -conversations to which I listened three years ago, when I was a -competitor in the Anglo-German motor competition, called the Prince -Henry Tour. It was a very singular experience, and was itself not -without some political meaning, since it could hardly have been -chance that a German gunboat should appear at Agadir at the very -instant when the head of the German Navy was making himself -agreeable (and he can be exceedingly agreeable) to a number of -Britons, and a genial international atmosphere was being created by -the nature of the contest, which sent the whole fleet of seventy or -eighty cars on a tour of hospitality through both countries. I -refuse to believe that it was chance, and it was a remarkable -example of the detail to which the Germans can descend. By the rules -of the competition a German officer had to be present in each -British car and a British officer in each German one during the -whole three weeks, so as to check the marks of the driver. It was -certainly an interesting situation, since every car had its foreign -body within it, which had to be assimilated somehow with the -alternative of constant discomfort. Personally we were fortunate in -having a Rittmeister of Breslau Cuirassiers, with whom we were able -to form quite a friendship. Good luck to you, Count Carmer, and bad -luck to your regiment! To you also, little Captain Tuerck, -_Fregattencapitaen am dienst_, the best of luck, and ill betide -your cruiser! We found pleasant friends among the Germans, though -all were not equally fortunate, and I do not think that the net -result helped much towards an international entente. - -However, the point of my reminiscence is that on this tour I, being -at that time a champion of Anglo-German friendship, heard continual -discussions, chiefly on the side of British officers, several of -whom were experts on German matters, as to when the impending war -would be forced upon us. The date given was always 1914 or 1915. -When I asked why this particular year, the answer was that the -German preparations would be ready by then, and especially the -widening of the Kiel Canal, by which the newer and larger -battleships would be able to pass from the Baltic to the North Sea. -It says something for the foresight of these officers that this -widening was actually finished on June 24 of this year, and within -six weeks the whole of Europe was at war. I am bound to admit that -they saw deeper into the future than I did, and formed a truer -estimate of our real relations with our fellow-voyagers. "Surely -you feel more friendly to them now," said I at the end to one -distinguished officer. "All I want with them now is to fight them," -said he. We have all been forced to come round to his point of view. - -Yes, it was a deep, deep plot, a plot against the liberties of -Europe, extending over several years, planned out to the smallest -detail in the days of peace, developed by hordes of spies, prepared -for by every conceivable military, naval, and financial precaution, -and finally sprung upon us on a pretext which was no more the real -cause of war than any other excuse would have been which would serve -their turn by having some superficial plausibility. The real cause -of war was a universal national insanity infecting the whole German -race, but derived originally from a Prussian caste who inoculated -the others with their megalomania. - -This insanity was based upon the universal supposition that the -Germans were the Lord's chosen people, that in the words of Buy, -they were "the most cultured people, the best settlers, the best -warriors"--the best everything. Having got that idea thoroughly -infused into their very blood, the next step was clear. If they were -infinitely the best people living amidst such tribes as "the -barbarous Russians, the fickle French, the beastly Servians and -Belgians," to quote one of their recent papers, then why should they -not have all the best things in the world? If they were really the -most powerful, who could gainsay them? They need not do it all at -once, but two great national efforts would give them the whole of -unredeemed Germany, both shores of the Rhine down to the sea, the -German cantons of Switzerland, and, in conjunction with Austria, the -long road that leads to Salonica. All local causes and smaller -details sink into nothing compared with this huge national ambition -which was the real driving force at the back of this formidable -project. - -And it was a very formidable project. If such things could be -settled by mere figures and time-tables without any reference to the -spirit and soul of the nations, it might very well have succeeded. I -think that we are not indulging too far in national complacency if -we say that without the British army--that negligible factor--it -would for the time at least have succeeded. Had the Germans -accomplished their purpose of getting round the left wing of the -French, it is difficult to see how a debacle could have been -avoided, and it was our little army which stood in the pass and held -it until that danger was past. It is certain now that the huge sweep -of the German right had never been allowed for, that the French -troops in that quarter were second-line troops, and that it was our -great honour and good fortune to have dammed that raging torrent and -stopped the rush which must have swept everything before it until it -went roaring into Paris. And yet how many things might have -prevented our presence at the right place at the right time, and how -near we were to a glorious annihilation upon that dreadful day when -the artillery of five German army corps--eight hundred and thirty -guns in all--were concentrated upon Smith-Dorrien's exhausted men. -The success or failure of the great conspiracy hung upon the -over-matched British covering batteries upon that one critical -afternoon. It was the turning-point of the history of the world. - - - * * * * * - - - - -V - -THE "CONTEMPTIBLE LITTLE ARMY" - - -Early last year, in the course of some comments which I made upon -the slighting remarks about our Army by General von Bernhardi, I -observed, "It may be noted that General von Bernhardi has a poor -opinion of our troops. This need not trouble us. We are what we are, -and words will not alter it. From very early days our soldiers have -left their mark upon Continental warfare, and we have no reason to -think that we have declined from the manhood of our forefathers." -Since then he has returned to the attack. With that curious power of -coming after deep study to the absolutely diametrically wrong -conclusion which the German expert, political or military, appears -to possess, he says in his _War of To-day_, "The English Army, -trained more for purposes of show than for modern war," adding in -the same sentence a sneer at our "inferior Colonial levies." He will -have an opportunity of reconsidering his views presently upon the -fighting value of our over-sea troops, and surely so far as our own -are concerned he must already be making some interesting notes for -his next edition, or rather for the learned volume upon _Germany and -the Last War_ which will no doubt come from his pen. He is a man to -whom we might well raise a statue, for I am convinced that his -cynical confession of German policy has been worth at least an army -corps to this country. We may address to him John Davidson's lines -to his enemy-- - - "Unwilling friend, let not your spite abate, - Spur us with scorn, and strengthen us with hate." - -There is another German gentleman who must be thinking rather -furiously. He is a certain Colonel Gadke, who appeared officially at -Aldershot some years ago, was hospitably entreated, being shown all -that he desired to see, and on his return to Berlin published a -most depreciatory description of our forces. He found no good thing -in them. I have some recollection that General French alluded in a -public speech to this critic's remarks, and expressed a modest hope -that he and his men would some day have the opportunity of showing -how far they were deserved. Well, he has had his opportunity, and -Colonel Gadke, like so many other Germans, seems to have made a -miscalculation. - -An army which has preserved the absurd _Paradeschritt_, an exercise -which is painful to the bystander, as he feels that it is making -fools of brave men, must have a tendency to throw back to earlier -types. These Germans have been trained in peace and upon the theory -of books. In all that vast host there is hardly a man who has -previously stood at the wrong end of a loaded gun. They live on -traditions of close formations, vast cavalry charges, and other -things which will not fit into modern warfare. Braver men do not -exist, but it is the bravery of men who have been taught to lean -upon each other, and not the cold, self-contained, resourceful -bravery of the man who has learned to fight for his own hand. The -British have had the teachings of two recent campaigns fought with -modern weapons--that of the Tirah and of South Africa. Now that the -reserves have joined the colours there are few regiments which have -not a fair sprinkling of veterans from these wars in their ranks. -The Pathan and the Boer have been their instructors in something -more practical than those Imperial Grand Manoeuvres where the -all-highest played with his puppets in such a fashion that one of -his generals remarked that the chief practical difficulty of a -campaign so conducted would be the disposal of the dead. - -Boers and Pathans have been hard masters, and have given many a slap -to their admiring pupils, but the lesson has been learned. It was -not show troops, General, who, with two corps, held five of your -best day after day from Mons to Compiegne. It is no reproach to -your valour: but you were up against men who were equally brave and -knew a great deal more of the game. This must begin to break upon -you, and will surely grow clearer as the days go by. We shall often -in the future take the knock as well as give it, but you will not -say that we have a show army if you live to chronicle this war, nor -will your Imperial master be proud of the adjective which he has -demeaned himself in using before his troops had learned their -lesson. - -The fact is that the German army, with all its great traditions, has -been petrifying for many years back. They never learned the lesson -of South Africa. It was not for want of having it expounded to them, -for their military attache--"'im with the spatchcock on 'is -'elmet," as I heard him described by a British orderly--missed -nothing of what occurred, as is evident from their official history -of the war. And yet they missed it, and with it all those ideas of -individual efficiency and elastic independent formations, which are -the essence of modern soldiering. Their own more liberal thinkers -were aware of it. Here are the words which were put into the mouth -of Guentz, the representative of the younger school, in Beyerlein's -famous novel: - -"The organisation of the German army rested upon foundations which -had been laid a hundred years ago. Since the great war they had -never seriously been put to the proof, and during the last three -decades they had only been altered in the most trifling details. In -three long decades! And in one of those decades the world at large -had advanced as much as in the previous century. - -"Instead of turning this highly developed intelligence to good -account, they bound it hand and foot on the rack of an everlasting -drill which could not have been more soullessly mechanical in the -days of Frederick. It held them together as an iron hoop holds -together a cask the dry staves of which would fall asunder at the -first kick." - -Lord Roberts has said that if ten points represent the complete -soldier, eight should stand for his efficiency as a shot. The German -maxim has rather been that eight should stand for his efficiency as -a drilled marionette. It has been reckoned that about 200 books a -year appear in Germany upon military affairs, against about 20 in -Britain. And yet after all this expert debate the essential point of -all seems to have been missed--that in the end everything depends -upon the man behind the gun, upon his hitting his opponent and upon -his taking cover so as to avoid being hit himself. - -After all the efforts of the General Staff the result when shown -upon the field of battle has filled our men with a mixture of -admiration and contempt--contempt for the absurd tactics, admiration -for the poor devils who struggle on in spite of them. Listen to the -voices of the men who are the real experts. Says a Lincolnshire -sergeant, "They were in solid square blocks, and we couldn't help -hitting them." Says Private Tait (2nd Essex), "Their rifle shooting -is rotten. I don't believe they could hit a haystack at 100 yards." -"They are rotten shots with their rifles," says an Oldham private. -"They advance in close column, and you simply can't help hitting -them," writes a Gordon Highlander. "You would have thought it was a -big crowd streaming out from a Cup-tie," says Private Whitaker of -the Guards. "It was like a farmer's machine cutting grass," so it -seemed to Private Hawkins of the Coldstreams. "No damned good as -riflemen," says a Connemara boy. "You couldn't help hitting them. -As to their rifle fire, it was useless." "They shoot from the hip, -and don't seem to aim at anything in particular." - -These are the opinions of the practical men upon the field of -battle. Surely a poor result from the 200 volumes a year, and all -the weighty labours of the General Staff! "Artillery nearly as good -as our own, rifle fire beneath contempt," that is the verdict. How -will the well-taught _Paradeschritt_ avail them when it comes to a -stricken field? - -But let it not seem as if this were meant for disparagement. We -should be sinking to the Kaiser's level if we answered his -"contemptible little army" by pretending that his own troops are -anything but a very formidable and big army. They are formidable in -numbers, formidable, too, in their patriotic devotion, in their -native courage, and in the possession of such material, such great -cannon, aircraft, machine guns, and armoured cars, as none of the -Allies can match. They have every advantage which a nation would be -expected to have when it has known that war was a certainty, while -others have only treated it as a possibility. There is a minuteness -and earnestness of preparation which are only possible for an -assured event. But the fact remains, and it will only be brought out -more clearly by the Emperor's unchivalrous phrase, that in every arm -the British have already shown themselves to be the better troops. -Had he the Froissart spirit within him he would rather have said: -"You have to-day a task which is worthy of you. You are faced by an -army which has a high repute and a great history. There is real -glory to be won to-day." Had he said this, then, win or lose, he -would not have needed to be ashamed of his own words--the words of -an ungenerous spirit. - -It is a very strange thing how German critics have taken for granted -that the British Army had deteriorated, while the opinion of all -those who were in close touch with it was that it was never so good. -Even some of the French experts made the same mistake, and General -Bonnat counselled his countrymen not to rely upon it, since "it -would take refuge amid its islands at the first reverse." One would -think that the causes which make for its predominance were obvious. -Apart from any question of national spirit or energy, there is the -all-important fact that the men are there of their own free will, an -advantage which I trust that we shall never be compelled to -surrender. Again, the men are of longer service in every arm, and -they have far more opportunities of actual fighting than come to any -other force. Finally, they are divided into regiments, with -centuries of military glory streaming from their banners, which -carry on a mighty tradition. The very words the Guards, the Rifles, -the Connaught Rangers, the Buffs, the Scots Greys, the Gordons, -sound like bugle-calls. How could an army be anything but dangerous -which had such units in its line of battle? - -And yet there remains the fact that both enemies and friends are -surprised at our efficiency. This is no new phenomenon. Again and -again in the course of history the British Armies have had to win -once more the reputation which had been forgotten. Continentals have -always begun by refusing to take them seriously. Napoleon, who had -never met them in battle, imagined that their unbroken success was -due to some weakness in his marshals rather than to any excellence -of the troops. "At last I have them, these English," he exclaimed, -as he gazed at the thin red line at Waterloo. "At last they have me, -these English," may have been his thought that evening as he spurred -his horse out of the debacle. Foy warned him of the truth. "The -British infantry is the devil," said he. "You think so because you -were beaten by them," cried Napoleon. Like von Kluck or von Kluck's -master, he had something to learn. - -Why this continual depreciation? It may be that the world pays so -much attention to our excellent right arm that it cannot give us -credit for having a very serviceable left as well. Or it may be that -they take seriously those jeremiads over our decay which are -characteristic of our people, and very especially of many of our -military thinkers. I have never been able to understand why they -should be of so pessimistic a turn of mind, unless it be a sort of -exaltation of that grumbling which has always been the privilege of -the old soldier. Croker narrates how he met Wellington in his -latter years, and how the Iron Duke told him that he was glad that -he was so old, as he would not live to see the dreadful military -misfortunes which were about to come to his country. Looking back we -can see no reasons for such pessimism as this. Above all, the old -soldier can never make any allowance for the latent powers which lie -in civilian patriotism and valour. Only a year ago I had a long -conversation with a well-known British General, in which he asserted -with great warmth that in case of an Anglo-German war with France -involved the British public would never allow a trained soldier to -leave these islands. He is at the front himself and doing such good -work that he has little time for reminiscence, but when he has he -must admit that he underrated the nerve of his countrymen. - -And yet under the pessimism of such men as he there is a curious -contradictory assurance that there are no troops like our own. The -late Lord Goschen used to tell a story of a letter that he had from -a captain in the Navy at the time when he was First Lord. This -captain's ship was lying alongside a foreign cruiser in some port, -and he compared in his report the powers of the two vessels. Lord -Goschen said that his heart sank as he read the long catalogue of -points in which the British ship was inferior--guns, armour, -speed--until he came to the postscript, which was: "I think I could -take her in twenty minutes." - -With all the grumbling of our old soldiers there is always some -reservation of the sort at the end of it. Of course those who are -familiar with our ways of getting things done would understand that -a good deal of the croaking is a means of getting our little army -increased, or at least preventing its being diminished. But whatever -the cause, the result has been the impression abroad of a -"contemptible little army." Whatever surprise in the shape of -17-inch howitzers or 900-foot Zeppelins the Kaiser may have for us, -it is a safe prophecy that it will be a small matter compared to -that which Sir John French and his men will be to him. - -But above all I look forward to the development of our mounted -riflemen. This I say in no disparagement of our cavalry, who have -done so magnificently. But the mounted rifleman is a peculiarly -British product--British and American--with a fresh edge upon it -from South Africa. I am most curious to see what a division of these -fellows will make of the Uhlans. It is good to see that already the -old banners are in the wind--Lovat's Horse, Scottish Horse, King -Edward's Horse, and the rest. All that cavalry can do will surely be -done by our cavalry. But I have always held, and I still very -strongly hold, that the mounted rifleman has it in him to alter our -whole conception of warfare, as the mounted archer did in his day; -and now in this very war will be his first great chance upon a large -scale. Ten thousand well-mounted, well-trained riflemen, young -officers to lead them, all broad Germany with its towns, its -railways, and its magazines before them--there lies one more -surprise for the doctrinaires of Berlin. - - - * * * * * - - - - -VI - -A POLICY OF MURDER - - -When one writes with a hot heart upon events which are still recent -one is apt to lose one's sense of proportion. At every step one -should check oneself by the reflection as to how this may appear ten -years hence, and how far events which seem shocking and abnormal may -prove themselves to be a necessary accompaniment of every condition -of war. But a time has now come when in cold blood, with every -possible restraint, one is justified in saying that since the most -barbarous campaigns of Alva in the Lowlands, or the excesses of the -Thirty Years' War, there has been no such deliberate policy of -murder as has been adopted in this struggle by the German forces. -This is the more terrible since these forces are not, like those of -Alva, Parma, or Tilly, bands of turbulent and mercenary soldiers, -but they are the nation itself, and their deeds are condoned or even -applauded by the entire national Press. It is not on the chiefs of -the army that the whole guilt of this terrible crime must rest, but -it is upon the whole German nation, which for generations to come -must stand condemned before the civilised world for this reversion -to those barbarous practices from which Christianity, civilisation, -and chivalry had gradually rescued the human race. They may, and do, -plead the excuse that they are "earnest" in war, but all nations are -earnest in war, which is the most desperately earnest thing of which -we have any knowledge. How earnest we are will be shown when the -question of endurance begins to tell. But no earnestness can condone -the crime of the nation which deliberately breaks those laws which -have been endorsed by the common consent of humanity. - -War may have a beautiful as well as a terrible side, and be full of -touches of human sympathy and restraint which mitigate its -unavoidable horror. Such have been the characteristics always of the -secular wars between the British and the French. From the old -glittering days of knighthood, with their high and gallant courtesy, -through the eighteenth-century campaigns where the debonair guards -of France and England exchanged salutations before their volleys, -down to the last great Napoleonic struggle, the tradition of -chivalry has always survived. We read how in the Peninsula the -pickets of the two armies, each of them as earnest as any Germans, -would exchange courtesies, how they would shout warnings to each -other to fall back when an advance in force was taking place, and -how, to prevent the destruction of an ancient bridge, the British -promised not to use it on condition that the French would forgo its -destruction--an agreement faithfully kept upon either side. Could -one imagine Germans making war in such a spirit as this? Think of -that old French bridge, and then think of the University of Louvain -and the Cathedral of Rheims. What a gap between them--the gap that -separates civilisation from the savage! - -Let us take a few of the points which, when focussed together, show -how the Germans have degraded warfare--a degradation which affects -not only the Allies at present, but the whole future of the world, -since if such examples were followed the entire human race would, -each in turn, become the sufferers. Take the very first incident of -the war, the mine-laying by the _Koenigin Luise_. Here was a -vessel, which was obviously made ready with freshly charged mines -some time before there was any question of a general European war, -which was sent forth in time of peace, and which, on receipt of a -wireless message, began to spawn its hellish cargo across the North -Sea at points 50 miles from land in the track of all neutral -merchant shipping. There was the keynote of German tactics struck at -the first possible instant. So promiscuous was the effect that it -was a mere chance which prevented the vessel which bore the German -Ambassador from being destroyed by a German mine. From first to last -some hundreds of people have lost their lives on this tract of sea, -some of them harmless British trawlers, but the greater number -sailors of Danish and Dutch vessels pursuing their commerce as they -had every right to do. It was the first move in a consistent policy -of murder. - -Leaving the sea, let us turn to the air. Can any possible term save -a policy of murder be applied to the use of aircraft by the Germans? -It has always been a principle of warfare that unfortified towns -should not be bombarded. So closely has it been followed by the -British that one of our aviators, flying over Cologne in search of a -Zeppelin shed, refrained from dropping a bomb in an uncertain light, -even though Cologne is a fortress, lest the innocent should suffer. -What is to be said, then, for the continual use of bombs by the -Germans, which have usually been wasted in the destruction of cats -or dogs, but which have occasionally torn to pieces some woman or -child? If bombs were dropped on the forts of Paris as part of a -scheme for reducing the place, then nothing could be said in -objection, but how are we to describe the action of men who fly over -a crowded city dropping bombs promiscuously which can have no -military effect whatever, and are entirely aimed at the destruction -of innocent civilians? These men have been obliging enough to drop -their cards as well as their bombs on several occasions. I see no -reason why these should not be used in evidence against them, or why -they should not be hanged as murderers when they fall into the hands -of the Allies. The policy is idiotic from a military point of view; -one could conceive nothing which would stimulate and harden national -resistance more surely than such petty irritations. But it is a -murderous innovation in the laws of war, and unless it is sternly -repressed it will establish a most sinister precedent for the -future. - -As to the treatment of Belgium, what has it been but murder, murder -all the way? From the first days at Vise, when it was officially -stated that an example of "frightfulness" was desired, until the -present moment, when the terrified population has rushed from the -country and thrown itself upon the charity and protection of its -neighbours, there has been no break in the record. Compare the story -with that of the occupation of the South of France by Wellington in -1813, when no one was injured, nothing was taken without full -payment, and the villagers fraternised with the troops. What a -relapse of civilisation is here! From Vise to Louvain, Louvain to -Aerschott, Aerschott to Malines and Termonde, the policy of murder -never fails. - -It is said that more civilians than soldiers have fallen in Belgium. -Peruse the horrible accounts taken by the Belgian Commission, who -took evidence in the most careful and conscientious fashion. Study -the accounts of that dreadful night in Louvain which can only be -equalled by the Spanish Fury of Antwerp. Read the account of the -wife of the burgomaster of Aerschott, with its heart-rending -description of how her lame son, aged sixteen, was kicked along to -his death by an aide-de-camp. It is all so vile, so brutally -murderous that one can hardly realise that one is reading the -incidents of a modern campaign conducted by one of the leading -nations in Europe. - -Do you imagine that the thing has been exaggerated? Far from it--the -volume of crime has not yet been appreciated. Have not many Germans -unwittingly testified to what they have seen and done? Only last -week we had the journal of one of them, an officer whose service had -been almost entirely in France and removed from the crime centres of -Belgium. Yet were ever such entries in the diary of a civilised -soldier? "Our men behaved like regular Vandals." "We shot the whole -lot" (these were villagers). "They were drawn up in three ranks. The -same shot did for three at a time." "In the evening we set fire to -the village. The priest and some of the inhabitants were shot." "The -villages all round were burning." "The villages were burned and the -inhabitants shot." "At Leppe apparently two hundred men were shot. -There must have been some innocent men among them." "In the future -we shall have to hold an inquiry into their guilt instead of merely -shooting them." "The Vandals themselves could not have done more -damage. The place is a disgrace to our army." So the journal runs on -with its tale of infamy. It is an infamy so shameless that even in -the German record the story is perpetuated of how a French lad was -murdered because he refused to answer certain questions. To such a -depth of degradation has Prussia brought the standard of warfare. - -And now, as the appetite for blood grows ever stronger--and nothing -waxes more fast--we have stories of the treatment of prisoners. Here -is a point where our attention should be most concentrated and our -action most prompt. It is the just duty which we owe to our own -brave soldiers. At present the instances are isolated, and we will -hope that they do not represent any general condition. But the -stories come from sure sources. There is the account of the -brutality which culminated in the death of the gallant motor-cyclist -Pearson, the son of Lord Cowdray. There is the horrible story in a -responsible Dutch paper, told by an eye-witness, of the torture of -three British wounded prisoners in Landen Station on October 9. - -The story carries conviction by its detail. Finally, there are the -disquieting remarks of German soldiers, repeated by this same -witness, as to the British prisoners whom they had shot. The whole -lesson of history is that when troops are allowed to start murder -one can never say how or when it will stop. It may no longer be part -of a deliberate, calculated policy of murder by the German -Government. But it has undoubtedly been so in the past, and we -cannot say when it will end. Such incidents will, I fear, make peace -an impossibility in our generation, for whatever statesmen may write -upon paper can never affect the deep and bitter resentment which a -war so conducted must leave behind it. - -Other German characteristics we can ignore. The consistent, -systematic lying of the German Press, or the grotesque blasphemies -of the Kaiser, can be met by us with contemptuous tolerance. After -all, what is is, and neither falsehood nor bombast will alter it. -But this policy of murder deeply affects not only ourselves but the -whole framework of civilisation so slowly and painfully built -upwards by the human race. - - - * * * * * - - - - -VII - -MADNESS - - -We have all, I suppose, read and marvelled at the wonderful German -"song of hate." This has been so much admired over the water that -Prince Ruprecht of Bavaria (who had just stated his bitter hatred of -us in a prose army order) distributed copies of the verses to his -Bavarians as a stimulant in their long, unsuccessful tussle with our -troops at Ypres. In case the reader has forgotten its flavour, I -append a typical verse: - - "We will never forgo our hate. - We have all but a single hate. - We love as one, we hate as one, - We have one foe and one alone-- - ENGLAND." - -This sort of thing is, it must be admitted, very painful and odious. -It fills us with a mixture of pity and disgust, and we feel as if, -instead of a man, we were really fighting with a furious, screaming -woman. Germany used to be a very great nation, mentally and morally -as well as in material ways, and many of us, even while we fight -her, are honestly pained by the depths of degradation into which she -has fallen. This shrill scream of hate and constant frenzied ranting -against Great Britain may reach its highest note in this poem, but -we know that it pervades the whole Press and every class of national -thought. It is deliberately fed by lying journals, which publish -bogus letters describing the imaginary sufferings of German -prisoners, and also by the Government itself, which upon receiving a -Socialist report partly favourable to Britain, excised those -passages and circulated the rest as a complete document, so as to -give the idea that it was wholly condemnatory. Wherever we touch -Germany in its present phase, whether it be the Overlord himself -with his megalomaniac messages, the princes with their looting of -chateaux, the Foreign Office with its trick of stealing American -passports for the use of German spies, the army with its absolute -brutality, the navy with its tactics of mine-laying in neutral -waters, the Press with its grotesque concoctions, the artists with -their pictures, which are so base that the decent Germans have -themselves at last rebelled against them, or the business men with -their assertion that there is less economic disturbance in Germany -than in Great Britain--wherever, I say, you touch them you come -always upon what is odious and deceitful. A long century will have -passed before Germany can wash her hands clean from murder, or purge -from her spirit the shadow of this evil time. - -If the words of one humble individual could reach across the seas, -there are two things upon which I should wish to speak earnestly to -a German: the one, our own character, the other, the future which he -is deliberately preparing for the Fatherland which he loves. Our -papers do get over there, even as theirs come over here, so one may -hope it is not impossible that some German may give a thought to -what I say, if he is not so bemused by the atmosphere of lies in -which his Press has enveloped him that he cannot recognise cold -truth when he sees it. - -First as to ourselves: we have never been a nation who fought with -hatred. It is our ideal to fight in a sporting spirit. It is not -that we are less in earnest, but it is that the sporting spirit -itself is a thing very largely evolved by us and is a natural -expression of our character. We fight as hard as we can, and we like -and admire those who fight hard against us so long as they keep -within the rules of the game. Let me take an obvious example. One -German has done us more harm than any other in this war. He is -Captain von Mueller of the _Emden_, whose depredations represent -the cost of a battleship. Yet an honest sigh of relief went up from -us all when we learned that he had not perished with his ship, and -if he walked down Fleet Street to-day he would be cheered by the -crowd from end to end. Why? Because almost alone among Germans he -has played the game as it should be played. It is true that -everything that he did was illegal. He had no right to burn -uncondemned prizes, and a purist could claim that he was a pirate. -But we recognised the practical difficulties of his position; we -felt that under the circumstances he had acted like a gentleman, and -we freely forgave him any harm that he had done us. With this -example before you, my German reader, you cannot say that it is -national hatred when we denounce your murderers and brigands in -Belgium. If they, too, had acted as gentlemen, we should have felt -towards them as to von Mueller. - -If you look back in British history, you will find that this absence -of hatred has always been characteristic of us. When Soult came to -London after the Napoleonic wars, he was cheered through the City. -After the Boer War, Botha, de Wet, and Delarey had a magnificent -reception. We did not know that one of them was destined to prove a -despicable and perjured traitor. They had been good fighters, the -fight was done, we had shaken hands--and we cheered them. All -British prize-fights ended with the shaking of hands. Though the men -could no longer see each other, they were led up and their hands -were joined. When a combatant refuses to do this, it has always been -looked upon as unmanly, and we say that bad blood has been left -behind. So in war we have always wished to fight to a finish and -then be friends, whether we had won or lost. - -Now, this is just what we should wish to do with Germany, and it is -what Germany is rapidly making impossible. She has, in our opinion, -fought a brave but a thoroughly foul fight. And now she uses every -means to excite a bitter hatred which shall survive the war. The -Briton is tolerant and easy-going in times of peace--too careless, -perhaps, of the opinion of other nations. But at present he is in a -most alert and receptive mood, noting and remembering very carefully -every word that comes to him as to the temper of the German people -and the prospects of the future. He is by no means disposed to pass -over all these announcements of permanent hatred. On the contrary, -he is evidently beginning, for the first time since Napoleon's era, -to show something approaching to hatred in return. He--and "he" -stands for every Briton across the seas as well as for the men of -the Islands--makes a practical note of it all, and it will not be -forgotten, but will certainly bear very definite fruits. The -national thoughts do not come forth in wild poems of hate, but they -none the less are gloomy and resentful, with the deep, steady -resentment of a nation which is slow to anger. - -And now, my problematical German reader, I want you to realise what -this is going to mean to you after the war. Whether you win or -lose--and we have our own very certain opinion as to which it will -be--Germany will still remain as a great independent State. She may -be a little trimmed at the edges, and she may also find herself with -some awkward liabilities; but none the less she will be a great -kingdom or republic--as the Fates may will. She will turn her hand -to trade and try to build up her fortunes once more--for even if we -suppose her to be the victor, she still cannot live for ever on -plunder, and must turn herself to honest trade, while if she loses -her trade will be more precious to her than ever. But what will her -position be when that time has come? - -It will be appalling. No other word can express it. No legislation -will be needed to keep German goods out of the whole British -Empire, which means more than a quarter of the globe. Anything with -that mark might as well have a visible cholera bacillus upon it for -the chance it will have of being handled after this war. That is -already certain, and it is the direct outcome of the madness which -has possessed Germany in her frantic outcry of hatred. What chance -they have of business with France, Russia, or Japan they know best -themselves; but the British Empire, with that wide trade toleration -which has long been her policy (and for which she has had so little -gratitude), would have speedily forgiven Germany and opened her -markets to her. Now it is not for many a long year that this can be -so--not on account of the war, but on account of the bitterness -which Germany has gone out of her way to import into the contest. It -is idle to say that in that case we should lose our exports to -Germany. Even if it were so, it would not in the least affect the -sentiments of the retail sellers and buyers in this country, whose -demands regulate the wholesale trade. But as a matter of fact, what -Germany buys from the British Empire is the coal, wool, etc., which -are the raw materials of her industry, with which she cannot -possibly dispense. - -But the pity of it all! We might have had a straight, honest fight, -and at the end of it we might have conceded that the German people -had been innocently misled, by their military caste and their Press, -into the idea that their country was being attacked, and so were -themselves guiltless in the matter. They, on their side, might at -last have understood that Britain had been placed in such a position -by her guarantees to Belgium that it was absolutely impossible that -she could stand out of the war. With these mutual concessions, some -sort of friendship could possibly have been restored, for it is no -one's interest, and least of all ours, that the keystone should be -knocked right out of the European arch. But all this has been -rendered impossible by these hysterical screamers of hate, and by -those methods of murder on land, sea, and in air with which the war -has been conducted. Hate is a very catching emotion, and when it -translates itself into action it soon glows on either side of the -North Sea. With neither race, to use Carlyle's simile, does it blaze -like the quick-flaming stubble, but with both it will smoulder like -the