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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 41519 ***
+
+THE
+
+New Psychology Series
+
+_By_ WILLIAM WALKER ATKINSON
+
+
+In the past few years a widespread mental and spiritual awakening has
+taken place among the people of this country. And this new awakening has
+been very aptly called THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY MOVEMENT, because it has to do
+with the development and expression of the mind, or soul, of both the
+individual and the nation.
+
+ The New Psychology
+ The Will
+ Memory
+ Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion
+ The Subconscious and Superconscious Planes of Mind
+ The Psychology of Success
+ The Art of Logical Thinking
+ Thought-Culture
+ The Psychology of Salesmanship
+ The Art of Expression
+ Mind and Body
+ Human Nature
+
+Although each book stands alone as an authority on the subject treated,
+yet one theme runs through the series, binding them together to make a
+complete whole.
+
+The uniform postpaid price of each volume is $1.00
+
+We are making a special price of $10.00 for the entire set
+
+
+THE PROGRESS COMPANY :: CHICAGO
+
+
+
+
+ THOUGHT-CULTURE
+ OR
+ PRACTICAL MENTAL TRAINING
+
+ By WILLIAM WALKER ATKINSON
+
+
+ L.N. FOWLER & COMPANY
+ 7, Imperial Arcade, Ludgate Circus
+ London, E.C., England
+
+
+ 1909
+ THE PROGRESS COMPANY
+
+ CHICAGO, ILL.
+
+
+
+
+ COPYRIGHT, 1910
+ BY
+ THE PROGRESS COMPANY
+
+
+ P.F. PETTIBONE & CO
+ Printers and Binders
+ Chicago
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+ I. The Power of Thought 9
+
+ II. The Nature of Thought 19
+
+ III. Phases of Thought 27
+
+ IV. Thought Culture 37
+
+ V. Attention 47
+
+ VI. Perception 57
+
+ VII. Representation 76
+
+ VIII. Abstraction 85
+
+ IX. Association of Ideas 95
+
+ X. Generalization 106
+
+ XI. Judgment 130
+
+ XII. Derived Judgments 138
+
+ XIII. Reasoning 152
+
+ XIV. Constructive Imagination 175
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+THE POWER OF THOUGHT
+
+
+In other volumes of this series we have considered the operations of the
+human mind known as Will, Memory, etc. We now approach the consideration
+of those mental activities which are concerned with the phenomena of
+_thought_--those activities which we generally speak of as the operation
+of the intellect or reason.
+
+What is thought? The answer is not an easy one, although we use the term
+familiarly almost every hour of our waking existence. The dictionaries
+define the term "Thought" as follows: "The act of thinking; the exercise
+of the mind in any way except sense and perception; serious
+consideration; deliberation; reflection; the power or faculty of
+thinking; the mental faculty of the mind; etc." This drives us back upon
+the term, "to think" which is defined as follows: "To occupy the mind on
+some subject; to have ideas; to revolve ideas in the mind; to cogitate;
+to reason; to exercise the power of thought; to have a succession of
+ideas or mental states; to perform any mental operation, whether of
+apprehension, judgment, or illation; to judge; to form a conclusion, to
+determine; etc."
+
+Thought is an operation of the intellect. The intellect is: "that
+faculty of the human soul or mind by which it receives or comprehends
+the ideas communicated to it by the senses or by perception, or other
+means, as distinguished from the power to feel and to will; the power or
+faculty to perceive objects in their relations; the power to judge and
+comprehend; also the capacity for higher forms of knowledge as
+distinguished from the power to perceive and imagine."
+
+When we say what we "think," we mean that we exercise the faculties
+whereby we compare and contrast certain things with other things,
+observing and noting their points of difference and agreement, then
+classifying them in accordance with these observed agreements and
+differences. In _thinking_ we tend to classify the multitude of
+impressions received from the outside world, arranging thousands of
+objects into one general class, and other thousands into other general
+classes, and then sub-dividing these classes, until finally we have
+found mental pigeon-holes for every conceivable idea or impression. We
+then begin to make inferences and deductions regarding these ideas or
+impressions, working from the known to the unknown, from particulars to
+generalities, or from generalities to particulars, as the case may be.
+
+It is this faculty or power of thought--this use of the intellect, that
+has brought man to his present high position in the world of living
+things. In his early days, man was a much weaker animal than those with
+whom he was brought into contact. The tigers, lions, bears, mammoths,
+and other ferocious beasts were much stronger, fiercer, and fleeter than
+man, and he was placed in a position so lacking of apparent equal chance
+of survival, that an observer would have unhesitatingly advanced the
+opinion that this weak, feeble, slow animal must soon surely perish in
+the struggle for existence, and that the "survival of the fittest" would
+soon cause him to vanish from the scene of the world's activities. And,
+so it would have been had he possessed no equipment other than those of
+the other animals; viz., strength, natural weapons and speed. And yet
+man not only survived in spite of these disadvantages, but he has
+actually conquered, mastered and enslaved these other animals which
+seemed likely to work his destruction. Why? How?
+
+This feeble animal called _man_ had within him the elements of a new
+power--a power manifested in but a slight degree in the other animals.
+He possessed an intellect by which he was able to deduce, compare,
+infer--reason.
+
+His lack of natural weapons he overcame by borrowing the idea of the
+tooth and claw of the other animals, imitating them in flint and shaping
+them into spears; borrowing the trunk of the elephant and the paw of the
+tiger, and reproducing their blow-striking qualities in his wooden club.
+Not only this but he took lessons from the supple limbs and branches of
+the trees, and copied the principle in his bow, in order to project its
+minature spear, his arrow. He sheltered himself, his mate and his
+young, from the fury of the storm, first by caves and afterwards by rude
+houses, built in inaccessible places, reached only by means of crude
+ladders, bridges, or climbing poles. He built doors for his habitations,
+to protect himself from the attacks of these wild enemies--he heaped
+stones at the mouth of his caves to keep them out. He placed great
+boulders on cliffs that he might topple them down on the approaching
+foe. He learned to hurl rocks with sure aim with his strong arm. He
+copied the floating log, and built his first rude rafts, and then
+evolved the hollowed canoe. He used the skins of animals to keep him
+warm--their tendons for his bowstrings. He learned the advantages of
+cooperation and combined effort, and thus formed the first rudiments of
+society and social life. And finally--man's first great discovery--he
+found the art of fire making.
+
+As a writer has said: "For some hundreds of years, upon the general
+plane of self-consciousness, an ascent, to the human eye gradual but
+from the point of view of cosmic evolution rapid, has been made. In a
+race large-brained, walking-erect, gregarious, brutal, but king of all
+other brutes, man in appearance but not in fact, was from the highest
+simple-consciousness born the basic human faculty, self-consciousness
+and its twin, language. From these and what went with these, through
+suffering, toil and war; through bestiality, savagery, barbarism;
+through slavery, greed, effort, through conquests infinite, through
+defeats overwhelming, through struggle unending; through ages of aimless
+semi-brutal existence, through subsistence on berries and roots; through
+the use of the casually found stone or stick; through life in deep
+forests, with nuts and seeds, and on the shores of waters with mollusks,
+crustaceans and fish for food; through that greatest, perhaps, of human
+victories, the domestication and subjugation of fire; through the
+invention and art of bow and arrow; through the training of animals and
+the breaking of them to labor; through the long learning which led to
+the cultivation of the soil; through the adobe brick and the building of
+houses therefrom; through the smelting of metals and the slow birth of
+the arts which rest upon these; through the slow making of alphabets
+and the evolution of the written work; in short, through thousands of
+centuries of human life, of human aspiration, of human growth, sprang
+the world of men and women as it stands before us and within us today
+with all its achievements and possessions."
+
+The great difference between thought as we find it in man, and its forms
+among the lower animals lies in what psychologists have called
+"progressive thought." The animals advance but little in their thinking
+processes but rest content with those of their ancestors--their thought
+seems to have become set or crystallized during the process of their
+evolution. The birds, mammals and the insects vary but little in their
+mental processes from their ancestors of many thousand years ago. They
+build their nests, or dens, in almost precisely the same manner as did
+their progenitors in the stone-age. But man has slowly but steadily
+progressed, in spite of temporary set-backs and failures. He has
+endeavored to progress and improve. Those tribes which fell back in
+regard to mental progress and advancement, have been left behind in the
+race, and in many cases have become extinct. The great natural law of
+the "survival of the fittest" has steadily operated in the life of the
+race. The "fittest" were those best adapted to grapple with and overcome
+the obstacles of their environment, and these obstacles were best
+overcome by the use of the intellect. Those tribes and those individuals
+whose intellect was active, tended to survive where others perished, and
+consequently they were able to transmit their intellectual quality to
+their descendants.
+
+Halleck says: "Nature is constantly using her power to kill off the
+thoughtless, or to cripple them in life's race. She is determined that
+only the fittest and the descendants of the fittest shall survive. By
+the 'fittest' she means those who have thought and whose ancestors have
+thought and profited thereby. Geologists tell us that ages ago there
+lived in England bears, tigers, elephants, lions and many other powerful
+and fierce animals. There was living contemporaneous with them a much
+weaker animal, that had neither the claws, the strength, nor the speed
+of the tiger. In fact this human being was almost defenceless. Had a
+being from another planet been asked to prophesy, he would undoubtedly
+have said that this helpless animal would be the first to be
+exterminated. And yet every one of those fierce creatures succumbed
+either to the change of climate, or to man's inferior strength. The
+reason was that man had one resource denied to the animals--the power of
+progressive thought. The land sank, the sea cut off England from the
+mainland, the climate changed, and even the strongest animals were
+helpless. But man changed his clothing with the changing climate. He
+made fires; he built a retreat to keep off death by cold. He thought out
+means to kill or to subdue the strongest animals. Had the lions, tigers
+or bears the power of progressive thought, they could have combined, and
+it would have been possible for them to exterminate man before he
+reached the civilized stage.... Man no longer sleeps in caves. The smoke
+no longer fills his home or finds its way out through the chinks in the
+walls or a hole in the roof. In traveling, he is no longer restricted to
+his feet or even to horses. For all this improvement man is indebted to
+_thought_. That has harnessed the very vibrations of the ether to do his
+bidding."
+
+And thus we see that man owes his present place on earth to his
+Thought-Culture. And, it certainly behooves us to closely consider and
+study the methods and processes whereby each and every man may cultivate
+and develop the wondrous faculties of the mind which are employed in the
+processes of Thought. The faculties of the Mind, like the muscles of the
+body, may be developed, trained and cultivated. The process of such
+mental development is called "THOUGHT-CULTURE," and forms the subject of
+this book.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+THE NATURE OF THOUGHT
+
+
+It was formerly considered necessary for all books on the subject of
+thought to begin by a recital of the metaphysical conceptions regarding
+the nature and "thingness" of Mind. The student was led through many
+pages and endless speculation regarding the metaphysical theories
+regarding the origin and inner nature of Mind which, so far from
+establishing a fixed and definite explanation in his mind, rather tended
+toward confusing him and giving him the idea that psychology was of
+necessity a speculative science lacking the firm practical basis
+possessed by other branches of science. In the end, in the words of old
+Omar, he "came out the door through which he went."
+
+But this tendency has been overcome of late years, and writers on the
+subject pass by all metaphysical conceptions regarding the nature of
+Mind, and usually begin by plunging at once into the real business of
+psychology--the business of the practical study of the mechanism and
+activities of the mind itself. As some writer has said, psychology has
+no more concern with the solution of the eternal riddle of "What is
+Mind?" than physics with the twin-riddle of "What is Matter?" Both
+riddles, and their answers, belong to entirely different branches and
+fields of thought than those concerned with their laws of operation and
+principles of activity. As Halleck says: "Psychology studies the
+phenomena of mind, just as physics investigates those of matter." And,
+likewise, just as the science of physics holds true in spite of the
+varying and changing conceptions regarding the nature of matter, so does
+the science of psychology hold true in spite of the varying and changing
+conceptions regarding the nature of Mind.
+
+Halleck has well said: "If a materialist should hold that the mind was
+nothing but the brain, and that the brain was a vast aggregation of
+molecular sheep herding together in various ways, his hypothesis would
+not change the fact that sensation must precede perception, memory and
+thought; nor would the laws of the association of ideas be changed, nor
+would the fact that interest and repetition aid memory cease to hold
+good. The man who thought his mind was a collection of little cells
+would dream, imagine, think and feel; so also would he who believed his
+mind to be immaterial. It is very fortunate that the same mental
+phenomena occur, no matter what theory is adopted. Those who like to
+study the puzzles as to what mind and matter really are must go to
+metaphysics. Should we ever find that salt, arsenic and all things else
+are the same substance with a different molecular arrangement, we should
+still not use them interchangeably."
+
+For the purposes of the study of practical psychology, we may as well
+lay aside, if even for the moment, our pet metaphysical conceptions and
+act as if we knew nothing of the essential nature of Mind (and indeed
+Science in truth does _not_ know), and confine ourselves to the
+phenomena and manifestations of Mind which, after all, is the only way
+in which and by which we can know anything at all about it. As Brooks
+says: "The mind can be defined only by its activities and
+manifestations. In order to obtain a definition of the mind, therefore,
+we must observe and determine its various forms of activity. These
+activities, classified under a few general heads and predicated of the
+unseen something which manifests them, will give us a definition of
+mind."
+
+The act of consciousness determines the existence of Mind in the person
+experiencing it. No one can be conscious of thought and, at the same
+time, deny the existence of mind within himself. For the very act of
+denial, in itself, is a manifestation of thought and consequently an
+assertion of the existence of mind. One may assert the axiom: "I think,
+therefore, I have a mind;" but he is denied the privilege of arguing: "I
+think, therefore, I have no mind." The mind has an ultimate and final
+knowledge of its own existence.
+
+The older view of Mind is that it is a something higher than matter
+which it uses for its manifestation. It was held to be unknowable in
+itself and to be studied only through its manifestations. It was
+supposed to involve itself, to become involved, in some way in matter
+and to there manifest itself in an infinitude of forms, degrees, and
+variations. The materialistic view, which arose into prominence in the
+middle of the Nineteenth Century, held, on the contrary, that Mind was
+merely an activity or property of Matter--a function of matter akin to
+extension and motion. Huxley, voicing this conception said: "We have no
+knowledge of any thinking substance apart from an extended substance....
+We shall, sooner or later, arrive at a mechanical equivalent of
+consciousness, just as we have arrived at a mechanical equivalent of
+heat." But, Huxley, himself, was afterwards constrained to acknowledge
+that: "How it is that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness
+comes about by the result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as
+unaccountable as the appearance of the _jinnee_ when Aladdin rubbed his
+lamp."
+
+The most advanced authorities of the day, are inclined to the opinion
+that both Matter and Mind are both differing aspects of some one
+fundamental Something; or, as some of the closest thinkers state it,
+both are probably two apparently differing manifestations or emanations
+of an Underlying Something which, as Spencer says: "transcends not only
+our reason but also our imagination." The study of philosophy and
+metaphysics serves an important purpose in showing us _how much we do
+not know_, and why we do not know--also in showing us the fallacy of
+many things we had thought we did know--but when it comes to telling us
+the real "why," actual cause, or essential nature of _anything_, it is
+largely a disappointment to those who seek fundamental truths and
+ultimate reasons. It is much more comfortable to "abjure the 'Why' and
+seek the 'How'"--if we can.
+
+Many psychologists classify the activities of the mind into three
+general divisions; _viz._, (1) Thinking; (2) Willing; (3) Feeling. These
+divisions, which result from what is known as "the tri-logical
+classification," were first distinctly enunciated by Upham although Kant
+had intimated it very plainly. For many years before the favored
+division was but two-fold the line of division being between the
+_cognitive_, or knowing, activities, and the _conative_, or acting,
+activities, generally known as the Understanding and the Will,
+respectively. It took a long time before the authorities would formally
+recognize the great field of the Feelings as forming a class by
+themselves and ranking with the Understanding and the Will. There are
+certain sub-divisions and shadings, which we shall notice as we proceed,
+some of which are more or less complex, and which seem to shade into
+others. The student is cautioned against conceiving of the mind as a
+thing having several compartments or distinct divisions. The
+classification does not indicate this and is only intended as a
+convenience in analyzing and studying the mental activities and
+operations. The "I" which feels, thinks and acts is the same--one
+entity.
+
+As Brooks well says: "The mind is a self-conscious activity and not a
+mere passivity; it is a centre of spiritual forces, all resting in the
+background of the ego. As a centre of forces, it stands related to the
+forces of the material and spiritual universe and is acted upon through
+its susceptibilities by those forces. As a spiritual activity, it takes
+the impressions derived from those forces, works them up into the
+organic growth of itself, converts them into conscious knowledge and
+uses these products as means to set other forces into activity and
+produce new results. Standing above nature and superior to its
+surroundings, it nevertheless feeds upon nature, as we may say, and
+transforms material influences into spiritual facts akin to its own
+nature. Related to the natural world and apparently originating from it,
+it yet rises above this natural world and, with the crown of freedom
+upon its brow, rules the natural obedient to its will."
+
+In this book, while we shall fully and unquestionably recognize the
+"tri-logical classification" of the activities of the Mind into the
+divisions of Thinking, Willing and Feeling, respectively, nevertheless,
+we shall, for convenience, use the term "Thought" in its broadest,
+widest and most general sense, as: "The power or faculty of thinking;
+the mental faculty; the mind," rather than in its narrower and
+particular sense of: "the understanding or cognitive faculty of the
+mind." Accordingly, we shall include the cultivation of the mental
+activities known as Attention, Perception, Imagination, etc., together
+with the strictly cognitive faculties, under the general term of
+Thought-Culture.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III.
+
+PHASES OF THOUGHT
+
+
+We have seen that the Mind is that something within us which Thinks,
+Feels and Wills. There are various phases of these three forms of
+activity. These phases have often been called "the faculties of the
+mind," although many authorities decry the use of this term, holding
+that it gives an impression of _several parts or divisions_ of the mind,
+separate and distinct from each other, whereas these phases are merely
+the several _powers or forms of activity_ of the Mind. Every
+manifestation of mental activity falls under one of the three
+before-mentioned general forms, i.e., Thinking, Feeling and Willing,
+respectively. Every manifestation of mental activity is either that of
+the Intellect, the Feelings, or the Will. Let us consider the first of
+these three general forms of mental activity--the Intellect.
+
+The _Intellect_ is defined as: "That faculty or phase of the human mind
+by which it receives or comprehends the ideas communicated to it by the
+senses or by perception, or other means, as distinguished from the power
+to feel and to will; the power or faculty to perceive objects in their
+relations; the power to judge and comprehend; also the capacity for
+higher forms of knowledge as distinguished from the power to perceive
+and imagine." The term itself is derived from the Latin term
+_intellectus_, the primary meaning of which is "to choose between,"
+which primary meaning will give the true essential meaning of the term
+in its present usage; namely, the faculty or phase of the mind by which
+we "choose between" things or by which we _decide_.
+
+The phase or faculty of Intellect concerns itself with Thinking, in the
+particular and narrower sense of that term. Its products are _thoughts_,
+_mental images_ and _ideas_. An _idea_ or _mental image_ is a mental
+conception of anything, as for instance our conception which we express
+by the terms, _man_, _animal_, _house_, _etc._ Sometimes the word _idea_
+is used to express merely the abstract or generalized conception of the
+thing, as, for instance, _Man_ in the sense of "all men;" while _mental
+image_ is used in the sense of the mental conception of some one
+particular thing, as a "_a man_;" it being held that no mental image can
+be had of a generalization. A _thought_ is held to be a mental product
+arising from a combination of two or more ideas or mental images, as for
+instance: "A horse is an animal;" "a man is a biped;" etc.
+
+The Intellect is held to embrace and include a number of minor phases or
+faculties, such as Perception, Understanding, Imagination, Memory,
+Reason and Intuition, which are explained as follows:
+
+_Perception_ is that faculty of the Mind which interprets the material
+presented to it by the senses. It is the power whereby we gain our
+knowledge of the external world, as reported to us by the channels of
+sense. Through Perception we are able to form ideas and mental images,
+which in turn lead to thoughts. The objects of which we become conscious
+through Perception are called _percepts_, which form the bases of what
+we call _concepts_, or ideas.
