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diff --git a/42055-8.txt b/42055-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 88188a7..0000000 --- a/42055-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5371 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook, Your Mind and How to Use It, by William -Walker Atkinson - - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - - - - -Title: Your Mind and How to Use It - A Manual of Practical Psychology - - -Author: William Walker Atkinson - - - -Release Date: February 9, 2013 [eBook #42055] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - - -***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK YOUR MIND AND HOW TO USE IT*** - - -E-text prepared by sp1nd, C.M., and the Online Distributed Proofreading -Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made available by -Internet Archive (http://archive.org) - - - -Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this - file which includes the original illustration. - See 42055-h.htm or 42055-h.zip: - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/42055/42055-h/42055-h.htm) - or - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/42055/42055-h.zip) - - - Images of the original pages are available through - Internet Archive. See - http://archive.org/details/yourmindhowtouse00atki - - -Transcriber's note: - - The author's use of three asterisks * * * to serve as ellipses - has been preserved as printed in the original publication. - - - - - -[Illustration: William Walker Atkinson] - - -YOUR MIND AND HOW TO USE IT - -A Manual of Practical Psychology - -by - -WILLIAM WALKER ATKINSON - - It is not enough merely to have a sound mind--one - must also learn how to use it, if he would - become mentally efficient. - - - - - - - -Published by -the Elizabeth Towne Co., -Holyoke, Mass. - -L.N. Fowler & Co., London. - -Copyright, 1911. -Elizabeth Towne. - -Copyrighted in the United States and England. - - - - -Contents. - - - CHAPTER PAGE - - I. WHAT IS THE MIND 5 - - II. THE MECHANISM OF MENTAL STATES 11 - - III. THE GREAT NERVE CENTERS 17 - - IV. CONSCIOUSNESS 24 - - V. ATTENTION 29 - - VI. PERCEPTION 36 - - VII. MEMORY 45 - - VIII. MEMORY (continued) 54 - - IX. IMAGINATION 62 - - X. THE FEELINGS 72 - - XI. THE EMOTIONS 79 - - XII. THE INSTINCTIVE EMOTIONS 88 - - XIII. THE PASSIONS 96 - - XIV. THE SOCIAL EMOTIONS 104 - - XV. THE RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS 111 - - XVI. THE ÆSTHETIC EMOTIONS 117 - - XVII. THE INTELLECTUAL EMOTIONS 125 - - XVIII. THE ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS 131 - - XIX. THE EMOTIONS AND HAPPINESS 136 - - XX. THE INTELLECT 143 - - XXI. CONCEPTION 151 - - XXII. CLASSES OF CONCEPTS 158 - - XXIII. JUDGMENTS 164 - - XXIV. PRIMARY LAWS OF THOUGHT 171 - - XXV. REASONING 176 - - XXVI. INDUCTIVE REASONING 181 - - XXVII. DEDUCTIVE REASONING 186 - - XXVIII. FALLACIOUS REASONING 193 - - XXIX. THE WILL 201 - - XXX. WILL-TRAINING 213 - - XXXI. WILL-TONIC 219 - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -What is the Mind? - - -Psychology is generally considered to be the science of mind, although -more properly it is the science of mental states--thoughts, feelings, -and acts of volition. It was formerly the custom of writers on the -subject of psychology to begin by an attempt to define and describe the -nature of mind, before proceeding to a consideration of the subject of -the various mental spates and activities. But more recent authorities -have rebelled against this demand, and have claimed that it is no more -reasonable to hold that psychology should be held to an explanation of -the ultimate nature of mind than it is that physical science be held to -an explanation of the ultimate nature of matter. The attempt to explain -the ultimate nature of either is futile--no actual necessity exists for -explanation in either case. Physics may explain the phenomena of matter, -and psychology the phenomena of mind, without regard to the ultimate -nature of the substance of either. - -The science of physics has progressed steadily during the past century, -notwithstanding the fact that the theories regarding the ultimate -nature of matter have been revolutionized during that period. The facts -of the phenomena of matter remain, notwithstanding the change of theory -regarding the nature of matter itself. Science demands and holds fast to -facts, regarding theories as but working hypotheses at the best. Some -one has said that "theories are but the bubbles with which the grown-up -children of science amuse themselves." Science holds several -well-supported, though opposing, theories regarding the nature of -electricity, but the _facts_ of the phenomena of electricity, and the -application thereof, are agreed upon by the disputing theorists. And so -it is with psychology; the facts regarding mental states are agreed -upon, and methods of developing mental powers are effectively employed, -without regard to whether mind is a product of the brain, or the brain -merely an organ of the mind. The fact that the brain and nervous system -are employed in the phenomena of thought is conceded by all, and that is -all that is necessary for a basis for the science of psychology. - -Disputes regarding the ultimate nature of mind are now generally passed -over to the philosophers and metaphysicians, while psychology devotes -its entire attention to studying the laws of mental activities, and to -discovering methods of mental development. Even philosophy is beginning -to tire of the eternal "why" and is devoting its attention to the "how" -phase of things. The pragmatic spirit has invaded the field of -philosophy, expressing itself in the words of Prof. William James, who -said: "Pragmatism is the attitude of looking away from first things, -principles, categories, supposed necessities; and of looking forward -toward last things, _fruits_, _consequences_, _facts_." Modern -psychology is essentially pragmatic in its treatment of the subject of -the mind. Leaving to metaphysics the old arguments and disputes -regarding the ultimate nature of mind, it bends all its energies upon -discovering the laws of mental activities and states, and developing -methods whereby the mind may be trained to perform better and more work, -to conserve its energies, to concentrate its forces. To modern -psychology the mind is _something to be used_, not merely something -about which to speculate and theorize. While the metaphysicians deplore -this tendency, the practical people of the world rejoice. - - -MIND DEFINED. - -Mind is defined as "the faculty or power whereby thinking creatures, -feel, think, and will." This definition is inadequate and circular in -nature, but this is unavoidable, for mind can be defined only in its -own terms and only by reference to its own processes. Mind, except in -reference to its own activities, cannot be defined or conceived. It is -known to itself only through its activities. Mind without mental states -is a mere abstraction--a word without a corresponding mental image or -concept. Sir William Hamilton expressed the matter as clearly as -possible, when he said: "What we mean by mind is simply _that which_ -perceives, thinks, feels, wills, and desires." Without the perceiving, -thinking, feeling, willing, and desiring, it is impossible to form a -clear conception or mental image of mind; deprived of its phenomena it -becomes the merest abstraction. - - -"THINK ABOUT THAT WHICH THINKS." - -Perhaps the simplest method of conveying the idea of the existence and -nature of the mind is that attributed to a celebrated German teacher of -psychology who was wont to begin his course by bidding his students -think of something, his desk, for example. Then he would say, "Now think -of _that which thinks about the desk_." Then, after a pause, he would -add, "This thing which thinks about the desk, and about which you are -now thinking, is the subject matter of our study of psychology." The -professor could not have said more had he lectured for a month. - -Professor Gordy has well said on this point: "The mind must either be -_that which_ thinks, feels, and wills, or it must be the thoughts, -feelings, and acts of will of which we are conscious--mental facts, in -one word. But what can we know about _that which_ thinks, feels, and -wills, and what can we find out about it? Where is it? You will probably -say, in the brain. But, if you are speaking literally, if you say that -it is in the brain, as a pencil is in the pocket, then you must mean -that it takes up room, that it occupies space, and that would make it -very much like a material thing. In truth, the more carefully you -consider it, the more plainly you will see what thinking men have known -for a long time--that we do not know and cannot learn anything about the -thing which thinks, and feels, and wills. It is beyond the range of -human knowledge. The books which define psychology as the science of -mind have not a word to say about that which thinks, and feels, and -wills. They are entirely taken up with these thoughts and feelings and -acts of the will,--mental facts, in a word,--trying to tell us what they -are, and to arrange them in classes, and tell us the circumstances or -conditions under which they exist. It seems to me that it would be -better to define psychology as _the science of the experiences, -phenomena, or facts of the mind, soul, or self--of mental facts, in a -word_." - -In view of the facts of the case, and following the example of the best -of the modern authorities, in this book we shall leave the consideration -of the question of the ultimate nature of mind to the metaphysicians, -and shall confine ourselves to the _mental facts_, the laws governing -them, and the best methods of governing and using them in "the business -of life." - -The classification and method of development to be followed in this book -is as follows:-- - -I. The mechanism of mental states, _i.e._, the brain, nervous system, -sense organs, etc. - -II. The fact of Consciousness and its planes. - -III. Mental processes or faculties, _i.e._, (1) Sensation and -Perception; (2) Representation, or Imagination and Memory; (3) Feeling -or Emotion; (4) Intellect, or Reason and Understanding; (5) Will or -Volition. - -Mental states depend upon the physical mechanism for manifestation, -whatever may be the ultimate nature of mind. Mental states, whatever -their special character, will be found to fit into one of the above five -general classes of mental activities. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -The Mechanism of Mental States. - - -The mechanism of mental states--the mental machinery by means of which -we feel, think, and will--consists of the brain, nervous system, and the -organs of sense. No matter what may be the real nature of mind,--no -matter what may be the theory held regarding its activities,--it must be -admitted that the mind is dependent upon this mechanism for the -manifestation of what we know as mental states. Wonderful as is the -mind, it is seen to be dependent upon this physical mechanism for the -expression of its activities. And this dependence is not upon the brain -alone, but also upon the entire nervous system. - -The best authorities agree that the higher and more complex mental -states are but an evolution of simple sensation, and that they are -dependent upon sensation for their raw material of feeling and thought. -Therefore it is proper that we begin by a consideration of the machinery -of sensation. This necessitates a previous consideration of the nerves. - - -THE NERVES. - -The body is traversed by an intricate system of nerves, which has been -likened to a great telegraph system. The nerves transmit sensations from -the various parts of the body to the great receiving office of the -brain. They also serve to transmit the motor impulses from the brain to -the various parts of the body, which impulses result in motion of -appropriate parts of the body. There are also other nerves with which we -have no concern in this book, but which perform certain physiological -functions, such as digestion, secretion, excretion, and circulation. Our -chief concern, at this point, is with the sensory nerves. - -The sensory nerves convey the impressions of the outside world to the -brain. The brain is the great central station of the sensory nerves, the -latter having countless sending stations in all parts of the body, the -"wires" terminating in the skin. When these nervous terminal stations -are irritated or excited, they send to the brain messages calling for -attention. This is true not only of the nerves of touch or feeling, but -also of those concerned with the respective senses of sight, smell, -taste, and hearing. In fact, the best authorities hold that all the five -senses are but an evolution of the primary sense of touch or feeling. - - -THE SENSE OF TOUCH. - -The nerves of the sense of touch have their ending in the outer -covering or skin of the body. They report _contact_ with other physical -objects. By means of these reports we are aware not only of contact with -the outside object, but also of many facts concerning the nature of that -object, as for instance, its degree of hardness, roughness, etc., and its -temperature. Some of these nerve ends are very sensitive, as, for -example, those of the tip of the tongue and finger ends, while others -are comparatively lacking in sensitiveness, as, for illustration, those -of the back. Certain of these sensory nerves confine themselves to -reporting contact and degrees of pressure, while others concern -themselves solely with reporting the degrees of temperature of the -objects with which their ends come in contact. Some of the latter -respond to the higher degrees of heat, while others respond only to the -lower degrees of cold. The nerves of certain parts of the body respond -more readily and distinctly to temperature than do those of other parts. -To illustrate, the nerves of the cheek are quite responsive to heat -impressions. - - -THE SENSE OF SIGHT. - -The nerves of the sense of sight terminate in the complex optical -apparatus which in popular terminology is known as "the eye." What is -known as "the retina" is a very sensitive nervous membrane which lines -the inner, back part of the eye, and in which the fibers of the optic -nerve terminate. The optical instrument of the eye conveys the focused -light vibrations to the nerves of the retina, from which the impulse is -transmitted to the brain. But, contrary to the popular notion, the -nerves of the eye do not gauge distances, nor form inferences of any -kind; that is distinctly the work of the mind. The simple office of the -optical nerves consists in reporting color and degrees of intensity of -the light waves. - - -THE SENSE OF HEARING. - -The nerves of the sense of hearing terminate in the inner part of the -ear. The tympanum, or "ear drum," receives the sound vibrations entering -the cavities of the ear, and, intensifying and adapting them, it passes -them on to the ends of the auditory nerve in the internal ear, which -conveys the sensation to the brain. The auditory nerve reports to the -brain the degrees of pitch, intensity, quality, and harmony, -respectively, of the sound waves reaching the tympanum. As is well -known, there are certain vibrations of sound which are too low for the -auditory nerve to register, and others too high for it to record, both -classes, however, capable of being recorded by scientific instruments. -It is also regarded as certain that some of the lower animals are -conscious of sound vibrations which are not registered by the human -auditory nerves. - - -THE SENSE OF SMELL. - -The nerves of the sense of smell terminate in the mucous membrane of the -nostrils. In order that these nerves report the odor of outside objects, -actual contact of minute particles of the object with the mucous -membrane of the nostrils is necessary. This is possible only by the -passage through the nostrils of air containing these particles; mere -nearness to the nostril will not suffice. These particles are for the -most part composed of tenuous gases. Certain substances affect the -olfactory nerves much more than do others, the difference arising from -the chemical composition of the substance. The olfactory nerves convey -the report to the brain. - - -THE SENSE OF TASTE. - -The nerves of the sense of taste terminate in the tongue, or rather in -the tiny cells of the tongue which are called "taste buds." Substances -taken into the mouth chemically affect these tiny cells, and an impulse -is transmitted to the gustatory nerves, which then report the sensation -to the brain. The authorities claim that taste sensations may be reduced -to five general classes, viz.: sweet, bitter, sour, salty, and "hot." - -There are certain nerve centers having important offices in the -production and expression of mental states, located in the skull and in -the spinal column--the brain and the spinal cord--which we shall -consider in the following chapter. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - -The Great Nerve Centers. - - -The great nerve centers which play an important part in the production -and expression of mental states are those of the brain and spinal cord, -respectively. - - -THE SPINAL CORD. - -The spinal cord is that cord or rope of nerve substance which is -inclosed in the spinal column or "backbone." It leaves the lower part of -the skull and extends downward in the interior of the spinal column for -about eighteen inches. It is continuous with the brain, however, and it -is difficult to determine where one begins and the other ends. It is -composed of a mass of gray matter surrounded by a covering of white -matter. From the spinal cord, along its length, emerge thirty-one pairs -of spinal nerves which branch out to each side of the body and connect -with the various smaller nerves, extending to all parts of the system. -The spinal cord is the great central cable of the nervous telegraphic -system, and any injury to or obstruction of it cripples or paralyzes -those portions of the body the nerves of which enter the spinal cord -below the seat of the injury or obstruction. Injuries or obstructions of -this kind not only inhibit the sensory reports from the affected area, -but also inhibit the motor impulses from the brain which are intended to -move the limbs or parts of the body. - - -THE GANGLIA OR "TINY BRAINS." - -What are known as ganglia, or tiny bunches of nerve cells, are found in -various parts of the nervous system, including the spinal nerves. These -groups of nerve cells are sometimes called "little brains," and perform -quite important offices in the mechanism of thought and action. The -spinal ganglia receive sensory reports, and issue motor impulses, in -many cases, without troubling the central brain regarding the matter. -These activities are known as "reflex nervous action." - - -REFLEX ACTION. - -What is known as reflex nervous action is one of the most wonderful of -the activities of the nervous and mental mechanism, and the knowledge -thereof usually comes as a surprise to the average person, for he is -generally under the impression that these activities are possible only -to the central brain. It is a fact that not only is the central brain -really a trinity of three brains, but that, in addition to these, every -one has a great number of "little brains" distributed over his nervous -system, any and all of which are capable of receiving sensory reports -and also of sending forth motor impulses. It is quite worth while for -one to become acquainted with this wonderful form of neuro-mental -activity. - -A cinder enters the eye, the report reaches a ganglion, a motor impulse -is sent forth, and the eyelid closes. The same result ensues if an -object approaches the eye but without actually entering it. In either -case the person is not conscious of the sensation and motor impulse -until the latter has been accomplished. This is reflex action. The -instinctive movement of the tickled foot is another instance. The -jerking away of the hand burnt by the lighted end of the cigar, or -pricked by the point of the pin, is another instance. The involuntary -activities, and those known as unconscious activities, result from -reflex action. - -More than this, it is a fact that many activities originally voluntary -become what is known as "acquired reflexes," or "motor habits," by means -of certain nervous centers acquiring the habit of sending forth certain -motor impulses in response to certain sensory reports. The familiar -movements of our lives are largely performed in this way, as, for -instance, walking, using knife and fork, operating typewriters, -machines of all kinds, writing, etc. The squirming of a decapitated -snake, the muscular movements of a decapitated frog, and the violent -struggles, fluttering, and leaps of the decapitated fowl, are instances -of reflex action. Medical reports indicate that in cases of decapitation -even man may manifest similar reflex action in some cases. Thus we may -see that we may _feel_ and _will_ by means of our "little brains" as -well as by the central brain or brains. Whatever mind may be, it is -certain that in these processes it employs other portions of the nervous -system than the central brain. - - -THE THREE BRAINS. - -What is known as the brain of man is really a trinity of three brains, -known respectively as (1) the _medulla oblongata_, (2) the _cerebellum_, -and (3) the _cerebrum_. If one wishes to limit the mental activity to -conscious intellectual effort, then and then only is he correct in -considering the cerebrum or large brain as "the brain." - -_The Medulla Oblongata._--The medulla oblongata is an enlargement of the -spinal cord at the base of the brain. Its office is that of controlling -the involuntary activities of the body, such as respiration, -circulation, assimilation, etc. In a broad sense, its activities may be -said to be of the nature of highly developed and complex reflex -activities. It manifests chiefly through the sympathetic nervous system -which controls the vital functions. It does not need to call on the -large brain in these matters, ordinarily, and is able to perform its -tasks without the plane of ordinary consciousness. - -_The Cerebellum._--The cerebellum, also known as "the little brain," -lies just above the medulla oblongata, and just below the rear portion -of the cerebrum or great brain. It combines the nature of a purely -reflex center on the one hand, with that of "habit mind" on the other. -In short, it fills a place between the activities of the cerebrum and -the medulla oblongata, having some of the characteristics of each. It is -the organ of a number of important acquired reflexes, such as walking, -and many other familiar muscular movements, which have first been -consciously acquired and then become habitual. The skilled skater, -bicyclist, typist, or machinist depends upon the cerebellum for the ease -and certainty with which he performs his movements "without thinking of -them." One may be said never to have thoroughly acquired a set of -muscular movements such as we have mentioned, until the cerebellum has -taken over the task and relieved the cerebrum of the conscious effort. -One's technique is never perfected until the cerebellum assumes control -and direction of the necessary movements and the impulses are sent -forth from below the plane of ordinary consciousness. - -_The Cerebrum._--The cerebrum, or "great brain" (which is regarded as -"the brain" by the average person), is situated in the upper portion of -the skull, and occupies by far the larger portion of the cavity of the -skull. It is divided into two great divisions or hemispheres. The best -of the modern authorities are agreed that the cerebrum has zones or -areas of specialized functioning, some of which receive the sensory -reports of the nerves and organs of sense, while others send forth the -motor impulses which result in voluntary physical action. Many of these -areas or zones have been located by science, while others remain as yet -unlocated. The probability is that in time science will succeed in -correctly locating the area or zone of each and every class of sensation -and motor impulse. - - -THE CORTEX. - -The area of thought, memory, and imagination has not been clearly -located, except that these mental states are believed to have their seat -in the _cortex_ or outer thin rind of gray brain matter which envelopes -and covers the mass of brain substance. It is, moreover, considered -probable that the higher processes of reasoning are performed in or by -the cortex of the frontal lobes. The cortex of a person of average -intelligence, if spread out on a flat surface, measures about four -square feet. The higher the degree of intelligence possessed by a lower -animal or human being, as a rule, the deeper and more numerous are the -folds or convolutions of the cortex, and the finer its structure. It may -be stated as a general rule, with but very few exceptions, that the -higher the degree of intelligence in a lower animal or human being, the -greater is the area of its cortex in proportion to the size of the -brain. The cortex, it must be remembered, is folded into deep furrows or -convolutions, the brain in shape, divisions, and convolutions resembling -the inner portion of an English walnut. The interior of the two -hemispheres of the cerebrum is composed largely of connective nerves -which doubtless serve to produce and maintain the unity of function of -the mental processes. - -While physiological psychology has performed great work in discovering -brain-centers and explaining much of the mechanism of mental processes, -it has but touched the most elementary and simple of the mental -processes. The higher processes have so far defied analysis or -explanation in the terms of physiology. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -Consciousness. - - -The fact of consciousness is the great mystery of psychology. It is -difficult even to define the term, although every person of average -intelligence understands what is sought to be conveyed by it. Webster -defines it as "knowledge of one's own existence, sensations, mental -operations, etc.; immediate knowledge or perception of any object, state, -or sensation; being aware; being sensible of." Another authority defines -the term as "the state of being aware of one's sensations; the power, -faculty, or mental state of being aware of one's own existence, -condition at the moment, thoughts, feelings, and actions." Halleck's -definition is: "That indefinable characteristic of mental states which -causes us to be aware of them." - -It will be seen that the idea of "awareness" is the essence of the idea -of consciousness. But, at the last, we are compelled to acknowledge that -it is impossible to closely define consciousness, for it is something so -entirely unique and different from anything else that we have no other -terms at all synonymous to it. We can define it only in its own terms, -as will be seen by reference to the definitions above given. And it is -equally impossible to clearly account for its appearance and being. -Huxley has well said: "How it is that anything so remarkable as a state -of consciousness comes about by the result of irritating nervous tissue, -is just as unaccountable as the appearance of the jinnee when Aladdin -rubbed his lamp." All that we can ever know regarding the nature of -consciousness must be learned from turning the consciousness in -ourselves back upon itself--by focusing consciousness upon its own -mental operations by means of introspection. By turning inward the -conscious gaze we may perceive the flow of the stream of thought from -its rise from the subconscious regions of the mind to its final -disappearance in the same region. - -It is a common error to suppose that we are directly conscious of -objects outside of ourselves. This is impossible, for there is no direct -knowledge of such outside objects. We are conscious merely of our -sensations of, or mental images of, the outside objects. All that it is -possible for us to be directly conscious of are our own mental -experiences or states. We cannot be directly conscious of anything -outside of our own minds. We are not directly conscious of the tree -which we _see_; we are directly conscious merely of the sensation of the -nerves arising from the impact of the light waves carrying the image of -the tree. We are not directly conscious of the tree when we touch it and -perceive its character in that way; we are directly conscious merely of -the sensation reported by the nerves in the finger tips which have come -in contact with the tree. We are directly conscious even of our own -bodies only in the same way. It is necessary for the mind to experience -that of which it may become conscious. We are conscious only of (1) that -which our mind is experiencing at this moment, or (2) that which it has -experienced in the past, and which is being re-experienced this moment -by the process of the memory, or which is being re-combined or -re-arranged this moment by the imagination. - - -SUBCONSCIOUS PLANES. - -But it must not be thought that every mental state or mental fact is in -the field of consciousness. This error has been exploded for many years. -The fact is now recognized that the field of consciousness is a very -narrow and limited one, and that the great field of mental activity lies -outside of its narrow limits. Beyond and outside of the narrow field of -consciousness lies the great subconscious storehouse of memory in which -are stored the experiences of the past, to be drawn again into the field -of consciousness by an effort of the will in the act of recollection, or -by association in ordinary remembrance. In that great region, also, the -mind manifests many of its activities and performs much of its work. In -that great region are evolved the emotions and feelings which play such -an important part in our lives, and which often manifest a vague -disturbing unrest long before they rise to the plane of consciousness. -In that great region are produced the ideas, feelings, and conceptions -which arise to the plane of consciousness and manifest that which men -call "genius." - -On the subconscious plane the imagination does much of its work, and -startles its owner by presenting him with the accomplished result in the -field of consciousness. In the subconscious field is performed that -peculiar process of mental mastication, digestion, and assimilation with -which all brain workers are familiar, and which absorbs the raw mental -material given it, separates, digests, and assimilates it, and -re-presents it to the conscious faculties sometime after as a -transformed substance. It has been estimated that at least eighty-five -per cent. of our mental activities are performed below or outside of the -field of consciousness. The psychology of to-day is paying much -attention to this formerly neglected great area or areas of the mind. -The psychology of to-morrow will pay still greater attention to it. - -The best of the modern authorities agree that in the great field of -subconscious mentation is to be found the explanation of much that is -unexplainable otherwise. In fact, it is probable that before long -consciousness will be regarded as a mere _focusing of attention_ upon -mental states, and the objects of consciousness merely as that portion -of the contents of the mind in the field of mental vision created by -such focusing. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -Attention. - - -Intimately connected with the object of consciousness is that process of -the mind which we call "attention." Attention is generally defined as -"the application of the mind to a mental state." It is often referred to -as "concentrated consciousness," but others have ventured the somewhat -daring conjecture that consciousness itself is rather the result of -attention, instead of the latter being an incident of consciousness. We -shall not attempt to discuss this question here, except to state that -consciousness depends very materially upon the degree of attention -bestowed upon its object. The authorities place great importance upon -the intelligent direction of the attention, and hold that without this -the higher forms of knowledge are impossible. - -It is the common belief that we feel, see, hear, taste, or smell -whenever objects affecting those senses come in contact with the organs -of sense governing them. But this is only a partial truth. The real -truth is that we become conscious of the report of these senses only -when the attention is directed toward the sensation, voluntarily or -involuntarily. That is to say, that in many cases although the sense -nerves and organs report a disturbance, the mind does not become -consciously aware of the report unless the attention is directed toward -it either by an act of will or else by reflex action. For instance, the -clock may strike loudly, and yet we may not be conscious of the fact, -for we are concentrating our attention upon a book; or we may eat the -choicest food without tasting it, for we are listening intently to the -conversation of our charming neighbor. We may fail to perceive some -startling occurrence happening under our very eyes, for we are buried in -deep thought concerning something far removed from the present scene. -There are many cases on record showing that one may be so interested in -speaking, thinking, or acting that he will not experience pain that -would otherwise be intolerable. Writers have forgotten their pain in the -concentrated interest bestowed upon their work; mothers have failed to -feel pain when their infants required urgent attention; orators have -been so carried away by their own eloquence that they have failed to -feel the pricking of the pin by means of which their friends have sought -to attract their attention. Not only perception and feeling depend -largely upon attention, but the processes of reasoning, memory, and even -of will, depend upon attention for much of their manifestation. - -Psychologists divide attention into two general classes, viz.: (1) -voluntary attention and (2) involuntary attention. - -Voluntary attention is attention directed by the will to some object of -our own more or less deliberate selection. It requires a distinct effort -of the will in order to focus the attention in this way, and many -persons are scarcely aware of its existence, so seldom do they manifest -it. Voluntary attention is the result of training and practice, and -marks the man of strong will, concentration, and character. Some -authorities go so far as to say that much of that which is commonly -called "will power" is really but a developed form of voluntary -attention, the man of "strong will" holding before him the one idea -which he wishes to realize. - -Involuntary attention, often called "reflex attention," is attention -called forth by a nervous response to some sense stimulus. This is the -common form of attention, and is but the same form which is so strongly -manifested by children whose attention is caught by every new object, -but which cannot be held for any length of time by a familiar or -uninteresting one. - -It is of the utmost importance that one should cultivate his power of -voluntary attention. Not only is the will power strengthened and -developed in this way, but every mental faculty is developed by reason -thereof. The training of the voluntary attention is the first step in -mental development. - - -TRAINING THE ATTENTION. - -That the voluntary attention may be deliberately trained and developed -is a fact which many of the world's greatest men have proved for -themselves. There is only one way to train and develop any mental power -of faculty--and that is _by practice and use_. By practice, interest may -be given to objects previously uninteresting, and thus the use of the -attention develops the interest which further holds it. Interest is the -natural road over which attention travels easily, but interest itself -may be induced by concentrated attention. By studying and examining an -object, the attention brings to light many new and novel features -regarding the thing, and these produce a new interest which in turn -attracts further and continued attention. - -There is no royal road to the development of voluntary attention. The -only true method is _work_, _practice_, _and use_. You must practice on -uninteresting things, the primary interest being your desire to develop -the power of voluntary attention. But as you begin to attend to the -uninteresting thing you will become interested in the task for its own -sake. Take some object and "place your mind upon it." Think of its -nature, where it came from, its use, its associations, its probable -future, of things related to it, etc., etc. Keep the attention firmly -upon it, and shut out all outside ideas. Then, after a little practice -of this kind, lay aside the object for the time being, and take it up -again the next day, endeavoring to discover new points of interest in -it. The main thing to be sought is _to hold the thing in your mind_, and -this can be done only by _discovering features of interest in it_. The -interest-loving attention may rebel at this task at first, and will seek -to wander from the path into the green pastures which are found on each -side thereof. But you must bring the mind back to the task, again and -again. - -After a time the mind will become accustomed to the drill, and will even -begin to enjoy it. Give it some variety by occasionally changing the -objects of examination. The object need not always be something to be -looked at. Instead, select some subject in history or literature, and -"run it down," endeavoring to bring to light all the facts relating to -it that are possible to you. _Anything_ may be used as the subject or -object of your inquiry; but what is chosen must be held in the field of -conscious attention firmly and fixedly. The habit once acquired, you -will find the practice most fascinating. You will invent new subjects or -objects of inquiry, investigation, and thought, which in themselves -will well repay you for your work and time. But never lose sight of the -main point--the development of the power of voluntary attention. - -In studying the methods of developing and training the voluntary -attention, the student should remember that _any_ exercise which -develops the will, will result in developing the attention; and, -likewise, any exercise which develops the voluntary attention will tend -to strengthen the will. The will and attention are so closely bound -together that what affects one also influences the other. This fact -should be borne in mind, and the exercises and practices based upon it. - -In practicing concentration of voluntary attention, it should be -remembered that concentrating consists not only of _focusing_ the -attention upon a given object or subject, but also of the _shutting out_ -of impressions from other objects or subjects. Some authorities advise -that the student endeavor to listen to one voice among many, or one -instrument among the many of a band or orchestra. Others advise the -practice of concentrating on the reading of a book in a room filled by -persons engaged in conversation, and similar exercises. Whatever aids in -_narrowing the circle_ of attention at a given moment tends to develop -the power of voluntary attention. - -The study of mathematics and logic is also held to be an excellent -practice in concentration of voluntary attention, inasmuch as these -studies require close concentration and attention. Attention is also -developed by any study or practice which demands _analysis_ of a whole -into its parts, and then the _synthesis_ or building up of a whole from -its scattered parts. Each of the senses should play a part in the -exercises, and in addition to this the mind should be trained to -concentrate upon some one idea held within itself--some mental image or -abstract idea existing independently of any object of immediate sense -report. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -Perception. - - -It is a common mistake that we _perceive_ everything that is reported to -the mind by the senses. As a matter of fact we perceive but a very small -portion of the reports of the senses. There are thousands of sights -reported by our eyes, sounds reported by our ears, smells reported by -our nostrils, and contacts reported by our nerves of touch, every day of -our lives, but which are not _perceived_ or _observed_ by the mind. We -perceive and observe only when the attention, reflex or voluntary, is -directed to the report of the senses, and when the mind interprets the -report. While perception depends upon the reports of the senses for its -raw material, it depends entirely upon the application of the mind for -its complete manifestation. - -The student usually experiences great difficulty in distinguishing -between _sensation_ and _perception_. A sensation is a simple report of -the senses, which is received in consciousness. Perception is the -_thought_ arising from the _feeling_ of the sensation. Perception -usually combines several sensations into one thought or percept. By -sensation the mind _feels_; by perception it _knows_ that it feels, and -recognizes the object causing the sensation. Sensation merely brings a -report from outside objects, while perception identifies the report with -the object which caused it. Perception _interprets_ the reports of -sensation. Sensation reports a flash of light from above; perception -interprets the light as starlight, or moonlight, or sunlight, or as the -flash of a meteor. Sensation reports a sharp, pricking, painful contact; -perception interprets it as the prick of a pin. Sensation reports a red -spot on a green background; perception interprets it as a berry on a -bush. - -Moreover, while we may perceive a simple single sensation, our -perceptions are usually of a group of sensations. Perception is usually -employed in grouping sensations and identifying them with the object or -objects causing them. In its identification it draws upon whatever -memory of past experiences the mind may possess. Memory, imagination, -feeling, and thought are called into play, to some extent, in every -clear perception. The infant has but feeble perception, but as it gains -experience it begins to manifest perceptions and form percepts. -Sensations resemble the letters of the alphabet, and perception the -forming of words and sentences from the letters. Thus _c_, _a_, and _t_ -symbolize sensations, while the word "cat," formed from them, symbolizes -the perception of the object. - -It is held that all knowledge begins with sensation; that the mental -history of the race or individual begins with its first sensation. But, -while this is admitted, it must be remembered that sensation simply -provides the simple, elementary, raw material of thought. The first -process of _actual thought_, or knowledge, begins with perception. From -our percepts all of our higher concepts and ideas are formed. Perception -depends upon association of the sensation with other sensations -previously experienced; it is based upon experience. The greater the -experience, the greater is the possibility of perception, all else being -equal. - -When perception begins, the mind loses sight of the sensation in itself, -for it identifies it as a quality of the thing producing it. The -sensation of light is thought of as a quality of the star; the pricking -sensation is thought of as a quality of the pin or chestnut bur; the -sensation of odor is thought of as a quality of the rose. In the case of -the rose, the several sensations of sight, touch, and smell, in their -impression of the qualities of color, shape, softness, and perfume, are -grouped together in the percept of the complete object of the flower. - -A _percept_ is "that which is perceived; the object of the act of -perception." The percept, of course, is a mental state corresponding -with its outside object. It is a combination of several sensations -which are regarded as the qualities of the outside object, to which are -combined the memories of past experiences, ideas, feelings, and -thoughts. A percept, then, while the simplest form of thought, is seen -to be a mental state. The formation of a percept consists of three -gradual stages, viz.: (1) The attention forms definite conscious -sensations from indefinite nervous reports; (2) the mind interprets -these definite conscious sensations and attributes them to the outside -object causing them; (3) the related sensations are grouped together, -their unity perceived, and they are regarded as qualities of the outside -object. - -The plain distinction between a sensation and a percept may be fixed in -the mind by remembering the following: _A sensation is a feeling_; _a -percept is a simple thought identifying one or more sensations_. A -sensation is merely the conscious recognition of an excitation of a -nerve end; a percept results from a distinct mental process regarding -the sensation. - - -DEVELOPING PERCEPTION. - -It is of the utmost importance that we develop and train our powers of -perception. For our education depends very materially upon our -perceptive power. What matters it to us if the outside world be filled -with manifold objects, if we do not perceive them to exist? Upon -perception depends the material of our mental world. Many persons go -through the world without perceiving even the most obvious facts. Their -eyes and ears are perfect instruments, their nerves convey accurate -reports, but the perceptive faculties of the mind fail to observe and -interpret the report of the senses. They see and hear distinctly, but -the reports of the senses are not observed or noted by them; they mean -nothing to them. One may see many things, and yet _observe_ but few. It -is not upon what we see or hear that our stock of knowledge depends, so -much as it does upon what we perceive, notice, or observe. - -Not only is one's stock of practical knowledge largely based upon -developed perception, but one's success also depends materially upon the -same faculties. In business and professional life the successful man is -usually he who has developed perceptive powers; he who has learned to -perceive, observe, and note. The man who perceives and takes mental -notes of what occurs in his world is the man who is apt to know things -when such knowledge is needed. In this age of "book education" we find -that the young people are not nearly so observant as are those children -who had to depend upon the powers of perception for their knowledge. The -young Arab or Indian will observe more in an hour than the civilized -child will in a day. To live in a world of books tends, in many cases, -to weaken the powers of observation and perception. - -Perception may be developed by practice. Begin by taking notice of the -things seen and heard in your usual walks. Keep wide open the eyes of -the mind. Notice the faces of people, their walk, their characteristics. -Look for interesting and odd things, and you will see them. Do not go -through life in a daydream, but keep a sharp lookout for things of -interest and value. The most familiar things will repay you for the time -and work of examining them in detail, and the practice gained by such -tasks will prove valuable in your development of perception. - -An authority remarks that very few persons, even those living in the -country, know whether a cow's ears are above, below, behind, or in front -of her horns; nor whether cats descend trees head first or tail first. -Very few persons can distinguish between the leaves of the various kinds -of familiar trees in their neighborhood. Comparatively few persons are -able to describe the house in which they live, at least beyond the most -general features--the details are unknown. - -Houdin, the French conjurer, was able to pass by a shop window and -perceive every article in it, and then repeat what he had seen. But he -acquired this skill only by constant and gradual practice. He himself -decried his skill and claimed that it was as nothing compared to that of -the fashionable woman who can pass another woman on the street and "take -in" her entire attire, from head to foot, at one glance, and "be able to -describe not only the fashion and quality of the stuffs, but also say if -the lace be real or only machine made." A former president of Yale is -said to have been able to glance at a book and read a quarter of a page -at one time. - -Any study or occupation which requires _analysis_ will develop the power -of perception. Consequently, if we will analyze the things we see, -resolving them into their parts or elements, we will likewise develop -the perceptive faculties. It is a good exercise to examine some small -object and endeavor to discover as many separate points of perception as -possible, noting them on a sheet of paper. The most familiar object, if -carefully examined, will yield rich returns. - -If two persons will enter into a contest of this kind, the spirit of -rivalry and competition will quicken the powers of observation. Those -who have had the patience and perseverance to systematically practice -exercises of this kind, report that they notice a steady improvement -from the very start. But even if one does not feel inclined to practice -in this way, it will be found possible _to begin to take notice_ of the -details of things one sees, the expression of persons' faces, the -details of their dress, their tone of voice, the quality of the goods we -handle, and _the little things especially_. Perception, like attention, -follows interest; but, likewise, interest may be created in things by -observing their details, peculiarities, and characteristics. - -The best knowledge gained by one is that resulting from his own personal -perception. There is a nearness and trueness about that which one -_knows_ in this way which is lacking in that which he merely _believes_ -because he has read or heard it. One can make such knowledge a part of -himself. Not only is one's knowledge dependent upon what he perceives, -but his very character also results from the character of his percepts. -The influence of environment is great--and what is environment but -things perceived about one? It is not so much what lies outside of one, -as what part of it gets _inside_ of one by perception. By directing his -attention to desirable objects, and perceiving as much of them as is -possible, one really builds his own character at will. - -The world needs good "perceivers" in all the walks of life. It finds a -shortage of them, and is demanding them loudly, being willing to pay a -good price for their services. The person who can voluntarily perceive -and observe the details of any profession, business, or trade will go -far in that vocation. The education of children should take the faculty -of perception into active consideration. The kindergarten has taken some -steps in this direction, but there is much more to be done. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - -Memory. - - -Psychologists class as "representative mental processes" those known as -memory and imagination, respectively. The term "representation" is used -in psychology to indicate the processes of re-presentation or presenting -again to consciousness that which has formerly been presented to it but -which afterward passed from its field. As Hamilton says: "The general -capability of knowledge necessarily requires that, besides the power of -evoking out of unconsciousness one portion of our retained knowledge in -preference to another, we possess the faculty of representing in -consciousness what is thus evoked." - -Memory is the primary representative faculty or power of the mind. -Imagination depends upon memory for its material, as we shall see when -we consider that faculty. Every mental process which involves the -remembrance, recollection, or representation of a sensation, perception, -mental image, thought, or idea previously experienced must depend upon -memory for its material. Memory is the great storehouse of the mind in -which are placed the records of previous mental experiences. It is a -part of the great subconscious field of mental activity, and the -greater part of its work is performed below the plane of consciousness. -It is only when its results are passed into the field of consciousness -that we are aware of its existence. We know memory only by its works. Of -its nature we know but little, although certain of its principal laws -and principles have been discovered. - -It was formerly customary to class memory with the various faculties of -the mind, but later psychology no longer so considers it. Memory is now -regarded as a power of the general mind, manifesting in connection with -every faculty of the mind. It is now regarded as belonging to the great -subconscious field of mentation, and its explanation must be sought -there. It is utterly unexplainable otherwise. - -The importance of memory cannot be overestimated. Not only does a man's -character and education depend chiefly upon it, but his very mental -being is bound up with it. If there were no memory, man would never -progress mentally beyond the mental state of the newborn babe. He would -never be able to profit by experience. He would never be able to form -clear perceptions. He would never be able to reason or form judgments. -The processes of thought depend for material upon the memory of past -experiences; this material lacking, there can be no thought. - -Memory has two important general functions, viz.: (1) The _retention_ of -impressions and experiences; and (2) the _reproduction_ of the -impressions and experiences so retained. - -It was formerly held that the memory retained only a portion of the -impressions and experiences originally noted by it. But the present -theory is that it retains every impression and experience which is noted -by it. It is true that many of these impressions are never reproduced in -consciousness, but experiments tend to prove, nevertheless, that the -records are still in the memory and that appropriate and sufficiently -strong stimuli will bring them into the field of consciousness. The -phenomena of somnambulism, dreams, hysteria, delirium, approach of -death, etc., show that the subconscious mind has an immense accumulation -of apparently forgotten facts, which unusual stimuli will serve to -recall. - -The power of the memory to reproduce the retained impressions and -experiences is variously called remembrance, recollection, or memory. -This power varies materially in various individuals, but it is an axiom -of psychology that the memory of any person may be developed and trained -by practice. The ability to recall depends to a great extent upon the -clearness and depth of the original impression, which in turn depends -upon the degree of attention given to it at the time of its occurrence. -Recollection is also greatly aided by the law of association, or the -principle whereby one mental fact is linked to another. The more facts -to which a given fact is linked, the greater the ease by which it is -recalled or remembered. Recollection is also greatly assisted by use and -exercise. Like the fingers, the memory cells of the brain become expert -and efficient by use and exercise, or stiff and inefficient by lack of -the same. - -In addition to the phases of retention and reproduction, there are two -important phases of memory, viz.: (3) Recognition of the reproduced -impression or experience; and (4) localization of the impression, or its -reference to a more or less definite time and place. - -The recognition of the recalled impression is quite important. It is not -enough that the impression be retained and recalled. If we are not able -to recognize the recalled impression as having been experienced before, -the recollection will be of but little use to us in our thought -processes; the purposes of thought demand that we shall be able to -identify the recalled impression with the original one. Recognition is -really re-cognition--re-knowing. Recognition is akin to perception. The -mind becomes conscious of the recalled impression just as it becomes -conscious of the sensation. It then recognizes the relation of the -recalled impression to the original one just as it realizes the relation -of the sensation to its object. - -The localization of the recalled and recognized impression is also -important. Even if we recognize the recalled impression, it will be of -comparatively little use to us unless we are able to locate it as having -happened yesterday, last week, last month, last year, ten years ago, or -at some time in the past; and as having happened in our office, house, -or in such-and-such a place in the street, or in some distant place. -Without the power of localization we should be unable to connect and -associate the remembered fact with the time, place, and persons with -which it should be placed to be of use and value to us in our thought -processes. - - -RETENTION. - -The retention of a mental impression in the memory depends very -materially upon the clearness and depth of the original impression. And -this clearness and depth, as we have previously stated, depend upon the -degree of attention bestowed upon the original impression. Attention, -then, is the important factor in the forming and recording of -impressions. The rule is: _Slight attention, faint record_; _marked -attention, clear and deep record_. To fix this fact in the mind, the -student may think of the retentive and reproductive phases of memory as -a phonographic record. The receiving diaphragm of the phonograph -represents the sense organs, and the recording needle represents the -_attention_. The needle makes the record on the cylinder deep or faint -according to the condition of the needle. A loud sound may be recorded -but faintly, if the needle is not properly adjusted. And, further, it -must be remembered that the strength of the reproduction depends almost -entirely upon the clearness and depth of the original impression on the -cylinder; as is the record, so is the reproduction. It will be well for -the student to carry this symbol of the phonograph in his mind; it will -aid him in developing his powers of memory. - -In this connection we should remember that attention depends largely -upon interest. Therefore we would naturally expect to find that we -remember interesting things far more readily than those which lack -interest. This supposition is borne out in actual experience. This -accounts for the fact that every one remembers a certain class of things -better than he does others. One remembers faces, another dates, another -spoken conversation, another written words, and so on. It will be found, -as a rule, that each person is interested in the class of things which -he most easily remembers. The artist easily remembers faces and details -of faces, or scenery and details thereof. The musician easily recalls -passages or bars of music, often of a most complicated nature. The -speculator easily recalls the quotations of his favorite stocks. The -racing man recalls without difficulty the "odds" posted on a certain -horse on a certain day, or the details of a race which was run many -years ago. The moral is: _Arouse and induce an interest in the things -which you wish to remember_. This interest may be aroused by studying -the things in question, as we have suggested in a preceding chapter. - - -VISUALIZATION IN MEMORY. - -Many of the best authorities hold that original impressions may be made -clear and deep, and the process of reproduction accordingly rendered -more efficient, by the practice of _visualizing_ the thing to be -remembered. By visualizing is meant the formation of a _mental image_ of -the thing in the imagination. If you wish to remember the appearance of -anything, look at it closely, with attention, and then turning away from -it endeavor to reproduce its appearance as a mental picture in the mind. -If this is done, a particularly clear impression will be made in the -memory, and when you recall the thing you will find that you will also -recall the clear mental image of it. Of course the greater the number -of details observed and included in the original mental image, the -greater the remembered detail. - - -PERCEPTION IN MEMORY. - -Not only is attention necessary in forming clear memory records, but -careful perception is also important. Without clear perception there is -a lack of detail in the retained record, and the element of association -is lacking. It is not enough to merely remember the thing itself; we -should also remember _what_ it is, and all about it. The practice of the -methods of developing perception, given in a preceding lesson, will tend -to develop and train the retentive, reproductive, recognitive, and -locative powers of the memory. The rule is: _The greater the degree of -perception accorded a thing, the greater the detail of the retained -impression, and the greater the ease of the recollection_. - - -UNDERSTANDING AND MEMORY. - -Another important point in acquiring impressions in memory is this: -_That the better the understanding of the subject or object, the clearer -the impressions regarding it, and the clearer the recollection of it_. -This fact is proved by experiment and experience. A subject which will -be remembered only with difficulty under ordinary circumstances will be -easily remembered if it is fully explained to the person, and -accompanied by a few familiar illustrations or examples. It is very -difficult to remember a meaningless string of words, while a sentence -which conveys a clear meaning may be memorized easily. If we understand -_what a thing is for_, its uses and employment, we remember it far more -easily than if we lack this understanding. Elbringhaus, who conducted a -number of experiments along this line, reports that he could memorize a -stanza of poetry in about one tenth the time required to memorize the -same amount of nonsense syllables. Gordy states that he once asked a -capable student of the Johns Hopkins University to give him an account -of a lecture to which he had just listened. "I cannot do it," replied -the student; "it was not logical." The rule is: _The more one knows -about a certain thing, the more easily is that thing remembered_. This -is a point worth noting. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - -Memory--Continued. - - -The subject of memory cannot be touched upon intelligently without a -consideration of the Law of Association, one of the important -psychological principles. - - -THE LAW OF ASSOCIATION. - -What is known in psychology as the Law of Association is based on the -fact that _no idea exists in the mind except in association with other -ideas_. This is not generally recognized, and the majority of persons -will dispute the law at first thought. But the existence and appearance -of ideas in the mind are governed by a mental law as invariable and -constant as the physical law of gravitation. Every idea has associations -with other ideas. Ideas travel in groups, and one group is associated -with another group, and so on, until in the end every idea in one's mind -is associated directly or indirectly with every other idea. -Theoretically, at least, it would be possible to begin with one idea in -the mind of a person, and then gradually unwind his entire stock of -ideas like the yarn on the ball. Our thoughts proceed according to this -law. We sit down in a "brown study" and proceed from one subject to -another, until we are unable to remember any connection between the -first thought and the last. But each step of the reverie was connected -with the one preceding and the one succeeding it. It is interesting to -trace back these connections. Poe based one of his celebrated detective -stories on this law. The reverie may be broken into by a sudden -impression from outside, and we will then proceed from that impression, -connecting it with something else already in our experience, and -starting a new chain of sequence. - -Often we fail to trace the associations governing our ideas, but the -chain is there nevertheless. One may think of a past scene or experience -without any apparent cause. A little thought will show that something -seen, or a few notes of a song floating to the ears, or the fragrance of -a flower, has supplied the connecting link between the past and the -present. A suggestion of mignonette will recall some past event in which -the perfume played a part; some one's handkerchief, perhaps, carried the -same odor. Or an old familiar tune reminds one of some one, something, -or some place in the past. A familiar feature in the countenance of a -passer-by will start one thinking of some one else who had that kind of -a mouth, that shaped nose, or that expression of the eye--and away he -will be off in a sequence of remembered experiences. Often the starting -idea, or the connecting links, may appear but dimly in consciousness; -but rest assured they are always there. In fact, we frequently accept -this law, unconsciously and without realizing its actual existence. For -instance, one makes a remark, and at once we wonder, "How did he come to -think of that?" and, if we are shrewd, we may discover what was in his -mind before he spoke. - -There are two general classes of association of ideas in memory, viz.: -(1) Association of contiguity, and (2) logical association. - -Association of contiguity is that form of association depending upon the -previous association in time or space of ideas which have been impressed -on the mind. For instance, if you met Mr. and Mrs. Wetterhorn and were -introduced to them one after the other, thereafter you will naturally -remember Mr. W. when you think of Mrs. W., and vice versa. You will -naturally remember Napoleon when you think of Wellington, or Benedict -Arnold when you think of Major André, for the same reason. You will also -naturally remember _b_ and _c_ when you think of _a_. Likewise, you will -think of abstract time when you think of abstract space, of thunder when -you think of lightning, of colic when you recall green apples, of love -making and moonlight nights when you think of college days. In the same -way we remember things which occurred just before or just after the -event in our mind at the moment; of things near in space to the thing of -which we are thinking. - -Logical association depends upon the relation of likeness or difference -between several things thought of. Things thus associated may have never -come into the mind at the same previous time, nor are they necessarily -connected in time and space. One may think of a book, and then proceed -by association to think of another book by the same author, or of -another author treating of the same subject. Or he may think of a book -directly opposed to the first, the relation of distinct difference -causing the associated idea. Logical association depends upon _inner -relations_, and not upon the outer relations of time and space. This -_innerness_ of relation between things not connected in space or time is -discovered only by experience and education. The educated man realizes -many points of relationship between things that are thought by the -uneducated man to be totally unrelated. Wisdom and knowledge consist -largely in the recognition of relations between things. - - -ASSOCIATION IN MEMORY. - -It follows from a consideration of the Law of Association that when one -wishes to impress a thing upon the memory he should, as an authority -says, "Multiply associations; entangle the fact you wish to remember in -a net of as many associations as possible, especially those that are -logical." Hence the advice to place your facts in groups and classes in -the memory. As Blackie says: "Nothing helps the mind so much as order -and classification. Classes are always few, individuals many; to know -the class well is to know what is most essential in the character of the -individual, and what burdens the memory least to retain." - - -REPETITION IN MEMORY. - -Another important principle of memory is that the impressions acquire -depth and clearness by repetition. Repeat a line of poetry once, and you -may remember it; repeat it again, and your chances of remembering it are -greatly increased; repeat it a sufficient number of times, and you -cannot escape remembering it. The illustration of the phonograph record -will help you to understand the reason of this. The rule is: _Constant -repetition deepens memory impressions; frequent reviewing and recalling -what has been memorized tends to keep the records clear and clean, -beside deepening the impression at each review_. - - -GENERAL RULES OF MEMORY. - -The following general rules will be of service to the student who wishes -to develop his memory:-- - - -_Making Impressions._ - - (1) Bestow attention. - (2) Cultivate interest. - (3) Manifest perception. - (4) Cultivate understanding. - (5) Form associations. - (6) Repeat and review. - - -_Recalling Impressions._ - -(1) Endeavor to get hold of the loose end of association, and then -unwind your memory ball of yarn. - -(2) When you recall an impression, send it back with energy to deepen -the impression, and attach it to as many new associations as possible. - -(3) Practice a little memorizing and recalling each day, if only a line -of verse. The memory improves by practice, and deteriorates by neglect -and disuse. - -(4) Demand good service of your memory, and it will learn to respond. -Learn to trust it, and it will rise to the occasion. How can you expect -your memory to give good service when you continually abuse it and tell -every one of "the wretched memory I have; I can never remember -anything"? Your memory is very apt to accept your statements as truth; -our mental faculties have an annoying habit of taking us at our word in -these matters. Tell your memory what you expect it to do; then trust it -and refrain from abusing it and giving it a bad name. - - -FINAL ADVICE. - -Finally, remember this rule: You get out of your memory only that which -you place in it. Place in it good, clear, deep impressions, and it will -reproduce good, clear, strong recollections. Think of your memory as a -phonographic record, and take care that you place the right kind of -impressions upon it. In memory you reap that which you have sown. You -must give to the memory before you can receive from it. Of one thing you -may rest assured, namely, that unless you take sufficient interest in -the things to be remembered, you will find that the memory will not take -sufficient interest in them to remember them. Memory demands interest -before it will take interest in the task. It demands attention before it -will give attention. It demands understanding before it will give -understanding. It demands association before it will respond to -association. It demands repetition before it will repeat. The memory is -a splendid instrument, but it stands on its dignity and asserts its -rights. It belongs to the old dispensation--it demands compensation and -believes in giving only in equal measure to what it receives. Our advice -is to get acquainted with your memory, and make friends with it. Treat -it well and it will serve you well. But neglect it, and it will turn its -back on you. - - - - -CHAPTER IX. - -Imagination. - - -The imagination belongs to the general class of mental processes called -the representative faculties, by which is meant the processes in which -there are re-presented, or presented again, to consciousness impressions -previously presented to it. - -As we have indicated elsewhere, the imagination is dependent upon memory -for its materials--its records of previous impressions. But imagination -is more than mere memory or recollection of these previously experienced -and recorded impressions. There is, in addition to the re-presentation -and recollection, a process of arranging the recalled impressions into -new forms and new combinations. The imagination not only gathers -together the old impressions, but also _creates_ new combinations and -forms from the material so gathered. - -Psychology gives us many hairsplitting definitions and distinctions -between simple reproductive imagination and memory, but these -distinctions are technical and as a rule perplexing to the average -student. In truth, there is very little, if any, difference between -simple reproductive imagination and memory, although when the -imagination indulges in constructive activity a new feature enters into -the process which is absent in pure memory operations. In simple -reproductive imagination there is simply the formation of the mental -image of some previous experience--the reproduction of a previous mental -image. This differs very little from memory, except that the recalled -image is clearer and stronger. In the same way in ordinary memory, in -the manifestation of recollection, there is often the same clear, strong -mental image that is produced in reproductive imagination. The two -mental processes blend into each other so closely that it is practically -impossible to draw the line between them, in spite of the technical -differences urged by the psychologists. Of course the mere remembrance -of a person who presents himself to one is nearer to pure memory than to -imagination, for the process is that of recognition. But the memory or -remembrance of the same person when he is absent from sight is -practically that of reproductive imagination. Memory, in its stage of -recognition, exists in the child mind before reproductive imagination is -manifested. The latter, therefore, is regarded as a higher mental -process. - -But still higher in the scale is that which is known as _constructive -imagination_. This form of imagination appears at a later period of -child mentation, and is regarded as a later evolution of mental -processes of the race. Gordy makes the following distinction between the -two phases of imagination: "The difference between reproductive -imagination and constructive imagination is that the images resulting -from reproductive imagination are _copies of past experience_, while -those resulting from constructive imagination are not. * * * To learn -whether any particular image, or combination of images, is the product -of reproductive or constructive imagination, all we have to do is to -learn whether or not it is a copy of a past experience. Our memories, of -course, are defective, and we may be uncertain on that account; but -apart from that, we need be in no doubt whatever." - -Many persons hearing for the first time the statement of psychologists -that the imaginative faculties can re-present and re-produce or -re-combine only the images which have previously been impressed upon the -mind, are apt to object that they can, and frequently do, image things -which they have not previously experienced. But can they and do they? Is -it not true that what they believe to be original creations of the -imagination are merely _new combinations_ of original impressions? For -instance, no one ever saw a unicorn, and yet some one originally -imagined its form. But a little thought will show that the image of the -unicorn is merely that of an animal having the head, neck, and body of -a horse, with the beard of a goat, the legs of a buck, the tail of a -lion, and a long, tapering horn, spirally twisted, in the middle of the -forehead. Each of the several parts of the unicorn exists in some living -animal, although the unicorn, composed of all of these parts, is -non-existent outside of fable. In the same way the centaur is composed -of the body, legs, and tail of the horse and the trunk, head, and arms -of a man. The satyr has the head, body, and arms of a man, with the -horns, legs, and hoofs of a goat. The mermaid has the head, arms, and -trunk of a woman, joined at the waist to the body and tail of a fish. -The mythological "devil" has the head, body, and arms of a man, with the -horns, legs, and cloven foot of the lower animal, and a peculiar tail -composed of that of some animal but tipped with a spearhead. Each of -these characteristics is composed of familiar images of experience. The -imagination may occupy itself for a lifetime turning out impossible -animals of this kind, but every part thereof will be found to correspond -to something existent in nature, and experienced by the mind of the -person creating the strange beast. - -In the same way the imagination may picture a familiar person or thing -acting in an unaccustomed manner, the latter having no basis in fact so -far as the individual person or thing is concerned, but being warranted -by some experience concerning other persons or things. For instance, one -may easily form the image of a dog swimming under water like a fish, or -climbing a tree like a cat. Likewise, one may form a mental image of a -learned, bewigged High Chancellor, or a venerable Archbishop of -Canterbury, dressed like a clown, standing on his head, balancing a -colored football on his feet, sticking his tongue in his cheek and -winking at the audience. In the same way one may imagine a railroad -running across a barren desert, or a steep mountain, upon which there is -not as yet a rail laid. The bridge across a river may be imaged in the -same way. In fact, this is the way that everything is mentally created, -constructed, or invented--the old materials being combined in a new way, -and arranged in a new fashion. Some psychologists go so far as to say -that no mental image of memory is an exact reproduction of the original -impression; that there are always changes due to the unconscious -operation of the constructive imagination. - -The constructive imagination is able to "tear things to pieces" in -search for material, as well as to "join things together" in its work of -building. The importance of the imagination in all the processes of -intellectual thought is great. Without imagination man could not reason -or manifest any intellectual process. It is impossible to consider the -subject of thought without first regarding the processes of imagination. -And yet it is common to hear persons speak of the imagination as if it -were a faculty of mere fancy, useless and without place in the practical -world of thought. - - -DEVELOPING THE IMAGINATION. - -The imagination is capable of development and training. The general -rules for development of the imagination are practically those which we -have stated in connection with the development of the memory. There is -the same necessity for plenty of material; for the formation of clear -and deep impressions and clear-cut mental images; the same necessity for -repeated impression, and the frequent use and employment of the faculty. -The practice of visualization, of course, strengthens the power of the -imagination as it does that of the memory, the two powers being -intimately related. The imagination may be strengthened and trained by -deliberately recalling previous impressions and then combining them into -new relations. The materials of memory may be torn apart and then -re-combined and re-grouped. In the same way one may enter into the -feelings and thoughts of other persons by imagining one's self in their -place and endeavoring to act out in imagination the life of such -persons. In this way one may build up a much fuller and broader -conception of human nature and human motives. - -In this place, also, we should caution the student against the common -waste of the powers of the imagination, and the dissipation of its -powers in idle fancies and daydreams. Many persons misuse their -imagination in this way and not only weaken its power for effective work -but also waste their time and energy. Daydreams are notoriously unfit -for the real, practical work of life. - - -IMAGINATION AND IDEALS. - -And, finally, the student should remember that in the category of the -imaginative powers must be placed that phase of mental activity which -has so much to do with the making or marring of one's life--the -formation of ideals. Our ideals are the patterns after which we shape -our life. According to the nature of our ideals is the character of the -life we lead. - -Our ideals are the supports of that which we call _character_. - -It is a truth, old as the race, and now being perceived most clearly by -thinkers, that indeed "as a man thinketh in his heart so is he." The -influence of our ideals is perceived to affect not only our character -but also our place and degree of success in life. We grow to be that of -which we have held ideals. If we create an ideal, either of general -qualities or else these qualities as manifested by some person living or -dead, and keep that ideal ever before us, we cannot help developing -traits and qualities corresponding to those of our ideal. Careful -thought will show that character depends greatly upon the nature of our -ideals; therefore we see the effect of the imagination in character -building. - -Moreover, our imagination has an important bearing on our actions. Many -a man has committed an imprudent or immoral act which he would not have -done had he been possessed of an imagination which showed him the -probable results of the action. In the same way many men have been -inspired to great deeds and achievements by reason of their imagination -picturing to them the possible results of certain action. The "big -things" in all walks of life have been performed by men who had -sufficient imagination to picture the possibilities of certain courses -or plans. The railroads, bridges, telegraph lines, cable lines, and -other works of man are the results of the imagination of some men. The -good fairy godmother always provides a vivid and lively imagination -among the gifts she bestows upon her beloved godchildren. Well did the -old philosopher pray to the gods: "And, with all, give unto me a clear -and active imagination." - -The dramatic values of life depend upon the quality of the imagination. -Life without imagination is mechanical and dreary. Imagination may -increase the susceptibility to pain, but it pays for this by increasing -the capacity for joy and happiness. The pig has but little -imagination,--little pain and little joy,--but who envies the pig? The -person with a clear and active imagination is in a measure a creator of -his world, or at least a re-creator. He takes an active part in the -creative activities of the universe, instead of being a mere pawn pushed -here and there in the game of life. - -Again, the divine gift of sympathy and understanding depends materially -upon the possession of a good imagination. One can never understand the -pain or problems of another unless he first can imagine himself in the -place of the other. Imagination is at the very heart of sympathy. One -may be possessed of great capacity for feeling, but owing to his lack of -imagination may never have this feeling called into action. The person -who would sympathize with others must first learn to understand them and -feel their emotions. This he can do only if he has the proper degree of -imagination. Those who reach the heart of the people must first be -reached by the feelings of the people. And this is possible only to him -whose imagination enables him to picture himself in the same condition -as others, and thus awaken his latent feelings and sympathies and -understanding. Thus it is seen that the imagination touches not only our -intellectual life but also our emotional nature. Imagination is the very -life of the soul. - - - - -CHAPTER X. - -The Feelings. - - -In thinking of the mind and its activities we are accustomed to the -general idea that the mental processes are chiefly those of intellect, -reason, thought. But, as a fact, the greater part of the mental -activities are those concerned with feeling and emotion. The intellect -is the youngest child of the mind, and while making its presence -strenuously known in the manner of all youngest children so that one is -perhaps justified in regarding it as "the whole thing" in the family, -nevertheless it really plays but a comparatively small part in the -general work of the mental family. The activities of the "feeling" side -of life greatly outnumber those of the "thinking" side, are far stronger -in their influence and effect, as a rule, and, in fact, so color the -intellectual processes, unconsciously, as to constitute their -distinctive quality except in the case of a very few advanced thinkers. - -But there is a difference between "feeling" and "emotion," as the terms -are employed in psychology. The former is the simple phase, the latter -the complex. Generally speaking, the resemblance or difference is akin -to that existing between sensation and perception, as explained in a -previous chapter. Beginning with the simple, in order later on to reach -the complex, we shall now consider that which is known as simple -"feeling." - -The term "feeling," as used in this connection in psychology, has been -defined as "the simple _agreeable_ or _disagreeable_ side of any mental -state." These agreeable or disagreeable sides of mental states are quite -distinct from the act of knowing, which accompanies them. One may -perceive and thus "know" that another is speaking to him and be fully -aware of the words being used and of their meaning. Ordinarily, and so -far as pure thought processes are concerned, this would complete the -mental state. But we must reckon on the feeling side as well as on the -thinking side of the mental state. Accordingly we find that the -knowledge of the words of the other person and the meaning thereof -results in a mental state agreeable or disagreeable. In the same way the -reading of the words of a book, the hearing of a song, or a sight or -scene perceived, may result in a more or less strong feeling, agreeable -or disagreeable. This sense of agreeable or disagreeable consciousness -is the essential characteristic of what we call "feeling." - -It is very difficult to explain feeling except in its own terms. We -know very well what we mean, or what another means, when it is said that -we or he "_feels_ sad," or has "a joyous feeling," or "a feeling of -interest." And yet we shall find it very hard to explain the mental -state except in terms of feeling itself. Our knowledge depends entirely -upon our previous experience of the feeling. As an authority says: "If -we have never felt pleasure, pain, fear, or sorrow, a quarto volume -cannot make us understand what such a mental state is." Every mental -state is not distinguished by strong feeling. There are certain mental -states which are concerned chiefly with intellectual effort, and in -which all trace of feeling seems to be absent, unless, as some have -claimed, the "feeling" of interest or the lack of same is a faint form -of the feeling of pleasure or pain. Habit may dull the feeling of a -mental state until it is apparently neutral, but there is generally a -faint feeling of like or dislike still left. - -The elementary forms of feeling are closely allied with those of simple -sensation. But experiments have revealed that there is a distinction in -consciousness. It has been discovered that one is often conscious of the -"touch" of a heated object before he is of the feeling or pain resulting -from it. Psychologists have pointed out another distinction, namely: -When we experience a sensation we are accustomed to refer it to the -outside thing which is the object of it, as when we touch the heated -object; but when we experience a feeling we instinctively refer it to -ourself, as when the heated object gives us pain. As an authority has -said: "My feelings belong to me; but my sensations seem to belong to the -object which caused them." - -Another proof of the difference and distinction between sensation and -feeling is the fact that the same sensation will produce different -feelings in different persons experiencing the former, even at the same -time. For instance, the same sight will cause one person to feel elated, -and the other depressed; the same words will produce a feeling of joy in -one, and a feeling of sorrow in another. The same sensation will produce -different feelings in the same person at different times. An authority -well says: "You drop your purse, and you see it lying on the ground as -you stoop to pick it up, with no feeling either of pleasure or pain. But -if you see it after you have lost it and have hunted for it a long time -in vain, you have a pronounced feeling of pleasure." - -There is a vast range of degree and kind in feeling. Gordy says: "All -forms of pleasure and pain are called feelings. Between the pleasure -which comes from eating a peach and that which results from solving a -difficult problem, or learning good news of a friend, or thinking of -the progress of civilization--between the pain that results from a cut -in the hand and that which results from the failure of a long-cherished -plan or the death of a friend--there is a long distance. But the one -group are all pleasures; the other all pains. And, whatever the source -of the pleasure or pain, it is alike feeling." - -There are many different kinds of feelings. Some arise from sensations -of physical comfort or discomfort; others from purely physiological -conditions; others from the satisfaction of accustomed tastes, or the -dissatisfaction arising from the stimulation of unaccustomed tastes; -others from the presence or absence of comfort; others from the presence -or absence of things or persons for whom we have an affection or liking. -Over-indulgence often transforms the feeling of pleasure into that of -pain; and, likewise, habit and practice may cause us to experience a -pleasurable feeling from that which formerly inspired feeling of an -opposite kind. Feelings also differ in degree; that is to say, some -things cause us to experience pleasurable feelings of a greater -intensity than do others, and some cause us to experience painful -feelings of a greater intensity than do others. These degrees of -intensity depend more or less upon the habit or experience of the -individual. As a general rule, feelings may be classified into (1) -those arising from physical sensations, and (2) those arising from -ideas. - -The feelings depending upon physical sensations arise either from -inherited tendencies and inclinations or from acquired habits and -experience. It is an axiom of the evolutionary school that any physical -activity that has been a habit of the race, long continued, becomes an -instinctive pleasure-giving activity in the individual. For instance, -the race for many generations was compelled to hunt, fish, travel, swim, -etc., in order to maintain existence. The result is that we, the -descendants, are apt to find pleasure in the same activities as sport, -games, exercise, etc. Many of our tendencies and feelings are inherited -in this way. To these we have added many acquired habits of physical -activity, which follow the same rule, _i.e._, that habit and practice -impart more or less pleasurable feeling. We find more pleasure in doing -those things which we can do easily or quite well than in the opposite -kind of things. - -The feelings depending upon ideas may also arise from inheritance. Many -of our mental tendencies and inclinations have come down to us from the -past. There are certain feelings that are born in one, without a doubt; -that is to say, there is a great capacity for such feelings which will -be transformed into manifestation upon the presentation of the proper -stimulus. Other mental feelings depend upon our individual past -experience, association, or suggestions from others--upon our past -environment, in fact. The ideals of those around us will cause us to -experience pleasure or pain, as the case may be, under certain -circumstances; the force of suggestion along these lines is very strong -indeed. Not only do we experience feelings in response to present -sensations, but the recollection of some previous experience will also -arouse feeling. In fact, feelings of this kind are closely bound up with -memory and imagination. Persons of vivid imagination are apt to feel far -more than others. They suffer more, and enjoy more. Our sympathies, -which depend largely upon our imaginative power, are the cause of many -of our feelings of this kind. - -Many of the facts which we generally ascribe to feeling are really a -part of the phenomena of emotion, the latter being the more complex -phase of feeling. For the purposes of this consideration we have -regarded simple feeling as the raw material of emotion, the relation -being compared to that existing between sensation and perception. In our -consideration of emotion we shall see the fuller manifestation of -feeling, and its more complex expressions. - - - - -CHAPTER XI. - -The Emotions. - - -As we have seen in the preceding lessons, an emotion is the more complex -phase of feeling. As a rule an emotion arises from a number of feelings. -Moreover, it is of a higher order of mental activity. As we have seen, a -feeling may arise either from a physical sensation or from an idea. -Emotion, however, as a rule, is dependent upon _an idea_ for its -expression, and always upon an idea for its direction and its -continuance. Feeling, of course, is the elemental spirit of all -emotional states, and, as an authority has said, is the thread upon -which the emotional states are strung. - -Halleck says: "When representative ideas appear, the feeling in -combination with them produces emotion. After the waters of the Missouri -combine with another stream, they receive a different name, although -they flow toward the gulf in as great volume as before. Suppose we liken -the feeling due to sensation to the Missouri River; the train of -representative ideas to the Mississippi before its junction with the -Missouri. Emotion may then be likened to the Mississippi _after_ its -junction--after feeling has combined with representative ideas. The -emotional stream will not be broader and deeper than before. This -analogy is employed only to make the distinction clearer. The student -must remember that mental powers are never actually as distinct as two -rivers before their union. * * * The student must beware of thinking -that we have done with feeling when we consider emotion. Just as the -waters of the Missouri flow on until they reach the gulf, so does -feeling run through every emotional state." In the above analogy the -term "representative ideas," of course, means the ideas of memory and -imagination as explained in previous chapters. - -There is a close relation between emotion and the physical expression -thereof--a peculiar mutual action and reaction between the mental state -and the physical action accompanying it. Psychologists are divided -regarding this relation. One school holds that the physical expression -follows and results from the mental state. For instance, we hear or see -something, and thereupon experience the feeling or emotion of anger. -This emotional feeling reacts upon the body and causes an increased -heart beat, a tight closing of the lips, a frown and lowered eyebrows, -and clinched fists. Or we may perceive something which causes the -feeling or emotion of fear, which reacts upon the body and produces -pallor, raising of the hair, dropping of the jaw, opening of the -eyelids, trembling of the legs, etc. According to this school, and the -popular idea, the mental state precedes and causes the physical -expression. - -But another school of psychology, of which the late Prof. William James -is a leading authority, holds that the physical expression precedes and -causes the mental state. For instance, in the cases above cited, the -perception of the anger-causing or fear-causing sight first causes a -reflex action upon the muscles, according to inherited race habits of -expression. This muscular expression and activity, in turn, is held to -react upon the mind and to cause the feeling or emotion of anger or -fear, as the case may be. Professor James, in some of his works, makes a -forcible argument in support of this theory, and his opinions have -influenced the scientific thought of the day upon this subject. Others, -however, have sought to combat his theory by equally forcible argument, -and the subject is still under lively and spirited discussion in -psychological circles. - -Without taking sides in the above controversy, many psychologists -proceed upon the hypothesis that there is a mutual action and reaction -between emotional mental states and the appropriate physical expression -thereof, each in a measure being the cause of the other, and each -likewise being the effect of the other. For instance, in the cases -above cited, the perception of the anger-producing or fear-producing -sight causes, almost or quite simultaneously, the emotional mental state -of anger or fear, as the case may be, and the physical expression -thereof. Then rapidly ensues a series of mental and physical reactions. -The mental state acts upon the physical expression and intensifies it. -The physical expression in turn reacts upon the mental state and induces -a more intense degree of the emotional feeling. And so on, until the -mental state and physical expression reach their highest point and then -begin to subside from exhaustion of energy. This middle-ground -conception meets all the requirements of the facts, and is probably more -nearly correct than either extreme theory. - -Darwin in his classic work, "The Expression of the Emotions in Man and -Animals," has thrown a great light on the subject of the expression of -emotion in physical motions. The Florentine scientist, Paolo Mantegazza, -added to Darwin's work with ideas of his own and countless examples -drawn from his own experience and observation. The work of François -Delsarte, the founder of the school of expression which bears his name, -is also a most valuable addition to the thought on this subject. The -subject of the relation and reaction between emotional feeling and -physical expression is a most fascinating one, and one in which we may -expect interesting and valuable discoveries during the next twenty -years. - -The relation and reaction above mentioned are interesting not only from -the viewpoint of theory but also because of their practicable -application in emotional development and training. It is an established -truth of psychology that each physical expression of an emotional state -serves to intensify the latter; it is pouring oil on the fire. Likewise, -it is equally true that the repression of the physical expression of an -emotion tends to restrain and inhibit the emotion itself. - -Halleck says: "If we watch a person growing angry, we shall see the -emotion increase as he talks loud, frowns deeply, clinches his fist, and -gesticulates wildly. Each expression of his passion is reflected back -upon the original anger and adds fuel to the fire. If he resolutely -inhibits the muscular expressions of his anger, it will not attain great -intensity, and it will soon die a quiet death. * * * Not without reason -are those persons called cold blooded who habitually restrain as far as -possible the expression of their emotion; who never frown or throw any -feeling into their tones, even when a wrong inflicted upon some one -demands aggressive measures. There is here no wave of bodily expression -to flow back and augment the emotional state." - -In this connection we call your attention to the familiar and -oft-quoted passage from the works of Prof. William James: "Refuse to -express a passion and it dies. Count ten before venting your anger and -its occasion seems ridiculous. Whistling to keep up courage is no mere -figure of speech. On the other hand, sit all day in a moping posture, -sigh and reply to everything with a dismal voice, and your melancholy -lingers. There is no more valuable precept in moral education than this, -as all who have experience know: If we wish to conquer undesirable -emotional tendencies in ourselves, we must assiduously, and in the first -instance cold-bloodedly, go through the outward movements of those -contrary dispositions which we prefer to cultivate. Smooth the brow, -brighten the eye, contract the dorsal rather than the ventral aspect of -the frame, and speak in a major key, and your heart must be frigid -indeed if it does not gradually thaw." - -Along the same lines Halleck says: "Actors have frequently testified to -the fact that emotion will arise if they go through the appropriate -muscular movements. In talking to a character on the stage, if they -clinch the fists and frown, they often find themselves becoming really -angry; if they start with counterfeit laughter, they find themselves -growing cheerful. A German professor says that he cannot walk with a -schoolgirl's mincing step and air without feeling frivolous." - -The wise student will acquire a great control over his emotional nature -if he will re-read and study the above statements and quotations until -he has grasped their spirit and essence. In those few lines he is given -a philosophy of self-control and self-mastery that will be worth much to -him if he will but apply it in practice. Patience, perseverance, -practice, and will are required, but the reward is great. Even to those -who have not the persistency to apply this truth fully, there will be a -partial reward if they will use it to the extent of restraining so far -as possible any undue physical expression of undesirable emotional -excitement. - -Some writers seem to regard capacity for great emotional excitement and -expression as a mark of a rich and full character or noble soul. This is -far from being true. While it is a fact that the cultivation of certain -emotions tends to create a noble character and a full life, it is -equally true that the tendency to "gush" and indulge in hysterical or -sentimental excesses is a mark of an ill-controlled nature and a weak, -rather than strong, character. Moreover, it is a fact that excess in -emotional excitement and expression tends toward the dissipation of the -finer and nobler feelings which otherwise would seek an outlet in actual -doing and practical action. In the language of the old Scotch engineer -in the story, they are like the old locomotive which "spends sae much -steam at the whustle that she hae nane left to gae by." - -Emotional excitement and expression are largely dependent upon habit and -indulgence, although there is a great difference, of course, in the -emotional nature and tendencies of various persons. Emotions, like -physical actions or intellectual processes, become habitual by -repetition. And habit renders all physical or mental actions easy of -repetition. Each time one manifests anger, the deeper the mental path is -made, and the easier it is to travel that path the next time. In the -same way each time that anger is conquered and inhibited, the easier -will it be to restrain it the next time. In the same way desirable -habits of emotion and expression may be formed. - -Another point in the cultivation, training, and restraint of the -emotions is that which has to do with the control of the ideas which we -allow to come into the mind. Ideative habits may be formed--_are_ -formed, in fact, by the majority of persons. We may cultivate the habit -of looking on the bright side of things; of looking for the best in -those we meet; of expecting the best things instead of the worst. By -resolutely refusing to give welcome to ideas calculated to arouse -certain emotions, feelings, passions, desires, sentiments, or similar -mental states, we may do much to prevent the arousing of the emotion -itself. Emotions usually are called forth by some idea, and if we shut -out the idea we may prevent the emotional feeling from appearing. In -this connection the universal rule of psychology may be applied: _A -mental state may be inhibited or restrained by turning the attention to -the opposite mental state_. - -The control of the attention is really the control of every mental -state. - -We may use the will in the direction of the control of the -attention--the development and direction of voluntary attention--and -thus actually control every phase of mental activity. The will is -nearest to the ego, or central being of man, and the attention is the -chief tool and instrument of the will. This fact cannot be repeated too -often. If it is impressed upon the mind it will prove to be useful and -valuable in many emergencies of mental life. He who controls his -attention controls his mind, and in controlling his mind controls -himself. - - - - -CHAPTER XII. - -The Instinctive Emotions. - - -Many attempts to classify the emotions have been made by the -psychologists, but the best authorities hold that beyond the purpose of -ordinary convenience in considering the subject _any_ classification is -scientifically useless by reason of its incompleteness. As James -cleverly puts it: "Any classification of the emotions is seen to be as -true and as natural as any other, if it only serves some purpose." The -difficulty attending the attempted classification arises from the fact -that every emotion is more or less complex, and is made up of various -feelings and shades of emotional excitement. Each emotion blends into -others. Just as a few elements of matter may be grouped into hundreds of -thousands of combinations, so the elements of feeling may be grouped -into thousands of shades of emotion. It is said that the two elements of -carbon and hydrogen form combinations resulting in five thousand -varieties of material substance, "from anthracite to marsh gas, from -black coke to colorless naphtha." The same thing may be said of the -emotional combinations formed from two principal elements of feeling. -Moreover, the close distinction between sensation and feeling on the one -hand, and between feeling and emotion on the other, serves to further -complicate the task. - -For the purposes of our consideration, let us divide the emotions into -five general classes, as follows: (1) Instinctive emotions, (2) social -emotions, (3) religious emotions, (4) æsthetic emotions, (5) -intellectual emotions. We shall now consider each of the above five -classes in turn. - - -THE INSTINCTIVE EMOTIONS. - -Instinct is defined as "unconscious, involuntary, or unreasoning -prompting to any action," or "the natural unreasoning impulse by which -an animal is guided to the performance of any action, without thought of -improving the method." An authority says: "Instinct is a natural impulse -leading animals, even prior to all experience, to perform certain -actions tending to the welfare of the individual or the perpetuation of -the species, apparently without understanding the object at which they -may be supposed to aim, or deliberating as to the best methods to -employ. In many cases, as in the construction of the cells of the bee, -there is a perfection about the result which reasoning man could not -have equaled, except by an application of the higher mathematics to -direct the operations carried out. Mr. Darwin considers that animals, in -time past as now, have varied in their mental qualities, and that those -variations are inherited. Instincts also vary slightly in a state of -nature. This being so, natural selection can ultimately bring them to a -high degree of perfection." - -It was formerly the fashion to ascribe instinct in the lower animals, -and in man, to something akin to "innate ideas" implanted in each -species and thereafter continued by inheritance. But the application of -the idea of evolution to the science of psychology has resulted in -brushing away these old ideas. To-day it holds that that which we call -"instinct" is the result of gradual development in the course of -evolution, the accumulated experience of the race being stored away in -the race memory, each individual adding a little thereto by his acquired -habits and experiences. Psychologists now hold that the lower forms of -these race tendencies are closely akin to purely reflex actions, and the -higher forms, which are known as "instinctive emotions," are phenomena -of the subconscious mind resulting from race memory and race experience. - -Clodd says: "Instinct is the higher form of reflex action. The salmon -migrates from sea to river; the bird makes its nest or migrates from one -zone to another by an unvarying route, even leaving its young behind to -perish; the bee builds its six-sided cell; the spider spins its web; the -chick breaks its way through the shell, balances itself, and picks up -grains of corn; the newborn babe sucks its mother's breast--all in -virtue of like acts on the part of their ancestors, which, arising in -the needs of the creature, and gradually becoming automatic, have not -varied during long ages, the tendency to repeat them being transmitted -within the germ from which insect, fish, bird, and man have severally -sprung." - -Schneider says: "It is a fact that men, especially in childhood, fear to -go into a dark cavern, or a gloomy wood. This feeling of fear arises, to -be sure, partly from the fact that we easily suspect that dangerous -beasts may lurk in these localities--a suspicion due to stories we have -heard and read. But, on the other hand, it is quite sure that this fear -at a certain perception is also directly inherited. Children who have -been carefully guarded from all ghost stories are nevertheless terrified -and cry if led into a dark place, especially if sounds are made there. -Even an adult can easily observe that an uncomfortable timidity steals -over him in a lonely wood at night, although he may have the fixed -conviction that not the slightest danger is near. This feeling of fear -occurs in many men even in their own houses after dark, although it is -much stronger in a dark cavern or forest. The fact of such instinctive -fear is easily explicable when we consider that our savage ancestors -through immemorable generations were accustomed to meet with dangerous -beasts in caverns, especially bears, and were for the most part attacked -by such beasts during the night and in the woods, and that thus an -inseparable association between the perceptions of darkness, caverns, -woods, and fear took place, and was inherited." - -James says: "Nothing is commoner than the remark that man differs from -lower creatures by the almost total absence of instincts, and the -assumption of their work in him by reason. * * * We may confidently say -that however uncertain man's reactions upon his environment may -sometimes seem in comparison with those of the lower mammals, the -uncertainty is probably not due to their possession of any principles of -action which he lacks. _On the contrary, man possesses all the impulses -that they have, and a great many more besides._ * * * High places cause -fear of a peculiarly sickening sort, though here again individuals -differ. The utterly blind instinctive character of the motor impulses -here is shown by the fact that they are almost always entirely -unreasonable, but that reason is powerless to suppress them. * * * -Certain ideas of supernatural agency, associated with real -circumstances, produce a peculiar kind of horror. This horror is -probably explicable as the result of a combination of simple horrors. To -bring the ghostly terror to its maximum, many unusual elements of the -dreadful must combine, such as loneliness, darkness, inexplicable -sounds, especially of a dismal character, moving pictures half discerned -(or, if discerned, of dreadful aspect), and a vertiginous baffling of -the expectation. * * * In view of the fact that cadaveric, reptilian, -and underground horrors play so specific and constant a part in many -nightmares and forms of delirium, it seems not altogether unwise to ask -whether these forms of dreadful circumstance may not at a former period -have been more normal objects of the environment than now. The -evolutionist ought to have no difficulty in explaining these terrors, -and the scenery that provokes them, as relapses into the consciousness -of the cave men, a consciousness usually overlaid in us by experiences -of a more recent date." - -Instinctive emotion manifests as an impulse arising from the dim -recesses of the feeling or emotional nature--an incentive toward a dimly -conscious end. It differs from the almost purely automatic nature of -certain forms of reflex process, for its beginning is a feeling arising -from the subconscious regions, which strives to excite an activity of -conscious volition. The feeling is from the subconscious, but the -activity is conscious. The end may not be perceived in consciousness, or -at least is but dimly perceived, but the action leading to the end is in -full consciousness. Instinct is seen to have its origin in the past -experiences of the race, transmitted by heredity and preserved in the -race memory. It has for its object the preservation of the individual -and of the species. Its end is often something far removed in time from -the moment, or the welfare of the species rather than that of the -individual; for instance, the caterpillar providing for its future -states, or the bird building its nest, or the bees building cells and -providing honey for their successors, for very few bees live to partake -of the honey which they have gathered and stored--they are animated by -"the spirit of the hive." - -The most elementary forms of the instinctive emotions are those which -have to do with the preservation of the individual, his comfort, and -personal physical welfare. This class of emotions comprises what are -generally known as purely "selfish" feelings, having little or no -concern for the welfare of others. In this class we find the emotional -feelings which have to do with the satisfaction of hunger and thirst, -the securing of comfortable quarters and warm clothing, and the spirit -of combat and strife arising from the desire to obtain these. These -elemental feelings had their birth early in the history of life, and -indeed life itself depended very materially upon them for its -preservation and continuance. It was necessary for the primitive living -thing to be "selfish." When man appeared, only those survived who -manifested these feelings strongly; the others were pushed to the wall -and perished. Even in our civilization the man below the average in this -class of feelings will find it difficult to survive. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII. - -The Passions. - - -Arising from the most elemental instinctive emotions, we find what may -be termed "the passions." By the term "passion" is meant those strong -feelings in which the elemental selfish instincts are manifested in -relation to other persons, either in the phase of attraction or -repulsion. In this class we find the elementary phases of love, and the -feelings of hate, anger, jealousy, revenge, etc. This class of emotions -usually manifests violently, as compared with the other emotions. The -passions generally arise from self-preservation, race preservation and -reproduction, self-interest, self-aggrandizement, etc., and may be -regarded as a more complex phase of the elemental instinctive emotions. -The elemental instinctive emotions of self-preservation and self-comfort -cause the individual to experience and manifest the passional emotions -of desire for combat, anger, hate, revenge, etc., while the instinctive -emotions leading to reproduction and continuance of the race give rise -to the passional emotions of sexual love, jealousy, etc. The desire to -attract the other sex increases ambition, vanity, love of display, and -other feelings. - -It is only when this class of emotions blends with the higher emotions -that the passions become purified and refined. But it must not be -forgotten that these emotions were very necessary for the welfare of the -race in the early stage of its evolution, and that they still play an -active part in human life, under the greater or less restraint imposed -by civilized society. Nor should it be forgotten that from these -emotions have evolved the highest love of one human being for another. -From instinctive sexual love and the "racial instinct" have developed -the higher affection of man for woman, and woman for man, in all their -beautiful manifestations--and the love of the parent for the child, and -the love of the child for the parent. The first manifestation of -altruism arises in the love of the living creature for its mate, and in -the love of the parents for their offspring. In certain forms of life -where the association of the sexes is merely for the moment, and is not -followed by protection, mutual aid, and companionship, there is found an -absence of mutual affection of any kind, the only feeling being an -elemental reproductive instinct bringing the male and female together -for the moment--an almost purely reflex activity. In the same way, in -the cases of certain animals (the rattlesnake, for instance) in which -the young are able to protect themselves from birth, there is seen a -total absence of parental affection or the return thereof. Human love -between the sexes, in its higher and lower degrees, is a natural -evolution from passional emotion of a low order, due to the growth of -social, ethical, moral, and æsthetic emotion arising from the -necessities of the increasing complexity and development of human life. - -The simpler forms of passional emotion are almost entirely instinctive -in their manifestation. Indeed, in many cases, there appears to be but -little more than a high form of reflex nervous action. The following -words of William James give us an interesting view of this fact of life: -"The cat runs after the mouse, runs or shows fight before the dog, -avoids falling from walls and trees, shuns fire and water, not because -he has any notion either of life or of death or of self-preservation. He -acts in each case separately and simply because he cannot help it; being -so framed that when that particular running thing called a mouse appears -in his field of vision, he _must_ pursue; that when that particular -barking and obstreperous thing called a dog appears there, he _must_ -retire if at a distance, and scratch if close by; that he _must_ -withdraw his feet from water, and his face from flame, etc. * * * Now, -why do the various animals do what seem to us such strange things in the -presence of such outlandish stimuli? Why does the hen, for instance, -submit herself to the tedium of incubating such a fearfully -uninteresting set of objects as a nestful of eggs, unless she have some -sort of prophetic inkling of the result? The only answer is _ad -hominem_. We can only interpret the instinct of brutes by what we know -of instincts in ourselves. Why do men always lie down, when they can, on -soft beds rather than on soft floors? Why do they sit around a stove on -a cold day? Why, in a room, do they place themselves, ninety-nine times -out of a hundred, with their faces toward its middle rather than to the -wall? Why does the maiden interest the youth so much that everything -about her seems more important and significant than anything else in the -world? Nothing more can be said than that these are human ways, and that -every creature likes its own ways, and takes to following them as a -matter of course. Science may come and consider these ways, and find -that most of them are useful. But it is not for the sake of their -utility that they are followed, but because at the moment of following -them we feel that it is the only appropriate and natural thing to do. -Not one man in a million, when taking his dinner, ever thinks of its -utility. He eats because the food tastes good, and makes him want more. -If you should ask him _why_ he wants to eat more of what tastes like -that, instead of revering you as a philosopher he will probably laugh at -you for a fool." - -James continues: "It takes, in short, what Berkeley called a mind -debauched by learning to carry the process of making the natural seem -strange, so far as to ask the _why_ of any instinctive human act. To the -metaphysician alone can such questions arise as: Why do we smile when -pleased and not scowl? Why are we unable to talk to a crowd as to a -single friend? Why does a particular maiden turn our wits upside down? -The common man can only say, '_Of course_ we smile, _of course_ our -heart palpitates at the sight of the crowd, _of course_ we love the -maiden--that beautiful soul clad in that perfect form, so palpably and -flagrantly made from all eternity to be loved!' And so, probably, does -each animal feel about the particular things it tends to do in the -presence of particular objects. They, too, are _a priori_ syntheses. To -the lion it is the lioness which is made to be loved; to the bear, the -she bear. To the broody hen the notion would seem monstrous that there -should be a creature in the world to whom a nestful of eggs was not the -utterly fascinating, precious, and never-to-be-too-much-sat-upon object -which it is to her. Thus we may be sure that however mysterious some -animals' instincts may appear to us, our instincts will appear no less -mysterious to them. And we may conclude that, to the animal which obeys -it, every impulse and every step of that instinct shines with its own -sufficient light, and seems at the moment the only externally right and -proper thing to do. It may be done for its own sake exclusively." - -One has very little need, as a rule, to develop the passional emotions. -Instinct has taken pretty good care that we shall have our share of this -class of feelings. But there is a need to train, restrain, govern, and -control these emotions, for the conditions which brought about their -original being have changed. Our social conventions require that we -should subordinate these passional feelings, to some extent at least. -Society insists that we must restrict our love impulses to certain -limits and to certain quarters, and that we subdue our anger and hate, -except toward the enemies of our land, the disturbers of public peace, -and the menacers of the social conventions of our time and land. The -public welfare requires that we inhibit our fighting impulses, except in -cases of self-defense or war. Public policy requires that we keep our -ambitions within reasonable limits, which limits change from time to -time, of course. In short, society has stepped in and insisted that man, -as a social being, must not only acquire a _social conscience_ but must -also develop sociable emotions and inhibit his unsociable ones. The -evolution of man's nature has caused him unconsciously to modify his -elemental, instinctive, passional emotions, and subordinate them to the -dictates of social, ethical, moral, and æsthetic feelings and ideals, -and to intellectual considerations. Even the original elemental -instincts of the lower animals have been modified by reason of the -social requirements of the pack, herd, or drove, until the modified -instinct is now the ruling force. - -The general principles of emotional control, restraint, and mastery, as -given in a preceding chapter, are applicable to the particular class of -emotions now under consideration here. - - (1) By refraining from the physical expression, one may at least - partially inhibit the emotion. - - (2) By refusing to create the habit, one may more easily manifest - control. - - (3) By refusing to dwell upon the idea or mental picture of the - exciting object, one may lessen the stimulus. - - (4) By cultivating the opposite class of emotions, one may inhibit - any class of feeling. - - (5) And, finally, by acquiring a control of the attention, by means - of the will, one has the reins firmly in hand, and may drive or hold - back the steeds of passion as he wills. - -The passions are like fiery horses, useful if well under control, but -most dangerous if the control is lost. The ego is the driver, the will -his hands, attention the reins, habit the bit, and the passions the -horses. To drive the chariot of life under social conditions, the ego -must have strong hands (will) to tighten or loosen the reins of -attention. He must also employ a well designed and shaped bit of habit. -Without strong hands, good reins, and well-adjusted bit, the fiery -steeds of passion may gain control and, running away, dash the chariot -and its driver over the precipice and on to the jagged rocks below. - - - - -CHAPTER XIV. - -The Social Emotions. - - -As man became a social animal he developed new traits of character, new -habits of action, new ideals, new customs, and consequently new -emotions. Emotions long entertained and long manifested by the race -become more or less instinctive, and are passed along in the form of -either (_a_) inherited stimulus akin to, but lesser in degree and force -than, the more elemental emotions; or (_b_) of inherited _tendency_ to -manifest the acquired emotional feeling upon the presentation of -sufficiently strong stimuli. Hence arises that which we have called "the -social emotions." - -Under the classification of "the social emotions" are those acquired -tendencies of action and feeling of the race which are more or less -altruistic, and are concerned with the welfare of others and one's -duties and obligations toward society and our fellow men. In this class -are found the emotions which impel us to perform what we consider or -feel to be our duty toward our neighbors, and our obligations and duty -toward the state, as expressed in its laws, the customs of men of our -country, or the ideals of the community. In another phase it manifests -as sympathy, fellow feeling, and "kindness" in general. In its first -phase we find civic virtue, law-abiding inclination, honesty, "square -dealing," and patriotism; in its second phase we find sympathy for -others, charity, mutual aid, the alleviation of poverty and suffering, -the erection of asylums for orphans and the aged, hospitals for the -sick, and the formation of societies for general charitable work. - -In many cases we find the social, ethical, and moral emotions closely -allied with religious emotion, and by many these are supposed to be -practically identical, but there is a vast difference in spite of their -frequent association. For instance, we find many persons of high civic -virtue, of exalted moral ideals, and manifesting ethical qualities of -the most advanced type, who are lacking in the ordinary religious -feelings. On the other hand, we too frequently find persons professing -great religious zeal, and apparently experiencing the most intense -religious emotional feeling, who are deficient in social, civic, -ethical, and moral qualities, in the best sense of these terms. The aim -of all religion worthy of the name, however, is to encourage ethical and -moral as well as religious emotions. - -We must here make the distinction between those manifesting the actions -termed ethical and moral _because they feel that way_, and those who -merely comply with the conventional requirements _because they fear the -consequences_ of their violation. The first class have the true social, -ethical, and moral feelings, tastes, ideals, and inclinations; while the -second manifest merely the elementary feelings of self-preservation and -selfish prudence. The first class are "good" because they feel that way -and find it natural to be so; while the others are "good" merely because -they have to be or be punished by legal penalty or public opinion, loss -of prestige, loss of financial support, etc. - -The social, moral, and ethical emotions are believed to have arisen in -the race by reason of the association of individuals in communities and -the rise of the necessity for mutual aid and forbearance. Even many of -the species of the lower animals have social, moral, or ethical codes of -their own, based on the experience of the species or family, infractions -of which they punish severely. In the same way sympathy and the -altruistic feelings are supposed to have arisen. The community of -interest and understanding in the tribe, family, or clan brought not -only the feeling of natural defense and protection but also the finer, -inner sympathetic feeling of the pains and sufferings of their -associates. This, in the progress of the race, has developed into -broader and more complex ideals and feelings. - -Theology explains the moral feelings as resulting from conscience, -which it holds to be a special faculty of the mind, or soul, divinely -given. Science, while admitting the existence of the state of feelings -which we call "conscience," denies its supernatural origin, and ascribes -it to the result of evolution, heredity, experience, education, and -suggestion. Conscience, according to science, is a compound of -intellectual and emotional states. Conscience is not an invariable or -infallible guide, but _depends entirely upon the heredity, education, -experience, and environment of the individual_. It accompanies the moral -and ethical codes of the race, which vary with time and with country. -Actions which were thought right a century ago are condemned now; -likewise, things condemned a century ago are thought right now. What is -commended in Turkey is condemned in England, and vice versa. Moral -tastes and ideals, like æsthetic ones, vary with time and country. There -is no absolute code which has been always true, in all places. There is -an evolution in the ideals of morals and ethics as in everything else, -and "conscience" and the moral and ethical emotions accompany the -changing ideals. - -Many of the moral and ethical principles originally arose from necessity -or utility, but have since developed into natural, spontaneous feeling -on the part of the race. It is held that the race is rapidly developing -a "social conscience" which will cause the wiping out of many social -conditions which are now the disgrace of civilization. It is predicted -that in time the race will look back upon the existence of poverty in -our civilization as our generation now looks back upon the existence of -slavery, imprisonment for debt, capital punishment for the theft of a -loaf of bread, the killing of prisoners of war, etc. It is thought that, -in time, wars of conquest will be deemed as utterly immoral as to-day is -regarded the murder of a body of men by a band of pirates or bandits. In -the same way the economic slavery of to-day will be seen as immoral as -now seems the physical slavery of the past. In not far distant time it -will seem incredible that society could have ever allowed one of its -members to die of hunger in the streets, or of poverty and inattention -in the sick room of the hovel. Not only will the ideals and feelings of -ethical and moral responsibility change and evolve, but the feelings of -personal sympathy will evolve in accordance therewith. At least such is -the dream and prophecy of some of the world's greatest thinkers. - -The social, ethical, and moral emotions may be developed by a study of -the evolution and meaning of society on the one hand, and the perception -of the condition of the lives of less fortunate individuals on the -other. The first will awaken new ideas of the history and real meaning -of social association and mutual intercourse, and will develop a new -sense of responsibility, duty, and civic and social pride. The second -will awaken understanding and sympathy, and a desire to do what one can -to help those who are "the under dog," and also to bring about a better -state of affairs in general. The study of history and civilization, of -sociology and civics, will do much in the first direction. The study of -human-kind, and its life problems and condition, will do the same in the -second case. In both cases there will be awakened a new sense of "right -and wrong"--a new conception of "ought and ought not"--regarding one's -relations to the race, society, and his fellow beings. - -Let no one deceive himself or herself by the smug assumption that the -race has entirely emerged from barbarism and is now on the top wave of -civilization. The truth, as known to all careful and conscientious -thinkers, is that we are but _half_ civilized, if, indeed, that much. -Many of our customs and conventions are those of a half-barbarous -people. Our ideals are low, our customs often vile. We lack not only -high ideals but in many cases we show a lack of sanity in our social -conventions. But evolution is moving us slowly ahead. A better day is -dawning. The signs are in the air, to be seen by all thoughtful men. -Civilization is climbing the ladder, aided by the evolution of the -social, ethical, and moral emotions and the development of the -intellect. - -In connection with this phase of the emotions, we invite the student to -consider the following excellent words of Professor Davidson in his -"History of Greek Education": "It is not enough for a man to understand -the conditions of rational life in his own time. He must likewise _love_ -these conditions and _hate_ whatever leads to life of an opposite kind. -This is only another way of saying that he must love the good and hate -the evil; for the good is simply what conduces to rational or moral -life, and the evil simply what leads away from it. It is perfectly -obvious, as soon as it is pointed out, that all immoral life is due to a -false distribution of affection, which again is often, though by no -means always, due to a want of intellectual cultivation. He that -attributes to anything a value greater or less than it really possesses, -in the order of things, has already placed himself in a false relation -to it, and will certainly, when he comes to act with reference to it, -act immorally." - - - - -CHAPTER XV. - -The Religious Emotions. - - -By "the religious emotions" is meant that class of emotional feeling -arising from the faith and belief in, or consciousness of the presence -of, supernatural beings, powers, entities, or forces. This form of -emotion is regarded as distinct from the ethical and moral emotions, -although frequently found in connection therewith. Likewise, it is -independent of any special form of intellectual belief, for it is far -more fundamental and often exists without creed, philosophy, or stated -belief, the only manifestation in such cases being a "feeling" of the -existence of supernatural beings, forces, and powers to which man has a -relation and to which he owes obedience. To those who may think that -this is too narrow a conception of religious emotion we refer the -following definition of "religion" from the dictionaries: "The acts or -feelings which result from the belief of a god, or gods, having superior -control over matter, life, or destiny. Religion is subjective, -designating the feelings and acts of men which relate to God; theology -is objective, denoting the science which investigates the existence, -laws, and attributes of God;" or (objectively) "the outer form and -embodiment which the inward spirit of a true or a false devotion -assumes," (subjectively) "the feeling of veneration with which the -worshiper regards the Being he adores." - -Darwin, in his "Descent of Man," says that the feeling of religious -devotion is a highly complex one, consisting of love, complete -submission to an exalted and mysterious superior, a strong sense of -dependence, fear, reverence, gratitude, hope for the future, and perhaps -other elements. He is of the opinion that no man can experience so -complex an emotion until advanced in his intellectual and moral -faculties to at least a moderately high level. The authorities generally -agree with Darwin, although the more recent study of the history of -religion has shown that religious feeling has a far more primitive -origin than that indicated by Darwin. - -It is true that the lower animals are not deemed capable of anything -approaching religious feeling, unless there is a feeling approaching it -in the attitude of the dog and horse and other domestic animals toward -their masters. But man, as soon as he is able to attribute natural -phenomena to a supernatural cause and power, manifests a crude religious -feeling and emotion. He begins by believing in, fearing, and worshiping -natural forces and objects, such as the sun, the moon, the wind, -thunder and lightning, the ocean, rivers, mountains, etc. It is claimed -that there is no natural object that has not been deified and worshiped -by some people at some time in the history of the race. Later, man -acquired the anthropomorphic conception of deities and created many gods -in his own image, endowing them with his own attributes, qualities, and -characteristics. The mental characteristics and morals of a people can -always be ascertained by a knowledge of the average conception of deity -held by them. Polytheism, or the belief in many gods, was succeeded by -monotheism, or belief in one god. - -Monotheism ranges from the crudest conception of a manlike god to the -highest conception of a spiritual Being transcending all human -qualities, attributes, or characteristics. Man began by believing in -many god _things_, then in many god _persons_, then in a one god-person, -then in one God who is a spirit, then in One Universal Spirit which is -God. It is a far cry from the savage, manlike god of old to the -conception of the Universal Spirit of the "God-drunken philosopher," -Spinoza. The extreme of religious belief is that which holds that "there -is nothing but God--all else is illusion," of pantheistic idealism. -Buddhism (at least in its original form) discarded the idea of a Supreme -Being, and held that Ultimate Reality is but Universal _Law_; hence the -accusation that Buddhism is an "atheistic religion," although it is one -of the world's greatest religions, having over 400,000,000 followers. - -But the _beliefs_ of the religious person may be considered as resulting -from intellectual processes; his religious _feelings and emotions_ arise -from another part of his mental being. It is the testimony of the -authorities of all religions that religious conviction is an inner -experience rather than an intellectual conception. The emotional element -is always active in religious manifestations everywhere. The purely -intellectual religion is naught but a philosophy. Religion without -feeling and emotion is an anomaly. In all true religion there exists a -feeling of inner assurance and faith, love, awe, dependence, submission, -reverence, gratitude, hope, and perhaps fear. The emotional element must -always be present, not necessarily in the form of emotional excess, as -in the case of revival hysteria or the dance of the whirling dervishes, -but at least in the form of the calm, fervent feeling of "that peace -which passeth understanding." When religion departs from the emotional -phase it becomes merely a "school of philosophy," or an "ethical culture -society." - -The student must not lose sight of the uplifting influence of true -religious emotion by reason of his knowledge of its lowly origin. Like -the lotus, which has its roots in the slimy, filthy mud of the river, -and its stem in the muddy, stagnant, and foul waters thereof, but its -beautiful flower unfolded in the clear air and facing the sun, so is -religious feeling responsible for some of the most beautiful and -uplifting ideals and actions of the race. If its origin and history -contain much that is not consistent with the highest ideals of the race -to-day, it is not the fault of religion but of the race itself. -Religion, like all else in the universal manifestation, is under the -laws of evolution, growth, and development. What the religion of the -future may be, we know not. But the prophets of the race are dreaming -visions of a religion as much higher than that of to-day as the latter -is higher than the crude fetichism of the savage. - -The following quotation from John Fiske's "Through Nature to God" is -appropriate in this place. Fiske says: "My aim is to show that 'that -other influence,' that inward conviction, the craving for a final cause, -the theistic assumption, is itself one of the master facts of the -universe, and as much entitled to respect as any fact in physical nature -can possibly be. The argument flashed upon me about ten years ago while -reading Herbert Spencer's controversy with Frederic Harrison concerning -the nature and reality of religion. Because Spencer derived historically -the greater part of modern belief in an Unseen World from the savage's -primeval world of dreams and ghosts, some of his critics maintained that -logical consistency required him to dismiss the modern belief as utterly -false; otherwise he would be guilty of seeking to evolve truth from -falsehood. 'By no means,' replied Spencer. 'Contrariwise, the ultimate -form of the religious consciousness is the final development of a -consciousness which at the outset contained a germ of truth obscured by -multitudinous errors.'" Fiske, in this connection, quotes the -Tennysonian question:-- - - "'Who forged that other influence, - That heat of inward evidence, - By which he doubts against the sense?'" - -The religious emotions may be developed by allowing the mind to dwell -upon the Power underlying the universe of fleeting, changing forms; by -reading prose and poetry in which an appeal is made to the religious -instinct; by listening to music which awakens the emotion of reverence -and awe; and, finally, by meditating upon the inner spirit immanent in -every living being. As an old Hindu sage once said: "There are many -paths by which men arrive at a knowledge of the presence of God, but -there is but one goal and destination." - - - - -CHAPTER XVI. - -The Aesthetic Emotions. - - -By "the æsthetic emotions" is meant those emotional feelings which are -concerned with the perception of beauty or taste, and by reason of which -we "like" or "dislike" certain perceptions of sensory impressions. In -order to get a clearer idea, let us consider what is meant by "beauty" -and "taste." - -"Beauty" is defined as "that quality or assemblage of qualities in an -object which gives the eye or the ear intense pleasure; or that -characteristic in an object which gratifies the intellect or moral -feeling." "Taste" (in this sense of the term) is defined as "nice -perception, or the power of perceiving and relishing excellence in human -performances; the power of appreciating the finer qualities of art; the -faculty of discerning beauty, order, congruity, proportion, symmetry, or -whatever constitutes excellence, particularly in the fine arts or -literature; the faculty of the mind by which we both perceive and enjoy -whatever is beautiful or sublime in the works of nature and art. The -possession of taste insures grace and beauty in the works of an artist, -and the avoidance of all that is low or mean. It is as often the result -of an innate sense of beauty or propriety as of art education, and no -genius can compensate for the want of it. * * * Tastes differ so much -among individuals, nations, or in different ages and conditions of -civilization that it is utterly impossible to set up a standard of taste -applicable to all men and to all stages in the evolution of society." - -The æsthetic sense, feeling, and emotion are products of the later -stages of the evolution of the mind of man. Their roots, however, may be -seen in the crude attempts at decoration and adornment in the savage, -and still further back in the tendency of certain birds to adorn their -nests or "bowers." Moreover, some sense of beauty must exist in the -lower animals, which are influenced thereby in the selection of their -mates, the bright plumage of the birds, and the coloring of the insects -and higher animals evidencing the existence of at least a primitive -æsthetic sense. Herbert Spencer says that one characteristic of the -æsthetic feelings is that they are separated from the functions vitally -requisite and necessary to sustain life, and it is not until the latter -are reasonably well satisfied that the former begin to manifest in -force. - -The authorities hold that the basic element concerned in the -manifestation of the æsthetic emotional feeling is the _sensory_ -element, which consists of the pleasure arising from the perception of -objects of vision or hearing which are deemed beautiful. There is a -certain nervous satisfaction which arises from the perception of the -sensation of the sight of a beautiful thing, or of the hearing of -beautiful sound. Just _why_ certain sights prove agreeable and others -disagreeable, or certain sounds pleasant and others unpleasant, is very -difficult to determine. Association and habit may have something to do -with the beauty of sight object, and there may be natural harmony of -vibration in colors as there is in sound. In the case of sounds there is -undoubtedly a natural harmony between the vibrations of certain notes of -the scale and inharmony between others. Some have held that the secret -of the enjoyment of music is found in the natural appreciation of -rhythm, as rhythm is a cosmic manifestation evident in everything from -great to small. But these theories do not account for the differences -existing in the tastes regarding color and music manifested by different -individuals, races, and classes of people. - -Grant Allen says: "The vulgar are pleased with great masses of color, -especially red, orange, and purple, which give their coarse, nervous -organization the requisite stimulus. The refined, with nerves of less -caliber, but greater discriminativeness, require delicate combinations -of complementaries and prefer neutral tints to the glare of the primary -hues. Children and savages love to dress in all the colors of the -rainbow." In the same way persons of certain types of taste are pleased -with "rag time" and cheap, rollicking songs or dances, while others -shudder at these and find delight in the classic productions of the -great composers. - -There is also the _intellectual_ element to be reckoned with in the -æsthetic emotions. The intellect must discover the beauty in certain -objects before the emotion is aroused by the perception. Halleck says: -"Every time the mind discerns unity amid variety, order, rhythm, -proportion, or symmetry, an æsthetic emotion arises. * * * The traveler -with a trained intellect will see far more beauty than an ignorant one. -In looking at a cathedral, a large part of the æsthetic enjoyment comes -from tracing out the symmetry, from comparing part with part. Not until -this process is complete will the full beauty of the structure as a -whole be perceived. If the traveler knows something of mediæval -architecture before starting on his European trip, he will see far more -beauty. The opposite of the æsthetic, which we call the ugly, is the -unsymmetrical, the disorderly--that in which we can discover no rhythm, -plan, or beauty." - -The element of _associative suggestion_ also enters into the -manifestation of æsthetic emotional feeling. The mind accepts the -suggestion of the beauty of certain styles of art, or the excellence of -certain classes of music. There are fashions in art and music, as in -clothes, and what is thought beautiful to-day may be deemed hideous -to-morrow. This is not entirely due to the evolution of taste, for in -many cases the old fashions are revived and again deemed beautiful. -There is, moreover, the effect of the association of the object of -emotion with certain events or persons. This association renders the -thing popular, and therefore agreeable and beautiful for the time being. -The suggestion in a story will often cause the beauty of a certain -scene, or the harmony of a certain piece of music, to dawn upon -thousands of persons. Some noted person sets the seal of approval upon a -certain picture or musical composition and lo! the multitude calls it -beautiful. It must not be supposed, however, that the crowd always -counterfeits this sense of beauty and excellence which has been -suggested to it. On the contrary, genuine æsthetic feeling often results -from the discovery so made. - -There is style and fashion in the use of words, resulting from fashion, -which gives rise to æsthetic feelings regarding them. These feelings do -not arise from the consideration of the nature of the object expressed -by the word; of two words designating the same thing, one causes disgust -and the other at least passive tolerance. For instance, in speaking of -the sensible moisture which is emitted from the pores of the skin, we -may use either of the respective terms "sweat" or "perspiration." Both -mean the same thing, and have an equally respectable origin. But to many -persons the word "sweat" causes unpleasant æsthetic emotion, while the -word "perspiration" is accepted without remonstrance. Some persons abhor -the term "victuals," while "viands" or "food" are accepted without -protest. There is often an unpleasant, low, vulgar association connected -with some words which accounts for the disfavor with which they are -received, and which association is absent from the more "polite" terms -employed to indicate the same thing. But in other cases there is nothing -but the simple suggestion of fashion and style to account for the -æsthetic acceptance or rejection. - -It is possible that some psychologist of the future will establish the -truth of the theory now tentatively advanced by a few investigators, -namely, that taste and the sense of beauty depend almost entirely upon -the element of suggestion, manifested as association, influence of -authority, habit, fashion, imitation, etc. It is known that the -emotional nature is peculiarly liable to suggestion, and that tastes may -be created or destroyed by repeated suggestion under the most favorable -circumstances. It is thought likely that if we could trace back to its -roots every emotion of taste, we would find it arising from some -associative, suggestive influence connected with another and more -elemental class of emotions. - -Regarding the fact that there is no universal standard of taste or -beauty, Halleck says: "It has been said that æsthetics cannot be treated -in a scientific way because there is no standard of taste. '_De gustibus -non est disputandum_' ('there is no disputing about tastes') is an old -proverb. Of two equally intelligent persons, the one may like a certain -book, the other dislike it. * * * While it is true that the standard of -taste is a varying one within certain limits, it is no more so than that -of morals. As men's nervous systems, education, and associations differ, -we may scientifically conclude that their tastes must differ. The -greater the uniformity in the factors the less does the product vary. On -the other hand, within certain limits, the standard of æsthetics is -relatively uniform. _It is fixed by the majority of intelligent people -of any age and country._ To estimate the standard by which to judge of -the correctness of language or of the literary taste of any era, we -examine the conversations of the best speakers, the works of the -standard writers." - -The æsthetic emotions may be developed and cultivated by exercise and -practice, and particularly by association and familiarity with -beautiful things, and with those who have "good taste." Appreciation of -beauty is more or less contagious, up to a certain point of development, -at least, and if one wishes to recognize, understand, and appreciate -beauty, he should go where beauty is, and where its votaries are -gathered. The study of standard works of art, or objects of nature, or -the best productions of the composers of music, will do much to develop -and unfold one's higher æsthetic feelings and understanding. - -It is claimed by some of the best authorities that to develop the finer -and higher æsthetic feelings and understanding we must learn to find -beauty and excellence in things removed from ourselves or our selfish -interests. The narrow, selfish emotions kill the æsthetic feelings--the -two cannot exist together. The person whose thoughts are centered on -himself or herself very rarely finds beauty or excellence in works of -art or music. Grant Allen well sums up the subject in the following -words: "_Good taste is the progressive product of progressing fineness -and discrimination in the nerves, educated attention, high and noble -emotional constitution, and increasing intellectual faculties._" - - - - -CHAPTER XVII. - -The Intellectual Emotions. - - -By "the intellectual emotions" is meant that class of emotional feeling -resulting from the presence of objects of intellectual interest. This -class of emotions depends for its satisfaction upon the exercise of the -intellectual faculties, from the most simple to the most complex, and -including perception, memory, imagination, reason, judgment, and all the -logical faculties. Those who are accustomed to employing the mind -through voluntary attention, particularly in the direction of creative -ideation or constructive imagination, experience these emotions to a -greater or less degree. - -The exercise of perception, if we are skilled therein, gives us a -pleasurable feeling, and if we succeed in making an interesting or -important discovery by reason thereof, we experience a strong degree of -emotional satisfaction. Likewise, we experience agreeable feelings when -we are able to remember distinctly something which might well have been -forgotten, or when we succeed in recalling something which had escaped -our memory for the moment. In the same way the exercise of the -imagination is a source of great pleasure in many cases in the direction -of writing, planning, inventing, or other creative processes, or even in -the building of air castles. The exercise of the logical faculties gives -great pleasure to those in whom these faculties are well developed. - -Halleck well says: "There was probably not a happier moment in Newton's -life than when he had succeeded in demonstrating that the same power -which caused the apple to fall held the moon and the planets in their -orbits. When Watts discovered that steam might be harnessed like a -horse, when an inventor succeeds in perfecting a labor-lightening -device, whenever an obscurity is cleared away, the reason for a thing -understood, and a baffling instance brought under a general law, -intellectual emotion results." - -The pleasurable feelings we experience upon the reading of a good book, -or the discovery of real poetry, are forms of intellectual emotion. The -same class of emotional feeling is aroused when we witness a good play. -Among other instances of this class we mention the perception of clever -work of any kind, intricate machinery, ingenious devices, helpful -improvements, or other works of man which indicate the existence of -thought and inventive ability in the designer or builder. To appreciate -mental work of this kind we must bring a mind developed along the same -or similar lines. It has well been said that before one can take away -anything from a book he must bring something to it. It takes mentality -to recognize and appreciate mentality or the work of mentality. - -The study of scientific subjects is a source of great pleasure to those -who are inclined to such pursuits. To the scientific mind the study of -the latest work on the favorite branch gives a joy which nothing else is -capable of arousing. To the philosopher the works of other philosophers -of the same school give intense satisfaction. - -It is claimed that the sense of humor and wit is an intellectual -emotion, for it depends upon the detection of the ludicrous features of -a happening. Certain psychologists have held that the distinctive -element of humor is the feeling attendant upon the perception of -incongruity; while that of wit is the feeling of superiority on the part -of the witty person, and the corresponding chagrin of the object of his -wit. It would seem, however, that the appreciation of wit must depend -upon the intellectual perception of cleverness of expression and the -pleasure resulting from the discovery thereof, and that the feeling of -humor is aroused principally by reason of the incongruous element; the -feeling of self-satisfaction as contrasted with the discomfiture of the -other person belongs to the more selfish emotions. An authority says: -"Humor is a mental faculty which tends to discover incongruous -resemblances between things which essentially differ, or essential -differences between things put forth as the same, the result being -internal mirth or an outburst of laughter. Wit does so likewise, but the -two are different. Humor has deep human sympathy, and loves men while -raising a laugh against their weaknesses. Wit is deficient in sympathy, -and there is often a sting in its ridicule. Somewhat contemptuous of -mankind, it has not the patience to study them thoroughly, but must -content itself with noting superficial resemblances or differences. -Humor is patient and keenly observant, and penetrates beneath the -surface; while, therefore, the sallies of wit are often one-sided and -unfair, those of humor are, as a rule, just and wise." - -The development and cultivation of the intellectual emotions depend, of -course, upon education, training, exercise, and practice. The -cultivation of the intellect (which has been referred to, in part, in -the previous parts of this book, and which will be again considered in -the chapters devoted to the intellect) results in the development and -cultivation of the emotions accompanying intellectual effort. In a -general way, however, it may be said that the reading of the best works -of fiction, science, and philosophy will bring out in time the best -form of intellectual enjoyment and feeling. The highest gives the -best--that is the rule. The present chapter should be read and studied -in connection with those devoted to the intellect. - - -BLENDED EMOTIONS. - -As we have said at the beginning of our consideration of the subject of -the emotions, the majority of emotions are composed of several feelings, -and tend to blend and combine emotional elements. For instance, the -emotion of sexual love certainly has its origin in the instinctive -feelings of the race, and its motive element is that of passion. But -passion is far from being all there is in human sexual love. Above the -plane of passion is found the social emotion of companionship, -protection, and care; the desire for the welfare of the loved one; the -mingling of the love of the parent with that of the mate. Human love -manifests many of the altruistic emotions during its course. The welfare -of the loved one becomes the chief concern of life, often stronger even -than self-preservation. The joy of the loved one becomes the greatest -joy, far surpassing the more selfish forms of happiness. Then come the -æsthetic feelings, which find satisfaction in the two "liking the same -things," sympathy and community of feeling being the connecting link. -The several ideals of the two combining, there is produced an idealistic -union, which is often called "spiritual harmony." Finally, there is -found the blending of the intellectual emotions, in which harmony there -exists one of the highest forms of pleasure satisfaction between two -persons of opposite sexes. It is said that the more things that a man -and woman "like" in common, the closer will be their "liking" for each -other. "I love you because you love the things I love," is no rare -thought and expression. - -So it is seen that though born in elemental instinct and passion, human -sexual love is something far different in its flowering. And yet without -its root it would not be, and cannot be. This is an excellent example of -the complex nature of the most common emotions. It may be used as a -typical illustration. What is true of it is also true, in a way and in a -degree, of every other form of emotion. Therefore in studying a -particular emotion, be not too quick to cry, "It is this; it is that!" -but rather seek to say, "It is composed of this and that, of this and -that!" Few, if any, emotions are simple; the majority are very complex. -Hence the difficulty of satisfactory classification, and the danger of -dogmatic definition. - - - - -CHAPTER XVIII. - -The Role of the Emotions. - - -The average person greatly underestimates the part played by the -emotional nature in the mental activities of the individual. He is -inclined to the opinion that, with the exception of the occasional -manifestation of some strong emotional feeling, the majority of persons -go through life using only the reasoning and reflective faculties in -deciding the problems of life and guiding the mental course of action. -There can be no greater mistake concerning the mental activities. So far -from being subordinate to the intellect, the emotional nature in the -majority of cases dominates the reasoning faculties. There are but very -few persons who are able to detach themselves, even in a small degree, -from the feelings, and to decide questions cold-bloodedly by pure reason -or intellectual effort. Moreover, there are but few persons whose wills -are guided by pure reason; the feelings supply the motive for the -majority of acts of will. The intellect, even when used, is generally -employed to better carry out the dictates of feeling and desire. Much of -our reasoning is performed in order to justify our feelings, or to find -proofs for the position dictated by our desires, feelings, sympathies, -prejudices, or sentiments. It has been said that "men seek not reasons -but _excuses for their actions_." - -Moreover, in the elementary processes of the intellect the emotions play -an important part. We have seen that attention largely follows interest, -and interest results from feeling. Therefore our attention, and that -which arises from it, is dependent largely upon the feelings. Thus -feeling asserts its power in guarding the very outer gate of knowledge, -and determines largely what shall or shall not enter therein. It is one -of the constantly-appearing paradoxes of psychology, that while feelings -have originally arisen from attention, it is equally true that attention -depends largely upon the interest resulting from the feelings. This is -readily admitted in the case of involuntary attention, which always goes -out toward objects of interest and feeling, but is likewise true of even -voluntary attention, which we direct to something of greater or more -nearly ultimate interest than the things of lesser or more immediate -interest. - -Sully says: "By an act of will I may resolve to turn my attention to -something--say a passage in a book. But if, after the preliminary -process of adjustment of the mental eye the object opens up no -interesting phase, all the willing in the world will not produce a -calm, settled state of concentration. The will introduces mind and -object; it cannot force an attachment between them. No compulsion of -attention ever succeeded in making a young child cordially embrace and -appropriate, by an act of concentration, an unsuitable and therefore -uninteresting object. We thus see that even voluntary interest is not -removed from the sway of interest. What the will _does_ is to determine -_the kind of interest_ that shall prevail at the moment." - -Again, we may see that memory is largely dependent upon interest in -recording and recalling its impressions. We remember and recall most -easily that which most greatly interests us. In proportion to the lack -of interest in a thing do we find difficulty in remembering or recalling -it. This is equally true of the imagination, for it refuses to dwell -upon that which is _not_ interesting. Even in the reasoning processes we -find the will balking at uninteresting subjects, but galloping along, -pushing before it the rolling chair of interesting intellectual -application. - -Our judgments are affected by our feelings. It is much easier to approve -of the actions of some person we like, or whose views accord with our -own, than of an individual whose personality and views are distasteful -to us. It is very difficult to prevent prejudice, for or against, from -influencing our judgments. It is also true that we "find that for which -we look" in things and persons, and that which we expect and look for is -often dependent upon our feelings. If we dislike a person or thing we -are usually able to perceive no end of undesirable things in him or it; -while if we are favorably inclined we easily find many admirable -qualities in the same person or thing. A little change in our feeling -often results in the formation of an entirely new set of judgments -regarding a person or thing. - -Halleck well says: "On the one hand the emotions are favorable to -intellectual action, since they supply the interest one feels in study. -One may feel intensely concerning a certain subject and be all the -better student. Hence the emotions are not, as was formerly thought, -entirely hostile to intellectual action. Emotion often quickens the -perception, burns things indelibly into the memory, and doubles the -rapidity of thought. On the other hand strong feelings often vitiate -every operation of the intellect. They cause us to see only what we wish -to, to remember only what interests our narrow feeling at the time, and -to reason from selfish data only. * * * Emotion puts the magnifying end -of the telescope to our intellectual eyes where our own interests are -concerned, the minimizing end when we are looking at the interest of -others. * * * _Thought_ _is deflected when it passes through an -emotional medium, just as a sunbeam is when it strikes water._" - -As for the will, the best authorities hold that it is almost if not -entirely dependent upon desire for its motive force. As desire is an -outgrowth and development of feeling and emotion, it is seen that even -the will depends upon feeling for its inciting motives and its -direction. We shall consider this point at greater detail in the -chapters devoted to the activities of the will. - -We would remind you again, at this point, of the great triangle of the -mind, the emotional, ideative, and volitional activities--feeling, -thinking, and willing--and their constant reaction upon each other and -absolute interdependence. We find that our feelings arise from previous -willing and ideation, and are aroused by ideas and repressed by will; -again we see that our ideas are largely dependent upon the interest -supplied by our feelings, and that our judgments are influenced by the -emotive side of our mental life, the will also having its part to play -in the matter. We also see that the will is called into activity -by the feelings, and often guided or restrained by our thoughts, the -will, indeed, being considered as moved entirely by our feelings -and ideas. Thus is the trinity of mental forces seen ever in mutual -relation--constant action and reaction ever existing between them. - - - - -CHAPTER XIX. - -The Emotions and Happiness. - - -"Happiness" has been defined by an authority as "the pleasurable emotion -arising from the gratification of all desires; the enjoyment of pleasure -without pain." Another has said that "happiness is the state in which -all desires are satisfied." But these definitions have been attacked. It -is held by many that a state of the absolute _satisfaction_ of desire -would not be happiness, for happiness consists largely in pleasurable -anticipation and imaginings which disappear upon the realization of the -desire. It is held that absolute satisfaction would be a negative state. -Paley expressed a better idea when he said that "any condition may be -denominated 'happy' in which the amount or aggregate of pleasure exceeds -that of pain, and the degree of happiness depends upon the quantity of -this excess." - -Some have held that an existing contrast between pain and pleasure (the -balance being in favor of the latter) is necessary to establish -happiness. Be this as it may, it is admitted by all that one's happiness -or unhappiness depends entirely upon one's emotional nature and the -degree of the satisfaction thereof. And it is generally admitted that to -be happy is the great aim and object of the life of the majority of -persons,--if, indeed, not of _every_ person,--the happiness, of course, -depending upon the quality and degree of the emotions forming the -person's emotional nature. Thus it is seen that we are dependent upon -the emotional side of our mental life in this as in nearly everything -else making life worth while. - -Theologians have often sought to point out that happiness is not the -goal of life and living, but human nature has always insisted that -happiness is the greatest end, and philosophy has generally supported -it. But wisdom shows that happiness is not always dependent upon the -pleasure of the moment, for the sacrifice of immediate pleasure -frequently results in a much greater happiness in the future. In the -same way an immediate disagreeable task often gains for us a greater -satisfaction in the future. Likewise, it is frequently greater happiness -to sacrifice a personal pleasure for the happiness of others than it -would be to enjoy the pleasure of the moment at the expense of the pain -of the other. There is often a far greater pleasure resulting from an -altruistic action of self-sacrifice than in the performance of the -selfish, egoistic act. But, as the subtle reasoner may insist, the -result is the same--the ultimate happiness and satisfaction of the -self. This conclusion does not rob the altruistic act of its virtue, -however, for the person who finds his greatest pleasure in giving -pleasure to others is to be congratulated--as is the community which -shelters him. - -There is no virtue in pain, suffering, sacrifice, or unhappiness _for -its own sake_. This illusion of asceticism is vanishing from the human -mind. Sacrifice on the part of the individual is valuable and valid only -when it results in higher present or future happiness for the individual -or some one else. There is no virtue in pain, physical or mental, except -as a step to a greater good for ourselves or others. Pain at the best is -merely nature's alarm and warning of "not this way." It is also held -that pain serves to bring out pleasure by contrast, and is therefore -valuable in this way. Be this as it may, no normal individual -deliberately seeks ultimate pain in preference to ultimate happiness; -the greatest ultimate happiness to one's self and to those he loves is -the normal and natural goal of the normal person. But the concept of -"those he loves," in many cases, includes the race as well as the -immediate family. - -Wisdom shows the individual that the greatest happiness comes to him who -controls and restrains many of his feelings. Dissipation results in pain -and unhappiness ultimately. The doctrine of thoughtless indulgence is -unphilosophical and is contradicted by the experience of the race. -Moreover, wisdom shows that the highest happiness comes not from the -indulgence of the physical feelings alone, or to excess, but rather from -the cultivation, development, and manifestation of the higher -feelings--the social, æsthetic, and intellectual emotions. The higher -pleasures of life, literature, art, music, science, invention, -constructive imagination, etc., yield a satisfaction and happiness -keener and more enduring than can possibly the lower forms of feeling. -But the human being must not despise any part of his emotional being. -Everything has its uses, which are good; and its abuses, which are bad. -Every part of one's being, mental and physical, is well to use; but no -part is well used if it uses the individual instead of being itself -used. - -A recent writer has held that the end and aim of life should not be the -pursuit of happiness, but rather the building of character. The obvious -answer is that the two are identical in spirit, for to the man who -appreciates the value of character, its attainment is the greatest -happiness; the wise teach that the greatest happiness comes to him who -is possessed of a well-rounded, developed character. Another writer has -said that "the aim of life should be self-improvement, with a due regard -to the interest of others." This is but saying that the greatest -happiness to the wise man lies in this course. Any one who is wise -enough, or great enough, to make these ends the aim and goal of life -will find the greatest happiness therefrom. Arnold Bennett advances as a -good working philosophy of life: "cheerfulness, kindliness, and -rectitude." Can any one doubt that this course would bring great -ultimate happiness? - -Happiness consists in that which "contents the spirit," and the latter -depends entirely upon the character of the feelings and emotions -entertained by one, as weighed in the balance of reason, and as passed -upon by judgment and the sense of right action. The greatest degree of -happiness, or at least the greatest ratio of pleasure over pain, is -obtained by a careful and intelligent cultivation of the feeling side of -one's being in connection with the cultivation of the intellect and the -mastery of the will. To be able to bring the capacity for enjoyment to -its highest; to be able to intelligently choose that which will bring -the greatest ultimate happiness in accordance with right action; and, -finally, to be able to use the will in the direction of holding fast to -that which is good and rejecting that which is bad--this is the power of -creating happiness. The feelings, the intellect, and the will--here, as -ever--combine to manifest the result. - -Finally, it must be remembered that all human happiness consists in -part of the ability to bear pain--to suffer. There must be the dash of -Stoicism in the wise Epicurean. One must learn to pluck from pain, -suffering, and unhappiness the secret drop of honey which lies at its -heart, and which consists in the knowledge of the meaning and use of -pain and the means whereby it may be transmuted into knowledge and -experience, from which later happiness may be distilled. To profit by -pain, to transmute suffering into joy, to transform present unhappiness -into a future greater happiness--this is the privilege of the -philosopher. - - * * * * * - -The mental states and activities known as "desire" are a direct -development of the feeling and emotional phase of the mind and form the -motive power of the will. Desire, in fact, may be said to be composed of -feeling on one side and will on the other. But the influence of the -intellect or reasoning faculties has a most important part to play in -the evolution of feeling into desire, and in the consequent action of -the will by the presentation and weighing of conflicting desires. -Therefore, the logical place for the consideration of the activities of -the intellect is at this point--between emotion and will. Accordingly, -we shall leave the subject of feeling and emotion for the present, to be -taken up again in connection with the subject of _desire_, after we -have considered the intellectual processes of the mind. But, as has been -indicated, we shall see the presence and influence of the feelings and -emotions even in the activities of the intellect. - - - - -CHAPTER XX. - -The Intellect. - - -The class of mental states or processes grouped together under the name -of "intellectual processes," forms the second great division of the -mental states, the two others being "feeling" and "will," respectively. - -"Intellect" has been defined as follows: "The part or faculty of the -human mind by which it knows, as distinguished from the power to feel -and to will; the thinking faculty; the understanding;" also as "that -faculty of the human mind by which it receives or comprehends the ideas -communicated to it by the senses or the perception, or other means, as -distinguished from the power to feel and to will; the power or faculty -to perceive objects in their relations; the power to judge and -comprehend; also the capacity for higher forms of knowledge, as -distinguished from the power to perceive and imagine." - -In the preceding chapters we have seen that the individual is able to -experience sensations in consciousness, and that he is able to -_perceive_ them mentally, the latter being the first step in -intellectual activity. We have also seen that he is able to reproduce -the perception by means of memory and imagination, and that by means of -the latter he is able to re-combine and rearrange the objects of -perception. We have also seen that he has what are known as "feelings," -which depend upon his previous experience and that of his progenitors. -So far the mind has been considered merely as a receiving and -reproducing instrument, with the added attachment of the re-combining -power of the imagination. Up to this point the mind may be compared to -the phonographic cylinder, with an attachment capable of re-combining -its recorded impressions. The impressions are received and perceived, -are stored away, are reproduced, and by the use of the imagination are -re-combined. - -Up to this point the mind is seen to be more or less of an automatic, -instinctive faculty. It may be traced from the purely reflex activity of -the lowest forms of life up through the lower animals, step by step, -until a very high degree of mental power is perceived in animals like -the horse, dog, or elephant. But there is something lacking. There is -missing that peculiar power of thinking in symbols and abstract -conceptions which distinguishes the human race and which is closely -bound up with the faculty of language or expressing thoughts in words. -The comparatively high mental process of the lower animals is dwarfed -by the human faculty of "thinking." And _thinking_ is the manifestation -of the intellect. - -What is it to _think_? Strange to say, very few persons can answer this -question correctly at first. They find themselves inclined to answer the -inquiry in the words of the child: "Why, to think is to _think_!" Let us -see if we can make it plain. The dictionary definition is a little too -technical to be of much use to the beginner, but here it is: "To employ -any of the intellectual powers except that of simple perception through -the senses." But what are the "intellectual powers" so employed, and how -are they employed? Let us see. - -Stating the matter plainly in common terms, we may say that "thinking" -is the mental process of (1) comparing our perceptions of things with -each other, noting the points of likeness and of difference; (2) -classifying them according to the ascertained likeness or difference, -and thus tying them up in mental bundles with each set of "things of a -kind" in its own bundle; (3) forming the abstract, symbolic mental idea -(concept) of each class of things, so grouped, which we may afterward -use as we use figures in mathematical calculations; (4) using these -concepts in order to form _inferences_, that is, to reason from the -known to the unknown, and to form judgments regarding things; (5) -comparing these judgments and deducing higher judgments from them; and -so on. - -Without thinking, man would be dependent upon each particular experience -for his knowledge, except so far as memory and imagination could -instinctively aid him. By thought processes he is enabled to infer that -if certain things be true of one of a certain kind of things, the same -thing may be expected from others of the same class. As he is able to -note points of likeness or difference, he is able to form clearer and -truer inferences. In addition, he is able to apply his constructive -imagination to the rearrangement and recombination of things whose -nature he has discovered, and thus progress along the line of material -achievement as well as of knowledge. It must be remembered, however, -that the intellect depends entirely for its material upon the -perception, which in turn receives its raw material from the senses. The -intellect merely groups together the material of perception, makes -inferences, draws conclusions from, and forms conclusions regarding, -them, and in the case of constructive imagination recombines them in -effective forms and arrangement. The intellect is the last in order in -the course of mental evolution. It appears last in order in the mind of -the child, but it often persists in old age after the feelings have -grown dim and the memory weak. - - -CONCEPTS. - -What is known as the "concept" is the first fruit of the elemental -processes of thought. The various images of outside objects are sensed, -then perceived, and then grouped according to their likenesses and -differences, and the result is the production of concepts. It is -difficult to define a concept so as to convey any meaning to the -beginner. For instance, the dictionaries give the definition as "an -abstract, general conception, idea, or notion formed in the mind." Not -very clear this, is it? Perhaps we can understand it better if we say -that the terms dog, cat, man, horse, house, etc., each expresses a -concept. Every term expresses a concept; every general name of a thing -or quality is a term applied to the concept. We shall see this a little -clearer as we proceed. - -We form a concept in this way: (1) We _perceive_ a number of things; (2) -then we notice certain _qualities_ possessed by things--certain -properties, attributes, or characteristics which make the thing what it -is; (3) then we _compare_ these qualities of the thing with the -qualities of other things and see that there is a likeness in some -cases, in various degrees, and a difference in other cases, in various -degrees; (4) then we _generalize_ or _classify_ the perceived things -according to their ascertained likenesses and differences; (5) then we -form a _general idea_ or _concept_ embodying each class of thing; and, -finally, we give to the concept a _term_, or _name_, which is its -symbol. - -The concept is a _general idea_ of a class of things; the _term_ is the -expression of that general idea. The concept is the idea of a class of -things; the term is the _label_ affixed to the thing. To illustrate this -last distinction, let us take the concept and term of "bird," for -instance. By perception, comparison, and classification of the qualities -of living things we have arrived at the conclusion that there exists a -great general class the qualities of which may be stated thus: -"Warm-blooded, feathered, winged, oviparous, vertebrate." To this -general class of quality-possessing animals we apply the English term -"bird." The name is merely a symbol. In German the term is _vogel_; in -Latin, _avis_; but in each and every case the _general idea_ or -_concept_ above stated, _i.e._, "warm-blooded, feathered, winged, -oviparous, vertebrate," is meant. If anything is found having all of -those particular qualities, then we know it must be what we call a -"bird." And everything that we call a "bird" must have those qualities. -The term "bird" is the symbol for that particular combination of -qualities existing in a thing. - -There is a difference between a mental image of the imagination and a -concept. The mental image must always be of a _particular_ thing, while -the concept is always an idea of a _general class_ of things which -cannot be clearly pictured in the mind. For instance, the imagination -may form the mental picture of any known bird, or even of an imaginary -bird, but that bird always will be a distinct, _particular_ bird. Try to -form a mental picture of the general class of birds--how will you do it? -Do you realize the difficulty? First, such an image would have to -include the characteristics of the large birds, such as the eagle, -ostrich, and condor; and of the small birds, such as the wren and -humming bird. It must be a composite of the shape of all birds, from the -ostrich, swan, eagle, crane, down to the sparrow, swallow, and humming -bird. It must picture the particular qualities of birds of prey, water -birds, and domestic fowls, as well as the grain eaters. It must exhibit -all the colors found in bird life, from the brightest reds and greens -down to the sober grays and browns. A little thought will show that a -clear mental image of such a concept is impossible. What the most of us -do, when we think of "bird," is to picture a vague, flying shape of dull -color; but when we stop to think that the term must also include the -waddling duck and the scratching barnyard chicken, we see that our -mental image is faulty. The trouble is that the term "bird" really means -"all-bird," and we cannot picture an "all-bird" from the very nature of -the case. Our terms, therefore, are like mathematical figures, or -algebraic symbols, which we use for ease, speed, and clearness of -thinking. - -The trouble does not end here. Concepts not only include the general -idea of _things_, but also the general idea of the _qualities of -things_. Thus sweetness, hardness, courage, and energy are concepts, but -we cannot form a mental image of them by themselves. We may picture a -sweet _thing_, but not sweetness itself. So you see that a concept is a -purely abstract mental idea--a symbol--akin to the figures 1, 2, 3, -etc., and used in the same way. They _stand_ for general classes of -things. A "term" is the verbal and written expression of the general -idea or concept. The student is requested to fix these distinctions in -his mind, so as to render further understanding of them easy. - - - - -CHAPTER XXI. - -Conception. - - -The process of conception has been well defined by Gordy as "that act of -mind by which it forms an idea of a class; or that act of the mind that -enables us to use general names intelligently." He adds: "It is, of -course, understood that I am using the word 'class' to denote an -indefinite number of individuals that resemble each other in certain -particulars." - - -PERCEPTION. - -The first step in conception, as we have seen, is that of perception. It -is readily perceived that the character of our intellectual processes -depends materially upon the variety, clearness, and accuracy of our -perceptions. Therefore, again, we would refer our students to the -chapter in which we have stated the importance of clear perception. - - -MEMORY. - -The future steps of conception depend materially upon the clearness of -the memory, as we can classify objects only by remembering their -qualities beyond the immediate moment of actual, original perception. -Therefore, the memory should be strengthened for this as well as other -objects. - - -ABSTRACTION. - -The second step in conception is that of the mental abstraction of -qualities from the observed thing. That is, we must perceive and then -mentally _set aside_ the observed qualities of the thing. For instance, -man first perceived the existence of certain qualities in things. He -found that a certain number of things possessed some of these qualities -in common, while others possessed other qualities in the same way, and -thus arose classification from comparison. But both comparison and -classification are possible only by abstraction, or _the perception of -the quality as a "thing"_; thus, the abstraction of the idea of the -quality of _sweetness_ from the idea of sugar. Sweetness is a _quality_ -rather than a thing itself. It is something possessed by sugar which -helps to make sugar what it is. - -Color, shape, size, mental qualities, habits of action--these are some -of the qualities first observed in things and abstracted from them in -thought. Redness, sweetness, hardness, softness, largeness, smallness, -fragrance, swiftness, slowness, fierceness, gentleness, warmness, -coldness, etc.--these are abstracted qualities of things. Of course -these qualities are really never divorced from things, but the mind -divorces them in order to make thinking easier. An authority says: -"Animals are incapable of making abstractions, and that is the reason -why they cannot develop formal thought. * * * Abstract thought is -identical with rational thought, which is the characteristic feature of -the thought of speaking beings. This is the reason why abstract thought -is upon earth the exclusive property of man, and why brutes are -incapable of abstract thought. The process of naming is the mechanism of -abstraction, for names establish the mental independence of the objects -named." - -The processes of abstraction depend upon attention--concentrated -attention. Attention directed to the qualities of a thing tends to -abstract the qualities in thought from the thing itself. Mill says: -"Abstraction is primarily the result of attention." Hamilton says: -"Attention and abstraction are only the same process viewed in different -relations." Cultivation of the power of abstraction means principally -cultivation of attention. Any mental activity which tends toward -_analysis_ or separation of a thing into its parts, qualities, or -elements will serve to cultivate and develop the power of abstraction. - -The habit of converting _qualities_ into concepts is acquired by -_transforming adjective terms into their corresponding noun terms_. For -instance, a piece of colored candy possesses the _qualities_ of being -round, hard, red, sweet, etc. Transforming these adjective qualities -into noun terms we have the _concepts_ of roundness, hardness, redness, -and sweetness, respectively. - - -COMPARISON. - -The third step in conception is that of _comparison_, in which the -qualities of several things are compared or examined for likenesses and -differences. We find many qualities in which the several things differ, -and a few in which there is a likeness. Classes are formed from -resemblances or likenesses, while individuals are separated from -apparent classes by detection of differences. Finally, it is found that -separate things, while having many points of difference which indicate -their individuality, nevertheless have a few points of likeness which -indicate that they belong to the same general family or class. The -detection of likenesses and differences in the qualities of various -things is an important mental process. Many of the higher thought -processes depend largely upon the ability to compare things properly. -The development of attention and perception tends to develop the power -of comparison. - - -CLASSIFICATION OR GENERALIZATION. - -The fourth step in conception is that of classification or -generalization, whereby we place individual things in a mental bundle or -class, and then this bundle in company with other bundles into a higher -class, and so on. Thus we group all the individual small birds having -certain characteristics into a species, then several related species -into a larger family, and this into a still larger, until finally we -group all the bird families into the great family which we call "birds" -and of which the simple term "bird" expresses the general concept. - -Jevons says: "We classify things together whenever we observe that they -are like each other in any respect, and therefore think of them -together. In classifying a collection of objects, we do not merely put -together into groups those which resemble each other, but we also divide -each class into smaller ones in which the resemblance is more complete. -Thus the class of _white substances_ may be divided into those which are -solid, and those which are fluid, so that we get the two minor classes -of solid-white and fluid-white substances. It is desirable to have names -by which to show that one class is contained in another, and, -accordingly, we call the class which is divided into two or more smaller -ones the _genus_, and the smaller ones into which it is divided, the -_species_." - -Every _species_ is a small family of the individuals composing it, and -at the same time is an individual species of the genus just above it; -the _genus_, in turn, is a family of several species, and at the same -time an individual genus in the greater family or genus above it. - -The student may familiarize himself with the idea of generalization by -considering himself as an individual, John Smith. John represents that -unit of generalization. The next step is to combine John with the other -Smiths of his immediate family. Then this family may be grouped with his -near blood relations, and so on, until finally all the related Smiths, -near and remote, are grouped together in a great Smith family. - -Or, in the same way, the family group may be enlarged until it takes in -all the white people in a county, then all the white people in the -state, then all in the United States; then all the white races, then all -the white and other light-skinned races, then all mankind. Then, if one -is inclined, the process may be continued until it embraces every living -creature from moneron to man. Reversing the process, living creatures -may be divided and subdivided until all mankind is seen to stand as a -class. Then the race of man may be divided into sub-races according to -color; then the white race may be subdivided into Americans and -non-Americans. Then the Americans may be divided into inhabitants of -the several states, or into Indianans and non-Indianans; then into the -inhabitants of the several counties of Indiana, and thus the Posey -Countians are reached. Then the Posey County people are divided into -Smiths and non-Smiths; then the Smith family into its constituent family -groups, and then into the smaller families, and so on, until the -classification reaches one particular John Smith, who at last is found -to be an individual--in a class by himself. This is the story of the -ascending and descending processes of generalization. - - - - -CHAPTER XXII. - -Classes of Concepts. - - -In the preceding chapter we have seen the process of conception--of the -forming of concepts. _The idea of a general class of things or qualities -is a concept._ Each concept contains the qualities which are _common to -all_ the individuals composing the class, but not those qualities which -pertain only to the minor classes or the individuals. For instance, the -concept of "bird" will necessarily include the common qualities of -warm-bloodedness, featheredness, wingedness, oviparousness, and -vertebratedness. But it will _not_ include color, special shape, size, -or special features or characteristics of the subfamilies or individuals -composing the great class. The class comprises the individuals and -subclasses composing it; the concept includes the general and common -qualities which _all_ in the class possess. A _percept_ is the mental -image of a particular thing; a _concept_ is the mental idea of the -general qualities of a class of things. A percept arises from the -perception of a sensation; a concept is a purely mental, abstract -creation, whose only existence is in the world of ideas and which has -no corresponding individual object in the world of sense. - -There are two general classes of concepts, namely: (1) concrete -concepts, in which the common qualities of a class of things are -combined into one conceptual idea, such as "bird," of which we have -spoken; (2) abstract concepts, in which is combined the idea of some -_quality_ common to a number of things, such as "sweetness" or -"redness." Jevons's well-known rule for terms is an aid in remembering -this classification: "_A concrete term is the name of a thing; an -abstract term is the name of a quality of a thing._" - -It is a peculiar fact and rule of concrete concepts that (1) the larger -the class of things embraced in a concept, the smaller are its general -qualities; and (2) the larger the number of general qualities included -in a concept, the smaller the number of individuals embraced by it. For -instance, the term "bird" embraces a great number of individuals--all -the birds that are in existence, in fact, but it has but few general -qualities, as we have seen. On the contrary, the concept "stork" has a -much larger number of general qualities, but embraces far fewer -individuals. Finally, the individual is reached, and we find that it has -more qualities than any class can have; but it is composed of the -smallest possible number of individuals, one. The secret is this: No -two individuals can have as many qualities _in common_ as each has -individually, unless they are precisely alike, which is impossible in -nature. - - -IMPERFECT CONCEPTS. - -It is said that outside of strictly scientific definitions very few -persons agree in their concepts of the same thing. Each has his or her -own concept of the particular thing which he or she expresses by the -same term. A number of persons asked to define a common term like -"love," "religion," "faith," "belief," etc., will give such a variety of -answers as to cause wonderment. As Green says: "My idea or image is mine -alone--the reward of careless observation if imperfect; of attentive, -careful, and varied observation if correct. Between mine and yours a -great gulf is fixed. No man can pass from mine to yours, or from yours -to mine. Neither in any proper sense of the term can mine be conveyed to -you. Words do not convey thoughts; they are not vehicles of thoughts in -any true sense of that term. A word is simply a common symbol which each -associates with his own idea or image." - -The reason of the difference in the concepts of several persons is that -very few of our concepts are nearly perfect; the majority of them are -quite imperfect and incomplete. Jevons gives us an idea of this in his -remarks on classification: "Things may seem to be very much like each -other which are not so. Whales, porpoises, seals, and several other -animals live in the sea exactly like a fish; they have a similar shape -and are usually classed among fish. People are said to go whale fishing. -Yet these animals are not really fish at all, but are much more like -dogs and horses and other quadrupeds than they are like fish. They -cannot live entirely under water and breathe the air contained in the -water like fish, but they have to come to the surface at intervals to -take breath. Similarly, we must not class bats with birds because they -fly about, although they have what would be called wings; these wings -are not like those of birds, and, in truth, bats are much more like rats -and mice than they are like birds. Botanists used at one time to -classify plants according to their size, as trees, shrubs, or herbs, but -we now know that a great tree is often more similar in character to a -tiny herb than it is to other great trees. A daisy has little -resemblance to a great Scotch thistle; yet the botanist regards them as -very similar. The lofty growing bamboo is a kind of grass, and the sugar -cane also belongs to the same class with wheat and oats." - -It is a matter of importance that clear concepts should be formed -regarding at least the familiar things of life. The list of clear -concepts should be added to from time to time by study, investigation, -and examination. The dictionary should be consulted frequently, and a -term studied until one has a clear meaning of the concept the term seeks -to express. A good encyclopedia (not necessarily an expensive one, in -these days of cheap editions) will also prove very useful in this -respect. As Halleck says: "It must be borne in mind that most of our -concepts are subject to change during our entire life; that at first -they are made only in a tentative way; that experience may show us, at -any time, that they have been erroneously formed, that we have -abstracted too little or too much, made the class too wide or too -narrow, or that here a quality must be added or there one taken away." - -It is a good practice to make a memorandum of anything of which you may -hear, but of which you know nothing, and then later to make a brief but -thorough investigation of that thing, by means of the dictionary and -encyclopedia, and of whatever good works may be obtained on the subject, -not leaving it until you feel that you have obtained at least a _clear -idea_ of what the thing really _means_. A half hour each evening devoted -to exercise of this kind will result in a wonderful increase of general -information. We have heard of a man who made a practice of reading a -short article in the encyclopedia every evening, giving preference to -subjects generally classed as familiar. In a year he made a noticeable -advance in general knowledge as well as habits of thought. In five years -he was looked upon by his associates as a man of a remarkably large -field of general information and of more than ordinary intelligence, -which verdict was a just one. As a rule we waste far more time on -worthless fiction than we are willing to devote to a little -self-improvement of this kind. We shrink at the idea of a general course -of instructive reading, little realizing that we can take our study in -small installments and at a very little cost in time or labor. - -Our concepts form the material which our intellect uses in its reasoning -processes. No matter how good a reasoner one may be, unless he has a -good supply of general information about the things of which he is -reasoning, he will not make much real headway. We must begin at the -bottom and build a firm foundation upon which the intellectual structure -may be erected. This foundation is composed of _facts_. These facts are -represented by our clear and correct concepts. - - - - -CHAPTER XXIII. - -Judgments. - - -We have seen the several steps of the mental process whereby simple -sensations are transformed into percepts and then into concepts or -general ideas. The formation of the concept is considered as the first -great step in thinking. The second great step in thinking is that of the -formation of the "judgment." The definition of "judgment," as the term -is used in logic; is "the comparing together in the mind of two ideas of -things, and determining whether they agree or disagree with each other, -or that one of them does or does not belong to the other. Judgment is, -therefore, (_a_) affirmative or (_b_) negative, as (_a_) 'Snow is -white,' or (_b_) 'All white men are not Europeans.'" - -What in logic is called a "proposition" is the expression in words of a -logical judgment. Hyslop defined the term "proposition" as follows: "Any -affirmation or denial of an agreement between two conceptions." For -instance, we compare the concepts "sparrow" and "bird" and find that -there is an agreement, and that the former belongs to the latter; this -mental process is a _judgment_. We then announce the judgment in the -_proposition_: "The sparrow is a bird." In the same way we compare the -concepts "bat" and "bird," find that there is a disagreement, and form -the judgment that neither belongs to the other, which we express in the -proposition: "The bat is not a bird." Or we may form the judgment that -"sweetness" is a quality of "sugar," which we express in the -proposition: "Sugar is sweet." Likewise, we may form the judgment which -results in the proposition: "Vinegar is not sweet." - -While the process of judgment is generally considered as constituting -the second great step of thinking, coming after the formation of the -concept, and consisting of the comparing of concepts, it must be -remembered that the act of judging is far more elementary than this, for -it is found still farther back in the history of thought processes. By -that peculiar law of paradox which we find everywhere operative in mind -processes, the same process of forming judgments which is used in -comparing concepts also has been used in forming the same concepts in -the stage of comparison. In fact, the result of all comparison, high or -low, must be _a judgment_. - -Halleck says: "Judgment is necessary in forming concepts. When we decide -that a quality is or is not common to a class, we are really judging. -This is another evidence of the complexity and unified action of the -mind." Brooks says: "The power of judgment is of great value in its -products. It is involved in or accompanies every act of the intellect, -and thus lies at the foundation of all intellectual activity. It -operates directly in every act of the understanding, and even aids the -other faculties of the mind in completing their activities and products. -* * * Strictly speaking, every intelligent act of the mind is -accompanied with a judgment. To know is to discriminate and, therefore, -to judge. Every sensation or cognition involves a knowledge and so a -judgment that it exists. The mind cannot think at all without judging; -to think is to judge. Even in forming the notions which judgment -compares, the mind judges. Every notion or concept implies a previous -act of judgment to form it; in forming a concept we compare the common -attributes before we unite them, and comparison is judgment. It is thus -true that 'Every concept is a contracted judgment; every judgment an -expanded concept.'" - -It is needless to say that as judgments lie at the base of our thinking, -and also appear in every part of its higher structure, the importance of -correct judgment in thought cannot be overestimated. But it is often -very difficult to form correct judgment even regarding the most -familiar things around us. Halleck says: "In actual life things present -themselves to us with their qualities disguised or obscured by other -conflicting qualities. Men had for ages seen burning substances and had -formed a concept of them. A certain hard, black, stony substance had -often been noticed, and a concept had been formed of it. This concept -was imperfect; but it is very seldom that we meet with perfect, -sharply-defined concepts in actual life. So it happened that for ages -the concept of burning substance was never linked by judgment to the -concept of stone coal. The combustible quality in the coal was -overshadowed by its stony attributes. 'Of course stone will not burn,' -people said. One cannot tell how long the development of mankind was -retarded for that very reason. England would not to-day be manufacturing -products for the rest of the world had not some one judged coal to be a -combustible substance. * * * Judgment is ever silently working and -comparing things that to past ages seemed dissimilar; and it is -constantly abstracting and leaving out of the field of view those -qualities which have simply served to obscure the point at issue." - -Gordy says: "The credulity of children is proverbial; but if we get our -facts at first hand, if we study 'the living, learning, playing child,' -we shall see that he is quite as remarkable for incredulity as for -credulity. The explanation is simple: _He tends to believe the first -suggestion that comes into his mind, no matter from what source_; and -since his belief is not the result of any rational process, he cannot be -made to disbelieve it in any rational way. Hence it is that he is very -credulous about any matter about which he has no ideas; but let the idea -once get possession of his mind, and he is quite as remarkable for -incredulity as before for credulity. * * * If we study the larger -child,--the man with a child's mind, an uneducated man,--we shall have -the same truth forced upon us. If the beliefs of men were due to -processes of reasoning, where they have not reasoned they would not -believe. But do we find it so? Is it not true that the men who have the -most positive opinions on the largest variety of subjects--so far as -they have ever heard of them--are precisely those who have the least -right to them? Socrates, we remember, was counted the wisest man in -Athens because he alone resisted his natural tendency to believe in the -absence of evidence; he alone would not delude himself with the conceit -of knowledge without the reality; and it would scarcely be too much to -say that the intellectual strength of men is in direct proportion to the -number of things they are absolutely certain of. * * * I do not, of -course, mean to intimate that we should have no opinions about matters -that we have not personally investigated. We take, and ought to take, -the opinion of some men about law, and others about medicine, and others -about particular sciences, and so on. But we should clearly realize the -difference between holding an opinion on trust and holding it as the -result of our own investigations." - -Brooks says: "It should be one of the leading objects of the culture of -young people to lead them to acquire the habit of forming judgments. -They should not only be led to see things but to have opinions about -things. They should be trained to see things in their relations and to -put these relations into definite propositions. Their ideas of objects -should be worked up into thoughts concerning the objects. Those methods -of teaching are best which tend to excite a thoughtful habit of mind -that notices the similitudes and diversities of objects and endeavors to -read the thoughts which they embody and of which they are the symbols." - -The study of logic, geometry, and the natural sciences is recommended -for exercise of the faculty of judgment and the development thereof. The -study and practice of even the lower branches of mathematics are also -helpful in this direction. The game of checkers or chess is recommended -by many authorities. Some have advocated the practice of solving -enigmas, problems, rebuses, etc., as giving exercise to this faculty of -the mind. The cultivation of the "Why?" attitude of mind, and the -answering of one's own mental questions, is also helpful, if not carried -to excess. "Doubting Thomas" is not always a term of reproach in these -days of scientific habits of thought, and "the man from Missouri" has -many warm admirers. - - - - -CHAPTER XXIV. - -Primary Laws of Thought. - - -In connection with this subject we herewith call the attention of the -student to the well-known Primary Laws of Thought which have been -recognized as valid from the time of the ancient Greek logicians. These -laws are self-evident, and are uncontradictable. They are axiomatic. -Jevons says of them: "Students are seldom able to see at first their -full meaning and importance. All arguments may be explained when these -self-evident laws are granted; and it is not too much to say that the -whole of logic will be plain to those who will constantly use these laws -as their key." Here are the Three Primary Laws of Thought:-- - - I. _Law of Identity._ "Whatever is, _is_." - - II. _Law of Contradiction._ "Nothing can both be and not be." - - III. _Law of Excluded Middle._ "Everything must either be or not be; - there is no middle course." - -I. The first of these laws, called "_The Law of Identity_," informs us -that a thing is always itself, no matter under what guise or form it is -perceived or may present itself. An animal is always a bird if it -possesses the general characteristics of a "bird," no matter whether it -exhibits the minor characteristics of an eagle, a wren, a stork, or a -humming bird. In the same way a whale is a mammal because it possesses -the general characteristics of a mammal notwithstanding that it swims in -the water like a fish. Also, sweetness is always sweetness, whether -manifested in sugar, honey, flowers, or products of coal tar. If a thing -_is_ that thing, then it _is_, and it cannot be logically claimed that -it _is not_. - -II. The second of these laws, called "_The Law of Contradiction_," -informs us that the same quality or class cannot be both affirmed and -denied of a thing at the same time and place. A sparrow cannot be said -to be both "bird" and "not bird" at the same time. Neither can sugar be -said to be "sweet" and "not sweet" at the same time. A piece of iron may -be "hot" at one end and "not hot" at another, but it cannot be both -"hot" and "not hot" at the same place at the same time. - -III. The third of these laws, called "_The Law of Excluded Middle_," -informs us that a given quality or class _must_ be affirmed or denied to -_everything_ at any given time and place. Everything either must be of a -certain class or not, must possess a certain quality or not, at a given -time or place. There is no other alternative or middle course. It is -axiomatic that any statement _must_ either be or not be true of a -certain other thing at any certain time and place; there is no escape -from this. Anything _either_ must be "black" or "not black," a bird or -not a bird, alive or not alive, at any certain time or place. There is -nothing else that it can be; it cannot both be and not be at the same -time and place, as we have seen; therefore, it must either be or not be -that which is asserted of it. The judgment must decide which -alternative; but it has only two possible choices. - -But the student must not confuse opposite qualities or things with -"not-ness." A thing may be "black" or "not black," but it need not be -white to be "not black," for blue is likewise "not black" just as it is -"not white." The neglect of this fact frequently causes error. We must -always affirm either the existence or non-existence of a quality in a -thing; but this is far different from affirming or denying the existence -of the opposite quality. Thus a thing may be "not hard" and yet it does -not follow that it is "soft"; it may be _neither_ hard nor soft. - - -FALLACIOUS APPLICATION. - -There exists what are known as "fallacies" of application of these -primary laws. A fallacy is an unsound argument or conclusion. For -instance, because a particular man is found to be a liar, it is -fallacious to assume that "_all_ men are liars," for lying is a -particular quality of the individual man, and not a general quality of -the family of men. In the same way because a stork has long legs and a -long bill, it does not follow that all birds must have these -characteristics simply because the stork is a bird. _It is fallacious to -extend an individual quality to a class._ But it is sound judgment to -assume that a class quality must be possessed by all individuals in that -class. It is a far different proposition which asserts that "_some_ -birds are black," from that which asserts that "_all_ birds are black." -The same rule, of course, is true regarding negative propositions. - -Another fallacy is that which assumes that because the affirmative or -negative proposition has not been, or cannot be, proved, it follows that -the opposite proposition must be true. The true judgment is simply "not -proven." - -Another fallacious judgment is that which is based on attributing -absolute quality to that which is but relative or comparative. For -instance, the terms "hot" and "cold" are relative and comparative, and -simply denote one's relative opinion regarding a fixed and certain -degree of temperature. The _certain_ thing is the degree of temperature, -say 75 degrees Fahrenheit; of this we may logically claim that it _is_ -or _is not_ true at a certain time or place. It either _is_ 75 degrees -Fahrenheit or it _is not_. But to one man this may seem _warm_ and to -another _cold_; both are right in their judgments, so far as their own -relative feelings are concerned. But neither can claim absolutely that -it is _warm_ or _cold_. Therefore, it is a fallacy to ascribe absolute -quality to a relative one. The _absolute fact_ comes under the Law of -Excluded Middle, but a personal opinion is not an absolute fact. - -There are other fallacies which will be considered in other chapters of -this book, under their appropriate heading. - - - - -CHAPTER XXV. - -Reasoning. - - -Reasoning, the third great step in thinking, may be said to consist of -ascertaining new truths from old ones, new judgments from old ones, -unknown facts from known ones; in short, of proceeding logically from -the known to the unknown, using the known as the foundation for the -unknown which is sought to be known. Gordy gives us the following -excellent definition of the term: "Reasoning is the act of going from -the known to the unknown through other beliefs; of basing judgment upon -judgments; reaching beliefs through beliefs." Reasoning, then, is seen -to be a process of building a structure of judgments, one resting upon -the other, the topmost point being the final judgment, but the whole -constituting an edifice of judgment. This may be seen more clearly when -the various forms of reasoning are considered. - - -IMMEDIATE REASONING. - -The simplest form of reasoning is that known as "immediate reasoning," -by which is meant reasoning by directly comparing two judgments without -the intervention of the third judgment, which is found in the more -formal classes of reasoning. This form of reasoning depends largely upon -the application of the Three Primary Laws of Thought, to which we have -referred in a previous chapter. - -It will be seen that _if_ (_a_) a thing is always itself, then (_b_) all -that is included in it must partake of its nature. Thus, the bird family -has certain class characteristics, therefore by immediate reasoning we -know that _any_ member of that family must possess those class -characteristics, whatever particular characteristics it may have in -addition. And we likewise know that we cannot attribute the _particular_ -characteristics, as a matter of course, to the other members of the -class. Thus, though all sparrows are birds, it is not true that all -birds are sparrows. "All biscuits are bread; but all bread is not -biscuit." - -In the same way we know that a thing cannot be bird and mammal at the -same time, for the mammals form a not-bird family. And, likewise, we -know that everything _must_ be either bird or not bird, but that being -not bird does not mean being a mammal, for there are many other not-bird -things than mammals. In this form of reasoning distinction is always -made between the _universal_ or general class, which is expressed by the -word _all_, and the _particular_ or individual, which is expressed by -the word "some." Many persons fail to note this difference in their -reasoning, and fallaciously reason, for instance, that because _some_ -swans are white, _all_ swans must be so, which is a far different thing -from reasoning that if _all_ is so and so, then _some_ must be so and -so. Those who are interested in this subject are referred to some -elementary text-book on logic, as the detailed consideration is too -technical for consideration here. - - -REASONING BY ANALOGY. - -Reasoning by analogy is an elementary form of reasoning, and is the -particular kind of reasoning employed by the majority of persons in -ordinary thought. It is based upon the unconscious recognition by the -human mind of the principle which is expressed by Jevons as: "_If two or -more things resemble each other in many points, they will probably -resemble each other in more points._" The same authority says: -"Reasoning by analogy differs only in degree from that kind of reasoning -called '_generalization_.' When _many things_ resemble each other in a -_few properties_, we argue about them by generalization. When a _few -things_ resemble each other in _many properties_, it is a case of -analogy." - -While this form of reason is frequently employed with more or less -satisfactory results, it is always open to a large percentage of error. -Thus, persons have been poisoned by toadstools by reason of false -analogous reasoning that because mushrooms are edible, then toadstools, -which resemble them, must also be fit for food; or, in the same way, -because certain berries resemble other edible berries they must likewise -be good food. As Brooks says: "To infer that because John Smith has a -red nose and is also a drunkard, then Henry Jones, who also has a red -nose, is also a drunkard, would be dangerous inference. Conclusions of -this kind drawn from analogy are frequently dangerous." Halleck says: -"Many false analogies are manufactured, and it is excellent thought -training to expose them. The majority of people think so little that -they swallow these false analogies just as newly-fledged robins swallow -small stones dropped into their mouths." - -Jevons, one of the best authorities on the subject, says: "There is no -way in which we can really assure ourselves that we are arguing safely -by analogy. The only rule that can be given is this: That the more -closely two things resemble each other, the more likely it is that they -are the same in other respects, especially in points closely connected -with those observed. In order to be clear about our conclusions, we -ought, in fact, never to rest satisfied with mere analogy, but ought to -try to discover the general laws governing the case. * * * We find that -reasoning by analogy is not to be depended upon, unless we make such an -inquiry into the causes and laws of the things in question that we -really employ inductive and deductive reasoning." - - -HIGHER FORMS OF REASONING. - -The two higher forms of reasoning are known, respectively, as (1) -inductive reasoning, or inference from particular facts to general laws; -and (2) deductive reasoning, or inference from general truths to -particular truths. While the class distinction is made for the purpose -of clear consideration, it must not be forgotten that the two forms of -reasoning are generally found in combination. Thus, in inductive -reasoning many steps are taken by the aid of deductive reasoning; and, -likewise, before we can reason deductively from general truths to -particular ones we must have discovered the general truths by inductive -reasoning from particular facts. Thus there is a unity in all reasoning -processes as there is in all mental operations. Inductive reasoning is a -_synthetical_ process; deductive reasoning, an _analytical_ one. In the -first we combine and build up, in the latter we dissect and separate. - - - - -CHAPTER XXVI. - -Inductive Reasoning. - - -Inductive reasoning is based upon the axiom: "_What is true of the many -is true of the whole._" This axiom is based upon man's belief in the -uniformity of nature. Inductive reasoning is a mental ladder by which we -climb from particular facts to general laws, but the ladder rests upon -the belief that the universe is governed by law. - -The steps in inductive reasoning are as follows:-- - -I. Observation, investigation, and examination of particular facts or -things. If we wish to know the general characteristics of the bird -family, we must first examine a sufficient number of birds of many kinds -so as to discover the comparatively few general characteristics -possessed by _all_ of the bird family, as distinct from the particular -characteristics possessed by only _some_ of that family. The greater the -number of individuals examined, the narrower becomes our list of the -general qualities common to _all_. In the same way we must examine many -kinds of flowers before we come to the few general qualities common to -all flowers, which we combine in the general concept of "flower." The -same, of course, is true regarding the discovery of general laws from -particular facts. We examine the facts and then work toward a general -law which will explain them. For instance, the Law of Gravitation was -discovered by the observation and investigation of the fact that all -objects are attracted to the earth; further investigation revealed the -fact that all material objects are attracted to each other; then the -general law was discovered, or, rather, the hypothesis was advanced, was -found to explain the facts, and was verified by further experiments and -observation. - -II. The second step in inductive reasoning is the making of an -hypothesis. An hypothesis is a proposition or principle assumed as a -_possible_ explanation for a set or class of facts. It is regarded as a -"working theory," which must be examined and tested in connection with -the facts before it is finally accepted. For instance, after the -observation that a number of magnets attracted steel, it was found -reasonable to advance the hypothesis that "all magnets attract steel." -In the same way was advanced the hypothesis that "all birds are -warm-blooded, winged, feathered, oviparous vertebrates." Subsequent -observation and experiment established the hypothesis regarding the -magnet, and regarding the general qualities of the bird family. If a -single magnet had been found which did not attract steel, then the -hypothesis would have fallen. If a single bird had been discovered which -was not warm-blooded, then that quality would have been stricken from -the list of the necessary characteristics of all birds. - -A theory is merely an hypothesis which has been verified or established -by continued and repeated observation, investigation, and experiment. - -Hypotheses and theories arise very frequently from the subconscious -assimilation of a number of particular facts and the consequent flashing -of a "great guess," or "sacred suspicion of the truth," into the -conscious field of attention. The scientific imagination plays an -important part in this process. There is, of course, a world of -difference between a "blind guess" based upon insufficient data and a -"scientific guess" resulting from the accumulation of a vast store of -careful and accurate information. As Brooks says: "The forming of an -hypothesis requires a suggestive mind, a lively fancy, a philosophic -imagination that catches a glimpse of the idea through the form or sees -the law standing behind the fact." But accepted theories, in the -majority of cases, arise only by testing out and rejecting many -promising hypotheses and finally settling upon the one which best -answers all the requirements and best explains the facts. As an -authority says: "To try wrong guesses is with most persons the only way -to hit upon right ones." - -III. Testing the hypothesis by deductive reasoning is the third step in -inductive reasoning. This test is made by applying the hypothetical -principle to particular facts or things; that is, to follow out mentally -the hypothetical principle to its logical conclusion. This may be done -in this way: "If _so and so_ is correct, then it follows that _thus and -so_ is true," etc. If the conclusion agrees with reason, then the test -is deemed satisfactory so far as it has gone. But if the result proves -to be a logical absurdity or inconsistent with natural facts, then the -hypothesis is discredited. - -IV. Practical verification of the hypothesis is the fourth step in -inductive reasoning. This step consists of the actual comparison of -observed facts with the "logical conclusions" arising from applying -deductive reasoning to the general principle assumed as a premise. The -greater number of facts agreeing with the conclusions arising from the -premise of the hypothesis, the greater is deemed the "probability" of -the latter. The authorities generally assume an hypothesis to be -_verified_ when it accounts for _all_ the facts which properly are -related to it. Some extremists contend, however, that before an -hypothesis may be considered as absolutely verified, it must not only -account for all the associated facts but that also there must be no -other possible hypothesis to account for the same facts. The "facts" -referred to in this connection may be either (1) observed phenomena, or -(2) the conclusions of deductive reasoning arising from the assumption -of the hypothesis, or (3) the agreement between the observed facts and -the logical conclusions. The last combination is generally regarded as -the most logical. The verification of an hypothesis must be "an -all-around one," and there must be an agreement between the observed -facts and the logical conclusions in the case--the hypothesis must "fit" -the facts, and the facts must "fit" the hypothesis. The "facts" are the -glass slipper of the Cinderella legend--the several sisters of -Cinderella were discarded hypotheses, the slipper and the sisters not -"fitting." When Cinderella's foot was found to be the one foot upon -which the glass slipper fitted, then the Cinderella hypothesis was -considered to have been proved--the glass slipper was hers and the -prince claimed his bride. - - - - -CHAPTER XXVII. - -Deductive Reasoning. - - -We have seen in the preceding chapter that from particular facts we -reason inductively to general principles or truths. We have also seen -that one of the steps of inductive reasoning is the testing of the -hypothesis by deductive reasoning. We shall now also see that the -results of inductive reasoning are used as premises or bases for -deductive reasoning. These two forms of reasoning are opposites and yet -complementary to each other; they are in a sense independent and yet are -interdependent. Brooks says: "The two methods of reasoning are the -reverse of each other. One goes from particulars to generals; the other -from generals to particulars. One is a process of analysis; the other is -a process of synthesis. One rises from facts to laws; the other descends -from laws to facts. Each is independent of the other, and each is a -valid and essential method of inference." - -Halleck well expresses the spirit of deductive reasoning as follows: -"After induction has classified certain phenomena and thus given us a -major premise, we may proceed deductively to apply the inference to any -new specimen that can be shown to belong to that class. Induction hands -over to deduction a ready-made premise. Deduction takes that as a fact, -making no inquiry regarding its truth. Only after general laws have been -laid down, after objects have been classified, after major premises have -been formed, can deduction be employed." - -Deductive reasoning proceeds from general principles to particular -facts. It is a descending process, analytical in its nature. It rests -upon the fundamental axiomatic basis that "_whatever is true of the -whole is true of its parts_," or "_whatever is true of the universal is -true of the particulars_." - -The process of deductive reasoning may be stated briefly as follows: (1) -A general principle of a class is stated as a _major premise_; (2) a -particular thing is stated as belonging to that general class, this -statement being the _minor premise_; therefore (3) the general class -principle is held to apply to the particular thing, this last statement -being the _conclusion_. (_A "premise" is "a proposition assumed to be -true."_) - -The following gives us an illustration of the above process:-- - - I. (_Major premise_)--A bird is a warm-blooded, feathered, winged, - oviparous vertebrate. - - II. (_Minor premise_)--The sparrow is a bird; therefore - - III. (_Conclusion_)--The sparrow is a warm-blooded, feathered, winged, - oviparous vertebrate. - -Or, again:-- - - I. (_Major premise_)--Rattlesnakes frequently bite when enraged, and - their bite is poisonous. - - II. (_Minor premise_)--This snake before me is a rattlesnake; - therefore - - III. (_Conclusion_)--This snake before me may bite when enraged, and - its bite will be poisonous. - -The average person may be inclined to object that he is not conscious of -going through this complicated process when he reasons about sparrows or -rattlesnakes. But he _does_, nevertheless. He is not conscious of the -steps, because mental habit has accustomed him to the process, and it is -performed more or less automatically. But these three steps manifest in -all processes of deductive reasoning, even the simplest. The average -person is like the character in the French play who was surprised to -learn that he had "been talking prose for forty years without knowing -it." Jevons says that the majority of persons are equally surprised when -they find out that they have been using logical forms, more or less -correctly, without having realized it. He says: "A large number even of -educated persons have no clear idea of what logic is. Yet, in a certain -way, every one must have been a logician since he began to speak." - -There are many technical rules and principles of logic which we cannot -attempt to consider here. There are, however, a few elementary -principles of correct reasoning which should have a place here. What is -known as a "syllogism" is the expression in words of the various parts -of the complete process of reasoning or argument. Whately defines it as -follows: "A syllogism is an argument expressed in strict logical form so -that its conclusiveness is manifest from the structure of the expression -alone, without any regard to the meaning of the term." In short, _if_ -the two premises are accepted as correct, it follows that there can be -only one true logical conclusion resulting therefrom. In abstract or -theoretical reasoning the word "_if_" is assumed to precede each of the -two premises, the "therefore" before the conclusion resulting from the -"if," of course. The following are the general rules governing the -syllogism:-- - -I. Every syllogism must consist of three, and no more than three, -propositions, namely (1) the major premise, (2) the minor premise, and -(3) the conclusion. - -II. The conclusion must naturally follow from the premises, otherwise -the syllogism is invalid and constitutes a fallacy or sophism. - -III. One premise, at least, must be affirmative. - -IV. If one premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative. - -V. One premise, at least, must be universal or general. - -VI. If one premise is particular, the conclusion also must be -particular. - -The last two rules (V. and VI.) contain the essential principles of all -the rules regarding syllogisms, and any syllogism which breaks them will -be found also to break other rules, some of which are not stated here -for the reason that they are too technical. These two rules may be -tested by constructing syllogisms in violation of their principles. The -reason for them is as follows: (Rule V.) Because "from two particular -premises no conclusion can be drawn," as, for instance: (1) Some men are -mortal; (2) John is a man. We cannot reason from this either that John -_is_ or _is not_ mortal. The major premise should read "_all_ men." -(Rule VI.) Because "a universal conclusion can be drawn only from two -universal premises," an example being needless here, as the conclusion -is so obvious. - - -CULTIVATION OF REASONING FACULTIES. - -There is no royal road to the cultivation of the reasoning faculties. -There is but the old familiar rule: Practice, exercise, use. -Nevertheless there are certain studies which tend to develop the -faculties in question. The study of arithmetic, especially mental -arithmetic, tends to develop correct habits of reasoning from one truth -to another--from cause to effect. Better still is the study of geometry; -and best of all, of course, is the study of logic and the practice of -working out its problems and examples. The study of philosophy and -psychology also is useful in this way. Many lawyers and teachers have -drilled themselves in geometry solely for the purpose of developing -their logical reasoning powers. - -Brooks says: "So valuable is geometry as a discipline that many lawyers -and others review their geometry every year in order to keep the mind -drilled to logical habits of thinking. * * * The study of logic will aid -in the development of the power of deductive reasoning. It does this, -first, by showing the method by which we reason. To know how we reason, -to see the laws which govern the reasoning process, to analyze the -syllogism and see its conformity to the laws of thought, is not only an -exercise of reasoning but gives that knowledge of the process that will -be both a stimulus and a guide to thought. No one can trace the -principles and processes of thought without receiving thereby an impetus -to thought. In the second place, the study of logic is probably even -more valuable because it gives practice in deductive thinking. This, -perhaps, is its principal value, since the mind reasons instinctively -without knowing how it reasons. One can think without the knowledge of -the science of thinking just as one can use language correctly without a -knowledge of grammar; yet as the study of grammar improves one's speech, -so the study of logic can but improve one's thought." - -In the opinion of the writer hereof, one of the best though simple -methods of cultivating the faculties of reasoning is to acquaint one's -self thoroughly with the more common _fallacies_ or forms of false -reasoning--so thoroughly that not only is the false reasoning detected -at once but also the _reason_ of its falsity is readily understood. To -understand the wrong ways of reasoning is to be on guard against them. -By guarding against them we tend to eliminate them from our thought -processes. If we eliminate the false we have the true left in its place. -Therefore we recommend the weeding of the logical garden of the common -fallacies, to the end that the flowers of pure reason may flourish in -their stead. Accordingly, we think it well to call your attention in the -next chapter to the more common fallacies, and the reason of their -falsity. - - - - -CHAPTER XXVIII. - -Fallacious Reasoning. - - -A fallacy is defined as "an unsound argument or mode of arguing which, -while appearing to be decisive of a question, is in reality not so; or a -fallacious statement or proposition in which the error is not readily -apparent. When a fallacy is used to deceive others, it is called -'sophistry,'" It is important that the student should understand the -nature of the fallacy and understand its most common forms. As Jevons -says: "In learning how to do right it is always desirable to be informed -as to the ways in which we are likely to go wrong. In describing to a -man the road which he should follow, we ought to tell him not only the -turnings which he is to take but also the turnings which he is to avoid. -Similarly, it is a useful part of logic which teaches us the ways and -turnings by which people most commonly go astray in reasoning." - -In presenting the following brief statement regarding the more common -forms of fallacy, we omit so far as possible the technical details which -belong to text-books on logic. - - -FALLACIES. - -I. _True Collective but False Particular._--An example of this fallacy -is found in the argument that because the French race, collectively, are -excitable, therefore a particular Frenchman must be excitable. Or that -because the Jewish race, collectively, are good business people, -therefore the particular Jew must be a good business man. This is as -fallacious as arguing that because a man may drown in the ocean he -should avoid the bath, basin, or cup of water. There is a vast -difference between the whole of a thing and its separate parts. Nitric -acid and glycerin, separately, are not explosive, but, combined, they -form nitro-glycerin, a most dangerous and powerful explosive. Reversing -this form of illustration, we remind you of the old saying: "Salt is a -good thing; but one doesn't want to be put in pickle." - -II. _Irrelevant Conclusion._--This fallacy consists in introducing in -the conclusion matter not contained in the premises, or in the confusing -of the issue. For instance: (1) All men are sinful; (2) John Smith is a -man; therefore (3) John Smith is a horse thief. This may sound absurd, -but many arguments are as fallacious as this, and for the same reason. -Or another and more subtle form: (1) All thieves are liars; (2) John -Smith is a liar; therefore (3) John Smith is a thief. The first example -arises from the introduction of new matter, and the last from the -confusion of the issue. - -III. _False Cause._--This fallacy consists in attributing cause to a -thing which is merely coincident with, or precedent to, the effect. For -instance: (1) The cock crows just before or at the moment of sunrise; -therefore (2) the cock-crowing is the cause of the sunrise. Or, again: -(1) Bad crops followed the election of a Whig president; therefore (2) -the Whig party is the cause of the bad crops. Or, again: (1) Where -civilization is the highest, there we find the greatest number of high -hats; therefore (2) high hats are the cause of civilization. - -IV. _Circular Reasoning._--In this form of fallacy the person reasoning -or arguing endeavors to explain or prove a thing by itself or its own -terms. For instance: (1) The Whig party is honest because it advocates -honest principles; (2) the Whig principles are honest because they are -advocated by an honest party. A common form of this fallacy in its phase -of sophistry is the use of synonyms in such a manner that they seem to -express more than the original conception, whereas they are really but -other terms for the same thing. An historic example of circular -reasoning is the following: (1) The Church of England is the true -Church, because it was established by God; (2) it must have been -established by God, because it is the true Church. This form of -sophistry is most effective when employed in long arguments in which it -is difficult to detect it. - -V. _Begging the Question._--This fallacy arises from the use of a false -premise, or at least of a premise the truth of which is not admitted by -the opponent. It may be stated, simply, as "_the unwarranted assumption -of a premise, generally the major premise_." Many persons in public life -argue in this way. They boldly assert an unwarranted premise, and then -proceed to argue logically from it. The result is confusing to the -average person, for, the steps of the reasoning being logical, it seems -as if the argument is sound, the fact of the unwarranted premise being -overlooked. The person using this form of sophistry proceeds on Aaron -Burr's theory of truth being "that which is boldly asserted and -plausibly maintained." - -Bulwer makes one of his characters mention a particularly atrocious form -of this fallacy (although an amusing one) in the following words: -"Whenever you are about to utter something astonishingly false, always -begin with: 'It is an acknowledged fact,' etc. Sir Robert Filmer was a -master of this manner of writing. Thus with what a solemn face that -great man attempted to cheat. He would say: '_It is a truth undeniable_ -that there cannot be any multitude of men whatsoever, either great or -small, etc., but that in the same multitude there is one man among them -_that in nature hath a right to be King of all the rest--as being the -next heir of Adam_!'" - -Look carefully for the major premise of propositions advanced in -argument, spoken or written. Be sure that the person making the -proposition is not "begging the question" by _the unwarranted assumption -of the premise_. - - -GENERAL RULE OF INFERENCE. - -Hyslop says concerning valid inferences and fallacious ones: "We cannot -infer _anything_ we please from any premises we please. We must conform -to certain definite rules or principles. Any violation of them will be a -fallacy. There are two simple rules which should not be violated: (1) -_The subject-matter in the conclusion should be of the same general kind -as in the premises_; (2) _the facts constituting the premises must be -accepted and must not be fictitious_." A close observance of these rules -will result in the detection and avoidance of the principal forms of -fallacious reasoning and sophistry. - - -SOPHISTICAL ARGUMENTS. - -There are a number of tricky practices resorted to by persons in -argument, that are fallacious in intent and result, which we do not -consider here in detail as they scarcely belong to the particular -subject of this book. A brief mention, however, may be permitted in the -interest of general information. Here are the principal ones:-- - -(1) Arguing that a proposition is correct because the opponent cannot -prove the contrary. The fallacy is seen when we realize that the -statement, "The moon is made of green cheese," is not proved because we -cannot prove the contrary. No amount of failure to _disprove_ a -proposition really _proves_ it; and no amount of failure to _prove_ a -proposition really _disproves_ it. As a general rule, the burden of -proof rests upon the person stating the proposition, and his opponent is -not called upon to disprove it or else have it considered proved. The -old cry of "You cannot _prove_ that it is _not_ so" is based upon a -fallacious conception. - -(2) Abuse of the opponent, his party, or his cause. This is no real -argument or reasoning. It is akin to proving a point by beating the -opponent over the head. - -(3) Arguing that an opponent does not live up to his principles is no -argument against the principles he advocates. A man may advocate the -principle of temperance and yet drink to excess. This simply proves that -he preaches better than he practices; but the truth of the principle of -temperance is not affected in any way thereby. The proof of this is -that he may change his practices; and it cannot be held that the change -of his personal habits improves or changes the nature of the principle. - -(4) Argument of authority is not based on logic. Authority is valuable -when really worthy, and merely as corroboration or adding weight; but it -is not logical argument. The _reasons_ of the authority alone constitute -a real argument. The abuse of this form of argument is shown, in the -above reference to "begging the question," in the quotation from Bulwer. - -(5) Appeal to prejudice or public opinion is not a valid argument, for -public opinion is frequently wrong and prejudice is often unwarranted. -And, at the best, they "have nothing to do with the case" from the -standpoint of logic. The abuse of testimony and claimed evidence is also -worthy of examination, but we cannot go into the subject here. - - -FALLACIES OF PREJUDICE. - -But perhaps the most dangerous of all fallacies in the search for truth -on the part of the most of us are those which arise from the -following:-- - -(1) The tendency to reason from what we feel and wish to be true, rather -than from the actual facts of the case, which causes us unconsciously to -assume the mental attitude of "if the facts agree with our likes and -pet theories, all is well; if they do not, so much the worse for the -facts." - -(2) The tendency in all of us to perceive only the facts that agree with -our theories and to ignore the others. We find that for which we seek, -and overlook that which does not interest us. Our discoveries follow our -interest, and our interest follows our desires and beliefs. - -The intelligent man or woman realizes these tendencies of human nature -and endeavors to avoid them in his or her own reasoning, but is keenly -conscious of them in the arguments and reasoning of others. A failure to -observe and guard one's self against these tendencies results in -bigotry, intolerance, narrowness, and intellectual astigmatism. - - - - -CHAPTER XXIX. - -The Will. - - -The activities of the will comprise the third great class of mental -processes. Psychologists always have differed greatly in their -conception of just what constitutes these activities. Even to-day it is -difficult to obtain a dictionary definition of the will that agrees with -the best opinion on the subject. The dictionaries adhere to the old -classification and conception which regarded the will as "that faculty -of the mind or soul by which it chooses or decides." But with the growth -of the idea that the will acts according to the strongest motive, and -that the motive is supplied by the average struck between the desires of -the moment, under the supervision of the intellect, the conception of -will as the choosing and deciding faculty is passing from favor. In the -place of the older conception has come the newer one which holds that -the will is primarily concerned with _action_. - -It is difficult to place the will in the category of mental processes. -But it is generally agreed that it abides in the very center of the -mental being, and is closely associated with what is called the ego, or -self. The will seems to have at least three general phases, viz.: (1) -The phase of desire, (2) the phase of deliberation or choice, and (3) -the phase of expression in action. In order to understand the will, it -is necessary to consider each of these three phases of its activities. - - -(1). DESIRE. - -The first phase of will, which is called "desire," is in itself somewhat -complex. On its lower side it touches, and, in fact, blends into, -feeling and emotion. Its center consists of a state of _tension_, akin -to that of a coiled spring or a cat crouching ready for a spring. On its -higher side it touches, penetrates, and blends into the other phases of -the will which we have mentioned. - -Desire is defined as "a feeling, emotion, or excitement of the mind -directed toward the attainment, enjoyment, or possession of some object -from which pleasure, profit, or gratification is expected." Halleck -gives us the following excellent conception of the moving spirit of -desire: "_Desire has for its object something which will bring pleasure -or get rid of pain, immediate or remote, for the individual or for some -one in whom he is interested. Aversion, or a striving away from -something, is merely the negative aspect of desire._" - -In Halleck's statement, above quoted, we have the explanation of the -part played by the intellect in the activities of will. The intellect -is able to perceive the relations between present action and future -results, and is able to point the way toward the suppression of some -desires in order that other and better ones may be manifested. It also -serves its purposes in regulating the "striking of the average" between -conflicting desires. Without the intervention of the intellect, the -temporary desire of the moment would invariably be acted upon without -regard to future results or consequences to one's self and others. It -also serves to point out the course of action calculated to give the -most satisfactory expression of the desire. - -While it is a fact that the action of will depends almost entirely upon -the motive force of desire, it is likewise true that desire may be -created, regulated, suppressed, and even killed by the action of the -will. The will, by giving or refusing attention to a certain class of -desires, may either cause them to grow and wax strong, or else die and -fade away. It must be remembered, however, that this use of the will -itself springs from another set of desires or feelings. - -Desire is aroused by feelings or emotions rising from the subconscious -planes of the mind and seeking expression and manifestation. We have -considered the nature of the feelings and emotions in previous chapters, -which should be read in connection with the present one. It should be -remembered that the feeling or emotional side of desire arises from -either inherited race memories existing as instincts, or from the memory -of the past experiences of the individual. In some cases the feeling -first manifests in a vague unrest caused by subconscious promptings and -excitement. Then the imagination pictures the object of the feeling, or -certain memory images connected with it, and the desire thus manifests -on the plane of consciousness. - -The entrance of the desire feeling into consciousness is accompanied by -that peculiar _tension_ which marks the second phase of desire. This -tension, when sufficiently strong, passes into the third phase of -desire, or that in which desire blends into will action. Desire in this -stage makes a demand upon will for expression and action. From mere -feeling, and tension of feeling, it becomes _a call to action_. But -before expression and action are given to it, the second phase of will -must manifest at least for a moment; this second phase is that known as -deliberation, or the weighing and balancing of desires. - - -(2). DELIBERATION. - -The second phase of will, known as deliberation, is more than the purely -intellectual process which the term would indicate. The intellect plays -an important part, it is true, but there is also an almost instinctive -and automatic _weighing and balancing of desires_. There is seldom only -one desire presenting its claims upon the will at any particular moment. -It is true that occasionally there arises an emotional desire of such -dominant power and strength that it crowds out every other claimant at -the bar of deliberation. But such instances are rare, and as a rule -there are a host of rival claimants, each insisting upon its rights in -the matter at issue. In the man of weak or undeveloped and untrained -intellect, the struggle is usually little more than a brief combat -between several desires, in which _the strongest at the moment wins_. -But with the development of intellect new factors arise and new forces -are felt. Moreover, the more complex one's emotional nature, and the -greater the development of the higher forms of feeling, the more intense -is the struggle of deliberation or the fight of the desires. - -We see, in Halleck's definition, that desire has not only the object of -"bringing pleasure or getting rid of pain" for the individual, but that -the additional element of the welfare of "some one in whom he is -interested" is added, which element is often the deciding factor. This -element, of course, arises from the development and cultivation of one's -emotional nature. In the same way we also see that it is not merely the -_immediate_ welfare of one's self or those in whom one is interested -that speaks before the bar, but also the more _remote_ welfare. This -consideration of future welfare depends upon the intellect and -cultivated imagination under its control. Moreover, the trained -intellect is able to discover possible greater satisfaction in some -course of action other than in the one prompted by the clamoring desire -of the moment. This explains why the judgment and action of an -intelligent man, as a rule, are far different from those of the -unintelligent one; and also why a man of culture tends toward different -action from that of the uncultured; and likewise, why the man of broad -sympathies and high ideals acts in a different way from one of the -opposite type. But the principle is ever the same--the feelings manifest -in desire, the greatest ultimate satisfaction apparent at the moment is -sought, and the strongest set of desires wins the day. - -Halleck's comment on this point is interesting. He says: "Desire is not -always proportional to the idea of one's own selfish pleasure. Many -persons, after forming an idea of the vast amount of earthly distress, -desire to relieve it, and the desire goes out in action, as the -benevolent societies in every city testify. Here the individual pleasure -is none the less, but it is secondary, coming from the pleasure of -others. The desire of the _near_ often raises a stronger desire than the -_remote_. A child frequently prefers a thing immediately if it is only -one tenth as good as something he might have a year hence. A student -often desires more the leisure of to-day than the success of future -years. Though admonished to study, he wastes his time and thus loses -incomparably greater future pleasure when he is tossed to the rear in -the struggle for existence." - -The result of this weighing and balancing of the desire is, or should -be, _decision and choice_, which then passes into action. But many -persons seem unable to "make up their own mind," and require a push or -urge from without before they will act. Others decide, without proper -use of the intellect, upon what they call "impulse," but which is merely -impatience. Some are like the fabled donkey which starved to death when -placed at an equal distance between two equally attractive haystacks and -was unable to decide towards which to move. Others follow the example of -Jeppe, in the comedy, who, when given a coin with which to buy a piece -of soap for his wife, stood on the corner deliberating whether to obey -orders or to buy a drink with the money. He wants the drink, but -realizes that his wife will beat him if he returns without the soap. "My -stomach says drink; my back says soap," says Jeppe. "But," finally he -remarks, "is not a man's stomach more to him than his back? Yes, says -I." - -The final decision depends upon the striking a balance between the -desires,--the weighing of desire for and desire against,--desire for -this and desire for something else. The strength of the several desires -depends upon nearness and present interest arising from attention, as -applied to the feelings and emotions arising from heredity, environment, -experience, and education, which constitute character; and also upon the -degree of intellectual clearness and power in forming correct judgments -between the desires. - -It must be remembered, however, that the intellect appears not as an -opponent of the principle of the satisfaction of desire, but merely as -an instrument of the ego in determining which course of action will -result in the greatest ultimate satisfaction, direct or indirect, -present or future. For, _at the last, every individual acts so as to -bring himself the greatest satisfaction, immediate or future, direct or -indirect, either personal or through the welfare of others, as this may -appear to him at the particular moment of deliberation_. We always act -in the direction of that which will greater "content our spirit." This -will be found to be the spirit of all decisions, although the motive is -often hidden and difficult to find even by the individual himself, many -of the strongest motives having their origin in the subconscious planes -of mentality. - - -(3). ACTION. - -The third and final phase of will is that known as action--the act of -volition by which the desire-idea is expressed in physical or mental -activity. The old conception of the will held that the decisive phase of -the will was its characteristic and final phase, ignoring the fact that -the very essence or spirit of will is bound up with _action_. Even those -familiar with the newer conception frequently assume that the act of -decision is the final phase of will, ignoring the fact that we -frequently _decide_ to do a thing and yet may never carry out the -intention and decision. The act of willing is not complete unless action -is expressed. There must be the manifestation of the motor element or -phase of will, else the will process is incomplete. - -A weakness of this last phase of will affects the entire will and -renders its processes ineffective. The world is filled with persons who -are able to _decide_ what is best to do, and what should be done, but -who never actually _act_ upon the decision. The few persons who promptly -follow up the decision with vigorous action are those who accomplish the -world's work. Without the full manifestation of this third phase of will -the other two phases are useless. - - -TYPES OF WILL. - -So far we have considered merely the highest type of will--that which -is accompanied by conscious deliberation, in which the intellect takes -an active part. In this process, not only do the conflicting feelings -push themselves forward with opposing claims for recognition, but the -intellect is active in examining the case and offering valuable -testimony as to the comparative merits of the various claimants and the -effect of certain courses of action upon the individual. There are, -however, several lower forms of will manifestation which we should -briefly consider in passing. - -_Reflex Action._--The will is moved to action by the reflex activities -of the nervous system which have been mentioned in the earlier chapters -of this book. In this general type we find unconscious reflex action, -such as that manifested when a sleeper is touched and moves away, or -when the frog's leg twitches when the nerve end is excited. We also find -conscious reflex action, such as that manifested by the winking of the -eye, or the performance of habitual physical motion, such as the -movement in walking, operating the sewing machine or typewriter, playing -the piano, etc. - -_Impulsive Action._--The will is often moved to action by a dim idea or -faint perception of purpose or impulse. The action is almost -instinctive, although there is a vague perception of purpose. For -instance, we feel an impulse to turn toward the source of a strange -sound or sight, or other source of interest or curiosity. Or we may -feel an impulse arising from the subconscious plane of our mind, causing -a dimly-conscious idea of movement or action to relieve the tension. For -instance, one may feel a desire to exercise, or to seek fresh air or -green fields, although he had not been thinking of these things at the -time. These impulses arise from a subconscious feeling of fatigue or -desire for change, which, added to a fleeting idea, produces the -impulse. Unless an impulse is inhibited by the will activities inspired -by other desires, habits, ideas, or ideals, we act upon it in precisely -the same way that a young child or animal does. Hoffding says of this -type of action: "The psychological condition of the impulse is, that -with the momentary feeling and sensation should be combined a more or -less clear idea of something which may augment the pleasure or diminish -the pain of the moment." - -_Instinctive Action._--The will is frequently moved to action by an -instinctive stimulus. This form of will activity closely resembles the -last mentioned form, and often it is impossible to distinguish between -the two. The activities of the bee in building its comb and storing its -honey, the work of the silkworm and caterpillar in building their -resting places, are examples of this form of action. Indeed, even the -building of the nest of the bird may be so classed. In these cases there -is an intelligent action toward a definite end, but the animal is -unconscious of that end. The experiences of the remote ancestors of -these creatures recorded their impressions upon the subconscious mind of -the species, and they are transmitted in some way to all of that -species. The nervous system of every living thing is a record cylinder -of the experiences of its early ancestors, and these cylinders tend to -reproduce these impressions upon appropriate occasions. In preceding -chapters we have shown that even man is under the influence of instinct -to a greater extent than he imagines himself to be. - - - - -CHAPTER XXX. - -Will-Training. - - -It is of the utmost importance that the individual develop, cultivate, -and train his will so as to bring it under the influence of the higher -part of his mental and moral being. While the will is used most -effectively in developing and training the intellect and building -character, it itself must be trained by itself to habitually come under -the guidance of the intellect and under the influence of that which we -call character. - -The influence of the trained will upon the several mental faculties is -most marked. There are no faculties which may not be cultivated by the -will. The first and great task of the will in this direction is the -control and direction of the attention. The will determines the kind of -interest that shall prevail at the moment, and the kind of interest -largely determines the character of the man, his tastes, his feelings, -his thoughts, his acts. Gordy says: "Coöperating with a pre-existing -influence, the will can make a weaker one prevail over a stronger. * * * -It determines which of pre-existing influences shall have control over -the mind." - -Moreover, concentrated and continued attention depends entirely upon the -exercise of the will. As Gordy says: "If the will relaxes its hold upon -the activities of the mind, the attention is liable to be carried away -by any one of the thousands of ideas that the laws of association are -constantly bringing into our minds." - -Even in the matter of mental images the will asserts its sway, and the -imagination may be trained to be the obedient servant of the developed -will. Regarding the influence of the will upon character, Davidson says: -"It is not enough for a man to understand correctly and love duly the -conditions of moral life in his own time; he must, still further, be -willing and able to fulfill these conditions. And he certainly cannot do -this unless his will is trained to perfect freedom, so that it responds, -with the utmost readiness, to the suggestions of his discriminating -intelligence and the movements of his chastened affections." Halleck -says: "We gradually make our characters by separate acts of will, just -as a blacksmith by repeated blows beats out a horseshoe or an anchor -from a shapeless mass of iron. A finished anchor or horseshoe was never -the product of a single blow." - - -TRAINING THE WILL. - -Perhaps the best way to train the will is to _use_ it intelligently, and -with a purpose. The training of any faculty of the mind is at the same -time a training of the will. The attention being so closely allied to -the will, it follows that a careful training of attention will result in -a strengthening of the will. The training of the emotional side of one's -nature also brings results in the strengthening of the will. - -Halleck gives his students excellent advice regarding the training of -the will. It would be hard to find anything better along these lines -than the following from his pen: "Nothing schools the will, and renders -it ready for effort in this complex world, better than accustoming it to -face disagreeable things. Professor James advises all to do something -occasionally for no other reason than that they would rather not do it, -if it is nothing more than giving up a seat in a street car. He likens -such effort to the insurance that a man pays on his house. He has -something that he can fall back on in time of trouble. A will schooled -in this way is always ready to respond, no matter how great the -emergency. While another would be crying over spilled milk, the -possessor of such a will has already found another cow. * * * The only -way to secure such a will is to practice doing disagreeable things. -There are daily opportunities. * * * A man who had declared his aversion -to what he deemed the dry facts of political economy was one day found -knitting his brow over a chapter of John Stuart Mill. When a friend -expressed surprise, the man replied: 'I am playing the schoolmaster with -myself. I am reading this because I dislike it.' Such a man has the -elements of success in him. * * * On the other hand, the one who -habitually avoids disagreeable action is training his will to be of no -use to him at a time when supreme effort is demanded. Such a will can -never elbow its way to the front in life." - - -HABITS. - -Habits are the beaten track over which the will travels. The beaten path -of habit is the line of least resistance to the will. One who would -train his will must needs pay attention to providing it with the proper -mental paths over which to travel. The rule for the creation of habits -is simply this: _Travel over the mental path as often as possible_. The -rule for breaking undesirable habits is this: _Cultivate the opposite -habit_. In these two rules is expressed the gist of what has been -written on the subject. - -Professor William James has left to the world some invaluable advice -regarding the cultivation of right habits. He bases his rules upon those -of Professor Bain, elaborates these, and adds some equally good ones. We -herewith quote freely from both James and Bain on this subject; it is -the best ever written regarding habit building. - -I. "In the acquisition of a new habit, or the leaving off of an old one, -launch yourself with as strong and decided an initiative as possible. -This will give your new beginning such a momentum that the temptation to -break down will not occur as soon as it otherwise might; and every day -during which a breakdown is postponed adds to the chances of it not -occurring at all."--_James._ - -II. "Never suffer an exception to occur till the new habit is securely -rooted in your life. Every lapse is like the letting fall of a ball of -string which one is carefully winding up--a single slip undoes more than -a great many turns will wind again."--_James._ "It is necessary, above -all things, in such a situation, never to lose a battle. Every gain on -the wrong side undoes the effect of many conquests on the right. The -essential precaution is so to regulate the two opposing powers that the -one may have a series of uninterrupted successes, until repetition has -fortified it to such a degree as to enable it to cope with the -opposition, under any circumstances."--_Bain._ - -III. "Seize the very first possible opportunity to act on every -resolution you make, and on every emotional prompting you may experience -in the direction of the habits you aspire to gain. It is not in the -moment of their forming, but in the moment of their producing _motor -effects_, that resolves and aspirations communicate their new 'set' to -the brain."--_James._ "The actual presence of the practical opportunity -alone furnishes the fulcrum upon which the lever can rest, by which the -moral will may multiply its strength and raise itself aloft. He who has -no solid ground to press against will never get beyond the stage of -empty gesture making."--_Bain._ - -IV. "Keep the faculty alive in you by a little gratuitous exercise every -day. That is, be systematically ascetic or heroic in little, unnecessary -points; do every day something for no other reason than that you would -rather not do it, so that when the hour of dire need draws nigh, it may -find you not unnerved and untrained to stand the test. * * * The man who -has daily inured himself to habits of concentrated attention, energetic -volition, and self-denial in unnecessary things will stand like a tower -when everything rocks around him, and when his softer fellow mortals are -winnowed like chaff in the blast."--_James._ - - - - -CHAPTER XXXI. - -Will-Tonic. - - -In addition to the general rules for developing and training the will -given in the preceding chapter, we ask you to tone up and strengthen the -will by the inspiration to be derived from the words of some of the -world's great thinkers and doers. In these words there is such a vital -statement of the recognition, realization, and manifestation of that -something within, which we call "will," that it is a dull soul, indeed, -which is not inspired by the contagion of the idea. These expressions -are the milestones on the Path of Attainment, placed by those who have -preceded us on the journey. We submit these quotations without comment; -they speak for themselves. - - -WORDS OF THE WISE. - -"They can who think they can. Character is a perfectly educated will." - -"Nothing can resist the will of a man who knows what is true and wills -what is good." - -"In all difficulties advance and will, for within you is a power, a -living force, which the more you trust and learn to use will annihilate -the opposition of matter." - - "The star of the unconquered will, - It rises in my breast, - Serene and resolute and still, - And calm and self-possessed. - - "So nigh is grandeur to our dust, - So near is God to man, - When duty whispers low, 'Thou must!' - The youth replies, 'I can!'" - -"The longer I live, the more certain I am that the great difference -between men, between the feeble and the powerful, the great and the -insignificant, is energy,--invincible determination,--a purpose once -fixed, and then death or victory. That quality will do anything that can -be done in this world, and no talents, no circumstances, no -opportunities will make a two-legged creature a man without -it."--_Buxton._ - - "The human will, that force unseen, - The offspring of a deathless soul, - Can hew a way to any goal, - Though walls of granite intervene. - - "You will be what you will to be; - Let failure find its false content - In that poor word environment, - But spirit scorns it and is free. - - "It masters time, it conquers space, - It cows that boastful trickster, chance, - And bids the tyrant circumstance - Uncrown and fill a servant's place." - -"Resolve is what makes a man manifest; not puny resolve, not crude -determinations, not errant purpose, but that strong and indefatigable -will which treads down difficulties and danger as a boy treads down the -heaving frost lands of winter, which kindles his eye and brain with a -proud pulse beat toward the unattainable. Will makes men -giants."--_Donald G. Mitchell._ - - "There is no chance, no destiny, no fate - Can circumvent, or hinder, or control - The firm resolve of a determined soul. - Gifts count for nothing, will alone is great; - All things give way before it soon or late. - What obstacle can stay the mighty force - Of the sea-seeking river in its course, - Or cause the ascending orb of day to wait? - Each well-born soul must win what it deserves. - Let the fools prate of luck. The fortunate - Is he whose earnest purpose never swerves, - Whose slightest action, or inaction, - Serves the one great aim. Why, even death itself - Stands still and waits an hour sometimes - For such a will." - - --_Ella Wheeler Wilcox._ - -"I have brought myself by long meditation to the conviction that a human -being with a settled purpose must accomplish it, and that nothing can -resist a will which will stake even existence upon its fulfillment." ---_Lord Beaconsfield._ - -"A passionate desire and an unwearied will can perform impossibilities, -or what may seem to be such to the cold and feeble."--_Sir John -Simpson._ - -"It is wonderful how even the casualties of life seem to bow to a spirit -that will not bow to them, and yield to subserve a design which they -may, in their first apparent tendency, threaten to frustrate. When a -firm, decisive spirit is recognized, it is curious to see how the space -clears around a man and leaves him room and freedom."--_John Foster._ - -"The great thing about General Grant is cool persistency of purpose. He -is not easily excited, and he has got the grip of a bulldog. When he -once gets his teeth in, nothing can shake him off."--_Abraham Lincoln._ - -"I am bigger than anything that can happen to me. All these things are -outside my door, _and I've got the key_. * * * Man was meant to be, and -ought to be, stronger and more than anything that can happen to him. -Circumstances, 'Fate,' 'Luck,' are all outside; and if he cannot change -them, he can always _beat_ them."--_Charles F. Lummis._ - -"The truest wisdom is a resolute determination." - -"Impossible is a word found only in the dictionary of fools." - -"Circumstances! I _make_ circumstances!"--_Napoleon._ - -"He who fails only half wills."--_Suwarrow._ - -"That which the easiest becomes a habit in us is the will. Learn, then, -to will strongly and decisively; thus fix your floating life, and leave -it no longer to be carried hither and thither, like a withered leaf, by -every wind that blows." - -"Man owes his growth chiefly to that active striving of the will,--that -encounter which we call effort,--and it is astonishing to find how often -results apparently impracticable are thus made possible. * * * It is -will--force of purpose--that enables a man to do or be whatever he sets -his mind upon being or doing." - -"A strong, defiant purpose is many-handed and lays hold of whatever is -near that can serve it; it has a magnetic purpose that draws to itself -whatever is kindred. * * * Let it be your first study to teach the world -that you are not wood and straw; that there is some iron in -you."--_Munger._ - -"It's _dogged_ as does it."--_Yorkshire Proverb._ - -"One talent with a will behind it will accomplish more than ten without -it, as a thimbleful of powder in a rifle, the bore of whose barrel will -give it direction, will do greater execution than a carload burned in -the open air."--_O.S. Marden._ - -"Will may not endow man with talents or capacities; but it does one very -important matter--it enables him to make the best, the very best, of his -powers."--_Fothergill._ - - "Tender-handed stroke a nettle, - And it stings you for your pains. - Grasp it like a man of mettle, - And it soft as down remains." - -"Don't flinch; don't foul; but hit the line hard."--_Roosevelt._ - -"The more difficulties one has to encounter, within and without, the -more significant and the higher in inspiration his life will be." - - - - - * * * * * - - - - -Transcriber's note: - -Obvious typographcial errors and printer errors have been corrected -without comment. 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