slow red peat. Are there not even now strong, sane men in -Germany who can tell these madmen what they are sowing for the next -generation and the one that comes after it? It is not that we ask -them to abate the resistance of their country. It is understood that -this is a fight to the end. That is what we desire. But let them -stand up and fight without reviling; let them give punishment -without malice and receive it without wincing; let their press cease -from lying, and their prophets from preaching hatred--then, lose or -win, there may still be some chance for their future. But, alas! the -mischief is already, I fear, too deep. When the seeds are sown, it -is hard to check the harvest. Let the impartial critic consider von -Mueller of the _Emden_, and then, having surveyed our Press and -that of Germany, let him say with whom lies the blame. - - - * * * * * - - - - -VIII - -GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NEXT WAR[4] - - [4] Published, _Fortnightly Review_, February 1913. - - - This essay is of some interest, as it was written two - years before the war, and was one of the first attempts - to make the public realise the importance of Bernhardi's - notorious book. The author follows it by an unpublished - essay called "Afterthoughts," in which he examines how - far his reading of the future has been justified by the - event. - -I am a member of the Anglo-German Society for the improvement of the -relations between the two countries, and I have never seriously -believed in the German menace. Frequently I have found myself alone -in a company of educated Englishmen in my opinion that it was -non-existent--or at worst greatly exaggerated. This conclusion was -formed upon two grounds. The first was, that I knew it to be -impossible that we could attack Germany save in the face of -monstrous provocation. By the conditions of our government, even if -those in high places desired to do such a thing, it was utterly -impracticable, for a foreign war could not be successfully carried -on by Great Britain unless the overwhelming majority of the people -approved of it. Our foreign, like our home, politics are governed by -the vote of the proletariat. It would be impossible to wage an -aggressive war against any Power if the public were not convinced of -its justice and necessity. For this reason we could not attack -Germany. On the other hand, it seemed to be equally unthinkable that -Germany should attack us. One fails to see what she could possibly -hope to gain by such a proceeding. She had enemies already upon her -eastern and western frontiers, and it was surely unlikely that she -would go out of her way to pick a quarrel with the powerful British -Empire. If she made war and lost it, her commerce would be set back -and her rising colonial empire destroyed. If she won it, it was -difficult to see where she could hope for the spoils. We could not -give her greater facilities for trade than she has already. We could -not give her habitable white colonies, for she would find it -impossible to take possession of them in the face of the opposition -of the inhabitants. An indemnity she could never force from us. Some -coaling stations and possibly some tropical colonies, of which -latter she already possesses abundance, were the most that she could -hope for. Would such a prize as that be worth the risk attending -such a war? To me it seemed that there could be only one answer to -such a question. - -It still seems to me that this reasoning is sound. I still think -that it would be an insane action for Germany deliberately to plan -an attack upon Great Britain. But unfortunately an attack delivered -from mistaken motives is as damaging as any other attack, and the -mischief is done before the insanity of it is realised. If I now -believe such an attack to be possible, and it may be imminent, it is -because I have been studying _Germany and the Next War_, by General -von Bernhardi. - -A book written by such a man cannot be set aside as the mere ravings -of a Pan-Germanic Anglophobe. So far as appears, he is not a -Pan-German at all. There is no allusion to that Germania _irredente_ -which is the dream of that party. He is a man of note, and the first -living authority in Germany upon some matters of military science. -Does he carry the same weight when he writes of international -politics and the actual use of those mighty forces which he has -helped to form? We will hope not. But when a man speaks with the -highest authority upon one subject, his voice cannot be entirely -disregarded upon a kindred one. Besides, he continually labours, and -with success, to make the reader understand that he is the direct -modern disciple of that main German line of thought which traces -from Frederick through Bismarck to the present day. He moves in -circles which actually control the actions of their country in a -manner to which we have no equivalent. For all these reasons, his -views cannot be lightly set aside, and should be most carefully -studied by Britons. We know that we have no wish for war, and desire -only to be left alone. Unfortunately, it takes two to make peace, -even as it takes two to make a quarrel. There is a very clear -statement here that the quarrel is imminent, and that we must think -of the means, military, naval, and financial, by which we may meet -it. Since von Bernhardi's book may not be accessible to every reader -of this article, I will begin by giving some idea of the situation -as it appears to him, and of the course of action which he -foreshadows and recommends. - -He begins his argument by the uncompromising statement that war is a -good thing in itself. All advance is founded upon struggle. Each -nation has a right, and indeed a duty, to use violence where its -interests are concerned and there is a tolerable hope of success. As -to the obvious objection that such a doctrine bears no possible -relation to Christianity, he is not prepared to admit the validity -of the Christian ethics in international practice. In an ingenious -passage he even attempts to bring the sanction of Christianity to -support his bellicose views. He says:-- - - "Again, from the Christian standpoint, we arrive at the - same conclusion. Christian morality is based, indeed, on - the law of love. 'Love God above all things, and thy - neighbour as thyself.' This law can claim no significance - for the relations of one country to another, since its - application to politics would lead to a conflict of - duties. The love which a man showed to another country as - such would imply a want of love for his own countrymen. - Such a system of politics must inevitably lead men - astray. Christian morality is personal and social, and in - its nature cannot be political. Its object is to promote - morality of the individual, in order to strengthen him to - work unselfishly in the interests of the community. It - tells us to love our individual enemies, but does not - remove the conception of enmity." - -Having thus established the general thesis that a nation should not -hesitate to declare war where a material advantage may be the -reward, he sets out very clearly what are some of the causes for war -which Germany can see before her. The following passages throw a -light upon them:-- - - "Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in - numbers. From a given moment they require a continual - expansion of their frontiers, they require new territory - for the accommodation of their surplus population. Since - almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new - territory must, as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its - possessors--that is to say, by conquest, which thus - becomes a law of necessity." - -Again:-- - - "Lastly, in all times the right of conquest by war has - been admitted. It may be that a growing people cannot win - colonies from uncivilised races, and yet the State wishes - to retain the surplus population which the mother country - can no longer feed. Then the only course left is to - acquire the necessary territory by war. Thus the instinct - of self-preservation leads inevitably to war, and the - conquest of foreign soil. It is not the possessor, but - the victor, who then has the right." - -And he concludes:-- - - "Arbitration treaties must be peculiarly detrimental to - an aspiring people, which has not yet reached its - political and national zenith, and is bent on expanding - its power in order to play its part honourably in the - civilised world." - -And adds:-- - - "It must be borne in mind that a peaceful decision by an - arbitration court can never replace in its effects and - consequences a warlike decision, even as regards the - State in whose favour it is pronounced." - -To many of us it would seem a legitimate extension of the author's -argument if we said that it would have a virile and bracing effect -upon our characters if, when we had a grievance against our -neighbour, we refrained from taking it into the law courts, but -contented ourselves with breaking his head with a club. However, we -are concerned here not so much with the validity of the German -general's arguments as with their practical application so far as -they affect ourselves. - -Brushing aside the peace advocates, the writer continues: "To such -views, the off-spring of a false humanity, the clear and definite -answer must be made that, under certain circumstances, it is not -only the right but the moral and political duty of the statesman to -bring about a war. The acts of the State cannot be judged by the -standard of individual morality." He quotes Treitschke: "The -Christian duty of sacrifice for something higher does not exist for -the State, for there is nothing higher than it in the world's -history--consequently it cannot sacrifice itself to something -higher." One would have hoped that a noble ideal and a moral purpose -were something higher, but it would be vain to claim that any -country, ourselves included, have ever yet lived fully up to the -doctrine. And yet some conscious striving, however imperfect, is -surely better than such a deliberate negation. - -Having laid down these general propositions of the value of war, and -of the non-existence of international moral obligations, General von -Bernhardi then proceeds to consider very fully the general position -of Germany and the practical application of those doctrines. Within -the limits of this essay I can only give a general survey of the -situation as seen by him. War is necessary for Germany. It should be -waged as soon as is feasible, as certain factors in the situation -tell in favour of her enemies. The chief of these factors are the -reconstruction of the Russian fleet, which will be accomplished -within a few years, and the preparation of a French native colonial -force, which would be available for European hostilities. This also, -though already undertaken, will take some years to perfect. -Therefore, the immediate future is Germany's best opportunity. - -In this war Germany places small confidence in Italy as an ally, -since her interests are largely divergent, but she assumes complete -solidarity with Austria. Austria and Germany have to reckon with -France and Russia. Russia is slow in her movements, and Germany, -with her rapid mobilisation, should be able to throw herself upon -France without fear of her rear. Should she win a brilliant victory -at the outset, Russia might refuse to compromise herself at all, -especially if the quarrel could be so arranged that it would seem as -if France had been the aggressor. Before the slow Slavonic mind had -quite understood the situation and set her unwieldy strength in -motion, her ally might be struck down, and she face to face with the -two Germanic Powers, which would be more than a match for her. - -Of the German army, which is to be the instrument of this -world-drama, General von Bernhardi expresses the highest opinion: -"The spirit which animates the troops, the ardour of attack, the -heroism, the loyalty which prevail among them, justify the highest -expectations. I am certain that if they are soon to be summoned to -arms their exploits will astonish the world, provided only that they -are led with skill and determination." How their "ardour of attack" -has been tested it is difficult to see, but the world will probably -agree that the German army is a most formidable force. When he goes -on, however, to express the opinion that they would certainly -overcome the French, the two armies being approximately of the same -strength, it is not so easy to follow his argument. It is possible -that even so high an authority as General von Bernhardi has not -entirely appreciated how Germany has been the teacher of the world -in military matters and how thoroughly her pupils have responded to -that teaching. That attention to detail, perfection of arrangement -for mobilisation, and careful preparation which have won German -victories in the past may now be turned against her, and she may -find that others can equal her in her own virtues. - -Poor France, once conquered, is to be very harshly treated. Here is -the passage which describes her fate:-- - - "In one way or another _we must square our account with - France_ if we wish for a free hand in our international - policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a - sound German policy, and since the hostility of France - once for all cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the - matter must be settled by force of arms. France must be - so completely crushed that she can never again come - across our path." - -It is not said how Germany could permanently extinguish France, and -it is difficult to think it out. An indemnity, however large, would -eventually