diff options
Diffstat (limited to '42055-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | 42055-0.txt | 4978 |
1 files changed, 4978 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/42055-0.txt b/42055-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b86bc30 --- /dev/null +++ b/42055-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4978 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 42055 *** + +Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this + file which includes the original illustration. + See 42055-h.htm or 42055-h.zip: + (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/42055/42055-h/42055-h.htm) + or + (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/42055/42055-h.zip) + + + Images of the original pages are available through + Internet Archive. See + http://archive.org/details/yourmindhowtouse00atki + + +Transcriber's note: + + The author's use of three asterisks * * * to serve as ellipses + has been preserved as printed in the original publication. + + + + + +[Illustration: William Walker Atkinson] + + +YOUR MIND AND HOW TO USE IT + +A Manual of Practical Psychology + +by + +WILLIAM WALKER ATKINSON + + It is not enough merely to have a sound mind--one + must also learn how to use it, if he would + become mentally efficient. + + + + + + + +Published by +the Elizabeth Towne Co., +Holyoke, Mass. + +L.N. Fowler & Co., London. + +Copyright, 1911. +Elizabeth Towne. + +Copyrighted in the United States and England. + + + + +Contents. + + + CHAPTER PAGE + + I. WHAT IS THE MIND 5 + + II. THE MECHANISM OF MENTAL STATES 11 + + III. THE GREAT NERVE CENTERS 17 + + IV. CONSCIOUSNESS 24 + + V. ATTENTION 29 + + VI. PERCEPTION 36 + + VII. MEMORY 45 + + VIII. MEMORY (continued) 54 + + IX. IMAGINATION 62 + + X. THE FEELINGS 72 + + XI. THE EMOTIONS 79 + + XII. THE INSTINCTIVE EMOTIONS 88 + + XIII. THE PASSIONS 96 + + XIV. THE SOCIAL EMOTIONS 104 + + XV. THE RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS 111 + + XVI. THE ÆSTHETIC EMOTIONS 117 + + XVII. THE INTELLECTUAL EMOTIONS 125 + + XVIII. THE ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS 131 + + XIX. THE EMOTIONS AND HAPPINESS 136 + + XX. THE INTELLECT 143 + + XXI. CONCEPTION 151 + + XXII. CLASSES OF CONCEPTS 158 + + XXIII. JUDGMENTS 164 + + XXIV. PRIMARY LAWS OF THOUGHT 171 + + XXV. REASONING 176 + + XXVI. INDUCTIVE REASONING 181 + + XXVII. DEDUCTIVE REASONING 186 + + XXVIII. FALLACIOUS REASONING 193 + + XXIX. THE WILL 201 + + XXX. WILL-TRAINING 213 + + XXXI. WILL-TONIC 219 + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +What is the Mind? + + +Psychology is generally considered to be the science of mind, although +more properly it is the science of mental states--thoughts, feelings, +and acts of volition. It was formerly the custom of writers on the +subject of psychology to begin by an attempt to define and describe the +nature of mind, before proceeding to a consideration of the subject of +the various mental spates and activities. But more recent authorities +have rebelled against this demand, and have claimed that it is no more +reasonable to hold that psychology should be held to an explanation of +the ultimate nature of mind than it is that physical science be held to +an explanation of the ultimate nature of matter. The attempt to explain +the ultimate nature of either is futile--no actual necessity exists for +explanation in either case. Physics may explain the phenomena of matter, +and psychology the phenomena of mind, without regard to the ultimate +nature of the substance of either. + +The science of physics has progressed steadily during the past century, +notwithstanding the fact that the theories regarding the ultimate +nature of matter have been revolutionized during that period. The facts +of the phenomena of matter remain, notwithstanding the change of theory +regarding the nature of matter itself. Science demands and holds fast to +facts, regarding theories as but working hypotheses at the best. Some +one has said that "theories are but the bubbles with which the grown-up +children of science amuse themselves." Science holds several +well-supported, though opposing, theories regarding the nature of +electricity, but the _facts_ of the phenomena of electricity, and the +application thereof, are agreed upon by the disputing theorists. And so +it is with psychology; the facts regarding mental states are agreed +upon, and methods of developing mental powers are effectively employed, +without regard to whether mind is a product of the brain, or the brain +merely an organ of the mind. The fact that the brain and nervous system +are employed in the phenomena of thought is conceded by all, and that is +all that is necessary for a basis for the science of psychology. + +Disputes regarding the ultimate nature of mind are now generally passed +over to the philosophers and metaphysicians, while psychology devotes +its entire attention to studying the laws of mental activities, and to +discovering methods of mental development. Even philosophy is beginning +to tire of the eternal "why" and is devoting its attention to the "how" +phase of things. The pragmatic spirit has invaded the field of +philosophy, expressing itself in the words of Prof. William James, who +said: "Pragmatism is the attitude of looking away from first things, +principles, categories, supposed necessities; and of looking forward +toward last things, _fruits_, _consequences_, _facts_." Modern +psychology is essentially pragmatic in its treatment of the subject of +the mind. Leaving to metaphysics the old arguments and disputes +regarding the ultimate nature of mind, it bends all its energies upon +discovering the laws of mental activities and states, and developing +methods whereby the mind may be trained to perform better and more work, +to conserve its energies, to concentrate its forces. To modern +psychology the mind is _something to be used_, not merely something +about which to speculate and theorize. While the metaphysicians deplore +this tendency, the practical people of the world rejoice. + + +MIND DEFINED. + +Mind is defined as "the faculty or power whereby thinking creatures, +feel, think, and will." This definition is inadequate and circular in +nature, but this is unavoidable, for mind can be defined only in its +own terms and only by reference to its own processes. Mind, except in +reference to its own activities, cannot be defined or conceived. It is +known to itself only through its activities. Mind without mental states +is a mere abstraction--a word without a corresponding mental image or +concept. Sir William Hamilton expressed the matter as clearly as +possible, when he said: "What we mean by mind is simply _that which_ +perceives, thinks, feels, wills, and desires." Without the perceiving, +thinking, feeling, willing, and desiring, it is impossible to form a +clear conception or mental image of mind; deprived of its phenomena it +becomes the merest abstraction. + + +"THINK ABOUT THAT WHICH THINKS." + +Perhaps the simplest method of conveying the idea of the existence and +nature of the mind is that attributed to a celebrated German teacher of +psychology who was wont to begin his course by bidding his students +think of something, his desk, for example. Then he would say, "Now think +of _that which thinks about the desk_." Then, after a pause, he would +add, "This thing which thinks about the desk, and about which you are +now thinking, is the subject matter of our study of psychology." The +professor could not have said more had he lectured for a month. + +Professor Gordy has well said on this point: "The mind must either be +_that which_ thinks, feels, and wills, or it must be the thoughts, +feelings, and acts of will of which we are conscious--mental facts, in +one word. But what can we know about _that which_ thinks, feels, and +wills, and what can we find out about it? Where is it? You will probably +say, in the brain. But, if you are speaking literally, if you say that +it is in the brain, as a pencil is in the pocket, then you must mean +that it takes up room, that it occupies space, and that would make it +very much like a material thing. In truth, the more carefully you +consider it, the more plainly you will see what thinking men have known +for a long time--that we do not know and cannot learn anything about the +thing which thinks, and feels, and wills. It is beyond the range of +human knowledge. The books which define psychology as the science of +mind have not a word to say about that which thinks, and feels, and +wills. They are entirely taken up with these thoughts and feelings and +acts of the will,--mental facts, in a word,--trying to tell us what they +are, and to arrange them in classes, and tell us the circumstances or +conditions under which they exist. It seems to me that it would be +better to define psychology as _the science of the experiences, +phenomena, or facts of the mind, soul, or self--of mental facts, in a +word_." + +In view of the facts of the case, and following the example of the best +of the modern authorities, in this book we shall leave the consideration +of the question of the ultimate nature of mind to the metaphysicians, +and shall confine ourselves to the _mental facts_, the laws governing +them, and the best methods of governing and using them in "the business +of life." + +The classification and method of development to be followed in this book +is as follows:-- + +I. The mechanism of mental states, _i.e._, the brain, nervous system, +sense organs, etc. + +II. The fact of Consciousness and its planes. + +III. Mental processes or faculties, _i.e._, (1) Sensation and +Perception; (2) Representation, or Imagination and Memory; (3) Feeling +or Emotion; (4) Intellect, or Reason and Understanding; (5) Will or +Volition. + +Mental states depend upon the physical mechanism for manifestation, +whatever may be the ultimate nature of mind. Mental states, whatever +their special character, will be found to fit into one of the above five +general classes of mental activities. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +The Mechanism of Mental States. + + +The mechanism of mental states--the mental machinery by means of which +we feel, think, and will--consists of the brain, nervous system, and the +organs of sense. No matter what may be the real nature of mind,--no +matter what may be the theory held regarding its activities,--it must be +admitted that the mind is dependent upon this mechanism for the +manifestation of what we know as mental states. Wonderful as is the +mind, it is seen to be dependent upon this physical mechanism for the +expression of its activities. And this dependence is not upon the brain +alone, but also upon the entire nervous system. + +The best authorities agree that the higher and more complex mental +states are but an evolution of simple sensation, and that they are +dependent upon sensation for their raw material of feeling and thought. +Therefore it is proper that we begin by a consideration of the machinery +of sensation. This necessitates a previous consideration of the nerves. + + +THE NERVES. + +The body is traversed by an intricate system of nerves, which has been +likened to a great telegraph system. The nerves transmit sensations from +the various parts of the body to the great receiving office of the +brain. They also serve to transmit the motor impulses from the brain to +the various parts of the body, which impulses result in motion of +appropriate parts of the body. There are also other nerves with which we +have no concern in this book, but which perform certain physiological +functions, such as digestion, secretion, excretion, and circulation. Our +chief concern, at this point, is with the sensory nerves. + +The sensory nerves convey the impressions of the outside world to the +brain. The brain is the great central station of the sensory nerves, the +latter having countless sending stations in all parts of the body, the +"wires" terminating in the skin. When these nervous terminal stations +are irritated or excited, they send to the brain messages calling for +attention. This is true not only of the nerves of touch or feeling, but +also of those concerned with the respective senses of sight, smell, +taste, and hearing. In fact, the best authorities hold that all the five +senses are but an evolution of the primary sense of touch or feeling. + + +THE SENSE OF TOUCH. + +The nerves of the sense of touch have their ending in the outer +covering or skin of the body. They report _contact_ with other physical +objects. By means of these reports we are aware not only of contact with +the outside object, but also of many facts concerning the nature of that +object, as for instance, its degree of hardness, roughness, etc., and its +temperature. Some of these nerve ends are very sensitive, as, for +example, those of the tip of the tongue and finger ends, while others +are comparatively lacking in sensitiveness, as, for illustration, those +of the back. Certain of these sensory nerves confine themselves to +reporting contact and degrees of pressure, while others concern +themselves solely with reporting the degrees of temperature of the +objects with which their ends come in contact. Some of the latter +respond to the higher degrees of heat, while others respond only to the +lower degrees of cold. The nerves of certain parts of the body respond +more readily and distinctly to temperature than do those of other parts. +To illustrate, the nerves of the cheek are quite responsive to heat +impressions. + + +THE SENSE OF SIGHT. + +The nerves of the sense of sight terminate in the complex optical +apparatus which in popular terminology is known as "the eye." What is +known as "the retina" is a very sensitive nervous membrane which lines +the inner, back part of the eye, and in which the fibers of the optic +nerve terminate. The optical instrument of the eye conveys the focused +light vibrations to the nerves of the retina, from which the impulse is +transmitted to the brain. But, contrary to the popular notion, the +nerves of the eye do not gauge distances, nor form inferences of any +kind; that is distinctly the work of the mind. The simple office of the +optical nerves consists in reporting color and degrees of intensity of +the light waves. + + +THE SENSE OF HEARING. + +The nerves of the sense of hearing terminate in the inner part of the +ear. The tympanum, or "ear drum," receives the sound vibrations entering +the cavities of the ear, and, intensifying and adapting them, it passes +them on to the ends of the auditory nerve in the internal ear, which +conveys the sensation to the brain. The auditory nerve reports to the +brain the degrees of pitch, intensity, quality, and harmony, +respectively, of the sound waves reaching the tympanum. As is well +known, there are certain vibrations of sound which are too low for the +auditory nerve to register, and others too high for it to record, both +classes, however, capable of being recorded by scientific instruments. +It is also regarded as certain that some of the lower animals are +conscious of sound vibrations which are not registered by the human +auditory nerves. + + +THE SENSE OF SMELL. + +The nerves of the sense of smell terminate in the mucous membrane of the +nostrils. In order that these nerves report the odor of outside objects, +actual contact of minute particles of the object with the mucous +membrane of the nostrils is necessary. This is possible only by the +passage through the nostrils of air containing these particles; mere +nearness to the nostril will not suffice. These particles are for the +most part composed of tenuous gases. Certain substances affect the +olfactory nerves much more than do others, the difference arising from +the chemical composition of the substance. The olfactory nerves convey +the report to the brain. + + +THE SENSE OF TASTE. + +The nerves of the sense of taste terminate in the tongue, or rather in +the tiny cells of the tongue which are called "taste buds." Substances +taken into the mouth chemically affect these tiny cells, and an impulse +is transmitted to the gustatory nerves, which then report the sensation +to the brain. The authorities claim that taste sensations may be reduced +to five general classes, viz.: sweet, bitter, sour, salty, and "hot." + +There are certain nerve centers having important offices in the +production and expression of mental states, located in the skull and in +the spinal column--the brain and the spinal cord--which we shall +consider in the following chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +The Great Nerve Centers. + + +The great nerve centers which play an important part in the production +and expression of mental states are those of the brain and spinal cord, +respectively. + + +THE SPINAL CORD. + +The spinal cord is that cord or rope of nerve substance which is +inclosed in the spinal column or "backbone." It leaves the lower part of +the skull and extends downward in the interior of the spinal column for +about eighteen inches. It is continuous with the brain, however, and it +is difficult to determine where one begins and the other ends. It is +composed of a mass of gray matter surrounded by a covering of white +matter. From the spinal cord, along its length, emerge thirty-one pairs +of spinal nerves which branch out to each side of the body and connect +with the various smaller nerves, extending to all parts of the system. +The spinal cord is the great central cable of the nervous telegraphic +system, and any injury to or obstruction of it cripples or paralyzes +those portions of the body the nerves of which enter the spinal cord +below the seat of the injury or obstruction. Injuries or obstructions of +this kind not only inhibit the sensory reports from the affected area, +but also inhibit the motor impulses from the brain which are intended to +move the limbs or parts of the body. + + +THE GANGLIA OR "TINY BRAINS." + +What are known as ganglia, or tiny bunches of nerve cells, are found in +various parts of the nervous system, including the spinal nerves. These +groups of nerve cells are sometimes called "little brains," and perform +quite important offices in the mechanism of thought and action. The +spinal ganglia receive sensory reports, and issue motor impulses, in +many cases, without troubling the central brain regarding the matter. +These activities are known as "reflex nervous action." + + +REFLEX ACTION. + +What is known as reflex nervous action is one of the most wonderful of +the activities of the nervous and mental mechanism, and the knowledge +thereof usually comes as a surprise to the average person, for he is +generally under the impression that these activities are possible only +to the central brain. It is a fact that not only is the central brain +really a trinity of three brains, but that, in addition to these, every +one has a great number of "little brains" distributed over his nervous +system, any and all of which are capable of receiving sensory reports +and also of sending forth motor impulses. It is quite worth while for +one to become acquainted with this wonderful form of neuro-mental +activity. + +A cinder enters the eye, the report reaches a ganglion, a motor impulse +is sent forth, and the eyelid closes. The same result ensues if an +object approaches the eye but without actually entering it. In either +case the person is not conscious of the sensation and motor impulse +until the latter has been accomplished. This is reflex action. The +instinctive movement of the tickled foot is another instance. The +jerking away of the hand burnt by the lighted end of the cigar, or +pricked by the point of the pin, is another instance. The involuntary +activities, and those known as unconscious activities, result from +reflex action. + +More than this, it is a fact that many activities originally voluntary +become what is known as "acquired reflexes," or "motor habits," by means +of certain nervous centers acquiring the habit of sending forth certain +motor impulses in response to certain sensory reports. The familiar +movements of our lives are largely performed in this way, as, for +instance, walking, using knife and fork, operating typewriters, +machines of all kinds, writing, etc. The squirming of a decapitated +snake, the muscular movements of a decapitated frog, and the violent +struggles, fluttering, and leaps of the decapitated fowl, are instances +of reflex action. Medical reports indicate that in cases of decapitation +even man may manifest similar reflex action in some cases. Thus we may +see that we may _feel_ and _will_ by means of our "little brains" as +well as by the central brain or brains. Whatever mind may be, it is +certain that in these processes it employs other portions of the nervous +system than the central brain. + + +THE THREE BRAINS. + +What is known as the brain of man is really a trinity of three brains, +known respectively as (1) the _medulla oblongata_, (2) the _cerebellum_, +and (3) the _cerebrum_. If one wishes to limit the mental activity to +conscious intellectual effort, then and then only is he correct in +considering the cerebrum or large brain as "the brain." + +_The Medulla Oblongata._--The medulla oblongata is an enlargement of the +spinal cord at the base of the brain. Its office is that of controlling +the involuntary activities of the body, such as respiration, +circulation, assimilation, etc. In a broad sense, its activities may be +said to be of the nature of highly developed and complex reflex +activities. It manifests chiefly through the sympathetic nervous system +which controls the vital functions. It does not need to call on the +large brain in these matters, ordinarily, and is able to perform its +tasks without the plane of ordinary consciousness. + +_The Cerebellum._--The cerebellum, also known as "the little brain," +lies just above the medulla oblongata, and just below the rear portion +of the cerebrum or great brain. It combines the nature of a purely +reflex center on the one hand, with that of "habit mind" on the other. +In short, it fills a place between the activities of the cerebrum and +the medulla oblongata, having some of the characteristics of each. It is +the organ of a number of important acquired reflexes, such as walking, +and many other familiar muscular movements, which have first been +consciously acquired and then become habitual. The skilled skater, +bicyclist, typist, or machinist depends upon the cerebellum for the ease +and certainty with which he performs his movements "without thinking of +them." One may be said never to have thoroughly acquired a set of +muscular movements such as we have mentioned, until the cerebellum has +taken over the task and relieved the cerebrum of the conscious effort. +One's technique is never perfected until the cerebellum assumes control +and direction of the necessary movements and the impulses are sent +forth from below the plane of ordinary consciousness. + +_The Cerebrum._--The cerebrum, or "great brain" (which is regarded as +"the brain" by the average person), is situated in the upper portion of +the skull, and occupies by far the larger portion of the cavity of the +skull. It is divided into two great divisions or hemispheres. The best +of the modern authorities are agreed that the cerebrum has zones or +areas of specialized functioning, some of which receive the sensory +reports of the nerves and organs of sense, while others send forth the +motor impulses which result in voluntary physical action. Many of these +areas or zones have been located by science, while others remain as yet +unlocated. The probability is that in time science will succeed in +correctly locating the area or zone of each and every class of sensation +and motor impulse. + + +THE CORTEX. + +The area of thought, memory, and imagination has not been clearly +located, except that these mental states are believed to have their seat +in the _cortex_ or outer thin rind of gray brain matter which envelopes +and covers the mass of brain substance. It is, moreover, considered +probable that the higher processes of reasoning are performed in or by +the cortex of the frontal lobes. The cortex of a person of average +intelligence, if spread out on a flat surface, measures about four +square feet. The higher the degree of intelligence possessed by a lower +animal or human being, as a rule, the deeper and more numerous are the +folds or convolutions of the cortex, and the finer its structure. It may +be stated as a general rule, with but very few exceptions, that the +higher the degree of intelligence in a lower animal or human being, the +greater is the area of its cortex in proportion to the size of the +brain. The cortex, it must be remembered, is folded into deep furrows or +convolutions, the brain in shape, divisions, and convolutions resembling +the inner portion of an English walnut. The interior of the two +hemispheres of the cerebrum is composed largely of connective nerves +which doubtless serve to produce and maintain the unity of function of +the mental processes. + +While physiological psychology has performed great work in discovering +brain-centers and explaining much of the mechanism of mental processes, +it has but touched the most elementary and simple of the mental +processes. The higher processes have so far defied analysis or +explanation in the terms of physiology. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +Consciousness. + + +The fact of consciousness is the great mystery of psychology. It is +difficult even to define the term, although every person of average +intelligence understands what is sought to be conveyed by it. Webster +defines it as "knowledge of one's own existence, sensations, mental +operations, etc.; immediate knowledge or perception of any object, state, +or sensation; being aware; being sensible of." Another authority defines +the term as "the state of being aware of one's sensations; the power, +faculty, or mental state of being aware of one's own existence, +condition at the moment, thoughts, feelings, and actions." Halleck's +definition is: "That indefinable characteristic of mental states which +causes us to be aware of them." + +It will be seen that the idea of "awareness" is the essence of the idea +of consciousness. But, at the last, we are compelled to acknowledge that +it is impossible to closely define consciousness, for it is something so +entirely unique and different from anything else that we have no other +terms at all synonymous to it. We can define it only in its own terms, +as will be seen by reference to the definitions above given. And it is +equally impossible to clearly account for its appearance and being. +Huxley has well said: "How it is that anything so remarkable as a state +of consciousness comes about by the result of irritating nervous tissue, +is just as unaccountable as the appearance of the jinnee when Aladdin +rubbed his lamp." All that we can ever know regarding the nature of +consciousness must be learned from turning the consciousness in +ourselves back upon itself--by focusing consciousness upon its own +mental operations by means of introspection. By turning inward the +conscious gaze we may perceive the flow of the stream of thought from +its rise from the subconscious regions of the mind to its final +disappearance in the same region. + +It is a common error to suppose that we are directly conscious of +objects outside of ourselves. This is impossible, for there is no direct +knowledge of such outside objects. We are conscious merely of our +sensations of, or mental images of, the outside objects. All that it is +possible for us to be directly conscious of are our own mental +experiences or states. We cannot be directly conscious of anything +outside of our own minds. We are not directly conscious of the tree +which we _see_; we are directly conscious merely of the sensation of the +nerves arising from the impact of the light waves carrying the image of +the tree. We are not directly conscious of the tree when we touch it and +perceive its character in that way; we are directly conscious merely of +the sensation reported by the nerves in the finger tips which have come +in contact with the tree. We are directly conscious even of our own +bodies only in the same way. It is necessary for the mind to experience +that of which it may become conscious. We are conscious only of (1) that +which our mind is experiencing at this moment, or (2) that which it has +experienced in the past, and which is being re-experienced this moment +by the process of the memory, or which is being re-combined or +re-arranged this moment by the imagination. + + +SUBCONSCIOUS PLANES. + +But it must not be thought that every mental state or mental fact is in +the field of consciousness. This error has been exploded for many years. +The fact is now recognized that the field of consciousness is a very +narrow and limited one, and that the great field of mental activity lies +outside of its narrow limits. Beyond and outside of the narrow field of +consciousness lies the great subconscious storehouse of memory in which +are stored the experiences of the past, to be drawn again into the field +of consciousness by an effort of the will in the act of recollection, or +by association in ordinary remembrance. In that great region, also, the +mind manifests many of its activities and performs much of its work. In +that great region are evolved the emotions and feelings which play such +an important part in our lives, and which often manifest a vague +disturbing unrest long before they rise to the plane of consciousness. +In that great region are produced the ideas, feelings, and conceptions +which arise to the plane of consciousness and manifest that which men +call "genius." + +On the subconscious plane the imagination does much of its work, and +startles its owner by presenting him with the accomplished result in the +field of consciousness. In the subconscious field is performed that +peculiar process of mental mastication, digestion, and assimilation with +which all brain workers are familiar, and which absorbs the raw mental +material given it, separates, digests, and assimilates it, and +re-presents it to the conscious faculties sometime after as a +transformed substance. It has been estimated that at least eighty-five +per cent. of our mental activities are performed below or outside of the +field of consciousness. The psychology of to-day is paying much +attention to this formerly neglected great area or areas of the mind. +The psychology of to-morrow will pay still greater attention to it. + +The best of the modern authorities agree that in the great field of +subconscious mentation is to be found the explanation of much that is +unexplainable otherwise. In fact, it is probable that before long +consciousness will be regarded as a mere _focusing of attention_ upon +mental states, and the objects of consciousness merely as that portion +of the contents of the mind in the field of mental vision created by +such focusing. + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +Attention. + + +Intimately connected with the object of consciousness is that process of +the mind which we call "attention." Attention is generally defined as +"the application of the mind to a mental state." It is often referred to +as "concentrated consciousness," but others have ventured the somewhat +daring conjecture that consciousness itself is rather the result of +attention, instead of the latter being an incident of consciousness. We +shall not attempt to discuss this question here, except to state that +consciousness depends very materially upon the degree of attention +bestowed upon its object. The authorities place great importance upon +the intelligent direction of the attention, and hold that without this +the higher forms of knowledge are impossible. + +It is the common belief that we feel, see, hear, taste, or smell +whenever objects affecting those senses come in contact with the organs +of sense governing them. But this is only a partial truth. The real +truth is that we become conscious of the report of these senses only +when the attention is directed toward the sensation, voluntarily or +involuntarily. That is to say, that in many cases although the sense +nerves and organs report a disturbance, the mind does not become +consciously aware of the report unless the attention is directed toward +it either by an act of will or else by reflex action. For instance, the +clock may strike loudly, and yet we may not be conscious of the fact, +for we are concentrating our attention upon a book; or we may eat the +choicest food without tasting it, for we are listening intently to the +conversation of our charming neighbor. We may fail to perceive some +startling occurrence happening under our very eyes, for we are buried in +deep thought concerning something far removed from the present scene. +There are many cases on record showing that one may be so interested in +speaking, thinking, or acting that he will not experience pain that +would otherwise be intolerable. Writers have forgotten their pain in the +concentrated interest bestowed upon their work; mothers have failed to +feel pain when their infants required urgent attention; orators have +been so carried away by their own eloquence that they have failed to +feel the pricking of the pin by means of which their friends have sought +to attract their attention. Not only perception and feeling depend +largely upon attention, but the processes of reasoning, memory, and even +of will, depend upon attention for much of their manifestation. + +Psychologists divide attention into two general classes, viz.: (1) +voluntary attention and (2) involuntary attention. + +Voluntary attention is attention directed by the will to some object of +our own more or less deliberate selection. It requires a distinct effort +of the will in order to focus the attention in this way, and many +persons are scarcely aware of its existence, so seldom do they manifest +it. Voluntary attention is the result of training and practice, and +marks the man of strong will, concentration, and character. Some +authorities go so far as to say that much of that which is commonly +called "will power" is really but a developed form of voluntary +attention, the man of "strong will" holding before him the one idea +which he wishes to realize. + +Involuntary attention, often called "reflex attention," is attention +called forth by a nervous response to some sense stimulus. This is the +common form of attention, and is but the same form which is so strongly +manifested by children whose attention is caught by every new object, +but which cannot be held for any length of time by a familiar or +uninteresting one. + +It is of the utmost importance that one should cultivate his power of +voluntary attention. Not only is the will power strengthened and +developed in this way, but every mental faculty is developed by reason +thereof. The training of the voluntary attention is the first step in +mental development. + + +TRAINING THE ATTENTION. + +That the voluntary attention may be deliberately trained and developed +is a fact which many of the world's greatest men have proved for +themselves. There is only one way to train and develop any mental power +of faculty--and that is _by practice and use_. By practice, interest may +be given to objects previously uninteresting, and thus the use of the +attention develops the interest which further holds it. Interest is the +natural road over which attention travels easily, but interest itself +may be induced by concentrated attention. By studying and examining an +object, the attention brings to light many new and novel features +regarding the thing, and these produce a new interest which in turn +attracts further and continued attention. + +There is no royal road to the development of voluntary attention. The +only true method is _work_, _practice_, _and use_. You must practice on +uninteresting things, the primary interest being your desire to develop +the power of voluntary attention. But as you begin to attend to the +uninteresting thing you will become interested in the task for its own +sake. Take some object and "place your mind upon it." Think of its +nature, where it came from, its use, its associations, its probable +future, of things related to it, etc., etc. Keep the attention firmly +upon it, and shut out all outside ideas. Then, after a little practice +of this kind, lay aside the object for the time being, and take it up +again the next day, endeavoring to discover new points of interest in +it. The main thing to be sought is _to hold the thing in your mind_, and +this can be done only by _discovering features of interest in it_. The +interest-loving attention may rebel at this task at first, and will seek +to wander from the path into the green pastures which are found on each +side thereof. But you must bring the mind back to the task, again and +again. + +After a time the mind will become accustomed to the drill, and will even +begin to enjoy it. Give it some variety by occasionally changing the +objects of examination. The object need not always be something to be +looked at. Instead, select some subject in history or literature, and +"run it down," endeavoring to bring to light all the facts relating to +it that are possible to you. _Anything_ may be used as the subject or +object of your inquiry; but what is chosen must be held in the field of +conscious attention firmly and fixedly. The habit once acquired, you +will find the practice most fascinating. You will invent new subjects or +objects of inquiry, investigation, and thought, which in themselves +will well repay you for your work and time. But never lose sight of the +main point--the development of the power of voluntary attention. + +In studying the methods of developing and training the voluntary +attention, the student should remember that _any_ exercise which +develops the will, will result in developing the attention; and, +likewise, any exercise which develops the voluntary attention will tend +to strengthen the will. The will and attention are so closely bound +together that what affects one also influences the other. This fact +should be borne in mind, and the exercises and practices based upon it. + +In practicing concentration of voluntary attention, it should be +remembered that concentrating consists not only of _focusing_ the +attention upon a given object or subject, but also of the _shutting out_ +of impressions from other objects or subjects. Some authorities advise +that the student endeavor to listen to one voice among many, or one +instrument among the many of a band or orchestra. Others advise the +practice of concentrating on the reading of a book in a room filled by +persons engaged in conversation, and similar exercises. Whatever aids in +_narrowing the circle_ of attention at a given moment tends to develop +the power of voluntary attention. + +The study of mathematics and logic is also held to be an excellent +practice in concentration of voluntary attention, inasmuch as these +studies require close concentration and attention. Attention is also +developed by any study or practice which demands _analysis_ of a whole +into its parts, and then the _synthesis_ or building up of a whole from +its scattered parts. Each of the senses should play a part in the +exercises, and in addition to this the mind should be trained to +concentrate upon some one idea held within itself--some mental image or +abstract idea existing independently of any object of immediate sense +report. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +Perception. + + +It is a common mistake that we _perceive_ everything that is reported to +the mind by the senses. As a matter of fact we perceive but a very small +portion of the reports of the senses. There are thousands of sights +reported by our eyes, sounds reported by our ears, smells reported by +our nostrils, and contacts reported by our nerves of touch, every day of +our lives, but which are not _perceived_ or _observed_ by the mind. We +perceive and observe only when the attention, reflex or voluntary, is +directed to the report of the senses, and when the mind interprets the +report. While perception depends upon the reports of the senses for its +raw material, it depends entirely upon the application of the mind for +its complete manifestation. + +The student usually experiences great difficulty in distinguishing +between _sensation_ and _perception_. A sensation is a simple report of +the senses, which is received in consciousness. Perception is the +_thought_ arising from the _feeling_ of the sensation. Perception +usually combines several sensations into one thought or percept. By +sensation the mind _feels_; by perception it _knows_ that it feels, and +recognizes the object causing the sensation. Sensation merely brings a +report from outside objects, while perception identifies the report with +the object which caused it. Perception _interprets_ the reports of +sensation. Sensation reports a flash of light from above; perception +interprets the light as starlight, or moonlight, or sunlight, or as the +flash of a meteor. Sensation reports a sharp, pricking, painful contact; +perception interprets it as the prick of a pin. Sensation reports a red +spot on a green background; perception interprets it as a berry on a +bush. + +Moreover, while we may perceive a simple single sensation, our +perceptions are usually of a group of sensations. Perception is usually +employed in grouping sensations and identifying them with the object or +objects causing them. In its identification it draws upon whatever +memory of past experiences the mind may possess. Memory, imagination, +feeling, and thought are called into play, to some extent, in every +clear perception. The infant has but feeble perception, but as it gains +experience it begins to manifest perceptions and form percepts. +Sensations resemble the letters of the alphabet, and perception the +forming of words and sentences from the letters. Thus _c_, _a_, and _t_ +symbolize sensations, while the word "cat," formed from them, symbolizes +the perception of the object. + +It is held that all knowledge begins with sensation; that the mental +history of the race or individual begins with its first sensation. But, +while this is admitted, it must be remembered that sensation simply +provides the simple, elementary, raw material of thought. The first +process of _actual thought_, or knowledge, begins with perception. From +our percepts all of our higher concepts and ideas are formed. Perception +depends upon association of the sensation with other sensations +previously experienced; it is based upon experience. The greater the +experience, the greater is the possibility of perception, all else being +equal. + +When perception begins, the mind loses sight of the sensation in itself, +for it identifies it as a quality of the thing producing it. The +sensation of light is thought of as a quality of the star; the pricking +sensation is thought of as a quality of the pin or chestnut bur; the +sensation of odor is thought of as a quality of the rose. In the case of +the rose, the several sensations of sight, touch, and smell, in their +impression of the qualities of color, shape, softness, and perfume, are +grouped together in the percept of the complete object of the flower. + +A _percept_ is "that which is perceived; the object of the act of +perception." The percept, of course, is a mental state corresponding +with its outside object. It is a combination of several sensations +which are regarded as the qualities of the outside object, to which are +combined the memories of past experiences, ideas, feelings, and +thoughts. A percept, then, while the simplest form of thought, is seen +to be a mental state. The formation of a percept consists of three +gradual stages, viz.: (1) The attention forms definite conscious +sensations from indefinite nervous reports; (2) the mind interprets +these definite conscious sensations and attributes them to the outside +object causing them; (3) the related sensations are grouped together, +their unity perceived, and they are regarded as qualities of the outside +object. + +The plain distinction between a sensation and a percept may be fixed in +the mind by remembering the following: _A sensation is a feeling_; _a +percept is a simple thought identifying one or more sensations_. A +sensation is merely the conscious recognition of an excitation of a +nerve end; a percept results from a distinct mental process regarding +the sensation. + + +DEVELOPING PERCEPTION. + +It is of the utmost importance that we develop and train our powers of +perception. For our education depends very materially upon our +perceptive power. What matters it to us if the outside world be filled +with manifold objects, if we do not perceive them to exist? Upon +perception depends the material of our mental world. Many persons go +through the world without perceiving even the most obvious facts. Their +eyes and ears are perfect instruments, their nerves convey accurate +reports, but the perceptive faculties of the mind fail to observe and +interpret the report of the senses. They see and hear distinctly, but +the reports of the senses are not observed or noted by them; they mean +nothing to them. One may see many things, and yet _observe_ but few. It +is not upon what we see or hear that our stock of knowledge depends, so +much as it does upon what we perceive, notice, or observe. + +Not only is one's stock of practical knowledge largely based upon +developed perception, but one's success also depends materially upon the +same faculties. In business and professional life the successful man is +usually he who has developed perceptive powers; he who has learned to +perceive, observe, and note. The man who perceives and takes mental +notes of what occurs in his world is the man who is apt to know things +when such knowledge is needed. In this age of "book education" we find +that the young people are not nearly so observant as are those children +who had to depend upon the powers of perception for their knowledge. The +young Arab or Indian will observe more in an hour than the civilized +child will in a day. To live in a world of books tends, in many cases, +to weaken the powers of observation and perception. + +Perception may be developed by practice. Begin by taking notice of the +things seen and heard in your usual walks. Keep wide open the eyes of +the mind. Notice the faces of people, their walk, their characteristics. +Look for interesting and odd things, and you will see them. Do not go +through life in a daydream, but keep a sharp lookout for things of +interest and value. The most familiar things will repay you for the time +and work of examining them in detail, and the practice gained by such +tasks will prove valuable in your development of perception. + +An authority remarks that very few persons, even those living in the +country, know whether a cow's ears are above, below, behind, or in front +of her horns; nor whether cats descend trees head first or tail first. +Very few persons can distinguish between the leaves of the various kinds +of familiar trees in their neighborhood. Comparatively few persons are +able to describe the house in which they live, at least beyond the most +general features--the details are unknown. + +Houdin, the French conjurer, was able to pass by a shop window and +perceive every article in it, and then repeat what he had seen. But he +acquired this skill only by constant and gradual practice. He himself +decried his skill and claimed that it was as nothing compared to that of +the fashionable woman who can pass another woman on the street and "take +in" her entire attire, from head to foot, at one glance, and "be able to +describe not only the fashion and quality of the stuffs, but also say if +the lace be real or only machine made." A former president of Yale is +said to have been able to glance at a book and read a quarter of a page +at one time. + +Any study or occupation which requires _analysis_ will develop the power +of perception. Consequently, if we will analyze the things we see, +resolving them into their parts or elements, we will likewise develop +the perceptive faculties. It is a good exercise to examine some small +object and endeavor to discover as many separate points of perception as +possible, noting them on a sheet of paper. The most familiar object, if +carefully examined, will yield rich returns. + +If two persons will enter into a contest of this kind, the spirit of +rivalry and competition will quicken the powers of observation. Those +who have had the patience and perseverance to systematically practice +exercises of this kind, report that they notice a steady improvement +from the very start. But even if one does not feel inclined to practice +in this way, it will be found possible _to begin to take notice_ of the +details of things one sees, the expression of persons' faces, the +details of their dress, their tone of voice, the quality of the goods we +handle, and _the little things especially_. Perception, like attention, +follows interest; but, likewise, interest may be created in things by +observing their details, peculiarities, and characteristics. + +The best knowledge gained by one is that resulting from his own personal +perception. There is a nearness and trueness about that which one +_knows_ in this way which is lacking in that which he merely _believes_ +because he has read or heard it. One can make such knowledge a part of +himself. Not only is one's knowledge dependent upon what he perceives, +but his very character also results from the character of his percepts. +The influence of environment is great--and what is environment but +things perceived about one? It is not so much what lies outside of one, +as what part of it gets _inside_ of one by perception. By directing his +attention to desirable objects, and perceiving as much of them as is +possible, one really builds his own character at will. + +The world needs good "perceivers" in all the walks of life. It finds a +shortage of them, and is demanding them loudly, being willing to pay a +good price for their services. The person who can voluntarily perceive +and observe the details of any profession, business, or trade will go +far in that vocation. The education of children should take the faculty +of perception into active consideration. The kindergarten has taken some +steps in this direction, but there is much more to be done. + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +Memory. + + +Psychologists class as "representative mental processes" those known as +memory and imagination, respectively. The term "representation" is used +in psychology to indicate the processes of re-presentation or presenting +again to consciousness that which has formerly been presented to it but +which afterward passed from its field. As Hamilton says: "The general +capability of knowledge necessarily requires that, besides the power of +evoking out of unconsciousness one portion of our retained knowledge in +preference to another, we possess the faculty of representing in +consciousness what is thus evoked." + +Memory is the primary representative faculty or power of the mind. +Imagination depends upon memory for its material, as we shall see when +we consider that faculty. Every mental process which involves the +remembrance, recollection, or representation of a sensation, perception, +mental image, thought, or idea previously experienced must depend upon +memory for its material. Memory is the great storehouse of the mind in +which are placed the records of previous mental experiences. It is a +part of the great subconscious field of mental activity, and the +greater part of its work is performed below the plane of consciousness. +It is only when its results are passed into the field of consciousness +that we are aware of its existence. We know memory only by its works. Of +its nature we know but little, although certain of its principal laws +and principles have been discovered. + +It was formerly customary to class memory with the various faculties of +the mind, but later psychology no longer so considers it. Memory is now +regarded as a power of the general mind, manifesting in connection with +every faculty of the mind. It is now regarded as belonging to the great +subconscious field of mentation, and its explanation must be sought +there. It is utterly unexplainable otherwise. + +The importance of memory cannot be overestimated. Not only does a man's +character and education depend chiefly upon it, but his very mental +being is bound up with it. If there were no memory, man would never +progress mentally beyond the mental state of the newborn babe. He would +never be able to profit by experience. He would never be able to form +clear perceptions. He would never be able to reason or form judgments. +The processes of thought depend for material upon the memory of past +experiences; this material lacking, there can be no thought. + +Memory has two important general functions, viz.: (1) The _retention_ of +impressions and experiences; and (2) the _reproduction_ of the +impressions and experiences so retained. + +It was formerly held that the memory retained only a portion of the +impressions and experiences originally noted by it. But the present +theory is that it retains every impression and experience which is noted +by it. It is true that many of these impressions are never reproduced in +consciousness, but experiments tend to prove, nevertheless, that the +records are still in the memory and that appropriate and sufficiently +strong stimuli will bring them into the field of consciousness. The +phenomena of somnambulism, dreams, hysteria, delirium, approach of +death, etc., show that the subconscious mind has an immense accumulation +of apparently forgotten facts, which unusual stimuli will serve to +recall. + +The power of the memory to reproduce the retained impressions and +experiences is variously called remembrance, recollection, or memory. +This power varies materially in various individuals, but it is an axiom +of psychology that the memory of any person may be developed and trained +by practice. The ability to recall depends to a great extent upon the +clearness and depth of the original impression, which in turn depends +upon the degree of attention given to it at the time of its occurrence. +Recollection is also greatly aided by the law of association, or the +principle whereby one mental fact is linked to another. The more facts +to which a given fact is linked, the greater the ease by which it is +recalled or remembered. Recollection is also greatly assisted by use and +exercise. Like the fingers, the memory cells of the brain become expert +and efficient by use and exercise, or stiff and inefficient by lack of +the same. + +In addition to the phases of retention and reproduction, there are two +important phases of memory, viz.: (3) Recognition of the reproduced +impression or experience; and (4) localization of the impression, or its +reference to a more or less definite time and place. + +The recognition of the recalled impression is quite important. It is not +enough that the impression be retained and recalled. If we are not able +to recognize the recalled impression as having been experienced before, +the recollection will be of but little use to us in our thought +processes; the purposes of thought demand that we shall be able to +identify the recalled impression with the original one. Recognition is +really re-cognition--re-knowing. Recognition is akin to perception. The +mind becomes conscious of the recalled impression just as it becomes +conscious of the sensation. It then recognizes the relation of the +recalled impression to the original one just as it realizes the relation +of the sensation to its object. + +The localization of the recalled and recognized impression is also +important. Even if we recognize the recalled impression, it will be of +comparatively little use to us unless we are able to locate it as having +happened yesterday, last week, last month, last year, ten years ago, or +at some time in the past; and as having happened in our office, house, +or in such-and-such a place in the street, or in some distant place. +Without the power of localization we should be unable to connect and +associate the remembered fact with the time, place, and persons with +which it should be placed to be of use and value to us in our thought +processes. + + +RETENTION. + +The retention of a mental impression in the memory depends very +materially upon the clearness and depth of the original impression. And +this clearness and depth, as we have previously stated, depend upon the +degree of attention bestowed upon the original impression. Attention, +then, is the important factor in the forming and recording of +impressions. The rule is: _Slight attention, faint record_; _marked +attention, clear and deep record_. To fix this fact in the mind, the +student may think of the retentive and reproductive phases of memory as +a phonographic record. The receiving diaphragm of the phonograph +represents the sense organs, and the recording needle represents the +_attention_. The needle makes the record on the cylinder deep or faint +according to the condition of the needle. A loud sound may be recorded +but faintly, if the needle is not properly adjusted. And, further, it +must be remembered that the strength of the reproduction depends almost +entirely upon the clearness and depth of the original impression on the +cylinder; as is the record, so is the reproduction. It will be well for +the student to carry this symbol of the phonograph in his mind; it will +aid him in developing his powers of memory. + +In this connection we should remember that attention depends largely +upon interest. Therefore we would naturally expect to find that we +remember interesting things far more readily than those which lack +interest. This supposition is borne out in actual experience. This +accounts for the fact that every one remembers a certain class of things +better than he does others. One remembers faces, another dates, another +spoken conversation, another written words, and so on. It will be found, +as a rule, that each person is interested in the class of things which +he most easily remembers. The artist easily remembers faces and details +of faces, or scenery and details thereof. The musician easily recalls +passages or bars of music, often of a most complicated nature. The +speculator easily recalls the quotations of his favorite stocks. The +racing man recalls without difficulty the "odds" posted on a certain +horse on a certain day, or the details of a race which was run many +years ago. The moral is: _Arouse and induce an interest in the things +which you wish to remember_. This interest may be aroused by studying +the things in question, as we have suggested in a preceding chapter. + + +VISUALIZATION IN MEMORY. + +Many of the best authorities hold that original impressions may be made +clear and deep, and the process of reproduction accordingly rendered +more efficient, by the practice of _visualizing_ the thing to be +remembered. By visualizing is meant the formation of a _mental image_ of +the thing in the imagination. If you wish to remember the appearance of +anything, look at it closely, with attention, and then turning away from +it endeavor to reproduce its appearance as a mental picture in the mind. +If this is done, a particularly clear impression will be made in the +memory, and when you recall the thing you will find that you will also +recall the clear mental image of it. Of course the greater the number +of details observed and included in the original mental image, the +greater the remembered detail. + + +PERCEPTION IN MEMORY. + +Not only is attention necessary in forming clear memory records, but +careful perception is also important. Without clear perception there is +a lack of detail in the retained record, and the element of association +is lacking. It is not enough to merely remember the thing itself; we +should also remember _what_ it is, and all about it. The practice of the +methods of developing perception, given in a preceding lesson, will tend +to develop and train the retentive, reproductive, recognitive, and +locative powers of the memory. The rule is: _The greater the degree of +perception accorded a thing, the greater the detail of the retained +impression, and the greater the ease of the recollection_. + + +UNDERSTANDING AND MEMORY. + +Another important point in acquiring impressions in memory is this: +_That the better the understanding of the subject or object, the clearer +the impressions regarding it, and the clearer the recollection of it_. +This fact is proved by experiment and experience. A subject which will +be remembered only with difficulty under ordinary circumstances will be +easily remembered if it is fully explained to the person, and +accompanied by a few familiar illustrations or examples. It is very +difficult to remember a meaningless string of words, while a sentence +which conveys a clear meaning may be memorized easily. If we understand +_what a thing is for_, its uses and employment, we remember it far more +easily than if we lack this understanding. Elbringhaus, who conducted a +number of experiments along this line, reports that he could memorize a +stanza of poetry in about one tenth the time required to memorize the +same amount of nonsense syllables. Gordy states that he once asked a +capable student of the Johns Hopkins University to give him an account +of a lecture to which he had just listened. "I cannot do it," replied +the student; "it was not logical." The rule is: _The more one knows +about a certain thing, the more easily is that thing remembered_. This +is a point worth noting. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +Memory--Continued. + + +The subject of memory cannot be touched upon intelligently without a +consideration of the Law of Association, one of the important +psychological principles. + + +THE LAW OF ASSOCIATION. + +What is known in psychology as the Law of Association is based on the +fact that _no idea exists in the mind except in association with other +ideas_. This is not generally recognized, and the majority of persons +will dispute the law at first thought. But the existence and appearance +of ideas in the mind are governed by a mental law as invariable and +constant as the physical law of gravitation. Every idea has associations +with other ideas. Ideas travel in groups, and one group is associated +with another group, and so on, until in the end every idea in one's mind +is associated directly or indirectly with every other idea. +Theoretically, at least, it would be possible to begin with one idea in +the mind of a person, and then gradually unwind his entire stock of +ideas like the yarn on the ball. Our thoughts proceed according to this +law. We sit down in a "brown study" and proceed from one subject to +another, until we are unable to remember any connection between the +first thought and the last. But each step of the reverie was connected +with the one preceding and the one succeeding it. It is interesting to +trace back these connections. Poe based one of his celebrated detective +stories on this law. The reverie may be broken into by a sudden +impression from outside, and we will then proceed from that impression, +connecting it with something else already in our experience, and +starting a new chain of sequence. + +Often we fail to trace the associations governing our ideas, but the +chain is there nevertheless. One may think of a past scene or experience +without any apparent cause. A little thought will show that something +seen, or a few notes of a song floating to the ears, or the fragrance of +a flower, has supplied the connecting link between the past and the +present. A suggestion of mignonette will recall some past event in which +the perfume played a part; some one's handkerchief, perhaps, carried the +same odor. Or an old familiar tune reminds one of some one, something, +or some place in the past. A familiar feature in the countenance of a +passer-by will start one thinking of some one else who had that kind of +a mouth, that shaped nose, or that expression of the eye--and away he +will be off in a sequence of remembered experiences. Often the starting +idea, or the connecting links, may appear but dimly in consciousness; +but rest assured they are always there. In fact, we frequently accept +this law, unconsciously and without realizing its actual existence. For +instance, one makes a remark, and at once we wonder, "How did he come to +think of that?" and, if we are shrewd, we may discover what was in his +mind before he spoke. + +There are two general classes of association of ideas in memory, viz.: +(1) Association of contiguity, and (2) logical association. + +Association of contiguity is that form of association depending upon the +previous association in time or space of ideas which have been impressed +on the mind. For instance, if you met Mr. and Mrs. Wetterhorn and were +introduced to them one after the other, thereafter you will naturally +remember Mr. W. when you think of Mrs. W., and vice versa. You will +naturally remember Napoleon when you think of Wellington, or Benedict +Arnold when you think of Major André, for the same reason. You will also +naturally remember _b_ and _c_ when you think of _a_. Likewise, you will +think of abstract time when you think of abstract space, of thunder when +you think of lightning, of colic when you recall green apples, of love +making and moonlight nights when you think of college days. In the same +way we remember things which occurred just before or just after the +event in our mind at the moment; of things near in space to the thing of +which we are thinking. + +Logical association depends upon the relation of likeness or difference +between several things thought of. Things thus associated may have never +come into the mind at the same previous time, nor are they necessarily +connected in time and space. One may think of a book, and then proceed +by association to think of another book by the same author, or of +another author treating of the same subject. Or he may think of a book +directly opposed to the first, the relation of distinct difference +causing the associated idea. Logical association depends upon _inner +relations_, and not upon the outer relations of time and space. This +_innerness_ of relation between things not connected in space or time is +discovered only by experience and education. The educated man realizes +many points of relationship between things that are thought by the +uneducated man to be totally unrelated. Wisdom and knowledge consist +largely in the recognition of relations between things. + + +ASSOCIATION IN MEMORY. + +It follows from a consideration of the Law of Association that when one +wishes to impress a thing upon the memory he should, as an authority +says, "Multiply associations; entangle the fact you wish to remember in +a net of as many associations as possible, especially those that are +logical." Hence the advice to place your facts in groups and classes in +the memory. As Blackie says: "Nothing helps the mind so much as order +and classification. Classes are always few, individuals many; to know +the class well is to know what is most essential in the character of the +individual, and what burdens the memory least to retain." + + +REPETITION IN MEMORY. + +Another important principle of memory is that the impressions acquire +depth and clearness by repetition. Repeat a line of poetry once, and you +may remember it; repeat it again, and your chances of remembering it are +greatly increased; repeat it a sufficient number of times, and you +cannot escape remembering it. The illustration of the phonograph record +will help you to understand the reason of this. The rule is: _Constant +repetition deepens memory impressions; frequent reviewing and recalling +what has been memorized tends to keep the records clear and clean, +beside deepening the impression at each review_. + + +GENERAL RULES OF MEMORY. + +The following general rules will be of service to the student who wishes +to develop his memory:-- + + +_Making Impressions._ + + (1) Bestow attention. + (2) Cultivate interest. + (3) Manifest perception. + (4) Cultivate understanding. + (5) Form associations. + (6) Repeat and review. + + +_Recalling Impressions._ + +(1) Endeavor to get hold of the loose end of association, and then +unwind your memory ball of yarn. + +(2) When you recall an impression, send it back with energy to deepen +the impression, and attach it to as many new associations as possible. + +(3) Practice a little memorizing and recalling each day, if only a line +of verse. The memory improves by practice, and deteriorates by neglect +and disuse. + +(4) Demand good service of your memory, and it will learn to respond. +Learn to trust it, and it will rise to the occasion. How can you expect +your memory to give good service when you continually abuse it and tell +every one of "the wretched memory I have; I can never remember +anything"? Your memory is very apt to accept your statements as truth; +our mental faculties have an annoying habit of taking us at our word in +these matters. Tell your memory what you expect it to do; then trust it +and refrain from abusing it and giving it a bad name. + + +FINAL ADVICE. + +Finally, remember this rule: You get out of your memory only that which +you place in it. Place in it good, clear, deep impressions, and it will +reproduce good, clear, strong recollections. Think of your memory as a +phonographic record, and take care that you place the right kind of +impressions upon it. In memory you reap that which you have sown. You +must give to the memory before you can receive from it. Of one thing you +may rest assured, namely, that unless you take sufficient interest in +the things to be remembered, you will find that the memory will not take +sufficient interest in them to remember them. Memory demands interest +before it will take interest in the task. It demands attention before it +will give attention. It demands understanding before it will give +understanding. It demands association before it will respond to +association. It demands repetition before it will repeat. The memory is +a splendid instrument, but it stands on its dignity and asserts its +rights. It belongs to the old dispensation--it demands compensation and +believes in giving only in equal measure to what it receives. Our advice +is to get acquainted with your memory, and make friends with it. Treat +it well and it will serve you well. But neglect it, and it will turn its +back on you. + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +Imagination. + + +The imagination belongs to the general class of mental processes called +the representative faculties, by which is meant the processes in which +there are re-presented, or presented again, to consciousness impressions +previously presented to it. + +As we have indicated elsewhere, the imagination is dependent upon memory +for its materials--its records of previous impressions. But imagination +is more than mere memory or recollection of these previously experienced +and recorded impressions. There is, in addition to the re-presentation +and recollection, a process of arranging the recalled impressions into +new forms and new combinations. The imagination not only gathers +together the old impressions, but also _creates_ new combinations and +forms from the material so gathered. + +Psychology gives us many hairsplitting definitions and distinctions +between simple reproductive imagination and memory, but these +distinctions are technical and as a rule perplexing to the average +student. In truth, there is very little, if any, difference between +simple reproductive imagination and memory, although when the +imagination indulges in constructive activity a new feature enters into +the process which is absent in pure memory operations. In simple +reproductive imagination there is simply the formation of the mental +image of some previous experience--the reproduction of a previous mental +image. This differs very little from memory, except that the recalled +image is clearer and stronger. In the same way in ordinary memory, in +the manifestation of recollection, there is often the same clear, strong +mental image that is produced in reproductive imagination. The two +mental processes blend into each other so closely that it is practically +impossible to draw the line between them, in spite of the technical +differences urged by the psychologists. Of course the mere remembrance +of a person who presents himself to one is nearer to pure memory than to +imagination, for the process is that of recognition. But the memory or +remembrance of the same person when he is absent from sight is +practically that of reproductive imagination. Memory, in its stage of +recognition, exists in the child mind before reproductive imagination is +manifested. The latter, therefore, is regarded as a higher mental +process. + +But still higher in the scale is that which is known as _constructive +imagination_. This form of imagination appears at a later period of +child mentation, and is regarded as a later evolution of mental +processes of the race. Gordy makes the following distinction between the +two phases of imagination: "The difference between reproductive +imagination and constructive imagination is that the images resulting +from reproductive imagination are _copies of past experience_, while +those resulting from constructive imagination are not. * * * To learn +whether any particular image, or combination of images, is the product +of reproductive or constructive imagination, all we have to do is to +learn whether or not it is a copy of a past experience. Our memories, of +course, are defective, and we may be uncertain on that account; but +apart from that, we need be in no doubt whatever." + +Many persons hearing for the first time the statement of psychologists +that the imaginative faculties can re-present and re-produce or +re-combine only the images which have previously been impressed upon the +mind, are apt to object that they can, and frequently do, image things +which they have not previously experienced. But can they and do they? Is +it not true that what they believe to be original creations of the +imagination are merely _new combinations_ of original impressions? For +instance, no one ever saw a unicorn, and yet some one originally +imagined its form. But a little thought will show that the image of the +unicorn is merely that of an animal having the head, neck, and body of +a horse, with the beard of a goat, the legs of a buck, the tail of a +lion, and a long, tapering horn, spirally twisted, in the middle of the +forehead. Each of the several parts of the unicorn exists in some living +animal, although the unicorn, composed of all of these parts, is +non-existent outside of fable. In the same way the centaur is composed +of the body, legs, and tail of the horse and the trunk, head, and arms +of a man. The satyr has the head, body, and arms of a man, with the +horns, legs, and hoofs of a goat. The mermaid has the head, arms, and +trunk of a woman, joined at the waist to the body and tail of a fish. +The mythological "devil" has the head, body, and arms of a man, with the +horns, legs, and cloven foot of the lower animal, and a peculiar tail +composed of that of some animal but tipped with a spearhead. Each of +these characteristics is composed of familiar images of experience. The +imagination may occupy itself for a lifetime turning out impossible +animals of this kind, but every part thereof will be found to correspond +to something existent in nature, and experienced by the mind of the +person creating the strange beast. + +In the same way the imagination may picture a familiar person or thing +acting in an unaccustomed manner, the latter having no basis in fact so +far as the individual person or thing is concerned, but being warranted +by some experience concerning other persons or things. For instance, one +may easily form the image of a dog swimming under water like a fish, or +climbing a tree like a cat. Likewise, one may form a mental image of a +learned, bewigged High Chancellor, or a venerable Archbishop of +Canterbury, dressed like a clown, standing on his head, balancing a +colored football on his feet, sticking his tongue in his cheek and +winking at the audience. In the same way one may imagine a railroad +running across a barren desert, or a steep mountain, upon which there is +not as yet a rail laid. The bridge across a river may be imaged in the +same way. In fact, this is the way that everything is mentally created, +constructed, or invented--the old materials being combined in a new way, +and arranged in a new fashion. Some psychologists go so far as to say +that no mental image of memory is an exact reproduction of the original +impression; that there are always changes due to the unconscious +operation of the constructive imagination. + +The constructive imagination is able to "tear things to pieces" in +search for material, as well as to "join things together" in its work of +building. The importance of the imagination in all the processes of +intellectual thought is great. Without imagination man could not reason +or manifest any intellectual process. It is impossible to consider the +subject of thought without first regarding the processes of imagination. +And yet it is common to hear persons speak of the imagination as if it +were a faculty of mere fancy, useless and without place in the practical +world of thought. + + +DEVELOPING THE IMAGINATION. + +The imagination is capable of development and training. The general +rules for development of the imagination are practically those which we +have stated in connection with the development of the memory. There is +the same necessity for plenty of material; for the formation of clear +and deep impressions and clear-cut mental images; the same necessity for +repeated impression, and the frequent use and employment of the faculty. +The practice of visualization, of course, strengthens the power of the +imagination as it does that of the memory, the two powers being +intimately related. The imagination may be strengthened and trained by +deliberately recalling previous impressions and then combining them into +new relations. The materials of memory may be torn apart and then +re-combined and re-grouped. In the same way one may enter into the +feelings and thoughts of other persons by imagining one's self in their +place and endeavoring to act out in imagination the life of such +persons. In this way one may build up a much fuller and broader +conception of human nature and human motives. + +In this place, also, we should caution the student against the common +waste of the powers of the imagination, and the dissipation of its +powers in idle fancies and daydreams. Many persons misuse their +imagination in this way and not only weaken its power for effective work +but also waste their time and energy. Daydreams are notoriously unfit +for the real, practical work of life. + + +IMAGINATION AND IDEALS. + +And, finally, the student should remember that in the category of the +imaginative powers must be placed that phase of mental activity which +has so much to do with the making or marring of one's life--the +formation of ideals. Our ideals are the patterns after which we shape +our life. According to the nature of our ideals is the character of the +life we lead. + +Our ideals are the supports of that which we call _character_. + +It is a truth, old as the race, and now being perceived most clearly by +thinkers, that indeed "as a man thinketh in his heart so is he." The +influence of our ideals is perceived to affect not only our character +but also our place and degree of success in life. We grow to be that of +which we have held ideals. If we create an ideal, either of general +qualities or else these qualities as manifested by some person living or +dead, and keep that ideal ever before us, we cannot help developing +traits and qualities corresponding to those of our ideal. Careful +thought will show that character depends greatly upon the nature of our +ideals; therefore we see the effect of the imagination in character +building. + +Moreover, our imagination has an important bearing on our actions. Many +a man has committed an imprudent or immoral act which he would not have +done had he been possessed of an imagination which showed him the +probable results of the action. In the same way many men have been +inspired to great deeds and achievements by reason of their imagination +picturing to them the possible results of certain action. The "big +things" in all walks of life have been performed by men who had +sufficient imagination to picture the possibilities of certain courses +or plans. The railroads, bridges, telegraph lines, cable lines, and +other works of man are the results of the imagination of some men. The +good fairy godmother always provides a vivid and lively imagination +among the gifts she bestows upon her beloved godchildren. Well did the +old philosopher pray to the gods: "And, with all, give unto me a clear +and active imagination." + +The dramatic values of life depend upon the quality of the imagination. +Life without imagination is mechanical and dreary. Imagination may +increase the susceptibility to pain, but it pays for this by increasing +the capacity for joy and happiness. The pig has but little +imagination,--little pain and little joy,--but who envies the pig? The +person with a clear and active imagination is in a measure a creator of +his world, or at least a re-creator. He takes an active part in the +creative activities of the universe, instead of being a mere pawn pushed +here and there in the game of life. + +Again, the divine gift of sympathy and understanding depends materially +upon the possession of a good imagination. One can never understand the +pain or problems of another unless he first can imagine himself in the +place of the other. Imagination is at the very heart of sympathy. One +may be possessed of great capacity for feeling, but owing to his lack of +imagination may never have this feeling called into action. The person +who would sympathize with others must first learn to understand them and +feel their emotions. This he can do only if he has the proper degree of +imagination. Those who reach the heart of the people must first be +reached by the feelings of the people. And this is possible only to him +whose imagination enables him to picture himself in the same condition +as others, and thus awaken his latent feelings and sympathies and +understanding. Thus it is seen that the imagination touches not only our +intellectual life but also our emotional nature. Imagination is the very +life of the soul. + + + + +CHAPTER X. + +The Feelings. + + +In thinking of the mind and its activities we are accustomed to the +general idea that the mental processes are chiefly those of intellect, +reason, thought. But, as a fact, the greater part of the mental +activities are those concerned with feeling and emotion. The intellect +is the youngest child of the mind, and while making its presence +strenuously known in the manner of all youngest children so that one is +perhaps justified in regarding it as "the whole thing" in the family, +nevertheless it really plays but a comparatively small part in the +general work of the mental family. The activities of the "feeling" side +of life greatly outnumber those of the "thinking" side, are far stronger +in their influence and effect, as a rule, and, in fact, so color the +intellectual processes, unconsciously, as to constitute their +distinctive quality except in the case of a very few advanced thinkers. + +But there is a difference between "feeling" and "emotion," as the terms +are employed in psychology. The former is the simple phase, the latter +the complex. Generally speaking, the resemblance or difference is akin +to that existing between sensation and perception, as explained in a +previous chapter. Beginning with the simple, in order later on to reach +the complex, we shall now consider that which is known as simple +"feeling." + +The term "feeling," as used in this connection in psychology, has been +defined as "the simple _agreeable_ or _disagreeable_ side of any mental +state." These agreeable or disagreeable sides of mental states are quite +distinct from the act of knowing, which accompanies them. One may +perceive and thus "know" that another is speaking to him and be fully +aware of the words being used and of their meaning. Ordinarily, and so +far as pure thought processes are concerned, this would complete the +mental state. But we must reckon on the feeling side as well as on the +thinking side of the mental state. Accordingly we find that the +knowledge of the words of the other person and the meaning thereof +results in a mental state agreeable or disagreeable. In the same way the +reading of the words of a book, the hearing of a song, or a sight or +scene perceived, may result in a more or less strong feeling, agreeable +or disagreeable. This sense of agreeable or disagreeable consciousness +is the essential characteristic of what we call "feeling." + +It is very difficult to explain feeling except in its own terms. We +know very well what we mean, or what another means, when it is said that +we or he "_feels_ sad," or has "a joyous feeling," or "a feeling of +interest." And yet we shall find it very hard to explain the mental +state except in terms of feeling itself. Our knowledge depends entirely +upon our previous experience of the feeling. As an authority says: "If +we have never felt pleasure, pain, fear, or sorrow, a quarto volume +cannot make us understand what such a mental state is." Every mental +state is not distinguished by strong feeling. There are certain mental +states which are concerned chiefly with intellectual effort, and in +which all trace of feeling seems to be absent, unless, as some have +claimed, the "feeling" of interest or the lack of same is a faint form +of the feeling of pleasure or pain. Habit may dull the feeling of a +mental state until it is apparently neutral, but there is generally a +faint feeling of like or dislike still left. + +The elementary forms of feeling are closely allied with those of simple +sensation. But experiments have revealed that there is a distinction in +consciousness. It has been discovered that one is often conscious of the +"touch" of a heated object before he is of the feeling or pain resulting +from it. Psychologists have pointed out another distinction, namely: +When we experience a sensation we are accustomed to refer it to the +outside thing which is the object of it, as when we touch the heated +object; but when we experience a feeling we instinctively refer it to +ourself, as when the heated object gives us pain. As an authority has +said: "My feelings belong to me; but my sensations seem to belong to the +object which caused them." + +Another proof of the difference and distinction between sensation and +feeling is the fact that the same sensation will produce different +feelings in different persons experiencing the former, even at the same +time. For instance, the same sight will cause one person to feel elated, +and the other depressed; the same words will produce a feeling of joy in +one, and a feeling of sorrow in another. The same sensation will produce +different feelings in the same person at different times. An authority +well says: "You drop your purse, and you see it lying on the ground as +you stoop to pick it up, with no feeling either of pleasure or pain. But +if you see it after you have lost it and have hunted for it a long time +in vain, you have a pronounced feeling of pleasure." + +There is a vast range of degree and kind in feeling. Gordy says: "All +forms of pleasure and pain are called feelings. Between the pleasure +which comes from eating a peach and that which results from solving a +difficult problem, or learning good news of a friend, or thinking of +the progress of civilization--between the pain that results from a cut +in the hand and that which results from the failure of a long-cherished +plan or the death of a friend--there is a long distance. But the one +group are all pleasures; the other all pains. And, whatever the source +of the pleasure or pain, it is alike feeling." + +There are many different kinds of feelings. Some arise from sensations +of physical comfort or discomfort; others from purely physiological +conditions; others from the satisfaction of accustomed tastes, or the +dissatisfaction arising from the stimulation of unaccustomed tastes; +others from the presence or absence of comfort; others from the presence +or absence of things or persons for whom we have an affection or liking. +Over-indulgence often transforms the feeling of pleasure into that of +pain; and, likewise, habit and practice may cause us to experience a +pleasurable feeling from that which formerly inspired feeling of an +opposite kind. Feelings also differ in degree; that is to say, some +things cause us to experience pleasurable feelings of a greater +intensity than do others, and some cause us to experience painful +feelings of a greater intensity than do others. These degrees of +intensity depend more or less upon the habit or experience of the +individual. As a general rule, feelings may be classified into (1) +those arising from physical sensations, and (2) those arising from +ideas. + +The feelings depending upon physical sensations arise either from +inherited tendencies and inclinations or from acquired habits and +experience. It is an axiom of the evolutionary school that any physical +activity that has been a habit of the race, long continued, becomes an +instinctive pleasure-giving activity in the individual. For instance, +the race for many generations was compelled to hunt, fish, travel, swim, +etc., in order to maintain existence. The result is that we, the +descendants, are apt to find pleasure in the same activities as sport, +games, exercise, etc. Many of our tendencies and feelings are inherited +in this way. To these we have added many acquired habits of physical +activity, which follow the same rule, _i.e._, that habit and practice +impart more or less pleasurable feeling. We find more pleasure in doing +those things which we can do easily or quite well than in the opposite +kind of things. + +The feelings depending upon ideas may also arise from inheritance. Many +of our mental tendencies and inclinations have come down to us from the +past. There are certain feelings that are born in one, without a doubt; +that is to say, there is a great capacity for such feelings which will +be transformed into manifestation upon the presentation of the proper +stimulus. Other mental feelings depend upon our individual past +experience, association, or suggestions from others--upon our past +environment, in fact. The ideals of those around us will cause us to +experience pleasure or pain, as the case may be, under certain +circumstances; the force of suggestion along these lines is very strong +indeed. Not only do we experience feelings in response to present +sensations, but the recollection of some previous experience will also +arouse feeling. In fact, feelings of this kind are closely bound up with +memory and imagination. Persons of vivid imagination are apt to feel far +more than others. They suffer more, and enjoy more. Our sympathies, +which depend largely upon our imaginative power, are the cause of many +of our feelings of this kind. + +Many of the facts which we generally ascribe to feeling are really a +part of the phenomena of emotion, the latter being the more complex +phase of feeling. For the purposes of this consideration we have +regarded simple feeling as the raw material of emotion, the relation +being compared to that existing between sensation and perception. In our +consideration of emotion we shall see the fuller manifestation of +feeling, and its more complex expressions. + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + +The Emotions. + + +As we have seen in the preceding lessons, an emotion is the more complex +phase of feeling. As a rule an emotion arises from a number of feelings. +Moreover, it is of a higher order of mental activity. As we have seen, a +feeling may arise either from a physical sensation or from an idea. +Emotion, however, as a rule, is dependent upon _an idea_ for its +expression, and always upon an idea for its direction and its +continuance. Feeling, of course, is the elemental spirit of all +emotional states, and, as an authority has said, is the thread upon +which the emotional states are strung. + +Halleck says: "When representative ideas appear, the feeling in +combination with them produces emotion. After the waters of the Missouri +combine with another stream, they receive a different name, although +they flow toward the gulf in as great volume as before. Suppose we liken +the feeling due to sensation to the Missouri River; the train of +representative ideas to the Mississippi before its junction with the +Missouri. Emotion may then be likened to the Mississippi _after_ its +junction--after feeling has combined with representative ideas. The +emotional stream will not be broader and deeper than before. This +analogy is employed only to make the distinction clearer. The student +must remember that mental powers are never actually as distinct as two +rivers before their union. * * * The student must beware of thinking +that we have done with feeling when we consider emotion. Just as the +waters of the Missouri flow on until they reach the gulf, so does +feeling run through every emotional state." In the above analogy the +term "representative ideas," of course, means the ideas of memory and +imagination as explained in previous chapters. + +There is a close relation between emotion and the physical expression +thereof--a peculiar mutual action and reaction between the mental state +and the physical action accompanying it. Psychologists are divided +regarding this relation. One school holds that the physical expression +follows and results from the mental state. For instance, we hear or see +something, and thereupon experience the feeling or emotion of anger. +This emotional feeling reacts upon the body and causes an increased +heart beat, a tight closing of the lips, a frown and lowered eyebrows, +and clinched fists. Or we may perceive something which causes the +feeling or emotion of fear, which reacts upon the body and produces +pallor, raising of the hair, dropping of the jaw, opening of the +eyelids, trembling of the legs, etc. According to this school, and the +popular idea, the mental state precedes and causes the physical +expression. + +But another school of psychology, of which the late Prof. William James +is a leading authority, holds that the physical expression precedes and +causes the mental state. For instance, in the cases above cited, the +perception of the anger-causing or fear-causing sight first causes a +reflex action upon the muscles, according to inherited race habits of +expression. This muscular expression and activity, in turn, is held to +react upon the mind and to cause the feeling or emotion of anger or +fear, as the case may be. Professor James, in some of his works, makes a +forcible argument in support of this theory, and his opinions have +influenced the scientific thought of the day upon this subject. Others, +however, have sought to combat his theory by equally forcible argument, +and the subject is still under lively and spirited discussion in +psychological circles. + +Without taking sides in the above controversy, many psychologists +proceed upon the hypothesis that there is a mutual action and reaction +between emotional mental states and the appropriate physical expression +thereof, each in a measure being the cause of the other, and each +likewise being the effect of the other. For instance, in the cases +above cited, the perception of the anger-producing or fear-producing +sight causes, almost or quite simultaneously, the emotional mental state +of anger or fear, as the case may be, and the physical expression +thereof. Then rapidly ensues a series of mental and physical reactions. +The mental state acts upon the physical expression and intensifies it. +The physical expression in turn reacts upon the mental state and induces +a more intense degree of the emotional feeling. And so on, until the +mental state and physical expression reach their highest point and then +begin to subside from exhaustion of energy. This middle-ground +conception meets all the requirements of the facts, and is probably more +nearly correct than either extreme theory. + +Darwin in his classic work, "The Expression of the Emotions in Man and +Animals," has thrown a great light on the subject of the expression of +emotion in physical motions. The Florentine scientist, Paolo Mantegazza, +added to Darwin's work with ideas of his own and countless examples +drawn from his own experience and observation. The work of François +Delsarte, the founder of the school of expression which bears his name, +is also a most valuable addition to the thought on this subject. The +subject of the relation and reaction between emotional feeling and +physical expression is a most fascinating one, and one in which we may +expect interesting and valuable discoveries during the next twenty +years. + +The relation and reaction above mentioned are interesting not only from +the viewpoint of theory but also because of their practicable +application in emotional development and training. It is an established +truth of psychology that each physical expression of an emotional state +serves to intensify the latter; it is pouring oil on the fire. Likewise, +it is equally true that the repression of the physical expression of an +emotion tends to restrain and inhibit the emotion itself. + +Halleck says: "If we watch a person growing angry, we shall see the +emotion increase as he talks loud, frowns deeply, clinches his fist, and +gesticulates wildly. Each expression of his passion is reflected back +upon the original anger and adds fuel to the fire. If he resolutely +inhibits the muscular expressions of his anger, it will not attain great +intensity, and it will soon die a quiet death. * * * Not without reason +are those persons called cold blooded who habitually restrain as far as +possible the expression of their emotion; who never frown or throw any +feeling into their tones, even when a wrong inflicted upon some one +demands aggressive measures. There is here no wave of bodily expression +to flow back and augment the emotional state." + +In this connection we call your attention to the familiar and +oft-quoted passage from the works of Prof. William James: "Refuse to +express a passion and it dies. Count ten before venting your anger and +its occasion seems ridiculous. Whistling to keep up courage is no mere +figure of speech. On the other hand, sit all day in a moping posture, +sigh and reply to everything with a dismal voice, and your melancholy +lingers. There is no more valuable precept in moral education than this, +as all who have experience know: If we wish to conquer undesirable +emotional tendencies in ourselves, we must assiduously, and in the first +instance cold-bloodedly, go through the outward movements of those +contrary dispositions which we prefer to cultivate. Smooth the brow, +brighten the eye, contract the dorsal rather than the ventral aspect of +the frame, and speak in a major key, and your heart must be frigid +indeed if it does not gradually thaw." + +Along the same lines Halleck says: "Actors have frequently testified to +the fact that emotion will arise if they go through the appropriate +muscular movements. In talking to a character on the stage, if they +clinch the fists and frown, they often find themselves becoming really +angry; if they start with counterfeit laughter, they find themselves +growing cheerful. A German professor says that he cannot walk with a +schoolgirl's mincing step and air without feeling frivolous." + +The wise student will acquire a great control over his emotional nature +if he will re-read and study the above statements and quotations until +he has grasped their spirit and essence. In those few lines he is given +a philosophy of self-control and self-mastery that will be worth much to +him if he will but apply it in practice. Patience, perseverance, +practice, and will are required, but the reward is great. Even to those +who have not the persistency to apply this truth fully, there will be a +partial reward if they will use it to the extent of restraining so far +as possible any undue physical expression of undesirable emotional +excitement. + +Some writers seem to regard capacity for great emotional excitement and +expression as a mark of a rich and full character or noble soul. This is +far from being true. While it is a fact that the cultivation of certain +emotions tends to create a noble character and a full life, it is +equally true that the tendency to "gush" and indulge in hysterical or +sentimental excesses is a mark of an ill-controlled nature and a weak, +rather than strong, character. Moreover, it is a fact that excess in +emotional excitement and expression tends toward the dissipation of the +finer and nobler feelings which otherwise would seek an outlet in actual +doing and practical action. In the language of the old Scotch engineer +in the story, they are like the old locomotive which "spends sae much +steam at the whustle that she hae nane left to gae by." + +Emotional excitement and expression are largely dependent upon habit and +indulgence, although there is a great difference, of course, in the +emotional nature and tendencies of various persons. Emotions, like +physical actions or intellectual processes, become habitual by +repetition. And habit renders all physical or mental actions easy of +repetition. Each time one manifests anger, the deeper the mental path is +made, and the easier it is to travel that path the next time. In the +same way each time that anger is conquered and inhibited, the easier +will it be to restrain it the next time. In the same way desirable +habits of emotion and expression may be formed. + +Another point in the cultivation, training, and restraint of the +emotions is that which has to do with the control of the ideas which we +allow to come into the mind. Ideative habits may be formed--_are_ +formed, in fact, by the majority of persons. We may cultivate the habit +of looking on the bright side of things; of looking for the best in +those we meet; of expecting the best things instead of the worst. By +resolutely refusing to give welcome to ideas calculated to arouse +certain emotions, feelings, passions, desires, sentiments, or similar +mental states, we may do much to prevent the arousing of the emotion +itself. Emotions usually are called forth by some idea, and if we shut +out the idea we may prevent the emotional feeling from appearing. In +this connection the universal rule of psychology may be applied: _A +mental state may be inhibited or restrained by turning the attention to +the opposite mental state_. + +The control of the attention is really the control of every mental +state. + +We may use the will in the direction of the control of the +attention--the development and direction of voluntary attention--and +thus actually control every phase of mental activity. The will is +nearest to the ego, or central being of man, and the attention is the +chief tool and instrument of the will. This fact cannot be repeated too +often. If it is impressed upon the mind it will prove to be useful and +valuable in many emergencies of mental life. He who controls his +attention controls his mind, and in controlling his mind controls +himself. + + + + +CHAPTER XII. + +The Instinctive Emotions. + + +Many attempts to classify the emotions have been made by the +psychologists, but the best authorities hold that beyond the purpose of +ordinary convenience in considering the subject _any_ classification is +scientifically useless by reason of its incompleteness. As James +cleverly puts it: "Any classification of the emotions is seen to be as +true and as natural as any other, if it only serves some purpose." The +difficulty attending the attempted classification arises from the fact +that every emotion is more or less complex, and is made up of various +feelings and shades of emotional excitement. Each emotion blends into +others. Just as a few elements of matter may be grouped into hundreds of +thousands of combinations, so the elements of feeling may be grouped +into thousands of shades of emotion. It is said that the two elements of +carbon and hydrogen form combinations resulting in five thousand +varieties of material substance, "from anthracite to marsh gas, from +black coke to colorless naphtha." The same thing may be said of the +emotional combinations formed from two principal elements of feeling. +Moreover, the close distinction between sensation and feeling on the one +hand, and between feeling and emotion on the other, serves to further +complicate the task. + +For the purposes of our consideration, let us divide the emotions into +five general classes, as follows: (1) Instinctive emotions, (2) social +emotions, (3) religious emotions, (4) æsthetic emotions, (5) +intellectual emotions. We shall now consider each of the above five +classes in turn. + + +THE INSTINCTIVE EMOTIONS. + +Instinct is defined as "unconscious, involuntary, or unreasoning +prompting to any action," or "the natural unreasoning impulse by which +an animal is guided to the performance of any action, without thought of +improving the method." An authority says: "Instinct is a natural impulse +leading animals, even prior to all experience, to perform certain +actions tending to the welfare of the individual or the perpetuation of +the species, apparently without understanding the object at which they +may be supposed to aim, or deliberating as to the best methods to +employ. In many cases, as in the construction of the cells of the bee, +there is a perfection about the result which reasoning man could not +have equaled, except by an application of the higher mathematics to +direct the operations carried out. Mr. Darwin considers that animals, in +time past as now, have varied in their mental qualities, and that those +variations are inherited. Instincts also vary slightly in a state of +nature. This being so, natural selection can ultimately bring them to a +high degree of perfection." + +It was formerly the fashion to ascribe instinct in the lower animals, +and in man, to something akin to "innate ideas" implanted in each +species and thereafter continued by inheritance. But the application of +the idea of evolution to the science of psychology has resulted in +brushing away these old ideas. To-day it holds that that which we call +"instinct" is the result of gradual development in the course of +evolution, the accumulated experience of the race being stored away in +the race memory, each individual adding a little thereto by his acquired +habits and experiences. Psychologists now hold that the lower forms of +these race tendencies are closely akin to purely reflex actions, and the +higher forms, which are known as "instinctive emotions," are phenomena +of the subconscious mind resulting from race memory and race experience. + +Clodd says: "Instinct is the higher form of reflex action. The salmon +migrates from sea to river; the bird makes its nest or migrates from one +zone to another by an unvarying route, even leaving its young behind to +perish; the bee builds its six-sided cell; the spider spins its web; the +chick breaks its way through the shell, balances itself, and picks up +grains of corn; the newborn babe sucks its mother's breast--all in +virtue of like acts on the part of their ancestors, which, arising in +the needs of the creature, and gradually becoming automatic, have not +varied during long ages, the tendency to repeat them being transmitted +within the germ from which insect, fish, bird, and man have severally +sprung." + +Schneider says: "It is a fact that men, especially in childhood, fear to +go into a dark cavern, or a gloomy wood. This feeling of fear arises, to +be sure, partly from the fact that we easily suspect that dangerous +beasts may lurk in these localities--a suspicion due to stories we have +heard and read. But, on the other hand, it is quite sure that this fear +at a certain perception is also directly inherited. Children who have +been carefully guarded from all ghost stories are nevertheless terrified +and cry if led into a dark place, especially if sounds are made there. +Even an adult can easily observe that an uncomfortable timidity steals +over him in a lonely wood at night, although he may have the fixed +conviction that not the slightest danger is near. This feeling of fear +occurs in many men even in their own houses after dark, although it is +much stronger in a dark cavern or forest. The fact of such instinctive +fear is easily explicable when we consider that our savage ancestors +through immemorable generations were accustomed to meet with dangerous +beasts in caverns, especially bears, and were for the most part attacked +by such beasts during the night and in the woods, and that thus an +inseparable association between the perceptions of darkness, caverns, +woods, and fear took place, and was inherited." + +James says: "Nothing is commoner than the remark that man differs from +lower creatures by the almost total absence of instincts, and the +assumption of their work in him by reason. * * * We may confidently say +that however uncertain man's reactions upon his environment may +sometimes seem in comparison with those of the lower mammals, the +uncertainty is probably not due to their possession of any principles of +action which he lacks. _On the contrary, man possesses all the impulses +that they have, and a great many more besides._ * * * High places cause +fear of a peculiarly sickening sort, though here again individuals +differ. The utterly blind instinctive character of the motor impulses +here is shown by the fact that they are almost always entirely +unreasonable, but that reason is powerless to suppress them. * * * +Certain ideas of supernatural agency, associated with real +circumstances, produce a peculiar kind of horror. This horror is +probably explicable as the result of a combination of simple horrors. To +bring the ghostly terror to its maximum, many unusual elements of the +dreadful must combine, such as loneliness, darkness, inexplicable +sounds, especially of a dismal character, moving pictures half discerned +(or, if discerned, of dreadful aspect), and a vertiginous baffling of +the expectation. * * * In view of the fact that cadaveric, reptilian, +and underground horrors play so specific and constant a part in many +nightmares and forms of delirium, it seems not altogether unwise to ask +whether these forms of dreadful circumstance may not at a former period +have been more normal objects of the environment than now. The +evolutionist ought to have no difficulty in explaining these terrors, +and the scenery that provokes them, as relapses into the consciousness +of the cave men, a consciousness usually overlaid in us by experiences +of a more recent date." + +Instinctive emotion manifests as an impulse arising from the dim +recesses of the feeling or emotional nature--an incentive toward a dimly +conscious end. It differs from the almost purely automatic nature of +certain forms of reflex process, for its beginning is a feeling arising +from the subconscious regions, which strives to excite an activity of +conscious volition. The feeling is from the subconscious, but the +activity is conscious. The end may not be perceived in consciousness, or +at least is but dimly perceived, but the action leading to the end is in +full consciousness. Instinct is seen to have its origin in the past +experiences of the race, transmitted by heredity and preserved in the +race memory. It has for its object the preservation of the individual +and of the species. Its end is often something far removed in time from +the moment, or the welfare of the species rather than that of the +individual; for instance, the caterpillar providing for its future +states, or the bird building its nest, or the bees building cells and +providing honey for their successors, for very few bees live to partake +of the honey which they have gathered and stored--they are animated by +"the spirit of the hive." + +The most elementary forms of the instinctive emotions are those which +have to do with the preservation of the individual, his comfort, and +personal physical welfare. This class of emotions comprises what are +generally known as purely "selfish" feelings, having little or no +concern for the welfare of others. In this class we find the emotional +feelings which have to do with the satisfaction of hunger and thirst, +the securing of comfortable quarters and warm clothing, and the spirit +of combat and strife arising from the desire to obtain these. These +elemental feelings had their birth early in the history of life, and +indeed life itself depended very materially upon them for its +preservation and continuance. It was necessary for the primitive living +thing to be "selfish." When man appeared, only those survived who +manifested these feelings strongly; the others were pushed to the wall +and perished. Even in our civilization the man below the average in this +class of feelings will find it difficult to survive. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII. + +The Passions. + + +Arising from the most elemental instinctive emotions, we find what may +be termed "the passions." By the term "passion" is meant those strong +feelings in which the elemental selfish instincts are manifested in +relation to other persons, either in the phase of attraction or +repulsion. In this class we find the elementary phases of love, and the +feelings of hate, anger, jealousy, revenge, etc. This class of emotions +usually manifests violently, as compared with the other emotions. The +passions generally arise from self-preservation, race preservation and +reproduction, self-interest, self-aggrandizement, etc., and may be +regarded as a more complex phase of the elemental instinctive emotions. +The elemental instinctive emotions of self-preservation and self-comfort +cause the individual to experience and manifest the passional emotions +of desire for combat, anger, hate, revenge, etc., while the instinctive +emotions leading to reproduction and continuance of the race give rise +to the passional emotions of sexual love, jealousy, etc. The desire to +attract the other sex increases ambition, vanity, love of display, and +other feelings. + +It is only when this class of emotions blends with the higher emotions +that the passions become purified and refined. But it must not be +forgotten that these emotions were very necessary for the welfare of the +race in the early stage of its evolution, and that they still play an +active part in human life, under the greater or less restraint imposed +by civilized society. Nor should it be forgotten that from these +emotions have evolved the highest love of one human being for another. +From instinctive sexual love and the "racial instinct" have developed +the higher affection of man for woman, and woman for man, in all their +beautiful manifestations--and the love of the parent for the child, and +the love of the child for the parent. The first manifestation of +altruism arises in the love of the living creature for its mate, and in +the love of the parents for their offspring. In certain forms of life +where the association of the sexes is merely for the moment, and is not +followed by protection, mutual aid, and companionship, there is found an +absence of mutual affection of any kind, the only feeling being an +elemental reproductive instinct bringing the male and female together +for the moment--an almost purely reflex activity. In the same way, in +the cases of certain animals (the rattlesnake, for instance) in which +the young are able to protect themselves from birth, there is seen a +total absence of parental affection or the return thereof. Human love +between the sexes, in its higher and lower degrees, is a natural +evolution from passional emotion of a low order, due to the growth of +social, ethical, moral, and æsthetic emotion arising from the +necessities of the increasing complexity and development of human life. + +The simpler forms of passional emotion are almost entirely instinctive +in their manifestation. Indeed, in many cases, there appears to be but +little more than a high form of reflex nervous action. The following +words of William James give us an interesting view of this fact of life: +"The cat runs after the mouse, runs or shows fight before the dog, +avoids falling from walls and trees, shuns fire and water, not because +he has any notion either of life or of death or of self-preservation. He +acts in each case separately and simply because he cannot help it; being +so framed that when that particular running thing called a mouse appears +in his field of vision, he _must_ pursue; that when that particular +barking and obstreperous thing called a dog appears there, he _must_ +retire if at a distance, and scratch if close by; that he _must_ +withdraw his feet from water, and his face from flame, etc. * * * Now, +why do the various animals do what seem to us such strange things in the +presence of such outlandish stimuli? Why does the hen, for instance, +submit herself to the tedium of incubating such a fearfully +uninteresting set of objects as a nestful of eggs, unless she have some +sort of prophetic inkling of the result? The only answer is _ad +hominem_. We can only interpret the instinct of brutes by what we know +of instincts in ourselves. Why do men always lie down, when they can, on +soft beds rather than on soft floors? Why do they sit around a stove on +a cold day? Why, in a room, do they place themselves, ninety-nine times +out of a hundred, with their faces toward its middle rather than to the +wall? Why does the maiden interest the youth so much that everything +about her seems more important and significant than anything else in the +world? Nothing more can be said than that these are human ways, and that +every creature likes its own ways, and takes to following them as a +matter of course. Science may come and consider these ways, and find +that most of them are useful. But it is not for the sake of their +utility that they are followed, but because at the moment of following +them we feel that it is the only appropriate and natural thing to do. +Not one man in a million, when taking his dinner, ever thinks of its +utility. He eats because the food tastes good, and makes him want more. +If you should ask him _why_ he wants to eat more of what tastes like +that, instead of revering you as a philosopher he will probably laugh at +you for a fool." + +James continues: "It takes, in short, what Berkeley called a mind +debauched by learning to carry the process of making the natural seem +strange, so far as to ask the _why_ of any instinctive human act. To the +metaphysician alone can such questions arise as: Why do we smile when +pleased and not scowl? Why are we unable to talk to a crowd as to a +single friend? Why does a particular maiden turn our wits upside down? +The common man can only say, '_Of course_ we smile, _of course_ our +heart palpitates at the sight of the crowd, _of course_ we love the +maiden--that beautiful soul clad in that perfect form, so palpably and +flagrantly made from all eternity to be loved!' And so, probably, does +each animal feel about the particular things it tends to do in the +presence of particular objects. They, too, are _a priori_ syntheses. To +the lion it is the lioness which is made to be loved; to the bear, the +she bear. To the broody hen the notion would seem monstrous that there +should be a creature in the world to whom a nestful of eggs was not the +utterly fascinating, precious, and never-to-be-too-much-sat-upon object +which it is to her. Thus we may be sure that however mysterious some +animals' instincts may appear to us, our instincts will appear no less +mysterious to them. And we may conclude that, to the animal which obeys +it, every impulse and every step of that instinct shines with its own +sufficient light, and seems at the moment the only externally right and +proper thing to do. It may be done for its own sake exclusively." + +One has very little need, as a rule, to develop the passional emotions. +Instinct has taken pretty good care that we shall have our share of this +class of feelings. But there is a need to train, restrain, govern, and +control these emotions, for the conditions which brought about their +original being have changed. Our social conventions require that we +should subordinate these passional feelings, to some extent at least. +Society insists that we must restrict our love impulses to certain +limits and to certain quarters, and that we subdue our anger and hate, +except toward the enemies of our land, the disturbers of public peace, +and the menacers of the social conventions of our time and land. The +public welfare requires that we inhibit our fighting impulses, except in +cases of self-defense or war. Public policy requires that we keep our +ambitions within reasonable limits, which limits change from time to +time, of course. In short, society has stepped in and insisted that man, +as a social being, must not only acquire a _social conscience_ but must +also develop sociable emotions and inhibit his unsociable ones. The +evolution of man's nature has caused him unconsciously to modify his +elemental, instinctive, passional emotions, and subordinate them to the +dictates of social, ethical, moral, and æsthetic feelings and ideals, +and to intellectual considerations. Even the original elemental +instincts of the lower animals have been modified by reason of the +social requirements of the pack, herd, or drove, until the modified +instinct is now the ruling force. + +The general principles of emotional control, restraint, and mastery, as +given in a preceding chapter, are applicable to the particular class of +emotions now under consideration here. + + (1) By refraining from the physical expression, one may at least + partially inhibit the emotion. + + (2) By refusing to create the habit, one may more easily manifest + control. + + (3) By refusing to dwell upon the idea or mental picture of the + exciting object, one may lessen the stimulus. + + (4) By cultivating the opposite class of emotions, one may inhibit + any class of feeling. + + (5) And, finally, by acquiring a control of the attention, by means + of the will, one has the reins firmly in hand, and may drive or hold + back the steeds of passion as he wills. + +The passions are like fiery horses, useful if well under control, but +most dangerous if the control is lost. The ego is the driver, the will +his hands, attention the reins, habit the bit, and the passions the +horses. To drive the chariot of life under social conditions, the ego +must have strong hands (will) to tighten or loosen the reins of +attention. He must also employ a well designed and shaped bit of habit. +Without strong hands, good reins, and well-adjusted bit, the fiery +steeds of passion may gain control and, running away, dash the chariot +and its driver over the precipice and on to the jagged rocks below. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV. + +The Social Emotions. + + +As man became a social animal he developed new traits of character, new +habits of action, new ideals, new customs, and consequently new +emotions. Emotions long entertained and long manifested by the race +become more or less instinctive, and are passed along in the form of +either (_a_) inherited stimulus akin to, but lesser in degree and force +than, the more elemental emotions; or (_b_) of inherited _tendency_ to +manifest the acquired emotional feeling upon the presentation of +sufficiently strong stimuli. Hence arises that which we have called "the +social emotions." + +Under the classification of "the social emotions" are those acquired +tendencies of action and feeling of the race which are more or less +altruistic, and are concerned with the welfare of others and one's +duties and obligations toward society and our fellow men. In this class +are found the emotions which impel us to perform what we consider or +feel to be our duty toward our neighbors, and our obligations and duty +toward the state, as expressed in its laws, the customs of men of our +country, or the ideals of the community. In another phase it manifests +as sympathy, fellow feeling, and "kindness" in general. In its first +phase we find civic virtue, law-abiding inclination, honesty, "square +dealing," and patriotism; in its second phase we find sympathy for +others, charity, mutual aid, the alleviation of poverty and suffering, +the erection of asylums for orphans and the aged, hospitals for the +sick, and the formation of societies for general charitable work. + +In many cases we find the social, ethical, and moral emotions closely +allied with religious emotion, and by many these are supposed to be +practically identical, but there is a vast difference in spite of their +frequent association. For instance, we find many persons of high civic +virtue, of exalted moral ideals, and manifesting ethical qualities of +the most advanced type, who are lacking in the ordinary religious +feelings. On the other hand, we too frequently find persons professing +great religious zeal, and apparently experiencing the most intense +religious emotional feeling, who are deficient in social, civic, +ethical, and moral qualities, in the best sense of these terms. The aim +of all religion worthy of the name, however, is to encourage ethical and +moral as well as religious emotions. + +We must here make the distinction between those manifesting the actions +termed ethical and moral _because they feel that way_, and those who +merely comply with the conventional requirements _because they fear the +consequences_ of their violation. The first class have the true social, +ethical, and moral feelings, tastes, ideals, and inclinations; while the +second manifest merely the elementary feelings of self-preservation and +selfish prudence. The first class are "good" because they feel that way +and find it natural to be so; while the others are "good" merely because +they have to be or be punished by legal penalty or public opinion, loss +of prestige, loss of financial support, etc. + +The social, moral, and ethical emotions are believed to have arisen in +the race by reason of the association of individuals in communities and +the rise of the necessity for mutual aid and forbearance. Even many of +the species of the lower animals have social, moral, or ethical codes of +their own, based on the experience of the species or family, infractions +of which they punish severely. In the same way sympathy and the +altruistic feelings are supposed to have arisen. The community of +interest and understanding in the tribe, family, or clan brought not +only the feeling of natural defense and protection but also the finer, +inner sympathetic feeling of the pains and sufferings of their +associates. This, in the progress of the race, has developed into +broader and more complex ideals and feelings. + +Theology explains the moral feelings as resulting from conscience, +which it holds to be a special faculty of the mind, or soul, divinely +given. Science, while admitting the existence of the state of feelings +which we call "conscience," denies its supernatural origin, and ascribes +it to the result of evolution, heredity, experience, education, and +suggestion. Conscience, according to science, is a compound of +intellectual and emotional states. Conscience is not an invariable or +infallible guide, but _depends entirely upon the heredity, education, +experience, and environment of the individual_. It accompanies the moral +and ethical codes of the race, which vary with time and with country. +Actions which were thought right a century ago are condemned now; +likewise, things condemned a century ago are thought right now. What is +commended in Turkey is condemned in England, and vice versa. Moral +tastes and ideals, like æsthetic ones, vary with time and country. There +is no absolute code which has been always true, in all places. There is +an evolution in the ideals of morals and ethics as in everything else, +and "conscience" and the moral and ethical emotions accompany the +changing ideals. + +Many of the moral and ethical principles originally arose from necessity +or utility, but have since developed into natural, spontaneous feeling +on the part of the race. It is held that the race is rapidly developing +a "social conscience" which will cause the wiping out of many social +conditions which are now the disgrace of civilization. It is predicted +that in time the race will look back upon the existence of poverty in +our civilization as our generation now looks back upon the existence of +slavery, imprisonment for debt, capital punishment for the theft of a +loaf of bread, the killing of prisoners of war, etc. It is thought that, +in time, wars of conquest will be deemed as utterly immoral as to-day is +regarded the murder of a body of men by a band of pirates or bandits. In +the same way the economic slavery of to-day will be seen as immoral as +now seems the physical slavery of the past. In not far distant time it +will seem incredible that society could have ever allowed one of its +members to die of hunger in the streets, or of poverty and inattention +in the sick room of the hovel. Not only will the ideals and feelings of +ethical and moral responsibility change and evolve, but the feelings of +personal sympathy will evolve in accordance therewith. At least such is +the dream and prophecy of some of the world's greatest thinkers. + +The social, ethical, and moral emotions may be developed by a study of +the evolution and meaning of society on the one hand, and the perception +of the condition of the lives of less fortunate individuals on the +other. The first will awaken new ideas of the history and real meaning +of social association and mutual intercourse, and will develop a new +sense of responsibility, duty, and civic and social pride. The second +will awaken understanding and sympathy, and a desire to do what one can +to help those who are "the under dog," and also to bring about a better +state of affairs in general. The study of history and civilization, of +sociology and civics, will do much in the first direction. The study of +human-kind, and its life problems and condition, will do the same in the +second case. In both cases there will be awakened a new sense of "right +and wrong"--a new conception of "ought and ought not"--regarding one's +relations to the race, society, and his fellow beings. + +Let no one deceive himself or herself by the smug assumption that the +race has entirely emerged from barbarism and is now on the top wave of +civilization. The truth, as known to all careful and conscientious +thinkers, is that we are but _half_ civilized, if, indeed, that much. +Many of our customs and conventions are those of a half-barbarous +people. Our ideals are low, our customs often vile. We lack not only +high ideals but in many cases we show a lack of sanity in our social +conventions. But evolution is moving us slowly ahead. A better day is +dawning. The signs are in the air, to be seen by all thoughtful men. +Civilization is climbing the ladder, aided by the evolution of the +social, ethical, and moral emotions and the development of the +intellect. + +In connection with this phase of the emotions, we invite the student to +consider the following excellent words of Professor Davidson in his +"History of Greek Education": "It is not enough for a man to understand +the conditions of rational life in his own time. He must likewise _love_ +these conditions and _hate_ whatever leads to life of an opposite kind. +This is only another way of saying that he must love the good and hate +the evil; for the good is simply what conduces to rational or moral +life, and the evil simply what leads away from it. It is perfectly +obvious, as soon as it is pointed out, that all immoral life is due to a +false distribution of affection, which again is often, though by no +means always, due to a want of intellectual cultivation. He that +attributes to anything a value greater or less than it really possesses, +in the order of things, has already placed himself in a false relation +to it, and will certainly, when he comes to act with reference to it, +act immorally." + + + + +CHAPTER XV. + +The Religious Emotions. + + +By "the religious emotions" is meant that class of emotional feeling +arising from the faith and belief in, or consciousness of the presence +of, supernatural beings, powers, entities, or forces. This form of +emotion is regarded as distinct from the ethical and moral emotions, +although frequently found in connection therewith. Likewise, it is +independent of any special form of intellectual belief, for it is far +more fundamental and often exists without creed, philosophy, or stated +belief, the only manifestation in such cases being a "feeling" of the +existence of supernatural beings, forces, and powers to which man has a +relation and to which he owes obedience. To those who may think that +this is too narrow a conception of religious emotion we refer the +following definition of "religion" from the dictionaries: "The acts or +feelings which result from the belief of a god, or gods, having superior +control over matter, life, or destiny. Religion is subjective, +designating the feelings and acts of men which relate to God; theology +is objective, denoting the science which investigates the existence, +laws, and attributes of God;" or (objectively) "the outer form and +embodiment which the inward spirit of a true or a false devotion +assumes," (subjectively) "the feeling of veneration with which the +worshiper regards the Being he adores." + +Darwin, in his "Descent of Man," says that the feeling of religious +devotion is a highly complex one, consisting of love, complete +submission to an exalted and mysterious superior, a strong sense of +dependence, fear, reverence, gratitude, hope for the future, and perhaps +other elements. He is of the opinion that no man can experience so +complex an emotion until advanced in his intellectual and moral +faculties to at least a moderately high level. The authorities generally +agree with Darwin, although the more recent study of the history of +religion has shown that religious feeling has a far more primitive +origin than that indicated by Darwin. + +It is true that the lower animals are not deemed capable of anything +approaching religious feeling, unless there is a feeling approaching it +in the attitude of the dog and horse and other domestic animals toward +their masters. But man, as soon as he is able to attribute natural +phenomena to a supernatural cause and power, manifests a crude religious +feeling and emotion. He begins by believing in, fearing, and worshiping +natural forces and objects, such as the sun, the moon, the wind, +thunder and lightning, the ocean, rivers, mountains, etc. It is claimed +that there is no natural object that has not been deified and worshiped +by some people at some time in the history of the race. Later, man +acquired the anthropomorphic conception of deities and created many gods +in his own image, endowing them with his own attributes, qualities, and +characteristics. The mental characteristics and morals of a people can +always be ascertained by a knowledge of the average conception of deity +held by them. Polytheism, or the belief in many gods, was succeeded by +monotheism, or belief in one god. + +Monotheism ranges from the crudest conception of a manlike god to the +highest conception of a spiritual Being transcending all human +qualities, attributes, or characteristics. Man began by believing in +many god _things_, then in many god _persons_, then in a one god-person, +then in one God who is a spirit, then in One Universal Spirit which is +God. It is a far cry from the savage, manlike god of old to the +conception of the Universal Spirit of the "God-drunken philosopher," +Spinoza. The extreme of religious belief is that which holds that "there +is nothing but God--all else is illusion," of pantheistic idealism. +Buddhism (at least in its original form) discarded the idea of a Supreme +Being, and held that Ultimate Reality is but Universal _Law_; hence the +accusation that Buddhism is an "atheistic religion," although it is one +of the world's greatest religions, having over 400,000,000 followers. + +But the _beliefs_ of the religious person may be considered as resulting +from intellectual processes; his religious _feelings and emotions_ arise +from another part of his mental being. It is the testimony of the +authorities of all religions that religious conviction is an inner +experience rather than an intellectual conception. The emotional element +is always active in religious manifestations everywhere. The purely +intellectual religion is naught but a philosophy. Religion without +feeling and emotion is an anomaly. In all true religion there exists a +feeling of inner assurance and faith, love, awe, dependence, submission, +reverence, gratitude, hope, and perhaps fear. The emotional element must +always be present, not necessarily in the form of emotional excess, as +in the case of revival hysteria or the dance of the whirling dervishes, +but at least in the form of the calm, fervent feeling of "that peace +which passeth understanding." When religion departs from the emotional +phase it becomes merely a "school of philosophy," or an "ethical culture +society." + +The student must not lose sight of the uplifting influence of true +religious emotion by reason of his knowledge of its lowly origin. Like +the lotus, which has its roots in the slimy, filthy mud of the river, +and its stem in the muddy, stagnant, and foul waters thereof, but its +beautiful flower unfolded in the clear air and facing the sun, so is +religious feeling responsible for some of the most beautiful and +uplifting ideals and actions of the race. If its origin and history +contain much that is not consistent with the highest ideals of the race +to-day, it is not the fault of religion but of the race itself. +Religion, like all else in the universal manifestation, is under the +laws of evolution, growth, and development. What the religion of the +future may be, we know not. But the prophets of the race are dreaming +visions of a religion as much higher than that of to-day as the latter +is higher than the crude fetichism of the savage. + +The following quotation from John Fiske's "Through Nature to God" is +appropriate in this place. Fiske says: "My aim is to show that 'that +other influence,' that inward conviction, the craving for a final cause, +the theistic assumption, is itself one of the master facts of the +universe, and as much entitled to respect as any fact in physical nature +can possibly be. The argument flashed upon me about ten years ago while +reading Herbert Spencer's controversy with Frederic Harrison concerning +the nature and reality of religion. Because Spencer derived historically +the greater part of modern belief in an Unseen World from the savage's +primeval world of dreams and ghosts, some of his critics maintained that +logical consistency required him to dismiss the modern belief as utterly +false; otherwise he would be guilty of seeking to evolve truth from +falsehood. 'By no means,' replied Spencer. 'Contrariwise, the ultimate +form of the religious consciousness is the final development of a +consciousness which at the outset contained a germ of truth obscured by +multitudinous errors.'" Fiske, in this connection, quotes the +Tennysonian question:-- + + "'Who forged that other influence, + That heat of inward evidence, + By which he doubts against the sense?'" + +The religious emotions may be developed by allowing the mind to dwell +upon the Power underlying the universe of fleeting, changing forms; by +reading prose and poetry in which an appeal is made to the religious +instinct; by listening to music which awakens the emotion of reverence +and awe; and, finally, by meditating upon the inner spirit immanent in +every living being. As an old Hindu sage once said: "There are many +paths by which men arrive at a knowledge of the presence of God, but +there is but one goal and destination." + + + + +CHAPTER XVI. + +The Aesthetic Emotions. + + +By "the æsthetic emotions" is meant those emotional feelings which are +concerned with the perception of beauty or taste, and by reason of which +we "like" or "dislike" certain perceptions of sensory impressions. In +order to get a clearer idea, let us consider what is meant by "beauty" +and "taste." + +"Beauty" is defined as "that quality or assemblage of qualities in an +object which gives the eye or the ear intense pleasure; or that +characteristic in an object which gratifies the intellect or moral +feeling." "Taste" (in this sense of the term) is defined as "nice +perception, or the power of perceiving and relishing excellence in human +performances; the power of appreciating the finer qualities of art; the +faculty of discerning beauty, order, congruity, proportion, symmetry, or +whatever constitutes excellence, particularly in the fine arts or +literature; the faculty of the mind by which we both perceive and enjoy +whatever is beautiful or sublime in the works of nature and art. The +possession of taste insures grace and beauty in the works of an artist, +and the avoidance of all that is low or mean. It is as often the result +of an innate sense of beauty or propriety as of art education, and no +genius can compensate for the want of it. * * * Tastes differ so much +among individuals, nations, or in different ages and conditions of +civilization that it is utterly impossible to set up a standard of taste +applicable to all men and to all stages in the evolution of society." + +The æsthetic sense, feeling, and emotion are products of the later +stages of the evolution of the mind of man. Their roots, however, may be +seen in the crude attempts at decoration and adornment in the savage, +and still further back in the tendency of certain birds to adorn their +nests or "bowers." Moreover, some sense of beauty must exist in the +lower animals, which are influenced thereby in the selection of their +mates, the bright plumage of the birds, and the coloring of the insects +and higher animals evidencing the existence of at least a primitive +æsthetic sense. Herbert Spencer says that one characteristic of the +æsthetic feelings is that they are separated from the functions vitally +requisite and necessary to sustain life, and it is not until the latter +are reasonably well satisfied that the former begin to manifest in +force. + +The authorities hold that the basic element concerned in the +manifestation of the æsthetic emotional feeling is the _sensory_ +element, which consists of the pleasure arising from the perception of +objects of vision or hearing which are deemed beautiful. There is a +certain nervous satisfaction which arises from the perception of the +sensation of the sight of a beautiful thing, or of the hearing of +beautiful sound. Just _why_ certain sights prove agreeable and others +disagreeable, or certain sounds pleasant and others unpleasant, is very +difficult to determine. Association and habit may have something to do +with the beauty of sight object, and there may be natural harmony of +vibration in colors as there is in sound. In the case of sounds there is +undoubtedly a natural harmony between the vibrations of certain notes of +the scale and inharmony between others. Some have held that the secret +of the enjoyment of music is found in the natural appreciation of +rhythm, as rhythm is a cosmic manifestation evident in everything from +great to small. But these theories do not account for the differences +existing in the tastes regarding color and music manifested by different +individuals, races, and classes of people. + +Grant Allen says: "The vulgar are pleased with great masses of color, +especially red, orange, and purple, which give their coarse, nervous +organization the requisite stimulus. The refined, with nerves of less +caliber, but greater discriminativeness, require delicate combinations +of complementaries and prefer neutral tints to the glare of the primary +hues. Children and savages love to dress in all the colors of the +rainbow." In the same way persons of certain types of taste are pleased +with "rag time" and cheap, rollicking songs or dances, while others +shudder at these and find delight in the classic productions of the +great composers. + +There is also the _intellectual_ element to be reckoned with in the +æsthetic emotions. The intellect must discover the beauty in certain +objects before the emotion is aroused by the perception. Halleck says: +"Every time the mind discerns unity amid variety, order, rhythm, +proportion, or symmetry, an æsthetic emotion arises. * * * The traveler +with a trained intellect will see far more beauty than an ignorant one. +In looking at a cathedral, a large part of the æsthetic enjoyment comes +from tracing out the symmetry, from comparing part with part. Not until +this process is complete will the full beauty of the structure as a +whole be perceived. If the traveler knows something of mediæval +architecture before starting on his European trip, he will see far more +beauty. The opposite of the æsthetic, which we call the ugly, is the +unsymmetrical, the disorderly--that in which we can discover no rhythm, +plan, or beauty." + +The element of _associative suggestion_ also enters into the +manifestation of æsthetic emotional feeling. The mind accepts the +suggestion of the beauty of certain styles of art, or the excellence of +certain classes of music. There are fashions in art and music, as in +clothes, and what is thought beautiful to-day may be deemed hideous +to-morrow. This is not entirely due to the evolution of taste, for in +many cases the old fashions are revived and again deemed beautiful. +There is, moreover, the effect of the association of the object of +emotion with certain events or persons. This association renders the +thing popular, and therefore agreeable and beautiful for the time being. +The suggestion in a story will often cause the beauty of a certain +scene, or the harmony of a certain piece of music, to dawn upon +thousands of persons. Some noted person sets the seal of approval upon a +certain picture or musical composition and lo! the multitude calls it +beautiful. It must not be supposed, however, that the crowd always +counterfeits this sense of beauty and excellence which has been +suggested to it. On the contrary, genuine æsthetic feeling often results +from the discovery so made. + +There is style and fashion in the use of words, resulting from fashion, +which gives rise to æsthetic feelings regarding them. These feelings do +not arise from the consideration of the nature of the object expressed +by the word; of two words designating the same thing, one causes disgust +and the other at least passive tolerance. For instance, in speaking of +the sensible moisture which is emitted from the pores of the skin, we +may use either of the respective terms "sweat" or "perspiration." Both +mean the same thing, and have an equally respectable origin. But to many +persons the word "sweat" causes unpleasant æsthetic emotion, while the +word "perspiration" is accepted without remonstrance. Some persons abhor +the term "victuals," while "viands" or "food" are accepted without +protest. There is often an unpleasant, low, vulgar association connected +with some words which accounts for the disfavor with which they are +received, and which association is absent from the more "polite" terms +employed to indicate the same thing. But in other cases there is nothing +but the simple suggestion of fashion and style to account for the +æsthetic acceptance or rejection. + +It is possible that some psychologist of the future will establish the +truth of the theory now tentatively advanced by a few investigators, +namely, that taste and the sense of beauty depend almost entirely upon +the element of suggestion, manifested as association, influence of +authority, habit, fashion, imitation, etc. It is known that the +emotional nature is peculiarly liable to suggestion, and that tastes may +be created or destroyed by repeated suggestion under the most favorable +circumstances. It is thought likely that if we could trace back to its +roots every emotion of taste, we would find it arising from some +associative, suggestive influence connected with another and more +elemental class of emotions. + +Regarding the fact that there is no universal standard of taste or +beauty, Halleck says: "It has been said that æsthetics cannot be treated +in a scientific way because there is no standard of taste. '_De gustibus +non est disputandum_' ('there is no disputing about tastes') is an old +proverb. Of two equally intelligent persons, the one may like a certain +book, the other dislike it. * * * While it is true that the standard of +taste is a varying one within certain limits, it is no more so than that +of morals. As men's nervous systems, education, and associations differ, +we may scientifically conclude that their tastes must differ. The +greater the uniformity in the factors the less does the product vary. On +the other hand, within certain limits, the standard of æsthetics is +relatively uniform. _It is fixed by the majority of intelligent people +of any age and country._ To estimate the standard by which to judge of +the correctness of language or of the literary taste of any era, we +examine the conversations of the best speakers, the works of the +standard writers." + +The æsthetic emotions may be developed and cultivated by exercise and +practice, and particularly by association and familiarity with +beautiful things, and with those who have "good taste." Appreciation of +beauty is more or less contagious, up to a certain point of development, +at least, and if one wishes to recognize, understand, and appreciate +beauty, he should go where beauty is, and where its votaries are +gathered. The study of standard works of art, or objects of nature, or +the best productions of the composers of music, will do much to develop +and unfold one's higher æsthetic feelings and understanding. + +It is claimed by some of the best authorities that to develop the finer +and higher æsthetic feelings and understanding we must learn to find +beauty and excellence in things removed from ourselves or our selfish +interests. The narrow, selfish emotions kill the æsthetic feelings--the +two cannot exist together. The person whose thoughts are centered on +himself or herself very rarely finds beauty or excellence in works of +art or music. Grant Allen well sums up the subject in the following +words: "_Good taste is the progressive product of progressing fineness +and discrimination in the nerves, educated attention, high and noble +emotional constitution, and increasing intellectual faculties._" + + + + +CHAPTER XVII. + +The Intellectual Emotions. + + +By "the intellectual emotions" is meant that class of emotional feeling +resulting from the presence of objects of intellectual interest. This +class of emotions depends for its satisfaction upon the exercise of the +intellectual faculties, from the most simple to the most complex, and +including perception, memory, imagination, reason, judgment, and all the +logical faculties. Those who are accustomed to employing the mind +through voluntary attention, particularly in the direction of creative +ideation or constructive imagination, experience these emotions to a +greater or less degree. + +The exercise of perception, if we are skilled therein, gives us a +pleasurable feeling, and if we succeed in making an interesting or +important discovery by reason thereof, we experience a strong degree of +emotional satisfaction. Likewise, we experience agreeable feelings when +we are able to remember distinctly something which might well have been +forgotten, or when we succeed in recalling something which had escaped +our memory for the moment. In the same way the exercise of the +imagination is a source of great pleasure in many cases in the direction +of writing, planning, inventing, or other creative processes, or even in +the building of air castles. The exercise of the logical faculties gives +great pleasure to those in whom these faculties are well developed. + +Halleck well says: "There was probably not a happier moment in Newton's +life than when he had succeeded in demonstrating that the same power +which caused the apple to fall held the moon and the planets in their +orbits. When Watts discovered that steam might be harnessed like a +horse, when an inventor succeeds in perfecting a labor-lightening +device, whenever an obscurity is cleared away, the reason for a thing +understood, and a baffling instance brought under a general law, +intellectual emotion results." + +The pleasurable feelings we experience upon the reading of a good book, +or the discovery of real poetry, are forms of intellectual emotion. The +same class of emotional feeling is aroused when we witness a good play. +Among other instances of this class we mention the perception of clever +work of any kind, intricate machinery, ingenious devices, helpful +improvements, or other works of man which indicate the existence of +thought and inventive ability in the designer or builder. To appreciate +mental work of this kind we must bring a mind developed along the same +or similar lines. It has well been said that before one can take away +anything from a book he must bring something to it. It takes mentality +to recognize and appreciate mentality or the work of mentality. + +The study of scientific subjects is a source of great pleasure to those +who are inclined to such pursuits. To the scientific mind the study of +the latest work on the favorite branch gives a joy which nothing else is +capable of arousing. To the philosopher the works of other philosophers +of the same school give intense satisfaction. + +It is claimed that the sense of humor and wit is an intellectual +emotion, for it depends upon the detection of the ludicrous features of +a happening. Certain psychologists have held that the distinctive +element of humor is the feeling attendant upon the perception of +incongruity; while that of wit is the feeling of superiority on the part +of the witty person, and the corresponding chagrin of the object of his +wit. It would seem, however, that the appreciation of wit must depend +upon the intellectual perception of cleverness of expression and the +pleasure resulting from the discovery thereof, and that the feeling of +humor is aroused principally by reason of the incongruous element; the +feeling of self-satisfaction as contrasted with the discomfiture of the +other person belongs to the more selfish emotions. An authority says: +"Humor is a mental faculty which tends to discover incongruous +resemblances between things which essentially differ, or essential +differences between things put forth as the same, the result being +internal mirth or an outburst of laughter. Wit does so likewise, but the +two are different. Humor has deep human sympathy, and loves men while +raising a laugh against their weaknesses. Wit is deficient in sympathy, +and there is often a sting in its ridicule. Somewhat contemptuous of +mankind, it has not the patience to study them thoroughly, but must +content itself with noting superficial resemblances or differences. +Humor is patient and keenly observant, and penetrates beneath the +surface; while, therefore, the sallies of wit are often one-sided and +unfair, those of humor are, as a rule, just and wise." + +The development and cultivation of the intellectual emotions depend, of +course, upon education, training, exercise, and practice. The +cultivation of the intellect (which has been referred to, in part, in +the previous parts of this book, and which will be again considered in +the chapters devoted to the intellect) results in the development and +cultivation of the emotions accompanying intellectual effort. In a +general way, however, it may be said that the reading of the best works +of fiction, science, and philosophy will bring out in time the best +form of intellectual enjoyment and feeling. The highest gives the +best--that is the rule. The present chapter should be read and studied +in connection with those devoted to the intellect. + + +BLENDED EMOTIONS. + +As we have said at the beginning of our consideration of the subject of +the emotions, the majority of emotions are composed of several feelings, +and tend to blend and combine emotional elements. For instance, the +emotion of sexual love certainly has its origin in the instinctive +feelings of the race, and its motive element is that of passion. But +passion is far from being all there is in human sexual love. Above the +plane of passion is found the social emotion of companionship, +protection, and care; the desire for the welfare of the loved one; the +mingling of the love of the parent with that of the mate. Human love +manifests many of the altruistic emotions during its course. The welfare +of the loved one becomes the chief concern of life, often stronger even +than self-preservation. The joy of the loved one becomes the greatest +joy, far surpassing the more selfish forms of happiness. Then come the +æsthetic feelings, which find satisfaction in the two "liking the same +things," sympathy and community of feeling being the connecting link. +The several ideals of the two combining, there is produced an idealistic +union, which is often called "spiritual harmony." Finally, there is +found the blending of the intellectual emotions, in which harmony there +exists one of the highest forms of pleasure satisfaction between two +persons of opposite sexes. It is said that the more things that a man +and woman "like" in common, the closer will be their "liking" for each +other. "I love you because you love the things I love," is no rare +thought and expression. + +So it is seen that though born in elemental instinct and passion, human +sexual love is something far different in its flowering. And yet without +its root it would not be, and cannot be. This is an excellent example of +the complex nature of the most common emotions. It may be used as a +typical illustration. What is true of it is also true, in a way and in a +degree, of every other form of emotion. Therefore in studying a +particular emotion, be not too quick to cry, "It is this; it is that!" +but rather seek to say, "It is composed of this and that, of this and +that!" Few, if any, emotions are simple; the majority are very complex. +Hence the difficulty of satisfactory classification, and the danger of +dogmatic definition. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII. + +The Role of the Emotions. + + +The average person greatly underestimates the part played by the +emotional nature in the mental activities of the individual. He is +inclined to the opinion that, with the exception of the occasional +manifestation of some strong emotional feeling, the majority of persons +go through life using only the reasoning and reflective faculties in +deciding the problems of life and guiding the mental course of action. +There can be no greater mistake concerning the mental activities. So far +from being subordinate to the intellect, the emotional nature in the +majority of cases dominates the reasoning faculties. There are but very +few persons who are able to detach themselves, even in a small degree, +from the feelings, and to decide questions cold-bloodedly by pure reason +or intellectual effort. Moreover, there are but few persons whose wills +are guided by pure reason; the feelings supply the motive for the +majority of acts of will. The intellect, even when used, is generally +employed to better carry out the dictates of feeling and desire. Much of +our reasoning is performed in order to justify our feelings, or to find +proofs for the position dictated by our desires, feelings, sympathies, +prejudices, or sentiments. It has been said that "men seek not reasons +but _excuses for their actions_." + +Moreover, in the elementary processes of the intellect the emotions play +an important part. We have seen that attention largely follows interest, +and interest results from feeling. Therefore our attention, and that +which arises from it, is dependent largely upon the feelings. Thus +feeling asserts its power in guarding the very outer gate of knowledge, +and determines largely what shall or shall not enter therein. It is one +of the constantly-appearing paradoxes of psychology, that while feelings +have originally arisen from attention, it is equally true that attention +depends largely upon the interest resulting from the feelings. This is +readily admitted in the case of involuntary attention, which always goes +out toward objects of interest and feeling, but is likewise true of even +voluntary attention, which we direct to something of greater or more +nearly ultimate interest than the things of lesser or more immediate +interest. + +Sully says: "By an act of will I may resolve to turn my attention to +something--say a passage in a book. But if, after the preliminary +process of adjustment of the mental eye the object opens up no +interesting phase, all the willing in the world will not produce a +calm, settled state of concentration. The will introduces mind and +object; it cannot force an attachment between them. No compulsion of +attention ever succeeded in making a young child cordially embrace and +appropriate, by an act of concentration, an unsuitable and therefore +uninteresting object. We thus see that even voluntary interest is not +removed from the sway of interest. What the will _does_ is to determine +_the kind of interest_ that shall prevail at the moment." + +Again, we may see that memory is largely dependent upon interest in +recording and recalling its impressions. We remember and recall most +easily that which most greatly interests us. In proportion to the lack +of interest in a thing do we find difficulty in remembering or recalling +it. This is equally true of the imagination, for it refuses to dwell +upon that which is _not_ interesting. Even in the reasoning processes we +find the will balking at uninteresting subjects, but galloping along, +pushing before it the rolling chair of interesting intellectual +application. + +Our judgments are affected by our feelings. It is much easier to approve +of the actions of some person we like, or whose views accord with our +own, than of an individual whose personality and views are distasteful +to us. It is very difficult to prevent prejudice, for or against, from +influencing our judgments. It is also true that we "find that for which +we look" in things and persons, and that which we expect and look for is +often dependent upon our feelings. If we dislike a person or thing we +are usually able to perceive no end of undesirable things in him or it; +while if we are favorably inclined we easily find many admirable +qualities in the same person or thing. A little change in our feeling +often results in the formation of an entirely new set of judgments +regarding a person or thing. + +Halleck well says: "On the one hand the emotions are favorable to +intellectual action, since they supply the interest one feels in study. +One may feel intensely concerning a certain subject and be all the +better student. Hence the emotions are not, as was formerly thought, +entirely hostile to intellectual action. Emotion often quickens the +perception, burns things indelibly into the memory, and doubles the +rapidity of thought. On the other hand strong feelings often vitiate +every operation of the intellect. They cause us to see only what we wish +to, to remember only what interests our narrow feeling at the time, and +to reason from selfish data only. * * * Emotion puts the magnifying end +of the telescope to our intellectual eyes where our own interests are +concerned, the minimizing end when we are looking at the interest of +others. * * * _Thought_ _is deflected when it passes through an +emotional medium, just as a sunbeam is when it strikes water._" + +As for the will, the best authorities hold that it is almost if not +entirely dependent upon desire for its motive force. As desire is an +outgrowth and development of feeling and emotion, it is seen that even +the will depends upon feeling for its inciting motives and its +direction. We shall consider this point at greater detail in the +chapters devoted to the activities of the will. + +We would remind you again, at this point, of the great triangle of the +mind, the emotional, ideative, and volitional activities--feeling, +thinking, and willing--and their constant reaction upon each other and +absolute interdependence. We find that our feelings arise from previous +willing and ideation, and are aroused by ideas and repressed by will; +again we see that our ideas are largely dependent upon the interest +supplied by our feelings, and that our judgments are influenced by the +emotive side of our mental life, the will also having its part to play +in the matter. We also see that the will is called into activity +by the feelings, and often guided or restrained by our thoughts, the +will, indeed, being considered as moved entirely by our feelings +and ideas. Thus is the trinity of mental forces seen ever in mutual +relation--constant action and reaction ever existing between them. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX. + +The Emotions and Happiness. + + +"Happiness" has been defined by an authority as "the pleasurable emotion +arising from the gratification of all desires; the enjoyment of pleasure +without pain." Another has said that "happiness is the state in which +all desires are satisfied." But these definitions have been attacked. It +is held by many that a state of the absolute _satisfaction_ of desire +would not be happiness, for happiness consists largely in pleasurable +anticipation and imaginings which disappear upon the realization of the +desire. It is held that absolute satisfaction would be a negative state. +Paley expressed a better idea when he said that "any condition may be +denominated 'happy' in which the amount or aggregate of pleasure exceeds +that of pain, and the degree of happiness depends upon the quantity of +this excess." + +Some have held that an existing contrast between pain and pleasure (the +balance being in favor of the latter) is necessary to establish +happiness. Be this as it may, it is admitted by all that one's happiness +or unhappiness depends entirely upon one's emotional nature and the +degree of the satisfaction thereof. And it is generally admitted that to +be happy is the great aim and object of the life of the majority of +persons,--if, indeed, not of _every_ person,--the happiness, of course, +depending upon the quality and degree of the emotions forming the +person's emotional nature. Thus it is seen that we are dependent upon +the emotional side of our mental life in this as in nearly everything +else making life worth while. + +Theologians have often sought to point out that happiness is not the +goal of life and living, but human nature has always insisted that +happiness is the greatest end, and philosophy has generally supported +it. But wisdom shows that happiness is not always dependent upon the +pleasure of the moment, for the sacrifice of immediate pleasure +frequently results in a much greater happiness in the future. In the +same way an immediate disagreeable task often gains for us a greater +satisfaction in the future. Likewise, it is frequently greater happiness +to sacrifice a personal pleasure for the happiness of others than it +would be to enjoy the pleasure of the moment at the expense of the pain +of the other. There is often a far greater pleasure resulting from an +altruistic action of self-sacrifice than in the performance of the +selfish, egoistic act. But, as the subtle reasoner may insist, the +result is the same--the ultimate happiness and satisfaction of the +self. This conclusion does not rob the altruistic act of its virtue, +however, for the person who finds his greatest pleasure in giving +pleasure to others is to be congratulated--as is the community which +shelters him. + +There is no virtue in pain, suffering, sacrifice, or unhappiness _for +its own sake_. This illusion of asceticism is vanishing from the human +mind. Sacrifice on the part of the individual is valuable and valid only +when it results in higher present or future happiness for the individual +or some one else. There is no virtue in pain, physical or mental, except +as a step to a greater good for ourselves or others. Pain at the best is +merely nature's alarm and warning of "not this way." It is also held +that pain serves to bring out pleasure by contrast, and is therefore +valuable in this way. Be this as it may, no normal individual +deliberately seeks ultimate pain in preference to ultimate happiness; +the greatest ultimate happiness to one's self and to those he loves is +the normal and natural goal of the normal person. But the concept of +"those he loves," in many cases, includes the race as well as the +immediate family. + +Wisdom shows the individual that the greatest happiness comes to him who +controls and restrains many of his feelings. Dissipation results in pain +and unhappiness ultimately. The doctrine of thoughtless indulgence is +unphilosophical and is contradicted by the experience of the race. +Moreover, wisdom shows that the highest happiness comes not from the +indulgence of the physical feelings alone, or to excess, but rather from +the cultivation, development, and manifestation of the higher +feelings--the social, æsthetic, and intellectual emotions. The higher +pleasures of life, literature, art, music, science, invention, +constructive imagination, etc., yield a satisfaction and happiness +keener and more enduring than can possibly the lower forms of feeling. +But the human being must not despise any part of his emotional being. +Everything has its uses, which are good; and its abuses, which are bad. +Every part of one's being, mental and physical, is well to use; but no +part is well used if it uses the individual instead of being itself +used. + +A recent writer has held that the end and aim of life should not be the +pursuit of happiness, but rather the building of character. The obvious +answer is that the two are identical in spirit, for to the man who +appreciates the value of character, its attainment is the greatest +happiness; the wise teach that the greatest happiness comes to him who +is possessed of a well-rounded, developed character. Another writer has +said that "the aim of life should be self-improvement, with a due regard +to the interest of others." This is but saying that the greatest +happiness to the wise man lies in this course. Any one who is wise +enough, or great enough, to make these ends the aim and goal of life +will find the greatest happiness therefrom. Arnold Bennett advances as a +good working philosophy of life: "cheerfulness, kindliness, and +rectitude." Can any one doubt that this course would bring great +ultimate happiness? + +Happiness consists in that which "contents the spirit," and the latter +depends entirely upon the character of the feelings and emotions +entertained by one, as weighed in the balance of reason, and as passed +upon by judgment and the sense of right action. The greatest degree of +happiness, or at least the greatest ratio of pleasure over pain, is +obtained by a careful and intelligent cultivation of the feeling side of +one's being in connection with the cultivation of the intellect and the +mastery of the will. To be able to bring the capacity for enjoyment to +its highest; to be able to intelligently choose that which will bring +the greatest ultimate happiness in accordance with right action; and, +finally, to be able to use the will in the direction of holding fast to +that which is good and rejecting that which is bad--this is the power of +creating happiness. The feelings, the intellect, and the will--here, as +ever--combine to manifest the result. + +Finally, it must be remembered that all human happiness consists in +part of the ability to bear pain--to suffer. There must be the dash of +Stoicism in the wise Epicurean. One must learn to pluck from pain, +suffering, and unhappiness the secret drop of honey which lies at its +heart, and which consists in the knowledge of the meaning and use of +pain and the means whereby it may be transmuted into knowledge and +experience, from which later happiness may be distilled. To profit by +pain, to transmute suffering into joy, to transform present unhappiness +into a future greater happiness--this is the privilege of the +philosopher. + + * * * * * + +The mental states and activities known as "desire" are a direct +development of the feeling and emotional phase of the mind and form the +motive power of the will. Desire, in fact, may be said to be composed of +feeling on one side and will on the other. But the influence of the +intellect or reasoning faculties has a most important part to play in +the evolution of feeling into desire, and in the consequent action of +the will by the presentation and weighing of conflicting desires. +Therefore, the logical place for the consideration of the activities of +the intellect is at this point--between emotion and will. Accordingly, +we shall leave the subject of feeling and emotion for the present, to be +taken up again in connection with the subject of _desire_, after we +have considered the intellectual processes of the mind. But, as has been +indicated, we shall see the presence and influence of the feelings and +emotions even in the activities of the intellect. + + + + +CHAPTER XX. + +The Intellect. + + +The class of mental states or processes grouped together under the name +of "intellectual processes," forms the second great division of the +mental states, the two others being "feeling" and "will," respectively. + +"Intellect" has been defined as follows: "The part or faculty of the +human mind by which it knows, as distinguished from the power to feel +and to will; the thinking faculty; the understanding;" also as "that +faculty of the human mind by which it receives or comprehends the ideas +communicated to it by the senses or the perception, or other means, as +distinguished from the power to feel and to will; the power or faculty +to perceive objects in their relations; the power to judge and +comprehend; also the capacity for higher forms of knowledge, as +distinguished from the power to perceive and imagine." + +In the preceding chapters we have seen that the individual is able to +experience sensations in consciousness, and that he is able to +_perceive_ them mentally, the latter being the first step in +intellectual activity. We have also seen that he is able to reproduce +the perception by means of memory and imagination, and that by means of +the latter he is able to re-combine and rearrange the objects of +perception. We have also seen that he has what are known as "feelings," +which depend upon his previous experience and that of his progenitors. +So far the mind has been considered merely as a receiving and +reproducing instrument, with the added attachment of the re-combining +power of the imagination. Up to this point the mind may be compared to +the phonographic cylinder, with an attachment capable of re-combining +its recorded impressions. The impressions are received and perceived, +are stored away, are reproduced, and by the use of the imagination are +re-combined. + +Up to this point the mind is seen to be more or less of an automatic, +instinctive faculty. It may be traced from the purely reflex activity of +the lowest forms of life up through the lower animals, step by step, +until a very high degree of mental power is perceived in animals like +the horse, dog, or elephant. But there is something lacking. There is +missing that peculiar power of thinking in symbols and abstract +conceptions which distinguishes the human race and which is closely +bound up with the faculty of language or expressing thoughts in words. +The comparatively high mental process of the lower animals is dwarfed +by the human faculty of "thinking." And _thinking_ is the manifestation +of the intellect. + +What is it to _think_? Strange to say, very few persons can answer this +question correctly at first. They find themselves inclined to answer the +inquiry in the words of the child: "Why, to think is to _think_!" Let us +see if we can make it plain. The dictionary definition is a little too +technical to be of much use to the beginner, but here it is: "To employ +any of the intellectual powers except that of simple perception through +the senses." But what are the "intellectual powers" so employed, and how +are they employed? Let us see. + +Stating the matter plainly in common terms, we may say that "thinking" +is the mental process of (1) comparing our perceptions of things with +each other, noting the points of likeness and of difference; (2) +classifying them according to the ascertained likeness or difference, +and thus tying them up in mental bundles with each set of "things of a +kind" in its own bundle; (3) forming the abstract, symbolic mental idea +(concept) of each class of things, so grouped, which we may afterward +use as we use figures in mathematical calculations; (4) using these +concepts in order to form _inferences_, that is, to reason from the +known to the unknown, and to form judgments regarding things; (5) +comparing these judgments and deducing higher judgments from them; and +so on. + +Without thinking, man would be dependent upon each particular experience +for his knowledge, except so far as memory and imagination could +instinctively aid him. By thought processes he is enabled to infer that +if certain things be true of one of a certain kind of things, the same +thing may be expected from others of the same class. As he is able to +note points of likeness or difference, he is able to form clearer and +truer inferences. In addition, he is able to apply his constructive +imagination to the rearrangement and recombination of things whose +nature he has discovered, and thus progress along the line of material +achievement as well as of knowledge. It must be remembered, however, +that the intellect depends entirely for its material upon the +perception, which in turn receives its raw material from the senses. The +intellect merely groups together the material of perception, makes +inferences, draws conclusions from, and forms conclusions regarding, +them, and in the case of constructive imagination recombines them in +effective forms and arrangement. The intellect is the last in order in +the course of mental evolution. It appears last in order in the mind of +the child, but it often persists in old age after the feelings have +grown dim and the memory weak. + + +CONCEPTS. + +What is known as the "concept" is the first fruit of the elemental +processes of thought. The various images of outside objects are sensed, +then perceived, and then grouped according to their likenesses and +differences, and the result is the production of concepts. It is +difficult to define a concept so as to convey any meaning to the +beginner. For instance, the dictionaries give the definition as "an +abstract, general conception, idea, or notion formed in the mind." Not +very clear this, is it? Perhaps we can understand it better if we say +that the terms dog, cat, man, horse, house, etc., each expresses a +concept. Every term expresses a concept; every general name of a thing +or quality is a term applied to the concept. We shall see this a little +clearer as we proceed. + +We form a concept in this way: (1) We _perceive_ a number of things; (2) +then we notice certain _qualities_ possessed by things--certain +properties, attributes, or characteristics which make the thing what it +is; (3) then we _compare_ these qualities of the thing with the +qualities of other things and see that there is a likeness in some +cases, in various degrees, and a difference in other cases, in various +degrees; (4) then we _generalize_ or _classify_ the perceived things +according to their ascertained likenesses and differences; (5) then we +form a _general idea_ or _concept_ embodying each class of thing; and, +finally, we give to the concept a _term_, or _name_, which is its +symbol. + +The concept is a _general idea_ of a class of things; the _term_ is the +expression of that general idea. The concept is the idea of a class of +things; the term is the _label_ affixed to the thing. To illustrate this +last distinction, let us take the concept and term of "bird," for +instance. By perception, comparison, and classification of the qualities +of living things we have arrived at the conclusion that there exists a +great general class the qualities of which may be stated thus: +"Warm-blooded, feathered, winged, oviparous, vertebrate." To this +general class of quality-possessing animals we apply the English term +"bird." The name is merely a symbol. In German the term is _vogel_; in +Latin, _avis_; but in each and every case the _general idea_ or +_concept_ above stated, _i.e._, "warm-blooded, feathered, winged, +oviparous, vertebrate," is meant. If anything is found having all of +those particular qualities, then we know it must be what we call a +"bird." And everything that we call a "bird" must have those qualities. +The term "bird" is the symbol for that particular combination of +qualities existing in a thing. + +There is a difference between a mental image of the imagination and a +concept. The mental image must always be of a _particular_ thing, while +the concept is always an idea of a _general class_ of things which +cannot be clearly pictured in the mind. For instance, the imagination +may form the mental picture of any known bird, or even of an imaginary +bird, but that bird always will be a distinct, _particular_ bird. Try to +form a mental picture of the general class of birds--how will you do it? +Do you realize the difficulty? First, such an image would have to +include the characteristics of the large birds, such as the eagle, +ostrich, and condor; and of the small birds, such as the wren and +humming bird. It must be a composite of the shape of all birds, from the +ostrich, swan, eagle, crane, down to the sparrow, swallow, and humming +bird. It must picture the particular qualities of birds of prey, water +birds, and domestic fowls, as well as the grain eaters. It must exhibit +all the colors found in bird life, from the brightest reds and greens +down to the sober grays and browns. A little thought will show that a +clear mental image of such a concept is impossible. What the most of us +do, when we think of "bird," is to picture a vague, flying shape of dull +color; but when we stop to think that the term must also include the +waddling duck and the scratching barnyard chicken, we see that our +mental image is faulty. The trouble is that the term "bird" really means +"all-bird," and we cannot picture an "all-bird" from the very nature of +the case. Our terms, therefore, are like mathematical figures, or +algebraic symbols, which we use for ease, speed, and clearness of +thinking. + +The trouble does not end here. Concepts not only include the general +idea of _things_, but also the general idea of the _qualities of +things_. Thus sweetness, hardness, courage, and energy are concepts, but +we cannot form a mental image of them by themselves. We may picture a +sweet _thing_, but not sweetness itself. So you see that a concept is a +purely abstract mental idea--a symbol--akin to the figures 1, 2, 3, +etc., and used in the same way. They _stand_ for general classes of +things. A "term" is the verbal and written expression of the general +idea or concept. The student is requested to fix these distinctions in +his mind, so as to render further understanding of them easy. + + + + +CHAPTER XXI. + +Conception. + + +The process of conception has been well defined by Gordy as "that act of +mind by which it forms an idea of a class; or that act of the mind that +enables us to use general names intelligently." He adds: "It is, of +course, understood that I am using the word 'class' to denote an +indefinite number of individuals that resemble each other in certain +particulars." + + +PERCEPTION. + +The first step in conception, as we have seen, is that of perception. It +is readily perceived that the character of our intellectual processes +depends materially upon the variety, clearness, and accuracy of our +perceptions. Therefore, again, we would refer our students to the +chapter in which we have stated the importance of clear perception. + + +MEMORY. + +The future steps of conception depend materially upon the clearness of +the memory, as we can classify objects only by remembering their +qualities beyond the immediate moment of actual, original perception. +Therefore, the memory should be strengthened for this as well as other +objects. + + +ABSTRACTION. + +The second step in conception is that of the mental abstraction of +qualities from the observed thing. That is, we must perceive and then +mentally _set aside_ the observed qualities of the thing. For instance, +man first perceived the existence of certain qualities in things. He +found that a certain number of things possessed some of these qualities +in common, while others possessed other qualities in the same way, and +thus arose classification from comparison. But both comparison and +classification are possible only by abstraction, or _the perception of +the quality as a "thing"_; thus, the abstraction of the idea of the +quality of _sweetness_ from the idea of sugar. Sweetness is a _quality_ +rather than a thing itself. It is something possessed by sugar which +helps to make sugar what it is. + +Color, shape, size, mental qualities, habits of action--these are some +of the qualities first observed in things and abstracted from them in +thought. Redness, sweetness, hardness, softness, largeness, smallness, +fragrance, swiftness, slowness, fierceness, gentleness, warmness, +coldness, etc.--these are abstracted qualities of things. Of course +these qualities are really never divorced from things, but the mind +divorces them in order to make thinking easier. An authority says: +"Animals are incapable of making abstractions, and that is the reason +why they cannot develop formal thought. * * * Abstract thought is +identical with rational thought, which is the characteristic feature of +the thought of speaking beings. This is the reason why abstract thought +is upon earth the exclusive property of man, and why brutes are +incapable of abstract thought. The process of naming is the mechanism of +abstraction, for names establish the mental independence of the objects +named." + +The processes of abstraction depend upon attention--concentrated +attention. Attention directed to the qualities of a thing tends to +abstract the qualities in thought from the thing itself. Mill says: +"Abstraction is primarily the result of attention." Hamilton says: +"Attention and abstraction are only the same process viewed in different +relations." Cultivation of the power of abstraction means principally +cultivation of attention. Any mental activity which tends toward +_analysis_ or separation of a thing into its parts, qualities, or +elements will serve to cultivate and develop the power of abstraction. + +The habit of converting _qualities_ into concepts is acquired by +_transforming adjective terms into their corresponding noun terms_. For +instance, a piece of colored candy possesses the _qualities_ of being +round, hard, red, sweet, etc. Transforming these adjective qualities +into noun terms we have the _concepts_ of roundness, hardness, redness, +and sweetness, respectively. + + +COMPARISON. + +The third step in conception is that of _comparison_, in which the +qualities of several things are compared or examined for likenesses and +differences. We find many qualities in which the several things differ, +and a few in which there is a likeness. Classes are formed from +resemblances or likenesses, while individuals are separated from +apparent classes by detection of differences. Finally, it is found that +separate things, while having many points of difference which indicate +their individuality, nevertheless have a few points of likeness which +indicate that they belong to the same general family or class. The +detection of likenesses and differences in the qualities of various +things is an important mental process. Many of the higher thought +processes depend largely upon the ability to compare things properly. +The development of attention and perception tends to develop the power +of comparison. + + +CLASSIFICATION OR GENERALIZATION. + +The fourth step in conception is that of classification or +generalization, whereby we place individual things in a mental bundle or +class, and then this bundle in company with other bundles into a higher +class, and so on. Thus we group all the individual small birds having +certain characteristics into a species, then several related species +into a larger family, and this into a still larger, until finally we +group all the bird families into the great family which we call "birds" +and of which the simple term "bird" expresses the general concept. + +Jevons says: "We classify things together whenever we observe that they +are like each other in any respect, and therefore think of them +together. In classifying a collection of objects, we do not merely put +together into groups those which resemble each other, but we also divide +each class into smaller ones in which the resemblance is more complete. +Thus the class of _white substances_ may be divided into those which are +solid, and those which are fluid, so that we get the two minor classes +of solid-white and fluid-white substances. It is desirable to have names +by which to show that one class is contained in another, and, +accordingly, we call the class which is divided into two or more smaller +ones the _genus_, and the smaller ones into which it is divided, the +_species_." + +Every _species_ is a small family of the individuals composing it, and +at the same time is an individual species of the genus just above it; +the _genus_, in turn, is a family of several species, and at the same +time an individual genus in the greater family or genus above it. + +The student may familiarize himself with the idea of generalization by +considering himself as an individual, John Smith. John represents that +unit of generalization. The next step is to combine John with the other +Smiths of his immediate family. Then this family may be grouped with his +near blood relations, and so on, until finally all the related Smiths, +near and remote, are grouped together in a great Smith family. + +Or, in the same way, the family group may be enlarged until it takes in +all the white people in a county, then all the white people in the +state, then all in the United States; then all the white races, then all +the white and other light-skinned races, then all mankind. Then, if one +is inclined, the process may be continued until it embraces every living +creature from moneron to man. Reversing the process, living creatures +may be divided and subdivided until all mankind is seen to stand as a +class. Then the race of man may be divided into sub-races according to +color; then the white race may be subdivided into Americans and +non-Americans. Then the Americans may be divided into inhabitants of +the several states, or into Indianans and non-Indianans; then into the +inhabitants of the several counties of Indiana, and thus the Posey +Countians are reached. Then the Posey County people are divided into +Smiths and non-Smiths; then the Smith family into its constituent family +groups, and then into the smaller families, and so on, until the +classification reaches one particular John Smith, who at last is found +to be an individual--in a class by himself. This is the story of the +ascending and descending processes of generalization. + + + + +CHAPTER XXII. + +Classes of Concepts. + + +In the preceding chapter we have seen the process of conception--of the +forming of concepts. _The idea of a general class of things or qualities +is a concept._ Each concept contains the qualities which are _common to +all_ the individuals composing the class, but not those qualities which +pertain only to the minor classes or the individuals. For instance, the +concept of "bird" will necessarily include the common qualities of +warm-bloodedness, featheredness, wingedness, oviparousness, and +vertebratedness. But it will _not_ include color, special shape, size, +or special features or characteristics of the subfamilies or individuals +composing the great class. The class comprises the individuals and +subclasses composing it; the concept includes the general and common +qualities which _all_ in the class possess. A _percept_ is the mental +image of a particular thing; a _concept_ is the mental idea of the +general qualities of a class of things. A percept arises from the +perception of a sensation; a concept is a purely mental, abstract +creation, whose only existence is in the world of ideas and which has +no corresponding individual object in the world of sense. + +There are two general classes of concepts, namely: (1) concrete +concepts, in which the common qualities of a class of things are +combined into one conceptual idea, such as "bird," of which we have +spoken; (2) abstract concepts, in which is combined the idea of some +_quality_ common to a number of things, such as "sweetness" or +"redness." Jevons's well-known rule for terms is an aid in remembering +this classification: "_A concrete term is the name of a thing; an +abstract term is the name of a quality of a thing._" + +It is a peculiar fact and rule of concrete concepts that (1) the larger +the class of things embraced in a concept, the smaller are its general +qualities; and (2) the larger the number of general qualities included +in a concept, the smaller the number of individuals embraced by it. For +instance, the term "bird" embraces a great number of individuals--all +the birds that are in existence, in fact, but it has but few general +qualities, as we have seen. On the contrary, the concept "stork" has a +much larger number of general qualities, but embraces far fewer +individuals. Finally, the individual is reached, and we find that it has +more qualities than any class can have; but it is composed of the +smallest possible number of individuals, one. The secret is this: No +two individuals can have as many qualities _in common_ as each has +individually, unless they are precisely alike, which is impossible in +nature. + + +IMPERFECT CONCEPTS. + +It is said that outside of strictly scientific definitions very few +persons agree in their concepts of the same thing. Each has his or her +own concept of the particular thing which he or she expresses by the +same term. A number of persons asked to define a common term like +"love," "religion," "faith," "belief," etc., will give such a variety of +answers as to cause wonderment. As Green says: "My idea or image is mine +alone--the reward of careless observation if imperfect; of attentive, +careful, and varied observation if correct. Between mine and yours a +great gulf is fixed. No man can pass from mine to yours, or from yours +to mine. Neither in any proper sense of the term can mine be conveyed to +you. Words do not convey thoughts; they are not vehicles of thoughts in +any true sense of that term. A word is simply a common symbol which each +associates with his own idea or image." + +The reason of the difference in the concepts of several persons is that +very few of our concepts are nearly perfect; the majority of them are +quite imperfect and incomplete. Jevons gives us an idea of this in his +remarks on classification: "Things may seem to be very much like each +other which are not so. Whales, porpoises, seals, and several other +animals live in the sea exactly like a fish; they have a similar shape +and are usually classed among fish. People are said to go whale fishing. +Yet these animals are not really fish at all, but are much more like +dogs and horses and other quadrupeds than they are like fish. They +cannot live entirely under water and breathe the air contained in the +water like fish, but they have to come to the surface at intervals to +take breath. Similarly, we must not class bats with birds because they +fly about, although they have what would be called wings; these wings +are not like those of birds, and, in truth, bats are much more like rats +and mice than they are like birds. Botanists used at one time to +classify plants according to their size, as trees, shrubs, or herbs, but +we now know that a great tree is often more similar in character to a +tiny herb than it is to other great trees. A daisy has little +resemblance to a great Scotch thistle; yet the botanist regards them as +very similar. The lofty growing bamboo is a kind of grass, and the sugar +cane also belongs to the same class with wheat and oats." + +It is a matter of importance that clear concepts should be formed +regarding at least the familiar things of life. The list of clear +concepts should be added to from time to time by study, investigation, +and examination. The dictionary should be consulted frequently, and a +term studied until one has a clear meaning of the concept the term seeks +to express. A good encyclopedia (not necessarily an expensive one, in +these days of cheap editions) will also prove very useful in this +respect. As Halleck says: "It must be borne in mind that most of our +concepts are subject to change during our entire life; that at first +they are made only in a tentative way; that experience may show us, at +any time, that they have been erroneously formed, that we have +abstracted too little or too much, made the class too wide or too +narrow, or that here a quality must be added or there one taken away." + +It is a good practice to make a memorandum of anything of which you may +hear, but of which you know nothing, and then later to make a brief but +thorough investigation of that thing, by means of the dictionary and +encyclopedia, and of whatever good works may be obtained on the subject, +not leaving it until you feel that you have obtained at least a _clear +idea_ of what the thing really _means_. A half hour each evening devoted +to exercise of this kind will result in a wonderful increase of general +information. We have heard of a man who made a practice of reading a +short article in the encyclopedia every evening, giving preference to +subjects generally classed as familiar. In a year he made a noticeable +advance in general knowledge as well as habits of thought. In five years +he was looked upon by his associates as a man of a remarkably large +field of general information and of more than ordinary intelligence, +which verdict was a just one. As a rule we waste far more time on +worthless fiction than we are willing to devote to a little +self-improvement of this kind. We shrink at the idea of a general course +of instructive reading, little realizing that we can take our study in +small installments and at a very little cost in time or labor. + +Our concepts form the material which our intellect uses in its reasoning +processes. No matter how good a reasoner one may be, unless he has a +good supply of general information about the things of which he is +reasoning, he will not make much real headway. We must begin at the +bottom and build a firm foundation upon which the intellectual structure +may be erected. This foundation is composed of _facts_. These facts are +represented by our clear and correct concepts. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIII. + +Judgments. + + +We have seen the several steps of the mental process whereby simple +sensations are transformed into percepts and then into concepts or +general ideas. The formation of the concept is considered as the first +great step in thinking. The second great step in thinking is that of the +formation of the "judgment." The definition of "judgment," as the term +is used in logic; is "the comparing together in the mind of two ideas of +things, and determining whether they agree or disagree with each other, +or that one of them does or does not belong to the other. Judgment is, +therefore, (_a_) affirmative or (_b_) negative, as (_a_) 'Snow is +white,' or (_b_) 'All white men are not Europeans.'" + +What in logic is called a "proposition" is the expression in words of a +logical judgment. Hyslop defined the term "proposition" as follows: "Any +affirmation or denial of an agreement between two conceptions." For +instance, we compare the concepts "sparrow" and "bird" and find that +there is an agreement, and that the former belongs to the latter; this +mental process is a _judgment_. We then announce the judgment in the +_proposition_: "The sparrow is a bird." In the same way we compare the +concepts "bat" and "bird," find that there is a disagreement, and form +the judgment that neither belongs to the other, which we express in the +proposition: "The bat is not a bird." Or we may form the judgment that +"sweetness" is a quality of "sugar," which we express in the +proposition: "Sugar is sweet." Likewise, we may form the judgment which +results in the proposition: "Vinegar is not sweet." + +While the process of judgment is generally considered as constituting +the second great step of thinking, coming after the formation of the +concept, and consisting of the comparing of concepts, it must be +remembered that the act of judging is far more elementary than this, for +it is found still farther back in the history of thought processes. By +that peculiar law of paradox which we find everywhere operative in mind +processes, the same process of forming judgments which is used in +comparing concepts also has been used in forming the same concepts in +the stage of comparison. In fact, the result of all comparison, high or +low, must be _a judgment_. + +Halleck says: "Judgment is necessary in forming concepts. When we decide +that a quality is or is not common to a class, we are really judging. +This is another evidence of the complexity and unified action of the +mind." Brooks says: "The power of judgment is of great value in its +products. It is involved in or accompanies every act of the intellect, +and thus lies at the foundation of all intellectual activity. It +operates directly in every act of the understanding, and even aids the +other faculties of the mind in completing their activities and products. +* * * Strictly speaking, every intelligent act of the mind is +accompanied with a judgment. To know is to discriminate and, therefore, +to judge. Every sensation or cognition involves a knowledge and so a +judgment that it exists. The mind cannot think at all without judging; +to think is to judge. Even in forming the notions which judgment +compares, the mind judges. Every notion or concept implies a previous +act of judgment to form it; in forming a concept we compare the common +attributes before we unite them, and comparison is judgment. It is thus +true that 'Every concept is a contracted judgment; every judgment an +expanded concept.'" + +It is needless to say that as judgments lie at the base of our thinking, +and also appear in every part of its higher structure, the importance of +correct judgment in thought cannot be overestimated. But it is often +very difficult to form correct judgment even regarding the most +familiar things around us. Halleck says: "In actual life things present +themselves to us with their qualities disguised or obscured by other +conflicting qualities. Men had for ages seen burning substances and had +formed a concept of them. A certain hard, black, stony substance had +often been noticed, and a concept had been formed of it. This concept +was imperfect; but it is very seldom that we meet with perfect, +sharply-defined concepts in actual life. So it happened that for ages +the concept of burning substance was never linked by judgment to the +concept of stone coal. The combustible quality in the coal was +overshadowed by its stony attributes. 'Of course stone will not burn,' +people said. One cannot tell how long the development of mankind was +retarded for that very reason. England would not to-day be manufacturing +products for the rest of the world had not some one judged coal to be a +combustible substance. * * * Judgment is ever silently working and +comparing things that to past ages seemed dissimilar; and it is +constantly abstracting and leaving out of the field of view those +qualities which have simply served to obscure the point at issue." + +Gordy says: "The credulity of children is proverbial; but if we get our +facts at first hand, if we study 'the living, learning, playing child,' +we shall see that he is quite as remarkable for incredulity as for +credulity. The explanation is simple: _He tends to believe the first +suggestion that comes into his mind, no matter from what source_; and +since his belief is not the result of any rational process, he cannot be +made to disbelieve it in any rational way. Hence it is that he is very +credulous about any matter about which he has no ideas; but let the idea +once get possession of his mind, and he is quite as remarkable for +incredulity as before for credulity. * * * If we study the larger +child,--the man with a child's mind, an uneducated man,--we shall have +the same truth forced upon us. If the beliefs of men were due to +processes of reasoning, where they have not reasoned they would not +believe. But do we find it so? Is it not true that the men who have the +most positive opinions on the largest variety of subjects--so far as +they have ever heard of them--are precisely those who have the least +right to them? Socrates, we remember, was counted the wisest man in +Athens because he alone resisted his natural tendency to believe in the +absence of evidence; he alone would not delude himself with the conceit +of knowledge without the reality; and it would scarcely be too much to +say that the intellectual strength of men is in direct proportion to the +number of things they are absolutely certain of. * * * I do not, of +course, mean to intimate that we should have no opinions about matters +that we have not personally investigated. We take, and ought to take, +the opinion of some men about law, and others about medicine, and others +about particular sciences, and so on. But we should clearly realize the +difference between holding an opinion on trust and holding it as the +result of our own investigations." + +Brooks says: "It should be one of the leading objects of the culture of +young people to lead them to acquire the habit of forming judgments. +They should not only be led to see things but to have opinions about +things. They should be trained to see things in their relations and to +put these relations into definite propositions. Their ideas of objects +should be worked up into thoughts concerning the objects. Those methods +of teaching are best which tend to excite a thoughtful habit of mind +that notices the similitudes and diversities of objects and endeavors to +read the thoughts which they embody and of which they are the symbols." + +The study of logic, geometry, and the natural sciences is recommended +for exercise of the faculty of judgment and the development thereof. The +study and practice of even the lower branches of mathematics are also +helpful in this direction. The game of checkers or chess is recommended +by many authorities. Some have advocated the practice of solving +enigmas, problems, rebuses, etc., as giving exercise to this faculty of +the mind. The cultivation of the "Why?" attitude of mind, and the +answering of one's own mental questions, is also helpful, if not carried +to excess. "Doubting Thomas" is not always a term of reproach in these +days of scientific habits of thought, and "the man from Missouri" has +many warm admirers. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIV. + +Primary Laws of Thought. + + +In connection with this subject we herewith call the attention of the +student to the well-known Primary Laws of Thought which have been +recognized as valid from the time of the ancient Greek logicians. These +laws are self-evident, and are uncontradictable. They are axiomatic. +Jevons says of them: "Students are seldom able to see at first their +full meaning and importance. All arguments may be explained when these +self-evident laws are granted; and it is not too much to say that the +whole of logic will be plain to those who will constantly use these laws +as their key." Here are the Three Primary Laws of Thought:-- + + I. _Law of Identity._ "Whatever is, _is_." + + II. _Law of Contradiction._ "Nothing can both be and not be." + + III. _Law of Excluded Middle._ "Everything must either be or not be; + there is no middle course." + +I. The first of these laws, called "_The Law of Identity_," informs us +that a thing is always itself, no matter under what guise or form it is +perceived or may present itself. An animal is always a bird if it +possesses the general characteristics of a "bird," no matter whether it +exhibits the minor characteristics of an eagle, a wren, a stork, or a +humming bird. In the same way a whale is a mammal because it possesses +the general characteristics of a mammal notwithstanding that it swims in +the water like a fish. Also, sweetness is always sweetness, whether +manifested in sugar, honey, flowers, or products of coal tar. If a thing +_is_ that thing, then it _is_, and it cannot be logically claimed that +it _is not_. + +II. The second of these laws, called "_The Law of Contradiction_," +informs us that the same quality or class cannot be both affirmed and +denied of a thing at the same time and place. A sparrow cannot be said +to be both "bird" and "not bird" at the same time. Neither can sugar be +said to be "sweet" and "not sweet" at the same time. A piece of iron may +be "hot" at one end and "not hot" at another, but it cannot be both +"hot" and "not hot" at the same place at the same time. + +III. The third of these laws, called "_The Law of Excluded Middle_," +informs us that a given quality or class _must_ be affirmed or denied to +_everything_ at any given time and place. Everything either must be of a +certain class or not, must possess a certain quality or not, at a given +time or place. There is no other alternative or middle course. It is +axiomatic that any statement _must_ either be or not be true of a +certain other thing at any certain time and place; there is no escape +from this. Anything _either_ must be "black" or "not black," a bird or +not a bird, alive or not alive, at any certain time or place. There is +nothing else that it can be; it cannot both be and not be at the same +time and place, as we have seen; therefore, it must either be or not be +that which is asserted of it. The judgment must decide which +alternative; but it has only two possible choices. + +But the student must not confuse opposite qualities or things with +"not-ness." A thing may be "black" or "not black," but it need not be +white to be "not black," for blue is likewise "not black" just as it is +"not white." The neglect of this fact frequently causes error. We must +always affirm either the existence or non-existence of a quality in a +thing; but this is far different from affirming or denying the existence +of the opposite quality. Thus a thing may be "not hard" and yet it does +not follow that it is "soft"; it may be _neither_ hard nor soft. + + +FALLACIOUS APPLICATION. + +There exists what are known as "fallacies" of application of these +primary laws. A fallacy is an unsound argument or conclusion. For +instance, because a particular man is found to be a liar, it is +fallacious to assume that "_all_ men are liars," for lying is a +particular quality of the individual man, and not a general quality of +the family of men. In the same way because a stork has long legs and a +long bill, it does not follow that all birds must have these +characteristics simply because the stork is a bird. _It is fallacious to +extend an individual quality to a class._ But it is sound judgment to +assume that a class quality must be possessed by all individuals in that +class. It is a far different proposition which asserts that "_some_ +birds are black," from that which asserts that "_all_ birds are black." +The same rule, of course, is true regarding negative propositions. + +Another fallacy is that which assumes that because the affirmative or +negative proposition has not been, or cannot be, proved, it follows that +the opposite proposition must be true. The true judgment is simply "not +proven." + +Another fallacious judgment is that which is based on attributing +absolute quality to that which is but relative or comparative. For +instance, the terms "hot" and "cold" are relative and comparative, and +simply denote one's relative opinion regarding a fixed and certain +degree of temperature. The _certain_ thing is the degree of temperature, +say 75 degrees Fahrenheit; of this we may logically claim that it _is_ +or _is not_ true at a certain time or place. It either _is_ 75 degrees +Fahrenheit or it _is not_. But to one man this may seem _warm_ and to +another _cold_; both are right in their judgments, so far as their own +relative feelings are concerned. But neither can claim absolutely that +it is _warm_ or _cold_. Therefore, it is a fallacy to ascribe absolute +quality to a relative one. The _absolute fact_ comes under the Law of +Excluded Middle, but a personal opinion is not an absolute fact. + +There are other fallacies which will be considered in other chapters of +this book, under their appropriate heading. + + + + +CHAPTER XXV. + +Reasoning. + + +Reasoning, the third great step in thinking, may be said to consist of +ascertaining new truths from old ones, new judgments from old ones, +unknown facts from known ones; in short, of proceeding logically from +the known to the unknown, using the known as the foundation for the +unknown which is sought to be known. Gordy gives us the following +excellent definition of the term: "Reasoning is the act of going from +the known to the unknown through other beliefs; of basing judgment upon +judgments; reaching beliefs through beliefs." Reasoning, then, is seen +to be a process of building a structure of judgments, one resting upon +the other, the topmost point being the final judgment, but the whole +constituting an edifice of judgment. This may be seen more clearly when +the various forms of reasoning are considered. + + +IMMEDIATE REASONING. + +The simplest form of reasoning is that known as "immediate reasoning," +by which is meant reasoning by directly comparing two judgments without +the intervention of the third judgment, which is found in the more +formal classes of reasoning. This form of reasoning depends largely upon +the application of the Three Primary Laws of Thought, to which we have +referred in a previous chapter. + +It will be seen that _if_ (_a_) a thing is always itself, then (_b_) all +that is included in it must partake of its nature. Thus, the bird family +has certain class characteristics, therefore by immediate reasoning we +know that _any_ member of that family must possess those class +characteristics, whatever particular characteristics it may have in +addition. And we likewise know that we cannot attribute the _particular_ +characteristics, as a matter of course, to the other members of the +class. Thus, though all sparrows are birds, it is not true that all +birds are sparrows. "All biscuits are bread; but all bread is not +biscuit." + +In the same way we know that a thing cannot be bird and mammal at the +same time, for the mammals form a not-bird family. And, likewise, we +know that everything _must_ be either bird or not bird, but that being +not bird does not mean being a mammal, for there are many other not-bird +things than mammals. In this form of reasoning distinction is always +made between the _universal_ or general class, which is expressed by the +word _all_, and the _particular_ or individual, which is expressed by +the word "some." Many persons fail to note this difference in their +reasoning, and fallaciously reason, for instance, that because _some_ +swans are white, _all_ swans must be so, which is a far different thing +from reasoning that if _all_ is so and so, then _some_ must be so and +so. Those who are interested in this subject are referred to some +elementary text-book on logic, as the detailed consideration is too +technical for consideration here. + + +REASONING BY ANALOGY. + +Reasoning by analogy is an elementary form of reasoning, and is the +particular kind of reasoning employed by the majority of persons in +ordinary thought. It is based upon the unconscious recognition by the +human mind of the principle which is expressed by Jevons as: "_If two or +more things resemble each other in many points, they will probably +resemble each other in more points._" The same authority says: +"Reasoning by analogy differs only in degree from that kind of reasoning +called '_generalization_.' When _many things_ resemble each other in a +_few properties_, we argue about them by generalization. When a _few +things_ resemble each other in _many properties_, it is a case of +analogy." + +While this form of reason is frequently employed with more or less +satisfactory results, it is always open to a large percentage of error. +Thus, persons have been poisoned by toadstools by reason of false +analogous reasoning that because mushrooms are edible, then toadstools, +which resemble them, must also be fit for food; or, in the same way, +because certain berries resemble other edible berries they must likewise +be good food. As Brooks says: "To infer that because John Smith has a +red nose and is also a drunkard, then Henry Jones, who also has a red +nose, is also a drunkard, would be dangerous inference. Conclusions of +this kind drawn from analogy are frequently dangerous." Halleck says: +"Many false analogies are manufactured, and it is excellent thought +training to expose them. The majority of people think so little that +they swallow these false analogies just as newly-fledged robins swallow +small stones dropped into their mouths." + +Jevons, one of the best authorities on the subject, says: "There is no +way in which we can really assure ourselves that we are arguing safely +by analogy. The only rule that can be given is this: That the more +closely two things resemble each other, the more likely it is that they +are the same in other respects, especially in points closely connected +with those observed. In order to be clear about our conclusions, we +ought, in fact, never to rest satisfied with mere analogy, but ought to +try to discover the general laws governing the case. * * * We find that +reasoning by analogy is not to be depended upon, unless we make such an +inquiry into the causes and laws of the things in question that we +really employ inductive and deductive reasoning." + + +HIGHER FORMS OF REASONING. + +The two higher forms of reasoning are known, respectively, as (1) +inductive reasoning, or inference from particular facts to general laws; +and (2) deductive reasoning, or inference from general truths to +particular truths. While the class distinction is made for the purpose +of clear consideration, it must not be forgotten that the two forms of +reasoning are generally found in combination. Thus, in inductive +reasoning many steps are taken by the aid of deductive reasoning; and, +likewise, before we can reason deductively from general truths to +particular ones we must have discovered the general truths by inductive +reasoning from particular facts. Thus there is a unity in all reasoning +processes as there is in all mental operations. Inductive reasoning is a +_synthetical_ process; deductive reasoning, an _analytical_ one. In the +first we combine and build up, in the latter we dissect and separate. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVI. + +Inductive Reasoning. + + +Inductive reasoning is based upon the axiom: "_What is true of the many +is true of the whole._" This axiom is based upon man's belief in the +uniformity of nature. Inductive reasoning is a mental ladder by which we +climb from particular facts to general laws, but the ladder rests upon +the belief that the universe is governed by law. + +The steps in inductive reasoning are as follows:-- + +I. Observation, investigation, and examination of particular facts or +things. If we wish to know the general characteristics of the bird +family, we must first examine a sufficient number of birds of many kinds +so as to discover the comparatively few general characteristics +possessed by _all_ of the bird family, as distinct from the particular +characteristics possessed by only _some_ of that family. The greater the +number of individuals examined, the narrower becomes our list of the +general qualities common to _all_. In the same way we must examine many +kinds of flowers before we come to the few general qualities common to +all flowers, which we combine in the general concept of "flower." The +same, of course, is true regarding the discovery of general laws from +particular facts. We examine the facts and then work toward a general +law which will explain them. For instance, the Law of Gravitation was +discovered by the observation and investigation of the fact that all +objects are attracted to the earth; further investigation revealed the +fact that all material objects are attracted to each other; then the +general law was discovered, or, rather, the hypothesis was advanced, was +found to explain the facts, and was verified by further experiments and +observation. + +II. The second step in inductive reasoning is the making of an +hypothesis. An hypothesis is a proposition or principle assumed as a +_possible_ explanation for a set or class of facts. It is regarded as a +"working theory," which must be examined and tested in connection with +the facts before it is finally accepted. For instance, after the +observation that a number of magnets attracted steel, it was found +reasonable to advance the hypothesis that "all magnets attract steel." +In the same way was advanced the hypothesis that "all birds are +warm-blooded, winged, feathered, oviparous vertebrates." Subsequent +observation and experiment established the hypothesis regarding the +magnet, and regarding the general qualities of the bird family. If a +single magnet had been found which did not attract steel, then the +hypothesis would have fallen. If a single bird had been discovered which +was not warm-blooded, then that quality would have been stricken from +the list of the necessary characteristics of all birds. + +A theory is merely an hypothesis which has been verified or established +by continued and repeated observation, investigation, and experiment. + +Hypotheses and theories arise very frequently from the subconscious +assimilation of a number of particular facts and the consequent flashing +of a "great guess," or "sacred suspicion of the truth," into the +conscious field of attention. The scientific imagination plays an +important part in this process. There is, of course, a world of +difference between a "blind guess" based upon insufficient data and a +"scientific guess" resulting from the accumulation of a vast store of +careful and accurate information. As Brooks says: "The forming of an +hypothesis requires a suggestive mind, a lively fancy, a philosophic +imagination that catches a glimpse of the idea through the form or sees +the law standing behind the fact." But accepted theories, in the +majority of cases, arise only by testing out and rejecting many +promising hypotheses and finally settling upon the one which best +answers all the requirements and best explains the facts. As an +authority says: "To try wrong guesses is with most persons the only way +to hit upon right ones." + +III. Testing the hypothesis by deductive reasoning is the third step in +inductive reasoning. This test is made by applying the hypothetical +principle to particular facts or things; that is, to follow out mentally +the hypothetical principle to its logical conclusion. This may be done +in this way: "If _so and so_ is correct, then it follows that _thus and +so_ is true," etc. If the conclusion agrees with reason, then the test +is deemed satisfactory so far as it has gone. But if the result proves +to be a logical absurdity or inconsistent with natural facts, then the +hypothesis is discredited. + +IV. Practical verification of the hypothesis is the fourth step in +inductive reasoning. This step consists of the actual comparison of +observed facts with the "logical conclusions" arising from applying +deductive reasoning to the general principle assumed as a premise. The +greater number of facts agreeing with the conclusions arising from the +premise of the hypothesis, the greater is deemed the "probability" of +the latter. The authorities generally assume an hypothesis to be +_verified_ when it accounts for _all_ the facts which properly are +related to it. Some extremists contend, however, that before an +hypothesis may be considered as absolutely verified, it must not only +account for all the associated facts but that also there must be no +other possible hypothesis to account for the same facts. The "facts" +referred to in this connection may be either (1) observed phenomena, or +(2) the conclusions of deductive reasoning arising from the assumption +of the hypothesis, or (3) the agreement between the observed facts and +the logical conclusions. The last combination is generally regarded as +the most logical. The verification of an hypothesis must be "an +all-around one," and there must be an agreement between the observed +facts and the logical conclusions in the case--the hypothesis must "fit" +the facts, and the facts must "fit" the hypothesis. The "facts" are the +glass slipper of the Cinderella legend--the several sisters of +Cinderella were discarded hypotheses, the slipper and the sisters not +"fitting." When Cinderella's foot was found to be the one foot upon +which the glass slipper fitted, then the Cinderella hypothesis was +considered to have been proved--the glass slipper was hers and the +prince claimed his bride. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVII. + +Deductive Reasoning. + + +We have seen in the preceding chapter that from particular facts we +reason inductively to general principles or truths. We have also seen +that one of the steps of inductive reasoning is the testing of the +hypothesis by deductive reasoning. We shall now also see that the +results of inductive reasoning are used as premises or bases for +deductive reasoning. These two forms of reasoning are opposites and yet +complementary to each other; they are in a sense independent and yet are +interdependent. Brooks says: "The two methods of reasoning are the +reverse of each other. One goes from particulars to generals; the other +from generals to particulars. One is a process of analysis; the other is +a process of synthesis. One rises from facts to laws; the other descends +from laws to facts. Each is independent of the other, and each is a +valid and essential method of inference." + +Halleck well expresses the spirit of deductive reasoning as follows: +"After induction has classified certain phenomena and thus given us a +major premise, we may proceed deductively to apply the inference to any +new specimen that can be shown to belong to that class. Induction hands +over to deduction a ready-made premise. Deduction takes that as a fact, +making no inquiry regarding its truth. Only after general laws have been +laid down, after objects have been classified, after major premises have +been formed, can deduction be employed." + +Deductive reasoning proceeds from general principles to particular +facts. It is a descending process, analytical in its nature. It rests +upon the fundamental axiomatic basis that "_whatever is true of the +whole is true of its parts_," or "_whatever is true of the universal is +true of the particulars_." + +The process of deductive reasoning may be stated briefly as follows: (1) +A general principle of a class is stated as a _major premise_; (2) a +particular thing is stated as belonging to that general class, this +statement being the _minor premise_; therefore (3) the general class +principle is held to apply to the particular thing, this last statement +being the _conclusion_. (_A "premise" is "a proposition assumed to be +true."_) + +The following gives us an illustration of the above process:-- + + I. (_Major premise_)--A bird is a warm-blooded, feathered, winged, + oviparous vertebrate. + + II. (_Minor premise_)--The sparrow is a bird; therefore + + III. (_Conclusion_)--The sparrow is a warm-blooded, feathered, winged, + oviparous vertebrate. + +Or, again:-- + + I. (_Major premise_)--Rattlesnakes frequently bite when enraged, and + their bite is poisonous. + + II. (_Minor premise_)--This snake before me is a rattlesnake; + therefore + + III. (_Conclusion_)--This snake before me may bite when enraged, and + its bite will be poisonous. + +The average person may be inclined to object that he is not conscious of +going through this complicated process when he reasons about sparrows or +rattlesnakes. But he _does_, nevertheless. He is not conscious of the +steps, because mental habit has accustomed him to the process, and it is +performed more or less automatically. But these three steps manifest in +all processes of deductive reasoning, even the simplest. The average +person is like the character in the French play who was surprised to +learn that he had "been talking prose for forty years without knowing +it." Jevons says that the majority of persons are equally surprised when +they find out that they have been using logical forms, more or less +correctly, without having realized it. He says: "A large number even of +educated persons have no clear idea of what logic is. Yet, in a certain +way, every one must have been a logician since he began to speak." + +There are many technical rules and principles of logic which we cannot +attempt to consider here. There are, however, a few elementary +principles of correct reasoning which should have a place here. What is +known as a "syllogism" is the expression in words of the various parts +of the complete process of reasoning or argument. Whately defines it as +follows: "A syllogism is an argument expressed in strict logical form so +that its conclusiveness is manifest from the structure of the expression +alone, without any regard to the meaning of the term." In short, _if_ +the two premises are accepted as correct, it follows that there can be +only one true logical conclusion resulting therefrom. In abstract or +theoretical reasoning the word "_if_" is assumed to precede each of the +two premises, the "therefore" before the conclusion resulting from the +"if," of course. The following are the general rules governing the +syllogism:-- + +I. Every syllogism must consist of three, and no more than three, +propositions, namely (1) the major premise, (2) the minor premise, and +(3) the conclusion. + +II. The conclusion must naturally follow from the premises, otherwise +the syllogism is invalid and constitutes a fallacy or sophism. + +III. One premise, at least, must be affirmative. + +IV. If one premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative. + +V. One premise, at least, must be universal or general. + +VI. If one premise is particular, the conclusion also must be +particular. + +The last two rules (V. and VI.) contain the essential principles of all +the rules regarding syllogisms, and any syllogism which breaks them will +be found also to break other rules, some of which are not stated here +for the reason that they are too technical. These two rules may be +tested by constructing syllogisms in violation of their principles. The +reason for them is as follows: (Rule V.) Because "from two particular +premises no conclusion can be drawn," as, for instance: (1) Some men are +mortal; (2) John is a man. We cannot reason from this either that John +_is_ or _is not_ mortal. The major premise should read "_all_ men." +(Rule VI.) Because "a universal conclusion can be drawn only from two +universal premises," an example being needless here, as the conclusion +is so obvious. + + +CULTIVATION OF REASONING FACULTIES. + +There is no royal road to the cultivation of the reasoning faculties. +There is but the old familiar rule: Practice, exercise, use. +Nevertheless there are certain studies which tend to develop the +faculties in question. The study of arithmetic, especially mental +arithmetic, tends to develop correct habits of reasoning from one truth +to another--from cause to effect. Better still is the study of geometry; +and best of all, of course, is the study of logic and the practice of +working out its problems and examples. The study of philosophy and +psychology also is useful in this way. Many lawyers and teachers have +drilled themselves in geometry solely for the purpose of developing +their logical reasoning powers. + +Brooks says: "So valuable is geometry as a discipline that many lawyers +and others review their geometry every year in order to keep the mind +drilled to logical habits of thinking. * * * The study of logic will aid +in the development of the power of deductive reasoning. It does this, +first, by showing the method by which we reason. To know how we reason, +to see the laws which govern the reasoning process, to analyze the +syllogism and see its conformity to the laws of thought, is not only an +exercise of reasoning but gives that knowledge of the process that will +be both a stimulus and a guide to thought. No one can trace the +principles and processes of thought without receiving thereby an impetus +to thought. In the second place, the study of logic is probably even +more valuable because it gives practice in deductive thinking. This, +perhaps, is its principal value, since the mind reasons instinctively +without knowing how it reasons. One can think without the knowledge of +the science of thinking just as one can use language correctly without a +knowledge of grammar; yet as the study of grammar improves one's speech, +so the study of logic can but improve one's thought." + +In the opinion of the writer hereof, one of the best though simple +methods of cultivating the faculties of reasoning is to acquaint one's +self thoroughly with the more common _fallacies_ or forms of false +reasoning--so thoroughly that not only is the false reasoning detected +at once but also the _reason_ of its falsity is readily understood. To +understand the wrong ways of reasoning is to be on guard against them. +By guarding against them we tend to eliminate them from our thought +processes. If we eliminate the false we have the true left in its place. +Therefore we recommend the weeding of the logical garden of the common +fallacies, to the end that the flowers of pure reason may flourish in +their stead. Accordingly, we think it well to call your attention in the +next chapter to the more common fallacies, and the reason of their +falsity. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVIII. + +Fallacious Reasoning. + + +A fallacy is defined as "an unsound argument or mode of arguing which, +while appearing to be decisive of a question, is in reality not so; or a +fallacious statement or proposition in which the error is not readily +apparent. When a fallacy is used to deceive others, it is called +'sophistry,'" It is important that the student should understand the +nature of the fallacy and understand its most common forms. As Jevons +says: "In learning how to do right it is always desirable to be informed +as to the ways in which we are likely to go wrong. In describing to a +man the road which he should follow, we ought to tell him not only the +turnings which he is to take but also the turnings which he is to avoid. +Similarly, it is a useful part of logic which teaches us the ways and +turnings by which people most commonly go astray in reasoning." + +In presenting the following brief statement regarding the more common +forms of fallacy, we omit so far as possible the technical details which +belong to text-books on logic. + + +FALLACIES. + +I. _True Collective but False Particular._--An example of this fallacy +is found in the argument that because the French race, collectively, are +excitable, therefore a particular Frenchman must be excitable. Or that +because the Jewish race, collectively, are good business people, +therefore the particular Jew must be a good business man. This is as +fallacious as arguing that because a man may drown in the ocean he +should avoid the bath, basin, or cup of water. There is a vast +difference between the whole of a thing and its separate parts. Nitric +acid and glycerin, separately, are not explosive, but, combined, they +form nitro-glycerin, a most dangerous and powerful explosive. Reversing +this form of illustration, we remind you of the old saying: "Salt is a +good thing; but one doesn't want to be put in pickle." + +II. _Irrelevant Conclusion._--This fallacy consists in introducing in +the conclusion matter not contained in the premises, or in the confusing +of the issue. For instance: (1) All men are sinful; (2) John Smith is a +man; therefore (3) John Smith is a horse thief. This may sound absurd, +but many arguments are as fallacious as this, and for the same reason. +Or another and more subtle form: (1) All thieves are liars; (2) John +Smith is a liar; therefore (3) John Smith is a thief. The first example +arises from the introduction of new matter, and the last from the +confusion of the issue. + +III. _False Cause._--This fallacy consists in attributing cause to a +thing which is merely coincident with, or precedent to, the effect. For +instance: (1) The cock crows just before or at the moment of sunrise; +therefore (2) the cock-crowing is the cause of the sunrise. Or, again: +(1) Bad crops followed the election of a Whig president; therefore (2) +the Whig party is the cause of the bad crops. Or, again: (1) Where +civilization is the highest, there we find the greatest number of high +hats; therefore (2) high hats are the cause of civilization. + +IV. _Circular Reasoning._--In this form of fallacy the person reasoning +or arguing endeavors to explain or prove a thing by itself or its own +terms. For instance: (1) The Whig party is honest because it advocates +honest principles; (2) the Whig principles are honest because they are +advocated by an honest party. A common form of this fallacy in its phase +of sophistry is the use of synonyms in such a manner that they seem to +express more than the original conception, whereas they are really but +other terms for the same thing. An historic example of circular +reasoning is the following: (1) The Church of England is the true +Church, because it was established by God; (2) it must have been +established by God, because it is the true Church. This form of +sophistry is most effective when employed in long arguments in which it +is difficult to detect it. + +V. _Begging the Question._--This fallacy arises from the use of a false +premise, or at least of a premise the truth of which is not admitted by +the opponent. It may be stated, simply, as "_the unwarranted assumption +of a premise, generally the major premise_." Many persons in public life +argue in this way. They boldly assert an unwarranted premise, and then +proceed to argue logically from it. The result is confusing to the +average person, for, the steps of the reasoning being logical, it seems +as if the argument is sound, the fact of the unwarranted premise being +overlooked. The person using this form of sophistry proceeds on Aaron +Burr's theory of truth being "that which is boldly asserted and +plausibly maintained." + +Bulwer makes one of his characters mention a particularly atrocious form +of this fallacy (although an amusing one) in the following words: +"Whenever you are about to utter something astonishingly false, always +begin with: 'It is an acknowledged fact,' etc. Sir Robert Filmer was a +master of this manner of writing. Thus with what a solemn face that +great man attempted to cheat. He would say: '_It is a truth undeniable_ +that there cannot be any multitude of men whatsoever, either great or +small, etc., but that in the same multitude there is one man among them +_that in nature hath a right to be King of all the rest--as being the +next heir of Adam_!'" + +Look carefully for the major premise of propositions advanced in +argument, spoken or written. Be sure that the person making the +proposition is not "begging the question" by _the unwarranted assumption +of the premise_. + + +GENERAL RULE OF INFERENCE. + +Hyslop says concerning valid inferences and fallacious ones: "We cannot +infer _anything_ we please from any premises we please. We must conform +to certain definite rules or principles. Any violation of them will be a +fallacy. There are two simple rules which should not be violated: (1) +_The subject-matter in the conclusion should be of the same general kind +as in the premises_; (2) _the facts constituting the premises must be +accepted and must not be fictitious_." A close observance of these rules +will result in the detection and avoidance of the principal forms of +fallacious reasoning and sophistry. + + +SOPHISTICAL ARGUMENTS. + +There are a number of tricky practices resorted to by persons in +argument, that are fallacious in intent and result, which we do not +consider here in detail as they scarcely belong to the particular +subject of this book. A brief mention, however, may be permitted in the +interest of general information. Here are the principal ones:-- + +(1) Arguing that a proposition is correct because the opponent cannot +prove the contrary. The fallacy is seen when we realize that the +statement, "The moon is made of green cheese," is not proved because we +cannot prove the contrary. No amount of failure to _disprove_ a +proposition really _proves_ it; and no amount of failure to _prove_ a +proposition really _disproves_ it. As a general rule, the burden of +proof rests upon the person stating the proposition, and his opponent is +not called upon to disprove it or else have it considered proved. The +old cry of "You cannot _prove_ that it is _not_ so" is based upon a +fallacious conception. + +(2) Abuse of the opponent, his party, or his cause. This is no real +argument or reasoning. It is akin to proving a point by beating the +opponent over the head. + +(3) Arguing that an opponent does not live up to his principles is no +argument against the principles he advocates. A man may advocate the +principle of temperance and yet drink to excess. This simply proves that +he preaches better than he practices; but the truth of the principle of +temperance is not affected in any way thereby. The proof of this is +that he may change his practices; and it cannot be held that the change +of his personal habits improves or changes the nature of the principle. + +(4) Argument of authority is not based on logic. Authority is valuable +when really worthy, and merely as corroboration or adding weight; but it +is not logical argument. The _reasons_ of the authority alone constitute +a real argument. The abuse of this form of argument is shown, in the +above reference to "begging the question," in the quotation from Bulwer. + +(5) Appeal to prejudice or public opinion is not a valid argument, for +public opinion is frequently wrong and prejudice is often unwarranted. +And, at the best, they "have nothing to do with the case" from the +standpoint of logic. The abuse of testimony and claimed evidence is also +worthy of examination, but we cannot go into the subject here. + + +FALLACIES OF PREJUDICE. + +But perhaps the most dangerous of all fallacies in the search for truth +on the part of the most of us are those which arise from the +following:-- + +(1) The tendency to reason from what we feel and wish to be true, rather +than from the actual facts of the case, which causes us unconsciously to +assume the mental attitude of "if the facts agree with our likes and +pet theories, all is well; if they do not, so much the worse for the +facts." + +(2) The tendency in all of us to perceive only the facts that agree with +our theories and to ignore the others. We find that for which we seek, +and overlook that which does not interest us. Our discoveries follow our +interest, and our interest follows our desires and beliefs. + +The intelligent man or woman realizes these tendencies of human nature +and endeavors to avoid them in his or her own reasoning, but is keenly +conscious of them in the arguments and reasoning of others. A failure to +observe and guard one's self against these tendencies results in +bigotry, intolerance, narrowness, and intellectual astigmatism. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIX. + +The Will. + + +The activities of the will comprise the third great class of mental +processes. Psychologists always have differed greatly in their +conception of just what constitutes these activities. Even to-day it is +difficult to obtain a dictionary definition of the will that agrees with +the best opinion on the subject. The dictionaries adhere to the old +classification and conception which regarded the will as "that faculty +of the mind or soul by which it chooses or decides." But with the growth +of the idea that the will acts according to the strongest motive, and +that the motive is supplied by the average struck between the desires of +the moment, under the supervision of the intellect, the conception of +will as the choosing and deciding faculty is passing from favor. In the +place of the older conception has come the newer one which holds that +the will is primarily concerned with _action_. + +It is difficult to place the will in the category of mental processes. +But it is generally agreed that it abides in the very center of the +mental being, and is closely associated with what is called the ego, or +self. The will seems to have at least three general phases, viz.: (1) +The phase of desire, (2) the phase of deliberation or choice, and (3) +the phase of expression in action. In order to understand the will, it +is necessary to consider each of these three phases of its activities. + + +(1). DESIRE. + +The first phase of will, which is called "desire," is in itself somewhat +complex. On its lower side it touches, and, in fact, blends into, +feeling and emotion. Its center consists of a state of _tension_, akin +to that of a coiled spring or a cat crouching ready for a spring. On its +higher side it touches, penetrates, and blends into the other phases of +the will which we have mentioned. + +Desire is defined as "a feeling, emotion, or excitement of the mind +directed toward the attainment, enjoyment, or possession of some object +from which pleasure, profit, or gratification is expected." Halleck +gives us the following excellent conception of the moving spirit of +desire: "_Desire has for its object something which will bring pleasure +or get rid of pain, immediate or remote, for the individual or for some +one in whom he is interested. Aversion, or a striving away from +something, is merely the negative aspect of desire._" + +In Halleck's statement, above quoted, we have the explanation of the +part played by the intellect in the activities of will. The intellect +is able to perceive the relations between present action and future +results, and is able to point the way toward the suppression of some +desires in order that other and better ones may be manifested. It also +serves its purposes in regulating the "striking of the average" between +conflicting desires. Without the intervention of the intellect, the +temporary desire of the moment would invariably be acted upon without +regard to future results or consequences to one's self and others. It +also serves to point out the course of action calculated to give the +most satisfactory expression of the desire. + +While it is a fact that the action of will depends almost entirely upon +the motive force of desire, it is likewise true that desire may be +created, regulated, suppressed, and even killed by the action of the +will. The will, by giving or refusing attention to a certain class of +desires, may either cause them to grow and wax strong, or else die and +fade away. It must be remembered, however, that this use of the will +itself springs from another set of desires or feelings. + +Desire is aroused by feelings or emotions rising from the subconscious +planes of the mind and seeking expression and manifestation. We have +considered the nature of the feelings and emotions in previous chapters, +which should be read in connection with the present one. It should be +remembered that the feeling or emotional side of desire arises from +either inherited race memories existing as instincts, or from the memory +of the past experiences of the individual. In some cases the feeling +first manifests in a vague unrest caused by subconscious promptings and +excitement. Then the imagination pictures the object of the feeling, or +certain memory images connected with it, and the desire thus manifests +on the plane of consciousness. + +The entrance of the desire feeling into consciousness is accompanied by +that peculiar _tension_ which marks the second phase of desire. This +tension, when sufficiently strong, passes into the third phase of +desire, or that in which desire blends into will action. Desire in this +stage makes a demand upon will for expression and action. From mere +feeling, and tension of feeling, it becomes _a call to action_. But +before expression and action are given to it, the second phase of will +must manifest at least for a moment; this second phase is that known as +deliberation, or the weighing and balancing of desires. + + +(2). DELIBERATION. + +The second phase of will, known as deliberation, is more than the purely +intellectual process which the term would indicate. The intellect plays +an important part, it is true, but there is also an almost instinctive +and automatic _weighing and balancing of desires_. There is seldom only +one desire presenting its claims upon the will at any particular moment. +It is true that occasionally there arises an emotional desire of such +dominant power and strength that it crowds out every other claimant at +the bar of deliberation. But such instances are rare, and as a rule +there are a host of rival claimants, each insisting upon its rights in +the matter at issue. In the man of weak or undeveloped and untrained +intellect, the struggle is usually little more than a brief combat +between several desires, in which _the strongest at the moment wins_. +But with the development of intellect new factors arise and new forces +are felt. Moreover, the more complex one's emotional nature, and the +greater the development of the higher forms of feeling, the more intense +is the struggle of deliberation or the fight of the desires. + +We see, in Halleck's definition, that desire has not only the object of +"bringing pleasure or getting rid of pain" for the individual, but that +the additional element of the welfare of "some one in whom he is +interested" is added, which element is often the deciding factor. This +element, of course, arises from the development and cultivation of one's +emotional nature. In the same way we also see that it is not merely the +_immediate_ welfare of one's self or those in whom one is interested +that speaks before the bar, but also the more _remote_ welfare. This +consideration of future welfare depends upon the intellect and +cultivated imagination under its control. Moreover, the trained +intellect is able to discover possible greater satisfaction in some +course of action other than in the one prompted by the clamoring desire +of the moment. This explains why the judgment and action of an +intelligent man, as a rule, are far different from those of the +unintelligent one; and also why a man of culture tends toward different +action from that of the uncultured; and likewise, why the man of broad +sympathies and high ideals acts in a different way from one of the +opposite type. But the principle is ever the same--the feelings manifest +in desire, the greatest ultimate satisfaction apparent at the moment is +sought, and the strongest set of desires wins the day. + +Halleck's comment on this point is interesting. He says: "Desire is not +always proportional to the idea of one's own selfish pleasure. Many +persons, after forming an idea of the vast amount of earthly distress, +desire to relieve it, and the desire goes out in action, as the +benevolent societies in every city testify. Here the individual pleasure +is none the less, but it is secondary, coming from the pleasure of +others. The desire of the _near_ often raises a stronger desire than the +_remote_. A child frequently prefers a thing immediately if it is only +one tenth as good as something he might have a year hence. A student +often desires more the leisure of to-day than the success of future +years. Though admonished to study, he wastes his time and thus loses +incomparably greater future pleasure when he is tossed to the rear in +the struggle for existence." + +The result of this weighing and balancing of the desire is, or should +be, _decision and choice_, which then passes into action. But many +persons seem unable to "make up their own mind," and require a push or +urge from without before they will act. Others decide, without proper +use of the intellect, upon what they call "impulse," but which is merely +impatience. Some are like the fabled donkey which starved to death when +placed at an equal distance between two equally attractive haystacks and +was unable to decide towards which to move. Others follow the example of +Jeppe, in the comedy, who, when given a coin with which to buy a piece +of soap for his wife, stood on the corner deliberating whether to obey +orders or to buy a drink with the money. He wants the drink, but +realizes that his wife will beat him if he returns without the soap. "My +stomach says drink; my back says soap," says Jeppe. "But," finally he +remarks, "is not a man's stomach more to him than his back? Yes, says +I." + +The final decision depends upon the striking a balance between the +desires,--the weighing of desire for and desire against,--desire for +this and desire for something else. The strength of the several desires +depends upon nearness and present interest arising from attention, as +applied to the feelings and emotions arising from heredity, environment, +experience, and education, which constitute character; and also upon the +degree of intellectual clearness and power in forming correct judgments +between the desires. + +It must be remembered, however, that the intellect appears not as an +opponent of the principle of the satisfaction of desire, but merely as +an instrument of the ego in determining which course of action will +result in the greatest ultimate satisfaction, direct or indirect, +present or future. For, _at the last, every individual acts so as to +bring himself the greatest satisfaction, immediate or future, direct or +indirect, either personal or through the welfare of others, as this may +appear to him at the particular moment of deliberation_. We always act +in the direction of that which will greater "content our spirit." This +will be found to be the spirit of all decisions, although the motive is +often hidden and difficult to find even by the individual himself, many +of the strongest motives having their origin in the subconscious planes +of mentality. + + +(3). ACTION. + +The third and final phase of will is that known as action--the act of +volition by which the desire-idea is expressed in physical or mental +activity. The old conception of the will held that the decisive phase of +the will was its characteristic and final phase, ignoring the fact that +the very essence or spirit of will is bound up with _action_. Even those +familiar with the newer conception frequently assume that the act of +decision is the final phase of will, ignoring the fact that we +frequently _decide_ to do a thing and yet may never carry out the +intention and decision. The act of willing is not complete unless action +is expressed. There must be the manifestation of the motor element or +phase of will, else the will process is incomplete. + +A weakness of this last phase of will affects the entire will and +renders its processes ineffective. The world is filled with persons who +are able to _decide_ what is best to do, and what should be done, but +who never actually _act_ upon the decision. The few persons who promptly +follow up the decision with vigorous action are those who accomplish the +world's work. Without the full manifestation of this third phase of will +the other two phases are useless. + + +TYPES OF WILL. + +So far we have considered merely the highest type of will--that which +is accompanied by conscious deliberation, in which the intellect takes +an active part. In this process, not only do the conflicting feelings +push themselves forward with opposing claims for recognition, but the +intellect is active in examining the case and offering valuable +testimony as to the comparative merits of the various claimants and the +effect of certain courses of action upon the individual. There are, +however, several lower forms of will manifestation which we should +briefly consider in passing. + +_Reflex Action._--The will is moved to action by the reflex activities +of the nervous system which have been mentioned in the earlier chapters +of this book. In this general type we find unconscious reflex action, +such as that manifested when a sleeper is touched and moves away, or +when the frog's leg twitches when the nerve end is excited. We also find +conscious reflex action, such as that manifested by the winking of the +eye, or the performance of habitual physical motion, such as the +movement in walking, operating the sewing machine or typewriter, playing +the piano, etc. + +_Impulsive Action._--The will is often moved to action by a dim idea or +faint perception of purpose or impulse. The action is almost +instinctive, although there is a vague perception of purpose. For +instance, we feel an impulse to turn toward the source of a strange +sound or sight, or other source of interest or curiosity. Or we may +feel an impulse arising from the subconscious plane of our mind, causing +a dimly-conscious idea of movement or action to relieve the tension. For +instance, one may feel a desire to exercise, or to seek fresh air or +green fields, although he had not been thinking of these things at the +time. These impulses arise from a subconscious feeling of fatigue or +desire for change, which, added to a fleeting idea, produces the +impulse. Unless an impulse is inhibited by the will activities inspired +by other desires, habits, ideas, or ideals, we act upon it in precisely +the same way that a young child or animal does. Hoffding says of this +type of action: "The psychological condition of the impulse is, that +with the momentary feeling and sensation should be combined a more or +less clear idea of something which may augment the pleasure or diminish +the pain of the moment." + +_Instinctive Action._--The will is frequently moved to action by an +instinctive stimulus. This form of will activity closely resembles the +last mentioned form, and often it is impossible to distinguish between +the two. The activities of the bee in building its comb and storing its +honey, the work of the silkworm and caterpillar in building their +resting places, are examples of this form of action. Indeed, even the +building of the nest of the bird may be so classed. In these cases there +is an intelligent action toward a definite end, but the animal is +unconscious of that end. The experiences of the remote ancestors of +these creatures recorded their impressions upon the subconscious mind of +the species, and they are transmitted in some way to all of that +species. The nervous system of every living thing is a record cylinder +of the experiences of its early ancestors, and these cylinders tend to +reproduce these impressions upon appropriate occasions. In preceding +chapters we have shown that even man is under the influence of instinct +to a greater extent than he imagines himself to be. + + + + +CHAPTER XXX. + +Will-Training. + + +It is of the utmost importance that the individual develop, cultivate, +and train his will so as to bring it under the influence of the higher +part of his mental and moral being. While the will is used most +effectively in developing and training the intellect and building +character, it itself must be trained by itself to habitually come under +the guidance of the intellect and under the influence of that which we +call character. + +The influence of the trained will upon the several mental faculties is +most marked. There are no faculties which may not be cultivated by the +will. The first and great task of the will in this direction is the +control and direction of the attention. The will determines the kind of +interest that shall prevail at the moment, and the kind of interest +largely determines the character of the man, his tastes, his feelings, +his thoughts, his acts. Gordy says: "Coöperating with a pre-existing +influence, the will can make a weaker one prevail over a stronger. * * * +It determines which of pre-existing influences shall have control over +the mind." + +Moreover, concentrated and continued attention depends entirely upon the +exercise of the will. As Gordy says: "If the will relaxes its hold upon +the activities of the mind, the attention is liable to be carried away +by any one of the thousands of ideas that the laws of association are +constantly bringing into our minds." + +Even in the matter of mental images the will asserts its sway, and the +imagination may be trained to be the obedient servant of the developed +will. Regarding the influence of the will upon character, Davidson says: +"It is not enough for a man to understand correctly and love duly the +conditions of moral life in his own time; he must, still further, be +willing and able to fulfill these conditions. And he certainly cannot do +this unless his will is trained to perfect freedom, so that it responds, +with the utmost readiness, to the suggestions of his discriminating +intelligence and the movements of his chastened affections." Halleck +says: "We gradually make our characters by separate acts of will, just +as a blacksmith by repeated blows beats out a horseshoe or an anchor +from a shapeless mass of iron. A finished anchor or horseshoe was never +the product of a single blow." + + +TRAINING THE WILL. + +Perhaps the best way to train the will is to _use_ it intelligently, and +with a purpose. The training of any faculty of the mind is at the same +time a training of the will. The attention being so closely allied to +the will, it follows that a careful training of attention will result in +a strengthening of the will. The training of the emotional side of one's +nature also brings results in the strengthening of the will. + +Halleck gives his students excellent advice regarding the training of +the will. It would be hard to find anything better along these lines +than the following from his pen: "Nothing schools the will, and renders +it ready for effort in this complex world, better than accustoming it to +face disagreeable things. Professor James advises all to do something +occasionally for no other reason than that they would rather not do it, +if it is nothing more than giving up a seat in a street car. He likens +such effort to the insurance that a man pays on his house. He has +something that he can fall back on in time of trouble. A will schooled +in this way is always ready to respond, no matter how great the +emergency. While another would be crying over spilled milk, the +possessor of such a will has already found another cow. * * * The only +way to secure such a will is to practice doing disagreeable things. +There are daily opportunities. * * * A man who had declared his aversion +to what he deemed the dry facts of political economy was one day found +knitting his brow over a chapter of John Stuart Mill. When a friend +expressed surprise, the man replied: 'I am playing the schoolmaster with +myself. I am reading this because I dislike it.' Such a man has the +elements of success in him. * * * On the other hand, the one who +habitually avoids disagreeable action is training his will to be of no +use to him at a time when supreme effort is demanded. Such a will can +never elbow its way to the front in life." + + +HABITS. + +Habits are the beaten track over which the will travels. The beaten path +of habit is the line of least resistance to the will. One who would +train his will must needs pay attention to providing it with the proper +mental paths over which to travel. The rule for the creation of habits +is simply this: _Travel over the mental path as often as possible_. The +rule for breaking undesirable habits is this: _Cultivate the opposite +habit_. In these two rules is expressed the gist of what has been +written on the subject. + +Professor William James has left to the world some invaluable advice +regarding the cultivation of right habits. He bases his rules upon those +of Professor Bain, elaborates these, and adds some equally good ones. We +herewith quote freely from both James and Bain on this subject; it is +the best ever written regarding habit building. + +I. "In the acquisition of a new habit, or the leaving off of an old one, +launch yourself with as strong and decided an initiative as possible. +This will give your new beginning such a momentum that the temptation to +break down will not occur as soon as it otherwise might; and every day +during which a breakdown is postponed adds to the chances of it not +occurring at all."--_James._ + +II. "Never suffer an exception to occur till the new habit is securely +rooted in your life. Every lapse is like the letting fall of a ball of +string which one is carefully winding up--a single slip undoes more than +a great many turns will wind again."--_James._ "It is necessary, above +all things, in such a situation, never to lose a battle. Every gain on +the wrong side undoes the effect of many conquests on the right. The +essential precaution is so to regulate the two opposing powers that the +one may have a series of uninterrupted successes, until repetition has +fortified it to such a degree as to enable it to cope with the +opposition, under any circumstances."--_Bain._ + +III. "Seize the very first possible opportunity to act on every +resolution you make, and on every emotional prompting you may experience +in the direction of the habits you aspire to gain. It is not in the +moment of their forming, but in the moment of their producing _motor +effects_, that resolves and aspirations communicate their new 'set' to +the brain."--_James._ "The actual presence of the practical opportunity +alone furnishes the fulcrum upon which the lever can rest, by which the +moral will may multiply its strength and raise itself aloft. He who has +no solid ground to press against will never get beyond the stage of +empty gesture making."--_Bain._ + +IV. "Keep the faculty alive in you by a little gratuitous exercise every +day. That is, be systematically ascetic or heroic in little, unnecessary +points; do every day something for no other reason than that you would +rather not do it, so that when the hour of dire need draws nigh, it may +find you not unnerved and untrained to stand the test. * * * The man who +has daily inured himself to habits of concentrated attention, energetic +volition, and self-denial in unnecessary things will stand like a tower +when everything rocks around him, and when his softer fellow mortals are +winnowed like chaff in the blast."--_James._ + + + + +CHAPTER XXXI. + +Will-Tonic. + + +In addition to the general rules for developing and training the will +given in the preceding chapter, we ask you to tone up and strengthen the +will by the inspiration to be derived from the words of some of the +world's great thinkers and doers. In these words there is such a vital +statement of the recognition, realization, and manifestation of that +something within, which we call "will," that it is a dull soul, indeed, +which is not inspired by the contagion of the idea. These expressions +are the milestones on the Path of Attainment, placed by those who have +preceded us on the journey. We submit these quotations without comment; +they speak for themselves. + + +WORDS OF THE WISE. + +"They can who think they can. Character is a perfectly educated will." + +"Nothing can resist the will of a man who knows what is true and wills +what is good." + +"In all difficulties advance and will, for within you is a power, a +living force, which the more you trust and learn to use will annihilate +the opposition of matter." + + "The star of the unconquered will, + It rises in my breast, + Serene and resolute and still, + And calm and self-possessed. + + "So nigh is grandeur to our dust, + So near is God to man, + When duty whispers low, 'Thou must!' + The youth replies, 'I can!'" + +"The longer I live, the more certain I am that the great difference +between men, between the feeble and the powerful, the great and the +insignificant, is energy,--invincible determination,--a purpose once +fixed, and then death or victory. That quality will do anything that can +be done in this world, and no talents, no circumstances, no +opportunities will make a two-legged creature a man without +it."--_Buxton._ + + "The human will, that force unseen, + The offspring of a deathless soul, + Can hew a way to any goal, + Though walls of granite intervene. + + "You will be what you will to be; + Let failure find its false content + In that poor word environment, + But spirit scorns it and is free. + + "It masters time, it conquers space, + It cows that boastful trickster, chance, + And bids the tyrant circumstance + Uncrown and fill a servant's place." + +"Resolve is what makes a man manifest; not puny resolve, not crude +determinations, not errant purpose, but that strong and indefatigable +will which treads down difficulties and danger as a boy treads down the +heaving frost lands of winter, which kindles his eye and brain with a +proud pulse beat toward the unattainable. Will makes men +giants."--_Donald G. Mitchell._ + + "There is no chance, no destiny, no fate + Can circumvent, or hinder, or control + The firm resolve of a determined soul. + Gifts count for nothing, will alone is great; + All things give way before it soon or late. + What obstacle can stay the mighty force + Of the sea-seeking river in its course, + Or cause the ascending orb of day to wait? + Each well-born soul must win what it deserves. + Let the fools prate of luck. The fortunate + Is he whose earnest purpose never swerves, + Whose slightest action, or inaction, + Serves the one great aim. Why, even death itself + Stands still and waits an hour sometimes + For such a will." + + --_Ella Wheeler Wilcox._ + +"I have brought myself by long meditation to the conviction that a human +being with a settled purpose must accomplish it, and that nothing can +resist a will which will stake even existence upon its fulfillment." +--_Lord Beaconsfield._ + +"A passionate desire and an unwearied will can perform impossibilities, +or what may seem to be such to the cold and feeble."--_Sir John +Simpson._ + +"It is wonderful how even the casualties of life seem to bow to a spirit +that will not bow to them, and yield to subserve a design which they +may, in their first apparent tendency, threaten to frustrate. When a +firm, decisive spirit is recognized, it is curious to see how the space +clears around a man and leaves him room and freedom."--_John Foster._ + +"The great thing about General Grant is cool persistency of purpose. He +is not easily excited, and he has got the grip of a bulldog. When he +once gets his teeth in, nothing can shake him off."--_Abraham Lincoln._ + +"I am bigger than anything that can happen to me. All these things are +outside my door, _and I've got the key_. * * * Man was meant to be, and +ought to be, stronger and more than anything that can happen to him. +Circumstances, 'Fate,' 'Luck,' are all outside; and if he cannot change +them, he can always _beat_ them."--_Charles F. Lummis._ + +"The truest wisdom is a resolute determination." + +"Impossible is a word found only in the dictionary of fools." + +"Circumstances! I _make_ circumstances!"--_Napoleon._ + +"He who fails only half wills."--_Suwarrow._ + +"That which the easiest becomes a habit in us is the will. Learn, then, +to will strongly and decisively; thus fix your floating life, and leave +it no longer to be carried hither and thither, like a withered leaf, by +every wind that blows." + +"Man owes his growth chiefly to that active striving of the will,--that +encounter which we call effort,--and it is astonishing to find how often +results apparently impracticable are thus made possible. * * * It is +will--force of purpose--that enables a man to do or be whatever he sets +his mind upon being or doing." + +"A strong, defiant purpose is many-handed and lays hold of whatever is +near that can serve it; it has a magnetic purpose that draws to itself +whatever is kindred. * * * Let it be your first study to teach the world +that you are not wood and straw; that there is some iron in +you."--_Munger._ + +"It's _dogged_ as does it."--_Yorkshire Proverb._ + +"One talent with a will behind it will accomplish more than ten without +it, as a thimbleful of powder in a rifle, the bore of whose barrel will +give it direction, will do greater execution than a carload burned in +the open air."--_O.S. Marden._ + +"Will may not endow man with talents or capacities; but it does one very +important matter--it enables him to make the best, the very best, of his +powers."--_Fothergill._ + + "Tender-handed stroke a nettle, + And it stings you for your pains. + Grasp it like a man of mettle, + And it soft as down remains." + +"Don't flinch; don't foul; but hit the line hard."--_Roosevelt._ + +"The more difficulties one has to encounter, within and without, the +more significant and the higher in inspiration his life will be." + + + + + * * * * * + + + + +Transcriber's note: + +Obvious typographcial errors and printer errors have been corrected +without comment. Other than obvious errors, no attempt has been made +to correct unconventional spelling, punctuation, grammar, etc. The +author's usage is preserved as printed in the original publication. + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 42055 *** |