+
+_Understanding_ is that faculty of the Mind by the means of which we are
+able intelligently to compare the objects presented to it by Perception,
+and by which we separate them into parts by analysis, or to combine
+them into greater classes, or wholes, by synthesis. It produces ideas,
+both abstract and general; also concepts of truths, laws, principles,
+causes, etc. There are several sub-phases of Understanding, which are
+known as: Abstraction, Conception or Generalization, or Judgment and
+Reasoning, respectively, which are explained as follows:
+
+_Abstraction_ is that faculty of the Mind which enables it to abstract,
+or draw off, and consider apart from an object, a particular _quality_
+or _property_ of an object, thus making of the quality or property a
+distinct object of thought apart from the original object. Thus are the
+_abstract ideas_ of _sweetness_, _color_, _hardness_, _courage_,
+_beauty_, etc., which we have abstracted or _drawn off_ from their
+original associations, either for the purpose of putting them out of
+sight and consideration, or else to view and consider them by
+themselves. No one ever tasted "sweetness" although one may have tasted
+_sweet things_; no one ever saw "red," although one may have seen _red
+things_; no one ever saw, heard, tasted or felt "courage" in another,
+although one may have seen _courageous people_. Abstract ideas are
+merely the mental conception of _qualities_ or _properties_ divorced
+from their associated objects by Abstraction.
+
+_Conception_ or Generalization is that faculty of the Mind by which it
+forms and groups together several particular ideas in the form of _a
+general idea_. By the processes of Conception we form _classes_ or
+_generalizations_ from particular ideas arising from our _percepts_.
+First, we _perceive_ things; then we _compare_ them with each other;
+then we abstract their particular qualities, which are not common to the
+several objects; then we _generalize_ them according to their
+resemblances; then we _name_ the generalized concept. From these
+combined processes we form a Concept, or _general idea_ of the class of
+things to which the particular things belong. Thus from subjecting a
+number of cows to this process, we arrive at the general Concept of
+"Cow." This general Concept includes all the qualities and properties
+_common to all cows_, while omitting those which are not common to the
+class. Or, we may form a concept of Napoleon Bonaparte, by combining his
+several qualities and properties and thus form a _general idea_ of the
+man.
+
+_Judgment_ is that faculty of the Mind whereby we determine the
+agreement or disagreement between two concepts, ideas, or objects of
+thought, by comparing them with each other. From this comparison arises
+the judgment, which is expressed in the shape of a logical
+_proposition_: "The horse is an animal;" or "the horse is not a cow."
+Judgment is also used in forming a concept, in the first place, for we
+must _compare qualities_ before we can form a _general idea_.
+
+_Reasoning_ is that faculty of the Mind whereby we compare two
+Judgments, one with the other, and from the comparison deduce a third
+Judgment. This is a form of indirect or mediate comparison, whereas the
+Judgment is a form of immediate or direct comparison. From this process
+of Reasoning arises a result which is expressed in what is called a
+Syllogism, as for instance: "All dogs are animals; Carlo is a dog;
+therefore, Carlo is an animal." Or expressed in symbols: "A equals C;
+and B equals C;" therefore, "A equals B." Reasoning is of two kinds or
+classes; _viz._, Inductive and Deductive, respectively. We have
+explained these forms of Reasoning in detail in another volume of this
+series.
+
+_The Feelings_ are the mental faculties whereby we experience emotions
+or feelings. Feelings are the experiencing of the agreeable or
+disagreeable nature of our mental states. They can be defined only in
+their own terms. If we have never experienced a feeling, we cannot
+understand the words expressing it. Feelings result in what are called
+emotion, affection and desire. An emotion is the simple feeling, such as
+joy, sorrow, etc. An affection is an emotion reaching out toward another
+and outside object, such as envy, jealousy, love, etc. A desire is an
+emotion arising from the _want_ of some lacking quality or thing, and
+the inclination to possess it.
+
+_Memory_ is the faculty of the Mind whereby we retain and reproduce, or
+consciously revive any kind of past mental experience. It has two
+sub-phases; _viz._, Retention and Recollection, respectively. It
+manifests in the storing away of mental images and ideas, and in the
+reproduction of them at a later period of time, and also of the
+recognition of them as objects of past experience.
+
+_Imagination_ is the faculty of the Mind whereby we represent
+(_re-pre-sent_) as a mental image some previously experienced idea,
+concept or image. Its activities are closely allied and blended with
+those of the Memory. It has the power not only of reproducing objects
+already perceived but also another power of _ideal creation_ whereby it
+_creates_ new combinations from the materials of past experience. It is
+a faculty, the importance of which is but little understood by the
+majority of men. Inasmuch as the mental image must always precede the
+material manifestation, the cultivation of the Imagination becomes a
+matter of great importance and worthy of the closest study.
+
+_Intuition_ is the faculty of the Mind whereby it evolves what have been
+called Primary Truths or Primary Ideas. By Primary Ideas are meant the
+ideas of Space, Time, Cause, Identity, etc. By Primary Truths are meant
+the so-called "Self-Evident Truths" of geometry, mathematics and logic.
+Under the head of Intuition are also sometimes included the activities
+of the Subconscious or Superconscious regions of the mind, of which we
+have spoken in detail in a volume under that name of this series. Some
+authorities hold to the older idea of "Innate Ideas" by which is meant
+that every human being is born with the knowledge of certain fundamental
+truths, unconnected with any experience. Others hold that these ideas
+are simply the result of the experience of the race, transmitted to us
+as "germ ideas" which must grow by experience and exercise.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+That each and every faculty of the Mind may be strengthened and
+developed by Culture and Exercise is now held to be a fact by nearly
+every authority worthy of that name. Just as the physical muscle may be
+cultivated by the proper methods, so may the mental faculties be
+strengthened and cultivated by the appropriate methods and means.
+Inasmuch as the majority of the race are deficient in the development of
+one or more of the leading mental faculties, it becomes a matter of
+great interest and importance that all should acquaint themselves with
+the means whereby their deficiencies may be corrected and remedied. We
+shall now proceed to the consideration of Thought-Culture in general,
+and then to the consideration of the culture of each particular general
+faculty, in detail.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.
+
+THOUGHT-CULTURE
+
+
+Thought-Culture is based upon two general scientific facts which may be
+stated as follows:
+
+I. The brain centres of thought may be developed by exercise. While we
+do not assert that the brain and the mind are identical, it is
+nevertheless a scientific truth that "the brain is the organ of the
+mind" and that one of the first requisites for a good mind is a good
+brain. It has been proven by experiment that the brain-cells concerned
+in special mental activities multiply in proportion to the active use of
+the special faculties employed in the mental operation. It has also been
+ascertained that disuse of special faculties of the mind tends to cause
+a process akin to atrophy in the brain-cells concerned in the particular
+activity, so that it becomes difficult to think clearly along those
+particular lines after a long period of disuse. Moreover, it is known
+that the education and mental culture of a child is accompanied by an
+increase and development of the brain-cells connected with the
+particular fields of thought in which the child is exercised.
+
+There is a close analogy between the exercise of the brain-cells and the
+exercise of the muscles of the body. Both respond to reasonable
+exercise; both are injured by overwork; both degenerate by disuse. As
+Brooks says: "The mind grows by its own inherent energies. Mental
+exercise is thus the law of mental development. As a muscle grows strong
+by use, so any faculty of the mind is developed by its proper use and
+exercise. An inactive mind, like an unused muscle, becomes weak and
+unskilful. Hang the arm in a sling and the muscle becomes flabby and
+loses its vigor and skill; let the mind remain inactive and it acquires
+a mental flabbiness that unfits it for any severe or prolonged activity.
+An idle mind loses its tone and strength like an unused muscle; the
+mental powers go to rust through idleness and inaction. To develop the
+faculties of the mind and secure their highest activity and efficiency,
+there must be a constant and judicious exercise of these faculties. The
+object of culture is to stimulate and direct the activity of the mind."
+
+Experiments conducted by scientists upon dogs have shown that in the
+case of dogs specially trained to unusual mental activity, there has
+been a corresponding increase of the number of active brain-cells in the
+particular parts of the brain concerned with those mental activities.
+Microscopic examination of the brain tissues showed the greatest
+difference between the brain structure of the trained dogs and untrained
+ones of the same brood. So carefully were the experiments conducted that
+it was possible to distinguish between the dogs trained in one set of
+activities from those trained in another. Biologists have demonstrated
+the correctness of the brain-cell development theory beyond reasonable
+doubt, and ordinary human experience also adds its testimony in its
+favor.
+
+In view of the above, it will be seen that by intelligent exercise and
+use any and all faculties of the mind may be developed and cultivated,
+just as may any special muscle of the body. And this exercise can come
+only from actual use of the faculties themselves. Development must come
+from within and not from without. No system of outward stimulation will
+develop the faculties of the mind--they may be cultivated only by an
+exercise in their own particular field of work. The only way to exercise
+any particular faculty of thought is to _think_ through that faculty.
+
+II. Not only are the brain-cells developed by exercise, but it also
+appears to be a fact that the mind appears actually to be _nourished_ by
+knowledge of the outside world of things. The raw material of thought is
+taken into the mind and there is digested by the thought-processes, and
+is afterward actually _assimilated_ by the mind in a manner strikingly
+similar to the processes of the physical organs of nutrition. A mind to
+be at its best must be supplied with a normal amount of mental
+nourishment. Lacking this, it tends to become weak and inefficient. And,
+likewise, if its owner is a mental glutton and furnishes too much
+nourishment, particularly of a rich kind, there is a tendency toward
+"mental dyspepsia" and indigestion--the mind, unable to assimilate the
+mental food furnished it, is inclined to rebel. Moreover, if the mind be
+supplied with mental food of only one kind--if the mind is confined to
+one narrow field of thought--it weakens and the mental processes become
+impaired. In many ways is this curious analogy apparent.
+
+Not only does the mind need development, but it also needs intelligent
+cultivation. For it may be _developed_ by improper objects of thought
+just as well as by the proper ones. A rich field will grow tares and
+weeds as well as good grain or fruit. Thought-culture should not be
+confined to the _development of a strong and active mind_, but should be
+also extended to the _cultivation of a wise and intelligent mind_.
+Strength and Wisdom should be combined. Moreover there should be sought
+a harmonious and normal development. A one-sided, mental development is
+apt to produce a "crank," while a development in unhealthy mental fields
+will produce an abnormal thinker tending dangerously near to the line of
+insanity. Some "one-idea" men have great mental power and development,
+but are nevertheless unbalanced and impractical. And insane persons
+often have strongly developed minds--developed abnormally.
+
+Some authorities, holding special theories regarding the nature of mind,
+hold that Thought-Culture is merely a _training_ of the faculties
+rather than a _creation_ of new mental power, inasmuch as the mind
+cannot be built up from the outside. This is a curious combination of
+truth and error. It is true that the mind cannot be built up from
+outside material, in the sense of creating _new mind_, but it is also
+true that in every mind there is the potentiality of growth and
+development. Just as the future oak is said to be in the acorn, so are
+the potentialities of mind-growth in every mind waiting for nourishment
+from outside and the proper cultivation. Brooks has well stated this, as
+follows: "The culture of the mind is not creative in its character; its
+object is to develop existing possibilities into realities. The mind
+possesses innate powers which may be awakened into a natural activity.
+The design of culture is to aid nature in improving the powers she has
+given. No new power can be created by culture; we can increase the
+activity of these powers, but cannot develop any new activities. Through
+these activities new ideas and thoughts may be developed, and the sum of
+human knowledge increased; but this is accomplished by a high activity
+of the natural powers with which the mind is endowed, and not by the
+culture of new powers. The profound philosopher uses the same faculties
+that the little child is developing in the games of the nursery. The
+object of culture is to arouse the powers which nature has given us into
+a normal activity and to stimulate and guide them in their unfolding."
+
+In connection with the objection above mentioned, it may be said that
+while the development of the mind must come from within itself, rather
+than from without, nevertheless, in order to develop, it must have the
+nourishing material from the outside world in order to grow. Just as the
+body can grow from within only by the aid of nourishment from outside,
+so the mind, while growing from within, needs the material for thought
+which can come only from without itself. Thought requires "things" upon
+which to exercise itself--and upon which it is nourished. Without these
+outside objects, it can have no exercise and can receive no nourishment.
+Thought consists in the perception, examination and comparison of
+_things_, and the consequent building up new combinations, arrangements
+and syntheses. Therefore, the perceptive faculties are most necessary to
+Thought, and their culture is most necessary in the general work of
+Thought-Culture.
+
+It must not be lost sight of that in Thought-Culture there is necessary
+a variety of exercises and forms of nourishment. What will develop one
+faculty will exert but a faint effect upon others. Each needs its own
+particular kind of exercise--each its particular kind of mental
+nourishment. While it is true that there is a certain benefit gained by
+the entire mind from an exercise of any of its parts, this effect is but
+secondary in importance. A man well developed mentally has been
+developed in each faculty, each in its own way. The faculty of
+perception requires objects of perception; the faculty of imagination
+requires objects of imagination; the faculty of reasoning requires
+objects of reasoning; and so on, each requiring objects of exercise and
+nourishment of its own kind--in its own class. In some persons some of
+the faculties are well developed while others are deficient. It follows
+that in such a case the weak faculties should be developed first, that
+they be brought up to the general standard. Then a further general
+development may be undertaken if desired. Moreover, in general
+development, it will be found that certain faculties will respond more
+readily to the cultivation given, while others will be slow to respond.
+In such cases wisdom dictates that a greater degree of exercise and
+nourishment be given to the slower and less responsible faculties, while
+the more responsive be given but a lighter development. In
+Thought-Culture as in physical culture, the less developed and slower
+responding parts should be given special attention.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+In the following chapters we shall point out the methods and exercises
+calculated to develop the several faculties of the mind to the best
+advantage, in each case giving general advice along the lines of the
+cultivation of the particular faculty which will serve as general
+instruction regarding its culture. The student should carefully study
+the entire work before he attempts to specialize in the development of
+any particular faculty. The particular work may be aided by an
+acquaintance with the entire field of Thought-Culture for many of the
+faculties shade into each other in their activities and are always more
+or less interdependent. For, be it remembered, the mind is a _whole_,
+and not a mere aggregation of many parts. To understand the parts, one
+must study the whole--to understand the whole, one must study the
+parts.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V.
+
+ATTENTION
+
+
+Attention is not a faculty of the mind in the same sense as perception,
+abstraction, judgment, etc., but is rather in the nature of an act of
+will concerned in the focusing of the consciousness upon some object of
+thought presented or represented to the mind. In some respects it bears
+a resemblance to Abstraction, inasmuch as it sets aside some particular
+object for the consideration of the consciousness, to the exclusion of
+other objects. Wayland explains attention as a condition of mind in
+which the consciousness is excited and directed by an act of the will.
+Hamilton says: "Consciousness may be compared to a telescope; Attention
+is the pulling out and pressing in of the tubes in accommodating the
+focus of the eye;" and also that: "An act of attention, that is an act
+of concentration, seems thus necessary to every exertion of
+consciousness, as a certain contraction of the pupil is requisite to
+every exertion of vision.... Attention then is to consciousness what
+the contraction of the pupil is to sight, or to the eye of the mind what
+the microscope or telescope is to the bodily eye.... It constitutes the
+better half of all intellectual power."
+
+Brodie says that: "It is Attention, much more than any difference in the
+abstract power of reasoning, which constitutes the vast difference which
+exists between minds of different individuals." Butler says: "The most
+important intellectual habit that I know of is the habit of attending
+exclusively to the matter in hand.... It is commonly said that genius
+cannot be infused by education, yet this power of concentrated
+attention, which belongs as a part of his gift to every great
+discoverer, is unquestionably capable of almost indefinite augmentation
+by resolute practice." And Beattie says: "The force wherewith anything
+strikes the mind is generally in proportion to the degree of attention
+bestowed upon it."
+
+Realizing the importance of attention, the student will naturally wish
+to cultivate the power of bestowing it when necessary. The first role in
+the cultivation of the attention is that the student shall carefully
+acquire _the habit of thinking of or doing but one thing at a time_.
+This first rule may seem easy, but in practice it will be found very
+difficult of observance, so careless are the majority of us in our
+actions and thinking. Not only will the trouble and care bestowed upon
+the acquiring of this habit of thought and action be well repaid by the
+development of the attention, but the student will also acquire a
+facility for accomplishing his tasks quickly and thoroughly. As Kay
+says: "There is nothing that contributes more to success in any pursuit
+than that of having the attention concentrated on the matter in hand;
+and, on the contrary, nothing is more detrimental than when doing one
+thing to have the mind taken up with something else." And as Granville
+says: "A frequent cause of failure in the faculty of attention is
+striving to think of more than one thing at a time." Kay also well says:
+"If we would possess the power of attention in a high degree, we must
+cultivate the habit of attending to what is directly before the mind, to
+the exclusion of all else. All distracting thoughts and feelings that
+tend to withdraw the mind from what is immediately before it are
+therefore to be carefully avoided. This is a matter of great importance,
+and of no little difficulty. Frequently the mind, in place of being
+concentrated on what is immediately before it, is thinking of something
+else--something, it may be, that went before or that may come after, or
+something quite alien to the subject."
+
+The following principles of the application of the attention have been
+stated by the authorities:
+
+I. The attention attaches more readily to interesting than to
+uninteresting things.
+
+II. The attention will decline in strength unless there is a variation
+in the stimulus, either by a change of object or the developing of some
+new attribute in the object.
+
+III. The attention, when tired by continuous direction toward some
+unvarying object, may be revived by directing it toward some new object
+or in allowing it to be attracted and held by some passing object.
+
+IV. The attention manifests in a two-fold activity; _viz._ (1) the
+concentration upon some one object of thought; and (2) the shutting out
+of outside objects. Thus, it has its positive and negative sides. Thus,
+when a man wishes to give his undivided attention to one speaker in a
+crowd of speaking individuals, he acts positively in focusing his
+consciousness upon the selected individual, and negatively by refusing
+to listen to the others.
+
+V. The attention is not a faculty, but a means of using any faculty with
+an increased degree of efficiency.
+
+VI. The degree of attention possessed by an individual is an indication
+of his power of using his intellect. Many authorities have held that, in
+cases of genius, the power of concentrated attention is usually greatly
+developed. Brooks says: "Attention is one of the principal elements of
+genius." Hamilton says: "Genius is a higher capacity of attention."
+Helvetius says: "Genius is nothing but protracted attention."
+Chesterfield says: "The power of applying our attention, steady and
+undissipated, to a single object is a sure mark of superior genius."
+
+The attention may be cultivated, just as may be the various faculties of
+the mind, by the two-fold method of Exercise and Nourishment; that is,
+by using and employing it actively and by furnishing it with the proper
+materials with which to feed its strength. The way to exercise the
+attention is _to use it frequently_ in every-day life. If you are
+listening to a man speaking, endeavor to give to him your undivided
+attention, and, at the same time, to shut out from your consciousness
+every other object. In working, we should endeavor to use the attention
+by concentrating our interest upon the particular task before us to the
+exclusion of all else. In reading, we should endeavor to hold our minds
+closely to the text instead of hastily glancing over the page as so many
+do.
+
+Those who wish to cultivate their attention should take up some line of
+study in which it is necessary to fasten the attention firmly for a
+time. A half-hour's study in this way is worth more than hours of
+careless reading so far as the cultivation of the attention is
+concerned. Mathematics is most valuable in the direction of developing
+the power of attention. Gibbon says: "After a rapid glance on the
+subject and distribution of a new book, I suspend the reading of it
+which I only resume after having myself examined the subject in all its
+relations."
+
+Some writers have held that the attention may be developed by the
+practice of selecting the voice of one person speaking among a crowd of
+speakers, and deliberately shutting out the other sounds, giving the
+whole attention to the particular speaker; or, in the same manner,
+selecting one singer in a church choir or band of singers; or one
+musical instrument in an orchestra; or one piece of machinery making
+sounds in a room filled with various machines, etc. The practice of so
+doing is held to strengthen one's powers of concentration and attention.
+
+Draper says: "Although many images may be simultaneously existing upon
+the retina, the mind possesses the power of singling out any one of them
+and fastening attention upon it, just as among a number of musical
+instruments simultaneously played, one, and that perhaps the feeblest,
+may be selected and its notes exclusively followed." And as Taylor says:
+"In a concert of several voices, the voices being of nearly equal
+intensity, regarded merely as organic impressions on the auditory
+nerve, we select one, and at will we lift out and disjoin it from the
+general volume of sound; we shut off the other voices--five, ten and
+more--and follow this one alone. When we have done so for a time, we
+freely cast it off and take up another." Carpenter says: "The more
+completely the mental energy can be brought into one focus and all
+distracting objects excluded, the more powerful will be the volitional
+effort."
