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THE PANAMA CANAL

       *       *       *       *       *

[Illustration: The 5 Points of Authority]

The 5 Points of Authority in this Book


     1. All of the chapters in this book pertaining to the actual
     construction of the Canal were read and corrected by Colonel
     George W. Goethals, Chairman and Chief Engineer of the Isthmian
     Canal Commission.

     2. All of the illustrations were made from photographs taken by
     Mr. Ernest Hallen, the official photographer of the Commission.

     3. The book contains the beautiful, colored Bird's-eye View of
     the Canal Zone, made under the direction of the National
     Geographic Society, as well as the black-and-white official map
     of the Canal.

     4. The extensive index was prepared by Mr. G. Thomas Ritchie, of
     the staff of the Library of Congress.

     5. The final proofs were revised by Mr. Howard E. Sherman, of the
     Government Printing Office, to conform with the typographical
     style of the United States Government.


"The American Government,"

by the same author, was read by millions of Americans, and still holds
the record as the world's best seller among all works of its kind.

       *       *       *       *       *

[Illustration: ATLANTIC OCEAN      PACIFIC OCEAN

Courtesy, National Geographic Magazine, Washington, D. C.

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE PANAMA CANAL

Copyright, 1913, by the J. N. Matthews Co., Buffalo, N. Y.]


THE PANAMA CANAL

by

FREDERIC J. HASKIN

Author of "The American Government," etc.

[Illustration: logo]

Illustrated from photographs taken by

ERNEST ALLEN

Official Photographer of the Isthmian Canal Commission







Garden City      New York
Doubleday, Page & Company
1913

Copyright, 1913, by
Doubleday, Page & Company

All rights reserved, including that of
translation into foreign languages,
including the Scandinavian

Press of
J. J. Little & Ives Co.
New York




PREFACE


The primary purpose of this book is to tell the layman the story of
the Panama Canal. It is written, therefore, in the simplest manner
possible, considering the technical character of the great engineering
feat itself, and the involved complexities of the diplomatic history
attaching to its inception and undertaking. The temptation to turn
aside into the pleasant paths of the romantic history of ancient
Panama has been resisted; there is no attempt to dispose of political
problems that incidentally concern the canal; in short, the book is
confined to the story of the canal itself, and the things that are
directly and vitally connected with it.

Colonel Goethals was good enough to read and correct the chapters
relating to the construction of the canal, and, when shown a list of
the chapters proposed, he asked that the one headed "The Man at the
Helm" be omitted. The author felt that to bow to his wishes in that
matter would be to fail to tell the whole story of the canal, and so
Colonel Goethals did not read that chapter.

Every American is proud of the great national achievement at Panama.
If, in the case of the individual, this book is able to supplement
that pride by an ample fund of knowledge and information, its object
and purpose will have been attained.




ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


The grateful acknowledgments of the author are due to Mr. William
Joseph Showalter for his valuable aid in gathering and preparing the
material for this book. Acknowledgments are also due to Colonel George
W. Goethals, chairman and chief engineer of the Isthmian Canal
Commission, for reading and correcting those chapters in the book
pertaining to the engineering phases of the work; to Mr. Ernest
Hallen, the official photographer of the Commission, for the
photographs with which the book is illustrated; to Mr. Gilbert H.
Grosvenor, editor of the _National Geographic Magazine_, for
permission to use the bird's-eye view map of the canal; to Mr. G.
Thomas Ritchie, of the Library of Congress, for assistance in
preparing the index; and to Mr. Howard E. Sherman, of the Government
Printing Office, for revising the proofs to conform with the
typographical style of the United States Government.




CONTENTS


  CHAPTER                                      PAGE

       I. The Land Divided--The World United      3

      II. Greatest Engineering Project           23

     III. Gatun Dam                              32

      IV. The Locks                              45

       V. The Lock Machinery                     57

      VI. Culebra Cut                            70

     VII. Ends of the Canal                      82

    VIII. The Panama Railroad                    93

      IX. Sanitation                            105

       X. The Man at the Helm                   118

      XI. The Organization                      133

     XII. The American Workers                  145

    XIII. The Negro Workers                     154

     XIV. The Commissary                        164

      XV. Life on the Zone                      176

     XVI. Past Isthmian Projects                194

    XVII. The French Failure                    206

   XVIII. Choosing the Panama Route             221

     XIX. Controversy with Colombia             233

      XX. Relations with Panama                 246

     XXI. Canal Zone Government                 256

    XXII. Congress and the Canal                268

   XXIII. Sea Level Canal Impossible            277

    XXIV. Fortifications                        283

     XXV. Fixing the Tolls                      295

    XXVI. The Operating Force                   309

   XXVII. Handling the Traffic                  317

  XXVIII. The Republic of Panama                326

    XXIX. Other Great Canals                    335

     XXX. A New Commercial Map                  347

    XXXI. American Trade Opportunities          358

   XXXII. The Panama-Pacific Exposition         368




THE ILLUSTRATIONS


  Birdseye View of the Panama Canal Zone         _Color insert_

                                                    FACING PAGE

  George W. Goethals, Chairman and Chief Engineer            10

  A Street in the City of Panama                             11

  Theodore Roosevelt                                         18

  William Howard Taft                                        18

  Woodrow Wilson                                             18

  Vendors in the Streets of Panama                           19

  A Native Boy Marketing                                     19

  Lieut. Col. W. L. Sibert                                   43

  The Upper Locks at Gatun                                   43

  Toro Point Breakwater                                      43

  Concrete Mixers, Gatun                                     50

  A Center Wall Culvert, Gatun Locks                         50

  The Machinery for Moving a Lock Gate                       51

  Steam Shovels Meeting at Bottom of Culebra Cut             74

  L. K. Rourke                                               74

  The Man-made Canyon at Culebra                             75

  The Disastrous Effects of Slides in Culebra Cut            82

  U. S. Ladder Dredge "Corozal"                              83

  A Mud Bucket of the "Corozal"                              83

  W. G. Comber                                               83

  Col. William C. Gorgas                                    106

  The Hospital Grounds, Ancon                               106

  Lieut. Frederic Mears                                     107

  The Old Panama Railroad                                   107

  Sanitary Drinking Cup                                     114

  Mosquito Oil Drip Barrel                                  114

  Spraying Mosquito Oil                                     114

  Typical Quarters of the Married Laborer                   115

  A Native Hut                                              115

  Maj. Gen. George W. Davis                                 138

  Rear Admiral J. G. Walker                                 138

  Theodore P. Shonts                                        138

  John F. Wallace                                           138

  John F. Stevens                                           138

  Charles E. Magoon                                         138

  Richard Lee Metcalfe                                      139

  Emory R. Johnson                                          139

  Maurice H. Thatcher                                       139

  Joseph Bucklin Bishop                                     139

  H. A. Gudger                                              139

  Joseph C. S. Blackburn                                    139

  Brig. Gen. Carroll A. Devol                               146

  American Living Quarters at Cristobal                     146

  Harry H. Rousseau                                         147

  Lowering a Caisson Section                                147

  John Burke                                                170

  Meal Time at an I. C. C. Kitchen                          170

  Washington Hotel, Colon                                   171

  Major Eugene T. Wilson                                    171

  The Tivoli Hotel, Ancon                                   171

  Floyd C. Freeman                                          178

  I. C. C. Club House at Culebra                            178

  A. Bruce Minear                                           179

  Reading Room in the I. C. C. Club House, Culebra          179

  Col. Chester L. Harding                                   202

  The Gatun Upper Locks                                     202

  Lieut. Col. David D. Gaillard                             203

  Culebra Cut, Showing Cucaracha Slide in Left Center       203

  The Man of Brawn                                          210

  Ferdinand de Lesseps                                      211

  An Old French Excavator Near Tabernilla                   211

  Philippe Bunau-Varilla                                    211

  S. B. Williamson                                          234

  The Lower Gates, Miraflores Locks                         234

  Middle Gates, Miraflores Locks                            235

  H. O. Cole                                                235

  The Pay Car at Culebra                                    242

  Edward J. Williams                                        242

  Uncle Sam's Laundry at Cristobal                          243

  Smoke from Heated Rocks in Culebra Cut                    266

  Tom M. Cooke                                              267

  The Post Office, Ancon                                    267

  A Negro Girl                                              274

  A Martinique Woman                                        274

  San Blas Chief                                            274

  An Indian Girl                                            274

  An Italian                                                274

  A Timekeeper                                              274

  A Spaniard                                                274

  A Negro Boy                                               274

  Testing the Emergency Dam, Gatun Locks                    275

  Col. Harry F. Hodges                                      275

  The Ancon Baseball Park                                   298

  Caleb M. Saville                                          399

  Gatun Spillway from Above and Below                       299

  An Electric Towing Locomotive in Action                   306

  Blowing Up the Second Dike South of Miraflores Locks      307


  DIAGRAMS

  A Graphic Illustration of the Material Handled at Panama   25

  A Cross Section of the Gatun Dam                           35

  Plan of the Gatun Dam and Locks                            36

  A Profile Section of the Canal                             40

  From a Model of Pedro Miguel Lock                          48

  A Cross-section of Locks, Giving an Idea of Their Size     49

  One of the 92 Gate-leaf Master Wheels                      64

  A _Mauretania_ in the Locks                                67

  The Effect of Slides                                       72

  Average Shape and Dimensions of Culebra Cut                75

  The _Corozal_ and its Method of Attack                     85

  International Shipping Routes                             351

  A Map Showing Isthmus with the Completed Canal            379




The Panama Canal

"_I have read the chapters in 'The Panama Canal' dealing with the
engineering features of the Canal and have found them an accurate and
dependable account of the undertaking._"

                                             GEO. W. GOETHALS.




THE PANAMA CANAL




CHAPTER I

THE LAND DIVIDED--THE WORLD UNITED


The Panama Canal is a waterway connecting the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans, cut through the narrow neck of land connecting the continents
of North and South America. It is the solution of the problem of
international commerce that became acute in 1452 when the Eastern
Roman Empire fell before the assaults of the Turks, and the land
routes to India were closed to Western and Christian Europe.

Forty years after the Crescent supplanted the Cross on the dome of St.
Sophia in Constantinople, Columbus set sail to seek a western route to
the Indies. He did not find it, but it was his fortune to set foot on
the Isthmus of Panama, where, more than four centuries later, the goal
of his ambition was to be achieved; not by discovery, but by virtue of
the strength and wealth of a new nation of which he did not dream,
although its existence is due to his own intrepid courage.

Columbus died not knowing that he had multiplied the world by two, and
many voyagers after him also vainly sought the longed-for western
passage. Magellan sought it thousands of leagues to the southward in
the cold and stormy seas that encircle the Antarctic Continent. Scores
of mariners sought it to the northward, but only one, Amundsen, in the
twentieth century, was able to take a ship through the frozen passages
of the American north seas.

Down the western coast of the new continent from the eternal ice of
Alaska through the Tropics to the southern snows of Tierra del Fuego,
the mighty Cordilleras stretch a mountain barrier thousands and
thousands and thousands of miles.

Where that mountain chain is narrowest, and where its peaks are
lowest, ships may now go through the Panama Canal. The canal is cut
through the narrowest part of the Isthmus but one, and through the
Culebra Mountain, the lowest pass but one, in all that longest,
mightiest range of mountains. There is a lower place in Nicaragua, and
a narrower place on the Isthmus east of the canal, but the engineers
agreed that the route from Colon on the Atlantic to Panama on the
Pacific through Culebra Mountain was the most practicable.

The canal is 50 miles long. Fifteen miles of it is level with the
oceans, the rest is higher. Ships are lifted up in giant locks, three
steps, to sail for more than 30 miles across the continental divide,
85 feet above the surface of the ocean, then let down by three other
locks to sea level again. The channel is 300 feet wide at its
narrowest place, and the locks which form the two gigantic water
stairways are capable of lifting and lowering the largest ships now
afloat. A great part of the higher level of the canal is the largest
artificial lake in the world, made by impounding the waters of the
Chagres River, thus filling with water the lower levels of the
section. Another part of the higher level is Culebra Cut, the channel
cut through the backbone of the continent.

Almost before Columbus died plans were made for cutting such a
channel. With the beginning of the nineteenth century and the
introduction of steam navigation, the demand for the canal began to be
insistent.

Many plans were made, but it remained for the French, on New Year's
Day of 1880, actually to begin the work. They failed, but not before
they had accomplished much toward the reduction of Culebra Cut. They
expended between 1880 and 1904 no less than $300,000,000 in their
ill-fated efforts.

In 1904 the United States of America undertook the task. In a decade
it was completed and the Americans had spent, all told, $375,000,000
in the project.

Because the Atlantic lies east and the Pacific west of the United
States, one is likely to imagine the canal as a huge ditch cut
straight across a neck of land from east to west. But it must be
remembered that South America lies eastward from North America, and
that the Isthmus connecting the two has its axis east and west. The
canal, therefore, is cut from the Atlantic south-eastward to the
Pacific. It lies directly south of Pittsburgh, Pa., and it brings Peru
and Chile closer to New York than California and Oregon. The first 7
miles of the canal, beginning at the Atlantic end, run directly south
and from thence to the Pacific it pursues a serpentine course in a
southeasterly direction.

At the northern, or Atlantic, terminus are the twin cities of Colon
and Cristobal, Colon dating from the middle of the nineteenth century
when the railroad was built across the Isthmus, and Cristobal having
its beginnings with the French attempt in 1880. At the southern, or
Pacific, terminus are the twin cities of Panama and Balboa. Panama was
founded in 1673 after the destruction by Morgan, the buccaneer, of an
elder city established in 1519. The ruins of the old city stand 5
miles east of the new, and, since their story is one, it may be said
that Panama is the oldest city of the Western World. Balboa is yet in
its swaddling clothes, for it is the new American town destined to be
the capital of the American territory encompassing the canal.

The waterway is cut through a strip of territory called the Canal
Zone, which to all intents and purposes is a territory of the United
States. This zone is 10 miles wide and follows the irregular line of
the canal, extending 5 miles on either side from the axis of the
channel. This Canal Zone traverses and separates the territory of the
Republic of Panama, which includes the whole of the Isthmus, and has
an area about equal to that of Indiana and a population of 350,000 or
about that of Washington City. The two chief Panaman cities, Panama
and Colon, lie within the limits of the Canal Zone, but, by the
treaty, they are excepted from its government and are an integral part
of the Republic of Panama, of which the city of Panama is the
capital. Cristobal and Balboa, although immediately contiguous to
Colon and Panama, are American towns under the American flag.

The Canal Zone historically and commercially has a record of interest
and importance longer and more continuous than any other part of the
New World. Columbus himself founded a settlement here at Nombre de
Dios; Balboa here discovered the Pacific Ocean; across this narrow
neck was transported the spoil of the devastated Empire of the Incas;
here were the ports of call for the Spanish gold-carrying galleons;
and here centered the activities of the pirates and buccaneers that
were wont to prey on the commerce of the Spanish Main.

Over this route, on the shoulders of slaves and the back of mules,
were transported the wares in trade of Spain with its colonies not
only on the west coasts of the Americas, but with the Philippines.

Not far from Colon was the site of the colony of New Caledonia, the
disastrous undertaking of the Scotchman, Patterson, who founded the
Bank of England, to duplicate in America the enormous financial
success of the East India Company in Asia.

Here in the ancient city of Panama in the early part of the nineteenth
century assembled the first Pan American conference that gave life to
the Monroe doctrine and ended the era of European colonization in
America.

Here was built with infinite labor and terrific toll of life the first
railroad connecting the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans--a railroad
less than 50 miles in length, but with perhaps the most interesting
story in the annals of railroading.

Across this barrier in '49 clambered the American argonauts, seeking
the newly discovered golden fleeces of California.

This was the theater of the failure of Count de Lesseps, the most
stupendous financial fiasco in the history of the world.

And this, now, is the site of the most expensive and most successful
engineering project ever undertaken by human beings.

It cost the French $300,000,000 to fail at Panama where the Americans,
at the expenditure of $375,000,000, succeeded. And, of the excavation
done by the French, only $30,000,000 worth was available for the
purpose of the Americans. That the Americans succeeded where the
French had failed is not to be assigned to the superiority of the
American over the French nation. The reasons are to be sought, rather,
in the underlying purposes of the two undertakings, and in the
scientific and engineering progress made in the double decade
intervening between the time when the French failure became apparent
and the Americans began their work.

In the first place, the French undertook to build the canal as a
money-making proposition. People in every grade of social and
industrial life in France contributed from their surpluses and from
their hard-earned savings money to buy shares in the canal company in
the hope that it would yield a fabulously rich return. Estimates of
the costs of the undertaking, made by the engineers, were arbitrarily
cut down by financiers, with the result that repeated calls were made
for more money and the shareholders soon found to their dismay that
they must contribute more and yet more before they could hope for any
return whatever. From the beginning to the end, the French Canal
Company was concerned more with problems of promotion and finance than
with engineering and excavation. As a natural result of this spirit at
the head of the undertaking the whole course of the project was marred
by an orgy of graft and corruption such as never had been known. Every
bit of work was let out by contract, and the contractors uniformly
paid corrupt tribute to high officers in the company. No watch was set
on expenditures; everything bought for the canal was bought at prices
too high; everything it had to sell was practically given away.

In the next place, the French were pitiably at the mercy of the
diseases of the Tropics. The science of preventive medicine had not
been sufficiently developed to enable the French to know that
mosquitoes and filth were enemies that must be conquered and
controlled before it would be possible successfully to attack the land
barrier. Yellow fever and malaria killed engineers and common laborers
alike. The very hospitals, which the French provided for the care of
the sick, were turned into centers of infection for yellow fever,
because the beds were set in pans of water which served as ideal
breeding places for the death-bearing stegomyia.

In this atmosphere of lavish extravagance caused by the financial
corruption, and in the continual fear of quick and awful death, the
morals of the French force were broken; there was no determined spirit
of conquest; interest centered in champagne and women; the canal was
neglected.

Yet, in spite of this waste, this corruption of money and morals, much
of the work done by the French was of permanent value to the
Americans; and without the lessons learned from their bitter
experience it would have been impossible for the Americans or any
other people to have completed the canal so quickly and so cheaply.

The Americans brought to the task another spirit. The canal was to be
constructed not in the hope of making money, but, rather, as a great
national and popular undertaking, designed to bring the two coasts of
the great Republic in closer communication for purposes of commerce
and defense.

The early estimates made by the American engineers were far too low,
but the French experience had taught the United States to expect such
an outcome. Indeed, it is doubtful if anybody believed that the first
estimates would not be doubled or quadrupled before the canal was
finished.

[Illustration: Signature of George Goethals
_Chairman and Chief Engineer_]

[Illustration: A STREET IN THE CITY OF PANAMA]

The journey of the U. S. S. _Oregon_ around the Horn from Pacific
waters to the theater of the War with Spain in the Caribbean, in 1898,
impressed upon the American public the necessity of building the canal
as a measure of national defense. Commercial interests long had been
convinced of its necessity as a factor in both national and
international trade, and, when it was realized that the _Oregon_ would
have saved 8,000 miles if there had been a canal at Panama, the
American mind was made up. It determined that the canal should be
built, whatever the cost.

From the very first there was never any question that the necessary
money would be forthcoming. It is a fact unprecedented in all
parliamentary history that all of the appropriations necessary for the
construction and completion of the Isthmian waterway were made by
Congress without a word of serious protest.

During the same War with Spain that convinced the United States that
the canal must be built, a long forward step was taken in the science
of medicine as concerned with the prevention and control of tropical
diseases. The theory that yellow fever was transmitted by mosquitoes
had been proved by a Cuban physician, Dr. Carlos Finley, a score of
years earlier. An Englishman, Sir Patrick Manson, had first shown that
disease might be transmitted by the bites of insects, and another
Englishman, Maj. Roland Ross, had shown that malaria was conveyed by
mosquitoes. It remained, however, for American army surgeons to
demonstrate, as they did in Cuba, that yellow fever was transmissible
only by mosquitoes of the stegomyia variety and by no other means
whatsoever.

With this knowledge in their possession the Americans were able to do
what the French were not--to control the chief enemy of mankind in
torrid climes. In the first years of the work the public, and
Congress, reflecting its views, were not sufficiently convinced of the
efficacy of the new scientific discoveries to afford the means for
putting them into effect. The Isthmian Canal Commission refused to
honor requisitions for wire screens, believing that they were demanded
to add to the comfort and luxury of quarters on the Zone, rather than
for protection against disease. But the outbreak of yellow fever in
1905 was the occasion for furnishing the Sanitary Department, under
Col. W. C. Gorgas, with the necessary funds, and thus provided, he
speedily and completely stamped out the epidemic. From that time on,
no one questioned the part that sanitation played in the success of
the project. The cities of Panama and Colon were cleaned up as never
were tropical cities cleaned before. All the time, every day, men
fought mosquitoes that the workers in the ditch might not be struck
down at their labors.

The Americans, too, made mistakes. In the beginning they attempted to
build the canal under the direction of a commission with headquarters
in Washington. This commission, at long distance and by methods
hopelessly involved in red tape, sought to direct the activities of
the engineer in charge on the Isthmus. The public also was impatient
with the long time required for preparation and insistently demanded
that "the dirt begin to fly."

The work was begun in 1904. It proceeded so slowly that two years
later the chairman of the Isthmian Canal Commission asserted that it
must be let out to a private contractor, this being, in his opinion,
the only way possible to escape the toils of governmental red tape.
The then chief engineer, the second man who had held that position
while fretting under these methods, was opposed to the contract
system. Bids were asked for, however, but all of them were rejected.

Fortunately, Congress from the beginning had left the President a
practically free hand in directing the course of the project. Mr.
Roosevelt reorganized the commission, made Col. George W. Goethals, an
Army engineer, chairman of the commission and chief engineer of the
canal. The constitution of the commission was so changed as to leave
all the power in the hands of the chairman and to lay all of the
responsibility upon his shoulders.

It was a master stroke of policy, and the event proved the choice of
the man to be admirable in every way. From the day the Army engineers
took charge there was never any more delay, never any halt in
progress, and the only difficulties encountered were those of
resistant Nature (such as the slides in Culebra Cut) and those of
misinformed public opinion (such as the absurd criticism of the Gatun
Dam).

The Americans, too, in the early stages of the work were hampered by
reason of the fact that the final decision as to whether to build a
sea-level canal or a lock canal was so long delayed by the conflicting
views of the partisans of each type in Congress, in the executive
branches of the Government, and among the engineers. This problem,
too, was solved by Mr. Roosevelt. He boldly set aside the opinion of
the majority of the engineers who had been called in consultation on
the problem, and directed the construction of a lock canal. The wisdom
of this decision has been so overwhelmingly demonstrated that the
controversy that once raged so furiously now seems to have been but a
tiny tempest in an insignificant teapot.

One other feature of the course of events under the American régime at
Panama must be considered. Graft and corruption had ruined the French;
the Americans were determined that whether they succeeded or not,
there should be no scandal. This, indeed, in part explains why there
was so much apparently useless circumlocution in the early stages of
the project. Congress, the President, the engineers, all who were in
responsible position, were determined that there should be no graft.
There was none.

Not only were the Americans determined that the money voted for the
canal should be honestly and economically expended, but they were
determined, also, that the workers on the canal should be well paid
and well cared for. To this end they paid not only higher wages than
were current at home for the same work, but they effectively shielded
the workers from the exactions and extortions of Latin and Oriental
merchants by establishing a commissary through which the employees
were furnished wholesome food at reasonable prices--prices lower,
indeed, than those prevailing at home.

As a result of these things the spirit of the Americans on the Canal
Zone, from the chairman and chief engineer down to the actual diggers,
was that of a determination to lay the barrier low, and to complete
the job well within the limit of time and at the lowest possible cost.
In this spirit all Americans should rejoice, for it is the highest
expression of the nearest approach we have made to the ideals upon
which the Fathers founded our Republic.

It is impossible to leave out of the reckoning, in telling the story
of the canal, the checkered history of the diplomatic engagements on
the part of the United States, that have served both to help and to
hinder the undertaking. What is now the Republic of Panama has been,
for the greater part of the time since continental Latin America threw
off the yoke of Spain, a part of that Republic having its capital at
Bogota, now under the name of Colombia, sometimes under the name of
New Granada, sometimes a part of a federation including Venezuela and
Ecuador. The United States, by virtue of the Monroe doctrine, always
asserted a vague and undefined interest in the local affairs of the
Isthmus. This was translated into a concrete interest when, in 1846, a
treaty was made, covering the construction of the railroad across the
Isthmus, the United States engaging always to keep the transit free
and open. Great Britain, by virtue of small territorial holdings in
Central America and of larger claims there, also had a concrete
interest, which was acknowledged by the United States, in the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, under which a projected canal should be
neutral under the guarantee of the Governments of the United States
and Great Britain.

For years the United States was inclined to favor a canal cut through
Nicaragua, rather than one at Panama, and, after 1898, when the
American nation had made up its mind to build a canal somewhere, the
partisans of the Panama and Nicaragua routes waged a bitter
controversy.

Congress finally decided the issue by giving the President authority
to construct a canal at Panama, with the proviso that should he be
unable to negotiate a satisfactory treaty with Colombia, which then
owned the Isthmus, he should proceed to construct the canal through
Nicaragua. Under this threat of having the scepter of commercial power
depart forever from Panama, Colombia negotiated a treaty, known as the
Hay-Herran treaty, giving the United States the right to construct the
canal. This treaty, however, failed of ratification by the Colombian
Congress, with the connivance of the very Colombian President who had
negotiated it.

But President Roosevelt was most unwilling to accept the alternative
given him by Congress--that of undertaking the canal at Nicaragua--and
this unwillingness, to say the least, encouraged a revolution in
Panama. This revolution separated the Isthmus from the Republic of
Colombia, and set up the new Republic of Panama. As a matter of fact,
Panama had had but the slenderest relations with the Bogota
Government, had been for years in the past an independent State, had
never ceased to assert its own sovereignty, and had been, indeed, the
theater of innumerable revolutions.

The part the United States played in encouraging this revolution, the
fact that the United States authorities prevented the transit of
Colombian troops over the Panama Railway, and that American marines
were landed at the time, has led to no end of hostile criticism, not
to speak of the still pending and unsettled claims made by Colombia
against the United States. Mr. Roosevelt himself, years after the
event and in a moment of frankness, declared: "I took Panama, and left
Congress to debate it later."

Whatever may be the final outcome of our controversy with Colombia, it
may be confidently predicted that history will justify the coup d'état
on the theory that Panama was the best possible site for the
interoceanic canal, and that the rupture of relations between the
territory of the Isthmus and the Colombian Republic was the best
possible solution of a confused and tangled problem.

These diplomatic entanglements, however, as the canal is completed,
leave two international disputes unsettled--the one with Colombia
about the genesis of the canal undertaking, and the other with Great
Britain about the terms of its operation.

Congress, in its wisdom, saw fit to exempt American vessels engaged
exclusively in coastwise trade--that is to say, in trade solely
between ports of the United States--from payment of tolls in transit
through the canal. This exemption was protested by Great Britain on
the ground that the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, which took the place of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, provided that the canal should be open to all
nations on exact and equal terms. The future holds the termination of
both these disputes.

Congress, that never begrudged an appropriation, indulged in many
disputes concerning the building and operation of the canal. First,
there was the controversy as to site, between Nicaragua and Panama.
Next, came the question as to whether the canal should be at sea level
or of a lock type. Then there was the question of tolls, and the
exemption of American coastwise traffic. But, perhaps the most
acrimonious debates were on the question as to whether or not the
canal should be fortified. Those who favored fortification won their
victory, and the canal was made, from a military standpoint, a very
Gibraltar for the American defense of, and control over, the
Caribbean. That this was inevitable was assured by two facts: One that
the trip of the _Oregon_ in 1898 crystallized public sentiment in
favor of constructing the canal; and the other that the canal itself
was wrought by Army engineers under the direction of Colonel Goethals.
Colonel Goethals never for a moment considered the possibility that
Congress would vote against fortifications, and the whole undertaking
was carried forward on that basis.

If the military idea, the notion of its necessity as a feature of the
national defense, was the determining factor in initiating the canal
project, it remains a fact that its chief use will be commercial, and
that its money return, whether small or large, nearly all will be
derived from tolls assessed upon merchant vessels passing through it.

[Illustration: THE THREE PRESIDENTS UNDER WHOSE DIRECTION THE CANAL
WAS BUILT]

[Illustration: VENDERS IN THE STREETS OF PANAMA]

[Illustration: A NATIVE BOY MARKETING]

The question of the probable traffic the canal will be called upon to
handle was studied as perhaps no other world-wide problem of
transportation ever was. Prof. Emory R. Johnson was the student of
this phase of the question from the beginning to the end. He
estimates that the canal in the first few years of its operation will
have a traffic of 10,000,000 tons of shipping each year, and that by
1975 this will have increased to 80,000,000 tons, the full capacity of
the canal in its present form. Provision has been made against this
contingency by the engineers who have so constructed the canal that a
third set of locks at each end may be constructed at a cost of about
$25,000,000, and these will be sufficient almost to double the present
ultimate capacity, and to take care of a larger volume of traffic than
now can be foreseen.

Americans are interested, first of all, in what the canal will do for
their own domestic trade. It brings Seattle 7,800 miles nearer to New
York; San Francisco, 8,800 miles nearer to New Orleans; Honolulu 6,600
miles nearer to New York than by the Strait of Magellan. Such saving
in distance for water-borne freight works a great economy, and
inevitably must have a tremendous effect upon transcontinental
American commerce.

In foreign commerce, also, some of the distances saved are tremendous.
For instance, Guayaquil, in Ecuador, is 7,400 miles nearer to New York
by the canal than by the Strait of Magellan; Yokohama is nearly 4,000
miles nearer to New York by Panama than by Suez; and Melbourne is
1,300 miles closer to Liverpool by Panama than by either Suez or the
Cape of Good Hope. Curiously enough, the distance from Manila to New
York, by way of Suez and Panama, is almost the same, the difference in
favor of Panama being only 41 miles out of a total of 11,548 miles.
The difference in distance from Hongkong to New York by the two
canals is even less, being only 18 miles, this slight advantage
favoring Suez.

But it is not by measure of distances that the effect of the canal on
international commerce may be measured. It spells the development of
the all but untouched western coast of South America and Mexico. It
means a tremendous up-building of foreign commerce in our own
Mississippi Valley and Gulf States. It means an unprecedented
commercial and industrial awakening in the States of our Pacific coast
and the Provinces of Western Canada.

While it was not projected as a money-making proposition, it will pay
for its maintenance and a slight return upon the money invested
from the beginning, and in a score of years will be not only
self-supporting, but will yield a sufficient income to provide for the
amortization of its capital in a hundred years.

The story of how this titanic work was undertaken, of how it
progressed, and of how it was crowned with success, is a story without
a parallel in the annals of man. The canal itself, as Ambassador Bryce
has said, is the greatest liberty man has ever taken with nature.

Its digging was a steady and progressive victory over sullen and
resistant nature. The ditch through Culebra Mountain was eaten out by
huge steam shovels of such mechanical perfection that they seemed
almost to be alive, almost to know what they were doing. The rocks and
earth they bit out of the mountain side were carried away by trains
operating in a system of such skill that it is the admiration of all
the transportation world, for the problem of disposing of the
excavated material was even greater than that of taking it out.

The control of the torrential Chagres River by the Gatun Dam, changing
the river from the chief menace of the canal to its essential and
salient feature, was no less an undertaking. And, long after Gatun Dam
and Culebra Cut cease to be marvels, long after the Panama Canal
becomes as much a matter of course as the Suez Canal, men still will
be thrilled and impressed by the wonderful machinery of the
locks--those great water stairways, operated by machinery as ingenious
as gigantic, and holding in check with their mighty gates such floods
as never elsewhere have been impounded.

It is a wonderful story that this book is undertaking to tell. There
will be much in it of engineering feats and accomplishments, because
its subject is the greatest of all engineering accomplishments. There
will be much in it of the things that were done at Panama during the
period of construction, for never were such things done before. There
will be much in it of the history of how and why the American
Government came to undertake the work, for nothing is of greater
importance. There will be something in it of the future, looking with
conservatism and care as far ahead as may be, to outline what the
completion of this canal will mean not only for the people of the
United States, but for the people of all the world.

Much that might be written of the romantic history of the Isthmian
territory--tales of discoverers and conquistadores, wild tales of
pirates and buccaneers, serio-comic narratives of intrigue and
revolution--is left out of this book, because, while it is
interesting, it now belongs to that antiquity which boasts of many,
many books; and this volume is to tell not of Panama, but of the
Panama Canal--on the threshold of its story, fitted by a noble birth
for a noble destiny.




CHAPTER II

GREATEST ENGINEERING PROJECT


The Panama Canal is the greatest engineering project of all history.
There is more than the patriotic prejudice of a people proud of their
own achievements behind this assertion. Men of all nations concede it
without question, and felicitate the United States upon the remarkable
success with which it has been carried out. So distinguished an
authority as the Rt. Hon. James Bryce, late British ambassador to
Washington, and a man not less famous in the world of letters than
successful in the field of diplomacy, declared before the National
Geographic Society that not only is the Panama Canal the greatest
undertaking of the past or the present but that even the future seems
destined never to offer any land-dividing, world-uniting project
comparable to it in magnitude or consequence.

We are told that the excavations total 232,000,000 cubic yards; that
the Gatun Dam contains 21,000,000 cubic yards of material; and that
the locks and spillways required the laying of some 4,500,000 cubic
yards of concrete. But if one is to realize the meaning of this he
must get out of the realm of cubic yards and into the region of
concrete comparisons. Every one is familiar with the size and shape of
the Washington Monument. With its base of 55 feet square and its
height of 555 feet, it is one of the most imposing of all the hand
reared structures of the earth. Yet the material excavated from the
big waterway at Panama represents 5,840 such solid-built shafts.
Placed in a row with base touching base they would traverse the entire
Isthmus and reach 10 miles beyond deep water in the two oceans at
Panama. Placed in a square with base touching base they would cover an
area of 475 acres. If all the material were placed in one solid shaft
with a base as large as the average city block, it would tower nearly
100,000 feet in the air.

Another illustration of the magnitude of the quantity of material
excavated at Panama may be had from a comparison with the pyramid of
Cheops, of which noble pile some one has said that "All things fear
Time, but Time fears only Cheops." We are told that it required a
hundred thousand men 10 years to make ready for the building of that
great structure, and 20 years more to build it. There were times at
Panama when, in 26 working days, more material was removed from the
canal than was required to build Cheops, and from first to last the
Americans removed material enough to build sixty-odd pyramids such as
Cheops. Were it all placed in one such structure, with a base as large
as that of Cheops, the apex would tower higher into the sky than the
loftiest mountain on the face of the earth.

Still another way of arriving at a true conception of the work of
digging the big waterway is to consider that enough material had to be
removed by the Americans to make a tunnel through the earth at the
equator more than 12 feet square.

[Illustration: A GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE MATERIAL HANDLED AT
PANAMA]

But perhaps the comparison that will best illustrate the immensity of
the task of digging the ditch is that of the big Lidgerwood dirt car,
on which so much of the spoil has been hauled away. Each car holds
about 20 cubic yards of dirt, and 21 cars make a train. The material
removed from the canal would fill a string of these cars reaching
about three and a half times around the earth, and it would take a
string of Panama Railroad engines reaching almost from New York to
Honolulu to move them.

Yet all these comparisons have taken account of the excavations only.
The construction of the Panama Canal represents much besides digging a
ditch, for there were some immense structures to erect. Principal
among these, so far as magnitude is concerned, was the Gatun Dam, that
big ridge of earth a mile and a half long, half a mile thick at the
base, and 105 feet high. It contains some 21,000,000 cubic yards of
material, enough to build more than 500 solid shafts like the
Washington Monument. Then there was the dam at Pedro Miguel--"Peter
Magill," as the irreverent boys of Panama christened it--and another
at Miraflores, each of them small in comparison with the great
embankment at Gatun, but together containing as much material as 70
solid shafts like our Washington Monument.

Besides these structures there still remain the locks and spillways,
with their four and a half million cubic yards of concrete and their
hundreds and thousands of tons of steel.

With all these astonishing comparisons in mind, is it strange that the
digging of the Panama Canal is the world's greatest engineering
project? Are they not enough to stamp it as the greatest single
achievement in human history? Yet even they, pregnant of meaning as
they are, fail to reveal the full and true proportions of the work of
our illustrious army of canal diggers. They tell nothing of the
difficulties which were overcome--difficulties before which the
bravest spirit might have quailed.

When the engineers laid out the present project, they calculated that
103,000,000 cubic yards of material would have to be excavated, and
predicted that the canal diggers would remove that much in nine years.
Since that time the amount of material to be taken out has increased
from one cause or another until it now stands at more than double the
original estimate. At one time there was an increase for widening the
Culebra Cut by 50 per cent. At another time there was an increase to
take care of the 225 acres of slides that were pouring into the big
ditch like glaciers. At still another time there was an increase for
the creation of a small lake between the locks at Pedro Miguel and
Miraflores. At yet another time it was found that the Chagres River
and the currents of the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans were
depositing large quantities of silt and mud in the canal, and this
again raised the total amount of material to be excavated. But none of
these unforeseen obstacles and additional burdens dismayed the
engineers. They simply attacked their problem with renewed zeal and
quickened energy, with the result that they excavated in seven years
of actual operations more than twice as much material as they were
expected to excavate in nine years. In other words, the material to be
removed was increased 125 per cent and yet the canal was opened at
least 12 months ahead of the time predicted.

How this unprecedented efficiency was developed forms in itself a
remarkable story of achievement. The engineers met with insistent
demands that they "make the dirt fly." The people had seen many months
of preparation, but they had no patience with that; they wanted to see
the ditch begin to deepen. It was a critical stage in the history of
the project. If the dirt should fail to fly public sentiment would
turn away from the canal.

So John F. Stevens addressed himself to making it fly. Before he left
he had brought the monthly output almost up to the million yard mark.
When that mark was passed the President of the United States, on
behalf of himself and the nation, sent a congratulatory message to the
canal army. Many people asserted that it was nothing but a burst of
speed; but the canal diggers squared themselves for a still higher
record. They forced up the mark to two million a month, and
straightway used that as a rallying point from which to charge the
heights three million. Once again the standard was raised; "four
million" became the slogan. Wherever that slogan was flashed upon a
Y.M.C.A. stereoptican screen there was cheering--cheering that
expressed a determined purpose. Finally, when March, 1909, came around
all hands went to work with set jaws, and for the only time in the
history of the world, there was excavated on a single project,
4,000,000 cubic yards of material in one month.

With the dirt moving, came the question of the cost of making it fly.
By eliminating a bit of lost motion here and taking up a bit of waste
there, even with the price of skilled labor fully 50 per cent higher
on the Isthmus than in the States, unit costs were sent down to
surprisingly low levels. For instance, in 1908 it was costing 11-1/2
cents a cubic yard to operate a steam shovel; in 1911 this had been
forced down to 8-7/8 cents a yard. In 1908 more than 18-1/2 cents were
expended to haul a cubic yard of spoil 8 miles; in 1911 a cubic yard
was hauled 12 miles for a little more than 15-1/5 cents.

Some of the efficiency results were astonishing. To illustrate: One
would think that the working power of a ton of dynamite would be as
great at one time as another; and yet the average ton of dynamite in
1911 did just twice as much work as in 1908. No less than $50,000 a
month was saved by shaking out cement bags.

It was this wonderful efficiency that enabled the United States to
build the canal for $375,000,000 when without it the cost might have
reached $600,000,000. In 1908, after the army had been going at
regulation double-quick for a year, a board was appointed to estimate
just how much material would have to be taken out, and how much it
would cost. That board estimated that the project as then planned
would require the excavation of 135,000,000 cubic yards of material,
and that the total cost of the canal as then contemplated would be
$375,000,000. Also it was estimated that the canal would be completed
by January 1, 1915. After that time the amount of material to be
excavated was increased by 97,000,000 cubic yards, and yet so great
was the efficiency developed that the savings effected permitted that
great excess of material to be removed without the additional expense
of a single penny above the estimates of 1908, and in less time than
was forecast.

Although the difficulties that beset the canal diggers were such as
engineers never before encountered, they were met and brushed aside,
and all the world's engineering records were smashed into smithereens.
It required 20 years to build the Suez Canal, through a comparatively
dry and sandy region. When the work at Panama was at its height the
United States was excavating the equivalent of a Suez Canal every 15
months. Likewise it required many years to complete the Manchester
Ship Canal between Liverpool and Manchester, a distance of 35 miles.
This canal cost so much more than was estimated that money was raised
for its completion only with the greatest difficulty. Yet at Panama
the Americans dug four duplicates of the Manchester Ship Canal in five
years. All of this was done in spite of the fact that they had to work
in a moist, hot, enervating climate where for nine months in a year
the air seems filled with moisture to the point of saturation, and
where, for more than half the length of the great ditch, the annual
rainfall often amounts to as much as 10 feet--all of this falling in
the nine months of the wet season.

A few comparisons outside of the construction itself will serve to
illustrate the tremendous proportions of the work. Paper money was not
handled at all in paying off the canal army. It took three days to pay
off the force with American gold and Panaman silver. When pay day was
over there had been given into the hands of the Americans, and thrown
into the hats of the Spaniards and West Indian negroes, 1,600 pounds
of gold and 24 tons of silver. When it is remembered that this
performance was repeated every month for seven years, one may imagine
the enormous outlay of money for labor.

The commissary also illustrates the magnitude of the work. Five
million loaves of bread, a hundred thousand pounds of cheese, more
than 9,000,000 pounds of meat, half a million pounds of poultry, more
than a thousand carloads of ice, more than a million pounds of onions,
half a million pounds of butter--these are some of the items handled
in a single year.

Wherever one turns he finds things which furnish collateral evidence
of the magnitude of the work. The Sanitary Department used each year
150,000 gallons of mosquito oil, distributed thousands of pounds of
quinine, cut and burned millions of square yards of brush, and spent
half a million dollars for hospital maintenance.

No other great engineering project has allowed such a remarkable
"margin of safety"--the engineering term for doing things better than
they need to be done. The engineers who dug the canal took nothing for
granted. No rule of physics was so plain or so obvious as to escape
actual physical proof before its acceptance, when such proof was
possible. No one who knows how the engineers approached the subject,
how they resolved every doubt on the side of safety, and how they kept
so far away from the danger line as actually to make their precaution
seem excessive can doubt that the Panama Canal will go down in history
as the most thorough as well as the most extensive piece of
engineering in the world.




CHAPTER III

GATUN DAM


The key to the whole Panama Canal is Gatun Dam, that great mass of
earth that impounds the waters of the Chagres River, makes of the
central portion of the canal a great navigable lake with its surface
85 feet above the level of the sea, and, in short, renders practicable
the operation of a lock type of canal across the Isthmus.

Around no other structure in the history of engineering did the fires
of controversy rage so furiously and so persistently as they raged for
several years around Gatun Dam. It was attacked on this side and that;
its foundations were pronounced bad and its superstructure not
watertight. Doubt as to the stability of such a structure led some of
the members of the Board of Consulting Engineers to recommend a
sea-level canal. Further examination of the site and experimentation
with the materials of which it was proposed to construct it, showed
the engineers that it was safe as to site and satisfactory as to
superstructure. The country had about accepted their conclusions,
when, in the fall of 1908, there was a very heavy rain on the Isthmus,
and some stone which had been deposited on the soil on the upstream
toe of the dam, sank out of sight--just as the engineers expected it
to do. A story thereupon was sent to the States announcing that the
Gatun Dam had given way and that the Chagres River was rushing
unrestrained through it to the sea. The public never stopped to recall
that the dam was not yet there to give way, or to inquire exactly what
had happened, and a wave of public distrust swept over the country.

To make absolutely certain that everything was all right, and to
restore the confidence of the people in the big project, President
Roosevelt selected the best board of engineers he could find and sent
them to the Isthmus in company with President-elect Taft to see
exactly what was the situation at Gatun.

They examined the site, they examined the material, they examined the
evidence in Colonel Goethal's hands. When they got through they
announced that they had only one serious criticism to make of the dam
as proposed. "It is not necessary to tie a horse with a log chain to
make sure he can not break away," observed one of them, "a smaller
chain would serve just as well." And so they recommended that the
crest of the dam be lowered from 135 feet to 115 feet. Still later
this was cut to 105 feet. They found that the underground river whose
existence was urged by all who opposed a lock canal, flowed nowhere
save in the fertile valleys of imagination. The engineers had known
this a long time, but out of deference to the doubters they had
decided to drive a lot of interlocking sheet piling across the Chagres
Valley. "What's the use trying to stop a river that does not exist?"
queried the engineers, and so the sheet piling was omitted.

As a matter of fact, Gatun Dam proved the happiest surprise of the
whole waterway. In every particular it more than fulfilled the most
optimistic prophecies of the engineers. They said that what little
seepage there would be would not hurt anything; the dam answered by
showing no seepage at all. They said that the hydraulic core would be
practically impervious; it proved absolutely so. Where it was once
believed that Gatun Dam would be the hardest task on the Isthmus it
proved to be the easiest. Culebra Cut exchanged places with it in that
regard.

Gatun Dam contains nearly 22,000,000 cubic yards of material. Assuming
that it takes two horses to pull a cubic yard of material it would
require twice as many horses as there are in the United States to move
the dam were it put on wheels. Loaded into ordinary two-horse dirt
wagons it would make a procession of them some 80,000 miles long. The
dam is a mile and a half long, a half mile thick at the base, 300 feet
thick at the water line, and 100 feet thick at the crest. Its height
is 105 feet.

Yet in spite of its vast dimensions it is the most inconspicuous
object in the landscape. Grown over with dense tropical vegetation it
looks little more conspicuous than a gradual rise in the surface of
the earth. Passengers passing Gatun on the Panama Railroad scarcely
recognize the dam as such when they see it, so gradual are its slopes.
An excellent idea of the gentle incline of the dam may be had by
referring to the accompanying figure, which shows the outlines of a
cross section of the dam.

The materials of which it is constructed are also shown there.
Starting on the upstream side there is a section made of solid
material from Culebra Cut. Beyond this is the upstream toe of the dam,
which is made of the best rock in the Culebra Cut. After this comes
the hydraulic fill. This material is a mixture of sand and clay which,
when it dries out thoroughly, is compact and absolutely impervious to
water. It was secured from the river channel and pumped with great
20-inch centrifugal pumps into the central portion of the dam, where a
veritable pond was formed; the heavier materials settled to the
bottom, forming layer after layer of the core, while the lighter
particles, together with the water, passed off through drain pipes. In
this way the water was not only the hod carrier of the dam
construction, but the stone mason as well. Where there was the tiniest
open space, even between two grains of sand, the water found it and
slipped in as many small particles as were necessary to stop it up.

[Illustration: A CROSS-SECTION OF THE GATUN DAM]

Above the hydraulic fill on the upstream side is a layer of solid
material, while that part of the face of the dam exposed to wave
action is covered with heavy rock. The same is true of the crest. On
the downstream half of the dam there is approximately 400 feet of
hydraulic fill, then 400 feet of solid fill, then a 30-foot toe, and
then ordinary excavated material.

The Chagres Valley is a wide one until it reaches Gatun. Here it
narrows down to a mile and a half. It is across this valley that the
Gatun Dam is thrown in opposition to the seaward journey of the
Chagres waters. At the halfway point across the valley there was a
little hill almost entirely of solid rock. It happened to be planted
exactly at the place the engineers needed it. Here they could erect
their spillway for the control of the water in the lake above.

[Illustration: GATUN LAKE PLAN OF THE GATUN DAM AND LOCKS]

The regulation of the water level in Gatun Lake is no small task, for
the Chagres is one of the world's moodiest streams. At times it is a
peaceful, leisurely stream of some 2 feet in depth, while at other
times it becomes a wild, roaring, torrential river of magnificent
proportions. Sometimes it reaches such high stages that it sends a
million gallons of water to the sea between the ticks of a clock.

In controlling the Chagres, the engineers again took what on any
private work would have been regarded as absurd precaution. In the
first place, Gatun Lake will be so big that the Chagres can break
every record it heretofore has set, both for momentary high water and
for sustained high water, and still, with no water being let out of
the lake, it can continue to flow that way for a day and a half
without disturbing things at all. It could flow for two days before
any serious damage could be done. Thus the canal force might be off
duty for some 45 hours, with the outlet closed, before any really
serious damage could be done by the rampage of the river.

But of course no one supposes that it would be humanly possible that
two such contingencies as the highest water ever known, and everybody
asleep at their posts for two days, could happen together. When the
water in the lake reached its normal level of 87 feet the spillway
gates would be opened, and, if necessary, it would begin to discharge
145,000 feet of water a second. This is 17,000 feet more than the
record for sustained flow heretofore set by the Chagres. But if it
were found that even this was inadequate the culverts in the locks
could be brought into play, and with them the full discharge would be
brought up to 194,000 feet a second, or 57,000 more than the Chagres
has ever brought down. But suppose even this would not suffice to take
care of the floods of the Chagres? The spillway is so arranged that as
the level of the water in the lake rises the discharging capacity
increases. With the spillway open, even if the Chagres were to double
its record for continued high water, it would take many days to bring
the lake level up to the danger point--92 feet. When it reached that
height the spillway would have a capacity of 222,000 feet, which, with
the aid of the big lock culverts, would bring the total discharge up
to 262,000 feet a second--only 12,000 cubic feet less than double the
highest known flow of the Chagres.

But this is only characteristic of what one sees everywhere. Whether
it be in making a spillway that would accommodate two rivers like the
Chagres instead of one, or in building dams with 63 pounds of weight
for every pound of pressure against it, or yet in building lock gates
which will bear several times the maximum weight that can ever be
brought against them, the work at Panama was done with the intent to
provide against every possible contingency.

The spillway through which the surplus waters of Gatun Lake will be
let down to the sea level, is a large semicircular concrete dam
structure with the outside curve upstream and the inside curve
downstream. Projecting above the dam are 13 piers and 2 abutments,
which divide it into 14 openings, each of them 45 feet wide. These
openings are closed by huge steel gates, 45 feet wide, 20 feet high,
and weighing 42 tons each. They are mounted on roller bearings,
suspended from above, and are operated by electricity. They work in
huge frames just as a window slides up and down in its frame. Each
gate is independent of the others, and the amount of water permitted
to go over the spillway dam thus can be regulated at will.

When a huge volume of water like a million gallons a second is to be
let down a distance of about 60 feet, it may be imagined that unless
some means are found to hold it back and let it descend easily, by the
time it would reach the bottom it would be transformed into a thousand
furies of energy. Therefore, the spillway dam has been made
semicircular, with the outside lines pointing up into the lake and the
inside lines downstream, so that as the water runs through the
openings it will converge all the currents and cause them to collide
on the apron below. This largely overcomes the madness of the water.
But still further to neutralize its force and to make it harmless as
it flows on its downward course, there are two rows of baffle piers on
the apron of the spillway. They are about 10 feet high and are built
of reinforced concrete, with huge cast-iron blocks upon their upstream
faces. When the water gets through them it has been tamed and robbed
of all its dangerous force. The spillway is so constructed that when
the water flowing over it becomes more than 6 feet deep it adheres to
the downstream face of the dam as it glides down, instead of rushing
out and falling perpendicularly.

The locks are situated against the high hills at the east side of the
valley, after which comes the east wing of the dam, then the spillway,
then the west wing of the dam, which terminates on the side of the low
mountain that skirts the western side of the valley. With the hills
bordering the valley and the dam across it, the engineers have been
able to inclose a gigantic reservoir which has a superficial surface
of 164 square miles. It is irregular in shape and might remind one of
a pressed chrysanthemum, the flower representing the lake and the
stem Culebra Cut. The surface of the water in this lake is normally 85
feet higher than the surface of the water seaward from Gatun and
Miraflores. The lake is entirely fresh water supplied by the Chagres
River. The accompanying figure shows the profile of the canal.

[Illustration: A PROFILE SECTION OF THE CANAL]

The Chagres River approaches the canal at approximately right angles
at Gamboa, some 21 miles above Gatun. The lake will be so large that
the river currents will all be absorbed, the water backing far up into
the Chagres, the river depositing its silt before it reaches the canal
proper.

With the currents thus checked, the Chagres will lose all power to
interfere with the navigation of the canal, although upon the bosom of
its water will travel for a distance of 35 miles all the ships that
pass through the big waterway from Gatun to Miraflores. This fresh
water will serve a useful purpose besides carrying ships over the
backbone of the continent. Barnacles lose their clinging power in
fresh water, and when a ship passes up through the locks from sea
level to lake level and from salt water to fresh, the barnacles that
have clung to the sides and bottom of the vessel through many a
thousand mile of "sky-hooting through the brine" will have their grip
broken and they will drop off helplessly and fall to the bed of the
lake, which, in the course of years, will become barnacle-paved. How
many times in dry-dock this will save can only be surmised, but the
ship that goes through the canal regularly will not have much bother
with barnacles.

The engineer who worked out the details of the engineering examination
of the dam in 1908 was Caleb M. Saville, who had had experience on
some of the greatest dams in the world. In the first place, the whole
foundation was honeycombed with test borings, and several shafts were
sunk so that the engineers could go down and see for themselves
exactly what was the nature of the material below. There are some
problems in engineering where a decision is so close between safety
and danger that none but an engineer can decide them. But Gatun Dam
could speak for itself and in the layman's tongue.

After investigating the site and getting such conclusive evidence that
the proverbial wayfaring man might understand it the engineers next
conducted a series of experiments to determine whether or not the
material of which they proposed to build the dam would be watertight.
They wanted to make sure whether enough water would seep through to
carry any of the dam material along with it. The maximum normal depth
of the water is 85 feet. The material it would have to seep through is
nearly a half mile thick. In order to determine how the water would
behave they took some 3 feet of the material and put it in a strong
iron cylinder with water above it and subjected it to a pressure
equivalent to a head of 185 feet of water. Only an occasional drop
came through. If only an occasional drop of clear water gets through 3
feet of material under a pressure of 185 feet of water, it does not
require a great engineer to determine that there will not be any
seepage through more than a thousand feet of the same material under a
head of only 85 feet.

And that is only a sample of their seeking after the truth. When they
had gone thus far it was then decided to build a little dam a few
yards long identical in cross section with Gatun Dam. It was built on
the scale of an inch to the foot, by the identical processes with
which it was intended to build the big dam. The result only added
confirmation to the other experiments. With a proportionate head of
water against it, it behaved exactly as they had concluded the big dam
would when completed. Every engineer who has read Saville's report
pronounces it a masterpiece of engineering investigation. It proved
conclusively that the site of the dam is stable, and the dam itself
impervious to seepage. The engineers who visited the Isthmus at the
time with President-elect Taft unanimously agreed that those
investigations removed every trace of doubt.

[Illustration: LIEUT. COL. W. L. SIBERT THE UPPER LOCKS AT GATUN]

[Illustration: TORO POINT BREAKWATER]

The Gatun Dam covers about 288 acres. The material in it weighs nearly
30,000,000 tons. The pressure of the highest part of the dam on the
foundations beneath amounts to many tons per square foot. The old
bugaboo about earthquakes throwing it down is a danger that exists
only in the minds of those who see ghosts. Some of the biggest
earth dams in the world are located in California. The Contra Costa
Water Company's dam at San Leandro is 120 feet high and not nearly so
immense in its proportions as Gatun Dam, yet it weathered the San
Francisco earthquake without difficulty. In Panama City there is an
old flat arch that once was a part of a church. It looks as though one
might throw it down with a golf stick, and yet it has stood there for
several centuries. As a matter of fact, Panama is out of the line of
earthquakes and volcanoes, but even if shocks much worse than those at
San Francisco were to come, there is no reason to fear for the safety
of the big structure.

The lack of knowledge of some of those who in years past criticized
the Gatun Dam was illustrated by an amusing incident that occurred at
a senatorial hearing on the Isthmus. Philander C. Knox, afterwards
Secretary of State, was then a Senator and a member of the committee
which went to the Isthmus. Another Senator in the party had grave
doubts about the stability of Gatun Dam, and asked Colonel Goethals to
explain how a dam could hold in check such an immense body of water.
Colonel Goethals, in his usual lucid way, explained that it was
because of that well-known principle of physics that the outward
pressure of water is determined by its depth and not by its
volume--that a column of water 10 feet high and a foot thick would
have just as much outward pressure as a lake 200 square miles in
extent and 10 feet deep. Still unconvinced, the Senator pressed his
examination further. At this juncture Senator Knox, who is a past
master at the art of answering a question with a question, interposed,
and asked his colleague: "Senator, if your theory holds good, how is
it that the dikes of Holland hold in check the Atlantic Ocean?"




CHAPTER IV

THE LOCKS


Ships that pass Panama way will climb up and down a titanic marine
stairway, three steps up into Gatun Lake and three steps down again.
These steps are the 12 huge locks in which will center the operating
features of the Isthmian waterway. The building of these locks
represents the greatest use of concrete ever undertaken. The amount
used would be sufficient to build of concrete a row of six-room
houses, reaching from New York to Norfolk, via Philadelphia,
Baltimore, Washington and Richmond--houses enough to provide homes for
a population as large as that of Indianapolis.