be paid and France recover herself. Germany has found the -half-German border provinces which she annexed so indigestible that -she could hardly incorporate Champagne or any other purely French -district. Italy might absorb some of Savoy and the French Riviera. -If the country were artificially separated the various parts would -fly together again at the first opportunity. Altogether, the -permanent sterilisation of France would be no easy matter to -effect. It would probably be attempted by imposing the condition -that in the future no army, save for police duties, would be allowed -her. The history of Prussia itself, however, shows that even so -stringent a prohibition as this can be evaded by a conquered but -indomitable people. - -Let us now turn to General von Bernhardi's views upon ourselves; -and, first of all, it is of interest to many of us to know what are -those historical episodes which have caused him and many of his -fellow-countrymen to take bitter exception to our national record. -From our point of view we have repeatedly helped Germany in the -past, and have asked for and received no other reward than the -consciousness of having co-operated in some common cause. So it was -in Marlborough's days. So in the days of Frederick. So also in those -of Napoleon. To all these ties, which had seemed to us to be of -importance, there is not a single allusion in this volume. On the -other hand, there are very bitter references to some other -historical events which must seem to us strangely inadequate as a -cause for international hatred. - -We may, indeed, congratulate ourselves as a nation, if no stronger -indictment can be made against us than is contained in the book of -the German general. The first episode upon which he animadverts is -the ancient German grievance of the abandonment of Frederick the -Great by England in the year 1761. One would have thought that there -was some statute of limitations in such matters, but apparently -there is none in the German mind. Let us grant that the premature -cessation of a campaign is an injustice to one's associates, and let -us admit also that a British Government under its party system can -never be an absolutely stable ally. Having said so much, one may -point out that there were several mitigating circumstances in this -affair. We had fought for five years, granting considerable -subsidies to Frederick during that time, and dispatching British -armies into the heart of Germany. The strain was very great, in a -quarrel which did not vitally affect ourselves. The British nation -had taken the view, not wholly unreasonably, that the war was being -waged in the interests of Hanover, and upon a German rather than a -British quarrel. When we stood out France did the same, so that the -balance of power between the combatants was not greatly affected. -Also, it may be pointed out as a curious historical fact that this -treatment which he so much resented was exactly that which Frederick -had himself accorded to his allies some years before at the close of -the Silesian campaign. On that occasion he made an isolated peace -with Maria Theresa, and left his associates, France and Bavaria, to -meet the full force of the Austrian attack. - -Finally the whole episode has to be judged by the words of a modern -writer: "Conditions may arise which are more powerful than the most -honourable intentions. The country's own interests--considered, of -course, in the highest ethical sense--must then turn the scale." -These sentences are not from the work of a British apologist, but -from this very book of von Bernhardi's which scolds England for her -supposed adherence to such principles. He also quotes, with -approval, Treitschke's words: "Frederick the Great was all his life -long charged with treachery because no treaty or alliance could -ever induce him to renounce the right of free self-determination." - -Setting aside this ancient grievance of the Seven Years' War, it is -of interest to endeavour to find out whether there are any other -solid grounds in the past for Germany's reprobation. Two more -historical incidents are held up as examples of our perfidy. The -first is the bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807, when the British -took forcible possession in time of peace of the Danish fleet. It -must be admitted that the step was an extreme one, and only to be -justified upon the plea of absolute necessity for vital national -reasons. The British Government of the day believed that Napoleon -was about to possess himself of the Danish fleet and would use it -against themselves. Fouche has admitted in his Memoirs that the -right was indeed given by a secret clause in the Treaty of Tilsit. -It was a desperate time, when the strongest measures were -continually being used against us, and it may be urged that similar -measures were necessary in self-defence. Having once embarked upon -the enterprise, and our demand being refused, there was no -alternative but a bombardment of the city with its attendant loss of -civilian life. It is not an exploit of which we need be proud, and -at the best can only be described as a most painful and unfortunate -necessity; but I should be surprised if the Danes, on looking back -to it, judge it more harshly than some more recent experiences which -they have had at the hands of General von Bernhardi's own -fellow-countrymen. That he is himself prepared to launch upon a -similar enterprise in a much larger and more questionable shape is -shown by his declaration that if Holland will not take sides against -England in the next war it should be overrun by the German troops. - -General von Bernhardi's next historical charge is the bombardment of -Alexandria in 1882, which he describes as having been affected upon -hypocritical pretences in a season of peace. To those who have a -recollection of that event and can recall the anti-European movement -of Arabi and the massacre which preceded the bombardment, the charge -will appear grotesque. But it is with a patchwork quilt of this sort -that this German publicist endeavours to cover the unreasoning, but -none the less formidable, jealousy and prejudice which inflame him -against this country. The foolish fiction that the British -Government declared war against the Boers in order to gain -possession of their gold mines is again brought forward, though one -would have imagined that even the gutter-Press who exploited it -twelve years ago had abandoned it by now. If General von Bernhardi -can explain how the British Government is the richer for these -mines, or whether a single foreign shareholder has been dispossessed -of his stock in them, he will be the first who has ever given a -solid fact in favour of this ridiculous charge. In a previous -paragraph of his book he declares that it was President Kruger who -made the war and that he was praiseworthy for so doing. Both -statements cannot be true. If it was President Kruger who made the -war, then it was not forced on by Great Britain in order to possess -herself of the goldfields. - -So much for the specific allegations against Great Britain. One can -hardly regard them as being so serious as to wipe out the various -claims, racial, religious, and historical, which unite the two -countries. However, we are only concerned with General von -Bernhardi's conclusions, since he declares that his country is -prepared to act upon them. There remain two general grounds upon -which he considers that Germany should make war upon the British -Empire. The first is to act as the champion of the human race in -winning what he calls the freedom of the seas. The second is to -further German expansion as a world-Power, which is cramped by our -opposition. - -The first of these reasons is difficult to appreciate. British -maritime power has been used to ensure, not to destroy, the freedom -of the seas. What smallest Power has ever been hindered in her -legitimate business? It is only the pirate, the slaver, and the -gun-runner who can justly utter such a reproach. If the mere fact of -having predominant latent strength upon the water is an encroachment -upon the freedom of the sea, then some nation must always be guilty -of it. After our mild supremacy we may well say to Germany, as -Charles said to James: "No one will assassinate me in order to put -you on the throne." Her mandate is unendorsed by those whom she -claims to represent. - -But the second indictment is more formidable. We lie athwart -Germany's world ambitions, even as, geographically, we lie across -her outlets. But when closely looked at, what is it of which we -deprive her, and is its attainment really a matter of such vital -importance? Do we hamper her trade? On the contrary, we exhibit a -generosity which meets with no acknowledgment, and which many of us -have long held to be altogether excessive. Her manufactured goods -are welcomed in without a tax, while ours are held out from Germany -by a 20 per cent. tariff. In India, Egypt, and every colony which -does not directly control its own financial policy, German goods -come in upon the same footing as our own. No successful war can -improve her position in this respect. There is, however, the -question of colonial expansion. General von Bernhardi foresees that -Germany is increasing her population at such a pace that emigration -will be needed soon in order to relieve it. It is a perfectly -natural national ambition that this emigration should be to some -place where the settlers need not lose their flag or nationality. -But if Great Britain were out of the way, where would they find such -a place? Not in Canada, Australia, South Africa, or New Zealand. -These States could not be conquered if the Motherland had ceased to -exist. General von Bernhardi talks of the high lands of Africa, but -already Germany possesses high lands in Africa, and their -colonisation has not been a success. Can any one name one single -place upon the earth's surface suitable for white habitation from -which Germany is excluded by the existence of Great Britain? It is -true that the huge continent of South America is only sparsely -inhabited, its whole population being about equal to that of -Prussia. But that is an affair in which the United States, and not -we, are primarily interested, and one which it is not our interest -either to oppose or to support. - -But, however inadequate all these reasons for war may seem to a -Briton, one has still to remember that we have to reckon with the -conclusions exactly as if they were drawn from the most logical -premises. These conclusions appear in such sentences as follows:-- - - "What we now wish to attain must be fought for and won against - a superior force of hostile interests and Powers." - - "Since the struggle is necessary and inevitable, we must fight - it out, cost what it may." - - "A pacific agreement with England is a will-o'-the-wisp, which - no serious German statesman would trouble to follow. We must - always keep the possibility of war with England before our - eyes and arrange our political and military plans accordingly. - We need not concern ourselves with any pacific protestations - of English politicians, publicists, and Utopians, which cannot - alter the real basis of affairs." - - "The situation in the world generally shows there can only be a - short respite before we once more face the question whether we - will draw the sword for our position in the world, or renounce - such position once for all. We must not in any case wait until - our opponents have completed their arming and decide that the - hour of attack has come." - - "Even English attempts at a _rapprochement_ must not blind us - to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay the - necessary and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we - have some prospect of success." - -This last sentence must come home to some of us who have worked in -the past for a better feeling between the two countries. And this is -the man who dares to accuse _us_ of national perfidy. - -These extracts are but a few from a long series which show beyond -all manner of doubt that Germany, so far as General von Bernhardi is -an exponent of her intentions, will undoubtedly attack us suddenly -should she see an opportunity. The first intimation of such attack -would, as he indicates, be a torpedo descent upon our Fleet, and a -wireless message to German liners which would bring up their -concealed guns, and turn each of them into a fast cruiser ready to -prey upon our commerce. That is the situation as he depicts it. It -may be that he mistakes it. But for what it is worth, that is his -opinion and advice. - -He sketches out the general lines of a war between England and -Germany. If France is involved, she is to be annihilated, as already -described. But suppose the two rivals are left face to face. Holland -and Denmark are to be bound over to the German side under pain of -conquest. The German Fleet is to be held back under the protection -of the land forts. Meanwhile, torpedoes, submarines, and airships -are to be used for the gradual whittling down of the blockading -squadrons. When they have been sufficiently weakened the Fleet is to -sally out and the day has arrived. As to the chances of success, he -is of opinion that in material and _personnel_ the two fleets may be -taken as being equal--when once the numbers have been equalised. In -quality of guns, he considers that the Germans have the advantage. -Of gunnery he does not speak, but he believes that in torpedo work -his countrymen are ahead of any others. In airships, which for -_reconnaissance_, if not for actual fighting power, will be of -supreme importance, he considers also that his country will have a -considerable