+
+Many authorities hold that the attention may be best applied and
+exercised by analyzing an object mentally, and then considering its
+parts one by one by a process of abstraction. Thus, as Kays says: "An
+apple presents to us form, color, taste, smell, etc., and if we would
+obtain a clear idea of any one of these, we must contemplate it by
+itself and compare it with other impressions of the same kind we have
+previously experienced. So in viewing a landscape, it is not enough to
+regard it merely as a whole, but we must regard each of its different
+parts individually by itself if we would obtain a clear idea of it. We
+can only obtain a full and complete knowledge of an object _by analyzing
+it and concentrating the attention upon its different parts, one by
+one_." Reid says: "It is not by the senses immediately, but rather by
+the power of _analyzing and abstraction_, that we get the most simple
+and the most distinct notions of objects of sense." And, as Brown says:
+"It is scarcely possible to advance even a single step in intellectual
+physics without the necessity of performing _some sort of analysis_." In
+all processes requiring analysis and examination of parts, properties or
+qualities, the attention is actively employed. Accordingly, it follows
+that such exercises are best adapted to the work of developing and
+cultivating the attention itself. Therefore, as a parting word we may
+say: _To develop and cultivate the power of attention and concentration,
+(1) Analyze; (2) Analyze; and (3) Analyze. Analyze everything and
+everybody with which or whom you come in contact._ There is no better or
+shorter rule.
+
+The student will also find that the various directions and the advice
+which we shall give in the succeeding chapters, regarding the
+cultivation of the various faculties, are also adapted to the
+development of the attention, for the latter is brought into active
+play in them. And, likewise, by developing the attention, one may
+practice the future exercises with greater effect.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI.
+
+PERCEPTION
+
+
+In preceding chapters we have seen that in the phase of mental activity
+in which the Intellect is concerned, the processes of which are known as
+"Thought" in the narrower sense of the term, there are several stages or
+steps involving the use of several faculties of the mind. The first of
+these steps or stages is called _Perception_.
+
+Many persons confuse the idea of Sensation and Perception, but there is
+a clear distinction between them. Sensations arise from nerve
+action--from the stimulation of nerve substance--which gives rise to a
+peculiar effect upon the brain, which results in an elementary form of
+consciousness. An authority says: "Sensation is the peculiar property of
+the nervous system in a state of activity, by which impressions are
+conveyed to the brain or sensorium. When an impression is made upon any
+portion of the bodily surface by contact, heat, electricity, light, or
+any other agent, the mind is rendered conscious of this by sensation.
+In the process there are three stages--reception of the impression at
+the end of the sensory nerve, the conduction of it along the nerve trunk
+to the sensorium, and _the change it excites in the sensorium itself,
+through which is produced sensation_."
+
+Just why and how this nerve action is translated into consciousness of
+an elementary kind, science is unable to explain. Our knowledge is based
+in a great part, or entirely, upon impressions which have been received
+over the channel of the senses--sensations of sight, hearing, tasting,
+smelling and touch. Many authorities hold that all of the five senses
+are modifications of the sense of touch, or feeling; as for instance,
+the impression upon the organs of sight is really in the nature of a
+delicate touch or feeling of the light-waves as they come in contact
+with the nerves of vision, etc. But, although sensations give us the raw
+materials of thought, so to speak, they are not _knowledge_ in
+themselves. Knowledge arises from the operation of Perception upon this
+raw material of Sensation.
+
+But yet, Sensation plays a most active part in the presentation of the
+raw material for the Perceptive faculties, and must not be regarded as
+merely a physiological process. It may be said to be the connecting link
+between the physical and the mental activities. As Ziehen says: "It
+follows that the constitution of the nervous system is an essential
+factor in determining the quality of sensation. This fact reveals the
+obvious error of former centuries, first refuted by Locke, though still
+shared by naive thought today, that the objects about us themselves are
+colored, warm, cold, etc. As external to our consciousness, we can only
+assume matter, vibrating with molecular motion and permeated by
+vibrating particles of ether. The nervous apparatus selects only certain
+motions of matter or of ether, which they transform into that form of
+nerve excitation with which they are familiar. It is only this nerve
+excitation that we perceive as red, warm or hard."
+
+Passing from Sensation to Perception, we see that the latter interprets
+the reports of the former. Perception translates into consciousness the
+impressions of Sensation. Perception, acting through one or more of the
+mental faculties, gives us _our first bit of real knowledge_. Sensation
+may give us the impression of a small moving thing--Perception
+translates this into the thought of _a cat_. Sensation is a mere
+_feeling_--Perception is the _thought_ arising from that feeling. A
+Percept is the product of Perception, or in other words, our _idea_
+gained through Perception. The majority of our percepts are complex,
+being built up from a number of minor percepts; as for instance, our
+percept of _a peach_ is built up from our minor percepts of the form,
+shape, color, weight, degree of hardness, smell, taste, etc., of the
+peach, each sense employed giving minor percepts, the whole being
+combined in the conscious as the whole percept of that particular peach.
+
+Brooks says: "All knowledge does not come directly from perception
+through the senses, however. We have a knowledge of external objects,
+and we have a knowledge that transcends this knowledge of external
+objects. Perception is the _immediate_ source of the first kind of
+knowledge, and the _indirect_ source of the second kind of knowledge.
+This distinction is often expressed by the terms _cause_ and
+_occasion_. Thus perception is said to be the _cause_ of our knowledge
+of objects, since it is the immediate source of such knowledge.
+Perception is also said to be the _occasion_ of the ideas and truths of
+intuition; for, though in a sense necessary to these ideas, it is not
+the source of them. Perception also furnishes the understanding with
+materials out of which it derives ideas and truths beyond the field of
+sense. As thus attaining a knowledge of external objects, affording
+material for the operations of the understanding, and furnishing the
+occasion for the activity of the intuitive power, _perception may be
+said to lie at the basis of all knowledge_."
+
+Perception is of course manifest in all persons. But it varies greatly
+in degree and power. Moreover, it may be developed and cultivated to a
+great degree. As Perception is an interpretation of the impression of
+the senses, we often confuse the cultivation of Perception with the
+development of the senses themselves. Two persons of equally perfect
+sense of sight may vary greatly in their degree of Perception of sight
+impressions. One may be a most careless observer, while the other may
+be a very close observer and able to distinguish many points of interest
+and importance in the object viewed which are not apparent to the first
+observer. Cultivation of Perception is cultivation of the _mental
+background of the senses_, rather than of the sense organs themselves.
+The Perception accompanying each sense may be developed and cultivated
+separately from that accompanying the others.
+
+The majority of persons are very careless observers. They will _see_
+things without _perceiving_ the qualities, properties, characteristics,
+or parts which together make up those things. Two persons, possessed of
+equal degrees of eyesight, will walk through a forest. Both of them will
+_see_ trees. To one of them there will be but trees perceived; while to
+the other there will be a perception of the different species of trees,
+with their varying bark, leaves, shape, etc. One perceives simply a
+"pile of stone," which to the perception of another will be recognized
+as granite, marble, etc. Brooks says: "Very few persons can tell the
+difference between the number of legs of a fly and of a spider; and I
+have known farmers' boys and girls who could not tell whether the ears
+of a cow are in front of her horns, above her horns, below her horns, or
+behind her horns." Halleck says of a test in a schoolroom: "Fifteen
+pupils were sure that they had seen cats climb trees and descend them.
+There was a unanimity of opinion that the cats went up head first. When
+asked whether the cats came down head or tail first, the majority were
+sure that the cats descended as they were never known to do. Anyone who
+had ever noticed the shape of the claws of any beast of prey could have
+answered that question without seeing an actual descent. Farmers' boys,
+who have often seen cows and horses lie down and rise, are seldom sure
+whether the animals rise with their fore or hind feet first, or whether
+the habit of the horse agrees with that of the cow in this respect."
+
+Brooks well says: "Modern education tends to the neglect of the culture
+of the perceptive powers. In ancient times people studied nature much
+more than at present. Being without books, they were compelled to depend
+upon their eyes and ears for knowledge; and this made their senses
+active, searching and exact. At the present day, we study books for a
+knowledge of external things; and we study them too much or too
+exclusively, and thus neglect the cultivation of the senses. We get our
+knowledge of the material world second-hand, instead of fresh from the
+open pages of the book of nature. Is it not a great mistake to spend so
+much time in school and yet not know the difference between the leaf of
+a beech and of an oak; or not be able to distinguish between specimens
+of marble, quartz, and granite? The neglect of the culture of the
+perceptive powers is shown by the scholars of the present time. Very few
+educated men are good observers; indeed, the most of them are sadly
+deficient in this respect.... They were taught to think and remember;
+but were not taught to use their eyes and ears. In modern education,
+books are used too much like spectacles, and the result is the blunting
+of the natural powers of perception."
+
+The first principle in the Cultivation of Perception is the correct use
+of the Attention. The intelligent control of voluntary attention is a
+prerequisite to clear and distinct perception. We have called your
+attention to this matter in the preceding chapter. Halleck says: "A body
+may be imaged on the retina without insuring perception. There must be
+an effort to concentrate the attention upon the many things which the
+world presents to our senses.... Perception, to achieve satisfactory
+results, must summon the will to its aid to concentrate the attention.
+Only the smallest part of what falls upon our senses at any time is
+actually perceived."
+
+The sense of sight is perhaps the one of the greatest importance to us,
+and accordingly the cultivation of Perception with regard to impressions
+received through the eye is the most important for the ordinary
+individual. As Kay says: "To see clearly is a valuable aid even to
+thinking clearly. In all our mental operations we owe much to sight. To
+recollect, to think, to imagine, is to see internally,--to call up more
+or less visual images of things before the mind. In order to understand
+a thing it is generally necessary to see it, and what a man has not seen
+he cannot properly realize or image distinctly to his mind.... It is by
+the habitual direction of our attention to the effects produced upon
+our consciousness by the impressions made upon the eye and transmitted
+to the sensorium that our sight, like our other senses, is trained."
+Bain says: "Cohering trains and aggregates of the sensations of sight
+make more than any other thing, perhaps more than all other things put
+together, the material of thought, memory and imagination." Vinet says:
+"The child, and perhaps the man as well, only knows well what is shown
+him, and the image of things is the true medium between their abstract
+idea and his personal experience." This being the case, advice
+concerning the Cultivation of Perception must needs be directed mainly
+to the cultivation of the perception of sight-impressions.
+
+Brooks says: "We should acquire the habit of observing with attention.
+Many persons look at objects with a careless, inattentive eye. We should
+guard against the habit of careless looking. We should fix the mind upon
+the object before us; we should concentrate the attention upon that upon
+which we are looking. Attention, in respect to Perception, has been
+compared to a burning glass; hold the sun-glass between the sun and a
+board and the concentrated rays will burn a hole through the latter. So
+attention concentrates the rays of perceptive power and enables the mind
+to penetrate below the surface of things."
+
+The best authorities agree in the idea that the Perception may be best
+cultivated by acquiring the habit of examining things in detail. And,
+that this examination in detail is best manifested by examining the
+parts going to make up a complex thing, separately, rather than
+examining the thing as a whole. Halleck says regarding this point: "To
+look at things intelligently is the most difficult of all arts. The
+first rule for the cultivation of accurate perception is: Do not try to
+perceive the whole of a complex object at once. Take the human face for
+example. A man holding an important position to which he had been
+elected offended many people because he could not remember faces, and
+hence failed to recognize individuals the second time he met them. His
+trouble was in looking at the countenance as a whole. When he changed
+his method of observation, and noticed carefully the nose, mouth, eyes,
+chin and color of hair, he at once began to find recognition easier. He
+was no longer in danger of mistaking A for B, since he remembered that
+the shape of B's nose was different, or the color of his hair at least
+three shades lighter. This example shows that another rule can be
+formulated: Pay careful attention to details.... To see an object merely
+as an undiscriminated mass of something in a certain place is to do no
+more than a donkey accomplishes as he trots along."
+
+Brooks says regarding the same point: "To train the powers of
+observation we should practice observing minutely. We should analyze the
+objects which we look at into their parts, and notice these parts.
+Objects present themselves to us as wholes; our definite knowledge of
+them is gained by analysis, by separating them into the elements which
+compose them. We should therefore give attention to the details of
+whatever we are considering; and thus cultivate the habit of observing
+with minuteness.... It is related of a teacher that if, when hearing a
+class, some one rapped at the door, he would look up as the visitor
+entered and from a single glance could tell his appearance and dress,
+the kind of hat he wore, kind of necktie, collar, vest, coat, shoes,
+etc. The skillful banker, also, in counting money with wondrous
+rapidity, will detect and throw from his pile of bills the counterfeits
+which, to the ordinary eye, seem to be without spot or blemish."
+
+One of the best methods of developing and cultivating the faculty of
+Perception is to take up some study in which the perceptive faculties
+_must be_ employed. Botany, physics, geology, natural history give
+splendid exercise in Perception, providing the student engages in actual
+experimental work, and actual observation, instead of confining himself
+to the textbooks. A careful scientific study and examination of _any
+kind of objects_, in a manner calculated to bring out the various points
+of resemblance and difference, will do most to develop the Perception.
+Training of this kind will develop these powers to a high degree, in the
+case of small children.
+
+Drawing is also a great help to the development of Perception. In order
+to draw a thing correctly we must of necessity examine it in detail;
+otherwise we will not be able to draw it correctly. In fact, many
+authorities use the test of drawing to prove the degree of attention and
+Perception that the student has bestowed upon an object which he has
+been studying. Others place an object before the pupil for a few
+minutes, and then withdraw it, the pupil then being required to draw the
+object roughly but with attention to its leading peculiarities and
+features. Then the object is again placed before the pupil for study,
+and he is then again required to draw from memory the additional details
+he has noticed in it. This process is repeated over and over again,
+until the pupil has proved that he has _observed_ every possible detail
+of interest in the object. This exercise has resulted in the cultivation
+of a high degree of perception in many students, and its simplicity
+should not detract from its importance. Any person may practice this
+exercise by himself; or, better still, two or more students may combine
+and endeavor to excel each other in friendly rivalry, each endeavoring
+to discover the greatest number of details in the object considered. So
+rapidly do students improve under this exercise, that a daily record
+will show a steady advance. Simple exercises in drawing are found in
+the reproduction, from memory, of geography maps, leaves of trees, etc.
+
+Similar exercises may be found in the practice of taking a hasty look at
+a person, animal or building, and then endeavoring to reproduce in
+writing the particular points about the person or thing observed. This
+exercise will reveal rapid progress if persisted in. Or, it may be
+varied by endeavoring to write out the contents of a room through which
+one has walked.
+
+The majority of our readers remember the familiar story of Houdin, who
+so cultivated the faculty of Perception that he was able to pass by a
+shop-window and afterward state in detail every object in the window. He
+acquired this power by gradual development, beginning with the
+observation of a single article in the window, then two, then three and
+so on. Others have followed his method with great success. Speaking of
+Houdin's wonderful Perception, Halleck says: "A wide-awake eagle would
+probably see more of a thing at one glance than would a drowsy lizard in
+a quarter of an hour. Extreme rapidity of Perception, due to careful
+training, was one of the factors enabling Houdin and his son to astonish
+everybody and to amass a fortune. He placed a domino before the boy, and
+instead of allowing him to count the spots, required him to give the sum
+total at once. This exercise was continued until each could give
+instantaneously the sum of the spots on a dozen dominoes. The sum was
+given just as accurately as if five minutes had been consumed in
+adding." Houdin, in his Memoirs relating the above facts regarding his
+own methods, states with due modesty, that many women far excel him in
+this respect. He says: "I can safely assert that a lady seeing another
+pass at full speed in a carriage will have had time to analyze her
+toilette from her bonnet to her shoes, and be able to describe not only
+the fashion and quality of the stuffs, but also say if the lace be real
+or only machine made."
+
+There are a number of games played by children which tend to the
+cultivation of the Perception, and which might well be adapted for the
+use of older people. These games are based on the general principle of
+the various participants taking a brief view of a number of objects
+displayed in one's hand, on a table, in a box, etc., and then stating
+what he or she has seen. There will be noticed a wonderful difference in
+the degree of Perception manifested by the various participants. And,
+equally interesting will be the degrees of progress noted after playing
+this game over several times, allowing time for rest between the series
+of games. It is a fact well known in police circles that thieves often
+train boys in this way, following this course by another in which the
+lads are expected to take in the contents of a room, the windows, locks,
+etc., at a glance. They are then graduated into spies looking out the
+details of the scenes of future robberies.
+
+In our volume of this series, devoted to the consideration of the
+Memory, we have related a number of exercises and methods, similar to
+those given above, by which the Perception may be cultivated. Perception
+plays a most important place in memory, for upon the clearness of the
+percepts depends to a great degree the clearness of the impressions made
+upon the memory. So close is the connection between Memory and
+Perception that the cultivation of one tends to develop the other. For
+instance, the cultivation of the Memory necessitates the sharpening of
+the Perception in the direction of obtaining clear original impressions;
+while the cultivation of Perception naturally develops the Memory by
+reason of the fact that the latter is used in testing and proving the
+clearness and degree of Perception. This being the case, those who find
+that the exercises and methods given above are too arduous may
+substitute the simple exercise of remembering as many details as
+possible of things they see. This effort to impress the memory will
+involuntarily bring into action the perceptive faculties in the
+acquirement of the original impressions, so that in the end the
+Perception will be found to have developed.
+
+Teachers and those having to do with children should realize the great
+value of the cultivation of Perception in the young, and thus
+establishing valuable habits of observation among them. The experience
+and culture thus acquired will prove of great value in their after life.
+As Brooks well says on this subject: "Teachers should appreciate the
+value of the culture of the perceptive powers, and endeavor to do
+something to afford this culture. Let it be remembered that by training
+the powers of observation of pupils, we lead them to acquire definite
+ideas of things, enable them to store their minds with fresh and
+interesting knowledge, lay the foundation for literary or business
+success, and thus do much to enhance their happiness in life and add to
+the sum of human knowledge."
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII.
+
+REPRESENTATION
+
+
+Sensation and Perception, as considered in the preceding chapter, are
+what are called by psychologists "Processes of Presentation." By
+Presentation is meant the direct offering to the consciousness of mental
+images or objects of thought. If there were no faculty of the mind
+capable of retaining and _re_-presenting to the consciousness the
+impression or record of Perception, we could never progress in
+knowledge, for each percept would be new each time it was presented and
+there would be no recognition of it as having been previously perceived,
+nor would there be any power to voluntarily recall any percept
+previously acquired. In short, we would be without that power of the
+mind called Memory.
+
+But, fortunately for us as thinkers, we possess the power of
+Representation; that is, of reproducing past perceptions and experiences
+in the shape of _mental images_ or pictures, "in the mind's eye," so to
+speak, which relieves us of the necessity of directly and immediately
+perceiving an object each time we desire or are required to think of it.
+The processes whereby this becomes possible are called the processes of
+Representation, for the reason that by them past experiences of
+Perception are _re_-presented to the consciousness.
+
+The subject of Representation is closely bound up with that of Memory.
+Strictly speaking, Representation may be said to be one phase of Memory;
+Association of Ideas another; and the authorities prefer to treat the
+whole subject under the general head of Memory. We have written a work
+on "Memory" which forms one of the volumes of the present series, and we
+have no intention, or desire, to repeat here the information given in
+that work. But we must consider the subject of Representation at this
+point in order to maintain the logical unity of the present general
+subject of Thought-Culture. The student will also notice, of course, the
+close relation between the processes of Representation and those of the
+Imagination, which we shall consider in other chapters of this work.
+
+Memory has several phases, the usual classification of which is as
+follows: (1) Impression; (2) Retention; (3) Recollection; (4)
+Representation, and (5) Recognition. Each phase requires the operation
+of special mental processes. _Impression_ is the process whereby the
+impressions of Perception are recorded or stamped upon the subconscious
+field of mentality, as the impress of the die upon the wax. _Retention_
+is the process whereby the subconsciousness _retains_ or holds the
+impressions so received. _Recollection_ is the process by which the mind
+_re-collects_ the impressions retained in the subconsciousness, bringing
+them again into consciousness as objects of knowledge. _Representation_
+is the process whereby the impressions so re-collected are _pictured or
+imaged_ in the mind. _Recognition_ is the process whereby the mind
+_recognizes_ the mental image or picture so re-presented to it as
+connected with its past experience.
+
+As we have stated, we have considered the general subject of Memory in
+another volume of this series and, therefore, shall not attempt to enter
+into a discussion of its general subject at this place. We shall,
+accordingly, limit ourselves here to a brief consideration of the phase
+of Representation and its cultivation.
+
+Representation, of course, depends upon the preceding phases of Memory
+known as Impression, Retention and Recollection. Unless the Impression
+is clear; unless the Retention is normal, there can be no
+Representation. And unless one _recollects_ there can be no
+Representation. Recollection (which is really a re-collection of
+percepts) must precede Representation in the shape of mental images or
+pictures. Recollection re-collects the mental materials out of which the
+image is to be constructed. But, as Brooks says: "It is not to be
+assumed that knowledge is retained as a picture; but that it is
+_recreated_ in the form of a picture or some other mental product when
+it is recalled." The process is analogous to the transmutation of the
+sound-waves entering the receiver of a telephone, into electrical-waves
+which are transmitted to the receiver, where they are in turn
+re-transmuted to sound-waves which enter the ear of the listener. It
+will be seen at once that there is the closest possible relation between
+the processes of Representation and those of Memory--in fact, it is
+quite difficult to draw a clear line of division between them. Some make
+the distinction that Representation furnishes us with an exact
+reproduction of _the past_; while Imagination combines our mental images
+into _new products_. That is, Representation merely _reproduces_; while
+Imagination _creates_ by forming new combinations; or Representation
+deals with a reproduction of the Actual; while Imagination deals with
+the Ideal.
+
+Wundt speaking of this difficult distinction says: "Psychologists are
+accustomed to define _memory images_ as ideas which _exactly reproduce_
+some previous perception, and _fancy images_ as ideas consisting of a
+combination of elements taken from a whole number of perceptions. Now
+memory images in the sense of this definition simply do not exist....
+Try, for instance, to draw from memory some landscape picture which you
+have only once seen, and then compare your copy with the original. You
+will expect to find plenty of mistakes and omissions; but you will also
+invariably find that you have put in a great deal which was not in the
+original, but which comes from landscape pictures which you have seen
+somewhere else."
+
+While we generally speak of Representation _picturing_ the recollected
+percepts, still, we must not make the mistake of supposing that it is
+concerned with, or limited to, only mental pictures. We are able to
+_represent_ not only visual percepts but also sounds, smells, tastes or
+feelings, often so vividly that they appear as almost actually existent.
+We may also even _represent_, symbolically the processes of reasoning,
+mathematical operations, etc. In short nearly, if not all experiences
+which are possible in Presentation are also possible in Representation.
+
+The phase of Representation, in the processes of Memory, is of course
+subject to the general laws of the Cultivation of Memory which we have
+stated in detail in our previous volume on that subject. But there are
+some special points of development and cultivation which may be
+considered briefly in this place. In the first place the importance of
+Attention and clear Perception, as necessary precedents for clear
+Representation, may be emphasized. In order to form clear mental images
+of a thing we must have perceived it clearly in the first place. The
+advice regarding the use of the Attention and Perception given in
+preceding chapters need not be repeated here, but special attention
+should be directed toward them in connection with the processes of
+Representation. If we wish to cultivate the Representative faculties, we
+must begin by cultivating the Presentative faculties.
+
+Then again we must remember what we have said elsewhere about the facts
+of development through (1) Use; and (2) Nourishment, in all mental
+faculties. We must begin to _use_ the faculties of Representation in
+order to exercise them. We must give them _nourishment_ in the shape of
+objects of mental food. That is to say we must furnish these faculties
+with _materials_ with which they may grow and develop, and with exercise
+in order to strengthen the mental-muscle and also to give the faculties
+the opportunity to "acquire the knack." The exercises and methods
+recommended in our chapter on Perception will furnish good _material_
+for the Representative faculties' growing requirements. By _perceiving_
+the details of things, one is able to reproduce clear mental images of
+them. In studying an object, always carry in your mind the fact that you
+wish to _reproduce_ it in your mind later. In fact, if you have the
+opportunity, let your mind "repeat it to itself" as soon as possible
+after the actual occurrence and experience. Just as you often murmur to
+yourself, or else write down, the name of a person or place which you
+have just heard, in order that you may recollect it the better
+thereafter, so it will be well for you to "mentally repeat" to yourself
+the experiences upon which you wish to exercise your Representative
+faculties.
+
+As to the matter of development and cultivation by Use, we would advise
+that you begin gradually to train your mind to _reproduce_ the
+experiences of the day or week or month, at intervals, until you feel
+that you are developing a new power in that direction. Tonight, if you
+try you will find that you can reproduce but a very small part of
+today's happenings with any degree of clearness. How clearly can you
+image the places you have been, the appearances of the people you have
+met, the various details of persons and things which you perceived
+during the experiences of the day? Not very clearly, we dare say. Try
+again, and you will find that you will be able to add new details. Keep
+it up until you feel tired or think that you have exhausted all the
+possibilities of the task. Tomorrow, try it again, and you will find
+that the second day's experiences are more clearly reproduced in your
+mind. Each day should find you a little more advanced, until you get to
+a place where the normal degree of power is attained, when the advance
+will be slower.
+
+Then, at the end of the week, review its experiences. Do the same the
+following week. At the end of the month, take a hasty mental trip over
+the month's experiences. And so on. Exercise, in moderation, along these
+lines will work wonders for you. Not only will it develop the
+Representation, but your powers of observation and your general memory
+will be found to be improved. And, moreover, in "chewing the mental cud"
+you will think of many things of interest and importance in connection
+with your work, etc., and your general mental efficiency will be
+increased for the faculties of the mind are interdependent and share
+benefits with each other.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII.
+
+ABSTRACTION
+
+
+As we have seen, the first stage or step in the process of Thought is
+that called Perception, which we have considered in the preceding
+chapter. Perception, as we have seen, is the process by which we gain
+our first knowledge of the external world as reported to us by the
+channels of sense. The Perceptive faculties interpret the material which
+is presented to us by the senses. Following upon Perception we find the
+processes resulting from the exercise of the group of faculties which
+are classified under the general head of Understanding.
+
+Understanding is the faculty, or faculties, of the mind by means of
+which we intelligently examine and compare the various _percepts_,
+either separating them by analysis, or else combining them by synthesis,
+or both, and thus securing our general ideas, principles, laws, classes,
+etc. There are several sub-phases of Understanding which are known to
+psychologists and logicians as: (1) Abstraction; (2) Conception or
+Generalization; (3) Judgment, and (4) Reasoning, respectively. In this
+chapter we shall consider the first of these sub-phases or steps of
+Understanding, which is known as "Abstraction."
+
+Abstraction is that faculty of the mind by which we abstract or "draw
+off," and then consider apart, the particular qualities, properties, or
+attributes of an object, and thus are able to consider _them_ as
+"things" or objects of thought. In order to form _concepts_ or general
+ideas, from our _percepts_ or particular ideas, we must consider and
+examine two common points or qualities which go to make up _differences
+and resemblances_. The special examination or consideration of these
+common points or qualities result in the exercise of Abstraction. In the
+process of Abstraction we mentally "draw away" a quality of an object
+and then consider it as a distinct object of thought. Thus in
+considering a flower we may _abstract_ its qualities of fragrance,
+color, shape, etc., and think of these as things independent of the
+flower itself from which they were derived. We think of _redness_,
+_fragrance_, etc., not only in connection with the particular flower
+but as _general qualities_. Thus the qualities of redness, sweetness,
+hardness, softness, etc., lead us to the abstract terms, _red_, _sweet_,
+_hard_, _soft_, _etc._ In the same way courage, cowardice, virtue, vice,
+love, hate, etc., are abstract terms. No one ever saw one of these
+things--they are known only in connection with objects, or else as
+"abstract terms" in the processes of Thought. They may be known as
+qualities, and expressed as predicates; or they may be considered as
+abstract things and expressed as nouns.
+
+In the general process of Abstraction we first draw off and set aside
+all the qualities which are _not common_ to the general class under
+consideration, for the concept or general idea must comprise only the
+qualities common to its class. Thus in the case of the general idea of
+horse, size and color must be abstracted as non-essentials, for horses
+are of various colors and sizes. But on the other hand, there are
+certain qualities which _are common to all horses_, and these must be
+abstracted and used in making up the concept or general idea.
+
+So, you see, in general Abstraction we form two classes: (1) the unlike
+and not-general qualities; and (2) the like or common qualities. As
+Halleck says: "In the process of Abstraction, we draw our attention away
+from a mass of confusing details, unimportant at the time, and attend
+only to qualities common to the class. Abstraction is little else than
+centering the power of attention on some qualities to the exclusion of
+others.... While we are forming concepts, we abstract or draw off
+certain qualities, either to leave them out of view or to consider them
+by themselves. Our dictionaries contain such words as purity, whiteness,
+sweetness, industry, courage, etc. No one ever touched, tasted, smelled,
+heard, or saw purity or courage. We do not, therefore, gain our
+knowledge of these through the senses. We have seen pure persons, pure
+snow, pure honey; we have breathed pure air, tasted pure coffee. From
+all these different objects we have abstracted the only like quality,
+the quality of being pure. We then say we have an idea of _purity_, and
+that idea is an abstract one. It exists only in the mind which formed
+it. No one ever saw _whiteness_. He may have seen white clouds, snow,
+cloth, blossoms, houses, paper, horses, but he never saw _whiteness_ by
+itself. He simply abstracted that quality from various white objects."
+
+In Abstraction we may either (1) abstract a quality and set it aside and
+apart from the other qualities under consideration, as being
+non-essential and not necessary; or we may (2) abstract a quality and
+hold it in the mind as essential and necessary for the concept which we
+are forming. Likewise, we may abstract (1) all the qualities of an
+object _except one_, and set them aside that we may consider the _one_
+quality by itself; or we may (2) abstract the one particular quality and
+consider it to the exclusion of all its associated qualities. In all of
+these aspects we have the same underlying process of considering a
+quality apart from its object, and apart from its associated qualities.
+The mind more commonly operates in the direction of abstracting one
+quality and viewing it apart from object and associated qualities.
+
+The importance of correct powers of Abstraction is seen when we realize
+that all concepts or general ideas are but combinations of abstract
+qualities or ideas. As Halleck says: "The difference between an
+_abstract idea_ and a _concept_ is that a concept may consist of a
+bundle of abstract ideas. If the class contains more than one common
+quality, so must the concept; it must contain as many of these
+abstracted qualities as are common to the class. The concept of the
+class _whale_ would embody a large number of such qualities." As Brooks
+says: "If we could not abstract, we could not _generalize_, for
+abstraction is a condition of generalization." The last-mentioned
+authority also cleverly states the idea as follows: "The products of
+Abstraction are _abstract ideas_, that is, ideas of qualities in the
+abstract. Such ideas are called _Abstracts_. Thus my idea of some
+particular color, or hardness, or softness, is an abstract. Abstract
+ideas have been wittily called 'the ghosts of departed qualities.' They
+may more appropriately be regarded as the spirits of which the objects
+from which they are derived are the bodies. In other words, they are,
+figuratively speaking, 'the disembodied spirits of material things.'"
+
+The cultivation of the faculty of Abstraction depends very materially,
+in the first place, upon the exercise of Attention and Perception. Mill
+holds that Abstraction is primarily a result of Attention. Others hold
+that it is merely the mental process by which the attention is directed
+exclusively to the consideration of one of several qualities,
+properties, attributes, parts, etc. Hamilton says: "Attention and
+Abstraction then are only the same process viewed in different
+relations. They are, as it were, the positive and negative poles of the
+same act." The cultivation of Attention is really a part of the process
+of the cultivation of the faculty of Abstraction. Unless the Attention
+be directed toward the object and its qualities we will be unable to
+perceive, set aside, and separately consider the abstract quality
+contained within it. In this process, as indeed in all other mental
+processes, Attention is a prerequisite. Therefore, here, as in many
+other places, we say to you: "Begin by cultivating Attention."
+
+Moreover, the cultivation of the faculty of Abstraction depends
+materially upon the cultivation of Perception. Not only must we _sense_
+the existence of the various qualities in an object, but we must also
+_perceive_ them in consciousness, just as we perceive the object itself.
+In fact, the perception of the object is merely a perception of its
+various qualities, attributes and properties, for the object itself is
+merely a composite of these abstract things, at least so far as its
+perception in consciousness is concerned. Try to think of _a horse_,
+without considering its qualities, attributes and properties, and the
+result is merely _an abstract horse_--something which belongs to the
+realm of unreality. Try to think of _a rose_ without considering its
+color, odor, shape, size, response to touch, etc., and you have simply
+_an ideal rose_ which when analyzed is seen to be a _nothing_. Take away
+the qualities, properties and attributes of anything, and you have left
+_merely a name_, or else a transcendental, idealistic, something apart
+from our world of sense knowledge. Thus it follows that in order to
+_know_ the qualities of a thing in order to classify it, or to form a
+general idea of it, we _must_ use the Perception in order to interpret
+or translate the sense-impressions we have received regarding them.
+Consequently the greater our power of Perception the greater must be
+the possibility of our power of Abstraction.
+
+Beyond the cultivation, use and exercise of the Attention and the
+Perception, there are but few practical methods for cultivating the
+faculty of Abstraction. Of course, _exercise_ of the faculty will
+develop it; and _the furnishing of material for its activities_ will
+give it the "nourishment" of which we have spoken elsewhere. Practice in
+distinguishing the various qualities, attributes and properties of
+objects will give a valuable training to the faculty.
+
+Let the student take any object and endeavor to analyze it into its
+abstract qualities, etc. Let him try to discover qualities hidden from
+first sight. Let him make a list of these qualities, and write them
+down; then try to add to the list. Two or more students engaging in a
+friendly rivalry will stimulate the efforts of each other. In children
+the exercise may be treated as a game. _Analysis of objects into their
+component qualities, attributes and qualities--the effort to extract as
+many adjectives applicable to the object_--this is the first step. The
+second step consists in _transforming these adjectives into their
+corresponding nouns_. As for instance, in a rose we perceive the
+_qualities_ which we call "redness," "fragrance," etc. We speak of the
+rose as being "red" or "fragrant"--then we think of "redness," or
+"fragrance" as abstract qualities, or things, which we express as nouns.
+Exercise and practice along these lines will tend to cultivate the
+faculty of Abstraction. By knowing qualities, we know the things
+possessing them.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX.
+
+ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS
+
+
+Having formed general ideas, or Concepts, it is important that we
+associate them with other general ideas. In order to fully _understand_
+a general idea we must know its associations and relations. The greater
+the known associations or relations of an idea, the greater is our
+degree of understanding of that idea. If we simply know many thousands
+of separated general ideas, without also knowing their associations and
+relations, we are in almost as difficult a position as if we merely knew
+thousands of individual percepts without being able to classify them in
+general concepts. It is necessary to develop the faculty of associating
+ideas into groups, according to their relations, just as we group
+particular ideas in classes. The difference, however, is that these
+group-ideas do not form classes of a genus, but depend solely upon
+associations of several kinds, as we shall see in a moment.
+
+Halleck says: "All ideas have certain definite associations with other
+ideas, and they come up in groups. There is always an association
+between our ideas, although there are cases when we cannot trace it....
+Even when we find no association between our ideas, we may be sure that
+it exists.... An idea, then, never appears in consciousness unless there
+is a definite reason why this idea should appear in preference to
+others." Brooks says: "One idea or feeling in the mind calls up some
+other idea or feeling with which it is in some way related. Our ideas
+seem, as it were, to be tied together by the invisible thread of
+association, so that as one comes out of unconsciousness, it draws
+another with it. Thoughts seem to exist somewhat in clusters like the
+grapes of a bunch, so that in bringing out one, we bring the entire
+cluster with it. The law of association is thus the tie, the thread, the
+golden link by which our thoughts are united in an act of reproduction."
+
+The majority of writers confine their consideration of Association of
+Ideas to its relation to Memory. It is true that the Laws of Association
+play an important part in Memory Culture, but Association of Ideas also
+form an important part of the general subject of Thought-Culture, and
+especially in the phase of the latter devoted to the development of the
+Understanding. The best authorities agree upon this idea and state it
+positively. Ribot says: "The most fundamental law which regulates
+psychological phenomena is the Law of Association. In its comprehensive
+character it is comparable to the law of attraction in the physical
+world." Mill says: "That which the law of gravitation is to astronomy,
+that which the elementary properties of the tissues are to physiology,
+the Law of Association of Ideas is to psychology."
+
+There are two general principles, or laws, operative in the processes of
+Association of Ideas, known as (1) Association by Contiguity; and (2)
+Association by Similarity, respectively.
+
+Association by Contiguity manifests particularly in the processes of
+memory. In its two phases of (1) Contiguity of Time; and (2) Contiguity
+of Space, respectively, it brings together before the field of
+consciousness ideas associated with each by reason of their time or
+space relations. Thus, if we remember a certain thing, we find it easy
+to remember things which occurred immediately before, or immediately
+after that particular thing. Verbal memory depends largely upon the
+contiguity of time, as for instance, our ability to repeat a poem, or
+passage from a book, if we can recall the first words thereof. Children
+often possess this form of memory to a surprising degree; and adults
+with only a limited degree of understanding may repeat freely long
+extracts from speeches they have heard, or even arbitrary jumbles of
+words. Visual memory depends largely upon contiguity of space, as for
+instance our ability to recall the details of scenes, when starting from
+a given point. In both of these forms of association by contiguity the
+mental operation is akin to that of unwinding a ball of yarn, the ideas,
+thus associated in the sequence of time or place, following each other
+into the field of consciousness. Association by Contiguity, while
+important in itself, properly belongs to the general subject of Memory,
+and as we have considered it in the volume of this series devoted to the
+last mentioned subject, we shall not speak of it further here.
+
+Association by Similarity, however, possesses a special interest to
+students of the particular subject of the culture of the Understanding.
+If we were compelled to rely upon the association of contiguity for our
+understanding of things, we would understand a thing merely in its
+relations to that which went before or came after it; or by the things
+which were near it in space--we would have to unwind the mental ball of
+time and space relations in order to bring into consciousness the
+associated relations of anything. The Association of Similarity,
+however, remedies this defect, and gives us a higher and broader
+association. Speaking of Association of Similarity, Kay says: "It is of
+the utmost importance to us in forming a judgment of things, or in
+determining upon a particular line of conduct, to be able to bring
+together before the mind a number of instances of a _similar_ kind,
+recent or long past, which may aid us in coming to a right
+determination. Thus, we may judge of the nature or quality of an
+article, and obtain light and leading in regard to any subject that may
+be before us. In this way we arrange and classify and reason by
+induction. _This is known as rational or philosophical association._"
+
+Halleck says: "An eminent philosopher has said that man is completely at
+the mercy of the association of his ideas. Every new object is seen in
+the light of its associated ideas.... It is not the business of the
+psychologist to state what power the association of ideas _ought_ to
+have. It is for him to ascertain what power it _does_ have. When we
+think of the bigotry of past ages, of the stake for the martyr and the
+stoning of witches, we can realize the force of Prof. Ziehen's
+statement: 'We cannot think as we _will_, but we _must_ think as just
+those associations which happen to be present prescribe.' While this is
+not literally true, it may serve to emphasize a deflecting factor which
+is usually underestimated."
+
+Locke says: "The connection in our minds of ideas, in themselves loose
+and independent of one another, has such an influence, and is of so
+great force, to set us awry in our actions, as well moral as natural,
+passions, reasonings, and notions themselves, that, perhaps, there is
+not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after." Stewart says:
+"The bulk of mankind, being but little accustomed to reflect and to
+generalize, associate their ideas chiefly according to their more
+obvious relations, and above all to the casual relations arising from
+contiguity in time and place; whereas, in the mind of a philosopher
+ideas are commonly associated according to those relations which are
+brought to light in consequence of particular efforts of attention, such
+as the relations of cause and effect, or of premises and conclusion.
+Hence, it must necessarily happen that when he has occasion to apply to
+use his acquired knowledge, time and reflection will be requisite to
+enable him to recollect it."
+
+This Association by Similarity, or the "rational and philosophical
+association of ideas," may be developed and cultivated by a little care
+and work. The first principle is that of _learning the true relations of
+an idea_--its various logical associations. Perhaps the easiest and best
+method is that adopted and practiced by Socrates, the old Greek
+philosopher, often called "the Socratic method"--the Method of
+Questioning. By questioning oneself, or others, regarding a thing, the
+mind of the person answering tends to unfold its stores of information,
+and to make new and true associations. Kays says: "Socrates, Plato, and
+others among the ancients and some moderns, have been masters of this
+art. The principle of asking questions and obtaining answers to them may
+be said to characterize all intellectual effort.... The great thing is
+to ask the right questions, and to obtain the right answers." Meiklejohn
+says: "This art of questioning possessed by Dr. Hodgson was something
+wonderful and unique, and was to the minds of most of his pupils a truly
+obstetric art. He told them little or nothing, but showed them how to
+find out for themselves. 'The Socratic method,' he said, 'is the true
+one, especially with the young.'"
+
+But this questioning must be done logically, and orderly, and not in a
+haphazard way. As Fitch says: "In proposing questions it is very
+necessary to keep in view the importance of arranging them in the exact
+order in which the subject would naturally develop itself in the mind of
+a logical and systematic thinker." A number of systems have been
+formulated by different writers on the subject, all of which have much
+merit. The following System of Analysis, designed for the use of
+students desiring to acquire correct associations, was given in the
+volume of this series, entitled "Memory," and is reproduced here because
+it is peculiarly adapted to the cultivation and development of the
+faculty of discovering and forming correct associations and relations
+between ideas:
+
+
+SYSTEM OF ANALYSIS
+
+When you wish to discover what you really _know_ regarding a thing, ask
+yourself the following questions about it, examining each point in
+detail, and endeavoring to bring before the mind _your full knowledge_
+regarding that particular point. Fill in the deficiencies by reading
+some good work of reference, an encyclopedia for instance; or consulting
+a good dictionary, or both:
+
+ I. Where did it come from, or originate?
+
+ II. What caused it?
+
+ III. What history or record has it?
+
+ IV. What are its attributes, qualities or characteristics?
+
+ V. What things can I most readily associate with it? What is it most
+ like?
+
+ VI. What is it good for--how may it be used--what can I do with it?
+
+ VII. What does it prove--what can be deduced from it?
+
+ VIII. What are its natural results--what happens because of it?
+
+ IX. What is its future; and its natural or probable end or finish?
+
+ X. What do I think of it, on the whole--what are my general
+ impressions regarding it?
+
+ XI. What do I know about it, in the way of general information?
+
+ XII. What have I heard about it, and from whom, and when?
+
+The following "Query Table," from the same volume, may be found useful
+in the same direction. It is simpler and less complicated than the
+system given above. It has well been called a "Magic Key of Knowledge,"
+and it opens many a mental door:
+
+QUERY TABLE
+
+Ask yourself the following questions regarding the thing under
+consideration. It will draw out many bits of information and associated
+knowledge in your mind:
+
+ I. What?
+ II. Whence?
+ III. Where?
+ IV. When?
+ V. How?
+ VI. Why?
+ VII. Whither?
+
+Remember, always, that the greater the number of associated and related
+ideas that you are able to group around a concept, the richer, fuller
+and truer does that concept become to you. The concept is a _general
+idea_, and its attributes of "generality" depend upon the associated
+facts and ideas related to it. The greater the number of the view points
+from which a concept may be examined and considered, the greater is the
+degree of knowledge concerning that concept. It is held that everything
+in the universe is related to every other thing, so that if we knew
+_all_ the associated ideas and facts concerning a thing, we would not
+only know that particular thing _absolutely_, but would, besides, know
+_everything_ in the universe. The chain of Association is infinite in
+extent.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X.
+
+GENERALIZATION
+
+
+We have seen that Sensation is translated or interpreted into
+Perception; and that from the Percepts so created we may "draw off," or
+separate, various qualities, attributes and properties by the analytical
+process we call Abstraction. Abstraction, we have seen, thus constitutes
+the first step in the process of what is called Understanding. The
+second step is called Generalization or Conception.
+
+Generalization, or Conception, is that faculty of the mind by which we
+are able to combine and group together several particular ideas into one
+general idea. Thus when we find a number of particular objects
+possessing the same general qualities, attributes or properties, we
+proceed to _classify_ them by the process of Generalization. For
+instance, in a number of animals possessing certain general and common
+qualities we form a concept of a class comprising those particular
+animals. Thus in the concept of cow, we include _all cows_--we know
+them to be cows because of their possession of certain general class
+qualities which we include in our concept of _cow_. The particular cows
+may vary greatly in size, color and general appearance, but they possess
+the common general qualities which we group together in our general
+concept of _cow_. Likewise by reason of certain common and general
+qualities we include in our concept of "Man," _all men_, black, white,
+brown, red or yellow, of all races and degrees of physical and mental
+development. From this generic concept we may make race concepts,
+dividing men into Indians, Caucasians, Malays, Negroes, Mongolians, etc.
+These concepts in turn may be divided into sub-races. These
+sub-divisions result from an analysis of the great concept. The great
+concept is built up by synthesis from the individuals, through the
+sub-divisions of minor concepts. Or, again, we may form a concept of
+"Napoleon Bonaparte" from the various qualities and characteristics
+which went to make up that celebrated man.
+
+The product of Generalization or Conception is called a _Concept_. A
+Concept is expressed in a word, or words, called "A Term." A Concept is
+more than a mere _word_--it is _a general idea_. And a Term is more than
+a mere word--it is _the expression of a general idea_.
+
+A _Concept_ is built up from the processes of Perception, Abstraction,
+Comparison and Generalization. We must first perceive; then analyze or
+abstract qualities; then compare qualities; then synthesize or classify
+according to the result of the comparison of qualities. By perceiving
+and comparing the qualities of various individual things, we notice
+their points of resemblance and difference--the points wherein they
+agree or disagree--wherein they are alike or unlike. Eliminating by
+abstraction the points in which they differ and are unlike; and, again
+by abstraction, retaining in consideration the points in which they
+resemble and are alike; we are able to group, arrange or classify these
+"_alike things_" into _a class-idea_ large enough to embrace them all.
+This class-idea is what is known as a General Idea or a Concept. This
+Concept we give a general name, which is called a Term. In grammar our
+particular ideas arising from Percepts are usually denoted by proper
+nouns--our general ideas arising from Concepts are usually denoted by
+common nouns. Thus "John Smith" (particular; proper noun) and "Man"
+(general; common noun). Or "horse" (general; common), and "Dobbin"
+(particular; proper).
+
+It will be seen readily that there must be lower and higher concepts.
+Every class contains within itself lower classes. And every class is,
+itself, but a lower class in a higher one. Thus the high concept of
+"animal" may be analyzed into "mammal," which in turn is found to
+contain "horse," which in turn may be sub-divided into special kinds of
+horses. The concept "plant" may be sub-divided many times before the
+concept "rose" is obtained, and the latter is capable of sub-division
+into varieties and sub-varieties, until at last a particular flower is
+reached. Jevons says: "We classify things together whenever we observe
+that they are like each other in any respect and, therefore, think of
+them together.... In classifying a collection of objects, we do not
+merely put together into groups those which resemble each other, but we
+also divide each class into smaller ones in which the resemblance is
+more complete. Thus the class of _white substances_ may be divided into
+those which are solid and those which are fluid, so that we get the two
+minor classes of solid-white, and fluid-white substances. It is
+desirable to have names by which to show that one class is contained in
+another and, accordingly, we call the class which is divided into two or
+more smaller ones, the _Genus_; and the smaller ones into which it is
+divided, the _Species_."
+
+Every Genus is a Species of the class next higher than itself; and every
+Species is a Genus of the classes lower than itself. Thus it would seem
+that the extension in either direction would be infinite. But, for the
+purposes of finite thought, the authorities teach that there must be a
+Highest Genus, which cannot be the Species of a higher class, and which
+is called the _Summum Genus_. The _Summum Genus_ is expressed by terms
+such as the following: "Being;" "Existence;" "The Absolute;"
+"Something;" "Thing;" "The Ultimate Reality," or some similar term
+denoting the state of being _ultimate_. Likewise, at the lowest end of
+the scale we find what are called the Lowest Species, or _Infima
+Species_. The Infima Species are always _individuals_. Thus we have the
+_individual_ at one end of the scale; and _The Absolute_ at the other.
+Beyond these limits the mind of man cannot travel.
+
+There has been much confusion in making classifications and some
+ingenious plans have been evolved for simplifying the process. That of
+Jevons is perhaps the simplest, when understood. This authority says:
+"All these difficulties are avoided in the _perfect logical method of
+dividing each Genus into two Species, and not more than two, so that one
+species possesses a particular quality, and the other does not_. Thus if
+I divide dwelling-houses into those which are made of brick and those
+which are not made of brick, I am perfectly safe and nobody can find
+fault with me.... Suppose, for instance, that I divide dwelling-houses
+as below:
+
+ Dwelling-House
+ |
+ --+------+-------+-------+-------+--
+ | | | | |
+ Brick Stone Earth Iron Wood
+
+"The evident objection will at once be made, that houses may be built of
+other materials than those here specified. In Australia, houses are
+sometimes made of the bark of gum-trees; the Esquimaux live in snow
+houses; tents may be considered as canvas houses, and it is easy to
+conceive of houses made of terra-cotta, paper, straw, etc. All logical
+difficulties will, however, be avoided _if I never make more than two
+species at each step_, in the following way:--
+
+ Dwelling-House
+ |
+ +----+----+
+ | |
+ Brick Not-Brick
+ |
+ +----+----+
+ | |
+ Stone Not-Stone
+ |
+ +----+----+
+ | |
+ Wooden Not-Wooden
+ |
+ +----+----+
+ | |
+ Iron Not-Iron
+
+"It is quite certain that I must in this division have left a place for
+every possible kind of house; for if a house is not made of brick, nor
+stone, nor wood, nor iron, it yet comes under the species at the right
+hand, which is not-iron, not-wooden, not-stone, and not-brick.... This
+manner of classifying things may seem to be inconvenient, but it is in
+reality the only logical way."
+
+The student will see that the process of Classification is two-fold. The
+first is by Analysis, in which the Genus is divided into Species by
+reason of _differences_. The second is by Synthesis, in which
+individuals are grouped into Species, and Species into the Genus, by
+reason of _resemblances_. Moreover, in building up general classes,
+which is known as Generalization, we must first _analyze_ the individual
+in order to ascertain its _qualities, attributes and properties_, and
+then _synthesize_ the individual with other individuals possessing like
+qualities, properties or attributes.
+
+Brooks says of Generalization: "The mind now takes the materials that
+have been furnished and fashioned by comparison and analysis and unites
+them into one single mental product, giving us the general notion or
+concept. The mind, as it were, brings together these several attributes
+into a bunch or package and then ties a mental string around it, as we
+would bunch a lot of roses or cigars.... Generalization is an
+_ascending_ process. The broader concept is regarded as higher than the
+narrower concept; a concept is considered as higher than percept; a
+general idea stands above a particular idea. We thus go up from
+particulars to generals; from percepts to concepts; from lower concepts
+to higher concepts. Beginning down with particular objects, we rise from
+them to the general idea of their class. Having formed a number of lower
+classes, we compare them as we did individuals and generalize them into
+higher classes. We perform the same process with these higher classes
+and thus proceed until we are at last arrested in the highest class,
+that of Being. Having reached the pinnacle of Generalization, we may
+descend the ladder by reversing the process through which we ascend."
+
+A Concept, then, is seen to be a _general idea_. It is a general thought
+that embraces _all the individuals_ of its own class and has in it all
+that is common to its own class, while it resembles _no_ particular
+individual of its class in _all_ respects. Thus, a concept of _animal_
+contains within itself the minor concepts of _all animals_ and the
+animal-quality of all animals--yet it differs from the _percept_ of any
+one particular animal and the minor concepts of minor classes of
+animals. Consequently a concept or general idea cannot be _imaged_ or
+mentally pictured. We may picture a percept of any particular thing, but
+we cannot picture a general idea or concept because the latter does not
+partake of the _particular_ qualities of any of its class, but embraces
+all the general qualities of the class. Try to picture the general idea,
+or concept, of Man. You will find that any attempt to do so will result
+in the production of merely _a man_--some particular man. If you give
+the picture dark hair, it will fail to include the light-haired men; if
+you give it white skin, it will slight the darker-skinned races. If you
+picture a stout man, the thin ones are neglected. And so on in every
+feature. It is impossible to form a correct general class picture unless
+we include every individual in it. The best we can do is to form a sort
+of _composite_ image, which at the best is in the nature of a symbol
+representative of the class--an ideal image to make easier the _idea_ of
+the general class or term.
+
+From the above we may see the fundamental differences between a Percept
+and a Concept. The Percept is the mental image of a real object--a
+particular thing. The Concept is merely a _general idea_, or general
+notion, of the common attributes of a class of objects or things. A
+Percept arises directly from sense-impressions, while a Concept is, in a
+sense, a pure thought--an abstract thing--a mental creation--an ideal.
+
+A Concrete Concept is a concept embodying the common qualities of a
+class of objects, as for instance, the concrete concept of _lion_, in
+which the general class qualities of all lions are embodied. An Abstract
+Concept is a concept embodying merely some one quality generally
+diffused, as for instance, the quality of _fierceness_ in the general
+class of lions. _Rose_ is a concrete concept; _red_, or _redness_, is an
+abstract concept. It will aid you in remembering this distinction to
+memorize Jevons' rule: "_A Concrete Term is the name of a Thing_; _an
+Abstract Term is the name of a Quality of a Thing_."
+
+A Concrete Concept, including all the particular individuals of a class,
+must also contain all the common qualities of those individuals. Thus,
+such a concept is composed of the ideas of the particular individuals
+and of their common qualities, in combination and union. From this
+arises the distinctive terms known as the _content_, _extension_ and
+_intension_ of concepts, respectively.
+
+The _content_ of a concept is _all that it includes--its full meaning_.
+The _extension_ of a concept depends upon its _quantity_ aspect--it is
+its property of including numbers of individual objects within its
+content. The _intension_ of a concept depends upon its _quality_
+aspect--it is its property of including class or common qualities,
+properties or attributes within its content.
+
+Thus, the _extension_ of the concept _horse_ covers all individual
+horses; while its _intension_ includes all qualities, attributes, and
+properties common to all horses--class qualities possessed by all horses
+in common, and which qualities, etc., make the particular animals
+_horses_, as distinguished from other animals.
+
+It follows that the larger the number of particular objects in a class,
+the smaller must be the number of general class qualities--qualities
+common to all in the class. And, that the larger the number of common
+class qualities, the smaller must be the number of individuals in the
+class. As the logicians express it, "the greater the extension, the less
+the intension; the greater the intension, the less the extension." Thus,
+_animal_ is narrow in intension, but very broad in extension; for while
+there are many animals there are but very few qualities common to _all_
+animals. And, _horse_ is narrower in extension, but broader in
+intension; for while there are comparatively few horses, the qualities
+common to all horses are greater.
+
+The cultivation of the faculty of Generalization, or Conception, of
+course, depends largely upon _exercise_ and _material_, as does the
+cultivation of every mental faculty, as we have seen. But there are
+certain rules, methods and ideas which may be used to advantage in
+developing this faculty in the direction of clear and capable work. This
+faculty is developed by all of the general processes of thought, for it
+forms an important part of all thought. But the logical processes known
+as Analysis and Synthesis give to this faculty exercise and employment
+particularly adapted to its development and cultivation. Let us briefly
+consider these processes.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+_Logical Analysis_ is the process by which we examine and unfold the
+meaning of Terms. A Term, you remember, is the verbal expression of a
+Concept. In such analysis we endeavor to unfold and discover the
+_quality-aspect_ and the _quantity-aspect_ of the content of the
+concept. We seek, thereby, to discover the particular general idea
+expressed; the number of particular individuals included therein; and
+the properties of the class or generalization. Analysis depends upon
+division and separation. Development in the process of Logical Analysis
+tends toward clearness, distinctness, and exactness in thought and
+expression. Logical Analysis has two aspects or phases, as follows: (1)
+_Division_, or the separation of a concept according to its _extension_,
+as for instance the analysis of a genus into its various species; and
+(2) _Partition_, or the separation of a concept into its component
+qualities, properties and attributes, as for instance, the analysis of
+the concept _iron_ into its several qualities of color, weight,
+hardness, malleability, tenacity, utility, etc.
+
+There are certain rules of Division which should be observed, the
+following being a simple statement of the same:
+
+I. _The division should be governed by a uniform principle._ For
+instance it would be illogical to first divide men into Caucasians,
+Mongolians, etc., and then further sub-divide them into Christians,
+Pagans, etc., for the first division would be according to the principle
+of race, and the second according to the principle of religion.
+Observing the rule of the "uniform principle" we may divide men into
+races, and sub-races, and so on, without regard to religion; and we may
+likewise divide men according to their respective religions, and then
+into minor denominations and sects, without regard to race or
+nationality. The above rule is frequently violated by careless thinkers
+and speakers.
+
+II. _The division should be complete and exhaustive._ For instance, the
+analysis of a genus should extend to every known species of it, upon the
+principle that _the genus is merely the sum of its several species_. A
+textbook illustration of a violation of this rule is given in the case
+of the concept _actions_, when divided into _good-actions_ and
+_bad-actions_, but omitting the very important species of
+_indifferent-actions_. Carelessness in observance of this rule leads to
+fallacious reasoning and cloudy thinking.
+
+III. _The division should be in logical sequence._ It is illogical to
+skip or pass over intermediate divisions, as for instance, when we
+divide _animals_ into _horses_, _trout and swallows_, omitting the
+intermediate division into _mammals_, _fish and birds_. The more perfect
+the sequence, the clearer the analysis and the thought resulting
+therefrom.
+
+IV. _The division should be exclusive._ That is, the various species
+divided from a genus, should be reciprocally exclusive--should exclude
+one another. Thus to divide _mankind_ into _male_, _men and women_,
+would be illogical, because the class _male_ includes _men_. The
+division should be either: "_male and female_;" or else: "men, women,
+boys, girls."
+
+The exercise of Division along these lines, and according to these
+rules, will tend to improve one's powers of conception and analysis.
+Any class of objects--any general concept--may be used for practice. A
+trial will show you the great powers of unfoldment contained within this
+simple process. It tends to broaden and widen one's conception of almost
+any class of objects.
+
+There are also several rules for Partition which should be observed, as
+follows:
+
+I. _The partition should be complete and exhaustive._ That is, it should
+unfold the full meaning of the term or concept, so far as is concerned
+its several general qualities, properties and attributes. But this
+applies only to the qualities, properties and attributes which are
+_common_ to the class or concept, and not to the minor qualities which
+belong solely to the various sub-divisions composing the class; nor to
+the accidental or individual qualities belonging to the separate
+individuals in any sub-class. The qualities should be _essential_ and
+not _accidental_--general, not particular. A famous violation of this
+rule was had in the case of the ancient Platonic definition of "Man" as:
+"A two-legged animal without feathers," which Diogenes rendered absurd
+by offering a plucked chicken as a "man" according to the definition.
+Clearness in thought requires the recognition of the distinction between
+the general qualities and the individual, particular or accidental
+qualities. Red-hair is an accidental quality of a particular man and not
+a general quality of the class _man_.
+
+II. _The partition should consider the qualities, properties and
+attributes_, according to the classification of logical division. That
+is, the various qualities, properties and attributes should be
+considered in the form of genus and species, as in Division. In this
+classification, the rules of Division apply.
+
+It will be seen that there is a close relationship existing between
+Partition and Definition. Definition is really a statement of the
+various qualities, attributes, and properties of a concept, either
+stated in particular or else in concepts of other and larger classes.
+There is perhaps no better exercise for the cultivation of clear thought
+and conception than Definition. In order to define, one must exercise
+his power of analysis to a considerable extent. Brooks says: "Exercises
+in logical definition are valuable in unfolding our conception. Logical
+definition, including both the genus and the specific difference, gives
+clearness, definiteness and adequacy to our conceptions. It separates a
+conception from all other conceptions by fixing upon and presenting the
+essential and distinctive property or properties of the conception
+defined. The value of exercises in logical definition is thus readily
+apparent."
+
+If the student will select some familiar term and endeavor to define it
+correctly, writing down the result, and will then compare the latter
+with the definition given in some standard dictionary, he will see a new
+light regarding logical definition. Practice in definition, conducted
+along these lines, will cultivate the powers of analysis and conception
+and will, at the same time, tend toward the acquiring of correct and
+scientific methods of thought and clear expression.
+
+Hyslop gives the following excellent Rules of Logical Definition, which
+should be followed by the student in his exercises:
+
+"I. A definition should state the essential attributes of the species
+defined.
+
+"II. A definition must not contain the name or word defined. Otherwise
+the definition is called _a circulus in definiendo_ (defining in a
+circle).
+
+"III. The definition must be exactly equivalent to the species defined.
+
+"IV. A definition should not be expressed in obscure, figurative or
+ambiguous language.
+
+"V. A definition must not be negative when it can be affirmative."
+
+_Logical Synthesis_ is the exact opposite of Logical Analysis. In the
+latter we strive to separate and take apart; in the former we strive to
+bind together and combine the particulars into the general. Beginning
+with individual things and comparing them with each other according to
+observed points of resemblance, we proceed to group them into species or
+narrow classes. These classes, or species, we then combine with similar
+ones, into a larger class or genus; and then, according to the same
+process, into broader classes as we have shown in the first part of this
+chapter.
+
+The process of Synthesis is calculated to develop and cultivate the mind
+in several directions and exercises along these lines will give a new
+habit and sense of orderly arrangement, which will be most useful to
+the student in his every-day life. Halleck says: "Whenever a person is
+comparing a specimen to see whether it may be put in the same class with
+other specimens, he is _thinking_. Comparison is an absolutely essential
+factor of thought, and classification demands comparison. The man who
+has not properly classified the myriad individual objects with which he
+has to deal, must advance like a cripple. He, only, can travel with
+seven-league boots, who has thought out the relations existing between
+these stray individuals and put them into their proper classes. In a
+minute a business man may put his hand on any one of ten thousand
+letters if they are properly classified. In the same way, the student of
+history, sociology or any other branch, can, if he studies the subjects
+aright, have all his knowledge classified and speedily available for
+use.... In this way, we may make our knowledge of the world more
+minutely exact. We cannot classify without seeing things under a new
+aspect."
+
+The study of Natural History, in any or all of its branches, will do
+much to cultivate the power of Classification. But one may practice
+classification with the objects around him in his every-day life.
+Arranging things mentally, into small classes, and these into larger,
+one will soon be able to form a logical connection between particular
+ideas and general ideas; particular objects and general classes. The
+practice of classification gives to the mind a constructive turn--a
+"building-up" tendency, which is most desirable in these days of
+construction and development. Regarding some of the pitfalls of
+classification, Jevons says:
+
+"In classifying things, we must take great care not to be misled by
+outward resemblances. Things may seem to be very much like each other
+which are not so. Whales, porpoises, seals and several other animals
+live in the sea exactly like fish; they have a similar shape and are
+usually classed among fish. People are said to go whale-fishing. Yet
+these animals are not really fish at all, but are much more like dogs
+and horses and other quadrupeds than they are like fish. They cannot
+live entirely under water and breathe the air contained in the water
+like fish, but they have to come up to the surface at intervals to take
+breath. Similarly, we must not class bats with birds because they fly
+about, although they have what would be called wings; these wings are
+not like those of birds and in truth bats are much more like rats and
+mice than they are like birds. Botanists used at one time to classify
+plants according to their size, as trees, shrubs or herbs, but we now
+know that a great tree is often more similar in its character to a tiny
+herb than it is to other great trees. A daisy has little resemblance to
+a great Scotch thistle; yet the botanist regards them as very similar.
+The lofty growing bamboo is a kind of grass, and the sugarcane also
+belongs to the same class with wheat and oats."
+
+Remember that analysis of a genus into its component species is
+accomplished by a separation according to _differences_; and species are
+built up by synthesis into a genus because of _resemblances_. The same
+is true regarding individual and species, building up in accordance to
+points of resemblance, while analysis or separation is according to
+points of difference.
+
+The use of a good dictionary will be advantageous to the student in
+developing the power of Generalization or Conception. Starting with a
+species, he may build up to higher and still higher classes by
+consulting the dictionary; likewise, starting with a large class, he may
+work down to the several species composing it. An encyclopedia, of
+course, is still better for the purpose in many cases. Remember that
+Generalization is a prime requisite for clear, logical thinking.
+Moreover, it is a great developer of Thought.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI.
+
+JUDGMENT
+
+
+We have seen that in the several mental processes which are grouped
+together under the general head of Understanding, the stage or step of
+Abstraction is first; following which is the second step or phase,
+called Generalization or Conception. The third step or phase is that
+which is called Judgment. In the exercise of the faculty of Judgment, we
+determine the agreement or disagreement between two concepts, ideas, or
+objects of thought, by comparing them one with another. From this
+process of comparison arises the Judgment, which is expressed in the
+shape of a logical Proposition. A certain form of Judgment must be used,
+however, in the actual formation of a Concept, for we must first compare
+qualities, and make a judgment thereon, in order to form a general idea.
+In this place, however, we shall confine ourselves to the consideration
+of the faculty of Judgment in the strictly logical usage of the term,
+as previously stated.
+
+We have seen that the expression of a concept is called a Term, which is
+the _name_ of the concept. In the same way when we compare two terms
+(expressions of concepts) and pass Judgment thereon, the expression of
+that Judgment is called a Proposition. In every Judgment and Proposition
+there must be two Terms or Concepts, connected by a little word "is" or
+"are," or some form of the verb "to be," in the present tense
+indicative. This connecting word is called the Copula. For instance, we
+may compare the two terms _horse_ and _animal_, as follows: "A horse is
+an animal," the word _is_ being the Copula or symbol of the
+_affirmative_ Judgment, which connects the two terms. In the same way we
+may form a _negative_ Judgment as follows: "A horse is not a cow." In a
+Proposition, _the term of which something is affirmed_ is called the
+Subject; and _the term expressing that which is affirmed of the subject_
+is called the Predicate.
+
+Besides the distinction between affirmative Judgments, or Propositions,
+there is a distinction arising from _quantity_, which separates them
+into the respective classes of _particular_ and _universal_. Thus,
+"_all_ horses are animals," is a _universal_ Judgment; while "_some_
+horses are black" is a particular Judgment. Thus all Judgments must be
+either _affirmative_ or _negative_; and also either _particular_ or
+_universal_. This gives us four possible classes of Judgments, as
+follows, and illustrated symbolically:
+
+ 1. Universal Affirmative, as "All A is B."
+
+ 2. Universal Negative, as "No A is B."
+
+ 3. Particular Affirmative, as "Some A is B."
+
+ 4. Particular Negative, as "Some A is not B."
+
+The Term or Judgment is said to be "_distributed_" (that is, extended
+universally) when it is used in its fullest sense, in which it is used
+in the sense of "each and every" of its kind or class. Thus in the
+proposition "Horses are animals" the meaning is that "_each and every_"
+horse is an animal--in this case the _subject_ is "distributed" or made
+universal. But the _predicate_ is _not_ "distributed" or made universal,
+but remains particular or restricted and implies merely "some." For the
+proposition does not mean that the class "_horses_" includes _all_
+animals. For we may say that: "_Some_ animals are _not_ horses." So you
+see we have several instances in which the "distribution" varies, both
+as regards the subject and also the predicate. The rule of logic
+applying in this case is as follows:
+
+ 1. In _universal_ propositions, the _subject_ is distributed.
+
+ 2. In _particular_ propositions, the _subject_ is _not_ distributed.
+
+ 3. In _negative_ propositions, the _predicate_ is distributed.
+
+ 4. In _affirmative_ propositions, the _predicate_ is _not_ distributed.
+
+A little time devoted to the analysis and understanding of the above
+rules will repay the student for his trouble, inasmuch as it will train
+his mind in the direction of logical distinction and judgment. The
+importance of these rules will appear later.
+
+Halleck says: "Judgment is the power revolutionizing the world. The
+revolution is slow because nature's forces are so complex, so hard to be
+reduced to their simplest forms, and so disguised and neutralized by
+the presence of other forces. The progress of the next hundred years
+will join many concepts, which now seem to have no common qualities. If
+the vast amount of energy latent in the sunbeams, in the rays of the
+stars, in the winds, in the rising and falling of the tides, is
+treasured up and applied to human purposes, it will be a fresh triumph
+for judgment. This world is rolling around in a universe of energy, of
+which judgment has as yet harnessed only the smallest appreciable
+fraction. Fortunately, judgment is ever working and silently comparing
+things that, to past ages, have seemed dissimilar; and it is constantly
+abstracting and leaving out of the field of view those qualities which
+have simply served to obscure the point at issue." Brooks says: "The
+power of judgment is of great value to its products. It is involved in
+or accompanies every act of the intellect, and thus lies at the
+foundation of all intellectual activity. It operates directly in every
+act of the understanding; and even aids the other faculties of the mind
+in completing their activities and products."
+
+The best method of cultivating the power of Judgment is the exercise of
+the faculty in the direction of making comparisons, of weighing
+differences and resemblances, and in generally training the mind along
+the lines of Logical Thinking. Another volume of this series is devoted
+to the latter subject, and should aid the student who wishes to
+cultivate the habit of logical and scientific thought. The study of
+mathematics is calculated to develop the faculty of Judgment, because it
+necessitates the use of the powers of comparison and decision. Mental
+arithmetic, especially, will tend to strengthen, and exercise this
+faculty of the mind.
+
+Geometry and Logic will give the very best exercise along these lines to
+those who care to devote the time, attention and work to the task.
+Games, such as chess, and checkers or draughts, tend to develop the
+powers of Judgment. The study of the definitions of words in a good
+dictionary will also tend to give excellent exercise along the same
+lines. The exercises given in this book for the cultivation and
+development of the several faculties, will tend to develop this
+particular faculty in a general way, for the exercise of Judgment is
+required at each step of the way, and in each exercise.
+
+Brooks says: "It should be one of the leading objects of the culture of
+young people to lead them to acquire the habit of forming judgments.
+They should not only be led to see things, but to have opinions about
+things. They should be trained to see things in their relations, and to
+put these relations into definite propositions. Their ideas of objects
+should be worked up into thoughts concerning the objects. Those methods
+of teaching are best which tend to excite a thoughtful habit of mind
+that notices the similitudes and diversities of objects, and endeavors
+to read the thoughts which they embody and of which they are the
+symbols."
+
+The exercises given at the close of the next chapter, entitled "Derived
+Judgments," will give to the mind a decided trend in the direction of
+logical judgment. We heartily recommend them to the student.
+
+The student will find that he will tend to acquire the habit of clear
+logical comparison and judgment, if he will memorize and apply in his
+thinking the following excellent _Primary Rules of Thought_, stated by
+Jevons:
+
+"I. _Law of Identity_: The same quality or thing is _always_ the same
+quality or thing, no matter how different the conditions in which it
+occurs.
+
+"II. _Law of Contradiction_: Nothing can at the same time and place
+_both_ be and not be.
+
+"III. _Law of Excluded Middle_: Everything must _either_ be, or not be;
+there is no other alternative or middle course."
+
+Jevons says of these laws: "Students are seldom able to see at first
+their full meaning and importance. All arguments may be explained when
+these self-evident laws are granted; and it is not too much to say that
+_the whole of logic will be plain to those who will constantly use these
+laws as their key_."
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII.
+
+DERIVED JUDGMENTS
+
+
+As we have seen, a Judgment is obtained by comparing two objects of
+thought according to their agreement or difference. The next higher
+step, that of logical Reasoning, consists of the comparing of two ideas
+through their relation to a third. This form of reasoning is called
+_mediate_, because it is effected through the _medium_ of the third
+idea. There is, however, a certain process of Understanding which comes
+in between this mediate reasoning on the one hand, and the formation of
+a plain judgment on the other. Some authorities treat it as a form of
+_reasoning_, calling it _Immediate Reasoning_ or Immediate Inference,
+while others treat it as a higher form of Judgment, calling it Derived
+Judgment. We shall follow the latter classification, as best adapted for
+the particular purposes of this book.
+
+The fundamental principle of Derived Judgment is that ordinary Judgments
+are often so related to each other that one Judgment may be derived
+directly and immediately from another. The two particular forms of the
+general method of Derived Judgment are known as those of (1) Opposition;
+and (2) Conversion; respectively.
+
+In order to more clearly understand the logical processes involved in
+Derived Judgment, we should acquaint ourselves with the general
+relations of Judgments, and with the symbolic letters used by logicians
+as a means of simplifying the processes of thought. Logicians denote
+each of the four classes of Judgments or Propositions by a certain
+letter, the first four vowels--A, E, I and O, being used for the
+purpose. It has been found very convenient to use these symbols in
+denoting the various forms of Propositions and Judgments. The following
+table should be memorized for this purpose:
+
+ _Universal Affirmative_, symbolized by "A."
+ _Universal Negative_, symbolized by "E."
+ _Particular Affirmative_, symbolized by "I."
+ _Particular Negative_, symbolized by "O."
+
+It will be seen that these four forms of Judgments bear certain
+relations to each other, from which arises what is called opposition.
+This may be better understood by reference to the following table called
+the Square of Opposition:
+
+ A CONTRARIES E
+ +------------------------+
+ |\ / |
+ | \ /S |
+ | C\ /E |
+ | O\ /I |
+ | N\ /R |
+ | T\ /O |
+ S| R\ /T |S
+ U| A\ /C |U
+ B| \ /I |B
+ A| \ /D |A
+ L| \ / |L
+ T| / \ |T
+ E| / D\ |E
+ R| / I\ |R
+ N| /A C\ |N
+ S| /R T\ |S
+ | /T O\ |
+ | /N R\ |
+ | /O I\ |
+ | /C E\ |
+ | / S\ |
+ |/ \ |
+ +------------------------+
+ I SUB-CONTRARIES O
+
+Thus, A and E are _contraries_; I and O are _sub-contraries_; A and I,
+and also E and O are _subalterns_; A and O, and also E and I are
+_contradictories_.
+
+The following will give a symbolic table of each of the four Judgments
+or Propositions with the logical symbols attached:
+
+(A) "All A is B."
+
+(E) "No A is B."
+
+(I) "Some A is B."
+
+(O) "Some A is not B."
+
+The following are the rules governing and expressing the relations above
+indicated:
+
+I. Of the Contradictories: _One must be true, and the other must be
+false_. As for instance, (A) "All A is B;" and (O) "Some A is not B;"
+cannot both be true at the same time. Neither can (E) "No A is B;" and
+(I) "Some A is B;" both be true at the same time. They are
+_contradictory_ by nature,--and if one is true, the other must be false;
+if one is false, the other must be true.
+
+II. Of the Contraries: _If one is true the other must be false; but,
+both may be false_. As for instance, (A) "All A is B;" and (E) "No A is
+B;" cannot both be true at the same time. If one is true the other
+_must_ be false. _But_, both may be _false_, as we may see when we find
+we may state that (I) "_Some_ A is B." So while these two propositions
+are _contrary_, they are not _contradictory_. While, if one of them is
+_true_ the other must be false, it does not follow that if one is
+_false_ the other must be _true_, for both _may be false_, leaving the
+truth to be found in a third proposition.
+
+III. Of the Subcontraries: _If one is false the other must be true; but
+both may be true_. As for instance, (I) "Some A is B;" and (O) "Some A
+is not B;" may both be true, for they do not contradict each other. But
+one or the other must be true--they can not both be false.
+
+IV. Of the Subalterns: _If the Universal (A or E) be true the Particular
+(I or O) must be true_. As for instance, if (A) "All A is B" is true,
+then (I) "Some A is B" must also be true; also, if (E) "No A is B" is
+true, then "Some A is not B" must also be true. The Universal carries
+the particular within its truth and meaning. But; _If the Universal is
+false, the particular may be true or it may be false_. As for instance
+(A) "All A is B" may be false, and yet (I) "Some A is B" may be either
+true or false, without being determined by the (A) proposition. And,
+likewise, (E) "No A is B" may be false without determining the truth or
+falsity of (O) "Some A is not B."
+
+But: _If the Particular be false, the Universal also must be false_. As
+for instance, if (I) "Some A is B" is false, then it must follow that
+(A) "All A is B" must also be false; or if (O) "Some A is not B" is
+false, then (E) "No A is B" must also be false. But: _The Particular may
+be true, without rendering the Universal true_. As for instance: (I)
+"_Some_ A is B" may be true without making true (A) "_All_ A is B;" or
+(O) "Some A is not B" may be true without making true (E) "No A is B."
+
+The above rules may be worked out not only with the symbols, as "All A
+is B," but also with _any_ Judgments or Propositions, such as "All
+horses are animals;" "All men are mortal;" "Some men are artists;" etc.
+The principle involved is identical in each and every case. The "All A
+is B" symbology is merely adopted for simplicity, and for the purpose of
+rendering the logical process akin to that of mathematics. The letters
+play the same part that the numerals or figures do in arithmetic or the
+_a_, _b_, _c_; _x_, _y_, _z_, in algebra. Thinking in symbols tends
+toward clearness of thought and reasoning.
+
+_Exercise_: Let the student apply the principles of Opposition by using
+any of the above judgments mentioned in the preceding paragraph, in the
+direction of erecting a Square of Opposition of them, after having
+attached the symbolic letters A, E, I and O, to the appropriate forms of
+the propositions.
+
+Then let him work out the following problems from the Tables and Square
+given in this chapter.
+
+1. If "A" is true; show what follows for E, I and O. Also what follows
+if "A" be _false_.
+
+2. If "E" is true; show what follows for A, I and O. Also what follows
+if "E" be _false_.
+
+3. If "I" is true; show what follows for A, E and O. Also what follows
+if "I" be _false_.
+
+4. If "O" is true; show what follows for A, E and I. Also what happens
+if "O" be _false_.
+
+
+CONVERSION OF JUDGMENTS
+
+Judgments are capable of the process of Conversion, or _the change of
+place of subject and predicate_. Hyslop says: "Conversion is the
+transposition of subject and predicate, or the process of immediate
+inference by which we can infer from a given preposition another having
+the predicate of the original for its subject, and the subject of the
+original for its predicate." The process of converting a proposition
+seems simple at first thought but a little consideration will show that
+there are many difficulties in the way. For instance, while it is a true
+judgment that "All _horses_ are _animals_," it is not a correct Derived
+Judgment or Inference that "All _animals_ are _horses_." The same is
+true of the possible conversion of the judgment "All biscuit is bread"
+into that of "All bread is biscuit." There are certain rules to be
+observed in Conversion, as we shall see in a moment.
+
+The Subject of a judgment is, of course, _the term of which something is
+affirmed_; and the Predicate is _the term expressing that which is
+affirmed of the Subject_. The Predicate is really an expression of an
+_attribute_ of the Subject. Thus when we say "All horses are animals" we
+express the idea that _all horses_ possess the _attribute_ of
+"animality;" or when we say that "Some men are artists," we express the
+idea that _some men_ possess the _attributes_ or qualities included in
+the concept "artist." In Conversion, the original judgment is called the
+Convertend; and the new form of judgment, resulting from the conversion,
+is called the Converse. Remember these terms, please.
+
+The two Rules of Conversion, stated in simple form, are as follows:
+
+I. Do not change the quality of a judgment. The quality of the converse
+must remain the same as that of the convertend.
+
+II. Do not distribute an undistributed term. No term must be distributed
+in the converse which is not distributed in the convertend.
+
+The reason of these rules is that it would be contrary to truth and
+logic to give to a converted judgment a higher degree of quality and
+quantity than is found in the original judgment. To do so would be to
+attempt to make "twice 2" more than "2 plus 2."
+
+There are three methods or kinds of Conversion, as follows: (1) Simple
+Conversion; (2) Limited Conversion; and (3) Conversion by
+Contraposition.
+
+_In Simple Conversion_, there is no change in either quality or
+quantity. For instance, by Simple Conversion we may convert a
+proposition by changing the places of its subject and predicate,
+respectively. But as Jevons says: "It does not follow that the new one
+will always be true if the old one was true. Sometimes this is the
+case, and sometimes it is not. If I say, 'some churches are
+wooden-buildings,' I may turn it around and get 'some wooden-buildings
+are churches;' the meaning is exactly the same as before. This kind of
+change is called Simple Conversion, because we need do nothing but
+simply change the subjects and predicates in order to get a new
+proposition. We see that the Particular Affirmative proposition can be
+simply converted. Such is the case also with the Universal Negative
+proposition. 'No large flowers are green things' may be converted simply
+into 'no green things are large flowers.'"
+
+_In Limited Conversion_, the quantity is changed from Universal to
+Particular. Of this, Jevons continues: "But it is a more troublesome
+matter, however, to convert a Universal Affirmative proposition. The
+statement that 'all jelly fish are animals,' is true; but, if we convert
+it, getting 'all animals are jelly fish,' the result is absurd. This is
+because the predicate of a universal proposition is really particular.
+We do not mean that jelly fish are 'all' the animals which exist, but
+only 'some' of the animals. The proposition ought really to be 'all
+jelly fish are _some_ animals,' and if we converted this simply, we
+should get, 'some animals are all jelly fish.' But we almost always
+leave out the little adjectives _some_ and _all_ when they would occur
+in the predicate, so that the proposition, when converted, becomes
+'_some_ animals are jelly fish.' This kind of change is called Limited
+Conversion, and we see that a Universal Affirmative proposition, when so
+converted, gives a Particular Affirmative one."
+
+In Conversion by Contraposition, there is a change in the position of
+the negative copula, which shifts the expression of the quality. As for
+instance, in the Particular Negative "Some animals are not horses," we
+cannot say "Some horses are not animals," for that would be a violation
+of the rule that "no term must be distributed in the converse which is
+not distributed in the convertend," for as we have seen in the preceding
+chapter: "In Particular propositions the _subject_ is _not_
+distributed." And in the original proposition, or convertend, "animals"
+is the _subject_ of a Particular proposition. Avoiding this, and
+proceeding by Conversion by Contraposition, we convert the Convertend
+(O) into a Particular Affirmative (I), saying: "Some animals are
+not-horses;" or "Some animals are things not horses;" and then
+proceeding by Simple Conversion we get the converse, "Some things not
+horses are animals," or "Some not-horses are animals."
+
+The following gives the application of the appropriate form of
+Conversion to each of the several four kind of Judgments or
+Propositions:
+
+(A) _Universal Affirmative_: This form of proposition is converted by
+Limited Conversion. The predicate not being distributed in the
+convertend, it cannot be distributed in the converse, by saying "all."
+("In affirmative propositions the _predicate_ is _not_ distributed.")
+Thus by this form of Conversion, we convert "All horses are animals"
+into "Some animals are horses." The Universal Affirmative (A) is
+converted by limitation into a Particular Affirmative (I).
+
+(E) _Universal Negative_: This form of proposition is converted by
+Simple Conversion. In a Universal Negative _both terms are distributed_.
+("In universal propositions, the _subject_ is distributed;" "In
+negative propositions, the _predicate_ is distributed.") So we may say
+"No cows are horses," and then convert the proposition into "No horses
+are cows." We simply convert one Universal Negative (E) into another
+Universal Negative (E).
+
+(I) _Particular Affirmative_: This form of proposition is converted by
+Simple Conversion. For _neither term is distributed_ in a Particular
+Affirmative. ("In particular propositions, the _subject_ is _not_
+distributed. In affirmative propositions, the _predicate_ is _not_
+distributed.") And neither term being distributed in the convertend, it
+must not be distributed in the converse. So from "Some horses are males"
+we may by Simple Conversion derive "Some males are horses." We simply
+convert one Particular Affirmative (I), into another Particular
+Affirmative (I).
+
+(O) _Particular Negative_: This form of proposition is converted by
+Contraposition or Negation. We have given examples and illustrations in
+the paragraph describing Conversion by Contraposition. The Particular
+Negative (I) is converted by contraposition into a Particular
+Affirmative (I) which is then simply converted into another Particular
+Affirmative (I).
+
+There are several minor processes or methods of deriving judgments from
+each other, or of making immediate inferences, but the above will give
+the student a very fair idea of the minor or more complete methods.
+
+_Exercise_: The following will give the student good practice and
+exercise in the methods of Conversion. It affords a valuable mental
+drill, and tends to develop the logical faculties, particularly that of
+Judgment. The student should _convert_ the following propositions,
+according to the rules and examples given in this chapter:
+
+ 1. All men are reasoning beings.
+ 2. Some men are blacksmiths.
+ 3. No men are quadrupeds.
+ 4. Some birds are sparrows.
+ 5. Some horses are vicious.
+ 6. No brute is rational.
+ 7. Some men are not sane.
+ 8. All biscuit is bread.
+ 9. Some bread is biscuit.
+ 10. Not all bread is biscuit.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII.
+
+REASONING
+
+
+In the preceding chapters we have seen that in the group of mental
+processes involved in the general process of Understanding, there are
+several stages or steps, three of which we have considered in turn,
+namely: (1) Abstraction; (2) Generalization or Conception; (3) Judgment.
+The _fourth_ step, or stage, and the one which we are now about to
+consider, is that called Reasoning.
+
+_Reasoning_ is that faculty of the mind whereby we compare two
+Judgments, one with the other, and from which comparison we are enabled
+to form a third judgment. It is a form of indirect or mediate
+comparison, whereas, the ordinary Judgment is a form of immediate or
+direct comparison. As, when we form a Judgment, we compare two concepts
+and decide upon their agreement or difference; so in Reasoning we
+compare two Judgments and from the comparison we draw or produce a new
+Judgment. Thus, we may reason that the particular dog "Carlo" is an
+animal, by the following process:
+
+(1) _All_ dogs are animals; (2) Carlo is a dog; therefore, (3) Carlo is
+an animal. Or, in the same way, we may reason that a whale is not a
+fish, as follows:
+
+(1) _All_ fish are cold-blooded animals; (2) A whale is _not_ a
+cold-blooded animal; therefore, (3) A whale is _not_ a fish.
+
+In the above processes it will be seen that the third and final Judgment
+is derived from a comparison of the first two Judgments. Brooks states
+the process as follows: "Looking at the process more closely, it will be
+seen that in inference in Reasoning involves a comparison of relations.
+We infer the relation of two objects from their relation to a third
+object. We must thus grasp in the mind two relations and from the
+comparison of these two relations we infer a third relation. The two
+relations from which we infer a third, are judgments; hence, Reasoning
+may also be defined as the process of deriving one judgment from two
+other judgments. We compare the two given judgments and from this
+comparison derive the third judgment. This constitutes a single step in
+Reasoning, and an argument so expressed is called a _Syllogism_."
+
+The _Syllogism_ consists of three propositions, the first two of which
+express the grounds or basis of the argument and are called the
+_premises_; the third expresses the inference derived from a comparison
+of the other two and is called the _conclusion_. We shall not enter into
+a technical consideration of the Syllogism in this book, as the subject
+is considered in detail in the volume of this series devoted to the
+subject of "Logic." Our concern here is to point out the natural process
+and course of Reasoning, rather than to consider the technical features
+of the process.
+
+Reasoning is divided into two general classes, known respectively as (1)
+_Inductive Reasoning_; (2) _Deductive Reasoning_.
+
+_Inductive Reasoning_ is the process of arriving at a general truth, law
+or principle from a consideration of many particular facts and truths.
+Thus, if we find that a certain thing is true of a great number of
+particular objects, we may infer that the same thing is true of _all_
+objects of this particular kind. In one of the examples given above, one
+of the judgments was that "all fish are cold-blooded animals," which
+general truth was arrived at by Inductive Reasoning based upon the
+examination of a great number of fish, and from thence assuming that
+_all_ fish are true to this general law of truth.
+
+_Deductive Reasoning_ is the reverse of Inductive Reasoning, and is a
+process of arriving at a particular truth from the assumption of a
+general truth. Thus, from the assumption that "all fish are cold-blooded
+animals," we, by Deductive Reasoning, arrive at the conclusion that the
+particular fish before us must be cold-blooded.
+
+Inductive Reasoning proceeds upon the basic principle that "_What is
+true of the many is true of the whole_," while Deductive Reasoning
+proceeds upon the basic principle that "_What is true of the whole is
+true of its parts_."
+
+Regarding the principle of _Inductive Reasoning_, Halleck says: "Man has
+to find out through his own experience, or that of others, the major
+premises from which he argues or draws his conclusions. By induction, we
+examine what seems to us a sufficient number of individual cases. We
+then conclude that the rest of these cases, which we have not examined,
+will obey the same general law. The judgment 'All men are mortal' was
+reached by induction. It was observed that all past generations of men
+had died, and this fact warranted the conclusion that all men living
+will die. We make that assertion as boldly as if we had seen them all
+die. The premise, 'All cows chew the cud,' was laid down after a certain
+number of cows had been examined. If we were to see a cow twenty years
+hence, we should expect to find that she chewed the cud. It was noticed
+by astronomers that, after a certain number of days, the earth regularly
+returned to the same position in its orbit, the sun rose in the same
+place, and the day was of the same length. Hence, the length of the year
+and of each succeeding day was determined, and the almanac maker now
+infers that the same will be true of future years. He tells us that the
+sun on the first of next December will rise at a given time, although he
+cannot throw himself into the future to verify the conclusion."
+
+Brooks says regarding this principle: "This proposition is founded on
+our faith in the uniformity of nature; take away this belief, and all
+reasoning by induction fails. The basis of induction is thus often
+stated to be _man's faith in the uniformity of nature_. Induction has
+been compared to a ladder upon which we ascend from facts to laws. This
+ladder cannot stand unless it has something to rest upon; and this
+something is our faith in the constancy of nature's laws."
+
+There are two general ways of obtaining our basis for the process of
+Inductive Reasoning. One of these is called Perfect Induction and the
+other Imperfect Induction. Perfect Induction is possible only when we
+have had the opportunity of examining every particular object or thing
+of which the general idea is expressed. For instance, if we could
+examine every fish in the universe we would have the basis of Perfect
+Induction for asserting the general truth that "all fishes are
+cold-blooded." But this is practically impossible in the great majority
+of cases, and so we must fall back upon more or less Imperfect
+Induction. We must assume the general law from the fact that it is seen
+to exist in a very great number of particular cases; upon the principle
+that "What is true of the many is true of the whole." As Halleck says
+regarding this: "Whenever we make a statement such as, 'All men are
+mortal,' without having tested each individual case or, in other words,
+without having seen every man die, we are reasoning from _imperfect_
+induction. Every time a man buys a piece of beef, a bushel of potatoes
+or a loaf of bread, he is basing his action on inference from imperfect
+induction. He believes that beef, potatoes and bread will prove
+nutritious food, although he has not actually tested those special
+edibles before purchasing them. They have hitherto been found to be
+nutritious on trial and he argues that the same will prove true of those
+special instances. Whenever a man takes stock in a new national bank, a
+manufactory or a bridge, he is arguing from past cases that this special
+investment will prove profitable. We instinctively believe in the
+uniformity of nature; if we did not we should not consult our almanacs.
+If sufficient heat will cause phosphorus to burn today, we conclude that
+the same result will follow tomorrow if the circumstances are the
+same."
+
+But, it will be seen, much care must be exercised in making
+observations, experiments and comparisons, and in making
+generalizations. The following general principles will give the views of
+the authorities regarding this:
+
+Atwater gives the two general rules:
+
+_Rule of Agreement_: "If, whenever a given object or agency is present,
+without counteracting forces, a given effect is produced, there is a
+strong evidence that the object or agency is the cause of the effect."
+
+_Rule of Disagreement_: "If when the supposed cause is present the
+effect is present, and when the supposed cause is absent the effect is
+wanting, there being in neither case any other agents present to effect
+the result, we may reasonably infer that the supposed cause is the real
+one."
+
+_Rule of Residue_: "When in any phenomena we find a result remaining
+after the effects of all known causes are estimated, we may attribute it
+to a residual agent not yet reckoned."
+
+_Rule of Concomitant Variations_: "When a variation in a given
+antecedent is accompanied by a variation of a given consequent, they
+are in some manner related as cause and effect."
+
+Atwater says, of the above rules, that "whenever either of these
+criteria is found, free from conflicting evidence, and especially when
+several of them concur, the evidence is clear that the cases observed
+are fair representatives of the whole class, and warrant a valid
+universal inductive conclusion."
+
+We now come to what is known as Hypothesis or Theory, which is an
+assumed general principle--a conjecture or supposition founded upon
+observed and tested facts. Some authorities use the term "theory" in the
+sense of "a verified hypothesis," but the two terms are employed loosely
+and the usage varies with different authorities. What is known as "the
+probability of a hypothesis" is the proportion of the number of facts it
+will explain. The greater the number of facts it will explain, the
+greater is its "probability." A Hypothesis is said to be "verified" when
+it will account for all the facts which are properly to be referred to
+it. Some very critical authorities hold that verification should also
+depend upon there being no other possible hypotheses which will account
+for the facts, but this is generally considered an extreme position.
+
+A Hypothesis is the result of a peculiar mental process which seems to
+act in the direction of making a sudden anticipatory leap toward a
+theory, after the mind has been saturated with a great body of
+particular facts. Some have spoken of the process as almost _intuitive_
+and, indeed, the testimony of many discoverers of great natural laws
+would lead us to believe that the Subconscious region of the mind is
+most active in making what La Place has called "the great guess" of
+discovery of principle. As Brooks says: "The forming of hypotheses
+requires a suggestive mind, a lively fancy, a philosophic imagination,
+that catches a glimpse of the idea through the form, or sees the law
+standing behind the fact."
+
+Thomson says: "The system of anatomy which has immortalized the name of
+Oken, is the consequence of a flash of anticipation which glanced
+through his mind when he picked up in a chance walk the skull of a deer,
+bleached and disintegrated by the weather, and exclaimed, after a
+glance, 'It is part of a vertebral column.' When Newton saw the apple
+fall, the anticipatory question flashed through his mind, 'Why do not
+the heavenly bodies fall like this apple?' In neither case had accident
+any important share; Newton and Oken were prepared by the deepest
+previous study to seize upon the unimportant fact offered to them, and
+show how important it might become; and if the apple and the deer-skull
+had been wanting, some other falling body, or some other skull, would
+have touched the string so ready to vibrate. But in each case there was
+a great step of anticipation; Oken thought he saw the type of the whole
+skeleton in a single vertebra, whilst Newton conceived at once that the
+whole universe was full of bodies tending to fall."
+
+Passing from the consideration of Inductive Reasoning to that of
+Deductive Reasoning we find ourselves confronted with an entirely
+opposite condition. As Brooks says: "The two methods of reasoning are
+the reverse of each other. One goes from particulars to generals; the
+other from generals to particulars. One is a process of analysis; the
+other is a process of synthesis. One rises from facts to laws; the
+other descends from laws to facts. Each is independent of the other; and
+each is a valid and essential method of inference."
+
+_Deductive Reasoning_ is, as we have seen, dependent upon the process of
+deriving a particular truth from a general law, principle or truth, upon
+the fundamental axiom that: "What is true of the whole is true of its
+parts." It is an analytical process, just as Inductive Reasoning is
+synthetical. It is a descending process, just as Inductive Reasoning is
+ascending.
+
+Halleck says of Deductive Reasoning: "After induction has classified
+certain phenomena and thus given us a major premise, we proceed
+deductively to apply the inference to any new specimen that can be shown
+to belong to that class. Induction hands over to deduction a ready-made
+major premise, _e.g._ '_All scorpions are dangerous_.' Deduction takes
+this as a fact, making no inquiry about its truth. When a new object is
+presented, say a possible scorpion, the only troublesome step is to
+decide whether the object is really a scorpion. This may be a severe
+task on judgment. The average inhabitant of the temperate zone would
+probably not care to risk a hundred dollars on his ability to
+distinguish a scorpion from a centipede, or from twenty or thirty other
+creatures bearing some resemblance to a scorpion. Here there must be
+accurately formed concepts and sound judgment must be used in comparing
+them. As soon as we decide that the object is really a scorpion, we
+complete the deduction in this way:--'_All scorpions are dangerous_;
+_this creature is a scorpion_; _this creature is dangerous_.' The
+reasoning of early life must be necessarily inductive. The mind is then
+forming general conclusions from the examination of individual
+phenomena. Only after general laws have been laid down, after objects
+have been classified, after major premises have been formed, can
+deduction be employed."
+
+What is called _Reasoning by Analogy_ is really but a higher degree of
+Generalization. It is based upon the idea that if two or more things
+resemble each other in many particulars, they are apt to resemble each
+other in other particulars. Some have expressed the principle as
+follows: "Things that have some things in common have other things in
+common." Or as Jevons states it: "The rule for reasoning by analogy is
+that if two or more things resemble each other in many points, they will
+probably resemble each other also in more points."
+
+This form of reasoning, while quite common and quite convenient, is also
+very dangerous. It affords many opportunities for making false
+inferences. As Jevons says: "In many cases Reasoning by Analogy is found
+to be a very uncertain guide. In some cases unfortunate mistakes are
+committed. Children are sometimes killed by gathering and eating
+poisonous berries, wrongly inferring that they can be eaten, because
+other berries, of a somewhat similar appearance, have been found
+agreeable and harmless. Poisonous toadstools are occasionally mistaken
+for mushrooms, especially by people not accustomed to gather them....
+There is no way in which we can really assure ourselves that we are
+arguing safely by analogy. The only rule that can be given is this,
+_that the more things resemble each other, the more likely is it that
+they are the same in other respects, especially in points closely
+connected with those observed_."
+
+Halleck says: "In argument or reasoning we are much aided by the habit
+of searching for hidden resemblances. We may here use the term _analogy_
+in the narrower sense as a resemblance of ratios. There is analogical
+relation between autumnal frosts and vegetation on the one hand, and
+death and human life on the other. Frosts stand in the same relation to
+vegetation that death does to life. The detection of such a relation
+cultivates thought. If we are to succeed in argument, we must develop
+what some call a sixth sense for the detection of such relations....
+Many false analogies are manufactured and it is excellent thought
+training to expose them. The majority of people think so little that
+they swallow false analogies just as newly-fledged robins swallow small
+stones dropped into their open mouths.... The study of poetry may be
+made very serviceable in detecting analogies and cultivating the
+reasoning powers. When the poet brings clearly to mind the change due to
+death, using as an illustration the caterpillar body transformed into
+the butterfly spirit, moving with winged ease over flowing meadows, he
+is cultivating our apprehension of relations, none the less valuable
+because they are beautiful."
+
+There are certain studies which tend to develop the power or faculty of
+_Inductive Reasoning_. Any study which leads the mind to consider
+classification and general principles, laws or truth, will tend to
+develop the faculty of deduction. Physics, Chemistry, Astronomy, Biology
+and Natural History are particularly adapted to develop the mind in this
+particular direction. Moreover, the mind should be directed to an
+inquiry into the _causes_ of _things_. Facts and phenomena should be
+observed and an attempt should be made not only to classify them, but
+also to discover general principles moving them. Tentative or
+provisional hypotheses should be erected and then the facts re-examined
+in order to see whether they support the hypotheses or theory. Study of
+the processes whereby the great scientific theories were erected, and
+the proofs then adduced in support of them, will give the mind the habit
+of thinking along the lines of logical induction. The question ever in
+the mind in Inductive Reasoning is "_Why?_" The dominant idea in
+Inductive Reasoning is the Search for Causes.
+
+ * * * * *
+
+In regard to the pitfalls of Inductive Reasoning--the fallacies,
+so-called, Hyslop says: "It is not easy to indicate the inductive
+fallacies, if it be even possible, in the formal process of
+induction.... It is certain, however, that in respect to the
+subject-matter of the conclusion in inductive reasoning there are some
+very definite limitations upon the right to transcend the premises. We
+cannot infer anything we please from any premises we please. We must
+conform to certain definite rules or principles. Any violation of them
+will be a fallacy. These rules are the same as those for material
+fallacies in deduction, so that the fallacies of induction, whether they
+are ever formal or not, are at least material; that is they occur
+whenever equivocation and presumption are committed. There are, then,
+two simple rules which should not be violated. (1) The subject-matter in
+the conclusion should be of the same general kind as in the premises.
+(2) The facts constituting the premises must be accepted and must not
+be fictitious."
+
+One may develop his faculty or power of _Deductive Reasoning_ by
+pursuing certain lines of study. The study of Mathematics, particularly
+in its branch of Mental Arithmetic is especially valuable in this
+direction. Algebra and Geometry have long been known to exercise an
+influence over the mind which gives to it a logical trend and cast. The
+processes involved in Geometry are akin to those employed in Logical
+reasoning, and must necessarily train the mind in this special
+direction. As Brooks says: "So valuable is geometry as a discipline that
+many lawyers and others review their geometry every year in order to
+keep the mind drilled to logical habits of thinking." The study of
+Grammar, Rhetoric and the Languages, are also valuable in the culture
+and development of the faculty of Deductive Reasoning. The study of
+Psychology and Philosophy have value in this connection. The study of
+Law is very valuable in creating logical habits of thinking deductively.
+
+But in the study of Logic we have possibly the best exercise in the
+development and culture of this particular faculty. As Brooks well
+says: "The study of Logic will aid in the development of the power of
+deductive reasoning. It does this first by showing the method by which
+we reason. To know how we reason, to see the laws which govern the
+reasoning process, to analyze the syllogism and see its conformity to
+the laws of thought, is not only an exercise of reasoning, but gives
+that knowledge of the process that will be both a stimulus and a guide
+to thought. No one can trace the principles and processes of thought
+without receiving thereby an impetus to thought. In the second place,
+the study of logic is probably even more valuable because it gives
+practice in deductive thinking. This, perhaps, is its principal value,
+since _the mind reasons instinctively without knowing how it reasons_.
+One can think without the knowledge of the science of thinking, just as
+one can use language correctly without a knowledge of grammar; yet as
+the study of grammar improves one's speech, so the study of logic cannot
+but improve one's thought."
+
+The study of the common _fallacies_, such as "Begging the Question,"
+"Reasoning in a Circle," etc., is particularly important to the
+student, for when one realizes that such fallacies exist, and is able to
+detect and recognize them, he will avoid their use in framing his own
+arguments, and will be able to expose them when they appear in the
+arguments of others.
+
+The fallacy of "Begging the Question" consists in assuming as a proven
+fact something that has not been proven, or is not accepted as proven by
+the other party to the argument. It is a common trick in debate. The
+fact assumed may be either the particular point to be proved, or the
+premise necessary to prove it. Hyslop gives the following illustration
+of this fallacy: "_Good institutions should be united_; Church and State
+are good institutions; therefore, Church and State should be united."
+The above syllogism seems reasonable at first thought, but analysis will
+show that the major premise "Good institutions should be united" is a
+mere assumption without proof. Destroy this premise and the whole
+reasoning fails.
+
+Another form of fallacy, quite common, is that called "Reasoning in a
+Circle," which consists in assuming as proof of a proposition the
+proposition itself, as for instance, "This man is a rascal, _because he
+is a rogue_; he is a rogue, _because he is a rascal_." "We see through
+glass, _because it is transparent_." "The child is dumb, _because it has
+lost the power of speech_." "He is untruthful, _because he is a liar_."
+"The weather is warm, _because it is summer_; it is summer, _because the
+weather is warm_."
+
+These and other fallacies may be detected by a knowledge of Logic, and
+the perception and detection of them strengthens one in his faculty of
+Deductive Reasoning. The study of the Laws of the Syllogism, in Logic,
+will give to one a certain habitual sense of stating the terms of his
+argument according to these laws, which when acquired will be a long
+step in the direction of logical thinking, and the culture of the
+faculties of deductive reasoning.
+
+In concluding this chapter, we wish to call your attention to a fact
+often overlooked by the majority of people. Halleck well expresses it as
+follows: "Belief is a mental state which might as well be classed under
+_emotion_ as under thinking, for it combines both elements. Belief is a
+part inference from the known to the unknown, and part feeling and
+emotion." Others have gone so far as to say that the majority of people
+employ their intellects merely to _prove_ to themselves and others that
+which they _feel to be true_, or _wish to be true_, rather than to
+ascertain what is _actually true_ by logical methods. Others have said
+that "men do not require _arguments_ to convince them; they want only
+_excuses_ to justify them in their feelings, desires or actions."
+Cynical though this may seem, there is sufficient truth in it to warn
+one to guard against the tendency.
+
+Jevons says, regarding the question of the culture of logical processes
+of thought: "Monsieur Jourdain, an amusing person in one of Moliere's
+plays, expressed much surprise on learning that he had been talking
+prose for more than forty years without knowing it. Ninety-nine people
+out of a hundred might be equally surprised on hearing that they had
+long been converting propositions, syllogizing, falling into
+paralogisms, framing hypotheses and making classifications with genera
+and species. If asked if they were logicians, they would probably
+answer, No. They would be partly right; for I believe that a large
+number even of educated persons have no clear idea of what logic is.
+Yet, in a certain way, every one must have been a logician since he
+began to speak. It may be asked:--If we cannot help being logicians, why
+do we need logic books at all? The answer is that there are logicians,
+and _logicians_. All persons are logicians in some manner or degree; but
+unfortunately many people are bad ones and suffer harm in consequence.
+It is just the same in other matters. Even if we do not know the meaning
+of the name, we are all _athletes_ in some manner or degree. No one can
+climb a tree or get over a gate without being more or less an athlete.
+Nevertheless, he who wishes to do these actions really well, to have a
+strong muscular frame and thereby to secure good health and personal
+safety, as far as possible, should learn athletic exercises."
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV.
+
+CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION
+
+
+From the standpoint of the old psychology, a chapter bearing the above
+title would be considered quite out of place in a book on
+Thought-Culture, the Imagination being considered as outside the realm
+of practical psychology, and as belonging entirely to the idealistic
+phase of mental activities. The popular idea concerning the Imagination
+also is opposed to the "practical" side of its use. In the public mind
+the Imagination is regarded as something connected with idle dreaming
+and fanciful mental imaging. Imagination is considered as almost
+synonomous with "Fancy."
+
+But the New Psychology sees beyond this negative phase of the
+Imagination and recognizes the positive side which is essentially
+constructive when backed up with a determined will. It recognizes that
+while the Imagination is by its very nature _idealistic_, yet these
+ideals may be made real--these subjective pictures may be materialized
+objectively. The positive phase of the Imagination manifests in
+planning, designing, projecting, mapping out, and in general in erecting
+the mental framework which is afterward clothed with the material
+structure of actual accomplishment. And, accordingly, it has seemed to
+us that a chapter on "Constructive Imagination" might well conclude this
+book on Thought-Culture.
+
+Halleck says: "It was once thought that the imagination should be
+repressed, not cultivated, that it was in the human mind like weeds in a
+garden.... In this age there is no mental power that stands more in need
+of cultivation than the imagination. So practical are its results that a
+man without it cannot possibly be a good plumber. He must image short
+cuts for placing his pipe. The image of the direction to take to elude
+an obstacle must precede the actual laying of the pipe. If he fixes it
+before traversing the way with his imagination, he frequently gets into
+trouble and has to tear down his work. Some one has said that the more
+imagination a blacksmith has, the better will he shoe a horse. Every
+time he strikes the red-hot iron, he makes it approximate to the image
+in his mind. Nor is this image a literal copy of the horse's foot. If
+there is a depression in that, the imagination must build out a
+corresponding elevation in the image, and the blows must make the iron
+fit the image."
+
+Brodie says: "Physical investigation, more than anything else, helps to
+teach us the actual value and right use of the imagination--of that
+wondrous faculty, which, when left to ramble uncontrolled, leads us
+astray into a wilderness of perplexities and errors, a land of mists and
+shadows; but which, properly controlled by experience and reflection,
+becomes the noblest attribute of man, the source of poetic genius, the
+instrument of discovery in science, without the aid of which Newton
+would never have invented fluxions nor Davy have decomposed the earths
+and alkalies, nor would Columbus have found another continent."
+
+The Imagination is more than Memory, for the latter merely reproduces
+the impressions made upon it, while the Imagination gathers up the
+material of impression and weaves new fabrics from them or builds new
+structures from their separated units. As Tyndall well said:
+"Philosophers may be right in affirming that we cannot transcend
+experience; but we can at all events carry it a long way from its
+origin. We can also magnify, diminish, qualify and combine experiences,
+so as to render them fit for purposes entirely new. We are gifted with
+the power of imagination and by this power we can lighten the darkness
+which surrounds the world of the senses. There are tories, even in
+science, who regard imagination as a faculty to be feared and avoided
+rather than employed. But bounded and conditioned by cooperant reason,
+imagination becomes the mightiest instrument of the physical discoverer.
+Newton's passage from a falling apple to a falling moon was, at the
+outset, a leap of the imagination."
+
+Brooks says: "The imagination is a creative as well as a combining
+power.... The Imagination can combine objects of sense into new forms,
+but it can do more than this. The objects of sense are, in most cases,
+merely the materials with which it works. The imagination is a plastic
+power, moulding the things of sense into new forms to express its
+ideals; and it is these ideals that constitute the real products of the
+imagination. The objects of the material world are to it like clay in
+the hands of the potter; it shapes them into forms according to its own
+ideals of grace and beauty.... He, who sees no more than a mere
+combination in these creations of the imagination, misses the essential
+element and elevates into significance that which is merely incidental."
+
+Imagination, in some degree or phase, must come before voluntary
+physical action and conscious material creation. Everything that has
+been created by the hand of man has first been created in the _mind_ of
+man by the exercise of the Imagination. Everything that man has wrought
+has first existed in his mind as an _ideal_, before his hands, or the
+hands of others, wrought it into material _reality_. As Maudsley says:
+"It is certain that in order to execute consciously a voluntary act we
+must have in the mind a conception of the aim and purpose of the act."
+Kay says: "It is as serving to guide and direct our various activities
+that mental images derive their chief value and importance. In anything
+that we purpose or intend to do, we must first of all have an idea or
+image of it in the mind, and the more clear and correct the image, the
+more accurately and efficiently will the purpose be carried out. We
+cannot exert an act of volition without having in the mind an idea or
+image of what we will to effect."
+
+Upon the importance of a scientific use of the Imagination in every-day
+life, the best authorities agree. Maudsley says: "We cannot do an act
+voluntarily unless we know what we are going to do, and we cannot know
+exactly what we are going to do until we have taught ourselves to do
+it." Bain says: "By aiming at a new construction, we must clearly
+conceive what is aimed at. Where we have a very distinct and
+intelligible model before us, we are in a fair way to succeed; in
+proportion as the ideal is dim and wavering we stagger and miscarry."
+Kay says: "A clear and accurate idea of what we wish to do, and how it
+is to be effected, is of the utmost value and importance in all the
+affairs of life. A man's conduct naturally shapes itself according to
+the ideas in his mind, and nothing contributes more to his success in
+life than having a high ideal and keeping it constantly in view. Where
+such is the case one can hardly fail in attaining it. Numerous
+unexpected circumstances will be found to conspire to bring it about,
+and even what seemed at first hostile may be converted into means for
+its furtherance; while by having it constantly before the mind he will
+be ever ready to take advantage of any favoring circumstances that may
+present themselves."
+
+Simpson says: "A passionate desire and an unwearied will can perform
+impossibilities, or what seem to be such, to the cold and feeble."
+Lytton says: "Dream, O youth, dream manfully and nobly, and thy dreams
+shall be prophets." Foster says: "It is wonderful how even the
+casualities of life seem to bow to a spirit that will not bow to them,
+and yield to subserve a design which they may, in their first apparent
+tendency, threaten to frustrate. When a firm decisive spirit is
+recognized it is curious to see how space clears around a man and leaves
+him room and freedom." Tanner says: "To believe firmly is almost
+tantamount in the end to accomplishment." Maudsley says: "Aspirations
+are often prophecies, the harbingers of what a man shall be in a
+condition to perform." Macaulay says: "It is related of Warren Hastings
+that when only seven years old there arose in his mind a scheme which
+through all the turns of his eventful life was never abandoned." Kay
+says: "When one is engaged in seeking for a thing, if he keep the image
+of it clearly before the mind, he will be very likely to find it, and
+that too, probably, where it would otherwise have escaped his notice."
+Burroughs says: "No one ever found the walking fern who did not have the
+walking fern in his mind. A person whose eye is full of Indian relics
+picks them up in every field he walks through. They are quickly
+recognized because the eye has been commissioned to find them."
+
+Constructive Imagination differs from the phases of the faculty of
+Imagination which are akin to "Fancy," in a number of ways, the chief
+points of difference being as follows:
+
+The Constructive Imagination is always exercised in the pursuance of _a
+definite intent and purpose_. The person so using the faculty starts out
+with the idea of accomplishing certain purposes, and with the direct
+intent of thinking and planning in that particular direction. The
+fanciful phase of the Imagination, on the contrary, starts with no
+definite intent or purpose, but proceeds along the line of mere idle
+phantasy or day-dreaming.
+
+The Constructive Imagination _selects its material_. The person using
+the faculty in this manner abstracts from his general stock of mental
+images and impressions those particular materials which fit in with his
+general intent and purpose. Instead of allowing his imagination to
+wander around the entire field of memory, or representation, he
+deliberately and voluntarily selects and sets apart only such objects as
+seem to be conducive to his general design or plan, and which are
+logically associated with the same.
+
+The Constructive Imagination operates upon the lines of _logical
+thought_. One so using the faculty subjects his mental images, or ideas,
+to his _thinking faculties_, and proceeds with his imaginative
+constructive work along the lines of Logical Thought. He goes through
+the processes of Abstraction, Generalization or Conception, Judgment and
+the higher phases of Reasoning, in connection with his general work of
+Constructive Imagination. Instead of having the objects of thought
+before him in material form, he has them represented to his mind _in
+ideal form_, and he works upon his material in that shape.
+
+The Constructive Imagination is _voluntary_--under the control and
+direction of the will. Instead of being in the nature of a dream
+depending not upon the will or reason, it is directly controlled not
+only by reason but also by the will.
+
+The Constructive Imagination, like every other faculty of the mind, may
+be developed and cultivated by Use and Nourishment. It must be exercised
+in order to develop its mental muscle; and it must be supplied with
+nourishment upon which it may grow. Drawing, Composing, Designing and
+Planning along any line is calculated to give to this faculty the
+exercise that it requires. The reading of the right kind of literature
+is also likely to lead the faculty into activity by inspiring it with
+ideals and inciting it by example.
+
+The mind should be supplied with the proper material for the exercise of
+this faculty. As Halleck says: "Since the imagination has not the
+miraculous power necessary to create something out of nothing, the
+first essential thing is to get the proper perceptional material in
+proper quantity. If a child has enough blocks, he can build a castle or
+a palace. Give him but three blocks, and his power of combination is
+painfully limited. Some persons wonder why their imaginative power is no
+greater, when they have only a few accurate ideas." It thus follows that
+the active use of the Perceptive faculties will result in storing away a
+quantity of material, which, when represented or reproduced by the
+Memory, will give to the Constructive Imagination the material it
+requires with which to build. The greater the general knowledge of the
+person, the greater will be his store of material for this use. This
+knowledge need not necessarily be acquired at first hand from personal
+observation, but may also be in the nature of information acquired from
+the experience of others and known through their conversation, writings,
+etc.
+
+The necessity of forming clear concepts is very apparent when we come to
+exercise the Constructive Imaginative. Unless we have clear-cut ideas of
+the various things concerned with the subject before us, we cannot focus
+the imagination clearly upon its task. The general ideas should be
+clearly understood and the classification should be intelligent.
+Particular things should be clearly seen in "the mind's eye;" that is,
+the power of visualization or forming mental images should be cultivated
+in this connection. One may improve this particular faculty by either
+writing a description of scenes or particular things we have seen, or
+else by verbally describing them to others. As Halleck says: "An attempt
+at a clear-cut oral description of something to another person will
+often impress ourselves and him with the fact that our mental images are
+hazy, and that the first step toward better description consists in
+improving them."
+
+Tyndall has aptly stated the importance of visualizing one's ideas and
+particular concepts, as follows: "How, for example, are we to lay hold
+of the physical basis of light since, like that of life itself, it lies
+entirely without the domain of the senses?... Bring your imaginations
+once more into play and figure a series of sound-waves passing through
+air. Follow them up to their origin, and what do you there find? A
+definite, tangible, vibrating body. It may be the vocal chords of a
+human being, it may be an organ-pipe, or it may be a stretched string.
+Follow in the same manner a train of ether waves to their source,
+remembering at the same time that your ether is matter, dense, elastic
+and capable of motions subject to and determined by mechanical laws.
+What then do you expect to find as the source of a series of ether
+waves? Ask your imagination if it will accept a vibrating multiple
+proportion--a numerical ratio in a state of oscillation? I do not think
+it will. You cannot crown the edifice by this abstraction. The
+scientific imagination which is here authoritative, demands as the
+origin and cause of a series of ether waves a particle of vibrating
+matter quite as definite, though it may be excessively minute, as that
+which gives origin to a musical sound. Such a particle we name an atom
+or a molecule. I think the seeking intellect, when focused so as to give
+definition without penumbral haze, is sure to realize this image at the
+last."
+
+By repeatedly exercising the faculty of Imagination upon a particular
+idea, we add power and clearness to that idea. This is but another
+example of the familiar psychological principle expressed by Carpenter
+as follows: "The continued concentration of attention upon a certain
+idea gives it a dominant power." Kay says: "Clearness and accuracy of
+image is only to be obtained by repeatedly having it in the mind, or by
+repeated action of the faculty. Each repeated act of any of the
+faculties renders the mental image of it more clear and accurate than
+the preceding, and in proportion to the clearness and accuracy of the
+image will the act itself be performed easily, readily, skillfully. The
+course to be pursued, the point to be gained, the amount of effort to be
+put forth, become more and more clear to the mind. It is only from what
+we have done that we are able to judge what we can do, and understand
+how it is to be effected. When our ideas or conceptions of what we can
+do are not based on experience, they become fruitful sources of error."
+
+Galton says: "There is no doubt as to the utility of the visualizing
+faculty where it is duly subordinated to the higher intellectual
+operations. A visual image is the most perfect form of mental
+representation wherever the shape, position and relation of objects in
+space are concerned. It is of importance in every handicraft and
+profession where design is required. The best workmen are those who
+visualize the whole of what they propose to do before they take a tool
+in their hands."
+
+Kay says: "If we bear in mind that every sensation or idea must form an
+image in the mind before it can be perceived or understood, and that
+every act of volition is preceded by its image, it will be seen that
+images play an important part in all our mental operations. According to
+the nature of the ideas or images which he entertains will be the
+character and conduct of the man. The man tenacious of purpose is the
+man who holds tenaciously certain ideas; the flighty man is he who
+cannot keep one idea before him for any length of time, but constantly
+flits from one to another; the insane man is he who entertains insane
+ideas often, it may be, on only one or two subjects. We may distinguish
+two great classes of individuals according to the prevailing character
+of their images. There are those in whose mind sensory images
+predominate, and those whose images are chiefly such as tend to action.
+Those of the former class are observant, often thoughtful, men of
+judgment and, it may be, of learning; but if they have not also the
+active faculty in due force, they will fail in giving forth or in
+turning to proper account their knowledge or learning, and instances of
+this kind are by no means uncommon. The man, on the other hand, who has
+ever in his mind images of things to be done, is the man of action and
+enterprise. If he is not also an observant and thoughtful man, if his
+mind is backward in forming images of what is presented to it from
+without, he will be constantly liable to make mistakes."
+
+Galton says of the faculty of visualization: "Our bookish and wordy
+education tends to repress this valuable gift of nature. A faculty that
+is of importance in all technical and artistic occupations, that gives
+accuracy to our perceptions and justness to our generalizations, is
+starved by lazy disuse, instead of being cultivated judiciously in such
+a way as will, on the whole, bring the best return. I believe that a
+serious study of the best method of developing and using this faculty
+without prejudice to the practice of abstract thought in symbols, is
+one of the many pressing desiderata in the yet unformed science of
+education."
+
+This consideration of the faculty of, and culture of, the Imagination,
+may appropriately be concluded by the following quotation from Prof.
+Halleck, which shows the danger of misuse and abuse of this important
+faculty. The aforesaid well-known authority says: "From its very nature,
+the imagination is peculiarly liable to abuse. The common practices of
+day-dreaming or castle-building are both morally and physically
+unhealthful. We reach actual success in life by slow, weary steps. The
+day-dreamer attains eminence with one bound. He is without trouble a
+victorious general on a vast battlefield, an orator swaying thousands, a
+millionaire with every amusement at his command, a learned man
+confounding the wisest, a president, an emperor or a czar. After
+reveling in these imaginative sweets, the dry bread of actual toil
+becomes exceedingly distasteful. It is so much easier to live in regions
+where everything comes at the magic wand of fancy. Not infrequently
+these castle-builders abandon effort in an actual world. Success comes
+too slow for them. They become speculators or gamblers, and in spite of
+all their grand castles, gradually sink into utter nonentities in the
+world of action.... The young should never allow themselves to build any
+imaginative castle, unless they are willing by hard effort to try to
+make that castle a reality. They must be willing to take off their
+coats, go into the quarries of life, chisel out the blocks of the stone,
+and build them with much toil into the castle walls. If castle-building
+is merely the formation of an ideal, which we show by our effort that we
+are determined to attain, then all will be well."
+
+It will be seen that, in reality, the Cultivation of the Imagination is
+rather the training and intelligent direction of that faculty, instead
+of the development of its power. The majority of people have the faculty
+of Imagination well developed, but to them it is largely an untrained,
+fanciful self-willed faculty. Cultivation is needed in the direction of
+bringing it under the guidance of the reason, and control by the will.
+Thought-Culture in general will do much for the Imagination, for the
+very processes employed in the development and cultivation of the
+various other faculties of the mind will also tend to bring the
+Imagination into subjection and under control, instead of allowing it to
+remain the wild, fanciful irresponsible faculty that it is in the
+majority of cases. Use the faculty of Imagination as a faculty of
+_Thought_, instead of a thing of _Fancy_. Attach it to the _Intellect_
+instead of to the _Emotions_. Harness it up with the other faculties of
+Thought, and your chariot of Understanding and Attainment will reach the
+goal far sooner than under the old arrangement. Establish harmony
+between Intellect and Imagination, and you largely increase the power
+and achievements of both.
+
+
+FINIS.
+
+
+
+
+THE
+
+Pathway of Roses
+
+_By_ CHRISTIAN D. LARSON
+
+
+Who would so live that the dreams of the night shall rise with the
+morning but shall not depart with the setting sun--it is to men and
+women such as these that we recommend THE PATHWAY OF ROSES.
+
+The thinking world of today is being filled with a phase of thought that
+has exceptional value. True, some of it is in a somewhat chaotic
+condition, but most of it is rich, containing within itself the very
+life of that truth that is making the world free. But in the finding of
+this truth, and in the application of its principles, where are we to
+begin? What are we to do first? And after we have begun, and find
+ourselves in the midst of a life so large, so immense and so marvelous
+that it will require eternity to live it all, what are the great
+essentials that we should ever remember and apply? What are the great
+centers of life about which we may build a greater and a greater life?
+These are questions that thousands are asking today, and the answer may
+be found in THE PATHWAY OF ROSES.
+
+Beautifully and substantially bound in silk cloth
+Contains about 400 pages
+
+Price, postpaid, $1.50
+
+THE PROGRESS COMPANY--CHICAGO
+
+
+
+
+TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE:
+
+
+Obvious typos and printer errors have been corrected without comment.
+
+In addition to obvious errors, the following corrections have been made:
+
+ 1. Page 140: Italics were added for consistency in the phrase, "E and O
+ are _subalterns_."
+
+ 2. Page 144: In order to preserve the meaning, "E" was changed to "I"
+ in the phrase, "Also what follows if "I" be _false_."
+
+ 3. Page 161: The word "is" was added to maintain the sense of the
+ phrase, "... the Subconscious region of the mind is most active...."
+
+Other than the above errors, no attempt has been made to correct common
+spelling, punctuation, grammar, etc. The author's usage is preserved as
+printed in the original publication. Unconventional spelling which has
+been preserved includes, but is not limited to the following:
+
+ minature
+ synonomous
+
+Spelling of the name "Kay" appears twice in the text as "Kays".
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's Thought-Culture, by William Walker Atkinson
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 41519 ***