The total length of the locks and their accessories, including the
guide walls, approximates 2 miles. The length of the six locks through
which a ship passes on its voyage from one ocean to the other is a
little less than 7,000 feet.

If one who has never seen a lock canal is to get a proper idea of what
part the locks play in the Panama Canal, he must follow attentively
while we make an imaginary journey through the canal on a ship that
has just come down from New York. Approaching the Atlantic entrance
from the north, we pass the end of the great man-made peninsula,
jutting out 11,000 feet into the bay known as Toro Point Breakwater.
It was built to protect the entrance of the canal, the harbor, and
anchorages from the violent storms that sweep down from the north over
that region. Omitting our stops for the payment of tolls, the securing
of supplies, etc., we steam directly in through a great ditch 500 feet
wide and 41 feet deep, which simply permits the ocean to come inland 7
miles to Gatun. When we arrive there we find that our chance to go
farther is at an end unless we have some means of getting up into the
beautiful lake whose surface is 85 feet above us. Here is where the
locks come to our rescue. They will not only give us one lift, but
three.

When we approach the locks we find a great central pier jutting out
into the sea-level channel. If our navigating officers know their duty
they will run up alongside of this guide wall and tie up to it. If
they do not they will run the ship's nose into a giant chain, with
links made of 3-inch iron, that is guaranteed to bring a 1,000-ton
ship, going at the rate of 5 knots per hour, to a dead standstill in
70 feet. When we are once safely alongside the guide wall, four quiet,
but powerful locomotives, run by electricity, come out and take charge
of our ship. Two of them get before it to pull us forward, and two
behind it to hold us back. Then the great chain, which effectively
would have barred us from going into the locks under our own steam, or
from colliding with the lock gates, is let down and we begin to move
into the first lock.

Starting at the sea-level channel, the first, second, and third gates
are opened and our ship towed into the first lock. Then the second
and third gates are closed again, and the lock filled with water, by
gravity, raising the ship at the rate of about 2 feet a minute,
although, if there is a great rush of business, it may be filled at
the rate of 3 feet a minute. When the water in this lock reaches the
level of the water in the lock above, gates four and five are opened,
and we are towed in. Then gate four is closed again, and water is let
into this lock until it reaches the level of the third one. Gates six,
seven, and eight are next opened, and we are towed into the upper
lock. Gates six and seven are now closed, and the water allowed to
fill the third lock until we are up to the level of Gatun Lake. Then
gates nine and ten are opened, the emergency dam is swung from athwart
the channel, if it happens to be in that position, the fender chain
like the one encountered when we entered the first lock, and like the
ones which protect gates seven and eight, is let down, the towing
engines turn us loose, and we resume our journey, with 32 miles of
clear sailing, until we reach Pedro Miguel. Here, by a reverse
process, we are dropped down 30-1/3 feet. Then we go on to Miraflores,
a mile and a half away, where we are lifted down 54-2/3 feet in two
more lifts. This brings us back to sea level again, where we meet the
waters of the Pacific, and steam out upon it through a channel 500
feet wide and 8 miles long.

Having learned something of the part the locks play in getting us
across the Isthmus, by helping us up out of one ocean into Gatun Lake
and then dropping down into the other ocean, it will be interesting to
note something of the mechanism. A very good idea of how a lock looks
may be gathered from the accompanying bird's-eye view of the model of
Pedro Miguel Lock.

[Illustration: FROM A MODEL OF PEDRO MIGUEL LOCK]

It will be seen that there are two of them side by side--twin locks,
they are called, making them like a double-track railway. The lock on
the right is nearly filled for an upward passage. The ship will be
seen in it, held in position by the four towing engines, which appear
only as tiny specks hitched to hawsers from the stem and stern. Behind
the ship are the downstream gates. They were first opened to admit the
ship, and then closed to impound the water that flows up through the
bottom of the lock. Ahead are the upstream gates, closed also until
the water in the lock is brought up to the level of the water in the
lake. Then the gates will be opened, the big chain fender will be
dropped down, and the ship will be towed out into the lake and turned
loose. On the side wall of the right lock there is a big bridge set on
a pivot so that it can be swung around across the lock and girders let
down from it to serve as a foundation upon which to lay a steel dam if
anything happens to the locks or gates. On the other lock the bridge
has been swung into position, and the steel girders let down. Great
steel sheets will be let down on live roller bearings on these
girders, and when all are in place they will form a watertight dam of
steel. Between this bridge and the reader is a huge floating tank of
steel, which may be used to dam all the water out of the locks when
that is desired.

Referring to the next figure we see a cross section of the twin locks.
The side walls are from 45 to 50 feet thick at the floor. At a point
24-1/3 feet above the floor they begin to narrow by a series of 6-foot
steps until they are 8 feet wide at the top. The middle wall is 60
feet wide all the way up, although at a point 42-1/2 feet above the
lock floor room is made for a filling of earth and for a three-story
tunnel, the top story being used as a passageway for the operators,
the second story as a conduit for electric wires, and the lower story
as a drainage system.

[Illustration: A CROSS-SECTION OF LOCKS, GIVING AN IDEA OF THEIR
SIZE]

In this figure D and G are the big 18-foot culverts through which
water is admitted from the lake to the locks. Each of these three big
culverts, which are nearly 7,000 feet long, is large enough to
accommodate a modern express train, and is about the size of the
Pennsylvania tubes under the Hudson and East Rivers. H represents the
culverts extending across the lock from the big ones. Each of them is
big enough to accommodate a two-horse wagon, and there are 14 in each
lock. Every alternate one leads from the side wall culvert and the
others from the center wall culvert. F represents the wells that lead
up through the floor into the lock, each larger in diameter than a
sugar barrel in girth. There are five wells on each cross culvert, or
70 in the floor of each lock.

[Illustration: CONCRETE MIXERS, GATUN]

[Illustration: A CENTER WALL CULVERT, GATUN LOCKS]

[Illustration: THE MACHINERY FOR MOVING A LOCK GATE]

The flow of the water into the locks and out again is controlled by
great valves. The ones which control the great wall tunnels or
culverts are called Stoney Gate valves, and operate something like
giant windows in frames. They are mounted on roller bearings to make
them work without friction. The others are ordinary cylindrical
valves, but, having to close a culvert large enough to permit a
two-horse team to be driven through it, they must be of great size.
When a ship is passing from Gatun Lake down to the Atlantic Ocean, the
water in the upper lock is brought up to the level of that in the
lake, being admitted through the big wall culverts, whence it passes
out through the 14 cross culverts and up into the locks through the 70
wells in the floor. Then the ship is towed in, the gates are shut
behind it, the valves are closed against the water in the lake, the
ones permitting the escape of this water into the lock below are
opened, and it continues to flow out of the upper lock into the lower
one until the water in the two has the same level. Then the gates
between the two locks are opened, the ship is towed into the second
one and the operation is repeated for the last lock in the same way.

The gates of the locks are an interesting feature. Their total weight
is about 58,000 tons. There are 46 of them, each having two leaves.
Their weight varies from 300 to 600 tons per leaf, dependent upon the
varying height of the different gates. The lowest ones are 47 feet
high and the highest ones 82 feet, their height depending upon the
place where they are used. Some of these are known as intermediate
gates, and are used for short ships, when it is desired to economize
on both water and time. They divide each lock chamber into two smaller
chambers of 350 and 550 feet, respectively. Perhaps 90 per cent of all
the ships that pass Panama will not need to use the full length
lock--1,000 feet. Duplicate gates will always be kept on the ground as
a precaution against accident. Each leaf is 65 feet wide and 7 feet
thick. The heaviest single piece of steel in each one of them is the
lower sill, weighing 18 tons. It requires 6,000,000 rivets to put them
together. In the lower part of each gate is a huge tank. When it is
desired that the gate shall have buoyancy, as when operating it, this
tank will be filled with air. When closed it is filled with water. The
gates are opened and closed by a huge arm, or strut, one end of which
is connected to the gate and the other to a huge wheel in the manner
of the connecting rod to the driver of a locomotive. Leakage through
the space between the gate and the miter sill on the floor of the lock
is prevented by a seal which consists of heavy timbers with flaps of
rubber 4 inches wide and half an inch thick. A special sealing device
brings the edges of the two leaves of a gate together and holds them
firmly while the gates are closed.

Remembering that these gates are nothing more than Brobdingnagian
double doors which close in the shape of a flattened V, it follows
that they must have hinges. And these hinges are worth going miles to
see. That part which fastens to the wall of the lock weighs 36,752
pounds in the case of the operating gates, and 38,476 pounds in the
protection gates. These latter are placed in pairs with the operating
gates at all danger points--so that if one set of gates are rammed
down, another pair will still be in position. The part of the hinge
attached to the gate was made according to specifications which
required that it should stand a strain of 40,000 pounds before
stretching at all, and 70,000 pounds before breaking. Put into a huge
testing machine, it actually stood a strain of 3,300,000 pounds before
breaking--seven times as great as any stress it will ever be called
upon to bear. The gates are all painted a lead gray, to match the
ships of the American Navy. Those which come into contact with sea
water will be treated with a barnacle-proof preparation.

Now that we have described the locks, we may go back and see them in
course of construction. The first task was getting the lock building
plant designed and built. At Gatun the plant consisted of a series of
immense cableways, an electric railroad, and enormous concrete mixers.
Great towers were erected on either side of the area excavated for the
locks, with giant cables connecting them. These towers were 85 feet
high, and were mounted on tracks like steam shovels, so that they
could be moved forward as the work progressed. The cables connecting
them were of 2-1/2-inch lock steel wire covered with interlocking
strands. They were guaranteed to carry 6 tons at a trip, 20 trips an
hour, and to carry 60,000 loads before giving way. They actually did
better than the specifications called for as far as endurance was
concerned.

The sand for making the concrete for Gatun came from Nombre de Dios
(Spanish for Name of God), and the gravel from Porto Bello. The sand
and gravel were towed in great barges, first through the old French
Canal, and later through the Atlantic entrance of the present canal.
Great clamshell buckets on the Lidgerwood cableways would swoop down
upon the barges, get 2 cubic yards of material at a mouthful, lift it
up to the cable, carry it across to the storage piles and there dump
it. In this way more than 2,000,000 wagon loads of sand and gravel
were handled.

A special equipment was required to haul the sand, gravel, and cement
from the storage piles to the concrete mixers. There were two circular
railroads of 24-inch gauge, carrying little electric cars that ran
without motormen. Each car was stopped, started, or reversed by a
switch attached to the car. Their speed never varied more than 10 per
cent whether they were going empty or loaded, up hill or down. When a
car was going down hill its motor was reversed into a generator so
that it helped make electricity to pull some other car up the hill.
The cars ran into a little tunnel, where each was given its proper
load of one part cement, three parts sand, and six parts gravel--2
cubic yards, in all--and was then hurried on to the big concrete
mixers. These were so arranged in a series that it was not necessary
to stop them to receive the sand, gravel, and cement, or to dump out
the concrete.

On the emptying sides of the concrete mixers there were other little
electric railway tracks. Here there were little trains of a motor and
two cars each, with a motorman. The train, with two big 2-cubic-yard
buckets, drew up alongside two concrete mixers. Without stopping their
endless revolutions the mixers tilted and poured out their contents
into the two buckets, 2 yards in each. Then the little train hurried
away, stopping under a great cable. Across from above the lock walls
came two empty buckets, carried on pulleys on the cableway. When they
reached a point over the train they descended and were set on the
cars, behind the full buckets. The full buckets were then attached to
the lifting hooks, and were carried up to the cable and then across to
the lock walls, where they were dumped and the concrete spread out by
a force of men. Meanwhile the train hustled off with its two empty
buckets, ready to be loaded again.

On the Pacific side the concrete handling plant was somewhat
different. Instead of cableways there were great cantilever cranes
built of structural steel. Some of these were in the shape of a giant
T, while others looked like two T's fastened together. Here the
clamshell dippers were run out on the arms of the cranes to the
storage piles, where they picked up their loads of material. This was
put in hoppers large enough to store material for 10 cubic yards. The
sand and stone then passed through measuring hoppers and to the mixers
with cement and water added. After it was mixed it was dumped into big
buckets on little cars drawn by baby steam locomotives, which looked
like overgrown toy engines. These little fellows reminded one of a lot
of busy bees as they dashed about here and there with their loads of
concrete, choo-chooing as majestically as the great dirt train engines
which passed back and forth hard by. The cranes would take their
filled buckets and leave empty ones in exchange, and this was kept up
day in and day out until the locks were completed. When the plant was
removed from Pedro Miguel to Miraflores, a large part of the concrete
was handled directly from the mixers to the walls by the cranes
without the intermediary locomotive service.

The cost of the construction of the locks was estimated in 1908 at
upward of $57,000,000. But economy in the handling of the material and
efficiency on the part of the lock builders cut the actual cost far
below that figure. On the Atlantic side about a dollar was saved on
every yard of concrete laid--about $2,000,000. On the Pacific side
more than twice as much was saved.

Before the locks could be built it became necessary to excavate down
to bed rock. This required the removal of nearly 5,000,000 cubic yards
of material at Gatun. Then extensive tests were made to make certain
that the floor of the locks could be anchored safely to the rock.
These tests demonstrated that by using the old steel rails that were
left on the Isthmus by the French, the concrete and rock could be tied
together so firmly as to defy the ravages of water and time. A huge
apron of concrete was built out into Gatun Lake from the upper locks
at that place, effectively preventing any water from getting between
the rocks and the concrete lying upon them.




CHAPTER V

THE LOCK MACHINERY


One of the problems that had to be solved before the Panama Canal
could be presented to the American people as a finished waterway, was
that of equipping it with adequate and dependable machinery for its
operation. Panama canals are not built every year, so it was not a
matter of ordering equipment from stock; everything had to be invented
and designed for the particular requirement it was necessary to meet.
And the first and foremost requirement was safety. When we look over
the canal machinery we see that word "safety" written in every bolt,
in every wheel, in every casting, in every machine. We see it in the
devices designed for protection and in those designed for operation as
well. We see it in the giant chain that will stop a vessel before it
can ram a gate; we see it in the great cantilever pivot bridges that
support the emergency dams; we see it in the double lock gates at all
exposed points; we see it in the electric towing apparatus, in the
limit switches that will automatically stop a machine when the
operator is not attending to his business, in the friction clutches
that will slip before the breaking point is reached. Safety, safety,
safety, the word is written everywhere.

The first thing a ship encounters when it approaches the locks is the
giant chain stretched across its path. That chain is made of links of
3 inches in diameter. When in normal position it is stretched across
the locks, and the vessel which does not stop as soon as it should
will ram its nose into the chain. There is a hydraulic paying-out
arrangement at both ends of the chain, and when the pressure against
it reaches a hundred gross tons the chain will begin to pay out and
gradually bring the offending vessel to a stop. After a ship strikes
the chain its momentum will be gradually reduced, its energy being
absorbed by the chain mechanism. While the pressure at which the chain
will begin to yield is fixed at 100 gross tons, the pressure required
to break it is 262 tons. Thus the actual stress it can bear is two and
a half times what it will be called upon to meet. The mechanism by
which the paying-out of the chain is accomplished is exceedingly
ingenious. The principle is practically the reverse of that of a
hydraulic jack. The two ends of the 428-foot chain are attached to big
plungers in the two walls of the locks. These plungers fit in large
cylinders, which contain broad surfaces of water. They are connected
with very small openings, which are kept closed until a pressure of
750 pounds to the square inch is exerted against them. By means of a
resistance valve these openings are then made available, the water
shooting out as through a nozzle under high pressure. This permits the
chain plunger to rise gradually, while keeping the tension at 750
pounds to the inch, and the paying-out of the chain proceeds
accordingly. Of course not all ships will strike the chain at the
same speed, and in some cases the paying-out process will have to be
more rapid than in others. This is provided for by the automatic
enlargement of the hole through which the water is discharged, the
size of the hole again becoming smaller as the tension of the chain
decreases. This chain fender will stop the _Olympic_ with full load,
when going a mile and a half an hour, bringing it to a dead standstill
within 70 feet, or it will stop an ordinary 10,000-ton ship in the
same distance even if it have a speed of 5 miles. The function of the
resistance valve is to prevent the chain from beginning to pay out
until the stress against it goes up to 100 tons, and to regulate the
paying-out so as to keep it constant at that point, so long as there
is necessity for paying-out. Any pressure of less than a hundred tons
will not put the paying-out mechanism into operation.

When a ship is to be put through the locks the chain will be let down
into great grooves in the floor of the lock. There is a fixed plunger
operating within a cylinder, which, in turn, operates within another
cylinder, the resulting movement, by a system of pulleys, being made
to pay out or pull in 4 feet of chain for every foot the plunger
travels. The chain must be raised or lowered in one minute, and always
will have to be lowered to permit the passage of a ship. The fender
machines are situated in pits in the lock walls. These pits are likely
to get filled with water from drippings, leakages, wave action, and
drainage, so they are protected with automatic pumps. Float valves are
lifted when the water rises in the pits. This automatically moves the
switch controlling an electric motor, which starts a pump to working
whenever the water gets within 1 inch of the top of the sump beneath
the floor of the pit. Twenty-four of these chain fenders are required
for the protection of the locks, and each requires two such tension
machines.

No ship will be allowed to go through the canal except under the
control of a canal pilot. He will certainly bring it to a stop at the
approach wall. But if he does not, there is the chain fender. There is
not a chance in a thousand for a collision with it, and not a chance
in a hundred thousand that the ship will not be stopped when there is
such a collision.

But if the pilot should fail to stop the ship, and it should collide
with the fender chain, and then if the fender chain should fail to
stop it, there would be the double gates at the head of the lock.
There is not one chance in a hundred that a ship, checked as it
inevitably would be by the fender chain, could ram down the first, or
safety gate. But if it did, there would still be another set of gates
some 70 feet away. The chances here might be one in a hundred of the
second set being rammed down. From all this it will be seen that the
chances of the second pair of gates being rammed is so remote as to be
almost without the realm of possibility. But suppose all these
precautions should fail, and suddenly the way should be opened for the
water of Gatun Lake to rush through the locks at the destructive speed
of 20 miles an hour? Even that day has been provided against by the
construction of the big emergency dams. The emergency dams, like the
fender chains, are designed only for protection, and have no other use
in the operation of the locks. There will be six of these dams, one
across each of the head locks at Gatun, Pedro Miguel, and Miraflores.

These emergency dams will be mounted on pivots on the side walls of
the locks about 200 feet above the upper gates. When not in use they
will rest on the side wall and parallel with it. When in use they will
be swung across the locks, by electric machinery or by hand, and there
rigidly wedged in. It will require two minutes to get them in position
by electricity and 30 minutes by hand. There is a motor for driving
the wedges which will hold the dam securely in position, and limit
switches to prevent the dams being moved too far.

When a bridge is put into position across the lock, a series of wicket
girders which are attached to the upstream side of the floor of the
bridge are let down into the water, the connection between the bridge
and one end of each girder being made by an elbow joint. The other end
goes down into the water, its motion being controlled by a cable
attached some distance from the free end of the girder and paid out or
drawn in over an electrically operated drum. This free end passes down
until it engages a big iron casting embedded in the concrete of the
lock floor. This makes a sort of inclined railway at an angle of about
30 degrees from the perpendicular, over which huge steel plates are
let down into the water. There are six of these girders, and they are
all made of the finest nickel steel. When they are all in position, a
row of six plates are let down, and they make the stream going
through the locks several feet shallower. Then another row of plates
is let down on these, and the stream becomes that much shallower.
Another row of plates is added, and then another, until there is a
solid sheet of steel plates resting on the six girders, and they make
a complete steel dam which effectively arrests the mad impulse of the
water in Gatun Lake to rush down into the sea. The plates are moved up
and down by electrical machinery, and are mounted on roller-bearing
wheels, so that the tremendous friction caused by their being pressed
against the girders by the great force of the water may be overcome.
That the emergency dams will be effective is shown by the experience
at the "Soo" locks, on the canal connecting Lakes Superior and Huron.
There, a vessel operating under its own power, rammed a lock gate.
Although the emergency dam had grown so rusty by disuse that it could
be operated only by hand, it was swung across the lock and effectively
fulfilled its mission of checking the maddened flow of the water.

Another protective device for the locks is the big caisson gates that
will be floated across the head and tail bays when it is desired to
remove all the water from the locks for the purpose of permitting the
lower guard gates to be examined, cleaned, painted, or repaired, and
for allowing the sills of the emergency dams to be examined in the
dry. The caisson gates are 112-1/2 feet long, 36 feet beam, and have a
light draft of 32 feet and a heavy draft of 61 feet. When one is
floated into position to close the lock, water will be admitted to
make it sink to the proper depth. Then its large centrifugal pumps,
driven by electric motors, will pump the water out of the lock. When
the work on the lock is completed these pumps will pump the water out
of the caisson itself until it becomes buoyant enough to resume its
light draft, after which it will be floated away.

The machinery for opening and closing the lock gates called for
unusual care in its designing. The existing types of gate-operating
machinery were all studied, and it was found that none of them could
be depended on to prove satisfactory, so special machines had to be
designed.

A great wheel, resembling a drive wheel of a locomotive, except that a
little over half of the rim is cog-geared, is mounted in a horizontal
position on a big plate, planted firmly in the concrete of the wall
and bolted there with huge bolts 11 feet long and 2-1/4 inches in
diameter. This plate weighs over 13,000 pounds, and the wheel, cast in
two pieces, weighs 34,000 pounds. As the weight of the rim of the
wheel on the eight spokes probably would tax their strength too much
when the wheel is under stress, this is obviated by four bearing
wheels, perpendicular to the big wheel, which support the rim. Between
the crank pin and the point of attachment on the gate leaf there is a
long arm, or strut, designed to bear an operating strain of nearly a
hundred tons. The wheel will be revolved by a motor geared to the
cogged part of the rim.

An ingenious arrangement of electric switches is that used to protect
the gate-moving machines from harm. The big connecting rod between the
master wheel and the gate leaf is attached to the gate leaf by a nest
of springs capable of sustaining a pressure of 184,000 pounds, in
addition to the fixed pressure of 60,000 pounds. Should any
obstruction interfere with the closing of the gate and threaten a
dangerous pressure on the connecting rod, the springs, as soon as they
reach their full compression, establish an electrical contact and thus
stop the motor. Likewise, should any obstruction come against the gate
as the connecting rod is pulling it open, the springs again permit the
establishment of an electrical contact and stop the motor. All of
these precautions are entirely independent of and supplemental to the
limit switches, which cut off the power from the gate-moving machine
should the strain reach the danger line. These big machines move the
huge gate leaves without the slightest noise or vibration. Such a
machine is required for each of the 92 leaves used in the 46 gates
with which the locks are equipped. The operator can open or close one
of these big gates in two minutes.

[Illustration: ONE OF THE 92 GATE-LEAF MASTER WHEELS]

The control of the water in the culverts of the locks is taken care of
by an ingeniously designed series of valves. The big wall culverts, 18
feet in diameter, are divided into two sections at the points where
the valves are installed, by the construction of a perpendicular pier.
This makes two openings 8 by 18 feet. The big gates of steel are
placed in frames to close these openings just as a window sash is
placed in its frame. They are mounted on roller bearings, so as to
overcome the friction caused by the pressure of water against the
valve gates. They must be mounted so that there is not more than a
fourth of an inch play in any direction. The big wall culvert gates
will weigh about 10 tons each, and must be capable of operating under
a head of more than 60 feet of water. They will be raised and lowered
by electricity.

The electric locomotives which will be used to tow ships through the
locks are one of the interesting features of the equipment. There will
be 40 of them on the 3 sets of locks. The average ship will require
four of them, two at the bow and two at the stern, to draw it through
the locks. They will run on tracks on the lock walls, and will have
two sets of wheels. One set will be cogged, and will be used when the
locomotives are engaged in towing. The other set will be pressed into
service when they are running light. When a vessel is in one lock
waiting for the water to be equalized with that in the next one and
the gates opened to permit passage, the forward locomotives will run
free up the incline to the lock wall above, paying out hawser as they
go. When they get to the next higher level they are ready to exert
their maximum pull. Each locomotive consists of three parts: two
motors hitched together, and the tandem may be operated from either
end. The third part is a big winding drum around which the great
hawsers are wound. This towing windlass permits the line to be paid
out or pulled in and the distance between the ship and the locomotives
varied at will. The locomotive may thus exert its pull or relax it
while standing still on the track, a provision especially valuable in
bringing ships to rest. In the main, however, the pull of the
locomotive is exercised by its running on the semi-suppressed rack
track anchored in the coping of the lock walls. Each flight of locks
will be provided with two towing tracks, one on the side and one on
the center wall. Each wall will be equipped with a return track of
ordinary rails, so that when a set of locomotives has finished towing
a ship through the locks they can be switched over from these tracks
and hustled back for another job. When they reach the inclines from
one lock to the next above the rack track will be pressed into service
again until they reach the next level stretch.

Here again one meets the familiar safeguard against accident. Some
engineer of one of these towing locomotives might sometime overload
it, so the power of doing so has been taken out of his hands. On the
windlass or drum that holds the towing hawser there is a friction
coupling. If the engineer should attempt to overload his engine, or if
for any other reason there should suddenly come upon the locomotive a
greater strain than it could bear, or upon the track, or upon the
hawser, the friction clutch would let loose at its appointed tension
of 25,000 pounds, and all danger would be averted.

When the locomotives are towing a ship from the walls it is natural
that there should be a side pull on the hawser. This is overcome by
wheels that run against the side of the track and are mounted
horizontally. All of the towing tracks extend out on the approach
walls of the locks so that the locomotives can get out far enough to
take charge of a ship before it gets close enough to do the locks any
damage.

[Illustration: A _Mauretania_ IN THE LOCKS]

From the foregoing it will be seen that a great deal of electric
current will be required in the operation of the locks. This will be
generated at a big station at Gatun, with a smaller one at Miraflores,
and they will be connected. The overflow water will be used for
generating the required current, and in addition to the operation of
the lock machinery it will operate the spillway gates, furnish the
necessary lighting current, and eventually it may furnish the power
for an electrified Panama Railroad.

In passing a ship through the canal it will be necessary to open and
close 23 lock gates, of an aggregate weight of more than 25,000 tons,
to lower and raise 12 fender chains, each weighing 24,000 pounds, and
to shut and open dozens of great valves, each of which weighs tons.
All these operations at each set of locks will be controlled by one
man, at a central switchboard. In addition to these operations there
is the towing apparatus. The arrangement at Gatun is typical; there 4
fender chains must be operated, 6 pairs of miter gates, and 46 valves.
In all not less than 98 motors will be set in motion twice, and
sometimes this number may be increased to 143. Some of them are more
than half a mile away from the operator, and half of them are nearly a
quarter of a mile away.

The operator in his control house will be high enough to have an
uninterrupted view of the whole flight of locks over which he has
command. His control board will consist of a representation of the
locks his switches control. On his model he will see the rise and fall
of the fender chains as he operates them, the movement of the big lock
gates as they swing open or shut, the opening and closing of the
valves which regulate the water in the culverts, and the rise and fall
of the water in the locks.

A system of interlocked levers will prevent him from doing the wrong
thing in handling his switches. Before he can open the valves at one
end of a lock he must close those at the other end. Before he can
open the lock gates, the valves in the culverts must be set so that no
harm can result. Before he can start to open a lock gate, he must
first have released the miter-forcing machine that latches the gates.
Before he can close the gates protected by a fender chain, he must
first have thrown the switch to bring the fender chain back to its
protecting position, and he can not throw the switch to lower the
chain until he first has provided for the opening of the gate it
protects. All of this interlocking system makes it next to impossible
to err, and taking into consideration the additional safeguard of
limit switches, which automatically cut off the power when anything
goes wrong, it will be seen that the personal equation is all but
removed from the situation.




CHAPTER VI

CULEBRA CUT


Culebra Cut! Here the barrier of the continental divide resisted to
the utmost the attacks of the canal army; here disturbed and outraged
Nature conspired with gross mountain mass to make the defense stronger
and stronger; here was the mountain that must be moved. Here came the
French, jauntily confident, to dig a narrow channel that would let
their ships go through. The mountain was the victor. And then here
came the Americans, confident but not jaunty. They weighed that mass,
laid out the lines of a wider ditch, arranged complicated
transportation systems to take away the half hundred million cubic
yards of earth and rocks that they had measured. Nature came to the
aid of the beleaguered mountain. The volcanic rocks were piled
helter-skelter and when the ditch deepened the softer strata
underneath refused to bear the burden and the slides, slowly and like
glaciers, crept out into the ditch, burying shovels and sweeping aside
the railway tracks. Even the bottom of the canal bulged up under the
added stress of the heavier strata above.

Grim, now, but still confident, the attackers fought on. The mountain
was defeated.

Now stretches a man-made canyon across the backbone of the continent;
now lies a channel for ships through the barrier; now is found what
Columbus sought in vain--the gate through the west to the east. Men
call it Culebra Cut.

Nine miles long, its average depth is 120 feet. At places its sides
tower nearly 500 feet above its channel bottom, which is nowhere
narrower than 300 feet.

It is the greatest single trophy of the triumph of man over the
terrestrial arrangement of his world. Compared to it, the scooping out
of the sand levels of Suez seems but child's play--the tunnels of
Hoosac and Simplon but the sport of boys. It is majestic. It is awful.
It is the Canal.

When estimates for digging the canal were made, it was calculated that
53,000,000 cubic yards of material would have to be removed from the
cut, and that under the most favorable conditions it would require
eight and a half years to complete the work. But at that time no one
had the remotest idea of the actual difficulties that would beset the
canal builders; no one dreamed of the avalanches of material that
would slide into the cut.

One can in no way get a better idea of the meaning of the slides and
breaks in Culebra Cut than to refer to the accompanying figure. There
it will be seen that whereas it was originally planned that the top
width of the cut at one point should be 670 feet, it has grown wider,
because of slides and breaks, to as much as 1,800 feet at one place.
In all, some 25,000,000 cubic yards of material which should have
remained outside the canal prism slipped into it and had to be
removed by the steam shovels.

[Illustration: THE EFFECT OF SLIDES]

No less than 26 slides and breaks were encountered in the construction
of Culebra Cut, their total area being 225 acres. The largest covered
75, and another 47 acres. When the slides, which were more like
earthen glaciers than avalanches, began to flow into the big ditch,
sometimes steam shovels were buried, sometimes railroad tracks were
caught beneath the débris, and sometimes even the bottom of the cut
itself began to bulge and disarrange the entire transportation system,
at the same time interfering with the compressed air and water
supplies. But with all these trials and tribulations, the army that
was trying to conquer the eternal hills that had refused passage to
the ships of the world for so many centuries, kept up its courage and
renewed its attack. The result is that ships sail through Culebra and
that engineers everywhere have new records of efficiency to inspire
them.

These efficiency records are told in the cost-keeping reports based
upon one of the most careful and thorough cost-accounting systems ever
devised. This system was instituted for the purpose of keeping a check
upon all expenditures by reducing everything to a unit basis and then
comparing the cost of doing the same thing at different places. For
instance, if it were found that it cost more to excavate a cubic yard
of material at one place than at another, under identical conditions,
this fact was brought to the attention of the men responsible and an
intimation given that there seemed to be room for taking up a little
lost motion. The lost motion usually was recovered or else someone had
to be satisfied that conditions were not identical after all.

In no other part of the canal work do these cost-keeping reports tell
such a graphic story as in Culebra Cut. In spite of the fact that as
the cut became deeper it became narrower, and the slides and breaks
became more troublesome, to say nothing of the extra effort required
to get the excavated material out of the cut, every unit cost was
forced down notch by notch and year by year until the bottom in costs
was reached only a little before the actual bottom of the cut was
exposed to view.

For instance, in 1908 it cost 11-1/2 cents a yard to load material
with steam shovels, while in 1912 it cost less than 7 cents. In 1908
it cost more than 14 cents a yard for drilling and blasting; in 1912
it cost less than 12 cents. In 1908 it cost $18.54 to haul away a
hundred yards of spoil; in 1912 it required only $13.31 to perform the
same operation, although the average distance it had to be hauled had
increased 50 per cent. In 1908 it cost more than 13 cents a yard to
dump the material as compared with less than 5 cents in 1912. The
whole operation of excavating and removing the material, including
overhead charges and depreciation, fell from $1.03 a cubic yard in
1908 to less than 55 cents a yard in 1912. And that is why 232,000,000
cubic yards of material were removed for less than it was estimated
135,000,000 cubic yards would cost.

To remove the 105,000,000 cubic yards of earth from the backbone of
the Americas required about 6,000,000 pounds of high-grade dynamite
each year to break up the material, so that it might be successfully
attacked by the steam shovels. To prepare the holes for placing the
explosives required the services of 150 well drills, 230 tripod rock
drills, and a large corps of hand drillers. Altogether they drilled
nearly a thousand miles of holes annually. During every working day in
the year about 600 holes were fired. They had an average depth of
about 19 feet. In addition to this a hundred toe holes were fired each
day, and as many more "dobe" blasts placed on top of large boulders to
break them up into loadable sizes. So carefully was the dynamite
handled that during a period of three years, in which time some
19,000,000 pounds were exploded in Culebra Cut, only eight men were
killed.

[Illustration: STEAM SHOVELS MEETING AT BOTTOM OF CULEBRA CUT

L. K. ROURKE]

[Illustration: THE MAN-MADE CANYON AT CULEBRA]

The transportation of the spoil from Culebra Cut was a tremendous job.
A large percentage of it was hauled out in Lidgerwood flat cars.
Twenty-one cars made up the average Lidgerwood train. It required
about 140 locomotives to take care of the spoil, and the average day
saw nearly 3,700 cars loaded and hauled out of the cut. In a single
year 1,116,286 carloads of material were hauled out. There were 75
trains in constant operation, for each 2-1/2 miles of track in the
Central Division, which was approximately 32 miles long. A huge steam
shovel, taking up 5 yards of material at a mouthful, would load one of
these trains in less than an hour with some 400 yards of material.
Then the powerful locomotive attached to it, assisted by a helper
engine, would pull the train out of the cut, and then, unassisted,
would haul it to the dumping ground some 12 miles or more away.

[Illustration: AVERAGE SHAPE AND DIMENSIONS OF CULEBRA CUT]

Arriving near the scene of the dump, another engine, having in front
of it a huge horizontal steam windlass mounted on a flat car, was
hooked on the rear end of the train. Then the locomotive which had
brought the train to the dump was uncoupled and moved away, and in its
stead there was attached an empty flat car, on which there was a huge
plow. A long wire cable was stretched from the big windlass at the
other end of the train and attached to this plow. As the drum of the
windlass began to turn it gradually drew the plow forward over the 21
cars, plowing the material off as it went forward. The cars were
equipped with a high sideboard on one side and had none at all on the
other. A flat surface over which the plow could pass from car to car
was made by hinging a heavy piece of sheet steel to the front end of
each car and allowing it to cover the break between that car and the
next, thus affording a practically continuous car floor over 800 feet
long. The operation of unloading 400 yards of material with this plow
seldom required more than 10 minutes.

After the plow had finished its work it left a long string of spoil on
one side of the track which must be cleared away. So another plow,
pushed by an engine, attacked the spoil and forced it down the
embankment. This process of unloading and spreading the material was
kept up until the embankment became wide enough to permit the track to
be shifted over. Here another especially designed machine, the track
shifter, was brought into play. It was a sort of derrick mounted on a
flat car, and with it the track shifters were able to pick up a piece
of track and lift it over to the desired position. With this machine a
score of men could do the work that without it would have required a
gang of 600 men.

In addition to the Lidgerwood dirt trains there were a large number of
trains made up of steel dump cars which were dumped by compressed air,
and still other trains made up of small hand-dumped cars, and each
class found its own peculiar uses.

As has been said, the problem of digging the big ditch has been one of
the transportation of the spoil, and this has involved numerous
difficulties. In Culebra Cut no little difficulty was experienced in
keeping open enough tracks to afford the necessary room for dirt
trains. Slides came down and forced track after track out of
alignment, burying some of them beyond the hope of usable recovery;
often the very bottom of the cut itself heaved up under the stress of
the heavy weight of faulty strata on the sides of the mountain; and
sometimes the slides and breaks threatened entirely to shut up one end
of the cut.

In hauling away the spoil one improvement after another was made in
the interest of efficiency. It was found at first that the capacity of
a big Lidgerwood flat car was only about 16 cubic yards, and that with
a sideboard on only one side of the car, the load did not center well
on the car, thus placing an undue strain on the wheels on one side.
The transportation department, therefore, extended the bed of the car
further out over the wheels on the open side, and this served a triple
purpose--it permitted the steam shovels to load the cars so that the
load rested in the center, increased the capacity of each car by about
3 yards, and permitted the unloader plow to throw the spoil further
from the track, thus adding to the efficiency of the dumping
apparatus.

Frequent breaks in the trains were caused by worn couplers. These
accidents were almost entirely overcome by equipping each train with a
sort of "bridle" which prevented the separation of the cars in the
event of the parting of a defective coupler. In the operation of the
unloader plows it was found that the big cables frequently broke when
a plow would strike an obstruction on the car, and this caused no end
of annoyance and frequent delays. Then someone thought of putting
between the cable and the plow a link whose breaking point was lower
than that of the cable. After that when a plow struck an obstruction
the cable did not part--the link simply gave way, and another was
always at hand. On the big spreaders no less than 51 improvements were
made, each the answer of the engineers to some challenge from the
stubborn material with which they had to contend.

The major portion of the material excavated from the canal had to be
hauled out and dumped where it was of no further use. From the Central
Division alone, which includes Culebra Cut, upward of a hundred
million cubic yards of material was hauled away and dumped as useless.
At Tabernilla one dump contained nearly 17,000,000 cubic yards. A
great deal of spoil, however, was used to excellent advantage.
Wherever there was swampy ground contiguous to the permanent
settlements it was covered over with material from the cut and brought
up above the water level. Many hundreds of acres were thus converted
from malaria-breeding grounds into high and dry lands.

During the last stages of the work in Culebra Cut it was found that
some of the slides were so bad that they were breaking back of the
crest of the hills that border the cut. Therefore it was found to be
feasible to attack the problem by sluicing the material down the side
of the hills into the valley beyond. To this end a big hydraulic plant
which had been used on the Pacific end of the canal was brought up and
installed beyond the east bank of the cut. A reservoir of water was
impounded and tremendous pumps installed. They pumped a stream of
water 40 inches in diameter. This was gradually tapered down to a
number of 4-inch nozzles, and out of these spouted streams of water
with a pressure of 80 pounds to the square inch. These streams ate
away the dirt at a rapid rate.

The slides did not hold up the completion of the canal a minute, at
least to the point of usability. The day that the lock gates were
ready there was water enough in the canal to carry the entire American
navy from ocean to ocean. That day the big dredges from the Atlantic
and the Pacific were brought into the cut, and with them putting the
finishing touches on the slides at the bottom, and the hydraulic
excavators attacking them at the top, the problem of the slides was
solved.

Viewing Culebra Cut in retrospect, it proved an immensely less
difficult task than some prophesied, and a much more serious one than
others predicted. There were those who opposed the building of the
Panama Canal because of the belief that Culebra Cut could not be dug,
that Culebra Mountain was an effective barrier to human ambition.
Also, there were those who asserted that Gold Hill and Contractor's
Hill were in danger of sliding into the big ditch and that they were
mountains which neither the faith nor the pocketbooks of the Americans
could remove. Others saw the handwriting of Failure on the wall in
the heaving up of the bottom of the cut, interpreting this as a
movement from the very depths of the earth. Still others saw it in the
smoke that issued from fissures in the cut, which spoke to them of
volcanoes being unearthed and told them that the Babel of American
ambitions must totter to the ground. They did not know that these were
only little splotches of decomposing metals suddenly exposed to the
air, any more than their fellow pessimists knew that the heaving up of
the bottom of the cut was due to the pressure of the earth on the
adjacent banks.

To-day Culebra Mountain bows its lofty head to the genius of the
American engineer and to the courage of the canal army. Through its
vitals there runs a great artificial canyon nearly 9 miles long, 300
feet wide at its bottom, in places as much as a half mile wide at its
top and nearly 500 feet deep at the deepest point. Out of it there was
taken 105,000,000 cubic yards of material, and at places it cost as
much as $15,000,000 a mile to make the excavations. Through it now
extends a great ribbon of water broad enough to permit the largest
vessels afloat to pass one another under their own power, and deep
enough to carry a ship with a draft beyond anything in the minds of
naval constructors to-day. With towering hills lining it on either
side, with banks that are precipitous here and farflung there, with
great and deep recesses at one place and another telling of the
gigantic breaks and slides with which the men who built it had to
contend, going through Culebra Cut gives to the human heart a thrill
such as the sight of no other work of the human hand can give. Its
magnitude, its awe-inspiring aspect as one navigates the channel
between the two great hills which stand like sentinels above it, and
the memory of the thousands of tons of dynamite, the hundreds of
millions of money and the vast investment of brain and brawn required
in its digging, all conspire to make the wonder greater. It is the
mightiest deed the hand of man has done.




CHAPTER VII

ENDS OF THE CANAL


While the completed Panama Canal does not wed the two oceans, or
permit their waters to mingle in Gatun Lake, it does bring them a
little closer together. On the Atlantic side a sea-level channel has
been dug from deep water due south to Gatun, a distance of 7 miles. On
the Pacific side a similar channel has been dug from deep water in a
northwesterly direction to Miraflores, a distance of 8 miles. It
follows that 15 of the 50 miles of the canal will be filled with salt
water. The remaining 35 miles will be filled with fresh water supplied
by the Chagres and the lesser rivers of Panama. The task of digging
these sea-level sections was a considerable one and almost every
method of ditch digging that human ingenuity has been able to devise
was employed. Steam shovels, dipper dredges, ladder dredges,
stationary suction dredges, and sea-going suction dredges, all
contributed their share toward bringing the waters of the Atlantic to
Gatun and those of the Pacific to Miraflores. In addition to these
methods, on the Pacific side use was made of the hydraulic process of
excavating soft material, washing it loose with powerful streams of
water and pumping it out with giant pumps.

[Illustration: THE DISASTROUS EFFECTS OF SLIDES IN CULEBRA CUT]

[Illustration: W. G. COMBER

U. S. LADDER DREDGE "COROZAL" AND ONE OF HER MUD BUCKETS]

As one travels along the Pacific end of the canal he is reminded of
the words of Isaiah:

     "Every valley shall be exalted, and every mountain and hill shall
     be made low; and the uneven shall be made level, and the rough
     places a plain."

Hundreds of acres of low, marshy land have been filled up, either with
mud from the suction dredges and the hydraulic excavators, or with
spoil from Culebra Cut. Much of this made land will be valuable for
tropical agriculture, while other parts will never serve any purpose
other than to keep down the marshes. But they afforded a dumping
ground for material taken out of the canal prism, and added something
to the improvement of health and living conditions on the Isthmus.

Probably the most interesting process of excavation in the sea-level
channels was that of the sea-going suction dredges. These dredges took
out material more cheaply than any other kind of excavating machinery
used on the Isthmus. Two of them were put to work in 1908, about the
time the operations reached full-blast and have been kept in
commission ever since. While it cost as much as $70,000 a year to keep
each one in commission, they were able to maintain an annual average
of about 5,000,000 cubic yards of material excavated at a cost per
yard of 5 cents and even less. With steam shovels it ranged from 10 to
20 times as much per yard. These big dredges were built with great
bins in their holds and equipped with powerful 20-inch centrifugal
pumps. When at work they steamed up and down the channel, sucking up
the mud, and carrying it out to sea.

Another interesting dredge used was the big ladder dredge Corozal. It
is a great floating dock, as it were, with a huge endless chain
carrying 52 immense, 35-cubic-foot buckets. On the center line
amidships there is a large opening down to the water. The big elevator
framework carrying the endless chain goes down through this and into
the water at a considerable angle. The buckets pass around this, and
as they round the end of it their great steel lips dig down into the
material until filled, then they come up at the rate of three every
five seconds and deposit their burden in a huge hopper which conveys
it to the barge at the side of the dredge. The dredge is anchored fast
at a given place, and keeps on attacking the material beneath it until
the desired level is reached. This dredge, with the sea-going suction
dredges, will be retained as the permanent dredging fleet. The
stationary suction dredges at the two ends of the canal were used to
pump up the soft material and to force it out through long pipe lines
into the swamps or into the hydraulic cores of the earth dams.

[Illustration: THE _Corozal_ AND ITS METHOD OF ATTACK]

Several old French ladder dredges were rescued from the jungle and put
into commission at the beginning of the work, and they held out
faithfully to the end, dividing honors with the newer equipment in
hastening the day when the oceans might go inland to Gatun and
Miraflores. While they looked like toys beside such giant excavators
as the Corozal, they probably showed more efficiency than any other
class of excavators of their period of construction. They were
attended by large self-propelling scows built by the French. When
these were filled they steamed out to sea and dumped their burden and
then steamed back again for another load. Some of the dredges were
attended by ordinary barges which were towed out to sea by tugs and
dumped.

Another interesting machine used on the Pacific end of the canal was
the Lobnitz rock breaker. This consists of a sort of pile driver
mounted on a large barge. Instead of a pile driving weight there is a
big battering ram made of round steel, pointed at one end. It is
lifted up perhaps 10 feet and allowed to drop suddenly. As some of
these rams weigh as much as 25 tons their striking force may be
imagined. When the ram struck the rock the top would shake back and
forth like a bamboo pole, in spite of the fact that it was made of the
best steel and more than 15 inches in diameter. Sooner or later the
rams would break off at the water line, this being due to the fact
that the constant flexion at that point set the molecules in the steel
and took away all its elasticity.

It was found desirable to excavate a part of the sea-level channel
before the water was let into it. To accomplish this a big dam, or
dike, was built across the channel several miles inland, and steam
shovels were used behind this dike. As the work neared completion,
however, it was found advisable to let the water come further inland,
so that the dredges could extend the field of their activities. To do
this another dike was thrown across the channel about a mile north of
the first one, and water was admitted to the section of the big ditch
between these two dikes. The engineers were afraid to cut a small
ditch in the top of the first dike, and allow the water to eat the dam
away as it flowed in, for fear that it would rush in so rapidly it
would destroy the second dike. Therefore they filled the basin between
the two dikes by siphon and by pumping, a process which required the
drawing in of billions of gallons of water. This was accomplished in
due time, however, and then 16 tons of dynamite was placed in the no
longer useful dike. An electric spark did the rest.

The distinguishing features of the ends of the canal are the big
breakwaters at Toro Point, at the Atlantic end, and Naos Island, at
the Pacific end. The former extends from the shore out into the sea
for a distance of 2 miles and has a large lighthouse at the seaward
end. It was built by dumping stone from the shore out into the sea,
this process being followed by driving piles into the dumped stone and
building a railroad on the crest, over which the stone was hauled for
its further extension. The top of the breakwater is covered with huge
stones weighing from 8 to 20 tons each, these to make sure that it
will stand against the pounding of the waves. Two minor breakwaters
were also built at the Atlantic end to protect the terminal basin.

The big dike at Naos Island in the Pacific is more than 17,000 feet
long and transforms the island into the cape of a small peninsula.
There was a threefold purpose in its construction--to cut out the
cross currents that brought thousands of yards of sand and silt into
the canal channel, to afford a dumping place for a large quantity of
the spoil from Culebra Cut, and to make a connection with the mainland
for the fortifications on Naos, Flamenco, and Perico Islands. In
building it the engineers were under the necessity of first building a
trestle on which the spoil trains could be backed and dumped. The
piles had to be driven in soft, blue mud, and as the rock was dumped,
it sank down and down until, at places, ten times as much stone was
required as would have been necessary if the ocean bottom had been
firm. In addition to this thousands of trainloads of material were
dumped in the landward end of the dike, some 20,000,000 cubic yards of
material being thus disposed of.

The last part of the canal work to be completed will be the terminal
facilities at the ends of the big waterway. At the time this book went
to press they were something more than a year from completion, but the
indications were that they would be finished within the time limit
originally set for the completion of the canal itself. These terminal
facilities consist of dry docks, wharfage space, storehouses, and
everything else necessary to perform any service that might ordinarily
be required for passing ships, whether they be those of commerce or of
war. The main coaling station is to be established at the Atlantic
end. The storehouses, the laundry, the bakery, and the other equipment
of the Isthmian Canal Commission and the Panama Railroad also will be
made a part of the permanent terminal plant on that side of the
Isthmus.

A large dry dock is being built at the Pacific end having the same
usable dimensions as the canal locks, capable of accommodating any
vessel that can pass through the canal. The principal machine shops
will also be erected there, and a coaling plant of half the capacity
of the one at the Atlantic end will be provided. A little to the east
of the Pacific terminal works will be stationed the capital of the
Canal Zone, where the administrative offices, the governor's
residence, and two new towns will be built. The administration
building, which is to be a three-story structure of concrete, hollow
tile, and structural steel, is to occupy an eminence on the side of
Ancon Hill, which will afford a splendid view of the Pacific
fortifications, the entrance to the canal channel, a part of the port
works, and of the canal itself from the great continental divide to
the Pacific.

There one may sit and see ships coming into the canal, tying up at the
docks, sailing up the big ditch, and passing through the locks at
Miraflores and Pedro Miguel. Near by will be the permanent home of the
marines who will be stationed on the Isthmus, their barracks and
grounds occupying the broad plateau on the side of Ancon Hill made by
taking out the millions of cubic yards of stone required for the
concrete works on the Pacific side of the Isthmus. Two permanent towns
will be built at Balboa, one for the Americans and the other for the
common laborers. The American town will be built under the capitol
hill on a broad plain that was made by pumping hydraulic material into
a swamp and by dumping spoil from Culebra Cut.

When the terminal plant at Balboa is completed it will represent
probably the most extensive and adequate port works in the New World.
In addition to the main dry dock it will have a second one which will
be smaller, but which will be large enough to accommodate a majority
of the ships that will pass through the canal. The existing dry dock
at the Atlantic end will be continued in service.

It is certain that none of these port works will ever fail by reason
of insecure foundations. Wherever unusual loads were to be carried
great piers of reinforced concrete were sent down to solid rock, often
a distance of 60 feet below the surface. They consisted of a hollow
shell of reinforced concrete which was allowed to sink to hardpan of
its own accord or under heavy weight. These shells were built in
sections 6 feet high. The bottom section was 10 feet in diameter, and
the lower end was equipped with a sharp steel shoe. As the section cut
down into the earth of its own weight and that above it, laborers on
the inside removed the material under the shoe and as they did so it
sank further down. The sections above were only 8 feet in diameter,
and did not quite fill up the hole made by the bottom of the section,
thus overcoming all skin friction, and permitting the full weight of
the series of sections to fall on the lower one. A jet of water was
forced around the sinking pier all the time it was going down, and
this made its progress the more easy. At times the weight of the
superimposed sections was sufficient to force the pier down through
the soft mud, while at other times the material became so heavy that
even a 25-ton weight on top of the pier scarcely moved it. At one
place a stratum of material was struck about 25 feet below the surface
which yielded sulphuretted hydrogen gas. This affected the laborers'
eyes, and some of them had to go to the hospital for treatment. The
work of digging out the material was continued until the lower section
reached bed rock, where it was anchored. The sections themselves were
tied together with heavy iron rods. After they were firmly in place
the interior was filled up with concrete, itself reinforced, so that
the foundations became, in reality, a series of huge concrete piles, 8
feet in diameter, anchored to bed rock.

The coaling plants at the two terminals will be the crowning features
of the terminal facilities. With an immense storage capacity, and with
every possible facility for the rapid handling of coal, both in
shipping and unshipping it, no other canal in the world will be so
well equipped. The coal storage basin at the Atlantic end will hold
nearly 300,000 tons. This basin will be built of reinforced concrete,
and will permit the flooding of the coal pile so that one-half of it
will be stored under water for war purposes. It is said that
deterioration in coal is not as great in subaqueous storage, and at
the same time the pile is less subject to fire. The plant will be able
to discharge a thousand tons of coal an hour and to load 2,000 tons an
hour. Ships will not go alongside the wharves to be coaled, but will
lie out in the ship basin and be coaled from barges with reloader
outfits. Special efforts have been made to provide for the quick
loading of colliers in case of war. The coal handling plant at the
Pacific entrance will have a normal capacity of 135,000 tons and will
be able to handle half as much coal in a given time as the one at the
Atlantic end.

There will be big supply depots where ships can get any kind of stores
they need from a few buckets of white lead to an anchor or a hawser; a
laundry in which a ship's wash can be accepted at the hour it begins
its transit of the canal, for delivery by railroad at the other end
before it is ready to resume its ocean journey; an ice plant which
will replenish the cold storage compartments of ships lacking such
facilities. In short, it is proposed to attempt to do everything that
may be done to make more attractive the bid of the canal for its share
of business.




CHAPTER VIII

THE PANAMA RAILROAD


When the United States acquired the properties of the new French Canal
Company it found itself in the possession of a railroad for which it
had allowed the canal company $7,000,000. This road, in the high tide
of its history, had proved a bonanza for its stockholders, and during
the 43 years between 1855 and 1898 it showed net profits five times as
great as the original cost of its construction.

When the United States took over the road someone described it as
being merely "two streaks of rust and a right of way." While the
Panama road as acquired by the United States in its purchase of the
assets of the new French Canal Company might have been all that this
phrase implies, it was none the less as great a bargain as was ever
bought by any Government, and probably the greatest bargain ever sold
in the shape of a railroad. It was not the rolling stock that was
valuable, nor yet the road itself; the real value was to be found in
the possibilities of the concession. Not only was this road destined
to render to the United States a service in the building of the Panama
Canal, worth to Uncle Sam a great many times more than its cost, but
it was also destined to yield a net profit from its commercial
operations which in 10 years would amount to double the price paid for
it. Since the Americans took it over it has been yielding net returns
ranging from a million and a quarter to a million and three-quarters
dollars a year. In these 10 years it has brought an aggregate profit
of some $15,000,000 into the coffers of the United States.

While $7,000,000 may have been a high price, judged from the
standpoint of the physical value of the road, it was a very reasonable
one, indeed, as compared with the price paid for it by the new French
Canal Company. This company, which sold it to the United States for
$7,000,000, paid the Panama Railroad Company $18,000,000 for it 23
years before. When the French Canal Company decided to undertake the
building of the canal, it found that the Panama Railroad Company held
concessions that were absolutely necessary to the construction of the
canal. The Colombian Government had granted the company the concession
to complete the road in 1849, and had agreed that no other
interoceanic communication should be opened without the consent of the
railroad. This gave to the railroad company the whip hand in trading
with the canal company and it was able to name its own price.

When the United States wanted to buy the rights and properties of the
new French Canal Company the shoe was on the other foot. There was
only one buyer--the United States; and it could choose between the
Panama and Nicaragua routes. If the United States did not buy the
property its principal value would have been what it was worth as an
uncertain prospect that at some future time a second Isthmian canal
might be built. That is why the United States was able to buy from the
French for $7,000,000 property that they had bought for $18,000,000.

After the United States acquired possession of the railroad, one
change after another took place--now in the location, now in the
rolling stock, now in directorate, and again in location--until almost
all that remained of the original road was its name. It is now built
almost every foot of the distance on a new location and the permanent
Panama Railroad is a thoroughly modern, well-ballasted, heavy-railed,
block-signal operated line of railway, built along the east bank of
the Panama Canal from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Nearly half of the
old right of way lies on the bottom of Lake Gatun, while the new line
skirts that artificial body of water along its eastern shore, at
places crossing its outlying arms over big bridges and heavy trestles.
The construction of this new line was attended with much difficulty
and probably no other road in the world has such a great percentage of
fills and embankments in proportion to its length. One embankment, a
mile and a quarter long and 82 feet high, required upward of 2,500,000
yards of material for its construction. The road is built about 10
feet above the water's edge, and more than 12,000,000 cubic yards of
material was required to make the fills necessary to carry the road
bed at this elevation.

When the United States took over the French property it was decided
that the canal work and the railroad operations should be maintained
as distinct activities. It was agreed that the Canal Commission
should have the right to haul its dirt trains over the Panama
Railroad, and in compensation therefor the commission undertook to
build a new road to take the place of the old line, which was in the
way of the completion of the canal.

The work of relocating the road was undertaken early in the
construction of the canal in order that it might be completed by the
time the old road had to be abandoned. It was built at a cost of
approximately $9,000,000, or close to $170,000 a mile. It is
interesting to note that the cost of this thoroughly modern railroad
was only about a million dollars more than the cost of the first
Panama road which has been built with rather less than usual attention
to grades, and with small rails and light bridges. The relocated
Panama Railroad was turned over to the railroad company in 1912.

How good a bargain the United States secured when it acquired the
Panama Railroad is shown by the fact that during the 10 years of canal
work the net earnings of the railroad company have reimbursed the
United States for the cost of the old road and the construction of the
new one, to say nothing of the invaluable aid rendered in the building
of the canal.

The relations existing between the Isthmian Canal Commission and the
Panama Railroad Company during the years of the construction of the
canal were somewhat peculiar. The Panama Railroad Company is as much
the property of the United States as the canal itself, yet the books
of the two organizations were kept as carefully separate and distinct
as though they were under entirely different ownership. The Panama
Railroad Company, being a chartered corporation, under the terms of
its ownership could engage in commercial business with all of the
facility of a private corporation. Money received by the Isthmian
Canal Commission from outside sources had to be covered into the
treasury and reappropriated for distinct and special purposes. On the
other hand, the railroad company could use its money over and over
again without turning it back into the treasury. This advantage of
operation was a useful one in conducting the road itself, and also in
the construction of the canal.

There was another reason which led the canal authorities to advocate
the maintenance of the two organizations as separate entities. This
had to do with the concession rights. Under the terms of the
concession of the railroad company the property was to revert to the
Republic of Colombia in 1967, or at any earlier date should the
company cease to exist as such. While most authorities agree that with
the secession of Panama and the setting up of the new Government all
of Colombia's rights in the railroad company passed with the
territory, and while the treaty between the United States and the
Republic of Panama expressly provides that the United States shall
have "absolute title--free from every present or reversionary interest
or claim" in the railroad, the Republic of Colombia contends that it
possesses some rights with reference to the railroad and, not desiring
to complicate matters, the canal authorities thought it best to live
up to the letter of the treaty, in spite of Panama's express grant of
title free from reversionary interest or claim.

While it was deemed desirable to have the Panama Railroad operated as
a separate organization, it was equally important that it should be
operated in a way that its interests always would be subordinate to
those of the canal. It was decided that the best way to accomplish
this was to make the chairman and chief engineer of the Canal
Commission the president of the railroad company, and the members of
the commission its directors. The stock of the company is held in the
name of the Secretary of War, with the exception of a few shares held
by the directors to entitle them to membership on the board. There are
also a few directors chosen from other parts of the Government
service, but their activities are purely perfunctory.

In addition to the railroad, the Panama Railroad Company also operates
a steamship line between New York and Colon. This line was acquired
with other properties of the new French Canal Company as a part of the
Panama Railroad's holdings. There were only a few years during the
construction period when this steamship line did not show a loss. But
the advantages of having a steamship line for carrying the supplies of
the canal were so great, because of the special facilities that could
be provided, that the loss was more than compensated by them. During
the year 1912 the cost of operating this steamship line was $305,000
greater than the revenues derived from its operation. But, at the same
time there was a return of net earnings by the Panama Railroad of
over $2,000,000, at least a part of which was made possible by the
operation of the steamship line. Even after deducting the losses
sustained in the operation of the steamship company there was a net
profit of more than $1,700,000, which for a railroad of less than 50
miles in length is no small item.

As a matter of fact, Government ownership of railways as applied at
Panama is remarkably successful from the standpoint of the Government,
and partially so to the patrons of the railroad. Probably no railroad
in the United States could show net earnings per mile of line anywhere
comparable with those of the Panama Railroad.

The rates for passengers and baggage across the Isthmus were rather
high for first-class passengers, the fare for the 48-mile trip being
$2.40, or 5 cents a mile. The second-class rate was only half as much.
On the handling of freight the railroad had to divide the through rate
with the steamship companies of the Atlantic and the Pacific, but,
while the rates were high, judged by American standards, and the
percentages of profits very large, the service maintained was so
superior to that encountered on the privately owned railroads of the
Tropics that no one ever seriously complained of the charges.

One of the most important services rendered by the Panama Railroad
Company in the construction of the canal was in connection with the
commissary. It had more to do with the maintenance of a reasonable
standard of living cost on the Isthmus than anything else.

When the canal was nearing completion it became advisable to
determine what rôle the Panama Railroad should play after the
permanent organization went into effect. Should it be continued as a
separate entity distinct from the canal but controlled by the canal
authorities? Or should it be merged into the Canal Government and
operated purely as an auxiliary of the canal with no separate
existence? This matter was carefully weighed by the canal authorities
and the Government at Washington, and it was finally decided that the
best plan would be to operate them as separate entities, but to have
all the work done by single organization. Another question that arose
was whether the Panama Railroad Steamship Line should be operated as a
Government line after the completion of the canal. Recalling the fact
that the line never had been a profitable one, and that there was no
further reason why it should be continued in operation with an annual
deficit, the recommendation was made by the chairman and the chief
engineer that the ships should be disposed of and the line
discontinued.

As the tide of tourist travel set toward Panama, the serious problem
of taking care of thousands of visitors confronted the canal
authorities. There were times when every available facility for taking
care of lodgers was called into requisition, and still hundreds of
American tourists had to find quarters in cheap, vermin-infested
native hotels at Colon. Believing that the situation demanded a modern
hotel at the Atlantic side of the Isthmus, and having in mind the
success of the Government in the construction and maintenance of the
Tivoli Hotel at the Pacific side, it was decided by the Secretary of
War that the Panama Railroad Company should build a new hotel at
Colon, to be operated by that company for the Government. The result
was the beautiful Washington Hotel, in whose architecture one finds
the world's best example of northern standards of hotel construction
adapted to tropical needs.

Built of concrete and cement block, it is constructed in a modified
Spanish Mission style that makes it cool and comfortable at all times.
Its public rooms, from the main lobby to the dining-rooms, from the
ladies' parlor to the telephone and cable rooms, from the barber shop
to the billiard room, are large, airy, and most attractively
furnished. Its ball room, opening on three sides to the breezes borne
in from the Caribbean is a delight to the disciples of Terpsichore,
while its open-air swimming pool, said to be the largest hotel
swimming pool in the world, affords ideal facilities for those who
otherwise would sigh for the surf. Persons who have visited every
leading hotel in the New World, from the Rio Grande southward to the
Strait of Magellan, say that it is without a superior in all that
region and, perhaps, without an equal except for one in Buenos Aires.

Here one may find accommodations to suit his taste and largely to meet
the necessities of his pocketbook. The best rooms with bath cost $5 a
day for one, or $6 for two. Table d'hote meals are served at $1 each,
while those who prefer it may secure club breakfasts and a la carte
service. Anyone who has visited the Hotel Washington, situated as it
is on Colon Beach, where the breakers sweep in from the Caribbean Sea,
feels that Uncle Sam is no less successful as a hotel keeper than as
a builder of canals.

The Panama Railroad, under the American régime, has always looked well
after the comfort of its patrons. The coaches are of the standard
American type, and enough of them are run on every train to make it
certain that no patron need stand for lack of a seat. The most popular
trains carry from 8 to 12 cars. These trains are run on convenient
schedules, permitting a person to go and come from any point on the
road in any forenoon or afternoon. All coaches are supplied with
hygienic drinking cups, and in every way the Panama Railroad shows
that Uncle Sam is solicitous for the welfare of his patrons.

All the rolling stock on the Isthmus is built on a 5-foot gauge, this
having been the gauge of the original Panama Railroad. As the rolling
stock of the Canal Commission had to run over the lines of the Panama
Railroad, it also was built on the gauge. When this rolling stock is
disposed of it will be necessary to readjust the gauge to meet the
ordinary American standard which is 2-1/2 inches narrower. It has been
estimated that the engine axles can be shortened for $750 per
locomotive and those of cars at prices ranging from $27 to $31 per
car.

The first attempt to build the Panama Railroad was made in 1847, when
a French company secured a charter from the Government of Colombia for
a building of a road across the Isthmus. This company was unable to
finance the project and the concession lapsed.

In 1849 William H. Aspinwall, John L. Stevens, and Henry Chauncey,
New York capitalists, undertook the construction of the road. The
terms of the concession provided that the road would be purchased by
the Government at the expiration of 20 years after its completion for
$5,000,000. The loss of life in the construction of this road, serious
as it was, has been monumentally exaggerated. It is an oft-repeated
statement that a man died for every tie laid on the road. This would
mean that there were 150,000 deaths in its construction. As a matter
of fact, the total number of persons employed during the six years the
line was being built did not exceed 6,000. But among these the death
rate was very high. Several thousand Chinese were brought over and
they died almost like flies. Malaria and yellow fever were the great
scourges they had to encounter, although smallpox and other diseases
carried away hundreds.

The road was completed in January, 1855. Before the last rail was laid
more than $2,000,000 had been taken in for hauling passengers as far
as the road extended. The way in which the original 50-cent per mile
rate across the Isthmus was established is interesting. The chief
engineer encountered much trouble from people who wanted to use the
road as far inland as it went from Colon, so he suggested that a
50-cent rate be established, thinking to make it prohibitory. But the
people who wanted to cross the Isthmus were willing to pay even 50
cents a mile. Hence for years after the completion of the road the
passenger rate continued at $25 for the one-way trip across the
Isthmus.

The railroad proved to be such an unexpectedly good investment that
the Republic of Colombia began to establish its claim to acquire
ownership of the road at the expiration of the 2-year term, which
would take place in 1875. It was necessary therefore, that the
railroad company should take steps to save the railroad from a forced
sale with $5,000,000 as the consideration. Representatives were
dispatched to Bogota with instructions to get an extension of the
concession under the most favorable terms possible. As it was realized
that the Republic of Colombia held the whip hand in the negotiations,
the railroad company understood that if it wished to escape selling
its great revenue producing road for $5,000,000 it would have to meet
any terms Colombia might dictate. The result of this mission was an
agreement by the railroad that in consideration of an extension of the
concession for a term of 99 years it would pay to the Colombian
Government $1,000,000 spot cash and $250,000 a year during the life of
the concession. That annual payment was continued as long as the
Isthmus remained a part of the Republic of Colombia. Under the terms
of the treaty between the United States and the Republic of Panama it
was resumed again in 1913, to be paid by the United States to the
Republic of Panama throughout all the years that the United States
maintains and operates the Panama Canal.




CHAPTER IX

SANITATION


Primarily, the conquest of the Isthmian barrier was the conquest of
the mosquito. Not mountains to be leveled, nor wild rivers to be
tamed, nor yet titanic machinery to be installed, presented the
gravest obstacles to the canal builders. Their most feared enemies
were none of these, but the swarms of mosquitoes that bred in myriads
in every lake, in every tiny pool, in every clump of weeds on the
rain-soaked, steaming, tropical land. For these mosquitoes were the
bearers of the dread germs of yellow fever and of malaria; and the
conditions that encouraged their multiplication bred also typhoid and
all manner of filthy disease. Each mosquito was a potential messenger
of death. The buzzing, biting pests had defeated the French in Panama
without the French ever having recognized the source of the attack. It
was because the Americans, thanks to Great Britain and to Cuba, knew
the deadly qualities of the mosquitoes that they were able to plan,
under the leadership of Col. W. C. Gorgas, a sanitary campaign of
unprecedented success. It achieved two victories. One was that it made
of the Canal Zone the most healthful strip of land under tropic skies.
The other is the Panama Canal.

When one looks about in an effort to place the credit for these great
sanitary achievements he must go back to Cuba, where the yellow fever
commission, consisting of Reed, Carroll, Lazear, and Agrimonte, made
the remarkable investigations proving that yellow fever is
transmissible only through the bite of a mosquito. He must go still
further back to Maj. Roland Ross of the British Army, and his
epoch-making discovery that malaria is conveyed only by the bite of
another kind of mosquito. And, if he is just to all who have
contributed to the establishment of the insect-bearing theory of
disease, he must not forget Sir Patrick Manson who first proved that
any disease could be transmitted by insect bites. It was he who
discovered that filariasis is transmissible by this method alone. It
was from him that Ross gathered the inspiration that is releasing
humanity from one of the most insidious of all the diseases to which
mortal flesh is heir. And it was from Ross's malaria discoveries, in
turn, that Reed carried forward to successful proof the theory which
had persisted in some quarters for generations that yellow fever was
transmissible through mosquitoes; a theory already partially proved by
Dr. Carlos Finley, of Havana, 20 years earlier.

[Illustration: COL. WILLIAM C. GORGAS

THE HOSPITAL GROUNDS, ANCON]

[Illustration: LIEUT. FREDERIC MEARS

THE OLD PANAMA RAILROAD]

But all of the surmises and theories came short of the truth until
Reed, Carroll, Lazear, and Agrimonte (Lazear at the cost of his life
and Carroll at the cost of a nearly fatal attack of yellow fever) took
up the work of proving that there was only one way in which yellow
fever could be transmitted; namely, by the bite of the mosquito.
Sleeping with patients who had yellow fever, wearing the clothes of
those who had died from it, eating from utensils from which yellow
fever victims had eaten--in short, putting to the most rigid test
every other possible method of infection, they proved by every
negative test that yellow fever could not be produced in any way other
than by the bite of a mosquito.

The next step was to give affirmative proof that yellow fever was
caused by the bite of the female "stegomyia"--she of the striped
stockings and the shrill song. This meant that someone had to have
enough love for humanity to risk his life by inviting one of the worst
forms of death to which human flesh is heir. Those doctors knew that
they could not as brave men ask others to undergo the risks that they
themselves might not accept, so in a little council chamber in Havana
the three Americans--Reed, Carroll, and Lazear--entered into a compact
that they themselves would permit infected mosquitoes to bite them.
Reed was called home, but Carroll and Lazear stood with the keen and
cold eyes of scientists and saw the mosquitoes inject the fateful
poison into their blood. Later, after Lazear had died and Carroll had
stood in the jaws of death, soldiers of the American army in Cuba
volunteered in the interest of humanity to undergo these same risks.
And it was thus, at this price, that the world came to know how yellow
fever is caused, and that the United States was to be able to build
the Panama Canal.

After the guilt of the female "stegomyia" mosquito was firmly
established the next problem was to find a method of combating her
work. Dr. Reed and his associates thought that it might be done
through a process of immunization, using the mosquito to bite patients
with very mild cases, and after the necessary period of incubation, to
transmit the disease to those who were to be rendered immune. It was
soon found, however, that there was no method of transmitting a mild
infection, and the next problem was to combat the work of the mosquito
by isolation of yellow fever patients, and by the extermination of the
mosquitoes themselves.

In Havana at this time there was another army surgeon who was destined
to write his name high upon the pages of medical achievement. He was
Dr. William C. Gorgas. Under the patronage of Gen. Leonard Wood,
himself a physician and alive to the lessons of the yellow fever
commission's investigations, Major Gorgas undertook to apply the
doctrine of yellow fever prevention promulgated by the commission, and
his efforts were attended with brilliant success. The result was that
Havana, in particular, and Cuba, in general, were freed from this
great terror of the Tropics. When President Roosevelt came to provide
for the building of the Panama Canal one of his earlier acts was to
appoint Dr. Gorgas the chief sanitary officer of the Canal Zone.

At first there was difficulty in establishing practical sanitation in
Panama. The chief sanitary officer was then a subordinate of the
commission, and, along with all of the other men who were trying to do
things on the Isthmus, he found himself hindered by unsatisfactory
conditions both as to supplies and as to force; consequently, his work
was no more satisfactory to himself than it was to the commission or
to the American people. Under these conditions an epidemic of yellow
fever broke out in Panama in 1905, and it was not long before the
yellow fever mosquito had seemingly established an alibi and had
secured a reopening of her case before the jury of public sentiment.
People, to emphasize their disbelief in the mosquito theory of the
transmission of the disease, tore the screens from their doors and
windows, and otherwise proclaimed their contempt for the doctors and
their doctrines. This matter went so far that the Isthmian Canal
Commission proposed not only a change in method but a change in
personnel as well.

At this juncture Charles E. Magoon became governor of the Canal Zone,
and he declared that Dr. Gorgas should have adequate financial and
moral support. He was determined that the panic which the yellow fever
outbreak had engendered should be halted--and a panic it was, for men
rushed madly to Colon and defied the efforts of the commission, and of
the captains and crews of the Panama Railroad steamships, to prevent
them from returning to the States without other transportation
arrangements than a determination to get aboard and stay there until
the Statue of Liberty had been passed in New York Harbor. So great was
this panic that Chief Engineer Stevens declared that there were three
diseases at Panama: Yellow fever, malaria, and cold feet: and that the
greatest of these was cold feet. The newspapers of the United States
at that time quoted the poetry of such writers as Gilbert, who said:

    "Beyond the Chagres River
    'Tis said (the story's old)
    Are paths that lead to mountains
    Of purest virgin gold;
    But 'tis my firm conviction
    What e'er the tales they tell,
    That beyond the Chagres River
    All paths lead straight to hell."

It did not matter that in four months there were only 47 deaths on the
Isthmus from yellow fever as compared with 108 from malaria in the
same period--men do not stop to study mortality tables and to compare
the relative fatalities of diseases when yellow fever stares them in
the face.

But after all, the yellow fever panic of 1905 served a good purpose,
for if the mosquito thereby secured a reopening of its case, it
stirred the United States Government to give to the sanitary officers
of the Canal Zone the powers they needed, and the means required to
prove finally and forever in the court of last resort, the guilt of
the mosquito, and to establish for once and all the method of
combating its stealthy work.

The whole world recognizes the remarkable results in sanitary work
that have been achieved at Panama. While it must be remembered that
the population of the Canal Zone is made up largely of able-bodied
men, and that, therefore, the death rate naturally would be lower than
under like conditions with a normal population of infancy and old
age, the fact remains that sanitary science has converted the Zone
from a mosquito paradise of swamp and jungle into a region where
mosquitoes have all but disappeared, and where men are as free from
danger of epidemic diseases as in the United States itself.

The sanitary statistics of the Canal Zone, and of the cities of Panama
and Colon, were based for several years upon an erroneous assumption
of population. The Department of Sanitation estimated the population
of the Canal Zone by deducting the recorded emigrants from the
recorded immigrants and assumed that the difference represented a
permanent addition to the Zone's population. Under this method of
estimating population a serious error crept in, since hundreds of
people came into Panama from the Panaman outports and were recorded as
arrivals, but who, departing in small sailing vessels and launches at
night after the port officers had gone home, were not recorded as
having departed. In this way the sanitary department estimates of
population in the Canal Zone reached a total of 93,000 in 1912. The
census taken that year showed only 62,000 population in the Zone. This
served to make the death rate given out by the Department of
Sanitation 50 per cent lower than was justified by actual population
conditions.

But one does not need to consider figures to realize what has been
accomplished at Panama. Anyone who goes there and sees the remarkable
evidence of the success of the efforts to conquer the disease of the
tropical jungles, finds a lesson taught that is too impressive to
need the confirmation of medical statistics.

The United States, after the yellow fever outbreak of 1905, never
counted the cost when the health of the canal army was at stake. Not
only was Uncle Sam successful in his efforts to make the Canal Zone
and the terminal cities of Panama and Colon healthful places of abode,
but no worker on the canal was denied the privilege of the best
medical care. An average of $2,000,000 a year was expended in the
prevention of sickness and the care of those who were sick. At Ancon
and at Colon large hospitals were maintained where the white American
and the West Indian negro had their respective wards. At Taboga a
large sanitarium was maintained to assist the recuperation of those
who had recovered sufficiently to leave the hospital. Besides this
there were rest camps along the line for those not ill enough to be
removed to the hospitals, and dispensaries where those who felt they
were not in need of other medical attention could consult with the
physicians and get the necessary medicines. All medical services to
the employees of the Canal Commission and the Panama Railroad were
free, and only nominal charges were made for members of their
families. No passenger train crossed the Isthmus of Panama without
carrying a hospital car for taking patients to or from the hospitals.
No way station was without its waiting shed bearing the inscription:
"For Hospital Patients Only." Each community had its dispensary, its
doctor, and its sanitary inspector.

During the year 1912 there were 48,000 cases of sickness in the Canal
Zone, of which 26,000 were white and 22,000 colored. During the same
year 633,000 trips to the dispensaries were made by employees and
nonemployees, divided almost evenly between white and colored. The
average number of employees constantly sick in Ancon Hospital was 712;
in Colon Hospital 209; and in Taboga Sanitarium 54. An average of 119
were in the sick camps all the time and 50 in the quarters. The
average number of days' treatment per employee in the hospitals was a
little over 14; in the sick camps a little under 3; and in quarters
2-1/3. It cost $160,000 a year to feed the patients in the hospitals
and $739,000 a year to operate the hospitals.

The work of sanitation proper cost some $400,000 a year. This includes
many items. During one year about 16,000,000 square yards of brush
were cut and burned; a million square yards of swamp were drained;
30,000,000 square yards of grass were cut; 250,000 feet of ditches
were dug; and some 2,000,000 linear feet of old ditches were cleaned.
During the same year nearly a million garbage cans and over 300,000
refuse cans were emptied. In addition to looking after the health of
the Canal Zone itself, it was necessary to care for that of the cities
of Panama and Colon. In the city of Panama 11,000 loads of sweepings
and 25,000 loads of garbage were removed in one year; 3,000,000
gallons of water were sprinkled on the streets and as much more
distributed to the poor of the city.

During one year the quarantine service, which keeps a strict lookout
for yellow fever, bubonic plague, and other epidemic diseases,
inspected over 100,000 passengers coming into the Zone. It required
about 150,000 gallons of mosquito oil a year to keep down the
mosquitoes. There are 50 known breeds of these insects on the Isthmus
and perhaps some 20 species more which have not been identified. Of
the 50 or more species of mosquitoes 11 belonged to the
malaria-producing family--anopheles. Their cousins of the
yellow-fever-producing family--the stegomyias--boast of only two
species. What the other 40 or more kinds are doing besides annoying
suffering humanity has not been determined. The mosquito is
comparatively easy to exterminate. Its life habits are such that a
terrific mortality may be produced among them during infancy. The
average young mosquito, during its "wriggler" state of development,
lives under the water and has to make about 8,000 trips to the surface
for air before it can spread its wings and fly. If oil is poured upon
the water it can get no air and death by asphyxiation follows. Two
classes of larvaecide are used on the waters to exterminate the baby
mosquitoes: One is an oil used to make a scum over the surface; the
other a carbolic solution which poisons the water. At the head of
every little rivulet and tiny, trickling stream one sees a barrel out
of which comes an endless drip! drip! drip! These drops of oil or
poison are carried down the stream and make inhospitable all of the
mosquito nurseries of the marshes through which the waters flow. In
addition to these barrels, men go about with tanks on their backs,
spraying the marshy ground and the small, isolated pools of water with
larvaecides.

[Illustration: SANITARY DRINKING CUP]

[Illustration: MOSQUITO OIL DRIP BARREL]

[Illustration: SPRAYING MOSQUITO OIL]

[Illustration: TYPICAL QUARTERS OF THE MARRIED LABORER]

[Illustration: A NATIVE HUT]

This method of treatment has not exterminated all mosquitoes on the
Isthmus, but it has so materially reduced their number that one may
stay in the Zone for weeks without seeing a single one. This is a
freedom, however, that must be paid for by vigilance of the most
painstaking and unremitting sort. The moment the work is relaxed the
mosquitoes again spread over the territory.

The United States Government will have to continue with the utmost
care its work of sanitation and quarantine at Panama. If, after the
canal is completed, an epidemic of bubonic plague or yellow fever
should break out, it might very seriously interfere with the operation
of the canal in several ways. To begin with, it would demoralize the
operating force. Further than this, India and China are afraid of
yellow fever because in both of these countries the stegomyia mosquito
abounds. If the disease should obtain a foothold there it would be
difficult to exterminate. Europe, also, might be expected to
quarantine against Panama under such conditions. A 10,000-ton
freighter carrying cargo through the canal would lose at least a
thousand dollars for every day it was detained in quarantine by reason
of having visited the canal.

A shrewd observer has said that the successful sanitation of the
Isthmus of Panama is a triumph at once of medical science and of
despotic government. Probably this does not overstate the case. The
methods employed at Panama were arbitrary, and had to be. They
probably could not be enforced at all in a democratic community in
ordinary times. The people would rebel against the severity of the
regulations and against the incidental invasion of their privacy. But
strike any community, however free, with the fear of a swift and
deadly disease and it will submit--as witness the shot-gun quarantines
that used to demark the northern limits of the yellow fever zone in
our own Southern States, or the despotism that governed New Orleans in
the terror of 1905. At Panama this fear is ever present, so there is
little danger that a responsible majority there ever would resist the
sanitary work on the grounds of outraged democracy. It may be that a
popular government would become careless, or inefficient, but it would
not renounce the pretension. This has been proved in Cuba.

The sanitarians at Panama gave to the workers there a sense of
security that contributed no little to the spirit of determination so
universally remarked and commended by visitors to the Zone during the
era of construction. While there was no immunity from sickness and
death, yet there was no panic, no constant dread, such as destroyed
the morale of the French force. The Isthmus of Panama still remained
hot, its inhabitants still were forced to take the precautions that
aliens must take in the Tropics; but they were inspired with a
confidence that if these precautions were taken they would not be in
any greater danger than if they had remained in their northern homes.

Pestilence, the scourge of the on-sweeping epidemic, the plague of
swift death that is only a little worse than the panic of fear it
inspires--this was the thing that was stamped out.

Not since the Science of Healing opened its doors to the Science of
Prevention have physicians scored a greater victory in their fight
against disease and death than on the Isthmus of Panama. Not only did
they help to build the canal; they demonstrated that tropical diseases
are capable of human control and thereby opened up a vista of hope
undreamed of to all that sweltering and suffering mass of humanity
that inhabits the Torrid Zone.




CHAPTER X

THE MAN AT THE HELM


In 1905, William H. Taft, then Secretary of War, made a trip to the
Isthmus of Panama to look over the preparations for the construction
of the Panama Canal, and at the same time to consider the question of
the fortification of the big waterway. On that trip a member of the
General Staff of the Army, who at that time was but little known
outside of Army circles, went with him. He was a tall, broad-shouldered,
bronze-faced, gray-haired man, 47 years old. He came and went
unheralded. Few people knew of the engineering record he had made, and
no one on the Isthmus dreamed that he was destined to become the
commander in chief of the army that would conquer the Isthmian
barrier.

He returned to the United States and wrote his report--a report which,
from the deep mastery of the subject it revealed, attracted the
favorable attention of the Secretary of War. Later when the board of
consulting engineers came to make its report upon the type of canal
which should be built--whether it should be a sea level or a lock
canal--the Secretary of War asked this officer to prepare a draft of
his report to the President recommending the lock canal.

Soon after New Year's Day, 1907, the chief engineer of the canal,
John F. Stevens, dissatisfied with the relations that existed between
the Government and himself, came to the conclusion that he could not
build the canal hampered as he was by red tape at Washington. It then
became a question of whether or not the canal should be built by
contract or by the Army. President Roosevelt asked for a preliminary
report upon this proposition and the unheralded Army engineer who had
visited the Canal Zone in 1905, made it. A few days later there was a
conference between President Roosevelt, Gen. Alexander MacKenzie,
Chief of Engineers of the United States Army, and the Secretary of
War. After this conference Maj. George Washington Goethals was
summoned to the White House and informed by the President that it had
been determined to build the Panama Canal under the auspices of the
Army, and that he was appointed chairman and chief engineer of the
Isthmian Canal Commission. He was requested to keep the fact of his
appointment a secret and to prepare immediately to go to Panama. A
ship sailed for the Isthmus three days thereafter, and he was ready to
sail when the President advised him that he might wait over and
arrange affairs in Washington, leaving in time to get to the Isthmus
to take charge on the first of April.

When the announcement was made to the country that the work of
building the canal was to be put in the hands of the Army, the whole
country began to inquire: Who is Major Goethals? that inquiry revealed
the fact that he was a man who had accomplished much in his 49 years.
Born in 1858, of Dutch parents, whose ancestors had settled in New
York when it was still New Amsterdam, he was appointed to the United
States Military Academy at West Point where he was graduated in the
class of 1880 with such honors that he was entitled to enter the
Engineer Corps of the Regular Army.

In 1891 he rose to the rank of captain, and in 1898 became lieutenant
colonel and chief engineer of the First Volunteer Army Corps in Cuba.
On the last day of that year he was honorably discharged from the
volunteer service, and, in 1900, became a major in the Engineer Corps
of the Regular Army. For a number of years prior to 1898 he had been
instructor in civil and military engineering at West Point. He had
been in charge of the Mussel Shoals canal construction on the
Tennessee River, a work which won praise from engineers both in civil
and in military life. It was in a measure his record made on the
Tennessee River work that led to his appointment as chairman and chief
engineer of the Isthmian Canal.

When he took charge of the work at Panama he was promoted to
lieutenant colonel. Arriving there he immediately informed all hands
that while the work of building the canal had been placed under Army
engineers, no man who was then on the job and faithfully executing his
work need fear anything from that administration. From that time down
to the last stages of the work that statement held good. Trained at
West Point, brought up in the atmosphere of the Army, a lover of its
traditions and in full sympathy with its spirit, he laid aside
everything that might handicap the success of the undertaking and
sought at once to get the full benefit of all that was best in the
Army and in civil life as well. He put his uniform in moth balls when
he started to the Isthmus, and from that day to this no man has ever
seen him on the Canal Zone wearing an Army uniform.

When he took charge of the big job, the foundations upon which he was
to build the superstructure of his success had been laid by his
predecessors, but there were many weak points in these foundations as
well as many strong ones. With a spirit of utilizing to the fullest
extent every advantage that the administrations of the former chief
engineers had left on the Isthmus, he undertook to make only such
changes as time demonstrated were necessary to the success of the
project. At that time 6,000,000 cubic yards of material had been
removed from the big waterway. Confronting him was the task of
removing some 215,000,000 yards the while building a great dam
containing 21,000,000 cubic yards, constructing a series of gigantic
locks containing four and a half million cubic yards of concrete, and
providing for the happiness and welfare of the sixty-odd thousand
people who constituted the canal army and its camp followers.

In the years that followed his appointment he proved himself in every
way worthy of his assignment as the managing director of the most
stupendous piece of work ever undertaken by man. Furthermore, he
established a claim to the title of the "Great Digger." No other man
in the history of the world has ever superintended the excavation of
an amount of earth half as great as that which has been taken out of
the Panama Canal during his administration. Since he went to the canal
to "make the dirt fly" the material excavated under his command,
together with that placed in the locks and dams, equals the amount
necessary to take out to cut a tunnel 13 feet square through the earth
at the Equator.

No man ever carried to a great position less fuss and feathers than
Colonel Goethals took to his work as chairman and chief engineer of
the Panama Canal. When, during the construction period, one visited
his office at Culebra, on almost any afternoon, he would find there an
unpretentious little room in the corner of the administration
building, about 18 feet square, containing four windows, overlooking
the cut from two sides, its painted walls hung with maps, its floors
uncarpeted, and in the center a large double-sided, flat-top desk
covered with papers. A swivel chair at the desk and two or three other
chairs constituted the furnishings of this room. The visitor walked
directly into the office of his private secretary and the chief clerk,
and if he had anything worth while about which to see the chairman and
chief engineer he was detained only long enough for the man ahead of
him to get out. With "no time like the present" as his motto in
handling the business of his office, he, the busiest man on the
Isthmus, and one of the busiest in the world for that matter, always
seemed to have more time than many men of lesser responsibilities and
far fewer burdens. He once declared that he had a contempt for the man
who always tried to make it appear that he was too busy to see his
callers, because his callers were frequently as busy as he himself.

The fact is that he is a man with a very unusual gift in the dispatch
of work. System has been the key-note of his success. With thousands
of details every day to look after, he has always kept his work so
well in hand that to the casual observer he seemed to be the most
leisurely man on the Isthmus. He maintained a well-established routine
all through his career on the canal. His mornings usually were spent
going over the work. When the morning trains passed Culebra at 7
o'clock they found him up, breakfasted, and at the station.

Although these trains carried parlor cars, one would seldom see the
chairman and chief engineer riding in them. Rather, he consistently
chose to ride in the ordinary day coaches with his sub-engineers, with
the steam-shovel men, and with the rank and file of the Americans who
made possible the success of the work at Panama. There were few of
these Americans whom he did not know by name, and with whom he did not
pass a pleasant word whenever he chanced to meet them.

A morning trip over the work with this presiding genius of the big
ditch reveals perhaps better than anything else the makeup of the man
and the secret of his success.

"Meet me on the early train to-morrow morning at Miraflores," said he
to one of his visitors in the early summer of 1913, "and we will go
over the Pacific end of the work."

This meant that both the chief engineer and the visitor had to leave
comfortable beds at 5 o'clock in the morning to keep the appointment.
At 7 o'clock they met at Miraflores. "We will walk through the tunnel
if you don't mind," said he, "as I don't want to hold up a dirt train
if it can be avoided."

At the other end of the railroad tunnel, the only one on the Isthmus,
a railway motor car stood on the siding ready to pick up the
distinguished engineer and carry him to the Miraflores Locks. This
motor car is something like a limousine on railroad trucks, and was
affectionately known by the people on the Isthmus, as "the yellow
peril" and "the brain wagon." The first stop was at the concrete work
on the spillway dam at Miraflores.

"How soon do you expect to have this dam up to its full height?" he
asked of the division engineer who joined him there. "Can't you find
room to operate another temporary concrete mixer down there?" he
queried further. "Is there anything else you need to keep the work
moving forward so as to be certain to complete the dam by the time you
promised?"

Going a little farther he came to a place where one division was doing
some work for another division. "Don't you think it would be more
satisfactory to keep both parts of that work under one division? Why
don't you allow it all to be done by the other people?"

Walking across the locks on the temporary bridge the chief engineer
and his assistant came to a point where the concrete lamp posts for
lighting the locks were being set up. "Don't you think that it would
better avoid any settling if you were to place beams of railroad iron
across those spaces and rest the posts on them?" he queried.

A little farther on he met the engineer in charge of the work of the
company erecting the gates. "When do you think you will have the gates
in the west chambers completed so that we can put the dredge through?"
he inquired of Mr. Wright.

"Well, sir," replied Mr. Wright, "if we have good luck I hope to have
them done by the first of September; if we have fair luck we ought to
have them completed by the middle of September; but at the lowest
calculation I can promise them to you by the first of October."

"But have you taken into consideration all of the time you are likely
to lose as the result of heavy rains?" queried the chief engineer.

"I have made full allowance therefor, I think," responded Mr. Wright.

Walking on, the watchful eye of the chief engineer fell upon a new
baby railway track which was being laid through the eastern lock
chambers. "What are you planning to do there?" he asked of the
division engineer.

"We wanted to get some additional material through the locks and Mr.
Wright informed us that if we would furnish the timbers, he would make
it so that we could run these little engines through there," responded
the engineer.

"But did you have a definite understanding with him that this should
afford no excuse for any further delay in completing the gates?"
queried Colonel Goethals.

"We did, sir," responded the division engineer.

"All right then, go ahead."

At this point the party boarded the motor car again and was taken to
the big dike which was to hold the Pacific Ocean from flooding the
locks after a dike a mile farther down had been blown out. "How much
water do you have in the stretch between the two dikes?" he asked of
the division engineer. He next wanted to know how many million cubic
feet they were able to pump and siphon in, and how much the Rio Grande
was bringing in per day. Then he wanted to know if every possible
precaution had been taken to insure the watertightness of the new
dike; how many thousand pounds of dynamite had been placed under the
one to be blown up; how many holes this dynamite was placed in; and a
large number of other bits of information which would tell him whether
every safeguard had been thrown around the plan to insure its success.

Going up on the other side of the canal the party came to the earth
dam joining the west lock walls with the hills, so as to impound 58
feet of water in Miraflores Lake. "How soon do you expect to get that
connection made between the lock walls and the dam proper?" he queried
of the engineer in immediate charge.

"In four weeks, sir."

"All right," answered Colonel Goethals, "you can't get that done any
too soon to suit me."

And so he went over the work around Miraflores from beginning to end,
talking now with an Irishman in charge of dumping the material on the
inside of the dam, now with a man in charge of some concrete work,
and now with the division engineer himself. By 11 o'clock he had
inspected every part of this division and was ready to take his car
back to Culebra. In four hours he had seen every man responsible for
any important work around Miraflores; had offered a suggestion there,
a word of encouragement here, and had obtained a bit of information at
another place.

Each day's morning program was like this one except as to the place he
visited and the people with whom he talked. One morning he might be
tramping over Cucaracha Slide, studying the prospects of its future.
Another morning he might be down at Gatun watching an official test of
an emergency dam. On these trips he usually wore either a most
unmilitary-looking blue serge or gray cheviot, with a somewhat
weather-beaten sailor straw hat, and carried a cheap dollar umbrella.

When Colonel Goethals went to the Isthmus he promised that every man
with a grievance should have a hearing. Each Sunday morning he had at
his office at Culebra what he termed his Sunday "at homes," the best
attended functions on the Isthmus, where the blackest Jamaica negro on
the job found as much of a welcome as the highest official. These
functions were for the purpose of hearing the canal employees who had
grievances. Once a visitor was congratulating him upon the smooth
manner in which the canal-building machine seemed to be working. "You
ought to attend one of my Sunday 'at homes,'" he replied. "You would
think that there was no smoothness at all to its running."

Here is the wife of one of the engineers: She wants to find out why it
is that she cannot get bread from the Ancon Hospital bakery. She
informs Colonel Goethals that Joseph B. Bishop, secretary of the
commission, gets bread from the hospital bakery and wants to know why
she cannot. "I will look into the matter for you," says the chief
engineer, and a note of this complaint is made. Later the telephone
bell rings and Mr. Bishop is asked if he gets bread at the hospital
bakery. He replies in the affirmative, explaining that about three
years ago he had breakfasted with Colonel Gorgas who arranged for him
to buy his bread there instead of at the commissary, this bread being
more to his liking. "Can't any other employee of the Canal Commission
get bread there under the same terms?" queries the chief engineer. "I
will see, sir," responds the secretary of the commission. "If they can
not," answers the chief engineer, "you must have your bread stopped at
once." And it was stopped.

The next person received is the representative of the Kangaroos, a
fraternal order. "The Spanish American War veterans get free
transportation on a special train on Memorial Day," he is informed,
"and the fraternal orders on the Zone are crowded out." "Let a
committee of all the fraternal orders appear next Sunday and talk it
over with me and we will see what we can do," responds the chief
engineer.

Here comes a negro who says that his boss is a tyrant and abuses his
men: "I will look into that," responds the presiding genius of the
canal, and the Jamaican goes away with an expansive smile on his
face.

And so it went. Small affairs, big affairs, and indifferent ones were
brought to his attention. In perhaps 80 per cent of them he could not
do what was requested, but when able he did it so promptly, and in
such a positive, straightforward manner, that his "at homes" have been
compared, by the French ambassador to the United States, to the court
of justice held by Saint Louis beneath the oak at Vincennes.

A railroad engineer on one of the dirt trains got drunk and ran over a
negro. He was sent to the penitentiary. The railroad men issued an
ultimatum saying that if he were not released by a certain hour on a
certain day, every dirt train on the canal would stop. A committee
conveyed this ultimatum to Colonel Goethals and asked his decision.
"You will get it at the penitentiary," he replied. "This man will
remain in prison and every man who quits work on that account will be
dropped from the rolls." There was no strike of engineers.

At another time the waiters at the Tivoli Hotel went on strike. The
whole force was promptly discharged, and the official paper of the
Canal Commission carried their names with the announcement that
thereafter they would not be eligible to employment in any capacity on
the Canal Zone.

If the chairman and chief engineer of the canal is just and firm in
his relations with his men, he is no less generous in giving credit
where credit belongs. Upon one occasion he was talking about the
success of the canal project with a friend, and declared that the
world would never give to John F. Stevens the credit that was due him
in the construction of the canal. "You know," said he, "the real
problem of building this canal has been that of removing the spoil;
that problem was preeminently the problem of a railroad man and to
solve it demanded the services of one of the best men in the railroad
business. We have extended the facilities laid out by Mr. Stevens, and
have modified them as experience and conditions have demanded, but
they have been operated from that day to this under the general plan
of transportation laid out by Mr. Stevens. I do not think that any
Army engineer in the United States could have laid out such excellent
transportation facilities."

At another time, in discussing this same matter, he declared that it
was his firm opinion that the canal could have been built by either of
the former chief engineers, John F. Wallace or John F. Stevens, if
they had been allowed a free hand. "You see," said he, "they were men
who were accustomed to handling big construction jobs. They would
outline their project and the cost of executing it to a board of
directors who would pass upon it and then leave them absolutely
unhampered in the matter of personnel and method, with results as the
only criterion of their success. When they came to the Isthmus they
found their hands tied by red tape. They had never dealt with a
President, a Secretary of War, a Congress, and the public at large.
Naturally, they grew restive under the conditions which confronted
them and resigned.

"The whole difference is largely that of training. The Army officer
knows from the time he leaves West Point that he has to work in
harmony with his superiors, with the President, the Secretary of War,
and Congress. That is why we have been able to stay where men from
civil life have thrown up the job."

Another remarkable characteristic of the Great Digger is his desire to
do his work economically as well as to do it promptly. When he went to
the Isthmus there was an insistent demand that the dirt be made to
fly. Along with the administration in Washington he realized that the
only way to gain the faith and confidence of the people in the work, a
faith and confidence essential to its full success, was to measure up
to their desire that the dirt begin to fly. It was not a time to
consider economies then. But, as soon as those demands had been met
and the people had been shown that the Army could make good, a
cost-keeping system was introduced. Men doing identical work were
pitted against one another; Army engineers were placed in command of
one task here and civilian engineers in command of another task there;
and thus a healthy rivalry was established.

As Colonel Gaillard, member of the commission, and engineer of the
Central Division, testified before a congressional committee, his
early work in Culebra Cut was to get out as much dirt as possible,
while his later work was given over largely to a study and comparison
of cost sheets with a view to cutting down the expense of removing a
yard of material, with the result that he was able to show a saving of
$17,000,000 in a 9-mile section of the Panama Canal as compared with
the estimates of 1908.

In other words, Colonel Goethals took that golden rule of all great
soldiers, "get there first with the most men," and adapted it to read
"dig the most dirt with the least money." He had ever in mind three
things: Safe construction, rapid progress, and low costs. On these
three foundation stones in his mind was reared the structure that
stands as the highest example of engineering science, and as the
proudest constructive accomplishment of the American Republic.

At the northern entrance to the Suez Canal stands a statue of de
Lesseps, a beckoning hand inviting the shipping of the world to go
through. Perhaps no such statue of Goethals ever will stand at Panama,
but there is no need. The canal itself is his monument and its story
will ever endure.




CHAPTER XI

THE ORGANIZATION


When the United States finally decided to build the Panama Canal, the
next question of gravity which pressed for consideration was the
creation of the organization by which it was to be built. Many
problems were encountered, and after repeated changes in personnel and
rearrangements of duties, the situation finally resolved into an
organization headed by one man, clothed with the necessary powers, and
held responsible for the consequent results.

The completion of the preliminaries for the acquisition of title to
the Canal Zone and to the property and rights of the New Panama Canal
Company took place when Congress, on April 28, 1904, made an
appropriation of $10,000,000, which was to be paid to the Republic of
Panama. Six days later the United States formally took possession of
the Canal Zone and of the property of the Panama Canal Company, when
at 7:30 o'clock in the morning, Lieut. Mark Brooke, of the United
States Army, took over the keys and raised the American flag. The
following day President Roosevelt announced the appointment of John
Findley Wallace, of Massachusetts, as chief engineer of the canal at a
salary of $25,000 a year, the appointment to be effective on the 1st
day of June.

The first ship to arrive at Panama carried Maj. Gen. George W. Davis,
who was to govern the Canal Zone; Col. William C. Gorgas, who was to
make it sanitary; and George R. Shanton, who was to drive out the
criminal element. Governor Davis was a member of the Isthmian Canal
Commission, Colonel Gorgas had proved his worth in the sanitation of
Cuba, and Shanton had been a "rough rider" with Colonel Roosevelt in
the Cuban campaign.

When Chief Engineer Wallace arrived on the scene he found there an all
but abandoned project. There were hundreds of French houses, but
nearly all of them were in the jungle and practically unfit for human
habitation. He found millions of dollars' worth of French machinery,
but almost none of it in condition to be put into service immediately.
He knew in a general way the line of the canal, but surveys were
lacking to determine its exact location at every point. With this
situation in front of him, he found it necessary to concentrate his
efforts upon the problem of getting ready for the work. While he was
doing this the people at home began to demand that the dirt fly.
Colonel Gorgas also found conditions which challenged his best
efforts. Colon was a paradise of disease, Panama was no better. It was
only by making both of these cities over again, from a sanitary
standpoint, that any hope could be held out for reasonably healthy
conditions.

During his stay on the Isthmus Mr. Wallace found himself handicapped
at every turn by red tape, a new thing in his experience as a
construction engineer. He could buy nothing without asking for bids;
every idea he sought to put into execution had to be submitted to
Washington, and he found himself so harassed and handicapped that he
wanted a new plan of organization.

Acting in accordance with his recommendations, President Roosevelt
decided to accept the resignation of the existing Canal Commission,
and to appoint a new one, in which, instead of having independent
departments, with the governor independent of the chief engineer, and
the chief sanitary officer independent of both the governor and the
chief engineer, there should be a more united relation, in which all
questions were to be decided by the commission as a whole, the final
authority being vested in an executive committee composed of the
chairman, the governor of the Canal Zone, and the chief engineer.

Under this plan, the second Isthmian Canal Commission was organized.
It consisted of Theodore P. Shonts, chairman; Charles E. Magoon,
Governor of the Canal Zone; John F. Wallace, chief engineer; Mordecai
T. Endicott; Peter C. Hains; Oswald H. Ernst; and Benjamin A. Harrod.
Following the suggestion of Chief Engineer Wallace, the control of the
Panama Railroad was also vested in the new commission.

While these changes were being made Chief Engineer Wallace was in
Washington. There was dissatisfaction on the Isthmus with an
accompanying spirit of unrest, and, to make matters worse, a
yellow-fever epidemic broke out. Only a few days after Mr. Wallace
reached the Isthmus, he cabled the Secretary of War that he wished to
return to Washington, hinting that he might resign. Secretary Taft
cabled to Governor Magoon for an opinion as to the motives which were
behind this step on the part of Mr. Wallace, and was advised that it
was brought about by the offer of a better salary and the fear of the
yellow-fever epidemic. When Mr. Wallace reached New York he had a
stormy interview with Secretary Taft, who roundly denounced him for
quitting at such a critical time. Mr. Wallace declared his lack of
confidence in the ability of Colonel Gorgas to control the
yellow-fever epidemic, and asserted that the continual interference of
red tape was so distracting to him as to make new employment
attractive. President Roosevelt upheld his Secretary of War in his
denunciation of Mr. Wallace, and promptly appointed John F. Stevens
chief engineer at a salary of $30,000.

John F. Stevens arrived on the Isthmus on July 27, 1905. He found the
Panama Railroad almost in a state of collapse. He declared that the
only claim heard for it was that there had been no collisions for some
time. "A collision has its good points as well as its bad ones," he
observed, "for it indicates that there is something moving on the
railroad."

Mr. Stevens immediately set to work to build up the road, and to
provide the means for housing and feeding the canal army. But like his
predecessor he found Government red tape hampering, and in his first
annual report begged for "a thorough business administration
unhampered by any tendency to technicalities, into which our public
work sometimes drifts." He protested against civil-service
requirements on the Isthmus, and against the eight-hour working day;
and President Roosevelt met his protests by exempting all employees
except clerks from the operations of civil-service rules, and by
abrogating the eight-hour day.

It was under the régime of Mr. Stevens that the question arose as to
whether the canal should be built as a sea-level channel through the
Isthmus, or as a lock canal with the water in the middle section 85
feet above the level of the sea. President Roosevelt thereupon
appointed a board of consulting engineers, made up of 14 members, to
visit the Isthmus and determine what type of canal should be built.
Five members of this board of consulting engineers were foreigners
appointed by their respective Governments at the request of President
Roosevelt. They included the inspector general of Public Works of
France, the consulting engineer of the Suez Canal, the chief engineer
of the Manchester Canal, the chief engineer of the Kiel Canal, and the
chief engineer of the Dutch dike system. Three of the American
engineers and all five of the foreign engineers voted in favor of a
sea-level canal. Chief Engineer Stevens and all but one member of the
Isthmian Canal Commission concurred in the vote of the minority, made
up wholly of American engineers in favor of the lock canal. President
Roosevelt sustained the minority report, and Congress sustained him in
the law of June 29, 1906.

In the fall of 1906 Chairman Shonts came out in advocacy of a plan to
build the canal by contract. Here arose a difference between Mr.
Shonts and Mr. Stevens, and Chairman Shonts shortly thereafter
resigned. A few months later Chief Engineer Stevens also resigned. It
is said that his resignation was mainly due to his objection to the
appointment of Army engineers as members of the Canal Commission, and
to a letter he wrote the President in which he scored the limitations
of red tape and Government methods generally. When Mr. Stevens quitted
the Isthmus he left behind him the nucleus of the general organization
for building of the canal. He saw housing conditions brought up to the
required standard, established the necessary commissary where canal
employees could supply their needs at reasonable prices, and aided
Colonel Gorgas in his fight to make the Isthmus healthful.

At this juncture the organization destined to build the canal was put
into effect, with Colonel George W. Goethals at its head. Colonel
Gorgas, the chief sanitary officer, was the only important official of
the old régime held over. The other members of the commission were
Maj. D. D. Gaillard and Maj. William L. Sibert, of the United States
Engineer Corps; Civil Engineer H. H. Rousseau, of the United States
Navy; and Messrs. J. C. S. Blackburn and Jackson Smith.

[Illustration: MAJ. GEN. GEORGE W. DAVIS REAR ADMIRAL J. G. WALKER

THEODORE P. SHONTS JOHN F. WALLACE

JOHN F. STEVENS CHARLES E. MAGOON]

[Illustration: RICHARD LEE METCALFE EMORY R. JOHNSON

MAURICE H. THATCHER JOSEPH BUCKLIN BISHOP

H. A. GUDGER JOSEPH C. S. BLACKBURN]

Under former commissions the Governor of the Canal Zone had ranked
above the chief engineer, and the chairman, the chief engineer, and
the governor had had rival powers, which resulted in a great deal of
friction. Under the new order the offices of chairman and chief
engineer were consolidated, and the governor was reduced to the title
of "head of the Department of Civil Administration," reporting to the
chairman, as did the chief sanitary officer and all of the division
engineers.

This commission, in personnel, remained intact during the long period
of construction, except for the resignation in 1908 of Jackson Smith,
who was succeeded by Lieut. Col. Harry F. Hodges; and for the
resignation in 1910 of Mr. Blackburn, who was succeeded by Morris H.
Thatcher. Mr. Thatcher, in turn, was succeeded in 1913 by Richard L.
Metcalfe as head of the Department of Civil Administration.

During the construction period there were several rearrangements of
the duties of the Army engineers associated with Colonel Goethals.
From June, 1908, Major Gaillard, afterwards promoted to a
lieutenant-colonelcy, was in charge of the ditch-digging work between
Gatun and Pedro Miguel, which included the entire Gatun Lake and
Culebra Cut sections. It is everywhere admitted that so far as
difficulties were concerned, he had the hardest job on the Isthmus,
next to the chief engineer. Colonel Gaillard entered the United States
Military Academy in 1884 and was graduated with honors entitling him
to appointment in the Corps of Engineers. Before being selected as a
member of the Canal Commission, he had had much experience in
important work. For two years he was in charge of all river and harbor
improvement in the Lake Superior region. When he first went to the
Isthmus he was assigned as the supervising engineer in charge of
harbors, the building of breakwaters, etc.

Lieut. Col. William L. Sibert, another of the Army engineers who was
made a member of the Canal Commission, was graduated from West Point
in 1884 and was made a lieutenant of engineers. From 1892 to 1894 he
was assistant engineer in charge of the construction of the ship
channel connecting the Great Lakes. The four years following he was in
charge of the river and harbor work in Arkansas, and following that,
spent one year teaching civil engineering in the Engineering School of
Application. He then went to the Philippines as chief engineer of the
Eighth Army Corps and became chief engineer and general manager of the
Manila & Dagupan Railroad. From 1900 to 1907 he was in charge of the
Ohio River improvements between Pittsburgh and Louisville. As division
engineer of the Atlantic division of the Panama Canal he was in charge
of the construction of the Gatun locks, Gatun Dam, and the breakwaters
at the Atlantic entrance to the canal.

Civil Engineer Harry H. Rousseau, of the United States Navy, was
appointed a member of the Isthmian Canal Commission at the same time
that Chief Engineer Goethals was selected to head the organization. He
had had much experience in engineering work prior to the appointment
and was a personal appointee of President Roosevelt, with whom he had
come in contact when he was serving in the Bureau of Yards and Docks
of the Navy Department when Mr. Roosevelt was assistant secretary of
that Department. He entered the employ of the United States through
the civil service, having been appointed a civil engineer in the Navy
with the rank of lieutenant, after a competitive examination in 1898.
For four years he was an engineer of the bureau of which he
afterwards became chief, and for four years following, from 1903 to
1907, he was engineer of the improvements of Mare Island Navy Yard,
California. The duties of Commissioner Rousseau were changed from time
to time, and he was finally given charge of the work of constructing
the terminals at the ends of the canal. At the same time he was made
assistant to the chief engineer, having charge of all mechanical
questions arising on the canal.

When Jackson Smith, one of the two civilian members of the Canal
Commission, resigned, he was succeeded by an Army officer, Col. Harry
F. Hodges, who would have been a member of the commission from the
first, upon the request of Colonel Goethals, had not the United States
Engineer Corps required his services. Colonel Hodges was graduated
from the United States Military Academy in 1881, and immediately
entered upon seven years of duty on river and harbor improvements in
the United States. This was followed by four years' service as
assistant professor of engineering at West Point, and that duty, in
turn, by six years of work on rivers and harbors and fortifications.
During the Spanish American War he served in Porto Rico, and then
returned to river and harbor duty for two years. In 1901-02 he was
chief engineer of the Department of Cuba, from which duty he was
transferred to the War Department, where he became assistant to the
chief of engineers. His experience in river and harbor work, coupled
with his success as the designer of the locks of the American Sault
Ste. Marie Canal, fitted him for the work at Panama. He became
assistant chief engineer and purchasing agent of the canal in 1907,
and the following year was chosen a member of the commission to
succeed Mr. Smith. The work of designing the locks and the lock
machinery fell upon his shoulders.

When President Roosevelt wanted a man to handle the delicate problems
arising out of the peculiar relations with the Republic of Panama and
the United States, he selected Joseph C. S. Blackburn, of Kentucky,
who had just finished a long term of service in the United States
Senate. Senator Blackburn was well equipped for such a position,
combining that suavity indicated by the velvet glove with that
determination of purpose which lies in the iron hand.

The service of Col. William C. Gorgas, the chief sanitary officer on
the Isthmus, began earlier than that of any of the higher officials.
He went to the Isthmus immediately after it was taken over by the
United States. He has been described as a man "with a gentle manner,
but with a hard policy toward the mosquito." He was born in Mobile,
Ala., in 1854, the son of Gen. Josiah Gorgas, of the Confederate Army.
He became a member of the Medical Corps of the United States Army in
1880, and since his work at the head of the Cuban health campaign his
name has been a household word in the United States.

In establishing the Isthmian Canal Commission, which was destined to
make the Panama Canal a reality, President Roosevelt selected Joseph
Bucklin Bishop as its secretary. Mr. Bishop was made the editor of the
Canal Record, a weekly paper which was the official organ of the
Canal Commission. He is a born investigator and when any matter arose
concerning the work on the canal, about which the chief engineer
desired an impartial report, he usually referred it to Mr. Bishop.

When the matter of organizing the work arose it was decided to arouse
a spirit of emulation and rivalry, and S. B. Williamson, a civilian
engineer, was put in charge of the Pacific end of the canal, with
duties similar to those of the Army engineer on the Atlantic side. Mr.
Williamson proved to be a master of the art of accomplishing a great
deal with a given amount of money, and the cost sheets of the Pacific
end will ever stand as a monument to his efficiency.

The list of engineers and other officials who contributed to the
success of the work at Panama is a long one, but among them may be
mentioned: Col. Chester Harding, who was the resident engineer at
Gatun; W. G. Comber, who headed the dredging work on the Pacific end
of the canal during the early days of the American undertaking, of the
entire canal during the final stages; W. G. Rourke, who was resident
engineer in Culebra Cut for a number of years; Caleb M. Saville, who
worked out the data for the construction of the Gatun Dam; H. O. Cole,
who succeeded S. B. Williamson on the Pacific end work; Lieut.
Frederick Mears, who relocated the Panama Railroad; John Burke, who
had charge of the commissary; Maj. Eugene T. Wilson, the chief
subsistence officer; Brig. Gen. C. A. Devol, who was in charge of the
quartermaster's department; E. J. Williams, Jr., the disbursing
officer; and Col. Tom F. Cook, the picturesque chief of the Division
of Posts and Customs.

To all these, and to scores of others who are not mentioned here
merely because of the limitations of space, the American people owe
the great success at Panama. The organization was imbued with a spirit
of loyalty to the great task, and having its accomplishment singly in
mind there was little room for jealous bickerings and none at all for
scandal and corruption.

Every man who had a part in it always will be proud of his share, and
that pride will be supported and justified by all Americans.




CHAPTER XII

THE AMERICAN WORKERS


The directory, supervisory, and mechanical work in constructing the
canal was done by Americans. The engineers, the foremen, the steam
shovelers, the operators of spoil trains, the concrete mixers, and, in
short, the skilled workers were American citizens; the common and
unskilled laborers were West Indians and Europeans. It is to the
American workers therefore that the credit is due, for without their
direction and aid in every operation the work could not have been
done.

Never was there a more loyal, a more earnest, a more enthusiastic band
of workmen than these same Americans. The steam shoveler felt as much
pride, as much responsibility, in the task as did the chief engineer.

The difficulties under which they labored, the enervating climate, the
absence from home, the lack of diversion and recreation, but served to
temper the steel in their make-up. The American spirit was there,
dominating every detail of the whole big job. Every man was determined
to "make good," not for himself alone, but for the organization of
which he was a part, and for his country.

In the beginning conditions were bad. There were few conveniences to
make life comfortable, and innumerable inconveniences harassing those
who went there. The food was bad and the water was not as good as the
food. The quarters were old French houses rescued from the jungle and
filled with scorpions.

The result was that few of those who first went to the Isthmus
remained, and those who returned to the United States spread far and
wide reports of bad conditions on the Isthmus.

With this situation in mind the Canal Commission decided that two
things had to be done. Wholesome living conditions had to be created
for the people who came to the Isthmus, and a standard of wages had to
be set that would prove attractive to good men at home. It was thus
that the pay for the Americans on the canal came to be placed at 50
per cent higher than pay for the same character of work in the States.
This soon proved a strong incentive to men to leave the States and go
to Panama, and as living conditions were improved the number of men
willing to accept work on the Isthmus increased.

Two classes of Americans turned their faces toward the Tropics as a
result of the inducements held out by the Canal Commission. One was
made up of those who were willing to go and stay a year or two,
accumulating in that time experience and, perhaps, saving some little
money; the other was made up of men whose desire was to go to the
Isthmus and stay with the job, utilizing the opportunities it afforded
for building up a comfortable bank account.

[Illustration: BRIG. GEN. CARROLL A. DEVOL

AMERICAN LIVING QUARTERS AT CRISTOBAL]

[Illustration: HARRY H. ROUSSEAU

LOWERING A CAISSON SECTION]

As the work moved forward those of weak purpose and indifference to
opportunity gradually dropped out. Their places were taken by others,
until through a process of years of elimination there were
approximately 5,000 Americans at Panama when the canal was finished;
an army was made up almost wholly of men with a purpose in life and
consequently of men who could be relied upon to do their work to the
best of their ability. The result was that the last years of the task
of construction saw every man loyal to his work and anxious to see the
job move forward.

American visitors to the Isthmus had occasion to be proud of their
countrymen there. Every tourist from a foreign country has commented
upon the distinguished courtesy received at the hands of these men.
One of them, perhaps England's most noted travel lecturer, said:

"The thing which impressed me more than anything else, outside of the
gigantic work and the masterful way in which it is being done, was the
exquisite courtesy of every American I met during my stay. I found
every one of them not only ready to give such information as he might
have but glad to do so. Each man was as proud of the work as if it
were his own, and as ready to show his part of it to a stranger as if
that stranger were his best friend. It was a delight to me from
beginning to end to see the magnificent type of American manhood at
work, and the pride taken by every worker in the project."

Every other tourist brought away the same impression. A man who went
there without any other credentials than a desire to see the work was
shown the same courtesy and consideration as one with a pocketful of
letters of introduction.

The Americans on the Isthmus did not count any hardship too great if
it were demanded for the successful prosecution of the work. A case in
point is that of J. A. Loulan, the engineer in charge of the
rock-crushing plant at Ancon. One morning he was introduced to a
visitor from the States who remarked that everything seemed to be
running so smoothly that he supposed the work of a supervising
engineer was no longer a difficult task. "Well," replied the engineer,
"at least it does not pay to worry. Last night at 2 o'clock I was
called out of bed by telephone and informed that a Jamaican negro
hostler had accidentally knocked the chock from under the wheels of an
engine he was firing up, and that it had run down the grade and off
the end of the track into about two feet of soft earth. We worked from
that time on until breakfast to get the engine back, and were
satisfied to know that the accident did not delay the operations at
the crusher. Not a man of the force was late getting back to work
after four hours of strenuous extra night duty."

Speaking of the patience of the men Commissioner H. H. Rousseau said,
"The reason for all this is not far to seek; the man who has 'nerves'
would never stick it out on a job like this. The climate, the exile
from home, and the character of the work all conspire against the man
who can not be patient. He soon finds that the Isthmus is no place for
him. The result is that a process of elimination has gone on until the
men who have 'nerves' have all left and their places filled with
those who are stoical enough to take things as they come."

The Americans on the Isthmus were early risers. The first train from
Colon for Panama leaves about 5 o'clock and the first train from
Panama for Colon at 6:50. Almost any morning during the construction
period one might walk into the dining room at the Tivoli Hotel and see
a number of canal engineers breakfasting there who had left Colon on
the early train. When one of them was asked if he did not find it
something of a hardship to rise so early, he replied:

"Well, you see, from the standpoint of a man just from the States it
would seem rather an unheard-of hour for a man to get out and go to
work; but we have to meet conditions as we find them down here, and we
soon get reconciled to it. There is scarcely a night that I am not
called by telephone two or three times, and I have to get up in time
to catch the early train several mornings in the week, so I get up at
the same hour the other mornings as well. We are well paid, and we owe
it to our country to make whatever sacrifices the work demands. And
after a month or two we get out of the habit of feeling that it is a
sacrifice."

It is this spirit of devotion to the work that enabled the canal
authorities to press it to a successful completion with such
unprecedented rapidity. These men knew full well that their sacrifices
in the interest of progress were appreciated. The most rigid spirit of
friendly competition was maintained from the beginning.

The spirit of rivalry nowhere counted for more than among the
steam-shovel men. In 1907 it was decided to publish in the Canal
Record the best steam-shovel performances from week to week. This
immediately put every steam-shovel gang on its mettle, and soon there
was a great race with nearly a hundred entries, a race that continued
from that day until the completion of the excavation. The result was
that records of steam-shovel performances were made eclipsing
everything that had gone before. The average daily excavation per
shovel rose from year to year until it was double in the end what it
was in the beginning.

As heretofore pointed out, the process of elimination that went on
continuously during the construction work sent large numbers of
American workers back to the States from the Isthmus. During a single
year about three-fifths of the Americans threw up their jobs and
returned home. The average stay of Americans during the construction
period was about a year. Bachelors were much more given to returning
to the States than married men. The endless round of working, eating,
sleeping, with its small chance of diversion, made the average
bachelor glad to get back to the States within two years. On the other
hand, the married men found home life just about as pleasant as in the
States. They had with them about 2,000 women, and as many children.
Many of the latter were born under the American Eagle at Panama.

The boys who were born there may, if they choose, become native
Panamans. The son of a former President of Panama, in talking with
Commissioner Rousseau, advised him to make a Panaman citizen of
little Harry Harwood Rousseau, Jr. "You see," said he, and he spoke in
all earnestness and seriousness, "he will stand so much better chance
of becoming President of the Republic of Panama than of becoming
President of the United States."

The American children on the Zone, brimming over with life and health,
proved conclusively that the Tropics worked no hardship upon them.

The Canal Commission, from the beginning to the end, made the welfare
of the army of workers one of its first cares. As the days of a
completed canal approached, every effort was made to enable the
employees who had to be laid off to find employment in the States.
Provision was made that they could accumulate their leave of absence
in such a way as to entitle them to 84 days of full pay after leaving.
This was arranged so as to give them sufficient time to establish
connections in the States again, without being forced to do it without
pay.

Close records also were kept of each employee, and the official
immediately over each man was ordered to give him a rating card
showing his record on the Canal Zone. No higher credentials could be
carried by anyone seeking employment than to have a card from the
Canal Commission showing a rating of "Excellent."

Owing to the firmness with which the commission ruled, there was
little trouble in the way of strikes. In 1910 a lot of boiler makers
who were getting 65 cents an hour on the per diem basis, struck for 75
cents an hour. Their demands were not met and some of them threw up
their jobs. The commission immediately arranged with its Washington
office to fill their places, and they had no chance whatever to get
further employment on the Isthmus.

The commission was given the power, by President Roosevelt, to order
anyone to leave the Isthmus whose presence there was regarded as a
detriment to the work. The result was that as soon as any man was
found to be fomenting trouble, he was advised that a ship was
returning to the United States on a certain date and that it would be
expedient for him to take passage thereon. This power of deportation
was more autocratic than any like power in the United States, but it
proved of immense value in keeping things going satisfactorily at
Panama. It was a power whose exercise was called for but few times,
since the very fact that the commission had the power was usually a
sufficient deterrent.

There are two societies on the Isthmus which tell of the effects of
homesickness of the Americans in the employ of the Canal
Commission--the Incas, and the Society of the Chagres. The Incas are a
group of men who meet annually on May 4th for a dinner. The one
requirement for membership in this dining club is service on the canal
from the beginning of the American occupation. In 1913 about 60 men
were left on the Isthmus of all those Americans who were there at the
time of the transfer of the canal property to the United States in
1904.

The Society of the Chagres was organized in the fall of 1911. It is
made up of American white employees who have worked six years
continuously on the canal. When President Roosevelt visited the
Isthmus in the late fall of 1906 he declared that he intended to
provide some memorial or badge which would always distinguish the man
who for a certain space of time had done his work well on the Isthmus,
just as the button of the Grand Army distinguishes the man who did his
work well in the Civil War. Two years later a ton of copper, bronze,
and tin was taken from old French locomotives and excavators and
shipped to Philadelphia, where it was made into medals by the United
States Mint. These medals are about the size of a dollar and each
person who has served two years is entitled to one. It is estimated
that by the time the last work is done on the canal, about 6,000 of
these medals will have been distributed. For each additional two years
a man worked, the Canal Commission gave a bar of the same material.

The Society of the Chagres, therefore, is made up of men who have
served at least six years, and who have won their medals and two
service bars. The emblem of the society is a circular button showing
on a small, black background six horizontal bars in gold which are
surrounded by a narrow gold border. In 1913 only about 400 out of the
many thousands of Americans at one time or another employed in the
construction of the Panama Canal were entitled to wear the insignia of
this society.




CHAPTER XIII

THE NEGRO WORKERS


The West Indian negro contributed about 60 per cent of the brawn
required to build the Panama Canal. When the United States undertook
the work the West Indian negro had a bad reputation as a workman. It
was said that he lacked physical strength; that he had little or no
pluck; that he was absolutely unreliable; that he was unusually
susceptible to disease; and that in view of these things the canal
never could be finished if he were to supply the greater part of the
labor. But he lived down this bad reputation in large part, and,
although it must be admitted that he is shiftless always, inconstant
frequently, and exasperating as a rule, he developed into a good
workman.

The Government paid the West Indian laborer 90 cents a day, furnished
him with free lodgings in quarters, and sold him three square meals a
day for 9 cents each, a total of 27 cents a day for board and lodging.
On the balance of 63 cents, the West Indian negro who saved was able
to go back home and become a sort of Rockefeller among his
compatriots. His possible savings, as a matter of fact, were about two
and a half times the total wages he received in his native country.

But the sanitary quarters, and the necessarily strict discipline
maintained therein, did not please him. He yearned for his thatched
hut in the "bush," for his family, and the freedom of the tropical
world. Thus the homesickness of the well-quartered, well-fed negro
became a greater hindrance to the work than the ill-fed condition of
the "bush dweller." The result was that the commission reached the
conclusion that it could better maintain a suitable force by allowing
the negroes to live as they chose. Therefore, permission was given
them to live in the "bush," and about nine-tenths of them promptly
exchanged the sanitary restrictions of the commission quarters, and
the wholesome food of the commission mess kitchen, for the _dolce far
niente_ of the "bush." The result of this experiment in larger liberty
was in part a success and in part a failure. The list of names on the
roll of workers was largely lengthened, but there was no great
addition to the force of the men at work on any given day. It was a
common saying in the Zone that if the negro were paid twice as much he
would work only half as long. Most of them worked about four days a
week and enjoyed themselves the other three. It may be that the "bush
dweller" was not fed as scientifically as the man in the quarters, but
he had his chickens, his yam and bean patch, his family and his
fiddle, and he made up in enjoyment what he lost in scientific care.

Marriage bonds are loose in the West Indies, and common-law marriages
are the rule rather than the exception. But, as one traveled across
the Isthmus and saw the hundreds of little thatched huts lining the
edge of the jungle, he could see that the families who lived there
seemed to be as happy, and the children as numerous, as though both
civil and religious marriage ceremonies had bound man and wife
together.

When the Americans first began work it was an accepted dictum that one
Spaniard or one Italian could do as much work as three negroes. The
negroes seemed to be weak. It took six of them to carry a railroad tie
where two Spaniards might carry it as well. This belief that the
Spaniard was more efficient than the negro stirred the West Indians to
get down to work, and in a year or two they were almost as efficient
while they were working as were the Spaniards, but the Spaniards
worked six days a week while the negroes worked only four.

Of course there were those who spent practically everything as they
made it, and they constituted no small percentage of the total negro
force. But, on the other hand, some of the negroes were industrious,
constant, and thrifty. They saved all they could, working steadily for
a year or two, and then went back to Jamaica or Barbados to invest
their money in a bit of land and become freeholders and consequently
better citizens.

The negro laborers at first were obtained by recruiting agents at work
in the various West Indian Islands, principally Jamaica and Barbados.
The recruiting service carried about 30,000 to the Isthmus, of whom
20,000 were from Barbados and 6,000 from Jamaica. It was not more than
a year or two, however, after the work got under way, until there was
little occasion for recruiting. Every ship that went back to Barbados
or to Jamaica carried with it some who had made what they considered
a sufficient fortune. Every community possessed those who had gone to
Panama with only the clothes on their backs, a small tin trunk, a
dollar canvas steamer chair and, mayhap, a few chickens; and who had
come back with savings enough to set them up for life. This fired
dozens from each of those same communities with the desire to go and
do likewise. The result was that the canal employment lists were kept
full by those who came on their own initiative.

The terms of entrance to the Canal Zone were easy, the steerage fares
were low, and as a result the excess of arrivals over departures
sometimes amounted to 20,000 in a single year. The steamship companies
had to keep careful and persistent watch to prevent stowaways. Even at
that there were hundreds who sought to reach the Isthmus in this way
in spite of the fact that they were usually carried back without being
permitted to land at Colon.

There was little or no friction between the whites and the blacks on
the Canal Zone. This immunity from racial clashes resulted from two
causes--one was the incomparable courtesy of the West Indian negro and
the other his knowledge that he could expect good treatment only so
long as he kept out of trouble. Few of them, indeed, were ever
inclined to be offensive. They are usually educated in the three
"R's," and are also very polite. Ask one a question and the answer
will be: "Oh, yes, Sir," or "Oh, no, Sir," or if he has not
understood, "Beg pardon, Sir." He would no more omit the honorific
than a Japanese maiden addressing her father would forget to call him
"Honorable."

The different types of West Indian negroes found on the Canal Zone
constituted an endless study in human characteristics. They were all
great lovers of travel, and no regular train ever made a trip without
from two to half a dozen coaches filled with them. After pay day
practically every negro on the Zone was wont to get out and get a
glimpse of the country.

Without exception they are adepts in carrying things on their heads;
consequently, they usually possess an erect carriage and splendid
bearing. It is said that the first ambition of a West Indian negro
child is to learn to carry things on its head in imitation of its
parents. Frequently a negro will be seen with nothing in either hand,
but carrying a closed umbrella balanced horizontally on his head. Once
in a while one may be seen to get a letter from the post office, place
it on top of his head, weight it down with a stone, and march off
without any apparent knowledge that he has executed a circus stunt.

Some of the negroes who came to work on the canal never saw a
wheelbarrow before arriving there. Upon one occasion some French
negroes from Martinique were placed on a job of pick and shovel work.
Three of them loaded a wheelbarrow with earth, then one of them
stooped down, the other two put the wheelbarrow on his head and he
walked away with it. But, with all of his inexperience, the Martinique
negro proved to be the best West Indian worker on the canal.

The Martinique negroes were the most picturesque of all the West
Indians on the job. The women wore striking though simple costumes,
bandana handkerchiefs around their heads, and bright-colored calico
dresses usually caught up on one side or at the back, thus
anticipating the Parisian fashion of the slit skirt by many years.

A large number of the negroes lived in small tenement houses built by
private capital, and oftener than not one room served the entire
family. Nearly every one of the American settlements had its West
Indian quarter where these buildings and the Chinese stores flourished
to the exclusion of everything else. At the Pacific end of the Panama
Railroad there was a suburb known as Caledonia, which was given over
almost entirely to West Indian families. One could drive through there
any day and see half-grown children dressed only in Eden's garb. In
other parts of the canal territory one saw very few naked children
except in the back streets of Colon.

The Government took the best of care of the negroes on the work during
the entire construction period. There were hospital facilities at both
ends of the canal and sick camps along the line. The commissary
protected them against extortion by the native merchants and gave them
the same favorable rates enjoyed by the Americans. The color line was
kindly but firmly drawn throughout the work, the negroes being
designated as silver employees and the Americans as gold employees.
The post offices had signs indicating which entrances were for silver
employees and which for gold employees. The commissaries had the same
provisions, and the railroad company made the general distinction as
much as it could by first and second class passenger rates. Very few
of the negroes ever made any protest against this. Once in awhile an
American negro would go to the post office and be told that he must
call at the "silver" window. He would protest for awhile, but finding
it useless, would acquiesce.

The idea of speaking of "silver and gold employees," rather than black
and white employees, was originated by E. J. Williams, Jr., the
disbursing officer of the Canal Commission. He first put this
designation on the entrances to the pay car and it was immediately
adopted as the solution of the troubles growing out of the
intermingling of the races.

One of the most interesting experiences that could come to any visitor
to the Isthmus was a trip across the Zone on the pay car; to see 24
tons of silver and 1,600 pounds of gold paid out for a single month's
work; and to watch the 30,000 negroes, the 5,000 Americans, and the
3,000 or 4,000 Europeans on the job file through the pay car and get
their money. The negroes were usually a good-natured, grinning lot of
men and boys, but they were wont to get impatient, not with the amount
of money they drew but with its weight. Under an agreement with the
Panama Government the Canal Commission endeavored to keep the Panaman
silver money at par. Two dollars Panaman money was worth one dollar
American, and the employees were paid in Panaman coin. Thus a negro
who earned $22 during the month would get 44 of the "spiggoty"
dollars. These "spiggoty" dollars are the same size as our own silver
dollars and to carry them around was something of a task.

When the negroes were asked what they proposed to do with their money
the almost invariable reply was: "Put it to a good use, sir." American
money was always at a premium with them and the money-changers in the
various towns usually did a land-office business on pay day.

Paper money was not used on the pay car at all. In the first place,
there was always danger of its blowing away, and in the second place
paper money in the hands of negro workmen soon assumed a most
unsanitary condition. The negroes were always desirous of getting
American paper money because they could send it home more cheaply than
gold.

Large numbers of West Indian women, the majority of them with their
relatives, lived on the Zone during the construction period. They were
for the most part industrious and made very good household servants.
They were nearly always polite and deferential, some of them even
saying, "Please, Ma'am," when saying "Good morning."

It was a rare experience to travel on a ship carrying workers to the
Canal Zone from the Islands of the West Indies. Ships calling at
Kingston, Jamaica, would usually take on a hundred or more passengers.
They would be quartered either forward or aft on the main deck. They
would carry aboard with them all kinds of small packages. Some would
have small boxes of chickens or pigeons, and some little old
sawbuck-fashioned folding beds covered with canvas. As soon as
inspected by the doctor for trachoma each negro would select the most
favorable spot, gather his furniture around him, and settle down in
one place, there to remain almost without moving during the whole of
the 40-hour trip across the Caribbean. When the water was fine and the
sailing smooth the first cabin passengers might conclude that they
were carrying a negro camp meeting. On the other hand, if the weather
were bad and the sea rough, a sicker lot of people nowhere might be
found. One of the favorite negro preventives of seasickness is St.
Thomas bay rum applied liberally to the face, although to the
on-looker it never seems to prevent or cure a single case.

Before landing at Colon every one of these negroes had to be
vaccinated. Almost without exception they tried to prevent the virus
"taking" by rubbing the scarified spot with lime juice or with some
other preparation. Meals on board generally consisted of rice and
potatoes, and, perhaps, coffee and bread. One might see a dozen young
girls in a group eating with one hand and with the other polishing
their complexions with the half of a lime.

With all his faults--and they were not few--the West Indian negro
laborer probably was the best workman that could have been employed
for the job at Panama. He was usually as irresponsible, as carefree,
and yet as reliable a workman as our own American cottonfield hand. He
made a law-abiding citizen on the Zone, was tractable as a workman,
and pretty certain always to make a fair return to the United States
on the money it paid him in wages.

Under the firm but gentle guidance of the master American hand, he
did his work so well that he has forever erased from the record of his
kind certain charges of inefficiency and laziness that had long stood
as a black mark against him.

The Canal Commission so appreciated his good work that it made
arrangements to return him to his native country when his services no
longer were required, there to take up the life he led before he heard
the call of the "spiggoty" dollars that took him across the Caribbean.

He will miss the life on the Isthmus. He was worked harder, he was
treated better, and he was paid higher wages there than he ever will
be again in his life. Perhaps he has saved; if so, he retires to be a
nabob. Perhaps he has wasted; if so, he must go back to the
hand-to-mouth existence that he knew in the days before.

But after all, the experience of the thousands of West Indian negroes
employed on the canal will have a stimulating effect on their home
countries, and their general level of industrial and social conditions
will be raised.

At any rate, the American Republic always must stand indebted to these
easy-going, care-free black men who supplied the brawn to break the
giant back of Culebra.




CHAPTER XIV

THE COMMISSARY


To build the canal required the labor of some fifty thousand men. To
induce these men to go to Panama, to stay there, to work there, and to
work there efficiently, was no light undertaking. Health was promised
them by the most efficient sanitary organization that ever battled
with disease. Wealth was promised them, relatively speaking, in the
form of wages and salaries much higher than they could obtain at home
for the same work. But health and wealth, much desired and much prized
as they are, can not of themselves compensate for transplanting a man
to an alien shore and an alien atmosphere, especially if that shore be
tropic and that atmosphere hot. There must also be comfort.

And comfort was promised to the canal diggers by the commissary
department. Good food at prices cheaper than one pays in the United
States, and quarters of the best--these things the commissary held out
as a part of the rewards at Panama.

Of course this was not the chief object of the commissary
department--it was the incidental factor that in the end almost
obscured the main issue. The main business was so well done that
everybody took it for granted, just as no one will remark about the
sun shining although that is the most important fact we know. The main
business of the commissary was to keep the canal diggers fed and
housed so that they would have the strength for their tasks. How this
was done, how fresh beef and ice cream were made daily staples in
tropic Panama, how the canal army was fed, is a big story in itself.

The history of the French régime was such as to prejudice the whole
world against the canal region and to deter any but the most
adventurous spirit from entering there into a gamble with death. The
Americans soon found that without extraordinary inducements it would
be next to impossible to recruit a force able to build the canal.
Therefore it was determined to make the rewards so great that extra
dollars to be gained by going to Panama would outweigh the fears of
those who had any desire to go. It was decided to pay the employees of
the Canal Commission and the Panama Railroad Company wages and
salaries approximately one-half higher than those obtaining at home
for the same work. Furthermore, it was decided that the Government
should furnish free quarters, free medical service, free light, and
other items which enter into the expense budget of the average family.
It was found advisable to establish Government hotels, messes, and
kitchens, where the needs of every employee from the highest officer
to the most lowly negro laborer could be met, and to operate them at
cost.

Still another problem had to be faced; that of providing places where
the people employed in building the canal could escape from the high
prices fixed by the merchants of Panama and Colon. With this end in
view, a great department store, carrying upward of 5,000 different
articles, was built at Cristobal. This store established branches in
every settlement of canal workers where patrons could go to ship and
receive the benefit of prices much lower than those prevailing with
regular Panaman merchants.

Anyone who will study carefully the annual reports of the operation of
the commissary of the Panama Railroad Company, will realize what great
profits are made by the various middlemen in the United States who
handle food products between the producer and the consumer. In 1912
the commissary had gross sales amounting to $6,702,000, with purchases
amounting to $5,325,000. This represents a gross profit of 26 per
cent. The cost of transportation from New York and distribution on the
Isthmus, amounted to about 24 per cent, leaving a net profit of
approximately 2 per cent on the sales of goods. When it is remembered
that transportation of commissary products from New York amounted
approximately to a quarter of a million dollars a year, and that wagon
deliveries on the Isthmus added $50,000 a year to this, it will be
seen that the expenses of distribution at Panama were approximately on
the same footing with those in the United States.

In the case of dressed beef, one finds a most illuminating example of
how it is possible to sell the ordinary items of a family budget to
the consumer at rates much lower than those obtaining in the United
States. According to the most authentic information dressed beef laid
down at Panama costs more, quality for quality, than it costs the
ordinary retail butcher in the States. At one time in 1912 the
commissary was paying $11.94-1/4 a hundred pounds for whole dressed
beeves laid down in New York. This was for the best corn-fed western
steers, a grade of beef that is found only in the best retail butcher
shops of any American city. Yet, with the expense of ocean-refrigerator
carriage added, and with other operating costs equal to those of the
retail butcher in the States, the commissary found it possible to sell
to the consumer, delivered at his kitchen door, porterhouse steaks
from this beef at 20 cents, sirloin steaks and roasts at 19 cents, and
round steaks at 13 cents a pound. At this same time the average
American housewife was paying from 26 to 30 cents for porterhouse
steaks, from 22 to 26 cents for sirloin steaks and roasts, and from 17
to 22 cents for round steaks; and in the butcher shops in the United
States where grades of meat comparable to those at Panama were handled
the figures were usually around the top quotations.

One cannot escape asking the question how it is that if the Panama
Railroad commissary could pay approximately 12 cents a pound for
dressed beef at New York, deliver it in refrigeration at Cristobal,
thence to the housewife by train and wagon, and make a gross profit of
some 26 per cent by the operation, that the American retail butcher
can reasonably claim that at the price he sells his meat he is making
little or no net profit.

One finds the same scale of prices on other commodities at Panama as
meats. Only the very best goods are handled in the commissary. Any
reasonable need of any employee could be supplied by the commissary at
prices probably lower than a retail merchant in the United States
could buy the same commodities.

A few instances of how the commissary fared when its supply ran short
will serve to illustrate the grasping disposition of the average
Panaman merchant.

In one case high waters in the Chagres interrupted traffic on the
Panama Railroad, and the price of ice in Panama City promptly jumped
from 50 cents to $1 a hundred pounds. At another time a ship bringing
coffee to the Isthmus ran aground and the commissary had to buy coffee
in the Panama market. It had to pay 6 cents a pound more at wholesale
for the coffee than it was selling for at retail in Panama the day
before the ship went aground. On another occasion a vessel carrying a
supply of milk went ashore and the wholesale price of that commodity
jumped a hundred per cent overnight. The Panaman merchants made a long
and persistent fight to get the privilege of doing the business which
is done by the commissary, but the canal officials were too wise to
allow the working force to be dependent upon native business men for
family budget needs.

Although the commissary did an annual business of nearly $7,000,000 a
year during the height of the construction period, it received
comparatively little actual money for the commodities it sold. A great
deal of this business was with the subsistence department of the Canal
Commission, furnishing supplies for the hotels, European laborers'
messes, and common laborers' kitchens. Practically all of the
remainder was with the employees of the commission, and was done
through coupon books. When an individual wanted to buy from the
commissary he asked that a coupon book be issued him. If it were found
that he had sufficient money coming to him for services rendered to
cover the cost of the book, it was issued to him and the clerk in the
commissary detached coupons to cover the purchases. When the monthly
pay roll was made up, the cost of the coupon books was deducted from
the amount due the employee for services. Many employees and their
families lived too far away from the commissaries to make daily
visits, so they simply deposited their coupon books with the main
commissary at Cristobal and sent their orders in by mail from day to
day. The commissary clerks would fill these written orders, sending
the goods out on the first train.

In addition to buying and selling products for the benefit of the
canal workers, the commissary operated a number of manufacturing
establishments. It had a bakery using some 20,000 barrels of flour,
baking 6,000,000 loaves of bread and other things in proportion
annually; an ice-cream plant freezing 138,000 gallons of ice-cream
annually; a laundry washing 4,250,000 pieces a year; a coffee-roasting
plant; and a large cold-storage warehouse. About 70,000 people were
constantly supplied with commodities from the commissary.

In its efforts to meet the needs of the several classes of employees
on the Canal Zone the commission established four different kinds of
eating places,--a large general hotel, a score of line hotels,
Spanish messes, and West Indian laborers' kitchens. At Ancon it built
the large Tivoli Hotel costing half a million dollars, for the
accommodation of visitors; and of those high-class employees who
desired modern hotel facilities. This hotel is the social center of
the Canal Zone. Here practically all of the tourists come and stay
while on the Isthmus.

During the year 1912 this hotel cleared $53,000 in its operations. The
cost of the supplies for the meals served, of which there were
161,000, was approximately 51 cents per meal. The cost of services was
approximately 19 cents, making a total of 70 cents per meal. The rates
were $3 up to $5.50 a day, employees being given special concessions.

[Illustration: JOHN BURKE

MEAL TIME AT AN I. C. C. KITCHEN]

[Illustration: WASHINGTON HOTEL, COLON

MAJOR EUGENE T. WILSON

THE TIVOLI HOTEL, ANCON]

The line hotels were, more properly speaking, merely dining-rooms
where the American employees were furnished substantial meals for 30
cents each. Outsiders paid 50 cents each for these meals. They were up
to a very high standard. Once the late Senator Thomas H. Carter, of
Montana, was a member of a Senate committee visiting the Isthmus and
he invited the subsistence officer, Maj. Wilson, to come to Washington
and show the manager of the Senate restaurant how to prepare a good
meal. A year later, after Senator Albert B. Cummins, of Iowa, had
eaten one of the lunches at Gatun, he renewed the invitation of
Senator Carter, telling Maj. Wilson he was sure that if he were to
come Senators would get better meals for their money. At one of the
Congressional hearings on the Isthmus Representative T. W. Sims, of
Tennessee, asked that the menu of a meal he had eaten at one of these
hotels be inserted in the record. Major Wilson inserted the menu for
several days instead. The following is the menu at the Cristobal Hotel
for January 20, 1912:

Breakfast.--Oranges, sliced bananas, oatmeal, eggs to order, German
potatoes, ham or bacon, hot cakes, maple sirup, tea, coffee, cocoa.

Lunch.--Vegetable soup, fried pork chops, apple sauce, boiled
potatoes, pork and beans, sliced buttered beets, stewed cranberries,
creamed parsnips, lemon meringue pie, tea, coffee, cocoa.

Dinner.--Consomme vermicelli, beefsteak, natural gravy, lyonnaise
potatoes, stewed beans, sliced beets, stewed apples, carrots a la
Julienne, hot biscuits, ice-cream, chocolate cake, tea, coffee, cocoa.

The line hotels in 1912, which were operated at a loss of $12,000,
served over 2,000,000 meals. The cost of the supplies per meal
amounted to $0.2504 and the service to $0.0165, making the average
meal cost $0.3065, while the employees were charged 30 cents.
Approximately 2,000 Americans were continuous patrons of the line
hotels.

The messes for European laborers were operated in 1912 at a total cost
of $405,000. The returns from their operations amounted to $443,000,
showing a net profit of $38,000 on 1,108,000 rations. The net profit
per day's ration approximated 3-1/2 cents. The supplies entering into
the ration cost $0.3106 and the service of preparing it $0.0547.

The national diet for Europeans would appear very monotonous to
Americans. For the Spaniards who constituted the major portion of the
European employees, it was a "rancho," which is a mixture of stewed
meat, potatoes, cabbage, tomatoes and garbanzos heavily flavored with
Spanish sweet pepper. Their soups were made very stiff, really a meal
in themselves, since they were about the consistency of Irish stew
mashed up. A day's ration for Spanish laborers ran about as follows:

Breakfast.--Roast beef, pork sausage, corned-beef, sardines or bacon,
one-half loaf of bread, chocolate and milk.

Dinner.--Garbanzos or macaroni, roast beef or hamburger steak, fried
potatoes, oranges or bananas, one-half loaf of bread, coffee.

Supper.--Rice soup, peas or beans, rancho, one-quarter loaf of bread,
tea.

The Government charged the European laborers 40 cents a day for their
meals. Their mess halls were large, airy, comfortable and
conspicuously clean. The European laborers nearly all patronized these
mess halls; about 3,200 of them constantly were fed at these places.

Wherever there was a West Indian negro settlement along the line of
the canal the commission operated a mess kitchen. These kitchens were
kept scrupulously clean and the laborers were furnished meals at 9
cents each. Each laborer who patronized the kitchen had his little kit
into which the attendants put his meal, and he could carry it anywhere
he desired to eat it. In spite of the fact that these meals
corresponded almost exactly to the American Regular Army field
rations, they were never popular with the West Indian negroes.
Although there were some 25,000 of these laborers on the canal in
1912, only a little more than a half million rations were issued to
them during the year. Less than 15 per cent of the negro force
patronized the commission kitchen.

The following is a specimen day's ration in a West Indian kitchen:

Breakfast.--Cocoa and milk, porridge, bread, jam.

Dinner.--Pea soup, beef, doughboys, rice, bread, bananas.

Supper.--Stewed beef, boiled potatoes, stewed navy beans, bread, tea.

During the construction period of the canal the average American
received approximately $150 a month for his labor. Those who were
married and remained in the service a reasonable time were provided,
rent free, with family quarters. Their light bills were never
rendered, the coal for their kitchen stoves cost them nothing, and the
iceman never came around to collect. The bachelors were provided with
bachelor quarters with the necessary furniture for making them
comfortable. The average married quarters cost from $1,200 to $1,800
each, and the average quarters for a bachelor about $500 to construct.
The higher officials had separate houses; lesser officials were
furnished with semi-detached houses. The majority of the rank and file
of American married employees were housed in roomy, four-flat houses.
The verandas were broad and screened in with the best copper netting,
and all quarters were provided with necessary furniture at Government
expense.

The assignment of quarters and furniture called for a great deal of
diplomacy on the part of the quartermaster's department, since, if
Mrs. Jones happened to visit Mrs. Smith, and found that she had a
swell-front dresser in her bedroom, while her own was a straight-front
dresser, an irate lady was very shortly calling on the district
quartermaster and demanding to know why such discrimination should be
practiced. Perhaps she had been on the Canal Zone longer than Mrs.
Smith, and felt that if anyone were entitled to the swell-front
dresser she was the one. The district quartermaster had to explain
with all the patience at his command that it was not a case of
discrimination but merely that the commission had bought swell-front
dressers at a later date for the same price that it formerly had paid
for the straight-front ones, and that consequently the people who
furnished houses later got them.

On another occasion Mrs. Brown, calling on Mrs. White, found that Mrs.
White had an electric light on her side porch. She immediately fared
forth to pull the hair of the quartermaster for this discrimination,
but was somewhat taken back when that official calmly informed her
that the light had been put there for a few days in anticipation of a
children's party that was to be given by Mrs. White one night that
week.

The marvelous success of the commissary, not only in affording its
patrons better service at lower prices, but also in making a
substantial profit on the undertaking, had been referred to as the
most valuable lesson taught by the whole canal digging operation. It
has proved the efficiency of government agencies in fields far removed
from the ordinary operations of government, and it may be that its
experience will be used to advantage in combating the high cost of
living in the United States itself.




CHAPTER XV

LIFE ON THE ZONE


Transplant a man or a woman from a home in a temperate climate to an
abode in the Tropics, and there is bound to be trouble. Disturbances
in the body are expected and, proper precautions being taken, most
often are warded off. Disturbances in the mind are not anticipated,
preventive measures are seldom taken, and there comes the trouble.
That is why the Young Men's Christian Association and the American
Federation of Women's Clubs had their part to do in digging the Panama
Canal, a part second in importance only to the sanitary work under
Colonel Gorgas.

It's an odd thing--this transplanting a man from the temperate to the
torrid zone. It affects men of different nations in different ways. It
is disastrous in inverse ratio to the adaptability of the man
transplanted. A German or a Dutchman goes to the Tropics and almost
without a struggle yields to the demands of the new climate all his
orderly daily habits. Your Dutchman in Java will, except on state
occasions, wear the native dress (or undress); eat the native food;
live in the native house; and, like as not, take a native woman to
wife. One thing only--he will retain his schnapps. The German is only
a little less adaptable, clings only a little longer to the routine
of the Fatherland, but he, too, keeps his beer.

Your Englishman, on the contrary, defies the tropical sun and scorns
to make any changes in his daily habit that he had not fixed upon as
necessary and proper before he left his right little, tight little,
island. He does, it is true, wear a pith helmet. That is due partly,
perhaps, to his fear of the sun, but it is much more due to the fact
that he associates it with lands where faces are not white; therefore
he wears it in Egypt in the winter when it is shivery cold with the
same religious devotion that he wears it in India when the mercury is
running out of the top of the thermometer. Your Englishman, it is
true, wears white duck clothes in the Tropics, but not the fiercest
heat that old Sol ever produced could induce him for one moment to
exchange his flannel underwear for cotton or to leave off his woolen
hose. It is a pretty theory and not without much support, that it is
this British defiance of tropical customs that has given him the
mastery over Tropic peoples. And wherever goes the Briton there goes
also Scotch-and-soda.

The Americans steer a middle course. They dress for the heat and make
themselves comfortable as possible. They consume even greater
quantities of ice than they do at home, and the average American eats
every day in summer enough ice to kill a score of Englishmen. At
least, that's what the Englishmen would think.

But the American in the Tropics tenaciously clings to many of his home
habits, despite the changed conditions of his place of sojourn. He
must have his bath, even though he talks less about it than the
Englishman. He must have his three square meals a day, and breakfast
must be a real breakfast. He demands screens to protect him from
pestiferous insects, no less for comfort's sake than health's. And
then he demands two other things--a soda fountain and a base-ball
team.

It is true that he often will indulge in a British peg of
Scotch-and-soda, or in a German stein of beer, but the native drink
that he takes with him to the Tropics, and one that he alone consumes,
and the one that he, in season and out of season, demands, is the
sweet, innocent, and non-alcoholic product of the soda fountain. How
incomprehensible is this to the sons of other nations no American may
ever understand.

It may seem to be going far field to discuss even in the general way
the differing tempers of men of different nations transplanted from a
temperate to a torrid clime. But, as a matter of fact, it has a direct
bearing on the accomplishment at Panama, of which Americans are so
proud.

[Illustration: FLOYD C. FREEMAN

I. C. C. CLUB HOUSE AT CULEBRA]

[Illustration: A. BRUCE MINEAR

READING ROOM IN THE I. C. C. CLUB HOUSE, CULEBRA]

When the Americans first undertook the task, the denizens of the
Isthmus prepared for them only such entertainment as had been
acceptable in other days. The only places open to the tired worker in
the evening were the saloons, selling bad whiskey and worse beer; or
darker hells of sure and quick damnation. There were no theaters that
would appeal to the American taste, no sports that the clean American
would tolerate. In short, when the American in the early days of the
construction was wearied with that weariness that would not respond
to resting, there was but one thing left. He got home--sick and drunk.

In those early days there were few women. Most of the men who came
then were moved rather by a spirit of adventure than by a
determination to share in a tremendous job of work, and such men were
not married. It was not long until the men at the head discovered that
the married men were more content, that they lost less time from the
work, and produced more results when on the job than did the
bachelors. (This, of course, must not be taken as an indictment
against every individual bachelor who worked at Panama, but rather as
a characterization based on the average of that class.) Thus in the
very order of things it became the policy of the commission to
encourage unmarried men at work to marry, and to bring married men
from the States rather than bachelors. Inducements were held out,
putting a premium on matrimony. The bachelor worker had good quarters,
but he perhaps shared but a room in a bungalow, whereas the married
man had a four-room house of his own, with a big porch, and free
furniture, free light, and the problem of the cost of living solved by
the paternal commissary.

So matrimony flourished. But when the women came in increasing
numbers, and with them many children, another problem arose. Women
born in temperate climes suffer more in the Tropics than do men. The
dry, dry heat of the dry season is succeeded by the wet, wet heat of
the rainy months. There is never any escape from that horrible,
hateful, hellish heat. Is it to be baked or steamed? The changing
seasons offer no other alternative. And the Fear! Not for a moment may
one forget that sickness and death stalk in the jungle; that a glass
of water or an unscreened door may be the end of it all. There is no
normality, no relaxation, no care free rest for the woman in the
Tropics.

At Panama her housekeeping duties were lightened by the excellence of
the commissary system, so that they were not enough to keep her mind
occupied. She became homesick and hysterical.

So, then, it being desirable to have married men on the job, it became
necessary to do something to keep the women at the minimum stage of
unhappiness. The Y. M. C. A. clubhouse, with their gymnasiums, their
libraries, their games, their sports, and their clubiness, had been
the substitute for home offered to the lonely American man at Panama.
The Civic Federation was invited to do what it could for the women. It
sent an agent of the American Federation of Women's Clubs to Panama,
who organized women's clubs, and these, by putting the women to work,
made them, in a measure, forget the Heat and the Fear.

Miss Helen Varick Boswell visited the Isthmus in the fall of 1907 and
assisted the women in forming their clubs. She found them literally
hungry for such activities and they responded with a will to her
suggestion. The result was frequent meetings in every town in the
Canal Zone and innumerable activities on the part of the women
interested in club work.

The transformation was most remarkable. Where almost every woman on
the Isthmus seemed to be unhappy, now everyone who needed an outlet
for her mental and social instincts found it in club work. Where once
they quarreled and disputed about their house furnishings, life on the
Isthmus, and the general status of things on the Canal Zone, now the
women seemed to take a happy and contented view of things, and became
as much interested in the work of building the canal as were their
husbands, their fathers, and their brothers. Looking back over the
task, and realizing how much longer the married men stayed on the job,
and how much more essential they were to the completion of the canal
than the bachelors, the cares of the canal authorities to keep the
women satisfied was a master stroke.

When the club movement was launched one of the first steps was to
organize classes in Spanish. Women from every part of the Zone
attended these Spanish classes and took up the work of learning the
language with zeal. Comparatively few of them had any opportunity to
learn Spanish, even in its most rudimentary form, from household
servants, since the same lethargy that characterized the native men of
Panama, and made them totally indifferent to the opportunities for
work on the Canal Zone, also characterized the Panaman women, with the
results that most of the American households at Panama had
English-speaking Jamaican servants instead of Spanish-speaking
Panamans.

The servant problem was not as serious as it is in the average
American city. There was always a full supply of Jamaican negro women
ready for engagement as household servants. They were polite and
efficient. Almost without exception they had a deeply religious turn
of mind, although they might transgress the Mosaic law far enough to
substitute plain water for violet water on the boudoir table of their
mistresses. Usually they were very neat of person and very careful in
the manner of doing their work. The wages they commanded were
approximately equal to those asked in the ordinary American city.

The greatest social diversion of the Isthmus, of course, was dancing.
Every two weeks the Tivoli Club gave a dance at the Tivoli Hotel.
Trains to carry visitors were run all the way across the Isthmus and
no American ever needed to miss a dance at the Tivoli Hotel because of
unsuitable railroad accommodations.

Each small town had its own dancing clubs and in those towns where
there were Y. M. C. A. buildings, the dances were held in them. The
new Hotel Washington proved a very popular rendezvous for the dancers,
and in the future the big functions of this kind probably will
alternate between the Tivoli at one end of the canal and the
Washington at the other.

The university men maintained the University Club in the city of
Panama, directly on the water front. This club frequently opened its
doors to women and its functions were always regarded as events in
Isthmian social history. In Colon there was organized several years
ago a club known as the Stranger's Club. This club, as did the
University Club at Panama, welcomed the American stranger.

The Isthmian Canal Commission always looked carefully after the
religious activities of the people of the Canal Zone. Its provision of
places of worship and facilities for getting to them was strictly
nonsectarian, and directed solely to giving every sect and every faith
opportunity to worship in its own way. Several chaplains were
maintained at Government expense, and railroad and wagonette service
for carrying people to their places of worship was maintained
throughout the years of the American occupation.

The West Indian negroes were provided with churches and with homes for
the leaders of their spiritual flocks. Church buildings were erected
at every settlement, and in many cases were so constructed that the
lower story could be used for a church and the second story for lodge
purposes. These buildings were 70 by 36 feet, with lodge rooms 60 by
36 feet.

The women on the Canal Zone were interested in religious work from the
beginning of their residence there. An Isthmian Sunday School
Association maintained church extension work. When the Women's
Federation of Clubs finally disbanded, in April, 1913, it presented
its library to this association and its pictures to the Ancon Study
Club. There was an art society at Ancon, which did much to foster art
work on the Zone during the days of the canal construction. The
organization of Camp Fire Girls extended its activities to Panama, and
many leading women there contributed both means and time to help the
girls on the Isthmus.

The women of the Zone did not fail to enlist themselves in any
movement for good in their communities. A few years since there was a
little blind boy on the Isthmus and the Federation of Women's Clubs
decided that he ought to have better educational advantages than could
be provided at Panama. Therefore, they agreed to finance his going to
Boston to enter an institution for the education of the blind. When
the Federation disbanded, owing to the gradual departure of members
for the States, it did not do so until it had created a committee
which was to continue indefinitely in charge of the education of this
blind boy.

Many secret societies existed on the Isthmus, the oldest one made up
of Americans being the Sojourners Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons,
organized in Colon in 1898. There were Odd Fellows' lodges and lodges
of Redmen, Modern Woodmen, Knights of Pythias, Elks, Junior Order of
American Mechanics, and representative bodies of many other American
secret orders. An Isthmian order is that of the Kangaroos, whose motto
is: "He is best who does best." This order was organized in 1907 under
the laws of Tennessee, and the mother council was organized at Empire
the same year. The object of the Kangaroos is to hold mock sessions of
court and to extract from them all of the fun and, at the same time,
all of the good that they will yield.

The men on the Isthmus, almost completely isolated as they were from
American political concerns, never allowed their interest in political
affairs at home to become completely atrophied. There was a common
saying that the Panamans were the only people on the Isthmus that
could vote, but at times the Americans would at least simulate
politics at home with the resulting campaigns and elections. During
the presidential campaign of 1912 it was decided to hold a mock
election in several of the American settlements. The elections were
for national offices and for municipal offices as well. There were a
number of parties, and in the national elections there were the usual
group of insurgents, progressives, reactionaries, and the like.

There were nominations for dog catchers and town grouches, while the
party platforms abounded in all the political claptrap of the ordinary
American document of like nature. Cartoons were circulated showing the
Panama Railroad to be a monopolistic corporation; flaring handbills
proving that the latest town grouch had not acquitted himself properly
in office; statistical tables showing that the dog catcher had allowed
more dogs to get away from him than he had caught; and all sorts of
other campaign tricks and dodges were brought into play, just as
though there were real issues at stake and real men to be elected. At
Colon the presidential returns showed 33 votes for Taft, 200 for
Wilson and 224 for Roosevelt. There were 204 votes in favor of Woman
Suffrage, both state and national, and 75 votes against it.

As has been said, when the American first went to Panama the only
diversion a man could find was to go to a cheap saloon and meet his
friends. It was a condition that was as unsatisfactory to the men
themselves as it was to the moral sentiment of those behind the work,
and almost as dangerous to the success of the undertaking as would
have been an outbreak of some epidemic disease. This led the
commission to urge the erection of clubhouses in several of the more
populous settlements, to be conducted under the auspices of the Young
Men's Christian Association, but to be operated on a basis that would
bring to the people those rational amusements of which they stood so
much in need.

From time to time clubhouses of this type were established in seven of
the American settlements and the work they did in promoting the
contentment and happiness of the people can be appreciated only by
those who have witnessed the conditions of living in Canal Zone towns
where there were no such clubhouses.

Almost the first effect of the construction of a clubhouse was a heavy
falling off in barroom attendance, and simultaneously a decline in the
receipts from the sales of liquor. It is estimated that these receipts
fell off 75 per cent within a short time after the clubhouses were
opened. The men who had been buying beer at 25 cents a bottle, or
whiskey at 15 cents a thimbleful, were now frequenting the clubhouses,
playing billiards, rolling tenpins, writing letters, reading their
home papers, or engaging in other diversions which served to banish
homesickness.

When the Y. M. C. A. clubhouses were opened a practical man was put at
the head of each. While no one would think of card-playing or dancing
at a Y. M. C. A. in the States, both were to be found in the
association clubhouses of the Isthmus. Bowling alleys, billiard
rooms, gymnasiums, and many other features for entertainment were
established in the clubhouses. Bowling teams were organized; billiard
and pool contests were started; gymnastic instruction was given;
pleasant reading rooms with easy chairs, cool breezes, and good lights
were provided; circulating libraries were established; good soda
fountains were put in operation where one could get a glass of soda
long enough to quench the deepest thirst; and in general the
clubhouses were made the most attractive places in town--places where
any man, married or single, might spend his leisure moments with
profit and with pleasure.

Every effort was put forth to capitalize the spirit of rivalry in the
interest of the men. The result was that in each clubhouse there were
continuous contests of one kind or another, which afforded
entertainment for those engaged and held the interest of those who
were looking on. Then the champions of each clubhouse, whether
individuals or teams, were pitted against the stars of other places,
and in this way there was always "something doing" around each
clubhouse.

In addition to maintaining a supervision over the sports of the
Isthmus, the clubhouses provided night schools for those who desired
to improve such educational opportunities. These night schools were
rather well patronized by the new arrivals on the Isthmus, but there
is something in that climate which, after a man has been there for a
year, makes him want to rest whenever he is off duty. Going to night
school became an intolerable bore by that time, so very few men kept
up their attendance after the first year. The study of Spanish was
found to be one exception to this rule, for, besides the satisfaction
of being able to talk with native Panamans and the Spaniards, there
was the hope of financial reward. Any employee who could pass an
examination in Spanish stood a better show of getting promotion in the
service. Besides, the man who had grit enough to carry through a
course of study on the Isthmus, with its enervating climate, was
almost certain to climb the ladder of success wherever he went.

A review of the work of the seven Y. M. C. A. clubhouses for 1912
gives a good idea of what they did during the entire construction
period. It required a force of 42 Americans and 64 West Indians to
operate these seven clubhouses. Twelve of the Americans were paid out
of the funds of the Canal Commission and 30 out of the funds of the Y.
M. C. A. Of the negro employees 43 were paid by the Canal Commission
and 21 by the Y. M. C. A. The American force for all seven clubhouses
consisted of one superintendent, four secretaries, four assistant
secretaries, one clerk, ten night clerks, six bowling alley night
attendants, six pool room night attendants, and seven barbers. At the
end of that year there were 2,100 members of the Y. M. C. A., no less
than 58 per cent of all the American employees living in towns having
clubhouses being members of the association.

During the year seven companies of players and musicians were engaged
to provide amusement a the clubhouses. They gave 85 entertainments
which had a total attendance of 21,000. Local talent and moving
pictures provided 406 entertainments with a total attendance of
96,000. Amateur oratorio societies, operatic troupes, minstrel
troupes, glee clubs, mixed choruses, vaudeville and black-face
sketches were organized during the year through the efforts of the
members cooperating with the secretaries. These organizations made the
whole circuit of the Isthmus. Weekly moving-picture exhibitions were
given and a man was employed who gave his entire attention to them.
Carefully chosen films were ordered from the United States, special
attention being given to educational features.

Special tournaments in bowling, billiards, and pool were organized and
gold, silver, and bronze medals were awarded the winners. Over a
hundred thousand bowling games and nearly 300,000 games of pool and
billiards were played during the year. Trained physical directors were
employed to direct the gymnastic exercises at the clubhouses and there
was an attendance of 15,000 at these classes during the year. A
pentathlon meet was held at Empire for the purpose of developing
all-around athletes. Religious meetings and song services were held at
such times as not to interfere with the organized religious work on
the Zone, the average attendance at 214 meetings being 50 and the
average attendance at Bible and discussion clubs 52. The average
enrollment was 65 in the Spanish class. Forty-two thousand books were
withdrawn for home reading during the year.

Soft drinks, ice-cream, light lunches, and the like were served on
the cool verandas of the clubhouses, the receipts from these sales
amounting to approximately $50,000. Nearly 4,000 calls on hospital
patients were made by committees for the visitation of the sick. Boys
from 10 to 16 years of age were allowed special privileges in the
clubhouses, and the secretaries arranged several outings during the
year. The total boys' membership was 146. The disbursements from the
funds of the Isthmian Canal Commission amounted to $50,000 and those
from clubhouse funds amounted to $114,000. The total receipts for the
year amounted to $118,000. The affairs of the clubhouses were in the
hands of the advisory committee appointed by the chairman and chief
engineer of the Isthmian Canal Commission.

In providing amusements the Canal Commission overlooked no opportunity
in the way of furnishing special trains and affording other facilities
for encouraging play by the canal workers. Each town had its ball team
and its ball park, and there was just as much enthusiasm in watching
the standing of the several clubs in the isthmian League as in the
States in watching the performances of the several clubs in the
American and National leagues. When there was a championship series to
be played there was just as much excitement over it as if it were a
post-season contest between the Athletics and the Giants.

It is probable that better amusements will be provided under the
permanent régime than were during the construction period. With ships
constantly passing through the canal, many opera companies, especially
those from Spain and Italy, will have opportunity to stop for a night
or two at Panama, while their ships are coaling or shipping cargo. In
Panama City there is a splendid theater built by the Panaman
Government largely out of funds derived from payments made by the
United States on account of the canal rights.

As the major portion of the permanent force will be quartered at Ancon
and Balboa, they will be able to drive to the theater or take the
street car. A new street-car system has just been established, and
those who can not afford the luxury of carriages will find in it
opportunities for taking airings as well as going to the theater. This
system runs from the permanent settlement at Balboa through the city
of Panama and down over the savannahs towards old Panama. It is the
first street-car system ever operated on the Isthmus, and will
probably prove much more satisfactory than the little, old, dirty
coaches which have afforded the only means of transportation on the
Zone.

The building of a number of roads along the canal to facilitate the
movement of military forces has made it possible to get a satisfactory
use of automobiles. Agencies already have been opened for a number of
the lower-priced cars in anticipation that a large number of the canal
employees will buy automobiles in order to get the benefit of these
good roads. There are few places where automobiling affords more
pleasant diversion than at Panama. After the sun goes down the
evenings are just cool enough and the breezes just strong enough to
make an automobile ride a delightful experience.

There are good opportunities for lovers of hunting and fishing on the
Isthmus. There is wild game in plenty--deer abounding in the entire
region contiguous to the canal and alligators being found in all of
the principal streams. There are both sea and river fishing, and some
tapirs and other wild animals still are left to attract the efforts of
the modern huntsman.

The entertainment headquarters on the Canal Zone under the permanent
occupation will be the big clubhouse at Balboa, which is being built
at a cost of about $50,000. This clubhouse will not only have all of
the features of the clubhouses of the construction period, but will be
equipped with a large auditorium, with a complete library and with
every facility for amusement and entertainment that experience on the
Isthmus has called for.

It can not be said that social life on the Isthmus during the period
of canal construction was ideal. Its inspiration was to be found in
the desire to make the best of a bad situation. Men and women all knew
that their stay in Panama was but temporary, none of them looked upon
the Canal Zone as home, and all of them counted time in two
eras--Before we came to Panama, and When we leave Panama.

Of course there was dining and dancing, and the bridge tables were
never idle. But every dinner hostess knew that every guest knew
exactly what every dish on the table cost, and she knew that guest
knew she knew. The family income was fixed and public. All one had to
do was to read the official bulletins.

The same paternalistic commissary that reduced the cost of living and
made housekeeping so easy, also tended with socialistic frankness to
bring everybody to a dead level. It was useless to attempt any of the
little deceits that make life so interesting at home.

Although the American is a home-loving animal, he managed to get on
fairly well in the alien atmosphere of the Tropic jungle. He brought
with him his home life, his base ball and his soda fountain. And,
considering how such things go in the Tropics, he managed to live a
clean life while he was doing a clean piece of work.




CHAPTER XVI

PAST ISTHMIAN PROJECTS


The digging of an Isthmian Canal was a dream in the minds of many men
in Europe and America from the day that Columbus found two continents
stretched across his pathway in his endeavor to discover a western
route to India. On his last voyage, as he beat down the coast of
Central America, here naming one cape "Gracias a Dios" and there
another "Nombre de Dios," testifying his thanks to God and his
reverence for His name, he touched the Isthmus near the present
Atlantic terminus of the Panama Canal. He little dreamed that some day
ships 500 times as large as his own would pass through the barrier of
mountains which Nature interposed between his ambitions and India.

The idea of a canal through the American Isthmus was in the mind of
Charles V of Spain as early as 1520. In that year he ordered surveys
to ascertain the practicability of a canal connecting the Atlantic and
the Pacific. His son, Philip II did not agree with him about the
desirability of a trans-Isthmian waterway, holding that a shipway
through the Isthmus would give to other nations easy access to his new
possessions, and in time of war might be of greater advantage to his
enemies than to himself. He invoked the Bible to put an end to these
propositions to dig a canal across the American Isthmus, calling to
mind that the Good Book declared that "what God hath joined together
let no man put asunder."

The policy of Philip was continued for about two centuries, although
in the reign of his father many efforts had been made in the direction
of a ship waterway across the Isthmus. In fact, ships crossed the
Isthmus nearly four centuries before the completion of the canal.
About 1521 Gil Gonzales was sent to the New World to seek out a strait
through the Isthmus. He sailed up and down the Central American coast,
entering this river and that, but failing of course to find a natural
waterway. Not to be outdone, he decided to take his two caravels to
pieces and to transport them across the Isthmus. He carried them on
the backs of Indians and mules from the head of navigation on the
Chagres River to the ancient city of Panama. There he rebuilt them and
set out to sea, but they were lost in a storm. Still determined to
make the most of his opportunities, Gonzales built others to take
their places and with these made his way up the Pacific coast through
the Gulf of Fonseca to Nicaragua, where he discovered Lake Nicaragua.
A few years later another explorer made a trip across Lake Nicaragua
and down the San Juan River to the Atlantic.

Cortez, the conquistador of Mexico, at one time was ordered to use
every resource at his command in a search for the longed-for strait.
He did not find it, but he did open up a line of communication across
the Isthmus of Tehauntepec, following practically the same line as
was afterwards followed by Eads with his proposed ship railway.

From those days to the time when the United States decided that the
canal should be built at Panama and that it should be made a national
undertaking, one route after another was proposed. In 1886,
immediately after the French failure, the Senate requested the
Secretary of the Navy to furnish all available information pertaining
to the subject of a canal across the Isthmus, and Admiral Charles H.
Davis reported that 19 canal and 7 railway projects had been proposed,
the most northerly across the Isthmus of Tehauntepec and the most
southerly across the Isthmus of Panama at the Gulf of Darien, 1,400
miles apart. Eight of these projects were located in Nicaragua.

In 1838 the Republic of New Granada, which then had territorial
possession of the Isthmus of Panama, granted a concession to a French
company to build a canal across the Isthmus. This company claimed to
have found a pass through the mountains only 37 feet above sea level.
In 1843 the French minister of foreign affairs instructed Napoleon
Carella to investigate these claims. That engineer found no such pass
and reported the claims to be worthless. He, in turn, advocated a
canal along the route followed by the present Panama Canal, with a
3-mile tunnel through Culebra Mountain and with 18 locks on the
Atlantic slope and 16 locks on the Pacific slope. He estimated the
cost of such a canal at $25,000,000. The first formal surveys of the
Panama route were made in 1827 by J. A. Lloyd. He recommended a
combination rail and water route, with a canal on the Atlantic side
and a railroad on the Pacific side.

The first serious proposition to build a Nicaragua Canal was made in
1779 when the King of England ordered an investigation into the
feasibility of connecting the Nicaraguan lakes with the sea. A year
later Capt. Horatio Nelson, destined to become the hero of Trafalgar,
headed an expedition from Jamaica to possess the Nicaraguan lakes,
which he considered to be the inland Gibraltar of Spanish America,
commanding the only water pass between the oceans. His expedition was
successful as far as overcoming Spanish opposition was concerned, but
a deadlier enemy than the Don decimated his ranks. Of the 200 who set
out with Nelson only 10 survived, and Nelson himself narrowly escaped
with his life after a long illness.

In 1825 what now constitute the several countries of Central America
were embraced in one federation--the Central American Republic. It
asked the cooperation of the American people in the construction of a
canal through Nicaragua. Henry Clay, then Secretary of State, favored
the proposition, and, in 1826, the Federation entered into a contract
with Aaron H. Palmer, of New York, for the construction of a canal
through Nicaragua capable of accommodating the largest vessels afloat.
Palmer was unable to command the necessary capital and the concession
lapsed. A few years later an English corporation sent John Bailey to
Nicaragua for the purpose of securing a canal concession. He failed to
get the concession but was later employed by the Nicaraguan
Government, which again had become independent, to determine the most
feasible location for a canal across Nicaragua.

The United States Government became deeply interested in Isthmian
Canal projects during the Forties of the last century. The extension
of the national domain to the Pacific coast made the building of an
Isthmian Canal a consideration of prime importance to the United
States, and made it a dangerous policy to allow any other country to
acquire a dominating hand over an Isthmian waterway. The result was
that the American Government advised the British Government that it
would not tolerate the control of any Isthmian Canal by any foreign
power. This later brought about the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which made
neutral the proposed Nicaraguan Canal.

In 1849 Elijah Hise, representing the United States, negotiated a
treaty with Nicaragua, by the terms of which that country gave to the
United States, or its citizens, exclusive right to construct and
operate roads, railways, canals, or any other medium of transportation
across its territory between the two oceans. The consideration exacted
by Nicaragua was that the United States should guarantee the
independence of that country--a consideration that was then paramount
because of the effort being made by Great Britain to gobble up the
"Mosquito Coast" as far east as the San Juan River. The United States
was not ready to give such a guarantee--although a half century later
it did give it to the Republic of Panama--and the Hise treaty failed
of ratification in the Senate.

A little later Cornelius Vanderbilt became interested in a canal and
road across Nicaragua under an exclusive concession running for 85
years. Modifications of this concession permitted the Vanderbilt
Company to exercise exclusive navigation rights on the lakes of
Nicaragua. As a result the Accessory Transit Company established a
transportation line from the Atlantic through the San Juan River and
across Lake Nicaragua, thence by stage coach over a 13-mile stretch of
road to San Juan del Sur on the Pacific.

In 1852 Col. Orville Childs made a report to President Fillmore upon
the results of his surveys for a Nicaraguan Canal; and, if the United
States, in 1902, had elected to build the Nicaraguan Canal, the route
laid out by Childs would have been followed for all but a few miles of
the entire distance. In 1858 a French citizen obtained from Nicaragua
and Costa Rica a joint concession for a canal, which contained a
provision that the French Government should have the right to keep two
warships on Lake Nicaragua as long as the canal was in operation. The
United States politely informed Nicaragua and Costa Rica that it would
not permit any such agreement--that it would be a menace to the United
States as long as the agreement was in force. Upon these
representations the concession was canceled.

In 1876 the first Nicaraguan Canal Commission created by the American
Congress made a unanimous report in favor of a canal across Nicaragua,
after it had investigated all the proposed routes from eastern Mexico
to western South America. It asserted that this route possessed, both
for the construction and maintenance of the canal, greater advantages
and fewer difficulties from engineering, commercial, and economic
points of view than any one of the other routes shown to be
practicable by surveys sufficient in detail to enable a judgment to be
formed of their respective merits.

When the first French Panama Canal Company began its work all other
projects fell by the wayside for the time being, just as all other
plans for interoceanic canals were abandoned when the United States
undertook the construction of the present canal. After that company
failed, however, the Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua was organized
in 1889 by A. G. Menocal, under concessions from the Government of
that country and Costa Rica. The Atlantic end of this canal, as
proposed by the Maritime Canal Company, was located on the lagoon west
of Greytown. The Pacific end was located at Brito, a few miles from
San Juan del Sur. This canal company built three-fourths of a mile of
canal, constructed a temporary railway and a short telegraph line, but
soon thereafter became involved in financial difficulties which led to
a suspension of operations. Even to this day the visitor to Nicaragua
may see many evidences of the wrecked hopes of that period for
whatever town he visits he finds there Americans and Europeans who
went to Nicaragua at the time of the opening of the work of building a
canal by the Maritime Canal Company. They expected to find a land of
opportunity. But, with failure of the canal project, they found
themselves in the possession of properties whose value lay only in
staying there and operating them.

When the first Isthmian Canal Commission, in 1899, undertook to
investigate all of the proposed routes across the connecting link
between North and South America, it placed on the Nicaraguan route
alone 20 working parties, made up of 159 civil engineers, their
assistants, and 455 laborers. The entire work of exploring the
Nicaraguan route was done with the greatest care. The depth of the
canal, as adopted by the commission, was 35 feet and the minimum width
150 feet. The locks were to be 840 feet long and 84 feet wide, and of
these there were to be eight on the Pacific and six on the Atlantic
side. This canal was to be 184 miles long. At the Atlantic end there
was to be a 46-mile sea-level section and at the Pacific end a 12-mile
sea-level section, while the water in the middle 126-mile section was
to be 145 feet above the water in the two oceans. It was estimated
that it would cost $189,000,000 to build the Nicaraguan Canal.

Although the distance between the Atlantic and Pacific ports of the
United States would have been more than 400 miles shorter by the
Nicaragua Canal than by the Panama Canal, it would have taken about 24
hours longer to pass through the former than through the latter, so
that, as far as length of time from Atlantic to Pacific ports was
concerned, the two routes would have been practically on a par. The
total amount of material it would have been necessary to excavate at
Nicaragua approximates, according to the estimates, 228,000,000 cubic
yards. This would have been increased, perhaps, by half, to make a
canal large enough to accommodate ships such as will be accommodated
by the present Panama Canal.

The three great trans-Isthmian projects may be said to have been: The
Panama Canal, the Nicaraguan Canal, and the James B. Eads ship railway
across the Isthmus of Tehauntepec. The latter proposition seems to be
the most remarkable, in some ways, of them all. In 1881, James B.
Eads, the great engineer who built the Mississippi River bridge at St.
Louis, and whose work in jetty construction at the mouths of the
Mississippi proved him to be one of the foremost engineers of his day,
secured a charter from the Mexican Government conveying to him
authority to utilize the Isthmus of Tehauntepec for the construction
of a ship railway from the Atlantic to the Pacific. His plan called
for a railway 134 miles long, with the highest point over 700 feet
above the sea, and designed to carry vessels up to 7,000 tons. He
calculated that the entire cost of the railway would not be more than
$50,000,000. His plan was to build a railroad with a large number of
tracks on which a huge cradle would run. This cradle would be placed
under a ship, and the ship braced in the manner of one in dry dock.
Heavy coiled springs were to equalize all stresses and to prevent
shocks to the vessel. A number of powerful locomotives would be
hitched to the cradle and would pull it across the Isthmus. Although
the proposition was indorsed by many authorities, it seems to anyone
who has crossed the Isthmus of Tehauntepec that it was a most
visionary scheme.

[Illustration: COL. CHESTER L. HARDING

THE GATUN UPPER LOCKS]

[Illustration: LIEUT. COL. DAVID D. GAILLARD

CULEBRA CUT, SHOWING CUCARACHA SLIDE IN LEFT CENTER]

If one can imagine a ship railway across the Allegheny Mountains
between Lewiston Junction and Pittsburgh on the Pennsylvania Railroad,
or between Washington and Goshen, Va., on the Chesapeake & Ohio
Railroad, he will have a very good idea of the difficulties which
would be encountered in building such a railway. The present
Tehauntepec railroad is 188 miles long. When crossing the Cordilleras
there are numerous places on this road where the rear car of the train
and the engine are traveling in diametrically opposite directions. The
road is well-built, and, as one crosses the backbone of the continent,
and beholds the engineering difficulties that were encountered in
building an ordinary American railroad, he can not help but marvel at
the confidence of a man who would endeavor to build across those
mountains a shipway large enough and straight enough to carry a
7,000-ton ship. Yet Captain Eads estimated that his shipway could be
constructed in four years at one-half the cost of the Nicaraguan
Canal; that vessels could be transported by rail much more quickly
than by canal; that in case of accident the railway could be repaired
more speedily; and that it could be enlarged to carry heavier ships as
business demanded.

He declared that he did not think it would be as difficult to build a
ship railway across the Isthmus of Tehauntepec as to build a harbor at
the Atlantic entrance of the Nicaraguan Canal. His confidence in his
project was such that he proposed to build a short section of the road
to prove its practicability before asking the United States to commit
itself to the project. Commodore T. D. Wilson, at that time Chief
Constructor of the United States Navy, declared in a letter to Captain
Eads that he did not believe the strains upon a ship hauled across the
Isthmus, as Eads proposed, would be greater than those to which ocean
steamers are constantly exposed. Gen. P. T. G. Beauregard, of
Confederate Army fame, declared that a loaded ship would incur less
danger in being transported on a smooth and well-built railway than it
would encounter in bad weather on the ocean.

A prominent English firm offered to undertake the building and
completion of the necessary works for placing ships with their cargo
on the railway tracks of the trans-Isthmian line, declaring that they
had no hesitation in guaranteeing the lifting of a fully loaded ship
of 8,000 or 10,000 tons on a railway car to the level of the railroad
in 30 minutes, if the distance to be lifted was not over 50 feet. The
death of Captain Eads ended this picturesque project.

A proposition once was made to build a canal across the Isthmus of
Tehauntepec. This would have required 30 locks on each side of the
Isthmus of 25 feet each, and these locks alone would have cost, on the
basis of the locks at Panama, perhaps as much as the whole Panama
Canal.

One of the narrowest parts of the Isthmus is that lying between the
present Panama Canal route and the South American border. Three routes
were proposed in this section, known as the Atrato River route, the
Caledonia route, and the San Blas route. It was found that a canal
built along any one of these routes would require a tunnel. The
estimated cost of building a tunnel 35 feet deep, 100 feet wide at the
bottom, and 117 feet on the waterline, with a height of 115 feet from
the water surface, the entire tunnel being lined with concrete 5 feet
thick, would approximate $22,500,000 a mile. The cost of building a
canal along one of these routes would have been greater than that of
building either the Nicaragua Canal or the Panama Canal.

The question of an Isthmian Canal will probably be forever set at rest
at no distant date. In an effort to forestall for all time any
competition in the canal business across the American Isthmus,
negotiations are now under way whereby the United States seeks to
acquire the exclusive rights for a canal through Nicaragua, just as it
now possesses exclusive rights for a canal through the Republic of
Panama. The conclusion of the work at Panama will end the efforts of
four centuries to open up a shipway from the Atlantic to the Pacific
across the American Isthmus.




CHAPTER XVII

THE FRENCH FAILURE


One writes of "the French failure" at Panama with a consciousness that
no other word but failure will describe the financial and
administrative catastrophe that humbled France on the Isthmus, but at
the same time with the knowledge that failure is no fit word to apply
to the engineering accomplishments of the French era.

The French fiasco ruined thousands of thrifty French families who
invested their all in the shares of the canal company because they had
faith in de Lesseps, faith in France, and faith in the ability of the
canal to pay handsome returns whatever might be its cost. The failure
itself was due primarily to the fact that de Lesseps was not an
engineer, but a promoter. The stock sales, the bond lottery, the pomp
and circumstance of high finance, were more to him than exact surveys
or frank discussion of actual engineering problems.

From the first, de Lesseps ignored the engineers. The Panama
proposition was undertaken in spite of their advice, and at every turn
he hampered them by impossible demands, and by making grave decisions
with a debonair turn of the hand.

The next factor in the failure was corruption. Extravagance such as
never was known wasted the sous and francs that came from the thrifty
homes of that beautiful France. Corruption, graft, waste--there was
never such a carnival of bad business.

And then the French had to fight the diseases of the tropic jungles
without being armed with that knowledge that gave the Americans the
victory over yellow fever and malaria. It was hardly to be expected
that the French ever would discover the necessity of substituting the
Y. M. C. A. and the soda fountain for the dance hall and the vintner's
shop, if the canal were to be completed.

But the engineers did their work well, as far as they were permitted
to go. It may have cost too much--but it was well done. The failure of
the French Panama Canal project was due, therefore, to moral as much
as to material reasons.

Long years after the French had retired defeated from the field, one
could behold a thousand mute but eloquent reminders of their failure
to duplicate their triumph at Suez. From one side of the Isthmus to
the other stretched an almost unbroken train of gloomy specters of the
disappointed hopes of the French people.

Here a half-mile string of engines and cars; there a long row of steam
cranes; at this place a mass of nondescript machinery; and at that
place a big dredge left high and dry on the banks of the mighty
Chagres at its flood stage, all spoke to the visitor of the French
defeat. Exposed to the ravages of 20 tropical summers, decay ran riot,
and but for the scenes of life and industry being enacted by the
Americans, one might have felt himself stalking amid the tombs of
thousands of dead hopes.

Almost as much money was raised by the French for their failure as was
appropriated by the Americans for their success. From the gilded
palace and from the peasant's humble cottage came the stream of gold
with which it was hoped to lay low the barrier that divided the
Atlantic and the Pacific. At first the French estimated that in seven
or eight years they could dig a 29-foot sea-level canal for
$114,000,000. After eight years they calculated that it would cost
$351,000,000 to make it a 15-foot lock canal and require 20 years to
build it.

Never was money spent so recklessly. For a time it flowed in faster
than it could be paid out--even by the Panama Canal Company. When the
company started it asked for $60,000,000. Double that amount was
offered. The seeming inexhaustibility of the funds led to unparalleled
extravagance; of the some $260,000,000 raised only a little more than
a third was spent in actual engineering work. Someone has said that a
third of the money was spent on the canal, a third was wasted, and a
third was stolen.

The director general at the expense of the stockholders built himself
a house costing $100,000. His summer home at La Boca cost $150,000. It
came to be known as "Dingler's Folly," for Dingler lost his wife and
children of yellow fever and never was able to live in his sumptuous
summer home. He drew $50,000 a year salary, and $50 a day for each day
he traveled a mile over the line in his splendid $42,000 Pullman. The
hospitals at Ancon and Colon cost $7,000,000, and the office
buildings over $5,000,000. Where a $50,000 building was needed, a
$100,000 building was erected, and the canal stockholders were charged
$200,000 for it.

Supplies were bought almost wholly without reference to actual needs.
Ten thousand snow shovels were brought to the Isthmus where no snow
ever has fallen. Some 15,000 torchlights were carried there to be used
in the great celebration upon the completion of the canal.
Steam-boats, dredges, launches, and whatnot were brought to the
Isthmus, knocked down, and taken into the interior to await the
opening of the waterway. The stationery bill of the canal company with
one firm alone amounted to $180,000 a year. When the Americans took
possession they found among other things a ton of rusty and useless
pen points, not one of which had ever been used.

Two years' service entitled employees to five months' leave of absence
and traveling expenses both ways. There was no adequate system of
accounting and any employee could have his requisition for household
articles honored almost as often as he liked. In a multitude of cases
this laxity was taken advantage of and quite a business was carried on
secretly in buying and selling furniture belonging to the company. One
official built a bath house costing $40,000. A son of de Lesseps
became a silent partner of nearly every large contractor on the
Isthmus, getting a large "rake-off" from every contract let.

Near the summit of the Great Divide the Americans who took possession
in 1904 found a small iron steamer. It is said to have been the
purpose of the canal promoters to put this little steamer on a small
pond in Culebra Cut, and by the aid of a skillful photographer to get
a picture showing navigation across the Isthmus. This steamer was
hauled by the Americans to Panama, where during the years of the
American construction work it did service in carrying the sick to the
sanitarium at Taboga.

The different uses to which this steamer was put during the French and
American régimes illustrates the different aims of the Americans and
the French in connection with the Panama Canal. There was little
concern about the health of the canal workers under the French, in
spite of great liberality in the construction of hospitals. The
construction work was let out to contractors, who were charged a
dollar a day by the French Company for maintaining the sick members of
their force in the hospital. Of course, the contractors were not over
anxious to put their employees into the hospitals. The result was that
the death rate at Panama reached almost unprecedented proportions.

[Illustration: THE MAN OF BRAWN]

[Illustration: FERDINAND DE LESSEPS

PHILIPPE BUNAU-VARILLA

AN OLD FRENCH EXCAVATOR NEAR TABERNILLA]

This was aided to a very large degree by the manner of living
obtaining there at that time. In 1887 Lieutenant Rogers, of the United
States Navy, inspected the canal work and reported that the laborers
were paid every Saturday, that they spent Sunday in drinking and
Monday in recuperating, returning to work on Tuesday. A prominent
English writer declared after a visit to Panama that in all the world
there was not, perhaps, concentrated in any single spot so much
swindling and villainy, so much vile disease, and such a hideous mass
of moral and physical abominations.

Add to these things the fact that no one then knew of the
responsibility of the stegomyia mosquito for the existence of yellow
fever, nor that the anopheles mosquito was the disseminator of
malaria, and it is little wonder that the French failed. The
hospitals, instead of aiding in the elimination of yellow fever,
became its greatest allies. The bedposts were set in cups of water,
and here the yellow-fever mosquitoes could breed uninterruptedly and
carry infection to every patient. Wards were shut up tight at night to
keep out the "terrible miasma," and the nurses went to their own
quarters. When morning came there were among those thus left alone
always some ready for the tomb.

The history of the French attempt to construct the Panama Canal
begins, in reality, with the Suez Canal. In 1854 Ferdinand de Lesseps,
a Frenchman connected with the diplomatic service, saw an opportunity
to revive the plans for a Suez Canal that had been urged by Napoleon
in 1798. His friend, Said Pasha, had just succeeded to the khediviate
of Egypt, and his proposals were warmly received. The building of the
canal, which presented no serious engineering problems, was begun in
1859 and completed 10 years later. There was a sordid side to its
story, too; but as the losses were borne chiefly by the Egyptians,
Europe ignored them and looked only to the great success of the canal
itself.

As a result, de Lesseps became a national hero in France, and when it
became known that he contemplated piercing another isthmus, the whole
country rose to his support. In 1875, six years after the Suez Canal
had been opened, and as soon as France had recovered her breath from
the shock of the war with Prussia, a company was organized by de
Lesseps to procure a concession for the building of a Panama Canal.

Already the world, as well as France, had come to regard de Lesseps as
an engineer, rather than as a promoter of stock companies, and in this
lay the germ of the disaster that was to overtake the whole scheme.

In 1876, Lucien Napoleon Bonaparte Wyse, a lieutenant of engineers in
the French Army, was sent to Panama to determine the most feasible
route and to conclude negotiations for the construction of a canal
there. He made a perfunctory survey, commencing at Panama and
extending only two-thirds of the way to the Atlantic coast;
nevertheless, he calculated the cost in detail and claimed that his
estimates might be depended upon to come within 10 per cent of the
actual figures. However weak in engineering he may have been, he was
strong in international negotiations, returning to France with a
concession which gave him the right to form a company to build the
canal, and which gave to that company all the rights it needed,
subject only to the prior rights of the Panama Railroad Company under
its concession. The concession was to run for 99 years, beginning from
the date when the collection of tolls on transit and navigation should
begin. The promoters were allowed 2 years to form the company and 12
years to build the canal. The Government of Colombia was entitled to a
share in the gross income of the canal after the seventy-fifth year
from its opening. Four-fifths of this was to be paid to the National
Government and one-fifth to the State of Panama. The canal company was
to guarantee that these annual payments should on no account be less
than $250,000.

When Wyse returned to Paris he got de Lesseps to head the project. The
hero of Suez summoned an international commission of individuals and
engineers, known as the International Scientific Congress, which met
in Paris, May 15, 1879. There were 135 delegates in attendance, most
of whom were Frenchmen, although nearly every European nation was
represented. The United States had 11 representatives at this
congress. After two weeks' conference the decision was reached that a
sea-level canal should be constructed from Colon to Panama. Only 42 of
the 135 men who met were engineers, and it has been stated that those
who knew most about the subject found their opinions least in demand.
M. de Lesseps dominated the conference. Several members who were
radically opposed to its conclusions, rather than declare their
difference from the opinions of a man of such great distinction and
high reputation as de Lesseps enjoyed at that time, absented
themselves when the final vote was taken.

After it was determined to build a sea-level canal, the canal
concession owned by Wyse and his associates was transferred to the
Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interoceanique (The Universal
Interoceanic Canal Company) of which de Lesseps was given control. The
canal company was capitalized at $60,000,000. The preliminary budget
of expenses amounted to $9,000,000, of which $2,000,000 went to Wyse
and his associates for the concession. The organizers were entitled to
certain cash payments and 15 per cent of the net profits.

The canal company soon found it necessary to acquire a controlling
interest in the Panama Railroad. That corporation insisted on charging
regular rates on all canal business. In addition, it possessed such
prior rights as made the Wyse concession worthless except there be
agreement on all matters between the railroad company and the canal
company. The result was that the canal company bought the railroad,
and its rights, for the sum of about $18,000,000.

The first visit of de Lesseps to the Isthmus was made in the early
weeks of 1880. He arrived on the 30th day of December, 1879, and was
met by a delegation appointed by the Government, and one nominated by
the State Assembly. There was the usual reception, with its attendant
champagne and conviviality, and a fine display of fire-works at night.
The next day, with a chart before him, de Lesseps promptly decided
where the breakwater to protect the mouth of the canal from the
"northers" sweeping into Limon Bay should be located. He declared that
in the construction of the canal there were only two great
difficulties--the Chagres River and Culebra Cut. The first he proposed
to overcome by sending its waters to the Pacific Ocean by another
route--a project which it has since been estimated would have cost
almost as much as building the canal. The second difficulty he thought
would disappear with the use of explosives of sufficient force to
remove vast quantities of material with each discharge. There was a
great hurrah, and an international celebration during de Lesseps'
stay. The flags of all nations were prominently displayed, with the
single exception of that of the United States.

Count de Lesseps was over 70 years old when he first visited the
Isthmus, though he was still active and vigorous. Mr. Tracy Robinson
described him as "a small man, French in detail, with winning manners
and a magnetic presence. He would conclude almost every statement
with, 'The Canal will be made,' just as a famous Roman always
exclaimed, 'Delende est Carthago.' He was accompanied to the Isthmus
by his wife and three of his seven children. Being a fine horseman, he
delighted in mounting the wildest steeds that Panama could furnish.
Riding over the rough country in which the canal was being located all
day long, he would dance all night like a boy and be ready for the
next day's work 'as fresh as a daisy.'"

On New Year's Day, 1880, de Lesseps formally inaugurated the work of
building the canal. A large party of ladies and gentlemen visited the
mouth of the Rio Grande where the first shovelful of sod was to be
turned. An address was made by Count de Lesseps, and a benediction
upon the enterprise was bestowed by the Bishop of Panama. Champagne
flowed like water, and it is said that the speechmaking continued so
long that the party did not have time to go ashore to turn the sod, so
it was brought on board and Miss Fernanda de Lesseps there made the
initial stroke in the digging of the big waterway.

Some days later the work at Culebra Cut was inaugurated. Tracy
Robinson thus described the scene: "The blessing had been pronounced
by the Bishop of Panama and the champagne, duly iced, was waiting to
quell the swelter of the tropical sun as soon as the explosion went
off. There the crowd stood breathless, ears stopped, eyes blinking,
half in terror lest this artificial earthquake might involve general
destruction. But there was no explosion! It would not go! Then a
humorous sense of relief stole upon the crowd. With one accord
everybody exclaimed, 'Good Gracious!' and hurried away for fear that
after all the dynamite should see fit to explode. That was Fiasco No.
1."

After de Lesseps left the Isthmus he toured the United States where he
was everywhere welcomed although he did not find a market in this
country for his stock.

The scientific congress estimated the cost of building the canal,
whose construction de Lesseps had inaugurated, at $214,000,000. M. de
Lesseps himself later arbitrarily cut this estimate to $131,000,000,
and announced that he believed that vessels would be able to go from
ocean to ocean after the expenditure of $120,000,000. He declared that
if the committee had decided to build a lock canal, he would have put
on his hat and gone home, since he believed it would be much more
expensive to build a lock canal with twin chambers than to build a
sea-level waterway. There were those who declared that six years was
the utmost limit that would be required for building the big ditch.
Others asserted with confidence that it could be done in four years.

During the first three years the company devoted its time to getting
ready for the real work. By 1885 the profligate use of the money
subscribed by the French people brought the funds of the canal company
to a very low ebb. M. de Lesseps asked for permission to establish a
lottery, by which he hoped to provide additional funds for carrying on
the work. The French Government held up the matter and finally sent an
eminent engineer to investigate. This engineer, Armand Rosseau,
reported that the completion of a sea-level canal was not possible
with the means in sight, and recommended a lock canal, plans for which
he submitted. The summit level of this canal was to be 160 feet,
reached by a series of seven or eight locks. After this plan was
adopted, to which de Lesseps reluctantly consented, lottery bonds of a
face value of $160,000,000 were issued which were to bear 4 per cent
interest. But the people failed to subscribe.

At the outset of the work de Lesseps established a bulletin for the
dissemination of information concerning the canal; during the entire
period of his connection with the project this bulletin was filled
with the most exaggerated reports, and the most reckless
mis-statements in favor of a successful prosecution of the work. By
1888 the confidence of the French people in de Lesseps waned. Unable
to raise more money, and now popularly dubbed the "Great Undertaker,"
he found himself in such straits that he saw the French Government
take over the wrecked organization by appointing a receiver with the
power to dispose of its assets. This proved a terrible blow to the
people on the Isthmus. Untold hardships befell the small army of
laborers and clerks. The Government of Jamaica repatriated over 6,000
negroes. The Chilean Government granted 40,000 free passages to Chile,
open to all classes except negroes and Chinese, and for several months
every mail steamer south took away from 600 to 800 stranded people
from the canal region. Where good times and the utmost plenty had
prevailed for years, the Isthmus was now face to face with a period of
want and privation, its glory departed and its hope almost gone.

The receiver of the Panama Canal Company assisted in the organization
of another company known as the New Panama Canal Company. With a
working capital of $13,000,000, it excavated more than 12,000,000
cubic yards of material. In 1890 it found itself in danger of losing
everything by reason of the expiration of its concession. The services
of Lieutenant Wyse were again brought into play, and he secured a
10-year extension of the concession. In 1893 another concession was
granted, with the provision that work should be begun on a permanent
basis by October 31, 1894, and that the canal should be completed by
October 31, 1904. Toward the end of the nineties, it was manifest that
the concession would expire before the work could be finished, so, in
April, 1900, another extension was arranged, which stipulated that the
canal should be completed by October 31, 1910. The New Panama Canal
Company, as a matter of fact, had no other aim in view than to keep
the concession alive in the hope that it could be sold to the United
States.

With all of their profligacy, however, the French left to their
American successors a valuable heritage. What they did was done with
the utmost thoroughness. The machinery which they bequeathed to the
Americans was of immense value. There was enough of this to cover a
500-acre farm 3 feet deep, with enough more to build a 6-foot fence
around it all. The French equipment was of the best. Dredges and
locomotives that stood in the jungle for 20 years were rebuilt by the
Americans at less than 10 per cent of their first cost, and did
service during the entire period of construction.

Although the New Panama Canal Company at one time asked $150,000,000
for its assets, it finally accepted $40,000,000. An appraisement made
by American engineers a few years ago showed that the actual worth of
the property acquired, aside from the franchise itself, amounted to
about $42,000,000.

Count de Lesseps lived to a great age. His last years were saddened
and embittered by the volumes of denunciation that were written and
spoken against him. Certain it is that no man ever went further than
he to maintain confidence in a project that was destined to fail, and
yet his partisans declared that his sin was the sin of overenthusiasm
and not of dishonest purpose. Under the torrents of abuse that fell
upon his head his mind weakened, and, fortunately, in his last days he
realized little of the immeasurable injustice his misplaced zeal and
overenthusiasm had wrought against the people of France.




CHAPTER XVIII

CHOOSING THE PANAMA ROUTE


Proud as Americans now are of the success of their venture at Panama,
in the beginning there was by no means a general agreement that the
United States would succeed where France had failed. Indeed, the
French disaster had much influence in strengthening the position of
those who favored building the American canal through Nicaragua.

Prior to the year 1900 little thought was given by the American people
to any project for building an Isthmian Canal anywhere else than
through Nicaragua. It is true that in 1897 the New Panama Canal
Company became active in its efforts to induce the United States to
adopt the Panama route, but these activities made little impression
upon public sentiment before the outbreak of the Spanish American War.
During that war interest in the question of an Isthmian Canal waned in
America, and immediately after it the sympathy which France had given
to Spain made it advisable for the Canal Company to postpone its
propaganda.

In his annual message to Congress in December, 1898, President
McKinley recommended the building of the Nicaragua Canal. Two days
later Senator John T. Morgan, of Alabama, made a vigorous speech in
the Senate, in which he charged that the transcontinental railroads of
the United States were making efforts to defeat the canal project.
This charge was made repeatedly thereafter, and it was asserted that
the railroads espoused the cause of the Panama Canal upon the ground
of choosing the lesser of two evils, judged from their standpoint.
Prior to 1900 both Republican and Democratic parties had repeatedly
favored the construction of the Nicaragua Canal in their national
platforms, and both branches of Congress had voted for the canal at
different times.

In the early part of 1899 the Senate passed a bill authorizing the
construction of a Nicaraguan Canal. The House refused to act on the
bill, and, at the instance of Senator Morgan, the Senate attached a
rider to the rivers and harbors bill, appropriating $10,000,000 to
begin the building of the canal. This passed the Senate by a vote of
54 to 3. The amendment was defeated in the House and the matter went
to conference. If the House conferees stood pat in their opposition to
the Senate amendment, the whole rivers and harbors bill would be
defeated unless the Senate conferees yielded. The House conferees
remained unshaken in their opposition to the Nicaragua Canal
provision, and were willing to wreck the whole rivers and harbors bill
rather than to authorize the beginning of operations in the
construction of the Nicaragua Canal under the plan framed by the
Senate.

According to Philippe Bunau-Varilla, the real secret of the defeat of
the Nicaragua Canal project at this juncture lay in a dispute between
the House and Senate as to the manner of building the canal. The
Senate wanted to do it by the reorganization of the Maritime Canal
Company, with the majority of its board of directors appointed by the
President, using that corporation as the agent of the Government for
constructing and operating the canal. Representative William P.
Hepburn, of Iowa, at that time Chairman of the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, contended that such a plan proposed that the
United States should masquerade as a corporation, instead of doing the
work in its own proper person, as it was in every sense capable of
doing. He asked for what purpose the Government should thus convert
itself into a corporation, making of itself an artificial person and
taking a position of equality with a citizen? He further pointed out
that as a corporation the Government might be sued in its own courts,
and fined for contempt by its own judicial servants.

A compromise was adopted in the form of an appropriation of $1,000,000
to defray the expenses of an investigation into all of the various
routes for an Isthmian Canal. This investigation was to have reference
particularly to the relative merits of the Nicaragua and Panama
routes, together with an estimate of the cost of constructing each.
The investigators were to ascertain what rights, privileges, and
franchises were held, and what work had been done in the construction
of the proposed canals. They were also to ascertain the cost of
acquiring the interests of any organizations holding franchises on
these routes. The President was directed to employ engineers of the
United States Army and engineers from civil life, together with such
other persons as were necessary to carry out the purposes of the
investigation. A few months later he appointed the first Isthmian
Canal Commission, consisting of Rear Admiral John G. Walker, Senator
Samuel Pasco, Alfred Noble, George S. Morison, Peter C. Hains, William
H. Burr, O. H. Ernst, Louis M. Haupt, and Emory R. Johnson.

Thus it came about that the House and Senate, divided only upon the
issue of the proper method of building the Nicaragua Canal, reopened
the whole question, and gave to the Panama Canal advocates a chance to
make a fight in favor of that route. The advocates of the Nicaragua
Canal were not satisfied, however, to await the discoveries of the
commission Congress had created. On May 2, 1900, before the commission
made its report, the House voted 234 to 36 in favor of the Nicaragua
route. The bill went to the Senate, where it was favorably reported by
the Committee on Interoceanic Canals. Senator Morgan made a formal
motion for the immediate consideration of the measure, but it was lost
by a vote of 28 to 21. He then had the 2nd day of December following
fixed as the date for again taking up the matter. His committee made a
report roundly scoring the representatives of the New Panama Canal
Company for their activities in favor of the Panama route.

In December, 1900, Secretary Hay signed protocols with the ministers
of Nicaragua and Costa Rica, by which those Governments undertook to
negotiate treaties as soon as the President of the United States
should be authorized by Congress to acquire the Nicaragua route. In
the following February, Senator Morgan offered an amendment to the
sundry civil appropriation bill authorizing the President to go ahead
with the construction of the canal. When Theodore Roosevelt became
President in September, 1901, he recommended the building of the
Nicaragua Canal in his official statement of policy.

In the meantime the Isthmian Canal Commission had been repeatedly
attempting to get the New Panama Canal Company to state for what sum
it would sell its holdings to the United States. The figures finally
presented placed a value of $109,000,000 upon the property. After
this, the Isthmian Canal Commission unanimously recommended the
adoption of the Nicaragua route. Congress again took up the matter,
upon a bill introduced by Representative Hepburn, making an
appropriation of $180,000,000 for the construction of the canal. This
measure was favorably reported by the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, and also secured the approval of the Senate
Committee on Interoceanic Canals.

A few days later a formal convention was signed in Nicaragua by the
minister of foreign affairs and the American minister, looking to the
construction of the canal through Nicaraguan territory. A week later
the Senate ratified the Hay-Pauncefote treaty with Great Britain. On
January 7 the House of Representatives again took up the matter and,
in spite of the fact that the New Panama Canal Company had decided to
accept $40,000,000 for its property, this offer was rejected by the
House of Representatives, which passed the bill authorizing the
construction of the Nicaragua Canal by the overwhelming vote of 309 to
2.

After the rejection of the offer of the New Panama Canal Company by
the House, President Roosevelt again called the members of the
Isthmian Canal Commission together, and asked them to make a
supplementary report in view of the offer in question. On a motion of
Commissioner Morison the commission decided that, in consideration of
the change of conditions brought about by the offer of the company to
sell its property for $40,000,000, the Panama route was preferable. It
has been stated that Professor Haupt, Senator Pasco, and two other
members of the commission were reluctant to abandon the Nicaragua
project; that President Roosevelt had made it quite clear to Admiral
Walker that he expected the commission to accept the Panama Canal
Company's offer; that Commissioners Noble and Pasco had given in, but
that Professor Haupt stood out; and that he was induced to sign the
report only after Admiral Walker had called him out of the committee
room and pleaded with him to do so, stating that the President
demanded a unanimous report. Professor Haupt afterwards publicly
admitted the truth of this story in a signed article in a magazine.

About this time the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals appointed
a subcommittee of six members to study and report on the legal
questions involved in the transfer of the New Panama Canal Company's
title, and a majority reported that the company's title was defective
and that it had no power to transfer. It was finally decided that the
Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals should make no report until
all of the members of the Isthmian Canal Commission had appeared
before it and testified. This delay permitted negotiations between the
United States, the New Panama Canal Company, and the Republic of
Colombia looking to a settlement of the question of title.

The New Panama Canal Company was now thoroughly in earnest in its
desire to dispose of its holdings to the United States, but the
Republic of Colombia, desiring to drive a good bargain, held aloof.
The hope of the situation as far as the Panama route was concerned,
lay in Senator Marcus A. Hanna, of Ohio, who had come to espouse the
Panama route. He declared he would not recommend the acceptance of the
proposals of the New Panama Canal Company unless a satisfactory treaty
could be obtained, and unless the shareholders of the company would
ratify the action of the board of directors in making the offer. A
meeting of the shareholders was called in February, 1902, at which the
Republic of Colombia, holding a million dollars' worth of stock in the
company, was represented by a Government delegate. He served formal
notice on the company that it was forbidden, on pain of forfeiture of
its concession, to sell its rights to the United States before that
action was approved by the Colombian Government, there being a clause
in the concession providing that in the event of such a sale to any
foreign Government all rights, titles, and property should revert to
Colombia.

When the Colombian Government took up the matter it showed a
disposition to grasp the lion's share. Its minister was instructed to
exact no less than $20,000,000 from the New Panama Canal Company for
Colombia's permission to transfer its concessions. This demand was
based on the following reasons: First, because Colombia's consent was
essential; second, because Colombia would lose its expectation of
acquiring the Panama Railroad at the expiration of its concession--a
road that was then valued at $18,000,000; third, because under the
proposed contract with the United States, Colombia was to renounce its
share in the prospective earnings of the canal, which might amount to
a million dollars a year.

Another proposition was drawn by the Colombian minister, proposing to
lease a zone across the Isthmus of the United States for a period of
200 years at an annual rental of $600,000. At another time the
Colombian minister declared that, inasmuch as the New Panama Canal
Company had taken advantage of the straitened circumstances of the
Colombian Government to obtain a six-year extension of its concession,
which was really what the canal company was about to sell for
$40,000,000, he thought Colombia ought to require the New Panama Canal
Company to pay $3,000,000 of the $40,000,000, for what the company
gained by the extension of its concession.

On January 30, 1902, Senator John C. Spooner, of Wisconsin, introduced
a bill in the Senate, authorizing the President of the United States
to build an Isthmian Canal at Panama, if the necessary rights could be
obtained. If those rights could not be obtained the President was
required to build the canal on the Nicaraguan route. The Spooner bill
provided the machinery for the construction of the canal, created the
Isthmian Canal Commission, and authorized the expenditures necessary
for undertaking the project. Some six weeks later the Senate Committee
on Interoceanic Canals rejected the Spooner bill and presented a
favorable report on the Hepburn bill, which authorized the Nicaragua
Canal.

The final struggle in the Senate lasted from June 4 to June 19, 1902.
Senators Morgan and Harris led the fight for the Hepburn bill, while
Senators Hanna and Spooner championed the Spooner measure. The fight
resulted in the passage of the Spooner bill by a vote of 32 to 24. The
disagreeing votes of the two Houses were then sent to conference, and
the House finally receded from its position in favor of the Nicaragua
route, and the Spooner bill became a law. The situation as it now
stood was that the Panama route was chosen on the conditions that the
title of the company be proved and that a satisfactory treaty with
Colombia be negotiated; with the alternative of the adoption of the
Nicaragua route in default of one or the other of these conditions.

Whatever may have been his motives--in the light of events which have
followed it would seem unjust to question them--Senator Hanna was
undoubtedly responsible for the revolution in Congress and in public
sentiment which resulted in the selection of the Panama route. M.
Bunau-Varilla declares that he met Myron T. Herrick in Paris,
converted him, and through him met Senator Hanna, whom he also
convinced. In Crowley's "Life and Work of Marcus Alonzo Hanna," it is
declared that a series of interviews between M. Bunau-Varilla and
Senator Hanna had much to do with Mr. Hanna's decision to make a fight
in behalf of Panama. It was claimed by William Nelson Cromwell, in his
suit for fees against the New Panama Canal Company, that he was
responsible for converting Senator Hanna to the Panama project, and it
was asserted, also, that he furnished the data from which Senator
Hanna made his speech which converted the Senate, and the House, and
the country, and led to the adoption of the Panama route.

At this juncture Providence seemed to lend support to the Panama
route, for one of the many volcanoes in Nicaragua became active and
did considerable damage. Occurrences since then have borne out the
wisdom of avoiding the Nicaragua route. A few years ago the city of
Cartago, only about a hundred miles distant from the site of the works
that would have been installed to control the waters of Lake
Nicaragua, was entirely destroyed by an earthquake.

With the Spooner bill enacted into law, the next proposition which
confronted the United States Government was that of reaching an
understanding with Colombia, which would permit the building of the
canal at Panama. That country was reminded on every hand and in divers
ways that unless an acceptable treaty were forthcoming the President
of the United States would be forced to adopt the Nicaragua route.
But, notwithstanding these reminders, Colombia still moved slowly in
the matter. After being repeatedly urged to come to terms, and after
one Colombian minister to the United States had been recalled and
another resigned, the Hay-Herran treaty finally was negotiated.

Before Colombia reached the stage, however, where it would agree to
enter into negotiations with the United States, it had been reminded
by its minister in Washington that it was dangerous not to enter into
an agreement. He had declared that if Colombia should refuse to hear
the American proposal that a new treaty be entered into, the United
States would, in retaliation, denounce the treaty of 1846, and
thereafter view with complacency any events which might take place in
Panama inimical to Colombia's interests. He had reported further that
the United States would, at the first interruption of the railroad
service, occupy at once Colombia's territory on the Isthmus and
embrace whatever tendency there might be toward separation, in the
hope of bringing about the independence of Panama. This, he had
concluded, would be a catastrophe of far greater consequence to
Colombia than any damage the Republic might suffer by the ratification
of a treaty with the United States permitting the building of the
canal.

His views in the matter were strengthened by a suggestion of Senator
Shelby M. Cullom, of Illinois, that if Colombia should continue to
refuse to allow the United States to build the canal, which the United
States claimed was its right to do under the treaty of 1846, the
American Government might invoke a sort of universal right of eminent
domain, take the Isthmian territory, and pay Colombia its value in
accordance with an appraisement by experts.

About this time President Roosevelt wrote a letter to his friend, Dr.
Albert D. Shaw, of the Review of Reviews, in which he said that he had
been appealed to for aid and encouragement to a revolution at Panama,
but that as much as he would like to see such a revolution, he could
not lend any encouragement to it. The Republic of Colombia was
repeatedly reminded by Secretary Hay that if it did not act promptly
the President would take up negotiations with Nicaragua and proceed to
construct the canal there. Under these conditions Colombia finally
agreed to negotiate the Hay-Herran treaty, which was afterwards
rejected by the Colombian Congress.

It has been asserted that President Roosevelt took the view all along
that under the treaty of 1846, Colombia had no right to prevent the
United States from building the canal, and that, in spite of the
provision of the Spooner Act requiring him to proceed with the
construction of the Nicaragua Canal in the event of the failure of
negotiations at Panama, he was determined to exhaust every possible
effort before giving up the Panama route.




CHAPTER XIX

CONTROVERSY WITH COLOMBIA


Seldom in the history of international relations has a controversy
afforded more grounds for honest difference of opinion than the issue
between the United States and Colombia, growing out of the revolution
and formation of the new Republic of Panama. The most careful and
unprejudiced study still may leave room for doubt as to the real
merits of the case.

In 1903, after the United States had decided to build an Isthmian
Canal, preferably at Panama, but if that route were not available at
Nicaragua, a treaty was entered into at Washington between the
Governments of the United States and Colombia. This Hay-Herran treaty,
as it was known, in simple terms provided that the United States would
pay Colombia $10,000,000 in cash, and $250,000 a year after the
completion of the canal, if the Republic of Colombia would agree to
permit the New Panama Canal Company to sell its concession and
property to the United States. This treaty, according to President
Roosevelt, was entered into under negotiations initiated by the
Republic of Colombia. The treaty was ratified by the United States
Senate, and was then sent to Colombia for its ratification.

At the time the treaty was pending in the Colombian Congress, the
President of the Republic was a man who had been elected Vice
President, but who had kidnapped the President with a troop of cavalry
and shut him up in an insanitary dungeon where he soon died. The Vice
President thus became the head of the Government. Anyone who knows
conditions in such countries as Colombia, understands that a President
has no use for a Congress except to have it register his own will. The
President of Colombia at first advocated the negotiation of the
treaty, but he repudiated it after it had been signed, and then
declared that if the Colombian minister to Washington were to return
to Colombia he would be hanged for signing it. The result of this
change of front was that the treaty was rejected by the Colombian
Congress. All sorts of stories were put abroad in Colombia to arouse
opposition to it. One was that the United States would make
$180,000,000 out of the canal deal the minute the treaty was ratified
by Colombia. It was claimed by the Colombian Government that the
constitutional prohibition of the cession of territory to a foreign
state would have to be changed by amending the Constitution before the
Congress could legally ratify the treaty.

[Illustration: S. B. WILLIAMSON

THE LOWER GATES, MIRAFLORES LOCKS]

[Illustration: H. O. COLE

MIDDLE GATES, MIRAFLORES LOCKS]

How little the President of Colombia respected the laws of his country
is shown by a dispatch received by the Government at Washington after
the secession of Panama, in which it was promised that if the United
States would assist Colombia in putting down the Panama revolution,
the next Colombian Congress would ratify the rejected treaty. Or,
failing that, the President would declare martial law, by virtue of
vested constitutional authority when public order is disturbed, and
ratify the canal treaty by presidential decree. If the Washington
Government did not like such a proposal, the President of Colombia
would call an extra session of Congress and immediately ratify the
treaty.

The real cause of the failure of the Hay-Herran treaty is not
difficult to discover. The concession of the New Panama Canal Company
under one of its renewals expired October 31, 1893. It was then
extended for a year, and, in 1894, was extended again for a period of
10 years. Still another extension was granted, which carried the date
of expiration to October 31, 1910. This last extension was granted by
the President without the consent of the Colombian Congress. In 1903,
when the Hay-Herran treaty was pending, the validity of this last
extension was denied, and the assertion made that on October 31, 1901,
all of the rights and property of the New Panama Canal Company would
revert to the Colombian Government.

The United States had agreed to pay to the New Panama Canal Company
$40,000,000 for its concession and property. According to
Representative Henry T. Rainey, of Illinois, who for years led the
attack in the United States Congress on the acts of President
Roosevelt in connection with the Panaman revolution, the purpose of
Colombia in defeating the treaty was to wait until the expiration of
the concession, when all of the property of the canal company would
revert to Colombia, and it could then sell it to the United States
and get the $40,000,000, or any other amount it could persuade the
United States to pay.

Of course, the New Panama Canal Company did not look upon such an
arrangement with any degree of complacency. It felt that it was a
deliberate scheme upon the part of the Colombian Government to mulct
it out of its property and its rights. As a result it was naturally
ready to lend aid and encouragement to any movement which would
circumvent this purpose of Colombia. It found conditions in Panama
just what it might have wished.

The people of Panama felt that they had the same sort of grievance
against Colombia that the people of the American colonies felt they
had against England in 1776. The governors of the province were, with
few exceptions, sent there from Bogota, and were entirely out of
sympathy with the people of Panama. The taxes collected at Panama were
carried to Bogota, as a rule, and the voice that the people of the
Isthmus had in the Government of Colombia was negligible. Furthermore,
they felt that they were entitled to their sovereignty.

After the countries of tropical America had thrown off the yoke of
Spain, Panama found itself too small to stand alone, and accepted an
invitation from Bogota to put itself under the Government there with
the understanding that it was to retain its sovereignty. It soon found
that this agreement was not respected at Bogota. Almost immediately
there were attempted revolts and, in 1840, the Isthmus again won
complete independence. The Confederation of New Granada promised that
the people of the Isthmus should have better treatment, and it was set
forth in the constitution of New Granada that Panama was a sovereign
state, and that it had full right to withdraw and set up an
independent government at any time. In 1885 a new constitution was
proclaimed by Colombia, which had succeeded New Granada, and this
constitution deprived Panama of all its rights as a sovereign state,
and made it a province under the control of the Federal Government at
Bogota. Upon these grounds Panama claimed that she was a sovereign
state temporarily under the duress of a superior government. After the
defeat of the Hay-Herran treaty the inhabitants of Panama knew that if
the treaty failed and no other steps were taken, the Nicaraguan route
would be followed and Panama would become almost a forgotten region
instead of a land of great opportunity.

The consequence was that the Panamans lent willing ears to the
suggestion of the representatives of the New Panama Canal Company that
they should undertake a revolution to be financed by the canal
company. Two representatives of the New Panama Canal Company working
along independent lines were trying to bring about the revolution. One
of these was Philippe Bunau-Varilla, formerly chief engineer of the
Old Panama Canal Company, but who had become estranged from the New
Panama Canal Company. The other was William Nelson Cromwell, for years
general counsel of the Panama Railroad Company, and who, in his suit
against the New Panama Canal Company for an $800,000 fee, claimed to
have engineered and directed the revolution. M. Bunau-Varilla had some
stock in the canal company and a great deal of pride in seeing
realized the undertaking to which he had committed the best years of
his life.

Coming to New York on another mission, he met Dr. Amador, who was one
of the Panamans desiring the independence of his country. According to
the testimony of M. Bunau-Varilla, which is borne out by documentary
evidence, he and Dr. Amador worked out the plan for the revolution. He
declares that the documents were drawn in the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel
and as far as they were written in Spanish, they were copied letter by
letter by an English stenographer who knew no Spanish, in order that
there might be no possibility of the secret leaking out. He declares
that the whole project of the revolution as it was carried out was
conceived by him in cooperation with Dr. Amador, and that William
Nelson Cromwell, the other factor in the situation, knew nothing about
what was going on. He also asserts that William Nelson Cromwell had
promised to introduce Dr. Amador to Secretary of State John Hay, but
that later Dr. Herran, the representative of Colombia, found out what
was going on and wrote a letter of warning to Mr. Cromwell as to the
consequences which would come to the Panama Railroad, of which Mr.
Cromwell was the representative, if that organization should give aid
or comfort to the projected Panama revolution. Thereupon, according to
M. Bunau-Varilla, Mr. Cromwell turned his back upon Dr. Amador,
although it has been claimed by some that this was only a ruse on the
part of Mr. Cromwell to shield himself and his company from
responsibility. About this time M. Bunau-Varilla borrowed $100,000 in
France to finance the revolution, pending the recognition of the new
Republic by the United States. Other money was forthcoming later.

The revolution itself, which took place in November, 1903, was
bloodless. The world knows that President Roosevelt forbade the
Colombian troops to move across the Isthmus, while at the same time he
would not allow the revolutionists to make any move. A similar
situation had arisen in a former revolution in 1902. At that time the
Colombian troops were disarmed, and three days later insurgent troops
were prevented by United States marines from using the railroad and
were actually compelled to leave a train which they had seized and
entered. The principle was enunciated and maintained that no troops
under arms should be transported on the railroad, no matter to which
party they belonged. That was because to permit such transportation
would be to make the railroad an adjunct to the side using it, and to
subject it to attack by the other party. In this way, if the Colombian
troops used it, the insurgents would have attacked, and the United
States would either have been forced to permit such an attack, which
might suspend traffic on the transit, or to prevent it with force,
which would make this country an ally of Colombia against the
insurgents. On the other hand, if the insurgents were permitted to
use the railroad, Colombia would attack it, and in that case the
United States would have to help repel the attack and thus would
become the ally of the insurgents. It was, therefore, held that the
only way to make the road absolutely neutral was to allow neither
party to use it.

This was the doctrine under which President Roosevelt proceeded in
1903. Of course, the world knows that this was tantamount to
preventing Colombia from reconquering the Isthmus, if that were
possible. It is claimed by some that if President Roosevelt had
allowed the insurgents to use the railroad in 1902, Colombia would
have been defeated in that revolution.

At the time of the revolution it is said that the Colombian garrison
which espoused the cause of the Panamans was bribed to do so; that
their commander two days afterwards was paid $12,500 for his services,
and that he is to this day drawing a pension of $2,400 a year. It is
also charged that some of the troops who could not be bribed were sent
into the interior to repel an imaginary invasion from Nicaragua. It is
asserted that when the governor of the State of Panama telegraphed the
Colombian Government that Nicaragua was invading Panama, the Bogota
authorities sent additional troops to the Isthmus to help fight
Nicaragua, and that this accounted for the arrival of the gunboats
from Cartagena on the eve of the revolution.

At the time of the _coup d'etat_, the United States was living under a
treaty made with Colombia in 1846, guaranteeing the sovereignty of
that country over the Isthmus in return for the recognition of the
rights of the United States, under the Monroe doctrine, in connection
with the building of a canal. Under this treaty it was mutually agreed
that the United States should keep the Isthmian transit free and open
at all times. It was contended by President Roosevelt that he was only
carrying out this provision when he refused to allow the
revolutionists and the Federal troops to fight along the line of the
Panama Railroad, although this was almost the only ground on the
Isthmus on which military operations could be prosecuted. He admitted
the justice of the contention of the Colombian Government that the
United States undertook to guarantee the sovereignty of Colombia over
the Isthmus so far as any alien power was concerned, but denied that
it was ever intended that the United States should be called upon to
guarantee it against the people of the Isthmus themselves.

Once the revolution was started three courses were left open to the
United States: One was to force the Panamans back under Colombian
rule; the second was to let the two sides fight to a finish; the third
was to recognize the independence of the Republic of Panama and forbid
Colombia to land troops on the Isthmus. President Roosevelt took the
last course. A breezy Western congressman remarked in defense of that
course: "When that jack rabbit jumped I am glad we didn't have a
bowlegged man for President!" The result of the revolution, and the
recognition of the independence of the Republic of Panama, was that
Colombia, which had tried to grasp everything and to get possession
of the assets of the New Panama Canal Company, now found itself
without anything.

Colombia ever since has contended that the United States was under a
solemn obligation to protect the Colombian sovereignty over the
Isthmus--an obligation that has been assumed in return for valuable
considerations--and that it had been despoiled of the Isthmus of
Panama under the very treaty that had guaranteed its permanent control
of that Isthmus. It further asserted that President Roosevelt had been
a party to the revolution for the purpose of circumventing the stand
of the Republic of Colombia. It made a long plea against the action of
the United States and urged that in the event the two countries could
not come to any agreement, the pending questions should be submitted
to The Hague for adjudication. Secretary Hay at one time proposed that
a popular election should be held on the Isthmus to determine whether
the people there preferred allegiance to the Republic of Panama or to
the Republic of Colombia, but Colombia would not agree to that.
Secretary Hay rejected the plea of Colombia for arbitration, upon the
ground that the questions that Colombia proposed to submit affected
the honor of the United States and that these matters were not
arbitrable.

[Illustration: EDWARD J. WILLIAMS

THE PAY CAR AT CULEBRA]

[Illustration: UNCLE SAM'S LAUNDRY AT CRISTOBAL]

After Elihu Root became Secretary of State, he declared that the real
gravamen of the Colombian complaint was the espousal of the cause of
Panama by the people of the United States. He said that no arbitration
could deal with the real rights and wrongs of the parties concerned,
unless it were to pass upon the question of whether the cause thus
espoused was just--whether the people of Panama were exercising their
just rights in maintaining their right of independence of Colombian
rule. "We assert and maintain the affirmative upon that question," he
declared. "We assert that the ancient State of Panama was independent
in its origin, and by nature and history a separate political
community; that it was federated with the other States of Colombia
upon terms that preserved and continued its sovereignty, and that it
never surrendered that sovereignty and was subjugated by force in
1885." Mr. Root further asserted that the United States was not
"willing to permit any arbitrator to determine the political policy of
the United States in following its sense of right and justice by
espousing the cause of the Government of Panama against the Government
of Colombia."

When Mr. Taft became President it was his desire to adjust our
controversy with Colombia. His Secretary of State, Philander C. Knox,
just before leaving office, declared that he had spared no efforts in
seeking to restore American-Colombian relations to a footing of
complete friendly feeling, but that these efforts had been rebuffed by
the Colombian Government. He declared that it was undeniable that
Colombia had suffered by its failure to reap a share of the benefits
of the canal, and that the Government of the United States was
entirely willing to take this consideration into account, and endeavor
to accommodate the conflicting interests of the three parties by
making a just compensation in money. In pursuance of this idea three
treaties were negotiated: One between the United States and the
Republic of Columbia, one between the United States and the Republic
of Panama, and one between the governments of Columbia and Panama, all
three being interdependent, to stand or to fall together. These
treaties were negotiated at the instance of Columbia and were framed
with every desire to accommodate their terms to the just expectations
of that country. They were accepted by the Columbian Cabinet but were
not acted upon by the Columbian Congress.

In the Knox treaty negotiated with Columbia in 1910 that country
proposed to agree to a popular election upon the separation of Panama
and to abide by the result. The United States offered to sign an
additional agreement to pay to Columbia $10,000,000 for a permanent
option for the construction of an interoceanic canal through Columbian
territory, and for the perpetual lease of the Islands of St. Andrews
and Old Providence, if Columbia would ratify the treaties with the
United States and Panama. This proposition was refused. It was then
proposed that in addition to the $10,000,000 the Unites States would
be willing to conclude with Columbia a convention submitting to
arbitration the question of the ownership of the reversionary rights
in the Panama Railroad--rights which the Columbian Government asserts
that it possesses. In addition to this the United States offered its
good offices to secure the settlement of the Panama-Columbian boundary
dispute.

All of these propositions being rejected, the Republic of Colombia was
asked if it would be willing to accept $10,000,000 outright, in
satisfaction of its claims against the United States. This was also
refused.

Acting upon his own authority, the American minister then inquired if
Colombia would accept $25,000,000, the good offices of the United
States in its boundary controversy with Panama, the arbitration of the
question of the reversionary rights in the Panama Railroad, and the
gift of preferential rights in the use of the canal--all these in
satisfaction of its claims. The Colombian Government replied that it
would not do this and that it did not care to negotiate any further
with the Taft administration, preferring to deal with the incoming
Wilson administration.




CHAPTER XX

RELATIONS WITH PANAMA


When the people of the Isthmus of Panama revolted against the
Government of Colombia, they fully realized that almost their only
hope of maintaining an independent government was to secure the
building of the Panama Canal by the United States. Therefore, they
were in a mood to ratify a treaty which would meet every condition
demanded by the Government of the United States.

The treaty, negotiated and ratified in 1904, gave to the United States
every right it could have desired or which it could have possessed had
it taken over the whole Isthmus itself. It was negotiated by John Hay,
Secretary of State, representing the United States, and Philippe
Bunau-Varilla, representing the Government of Panama. As the latter
was a stockholder in the New French Canal Company, whose assets could
be realized upon only through the success of the treaty negotiations,
it naturally followed that he would put nothing in the way of the
desires of the United States.

The treaty gave to the United States most unusual rights. For
instance, in no other country on earth does one nation possess
ultimate jurisdiction over the capital of another nation; yet this is
what the United States possesses at Panama. The first consideration of
the treaty was the establishment of the Canal Zone. This gave to the
United States a territory 5 miles beyond the center line of the canal
on either side, and 3 miles beyond its deep water ends, with the
exception of the cities of Colon and Panama, to hold in perpetuity
with all rights, powers, and authority that the United States would
possess if it were sovereign, and to the entire exclusion of the
exercise of any sovereign rights, powers, or authority by the Republic
of Panama.

Further than this, it gave to the United States the same rights with
respect to any land, or land under water, outside of the Canal Zone
necessary and convenient for the canal itself, or any auxiliary canals
or other works required in its operations.

Further yet, the Republic granted in perpetuity a canal monopoly
throughout its entire territory, and also monopolies of railroad and
other means of communication between the two oceans.

Under the terms of the treaty the cities of Panama and Colon are
required to comply in perpetuity with all sanitary ordinances, whether
curative or preventive, which the United States may promulgate. The
Republic of Panama also agrees that if it can not enforce these
ordinances, the United States become vested with the power to enforce
them. The same is true with reference to the maintenance of order. The
Republic of Panama agrees to maintain order, but gives to the United
States not only the right to step in with American forces and restore
it, but also to determine when such action is necessary.

The treaty between the two countries further provides that the United
States has the right to acquire by condemnation any property it may
need for canal purposes in the cities of Panama and Colon. The
Republic of Panama also grants to the United States all rights it has
or may acquire to the property of the New Panama Canal Company and of
the Panama Railroad, except such lands as lie outside of the Canal
Zone and the cities of Panama and Colon, not needed for the purposes
of building the canal. The Republic guarantees to the United States
every title as absolute and free from any present or reversionary
interest or claim. It will be seen from all this that the United
States did not overlook any opportunity to make sure that it had all
of the powers necessary to build a canal.

It is also agreed by the Panama Government that no dues of any kind
ever shall be collected by it from vessels passing through or using
the canal, or from vessels belonging to the United States Government.
All employees of the canal are exempted from taxation, whether living
inside or outside the Zone. The Republic grants to the United States
the use of all its rivers, streams, lakes, and other bodies of water
for purposes of navigation, water supply, and other needs of the
canal. It also agrees to sell or lease to the United States any of its
lands on either coast for use for naval bases or coaling stations.

The Republic of Panama further agrees that the United States shall
have the right to import commodities for the use of the Canal
Commission and its employees, free of charge, and that it shall have
the right to bring laborers of any nationality into the Canal Zone.

In return for all of these concessions the United States gives to the
Republic of Panama many valuable considerations. Most vital of all, it
guarantees the independence of the Republic. This means that the
Republic of Panama is today practically the possessor of an army and a
navy as large as the United States can put into the field and upon the
seas. The only aggressor that Panama need fear is her benefactor.

The second consideration involved the payment of $10,000,000 cash to
the Republic, and a perpetual annual payment of a quarter of a million
dollars beginning with the year 1913. The ten-million-dollar cash
payment gave the impoverished new-born government a chance to get on
its feet, and from this time forward the Panaman Government can look
to the United States for the major portion of its necessary revenues.

Under the terms of the treaty the United States undertakes to give
free passage to any warships belonging to the Republic of Panama when
going through the canal, and also agrees that the canal shall be
neutral. It also agrees to provide free transportation over the Panama
Railroad for persons in the service of the Government of Panama, and
for the munitions of war of the Republic. It also allows the Republic
of Panama to transmit over its telegraph and telephone lines its
message at rates not higher than those charged United States officials
for their private messages.

Another stipulation of the treaty provides that it shall not
invalidate the titles and rights of private landholders and owners of
private property, nor of the right of way over public roads of the
Zone unless they conflict with the rights of the United States, when
the latter shall be regarded as superior. No part of the work of
building or operating the canal, however, at any time may be impeded
by any claims, whether public or private. A commission is provided,
whose duty it shall be to pass upon the claims of those whose land or
properties are taken from them for the purpose of the construction or
operation of the canal.

In carrying out the terms of the treaty the first step taken by the
Americans was to "clean up" the cities of Panama and Colon. Remarkable
changes were wrought by the establishment of water and sewerage
systems, and by street improvements. For several years preceding the
acquisition of the Canal Zone, and the sanitization of the cities of
Panama and Colon, the late W. L. Buchanan was the United States
minister to Colombia. He was transferred to another South American
capital and afterwards came back to the United States by way of
Panama. Former Senator J. C. S. Blackburn was then governor of the
Canal Zone or, more strictly speaking, the head of the Department of
Civil Administration. As he and Minister Buchanan drove through the
streets of Panama and surveyed the changes that had taken place, Mr.
Buchanan declared to Governor Blackburn that if an angel from heaven
had appeared to him and said that such a transformation in the city of
Panama could be made in so few years he scarcely could have believed
it.

When he was there the main streets of the city were nothing but
unbroken chains of mud puddles in which, during the wet season,
carriages sank almost to the axles. When he returned he found those
same streets well paved with vitrified brick, measuring up to the best
standards of American street work. Where formerly peddlers hawked
water from disease-scattering springs, there were hydrants throughout
the town and wholesome water on tap in almost every house. Where there
had been absolutely no attempt to solve the problems of sewage
disposal, where the masses of people lived amid indescribable filth,
absolutely oblivious to its stenches and its dangers, now there was a
sewerage system fully up to the best standard of American municipal
engineering.

When one considers that the Republic of Panama is made up largely of
the cities of Panama and Colon, with a large area of almost wholly
undeveloped territory, it will be seen that this service was rendered
to practically all the people of the Republic.

The relations which have existed between the Republic of Panama and
the United States have not always proved wholly satisfactory to the
Panamans. Like all other tropical Americans, the Panamans profess
great admiration for a republican form of government, but the party in
power seldom has relished the idea of a full and free accounting of
its stewardship at the polls. When the time came for the first
national election, the party in power sought to insure its return by
the use of tropical-American methods; that is, by a wholesale
intimidation of the opposition supporters. When the registration books
were opened the administration was unwilling to register the
supporters of the opposition. The government forces always were relied
upon to back up the registrars. This situation was resented by the
opposition and the indications were that the usual civil war, the
tropical American substitute for an election, was about to follow.

At this juncture Governor Blackburn called the Panaman authorities
together and notified them that the United States did not care a
continental which side won the election, but that it was very deeply
interested in maintaining conditions of peace and amity on the
Isthmus--conditions which could not prevail except there be a fair
election. He reminded them of the right of the United States to
maintain order in their two principal cities, and of the blood and
treasure the United States had invested in Panama, all of which would
be placed in jeopardy by any civil conflict. He therefore declared it
the intention of the United States to see that there was a fair
election.

Election commissioners were consequently appointed, and they saw to it
that the voters were fairly registered, allowed to vote, and to have
their votes counted. The result was that for the first time in Central
American history there was a fair election and for the first time a
real change of administration without a resort to arms. So successful
was this plan that in the election of 1912 both sides agreed again to
call in the United States to umpire their battle of the ballots, and
once again the "outs" won over the "ins."

The French Canal Company has some very unpleasant experiences with
the Republic of Colombia when it, as a private corporation, undertook
to build the canal. It was at the mercy of the Government and the
Government seldom showed mercy. For instance, a Colombian owned 30
acres of swamp land which was needed for the construction of the
canal. It was worth $10 an acre; he demanded $10,000. The canal
company took the matter to the courts of the Republic and instituted
condemnation proceedings. Here the owner admitted that the land was
not intrinsically worth more than $10 an acre, but claimed that he had
as much right to demand $300,000 for the tract as if it were located
in the very heart of Paris; that in every case it was what the land
could be used for that determined its value. The court shared his view
and nothing was left for the canal company to do but to pay the
$300,000.

Shortly after the Americans took charge, the Central and South
American Telegraph Company wanted to land the new "all American" cable
on the Canal Zone. They applied to the United States for permission
which was granted. The Panamans fought against it under every possible
pretext, their desire being to have their consent regarded as
essential, so that they could get a good fee for the concession, but
the United States notified the Republic of Panama that it had no
interest whatever in requiring compensation, and so the cable was
laid.

While there has been substantial agreement between the two countries,
it has been difficult to prevent some conditions which are contrary to
American ideas of morality. For instance, while the Canal Commission
was strongly opposed to having a lottery on the Canal Zone, one is
maintained just across the line in the city of Panama. The Panama
lottery and the Bishop of Panama share the same house. One has to pass
the lottery to see the bishop and, mayhap, a half dozen old women
ticket sellers will try to intercept him before he reaches the church
dignitary.

This lottery is a veritable gold mine to those who own it. Each
ordinary drawing brings in $10,000--$1 for each ticket issued. The
grand prize takes $3,000 of this, the next 9 prizes calling for a
total of $900, the next 90 for a total of $450 and the remaining
prizes for $2,070. Thus, $6,420 in prizes is paid out of the total of
$10,000 received. Out of the remainder, 5 per cent goes to the ticket
sellers and 5 per cent to the Panaman Government. Once a month the
drawing is made for a grand prize of $7,500. Most of the money which
the lottery people make is contributed by workers on the canal. Only
64 per cent of the money received from the sale of tickets is won back
by the ticket buyer at each drawing. The net profits approximate a
hundred thousand dollars a year.

On the whole, however, the relations entered into between the two
Republics in 1904 have been such as to leave no serious ground for
complaint. They have permitted the satisfactory construction of the
canal, and they will permit its satisfactory operation. With the
United States as the ultimate judge of every question vital to
American interests, little is left to be desired. The fact is that the
canal has been built with less friction and fewer difficulties with
the Republic of Panama than could reasonably have been hoped for at
the outset. This has been due principally to the fact that the
Americans responsible for the success of the work have approached the
Panaman situation with tact where tact was needed and with firmness
where firmness was essential.




CHAPTER XXI

THE CANAL ZONE GOVERNMENT


The Canal Zone is a strip of territory ten miles wide, its irregular
lines following the course of the canal, which is its axis. Over this
zone the United States, under its treaty with Panama, exercises
jurisdiction "as if it were sovereign." The American Government was
unwilling to undertake the great and expensive work of constructing
the canal without having this guaranty to protect it from possible
harassment at the hands of the Panaman authorities.

One of the first tasks that confronted the United States authorities
when they entered upon the work of building the canal was that of
providing a civil government for this territory named by law the Canal
Zone. Postal facilities had to be provided; a police system had to be
established; customs offices were required; fire protection was
necessary; a court system was needed; a school system was demanded;
and, in short, a sort of territorial government had to be put in
operation before the work of building the canal could go forward
satisfactorily.

This government was established in 1904 under the direction of Major
General George W. Davis, the first governor of the Canal Zone. From
time to time it was extended and improved. More than half of this was
appropriated out of the Treasury of the United States, and the
remainder collected in the operations of the government. In addition
to directing the government of the Zone, the head of the department of
civil administration was the titular representative of the Canal
Commission in all matters in which the commission and the Republic of
Panama had a mutual interest. However, in practice, the Panaman
Government looked directly to the chairman and chief engineer on all
important matters.

One of the earliest and most important subjects requiring their
cooperation was that of sanitation in the cities of Panama and Colon.
The United States agreed to advance money for building sewer and water
systems, and for street improvements, in the two principal cities of
the Republic, on condition that the Republic of Panama and the two
cities would reimburse the United States Treasury through the water
rents. The street improvements were to be paid for in 10 years, and
the sewer and water systems in 50 years; in the meantime the United
States was to be allowed 2 per cent interest on the money advanced.
This amortization of the Republic's debt for these improvements has
been going steadily forward.

In laying out the government of the Canal Zone it was thought wise to
adhere as closely to Spanish laws and customs as was expedient under
the new conditions. In view of this consideration the methods of
taxation on the Canal Zone were allowed to remain largely the same as
under the old Spanish laws of Colombia. Likewise the Spanish system
of judicial procedure was adhered to during the early years of the
construction period. It was not, indeed, until 1908 that the right of
trial by jury was established in the Canal Zone. At that time former
Senator J. C. S. Blackburn, of Kentucky, was at the head of the
department of civil administration, and he regarded it as repugnant to
American ideas of justice to deny to Americans on the Isthmus the
right to be tried for felonious offenses by juries of their peers.
Upon his representations President Roosevelt issued an executive order
extending the right of trial by jury to the Canal Zone, and that order
was effective after 1908.

With the early opening of the canal it became advisable for Congress
to determine the future policy of the United States toward the Canal
Zone, and to lay out a system of government there which would meet the
needs of the future. It was determined that the Canal Zone should be
used for the operation of the canal, rather than for a habitation for
such settlers as might choose to go there. Hence the provision was
made that the President of the United States should have the right to
determine how many settlements there should be on the Canal Zone and
how many people should be permitted to live there.

It will be the policy of the United States to discourage general
settlement and to maintain only such towns as are necessary for the
operation of the big waterway, granting only revocable leases to any
outsiders when it is deemed advisable to allow them to occupy land
within the Zone. There will be only five settlements in the Zone, if
present plans are carried out: One at Cristobal, one at Gatun, one at
Pedro Miguel, one at Corozal, and the settlement at Ancon and Balboa
at the Pacific terminus of the canal. The total number of people who
will reside in these settlements will probably not exceed 10,000, a
material reduction from the 62,000 living on the Zone in 1912. Those
who are still there, but who will not be needed in the permanent
organization, will be repatriated at the expense of the United States
Government. In 1912 there were approximately 31,000 British subjects
on the Zone, practically all of them negroes from the British West
Indian islands and British Guiana. The great majority of these will be
carried back to their homes, as will all of the 4,300 Spaniards who
desire to return. There were nearly 12,000 Americans on the Zone at
that time, and perhaps two-thirds of them will leave before 1915.
There were nearly 8,000 Panamans on the Zone and most of them will go
to the cities of Panama and Colon, or upon the Government lands owned
by the Panama Republic outside of the Zone.

The work of clearing the Zone of its population was begun early in
1913. A joint land commission was appointed to adjudicate the claims
of those Panamans who were living within the Zone on lands that were
needed for the operation of the canal. This commission consisted,
under the treaty existing between the two countries, of two Americans
and two Panamans. In their work they first took up the claims of the
poorer classes who had nothing but a thatched hut and a small patch of
ground. The commission visited the various parts of the Zone and
fixed the value of such holdings. The people were given free
transportation over the Panama Railroad, and usually were allowed from
$50 to $100 for their homes. They preferred to move in colonies, so
the Republic of Panama laid out small towns away from the Canal Zone
for them. These natives, usually almost full-blooded Indians, were
treated as kindly and as considerately as conditions would allow. They
were willing to "fold their tents" like the Arabs, and leave their
homes behind as they went out to conquer new ones in the jungles where
the needs of a gigantic waterway could not encroach upon them.

The claims for lands which have to be taken from individuals by the
United States will aggregate a half million dollars. As the Panaman
Government allows homesteading on Government lands at a cost of about
a dollar an acre, and as there are tens of thousands of acres of
better land outside of the Canal Zone than inside, the policy of the
United States in freeing this strip from native population will not
work any great injury to the people.

During the construction period the laws under which the people of the
Zone lived were made in three different ways. Of course, Congress as
the legislative assembly was always supreme. But under the laws passed
by it, the President of the United States was empowered to issue
executive orders covering points not touched by congressional
legislation, and under his instructions the Secretary of War could
promulgate certain orders. In addition to this, the Canal Commission
had a right to serve as a sort of local legislature. During the year
1912 sixteen executive orders pertaining to the Canal Zone were signed
by the President and the Secretary of War, while five ordinances were
promulgated by the Isthmian Canal Commission during the same period.

The court system under the construction-period government consisted of
district courts, circuit courts, and a supreme court. There were five
district judges and three circuit judges; and the circuit judges
sitting together constituted the supreme court, from whose decisions
there was no appeal. Under the permanent law there will be a
magistrate's court in each town, which will have exclusive, original
jurisdiction in all civil cases involving not more than $300, and of
all criminal cases where the punishment does not exceed a fine of a
hundred dollars or 30 days in jail, or both. Its jurisdiction will
include all violations of police regulations and ordinances, and all
actions involving possession or title to personal property or the
forcible entry and detainer of real estate. These magistrates and the
constables under them will serve for terms of four years. There will
be a district court which will sit at the two terminal towns with the
usual court officers. The circuit court of appeals of the fifth
circuit of the United States will be the court to which appeals from
the district court will be carried.

The postal service of the Canal Zone is practically identical with
that of the United States. The revenues collected from the sale of
stamps and postal cards amounted to $87,550 in 1912. Nearly a quarter
of a million money orders were issued during that year, representing
a total of approximately $5,000,000. A postal savings bank system is
also maintained, a counterpart of the one in the United States.

All mail matter sent from the Canal Zone bears Panaman stamps
countermarked by the Canal Zone government. When the United States
established the postal system at Panama, American postage was used.
The Panamans were very much dissatisfied with such a procedure,
however, since it deprived them of a large share of their postal
revenue. Their postal rates to the United States were those of the
universal postal union--5 cents per ounce or fraction thereof on all
first-class mail matter. The rate from the Canal Zone Was only 2
cents. The result was that the citizens of Panama and Colon would not
patronize their own post offices, but carried their mail across the
line to the post offices at Ancon and Cristobal where they could mail
their letters at the 2-cent rate. The Panaman Government protested
against this, and it was agreed by the Americans that in the future
all mail matter should carry Panaman postage stamps. These are
furnished to the Canal Zone government at 40 per cent of their face
value. In this way the share of the Republic of Panama in the postal
receipts of 1912 amounted to nearly $33,000.

President Roosevelt selected one of his "rough riders," George R.
Shanton, to establish the police force on the Zone. This police force
was selected generally from men who had seen service in the United
States Army and had made good records there. In 1912 the force
consisted of 117 first-class white policemen, 116 colored policemen,
20 corporals, 8 sergeants, 7 lieutenants, and 2 inspectors, besides a
chief of police and an assistant chief of police. During that year
7,055 arrests were made, 70 per cent of which resulted in convictions.
Police stations were maintained at all settlements along the line. A
penitentiary was located at Culebra where approximately 140 convicts
were confined. The penitentiary had to be removed owing to slides at
Culebra Cut, and the men were put to work on the roads of the Canal
Zone. They were kept in well-guarded stockades at night.

When Judge Henry A. Gudger was made a member of the judicial system of
the Canal Zone he believed that it would be the scene of unusual
lawlessness; he thought it would be a dumping ground for lawless
people from all parts of the world. He therefore believed in strong
repressive measures, and his earlier sentences were made heavy with
that end in view. He found later, however, that the opposite was true.
Under the system of quartering the canal help there was comparatively
little mixing of the races. The negroes lived to themselves, the
Spaniards to themselves, and the Americans to themselves; therefore,
racial friction was largely overcome. The lawless found the Canal Zone
a desirable place to shun. Judge Gudger soon discovered that severe
measures were unnecessary, and in recommending pardons frequently
stated that he had imposed sentences heavier than necessary to carry
out the repressive policies he had in mind.

A well-organized, paid fire department was maintained from the
beginning and it was supplemented by volunteer companies in many
places. In a number of towns fire engines of the latest automobile
type were installed. Out of 300 fire alarms in 1912, nearly 200 were
for fires in Government property valued at one and three-quarters
million dollars, while the total loss was only $5,000.

The school system of the Canal Zone was laid out along the same lines
that characterized all other activities for the welfare of the people
who were engaged in building the canal. It was founded by Charles E.
Magoon when he was governor of the Zone, and in 1912 had 75 teachers
and officials, with an enrollment of 2,105, of whom nearly 1,200 were
white. The standard required of the teachers was maintained at a high
point. Of the 48 white teachers employed in 1912, 13 held degrees from
colleges and universities, 19 held diplomas from standard normal
schools, and 12 others had enjoyed at least two years of normal
teaching. The white children on the Zone were given free
transportation to and from the schools. Those who had to go on the
railroad to reach their schools were given free passes. Those who
attended the schools in their own neighborhood were gathered up in
wagons and transported to school.

The system of roads for the parts of the Canal Zone adjacent to the
canal itself was built mainly by convict labor at comparatively little
cost. They have been useful to the natives in getting their few
products to market, and during the years to come will be available as
military roads for use in the defense of the Zone. These roads are
built according to the best American standards and are almost the only
real roads in the entire Republic. The Panaman Government has extended
one road from the Zone line to old Panama, and for a few miles into
the interior, but aside from this national road activities have been
few indeed.

The American road from Panama to the Zone boundary, leading toward old
Panama, over the savannahs, is the pleasure highway of the Republic.
It is practically the only road in the Republic where one drives for
pleasure, and here every automobile in Panama City is pressed into
service during the late afternoon and the evening. The elite of the
capital city own summer homes along this road. These homes are by no
means as elaborate as the summer homes along the Hudson, but the fact
that they were seated amidst veritable gardens of flowers gives them
an air of beauty and restfulness attractive even to the most blase
traveler.

The water-supply system of the Canal Zone consists of a number of
reservoirs on the watersheds of the Isthmus where no human habitations
are allowed, and where trespassing is forbidden. The waters are
examined for bacteria and other properties once each month, and a
report thereon is made to the proper officials. Twice each month a
physical examination of each reservoir, and the land from which it
receives its water, is made by inspectors who report all conditions to
the sanitary and other authorities. If there is any sign of
contamination, steps to overcome the trouble are taken immediately.

Where the reservoirs fill up to the spillway the waste water is not
allowed to go over the top, but is drawn out from the bottom in order
that the under layers of water may be the ones wasted. Water drawn out
for domestic purposes is taken from the top wherever possible. The
water has a somewhat unpleasant taste to people newly arrived upon the
Isthmus, and in some cases serves to disturb the digestive tract, but
to the people who become accustomed to it the unpleasant flavor, due
to the presence of decayed vegetation, is forgotten, and the workers
on the Canal Zone frequently declare they miss the Panama water when
they go back to the States.

The permanent Government of the Canal Zone will be, in the main,
merely a miniature of the government during the construction period.
The law providing for the operation of the canal makes this Government
entirely subsidiary to the main purpose for which the canal was built.
It provides that when war is in prospect the President may appoint a
military officer to take charge of the Canal Zone, and to conduct its
affairs as they might be conducted were the Zone nothing more than a
military reservation. The Government will have its headquarters at the
Pacific end of the canal where Balboa, the principal permanent town on
the Isthmus, will be located. This little American city will be
Government-built and Government-owned, and it will be the smallest of
all the world's capitals.

[Illustration: SMOKE FROM HEATED ROCKS IN CULEBRA CUT]

[Illustration: TOM M. COOKE

THE POST OFFICE, ANCON]

Under the new Government all old laws, not specifically repealed,
or contrary to the new ones, will be continued in force. All executive
orders issued by the President, and all orders and ordinances
promulgated by the Canal Commission, during the construction period,
not inconsistent with the act creating a permanent form of government,
are made laws of the Canal Zone to continue as such until specifically
repealed by act of Congress.




CHAPTER XXII

CONGRESS AND THE CANAL


While the Congress of the United States ever has been charged with a
lack of appreciation of the needs of the executive branch of the
Government, spending money foolishly here and being niggardly with its
appropriations there, the history of the legislation under which the
Panama Canal was undertaken and completed shows that American
lawmakers backed up the canal diggers in every necessary way.

One may read in all the hearings that were conducted, both on the
Isthmus and in Washington, a desire on the part of the congressional
committees having to do with the canal matters, to promote the work,
and to enable those directly concerned in its execution to carry out
their plans without hindrance.

It is probable that no project ever carried to completion under the
aegis of the United States Government was studied more carefully by
the legislators than the Panama Canal. There was a standing invitation
from the Isthmian Canal Commission to members of the Senate and House
of Representatives to visit the Isthmus, collectively or individually,
for the purpose of acquainting themselves with the character of the
work and its needs. This invitation was accepted by a large
percentage of the members of the House and Senate who served during
the construction period. When a member of either branch of Congress
visited the Isthmus and saw there the character of the work being
done, and the spirit of the men behind it, he never failed to return
an enthusiastic supporter of the work, ready by vote and voice to
contribute his share to the legislation needed.

When the final Isthmian Canal Commission came into power a policy of
absolute candor with Congress was adopted. When the annual estimates
for appropriations were submitted, they came to Congress with the
understanding that they represented exactly what was needed, no more
and no less. Instead of recommending from 10 to 25 per cent more than
they hoped to get, upon the assumption that Congress would scale down
the appropriations--a policy long followed in many of the bureaus of
the Government--the canal officials asked Congress to understand from
the beginning that the figures they submitted had been pared down to
the bone. The result was a happy one. Congress learned to depend upon
the figures and to make its appropriations accordingly; consequently,
the work was never handicapped by appropriations deficient in one
branch and overabundant in another.

Congress for several years made its appropriations for building the
canal under the assumption that it was to cost about $145,000,000,
exclusive of government, sanitation, purchase price, and payments to
the Republic of Panama. It was not until 1908 that a straightforward,
definite effort was made to fix the ultimate cost. Experience showed
clearly that all hands had hopelessly underestimated both the total
amount of work to be done and the unit cost of doing it.

After a year's experience of carrying forward the work at full swing,
the commission decided to face the situation frankly and attempt to
ascertain exactly what might be expected. This investigation disclosed
the fact that the estimates of the amount of work to be done were a
little over 50 per cent short. Under the experience of one year's work
it was calculated that the total cost of the canal would be
$375,000,000, including sanitation, government, and payments to the
New Panama Canal Company and the Republic of Panama, instead of
$210,000,000, as these items would have aggregated under the estimates
made in 1906. This was about one and a half times as much as the
estimated cost of a sea-level canal. But, although Congress had fixed
the limit upon the basis of an aggregate cost of $210,000,000, it
cheerfully faced the restatement of the anticipated cost, and finally
set the limit at $375,000,000.

From that day forward the great effort at Panama was to live within
this limit, in spite of the extra work required. While Congress might
have been willing to increase this limit, in view of the fact that an
additional 97,000,000 cubic yards of material had to be removed, it
was not asked to do so. The engineers desired above everything else to
stay within their own estimates, and they did the extra work with
money saved by increasing the efficiency of the force.

The first law providing for the government of the Canal Zone was
enacted in 1904. It gave to the President and those appointed by him
the right to govern the Zone and imposed the duty "of maintaining and
protecting its inhabitants in the free enjoyment of their liberty,
property, and religion."

In 1907 an effort was made to reduce wages on the canal. The sundry
civil bill of that year carried a provision that wages on the Isthmus
for skilled and unskilled labor should not exceed more than 25 per
cent the average wage paid in the United States for similar labor.
This proposition was urged by Representative James A. Tawney, of
Minnesota, then chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House.
When it came to a vote the wages fixed under Chief Engineers Wallace
and Stevens were upheld by a vote of 101 to 10. Congress took the
ground that the canal could be built only by the most liberal
treatment of the people who were building it.

At another time a provision was inserted in the appropriation law
establishing the 8-hour day law for American workers on the canal. A
fight was made by the American Federation of Labor and other
organizations to make it apply to the common laborer as well as to the
Americans, but this was unsuccessful. The 8-hour provision did not
work well, since the foremen and superintendents were permitted to
stop work after 8 hours, while the laborers under them had to work an
hour longer. This was later rectified by providing that the 8-hour law
should not affect foremen and superintendents in charge of alien
labor; and thus was overcome the difficulty of having an army of
common laborers at work an hour or so each day without superintendence
or direction.

In 1906 it was provided by a joint resolution of the Senate and House
that the purchase of material and equipment for use in the
construction of the canal should be restricted to articles of American
production and manufacture, except in cases where the President should
deem prices extortionate or unreasonable. This provision undoubtedly
increased by many millions of dollars the cost of the machinery with
which the canal work was executed. While some dredges and other
equipment were purchased in Europe, foreign purchases were the
exception rather than the rule. When bids were submitted there were
times when European prices of dredges were placed at less than
$700,000, while American prices for the same dredges would amount to
more than $1,000,000. When there were such marked difference in bids
the awards were made to the European manufacturers.

Although the construction of the canal was authorized by the Spooner
Act in 1902, it was not until 1906 that Congress expressed its views
in legislation on the question of the type of canal that should be
built. It was then that it declared the canal should be of the general
lock type proposed by the minority of the board of consulting
engineers, which was a complete approval of the plans urged by
President Roosevelt. In order to make certain this decision as to the
type of canal, a provision was incorporated in the appropriation bill
of that year, setting forth that no part of the sums therein
appropriated should be used for the construction of a sea-level
canal.

Congress was always willing to aid the engineers in meeting unforeseen
contingencies by giving them unusual liberties in the application of
moneys appropriated. It was provided that as much as 10 per cent of
any appropriation might be used for any of the other purposes for
which money was appropriated, thus allowing the necessary leeway to
insure a systematic progress of the work throughout all its features.
This provision many times came to the rescue of the chief engineer,
when he found that more money was needed at one point and less at
another than had been estimated 16 or 18 months before.

While President Roosevelt was in the White House Congress gave him
abundant authority over all phases of the task at Panama. He was
empowered to do almost anything he thought expedient for hastening the
work. For instance, in 1907 when he considered building the canal by
contract, Congress provided that nothing in the Spooner Act should
prevent him from entering into such contract or contracts as he might
deem expedient for the construction of the canal. This practically
gave him full authority over the limit of cost and the methods of
building. He was thus the sole judge of the character of the contracts
that he might make. No President in the history of the country ever
was vested with fuller jurisdiction and control over a great matter
than was President Roosevelt in this case. That he did not enter into
such contract was due mainly to the reports made to him by Col. George
W. Goethals, who had just been appointed chief engineer.

In 1908 the Secretary of War was authorized to purchase for the
Panama Railroad Company two steamships of American registry of not
less than 9,000 gross tons each, the cost of which should not exceed
$1,550,000, for the transportation of supplies, equipment, and
material, and of officers and employees of the Canal Commission. These
ships, when no longer required for that service were to be transferred
to the Secretary of the Navy for use as colliers or other auxiliary
naval vessels. These ships carried the bulk of the cement used in
building of the great locks, and more than paid for themselves in the
saving of transportation charges which would have been levied by
private carriers. In the appropriation act of 1909 Congress decided
that the carrying of marine or fire insurance was bad policy for the
Government, and provided that no such insurance should be carried by
the Panama Railroad Company, but that it should be reimbursed for any
loss it might sustain from the appropriations made by Congress for the
building of the canal.

[Illustration: A NEGRO GIRL A MARTINIQUE WOMAN SAN BLAS CHIEF AN
INDIAN GIRL]

AN ITALIAN A TIMEKEEPER A SPANIARD A NEGRO BOY

A FEW OF THE MANY TYPES ON THE ISTHMUS]

[Illustration: COL. HARRY F. HODGES

TESTING THE EMERGENCY DAM, GATUN LOCKS]

There were a number of committees in Congress which dealt with canal
legislation. Principal among these were the Committees on
Appropriations of the two Houses, the Committee on Interoceanic Canals
of the Senate, and the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of
the House. The Appropriations Committees dealt with the question of
appropriations. The House Appropriations Committee usually made a trip
to the Isthmus before each session of Congress. There it would hold
hearings, questioning closely every person connected with the work who
had made estimates for its benefit, its members seeing with their
own eyes the projects for which each individual appropriation was
asked. The practice was, during these visits, to go over a part of the
work and then to hold sessions of the committee for the purpose of
asking questions about that phase of the undertaking. The testimony
was taken down by an official stenographer and printed for the use of
every Member of Congress. A few months later the chairman and chief
engineer would make a trip to Washington and furnish the committee
with such supplementary information as the intervening time might have
disclosed.

The Senate Committee did not visit the Isthmus as frequently, as it
usually found that the hearings held by the House Committee afforded
it sufficient information on which to predicate its action. All
matters having to do with organization traffic, or general laws for
the Canal Zone, were handled by the Committee on Interoceanic Canals
of the Senate and the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of
the House. It was the latter committee, under the chairmanship of
Representative William C. Adamson, of Georgia, which framed the
permanent Canal Law, under which the Isthmian waterway will be
governed and operated. The big fight in Congress over the type of
canal was waged before the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals.
The records of this committee, together with the additional records in
the hands of Congress, constitute one of the most extensive accounts
of a great work anywhere to be found. The official literature of the
Panama Canal is almost as voluminous as the canal is big.

Although Congress usually left the details of canal construction to be
worked out by the Canal Commission and the President, from start to
finish it showed a determination so to deal with the big project that
it could look back over the work with the feeling that it had
contributed its share to the triumph of the undertaking.




CHAPTER XXIII

SEA-LEVEL CANAL IMPOSSIBLE


No one can dispute the wisdom of the United States in deciding to
build a lock canal. To have undertaken a sea-level canal would have
involved this Government in difficulties so great that even with all
the wealth and determination of America, failure would have ensued. It
is, perhaps, putting it too strongly to say that a sea-level canal is
a physical impossibility, but it is not too much to say that such a
canal would take so much money and so much time to build that the
resources and patience of the American people would be exhausted long
before it could be made navigable.

The advocates of a sea-level canal declared that a channel could be
dug through Culebra Mountain with the excavation of 110,000,000 cubic
yards. As a matter of fact, Culebra Cut, with its bottom 85 feet above
sea level, required the excavation of almost that same amount.

Engineers who advocated a sea-level canal declared that the material
in Culebra Mountain was stable, and that only moderate slopes would be
necessary. As a matter of fact, the material in the mountain proved
highly unstable, and, except for a few short sections, slides and
breaks were encountered all during the construction period. The
result was that practically two Culebra Cuts were dug. The engineers,
in beginning the present canal, calculated that 53,000,000 cubic yards
would be excavated in Culebra; the amount actually removed was
105,000,000 cubic yards. Upon this basis a sea-level Culebra Cut might
have required the excavation of 230,000,000 cubic yards.

Calculating an average monthly excavation of a million cubic yards,
the task would have required 17 years to complete. In other words, if
a sea-level canal had been undertaken and had been physically
possible, the celebration of the opening of the waterway would have
been set for 1925 instead of 1915.

Among all of the members of the majority of the board of consulting
engineers who favored a sea-level canal, only one, E. Quellenec,
Consulting Engineer of the Suez Canal, showed any appreciation of the
difficulties which were to be expected in Culebra Cut. He announced,
in voting in favor of a sea-level canal, that he could not do so
without first reminding the United States Government of the great
difficulties that would lie before it in Culebra Cut. Henry Hunter,
Engineer of the Manchester Ship Canal, declared that Culebra Cut
presented no serious problems at all; that a sea-level cut could be
dug more quickly than the locks of the other type of canal could be
built. He further declared that it was as clearly demonstrable as any
engineering problem could be, that it would be possible to use 100
steam shovels in Culebra Cut. No one has accused the engineers on the
canal of lack of ability in maneuvering shovels, yet at no time were
they able to use more than 46.

If President Roosevelt had followed the recommendation of the majority
of the board of consulting engineers in favor of a sea-level canal, it
seems probable that the United States would have followed the French
in retiring defeated from the Isthmus, or else would have reconsidered
its purpose to build a sea-level canal and have undertaken a lock
canal, as the French had done.

But, even if it had been possible to build a sea-level canal at
Panama, it appears that such a canal would not have been as
satisfactory as the present one. While the canal the United States
possesses at Panama to-day is a great waterway 300 feet wide at its
narrowest part, in which ships can pass at any point, the sea-level
canal projected would have been a narrow channel winding in and out
among the hills, too narrow for half its length for the largest ships
to pass. Currents, caused by the Chagres River, and by the flow of
other streams into the canal, would have made navigation somewhat
dangerous.

The principal ground upon which the majority members of the board of
consulting engineers voted in favor of a sea-level canal was that it
was less vulnerable. This contention, in the light of what has
happened at Panama, seems to carry no great weight. Such a canal would
have required a masonry dam 180 feet high across the Chagres at
Gamboa, to regulate the flow of that river into the canal. This dam,
very narrow and very high, would have been a much fairer mark than the
great Gatun Dam for the wielder of high explosives. Furthermore, while
earth dams, like that at Gatun, have weathered earthquake shocks of
great severity, masonry dams, like that proposed for Gamboa, have
been tumbled to the earth by shocks of much less power. The regulating
works at Gatun will take care of a volume of water approximately twice
as great as the Chagres has ever brought down. On the other hand, the
proposed dam at Gamboa would have cared for only one-third as great a
discharge as the highest known flow of the Chagres.

It was calculated that the lake made by the dam at Gamboa would always
be held at low stage between floods, but if two floods came in quick
succession this might have been impossible. Such a situation would
have made the Chagres River always a menace to the canal, instead of
its most essential and beneficent feature.

Those who objected to the lock type, on the ground that the locks
could be destroyed, seemed to forget that even the sea-level project
demanded a set of locks to regulate the tides of the Pacific. While,
contrary to the usual idea, there is no difference in the mean level
of the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, the difference in the tides at
Panama is about 18 feet. This is due to the shape of the Bay of
Panama. As the tide sweeps over the Pacific and into that bay, it
meets a funnel-shaped shore line, which gradually contracts as the
tide travels landward. The result is that the tide rises higher and
higher until it reaches a maximum of 10 feet above average sea level.
When it flows out it reaches a point 10 feet below average sea level,
thus giving a tidal fluctuation of 20 feet. On the Atlantic side the
tidal fluctuation is only 2 feet.

Under these conditions the canal could not be operated during many
hours of the 24 without the tidal locks, if at all, and it would be
almost as great a hindrance to have the tidal locks destroyed as to
have the present locks injured. Another perpetual menace in a canal
with a bottom width of only 150 feet for half of its distance, would
be the danger of a ship sinking and blocking the channel. When the
_Cheatham_ sank in the Suez Canal it wholly blocked the waterway for
nine days, and partially blocked it for a month.

According to the Isthmian Canal Commission, the present canal affords
greater safety for ships and less danger of interruption to traffic by
reason of its wider and deeper channels; it provides for quicker
passage across the Isthmus for large ships and for heavy traffic; it
is in much less danger of being damaged, and of delays to ships
because of the flood waters of the Chagres; it can be enlarged more
easily and much more cheaply than could a sea-level canal. The lock
canal has a minimum depth of 41 feet, and less than 5 miles of it has
a width as narrow as 300 feet. It can take care of 80,000,000 tons of
shipping a year, and, by the expenditure of less than $25,000,000
additional, can increase this capacity by at least a third. It can
pass at least 48 ships a day, doing all that a sea-level canal could
do, and many things that a sea-level canal could not do.

No one denies that if it were possible to have a great Isthmian
waterway at sea level as wide as the present lock canal, it would be
the ideal interoceanic waterway. But, as such a proposition is out of
the question, the American people have at least one thing for which to
thank Theodore Roosevelt--that at a critical time in the history of
the canal project he allowed himself to be converted from the advocacy
of a sea-level canal to the championship of a lock-level canal, in the
face of a majority report of one of the strongest boards of engineers
ever assembled, and prevented a situation at Panama that would have
been humiliating to America, and which probably would have ended for
all time the efforts of centuries to let ships through the American
Isthmus.




CHAPTER XXIV

FORTIFICATIONS


When Congress decided that the Panama Canal should be regarded as a
part of the military defenses of the Nation, it became necessary to
fortify it in such a way as to make it practically impregnable to
naval attack. It was, therefore, decided that there should be ample
coast defenses at the two ends of the canal and that these defenses
should be protected from land attack by the quartering of a sufficient
number of mobile troops to hold in check any landing parties that
might attack the works by an overland route.

In carrying out this plan Congress met every demand of the military
experts. When the plans for the fortifications were pending before the
Appropriations Committee of the House every military authority, from
Gen. Leonard Wood and Col. George W. Goethals down, who appeared
before the committee was asked if he considered the defenses
recommended as sufficient for the purposes intended, and each replied
in the affirmative.

These defenses consist of large forts at each end of the canal, with
field works for some 6,000 mobile troops. The defenses on the Pacific
side will be somewhat stronger than those on the Atlantic side,
probably for the reason that better naval protection ordinarily could
be afforded to the Atlantic than to the Pacific entrance, on account
of the proximity of the Atlantic Waters of the canal to American
shores.

At the forts on the Atlantic side four 12-inch guns, sixteen 12-inch
mortars, six 6-inch guns and four 4-7/10-inch howitzers will be
mounted. The guns at this end of the canal will be distributed between
Toro Point on the west side of the entrance channel and Margarita
Island on the east side. There will be two big 14-inch disappearing
guns at each of these points. They will be so placed as to sweep the
horizon in the seaward direction, and at the same time will be able to
concentrate their fire on the enemy as he steams in toward the channel
entrance between the great breakwaters which cut off Limon Bay from
the ocean.

At the Pacific end all of the defenses will be on the east side of the
channel. They will consist of one 16-inch gun, six 14-inch guns, six
6-inch guns and eight 4-7/10-inch howitzers. There are three small
islands on the east side of the Pacific entrance channel known as
Naos, Perico, and Flamenco. They rise precipitously out of the water
and offer ideal sites for heavy defense. A huge dump or breakwater has
been built from the mainland at Balboa out to Naos Island and this, in
turn, has been connected with Perico and Flamenco by large stone
causeways. The great dump has made several hundred acres of available
land for quartering the eight companies of coast-defense troops which
will be stationed at the Pacific end of the canal. These islands are
3 miles from the mainland and their guns will completely bar the way
to any hostile ships which might seek to enter the canal.

On the other side of the channel, at a distance of about 12 miles,
lies the island of Taboga where the Canal Commission maintains the
sanitarium for its employees. It had been suggested by some that
fortifications should be planted there, but it was declared by the
military authorities that the guns of Naos, Perico, and Flamenco would
completely command this island and prevent a hostile nation from using
it as a base of operations.

The range of the guns extends more than a mile beyond Taboga Island.
The big 16-inch gun which will be mounted on Perico Island is the
largest ever built. It was made at the Watervliet Arsenal. It carries
a projectile weighing more than a ton for a distance of 21 miles. At
17 miles it can toss its death-dealing 2,400-pound shell at an enemy
as accurately as a base-ball player throws a ball to a team-mate 17
yards away. Its projectiles are filled with powerful explosives, a
single one of which in the vitals of any battleship would be enough to
place it out of commission. The big guns and the mortars are intended
primarily for defending the canal from attack by water. The smaller
guns and howitzers would come into play when an enemy approached
within a mile and would be used to repel his efforts to effect a
landing. Nearly all of these howitzers may be moved from place to
place to meet the needs of the field troops in case of land attack.
Eight of them will be permanently stationed at Gatun Locks. There
will be other field works at Gatun, Miraflores, and Pedro Miguel ready
for occupancy at a moment's notice by the field troops stationed on
the Isthmus. These howitzers are so located that 12 of them may be
concentrated at any given point in case of danger.

The big guns of the permanent forts are all mounted on disappearing
carriages so that they are exposed to fire only at the moment of
discharge. The 12-inch mortars will not only play their part in
defending the canal from water attack, but will be able to sweep the
country on the Atlantic side as far inland as the Gatun Locks and on
the Pacific side as far inland as the locks at Miraflores. They have a
range of nearly 4 miles, and when loaded with shrapnel will prove a
most effective weapon against field troops operating anywhere within
the vicinity of the locks.

The land lying contiguous to the sea-level ends of the canal will be
platted off into squares exactly as a city is laid out. Should hostile
troops come upon this territory the men in the fire-control station
would simply ascertain the number of the block or blocks on which they
were operating, and the mortars would be so oriented as to throw their
big projectiles thousands of yards into the air to fall directly on
those blocks. They would, therefore, be practically as useful in land
operations as in the water defense.

Every feature of the armament defending the entrance of the canal will
embody the latest improvements known to military science. The
carriages for the big guns have been specially designed, and were put
through the most thorough and exacting tests before their adoption.
The fire-control stations are said to be the last word in insuring the
effective use of the guns. Determining how a big gun shall be aimed so
that its projectile will hit a target 10 miles away is not an easy
task. Of course, the gun can not be pointed directly at the target,
since this would cause the projectile to fall far short of the enemy,
and also the effect of the wind and the motion of the enemy would
carry it wide of its mark. To guess the range and to secure it by
experimentation would be to prevent any effective fire whatever.
Therefore, it is necessary first to determine the approximate range,
the motion of the enemy and the velocity of the wind.

There is an ingenious instrument known as the range finder, by which
the approximate distance of the target is determined. This instrument
looks something like a cross between an opera glass and a small
telescope. The operator puts his eyes to the opera glass part of the
range finder and locates the enemy just as one would with an ordinary
pair of glasses. When he locates the hostile ship he sees two images
of it. There is an adjusting screw which he turns until the two images
blend together and become one. The turning of this screw automatically
adjusts a scale on the instrument, and when the two images exactly
coalesce the distance of the ship is registered on the scale. The
operators in the fire-control station make the necessary calculations
as to the effect of the wind, the motion of the enemy and other
elements entering into marksmanship, and telephone the results below
to the men who aim the gun.

It takes two men to aim each gun; one takes care of its up-and-down
movement, and the other of its right-and-left movement. When the man
in the fire-control station telephones that the enemy is so many miles
away, the man who has charge of the up-and-down movement of the gun so
adjusts his telescopic sight on a registering scale that when it is
pointed directly on the enemy the muzzle of the gun will be elevated
high enough to carry the projectile that distance. The man who has
charge of the right-to-left movement adjusts his sight so that when it
is pointed directly at the enemy the muzzle of the gun will be pointed
far enough to the right or to the left to land its projectile amidship
on the enemy. Each man stands on a platform and operates a little
wheel on an endless screw. He turns this wheel backward or forward
just enough to keep his sight exactly on the enemy.

After the gunners have received their instructions the first shot is
fired. This is called a "ranging" shot, and as the best range finder
can not register the distance to the exact yard it is necessary for
the fire-control station to gauge exactly how far short of, or how far
over, the target the projectile has carried. The up-and-down sight is
adjusted in accordance therewith and usually the second, or at most
the third, shot gets the exact range. This method of locating the
enemy will be used on all the fortifications of the canal.

It is unanimously agreed by military authorities that no naval force
will risk an open attack upon such fortifications, since almost
inevitably it would result in the disabling, if not the sinking, of a
number of battleships and a great crippling of the enemy's force that
he could not afford to risk unless he had first swept the seas of our
own naval strength.

In order to make certain that no surprise attack could be successful,
one of the most complete searchlight equipments to be found in any
fortress in the world has been authorized for the canal
fortifications. There will be 14 searchlights, with 60-inch
reflectors, made so that they will send the brightest of white lights
out to sea and over the land as far as the range of the guns may
reach. These searchlights cost more than $20,000 each, and it requires
a year to construct the big mirror which is placed in each of them.
Electric plants at each fortress will generate electricity for the
operation of the guns and of the searchlights.

In anticipation of sudden need nearly $2,000,000 worth of reserve
ammunition will be kept on the Isthmus. There will be 70 rounds for
the big 16-inch gun--enough to operate it constantly for two hours,
providing for a shot about every two minutes. The big 14-inch guns
will carry a shell weighing 1,400 pounds, propelled by a 365-pound
charge of smokeless powder which will drive it through the air at an
initial speed of nearly half a mile a second--enough momentum to carry
it through at least 5 feet of wrought iron. The charge of powder by
which these guns will hurl their projectiles on their death-dealing
mission, generates a force which would lift the great Masonic Temple
of Chicago 2 feet in a single second.

Three regiments of infantry, 1 squadron of cavalry, 1 battalion of
field artillery, and 12 companies of coast-defense troops will be
permanently stationed on the Isthmus. The field troops, consisting of
the infantry, cavalry, and field artillery, will be stationed at
Miraflores, where permanent quarters will be provided together with
the necessary drill grounds. These quarters will cost in the
neighborhood of $3,000,000. At this point they can be maneuvered to
advantage and moved to any part of the Canal Zone needing defense. It
was originally intended to place these troops at Culebra on the east
side of the channel, but this would necessitate their going a distance
of about 5 miles to get to a point where they could conveniently cross
with the artillery to the other side of the canal.

Quarters for eight companies of coast-defense troops are being
established on the Naos Island dumps. Quarters for two companies of
these troops are being provided at Toro Point, and for two other
companies at Margarita Island. These will afford sufficient strength
at the Atlantic side to man the guns temporarily, in case of
hostilities, until any additional troops needed can be brought up. All
of the troops, both field and coast defense, will be adequately housed
and the permanent structures erected for them will be as substantially
built as those of any modern army post in continental United States.
There will be drill grounds large enough to maneuver the troops
stationed on the Isthmus. Roads affording access to all parts of the
Canal Zone have been built.

In addition to the provisions for the permanent forces on the Isthmus,
additional field works will be provided to accommodate the 20,000
troops which might be brought to the Isthmus in case of war. These
field works will take the form of barricaded positions, entrenchments,
and other protective breastworks which will enable the troops to
undergo a state of siege. It has been estimated by the engineers that
behind such works as have been planned one defender can stand off six
assailants, so that a body of 20,000 mobile troops under these
conditions could hold the Isthmus against a siege of 100,000 for a
reasonable time. These field works will be constructed principally
around Gatun and Pedro Miguel. The buildings for the permanent force
stationed on the Isthmus will be constructed on the unit system so
that any necessary expansion can be made.

The question of fortifying the canal was one which engaged the serious
attention of Congress for a long time. There were two main viewpoints
as to what policy should be pursued. One contention was that the canal
should be made neutral, open to the ships of all nations, including
the United States, on equal terms even in case of war between the
United States and any other country. It was contended by those who
took this view that to declare it neutral would render it immune from
any attack and guarantee its perpetuity as a great commercial
undertaking under the control of the United States.

They contended, furthermore, that the United States was bound, under
the terms of its treaty with Great Britain, to make the canal neutral
and that to fortify it would be to violate the Hay-Pauncefote treaty.
They asserted that the United States was under solemn obligations to
recognize the principle of neutrality as applied at Suez and offered
the express terms of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty in proof of their
contention. This treaty provided that "the United States adopts, as
the basis of the neutralization of such a ship canal, the following
rules substantially embodied in the Convention of Constantinople,
signed the twenty-eighth of October, 1888, for the free navigation of
the Suez Canal; that is to say:

"First, the canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce
and of war, all nations observing these rules on terms of entire
equality so that there shall be no discrimination against any such
nation, or its citizens or subjects, in respect of the conditions or
charges of traffic, or otherwise. Such conditions and charges of
traffic shall be just and equitable.

"Second, the canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of
war be exercised, nor any act of hostility be committed within it. The
United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such military
police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against
lawlessness and disorder.

"Third, vessels of war of a belligerent shall not revictual nor take
any stores in the canal except so far as may be strictly necessary;
and the transit of such vessels through the canal shall be effected
with the least possible delay in accordance with the regulations in
force, and with only such intermissions as may result from the
necessities of the service."

It will be seen from this that the language of the treaty seems
plainly to imply that the United States had no right to fortify the
canal. It is interesting to note, however, that when the controversy
over the tolls between the United States and England arose, the
English Government expressly conceded the right of the United States
to fortify the canal and to exercise absolute rights of sovereignty so
far as military considerations were concerned. It would constitute an
interesting chapter in diplomatic history if someone would tell the
real reason why the English Government waived its rights of demanding
a neutral canal under the Hay-Pauncefote treaty.

Those who advocated the fortification of the canal contended that the
United States had acquired practical sovereignty over the Canal Zone,
and that thereunder it had a perfect right to provide for the defense
of the territory. They asserted that the canal was undertaken because
of the military necessities of the United States, as demonstrated by
the trip of the _Oregon_ from the Pacific to the Atlantic, during the
Spanish-American War and that to fail to fortify the canal would be to
lose the military advantages which its construction had given to the
United States.

It was further contended that to allow the canal to be neutral would,
in the case of war between the United States and some foreign power,
compel the United States to keep its own warships out of the canal its
own blood and money had built, or else compel its permanent operating
force at Panama to commit a sort of legal treason by putting the
enemy's ships through the big waterway on the same terms with American
ships.

This contention was answered by those who took the opposite view with
the statement that all treaties would be suspended in case of war and
that neutralization would cease between the United States and its
enemies at such a time.

The other side replied that if this were true, it would then be too
late properly to fortify the Isthmus, and that if the United States
expected ever to deny to any country the neutrality provisions of the
Hay-Pauncefote treaty, the fortifications should by all means be built
in advance.

The long and earnest debate brought forth from some the prediction
that England would not acquiesce in such a construction of the treaty,
and from others the statement that under the terms of that instrument
other nations had a right to protest against the fortification of the
canal. In the face of these arguments, however, Congress determined by
a substantial majority to fortify the canal, and the whole world has
acquiesced. England not only did not protest, but in its toll
controversy notes expressly declared that the United States had the
right to fortify the canal.




CHAPTER XXV

FIXING THE TOLLS


Long before the Panama Canal was finished shipping interests in every
part of the world began inquiring minutely as to probable rates of
toll, stating that it would be necessary for them to have this
information before making plans to meet the changed conditions. Some
wanted to plan construction of new ships, while others desired
principally to readjust their transportation lines in accordance with
the new conditions.

With this in mind, President Taft in 1912 recommended to Congress the
passage of a law fixing the tolls and providing for the permanent
operation of the canal. Congress, acting upon this recommendation,
passed what is known as the Permanent Canal Law. In this law are
stated the terms under which the canal may be used by the shipping
world. It authorizes the President to prescribe, and from time to time
to change, the tolls that shall be levied by the Government of the
United States for the use of the canal. No tolls may be levied on
vessels passing through the canal from one United States port to
another. Provision was also made that tolls might be based upon gross
or net registered tonnage, displacement tonnage, or otherwise, and
that they might be lower on vessels in ballast than upon vessels
carrying cargo. When based upon net registered tonnage, for ships of
commerce, the tolls can not exceed $1.25 per ton, nor be less, other
than for vessels of the United States and its citizens, than the
estimated proportional cost of the actual maintenance and operation of
the canal. The toll for each passenger was fixed at not more than
$1.50.

Acting under the law authorizing him to fix the rates within the
limitations stated by the law itself, President Taft issued a
proclamation fixing the toll at $1.20 per net registered ton on all
ships of commerce, other than those carrying cargo from one United
States port to another. The net registered ton is the unit of
measuring a ship's cargo-carrying capacity, used throughout the world
in general, and by British shipping in particular. It consists of 100
cubic feet of space, so that when a ship is measured its net
registered tonnage is determined by the number of these units of space
it contains. A ton of cargo seldom fills a hundred cubic feet of
space; frequently it will not fill more than 40 cubic feet. The charge
per ton of actual freight under this toll of $1.20 per net registered
ton ranges from 44 to 80 cents a long ton upon the freight carried,
depending upon the class of cargo. Such a toll adds from 2 to 4 cents
per hundredweight to the freight rate between two points through the
canal. It might cost 5 cents to take a barrel of flour from Colon to
Panama, or vice versa.

While ships will be charged tolls on the basis of net registered
tonnage, not all ships carry freight upon that basis. In the majority
of cases cargo is taken on at "ship's option"--either by weight or
space. Forty cubic feet is estimated as the space occupied by an
ordinary ton of freight, and ships usually carry cargo at rates based
on that amount of space for each ton. The 40 cubic feet method of
determining the amount of cargo carried is adopted by maritime
interests because a long ton of wheat occupies about that amount of
space. From this it will be seen that for the purpose of collecting
tolls the United States allows 100 cubic feet of space for a ton,
while the ordinary shipping firm allows only 40 feet per ton. Thus it
happens that a shipowner charges the shipper for carrying 2-1/2 tons
where the United States charges the shipowner for carrying 1 ton.

Notwithstanding the fact that the shipowner collects for the carrying
of 2-1/2 tons where he pays toll on 1 ton, he still has to pay what
seems, in the aggregate, a large sum of money each time his ship
passes through the canal. An ordinary 5,000-ton ship will be charged
$6,000 for passing from one ocean to the other. A ship like the
_Cleveland_, the first around the world tourist steamer advertised to
pass through the canal, will have to pay $14,000 for the 12-hour trip
from Colon to Panama. A steamship like the _Lusitania_ will have to
put up some $30,000 for a single passage. The average ship will pay
from $5,000 to $10,000 for its passage. This seems like a high rate,
even though it does amount to only 2 or 4 cents per hundredweight of
cargo, but when one takes into consideration the time saved in passing
through the canal, and the cost of maintaining a ship on the high
seas, the rate becomes a reasonable one.

The average ship costs about 10 cents per net registered ton per day
for keeping it in operation. Thus a 10,000-ton ship will save about a
thousand dollars for each day its voyage is shortened. If this voyage
be shortened by 20 days, the shipowner makes a net saving of $8,000
when he selects the Panama route over some other route. In fact, he
may save even more than this, for the other route might involve the
giving of additional space for bunker coal, which otherwise would be
used for cargo. Convenient coaling stations mean a minimum of space
required for the operation of the ship and a maximum of cargo-carrying
capacity. In this way a merchant ship might save several thousand
dollars additional by choosing the Panama route over the Strait of
Magellan.

It is estimated that the tolls it will be necessary to collect to make
the canal self-supporting will be $15,500,000 a year, since that
amount will be required to meet the expense of operation and return 3
per cent interest on the investment. The $15,500,000 is made up of
$3,500,000 for operations, $250,000 for sanitation and government and
$11,250,000 for interest on the $375,000,000 the canal cost. This
takes no account of approximately $10,000,000 which will be required
for the support of the troops on the Isthmus. Should this be
considered, the total annual charges to be made would approximate
$25,000,000, but this, in the view of those who have considered the
matter, is not a proper charge against the cost of operation.

[Illustration: THE ANCON BASEBALL PARK]

[Illustration: CALEB M. SAVILLE

GATUN SPILLWAY FROM ABOVE AND BELOW]

It has been stated that a proper system of finances would provide
for the repayment of the cost of constructing the canal in a hundred
years. This would mean an annual charge of $3,750,000, and would bring
the total annual outlay, exclusive of the cost of protection, up to
$19,250,000. From this viewpoint the canal will not be self-sustaining
until the total traffic approximates 17,000,000 tons a year, which it
will reach about 1925.

It has been estimated by Prof. Emory R. Johnson, the Government expert
on canal traffic, that the total tonnage which will pass through the
canal during the first year of its operation will approximate
10,500,000 net registered tons. Since the shipping of the United
States is permitted to pass through without paying tolls, the tonnage
upon which toll will be collected will yield a gross revenue of
approximately $10,000,000. This will afford the United States an
income of a little less than 2 per cent on the money invested, after
paying the actual cost of operation. On this basis it probably will be
four or five years from the opening of the canal before the returns
will yield 3 per cent on the investment.

The ships of the world use approximately 75,000,000 tons of coal
annually. The opening of the Panama Canal will save several million
tons a year and the money thus saved will, in part, fall into the
coffers of Uncle Sam. A vessel en route from Chile to Europe can save
nearly enough in the cost of coal alone to pay the tolls that will be
exacted at Panama.

When the United States came to frame its system of toll charges and
collections, it was found that there was a wide difference of opinion
as to the right of the United States Government to exempt coastwise
shipping from the payment of tolls. Under the Hay-Pauncefote treaty
with Great Britain there was also a wide variance of opinion as to the
question of whether the United States, as a matter of national policy,
ought to exempt from the payment of tolls, ships trading between its
own ports on the two coasts. These questions were argued pro and con,
and Congress finally decided by a very close vote that the United
States ought to allow ships trading between its own ports to use the
canal free of charge. No foreign ships are permitted under any
circumstances to engage in such traffic.

Those who advocated the exemption of ships trading exclusively between
United States ports from the payment of tolls, did so on the ground
that it would build up a wealthy American merchant marine which would
be invaluable to the United States in time of war, and also that it
would tend to reduce freight rates between Atlantic and Pacific
points. They argued that every cent added to the cost of
transportation through the canal would be reflected in freight rates
between the East and the West.

Those who opposed the exemption of American coastwise shipping from
the payment of tolls, asserted that the coastwise shipowners already
had a monopoly on the handling of cargo between American ports, and
that no further encouragement was needed. They argued that it would
make little or no difference in rates whether tolls were charged or
not, and that the only people who would benefit would be the
shipowners. They contended that the United States ought to charge
everybody alike and use the tolls collected for the purpose of
repaying the money it spent in building the canal. Some of them also
contended that the Hay-Pauncefote treaty bound the United States to
treat all shippers alike, and that the United States could not
discriminate in favor of the American coastwise traffic without
contravening the treaty with Great Britain. This view, however, did
not prevail, and the law, as enacted, exempted coastwise shipping.

England immediately protested against this exemption on the ground
that it was in contravention of the treaty between the two countries.
The story of how the United States came to be bound by a treaty with
Great Britain in the building of an Isthmian canal goes back for more
than half a century. The year 1850 found the North American continent,
north of the Rio Grande, in the possession of the United States,
England, and Russia. The United States had only recently finished its
continental expansion, and each of the two countries needed a canal to
connect their east and west coasts. England had long possessed a west
coast in Canada, but the United States had only recently come into
possession of a Pacific seaboard. When it came to consider the
question of connecting its two coasts the United States found that
Great Britain was holding the position of advantage in the Isthmian
region. It held the Bahamas, Bermuda, Jamaica, the Barbados, Trinidad,
the Windward and Leeward Islands, British Guiana and British
Honduras; and held a protectorate over the "Mosquito Coast," now the
east coast of Nicaragua. That protectorate covered the eastern
terminus of the only ship canal then deemed possible.

Under these conditions the United States concluded that it was
necessary for the support of the Monroe doctrine that some sort of an
understanding should be reached between the two countries. England
assented to such an understanding only after Nicaragua and Costa Rica
had given to the United States its consent to the building of a canal
across its territory. These treaties with Nicaragua and Costa Rica
were negotiated but never ratified, and were used as a club to force
Great Britain to make a treaty. The result was the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty, which provided that neither Government should ever obtain or
maintain for itself any exclusive control over an Isthmian canal, and
that neither Government should ever secure for itself any rights or
advantages not enjoyed by the other in such a canal. The proposed
canal was to be entirely neutral, and the treaty set forth that the
two countries agreed jointly to protect the entire Isthmian region
from Tehauntepec to South America, and that the canal always should be
open to both countries on equal terms. The canal under this treaty was
intended to be entirely neutral with reference to defense, with
reference to tolls, and with reference to such other nations as might
join in maintaining neutrality.

When the United States decided to build the Panama Canal, it found the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty wholly unsuited to its aims and desires. It
therefore asked England to enter into a new convention; the
Hay-Pauncefote treaty was the result. This document declared that its
purpose was to remove any objections that might arise under the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty to the construction of an Isthmian canal under
the auspices of the Government of the United States without impairing
the general principle of neutralization.

Under this treaty the Government of Great Britain made a protest
against the decision of the United States to exempt its coastwise
traffic from the payment of tolls, claiming such exemption to be a
violation of the neutrality agreement. This protest came in the form
of two notes to the American Government. The first was written as a
warning to Congress that the British Government would regard the
exemption of American coastwise traffic from the payment of tolls as a
discrimination against British shipping, and a violation of the
neutrality agreement between the two countries. It admitted that if
the United States were to refund or to remit the tolls charged, it
would not be a violation of the letter of the treaty, and acknowledged
that if the exemption of coastwise American shipping from toll charges
were so regulated as to make it certain that only bona fide coastwise
traffic, which is reserved for American vessels, would be benefited by
this agreement, then Great Britain could have no objection. But it
declared that England did not believe that such regulation was
possible.

After Congress, with this note in mind, had passed the canal toll law
with an exemption to ships carrying goods between the two coasts of
the United States, President Taft, in approving the measure, declared
that the canal was built wholly at the cost of the United States on
territory ceded to it by a nation that had the indisputable right to
make the cession, and that, therefore, it was nobody else's business
how we managed it. He contended that for many years American law had
given to American ships the exclusive right to handle cargo between
American ports, and that, therefore, England was not hurt at all when
that shipping was exempted from toll charges.

England responded, in a second note, that the clear obligation of the
United States under the treaty was to keep the canal open to the
citizens and subjects of the United States and Great Britain on equal
terms, and to allow the ships of all nations to use it on terms of
entire equality. It also contended that the United States is embraced
in this term of "all nations"; that the British Government would
scarcely have entered into the Hay-Pauncefote treaty if it had
understood that England was to be denied the equal use of the Panama
Canal with America. The three direct objections urged by the British
against the American canal law were: That it gives the President the
right to discriminate against foreign shipping; that it exempts
coastwise traffic from paying tolls; and that it gives the
Government-owned vessels of the Republic of Panama the right to use
the canal free. The answer of the United States to the first of these
objections was that the right of the President to fix tolls in a way
that would be discriminatory against British shipping was a question
that could be considered only when the President should exercise such
action.

The British Government expressed the fear that the United States, in
remitting tolls on coastwise business, would assess the entire charges
of maintenance of the canal upon the vessels of foreign trade and thus
cause them to bear an unequal burden. This, the second objection was
answered with the statement that, whereas the treaty gives the United
States the right to levy charges sufficient to meet the interest of
the capital expended and the cost of maintaining and operating the
canal, the early years of its operation will be at a loss and,
therefore, at a lower rate than Great Britain could ask under the
treaty. The third objection was considered insignificant.

The British Government, after laying down its objections to the
American canal toll law, requested that the matter be submitted to The
Hague tribunal for adjudication. The American Government declared that
this course would not be just to the United States, since the majority
of the court would be composed of men, the interests of whose
countries would be identical with those of England in such a
controversy. Before leaving office President Taft proposed that the
matter should be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The whole question was left in that situation when the change from the
Taft to the Wilson administration took place.

As to the merits of the controversy, there is no unanimity of opinion
on either side of the Atlantic. Some British authorities entirely
justify the American position, while some American authorities take
the British position. It is probable that the controversy will require
years for settlement.

Before the canal was open for traffic there was much speculation as to
what rate policies the railroads would adopt to meet the situation
caused by the competition of the Panama Canal. If the same classes of
goods are handled through the canal as across the United States, there
will be more than 3,000 different articles on the tariff books of
steamship lines using the canal. In his report on the effects of canal
tolls on railroad rates, Prof. Emory R. Johnson expressed the opinion
that the payment of tolls by ships engaged in coast trade would affect
neither the rates of the regular steamship lines nor the charges of
the transcontinental railroads.

[Illustration: AN ELECTRIC TOWING LOCOMOTIVE IN ACTION]

[Illustration: BLOWING UP THE SECOND DIKE SOUTH OF MIRAFLORES LOCKS]

A provision of the canal toll law forbids any railroad to be directly
or indirectly interested in any ship passing through the canal,
carrying freight in competition with that railroad. This provision was
inserted to prevent the railroads from controlling the steamship lines
using the canal, and through that control fixing rates between the two
coasts on such a basis as to prevent effective competition with the
railroads themselves. The result was that a number of railroads had to
dispose of their steamships engaged in coastwise trade. This provision
affects several Canadian railroads, and after it was made the British
Government served notice on the United States that it intended to take
up this question and consider whether or not the law in this
particular does not infringe upon British rights.

Nothing seems more certain than that, in the course of years, canal
tolls will be materially lowered from the $1.20 fixed by the
President. It seems inevitable that the Panama Canal and the Suez
Canal will enter into a lively battle for the great volume of trade
between eastern Asiatic and Australasian points and western European
ports. On this dividing line between the two great interoceanic
highways there originates many millions of tons of traffic, and this
will be largely clear gain to the canal which gets it. The
considerations which will draw this trade one way or the other are the
rates of toll, the convenience of coaling stations, the price of coal,
and the certainty of the ability to secure proper ship stores. This
spirit of competition will probably serve to lower rates more rapidly
than they otherwise might be reduced. With some 10,000,000 tons of
traffic on the great divide between the two canals, ready to be sent
forward by the route which offers the best inducements, it is certain
that good business policy will call for some hustling on the part of
both canals. As the business of the Panama Canal expands, it can
afford to reduce rates. With an ultimate capacity of 80,000,000 tons a
year, as the canal stands to-day, the rate of toll could be cut down
to 25 cents a ton when that capacity is reached, and still afford the
United States an income large enough to take care of the operation and
maintenance of the canal, and sanitation and government of the Canal
Zone, to meet the interest on the cost of building it, and to
amortize the entire debt in a hundred years.

It is certain that the United States made a good investment at Panama.
Assuming that the coastwise traffic is worth to the Government the
amount of the tolls it is exempted from paying, the canal becomes a
self-supporting institution from the day of its opening, leaving all
the military and trade advantages it affords the United States as
clear profit.




CHAPTER XXVI

THE OPERATING FORCE


It will require a force of about 2,700 persons to operate the Panama
Canal. The major portion of this force will be engaged on the port
works at the two ends of the waterway. With a large mechanical plant
at Balboa, with large docks for the transhipment of cargo, and with
other facilities required for making the canal the best equipped
waterway in the world for handling marine business, more men will be
needed for the conduct of the auxiliary works than for actually
putting ships through the locks.

The force required at the locks will be comparatively small. It will
consist of men in general charge of the lock operations, men in charge
of the towing operations, men who handle the various mechanism and
operate the several types of valves for the regulation of the water in
the locks; and the general labor force consisting of a few hundred
operatives at each end of the canal. A force will be required to
operate the big hydro-electric station at Gatun Spillway, where the
electricity for the operation of the locks and for the lighting of the
canal will be generated. Another force will be required at the
auxiliary power plant at Miraflores which will be operated by steam.
Fewer than a thousand men will be required in putting ships through
the canal.

When the question of placing the canal on a permanent operating basis
arose one of the first considerations was the scale of salaries to be
fixed. Having in mind the fact that salaries paid during the
construction period (which were 50 per cent above the standard in the
United States) were based upon conditions existing in the early days
of the American occupation, it was decided that this was an unfair
basis for the permanent organization. The salaries for the
construction period were made high because they had to be. It was more
a question of reducing men to risk their lives than of fixing fair
rates of compensation. The conclusion reached was that there was no
longer any reason why the Government should pay salaries so much
higher than obtained in the States, especially in view of the fact
that all positions under the permanent organization would carry with
them free quarters, free medical attendance, free fuel, free light,
free hospital service and the like. It was finally determined that it
would be fair to both the employee and the employer to establish as a
basis of compensation for services in the permanent organization a
scale of salaries not to exceed 25 per cent higher than obtained for
similar positions in the United States. This decision was made on the
basis that it would be fair to the employee and at the same time would
allow the canal to be operated at a cost which would impose no undue
burden on shipping.

When Congress took up the matter in the enactment of the permanent
canal law, it reflected the recommendations of the chairman and chief
engineer of the Canal Commission in almost every particular. With
reference to the canal employees, that body provided that they should
be appointed by the President or by his authorities, and that they
should be removable at his pleasure; also, that their compensation
should be fixed by him until such time as Congress should regulate it
by law.

The head of the permanent force on the Canal Zone will be known as the
Governor of the Panama Canal. He is to be appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a four-year term, or
until his successor shall be appointed and qualified. He will receive
a salary of $10,000 a year, and will be the personal representative of
the President on the Isthmus. Indeed, the permanent organic act
provides that the President himself is authorized, after the
disbanding of the Isthmian Canal Commission--which is to take place
whenever the President thinks the work has approached a sufficient
degree of completion to warrant it--to complete, govern, and operate
the Panama Canal, and to govern the Canal Zone, if he desires to do it
himself; or "cause it to be completed, governed, and operated through
a governor of the canal." Of course, the President will prefer to
"cause it to be completed, governed, and operated" through such a
governor. As a matter of fact, when the question of selecting a
governor comes before the President it may be expected that he will
choose a man in whom he has every confidence to carry out the organic
law on the Canal Zone, and to place the canal in operation. This man
will be as much of an autocrat on the Zone under the permanent
organization as the chairman and chief engineer was during the
construction.

When President Roosevelt undertook to carry out the provisions of the
Spooner Act, and to have the canal dug by a board of seven
commissioners, each independent of the other, he soon found that it
would not work. After repeated trials he came to the conclusion that
the control of affairs on the Isthmus should be concentrated largely
under the chairman and chief engineer. He therefore issued an
executive order requiring that all officials on the Isthmus should
report to the chairman and chief engineer, giving him practically all
control over the entire project. This brought both the Canal Zone
Government and the sanitary department under the supervision of the
chairman and chief engineer. The result was a coordination of the work
and a satisfactory organization for its prosecution.

When Congress came to make the permanent canal law it profited by the
unsatisfactory results that would have grown out of a rigid adherence
to the principles of the Spooner Act, and concentrated all authority
under the governor of the Canal Zone. There were those who thought the
sanitary department should not be under the control of the governor,
and still others who felt that the operation of the canal probably
should be under one man and the civil government under another. But
these suggestions were not followed, and the act as finally adopted
makes the President practically a czar of the Isthmus, and under him
the governor need give account to no one but the President.

It has been the ambition of the present chief engineer of the canal to
see the operating force fully installed and things moving along on a
satisfactory working basis before leaving the Isthmus. He thinks
arrangements should be made whereby acute changes of policy should be
prevented. This he would do by having a principal assistant who would
succeed the governor at the end of his four-year term. This would
permit a continuous policy and an unbroken line of action which,
according to his view, would make for the efficiency of the operating
force. In speaking of this phase of the matter, he stated that were a
new man chosen at the end of the four-year term of his predecessor--a
man who had had no previous experience on the Isthmus--there would
always be a tendency to make radical changes.

He would have on the governor's staff a doctor from the Army to have
charge of the work of sanitation on the Canal Zone, who would report
directly to the governor. The quarantine officer, in his opinion,
should be under the Public Health Service of the United States. Under
the plan as adopted in the permanent canal law, any officer of the
Army or of the Navy chosen to fill a position in the canal operating
force will be paid the same salary as a civilian, with the exception
that he would get only the difference between his regular Army or Navy
pay and the salary his position carried.

It is estimated that the expense of operating the canal will amount to
about $3,500,000 a year. This includes the cost of operating a number
of dredges which will have to be maintained in connection with the
canal work. The estimate was made upon the amount of business handled
at the Sault Ste. Marie Canal which has the largest traffic of any
canal in the world.

There will be five departments for the operation of the canal outside
of the work of maintaining the civil government and sanitation. The
operating department will have charge of the operation of docks and
wharves at the terminals, pilotage, lockage, and the lighting of the
canal. It is estimated that it will cost $400,000 a year to maintain
the terminals, $150,000 a year to light the canal, and that it will
require 60 pilots, at $1,800 each a year, to take ships through.
During the first years of operation it is believed that a single shift
can handle all the business that comes, but, as the years go by, it
may require two shifts and eventually three to keep the work going.

The engineering department will require about 500 men and will have
charge of all the construction and repair work pertaining to the canal
property, and of all excavation and dredging in the canal. It will
cost approximately a million dollars a year to maintain this
department, of which three-fourths will be required for the operation
of the dredges and other equipment for keeping the canal open.

The quartermaster's department will have charge of the construction,
repair, and maintenance of all buildings, roads, and municipal
improvements in the Zone settlements and of the receipt, care, and
issue of all property and material. This department will require
nearly a thousand men and the total expense will be in the
neighborhood of $600,000.

The electrical and mechanical department will have charge of the
mechanical and electrical apparatus belonging to the canal, and of the
permanent works at its two ends.

The accounting department will require some 60 men with annual
salaries amounting to approximately a hundred thousand dollars. It is
estimated that the cost of materials for the operation of the canal
will range around three-fourths of a million dollars a year.

The force which will be maintained on the Isthmus, with their
families, will make a Canal Zone population of approximately 5,000.
These, in addition to the eight or nine thousand troops and marines
which will be quartered there, will bring the total population up to
about thirteen or fourteen thousand. Of these perhaps three-fourths
will be along the southern 10-mile section of the canal. But, in spite
of the greater population at the Pacific side, the Atlantic end will
probably not lack for attraction. It is likely that Gatun Lake will be
stocked with a supply of fresh-water fish, and that shooting preserves
will be established adjacent to Gatun, to be conducted in connection
with the Washington Hotel at Colon. There is also some talk of
constructing golf links adjacent to Gatun, which will be open alike to
the employees of the canal and to the guests of the two big Government
hotels--the Washington and the Tivoli.

While a freight-carrying steamer will make its stay as short as
possible, the probabilities are that the passenger-carrying steamer
will require at least 48 hours to make its calls at the two terminal
cities and pass through the canal. They will probably handle the major
portion of the package cargo, leaving the bulk cargo business entirely
for freighters. When going through the canal from the Atlantic to the
Pacific they probably will have cargo bound for a large number of
Pacific ports on diverse routes. This would be discharged at Balboa
and there be put into other ships to be carried to its destination.
During the time the shipping and unshipping of cargo, replenishing
stores, taking on coal and like operations are being performed, the
traveler will be afforded opportunity to get acquainted with dry land
again, and to enjoy for a day or two a respite from his long sea
journey.

The plan advocated on the Isthmus for perfecting the permanent
organization was as follows: The chairman and chief engineer would
call upon each of the departments to furnish a list with the ratings
of the best men. The man having the best record would be offered a
position under the permanent organization similar to the one held by
him under the construction organization. If he chose to accept this
position under the wage standard laid out he could do so; if he did
not, the next man would be given the opportunity, and so on down. In
this way it was expected that the entire force would be chosen because
of records made in the service.




CHAPTER XXVII

HANDLING THE TRAFFIC


Four or five years before the earliest probable opening date, shipping
interests began to arrange their future schedules with respect to the
Panama Canal.

One can scarcely realize how rapidly the facilities of the canal will
be utilized. At the rate of expansion witnessed in the world's marine
traffic during the past two or three decades, 17,000,000 tons of
shipping will be handled through the canal in 1925, 27,000,000 tons in
1935, and 44,000,000 tons in 1945.

The maximum capacity of 80,000,000 tons assumes a passage of 48
vessels a day through the canal, or one for every half hour of the
twenty-four. Two vessels a day of 4,000 tons each, at the present
charge, will render the canal self-supporting.

While the great Isthmian highway will be completed far enough ahead to
be ready to handle all traffic that offers long before the official
opening date, it will, on the other hand, never reach that stage where
dredges will not be needed. There are 22 rivers which wend their way
from the watersheds of the canal, and pour their loads of sand and
silt into it. Of course, these rivers are small--so small, indeed,
that few of them would be dignified by being called rivers in the
United States. But when the heavens open and the floods descend, as
they do so frequently during the rainy season at Panama, these usually
quiet, lazy, little streams become almost as angry as the mighty
Chagres itself, and they rush down to the canal heavily freighted with
sand and silt. If the water in the great interoceanic channel is to be
kept at its appointed depth of 41 feet, dredging perforce must be
continued from year to year, summer and winter, spring and fall. And
so it is that the dredges will be met by every ship that steers its
course from Cristobal to Balboa, or from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

Few ships large enough to tax the dimensional capacity of the locks
ever will go through the canal. Full 90 per cent of all the ships that
sail the seas could go through locks one-half the size of those at
Panama. So far as commercial shipping is concerned, a 15,000-ton
vessel plying tropical waters is considered large, and a 20,000-ton
ship is an exception. According to the best shipping authorities, the
day when vessels of more than 25,000 tons will find it profitable to
ply on the routes which lead through the Panama Canal is so far in the
future that they are not able to discern it. With reference to the
Navy, naval experts generally agree that the United States will
celebrate many a decade of passing years before a battleship too large
to use the present lock chambers is a possibility.

When a ship makes its maiden voyage through the canal, the
measurements to determine its net register will be taken by the
shipping experts in the employ of the United States. When this work
is completed the master of the ship will be required to pay the toll
before he can take his vessel through the canal. If he should fail to
pay the toll the vessel itself would be put on the block and sold at
auction, if necessary, to reimburse the United States for its passage.
However, it is not to be expected that such contingencies as these
will arise. When once a ship has been measured, the formality will not
have to be gone through with on future visits. It is not expected that
each ship will be actually measured for every dimension as it comes to
the canal on its first trip, since its net register tonnage probably
will have been determined long before, and the canal officials will
only check up the work already done elsewhere to assure its accuracy.

Many ships will go to Panama which will not use the canal. For
instance, there will be those which will leave European ports, loaded
in part with cargo bound to Pacific points and in part with cargo for
Atlantic points on the South and Central American coast. Such ships
will simply call at Colon, discharge their cargo bound to Pacific
points, and take on what additional cargo they can get bound for
points for which they are sailing on the Atlantic side. In stopping at
Colon they will probably replenish their supplies from the commissary
department of the canal.

What the freight department is to a railroad the cargo ship will be to
the Panama Canal--its greatest revenue producer. Such ships will do
comparatively little loading and unloading of cargo at either end of
the canal. The tramp steamer will figure largely in the traffic that
passes from ocean to ocean at Panama. With no schedule of sailing
dates and with no definite routes, the tramps constitute the flying
squadron of the shipping world, moving hither and thither seeking
cargoes wherever they can find them. A tramp steamer may load at
Liverpool for San Francisco, reach that point through the Panama
Canal, and, after discharging its cargo, go on up to Seattle and load
for China. There it may discharge its cargo again and go thence to
India to pick up a load of grain for Liverpool, passing through the
Suez Canal. Its master always will turn its prow to the point where
profitable cargo awaits it, and this may carry it by Panama once or a
dozen times a year. The line steamers will have their regular sailing
dates and will pass through the canal at stated intervals.

The problem of providing coal for passing ships is one of the most
important with which the canal authorities will have to deal. The
cheaper that commodity can be sold to the ships, the more attractive
the route will be. For instance, a 10,000-ton ship which saves a
dollar a ton on a thousand tons of coal, saves the equivalent of the
cost of operating the vessel for a period of from 24 to 36 hours, and
this, with the rates at Suez and Panama on an equal basis, gives at
least one day's advantage to the Panama route in figuring on a voyage.
Pocahontas steaming coal costs $2.70 per ton laid down at Newport
News. Under the carrying agreements with shipping interests that
obtained during the construction period, this coal was carried to
Panama for $1.395 a ton. It is estimated that the canal colliers,
which have been authorized by Congress, with a capacity of 12,000 tons
of coal and with a speed of 14 knots, can deliver to the Isthmus a
half million tons of coal a year. The saving which will be effected by
having the coal carried by Government colliers is a large one. A
merchantman would get $368,000 for delivering 264,000 tons of coal,
while the cost of delivery by collier for the same amount would
approximate $184,000. The average life of a collier is 20 years. The
saving effected in these 20 years by the Government carrying its own
coal would be large enough to pay back the million dollars which the
collier cost, and to yield an additional profit of $2,630,000 during
the life of the vessel.

The sale of coal at Suez, where an annual shipping traffic of some
21,000,000 tons is handled, amounts approximately to 1,000,000 tons.
Thus, it will require two colliers to handle the coal when the canal
opens, and two more 13 years later.

Not all the ships which use the canal will coal there. For instance,
the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, which was so forehanded in its
effort to get a good share of the trans-Isthmian traffic that it
acquired the Pacific Steam Navigation Company long before the canal
opened, is building a coaling station at Kingston, Jamaica, where its
ships will replenish their bunkers. This coaling station will, of
course, always be at the disposition of the British Government in case
of war, and of such British merchantmen that choose to pass that way.

Some ships will not negotiate the canal under their own power. Many
small vessels steer so badly that their masters would be afraid to
risk them going through without aid. For instance, the skipper of the
Cristobal, one of the 6,000-ton cement-carrying ships bought by the
United States a few years ago, declared, in discussing this phase of
the matter, that he would be afraid to trust his vessel going through
the canal under its own power. To ships not sufficiently responsive to
their helms, Government tugs will be furnished.

Some skippers prefer to have their vessels towed by one powerful tug,
while others prefer several smaller ones. Several tugs are now
building for towing purposes, and they will also be used to tow
vessels through the locks in the early days of operation, pending the
completion of all of the electric towing locomotives.

Two floating cranes will be provided in the permanent equipment at a
cost of a quarter of a million dollars each. These cranes, with a
lifting power of 250 tons, will be suitable for any wrecking
operations in the canal and, also, for lifting the gates in case of
repairs being required.

The canal will probably be the death blow to the sailing ship of
international commerce. Not being able to negotiate the canal under
their own power, and because of the dead calms which prevail in the
Gulf of Panama, sailing ships will be stopped from using the Isthmian
waterway. When they attempt to journey around Cape Horn and the Cape
of Good Hope in competition with steam vessels which pass through the
Panama Canal, the operation will afford such little profit that in
the course of a few years they will have to surrender what little
share of international commerce they have succeeded in keeping.

The Panamans are inclined to think the United States drove a hard
bargain when the provision was inserted in the treaty that all
supplies for the building and operation of the canal, and for the
demands of shipping using it, when imported by the United States,
should be free of duty. This practically gives the United States a
monopoly of the business of catering to the needs of ships passing
Panama. The present duty on imports is 15 per cent, and the local
merchant who would sell supplies to the passing ships would be under
the necessity of adding 15 per cent to his buying price before he
could compete with the United States Government on equal terms. This
advantage is made all the more marked by the reasons of the fact that
the United States often can make much money out of the operation by
selling at actual cost, the profit arising from the extra shipping
which is thereby attracted to the canal.

The United States will reimburse the owners of any vessels passing
through the locks of the canal, under the control of its operatives,
for any injury which may result to vessel, cargo, or passengers.
Provision is made under the permanent canal law that regulations shall
be promulgated by the President which will provide for the prompt
adjustment, by agreement, and immediate payment of claims. In case of
disagreement, suit may be brought in the district court of the Canal
Zone against the governor of the Panama Canal. The law says: "The
hearing and disposition of such cases shall be expedited and the
judgment shall be immediately paid out of any moneys appropriated or
allotted for canal operation."

The character of misrepresentations made concerning the canal was
illustrated in a story published in the midsummer of 1913. This story
originated in London and declared that all of the big shipping
interests were afraid of the Panama Canal, and that Lloyds would
insure vessels and cargo only at much advanced rates. The article went
on to state that the representative of one of the biggest European
lines had visited the Isthmus and had returned with the announcement
that his company could not afford to trust its vessels in the canal.

As a matter of fact, with the United States Government standing
responsible for any damage sustained in the canal, no shipping
interest could sensibly regard it as extra hazardous to pass through
it; rather, it would be less hazardous than to negotiate the tortuous
Strait of Magellan, where thousands of wrecks tell of unseen dangers,
or to round Cape Horn with its fierce storms and its grave perils.

Much has been said about the probability of injury to the canal by
persons of evil intent, and the Panama Canal law imposes heavy
penalties on anyone attempting to inflict such an injury. The law
provides that the governor of the Canal Zone shall make rules and
regulations, subject to the approval of the President, touching the
right of any person to remain upon or pass over any part of the Canal
Zone. "Any person violating these rules or regulations shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction in the district court of the
Canal Zone, shall be fined not exceeding $500 or imprisoned not
exceeding a year, or both penalties in the discretion of the court.
Any person who, by any means or any way, injures or obstructs or
attempts to injure or obstruct any part of the Panama Canal, or the
locks thereof, or the approaches thereof, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony and on conviction shall be punished by a fine not to exceed
$10,000 or by imprisonment not to exceed 20 years, or by the
infliction of both of these penalties. If the act shall cause the
death of any person within a year and a day thereafter, the person so
convicted shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished
accordingly." As a further precaution, individuals will not be allowed
to approach the locks with any sort of packages unless they are
properly vouched for.

The possibility of serious injury to the locks will be carefully
guarded against. They will be lighted at night by electric lamps of
large candlepower and the whole lock structure will be kept as light
as day throughout the night. Men will be always on sentry duty, and an
adequate system of intercommunication will enable the sentries to call
out a guard large enough to repulse any attack of any small surprising
party.




CHAPTER XXVIII

THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA


The Republic of Panama is one of the smallest countries in the world,
its territory being about equal to that of the State of Indiana. It
has no national debt, and has $7,000,000 invested in mortgages, on
real estate in New York City.

When it received $10,000,000 from the United States, in payment for
the rights under which the Panama Canal was built, it immediately
invested about 75 per cent of it, using the remainder for paying the
expenses of the revolution, and for setting the new government on its
feet. It now receives $250,000 a year from the United States as rental
for the Canal Zone, and this, with the $350,000 received as interest
from its real estate mortgages in New York, gives it an annual income
of $600,000 outside of money raised by the usual processes of
taxation.

Under the treaty with the United States, Panama has its independence
guaranteed, and recognizes the right of the United States to maintain
order within its boundaries. This entirely does away with the
necessity of maintaining an army and navy. The result is that with no
appropriations required for military purposes, and with a $600,000
income from the Canal Zone, it enjoys one of the lowest tax rates in
the world.

Although the Republic of Panama has its Declaration of Independence
and its Glorious Fourth, the former was written by a foreigner, and
the latter occurs in November. There is some dispute as to who wrote
the declaration of independence, but the best information points
either to Philippe Bunau-Varilla, a Frenchman, or to William Nelson
Cromwell, an American. These two gentlemen differ upon this subject,
each claiming that he was the Thomas Jefferson of Panama.

When the $10,000,000 was paid to Panama by the United States, one of
the first things done was to build a university, locally known as the
National Institute. Some $800,000 was spent in the construction of the
buildings, which are located near the line of the Canal Zone. But it
so happens that Panama has few teachers qualified to hold university
chairs, and fewer students qualified to pursue university courses; and
the result is that the university is more a place of buildings than a
seat of learning.

No other country in the world calls in another nation to superintend
its elections. When the first presidential election was held the
United States took the initiative and demanded the right to supervise
the balloting. Before the second election was held the President
became ambitious to succeed himself, although the constitution
provided that he could not do so. He thereupon decided to resign for a
period of six months, in favor of one of his partisans, thinking that
this would allow him to live up to the letter of the constitution
even though he were violating its spirit in becoming a candidate for
reelection. This situation was brought to the attention of the United
States, and the President was politely but firmly informed that the
subterfuge would not be permitted. When the election approached each
side thought that the other was trying to win by fraud, and the United
States was asked to referee the political battle.

The City of Panama is famous for its wickedness. Men who have seen the
seamy side of life in all of the big cities of the world declare that
Panama is as bad as the worst of them. Until a few years ago
bull-fighting was permitted, but the bulls were so poor and the
fighters were such butchers that the Government finally outlawed this
form of entertainment. Cock-fighting persists, and numerous cock pits
are popular resorts every Sunday. Nowhere else can one witness a
greater frenzy in betting than at one of these cocking mains. The
backers of the rival birds nod their heads and place their bets so
rapidly that it is more bewildering to the onlooker than the bidding
at an auctioneer's junk sale.

The prize ring has succeeded the bull ring in gratifying the
Spaniard's thirst for gore, and scarcely a Sunday passes that there is
not a prize fight in Panama. Few Americans who attend them come away
without a feeling of disgust over the poor fighting, the brutality,
and the trickery resorted to.

While the Americans have done so much for public cleanliness in Panama
and Colon, the masses seem to know little more about sanitary living
today than before the Americans came. The stenches which greet the
visitor in the native quarters are no less odorous than those
encountered in other cities of tropical America. The bathtub is an
unknown quantity among the masses. Most of the natives who live in the
cities are engaged in some line of small trade. It may be that a shop
has only a platter of sweetmeats and a few bottles of soda on ice, and
that another has only a bushel of different kinds of tropical fruits,
but out of the small sales large families manage in some way to exist.
The markets open early in the morning. There is no spirit of rivalry
among the market men, and they act usually as if they were conferring
a favor upon the buyer. At the markets many Indians are encountered
who bring their wares from the interior and offer them for sale. These
usually consist of pottery, net bags, charcoal and the like.

Life among the Panamans in the jungle is simple indeed. With his
machete the householder may provide a thatched roof for his
mud-floored hut, and he can raise enough beans, plantains and yams,
and burn enough charcoal, and catch enough fish to meet all of his
needs. In the kitchen the principal utensils are gourds and cocoanut
shells. The most tempting morsel that the Panaman can get is the
iguana, a lizard as big as a cat, whose meat is said to taste like
spring chicken. It is about the ugliest creature in the animal world,
and yet it means more to the native Panaman than does possum meat to
the cotton-field darky of the South.

The unconscious cruelty of the average native is remarked by almost
every visitor. He is usually too lazy to be conscious of cruelty, for
that would require exertion. When he catches the iguana, for
instance, he takes it alive so that it may be fattened before being
killed. Its short legs are twisted and crossed above its back, and the
sharp claw of one foot is thrust through the fleshy part of the other,
so as to hold them together without other fastening. The tail, being
useless for food, is chopped off with the machete, and thus mutilated
and unable to move, the lizard is kept captive until fat enough to
eat.

The fruits of Panama are neither so numerous nor so plentiful as those
of Nicaragua or Jamaica. The mamei is a curious pulpy fruit the size
of a peach, with a skin like chamois and with a smooth pit the size of
a peach-stone. The sapodilla is a plum-colored fruit with seeds in a
gelatinous mass. One is usually introduced to the sapodilla with the
remark that, although the seeds are eaten, they have never been known
to cause appendicitis.

Cedar is preferred to mahogany in Panama. The Indians make their
cayucas out of mahogany logs, and it is not uncommon to see bridges 40
feet long and 5 feet thick, made of mahogany logs which would be worth
several thousands of dollars in an American furniture factory.

Panama is famous for its tropical flowers. Many of them are beautiful,
but few are sweet smelling. Orchids abound, especially on the Atlantic
side, and while the waters of the Chagres were being impounded in
Gatun Lake, native boatmen would go out in their cayucas and gather
orchids from the trees. One of the most beautiful of the orchids of
Panama is the Holy Ghost orchid. It blooms biennially, and when its
petals fold back they reveal a likeness to a dove.

Some of the American Women on the Canal Zone became enthusiastic
collectors of tropical flowers. Among these were Mrs. David Du Bose
Gaillard and Mrs. Harry Harwood Rousseau. Both of these ladies spent
much time hunting orchids and other flowers for the verandas of their
houses and for their gardens. Mrs. Rousseau made trips into several of
the other countries of Central America in her quest for new orchids.
The collections made by these two ladies represent the finest on the
whole Isthmus of Panama.

The animal life of the Isthmus is not abundant, although some deer and
a few tapirs are to be found. Alligators abound in the Chagres River
and other streams of the Zone. Perhaps the most interesting form of
animal life to be found on the Isthmus is the leaf-cutting ant. This
ant seems to be nature's original fungus grower. As one walks around
the American settlements, he frequently comes upon a long path filled
with ants, passing back and forth. They resemble a sort of miniature
yacht under full sail, except that the sails are green instead of
white. Upon closer examination it is found that what seemed to be a
sail is a triangular piece of leaf carried on the back of the ant,
with its edges to the wind so as to overcome air resistance. The ants
do not gather these leaves for food, but they store them in such a way
that a fungus grows upon them. They eat the fungus, and when the
leaves are no longer useful they are thrown out and new supplies
brought in.

The native remedies used by the Panamans are many and interesting. For
stomach troubles, which are very rare, they eat papaya. The papaya is
a sort of fruit which might be a cross between a cantaloupe, a
watermelon and a pumpkin, except that it grows on trees. It has the
rind of a green pumpkin, the meat of a cantaloupe, and the seeds of a
watermelon. It is probably richer in vegetable pepsin than any other
plant in existence--a pepsin which neutralizes either alkaline or acid
conditions in the stomach. It is said that a tough steak, wrapped in
the leaf of the papaya tree overnight, becomes tender as the result of
the digestive action of the pepsin in it.

The Indians and Panamans who live in the jungle use the wood of the
cacique, or "monkey cocoanut," to stop any flow of blood. In their
materia medica they have a large number of tropical plants which they
use for their ailments.

The way in which sanitary instruction may be made efficient is
illustrated among some of the people of Panama. Upon one occasion the
Canal Record carried a small diagram of how to make a sanitary
drinking cup out of a sheet of paper. After that there were many
Panamans who, although in a hundred ways indifferent to contagion,
would no longer drink from common drinking cups, but would make their
own sanitary cups. Even the Jamaican negroes employed around the
offices of the commission in many instances would not think of using
the common drinking glass at the office water-cooler.

Two tribes of Indians on the Isthmus have not mixed with the
Caucasians or the negroes. They are the Chucunoques and the San Blas
Indians. The latter tribe has never been known to allow a white man to
remain in its territory after sundown. Even the higher officials of
the Panaman Government are forced to respect this tradition when they
treat with the San Blas chiefs.

Government land in Panama can be bought at the rate of $49.60 for 247
acres, with reductions for larger areas. The Government invites
foreign capital, declaring that the United States stands as a
perpetual guarantee against revolutions within and aggressions
without.

The story of the early days in Panaman history is a strange admixture
of romance and cruelty. The Isthmus was discovered in 1500, and first
settled by an adventurer who had been the Royal Carver in the king's
household at Madrid. Balboa, carrying with him a small force of men
and a lot of bloodhounds, one of them a dog of mighty prowess, known
as Lioncico, or "Little Lion," which drew a captain's pay because of
its fighting qualities, crossed the Isthmus in 1513 and discovered the
Pacific Ocean. After him came a new governor of the Isthmus, who put
Balboa to death.

The Spaniards were unspeakably cruel to the Indians. Even those who
received them kindly were tortured and roasted to death, because they
did not produce enough gold. One governor rode a mule, which was noted
for the frequency of its braying. The Indians were taught that the
mule was asking for gold, and in meeting these demands they not only
had to give what they possessed, but were forced to rob the graves of
their ancestors as well. Upon one occasion the Indians, having
captured a number of Spaniards, melted a lot of the yellow metal and
poured it down their throats, telling them to drink until their
thirst for gold was quenched.

After the Spaniards had established themselves upon the Isthmus, the
English buccaneers, Drake and Morgan, fell upon their cities and
despoiled them. The ruins at Old Panama, which once was a city of
30,000 inhabitants, to-day tell the story of the effective work of
Henry Morgan when he raided it and captured its treasure.

While the Spanish conquerors, the French filibusters, and the English
buccaneers, who took their turns in pillaging Panama, were cruel
beyond imagination, they were always famous for their outward
evidences of religion and piety. The Spanish were always chanting
hymns and honoring the saints; the French would shoot down their own
soldiers for irreverent behavior during mass; the English pirate
captains never failed to hold divine services on Sunday, and often
prohibited profanity and gambling.

Where once Spaniards tortured Indians and British buccaneers raided
Spaniards, where once revolution after revolution left a poor and
desolate country, to-day the gates of Panama are open to the world,
and its trade is invited again to pass that way. The people of the
Isthmus believe that the glory which departed when Morgan sacked Old
Panama, forcing the Pacific trade to seek the Strait of Magellan, will
return with the opening of the Panama Canal, and that their capital,
whose walls cost so much that the Spanish king thought he could see
them from his chamber window in Madrid, will retrieve its ancient
glory.




CHAPTER XXIX

OTHER GREAT CANALS


While the Panama Canal seems destined to endure for all time as the
greatest artificial shipway in the world, there are other waterways,
while small in comparison, that are in themselves wonderful works of
engineering. In point of traffic the greatest canal in the world is
the Sault Ste. Marie Canal, popularly called the "Soo." In point of
economy of distance and world-affecting consequence the Suez Canal
ranks with, or next to, Panama.

The Suez Canal was built while the Civil War was raging in the United
States, and was opened for the passage of vessels on November 17,
1869. It is about twice as long as the Panama Canal, the distance from
Port Said, at the Mediterranean terminus, to Suez at the Red Sea end,
being approximately 100 miles. When constructed its depth was 26 feet,
3 inches, and its bottom width 72 feet. The maximum vessel draft
permitted was 24 feet 7 inches. The canal was in operation for 11
years before vessels of this draft presented themselves for passage.

During the first dozen years of its operation various curves were
straightened, the turning-out places where vessels passed one another
were enlarged, and their number increased to 13. This work of
straightening curves and widening the canal has continued from that
time until the present, and to-day vessels may pass one another
through a large part of its length. The policy increasing the general
dimensions of the canal was begun in 1887. By 1890 its depth had been
increased to 29-1/2 feet, so that it could accommodate ships having a
draft of 26 feet 3 inches. The work of deepening continued, and when
the United States began to build the Panama Canal this work was
speeded up, so that by 1908 a depth of 32-3/4 feet was attained and
vessels of 28 feet draft could be accommodated. In 1909 it was decided
that it would be necessary to make the canal still deeper, and a
project, which will not be completed until 1915, was then undertaken,
calling for a depth of 36 feet 1 inch. By 1898 the width of the canal
had been increased from 72 feet to 98-1/2 feet. This is now being
still further increased to 134-1/2 feet. Even when this project is
completed in 1915, the Panama Canal still can accommodate ships of 5
feet greater draft than the Suez Canal.

The maximum draft of ships permitted to use the Suez Canal is demanded
in comparatively few instances. A recent report showed that 94 per
cent of the ships using the canal had a draft of less than 26-1/4
feet, and that only 1 per cent had a draft of 28 feet. The increase in
the depth of the canal, therefore, was made largely in anticipation of
future shipping requirements.

When the canal was completed it required 49 hours for a ship to pass
through it. The growth in its dimensions, together with the increase
in the number and size of passing stations, the straightening of
curves, and the improvement of facilities, have brought down to 17
hours the average length of time required for the transit. Ships not
equipped with electric searchlights are not permitted to pass through
at night. The improvements being made on the canal are being paid for
mainly from the revenues derived from tolls.

The Suez Canal was constructed, and has been enlarged and managed, by
a private corporation which has invested from the beginning of the
construction up to the present time about $127,000,000 of which
approximately two-thirds has been secured from the sale of securities,
and one-third from the earnings. The original capital of the Suez
Canal Company, issued in 1859, was 400,000 shares of $100 each. These
shares partake of the nature of both bonds and stock, for they are
entitled to interest of 5 per cent as well as to participation in the
company's profits. Provision is made for their redemption, but when
redeemed they continue to share in the profits and merely lose the
interest-bearing feature. On December 31, 1911, 378,231 of these
shares were in circulation.

In 1875 the British Government, through Lord Beaconsfield, purchased
the 176,602 shares held by the Khedive of Egypt, paying some
$20,000,000 for them. The British Government does not own a majority
of the shares, and the Suez Canal is controlled and operated by a
French company. The annual dividends have increased from 4.7 per cent
to 33 per cent. The shares are closely held and trading in them is
light. The stock sells at a premium of over 1,000 per cent. When the
work of building the canal was undertaken, 100,000 shares were given
to the founders. These shares are not stock, but are, rather,
certificates of obligation, requiring the company to pay 10 per cent
of its profits to the promoters and founders of the original company
and their heirs and assigns. The net profits of the canal amount to
about $17,000,000 a year. Of this the stockholders get $12,000,000,
the Egyptian Government $2,500,000, the founders of the company
$1,500,000 and the administrative officers and the employees divide
$100,000 among them.

The traffic of the Suez Canal during the first two years was
relatively small, for the reason that the canal is not a practicable
one for sailing vessels, and steam vessels had to be built. These,
being much less efficient than freight steamers are to-day, were slow
in securing the trade that had been enjoyed by the sailing vessels.
The rate of tolls charged by the Suez Canal Company has declined
steadily since the canal went into operation. On January 1, 1912, they
approximated $1.30 a ton, with a reduction of nearly a third for
vessels in ballast. On January 1, 1913, the rate was made
approximately $1.20 a ton, the fraction of a cent higher than the rate
at Panama. The passenger tolls are $2 for passengers above 12 years
and $1 for children from 3 to 12 years of age; children below 3 years
are carried free. The highest toll charged on the Suez Canal was in
1874 when it was $2.51 a ton.

The Suez Canal has proved highly profitable to its owners. No one
believes that the Panama Canal will yield as great a return on the
capital invested. The cost of the Panama Canal will be four times the
cost of Suez, and it is doubted by traffic authorities whether the
Panama Canal will ever handle as much business.

The Manchester Ship Canal, which connects Manchester with Liverpool,
was constructed only after years of preliminary agitation. There was
opposition by the railways, and from the industrial and commercial
centers with which Manchester competes. Over 300 petitions were
presented to Parliament before its consent was obtained for the
construction of the canal. Work was begun in November, 1887, at which
time it was estimated that the canal would cost $42,000,000. It was
opened for traffic January 1, 1894, after $75,000,000 had been spent
in building it. Of this about $60,000,000 went into actual
construction work. The Manchester Canal is 35-1/2 miles long. It
extends from Eastham, about 6 miles from Liverpool, to Manchester. Its
original depth was 26 feet, but this has been increased to 28 feet.
Ships with a length of 550 feet, a beam of 61 feet, a height of 70
feet, and a draft of 27 feet can use the canal. There is a difference
of 58 feet 6 inches in level between Eastham and Manchester, and this
is overcome by five sets of locks. The highest lift is 16 feet.

The Manchester Canal Company owns the Bridgewater Canal and makes
connections with 13 other barge canals. It handles about 6,000,000
tons of freight a year, of which the bulk is sea-borne. Although it
connects with 13 barge canals, the amount of barge traffic handled is
less to-day than it was a decade ago. From the beginning the
Manchester Canal has had to compete with the railroads, and they cut
their rates to such a basis that they get the business and force the
canal company to operate as a losing venture to its stockholders.

In spite of the competition of the railroads, the canal has managed to
increase its business at about the same rate that traffic through the
Suez Canal has increased, and a little more rapidly than it has been
estimated that traffic through the Panama Canal will grow. The
shareholders have not yet received any dividends, but it seems
probable that in the course of a few years all of the securities will
earn an annual income. Many shareholders have been more than
compensated for their subscriptions by the collateral benefits they
have received from the canal.

The Government of Germany constructed a canal connecting its Baltic
and North Sea ports, and named it the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal. The
natural route from the Baltic to the North Sea around Denmark is
circuitous, dangerous because of storms, and is guarded by foreign
powers. The canal was begun in 1887 and completed in 1895, and was
constructed primarily for military and naval purposes, although it has
proved to be of great value to the commerce of Germany. It connects
Brunsbuttel Harbor on the Elbe with Holtenau on Kiel Bay. It passes
through low lands and lakes and along river valleys. It is 61 miles
long and, as it was first constructed, had a width of 72 feet and a
depth of 29-1/2 feet. The total cost of the canal was approximately
$37,000,000. It was in operation only 12 years until it was found
necessary to enlarge it. The reconstruction of the canal was
authorized by the German Government in 1907, and the work, which is
expected to be completed in 1914, was started in 1909. When this work
is completed the canal will be 144 feet wide and 36 feet deep. At 10
places it will be widened so as to permit ships to pass. New twin
locks, built for the regulation of the tides--for the canal itself is
at sea level--will be 82 feet longer and 37 feet wider than the Panama
locks. The maximum depth of these locks will be 45 feet, although at
low tide they will be a little less than 40 feet.

During a recent year commercial vessels with an aggregate net register
of over 7,000,000 tons used the Kiel Canal. The increase of business
during the first decade of the present century amounted to 70 per
cent, or a little more than the estimated increase for each decade at
Panama. The net receipts from the operation of the canal are not
sufficient to pay interest on the investment. No effort is made to
levy tolls that will provide for interest charges, or for the
amortization of the principal. The canal does not connect regions of
enormous traffic, nor does it greatly shorten ocean routes. The
longest route is cut down only 429 miles. The German Empire was so
well pleased with the success of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal that the
enlargement it is now making represents an expenditure one and a half
times the original cost.

The Amsterdam Canal was built to connect Amsterdam with the sea.
Formerly, ocean-going vessels were small and the Zuider Zee River was
then a stream of considerable depth. Gradually, however, the Zuider
Zee became shallower and the size of ocean vessels larger, so that
the commercial supremacy of Amsterdam was threatened by the
competition of Rotterdam and Antwerp and north German ports. In 1818 a
corporation constructed what was known as the "North Holland Canal,"
which was large enough to accommodate ships employed in the East India
trade. It had a minimum depth of 20 feet and a minimum width of 100
feet. This canal, however, had numerous curves and it was constructed
by a roundabout route of 52 miles from Amsterdam northward to the
North Sea, while Amsterdam is less than 17 miles from the sea by
direct route.

In 1863 a concession for the construction of the North Sea Canal was
granted and two years later active work began. It was finished in
1876. There were no serious engineering difficulties to be met, there
being no rivers to be crossed, no towns to block the way, and only
three bridges to be built. The work consisted mainly of building
embankments, draining and reclaiming land, and dredging the channel.
The canal was not completed according to the original plan. Extensive
enlargements and improvements were decided on, and a larger additional
lock was undertaken in 1889 and completed in 1896. At that time it was
the largest canal lock in the world. Plans are now being considered
for building another new lock, which will be larger than those at
Panama. The bottom width of the canal is now 164 feet. It can
accommodate vessels 721 feet long, with a 79-foot beam and of 30 feet
draft. The construction of the canal cost $16,000,000. Improvements
have brought the total amount up to about $24,000,000. Since 1893 all
toll charges have been eliminated, and the canal has been operated at
the expense of the State. The annual average cost of operation and
maintenance is about $200,000. This canal bears about the same
relation to the city of Amsterdam that the Delaware River Channel
bears to the city of Philadelphia, or the improvements on the lower
Mississippi to the city of New Orleans.

The Cronstadt and St. Petersburg Canal is 16 miles long and gives St.
Petersburg an outlet to the Gulf of Finland. It was built at a total
cost of about $10,000,000. It has a minimum width of 220 feet and a
navigable depth of about 20-1/2 feet. It was built primarily as a
military undertaking, but has proved of great service to Russian
commerce.

Another important European canal is that extending from the Gulf of
Corinth to the Gulf of Aegina in southern Greece. Its length is about
4 miles, a part of which was cut through soft granite rock and the
remainder through soil. It has no locks. The bottom width is 72 feet
and the depth 26-1/4 feet. The average tolls are 18 cents per ton and
20 cents for passengers.

No other canal in the world can rival the one at Sault Ste. Marie,
Mich., which connects Lake Superior with Lake Huron, in the enormous
volume of its shipping. There are really two canals--one owned by the
Canadian Government, and one by the United States Government. The
canal belonging to the United States was begun in 1853 by the State of
Michigan, and opened in 1855. It had a length of about a mile and was
provided with twin locks 350 feet long, allowing the passage of
vessels drawing 12 feet of water. The United States Government, by
consent of the State of Michigan, began in 1870 to enlarge the canal,
and, by 1881, had increased its length to 1.6 miles, its width to an
average of 160 feet and its depth to 16 feet. A lock 515 feet long, 80
feet wide, and 17 feet deep was located south of the locks which were
built by the State.

In 1882 the United States Government took over the entire control of
the canal. Five years later the locks that had been built by the State
were torn down, and a new one 800 feet long, 100 feet wide, and 22
feet deep was put into commission in 1896. The Canadian Canal, 1-1/8
miles long, 150 feet wide, and 22 feet deep, was built on the north
side of the river during the years 1888 to 1895. Its locks are 900
feet long, 60 feet wide, and 22 feet deep.

The traffic through the Sault Ste. Marie Canals averages around
60,000,000 tons a year. This is as much as the Panama Canal can expect
to get 40 years after its opening. The tonnage of the American Soo
Canal passed the million mark in 1873, reached the 20,000,000 mark in
1899, and amounted to 46,000,000 net tons in 1909. It now ranges
around 50,000,000 tons. It will be seen from this that the American
Canal, built on the south side of St. Mary's River, gets about ten
times as much traffic as the Canadian Canal, built on the north side
of the river. This gives the American Soo Canal more than twice as
much traffic as the Suez Canal, and about four times as much as the
Panama Canal expects to begin with.

A canal which was built primarily for drainage purposes, but which
seems destined to fill an important place as a traffic-carrying
waterway, is the Chicago Drainage Canal connecting Lake Michigan at
Chicago with the Illinois River at Lockport--a distance of 34 miles.
It was built for the purpose of reversing the movement of water in the
Chicago River and preventing the pollution of Lake Michigan. The
sewage of the city now goes to the faraway Mississippi instead of the
Lakes. The minimum depth of the canal is 22 feet, and its bottom width
160 feet. To complete the project the excavation of nearly 44,000,000
yards of material was required--enough, if deposited in Lake Michigan
in 40 feet of water, to form an island a mile square with a surface 12
feet above the water. The city of Chicago and the State of Illinois
have agreed to turn this canal over to the United States Government,
if it will deepen the Illinois and Mississippi Rivers to 14 feet
between Lockport and St. Louis. This would give a complete water
connection from upper Mississippi River points to Lake Michigan, and
open up a highway to the Gulf of Mexico. The estimated cost of this
project is $25,000,000.

The completion of the Panama Canal will probably result in an
unprecedented activity in the development of inland waterways in the
United States. The new markets which it will open up to American
products and the old markets it will stimulate and extend, will demand
large additional facilities for getting the products of the American
farm and factory to the seaboard. Already preparations for
capitalizing the commercial opportunities which the opening of the
canal will afford, are being made in various parts of the country.

The Erie Canal, connecting Buffalo and Albany and giving the Great
Lakes a water outlet at New York, is being widened and deepened at an
expense of $101,000,000. The propaganda of the American Rivers and
Harbors Congress, looking to the appropriation of $500,000,000 to be
spent in a systematic program of inland waterway development, is
meeting with encouragement in every part of the country, and it is the
expectation of those who believe that the Government should commit
itself to such a program, that within 25 years the stimulus to
waterway development given by the opening of the Panama Canal, will
give to the United States one of the finest systems of inland
waterways in the world.




CHAPTER XXX

A NEW COMMERCIAL MAP


The most rapid change in the commercial map of the world wrought in
centuries will be witnessed during the years following the completion
of the Panama Canal. Cities that heretofore have been mere way
stations on the international routes of trade will grow into rich
centers where the new roads of the commercial world will cross. On the
other hand, cities which in the past have gloried in a trade supremacy
of international recognition will see themselves displaced and their
prestige lost. The readjustment will not be the matter of a day or a
year; even a generation may pass before it is completed; but the
ultimate changes will certainly be greater and more world-encompassing
than anyone now can forecast.

The capture of Constantinople by the Turks was directly responsible
for the discovery of the New World. It cut off the cities of the
Mediterranean from communication with India, and sent Columbus
westward in quest of another passage, which could not be obstructed by
the Mussulman tyrants of the East. At last the Panama Canal is to
afford that passage, and to bring the whole earth into smaller
compass.

Of course, the United States will be the first to realize the great
benefits of the canal. It will double the efficiency of the American
Navy by permitting it to concentrate its forces on either ocean in
shorter time, by weeks, than can be done by any other nation;
consequently, it will add to American military prestige throughout the
world. The benefits immediately accruing to the people of the United
States will be as great in a commercial way as in military advantage.
As the capture of Constantinople caused the up-building of many
notable regions through the transformation of international trade
routes, so will the completion of the Panama Canal open up new markets
and new opportunities to the Mississippi Valley, the world's greatest
granary. Its grain and meat products, loading by way of Gulf ports,
can go to the ends of the earth with but little outlay for expensive
rail transportation. It is even probable that the great awakening
incident to the opening of the canal, may hasten the day when the
Lakes-to-the-Gulf waterway will be an accomplished fact and when ships
may load in Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, St. Paul, and Minneapolis and
sail directly to the ports of the world, thus beginning an era of
commercial development surpassing even the wonderful growth of the
half century just closed.

Pittsburgh may then be able to send its tremendous output of
manufactures to all parts of the world without transhipment; Kansas
City will feel the stimulus of the new waterway; and the Pacific
coast, long cut off from the eastern section of the United States by
high mountain barriers that have been only partially overcome by
railroads, will find its great resources within marketable distance of
the Eastern States.

Canada, too, will feel the stimulus of the canal. No longer will its
great crops have to find their slow outlet over railroads that must
cross the backbone of a continent, but, pursuing the avenues of least
resistance, they may move to all parts of the world by way of the
Great Lakes and the Mississippi River.

South America will greatly benefit by the completion of the canal.
Already its west coast countries and cities are getting ready for the
boom of business that is to follow. Brought thousands of miles nearer
to all western trade centers--so close that their raw products and
American manufactured products can be exchanged to advantage--there
will be a growth of trade whose prospect already has awakened the
lethargic South American to the possibilities ahead.

These possibilities well may be considered by the business men of the
United States. To-day North America buys a large percentage of the
products of South America; but, when the South Americans have money to
spare, they spend only $1 out of $8 in North America--the other $7
goes to Europe. The American exporter will find himself quickened by
the history-making change the canal will produce and, if he goes at it
in earnest, he will be in a position to reverse the present situation
and get $7 of South American trade where Europe gets only $1.

Australia and New Zealand will experience, perhaps, a greater change
in the trade routes than any other countries outside of the Americas.
The Australian commerce now is largely carried by way of Suez. The
opening of the Panama Canal will place New Zealand 1,200 miles nearer
to London than it is by way of Suez, and the eastern ports of
Australia will be as near to England by way of Panama as by Suez. All
Australasian ports will be brought several thousand miles closer to
the Atlantic ports of the United States than they are to-day. No one
who has heard an Australasian complain of the long delays and the
excessive freight rates that intervene between him and his American
shoes, can doubt that the closer proximity of American markets will be
welcomed in that faraway land under the southern cross. Sydney will be
4,000 miles nearer to New York through the Panama Canal, and 5,500
miles nearer to New Orleans and Galveston.

The transcontinental tonnage now handled by the railroads, which
ultimately will go by the canal, aggregates 3,000,000 tons a year. The
seaboard sections of the United States, of course, will benefit more
largely than interior points, for the reason that interior points will
have to take a combined rail-and-water route. This will involve
railroad transportation and transhipment of cargo, also rehandling
charges. After the canal is opened it is probable that the railroads
will prefer to supply the intermountain States directly from eastern
sources, instead of maintaining the existing policy of giving low
rates to Pacific coast cities, so as to give them dominance over the
shipping business of the intermountain region. The total
coast-to-coast traffic of the railroads is said to approximate
one-fifth of the entire traffic carried across the Rocky Mountains.
Only one-third of the through traffic of the transcontinental lines
from the East to the West originates east of a line drawn through
Buffalo and Pittsburgh. It is this third of the westward business that
will be affected mainly by the operation of the canal.

[Illustration: INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING ROUTES]

The principal effect the Panama Canal will have in the readjustment of
the trade map of the world is not, perhaps, as much in changing
existing routes as in creating new avenues of business. In every
region where there is promise of unusual benefit by reason of the
opening of the Panama Canal, an effort is being made to capitalize the
advantages to be derived therefrom. The west coast of South America
feels the stimulus of suddenly being brought thousands of miles closer
to the best markets of the world, and anyone who travels down the
coast from Panama may see at every port signs of a determination to
reap full advantage of the new opportunities.

Even Guayaquil, a city that for years has been a hissing and a byword
to the masters of all ships plying up and down the west coast because
of its absolute indifference to all requirements of sanitation, has
prepared for a campaign of cleaning-up, in order that it may become a
port of call for all the ships passing that way. Heretofore, masters
of ships, in order to comply with quarantine regulations elsewhere,
have given it a wide berth whenever possible.

Chile, Peru, and Ecuador--all three have caught the spirit of the new
era which a completed canal proclaims, and are striving to set their
houses in order for the quickened times they see ahead. With the
Central American Republics it is the same. Handicapped as they are by
revolutions that sap their life-blood, or dominated by rulers who have
no other object in governing the people than to exploit them, these
countries still hope for much from the canal, and new activities are
beginning to spring up in every one of them.

It is not improbable that the canal will play an important part in
transforming the economic situation of the world during the
generations immediately ahead of us. One needs only to study the
distribution of humanity over the countries of the earth to find how
unevenly the population is scattered, and to learn what great tides of
immigration will have to flow westward to establish the equilibrium of
population, which some day is bound to come. When Asia has a
population of 50 per square mile and Europe a population of 100 a
square mile, while North America has 15 and South America has 7, it is
apparent that the future holds great changes in store. The potential
development of the two Americas challenges the imagination. South
America, with its virgin soil all but untouched, can support a
population half as dense as that of Europe. This means that it can
make room for 300,000,000 immigrants. Likewise, it is fair to assume
that North America, with its up-to-date methods of agriculture,
industry, and commerce, can support a population as dense as that of
Asia with its primitive methods of manufacture and agriculture. This
means that North America has room to accommodate 300,000,000 souls. In
other words, room still remains for 600,000,000 persons on the
continents which the Panama Canal divides. When the day comes, as it
seems certain that it will, that the Americas reach their full growth,
even the Panama Canal, larger by far than any other artificial
waterway in the world, will be much too small to accommodate the
traffic which naturally would pass its way.

The foreign trade of the United States with its 90,000,000 of
population, aggregates 60,000,000 tons a year. Assuming that foreign
trade would grow in the same proportion as population, it will be seen
that the foreign trade of the two Americas at a time when the
population of South America becomes half as dense as that of Europe,
and that of North America half as dense as that of Asia, will
approximate 500,000,000 tons. Assuming further that only one-fifth of
this would pass through the canal, the American commerce alone would
exceed its capacity, leaving all the trade between the Orient and
eastern Europe to be taken care of by future enlargements.

More immediate, however, will be the realization of the prophecy of
William H. Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of State, that the Pacific is
destined to become the chief theater of the world's events. As the
population of the earth stands to-day, more than half of all the
people who inhabit the globe dwell on lands which drain into this
greatest of oceans. Yet, in spite of that fact, the trade that sweeps
over the Pacific is but small in comparison with that which traverses
the Atlantic. Where a thousand funnels darken the trade routes of the
Atlantic, a few hundred are seen on the Pacific.

But in Japan one may find an example of the possibilities of the
Pacific in the years to come. When China, with its 400,000,000 people,
awakens as Japan has awakened, and builds up an international trade in
proportion to that of Japan, it will send a commerce across the seas
unprecedented in volume. When it buys and sells as Japan buys and
sells, the waters of the Orient will vie with those of the Occident in
the size of their fleets of commerce.

The opening of the Panama Canal promises to be one of the factors in
hastening the day when the Orient will become as progressive as the
Occident, and when sleeping nations will arise from their lethargy and
contribute uncounted millions of tons of traffic to the Pacific Ocean,
making it a chief theater of commerce as well as of world events.

In our own country the course of empire has been sweeping toward the
Pacific. Where once the center of most things lay east of the
Mississippi River, now we find its agriculture, its mining industries,
and its commercial activities gradually moving westward. The center of
cotton production, once in those States celebrated in the melodies of
the Southern plantation, has moved westward and to-day in Texas,
Oklahoma, and even Southern California, cotton is grown in a way which
shows that King Cotton has caught the spirit of the age and is
extending his territories westward toward the Pacific. And all of this
means a growing business and an expanding traffic through the Panama
Canal.

On the Atlantic side there are signs without number that many nations
will be up and doing in the reformation of the commercial map of the
world. The islands of the Caribbean form a screen around the Atlantic
end of the canal, and the majority of them are British possessions.
Many of their cities will be situated upon the new international trade
routes that will be called into being by the opening of the Panama
Canal. At Kingston, Jamaica, great improvements are projected, coaling
stations are planned, and other steps are being taken which will
enable the British Government to reap what advantage it can from the
construction of the canal. With its splendid diversity of climate,
brought about by the wide range of elevated land, the fruits of the
temperate zones may be grown, as well as those of the Tropics, and, as
John Foster Fraser expresses it, Jamaica may become the orchard of
Great Britain.

Denmark is planning extensive shipping facilities in its beautiful
harbor of Charlotte Amalia on the Island of St. Thomas. This island,
which commands one of the principal passages from the Atlantic to the
Caribbean Sea, might to-day be a possession of the United States had
this Government been willing to buy it when Denmark was anxious to
sell. It was here that the bold pirates of the _Spanish Main_ hid
their crews in the all but landlocked harbor, and waited for the
shipping which passed through Mona passage. Here Bluebeard's castle
still stands a mute reminder of the romantic days when buccaneers
dominated the _Spanish Main_.

The north coast of South America also expects to figure largely in the
new commercial map. The northern cities of Venezuela are on the route
from eastern South America through the canal, and on one of the
natural routes from Pacific ports to Europe. Nowhere else in the world
will one find a more delightful climate or a more picturesque city or
scenery than in northern Venezuela. Caracas, the capital, is but two
hours' ride from the port of La Guaira, and less than a day's journey
from Puerto Cabello, and, while the commerce which may be developed in
Venezuela will, for the most part, find its outlet to the sea through
the Orinoco River, La Guaira and Puerto Cabello will always prove
attractive ports of call for passenger-carrying ships.

The changes in the commercial situation of Asia and the Americas,
brought about by the opening of the canal, will be many. There will be
a sudden readjustment of existing trade routes and this will be
followed by a long era of development of new conditions, which will be
so gradual as to be almost imperceptible, and yet so immense as to
excite the wonder of humanity when it stops to reckon its full effect
and meaning.




CHAPTER XXXI

AMERICAN TRADE OPPORTUNITIES


The great development of the southern part of the New World, extending
from the Rio Grande to the Strait of Magellan, certain to take place
as a result of the opening of the Panama Canal, spells opportunity for
American commercial expansion. This vast territory, covering an area
nearly three times as great as that of the United States, has a
population of only 50,000,000. Its resources have been merely
scratched on the surface. Its potentialities, acre for acre, are as
great as those of the United States.

Porto Rico will serve for a criterion by which to measure the future
possibilities of this Empire of the South. In Porto Rico one may see
the benefits of the institution of a really good government, and the
success which attends a proper effort to develop natural resources in
tropical America. If American opportunities in all Latin America may
be measured by American successes in that island, then, indeed, the
future is rich with promise. During a single decade the external
commerce of this little gem of the West Indies was more than
quadrupled. It now amounts to some $80,000,000 a year, and only about
12 other countries in the world buy more goods from the American
manufacturer.

The expansion of internal business has kept pace with the growth of
external commerce. In seven years taxable values increased from less
than $90,000,000 to more than $160,000,000. In a single year the
amount of life insurance written in the island nearly doubled, and
fire insurance increased nearly half. The exportation of sugar
increased fivefold in 10 years, and the exportation of cigars 14
times. The population of the island has increased by half under the
beneficient policies of the United States, going up from 800,000 in
1898 to 1,200,000 in 1912. During a single year Porto Rico buys about
$35,000,000 worth of goods from the United States, and ships
practically the same amount to this country.

Should all Latin America prove as good a customer in proportion to
area as Porto Rico, our trade with Latin America alone would be many
fold greater than the entire foreign trade of the United States
to-day. Should all Latin America, even with its present population,
buy as liberally from the United States as Porto Rico does, we would
sell annually to it nearly $2,000,000,000 worth of products.

The most necessary step in developing the potentialities of Latin
America is to provide good and stable government. Commercial
statistics show how prosperity flourishes where good government
reigns, and of how poverty dwells where misgovernment exists. One may
go to Porto Rico, to Jamaica, to Curacao, or to St. Thomas, and in
each of these countries may behold the wholesome rule of northern
Europeans and their descendants. The people have at least those
substantial rights which are necessary to the peace, happiness, and
well-being of humanity; and equally without exception trade statistics
show a greater foreign trade, in proportion to area and population,
than is enjoyed in any country where misrule prevails. Porto Rico
could be buried in a single lake of Nicaragua; it is only
one-fifty-seventh as large as Central America; and yet Porto Rico has
a foreign trade greater than all the territory from the Isthmus of
Tehuantepec to the Isthmus of Panama.

How to improve governmental conditions in those countries where
misrule prevails is a most serious problem. Had it not been for the
Monroe doctrine it is safe to say that not one of the Republics of
tropical America would be in existence today. Instead, their territory
would be colonial possessions of the several powerful nations, and
their people would be living under the comparatively wholesome rule of
those nations. As it is, in a majority of the Republics south of the
Rio Grande there is a state of affairs which makes against the
development of resources and the best interests of the people. The
whole theory under which these countries are governed is that
primitive one: "Let him take who has the power, and let him keep who
can." The result is that they are Republics only in name, and that the
only way to change administrations is to have a revolution.
Revolutions mean poverty; poverty means undeveloped resources, and so
in some of these countries conditions were as bad in 1913, after
nearly a century of so-called republican rule, as they were when the
yoke of Spain was thrown off in 1821. How to bring about those
conditions of peace and amity essential to national growth and
development in these countries is the problem that has vexed more than
one administration in Washington.

Some have answered that the best way to do it is to abrogate the
Monroe doctrine and to let every Latin American tub stand on its own
bottom, a proposal that might benefit these countries vastly, but
which contains many possibilities of evil to the United States. Others
have suggested that our experiment in Porto Rico offers the solution
of the problem, at least so far as tropical North America is
concerned. They assert that the end would justify the means, and that
the planning of the same character of government in this territory
that exists in Porto Rico today, would be the greatest godsend that
the masses of the people of these countries could have. Still others
have advocated a "hands-off" policy so far as the rule of these
countries is concerned, allowing them to fight whenever, and in
whatever way, they wish, but at the same time adhering rigidly to the
Monroe doctrine against European interference.

Whatever the ultimate conclusion, it seems useless to hope for
prosperity and expansion in countries whose industries constantly
suffer from the galling blight of ever-recurring revolution. The great
problem that lies before the American people, if the Latin America of
the future is to become like the Anglo-Saxon America of today, is that
of devising a policy which will insure conditions of peace and good
will in the several sword-ruled countries south of the Rio Grande.

As matters stand today in the majority of the countries of Latin
America, although their Governments owe their very existence to the
United States, there is a feeling of antipathy against Americans,
which places the American exporter on an unequal footing with his
European rival. There is a prejudice against Americans, partly the
result of a widespread feeling that the United States is the great
land-grabber of the Western world, but mostly the result of the
attitude of a large number of Americans who go into these regions. For
instance, for years one could not go about the streets of Mexico City
without hearing some American berating the "blankety blank greasers,"
and asserting that the United States could take 5,000 men and capture
Mexico City in a two-month campaign. It happens that the Mexican is a
proud individual and naturally he bitterly resents such asseverations.

The same is true elsewhere, and by personal contact prejudice rather
than a feeling of friendship has been aroused. The European usually
goes into these countries because there are few opportunities at home.
He is usually representative of the best citizenship of his homeland,
and quite as much the gentleman in Latin America as at home. While
there are a great many splendid types of American citizenship
scattered throughout Latin America, a greater number of people have
gone there because they could not get along in the United States, and
their hostile attitude toward the natives excites by far more
prejudice than the better class of Americans can counteract by
sympathy and good feeling. Americans who visit these countries
expressing contempt for everything they see, and everything the people
do, are the greatest hindrances to the realization of the commercial
opportunities which the United States possesses in Latin America.

If the manufacturers of the United States are to realize to the full
the benefits which may be derived from the opening of the Panama Canal
they will have to reform their methods of dealing with the Latin
Americans. It is just as effective to send to buyers at home catalogs
written in Greek or Sanscrit as to send to the majority of Latin
Americans catalogs printed in English. In traveling through these
countries, endeavoring to ascertain wherein Americans have failed in
their efforts to get a proper share of their foreign trade, one hears
on every hand the complaint that the American manufacturer seldom
meets the conditions upon which their trade may be based. No
satisfactory credits are given, and no effort is made to manufacture
machinery fitted to their peculiar needs. Agricultural machinery, for
instance, which may serve admirably in the United States, is wholly
out of place in many of these countries; and yet the Latin American
customer must either buy the surplus of these machines or go elsewhere
for machinery built to answer his requirements.

The European traveling salesman in these countries carries a line of
goods immediately answerable to local requirements. Furthermore, the
European exporter understands that the system of credits in Latin
America is not the same as prevails in Europe and the United States,
and he complies with their requirements. Of course, his prices are
placed high enough so that he is nothing out of pocket for the seeming
concessions he had made. The result is that in traveling in these
countries, one meets three or four foreign "drummers" where he meets
one American traveling man, in spite of their nearness to the United
States. It will take years, even with the Panama Canal in operation,
to overcome the disadvantage which bad business policy has placed upon
the American manufacturers.

If the opening of the Panama Canal spells new American commercial
opportunities, it also develops a new field of international politics
in which the United States must make itself the dominant factor, and
in which it will have a transcendental interest. It will
unquestionably give to the Monroe doctrine a new importance and render
its maintenance a more urgent necessity than ever. Prior to this time
the breaking down of the Monroe doctrine would have been greatly
detrimental to the interests of the United States, but from this time
forth the domination of the Caribbean by some other strong nation
would likely prove most disastrous to American welfare. It might even
lead to the loss of the canal itself, and we then would witness that
great waterway transformed from a military asset of immeasureable
benefit into a base of operations against us.

Probably the chief danger to which the Monroe doctrine is exposed is
from those countries whose rulers profit most by its enforcement.
While the United States can control its own affairs in such a way as
not to bring into question this doctrine, it is not so certain that
the rulers of some of the Latin American nations will always do as
well. In fact, some of the countries have conducted their affairs in
such a way as might have involved the United States in a war with a
foreign power. The knowledge that a small tropical American republic
might act so as to force the United States into a critical situation
has resulted in a desire on the part of the responsible authorities at
Washington to exercise over the Republics of the Caribbean such a
guiding control as would serve to prevent them, through any
ill-considered or irresponsible act, from exposing the United States
to dangerous controversies with foreign nations.

For instance, here is a country which owes a large debt to British
bondholders. It defaults on the interest for a period of years.
Efforts to collect are futile. Finally it is decided by the President
that he needs additional funds. He reaches an agreement with the
representatives of the bondholders, by which they agree to refund the
debt and to lend him an additional half a million dollars, upon the
condition that he hypothecate the Government's export tax upon coffee
to secure the amortization of the refunded debt. He does so. Matters
move along quietly for a little while, but soon he needs additional
funds. He negotiates with New York bankers, getting from them the
funds he needs, and hypothecates with them the same coffee tax that he
had hitherto hypothecated with the British bondholders. Of course, the
British bondholders protest at this impairment of their securities.
He laughs at their protest. England sends a warship to his ports. He
appeals loudly to the United States for the maintenance of the Monroe
doctrine; but the United States does not hear him, so he decides to
treat the British bondholders fairly. If he had not done so, and
England had been seeking to break down the Monroe doctrine, an ideal
opportunity would have been afforded.

It is to prevent such situations as these that many Americans hope
that the Government may devise some plan that will at once protect the
United States from such menaces, and at the same time allow the people
of these countries to work out their own destiny in their own way.

The situation in tropical America today, with a few exceptions, seems
to be that the republics have the form of liberty without its
substance, and the shadow of civilization without its realities. Some
of them have had over fifty revolutions in as many years. Some of them
have been in the grip of tyrants who were as heartless in exploiting
their people as was Nero in ruling Rome. The masses have received
nothing from the Government except oppression, and they live in that
hopeless, heartless ignorance so well described by a Spanish writer,
picturing conditions in Porto Rico before the American occupation. We
know that this picture was a true one. It was drawn in 1897 and won
the prize awarded by the Spanish Government at the centennial
celebration of the retirement of the English from this island. After
dilating upon the splendors and magnificence of Porto Rico, this
artist of the pen said of the masses:

"Only the laborer, the son of our fields, one of the most unfortunate
beings in the world, with the pallid face, the bare foot, the
fleshless body, the ragged clothing, and the feverish glance, strolls
indifferently with the darkness of ignorance in his eyes. In the
market he finds for food only the rotten salt fish or meat, cod fish
covered with gangrenish splotches, and Indian rice; he that harvests
the best coffee in the world, who aids in gathering into the granary
the sweetest grain in nature, and drives to pasture the beautiful
young meat animals, can not carry to his lips a single slice of meat
because the municipal exactions place it beyond his means, almost
doubling the price of infected cod fish; coffee becomes to him an
article of luxury because of its high price, and he can use only sugar
laden with molasses and impurities."

That picture applies to more than 90 per cent of the people in
tropical America to-day. It explains why these countries, which might
be made to flow with the milk and honey of a wondrous plenty, are
poverty-stricken and unable to work out a satisfactory destiny for
themselves. It shows why Cuba, Porto Rico, and Jamaica to-day are rich
in internal trade, and prosperous in foreign commerce, while other
countries are eking out a bare and scanty existence.

American commercial opportunities around the Mediterranean of the
West, in particular, and in Latin America, in general, will reach
their full when government there becomes government for the welfare of
the people rather than for the aggrandizement of the ruling class.




CHAPTER XXXII

THE PANAMA-PACIFIC EXPOSITION


When, on February 20, 1915, the Panama-Pacific International
Exposition opens its gates to the world, in celebration of the
completion of the Panama Canal, it expects to offer to the nations of
the earth a spectacle the like of which has never been equaled in the
history of expositions. It is estimated that $50,000,000 will be spent
in thus celebrating the great triumph of American genius at Panama.
And those who know the spirit of the people of California, who are
immediately responsible to the United States and to the world for the
success of the undertaking, understand that nothing will be overlooked
that might please the eye, stir the fancy, or arouse the patriotism of
those who journey to the Golden Gate to behold the wonders of this
great show.

The spirit that was San Francisco's following the terrible calamity of
April 18, 1906, when the city was shaken to its foundations by a great
earthquake, and when uncontrollable fire completed the ruin and
devastation which the earthquake had begun, has been the spirit that
has planned and is carrying to a successful culmination the
Panama-Pacific Exposition. The San Francisco earthquake came as the
most terrific blow that ever descended upon an American city. It left
the metropolis of the Pacific a mass of ruins and ashes. In five years
a newer and a prouder San Francisco arose from the ashes of the old,
and greeted the world as the highest example of municipal greatness to
which a community can rise at times when nothing is left to man but
hope, and that hope is half despair.

The fire destroyed 8,000 houses, leaving such a hopeless mass of
débris that $20,000,000 had to be raised to reclaim the bare earth
itself. In five years 31,000 finer and better houses had taken their
places. Assessed values before the fire were $30,000,000 less than
five years after. Bank clearings increased by a third and savings-bank
deposits were greater after only five years than they were before the
terrible catastrophe.

It may be imagined what wonders this spirit of the Golden West will
accomplish when applied to the creation of an exposition. It is easy
to forecast that, beautiful as have been the expositions of the past,
and magnificent as has been the scale upon which they were planned,
fresh palms will be awarded to San Francisco and the great fair it
will offer to the World in 1915.

The city of the Golden Gate was planning a great celebration nearly
two years before the calamity which overtook it in 1906. The first
suggestion for holding a world's fair at San Francisco was made on
June 12, 1904, when Mr. R. B. Hale wrote a letter to the San Francisco
Merchants' Association advising its members that it would be wise to
take steps toward securing for that city a great celebration of the
400th anniversary of the discovery of the Pacific Ocean, in 1913. The
matter was agitated for a year and a half and, a little more than
three months prior to the earthquake, Representative Julius Kahn
introduced in the National House of Representatives a bill providing
for the celebration of the discovery of the Pacific, in 1913. Then
followed the great catastrophe, and for the eight months next ensuing
the problems of planning a new and greater San Francisco demanded all
the attention of the people of that city. In December, 1906, however,
the Pacific Ocean Exposition Company was incorporated with a capital
stock of $5,000,000.

By 1910 New Orleans had loomed up as an aspirant for the honor of
holding the great international celebration of the completion of the
Panama Canal, and San Francisco understood that time for action was at
hand, and, moreover, that money raised at home for the exposition
would be the most eloquent advocate before Congress. Realizing this, a
great mass meeting was called and in two hours subscriptions amounting
to $4,089,000 were raised, headed by 40 subscriptions of $25,000 each.

In the fall of that year San Francisco was afforded an opportunity of
attesting the universality of its interest in the success of the
exposition. A proposition to vote $5,000,000 worth of bonds for the
exposition was referred to the people. It carried by a vote of 42,040
to 2,122. The State of California also gave its citizens an
opportunity to show their feeling, and by a vote of 174,000 to 50,000
made available bonds for $5,000,000 for the purposes of the
exposition. The result has been that from first to last, within the
confines of California's borders, a sum approximating $20,000,000 has
been raised for exposition purposes. To this, $30,000,000 will be
added by outside governments and by exhibitors and concessionaires.

The fight which led to the choosing of San Francisco as the city for
holding the Panama celebration is, for the most part, familiar
history. The law under which this choice was made was signed by
President Taft on February 15, 1911. The presidential signature was
the signal for the beginning of operations looking to the completion
of all of the exposition buildings a full six months ahead of the
opening date. The details of the site were worked out promptly. The
site selected includes the western half of Golden Gate Park; Lincoln
Park, which is situated on a high bluff overlooking the approach from
the Pacific Ocean and the Golden Gate; and Harbor View, which is an
extensive tract of level land, stretching along the shore of San
Francisco Bay and back to the hills and the principal residential
portion of the city.

Each element in this extensive site possesses its own peculiar charm;
Golden Gate Park with its great variety of flowers and semitropical
plants and trees; Lincoln Park with its outlook on the broad Pacific
and along the rugged coastline to the north; and Harbor View with the
Golden Gate to the left, a chain of climbing hills across the harbor
in front, and the long sweep of bay and islands to the right. What
nature has not done for the site of the exposition will be done by
the art of the landscape gardener.

An ocean boulevard, to be made one of the most beautiful drives in the
world, will become one of the permanent memorials of the exposition. A
great esplanade, planted with cypress and eucalypti and liberally
provided with seats, will extend along the water's edge for about half
the entire length of the exposition grounds, affording ample
opportunity for the thousands of visitors to watch the great water
events which will constitute one of the features of the exposition. On
the south side of this esplanade the principal exposition buildings,
consisting of eight great palaces, will be located. A great wall, 60
feet high, will be built along the northern and western waterfronts
for the purpose of breaking the winds which sweep down the harbor, and
will be continued around the other two sides of the exposition grounds
proper so as to constitute a walled inclosure which, in appearance,
will remind one of the old walled towns of southern France and Spain.

The two principal gateways to the exposition grounds will open into
great interior courts, around which the buildings will be ranged. It
will be possible for the visitor to go from one building to another
and complete the entire circuit of eight main exhibition palaces
without once stepping from under cover. The three largest courts are
named: The Court of the Sun and Stars, the Court of Abundance, and the
Court of the Four Seasons. The Court of Abundance represents the
Orient, and the Court of the Four Seasons, the Occident; the Court of
the Sun and Stars, uniting the other two, will typify the linking of
the Orient and the Occident through the completion of the Panama
Canal. There will also be two lesser courts, known as the Court of
Flowers and the Court of Palms. Outside of the walled city there will
be five other important exhibition palaces.

The Panama-Pacific Exposition will be different from any that has gone
before. Where others have been built on broad, level plains, this one
will be located in one of nature's most beautiful natural
amphitheaters, with the residential portions of San Francisco and the
towns of the surrounding country looking down upon it. The
architecture will be of such a nature that will make the "Fair City"
indeed a fair city to behold.

If Chicago had its "White City," the San Francisco fair will be all
aglow with rich color. It will be made to harmonize with the "vibrant
tints of the native wild flowers, the soft browns of the surrounding
hills, the gold of the orangeries, the blue of the sea." The artist in
charge of this phase of the work declares that, "as the musician
builds his symphony around a motif or chord," so it became his duty to
"strike a chord of color and build his symphony upon it." The one
thing upon which he insisted was that there should be no white, and
the pillars, statues, fountains, masts, walls, and flagpoles that are
to contrast with the tinted decorations are to be of ivory yellow.
Even the dyeing of the bunting for flags and draperies is under the
personal supervision of the artist in charge of the color scheme of
the exposition. The roofs of the buildings will be harmoniously
colored and the city will be a great party-colored area of red tiles,
golden domes, and copper-green minarets. "Imagine," said Jules Guerin,
the artist, "a gigantic Persian rug of soft melting tones with
brilliant splotches here and there, spread down for a mile or more,
and you may get some idea of what the Panama-Pacific Exposition will
look like when viewed from a distance."

The lighting of the exposition will be by indirect illumination,
affording practically the same intensity of light by night as by day.
Lights will be hidden behind the colonnades, above the cornices, and
behind masts on the roofs. Sculpture will stand out without shadow at
night as by day. Great searchlights, many of them concentrated upon
jets of steam, and playing in varying color, will add to the beauty of
the scene. Even the fogs of the harbor will be made to contribute to
the night effect of the exposition, and auroras will spread like
draped lilies in the sky over the exhibition.

The sculpture will be unique in the history of exposition-giving. That
phase of the work is under the control of Karl Bitter. In front of the
main entrance, at the tower gate, there will be an allegory of the
Panama Canal called "Energy; the lord of the Isthmian way." It will be
represented by an enormous horse standing on a heavy pedestal, the
horse carrying a man with extended arms pushing the waters apart. In
the Court of the Sun and Stars two great sculptural fountains,
typical of the rising and setting of the sun, will carry out the idea
of "the world united and the land divided." In every part of the
exposition scheme the sculpture will tell the story of the unification
of the nations of the East and the West through the construction of
the Panama Canal.

Nothing seems to have been overlooked in the plans that have been made
to celebrate the opening of the Panama Canal at San Francisco. There
will be a working model of the Panama Canal, with a capacity of
handling 2,000 people every 20 minutes. A reproduction of the Grand
Canyon of Arizona will be another feature. The liberality of the
prizes offered is indicated by the fact that premiums in the
live-stock exhibits alone aggregate $175,000.

One of the greatest events of the exposition will be the rendezvous of
representative ships from the fleets of all the nations of the earth
in Hampton Roads in January and February, 1915. Their commanders will
visit Washington and be received by the President. He will return with
them to Hampton Roads and there review what promises to be the
greatest international naval display in history. After this a long
procession of fighting craft, perhaps accompanied by an equally long
procession of tourist steamers, private yachts, and ships of commerce,
will steam out of the Virginia Capes and turn their prows down the
Spanish Main to Colon. Here the canal authorities will formally
welcome the shipping world and pass its representatives through to the
Pacific, whence they will sail to San Francisco, there to participate
in the great celebration during the months which will follow. It may
be that this great procession will be headed by the U. S. S. _Oregon_,
whose trip around South America in 1898 proclaimed in tones that were
heard in every hamlet in the United States the necessity of building
the great waterway.

In addition to the great exposition at San Francisco, another will
throw open its gates during 1915--the Panama-California Exposition at
San Diego. This exposition will be held at a total outlay of, perhaps,
$20,000,000. Nearly $6,000,000 is being spent on a magnificent sea
wall. The San Diego and Arizona Railway is being built on a new and
lower grade for nearly 220 miles. About $5,000,000 will be spent in
making the exposition proper in Balboa Park. Over 11 miles of docks
and a thousand acres of reclaimed land for warehouses and factory
sites will be ready when the exposition opens on January 1, 1915. The
fair will have 30 acres of Spanish gardens. A great Indian congress
and exhibit will be held, representing every tribe of North and South
America. This exposition will in nowise interfere with the big show at
San Francisco, but will be supplemental to it.

When the Suez Canal was finished, its opening was celebrated by the
most magnificent fete of modern times, the profligate Khedive Ismail
Pasha apparently endeavoring to outdo the traditions of his Mussulman
predecessors, Haroun al Raschid and Akbar. The fete lasted for four
weeks, Cairo was decorated and illuminated as no city, of either
Occident or Orient, ever had been before. The expense of the month's
carnival was more than $21,000,000.

An opera house was built especially for the occasion, and Verdi, the
famous Italian composer, was employed to write a special opera for the
occasion. That the opera was "Aida," and that it marked the high tide
of Verdi's genius, was perhaps more than might have been expected of a
work of art produced at the command of an extravagant prince's gold.

The canal itself was opened on November 16, 1869, a procession of
forty-eight ships, men of war, royal yachts and merchantmen, making
the transit of the Isthmus in three days' time. In the first ship was
Eugenie, Empress of the French. In another was the Emperor of Austria,
and in still another the Prince of Wales, afterwards Edward VII. A
more imposing gathering of imperial and royal personages never before
had been witnessed, and all of them were the Christian guests of the
Moslem Ismail.

When the procession of royal vessels had passed through, the captains
and the kings went to Cairo for the fete. The canal was open for
traffic. It was significant that the first vessel to pass through in
the course of ordinary business, paying its tolls, flew the British
ensign. The building of the canal had wrecked Egypt, financially and
politically; was destined to end forever the hope of Asiatic empire
for France; and was to make certain England's dominion over India, a
thing de Lesseps and Napoleon III had intended it to destroy.

The celebration of the completion of the Suez Canal was the wildest
orgy of modern times, the last attempt to Orientalize a commercial
undertaking of the Age of Steam and Steel.

The celebration at San Francisco will be more magnificent in its way,
and will cost more money. But the millions will not be thrown away for
the mere delectation of the senses of two score princes--they will be
expended for the entertainment and the education of millions of
people, the humblest of whom will have his full share in the
celebration.

From the spruce woods of Maine, from the orange groves of Florida,
from the wide fields of the Mississippi Valley, from the broad plains
of the Colorado, from the blue ridges of the Alleghenies and the snow
peaks of the Rockies, Americans will go to the Golden Gate to
commemorate in their American way the closer union of their States,
the consummation of the journeys of Columbus: The Land Divided--the
World United.




THE END


[Illustration: A MAP SHOWING THE ISTHMUS WITH THE COMPLETED CANAL]




INDEX


  Accessory Transit Company, 199

  Accidents, 72

  Amador, Dr., 238, 239

  Accounting department, 315

  American Federation of Labor, 271

  American clings to home habits, 177

  American Federation of Women's Clubs, 176, 180

  American mind wanted canal, 11

  American Rivers and Harbors Congress, 346

  Amsterdam Canal, 341-342

  Amundsen, 4

  Amusements, 178, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192

  Ancon Hill, 89

  Ancon Study Club, 183

  Animal life, 331

  Ants, 331

  Appropriations for canal, 269

  Aspinwall, William H., 102


  Babel of American ambitions, 80

  Bailey, John, 197

  Balboa, 6, 7, 89, 90, 333

  Barnacles, 40

  Beef, Price of, 166, 167

  Beauregard, P. T. G., 204

  Bitter, Karl, 374

  Blackburn, Joseph C. S., 138, 142, 250, 252, 258

  Board of consulting engineers, 32

  Boswell, Helen Varick, 180

  Bridles, 77

  British bondholders, 365

  Brooke, Mark, 133

  Bryce, James, 20, 23

  Buccaneers, English, 334

  Bull-fighting, 328

  Bunau-Varilla, Philippe, 222, 230, 237, 238, 246, 327

  Burke, John, 143

  "Bush dwellers," 155


  Cables, 78

  Caisson gates, 62, 63

  Caledonia, 159

  Camp Fire Girls, 183

  Cantilever pivot bridges, 57

  Canada, Western, 20

  Canal not constructed to make money, 10

  Canal Zone, 6, 7, 247, 326

  Canal Zone government, 256-267, 271, 312

  Canals, 335-346

  Canals, Isthmian, 194-205

  Cargo ship, 319

  Central and South American Telegraph Company, 253

  Chagres River, 2, 5, 27, 32, 33, 36, 37, 40, 82, 110, 214, 280, 330

  Chagres Valley, 33, 36

  Chain for stopping vessels, 58, 59, 60

  Channel, Sea-level, 46

  Charles V, 194

  Chauncey, Henry, 103

  Cheops, Pyramid of, 24

  Chicago Drainage Canal, 345

  Childs, Orville, 199

  Choice of route, 221-232

  Chucunoques, 332

  Civil administration, 138

  Civil-service requirements, 136

  Claims, Adjustment of, 323

  Claims for lands, 260

  Clay, Henry, 197

  Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 15, 17, 198, 302, 303

  Cleveland (Ship), 297

  Clutches, Friction, 57

  Clubhouses, 186

  Coaling, 320

  Coaling plants, 91, 92

  Cock-fighting, 328

  Cole, H. O., 143

  Collisions, 60

  Colombia, 227, 228, 231, 233-245

  Colon Beach, 101

  Columbus, Christopher, 3, 194, 347

  Comber, W. G., 143

  Commercial map, 347-357

  Commissary, 164-175

  Commissary department, 30

  Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interoceanique, 213, 214

  Concession, Extension of, 104

  Concession to the French, 196

  Concrete mixers, 54

  Congress and the canal, 268-276

  Conquerers, Spanish, 334

  Constantinople, Capture of, 347, 348

  Constantinople, Convention of, 292

  Contra Costa Water Company, 43

  Contract system, 13

  Contractor's Hill, 79

  Controversy with Colombia, 233-245

  Cook, Thomas F., 144

  Corozal (Dredge), 84

  Corruption, 14

  Corruption in building French canal, 9, 207

  Cortez, Hernando, 195

  Cost of canal, 5

  Cost of French canal, 208

  Cotton production, Center of, 355

  Coupon books, 169

  Court system, 261

  Courtesy of West Indian Negro, 157

  Courtesy of workmen, 147

  Cranes, Floating, 322

  Cristobal, 6, 7

  Cromwell, William Nelson, 280, 287, 327

  Cronstadt and St. Petersburg Canal, 343

  Cruelty of natives, 329

  Cruelty of Spaniards, 333

  Culebra Cut, 5, 13, 21, 26, 34, 35, 40, 70-81, 214, 216, 277, 278

  Culebra Mountain, 4, 20, 79, 80, 196, 277

  Cullom, Shelby M., 282

  Culverts, 50


  Dams, Emergency, 60, 61

  Davis, Charles H., 196

  Davis, George W., 134, 256

  Death rate, 303

  Debts of American Republics, 365

  Department store, 166

  Deportation of laborers, 152

  Devol, C. A., 143

  Dikes, 126

  Dikes of Holland, 44

  "Dingler's folly," 208

  Diplomatic entanglements, 17

  Dredges, Ladder, 84

  Dredges, Suction, 83

  Duty on imports, 325

  Dynamite, 28, 74


  Eads, James B., 202, 203

  Eastern Roman Empire, 3

  Eating places, 170

  Economy in handling material, 55

  Efficiency records, 72, 73

  Eight-hour working day, 137, 271

  Elections in Panama, 251, 327

  Electric current, 67

  Electrical department, 315

  Endicott, Mordecai T., 135

  "Energy; the lord of the Isthmian way," 394

  Engineering department, 314

  Engineering difficulties, 29

  Engineering project of all history, 23

  Englishman defies Tropics, 177

  Equipment for hauling material, 53

  Erie Canal, 346

  Expense of operating canal, 313

  Extravagance in building French canal, 207

  Ernst, Oswald H., 135


  Filibusters, French, 334

  Finley, Carlos, 11, 106

  Fire department, 264

  Fishing, 192

  Flamenco Island, 88

  Flowers, 330

  Foreign trade of U. S., 353

  Fortifications, 18, 283-294

  Foundations, 90

  Fraser, John Foster, 355

  French began work in 1880, 5

  French canal, 53

  French failure, 206-220

  French Panama Canal Company, 200

  French spent $300,000,000, 8

  French Canal Company, 9, 93, 252

  Fruits, 330


  Gaillard, D. D., 138, 139

  Gamboa, 40

  Gatun Dam, 13, 21, 23, 25, 26, 32-34, 36, 41-43, 56, 279

  Gatun Lake, 36, 37, 38, 45, 47, 50, 56, 60, 62, 82, 95, 315, 330

  Goethal, George Washington, 13, 18, 33, 43, 119-132, 273

  Gold Hill, 79

  Golf links, 315

  Good Hope, Cape of, 19

  Gorgas, William C., 105, 108, 134, 138, 142

  Government ownership of railways, 99

  Graft, 14

  "Great undertaker," 218

  Guayaquil, 19

  Gudger, H. A., 263

  Guerin, Jules, 374

  Gulf States, 20


  Hains, Peter C., 135

  Handling the traffic, 317-325

  Hanna, Marcus A., 227, 230

  Harding, Chester, 143

  Harrod, Benjamin A., 135

  Hay, John, 246

  Hay-Herran treaty, 16, 231, 232, 233, 235

  Hay-Pauncefote treaty, 17, 225, 300, 301, 303, 304

  Health of canal workers, 210

  Heat of the Tropics, 179

  Hepburn, William P., 223

  High cost of living, 175

  Hise, Elijah, 198

  Hodges, Harry F., 139, 141

  Honolulu, 19

  Hoosac Tunnel, 71

  Hospitals, 112, 208, 209

  Hotels, 100, 101, 171

  Hunter, Henry, 278

  Hunting, 191, 192

  Hydraulic excavation, 79

  Hydraulic Fill, 35


  Ice plant, 92

  Ice, Price of, 168

  Iguana, 329

  Immigration, 157

  Incas Society, 152

  Injury to the canal, 324

  International commerce, 3

  Isthmian Canal Commission, 12, 88, 96, 97, 109, 119, 201, 224,
        225, 229, 268, 269, 311


  Johnson, Emory H., 18, 299, 306


  Kahn, Julius, 370

  Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal, 340-341

  Kid Canal, 340-341

  Knox, Philander C., 43, 243


  Labor in passing ships through, 68, 69

  Laborers, 307

  Land, Prices of, 333

  Laws of Canal Zone, 268, 267

  Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 8, 132, 211-219

  Lidgerwood cableways, 53

  Lidgerwood dirt car, 25

  Lidgerwood dirt trains, 76

  Lidgerwood flat cars, 74, 77

  Life on the zone, 176-193

  Lighting of locks, 325

  Liquor question, 186

  Lloyd, J. A., 196

  Lloyds, 324

  Lock canal, 13, 18, 137, 216, 217, 281

  Lock machinery, 57-67

  Locks, 19, 26, 46, 48-55, 58, 62, 318

  Locomotives, Electric, 65-67

  Lottery, 217, 254

  Loulan, J. A., 148

  Lusitania, 297


  Machinery, Dependable, 57

  Machinery, Abandoned, 207

  Machinery, Value of, 219

  MacKenzie, Alexander, 119

  Magellan, 4

  Magellan, Straits of, 19

  Magoon, Charles E., 109, 135, 136, 264

  "Making the dirt fly," 27

  Malaria, 9, 11, 106, 207, 211

  Man-made peninsula, 45

  Manchester ship canal, 20, 30, 339

  Manila, 19

  Manson, Sir Patrick, 11, 106

  Manufacturers of U. S., 363

  Margarita Island, 284

  Maritime Canal Company, 200, 223

  Markets, 329

  Marriage, 155

  Married men more content, 179

  Materia medica of Panamans, 381

  Matrimony, Premium on, 179

  Mears, Frederick, 143

  Melbourne, 19

  Menocal, A. G., 200

  Metcalf, Richard L., 189

  Miraflores, 26, 27, 40, 47, 55, 61, 67, 82, 89, 126

  Mississippi Valley, 20

  Mistakes in building, 12

  Mahogany, 330

  Money for building always ready, 11

  Monroe doctrine, 7, 15, 360, 361

  Morgan, Henry, 334

  Morgan, John T., 221

  Mosquito Coast, 198

  Mosquitoes, 9, 11, 12, 105-107, 114, 115


  Naos Island, 87, 284

  National geographic society, 23

  National Institute, 327

  Naval display, 375

  Navy, Efficiency of, 348

  Negroes, 154-163

  Nelson, Horatio, 197

  New Caledonia, 7

  New Granada, 237

  New Panama Canal Company, 133, 219, 221, 224-228, 233,
        235-237, 242, 270

  Nicaraguan Canal, 15, 16, 198, 199, 201, 222, 230, 231

  Nicaraguan Canal Commission, 199

  Nombre de Dios, 7, 53

  North Sea Canal, 342-343


  Olympic, 59

  Operating force, 309-312

  Orchids, 330

  Oregon (U. S. Ship), 10

  Organization, 133-144

  Organization of government on Canal Zone, 313


  Pacific Ocean Exposition Company, 370

  Pacific Steamer Navigation Company, 321

  Palmer, Aaron H., 197

  Pan American Conference, 7

  Panama, 230, 237, 238, 240, 241, 243, 246-255

  Panama, Bay of, 280

  Panama-California Exposition, 376

  Panama Canal Company, 133, 218

  Panama City, 12, 43

  Panama-Pacific Exposition, 368-378

  Panama (Republic), 6, 15, 326-334

  Panama Railroad, 7, 34, 68, 88, 93, 104, 136, 214, 228, 245

  Panama Railroad Steamship Line, 100

  Pay-day, 160, 161

  Pay of Americans, 178

  Paying off canal army, 30

  Pedro Miguel, 25, 27, 47, 48, 55, 61, 89

  Pennsylvania tubes, 50

  Perico Island, 88, 285

  Pilots, Canal, 60

  Police force, 262, 263

  Population of the zone, 315

  Porto Rico, 358-360

  Position of canal, 5

  Postal service, 261

  Prize fighting, 328

  Purchase of material, 272


  Quartermaster's department, 174, 314

  Quellenec, F., 278


  Railroads opposed to canal, 222

  Rates, Passenger, 103

  Rates, Railroad, 99

  Rating of employees, 151

  Reed, Walter, 106

  Reimbursement to owners of vessels for accidents, 323

  Rental for Canal Zone, 326

  Religious activities, 183

  Roads, 191, 264, 265

  Robinson, Tracy, 215, 216

  Root, Elihu, 242

  Ross, Roland, 11, 106

  Rosseau, Armand, 217

  Rourke, W. G., 143

  Rousseau, Harry H., 138, 139, 148

  Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, 321


  Safety appliances, 57

  Safety for ships, 281

  Sailing ships, Death blow to, 322

  Salaries, 310

  San Blas Indians, 332

  San Diego and Arizona Railway, 376

  San Francisco earthquake, 368-369

  Sanitary department, 30

  Sanitation, 105-117, 328, 332, 352

  Sault Ste. Marie canal, 314, 335, 343-344

  Saville, Caleb M., 41, 143

  School system, 264

  Schools, Night, 187

  Sea-level canal, 13, 18, 137, 272, 279-282

  Secret societies, 184

  Servants, 181, 182

  Shanton, George R., 262

  Shaw, Albert D., 232

  Ship railway, 202, 203, 204

  Shipping routes, International, 351

  Shonts, Theodore P., 135, 137

  Shovels, Steam, 83, 150

  Sibert, William L., 138, 139

  Simplon Tunnel, 71

  Site of exposition, 371

  Slides, 77, 78

  Smith, Jackson, 138, 139

  Social diversion, 182

  Society of the Chagres, 152, 153

  Soda fountain, 178

  "Soo" locks, 62

  Spanish American war veterans, 128

  Spanish language, Study of, 181, 188

  Spanish Main, 356

  Spillway, 26, 37, 38, 39

  Spooner, John C., 229

  Steamship lines, 98

  Stegomyia, 11, 107, 115, 211

  Stevens, John F., 27, 102, 119, 129, 130, 136, 138

  Stoney Gate valves, 50

  Strangers' Club, 182

  Street-car system, 191

  Strikes, 129

  Suez Canal, 21, 29, 335-339, 376, 377

  Suez Canal rules, 292

  Supplies for building canal free of duty, 323

  Switches, Limit, 57


  Tabernilla, 78

  Taboga Island, 285

  Taboga Sanitarium, 113

  Taft, Wm. Howard, 33, 118

  Tehuantepec, Isthmus of, 202, 204

  Tehuantepec railroad, 203

  Tierra del Fuego, 4

  Thatcher, Maurice H., 139

  Tivoli Hotel, 100, 170

  Titanic marine stairway, 45

  Tolls, 18, 295-308, 319

  Toro Point, 46, 87, 284

  Towing, 322

  Track shifter, 76

  Trade opportunities, 358-367

  Traffic, 18, 19

  Tramp steamer, 320

  Transcontinental tonnage, 350

  Transportation of material excavated, 75

  Traveling salesmen, 363-364

  Treaties with Colombia and Panama, 244

  Tropics, Diseases of, 9

  Type of canal, 275


  University Club, 182


  Vaccination of negroes, 162

  Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 199

  Voting, 184, 185


  Wages, 146, 165

  Wallace, John Findley, 130, 133, 135

  Washington Hotel, 101

  Washington monument, 23, 25, 26

  Water, Control of, 65

  Water supply, 265, 266

  Watertight material, 41

  Wickedness of the City of Panama, 328

  Williams, E. J., 143, 160

  Williamson, S. B., 143

  Wilson, Eugene T., 143

  Wilson, T. D., 204

  Wire screens, 12

  Women's clubs, 180, 181

  Women's Federation of Clubs, 183

  Wood, Leonard, 108

  Workmen, 145-153

  Wyse, Lucien Napoleon Bonaparte, 212, 218


  Yellow fever, 9, 11, 12, 105, 109, 110, 112, 211

  Yellow fever commission, 106

  Young Men's Christian Association, 178, 180, 207




The American Government

The Book That Shows Uncle Sam at Work

By Frederic J. Haskin


This is the only book that tells accurately and without partisan bias
just what the working machinery of the great American Government
accomplishes for its people.

It has been endorsed by scores of public officials, has been placed in
hundreds of libraries, studied in thousands of schools and read by
hundreds of thousands of Americans.

It is the book Woodrow Wilson read on the night of his election to the
Presidency.

It will hold your interest whether you are nine or ninety, a man or
woman, boy or girl. _Illustrated._

Published by

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY

Philadelphia

       *       *       *       *       *

The Immigrant

An Asset and a Liability

By Frederic J. Haskin


The author has succeeded to a remarkable degree in investing the
subject of Immigration with intense interest. The story of the
greatest human migration of all the ages is told in vivid, incisive
and picturesque style. The three centuries of this great world
movement are spread out before the reader like a panoramic parade of
all nations. Accurate historical statement, philosophic presentation
of the underlying principles and a judicial consideration of the
ultimate influence on our country characterize this latest and in many
respects most satisfactory and complete handbook. _Illustrated._

Published by

FLEMING H. REVELL COMPANY

New York

       *       *       *       *       *

_The Haskin Letter_

The daily letter by Frederic J. Haskin has more readers than any other
newspaper feature in the United States. Its great popularity is due to
its accurate presentation of worth-while information.

       *       *       *       *       *

The New Freedom

By

WOODROW WILSON


Certain it is that the more pertinent phase: of present day conditions
have never been more simply and more luminously set forth. The large,
free lines in which the story is told, the easy style of
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Every phrase is fresh as a May morning, and every thought is quick
with life.

_Fifth Large Printing_


DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & CO.

Garden City New York




       *       *       *       *       *




Transcriber's note:

Variations in spelling, punctuation and hyphenation have been
retained except in obvious cases of typographical error.

Facing page 10: The photo of George Goethals includes a signature.

The illustrations have been moved so that they do not break up
paragraphs, thus the page number of the illustration might not
match the page number in the List of Illustrations.

*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 41807 ***