advantage. - -Such, in condensed form, is the general thesis and forecast of this -famous German officer. If it be true, there are evil days coming -both for his country and for ours. One may find some consolation in -the discovery that wherever he attempts to fathom our feelings he -makes the most lamentable blunders. He lays it down as an axiom, for -example, that if we were hard-pressed the Colonies would take the -opportunity of abandoning us. We know, on the other hand, that it is -just such a situation which would bring about the federation of the -Empire. He is under the delusion also that there is deep commercial -and political jealousy of the United States in this country, and -that this might very well culminate in war. We are aware that there -is no such feeling, and that next to holding the trident ourselves -we should wish to see it in the hands of our American cousins. One -thing he says, however, which is supremely true, which all of us -would endorse, and which every German should ponder: it is that the -idea of a war between Germany and ourselves never entered into the -thoughts of any one in this country until the year 1902. Why this -particular year? Had the feeling risen from commercial jealousy -upon the part of Great Britain, it must have shown itself far -earlier than that--as early as the "Made in Germany" enactment. It -appeared in 1902 because that was the close of the Boer War, and -because the bitter hostility shown by the Germans in that war opened -our eyes to the fact that they would do us a mischief if they could. -When the German Navy Act of 1900 gave promise that they would soon -have the means of doing so, the first thoughts of danger arose, and -German policy drove us more and more into the ranks of their -opponents. Here, then, General von Bernhardi is right; but in nearly -every other reference to our feelings and views he is wrong; so that -it is to be hoped that in those matters in which we are unable to -check him, such as the course of German thought and of German action -in the future, he is equally mistaken. But I repeat that he is a man -of standing and reputation, and that we should be mad if we did not -take most serious notice of the opinions which he has laid down. - -I have headed this article "Great Britain and the Next War," since -it looks at the arguments and problems which General von Bernhardi -has raised in his _Germany and the Next War_ from the British point -of view. May it prove that the title is an absurdity and the war an -imaginative hypothesis. But I should wish, before I close, to devote -a few pages to my view upon the defensive measures of our country. I -am well aware that I speak with no expert authority, which makes it -the more embarrassing that my opinions do not coincide with those of -any one whom I have encountered in this controversy. Still, it is -better to be a voice, however small, than an echo. - -It would simplify the argument if we began by eliminating certain -factors which, in my opinion, simply darken counsel, as they are -continually brought into the front of the question to the exclusion -of the real issues which lie behind them. One of them is the -supposed possibility of an invasion--either on a large scale or in -the form of a raid. The former has been pronounced by our highest -naval authorities of the time as being impossible, and I do not -think any one can read the Wilson Memorandum without being convinced -by its condensed logic. Von Bernhardi, in his chapter upon the -possible methods of injuring Great Britain, though he treats the -whole subject with the greatest frankness, dismisses the idea either -of raid or invasion in a few short sentences. The raid seems to me -the less tenable hypothesis of the two. An invasion would, at least, -play for a final stake, though at a deadly risk. A raid would be a -certain loss of a body of troops, which would necessarily be the -flower of the army; it could hope to bring about no possible -permanent effect upon the war, and it would upset the balance of -military power between Germany and her neighbours. If Germany were -an island, like ourselves, she might risk such a venture. Sandwiched -in between two armed nations as strong as herself, I do not believe -that there is the slightest possibility of it. - -But if, as Von Bernhardi says, such plans are visionary, what is the -exact object of a Territorial Army, and, even more, what would be -the object of a National Service Army upon compulsory lines for home -defence? Is it not a waste of money and energy which might be more -profitably employed in some other form? Every one has such an -affection and esteem for Lord Roberts--especially if one has the -honour of his personal acquaintance--that one shrinks from -expressing a view which might be unwelcome to him.[5] And yet he -would be the first to admit that it is one's duty to add one's -opinion to the debate, if that opinion has been conscientiously -formed, and if one honestly believes that it recommends the best -course of action for one's country. So far as his argument for -universal service is based upon national health and physique, I -think he is on ground which no one could attack. But I cannot bring -myself to believe that a case has been made out for the substitution -of an enforced soldier in the place of the volunteer who has always -done so splendidly in the past. Great as is Lord Roberts's -experience, he is talking here of a thing which is outside it, for -he has never seen an enforced British soldier, and has, therefore, -no data by which he can tell how such a man would compare with the -present article. There were enforced British sailors once, and I -have seen figures quoted to show that of 29,000 who were impressed -27,000 escaped from the Fleet by desertion. It is not such men as -these who win our battles. - - [5] More now, alas! than ever.--Nov. 26, A. C. D. - -The argument for enforced service is based upon the plea that the -Territorial Army is below strength in numbers and deficient in -quality. But if invasion is excluded from our calculations this is -of less importance. The force becomes a nursery for the Army, which -has other reserves to draw upon before it reaches it. Experience has -shown that under warlike excitement in a virile nation like ours, -the ranks soon fill up, and as the force becomes embodied from the -outbreak of hostilities, it would rapidly improve in quality. It is -idle to assert that because Bulgaria can, in a day, flood her troops -into Turkey, therefore we should always stand to arms. The -Turko-Bulgarian frontier is a line of posts--the Anglo-German is a -hundred leagues of salt water. - -But am I such an optimist as to say that there is no danger in a -German war? On the contrary, I consider that there is a vast danger, -that it is one which we ignore, and against which we could at a -small cost effect a complete insurance. Let me try to define both -the danger and the remedy. In order to do this we must consider the -two different forms which such a war might take. It might be a -single duel, or it might be with France as our ally. If Germany -attacked Great Britain alone, it may safely be prophesied that the -war would be long, tedious, and possibly inconclusive, but our -_role_ would be a comparatively passive one. If she attacked -France, however, that _role_ would be much more active, since we -could not let France go down, and to give her effective help we must -land an expeditionary force upon the Continent. This force has to be -supplied with munitions of war and kept up to strength, and so the -whole problem becomes a more complex one. - -The element of danger, which is serious in either form of war, but -more serious in the latter, is the existence of new forms of naval -warfare which have never been tested in the hands of competent men, -and which may completely revolutionise the conditions. These new -factors are the submarine and the airship. The latter, save as a -means of acquiring information, does not seem to be formidable--or -not sufficiently formidable to alter the whole conditions of a -campaign. But it is different with the submarines. No blockade, so -far as I can see, can hold these vessels in harbour, and no skill or -bravery can counteract their attack when once they are within -striking distance. One could imagine a state of things when it might -be found impossible for the greater ships on either side to keep the -seas on account of these poisonous craft. No one can say that such a -contingency is impossible. Let us see, then, how it would affect us -if it should come to pass. - -In the first place, it would not affect us at all as regards -invasion or raids. If the German submarines can dominate our own -large ships, our submarines can do the same for theirs. We should -still hold the seas with our small craft. Therefore, if Great -Britain alone be at war with Germany, such a naval revolution would -merely affect our commerce and food supply. What exact effect a -swarm of submarines, lying off the mouth of the Channel and the -Irish Sea, would produce upon the victualling of these islands is a -problem which is beyond my conjecture. Other ships besides the -British would be likely to be destroyed, and international -complications would probably follow. I cannot imagine that such a -fleet would entirely, or even to a very large extent, cut off our -supplies. But it is certain that they would have the effect of -considerably raising the price of whatever did reach us. Therefore -we should suffer privation, though not necessarily such privation as -would compel us to make terms. From the beginning of the war, every -home source would naturally be encouraged, and it is possible that -before our external supplies were seriously decreased, our internal -ones might be well on the way to make up the deficiency. Both of the -two great protagonists--Lord Haldane and Lord Roberts--have declared -that if we lost the command of the seas we should have to make -peace. Their reference, however, was to complete naval defeat, and -not to such a condition of stalemate as seems to be the more -possible alternative. As to complete naval defeat, our estimates, -and the grand loyalty of the Overseas Dominions, seem to be amply -adequate to guard against that. It is useless to try to alarm us by -counting in the whole force of the Triple Alliance as our possible -foes, for if they came into the war, the forces of our own allies -would also be available. We need only think of Germany. - -A predominance of the submarine would, then, merely involve a period -of hard times in this country, if we were fighting Germany -single-handed. But if we were in alliance with France, it becomes an -infinitely more important matter. I presume that I need not argue -the point that it is our vital interest that France be not -dismembered and sterilised. Such a tragedy would turn the western -half of Europe into a gigantic Germany with a few insignificant -States crouching about her feet. The period of her world dominance -would then indeed have arrived. Therefore, if France be wantonly -attacked, we must strain every nerve to prevent her going down, and -among the measures to that end will be the sending of a British -expeditionary force to cover the left or Belgian wing of the French -defences. Such a force would be conveyed across the Channel in -perhaps a hundred troopships, and would entail a constant service of -transports afterwards to carry its requirements. - -Here lies, as it seems to me, the possible material for a great -national disaster. Such a fleet of transports cannot be rushed -suddenly across. Its preparation and port of departure are known. A -single submarine amid such a fleet would be like a fox in a poultry -yard destroying victim after victim. The possibilities are -appalling, for it might be not one submarine, but a squadron. The -terrified transports would scatter over the ocean to find safety in -any port. Their convoy could do little to help them. It would be a -debacle--an inversion of the Spanish Armada. - -If the crossing were direct from the eastern ports to Antwerp, the -danger would become greater.[6] It is less if it should be from -Portsmouth to Havre. But this is a transit of seven hours, and the -railways from Havre to the Belgian frontier would be insufficient -for such a force. No doubt the Straits of Dover would be strongly -patrolled by our own torpedo craft, and the crossing would, so far -as possible, be made at night, when submarines have their minimum of -efficiency; but, none the less, it seems to me that the risk would -be a very real and pressing one. What possible patrol could make -sure of heading off a squadron of submarines? I should imagine it to -be as difficult as to bar the Straits to a school of whales. - - [6] This, of course, would presuppose that Holland was - involved in the war.