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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 40845 ***
+
+  THE
+  CONNEXION
+  BETWEEN
+  TASTE AND MORALS:
+  TWO LECTURES
+
+  BY
+  MARK HOPKINS, D. D.
+  PRESIDENT OF WILLIAMS COLLEGE.
+
+  Boston:
+  PUBLISHED BY DUTTON AND WENTWORTH.
+  1841.
+
+
+
+
+LECTURE I.
+
+
+Is the prevalence of a cultivated taste, favorable to morals? Is there a
+connexion, either in individuals, or in communities, between good taste
+and good morals?
+
+When I began to reflect upon this point with reference to a public
+discussion of it, I put the above questions to three educated men, as I
+happened to meet them. The first said, he had not thought of it, but
+that, at the first view, he did not believe there was any such
+connexion; the second said he should wish to see it proved before he
+would believe it; and the third said, he thought there was such a
+connexion. This difference of opinion among educated men, led me to
+think that an investigation of the subject might be a matter of
+interest, and perhaps of profit. As every thing, in this country,
+depends upon a sound state of morals in the community, whatever bears
+upon that, deserves our most careful scrutiny.
+
+To discuss this subject understandingly, we must know precisely what we
+are talking about. What then is taste? This term is sometimes used to
+express mere desire, as a taste for dress, or for low pleasures. It can
+hardly be necessary to say that that is not the meaning now attached to
+it. Taste is defined by Alison, to be, "That faculty of the human mind
+by which we perceive and enjoy whatever is beautiful or sublime in the
+works of nature or of art." According to this definition, which is
+sufficiently correct for our present purpose, it will be perceived that
+there is, first, a perception of certain qualities in external objects,
+and then, according to the nature of the object, an emotion of beauty,
+or of sublimity in the mind. These emotions are, of course, incapable of
+definition except by stating the occasions on which they arise, and can
+be known only by being felt. To talk of an emotion to those who have not
+felt it, is like talking of colors to the blind. And here I may remark,
+that these terms, beauty and sublimity, have, in common with those
+denoting sensations, an ambiguity which has often produced confusion. As
+the term heat is used to denote both the sensation we feel on
+approaching the fire, and that quality in the fire which produces the
+sensation, so beauty and sublimity are sometimes used to express the
+emotions in the mind, and sometimes those qualities in external objects
+which are fitted to produce them, though there is, of course, in the
+external object, no emotion, nor any thing resembling one.
+
+If this account of taste be correct, it will be perceived that it
+cannot, with any propriety, be compared, as it often has been, to a
+bodily sense. The impression upon a bodily sense, necessarily follows
+the presence of the object, and is uniform in all mankind. A tree
+clothed in fresh foliage is necessarily seen, and seen to be green by
+all who turn their eyes upon it. The same tree, when seen, may be
+pronounced by one individual to be beautiful, by another, from some
+peculiar association, to be the reverse, and by a third, however
+beautiful in itself, it may be looked upon without any emotion at all.
+It is, therefore, a great mistake to suppose, as many do, that those
+qualities in objects which awaken the emotions of taste, act directly
+and necessarily upon us, like those which affect the senses.
+
+A second preliminary inquiry is, What are the causes which produce these
+emotions? And here I barely remark, without inquiring after any common
+principle by which they produce similar results, that these causes
+differ widely from each other. The emotions may be awakened by natural
+objects, by sound, by the products of the imagination, by the
+combinations of the intellect, and by certain manifestations of the
+affections and moral character.
+
+A third inquiry is, how the taste can be cultivated? This obviously can
+be done only on two conditions. The first is, that we put ourselves in
+situations adapted to produce the emotions of taste; and the second is,
+that we preserve a state of mind that will permit those emotions to
+arise. This last, a proper state of mind, though less often considered,
+is quite as important as the first. "It is," says the poet,
+
+                  "The soul that sees; the outward eyes
+  Present the object, but the mind descries,
+  And thence delight, disgust, or cool indifference rise."
+
+Upon him whose mind is engrossed by care, or ruffled by passion, the
+most beautiful objects make no impression. To perceive and enjoy them,
+the mind must be calm. The beauties and sublimities of nature are like
+the stars, which the storm shuts out, but when the heavens are serene,
+they come out, one after another, to the eye that is watching for them,
+till the firmament glows with their light. He, therefore, and he only,
+who, in a proper state of mind, will place himself in the presence of
+beautiful or sublime objects, and will compare the effects produced
+under different circumstances, will improve his taste, both in its
+susceptibility to emotion, and in its power of discrimination.
+
+The question then, which we are now prepared to discuss, is, whether
+such a cultivation and improvement of the taste, has a favorable effect
+upon the moral character?
+
+That it has such an effect, I infer, first, because we find in the
+emotions of taste, to say the least, an innocent source of enjoyment for
+our leisure hours, and the mind that is innocently happy, is less
+accessible to temptation. Indolence, mere vacuity, we all know, is the
+porch of vice, and the great dangers to the young arise from their
+leisure hours--from the want of some means of innocent mental
+exhilaration, in which they can be induced to spend those hours. It was
+said by Franklin, that leisure was a time in which to do something
+useful; but all are not Franklins. If leisure time can be, as it is by
+many, usefully employed, so much the better; but he who should provide
+for our youth the means and the inducements to spend their leisure time
+innocently, would be a public benefactor. In our cities, where the
+temptations to mere sensual gratification are so numerous and obtrusive,
+and where natural objects are very much excluded, this is a point of
+great importance, and of great difficulty. Until of late very little of
+this kind has been attempted, unless theatres may be called an attempt.
+But theatres with us are out of the question, for Miss Martineau says
+that "the Americans have very little dramatic taste; and that the spirit
+of puritanism still rises up in such fierce opposition to the stage, as
+to forbid the hope that this grand means of intellectual exercise will
+ever be made the instrument of moral good to society there, that it
+might be made." She says, moreover, so hopeless is our case, that "those
+who respect dramatic entertainments the most highly, will be the most
+anxious that the American theatres should be closed." Theatres are
+indeed out of the question, and I trust it will be a long time before we
+shall make progress backwards, to that state of morals which is produced
+by the instructions even of an English theatre.
+
+It is in view of the want now under consideration, that the
+establishment of Associations for literary purposes, and for procuring
+popular lectures open to all, is not only a new, but a most promising
+feature in the history of our cities. Man needs, and must have,
+excitement and mental exhilaration, and our Creator, if we would but see
+it, has not been inattentive to this want of our frame. No; to supply
+it, we have the pleasures of rational social converse, the play of the
+affections, the duties of kindness and benevolence--does a man feel
+depressed, let him do a good action--and last, but not least, the
+gratifications of taste: all the pleasure to be derived from the concord
+of sweet sounds, from the charms of literature, from the forms and
+colors and groupings of nature, from her sunrisings and sunsettings,
+from her landscapes of mountain and valley and lake and river, from the
+stars that roll in their courses, and the flowers that nod to each other
+by the way-side.--These are the sources of mental exhilaration which God
+has provided; and they are, to the artificial stimulants of theatrical
+exhibitions and of gambling, what the cold water that was drank in Eden
+is to brandy and gin. May I not here venture to say to young men,
+'Beware how you spend your _leisure_ hours! your character and destiny
+in life will probably turn upon it.' Among the means, as I have already
+said, of spending these hours at least innocently, the gratifications of
+taste are conspicuous. They seem for this very purpose to have been had
+distinctly in view in the fitting up of this world; and so far as they
+lure the mind from the lower gratifications of sense, they must be
+favorable to morals.
+
+The remarks now made respect taste chiefly as a guard against evil; but
+I cannot dismiss this head without noticing more fully its positive
+influence, as a source of innocent enjoyment, upon morals. A good taste,
+and I do not hold myself answerable for its perversions, involves a
+ready susceptibility to the emotions of beauty and sublimity, and of
+course a readiness to receive pleasure from the common appearances of
+nature, and from every free and natural expression of good feeling. It
+is, in my view, of the first importance both to character and to
+happiness, that the young should cultivate a relish for those simple and
+natural pleasures, the sources of which are open to all. It is important
+to happiness. How much happiness does the young florist secure, who can
+look upon the common violet as it opens its eye from under the snows of
+the early spring, with much the same pleasure as upon the choice exotic
+which is resorted to and exclusively admired by those who have
+unfortunately been taught that it is vulgar to admire what is common!
+How much happiness does he secure who is touched by a beautiful action
+wherever he sees it, who appreciates sympathy wherever he finds it, and
+however expressed! A mind rightly constituted in this respect, drinks in
+enjoyment from the objects and occurrences of daily life, as the eye
+does light. It is also essential to character. How many young men enter
+life with a false estimate of the advantages which wealth and fashion
+can confer; who find their happiness, not in the contemplation and
+pursuit of appropriate objects, but in what others think of them, and to
+whom the world becomes insipid unless _they_ make a figure in it! Let
+now misfortune come upon such men, and the world fails them. _Their_
+world is gone; they have no resource; they become, generally dishonest,
+sometimes inefficient and gloomy, and commit suicide. These persons come
+to consider the common and truly great blessings which God has given as
+nothing unless they may possess those artificial and egotistical
+enjoyments which arise from conventional society. They see not the
+splendid ornaments and rich provisions which, to adopt, with a slight
+accommodation, the beautiful language of another, are gathered round the
+earth for them;--"its ocean of air above, its ocean of water beneath,
+its zodiac of lights, its tent of dropping clouds, its striped coat of
+climates, its fourfold year." It is nothing to them, if they have not
+man for their servant, that "all the parts of nature incessantly work
+into each other's hands for their profit; that the wind sows the seed,
+the sun evaporates the sea, the wind blows the vapor to the field, the
+ice on the other side of the planet condenses the rain on this, and thus
+the endless circulations of the divine charity nourish man." What a
+change when such a person is brought back to a true relish of the simple
+pleasures of nature! Even sickness, depriving him for a time of what he
+had undervalued, if it bring him back to this, is a blessing; and then
+the result may be stated in the words of Gray:--
+
+  "See the wretch who long has tost
+    On the thorny bed of pain,
+  At length regain his vigor lost,
+    And breathe and walk again."
+
+Then,
+
+  "The meanest flow'ret of the vale,
+  The simplest note that swells the gale,
+  The common sun, the air, the skies,
+  To him are opening paradise!"
+
+Then, though he may hold little property by that title which the law
+gives, he yet feels that the universe is his for those nobler purposes
+for which it was intended to act on the spirit:
+
+  "His are the mountains, and the valleys his,
+  And the resplendent rivers;"
+
+and he looks back upon his former discontent as the petulance of a
+child. The simple beauties and the glad voices of nature have made him a
+man again.
+
+But again, I infer that there is a connexion between good taste and good
+morals, because there is an analogy between those qualities in matter
+which excite the emotions of taste, and those relations on which morals
+depend. So much is this the case, that some philosophers found morality
+upon a theory of the beautiful, considering it a sublime harmony. In all
+beautiful objects in nature, or in art, there is an order, a propriety,
+a fitness, a proportion; and the impression which these make upon us is
+so analogous to that which is made by virtuous conduct, that we use the
+same terms to express both. To me, indeed, it seems that beauty in
+matter is to moral beauty what instinct is to reason, or what the light
+of the moon is to that of the sun; containing some of the same elements,
+but destitute of the highest. Hence, as we should naturally expect,
+morals furnish that region in the province of taste in which she gathers
+those flowers that are richest in beauty and sweetest in perfume.
+
+                  "Is aught so fair,
+  In all the dewy landscape of the spring,
+  In the bright eye of Hesper, or the morn,
+  In nature's fairest forms, is aught so fair
+  As virtuous friendship?"
+
+But I observe again, that as there is the analogy just pointed out
+between their causes, so there is an affinity between the emotions
+themselves of taste and correct moral feeling, and the transition from
+one to the other is obvious. This point requires illustration. That our
+emotions are associated in groups, is practically known to every body.
+Even the child does not ask his father for a sixpence when he is in an
+ill temper, because he knows the transition is not easy from ill temper
+to generosity. Deep grief cannot pass at once to sudden joy. It must be
+by a gradual transition, first to a tender melancholy, and then to
+cheerfulness, and then to joy. "The garment of sorrow," as Coleridge
+expresses it, "must be drawn off so gradually, and that to be put in its
+stead so gradually slipt on and feel so like the former, that the
+sufferer shall be sensible of the change only by the refreshment." It is
+by understanding well these affinities of the feelings that the orator
+can continue to control them as they pass over their widest range. The
+necessity of a suitable state of mind in order that the emotions of
+taste may arise, has already been noticed, and what I now observe is,
+that a state of correct moral feeling is more favorable to these
+emotions than any other. There is between them such an affinity that
+they readily associate with each other; while there is, between the
+emotions of taste and a vicious state of mind, no such affinity, but
+they are to a great extent incompatible.
+
+The external world often gives back to us but the image of our own
+thoughts, and hence may seem almost as variable as the dim forms of
+twilight to which the imagination gives its own shape. This tendency of
+the mind to cast its own hue over nature, or rather to receive different
+emotions from external objects, according to its own state, is well
+illustrated by Crabbe, in his tale called "The Lover's Journey." In this
+tale, Orlando, the lover, starts on a pleasant morning with the
+expectation of finding the object of his affections at a village, where
+she had agreed to meet him. The first part of his journey lay across a
+heath covered with furze. But hear him:--
+
+                "Men may say
+  A heath is barren; nothing is so gay;
+  Barren or bare to call this charming scene
+  Argues a mind possessed by care or spleen."
+
+And thus he went on, admiring the wholesome wormwood and the vigorous
+brier, till he reached the village, and then disappointment came. The
+lady had gone to a village some miles further on, under circumstances
+that vexed him, and led him to doubt her affection. He doubted even
+whether he should proceed, but at length determined to see and upbraid
+her. Now hear him again, as he passes along by the side of a beautiful
+river:--
+
+  "I hate these scenes, Orlando angry cried;
+  And these proud farmers, yes, I hate their pride;
+  See that sleek fellow, how he stalks along,
+  Strong as an ox, and ignorant as strong.
+  These deep, fat meadows I detest; it shocks
+  One's feelings there to see the grazing ox;--
+  For slaughter fatted--as a lady's smile
+  Rejoices man, and means his death the while."
+
+And if mere disappointment, without a consciousness of guilt and
+remorse, could produce such effects, what must we expect when the mind
+is not at peace with itself? Tendencies are shown by extreme cases, and
+it is in perfect consistency with the nature of things that Milton makes
+Satan exclaim, on seeing Eden in its united innocence and beauty,
+
+  "O hell! what do mine eyes with grief behold!"
+
+Who can imagine a miser, even, to say nothing of a thief, or a drunkard,
+lifting his eyes from his buried heaps, and enjoying the scene before
+him, however beautiful? While he who performs a deed of charity at the
+end of his walk, will find nature wearing a richer dress on his return.
+The mind conscious of rectitude is at peace with itself, and is in that
+calm state which permits it to enjoy whatever is pleasing.
+
+But not only, as in the cases now mentioned, is a right state of moral
+feeling favorable to taste, but the emotions of taste also tend to
+introduce moral ideas and emotions. It is, as I conceive, chiefly from
+this fact that nature has a tendency to lead the mind "up to nature's
+God;" for we must all be conscious that when we view nature as beautiful
+or sublime, this tendency is strongest. No one can have stood by
+Niagara, or upon the White Mountains, without feeling this. Hence the
+groves and the high hills were the first places of worship. Hence the
+Indian sacrifices to the Great Spirit when he passes through the wild
+rapids. And as we associate the beauties of nature with the wisdom and
+goodness of God, so do we, in many cases, instinctively infer from the
+displays of taste in man, something of his moral character. Who, for
+example, in travelling through a solitary forest, if he should come, as
+there are many such, to a neat log-house, with a trellised woodbine at
+the door, and with every thing orderly and clean about it, would not
+expect to pass by unmolested, or, if he should call, to be civilly and
+kindly treated?--whereas, if every thing bore the appearance of filth
+and dilapidation, and the only signs of taste were those which indicated
+a taste for rum, he might well quicken his pace for fear he should be
+waylaid. No one expects to find indications of taste about the dwelling
+of a drunkard, or of one abandoned to any low vice. I appeal to any one
+who hears me, whether he has not felt that it was an indication of a
+good moral character, and an encouragement to charity, when he has
+entered some poor dwelling and found that there was still kept alive, in
+the midst of poverty, a susceptibility to the emotions, and a regard to
+the requisitions of taste.
+
+I have just observed, that there is an affinity between correct moral
+feeling and the emotions of taste. I now observe, that the highest
+pleasures of taste cannot be enjoyed without correct views on great
+moral subjects, and especially respecting the being and attributes of
+God. Whatever may be said of the power of material objects, in
+themselves considered, to produce the emotions of taste, it is certain
+that their chief power depends on the conceptions of the mind which they
+awaken as signs. A single instance will illustrate this. Most of us have
+probably felt the emotion of sublimity on hearing what we supposed to be
+distant thunder, which vanished, and perhaps seemed ridiculous, the
+moment we ascertained that the sound was produced by the rumbling of a
+cart. In this case, it is obvious that the emotion depended, not on the
+sound itself, but on the conception of the mind awakened by it. Now this
+is pre-eminently the case in the works of nature. How different must be
+the emotions awakened by a view of the evening firmament in the mind of
+him who should suppose the stars to be mere points of light, set at no
+great distance above him, and moving around the earth solely for the
+convenience of man, from those awakened in the mind of him to whom those
+points of light indicate the existence of an infinite space; and of
+suns, and worlds, and systems without number, and at distances which
+cause the wing of the strongest imagination to flag! How different the
+emotions produced by the comet now, as it returns at its predicted
+period, from those excited as it fired
+
+            "the length of Ophiucus huge
+  In the Arctic sky, and, from his horrid hair,"
+
+was supposed to shake "pestilence and war!" As, therefore, he who cannot
+see beyond the stars as they appear to the sense, must lose by far the
+highest pleasure which they are adapted as objects of taste to give; so
+he who knows the physical structure of the universe, and who yet does
+not see in it, and behind it, an infinite and beneficent Intelligence,
+cannot have connected with his view those conceptions which awaken the
+highest emotions of beauty and sublimity.
+
+The relations of man to nature are much less intimate than those of God,
+and yet our emotions in view of nature are greatly modified by the view
+which we take of _His_ dignity and moral character. It was when Hamlet
+supposed there was foul corruption and a general want of principle in
+society, that "this goodly frame, the earth," seemed to him but "a
+steril promontory;" "this most excellent canopy, the air, look you, this
+brave o'erhanging firmament," why, it appeared no other thing to him
+"than a foul and pestilent congregation of vapors." It was when her
+inhabitants were oppressed and degraded, that the natural beauty, which
+is still as bright as ever on the shores of Greece, seemed in the eye of
+the poet but as
+
+            "The loveliness in death
+  That parts not quite with parting breath,
+  But beauty with that fearful bloom,
+  That hue which haunts it to the tomb,
+  So coldly sweet, so deadly fair,
+  We start, for life is wanting there."
+  "'Twas Greece, but living Greece no more."
+
+We must all have felt that a shade of sadness was cast over the face of
+nature when we have thought of the passions, and wars, and lust, and
+rapine of man, in connexion with her quiet scenes. On the other hand,
+were the moral state of the world what we trust it shall one day
+be,--did universal purity, and goodness, and love reign,--would not the
+sun seem to shine with a more benignant radiance; instead of the thorn,
+would there not come up the fir-tree: would not the mountains and hills
+break forth into singing, and all the trees of the field clap their
+hands?
+
+And if the emotions of taste are thus modified by our views of man, how
+much more must they be by those respecting God! How must a blank atheism
+hang the heavens in sackcloth, and cover the earth with a pall, and turn
+the mute promisings of nature into a mockery, and make of her mighty
+fabric one great charnel-house of death, without the hope of a
+resurrection! On the other hand, how must the beauty and sublimity of
+nature and of the universe be heightened, the moment we perceive them in
+their connexion with God! Nothing is more common than to hear those, who
+emerge from that practical atheism in which most men live, speak of the
+new perceptions of beauty and sublimity with which they look upon the
+works of nature:--
+
+  "In that blest moment, Nature, throwing wide
+  Her veil opaque, discloses, with a smile,
+  The Author of her beauties, who, retired
+  Behind his own creation, works unseen
+  By the _impure_, and hears his power denied."
+
+All our investigations into nature show that man has no faculties to
+which there are not corresponding and adequate objects. As infinite as
+he is in reason, yet the works of God are not exhausted by the
+operations of that reason. No intellectual Alexander ever sat down and
+wept for the want of more worlds to conquer. As vast as is his
+imagination, the revelations of astronomy, as sober facts, go beyond any
+thing that the imagination had conceived. And is it so, that, in the
+region of taste alone, the faculties of man have no adequate object? But
+it is only when nature, like the Bible, is seen to be full of God, that
+she is clothed with her true sublimity. It is only when "the heavens
+declare the glory of God and the firmament showeth his handy work," that
+they correspond to the highest conceptions either of the taste or of the
+intellect. Man rests in the Infinite alone, and the universe without a
+God is not in harmony with his constitution, even when he is considered
+as endowed with taste only. But if our views on moral subjects thus
+modify the emotions of taste, it cannot be doubted that those emotions
+react upon our moral views, tending to elevate and purify them.
+
+I remark again, that the emotions of taste are favorable to morals,
+because they are disinterested. As admiration becomes intense, men
+forget themselves, and, in proportion as they thus find enjoyment, they
+are prepared for that higher enjoyment which a disinterested performance
+of duty brings with it. Whenever we see excellence in another, we are
+bound to admire it without reference to sect or party; and admiration,
+thus bestowed, is almost always connected with a high moral character.
+The beauty who can truly forget herself in her admiration for another,
+deserves admiration for qualities far higher and nobler than beauty.
+
+I only observe further, that a cultivated taste is favorable to morals,
+because the cultivation of one of our powers has a tendency to
+strengthen the rest.--This, I know, is disputed, and it is even supposed
+that the union of certain powers in any high degree is impossible. Thus,
+it is often supposed that a remarkable memory and a sound judgment do
+not go together; and it must be confessed that the memory may be so
+cultivated as not to strengthen the judgment. But when I speak of
+cultivating a faculty, I mean cultivating it on correct principles and
+with reference to the end for which it was given. Those who remember
+events as isolated, or only as they are connected by the relations of
+time and place, and who do not see and remember them as connected by the
+relations of cause and effect, means and end, premises and conclusion,
+do not, by such an exercise of the memory, strengthen the judgment,
+though they certainly show that it has great need of being strengthened.
+Of what possible use can it be, to the forming of a correct judgment on
+any point, for a good woman to remember the precise age of every child
+in the neighborhood? It is these walking chronicles, these living
+almanacs, who will tell you the weather for all time past, if not for
+all time to come, who get the credit of having great memories and little
+judgment. But such a memory is, to one cultivated on correct principles,
+only what a room full of minerals and birds and fish and insects and
+rubbish, promiscuously tumbled together, is to a well-arranged museum.
+Who does not know that experience is the best enlightener of the
+judgment?--And where does experience garner her stores but in the
+memory? It is obvious that he who has the best memory of past events, in
+their true connexions, will have the best possible materials for forming
+a judgment of the future. The same opposition is generally supposed to
+exist between the imagination and the judgment. But it occasionally
+happens that an individual, like Edmund Burke, unites the most gorgeous
+imagination with the profoundest judgment; and then it is seen that the
+analogies which the imagination suggests yield important lights to the
+judgment instead of misleading it. I know that the imagination, striking
+its roots into the hotbed of novel-reading, may overtop the judgment;
+but, judiciously cultivated, I contend that it is not unfavorable to the
+judgment. And if, in these cases, a judicious cultivation of one power
+tends to strengthen the other, much more will the cultivation of taste
+have a favorable tendency upon the moral nature, since these departments
+of the mind have never been supposed to be in opposition, but are, as we
+have seen, closely allied to each other.
+
+But all this time it has probably been objected that, however plausible
+the reasoning may be on this subject, it is yet contrary to experience.
+If it were so, it might perhaps be said of it, as was said by Euler of a
+demonstrated property of the arch, "this is contrary to all experience,
+but is nevertheless true:"--it is so in the nature of things, but the
+materials are refractory. But let us see how far it is contrary to
+experience; or rather, whether we cannot, so far as it is thus contrary,
+satisfactorily account for it.
+
+In order to this, we must make, as it seems to me, three important
+distinctions. And, first, we must distinguish between taste considered
+as a power of judging, and as a susceptibility to emotion. This
+distinction is often overlooked. Mr. Blair, for instance, defines taste
+to be, "the power of receiving pleasure or pain from the beauties or
+deformities of nature and of art;" in which, regard is had to the
+susceptibility only. But afterwards, when contrasting taste with genius,
+he says--"Taste is the power of judging, genius is the power of
+executing;" in which the susceptibility to emotion is left out of sight.
+Can I make this distinction obvious? When an unpractised person sees for
+the first time a grand historical picture, or reads a beautiful poem, he
+gives himself up to the emotion; he is absorbed; he takes no note of
+time; he forgets where he is, and neither knows nor cares why he is
+pleased. The eye drinks in beauty as the thirsty man the cold water, and
+it refreshes the soul. He sees the picture, or reads the poem, again and
+again, and at length sits down to give an account to a friend of that
+which had pleased him. Now, he wishes to state the reasons why he was
+pleased, and he begins to inquire what those qualities were which
+produced the effect. Here is the rudiment of philosophical criticism,
+and he goes on perhaps investigating, till he discovers those general
+principles of taste according to which the work was executed. As long,
+however, as his mind is thus occupied in analyzing, he feels no emotion
+of beauty or sublimity. But as this is an enticing species of logic, he
+may follow it till a work of art shall give him pleasure only by its
+conformity to certain principles, true or false, which he may have
+established for himself, and till he becomes a cold critic, or perhaps a
+reviewer by trade. He may become a mere teller in the bank of taste, to
+pronounce on what is genuine, and hand it over to others to be used and
+enjoyed. Now, a man who writes a skilful review of a work of genius, and
+tells us why we are or ought to be pleased, is supposed to be a man of
+taste; and the writing of the review is considered as an exercise of
+taste. This is true of taste considered as a power of judging, but not
+as a power of feeling. If it were so, the mass of men would be in a
+pitiable condition. God no more intended that the uninitiated should
+wait to be pleased with the beauty which they see, until its principles
+are analyzed, and they are told when and why they ought to be pleased,
+than He intended they should wait to be cheered and warmed by the rays
+of the sun, till they should see light decomposed into the seven colors
+of the prismatic image. But it is by cherishing and keeping alive these
+universal emotions, which belong to the race, and which find excitement
+everywhere, that I suppose there is a healthful effect produced on the
+moral character. The power of genuine philosophical criticism; the power
+of going back, if I may so express it, into the workshop of nature, and
+seeing how she mixes her colors, is a rare, a valuable and a dignified
+power; but it is still an exercise of the intellect, and I am not aware
+that it has any peculiarly favorable effect upon the moral character.
+Indeed, when literature and the fine arts become fashionable, and much
+the subject of conversation, there is a vast deal of this kind of
+criticism, which is fallen into from imitation and vanity, and which can
+have no good effect upon morals except as it supplies the place of
+scandal. It is not, then, in an egotistical and vain community, who read
+works of genius, and look at pictures, not to admire and enjoy them, but
+that they may themselves talk about them and be admired, that any good
+effect upon the moral character is to be expected from the prevalence of
+what they are pleased to call taste. How far this comes to be the case
+with communities in which taste is said to be prevalent, and morals are
+corrupt, I leave others to judge.
+
+The second distinction which I would make, is that between the
+cultivation of a taste for the fine arts and for natural objects. This I
+consider a distinction of much importance on this subject; and I propose
+to give some reasons why the cultivation of the fine arts--as painting,
+sculpture, architecture, poetry--has less tendency than a taste for
+natural objects to improve the character. This I am bound to do; because
+it is well known that certain nations, as the Spartans and ancient
+Romans, considered a taste for the fine arts as having a tendency to
+corrupt morals; and some of the sterner moralists of modern times,
+especially religious moralists, have objected to it on the same ground.
+It must also be conceded that those nations, as the Greeks and Italians,
+among whom these arts have flourished most, have been exceedingly
+corrupt, and that that corruption has co-existed with an advanced state
+of the arts in question.
+
+And, first, I remark, that a taste for the fine arts cannot be general
+in a community of any considerable extent. If we suppose such a taste,
+when formed, to have a tendency to improve the morals, yet how few, in a
+country like ours, have an opportunity to form it! The products of the
+arts are to be found, for the most part, only in cities; and of the
+inhabitants of cities, it is only those who have leisure and wealth, who
+are affected by them. It ought also to be observed that, as these arts
+do not come to perfection in the early stages of society, they cannot
+produce their effect till wealth and luxury have had time to work
+general corruption.
+
+But I observe again that, as the power either of executing or of judging
+in these arts is confined to comparatively a few, it becomes a mark of
+distinction and a ground of ostentation, and thus there comes to be the
+appearance of more taste than there really is. The artist finds himself
+a candidate for fame and wealth through his skill, and hence his
+passions are aroused and his interests are involved. If successful, he
+is flattered, perhaps almost deified; if unsuccessful, he becomes
+irritable and sinks back on the proud consciousness of neglected merit.
+This peculiar position will account for the bad character of many
+artists. Those also who _patronize_ the arts, as it is significantly
+termed, often do it from ostentation. What better resource has an
+ordinary person who has money, and who wishes to be distinguished in the
+fashionable world, than to become a patron of the fine arts? I knew a
+person who spent several thousand dollars for pictures, and who, to my
+certain knowledge, knew and cared nothing about them except as they
+affected her standing in the fashionable world. But of those who have a
+good degree of taste, there are few whose motives are not mixed. And
+then it is to be remembered, that a product of art may be viewed in many
+different aspects. It may be regarded as costing so much, as requiring
+such a frame, or to be placed in such a light, or as an ornamental piece
+of furniture, while there is but a single point of view in which it can
+be regarded as gratifying taste. The moment a picture comes to be
+considered as an ornament, or an article of furniture, you might as well
+have a looking-glass or a pier-table. It not unfrequently happens, that
+the owner of fine pictures thinks so much of them as ornamental or
+valuable, so much of their framing, or light, or preservation, that he
+becomes indifferent to them in the only point of view in which they are
+truly valuable.
+
+But again, in order to see this point in its true light we must consider
+the peculiar rank which is held by the pleasures connected with the fine
+arts. These pleasures are addressed to the eye and to the ear, and hold
+a middle rank between the lower pleasures of sense on the one hand, and
+the higher enjoyments of the intellect and of the affections on the
+other; and may readily associate with, and promote either. This point is
+well stated by Lord Kames. It is observed by him, that "in touching,
+tasting, and smelling, we are sensible of the impression made upon the
+organ, and are led to place there the pleasant or painful feeling caused
+by that impression;" but that with respect to hearing and seeing, "we
+are insensible to the organic impression, and hence conceive the
+pleasures derived from these senses to be more refined and spiritual
+than those which seem to exist externally at the organ of sense, and
+which are conceived to be merely corporeal. These pleasures," says he,
+"being sweet and moderately exhilarating, are, in their tone, equally
+distant from the turbulence of passion and the languor of indolence, and
+by that tone are perfectly well qualified not only to revive the spirits
+when sunk by sensual gratification, but also to relax them when
+overstrained in any violent pursuit." "Organic pleasures," he observes
+again, "have naturally a short duration; when prolonged, they lose their
+relish; when indulged to excess, they beget satiety and disgust; and to
+restore a proper tone of mind, nothing can be more happily contrived
+than the exhilarating pleasures of the eye and ear." Now this is
+precisely the use, and all the use that many make of the fine arts, and
+I may add, to some extent of the beauties of nature too. How many
+wealthy sensualists are there in our cities who give an appearance of
+elevation and refinement to their low and selfish mode of life, by
+collecting about them specimens of the arts! These men may be best
+compared to that amphibious animal, the frog. They come up occasionally
+from that lower element in which they live, into a region of light and
+beauty, but no sooner are they a little refreshed than they plunge again
+into the mud of sensual gratification. It is men like these, who, when
+their capacity for the lower pleasures is exhausted, drive in their
+carriages about the cities of the old world (perhaps we are not yet
+sufficiently corrupt,) and set up to be _virtuosi_. It is easy to see
+how such a taste must bear upon morals.
+
+But I remark once more, that the fine arts may be made to pander
+directly to vice. From the middle rank which the pleasures derived from
+them hold, they readily associate, as has been said, both with the
+higher and the lower. Thus, music may quicken the devotions of a seraph,
+and lend its strains to cheer the carousals of the bacchanal; and
+poetry, painting and sculpture, while they have power to elevate, and
+charm, and purify the mind, may be made direct stimulants to the vilest
+and lowest passions. It is indeed from this quarter that we are to look
+for danger from the prevalence of these arts. It was thus that they
+corrupted the ancient cities; and those who have seen the abominable
+statuary dug from the ruins of Herculaneum and Pompeii, do not wonder
+that they were buried under a sea of fire. The same process of
+corruption through these arts has gone to a fearful extent on the
+eastern continent, and has commenced in this country. Clothed in this
+garment of light, vice finds access where it otherwise could not. Under
+the pretence of promoting the fine arts, modesty is cast aside, and
+indecent pictures are exhibited, and respectable people go to see them.
+If I might utter a word of warning to the young, it would be to beware
+of vice dressed in the garments of taste. The beauties of nature are
+capable of no such perversion. All the associations connected with them
+tend to elevate and to purify the mind. No case can be adduced in which
+a taste for gardening or for natural objects has corrupted a people.
+While, therefore, I believe that the cultivation of the arts, in their
+genuine spirit of beauty and of purity, has a tendency to improve the
+character, it would appear that they are greatly liable to abuse, and
+that they have been extensively abused.
+
+But though I may thus dispose of the general objection from the
+co-existence in many cases of refinement in the arts and corrupt morals,
+yet this, I think, will not fully meet the objection which first arose
+in the minds of some, from those numerous individual instances in which
+men have been eminent for taste and genius, and at the same time
+corrupt. What, you have been ready to say, do you make of such a case
+as that of Byron? Now I would here make an inquiry, how far, and in what
+sense, those productions of genius which have a corrupt tendency are
+really consistent with good taste. Take the Don Juan of Byron for
+instance. To say nothing of principle, such a work certainly is not
+compatible with a correct _moral_ taste. That it is in some sense,
+however, a work of taste, cannot be denied; but it seems to me to be
+only as a splendid palace, built in a low and fetid morass, is a work of
+taste. The palace may be beautiful, but it was in bad taste _to set it
+there_. Particular rooms may be elegantly furnished, but still there
+comes up from the surrounding marsh a pestilential miasm, and it may be
+said of the atmosphere around it, as was said of that around New Orleans
+a few autumns since, that "all is beauty and all is death." So far
+therefore as these works have a corrupt tendency, they cannot be said to
+be in the highest sense consistent with good taste. But still it is said
+that corrupt men have produced works of the highest genius and of the
+best taste that have had no such tendency. This is granted, but it is to
+be accounted for from the fact that men of genius are often men of
+strong passions and of wayward and unbalanced minds, and from the
+peculiar temptations in which, as I have already said, they are placed.
+Taste seems to me to be, to such men, what the music of David was to
+Saul,--it charms away the evil spirit, but it is only for a time.
+
+But we now pass to the third distinction which was to be made, and that
+is, between a true taste for natural objects and the fine arts, and
+what is called taste in the world of fashion. The point of distinction
+to which I would draw your attention is well stated by Stewart. "It is
+obvious," says he, "that the circumstances which please in the objects
+of taste are of two kinds: first, those which are fitted to please by
+nature, or by associations which all mankind are led to form by their
+common condition; and secondly, those which please in consequence of
+associations arising from local and accidental circumstances. Hence
+there are two kinds of taste; the one enabling us to judge of those
+beauties which have a foundation in the human constitution; the other,
+of such objects as derive their principal recommendation from the
+influence of fashion. These two kinds of taste are not always united in
+the same person; indeed, I am inclined to think that they are united but
+rarely. The perfection of the one depends much on the degree in which we
+are able to free the mind from the influence of casual associations;
+that of the other, on the contrary, depends on a faculty of association
+which enables us to fall in at once with all the turns of the fashion,
+and, as Shakspeare expresses it, to catch the tune of the times."
+Association is the sole foundation of the value which we put upon some
+articles, and of the beauty which we find in others. Thus, a lock of
+hair, valueless in itself, may, from associations connected with it,
+have a value which money cannot measure; and articles of dress, which
+would otherwise be to us indifferent, or odious, become beautiful by
+their association with those persons whom we have been accustomed to
+consider as models of elegance. It is indeed astonishing what an effect
+this principle will have upon our feelings; and from looking too
+exclusively at facts connected with it, some have been led to doubt
+whether there is any such thing as a permanent principle of taste. It
+would really seem, that, within the bounds of comfort and decency, both
+of which are often outraged by fashion, one mode of dress may come to be
+as becoming as another. The wigs, the knee-buckles, the small-clothes,
+the long-skirts and cocked-hats of our grandfathers, were as becoming
+then, as is now the dress of the present day. Says Sir Joshua Reynolds,
+"If an European, when he has cut off his beard, and put false hair on
+his head, or bound up his own natural hair in regular hard knots, as
+unlike nature as he can possibly make it, and after having rendered them
+immovable by the help of the fat of hogs, has covered the whole with
+flour, laid on by a machine with the utmost regularity; if, when thus
+attired, he issues forth and meets a Cherokee Indian, who has bestowed
+as much time at _his_ toilet, and laid on, with equal care and
+attention, his yellow and red ochre on particular parts of his forehead
+or cheeks, as he judges most becoming; whoever of these two despises the
+other for his attention to the fashion of his country; whichever feels
+himself provoked to laugh, is the barbarian." Good taste with respect to
+the fashions, then, would seem to consist, not in following them, or in
+paying them attention, except so far as to avoid attracting notice in
+any way by dress; for it is a strong indication, when a person seeks
+notice from that, that there is about him little else that is worthy of
+notice. The foundation of taste in the fashions, however, being what I
+have now stated, it is obvious that a quick perception of their
+ever-varying changes and a ready and careful accommodation to them, can
+belong, whether in man or woman, only to a mind essentially frivolous;
+and that such a taste, if not absolutely incompatible with a perception
+of all that is permanently grand and beautiful in the works of God, is
+yet seldom connected with it. Such a taste must, of course, rather
+injure than promote good morals.
+
+
+I have now considered taste as exercised indifferently upon any objects
+within its appropriate province. It still remains that I should say
+something, which I propose to do in another Lecture, on Moral Taste, or
+on taste having moral actions for its object.
+
+
+
+
+LECTURE II.
+
+
+It was observed on a former occasion, that material objects produce
+their effect upon taste chiefly as signs; but it is the opinion of Mr.
+Alison, of Mr. Jeffries, and others of high authority on this point,
+that it is solely as signs--solely as suggesting intellectual and moral
+qualities--that they have an effect. It is quite evident that mere
+matter in a chaotic state, or in any state which is not either produced
+by mind or such as mind would produce, cannot be beautiful; and hence it
+is said that it can be beautiful only as a means of indicating qualities
+that do not belong to itself.
+
+The great difficulty which this theory has to encounter arises from the
+apparent instantaneousness with which the emotion seems to arise when a
+beautiful object is presented. But this is not a conclusive objection,
+because emotions which can arise only from association seem to come in
+the same way. How instantaneous, for instance, are the emotions that
+throng up when he who has been long on a foreign shore sees, for the
+first time, the stars and stripes of his country's flag as it enters the
+port where he is;--and yet, these emotions can be awakened by it only as
+a link of association with scenes that are past, or as a sign of his
+country's presence and protection. I have heard the rainbow adduced as
+an instance of an object which produces the emotion of beauty without a
+reference to any thing beyond itself. But what was the impression made
+by it more than two thousand years ago, upon the mind of one who had no
+theory to maintain?--"Look upon the rainbow," says he, "and praise Him
+that made it: very beautiful it is in the brightness thereof. It
+compasseth the heavens about with a glorious circle, and _the hands of
+the Most High have bended it_." How apparently instantaneous, yet how
+different, are our emotions when looking at the cheek flushed by the
+bloom of health, or suffused by the blush of shame, or reddened by
+anger, or wearing that hectic flush which is the flag of distress held
+out by nature when she is sinking in consumption!--And yet no one can
+doubt, if these indications were reversed, that the emotions would be
+reversed also. It is conceded by all, that it is the expression, the
+indication of mental and moral qualities, that gives its highest beauty
+to the human countenance. There are no features which may not be so
+lighted up with noble or tender emotion as to be beautiful. But is
+there, it will be asked, _no_ beauty in any combination of features, or
+of matter, except as connected with expression? I am inclined to think
+there is what may be called an instinctive beauty on the perception of
+certain colors and forms; but it is of little value compared with that
+of which a rational and reflective being can give an account to himself.
+Even this, however, presupposes the action of mind upon matter, though
+that action is not recognized by us as the cause of our emotion. It is
+therefore still true that, as the beauty of the early morning is
+produced solely by a reflexion from the sun while he is still below the
+horizon, so the beauty of matter is wholly a reflexion from that great
+central orb of mind which has never yet beamed upon the eye of man in
+its direct effulgence--that, to him who views it aright, the beauty of
+this world is but the morning twilight of heaven.
+
+But, however this question may be decided, the fact that it can be made
+a question at all, shows how largely moral ideas and emotions enter into
+the province of taste, and the intimate connexion there is between taste
+and morals. What is called moral taste is, in fact, discriminated from
+taste in general, only as it has the moral actions of free and
+intelligent agents for its object. When we look at a moral action, there
+is a plain difference between our perception of it as right, and our
+perception of it as beautiful. In one case there arises the feeling of
+_approbation_, in the other of _admiration_, which are entirely
+distinct, and may exist in very different proportions.
+
+It is, indeed, not always easy to distinguish the point at which
+approbation and admiration run into each other; and in treating of this
+subject, I shall first say a few words of that border-ground between
+taste and morals where the dividing line seems to be unsettled. Where,
+for example, shall we place that feeling which we have in view of the
+manner of doing a thing, in distinction from the thing done? Is that
+feeling merely the result of taste, or are there mingled with it some
+elements of moral approbation or disapprobation? Where will you place a
+mean action in distinction from a dishonest one? I have heard it
+disputed whether neatness is a virtue, a matter of moral obligation, or
+merely a requisition of taste. Is a man under moral obligation to be
+neat in his person? It is along this dividing line that all those
+actions lie which relate to the proprieties and courtesies of life--all
+those smaller attentions to the convenience and comfort of others, and
+that delicate regard to their feelings, which have been designated by
+the French as the smaller morals.
+
+In regard to this very extensive, and therefore important department of
+human conduct, there seem to be two common mistakes. The first consists
+in disregarding it altogether. There are many men whose characters, in
+their sketching and outline, are fine, and which, seen at a distance,
+appear well; but on approaching them, they seem coarse and very
+imperfect. In all the great duties of life they appear to advantage; but
+through negligence, or some greater failing, the minor duties, and
+especially the department of manners, is entirely neglected. They seem
+like stately trees, in the trunk and main branches of which the sap
+circulates vigorously, but does not reach and animate the smaller twigs,
+and give to the leaves their perfect green.
+
+A second, and more common mistake, is the giving up of this department
+to the control of taste under the guidance of selfishness. The manners
+are polished, and all the forms of politeness adopted, not for the
+purpose of making others happy, but of securing to ourselves their
+esteem, and of effecting our own ends in life. This is the school of
+manners recommended by Chesterfield, and young persons are often
+exhorted to pay attention to their manners on this ground. In this case
+the sap does not circulate at all, and the leaves are painted.
+
+But to me it seems, that this whole class of actions falls within the
+province of morality. Wherever human happiness is concerned, there is
+room for principle to operate, and the constitution of society will
+never be sound, and its beauty will never be perfect, till the sap of
+principle circulates to the extremities of human action. The true polish
+and beauty of society can result only from the principle of benevolence
+showing itself in a graceful and practical attention to the minor wants
+and to the feelings of others. But whatever we may decide in regard to
+their respective limits in this department, it is obvious that taste, so
+far as it goes, must be favorable to morals.
+
+We now pass to what is indisputably the province of morals. And here our
+first inquiry will be, what are the circumstances under which the
+emotions of taste are awakened by moral actions? In reply to this
+inquiry I observe, that the emotion of beauty, leaving sublimity for the
+present out of the question, is awakened by a moral action chiefly,
+and perhaps solely, when it springs from the principle of duty acting in
+coincidence with the desires, the affections, or some other natural and
+inferior principle of action. This point is of practical importance, and
+requires illustration. Man, as we all know, has various principles of
+action,--such as instincts, desires, affections, passions. These may
+impel him to a course of action directly opposed to that indicated by a
+sense of duty, and they may also lead him to perform the same actions as
+are dictated by it; and the position is, that moral beauty arises when
+there is a partial or entire coincidence between the principle of duty
+and these inferior powers.
+
+That this is so is evident, because there are many actions which are
+right, which are imperatively required by duty, which yet do not awaken
+in the mind of the impartial spectator any admiration--for we must here
+keep in mind the distinction already made between admiration and
+approbation. The simple payment of a debt, for example, does not awaken
+any admiration, though we approve the act and should strongly condemn
+him who should not do it when it was in his power. In this case, there
+can be mingled with the performance of duty no play of the generous
+emotions. He who performs all his actions solely from a sense of duty,
+has our approbation, our respect; but he who, in addition to this, is
+possessed of warm affections, which always coincide in their promptings
+with what is right, has also our admiration and love. Duty is to the
+affections, in the conduct of life, what logic is to rhetoric in a
+discourse. Logic forms an excellent body for a discourse; we assent to
+it, we approve it, it is good, all good, but it awakens no admiration.
+It is not till rhetoric sends its warm life-blood to mantle on the cold
+cheek of logic, and clothes its angular form in the garments of taste,
+that we begin to admire the discourse. And so it is with duty. It is an
+excellent body to the course of our conduct in life; nothing else will
+do, but it may be so performed as to appear unamiable and even
+repulsive. In order to be beautiful, there must be connected with it
+some manifestation of natural affection or graceful emotion.
+
+And here I may remark, that though we have a right to expect of every
+man that he will do his duty, yet the display of this beauty is not
+equally within the power of all, since the existence and manifestation
+of emotion depend, to some extent, upon the temperament. As there are
+some who have naturally a meagre intellect, so there are others whose
+minds seem to be barren of those finer sympathies and affections of our
+nature which are the verdure of the soul, and upon which the eye always
+rests with pleasure. The characters of some good men are dry and
+unattractive. They are harsh, and hard-visaged, and seem too much like
+wooden men, moved by rule and calculation. Such persons often seem
+better, and worse, than they really are. Their freedom from
+extravagancies on the one hand, and on the other, that want of feeling
+which is wrongly termed by many hardness of heart, is equally the result
+of temperament.
+
+That the doctrine which I now advocate is correct, appears also from the
+effect produced upon our feelings when we observe habit taking the place
+of sentiment in the performance of duty. We have all seen persons enter
+upon a course of virtuous activity, and continue it for a time from a
+sense of duty, sustained by ardent feeling; but after a time the feeling
+has died away, and there has come in its stead habit, or a regard to
+consistency, to sustain the sense of duty in keeping up the same course
+of external action. When this change has taken place, we are all
+conscious that the beauty of the conduct is greatly diminished;--its
+spirit has vanished; the dew of its youth is exhaled.
+
+I said that this was a practical point, and I now wish to show, in
+connexion with it, precisely how it is that mischief arises from the
+perversion of moral taste; as was shown, in the former Lecture, how it
+arises from its perversion in other things. In opposition to the hard
+and dry characters mentioned above, there are those whose
+susceptibilities are acute, whose sympathies are quick, whose feelings
+are generous, whose affections are ardent, who do every thing so
+promptly and so heartily that impulse seems almost to supply the place
+of principle. There is something very attractive in a character of this
+kind; there is an ease and freedom about it which seems to put aside all
+labor of calculation, and it moreover exhibits our nature in the
+pleasing garb of natural goodness. It is for this reason that novelists,
+who draw men as they wish to have them, and not as they are, have
+almost universally made these fine instincts of humanity the guide of
+their hero, and the basis of his character. This is, indeed, if I
+understand it, the basis of this kind of literature, and one chief
+source of the injury it produces. The exhibition of these instincts, and
+affections, and emotions, springing up at random and acting without the
+control of principle, holds out no stimulus to exertion; and their
+possession and exercise is often in fact, and often too in books,
+connected with great corruption of moral character.
+
+Taking, therefore, as the main ingredient in the character of those who
+are to make the chief figure in this kind of writing, what Miss
+Martineau calls _spontaneousness_, and which she and a certain wise
+friend of hers in Boston thought should by all means be encouraged and
+_reverenced_, we may mix the other materials somewhat to our taste. An
+excellent and much-approved receipt for the hero of a novel is the
+following:--1st. Make him handsome, for beauty is to the body what
+spontaneousness is to the mind, a sort of physical spontaneousness. Or,
+if you do not make him handsome, do what amounts to much the same thing,
+give him an _air_; let him have something about him that is peculiar, so
+that those who scan him closely may observe, under those apparently
+indifferent features, a certain something, a sign of the fire that is
+slumbering within. 2d. If you find it necessary, for fashion's sake, to
+put him at school, or at any place for study, make him idle, generous,
+somewhat mischievous, a great hater of mathematics, (for, so far as my
+knowledge extends, no hero of a novel ever yet knew any thing about
+mathematics,) give him some whimsical pursuit for the hours when he
+chooses to do any thing, and then make him speak, as he has occasion,
+Italian, French and Spanish, which he learned by instinct. 3d. _Make him
+act from impulse, and not from principle, and get him into difficulty
+through the influence of these same generous impulses._ It is on
+difficulties thus created that the plot must turn. 4th. Get him in love.
+5th. Make him run a gauntlet of difficulties a volume and a half long,
+furnishing a new illustration of that old adage, "the course of true
+love never did run smooth." 6th. Marry him, and let him live many years
+in perfect felicity.
+
+We commonly hear it said, that the chief mischief of novel-reading
+arises from the false pictures of life which novels present. This is
+doubtless a source of no small mischief; but in my view, a much greater
+evil arises from their holding up, directly or indirectly, false
+principles of action, and casting contempt upon the true; from their
+leading young persons to admire that which they esteem graceful rather
+than that which is respectable and right in the conduct of life. There
+is in those works an unnatural separation made between the principle of
+virtue and that which gives to virtue its beauty; and principle is
+represented as formal and cold, and perhaps ridiculous. Prudence,
+especially, is a virtue which no heroine of a novel must ever be guilty
+of. In a recent work, which deserves great credit for avoiding the
+general fault just mentioned, we are yet told that prudence was a
+virtue for which the heroine was never famous, and a slight odium is
+cast upon the virtue itself by making it appear, in the rival of the
+heroine, somewhat stiff and pragmatical.
+
+It is thus that these works awaken extensively, in the minds of the
+young, associations unfavorable to the sterner and sterling virtues; and
+in many cases, these amiable qualities are so associated with vice as to
+render it attractive. It is thus that we are presented by popular
+novelists--and in such a manner as I know carries along the sympathies
+of many young men, while their imaginations are rendered familiar with
+the haunts of vice--with gentlemen robbers who rob in style; who are so
+generous that they never rob the poor; who never shed human blood if
+people will give up their money without it; and if they are occasionally
+obliged to blow out the brains of some agent of the law, they are really
+sorry for it, though they do not see how such impertinent fellows could
+expect any thing better. It is thus that the impression is received,
+that a certain class of impulses is sufficient to secure success in
+life, and even to excuse the want of principle; and young men with their
+heads full of pictures, not perhaps so bad as this, yet fundamentally
+the same, rush eagerly into life without fixed principles and fixed
+aims.
+
+To him who is without experience, there is no sight more beautiful than
+that of a young man of an ingenuous nature entering upon life, and
+resting upon his own good impulses to keep him from evil. But such a
+sight, even when there has been no corruption like that just spoken of,
+now causes apprehension in me; for I have seen him who had every thing,
+in his person and in his sensibilities, to excite admiration and love,
+tarrying long at the wine, and seeking mixed wine; I have seen him going
+to that "house" which "is the way to hell;" and therefore it is that I
+would utter a solemn protest against any thing which would divorce the
+beauty of virtue from the principle of virtue, or which would give an
+impression that there is security without fixed principle. Even
+"genius," with all these amiable qualities--
+
+                "Yet may lack the aid
+  Implored by humble minds and hearts afraid,
+  May leave to timid souls the shield and sword
+  Of the tried faith and the resistless word;
+  Amid a world of dangers venturing forth,
+  Frail but yet fearless, proud in conscious worth,
+  Till strong temptation, in some fatal time,
+  Assails the heart and wins the soul to crime."
+
+Then,
+
+      "All that honor brings against the force
+      Of headlong passion, aids its rapid course;
+      Its slight resistance but provokes the fire,
+  As wood-work stops the flame, and then conveys it higher."
+
+With such a basis to the characters presented, it will follow of course,
+that the emotions and the sensibilities will be chiefly addressed in
+these works, and thus they become the principal means of promoting that
+false and selfish sensibility which is so often cultivated in refined
+society. This is a more refined species of intemperance, and is to the
+mind what intemperance in strong drink is to the body. It causes
+excitement for the mere selfish enjoyment produced by it, without
+leading to any exertion. And as the grosser species of intemperance is
+more common among one sex, so it is to be feared, that this more refined
+species is more common among the other; and that for both, circulating
+libraries, and other libraries, instead of furnishing wholesome
+entertainment, are too often converted into mere intellectual
+dram-shops. There are many who seek chiefly for excitement, who have a
+constant craving for it, whose emotions and mental sensibilities have
+become accustomed to a set of artificial stimulants till they are
+sensible to no other, and they become as remorselessly selfish as the
+drunkard himself. I would sooner apply for an act of genuine kindness,
+one which should reach actual want, to a woman in a log-house, upon the
+side of a mountain, surrounded by hungry children, than to the daintiest
+young lady whose sensibilities have spindled up and wilted in the
+artificial heat of novel-reading. In order to perform the duties of
+benevolence and philanthropy, it is indispensable that the sensibilities
+should be kept alive to the impressions of misery as it actually
+presents itself in all its squalid accompaniments.
+
+  "Sweet are the tears that from a Howard's eye
+  Drop on the cheek of one he lifts from earth;
+  And he who works me good with unmoved face,
+  Does it but half; he chills me while he aids,
+  My benefactor, not my fellow-man.
+  But even this, this cold benevolence,
+  Seems worth, seems manhood, when there rise before me
+  The sluggard Pity's vision-weaving tribe,
+  Who sigh for wretchedness, yet shun the wretched,
+  Nursing, in some delicious solitude,
+  Their slothful loves and dainty sympathies!"
+
+It was this esteem in which mankind hold the sensibilities and impulses,
+this preference of spontaneousness without its connexion with principle,
+which gave its popularity to what has been called the sentimental
+school--the results of which ought to teach society a lesson not soon to
+be forgotten. Concerning this school, it is justly remarked by
+Coleridge, that "all the mischief achieved by Hobbes, and the whole
+school of materialists, will appear inconsiderable if it be compared
+with the mischief effected and occasioned by the sentimental philosophy
+of Sterne and his numerous imitators. The vilest appetites, and the most
+remorseless inconstancy towards their objects, acquired the title of the
+_heart_--the irresistible feelings--the too tender sensibility: and if
+the frosts of prudence, the icy chains of human law, thawed and vanished
+at the genial warmth of human nature, who _could_ help it? It was an
+amiable weakness."
+
+I would here remark, that I have no objection to fictitious writings as
+such. There are those to which I do not object. Let them cease, first,
+to present false pictures of life: secondly, to array the sensibilities
+and associations of the mind against principle: and, thirdly, let them
+cease to create and feed a morbid craving for excitement, and to destroy
+the balance between the feelings and the judgment: and I shall not
+object to them. The mass of these writings, however, do produce each
+and all of these effects, and are, so far, indisputably pernicious.
+
+I have been thus particular in pointing out the evils which arise from
+arraying what is beautiful and graceful in morals and in conduct against
+that which is right, because I do not believe that the community are
+sufficiently warned against the mischief it is working, and in many
+cases are not perhaps aware of the manner in which it is wrought. Evil
+gains advantage over man by dividing him against himself, by bringing
+into collision faculties that were intended to work harmoniously
+together; and we may regard it as settled, that whoever or whatever
+would set up mere impulses, or sensibilities, or emotions, in the place
+of the reason and conscience of man, is thus dividing him against
+himself. It is with the conscience of man as it is with a king. He may
+have his prime minister, who is his chief favorite, and next to himself,
+but he must never abandon his power, or suffer the highest subject to
+depose him from the throne. The desires and affections are then only
+truly beautiful, when they are in ready attendance at the court of their
+rightful sovereign.
+
+Having now spoken of the manner in which evil is done by those who care
+to please rather than to improve mankind, I cannot leave this part of
+the subject without suggesting, to the friends of principle and of
+religion, how much, if what has been said is correct, they may do to
+counteract this evil by a free, a hearty, a joyful, and therefore an
+attractive, mode of doing that which is right. Whence have arisen those
+associations of coldness and formality and gloom, as connected with
+duty, which haunt the imaginations of many young persons, and which have
+just as little existence in reality as other spectres of the night? Is
+it not in part from an unnatural austerity, or from a cowardly and
+faltering step, a want of freedom and power and beauty in the
+exhibitions of virtue and principle on the part of those who profess to
+adhere to them? It is not as it should be, when the glad and the
+graceful emotions readily spring up by the side of every path that we
+walk in except the path of duty. He who marches under the banner of
+principle is not only to feel that he is engaged in a good cause, but is
+also to see in that cause a beauty which shall be to him what music is
+to the soldier, giving cheerfulness to his countenance and alacrity to
+his step. His is not indeed to be the unchastened, and reckless, and
+merely animal joy that is unconscious of the evil that exists, and that
+is to be met; but it is to be the joy of him who, though he is
+travelling in a difficult and obscure path, yet sees before him the
+bright and steady light of his own happy home. The more those who act
+from principle are able to combine, with the most perfect rectitude and
+uncompromising faithfulness, the cultivation and play of all the
+graceful and tender emotions, the more will they do to promote the cause
+in which they labor. I know, and here is the difficulty, that most
+virtue is too feeble for this; and I would not that there should be put
+on any affectation of freedom or ease. Virtue should move easily and
+gracefully only as it is strong, but it should become strong that it
+may move easily and gracefully, and thus become to all men as beautiful
+as it is obligatory.
+
+It is not a little that the Christian religion has suffered from the
+mistakes of its adherents on this point. It had been better if they had
+more regarded the spirit of its Founder when He commanded his disciples,
+even when they fasted, not to be of a sad countenance, as the hypocrites
+were. The impression we get of Paul, notwithstanding his labors and
+sufferings, is that he was a happy man. If he was sometimes "sorrowful,"
+he was yet "always rejoicing." The movements of his spirit were so ready
+and free, in view of the great subjects that filled his mind, that he
+reminds us more than any other man of the "rapt seraph that adores and
+burns." What is it, indeed, that gives its perfect beauty to our
+conception of the worship of heaven? Is it not, that the most perfect
+law is there fully obeyed, and is yet no restraint upon the highest and
+freest expansion of feeling? It is when this is so, and then only, that
+moral beauty is perfect.
+
+We have thus far considered moral beauty only. We now pass to another
+branch of our subject, the moral sublime. When speaking on taste in
+general, it was not necessary, for any purposes I then had in view, that
+I should make a distinction between beauty and sublimity, either as they
+exist in themselves, or as they are occasioned by outward objects.
+Indeed, it is the opinion of many writers, that there is no radical
+distinction between them, but that sublimity is merely the feeling of
+beauty heightened. This seems to me doubtful, even in material beauty;
+but in our present department, the occasions on which they arise are so
+different, that they must be distinguished. It was for this reason that
+I treated of beauty by itself.
+
+It has been observed, that the emotion of moral beauty arises when there
+is a coincidence between the sense of duty and certain inferior
+principles of action. I now observe, that the emotion of moral sublimity
+is awakened, when the sense of duty is opposed by inclination, or
+affection, or by any or all the inferior principles of action, and
+triumphs over them. Its principle consists in a power of self-control
+and of self-sacrifice, in those cases in which they are difficult.
+
+The illustration of this point will lead to a further confirmation of
+what was said in reference to moral beauty. No sight, for example, can
+be more beautiful than that of a family in which there is mutual
+attachment, and in which the performance of every duty is sweetened by
+affection. How beautiful is the assiduity of a child, who bears with
+every infirmity, and soothes every care, and anticipates every want, of
+a parent in sickness or in age! It is beautiful, but not sublime. The
+conduct of that young man, who labors hard and denies himself the
+ordinary pleasures of the young that he may support an aged mother, or
+add to her comfort, is highly beautiful; but natural affection
+coöperates with a sense of duty, and therefore it is not sublime. No one
+has ever considered as sublime the conduct of Æneas, when he bore his
+aged father upon his shoulders from the flames of Troy. But when the
+ancient Brutus, with a power that was supreme, sat in judgment on his
+own son who was accused of being a traitor, and when he gave the sign to
+the lictor to take him to execution, then there was a struggle, then
+inflexible justice triumphed over natural affection, and it was--not
+beautiful, it was too awful for that--but it was sublime. That act of
+our Saviour, (if I may be permitted to refer to such a scene in this
+connexion,) by which he remembered his mother upon the cross and
+provided for her wants, was beautiful--how beautiful! His prayer for his
+murderers was sublime. It is, in general, acts of tenderness,
+gentleness, condescension, pity, gratitude, humanity, that are
+beautiful; while it is, on the other hand, acts of magnanimity, of
+fortitude, of inflexible justice, of high patriotism, and, on proper
+occasions, of contempt of danger and of death, that are sublime. In all
+these latter cases it will be seen that the principle is the same, and
+that the sublime emotion is awakened by virtuous self-control, in union
+with high resolve.
+
+We hence see why it is that periods of difficulty, and oppression, and
+persecution, are favorable to the exhibition of the moral sublime. They
+test the amount of attachment to principle which there is among men, and
+the sacrifices which they are willing to make for it. Accordingly, it
+has been in such emergencies that men have arisen, who, under the
+inspiration of the great principles of civil and religious liberty,
+have been ready to go in the face of every danger, wherever their duty
+should call them; as Luther was determined to go to the diet of Worms,
+though he should find as many devils in that city as there were tiles
+upon the houses. These are the men, who, though they have been opposed,
+and vilified, and persecuted in their day, have yet received the homage
+of after ages; who have stood as the beacon-lights of the world, and
+whose names have been the watchword of those who have rallied and struck
+for the united reign of liberty and law. Such men have almost always
+been in advance of their age, and the people of that age have not
+comprehended them. They have reverenced the great men of former times;
+they have built the sepulchres of the prophets, but have persecuted
+those who were sent unto _them_. It is not therefore surprising that
+Seneca has spoken so largely of the benefits of adversity, as alone
+giving an opportunity for the display of the heroic virtues, and has
+said that a good man, struggling with adversity, was a spectacle worthy
+of the gods.
+
+But it is not necessary to the existence, though it may be to the
+exhibition, of moral heroism, that we should be placed in circumstances
+of external adversity. Wherever there is moral combat, there may be
+moral sublimity, and this combat is necessary for the accomplishment of
+that triumph which every man is called to gain over himself. The force
+and grandeur of virtue are then seen when we sacrifice to it our
+appetites, our avarice, our pride, our vanity, our ambition, our
+resentments, till every evil passion is brought into subjection to
+reason and conscience.
+
+Such being the nature of the moral sublime, it is obvious that there is
+much less danger to morals from its perversion than from the perversion
+of the beautiful. There is here no natural passion to come in as an ally
+of principle; and which may take the place of it, but it is duty
+struggling single-handed, and triumphing over all the might of external
+nature, and all the force of human propensity. Virtue may indeed exist
+in perfect serenity, and be exercised without an obstacle; but in this
+world, and it is that which makes it a place of probation, there is
+little virtue except on the condition of struggling against and
+overcoming inclination or passion. If we succeed in this struggle, we
+feel in our own breasts a peace which is not only present happiness, but
+the promise of future reward; and we awaken in the breasts of others the
+emotions of moral sympathy, of approbation, of sublimity in its highest
+forms, till they are ready to welcome us with acclaim, and we find that
+virtue is not only happiness, but is also "glory, and honor, and
+immortality."
+
+But though moral beauty and sublimity are so different in their nature
+and in the occasions on which they arise, it must not be supposed that
+they do not often blend with each other in actual life. The general
+course of Howard, for instance, being in accordance with the dictates of
+humanity, had great moral beauty, and yet the sacrifices which he made
+were often so great as to cause that course to partake of the moral
+sublime.
+
+If the account of moral taste, now given, be correct, the analysis of
+the subject is the only argument needed. Its cultivation must, of
+course, be favorable to morals, since it would lead, in its perfect
+state, to the same course of conduct as would be required by principle.
+There is, indeed, a whole school of philosophers, that of Shaftesbury,
+who have looked upon virtue, and have recommended it, as beautiful
+rather than as obligatory; who have regarded it as a sentiment rather
+than a principle; and whose writings have been calculated to awaken
+enthusiasm in the cause of virtue, but not to give it its proper
+sanctions. So far, however, as this class of feelings would lead us, it
+is in the direct path of virtue, and they may, no doubt, be so
+cultivated, and especially by the young, as to furnish efficient aid to
+the principle of duty. Perhaps few persons, rightly educated, are aware
+how many wrong actions they avoid with the greater care because they are
+also mean; how many right actions they perform with the greater
+readiness because they are in accordance with the requisitions of a
+cultivated moral taste. Considered as a principle of action, such a
+taste provides an effectual security against the grossness connected
+with many vices, and cherishes a temper of mind friendly to all that is
+amiable, or generous, or elevated in our nature. While, therefore, we
+regard taste as an important ally to the sense of duty, we are not to
+rely chiefly upon it. It would need stability, and would be constantly
+liable to be led astray by the influence of fashion, or of casual
+association. We may however do more, we should do more to combine them;
+to unite taste and principle in the conduct of life; to do, ourselves,
+and to lead others to do, what is becoming, as well as what is right.
+
+Man is capable of forming to himself an ideal model, of embodying a
+conception of excellence such as he has never seen, and of acting with
+reference to it. It is this which renders him capable of progression;
+and one great reason why men are stationary, is, that they have in their
+minds no fixed and definite standard of excellence after which they are
+reaching. Young men, to whom I speak, here is the point at which many of
+you doubtless fail. You are borne on by the current, and form to
+yourselves no worthy object of pursuit, after which you bring
+yourselves, by self-discipline, steadily to labor. But without doing
+this, no man ever yet exerted a high and worthy influence; no man ever
+can. Permit me then to propose to you, in your capacity as social
+beings, an object after which you may thus strive. It is the combination
+of perfect moral principle with perfect simplicity and refinement of
+manners--the union, in the conduct of life, of Morals and Taste.
+
+There remains but a single consideration which I shall adduce, to show
+that there is the connexion between taste and morals for which I
+contend. It is, that we naturally associate with goodness, beauty of
+form; and that in a perfect state, we conceive of goodness as surrounded
+by objects that are pleasing to the taste. Perhaps this may not have
+been noticed by all, but a little attention to what passes in our own
+minds will convince us that it is so. This natural association of beauty
+and goodness perhaps arises from the fact, that every indication of
+goodness as expressed in the countenance is pleasing, and may be
+heightened into beauty. It is surprising how soon we come to regard as
+pleasing, the most ordinary features, when we have associated with them
+a fund of good qualities; or rather, the features soon become like the
+letters of a book, which we regard only for the meaning they convey. As
+I have said before, no features are so ordinary that they may not come
+to appear to us beautiful by the expression of good qualities; and if I
+may suppose, which I would by no means assert, that there are any homely
+persons present, I would congratulate them on the inducements they have
+to cultivate the only beauty that is permanent, or that can be the
+foundation of lasting attachment.
+
+Not only however may homely features become beautiful by their
+expression, but we have, I think, a natural association of positive
+beauty as connected with the goodness which we have not seen, and of
+positive deformity as connected with vice. When we read of good men
+even, we regard them as having something in their appearance
+corresponding with their character, and no man, I am sure, can suppose
+that Benedict Arnold had a countenance that was pleasant to look upon.
+But what is conclusive on this point is, that no man ever conceived of
+Satan in his proper form, as beautiful, or ever conceived of an angel,
+except as clothed in light and beauty.
+
+It is this natural supposition of the connexion of beauty of mind with
+beauty of form, that gives its plausibility and point to a dream of Sir
+Isaac Bickerstaff, as related in one of the Tattlers. He seemed to
+himself to be in an open plain, surrounded by an immense assembly of
+females, in the midst of whom the goddess of justice sat enthroned, and
+holding in her hand a mirror of such peculiar properties as to reflect
+the faces of those who looked into it in exact correspondence with their
+characters. This mirror was held up and turned before the assembly, and
+the effect may well be imagined. Some beautiful women had the
+satisfaction of seeing their faces become still more beautiful, while
+many more were shocked to see themselves converted into perfect frights.
+Some who were homely before, became still more so; while many unassuming
+and modest persons, who had never dreamed of being handsome, and so had
+sought the approbation of their own consciences, were surprised to see
+how their faces were brightened up. There was however one face, which
+seemed to beam with a celestial radiance, and was so surprisingly
+beautiful that Sir Isaac determined at once on making proposals to the
+lady, if he could but ascertain to whom it belonged. This, by careful
+attention, he was soon enabled to do, and found that it was a little,
+grey-headed, wrinkled old woman who stood by his side.
+
+There is something ludicrous in the manner in which this is set forth,
+but it involves a most serious and pleasing truth. It is as much a part
+of the disorders of the present state of things, that goodness is ever
+connected with any thing but beauty, as it is that virtue is depressed
+while vice triumphs. In a perfect organization and state of things,
+matter would be entirely flexible to the action of spirit, and, of
+course, intellectual and moral beauty, as well as their opposites, must
+stamp their impress perfectly on the features. This we believe will be
+the case when the physical nature of man shall be reorganized, and the
+good shall not only be beautiful, but, as I have already remarked that
+we are naturally led to expect, shall be surrounded with all those
+objects that are pleasing to the taste. That these expectations are
+natural may be shown from the writings of all the heathen poets, and it
+is pleasing to observe how perfectly they coincide with the
+representations of the Scriptures on this point. We are there taught,
+not only that the righteous shall shine forth as the sun, but their
+dwelling-place is described as a city whose foundations are garnished
+with all manner of precious stones, whose streets are of pure gold, and
+whose gates are of pearl.
+
+Thus, as we associate with royalty its regalia, so do we associate with
+goodness, beauty, which seems to be its natural appendage; and not only
+in the Scriptures, but also in our own constitution, do we find a
+promise, that Goodness and Beauty shall be finally and forever united.
+
+
+
+
+TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES:
+
+
+  Text in italics is surrounded with underscores: _italics_.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Connexion Between Taste and Morals, by 
+Mark Hopkins
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 40845 ***