--A. C. D. - -But supposing such a wholesale tragedy were avoided, and that in -spite of the predominance of submarines the army got safely to -France or to Belgium, how are we to ensure the safe passage of the -long stream of ships which, for many months, would be employed in -carrying the needful supplies? We could not do it. The army might -very well find itself utterly isolated, with its line of -communications completely broken down, at a time when the demand -upon the resources of all Continental countries was so great that -there was no surplus for our use. Such a state of affairs seems to -me to be a perfectly possible one, and to form, with the chance of -a disaster to the transports, the greatest danger to which we should -be exposed in a German war. But these dangers and the food question, -which has already been treated, can all be absolutely provided -against in a manner which is not only effective, but which will be -of equal value in peace and in war. The Channel Tunnel is essential -to Great Britain's safety. - -I will not dwell here upon the commercial or financial advantages of -such a tunnel. Where the trade of two great nations concentrates -upon one narrow tube, it is obvious that whatever corporation -controls that tube has a valuable investment, if the costs of -construction have not been prohibitive. These costs have been placed -as low as five million pounds by Mr. Rose Smith, who represents a -practical company engaged in such work. If it were twice, thrice, or -four times that sum it should be an undertaking which should promise -great profits, and for that reason should be constructed by the -nation, or nations, for their common national advantage. It is too -vital a thing for any private company to control. - -But consider its bearing upon a German war. All the dangers which I -have depicted are eliminated. We tap (_via_ Marseilles and the -tunnel) the whole food supply of the Mediterranean and the Black -Sea. Our expeditionary force makes its transit, and has its supplies -independent of weather or naval chances. Should anything so unlikely -as a raid occur, and the forces in this country seem unable to cope -with it, a Franco-British reinforcement can be rushed through from -the Continent. The Germans have made great works like the Kiel Canal -in anticipation of war. Our answer must be the Channel Tunnel, -linking us closer to our ally. - -Though this scheme was discarded (under very different naval and -political conditions) some twenty years ago, no time has, as a -matter of fact, been lost by the delay; as I am informed that -machinery for boring purposes has so enormously improved that what -would have taken thirty years to accomplish can now be done in -three. If this estimate be correct, there may still be time to -effect this essential insurance before the war with which General -von Bernhardi threatens us breaks upon us. - -Let us, before leaving the subject, glance briefly at the objections -which have formerly been urged against the tunnel. Such as they are, -they are as valid now as ever, although the advantages have -increased to such an extent as to throw the whole weight of the -argument upon the side of those who favour its construction. The -main (indeed, the only) objection was the fear that the tunnel would -fall into wrong hands and be used for purposes of invasion. By this -was meant not a direct invasion through the tunnel itself--to invade -a nation of forty-five million people through a hole in the ground -twenty-five miles long would stagger the boldest mind--but that the -tunnel might be seized at each end by some foreign nation, which -would then use it for aggressive military purposes. - -At the time of the discussion our relations with France were by no -means so friendly as they are now, and it was naturally to France -only that we alluded, since they would already hold one end of the -tunnel. We need not now discuss any other nation, since any other -would have to seize both ends by surprise, and afterwards retain -them, which is surely inconceivable. We are now bound in close ties -of friendship and mutual interest to France. We have no right to -assume that we shall always remain on as close a footing, but as our -common peril seems likely to be a permanent one, it is improbable -that there will be any speedy or sudden change in our relations. At -the same time, in a matter so vital as our hold upon the Dover end -of the tunnel, we could not be too stringent in our precautions. The -tunnel should open out at a point where guns command it, the mouth -of it should be within the lines of an entrenched camp, and a -considerable garrison should be kept permanently within call. The -latter condition already exists in Dover, but the numbers might well -be increased. As an additional precaution, a passage should be -driven alongside the tunnel, from which it could, if necessary, be -destroyed. This passage should have an independent opening within -the circle of a separate fort, so that the capture of the end of the -tunnel would not prevent its destruction. With such precautions as -these, the most nervous person might feel that our insular position -had not really been interfered with. The strong fortress of the -Middle Ages had a passage under the moat as part of the defence. -This is our passage. - -Could an enemy in any way destroy it in time of war? - -It would, as I conceive, be sunk to a depth of not less than two -hundred feet below the bed of the ocean. This ceiling would be -composed of chalk and clay. No explosive from above could drive it -in. If it were designed on a large scale--and, personally, I think -it should be a four-line tunnel, even if the cost were doubled -thereby--no internal explosion, such as might be brought about by -secreting explosive packets upon the trains, would be likely to do -more than temporarily obstruct it. If the very worst happened, and -it were actually destroyed, we should be no worse off than we are -now. As to the expense, if we are driven into a war of this -magnitude, a few millions one way or the other will not be worth -considering. - -Incidentally, it may be noted that General von Bernhardi has a poor -opinion of our troops. This need not trouble us. We are what we are, -and words will not alter it. From very early days our soldiers have -left their mark upon Continental warfare, and we have no reason to -think that we have declined from the manhood of our forefathers. He -further calls them "mercenaries," which is a misuse of terms. A -mercenary is a man who is paid to fight in a quarrel which is not -his own. As every British soldier must by law be a British citizen, -the term is absurd. What he really means is that they are not -conscripts in the sense of being forced to fight, but they are -sufficiently well paid to enable the army as a profession to attract -a sufficient number of our young men to the colours. - -Our military and naval preparations are, as it seems to me, adequate -for the threatened crisis. With the Channel Tunnel added our -position should be secure. But there are other preparations which -should be made for such a contest, should it unhappily be forced -upon us. One is financial. Again, as so often before in the history -of British wars, it may prove that the last guinea wins. Everything -possible should be done to strengthen British credit. This crisis -cannot last indefinitely. The cloud will dissolve or burst. -Therefore, for a time we should husband our resources for the -supreme need. At such a time all national expenditure upon objects -which only mature in the future becomes unjustifiable. Such a tax as -the undeveloped land tax, which may bring in a gain some day, but at -present costs ten times what it produces, is the type of expenditure -I mean. I say nothing of its justice or injustice, but only of its -inopportuneness at a moment when we sorely need our present -resources. - -Another preparation lies in our national understanding of the -possibility of such a danger and the determination to face the -facts. Both Unionists and Liberals have shown their appreciation of -the situation, and so have two of the most famous Socialist leaders. -No audible acquiescence has come from the ranks of the Labour Party. -I would venture to say one word here to my Irish fellow-countrymen -of all political persuasions. If they imagine that they can stand -politically or economically while Britain falls, they are woefully -mistaken. The British Fleet is their one shield. If it be broken, -Ireland will go down. They may well throw themselves heartily into -the common defence, for no sword can transfix England without the -point reaching Ireland behind her. - -Let me say in conclusion, most emphatically, that I do not myself -accept any of those axioms of General von Bernhardi which are the -foundation-stones of his argument. I do not think that war is in -itself a good thing, though a dishonourable peace may be a worse -one. I do not believe that an Anglo-German war is necessary. I am -convinced that we should never, of our own accord, attack Germany, -nor would we assist France if she made an unprovoked attack upon -that Power. I do not think that as the result of such a war, Germany -could in any way extend her flag so as to cover a larger white -population. Every one of his propositions I dispute. But that is all -beside the question. We have not to do with his argument, but with -its results. Those results are that he, a man whose opinion is of -weight, and a member of the ruling class in Germany, tells us -frankly that Germany will attack us the moment she sees a favourable -opportunity. I repeat that we should be mad if we did not take very -serious notice of the warning. - - - * * * * * - - - - -IX - -AFTERTHOUGHTS - - -So it was so after all. I write after perusing what was written two -years ago. I lean back in my chair and I think of the past. "So it -really was so after all," represents the thought which comes to my -mind. - -It seems hardly fair to call it a conspiracy. When a certain action -is formulated quite clearly in many books, when it is advocated by -newspapers, preached by professors, and discussed at every -restaurant, it ceases to be a conspiracy. We may take Bernhardi's -book as a text, but it is only because here between two covers we -find the whole essence of the matter in an authoritative form. It -has been said a thousand times elsewhere. And now we know for all -time that these countless scolding and minatory voices were not mere -angry units, but that they were in truth the collective voice of -the nation. All that Bernhardi said, all that after long disbelief -he made some of us vaguely realise, has now actually happened. So -far as Germany is concerned it has been fulfilled to the letter. -Fortunately so far as other nations have been concerned it has been -very different. He knew his own, but he utterly misjudged all else, -and in that misjudgment he and his spy-trusting Government have dug -a pit for themselves in which they long may flounder. - -Make war deliberately whenever you think that you may get profit -from it. Find an excuse, but let it be an excuse which will give you -a strong position before the world and help your alliances. Take -advantage of your neighbour's temporary weakness in order to attack -him. Pretend to be friendly in order to screen warlike preparations. -Do not let contracts or treaties stand in the way of your vital -interests. All of these monstrous propositions are to be found in -this _vade mecum_ of the German politician and soldier, and each of -them has been put in actual practice within a very few years of the -appearance of the book. Take each of them in turn. - -Take first the point that they made war deliberately, and took -advantage of the imagined weakness of their neighbours in order to -attack them. When was it that they backed up, if they did not -actually dictate, the impossible ultimatum addressed as much to -Russia as to Servia? When was it that they were so determined upon -war that they made peace impossible at the moment when Austria was -showing signs of reconsidering her position? Why so keen at that -particular moment? Was it not that for the instant each of her three -antagonists seemed to be at a disadvantage? Russia was supposed not -to have recovered yet from her Japanese misadventure. France was -torn by politics, and had admitted in the Senate that some important -branches of her armies were unprepared. Britain seemed to be on the -verge of civil war. It was just such a combination as was predicated -by Bernhardi. And his country responded to it exactly as he had -said, choosing the point of quarrel against the Slav race so as to -conciliate the more advanced or liberal nations of the world. - -Then again they pretended to be friendly in order to cover hostile -preparations. To the very last moment the German Minister in -Brussels was assuring the Government of King Albert that nothing but -the best intentions animated those whom he represented, and that -Belgian neutrality was safe. The written contract was deliberately -dishonoured on the false and absurd plea that if they did not -dishonour it some one else would. Thus, of the five propositions -which had seemed most monstrous and inhuman in Bernhardi's book in -1912, every single one had been put into actual practice by his -country in 1914. Those of us who advised at the time that the book -should be taken seriously have surely been amply justified. - -It is a singular thing that Bernhardi not only indicated in a -general way what Germany was contemplating, but in his other book -upon modern warfare he gives a very complete sketch of the strategic -conception which has been followed by the Germans. He shows there -how their armies might come through Belgium, how their eastern -forces might mark time while the western, which were to consist of -the picked troops, would travel by forced marches until they reached -the neighbourhood of the coast, or at least the west of Paris, after -which the whole line should swing round into France. The chance that -by these movements the German right would come into the region of -the British expeditionary force is dismissed lightly, since he -entirely underestimated the power of such a force, while as to the -Belgian army it is hardly admitted as a factor at all. A comparison -of the opinions of this great military authority with the actual -facts as we have recently known them, must weaken one's faith in the -value of expert judgment. He is, for example, strongly of opinion -that battles will not as a rule last for more than one day. He has -also so high an opinion of the supreme fighting value of the German -soldiers, that he declares that they will always fight in the open -rather than behind entrenchments. It makes strange reading for us -who have seen them disappear from sight into the ground for a month -at a time. - -In what I have said in the previous article of the naval and -military position, I find nothing to withdraw, and little to modify. -I write with the Germans at Ostend, and yet the possibility of -either a raid or an invasion seems to me as remote as it did two -years ago. I do not of course refer to an aerial raid, which I look -upon as extremely probable, but to a landing in these islands. The -submarine which has been used so skilfully against us is an -all-powerful defensive weapon in our hands. As to the submarine, I -think that I may claim to have foreseen the situation which has -actually come upon us. "No blockade," I remarked, "can hold these -vessels in harbour, and no skill or bravery can counteract their -attack when once they are within striking distance. One could -imagine a state of things when it might be found impossible for the -greater ships on either side to keep the seas on account of these -poisonous craft. No one can say that such a contingency is -impossible." It is largely true at the present moment as regards the -North Sea. But the submarine will not shake Great Britain as -mistress of the seas. On the contrary, with her geographical -position, it will, if her internal economic policy be wise, put her -in a stronger position than ever. - -The whole question of the Channel Tunnel and its strategic effect, -which is treated of in the last essay, becomes entirely academic, -since even if it had been put in hand when the German menace became -clearer it could not yet have been completed. The idea of an -invasion through it has always seemed and still seems to me to be -absurd, but we should have been brought face to face at the present -moment with the possibility of the enemy getting hold of the farther -end and destroying it, so as to wreck a great national enterprise. -This is a danger which I admit that I had not foreseen. At the same -time, when a tunnel is constructed, the end of it will no doubt be -fortified in such a fashion that it could be held indefinitely -against any power save France, which would have so large a stake in -it herself that she could not destroy it. The whole operation of -sending reinforcements and supplies to the scene of war at the -present instant would be enormously simplified if a tunnel were in -existence. - -There remains the fiercely debated question of compulsory national -service. Even now, with the enemy at the gate, it seems to me to be -as open as ever. Would we, under our constitution and with our -methods of thought, have had such a magnificent response to Lord -Kitchener's appeal, or would we have had such splendid political -unanimity in carrying the war to a conclusion, if a large section of -the people had started by feeling sore over an Act which caused -themselves or their sons to serve whether they wished or not? -Personally I do not believe that we should. I believe that the new -volunteer armies now under training are of really wonderful material -and fired with the very best spirit, and that they will be worth -more than a larger force raised by methods which are alien to our -customs. I said in my previous essay, "Experience has shown that -under warlike excitement in a virile nation like ours the ranks soon -fill up, and as the force becomes embodied from the outbreak of -hostilities it would rapidly improve in quality." Already those -Territorials who were so ignorantly and ungenerously criticised in -times of peace are, after nearly three months of camp-life, -hardening into soldiers who may safely be trusted in the field. -Behind them the greater part of a million men are formed who will -also become soldiers in a record time if a desperate earnestness can -make them so. It is a glorious spectacle which makes a man thankful -that he has been spared to see it. One is more hopeful of our -Britain, and more proud of her, now that the German guns can be -heard from her eastern shore, than ever in the long monotony of her -undisturbed prosperity. Our grandchildren will thrill as they read -of the days that we endure. - - - * * * * * - - - _Printed in Great Britain by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld.,_ - _London and Aylesbury._ - - - * * * * * - - - - -TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES - - -Italic text has been denoted by _underscores_. - -Characters in small caps have been replaced by all caps. - -The non-printable characters have been replaced as shown below: - - 'oe' ligature --> oe - -This book was written in a period when many words had not become -standarized in their spelling. Numerous words have multiple spelling -variations in the text. These have been left unchanged unless noted -below: - - p 29 - typo: missing 'the' added (in the future) - - p 75 - typo: at --> as (he exclaimed, as he gazed) - - p 86 - typo: missing 'the' added (in the future) - - p 111 - typo: missing 'the' added (in the future) - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The German War, by Arthur Conan Doyle - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE GERMAN WAR *** - -***** This file should be named 42127.txt or 42127.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/2/1/2/42127/ - -Produced by Richard Hulse, Suzanne Shell and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, -set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to -copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to -protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project -Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you -charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you -do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the -rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose -such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and -research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do -practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is -subject to the trademark license, especially commercial -redistribution. - - - -*** START: FULL LICENSE *** - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project -Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at - www.gutenberg.org/license. - - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy -all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. -If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the -terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or -entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement -and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" -or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the -collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an -individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are -located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from -copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative -works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg -are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project -Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by -freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of -this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with -the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by -keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project -Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in -a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check -the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement -before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or -creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project -Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning -the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United -States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate -access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently -whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, -copied or distributed: - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived -from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is -posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied -and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees -or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work -with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the -work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 -through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the -Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or -1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional -terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked -to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the -permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any -word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or -distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than -"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version -posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), -you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a -copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon -request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other -form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided -that - -- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is - owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he - has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the - Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments - must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you - prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax - returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and - sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the - address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to - the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." - -- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or - destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium - and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of - Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any - money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days - of receipt of the work. - -- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set -forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from -both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael -Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the -Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm -collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain -"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or -corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual -property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a -computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by -your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with -your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with -the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a -refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity -providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to -receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy -is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further -opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO OTHER -WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO -WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. -If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the -law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be -interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by -the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any -provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance -with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, -promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, -harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, -that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do -or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm -work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any -Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. - - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers -including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists -because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from -people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. -To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation -and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 -and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive -Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent -permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. -Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered -throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at 809 -North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email -contact links and up to date contact information can be found at the -Foundation's web site and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To -SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any -particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. -To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm -concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared -with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project -Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. -unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily -keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: - - www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - |