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diff --git a/40679-0.txt b/40679-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da31041 --- /dev/null +++ b/40679-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,21869 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 40679 *** + +Transcriber's Note: + +In text file only, superscripts (located in the Appendix) have been +enclosed in curly brackets {}. + +Remaining transcriber's notes are at the end of the text. + + * * * * * + + + + HISTORY + + OF THE + + ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND ADOPTION + + OF THE + + CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES; + + WITH + + NOTICES OF ITS PRINCIPAL FRAMERS. + + + BY + GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS. + + + IN TWO VOLUMES. + + VOLUME II. + + + NEW YORK: + HARPER AND BROTHERS, + FRANKLIN SQUARE. + 1858. + + + + + Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1858, by + + GEORGE T. CURTIS, + + in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District + of Massachusetts. + + + + +CONTENTS + +OF + +VOLUME SECOND. + + +BOOK IV. + + FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION. + + +CHAPTER I. + + PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.--ORGANIZATION OF THE + CONVENTION.--POSITION OF THE STATES.--RULE OF INVESTIGATION. + + Page + + Explanation of the Author's Plan 3, 4 + + Preservation of Republican Government 5-7 + + Nature of American Freedom 7-9 + + Its Dependence upon the Union 9, 10 + + Intention of the Framers of the Constitution 11 + + Hamilton's Purposes 11 + + The Confederation officially condemned 11, 12 + + Purposes of the States 12 + + The declared Objects of the Convention 13 + + Nature of the previous Union 14, 15 + + General Purpose of the People 16 + + Powers of the Convention 17 + + Opposite Views of the Members 18 + + Presence of Slavery in the States 19, 20 + + The Slaves in some Form to be considered 20-22 + + How they were regarded under the Confederation 21 + + Complex Relations of the Subject 22 + + All the States but one represented in Convention 23 + + Absence of Rhode Island 24, 25 + + Application of the Minority of Rhode Island 25, 26 + + Position of the States in Convention 27, 28 + + Reserved Authority of the People 28, 29 + + Present Importance of the Process of forming the + Constitution 29 + + Cautions to be used in Interpretation 30 + + +CHAPTER II. + + CONSTRUCTION OF A LEGISLATIVE POWER.--BASIS OF REPRESENTATION + AND RULE OF SUFFRAGE.--POWERS OF LEGISLATION. + + Randolph's Outline of a Constitution 32 + + Referred to Committee of the Whole 32 + + Idea of a National Government 32-35 + + Rule of Suffrage in the Legislature 35 + + First Parties in the Convention 36 + + Representatives in one Branch to be chosen by the People 37 + + Representation of the People 39-40 + + States in some way to be represented 40, 41 + + State Legislatures to choose the Members of the other Branch 41 + + Ratio of Representation as between the States 42-44 + + Basis of the Representative System 44-49 + + Rule of Suffrage in the Senate 48 + + Consequences of Numerical Representation 49, 50 + + Powers to be conferred on the Legislature 50 + + Control of State Legislation 51-55 + + Population of the States 55 + + +CHAPTER III. + + CONSTRUCTION OF THE EXECUTIVE AND THE JUDICIARY. + + Of how many Persons the Executive to consist 56 + + Negative to be given to the Executive 57 + + Mode of choosing the Executive 59 + + Purpose and Necessity of a Judiciary 60 + + To be made supreme 65 + + Its Jurisdiction 65 + + Tenure of the Judicial Office 67 + + Note on the Judicial Tenure 69 + + +CHAPTER IV. + + ADMISSION OF NEW STATES.--GUARANTY OF REPUBLICAN + GOVERNMENT.--POWER OF AMENDMENT.--OATH TO SUPPORT THE NEW + SYSTEM.--RATIFICATION. + + The Union destined to be enlarged 75 + + Jefferson's Measure for the Admission of New States in 1784 76 + + Want of Power in the Confederation 77 + + Power to be supplied in the Constitution 78 + + Guaranty of State Governments to be provided 79 + + Necessity and Utility of the Guaranty 80-83 + + A Mode of Amendment to be provided 84 + + Oath to support the Constitution 84 + + Mode of Ratification 84-86 + + Report of the Committee of the Whole 86 + + +CHAPTER V. + + ISSUE BETWEEN THE VIRGINIA AND THE NEW JERSEY + PLANS.--HAMILTON'S PROPOSITIONS.--MADISON'S VIEW OF THE NEW + JERSEY PLAN. + + General Character of the Virginia Plan 89 + + Difficulties and Obstacles in its Way 91 + + The chief Cause of Opposition 92 + + The counter Plan by the New Jersey Members 92 + + Referred to a Second Committee of the Whole 92 + + Argument of Patterson in its Support 93 + + Hamilton interposes 94 + + The Nature of the Issue pending 95 + + Hamilton's Leading Principles 95 + + He states the Courses open to the Convention 96 + + Explains the Principles on which Government must be founded 96-98 + + Objects to the New Jersey Plan 98, 99 + + Not satisfied with the Virginia Plan 99 + + His Views of what must be done 99, 100 + + Introduces his own Plan 101 + + It must be judged by the Issue pending 101-106 + + Madison examines the New Jersey Plan 106 + + Explains its Effect on the smaller States 107 + + Declares the Representation to be the great Difficulty 108 + + The States must be represented proportionally 109 + + The Virginia Plan again adhered to 109 + + Note on the Opinions of Hamilton 110 + + +CHAPTER VI. + + CONFLICT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AND FEDERAL SYSTEMS.--DIVISION + OF THE LEGISLATURE INTO TWO CHAMBERS.--DISAGREEMENT OF THE + STATES ON THE NATURE OF REPRESENTATION IN THE TWO + BRANCHES.--THREATENED DISSOLUTION OF THE UNION. + + Different Magnitudes of the States 116 + + Inequalities in other Respects 117 + + The Majority and Minority of States 117, 118 + + Views of New York 118-121 + + Luther Martin's Opinions 121 + + Position of Connecticut 122 + + Nature of the Question between the Larger and the Smaller + States 122-125 + + Advantages of a National System 127 + + Difficulties attending it 128 + + Dangers of adhering inflexibly to Theory 129 + + Division of the Legislature into Two Chambers 130 + + Origin of the Division in England 130, 131 + + Practical Advantages of the Separation 131, 132 + + Why resisted by the Minority 133 + + Defect in the Virginia Plan 133 + + Mode of electing the Members 134 + + Rule of Suffrage for the House 135 + + Madison's View of the Interest of the Small States 136 + + Hamilton on the Consequences of Dissolution 136, 137 + + Evil Results of a perfect Theory 137 + + Purpose of a Senate 138 + + Necessity for a distinct Basis 138-140 + + Irreconcilable Differences 140 + + Proposition of Compromise rejected 141 + + Disagreement on the Senate 141 + + Consequences of a Failure to form a Constitution 142-144 + + +CHAPTER VII. + + FIRST GRAND COMPROMISES OF THE CONSTITUTION.--POPULATION OF + THE STATES ADOPTED AS THE BASIS OF REPRESENTATION IN THE + HOUSE.--RULE FOR COMPUTING THE SLAVES.--EQUALITY OF + REPRESENTATION OF THE STATES ADOPTED FOR THE SENATE. + + Appointment of a Committee of Compromise 145 + + Representation adjusted by the Committee 146 + + Character of the Compromise 147 + + How treated in the Convention 147, 148 + + Apportionment of Representatives re-arranged 148, 149 + + Objections to the Plan 149, 150 + + Representation of the Slaves 150 + + Combined Rule of Numbers and Wealth 151 + + Test Question respecting the Slaves 153 + + Necessity for their Admission into the Basis of + Representation 154-162 + + The Difficulties only to be adjusted by Compromise 162 + + Form of the Compromise 163, 164 + + Equality of Vote adopted for the Senate 165, 166 + + Value of this Feature of the Constitution 166, 167 + + Population of the Slaveholding and Non-slaveholding States + compared 168 + + +CHAPTER VIII. + + POWERS OF LEGISLATION.--CONSTITUTION AND CHOICE OF THE + EXECUTIVE.--CONSTITUTION OF THE JUDICIARY.--ADMISSION OF NEW + STATES.--COMPLETION OF THE ENGAGEMENTS OF CONGRESS.--GUARANTY + OF REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTIONS.--OATH TO SUPPORT THE + CONSTITUTION.--RATIFICATION.--NUMBER OF + SENATORS.--QUALIFICATIONS FOR OFFICE.--SEAT OF GOVERNMENT. + + The General Interests of the Union to be provided for 170 + + Constitution, Laws, and Treaties to be Supreme 170 + + Appointment and Powers of the Executive 171 + + Re-eligibility of the Executive 172, 173 + + Tenure of the Office 173 + + Right of Suffrage in Choice of the Executive 174 + + Appointment by Electors 175 + + Construction of the Judiciary 176 + + Admission of New States 176 + + Completion of the Engagements of Congress 176 + + Guaranty of Republican Governments 177 + + Future Amendments 177 + + Oath to Support the Constitution 177 + + Ratification 177 + + Objects of a Popular Ratification 177-184 + + Constitution to be submitted to the Congress 185 + + Number of Senators 186 + + Qualifications for Office 186 + + Property Qualification 187 + + Seat of the National Government 189 + + General Pinckney's Notice respecting Slaves and Exports 189 + + Resolutions sent to Committee of Detail 190 + + +CHAPTER IX. + + REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL.--CONSTRUCTION OF THE + LEGISLATURE.--TIME AND PLACE OF ITS MEETING. + + Power confided to the Committee of Detail 193 + + Their Draft of a Constitution 194 + + Right of Suffrage 194 + + Foreign-born Inhabitants 195-196 + + Immigration to be encouraged 197 + + Qualifications for Voting 198-202 + + Power of Naturalization 199 + + Qualifications for Office 203-210 + + Spirit of the Constitution 211 + + Ratio of Representation 212-214 + + Money Bills 215-222 + + Qualifications of Senators 223, 224 + + Number of Senators 224-226 + + Method of Voting in the Senate 226-228 + + Vacancies in the Senate and House 229 + + Powers of the Senate 229-240 + + Senatorial Term 240-242 + + Disqualifications of Members of both Branches 242 _et seq._ + + Parliamentary Corruption 242-244 + + Executive Influence 244-256 + + Time and Place for Elections 257 + + Pay of Members 258, 259 + + Impeachments 260-262 + + Quorum of each House 262 + + Separate Powers of each House 262-263 + + President of the Senate 263 + + Enactment of Laws 264 + + President's Negative 265-268 + + Seat of Government 268-277 + + Session of Congress 277, 278 + + +CHAPTER X. + + REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL, CONTINUED.--THE POWERS OF + CONGRESS.--THE GRAND COMPROMISES OF THE CONSTITUTION + RESPECTING COMMERCE, EXPORTS, AND THE SLAVE-TRADE. + + General Principles of the Powers of Legislation 279, 280 + + Limitations 280 + + Exports and the Slave-Trade 281 + + Fitness and Unfitness of a Tax on Exports 282 + + Variety in the Exports of the United States 283 + + Impracticability of such a Tax 284 + + The Slave-Trade Controversy 285 _et seq._ + + How adjusted 289 _et seq._ + + Restrictions on the Revenue and Commercial Powers 289 + + Regulation of Commerce 291 _et seq._ + + Settlement of the Revenue and Commercial Powers 295 _et seq._ + + Proposition of Compromise 301 + + Arrangement of the Compromise 303 + + Value of the Compromise 307 + + Benefits of the Revenue and Commercial Powers 309 + + +CHAPTER XI. + + REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL, CONTINUED.--THE REMAINING + POWERS OF CONGRESS.--RESTRAINTS UPON CONGRESS AND UPON THE + STATES. + + Purpose of the Revenue Power 318-322 + + Preference of Ports prohibited 323, 324 + + Duties, &c. to be equal 325 + + Commerce with the Indian Tribes 325-328 + + Uniform Rule of Naturalization 328 + + Coining and Regulating Value of Money 328 + + Standard of Weights and Measures 328 + + Post-Offices and Post-Roads 328 + + Power to borrow Money 328-330 + + Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court 330 + + Rules as to Captures 330 + + Offences against the Law of Nations 331 + + Counterfeiting 332 + + War Power 332 + + Raising and supporting Armies 333 + + Navy 334 + + Power over the Militia 334-338 + + Necessary and proper Laws to execute the Specific Powers 338 + + Patents and Copyrights 339 + + Power over Territories 341-358 + + Admission of New States 358 + + Restraints upon Congress 359 + + Suspension of the _habeas corpus_ 359 + + Bills of Attainder 360 + + _Ex post facto_ Laws 360 _et seq._ + + Titles of Nobility 362 + + Gifts and Emoluments from foreign Princes 362 + + Restraints upon the States 362 _et seq._ + + Obligation of Contracts 365 + + State Imposts 369 + + Tonnage Duties 370 + + Other Restraints 371 + + +CHAPTER XII. + + REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL, CONTINUED.--SUPREMACY OF + THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.--DEFINITION AND PUNISHMENT OF + TREASON. + + Principles of the National Supremacy 372 + + Preamble of the Constitution 373 + + Supremacy effected through the Judicial Power 374 + + Ratification 375 + + Meaning and Operation of the Supremacy 376-381 + + Its Effect on the Growth of the Country 381-384 + + Definition and Punishment of Treason 384-387 + + +CHAPTER XIII. + + REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL, CONTINUED.--ELECTION AND + POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT. + + Election of the President, why not made directly by the People 388 + + Origin of the Plan of Electors 389 + + Choice of President and Vice-President 390-395 + + Succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency 395-398 + + Mode of filling the Vacancy when there is no Vice-President 398 + + Mode of choosing the Electors 398, 399 + + Opening of the Votes of the Electors 399, 400 + + Modifications of the Mode of Election made by the + Amendment 400, 401 + + Contingency, for which no Provision is made 401-403 + + Qualifications for the Presidency 404 + + Salary of the President 404-407 + + Question of a Cabinet, or a Council 407-409 + + Powers of the President 409 _et seq._ + + Executive Power 412, 413 + + Pardoning Power 413, 414 + + Treaty-making Power 414-417 + + Appointing Power 417, 418 + + To give Information on the State of the Union 419 + + Power to convene Congress 419 + + +CHAPTER XIV. + + REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL, CONTINUED.--FORMATION OF + THE JUDICIAL POWER. + + Scope of the Judicial Power 421-431 + + Its Purposes 431-445 + + +CHAPTER XV. + + REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL, CONTINUED.--EFFECT OF + RECORDS.--INTER-STATE PRIVILEGES.--FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE AND + FROM SERVICE. + + Intimacy of the Relations between the People of the States 447 + + Difference between the Confederation and the Constitution 447, 448 + + Privileges of Citizenship in all the States 448 + + Effect of Records 449 + + Fugitives from Justice 449, 450 + + Fugitives from Service 450-467 + + +CHAPTER XVI. + + REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL, CONTINUED.--GUARANTY OF + REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT AND INTERNAL TRANQUILLITY.--OATH TO + SUPPORT THE CONSTITUTION.--MODE OF AMENDMENT.--RATIFICATION + AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION.--SIGNING BY THE MEMBERS + OF THE CONVENTION. + + Purpose of the Guaranty of Republican Government 468 + + Meaning of the Guaranty 469 + + American Sense of a "Republican" Government 471 + + Amendment a Conservative Element 473 + + Distinction between Amendment and Revolution 473-474 + + Settlement of the Mode of Amending the Constitution 474-477 + + Restrictions on the Power of Amendment 477, 478 + + Oath to support the Constitution 478 + + Establishment of the Constitution provided for 479-485 + + Signatures of the Delegates 485-487 + + The Issue presented 487 + + + + +BOOK V. + + ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION. + + +CHAPTER I. + + GENERAL RECEPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION.--HOPES OF A REUNION + WITH GREAT BRITAIN.--ACTION OF THE CONGRESS.--STATE OF FEELING + IN MASSACHUSETTS, NEW YORK, VIRGINIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, + MARYLAND, AND NEW HAMPSHIRE.--APPOINTMENT OF THEIR + CONVENTIONS. + + Public Anxiety 491 + + Rumors about the Bishop of Osnaburg 492 + + Scheme of the Tories 493, 494 + + Publication of the Constitution 495 + + Its Friends and Opponents 495, 496 + + Position of the People 497, 498 + + Reception of the Instrument in Congress 499 + + Action upon it 500 + + Reception in Massachusetts 501 + + Reception in New York 502-504 + + Reception in Virginia 505, 506 + + Jefferson's Opinion 506, 507 + + Course recommended by Jefferson 508 + + Washington's Exertions 509 + + Patrick Henry's Course in the Legislature 510 + + Debate in the Legislature of South Carolina 511 + + Action of the Legislature of Maryland 512 + + Luther Martin's Address 512-514 + + State of Opinion in New Hampshire 514 + + The real Crisis anticipated 515 + + Chances for the Constitution 516 + + Uncertainty of the Result 517 + + +CHAPTER II. + + RATIFICATIONS OF DELAWARE, PENNSYLVANIA, NEW JERSEY, GEORGIA, + AND CONNECTICUT, WITHOUT OBJECTION.--CLOSE OF THE YEAR + 1787.--BEGINNING OF THE YEAR 1788.--RATIFICATION OF + MASSACHUSETTS, THE SIXTH STATE, WITH PROPOSITIONS OF + AMENDMENT.--RATIFICATION OF MARYLAND WITHOUT OBJECTION.--SOUTH + CAROLINA, THE EIGHTH STATE, ADOPTS, AND ADOPTS, AND PROPOSES + AMENDMENTS. + + Delaware ratifies unanimously 518 + + _Prestige_ of Philadelphia 519 + + James Wilson in the Convention of Pennsylvania 520 + + His Defence of the Constitution 521-524 + + Ratification of Pennsylvania 524 + + Position of New Jersey 524, 525 + + Ratifies the Constitution 526 + + Position of Georgia 526 + + Ratifies the Constitution 527 + + Convention of Connecticut 527, 528 + + Her Adoption 529 + + New Aspect of the Subject 529, 530 + + Convention of Massachusetts assembles 530 + + Nature of her Opposition 531 + + Value of her State Constitution 532 + + Parties in her Convention 532, 533 + + Samuel Adams and the Opposition 533, 534 + + The Federal Leaders 534 + + They recognize the Necessity for Amendments 535 + + Dangers of this Admission 535, 536 + + Hancock proposes the Amendments 537 + + Ratification procured by them 538 + + Conduct of the Minority 539 + + Nature of the Amendments 539, 540 + + The People of Boston rejoice 540 + + Influence of Massachusetts on New Hampshire 541 + + Critical Position of Maryland 542 + + Her Ratification 543 + + Rejoicings in Baltimore 543 + + Good News from South Carolina 544 + + Liberal Conduct of her People 544, 545 + + Defence of the Constitution by her Delegates 546 + + The Convention admits the Justice of the Commercial Power 547 + + Efforts of the Opposition 548 + + Charleston celebrates the Constitution 548 + + +CHAPTER III. + + RATIFICATIONS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, VIRGINIA, AND NEW YORK, WITH + PROPOSED AMENDMENTS. + + New Hampshire, Virginia, and New York are to act in the + same Month 549 + + Hamilton's Expresses arranged 550 + + Virginia Convention meets 551 + + Patrick Henry leads the Opposition 552 + + His peculiar Tendencies 553 + + Character of his Politics 554 + + Edmund Randolph's Position 555 + + Unexpectedly supports the Constitution 556 + + George Mason on the Power of Direct Taxation 557 + + Henry denounces the Constitution 558 + + Madison defends it 559 + + He denies the Dangers imputed to it 560 + + Henry vouches the Advice of Jefferson 561 + + Jefferson's Advice misconstrued 562 + + Henry persists in pressing his View of it 563 + + It strengthens the Opposition 564 + + They employ the Mississippi Question 565 + + True Aspect of that Question 566 + + Madison's Answer to the Opposition 567 + + Negotiations opened with the Anti-Federalists of New York and + Pennsylvania 568 + + The Convention of New York assembles 568 + + Hamilton at the Intersection of his Expresses 569 + + His Critical and Responsible Position 569, 570 + + Nature of his Ambition 570, 571 + + His Opinion of the Purposes of the Opposition 571 + + His Answer to their Plans 572 + + He receives News of the Ratification by New Hampshire 573 + + Chancellor Livingston announces the Ratification of the Ninth + State 574 + + The Opposition not subdued 574 + + Hamilton's Conduct at this Crisis 575-578 + + He despatches a Courier to Richmond 578 + + But the Constitution is ratified before the Courier arrives 578 + + How its Ratification was obtained 579-581 + + Henry's magnanimous Submission 581 + + The News from Virginia received at Philadelphia 582 + + Elaborate Procession in Honor of the Constitution 583 + + Hamilton receives the News from Virginia 584 + + He consults his Friends 585 + + They force the Opposition to an Issue 586 + + Hamilton advises with Madison 587 + + An Unconditional Ratification carried 588 + + The Federalists unite in a Call for a Second General Convention 588 + + Their Justification for so doing 589-592 + + The City of New York celebrates the Adoption of the + Constitution 592 + + Honors paid to Hamilton by the People 592-595 + + +CHAPTER IV. + + ACTION OF NORTH CAROLINA AND RHODE ISLAND.--CONCLUSION. + + Convention of North Carolina assembles 596 + + Refuses to ratify the Constitution 597 + + Elements of the Opposition in Rhode Island 598 + + Local Parties in the State 599 + + Town and Country divided 600 + + Spirit of a Majority of the People 600, 601 + + They reject the Constitution 602 + + Embarrassing Position of the Union 603 + + Conclusion 604 + + +APPENDIX. + + Constitution of the United States of America 607 + + Articles in Addition to, and Amendment of, the Constitution of + the United States of America 619 + + + INDEX 633 + + + + +BOOK IV. + +FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.--ORGANIZATION OF THE CONVENTION.--POSITION +OF THE STATES.--RULE OF INVESTIGATION. + + +After long wanderings through the struggles, the errors, and the +disappointments of the earlier years of our constitutional history, I +now come to consider that memorable assembly to which they ultimately +led, in order to describe the character of an era that offered the +promise of a more vigorous nationality, and presented the alternative +of final dissolution. How the people of the United States were enabled +to seize the happy choice of one of these results, and to escape the +disasters of the other, is to be learned by examining the mode in +which the Constitution of the United States was framed. + +In approaching this interesting topic, I am naturally anxious to place +myself at once on a right understanding with the reader,--to apprise +him of the purpose of the discussions to which he is invited, and to +guard against expectations which might be entertained, but which will +not be fulfilled. + +In a work designed for general and--as I venture to hope it may +prove--for popular use, it would be out of place, as it certainly +would be impracticable within the limits of a single volume, to +undertake the explanation and discussion of all those particular +questions of construction that must constantly arise under almost +every clause and feature of such an instrument as the Constitution of +the United States, and which, as our whole experience has taught us, +are fruitful both of extensive debate and of wide as well as honest +diversities of opinion. I shall consider questions of construction +only so far as may be necessary to elucidate my subject; for I +propose, in writing the history of the formation of the Constitution, +to describe rather those great modifications in the principles and +structure of the Union that took place in the period at which we have +now arrived in the course of this work; to state the essential +features of the new government; and to trace the process by which they +were evolved from the elements to which the framers of that government +resorted. + +Happily for us, the materials for such a description are ample. The +whole civil change which transformed the character of our Union, and +established for it a national government, took place peacefully and +quietly, within a single twelvemonth. It was attended with +circumstances which enable us to ascertain its character with a high +degree of certainty. The leading purposes that were entertained and +carried out were not left to the conjecture of posterity, but were +recorded by deliberative assemblies, whose acts of themselves +expressed and ascertained the objects and intentions of the national +will. First framed by an assembly in which the States participating in +the change were fully represented, and subsequently debated and +ratified in conventions of the people in the separate States, the +general nature and design of the Constitution may be traced and +understood without serious difficulty. + +But to the right understanding of its nature and objects, a careful +examination of the proceedings of the national Convention is, in the +first place, essential. Before we enter, however, upon this +examination, there are certain preliminary facts that explain the +circumstances in which the Convention was assembled, and which will +enable us to appreciate the results at which it arrived. To these, +therefore, the reader is now desired to turn. + +First of all, then, it is to be remembered that the national +Convention of 1787 was assembled with the great object of framing a +system of government for the united interests of the thirteen States, +by which the forms and spirit of republican liberty could be +preserved. The warnings and teachings of the ten preceding years, +which I have attempted to describe in a previous volume, had presented +to the people of these States the serious question, whether their +system of conducting their common affairs then rested upon principles +that could secure their permanent prosperity and happiness. That the +States had national interests; that each of them stood in relations to +the others, and to the rest of the world, which its separate and +unaided power was unable to manage with success; and that even its +own internal peace and prosperity required some external +protection,--had been brought home to the convictions of the people by +an experience that commenced with the day on which they declared +themselves independent, and had now forced upon them its last stern +and sorrowful lesson in the general despondency of the national heart. +As they turned anxiously and fearfully to the near and dear interests +involved in their separate and internal concerns, they saw that +self-government was a necessity of their existence. They saw that +equality before the law for the whole people; the right and the power +to appoint their own rulers; the right and the power to mould and form +and modify every law and institution at their own sovereign will,--to +lay restraints upon their own power, or not to lay them,--to limit +themselves by public compact to a particular mode of action, or to +remain free to choose other modes,--were the essential conditions of +American society. In a word, they beheld that republican and +constitutional liberty, which, with all that it comprehends and all +that it bestows, was not only altogether lovely in their eyes, but +without which there could be no peace, no social order, no +tranquillity, and no safety for them and their posterity. + +This liberty they knew must be preserved. They loved it with +passionate devotion. They had been trained for it by the whole course +of their political and social history. They had fought for it through +a long and exhausting war. Their habits of thought and action, their +cherished principles, their hopes, their life as a people, were all +bound up in it; and they knew that, if they suffered it to be lost, +there would remain for them nothing but a heritage of shame, and ages +of confusion, strife, and sorrow. + +Great as was their devotion to this republican liberty, and ardent as +was their love of it, they did not value it too highly. The doctrine +that all power resides originally in the people; that they are the +source of all law; that their will is to be pronounced by a majority of +their numbers, and can know no interruption,--was not first discovered +in America. But to this principle of a democracy the people of the +American States had added two real and important discoveries of their +own. They had ascertained that their own power might be limited by +compacts which would regulate and define the modes in which it shall be +exercised. Their written constitutions had taken the place of the royal +charters which formerly embraced the fundamental conditions of their +political existence, but with this essential difference,--that whereas +the charter emanated from a foreign sovereign to those who claimed no +original authority for themselves, the constitution proceeded from the +people, who claimed all authority to be resident in themselves alone. +While the charter embraced a compact between the foreign sovereign and +his subjects who lived under it, the constitution, framed by the people +for their own guidance in exercising their sovereign power, became a +compact between themselves and every one of their number. In this +substitution of one supreme authority for another, some limitation of +the mode in which the sovereign power was to act became the necessary +consequence of the change; for as soon as the people had declared and +established their own sovereignty, some declaration of the nature of +that sovereignty, and some prescribed rules for its exercise, became +immediately necessary, and that declaration and those rules became at +once a limitation of power, extending to every citizen the protection +of every principle involved in them, until the same authority which had +established should change them. + +Against the evils, too, that might arise from the unrestricted control +of a majority of the people over the fundamental law,--against the +abuse of their power by frequent and passionate changes of the rules +which limit its exercise for the time being,--they had discovered the +possibility of limiting the mode in which the organic law itself was +to be changed. By prescribing certain forms in which the change was to +be made, and especially by requiring the fact, that a change had been +decreed by those having a right to make it, to be clearly and +carefully ascertained by a particular evidence, they guarded the +fundamental law itself against usurpation and fraud, and greatly +diminished the influences of haste, prejudice, and passion. + +Such was the nature of American republican liberty; not then fully +understood, not then fully developed in all the States, but yet +discovered,--a liberty more difficult of attainment, more elaborate in +its structure, and therefore more needful of defence, than any of the +other forms of constitutional freedom under which civilized man had +hitherto been found. + +Now, the fate of republican liberty in America, at that day, depended +directly upon the preservation of some union of the States, and not +simply upon the existing State institutions, or upon the desires of +the people of each separate State. It is true, that their previous +training and history, and their own intelligent choice, had made the +States, in all their forms and principles, republican governments; and +almost all of them had, at this period, written constitutions, in +which the American ideal of such governments was aimed at, and more or +less nearly reached. But how long were these constitutions, these +republican forms, to exist? What was to secure them? Who was to stand +as their guarantor and protector, and to vindicate the right of the +majority to govern and alter and modify? Who was to enforce the rules +which the people of a State had prescribed for their own action, when +threatened by an insurgent and powerful minority? Who was to protect +them against foreign invasion or domestic violence? There was no +common sovereign, or supreme arbiter, to whom they could all alike +appeal. There was no power upon this broad continent to whom the +States could intrust the duty of preserving their institutions +inviolate, except the people of the United States in some united and +sovereign capacity. No single State, however great its territory or +its population, could have discharged these duties for itself by its +unaided power; for no one of them could have repelled a foreign +invasion alone, and the government of one of the most respectable and +oldest of them, whose people had exhibited as much energy as any other +community in America, had almost succumbed to the first internal +disorder which it had been forced to encounter. + +The preservation of the Union of the States was, therefore, essential +to the continuance of their independence, and to the continuance of +republican constitutional liberty,--of that liberty which resides in +law duly ascertained to be the authentic will of a majority. With this +vastly important object before them, the people of the States of +course could give to the Union no form that would not reflect the same +spirit, and harmonize with the nature of their existing institutions. +To have left their State governments resting upon the broad basis of +popular freedom acting through republican forms, and to have framed, +or to have attempted to frame, national institutions on any other +model, would have been an act of political suicide. To enable the +Union to preserve and uphold the authority of the people within the +respective States, it must itself be founded on the same authority, +must embody the same principles, spring from the same source, and act +through similar institutions. + +Accordingly, the student of this portion of our history will find +everywhere the clearest evidence that, so far as the purpose of +forming a national government of a new character was entertained at +the period when the Convention was assembled, a republican form for +that government was a foregone conclusion. Not only did no State +entertain any purpose but this, but no member of the Convention +entered that body with any expectation of a different result. There is +but one of the statesmen composing that assembly to whom a purpose of +creating what has been called a monarchical government has ever been +distinctly imputed; and with regard to him, as much as to every other +person in the Convention, I shall show that the imputation is unjust. +Hamilton,--for it is to him of course that I now allude,--together +with many others, believed that a failure, at that crisis, to +establish a government of sufficient energy to pervade the whole Union +with the necessary control, would bring on at once a state of things +that must end in military despotism. Hence his efforts to give to the +republican form, which he acknowledged to be the only one suited to +the circumstances and condition of the country, the highest degree of +vigor, stability, and power that could be attained. + +Another very important fact, which the reader is to carry along with +him into the examination of the proceedings of the Convention, is, +that by the judgment of the old Congress, and of every State in the +Union save one,[1] the Confederation had been declared defective and +inadequate to the exigencies of government, and the preservation of +the Union. That this declaration was expressly intended to embrace the +principle of the Union, or looked to the substitution of a system of +representative government, to which the people of the States should be +the immediate parties, in the place of their State governments, does +not appear from the proceedings which authorized and constituted the +Convention. In substance, those proceedings ascertained that there +were great defects in the existing Confederation; that there were +important purposes of the federal Union which it had failed to secure; +and that a Convention of all the States, for the purpose of revising +and amending the Articles of Confederation, was the most probable +means of establishing a firm general government, and was therefore to +be held. But what were the original purposes of the Union, or what +purposes had come to be regarded as essential to the public welfare, +was not indicated in most of the acts constituting the Convention. +Virginia, whose declaration preceded that of Congress and of the other +States, and on whose recommendation they all acted, had made the +commercial interests of the United States the leading object of the +proposed assembly; but she had also declared the necessity of +extending the revision of the federal system to all its defects, and +had advised further concessions and provisions, in order to secure the +great objects for which that system was originally instituted. These +general and somewhat indefinite purposes were declared by the other +States, without any material variation from the terms employed by +Virginia.[2] + +Hence it is that the previous history of the Union becomes important +to be examined before we can appreciate the great general purposes of +its original formation, as they were understood at the time of these +proceedings, or can appreciate the further purposes that were intended +to be engrafted upon it. The declarations made by the Congress and the +States seem obviously to embrace two classes of objects; the one is +what, in the language of Virginia, they conceived to have been "the +great objects for which the federal government was instituted"; the +other is the "exigencies of the Union," for peace as well as for war, +as they had been displayed and developed by the defects of the +Confederation, and by its failures to secure the general welfare. The +first of these classes of objects could be ascertained by reference to +the terms and provisions of the Articles of Confederation; the second +could only be ascertained by resorting to the history of the +confederacy, and by regarding its recorded failures to promote the +general prosperity as proofs of what the exigencies of the Union +demanded in a general government.[3] + +In the first volume of this work we have examined the nature and +operation of the previous Union, in both of its aspects, and we must +carry the results of that examination along with us in studying the +formation of the new system. We have seen the character of the Union +which was formed by the assembling of the Revolutionary Congress, to +enable the States to secure their independence of the crown of Great +Britain. We have seen that, from the jealousies of the States, even +this Congress never assumed the whole revolutionary authority which +its situation and office would have entitled it to exercise. We have +seen also, that, from the want of a properly defined system, and from +the absence of all proper machinery of government, it was unable to +keep an adequate army in the field, until, in a moment of extreme +emergency, it conferred upon the Commander-in-chief the powers of a +dictator. We have witnessed the establishment of the Confederation,--a +government which bore within itself the seeds of its own destruction; +for it relied entirely, for all the sinews of war, upon requisitions +on the States, with which the States perpetually refused or neglected +to comply. We have thus seen the war lingering and languishing until +foreign aid could be procured, and until loans of foreign money +supplied the means of keeping it alive long enough for the admirable +courage, perseverance, and energy of Washington to bring it to a +close, against all obstacles and all defects of the civil power. When +the war was at length ended, and the duty of paying the debts thus +incurred to the meritorious and generous foreign creditor, and the +more than meritorious and generous domestic creditor, pressed upon the +conscience of the country, we have seen that there was no power in the +Union to command the means of paying even the interest on its +obligations. We have seen that the treaty of peace could not be +executed; that the Confederation could do nothing to secure the +republican governments of the States; that the commerce of the country +could not be protected against the policy of foreign governments, +constantly watching for advantages which the clashing interests of the +different States at all times held out to them; and that, with the +rule which required the assent of nine States to every important +measure, it was possible for the Congress to refuse or neglect to do +what it was of the last importance to the people of the United States +they should do. Finally, we have seen that what now kept the existing +Union from dissolution, as it had been one immediate inducement to its +formation, was the cession of the vast Northwestern territory to the +United States; and that over this territory new States were forming, +to take their places in the band of American republics, while the +Confederation possessed no sufficient power to legislate for their +condition, or to secure their progress toward the great ends of civil +liberty and prosperity. + +A retrospection, therefore, of the previous history of the +Confederacy, while it reveals to us the public appreciation of the +national wants and the national failures, displays the general +purposes contemplated by the States when they undertook effectually to +provide for "the exigencies of the Union." But what the nature of the +proposed changes was to be, and in what mode they were to be reached, +was, as we have seen, left undetermined by the constituent States when +they assembled the Convention; and we are now, therefore, brought to +the third preliminary fact, necessary to be regarded in our future +inquiries, namely, the condition of the actual powers of that +assembly. + +The Confederation has already been described as a league, or federal +alliance between independent and sovereign States, for certain +purposes of mutual aid. So far as it could properly be called a +government, it was a government for the States in their corporate +capacities, with no power to reach individuals; so that, if its +requirements were disregarded, compulsion could only be directed--if +against anybody--against the delinquent member of the association, the +State itself. + +At the time when the Convention was assembled, the general purpose +entertained throughout the Union appears to have been, by a revision +and amendment of the Articles of Confederation, to give to the +Congress power over certain subjects, of which that instrument did not +admit of its taking cognizance, and to add such provisions as would +render its power efficient. But it was not at all understood by the +country at large, that, while the nominal powers of the Confederation +might be increased at the pleasure of the States, those powers could +not be made effectual without a change in the principle of the +government. Hence, the idea of abolishing the Confederation, and of +erecting in its place a government of a totally different character, +was not entertained by the States, or, if entertained at all, was not +expressed in the public acts of the States by which the Convention was +called. This idea, however, was perhaps not necessarily excluded by +the terms employed by the States in the instruction of their +delegates: and we may therefore expect to find the members of that +assembly, in construing or defining the powers conferred upon it, +taking a broader or narrower view of those powers, according to the +character of their own minds, the nature of their previous public +experience, and the real or supposed interests of their particular +States. + +Many of the persons who had been clothed with this somewhat vague and +indeterminate authority to "revise" the existing federal system, and +to agree upon and propose such amendments and further provisions as +might effectually provide for the "exigencies of the Union," were +statesmen who had passed the active period of their previous lives in +vain endeavors to secure efficient action for the powers possessed by +the Congress, both under the revolutionary government and under the +Confederation. They were selected by their States on account of this +very experience, and in order that their counsels might be made +available to the country.[4] They saw that the mere grant of further +powers, or the mere consent that the Congress should have jurisdiction +over certain new subjects, would be of no avail while the government +continued to rest upon the vicious principle of a naked federal +league, leaving the question constantly to recur, whether the compact +was not virtually dissolved by the refusal of individual States to +discharge their federal obligations. These persons, consequently, came +to the Convention feeling strongly the necessity for a radical change +in the principles and structure of the national Union; but feeling +also great embarrassment as to the mode in which that change was to be +effected. + +On the other hand, there were other members of the Convention who came +with a disposition to adhere to the more literal meaning of their +instructions, and who did not concur in the alleged necessity for a +radical change of the principle of the government. Fearing that the +power and consequence of their own States would be diminished by the +introduction of numbers as a basis of representation, they adhered to +the system of representation by States, and insisted that nothing was +needed to cure the evils that pressed upon the country, but to enlarge +the jurisdiction of the Congress under that system. They were +naturally, therefore, the first to suggest and the last to surrender +the objection, that the Convention had received no authority, either +from the States or from the Congress, to do anything more than revise +the Articles of Confederation, and recommend such further powers as +might be engrafted upon the present system of the Union. + +That the construction of their powers by the latter class of the +members of the Convention comported with the mere terms of the acts of +the States, and with the general expectation, I have more than once +intimated; but we shall see, as the experiment of framing the new +system proceeded, that the views of the other class were equally +correct; that the addition of further powers to the existing system of +the Union would have left it as weak and inefficient as it had been +before; and that what were universally regarded as the "exigencies of +the Union"--which was but another name for the wants of the +States--could only be provided for by the creation of a different +basis for the government. + +Another fact which we are to remember is the presence, in five of the +States represented in the Convention, of large numbers of a distinct +race, held in the condition of slaves. Whatever mode of constituting a +national system might be adopted, if it was to be a representative +government, the existence of these persons must be recognized and +provided for in some way. Whatever ratio of representation might be +established,--whether the States were to be represented according to +the numbers of their inhabitants, or according to their wealth,--this +part of the population of the slave-holding States presented one of +the great difficulties to be encountered. A change of their condition +was not now, and never had been, one of the powers which those States +proposed to confide to the Union. In no previous form of the +confederacy had any State proposed to surrender its own control over +the condition of persons within its limits, or its power to determine +what persons should share in the political rights of that community; +and no State that now took part in the new effort to amend the present +system of the Union proposed to surrender this control over its own +inhabitants, or sought to acquire any control over the condition of +persons within any of the other States. + +The deliberations of the Convention were therefore begun with the +necessary concession of the fact, that slavery existed in some of the +States, and that the existence and continuance of that condition of +large masses of its population was a matter exclusively belonging to +the authority of each State in which they were found. Not only was +this concession implied in the terms upon which the States had met for +the revision of the national system, but the further concession of the +right to have the slave populations included in the ratio of +representation became equally unavoidable. They must be regarded +either as persons or as chattels. If they were persons, and the basis +of the new government was to be a representation of the inhabitants of +the States according to their numbers,--the only mode of +representation consistent with republican government,--their precise +condition, their possession or want of political rights, could not +affect the propriety of including them in some form in the census, +unless the basis of the government should be composed exclusively of +those inhabitants of the States who were acknowledged by the laws of +the States as free. The large numbers of the slaves in some of the +States would have made a government so constructed entirely unequal in +its operation, and would have placed those States, if they had been +willing to enter it,--as they never could have been,--in a position of +inferiority which their wealth and importance would have rendered +unjustifiable. On the other hand, if the wealth of the States was to +be the measure of their representation in the new government, the +slaves must be included in that wealth, or they must be treated simply +as persons. The slaves might or might not be persons, in the view of +the law, where they were found; but they were certainly in one sense +property under that law, and as such they were a very important part +of the wealth of the State. The Confederation had already been obliged +to regard them, in considering a rule by which the States should +contribute to the national expenses. They had found it to be just, +that a State should be required to include its slaves among its +population, in a certain ratio, when it was called upon to sustain the +national burdens in proportion to its numbers; and they had +recommended the adoption of this fundamental rule as an amendment of +the federal Articles.[5] Either in one capacity, therefore, or in the +other, or in both,--either as persons or as property, or as both,--the +Union had already found it to be necessary to consider the slaves. In +framing the new Union, it was equally necessary, as soon as the +equality of representation by States should give place to a +proportional and unequal representation, to regard these inhabitants +in one or the other capacity, or in both capacities, or to leave the +States in which they were found, and to which their position was a +matter of grave importance, out of the Union. + +This difficulty should be rightly appreciated and fairly stated by the +historian who attempts to describe its adjustment, and it should be +carefully regarded by the reader. What reflections may arise upon the +facts that we have to consider,--what should be the judgment of an +enlightened benevolence upon the whole matter of slavery, as it was +dealt with or affected by the Constitution of the United States,--may +perhaps find an appropriate place in some future discussion. + +Here, however, the reader must approach the threshold of the subject +with the expectation of finding it surrounded by many and complex +relations. History should undoubtedly concern itself with the +interests of man. But it is bound, as it makes up the record of events +which involve the destinies and welfare of different races, to look at +the aggregate of human happiness. It is not to rest, for its final +conclusions, in seeming or in real inconsistencies; in real or +apparent conflicts between opposite principles; or in the mere letter +of those adjustments by which such conflicts have been avoided, or +reconciled, or acknowledged. It is to arrive at results. It is to draw +the wide deduction which will show whether human nature has lost or +gained by the conditions and forms of national existence which it +undertakes to describe. As the question should always be, in such +inquiries, whether any different and better result was attainable +under all the circumstances of the case,--a question to which a calm +and dispassionate examination will generally find an answer,--the +amount of positive good that has been gained for all, or of positive +evil that has been averted from all, is the true justification of +existing institutions. + +The Convention, when fully organized, embraced a representation from +all the States, with the single exception of Rhode Island. + +Connecticut, which had steadily opposed the measure of a +Convention,[6] came into it at a late period, and did not send a +delegation until a fortnight after the time appointed for its +session.[7] It had always been the inclination of that State to retain +in her own hands the regulation of commerce; she had taxed imports +from some of her neighbors, and this advantage, as it was considered, +had made her reluctant to enlarge the powers of the Union. Her +delegation appeared on the 28th of May. + +That of New Hampshire was not appointed until the latter part of +June,[8] and did not appear until the 23d of July.[9] + +Rhode Island, small in territory and in numbers, but favorably +situated for the pursuits of commerce, had strenuously resisted every +effort to enlarge the powers of the Union. Ever since the Declaration +of Independence, the people of that State had clung to the +opportunity, afforded by their situation, of taxing the contiguous +States, through their consumption of commodities brought into its +numerous and convenient ports. For this object they had refused their +assent to the revenue system of 1783; and as the failure of that +system had prevented an exhibition of some of the benefits to be +derived from uniform fiscal regulations, the local government of Rhode +Island adhered, in 1786-7, to what they had always regarded as the +true interest of their State. They did, it is true, appoint delegates +to the commercial convention at Annapolis, but the persons appointed +did not attend; and when the resolve which sanctioned the Convention +of 1787 was adopted in Congress, Rhode Island was not represented in +that body. + +When the recommendation of the Congress came before the legislature +of the State, there appears to have been a strong party in favor of +making an appointment of delegates to the Convention. The mercantile +part of the population had come to entertain more liberal and +far-seeing notions of their true interests; and the views of some of +the more intelligent of the farmers and mechanics had been much +modified. But by far the larger portion of the people--wedded to a +system of paper money, which furnished almost their sole currency, and +vaguely apprehending that a new government for the Union would destroy +it, seeking the abolition of debts, public and private, and jealous of +all influence from without--were in a condition to be ruled by their +demagogues, rather than to be enlightened and aided by their +statesmen. In May, the legislature rejected a proposition to appoint +delegates to the Federal Convention; and in June, although the upper +house, or Governor and Council, embraced the measure, it was again +negatived in the House of Assembly by a large majority. The minority +then formed an organization, which never lost sight of the national +relations of the State, and which finally succeeded in bringing her +into the Union under the new Constitution, in 1790. + +Immediately after the first rejection of the proposal to unite with +the other States in reforming the Confederation, a body of commercial +persons in Providence addressed a letter to the Convention, expressing +the opinion that full power for the regulation of the commerce of the +United States, both foreign and domestic, ought to be vested in the +national council, and that effectual arrangements should also be made +for giving operation to the existing powers of Congress in their +requisitions for national purposes. Their object in this communication +was to prevent an impression among the other States, unfavorable to +the commercial interests of Rhode Island, from growing out of the +circumstance of their being unrepresented in the Convention. +Expressing the hope that the result of its deliberations would be to +"strengthen the Union, promote the commerce, increase the power, and +establish the credit of the United States," they pledged their +influence and best exertions to secure the adoption of that result by +the State of Rhode Island. The signers of this letter formed the +nucleus of that party which afterwards fulfilled the pledge thus given +to the Convention. + +The absence of Rhode Island did not occasion a serious embarrassment. +The resolve of Congress recommending the Convention did not expressly +require the presence of all the States; and the commissions given by +each of the States which adopted the recommendation clearly implied +that their delegates were to meet and act with the delegations of such +other States as might see fit to be represented. The communication of +the minority party in Rhode Island was received and read, and the +interests of that State were attended to throughout the proceedings. + +We are now carefully to observe the position of the States when thus +assembled in Convention. Their meeting was purely voluntary; they met +as equals; and they were sovereign political communities, whom no +power could rightfully coerce into a change of their condition, and +with whom such a change must be the result of their own free and +intelligent choice, governed by no other than the force of +circumstances. That they were independent of foreign control was +ascertained by the Declaration of Independence, by the war, and by the +Treaty of Peace. That they were independent of each other, except so +far as they had made certain mutual stipulations in the Articles of +Confederation, was the necessary result of the events which had made +the people of each State its rightful and exclusive sovereigns. We +must recur, therefore, to the Articles of Confederation for the +purpose of determining the nature of the position in which the States +now stood. + +When the States, in 1781, entered into the confederacy then +established, they reserved their freedom, sovereignty, and +independence, and every jurisdiction, power, and right not expressly +delegated to the United States. By the provisions of the federal +compact, these separate and sovereign communities committed to a +general council the management of certain interests common to them +all; in that council they were represented equally, each State having +one vote; but as neither the powers conferred upon that body, nor the +restraints imposed by the States upon themselves, were to be enforced +by any agreed sanctions, the parties to the compact were left to a +voluntary performance of their stipulations. Still, there were certain +powers which the States agreed should be exercised by the United +States in Congress assembled, and certain duties towards the +confederacy which they agreed to discharge; and therefore, so far as +authority and jurisdiction had been conferred upon the United States, +so far they had been surrendered by the States. The peculiarity of the +case was, that the powers surrendered were ineffectual for the want of +appropriate means of coercion. + +These powers the States did not propose to recall. The Union was +unbroken, though feeble, and trembling on the verge of dissolution. +The purpose of all was to strengthen and secure its powers, to add +somewhat to their number, and to render the whole efficient and +operative by providing some form of direct and compulsory authority. +For this end, as members of an existing confederacy, in possession of +all the powers not previously delegated to the Union, the States had +assembled upon the same equality, and under the same form of +representation, with which they had always acted in the Congress. + +As the States had conferred certain powers upon the Confederation, so +it was equally competent to them to enlarge and add to those powers. +They had formed State governments, and established written +constitutions. But the people of the States, and not their +governments, held the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power. +They had created, and they could modify or destroy; they could +withdraw the powers conferred upon one class of agents, and bestow +them upon another class. What was wanted was the discovery of some +mode of proceeding, which, by involving the consent of the State +governments, would avoid the appearance and the reality of revolution, +and make the contemplated changes consist with the American idea of +constitutional action. + +Here also it seems proper to state the reasons why the process of +framing the Constitution is so important as to demand a careful +exhibition of the proceedings of those to whom this great undertaking +was intrusted. + +The Convention had confessedly no power to enact or establish +anything. It was a representative body, clothed with authority to +agree upon a system of government to be recommended to the adoption of +their constituents. The constituents were twelve of the thirteen +States of the confederacy, each having an equal voice and vote in the +proceedings; but neither the assent nor the dissent of a State, in the +Convention, to the whole system, or to any part of it, bound the +people of that State to receive or to reject it when it should come +before them. Still, the results of the various determinations of a +majority of the States in this body; the purposes of particular +provisions which those results clearly disclose; the relations which +they evince between the different parts of the system,--are all of +the utmost importance in determining the sense in which the whole +ultimately came before the enacting authority for approval or +rejection. If, for example, a majority of the States came to a very +early determination that the principle of the government should no +longer be that of an exclusive representation of States, but should +include a representation of the people of the different States in some +fair and equitable ratio; if they adhered to this throughout their +deliberations, and adjusted everything with reference to it; and if, +when they finally provided for a mode of establishing the new system, +they submitted it directly to the people of each State to declare +whether they would be so represented,--it is manifest that these +results of their action have much to do with the inquiry, What is the +true nature of the present government of the United States? + +Every student of the proceedings and discussions in the national +Convention should, however, be careful not to extend this principle of +general interpretation to the views, opinions, or arguments expressed +or employed by individuals in that assembly. The line of argument or +illustration adopted by different members may be more or less +important, as tending to explain the scope or purpose of a particular +decision arrived at by a vote of the Convention; and occasionally, as +will be seen in reference to the arrangements which were finally +entered into as mutual concessions or compromises between different +interests, the discussions will be found to be of great significance +and importance. But it is, after all, to the results themselves, and +to the principles involved in the various decisions of the Convention, +as indicated by the votes taken, that we are to look for the landmarks +that are to guide our inquiries into the fundamental changes, +improvements, and additions proposed by the Convention to the country, +and afterwards adopted by the people of the States. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] Rhode Island. + +[2] New Jersey specifically contemplated a regulation of commerce. See +the proceedings of Congress, and those of the States, _ante_, Vol. I. +pp. 361, 367, notes. + +[3] Thus, for example, the regulation of commerce was not one of the +original purposes for which the Union was formed in 1775 or in 1781. +But it became one of the exigencies of the Union, by becoming a +national want, and by the revealed incompetency of most of the States +to deal with the subject so as to promote their own welfare, or to +avoid injury to their confederates. So of a great many other things, +for which we must resort, as the framers of the Constitution resorted, +to the history of the times. + +[4] See the preamble to the act of Virginia, _ante_, Vol. I. p. 367, +note. + +[5] See the Resolve of Congress, passed April 18, 1783, proposing to +amend the Articles of Confederation. This Resolve was the origin of +the proportion of three fifths, in counting the slaves. See _post_, +Chapter II. p. 48; _ante_, Vol. I. p. 213, note 2. + +[6] Madison, Elliot, V. 96. + +[7] Ibid. 124. + +[8] Elliot, I. 126. + +[9] Ibid. 351. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +CONSTRUCTION OF A LEGISLATIVE POWER.--BASIS OF REPRESENTATION, AND +RULE OF SUFFRAGE.--POWERS OF LEGISLATION. + + +The Convention having been organized, Governor Randolph of +Virginia[10] submitted a series of resolutions, embracing the +principal changes that ought to be proposed in the structure of the +federal system. + +Mr. Charles Pinckney of South Carolina also submitted a plan of +government, which, with Governor Randolph's resolutions, was referred +to a committee of the whole. It is not necessary here to state the +details of these several systems; for although that introduced by +Randolph gave a direction to the deliberations of the committee, the +results arrived at were in some respects materially different. + +The first distinct departure that was made from the principles of the +Confederation was involved in one of the propositions brought forward +by Governor Randolph, "that a NATIONAL government ought to be +established, consisting of a supreme legislative, executive, and +judiciary"; and as this proposition was affirmed in the committee by +a vote of six States, it is important to understand the sense in which +it was understood by them.[11] + +Most of the framers of the Constitution seem to have considered that a +compact between sovereign States, which rested for its efficacy on the +good faith of the parties, and had no other compulsory operation than +a resort to arms against a delinquent member, was a "federal" +government. This was the principle of the Confederation. At this early +stage of their deliberations, the idea which was intended by those who +favored a change of that principle, when they spoke of a "national" +government, was one that would be a supreme power with respect to +certain national objects committed to it, and that would have some +kind of direct compulsory action upon individuals. This distinction +was understood by all to be real and important. It led directly to the +question of the powers of the Convention, and formed the early line of +division between those who desired to adhere to the existing system, +and those who aimed at a radical change. The former admitted the +necessity for a more effective government, and supposed that the +Confederation could be made so by distributing its powers into the +three great departments of a legislative, executive, and judiciary; +but they did not suggest any mode by which those powers could be made +supreme over the authority of the separate States. The latter +contended, that there could be no such thing as government unless it +were a supreme power, and that there could be but one supreme power +over the same subjects in the same community; that supreme power could +not from the nature of things act on the States collectively, in the +usual and peaceful mode in which the operations of government ought to +be conducted, but that it must be able to reach individuals; and that, +as the Confederation could not operate in this way, the distribution +of its powers into distinct departments would be no improvement upon +the present condition of things. + +But when the distinction between a national and a federal government +had been so far developed, the subject was still left in a great +degree vague and indeterminate. What was to mark this distinction as +real, and give it practical effect? By what means was the government, +which was now, as all admitted, a mere federal league between +sovereign States, to become, in any just sense, national? The idea of +a nation implies the existence of a people united in their political +rights, and possessed of the same political interests. A national +government must be one that exercises the political rights, and +protects the political interests, of such a people. But, hitherto, the +people of the United States had been divided into distinct +sovereignties; and although by the Articles of Confederation some +portion of the sovereign power of each of the separate States had +been vested in a general government, that government had been found +inefficient, and incapable of resisting the great power that had been +reserved to the respective States, and was constantly exerted by them. +The difficulty was, that the constituent parties to the federal union +were themselves political governments and sovereigns; the people of +the States had no direct representation, and no direct suffrage, in +the general legislature; and as in a republican government the +representation and the suffrage must determine its character, it +became obvious that, in order to establish a national government that +would embrace the political rights and interests of the people +inhabiting the States, the basis of representation and the rule of +suffrage must be changed. + +It being assumed that the new government was to be divided into the +three departments of the legislative, executive, and judiciary, +several questions at once presented themselves with regard to the +constitution of the national legislature. Was it to consist of one or +of two houses? and if the latter, what was to be the representation +and the rule of suffrage in each? + +The resolutions of Governor Randolph raised the question as to the +rule of suffrage, before the committee had determined on the division +of the legislative power into two branches. One of his propositions +was, "That the rights of suffrage in the national legislature ought to +be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of +free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in +different cases." This was no sooner propounded, than a difficulty was +suggested by the deputies of the State of Delaware, which threatened +to impede the whole action of the Convention. They declared that they +felt restrained by their commissions from assenting to any change of +the rule of suffrage, and announced their determination to retire from +the Convention if such a change were adopted. The firmness and address +of Madison and Gouverneur Morris surmounted this obstacle. They +declared that the proposed change was absolutely essential to the +formation of a national government; but they consented to postpone the +question, having ascertained that it would finally be carried.[12] + +The committee thereupon immediately determined that the national +legislature should consist of two branches,[13] and proceeded to +consider the mode of representation and suffrage in both. As the +discussions proceeded, the members became divided into two parties +upon the general subject; the one was for a popular basis and a +proportionate representation in both branches; the other was in favor +of an equal representation by States in both. The first issue between +them was made upon the House, or what was termed the first branch of +the legislature. On the one side it was urged, that to give the +election of this branch to the people of the States would make the new +government too democratic; that the people were unsafe depositaries +of such a power, not because they wanted virtue, but because they were +liable to be misled; and that the State legislatures would be more +likely to appoint suitable persons. On the other hand, it was admitted +that an election of the more numerous branch of the national +legislature by the people would introduce a true democratic principle +into the government, and this, it was said, was necessary. It was +urged that this branch of the legislature ought to know and sympathize +with every part of the community, and ought therefore to be taken, not +only from different parts of the republic, but also from different +districts of the larger members of it. The broadest possible basis, it +was said, ought to be given to the new system; and as that system was +to be republican, a direct representation of the people was +indispensable. To increase the weight of the State legislatures, by +making them electors of the national legislature, would only +perpetuate some of the worst evils of the Confederation. + +A decided majority of the States sustained the election of the first +branch of the national legislature by the people.[14] Great efforts +were, however, subsequently made to change this decision; and the +discussion which ensued on a motion that this branch should be elected +by the State legislatures, throws much light upon the nature of the +government which the friends of an election by the people were aiming +to establish. From that discussion it appears that the idea was +already entertained of forming a government that should have a +vigorous authority derived directly from the people of the +States,--one that should possess both the force and the sense of the +people at large. For the formation of such a government one of two +courses was necessary: either to abolish the State governments +altogether; or to leave them in existence, and to regard the people of +each State as competent to withdraw from their local governments such +portions of their political power as they might see fit to bestow upon +a national government. The latter plan was undoubtedly a novelty in +political science; for no system of government had yet been +constructed in which the individual stood in the relation of subject +to two distinct sovereignties, each possessed of a distinct sphere, +and each supreme in its own sphere. But if the American doctrine were +true, that all supreme power resides originally in the people, and +that all governments are constituted by them as the agents and +depositaries of that power, there could be no incompatibility in such +a system. The people who had deposited with a State government the +sovereign power of their community, could withdraw it at their +pleasure; and as they could withdraw the whole, they could withdraw a +part of it. If a part only were withdrawn, or rather, if the supreme +power in relation to particular objects were to be taken from the +State governments, and vested in another class of agents, leaving the +authority of the former undiminished except as to those particular +objects, the individual might owe a double allegiance, but there could +be no confusion of his duties, provided the powers withdrawn and +revested were clearly defined. + +The advocates of a national government, besides and beyond the +intrusting of a particular jurisdiction to that government, wished to +make it certain that its legislative power, in each act of +legislation, should rest on the direct authority of the people. For +this purpose they desired to avoid all agency of the State governments +in the appointment of the members of the national legislature. They +held this to be necessary for two reasons. In the first place, they +said that in a national government the people must be represented; and +that in a republican system the real constituent should act directly, +and without any intermediate agency, in the appointment of the +representative. In the second place, they deduced from the objects of +a national government the necessity for excluding the agency of the +State governments in the appointment of those who were to exercise its +legislative power. Those objects, they contended, were not fully +stated by their opponents. The latter generally regarded the objects +of the Union as confined to defence against foreign danger and +internal disorder; the power to make binding treaties with foreign +countries; the regulation of commerce, and the power to derive +revenues therefrom.[15] The former insisted that another great object +must be, to provide more effectually for the security of private +rights, and the steady dispensation of justice. Mr. Madison declared +that republican liberty could not long exist under the abuses of it +which had been practised in some of the States, where the +uncontrollable power of a majority had enabled debtors to elude their +creditors, the holders of one species of property to oppress the +holders of another species, and where paper money had become a +stupendous fraud. These evils had made it manifest that the power of +the State governments, even in relation to some matters of internal +legislation, must be to some extent restrained; and in order +effectually to restrain it, the national government must, in the +construction of its departments, as well as in its powers, be derived +directly from the people.[16] + +These views again prevailed as to the first branch, and Mr. Pinckney's +proposition for electing that branch by the State legislatures was +negatived by a vote of three States in the affirmative, and eight in +the negative.[17] + +But as soon as the impracticability of abolishing the State +governments was seen and admitted,--and it was at once both seen and +admitted by some of the strongest advocates for a national +government,--it became apparent to a large part of the assembly, that +to exclude those governments from all agency in the election of both +branches of the national legislature would be inexpedient. It would +obviously have been theoretically correct to have given the election +of both the Senate and the House to the people of the States, +especially when it was intended to adhere to the principle of a +proportionate representation of the people of the States in both +branches.[18] But the necessity for providing some means by which the +States, as States, might defend themselves against encroachments of +the national government, made it apparent that they must become, in +the election, a constituent part of the system. No mode of doing this +presented itself, except to give the State legislatures the +appointment of the less numerous branch of the national +legislature,--a provision which was finally adopted in the committee +by the unanimous vote of the States.[19] + +The results thus reached had settled for the present the very +important fact, that the people of the States were to be represented +in both branches of the legislature; that for the one they were to +elect their representatives directly, and for the other they were to +be elected by the legislature of the State. + +But when it had been ascertained by whom the members of the two +branches were to be elected, there remained to be determined the +decisive question, which was to mark still more effectively the +distinction between a purely national and a purely federal government, +namely, the rule of suffrage, or the ratio of representation in the +national legislature. + +The rule of suffrage adopted in the first Continental Congress was, as +we have seen, the result of necessity; for it was impossible to +ascertain the relative importance of each Colony; and, moreover, that +Congress was in fact an assembly of committees of the different +Colonies, called together to deliberate in what mode they could aid +each other in obtaining a redress of their several grievances from +Parliament and the Crown. But while, from the necessity of the case, +they assigned to each Colony one vote in the Congress, they looked +forward to the time when the relative wealth or population of the +Colonies must regulate their suffrage in any future system of +continental legislation.[20] The character of the government formed by +the Articles of Confederation had operated to postpone the arrival of +this period; because it was in the very nature of that system that +each State should have an equal voice with every other. This system +was the result of the formation of the State governments, each of +which had become the present depositary of the political powers of an +independent people. + +But if this system were to be changed,--if the people of the States +were to be represented in each branch of the national legislature,--some +ratio of representation must be adopted, or the idea of connecting them +as a nation with the government that was to be instituted must be +abandoned. It was obviously for the interest of the larger States, such +as Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts,--then the three leading +States in point of population,--to have a proportionate representation +of their whole inhabitants, without reference to age, sex, or condition. +On the other hand, it was for the interest of the smaller States to +insist on an equality of votes in the national legislature, or at least +on the adoption of a ratio that would exclude some portions of the +population of the great States. Some of the lesser States were +exceedingly strenuous in their efforts to accomplish these objects, and +more than once, in the course of the proceedings, declared their purpose +to form a union on no other basis. + +In this posture of things the alternatives were, either to form no +union at all, or only to form one between the large States willing to +unite on the basis of proportionate representation; or to abolish the +State governments, and throw the whole into one mass; or to leave the +distinctions and boundaries between the different States, and adopt +some equitable ratio of suffrage, as between the people of the several +States, in the national legislature. The latter course was adopted in +the committee, as to the first branch, by a vote of seven States in +the affirmative, against three in the negative, one being +divided.[21] + +The question was then to be determined, by what ratio the +representation of the different States should be regulated; and here +again any one of several expedients might be adopted. The basis of +representation might be made to consist of the whole number of voters, +or those on whom the States had conferred the elective franchise; or +it might be confined to the white inhabitants, excluding all other +races; or it might include all the free inhabitants of every race, +excluding only the slaves; or it might embrace the whole population of +each State. Some examination of each of these plans will illustrate +the difficulties which had to be encountered. + +To have adopted the number of legal voters of the States as the ratio +of representation in the national legislature would have been to adopt +a system in which there were great existing inequalities. The elective +franchise had been conferred in the different States upon very +different principles; it was very broad in some of the States, and +much narrower in others, according to their peculiar policy and +manners. These inequalities could scarcely have been removed; for the +right of suffrage in some of the States was more or less connected +with their systems of descent and distribution of property, and those +systems could not readily be changed, so as to adapt the condition of +society to the new interest of representation and influence in the +general government. This plan was, therefore, out of the question. + +It was nearly as impracticable, also, to confine the basis of +representation to the white inhabitants of the States. Some of the +States--such as Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, +and Pennsylvania, in which slavery was already, or was ultimately to +become, extinct, and Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia, where +slavery was likely to remain--had large numbers of free blacks. These +inhabitants, who were regarded as citizens in some of the States, but +not in others, were in all a part of their populations, contributing +to swell the aggregate of the numbers and wealth of the State, and +thus to raise it in the scale of relative rank. Their personal +consequence, or social rank, was a thing too remote for special +inquiry. A State that contained five or ten thousand of these +inhabitants might well say, that, although of a distinct race, they +formed an aggregate portion of its free population, too large to be +omitted without opening the door to inquiries into the condition and +importance of other classes of its free inhabitants. This was the +situation of all the Northern States except New Hampshire, as well as +of all the Middle and Southern States; and it was especially true of +Virginia, which had nearly twice as many free colored persons as any +other State in the Union. + +It was equally impracticable to form a national government in which +the basis of representation should be confined to the free inhabitants +of the States. The five States of Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, +South Carolina, and Georgia, including their slaves, were found by the +first census, taken three years after the formation of the +Constitution, to contain a fraction less than one half of the whole +population of the Union.[22] In three of those States the slaves were +a little less than half, and in two of them they were more than half, +as numerous as the whites.[23] There was no good reason, +therefore,--except the theoretical one that a slave can have no actual +voice in government, and consequently does not need to be +represented,--why a class of States containing nearly half of the +whole population of the confederacy should consent to exclude such +large masses of their populations from the basis of representation, +and thereby give to the free inhabitants of each of the other eight +States a relatively larger share of legislative power than would fall +to the free inhabitants of the States thus situated. The objection +arising from the political and social condition of the slaves would +have had great weight, and indeed ought to have been decisive of the +question, if the object had been to efface the boundaries of the +States, and to form a purely consolidated republic. But this purpose, +if ever entertained at all, could not be followed by the framers of +the Constitution. They found it indispensable to leave the States +still in possession of their distinct political organizations, and of +all the sovereignty not necessary to be conferred on the central +power, which they were endeavoring to create by bringing the free +people of these several communities into some national relations with +each other. It became necessary, therefore, to regard the peculiar +social condition of each of the States, and to construct a system of +representation that would place the free inhabitants of each distinct +State upon as near a footing of political equality with the free +inhabitants of the other States as might, under such circumstances, be +practicable. This could only be done by treating the slaves as an +integral part of the population of the States in which they were +found, and by assuming the population of the States as the true basis +of their relative representation. + +It was upon this idea of treating the slaves as inhabitants, and not +as chattels, or property, that the original decision was made in the +committee of the whole, by which it was at first determined to include +them.[24] Having decided that there ought to be an equitable ratio of +representation, the committee went on to declare that the basis of +representation ought to include the whole number of white and other +free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex, and condition, +including those bound to servitude for a term of years; and they then +added to the population thus described three fifths of all other +persons not comprehended in that description, except Indians not +paying taxes. The proportion of three fifths was borrowed from a rule +which had obtained the sanction of nine States in Congress, in the +year 1783, when it was proposed to change the basis of contribution by +the States to the expenses of the Union from property to +population.[25] At that time, the slaveholding States had consented +that three fifths of their slaves should be counted in the census +which was to fix the amount of their contributions; and they now asked +that, in the apportionment of representatives, these persons might +still be regarded as inhabitants of the State, in the same ratio. The +rule was adopted in the committee, with the dissent of only two +States, New Jersey and Delaware; but on the original question of +substituting an equitable ratio of representation for the equality of +suffrage that prevailed under the Confederation, New York united with +New Jersey and Delaware in the opposition, and the vote of Maryland +was divided. + +The next step was to settle the rule of suffrage in the Senate; and +although it was earnestly contended that the smaller States would +never agree to any other principle than an equality of votes in that +body,[26] it was determined in the committee, by a vote of six States +against five, that the ratio of representation should be the same as +in the first branch.[27] + +Thus it appears that originally a majority of the States were in favor +of a numerical representation in both branches. The three States of +Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, the leading States in +population, and with them North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, +found it at present for their interest to adopt this basis for both +houses of the national legislature. It was a consequence of the +principle of numerical representation, that the slaves should be +included; and it does not appear that at this time any delegate from a +Northern State interposed any objection, except Mr. Gerry of +Massachusetts, who regarded the slaves as "property," and said that +the cattle and horses of the North might as well be included. But the +State which he represented was at this time pressing for the rights of +population, and for a system in which population should have its due +influence; and her vote, as well as that of Pennsylvania, was +accordingly given for the principle which involved an admission of the +slaves into the basis of representation, and for the proportion which +the slave States were willing to take. + +These transactions in the committee of the whole are quite important, +because they show that the original line of division between the +States, on the subject of representation, was drawn between the States +having the preponderance of population and the States that were the +smallest in point of numbers. When, and under what circumstances, this +line of division changed, what combinations a nearer view of all the +consequences of numerical representation may have brought about, and +how the conflicting interests were finally reconciled, will be seen +hereafter. What we are here to record is the declaration of the +important principle, that the legislative branch of the government was +to be one in which the free people of the States were to be +represented, and to be represented according to the numbers of the +inhabitants which their respective States contained, counting those +held in servitude in a certain ratio only. + +The general principles on which the powers of the national legislature +were to be regulated, were declared with a great degree of unanimity. +That it ought to be invested with all the legislative powers belonging +to the Congress of the Confederation was conceded by all. This was +followed by the nearly unanimous declaration of a principle, which was +intended as a general description of a class of powers that would +require subsequent enumeration, namely, that the legislative power +ought to embrace all cases to which the State legislatures were +incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States would be +interrupted by the exercise of State legislation. But the committee +also went much farther, and without discussion or dissent declared +that there ought also to be a power to negative all laws passed by the +several States contravening, in the opinion of the national +legislature, the Articles of Union, or any treaties made under the +authority of the Union.[28] + +The somewhat crude idea of making a negative on State legislation a +legislative power of the national government, shows that the admirable +discovery had not yet been made of exercising such a control through +the judicial department. Without such a control lodged somewhere, the +national prerogatives could not be defended, however extensive they +might be in theory. There had been, as Mr. Madison well remarked, a +constant tendency in the States to encroach on the federal authority, +to violate national treaties, to infringe the rights and interests of +each other, and to oppress the weaker party within their respective +jurisdictions. The expedient that seemed at first to be the proper +remedy, and, as was then supposed, the only one that could be employed +as a substitute for force, was to give the general government a power +similar to that which had been exercised over the legislation of the +Colonies by the crown of England, before the Revolution; and there +were some important members of the Convention who at this time thought +that this power ought to be universal.[29] They considered it +impracticable to draw a line between the cases proper and improper for +the exercise of such a negative, and they argued from the correctness +of the principle of such a power, that it ought to embrace all cases. + +But here the complex nature of the government which they were obliged +to establish made it necessary to depart from the theoretical +correctness of a general principle. The sovereignty of the States +would be entirely inconsistent with a power in the general government +to control their whole legislation. As the direct authority of the +national legislature was to extend only to certain objects of national +concern, or to such as the States were incompetent to provide for, all +the political powers of the States, the surrender of which was not +involved in the grant of powers to the national head, must remain; and +if a general superintendence of State legislation were added to the +specific powers to be conferred on the central authority, there would +be in reality but one supreme power in all cases in which the general +government might see fit to exercise its prerogative. The just and +proper sphere of the national government must be the limit of its +power over the legislation of the States. In that sphere it must be +supreme, as the power of each State within its own sphere must also be +supreme. Neither of them should encroach upon the prerogatives of the +other; and while it was undoubtedly necessary to arm the national +government with some power to defend itself against such encroachments +on the part of the States, there could be no real necessity for making +this power extend beyond the exigencies of the case. Those exigencies +would be determined by the objects that might be committed to the +legislation of the central authority; and if a mode could be devised, +by which the States could be restrained from interfering with or +interrupting the just exercise of that authority, all that was +required would be accomplished.[30] + +But to do this by means of a negative that was to be classed among the +legislative powers of the new government, was to commit the subject of +a supposed conflict between the rights and powers of the State and the +national governments to an unfit arbitration. Such a question is of a +judicial nature, and belongs properly to a department that has no +direct interest in maintaining or enlarging the prerogatives of the +government whose powers are involved in it. + +But the framers of the Constitution had come fresh from the +inconveniences and injustice that had resulted from the unrestrained +legislative powers of the States. Some of them believed it, therefore, +to be necessary to make the authority of the United States paramount +over the authority of each separate State; and a negative upon State +legislation, to be exercised by the legislative branch of the +national government, seemed to be the readiest way of accomplishing +the object. Some of the suggestions of the mode in which this power +was to operate strike us, at the present day, as singularly strange. +No less a person than Mr. Madison, in answer to the objections arising +from the practical difficulties in subjecting all the legislation of +all the States to the revision of a central power, thought at this +time that something in the nature of a commission might be issued into +each State, in order to give a temporary assent to laws of urgent +necessity. He suggested also that the negative might be lodged in the +Senate, in order to dispense with constant sessions of the more +numerous branch. + +But the radical objection to any plan of a negative on State +legislation, as a legislative power of the general government, was, +that it would not in fact dispense with the use of force against a +State in the last resort. If, after the exercise of the power, the +State whose obnoxious law had been prohibited should see fit to +persist in its course, force must be resorted to as the only ultimate +remedy. How different, how wise, was the expedient subsequently +devised, when the appropriate office of the judicial power was +discerned,--a power that waits calmly until the clashing authorities +of the State and the nation have led to a conflict of right or duty in +some individual case, and then peacefully adjudicates, in a case of +private interest, the great question, with which of the two +governments resides the power of prescribing the paramount rule of +conduct for the citizen! Disobedience on the part of the State may, it +is true, still follow after such an adjudication, and against an open +array of force on the one side nothing but force remains to be +employed on the other. But the great preventive of this dread +necessity is found in the fact, that there has been an adjudication by +a tribunal that commands the confidence of all, and in the moral +influence of judicial determinations over a people accustomed to +submit not only their interests, but their feelings even, to the +arbitrament of juridical discussion and decision. + + * * * * * + +TABLE + +EXHIBITING THE POPULATIONS OF THE THIRTEEN STATES, ACCORDING TO THE +CENSUS OF 1790. + +N. B.--In this abstract Maine is not included in Massachusetts, nor +Kentucky and Tennessee in the States from which they were severed. + + +----------------+-----------+---------------+---------+-----------+ + | | Whites. | Free Colored. | Slaves. | Total. | + | +-----------+---------------+---------+-----------+ + |New Hampshire, | 141,111 | 630 | 158 | 141,899 | + |Massachusetts, | 373,254 | 5,463 | ..... | 378,717 | + |Rhode Island, | 64,689 | 3,469 | 952 | 69,110 | + |Connecticut, | 232,581 | 2,801 | 2,759 | 238,141 | + |New York, | 314,142 | 4,654 | 21,324 | 340,120 | + |New Jersey, | 169,954 | 2,762 | 11,423 | 184,139 | + |Pennsylvania, | 424,099 | 6,537 | 3,737 | 434,373 | + |Delaware, | 46,310 | 3,899 | 8,887 | 59,096 | + |Maryland, | 208,649 | 8,043 | 103,036 | 319,728 | + |Virginia, | 442,115 | 12,765 | 293,427 | 748,307 | + |North Carolina, | 288,204 | 4,975 | 100,572 | 393,751 | + |South Carolina, | 140,178 | 1,801 | 107,094 | 249,073 | + |Georgia, | 52,886 | 398 | 29,264 | 82,548 | + | +-----------+---------------+---------+-----------+ + | Aggregate, | 2,898,172 | 58,197 | 682,633 | 3,639,002 | + +----------------+-----------+---------------+---------+-----------+ + +Total population of the eight States in 1790, in which slavery had +been or has since been abolished, 1,845,595. + +Total population of the five States in 1790, in which slavery existed, +and still exists, 1,793,407. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[10] Edmund Randolph. See _ante_, Vol. I. p. 480. + +[11] Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, +South Carolina, _ay_, 6; Connecticut, _no_, 1; New York divided +(Colonel Hamilton _ay_, Mr. Yates _no_). Madison, Elliot, V. 132, 134. + +[12] Madison, Elliot, V. 134, 135. + +[13] Ibid. 135. The vote of Pennsylvania, in compliance with the +wishes of Dr. Franklin, was given for a single house. + +[14] Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, +Georgia, _ay_, 6; New Jersey, South Carolina, _no_, 2; Connecticut and +Delaware divided. + +[15] See Mr. Sherman's remarks, made in committee, June 6; Madison, +Elliot, V. 161. + +[16] See Mr. Madison's views, as stated in his debates, Elliot, V. +161. + +[17] Connecticut, New Jersey, South Carolina, _ay_, 3; Massachusetts, +New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, +Georgia, _no_, 8. + +[18] Mr. Wilson was in favor of this plan, and Mr. Madison seems to +have favored it. + +[19] Madison, Elliot, V. 170. + +[20] _Ante_, Vol. I. Book I. ch. I. pp. 15-17. + +[21] Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North +Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, _ay,_ 7; New York, New Jersey, +Delaware, _no_, 3; Maryland, divided. + +[22] They contained 1,793,407 inhabitants; the other eight States had +1,845,595 when the federal census of 1790 was taken. + +[23] See the census of 1790, _post_, p. 55. + +[24] The population of the States was adopted in the committee of the +whole, instead of their quotas of contribution, which, in one or +another form, was the alternative proposition. The slaves were +included, in a proportion accounted for in the text, as a part of the +aggregate _population_; and it was not until a subsequent stage of the +proceedings that this result was defended on the ground of their +forming part of the aggregate _wealth_ of the State. + +[25] _Ante_, Vol. I. Book II. ch. III. p. 213, note 2, where the +origin of the proportion of three fifths is explained. + +[26] By Mr. Sherman and Mr. Ellsworth. + +[27] Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South +Carolina, Georgia, _ay_, 6; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, +Delaware, Maryland, _no_, 5. Elliot, V. 182. + +[28] Madison, Elliot, V. 139. + +[29] Mr. Madison, Mr. Wilson, Mr. C. Pinckney, Mr. Dickinson. On the +other hand, Mr. Williamson, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Bedford, and Mr. Butler +strenuously opposed this plan. + +[30] Accordingly, a proposition to extend the negative on State +legislation to all cases received the votes of three States only, viz. +Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +CONSTRUCTION OF THE EXECUTIVE AND THE JUDICIARY. + + +The construction of a national executive, although not surrounded by +so many inherent practical difficulties as the formation of the +legislative department, was likely to give rise to a great many +opposite theories. The questions, of how many persons the executive +ought to consist, in what mode the appointment should be made, and +what were to be its relations to the legislative power, were attended +with great diversities of opinion. + +The question whether the executive should consist of one, or of more +than one person, was likely to be influenced by the nature of the +powers to be conferred upon the office. Foreseeing that it must +necessarily be an office of great power, some of the members of the +Convention thought that a single executive would approach too nearly +to the model of the British government. These persons considered that +the great requisites for an executive department--vigor, despatch, and +responsibility--could be found in three persons as well as in one. +Those, on the other hand, who favored the plan of a single magistrate, +maintained that the prerogatives of the British monarchy would not +necessarily furnish the model for the executive powers; and that unity +in the executive would be the best safeguard against tyranny. + +But this point connected itself with the question, whether the +executive should be surrounded by a council, and the latter +proposition again involved the consideration of the precise relation +of the executive to the legislative power. That a negative of some +kind upon the acts of the legislature was essential to the +independence of the executive, was a truth in political science not +likely to escape the attention of many of the members of the +Convention. Whether it should be a qualified or an absolute negative +was the real, and almost the sole question; for although there were +some who held the opinion that no such power ought to be given, it was +evident from the first that its necessity was well understood by the +larger part of the assembly. In the first discussion of this subject, +the negative was generally regarded as a means of defence against +encroachments of the legislature on the rights and powers of the other +departments. It was supposed that, although the boundaries of the +legislative authority might be marked out in the Constitution, the +executive would need some check against unconstitutional interference +with its own prerogatives; and that, as the judicial department might +be exposed to the same dangers, the power of resisting these also +could be best exercised by the executive. But an absolute negative for +any purpose was favored by only a very few of the members, and the +proposition first adopted was to give the executive alone a +revisionary check upon legislation, which should not be absolute if it +were afterwards overruled by two thirds of each branch of the +legislature.[31] + +But inasmuch as this provision would leave the precise purposes of the +check undetermined, and in order, as it would seem, to subject the +whole of the legislative acts to revision and control by the +executive, some of the members desired that the judiciary, or a +convenient number of the judges, might be added to the executive as a +council of revision. Among these persons were Mr. Madison and Mr. +Wilson. The former expressed a very decided opinion, that, whether the +object of a revisionary power was to restrain the encroachments of the +legislature on the other departments, or on the rights of the people +at large, or to prevent the passage of laws unwise in principle or +incorrect in form, there would be great utility in annexing the wisdom +and weight of the judiciary to the executive. But this proposition was +rejected by a large majority of the States, and the power was left by +the committee as it had been settled by their former decision. These +proceedings, however, do not furnish any decisive evidence of the +nature and purpose of the revisionary check. + +But before this feature of the Constitution had been settled by the +committee, they had determined on a mode in which the executive should +be appointed. It is singular that the idea of an election of the +executive by the people, either mediately or immediately, found so +little favor at first, that on its first introduction it received the +votes of but two States. Since the executive was to be the agent of +the legislative will, it was argued by some members that it ought to +be wholly dependent, and ought therefore to be chosen by the +legislature. The experience of New York and of Massachusetts, on the +other hand,--where the election of the first magistrate by the people +had been successfully practised,--and the danger that the legislature +and the candidates might play into each other's hands, and thus give +rise to constant intrigues for the office, were the arguments employed +by others. Upon the introduction of a proposition that the States be +divided into districts, for the election by the people of electors of +the executive, two States only recorded their votes in its favor, and +eight States voted against it.[32] By the vote of eight States it was +then determined that the executive should be elected by the national +legislature for the term of seven years;[33] and subsequently it was +determined that the executive should be ineligible to a second term of +office, and should be removable on impeachment and conviction of +malpractice or neglect of duty. A single executive was agreed to by a +vote of seven States against three.[34] After the mode in which the +negative was to be exercised had been settled, an attempt was made to +change the appointment, and vest it in the executives of the States. +But this proposal was decisively rejected.[35] + +The judiciary was the next department of the proposed plan of +government that remained to be provided. Like the executive, it was a +branch of sovereign power unknown to the Confederation. The most +palpable defect of that government, as I have more than once had +occasion to observe, was the entire want of sanction to its laws. It +had no judicial system of its own for decree and execution against +individuals. All its legislation, both in nature and form, prescribed +duties to States. The observance of these duties could only be +enforced against the parties on whom they rested, and this could be +done only by military power. But it was the peculiar and anomalous +situation of the American Confederacy, that the power to employ force +against its delinquent members had not been expressly delegated to it +by the Articles of Union; and that it could not be implied from the +general purposes and provisions of that instrument, without a seeming +infraction of the article by which the States had reserved to +themselves every power, jurisdiction, and right not "expressly" +delegated to the United States. If this objection was well +founded,--and it was universally held to be so,--we may well concur +in the remark of The Federalist, that "the United States presented the +extraordinary spectacle of a government destitute even of the shadow +of constitutional power to enforce the execution of its own laws."[36] + +The Confederation, too, had found it to be entirely impracticable to +rely on the tribunals of the States for the execution of its laws. +Such a reliance in a confederated government presupposes that the +party guilty of an infraction of the laws or ordinances of the +confederacy will try, condemn, and punish itself. The whole history of +our Confederation evinces the futility of laws requiring the obedience +of States, and proceeding upon the expectation that they will enforce +that obedience upon themselves. + +The necessity for a judicial department in the general government was, +therefore, one of the most prominent of those "exigencies of the +Union," for which it was the object of the present undertaking to +provide. The place which that department was to occupy in a national +system could be clearly deduced from the office of the judiciary in +all systems of constitutional government. That office is to apply to +the subjects of the government the penalties inflicted by the +legislative power for disobedience of the laws. Disobedience of the +lawful commands of a government may be punished or prevented in two +modes. It may be done by the application of military power, without +adjudication; or it may be done through the agency of a tribunal, +which adjudicates, ascertains the guilty parties, and applies to them +the coercion of the civil power. This last is the peculiar function of +a judiciary; and in order that it may be discharged effectually, the +judiciary that is to perform this office must be a part of the +government whose laws it is to enforce. It is essential to the +supremacy of a government, that it should adjudicate on its own +powers, and enforce its own laws; for if it devolves this prerogative +on another and subordinate authority, the final sanction of its laws +can only be by a resort to military power directed against those who +have refused to obey its lawful commands. + +One of the leading objects in forming the Constitution was to obtain +for the United States the means of coercion, without a resort to force +against the people of the States collectively. Mr. Madison, at a very +early period in the deliberations of the Convention, declared that the +use of force against a State would be more like a declaration of war +than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by +the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which +it might be bound.[37] At his suggestion, a clause in Governor +Randolph's plan authorizing the use of force against a delinquent +member of the confederacy was laid aside, in order that a system +might be framed which would render it unnecessary. This could be done +only by making the authority of the government supreme in relation to +the rights and powers that might be committed to it; and it could be +made so only by applying its legislation to individuals through the +intervention of a judiciary. A confederacy whose legislative power +operates only upon States, or upon masses of people in a collective +capacity, can be supreme only so far as it can employ superior force; +and when the issue that is to determine the question of supremacy is +once made up in that form, there is an actual civil war. + +The introduction, therefore, of a judicial department into the new +plan of government, of itself evinces an intention to clothe that +government with powers that could be executed peacefully, and without +the necessity of putting down the organized opposition of subordinate +communities. By their resort to this great instrumentality, we may +perceive how much, in this particular, the framers of the Constitution +were aided by the spirit and forms of the institutions which the +people of these States had already framed for their separate +governments. The common law, which the founders of all these States +had brought with them to this country, had accustomed them to regard +the judiciary as clothed with functions in which two important objects +were embraced. By the known course of that jurisprudence the judiciary +is, in the first place, the department which declares the construction +of the laws; and, in the second place, when that department has +announced the construction of a law, it is not only the particular +case that is settled, but the rule is promulgated that is to determine +all future cases of the same kind arising under the same law. Thus the +judiciary, in governments whose adjudications proceed upon the course +of the common law, becomes not merely the arbitrator in a particular +controversy, but the department through which the government +interprets the rule of action prescribed by the legislature, and by +which all its citizens are to be guided. This office of the judicial +department had long been known in all the States of the Union at the +time of the formation of the national Constitution. + +By the introduction of this department into their plan of government, +the framers of the Constitution obviously intended that it should +perform the same office in their national system which the +corresponding department had always fulfilled in the States. No other +function of a judiciary was known to the people of the United States, +and this function was both known and deemed essential to a +well-regulated liberty. It was known that the judicial department of a +government is that branch by which the meaning of its laws is +ascertained, and applied to the conduct of individuals. To effect +this, it was introduced into the system whose gradual formation and +development we are now examining. + +The committee not only declared that this department, like the +legislative and the executive, was to be "supreme," but they +proceeded to make it so. One of the first questions that arose +concerning the construction of the judiciary was, whether it should +consist solely of one central tribunal, to which appeals might be +carried from the State courts, or should also embrace inferior +tribunals to be established within the several States. The latter plan +was resisted as an innovation, which, it was said, the States would +not tolerate. But the necessity for an effective judiciary +establishment, commensurate with the legislative authority, was +generally admitted, and a large majority of the States were found to +be in favor of conferring on the national legislature power to +establish inferior tribunals;[38] while the provision for a supreme +central tribunal was to be made imperative by the Constitution. + +The intention of the committee also to make the judicial coextensive +with the legislative authority, appears from the definition which they +gave to both. Upon the national legislature they proposed to confer, +in addition to the rights vested in Congress by the Confederation, +power to legislate in all cases to which the separate States were +incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States might be +interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation; and the further +power to negative all laws passed by the several States contravening, +in the opinion of the national legislature, the Articles of Union, or +any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union. The +jurisdiction of the national judiciary it was declared should extend +to all cases which respect the collection of the national revenue, and +to impeachments of national officers; and then the comprehensive +addition was made of "questions which involve the national peace and +harmony." This latter provision placed the general objects, which it +was declared ought to be embraced by the legislative power, within the +cognizance of the judiciary. Those objects were not yet described in +detail, the purpose being merely to settle and declare the principles +on which the powers of both departments ought to be founded. + +But, as we have already had occasion to see, the idea of vesting in +the judicial department such control over the legislation of the +separate States as might be surrendered by them to the national +government, was not yet propounded. The principle which was to +ascertain the extent of that control was already introduced and acted +upon, namely, that it should embrace all laws of the States which +might conflict with the Constitution, or the treaties made under the +national authority. The plan at present was, as we have seen, to treat +this as a legislative power, to be executed by the direct control of a +negative. But a nearer view of the great inconveniences of such an +arrangement, and the general basis of the jurisdiction already marked +out for the national judiciary, led to the development of the +particular feature which was required as a substitute for direct +interference with the legislative powers of the States. In truth, the +important principle which proposed to extend the judicial authority to +questions involving the national peace and harmony, embraced all the +power that was required; and it only remained to be seen that the +exercise of that power by the indirect effect of judicial action on +the laws of the States after they had been passed, was far preferable +to a direct interference with those laws while in the process of +enactment. + +The committee, with complete unanimity, determined that the judges of +the supreme tribunal should hold their offices during good +behavior.[39] This tenure of office was taken from the English +statutes, and from the constitutions of some of the States which had +already adopted it. The commissions of the judges in England, until +the year 1700, were prescribed by the crown; and although they were +sometimes issued to be held during good behavior, they were generally +issued during the pleasure of the crown, and it was always optional +with the crown to adopt the one or the other tenure, as it saw fit. +But in the statute passed in the thirteenth year of the reign of +William III., which finally secured the ascendency of the Protestant +religion in that country, and made other provisions for the rights and +liberties of the subject, it was enacted that judges' commissions +should be made during good behavior, and that their salaries should be +ascertained and established; but it was made lawful for the crown to +remove them upon the address of both houses of Parliament.[40] Still, +however, it was always considered that the commissions of the judges +expired on the death of the king; and for the purpose of preventing +this, and in order to make the judges more effectually independent, a +new statute, passed in the first year of the reign of George III., +declared that the commissions of the judges should continue in force +during their good behavior, notwithstanding the demise of the crown; +and that such salaries as had been once granted to them should be paid +in all future time, so long as their commissions should remain in +force. The provision which made them removable by the crown on the +address of both houses of Parliament was retained and re-enacted.[41] + +In framing the Constitution of the United States, the objectionable +feature of the English system was rejected, and its valuable +provisions were retained. No one, at the stage of the proceedings +which we are now examining, proposed to make the judges removable on +the address of the legislature; and although at a much later period +this provision was brought forward, it received the vote of a single +State only. The first determination of the Convention, in committee of +the whole, was, that the judges should hold their offices during good +behavior; that they should receive punctually, at stated times, a +fixed compensation for their services, in which no _increase_[42] or +diminution should be made so as to affect the persons actually in +office at the time. + +The appointment of the judges was by general consent, at this stage of +the proceedings, vested in the Senate. + + * * * * * + +NOTE ON THE JUDICIAL TENURE. + + The English historians and juridical writers have not given a + very satisfactory account of the purpose for which the power + of removal on the address of the two Houses of Parliament was + incorporated with the provision which gave the judges their + commissions during good behavior. It is obvious that, if the + power of removal is to be regarded as an unqualified power, + to be exercised for any cause, or without the existence of + any cause, the office is held during the pleasure of the + legislative and executive branches of the government, and not + during the official good conduct of the incumbent. In this + view of it, therefore, the provision is inconsistent with the + declared tenure of the commission. On the other hand, if the + _power_ of removal is not to be regarded as a limitation upon + the tenure of the office, but the _process_ of removal is to + be considered as a mode in which the unfitness or incapacity + of the incumbent is to be ascertained,--treating it as a + substitute for impeachment, to be used in cases of palpable + official incapacity or unfitness,--then it is not repugnant + to the tenure of good behavior. In support of this view of + the subject it is to be observed that, in the statute of 1 + Geo. III. c. 23, the tenure of good behavior is made the + leading and primary object of the enactment. The motives for + it are set forth with great point and emphasis. The King is + made to declare from the throne to the two houses of + Parliament that he looks upon the independency and + uprightness of judges as essential to the impartial + administration of justice, as one of the best securities to + the rights and liberties of the subject, and as most + conducive to the honor of the crown. The enacting part of the + statute, which follows this recital, provides anew that the + judges' commissions shall be and remain in force during their + good behavior, notwithstanding a demise of the crown; and + the power of removal by the King, on the address of both + houses, follows this enactment as a _proviso_. If, therefore, + a not unusual rule of construction is applied, the power + embraced in the _proviso_ should be so construed as to make + its operation consistent with, and not repugnant to, the + great purpose of the statute, which was to establish the + tenure of good behavior. In this view the rightful exercise + of the power may be confined to cases where the individual is + no longer within that tenure, or, in other words, where the + good behavior has ceased, or become impossible. Upon this + construction the power of removal can only be rightfully + exercised when a cause exists which touches the official + conduct or capacity of the incumbent. + + In the Constitution of the State of Massachusetts, formed in + 1780, the power of removal by the executive, on the address + of both houses of the legislature, was adopted from the + English statutes, and it was introduced as a _proviso_ after + the tenure of good behavior had been emphatically declared + for all judicial officers, just as it stands in the act of 1 + Geo. III. + + An objection which has sometimes been urged against the + construction above suggested is, that it is narrower than the + terms of the provision, and that it would not include a case + where a judge may have discharged all his official duties + with propriety and ability, and may yet be personally + obnoxious, as, for example, on account of gross immorality. + But the answer to this objection is, that the question, + whether a case of official good conduct accompanied by + personal immorality, or the like defect of character, was + intended to be within the power of removal, must be + determined on a careful view of the whole provision. The + meaning and scope of the qualification of "good behavior" + must be first ascertained. If it means simply that the + individual is to hold his commission so long as each official + duty is discharged in the manner contemplated by law, then a + mere personal immorality, which has not affected or + influenced the discharge of official duty, is not + inconsistent with the good behavior established as the tenure + of the office. But if the good behavior means, not merely + that the individual shall discharge his official duties in a + competent manner, with an average amount of ability, and + without corruption, but that he shall so order his life and + conversation as not to expose himself to a cessation of the + power to act intelligently and uprightly, then there may + undoubtedly be a case of personal immorality that would touch + the tenure of the office. Still it must be the tenure of the + office that is touched, and it must be touched by misconduct + or incapacity. The phrase "good behavior" is technical, and + has always had a meaning attached to it which confines it to + the discharge of official duty. It is, therefore, not what + men think of the individual, or how they feel towards him, + or how they regard him, but what he does or omits officially, + that is to determine whether he continues to behave well in + his office; and unless some conduct, or some bodily or mental + condition, is adduced, that shows him to be incapable of + fulfilling the duties of his station in the manner in which + the law intends they shall be discharged, his tenure of good + behavior is not lost. + + But the naked power of removal by the other two branches of + the government exists in the English constitution, and in + that of the State of Massachusetts, without any declaration + of the purposes or occasions to which it is to be applied; + and it is not easy to reconcile it with the avowed object of + judicial independence obviously embraced by the terms of the + commission prescribed in both of them. The two most important + native writers on the English constitution, Sir William + Blackstone and Mr. Hallam, regard the provision as a + restraint on the former practice of the crown, of dismissing + judges when they were not sufficiently subservient to the + views of the government in political prosecutions. Mr. + Hallam, after referring to the provisions of the two + statutes, lays down the proposition, that "no judge can be + dismissed from office, except in consequence of a conviction + for some offence, or the address of both houses of + Parliament, which is tantamount to an act of the + legislature." (Constitutional History, III. 262.) He suggests + further, that although the commissions of the judges cannot + be vacated by the authority of the crown, yet that they are + not wholly out of the reach of its influence. They are + accessible to the hope of further promotion, to the zeal of + political attachment, to the flattery of princes and + ministers, and to the bias of their professional training. He + therefore commends the wisdom of subjecting them in some + degree to legislative control. (Ibid.) But it is not to be + inferred from his remarks that that control can be rightfully + exercised without the existence of a cause which affects + their good behavior. On the contrary, he appears to consider + that the purpose was to prevent a subserviency to the crown + in their official conduct, by subjecting _that conduct_ to + legislative scrutiny. To the honor of England, it is to be + remembered that, since this power was recognized, there has + never been an instance in which a judge has been removed for + political or party purposes. + + Mr. Justice Story has taken substantially the same view of + the subject. He says: "The object of the act of Parliament + was to secure the judges from removal at the mere pleasure of + the crown; but not to render them independent of the action + of Parliament. By the theory of the British constitution, + every act of Parliament is supreme and omnipotent. It may + change the succession to the crown, and even the very + fundamentals of the constitution. It would have been absurd, + therefore, to have exempted the judges alone from the + general jurisdiction of this supreme authority in the realm. + The clause was not introduced into the act for the purpose of + conferring the power on Parliament, for it could not be taken + away or restricted, but simply to recognize it as a + qualification of the tenure of office; so that the judges + should have no right to complain of any breach of an implied + contract with them, and the crown should not be deprived of + the means to remove an unfit judge whenever Parliament + should, in their discretion, signify their assent." + (Commentaries on the Constitution, Vol. II. § 1623.) + + By describing it as a "qualification of the tenure of + office," the learned commentator probably did not mean that + the power was intended to be recognized as a power to remove + judges against whom no official misconduct or incapacity + could be charged; for the context shows that he was speaking + of the removal of "unfit" judges as a power that it was + proper to recognize and regulate. If he intended to lay it + down as a complete and actual qualification of the tenure of + good behavior, it must have been upon the theory to which he + refers, upon which an act of Parliament can do anything, + either with or without reason. Upon this theory all the + commissions of all the judges in the realm may be vacated + without inquiry into their fitness or unfitness. But if the + true view of the subject is, that the _King's commission_, + which runs _quamdiu se bene gesserit_, cannot be determined + when the crown alone decides that the good behavior has + ceased, or become impracticable, but may be determined when + the whole legislative power has so decided, then in one sense + it _is_ a qualification of the commission; because the latter + emanates from the crown, but after it has issued, it is to be + superintended by Parliament _and_ the crown. + + When we turn to our American constitutions, all embarrassment + arising from the English theory of the omnipotence of the + legislative department vanishes. In our systems of government + the people alone possess supreme power. The legislature is + but the organ of their will for certain specific and limited + purposes, which are carefully defined in a written + constitution; and no power that is not plainly confided by + the constitution to the legislative and executive departments + of the government can be exercised by them. Under every + American constitution, therefore, which has conferred upon + the executive power to remove a judge upon the address of the + two houses of the legislature, the question whether that + power extends to any cases but those of official misconduct + or incapacity must be determined by a careful consideration + of the position which that constitution assigns to the + judiciary. If, as is the case, for example, under the + Constitution of the State of Massachusetts, there is a clear + intention manifest to make the judiciary independent of the + other departments, and this intention appears by other + provisions, and the enunciation of other principles besides + that which in terms establishes the tenure of good behavior, + then the power of removal upon address ought to be construed + and exercised consistently with the tenure of good behavior, + and not in direct repugnance to it. It is plain that, if the + power is construed as a naked and unrestrained power, + established as a direct qualification of the tenure of + office, it may be used for party purposes, and may be + exercised for any cause for which a dominant party may see + fit to employ it. + + The danger of the abuse of this power, arising from the + absence of any express restriction upon it, and of any + statement of its purpose, in the Constitution of + Massachusetts, has led to an unsuccessful effort in that + State to make its exercise more difficult than it is under + the actual provision. In the Convention held in the year + 1820, in which the Constitution was subjected to revision, + Mr. Webster, Mr. Justice Story, and others of the eminent + jurists of Massachusetts, endeavored to procure an amendment + requiring the address to be adopted by a vote of two thirds + in both branches, instead of allowing it to be carried, as + the Constitution has always stood, and as the rule is in + England, by a bare majority. The effort failed; but the + result of the whole discussion to which it gave rise shows + the general understanding of the people of the State with + regard to the rightful extent of this power. The Convention + was a very remarkable assembly of the intellect and worth of + the State, and both the political parties of the time were + fully represented in it, by their most distinguished members. + All were agreed that the power was capable of abuse, and that + to apply it to any other than cases of official incapacity or + unfitness would be an abuse. But those who opposed the + adoption of a two-thirds rule were unwilling to anticipate + such an abuse of the power, and their arguments prevailed. + + The framers of the Constitution of the United States + intrusted no such power over the judiciary to the other + branches of the government. They regarded the possibility of + its being used for improper purposes as a sufficient reason + why it should not exist. They thought it, moreover, a + contradiction in terms to say that the judges should hold + their offices during good behavior, and yet be removable + without a trial. But the radical objection was one that does + not seem to have been sufficiently attended to in the early + formation of some of the State constitutions, but which the + peculiar system established by the Constitution of the United + States made especially prominent. + + That Constitution was designed to be in some respects an + abridgment of the previous powers of the States. Like the + State constitutions, also, it embraced a careful + distribution of the powers of government between the + different departments, and a careful separation of the + functions of one department from those of another. Questions + must, therefore, necessarily arise in the administration of + the government, whether one of these departments had + overstepped the limits assigned to it as against the others, + and whether the action of the general or the State + governments in particular instances is within their + appropriate spheres. These, now familiar to us as + constitutional questions, were to be subjected to the + arbitrament of the national judiciary; and it was almost + universally felt that this delicate and important power must + be confided to judges whose tenure of office could be touched + only by the solemn process of accusation and impeachment. The + same necessity exists under a State constitution, but perhaps + not in the same degree; for while the judiciary of a State is + often called upon to decide finally upon the conformity of + acts of legislation with the State constitution,--and ought + therefore clearly to be beyond the reach of legislative + influence,--yet no State judiciary is the final arbiter + between the rights and powers of the national government and + the rights and powers of the States. This function belongs to + the supreme judiciary of the United States. It was foreseen + that it would not infrequently involve the decision of + questions in which whole classes of States might have the + deepest interest, which would connect themselves with party + discussions, and on which the representatives of the States + in the national legislature would be likely to share in the + feelings, and even in the passions, of their constituents. + There could be no security for a judiciary called upon to + decide such questions, if they were to be subject to a power + of removal by the other two branches of the government. Their + commissions might make them theoretically independent, but + practically they could be removed at the pleasure of those + whom they might have offended. In truth, there is no State in + this Union where such a power of removal is vested without + qualification in the legislative and executive departments, + in which the judges can be said to hold their commissions + during good behavior, unless that power is construed to + embrace only those cases of palpable incapacity in which an + impeachment would be unnecessary or impracticable. As a naked + and unqualified power, it is repugnant to the tenure of good + behavior. It was so regarded in the Convention which framed + the Constitution of the United States, where a proposition to + introduce it received the vote of the single State of + Connecticut only. (Madison, Elliot, V. 481, 482.) + +FOOTNOTES: + +[31] Adopted by the votes of eight States against two,--Connecticut +and Maryland voting in the negative. + +[32] Pennsylvania, Maryland, _ay_, 2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New +York, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, +_no_, 8. + +[33] Pennsylvania and Maryland, _no_. + +[34] New York, Delaware, and Maryland, _no_. + +[35] Nine States voted against it, and one (Delaware) was divided. + +[36] The Federalist, No. 21. + +[37] Madison, Elliot, V. p. 140. + +[38] Eight States in the affirmative, two in the negative, and one +divided. + +[39] This was afterwards applied to the judges of the inferior courts +also. + +[40] Act 12 & 13 William III. ch. 2. + +[41] Act 1 Geo. III. ch. 23. + +[42] This was afterwards stricken out. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +ADMISSION OF NEW STATES.--GUARANTY OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT.--POWER OF +AMENDMENT.--OATH TO SUPPORT THE NEW SYSTEM.--RATIFICATION. + + +Having settled a general plan for the organization of the three great +departments of government, the committee next proceeded to provide for +certain other objects of primary importance, the necessity for which +had been demonstrated by the past history of the Confederacy. The +first of these was the admission of new States into the Union. + +It had long been apparent, that the time would sooner or later arrive +when the limits of the United States must be extended, and the number +of the States increased. Circumstances had made it impossible that the +benefits and privileges of the Union should be confined to the +original thirteen communities by whom it had been established. +Population had begun to press westward from the Atlantic States with +the energy and enterprise that have marked the Anglo-American +character since the first occupation of the country. Wherever the +hardy pioneers of civilization penetrated into the wilderness of the +Northwest, they settled upon lands embraced by those shadowy +boundaries which carried the territorial claims of some of the older +States into the region beyond the Ohio. Circumstances, already +detailed in a former part of this work, had compelled a surrender of +these territorial claims to the United States; and in the efforts made +by Congress, both before and after the cessions had been completed, to +provide for the establishment of new States, and for their admission +into the Union, we have already traced one of the great defects of the +Confederation, which rendered it incapable of meeting the exigencies +created by this inevitable expansion of the country.[43] + +In the year 1784, when Mr. Jefferson brought into Congress a measure +for the organization and admission of new States, to be formed upon +the territories that had been or might thereafter be ceded to the +United States, he seems to have considered that the Articles of +Confederation authorized the admission of new States formed out of +territory that had belonged to a State already in the Union, by a vote +of nine States in Congress. But a majority of the States in Congress +evidently regarded the power of admission as doubtful; and although +they passed the resolves for the admission of new States,--principally +because it was extremely important to invite cessions of Western +territory,--they left the provision as to the mode of admission so +indefinite, that the whole question of power would have to be opened +and decided on the first application that might be made by a State to +be admitted into the Union.[44] + +When the Ordinance of 1787 was formed, it made provision for the +establishment of new States in the territory, and declared that, when +any of them should have sixty thousand free inhabitants, it should be +admitted into Congress on an equal footing with the original States. +But the mode of admission was not prescribed. The power to admit was +assumed, and no rule of voting on the question of admission was +referred to. The probability is, that Congress anticipated at this +time that a definite constitutional power would be provided by the +Convention that had been summoned to revise the federal system. This +power was embraced in the plan adopted in the committee of the whole +of that body, by a resolve which declared "that provision ought to be +made for the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of +the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of government and +territory, or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the +national legislature less than the whole." In what mode this provision +was made will be seen hereafter, when we come to examine the framework +of the Constitution. + +Another of the new powers now proposed to be given to the Union was +that of protecting and upholding the governments of the States. I have +already had occasion to explain the relations of the Confederation to +its members in a time of internal disturbance and peril; and have +given to the incapacity of that government to afford any aid in such +emergencies great prominence among the causes which led to the +revision of the federal system.[45] Under that system the States had +been so completely sovereign, and so independent of each other in all +that related to their internal concerns, that the government of any +one of them might have been subverted without the possibility of an +authorized and regulated interference by the rest. The constitutional +and republican liberty that had been established in these States after +the Revolution had freed them from the dominion of England, was at +that period a new and untried experiment; and in order that we of this +generation may be able to appreciate the importance of the guaranty +proposed to be introduced into the Constitution of the United States, +it is necessary for us to look somewhat farther than the particular +circumstances of the commotions in New England that marked the year +1787 as an era of especial danger to these republican governments. It +is, in fact, necessary for us to remember the contemporaneous history +of Europe, and to observe how the events that were taking place in the +Old World necessarily acted upon our condition, prospects, and +welfare. + +The French Revolution, consummated in 1791 by the execution of the +King, was already begun when the Constitution of the United States +went into operation. No one who has examined the history of the first +years of our present national government, can fail to have been +impressed with the dangers which the administration of our domestic +affairs incurred of becoming complicated with the politics of Europe. +As in all other countries, so in America, the events and progress of +the Revolution in France found sympathy or reprobation, according to +the natural tendencies, the previous associations, and the political +sentiments of individuals. But in the United States there was a +peculiar and predisposing cause for the liveliest interest in the +success of the principles that were believed, by large masses of the +people, to be involved in the French Revolution. Our own struggles for +liberty, our bold and successful assertion of the rights of man, and +our achievement of the means and opportunity of self-government, had +evidently and strikingly acted upon France. The people of the United +States were fully sensible of this; and transferring to the French +nation the debt of gratitude for the aid which had flowed to us in the +first instance from their government without any special influence of +their own, large numbers of our people became warmly enlisted in the +cause of that Revolution, of which the early promise seemed so +encouraging to the best hopes of mankind, and the full development of +which first ruined the interests of liberty, in the wanton excesses of +anarchy and national ambition, and finally crushed them beneath the +usurpations and necessities of military despotism. On the other hand, +the more cautious--who, if they had not from the first looked with +distrust upon the whole movement of the Revolutionary party in France, +very soon believed that it could result in no real benefit to France +or to the world--tended strongly and naturally to the side of those +governments with which the leaders of the Revolution had to contend. +In consequence of this state of feeling among different portions of +the people of the United States, with reference to French affairs, and +of the conduct of France and England towards ourselves, the +administration of Washington had great difficulty both in preserving +the neutrality of the country, and in excluding foreign influence and +interference in our domestic affairs. + +Had this state of things, which followed immediately after the +inauguration of our new government, found us still under the +Confederation, there can be no doubt that our condition would have +afforded to the Revolutionary party in France the means not only of +disseminating their principles among us, but also of overturning any +of the institutions of the weaker States which might have stood in the +way of their acquiring an influence in America. Yet what form or +principle of government is there in the world, that more imperatively +requires all foreign or external influence to be repelled, than our +own republican system, of which it is a cardinal doctrine that every +institution and every law must express the uncontrolled and +spontaneous will of a majority of the people who constitute the +political society? Other governments may be upheld by the interference +of their neighbors; other systems may require, and perhaps rightfully +admit, foreign influence. Ours demand an absolute immunity from +foreign control, and can exist only when the authority of the people +is made absolutely free. That their authority should be made and kept +free to act upon the principles that enable it to operate with +certainty and safety, it requires the guaranty of a system that rests +upon the same principles, is committed to the same destiny, is itself +constituted by American power, and is created for the express purpose +of preserving the republican form, the theory and the right of +self-government. + +Such was the purpose of the framers of the Constitution, when, in this +early stage of their deliberations, they determined that a republican +constitution should be guaranteed by the United States to each of the +States.[46] The object of this provision was, to secure to the people +of each State the power of governing their own community, through the +action of a majority, according to the fundamental rules which they +might prescribe for ascertaining the public will. The insurrection in +Massachusetts, then just suppressed, had made the dangers that +surround this theory of government painfully apparent. It had +demonstrated the possibility that a minority might become in reality +the ruling power. Fortunately, no foreign interference had then +intervened; but a very few years only elapsed, before a crisis +occurred, in which the institutions of the States would have been +quite unable to withstand the shocks proceeding from the French +Revolution, if the government of the Union had not been armed with +the power of protecting and upholding them. + +The committee also added another new feature to their plan of +government, which was a capacity of being amended. The Articles of +Confederation admitted of changes only when they had been agreed upon +in Congress, and had afterwards been confirmed by the legislatures of +all the States. Indeed, it resulted necessarily from the nature of +that government, that it could only be altered by the consent of all +the parties to it. It was now proposed and declared, that provision +ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union, whenever +it should seem necessary. This declaration looked to the establishment +of some new method of originating improvements in the system of +government, and a new rule for their adoption. + +It was also determined that the members of the State governments +should be bound by oath to support the Articles of Union. The purpose +of this provision was to secure the supremacy of the national +government, in cases of collision between its authority and the +authority of the States. It was a new feature in the national system, +and received at first the support of only a bare majority of the +States.[47] + +Finally, it was provided that the new system, after its approbation by +Congress, should be submitted to representative assemblies +recommended by the State legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the +people to consider and decide thereon. The question has often been +discussed, whether this mode of ratification marks in any way the +character of the government established by the Constitution. At +present it is only necessary to observe, that the design of the +committee was to substitute the authority of the people of the States +in the place of that of the State legislatures, for a threefold +purpose. First, it was deemed desirable to resort to the supreme +authority of the people, in order to give the new system a higher +sanction than could be given to it by the State governments. Secondly, +it was thought expedient to get rid of the doctrine often asserted +under the Confederation, that the Union was a mere compact or treaty +between independent States, and that therefore a breach of its +articles by any one State absolved the rest from its obligations. In +the third place, it was intended, by this mode of ratification, to +enable the people of a less number of the States than the whole to +form a new Union, if all should not be willing to adopt the new +system.[48] The votes of the States in committee, upon this new mode +of ratification, show that on one side were ranged the States that +were aiming to change the principle of the government, and on the +other the States that sought to preserve the principle of the +Confederation.[49] + +These, together with a provision that the authority of the old +Congress should be continued to a given day after the changes should +have been adopted, and that their engagements should be completed by +the new government, were the great features of the system prepared by +the committee of the whole, and reported to the Convention, on the +thirteenth of June.[50] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[43] _Ante_, Vol. I. Book III. Chap. V. + +[44] Mr. Jefferson has very lucidly stated the position of the +question in some observations furnished by him, when in Paris, to one +of the editors of the _Encyclopédie Méthodique_, in 1786 or 1787, +which I here insert entire. "The eleventh Article of Confederation +admits Canada to accede to the Confederation at its own will, but +adds, 'no other Colony shall be admitted to the same unless such +admission be agreed to by nine States.' When the plan of April, 1784, +for establishing new States, was on the carpet, the committee who +framed the report of that plan had inserted this clause: 'Provided +nine States agree to such admission, according to the reservation of +the eleventh of the Articles of Confederation.' It was objected,--1. +That the words of the Confederation, 'no other Colony,' could refer +only to the residuary possessions of Great Britain, as the two +Floridas, Nova Scotia, &c., not being already parts of the Union; that +the law for 'admitting' a new member into the Union could not be +applied to a territory which was already in the Union, as making part +of a State which was a member of it. 2. That it would be improper to +allow 'nine' States to receive a new member, because the same reasons +which rendered that number proper now would render a greater one +proper when the number composing the Union should be increased. They +therefore struck out this paragraph, and inserted a proviso, that 'the +consent of so many States in Congress shall be first obtained as may +at the time be competent'; thus leaving the question whether the +eleventh Article applies to the admission of new States to be decided +when that admission shall be asked. See the Journal of Congress of +April 20, 1784. Another doubt was started in this debate, viz. whether +the agreement of the nine States required by the Confederation was to +be made by their legislatures, or by their delegates in Congress? The +expression adopted, viz. 'so many States in Congress is first +obtained,' shows what was their sense of this matter. If it be agreed +that the eleventh Article of the Confederation is not to be applied to +the admission of these new States, then it is contended that their +admission comes within the thirteenth Article, which forbids 'any +alteration unless agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and +afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.' The +independence of the new States of Kentucky and Franklin will soon +bring on the ultimate decision of all these questions." (Jefferson's +Works, IX. 251.) That the admission of a new State into the Union +could have been regarded as an alteration of the Articles of +Confederation, within the meaning and intention of the thirteenth +Article, seems scarcely probable. Such an admission would only have +increased the number of the parties to the Union, but it would of +itself have made no change in the Articles; and it was against +alterations _in the Articles_ that the provision of the thirteenth was +directed. The objections which Mr. Jefferson informs us were raised in +Congress to a deduction of the power from the eleventh Article, appear +to be decisive. In truth, when the Articles of Confederation were +framed, the subject of the admission of new States, so far as it had +been considered at all, was connected with the difficult and delicate +controversy respecting the western boundaries of some of the old +States, and the equitable claim of the Union to become the proprietor +of the unoccupied lands beyond those boundaries. An attempt was made +to obtain for Congress, in the Articles of Confederation, power to +ascertain and fix the western boundaries of those States, and to lay +out the lands beyond them into new States. But it failed (_ante_, Vol. +I. 291), and Congress could thereafter be said to possess no power to +admit new States, except what depended on a doubtful construction of +the Articles of Confederation. + +Still, both when they invited the cessions of their territorial claims +by the States of Virginia, New York, &c., and after those cessions had +been made, Congress acted as if they had constitutional authority to +form new States, and to admit them into the Union. (_Ante_, Vol. I. +292-308.) When the Ordinance of 1787, for the regulation and +government of the Northwestern Territory, was adopted, the power to +admit new States was again assumed. The Convention for forming the +Constitution was, however, then sitting, and it may be that the +framers of the Ordinance introduced into that instrument the +stipulation that the new States should be admitted on an equal footing +with the old ones, in the confidence that the constitutional power +would be supplied by the Convention. At any rate, the provisions of +the Ordinance, as well as those of the previous resolves of Congress +on the same subject of the Northwestern Territory, and the position of +Kentucky, Vermont, Maine, and Tennessee (then called Franklin), +imposed upon the Convention an imperative necessity for some action +that would open the door of the Union to new members. + +[45] _Ante_, Vol. I. Book III. Chap. III. pp. 260-275. + +[46] As the resolution was originally passed, it declared that "a +republican constitution, and its existing laws, ought to be guaranteed +to each State by the United States." On account of the ambiguity of +the expression "existing laws," and the controversies to which it +might give rise, the provision was subsequently changed to a guaranty +of "a republican form of government," and of protection against +"invasion" and "domestic violence," as it now stands in Art. IV. Sect. +4 of the Constitution. + +[47] Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South +Carolina, and Georgia voted for it (6); Connecticut, New Jersey, New +York, Delaware, and Maryland voted against it (5). + +[48] See Madison, Elliot, V. 157, 158, 183. + +[49] Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South +Carolina, Georgia, _ay_, 6; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, _no_, +3; Delaware, Maryland, divided. See further on the subject of +"Ratification," _post_, Index. + +[50] The report was in the following words:-- + +"1. _Resolved_, That it is the opinion of this committee that a +national government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme +legislative, executive, and judiciary. + +"2. _Resolved_, That the national legislature ought to consist of two +branches. + +"3. _Resolved_, That the members of the first branch of the national +legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States +for the term of three years; to receive fixed stipends by which they +may be compensated for the devotion of their time to the public +service, to be paid out of the national treasury; to be ineligible to +any office established by a particular State, or under the authority +of the United States, (except those peculiarly belonging to the +functions of the first branch,) during the term of service, and under +the national government, for the space of one year after its +expiration. + +"4. _Resolved_, That the members of the second branch of the national +legislature ought to be chosen by the individual legislatures; to be +of the age of thirty years, at least; to hold their offices for a term +sufficient to insure their independence, namely, seven years; to +receive fixed stipends, by which they may be compensated for the +devotion of their time to the public service, to be paid out of the +national treasury; to be ineligible to any office established by a +particular State, or under the authority of the United States, (except +those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch,) +during the term of service, and under the national government, for the +space of one year after its expiration. + +"5. _Resolved_, That each branch ought to possess the right of +originating acts. + +"6. _Resolved_, That the national legislature ought to be empowered to +enjoy the legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; +and, moreover, to legislate in all cases to which the separate States +are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be +interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation; to negative all +laws passed by the several States contravening, in the opinion of the +national legislature, the Articles of Union, or any treaties +subsisting under the authority of the Union. + +"7. _Resolved_, That the right of suffrage in the first branch of the +national legislature ought not to be according to the rule established +in the Articles of Confederation, but according to some equitable +ratio of representation; namely, in proportion to the whole number of +white and other free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex, and +condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and +three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing +description, except Indians not paying taxes in each State. + +"8. _Resolved_, That the right of suffrage in the second branch of the +national legislature ought to be according to the rule established for +the first. + +"9. _Resolved_, That a national executive be instituted, to consist of +a single person, to be chosen by the national legislature, for the +term of seven years, with power to carry into execution the national +laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, to be +ineligible a second time, and to be removable on impeachment and +conviction of malpractice or neglect of duty; to receive a fixed +stipend, by which he may be compensated for the devotion of his time +to the public service, to be paid out of the national treasury. + +"10. _Resolved_, That the national executive shall have a right to +negative any legislative act, which shall not be afterwards passed +unless by two thirds of each branch of the national legislature. + +"11. _Resolved_, That a national judiciary be established, to consist +of one supreme tribunal, the judges of which shall be appointed by the +second branch of the national legislature, to hold their offices +during good behavior, and to receive punctually, at stated times, a +fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or +diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in +office at the time of such increase or diminution. + +"12. _Resolved_, That the national legislature be empowered to appoint +inferior tribunals. + +"13. _Resolved_, That the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall +extend to all cases which respect the collection of the national +revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and questions which +involve the national peace and harmony. + +"14. _Resolved_, That provision ought to be made for the admission of +States lawfully arising without the limits of the United States, +whether from a voluntary junction of government and territory, or +otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the national +legislature less than the whole. + +"15. _Resolved_, That provision ought to be made for the continuance +of Congress, and their authorities and privileges, until a given day +after the reform of the Articles of Union shall be adopted, and for +the completion of all their engagements. + +"16. _Resolved_, That a republican constitution, and its existing +laws, ought to be guaranteed to each State by the United States. + +"17. _Resolved_, That provision ought to be made for the amendment of +the Articles of Union, whensoever it shall seem necessary. + +"18. _Resolved_, That the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers +within the several States ought to be bound by oath to support the +Articles of Union. + +"19. _Resolved_, That the amendments which shall be offered to the +Confederation by the Convention ought, at a proper time or times after +the approbation of Congress, to be submitted to an assembly or +assemblies of representatives, recommended by the several +legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and +decide thereon." + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +ISSUE BETWEEN THE VIRGINIA AND THE NEW JERSEY PLANS.--HAMILTON'S +PROPOSITIONS.--MADISON'S VIEW OF THE NEW JERSEY PLAN. + + +The nature of the plan of government thus proposed--called generally +in the proceedings of the Convention the Virginia plan--may be +perceived from the descriptions that have now been given of the design +and scope of its principal features, and of the circumstances out of +which they arose. It purported to be a supreme and a national +government; and we are now to inquire in what sense and to what extent +it was so. + +Its powers, as we have seen, were to be distributed among the three +departments of a legislative, an executive, and a judiciary. Its +legislative body was to consist of two branches, one of which was to +be chosen directly by the people of the States, the other by the State +legislatures; but in both, the people of the States were to be +represented in proportion to their numbers. + +Its legislative powers were to embrace certain objects, to which the +legislative powers of the separate States might be incompetent, or +where their exercise might be injurious to the national +interests;[51] and it was moreover to have a certain restraining +authority over the legislation of the States. This plan necessarily +supposed that the residue of the sovereignty and legislative power of +the States would remain in them after these objects had been provided +for; and it therefore contemplated a system of government, in which +the individual citizen might be acted upon by two separate and +distinct legislative authorities. But by providing that the +legislative power of the national government should be derived from +the people inhabiting the several States, and by creating an executive +and a judiciary with an authority commensurate with that of the +legislature, it sought to make, and did theoretically make, the +national government, in its proper sphere, supreme over the +governments of the States. + +With respect to the element of stability, as depending on the length +of the tenure of office, this system was far in advance of any of the +republican governments then existing in America; for it contemplated +that the members of one branch of the legislature should be elected +for three, and those of the other branch, and the executive, for seven +years. + +If we compare it with the Confederation, which it was designed to +supersede, we find greatly enlarged powers, somewhat vaguely defined; +the addition of distinct and regular departments, accurately traced; +and a totally different basis for the authority and origin of the +government itself. + +Such was the nature of the plan of government proposed by a majority +of the States in Convention, for the consideration of all. It had to +encounter, in the first place, the want of an express authority in the +Convention to propose any change in the fundamental principle of the +government. The long existence of the distinctions between the +different States, the settled habit of the people of the States to act +only in their separate capacities, their adherence to State interests, +and their strong prejudices against all external power, had prevented +them from contemplating a government founded on the principle of a +national unity among the populations of their different communities. +Hence, it is not surprising that men, who came to the Convention +without express powers which they could consider as authority for the +introduction of so novel a principle, should have been unwilling to +agree to the formation of a government, that was to involve the +surrender of a large portion of the sovereignty of each State. They +felt a real apprehension lest their separate States should be lost in +the comprehensive national power which seemed to be foreshadowed by +the plans at which others were aiming. It seemed to them that the +consequence, the power, and even the existence, of their separate +political corporations, were about to be absorbed into the nation. + +In the second place, the mode of reconciling the co-ordinate existence +of a national and a State sovereignty had undergone no public +discussion. At the same time, almost all the evils, the +inconveniences, and the dangers which the country had encountered +since the peace of 1783, had sprung from the impossibility of uniting +the action of the States upon measures of general concern. For this +reason, there were men in the Convention who at one time doubted the +utility of preserving the States, and who naturally considered that +the only mode in which a durable and sufficient government could be +established, was to fuse all the elements of political power into a +single mass. To those who had this feeling, the Virginia plan was as +little acceptable as it was, for the opposite reason, to others. + +It was, however, from the party opposed to any departure from the +principle of the Confederation, that the first and the chief +opposition came. The delegations of Connecticut, New York (with the +exception of Hamilton), New Jersey, and Delaware, and one prominent +member from Maryland,--Luther Martin,--preferred to add a few new +powers to the existing system, rather than to substitute a national +government. They were determined not to surrender the present equality +of suffrage in Congress; and accordingly the members from the State of +New Jersey brought forward a plan of a purely "federal" character.[52] + +This plan proposed that the Articles of Confederation should be so +revised and enlarged as to give to Congress certain additional powers, +including a power to levy duties for purposes of revenue and the +regulation of commerce. But it left the constitution of Congress as +it was under the Confederation, and left also the old mode of +discharging the national expenses, by means of requisitions on the +States, changing only the rule of proportion from the basis of real +property to that of free population. It contemplated an executive, to +be elected by Congress, and a supreme judiciary to be appointed by the +executive; leaving to the judiciaries of the States original +cognizance of all cases arising under the laws of the Union, and +confining the national judiciary to an appellate jurisdiction, except +in the cases of impeachments of national officers. It proposed to +secure obedience to the acts and regulations of Congress, by making +them the supreme law of the States, and by authorizing the executive +to employ the power of the confederated States against any State or +body of men who might oppose or prevent their being carried into +execution. + +The mover of this system[53] founded his opposition to the plan framed +by the committee of the whole chiefly upon the want of power in the +Convention to propose a change in the principle of the existing +government. He argued, with much acuteness, that there was either a +present confederacy of the States, or there was not; that if there +was, it was one founded on the equal sovereignties of the States, and +that it could be changed only by the consent of all; that as some of +the States would not consent to the change proposed, it was necessary +to adhere to the system of representation by States; and that a +system of representation of the people of the States was inconsistent +with the preservation of the State sovereignties. The answer made to +this objection was, that although the States, in appointing their +delegates to the Convention, had given them no express authority to +change the principle of the existing constitution, yet that the +Convention had been assembled at a great crisis in the affairs of the +Union, as an experiment, to remedy the evils under which the country +had long suffered from the defects of its general government; that +whatever was necessary to the safety of the republic must, under such +circumstances, be considered as within the implied powers of the +Convention, especially as it was proposed to do nothing more than to +recommend the changes which might be found necessary; and that +although all might not assent to the changes that would be proposed, +the dissentient States could not require the others to remain under a +system that had completely failed, when they could form a new +confederacy upon wiser and better principles.[54] + +It was at this point that Hamilton interposed, with the suggestion of +views and opinions that have sometimes subjected him, unjustly, to the +charge of anti-republican and monarchical tendencies and designs. +These views and opinions should be carefully considered by the reader, +not only in justice to this great statesman, but because they had much +influence, in an indirect manner, in producing the form and tone +which the Constitution finally received. + +It should be recollected, in making this examination, that, so far as +there was at this time a distinct issue before the Convention, it was +presented by the New Jersey plan of a system that would leave the +sovereignties of the States almost wholly undiminished, on the one +hand, and on the other by the Virginia plan of a partial but as yet +undefined surrender of powers to a general government. The +construction of this proposed government, and the powers that it ought +to possess, were the points which Hamilton now dealt with, in the +first address which he made to the committee. + +He has left it on record, that the views which he announced on this +occasion were rested upon the three following positions:--1. That the +political principles of the people of this country would endure +nothing but a republican government. 2. That, in the actual situation +of the country, it was of itself right and proper that the republican +theory should have a full and fair trial. 3. That to such a trial it +was essential that the government should be so constructed as to give +it all the energy and stability reconcilable with the principles of +that republican theory.[55] The opinions advanced by Hamilton at the +stage of the proceedings which we are now examining must always be +considered with reference to the principles which guided him, in order +that a right estimate may be formed of their influence on the final +result of the issue then pending. + +After disposing of the objection that the Convention had no power to +propose a plan of government differing from the principle of the +Confederation, he proceeded to say, that there were three lines of +conduct before them: first, to make a league offensive and defensive +between the States, treaties of commerce, and an apportionment of the +public debt; secondly, to amend the present Confederation by adding +such powers as the public mind seemed ready to grant; thirdly, to form +a new government, which should pervade the whole, with decisive powers +and a complete sovereignty. The practicability of the last course, and +the mode in which the object should be accomplished, were the +important and the only real questions before them. But the solution of +those questions involved an inquiry into the principles of civil +obedience, which are the great and essential supports of all +government. + +The first of these principles, he said, is an active and constant +interest in the support of a government. This principle did not then +exist in the States, in favor of the general government. They +constantly pursued their own particular interests, which were adverse +to those of the whole. The second principle is a conviction of the +utility and necessity of a government. As the general government might +be dissolved and yet the order of society would continue,--so that +many of the purposes of government would still be attainable, to a +considerable degree, within the States themselves,--a conviction of +the utility or the necessity of a general government could not at that +time be considered as an active principle among the people of the +States. The third principle is an habitual sense of obligation; and +here the whole force of the tie was on the side of State government. +Its sovereignty was immediately before the eyes of the people; its +protection they immediately enjoyed; by its hand, private justice was +administered. In the existing state of things, the central government +was known only by its unwelcome demands of money or service. + +The fourth principle on which government must rely is force; by which +he meant both the coercion of laws and the coercion of arms. But as to +the general government, the coercion of laws did not exist; and to +employ the force of arms on the States would amount to a war between +the parties to the confederacy. The fifth principle was influence; by +which he did not mean corruption, but a dispensation of those regular +honors and just emoluments which produce an attachment to government. +Almost the whole weight of these was then on the side of the States, +and must remain so in any mere confederacy, rendering it in its very +nature feeble and precarious. + +The lessons afforded by experience led to the evident conclusion that +all federal governments were weak and distracted. They were so, +because the strong principles which he had enumerated operated on the +side of the constituent members of the confederacy, and against the +central authority. In order, therefore, to establish a general and +national government, with any hope of its duration, they must avail +themselves of these principles. They must interest the wants of men in +its support; they must make it useful and necessary; and they must +give it the means of coercion. For these purposes, it would be +necessary to make it completely sovereign. + +The New Jersey plan certainly would not produce this effect. It merely +granted the regulation of trade and a more effectual collection of the +revenue, and some partial duties, which, at five or ten per cent, +would perhaps only amount to a fund to discharge the debt of the +corporation. But there were a variety of objects which must +necessarily engage the attention of a national government. It would +have to protect our rights against Canada on the north, against Spain +on the south, and the western frontier against the savages. It would +have to adopt necessary plans for the settlement of the frontiers, and +to institute the mode in which settlements and good governments were +to be made. According to the New Jersey plan, the expense of +supporting and regulating these important matters could only be +defrayed by requisitions. This mode had already proved, and would +always be found, ineffectual. The national revenue must be drawn from +commerce,--from imposts, taxes on specific articles, and even from +exports, which, notwithstanding the common opinion, he held to be fit +objects of moderate taxation. + +The radical objections to the New Jersey plan he held to be its +equality of suffrage as between the States; its incapacity to raise +forces or to levy taxes; and the organization of Congress, which it +proposed to leave unchanged. On the other hand, the great extent of +the country to be governed, and the difficulty of drawing a suitable +representation from such distances, led him to regard the Virginia +plan with doubt and hesitation. At the same time, he declared that the +system must be a representative and republican government. But +representation alone, without the element of a permanent tenure of +office in some part of the system, would not, as he believed, answer +the purpose. For, as society naturally falls into the political +divisions of the few and the many, or the majority and the minority, +some part of every good representative government must be so +constituted as to furnish a check to the mere democratic element. The +Virginia plan, which proposed that both branches of the national +legislature should be chosen by the people of the States, and that the +executive should be appointed by the legislature, presented a +democratic Assembly to be checked by a democratic Senate, and both of +them by a democratic chief magistrate. To give a Senate or an +executive thus chosen an official term a few years longer than that of +the members of the Assembly, would not be sufficient to remove them +from the violence and turbulence of the popular passions. + +For these reasons, they must go as far, in order to attain stability +and permanency, as republican principles would admit. He would +therefore have the Senate and the executive hold their offices during +good behavior. Such a system would be strictly republican, so long as +these offices remained elective and the incumbents were subject to +impeachment. The term _monarchy_ could not apply to such a system, for +it marks neither the degree nor the duration of power. And in order to +obviate the danger of tumults attending the election of an executive +who should hold his office during good behavior, he proposed that the +election should be made by a body of electors, to be chosen by the +people, or by the legislatures of the States. The Assembly he proposed +to have chosen by the people of the States for three years. The +legislative _powers_ of the general government he desired to have +extended to all subjects; at the same time, he did not contemplate the +total abolition of the State governments, but considered them +essential, both as subordinate agents of the general government, and +as the administrators of private justice among their own citizens.[56] + +His conclusions were, first, that it was impossible to secure the +Union by any modification of a federal government; secondly, that a +league, offensive and defensive, was full of certain evils and greater +dangers; thirdly, that to establish a general government would be very +difficult, if not impracticable, and liable to various objections. +What then was to be done? He answered, that they must balance the +inconveniences and the dangers, and choose that system which seemed to +have the fewest objections. + +The plan which Hamilton then read to the Convention, the principal +features of which have thus been stated, was designed to explain his +views, but was not intended to be offered as a substitute for either +of the two others then under consideration. The issue accordingly +remained unchanged; and that issue lay between the Virginia and the +New Jersey plans, or between a system of equal representation by +States, and a system of proportionate representation of the people of +the States. Besides this radical difference, the Virginia plan +contemplated two houses, while the New Jersey plan proposed to retain +the existing system of a single body. + +But in order that a sound judgment may be formed of the correctness of +Hamilton's opinions, and of the useful influence which they exerted, +it must be remembered that there was an inconsistency in the Virginia +plan, which he was then aiming to exhibit. That plan was a purely +national system; it drew both branches of the national legislature +from the people of the States, in proportion to their numbers, and +merely interposed the legislatures of the States as the electors of so +many senators as the State might be entitled to have according to the +ratio of representation. Its inconsistency lay in the fact, that, +while it would have created a government in which the proportionate +principle of representation would have obtained in both houses, making +a purely national government, in which the States, as equal political +corporations, could have exercised no direct control over its +legislation, it left the separate political sovereignties of the +States almost wholly unimpaired, taking from them jurisdiction over +such subjects only as seemed to require national legislation. The +operation of such a system must necessarily have involved perpetual +conflicts between national and State power; for the States, possessed +of a large part of their original sovereignties, and yet unable to +exert an equal control in either branch of Congress, would have been +constantly tempted and obliged to exert the indirect power of their +separate legislation against the direct and democratic force of a +majority of the people of the United States. To such a system, the +objection urged by Hamilton, that it presented a democratic House +checked by a democratic Senate, was strikingly applicable. This +objection, it is true, was not presented by him as a reason for +admitting the States to a direct and equal representation in the +government; he employed it to enforce the expediency of giving to the +Senate a different basis from that of the House, and one farther +removed from popular influences. But when, at a subsequent period, the +first great compromise of the Constitution--that between a purely +national and a purely federal system--took place by the admission of +the States to an equal representation in the Senate, the force of +Hamilton's reasoning was felt, and the necessity for a check as +between the two houses, founded on a difference of origin, which he +had so strenuously maintained, both facilitated and hastened the +concession to the demands of the smaller States. + +At present, Hamilton's object, in the discussions which we are now +considering, was to show that, if the government was to be purely +national,--as was the theory of the Virginia plan, and as he +undoubtedly preferred,--it must be consistent with that theory and +with the situation in which its adoption would leave the country. It +must introduce through the Senate a real check upon the democratic +power that would act through the House, by a different mode of +election and a permanent tenure of office; and in order that the +States might not be in a situation to resist the measures of a +government designed to be national and supreme, that government must +possess complete and universal legislative power. + +Surely it can be no impeachment of the wisdom or the statesmanship of +this great man, that, at a time when a large majority of the +Convention were seeking to establish a purely national system, founded +on a proportionate representation of the people of the States, he +should have pointed out the inconsistencies of such a plan, and should +have endeavored to bring it into a nearer conformity with the theory +which so many of the members and so many of the States had determined +to adopt. It seems rather to be a proof of the deep sagacity which had +always marked his opinions and his conduct, that he should have +foreseen the inevitable collisions between the powers of a national +government thus constituted and the powers of the States. The whole +experience of the past had taught him to anticipate such conflicts, +and the theory of a purely national government, when applied by the +arrangement now proposed, rendered it certain that these conflicts +must continue and increase. That theory could only be put in practice +by transferring the whole legislative powers of the people of the +States to the national government. This he would have preferred; and +in this, looking from the point of view at which he then stood, and +considering the actual position of the subject, he was undoubtedly +right.[57] + +For it is not to be forgotten, that after the votes which had been +taken, and after the position assumed by the States opposed to +anything but a federal plan, the choice seemed to lie between a purely +national and a purely federal system; that the indications then were, +that the Virginia plan would be adopted; and that we owe the present +compound character of the Constitution, as a government partly +national and partly federal, not to the mere theories proposed on +either side, but to the fortunate results of a wise compromise, made +necessary by the collision between the opposite purposes and desires +of different classes of the States. + +At the time when Hamilton laid his views before the Convention, there +were two parties in that body, which were coming gradually to a +struggle, not yet openly avowed, between the larger and the smaller +States, on the fundamental principle of the government. The principal +question at stake was whether there should be any national popular +representation at all. While the Virginia plan carried a popular +representation into both branches of the legislature, the New Jersey +plan excluded it, and confined the system to a representation of +States, in a single body. The larger and more populous States adhered +to the former of these two systems, because it involved the only +principle upon which they believed they could form a new Union, or +enter into new relations with the smaller members of the confederacy; +while, on the other hand, the smaller members felt that +self-preservation was for them involved in adhering to the old +principle of the Confederation. Notwithstanding the defects and +imperfections of the Virginia plan, it was deemed necessary by the +majority of the Convention to insist upon it, until the principle of +popular representation should be conceded by all, as proper to exist +in some part of the government; for an admission that it was +theoretically incorrect in its application to either branch of the +proposed legislature would have applied equally to the other branch; +and the admission that would have been involved in the acceptance of +Hamilton's propositions, namely, that in a purely national system +there must be a Senate permanently in office, and that the legislative +powers of the States must be mainly surrendered, would have tended +only to confirm the opposition and to swell the numbers of the +minority. The contest went on, therefore, as it had begun, between +the opposite principles of popular and State representation, until it +resulted in an absolute difference, requiring mutual concessions, or +an abandonment of the effort to form a Constitution. + +On the day following that on which Hamilton had addressed the +committee, Mr. Madison entered into an elaborate examination of the +plan proposed by the minority. The previous Congressional experience +of this distinguished and sagacious man had well qualified him to +detect the imperfections of a system calculated to perpetuate the +evils under which the country had long suffered. His object now was to +show that a Union founded on the principle of the Confederation, and +containing no diminution of the existing powers of the States, could +not accomplish even the principal objects of a general government. It +would not, he observed, in the first place, prevent the States from +violating, as they had all along violated, the obligations of treaties +with foreign powers; for it left them as uncontrolled as they had +always been. It would not restrain the States from encroaching on the +federal authority, or prevent breaches of the federal articles. It +would not secure that equality of privileges between the citizens of +different States, and that impartial administration of justice, the +want of which had threatened both the harmony and the peace of the +Union. It would not secure the republican theory, which vested the +right and the power of government in the majority; as the case of +Massachusetts then demonstrated. It would not secure the Union against +the influence of foreign powers over its members. Whatever might have +been the case with ours, all former confederacies had exhibited the +effects of intrigues practised upon them by other nations; and as the +New Jersey plan gave to the general councils no negative on the will +of the particular States, it left us exposed to the same pernicious +machinations. + +He begged the smaller States, which had brought forward this plan, to +consider in what position its adoption would leave them. They would be +subject to the whole burden of maintaining their delegates in +Congress. They and they alone would feel the power of coercion on +which the efficacy of this plan depended, for the larger States would +be too powerful for its exercise. On the other hand, if the obstinate +adherence of the smaller States to an inadmissible system should +prevent the adoption of any, the Union must be dissolved, and the +States must remain individually independent and sovereign, or two or +more new confederacies must be formed. In the first event, would the +small States be more secure against the ambition and power of their +larger neighbors, than they would be under a general government +pervading with equal energy every part of the empire, and having an +equal interest in protecting every part against every other part? In +the second event, could the smaller States expect that their larger +neighbors would unite with them on the principle of the present +confederacy, or that they would exact less severe concessions than +were proposed in the Virginia scheme? + +The great difficulty, he continued, lay in the affair of +representation; and if that could be adjusted, all others would be +surmountable. It was admitted by both of the gentlemen from New +Jersey,[58] that it would not be just to allow Virginia, which was +sixteen times as large as Delaware, an equal vote only. Their language +was, that it would not be safe for Delaware to allow Virginia sixteen +times as many votes. Their expedient was, that all the States should +be thrown into one mass, and a new partition be made into thirteen +equal parts. Would such a scheme be practicable? The dissimilarities +in the rules of property, as well as in the manners, habits, and +prejudices of the different States, amounted to a prohibition of the +attempt. It had been impossible for the power of one of the most +absolute princes in Europe,[59] directed by the wisdom of one of the +most enlightened and patriotic ministers that any age had +produced,[60] to equalize in some points only the different usages and +regulations of the different provinces. But, admitting a general +amalgamation and repartition of the States to be practicable, and the +danger apprehended by the smaller States from a proportional +representation to be real, would not their special and voluntary +coalition with their neighbors be less inconvenient to the whole +community and equally effectual for their own safety?[61] If New +Jersey or Delaware conceived that an advantage would accrue to them +from an equalization of the States, in which case they would +necessarily form a junction with their neighbors, why might not this +end be attained by leaving them at liberty to form such a junction +whenever they pleased? And why should they wish to obtrude a like +arrangement on all the States, when it was, to say the least, +extremely difficult, and would be obnoxious to many of the +States,--and when neither the inconvenience nor the benefit of the +expedient to themselves would be lessened by confining it to +themselves? The prospect of many new States to the westward was +another consideration of importance. If they should come into the +Union at all, they would come when they contained but few inhabitants. +If they should be entitled to vote according to their proportion of +inhabitants, all would be right and safe. Let them have an equal vote, +and a more objectionable minority than ever might give law to the +whole.[62] + +At the close of Mr. Madison's remarks, the committee decided, by a +vote of seven States against three, one State being divided, to report +the Virginia plan to the Convention. The delegation of New York (with +the exception of Hamilton), and those of New Jersey and Delaware, +constituted the negative votes. The vote of Maryland was divided by +Luther Martin, who had constantly acted with the minority. The vote of +Connecticut was given for the report, but she was not long to remain +on that side of the question.[63] + + +NOTE ON THE OPINIONS OF HAMILTON. + + The idea has been more or less entertained, from the time of + the Convention to the present day, that Hamilton desired the + establishment of a _monarchical_ government. This impression + has arisen partly from the theoretical opinions on government + which he undoubtedly held, and which he expressed with entire + freedom in the course of the debate, of which an account has + been given in the previous chapter; and partly from the + nature of some of his propositions, especially that for an + executive during good behavior, which has been sometimes + assumed to have been the same thing as an executive for life. + I believe that the imputation of a purpose on his part to + bring about the establishment of any system not essentially + republican in its spirit and forms, is unfounded and unjust, + and that it can be shown to be so. + + Mr. Luther Martin, in his celebrated letter or report to the + legislature of Maryland on the doings of the Federal + Convention, referred to a distinct monarchical party in that + body, "whose object and wish," he said, "it was to abolish + and annihilate all State governments, and to bring forward + one general government over this whole continent, of a + monarchical nature, under certain restrictions and + limitations. Those who openly avowed this sentiment," he + said, "were, it is true, but few; yet it is equally true, + that there was a considerable number who did not openly avow + it, who were, by myself and many others of the Convention, + considered as being in reality favorers of that sentiment and + acting upon those principles, covertly endeavoring to carry + into effect what they well knew openly and avowedly could not + be accomplished." He then goes on to say, that there was a + second party, who were "not for the abolition of the State + governments, nor for the introduction of a monarchical + government under any form; but they wished to establish such + a system as could give their own States undue power and + influence, in the government, over the other States." "A + third party," he adds, "was what I considered _truly federal + and republican_"; that is to say, it consisted of the + delegations from Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, + and in part from Maryland, and of some members from other + States, who were in favor of a federal equality and the old + principle of the Confederation. + + Upon this rule of classification, the test of republicanism + was to be found in the views entertained by members upon the + question whether the State governments ought to be abolished. + Mr. Martin, indeed, went further, and considered those only + as _truly_ republican, who were in favor of a purely federal + system, and opposed to any plan of popular representation. + Now it is quite clear, that the abolition of the State + governments, so far as that subject was considered at all, + and in the sense in which it was at any time mentioned, did + not necessarily lead to _monarchy_ as a conclusion. The + reduction of the State governments to local corporations and + to the position of subordinate agents of the central + government, was considered by some as a necessary consequence + of a national representative government. This arose from the + circumstance that a union of federal and national + representation had nowhere been witnessed, and had not + therefore been considered. I have already suggested, in the + text, that, if the framers of the Constitution had gone on to + the adoption of a pure system of popular and proportional + representation in all the branches of the government, they + must inevitably have bestowed upon that government full + legislative power over all subjects; otherwise, they would + have left the States, possessed of the sovereign powers of a + distinct political organization, to contend with the national + government by adverse legislation. The subsequent expedient + of a direct and equal representation of the States in one + branch of the government has in reality, to a great degree, + disarmed State jealousy and opposition, by giving to the + States as political bodies an equal voice in the check + established by the branch in which they are represented. + + So that to argue, that, because there were men who saw the + necessity for making a purely national or proportionate + system of popular representation consistent with the + situation in which it would place the country, they were + therefore in favor of a monarchical system, was to argue from + premises to a conclusion in no way connected. Had such a plan + been carried out, it could have been, and must have been, + purely republican in all its details; and it would have been + liable to the reproach of being _monarchical_ in no other + sense than any system which did not yield the point of a full + federal equality, for which Mr. Martin and his party + contended. + + Undoubtedly, Hamilton, as I have said, was in favor of + bestowing upon the national government full _power_ to + legislate upon all subjects; and to this extent, and in this + sense, he proposed the abolition of the State governments. + But any one who will attend carefully to the course of his + argument,--imperfectly as it has been preserved,--will find + that it embraces the following course of reasoning. All + federal governments are weak and distracted. In order to + avoid the evils incident to that form, the government of the + American Union must be a national representative system. But + no such system can be successful, in the actual situation of + this country, unless it is endowed with all the principles + and means of influence and power which are the proper + supports of government. It must therefore be made completely + sovereign, and State power, as a separate legislative + authority, must be annihilated; otherwise, the States will be + not only able, but will be constantly tempted, to exert their + own authority against the authority of the nation. I have + already expressed the opinion, that in this view of the + subject, assuming that the States were not to be admitted to + an equal representation as political corporations in any + branch of the government,--as the framers and friends of the + Virginia plan had thus far contended,--Hamilton was right. I + believe that a constitution, in which the States had not been + placed upon an equal footing in one branch of the legislative + power, and under which the State sovereignties had been left + as they were left by the system actually adopted, if it could + have been ratified by all the States, could not have endured + to our times. Yet the fortunate result of the mixed system + that is embraced in the Constitution of the United States, is + the product, not simply of either of the theories of a + national or a federal government, but of a compromise between + the two. + + But the charge of anti-republican tendencies or designs has + been most often urged against Hamilton, on account of his + theoretical opinions concerning the comparative merits of + different governments, and of certain features of the plan of + a constitution which he read to the Convention. With respect + to these points, I shall state the results of a very careful + examination which I have made of all the sources of + information as to the views and opinions which he expressed + or entertained. Mr. Madison has given us what he probably + intended as a full report of at least the substance of + Hamilton's great speech addressed to the committee of the + whole, and has informed us that his report was submitted to + Colonel Hamilton, who approved it, with a few verbal changes. + But how meagre a report, which fills but six pages in the + octavo edition of Mr. Madison's "Debates," must have been in + comparison with the speech actually made by Hamilton, will + occur to every reader who notices the fact that the speech + occupied the entire session of one day (June 18), and who + examines the brief from which he spoke, and which is still + extant. (Hamilton's Works, II. 409.) + + He was an earnest, and I am inclined to think a fervid and + rapid speaker. Certainly he spoke from a mind full of + knowledge of the principles and the working of other systems + of polity, and possessed of resources which have never been + excelled in any statesman who has been called to aid in the + work of creating a government. The topics set down in his + brief exhibit a very wide range of thought, enriched by + copious illustrations from the history and experience of + other countries, and from the views of the most important + writers on government; while the whole argument bears + logically and closely upon the actual situation of our + confederacy and upon the questions at issue. It is not + probable, therefore, that Mr. Madison's report gives us an + adequate idea of the speech, or fully exhibits its reasoning. + I have collated it, sentence by sentence, with the report in + Judge Yates's Minutes, and with Hamilton's own brief, and + have prepared for my own use a draft containing the substance + of what these three sources can give us. The results may be + thus given:-- + + 1. That Hamilton, in stating his views of the theoretical + value of different systems of government, frankly expressed + the opinion that the British constitution was the best form + which the world had then produced;--citing the praise + bestowed upon it by Necker, that it is the only government + "which unites public strength with individual security." + + 2. That, with equal clearness, he stated it as his opinion + that none but a republican form could be attempted in this + country, or would be adapted to our situation. + + 3. That he proposed to look to the British Constitution for + nothing but those elements of stability and permanency which + a republican system requires, and which may be incorporated + into it without changing its characteristic principles. + + The only question that remains, in order to form a judgment + of his purposes, is, whether there was anything in the plan + of a constitution drawn up by him that is inconsistent with + the spirit of republican liberty. The answer is, that there + was not. There is throughout this plan a constant recognition + of the authority of the people, as the source of all + political power. It proposed that the members of the Assembly + should be elected by the people directly, and the members of + the Senate by electors chosen for the purpose by the people. + The executive was in like manner to be chosen by electors, + appointed by the people or by the State legislatures. So far, + therefore, his plan was as strictly republican, as is that of + the Constitution under which we are actually living. But he + proposed that the executive and the senators should hold + their offices _during good behavior_; and this has been his + offence against republicanism, with those who measure the + character of a system by the frequency with which it admits + of rotation in office. His accusers have failed to notice + that he made his executive personally responsible for + official misconduct, and provided that both he and the + senators should be subject to impeachment and to removal from + office. This was a wide departure from the principles of the + English constitution, and it constitutes a most important + distinction between a republican and a monarchical system, + when it is accompanied by the fact that the office of a ruler + or legislator is attained, not by hereditary right, or the + favor of the crown, but by the favor and choice of the + people. + + I have thus stated the principal points to which the + inquiries of the reader should be directed in investigating + the opinions of this great man, because I believe it to be + unjust to impute to him any other than a sincere desire for + the establishment and success of republican government. That + he desired a strong government, that he was little disposed + to dogmatize upon abstract theories of liberty, and that he + trusted more to experience than to hypothesis, may be safely + assumed. But that he ardently desired the success of that + republican freedom which is founded on a perfect equality of + rights among citizens, exclusive of hereditary distinctions, + is as certain as that he labored earnestly throughout his + life for the maxims, the doctrines, and the systems which he + believed most likely to secure for it a fair trial and + ultimate success. (See his description of his own opinions, + when writing of himself as a third person in 1792; Works, + VII. 52.) + + That the system of government sketched by Hamilton was not + received by many of those who listened to him with + disapprobation on account of what has since been supposed its + _monarchical_ character, we may safely assume, on the + testimony of Dr. Johnson of Connecticut, one of the most + moderate men in the Convention. Contrasting the New Jersey + and Virginia plans, he is reported (by Yates) to have said: + "It appears to me that the Jersey plan has for its principal + object the preservation of the State governments. So far it + is a departure from the plan of Virginia, which, although it + concentrates in a distinct national government, is not + totally independent of that of the States. A gentleman from + New York, with boldness and decision, proposed a system + totally different from both; _and although he has been + praised by everybody_, he has been supported by none." + (Yates's Minutes, Elliot, I. 431.) + + Even Luther Martin did not seem to regard the objects of what + he calls the monarchical party as being any worse, or more + dangerous to liberty, than the projects of those whom he + represents as aiming to obtain undue power and influence for + their own States, and whom at the same time he acquits of + monarchical designs or a desire to abolish the State + governments. The truth is, that nobody had any improper + purposes, or anything at heart but the liberties and + happiness of the people of America. We are not to try the + speculative views of men engaged in such discussions as these + by the charges or complaints elicited in the heats of + conflicting opinions and interests, inflamed by a zeal too + warm to admit the possibility of its own error, or to + perceive the wisdom and purity of an opponent. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[51] The regulation of commerce was not, any more than other specific +powers, otherwise provided for than by these general descriptions. + +[52] This, together with the Virginia plan, which was recommitted +along with it, was referred to a second committee of the whole, June +15th. + +[53] William Patterson of New Jersey. + +[54] See the remarks of Wilson, Pinckney, and Randolph, as given in +Madison, Elliot, V. 195-198. + +[55] See his letter of September 16, 1803, addressed to Timothy +Pickering; first published in Niles's Register, November 7, 1812. + +[56] See the note at the end of this chapter. + +[57] See the note at the end of this chapter. + +[58] Mr. Brearly and Mr. Patterson. + +[59] Louis XVI. + +[60] Necker. + +[61] Mr. Patterson had said, that, if they were to depart from the +principle of equal sovereignty, the only expedient that would cure the +difficulty would be to throw the States into hotchpot. To say that +this was impracticable, would not make it so. Let it be tried, and +they would see whether Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia would +accede to it. (Madison, Elliot, V. 194.) + +[62] Elliot, V. 206-211. + +[63] Madison, Elliot, V. 212. Journal, Elliot, I. 180. This vote was +taken, and the committee of the whole were discharged, on the 19th of +June. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +CONFLICT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AND FEDERAL SYSTEMS.--DIVISION OF THE +LEGISLATURE INTO TWO CHAMBERS.--DISAGREEMENT OF THE STATES ON THE +NATURE OF REPRESENTATION IN THE TWO BRANCHES.--THREATENED DISSOLUTION +OF THE UNION. + + +We are now approaching a crisis in the action of the Convention, the +history of which is full of instruction for all succeeding generations +of the American people. We have witnessed the formation of a minority +of the States, whose bond of connection was a common opposition to the +establishment of what was regarded as a "national" government. The +structure of this minority, as well as that of the majority to which +they were opposed, the motives and purposes by which both were +animated, and the results to which their conflicts finally led, are +extremely important to be understood by the reader. + +The relative rank of the different States in point of population, at +the time of the formation of the Constitution, was materially +different from what it is at the present day. Virginia, then the first +State in the Union, is now the fourth. New York, now at the head of +the scale, then ranked after North Carolina and Massachusetts, which +occupied the third and fourth positions in the first census, and which +now occupy respectively the sixth and tenth. South Carolina, which +then had a smaller population than Maryland, now has a much greater. +Georgia at that time had not half so many inhabitants as New Jersey, +but now has twice as many. + +Great inequalities existed, as they still exist, between the different +members of the confederacy, not only in the actual numbers of their +inhabitants, and their present wealth, but in their capacity and +opportunity of growth. Virginia, with a population fourteen times as +large, had a territorial extent of thirty times the size of Delaware. +Pennsylvania had nearly seven times as many people as Rhode Island, +and nearly forty times as much territory. The State of Georgia +numbered a little more than a third as many people, but her territory +was nearly twelve times as large as the territory of Connecticut. + +The four leading States, Virginia, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and +Massachusetts, had an obvious motive for seeking the establishment of +a government founded on a proportionate representation of their +respective populations. The States of South Carolina and Georgia had +generally acted with them in the formation of the Virginia plan; and +these six States thus constituted the majority by which the principle +of what was called a "national," in distinction from a "federal" +government, had been steadily pressed to the conclusions arrived at in +the committee of the whole, and now embraced in its report.[64] All +but two of them were certain to remain slaveholding States; but in the +adoption of numbers as the basis of representative influence in the +government, they all had a common interest, which led them for the +present to act together.[65] + +At the head of the minority, or the States which desired a government +of federal equality, stood the State of New York, then the fifth State +in the Union. She was represented by Alexander Hamilton, Robert Yates, +and John Lansing, Junior. The two latter uniformly acted together, and +of course controlled the vote of the State. Hamilton's vote being thus +neutralized, his influence on the action of the Convention extended no +farther than the weight and importance attached to his arguments by +those who listened to them. + +Occupying at that period nearly a middle rank between the largest and +the smallest of the States with respect to population, New York had +not yet grasped, or even perceived, the wonderful elements of her +future imperial greatness. Her commerce was not inconsiderable; but it +had hitherto been the disposition of those who ruled her counsels to +retain its regulation in their own hands, and to subject it to no +imposts in favor of the general interests of the Union. Most of her +public men, also,[66] held it to be impracticable to establish a +general government of sufficient energy to pervade every part of the +United States, and to carry its appropriate benefits equally to all, +without sacrificing the constitutional rights of the States to an +extent that would ultimately prove to be dangerous to the liberties of +their people. Their view of the subject was, that the uncontrolled +powers and sovereignties of the States must be reserved; and that, +consistently with the reservation of these, a mode might be devised of +granting to the confederacy the moneys arising from a general system +of revenue, some power of regulating commerce and enforcing the +observance of treaties, and other necessary matters of less moment. +This was the opinion of Yates, the Chief Justice of the State, who may +be taken as a fair representative of the sentiments of a large part, +if not of a majority, of its people at this time.[67] But neither he, +nor any of those who concurred with him, succeeded in pointing out the +mode in which the power to collect revenues, to regulate commerce, and +to enforce the observance of treaties, could be conferred on the +confederacy, without impairing the sovereignties of the States. It +does not appear whether this class of statesmen contemplated a grant +of full and unrestrained power over these subjects to a federal +government, or whether they designed only a qualified grant, capable +of being recalled or controlled by the parties to the confederacy, for +reasons and upon occasions of which those parties were to judge. From +the general course of their reasoning on the nature of a federal +government, it might seem that the latter was their intention.[68] It +is not difficult to understand how these gentlemen may have supposed +that an irrevocable grant of powers to a general government might be +dangerous to the liberties of the people of the States, because such a +grant would involve a surrender of more or less of the original State +sovereignties to a legislative body external to the State itself. But +if they supposed that a grant of such powers could be made to a +"federal" government, or a political league of the States, acting +through a single body in the nature of a diet, and to be exercised +when necessary by the combined military power of the whole, and yet be +any less dangerous to liberty, it is difficult to appreciate their +fears or to perceive the consistency of their plan. If the liberties +of the people were any the less exposed under their system, than under +that of a "national" government, it must have been because their +system was understood by them to involve only a qualified and +revocable surrender of State sovereignty. + +But however this may have been, there was undoubtedly a settled +conviction on the part of the two delegates of New York who controlled +the vote of the State in the Convention, that they had not received +the necessary authority from their own State to go beyond the +principle of the Confederation; that it would be impracticable to +establish a general government, without impairing the State +constitutions and endangering the liberties of the people; and that +what they regarded as a "consolidated" government was not in the +remotest degree within the contemplation of the legislature of New +York when they were sent to take their seats in the Convention. + +The same sentiments, with far greater zeal, with intense feeling and +some acrimony, were held and acted upon by Luther Martin of Maryland, +a very eminent lawyer, and at that time Attorney-General of the State, +who sometimes had it in his power, from the absence of his colleagues, +to cast the vote of his State with the minority, and who generally +divided it on all critical questions that touched the nature of the +government. The State itself, with a population but a little less than +that of New York, had no great reason to regard itself as peculiarly +exposed to the dangers to be apprehended from combinations among the +larger States to oppress the smaller; and it does not appear that +these apprehensions were strongly felt by any of her representatives +excepting Mr. Martin.[69] The great energy and earnestness, however, +of that distinguished person, prevented a concurrence of the State +with the purposes and objects of the majority. + +Connecticut might reasonably consider herself as one of the smaller +States, and her vote was steadily given for an equality of suffrage in +both branches of the national legislature, down to the time of the +final division upon the Senate. The States of New Jersey and Delaware +formed the other members of the minority, upon this general question. + +On the one side, therefore, of what would have been, but for the great +inequalities among the States, almost a purely speculative question, +we find a strong determination, the result of an apparent necessity, +to establish a government in which the democratic majority of the +whole people of the United States should be the ruling power; and in +which, so far as State influence was to be felt at all, it should be +felt only in proportion to the relative numbers of the people +composing each separate community. It was considered by those who +embraced this side of the question, that, when the great States were +asked to perpetuate the system of federal equality on which the +Confederation had been founded, they were asked to submit to mere +injustice, on account of an imaginary danger to their smaller +confederates. They held it to be manifestly wrong, that a State +fourteen times as large as Delaware should have only the same number +of votes in the national legislature. Whether the States were now met +as parties to a subsisting confederacy, under which they might be +regarded in the same light as the individuals composing the social +compact; or whether they were to be looked upon as so many aggregates +of individuals for whose personal rights and interests provision was +to be made, as if they composed a nation already united, it was +believed by the majority that no safe and durable government could be +formed, if the democratic element were to be excluded. Pure +democracies had undoubtedly been attended with inconveniences. But how +could peace and real freedom be preserved, under the republican form, +if half a million of people dwelling in one political division of the +country possessed only the same suffrage in the enactment of laws as +sixty thousand people dwelling in another division? Leave out of view +the theory which taught that the States alone, regarded as members of +an existing compact, must be considered as the parties to the new +system, as they had been to the old, and it would be found that the +political equality of the free citizens of the United States could be +made a source of that energy and strength so much needed and as yet so +little known. With it was connected the idea and the practicability of +legislation that would reach and control individuals. Without it, +there could be only a system of coercion of the States, whose +opposition would be invited, rather than repressed, upon all occasions +of importance. Abandon the necessary principle of governing by a +democratic majority, said George Mason, and if the government +proceeds to taxation, the States will oppose its powers.[70] + +On the other hand, the minority, insisting on a rigid construction of +their powers, and planting themselves upon the nature of the compact +already formed between the States, contended that these separate and +sovereign communities had distinct governments already vested with the +whole political power of their respective populations, and therefore +that they could not, consistently with the truth of their situation, +act as if the whole or any considerable part of that power could be +transferred by the people themselves to another government. They said, +that whatever power was to be conferred on a central or general +government must be granted by the States, as political corporations, +and that therefore the principle of the Union could not be changed, +whatever addition it might be expedient to make to its authority. They +said, that, even if this theory were not strictly true, the smaller +States could not safely unite with the larger upon any other; and +especially that they could not surrender their liberties to the +keeping of a majority of the people inhabiting all the States, for +such a power would inevitably destroy the State constitutions. They +were willing, they said, to enlarge the powers of the federal +government; willing to provide for it the means of compelling +obedience to its laws; willing to hazard much for the general welfare. +But they could not consent to place the very existence of their local +governments, with all their capacity to protect the distinct +interests of the people, and all their peculiar fitness for the +administration of local concerns, at the mercy of great communities, +whose policy might overshadow and whose power might destroy them. + +To the claim of political equality as between a citizen of the largest +and a citizen of the smallest State in the Union, they opposed the +doctrine, that in his own State every citizen is equal with every +other, and holds such rights and liberties, and so much political +power, as the State may see fit to bestow upon him; but that, when +separate States enter into political relations with each other for +their common benefit, it is among the States themselves that the +equality must prevail, because States can only be parties to a compact +upon a footing of natural equality, just as individuals are supposed +to enter society with equal natural rights. This doctrine, they said, +was especially necessary to be applied between States of very unequal +magnitudes. If applied, it would render unnecessary the division of +the legislative body into two chambers; would dispense with any but a +supreme judicial tribunal; and would admit of a ratification by the +States in Congress, without raising the hazardous and doubtful +question of a direct resort to the people, whose power to act +independently of their State governments was by some strenuously +denied. + +These, in substance, were the principles now brought into direct +collision, urged under a great variety of forms, and recurring upon +the successive details of the Constitution, as its formation +proceeded, and pressed with equal earnestness and equally firm +convictions of duty on both sides. I confess that it does not seem to +me important, if it be practicable, to decide which party was +theoretically correct. A great deal of the reasoning on both sides was +speculative, and it is not easy to deny some of the chief propositions +which were maintained on the one side and the other. We are too apt, +perhaps, to judge of the real soundness of the opinions held by +opposite parties to the first compromise of the Constitution, by the +subsequent history and success of the government, and by the views and +feelings which we entertain of that history and that success. Whereas, +in truth, if we place ourselves at the point where the framers of the +Constitution stood at the time we are examining, we shall find that, +with the exception of the influence due to one or two governing facts +of previous history, it was theoretically as correct to contend for a +purely federal as for a purely national government. Almost everything +depends upon the object towards which they were to reason; and +therefore the premises were in a considerable degree open to an +arbitrary choice. If the object was to establish a government, against +the exercise of whose legitimate powers State legislation could not +possibly be exerted, some higher authority than that of the State +governments must be resorted to; and the reasoning which tended to +prove the existence of that authority and the practicability of +invoking it, and the danger of any other kind of government, comes +logically and consistently in support of the great purpose to be +attained. If, however, from an honest fear for the safety of local +interests, the purpose was to have a government that would not +seriously diminish the powers of the States, but would leave them with +always unimpaired sovereignties, capable of resisting the measures of +the central power, then the States were certainly competent and +sufficient to the formation of such a system, and the reasoning which +placed them in the light of parties to a social compact was +theoretically true. On the one side, it was believed that a government +formed by the States upon the principle of federal equality would be +destructive of the powers of the general government, whatever those +powers might be. On the other side, it was considered that the +principle of governing by a democratic majority of the people of all +the States would make those powers too formidable for the safety of +the State constitutions. According to the force we may assign to the +one or the other tendency, the reasoning on either side will appear to +us to be almost equally correct. + +But there were, as I have said, one or two facts of previous history, +which gave the advocates of a national government a great advantage +over their opponents, and went far towards settling the real merits of +the two opposite systems. A federal system had been tried, and had +broken down in complete prostration of all the appropriate energies +and functions of government. The advocates of the opposite system, +therefore, could point to all the failures and all the defects of the +Confederation, in proof of the reasoning which they employed. In +addition to this, they could adduce the same general tendency in all +former confederacies of the same nature. But no experiment had been +made by the people of the American States, of a government founded +expressly on the national character and relations of their +inhabitants; and if the merits of such a government were now only to +be maintained by theoretical reasoning, on the other hand it had not +suffered the injury of acknowledged defeat. + +The difficulty in the way of its adoption was its supposed tendency to +absorb, and perhaps to annihilate, the sovereignties of the States. +The advocates of the Virginia plan were called upon to show how the +general sovereignty and jurisdiction which they proposed to give to +their system could consist with a considerable, though subordinate, +jurisdiction in the States. One of its moderate and candid +opponents[71] declared that, if this could be shown, the objections to +it ought to be surrendered; but if not, he thought that those +objections must have their full force. But, from the very nature of +the case, that which had not been demonstrated by experience could +rest only upon opinion; and while the Virginia system made no other +provision for State defence against encroachments of the general +government than such as might be found in the election by the State +legislatures of the national Senate, the apprehensions of the smaller +States could not be satisfied, however admirable the theory, and +however able might be the reasoning by which it was supported. + +Let the reader, then, as he pursues the history of this conflict +between the opposing interests of the two classes of States, and +observes how strenuously the different theories were maintained, until +victory became impossible on either side, note the danger of adhering +too firmly to mere theoretical principles, in matters of government. +He will see the impressive spectacle of States assembled for the +formation of some system capable of answering the exigencies of their +situation; he will see how rapidly a difference of local interests +developed the most opposite theories, and how profoundly those +theories were discussed; and he will see this conflict carried on for +days, and even for weeks, with all the sincerity that interest lends +to conviction, and all the tenacity that conviction can produce, until +at last the whole discussion leads to the probable failure of the +purpose for which the assembly had been instituted. He will then see +an amalgamation of the two systems, which in their integrity were +irreconcilable, and will witness the first introduction of that mode +of adjusting opposite interests and conflicting theories of government +which lies at the basis of the Constitution of the United States, and +which alone can furnish a safe foundation on which to unite the +destinies and wants of separate communities possessed of distinct +political organizations and rights. + +The Convention had received the report of the committee of the whole +on the 19th of June. From that day until the 5th of July the struggle +was continued, commencing with the proposition which affirmed the +division of the legislative department of the government into two +branches. Although such an arrangement did not necessarily involve the +principle of national and popular representation, it was opposed as +unnecessary by those who desired to retain the system of +representation by States, and who therefore intended to preserve the +existing organization of the Congress. Still, the needful harmony and +completeness of the scheme, according to the genius of the +Anglo-American liberty, required this division of the legislature. + +Doubtless a single council or chamber can promulgate decrees and enact +laws; but it had never been the habit of the people of America, as it +never had been the habit of their ancestors for at least a period of +somewhat more than five centuries, to regard a single chamber as +favorable to liberty, or to wise legislation.[72] The separation into +two chambers of the lords spiritual and temporal, and the commons, in +the English constitution, does not seem to have originated in a +difference of personal rank, so much as in their position as separate +estates of the realm. All the orders might have voted promiscuously in +one house, and just as effectually signified the assent or dissent of +Parliament to any measure proposed.[73] But the practice of making the +assent of Parliament to consist in the concurrent and separate action +of the two estates, though difficult to be traced to its origin in any +distinct purpose or cause, became confirmed by the growing importance +of the commons, by their jealousy and vigilance, and by the +controlling position which they finally assumed. As Parliament +gradually proceeded to its present constitution, and the separate +rights and privileges of the two houses became established, it was +found that the practice of discussing a measure in two assemblies, +composed of different persons, holding their seats by a different +tenure and representing different orders of the state, was in the +highest degree conducive to the security of the subject, and to sound +legislation.[74] + +So fully was the conviction of the practical convenience and utility +of two chambers established in the Anglican mind, that, when +representative government came to be established in the British North +American Colonies, although the original reason for the division +ceased to be applicable, it was retained for its incidental +advantages. In none of these Colonies was there any difference of +social condition, or of political privilege or power, recognized in +the system of representation; and as there were, therefore, no +separate estates or orders among the people, requiring to be protected +against each other's encroachments, or holding different relations to +the crown, we cannot attribute the adherence to the system of two +chambers, on the part of those who solicited and received the +privilege of establishing these colonial governments, to anything but +their belief in its practical advantages for the purposes of +legislation. Still less can we suppose, that after the Revolution, and +when there no longer existed any such motive as might have influenced +the crown in modelling the colonial after the imperial institutions, +to a certain extent, the people of these States should have +perpetuated in their constitutions the principle of a division of the +legislature into two chambers, for any other purpose than to secure +the practical benefits which they and their ancestors had always found +to flow from it. + +Only three exceptions to this practice existed in America, at the time +of the formation of the Constitution. They were the legislatures of +the States of Pennsylvania and Georgia, and the Congress of the +Confederation. + +But the Congress being in fact only an assembly of deputies from +confederated States, the means scarcely existed for the application of +the principle so familiar in the legislatures of most of the States +themselves. As a new government was now to be formed, whose +theoretical and actual powers were to be essentially different, an +opportunity was afforded for the ancient and favorite construction of +the legislative department. The proposal was resisted, not because it +was doubted that, in a government of direct legislative authority, in +which the people are themselves to be represented, the system of two +chambers is practically the best, but because those who opposed its +introduction denied the propriety of attempting to establish a +government of that kind. The States of New York, New Jersey, and +Delaware, therefore, recorded their votes against such a division of +the legislature, and the vote of Maryland was divided upon the +question.[75] + +The reader will observe, however, that, in its present aspect, there +was a chasm in the Virginia plan, which to some extent justifies the +opposition of the minority to the system of two legislative chambers. +According to that plan, the people of the States were to be +represented in both chambers in proportion to their numbers. But as +there were no distinct orders among the people to furnish a different +basis for the two houses, the system must either be a mere duplicate +representation of the whole people, as it is in the State +constitutions generally, or some artificial basis must be provided +for one house, to distinguish it from the other, and to furnish a +check as between the two. In a republican government, and in a state +of society where property is not entailed and distinctions of personal +rank cannot exist, such a basis is not easily found; and if found, is +not likely to be stable and effectual. The happy expedient of +selecting the States as the basis of representation in the Senate, +which had not yet been agreed upon, and which was resorted to as an +adjustment of a serious conflict between two opposite principles of +government, has furnished a really different foundation for the two +branches, as distinct as the separate representation of the different +orders in the British constitution. It has thus secured the incidental +advantages of two chambers, without resorting to those fluctuating or +arbitrary distinctions among the people, which can alone afford, in +such a country as ours, even an ostensible difference of origin for +legislative bodies. + +The same struggle which had been maintained upon this question was +continued through all the votes taken upon the mode of electing the +members of the two branches, and upon their tenure of office. It is +not necessary here to rehearse the details of these proceedings; the +result was, that the members of the first branch of the legislature +were to be chosen by the people of the States for a period of two +years, and to be twenty-five years of age, while the members of the +second or senatorial branch were to be chosen by the State +legislatures for a period of six years, and to be thirty years of +age. The States of Pennsylvania and Virginia voted against the +election of senators by the legislatures of the States, because it was +still uncertain whether an equality or a ratio of representation would +finally prevail in that branch, and the election by the legislatures +was considered to have a tendency to the adoption of an equality.[76] + +At length, the sixth resolution, which defined the powers of Congress, +and the seventh and eighth, which involved the fundamental point of +the suffrage in the two branches, were reached.[77] The subject of the +powers of Congress was postponed, and the question was stated on the +rule of suffrage for the first branch, which the resolution declared +ought to be according to an equitable ratio. In the great debate which +ensued, Madison, Hamilton, Gorham, Reed, and Williamson combated the +objections of the smaller States, while Luther Martin, with his +accustomed warmth, resisted the introduction of the new principle. The +discussion involved on both sides a repetition of the arguments +previously employed; but some of the views presented are of great +importance, especially those taken by Madison and Hamilton, of the +situation in which the smaller States must be placed, if a +constitution should not be formed and adopted containing a just +distribution of political power among the whole people of the country, +creating thereby a government of sufficient energy to protect each and +all of the States against foreign powers, against the influence of +the larger members of the confederacy, and against the dangers to be +apprehended from their own governments. + +Let each State, said Mr. Madison, depend on itself for its security, +in a position of independence of the Union, and let apprehensions +arise of dangers from distant powers, or from neighboring States, and +from their present languishing condition, all the States, large as +well as small, would be transformed into vigorous and high-toned +governments, with an energy fatal to liberty and peace. The weakness +and jealousy of the smaller States would quickly introduce some +regular military force, against sudden danger from their powerful +neighbors; the example would be followed, would soon become universal, +and the means of defence against external danger would become the +instruments of tyranny at home. These consequences were to be +apprehended, whether the States should run into a total separation +from each other, or into partial confederacies. Either event would be +truly deplorable, and those who might be accessory to either could +never be forgiven by their country, or by themselves.[78] + +To these consequences of a dissolution of the Union, Hamilton added +another, equally serious. Alliances, he declared, must be formed with +different rival and hostile nations of Europe, who would seek to make +us parties to their own quarrels. The representatives of foreign +nations having American dominions betrayed the utmost anxiety about +the result of that meeting of the States. It had been said that +respectability in the eyes of Europe was not the object at which we +were to aim; that the proper design of republican government was +domestic tranquillity and happiness. This was an ideal distinction. No +government could give us tranquillity and happiness at home, which did +not possess sufficient stability and strength to make us respectable +abroad. This was the critical moment for forming such a government. We +should run every risk in trusting to future amendments. As yet, we +retain the habits of union. We are weak, and sensible of our weakness. +Henceforward the motives would become feeble and the difficulties +greater. It was a miracle that they were here, exercising their +tranquil and free deliberations on the subject. It would be madness to +trust to future miracles.[79] + +But these warnings were of no avail against the settled determination +of those who saw greater dangers in the establishment of a government +which was in their view to approximate the condition of the States to +that of counties in a single State. The principle of a proportionate +representation of the populations of the State, was just and +necessary; but it was now leading to the extreme of an entire +separation, because it was carried to the extreme of a full +application to every part of the government. In like manner, there was +an equally urgent necessity for some provision which should receive +the States in their political capacity, and on a footing of equality, +as constituent parts of the system. But this principle was now forcing +the majority into the alternative of a partial confederacy, or of none +at all, because it was insisted that the government must be +exclusively founded on it. Neither party was ready to adopt the +suggestion that the two ideas, instead of being opposed, ought to be +combined, so that in one branch the people should be represented, and +in the other the States.[80] The consequence was that the +proportionate rule of suffrage for the first branch was established by +a majority of one State only;[81] and the Convention passed on, with a +fixed and formidable minority wholly dissatisfied, to consider what +rule should be applied to the Senate. + +The objects of a Senate were readily apprehended. They were, in the +first place, that there might be a second chamber, with a concurrent +authority in the enactment of laws; secondly, that a greater degree of +stability and wisdom might reside in its deliberations, than would be +likely to be found in the other branch of the legislative department; +and, thirdly, that there might be some diversity of interest between +the two bodies. These objects were to be attained by providing for the +Senate a distinct and separate basis of its own. If such a basis is +found among the individuals composing a political society, it must +consist of the distinctions among them either in respect to social +rank or in respect to property. With regard to the first, the absence +of all distinctions of rank rendered it impossible to assimilate the +Senate of the United States to the aristocratic bodies which were +found in other governments possessed of two legislative chambers. +Property, as held by individuals, might have been assumed as the basis +of a distinct representation, if the laws and customs of the different +States had generally admitted of its possession in large masses +through successive generations. But they did not admit of it. The +general distribution and diffusion of property was the rule; its +lineal transmission from the father to the eldest son was the +exception. Had the Senate been founded upon property, it must have +been upon the ratio of wealth as between the different States, in the +same manner in which the senatorial representation of counties was +arranged under the first constitution of Massachusetts.[82] It was +very soon settled and conceded, that the States, as political +societies, must be preserved; and if they were to be represented as +corporations, or as so many separate aggregates of individuals, they +must be received into the representation on an equal footing, or +according to their relative weight. An inquiry into their relative +wealth must have involved the question, as to five of them at least, +whether their slaves were to be counted as part of that wealth. No +satisfactory decision of this naked question could have been had; and +it is to be considered among the most fortunate of the circumstances +attending the formation of the Constitution, that this question was +not solved, with a view of founding the Senate upon the relative +wealth of the States. + +Two courses only remained. The basis of representation in the Senate +must either be found in the numbers of people inhabiting the States, +creating an unequal representation, or the people of each State, +regarded as one, and as equal with the people of every other State, +must be represented by the same number of voices and votes. The former +was the plan insisted on by the friends and advocates of the +"national" system; the latter was the great object on which the +minority now rallied all their strength. + +The debate was not long protracted; but it was marked with an energy, +a firmness, and a warmth, on both sides, which reveal the nature of +the peril then hanging over the unformed institutions, whose existence +now blesses the people of America. As the delegations of the States +approached the decision of this critical question, the result of a +separation became apparent, and with it phantoms of coming dissension +and strife, of foreign alliances and adverse combinations, loomed in +the future. Reason and argument became powerless to persuade. +Patriotism, for a moment, lost its sway over men who would at any time +have died for their common country. Not mutterings only, but threats +even were heard of an appeal to some foreign ally, by the smaller +States, if the larger ones should dare to dissolve the confederacy by +insisting on an unjust scheme of government. + +Ellsworth, of Connecticut, in behalf of the minority, offered to +accept the proportional representation for the first branch, if the +equality of the States were admitted in the second, thus making the +government partly national and partly federal. It would be vain, he +said, to attempt any other than this middle ground. Massachusetts was +the only Eastern State that would listen to a proposition for +excluding the States, as equal political societies, from an equal +voice in both branches. The others would risk every consequence, +rather than part with so dear a right. An attempt to deprive them of +it was at once cutting the body of America in two. + +At this moment, foreseeing the probability of an equal division of the +States represented in the Convention, one of the New Jersey +members[83] proposed that the President should write to the executive +of New Hampshire, to request the attendance of the deputies who had +been chosen to represent that State, and who had not yet taken seats. +Two States only voted for this motion,[84] and the discussion +proceeded. Madison, Wilson, and King, with great earnestness, resisted +the compromise proposed by Ellsworth, and when the vote was finally +taken, five States were found to be in favor of an equal +representation in the Senate, five were opposed to it, and the vote of +Georgia was divided.[85] + +Thus was this assembly of great and patriotic men brought finally to +a stand, by the singular urgency with which opposite theories, +springing from local interests and objects, were sought to be pressed +into a constitution of government, that was to be accepted by +communities widely differing in extent, in numbers, and in wealth, and +in all that constitutes political power, and which were at the same +time to remain distinct and separate States. As we look back to the +possibility of a failure to create a constitution, and try to divest +ourselves of the identity which the success of that experiment has +given to our national life, the imagination wanders over a dreary +waste of seventy years, which it can only fill with strange images of +desolation. That the administration of Washington should never have +existed; that Marshall should never have adjudicated, or Jackson +conquered; that the arts, the commerce, the letters of America should +not have taken the place which they hold in the affairs of the world; +that instead of this great Union of prosperous and powerful republics, +made one prosperous and powerful nation, history should have had +nothing to show and nothing to record but border warfare and the +conflicts of worn-out communities, the sport of the old clashing +policies of Europe; that self-government should have become one of the +exploded delusions with which mankind have successively deceived +themselves, and republican institutions have been made only another +name for anarchy and social disorder;--all these things seem at once +inconceivable and yet probable,--at once the fearful conjurings of +fancy, and the inevitable deductions of reason. + +We know not what combinations, what efforts, might have followed the +separation of that convention of American statesmen, without having +accomplished the work for which they had been assembled. We do know, +that, if _they_ could not have succeeded in framing and agreeing upon +a system of government capable of commending itself to the free choice +of the people of their respective States, no other body of men in this +country could have done it. We know that the Confederation was +virtually at an end; that its power was exhausted, although it still +held the nominal seat of authority. The Union must therefore have been +dissolved into its component parts, but for the wisdom and +conciliation of those who, in their original earnestness to secure a +perfect theory, had thus encountered an insuperable obstacle and +brought about a great hazard. I have elsewhere said that these men +were capable of the highest of the moral virtues,--that their +magnanimity was as great as their intellectual acuteness and strength. +Let us turn to the proof on which rests their title to this +distinction. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[64] Rhode Island was never represented in the Convention, and the +delegation of New Hampshire had not yet attended. + +[65] In all these statements of the relative rank of the States, I +compare the census of 1790 and that of 1850. + +[66] The two great exceptions of course were Hamilton and Jay. + +[67] See the candid and moderate letter of Messrs. Yates and Lansing +to the legislature of the State, giving their reasons for not signing +the Constitution. (Elliot, I. 480.) + +[68] In the New Jersey plan, which the New York gentlemen (Hamilton +excepted) supported, although the power to levy duties and the +regulation of commerce were to be added to the existing powers of the +old Congress, yet as these powers were to be exerted against the +States, in the last resort, by force, it would only have been +necessary for a State to place itself in an attitude of resistance, by +a public act, and then the grant of power might have been considered +to be revoked by the very act of resisting its execution. + +[69] Three of the delegates of the State, James McHenry, Daniel of St. +Thomas Jenifer, and Daniel Carroll, signed the Constitution. + +[70] Yates's Minutes, Elliot, I. 433. + +[71] Dr. Johnson of Connecticut. + +[72] Mr. Hallam has traced the present constitution of Parliament to +the sanction of a statute in the 15th of Edward II. (1322), which he +says recognizes it as already standing upon a custom of some length of +time. Const. History, I. 5. + +[73] Mr. Hallam does not concur in what he says has been a prevailing +opinion, that Parliament was not divided into two houses at the first +admission of the commons. That they did not sit in separate chambers +proves nothing; for one body may have sat at the end of Westminster +Hall, and the other at the opposite end. But he thinks that they were +never intermingled in voting; and, in proof of this, he adduces the +fact that their early grants to the King were separate, and imply +distinct grantors, who did not intermeddle with each others' +proceedings. He further shows, that in the 11th Edward I. the commons +sat in one place and the lords in another; and that in the 8th Edward +II. the commons presented a separate petition or complaint to the +King, and the same thing occurred in 1 Edward III. He infers from the +rolls of Parliament, that the houses were divided as they are at +present in the 8th, 9th and 19th Edward II. (See the very valuable +Chapter VIII., on the English Constitution, in Hallam's Middle Ages, +III. 342.) + +[74] See on this subject Lieber on Civil Liberty, I. 209, edit. 1853. + +[75] Connecticut upon this question voted with the majority. + +[76] Madison, Elliot, V. 240. + +[77] June 28. + +[78] Madison, Elliot, V. 256. + +[79] Madison, Elliot, V. 258. + +[80] It was made at this stage by Dr. Johnson. + +[81] The States opposed to an equality of suffrage in the first branch +were Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South +Carolina, and Georgia, 6; those in favor of it were Connecticut, New +York, New Jersey, and Delaware. The vote of Maryland was divided. + +[82] Mr. Baldwin of Georgia suggested this model. + +[83] David Brearly. + +[84] New York and New Jersey. + +[85] The question was put upon Ellsworth's motion to allow the States +an equal representation in the Senate. The vote stood, Connecticut, +New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, _ay_. 5; Massachusetts, +Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, _no_, 5; +Georgia divided. The person who divided the vote of Georgia, and thus +prevented a decision which must have resulted in a disruption of the +Convention, was Abraham Baldwin. We have no account of the motives +with which he cast this vote, except an obscure suggestion by Luther +Martin, which is not intelligible. (Elliot, I. 356.) Baldwin was a +very wise and a very able man. He was not in favor of Ellsworth's +proposition, but he probably saw the consequences of forcing the +minority States to the alternatives of receiving what they regarded as +an unjust and unsafe system, or of quitting the Union. By dividing the +vote of his State he prevented this issue, although he also made it +probable that the Convention must be dissolved without the adoption of +any plan whatever. + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +FIRST GRAND COMPROMISES OF THE CONSTITUTION.--POPULATION OF THE STATES +ADOPTED AS THE BASIS OF REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE.--RULE FOR +COMPUTING THE SLAVES.--EQUALITY OF REPRESENTATION OF THE STATES +ADOPTED FOR THE SENATE. + + +As the States were now exactly divided on the question whether there +should be an equality of votes in the second branch of the +legislature, some compromise seemed to be necessary, or the effort to +make a constitution must be abandoned. A conversation as to what was +expedient to be done, resulted in the appointment of a committee of +one member from each State, to devise and report some mode of +adjusting the whole system of representation.[86] + +According to the Virginia plan, as it then stood before the +Convention, the right of suffrage in both branches was to be upon some +equitable ratio, in proportion to the whole number of free inhabitants +in each State, to which three fifths of all other persons, except +Indians not paying taxes, were to be added. Nothing had been done, to +fix the ratio of representation; and although the principle of popular +representation had been affirmed by a majority of the Convention as +to the first branch, it had been rejected as to the second by an +equally divided vote of the States. The whole subject, therefore, was +now sent to a committee of compromise, who held it under consideration +for three days.[87] + +The same struggle which had been carried on in the Convention was +renewed in the committee; the one side contending for an inequality of +suffrage in both branches, the other for an equality in both. Dr. +Franklin at length gave way, and proposed that the representation in +the first branch should be according to a fixed ratio of the +inhabitants of each State, computed according to the rule already +agreed upon, and that in the second branch each State should have an +equal vote. The members of the larger States reluctantly acquiesced in +this arrangement; the members of the smaller States, with one or two +exceptions, considered their point gained. When the report came to be +made, it was found that the committee had not only agreed upon this as +a compromise, but that they had made a distinction of some importance +between the powers of the two branches, by confining to the first +branch the power of originating all bills for raising or appropriating +money and for fixing the salaries of officers of the government, and +by providing that such bills should not be altered or amended in the +second branch. This was intended for a concession by the smaller +States to the larger.[88] The ratio of representation in the House was +fixed by the committee at one member for every forty thousand +inhabitants, in which three fifths of the slaves were to be computed; +each State not possessing that number of inhabitants to be allowed one +member. The number of senators was not designated. + +This arrangement was, upon the whole, reasonable and equitable. It +balanced the equal representation of the States in the Senate against +the popular representation in the House, and it gave to the larger +States an important influence over the appropriations of money and the +levying of taxes. Nor can the admission of the slaves, in some +proportion, into the rule of representation, be justly considered as +an improper concession, in a system in which the separate +organizations of the States were to be retained, and in which the +States were to be represented in proportion to their respective +populations. + +The report of the committee had recommended that this plan should be +taken as a whole; but as its several features were distasteful to +different sections of the Convention, and almost all parties were +disappointed in the result arrived at by the committee, the several +parts of the plan became at once separate subjects of discussion. In +the first place, the friends of a pure system of popular +representation in both branches objected to the provision concerning +money and appropriation bills, as being no concession on the part of +the smaller States, and as a useless restriction.[89] It therefore, in +their view, left in force all their objections against allowing each +State an equal voice in the Senate. But it was voted to retain it in +the report,[90] and the equal vote of the States in the second branch +was also retained.[91] + +The scale of apportionment of representatives, recommended in the +report of the committee, was also objected to on various grounds. It +was said that a mere representation of persons was not what the +circumstances of the case required;--that property as well as persons +ought to be taken into the account in order to obtain a just index of +the relative rank of the States. It was also urged, that, if the +system of representation were to be settled on a ratio confined to the +population alone, the new States in the West would soon equal, and +probably outnumber, the Atlantic States, and thus the latter would be +in a minority for ever. For these reasons, the subject of apportioning +the representatives was recommitted to five members,[92] who +subsequently proposed a scheme, by which the first House of +Representatives should consist of fifty-six members, distributed among +the States upon an estimate of their present condition,[93] and +authorizing the legislature, as future circumstances might require, +to increase the number of representatives, and to distribute them +among the States upon a compound ratio of their wealth and the numbers +of their inhabitants.[94] The latter part of this proposition was +adopted, but a new and different apportionment, of sixty-five members +for the first meeting of the legislature, was sanctioned by a large +vote of the States, after a second reference to a committee of one +member from each State.[95] + +These votes had been taken for the purpose of agreeing upon amendments +to the original report of the compromise committee, which they would +have so modified as to introduce into it, in place of a ratio of forty +thousand inhabitants, including three fifths of the slaves, a fixed +number of representatives for the first meeting of the legislature, +distributed by estimate among the States, and for all subsequent +meetings an apportionment by the legislature itself upon the combined +principles of the wealth and numbers of inhabitants of the several +States. But in order to understand the objections to the latter part +of this proposition, and the modifications that were still to be made +in it, it is necessary for us here to recur to that special interest +which caused a new and most serious difficulty in the subject of +representation, and which now began to be distinctly asserted by those +whose duty it was to provide for it. There is no part of the history +of the Constitution that more requires to be examined with a careful +attention to facts, with an unprejudiced consideration of the purposes +and motives of those who became the agents of its great compromises +and compacts between sovereign States, and with an impartial survey of +the difficulties with which they had to contend. + +Twice had the Convention affirmed the propriety of counting the +slaves, if the States were to be represented according to the numbers +of their inhabitants; and on the part of the slaveholding States there +had hitherto been no dissatisfaction manifested with the old +proportion of three fifths, originally proposed under the +Confederation as a rule for including them in the basis of taxable +property. But the idea was now advanced, that numbers of inhabitants +were not a sufficient measure of the wealth of a State, and that, in +adjusting a system of representation between such States as those of +the American Union, regard should be had to their relative wealth, +since those which were to be the most heavily taxed ought to have a +proportionate influence in the government. Hence the plan of combining +numbers and wealth in the rule. This was mainly an expedient to +prevent the balance of power from passing to the Western from the +Atlantic States.[96] It was supposed that the former might in +progress of time have the larger amount of population; but that, as +the latter would at the commencement of the government have the power +in their own hands, they might deal out the right of representation to +new States in such proportions as would be most for their own +interests. Still there were grave objections to this combined rule of +numbers and wealth as applied to the slaveholding States. In the first +place, it was extremely vague; it left the question wholly +undetermined whether the slaves were to be regarded as persons or as +property, and therefore left that question to be settled by the +legislature at every revision of the system. Moreover, although this +rule might enable the Atlantic States to retain the predominating +influence in the government as against the Western interests, it might +also enable the Northern to retain the control as against the Southern +States, after the former had lost and the latter had gained a majority +of population. The proposed conjectural apportionment of members for +the first Congress would give thirty-six members to the States that +held few or no slaves, and twenty-nine to the States that held many. +Mason and Randolph, who represented in a candid manner the objections +which Virginia must entertain to such a scheme, did not deny, that, +according to the present population of the States, the Northern part +had a right to preponderate; but they said that this might not always +be the case; and yet that the power might be retained unjustly, if the +proportion on which future apportionments were to be made by the +legislature were not ascertained by a definite rule, and peremptorily +fixed by the Constitution. Gouverneur Morris, who strenuously +maintained the necessity for guarding the interests of the Atlantic +against those of the Western States, insisted that the combined +principles of numbers and wealth gave a sufficient rule for the +legislature; that it was a rule which they could execute; and that it +would avoid the necessity of a distinct and special admission of the +slaves into the census,--an idea which he was sure the people of +Pennsylvania would reject. Mr. Madison argued, forcibly, that +unfavorable distinctions against the new States that might be formed +in the West would be both unjust and impolitic. He thought that their +future contributions to the treasury had been much underrated; that +the extent and fertility of the Western soil would create a vast +agricultural interest; and that, whether the imposts on the foreign +supplies which they would require were levied at the mouth of the +Mississippi or in the Atlantic ports, their trade would certainly +advance with their population, and would entitle them to a rule which +should assume numbers to be a fair index of wealth. + +The arguments against the combined principles of numbers and wealth, +as a mere general direction to the legislature, and against their +joint operation upon the contrasted interests of the Western and the +Atlantic States, appear to have prevailed with some of the more +prominent of the Northern members.[97] Accordingly, when a counter +proposition was brought forward by Williamson,[98]--which contemplated +a return to the principle of numbers alone, and was intended to +provide for a periodical census of the free white inhabitants and of +three fifths of all other persons, and that the representation should +be regulated accordingly,--six States on a division of the question +voted for a census of the free inhabitants, and four States recorded +their votes against it.[99] This result brought the Convention to a +direct vote upon the naked question whether the slaves should be +included as persons, and in the proportion of three fifths, in the +census for the future apportionment of representatives among the +States. + +Massachusetts and Pennsylvania now, for the first time, separated +themselves from Virginia. It was perceived that a system of +representation by numbers would draw after it the necessity for an +admission of the slaves into the enumeration, unless it were confined +to the free inhabitants. On the one hand, the delegates of these two +States had to look to the probable encouragement of the slave-trade, +that would follow an admission of the blacks into the representation, +and to the probable refusal of their constituents to sanction such an +admission. On the other hand, they had to encounter the difficulty of +arranging a just rule of popular representation between States which +would have no slaves, or very few, and States which would have great +numbers of persons in that condition, without giving to the latter +class of States some weight in the government proportioned to the +magnitude of their populations. But they would not directly admit the +naked principle that a slave is to be placed in the same category with +a freeman for the purpose of representation, when he has no voice in +the appointment of the representative; and the proposition was +rejected by their votes and those of four other States.[100] Thereupon +the whole substitute of Mr. Williamson, which contemplated numerical +representation in the place of the combined rule of numbers and +wealth, was unanimously rejected. + +The report of the committee of compromise still stood, therefore, but +modified into the proposition of a fixed number for the first House of +Representatives, and a rule to be compounded of the numbers and wealth +of the States, to be applied by the legislature in adjusting the +representation in future houses. A difficulty, apparently insuperable, +had defeated the application of the simple and--as it might otherwise +appropriately be called--the natural rule of numerical representation. +The social and political condition of the slave, so totally unlike +that of the freeman, presented a problem hitherto unknown in the +voluntary construction of representative government. It was certainly +true, that, by the law of the community in which he was found, and by +his normal condition, he could have no voice in legislation. It was +equally true, that he was no party to the establishment of any State +constitution; that nobody proposed to make him a party to the +Constitution of the United States, to confer upon him any rights or +privileges under it, or to give to the Union any power to affect or +influence his _status_ in a single particular. It was true also, that +the condition in which he was held was looked upon with strong +disapprobation and dislike by the people of several of the States, and +it was not denied by some of the wisest and best of the Southern +statesmen that it was a political and social evil. + +Still, there were more than half a million of these people of the +African race, distributed among five of the States, performing their +labor, constituting their peasantry, and--if the numbers of laborers in +a community form any just index of its wealth and importance--forming +in each of those States a most important element in its relative +magnitude and weight. It should be recollected, that the problem before +the framers of the Constitution was, not how to create a system of +representation for a single community possessing in all its parts the +same social institutions, but how to create a system in which different +communities of mere freemen and other different communities of freemen +and slaves could be represented, in a limited government instituted for +certain special objects, with a proper regard to the respective rights +and interests of those communities, and to the magnitude of the stake +which they would respectively have in the legislation by which all were +to be affected.[101] + +It does not appear, from any records of the discussions that have come +down to us, in what way it was supposed the combined rule of numbers +and wealth could be applied. If its application were left to Congress, +in adjusting the system with reference to slaveholding States, the +slaves must be counted as persons or as property; and as the proposed +rule did not determine which, they might be treated as persons in one +census, and as property in the next, and so on interchangeably. The +suggestion of the principle, however, which seemed to be a just one, +and which grew out of the conflicting opinions entertained upon the +question whether numbers of inhabitants are alone a just index of the +wealth of a community, brought into view a very important doctrine, +that had long been familiar to the American people; namely, that the +right of representation ought to be conceded to every community on +which a tax is to be imposed; or, as one of the maxims of the +Revolutionary period expressed it, that "taxation and representation +ought to go together." This doctrine was really applicable to the +case, and capable of furnishing a principle that would alleviate the +difficulty; for if it could be agreed that, in levying taxes upon a +slaveholding State, the wealth that consisted in slaves should be +included, the maxim itself demonstrated the propriety of giving as +large a proportion of representation as the proportion of tax imposed; +and if, in order to ascertain the representative right of the State, +the slaves were to be counted as persons, and, in ascertaining the tax +to be paid, they were to be counted as property, they would not +require to be considered in both capacities under either branch of the +rule. But in order to give the maxim this application, it would be +necessary to concede that the numbers of the slaves and the free +persons furnished a fair index of the wealth of one State, as it was +necessary to admit that the numbers of its free inhabitants furnished +a fair index of the wealth of another State. If the latter were to be +assumed, and the taxation imposed upon a State were regulated by its +numbers of people, upon the idea that such numbers fairly represented +the wealth of the community, it was proper to apply the same principle +to the slaves. If this principle were applied to the slaves when +ascertaining the amount of taxes to be paid, it ought equally to be +applied to them in ascertaining the numbers of representatives to be +allowed to the State; otherwise, the value of the slaves must be +ascertained in some other way, for the purposes of taxation; the value +or wealth residing in other kinds of property must be ascertained in +the same mode, or under the different rule of assuming numbers of +inhabitants as its index; and the slaves must be excluded as persons +from the representation, which they could only enhance by being +treated as taxable property. + +These further difficulties will appear, as we follow out the various +steps taken for the purpose of applying the maxim which connects +taxation with representation. The rule now under consideration, as the +means of guiding the legislature in future distributions of the right +of representation, was that they were to regulate it upon a ratio +compounded of the wealth and numbers of inhabitants of the States. +Gouverneur Morris now proposed to add to this, as a proviso, the +correlative proposition, "that direct taxation shall be in proportion +to representation." This was adopted; and it made the proposed rule of +numbers and wealth combined applicable both to taxation and +representation. + +But in truth it was as difficult to apply the combined rule of wealth +and numbers to the subject of taxation, as between the States, as it +was to apply it to the right of representation. This was not the first +time in the history of the Union that these two subjects had been +considered, and had been found to be surrounded with embarrassments. +In 1776, when the Articles of Confederation were framed, it became +necessary to determine the proportion in which the quotas of +contribution to the general treasury should be assessed upon the +States. Two obvious rules presented themselves as alternatives; either +to apportion the quotas upon an estimate of the wealth of the States, +or to assume that numbers of inhabitants of every condition presented +a fair index of the pecuniary ability of a State to sustain public +burdens. Here again, however, under either of these plans, the +question would arise as to the kind of property to be regarded in the +basis of the assessment. Should the slaves be treated as part of the +property of a slaveholding State, either by a direct computation, or +by counting them as part of the population, which was to be considered +as the measure of its wealth? Mr. John Adams forcibly maintained that +they ought not to be regarded as subjects of federal taxation, any +more than the free laborers of the Northern States; but that numbers +of inhabitants ought to be taken, indiscriminately, as the true index +of the wealth of each State; and that thus the slave would stand upon +the same footing with the free laborer, both being regarded as the +producers of wealth, and therefore that both should add to the quota +of tax or contribution to be levied upon the State.[102] Mr. +Chase,[103] on the other hand, contended that practically this rule +would tax the Northern States on numbers only, while it would tax the +Southern States on numbers and wealth conjointly, since the slaves +were property as well as persons. + +It is probable, however, that the slaveholding States would at that +time have agreed to the adoption of numbers as the basis of +assessment, if the Northern and Eastern States could have consented to +receive the slaves into the enumeration in a smaller ratio than their +whole number. But it was insisted that they should be counted equally +with the free laborers of the other States; and the result of this +attempt to solve a complicated and abstruse question of political +economy by a theoretical rule, determining that a slave, as a producer +of wealth, stands upon a precise equality with a freeman performing +the same species of labor, was, that the Congress of 1776 were driven +to the adoption of land as a measure of wealth, instead of the more +convenient and practicable rule of numbers.[104] + +But the Articles of Confederation had not been in operation for two +years, when it was found that the system of obtaining supplies for the +general treasury by assessing quotas upon the States according to an +estimate of their relative wealth, represented by the value of their +lands, was entirely impracticable; that the value of land must +constantly be a source of contention and dissatisfaction between the +States; and that, if the mode of defraying the expenses of the Union +by requisitions were adhered to, some simpler rule must be adopted. +Accordingly, in 1783 the Congress were compelled to return to the +rule of numbers; and it was in the effort to agree upon the ratio in +which the slaves should enter into that rule, that the proportion of +three fifths was fixed upon, as a compromise of different views, in +the amendment then proposed to the Articles of Confederation.[105] + +Such had been the previous experience of the Union on the subject of +taxation; and now, in 1787, when an effort was to be made to establish +a government upon a popular representation of the States which had +found it so difficult to agree upon a just and practicable rule for +determining their proportions of the public burdens, the whole subject +became still further complicated with the difficulties attending the +adjustment of this new right of proportional representation. The maxim +which would regulate it by the same ratio that is applied to the +distribution of taxes, contained within itself a just principle; but +it went no farther than to assert a principle of justice, and it left +the subject of the rule itself surrounded by the same difficulties as +before. The Southern States complained that their slaves, if counted +as property for the purposes of taxation, were to be so counted upon a +ratio left wholly to the discretion of Congress; and if counted as +numbers, for the same purpose, that they ought not to be reckoned in +their entire number. They professed their readiness to have +representation and taxation regulated by the same rule, but they +insisted on the security of a definite rule, to be established in the +Constitution itself; and this security, they said, must embrace an +admission of the slaves into the basis of representation, if they were +to be included in the basis of direct taxation.[106] Accordingly, +before the rule as to taxation had been determined, Randolph submitted +a distinct proposition, which contemplated a census of the white +inhabitants and of three fifths of all other persons, with a +peremptory direction to Congress to arrange the representation +accordingly. + +The Northern States, on the other hand, resisted the direct +introduction of the slaves into the representation, as persons; and it +was plain that, if they were to be treated as property, and the +representation was to be regulated by a rule of wealth, their value as +property must be compared with that of other species of personalty +held in the same and in other States, and some principles for +computing it must be ascertained. Upon such economical questions as +these, the agreement of different minds, under the influence of +different interests, was absolutely impossible. + +Thus the knot of these complicated difficulties could only be cut by +the sword of compromise. In whatever direction a theoretical rule was +applied,--whatever view was taken of the slave, as a person or as an +article of property; as a productive laborer equally or less valuable +to the State when compared with the freeman,--whatever principles +were maintained upon the question whether numbers constitute a proper +measure of the wealth of a community, and one that will work out the +same result in communities where slavery exists, as well as where it +is absent,--absolute truth, or what the whole country would receive as +such, was unattainable. But an adjustment of the problem, founded on +mutual conciliation and a desire to be just, was not impossible. + +The two objects to be accomplished were to avoid the offence that +might be given to the Northern States by making the slaves in direct +terms an ingredient in the rule of representation, and, on the other +hand, to concede to the Southern States the right to have their +representation enhanced by the same enumeration of their slaves that +might be adopted for the purpose of apportioning direct taxation. +These objects were effected by an arrangement proposed by Wilson. It +consisted, first, in affirming the maxim that representation ought to +be proportioned to direct taxation; and then, by directing a +periodical census of the free inhabitants, and three fifths of all +other persons, to be taken by the authority of the United States, and +that the direct taxation should be apportioned among the States +according to this census of persons. The principle was thus +established, that, for the purpose of direct taxation, the number of +inhabitants in each State should be assumed as the measure of its +relative wealth; and that its right of representation should be +regulated by the same measure; and as the slaves were to be admitted +into the rule for taxation in the proportion of three fifths of their +number only,--apparently upon the supposition that the labor of a +slave is less valuable to the State than the labor of a freeman,--so +they were in the same proportion only to enhance the representation. +This expedient was adopted by the votes of a large majority of the +States;[107] but since it had been moved as an amendment to the +proposition previously accepted, which affirmed that the +representation ought to be regulated by the combined rule of numbers +and wealth, it appeared, when brought into that connection, to rest +the representation of the slaveholding States in respect to the +slaves, in part at least, upon the idea of property. To avoid all +discrepancy in the application of the rule to the two subjects of +representation and taxation, Governor Randolph proposed to strike the +word "wealth" from the resolution; and this, having been done by a +vote nearly unanimous,[108] left the enumeration of the slaves for +both purposes an enumeration of persons, in less than their whole +numbers; placing them in the rule for taxation, not as property and +subjects of taxation, but as constituting part of an assumed measure +of the wealth of a State, just as the free inhabitants constituted +another part of the same measure, and placing them in the same ratio +and in the same capacity in the rule for representation.[109] + +The basis of the House of Representatives having been thus agreed to, +the remaining part of the report, which involved the basis of the +Senate, was then taken up for consideration. Wilson, King, Madison, +and Randolph still opposed the equality of votes in the Senate, upon +the ground that the government was to act upon the people and not upon +the States, and therefore the people, not the States, should be +represented in every branch of it. But the whole plan of +representation embraced in the amended report, including the equality +of votes in the Senate, was adopted, by a bare majority, however, of +the States present.[110] + +When this result was announced, Governor Randolph complained of its +embarrassing effect on that part of the plan of a constitution which +concerned the powers to be vested in the general government; all of +which, he said, were predicated upon the idea of a proportionate +representation of the States in both branches of the legislature. He +desired an opportunity to modify the plan, by providing for certain +cases to which the equality of votes should be confined; and in order +to enable both parties to consult informally upon some expedient that +would bring about a unanimity, he proposed an adjournment. On the +following morning, we are told by Mr. Madison, the members opposed to +an equality of votes in the Senate became convinced of the impolicy of +risking an agreement of the States upon any plan of government by an +inflexible opposition to this feature of the scheme proposed, and it +was tacitly allowed to stand.[111] + +Great praise is due to the moderation of those who made this +concession to the fears and jealousies of the smaller States. That it +was felt by them to be a great concession, no one can doubt, who +considers that the chief cause which had brought about this convention +of the States was the inefficiency of the "federal" principle on which +the former Union had been established. Looking back to all that had +happened since the Confederation was formed,--to the repeated failures +of the States to comply with the constitutional demands of the +Congress, and to the entire impracticability of a system that had no +true legislative basis, and could therefore exert no true legislative +power,--we ought not to be surprised that the retention of the +principle of an equal State representation in any part of the new +government should have been resisted so strenuously and so long. + +That the final concession of this point was also a wise and fortunate +determination, there can be no doubt. Those who made it probably did +not foresee all its advantages, or comprehend all its manifold +relations. They looked to it, in the first instance, as the means of +securing the acceptance of the Constitution by all the States, and +thus of preventing the evils of a partial confederacy. They probably +did not at once anticipate the benefits to be derived from giving to a +majority of the States a check upon the legislative power of a +majority of the whole people of the United States. Complicated as this +check is, it both recognizes and preserves the residuary sovereignty +of the States; it enables them to hold the general government within +its constitutional sphere of action; and it is in fact the only +expedient that could have been successfully adopted, to preserve the +State governments, and to avoid the otherwise inevitable alternative +of conferring on the general government plenary legislative power upon +all subjects. It is a part of the Constitution which it is vain to try +by any standard of theory; for it was the result of a mere compromise +of opposite theories and conflicting interests. Its best eulogium is +to be found in its practical working, and in what it did to produce +the acceptance of a constitution believed, at the time of its +adoption, to have given an undue share of influence and power to the +larger members of the confederacy.[112] + + +NOTE ON THE POPULATION OF THE SLAVEHOLDING AND NON-SLAVEHOLDING +STATES. + + Although, at the time of the formation of the Constitution, + slavery had been expressly abolished in two of the States + only (Massachusetts and New Hampshire), the framers of that + instrument practically treated all but the five Southern + States as if the institution had been already abolished + within their limits, and counted all the colored persons + therein, whether bond or free, as part of the free + population; assuming that the eight Northern and Middle + States would be free States, and that the five Southern + States would continue to be slave States. This appears from + the whole tenor of the debates, in which the line is + constantly drawn, as between slaveholding and + non-slaveholding States, so as to throw eight States upon the + Northern and five upon the Southern side. I have found also, + in a newspaper of that period (New York Daily Advertiser, + February 5, 1788), the following + + "ESTIMATE OF THE POPULATION OF THE STATES MADE AND USED IN + THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, ACCORDING TO THE MOST ACCURATE + ACCOUNTS THEY COULD OBTAIN." + + New Hampshire, 102,000 + Massachusetts, 360,000 + Rhode Island, 58,000 + Connecticut, 202,000 + New York, 238,000 + New Jersey, 138,000 + Pennsylvania, 360,000 + Delaware, 37,000 + ---------1,495,000 + Maryland, including three fifths of 80,000 negroes, 218,000 + Virginia, " " 280,000 " 420,000 + North Carolina, " " 60,000 " 200,000 + South Carolina, " " 80,000 " 150,000 + Georgia, " " 20,000 " 90,000 + ---------1,078,000 + + The authenticity of this table is established by referring to + a speech made by General Pinckney in the legislature of South + Carolina, in which he introduced and quoted it at length. + (Elliot's Debates, IV. 283.) + + From this it appears that the estimated population of the + eight Northern and Middle States, adopted in the Convention, + was 1,495,000; that of the five Southern States (including + three fifths of an estimated number of negroes) was + 1,078,000. Comparing this estimate with the results of the + first census, it will be seen that the _total_ population of + the eight Northern and Middle States exceeds the _federal_ + population of the five Southern States, in the census of + 1790, in about the same ratio as the former exceeds the + latter in the estimate employed by the Convention. Thus in + 1790 the _total_ population of the eight Northern and Middle + States, including all slaves, was 1,845,595; the _federal_ + population of the five Southern States, including three + fifths of the slaves, was 1,540,048;--excess 305,547. In the + estimate of 1787, the population allotted to the eight + Northern and Middle States was 1,495,000; that allotted to + the five Southern States, counting only three fifths of the + estimated number of slaves, was 1,078,000;--excess in favor + of the eight States, 417,000. This calculation shows, + therefore, that, in estimating the population of the + different States for the purpose of adjusting the first + representation in Congress, the Convention applied the rule + of three fifths of the slaves to the five Southern States + only, and that as to the other eight States no discrimination + was made between the different classes of their inhabitants. + Other methods of comparing the estimate of 1787 with the + census of 1790 will lead to the same conclusion. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[86] The committee consisted of Gerry, Ellsworth, Yates, Patterson, +Franklin, Bedford, Martin, Mason, Davie, Rutledge, and Baldwin. + +[87] The committee was appointed on the 2d of July, and made their +report on the 5th. The Convention in the interval transacted no +business. + +[88] See further as to this exclusive power of the House, _post._ + +[89] Madison, Butler, Gouverneur Morris, and Wilson. + +[90] Five States voted to retain it, three voted against it, and three +were divided. This was treated as an affirmative vote. Elliot, V. 255. + +[91] Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North +Carolina, _ay_ 6; Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, _no_,3; +Massachusetts, Georgia, divided. Ibid. 285, 286. + +[92] Gouverneur Morris, Gorham, Randolph, Rutledge, and King. + +[93] They gave to New Hampshire, 2; Massachusetts, 7; Rhode Island, 1; +Connecticut, 4; New York, 5; New Jersey, 3; Pennsylvania, 8; Delaware, +1; Maryland, 4; Virginia, 9; North Carolina, 5; South Carolina, 5; +Georgia, 2. + +[94] Elliot, V. 287, 288. + +[95] This apportionment gave to New Hampshire, 3; Massachusetts, 8; +Rhode Island, 1; Connecticut, 5; New York, 6; New Jersey, 4; +Pennsylvania, 8; Delaware, 1; Maryland, 6; Virginia, 10; North +Carolina, 5; South Carolina, 5; Georgia, 3. + +[96] See Mr. Gorham's explanation; Madison, Elliot, V. 288. + +[97] Sherman and Gorham. + +[98] Of North Carolina. + +[99] Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, +North Carolina, _ay_, 6; Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, +_no_, 4. The votes of South Carolina and Georgia were given in the +negative, because they desired that the blacks should be included in +the census equally with the whites. For the same reason, as we shall +see presently, those States voted against the other branch of the +proposition, which would give but three fifths of the slaves. But upon +what principle, unless it was from general opposition to all numerical +representation, the State of Delaware should have voted with them on +both of these features of the proposed census, is, I confess, to me +inexplicable. + +[100] Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, _ay_, 4; +Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South +Carolina, _no_, 6. South Carolina voted in the negative, for a reason +suggested in the previous note, _ante_, p. 153. + +[101] See the note on the population of the slaveholding and +non-slaveholding States, at the end of this chapter. + +[102] See Mr. Jefferson's notes of this debate in the Congress of +1776, Works, Vol. I. pp. 26-30. John Adams's Works, Vol. II. pp. +496-498. + +[103] Samuel Chase of Maryland. + +[104] See _ante_, Vol. I. pp. 210-213. + +[105] See Mr. Madison's notes of the debate in the Congress of 1783, +Elliot, V. 78-80. Journals of Congress, VIII. 188 (April 18, 1783). +_Ante_, Vol. I. p. 213. + +[106] See the remarks of General Pinckney, Mr. Mason, Mr. Butler, and +Governor Randolph. Elliot, V. 294-305. + +[107] Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, +Georgia, _ay_, 6; New Jersey, Delaware, _no_, 2; Massachusetts, South +Carolina, divided. + +[108] The only opposition was from Delaware, the vote of which was +divided. + +[109] See the note at the end of this chapter. + +[110] Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina (Mr. +Spaight, _no_), _ay_, 5; Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, +Georgia, _no_, 4; Massachusetts divided (Mr. Gerry, Mr. Strong, _ay_, +Mr. King, Mr. Gorham, _no_). The delegates of New York were all +absent; Messrs. Yates and Lansing left the Convention on the 5th of +July, after the principle of popular representation had been adopted. +Colonel Hamilton was absent on private business. If the two former had +been present, the vote of the State would doubtless have been given in +favor of the report, on account of the basis which it gave to the +Senate. + +[111] Elliot, V. 319. + +[112] Mr. Madison, who was to the last a strenuous opponent of the +equality of votes in the Senate, candidly and truly stated its merits +in the 62d number of the Federalist, as they had been disclosed to him +by subsequent reflection. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +POWERS OF LEGISLATION.--CONSTITUTION AND CHOICE OF THE +EXECUTIVE.--CONSTITUTION OF THE JUDICIARY.--ADMISSION OF NEW +STATES.--COMPLETION OF THE ENGAGEMENTS OF CONGRESS.--GUARANTY OF +REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTIONS.--OATH TO SUPPORT THE +CONSTITUTION.--RATIFICATION.--NUMBER OF SENATORS.--QUALIFICATIONS FOR +OFFICE.--SEAT OF GOVERNMENT. + + +Of the remaining subjects comprehended in the report of the committee +of the whole, it will only be necessary here to make a brief statement +of the action of the Convention, before we arrive at the stage at +which the principles agreed upon were sent to a committee of detail to +be cast into the forms of a Constitution. + +Recurring to the sixth resolution in the report of the committee of +the whole, an addition was made to its provisions, by inserting a +power to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the +Union; and for the clause giving the legislature power to negative +certain laws of the States, the principle was substituted of making +the legislative acts and treaties of the United States the supreme law +of the land, and binding upon the judiciaries of the several States. + +The constitution of the executive department had been provided for, by +declaring that it should consist of a single person, to be chosen by +the national legislature for a period of seven years, and to be +ineligible a second time; to have power to carry into execution the +national laws, to appoint to offices not otherwise provided for, to be +removable on impeachment, and to be paid for his services by a fixed +stipend out of the national treasury. The mode of constituting this +department did not, as in the case of the legislative, present the +question touching the nature of the government described by the terms +"federal" and "national." It was entirely consistent with either +plan,--with that of a union formed by the States in their political +capacities, or with one formed by the people of the States, or with +one partaking of both characters,--that the executive should be chosen +mediately or immediately by the people, or by the legislatures or +executives of the States, or by the national legislature. + +The same contest, therefore, between the friends and opponents of a +national system was not obliged to be renewed upon this department. So +long as the form to be given to the institution was consistent with a +system of republican government,--so long as it provided an elective +magistrate, not appointed by an oligarchy, and holding by a +responsible and defeasible tenure of office,--whether he should be +chosen by the people of the States, or by some of their other public +servants, would not affect the principles on which the legislative +power of the government was to be founded. But this very latitude of +choice, as to the mode of appointment, and the duration of office, +opened the greatest diversity of opinion. In the earlier stages of the +formation of a plan of government of three distinct departments, the +idea of an election of the executive by the people at large was +scarcely entertained at all. It was not supposed to be practicable for +the people of the different States to make an intelligent and wise +choice of the kind of magistrate then contemplated,--a magistrate +whose chief function was to be that of an executive agent of the +legislative will. Regarding the office mainly in this light, without +having yet had occasion to look at it closely as the source of +appointments to other offices and as the depositary of a check on the +legislative power itself, the framers of the plan now under +consideration had proposed to vest the appointment in the legislature, +as the readiest mode of obtaining a suitable incumbent, without the +tumults and risks of a popular election. But the power of appointment +to other offices and the revisionary check on legislation were no +sooner annexed to the executive office, than it was perceived that +some provision must be made for obviating the effects of its +dependence on the legislative branch. An executive chosen by the +legislature must be to a great extent the creature of those from whom +his appointment was derived. + +To counteract this manifestly great inconvenience and impropriety, the +incumbent of the executive office was to be ineligible a second time. +This, however, was to encounter one inconvenience by another, since +the more faithfully and successfully the duties of the station might +be discharged, the stronger would be the reasons for continuing the +individual in office. The ineligibility was accordingly stricken out. +Hence it was, that a variety of propositions concerning the length of +the term of office were attempted, as expedients to counteract the +evils of an election by the legislature of a magistrate who was to be +re-eligible; and among them was one which contemplated "good behavior" +as the sole tenure of the office.[113] This proposition was much +considered; it received the votes of four States out of ten;[114] and +it is not at all improbable that it would have received a much larger +support, if the supposed disadvantages of an election by the people +had led a majority of the States finally to retain the mode of an +election by the national legislature.[115] But in consequence of the +impossibility of agreeing upon a proper length of term for an +executive that was to be chosen by the legislature, the majority of +the Convention went back to the plan of making the incumbent +ineligible a second time, which implied that some definite term was to +be adopted. This again compelled them to consider in what other mode +the executive could be appointed, so as to avoid the evil of +subjecting the office to the unrestrained influence of the +legislature, and to remove the restriction upon the eligibility of the +officer for a second term. + +In an election of the chief executive magistrate by the people, voting +directly, the right of suffrage would have to be confined to the free +inhabitants of the several States. But even with respect to the free +inhabitants, the right of suffrage was differently regulated in the +different States; and there must either be a uniform and special rule +established as to the qualification of voters for the executive of the +United States, or the rule of suffrage of each State must be adopted +for this as well as other national elections. In the Northern States, +too, the right of suffrage was much more diffused than in the +Southern, and the question must arise, as it had arisen in the +construction of the representative system, whether the States were to +possess an influence in the choice of a chief magistrate for the Union +in proportion to the number of their inhabitants, or only in +proportion to their qualified voters, or their free inhabitants. + +The substitution of electors would obviate these difficulties, by +affording the means of determining the precise weight in the election +that should be allotted to each State, without attempting to prescribe +a uniform rule of suffrage in the primary elections, and without being +obliged to settle the discrepancies between the election laws of the +States. They furnished, also, the means of removing the election from +the direct action of the people, by confiding the ultimate selection +to a body of men, to be chosen for the express purpose of exercising a +real choice among the eminent individuals who might be thought fit for +the station. But the mode of choice was complicated with the other +questions of re-eligibility, and especially with that of impeachment. +If appointed by electors, there would be danger of their being +corrupted by the person in office, if he were eligible a second time, +or by a candidate who had not filled the station. Hence there would be +a propriety in making the executive subject to impeachment while in +office. If chosen by the legislature, it seemed to be generally +agreed, that the executive ought not to be eligible a second time; but +whether he ought to be subject to impeachment, and by what tribunal, +was a subject on which there were great differences of opinion. + +The consequence of this great diversity of views was, that the plan +embraced in the ninth resolution of the committee of the whole was +retained and sent to the committee of detail. + +With respect to the judiciary, several important changes were made in +the plan of the committee of the whole. The prohibition against any +increase of salary of the individuals holding the office was stricken +out, and the restriction was made applicable only to a diminution of +the salary. The cognizance of impeachments of national officers was +taken from their jurisdiction, and the principle was adopted which +extended that jurisdiction to "all cases arising under the national +laws, and to such other questions as may involve the national peace +and harmony." The power to appoint inferior tribunals was confirmed to +the national legislature. + +The fourteenth resolution, providing for the admission of new States, +was unanimously agreed to. + +The fifteenth resolution, providing for the continuance of Congress +and for the completion of their engagements, was rejected. + +The principle of the sixteenth resolution, which provided a guaranty +by the United States of the institutions of the States, was +essentially modified. In the place of a guaranty applicable both to a +republican constitution and the "existing laws" of a State, the +declaration was adopted, "that a republican form of government shall +be guaranteed to each State, and that each State shall be protected +against foreign and domestic violence."[116] + +The seventeenth resolution, that provision ought to be made for future +amendments, was adopted without debate.[117] + +The eighteenth resolution, requiring the legislative, executive, and +judicial officers of the States to be bound by oath to support the +Articles of Union, was then extended to include the officers of the +national government. + +The next subject that occurred in the order of the resolutions was +that of the proposed ratification of the new system by the people of +the States, acting through representative bodies to be expressly +chosen for this purpose, instead of referring it for adoption to the +legislatures of the States. + +As this is a subject on which very different theories are maintained, +arising partly from different views of the historical facts, and as +there are very different degrees of importance attached to the mode in +which the framers of the Constitution provided for its establishment, +it will be convenient here to state the position in which they found +themselves at this period in their deliberations, the purposes which +they had in view, and the steps which they took to accomplish their +objects. + +They were engaged in preparing a new system of government, and in +providing for its introduction. When they were first called together, +the general purpose of the States may seem to have been confined to a +mode of introducing changes in the fundamental compact of the Union, +such as was provided for by the Articles of Confederation. But the +Convention had found itself obliged, from the sheer necessities of the +country, to go far beyond the Confederation, and to make a total +change in the principle of the government. It became, therefore, +necessary for them to provide a mode of enacting or establishing this +change, which would commend itself to the confidence of the people, by +its conformity with their previous ideas of constitutional action, and +be at the same time consonant with reason and truth. + +Again, there was a peculiarity in their situation, which rendered it +quite different from that of the delegates of a people who had +abolished a pre-existing government, and had assembled a +representative body to form a new one. The Confederation still +existed. As a compact between sovereign States, providing for a +special mode in which alterations of its articles were to be made, and +limiting their adoption to the case of unanimous consent, it was still +in force. The States, in their political capacities as sovereign +communities, were still the parties to the compact, and their +legislatures alone were clothed with the authority to change its +provisions. It was necessary, therefore, to encounter and to solve the +question, whether a new government, framed upon a principle unlike +that of the Confederation, and embracing an entirely different +legislative authority, could be established in the mode prescribed by +the existing compact of the States; and if it could not, whether there +existed any power, apart from the State governments, by which it could +be established and be clothed with a paramount authority, resting on a +basis of principle, and not upon force, fiction, or fraud. + +In the early formation of the Union that took place before the +Declaration of Independence, questions of the constitutional power of +the Colonies which became members of it could scarcely arise at all, +since those who undertook to act for and to represent the people of +each Colony were proceeding upon revolutionary principles and rights. +But before the Articles of Confederation, which constituted the first +union of the States upon ascertained and settled principles of +government, had been agreed upon, many of the State constitutions were +formed; and when those Articles were entered into, the State +governments represented the sovereignty of distinct political +communities, and were entirely competent to form such a confederacy as +was then established by their joint and unanimous consent. All the +obligations which the Confederation imposed upon its members rested +upon the States in their corporate capacities; and the government of +each of them was competent to assume, for the State, such obligations, +and to enter into such stipulations. In the same way, it was competent +to the State governments to make alterations in the Articles of +Confederation, by unanimous consent, so long as those alterations did +not change the fundamental principle of the Union, which was that of a +system of legislation for the States in their corporate capacities. + +But when it was proposed to reverse this principle, and to create a +government, external to the governments of the States, clothed with +authority to exact obedience from the individual inhabitants of the +States, and to act upon them directly, the question might well arise, +whether the State governments were competent to cede such an authority +over their constituents, and whether it could be granted by anybody +but the people themselves. It might, it is true, be said, that their +constitutions made the governments of the States the depositaries of +the sovereignty and political powers of the people inhabiting those +States. But if this was true, in a general sense, for the purpose of +exercising the political powers of the people, it was not true, in any +sense, for the purpose of granting away those powers to other agents. +The latter could only be done by those who had constituted the first +class of agents, and who were able to say that certain portions of the +authority with which they had been clothed should be withdrawn, and be +revested in another class. + +Undoubtedly it would have been possible to have given the Constitution +of the United States a theoretical adoption by the people of the +States, by committing its acceptance to the State legislatures, +relying on the acquiescence of the people in their acts. But there +were two objections to this course. The one was, that the legislatures +were believed less likely than the people to favor the establishment +of such a government as that now proposed. The other was, that the +kind of legal fiction by which the presumed assent of the people must +be reached, in this mode, would leave room for doubts and disputes as +to the real basis and authority of the government, which ought, if +possible, to be avoided. + +Another difficulty of a kindred nature rendered it equally inexpedient +to rely on the sanction of the State legislatures. The States, in +their corporate capacities, and through the agency of their respective +governments, were parties to a federal system, which they had +stipulated with each other should be changed only by unanimous +consent. The Constitution, which was now in the process of formation, +was a system designed for the acceptance of the people of all the +States, if the assent of all could be obtained; but it was also +designed for the acceptance of a less number than the whole of the +States, in case of a refusal of some of them; and it was at this time +highly probable that at least two of them would not adopt it. Rhode +Island had never been represented in the Convention; and the whole +course of her past history, with reference to enlargements of the +powers of the Union, made it quite improbable that she would ratify +such a plan of government as was now to be presented to her. The State +of New York had, through her delegates, taken part in the proceedings, +until the final decision, which introduced into the government a +system of popular representation; but two of those delegates, entirely +dissatisfied with that decision, had withdrawn from the Convention, +and had gone home to prepare the State for the rejection of the +scheme.[118] The previous conduct of the State had made it not at all +unlikely that their efforts would be successful. Nor were there +wanting other indications of the most serious dissatisfaction, on the +part of men of great influence in some of the other States. Unanimity +had already become hopeless, if not impracticable; and it was +necessary, therefore, to look forward to the event of an adoption of +the system by a less number than the whole of the States, and to make +it practicable for a less number to form the new Union for which it +provided. This could only be done by presenting it for ratification to +the people of each State, who possessed authority to withdraw the +State government from the Confederation, and to enter into new +relations with the people of such other States as might also withdraw +from the old and accept the new system. + +There was another and more special reason for resorting to the direct +sanction of the people of the States, which has already been referred +to in general terms, but for which we must look still more closely +into the nature of the system proposed. In that system, the +legislative authority was to reside in the concurrent action of a +majority of the people and a majority of the States. How could the +State government of Delaware, for example, confer upon a majority of +the representatives of the people of all the States, and a majority of +the representatives of all the States, that might adopt the new +Constitution, power to bind the people of Delaware by a legislative +act, to which their own representatives might have refused their +assent? The State government was appointed and established for the +purpose of binding the people of the State by legislative acts of +their own servants and immediate representatives; but not for the +purpose of consenting that legislative power over the people of that +State should be exercised by agents not delegated by themselves. Yet +such a consent was involved in the new system now to be proposed, and +was, in some way--by some safe and competent method--to be obtained. A +legislative power was to be created by the assembling in one branch of +the representatives of the people of all the States, in proportion to +their numbers, and in the other branch by assembling an equal number +of representatives of each State, without regard to its numbers of +people. The authority of law, upon all subjects that might be +committed to this legislative power, was to attend the acts of +concurring majorities in both branches, even against the separate and +adverse will of the minority. It was impossible to rest this +authority upon any other basis than that of the ratification of the +system by the people of each State, to be given by themselves in +primary assemblies, or by delegates expressly chosen in such +assemblies, and appointed to give it, if they should see fit. A system +founded on the consent of the legislatures would be a treaty between +sovereign States; a system founded on the consent of the people would +be a constitution of government, ordained by those who hold and +exercise all political power.[119] + +There were not wanting, however, strong advocates of a reference to +the State legislatures; and the votes of three of the States were at +first given for that mode of ratifying the Constitution; but the other +plan was finally adopted with nearly unanimous consent.[120] + +Still, the resolution under consideration contained a feature which +wisely provided for the assent of the existing Congress to the changes +that were to be made by the establishment of the new system. It +proposed that the plan of the new Constitution should be first +submitted to Congress for its approbation, and that the legislatures +of the States should then recommend to the people to institute +assemblies to consider and decide on its adoption. These steps were to +be taken, in pursuance of the course marked out when the Convention +was called. The resolution of Congress, which recommended the +Convention, required that the alterations which it might propose +should be "agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States"; and +such was the tenor of the instructions given to the delegates of most +of the States. This direction would be substantially complied with, if +the legislatures, on receiving and considering the system, should +recommend to the people to appoint representative bodies to consider +and decide on its adoption, and the people should so adopt and ratify +it.[121] + +The topics covered by the report of the committee of the whole had +thus been passed upon in the Convention, and the outline of the +Constitution had been framed. There remained only three subjects on +which it would be necessary to act in order to provide for a complete +scheme of government. It was necessary to determine the number of +senators to which each State should be entitled; to ascertain the +qualifications of members of the government; and to determine at what +place the government should be seated. + +The number of senators was not agreed upon at the time when the +principle of an equal representation of the States in the Senate was +adopted; and it had not been determined in what method they were to +vote. It was now settled that the Senate should consist of two members +from each branch, and that they should vote _per capita_. To this +arrangement one State only dissented. The vote of Maryland was given +against it, through the influence of Luther Martin, who considered +this method of voting a departure from the idea of the States being +represented in the Senate. But this objection was obviously unsound; +for although, by this method of voting, the influence of a State _may_ +be divided, its members have the _power_ to concur, and to make the +vote of the State more effectual than it would be if it had only a +single suffrage. + +The subject of the qualifications to be required of the executive, the +judiciary, and the members of both branches of the legislature, went +to the committee of detail in a form which was subsequently modified +in a very important particular. It was at first proposed,[122] that +landed property, as well as citizenship in the United States, should +be embraced in the qualifications. But there were solid objections to +this requirement, founded on the circumstances of the country and the +nature of a republican constitution. So far as the people of the +United States could be said to be divided into classes, the principal +divisions related to the three occupations of agriculture, commerce, +and manufactures of all kinds, including in the latter all who +exercised the mechanic arts. As a general rule, it was supposed at +that time to be true, that the commercial and manufacturing classes +held very little landed property; and that although they were much +less numerous than the agricultural class, yet that they were likely +to increase in a far greater ratio than they had hitherto. +Practically, therefore, to require a qualification of landed property, +would be to give the offices of the general government to the +agricultural interest. These considerations led the Convention, by a +nearly unanimous vote, to reject the proposition for a landed +qualification.[123] + +Very serious doubts were also entertained, whether, in constructing a +republican constitution, it was proper to pay so much deference to +distinctions of wealth as would be implied by the adoption of any +property qualification for office. There are two methods in which the +interests of property may be secured, in the organization of a +representative government. It may be required as a qualification, +either of the elector or the elected, that the individual shall +possess a certain amount of property. But it seems scarcely +consistent with the spirit of a republican constitution, that this +should be made a qualification for holding office, although it may be +quite proper to require some degree of property, or its equivalent +evidence of moral fitness, as a qualification for the right of +choosing to office. The solid reason for a distinction is, that, in +order to have a property qualification for office at all efficient, or +even of any perceptible operation, it must be made so large that it +will tend to exclude persons of real talent, or even the highest +capacity for the public service. Whereas, a property qualification may +be applied to the exercise of the elective franchise, by requiring so +small an amount that it will practically exclude but few who possess +the moral requisites for its intelligent and honest use; and even to +this extent the operation of such a rule may be, as it is in some +well-governed communities, greatly relieved, by substituting for the +positive possession of any amount of property, that species of +evidence of moral fitness for the right of voting that is implied by +the capacity to pay a very small portion of the public burdens.[124] + +At the present stage, however, of the formation of the Constitution +of the United States, the opinions of a majority of the States were in +favor of a property qualification for office, as well as a requirement +of citizenship; and the committee of detail were instructed +accordingly, with, the dissent of only three of the States.[125] But, +as we shall afterwards find, another view of the subject finally +prevailed.[126] + +No definite action was had, at this stage, upon the subject of a seat +of the national government; but it was almost unanimously agreed to be +the general sense of the country, that it ought not to be placed at +the seat of any State government, or in any large commercial city; and +that provision ought to be made by Congress, as speedily as possible, +for the establishment of a national seat and the erection of suitable +public buildings. + +Such was the character of the system sent to a committee of detail, to +be put into the form of a constitution.[127] Before it was sent to +them, however, a notice was given by an eminent Southern member, which +looked to the introduction of provisions not yet contemplated or +discussed. According to Mr. Madison's minutes, General Pinckney rose +and reminded the Convention, that, if the committee should fail to +insert some security to the Southern States against an emancipation of +slaves, and taxes on exports, he should be bound by duty to his State +to vote against their report.[128] + +The resolutions as adopted by the Convention, together with the +propositions offered by Mr. Charles Pinckney on the 29th of May, and +those offered by Mr. Patterson on the 15th of June, were then referred +to a committee of detail.[129] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[113] Moved by Dr. M'Clurg, one of the Virginia delegates, and the +person appointed in the place of Patrick Henry, who declined to attend +the Convention. + +[114] New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, _ay_, 4; +Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, +Georgia, _no_, 6. + +[115] I understand Mr. Madison to have voted for this proposition, and +that his view of it was, that it might be a necessary expedient to +prevent a dangerous union of the legislative and executive +departments. He said that the propriety of the plan of an executive +during good behavior would depend on the practicability of instituting +a tribunal for impeachments, as certain and as adequate in the case of +the executive as in the case of the judges. His remarks, of course, +were predicated upon the idea of a final necessity for retaining the +choice of the executive by the legislature. In a note to his +"Debates," appended to the vote on this question, it is said: "This +vote is not to be considered as any certain index of opinion, as a +number in the affirmative probably had it chiefly in view to alarm +those attached to a dependence of the executive on the legislature, +and thereby to facilitate some final arrangement of a contrary +tendency. The avowed friends of an executive 'during good behavior' +were not more than three or four, nor is it certain they would have +adhered to such a tenure." (Madison, Elliot, V. 327.) By "the avowed +friends of an executive during good behavior," I understand Mr. +Madison to mean those who would have preferred that tenure, under all +forms and modes of election. I can trace in the debates no evidence +that any other person except Gouverneur Morris was indifferent to the +mode in which the executive should be chosen, provided he held his +place by this tenure. Whether Hamilton held this opinion, and adhered +to it throughout, is a disputed point. In a letter to Timothy +Pickering, written in 1803, he says that his final opinion was against +an executive during good behavior, "on account of the increased danger +to the public tranquillity incident to the election of a magistrate of +this degree of permanency." In proof of this view of the subject, he +remarks: "In the plan of a constitution which I drew up while the +Convention was sitting, and which I communicated to Mr. Madison about +the close of it, perhaps a day or two after, the office of President +has no longer duration than for three years." (Niles's Register, +November 7, 1812.) In this he was probably mistaken. (See Hamilton's +Works, II. 401. Madison, Elliot, V. 584.) + +[116] _Ante_, Chap. V. + +[117] At this point (July 23) John Langdon and Nicholas Gilman took +their seats as delegates from New Hampshire. + +[118] See the letter of Messrs. Yates and Lansing to Governor Clinton, +Elliot, I. 480. + +[119] There seems to be a sound distinction between the two, which was +pointed out by Mr. Madison. He said that "he considered the difference +between a system founded on the legislatures only, and one founded on +the people, to be the true difference between a _league_, or treaty, +and a _constitution_. The former, in point of _moral obligation_, +might be as inviolable as the latter. In point of _political +operation_, there were two important distinctions in favor of the +latter. First, a [State] law violating a treaty ratified by a +pre-existing [State] law might be respected by the judges as a law, +though an unwise or perfidious one. A [State] law violating a +constitution established by the people themselves would be considered +by the judges as null and void. Secondly, the doctrine laid down by +the law of nations in the case of treaties was, that a breach of any +one article by any of the parties freed the other parties from their +engagements. In the case of a union of people under one constitution, +the nature of the pact had always been understood to exclude such an +interpretation." Elliot, V. 355, 356. + +[120] Connecticut, Delaware, and Maryland voted for an amendment to +the original resolution, which, if adopted, would have submitted the +Constitution to the State legislatures. The resolution to refer it to +assemblies chosen for the purpose by the people, was subsequently +adopted, with the dissent of one State only, Delaware. + +[121] For the history of the proceedings relating to the institution +of the national Convention, see _Ante_, Vol. I. Book III. Chap. VI. + +[122] By Mason. + +[123] Maryland alone voted to retain it. + +[124] As in the State of Massachusetts; where the sole money +qualification required of a voter is the payment of an annual poll-tax +of $1.25, or about five shillings _sterling_. + +[125] Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. + +[126] See the title "Qualifications" in the Index. + +[127] The committee of detail, appointed July 24, consisted of Messrs. +Rutledge, Randolph, Gorham, Ellsworth, and Wilson. Elliot, V. 357. + +[128] By a security against an emancipation of slaves, General +Pinckney meant some provision for their extradition in cases of escape +into the free States. This is apparent from the history of the +extradition clause; and it is upon the notice thus given by him, and +the action had upon this clause, that the statement often made, which +assumes that the Constitution could not have been established without +some provision on this subject--as well as upon general reasoning from +the circumstances of the case--rests for its proof. See as to the +origin and history of the extradition clause, _post_, p. 450. + +[129] The resolutions, as referred, were as follows:-- + +"1. _Resolved_, That the government of the United States ought to +consist of a supreme legislative, judiciary, and executive. + +"2. _Resolved_, That the legislature consist of two branches. + +"3. _Resolved_, That the members of the first branch of the +legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States +for the term of two years; to be paid out of the public treasury; to +receive an adequate compensation for their services; to be of the age +of twenty-five years at least; to be ineligible to, and incapable of +holding, any office under the authority of the United States, (except +those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the first branch,) +during the term of service of the first branch. + +"4. _Resolved_, That the members of the second branch of the +legislature of the United States ought to be chosen by the individual +legislatures; to be of the age of thirty years at least; to hold their +offices for six years, one third to go out biennially; to receive a +compensation for the devotion of their time to the public service; to +be ineligible to, and incapable of holding, any office under the +authority of the United States, (except those peculiarly belonging to +the functions of the second branch,) during the term for which they +are elected, and for one year thereafter. + +"5. _Resolved_, that each branch ought to possess the right of +originating acts. + +"6. _Resolved_, That the national legislature ought to possess the +legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and, +moreover, to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the +Union, and also in those to which the States are separately +incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be +interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation. + +"7. _Resolved_, That the legislative acts of the United States, made +by virtue and in pursuance of the Articles of Union, and all treaties +made and ratified under the authority of the United States, shall be +the supreme law of the respective States, as far as those acts or +treaties shall relate to the said States, or their citizens and +inhabitants; and that the judiciaries of the several States shall be +bound thereby in their decisions, anything in the respective laws of +the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding. + +"8. _Resolved_, That, in the original formation of the legislature of +the United States, the first branch thereof shall consist of +sixty-five members; of which number, New Hampshire shall send three; +Massachusetts, eight; Rhode Island, one; Connecticut, five; New York, +six; New Jersey, four; Pennsylvania, eight; Delaware, one; Maryland, +six; Virginia, ten; North Carolina, five; South Carolina, five; +Georgia, three. But as the present situation of the States may +probably alter in the number of their inhabitants, the legislature of +the United States shall be authorized, from time to time, to apportion +the number of representatives; and in case any of the States shall +hereafter be divided, or enlarged by addition of territory, or any two +or more States united, or any new States created within the limits of +the United States, the legislature of the United States shall possess +authority to regulate the number of representatives, in any of the +foregoing cases, upon the principle of their number of inhabitants, +according to the provisions hereafter mentioned, namely: Provided +always, that representation ought to be proportioned to direct +taxation. And in order to ascertain the alteration in the direct +taxation which may be required from time to time by the changes in the +relative circumstances of the States,-- + +"9. _Resolved_, That a census be taken within six years from the first +meeting of the legislature of the United States, and once within the +term of every ten years afterwards, of all the inhabitants of the +United States, in the manner and according to the ratio recommended by +Congress in their resolution of the 18th of April, 1783; and that the +legislature of the United States shall proportion the direct taxation +accordingly. + +"10. _Resolved_, That all bills for raising or appropriating money, +and for fixing the salaries of the officers of the government of the +United States, shall originate in the first branch of the legislature +of the United States, and shall not be altered or amended by the +second branch; and that no money shall be drawn from the public +treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated by the +first branch. + +"11. _Resolved_, That, in the second branch of the legislature of the +United States, each State shall have an equal vote. + +"12. _Resolved_, That a national executive be instituted, to consist +of a single person; to be chosen by the national legislature, for the +term of seven years; to be ineligible a second time; with power to +carry into execution the national laws; to appoint to offices in cases +not otherwise provided for; to be removable on impeachment, and +conviction of malepractice or neglect of duty; to receive a fixed +compensation for the devotion of his time to the public service, to be +paid out of the public treasury. + +"13. _Resolved_, That the national executive shall have a right to +negative any legislative act; which shall not be afterwards passed, +unless by two third parts of each branch of the national legislature. + +"14. _Resolved_, That a national judiciary be established, to consist +of one supreme tribunal, the judges of which shall be appointed by the +second branch of the national legislature; to hold their offices +during good behavior; to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed +compensation for their services, in which no diminution shall be made +so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such +diminution. + +"15. _Resolved_, That the national legislature be empowered to appoint +inferior tribunals. + +"16. _Resolved_, That the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall +extend to cases arising under laws passed by the general legislature; +and to such other questions as involve the national peace and harmony. + +"17. _Resolved_, That provision ought to be made for the admission of +States lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, +whether from a voluntary junction of government and territory, or +otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the national +legislature less than the whole. + +"18. _Resolved_, That a republican form of government shall be +guaranteed to each State; and that each State shall be protected +against foreign and domestic violence. + +"19. _Resolved_, That provision ought to be made for the amendment of +the Articles of Union, whensoever it shall seem necessary. + +"20. _Resolved_, That the legislative, executive, and judiciary +powers, within the several States, and of the national government, +ought to be bound, by oath, to support the Articles of Union. + +"21. _Resolved_, That the amendments which shall be offered to the +Confederation by the Convention ought, at a proper time or times, +after the approbation of Congress, to be submitted to an assembly or +assemblies of representatives, recommended by the several +legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and +decide thereon. + +"22. _Resolved_, That the representation in the second branch of the +legislature of the United States shall consist of two members from +each State, who shall vote _per capita_. + +"23. _Resolved_, That it be an instruction to the committee to whom +were referred the proceedings of the Convention for the establishment +of a national government, to receive a clause, or clauses, requiring +certain qualifications of property and citizenship in the United +States, for the executive, the judiciary, and the members of both +branches of the legislature of the United States." + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL.--CONSTRUCTION OF THE +LEGISLATURE.--TIME AND PLACE OF ITS MEETING. + + +Having now reached that stage in the process of framing the +Constitution at which certain principles were confided to a committee +of detail, the reader will now have an opportunity to observe the +farther development and application of those principles, the mode in +which certain chasms in the system were supplied, and the final +arrangements which produced the complete instrument that was submitted +to the people of the United States for their adoption. + +Great power was necessarily confided to a committee, to whom was +intrusted the first choice of means and of terms that were to give +practical effect to the principles embraced in the resolutions of the +Convention. There might be a substantial compliance with the +intentions previously indicated by the debates and votes of the +Convention, and at the same time the mode in which those intentions +should be carried out by the committee might require a new +consideration of the subjects involved. Hence it is important to +pursue the growth of the Constitution through the entire proceedings. + +The committee of detail presented their report on the 6th of August, +in the shape of a Constitution divided into three-and-twenty Articles. +It is not my purpose to examine this instrument in the precise order +of its various provisions, or to describe all the discussions which +took place upon its minute details. It is more consonant with the +general purpose of this history, to group together the different +features of the Constitution which relate to the structure and powers +of the different departments and to the fundamental purposes of the +new government.[130] + +In accordance with the previous decisions of the Convention, the +committee of detail had provided that the legislative power of the +United States should be vested in a Congress, to consist of two +branches, a House of Representatives and a Senate, each of which +should have a negative on the other. But as to the persons by whom the +members of the national legislature were to be appointed, no decision +had been made in the Convention, excepting that the members of the +House were to be chosen by the people of the States, and the members +of the Senate by their legislatures. Nothing had been settled +respecting the qualifications of the electors of representatives; nor +had the qualifications of the members of either branch been +determined.[131] Two great questions, therefore, remained open; +first, with what class of persons was the election of members of the +popular branch of the legislature to be lodged; secondly, what persons +were to be eligible to that and to the other branch. In substance, +these questions resolved themselves into the inquiry, in whom was the +power of governing America to be vested; for it is to be remembered +that, according to a decision of the Convention not yet reversed, the +national executive was to be chosen by the national legislature. + +So far as the people of the United States had evinced any distinct +purpose, at the time when this Convention was assembled, it appeared +to be well settled that the new system of government, whatever else it +might be, should be republican in its form and spirit. When the States +had assembled in Convention, it became the result of a necessary +compromise between them, that the appointment of one branch of the +legislature should be vested in the people of the several States. But +who were to be regarded as the people of a State, for this purpose, +was a question of great magnitude, now to be considered. + +The situation of the country, in reference to this as well as to many +other important questions, was peculiar. The streams of emigration, +which began to flow into it from Europe at the first settlement of the +different Colonies, had been interrupted only by the war of the +Revolution. On the return of peace, the tide of emigration again began +to set towards the new States, which had risen into independent +existence on the western shores of the Atlantic by a struggle for +freedom that had attracted the attention of the whole civilized world; +and when the Constitution of the United States was about to be framed, +large and various classes of individuals in the different countries of +Europe were eagerly watching the result of the experiment. It appeared +quite certain that great accessions of population would follow the +establishment of free institutions in America, if they should be +framed in a liberal and comprehensive spirit. It became necessary, +therefore, to meet and provide for the presence in the country of +great masses of persons not born upon the soil, who had not +participated in the efforts by which its freedom had been acquired, +and who would bring with them widely differing degrees of intelligence +and of fitness to take part in the administration of a free +government. The place that was to be assigned to these persons in the +political system of the country was a subject of much solicitude to +its best and most thoughtful statesmen. + +On the one hand, all were aware that there existed among the native +populations of the States a very strong American feeling, engendered +by the war, and by the circumstances attending its commencement, its +progress, and its results. It was a war begun and prosecuted for the +express purpose of obtaining and securing, for the people who +undertook it, the right of self-government. It necessarily created a +great jealousy of foreign influence, whether exerted by governments or +individuals, and a strong fear that individuals would be made the +agents of governments in the exercise of such influence. The political +situation of the country under the Confederation had increased rather +than diminished these apprehensions. The relations of the States with +each other and with foreign nations, under a system which admitted of +no efficient national legislation binding upon all alike, afforded, or +were believed to afford, means by which the policy of other countries +could operate on our interests with irresistible force. + +There was, therefore, among the people of the United States, and among +their statesmen who were intrusted with the formation of the +Constitution, a firmly settled determination, that the institutions +and legislation of the country should be effectually guarded against +foreign control or interference. + +On the other hand, it was extremely important that nothing should be +done to prevent the immigration from Europe of any classes of men who +were likely to become useful citizens. The States which had most +encouraged such immigration had advanced most rapidly in population, +in agriculture, and the arts. There were, too, already in the country +many persons of foreign birth, who had thoroughly identified +themselves with its interests and its fate, who had fought in its +battles, or contributed of their means to the cause of its freedom; +and some of these men were at this very period high in the councils of +the nation, and even occupied places of great importance in the +Convention itself.[132] They had been made citizens of the States in +which they resided, by the State power of naturalization; and they +were in every important sense Americans. It was impossible, therefore, +to adopt a rule that would confine the elective franchise, or the +right to be elected to office, to the native citizens of the States. +The States themselves had not done this; and the institutions of the +United States could not rest on a narrower basis than the institutions +of the States. + +Another difficulty which attended the adjustment of the right of +suffrage grew out of the widely differing qualifications annexed to +that right under the State constitutions, and the consequent +dissatisfaction that must follow any effort to establish distinct or +special qualifications under the national Constitution. In some of the +States, the right of voting was confined to "freeholders"; in +others,--and by far the greater number,--it was extended beyond the +holders of landed property, and included many other classes of the +adult male population; while in a few, it embraced every male citizen +of full age who was raised at all above the level of the pauper by the +smallest evidence of contribution to the public burdens. The +consequence, therefore, of adopting any separate system of +qualifications for the right of voting under the Constitution of the +United States would have been, that, in some of the States, there +would be persons capable of voting for the highest State officers, +and yet not permitted to vote for any officer of the United States; +and that in the other States persons not admitted to the exercise of +the right under the State constitution might have enjoyed it in +national elections. + +This embarrassment, however, did not extend to the qualifications +which it might be thought necessary to establish for the right of +being elected to office under the general government. As the State and +the national governments were to be distinct systems, and the officers +of each were to exercise very different functions, it was both +practicable and expedient for the Constitution of the United States to +define the persons who should be eligible to the offices which it +created. + +At the same time, in relation to both of these rights--that of +electing and that of being elected to national offices--it was highly +necessary that the national authority, either by direct provision of +the Constitution, or by a legislative power to be exercised under it, +should determine the period when the rights of citizenship could be +acquired by persons of foreign birth. From the first establishment of +the State governments down to the present period, those governments +had possessed the power of naturalization. Their rules for the +admission of foreigners to the privileges of citizenship were +extremely unlike; and if the power of prescribing the rule were to be +left to them, and the Constitution of the United States were to adopt +the qualifications of voters fixed by the laws of the States, or were +to be silent with respect to the qualifications of its own officers, +the rights both of electing and of being elected to national office +would, in respect to citizenship, be regulated by no uniform +principle. If, therefore, the right of voting for any class of federal +officers were to be in each State the same as that given by the State +laws for the election of any class of State officers, it was quite +essential that the States should surrender to the general government +the power to determine, as to persons of foreign birth, what period of +residence in the country should be required for the rights of +citizenship. It was equally necessary that the national government +should possess this power, if it was intended that citizenship should +be regarded at all in the selection of those who were to fill the +national offices. + +The committee of detail, after a review of all these considerations, +presented a scheme that was well adapted to meet the difficulties of +the case. They proposed that the same persons who, by the laws of the +several States, were admitted to vote for members of the most numerous +branch of their own legislatures, should have the right to vote for +the representatives in Congress. The adoption of this principle +avoided the necessity of disfranchising any portion of the people of a +State by a system of qualifications unknown to their laws. As the +States were the best judges of the circumstances and temper of their +own people, it was certainly best to conciliate them to the support of +the new Constitution by this concession. It was possible, indeed, but +not very probable, that they might admit foreigners to the right of +voting without the previous qualification of citizenship. It was +possible, too, that they might establish universal suffrage in its +most unrestricted sense. But against all these evils there existed one +great security; namely, that the mischiefs of an absolutely free +suffrage would be felt most severely by themselves in their domestic +concerns; and against the special danger to be apprehended from the +indiscriminate admission of foreigners to the right of voting, another +feature of the proposed plan gave the national legislature power to +withhold from persons of foreign birth the privileges of general +citizenship, although a State might confer upon them the power of +voting without previous naturalization. + +This part of the scheme consisted in the transfer of the power of +naturalization to the general government; a power that was necessarily +made exclusive, by being made a power to establish a _uniform_ rule on +the subject. + +These provisions were not only necessary in the actual situation of +the States, but they were also in harmony with the great purpose of +the representative system that had been agreed upon as the basis of +one branch of the legislative power. In that branch the people of each +State were to be represented; but they were to remain the people of a +distinct community, whose modes of exercising the right of +self-government would be peculiar to themselves; and that would +obviously be the most successful representation of such a people in a +national assembly, which most conformed itself to their habits and +customs in the organization of their own legislative bodies. +Accordingly, although very strenuous efforts were made to introduce +into the Constitution of the United States particular theories with +regard to popular suffrage,--some of the members being in favor of one +restriction and some of another,--the rule which referred the right in +each State to its domestic law was sustained by a large majority of +the Convention. But the power that was given, by unanimous consent, +over the subject of naturalization, shows the strong purpose that was +entertained of vesting in the national authority an efficient +practical control over the States in respect to the political rights +to be conceded to persons not natives of the country.[133] + +As we have already seen, the committee of detail had been instructed +to report qualifications of property and citizenship for the members +of every department of the government. But they found the subject so +embarrassing, that they contented themselves with providing that the +legislature of the United States should have authority to establish +such uniform qualifications for the members of each house, with regard +to property, as they might deem expedient.[134] + +They introduced, however, into their draft of a Constitution, an +express provision that every member of the House of Representatives +should be of the age of twenty-five years at least, should have been a +citizen of the United States for at least three years before his +election, and should be, at the time of his election, a resident in +the State in which he might be chosen.[135] + +A property qualification for the members of the House of +Representatives was a thing of far less consequence than the fact of +citizenship. Indeed, there might well be a doubt, whether a +requisition of this kind would not be in some degree inconsistent with +the character that had already been impressed upon the government, by +the compromise which had settled the nature of the representation in +the popular branch. It was to be a representation of the people of the +States; and as soon as it was determined that the right of suffrage in +each State should be just as broad as the legislative authority of the +State might see fit to make it, the basis of the representation became +a democracy, without any restrictions save those which the people of +each State might impose upon it for themselves. If then the +Constitution were to refrain from imposing on the electors a property +qualification, for the very purpose of including all to whom the +States might concede the right of voting within their respective +limits, thus excluding the idea of a special representation of +property, it was certainly not necessary to require the possession of +property by the representatives, or to clothe the national legislature +with power to establish such a qualification. The clause reported by +the committee of detail for this purpose was accordingly left out of +the Constitution.[136] + +But with respect to citizenship, as a requisite for the office of a +representative or a senator, very different considerations applied. +With whatever degree of safety the States might be permitted to +determine who should vote for a representative in the national +legislature, it was necessary that the Constitution itself should meet +and decide the grave questions, whether persons of foreign birth +should be eligible at all, and if so, at what period after they had +acquired the general rights of citizens. It seems highly probable, +from the known jealousies and fears that were entertained of foreign +influence, that the eligibility to office would have been strictly +confined to natives, but for a circumstance to which allusion has +already been made. The presence of large numbers of persons of foreign +birth, who had adopted, and been adopted by, some one of the States, +who stood on a footing of equality with the native inhabitants, and +some of whom had served the country of their adoption with great +distinction and unsuspected fidelity, was the insuperable obstacle to +such a provision. The objection arising from the impolicy of +discouraging future immigration had its weight; but it had not the +decisive influence which was conceded to the position of those +foreigners already in the country and already enjoying the rights of +citizenship under the laws and constitutions of the several States. +That men should be perpetually ineligible to office under a +constitution which they had assisted in making, could not be said to +be demanded by the people of America. + +The subject, therefore, was found of necessity to resolve itself into +the question, what period of previous citizenship should be required. +The committee of detail proposed three years. Other members desired a +much longer period. Hamilton, on the other hand, supported by Madison, +proposed that no definite time should be established by the +Constitution, and that nothing more should be required than +citizenship and inhabitancy. He thought that the discretionary power +of determining the rule of naturalization would afford the necessary +means of control over the whole subject. But this plan did not meet +the assent of a majority of the States, and, after various periods had +been successively rejected, the term of seven years' citizenship as a +qualification of members of the House of Representatives was finally +established. + +But was this qualification to apply to those foreigners who were then +citizens of the States, and who, as such, would have the right to vote +on the acceptance of the Constitution? Were they to be told that, +although they could ratify the Constitution, they could not be +eligible to office under it, until they had enjoyed the privileges of +citizenship for seven years? They had been invited hither by the +liberal provisions of the State institutions; they had been made +citizens by the laws of the State where they resided; the Articles of +Confederation gave them the privileges of citizens in every other +State; and thus the very communities by which this Convention had been +instituted were said to have pledged their public faith to these +persons, that they should stand upon an equality with all other +citizens. It is a proof that their case was thought to be a strong +one, and it is a striking evidence of the importance attached to the +principles involved, that an effort was made to exempt them from the +operation of the rule requiring a citizenship of seven years, and that +it was unsuccessful.[137] + +It is impossible now to determine how numerous this body of persons +were, in whose favor the attempt was made to establish an exception to +the rule; and their numbers constitute a fact that is now historically +important only in its bearing upon a principle of the Constitution. +From the arguments of those who sought to introduce the exception, it +appears that fears were entertained that the retrospective operation +of the rule would expose the acceptance of the Constitution to great +hazards; for the States, it was said, would be reduced to the dilemma +of rejecting it, or of violating the faith pledged to a part of their +citizens. Accordingly, the implied obligation of the States to secure +to their citizens of foreign birth the same privileges with natives +was urged with great force, and it was inferred from the notorious +inducements that had been held out to foreigners to emigrate to +America, and to avail themselves of the easy privileges of +citizenship. Whether the United States were in any way bound to redeem +these alleged pledges of the States, was a nice question of casuistry, +that was a good deal debated in the discussion. But in truth there was +no obligation of public faith in the case, the disregard of which +could be justly made a matter of complaint by anybody. When the States +had made these persons citizens, and through the Articles of +Confederation had conferred upon them the privileges of citizens in +every State in the Union, they did not thereby declare that such +adopted citizens should be immediately eligible to any or all of the +offices under any new government which the American people might see +fit to establish at any future time. To have said that they never +should be eligible, would have been to establish a rule that would +have excluded some of the most eminent statesmen in the country. But +the period in their citizenship when they should be made eligible, was +just as much an open question of public policy, as the period of life +at which all native and all adopted citizens should be deemed fit to +exercise the functions of legislators. If the citizen of foreign birth +was disfranchised by the one requirement, the native citizen was +equally disfranchised by the other, until the disability had ceased. +The question was decided, therefore, and rightly so, upon large +considerations of public policy; and the principal reasons that +exercised a controlling influence upon the decision, and caused the +refusal to establish any exception to the rule, afford an interesting +proof of the national tone and spirit that were intended to be +impressed upon the government at the beginning of its history. + +It was quite possible, as all were ready to concede, that the time +might arrive, when the qualification of so extended a period of +citizenship as seven years might not be practically very important; +since the people, after having been long accustomed to the duty of +selecting their representatives, would not often be induced to confer +their suffrages upon a foreigner recently admitted to the position of +a citizen. The mischiefs, too, that might be apprehended from such +appointments would be far less, after the policy of the government had +been settled and the fundamental legislation necessary to put the +Constitution into activity had been accomplished. But the first +Congress that might be assembled under the Constitution would have a +work of great magnitude and importance to perform. Indeed, the +character which the government was to assume would depend upon the +legislation of the few first years of its existence. Its commercial +regulations would then be mainly determined. The relations of the +country with foreign nations, its position towards Europe, its rights +and duties of neutrality, its power to maintain a policy of its own, +would all then be ascertained and settled. Nothing, therefore, could +be more important, than to prevent persons having foreign attachments +from insinuating themselves into the public councils; and with this +great leading object in view, the Convention refused, though by a mere +majority only of the States, to exempt from the rule those foreigners +who had been made citizens under the naturalization laws of the +States.[138] + +Thus it appears that the Constitution of the United States discloses +certain distinct purposes with reference to the participation of +foreigners in the political concerns of the country. In the first +place, it was clearly intended that there should be no real +discouragement to immigration. The position and history of the country +from its first settlement, its present and prospective need of labor +and capital, its territorial extent, and the nature of its free +institutions, were all inconsistent with any policy that would prevent +the redundant population of Europe from finding in it an asylum. +Accordingly, the emigrant from foreign lands was placed under no +perpetual disqualifications. The power of naturalization that was +conferred upon the general government, and the accompanying +circumstances attending its transfer by the States, show an intention +that some provision should be made for the admission of emigrants to +the privileges of citizenship, and that in this respect the +inducements to a particular residence should be precisely equal +throughout the whole of the States. The power was not to remain +dormant, under ordinary circumstances, although there might +undoubtedly be occasions when its exercise should be suspended. The +intention was, that the legislature of the United States should always +exercise its discretion on the subject; but the existence of the +power, and the reasons for which it was conferred, made it the duty of +the legislature to exercise that discretion according to the wants of +the country and the requirements of public policy. + +In the second place, it is equally clear that the founders of the +government intended that there should be a real, as well as formal, +renunciation of allegiance to the former sovereign of the emigrant,--a +real adoption, in principle and feeling, of the new country to which +he had transferred himself,--an actual amalgamation of his interests +and affections with the interests and affections of the native +population,--before he should have the power of acting on public +affairs. This is manifest, from the discretionary authority given to +Congress to vary the rule of naturalization from time to time as +circumstances might require,--an authority that places the States +under the necessity of restricting their right of suffrage to +citizens, if they would avoid the evils to themselves of an +indiscriminate exercise of that right by all who might choose to claim +it. The period of citizenship, too, that was required as a +qualification for a seat in the popular branch of the government, and +which was extended to nine years for the office of senator, was placed +out of the discretionary power of change by the legislature, in order +that an additional term, beyond that required for the general rights +of citizenship, might for ever operate to exclude the dangers of +foreign predilections and an insufficient knowledge of the duties of +the station. + +No one who candidly studies the institutions of America, and considers +what it was necessary for the founders of our government to foresee +and provide for, can hesitate to recognize the wisdom and the +necessity of these provisions. A country of vast extent opened to a +boundless immigration, which nature invited and which man could +scarcely repel,--a country, too, which must be governed by popular +suffrage,--could not permit its legislative halls to be invaded by +foreign influence. The independence of the country would have been a +vain and useless achievement, if it had not been followed by the +practical establishment of the right of self-government by the native +population; and that right could be secured for their posterity only +by requiring that foreigners, who claimed to be regarded as a part of +the people of the country, should be first amalgamated in spirit and +interest with the mass of the nation. + +No other changes were made in the proposed qualifications for the +representatives, excepting to require that the person elected should +be an _inhabitant_ of the State for which he might be chosen, at the +time of election, instead of being a _resident_. This change of +phraseology was adopted to avoid ambiguity; the object of the +provision being simply to make the representation of the State a real +one. + +The Convention, as we have seen, had settled the rule for computing +the number of inhabitants of a State, for the purposes of +representation, and had made it the same with that for apportioning +direct taxes among the States.[139] The committee of detail provided +that there should be one representative for every forty thousand +inhabitants, when Congress should find it necessary to make a new +apportionment of representatives; a ratio that had not been previously +sanctioned by a direct vote of the Convention, but which had been +recommended by the committee of compromise, at the time when the +nature of the representation in both houses was adjusted.[140] This +ratio was now adopted in the article relating to the House of +Representatives; but not before an effort was made to exclude the +slaves from the enumeration.[141] The renewed discussion of this +exciting topic probably withdrew the attention of members from the +consideration of the numbers of the representatives, and nothing more +was done, at the time we are now examining, than to make a provision +that the number should not exceed one for every forty thousand +inhabitants. But at a subsequent stage of the proceedings,[142] before +the Constitution was sent to the committee of revision, Wilson, +Madison, and Hamilton endeavored to procure a reconsideration of this +clause, for the purpose of establishing a more numerous representation +of the people. Hamilton, who had always and earnestly advocated the +introduction of a strong democratic element into the Constitution, +although he desired an equally strong check to that element in the +construction of the Senate, is represented to have expressed himself +with great emphasis and anxiety respecting the representation in the +popular branch. He avowed himself, says Mr. Madison, a friend to +vigorous government, but at the same time he held it to be essential +that the popular branch of it should rest on a broad foundation. He +was seriously of opinion, that the House of Representatives was on so +narrow a scale as to be really dangerous, and to warrant a jealousy in +the people for their liberties.[143] + +But the motion to reconsider was lost,[144] and it was not until the +Constitution had been engrossed, and was about to be signed, that an +alteration was agreed to, at the suggestion of Washington. This was +the only occasion on which he appears to have expressed an opinion +upon any question depending in the Convention. With the habitual +delicacy and reserve of his character, he had confined himself +strictly to the duties of a presiding officer, throughout the +proceedings. But now, as the Constitution was likely to go forth with +a feature that would expose it to a serious objection, he felt it to +be his duty to interpose. But it was done with great gentleness. As he +was about to put the question, he said that he could not forbear +expressing his wish that the proposed alteration might take place. The +smallness of the proportion of representatives had been considered by +many members, and was regarded by him, as an insufficient security for +the rights and interests of the people. Late as the moment was, it +would give him much satisfaction to see an amendment of this part of +the plan adopted. The intimation was enough; no further opposition was +offered, and the ratio was changed to one representative for thirty +thousand inhabitants.[145] + +It is now necessary to trace the origin of a peculiar power of the +House of Representatives, that is intimately connected with the +practical compromises on which the government was founded, although +the circumstances and reasons of its introduction into the +Constitution are not generally understood. I refer to the exclusive +power of originating what are sometimes called "money bills." In +making this provision, the framers of our government are commonly +supposed to have been guided wholly by the example of the British +constitution, upon an assumed analogy between the relations of the +respective houses in the two countries to the people and to each +other. This view of the subject is not wholly correct. + +At an early period in the deliberations, when the outline of the +Constitution was prepared in a committee of the whole, a proposition +was brought forward to restrain the Senate from originating money +bills, upon the ground that the House would be the body in which the +people would be the most directly represented, and in order to give +effect to the maxim which declares that the people should hold the +purse-strings. The suggestion was immediately encountered by a general +denial of all analogy between the English House of Lords and the body +proposed to be established as the American Senate. In truth, as the +construction of the Senate then stood in the resolutions agreed to in +the committee of the whole, the supposed reason for the restriction in +England would have been inapplicable; for it had been voted that the +representation in the Senate should be upon the same proportionate +rule as that of the House, although the members of the former were to +be chosen by the legislatures, and the members of the latter by the +people, of the States. It was rightly said, therefore, at this time, +that the Senate would represent the people as well as the House; and +that if the reason in England for confining the power to originate +money bills to the House of Commons was that they were the immediate +representatives of the people, the reason had no application to the +two branches proposed for the Congress of the United States.[146] It +was however admitted, that, if the representation in the Senate should +not finally be made a proportionate representation of the people of +the several States, there might be a cause for introducing this +restriction.[147] This intimation referred to a reason that +subsequently became very prominent. But when first proposed, the +restriction was rejected in the committee by a vote of seven States +against three; there being nothing involved in the question at that +time excepting the theoretical merits of such a distinction between +the powers of the two houses.[148] + +But other considerations afterwards arose. When the final struggle +came on between the larger and the smaller States, upon the character +of the representation in the two branches, the plan of restricting +the origin of money bills to the House of Representatives presented +itself in a new aspect. The larger States were required to concede an +equality of representation in the Senate; and it was supposed, +therefore, that they would desire to increase the relative power of +the branch in which they would have the greatest numerical strength. +The five States of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North +Carolina, and South Carolina had steadily resisted the equality of +votes in the Senate. When it was at length found that the States were +equally divided on this question, and it became necessary to appoint +the first committee of compromise, the smaller States tendered to the +five larger ones the exclusive money power of the House, as a +compensation for the sacrifice required of them. It was so reported by +the committee of compromise; and although it met with resistance in +the Convention, and was denied to be a concession of any importance to +the larger States, it was retained in the report,[149] and thus formed +a special feature of the resolutions sent to the committee of detail. +But those resolutions had also established the equality of +representation in the Senate, and the whole compromise, with its +several features, had therefore been once fully ascertained and +settled. A strong opposition, nevertheless, continued to be made to +the exclusive money power of the House, by those who disapproved of it +on its merits; and when the article by which it was given in the +reported draft prepared by the committee of detail was reached, it was +stricken out by a very large vote of the States.[150] In this vote +there was a concurrence of very opposite purposes on the part of the +different States composing the majority. New Jersey, Delaware, and +Maryland, for example, feeling secure of their equality in the Senate, +were not unwilling to allow theoretical objections to prevail, against +the restriction of money bills to the branch in which they would +necessarily be outnumbered. On the other hand, some of the delegates +of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina, still unwilling to +acquiesce in the equality of representation in the Senate, may have +hoped to unhinge the whole compromise. There was still a third party +among the members, who insisted on maintaining the compromise in all +its integrity, and who considered that the nature of the +representation in the Senate, conceded to the wishes of the smaller +States, rendered it eminently fit that the House alone should have the +exclusive power to originate money bills.[151] + +This party finally prevailed. They rested their first efforts chiefly +upon the fact that the Senate was to represent the States in their +political character. Although it might be proper to give such a body a +negative upon the appropriations to be made by the representatives of +the people, it was not proper that it should tax the people. They +first procured a reconsideration of the vote which had stricken out +this part of the compromise. They then proposed, in order to avoid an +alleged ambiguity, that bills for raising money for the purpose of +_revenue_, or appropriating money, should originate in the House, and +should not be so amended or altered in the Senate as to increase or +diminish the sum to be raised, or change the mode of levying it, or +the object of its appropriation.[152] An earnest and somewhat excited +debate followed this proposition, but it was lost.[153] + +In a day or two, however, another effort was made, conceding to the +Senate the power to amend, as in other cases, but confining the right +to the House of originating bills for raising money for the purpose of +revenue, or for appropriating the same, and for fixing the salaries of +officers of the government.[154] + +This new proposition was postponed for a long time, until it became +necessary to refer several topics not finally acted upon to a +committee of one member from each State.[155] Among these subjects +there was one that gave rise to protracted conflicts of opinion, which +will be examined hereafter. It related to the mode of choosing the +executive. In the plan reported by the committee of detail, pursuant +to the instructions of the Convention, the executive was to be chosen +by the national legislature, for a period of seven years, and was to +be ineligible a second time. Great efforts were subsequently made to +change both the mode of appointment and the tenure of the office, and +the whole subject was finally referred with others to a committee. In +this committee, a new compromise, which has attracted but little +attention, embraced the long-contested point concerning the origin of +money bills. In this compromise, as in so many of the others on which +the Constitution was founded, two influences are to be traced. There +were in the first place what may be called the merits of a +proposition, without regard to its bearing on the interests of +particular States; and in the second place there were the local or +State interests, which entered into the treatment of every question by +which they could be affected. In studying the compromises of the +Constitution, it is constantly necessary to observe how the +arrangement finally made was arrived at by the concurrence of votes +given from these various motives. + +It was now proposed in the new committee, that the executive should be +chosen by electors, appointed by each State in such manner as its +legislature might direct, each State to have a number of electors +equal to the whole number of its senators and representatives in +Congress; that the person having the greatest number of votes, +provided it were a majority of the electors, should be declared +elected; that if there should be more than one having such a majority, +the Senate should immediately choose one of them by ballot; and that +if no person had a majority, the Senate should immediately choose by +ballot from the five highest candidates on the list returned by the +electors. This plan of vesting the election in the Senate, in case +there should be no choice by the electors, was eagerly embraced by the +smaller States, because it was calculated to restore to them the +equilibrium which they would lose in the primary election, by the +preponderance of votes held by the larger States. At the same time, it +gave to the larger States great influence in bringing forward the +candidates, from whom the ultimate choice must be made, when no choice +had been effected by the electors; and it put it in their power, by a +combination of their interests against those of the smaller States, to +choose their candidate at the first election. To this great influence, +many members from the larger States desired, naturally, to add the +privilege of confining the origin of revenue bills to the House of +Representatives. They found in the committee some members from the +smaller States willing to concede this privilege, as the price of an +ultimate election of the executive by the Senate, and of other +arrangements which tended to elevate the tone of the government, by +increasing the power and influence of the Senate. They found others +also who approved of it upon principle. The compromise was accordingly +effected in the committee, and in this attitude the question +concerning revenue bills again came before the Convention.[156] + +But there, a scheme that seemed likely to elevate the Senate into a +powerful oligarchy, and that would certainly put it in the power of +seven States, not containing a third of the people, to elect the +executive, when there failed to be a choice by the electors, met with +strenuous resistance. For these and other reasons, not necessary to be +recounted here, the ultimate choice of the executive was transferred +from the Senate to the House of Representatives.[157] This change, if +coupled with the concession of revenue bills to the House, without the +right to amend in the Senate, would have thrown a large balance of +power into the former assembly; and in order to prevent this +inequality, a provision was made, in the words used in the +Constitution of Massachusetts, that the Senate might propose or concur +with amendments, as on other bills. With this addition, the +restriction of the origin of bills for raising revenue to the House of +Representatives finally passed, with but two dissentient votes.[158] + +The qualifications of the Senators had been made superior in some +respects to those of the members of the House of Representatives, on +account of the peculiar duties which it was intended they should +discharge, and the length of their term of office. They were to be of +the age of thirty years; to be inhabitants of the States for which +they might be chosen; and in the report of the committee of detail the +period of four years' citizenship was made one of the requirements. +But so great was the jealousy of foreign influence, and so important +was the position of a senator likely to become, that, when this +particular qualification came to be considered, it was found to be +altogether impossible to make so short a period of citizenship +acceptable to a majority. According to the plan then contemplated, the +Senate was to be a body of great power. Its legislative duties were to +form but a part of its functions. It was to have the making of +treaties, and the appointment of ambassadors and judges of the Supreme +Court, without the concurrent action of any other department of the +government. In addition to these special powers, it was to have a +concurrent vote with the House of Representatives in the election of +the executive. It was also to exercise the judicial function of +hearing and determining questions of boundary between the States. + +This formidable array of powers, which were subsequently much modified +or entirely taken away, but which no one could then be sure would not +be retained as they had been proposed, rendered it necessary to guard +the Senate with peculiar care. A very animated discussion, in which +the same reasons were urged on both sides which had entered into the +debate on the qualifications of the representatives, enforced by the +peculiar dangers to which the Senate might be exposed, at length +resulted in a vote establishing the period of nine years' citizenship +as a qualification for the office of a senator.[159] + +The origin of the number of senators and of the method of voting forms +an interesting and important topic, to which our inquiries should now +be directed. We have already seen that, in the formation of the +Virginia plan of government, as it was digested in the committee of +the whole, the purpose was entertained, and was once sanctioned by a +bare majority of the States, of giving to both branches of the +legislature a proportional representation of the respective +populations of the States; and that the sole difference between the +two chambers then contemplated was to be in the mode of election. But +in the actual situation of the different members of the confederacy, +it was a necessary consequence of such a representation, that the +Senate would be made by it inconveniently large, whether the members +were to be elected by the legislatures, the executives, or the people +of the States. It would, in fact, have made the first Senate to +consist of eighty or a hundred persons, in order to have entitled the +State of Delaware to a single member. This inconvenience was pointed +out at an early period, by Rufus King;[160] but it did not prevent the +adoption of this mode of representation. On the one side of that long +contested question were those who desired to found the whole system of +representation, as between the States, upon their relative numbers of +inhabitants. On the other side were those who insisted upon an +absolute equality between the States. But among the former there was a +great difference of opinion as to the best mode of choosing the +senators,--whether they should be elected by the people in districts, +by the legislatures or the executives of the States, or by the other +branch of the national legislature. So strongly, however, were some of +the members even from the most populous States impressed with the +necessity of preserving the State governments in some connection with +the national system, that, while they insisted on a proportional +representation in the Senate, they were ready to concede to the State +legislatures the choice of its members, leaving the difficulty arising +from the magnitude of the body to be encountered as it might be.[161] +The delegates of the smaller States accepted this concession, in the +belief that the impracticability of constructing a convenient Senate +in this mode would compel an abandonment of the principle of unequal +representation, and would require the substitution of the equality for +which they contended. + +In this expectation they were not disappointed; for when the system +framed in the committee came under revision in the Convention, and the +severe and protracted contest ended at last in the compromise +described in a previous chapter, the States were not only permitted to +choose the members of the Senate, but they were admitted to an +equality of representation in that branch, and the subject was freed +from the embarrassment arising from the numbers that must have been +introduced into it by the opposite plan. From this point, the sole +questions that required to be determined related to the number of +members to be assigned to each State, and the method of voting. The +first was a question of expediency only; the last was a question both +of expediency and of principle. + +The constant aim of the States, which had from the first opposed a +radical change in the structure of the government, was to frame the +legislature as nearly as possible upon the model of the Congress of +the Confederation. In that assembly, each State was allowed not more +than seven, and not less than two members; but in practice, the +delegations of the States perpetually varied between these two +numbers, or fell below the lowest, and in the latter case the State +was not considered as represented. The method of voting, however, +rendered it unimportant how many members were present from a State, +provided they were enough to cast the vote of the State at all; for +all questions were decided by the votes of a majority of the States, +and not of a majority of the members voting. I have already had +occasion more than once to notice the fact,--and it is one of no +inconsiderable importance,--that the first Continental Congress, +assembled in 1774, adopted the plan of giving to each Colony one vote, +because it was impossible to ascertain the relative importance of the +different Colonies. The record that was then made of this reason for a +method of voting that would have been otherwise essentially unjust, +shows quite clearly that a purpose was then entertained of adopting +some other method at a future time. But when the Articles of +Confederation were framed, in 1781, it appears as clearly from the +discussions in Congress, not only that the same difficulty of +obtaining the information necessary for a different system continued, +but that some of the States were absolutely unwilling to enter the +Confederation upon any other terms than a full federal equality. In +this way the practice of voting by States in Congress was perpetuated +down to the year 1787. It had come to be regarded by some of the +smaller States, notwithstanding the injustice and inconvenience which +it constantly produced, as a kind of birthright; and when the Senate +of the United States came to be framed, and an equality of +representation in it was conceded, some of the members of those States +still considered it necessary to preserve this method of voting, in +order to complete the idea of State representation, and to enable the +States to protect their individual rights.[162] But it is obvious +that, for this purpose, the question had lost its real importance, +when an equal number of Senators was assigned to each State; since, +upon every measure that can touch the separate rights and interests of +a State, the unanimity which is certain to prevail among its +representatives makes the vote of the State as efficient as it could +be if it were required to be cast as a unit, while the chances for its +protection are increased by the opportunity of gaining single votes +from the delegations of other States. + +These and similar considerations ultimately led a large majority of +the States to prefer a union of the plan of an equal number of +senators from each State with that which would allow them to vote _per +capita_.[163] The number of two was adopted as the most convenient, +under all the circumstances, because most likely to unite the despatch +of business with the constant presence of an equal number from every +State. + +With this peculiar character, the outline of the institution went to +the committee of detail. On the consideration of their report, these +provisions, as we have seen, became complicated with the restriction +of "money bills" to the House of Representatives, and the choice of +the executive. The mode in which those controversies were finally +settled being elsewhere stated, it only remains here to record the +fact that the particular nature and form of the representation in the +Senate was generally acquiesced in, when its relations to the other +branches of the government had been determined. + +The difference of origin of the two branches of the legislature made +it necessary to provide for different modes of supplying the vacancies +that might occur in them. The obvious way of effecting this in the +case of a vacancy in the office of a representative was to order a new +election by the people, who can readily assemble for such a purpose; +and the duty of ordering such elections was imposed on the executives +of the States, because those functionaries would be best informed as +to the convenience of their meeting. But the State legislatures, to +whom the choice of senators was to be confided, would be in session +for only a part of the year; and to summon them for the special +purpose of filling a vacancy in the Senate might occasion great +inconvenience. The committee of detail, therefore, provided that +vacancies in the Senate might be supplied by the executive of the +State until the next meeting of its legislature. + +It is now time to turn to the examination of that great scheme of +separate and concurrent powers, which it had been proposed to confer +upon the Senate, and the suggestion of which influenced to a great +degree the qualifications of the members, their term of office, and +indeed the entire construction of this branch of the legislature. The +primary purpose of a Senate was that of a second legislative chamber, +having equal authority in all acts of legislation with the first, the +action of both being necessary to the passage of a law. As the +formation of the Constitution proceeded, from the single idea of such +a second chamber, without any special character of representation to +distinguish it from the first, up to the plan of an equal +representation of the States, there was a strong disposition +manifested to accumulate power in the body for which this peculiar +character had been gained. It had been made the depositary of a direct +and equal State influence; and this feature of the system had become +fixed and irrevocable before the powers of the other departments, or +their origin or relations, had been finally settled. The consequence +was, that for a time, wherever jealousy was felt with regard to the +executive or the judiciary,--wherever there was a doubt about +confiding in the direct action of the people,--wherever a chasm +presented itself, and the right mode of filling it did not +occur,--there was a tendency to resort to the Senate. + +Thus, when the committee of detail were charged with the duty of +preparing the Constitution according to the resolutions agreed upon in +the Convention, the Senate had not only been made a legislative body, +with authority co-ordinate to that of the House, but it had received +the separate power of appointing the judges, and the power to give a +separate vote in the election of the executive. The power to make war +and treaties, the appointment of ambassadors, and the trial of +impeachments, had not been distinctly given to any department; but +the general intention to be inferred from the resolutions was, that +these matters should be vested in one or both of the two branches of +the legislature. To the executive, the duty had been assigned, which +the name of the office implies, of executing the laws; to which had +been added a revisionary check upon legislation, and the appointment +to offices in cases not otherwise provided for. The judicial power had +been described in general and comprehensive terms, which required a +particular enumeration of the cases embraced by the principles laid +down; but it had not been distinctly foreseen, that one of the cases +to which those principles must lead would be an alleged conflict +between an act of legislation and the fundamental law of the +Constitution. The system thus marked out was carried into detail by +the committee, by vesting in the Senate the power to make treaties, to +appoint ambassadors and judges of the Supreme Court, and to adjudicate +questions of boundary between the States; by giving to the two +branches of the legislature the power to declare war; by assigning the +trial of impeachments to the Supreme Court, and enumerating the other +cases of which it was to have cognizance; and by providing for the +election of the executive by the legislature, and confining its powers +and duties to those prescribed for it by the resolutions. + +It is scarcely necessary to pause for the purpose of commenting on the +practical inconveniences of some of these arrangements. However proper +it may be, in a limited and republican government, to vest the power +of declaring war in the legislative department, the negotiation of +treaties by a numerous body had been found, in our own experience, and +in that of other republics, extremely embarrassing. However wise may +be a jealousy of the executive department, it is difficult to say that +the same authority that is intrusted with the appointment to all other +offices should not be permitted to make an ambassador or a judge. +However august may be a proceeding that is to determine a boundary +between sovereign States, it is nothing more and nothing less than a +strictly judicial controversy, capable of trial in the ordinary forms +and tribunals of judicature, besides being one that ought to be safely +removed from all political influences. However necessary it may be +that an impeachment should be conducted with the solemnities and +safeguards of allegation and proof, it is not always to be decided by +the rules with which judges are most familiar, or to be determined by +that body of law which it is their special duty to administer. However +desirable it may be, that an elective chief magistracy should be +filled with the highest capacity and fitness, and that popular tumults +should be avoided, no government has yet existed, in which the +election of such a magistrate by the legislative department has +afforded any decided advantage over an election directly or indirectly +by the people; and to give a body constituted as the American Senate +is a negative in the choice of the executive, would be certainly +inconvenient, probably dangerous. + +But the position of the Senate as an assembly of the States, and +certain opinions of its superior fitness for the discharge of some of +these duties, had united to make it far too powerful for a safe and +satisfactory operation of the government. It was found to be +impossible to adjust the whole machine to the quantity of power that +had been given to one of its parts. It was eminently just and +necessary that the States should have an equal and direct +representation in some branch of the government; but that a majority +of the States, containing a minority of the people, should possess a +negative in the appointment of the executive, and in the question of +peace or war, and the sole voice in the appointment of judges and +ambassadors, was neither necessary nor proper. Theoretically, it might +seem appropriate that a question of boundary between any two of the +States represented in it should be committed to the Senate, as a court +of the peers of the sovereign parties to the dispute; but practically, +this would be a tribunal not well fitted to try a purely judicial +question. It became necessary, therefore, to discover the true limit +of that control which the nature of the representation in the Senate +was to be allowed to give to a majority of the States. There had been +some effort, in the progress of the controversy respecting the +representative system, to confine the equal power of the States, in +matters of legislation, to particular questions or occasions; but it +had turned out to be impracticable thus to divide or limit the +ordinary legislative authority of the same body. If the Senate, as an +equal assembly of the States, was to legislate at all, it must +legislate upon all subjects by the same rule and method of suffrage. +But when the question presented itself as to the separate action of +this assembly,--how far it should be invested with the appointment of +other functionaries, how far it should control the relations of the +country with foreign nations, how far it should partake both of +executive and judicial powers,--it was much less difficult to draw the +line, and to establish proper limits to the direct agency of the +States. Those limits could not indeed be ascertained by the mere +application of theoretical principles. They were to be found in the +primary necessity for reposing greater powers in other departments, +for adjusting the relations of the system by a wider distribution of +authority, and for confiding more and more in the intelligence and +virtue of the people; and therefore it is, that, in these as in other +details of the Constitution, we are to look for the clew that is to +give us the purpose and design, quite as much to the practical +compromises which constantly took place between opposite interests, as +to any triumph of any one of opposite theories. + +The first experiment that was made towards a restriction of the power +of the Senate, and an adjustment of its relations to the other +departments, was the preparation of a plan, by which the President was +to have the making of treaties, and the appointment of ambassadors, +judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers not otherwise +provided for, by and with, the advice and consent of the Senate. The +trial of impeachments, of the President included, was transferred to +the Senate, and the trial of questions of boundary was placed, like +other controversies between States, within the scope of the judicial +power. The choice of the President was to be made in the first +instance by electors appointed by each State, in such manner as its +legislature might direct, each State to have a number of electors +equal to the whole number of its senators and representatives in +Congress; but if no one of the persons voted for should have a +majority of all the electors, or if more than one person should have +both a majority and an equal number of votes, the Senate were to +choose the President from the five highest candidates voted for by the +electors. In this plan, there was certainly a considerable increase of +the power of the President; but there was not a sufficient diminution +of the power of the Senate. The President could nominate officers and +negotiate treaties; but he must obtain the consent of the body by whom +he might have been elected, and by whom his re-election might be +determined, if he were again to become a candidate. It appeared, +therefore, to be quite necessary, either to take away the revisionary +control of the Senate over treaties and appointments, or to devise +some mode by which the President could be made personally independent +of that assembly. He could be made independent only by taking away all +agency of the Senate in his election, or by making him ineligible to +the office a second time. There were two serious objections to the +last of these remedies,--the country might lose the services of a +faithful and experienced magistrate, whose continuance in office would +be highly important; and even in a case where no pre-eminent merit had +challenged a re-election, the effect of an election by the Senate +would always be pernicious, and must be visible throughout the whole +term of the incumbent who had been successful over four other +competitors. + +And after all, what necessity was there for confiding this vast power +to the Senate, opening the door of a small body to the corruption and +intrigue for which the magnitude of the prize to be gained and to be +given, and the facility for their exercise, would furnish an enormous +temptation? Was it so necessary that the States should force their +equality of privilege and of power into every department of the +Constitution, making it felt not only in all acts of legislation, but +in the whole administration of the executive and judicial duties? Was +nothing due to the virtue and sense and patriotism of a majority of +the people of the United States? Might they not reasonably be expected +to constitute a body of electors, who, chosen for the express purpose, +and dissolved as soon as their function had been discharged, would be +able to make an upright and intelligent choice of a chief magistrate +from among the eminent citizens of the Union? + +Questions like these, posterity would easily believe, without the +clear record that has descended to them, must have anxiously and +deeply employed the framers of the Constitution. They were to +consider, not only what was theoretically fit and what would +practically work with safety and success, but what would be accepted +by the people for whom they were forming these great institutions. +That people undoubtedly detested everything in the nature of a +monarchy. But there was another thing which they hated with equal +intensity, and that was an oligarchy. Their experience had given them +quite as much reason for abhorring the one as the other. Such, at +least, was their view of that experience. A king, it is true, was the +chief magistrate of the mother country against which they had +rebelled, against which they had fought successfully for their +independence. The measures that drove them into that resistance were +executed by the monarch; but those measures were planned, as they +believed, by a ministry determined to enslave them, and were +sanctioned by a Parliament in which even the so-called popular branch +was then but another phase of the aristocracy which ruled the empire. +The worst enemy our grandfathers supposed they had in England, +throughout their Revolution, was the ministerial majority of that +House of Commons, made up of placemen sitting for rotten boroughs, the +sons of peers, and the country gentlemen, who belonged to a caste as +much as their first-cousins who sat by titles in the House of Lords. +Our ancestors did not know--they went to their graves without +knowing--that in the hard, implacable temper of the king, made harder +and more implacable by a narrow and bigoted conscientiousness, was +the real cause for the persistency in that fatal policy which severed +these Colonies from his crown. + +That long struggle had been over for several years, and its result was +certainly not to be regretted by the people of America. But it had +left them, as it naturally must have left them, with as strong +prejudices and jealousies against every aristocratic, as against every +monarchical institution. Public liberty in England they knew might +consist with an hereditary throne, and with a privileged and powerful +aristocracy. But public liberty in America could consist with neither. +The people of the United States could submit to restraints; they could +recognize the necessity for checks and balances in the distribution of +authority; and they understood as much of the science of government as +any people then alive. But an institution,--however originating and +however apparently necessary its peculiar construction might +be,--embracing but a small number of persons, with power to elect the +chief magistrate, with power to revise every appointment from a chief +justice down to a tidewaiter, with power to control the President +through his subordinate agents, with power to reject every treaty that +he might negotiate, and with power to sit in judgment on his +impeachment, they would not endure. "We have, in some revolutions of +this plan of government," said Randolph, "made a bold stroke for +monarchy. We are now doing the same for an aristocracy." + +How to attain the true intermediate ground, to avoid the substance of +a monarchy and the substance of an aristocracy, and yet not to found +the system on a mere democracy, was a problem not easy of solution. +All could see, that a government extended over a country so large, +which was to have the regulation of its commerce, the collection of +great revenues, the care of a vast public domain, the superintendence +of intercourse with hordes of savage tribes, the control of relations +with all the nations of the world, the administration of a peculiar +jurisprudence, and the protection of the local constitutions from +violence, must have an army and a navy, and great fiscal, +administrative, and judicial establishments, embracing a very numerous +body of public officers. To give the appointment of such a multitude +of public servants, invested with such functions, to the unchecked +authority of the President, would be to create an executive with power +not less formidable and real than that of some monarchs, and far +greater than that of others. No one desired that a sole power of +appointment should be vested in the President alone; it was +universally conceded that there must be a revisionary control lodged +somewhere, and the only question was where it should be placed. That +it ought to be in a body independent of the executive, and not in any +council of ministers that might be assigned to him, was apparent; and +there was no such body, excepting the Senate, which united the +necessary independence with the other qualities needful for a right +exercise of this power. + +The negotiation of treaties was obviously a function that should be +committed to the executive alone. But a treaty might undertake to +dismember a State of part of its territory, or might otherwise affect +its individual interests; and even where it concerned only the general +interests of all the States, there was a great unwillingness to +intrust the treaty-making power exclusively to the President. Here, +the States, as equal political sovereignties, were unwilling to relax +their hold upon the general government; and the result was that +provision of the Constitution which makes the consent of two thirds of +the Senators present necessary to the ratification of a treaty. + +But if it was to have these great overruling powers, the Senate must +have no voice in the appointment of the executive. There were two +modes in which the election might be arranged, so as to prevent a +mutual connection and influence between the Senate and the President. +The one was, to allow the highest number of electoral votes to appoint +the President;[164] the other was, to place the eventual election--no +person having received a majority of all the electoral votes--in the +House of Representatives. The latter plan was finally adopted, and the +Senate was thus effectually severed from a dangerous connection with +the executive. + +This separation having been effected, the objections which had been +urged against the length of the senatorial term became of little +consequence. In the preparation of the plan marked out in the +resolutions sent to the committee of detail, the Senate had been +considered chiefly with reference to its legislative function; and the +purpose of those who advocated a long term of office was to establish +a body in the government of sufficient wisdom and firmness to +interpose against the impetuous counsels and levelling tendencies of +the democratic branch.[165] Six years was adopted as an intermediate +period between the longest and the shortest of the terms proposed; and +in order that there might be an infusion of different views and +tendencies from time to time, it was provided that one third of the +members should go out of office biennially.[166] Still, in the case of +each individual senator, the period of six years was the longest of +the limited terms of office created by the Constitution. Under the +Confederation, the members of the Congress had been chosen annually, +and were always liable to recall. The people of the United States were +in general strongly disposed to a frequency of elections. A term of +office for six years would be that feature of the proposed Senate most +likely, in the popular mind, to be regarded as of an aristocratic +tendency. If united with the powers that have just passed under our +review, and if to those powers it could be said that an improper +influence over the executive had been added, the system would in all +probability be rejected by the people. But if the Senate were deprived +of all agency in the appointment of the President, it would be mere +declamation to complain of their term of office; for undoubtedly the +peculiar duties assigned to the Senate could be best discharged by +those who had had the longest experience in them. The solid objection +to such a term being removed, the complaint of aristocratic tendencies +would be confined to those who might wish to find plausible reasons +for opposition, and might not wish to be satisfied with the true +reasons for the provision. + +Having now described the formation and the special powers of the two +branches of the legislature, I proceed to inquire into the origin and +history of the disqualifications to which the members were subjected. + +The Constitution of the United States was framed and established by a +generation of men, who had observed the operation upon the English +legislature of that species of influence, by the crown or its +servants, which, from the mode of its exercise, not seldom amounting +to actual bribery, has received the appropriate name of parliamentary +corruption. That generation of the American people knew but +little--they cared less--about the origin of a method of governing the +legislative body, which implies an open or a secret venality on the +part of its members, and a willingness on the part of the +administration to purchase their consent to its measures. What they +did know and what they did regard was, that for a long succession of +years the votes of members of Parliament had been bought, with money +or office, by nearly every minister who had been at the head of +affairs; that, if this practice had not been introduced under the +prince who was placed upon the throne by the revolution of 1688, it +had certainly grown to a kind of system in the hands of the statesmen +by whom that revolution was effected, and had attained its greatest +height under the first two princes of the house of Hanover; that it +was freely and sometimes shamefully applied throughout the American +war; and that, down to that day, no British statesman had had the +sagacity to discover, and the virtue to adopt, a purer system of +administration.[167] Whether this was a necessary vice of the English +constitution; whether it was inherent or temporary; or whether it was +only a stage in the development of parliamentary government, destined +to pass away when the relations of the representative body to the +people had become better settled,--could not then be seen even in +England. But to our ancestors, when framing their Constitution, it +presented itself as a momentous fact; whose warning was not the less +powerful, because it came from the centre of institutions with which +they had been most familiar, and from the country to which they traced +their origin,--a country in which parliamentary government had had the +fairest chances for success that the world had witnessed. + +Yet it would not have been easy at that time, as it is not at the +present, and as it may never be, to define with absolute precision the +true limits which executive influence with the legislative body should +not be suffered to pass. Still less is it easy to say that such +influence ought not to exist at all;[168] although it is not difficult +to say that there are methods in which it should not be suffered to be +exercised. The more elevated and more clear-sighted public morality of +the present age, in England and in America, condemns with equal +severity and equal justice both the giver and the receiver in every +transaction that can be regarded as a purchase of votes upon +particular measures or occasions, whatever may have been the +consideration or motive of the bargain. But whether that morality +goes, or ought to go, farther,--whether it includes, or ought to +include, in the same condemnation, every form of influence by which an +administration can add extrinsic weight to the merits of its +measures,--is a question that admits of discussion. + +It may be said, assuming the good intentions of an administration, and +the correctness of its policy and measures, that its policy and its +measures should address themselves solely to the patriotism and sense +of right of the members of the legislative department. But an ever +active patriotism and a never failing sense of right are not always, +if often, to be found; the members of a legislative body are men, with +the imperfections, the failings, and the passions of men; and if pure +patriotism and right perceptions of duty are alone relied upon, they +may, and sometimes inevitably will be, found wanting. On the other +hand, it is just as true, that the persons composing every +administration are mere men, and that it will not do to assume their +wisdom and good intentions as the sole foundations on which to rest +the public security, leaving them at liberty to use all the appliances +that may be found effectual for gaining right ends, and overlooking +the character of the means. One of the principal reasons for the +establishment of different departments, in the class of governments to +which ours belongs, is, that perfect virtue and unerring wisdom are +not to be predicated of any man in any station. If they were, a simple +despotism would be the best and the only necessary form of +government. + +All correct reasoning on this subject, and all true construction of +governments like ours, must commence with two propositions, one of +which embraces a truth of political science, and the other a truth of +general morals. The first is, that, while the different functions of +government are to be distributed among different persons, and to be +kept distinctly separated, in order that there may be both division of +labor and checks against the abuse of power, it is occasionally +necessary that some room should be allowed for supplying the want of +wisdom or virtue in one department by the wisdom or virtue of another. +In matters of government depending on mere discretion, unlimited +confidence cannot with safety be placed anywhere.[169] The other +proposition is the very plain axiom in morals, that, while in all +human transactions there may be bad means employed to effect a worthy +object, the character of those means can never be altered, nor their +use justified, by the character of the end. With these two +propositions admitted, what is to be done is to discover that +arrangement of the powers and relations of the different departments +whose acts involve, more or less, the exercise of pure discretion, +which will give the best effect to both of these truths; and as all +government and all details of government, to be useful, must be +practically adapted to the nature of man, it will be found that an +approximation in practice to a perfect theory is all that can be +attained. + +Thus the general duties and powers of the legislative and the +executive departments are capable of distinct separation. The one is +to make, the other is to execute the laws. But execution of the laws +of necessity involves administration, and administration makes it +necessary that there should be an executive policy. To carry out that +policy requires new laws; authority must be obtained to do acts not +before authorized; and supplies must be perpetually renewed. The +executive stands therefore in a close relation to the legislative +department;--a relation which makes it necessary for the one to appeal +frequently, and indeed constantly, to the discretion of the other. If +the executive is left at liberty to purchase what it believes or +alleges to be the right exercise of that discretion, by the +inducements of money or office applied to a particular case, the rule +of common morals is violated; conscience becomes false to duty, and +corruption, having once entered the body politic, may be employed to +effect bad ends as well as good. Nay, as bad ends will stand most in +need of its influence, it will be applied the most grossly where the +object to be attained is the most culpable. On the other hand, if the +members of the legislative body, by being made incapable of accepting +the higher or more lucrative offices of state, are cut off from those +inducements to right conduct and a true ambition which the +imperfections of our nature have made not only powerful, but sometimes +necessary, aids to virtue, the public service may have no other +security than their uncertain impulses or imperfect judgments. In the +midst of such tendencies to opposite mischiefs, all that human wisdom +and foresight can do is, to anticipate and prevent the evils of both +extremes, by provisions which will guard both the interests of +morality and the interests of political expediency as completely as +circumstances will allow. + +I am persuaded it was upon such principles as I have thus endeavored +to state, that the framers of our national Constitution intended to +regulate this very difficult part of the relations between the +executive and the legislature. During a considerable period, however, +of their deliberations on the disabilities to which it would be proper +to subject the members of the latter department, they had another +example before them besides that afforded by the history of +parliamentary corruption in England. The Congress of the Confederation +had of course the sole power of appointment to offices under the +authority of the United States; and although there is no reason to +suppose that body at any time to have been justly chargeable with +corrupt motives, there were complaints of the frequency with which it +had filled the offices which it had created with its own members. In +these complaints, the people overlooked the justification. They forgot +that the nature of the government, and the circumstances of the +country, rendered it difficult for an assembly which both made and +filled the offices, and which exercised its functions at a time when +the State governments absorbed by far the greater part of the +interests and attention of their citizens, to find suitable men out of +its own ranks. In that condition of things, it might have been +expected,--and it implies no improper purpose,--that offices would be +sometimes framed or regulated with a view to their being filled by +particular persons. But the complaints existed;[170] the evil was one +that tended constantly to become worse; and, in framing the new +government, this was the first aspect in which the influence of office +and its emoluments presented itself to the Convention. + +For when the Virginia members, through Edmund Randolph, brought +forward their scheme of government, they not only gave the executive +no power of appointment to any office, but they proposed to vest the +appointment of both the executive and the judiciary in the +legislature. Hence they felt the necessity of guarding against the +abuse that might follow, if the members of the legislature were to be +left at liberty to appoint each other to office,--an abuse which they +knew had been imputed to the Congress, and which they declared had +been grossly practised by their own legislature.[171] They proposed, +therefore, to go beyond the Confederation, and to make the members of +both branches ineligible to any office established under the authority +of the United States, (excepting those peculiarly belonging to their +own functions,) during their term of service and for one year after +its expiration. This provision passed the committee of the whole; but +in the Convention, on a motion made by Mr. Gorham to strike it out, +the votes of the States were divided. An effort was then made by Mr. +Madison to find a middle ground, between an eligibility in all cases +and an absolute disqualification. If the unnecessary creation of +offices and the increase of salaries was the principal evil to be +anticipated, he believed that the door might be shut against that +abuse, and might properly be left open for the appointment of members +to places not affected by their own votes, as an encouragement to the +legislative service. But there were several of the stern patriots of +the Convention who insisted on a total exclusion, and who denied that +there was any such necessity for holding out inducements to enter the +legislature.[172] This was a question on which different minds, of +equal sagacity and equal purity, would naturally arrive at different +conclusions. Still, it is apparent that the mischiefs most apprehended +at the time of Mr. Madison's proposition would be in a great degree +prevented, by taking from the legislature the power of appointing to +office; and that this modification of the system was what was needed, +to make his plan a true remedy for the abuses that had been displayed +in our own experience. The stigma of venality cannot properly be +applied to the laudable ambition of rising into the honorable offices +of a free government; and if the opportunity to create places, or to +increase their emoluments, and then to secure those places, is taken +away, by vesting the appointment in the executive, the question turns +mainly on the relations that ought to exist between that department +and the legislature. But Mr. Madison's suggestion was made before it +was ascertained that the executive would have any power of +appointment, and it was accordingly rejected;--a majority of the +delegations considering it best to retain the ineligibility in all +cases, as proposed by the Virginia plan.[173] In this way, the +disqualification became incorporated into the first draft of the +Constitution, prepared by the committee of detail.[174] + +But by this time it was known that a large part of the patronage of +the government must be placed in the hands of the President; for it +had been settled that he was to appoint to all offices not otherwise +provided for, and the cases thus excepted were those of judges and +ambassadors, which stood, in this draft of the Constitution, vested in +the Senate. A strong opposition to this arrangement, however, had +already manifested itself, and the result was very likely to be,--as +it in fact turned out,--that nearly the whole of the appointments +would be made on the nomination of the President, even if the Senate +were to be empowered to confirm or reject them. Accordingly, when this +clause came under consideration, the principle of an absolute +disqualification for office was vigorously attacked, and as vigorously +defended. The inconvenience and impolicy of excluding officers of the +army and navy from the legislature; of rendering it impossible for the +executive to select a commander-in-chief from among the members, in +cases of pre-eminent fitness; of refusing seats to the heads of +executive departments; and of closing the legislature as an avenue to +other branches of the public service,--were all strenuously urged and +denied.[175] At length, a middle course became necessary, to +reconcile all opinions. By a very close vote, the ineligibility was +restrained to cases in which the office had been created, or the +emolument of it increased, during the term of membership;[176] and a +seat in the legislature was made incompatible with any other office +under the United States.[177] + +Some at least of the probable sources of corruption were cut off by +these provisions. The executive can make no bargain for a vote, by the +promise of an office which has been acted upon by the member whose +vote is sought for; and there can be no body of placemen, ready at all +times to sell their votes as the price for which they are permitted to +retain their places. At the same time, the executive is not deprived +of the influence which attends the power of appointing to offices not +created, or the emoluments of which have not been increased, by any +Congress of which the person appointed has been a member. This +influence is capable of abuse; it is also capable of being honorably +and beneficially exerted. Whether it shall be employed corruptly or +honestly, for good or for bad purposes, is left by the Constitution to +the restraints of personal virtue and the chastisements of public +opinion. + +A serious question, however, has been made, whether the interests of +the public service, involved in the relations of the two departments, +would not have been placed upon a better footing, if some of the +higher officers of state had been admitted to hold seats in the +legislature. Under the English constitution, there is no practical +difficulty, at least in modern times, in determining the general +principle that is to distinguish between the class of officers who +can, and those who cannot, be usefully allowed to have seats in the +House of Commons. The principle which, after much inconsistent +legislation and many abortive attempts to legislate, has generally +been acted on since the reign of George II., is, that it is both +necessary and useful to have in that House some of the higher +functionaries of the administration; but that it is not at all +necessary, and not useful, to allow the privilege of sitting in +Parliament to subordinate officers.[178] The necessity of the case +arises altogether from the peculiar relations of the ministry to the +crown, and of the latter to the Commons. If the executive government +were not admitted, through any of its members, to explain and +vindicate its measures, to advocate new grants of authority, or to +defend the prerogatives of the crown, the popular branch of the +legislature would either become the predominant power in the state, or +sink into insignificance. This is conceded by the severest writers on +the English government. + +But when we pass from a civil polity which it has taken centuries to +produce, and which has had its departments adjusted much less by +reference to exact principles than by the results of their successive +struggles for supremacy over each other, and when we come to an +original distribution of powers, in the arrangements of a constitution +made entire and at once by a single act of the national will, we must +not give too much effect to analogies which after all are far from +being complete. In preparing the Constitution of the United States, +its framers had no prerogative, in any way resembling that of the +crown of England, to consider and provide for. The separate powers to +be conferred on the chief magistracy--aside from its concurrence in +legislation--were simply executive and administrative; the office was +to be elective, and not hereditary; and its functions, like those of +the legislature, were to be prescribed with all the exactness of which +a written instrument is capable. There was, therefore, little of such +danger that the one department would silently or openly encroach on +the rights or usurp the powers of the other, as there is where there +exists hereditary right on the one side and customary right on the +other, and where the boundaries between the two departments are to be +traced by the aid of ancient traditions, or collected from numerous +and perhaps conflicting precedents. There was no such necessity, +therefore, as there is in England, for placing members of the +administration in the legislature, in order to preserve the balance of +the Constitution. The sole question with us was, whether the public +convenience required that the administration should be able to act +directly upon the course of legislation. The prevailing opinion was +that this was not required. This opinion was undoubtedly formed under +the fear of corruption and the jealousy of executive power, chiefly +produced--and justly produced--by the example of what had long existed +in England. That the error, if any was committed, lay on the safer +side, none can doubt. It is possible that the chances of a corrupt +influence would not have been increased, and that the opportunities +for a salutary influence might have been enlarged,--as it is highly +probable that the convenience of communication would have been +promoted,--if some of the higher officers of state could have been +allowed to hold seats in either house of Congress. But it is difficult +to see how this could have been successfully practised, under the +system of representation and election which the framers of the +Constitution were obliged to establish: and perhaps this is a decisive +answer to the objection.[179] + +Among the powers conceded by the Constitution to the legislature of +each State is that of prescribing the time, place, and manner of +holding the elections of its senators and representatives in Congress. +This provision[180] originated with the committee of detail; but, as +it was reported by them, there was no other authority reserved to +Congress itself than that of altering the regulations of the States; +and this authority extended as well to the place of choosing the +senators, as to all the other circumstances of the election.[181] In +the Convention, however, the authority of Congress was extended beyond +the alteration of State regulations, so as to embrace a power to make +rules, as well as to alter those made by the States. But the place of +choosing the senators was excepted altogether from this restraining +authority, and left to the States.[182] Mr. Madison, in his minutes, +adds the explanation, that the power of Congress to _make_ regulations +was supplied, in order to enable them to regulate the elections, if +the States should fail or refuse to do so.[183] But the text of the +Constitution, as finally settled, gives authority to Congress at "any +time" to "make or alter such regulations"; and this would seem to +confer a power, which, when exercised, must be paramount, whether a +State regulation exists at the time or not. + +There is one other peculiarity of the American legislature, of which +it is proper in this connection to give a brief account; namely, the +compensation of its members for their public services. In the plan +presented by the Virginia delegation, it was proposed that the members +of both branches should receive "liberal stipends"; but it was not +suggested whether they were to be paid by the States, or from the +national treasury. The committee of the whole determined to adopt the +latter mode of payment; and as the representation in both branches, +according to the first decision, was to be of the same character, no +reason was then suggested for making a difference in the source of +their compensation. But when the construction of the Senate was +considered in the Convention, the idea was suggested that this body +ought in some way to represent wealth; and it was apparently under the +influence of this suggestion, that, after a refusal to provide for a +payment of the senators by their States, payment out of the national +treasury was stricken from the resolution under debate.[184] There was +thus introduced into the resolutions sent to the committee of detail, +a discrepancy between the modes of compensating the members of the two +branches; for while the members of the House were to be paid "an +adequate compensation" out of "the public treasury," the Senate were +to receive "a compensation for the devotion of their time to the +public service," but the source of payment was not designated. But +when the whole body of those resolutions had been acted on, the +character of the representation in the Senate had been settled, and +the idea of its being made a representation of wealth, in any sense, +had been rejected. The committee of detail had, therefore, in giving +effect to the decisions of the Convention, to consider merely whether +the members of the two branches should be paid by their States, or +from the national treasury; and for the purpose of making the same +provision as to both, and in order to avoid the question whether the +Constitution should establish the amount, or should leave it to be +regulated by the Congress itself, they provided that the members of +each house should receive a compensation for their services, to be +ascertained and paid by the State in which they should be chosen.[185] + +This, however, was to encounter far greater evils than it avoided. If +paid by their States, the members of the national legislature would +not only receive different compensations, but they would be directly +subjected to the prejudices, caprices, and political purposes of the +State legislatures. Whatever theory might be maintained with respect +to the relations between the representatives, in either branch, and +the State in which they were chosen, or the people of the States, to +subject one class of public servants to the power of another class +could not fail to produce the most mischievous consequences. A large +majority of the States, therefore, decided upon payment out of the +national treasury,[186] and it was finally determined that the rate +of compensation should not be fixed by the Constitution, but should be +left to be ascertained by law.[187] + +Among the separate functions assigned by the Constitution to the +houses of Congress are those of presenting and trying impeachments. An +impeachment, in the report of the committee of detail, was treated as +an ordinary judicial proceeding, and was placed within the +jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. That this was not in all respects a +suitable provision, will appear from the following considerations. +Although an impeachment may involve an inquiry whether a crime against +any positive law has been committed, yet it is not necessarily a trial +for crime; nor is there any necessity, in the case of crimes committed +by public officers, for the institution of any special proceeding for +the infliction of the punishment prescribed by the laws, since they, +like all other persons, are amenable to the ordinary jurisdiction of +the courts of justice, in respect of offences against positive law. +The purposes of an impeachment lie wholly beyond the penalties of the +statute or the customary law. The object of the proceeding is to +ascertain whether cause exists for removing a public officer from +office. Such a cause may be found in the fact, that, either in the +discharge of his office, or aside from its functions, he has violated +a law, or committed what is technically denominated a crime. But a +cause for removal from office may exist, where no offence against +positive law has been committed, as where the individual has, from +immorality or imbecility or maleadministration, become unfit to +exercise the office. The rules by which an impeachment is to be +determined are therefore peculiar, and are not fully embraced by those +principles or provisions of law which courts of ordinary jurisdiction +are required to administer. + +From considerations of this kind, especially when applied to the +impeachment of a President of the United States, the Convention found it +expedient to place the trial in the Senate. In fact, the whole subject +of impeachments, as finally settled in the Constitution, received its +impress in a great degree from the attention that was paid to the +bearing of this power upon the executive. Few members of the Convention +were willing to constitute a single executive, with such powers as were +proposed to be given to the President, without subjecting him to removal +from office on impeachment; and when it was perceived to be necessary to +confer upon him the appointment of the judges, it became equally +necessary to provide some other tribunal than the Supreme Court for the +trial of his impeachment. There was no other body already provided for +in the government, with whom this jurisdiction could be lodged, +excepting the Senate; and the only alternative to this plan was to +create a special tribunal for the sole purpose of trying impeachments of +the President and other officers. This was justly deemed a manifest +inconvenience; and although there were various theoretical objections +suggested against placing the trial in the Senate, on the question being +stated there were found to be but two dissentient States.[188] This +point having been settled, in relation to impeachments of the President, +the trial of impeachments of all other civil officers of the United +States was, for the sake of uniformity, also confided to the +Senate.[189] The power of impeachment was confined, as originally +proposed, to the House of Representatives.[190] + +The number of members of each house that should be made a _quorum_ for +the transaction of business gave rise to a good deal of difference of +opinion. The controlling reason why a smaller number than a majority +of the members of each house should not be permitted to make laws, was +to be found in the extent of the country and the diversity of its +interests. The central States, it was said, could always have their +members present with more convenience than the distant States; and +after some discussion, it was determined to establish a majority of +each house as its quorum for the transaction of business, giving to a +smaller number power to adjourn from day to day, and to compel the +attendance of absent members.[191] + +Provisions making each house the judge of the elections, returns, and +qualifications of its own members; that for any speech, or debate in +either house no member shall be questioned in any other place; and +that in all cases, except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, the +members shall be privileged from arrest during their attendance at, +and in going to and returning from, the sessions of their respective +houses,--were agreed to without any dissent.[192] + +The power of each house to determine the rules of its proceedings, to +punish its members for disorderly behavior, and to expel with the +concurrence of two thirds, was agreed to with general assent.[193] +Each house was also directed to keep a journal of its proceedings, and +from time to time to publish the same, excepting such parts as may in +their judgment require secrecy; and one fifth of the members present +in either house were empowered to require the yeas and nays to be +entered on its journal.[194] + +The report of the committee of detail had made no provision for such +an officer as the Vice-President of the United States, and had +therefore declared that the Senate, as well as the House, should +choose its own presiding officer. This feature of their report +received the sanction of the Convention; but subsequently, when it +became necessary to create an officer to succeed the President of the +United States, in case of death, resignation, or removal from office, +the plan was adopted of making the former _ex officio_ the presiding +officer of the Senate, giving him a vote only in cases where the votes +of the members are equally divided.[195] To this was added the further +provision, that the Senate shall choose, besides all its other +officers, a President _pro tempore_, in the absence of the +Vice-President, or when he shall exercise the office of President of +the United States.[196] The House of Representatives were empowered to +choose their own Speaker, and other officers, as originally +proposed.[197] + +The mode in which laws were to be enacted was the last topic +concerning the action of the legislature which required to be dealt +with in the Constitution. The principle had been already settled, that +the negative of the President should arrest the passage of a law, +unless, after he had refused his concurrence, it should be passed by +two thirds of the members of each house. In order to give effect to +this principle, the committee of detail made the following +regulations, which were adopted into the Constitution;--that every +bill, which shall have passed the two houses, shall, before it become +a law, be presented to the President of the United States; that, if he +approve, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it, with his +objections, to the house in which it originated, who shall enter the +objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it; +that if, after such reconsideration, two thirds of that house agree to +pass the bill, it is to be sent with the objections to the other +house, by which it is likewise to be reconsidered, and, if approved by +two thirds of that house, it is to become a law; but in all such +cases, the votes of both houses are to be determined by yeas and nays +entered upon the journal. If any bill be not returned by the President +within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it has been presented to him, +it is to become a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless +the Congress by adjourning prevent its return, in which case it is not +to become a law. All orders, resolutions, and votes to which the +concurrence of both houses is necessary, (except on a question of +adjournment,) are subject to these provisions.[198] + +The two important differences between the negative thus vested in the +President of the United States and that which belongs to the King of +England are, that the former is a qualified, while the latter is an +absolute, power to arrest the passage of a law; and that the one is +required to render to the legislature the reasons for his refusal to +approve a bill, while the latter renders no reasons, but simply +answers that he will advise of the matter, which is the parliamentary +form of signifying a refusal to approve. The provision in our +Constitution which requires the President to communicate to the +legislature his objections to a bill, was rendered necessary by the +power conferred upon two thirds of both houses to make it a law, +notwithstanding his refusal to sign it. By this power, which makes the +negative of the President a qualified one only, the framers of the +Constitution intended that the two houses should take into +consideration the objections which may have led the President to +withhold his assent, and that his assent should be dispensed with, if, +notwithstanding those objections, two thirds of both houses should +still approve of the measure. These provisions, therefore, on the one +hand, give to the President a real participation in acts of +legislation, and impose upon him a real responsibility for the +measures to which he gives his official approval, while they give him +an important influence over the final action of the legislature upon +those which he refuses to sanction; and, on the other hand, they +establish a wide distinction between his negative and that of the King +in England. The latter has none but an absolute "veto"; if he refuse +to sign a bill, it cannot become a law; and it is well understood, +that it is on account of this absolute effect of the refusal, that +this prerogative has been wholly disused since the reign of William +III., and that the practice has grown up of signifying, through the +ministry, the previous opposition of the executive, if any exists, +while the measure is under discussion in Parliament. It is not needful +to consider here which mode of legislation is theoretically or +practically the best. It is sufficient to notice the fact, that the +absence from our system of official and responsible advisers of the +President, having seats in the legislature, renders it impracticable +to signify his views of a measure, while it is under the +consideration of either house. For this reason, and because the +President himself is responsible to the people for his official acts, +and in order to accompany that responsibility with the requisite power +both to act upon reasons and to render them, our Constitution has +vested in him this peculiar and qualified negative.[199] + +The remaining topic that demands our inquiries, respecting the +legislature, relates to the place of its meeting. The Confederation +was a government without a capitol, or a seat; a want which seriously +impaired its dignity and its efficiency, and subjected it to great +inconveniences; at the same time, it was unable to supply the defect. +Its Congress, following the example of their predecessors, had +continued to assemble at Philadelphia, until June, 1783; when, as we +have already seen, in consequence of a mutiny by some of the federal +troops stationed in that neighborhood, against which the local +authorities failed to protect them, they left that city, and +reassembled at Princeton, in the State of New Jersey, in the halls of +a college.[200] There, in the following October, a resolution was +passed, directing that buildings for the use of Congress should be +erected at some suitable place near the falls of the Delaware; for +which the right of soil and an exclusive jurisdiction should be +obtained.[201] But this was entirely unsatisfactory to the Southern +States. They complained that the place selected was not central, was +unfavorable to the Union, and unjust to them. They endeavored to +procure a reconsideration of the vote, but without success.[202] +Several days were then consumed in fruitless efforts to agree on a +temporary residence; and at length it became apparent that there was +no prospect of a general assent to any one place, either for a +temporary or for a permanent seat. The plan of a single residence was +then changed, and a resolution was passed, providing for an alternate +residence at two places, by directing that buildings for the use of +Congress, and a federal town, should also be erected at or near the +lower falls of the Potomac, or Georgetown; and that until both places, +that on the Delaware and that on the Potomac, were ready for their +reception, Congress should sit alternately, for equal periods of not +more than one year and not less than six months, at Trenton, the +capital of the State of New Jersey, and at Annapolis, the capital of +the State of Maryland. The President was thereupon directed to adjourn +the Congress, on the 12th of the following November, to meet at +Annapolis on the 26th, for the despatch of business. Thither they +accordingly repaired, and there they continued to sit until June 3, +1784. A recess followed, during which a committee of the States sat, +until Congress reassembled at Trenton, on the 30th of the following +October. + +At Trenton, the accommodations appear to have been altogether +insufficient, and the States of South Carolina and Pennsylvania proposed +to adjourn from that place.[203] The plan of two capitols in different +places was then rescinded,[204] and an ordinance was passed, for the +appointment of commissioners to establish a seat of government on the +banks of the Delaware, at some point within eight miles above or below +the lower falls of that river. Until the necessary buildings should be +ready for their reception, the ordinance provided that Congress should +sit at the city of New York.[205] When assembled there in January, 1785, +they received and accepted from the corporation an offer of the use of +the City Hall; and in that building they continued to hold their +sessions until after the adoption of the Constitution.[206] + +It does not appear that any steps were taken under the ordinance of +1784, or under any of the previous resolutions, for the establishment +of a federal town and a seat of government at any of the places +designated. Whether the Congress felt the want of constitutional power +to carry out their project, or whether the want of means, or a +difficulty in obtaining a suitable grant of the soil and jurisdiction, +was the real impediment, there are now no means of determining. It +seems quite probable, however, that, after their removal to the city +of New York, they found themselves much better placed than they or +their predecessors had ever been elsewhere; and as the discussions +respecting a total revision of the federal system soon afterwards +began to agitate the public mind, the plan of establishing a seat for +the accommodation of the old government was naturally postponed. + +The plan itself, on paper, was a bold and magnificent one. It +contemplated a district not less than two and not more than three +miles square, with a "federal house" for the use of Congress; suitable +buildings for the executive departments; official residences for the +president and secretary of Congress, and the secretaries of foreign +affairs, of war, of the marine, and the officers of the treasury; +besides hotels to be erected and owned by the States as residences for +their delegates. But, for this fine scheme of a federal metropolis, an +appropriation was made, which, even in those days, one might suppose, +would scarcely have paid for the land required. The commissioners who +were to purchase the site, lay out the town, and contract for the +erection and completion of all the public edifices,--excepting those +which were to belong to the States,--"in an elegant manner," were +authorized to draw on the federal treasury for a sum not exceeding one +hundred thousand dollars, for the whole of these purposes. If we are +to understand it to have been really expected and intended that this +sum should defray the cost of this undertaking, we must either be +amused by the modest requirements of the Union at that day, or stand +amazed at the strides it has since taken in its onward career of +prosperity and power. From the porticos of that magnificent Capitol +whose domes overhang the Potomac, the eye now looks down upon a city, +in which, at a cost of many millions, provision has been made for the +central functions of a government, whose daily expenditure exceeds the +entire sum appropriated for the establishment of the necessary public +buildings and official residences seventy years ago. + +In truth, however, there is not much reason to suppose that the +Congress of the Confederation seriously contemplated the establishment +of a federal city. They were too feeble for such an undertaking. They +could pass resolutions and ordinances for the purpose, and send them +to the authorities of the States;--and if a more decent attention to +the wants and dignity of the federal body was excited, it was well, +and was probably the effect principally intended. If they had actually +proceeded to do what their resolution of 1783 proposed,--to acquire +the jurisdiction, as well as the right of soil, over a tract of +land,--they must have encountered a serious obstacle in the want of +constitutional power. This difficulty seems to have been felt at a +later period; for the ordinance of 1784 only directs a purchase of the +land, and is silent upon the subject of municipal jurisdiction. It is +fortunate, too, on all accounts, that the design was never executed, +if it was seriously entertained. The presence of Congress in the city +of New York, where the legislature of the State was also sitting, in +the winter of 1787, enabled Hamilton to carry those measures in both +bodies, which led immediately to the summoning of the national +Convention.[207] And it was especially fortunate that this whole +subject came before the Convention unembarrassed with a previous +choice of place by the old Congress, or with any steps concerning +municipal jurisdiction which they might have taken, or omitted. + +For it was no easy matter, in the temper of the public mind existing +from 1783 to 1788, to determine where the seat of the federal, or that +of the national government, ought to be placed. The Convention found +this an unsettled question, and they wisely determined to leave it so. +The cities of New York and Philadelphia had wishes and expectations, +and it was quite expedient that the Constitution should neither decide +between them, nor decide against both of them. It was equally +important that it should not direct whether the seat of the national +government should be placed at any of the other commercial cities, or +at the capital or within the jurisdiction of any State, or in a +district to be exclusively under the jurisdiction of the United +States. These were grave questions, which involved the general +interests of the Union; but however settled, they would cost the +Constitution, in some quarter or other, a great deal of the support +that it required, if determined before it went into operation.[208] +Temporarily, however, the new government must be placed somewhere +within the limits of a State, and at one of the principal cities; and +as the Congress then sitting at New York would probably invite their +successors to assemble there, it became necessary to provide for a +future removal, when the time should arrive for a general agreement on +the various and delicate questions involved. The difference of +structure, however, between the two branches of the proposed Congress, +and the difference of interests that might predominate in each, made a +disagreement on these questions probable, if not inevitable; and a +disagreement on the place of their future sessions, if accompanied by +power to sit in separate places, would be fatal to the peace of the +Union and the operation of the government. + +The committee of detail, therefore, inserted in their draft a clause +prohibiting either house, without the consent of the other, from +adjourning for more than three days, or to any other place than that +at which the Congress might be sitting. Mr. King expressed an +apprehension that this implied an authority in both houses to adjourn +to any place; and as a frequent change of place had dishonored the +federal government, he thought that a law, at least, should be made +necessary for a removal. Mr. Madison considered a central position +would be so necessary, and that it would be so strongly demanded by +the House of Representatives, that a removal from the place of their +first session would be extorted, even if a law were required for it. +But there was a fear that, if the government were once established at +the city of New York, it would never be removed if a law were made +necessary. The provision reported by the committee was therefore +retained, and it was left in the power of the two houses alone, during +a session of Congress, to adjourn to any place, or to any time, on +which they might agree.[209] + +Still it was needful that the Constitution should empower the +legislature to establish a seat of government out of the jurisdiction +of any of the States, and away from any of their cities. The time +might come when this question could be satisfactorily met. The time +would certainly come, when the people of the whole Union could see +that the dignity, the independence, and the purity of the government +would require that it should be under no local influences; when every +citizen of the United States, called to take part in the functions of +that government, ought to be able to feel that he and his would owe +their protection to no power, save that of the Union itself. Some +disadvantage, doubtless, might be experienced, in placing the +government away from the great centres of commerce. But neither of the +principal seats of wealth and refinement was very near to the centre +of the Union; and if either of them had been, the necessity for an +exclusive local jurisdiction would probably be found, after the +adoption of the Constitution, to outweigh all other considerations. +Accordingly, when the Constitution was revised for the purpose of +supplying the needful provisions omitted in its preparation, it was +determined that no peremptory direction on the subject of a seat of +government should be given to the legislature; but that power should +be conferred on Congress to exercise an exclusive legislation, in all +cases, over such district, not exceeding ten miles square, as might, +by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become +the seat of government of the United States. This provision has made +the Congress of the United States the exclusive sovereign of the +District of Columbia, which it governs in its capacity of the +legislature of the Union. It enabled Washington to found the city +which bears his name; towards which, whatever may be the claims of +local attachment, every American who can discern the connection +between the honor, the renown, and the welfare of his country, and the +dignity, convenience, and safety of its government, must turn with +affection and pride. + +With respect to a regular time of meeting, no instructions had been +given to the committee of detail; but they inserted in their draft of +the Constitution a clause which required the legislature to assemble +on the first Monday of December in every year. There was, however, a +great difference of opinion as to the expediency of designating any +time in the Constitution, and as to the particular period adopted in +the report. But as it was generally agreed that Congress ought to +assemble annually, the provision which now stands in the Constitution, +which requires annual sessions, and establishes the first Monday in +December as the time of their commencement, unless a different day +shall be appointed by law, was adopted as a compromise of different +views.[210] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[130] The first draft of the Constitution, reported by the committee +of detail, will be found in the Appendix. + +[131] A general instruction had been given to report "certain +qualifications of property and citizenship," for the executive, the +judiciary, and the members of both houses of Congress. + +[132] It is only necessary to mention the names of Hamilton, Wilson, +Robert Morris, and Fitzsimmons, to show the entire impracticability of +a rule that would have excluded all persons of _foreign birth_ from +being electors, or from being elected to office. + +[133] I have called the naturalization power a _practical_ control +upon the States in the matter of suffrage. It is indirect, but it is +effectual; for I believe that no State has ever gone so far as, by +express statutory or constitutional provision, to admit to the right +of voting persons of foreign birth who are not naturalized citizens of +the United States. + +[134] Art. VI. Sect. 2 of the reported draft. + +[135] Art. IV. Sect. 2 of the reported draft. + +[136] New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Georgia alone voted to retain +it. Elliot, V. 404. + +[137] The Constitution of Pennsylvania had given to foreigners, after +two years' residence, all the rights of citizens. There were similar +provisions in nearly all of the States. + +[138] The members who advocated the exemption were G. Morris, Mercer, +Gorham, Madison, and Wilson; those who opposed it were Rutledge, +Sherman, General Pinckney, Mason, and Baldwin. The States voting for +it were Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, 5; +the States voting against it were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, +Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 6. The question +elicited a good deal of feeling, and was debated with some warmth. + +[139] _Ante_, Chap. VII. + +[140] See _ante_, Chap. VIII. + +[141] See _post_, as to the compromise on this subject. + +[142] September 8. + +[143] Elliot, V. 530. + +[144] By a majority of one State. Ibid. + +[145] That is to say, Congress were authorized to apportion one +representative to thirty thousand inhabitants, but not to exceed that +number. Constitution, Art. I. § 2. + +[146] Let the reader consult Mr. Hallam's acute and learned discussion +of this exclusive privilege of the House of Commons, (Const. Hist., +III. 37-46,) and he will probably be satisfied, that, whatever +theoretical reasons different writers may have assigned for it, its +origin is so obscure, and its precise limits and purposes, deduced +from the precedents, are so uncertain, that it can now be said to rest +on no positive principles. Its basis is custom; which, having no +definite beginning, is now necessarily immemorial. It would not be +quite safe, therefore, to reason upon the well-defined provision of +our Constitution, as if there were a close analogy between the +situation of the two houses of Congress and the two branches of the +British legislature. The English example certainly had an influence, +in suggesting the plan of such a restriction; but care must be taken +not to overlook the peculiar arrangements which made it so highly +expedient, that it may be said to have been a necessity, even if there +had been no British example. + +[147] C. Pinckney. Elliot, V. 189. June 13. + +[148] On the question for restraining the Senate from originating +money bills, New York, Delaware, Virginia, _ay_, 3; Massachusetts, +Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, +Georgia, _no_, 7. Ibid. + +[149] Elliot, V. 285. _Ante_, Chap. VIII. + +[150] August 8. For striking out, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, +Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, _ay_, 7; New Hampshire, +Massachusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, _no_, 4. + +[151] Dr. Franklin, Mason, Williamson, and Randolph (Elliot, V. +395-397.) It would be endless to cite the observations of different +members, to show the purposes which they entertained. The reader, who +desires to test the accuracy of my inferences in any of these +descriptions, must study the debates, and compare, as I have done, the +different _phases_ which the subject assumed from time to time. + +[152] Moved by Randolph, August 13. Elliot, V. 414. + +[153] Ibid. 420. + +[154] Moved by Mr. Strong, August 15. Ibid. 427. This was brought +forward as an amendment to the article (Art. VI. § 12) which was to +define the powers of the two houses. + +[155] August 31. Elliot, V. 503. + +[156] Elliot, V. 506, 510, 511, 514. The privilege, as it came from +this committee, was confined to "bills for raising revenue"; and these +were made subject to "alterations and amendments by the Senate." + +[157] Ibid. 519. + +[158] The history of this provision shows clearly that a bill for +appropriating money may originate in the Senate. + +[159] August 9. Elliot, V. 398-401. Massachusetts, Connecticut, +Pennsylvania, and Maryland voted in the negative, and the vote of +North Carolina was divided. + +[160] May 31. Elliot, V. 133. + +[161] Dickinson, Gerry, Mason. + +[162] Sherman, Luther Martin, Ellsworth. On the naked proposition, +moved by Ellsworth, July 2, to allow each State one vote in the +Senate, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, _ay_, +5; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South +Carolina, _no_, 5; Georgia divided. + +[163] Maryland alone voted against it. + +[164] This suggestion was made by Hamilton. Elliot, V. 517. + +[165] Madison, Hamilton, Wilson, and Read. Elliot, V. 241-245. June +26. + +[166] Ibid. + +[167] In Horace Walpole's Memoirs of the Reign of George II., there is +an amusing parallel--gravely drawn, however--between the mode in which +his father, Sir Robert, "traded for members," and the manner in which +Mr. Pelham carried on _his_ corruption. Lord Mahon has called Sir +Robert Walpole "the patron and parent of parliamentary corruption." +(Hist. of England, I. 268.) But both Mr. Hallam and Mr. Macaulay say +that it originated under Charles II., and both admit that it was +practised down to the close of the American war. (Hallam's Const. +Hist., III. 255, 256, 351-356. Macaulay's Hist. of England, III. +541-549.) The latter, in a very masterly analysis of its origin and +history, treats it as a local disease, incident to the growth of the +English constitution. It must be confessed, that it had become +_chronic_. + +[168] I am quite aware of the danger of reasoning from the +circumstances of one country to those of another, even in the case of +England and the United States. But I avail myself, in support of the +text, of the authority of a writer, whose high moral tone, and whose +profound knowledge of the constitution on which he has written, unite +to make it unnecessary that its history should be written again;--I +mean, of course, Mr. Hallam. He pronounces it an extreme supposition, +and not to be pretended, that Parliament was ever "absolutely, and in +all conceivable circumstances, under the control of the sovereign, +whether through intimidation or corrupt subservience." "But," he adds, +"as it would equally contradict notorious truth to assert that every +vote has been disinterested and independent, _the degree of influence +which ought to be permitted_, or which has at any time existed, +_becomes one of the most important subjects in our constitutional +policy_." (Const. Hist., III. 351.) + +[169] The position and functions of the judiciary, after proper +measures have been taken to secure individual capacity and integrity, +do admit and require what may be called absolute confidence. That is +to say, their action is not only final and conclusive, but it is never +legitimately open to the influence of any other department. The reason +is, that their action does not proceed from individual discretion, but +is regulated by the principles of a moral science, whose existence is +wholly independent of the will of the particular judge. Whereas the +action of both the executive and the legislative departments, within +the limits prescribed to it by the fundamental law, involves the +exercise, to a wide extent, of mere individual discretion. The remedy +for a failure in the judge to justify the confidence reposed in him +is, therefore, only by impeachment. + +[170] The legislature of Massachusetts had, before Congress +recommended the national Convention, instructed its delegates in +Congress not to agree to any modification of the fifth Article of the +Confederation, which prohibited the members of Congress from _holding_ +any office under the United States, for which they or any other person +for their benefit could receive any salary, fee, or emolument. This +instruction was repealed, by the unqualified manner in which the State +accepted the recommendation for a national Convention. But it shows +the sentiment of the State on this point, and it also shows the +jealousy that was felt. + +[171] See the assertion by Mr. Mason, and the admission by Mr. +Madison, Elliot, V. 230, 232. + +[172] Butler, Mason, and Rutledge. + +[173] Two States only, Connecticut and New Jersey, voted for Madison's +amendment. June 23. Elliot, V. 230-233. + +[174] The disqualification, as applied to members of both houses, was +incorporated into one clause. Art. VI. § 9 of the draft of the +committee of detail. Elliot, V. 377. + +[175] See the debate, August 14. Elliot, V. 420-425. + +[176] There was a majority of only one State in favor of this +principle. Elliot, V. 506. + +[177] This provision received a unanimous vote. Ibid. + +[178] For the history of what have been called place-bills, see +Hallam's Const. Hist., III. 255, 256, 351. Macaulay, IV. 336-338, 339, +341, 342, 479, 480, 528. + +[179] Mr. Justice Story has suggested, that, "if it would not have +been safe to trust the heads of departments, as representatives, to +the choice of the people, as their constituents, it would have been at +least some gain to have allowed them a seat, like territorial +delegates, in the House of Representatives, where they might freely +debate without a title to vote." (Commentaries on the Constitution, I. +§ 869.) An officer of an executive department, thus admitted to a seat +in Congress, must have been placed there merely in virtue of his +office, by a special provision. He could have represented no real +constituency, and must therefore have had an anomalous position. A +territorial delegate is admitted as the representative of a +dependency, somewhat colonial in its nature, whose inhabitants are not +on an equal footing with the constituencies of the States. He has +therefore no vote. When speaking for the interests of those whom he +represents, he is in somewhat the same attitude as counsel admitted to +be heard at the bar of the House. Whether the head of an executive +department could with dignity and convenience be placed in a similar +position, admits at least of grave doubt. + +[180] Art. I. § 4 of the Constitution. + +[181] Art. VI. § 1 of the first draft. + +[182] Madison, Elliot, V. 401, 402. Journal, Elliot, I. 309. + +[183] Elliot, V. 402. + +[184] Elliot, V. 247. + +[185] Art. VI. § 10 of the first draft. Elliot, V. 378. + +[186] Massachusetts and South Carolina in the negative. + +[187] See the discussion on Art. VI. § 10 of the first draft. Elliot, +V. 425-427. + +[188] Pennsylvania and Virginia. + +[189] See Elliot, V. 507, 528, 529. + +[190] As to the other provisions of the Constitution on this subject, +see the Index, _verb._ Impeachment. + +[191] Elliot, V. 405, 406. Art. I. § 5 of the Constitution. + +[192] Elliot, V. 406. Constitution, Art. I. §§ 5, 6. + +[193] Elliot, V. 407. Constitution, Art. I. § 5. + +[194] Elliot, V. 407. Constitution, Art. I. § 5. + +[195] Elliot, V. 507, 520. Constitution, Art. I. § 3. + +[196] Ibid. + +[197] Art. I. § 2. + +[198] Constitution, Art. I. § 7. + +[199] A question has been made, whether it is competent to two thirds +of the members _present_ in each house to pass a bill notwithstanding +the President's objections, or whether the Constitution means that it +shall be passed by two thirds of all the members of each branch of the +legislature. The history of the "veto" in the Convention seems to me +to settle this question. There was a change of phraseology, in the +course of the proceedings on this subject, which indicates very +clearly a change of intention. The language employed in the +resolutions, in all the stages through which they passed, was, that +"The national executive shall have a right to negative any legislative +act, which shall not be afterwards passed by _two third parts of each +branch of the national legislature_." This was the form of expression +contained in the resolutions sent to the committee of detail; and if +it had been incorporated into the Constitution, there could have been +no question but that its meaning would have been, that the bill must +be afterwards passed by two thirds of all the members to which each +branch is constitutionally entitled. But the committee of detail +changed this expression, and employed one which has a technical +meaning, that meaning being made technical by the Constitution itself. +Before the committee came to carry out the resolution relating to the +President's negative, they had occasion to define what should +constitute a "_house_" in each branch of the legislature; and they did +so by the provision that a majority of each _house_ shall constitute a +quorum to do business. This expression, a "house," or "each house," is +several times employed in the Constitution, with reference to the +faculties and powers of the two chambers respectively, and it always +means, when so used, the constitutional quorum, assembled for the +transaction of business, and capable of transacting business. This +same expression was employed by the committee when they provided for +the mode in which a bill, once rejected by the President, should be +again brought before the legislative bodies. They directed it to be +returned "_to that_ HOUSE _in which it shall have originated_,"--that +is to say, to a constitutional quorum, a majority of which passed it +in the first instance; and they then provided, that, if "_two thirds_ +of that HOUSE shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together +with the objections, to the other HOUSE,... and if approved by _two +thirds_ of that HOUSE, it shall become a law." This change of +phraseology, taken in connection with the obvious meaning of the term +"house," as used in the Constitution when it speaks of a chamber +competent to do business, shows the intention very clearly. It is a +very different provision from what would have existed, if the phrase +"two third parts of each branch of the national legislature" had been +retained. (See Elliot, V. 349, 376, 378, 431 536.) + +This view will be sustained by an examination of all the instances in +which the votes of "two thirds" in either body are required. Thus, +"each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its +members for disorderly behavior, and, _with the concurrence of two +thirds_, expel a member." (Art. I. § 5.) The context of the same +article defines what is to constitute a "house," and makes it clear +that two thirds of a "house" may expel. That this was the intention is +also clear from what took place in the Convention. Mr. Madison +objected to the provision as it stood on the report of the committee, +by which a mere _majority_ of a quorum was empowered to expel, and, on +his motion, the words "with the concurrence of two thirds" were +inserted. (Elliot, V. 406, 407.) In like manner, the fifth Article of +the Constitution empowers Congress, "_whenever two thirds of both_ +HOUSES _shall deem it necessary_," to propose amendments to the +Constitution. The term "house" is here used as synonymous with a +quorum. + +It has been suggested, however, that the use of a positive expression, +in relation to the action of the Senate upon treaties, throws some +doubt upon the meaning of the term "two thirds," as used in other +parts of the Constitution. A treaty requires the concurrence of "two +thirds of the senators _present_"; and it has been argued that the +omission of this term in the other cases shows that two thirds of all +the members are required in those cases. But it is to be remembered, +that the Constitution makes a general provision as to what shall +constitute a house for the transaction of business; that when it means +that a particular function shall not be performed by such a house, or +quorum, it establishes the exception by a particular provision, as +when it requires two thirds of all the States to be present in the +House of Representatives on the choice of a President, and makes a +majority of all the States necessary to a choice; and that whether the +function of the Senate in approving treaties is or is not a part of +the business which under the general provision is required to be done +in a "house" or quorum consisting of a majority of all the members, +the Constitution does not speak of this function as being done by a +"house," but it speaks of the "advice and consent of the _Senate_," to +be given "by two thirds of the senators _present_." The use of the +term "present" was necessary, therefore, in this connection, because +no term had preceded it which would guide the construction to the +conclusion intended; but in the other cases, the previous use of the +term "house," defined to be a majority of all the members, determines +the sense in which the term "two thirds" is to be understood, and +makes it, as I humbly conceive, two thirds of a constitutional quorum. + +[200] _Ante_, Vol. I. 220, note, 226, note. + +[201] October 6, 1783, Journals, VIII. 423. + +[202] October 8. Ibid. 424, 425. + +[203] December 10, 11, 1784. Journals, X. 16-18. + +[204] December 20, 21. Ibid. 23, 24. + +[205] Passed December 23. Ibid. 29. + +[206] They removed from it October 2, 1788, on a notice from the Mayor +of the city that repairs were to be made. + +[207] See _ante_, Vol. I. pp. 358-361. + +[208] See the conversation reported by Madison, Elliot, V. 374. + +[209] Elliot, V. 409, 410. See _post_, as to the power of the +President to assemble and adjourn Congress. + +[210] Mr. Justice Story has stated in his Commentaries (§ 829), that +this clause came into the Constitution in the _revised_ draft, near +the close of the Convention, and was silently adopted, without +opposition. This is a mistake. The clause was contained in the draft +of the committee of detail, and was modified as stated in the text, on +the 7th of August, after a full debate. Elliot, V. 377, 383-385. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL, CONTINUED.--THE POWERS OF +CONGRESS.--THE GRAND COMPROMISES OF THE CONSTITUTION RESPECTING +COMMERCE, EXPORTS, AND THE SLAVE-TRADE. + + +In the examination which has thus far been made of the process of +forming the Constitution, the reader will have noticed the absence of +any express provisions concerning the regulation of commerce, and the +obtaining of revenues. A system of government had been framed, +embracing a national legislature, in which the mode of representation +alone had been determined with precision. The powers of this +legislature had been described only in very general terms. It was to +have "the legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation," +and the power "to legislate in all cases for the general interests of +the Union, and also in those to which the States were separately +incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be +interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation." + +It might undoubtedly have been considered that, as the want of a power +in the Confederation to make uniform commercial regulations affecting +the foreign and domestic relations of the States was one of the +principal causes of the assembling of this Convention, such a power +was implied in the terms of the resolution, which had declared the +general principles on which the authority of the national legislature +ought to be regulated. Still, it remained to be determined what kind +of regulation of commerce was required by "the general interests of +the Union," or how far the States were incompetent, by their separate +legislation, to deal with the interests of commerce so as to promote +"the harmony of the United States." In the same way, a power to obtain +revenues might be implied on the same general principles. But whether +the commercial power foreshadowed in these broad declarations was to +be limited or unlimited; whether there were any special objects or +interests to which it was not to extend; and whether the revenues of +the government were to be derived from imposts laid at pleasure upon +imports or exports, or both; whether they might be derived from +excises on the manufactures or produce of the country; whether its +power of direct taxation was to be exercised under further limitations +than those already agreed upon for the apportionment of direct taxes +among the States;--all these details were as yet entirely unsettled. + +Two subjects, one of which might fall within a general commercial +power, and the other within a general power to raise revenues, had +already been incidentally alluded to, and both were likely to create +great embarrassment. General Pinckney had twice given notice that +South Carolina could not accede to the new Union proposed, if it +possessed a power to tax exports.[211] It had also become apparent, in +the discussions and arrangements respecting the apportionment of +representatives, that the possible encouragement of the slave-trade, +which might follow an admission of the blacks into the rule of +representation, was one great obstacle, in the view of the Northern +States, to such an admission; and at the same time, that it was very +doubtful whether all the Southern States would surrender to the +general government the power to prohibit that trade.[212] The +compromise which had already taken place on the subject of +representation had settled the principles on which that difficult +matter was to be arranged. But the power to increase the slave +populations by continued importation had not been agreed to be +surrendered; and unless some satisfactory and reasonable adjustment +could be made on this subject, there could be no probability that the +Constitution would be finally ratified by the people of the Northern +States.[213] It is necessary, therefore, to look carefully at these +two subjects, namely, the taxation of exports and the prohibition of +the slave-trade. + +That a power to lay taxes or duties on exported products belongs to +every government possessing a general authority to select the objects +from which its revenues are to be derived, is a proposition which +admits of little doubt. It is not to be doubted, either, that it is a +power which may be attended with great benefit, not only for purposes +of revenue, but for the encouragement of manufactures; and it is clear +that it may often be used as a means of controlling the commercial +policy of other countries, when applied to articles which they cannot +produce, but which they must consume. A government that is destitute +of this power is not armed with the most complete and effectual means +for counteracting the regulations of foreign countries that bear +heavily upon the industrial pursuits of its people, although it may +have other and sufficient sources of revenue; and therefore, until an +unrestricted commercial intercourse and a free exchange of commodities +become the general policy of the world, to deny to any government a +power over the exported products of its own country, is to place it at +some disadvantage with all commercial nations that possess the power +to enhance the price of commodities which they themselves produce. + +But, on the other hand, the practice of taxing the products of a +country, as they pass out of its limits to enter into the consumption +of other nations, can be beneficially exercised only by a government +that can select and arrange the objects of such taxation so as to do +nearly equal justice to all its producing interests. If, for example, +the article of wine were produced only by a single province of France, +and all the other provinces produced no commodities sought for by +other nations, an export duty upon wine would fall wholly upon the +single province where it was produced, and would place its production +at an unequal competition with the wines of other countries. But +France produces a variety of wines, the growth of many different +provinces; and therefore, in the adjustment of an export duty upon +wines, the government of that country, after a due regard to the +demand for each kind or class of this commodity, has chiefly to +consider the effect of such a tax in the competition with the same +commodity produced by other nations. + +At the time of the formation of the Constitution of the United States, +there was not a single production, common to all the States, of +sufficient importance to become an article of general exportation. +Indeed, there were no commodities produced for exportation by so many +of the States, that a tax or duty imposed upon them on leaving the +country would operate with anything like equality even in different +sections of the Union. In fact, from the extreme northern to the +extreme southern boundary of the Union, the exports were so various, +both in kind and amount, that a tax imposed on an article the produce +of the South could not be balanced by a tax imposed upon an article +produced or manufactured at the North. How, for example, could the +burden of an export duty on the tobacco of Virginia, or the rice or +indigo of South Carolina, be equalized by a similar duty on the lumber +or fish or flour of other States? Possibly, after long experience and +the accumulation of the necessary statistics, an approach towards an +equality of such burdens might have been made; but it could never have +become more than an unsatisfactory approximation; and while the effect +of such a tax at one end of the Union on the demand for the commodity +subjected to it might be estimated,--because the opportunity for other +nations to supply themselves elsewhere might be so precise as to be +easily measured,--its effect at the other end of the Union, on another +commodity, might be wholly uncertain, because the demand from abroad +might be influenced by new sources of supply, or might from accidental +causes continue to be nearly the same as before. + +However theoretically correct it might have been, therefore, to confer +on the general government the same authority to tax exports as to +impose duties on imported commodities,--and the argument for it drawn +from the necessities for revenue and protection of manufactures was +exceedingly strong,--the actual situation of the country made it quite +impracticable to obtain the consent of some of the States to a full +and complete revenue power. Several of the most important persons in +the Convention were strongly in favor of it. Washington, Madison, +Wilson, Gouverneur Morris, and Dickinson are known to have held the +opinion, that the government would be incomplete, without a power to +tax exports as well as imports. But the decided stand taken by South +Carolina, whose exports for a single year were said by General +Pinckney to have amounted to £600,000, the fruit of the labor of her +slaves, probably led the committee of detail to insert in their report +of a draft of the Constitution a distinct prohibition against laying +any tax or duty on articles exported from any State. + +A similar question, in relation to the extent of the commercial power, +was destined to arise out of the relations of the different States to +the slave-trade. If the power to regulate commerce, that might be +conferred upon the general government, was to be universal and +unlimited, it must include the right to prohibit the importation of +slaves. If the right to sanction or tolerate the importation of +slaves, which, like all other political rights, belonged to the people +of the several States as sovereign communities, was to be retained by +them as an exception from the commercial power which they might confer +upon the national legislature, that exception must be clearly and +definitely established. For several reasons, the question was +necessarily to be met, as soon as the character and extent of the +commercial power should come into discussion. While the trade had been +prohibited by all the other States, including Virginia and Maryland, +it had only been subjected to a duty by North Carolina, and was +subjected to a similar discouragement by South Carolina and Georgia. +The basis of representation in the national legislature, in which it +had been agreed that the slaves should be included in a certain ratio, +created a strong political motive with the Northern States to obtain +for the general government a power to prevent further importations. It +was fortunate that this motive existed; for the honor and reputation +of the country were concerned to put an end to this traffic. No other +nation, it was true, had at that time abolished it; but here were the +assembled States of America, engaged in framing a Constitution of +government, that ought, if the American character was to be consistent +with the principles of the American Revolution, to go as far in the +recognition of human rights as the circumstances of their actual +situation would admit. What was practicable to be done, from +considerations of humanity, and all that could be successfully done, +was the measure of their duty as statesmen, admitted and acted upon by +the framers of the Constitution, including many of those who +represented slaveholding constituencies, as well as the +representatives of States that had either abolished both the traffic +in slaves and the institution itself, or were obviously destined to do +it. + +This just and necessary rule of action, however, which limited their +efforts to what the actual circumstances of the country would permit, +made a clear distinction between a prohibition of the future +importation of slaves, and the manumission of those already in the +country. The former could be accomplished, if the consent of the +people of the States could be obtained, without trenching on their +sovereign control over the condition of all persons within their +respective limits. It involved only the surrender of a right to add to +the numbers of their slaves by continued importations. But the power +to determine whether the slaves then within their limits should remain +in that condition, could not be surrendered by the people of the +States, without overturning every principle on which the system of the +new government had been rested, and which had thus far been justly +regarded as essential to its establishment and to its future +successful operation. + +It is not, therefore, to be inferred, because a large majority of the +Convention sought for a power to prohibit the increase of slaves by +further importation, that they intended by means of it to extinguish +the institution of slavery within the States. So far as they acted +from a political motive, they designed to take away the power of a +State to increase its congressional representation by bringing slaves +from Africa; and so far as they acted from motives of general justice +and humanity, they designed to terminate a traffic which never has +been and never can be carried on without infinite cruelty and national +dishonor. That the individuals of an inferior race already placed in +the condition of servitude to a superior one may, by the force of +necessity, be rightfully left in the care and dominion of those on +whom they have been cast, is a proposition of morals entirely fit to +be admitted by a Christian statesman. That new individuals may +rightfully be placed in the same condition, not by the act of +Providence through the natural increase of the species, but by the act +of man in transferring them from distant lands, is quite another +proposition. The distinction between the two, so far as a moral +judgment is concerned with the acts of the framers of the Constitution +upon the circumstances before them, defines the limits of duty which +they intended to recognize. + +No satisfactory means exist for determining to what extent a +continuance of the importation of slaves was necessary, in an +economical point of view, to the States of North Carolina, South +Carolina, and Georgia. There is some reason to suppose that the +natural increase of the slave population in Virginia at that period +more than supplied her wants; and perhaps the less healthy regions of +the more southern States may have still required foreign supplies in +order to keep the lands already occupied under cultivation, or to make +new lands productive.[214] All that is historically certain on this +subject is, that the representatives of the three most southerly +States acted upon the belief, that their constituents would not +surrender the right to continue the importation of slaves, although +they might, if left to themselves, discontinue the practice at some +future time. + +These declarations, however, had not been made at the time when the +principles on which the Constitution was to be framed were sent to the +committee of detail. Nothing had yet occurred in the Convention, to +make it certain that the power to import would be retained by any of +the States. The committee of detail had, therefore, so far as the +action of the Convention had gone, an unrestricted choice between a +full and a limited commercial power. They consisted of three members +from non-slaveholding and two from slaveholding States;[215] but as +one of them, Mr. Rutledge of South Carolina, was one of the persons +who subsequently announced to the Convention the position that would +be taken by his own State and by North Carolina and Georgia, there can +be no doubt that he announced the same determination in the committee. +In their report, they shaped the commercial power accordingly. They +provided that the legislature of the United States should have power +to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; and to +regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States. + +But they also reported several restrictions upon both the revenue and +commercial powers. Besides providing, in accordance with the ninth +resolution adopted by the Convention, that direct taxation should be +proportioned among the States according to the census, to be taken by +a particular rule, they added the further restrictions, that no tax or +duty should be laid by the national legislature on articles exported +from any State, nor on the migration or importation of such persons as +the several States might think proper to admit; that such migration or +importation should not be prohibited; that no capitation tax should be +laid, unless in proportion to the census; and that no navigation act +should be passed without the assent of two thirds of the members +present in each house. + +That the new government must have a direct revenue power, was +generally conceded, and it was also generally admitted that it must +have a power to regulate commerce with foreign countries. But the idea +was more or less prevalent among the Southern statesmen, that the +interest of their own States, considered as a distinct and separate +interest from that of the commercial States, did not require a +regulation of commerce by the general government. It is not easy to +determine to what extent these views were correct. Taking into +consideration nothing more than the fact, that the staple production +of Virginia was tobacco, as it was also partly that of North Carolina; +that rice and indigo were the great products of South Carolina and +Georgia; and that neither of these four States possessed a large +amount of shipping;--it might certainly be considered that an +unrestricted foreign intercourse was important to them. + +But, on the other hand, if those States, by clothing the Union with a +power to regulate commerce, were likely to subject themselves to a +temporary rise of freights, the measures which might have that effect +would also tend directly to increase Southern as well as Northern +shipping, to augment the commercial marine of the whole country, and +thus to increase its general maritime strength. The general security +thus promoted was as important to one class of States as to another. +The increase of the coasting trade would also increase the consumption +of the produce of all the States. The great benefit, however, to be +derived from a national regulation of commerce,--a benefit in which +all the States would equally share, whatever might be their +productions,--was undoubtedly the removal of the existing and +injurious retaliations which the States had hitherto practised against +each other.[216] + +Still, these advantages were indirect or incidental. The immediate and +palpable commercial interests of different portions of the Union, +regarded in the mass, were not identical; and it was in one sense +true, that the power of regulating commerce was a concession on the +part of the Southern States to the Northern, for which they might +reasonably expect equivalent advantages, or which they might +reasonably desire to qualify by some restriction. + +On the reception of the report of the committee of detail, and when +the article relating to representation was reached, the consequences +of agreeing that the slaves should be computed in the rule, taken in +connection with an unrestrained power in the States to increase the +slave populations by further importation, and with the exemption of +exports from taxation, became more prominent, and more likely to +produce serious dissatisfaction. The concession of the slave +representation had been made by some of the Northern members, in the +hope that it might be the means of strengthening the plan of +government, and of procuring for it full powers both of revenue and of +commercial regulation. But now, it appeared that, as to two very +important points, the hands of the national legislature were to be +absolutely tied. The importation of slaves could not be prohibited; +exports could not be taxed. These restrictions seemed to many to have +an inevitable tendency to defeat the great primary purposes of a +national government. All must agree, that defence against foreign +invasion and against internal sedition was one of the principal +objects for which such a government was to be established. Were all +the States then to be bound to defend each, and was each to be at +liberty to introduce a weakness which would increase both its own and +the general danger, and at the same time to withhold the compensation +for the burden? If slaves were to be imported, why should not the +exports produced by their labor supply a revenue, that would enable +the general government to defend their masters? To refuse it, was so +inequitable and unreasonable, said Rufus King, that he could not +assent to the representation of the slaves, unless exports should be +taxable;--perhaps he could not finally consent to it, under any +circumstances.[217] + +Gouverneur Morris, with his accustomed ardor, went further still, and +insisted on re-opening the subject of representation, now that the +other features of the system were to be made to favor the increase of +slaves, and to throw the burdens of maintaining the government chiefly +upon the Northern States. It was idle, he declared, to say that direct +taxation might be levied upon the slaveholding States in proportion to +their representative population: for the general government could +never stretch out its hand, and put it directly into the pockets of +the people, over so vast a country. Its revenues must be derived from +exports, imports, and excises. He therefore would not consent to the +sacrifices demanded, and moved the insertion of the word "free" before +the word "inhabitants," in the article regulating the basis of +representation.[218] + +But there were few men in the Convention bold enough to hazard the +consequences of unsettling an arrangement, which had cost so much +labor and anxiety; which had been made as nearly correct in theory as +the circumstances of the case would allow; and which was, in truth, +the best practical solution of a great difficulty. Mr. Morris's motion +received the vote of a single State only.[219] The great majority of +the delegations considered it wiser to go on to the discussion of the +proposed restrictions upon the revenue and commercial powers, in the +hope that each of them might be considered and acted upon with +reference to the true principles applicable to the subject, or that +the whole might be adjusted by some agreement that would not disturb +what had been settled with so much difficulty. + +The great embarrassment attending the proposed restriction upon the +taxation of exports was, that, however the question might be decided, +it would probably lose for the new government the support of some +important members of the Convention. Those who regarded it as right +that the government should have a complete revenue power, contended +for the convenience with which a large staple production, in which +America was not rivalled in foreign markets, could be made the subject +of an export tax, that would in reality be paid by the foreign +consumer. On the other side, the very facility with which such objects +could be selected for taxation alarmed the States whose products +presented the best opportunity for exercising this power. They did not +deny the obvious truth, that the tax must ultimately fall on the +consumer; but they considered it enough to surrender the power of +levying duties upon imports, without giving up the control which each +State now had over its own productions.[220] + +But there was also another question involved in the form in which the +proposed restriction had been presented. It prohibited the national +government from taxing exports, but imposed no restraint in this +respect upon the power of the States. If they were to retain the power +over their own exports, they would have the same right to tax the +products of other States exported through their maritime towns. This +power had been used to a great extent, and always oppressively. +Virginia had taxed the tobacco of North Carolina; Pennsylvania had +taxed the products of Maryland, of New Jersey, and of Delaware; and it +was apparent, that every State, not possessed of convenient and +accessible seaports, must hereafter submit to the same exactions, if +this power were left unrestrained. Give it to the general government, +said the advocates for a full revenue power, and the inconveniences +attending its exercise by the separate States will be avoided. But +those who were opposed to the possession of such a power by the +general government, apprehended greater oppression by a majority of +the States acting through the national legislature, than they could +suffer at the hands of individual States. The eight Northern States, +they said, had an interest different from the five Southern States, +and in one branch of the legislature the former were to have +thirty-six votes, and the latter twenty-nine. + +From considerations like these, united with others which would render +it nearly impracticable to select the objects of such taxation so as +to make it operate equally, the restriction prevailed.[221] The +revenue power was thus shorn of one great branch of taxation, which, +however difficult it might be to practise it throughout such a country +as this, is part of the prerogatives of every complete government, +which was believed by many to be essential to the success of the +proposed Constitution, but which was resisted successfully by others, +as oppressive to their local and peculiar interests. + +Was the commercial power to experience a like diminution from the full +proportions of a just authority over the external trade of the States? +Were the States, whose great homogeneous products, derived from the +labor of slaves, would supply no revenue to the national treasury, to +be left at liberty to import all the slaves that Africa could furnish? +Were the commercial States to see the carrying trade of the +country--embracing the very exports thus exempted from burdens of +every kind, and thus stimulated by new accessions of slaves--pass +into foreign bottoms, and be unable to protect their interests by a +majority of votes in the national legislature? Was there to be no +advantageous commercial treaty obtained from any foreign power, unless +the measures needful to compel it could gain the assent of two thirds +of Congress? Was the North to be shut out for ever from the West India +trade, and was it at the same time to see the traffic in slaves +prosecuted without restraint, and without the prospect or the hope of +a final termination? + +These were grave and searching questions. The vote exempting exports +from the revenue power could not be recalled. It had passed by a +decided majority of the States; and many suffrages had been given for +the exemption, not from motives of a sectional nature, but on account +of the difficulty that must attend the exercise of the power, and from +the conviction that such taxation is incorrect in principle. So far, +therefore, the Southern States had gained all that they desired in +respect to the revenue power, and now three of them, with great +firmness, declared that the question in relation to the commercial +power was, whether they should or should not be parties to the Union. +If required to surrender their right to import slaves, North Carolina, +South Carolina, and Georgia would not accept the Constitution, +although they were willing to make slaves liable to an equal tax with +other imports.[222] It was also manifest, that the clause which +required a navigation act to be passed by two thirds of each house, +was to be insisted on by some, although not by all, of the Southern +members. + +Thus was a dark and gloomy prospect a second time presented to the +framers of the Constitution. If, on the one side, there were States +feeling themselves bound as a class to insist on certain concessions, +on the other side were those by whom such concessions could not be +made. The chief motive with the Eastern, and with most of the Northern +States, in seeking a new union under a new frame of government, was a +commercial one. They had suffered so severely from the effects of the +commercial policy of England and other European nations, and from the +incapacity of Congress to control that policy, that it had become +indispensable to them to secure a national power which could dictate +the terms and vehicles of commercial intercourse with the whole +country. Cut off from the British West India trade by the English +Orders in Council, the Eastern and Middle States required other means +of counteracting those oppressive regulations than could be found in +their separate State legislation, which furnished no power whatever +for obtaining a single commercial treaty.[223] Besides these +considerations, which related to the special interests of the +commercial States, the want of a navy, which could only be built up by +measures that would encourage the growth of the mercantile marine, and +which, although needed for the protection of commerce, was also +required for the defence of the whole country, made it necessary that +the power to pass a navigation act should be burdened with no serious +restrictions. + +The idea of requiring a vote of two thirds in Congress for the passage +of a navigation act, founded on the assumed diversity of Northern and +Southern, or the commercial and the planting interests, proceeded upon +the necessity for a distinct protection of the latter against the +former, by means of a special legislative check. To a certain extent, +as I have already said, these interests, when regarded in their +aggregates, offered a real diversity. But it did not follow that this +peculiar check upon the power of a majority was either a necessary or +an expedient mode of providing against oppressive legislation. In +every system of popular government, there are great disadvantages in +departing from the simple rule of a majority; and perhaps the +principle which requires the assent of more than a majority ought +never to be extended to mere matters of legislation, but should be +confined to treaty stipulations, and to those fundamental changes +which affect the nature of the government and involve the terms on +which the different portions of society are associated together. + +It was undoubtedly the purpose of those who sought for this particular +restriction, to qualify the nature of the government, in its relation +to the interests of commerce. But the real question was, whether there +existed any necessary reason for placing those interests upon a +different footing from that of all other subjects of national +legislation. The operation of the old rule of the Confederation, which +required the assent of nine States in Congress to almost all the +important measures of government, many of which involved no +fundamental right of separate States, had revealed the inconveniences +of lodging in the hands of a minority the power to obstruct just and +necessary legislation. If, indeed, it was highly probable that the +power, by being left with a majority, would be abused,--if the +interests of the Eastern and Middle States were purely and wholly +commercial, and would be likely so to shape the legislation of the +country as to encourage the growth of its mercantile marine, at the +expense of other forms of industry and enterprise, and no other +suitable and efficient checks could be found,--then the restriction +proposed might be proper and necessary. + +But in truth the separate interests of the Eastern and Middle States, +when closely viewed, were not in all respects the same. Connecticut +and New Jersey were agricultural States. New York and Pennsylvania, +although interested in maritime commerce, were destined to be great +producers of the most important grains. Maryland, although a +commercial, was also an agricultural State. The new States likely to +be formed in the West would be almost wholly agricultural, and would +have no more shipping than might be required to move the surplus +products of their soil upon their great inland lakes towards the +shores of the Atlantic. All these States, existing and expectant, were +interested to obtain commercial treaties with foreign countries; all +needed the benefits of uniform commercial regulations; but they were +not all equally interested in a high degree of encouragement to the +growth of American shipping, by means of a stringent navigation act, +that would bear heavily upon the Southern planter. + +Not only was there a very considerable protection against the abuse of +its power by a sectional majority, in these more minute diversities of +interest, but there were also two very efficient legislative checks +upon that power already introduced into the government. If an unjust +and oppressive measure had commanded a majority in the House, it might +be defeated in the Senate, or, if that check should fail, it might be +arrested by the executive. + +It had, nevertheless, been made part of the limitations upon the +commercial power, embraced in the report of the committee of detail, +that a navigation act should require a vote of two thirds of both +branches of the legislature. The vote which adopted the prohibition +against taxes on exports, taken on the 21st of August, was followed, +on that day and the next, by an excited debate on the taxation of the +slave-trade, in which the three States of Georgia, North Carolina, and +South Carolina made the limitation upon the power of the Union over +this traffic the condition of their accepting the Constitution. This +debate was closed by the proposition of Gouverneur Morris, to refer +the whole subject to a committee of one from each State, in order +that the three matters of exports, the slave-trade, and a navigation +act might form a bargain or compromise between the Northern and the +Southern States.[224] But the prohibition against taxing exports had +already been agreed to, and there remained to be committed only the +proposed restriction against taxing or prohibiting the migration or +importation of such persons as the States might see fit to admit, the +restriction which required a capitation tax to conform to the census, +and the proposed limitation upon the power to pass a navigation act. +Thus, in effect, the questions to come before this committee were, +whether the slave-trade should be excepted from both the commercial +and revenue powers of the general government, and whether the +commercial power should be subjected to a restriction which required a +vote of two thirds in dealing with the commercial interests of the +Union. + +We know very little of the deliberations of this committee; but as +each State was equally represented in it, and as the position of the +different sectional objects is quite clear, we can have no difficulty +in forming an opinion as to the motives and purposes of the settlement +which resulted from their action, or in obtaining a right estimate of +the result itself. + +In the first place, then, we are to remember the previous concessions +already made by the Northern States, and the advantages resulting from +them. These concessions were the representation of the slaves and the +exemption of exports from taxation. If the slaves had not been +included in the system of representation, the Northern States could +have had no political motive for acquiring the power to put an end to +the slave-trade. If the exports of their staple productions had not +been withdrawn from the revenue power, the Southern States could have +had no very strong or special motive to draw them into the new Union; +but with such an exemption, they could derive benefits from the +Constitution as great as those likely to be enjoyed by their Northern +confederates. Both parties, therefore, entered the final committee of +compromise with a strong desire to complete the Union and to establish +the new government. The Northern States wished for a full commercial +power, including the slave-trade and navigation laws, to be dependent +on the voices of a majority in Congress. The Southern States struggled +to retain the right to import slaves, and to limit the enactment of +navigation laws to a vote of two thirds. Both parties could be +gratified only by conceding some portion of their respective demands. + +If the Northern States could accept a future, instead of an immediate, +prohibition of the slave-trade, they could gain ultimately a full +commercial power over all subjects, to be exercised by a national +majority. If the Southern States could confide in a national majority, +so far as to clothe them with full ultimate power to regulate +commerce, they could obtain the continuance of the slave-trade for a +limited period. + +Such was in reality the adjustment made and recommended by the +committee. They proposed that the migration or importation of such +persons as the several States then existing might think proper to +admit, should not be prohibited by the national legislature before the +year 1800, but that a tax or duty might be imposed on such persons, at +a rate not exceeding the average of the duties laid on imports; that +the clause relating to a capitation tax should remain; and that the +provision requiring a navigation act to be passed by a vote of two +thirds, should be stricken out.[225] + +No change was made in this arrangement, when it came before the +Convention, except to substitute the year 1808 as the period at which +the restriction on the commercial power was to terminate, and to +provide for a specific tax on the importation of slaves, not exceeding +ten dollars on each person.[226] The remaining features of this +settlement, relating to a capitation tax and a navigation act, were +sanctioned by a large majority of the States.[227] + +Thus, by timely and well-considered concessions on each side, was the +slave-trade brought immediately within the revenue power of the +general government, and also, at the expiration of twenty years, +within its power to regulate commerce. By the same means, the +commercial power, without any other restriction than that relating to +the temporary toleration of the importation of slaves, was vested in +a national majority. This result at once placed the foreign +slave-trade by American vessels or citizens within the control of the +national legislature, and enabled Congress to forbid the carrying of +slaves to foreign countries; and at the end of the year 1808, it +brought the whole traffic within the reach of a national +prohibition.[228] + +Too high an estimate cannot well be formed, of the importance and +value of this final settlement of conflicting sectional interests and +demands. History has to thank the patriotism and liberality of the +Northern States, for having acquired, for the government of the Union, +by reasonable concessions, the power to terminate the African +slave-trade. We know, from almost every day's experience since the +founding of the government, that individual cupidity, which knows no +geographical limits, which defies public opinion whether in the North +or in the South, required and still requires the restraint and +chastisement of national power. The separate authority of the States +would have been wholly unequal to the suppression of the slave-trade: +for even if they had all finally adopted the policy of a stringent +prohibition, without a navy, and without treaties, they could never +have contended against the bold artifice and desperate cunning of +avarice, stimulated by the enormous gains which have always been +reaped in this inhuman trade. + +The just and candid voice of History has also to thank the Southern +statesmen who consented to this arrangement, for having clothed a +majority of the two houses of Congress with a full commercial power. +They felt, and truly felt, that this was a great concession. But they +looked at what they had gained. They had gained the exemption of their +staple productions from taxation as objects of foreign commerce; the +enumeration of their slaves in the basis of Congressional +representation; and the settlement of the slave-trade upon terms not +offensive to State pride. They had also gained the Union, with its +power to maintain an army and a navy,--with its power and duty to +protect them against foreign invasion and domestic insurrection, and +to secure their republican constitutions. They looked, therefore, upon +the grant of the power to regulate commerce by the ordinary modes of +legislation, in its relations to the interests of a great empire, +whose foundations ought to be laid broadly and deeply on the national +welfare.[229] They saw that the Revolution had cost the Eastern States +enormous sacrifices of commercial wealth, and that the weakness of the +Confederation had destroyed the little remnant of their trade.[230] +They saw and admitted the necessity for an unrestrained control over +the foreign commerce of the country, if it was ever to rise from the +prostrate condition in which it had been placed by foreign powers. +They acted accordingly; and by their action, they enabled the States +of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia to enter the new Union +without humiliation and without loss.[231] + +Thus was accomplished, so far as depended on the action of this +Convention, that memorable compromise, which gave to the Union its +control over the commercial relations of the States with foreign +nations and with each other. An event so fraught with consequences of +the utmost importance cannot be dismissed without some of the +reflections appropriate to its consideration. + +Nature had marked America for a great commercial nation. The sweep of +the Atlantic coast, from the Bay of Fundy to the Gulf of Florida, +comprehending twenty degrees of latitude, broken into capacious bays +and convenient harbors, and receiving the inward flow of the sea into +great navigable rivers that stretched far into the interior, presented +an access to the ocean not surpassed by that of any large portion of +the globe. This long range of sea-coast embraced all the varieties of +climate that are found between a hard and sterile region, where summer +is but the breath of a few fervid weeks, and the ever blooming +tropics, where winter is unknown. The products of the different +regions, already entering, or fit to enter, into foreign commerce, +attested as great a variety of soils. The proximity of the country to +the West Indies, where the Eastern and the Middle States could find +the best markets for some of their most important exports, afforded +the promise of a highly lucrative trade; while the voyage to the East +Indies from any American port could be performed in as short a time as +from England or Holland or France. In the South, there were great +staples already largely demanded by the consumption of Europe. In the +North, there were fisheries of singular importance, capable of +furnishing enormous additions to the wealth of the country. Beyond the +Alleghanies, the West, with its vast internal waters and its almost +unequalled fertility, had been opened to a rapid emigration, which was +soon to lay the foundation of new States, destined to be the abodes of +millions of men. + +The very variety and extent of these interests had for many years +occasioned a struggle for some mode of reconciling and harmonizing +them all. But divided into separate governments, the commercial +legislation of the States could produce nothing but the confusion and +uncertainty which retaliation necessarily engenders. Different systems +and rates of revenue were in force in seaports not a hundred miles +apart, through which the inhabitants of other jurisdictions were +obliged to draw their supplies of foreign commodities, and to export +their own productions. The paper-money systems of the several States +made the commercial value of coin quite different in different places, +and gave an entirely insecure basis to trade. + +The reader, who has followed me through the preceding volume, has +seen how the people of the United States, from the earliest stages of +the Revolution, struggled to free themselves from these +embarrassments;--how they commenced with a jealous reservation of +State authority over all matters of commerce and revenue; how they +undertook to supply the necessities of a central government by +contributions which they had not the power to make good, because their +commercial condition did not admit of heavy taxation; how they +endeavored to pass from this system to a grant of temporary revenues +and temporary commercial regulation, to be vested in the federal +Union; how they found it impracticable to agree upon the principles +and details of a temporary power; how they turned to separate +commercial leagues, each with its immediate neighbors, and were +disappointed in the result or frustrated in the effort; and how at +last they came to the conception of a full and irrevocable surrender +of commercial and fiscal regulations to a central legislature, that +could grasp the interests of the whole country and combine them in one +harmonious system. + +The influence of the commercial and revenue powers, thus obtained by +the general government, on the condition of this country, has far +exceeded the most sanguine hopes which the framers of the Constitution +could have indulged. No one can doubt that the people of America owe +to it both the nature and the degree of their actual prosperity;--and +as the national prosperity has given them importance in the world, it +is just and accurate to say, that commerce and its effects have +elevated republican institutions to a dignity and influence which they +have attained through no other of the forms or the spirit of society. +Let the reader consider the interests of commerce, in their widest +relations with all that they comprehend,--the interests of the +merchant, the artisan, and the tiller of the soil being alike +involved,--as the chief purpose of the new government given to this +Union; let him contemplate this as the central object around which are +arranged almost all the great provisions of the Constitution of the +United States;--and he will see in it a wonderfully harmonious and +powerful system, created for the security of property, and the +promotion of the material welfare and prosperity of individuals, +whatever their occupation, employment, or condition. That such a code +of civil government should have sprung from the necessities of +commerce, is surely one of the triumphs of modern civilization. + +It is not to be denied, that the sedulous care with which this great +provision was made for the general prosperity has had the effect of +impressing on the national character a strong spirit of acquisition. +The character of a people, however, is to be judged not merely by the +pursuit or the possession of wealth, but chiefly by the use which they +make of it. If the inhabitants of the United States can justly claim +distinction for the benevolent virtues; if the wealth that is eagerly +sought and rapidly acquired is freely used for the relief of human +suffering; if learning, science, and the arts are duly cultivated; if +popular education is an object of lavish expenditure; if the +institutions of religion, though depending on a purely voluntary +support, are provided for liberally, and from conscientious +motives;--then is the national spirit of acquisition not without +fruits, of which it has no need to be ashamed. + +The objection, that the Constitution of the United States, and the +immense prosperity which has flowed from it, were obtained by certain +concessions in favor of the institution of slavery, results from a +merely superficial view of the subject. If we would form a right +estimate of the gain or loss to human nature effected by any given +political arrangement, we must take into consideration the antecedent +facts, and endeavor to judge whether a better result could have been +obtained by a different mode of dealing with them. We shall then be +able to appreciate the positive good that has been gained, or the +positive loss that has been suffered. + +The prominent facts to be considered in this connection are, in the +first place, that slavery existed, and would long exist, in certain of +the States; and that the condition of the African race in those States +was universally regarded as a matter of purely local concern. It could +not in fact have been otherwise; for there were slaves in every State +excepting Massachusetts and New Hampshire; and among the other States +in which measures had been, or were likely to be, taken for the +removal of slavery, there was a great variety of circumstances +affecting the time and mode in which it should be finally +extinguished. As soon as the point was settled, in the formation of +the Constitution of the United States, that the State governments were +to be preserved, with all their powers unimpaired which were not +required by the objects of the national government to be surrendered +to the Union, the domestic relations of their inhabitants with each +other necessarily remained under their exclusive control. Those +relations were not involved in the purposes of the Federal Union. + +So soon, also, as this was perceived and admitted, it became a +necessary consequence of the admission, that the national authority +should guarantee to the people of each State the right to shape and +modify their own social institutions; for without this principle laid +at the foundation of the Union, there could be no peace or security +for such a mixed system of government. + +In the second place, we have to consider the fact, that, among the +political rights of the States anterior to the national Constitution, +was the right to admit or to prohibit the further importation of +slaves;--a traffic not then forbidden by any European nation to its +Colonies, but which had been interdicted by ten of the American +States. The transfer of this right to the Federal Union was a purely +voluntary act; it was not strictly necessary for the purposes for +which it was proposed to establish the Constitution of the United +States; although there were political reasons for which a part of the +States might wish to acquire control over this subject, as well as +moral reasons why all the States should have desired to vest that +control in the general government. Three of the States, however, as we +have seen, took a different view of their interest and duty, and +declined to enter the new Union unless this traffic should be excepted +from the power over commerce for a period of twenty years. + +It is quite plain, that, if these facts had been met and dealt with in +a manner different from the settlement that was actually made, one of +two consequences must have ensued;--either no Constitution at all +could have been adopted, or there would have been a Union of some +kind, from which three at least of the States must have been excluded. +If the first, by far the most probable contingency, had happened, a +great feebleness and poverty of society must have continued to be the +lot of all these States; there must have been perpetual collisions and +rival confederacies; there certainly would have been an indefinite +continuance of the slave-trade, accompanied and followed by a great +external pressure upon the States which permitted it, which would have +led to a war of races, or to a frightful oppression of the slaves. +Most of these evils would have followed the establishment of a partial +confederacy. + +On the other hand, we are to consider what has been gained to humanity +by the establishment of the Constitution. The extinction of the +slave-trade, followed by a public opinion with reference to it that is +as strong and reliable in the Southern as in the Northern States, was +purchased at a price by no means unreasonable, when compared with the +magnitude of the acquisition. The great prosperity and high +civilization which are due to the commercial power of the Constitution +have been a vast benefit to both races;--to the whites by the superior +refinement they have created, and to the blacks by the gradual but +certain amelioration of their condition. The social strength and +security occasioned by constantly increasing wealth, combined with the +acknowledgment and establishment of the doctrine which makes every +State the uncontrolled arbiter of the domestic condition of its +inhabitants, has put it in the power of those who have charge of the +negro to deal prudently and wisely with their great problem, without +the interference of those who could benefit neither race by their +intervention. This, in every rational view of the subject, cannot but +be regarded as one of the chief blessings conferred by the +Constitution of the United States. + +It has made emancipation possible, where otherwise it would have been +impossible, or where it could have been obtained only through the +horrors of both servile and civil war. It has enabled local +authorities to adapt changes to local circumstances. Its beneficent +influences may be traced in the laws of the States, in the records of +their jurisprudence, and in the advanced and advancing condition of +their public sentiment; and he who should follow those influences in +all their details, and count the sum of what it has effected for the +moral and physical well-being of the subjected race, would find cause +for devout gratitude to the Ruler of the Universe. Great as has been +the increase of slaves in the United States during the last seventy +years, there can be no question that the general improvement of their +condition has been equally great, and that it has kept pace with the +increasing prosperity of the country. That prosperity has enabled +individual enterprise and benevolence to plant a colony upon the coast +of Africa, which, after centuries of discipline and education, may yet +be the means of restoring to its native soil, as civilized and +Christian men, a race that came to us as heathens and barbarians. + +Surely, then, with such results to look back upon, with such hopes in +the future, the patriot and the Christian can have no real cause for +regret or complaint, that in a system of representative government, +made necessary by controlling circumstances, the unimportant anomaly +should be found, of a representation of men without political rights +or social privileges; or that the question of emancipation, either for +the mass or the individual, should be carefully secured to local +authority; or even that the slave-trade should have been prosecuted +for a few years, to be extinguished by America first of all the +nations of the world. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[211] See Madison, Elliot, V. 302, 357. + +[212] See the remarks of Gouverneur Morris in the debate on the +apportionment of representatives, in which he stated the dilemma +precisely in this way. Elliot, V. 301. + +[213] No candid man, said Rufus King, could undertake to justify to +them a system under which slaves were to continue to be imported, and +to be represented, while the exports produced by their labor were not +to pay any part of the expenses of the government which would be +obliged to defend their masters against domestic insurrections or +foreign attacks. Elliot, V. 391. + +[214] See the remarks of Mr. Ellsworth and General Pinckney, as +reported by Mr. Madison, Elliot, V. 458, 459. + +[215] They were Messrs. Rutledge, Randolph, Gorham, Ellsworth, and +Wilson. I have classed Mr. Ellsworth among the representatives of +non-slaveholding States; for although there were between two and three +thousand slaves in Connecticut at this time, provision had already +been made for its prospective and gradual abolition. It was not +finally extinct in that State until after the year 1840. The United +States census for 1790 returned 2,759 slaves for Connecticut; the +census for 1840 returned 17; in the census for 1850 none were +returned. A like gradual abolition took place in New Hampshire, Rhode +Island, Vermont, New York, and Pennsylvania. In Massachusetts, slavery +was abolished by the State Constitution of 1780. + +[216] See the remarks of Mr. Madison, Elliot, V. 490. + +[217] Madison, Elliot, V. 391, 392. + +[218] Ibid. 392, 393. + +[219] New Jersey. + +[220] The opposition to a power to tax exports was not confined to the +members from North and South Carolina and Georgia. Ellsworth and +Sherman of Connecticut, Mason of Virginia, and Gerry of Massachusetts +considered such a power wrong in principle, and incapable of being +exercised with equality and justice. + +[221] The vote was taken (August 21) upon so much of the fourth +section of the seventh article of the reported draft, as affirmed that +"no tax or duty shall be laid by the legislature on articles exported +from any State." Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia +(General Washington and Mr. Madison _no_), North Carolina, South +Carolina, Georgia, _ay_, 7; New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, +Delaware, _no_, 4.--If the subject had been left in this position, +exports would have been taxable by the States. The plan of restraining +the power of the States over exports was subsequently adopted, after +the compromise involving the revenue and commercial powers of the +general government had been settled. + +[222] Elliot, V. 457-461. + +[223] See _ante_, Vol. I. Book III. Chap. IV., on the origin and +necessity of the commercial power. + +[224] Elliot, V. 460. + +[225] Elliot, V. 470, 471. + +[226] Two grave objections were made to this settlement respecting the +importation of slaves. Mr. Madison records himself as saying, in +answer to the motion of General Pinckney to adopt the year 1808, that +twenty years would produce all the mischief that could be apprehended +from the slave-trade, and that so long a term would be more +dishonorable to the American character, than to say nothing about it +in the Constitution. But the real question was, whether the power to +prohibit the importation at any time could be acquired for the +Constitution; and the facts show that it could have been obtained only +by the arrangement proposed and carried. The votes of seven States +against four, given for General Pinckney's motion, show the +convictions then entertained. The other objection (urged by Roger +Sherman and Mr. Madison) was, that to lay a tax upon imported slaves +implied an acknowledgment that men could be articles of property. But +it appears from the statements of other members, also recorded by +Madison, that it was part of the compromise agreed upon in committee, +that the slave-trade should be placed under the revenue power, in +consideration of its not being placed at once within the commercial +power. It also appears that the tax was made to apply to the +"_importation_ of such persons as the States might see fit to admit," +until the year 1808, in order to include and to discourage the +introduction of convicts. + +But the principal object was undoubtedly the slave-trade; and this +particular phraseology was employed, instead of speaking directly of +the importation of _slaves_ into the States of North Carolina, South +Carolina, and Georgia, in order, on the one hand, not to give offence +to those States, and on the other, to avoid offending those who +objected to the use of the word "slaves" in the Constitution. Elliot, +V. 477, 478. + +[227] That part of the compromise relating to the slave-trade, &c. was +adopted in Convention by the votes of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, +Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, _ay_, +7; New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, _no_, 4. Maryland, +Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia voted for a proposition made by +C. Pinckney, to postpone the report, in order to take up a clause +requiring all commercial regulations to be passed by two thirds of +each house. But on the rejection of this motion, the report of the +compromise committee, recommending that a two-thirds vote for a +navigation act be stricken out, was agreed to, _nem. con._; as was +also the clause relating to a capitation tax. + +[228] See the note on the American abolition of the slave-trade, +_ante_, Vol. I. p. 460. + +[229] See the remarks of John Rutledge. Madison, Elliot, V. 491. + +[230] General Pinckney. Ibid. 489. + +[231] The point respecting the slave-trade was insisted upon by the +delegates of those three States, both as a matter of State pride and a +matter of practical interest. They regarded the increase of their +slave population by new importations as a thing of peculiarly domestic +concern, the control of which they were unwilling to transfer to the +general government. But they also contended for a political right +which their States intended to exercise. The following table, taken +from the United States Census, shows that in the twenty years which +elapsed from 1790 to 1810 during eighteen of which the importation of +slaves could not be prohibited by Congress, the slaves of those three +States increased in a ratio so much larger than the rate of increase +after the year 1808, as to make it apparent that it was not a mere +abstraction on which they insisted. The right to admit the importation +of slaves was exercised, and was intended to be exercised;--as some of +the delegates of the three States declared in the Convention. + +PROGRESS OF THE SLAVE POPULATION FROM 1790 TO 1850, SHOWING THE +INCREASE PER CENT IN EACH PERIOD OF TEN YEARS. + + North Carolina. South Carolina. Georgia. + 1790 to 1800 32.53 36.46 102.99 + 1800 to 1810[A] 26.65 34.35 77.12 + 1810 to 1820 21.43 31.62 42.23 + 1820 to 1830 19.79 22.62 45.35 + 1830 to 1840[B] 0.08 3.68 29.15 + 1840 to 1850 17.38 17.71 35.85 + + [A] The constitutional power of Congress to prohibit the importation + took effect and was exercised in 1808. + + [B] The great diminution in the rates of increase during this period + is probably due to the removal of slaves into Alabama, Arkansas, + Louisiana, and Texas. + +But while the census shows that the power to admit slaves was +exercised freely during the twenty years that followed the adoption of +the Constitution of the United States, it also shows that the States +which insisted on retaining it for that period could well afford to +surrender it at the stipulated time. In 1810, the proportion of the +blacks of North Carolina to the whole population was 32.24 per cent, +and in 1850 it was 36.36; in South Carolina the proportion in 1810 was +48.4, and in 1850, 58.93; in Georgia, in 1810 it was 42.4, and in +1850, 42.44. It is not probable, therefore, that the prosperity of +those States has been diminished by the discontinuance of the +slave-trade; for it is not likely that they could well sustain a much +larger ratio of the blacks to the whites than that which now exists, +and which will probably continue to be maintained at about the same +point for a long period of time. + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + +REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL, CONTINUED.--THE REMAINING POWERS OF +CONGRESS.--RESTRAINTS UPON CONGRESS AND UPON THE STATES. + + +In the last preceding chapter, the reader has traced the origin of the +revenue and commercial powers, and of certain restrictions applied to +them in the progress of those great compacts, by means of which they +became incorporated into the Constitution. We have now to examine some +other qualifications which were annexed to those powers after the +first draft of the instrument had been prepared and reported by the +committee of detail. + +That committee had presented a naked power to lay and collect taxes, +duties, imposts, and excises,[232] with a certain restriction as to +the taxation of exports, the final disposition of which has been +already described; but they had designated no particular objects to +which the revenues thus derived were to be applied. The general clause +embracing the revenue power was affirmed unanimously by the +Convention, on the 16th of August, leaving the exception of exports +for future action. At a subsequent period we find the words, "to pay +the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of +the United States," added to the clause which empowers Congress to +levy taxes and duties; and it is a somewhat important inquiry, how and +with what purpose they were placed there. + +While the powers proposed by the committee of detail were under +consideration, Mr. Charles Pinckney introduced several topics designed +to supply omissions in their report, which were thereupon referred to +that committee. The purpose of one of his suggestions was to provide, +on the one hand, that funds appropriated for the payment of public +creditors should not, during the time of such appropriation, be +diverted to any other purpose; and, on the other hand, that Congress +should be restrained from establishing perpetual revenues. Another of +his suggestions contemplated a power to secure the payment of the +public debt, and still another to prevent a violation of the public +faith when once pledged to any public creditor.[233] Immediately after +this reference, Mr. Rutledge moved for what was called a grand +committee,[234] to consider the expediency of an assumption by the +United States of the State debts; and after some discussion of the +subject, such a committee was raised, and Mr. Rutledge's motion was +referred to them, together with a proposition introduced by Mr. Mason +for restraining grants of perpetual revenue.[235] Thus it appears that +the principal subject involved in the latter reference was the +propriety of inserting in the Constitution a specific power to make +special appropriations for the payment of debts of the United States +and of the several States, incurred during the late war for the common +defence and general welfare; and not to make a declaration of the +general purposes for which revenues were to be raised. Both +committees, however, seemed to have been charged with the +consideration of some restraint on the revenue power, with a view to +prevent perpetual taxes of any kind. The grand committee reported +first, presenting the following special provision:--"The legislature +of the United States shall have power to fulfil the engagements which +have been entered into by Congress, and to discharge, as well the +debts of the United States, as the debts incurred by the several +States during the late war for the common defence and general +welfare."[236] On the following day, the committee of detail presented +a report, recommending that at the end of the clause already adopted, +which contained the grant of the revenue power, the following words +should be added: "for payment of the debts and necessary expenses of +the United States; provided that no law for raising any branch of +revenue, except what may be specially appropriated for the payment of +interest on debts or loans, shall continue in force for more than +----years."[237] + +Two distinct propositions were thus before the Convention. One of them +contemplated a qualification of the revenue power, the other did not. +One was to give authority to Congress to pay the revolutionary debt, +both of the United States and of the States, and to fulfil all the +engagements of the Confederation; the other was to declare that +revenues were to be raised and taxes levied for the purpose of paying +the debts and necessary expenses of the United States, limiting all +revenue laws, excepting those which were to appropriate specific funds +to the payment of interest on debts or loans, to a term of years. When +these propositions came to be acted upon, that reported by the grand +committee was modified into the declaration that "all debts contracted +and engagements entered into, by or under the authority of Congress, +shall be as valid against the United States, under this Constitution, +as under the Confederation." The State debts were thus left out; the +declaration was prefixed, as an amendment, to the clause which granted +the revenue power, and was thus obviously no qualification of that +power.[238] + +But it was thought by Mr. Sherman, that the clause for laying taxes +and duties ought to have connected with it an express provision for +the payment of the old debts; and he accordingly moved to add to that +clause the words, "for the payment of said debts, and for the +defraying the expenses that shall be incurred for the common defence +and general welfare." This was regarded by the Convention as +unnecessary, and was therefore not adopted.[239] But the provision +reported by the committee of detail, which was intended as a +qualification of the revenue power, by declaring the objects for which +taxes and duties were to be levied, had not yet been acted upon, and +on the 31st of August, this, with all other matters not disposed of, +was referred to a new grand committee, who, on the 4th of September, +introduced an amendment to the revenue clause, which made it read as +follows:--"The legislature shall have power to lay and collect taxes, +duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the +common defence and general welfare of the United States." This +amendment was unanimously adopted;[240] and when the Constitution was +revised, at the close of the proceedings, the declaration which made +the debts and engagements of the Confederation obligatory upon the new +Congress, was separated from the context of the revenue clause, and +placed by itself in the _sixth_ article. + +There is one other restraint upon the revenue, as well as upon the +commercial power, the history of which now demands our inquiries. But +in order to understand it correctly, it will be necessary for the +reader to recur to the position in which the revenue and commercial +powers were left by the sectional compromises described in the last +chapter. The struggle between the Northern and the Southern States +concerning the limitations of those powers turned, as we have seen, on +certain restrictions desired by the latter. They wished to have +exports excepted out of the revenue power; they wished to have a vote +of two thirds made necessary to the passage of any commercial +regulation; and three of them wished to have the slave-trade excepted +from both the revenue and the commercial powers. We have seen that the +result of the sectional compromises was to leave the commercial and +revenue powers unlimited, excepting by the saving in relation to the +slave-trade; that they left the revenue power unlimited, excepting by +the restriction concerning exports and a capitation tax; and that the +commercial power was to be exercised, like other legislative powers, +by a majority in Congress. General commercial and revenue powers, +then, without other restrictions than these, would enable Congress to +collect their revenues where they should see fit, without obliging +them to adopt the old ports of entry of the States, or to consider the +place where a cargo was to be unladen. They might have custom-houses +in only one place in each State, or in only such States as they might +choose to select, and might thus compel vessels bound from or to all +the other States to clear or enter at those places. But, on the other +hand, a constitutional provision which would require them to establish +custom-houses at the old ports of entry of the States, without leaving +them at liberty to establish other ports of entry, or to compel +vessels to receive on board revenue officers before they had reached +their ports of destination, would create opportunities and facilities +for smuggling. + +It appears that the people of Maryland felt some apprehension that an +unrestricted power to make commercial and fiscal regulations might +result in compelling vessels bound to or from Baltimore to enter or +clear at Norfolk, or some other port in Virginia. The delegates of +Maryland accordingly introduced a proposition, which embraced two +ideas; first, that Congress shall not oblige vessels, domestic or +foreign, to enter or pay duties or imposts in any other State than in +that to which they may be bound, or to clear from any other State than +that in which their cargoes may be laden; secondly, that Congress +shall not induce vessels to enter or clear in one State in preference +to another, by any privileges or immunities.[241] This proposition +became the basis of that clause of the Constitution, which declares +that "no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or +revenue to the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall +vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or +pay duties in another."[242] + +It was while this subject of the equal operation of the commercial and +revenue powers upon the different States was under consideration, that +the further provision was devised and incorporated into the +Constitution, which requires all duties, imposts, and excises to be +uniform throughout the United States. This clause, in the final +revision of the instrument, was annexed to the power of taxation.[243] + +The commercial power, besides being subjected to the restrictions +which have been thus described, was extended to a subject not embraced +in it by the report of the committee of detail. They had included in +it "commerce with foreign nations, and among the several +States";--meaning, by the former term, not to include the Indian +tribes upon this continent, but all other communities, civilized and +barbarian, foreign to the people of the United States. By the system +which had always prevailed in the relations of Europeans and their +descendants with the Indians of America, those tribes had constantly +been regarded as distinct and independent political communities, +retaining their original rights, and among them the undisputed +possession of the soil; subject to the exclusive right of the European +nation making the first discovery of their territory to purchase it. +This principle, incorporated into the public law of Europe at the time +of the discovery and settlement of the New World, and practised by +general consent of the nations of Europe, was the basis of all the +relations maintained with the Indian tribes by the imperial +government, in the time of our colonial state, by our Revolutionary +Congress, and by the United States under the Confederation. It +recognized the Indian tribes as nations, but as nations peculiarly +situated, inasmuch as their intercourse and their power to dispose of +their landed possessions were restricted to the first discoverers of +their territory. This peculiar condition drew after it two +consequences;--first, that, as they were distinct nations, they could +not be treated as part of the subjects of any one of the States, or of +the United States; and secondly, that, as their intercourse and trade +were subjected to restraint, that restraint would be most +appropriately exercised by the federal power. So general was the +acquiescence in these necessities imposed by the principle of public +law which defined the condition of the Indian tribes, that during the +whole of the thirteen years which elapsed from the commencement of the +Revolution to the adoption of the Constitution, the regulation of +intercourse with those tribes was left to the federal authority. It +was tacitly assumed by the Revolutionary Congress, and it was +expressly conferred by the Articles of Confederation. + +The provision of the Confederation on this subject gave to the United +States the exclusive right and power "of regulating the trade and +managing all affairs with the Indians not members of any of the +States, provided that the legislative right of any State within its +own limits be not infringed or violated." The exception of such +Indians as were members of any State, referred to those broken +members of tribes who had lost their nationality, and had become +absorbed as individuals into the political community of the whites. +With all other Indians, remaining as distinct and self-governing +communities, trade and intercourse were subject to the regulation of +Congress; while at the same time each State retained to itself the +regulation of its commerce with all other nations. The broad +distinction thus early established, and thus perpetuated in the +Confederation, between commerce with the Indian tribes, and commerce +with "foreign nations," explains the origin and introduction of a +special provision for the former, as distinguished from the latter, in +the Constitution of the United States. + +For although there might have been some reason to contend that +commerce with "foreign nations"--if the grant of the commercial power +had not expressly embraced the Indian tribes--would have extended to +those tribes, as nations foreign to the United States, yet the entire +history of the country, and the peculiarity of the intercourse needful +for their security, made it eminently expedient that there should be a +distinct recognition of the Indian communities, in order that the +power of Congress to regulate all commerce with them might not only be +as ample as that relating to foreign nations, but might stand upon a +distinct assertion of their condition as _tribes_. Accordingly, Mr. +Madison introduced the separate proposition "to regulate affairs with +the Indians, as well within as without the limits of the United +States";[244] and the committee to whom it was referred gave effect to +it, by adding the words, "and with the Indian tribes," to the end of +the clause containing the grant of the commercial power.[245] + +The remaining powers of Congress may be considered in the order in +which they were acted upon by the Convention. The powers to establish +a uniform rule of naturalization, to coin money and regulate the value +thereof and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and +measures, were adopted without discussion and with entire unanimity, +as they had been proposed in the draft prepared by the committee of +detail. The power to establish post-offices was extended to embrace +post-roads.[246] + +These were succeeded by the subject of borrowing money and emitting +bills on the credit of the United States; a power that was proposed to +be given by the committee of detail, while they at the same time +proposed to restrain the States from emitting bills of credit. I have +not been able to discover upon what ground it was supposed to be +proper or expedient to confer a power of emitting bills of credit on +the United States, and to prohibit the States from doing the same +thing. That the same thing was in contemplation in the two provisions +reported by the committee, sufficiently appears from the debates and +from the history of the times. The object of the prohibition on the +States was to prevent the issue and circulation of paper money; the +object of the proposed grant of power to the United States was to +enable the government to employ a paper currency, when it should have +occasion to do so. But the records of the discussions that have come +down to us do not disclose the reasons which may have led to the +supposition that a paper currency could be used by the United States +with any more propriety or safety than by a State. One of the +principal causes which had led to the experiment of making a national +government with power to prevent such abuses, had been the frauds and +injustice perpetrated by the States in their issues of paper money; +and there was at this very time a loud and general outcry against the +conduct of the people of Rhode Island, who had kept themselves aloof +from the national Convention, for the express purpose, among others, +of retaining to themselves the power to issue such a currency. + +It is possible that the phrase "emit bills on the credit of the United +States" might have been left in the Constitution, without any other +danger than the hazards of a doubtful construction, which would have +confined its meaning to the issuing of certificates of debt under the +power to "borrow money." But this was not the sense in which the term +"bills of credit" was generally received throughout the country, nor +the sense intended to be given to it in the clause which contained the +prohibition on the States. The well-understood meaning of the term had +reference to paper issues, intended to circulate as currency, and +bearing the public promise to pay a sum of money at a future time, +whether made or not made a legal tender in payment of debts. It would +have been of no avail, therefore, to have added a prohibition against +making such bills a legal tender. If a power to issue them should once +be seen in the Constitution, or should be suspected by the people to +be there, wrapt in the power of borrowing money, the instrument would +array against itself a formidable and probably a fatal opposition. It +was deemed wiser, therefore, even if unforeseen emergencies might in +some cases make the exercise of such a power useful, to withhold it +altogether. It was accordingly stricken out, by a vote of nine States +against two, and the authority of Congress was thus confined to +borrowing money on the credit of the United States, which appears to +have been intended to include the issuing of government notes not +transferable as currency.[247] + +The clauses which authorize Congress to constitute tribunals inferior +to the Supreme Court,[248] and to make rules as to captures on land +and water,[249]--the latter comprehending the grant of the entire +prize jurisdiction,--were assented to without discussion.[250] Then +came the consideration of the criminal jurisdiction in admiralty, and +that over offences against the law of nations. The committee of +detail had authorized Congress "to declare the law and punishment of +piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, ... and of offences +against the law of nations." The expression to "declare the law," &c. +was changed to the words "define and punish," for the following +reason. Piracy is an offence defined by the law of nations, and also +by the common law of England. But in those codes a single crime only +is designated by that term.[251] It was necessary that Congress should +have the power to declare whether this definition was to be adopted, +and also to determine whether any other crimes should constitute +piracy. In the same way, the term "felony" has a particular meaning in +the common law, and it had in the laws of the different States of the +Union a somewhat various meaning. It was necessary that Congress +should have the power to adopt any definition of this term, and also +to determine what other crimes should be deemed felonies. So also +there were various offences known to the law of nations, and generally +regarded as such by civilized States. But before Congress could have +power to punish for any of those offences, it would be necessary that +they, as the legislative organ of the nation, should determine and +make known what acts were to be regarded as offences against the law +of nations; and that the power to do this should include both the +power to adopt from the code of public law offences already defined +by that code, and to extend the definition to other acts. The term +"declare" was therefore adopted expressly with a view to the +ascertaining and creating of offences, which were to be treated as +piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and as offences +against the law of nations.[252] + +The same necessity for an authority to prescribe a previous definition +of the crime of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the +United States would seem to have been felt; and it was probably +intended to be given by the terms "to provide for the punishment of" +such counterfeiting.[253] + +The power to "declare" war had been reported by the committee as a +power to "make" war. There was a very general acquiescence in the +propriety of vesting the war power in the legislature rather than the +executive; but the former expression was substituted in place of the +latter, in order, as it would seem, to signify that the legislature +alone were to determine formally the state of war, but that the +executive might be able to repel sudden attacks.[254] The clause which +enables Congress to grant "letters of marque and reprisal" was added +to the war power, at a subsequent period, on the recommendation of a +committee to whom were referred sundry propositions introduced by +Charles Pinckney, of which this was one.[255] + +In addition to the war power, which would seem to involve of itself +the authority to raise all the necessary forces required by the +exigencies of a war, the committee of detail had given the separate +power "to raise armies," which the Convention enlarged by adding the +term to "support."[256] This embraced standing armies in time of +peace, and, as the clause thus amended would obviously allow, such +armies might be enlarged to any extent and continued for any time. The +nature of the government, and the liberties and the very prejudices of +the people, required that some check should be introduced, to prevent +an abuse of this power. A limitation of the number of troops that +Congress might keep up in time of peace was proposed, but it was +rejected by all the States as inexpedient and impracticable.[257] +Another check, capable of being adapted to the proper exercise of the +power itself, was to be found in an idea suggested by Mr. Mason, of +preventing a perpetual revenue.[258] The application of this principle +to the power of raising and supporting armies would furnish a salutary +limitation, by requiring the appropriations for this purpose to pass +frequently under the review of the representatives of the people, +without embarrassing the exercise of the power itself. Accordingly, +the clause now in the Constitution, which restricts the appropriation +of money to the support of the army to a term not longer than two +years, was added to the power of raising and supporting armies.[259] + +Authority "to provide and maintain a navy" was unanimously agreed as +the most convenient definition of the power, and to this was added, +from the Articles of Confederation, the power "to make rules for the +government and regulation of the land and naval forces."[260] + +The next subject which required consideration was the power of the +general government over the militia of the States. There were few +subjects dealt with by the framers of the Constitution exceeding this +in magnitude, in importance, and delicacy. It involved not only the +relations of the general government to the States and the people of +the States, but the question whether and how far the whole effective +force of the nation could be employed for national purposes and +directed to the accomplishment of objects of national concern. The +mode in which this question should be settled would determine, in a +great degree, and for all time, whether the national power was to +depend, for the discharge of its various duties in peace and in war, +upon standing armies, or whether it could also employ and rely upon +that great reservation of force that exists in all countries +accustomed to enroll and train their private citizens to the use of +arms. + +The American Revolution had displayed nothing more conspicuously than +the fact, that, while the militia of the States were in general +neither deficient in personal courage, nor incapable of being made +soldiers, they were inefficient and unreliable as troops. One of the +principal reasons for this was, that, when called into the field in +the service of the federal power, the different corps of the several +States looked up to their own local government as their sovereign; and +being amenable to no law but that of their own State, they were +frequently indisposed to recognize any other authority. But a far more +powerful cause of their inefficiency lay in the fact that they were +not disciplined or organized or armed upon any uniform system. A +regiment of militia drawn from New Hampshire was a very different body +from one drawn from New York, or Pennsylvania, or New Jersey, or South +Carolina. The consequence was, that when these different forces were +brought to act together, there were often found in the same campaign, +and sometimes in the same engagement, portions of them in a very +respectable state of discipline and equipment, and others in no state +of discipline or equipment at all. + +The necessity, therefore, for a uniform system of disciplining and +arming the militia was a thing well ascertained and understood, at the +time of the formation of the Constitution. But the control of this +whole subject was a part of the sovereignty of each State, not likely +to be surrendered without great jealousy and distrust; and one of the +most delicate of the tasks imposed upon the Convention was that of +determining how far and for what purposes the people of the several +States should be asked to confer upon the general government this very +important part of their political sovereignty. One thing, however, was +clear;--that, if the general government was to be charged with the +duty of undertaking the common defence against an external enemy, or +of suppressing insurrection, or of protecting the republican character +of the State constitutions, it must either maintain at all times a +regular army suitable for any such emergency, or it must have some +power to employ the militia. The latter, when compared with the +resource of standing armies, is, as was said of the institution of +chivalry, "the cheap defence of nations"; and although no nation has +found, or will be likely to find, it sufficient, without the +maintenance of some regular troops, the nature of the liberties +inherent in the construction of the American governments, and the +whole current of the feelings of the American people, would lead them +to the adoption of a policy that might restrain, rather than +encourage, the growth of a permanent army. So far, therefore, it +seemed manifest, from the duties which were to be imposed on the +government of the Union, that it must have a power to employ the +militia of the States; and this would of necessity draw after it, if +it was to be capable of a beneficial exercise, the power to regulate, +to some extent, their organization, armament, and discipline. + +But the first draft of the Constitution, prepared by the committee of +detail, contained no express power on this subject, excepting "to +call forth the aid of the militia in order to execute the laws of the +Union, enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and repel +invasions."[261] Possibly it might have been contended, after the +Constitution had gone into operation, that the general power to make +all laws necessary and proper for the execution of the powers +specially enumerated, would enable Congress to prescribe regulations +of the force which they were authorized to employ, since the authority +to employ would seem to involve the right to have the force kept in a +fit state to be employed. But this would have been a remote +implication of power, too hazardous to be trusted; and it at once +occurred to one of the wisest and most sagacious of the statesmen +composing the Convention, who, though he never signed the +Constitution, exercised a great and salutary influence in its +preparation,--Mr. Mason of Virginia,--that an express and unequivocal +power of regulating the militia must be conferred. He stated the +obvious truth, that, if the disciplining of the militia were left in +the hands of the States, they never would concur in any one system; +and as it might be difficult to persuade them to give up their power +over the whole, he was at first disposed to adopt the plan of placing +a part of the militia under the control of the general government, as +a select force.[262] But he, as well as others, became satisfied that +this plan would not produce a uniformity of discipline throughout the +entire mass of the militia. The question, therefore, resolved itself +practically into this,--what should be the nature and extent of the +control to be given to the general government, assuming that its +control was to be applicable to the entire militia of the several +States. This important question, involved in several distinct +propositions, was referred to a grand committee of the States.[263] It +was by them that the plan was digested and arranged by which Congress +now has the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining +the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in +the service of the United States, reserving to the States the +appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia +according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;[264]--a provision +that was adopted by a large majority of the States. The clause +reported by the committee of detail was also adopted, by which +Congress is enabled to provide for calling forth the militia to +execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel +invasions.[265] + +The next subject in the order of the report made by the committee of +detail was that general clause now found at the close of the +enumeration of the express powers of Congress, which authorizes them +"to make all laws which may be necessary and proper for carrying into +execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this +Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any +department or officer thereof."[266] Nothing occurred in the +proceedings on this provision which throws any particular light upon +its meaning, excepting a proposition to include in it, expressly, the +power to "establish all offices" necessary to execute the powers of +the Constitution; an addition which was not made, because it was +considered to be already implied in the terms of the clause.[267] + +The subjects of patents for useful inventions and of copyrights of +authors appear to have been brought forward by Mr. Charles Pinckney. +They gave rise to no discussion in the Convention, but were considered +in a grand committee, with other matters, and there is no account of +the views which they took of this interesting branch of the powers of +Congress. We know, however, historically, that these were powers not +only possessed by all the States, but exercised by some of them, +before the Constitution of the United States was formed. Some of the +States had general copyright laws, not unlike those which have since +been enacted by Congress;[268] but patents for useful inventions were +granted by special acts of legislation in each case. When the power to +legislate on these subjects was surrendered by the States to the +general government, it was surrendered as a power to legislate for the +purpose of securing a natural right to the fruits of mental labor. +This was the view of it taken in the previous legislation of the +States, by which the power conferred upon Congress must of course, to +a large extent, be construed. + +Such are the legislative powers of Congress, which are to be exercised +within the States themselves;--and it is at once obvious, that they +constitute a government of limited authority. The question arises, +then, whether that authority is anywhere full and complete, embracing +all the powers of government and extending to all the objects of which +it can take cognizance. It has already been seen, that, when provision +was made for the future acquisition of a seat of government, exclusive +legislation over the district that might be acquired for that purpose +was conferred upon Congress.[269] In the same clause, the like +authority was given over all places that might be purchased, with the +consent of any State legislature, for the erection of forts, +magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings.[270] All +the other places to which the authority of the United States can +extend are included under the term "territories," which are out of the +limits and jurisdiction of any State. As this is a subject which is +intimately connected with the power to admit new States into the +Union, we are now to consider the origin and history of the authority +given to Congress for that purpose. + +In examining the powers of Congress contained in the first article of +the Constitution, the reader will not find any power to admit new +States into the Union; and while he will find there the full +legislative authority to govern the District of Columbia and certain +other places ceded to the United States for particular purposes, of +which I have already spoken, he will find no such authority there +conferred in relation to the territory which had become the property +of the United States by the cession of certain of the States before +and after the adoption of the Articles of Confederation. If this power +of legislation exists as to the territories, it is to be looked for in +another connection; and although it is not the special province of +this work to discuss questions of construction, it is proper here to +state the history of those portions of the Constitution which relate +to this branch of the authority of Congress. + +In the first volume of this work, I have given an account of the +origin of the Northwestern Territory, of its relations to the Union, +and of the mode in which the federal Congress had dealt with it down +to the time when the national Convention was assembled.[271] From the +sources there referred to, and from others to which reference will now +be made, it may be convenient to recapitulate what had been done or +attempted by the Congress of the Confederation. + +It appears that during the preparation of the Articles of +Confederation an effort was made to include in them a grant of express +power to the United States in Congress to ascertain and fix the +western boundaries of the existing States, and to lay out the +territory beyond the boundaries that were to be thus ascertained into +new States. This effort totally failed. It was founded upon the idea +that the land beyond the rightful boundaries of the old States was +already, or would by the proposed grant of power to ascertain those +boundaries become, the common property of the Union. But the States, +which then claimed an uncertain extension westward from their actual +settlements, were not prepared for such an admission, or such a grant; +and accordingly the Articles of Confederation, which were issued in +1777 and took effect in 1781, contained no express power to deal with +landed property of the United States, and no provision which could +safely be construed into a power to form and admit new States out of +then unoccupied lands anywhere upon the continent. Still, the Articles +were successively ratified by some of the States, and finally became +established, in the express contemplation that the United States +should be made the proprietor of such lands, by the cession of the +States which claimed to hold them. In order to procure such cessions, +as the means of inducing a unanimous accession to the confederacy, the +Congress in 1780 passed a resolve, in which they promised to dispose +of the lands for the common benefit of the United States, to settle +and form them into distinct republican States, and to admit such +States into the Union on an equal footing with its present +members.[272] The great cession by Virginia, made in 1784, was +immediately followed by another resolve, for the regulation of the +territory thus acquired.[273] + +This resolve, as originally reported by Mr. Jefferson, embraced a plan +for the organization of temporary governments in certain States which +it undertook to describe and lay out in the Western territory, and for +the admission of those States into the Union. In one particular, also, +it undertook, as it was first reported, to regulate the personal +rights or relations of the settlers, by providing that, after the year +1800, slavery, or involuntary servitude except for crime, should not +exist in any of the States to be formed in the territory. But this +clause was stricken out before the resolve was passed, and its removal +left the measure a mere provision for the political organization of +temporary and permanent governments of States, and for the admission +of such States into the Union. So far as personal rights or relations +were involved in it, the settlers were authorized to adopt, for a +temporary government, the constitution and laws of any one of the +original States, but the laws were to be subject to alteration by +their ordinary legislature. The conditions of their admission into the +Union referred solely to their political relations to the United +States, or to the rights of the latter as the proprietor of the +ungranted lands. + +In about a year from the passage of this measure introduced by Mr. +Jefferson, and after he had gone on his mission to France, an effort +was made by Mr. King to legislate on the subject of the immediate and +perpetual exclusion of slavery from the States described in Mr. +Jefferson's resolve. Mr. King's proposition was referred to a +committee, but it does not appear that it was ever acted upon.[274] +The cessions of Massachusetts and Connecticut followed, in 1785 and +1786. Within two years from this period, such had been the rapidity of +emigration and settlement, and so inconvenient had become the plan of +1784, that Congress felt obliged to legislate anew on the whole +subject of the Northwestern Territory, and proceeded to frame and +adopt the Ordinance of July 13, 1787. This instrument not only +undertook to make political organizations, and to provide for the +admission of new States into the Union, but it also dealt directly +with the rights of individuals. Its exclusion of slavery from the +territory is well known as one of its fundamental articles, not +subject to alteration by the people of the territory, or their +legislature.[275] + +The power of Congress to deal with the admission of new States was not +only denied at the time, but its alleged want of such power was one of +the principal reasons which were said to require a revision of the +federal system. It does not appear that the subject of legislation on +the rights or condition of persons attracted particular attention; nor +do we know, from anything that has come down to us, that the clause +relating to slavery was stricken from Mr. Jefferson's resolve in +1784, upon the special ground of a want of constitutional power to +legislate on such a question. But Mr. Jefferson has himself informed +us, that a majority of the States in Congress would not consent to +construe the Articles of Confederation as if they had reserved to nine +States in Congress power to admit new States into the Union from the +territorial possessions of the United States; and that they so shaped +his measure, as to leave the question of power and the rule for voting +to be determined when a new State formed in the territory should apply +for admission.[276] It seems, also, that although the power to frame +territorial governments, to organize States and admit them into the +Union, was assumed in the Ordinance of 1787, the Congress of the +Confederation never acted upon the power so far as to admit a +State.[277] Finally, we are told by Mr. Madison, in the Federalist, +that all that had been done in the Ordinance by the Congress of the +Confederation, including the sale of lands, the organization of +governments, and the prescribing of conditions of admission into the +Union, had been done "without the least color of constitutional +authority";[278]--an assertion which, whether justifiable or not, +shows that the power of legislation was by some persons strenuously +denied.[279] + +With regard to the powers of Congress, under the Confederation, to +erect new States in the Northwestern Territory, and to admit them into +the Union, the truth seems to be this. There is no part of the +Articles of Confederation which can be said to confer such a power; +and, in fact, when the Articles were framed, the Union, although it +then existed by an imperfect bond, not only possessed no such +territory, but it did not then appear likely to become the proprietor +of lands, claimed by certain of the States as the successors of the +crown of Great Britain, and lying within what they regarded as their +original chartered limits. The refusal of those States to allow the +United States to determine their boundaries, made it unnecessary to +provide for the exercise of authority over a public domain. But in the +interval between the preparation of the Articles and their final +ratification, a great change took place in the position of the Union. +It was found that certain of the smaller States would not become +parties to the Confederation, if the great States were to persist in +their refusal to cede to the Union their claims to the unoccupied +Western lands; and although the States which thus held themselves +back, for a long time, from the ratification of the Articles, finally +adopted them, before the cessions of Western territory were made, +they did so upon the most solemn assertion that they expected and +confided in a future relinquishment of their claims by the other +States. Those just expectations were fulfilled. By the acts of +cession, and by the proceedings of Congress which invited them, the +United States not only became the proprietors of a great public +domain, but they received that domain upon the express trust that its +lands should be disposed of for the common benefit, and that the +country should be settled and formed into republican States, and that +those States should be admitted into the Union. In these conveyances, +made and accepted upon these trusts, there was a unanimous +acquiescence by the States. + +While, therefore, in the formal instrument under which the Congress +was organized, and by which the United States became a corporate body, +there was no article which looked to the admission of new States into +that body, formed out of territory thus acquired, and no power was +conferred to dispose of such lands or govern such territory, there +were, outside of that instrument, and closely collateral to it, +certain great compacts between the States, arising out of deeds of +cession and the formal guaranties by which those cessions had been +invited, and with which they had been received, which proceeded as if +there were a competent authority in the United States in Congress to +provide for the formation of the States contemplated, and for their +admission into the Union. Strictly speaking, however, there was no +such authority. It was to be gathered, if at all, from public acts +and general acquiescence, and could not be found in the instrument +that formed the charter and established the powers of the Congress. It +was an authority, therefore, liable to be doubted and denied; it was +one for the exercise of which the Congress was neither well fitted nor +well situated; and it was moreover so delicate, so extensive, and so +different from all the other powers and duties of the government, as +to make it eminently necessary to have it expressly stated and +conferred in the instrument under which all the other functions of the +government were to be exercised.[280] + +Such was the state of things at the period of the formation of the +Constitution; and as we are to look for the germ of every power +embraced in that instrument in some stage of the proceedings which +took place in the course of its preparation, it is important at once +to resort to the first suggestion of any authority over these +subjects. In doing so, we are to remember that the United States had +accepted cessions of the Northwestern Territory, impressed with two +distinct trusts: first, that the country should be settled and formed +into distinct republican States, which should be admitted into the +Union; secondly, that the lands should be disposed of for the common +benefit of all the States.[281] + +Accordingly, we find in the plan of government presented by Governor +Randolph at the opening of the Convention, a resolution declaring +"that provision ought to be made for the admission of States lawfully +arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a +voluntary junction of government and territory or otherwise, with the +consent of a number of voices in the national legislature less than +the whole."[282] This resolution remained the same in phraseology and +in purpose through all the stages to which the several propositions +that formed the outline of the new government were subjected, down to +the time when they were sent to the committee of detail for the +purpose of having the Constitution drawn out. Looking to the manifest +want of power in the Confederation to admit new States into the +Union; to the probability that Vermont, Kentucky, Tennessee (then +called Franklin), and Maine,--none of which were embraced in any +cessions that had then been made to the United States,--might become +separate States; and to the prospective legislation of the Ordinance +of 1787 concerning the admission of States that were to be formed in +the territory northwest of the Ohio, which had been ceded to the +Union;--it seems quite certain that the purpose of the resolution was +to supply a power to admit new States, whether formed from the +territory of one of the existing States, or from territory that had +become the exclusive property of the United States. The resolution +contained, however, no positive restriction, which would require the +assent of any existing State to the separation of a part of its +territory; but as the States to be admitted were to be those "lawfully +arising," it is apparent that the original intention was that no +present State should be dismembered without its consent. But in order +to make this the more certain, the committee of detail, in the article +in which they carried out the resolution, gave effect to its +provisions in these words:--"New States lawfully constituted or +established within the limits of the United States may be admitted, by +the legislature, into this government; but to such admission the +consent of two thirds of the members present in each house shall be +necessary. If a new State shall arise within the limits of any of the +present States, the consent of the legislatures of such States shall +be also necessary to its admission. If the admission be consented to, +the new States shall be admitted on the same terms with the original +States. But the legislature may make conditions with the new States +concerning the public debt which shall be then subsisting."[283] + +In the first draft of the Constitution, therefore, there was contained +a qualified power to admit new States, whether arising within the +limits of any of the old States, or within the territory of the United +States. But in this proposition there was a great omission; for +although the States to be admitted were to be those lawfully arising, +and such a State might be formed out of the territory of an existing +State by the legislative power of the latter, yet it was not +ascertained how a State was "lawfully to arise" in the territory of +the United States. Nor was there, at present, any provision introduced +into the Constitution by which Congress could dispose of the soil of +the national domain. These as well as other omissions at once +attracted the attention of Mr. Madison, who, as we have seen, held the +opinion that the entire legislation of the old Congress in reference +to the Northwestern Territory was without constitutional authority. +Before the article which embraced the admission of new States was +reached, he moved the following among other powers:[284] "to dispose +of the unappropriated lands of the United States"; and "to institute +temporary governments for new States arising therein." These +propositions were referred to the committee of detail, but before any +action upon them, the article previously reported by that committee +was reached and taken up, and there ensued upon it a course of +proceeding which resulted in the provisions that now stand in the +third section of the fourth article of the Constitution.[285] + +The first alteration made in the article reported by the committee was +to strike out the clause which declared that the new States should be +admitted on an equal footing with the old ones. The reason assigned +for this change was, that the legislature ought not to be tied down to +such an admission, as it might throw the balance of power into the +Western States.[286] The next modification was to strike out the +clause which required a vote of two thirds of the members present for +the admission of a State.[287] This left the proposed article a mere +grant of power to admit new States, requiring the consent of the +legislature of any State that might be dismembered, as well as the +consent of Congress. An earnest effort was then made, by some of the +members from the smaller States, to remove this restriction, upon the +ground that the United States, by the treaty of peace with England, +had become the proprietor of the crown lands which were situated +within the limits claimed by some of the States that would be likely +to be divided; and it was urged, that to require the consent of +Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia to the separation of their +Western settlements, might give those States an improper control over +the title of the United States to the vacant lands lying within the +jurisdiction claimed by those States, and would enable them to retain +the jurisdiction unjustly, against the wish of the settlers. But a +large majority of the States refused to concede a power to dismember a +State, without its consent, by taking away even its claims to +jurisdiction. It was considered by them, that as to municipal +jurisdiction over settlements already made within limits claimed by +Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, the Constitution ought not to +interfere, without the joint consent of the settlers and the State +exercising such jurisdiction; that if the title to lands unoccupied at +the treaty of peace, lying within the originally chartered limits of +any of the States, was in dispute between them and the United States, +that controversy would be within the reach of the judicial power, as +one between a State and the United States, or it might be terminated +by a voluntary cession of the State claim to the Union.[288] + +The next step taken in the settlement of this subject was to provide +for the case of Vermont, which was then in the exercise of an +independent sovereignty, although it was within the asserted limits of +New York. It was thought proper, in this particular case, not to make +the State of Vermont, already formed, dependent for her admission +into the Union on the consent of New York. For this reason, the words +"hereafter formed" were inserted in the article under consideration, +and the word "jurisdiction" was substituted for "limits."[289] Thus +modified, the article stood as follows:-- + +"New States may be admitted by the legislature into the Union; but no +new State shall be hereafter formed or erected within the jurisdiction +of any of the present States, without the consent of the legislature +of such State, as well as of the general legislature." + +This provision was quite unsatisfactory to the minority. They wished +to have the Constitution assert a distinct power in Congress to erect +new States within, as well as without, the territory claimed by any of +the States, and to admit such new States into the Union; and they also +wished for a saving clause to protect the title of the United States +to vacant lands ceded by the treaty of peace. Luther Martin +accordingly moved a substitute article, embracing these two objects, +but it was rejected.[290] A clause was then added to the article +pending, which declared that no State should be formed by the junction +of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the +States concerned, as well as the consent of Congress. This completed +the substance of what is now the first clause of the third section of +the fourth article of the Constitution.[291] + +Mr. Carroll thereupon renewed the effort to introduce a clause saving +the rights of the United States to vacant lands; and after some +modification, he finally submitted it in these words: "Nothing in this +Constitution shall be construed to alter the claims of the United +States, or of the individual States, to the Western territory; but all +such claims shall be examined into, and decided upon, by the Supreme +Court of the United States." Before any vote was taken upon this +proposition, however, Gouverneur Morris moved to postpone it, and +brought forward as a substitute the very provision which now forms the +second clause of the third section of article fourth, which he +presented as follows: "The legislature shall have power to dispose of, +and make all needful rules and regulations respecting, the territory +or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this +Constitution contained shall be so construed as to prejudice any +claims, either of the United States or of any particular State." This +provision was adopted, without any other dissenting vote than that of +the State of Maryland.[292] + +The purpose of this provision, as it existed at the time in the minds +of the framers of the Constitution, must be gathered from the whole +course of their proceedings with respect to it, and from the +surrounding facts, which exhibit what was then, and what was +afterwards likely to become, the situation of the United States in +reference to the acquisition of territory and the admission of new +States. There were, then, at the time when this provision was made, +four classes of cases in the contemplation of the Convention. The +first consisted of the Northwestern Territory, in which the title to +the soil and the political jurisdiction were already vested in the +United States. The second embraced the case of Vermont, which was then +exercising an independent jurisdiction adversely to the State of New +York, and the case of Kentucky, then a district under the jurisdiction +of Virginia; in both of which the United States neither claimed nor +sought to acquire either the title to the vacant lands or the rights +of political sovereignty, but which would both require to be received +as new and separate States, the former without the consent of New +York, the latter with the consent of Virginia. The third class +comprehended the cessions which the United States in Congress were +then endeavoring to obtain from the States of North Carolina, South +Carolina, and Georgia, and in which were afterwards established the +States of Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama.[293] These cessions, as +it then appeared, might or might not all be made. If made, the title +of the United States to the unoccupied lands would be complete, +resting both upon the cessions and upon the treaty of peace with +England; and the political jurisdiction over the existing settlements, +as well as over the whole territory, would be transferred with the +cessions, subject to any conditions which the ceding States might +annex to their grants. If the cessions should not be made, the claims +of the United States to the unoccupied lands would stand upon the +treaty of peace, and would require to be saved by some clause in the +Constitution which should signify that they were not surrendered; +while the claims of the respective States would require to be +protected in like manner. + +The reader will now be prepared to understand the following +explanation of the third section of the fourth article of the +Constitution. First, with reference to the Northwestern Territory, the +soil and jurisdiction of which was already completely vested in the +United States, it was necessary that the Constitution should confer +upon Congress power to exercise the political jurisdiction of the +United States, power to dispose of the soil, and power to admit new +States that might be formed there into the Union. Secondly, with +reference to such cases as that of Vermont, it was necessary that +there should be a power to admit new States into the Union without +requiring the assent of any other State, when such new States were not +formed within the actual jurisdiction of any other State. Thirdly, +with reference to such cases as that of Kentucky, which would be +formed within the actual jurisdiction of another State, it was +necessary that the power to admit should be qualified by the condition +of the consent of that State. Fourthly, with reference to such +cessions as were expected to be made by North Carolina, South +Carolina, and Georgia, it was necessary to provide the power of +political government, the power to admit into the Union, and the power +to dispose of the soil, if the cessions should be made; and at the +same time to save the claims of the United States and of the +respective States as they then stood, if the cessions anticipated +should not be made. None of these cases, however, were specifically +mentioned in the Constitution, but general provisions were made, which +were adapted to meet the several aspects of these cases. From the +generality of these provisions, it is held by some that the clause +which relates to "the territory or other property of the United +States," was intended to be applied to all cessions of territory that +might ever be made to the United States, as well as to those which had +been made, or which were then specially anticipated; while others give +to the clause a much narrower application.[294] + +There now remain to be considered the restraints imposed upon the +exercise of the powers of Congress, both within the States and in all +other places; both where the authority of the United States is limited +to certain special objects, and where it is unlimited and universal, +excepting so far as it is narrowed by these constitutional restraints. +Some of them I have already described, in tracing the manner in which +they were introduced into the Constitution. We have seen how far the +commercial and revenue powers became limited in respect to the +slave-trade, to taxes on exports, to preferences between the ports of +different States, and to the levying of capitation or other direct +taxes. These restrictions were applicable to these special powers. But +others were introduced, which apply to the exercise of all the powers +of Congress, and are in the nature of limitations upon its general +authority as a government. + +One of these is embraced in the provision, "that the privilege of the +writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of +rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it."[295] The +common law of England, which recognizes the right to the writ of +habeas corpus for the purpose of delivery from illegal imprisonment +or restraint, was the law of each of the American States; and it +appears from the proceedings of the Convention to have been the +purpose of this provision to recognize this right, in the relations of +the people of the States to the general government, and to secure and +regulate it. The choice lay between a declaration of the existence of +the right, making it inviolable and absolute, under all circumstances, +and a recognition of its existence by a provision which would admit of +its being suspended in certain emergencies. The latter course was +adopted, although three of the States recorded their votes against the +exception of cases of rebellion or invasion.[296] + +The prohibition upon Congress to pass bills of attainder, or _ex post +facto_ laws, came into the Constitution at a late period, and while +the first draft of it was under consideration. Bills of attainder, in +the jurisprudence of the common law, are acts of legislation +inflicting punishment without a judicial trial. The proposal to +prohibit them was received in the Convention with unanimous assent. +With regard to the other class of legislative acts, described as "_ex +post facto_ laws," there was some difference of opinion, in +consequence probably of different views of the extent of the term. In +the common law, this expression included only, then and since, laws +which punish as crimes acts which were not punishable as crimes when +they were committed. Laws of a civil nature, retrospective in their +operation upon the civil rights and relations of parties, were not +embraced by this term, according to the definition of English jurists. +But it is manifest from what was said by different members, that, at +the time when the vote was taken which introduced this clause into the +Constitution, the expression "_ex post facto_ laws" was taken in its +widest sense, embracing all laws retrospective in their operation. It +was objected, therefore, that the prohibition was unnecessary, since, +upon the first principles of legislation, such laws are void of +themselves, without any constitutional declaration that they are so. +But experience had proved that, whatever might be the principles of +civilians respecting such laws, the State legislatures had passed +them, and they had been acted on. A large majority of the Convention +determined, therefore, to place this restraint upon the national +legislature, and at the time of the vote I think it evident that all +retrospective laws, civil as well as criminal, were understood to be +included.[297] But when the same restraint came afterwards to be +imposed upon the State legislatures, the attention of the assembly was +drawn to the distinction between criminal laws and laws relating to +civil interests. In order to reach and control retrospective laws +operating upon the civil rights of parties, when passed by a State, a +special description was employed to designate them, as "laws impairing +the obligation of contracts," and the term "_ex post facto_ laws" was +thus confined to laws creating and punishing criminal offences after +the acts had been committed.[298] What is now the settled +construction of this term, therefore, is in accordance with the sense +in which it was finally intended to be used by the framers of the +Constitution before the instrument passed from their hands. + +The committee of detail had reported in their draft of the +Constitution a clause which restrained the United States from granting +any title of nobility. The Convention, for the purpose of preserving +all officers of the United States independent of external influence, +added to this a provision that no person holding an office of profit +or trust under the United States shall, without the consent of +Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any +kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state.[299] + +In addition to the special powers conferred by the Constitution upon +the national government, it has imposed certain restraints on the +political power of the States, which qualify and diminish what would +otherwise be the unlimited sovereignty of each of them. These +restraints are of two classes;--a part of them being designed to +remove all obstructions that might be placed by State legislation or +action in the way of the appropriate exercise of the powers vested in +the United States, and a part of them being intended to assimilate the +nature of the State governments to that of the Union, by the +application of certain maxims or rules of public policy. These +restraints may now be briefly examined, with reference to this +classification. + +The idea of imposing special restrictions upon the power of the +separate States was not expressly embraced in the plan of government +described by the resolutions on which the committee of detail were +instructed to prepare the instrument of government. Such restrictions, +however, were not unknown to the previous theory of the Union. They +existed in the Articles of Confederation, where they had been +introduced with the same general purpose of withdrawing from the +action of the States those objects, which, by the stipulations of that +instrument, had been committed to the authority of the United States +in Congress. But the inefficacy of those provisions lay in the fact, +that they were the mere provisions of a theory. The step now proposed +to be taken was to superadd to the prohibitions themselves the +principle of their supremacy as matters of fundamental law, and to +enable the national judiciary to make that supremacy effectual. + +Almost all the restraints imposed by the Articles of Confederation +upon the States could be removed or relaxed by the consent of the +Congress to the doing of what was otherwise prohibited. In the first +draught of the Constitution, the committee of detail inserted four +absolute prohibitions, which could not be removed by Congress itself. +These related to the coining of money, the granting of letters of +marque and reprisal, the making of treaties, alliances, and +confederations, and the granting of titles of nobility. All the other +restraints on the States were to be operative or inoperative, +according to the pleasure of Congress.[300] Among these were included +bills of credit; laws making other things than specie a tender in +payment of debts; the laying of imposts or duties on imports; the +keeping of troops or ships of war in time of peace; the entering into +agreements or compacts with other States, or with foreign powers; and +the engaging in war, when not invaded, or in danger of invasion before +Congress could be consulted. The enactment of attainder and _ex post +facto_ laws, and of laws impairing the obligation of contracts, was +not prohibited at all. + +But when these various subjects came to be regarded more closely, it +was perceived that the list of absolute prohibitions must be +considerably enlarged. Thus the power of emitting bills of credit, +which had been the fruitful source of great evils, must either be +taken away entirely, or the contest between the friends and the +opponents of paper money would be transferred from the State +legislatures to Congress, if Congress should be authorized to sanction +the exercise of the power. Fears were entertained that an absolute +prohibition of paper money would excite the strenuous opposition of +its partisans against the Constitution; but it was thought best to +take this opportunity to crush it entirely; and accordingly the votes +of all the States but two were given to a proposition to prohibit +absolutely the issuing of bills of credit.[301] To the same class of +legislation belonged the whole of that system of laws by which the +States had made a tender of certain other things than coin legal +satisfaction of a debt. By placing this class of laws under the ban of +a strict prohibition, not to be removed by the consent of Congress in +any case, the mischiefs of which they had been a fruitful source would +be at once extinguished. This was accordingly done, by unanimous +consent.[302] + +At this point, the kindred topic of the obligation of contracts +presented itself to the mind of Rufus King, suggested doubtless by a +provision in the Ordinance then recently passed by Congress for the +government of the Northwestern Territory.[303] The idea of a special +restraint on legislative power, for the purpose of rendering inviolate +the obligation of contracts, appears to have originated with Nathan +Dane, the author of that Ordinance. It was not embraced in the resolve +of 1784, reported by Mr. Jefferson, which contained the first scheme +adopted by Congress for the establishment of new States in the +Northwestern Territory; and it first appears in our national +legislation in the Ordinance of 1787. Its transfer thence into the +Constitution of the United States was a measure of obvious expediency, +and indeed of clear necessity. In the Ordinance, Congress had +provided a system of fundamental law, intended to be of perpetual +obligation, for new communities, whose legislative power was to be +moulded by certain original maxims of assumed justice and right. The +opportunity thus afforded for shaping the limits of political +sovereignty according to the requirements of a preconceived policy, +enabled the framers of the Ordinance to introduce a limitation, which +is not only peculiar to American constitutional law, but which, like +many features of our institutions, grew out of previous abuses. + +In the old States of the Confederacy, from the time when they became +self-governing communities, the power of a mere majority had been +repeatedly exercised in legislation, without any regard to its effect +on the civil rights and remedies of parties to existing contracts. The +law of debtor and creditor was not only subjected to constant changes, +but the nature of the change depended in many of the States upon the +will of the debtor class, who formed the governing majority. So +pressing were the evils thus engendered, that, when the framers of the +Ordinance came to provide for the political existence of communities +whose institutions they were to dictate, they determined to impose an +effectual restraint on legislative power; and they accordingly +provided, in terms much more stringent than were afterwards employed +in the Constitution, that no law should have effect in the Territory +which should in any manner whatever interfere with or affect private +contracts or engagements previously made.[304] + +The framers of the Constitution were not engaged in the same work of +creating new political societies, but they were to provide for such +surrenders by existing States of their present unquestioned +legislative authority, as the dictates of sound policy and the evils +of past experience seemed to require. When this subject was first +brought forward in the Convention, the restriction was made to embrace +all retrospective laws bearing upon contracts, which were supposed to +be included in the term "_ex post facto_ laws." It being ascertained, +however, that the latter phrase would not, in its usual acceptation, +extend to civil cases, it became necessary to consider how such cases +were to be provided for, and how far the prohibition should extend. +The provision of the Ordinance was regarded as too sweeping; no +legislature, it was said, ever did or can altogether avoid some +retrospective action upon the civil relations of parties to existing +contracts, and to require it would be extremely inconvenient. At +length, a description was found, which embodied the extent to which +the prohibition could with propriety be carried. The legislatures of +the States were restrained from passing any "law impairing the +obligation of contracts";--a provision that has been found amply +sufficient, and attended with the most salutary consequences, under +the interpretation that has been given to it.[305] + +Bills of attainder and _ex post facto_ laws, which had not been +included in the prohibitions on the States by the committee of detail, +were added by the Convention to the list of positive restrictions, +which was thus completed. + +In the class of conditional prohibitions, or those acts which might be +done by the States with the consent of Congress, the committee of +detail had placed the laying of "imposts or duties on imports." To +this the Convention added "exports," in order to make the restriction +applicable both to commodities carried out of and those brought into a +State. But this provision, as thus arranged, would obviously make the +commercial system extremely complex and inconvenient. On the one hand, +the power to lay duties on imports had been conferred upon the general +government, for the purposes of revenue, and to leave the States at +liberty, with the consent of Congress, to lay additional duties, would +subject the same merchandise to separate taxation by two distinct +governments. On the other hand, if the States should be deprived of +all power to lay duties on exports, they would have no means of +defraying the charges of inspecting their own productions. At the same +time, it was apparent that, under the guise of inspection laws, if +such laws were not to be subject to the revision of Congress, a State +situated on the Atlantic, with convenient seaports, could lay heavy +burdens upon the productions of other States that might be obliged to +pass through those ports to foreign markets. Again, if the States +should be deprived of all power to lay duties on imports, they could +not encourage their own manufactures; and if allowed to encourage +their own manufactures by such State legislation, it must operate not +only upon imports from foreign countries, but upon imports from other +States of the Union, which would revive all the evils that had flowed +from the want of general commercial regulations. To prevent these +various mischiefs, the Convention adopted three distinct safeguards. +They provided, first, by an exception, that the States might, without +the consent of Congress, lay such duties and imposts as "may be +absolutely necessary for executing their inspection laws"; second, +that the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State, +whether with or without the consent of Congress, shall be for the use +of the Treasury of the United States; third, that all such State laws, +whether passed with or without the previous consent of Congress, shall +be subject to the revision and control of Congress.[306] There is, +therefore, a twofold remedy against any oppressive exercise of the +State power to lay duties for purposes of inspection. The question +whether the particular duties exceed what is absolutely necessary for +the execution of an inspection law, may be made a judicial question; +and in addition to this, the law imposing the inspection duty is at +all times subject to the revision and control of Congress. Any +tendency to lay duties or imposts for purposes of revenue or +protection, is checked by the requirement that the net produce of all +duties or imposts laid by any State on imports or exports shall be +paid over to the United States, and such tendency may moreover be +suppressed by Congress at any time, by the exercise of its power of +revision and control. + +In order to vest the supervision and control of the whole subject of +navigation in Congress, it was further provided that no State, without +the consent of Congress, shall lay any duty of tonnage. An exception, +proposed by some of the Maryland and Virginia members, with a view to +the situation of the Chesapeake Bay, illustrates the object of this +provision. They desired that the States might not be restrained from +laying duties of tonnage "for the purpose of clearing harbors and +erecting light-houses." It was perhaps capable of being contended, +that, as the regulation of commerce was already agreed to be vested in +the general government, the States were restrained by that general +provision from laying tonnage duties. The object of the special +restriction was, to make this point entirely certain; and the object +of the proposed exception was to divide the commercial power, and to +give the States a concurrent authority to regulate tonnage for a +particular purpose. But a majority of the States considered the +regulation of tonnage an essential part of the regulation of trade. +They adopted the suggestion of Mr. Madison, that the regulation of +commerce was, in its nature, indivisible, and ought to be wholly under +one authority. The exception was accordingly rejected.[307] + +The same restriction, with the like qualification of the consent of +Congress, was applied to the keeping of troops or ships of war in time +of peace, entering into agreements or compacts with another State or a +foreign power, or engaging in war, unless actually invaded or in such +imminent danger as will not admit of delay.[308] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[232] Art. VII. § 1 of the first draft of the Constitution. Elliot, V. +378. + +[233] August 18. Elliot, V. 440. + +[234] A committee of one member from each State. + +[235] Elliot, V. 441. To the same grand committee was afterwards +referred the subject of the militia. See _infra_. + +[236] August 21. Elliot, V. 451. + +[237] August 22. Ibid. 462. + +[238] See the proceedings which took place, August 22, 24, and 25. +Elliot, V. 462, 463, 464, 471, 475-477. + +[239] Elliot, V. 476, 477. Mr. Madison says, "This proposition, as +being unnecessary, was disagreed to"; that is, unnecessary as a +security of the _old debts_ of the United States. + +[240] Ibid. 506, 507. + +[241] Elliot, V. 478, 479. + +[242] Constitution, Art. I. §9. See the proceedings which took place +on the proposition of the Maryland delegates. Elliot, V. 478, 479, +483, 502, 545. + +[243] Elliot, V. 543. Constitution, Art. I. § 8, clause 1. + +[244] Elliot, V. 439. + +[245] Ibid. 506, 507. + +[246] Ibid. 434. Journal, Elliot, I. 245. + +[247] See the debate, and Mr. Madison's explanation of his vote, +Elliot, V. 434, 435, and the note on the latter page. + +[248] Constitution, Art. I. § 8, clause 9. + +[249] Ibid., clause 11. + +[250] Elliot, V. 436. + +[251] That is to say, it is the same crime, committed on the high +seas, that is denominated robbery when committed on the land. + +[252] Madison, Elliot, V. 436, 437. + +[253] In the clause as it passed the Convention, the offence of +_counterfeiting_ was placed with the other crimes which Congress was +to "define" and "punish"; but, on the revision of the Constitution, +counterfeiting was placed in a separate clause, under the term "to +provide for the punishment of," &c. See Art. I. § 8, clauses 6, 10. + +[254] Elliot, V. 438, 439. + +[255] Elliot, V. 440, 510, 511. + +[256] Ibid. 442. + +[257] Ibid. 443. + +[258] Ibid. 440. + +[259] Elliot, V. 510, 511. Constitution, Art. 1. § 8, clause 12. + +[260] Elliot, V. 443. + +[261] Art. VII. § 1 of the first draft. Elliot, V. 379. + +[262] Ibid. 440. + +[263] Aug 18. Elliot, V. 445. + +[264] Constitution, Art. I § 8, cl. 16. + +[265] Art. I. § 8, cl. 15. Ibid. p. 467. + +[266] Constitution, Art. I. § 8, cl. 18. + +[267] Elliot, V. 447. + +[268] See the statutes of Massachusetts and Connecticut, &c. cited in +Curtis on Copyright, pp. 77, 78, 79. + +[269] _Ante_, Chap. IX. + +[270] Elliot, V. 510, 511, 512. + +[271] _Ante_, Vol. I. Book III. ch. 5, p. 291 _et seq._ + +[272] Resolve of October 10, 1780. Journals, VI. 325. + +[273] Resolve of April 23, 1784. Journals, IX. 153. + +[274] March 16, 1785. Journals, X. 79. See _ante_, Vol. I. p. 299. + +[275] See the note on the authorship of the Ordinance of 1787, in the +Appendix to this volume. + +[276] _Ante_, Chap. IV. p. 77, note. + +[277] See the proceedings concerning Kentucky, in 1788. Journals, +XIII. 16, 32, 51, 52, 55. + +[278] The Federalist, No. 38. + +[279] The passage quoted from Mr. Jefferson, _ante_, p. 77, also shows +that strong doubts were felt in Congress, in 1784, respecting their +power to admit new States formed out of unoccupied territory. Indeed, +the whole of the proceedings upon Mr. Jefferson's measure of April 23, +1784, show that the powers of Congress over the territory that had +been acquired under the cession of Virginia were very variously +regarded by the different delegates. See Journals, IX. 138-156. The +State of South Carolina voted against the resolve on its final +passage, and after it had been modified to meet some of the objections +raised. + +[280] I think we are to understand Mr. Madison's assertion in the +Federalist,--that what had been done by Congress in relation to the +Northwestern Territory was without constitutional authority,--to mean, +that it had been done without the authority of any proper +constitutional provision. Mr. Madison himself, being a member of +Congress in 1783, voted for the acceptance of a report, by the +adoption of which Congress settled the conditions on which the cession +of Virginia was to be received by the United States. These conditions +embraced the whole of the three fundamental points, that the territory +should be held and disposed of for the common benefit of the United +States, that it should be divided into States, and that those States +should be admitted into the Union. So that Mr. Madison was a party to +the arrangement by which Congress undertook to hold out these promises +to the States. (Journals of Congress for September 13, 1783, VIII. +355-359.) But he was not a member of Congress in 1784, when Mr. +Jefferson's measure was adopted; and although he was a member in 1787, +when the Ordinance was adopted, he was at that time in attendance upon +the national Convention, and consequently never voted upon the +Ordinance. His participation in the proceedings of the Convention, by +which the necessary power was created, shows his sense of its +necessity. + +[281] See especially the cession by Virginia, of March 1, 1784. +Journals of Congress, IX. 67. Cession by Massachusetts, April 19, +1785. Journals, X. 128. Cession by Connecticut, September 13, 1786. +Journals, XI. 221. Also the resolve of Congress passed, in +anticipation of these cessions, October 10, 1780. Journals, VI. 325. + +[282] Resolution 10. Madison, Elliot, V. 128. + +[283] Art. XVII. of the draft prepared by the committee of detail. +Elliot, V. 381. + +[284] August 18. Elliot, Vol. V. p. 439. + +[285] August 29. Elliot, V. 492-497. + +[286] Ibid. 492, 493. + +[287] Ibid. 493. + +[288] See the vote on a proposition moved by Mr. Carroll for a +recommitment for the purpose of asserting in the Constitution the +right of the United States to the lands ceded by Great Britain in the +treaty of peace. New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland alone voted for +the recommitment. Elliot, V. 493, 494. + +[289] Elliot, V. 495. + +[290] Ibid. 496. New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, _ay_. + +[291] When the Constitution was finally revised, the word "hereafter" +was left out of the first clause of the third section of article +fourth, apparently because the phraseology of the clause was +sufficient, without it, to save the case of Vermont, which was +regarded as not being within the "_jurisdiction_," although it was +within the asserted _limits_, of the State of New York. + +[292] Elliot, V. 496, 497. + +[293] The cession by South Carolina of all its "right, title, +interest, jurisdiction, and claim" to the "territory or tract of +country" lying, within certain northern and southern limits, between +the western boundary of that State and the river Mississippi, was in +fact made and accepted in Congress, August 9-10, 1787, twenty days +before the territorial clause was finally settled in the Convention, +which took place August 30. (Journals of the Old Congress, XII. +129-139. Madison, Elliot, V. 494-497.) On the 20th of October of the +same year, the Congress passed a resolution urging the States of North +Carolina and Georgia to cede their Western claims. This request was +not complied with until after the Constitution had gone into +operation. The cession of North Carolina was made February 25, 1790; +that of Georgia, April 24, 1802. + +[294] It is not my purpose to enter into the argument on this +question. I have recently had occasion professionally to maintain that +the territorial clause is applicable to all territorial cessions made +to the United States, whether by States of the Union or by foreign +States, and that it clothes the government with a full legislative +power over such territories and their inhabitants, which is subject +only to the particular restrictions enumerated in the Constitution. +Perhaps it is needless for me to add that I entertain this opinion. +But it is rejected by others, and, in the present state of judicial +interpretation of this part of the Constitution, by the supreme +tribunal, it is not easy to determine what will finally become the +settled construction. + +[295] Constitution, Art. I. § 9, cl. 2. + +[296] See Elliot, V. 484. The three States were North Carolina, South +Carolina, and Georgia. + +[297] Elliot, V. 462, 463. + +[298] Elliot, V. 488. + +[299] Ibid. 467. Constitution, Art. I. § 9, cl. 8. + +[300] Articles XII., XIII. of the first draft, Elliot, V. 381. + +[301] Elliot, V. 484, 485. + +[302] Elliot, V. 484, 485. + +[303] The Ordinance, which was passed July 13, was published at length +in "The Pennsylvania Herald," a newspaper printed at Philadelphia, on +the 25th of July (1787). Mr. King's motion was made August 28, and is +described by Mr. Madison as a motion "to add, in the words used in the +Ordinance of Congress establishing new States, a prohibition on the +States to interfere in private contracts." Elliot, V. 485. + +[304] See the clause of the Ordinance, cited _ante_, Vol. I. p. 452, +note 2. + +[305] Elliot, V. 485, 488, 545, 546. + +[306] Elliot, V. 479, 484, 486, 502, 538, 539, 540, 545, 548. + +[307] By a vote of six States against four. Elliot, V. 548. + +[308] Elliot, V. 548. + + + + +CHAPTER XII. + +REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL, CONTINUED.--SUPREMACY OF THE +NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.--DEFINITION AND PUNISHMENT OF TREASON. + + +Among the resolutions sent to the committee, there were four which had +reference to the supremacy of the government of the United States. +They declared that it ought to consist of a supreme legislative, +executive, and judiciary;--that its laws and treaties should be the +supreme law of the several States, so far as they related to the +States or their citizens and inhabitants, and that the judiciaries of +the States should be bound by them, even against their own laws;--that +the officers of the States, as well as of the United States, should be +bound by oath to support the Articles of Union;--and that the question +of their adoption should be submitted to assemblies of representatives +to be expressly chosen by the people of each State under the +recommendation of its legislature.[309] + +In order to give effect to these precise and stringent directions, the +committee of detail introduced into their draft of a constitution a +preamble; two articles asserting and providing for the supremacy of +the national government; a provision for the oath of officers; and a +declaration of the mode in which the instrument was intended to be +ratified. + +The preamble of the Constitution, as originally reported by this +committee, differed materially from that subsequently framed and +adopted. It spoke in the name of the people of the States of New +Hampshire, Massachusetts, &c., who were said "to ordain, declare, and +establish this Constitution for the government of ourselves and our +posterity"; and it stated no special motives for its establishment. In +this form it was unanimously adopted on the 7th of August. But when, +at a subsequent period, the instrument was sent to another committee, +whose duty it was to revise its style and arrangement, this +phraseology was changed, and the preamble was made to speak in the +name of the people of the United States, and to declare the purposes +for which _they_ ordained and established the Constitution.[310] The +language thus employed in the preamble has justly been considered as +having an important connection with the provisions made for the +ratification of the instrument to which it was prefixed. + +The articles specially designed to assert and carry out the supremacy +of the national government, as they came from the committee, embodied +the resolutions on the same subject which had passed the Convention. +The only material addition consisted in the qualification, that the +legislative acts of the United States, which were to be the supreme +law, were such as should be made in pursuance of the Constitution. +Subsequently, the article was so amended as to make the Constitution, +the laws passed in pursuance of it, and the treaties of the United +States, the supreme law of the land, binding upon all judicial +officers.[311] + +It is a remarkable circumstance, that this provision was originally +proposed by a very earnest advocate of the rights of the +States,--Luther Martin. His design, however, was to supply a +substitute for a power over State legislation, which had been embraced +in the Virginia plan, and which was to be exercised through a negative +by the national legislature upon all laws of the States contravening +in their opinion the Articles of Union, or the treaties subsisting +under the authority of the Union.[312] The purpose of the substitute +was to change a legislative into a judicial power, by transferring +from the national legislature to the judiciary the right of +determining whether a State law, supposed to be in conflict with the +Constitution, laws, or treaties of the Union, should be inoperative or +valid. By extending the obligation to regard the requirements of the +national Constitution and laws to the judges of the State tribunals, +their supremacy in all the judicatures of the country was secured. +This obligation was enforced by the oath or affirmation to support +the Constitution of the United States;[313] and, as we shall see +hereafter, lest this security should fail, the final determination of +questions of this kind was drawn to the national judiciary, even when +they might have originated in a State tribunal.[314] + +Closely connected in purpose with these careful provisions was the +mode in which the Constitution was to be ratified. The committee of +detail had made this the subject of certain articles in the +Constitution itself.[315] But the committee of revision afterwards +presented certain resolutions in the place of two of those articles, +which were adopted by the Convention after the Constitution had been +signed; leaving in the instrument itself nothing but the article which +determined the number of States whose adoption should be sufficient +for establishing it.[316] These resolutions pursued substantially the +mode previously agreed upon, of a transmission of the instrument to +Congress, a recommendation by the State legislatures to the people to +institute representative assemblies to consider and decide on its +adoption, and a notice of their action to Congress by each State +assembly so adopting it. The purpose of this form of proceeding, so +far as it was connected with the primary authority by which the +Constitution was to be enacted, has been already explained.[317] + +What then were the meaning and scope of that supremacy which the +framers of the Constitution designed to give to the acts of the +government which they constructed? + +In seeking an answer to this question, it is necessary to recur, as we +have constantly been obliged to do, to the nature of the government +which the Constitution was made to supersede. In that system, the +experiment had been tried of a union of States,--each possessed of a +complete government of its own,--which was intended to combine their +several energies for the common defence and the promotion of the +general welfare. But this combined will of distinct communities, +expressed through the action of a common agent, was wholly unable to +overcome the adverse will of any of them expressed by another and +separate agent, although the objects of the powers bestowed on the +confederacy were carefully stated and sufficiently defined in a public +compact. Thus, for example, the treaty-making power was expressly +vested in the United States in Congress assembled; but when a treaty +had been made, it depended entirely upon the separate pleasure of each +State whether it should be executed. If the State governments did not +see fit to enforce its provisions upon their own citizens, or thought +proper to act against them, there was no remedy, both because the +Congress could not legislate to control individuals, and because there +was no department clothed with authority to compel individuals to +conform their conduct to the requirements of the treaty, and to +disregard the opposing will of the State. + +This defect was now to be supplied, by giving to the national +authority, not only theoretically but practically, a supremacy over +the authority of each State. But this was not to be done by +annihilating the State governments. The government of every State was +to be preserved; and so far as its original powers were not to be +transferred to the general government, its authority over its own +citizens and within its own territory must, from the nature of +political sovereignty, be supreme. There were, therefore, to be two +supreme powers in the same country, operating upon the same +individuals, and both possessed of the general attributes of +sovereignty. In what way, and in what sense, could one of them be made +paramount over the other? + +It is manifest that there cannot be two supreme powers in the same +community, if both are to operate upon the same objects. But there is +nothing in the nature of political sovereignty to prevent its powers +from being distributed among different agents for different purposes. +This is constantly seen under the same government, when its +legislative, executive, and judicial powers are exercised through +different officers; and in truth, when we come to the law-giving +power alone, as soon as we separate its objects into different +classes, it is obvious that there may be several enacting authorities, +and yet each may be supreme over the particular subject committed to +it by the fundamental arrangements of society. Supreme laws, emanating +from separate authorities, may and do act on different objects without +clashing, or they may act on different parts of the same object with +perfect harmony. They are inconsistent when they are aimed at each +other, or at the same indivisible object.[318] When this takes place, +one or the other must yield; or, in other terms, one of them ceases to +be supreme on the particular occasion. It was the purpose of the +framers of the Constitution of the United States to provide a +paramount rule, that would determine the occasions on which the +authority of a State should cease to be supreme, leaving that of the +United States unobstructed. Certain conditions were made necessary to +the operation of this rule. The State law must conflict with some +provision of the Constitution of the United States, or with a law of +the United States enacted in pursuance of the constitutional authority +of Congress, or with a treaty duly made by the authority of the Union. +The operation of this rule constitutes the supremacy of the national +government. It was supposed that, by a careful enumeration of the +objects to which the national authority was to extend, there would be +no uncertainty as to the occasions on which the rule was to apply; +and as all other objects were to remain exclusively subject to the +authority of the States within their respective territorial limits, +the operation of the rule was carefully limited to those occasions. + +The highly complex character of a system in which the duties and rights +of the citizen are thus governed by distinct sovereignties, would seem +to render the administration of the central power--surrounded as it is +by jealous and vigilant local governments--an exceedingly difficult and +delicate task. Its situation is without an exact parallel in any other +country in the world. But it possesses the means which no government of +a purely federal character has ever enjoyed, of an exact determination +by itself of its own powers; because every conflict between its +authority and the authority of a State may be made a judicial question, +and as such is to be solved by the judicial department of the nation. +This peculiar device has enabled the government of the United States to +act successfully and safely. Without it, each State must have been left +to determine for itself the boundaries between its own powers and those +of the Union; and thus there might have been as many different +determinations on the same question as the number of the States. At the +same time, this very diversity of interpretation would have deprived +the general government of all power to enforce, or even to have, an +interpretation of its own. Such a confused and chaotic condition had +marked the entire history of the Confederation. It was terminated with +the existence of that political system, by the establishment of the +rule which provides for the supremacy of the Constitution of the United +States, and by making one final arbiter of all questions arising under +it. + +By means of this skilful arrangement, a government, in which the +singular condition is found of separate duties prescribed to the +citizen by two distinct sovereignties, has operated with success. That +success is to be measured not wholly, or chiefly, by the diversities +of opinion on constitutional questions that may from time to time +prevail; nor by the means, aside from the Constitution, that may +sometimes have been thought of for counteracting its declared +interpretation; but by the practical efficiency with which the powers +of the Union have operated, and the general readiness to acquiesce in +the limitations given to those powers by the department in which their +construction is vested. This general acquiescence has steadily +increased, from the period when the government was founded until the +present day; and it has now come to be well understood, that there is +no alternative to take the place of a ready submission to the national +will, as expressed by or under the Constitution interpreted by the +proper national organ, excepting a resort to methods that lie wholly +without the Constitution, and that would completely subvert the +principles on which it was founded. For while it is true that the +people of each State constitute the sovereign power by which the +rights and duties of its inhabitants not involved in the Constitution +of the United States are to be exclusively governed, it is equally +true that they do not constitute the whole of the sovereign power +which governs those relations of its inhabitants that are committed to +the national legislature. The framers of the Constitution resorted to +an enactment of that instrument by the people of the United States, +and employed language which speaks in their name, for the express +purpose, among other things, of bringing into action a national +authority, on certain subjects. The organs of the general government, +therefore, are not the agents of the separate will of the people of +each State, for certain specified purposes, as its State government is +the agent of their separate will for all other purposes; but they are +the agents of the will of a collective people, of which the +inhabitants of a State are only a part. That the will of the whole +should not be defeated by the will of a part, was the purpose of the +supremacy assigned to the Constitution of the United States; and that +the rights and liberties of each part, not subject to the will of the +whole, should not be invaded, was the purpose of the careful +enumeration of the objects to which that supremacy was to extend. + +In this supremacy of the national government within its proper sphere, +and in the means which were devised for giving it practical +efficiency, we are to look for the chief cause that has given to our +system a capacity of great territorial extension. It is a system in +which a few relations of the inhabitants of distinct States are +confided to the care of a central authority; while, for the purpose of +securing the uniform operation of certain principles of justice and +equality throughout the land, particular restraints are imposed on the +power of the States. With these exceptions, the several States remain +free to pursue such systems of legislation as in their own judgment +will best promote the interest and welfare of their inhabitants. Such +a division of the political powers of society admits of the union of +far greater numbers of people and communities, than could be provided +for by a single representative government, or by any other system than +a vigorous despotism. Many of the wisest of the statesmen of that +period, as we now know, entertained serious doubts whether the country +embraced by the thirteen original States would not be too large for +the successful operation of a republican government, having even so +few objects committed to it as were proposed to be given to the +Constitution of the United States. If those objects had been made to +embrace all the relations of social life, it is extremely probable +that the original limits of the Union would have far exceeded the +capacities of a republican and representative government, even if the +first difficulties arising from the differences of manners, +institutions, and local laws could have been overcome. + +But these very differences may be, and in fact have been, made a means +of vast territorial expansion, by the aid of a principle which has +been placed at the foundation of the American Union. Let a number of +communities be united under a system which embraces the national +relations of their inhabitants, and commits a limited number of the +objects of legislation to the central organs of a national will, +leaving their local and domestic concerns to separate and local +authority, and the growth of such a nation may be limited only by its +position on the surface of the earth. The ordinary obstacles arising +from distance, and the physical features of the country, may be at +once overcome for a large part of the purposes of government, by this +division of its authority. The wants and interests of civilized life, +modified into almost endless varieties, by climate, by geographical +position, by national descent, by occupation, by hereditary customs, +and by the accidental relations of different races, may in such a +state of things be governed by legislation capable of exact adaptation +to the facts with which it has to deal. In this way, separate States +under the republican form may be multiplied indefinitely. + +Now what is required in order to make such a multiplication of +distinct States at the same time a national growth, is the operation +of some principle that will preserve their national relations to the +control of a central authority. This is effected by the supremacy of +the Constitution of the United States, against which no separate State +power can be exerted. This supremacy secures the republican form of +government, the same general principles and maxims of justice, and the +same limitations between State and national authority, throughout all +the particular communities; while, at the same time, it regulates by +the same system of legislation, applied throughout the whole, the +rights and duties of individuals that are committed to the national +authority. It was for the want of this supremacy and of the means of +enforcing it, that the Confederation, and all the other federal +systems of free government known in history, had failed to create a +powerful and effective nationality; and it is precisely this, which +has enabled the Constitution of the United States to do for the nation +what all other systems of free government had failed to accomplish. + +In this connection, it seems proper to state the origin and purpose of +that definition of treason which is found in the Constitution, and +which was placed there in order, on the one hand, to defend the +supremacy of the national government, and on the other, to guard the +liberty of the citizen against the mischiefs of constructive +definitions of that crime. No instructions had been given to the +committee of detail on this subject. They, however, deemed it +necessary to make some provision that would ascertain what should +constitute treason against the United States. They resorted to the +great English statute of the 25th Edward III.; and from it they +selected two of the offences there defined as treason, which were +alone applicable to the nature of the sovereignty of the United +States. The statute, among a variety of other offences, denominates as +treason the levying of war against the king in his realm, and the +adhering to the king's enemies in his realm, giving them aid and +comfort in the realm, or elsewhere.[319] The levying of war against +the government, and the adhering to the public enemy, giving him aid +and comfort, were crimes to which the government of the United States +would be as likely to be exposed as any other sovereignty; and these +offences would tend directly to subvert the government itself. But to +compass the death of the chief magistrate, to counterfeit the great +seal or the coin, or to kill a judge when in the exercise of his +office, however necessary to be regarded as treason in England, were +crimes which would have no necessary tendency to subvert the +government of the United States, and which could therefore be left out +of the definition of treason, to be punished according to the separate +nature and effects of each of them. The committee accordingly provided +that "treason against the United States shall consist only in levying +war against the United States, or any of them; and in adhering to the +enemies of the United States, or any of them."[320] + +But here, it will be perceived, two errors were committed. The first +was, that the levying of war against a State was declared to be +treason against the United States. This opened a very intricate +question, and loaded the definition with embarrassment; for, however +true it might be, in some cases, that an attack on the sovereignty of +a State might tend to subvert or endanger the government of the +United States, yet a concerted resistance to the laws of a State, +which is one of the forms of "levying war" within the meaning of that +phrase, might have in it no element of an offence against the United +States, and might have no tendency to injure their sovereignty. +Besides, if resistance to the government of a State were to be made +treason against the United States, the offender, as was well said by +Mr. Madison, might be subject to trial and punishment under both +jurisdictions.[321] In order, therefore, to free the definition of +treason of all complexity, and to leave the power of the States to +defend their respective sovereignties without embarrassment, the +Convention wisely determined to make the crime of treason against the +United States to consist solely in acts directed against the United +States themselves. + +The other error of the committee consisted in omitting from the +definition the qualifying words of the statute of Edward III., "giving +them aid and comfort," which determine the meaning of "adhering" to +the public enemy.[322] These words were added by the Convention, and +the crime of treason against the United States was thus made to +consist in levying war against the United States, or in adhering to +_their_ enemies by the giving of aid and comfort.[323] + +With respect to the nature of the evidence of this crime, the +committee provided that no person should be convicted of treason +unless on the testimony of two witnesses. But to make this more +definite, it was provided by an amendment, that the testimony of the +two witnesses should be to the same overt act; and also that a +conviction might take place on a confession made in open court. The +punishment of treason was not prescribed by the Constitution, but was +left to be declared by the Congress; with the limitation, however, +that no attainder of treason should work corruption of blood, or +forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.[324] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[309] These were the 1st, 7th, 20th, and 21st of the resolutions. +_Ante_, p. 190 _et seq._, note. + +[310] "We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more +perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, +provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and +secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do +ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of +America." + +[311] The Constitution, Art. VI. (See Appendix.) + +[312] July 17. Elliot, V. 322. + +[313] The Constitution. Art. VI. + +[314] Ibid. Art. III. § 2. + +[315] Articles XXI., XXII., XXIII. of their draft. Elliot, V. 381. + +[316] The Constitution, Art. VII. + +[317] _Ante_, p. 177, _et seq._ The resolutions may be found in +Elliot, V. 541 (Sept. 13). But the proceedings on them are not found +in Mr. Madison's Minutes, or in the Journal of the Convention. The +official record of their unanimous adoption was laid before Congress +on the 28th of September, 1787, and it bears date September 17th. It +recites the presence in Convention of all the states that attended +excepting New York, and in the place of that _State_ stands "Mr. +Hamilton _from_ New York." This record precedes the official letter +addressed by the Convention to Congress. See Journals of Congress for +September 28, 1787, Vol. XII. pp. 149-165. + +[318] See a speech made by Hamilton in the Convention of New York. +Works, II. 462. + +[319] 4 Blackstone's Com., Book IV. ch. 6. + +[320] Art. VI. § 2 of the first draft of the Constitution. Elliot, V. +379. + +[321] Elliot, V. 450. + +[322] The effect of these words is as if the statute read "adhering to +the enemy _by_ giving him aid and comfort," and not as if they were +two separate offences. + +[323] See the debate, Elliot, V. 447-451. + +[324] Ibid. Art. III. § 3 of the Constitution. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII. + +REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL, CONTINUED.--ELECTION AND POWERS OF +THE PRESIDENT. + + +In describing the manner in which the Constitution and powers of the +Senate were finally arranged, I have already had occasion to state, +that, after the report of the committee of detail came in,--vesting +the appointment of the President in the national legislature, creating +a term of seven years, and making the incumbent ineligible a second +time,--a direct election by the people was negatived by a large +majority. This mode of election, as a means of removing the +appointment from the legislature, would have been successful, but it +was inadmissible on other accounts. In the first place, it would have +given to the government a character of complete consolidation, so far +as the executive department was concerned, to have vested the election +in the people of the United States as one community. In the second +place, not only would the States, as sovereignties, have been excluded +from representation in this department, but the slaveholding States +would have had a relative weight in the election only in the +proportion of their free inhabitants. On the other hand, to provide +that the executive should be appointed by electors, to be chosen by +the people of the States, involved the necessity of prescribing some +rule of suffrage for the people of all the States, or of adopting the +existing rules of the States themselves. Probably it was on account of +this embarrassment, that a proposition for electors to be chosen in +this mode was negatived, by a bare majority, soon after the vote +rejecting a direct election of the President by the people.[325] There +remained the alternatives of an election by one or both of the houses +of Congress, or by electors appointed by the States in a certain +ratio, or by electors appointed by Congress. The difficulty of +selecting from these various modes led the Convention to adhere to an +election by the two houses; and when the disadvantages of this plan, +already described, had developed the necessity for some other mode of +appointment, the relations between the Senate and the executive were, +as we have seen, sent to a grand committee, who devised a scheme for +their adjustment. + +In this plan it was proposed that each State should appoint, in such +manner as its legislature might direct, a number of electors equal to +the whole number of senators and representatives in Congress to which +the State might be entitled under the provisions of the Constitution +already agreed upon. The advantages of this plan were, that it +referred the mode of appointing the electors to the States themselves, +so that they could adopt a popular election, or an election by their +legislatures, as they might prefer; and that it would give to each +State the same weight in the choice of the President that it was to +have in the two houses of Congress, provided a majority or a plurality +of the electoral votes were to determine the appointment. The +committee recommended that the electors should meet in their +respective States, on the same day, and vote by ballot for two +persons, one of whom, at least, should not be an inhabitant of the +same State with themselves; and that the person having the greatest +number of votes, if such number were a majority of all the electoral +votes, should be the President. To this part of the plan, there was +likely to be little objection. But the mode of electing the President +in case of a failure to concentrate a majority of the electoral votes +upon one person, or in case more than one person should have such a +majority, was the most difficult part of the whole scheme. The object +of the committee was to devise a process which should result in the +election both of a President and a Vice-President; and they proposed +to make the person having the next largest number of electoral votes +the Vice-President. If two of the persons voted for should have a +majority of all the votes, and the same number of votes, then the +Senate were immediately to choose one of them, by ballot, as the +President; if no person should have such a majority, then the Senate +were to choose the President by ballot from the five highest on the +list of candidates returned by the electors. If a choice of the +President had been effected by the electoral votes, the person having +the next highest number of electoral votes was to be the +Vice-President; and if there were two or more having an equal number +of electoral votes, the Senate were to choose one of them as +Vice-President. + +From the proceedings which took place upon this plan, it appears that +what many of the framers of the Constitution most apprehended was, +that the votes in the electoral bodies would not be sufficiently +concentrated to effect a choice, from want of the requisite general +knowledge of the persons who might be considered in different parts of +the Union as fit candidates for these high offices; and consequently +that the election would be thrown into such other body as might be +directed to make it after a failure in the action of the electors. It +is a remarkable proof of their wisdom, that, although intimations +began to appear in the public prints, as soon as the Constitution was +published, that Washington would be the first President of the United +States,--an expectation that must, therefore, have been entertained by +the members of the Convention before they had finished their +labors,--they were at no time under the influence of this pleasing +anticipation.[326] They kept steadily in view a state of things in +which, from the absence of statesmen of national reputation and +influence, and from the effect of local preferences, no choice would +be made by the electors. Hence their solicitude to provide for the +secondary election, in such a way as to admit of a re-election of the +incumbent. It was soon found that between the President and the Senate +there would be a mutual connection and influence, which would be +productive of serious evils, whether he were to be made eligible or +ineligible a second time, if the Senate were to have the appointment +after the electors had failed to make a choice. To remedy this, many +of the members, among whom was Hamilton, preferred to let the highest +number of electoral votes, whether a majority or not, appoint the +President. As the grand committee had proposed to reduce the term of +office from seven to four years, and to strike out the clause making +the incumbent ineligible,--a change which met the approbation of a +large majority of the States,--it became still more necessary to +prevent any resort to the Senate for a secondary election. But an +appointment by less than a majority of the electoral votes presented, +on the other hand, the serious objection that the President might owe +his appointment to a minority of the States. To preserve, as far as +possible, a federal character for the government, in some of its +departments, was justly regarded as a point of great importance. One +branch of the legislature had become a depositary of the democratic +power of a majority of the people of the United States;--the other +branch was the representative of the States in their corporate +capacities;--the President was to be in some sense a third branch of +the legislative power, by means of his limited control over the +enactment of laws;--and it was, therefore, something more than a mere +question of convenience, whether he should, at the final stage of the +process, be elected by a less number than a majority of all the +States. That part of the plan which proposed to elect him by a +majority of all the electoral votes, giving to each State as many +votes as it was to have in both houses of Congress, might make the +individual, when so elected, theoretically the choice of a majority of +the people of the United States, although not necessarily the choice +of a majority of the States. But there was a peculiar feature of this +plan,--afterwards, in the year 1804, changed to a more direct +method,--by which the electors were required to return their votes for +two persons, without designating which of them was their choice for +President, and which for Vice-President, the designation being +determined by the numbers of votes found to be given for each person. +This method of voting increased the chances of a failure to choose the +President by the electoral votes. It is not easy to understand why the +framers of the Constitution adhered to it; although it is probable +that its original design was to prevent corruption and intrigue. +Whatever its purpose may have been, it served to make still more +prominent the expediency, not only of removing the ultimate election +from the Senate, but of providing some mode of conducting that +election by which an appointment by a minority of the States would be +prevented, when a majority of the electoral votes had not united upon +any one individual, or had united upon two. + +The plan which had been prepared by the grand committee, and which +adjusted the relations between the executive and the Senate respecting +appointments and treaties, had left no body in the government so +likely to be free from intimate relations with the President, and at +the same time so capable of being made the instrument of an election, +as the House of Representatives. By the fundamental principle on which +that body had been agreed to be organized,--in direct contrast to the +basis of the Senate,--its members were the representatives of the +people inhabiting the several States, and in the business of +legislation a majority of their votes was to express the will of a +majority of the people of the United States. But the representatives +were to be chosen in the separate States; and nothing was more easy, +therefore, than to provide that, in any other function, they should +act as the agents of their States, making the States themselves the +real parties to the act, without doing any violence to the principle +on which they were assembled for the purposes of legislation. +Accordingly, as soon as a transfer of the ultimate election from the +Senate to the House of Representatives was proposed, the method of +voting by States was adopted, with only a single dissent.[327] The +establishment of two thirds as a quorum of the States for this +purpose, and the provision that a majority of all the States should be +necessary to a choice, followed naturally as the proper safeguards +against corruption, and were adopted unanimously. + +The principal office of the executive department was thus provided +for; but the ultimate choice of the Vice-President remained to be +regulated. This office was unknown to the draft of the Constitution +prepared by the committee of detail, and was suggested only when the +mode of organizing the executive, and of providing for some of the +separate functions of the Senate, came to be closely considered +together. We are to look for its purposes, therefore, in the +provisions specially devised for the settlement of these relations. In +the first place, it was apparent that the executive would be a branch +of the government that ought never to be vacant. The principle which, +in hereditary monarchies, on the death of the sovereign, instantly +devolves the executive power upon him who stands next in a fixed order +of succession, must in some degree be imitated in purely elective +governments, if great mischiefs are to be avoided. The difficulty +which attends its application to such governments consists not in the +nature of the principle itself, but in finding a number of public +functionaries who can be placed in a certain order of succession, +without creating mere heirs to the succession, for that purpose alone. +In hereditary governments, the members of a family, in a designated +order, stand as the successive recipients of the executive office; and +each of them, until he reaches the throne, may have no other function +in the state than that of an heir, near or remote, to the crown, and +may, without inconvenience to the public welfare, occupy that +position alone. But in elective, and especially in republican +governments, the succession must be devolved on some person already +filling some other office; for to designate as a successor to the +chief magistrate a person who has no public employment, and no other +public position than that of an heir apparent, would be attended with +many obvious disadvantages, in such a government. + +Fortunately, the peculiar construction of the Senate was found to +require a presiding officer who should not be a member of the body +itself. As each State was to be represented by two delegates, and as +it would be important not to withdraw either of them from active +participation in the business of the chamber, a presiding officer was +needed who would represent neither of the States. By placing the +Vice-President of the United States in this position, he would have a +place of dignity and importance, would be at all times conversant with +the public interests, and might pass to the chief magistracy, on the +occurrence of a vacancy, attended with the public confidence and +respect. This arrangement was devised by the grand committee, and was +adopted with general consent. It contemplated, also, that the +Vice-President, as President of the Senate, should have no vote, +unless upon questions on which the Senate should be equally divided; +and on account of his relation to this branch of the legislature, the +ultimate election of the Vice-President, when the electors had failed +to appoint him under the rule prescribed, was retained in the hands of +the Senate. + +The rule that was to determine when the Vice-President was to succeed +to the functions of the chief magistrate, was also embraced in the +plan of the grand committee. It was apparent that a vacancy in the +principal office might occur by death, by resignation, by the effect +of inability to discharge its powers and duties, and by the +consequences of an impeachment. When either of these events should +occur, it was provided that the office should devolve on the +Vice-President. In the case of death or resignation of the President, +no uncertainty can arise. In a case of impeachment, a judgment of +conviction operates as a removal from office. But the grand committee +did not provide, and the Constitution does not contain any provision +or direction, for ascertaining the case of an inability to discharge +the powers and duties of the office. When such an inability is +supposed to have occurred, and is not made known by the President +himself, how is it to be ascertained? Is there any department of the +government that can, with or without a provision of law, proceed to +inquire into the capacity of the President, and to pronounce him +unable to discharge his powers and duties? What is meant by the +Constitution as _inability_ is a case which does not fall within the +power of impeachment, for that is confined to treason, bribery, and +other high crimes and misdemeanors. It is the case of a simple +incapacity, arising from insanity, or ill health, or, as might +possibly occur, from restraint of the person of the President by a +public enemy. But in the former case, how shadowy are the lines which +often separate the sound mind or body from the unsound! Society has +had one memorable example, in modern times and in constitutional +monarchy, of the delicacy and difficulty of such an inquiry;--an +instance in which all the appliances of science and all the fixed +rules of succession were found scarcely sufficient to prevent the rage +of party, and the struggles of personal ambition, from putting the +state in jeopardy.[328] With us, should such a calamity ever happen, +there must be a similar effort to meet it as nearly as possible upon +the principles of the Constitution, and consequently there must be a +similar strain on the Constitution itself. + +In order to make still further provision for the succession, Congress +were authorized to declare by law what officer should act as +President, in case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability of +both the President and the Vice-President, until the disability should +be removed, or a new President should be elected. + +The mode of choosing the electors was, as we have seen, left to the +legislatures of the States. Uniformity, in this respect, was not +essential to the success of this plan for the appointment of the +executive, and it was important to leave to the people of the States +all the freedom of action that would be consistent with the free +working of the Constitution. But it was necessary that the time of +choosing the electors, and the day on which they were to give their +votes, should be prescribed for all the States alike. These +particulars were, therefore, placed under the direction of Congress, +with the single restriction, that the day of voting in the electoral +colleges should be the same throughout the United States. In order to +make the electors a distinct and independent body of persons, +appointed for the sole function of choosing the President and +Vice-President, it was provided further, that no senator or +representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under +the United States, shall be appointed an elector.[329] + +The electors were required to meet in their respective States, and to +vote by ballot for two persons, one of whom at least should not be an +inhabitant of the same State with themselves. Having made a list of +all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes given for each, +they were to sign and certify it, and to transmit it sealed to the +seat of government of the United States, directed to the President of +the Senate, who, in the presence of the Senate and the House of +Representatives, was to open all the certificates, and the votes were +then to be counted. + +Such was the method devised by the framers of the Constitution for +filling the executive office. Experience has required some changes to +be made in it. It has been found that to require the electors to +designate the persons for whom they vote as the President and +Vice-President, respectively, has a tendency to secure a choice by the +electoral votes, and therefore to prevent the election from being +thrown into the House of Representatives; and it has also been deemed +expedient, when the election has devolved on the House of +Representatives, to confine the choice of the States to the three +highest candidates on the list returned by the electors. These changes +were made by the twelfth of the amendments to the Constitution, +adopted in the year 1804, which also provides that the person having +the greatest number of the electoral votes for President shall be +deemed to be chosen by the electors, if such number be a majority of +the whole number of electors appointed. If a choice is not made by the +electors, or by the House of Representatives, before the fourth day of +March next following the election, the amendment declares that the +Vice-President shall act as President, "as in the case" (provided by +the Constitution) "of the death or other constitutional disability of +the President." + +In the appointment of the Vice-President, the amendment has also +introduced some changes. The person having the greatest number of the +electoral votes as Vice-President, if the number is a majority of all +the electors appointed, is to be the Vice-President; but if no choice +is thus effected, the Senate are to choose the Vice-President from the +two highest candidates on the list returned by the electors; but a +quorum for this purpose is to consist of two thirds of the whole +number of senators, and a majority of the whole number is made +necessary to a choice. The amendment further adopts the same +qualifications for the office of Vice-President as had been +established by the Constitution for the office of President.[330] + +Thus it appears, from an examination of the original Constitution and +the amendment, that the most ample provision is made for filling the +executive office, in all contingencies but one. If the electors fail +to choose according to the rule prescribed for them, the election +devolves on the House of Representatives. If that body does not choose +a President before the fourth day of March next ensuing, the office +devolves on the Vice-President elect, whether he has been chosen by +the electors or by the Senate. But if the House of Representatives +fail to choose a President, and the Senate make no choice of a +Vice-President, or the Vice-President elect dies before the next +fourth day of March, the Constitution makes no express provision for +filling the office, nor is it easy to discover in it how such a +vacancy is to be met. The Constitution, it is true, confers upon +Congress authority to provide by law for the case of removal, death, +resignation, or inability of _both_ the President and Vice-President, +and to declare what officer shall then act as President; and it +provides that the officer so designated by a law of Congress shall act +accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be +elected. But there is every reason to believe that this provision +embraces the case of a vacancy in both offices occasioned by removal, +death, resignation, or inability, not of the President and +Vice-President elect, but of the President and Vice-President in +office. It may be doubted whether the framers of the original +Constitution intended to provide for a vacancy in both offices +occasioned by the failure of the House of Representatives to elect a +President and the death of the Vice-President elect, or a non-election +of a Vice-President by the Senate, before the fourth day of March. +Their plan was in the first instance studiously framed for the purpose +of impressing on the electors the duty of concentrating their votes; +and although they saw and provided for the evident necessity of an +election of a President by the House of Representatives, when the +electoral votes had not produced a choice, they omitted all express +provision for a failure of the House to choose a President, apparently +for the purpose of making the States in that body feel the importance +of the secondary election, and the duty of uniting their votes. This +omission was supplied by the amendment, which authorizes the +Vice-President elect to act as President, when the House of +Representatives have failed to choose a President, "as in the case of +the death or other constitutional disability of the President." This +adoption, for the case of a non-election by the House, of the mode of +succession previously established by the Constitution, shows that the +authority which the Constitution gave to Congress to declare by law +what officer shall act as President, in case of a vacancy in both +offices, was confined to the removal, death, resignation, or inability +of the President and Vice-President in office, and does not refer to +the President and Vice-President elect, whose term of office has not +commenced.[331] + +The committee of detail made no provision respecting the +qualifications of the President. But the grand committee, to whom the +construction of the office was referred, recommended the +qualifications which are to be found in the Constitution; namely, that +no person shall be eligible to the office who was not born a citizen +of the United States, or was not a citizen at the time of the adoption +of the Constitution, and who had not attained the age of thirty-five +years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United States. +These requirements were adopted with unanimous assent.[332] + +That the executive should receive a stipend, or pecuniary +compensation, was a point which had been settled in the earliest stage +of the proceedings, notwithstanding the grave authority of Franklin, +who was opposed to it. The speech which he delivered on this subject +was based upon the maxim, that, in all cases of public service, the +less profit, the greater honor. He seems to have been actuated chiefly +by the fear that the government would in time be resolved into a +monarchy; and he thought this catastrophe would be longer delayed, if +the seeds of contention, faction, and tumult were not sown in the +system, by making the places of honor places of profit. He maintained +this opinion for the case even of a plural executive, which he +decidedly advocated; and he instanced the example of Washington, who +had led the armies of the Revolution for eight years without receiving +the smallest compensation for his services, to prove the +practicability of "finding three or four men, in all the United +States, with public spirit enough to bear sitting in peaceful council +for perhaps an equal term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, +and see that our laws are duly executed." His plan was treated with +the respect due to his illustrious character, but no one failed to see +that it was a "Utopian idea."[333] The example of Washington was, in +truth, inapplicable to the question. A patriotic Virginia gentleman, +of ample fortune, was called upon, in the day of his country's +greatest trial, to take the lead in a desperate struggle for +independence. The nature of the war, his own eminence, his character +and feelings, the poverty of a country which he foresaw would often be +unable to pay even the common soldier, and his motives for embarking +in the contest, all united to make the idea of compensation +inadmissible to a man whose fortune made it unnecessary. Such a +combination of circumstances could scarcely ever occur in the case of +a chief magistrate of a regular and established government. If an +individual should happen to be placed in the office, who possessed +private means enough to render a salary unnecessary to his own wants, +or to the dignity of the position, the duty of his example might point +in precisely the opposite direction, and make it expedient that he +should receive what his successors would be unable to decline. But the +real question which the framers of the Constitution had to decide was, +in what way could the office be constituted so as to give the people +of the United States the widest range of choice among the public men +fit to be placed in it. To attach no salary to the chief executive +office, in a republican government, would practically confine the +office to men who had inherited or accumulated wealth. The Convention +determined that this mischief should be excluded. They adopted the +principle of compensation for the office of chief magistrate, and when +the committee of detail came to give effect to this decision, they +added the provision, that the compensation shall neither be increased +nor diminished during the period for which a President has been +elected.[334] The limitation which confines the President to his +stated compensation, and forbids him to receive any other emolument +from the United States, or from any State, was subsequently +introduced, but not by unanimous consent.[335] + +The question whether the single person in whom the executive power was +to be vested should exercise it with or without the aid or control of +any council of state, was one that in various ways ran through the +several stages of the proceedings. As soon as it was settled that the +executive should consist of a single person, the nature and degree of +his responsibility, and the extent to which it might be shared by or +imposed upon any other officers, became matters of great practical +moment. What was called at one time a council of revision was a body +distinct from a cabinet council, and was proposed for a different +purpose. The function intended for it by its advocates related +exclusively to the exercise of the revisionary check upon legislation. +But we have seen that the nature of this check, the purposes for which +it was to be established, and the practical success with which it +could be introduced into the legislative system, required that the +power and the responsibility should rest with the President alone. +There remained, however, the further question concerning a cabinet, or +council of state; an advisory body, with which some of the most +important persons in the Convention desired to surround the +President, to assist him in the discharge of his duties, without the +power of controlling his actions, and without diminishing his legal +responsibility. Such a plan not having received the sanction of the +Convention, the draft of the Constitution reported by the committee of +detail of course contained no provision for it. It was subsequently +brought forward, and received the recommendation of a committee;[336] +but the grand committee, who were charged with the adjustment of the +executive office, substituted for it a different provision, which gave +the President power to "require the opinion in writing of the +principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any +subject relating to the duties of their respective offices." The +friends of a council[337] regarded this arrangement of the executive +office, especially with regard to the power of appointment, as +entirely defective.[338] But the reason on which it was rested by the +grand committee, and on which the plan of a council of state was +rejected, was, that the President of the United States, unlike the +executive in mixed governments of the monarchical form, was to be +personally responsible for his official conduct, and that the +Constitution should do nothing to diminish that responsibility, even +in appearance. If it had not been intended to make the President +liable to impeachment, a cabinet might have been useful, and would +certainly have been necessary, if there was to be any responsibility +anywhere for executive acts. But a large majority of the States +preferred to interpose no shield between the President and a public +accusation. He might derive any assistance from the great officers of +the executive departments which Congress might see fit to establish, +that he could obtain from their opinions or advice; but the powers +which the Constitution was to confer on him must be exercised by +himself, and every official act must be performed as his own.[339] + +What those powers were to be, had not been fully settled when the +first draft of the Constitution came from the committee of detail. The +executive function, or the power and duty of causing the laws to be +duly and faithfully executed; authority to give information to +Congress on the state of the Union, and to recommend measures for +their consideration; power in certain cases to convene and to adjourn +the two houses; the commissioning of all officers, and the appointing +to office in cases not otherwise provided for by the Constitution; the +receiving of ambassadors; the granting of reprieves and pardons; the +chief command of the army and navy of the United States and of the +militia of the several States,--were all provided for. But the foreign +relations of the country were committed wholly to the Senate, as was +also the appointment of ambassadors and of judges of the Supreme +Court. It is not necessary to explain again the grounds on which the +Convention were finally obliged to alter this arrangement. It will be +convenient, however, to take up the several powers and functions of +the executive, and to describe briefly the scope and purpose +ultimately given to each of them. + +In the plan of government originally proposed by Governor Randolph, +the division into the three departments of an executive, a +legislative, and a judiciary, implied, for the first of these +departments, according to the theory of all governments which are thus +separated, power to carry into execution the existing laws. This +government, however, was to succeed one that had regulated the affairs +of the Union for several years, in which all the powers vested in the +confederacy of the States were held and exercised by the Congress of +their deputies; and among those powers was that of declaring war and +making peace. This function is, moreover, embraced in the general +powers of the executive department, in most governments in which there +is a regular separation of that department from the legislative and +the judiciary. But it became apparent at the very commencement of the +process of forming the Constitution of the United States, that the +question whether the executive should be intrusted with the power of +war and peace would not only be made, but that the system would have +to be so arranged as to make the government, in this particular, an +exception to the general rule. This was partly owing to an +unwillingness to intrust such a power to one person;--or even to a +plurality of persons, if the executive should be so constituted. If to +the general powers of executing the laws, and of appointing to office, +there were to be added the power to make war and peace, and the whole +were to be vested in a single magistrate, it was rightly said that the +government would be in substance an elective monarchy. The power of +the executive, over the external relations of the country at least, +would be the same, in kind and in extent, as it is in constitutional +monarchies, and the sole difference would be that the supreme +magistrate would be elective. This was not intended, and was not +admissible. Still another reason for making the government of the +United States, in this feature, an exception to the general rule, was +the necessity for giving to the States, in their corporate capacities, +some control over the foreign relations of the country. + +Our further inquiries concerning this part of the powers and functions +of the chief magistrate will only need to extend so far as to +ascertain what is the "executive power," which the Constitution +declares shall be "vested" in the President. In the resolutions, which +at different stages had previously passed in the Convention, this had +been described as a "power to carry into execution the national laws"; +and this description was regarded as including such other powers, not +legislative or judicial in their nature, as might from time to time be +delegated to the President by Congress.[340] The committee of detail, +in drafting the Constitution, employed the phrase "executive power" to +describe what had thus been designated by the resolutions sent to +them; and as the plan of government which they presented proposed to +make the declaration of a state of war a legislative act, the +prosecution of a war, when declared, was left to fall within the +executive duties as part of the "executive power." In order, moreover, +that the executive duties might be still more clearly defined, the +committee provided that the President "shall take care that the laws +be faithfully executed," and imposed upon him the same obligation by +the force of his oath of office. The committee having been directed to +provide for the end in view, it was considered that they were also to +provide the means by which the end was to be obtained.[341] +Accordingly, they made the President commander-in-chief of the army +and navy, and of the militia of the States when called into the +service of the United States. The President appears, therefore, to +have been placed in the same position with reference to the means to +be employed in the discharge of all his executive duties, when force +may in his judgment be necessary. The declaration of a state of war is +an enactment by the legislative branch of the government; the creation +of laws is a function that belongs exclusively to the same +department;--but when a law exists, or the state of war exists, it is +for the President, by virtue of his executive office, and of his +position as commander-in-chief, to employ the army and navy, and the +militia actually called into the service of the United States, in the +execution of the law, or the prosecution of hostilities, in such a +manner as he may think proper.[342] + +Closely allied to the power of executing the laws is that of pardoning +offences, and relieving against judicial sentences. This power was +originally extended by the committee of detail to all offences +against the United States, excepting cases of impeachment, in which +they provided that the pardon of the President should not be pleaded +in bar. This would have made the power precisely like that of the king +of England; since, by the English law, although the king's pardon +cannot be pleaded in bar of an impeachment, he may, after conviction, +pardon the offender. But as it was intended in the Constitution of the +United States to limit the judgment in an impeachment to a removal +from office, and to subsequent disqualification for office, there +would not be the same reason for extending to it the executive power +of pardon that there is in England, where the judgment is not so +limited. The Convention, therefore, took from the President all power +of pardon in cases of impeachment, making them the sole exception to +the power.[343] A strong effort was indeed made to establish another +exception in cases of treason, upon the ground, chiefly, that the +criminal might be the President's own instrument in an attempt to +subvert the Constitution. But since all agreed that a power of pardon +was as necessary in cases of treason as in all other offences, and as +it must be given to the legislature, or to one branch of it, if not +lodged with the executive, a very large majority of the States +preferred to place it in the hands of the President, especially as he +would be subject to impeachment for any participation in the guilt of +the party accused.[344] + +The power to make treaties, which had been given to the Senate by the +committee of detail, and which was afterwards transferred to the +President, to be exercised with the advice and consent of two thirds +of the senators present, was thus modified on account of the changes +which the plan of government had undergone, and which have been +previously explained. The power to declare war having been vested in +the whole legislature, it was necessary to provide the mode in which a +war was to be terminated. As the President was to be the organ of +communication with other governments,[345] and as he would be the +general guardian of the national interests, the negotiation of a +treaty of peace, and of all other treaties, was necessarily confided +to him. But as treaties would not only involve the general interests +of the nation, but might touch the particular interests of individual +States, and, whatever their effect, were to be part of the supreme law +of the land, it was necessary to give to the senators, as the direct +representatives of the States, a concurrent authority with the +President over the relations to be affected by them. The rule of +ratification suggested by the committee to whom this subject was last +confided was, that a treaty might be sanctioned by two thirds of the +senators present, but not by a smaller number. A question was made, +however, and much considered, whether treaties of peace ought not to +be subjected to a different rule. One suggestion was, that the Senate +ought to have power to make treaties of peace without the concurrence +of the President, on account of his possible interest in the +continuance of a war from which he might derive power and +importance.[346] But an objection, strenuously urged, was, that, if +the power to make a treaty of peace were confided to the Senate alone, +and a majority or two thirds of the whole Senate were to be required +to make such a treaty, the difficulty of obtaining peace would be so +great, that the legislature would be unwilling to make war on account +of the fisheries, the navigation of the Mississippi, and other +important objects of the Union.[347] On the other hand, it was said +that a majority of the States might be a minority of the people of the +United States, and that the representatives of a minority of the +nation ought not to have power to decide the conditions of peace. + +The result of these various objections was a determination on the part +of a large majority of the States not to make treaties of peace an +exception to the rule, but to provide a uniform rule for the +ratification of all treaties. The rule of the Confederation, which had +required the assent of nine States in Congress to every treaty or +alliance, had been found to work great inconvenience; as any rule must +do, which should give to a minority of States power to control the +foreign relations of the country. The rule established by the +Constitution, while it gives to every State an opportunity to be +present and to vote, requires no positive quorum of the Senate for the +ratification of a treaty; it simply demands that the treaty shall +receive the assent of two thirds of all the members who may be +present. The theory of the Constitution undoubtedly is, that the +President represents the people of the United States generally, and +the senators represent their respective States; so that, by the +concurrence which the rule thus requires, the necessity for a fixed +quorum of the States is avoided, and the operations of this function +of the government are greatly facilitated and simplified.[348] The +adoption, also, of that part of the rule which provides that the +Senate may either "advise or consent," enables that body so far to +initiate a treaty, as to propose one for the consideration of the +President;--although such is not the general practice. + +Having already described the changes which took from the Senate alone +the appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court and ambassadors, it +is only necessary in this connection to notice the manner in which the +power of appointment to all offices received its final scope and +limitations. The plan reported by the committee of detail had, as we +have repeatedly seen, vested the appointment of ambassadors and judges +of the Supreme Court in the Senate, and had given to the President the +sole voice in the appointment of all other officers of the United +States. The adjustment afterwards made gave the nomination of all +officers to the President, but required the advice and consent of the +Senate to complete an appointment. Two inconveniences were likely to +be experienced under this arrangement. Many inferior offices might be +created, which it would be unnecessary and inexpedient to fill by this +process of nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate; +and vacancies might occur in all offices, which would require to be +filled while the Senate was not in session. To obviate these +inconveniences, the Congress were authorized to vest the appointment +of such inferior officers as they might think proper in the President +alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments; and power +was given to the President to fill up all vacancies that might happen +during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which should +expire at the end of their next session.[349] In order to restrain the +President from practically creating offices by the power of +appointment, his power was limited to "offices created by law," and to +those specially enumerated in the Constitution.[350] + +In addition to these powers, the committee of detail had provided for +certain direct relations, of a special nature, between the President +and the Congress. One of these was to consist in giving to the +Congress from time to time information of the state of the Union, and +in recommending to their consideration such measures as he shall judge +necessary and expedient. The other was embraced in the power to +convene the two houses on extraordinary occasions; and, whenever there +should be a disagreement between them with respect to the time of +adjournment, to adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper. +The latter power is to be taken in connection with the clause which +requires Congress to meet at least once in every year, and on the +first Monday in December, unless a different day shall be appointed by +law. Neither the two houses by agreement, nor the President in case of +a disagreement, can fix on a time of adjournment beyond the day of the +commencement of the next regular session. But subject to this +restriction, the power of the President to determine the time at which +the two houses shall reassemble, when they do not agree upon a time, +extends to every session of Congress, whether it be regular or +"extraordinary."[351] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[325] August 24. Elliot, V. 472, 473. + +[326] The Constitution was published in the Pennsylvania Journal, +Sept. 19th. On the 27th, another Philadelphia paper suggested, or, as +we should now say, "nominated" General Washington for the Presidency. + +[327] Delaware. Elliot, V. 519. + +[328] I allude, of course, to the case of King George III., which had +not happened when our Constitution was framed. To ascertain the sanity +of a private person is certainly often no less delicate and difficult, +than to inquire into the sanity of a person in a high public position. +But there is a legal process for determining the capacity of every +person to discharge private duties or to exercise private rights. In +the case of the President of the United States, there is no mode +provided by the Constitution for ascertaining his inability to +discharge his public functions, and no authority seems to have been +given to Congress to provide for such an inquiry. Perhaps the +authority could not have been given, with safety and propriety. + +[329] This clause was inserted, by unanimous consent, on the motion of +Mr. King and Mr. Gerry, September 6. Elliot, V. 515. + +[330] See _post_, p. 621. + +[331] Congress, however, have not only provided that the President +_pro tempore_ of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of +Representatives shall successively act as President, in case of the +removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the President and +Vice-President, until the disability be removed or a President shall +be elected, but also that, whenever the offices of President and +Vice-President _shall both become vacant_, a new appointment of +electors shall be ordered, and a new election made. The constitutional +authority for this latter provision is at least doubtful. (Act of +March 1, 1792.) I have discovered no evidence that the framers of the +Constitution contemplated an intermediate election of President and +Vice-President, excepting an amendment moved by Mr. Madison. The +clause which enables Congress to declare what officer shall act as +President, on the death, &c. of both the President and Vice-President, +was introduced by Governor Randolph, and terminated thus: "And such +officer shall act accordingly, until the time of electing a President +shall arrive." Mr. Madison moved to substitute for this the words, +"until such disability be removed, or a President shall be elected"; +and he has recorded in his Minutes, that he remarked, on moving this +amendment, that the phraseology of Governor Randolph "would prevent a +supply of the vacancy by an intermediate election." This amendment was +adopted. (Elliot, V. 520, 521.) But the difficulty in the way of +construing the clause so as to give effect to this suggestion is, that +the terms employed by Mr. Madison do not of themselves necessarily +import an authority to Congress to order an intermediate election, any +more than those used by Governor Randolph. Either of these +expressions, when incorporated into the Constitution, would have to be +construed with reference to the whole system prescribed by the +Constitution for filling the executive branch of the government. +Taking all the provisions together, it appears that the executive +power is to be vested in a President, who is to hold his office for a +term of four years; that Congress shall fix the day on which he is to +be chosen by the electors; that, when so chosen, he is to hold the +executive power for four years; that if he dies, or is disabled, +within that term, and there is no Vice-President to succeed him, +Congress shall declare by law what officer shall then _act as +President_, that is, shall hold and exercise the executive power, and +such officer is to _act accordingly_, until the disability be removed, +or a President shall be elected. It would seem, therefore, that when +the officer designated by Congress is required to _act as President_, +the powers and duties of the office are devolved upon him for the +residue of the term of four years, in a case of vacancy by death, +removal, or resignation; for the terms "until a President shall be +elected" certainly do not import any express authority to order a new +election; and although there is a general authority in Congress to fix +the day for the election of a President, it must be a President chosen +for the term of four years. + +[332] Elliot, V. 462, 507, 521, 522. + +[333] He anticipated that it would be so regarded. Hamilton, who was +in all his views, as unlike Franklin as any man could be, seconded the +motion, out of respect for the mover. + +[334] Elliot, V. 380. + +[335] Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, and North Carolina voted +against it. + +[336] Elliot, V. 446, 462. + +[337] Mason, Franklin, Wilson, Dickinson, and Madison. + +[338] Elliot, V. 525. + +[339] Those who are not familiar with the precise structure of the +American government will probably be surprised to learn that what is +in practice sometimes called the "Cabinet" has no constitutional +existence as a directory body, or one that can decide anything. The +theory of our government is, that what belongs to the executive power +is to be exercised by the uncontrolled will of the President. Acting +upon the clause of the Constitution which empowers the President to +call for the opinions in writing of the heads of departments, +Washington, the first President, commenced the practice of taking +their opinions in separate consultation; and he also, upon important +occasions, assembled them for oral discussion, in the form of a +council. After having heard the reasons and opinions of each, he +decided the course to be pursued. The second President, Mr. John +Adams, followed substantially the same practice. The third President, +Mr. Jefferson, adopted a somewhat different practice. When a question +occurred of sufficient magnitude to require the opinions of all the +heads of departments, he called them together, had the subject +discussed, and a vote taken, in which he counted himself but as one. +But he always seems to have considered that he had the _power_ to +decide against the opinion of his cabinet. That he never, or rarely, +exercised it, was owing partly to the unanimity in sentiment that +prevailed in his cabinet, and to his desire to preserve that +unanimity, and partly to his disinclination to the exercise of +personal power. When there were differences of opinion, he aimed to +produce a unanimous result by discussion, and almost always succeeded. +But he admits that this practice made the executive, in fact, a +directory. Jefferson's Works, V. 94, 568, 569. + +[340] Elliot, V. 141, 142. + +[341] Elliot, V. 343, 344. + +[342] The Constitution having vested in Congress power to provide for +calling the militia into the service of the United States, to execute +the laws, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, the President +cannot call out the militia unless authorized to do so by Congress. +But with respect to the employment of the army and navy for any +executive purpose, it may be doubted whether any authority from +Congress is necessary; as it may also be doubted whether Congress can +exercise any control over the President in the use of the land or +naval forces, either in the execution of the laws, or in the discharge +of any other executive duty. + +[343] Elliot, V. 480. + +[344] Ibid. 549. + +[345] It was to be one of the distinct functions of the President "to +receive ambassadors and other public ministers." + +[346] Mr. Madison so thought. Elliot, V. 524. + +[347] Ibid. + +[348] The several votes taken upon different aspects of the rule for +the ratification of treaties make the theory quite clearly what is +stated in the text. See the proceedings, September 7, 8. Elliot, V. +524, 526. + +[349] This power embraces of course only those offices the appointment +to which is vested in the President and Senate. + +[350] The Constitution (Art. II. § 2) seems to contemplate +ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and judges of the +Supreme Court, as officers to exist under the Constitution, whether +provision is or is not made by law for their appointment and +functions. It is made the imperative duty of the President to +nominate, and with the consent of the Senate to appoint them. Hence it +has been supposed that the President can appoint a foreign minister +without waiting to have his particular office regulated or established +by law; and as the President conducts the foreign intercourse of the +country, he could prescribe the duties of such a minister. In like +manner, with the consent of the Senate, the President could appoint a +judge of the Supreme Court, and would be bound to do so, although no +act of Congress existed providing for the organization and duties of +the Court. But as the President cannot distribute the judicial power, +the Court, when so appointed, would have only the functions conferred +by the Constitution, namely, original jurisdiction in certain +enumerated cases. + +[351] In the text of the Constitution, the President's power to adjourn +the two houses of Congress in case of a disagreement follows immediately +after his power to convene them on "extraordinary occasions"; and it +has, therefore, been suggested that his power to adjourn them is +confined to cases where they have been "extraordinarily" convened under +the first power. But it is to be observed that the whole of the third +section of Article II. contains an enumeration of separate powers of the +President, recited _seriatim_. The power to _convene_ Congress is one +power; and it extends only to "extraordinary" occasions, because the +Constitution itself, or a law, convenes them at a fixed period, and thus +makes the _ordinary_ occasions. But the power to adjourn the two houses +to a particular time, in cases of disagreement as to the time, is a +separate and general power, because the reason for which it was given at +all applies equally to all sessions. That reason is, that there may be a +peaceful termination of what would otherwise be an endless and dangerous +controversy. Both Hamilton in the Federalist and Judge Story in his +Commentaries have treated this as a separate and general power. (The +Federalist, No. 77. Story on the Constitution, § 1563.) + + + + +CHAPTER XIV. + +REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL, CONTINUED.--FORMATION OF THE +JUDICIAL POWER. + + +There now remains to be described the full conception and creation of +the third department of the government, its judicial power. + +The distribution of the powers of government, when its subjects are to +sustain no relation to any other sovereignty than that whose +fundamental laws it is proposed to ordain, is a comparatively easy +task. In such a government, when the theoretical division into the +legislative, executive, and judicial functions is once adopted, the +objects to which each is to be directed fall readily into their +appropriate places. All that is necessary is, to see that these +departments do not encroach upon the rights and duties of each other. +There is, at least, no other power, claiming the obedience of the same +people, whose just authority it is necessary to regard, and on whose +proper domain no intrusion is to be permitted. + +How different is the task, when a government, either federal or +national, is to be created, for a people inhabiting distinct political +States, whose sovereign power is to remain for many purposes supreme +over their respective subjects; when the individual is to be under +rules of civil duty declared by different public organs; and when the +object is to provide a judicial system through which this very +difference of authority may be made to work out the ends of social +order, harmony, and peace! This difficult undertaking was imposed upon +the framers of the Constitution of the United States, and it was by +far the most delicate and difficult of all their duties. It was +comparatively easy to agree on the powers which the people of the +States ought to confer on the general government, to define the +separate functions of the legislature and the executive, and to lay +down certain rules of public policy which should restrain the States +in the exercise of their separate powers over their own citizens. But +to construct a judicial power within the general government, and to +clothe it with attributes which would enable it to secure the +supremacy of the general Constitution and of all its provisions; to +give it the exact authority that would maintain the dividing line +between the powers of the nation and those of the State, and to give +to it no more; and to add to these a faculty of dispensing justice to +foreigners, to citizens of different States, and among the sovereign +States themselves, with a more even hand and with a more assured +certainty of the great ends of justice than any State power could +furnish,--these were objects not readily or easily to be attained. Yet +they were attained with wonderful success. The judicial power of the +United States, considered with reference to its adaptation to the +purposes of its creation, is one of the most admirable and felicitous +structures that human governments have exhibited. + +The groundwork of its formation has been partly described in a +previous chapter, where some of the principles are stated, which had +been arrived at as being necessary to its great purposes. These +principles related to the persons who were to exercise its functions, +and to the jurisdiction or authority which they were to possess. With +respect to the persons who were to exercise the judicial power, the +result that had been reached when the first draft of the Constitution +was to be prepared had fixed the tenure of good behavior for their +office, and had placed their salaries, when once established, beyond +the reach of any power of diminution by the legislature. It had also +been determined that there should be one supreme tribunal, under the +Constitution, and that the legislature should have power to establish +inferior tribunals. But nothing more precise had been arrived at +respecting jurisdiction, than the broad principles which declared that +it should extend to cases arising under laws passed by the general +legislature, and to such other questions as might touch the national +peace and harmony. The committee of detail were to give effect to this +declaration. Their scheme provided, under the first of these heads, +that the jurisdiction should embrace cases arising under the laws of +the United States; and as questions touching the national peace and +harmony, they enumerated all cases affecting ambassadors, other +public ministers, and consuls; impeachments of officers of the United +States; all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; +controversies between two or more States, excepting such as might +regard territory or jurisdiction; controversies between a State and +citizens of another State, between citizens of different States, and +between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, +or subjects. In cases of impeachment, cases affecting ambassadors, +other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a State should +be party, they assigned the original jurisdiction to the Supreme +Court. In all the other cases enumerated, the jurisdiction of the +supreme tribunal was to be appellate only, with such exceptions and +regulations as the legislature might make; and the original +jurisdiction was left to be assigned by the legislature to such +inferior tribunals as they might from time to time create. The trial +of all criminal offences, except in cases of impeachment, was to be in +the State where they had been committed, and was to be by jury. +Controversies between States respecting jurisdiction or territory, and +controversies concerning lands claimed under grants of different +States, were to be tried by the Senate, and were consequently excluded +from the judicial power. + +This plan, when compared with the full outline of the jurisdiction, as +it was finally established, presented several remarkable defects. In +the first place, it was silent with respect to the important +distinction, familiar to the people of the United States, between +proceedings in equity and proceedings at common law. This distinction, +which extends not only to the forms of pleading, but to the principles +of decision, the mode of trial, and the nature of the remedy, had been +brought by the settlers of most of the Colonies from England, and had +been perpetuated in their judicial institutions. It existed in most of +the States, at the time of the formation of the national Constitution, +and it was, in fact, a characteristic feature of the only system of +judicature which the American people had known, excepting in their +courts of admiralty. Although the institutions of the States differed +in the degree in which they had adopted and followed it, the basis of +their jurisprudence and forms of proceeding was the common law, as +derived from its English sources and modified by their own customs or +legislation, with more or less of that peculiar and more ample relief +which is afforded by the jurisprudence and remedy known in the English +system under the name of equity. + +Since the judicial power of the United States was to be exercised over +a people whose judicial habits were thus fixed; since it must, to some +extent, take cognizance of rights that would have to be adjudicated in +accordance with the jurisprudence under which they had arisen; and +since the individuals who would have a title to enter its tribunals +might reasonably demand remedies as ample as a judicature of English +origin could furnish, it was highly expedient that the Constitution +should fully adopt the main features of that judicature. It is quite +true, that a provision in the Constitution extending the judicial +power to "all cases" affecting certain persons or certain rights, +might be regarded by the legislature as a sufficient authority for the +establishment of inferior courts with both a legal and an equitable +jurisdiction, and might be considered to confer such a double +jurisdiction on the supreme tribunal contemplated by the Constitution. +But the text of the Constitution itself would be the source to which +the people of the United States would look, when called upon to adopt +it, for the benefits which they were to derive from it, and there +would be no part of it which they would scrutinize more closely than +that which was to establish the judicial power of the new government. +If they found in it no imperative declaration making it the duty of +Congress to provide for a jurisdiction in equity as well as at law, +and no express adoption of such a jurisdiction for the supreme +tribunal, they might well say that the character of the judicial power +was left to the accidental choice of Congress, or to doubtful +interpretation, instead of being expressly ordained in its full and +essential proportions by the people. If a citizen of one State were to +pursue a remedy in the courts of the Union against a citizen of +another State, or if one State should have a judicial controversy with +another, that would be a very imperfect system of judicature which +should leave the form and extent of the remedy to be determined by the +local law where the process was to be instituted, or which should +confine the relief to the forms and proceedings of the common law. If +the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme national tribunal were to be +exercised over any class of controversies originating in the State +courts, it was extremely important that the Constitution should +expressly ascertain whether suits at law, or suits in equity, or both, +were to be embraced within that appellate power. For these reasons, it +became necessary for the Convention to supply this defect, by +extending the judicial power, both in equity and at law, to the +several cases embraced in it. + +Another defect in the report of the committee,--or what was regarded +as a defect when the Constitution was ratified,--and one which the +Convention did not supply, was in the omission of any express +provision for trial by jury in civil cases. Such a provision was +supplied by an amendment proposed by the first Congress that assembled +under the Constitution, and adopted in 1791; but it was regarded by +the framers of the Constitution as inexpedient, on account of the +different construction of juries in the different States, and the +diversity of their usages with respect to the cases in which trial by +jury was used.[352] It is quite possible that, after the Constitution +had declared that the jurisdiction of the national tribunals should +extend to all cases "in law" affecting certain parties or rights, +Congress would not have been at liberty to establish inferior +tribunals for the trial of cases "in law" by any other method than +according to the course of the common law, which requires that the +fact in such cases shall be tried by a jury. But the objection which +afterwards prevailed was connected, as we shall presently see, with +what was regarded as a dangerous ambiguity in the clause of the +Constitution which gave to the Supreme Court its appellate +jurisdiction both as to law and fact. + +The plan of the committee of detail contemplated a supreme tribunal +with original jurisdiction over a few of the cases within the judicial +power, and appellate jurisdiction over all the other cases enumerated. +Inquiry was made in the Convention, whether this appellate +jurisdiction was intended to embrace fact as well as law, and to +extend to cases of common law as well as to those of equity and +admiralty jurisdiction. The answer was given, that such was the +intention of the committee, and the jurisdiction of the federal court +of appeals, under the Confederation, was referred to as having been so +construed. The words "both as to law and fact" were thereupon +introduced into the description of the appellate power, by unanimous +consent.[353] Various explanations were subsequently given, when the +Constitution came before the people, of the force and meaning of these +words. The most probable and the most acute of these explanations was +that made by Hamilton in the Federalist,[354] which limited the effect +of the words, in reference to common law cases, to so much cognizance +of the facts involved in a record as is implied in the application of +the law to them by the appellate tribunal. But the truth was, the +words were of very comprehensive import. While they were used in order +to save to the Supreme Court power to revise the facts in equity and +admiralty proceedings, they made no distinction, and imposed upon +Congress no duty to make a distinction, between cases in equity and +admiralty, and cases at common law; and although it might be true, +that in some States the facts in all cases were tried by a jury, and +that in some cases so tried there ought to be a power to revise the +facts, yet it was not conceded that such a power ought to exist over +the verdicts of juries in cases of common law jurisdiction. This +explanation will serve to show the double purpose of the amendment +made in 1791. The people of many of the States required an express +guaranty that trial by jury should be preserved in suits at common +law, and that the facts once tried by a jury should not be re-examined +otherwise than according to the rules of the common law, which have +established certain well-defined limits to the power of an appellate +tribunal concerning the facts appearing to have been found by a +jury.[355] + +There was still another omission in the report of the committee, of +great magnitude. They had included in the judicial power cases arising +under the laws of the United States, but they had not embraced cases +arising under the Constitution and under treaties. At the same time, +the Constitution was to embrace not only the powers of the general +government, but also special restrictions upon the powers of the +States; and not only the Constitution itself, but the laws made in +pursuance of its provisions, and all treaties made under the authority +of the United States, were to be the supreme law of the land. This +supremacy could only be enforced by some prescribed action of some +department of the general government. The idea of a legislative +arrest, or _veto_, of State laws supposed to be in conflict with some +provision of the national Constitution, or with a treaty or a law of +the United States, had been abandoned. The conformity, moreover, of +the laws of Congress to the provisions of the Constitution, could only +be determined by the judicial power, when drawn into question in a +judicial proceeding. The just and successful operation of the +Constitution, therefore, required that, by some comprehensive +provision, all judicial cases[356] arising under the Constitution, +laws, or treaties of the United States--whether the question should +grow out of the action of a State legislature, or the action of any +department of the general government--should be brought within the +cognizance of the national judiciary. This provision was added by the +Convention. It completed the due proportions and efficacy of this +branch of the judicial power. + +Trial by jury of all criminal offences (except in cases of +impeachment) had been provided for by the committee of detail, and +such trial was to be had in the State where the offence had been +committed. The Convention, in order to secure the same right of a jury +trial in cases where the offence had been committed out of any State, +provided that the trial should be at such place or places as the +Congress might by law have directed.[357] + +These additions, with one other which included within the judicial +power all cases to which the United States might be party; the +transfer of the trial of impeachments to the Senate; and the transfer +to the judiciary of controversies between the States respecting +jurisdiction or territory, and controversies respecting land titles +claimed under the grants of different States,--were the principal +changes and improvements made in the plan of the committee. + +The details of the arrangement will perhaps fail to interest the +general reader. Yet I cannot but think that to understand the purpose +and operation of this department of the national government would be a +very desirable acquisition for any of my readers not already possessed +of it; and having completed the description of the mode in which the +judicial power was constructed, I shall conclude this part of the +subject with a brief statement of its constitutional functions. + +One of the leading purposes for which this branch of the government +was established, was to enable the Constitution to operate upon +individuals, by securing their obedience to its commands, and by +protecting them in the enjoyment of the rights and privileges which it +confers. The government of the United States was eminently intended, +among other purposes, to secure certain personal rights, and to exact +certain personal duties. The Constitution confers on the general +government a few special powers, but it confers them in order that the +general government may accomplish for the people of each State the +advantages and blessings for which the State governments are presumed +to be, and have in fact proved to be, inadequate. It lays upon the +governments and people of the States certain restrictions, and it lays +them for the protection of the people against an exercise of State +power deemed injurious to the general welfare. The government of the +United States, therefore, is not only a government which seeks to +protect the welfare and happiness of the people who live under it, but +it is so constructed as to make its citizens directly and individually +its subjects, exacting of them certain duties, and securing to them +certain rights. It comes into this relation by reason of its supreme +legislative power over certain interests, and the supreme authority of +its restrictions upon the powers of the States; and it is enabled to +make this relation effectual through its judicial department, which +can take cognizance of every duty that the Constitution exacts and of +every right that it confers, whenever they have assumed a shape in +which judicial power can act upon them. Let us take, as illustrations +of this function of the national judiciary, a single instance of the +obedience required by the Constitution, and also one of a right which +it protects. The Constitution empowers Congress to lay and collect +duties; which, when they are laid and incurred, become a debt due from +the individual owner of the property on which they are assessed to the +general government. Payment, in disputed cases, might have been left +to be enforced by executive power; but the Constitution has interposed +the judicial department, as the more peaceful agent, which can at once +adjudicate between the government and the citizen, and compel the +payment of what is found due. Again, the Constitution provides that no +State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. An +individual supposing himself to be aggrieved by such a law might have +been left to obtain such redress as the judicial or legislative +authorities of the State might be disposed to give him; but the +Constitution enables him finally to resort to the national judiciary, +which has power to relieve him against the operation of the law upon +his personal rights, while the law itself may be left upon the +statute-book of the State. + +But while the judicial department of the general government was thus +designed to enforce the duties and protect the rights of individuals, +it is obvious that, in a system of government where such rights and +duties are to be ascertained by the provisions of a fundamental law +framed for the express purpose of defining the powers of the general +government and of each of its departments, and establishing certain +limits to the powers of the States, the mere act of determining the +existence of such rights or duties may involve an adjudication upon +the question, whether acts of legislative or executive power are in +conformity with the requirements of the fundamental law. On the one +hand, the judicial department is to see that the legislative authority +of the Union does not exact of individuals duties which are not within +its prescribed powers, and that no department of the general +government encroaches upon the rights of any other, or upon the rights +of the States; and, on the other hand, it has to see that the +legislative authority of the States does not encroach upon the powers +conferred upon the general government, or violate the rights which the +Constitution secures to the citizen. All this may be, and constantly +is, involved in judicial inquiries into the rights, powers, functions, +and duties of private citizens or public officers; and therefore, in +order that the judicial power should be able effectually to discharge +its functions, it must possess authority, for the purposes of the +adjudication, to declare even an act of legislation to be void, which +conflicts with any provision of the Constitution. + +There were great differences of opinion in the Convention upon the +expediency of giving to the judges, as expositors of the Constitution, +power to declare a law to be void;[358] and undoubtedly such a power, +if introduced into some governments, would be legislative in its +nature, whether the persons who were to exercise it should be called +judges, or be clothed with the functions of a council of revision. But +under a limited and written constitution, such a power, when given in +the form and exercised in the mode provided for in the Constitution of +the United States, is strictly judicial. This is apparent from the +question that is to be determined. It arises in a judicial controversy +respecting some right asserted by or against an individual; and the +matter to be determined is whether an act of legislation, supposed to +govern the case as law, is itself in conformity to the supreme law of +the Constitution. In a government constituted like ours, this question +must be determined by some one of its departments. If it be left with +the executive to decide finally what laws shall be executed, because +they are consistent with the Constitution, and what laws shall be +suspended, because they violate the Constitution, this practical +inconvenience may arise, namely, that the decision is made upon the +abstract question, before a case to be governed by the law has arisen. +If the legislature were empowered to determine, finally, that the laws +which they enact are constitutional, the same practical difficulty +would exist; and the individual, whose rights or interests may be +affected by a law, when put into operation, would have no opportunity +to be heard upon what in our form of government is a purely juridical +question, on which every citizen should be heard, if he desires it, +before the law is enforced in his case. On the other hand, if the +final and authoritative determination is postponed until the question +arises in the course of a judicial controversy respecting some right +or duty or power of an individual who is to be affected by the law, or +who acts under it, the question itself is propounded not in the +abstract, but in the concrete; not in reference to the bearing of the +law upon all possible cases, but to its bearing upon the facts of a +single case. In this aspect, the question is of necessity strictly +judicial. To withhold from the citizen a right to be heard upon the +question which in our jurisprudence is called the constitutionality of +a law, when that law is supposed to govern his rights or prescribe his +duties, would be as unjust as it would be to deprive him of the right +to be heard upon the construction of the law, or upon any other legal +question that arises in the cause. The citizen lives under the +protection, and is subject to the requirements, of a written +fundamental law. No department of the national, or of any State +government, can lawfully act otherwise than according to the powers +conferred or the restrictions imposed by that instrument. If the +citizen believe himself to be aggrieved by some action of either +government which he supposes to be in violation of the Constitution, +and his complaint admit of judicial investigation, he must be heard +upon that question, and it must be adjudicated, or there can be no +administration of the laws worthy of the name of justice. + +It is interesting, therefore, to observe how this function of the +judicial power gives to the operation of the government a +comparatively high degree of simplicity, exactness, and directness, +notwithstanding the refined and complex character of the system which +its framers were obliged to establish. To judge of the merits of that +system, in this particular, it is necessary to recur again to those +alternative measures, to which I have frequently referred, and which +lay directly in their path. One of these measures was that of a +council of revision, to be charged with the duty of arresting improper +laws. Besides the objection which has been already alluded to,--that +the question of the conformity of a law to the Constitution would have +thus been finally passed upon in the abstract,--such an institution, +although theoretically confined to this inquiry, would have become +practically a third legislative chamber; for it would inevitably have +happened that considerations of expediency would also have found their +way into the deliberations of a numerous body appointed to exercise a +revisory power over all acts of legislation. There is no mode in which +the question of constitutional power to enact a law can be determined, +without the influence of considerations of policy or expediency, so +effectually, as by confining the final determination to the special +operation of the law upon the facts of an individual case. When the +tribunal that is to decide this question is, by the very form in which +it is required to act, limited to the bearing of the law upon some +right or duty of an individual placed in judgment by a record, it is +at once relieved of the responsibility, and in a great degree freed +from the temptation, of considering the policy of the legislation. If, +therefore, it be conceded--as every one will concede--that, whatever +public body is specially instituted for the purpose of submitting the +acts of the legislature to the test of the Constitution, it should +neither possess the power, nor be exposed to the danger, of invading +the legislative province, by acting upon motives of expediency, it +must be allowed that the framers of the Constitution did wisely in +rejecting the artificial, cumbrous, and hazardous project of a council +of revision. The plan of such a council was, it is true, much favored, +and indeed insisted upon, by some of the wisest men in the Convention. +But it was urged at a time when the negative that was to be given to +the President had not been settled, and when he had not been made +sufficiently independent of the legislature to insure his unfettered +employment of the negative that might be given to him. The purpose of +the proposed council of revision was to strengthen his hands, by +uniting the judges with him in the exercise of the "veto." This would +have given to the judges a control both over the question of +constitutional power and the question of legislative policy. As to the +latter, it became unnecessary, as well as inexpedient, to unite the +judges with the President, after he had been clothed with a suitable +negative, and after his election had been taken from the legislature; +and as to the former question, the final arrangement of the judicial +power made it equally unnecessary to form the judges into a council +of revision, since, if the President should fail to arrest an +unconstitutional law, when presented for his approval, it could be +tested in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings after it had +gone into operation. + +But the conformity of laws of Congress to the Constitution was not all +that was to be secured. Some prudent and effectual means were to be +devised, by which the acts of the State governments could be subjected +to the same test. The project of submitting the laws of the States to +some department of the general government, while they were in the +process of being enacted, or before they could have the form of law, +was full of inconvenience and hazard. It could not have been attempted +without an injury to State pride, that would have aroused an +inextinguishable opposition to the national authority, even if the +plan could once have been assented to. Yet there was no other +alternative, unless the judicial power of the general government +should be so constructed as to enable it to take the same cognizance +of a constitutional question, when arising upon the law of a State, +that it was to take of such a question when arising upon an act of +Congress. The same necessity would exist in the one case, as in the +other, for a power within the general government to give practical +effect to that supremacy which the Constitution was to claim for +itself, for treaties, and for the laws passed in pursuance of its +provisions. All the restrictions which the Constitution was to lay +upon the powers of the States would be nugatory, if the States +themselves were to be the final judges of their meaning and operation. +This transcendent power of interpretation and application, so +logically necessary, and yet so certain to wound and irritate, if +exercised by direct interference, could be wielded, without injurious +results, through the agency of judicial forms, by a judicial +investigation into personal rights, when affected by the action of a +State government, just as it could be in reference to the acts of any +department of the national government that could be made the subject +of proceedings in a court of justice. + +The relation of the judicial power to the execution of treaties rests +upon the same grounds of paramount necessity. It is not merely for the +sake of uniformity of interpretation, that the national judiciary is +authorized to decide finally all cases arising under treaties, +although uniformity of interpretation is essential to the preservation +of the public faith; but it is in order that the treaty shall be +executed, by being placed beyond the hazards both of wrong +construction and of interested opposition. The memorable instance of +the Treaty of Peace, the absolute failure of which in point of +execution, before the adoption of the Constitution, has been described +in the first volume of this work, presents the great illustration, in +our constitutional history, of the only mode in which the supremacy of +treaty stipulations as law can be maintained in our system of +government. "The United States in Congress assembled," under the +Confederation, had the same exclusive authority to make treaties that +is now possessed by the President and the Senate under the +Constitution, and a treaty was in theory as obligatory then, upon the +separate States and their inhabitants, as it is now. But it has been +found to be an axiom of universal application in the art of +government, that a supremacy which is merely theoretical is no real +supremacy. If a stipulation made by the proper authority with a +foreign government is to have the force of law, requiring the +obedience of individuals and of all public authorities, its execution +must be committed to a judiciary acting upon private rights without +the hinderance or influence of adverse legislation. + +There is another branch of the judicial power which illustrates in a +striking manner the object embraced in the preamble of the +Constitution, where the people of the United States declare it to be +their purpose "to establish justice." This is found in the provision +for a special jurisdiction over the rights of persons bearing a +certain character. Like almost everything else in the Constitution, +this feature of the judicial power sprang from a necessity taught by +previous and severe experience. Reasoning from the mere nature of such +a government as that of the United States, it might seem that the +judicatures of the separate States would be sufficient for the +administration of justice in all cases in which private rights alone +are concerned, and by which no power or interest of the general +government, and no provision of the general Constitution, is likely to +be affected. But we find in the judicial power of the United States a +particular jurisdiction given on account of the mere civil characters +of the parties to a controversy; and its existence there is to be +accounted for upon other than speculative reasons. From the +Declaration of Independence to the day of the ratification of the +Constitution, the judicial tribunals of the States had been unable to +administer justice to foreigners, to citizens of other States, to +foreign governments and their representatives, and to the governments +of their sister States, so as to command the confidence and satisfy +the reasonable expectations of an enlightened judgment. Hence the +necessity for opening the national courts to these various classes of +parties, whose different positions may now be briefly considered. + +In a country of confederated States, each possessing a full power of +legislation, it could not but happen--as it did constantly happen in +this Union before the adoption of the Constitution--that the +determination of controversies between citizens of the State where the +adjudication was to be had, and citizens of another State, would be +exposed to influences unfavorable to the ends of justice. In truth, +one of the parties in such a controversy was virtually an alien, in +the tribunal which he was obliged to enter; for although the Articles +of Confederation undertook to secure to the free inhabitants of each +State all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the +several States, yet it is obvious that the efficacy of such a +provision must depend almost wholly upon the spirit of the tribunals, +and upon their capacity to give effect to such a declaration of +rights, against a course of State policy or the positive enactments of +a State code. The chief difficulty of the condition of affairs +existing before the Constitution lay not so much in the hazards of a +violation of principle through local prejudice, or the superior force +of local policy or legislation,--although these influences were always +powerful,--as in the fact that, when these influences were likely to +be most active, or were most feared, there was no tribunal to which +resort could be had, and which was known to be beyond their operation +and their reach. The articles of compact between the States had +intended to remove from the citizens of the different States the +disabilities of practical alienage under which they would have stood +in the tribunals of each other. But with that mere declaration those +articles stopped. If the litigant saw that the local law was likely to +be administered to him as if he were a foreigner, or feared that the +scales of justice would not be held with an impartial hand, he could +go nowhere else for a decision. This was a great evil; for much of the +value of every judicature depends upon the confidence it inspires. + +There were still other and perhaps stronger reasons for creating an +independent jurisdiction, to be resorted to by foreigners, in +controversies with citizens of the States. No clause in the +Constitution was to make them equal in rights with citizens, and for +the very reason of their alienage, therefore, it was necessary to +give them access to tribunals organized under the authority of the +general government, which would be responsible to foreign powers for +the treatment that their subjects might receive in the United States. +Ambassadors, too, and other foreign ministers, would not only be +aliens, but would possess the character of representatives of their +sovereigns; and consuls would be the public agents of their +governments, although not bearing the diplomatic character. These +functionaries were therefore permitted to resort to the judicial power +of the United States; and for the purpose of more effectually +protecting the national interests that might be involved in their +personal or official relations, original jurisdiction was given to the +Supreme Court in all cases affecting them. + +In addition to these, there were other controversies, which, as we +have seen, were included within the judicial power of the United +States, on account of the character of the parties; namely, those to +which the United States might be a party; those to which a State of +the Union might be a party, where the opposite party was another State +of the Union, or a citizen of another State of the Union, or a foreign +state or its citizens or subjects; and those between citizens of a +State of the Union, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. +Finally, controversies between citizens of the same State claiming +lands under grants of different States were placed under the same +jurisdiction for similar reasons;--because the State tribunals could +not be expected to afford that degree of impartiality which the +circumstances of these several cases required. + +There remains only one other branch of the jurisdiction conferred by +the Constitution on the tribunals of the United States which it is +necessary to notice; namely, the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. +With respect to the criminal jurisdiction in admiralty, in cases of +piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and the prize +jurisdiction, the Articles of Confederation had given to the Congress +the exclusive power of appointing courts for the trial of the former, +and for hearing and finally determining appeals in all cases of +capture. Such appeals were taken from the State courts of +admiralty,--tribunals which also possessed and exercised a civil +jurisdiction corresponding to that of the admiralty in England, but in +practice somewhat more extensive. When the Constitution was framed, it +was perceived to be expedient, on account of the relation of maritime +commerce to the intercourse of the people of the United States with +foreign nations, or to the intercourse of the people of different +States with each other, to give the whole civil as well as criminal +jurisdiction in admiralty, and the entire prize jurisdiction, original +as well as appellate, to the government of the Union. This was +effected by the comprehensive provision, which gives the judicial +power cognizance of "all cases of admiralty and maritime +jurisdiction"; expressions which have often been, and are still likely +to be, the subject of much forensic controversy with respect to the +particular transactions, of a civil nature, intended to be embraced +in the jurisdiction, but in reference to which there is nothing in the +known proceedings of the Convention, other than what is to be inferred +from the language selected, that affords any special evidence of the +intention of the framers of the Constitution. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[352] Elliot, V. 550. + +[353] Elliot, V. 483. + +[354] No. 81. + +[355] See the seventh Amendment. + +[356] By "cases arising under the Constitution," &c. the framers of +that instrument did not mean all cases in which any department of the +government might have occasion to act under provisions of the +Constitution, but all cases _of a judicial nature_; that is, cases +which, having assumed the form of judicial proceedings between party +and party, involve the construction or operation of the Constitution +of the United States. Elliot, V. 483. + +[357] Elliot, V. 484. Constitution, Art. III. § 2, clause 3. + +[358] Elliot, V. 429. + + + + +CHAPTER XV. + +REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL, CONTINUED.--EFFECT OF +RECORDS.--INTER-STATE PRIVILEGES.--FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE AND FROM +SERVICE. + + +We now come to a class of provisions designed to place the people of +the separate States in more intimate relations with each other, by +removing, in some degree, the consequences that would otherwise flow +from their distinct and independent jurisdictions. This was to be done +by causing the rights and benefits resulting from the laws of each +State to be, for some purposes, respected in every other State. In +other words, by the establishment and effect of certain exceptions, +the general rule which absolves an independent government from any +obligation to regard the law, the authority, or the policy of another +government was, for some purposes, to be obviated between the States +of the American Union. + +To some extent, this had been attempted by the Articles of +Confederation, by providing,--first, that the free inhabitants of each +of the States (paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted) +should be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in +the several States; and that the people of each State should have free +ingress and regress to and from any other State, and the same +privileges of trade and commerce as its inhabitants;--secondly, that +fugitives from justice charged with certain enumerated crimes, and +escaping from one State into another, should be given up, on demand of +the executive of the State from which they had escaped;--and thirdly, +that full faith and credit should be given in each State to the +records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates +of every other State. + +The Confederation, however, was a "firm league of friendship with each +other," entered into by separate States, and the object of the +provisions above cited was "the better to secure and perpetuate mutual +friendship and intercourse among the people" of those States. One of +the purposes of the Constitution, on the other hand, was "to form a +more perfect Union"; and we are therefore to expect to find its +framers enlarging and increasing the scope of these provisions, and +giving to them greater precision and vigor. We shall see, also, that +they made a very important addition to their number. + +The first thing that was done was to make the language of the +Confederation respecting the privileges of general citizenship +somewhat more precise. The Articles of Confederation had made "the +free _inhabitants_ of each State," with certain exceptions, entitled +to the privileges and immunities of "free _citizens_ in the several +States."[359] It is probable that these two expressions were intended +to be used in the same sense, and that by "free inhabitants" of a +State was meant its "free citizens." The framers of the Constitution +substituted the latter expression for the former, and thus designated +more accurately the persons who are to enjoy the privileges and +immunities of free citizens in other States besides their own. + +In the next place, while the Articles of Confederation declared that +full faith should be given in each State to the acts, records, and +judicial proceedings of every other State, they neither prescribed the +mode in which the proof was to be made, nor the effect when it had +been made. The committee of detail, in preparing the first draft of +the Constitution, merely adopted the naked declaration of the +articles. The Convention added to it the further provision, which +enabled Congress to prescribe by general laws the manner in which such +acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect to be +given to them when proved.[360] + +With respect to fugitives from justice, the Articles of Confederation +had specified persons "charged with treason, felony, or other high +misdemeanor in any State," as those who were to be given up by the +States to each other. For the purpose of avoiding the ambiguity of +this language, the provision was made to embrace all other crimes, as +well as treason and felony.[361] + +Besides correcting and enlarging these provisions, the framers of the +Constitution introduced into the system of the Union a special +feature, which, in the relations _of the States to each other_, was +then entirely novel, although not without precedent. I refer, of +course, to the clause requiring the extradition of "fugitives from +service," who have escaped from one State into another. + +In describing the compromises of the Constitution relating to slavery, +I have not placed this provision among them, because it was not a part +of the arrangement by which certain powers were conceded to the Union +by one class of States, in consideration of certain concessions made +by another class. It is a provision standing by itself, in respect to +its origin, about which there is some popular misapprehension. Its +history is as follows. + +In many of the discussions that had taken place, in preparing the +outline of the government that was sent to the committee of detail, a +good deal of jealousy had been felt and expressed by some of the +Southern members, not only with regard to the relative weight of their +States in the representative system, but also with respect to the +security of their slave property. Slavery, although it had existed in +all of the States, and although there still remained in all of them +excepting Massachusetts some persons of the African race still held in +that condition, was likely soon to disappear from the States of New +Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania, +under changes that would be introduced by their constitutions or by +statutory provision. In the whole of New England, therefore, and in +nearly all of the Middle States excepting Maryland, if the principles +of the common law and of the law of nations were to be applied to such +cases, the relation of master and slave, existing under the law of +another State, could not be recognized, and there could be no means of +enforcing a return to the jurisdiction which gave to the master a +right to the custody and services of the slave. At the same time, it +was apparent that, in the five States of Maryland, Virginia, North +Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, slavery would not only be +likely to continue for a very long period of time, but that this form +of labor constituted, and would be likely long to constitute, a +necessary part of their social system. The theory on which the +previous Union had been framed, and on which the new Union now +intended to be consummated was expressly to be founded, was, that the +domestic institutions of the States were exclusively matters of State +jurisdiction. But if a relation between persons, existing by the law +of a particular State, was to be broken up by an escape into another +State, by reason of the fact that such a relation was unknown to or +prohibited by the law of the place to which the party had fled, it +was obvious that this theory of the Union would be of very little +practical value to the States in which such a relation was to exist, +and to be one of great importance. If the territory of every State in +which this relation was not to be recognized, were to be made an +asylum for fugitives, the right of the master to the services of the +slave would be wholly insecure. + +It was in reference to this anticipated condition of things, that +General Pinckney of South Carolina, at the time when the principles +that were to be the basis of the Constitution were sent to the +committee of detail,[362] gave notice, that, unless some provision +should be inserted in their report to prevent this consequential +emancipation, he should vote against the Constitution. Considering the +position and influence of this gentleman, his declaration was +equivalent to a notice that, without such a provision, the +Constitution would not be accepted by the State which he represented. +Still, the committee of detail omitted to make any such special +provision in their report of a Constitution, and inserted only a +general article that the _citizens_ of each State should be entitled +to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several +States.[363] General Pinckney was not satisfied with this, and renewed +his demand for a provision "in favor of property in slaves."[364] But +the article was adopted, South Carolina voting against it, and the +vote of Georgia being divided. + +As soon, however, as the next article was taken up, which required the +surrender of fugitives from justice escaping from one State into +another, the South Carolina members moved to require "fugitive slaves +and servants to be delivered up, like criminals."[365] Objection was +made, that this would require the executive of the State to do it at +the public expense,[366] and that there was no more propriety in the +public seizing and surrendering a slave or a servant, than a +horse.[367] The proposition was then withdrawn, in order that a +particular provision might be framed, apart from the article requiring +the surrender of fugitives from justice. That article was then adopted +without opposition.[368] + +For a provision respecting fugitives from service, the movers had two +remarkable precedents to which they could resort, and which had +settled the correctness of the principle involved. Negro slavery, as +well as other forms of service, had existed in the New England +Colonies at a very early period. In 1643, the four Colonies of +Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven had formed a +confederation, in which, among other things, they had mutually +stipulated with each other for the restoration of runaway "servants"; +and there is indubitable evidence, that African slaves, as well as +other persons in servitude, were included in this provision.[369] + +The other precedent was found in the Ordinance which had just been +adopted by Congress for the settlement and government of the Territory +northwest of the river Ohio; in which, when legislating for the +perpetual exclusion of "slavery or involuntary servitude," a similar +provision was made for the surrender of persons escaping into the +Territory, "from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one +of the original States." + +In making this provision, the early colonists of New England, and the +Congress of the Confederation, had acted upon a principle directly +opposite to the objection that was raised in the formation of the +Constitution of the United States. When it was said in the Convention, +that the public authority ought no more to interfere and surrender a +fugitive slave or servant than a horse, it was forgotten that, by the +principles of the common law and the comity of nations, not only is +property in movable things recognized by civilized states, but a +remedy is afforded for restitution. But in the case of a fugitive +person, from whom, by the law of the community from which he escapes, +service is due to another, the right to the service is not recognized +by the common law or the law of nations, and no means exist of +enforcing the duties of the relation. If the case is to be met at all, +therefore, it can only be by a special provision, in the nature of a +treaty, which will so far admit the relation and the claim of service, +as to make them the foundation of a right to restore the individual to +the jurisdiction of that law which recognizes and enforces its duties. + +This was precisely what was done by the New England Confederation of +1643, and the Ordinance of 1787; and it was what was now proposed to +be done by the Constitution of the United States. It was regarded at +the time by the Southern States as absolutely necessary to secure to +them their right of exclusive control over the question of +emancipation,[370] and it was adopted in the Convention by unanimous +consent,[371] for the express purpose of protecting a right that would +otherwise have been without a satisfactory security. A proper +understanding of the grounds of this somewhat peculiar provision is +quite important. + +The publicists of Christendom are universally agreed, that independent +nations are under no positive obligation to support the institutions, +or to enforce the municipal laws, of each other. So far does this +negative principle extend, that the general law of nations does not +even require the extradition of fugitive criminals, who have escaped +from one country into another. If compacts are made for this purpose, +they rest entirely upon comity, and upon those considerations of +public policy which make it expedient to expel from our own borders +those who have violated the great laws on which the welfare of society +depends; and such compacts are usually limited to those offences which +imply great moral as well as civil guilt. The general rule is, that a +nation is not obliged to surrender those who have taken sanctuary in +its dominions. At the same time, every political state has an +undoubted right to forbid the entry into its territories of any person +whose presence may injure its welfare or thwart its policy. No +foreigner, whether he comes as a fugitive escaping from the violated +laws of another country, or comes for the innocent purposes of travel +or residence, can demand a sanctuary as a matter of right. Whether he +is to remain, or not to remain, depends entirely upon the discretion +of the state to which he has resorted;--a discretion that is regulated +by a general principle, among Christian nations, while at the same +time the general principle is subject to such exceptions as the +national interest may require to be established. + +Slavery, or involuntary servitude, being considered by public law as +contrary to natural right, and being a relation that depends wholly on +municipal law, falls entirely within the principle which relieves +independent nations of the obligation to support or to enforce each +other's laws. It has not, therefore, been customary for states which +have no peculiar connection, to surrender fugitives from that +relation, or to do anything to enforce its duties. But such fugitives +stand upon a precise equality with all other strangers who seek to +enter a society of which they are not members. If the welfare of the +society demands their exclusion, or if it may be promoted by a +stipulation that they shall be taken back to the place where their +service is lawfully due, the right to exclude or to surrender them is +perfect; for every political society has the moral power, and is under +a moral obligation, to provide for its own welfare. If such +stipulations have not usually been made among independent nations, +their absence may prove that the public interest has not required +them, but it does not prove the want of a right to make them. + +Each of the American States, when its people adopted the national +Constitution, possessed the right that belongs to every political +society, of determining what persons should be permitted to enter its +territories. Each of them had a complete right to judge for itself how +far it would go, in recognizing or aiding the laws or institutions of +the other States. It is obvious, moreover, that States which are in +general independent of each other, but which propose to enter into +national relations with each other under a common government, for +certain great political and social ends, may have reasons for giving a +particular effect to each other's laws, or for sustaining each other's +institutions, which do not operate with societies not standing in such +a relation; and that these reasons may be of a character so grave and +important, as to amount to a moral obligation. Thus independent and +disconnected nations are ordinarily under no obligation to support or +guarantee each other's forms of government. But the American States, +in entering into the new Union under their national Constitution, +found that a republican form of government in every State was a thing +so essential to the welfare and safety of all of them, as to make it +both a necessity and a duty for all to guarantee that form of +government to each other. In the same way, although nations in +general do not recognize the relation of master and servant prevailing +by the law of another country, so far as to stipulate for the +surrender of persons escaping from that relation, the American States +found themselves surrounded by circumstances so imperative, as to make +it both a necessity and a duty to make with each other that +stipulation. These circumstances I shall now briefly state. + +I have already referred to all the known proceedings in the Convention +on this subject, and have stated to what extent those proceedings +justify the opinion that the Constitution could not have been formed +without this provision.[372] But there is higher evidence both of its +necessity and its propriety than anything that may have been said by +individuals or delegations. The States were about to establish a more +perfect Union, under a peculiar form of national government, the +effect of which would necessarily bring them into closer relations +with each other, multiplying greatly the means and opportunities of +intercourse, and enabling them to act on each other's internal +condition with an influence that would be nearly irresistible, unless +it should be arrested by constitutional barriers. Among the features +of their internal condition, the relation of master and servant, or +the local institution of servitude, was one that must either be placed +under national cognizance, or be left exclusively to the local +authority of each State. There was no middle or debatable ground, +which it could with safety be suffered to occupy. The African race, +although scattered throughout all of the States, was placed in very +different circumstances in different parts of the country. There could +have been no national legislation with respect to that race, +concerning the time or mode of emancipation, the tenure of the +master's right, or the treatment of the slave, that would not have +been forced to adapt itself to an almost endless variety of +circumstances in different localities. At the same time, it was one of +the fundamental principles on which the whole Constitution was +proposed to be founded, that, where the national authority could not +furnish a uniform rule, its legislative power was not to extend. +Whatever required one rule in Massachusetts and another rule in +Virginia, for the exigencies of society, was necessarily left to the +separate authority of the respective States. It was upon matters on +which the States could not legislate alike, but on which the national +power could furnish a safe and advantageous uniform rule, that the +want of a national Constitution was felt, and for these alone was its +legislative power to be created. + +We may suppose, then, that the framers of the Constitution had sought +to bring the relation of master and servant, or the condition of the +African race, within the States, under the cognizance of national +legislation; and we may imagine, for the purposes of the argument, +that consent had been given by every one of the States. The power +must have remained dormant, or its exercise would have been positively +mischievous. It never could have been exercised beneficially for +either of the two races; not only because it could not have followed +any uniform system, but because the confusions and jealousies which +must have attended any attempt to legislate specially, must either +have totally obstructed the power, or must have made its exercise +absolutely pernicious. These consequences, which the least reflection +will reveal, may serve to show us, far better than any declarations or +debates, why the framers of the Constitution studiously avoided +acquiring any power over the institution of slavery in the +States;--why the representatives of one class of States could not have +consented to give, and the representatives of another class could +never have desired to obtain, such a power for the national +Constitution. + +But it may be asked,--and the question is often prompted by a feeling +of pity towards individual cases of hardship,--Why did not the framers +of the Constitution content themselves with the negative position, +which leaves the institution of slavery to the uncontrolled direction +of every State in which it is found? Why did they establish a rule +that obtains nowhere else among distinct communities, and require that +the fugitive from this relation of a purely local character, who has +committed no crime, and has fled only to acquire a natural liberty, +shall be restored to the dominion of the local law which declares him +to be a slave? Why should the States which had abolished, or were +about to abolish, this relation, consent to the use of force within +their own territories, for the purpose of upholding the relation in +other States? These questions are pertinent to the estimate which +mankind may be called upon to form concerning the provisions of our +national Constitution, and they admit of an answer. + +The most material answer to them is, that, without some stipulation on +the part of the States where slavery was not to exist that their free +territory should not be made the means of a practical interference +with the relation in other States, the mere concession of the abstract +principle that slavery was to be exclusively under the control of +State authority would have been of no real value to any one of the +States, or to any of their inhabitants, of either race. But some +active security for this principle was of the utmost importance, not +merely as a concession which would secure the formation of the new +Union, but as a means to secure the beneficent working of the +Constitution after its acceptance had been obtained. It was as +important to the black race as it was to the whites; for it is not to +be doubted, that the continuance of a division into separate States, +and the firm maintenance of an exclusive local authority over the +domestic relations of their inhabitants, have been the cause, under +the Divine Providence, of a far higher civilization, and consequently +of a far better condition of the subjected race, than could have been +attained in the same localities if the States had been in all respects +resolved into one consolidated republic. + +Let the reader spread before him the map of the thirteen republics of +1787, and mark upon each of them the relative numbers of their white +and colored inhabitants, and then efface the boundaries of the States. +Let him imagine all legislative power, all the superintending care of +government, withdrawn into a central authority, whose seat must have +been somewhere near the centre of the free white population. Let him +observe how that population must have tended away from the regions +where the labor of slaves would be most productive, and how dense the +slave populations must there have become. All that now constitutes the +pride of men in their separate State, that induces to residence and +makes it the home of their affections, would have passed away; and at +the same time, vast tracts of wonderful fertility must have retained +the African, and with him scarcely any white man but the speculator, +the overseer, and a solitary tradesman. Into such regions as those, +the national authority could not have penetrated with success. +Legislation would have wanted the necessary machinery, by which to +reach and elevate the condition of society at such remote extremities +from the centre. A more than Russian despotism would not have sufficed +to carry the authority of government and the restraints of law into +communities so depopulated of freemen, so filled with slaves, and so +far removed from the seat of power. + +But now let the same map be again unfolded, with all the lines that +mark the distinct sovereignties of the States. In each of them there +is a complete and efficient government. Each has its history, unbroken +since the first settlers laid the foundations of a State. In each +there is a centre of civilization, a source of law, and the public +conscience of an organized self-governing community. Each of them can +act, and does act, upon the condition of the African race within its +own limits, according to its own judgment of the exigencies of the +case; and it is a fact capable of easy verification, that, in the +progress of three quarters of a century, this local power has effected +for that race what no national legislature could have accomplished. +For, if we look back to the period when the Constitution of the United +States was adopted, and suppose it to have acquired the means of +acting on the institution of slavery within the States, we shall see +that, if the national authority had approached the subject of +emancipation at all, it must have applied the same rule in South +Carolina as in Pennsylvania, and at the same time. But the +emancipation of the half a million of slaves held in widely different +proportions in the various subdivisions of the country, or of their +still more numerous descendants, by a single and uniform measure +comprehending them all, would at no time since the Constitution was +adopted have been a merciful or defensible act. Nothing could have +remained, therefore, for the national power to do, but to attempt such +legislation as might tend to regulate and ameliorate the condition of +servitude; and such legislation must have been wholly ineffectual, and +would soon have been abandoned, or been superseded by schemes that +must have increased the evils which they aimed to remove. + +In thus placing a high value upon the exclusive power of the separate +States over this the most delicate and embarrassing of all the social +problems involved in their destiny, I have not forgotten that, since +the adoption of the national Constitution, nine slave States have been +added to the Union, and that the slaves have increased to more than +three millions. This increase, however, has not been in a greater +_ratio_ than that of the white population, nor greater than it must +have been under any form of polity which the thirteen original States +might have seen fit to adopt in the year 1787, unless that polity had +had a direct tendency to restrain the growth of the country, and to +prevent the settlement of new regions.[373] As it is, it is to be +remembered that, wherever the institution of slavery has gone, there +has gone with it the system of State government, the power and +organization of a distinct community, and consequently a better +civilization than could have been the lot of distant provinces of a +great empire, or distant territories of a consolidated republic. + +These considerations will account for that apparent inconsistency +which has sometimes attracted the attention of those who view the +institutions of the United States from a distance, and without a +sufficient knowledge of the circumstances in which they originated. +It has been occasionally made a matter of reproach, that a people who +fought for political and personal freedom, who proclaimed in their +most solemn papers the natural rights of man, and who proceeded to +form a constitution of government that would best secure the blessings +of liberty to themselves and their posterity, should have left in +their borders certain men from whom those rights and blessings are +withheld. But in truth the condition of the African slaves was neither +forgotten nor disregarded by the generation who established the +Constitution of the United States; and it was dealt with in the best +and the only mode consistent with the facts and with their welfare. +The Constitution of the United States does not purport to secure the +blessings of liberty to all men within the limits of the Union, but to +the people who established it, and their posterity. It could not have +done more; for the slaveholding States could not, and ought not, to +have entered a Union which would have conferred freedom upon men +incapable of receiving it, or which would have required those States +to surrender to a central and insufficient power that trust of custody +and care which, in the providence of God, had been cast upon their +more effectual local authority. The reproach to which they would have +been justly liable would have been that which would have followed a +desertion of the duty they owed to those who could not have cared for +themselves, and whose fate would have been made infinitely worse by a +consolidation of all government into a single community, or by an +attempt to extend the principles of liberty to all men. The case is +reduced, therefore, to the single question, whether the people of the +United States should have foregone the blessings of a free republican +government, because they were obliged by circumstances to limit the +application of the maxims of liberty on which it rests. On this +question, they may challenge the judgment of the world. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[359] See and compare Art. IV. of the Confederation and Art. IV. § 2 +of the Constitution. + +[360] So far as the proceedings in the Convention are to be regarded +as a guide to construction, it appears clearly that the clause which +empowers Congress to "prescribe the manner in which such acts, +records, and proceedings shall be proved, _and the effect thereof_," +was intended to give a power to declare the effect of the acts, +records, and judicial proceedings of any State, when offered in +evidence in another State, as well as to prescribe the mode of proving +them. See Elliot, V. 487, 488, 503, 504. See also a learned discussion +on this clause in Story's Commentaries, §§ 1302-1313. + +[361] Elliot, V. 487. + +[362] July 23d. Elliot, V. 357. + +[363] Art. XIV. of the report of the committee of detail. + +[364] These are the words of Mr. Madison's Minutes. Elliot, V. 487. +This was on the 26th of August. + +[365] Madison, _ut supra_. The motion was made by Butler and Pinckney, +according to Mr. Madison. + +[366] By Wilson. + +[367] By Sherman. + +[368] Madison, _ut supra_. August 28. + +[369] The reader who will consult a paper in the fourth volume of the +Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society (p. 194), written +by Dr. Belknap, in 1795, will find that slavery, in the sense in which +the term is now commonly understood, existed in Massachusetts Bay as +early as 1630. The proof of it consists,--1. In the provisions of the +colonial laws and ordinances, which recognize and regulate a relation +very different from that of service for hire. On this subject, the +early colonists of Massachusetts held and practised the law of Moses. +They regarded it as lawful to _buy_ and _sell_ "slaves taken in lawful +war," or reduced to servitude by judicial sentence, and placed them +under the same privileges as those given by the Mosaic law. But they +punished man-_stealing_ capitally, re-enacting expressly the 16th +verse of the 21st chapter of Exodus; and when there were any negroes +in their jurisdiction who had been stolen, or "fraudulently" acquired +in Africa, they endeavored to send them back again. 2. In the actual +presence of negro slaves, brought from Africa, who had been "lawfully" +acquired, that is, by fair purchase from those who held them as +prisoners of war. These existed to some extent in the Colony in 1638, +and were numerous in 1673; and of course were included in all the +legislation of that period respecting service, being sometimes +described as "slaves," and sometimes by the more general and +comprehensive term of "servants."--Slavery by judicial sentence was +inflicted for no higher crimes than theft and burglary. Thus at a +Quarter Court holden at Boston the 4th day of the 10th month, 1638, +"John Hazlewood being found guilty of severall thefts and breaking +into severall houses, was censured to be severely whipped and +delivered up a _slave_ to whom the Court shall appoint." (Shurtleff's +Edition of Records of Massachusetts, I. 246.) Many of the Indians +taken prisoners in King Philip's war, who had formerly submitted to +the Colonial government and had been called "Praying Indians" from +their supposed conversion to Christianity, were adjudged guilty of +"rebellion," and were sold into slavery in foreign countries. Dr. +Belknap says that some of them found their way back again, and took a +severe revenge on the English in a subsequent war. (Hist. Soc. Coll. +_ut supra_.) + +[370] Mr. Madison stated in the Convention of Virginia in which the +Constitution was ratified, that "this clause was expressly inserted, +to enable owners of slaves to reclaim them." (Elliot's Debates, III. +453.) + +[371] August 29. Elliot, V. 492. + +[372] I am not aware of any more positive evidence than that above +given in the text, that this clause of the Constitution was expressly +made in the Convention a condition of assent by any of the States. + +[373] In 1790, the slaves numbered 697,897, and the whites 3,172,464. +In 1850, the slaves had increased to 3,204,313, and the whites to +19,533,068. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI. + +REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL, CONCLUDED.--GUARANTY OF REPUBLICAN +GOVERNMENT AND INTERNAL TRANQUILLITY.--OATH TO SUPPORT THE +CONSTITUTION.--MODE OF AMENDMENT.--RATIFICATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF +THE CONSTITUTION.--SIGNING BY THE MEMBERS OF THE CONVENTION. + + +The power and duty of the United States to guarantee a republican form +of government to each State, and to protect each State against +invasion and domestic violence, had been declared by a resolution, the +general purpose of which has been already described. It should be said +here, however, that the objects of such a provision were two; first, +to prevent the establishment in any State of any form of government +not essentially republican in its character, whether by the action of +a minority or of a majority of the inhabitants; second, to protect the +State against invasion from without, and against every form of +domestic violence.[374] When the committee of detail came to give +effect to the resolution, they prepared an article, which made it the +duty of the United States to guarantee to each State a republican form +of government, and to protect each State against invasion, without any +application from its authorities; and to protect the State against +domestic violence, on the application of its legislature.[375] No +change was made by the Convention in the substance of this article, +excepting to provide that the application, in a case of domestic +violence, may be made by the executive of the State, when the +legislature cannot be convened.[376] + +It now remains for me to state what appears to have been the meaning +of the framers of the Constitution, embraced in these provisions. It +is apparent, then, from all the proceedings and discussions on this +subject, that, by guaranteeing a republican form of government, it was +not intended to maintain the existing constitutions of the States +against all changes. This would have been to exercise a control over +the sovereignty of the people of a State, inconsistent with the nature +and purposes of the Union. The people must be left entirely free to +change their fundamental law, at their own pleasure, subject only to +the condition, that they continue the republican form of government. +The question arises then, What is that form? Does it imply the +existence of some organic law, establishing the departments of a +government, and prescribing their powers, or does it admit of a form +of the body politic under which the public will may be declared from +time to time, either with or without the agency of any established +organs or representatives? Is it competent to a State to abolish +altogether that body of its fundamental law which we call its +Constitution, and to proceed as a mere democracy, enacting, +expounding, and executing laws by the direct action of the people, and +without the intervention of any representative system constituting +what is known as a government? + +The Constitution of the United States assumes, in so many of its +provisions, that the States will possess organized governments, in +which legislative, executive, and judicial departments will be known +and established, that it must be taken for granted that the existence +of such agents of the public will is a necessary feature of a State +government, within the meaning of this clause. No State could +participate in the government of the Union, without at least two of +these agents, namely, a legislature and an executive; for the people +of a State, acting in their primary capacity, could not appoint a +Senator of the United States; nor fill a vacancy in the office of +Senator; nor appoint Electors of the President of the United States, +without the previous designation by a legislature of the mode in which +such Electors were to be chosen; nor apply to the government of the +United States to protect them against "domestic violence," through any +other agent than the legislature or the executive of the State. It is +manifest, therefore, that each State must have a government, +containing at least these distinct departments; and whether this +government is organized periodically, under mere laws perpetually +re-enacted, and subject to perpetual changes without reference to +forms, or under standing and fundamental laws, changeable only in a +prescribed form, and being so far what is called a constitution, it is +apparent that there must be a "form of government" possessed of these +distinct agencies. + +There must be, moreover, not only this "form of government," but it +must be a "republican" form; and in order to determine the sense in +which this term qualifies the nature of the government in other +respects besides those already referred to, it is necessary to take +into view the previous history of American political institutions, +because that history shows what is meant, in the American sense, by a +"republican" government. + +History, then, establishes the fact, that, in the American system of +government, the people are regarded as the sole original source of all +political authority; that all legitimate government must rest upon +their will. But it also teaches that the will of the people is to be +exercised through representative forms. For even in the exercise of +original suffrage, which has never been universal in any of the States +of the Union, and in the bestowal of power upon particular organs, +those who are regarded as competent to express the will of society +are, in that expression, deemed to represent all its members; and +those who, in the distribution of political functions, exercise the +sovereignty of the people, so far as it has been thus imparted to +them, exercise a representative function, to which they are appointed, +directly or indirectly, by popular suffrage, that may be more or less +restricted, according to the public will. It may be said, therefore, +with strictness, that in the American system a republican government +is one based on the right of the people to govern themselves, but +requiring that right to be exercised through public organs of a +representative character; and these organs constitute the government. +How much or how little power shall be imparted to this government, +what restrictions shall be imposed upon it, and what the precise +functions of its several departments shall be, with respect to the +internal concerns of the State, the Constitution of the United States +leaves untouched, except in a few particulars. It merely declares that +a government having the essential characteristics of an American +republican system shall be guaranteed by the United States; that is to +say, that no other shall be permitted to be established. + +The provision by which the State is protected against domestic +violence was necessary to complete the republican character of the +system intended to be upheld. The Constitution of the United States +assumes that the governments of the States, existing when it goes into +operation, are rightfully in the exercise of the authority of the +State, and will so continue until they are changed. But it means that +no change shall be made by force, by public commotion, or by setting +aside the authority of the existing government. It recognizes the +right of that government to be protected against domestic violence; in +which expression is to be included every species of force directed +against that government, excepting the will of the people operating +to change it through the forms of constitutional action. + +The next topic on which the Convention was required to act was the +question whether the Constitution should be made capable of amendment, +and in what mode amendments were to be proposed and adopted. The +Confederation, from its nature as a league between States otherwise +independent of each other, was made incapable of alteration excepting +by the unanimous consent of the States. It affords a striking +illustration of the different character of the government established +by the Constitution, that a mode was devised by which changes in the +organic law could become obligatory upon all the States, by the action +of a less number than the whole. + +The frame of government which the members of the Convention were +endeavoring to establish, if once adopted, was to endure, as a +continuing power, indefinitely; and that it might, as far as possible, +be placed beyond the danger of destruction, it was necessary to make +it subject to such peaceful changes as experience might render proper, +and which, by being made capable of introduction by the organic law +itself, would preserve the identity of the government. The existence +and operation of a prescribed method of changing particular features +of a government mark the line between amendment and revolution, and +render a resort to the latter, for the purpose of melioration or +reform, save in extreme cases of oppression, unnecessary. According to +our American theory of government, revolution and amendment both rest +upon the doctrine, that the people are the source of all political +power, and each of them is the exercise of an ultimate right. But this +right is exercised, in the process of amendment, in a prescribed form, +which preserves the continuity of the existing government, and changes +only such of its fundamental rules as require revision, without the +destruction of any public or private rights that may have become +vested under the former rule. Revolution, on the contrary, proceeds +without form, is the violent disruption of the obligations resting on +the authority of the former government, and terminates its existence +often, without saving any of the rights which may have grown up under +it. The question, therefore, whether the Constitution should be made +capable of amendment, was identical with the question whether some +mode of amending it should be prescribed in the instrument itself, +since, without an ascertained and limited method of proceeding, all +change becomes, in effect, revolution; and this was accordingly, in +substance, the same as the question whether revolution should be the +only method by which the American people could ever modify their +system of government, when in the progress of time changes might +become indispensable. + +It was originally proposed in the Convention, that provision should be +made for amending the Constitution, without requiring the assent of +the national legislature.[377] But this was justly regarded as a very +important question, and the Convention came to no other decision, +when the committee of detail were instructed, than to declare that +provision ought to be made for amending the Constitution whenever it +should seem necessary.[378] The mode selected by the committee, and +embraced in the first draft of the instrument, was to have a +convention called by the Congress, when applied for by the +legislatures of two thirds of the States; but they did not declare +whether the legislatures were to propose amendments and the convention +was to adopt them, or whether the convention was both to propose and +adopt them, or only to propose them for adoption by some other body or +bodies not specified. There lay, therefore, at the basis of this whole +subject, the very grave question whether there should ever be another +national convention, to act in any manner upon or in reference to the +national Constitution, after its adoption, and if so, what its +functions and authority were to be. There would follow, also, the +further question, whether this should be the sole method in which the +Constitution should be made capable of amendment. Several reasons +concurred to render it highly inexpedient to make a resort to a +convention the sole method of reaching amendments, and we can now see +that the decision that was made on this subject was a wise one. It was +a rare combination of circumstances that gave to the first national +Convention its success. The war of the Revolution, and the exigencies +which it caused, had produced a class of men, possessing an influence, +as well as qualifications for the duty assigned to them, that would +not be likely to be again witnessed. Of these men, Washington was the +head; and no second Washington could be looked for. The peculiar +crisis, too, occasioned by the total failure of the Confederation, +notwithstanding the apparent fitness and actual necessity of that +government at the time of its formation, could never occur again. +There were, moreover, but thirteen States in the confederacy, nearly +all of which dated their settlement and their existence as political +communities from about the same period, and all had passed through the +same revolutionary history. But the number of the States was evidently +destined to be greatly increased, and the new members of the Union +would also be likely to be very different in character from the old +States. It was not probable, therefore, that the time would ever +arrive when the people of the United States would feel that another +national convention, for the purpose of acting on the national +Constitution, would be safe or practicable. Still, it would not have +been proper to have excluded the possibility of a resort to this +method of amendment; since the national legislature might itself be +interested to perpetuate abuses springing from defects in the +Constitution, and to incur the hazards attending a convention might +become a far less evil than the continuance of such abuses, or the +failure to make the necessary reforms. + +But it was indispensable that the precise functions and authority of +such a convention should be defined, lest its action might result in +revolution. The method of amendment proposed by the committee of +detail did not enable the Congress to call a convention on their own +motion, and did not prescribe the action of such a body, or provide +any mode in which the amendments proposed by it should be adopted. +Hamilton and Madison both opposed this plan;--the former, because it +was inadequate, and because he considered it desirable that a much +easier method should be devised for remedying the defects that would +become apparent in the new system; the latter, on account of the +vagueness of the plan itself. Accordingly, Mr. Madison brought +forward, as a substitute, a method of proceeding, which, with some +modifications, became what is now the fifth article of the +Constitution; namely, that the Congress, whenever two thirds of both +houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments; or, on the +application of the legislatures of two thirds of the States, shall +call a convention for proposing amendments. In either case, the +amendments proposed are to become valid as part of the Constitution, +when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the States, or +by conventions in three fourths of the States, as the one or the other +mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress.[379] + +But when this provision had been agreed upon, the grave question +arose, whether the power of amendment was to be subjected to any +limitations. There were two objects, in respect to which, as we have +more than once had occasion to see, different classes of the States +felt great jealousy. One of them had been covered by the stipulations +that the States should not be prohibited before the year 1808 from +admitting further importations of slaves, and that no capitation or +other direct tax should be laid unless in proportion to the census or +enumeration of the inhabitants of the States, in which three fifths +only of the slaves were included.[380] The other was the equality of +representation in the Senate, so long and at length so successfully +contended for by the smaller States.[381] At the instance of Mr. +Rutledge of South Carolina, a proviso was added, which forbade any +amendment before the year 1808 affecting in any manner the clauses +relating to the slave-trade and the capitation or other direct +taxes.[382] This proviso having now become inoperative, those clauses +are, like others, subject to amendment. At the instance of Mr. Sherman +of Connecticut, a restriction that is of perpetual force was placed +upon the power of amendment, which prevents each State from being +deprived of its equality of representation in the Senate, without its +consent.[383] + +The oath or affirmation to support the Constitution was provided for +by the committee of detail, in accordance with the resolution +directing that it should be taken by the members of both houses of +Congress and of the State legislatures, and by all executive and +judicial officers of the United States and of the several States; and +for the purpose of for ever preventing any connection between church +and state, and any scrutiny into men's religious opinions, the +Convention unanimously added the clause, that "no religious test shall +ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust +under the United States."[384] + +We are next to ascertain in what mode the Constitution, which had thus +been framed, was to provide for its own establishment and authority. +There is a great difference between the importance of this question, +as it presented itself to the framers of the Constitution, and its +importance to this or any succeeding generation. To us it is chiefly +interesting because it displays the basis of a government which has +been established for seventy years over the thirteen original States +of the confederacy, and is now acknowledged by more than twice the +number of those original States. To those who made the Constitution, +and to the people who were to vote upon it and to put it into +operation, the mode in which it was to become the organic law of the +Union was a topic of serious import and delicacy. It involved the +questions, of what course would be politic with reference to the +people; of what would be practicable; of the initiation of the new +government without force; of its establishment on a firm, just, and +legitimate authority; and of its right to supersede the Confederation, +without a breach of faith toward the members of that body by whose +inhabitants the new system might be rejected. + +The Convention had already decided that the Constitution must be +ratified by the people of the States; but a difficulty had all along +existed, in the opinions held by some of the members respecting the +compact then subsisting between the States, which they regarded as +indissoluble but by the consent of all the parties to it. The +resolution, which the committee of detail were instructed to carry +out, had declared that the new plan of government should first be +submitted to the approbation of the existing Congress, and then to +assemblies of representatives to be recommended by the State +legislatures and to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and +decide upon it. But this direction embraced no decision of the +question, whether the ratification by the people of a less number than +all the States should be sufficient for putting the government into +operation. If the people of a smaller number than the whole of the +States could establish this form of government, what was to be its +future relation to the States which might reject or refuse to consider +it? Could any number of the States thus withdraw themselves from the +Confederation, and establish for themselves a new general government, +and could that government have any authority over the rest? Various +and widely opposite theories were maintained. One opinion was, that +all the States must accept the Constitution, or it would be a +nullity;--another, that a majority of the States might establish it, +and so bind the minority, upon the principle that the Union was a +society subject to the control of the greater part of its +members;--still another, that the States which might ratify it would +bind themselves, but no one else. + +The truth with regard to these questions, which perplexed the minds of +men in that assembly somewhat in proportion to their acuteness and +their proneness to metaphysical speculations, was in reality not very +far off. The Articles of Confederation had certainly declared that no +alteration should be made in any of them, unless first proposed by the +Congress, and afterwards unanimously agreed to by the State +legislatures. But in two very important particulars the Convention had +already passed beyond what could be deemed an alteration of those +Articles. They had prepared and were about to propose a system of +government that would not merely alter, but would abolish and +supersede, the Confederation; and they had determined to obtain, what +they regarded as a legitimate authority for this purpose, the consent +of the people of the States, by whose will the State governments +existed, from whom those governments derived their authority to enter +into the compact of the Confederation, and whose sovereign right to +ameliorate their own political condition could not be disputed. This +system they intended should be offered to all. The refusal of some +States to accept it could not, upon principles of natural justice and +right, oblige the others to remain fettered to a government which had +been pronounced by twelve of the thirteen legislatures to be +defective and inadequate to the exigencies of the Union. At the same +time, the independent political existence of the people of each State +made it impossible to treat them as a minority subject to the power of +such majority as would be formed by the States that might adopt the +Constitution. If the people of a State should ratify it, they would be +bound by it. If they should refuse to ratify it, they would simply +remain out of the new Union that would be formed by the rest. It was +therefore determined that the Constitution should undertake to be in +force only in those States by whose inhabitants it might be +adopted.[385] + +Then came the question, in what mode the assent of the people of the +States was to be given. The constitution of one of the States[386] +provided that it should be altered only in a prescribed mode; and it +was said that the adoption of the Constitution now proposed would +involve extensive changes in the constitution of every State. This was +equally true of the constitutions of those States which had provided +no mode for making such changes, and in which the State officers were +all bound by oath to support the existing constitution. These +difficulties, however, were by no means insurmountable. It was +universally acknowledged that the people of a State were the fountain +of all political power, and if, in the method of appealing to them, +the consent of the State government that such appeal should be made +were involved, there could be no question that the proceeding would +be in accordance with what had always been regarded as a cardinal +principle of American liberty. For, since the birth of that liberty, +it had been always assumed that, when it has become necessary to +ascertain the will of the people on a new exigency, it is for the +existing legislative power to provide for it by an ordinary act of +legislation.[387] + +Whatever changes, therefore, in the State constitutions might become +necessary in consequence of the adoption of the national Constitution, +it would be a just presumption that the will of the people, duly +ascertained by their legislature, had decided, by that adoption, that +such changes should be made; and the formal act of making them could +follow at any time when arrangements might be made for it. But if no +mode of ratification of the national Constitution were to be +prescribed, and it were left to each State to act upon it in any +manner that it might prefer, there would be no uniformity in the mode +of creating the new government in the different States; and if the +Convention and the Congress were to refer its adoption to the State +legislatures, it would not rest on the direct authority of the people. +For these reasons, the Convention adhered to the plan of having the +Constitution submitted directly to assemblies of representatives of +the people in each State, chosen for the express purpose of deciding +on its adoption.[388] + +There was still another question, of great practical importance, to +be determined. Was the Constitution to go into operation at all, +unless adopted by all the States, and if so, what number should be +sufficient for its establishment? It appeared clearly enough, that to +require a unanimous adoption would defeat all the labors of the +Convention. Rhode Island had taken no part in the formation of the +Constitution, and could not be expected to ratify it. New York had not +been represented for some weeks in the Convention, and it was at least +doubtful how the people of that State would receive the proposed +system, to which a majority of their delegates had declared themselves +to be strenuously opposed.[389] Maryland continued to be present in +the Convention, and a majority of her delegates still supported the +Constitution; but Luther Martin confidently predicted its rejection by +the State, and it was evident that his utmost energies would be put +forth against it. Under these circumstances, to have required a +unanimous adoption by the States would have been fatal to the +experiment of creating a new government. Some of the members were in +favor of such a number as would form both a majority of the States and +a majority of the people of the United States. But there was an idea +familiar to the people, in the number that had been required under the +Confederation upon certain questions of grave importance; and in order +that the Constitution might avail itself of this established usage, it +was determined that the ratifications of the conventions of _nine_ +States should be sufficient to establish the Constitution between the +States that might so ratify it.[390] + +The Constitution, as thus finally prepared, received the formal assent +of the States in the Convention, on the last day of the session.[391] +The great majority of the members desired that the instrument should +go forth to the public, not only with an official attestation that it +had been agreed upon by the States represented, but also with the +individual sanction and signatures of their delegates. Three of the +members present, however, Randolph and Mason of Virginia, and Gerry of +Massachusetts, notwithstanding the proposed form of attestation +contained no personal approbation of the system, and signified only +that it had been agreed to by the unanimous consent of the States then +present, refused to sign the instrument.[392] The objections which +these gentlemen had to different features of the Constitution would +have been waived, if the Convention had been willing to take a course +quite opposite to that which had been thought expedient. They desired +that the State conventions should be at liberty to propose amendments, +and that those amendments should be finally acted upon by another +general convention.[393] The nature of the plan, however, and the form +in which it was to be submitted to the people of the States, made it +necessary that it should be adopted or rejected as a whole, by the +convention of each State. As a process of amendment by the action of +the Congress and the State legislatures had been provided in the +instrument, there was the less necessity for holding a second +convention. The State conventions would obviously be at liberty to +propose amendments, but not to make them a condition of their +acceptance of the government as proposed. + +A letter having been prepared to accompany the Constitution, and to +present it to the consideration and action of the existing Congress, +the instrument was formally signed by all the other members then +present. The official record sent to the Congress of the resolutions, +which directed that the Constitution be laid before that body, recited +the presence of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, +Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, +North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. New York was not regarded +as officially present; but in order that the proceedings might have +all the weight that a name of so much importance could give to them, +in the place that should have been filled by his State, was recited +the name of "Mr. Hamilton from New York." The prominence thus given to +the name of Hamilton, by the absence of his colleagues, was +significant of the part he was to act in the great events and +discussions that were to attend the ratification of the instrument by +the States. His objections to the plan were certainly not less grave +and important than those which were entertained by the members who +refused to give to it their signatures; but like Madison, like +Pinckney and Franklin and Washington, he considered the choice to be +between anarchy and convulsion, on the one side, and the chances of +good to be expected of this plan, on the other. Upon this issue, in +truth, the Constitution went to the people of the United States. There +is a tradition, that, when Washington was about to sign the +instrument, he rose from his seat, and, holding the pen in his hand, +after a short pause, pronounced these words:--"Should the States +reject this excellent Constitution, the probability is that an +opportunity will never again offer to cancel another in peace,--the +next will be drawn in blood."[394] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[374] Elliot, V. 332, 333. + +[375] First draft of the Constitution, Art. XVIII. Elliot, V. 381. + +[376] Constitution, Art. IV. § 4. + +[377] Elliot, V. 157. + +[378] Elliot, V. 376. + +[379] Elliot, V. 530-532. + +[380] Constitution, Art. I § 9. + +[381] Ibid. Art. I. § 3. + +[382] Elliot, V. 532. + +[383] Ibid. 551, 552. Constitution, Art. I § 3. + +[384] Constitution, Art. VI. + +[385] Elliot, V. 499. + +[386] Maryland. + +[387] Works of Daniel Webster, VI. 227. + +[388] The vote, however, was only six States to four. Elliot, V. 500. + +[389] Two of the New York delegates, Messrs. Yates and Lansing, left +the Convention on the 5th of July. Hamilton had previously returned to +the city of New York, on private business. He left June 29 and +returned August 13. It appears from his correspondence that he was +again in the city of New York on the 20th of August, and that he +remained there until the 28th. On the 6th of September he was in the +Convention. The vote of the State was not taken in the Convention +after the retirement of Yates and Lansing. + +[390] 1 Elliot, V. 499-501. The article embodying this decision was +the 21st in the report of the committee of detail. It became, on the +revision, Article VIII. of the Constitution. + +[391] September 17. + +[392] This form of attestation had been adopted in the hope of gaining +the signatures of all the members, but without success. + +[393] Mr. Madison has given the principal grounds of objection which +these gentlemen felt to the Constitution. It is not necessary to +repeat them here, as they were nearly all met by the subsequent +amendments, so far as they were special, and did not relate to the +general tendency of the system. (See Madison, Elliot, V. 552-558.) + +[394] My authority for this anecdote is the Pennsylvania Journal of +November 14, 1787, where it was stated by a writer who dates his +communication from Elizabethtown, November 7. + + + + +BOOK V. + +ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +GENERAL RECEPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION.--HOPES OF A REUNION WITH GREAT +BRITAIN.--ACTION OF THE CONGRESS.--STATE OF FEELING IN MASSACHUSETTS, +NEW YORK, VIRGINIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, MARYLAND, AND NEW +HAMPSHIRE.--APPOINTMENT OF THEIR CONVENTIONS. + + +The national Convention was dissolved on the 14th of September. The +state of expectation and anxiety throughout the country during its +deliberations, and at the moment of its adjournment, will appear from +a few leading facts and ideas, which illustrate the condition of the +popular mind when the Constitution made its appearance. + +The secrecy with which the proceedings of the Convention had been +conducted, the nature of its business, and the great eminence and +personal influence of its principal members, had combined to create +the deepest solicitude in the public mind in all the chief centres of +population and intelligence throughout the Union. An assembly of many +of the wisest and most distinguished men in America had been engaged +for four months in preparing for the United States a new form of +government, and the public had acquired no definite knowledge of +their transactions, and no information respecting the nature of the +system they were likely to propose. Under these circumstances, we may +expect to find the most singular rumors prevailing during the session +of the Convention, and a great excitement in the public mind in many +localities, when the result was announced. Among the reports that were +more or less believed through the latter part of the summer, was the +idle one that the Convention were framing a system of monarchical +government, and that the Bishop of Osnaburg was to be sent for, to be +the sovereign of the new kingdom. + +Foolish as it may appear to us, this story occasioned some real alarm +in its day. It is to be traced to a favorite idea of that class of +Americans who had either been avowed "Tories" during the Revolution, +or had secretly felt a greater sympathy with the mother country than +with the land of their birth, and who were at this period generally +called "Loyalists." Some of these persons had taken no part, on either +side, during the Revolutionary war, and had abstained from active +participation in public affairs since the peace. They were all of that +class of minds whose tendencies led them to the belief that the +materials for a safe and efficient republican government were not to +be found in these States, and that the public disorders could be +corrected only by a government of a very different character. Their +feelings and opinions carried them towards a reconciliation with +England, and their grand scheme for this purpose was to invite hither +the titular Bishop of Osnaburg.[395] + +Their numbers were not large in any of the States; but the feeling of +insecurity and the dread of impending anarchy were shared by others +who had no particular inclination towards England; and it is not to +be doubted that the Constitution, among the other mischiefs which it +averted, saved the country from a desperate attempt to introduce a +form of government which must have been crushed beneath commotions +that would have made all government, for a long time at least, +impracticable. The public anxiety, created by the reports in +circulation, had reached such a point in the month of August,--when +it was rumored that the Convention had recently given a higher tone to +the system they were preparing,--that members found it necessary to +answer numerous letters of inquiry from persons who had become +honestly alarmed. "Though we cannot affirmatively tell you," was their +answer, "what we are doing, we can negatively tell you what we are +_not_ doing:--we never once thought of a king."[396] + +All doubt and uncertainty were dispelled, however, by the publication +of the Constitution in the newspapers of Philadelphia, on the 19th of +September. It was at once copied into the principal journals of all +the States, and was perhaps as much read by the people at large as any +document could have been in the condition of the means of public +intelligence which a very imperfect post-office department then +afforded. It met everywhere with warm friends and warm opponents; its +friends and its opponents being composed of various classes of men, +found, in different proportions, in almost all of the States. Those +who became its advocates were, first, a large body of men, who +recognized, or thought they recognized, in it the admirable system +which it in fact proved to be when put into operation; secondly, those +who, like most of the statesmen who made it, believed it to be the +best attainable government that could be adopted by the people of the +United States, overlooking defects which they acknowledged, or +trusting to the power of amendment which it contained; and, thirdly, +the mercantile and manufacturing classes, who regarded its commercial +and revenue powers with great favor. Its adversaries were those who +had always opposed any enlargement of the federal system; those whose +consequence as politicians would be diminished by the establishment of +a government able to attract into its service the highest classes of +talent and character, and presenting a service distinct from that of +the States; those who conscientiously believed its provisions and +powers dangerous to the rights of the States and to public liberty; +and, finally, those who were opposed to any government, whether State +or national or federal, that would have vigor and energy enough to +protect the rights of property, to prevent schemes of plunder in the +form of paper money, and to bring about the discharge of public and +private debts. The different opponents of the Constitution being +animated by these various motives, great care should be taken by +posterity, in estimating the conduct of individuals, not to confound +these classes with each other, although they were often united in +action. + +As the Constitution presented itself to the people in the light of a +proposal to enlarge and reconstruct the system of the Federal Union, +its advocates became known as the "Federalists," and its adversaries +as the "Anti-Federalists." This celebrated designation of Federalist, +which afterwards became so renowned in our political history as the +name of a party, signified at first nothing more than was implied in +the title of the essays which passed under that name, namely, an +advocacy of the Constitution of the United States.[397] + +Midway between the active friends and opponents of the Constitution +lay that great and somewhat inert mass of the people, which, in all +free countries, finally decides by its preponderance every seemingly +doubtful question of political changes. It was composed of those who +had no settled convictions or favorite theories respecting the best +form of a general government, and who were under the influence of no +other motive than a desire for some system that would relieve their +industry from the oppressions under which it had long labored, and +would give security, peace, and dignity to their country. Ardently +attached to the principles of republican government and to their +traditionary maxims of public liberty, and generally feeling that +their respective States were the safest depositaries of those +principles and maxims, this portion of the people of the United States +were likely to be much influenced by the arguments against the +Constitution founded on its want of what was called a Bill of Rights, +on its omission to secure a trial by jury in civil cases, and on the +other alleged defects which were afterwards corrected by the first ten +Amendments. But they had great confidence in the principal framers of +the instrument, an unbounded reverence for Washington and Franklin, +and a willingness to try any experiment sanctioned by men so +illustrious and so entirely incapable of any selfish or unworthy +purpose.[398] There were, however, considerable numbers of the +people, in the more remote districts of several of the States, who had +a very imperfect acquaintance, if they had any, with the details of +the proposed system, at the time when their legislatures were called +upon to provide for the assembling of conventions; for we are not to +suppose that what would now be the general and almost instantaneous +knowledge of any great political event or topic, could have taken +place at that day concerning the proposed Constitution of the United +States. Still it was quite generally understood before its final +ratification in the States where its adoption was postponed to the +following year, where information was most wanted, and where the chief +struggles occurred; and it is doubtless correct to assert that its +adoption was the intelligent choice of a majority of the people of +each State, as well as the choice of their delegates, when their +conventions successively acted upon it. + +On the adjournment of the Convention, Madison, King, and Gorham, who +held seats in the Congress of the Confederation, hastened to the city +of New York, where that body was then sitting. They found eleven +States represented.[399] But they found also that an effort was likely +to be made, either to arrest the Constitution on its way to the people +of the States, or to subject it to alteration before it should be sent +to the legislatures. It was received by official communication from +the Convention in about ten days after that assembly was dissolved. +All that was asked of the Congress was, that they should transmit it +to their constituent legislatures for their action. The old objection, +that the Congress could with propriety participate in no measure +designed to change the form of a government which they were appointed +to administer, having been answered, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia +proposed to amend the instrument by inserting a Bill of Rights, trial +by jury in civil cases, and other provisions in conformity with the +objections which had been made in the Convention by Mr. Mason. + +To the address and skill of Mr. Madison, I think, the defeat of this +attempt must be attributed. If it had succeeded, the Constitution +could never have been adopted by the necessary number of States; for +the recommendation of the Convention did not make the action of the +State legislatures conditional upon their receiving the instrument +from the Congress; the legislatures would have been at liberty to send +the document published by the Convention to the assemblies of +delegates of the people, without adding provisions that might have +been added by the Congress; some of them would have done so, while +others would have followed the action of the Congress, and thus there +would have been in fact two Constitutions before the people of the +States, and their acts of ratification would have related to +dissimilar instruments. This consideration induced the Congress, by a +unanimous vote of the States present, to adopt a resolution which, +while it contained no approval of the Constitution, abstained from +interfering with it as it came from the Convention, and transmitted +it to the State legislatures, "in order to be submitted to a +convention of delegates chosen in each State by the people thereof, in +conformity to the resolves of the Convention made and provided in that +case."[400] + +In Massachusetts, the Constitution was well received, on its first +publication, so far as its friends in the central portion of the Union +could ascertain. Mr. Gerry was a good deal censured for refusing to +sign it, and the public voice, in Boston and its neighborhood, +appeared to be strongly in its favor. But in a very short time three +parties were formed among the people of the State, in such proportions +as to make the result quite uncertain. The commercial classes, the men +of property, the clergy, the members of the legal profession, +including the judges, the officers of the late army, and most of the +people of the large towns, were decidedly in favor of the +Constitution. This party amounted to three sevenths of the people of +the State. The inhabitants of the district of Maine, who were then +looking forward to the formation of a new State, would be likely to +vote for the new Constitution, or to oppose it, as they believed it +would facilitate or retard their wishes; and this party numbered two +sevenths. The third party consisted of those who had been concerned in +the late insurrection under Shays, and their abettors; the majority of +them desiring the annihilation of debts, public and private, and +believing that the proposed Constitution would strengthen all the +rights of property. Their numbers were estimated at two sevenths of +the people.[401] It was evident that a union of the first two parties +would secure the ratification of the instrument, and a union of the +last two would defeat it. Great caution, conciliation, and good temper +were, therefore, required, on the part of its friends. The influence +of Massachusetts on Virginia, on New York, and indeed on all the +States that were likely to act after her, would be of the utmost +importance. The State convention was ordered to assemble in January. + +In New York, as elsewhere, the first impressions were in favor of the +Constitution. In the city, and in the southern counties generally, it +was from the first highly popular. But it was soon apparent that the +whole official influence of the executive government of the State +would be thrown against it. There had been a strong party in the +State, ever since its refusal to bestow on the Congress the powers +asked for in the revenue system of 1783, who had regarded the Union +with jealousy, and steadily opposed the surrender to it of any further +powers. Of this party, the Governor, George Clinton, was now the head; +and the government of the State, which embraced a considerable amount +of what is termed "patronage," was in their hands. Two of the +delegates of the State to the national Convention, Yates and Lansing, +had retired from that body before the Constitution was completed, and +had announced their opposition to it in a letter to the Governor, +which, from its tone and the character of its objections, was likely +to produce a strong impression on the public mind. It became evident +that the Constitution could be carried in the State of New York in no +other way than by a thorough discussion of its merits,--such a +discussion as would cause it to be understood by the people, and would +convince them that its adoption was demanded by their interests. For +this purpose, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, under the common signature +of Publius, commenced the publication of the series of essays which +became known as The Federalist. The first number was issued in the +latter part of October. + +In January, the Governor presented the official communication of the +instrument from the Congress to the legislature, with the cold remark, +that, from the nature of his official position, it would be improper +for him to have any other agency in the business than that of laying +the papers before them for their information. Neither he nor his +party, however, contented themselves with this abstinence. After a +severe struggle, resolutions ordering a State convention to be elected +were passed by the bare majorities of three in the Senate and two in +the House, on the first day of February, 1788. The elections were held +in April; and when the result became known, in the latter part of May, +it appeared that the Anti-Federalists had elected two thirds of the +members of the Convention, and that probably four sevenths of the +people of the State were unfriendly to the Constitution. Backed by +this large majority, the leaders of the Anti-Federal party intended to +meet in convention at the appointed time, in June, and then to adjourn +until the spring or summer of 1789. Their argument for this course +was, that, if the Constitution had been adopted in the course of a +twelvemonth by nine other States, New York would have an opportunity +to witness its operation and to act according to circumstances. They +would thus avoid an immediate rejection,--a step which might lead the +Federalists to seek a separation of the southern from the northern +part of the State, for the purpose of forming a new State. On the +other hand, the Federalists rested their hopes upon what they could do +to enlighten the public at large, and upon the effect on their +opponents of the action of other States, especially of Virginia, whose +convention was to meet at nearly the same time. The Convention of New +York assembled at Poughkeepsie,[402] on the 17th of June, 1788. + +However strong the opposition in other States, it was to be in +Virginia far more formidable, from the abilities and influence of its +leaders, from the nature of their objections, and from the peculiar +character of the State. Possessed of a large number of men justly +entitled to be regarded then and always as statesmen, although many of +them were prone to great refinements in matters of government; filled +with the spirit of republican freedom, although its polity and +manners were marked by several aristocratic features; having, on the +one hand, but few among its citizens interested in commerce, and still +fewer, on the other hand, of those levelling and licentious classes +which elsewhere sought to overturn or control the interests of +property; ever ready to lead in what it regarded as patriotic and +demanded by the interests of the Union, but jealous of its own dignity +and of the rights of its sovereignty;--the State of Virginia would +certainly subject the Constitution to as severe an ordeal as it could +undergo anywhere, and would elicit in the discussion all the good or +the evil that could be discovered in the examination of a system +before it had been practically tried. The State was to feel, it is +true, the almost overshadowing influence of Washington, in favor of +the new system, exerted, not by personal participation in its +proceedings, but in a manner which could leave no doubt respecting his +opinion. But it was also to feel the strenuous opposition of Patrick +Henry, that great natural orator of the Revolution, whose influence +over popular assemblies was enormous, and who added acuteness, +subtilty, and logic to the fierce sincerity of his unstudied +harangues, although his knowledge was meagre and his range of thought +circumscribed; and the not less strenuous or effective opposition of +George Mason, who had little of the eloquence and passion of his +renowned compatriot, but who was one of the most profound and able of +all the American statesmen opposed to the Constitution, while he was +inferior in general powers and resources to not more than two or +three of those who framed or advocated it. Richard Henry Lee, William +Grayson, Benjamin Harrison, John Tyler, and others of less note, were +united with Henry and Mason in opposing the Constitution. Its leading +advocates were to be Madison, Marshall, the future Chief Justice of +the United States, George Nicholas, and the Chancellor Pendleton. The +Governor, Edmund Randolph, occupied for a time a middle position +between its friends and its opponents, but finally gave to it his +support, from motives which I have elsewhere described as eminently +honorable and patriotic. + +One of the most distinguished of the public men of Virginia had been +absent in the diplomatic service of the country for three years. His +eminent abilities and public services, his national reputation, and +the influence of his name, naturally made both parties anxious to +claim the authority of Jefferson, and he was at once furnished with a +copy of the Constitution as soon as it appeared. In the heats of +subsequent political conflicts he has been often charged by his +opponents with a general hostility to the Constitution. The truth is, +that Mr. Jefferson's opinions on the subject of government, and of +what was desirable and expedient to be done in this country, united +with the effect of his long absence from home,[403] did lead him, at +first, to think and to say that the Constitution had defects which, if +not corrected, would destroy the liberties of America. He was by far +the most democratic, in the tendency of his opinions, of all the +principal American statesmen of that age. He was, according to his own +avowal, no friend to an energetic government anywhere. He carried +abroad the opinion that the Confederation could be adapted, with a few +changes, to all the wants of the Union; and this opinion he continued +to retain, because the events which had taken place here during his +absence did not produce upon his mind the effect which they produced +upon the great majority of public men who remained in the midst of +them. He freely declared to more than one of his correspondents in +Virginia, at this time, that such disorders as had been witnessed in +Massachusetts were necessary to public liberty, and that the national +Convention had been too much influenced by them, in preparing the +Constitution. He held that the natural progress of things is for +liberty to lose and for government to gain ground; and that no +government should be organized without those express and positive +restraints which will jealously guard the liberties of the people, +even if those liberties should periodically break into licentiousness. +One of his favorite maxims of government was "rotation in office"; and +he thought the government of the Union should have cognizance only of +matters involved in the relations of the people of each State to +foreign countries, or to the people of the other States, and that each +State should retain the exclusive control of all its internal and +domestic concerns, and especially the power of direct taxation. + +Hence it is not surprising that, when Mr. Jefferson received at Paris, +early in November, a copy of the Constitution, and when he found in it +no express declarations insuring the freedom of religion, freedom of +the press, and freedom of the person under the uninterrupted +protection of the _habeas corpus_, and no trial by jury in civil +cases, and found also that the President would be re-eligible, and +that the government would have the power of direct taxation, his +anxiety should have been excited. It is a mistake, however, to suppose +that he counselled a direct rejection of the instrument by the people +of Virginia. His first suggestion was, that the nine States which +should first act upon it should adopt it, unconditionally, and that +the four remaining States should accept it only on the previous +condition that certain amendments should be made. This plan of his +became known in Virginia in the course of the winter of 1787-88, and +it gave the Anti-Federalists what they considered a warrant for using +his authority on their side. But before the following spring, when he +had had an opportunity to see the course pursued by Massachusetts, he +changed his opinion, and authorized his friends to say that he +regarded an unconditional acceptance by each State, and subsequent +amendments, in the mode provided by the Constitution, as the only +rational plan.[404] He also abandoned the opinion that the general +government ought not to have the power of direct taxation; but he +never receded from his objections founded on the want of a bill of +rights, and of trial by jury, and on the re-eligibility of the +President. + +Immediately after his return to Mount Vernon from the national +Convention, Washington sent copies of the Constitution to Patrick +Henry, Mason, Harrison, and other leading persons whose opposition he +anticipated, with a temperate but firm expression of his own opinion. +The replies of these gentlemen furnished him with the grounds of their +objections, and at the same time relieved him, as to all of them but +Henry, from the apprehension that they might resist the calling of a +State convention. Mason and Henry were both members of the +legislature. The former was expressly instructed by his constituents +of Alexandria county[405] to vote for a submission of the Constitution +to the people of the State in convention;--a vote which he would +probably have given without instruction, as he declared to General +Washington that he should use all his influence for this purpose. Mr. +Henry was not instructed, and the friends of the Constitution +expected his resistance. The legislature assembled in October, and on +the first day of the session, in a very full House, Henry declared, to +the surprise of everybody, that the proposed Constitution must go to a +popular convention. The elections for such a body were ordered to be +held in March and April of the following spring. When they came on, +the news that the convention of New Hampshire had postponed their +action was employed by the Anti-Federalists, who insisted that this +step had been taken in deference to Virginia; although it was in fact +taken merely in order that the delegates of New Hampshire might get +their previous instructions against the Constitution removed by their +constituents. The pride of Virginia was touched by this electioneering +expedient, and the result was that the parties in the State convention +were nearly balanced, the Federalists however having, as they +supposed, a majority.[406] The convention was to assemble on the 2d of +June, 1788. + +In the legislature of South Carolina the Constitution was debated, +with great earnestness, for three days, before it was decided to send +it to a popular convention. This was owing to the great persistency of +Rawlins Lowndes, who carried on the discussion in opposition to the +Constitution, almost single-handed and with great ability, against the +two Pinckneys, Pierce Butler, John and Edward Rutledge, John Julius +Pringle, Robert Barnwell, Dr. David Ramsay, and many other gentlemen. +At length, on the 19th of January, a resolution was passed, directing +a convention of the people to assemble on the 12th of May. The debate +in the legislature had tended to diffuse information respecting the +system, but it had also produced a formidable minority throughout the +State. Mr. Lowndes had employed, with a good deal of skill, the local +arguments which would be most likely to form the objections of a +citizen of South Carolina. He inveighed against the regulation of +commerce, the power over the slave-trade that was to belong to +Congress at the end of twenty years, and the preponderance which he +contended would be given to the Eastern States by the system of +representation in Congress; and although he was ably answered on all +points, the effect of the discussion was such, that a large minority +was returned to the Convention having a strong hostility to the +proposed system.[407] + +The legislature of Maryland assembled in December, and directed the +delegates who had represented the State in the national Convention to +attend and give an account of the proceedings of that assembly. It +was in compliance with this direction that Luther Martin laid before +the legislature that celebrated communication which embodied not only +a very clear statement of the mode in which the principal compromises +of the Constitution were framed, as seen from the point of view +occupied by one who resisted them at every step, but also an +exceedingly able argument against the fundamental principle of the +proposed government. It was a paper, too, marked throughout with an +earnestness almost amounting to fanaticism. Repelling, with natural +indignation and dignity, the imputation that he was influenced by a +State office which he then held, he referred to the numerous honors +and emoluments which the Constitution of the United States would +create, and suggested--what his abilities and reputation well +justified--that his chance of obtaining a share of them was as good as +most men's. "But this," was his solemn conclusion, "I can say with +truth,--that so far was I from being influenced in my conduct by +interest, or the consideration of office, that I would cheerfully +resign the appointment I now hold; I would bind myself never to accept +another, either under the general government or that of my own State; +I would do more, sir;--so destructive do I consider the present system +to the happiness of my country, I would cheerfully sacrifice that +share of property with which Heaven has blessed a life of industry; I +would reduce myself to indigence and poverty; and those who are dearer +to me than my own existence, I would intrust to the care and +protection of that Providence who hath so kindly protected myself,--if +on _those terms only_ I could procure my country to reject those +chains which are forged for it." + +Such a strength of conviction as this, on the part of a man of high +talent, was well calculated to produce an effect. No document that +appeared anywhere, against the Constitution, was better adapted to +rouse the jealousy, to confirm the doubts, or to decide the opinions, +of a certain class of minds. But it was an argument which reduced the +whole question substantially to the issue, whether the principle of +the Union could safely be changed from that of a federal league, with +an equality of representation and power as between the States, to a +system of national representation in a legislative body having +cognizance of certain national interests, in one branch of which the +people inhabiting the respective States should have power in +proportion to their numbers.[408] This was a question on which men +would naturally and honestly differ; but it was a question which a +majority of reflecting men, in almost every State, were likely, after +due inquiry, to decide against the views of Mr. Martin, because it was +clear that the Confederation had failed, and had failed chiefly by +reason of the peculiar and characteristic nature of its representative +system, and because the representative system proposed in the +Constitution was the only one that could be agreed upon as the +alternative. Mr. Martin's objections, however, like those of other +distinguished men who took the same side in other States, were of a +nature to form the creed of an earnest, conscientious, and active +minority. They had this effect in the State of Maryland. The +legislature ordered a State convention, to consider the proposed +Constitution, and directed it to meet on the 21st of April, 1788. + +The convention of New Hampshire was to assemble in February. A large +portion of the State lay remote from the channels of intelligence, and +a considerable part of the people in the interior had not seen the +Constitution, when they were called upon to elect their delegates. The +population, outside of two or three principal places, was a rural one, +thinly scattered over townships of large territorial extent, lying +among the hills of a broken and rugged country, extending northerly +from the narrow strip of sea-coast towards the frontier of Canada. It +was easy for the opposition to persuade such a people that a scheme of +government had been prepared which they ought to reject; and the +consequence of their efforts was that the State convention assembled, +probably with a majority, certainly with a strong minority, of its +members bound by positive instructions to vote against the +Constitution which they were to consider. + +I have thus, in anticipation of the strict order of events, given a +general account of the position of this great question in six of the +States, down to the time of the meeting of their respective +conventions, because when the session of the convention of +Massachusetts commenced, in January, 1788, the people of the five +States of Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, and Connecticut +had successively ratified the Constitution without proposing any +amendments, and because the action of the others, extending through +the six following months, embraced the real crisis to which the +Constitution was subjected, and developed what were thereafter to be +considered as its important defects, according to the view of a +majority of the States, and probably also of a majority of the people +of all the States. For although the people of Delaware, Pennsylvania, +New Jersey, Georgia, and Connecticut ratified the Constitution without +insisting on previous or subsequent amendments, it is certain that +some of the same topics were the causes of anxiety and objection in +those States, which occasioned so much difficulty, and became the +grounds of special action, in the remaining States. + +In coming, however, to the more particular description of the +resistance which the Constitution encountered, it will be necessary to +discriminate between the opposition that was made to the general plan +of the government, or to the particular features of it which it was +proposed to create, and that which was founded on its omission to +provide for certain things that were deemed essential. Of what may be +called the positive objections to the Constitution, it may be said, in +general, that, however fruitful of debate, or declamation, or serious +and important doubt, might be the question whether such a government as +had been framed by the national Convention should be substituted for +the Confederation, the opposition were not confined to this question, +as the means of persuading the people that the proposed system ought to +be rejected. One of the most deeply interested of the men who were +watching the currents of public opinion with extreme solicitude, +observed "a strong belief in the people at large of the insufficiency +of the Confederation to preserve the existence of the Union, and of the +necessity of the Union to their safety and prosperity; of course, a +strong desire of a change, and a predisposition to receive well the +propositions of the Convention."[409] But while the Constitution came +before the people with this conviction and this predisposition in its +favor, yet when its opponents, in addition to their positive objections +to what it did contain, could point to what it did _not_ embrace, and +could say that it proposed to establish a government of great power, +without providing for rights of primary importance, and without any +declaration of the cardinal maxims of liberty which the people had from +the first been accustomed to incorporate with their State +constitutions; and while the local interests, the sectional feelings, +and the separate policy, real or supposed, of different States, +furnished such a variety of means for defeating its adoption by the +necessary number of nine States;--we may not wonder that its friends +should have been doubtful of the issue. "It is almost arrogance," said +the same anxious observer, "in so complicated a subject, depending so +entirely upon the incalculable fluctuations of the human passions, to +attempt even a conjecture about the result."[410] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[395] It may be amusing to Americans of this and future generations to +know who this personage was for whom it was rumored that the Loyalists +desired to "send," and whose advent as a possible ruler of this +country was a vague apprehension in the popular mind for a good while, +and finally came to be imputed as a project to the framers of the +Constitution. The Bishop of Osnaburg was no other than the late Duke +of York, Frederick, the second son of King George III.; a prince whose +conduct as commander-in-chief of the army, in consequence of the sale +of commissions by his mistress, one Mrs. Clarke, became in 1809 a +subject of inquiry, leading to the most scandalous revelations, before +the House of Commons. The Duke was born in 1763, and was consequently, +at the period spoken of in the text, at the ripe age of twenty-four. +When about a year old (1764), he was chosen Bishop of Osnaburg. This +was a German province (Osnabrück), formerly a bishopric of great +antiquity, founded by Charlemagne. At the Reformation most of the +inhabitants became Lutherans, and by the Treaty of Westphalia it was +agreed that it should be governed alternately by a Roman Catholic and +a Protestant Bishop. In 1802 it was secularized, and assigned as an +hereditary principality to George III., in his capacity of King of +Hanover. Prince Frederick continued to be called by the title of +Bishop of Osnaburg, until he was created Duke of York. I am not aware +that the whispers of his name in the secret counsels of our Loyalists, +as a proposed king for America, became known in England. Whether such +knowledge would have excited a smile, or have awakened serious hopes, +is a question on which the reader can speculate. But it is certain +that there were persons in this country, and in the neighboring +British Provinces, who had long hoped for a reunion of the American +States with the parent country, through this or some other "mad +project." Colonel Humphreys, (who had been one of Washington's +_aides_,) writing to Hamilton, from New Haven, under date of September +16, 1787, says: "The quondam Tories have undoubtedly conceived hopes +of a future union with Great Britain, from the inefficacy of our +government, and the tumults which prevailed during the last winter. I +saw a letter, written at that period, by a clergyman of considerable +reputation in Nova Scotia, to a person of eminence in this State, +stating the impossibility of our being happy under our present +constitution, and proposing (now we could think and argue calmly on +all the consequences), that the efforts of the moderate, the virtuous, +and the brave should be exerted to effect a reunion with the parent +state.... It seems, by a conversation I have had here, that the +ultimate practicability of introducing the Bishop of Osnaburg is not a +novel idea among those who were formerly termed Loyalists. Ever since +the peace it has been occasionally talked of and wished for. +Yesterday, where I dined, half jest, half earnest, he was given as the +first toast. I leave you now, my dear friend, to reflect how ripe we +are for the most mad and ruinous project that can be suggested, +especially when, in addition to this view, we take into consideration +how thoroughly the patriotic part of the community, the friends of an +efficient government, are discouraged with the present system, and +irritated at the popular demagogues who are determined to keep +themselves in office, at the risk of everything. Thence apprehensions +are formed, that, though the measures proposed by the Convention may +not be equal to the wishes of the most enlightened and virtuous, yet +that they will be too high-toned to be adopted by our popular +assemblies. Should that happen, our political ship will be left afloat +on a sea of chance, without a rudder as well as without a pilot." +(Works of Hamilton, I. 443.) In a grave and comprehensive private +memorandum, drawn up by Hamilton soon after the Constitution appeared, +in which he summed up the probabilities for and against its adoption, +and the consequences of its rejection, the following occurs, as among +the events likely to follow such rejection: "A reunion with Great +Britain, from universal disgust at a state of commotion, is not +impossible, though not much to be feared. The most plausible shape of +such a business would be, the establishment of a son of the present +monarch in the supreme government of this country, with a family +compact." (Works, II. 419, 421.) + +[396] Pennsylvania Journal, August 22, 1787. + +[397] The history of the term "Federal," or "Federalist," offers a +curious illustration of the capricious changes of sense which +political designations often undergo, within a short period of time, +according to the accidental circumstances which give them their +application. During the discussions of the Convention which framed the +Constitution of the United States, the term _federal_ was employed in +its truly philosophic sense, to designate the nature of the government +established by the Articles of Confederation, in distinction from a +national system, that would be formed by the introduction of the plan +of having the States represented in the Congress in proportion to the +numbers of their inhabitants. But when the Constitution was before the +people of the States for their adoption, its friends and advocates +were popularly called Federalists, because they favored an enlargement +of the Federal government at the expense of some part of the State +sovereignties, and its opponents were called the Anti-Federalists. In +this use, the former term in no way characterized the nature of the +system advocated, but merely designated a supporter of the +Constitution. A few years later, when the first parties were formed, +in the first term of Washington's Administration, it so happened that +the leading men who gave a distinct character to the development which +the Constitution then received had been prominent advocates of its +adoption, and had been known therefore as Federalists, as had also +been the case with some of those who separated themselves from this +body of persons and formed what was termed the Republican, afterwards +the Democratic party. But the prominent supporters of the policy which +originated in Washington's administration continued to be called +Federalists, and the term thus came to denote a particular school of +politics under the Constitution, although it previously signified +merely an advocacy of its adoption. Thus, for example, Hamilton, in +1787, was no Federalist, because he was opposed to the continuance of +a federal, and desired the establishment of a national government. In +1788, he was a Federalist, because he wished the Constitution to be +adopted; and he afterwards continued to be a Federalist, because he +favored a particular policy in the administration of the government, +under the Constitution. It was in this latter sense that the term +became so celebrated in our political history. The reader will observe +that I use it, of course, in this work, only in the sense attached to +it while the Constitution was before the people of the States for +adoption. + +[398] A striking proof of the importance attached by the people to the +opinions of Washington and Franklin may be found in a controversy +carried on for a short time in the newspapers of Philadelphia and New +York, after the Constitution appeared, whether those distinguished +persons _really approved_ what they had signed. + +[399] All but Maryland and Rhode Island. + +[400] Passed September 28, 1787. Journals, XII. 149-166. + +[401] This is the substance of a careful account given by General Knox +to General Washington. (Works of Washington, IX. 310, 311.) + +[402] A town on the Hudson River, seventy-five miles north of the city +of New York. + +[403] He went abroad in the summer of 1784. + +[404] Compare Mr. Jefferson's autobiography, and his correspondence, +in the first, second, and third volumes of his collected works +(edition of 1853), and the letters of Mr. Madison. + +[405] In the newspapers of the time there is to be found a story that +Mr. Mason was very roughly received on his arrival at the city of +Alexandria, after the adjournment of the national Convention, on +account of his refusal to sign the Constitution. The occurrence is not +alluded to in Washington's correspondence, although he closely +observed Mr. Mason's movements, and regarded them with evident +anxiety. The story is told in the Pennsylvania Journal of October 17, +1787,--a strong Federal paper. I know of no other confirmation of it +than the fact that the people of Alexandria embraced the Constitution +from the first with "enthusiastic warmth," according to the account +given by General Washington to one of his correspondents. (Works, IX. +272.) + +[406] Washington's Works, IX. 266, 267, 273, 340-342, 345, 346. + +[407] This debate of three days in the South Carolina legislature was +one of the most able of all the discussions attending the ratification +of the Constitution. Mr. Lowndes was overmatched by his antagonists, +but he resisted with great spirit, finally closed with the declaration +that he saw dangers in the proposed government so great, that he could +wish, when dead, for no other epitaph than this: "Here lies the man +that opposed the Constitution, because it was ruinous to the liberty +of America." He lived to find his desired epitaph a false prophecy. He +was the father, of the late William Lowndes, who represented the State +of South Carolina in Congress, with so much honor and distinction, +during the administration of Mr. Madison. + +[408] Mr. Martin's objections extended to many of the details of the +Constitution, but his great argument was that directed against its +system of representation, which he predicted would destroy the State +governments. + +[409] Hamilton, Works, II. 419, 420. + +[410] Hamilton, Works, II. 421. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +RATIFICATIONS OF DELAWARE, PENNSYLVANIA, NEW JERSEY, GEORGIA, AND +CONNECTICUT, WITHOUT OBJECTION.--CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1787.--BEGINNING OF +THE YEAR 1788.--RATIFICATION OF MASSACHUSETTS, THE SIXTH STATE, WITH +PROPOSITIONS OF AMENDMENT.--RATIFICATION OF MARYLAND, WITHOUT +OBJECTION.--SOUTH CAROLINA, THE EIGHTH STATE, ADOPTS, AND PROPOSES +AMENDMENTS. + + +The first State that ratified the Constitution, although its +convention was not the first to assemble, was Delaware. It was a +small, compact community, with the northerly portion of its territory +lying near the city of Philadelphia, with which its people had +constant and extensive intercourse. Its public men were intelligent +and patriotic. In the national Convention it had contended with great +spirit for the interests of the smaller States, and its people now had +the sagacity and good sense to perceive that they had gained every +reasonable security for their peculiar rights. The public press of +Philadelphia friendly to the Constitution furnished the means of +understanding its merits, and the discussions in the convention of +Pennsylvania, which assembled before that of Delaware, threw a flood +of light over the whole subject, which the people of Delaware did not +fail to regard. Their delegates unanimously ratified and adopted the +Constitution on the 7th of December. + +The convention of Pennsylvania met, before that of any of the other +States, at Philadelphia, on the 20th of November. It was the second +State in the Union in population. Its chief city was perhaps the first +in the Union in refinement and wealth, and had often been the scene of +great political events of the utmost interest and importance to the +whole country. There had sat, eleven years before, that illustrious +Congress of deputies from the thirteen Colonies, who had declared the +independence of America, had made Washington commander-in-chief of her +armies, and had given her struggle for freedom a name throughout the +world. There, the Revolutionary Congress had continued, with a short +interruption, to direct the operations of the war. There, the alliance +with France was ratified, in 1778. There, the Articles of +Confederation were finally carried into full effect, in 1781. There, +within six months afterwards, the Congress received intelligence of +the surrender of Cornwallis, and walked in procession to one of the +churches of the city, to return thanks to God for a victory which in +effect terminated the war. There, the instructions for the treaty of +peace were given, in 1782, and there the Constitution of the United +States had been recently framed. For more than thirteen years, since +the commencement of the Revolution, and with only occasional +intervals, the people of Philadelphia had been accustomed to the +presence of the most eminent statesmen of the country, and had +learned, through the influences which had gone forth from their city, +to embrace in their contemplation the interests of the Union. + +They placed in the State convention, that was to consider the proposed +Constitution of the United States, one of the wisest and ablest of its +framers,--James Wilson. The modesty of his subsequent career,[411] and +the comparatively little attention that has been bestowed by +succeeding generations upon the personal exertions that were made in +framing and establishing the Constitution, must be regarded as the +causes that have made his reputation, at this day, less extensive and +general than his abilities and usefulness might have led his +contemporaries to expect that it would be. Yet the services which he +rendered to the country, first in assisting in the preparation of the +Constitution, and afterwards in securing its adoption by the State of +Pennsylvania, should place his name high upon the list of its +benefactors. He had not the political genius which gave Hamilton such +a complete mastery over the most complex subjects of government, and +which enabled him, when the Constitution had been adopted, to give it +a development in practice that made it even more successful than its +theory alone could have allowed any one to regard as probable; nor had +he the talent of Madison for debate and for constitutional analysis; +but in the comprehensiveness of his views, and in his perception of +the necessities of the country, he was not their inferior, and he was +throughout one of their most efficient and best informed coadjutors. + +He had to encounter, in the convention of the State, a body of men, a +majority of whom were not unfriendly to the Constitution, but among +whom there was a minority very hard to be conciliated. In the counties +which lay west of the Susquehanna,--the same region which afterwards, +in Washington's administration, became the scene of an insurrection +against the authority of the general government,--there was a +rancorous, active, and determined opposition. Mr. Wilson, being the +only member of the State convention who had taken part in the framing +of the Constitution, was obliged to take the lead in explaining and +defending it. His qualifications for this task were ample. He had been +a very important and useful member of the national Convention; he had +read every publication of importance, on both sides of the question, +that had appeared since the Constitution was published, and his legal +and historical knowledge was extensive and accurate. No man succeeded +better than he did, in his arguments on that occasion, in combating +the theory that a State government possessed the whole political +sovereignty of the people of the State. However true it might be, he +said, in England, that the Parliament possesses supreme and absolute +power, and can make the constitution what it pleases, in America it +has been incontrovertible since the Revolution, that the supreme, +absolute, and uncontrollable power is in the people, before they make +a constitution, and remains in them after it is made. To control the +power and conduct of the legislature by an overruling constitution, +was an improvement in the science and practice of government reserved +to the American States; and at the foundation of this practice lies +the right to change the constitution at pleasure,--a right which no +positive institution can ever take from the people. When they have +made a State constitution, they have bestowed on the government +created by it a certain portion of their power; but the fee simple of +their power remains in themselves. + +Mr. Wilson was equally clear in accounting for the omission to insert +a bill of rights in the Constitution of the United States. In a +government, he observed, consisting of enumerated powers, such as was +then proposed for the United States, a bill of rights, which is an +enumeration of the powers reserved by the people, must either be a +perfect or an imperfect statement of the powers and privileges +reserved. To undertake a perfect enumeration of the civil rights of +mankind, is to undertake a very difficult and hazardous, and perhaps +an impossible task; yet if the enumeration is imperfect, all implied +power seems to be thrown into the hands of the government, on subjects +in reference to which the authority of government is not expressly +restrained, and the rights of the people are rendered less secure than +they are under the silent operation of the maxim that every power not +expressly granted remains in the people. This, he stated, was the view +taken by a large majority of the national Convention, in which no +direct proposition was ever made, according to his recollection, for +the insertion of a bill of rights.[412] There is, undoubtedly, a +general truth in this argument, but, like many general truths in the +construction of governments, it may be open to exceptions when applied +to particular subjects or interests. It appears to have been, for the +time, successful; probably because the opponents of the Constitution, +with whom Mr. Wilson was contending, did not bring forward specific +propositions for the declaration of those particular rights which were +made the subjects of special action in other State conventions. + +Besides a very thorough discussion of these great subjects, Mr. Wilson +entered into an elaborate examination and defence of the whole system +proposed in the Constitution. He was most ably seconded in his efforts +by Thomas McKean, then Chief Justice of Pennsylvania and afterwards +its Governor, the greater part of whose public life had been passed in +the service of Delaware, his native State, and who had always been a +strenuous advocate of the interests of the smaller States, but who +found himself satisfied with the provision for them made by the +Constitution for the construction of the Senate of the United +States.[413] "I have gone," said he, "through the circle of office, in +the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of government; +and from all my study, observation, and experience, I must declare, +that, from a full examination and due consideration of this system, it +appears to me the best the world has yet seen. I congratulate you on +the fair prospect of its being adopted, and am happy in the +expectation of seeing accomplished what has long been my ardent wish, +that you will hereafter have a salutary permanency in magistracy and +stability in the laws." + +The result of the discussion in the convention of Pennsylvania was the +ratification of the Constitution. The official ratification sent to +Congress was signed by a very large majority of the delegates, and +contains no notice of any dissent.[414] But the representatives of +that portion of the State which lay west of the Susquehanna generally +refused their assent, and their district afterwards became the place +in which the proposition was considered whether the government should +be allowed to be organized.[415] + +The convention of New Jersey was in session at the time of the +ratification by Pennsylvania. Mr. Madison had passed through the +State, in the autumn, on his way to the Congress, then sitting in the +city of New York, and could discover no evidence of serious opposition +to the Constitution. Lying between the States of New York and +Pennsylvania, New Jersey was closely watched by the friends and the +opponents of the Constitution in both of those States, and was likely +to be much influenced by the predominating sentiment in the one that +should first act.[416] But the people of New Jersey had, in truth, +fairly considered the whole matter, and had found what their own +interests required. They alone, of all the States, when the national +Convention was instituted, had expressly declared that the regulation +of commerce ought to be vested in the general government. They had +learned that to submit longer to the diverse commercial and revenue +systems in force in New York on the one side of them, and in +Pennsylvania on the other side, would be like remaining between the +upper and the nether millstone. Their delegates in the national +Convention had, it is true, acted with those of New York, in the long +contest concerning the representative system, resisting at every step +each departure from the principle of the Confederation, until the +compromise was made which admitted the States to an equal +representation in the Senate. Content with the security which this +arrangement afforded, the people of New Jersey had the sagacity to +perceive that their interests were no longer likely to be promoted by +following in the lead of the Anti-Federalists of New York. Their +delegates unanimously ratified the Constitution on the 12th of +December, five days after the ratification of Pennsylvania. + +A few days later, there came from the far South news that the +convention of Georgia had, with like unanimity, adopted the +Constitution. Neither the people of the State, nor their delegates, +could well have acted under the influence of what was taking place in +the centre of the Union. Their situation was too remote for the +reception, at that day, within the same fortnight, of the news of +events that had occurred in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and they +could scarcely have read the great discussions that were going on in +various forms of controversy in the cities of New York and +Philadelphia, and throughout the Middle and the Eastern States. Wasted +excessively during the Revolution, by the nature of the warfare +carried on within her limits; left at the peace to contend with a +large, powerful, and cruel tribe of Indians, that pressed upon her +western settlements; and having her southern frontier bordering upon +the unfriendly territory of a Spanish colony,--the State of Georgia +had strong motives to lead her to embrace the Constitution of the +United States, and found little in that instrument calculated to draw +her in the opposite direction. Her delegates had resisted the +surrender of control over the slave-trade, but they had acquiesced in +the compromise on that subject, and there was in truth nothing in the +position in which it was left that was likely to give the State +serious dissatisfaction or uneasiness. The people of Georgia had +something more important to do than to quarrel with their +representatives about the principles or details of the system to which +they had consented in the national Convention. They felt the want of a +general government able to resist, with a stronger hand than that of +the Confederation, the evils which pressed upon them.[417] Their +assent was unanimously given to the Constitution on the 2d of January, +1788. + +The legislature of Connecticut had ordered a convention to be held on +the 4th of January. When the elections were over, it was ascertained +that there was a large majority in favor of the Constitution; but +there was to be some opposition, proceeding principally from that +portion of the people who resisted whatever tended to the vigor and +stability of government,--a spirit that existed to some extent in all +the New England States. When the convention of the State assembled, +the principal duty of advocating the adoption of the Constitution +devolved on Oliver Ellsworth, who had borne an active and +distinguished part in its preparation. He found that the topic which +formed the chief subject of all the arguments against the +Constitution, was the general power of taxation which it would confer +on the national government, and the particular power of laying +imposts. Mr. Ellsworth was eminently qualified to explain and defend +the proposed revenue system. While he contended for the necessity of +giving to Congress a general power to levy direct taxes, in order that +the government might be able to meet extraordinary emergencies, and +thus be placed upon an equality with other governments, he +demonstrated by public and well-known facts that an indirect revenue, +to be derived from imposts, would be at once the easiest and most +reliable mode of defraying the ordinary expenses of the government, +because it would interfere less than any other form of taxation with +the internal police of the States; and he argued, from sufficient +data, that a very small rate of duty would be enough for this +purpose.[418] Under his influence and that of Oliver Wolcott, Richard +Law, and Governor Huntington, the Constitution was ratified by a large +majority, on the 9th of January.[419] + +The action of Connecticut completed the list of the States that +ratified the Constitution without any formal record of objections, and +without proposing or insisting upon amendments. The opposition in +these five States had been overcome by reason and argument, and they +were a majority of the whole number of States whose accession was +necessary to the establishment of the government. But a new act in the +drama was to open with the new year. The conventions of Massachusetts, +New York, and Virginia were still to meet, and each of them was full +of elements of opposition of the most formidable character, and of +different kinds, which made the result in all of them extremely +doubtful. If all the three were to adopt the Constitution, still one +more must be gained from the States of New Hampshire, Maryland, and +North and South Carolina. The influence of each accession to the +Constitution on the remaining States might be expected to be +considerable; but, unfortunately, the convention of New Hampshire was +to meet five months before those of Virginia and New York, and a large +number of its members had been instructed to reject the Constitution. +If New Hampshire and Massachusetts were to refuse their assent in the +course of the winter, the States that were to act in the spring could +scarcely be expected to withstand the untoward influence of such an +example, which would probably operate with a constantly accelerating +force throughout the whole number of the remaining States. + +The convention of Massachusetts commenced its session on the 9th of +January, the same day on which that of Connecticut closed its +proceedings. The State certainly held a very high rank in the Union. +Her Revolutionary history was filled with glory; with sufferings +cheerfully borne; with examples of patriotism that were to give her +enduring fame. The blood of martyrs in that cause, which she had made +from the first the cause of the whole country, had been poured +profusely upon her soil, and in the earlier councils of the Union she +had maintained a position of commanding influence. But there had been +in her political conduct, since the freedom of the country was +achieved, an unsteadiness and vacillation of which her former +reputation gave no presage. In 1783, the legislature had refused to +give the revenue powers asked for by the Congress, for the miserable +reason that the Congress had granted half-pay for life to the officers +of the Revolutionary army. In May, 1785, the legislature adopted a +resolution for a convention of the States to consider the subject of +enlarging the powers of the Federal Union, and in the following +November they rescinded it. These, and other occurrences, when +remembered, gave the friends of the Constitution elsewhere great +anxiety, as they turned their eyes towards Massachusetts. They were +fully aware, too, that the recent insurrection in that State, and the +severe measures which had followed it, had created divisions in +society which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to heal. + +But it was not easy for the most intelligent men out of the State to +appreciate fully all the causes that exposed the Constitution of the +United States to a peculiar hazard in Massachusetts, and made it +necessary to procure its ratification by a kind of compromise with the +opposition for a scheme of amendments. In no State was the spirit of +liberty more jealous and exacting. In the midst of the Revolution, and +led by the men who had carried on the profound discussions which +preceded it,--discussions in which the natural rights of mankind and +the civil rights of British subjects were examined and displayed as +they had never been before,--the people of Massachusetts had framed a +State constitution, filled with the most impressive maxims and the +most solemn securities with which public liberty has ever been +invested. Not content to trust obvious truths to implication, they +expressly declared that government is instituted for the happiness and +welfare of the governed, and they fenced it round not only with the +chief restrictions gained by their English ancestors, from Magna +Charta down to the Revolution of 1688, but with many safeguards which +had not descended to them from Runnymede or Westminster. It may be +that an anxious student of politics, examining the early constitution +of Massachusetts,--happily in its most important features yet +unchanged,--would pronounce it unnecessarily careful of personal +rights and too jealous for the interests of liberty. But no +intelligent mind, thoughtful of the welfare of society, can now think +that to have been an excess of wisdom which formed a constitution of +republican government that has so well withstood the assaults of +faction and the levelling tendencies of a levelling age, and has +withstood them because, while it carefully guarded the liberties of +the people, it secured those liberties by institutions which stand as +bulwarks between the power of the many and the rights of the few. + +It may hereafter become necessary for me to consider what degree of +importance justly belongs to the amendments which the State of +Massachusetts, and to those which other States, so impressively +insisted ought to be made to the Constitution of the United States. +Without at present turning farther aside from the narrative of events, +I content myself here with observing, that, whether the alleged +defects in the Constitution were important or unimportant, a people +educated as the people of Massachusetts had been would naturally +regard some provisions as essential which they did not find in the +plan presented to them. + +The general aspect of parties in Massachusetts, down to the time when +the convention met, has been already considered. In the convention +itself there was a majority originally opposed to the Constitution; +and if a vote had been taken at any time before the proposition for +amendments was brought forward, the Constitution would have been +rejected. The opposition consisted of a full representation of the +various parties and interests already described as existing among the +people of the State who were unfriendly to it. One contemporary +account gives as many as eighteen or twenty members, who had actually +been out in what was called Shays's "army." Whether this enumeration +was strictly correct or not, it is well known that the western +counties of the State sent a large number of men whose sympathies were +with that insurrection, who were friends of paper money and tender +laws, and enemies of any system that would promote the security of +debts. The members from the province of Maine had their own special +objects to pursue. In addition to these were the honest and +well-meaning doubters, who had examined the Constitution with care and +objected to it from principle. The anticipated leader of this +miscellaneous host was that celebrated and ardent patriot of the +Revolution, Samuel Adams. With all his energy and his iron +determination of character, however, he could be cautious when caution +was expedient. He had read the Constitution, and all the principal +publications respecting it which had then appeared, and down to the +time of the meeting of the convention he had maintained a good deal of +reserve. But it was known that he disapproved of it. + +This remarkable man--often called the American Cato--was far better +fitted to rouse and direct the storms of revolution, than to +reconstruct the political fabric after revolution had done its work. +He had the passionate love of liberty, fertility of resource, and +indomitable will, which are most needed in a truly great leader of a +popular struggle with arbitrary power. But that struggle over, his +usefulness in an emergency like the one in which Massachusetts was now +placed was limited to the actual necessity for the intervention of an +extreme devotion to the maxims and principles of popular freedom. He +believed that there was such a necessity, and he acted always as he +believed. But his influence, at this time, was by no means +commensurate with his power and reputation at a former day, and he +appears to have wisely avoided a direct contest with the large body of +very able men who supported the Constitution. + +That body of men would certainly have been, in any assembly convened +for such a purpose, an overmatch in debate for Samuel Adams; for they +were the civilians Fisher Ames, Parsons, King, Sedgwick, Gorham, Dana, +Gore, Bowdoin, and Sumner, the Revolutionary officers Heath, Lincoln, +and Brooks, and several of the most distinguished clergymen in the +State. The names of the members who acted on the same side with Mr. +Adams, and were then regarded as leaders of the opposition, have +reached posterity in no other connection.[420] But some of the +elements of which that opposition was composed could not be controlled +by any superiority in debate, and were, therefore, little in need of +great powers of discussion or great wisdom in council. So far as their +objections related to the powers to be conferred on the general +government, or to the structure of the proposed system, they could be +answered, and many of them could be, and were, convinced. But with +respect to what they considered the defects of the Constitution, +theoretical reasoning, however able, could have no influence over men +whose minds were made up; and it became, as the reader will see, +necessary to make an effort to gain a majority by some course of +action which would involve the concession that the proposed system +required amendment. + +There were great hazards attending this course, in reference to its +effect on other States, although it was not impossible to procure by +it the ratification of this convention. Notwithstanding all that had +detracted from the former high standing of the State,--notwithstanding +the easy explanation that might be given of the influence of her late +internal disturbances upon her subsequent political affairs,--she was +still Massachusetts; still she was the eldest of all the States but +one,--still she held in the sacred places of her soil the bones of the +first martyrs to liberty,--still she was renowned, as she has ever +been, for her intelligence,--still she wore a name of more than +ordinary consideration among her sisters of the Confederacy. If it +should go forth to New York, to Virginia, to the Carolinas, that +Massachusetts had pronounced the Constitution unfit for the acceptance +of a free people, or had declared that public liberty could not be +preserved under it without the addition of provisions which its +framers had not made, the effect might be disastrous beyond all +previous calculation. The legislature of New York, in session at the +same time with the convention of Massachusetts, was much divided on +the question of submitting the Constitution to a convention, and it +was the opinion of careful observers that the result in either way in +the latter State would involve that in the former. In Virginia the +elections for their convention were soon to take place. In +Pennsylvania the minority were becoming restless under their defeat, +and were agitating plans which looked to the obstruction of the +government when an attempt should be made to organize it. The +convention of South Carolina was not to meet until May, and North +Carolina stood in an extremely doubtful position. A great weight of +responsibility rested therefore upon the convention of Massachusetts. + +Its proceedings commenced with a desultory debate upon the several +parts of the instrument, which lasted until the 30th of January; the +friends of the Constitution having carefully provided, by a vote at +the outset, that no separate question should be taken. The discussion +of the various objections having been exhausted, Parsons[421] moved +that the instrument be assented to and ratified. One or two general +speeches followed this motion, and then Hancock, the President of the +convention, descended from the chair, and, with some conciliatory +observations, laid before it a proposition for certain amendments. +This step was not taken by him upon his own suggestion merely, +although he was doubtless very willing to be the medium of a +reconciliation between the contending parties. He was at that time +Governor of the State, and had been placed in the chair of the +convention, partly in deference to his official station and his +personal eminence, and partly because he held a rather neutral +position with respect to the Constitution. These circumstances, as +well as his Revolutionary distinction, led the friends of the +Constitution to seek his intervention; and his love of popularity and +deference made the office of arbitrator exceedingly agreeable to him. +The selection was a wise one, for Hancock had great influence with the +classes of men composing the opposition, and he could not be suspected +of any undue admiration of the system the adoption of which he was to +recommend. + +He proceeded with characteristic caution. It does not appear, from +what is preserved of the remarks with which he presented his +amendments, whether he intended they should become a condition +precedent to the ratification, or should be adopted as a +recommendation subsequent to the assent of the convention to the +Constitution then before it. He brought them forward, he said, to +quiet the apprehensions and remove the doubts of gentlemen, relying on +their candor to bear him witness that his wishes for a good +constitution were sincere. But the form of ratification which he +proposed contained a distinct and separate acceptance of the +Constitution, and the amendments followed it, with a recommendation +that they "be introduced into the said Constitution." Samuel Adams, +with much commendation of the Governor's proposition, immediately +affected to understand it as recommending conditional amendments, and +advocated it in that sense. Other members of the opposition understood +it in the opposite sense, and, fearing its effect, insisted that the +convention had no power to propose amendments, and that there could be +no probability that, if recommended to the attention of the first +Congress that might sit under the Constitution, they would ever be +adopted. Upon both of these points, the arguments of the other side +were sufficient to convince a few of the more candid members of the +opposition, and the Constitution was ratified on the 7th of February, +by a majority of nineteen votes,[422] the ratification being followed +by a recommendation of certain amendments, and an injunction addressed +to the representatives of the State in Congress to insist at all times +on their being considered and acted upon in the mode provided by the +fifth article of the Constitution. + +The smallness of the majority in favor of the Constitution was in a +great degree compensated by the immediate conduct of those who had +opposed it. Many of them, before the final adjournment, expressed +their determination, now that it had received the assent of a +majority, to exert all their influence to induce the people to +anticipate the blessings which its advocates expected from it. They +acted in accordance with their professions; and those portions of the +people whose sentiments they had represented exhibited generally the +same candor and patriotism, and acquiesced at once in the result. This +course of the opposition in Massachusetts was observed elsewhere, and +largely contributed to give to the action of the State, in proposing +amendments, a salutary influence in some quarters, which would +otherwise have probably failed to attend it. + +The amendments proposed by the convention of Massachusetts were, as +was claimed by those who advocated them, of a general, and not a local +character; but they were at the same time highly characteristic of the +State. They may be divided into three classes. One of them embraced +that general declaration which was afterwards incorporated with the +amendments to the Constitution, and which expressly reserved to the +States or the people the powers not delegated to the United States. +Another class of them comprehended certain restraints upon the powers +granted to Congress by the Constitution, with respect to elections, +direct taxes, the commercial power, the jurisdiction of the courts, +and the power to consent to the holding of titles or offices conferred +by foreign sovereigns. The third class contemplated the two great +provisions of a presentment by a grand jury, for crimes by which an +infamous or a capital punishment might be incurred, and trial by jury +in civil actions at the common law between citizens of different +States. + +The people of Boston, although in general strongly in favor of the +Constitution, had carefully abstained from every attempt to influence +the convention. But now that the ratification was carried, they +determined to give to the event all the importance that belonged to +it, by public ceremonies and festivities. On the 17th of February, +there issued from the gates of Faneuil Hall an imposing procession of +five thousand citizens, embracing all the trades of the town and its +neighborhood, each with its appropriate decorations, emblems, and +mottoes. In the centre of this long pageant, to mark the relation of +everything around it to maritime commerce, and the relation of all to +the new government, was borne the ship Federal Constitution, with full +colors flying, and attended by the merchants, captains, and seamen of +the port.[423] On the following day, the rejoicings were terminated by +a public banquet, at which each of the States that had then adopted +the Constitution was separately toasted, the minorities of +Connecticut and Massachusetts were warmly praised for their frank and +patriotic submission, and strong hopes were expressed of the State of +New York. + +In this manner the Federalists of Massachusetts wisely sought to +kindle the enthusiasm of the country, and to conciliate the opinion of +the States which were still to act, in favor of the new Constitution. +The influence of their course did not fail in some quarters. In the +convention of New Hampshire, which assembled immediately after that of +Massachusetts was adjourned, although there was a majority who, either +bound by instructions or led by their own opinions, would have +rejected the Constitution if required to vote upon it immediately, yet +that same majority was composed chiefly of men willing to hear +discussion, willing to be convinced, and likely to feel the influence +of what had occurred in the leading State of New England. There was a +body of Federalists in New Hampshire acting in concert with the +leading men of that party in Massachusetts. They caused the same form +of ratification and the same amendments which had been adopted in the +latter State, with some additional ones, to be presented to their own +convention.[424] The discussions changed the opinions of many of the +members, but it was not deemed expedient to incur the hazard of a +vote. The friends of the Constitution found it necessary to consent to +an adjournment, in order that the instructed delegates might have an +opportunity to lay before their constituents the information which +they had themselves received, and of which the people in the more +remote parts of the State were greatly in need. Unfortunately, +however, for the course of things in other States, the occurrence of a +general election in New Hampshire made it necessary to adjourn the +convention until the middle of June. We have seen what was the effect +of this proceeding in Virginia, where it was both misunderstood and +misrepresented. But it saved the Constitution in New Hampshire. + +Six States only, therefore, had adopted the Constitution at the +opening of the spring of 1788. The convention of Maryland assembled at +Annapolis on the 21st of April. The convention of South Carolina was +to follow in May, and the conventions of Virginia and New York were to +meet in June. So critical was the period in which the people of +Maryland were to act, that Washington considered that a postponement +of their decision would cause the final defeat of the Constitution; +for if, under the influence of such a postponement, following that of +New Hampshire, South Carolina should reject it, its fate would turn +on the determination of Virginia. + +The people of Maryland appear to have been fully aware of the +importance of their course. They not only elected a large majority of +delegates known to be in favor of the Constitution, but a majority of +the counties instructed their members to ratify it as speedily as +possible, and to do no other act. This settled determination not to +consider amendments, and not to have the action of the State +misinterpreted, or its influence lost, gave great dissatisfaction to +the minority. Their efforts to introduce amendments were disposed of +quite summarily. The majority would entertain no proposition but the +single question of ratification, which was carried by sixty-three +votes against eleven, on the 28th of April. + +On the first of May, there were public rejoicings and a procession of +the trades, in Baltimore, followed by a banquet, a ball, and an +illumination. In this procession, the miniature ship "Federalist," +which was afterwards presented to General Washington, and long rode at +anchor in the Potomac opposite Mount Vernon, was carried, as the type +of commerce and the consummate production of American naval +architecture.[425] The next day a packet sailed from the port of +Baltimore for Charleston, carrying the news of the ratification by +Maryland.[426] In how many days this "coaster" performed her voyage +is not known; but it is a recorded, though now forgotten, fact among +the events of this period, that on her return to Baltimore, where she +arrived on Saturday the 31st of May, the same vessel brought back the +welcome intelligence, that on the 23d of that month, "at five o'clock +in the afternoon," the convention of South Carolina had ratified the +Constitution of the United States. A salute of cannon on Federal Hill, +in the neighborhood of Baltimore, spread the joyful news far down the +waters of the Chesapeake to the shores of Virginia, and bold express +riders placed it in Philadelphia before the following Monday evening. + +Such was the anxiety with which the friends of the Constitution in the +centre of the Union watched the course of events in the remaining +States. The accession of South Carolina was naturally regarded as very +important. Her delegates in the national Convention had assumed what +might be thought, at home and elsewhere, to be a great responsibility. +They had taken a prominent part in the settlement of the compromises +which became necessary between the Northern and the Southern States. +They had consented to a full commercial power, to be exercised by a +majority in both houses of Congress; to a power to extinguish the +slave-trade in twenty years; and to a power of direct and indirect +taxation, exports alone excepted. Would the people of South Carolina +consider the provisions made for their peculiar demands as equivalents +for what had been surrendered? Would they acquiesce in a system +founded in the necessities for local sacrifices, standing as they did +at the extremity of the interests involved in the Southern side of the +adjustment? + +It is not probable that the people of South Carolina, at the time of +their adoption of the Constitution, supposed that they had any solid +reasons for dissatisfaction with such of its arrangements as in any +way concerned the subject of slavery. A good deal was said, _ad +captandum_, by the opponents of the Constitution, on these points, but +it does not appear to have been said with much effect. No man who has +ever been placed by the State of South Carolina in a public position, +has been more true to her interests and rights than General Pinckney; +and General Pinckney furnished to the people of the State--speaking +from his place in the legislature on his return from the national +Convention--what he considered, and they received, as a complete +answer to all that was addressed to their local fears and prejudices, +on these particular topics. When he had shown that, by the universal +admission of the country, the Constitution had given to the general +government no power to emancipate the slaves within the several +States, and that it had secured a right which did not previously +exist, of recovering those who might escape into other States; that +the slave-trade would remain open for twenty years, a period that +would suffice for the supply of all the labor of that kind which the +State would require; and that the admission of the blacks into the +basis of representation was a concession in favor of the State, of +singular importance as well as novelty;--he had disposed of every +ground of opposition relating to these points. And so the people of +the State manifestly considered. + +But there was one part of the arrangements included in the +Constitution, on which they appear to have thought that they had more +reason to pause; and it is quite important that we should understand +both the grounds of their doubt, and the grounds on which they yielded +their assent to this part of the system. South Carolina was then, and +was ever likely to be, a great exporting State. Some of her people +feared that, if a full power to regulate commerce by the votes of a +majority in the two houses of Congress were to be exercised in the +passage of a navigation act, the Eastern States, in whose behalf they +were asked to grant such a power, would not be able to furnish +shipping enough to export the products of the planting States. This +apprehension arose entirely from a want of information; which some of +the friends of the Constitution supplied, while it was under +discussion. They showed that, if all the exported products of +Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia were obliged to be carried in +American bottoms, the Eastern States were then able to furnish more +than shipping enough for the purpose; and that this shipping must also +compete with that of the Middle States. Still it remained true, that +the grant of the commercial power would enable a majority in Congress +to exclude foreign vessels from the carrying trade of the United +States, and so far to enhance the freights on the products of South +Carolina. What then were the motives which appear to have led the +convention of that State to agree to this concession of the commercial +power? + +It is evident from the discussions which took place in the +legislature, and which had great influence in the subsequent +convention, that the attention of the people of South Carolina was not +confined to the particular terms and arrangements of the compromises +which took place in the formation of the Constitution. They looked to +the propriety, expediency, and justice of a general power to regulate +commerce, apart from the compromise in which it was involved. They +admitted the commercial distresses of the Northern States; they saw +the policy of increasing the maritime strength of those States, in +order to encourage the growth of a navy; and they considered it +neither prudent, nor fit, to give the vessels of all foreign nations a +right to enter American ports at pleasure, in peace and in war, and +whatever might be the commercial legislation of those nations towards +the United States. For these reasons, a large majority of the people +of South Carolina were willing to make so much sacrifice, be it more +or less, as was involved in the surrender to a majority in Congress +of the power to regulate commerce.[427] + +Still, the Constitution was not ratified without a good deal of +opposition on the part of a considerable minority. As the convention +drew towards the close of its proceedings, an effort was made to carry +an adjournment to the following autumn, in order to gain time for the +anticipated rejection of the Constitution by Virginia. This motion +probably stimulated the convention to act more decisively than they +might otherwise have done, for it touched the pride of the State in +the wrong direction. After a spirited discussion it was rejected by a +majority of forty-six votes, and the Constitution was thereupon +ratified by a majority of seventy-six. Several amendments were then +adopted, to be presented to Congress for consideration, three of which +were substantially the same with three of those proposed by +Massachusetts.[428] + +On the 27th of May, there was a great procession of the trades, in +Charleston, in honor of the accession of the State, in which the ship +Federalist, drawn by eight white horses, was a conspicuous object, as +it had been in the processions of other cities. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[411] See an account of him, _ante_, Vol. I. Book III. Chap. XIV. + +[412] This was a mistake. On the 12th of September, Messrs. Gerry and +Mason moved for a committee to prepare a bill of rights, but the +motion was lost by an equal division of the States. Elliot, V. 538. + +[413] Mr. McKean, although his residence was at Philadelphia, +represented the lower counties of Delaware in Congress from 1774 to +1783. In 1777 he was made Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, being at the +same time a member of Congress and President of the State of Delaware. + +[414] The Constitution was ratified by a vote of 46 to 23. + +[415] This was at a meeting held at Harrisburg, September 3d, 1788. + +[416] The opposite parties were so much excited against each other, +and the course of New Jersey was viewed with so much interest at +Philadelphia among the "Federalists," that a story found currency and +belief there, to the effect that Clinton, the Governor of New York, +had offered the State of New Jersey, through one of its influential +citizens, one half of the impost revenue of New York, if she would +reject the Constitution. The preposterous character of such a +proposition stamps the rumor with gross improbability. But its +circulation evinces the anxiety with which the course of New Jersey +was regarded in the neighboring States, and it is certain that the +opposition in New York made great efforts to influence it. + +[417] The situation of Georgia was brought to the notice of Washington +immediately after his first inauguration as President of the United +States, in an Address presented to him by the legislature of the +State, in which they set forth two prominent subjects on which they +looked for protection to "the influence and power of the Union." One +of these was the exposure of their frontier to the ravages of the +Creek Indians. The other was the escape of their slaves into Florida, +whence they had never been able to reclaim them. Both of these matters +received the early attention of Washington's administration. + +[418] He stated the annual expenditure of the government, including +the interest on the foreign debt, at £260,000 (currency), and then +showed that, in the three States of Massachusetts, New York, and +Pennsylvania, £160,000 or £180,000 per annum had been raised by +impost. + +[419] Fragments only of the debates in the convention of Connecticut +are known to be preserved. They may be found in the second volume of +Elliot's collection. + +[420] Three of them, Widgery, Thompson, and Nason, were from Maine; +there was a Dr. Taylor from the county of Worcester, and a Mr. Bishop +from the county of Bristol. These gentlemen carried on the greater +part of the discussion against the Constitution. + +[421] Theophilus Parsons, afterwards the celebrated Chief Justice of +Massachusetts. + +[422] Yeas, 187; nays, 168. + +[423] This was the first of a series of similar pageants, which took +place in the other principal cities of the Union, in honor of the +ratification of the Constitution. + +[424] The form of ratification and the amendments introduced by +Hancock into the convention of Massachusetts were drawn by Theophilus +Parsons. They were probably communicated to General Sullivan, the +President of the New Hampshire convention, by his brother, James +Sullivan, an eminent lawyer of Boston, afterwards Governor of +Massachusetts. The reader should compare the Massachusetts amendments +with those of the other States whose action followed that of +Massachusetts, for the purpose of seeing the influence which they +exerted. (All the amendments may be found in the Journals of the Old +Congress, Vol. XIII., Appendix.) See also _post_, Chap. III., as to +the effect of the course of Massachusetts on the mind of Jefferson. + +[425] This little vessel sailed from Baltimore on the 1st of June, and +arrived at Mount Vernon, "completely rigged and highly ornamented," on +the 8th. It was a fine specimen of the then state of the mechanic +arts. See an account of it in Washington's Works, IX. 375, 376. + +[426] There was then no land communication between the two places, +that could have carried intelligence in less than a month. A letter +written by General Pinckney to General Washington on the 24th of May, +announcing the result in South Carolina, was more than four weeks on +its way to Mount Vernon. (Washington's Works, IX. 389.) General +Washington had received the same news by way of Baltimore soon after +its arrival there. + +[427] See the course of argument of Edward Rutledge, General Pinckney, +Robert Barnwell, Commodore Gillon, and others, as given in Elliot, IV. +253-316. + +[428] See the Amendments, Journals of the Old Congress, Vol. XIII., +Appendix. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +RATIFICATIONS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, VIRGINIA, AND NEW YORK, WITH PROPOSED +AMENDMENTS. + + +South Carolina was the eighth State that had ratified the +Constitution, and one other only was required for its inauguration. In +this posture of affairs the month of May in the year 1788 was closed. +An intense interest was to be concentrated into the next two months, +which were to decide the question whether the Constitution was ever to +be put into operation. The convention of Virginia was to meet on the +2d, and that of New York on the 17th, of June; the convention of New +Hampshire stood adjourned to the 18th of the same month. The latter +assembly was to meet at Concord, from which place intelligence would +reach the Middle and Southern States through Boston and the city of +New York. The town of Poughkeepsie, where the convention of New York +was to sit, lay about midway between the cities of Albany and New +York, on the east bank of the Hudson. The land route from the city of +New York to Richmond, where the convention of Virginia was to meet, +was of course through the city of Philadelphia. The distance from +Concord to Poughkeepsie, through Boston, Springfield, and Hudson, was +about two hundred and fifty miles. The distance from Poughkeepsie to +Richmond, through the cities of New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, +was about four hundred and fifty miles. The public mails, over any +part of these distances, were not carried at a rate of more than fifty +miles for each day, and over a large part of them they could not have +been carried so fast. The information needed at such a crisis could +not wait the slow progress of the public conveyances. + +No one could tell how long the conventions of New York and Virginia +might be occupied with the momentous question that was to come before +them. It was evident, however, that there was to be a great struggle +in both of them, and it was extremely important that intelligence of +the final action of New Hampshire should be received in both at the +earliest practicable moment. For, whatever might be the weight due to +the example of New Hampshire under other circumstances, if, before the +conventions of New York and Virginia had decided, it should appear +that nine States had ratified the Constitution, the course of those +bodies might be materially influenced by a fact of so much consequence +to the future position of the Union, and to the relations in which +those two States were to stand to the new government. It was equally +important, too, that whatever might occur in the conventions of New +York and Virginia should be known respectively in each of them, as +speedily as possible. About the middle of May, therefore, Hamilton +arranged with Madison for the transmission of letters between Richmond +and Poughkeepsie, by horse expresses; and by the 12th of June he had +made a similar arrangement with Rufus King, General Knox, and other +Federalists at the East, for the conveyance from Concord to +Poughkeepsie of intelligence concerning the result in New Hampshire. + +A very full convention of delegates of the people of Virginia +assembled at Richmond on the 2d of June, embracing nearly all the most +eminent public men of the State, except Washington and Jefferson. All +parties felt the weight of responsibility resting upon the State. +Every State that had hitherto acted finally on the subject had +ratified the Constitution; in three of them it had been adopted +unanimously; in several of the others it had been sanctioned by large +majorities; and in those in which amendments had been proposed, they +had not been made conditions precedent to the adoption. So far, +therefore, as the voice of any State had pronounced the Constitution +defective, or dangerous to any general or particular interest, the +mode of amendment provided by it, to be employed after it had gone +into operation, had been relied upon as sufficient and safe. The +opposition in Virginia were consequently reduced to this +dilemma;--they must either take the responsibility of rejecting the +Constitution entirely, or they must assume the equally hazardous +responsibility of insisting that the ratification of the State should +be given only upon the condition of previous amendments. They were +prepared to do both, or either, according to the prospects of success; +for their convictions were fixed against the system proposed; their +abilities, patriotism, courage, and personal influence were of a high +order; and their devotion to what they deemed the interests of +Virginia was unquestionable. + +They were led, as I have already said they were to be, by Patrick +Henry, whose reputation had suffered no abatement since the period +when he blazed into the darkened skies of the Revolution,--when his +untutored eloquence electrified the heart of Virginia, and became, as +has been well said, even "a cause of the national independence."[429] +He had held the highest honors of the State, but had retired, poor, +and worn down by twenty years of public service, to rescue his private +affairs by the practice of a profession which, in some of its duties, +he did not love, and for which he had, perhaps, a single qualification +in his amazing oratorical powers. His popularity in Virginia was +unbounded. It was the popularity that attends genius, when thrown with +heart and soul, and with every impulse of its being, into the cause of +popular freedom; and it was a popularity in which reverence for the +stern independence and the self-sacrificing spirit of the patriot was +mingled with admiration for the splendid gifts of oratory which +Nature, and Nature alone, had bestowed upon him. But Mr. Henry was +rightly appreciated by his contemporaries. They knew that, though a +wise man, his wisdom lacked comprehensiveness, and that the mere +intensity with which he regarded the ends of public liberty was likely +to mislead his judgment as to the means by which it was to be secured +and upheld. The chief apprehension of his opponents, on this important +occasion, was lest the power of his eloquence over the feelings or +prejudices of his auditory might lead the sober reflections of men +astray. + +He was at this time fifty-two years of age. Although feeling or +affecting to feel himself an old and broken man, he was yet +undoubtedly master of all his natural powers. Those powers he exerted +to the utmost, to defeat the Constitution in the convention of +Virginia. He employed every art of his peculiar rhetoric, every +resource of invective, of sarcasm, of appeal to the fears of his +audience for liberty; every dictate of local prejudice and State +pride. But he employed them all with the most sincere conviction that +the adoption of the proposed Constitution would be a wrong and +dangerous step. Nor is it surprising that he should have so regarded +it. He had formed to himself an ideal image which he was fond of +describing as the American spirit. This national spirit of liberty, +erring perhaps at times, but in the main true to right and justice as +well as to freedom, was with him a kind of guardian angel of the +republic. He seems to have considered it able to correct its own +errors without the aid of any powerful system of general +government,--capable of accomplishing in peace all that it had +unquestionably effected for the country in war. As he passed out of +the troubles and triumphs of the Revolution into the calmer atmosphere +of the Confederation, his reliance on this American spirit, and his +jealousy for the maxims of public liberty, led him to regard that +system as perfect, because it had no direct legislative authority. He +could not endure the thought of a government, external to that of +Virginia, and yet possessed of the power of direct taxation over the +people of the State. He regarded with utter abhorrence the idea of +laws binding the people of Virginia by the authority of the people of +the United States; and thinking that he saw in the Constitution a +purely national and consolidated government, and refusing to see the +federal principle which its advocates declared was incorporated in its +system of representation, he shut his eyes resolutely upon all the +evils and defects of the Confederation, and denounced the new plan as +a monstrous departure from the only safe construction of a Union. He +belonged, too, to that school of public men--some of whose principles +in this respect it is vain to question--who considered a Bill of +Rights essential in every republican government that is clothed with +powers of direct legislation. + +On the first day of the session, at the instance of Mr. Mason, the +convention determined not to take a vote upon any question until the +whole Constitution had been debated by paragraphs; but the +discussions in fact ranged over the whole instrument without any +restriction. The opposition was opened by Henry, in a powerful speech +of a general nature, in which he demanded the reasons for such a +radical change in the character of the general government. That the +new plan was a consolidated government, and not a confederacy, he held +to be indisputable. The language of the preamble, which said _We, the +People_, and not _We, the States_, made this perfectly clear. But +States were the characteristics and the soul of a confederation. If +States were not to be the agents of this new compact, it must be one +great, consolidated, national government of the people of all the +States. This perilous innovation, altogether beyond the powers of the +Convention which had proposed it, had given rise to differences of +opinion which had gone to inflammatory resentments in different parts +of the country. He denied altogether the existence of any necessity +for exposing the public peace to such a hazard. + +As soon as Henry had sat down, the Governor, Edmund Randolph, rose, to +place himself in a position of some apparent inconsistency. He had, as +we have seen, refused to sign the Constitution. On his return to +Virginia, he had addressed a long, exculpatory letter to the Speaker +of the House of Delegates, giving his reasons for this refusal; which +were, in substance, that he considered the Constitution required +important amendments, and that, as it would go to the conventions of +the States to be accepted or rejected as a whole, without power to +amend, he thought that his signature would preclude him from proposing +the changes and additions which he deemed essential. This letter had +attracted much attention both in and out of Virginia, and Randolph was +consequently, up to this moment, regarded as a firm opponent of the +Constitution. He chose, however, to incur the charge of that kind of +inconsistency which a statesman should never hesitate to commit, when +he finds that the public good is no longer consistent with his +adherence to a former opinion. He declared that the day of previous +amendments had passed. The ratification of the Constitution by eight +States had placed Virginia and the country in a critical position. If +the Constitution should not be adopted by the number of States +required to put it into operation, there could be no Union; and if it +were to be ratified by that number, and Virginia were to reject it, +she would have at least two States at the south of her which would +belong to a confederacy of which she would not be a member. He should, +therefore, vote for the unconditional adoption of the Constitution, +looking to future amendments, although he had little expectation that +they would be made. + +This announcement took the opposition by surprise. But they relaxed +none of their efforts. They subjected every part of the Constitution +to a rigid scrutiny, and to the most subtle course of reasoning, as +well as to one which addressed the prejudices of the common mind. Some +of the most important only of the topics on which they enlarged can be +noticed here. + +Their first and chief object was to show that the Constitution +presented a national and consolidated government, in the place of the +Confederation, and that under such a government the liberties of the +people of the States could not be secure. This character of the +proposed government Mr. Mason deduced from the power of direct +taxation, which, he contended, entirely changed the confederacy into +one consolidated government. This power, being at discretion and +unrestrained, must carry everything before it. The general government +being paramount to, and in every respect more powerful than, the State +governments, the latter must give way; for two concurrent powers of +direct taxation cannot long exist together. Assuming that taxes were +to be levied for the use of the general government, the mode in which +they were to be assessed and collected was of the utmost consequence, +and it ought not to be surrendered by the people of Virginia to those +who had neither a knowledge of their situation nor a common interest +with them. He would cheerfully acquiesce in giving an effectual +alternative for the power of direct taxation. He would give the +general government power to demand their quotas of the States, with an +alternative of laying direct taxes in case of non-compliance. The +certainty of this conditional power would, in all probability, prevent +the application of it, and the sums necessary for the Union would then +be raised by the States, and by those who would best know how they +could be raised. + +Mr. Henry took a broader ground. He argued that the Constitution +presented a consolidated government, because it spoke in the name of +the People, and not in the name of the States. It was neither a +monarchy like England,--a compact between prince and people, with +checks on the former to secure the liberty of the latter; nor a +confederacy like Holland,--an association of independent States, each +retaining its individual sovereignty; nor yet a democracy, in which +the people retain securely all their rights. It was an alarming +transition from a confederacy to a consolidated government. It was a +step as radical as that which separated us from Great Britain. The +rights of conscience, trial by jury, liberty of the press, all +immunities and franchises, all pretensions to human rights and +privileges, were rendered insecure, if not lost, by such a transition. +It was said that eight States had adopted it. He declared that, if +twelve States and a half had adopted it, he would, with manly +firmness, and in spite of an erring world, reject it. "You are not to +inquire," said he, "how your trade may be increased, or how you are to +become a great and prosperous people, but how your liberties may be +secured";--and then, kindling with the old fire of his earlier days, +and with the recollection of what he had done and suffered for the +liberties of his country, he broke forth in one of his most indignant +and impassioned moods.[430] + +Madison, always cool, clear, and sensible, answered these objections. +He described the new government as having a mixed character. It would +be in some respects federal, in others consolidated. The manner in +which it was to be ratified established this double character. The +parties to it were to be the people, but not the people as composing +one great society, but the people as composing thirteen sovereignties. +If it were a purely consolidated government, the assent of a majority +of the people would be sufficient to establish it. But it was to be +binding on the people of a State only by their own separate consent; +and if adopted by the people of all the States, it would be a +government established, not through the intervention of their +legislatures, but by the people at large. In this respect, the +distinction between the existing and the proposed governments was very +material. + +The mode in which the Constitution was to be amended also displayed +its mixed character. A majority of the States could not introduce +amendments, nor yet were all the States required; three fourths of +them must concur in alterations; and this constituted a departure from +the federal idea. Again, the members of one branch of the legislature +were to be chosen by the people of the States in proportion to their +numbers; the members of the other were to be elected by the States in +their equal and political capacities. Had the government been +completely consolidated, the Senate would have been chosen in the same +way as the House; had it been completely federal, the House would have +been chosen in the same way as the Senate. Thus it was of a complex +nature; and this complexity would be found to exclude the evils of +absolute consolidation and the evils of a mere confederacy. Finally, +if Virginia were separated from all the States, her power and +authority would extend to all cases; in like manner, were all powers +vested in the general government, it would be a consolidated +government; but the powers of the general government are enumerated; +it can only operate in certain cases; it has legislative powers on +defined and limited objects, beyond which it cannot extend its +jurisdiction. + +With respect to the powers proposed to be conferred on the new +government, he conceived that the question was whether they were +necessary. If they were, Virginia was reduced to the dilemma of either +submitting to the inconvenience which the surrender of those powers +might occasion, or of losing the Union. He then proceeded to show the +necessity for the power of direct taxation; and in answer to the +apprehended danger arising from this power united with the +consolidated nature of the government,--thus giving it a tendency to +destroy all subordinate or separate authority of the States,--he +admitted that, if the general government were wholly independent of +the governments of the States, usurpation might be expected to the +fullest extent; but as it was not so independent, but derived its +authority partly from those governments, and partly from the +people,--the same source of power,--there was no danger that it would +destroy the State governments. + +In this manner, extending to all the details of the Constitution, the +discussion proceeded for nearly a week, the opposition aiming to show +that at every point it exposed the liberties of the people to great +hazards; Henry sustaining nearly the whole burden of the argument on +that side, and fighting with great vigor against great odds.[431] At +length, finding himself sorely pressed, he took advantage of an +allusion made by his opponents to the debts due from the United States +to France, to introduce the name of Jefferson. + +"I might," said he, "not from public authority, but from good +information, tell you that his opinion is that you reject this +government. His character and abilities are in the highest estimation; +he is well acquainted in every respect with this country; equally so +with the policy of the European nations. This illustrious citizen +advises you to reject this government till it be amended. His +sentiments coincide entirely with ours. His attachment to, and +services done for, this country are well known. At a great distance +from us, he remembers and studies our happiness. Living in splendor +and dissipation, he thinks yet of Bills of Rights,--thinks of those +little, despised things called _maxims_. Let us follow the sage +advice of this common friend of our happiness."[432] + +At the time when Mr. Henry made this statement, he had seen a letter +written by Mr. Jefferson from Paris, in the preceding February, which +was much circulated among the opposition in Virginia, and in which Mr. +Jefferson had expressed the hope that the first nine conventions might +accept the Constitution, and the remaining four might refuse it, until +a Declaration of Rights had been annexed to it.[433] Mr. Henry chose +to construe this into an advice to _Virginia_ to reject the +Constitution. But this use of Mr. Jefferson's opinion was not strictly +justifiable, since Virginia, in the actual order of events, might be +the ninth State to act; for the convention of New Hampshire was not to +reassemble until nearly three weeks after the first meeting of that of +Virginia, in which Mr. Henry was then speaking. The friends of the +Constitution, therefore, became somewhat restive under this attempt to +employ the influence of Jefferson against them. Without saying +anything disrespectful of him, but, on the contrary, speaking of him +in the highest terms of praise and honor, they complained of the +impropriety of introducing his opinion,--saying that, if the opinions +of important men not within that convention were to govern its +deliberations, they could adduce a name at least equally great on +their side;[434] and they then contended that Mr. Jefferson's letter +did not admit of the application that had been given to it.[435] But +the truth was, that the assertions of his opponents respecting New +Hampshire, and the ambiguous form of Mr. Jefferson's opinion, gave +Henry all the opportunity he wanted to employ that opinion for the +purpose for which he introduced it. "You say," said he, "that you are +absolutely certain New Hampshire will adopt this government. Then she +will be the ninth State; and if Mr. Jefferson's advice is of any +value, and this system requires amendments, we, who are to be one of +the four remaining States, ought to reject it until amendments are +obtained."[436] + +Notwithstanding the efforts of Madison to counteract this artifice, it +gave the opposition great strength, because it enabled them to throw +the whole weight of their arguments against the alleged defects and +dangers of the Constitution into the scale of an absolute rejection. +Mr. Jefferson's subsequent opinion, formed after he had received +intelligence of the course of Massachusetts, had not then been +received, and indeed did not reach this country until after the +convention of Virginia had acted.[437] The opposition went on, +therefore, with renewed vigor, to attack the Constitution in every +part which they considered vulnerable. + +Among the topics on which they expended a great deal of force was +that of the navigation of the Mississippi. They employed this subject +for the purpose of influencing the votes of members who represented +the interests of that part of Virginia which is now Kentucky. They +first extorted from Madison, and other gentlemen, who had been in the +Congress of the Confederation, a statement of the negotiations which +had nearly resulted in a temporary surrender of the right in the +Mississippi to Spain.[438] They then made use of the following +argument. It had appeared, they said, from those transactions, that +the Northern and Middle States, seven in number,[439] were in favor of +bartering away this great interest for commercial privileges and +advantages; that those States, particularly the Eastern ones, would be +influenced further by a desire to suppress the growth of new States in +the Western country, and to prevent the emigration of their own people +thither, as a means of retaining the power of governing the Union; and +that the surrender of the Mississippi could be made by treaty, under +the Constitution, by the will of the President and the votes of ten +Senators,[440] whereas, under the Confederation, it never could be +done without the votes of nine States in Congress. + +It must be allowed that there had been much in the history of this +matter on which harsh reflections could be made by both sections of +the Union. But it was not correct to represent the Eastern and Middle +States as animated by a desire to prevent the settlement of the +Western country, or to say that they would be ready at any time to +barter away the right in the Mississippi. Seven of the States had +consented, in a time of war and of great peril, to the proposal of a +temporary surrender of the right to Spain, just when it was supposed +that negotiations between Spain and Great Britain might result in a +coalition which would deprive us of the river for ever, and when it +was thought that a temporary cession would fix the permanent right in +our favor.[441] This was undoubtedly an error; but it was one from +which the country had been saved, by the disputes which arose +respecting the constitutional power of seven States to give +instructions for a treaty, and by the prospect of a reconstruction of +the general government.[442] Now, therefore, that an entirely new +constitutional system had been prepared, the real question, in +relation to this very important subject, was one of a twofold +character. It involved, first, the moral probabilities respecting the +wishes and policy of a majority of the States; and, secondly, a +comparison of the means afforded by the Constitution for protecting +the national right to the Mississippi, with those afforded by the +Confederation,--assuming that any State or States might wish to +surrender it. + +Upon this question Mr. Madison made an answer to the opposition, which +shows how accurately he foresaw the relations between the western and +the eastern portions of the Union, and how justly he estimated the +future working of the Constitution with respect to the preservation of +the Mississippi, or any other national right. + +If interest alone, he said, were to govern the Eastern States, they +must derive greater advantage from holding the Mississippi than even +the Southern States; for if the carrying trade were their natural +province, it must depend mainly on agriculture for its support, and +agriculture was to be the great employment of the Western country. But +in addition to this security of local interest, the Constitution would +make it necessary for two thirds of all the Senators present--and those +present would represent all the States, if all attended to their +duty--to concur in every treaty. The President, who would represent the +people at large, must also concur. In the House of Representatives, the +landed, rather than the commercial interest, would predominate; and the +House of Representatives, although not to be directly concerned in the +making of treaties, would have an important influence in the +government. A weak system had produced the project of surrendering the +Mississippi; a strong one would remove the inducement.[443] + +In the midst of these discussions, and while the opposition were +making every effort to protract them until the 23d of June,--when the +assembling of the legislature would afford a colorable pretext for an +adjournment,--Colonel Oswald of Philadelphia arrived at Richmond, with +letters from the Anti-Federalists of New York and Pennsylvania to the +leaders of that party at Richmond, for the purpose of concerting a +plan for the postponement of the decision of Virginia until after the +meeting of the convention of New York. It was supposed that, if this +could be effected, the opponents of the Constitution in New York would +be able to make some overture to the opposition in Virginia, for the +same course of action in both States. If this could not be brought +about, it was considered by the opposition at Richmond that the +chances of obtaining a vote for previous amendments would be +materially increased by delay. The parties in their convention were +nearly balanced, at this time. Mr. Madison estimated the Federal +majority at not more than three or four votes, if indeed the +Federalists had a majority, on the 17th of June, the day on which the +convention of New York was to meet.[444] + +But we must now leave the convention of Virginia, and turn our eyes to +the pleasant village on the banks of the Hudson, where the convention +of New York was already assembling. Hamilton was there, and was its +leading spirit. How vigilant and thoughtful he was, we know;--sometimes +watching for the messenger who might descend the eastern hills with +reports from New Hampshire,--sometimes turning to the South and +listening for the footfall of his couriers from Virginia;--but always +preparing to meet difficulties, always ready to contest every inch of +ground, and never losing sight of the great end to be accomplished. The +hours were slow and heavy to him. The lines of horse-expresses which he +had so carefully adjusted, and at whose intersection he stood to +collect the momentous intelligence they would bring him, were indeed a +marvel of enterprise at that day; but how unlike were they to the +metallic lines that now daily gather for us, from all the ends of the +land and with the speed of lightning, minute notices of the most +trivial or the most important events! Still, such as his apparatus was, +it was all that could be had; and he awaited, alike with a firm +patience and a faithful hope, for the decisive results. Even at this +distance of time, we share the fluctuations of his anxious spirit, and +our patriotism is quickened by our sympathy. + +Rarely, indeed, if ever, was there a statesman having more at stake in +what he could not personally control, or greater cause for solicitude +concerning the public weal of his own times or that of future ages, +than Hamilton now had. His own prospects of usefulness, according to +the principles which had long guided him, and the happiness or the +misery of his country, were all, as he was deeply convinced, involved +in what might happen within any hour of those few eventful days. The +rejection of the Constitution by Virginia would, in all probability, +cause its rejection by New York. Its rejection by those States would, +as he sincerely believed, be followed by eventual disunion and civil +war. But if the Constitution could be established, he could see the +way open to the happiness and welfare of the whole Union; for although +it was not in all respects the system that he would have preferred, he +had shown, in the Federalist, how profoundly he understood its bearing +upon the interests of the country, into what harmony he could bring +its various provisions, and what powerful aid he could give in +adjusting it into its delicate relations to the States. He had, too, +already conceived the hope that its early administration might be +undertaken by Washington; and with the government in the hands of +Washington, Hamilton could foresee the success which to us is now +historical. + +To say that Hamilton was ambitious, is to say that he was human; and +he was by no means free from human imperfections. But his was the +ambition of a great mind, regulated by principle, and made incapable, +by the force and nature of his convictions, of seeking personal +aggrandizement through any course of public policy of which those +convictions were not the mainspring and the life. In no degree is the +character of any other American statesman undervalued or disparaged, +when I insist on the importance to all America, through all time, of +Hamilton's public character and conduct in this respect. It was +because his future opportunities for personal distinction and +usefulness were now evidently at stake in the success of a system that +would admit of the exercise of his great powers in the service of the +country,--a system that would afford at once a field for their +exercise and for the application of his political principles,--and +because he could neither seek nor find distinction in a line of +politics which tended to disunion,--that his position at this time is +so interesting and important. As a citizen of New York, too, his +position was personally critical. He had carried on a vigorous contest +with the opponents of the Constitution in that State; he had +encountered obloquy and misrepresentation and rancor,--perhaps he had +provoked them. He had told the people of the State, for years, that +they had listened to wrong counsels, when they had lent themselves to +measures that retarded the growth of a national spirit and an +efficient general government. The correctness of his judgment was now, +therefore, openly and palpably in the issue. His public policy, with +reference to the relations of the State to the Union, was now to +stand, or to fall, with the Constitution proposed. + +When he entered the convention of the State, he was convinced that the +Anti-Federalists were determined that New York should not become a +member of the new Union, whatever might be done by the other +States.[445] He had also received information, which led him to +believe that the Governor, Clinton, had in conversation declared the +Union unnecessary; but of this, if true, he could make no public use. +His suspicions were certainly justified by the tendency of the +arguments made use of by the opposition, during the few first days of +the session; for it was the tendency of those arguments to maintain +the idea that New York could very well stand alone, even if the +Constitution should be established by nine States, she refusing to be +one of them. With this view, they pressed the consideration under +which they had all along acted, that the Confederation, if amended, +would be sufficient for all the proper purposes of a general +government; and their plan for such an amendment of the Confederation +was, to provide that its requisitions for money should continue to be +made as they had been, and that Congress should have the new power of +compelling payment by force, when a State had refused to comply with a +requisition. + +Hamilton answered this suggestion with great energy. It is +inseparable, he said, from the disposition of bodies which have a +constitutional power of resistance, to inquire into the merits of a +law. This had ever been the case with the federal requisitions. In +this examination, the States, unfurnished with the lights which +directed the deliberations of the general government, and incapable of +embracing the general interests of the Union, had almost uniformly +weighed the requisitions by their own local interests, and had only +executed them so far as answered their particular convenience or +advantage. But if we have national objects to pursue, we must have +national revenues. If requisitions are made and are not complied with, +what is to be done? To coerce the States would be one of the maddest +projects ever devised. No State would ever suffer itself to be used as +the instrument of coercing another. A federal standing army, then, +must enforce the requisitions, or the federal treasury would be left +without supplies and the government without support. There could be no +cure for this great evil, but to enable the national laws to operate +on individuals, like the laws of the States. To take the old +Confederation as the basis of a new system, and to trust the sword and +the purse to a single assembly organized upon principles so +defective,--giving it the full powers of taxation and the national +forces,--would be to establish a despotism. These considerations +showed clearly that a totally different government, with proper powers +and proper checks and balances, must be established. + +The convention soon afterwards passed to an animated discussion on the +system of representation proposed in the Constitution, and while an +amendment relating to the Senate was pending, on the 24th of June, +Hamilton received intelligence from the East, that on the 21st the +convention of New Hampshire had ratified the Constitution. Up to this +moment, the opposition, while disclaiming earnestly all wish to bring +about a dissolution of the Union, or to prevent the establishment of +some firm and efficient government, had still continued, in every +form, to press a line of argument which tended to produce the +rejection of the Constitution proposed; and it was evident that their +opponents could throw upon them the responsibility of a dissolution of +the Union only by a deduction from the tendency of their reasoning. +But now that the Constitution had been adopted by the number of States +which its provisions required for its establishment, the Federalists +determined that the opposition should publicly meet the issue raised +by the new aspect of affairs, which was to determine whether the State +of New York should or should not place itself out of the pale of the +new confederacy,--whether it should or should not stand in a hostile +attitude towards the nine States which had thus signified their +determination to institute a new government. Accordingly, on the next +day, Chancellor Livingston formally announced in the convention the +intelligence that had been received from New Hampshire, which, he +said, had evidently changed the circumstances of the country and the +ground of the present debate. He declared that the Confederation was +now dissolved. Would they consider the situation of their country? +However some might contemplate disunion without pain, or flatter +themselves that some of the Southern States would form a league with +them, he could not look without horror at the dangers to which any +such confederacy would expose the State of New York. + +This dilemma embarrassed, but did not subdue, the opposition. They +reiterated their denial of a purpose to produce a dissolution of the +Union, doubtless with entire sincerity; but they continued the +argument which was designed to show that the State ought not to adopt +a system dangerous to liberty, under a fear of the situation in which +it might be placed. + +Here, then, the reader should pause for a moment, in order to form a +just appreciation of the course pursued by Hamilton, in this altered +aspect of affairs, when nothing remained to be done but to get the +State of New York, if possible, into the new Union. We have now the +means of knowing precisely how he estimated the chances of succeeding +in this effort. On the 27th, while the discussion was still going on, +he wrote to Madison as follows: "There are some slight symptoms of +relaxation in some of the leaders, which authorizes a gleam of hope, +if you do well; but certainly I think not otherwise."[446] At the same +time, we know that his latest news from Virginia was not +encouraging.[447] + +How easy, then, perhaps natural, it would have been for him to have +abandoned this "gleam of hope,"--to have turned his back upon the +State and all its cabals,--to have left the Anti-Federalists to +determine the fate of New York, and to have transferred himself to +what was then the larger community, the great State of Pennsylvania, +or to any of the other States which had adopted the Constitution! He +must have been received anywhere with the consideration due to his +high reputation, his abilities, his public services, and his +acknowledged patriotism. He must have been regarded, in any State that +had accepted the new government, as a person whose assistance was +indispensable to its success; and so he would have been looked upon by +the main body of the people throughout the new confederacy. He had no +ties of office to bind him to the State of New York. He held one of +her seats in the Congress of the Confederation, but that was a body +which must soon cease to exist. His political opponents had an +undoubted majority in the State. The social ties which had bound him +to her soil could have been severed. He could have left her, +therefore, to the counsels of his adversaries, and could have sought +and found for himself a career of ambition in the new sphere that was +open to receive him. That career would have tempted men of an inferior +mould, and would have seen them yield to the temptation perhaps the +more readily, because the conflicts that would have been inevitable +between rival confederacies would have presented fresh fields for +exertion and personal energy, new excitements and new adventures. It +is, too, a mournfully interesting reflection, that if Hamilton had +then cut himself free from the entanglements of the local politics of +New York by a change of residence, he probably could never have been +drawn into that miserable quarrel with the wretch who in after years +planned his destruction, and who gained by it the execrable +distinction of having taken the most important life that has ever +fallen by the assassination of the duel, since its opportunities for +murder have been known among men. + +But with whatever melancholy interest we may pursue such a suggestion +of what Hamilton might have done, it needs but to be made, in order to +show how far he stood above the reach of such a temptation. From his +first entrance, in boyhood, into public life, his patriotism had +comprehended nothing less than the whole of the United States. +Whatever may be thought of his policy, either before or after the +Constitution was established, no just man will deny its comprehensive +nationality. He now saw that no partial confederacy of the States +could be of any permanent value. He had no favorite theories involved +in the Constitution, no peculiar experiments that he wished to try. He +embraced it, because he believed in its capacity to unite the whole of +the States, to concentrate and harmonize their interests, and to +accomplish national objects of the utmost importance to their welfare. +It could, without doubt, be inaugurated and put into operation without +the concurrence of New York. But to leave that, or any other State +near the geographical centre of the Union, out of the confederacy, +would be to leave its sovereignty and rights exposed to perpetual +collision with the new government. No public or private purpose could +have induced Hamilton to abandon any effort that might prevent such a +result. He still labored, therefore, with those who were associated +with him, to procure an adoption of the Constitution by the State of +New York; and we must bear in mind the vast importance of her action, +and the difficulties with which he had to contend, that we may take a +just view of the concessions to the opposition which he seems at one +stage of the crisis to have been obliged to consider. + +But we must now leave him in the midst of the embarrassments by which +he was surrounded, to follow his messenger, whom he instantly +despatched, on the 24th, with letters to Madison at Richmond, +announcing the news of the ratification by New Hampshire. The courier +passed through the city of New York on the 25th, and reached +Philadelphia on the 26th. The newspapers of the latter city +immediately cried out, "The reign of anarchy is over," and the popular +enthusiasm rose to the highest point. The courier passed on to the +South; but the convention of Virginia had, in fact, ratified the +Constitution before he arrived in Philadelphia. Thus, while New +Hampshire, in the actual order of events, was the ninth State to adopt +the Constitution, yet Virginia herself, so far as the members of her +convention were informed, appeared at the time of their voting to be +the ninth adopting State. It is certain that they acted without any +real knowledge of what had taken place in New Hampshire, although +there may have been random assertions of what nobody at Richmond could +then have known.[448] + +The result was brought about in Virginia by the force of argument, and +because the friends of the Constitution were at last able to reduce +the issue to the single question of previous or subsequent, that is, +of conditional or recommendatory, amendments. As the State appeared +likely to be the ninth State to act, and they could insist that, if +she rejected the Constitution, she must bear the responsibility of +defeating the establishment of the new government,--a consequence +which they could reasonably predict,--they had a high vantage-ground +from which to address the reason and patriotism of the assembly. + +Henry and the other leaders of the opposition fought valiantly to the +last. When the whole subject had been exhausted, the friends of the +Constitution presented the propositions on which they were willing to +rest the action of the State, and which declared, in substance, that +the powers granted under the proposed Constitution are the gift of the +people, and that every power not granted thereby remains with them, +and at their will,--consequently that no right can be abridged, +restrained, or modified by the general government or any of its +departments, except in those instances in which power is given by the +Constitution for those purposes; and that, among other essential +rights, liberty of conscience and of the press cannot be cancelled, +abridged, restrained, or modified, by any authority of the United +States; that the Constitution ought, therefore, to be ratified, but +that whatsoever amendments might be deemed necessary ought to be +recommended to the consideration of the first Congress that should +assemble under the Constitution, to be acted upon according to the +mode prescribed therein. + +Mr. Henry, on the other hand, brought forward a counter project, by +which he proposed to declare that, previous to the ratification of the +Constitution, a Declaration of Rights, asserting and securing from +encroachment the great principles of civil and religious liberty, and +the inalienable rights of the people, together with amendments to the +most exceptionable parts of the Constitution, ought to be referred by +the convention of Virginia to the other States in the American +confederacy for their consideration. + +The issue was thus distinctly made between previous or conditional and +subsequent or unconditional amendments, and made in a form most +favorable to the friends of the Constitution; for it enabled them to +present so vigorously and vividly the consequences of suspending the +inauguration of the new government until the other States could +consider the amendments desired by Virginia, that they procured a +rejection of Mr. Henry's resolution by a majority of eight, and a +ratification of the Constitution by a majority of ten votes. A long +list of amendments, together with a Bill of Rights, was then adopted, +to be presented to Congress for its consideration.[449] + +The conduct of Mr. Henry, when he saw that the adoption of the +Constitution was inevitable, was all that might have been expected +from his patriotic and unselfish character. "If I shall be in the +minority," he said, "I shall have those painful sensations which arise +from a conviction of being overpowered in a good cause. Yet I will be +a peaceable citizen. My head, my hand, and my heart shall be free to +retrieve the loss of liberty, and remove the defects of this system in +a constitutional way. I wish not to go to violence, but will wait with +hopes that the spirit which predominated in the Revolution is not yet +gone, nor the cause of those who are attached to the Revolution yet +lost. I shall, therefore, patiently wait in expectation of seeing this +government so changed as to be compatible with the safety, liberty, +and happiness of the people."[450] This noble and disinterested +patriot lived to find the Constitution all that he wished it to be, +and to enroll himself, in the day of its first serious trial, among +its most vigorous and earnest defenders. + +But some of the members of the opposition were not so discreet. +Immediately after the adjournment of the convention, they prepared an +address to the people, intended to produce an effort to prevent the +inauguration of the new government by a combined arrangement among the +legislatures of the several States. But this paper, which never saw +the light, was rejected by their own party, and the opposition in +Virginia subsided into a general acquiescence in the action of the +convention.[451] + +The ratification of Virginia took place on the 25th of June; the news +of this event was received and published in Philadelphia on the 2d of +July. The press of the city was at once filled with rejoicings over +the action of Virginia. She was the tenth pillar of the temple of +liberty. She was Virginia,--eldest and foremost of the States,--land +of statesmen whose Revolutionary services were as household words in +all America,--birthplace and home of Washington! We need not wonder, +when she had come so tardily, so cautiously, into the support of the +Constitution, that men should have hailed her accession with +enthusiasm. The people of Philadelphia had been for some time +preparing a public demonstration, in honor of the adoption of the +Constitution by nine States. Now that Virginia was added to the +number, they determined that all possible magnificence and splendor +should be given to this celebration, and they chose for it the +anniversary day of the National Independence. + +A taste for allegory appears to have been quite prevalent among the +people of the United States at this period. Accordingly, the +Philadelphia procession of July 4, 1788, was filled with elaborate and +emblematic representations. It was a long pageant of banners, of +trades, and devices. A decorated car bore the Constitution framed as a +banner and hung upon a staff. Then another decorated car carried the +American flag and the flags of all friendly nations. Then followed the +judges in their robes, and all the public bodies, preceding a grand +federal edifice, which was carried on a carriage drawn by ten horses. +On the floor of this edifice were seated, in chairs, ten gentlemen, +representing the citizens of the United States at large, to whom the +Federal Constitution had been committed before its ratification. When +it arrived at "Union Green," they gave up their seats to ten others +representing the ten States which had ratified the instrument. The +federal ship, "The Union," came next, followed by all the trades, +plying their various crafts upon elevated platforms, with their +several emblems and mottoes, strongly expressing confidence in the +protection that would be afforded under the Constitution to all the +forms of American manufactures and mechanic arts. Ten vessels paraded +on the Delaware, each with a broad white flag at its masthead, bearing +the name of one of the ten States in gold letters; and, as if to +combine the ideas both of the absence and the presence of the ten +States, ten carrier-pigeons were let off from the printers' platform, +each with a small package bearing "the ode of the day" to one of the +ten rejoicing and sympathizing States. + +Thus did ingenuity and mechanical skill exert themselves in quaint +devices and exhibitions, to portray, to personify, and to celebrate +the vast social consequences of an event which had then no parallel in +the history of any other country,--the free and voluntary adoption by +the people of a written constitution of government framed by the +agents and representatives of the people themselves. The carrier birds +are not known to have literally performed their tasks, but as rapidly +as horse and man could carry it, the news from Virginia pressed on to +the North, and reached Hamilton at Poughkeepsie on the 8th of July. + +It found him still surrounded by the same difficulties that existed +when he received the result of the convention of New Hampshire. The +opposition had relaxed none of their efforts to prevent the adoption +of the Constitution; they had only become somewhat divided respecting +the method to be pursued for its defeat. Some of them were in favor of +conditions precedent, or previous amendments; some, of conditions +subsequent, or the proposal of amendments upon the condition that, if +they should not be adopted within a certain time, the State should be +at liberty to withdraw from the Union; and all of them were +determined, in case the Constitution should be ratified, to carry +constructive declarations of its meaning and powers as far as +possible. Hamilton was conscious that the chief danger to which the +Constitution itself was now exposed, was that a general concurrence in +injudicious recommendations might seriously wound its power of +taxation, by causing a recurrence, in some shape, to the system of +requisitions. The danger to which the State of New York was exposed, +was that it might not become a member of the new Union, in any form. + +The leading Federalists who were united with Hamilton in the effort to +prevent such a disastrous issue of this convention were John Jay, the +Chancellor Robert R. Livingston, and James Duane. A few days after the +intelligence from New Hampshire was received, these gentlemen held a +consultation as to the most effectual method of encountering the +objections made to the general power of taxation that would be +conferred by the Constitution upon the general government. The +legislative history of the State, from 1780 to 1782, embraced a series +of official acts and documents, showing that the State had been +compelled to sustain a very large share of the burden of the +Revolutionary war; that requisitions had been unable to call forth the +resources of the country; and that, in the judgment of the State, +officially and solemnly declared in 1782, and concurred in by those +who now resisted the establishment of the Constitution, it was +necessary that the Union should possess other sources of revenue. The +Federalists now resolved that these documents be formally laid before +the convention, and Hamilton undertook to bring them forward. + +On the 27th of June, he commenced the most elaborate and important of +the speeches which he made in this assembly, for the purpose of +showing that in the construction of a government the great objects to +be attained are a free and pure representation, and a proper balance +between the different branches of administration; and that when these +are obtained, all the powers necessary to answer, in the most ample +manner, the purposes of government, may be bestowed with entire +safety. He proceeded to argue, not only that a general power of +taxation was essential, but that, under a system so complex as that of +the Constitution,--so skilfully endowed with the requisite forms of +representation and division of executive and legislative power,--it +was next to impossible that this authority should be abused. In the +course of this speech, and for the purpose of showing that the State +had suffered great distresses during the war from the mode of raising +revenues by requisitions, he called for the reading at the clerk's +table of a series of documents exhibiting this fact. Governor Clinton +resisted their introduction, but they were read; and Hamilton and his +friends then contended, that they proved beyond dispute that the State +had once been in great peril for want of an energetic general +government. + +This movement produced a warm altercation between the leading +gentlemen on the opposite sides of the house. But while it threw a +grave responsibility upon the opposition, it did not conquer them; and +by the day on which the intelligence from Virginia arrived, they had +heaped amendments upon the table on almost every clause and feature of +the Constitution, some one or more of which it was highly probable +they would succeed in making a condition of its acceptance. + +This critical situation of affairs led Hamilton to consider, for a +short time, whether it might not be necessary to accede to a plan, by +which the State should reserve the right to recede from the Union, in +case its amendments should not have been decided upon, in one of the +modes pointed out by the Constitution, within five or six years. He +saw the objections to this course; and he was determined to leave no +effort untried to bring the opposition to an unqualified ratification. +But the danger of a rejection of the Constitution was extreme; and as +a choice of evils, he thought that, if the State could in the first +instance be received into the Union under such a reserved right to +withdraw, succeeding events, by the adoption of all proper and +necessary amendments, would make the reservation unimportant, because +such amendments would satisfy the more reasonable part of the +opposition, and would thus break up their party. But he determined not +to incur the hazard of this step upon his own judgment alone, or that +of any one else having a personal interest in the question; and +accordingly, on the 12th of July, he despatched a letter to Madison, +who was then attending in Congress at the city of New York, asking +his opinion upon the possibility of receiving the State into the Union +in this form.[452] + +Madison instantly replied, that, in his opinion, this would be a +conditional ratification, and would not make the State of New York a +member of the new Union; that the Constitution required an adoption +_in toto_ and for ever; and that any condition must vitiate the +ratification of any State.[453] + +Before this reply could have been received at Poughkeepsie, the +Federalists had introduced their proposition for an unconditional +ratification, and this was followed by that of the Anti-Federalists +for a conditional one. The former was rejected by the convention on +the 16th of July. The opposition then brought forward a new form of +conditional ratification, with a Bill of Rights prefixed, and with +amendments subjoined. After a long debate, the Federalists succeeded, +on the 23d of July, in procuring a vote to change this proposition, so +that, in place of the words "on condition," the people of the State +would be made to declare that they assented to and ratified the +Constitution "in full confidence" that, until a general convention +should be called for proposing amendments, Congress would not exercise +certain powers which the Constitution conferred upon them. This +alteration was carried by thirty-one votes against twenty-seven. A +list of amendments was then agreed upon, and a circular letter was +adopted, to be sent to all the States, recommending a general +convention; and on Saturday, the 26th of July, the ratification, as +thus framed, with the Bill of Rights and the amendments, was carried +by thirty affirmative against twenty-seven negative votes.[454] + +By this slender majority of her delegates, and under circumstances of +extreme peril of an opposite decision, did the State of New York +accept the Constitution of the United States, and become a member of +the new government. The facts of the case, and the importance of her +being brought into the new Union, afford a sufficient vindication of +the course pursued by the Federalists in her convention. But it is +necessary, before closing the history of these events, to consider a +complaint that was made at the time, by some of the most zealous of +their political associates in other quarters, and which touched the +correctness of their motives in assenting to the circular letter +demanding a general convention for the amendment of the Constitution. + +That there was danger lest another general convention might result in +serious injury to the Constitution, perhaps in its overthrow, was a +point on which there was probably no difference of opinion among the +Federalists of that day. Washington regarded it in this light; and +there is no reason to doubt that Hamilton and Jay, and many others of +the friends of the Constitution, would have felt great anxiety about +its result. But there were some members of the Federal party, in +several of the States, who do not seem to have fully appreciated the +importance of conceding to the opposition, at the time of the adoption +of the Constitution, the use of any and every form of obtaining +amendments which the Constitution itself recognized. This was true +everywhere, where serious dissatisfaction existed, and it was +especially true in the State of New York. It was impossible to procure +a ratification in that State, without an equivalent concession; and if +the Federal leaders in that convention assented to the proposal of a +course of amending the Constitution for which the instrument itself +provided, however ineligible it might be, their justification is to be +found in the circumstances of their situation. Washington himself, +when all was over, wrote to Mr. Jay as follows:--"Although I could +scarcely conceive it possible, after ten States had adopted the +Constitution, that New York, separated as it is from the others, and +peculiarly divided in sentiments as it is, would withdraw from the +Union, yet, considering the great majority which appeared to cling +together in the convention, and the decided temper of the leaders, I +did not, I confess, see how it was to be avoided. The exertion of +those who were able to effect this great work must have been equally +arduous and meritorious."[455] + +But others were not so just. The Federalists of the New York +convention were complained of by some of their friends for having +assented to the circular letter, for the purpose of procuring a +ratification at any price, in order to secure the establishment of the +new government at the city of New York. It was said that the State had +better have remained out of the Union, than to have taken a course +which would prove more injurious than her rejection would have +done.[456] + +With respect to these complaints and the accompanying charge, it is +only necessary to say, in the first place, that Hamilton and Jay and +their associates believed that there was far less danger to be +apprehended from a mere call for a second general convention, than +from a rejection of the Constitution by the State of New York; and +they had to choose between these alternatives. The result shows that +they chose rightly; for the assembling of a general convention was +superseded by the action of Congress upon the amendments proposed by +the States. In the second place, the alleged motive did not exist. We +now know that Hamilton certainly, and we may presume his friends also, +did not expect or desire the new government to be more than +temporarily placed at the city of New York. He himself saw the +impolicy of establishing it permanently either at that place or at +Philadelphia. He regarded its temporary establishment at the city of +New York as the certain means of carrying it farther south, and of +securing its final and permanent place somewhere upon the banks of the +Delaware within the limits of New Jersey, or upon the banks of the +Potomac within the limits of Virginia.[457] + +The people of the city of New York had waited long for the decision of +their State convention. They had postponed several times their +intended celebration in honor of the Constitution, which, as it was to +be the last, they determined should be the most imposing of these +ceremonies. When the day at length came, on the 5th of August, 1788, +it saw a population whose mutual confidence and joy had absorbed every +narrow and bigoted distinction in that noblest of all the passions +that a people can exhibit,--love of country. It were a vain and +invidious task to attempt to determine, from the contemporary +descriptions, whether this display exceeded that of all the other +cities in variety and extent. But there was one feature of it so +striking, so creditable to the people of the city of New York, that it +should not be passed over. It consisted in the honors they paid to +Hamilton. + +He must have experienced on that day the best reward that a statesman +can ever find; for there is no purer, no higher pleasure for a +conscientious statesman, than to know, by demonstrations of public +gratitude, that the humblest of the people for whose welfare he has +labored appreciate and are thankful for his services. Public life is +often represented, and often found, to be a thankless sphere, for men +of the greatest capacity and the highest patriotism; and the +accidents, the defeats, the changes, the party passions and +obstructions of the political world, in a free government, frequently +make it so. But mankind are neither deliberately heartless nor +systematically unthankful; and it has sometimes happened, in popular +governments, that statesmen of the first order of mind and character +have, while living, received the most unequivocal proofs of feeling +directly from the popular heart, while the sum total of their lives +appears in history to be wanting in evidences of that personal success +which is attained in a constant triumph over opponents. Such an +expression of popular gratitude and sympathy it was now the fortune of +Hamilton to receive. + +The people of the city did not stop to consider, on this occasion, +whether he was entitled, in comparison with all the other public men +in the United States, to be regarded as the chief author of the +blessings which they now anticipated from the Constitution. And why +should they? He was their fellow-citizen,--their own. They remembered +the day when they saw him, a mere boy, training his artillerymen in +their public park, for the coming battles of the Revolution. They +remembered the youthful eloquence and the more than youthful power +with which he encountered the pestilent and slavish doctrines of their +Tories. They thought of his career in the army, when the extraordinary +maturity, depth, and vigor of his genius, and his great +accomplishments, supplied to Washington, in some of the most trying +periods of his vast and prolonged responsibility, the assistance that +Washington most needed. They recollected his career in Congress, when +his comprehensive intellect was always alert, to bear the country +forward to measures and ideas that would concentrate its powers and +resources in some national system. They called to mind how he had kept +their own State from wandering quite away into the paths of +disunion,--how he had enlightened, invigorated, and purified public +opinion by his wise and energetic counsels,--how he had led them to +understand the true happiness and glory of their country,--how he had +labored to bring about those events which had now produced the +Constitution,--how he had shown to them the harmony and success that +might be predicted of its operation, and had taught them to accept +what was good, without petulantly demanding what individual opinion +might claim as perfect. + +What was it to them, therefore, on this day of public rejoicing, that +there might be in his policy more of consolidation than in the policy +of others,--that he was said to have in his politics too much that was +national and too little that was local,--that some had done as much as +he in the actual construction of the system which they were now to +celebrate? Such controversies might be for history, or for the +contests of administration that were soon to arise. On this day, they +were driven out of men's thoughts by the glow of that public +enthusiasm which banishes the spirit of party, and touches and opens +the inmost fountains of patriotism. Hamilton had rendered a series of +great services to his country, which had culminated in the adoption of +the Constitution by the State of New York; and they were now +acknowledged from the very hearts of those who best knew his motives +and best understood his character. + +The people themselves, divided into their respective trades, evidently +undertook the demonstrations in his honor, and gave them an emphasis +which they could have derived from no other source. They bore his +image aloft upon banners. They placed the Constitution in his right +hand, and the Confederation in his left. They depicted Fame, with her +trumpet, crowning him with laurels. They emblazoned his name upon the +miniature frigate, the federal ship of state. They anticipated the +administration of the first President, by uniting on the national flag +the figure of Washington and the figure of Hamilton.[458] All that +ingenuity, all that affection, that popular pride and gratitude could +do, to honor a public benefactor, was repeated again and again through +the long line of five thousand citizens, of all orders and conditions, +which stretched away from the shores of that beautiful bay, where +ocean ascends into river and river is lost in ocean,--where Commerce +then wore her holiday attire, to prefigure the magnificence and power +which she was to derive from the Constitution of the United States. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[429] Notice of Henry, in the National Portrait Gallery of +Distinguished Americans, Vol. II. Mr. Jefferson has said that Henry's +power as a popular orator was greater than that of any man he had ever +heard, and that Henry "appeared to speak as Homer wrote." (Jefferson's +Works, I. 4.) + +[430] It is said in the newspapers of that period that Henry was on +his legs in one speech for seven hours. I think it must have been the +one from which I have made the abstract in the text. But he made a +great many speeches, quite as earnest. + +[431] There has been, I am aware, a modern scepticism concerning +Patrick Henry's abilities; but I cannot share it. He was not a man of +much information, and he had no great breadth of mind. But he must +have been, not only a very able debater, but a good parliamentary +tactician. The manner in which he carried on the opposition to the +Constitution in the convention of Virginia, for nearly a whole month, +shows that he possessed other powers besides those of great natural +eloquence. + +[432] Elliot, III. 152, Debates in the Virginia Convention. + +[433] Under date of February 7, 1788, Mr. Jefferson wrote from Paris, +in a private letter to a gentleman in Virginia, as follows:--"I wish, +with all my soul, that the nine first conventions may accept the new +Constitution, because this will secure to us the good it contains, +which I think great and important. But I equally wish that the four +latest conventions, whichever they be, may refuse to accede to it till +a Declaration of Rights be annexed. This would probably command the +offer of such a Declaration, and thus give to the whole fabric, +perhaps, as much perfection as any one of that kind ever had. By a +Declaration of Rights, I mean one which shall stipulate freedom of +religion, freedom of the press, freedom of commerce against +monopolies, trial by juries in all cases, no suspensions of the +_habeas corpus_, no standing armies. These are fetters against doing +evil, which no honest government should decline. There is another +strong feature in the new Constitution which I as strongly dislike. +That is, the perpetual re-eligibility of the President. Of this, I +expect no amendment at present, because I do not see that anybody has +objected to it on your side the water. But it will be productive of +cruel distress to our country, even in your day and mine. The +importance to France and England to have our government in the hands +of a friend or foe, will occasion their interference by money, and +even by arms. Our President will be of much more consequence to them +than a king of Poland. We must take care, however, that neither this +nor any other objection to the new form produces a schism in our +Union. That would be an incurable evil, because near friends falling +out never reunite cordially; whereas, all of us going together, we +shall be sure to cure the evils of our new Constitution before they do +great harm." (Jefferson's Works, II. 355.) That Mr. Jefferson intended +this letter should be used as it was in the convention of Virginia, is +not probable; but it would seem from the care he took to state a plan +of proceeding in the adoption of the Constitution, that he intended +his suggestions should be known. His subsequent opinion will be found +in a note below. + +[434] Alluding, evidently, to Washington. + +[435] See the speeches of Pendleton and Madison, in reply to Henry. +Elliot, III. 304, 329. + +[436] Elliot, III. 314. + +[437] On the 27th of May, 1788, Mr. Jefferson wrote from Paris to +Colonel Carrington, as follows:--"I learn with great pleasure the +progress of the new Constitution. Indeed, I have presumed it would +gain on the public mind, as I confess it has on my own. At first, +though I saw that the great mass and groundwork was good, I disliked +many appendages. Reflection and discussion have cleared off most of +those. You have satisfied me as to the query I had put to you about +the right of direct taxation. My first wish was that nine States would +adopt it, and that the others might, by holding off, produce the +necessary amendments. But the plan of Massachusetts is far preferable, +and will, I hope, be followed by those who are yet to decide," &c. +(Jefferson's Works, II. 404.) Colonel Carrington, the person to whom +this letter was addressed, was a member of Congress, and received it +at New York, about the 2d of July, when it was seen by Madison. (See a +letter from Madison to E. Randolph of that date, among the Madison +papers. Elliot, V. 573.) + +[438] See an account of this matter, _ante_, Vol. I. Book III. Chap. +V. pp. 309-327. + +[439] They meant the four New England States and New York, +Pennsylvania, and Maryland. New Jersey and Delaware were supposed to +be with the four Southern States on this question. + +[440] Ten would be two thirds of the constitutional quorum of +fourteen; so that the argument supposed only a quorum to be present. + +[441] See Mr. Madison's explanation in the convention of Virginia. +Elliot, III. 346. + +[442] _Ante_, Book III. Chap. V., Vol. I. pp. 324-327. + +[443] Debates in the Virginia Convention, Elliot, III. 344-347. + +[444] He thought at this moment that if the Constitution should be +lost, the Mississippi question would be the cause. The members from +Kentucky were then generally hostile. (See a letter from Madison to +Hamilton, of June 16th, Hamilton's Works, I. 457.) + +[445] See his correspondence with Madison, Works, I. pp. 450-469. + +[446] Works, I. 462. + +[447] See the latest letter which he had then received from Madison. +Ibid. 461. + +[448] It has been supposed that this was not so, but that Hamilton's +messenger arrived at Richmond before the final action of the Virginia +convention, and so that the decision of New Hampshire had an important +influence. I think this is clearly a mistake. I have traced the +progress of the messenger in the newspapers of that time, and find his +arrival at New York and Philadelphia chronicled as it is given in the +text. The dates are therefore decisive. It appears also from Mr. +Madison's correspondence with Hamilton, that he did not receive the +despatch about New Hampshire until the 31st. (Hamilton's Works, I. +463.) The ratification passed the Virginia convention on the 25th, and +that body was dissolved on the 27th. There is no trace in the Virginia +debates of any authentic news from New Hampshire. On the contrary, it +was assumed by one of the speakers, Mr. Innes, on the day of their +ratification, that the Constitution then stood adopted by _eight_ +States. (Elliot, III. 636.) + +[449] The form of ratification embraced the recitals given in the text +respecting the powers of Congress. It was adopted by a vote of 89 to +79, on the 25th of June, 1788. I do not go into the particular +consideration of the amendments proposed by several of the State +conventions, because the present work is confined to the origin, the +formation, and the adoption of the Constitution, and no State that +ratified the instrument proposed by the national Convention made +amendments a condition. The examination of the amendments proposed, +therefore, belongs to the history of the Constitution subsequent to +its inauguration. They may all be found in the Appendix to the +thirteenth volume of the Journals of the Old Congress. + +[450] Debates in Virginia Convention, Elliot, III. 652. + +[451] Madison's letters to Hamilton, Works of Hamilton, I. 462, 463. + +[452] Letter to Madison, Works of Hamilton, I. 464. + +[453] Ibid. 465. + +[454] It was reported in the newspapers of that period that the +Constitution was adopted in this convention by 30 yeas against 25 +nays. But the official record gives the several votes as they are +stated in the text; from which it appears that, on the critical +question of a conditional or unconditional ratification, the majority +was only 2. In truth, the ratification of New York barely escapes the +objection of being a qualified one, if it does in fact escape it. + +[455] Works of Washington, IX. 408. + +[456] Madison's letter to Washington, August 24, 1788, Works of +Washington, IX. 549. + +[457] See his letter to Governor Livingston of New Jersey, August 29, +1788, Works, I. 471. + +[458] Some of the most elaborate of these devices were borne by the +"Block and Pump Makers" and the "Tallow-Chandlers." + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +ACTION OF NORTH CAROLINA AND RHODE ISLAND.--CONCLUSION. + + +Thus had eleven States, at the end of July, 1788, unconditionally +adopted the Constitution; five of them proposing amendments for the +consideration of the first Congress that would assemble under it, and +one of the five calling for a second general convention to act upon +the amendments desired. Two other States, however, North Carolina and +Rhode Island, still remained aloof. + +The legislature of North Carolina, in December, 1787, had ordered a +State convention, which assembled July 21, 1788, five days before the +convention of New York ratified the Constitution. In this body the +Anti-Federalists obtained a large majority. They permitted the whole +subject to be debated until the 2d of August; still it had been +manifest from the first that they would not allow of an unconditional +ratification. They knew what had been the result in New Hampshire and +Virginia; but the decision of New York had, of course, not reached +them. Their determination was not, however, to be affected by the +certainty that the new government would be organized. Their purpose +was not to enter the new Union, until the amendments which they +desired had been obtained. They assumed that the Congress of the +Confederation would not provide for the organization of the new +government until another general convention had been held; or, if they +did, that such a convention would be called by the new Congress;--and +it appeared to them to be the most effectual mode of bringing about +one or the other of these courses, to remain for the present in an +independent position. The inconvenience and hazard attending such a +position do not seem to have had much weight with them, when compared +with what they regarded as the danger of an unconditional assent to +the Constitution as it then stood. + +The Federalists contended strenuously for the course pursued by the +other States which had proposed amendments, but they were overpowered +by great numbers, and the convention was dissolved, after adopting a +resolution declaring that a Bill of Rights, and certain amendments, +ought to be laid before Congress and the convention that might be +called for amending the Constitution, previous to its ratification by +the State of North Carolina.[459] But in order, if possible, to place +the State in a position to accede to the Constitution at some future +time, and to participate fully in its benefits, they also declared, +that, having thought proper neither to ratify nor to reject it, and as +the new Congress would probably lay an impost on goods imported into +the States which had adopted it, they recommended the legislature of +North Carolina to lay a similar impost on goods imported into the +State, and to appropriate the money arising from it to the use of +Congress.[460] + +The elements which formed the opposition to the Constitution in other +States received in Rhode Island an intense development and +aggravation, from the peculiar spirit of the people, and from certain +local causes, the history of which has never been fully written, and +is now only to be gathered from scattered sources. Constitutional +government was exposed to great perils, in that day, throughout the +country, in consequence of the false notions of State sovereignty and +of public liberty which prevailed everywhere. But it seemed as if all +these causes of opposition and distrust had centred in Rhode Island, +and had there found a theatre on which to exhibit themselves in their +worst form. Fortunately, this theatre was so small and peculiar, as to +make the display of these ideas extremely conspicuous. + +The Colony of Rhode Island was established upon the broadest +principles of religious and civil freedom. Its early founders and +rulers, flying from religious persecution in the other New England +Colonies, had transmitted to their descendants a natural jealousy of +other communities, and a high spirit of individual and public +independence. In the progress of time, as not infrequently happens in +such communities, the principles on which the State was founded were +falsely interpreted and applied, until, in the minds of a large part +of the people, they had come to mean a simple aversion to all but the +most democratic form of government. No successful appeal to this +hereditary feeling could be made during the early part of the +Revolution, against the interests and influence of the confederacy, +because the early and local effect of the Revolution in fact coincided +with it. But when the Revolution was fairly accomplished, and the +State had assumed its position of absolute sovereignty, what may be +called the extreme _individualism_ of the people, and their old +unfortunate relations with the rest of New England, made them +singularly reluctant to part with any power to the confederated +States. The manifestations of this feeling we have seen all along, +from the first establishment of the Confederation down to the period +at which we are now arrived. + +The local causes which gave to this tendency its utmost activity, at +the time of the formation of the Constitution of the United States, +were the following. + +First, there had existed in the State, for a considerable period, a +despotic and well-organized party, known as the paper-money party. +This faction had long controlled the legislation of the State, by +furnishing the agricultural classes, in the shape of paper money, with +the only circulating medium they had ever had in any large quantity; +and they were determined to extinguish the debt of the State by this +species of currency, which the legislature could, and did, depreciate +at pleasure. + +Secondly, there existed, to a great and ludicrous extent, a constant +antagonism between town and country,--between the agricultural and the +mercantile or trading classes; and this hostility was especially +violent and active between the people of the towns of Providence and +Newport and the people of the surrounding and the more remote rural +districts.[461] The paper-money question divided the inhabitants of +the State in the same way. The loss of this circulation would deprive +the agricultural classes of their sole currency. They kept their +paper-money party, therefore, in a state of constant activity; and +when the Constitution of the United States appeared, this was an +organized and triumphant party, ready for any new contest. Finally, +there prevailed among the country party a notion that the maritime +advantages of the State ought in some way to be made use of, for +obtaining better terms with the general government than could be had +under the Constitution, and that by some such means funds could be +obtained for paying their most urgent debts. + +If we may judge of the spirit and the acts of the majority of the +people of Rhode Island, at this time, by the manner in which they were +looked upon throughout the rest of the Union, no language of censure +can be too strong to be applied to them. They were regarded and spoken +of everywhere, among the Federalists, with contempt and abhorrence. +Even the opposition in other States, in all their arguments against +the Constitution, never ventured to defend the people of Rhode Island. +Ridicule and scorn were heaped upon them from all quarters of the +country, and ardent zealots of the Federal press urged the adoption of +the advice which they said the Grand Seignior had given to the king of +Spain, with respect to the refractory States of Holland, namely, to +send his men with shovels and pickaxes, and throw them all into the +sea. Such an undertaking, we may suppose, might have proved as +difficult on this, as it would have been on the other side of the +Atlantic. But however this might have been, it is probable that the +natural effect of their conduct on the minds of men in other States, +and the treatment they received, reacted upon the people of Rhode +Island, and made them still more tenacious and persistent in their +wrongful course. + +But we need not go out of the State itself, to find proof that a +majority of its people were at this time violent, arbitrary, and +unenlightened, both as to their true interests and as to the +principles of public honesty. Determined to adhere to their +paper-money system, they did not pause to consider and to discuss the +great questions respecting the Constitution,--its bearing upon the +welfare of the States,--its effect upon public liberty and social +order,--the necessity for its amendment in certain particulars,--which +led, in the conventions of the other States, to some of the most +important debates that the subjects of government and free +institutions have ever produced. Indeed, they resolved to stifle all +such discussions at once; or, at any rate, to prevent them from being +had in an assembly whose proceedings would be known to the world. When +the General Assembly received the Constitution, at their session in +October, 1787, they directed it to be published and circulated among +the inhabitants of the State. In February, 1788, instead of calling a +convention, they referred the adoption of the Constitution to the +freemen in their several town meetings, for the purpose of having it +rejected. There were at this time a little more than four thousand +legal voters in the State. The Federalists, a small minority, +indignant at the course of the legislature, generally withdrew from +the meetings and refused to vote. The result was, that the people of +the State appeared to be nearly unanimous in rejecting the +Constitution.[462] + +The freemen of the towns of Providence and Newport, thereupon +presented petitions to the General Assembly, complaining of the +inconvenience of acting upon the proposed Constitution in meetings in +which the people of the seaport towns and the people of the country +could not hear and answer each other's arguments, or agree upon the +amendments that it might be desirable to propose, and praying for a +State convention. Their application was refused, and Rhode Island +remained in this position, at the time when the question of organizing +the new government came before the Congress of the Confederation, in +July, 1788. + +Better counsels prevailed with her people, at a later period, and the +same redeeming virtue and good sense were at length triumphant, which, +in still more recent trials, have enabled her to overcome error, and +party passion, and the false notions of liberty that have sometimes +prevailed within her borders. As the stranger now traverses her little +territory, in the journey of a day, and beholds her ample enjoyment of +all civil and religious blessings,--her busy towns, her fruitful +fields, her fair seat of learning, crowning her thriving capital, her +free, happy, and prosperous people, her noble waters where she sits +enthroned upon her lovely isles,--and remembers her ancient and her +recent history, he cannot fail, in his prayer for her welfare, to +breathe the hope that an escape from great social perils may be found +for her and for all of us, in the future, as it has been in the past. + +But the attitudes taken by North Carolina and Rhode Island--although +in truth quite different and taken from very different motives--placed +the Union in a new crisis, involving the Constitution in great danger +of being defeated, notwithstanding its adoption by more than nine +States. Both of them were members of the existing confederacy; both +had a right to vote on all questions coming before the Congress of +that confederacy; and it was to this body that the national +Convention itself had looked for the initiatory measures necessary to +organize the new government under the Constitution. The question +whether that government should be organized at all, was necessarily +involved with the question as to the place where it should be directed +to assemble and to exercise its functions. This latter topic had often +been a source of dissension between the States; and there was much +danger lest the votes of North Carolina and Rhode Island, in the +Congress of the Confederation, by being united with the votes of +States opposed to the selection of the place that might be named as +the seat of the new government, might prevent the Constitution from +being established at all. + + * * * * * + +But now, the pen that has thus traced these great events, and has +sought to describe them in their true relations to the social welfare +of the American people, must seek repose. How the Constitution was +inaugurated,--by whom and upon what principles it was put into +operation,--how and why it was amended or altered,--when and under +what circumstances the two remaining States accepted its +benefits,--what development and what direction it received from the +generation of statesmen who made and established it,--belongs to the +next epoch in our political history, the Administration of +Washington. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[459] This resolution was adopted August 2, 1788, by 184 yeas to 84 +nays. North Carolina Debates, Elliot, IV. 250, 251. + +[460] North Carolina Debates, Elliot, IV. 250, 251. + +[461] The march of the country people upon Providence, on the 4th of +July, 1788, and the manner in which they compelled the inhabitants of +the town to abandon their purpose of celebrating the adoption of the +Constitution by nine States,--dictating even their toasts and +salutes,--reads more like a page in Diedrich Knickerbocker's History +of New York than like anything else. But it is a veracious as well as +a most amusing story. (See Staples's Annals of Providence, pp. +329-335.) + +[462] There were 2,708 votes thrown against it, and 232 in its favor. +This occurred in March, 1788. + + + + +APPENDIX. + + +NOTE + +ON THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE ORDINANCE OF 1787. + +(See page 344, _ante_.) + +When writing this volume, I prepared an elaborate note, for the +purpose of proving that the Ordinance of 1787 was drawn up by Nathan +Dane. The subsequent publication by Mr. Charles King, of New York, of +an autograph letter of Mr. Dane's to his father, the Hon. Rufus King, +written a few days after the passage of the Ordinance, put an end to +all possibility of controversy on this subject, and made it +unnecessary for me to burden my readers with a discussion of Mr. +Dane's claim to be regarded as the author of that instrument. + +The following sentence in Mr. Dane's letter to Mr. King is decisive of +the point which has sometimes been controverted:-- + + "When I drew the Ordinance, (which passed, a few words + excepted, as I originally formed it,) I had no idea the + States would agree to the sixth article, prohibiting slavery, + as only Massachusetts, of the Eastern States, was present, + and therefore omitted it in the draft; but finding the House + favorably disposed on the subject, after we had completed the + other parts, I moved the article, which was agreed to without + opposition." + + +FIRST DRAFT OF THE CONSTITUTION, + +AS REPORTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL. + + MONDAY, _August 6_. + +_In Convention._--Mr. RUTLEDGE delivered in the report of the +committee of detail, as follows,--a printed copy being at the same +time furnished to each member:-- + + We, the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, + Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New + York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, + North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, + declare, and establish the following Constitution for the + government of ourselves and our posterity:-- + + ARTICLE I.--The style of the government shall be, "The United + States of America." + + ART. II.--The government shall consist of supreme + legislative, executive, and judicial powers. + + ART. III.--The legislative power shall be vested in a + Congress, to consist of two separate and distinct bodies of + men, a House of Representatives and a Senate; each of which + shall in all cases have a negative on the other. The + legislature shall meet on the first Monday in December in + every year. + + ART. IV.--Sect. 1. The members of the House of + Representatives shall be chosen, every second year, by the + people of the several States comprehended within this Union. + The qualifications of the electors shall be the same, from + time to time, as those of the electors, in the several + States, of the most numerous branch of their own + legislatures. + + Sect. 2. Every member of the House of Representatives shall + be of the age of twenty-five years at least; shall have been + a citizen in the United States for at least three years + before his election; and shall be, at the time of his + election, a resident of the State in which he shall be + chosen. + + Sect. 3. The House of Representatives shall, at its first + formation, and until the number of citizens and inhabitants + shall be taken in the manner hereinafter described, consist + of sixty-five members, of whom three shall be chosen in New + Hampshire, eight in Massachusetts, one in Rhode Island and + Providence Plantations, five in Connecticut, six in New York, + four in New Jersey, eight in Pennsylvania, one in Delaware, + six in Maryland, ten in Virginia, five in North Carolina, + five in South Carolina, and three in Georgia. + + Sect. 4. As the proportions of numbers in different States + will alter from time to time; as some of the States may + hereafter be divided; as others may be enlarged by addition + of territory; as two or more States may be united; as new + States will be erected within the limits of the United + States,--the legislature shall, in each of these cases, + regulate the number of representatives by the number of + inhabitants, according to the provisions hereinafter made, at + the rate of one for every forty thousand. + + Sect. 5. All bills for raising or appropriating money, and + for fixing the salaries of the officers of government, shall + originate in the House of Representatives, and shall not be + altered or amended by the Senate. No money shall be drawn + from the public treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations + that shall originate in the House of Representatives. + + Sect. 6. The House of Representatives shall have the sole + power of impeachment. It shall choose its speaker and other + officers. + + Sect. 7. Vacancies in the House of Representatives shall be + supplied by writs of election from the executive authority of + the State in the representation from which they shall happen. + + ART. V.--Sect. 1. The Senate of the United States shall be + chosen by the legislatures of the several States. Each + legislature shall choose two members. Vacancies may be + supplied by the executive until the next meeting of the + legislature. Each member shall have one vote. + + Sect. 2. The senators shall be chosen for six years; but + immediately after the first election, they shall be divided, + by lot, into three classes, as nearly as may be, numbered + one, two, and three. The seats of the members of the first + class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year; + of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year; of + the third class at the expiration of the sixth year; so that + a third part of the members may be chosen every second year. + + Sect. 3. Every member of the Senate shall be of the age of + thirty years at least; shall have been a citizen in the + United States for at least four years before his election; + and shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the + State for which he shall be chosen. + + Sect. 4. The Senate shall choose its own President and other + officers. + + ART. VI.--Sect. 1. The times, and places, and manner, of + holding the elections of the members of each House, shall be + prescribed by the legislature of each State; but their + provisions concerning them may, at any time, be altered by + the legislature of the United States. + + Sect. 2. The legislature of the United States shall have + authority to establish such uniform qualifications of the + members of each House, with regard to property, as to the + said legislature shall seem expedient. + + Sect. 3. In each House a majority of the members shall + constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may + adjourn from day to day. + + Sect. 4. Each House shall be the judge of the elections, + returns, and qualifications of its own members. + + Sect. 5. Freedom of speech and debate in the legislature + shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place + out of the legislature; and the members of each House shall, + in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the + peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at + Congress, and in going to and returning from it. + + Sect. 6. Each House may determine the rules of its + proceedings; may punish its members for disorderly behavior; + and may expel a member. + + Sect. 7. The House of Representatives, and the Senate when it + shall be acting in a legislative capacity, shall keep a + journal of their proceedings; and shall, from time to time, + publish them; and the yeas and nays of the members of each + House, on any question, shall, at the desire of one fifth + part of the members present, be entered on the Journal. + + Sect. 8. Neither House, without the consent of the other, + shall adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other + place than that at which the two Houses are sitting. But this + regulation shall not extend to the Senate when it shall + exercise the powers mentioned in the ---- Article. + + Sect. 9. The members of each House shall be ineligible to, + and incapable of holding, any office under the authority of + the United States, during the time for which they shall + respectively be elected; and the members of the Senate shall + be ineligible to, and incapable of holding, any such office + for one year afterwards. + + Sect. 10. The members of each House shall receive a + compensation for their services, to be ascertained and paid + by the State in which they shall be chosen. + + Sect. 11. The enacting style of the laws of the United States + shall be, "Be it enacted, and it is hereby enacted, by the + House of Representatives, and by the Senate of the United + States, in Congress assembled." + + Sect. 12. Each House shall possess the right of originating + bills, except in the cases before mentioned. + + Sect. 13. Every bill which shall have passed the House of + Representatives and the Senate shall, before it becomes a + law, be presented to the President of the United States for + his revision. If, upon such revision, he approve of it, he + shall signify his approbation by signing it. But if, upon + such revision, it shall appear to him improper for being + passed into a law, he shall return it, together with his + objections against it, to that House in which it shall have + originated; who shall enter the objections at large on their + Journal, and proceed to reconsider the bill. But if, after + such reconsideration, two thirds of that House shall, + notwithstanding the objections of the President, agree to + pass it, it shall, together with his objections, be sent to + the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, + and, if approved by two thirds of the other House also, it + shall become a law. But, in all such cases, the votes of both + Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays; and the names of + the persons voting for or against the bill shall be entered + on the Journal of each House respectively. If any bill shall + not be returned by the President within seven days after it + shall have been presented to him, it shall be a law, unless + the legislature, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in + which case it shall not be a law. + + ART. VII.--Sect. 1. The legislature of the United States + shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, + imposts, and excises; + + To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the + several states; + + To establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the + United States; + + To coin money; + + To regulate the value of foreign coin; + + To fix the standard of weights and measures; + + To establish post-offices; + + To borrow money, and emit bills, on the credit of the United + States; + + To appoint a treasurer by ballot; + + To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court; + + To make rules concerning captures on land and water; + + To declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies + committed on the high seas, and the punishment of + counterfeiting the coin of the United States, and of offences + against the law of nations; + + To subdue a rebellion in any State on the application of its + legislature; + + To make war; + + To raise armies; + + To build and equip fleets; + + To call forth the aid of the militia, in order to execute the + laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, + and repel invasions; + + And to make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for + carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other + powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the + United States, or in any department or office thereof. + + Sect. 2. Treason against the United States shall consist only + in levying war against the United States, or any of them; and + in adhering to the enemies of the United States, or any of + them. The legislature of the United States shall have power + to declare the punishment of treason. No person shall be + convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two + witnesses. No attainder of treason shall work corruption of + blood, nor forfeiture, except during the life of the person + attainted. + + Sect. 3. The proportions of direct taxation shall be + regulated by the whole number of white and other free + citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex, and condition, + including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and + three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the + foregoing description (except Indians not paying taxes); + which number shall, within six years after the first meeting + of the legislature, and within the term of every ten years + afterwards, be taken in such a manner as the said legislature + shall direct. + + Sect. 4. No tax or duty shall be laid by the legislature on + articles exported from any State; nor on the migration or + importation of such persons as the several States shall think + proper to admit; nor shall such migration or importation be + prohibited. + + Sect. 5. No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in + proportion to the census hereinbefore directed to be taken. + + Sect. 6. No navigation act shall be passed without the assent + of two thirds of the members present in each House. + + Sect. 7. The United States shall not grant any title of + nobility. + + ART. VIII.--The acts of the legislature of the United States + made in pursuance of this Constitution, and all treaties made + under the authority of the United States, shall be the + supreme law of the several States, and of their citizens and + inhabitants; and the judges in the several States shall be + bound thereby in their decisions, anything in the + constitutions or laws of the several States to the contrary + notwithstanding. + + ART. IX.--Sect. 1. The Senate of the United States shall have + power to make treaties, and to appoint ambassadors, and + judges of the supreme court. + + Sect. 2. In all disputes and controversies now subsisting, or + that may hereafter subsist, between two or more States, + respecting jurisdiction or territory, the Senate shall + possess the following powers:--Whenever the legislature, or + the executive authority, or lawful agent of any State, in + controversy with another, shall, by memorial to the Senate, + state the matter in question, and apply for a hearing, notice + of such memorial and application shall be given, by order of + the Senate, to the legislature, or the executive authority, + of the other State in controversy. The Senate shall also + assign a day for the appearance of the parties, by their + agents, before that House. The agents shall be directed to + appoint, by joint consent, commissioners or judges to + constitute a court for hearing and determining the matter in + question. But if the agents cannot agree, the Senate shall + name three persons out of each of the several States; and + from the list of such persons, each party shall alternately + strike out one, until the number shall be reduced to + thirteen; and from that number not less than seven, nor more + than nine, names, as the Senate shall direct, shall, in their + presence, be drawn out by lot; and the persons whose names + shall be so drawn, or any five of them, shall be + commissioners or judges to hear and finally determine the + controversy; provided a majority of the judges who shall hear + the cause agree in the determination. If either party shall + neglect to attend at the day assigned, without showing + sufficient reasons for not attending, or being present shall + refuse to strike, the Senate shall proceed to nominate three + persons out of each State, and the Clerk of the Senate shall + strike in behalf of the party absent or refusing. If any of + the parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such + court, or shall not appear to prosecute or defend their claim + or cause, the court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce + judgment. The judgment shall be final and conclusive. The + proceedings shall be transmitted to the President of the + Senate, and shall be lodged among the public records, for the + security of the parties concerned. Every commissioner shall, + before he sit in judgment, take an oath, to be administered + by one of the judges of the supreme or superior court of the + State where the cause shall be tried, "well and truly to hear + and determine the matter in question, according to the best + of his judgment, without favor, affection, or hope of + reward." + + Sect. 3. All controversies concerning lands claimed under + different grants of two or more States, whose jurisdictions, + as they respect such lands, shall have been decided or + adjusted subsequently to such grants, or any of them, shall, + on application to the Senate, be finally determined, as near + as may be, in the same manner as is before prescribed for + deciding controversies between different States. + + ART. X.--Sect. 1. The executive power of the United States + shall be vested in a single person. His style shall be, "The + President of the United States of America," and his title + shall be, "His Excellency." He shall be elected by ballot by + the legislature. He shall hold his office during the term of + seven years; but shall not be elected a second time. + + Sect. 2. He shall, from time to time, give information to the + legislature of the state of the Union. He may recommend to + their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary + and expedient. He may convene them on extraordinary + occasions. In case of disagreement between the two Houses, + with regard to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them + to such time as he thinks proper. He shall take care that the + laws of the United States be duly and faithfully executed. He + shall commission all the officers of the United States; and + shall appoint officers in all cases not otherwise provided + for by this Constitution. He shall receive ambassadors, and + may correspond with the supreme executives of the several + States. He shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons, + but his pardon shall not be pleadable in bar of an + impeachment. He shall be commander-in-chief of the army and + navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several + States. He shall, at stated times, receive for his services a + compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished + during his continuance in office. Before he shall enter on + the duties of his department, he shall take the following + oath or affirmation, "I ---- solemnly swear (or affirm) that + I will faithfully execute the office of President of the + United States of America." He shall be removed from his + office on impeachment by the House of Representatives, and + conviction, in the supreme court, of treason, bribery, or + corruption. In case of his removal, as aforesaid, death, + resignation, or disability to discharge the powers and duties + of his office, the President of the Senate shall exercise + those powers and duties until another President of the United + States be chosen, or until the disability of the President be + removed. + + ART. XI.--Sect. 1. The judicial power of the United States + shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior + courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be + constituted by the legislature of the United States. + + Sect. 2. The judges of the supreme court, and of the inferior + courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior. They + shall, at stated times, receive for their services a + compensation, which shall not be diminished during their + continuance in office. + + Sect. 3. The jurisdiction of the supreme court shall extend + to all cases arising under laws passed by the legislature of + the United States; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other + public ministers and consuls; to the trial of impeachments of + officers of the United States; to all cases of admiralty and + maritime jurisdiction; to controversies between two or more + States (except such as shall regard territory or + jurisdiction); between a State and citizens of another State; + between citizens of different States; and between a State, or + the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or + subjects. In cases of impeachment, cases affecting + ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in + which a State shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be + original. In all the other cases before mentioned, it shall + be appellate, with such exceptions, and under such + regulations, as the legislature shall make. The legislature + may assign any part of the jurisdiction above mentioned, + (except the trial of the President of the United States,) in + the manner and under the limitations which it shall think + proper, to such inferior courts as it shall constitute from + time to time. + + Sect. 4. The trial of all criminal offences (except in cases + of impeachment) shall be in the State where they shall be + committed; and shall be by jury. + + Sect. 5. Judgment, in cases of impeachment, shall not extend + further than to removal from office, and disqualification to + hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit, under + the United States. But the party convicted shall nevertheless + be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and + punishment, according to law. + + ART. XII.--No State shall coin money; nor grant letters of + marque and reprisal; nor enter into any treaty, alliance, or + confederation; nor grant any title of nobility. + + ART. XIII.--No State, without the consent of the legislature + of the United States, shall emit bills of credit, or make + anything but specie a tender in payment of debts; nor lay + imposts or duties on imports; nor keep troops or ships of war + in time of peace; nor enter into any agreement or compact + with another State, or with any foreign power; nor engage in + any war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies, or + the danger of invasion be so imminent as not to admit of a + delay until the legislature of the United States can be + consulted. + + ART. XIV.--The citizens of each State shall be entitled to + all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several + States. + + ART. XV.--Any person charged with treason, felony, or high + misdemeanor in any State, who shall flee from justice, and + shall be found in any other State, shall, on demand of the + executive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered + up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of the + offence. + + ART. XVI.--Full faith shall be given in each State to the + acts of the legislatures, and to the records and judicial + proceedings of the courts and magistrates, of every other + State. + + ART. XVII.--New States lawfully constituted or established + within the limits of the United States may be admitted, by + the legislature, into this government; but to such admission + the consent of two thirds of the members present in each + House shall be necessary. If a new State shall arise within + the limits of any of the present States, the consent of the + legislatures of such States shall be also necessary to its + admission. If the admission be consented to, the new States + shall be admitted on the same terms with the original States. + But the legislature may make conditions with the new States + concerning the public debt which shall be then subsisting. + + ART. XVIII.--The United States shall guarantee to each State + a republican form of government; and shall protect each State + against foreign invasions, and, on the application of its + legislature, against domestic violence. + + ART. XIX.--On the application of the legislatures of two + thirds of the States in the Union, for an amendment of this + Constitution, the legislature of the United States shall call + a convention for that purpose. + + ART. XX.--The members of the legislatures, and the executive + and judicial officers of the United States, and of the + several States, shall be bound by oath to support this + Constitution. + + ART. XXI.--The ratification of the conventions of ---- States + shall be sufficient for organizing this Constitution. + + ART. XXII.--This Constitution shall be laid before the United + States in Congress assembled, for their approbation; and it + is the opinion of this Convention, that it should be + afterwards submitted to a convention chosen in each State, + under the recommendation of its legislature, in order to + receive the ratification of such convention. + + ART. XXIII.--To introduce this government, it is the opinion + of this Convention, that each assenting convention should + notify its assent and ratification to the United States in + Congress assembled; that Congress, after receiving the assent + and ratification of the conventions of ---- States, should + appoint and publish a day, as early as may be, and appoint a + place, for commencing proceedings under this Constitution; + that, after such publication, the legislatures of the several + States should elect members of the Senate, and direct the + election of members of the House of Representatives; and that + the members of the legislature should meet at the time and + place assigned by Congress, and should, as soon as may be + after their meeting, choose the President of the United + States, and proceed to execute this Constitution. + + * * * * * + +CONSTITUTION + +OF + +THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.[463] + +We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect +Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for +the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the +Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and +establish this CONSTITUTION for the United States of America. + + +ARTICLE. I. + +SECTION. 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a +Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and +House of Representatives. + +SECTION. 2. {1} The House of Representatives shall be composed of +Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, +and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite +for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature. + +{2} No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to +the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the +United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of +that State in which he shall be chosen. + +{3} Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the +several States which may be included within this Union, according to +their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the +whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a +Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all +other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years +after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and +within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they +shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed +one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one +Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of +New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, +Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, +New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, +Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, +and Georgia three. + +{4} When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the +Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such +Vacancies. + +{5} The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other +Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. + +SECTION. 3. {1} The Senate of the United States shall be composed of +two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for +six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote. + +{2} Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the +first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three +Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated +at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the +Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the +Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one-third may be chosen every +second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, +during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive +thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the +Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies. + +{3} No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the +Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United +States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that +State for which he shall be chosen. + +{4} The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the +Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided. + +{5} The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President +pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall +exercise the office of President of the United States. + +{6} The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When +sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When +the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall +preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of +two thirds of the Members present. + +{7} Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to +removal from Office, and Disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office +of honour, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party +convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, +Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. + +SECTION. 4. {1} The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for +Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the +Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or +alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators. + +{2} The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such +Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by +Law appoint a different Day. + +SECTION. 5. {1} Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, +Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each +shall constitute a Quorum to do business; but a smaller Number may +adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the +Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties +as each House may provide. + +{2} Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its +Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two +thirds, expel a Member. + +{3} Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time +to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their +Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of +either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of +those Present, be entered on the Journal. + +{4} Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the +Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any +other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. + +SECTION. 6. {1} The Senators and Representatives shall receive a +Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid +out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, +except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from +Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective +Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any +Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any +other Place. + +{2} No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he +was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of +the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments +whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person +holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of +either House during his Continuance in Office. + +SECTION. 7. {1} All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the +House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with +Amendments as on other Bills. + +{2} Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives +and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the +President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if +not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it +shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on +their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such +Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, +it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by +which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds +of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes +of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of +the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the +Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned +by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall +have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as +if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent +its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law. + +{3} Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the +Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a +question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the +United States; and before the same shall take Effect, shall be +approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two +thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the +Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill. + +SECTION. 8. The Congress shall have Power {1} To lay and collect +Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for +the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all +Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United +States; + +{2} To borrow Money on the credit of the United States; + +{3} To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several +States, and with the Indian Tribes; + +{4} To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws +on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States; + +{5} To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, +and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures; + +{6} To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and +current Coin of the United States; + +{7} To establish Post Offices and post Roads; + +{8} To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing +for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to +their respective Writings and Discoveries; + +{9} To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court; + +{10} To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high +Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations; + +{11} To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make +Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; + +{12} To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to +that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; + +{13} To provide and maintain a Navy; + +{14} To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and +naval Forces; + +{15} To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of +the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; + +{16} To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, +and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service +of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the +Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia +according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; + +{17} To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over +such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of +particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of +the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority +over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the +State in which the same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, +Magazines, Arsenals, Dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;--And + +{18} To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying +into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by +this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any +Department or Officer thereof. + +SECTION. 9. {1} The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of +the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be +prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight +hundred and eight, but a Tax or Duty may be imposed on such +Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person. + +{2} The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, +unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may +require it. + +{3} No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. + +{4} No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in +Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be +taken. + +{5} No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State. + +{6} No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or +Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall +Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or +pay Duties in another. + +{7} No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of +Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the +Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from +time to time. + +{8} No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no +Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, +without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, +Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or +foreign State. + +SECTION. 10. {1} No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or +Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit +Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in +Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or +Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of +Nobility. + +{2} No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any +Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely +necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of +all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall +be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws +shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress. + +{3} No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of +Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any +Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or +engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as +will not admit of Delay. + + +ARTICLE. II. + +SECTION. 1. {1} The executive Power shall be vested in a President of +the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term +of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the +same Term, be elected, as follows + +{2} Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature +thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of +Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the +Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an +Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed +an Elector. + +The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot +for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of +the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the +Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List +they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the +Government of the United States, directed to the President of the +Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the +Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and +the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number +of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the +whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who +have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House +of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for +President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five +highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the +President. But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by +States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum +for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two-thirds +of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to +a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person +having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice +President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal +Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice +President.[464] + +{3} The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and +the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the +same throughout the United States. + +{4} No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the +United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall +be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be +eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of +thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the +United States. + +{5} In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his +Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of +the said Office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the +Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, +Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, +declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer +shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President +shall be elected. + +{6} The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a +Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during +the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not +receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, +or any of them. + +{7} Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the +following Oath or Affirmation:-- + +"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the +Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my +Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United +States." + +SECTION. 2. {1} The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army +and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several +States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he +may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each +of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties +of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant +Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except +in Cases of Impeachment. + +{2} He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the +Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present +concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent +of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and +Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the +United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided +for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by +Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think +proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads +of Departments. + +{3} The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may +happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which +shall expire at the End of their next Session. + +SECTION. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress +Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their +Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; +he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of +them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the +time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall +think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; +he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall +Commission all the officers of the United States. + +SECTION. 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of +the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, +and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and +Misdemeanors. + + +ARTICLE III. + +SECTION. 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested +in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may +from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the +supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good +Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a +Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance +in Office. + +SECTION. 2. {1} The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law +and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United +States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their +Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public +Ministers, and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime +Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a +Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State +and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different +States,--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under +Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens +thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. + +{2} In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and +Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court +shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before +mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both +as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations +as the Congress shall make. + +{3} The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be +by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said +Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any +State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may +by Law have directed. + +SECTION. 3. {1} Treason against the United States, shall consist only +in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving +them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless +on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on +Confession in open Court. + +{2} The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of +Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, +or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted. + + +ARTICLE. IV. + +SECTION. 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the +public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. +And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which +such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect +thereof. + +SECTION. 2 {1} The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all +Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. + +{2} A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other +Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, +shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he +fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction +of the Crime. + +{3} No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws +thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or +Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but +shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or +Labour may be due. + +SECTION. 3. {1} New States may be admitted by the Congress into this +Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the +Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the +Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the +Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the +Congress. + +{2} The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful +Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property +belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall +be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of +any particular State. + +SECTION. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this +Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them +against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the +Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic +Violence. + + +ARTICLE. V. + +The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it +necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the +Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, +shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either +Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this +Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of +the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the +one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; +Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year one +thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first +and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that +no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage +in the Senate. + + +ARTICLE. VI. + +{1} All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the +Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United +States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation. + +{2} This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall +be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be +made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme +Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, +any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary +notwithstanding. + +{3} The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members +of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial +Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall +be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no +religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office +or public Trust under the United States. + + +ARTICLE. VII. + +The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be +sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the +States so ratifying the Same. + + DONE in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States + present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our + Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the + Independance of the United States of America the Twelfth =In + Witness= whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names, + + G{o}: WASHINGTON-- + _Presidt and Deputy from Virginia_ + + NEW HAMPSHIRE. + + JOHN LANGDON, + NICHOLAS GILMAN. + + MASSACHUSETTS. + + NATHANIEL GORHAM, + RUFUS KING. + + CONNECTICUT. + + WM. SAML. JOHNSON, + ROGER SHERMAN. + + NEW YORK. + + ALEXANDER HAMILTON. + + NEW JERSEY. + + WIL: LIVINGSTON, + DAVID BREARLEY, + WM. PATERSON, + JONA. DAYTON. + + PENNSYLVANIA. + + B. FRANKLIN, + THOMAS MIFFLIN, + ROBT. MORRIS, + GEO: CLYMER, + THO{S}. FITZ SIMONS, + JARED INGERSOLL, + JAMES WILSON, + GOUV: MORRIS. + + DELAWARE. + + GEO: READ, + GUNNING BEDFORD, jun. + JOHN DICKINSON, + RICHARD BASSETT. + JACO: BROOM. + + MARYLAND. + + JAMES M'HENRY, + DAN: OF ST. THOS. JENIFER, + DANL. CARROLL. + + VIRGINIA. + + JOHN BLAIR, + JAMES MADISON, JR. + + NORTH CAROLINA. + + WM. BLOUNT, + RICH'D DOBBS SPAIGHT. + HU. WILLIAMSON. + + SOUTH CAROLINA. + + J. RUTLEDGE, + CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY, + CHARLES PINCKNEY, + PIERCE BUTLER. + + GEORGIA. + + WILLIAM FEW, + ABR. BALDWIN. + + Attest: + + WILLIAM JACKSON, _Secretary_. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[463] This copy of the Constitution has been compared with the Rolls in +the Department of State, and is punctuated and otherwise printed in +exact conformity therewith. + +[464] Altered by the 12th Amendment. + + + + +ARTICLES + +IN ADDITION TO, AND AMENDMENT OF, + +THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, + + PROPOSED BY CONGRESS, AND RATIFIED BY THE LEGISLATURES OF THE + SEVERAL STATES, PURSUANT TO THE FIFTH ARTICLE OF THE ORIGINAL + CONSTITUTION.[465] + +(ARTICLE 1.) + +Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or +prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of +speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to +assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. + +(ARTICLE 2.) + +A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free +State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be +infringed. + +(ARTICLE III.) + +No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without +the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be +prescribed by law. + +(ARTICLE IV.) + +The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, +and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be +violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, +supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the +place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. + +(ARTICLE V.) + +No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous +crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except +in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when +in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any +person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of +life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a +witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or +property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be +taken for public use, without just compensation. + +(ARTICLE VI.) + +In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a +speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and +district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district +shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of +the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the +witnesses against him; to have Compulsory process for obtaining +Witnesses in his favour, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his +defence. + +(ARTICLE VII.) + +In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed +twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no +fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of +the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. + +(ARTICLE VIII.) + +Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor +cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. + +(ARTICLE IX.) + +The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be +construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. + +(ARTICLE X.) + +The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor +prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States +respectively, or to the people. + +ARTICLE XI. + +The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to +extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against +one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens +or Subjects of any Foreign State. + +ARTICLE XII. + +The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot +for President and Vice President, one of whom, at least, shall not be +an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in +their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct +ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make +distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all +persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for +each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to +the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the +President of the Senate;--The President of the Senate shall, in +presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the +certificates and the votes shall then be counted;--The person having +the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if +such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; +and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the +highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as +President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by +ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall +be taken by states, the representation from each state having one +vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members +from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall +be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall +not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon +them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the +Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or +other constitutional disability of the President.--The person having +the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the +Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of +Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the +two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the +Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds +of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number +shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally +ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of +Vice-President of the United States. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[465] Although this work does not embrace the history of the Amendments, +they are printed here in connection with the Constitution, for the +convenience of the reader. + + + + +INDEX. + + + A. + + _Acquisition_, national spirit of, reflections on, II. 312. + + ADAMS, JOHN, delegate to first Continental Congress, I. 13. + On Washington's appointment as commander-in-chief, 42. + One of the committee to prepare Declaration of Independence, 50. + His account of the Declaration, 82. + First minister to Great Britain, 257. + Answer to his complaints about the treaty, 257. + Instructed to negotiate treaty with the Netherlands, 280. + One of the commissioners to procure commercial treaties, 287. + Views of, respecting taxation of slaves, II. 159. + Practice of, respecting cabinet, 409. + + ADAMS, SAMUEL, delegate to first Continental Congress, I. 13. + Reserve of, respecting Constitution, II. 533. + Disapproves of Constitution, 533. + Character of, 534. + Position of, in convention of Massachusetts, 534. + In favor of Hancock's amendments to Constitution, 538. + + ADAMS, captain in the Revolutionary naval force, I. 74. + + _Address_ of the Colonies to the people of Great Britain, I. 23. + + _Admiralty Jurisdiction_, criminal, II. 330. + Of courts of United States, 445. + Under Confederation, 445. + + _Adoption_ of Constitution, mode of, recommended, II. 372. + + _Albany_, convention of Colonies at, in 1753-54, I. 8. + + _Alexandria_, meeting of commissioners at, from Virginia and Maryland, + I. 341. + + _Alexandria Commissioners_, visit General Washington, I. 425. + Report of, received in Virginia legislature, 426. + + _Aliens_, rights to be conceded to, in certain treaties, I. 280. + See _Foreigners_. + + _Allegiance_ of people of the Colonies, transferred, I. 52. + + _Alliance._ See _Treaty of Alliance_. + + _Ambassadors_, proposed appointment of, by Senate, II. 223, 410; + by President, 234. + Received by President, 415. + To be nominated by President, 418. + Jurisdiction of cases affecting, 444. + + _Amendment_ of Constitution, II. 84. + Provision for, adopted without debate, 177. + And revolution, distinction between, 473. + + _Amendments_ of Constitution, when to be proposed by Congress, II. + 268. + How to be proposed and adopted, 473. + How ratified, 477. + Power to make, limited, 477. + States at liberty to propose, 486. + Proposed by Hancock, 537; + by Massachusetts, classified, 539; + by South Carolina, 548; + by Patrick Henry, 580; + by Virginia, 581; + by New York, 587, 588; + by North Carolina, 597. + Refused in Maryland convention, 543. + Proposed, not made conditions of adoption, 551. + + _Amendments_ of Articles of Confederation, how made, II. 84, 473, 481. + + _America_, natural advantages of, for commercial pursuits, II. 309. + Variety of climate and products of, 309. + + _American Constitutions_, character of, I. 261. + + _American Feeling_, Washington's efforts to create, I. 110. + + _American People_ perceive the insufficiency of State governments, I. + 114. + Early familiarity of, with the principles of government, 117. + Perceive the necessity of a union, 121. + See _People of America_. + + _American Revolution_, commencement + of, I. 3. + Attempt to alter charter governments, a principal cause of, 6. + Found local legislatures in all the Colonies, 7. + Fundamental principle established by, 379. + Object and effects of, II. 196. + Policy which led to, real cause of, 238. + Effect of, on views of people of United States, relating to + government, 238. + + _Annapolis_, general commercial convention at, I. 326, 340, 350. + Recommends general convention to revise the federal system, 349. + Recommendation, how received, 351. + See HAMILTON and MADISON. + + _Annapolis Commissioners_, report of, acted upon in Congress, I. 355. + + _Anti-Federalists_, plan of, to postpone action of Virginia on + Constitution, II. 568. + See _Federalists_. + + _Appropriation Bills_, provision concerning, objected to, II. 147. + See _Money Bills_ and _Revenue Bills_. + + _Arms of the United States_, when adopted, I. 151. + + ARMSTRONG, JOHN, wrote the Newburgh Addresses, I. 168. + + _Army_, power of Congress to raise and support, II. 333. + Appropriation of money for support of, 333. + Power of Congress to make rules for, 334. + Standing, repugnant to American feelings, 336. + Not to be kept by States in time of peace, 371. + President commander-in-chief of, 413. + Power of President to employ, 413. + + _Army of the Revolution_, first suggested, I. 31. + How first raised, 32. + State of, when Washington arrived at Cambridge, 55. + How constituted, 58. + Short enlistments in, how accounted for, 60. + Committee of Congress sent to examine, 60. + Discontents in, 79, 158, 186. + History of, after the evacuation of Boston, 91. + Reorganized, 91, 92. + Defects in organization of, 93. + Officers of, how appointed, 93; + how treated in 1776, 94. + Bad construction of, 94, 96. + Third effort of Washington to reorganize, 109. + Embarrassments and difficulties attending, 110. + State of, in April, 1777, 111; + in May, 1782, 158. + + _Arrest_, privilege from, II. 263. + + _Arsenals_, authority of Congress over, II. 340. + + _Articles of Confederation_, I. 509. + Reported in Congress, and recommended to the States, 53, 104, 113. + Adoption of, by the States, 124. + Amendments to, proposed by the States, 128; + by New Jersey, for regulation of commerce, 129. + Chief obstacle to the completion of, 131. + States urged to accede to, 134. + Ratified by New Jersey, 135; + by Delaware, 135; + by Maryland, 136. + Completion of, announced, 137. + Established by patriotic sacrifices, 139. + Outline of, 142. + Construction of third article of, 265. + Circular letter of Congress, recommending adoption of, 491. + Representation of New Jersey respecting, 493. + Act of New Jersey accepting, 497. + Resolves of Delaware respecting, 498. + Action of Maryland on, 501; + of New York on, 505. + Amendment of, at first contemplated, II. 16. + How altered, 84, 180, 481. + Citizenship under, 206. + Effort to include in, power over Western Territory, 341. + Admission of new States under, 345. + On what terms ratified by smaller States, 346. + Restraints imposed on States by, 363. + Inter-state privileges under, 447. + + _Assemblies_ in Provincial governments, how constituted, I. 4. + + _Assembling_, one of the common law rights, I. 23. + + _Association_, drawn up by House of Burgesses in Virginia, I. 12. + For non-importation, &c., how carried out by colonists, 24. + + _Attainder, Bills of_, defined, II. 360. + Congress prohibited to pass, 360. + States prohibited to pass, 368. + + _Attestation_ to Constitution, form of, II. 485. + + + B. + + BALDWIN, ABRAHAM, model of Senate suggested by, II. 139. + Vote and views of, respecting representation in Senate, 142. + + _Baltimore_, public rejoicings in, in honor of Constitution, II. 543. + + BARNWELL, ROBERT, in favor of Constitution, II. 510. + Arguments of, in convention of South Carolina, 548. + + BELKNAP, Dr., on slavery in Massachusetts, II. 454. + + _Bill of Rights_, want of, a strong argument with some against + Constitution, II. 498. + James Wilson's views respecting, 522. + States equally divided on question of, in Convention, 523. + Considered essential by Patrick Henry, 554. + Proposed by Virginia, 581. + + _Bills of Credit_, power to emit, prohibited to States, II. 328, 364. + Meaning of, 329. + + _Boston_, occupied by royal troops in 1774-75, I. 27. + Invested by army under General Ward, in 1775, 32. + Reception of Constitution by people of, II. 501. + Rejoicings in, in honor of Constitution, 540. + + _Boundary_, Southern, fixed by the Treaty of Peace, I. 312. + Questions of, proposed to be determined by Senate, II. 223, 231; + plan respecting, 235. + Determination of, a judicial question, 232. + See _Western Territory_, _Lands_, and _Northwestern Territory_. + + _Bounties_ offered for enlistment in 1776, I. 93. + Additional, offered by States, 95; + effect of, 110. + + BOWDOIN, JAMES, delegate to first Continental Congress, I. 13. + Governor of Massachusetts, 270. + Suppresses Shays's rebellion, 270. + Message of, suggesting a general convention, 336. + + _Brandywine_, battle of the, force engaged in, I. 113. + + _Bribery_, by executive, dangers of, II. 242. + + _British Colonies_, legislatures of, divided into two branches, II. + 132. + + BROUGHTON, NICHOLAS, commander of the Hannah, I. 74. + + BUTLER, PIERCE, in favor of the Constitution, II. 510. + + + C. + + _Cabinet_, functions of, II. 407. + Views respecting, in Convention, 408. + President may require opinions of, 408. + Constitutional character of, 409. + Practice of first three Presidents respecting, 409. + + _Captures_, power of Congress to regulate, II. 330. + + _Capitation Tax_, report of committee of detail respecting, II. 290. + Provision respecting, adopted, 304. + + CARROLL, CHARLES, proposition of, for asserting right of United States + to vacant lands, II. 353, 355. + + _Cases_ arising under Constitution, &c., meaning of, II. 430. + + _Census_, periodical, proposed by Williamson of North Carolina, II. + 153. + Vote respecting, 153. + See _Federal Census_. + + _Cessions_ of Northwestern Territory, II. 342. + Of land by States to United States, 356. + See _Western_ and _Northwestern Territory_. + + _Charleston_, rejoicings in, on adoption of Constitution, II. 548. + + _Charter_, of William and Mary to Massachusetts, I. 5; + attempt to alter, 6. + Inviolability of, 23. + How distinguished from constitution, II. 7. + + _Charter Governments_, form and character of, I. 5. + + CHASE, SAMUEL, views of, respecting taxation of slaves, II. 159. + + _Checks_ of one department on another, II. 301. + + _Citizenship_, as qualification of national officers, II. 186, 188, + 204; + of senators, 223. + State rules respecting, unlike, 199. + General privileges of, under Confederation, 206, 448; + under Constitution, 448. + See _Naturalization_. + + CLARKE, GEORGE ROGERS, General, proceedings of, in Kentucky, I. 322. + + CLINTON, GEORGE, message of, as Governor of New York, on revenue + system of 1783, I. 359. + Head of party in New York opposed to Constitution, II. 502. + + _Coinage_ of the United States, origin of, I. 443. + + COIT, captain in the Revolutionary naval force, I. 74. + + _Colonies_, thirteen English, I. 3. + Ante-Revolutionary governments of, 3. + Form a union, 3. + No union of, before the Revolution, 7. + Common grievances of, 9. + People of, how descended, 9. + Rights of, how to be determined, 16; + when and how stated, 20; + declaration of, 22; + what included in, 22; + how to be enforced, 23. + Trade of, how far right to regulate in Parliament, 20. + Reduction of, to submission, great preparations for, 38. + Trade with, prohibited by Parliament, December, 1775, 38. + Change of, into States, 116. + Constitutional power of, II. 179. + + _Commerce_, of the United States, I. 276; + capacity of, at the close of the war, 284. + Regulation of, a leading object of Constitutional Convention, II. 12; + became an exigency of the Union, 13; + how provided for, by Virginia plan, 90; + if universal, must include slave-trade, 285; + report of committee of detail respecting, 289; + generally conceded to general government as necessary, 290; + views of Southern statesmen respecting, 290; + by Congress, beneficial to North and South, 291; + a power conceded by South to North, 291; + indivisible, 370; + reluctance of South Carolina to concede, 546. + Want of power over, in Confederation, 279. + Interest of, in different States, not identical, 291, 299. + Powers of government over, influence of, 311. + Necessities of, basis of Constitution, 312. + See _Regulation of Commerce_. + + _Commercial Convention._ + See _Annapolis_ and _Virginia_. + + _Commercial Power_ asked for by Congress, I. 285. + Action of the States respecting, 286. + + _Commercial Treaties_, want of, displayed, I. 277. + Existing at the peace, 279. + How far the Confederation competent to make, 279. + Why not made with England, 282. + Congress endeavors to get power to make, 285. + Attempt to negotiate without power, 286. + States refuse the power to make, 287. + Fruitless efforts of the commissioners to negotiate, 289. + + _Commission._ + See _Commercial Treaties_ and JOHN ADAMS. + + _Committee of Congress_ sent to confer with Washington, I. 60, 93. + + _Committee of the States_ under the Confederation, I. 146. + + _Committees of Correspondence_ recommended by Virginia, I. 11. + Agency of, 12. + + _Common Law_, one of the rights of the Colonies, I. 23. + And equity, distinction between, preserved by Constitution, II. 425. + Basis of State jurisprudence, 425. + + _Commutation._ + See _Half-Pay_. + + _Compromises_ between national and federal systems, II. 102, 104. + Lie at the basis of the Constitution, 129. + Respecting formation of Congress, 141, 167, 195; + representation in Congress, 146. + Respecting slavery, 161; + how to be effected, 163; + reflections on, 309. + Committee of, proposed by Gouverneur Morris, 201. + Respecting Senate, as affected by money bills, 217; + choice of executive, 220. + How to be studied, 220. + Respecting slave-trade and navigation act, 302. + If not made, necessary consequences, 315. + + _Confederation_, office of, in American history, I. 140, 149. + Revenues of, 147. + Defects of, 148, 155; II. 11, 14, 15, 35, 60, 79, 376. + Restraints imposed by, upon the States, I. 149. + Legal commencement of, 149. + Operation of, to the close of the war, 181. + Power of, to maintain an army and navy in peace, 215. + Analyzed by Hamilton, 221. + Principle of, adhered to, 225. + Summary of its operations, 228. + Incapacity of, to protect the State governments, 260. + Had no strict power to hold or manage public lands, 291. + Decay and failure of, 328; II. 13. + Fatal defect in the principle of the, I. 371. + Nature of, II. 16. + Had no power of compulsion, 16, 376. + Powers of, 27. + Principle of, 33. + Rule of suffrage under, 42. + Had no executive or judiciary, 60. + Laws of, to be executed by State tribunals, 61. + Compared with Constitution, 90. + Articles of, framed in 1776, 158. + Assessments on States under, 160. + Still in force while Convention in session, 178. + Relation of, to States, 179. + States opposed to entering, except on full federal equality, 227. + Had no seat of government, 268. + Want of power in, over commerce, 279; + over revenues, 279. + Engagements of, proposal to assume, 321. + Want of power in, to admit new States, 349. + Rule of, respecting making of treaties, 376, 416, 441. + Nature and objects of, 448. + How amended, 473. + Chief cause of failure of, 573. + See _Articles of Confederation_ and _Congress_. + + _Confiscations_, provided against, by the Treaty of Peace, I. 250. + Strict right of, belonged to the Union, 251. + + _Congress_ of the Revolution, leaves Philadelphia after the battle of + the Brandywine, I. 113; + assembles at Lancaster and Yorktown, 113. + Of the Confederation, first meeting of, 125; + structure and form of, 143; II. 133, 226; + powers of, I. 144; + restrictions on powers of, 146; + attendance diminished after the peace, 189; + driven from Philadelphia by a mutiny, 220; + decline of, 226; + meeting of, in 1783, 235; + thinly attended, 235; + appointment and attendance of delegates, 237, 239; + perpetually in session, 238; + public objects to be accomplished by, 239; + condition of, in 1785, 339; + unfitted to revise the federal system, 364; + had but one chamber, II. 132; + resolution for continuance of, 176; + method of voting in, 226; + members of, chosen annually, and liable to recall, 241; + appointment of officers by, complaints respecting, 248; + met where, 268; + presence of, in New York, benefits resulting from, 273; + attempts of, to procure cessions from States, 342; + resolve of, for regulation of Northwest Territory, 342; + power of, to admit new States, 344; + transmission of Constitution to, 486; + action of, on Constitution, 499. + Old, authority of, continued till new adopted, 86. + Under Virginia plan, to have two houses, 101. + Under New Jersey plan, to be one body, 101. + Present constitution of, by whom first suggested, 138; + compromise respecting, 141, 167. + Power of, to legislate for general interests of Union, 170; + to negative State laws, 170; + respecting elections to, 257; + in general, 279; + over taxes, duties, &c., 322; + to pay debts of United States, 322; + to provide for common defence, &c., 322; + over places purchased for forts, &c., 340; + over Territories, different views concerning, 340, 358; + limited, 340; + over soil of national domain, 351; + proposed, over property of United States, 355; + restraints on, 359; + to establish inferior tribunals, 423, 427. + Acts of, supreme law, 170; + how passed, 264. + Proposal that executive be chosen by, 171. + Members of, qualifications of, 194; + ineligibility of, to office, 250; + time, &c. of electing, left to States, 258; + pay of, proceedings in Convention respecting, 258; + objections to States paying, 259; + privileged from arrest, 263; + punishment and expulsion of, 263; + not to be questioned elsewhere for speech or debate, 263. + Importance of early legislation of, 208. + Proposed to be modelled after Congress of Confederation, 226. + Admission of members of Cabinet, &c. to, question respecting, 253. + Each house of, to be judge of elections, &c. of its own members, 262; + to determine its own rules of proceeding, 263; + to keep journal, 263. + Adjournment of, 275, 419. + Exclusive sovereign of District of Columbia, 277. + Time of meeting of, 277. + To make all necessary and proper laws for execution of powers, 338. + To declare war, 413. + To authorize calling out of militia, 413. + Special relations of President to, 419. + To prescribe mode of proof and effect of State records, &c., 449. + To propose amendments to Constitution, 477. + To call Convention to amend Constitution, when, 477. + + _Connecticut_, a charter government, I. 5. + Governor, council, and representatives always chosen by the people, + 6. + Had five representatives in first House, 149. + Cedes claims to Western territory, 300, 344. + Appoints and instructs delegates to the Convention, 369. + Opposed to Convention, II. 23; + to executive holding office during "good behavior," 173; + to property qualification for office, 189; + to nine years' citizenship as qualification of Senator, 224; + to taxing exports, 296; + to restricting President to stated salary, 407. + In favor of equality of suffrage in both branches of Congress, 122, + 138; + of equal representation of States in Senate, 141, 148, 165; + of census of free inhabitants, 153; + of referring Constitution to State legislatures, 184; + of each State having one vote in Senate, 227. + Vote of, respecting citizenship as qualification for office, 209; + respecting money bills, 216, 218; + respecting eligibility of members of Congress to office, 251; + respecting slave-trade, 305. + Ratification of Constitution by, 515. + Convention of, 527; + debates in, mostly lost, 529. + + _Connecticut Reservation_, note on, I. 300. + + _Constitution_, how framed, II. 3. + Means of peaceful coercion a leading object of, 62. + An abridgment of State powers in some respects, 73. + Republican government guaranteed to States by, 80, 458, 468. + Capacity of, of amendment, 84. + Why submitted to people for ratification, 84. + As reported to Convention, 86. + Different plans of, proposed in Convention, 89. + Compared with Confederation, 90. + Compromise of, between national and federal system, 102. + Based on compromises, 129. + Possibility of failure to create, reflections on, 142. + Framers of, problem before, 155; + position and purposes of, 178; + had been observers of Parliamentary corruption, 242. + State and national officers sworn to support, 177, 372. + Ratification of, 177. + Dissatisfaction with, in different States, 182. + How differs from league, 184. + Proposal to submit, to Congress of Confederation, 185. + Growth of, important to be pursued through entire proceedings, 193. + Divided into twenty-three articles by committee's report, 194. + Interest in Europe respecting, 196. + Should define eligibility to national offices, 199. + Purposes of, respecting immigrants, 209. + Analogy of, to British Constitution, 214. + Provisions of, as originally proposed, 230. + Benefits of, to North and South, 303. + Conception of, gradually attained, 311. + Hopes of framers of, exceeded, 311. + Sprung from necessities of commerce, 312. + Objections to, of favoring slavery, superficial, 313. + Proper mode of judging, 313. + Rights guaranteed to States by, 314. + Beneficent operation of, on condition of slaves, 315. + Provision of, respecting power of Congress over Territories, 355; + purpose of, 355; + explanation of, 357. + Adoption of, 372. + Preamble to, 372. + Supreme law, 374. + Binding on all judicial officers, 374. + Complex character of, 379. + Workings of, not impaired by territorial growth, 381. + Success of, when other systems had failed, cause of, 384. + Proposed by Governor Randolph, 410. + Cases arising under, meaning of, 430. + Confers few special powers on general government, 432. + Restrictions laid on States by, 432. + Powers of national and State governments determined by, 436. + Designed to form a more perfect union, 448. + Inter-state privileges under, 448. + Amendments of, how proposed and adopted, 473. + Oath to support, by whom to be taken, 478. + Religious test never to be required under, 478. + Serious questions respecting mode of establishing, 479. + Effect of ratification of, by only part of States, 484. + Formal assent of States to, in Convention, 485. + Form of attestation to, 485. + Refusal of three delegates to sign, 485. + Presentation of, to Congress, 486. + Probable consequences of rejection of, 487. + Issue presented by, to people of United States, 487. + Attempt to introduce monarchy averted by, 494. + Published September 19th, 1787, 495. + Reception of, among the people, 495. + Friends and opponents of, classified, 495. + Advocates of, why styled Federalists, 496. + Adopted by intelligent majority in each State, 499. + Reception of, by Congress, 499. + Attempt in Congress to arrest or alter, 499. + Real crisis of, 515. + General and special opposition to, 515. + People predisposed to adopt, 516. + First ratified by Delaware, 518. + Right of people to change at pleasure, 522. + Bestows only a part of power of people, 522. + Ratification of, rejoicings in honor of, 540. + Anxiety respecting State action on, 544. + Amendments of, proposed by South Carolina, 548. + Opposition to, in New York, 572. + Adoption of, an event unparalleled in history, 584. + Opponents of, concessions to, justified, 590. + + _Constitutions_, written, how far existed before the Revolution, I. 4. + Of the States, origin and character of, 261. + + _Constitutional Convention_, first suggestion of, I. 206. + First suggested by Massachusetts, 336. + Suggestion of Massachusetts respecting, not adopted, 337; + withdrawn, 338; + objections of her delegates in Congress to, 339. + Urged by various public bodies, 349. + Considered and adopted by Congress, 350. + Early recommendations of, 350. + Recommended by the Annapolis Commissioners, 350; + by Congress, 361. + Difficulties of its position, 367. + Powers of, not strictly defined, 367. + Opinions of leading statesmen respecting, 373. + Assembles at Philadelphia, 374. + Novelty and peculiarity of its task, 374. + List of members of, 516. + Great object of, II. 5. + Members of, character of, 17; + different views of, 17; + greatness of, 144. + Authority and powers of, uncertain, 18. + All States but Rhode Island represented in, 23. + Presence of all States in, not required, 26. + Had no power to enact or establish, 29. + Character of, 29. + Proceedings of, how to be studied, 29; + secrecy of, 491; + singular rumors respecting, 492. + Supposed want of authority in, to propose fundamental changes, 91. + Report of committee of the whole made to, June 19th, 129. + Struggle in, respecting form of Constitution, 129. + Disruption of, imminent at one time, 142. + Possible consequences of failure of, 143. + Resolution recommending, 185. + Instructions to delegates to, 185. + Causes of success of, 475. + A second, inexpedient, 475, 589. + Dissolved September 14th, 1787, 491. + + _Constitutional Law, American_, originates in The Federalist, I. 417. + Questions of, how determined, II. 375. + + _Constitutionality_ of laws, questions of, how settled, II. 433. + + _Construction_, questions of, how far considered, II. 4. + + _Consuls_, to be nominated by President, I. 418. + Cases affecting, jurisdiction of, 444. + + _Continental Congress_, formation of first, I. 3. + Advised by Franklin in 1773, 10. + First suggestion of, 11. + Recommended by Virginia, 11. + Appointed for September, 1774, 12. + Declared expedient by Massachusetts, 12. + First, assembled and organized, 13; + delegates to, how appointed, 13; + how composed, 14; + method of voting in, 15; + relation of, to the people of the several Colonies, 15; + purpose of, not revolutionary, 16; + instructions to delegates in, 18; + how it sought redress, 18, 19; + revolutionary tendency of, 19; + assumed guardianship of rights and liberties, 19; + proceedings of, in stating rights, 20; + duration of, 24; + adjournment of, 25; + recommends another Congress, 25; + where held from 1774 to 1783, 226; + each Colony had one vote in, II. 227. + Second, election of delegates to, by Massachusetts Provincial + Congress, I. 27; + assembles at Philadelphia, 28; + delegates to, how appointed, 29; + instructions to delegates to, 29; + rule of voting in, 29; + powers assumed by, 31. + Becomes a permanent body, 30. + Petition of, to the King, 38. + Dissolves the allegiance of the Colonies to the King, 38. + Becomes a revolutionary government, 39. + Nature of the government by, 54. + Situation of, at the end of 1776, 100. + Change in the members of, in 1777, 104. + Credentials of members of, in 1776, 105. + Constitution of, II. 42. + + _Continental Currency_ first issued, I. 34. + + _Contracts_, restraint on legislative violation of, origin of, II. + 361, 365; + obligation of, impaired by State law, redress in case of, 433. + See _Obligation of Contracts_. + + _Contribution_, rule of, attempted to be changed, I. 210. + + _Convention_, at Williamsburg, I. 12. + At Hartford, in 1779, 205. + + _Convention of all the States._ See _Constitutional Convention_. + + _Copyrights_, State legislation concerning, II. 339. + Power over, surrendered to Congress, 339. + + CORNWALLIS, enters Newark, I. 98. + Effect of capture of, 157. + + _Council_, vacancies in, how filled in provincial governments, I. 4. + Suspension of, from office in provincial governments, 4. + Part of the provincial governments, 4; + charter governments, 5. + How chosen, 5. + + _Council of Revision_, proposed, dangers of, II. 435; + much favored in Convention, 438; + purpose of, 438. + + _Counterfeiting_, power of Congress to define and punish, II. 332. + + _Courts_, inferior, Congress may establish, II. 330, 423. + + _Courts of United States_, jurisdiction of, over persons of certain + character, II. 441. + Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of, 445. + + _Creditors_, rights of, secured by the Treaty of Peace, I. 250. + + _Crimes_, trial for, to be in State where committed, II. 424; + to be by jury, 424. + + _Crown_, the source of political power in the Colonies, I. 3. + Powers of, in provincial governments, 4. + + _Currency_ under Revolutionary government, I. 78. + + CUSHING, THOMAS, suggests Continental Congress, I. 11. + Delegate to first Continental Congress, 13. + + + D. + + DANE, NATHAN, author of Ordinance of 1787, II. 344, 365. + + _Debts_ due to English merchants at the peace, I. 250. + Action of Congress respecting, 258. + Of States, proposition to assume, II. 319. + Of United States, provision for payment of, 320; + power of Congress to pay, 322. + + _Debt of the United States_, in 1783, I. 172. + Foreign and domestic, where held, 178. + National character of, 182. + Necessity of revenue power to discharge, 183. + Amount of, at the close of the war, 184. + + _Declaration of Independence_, authorship of, I. 81. + Effect of, upon the country, 89; + upon Congress, 90. + See _Independence_. + + _Declaration of Rights_, by first Continental Congress, I. 22. + + _Delaware_, a proprietary government, I. 5. + Constitution of, formed, 122. + Resists the claim of great States to Western lands, 131. + Ratifies the Confederation, 135. + Action of, commended, 138. + Resolves of, respecting the Articles of Confederation, 498. + Opposed to change in rule of suffrage, II. 35; + to division of legislature, 133; + to census of free inhabitants, 153; + to striking out wealth from rule of representation, 164; + to referring Constitution to people, 185; + to property qualification for office, 189; + to restricting President to stated salary, 407. + Vote of, respecting citizenship as qualification for office, 209; + respecting money bills, 216, 218; + respecting slave-trade, 305; + respecting admission of States, 354. + In favor of equality of suffrage in House of Representatives, 138; + of equality of States in Senate, 165; + of executive holding office during "good behavior," 173; + of referring Constitution to State legislatures, 184; + of each State having one vote in Senate, 227; + of taxing exports, 296. + Had one representative in first House, 149. + Ratification of Constitution by, 515, 518. + Patriotism of, 518. + Enlightened by discussions on Constitution in Pennsylvania + convention, 518. + + _Delaware River_, Washington crosses the, I. 99. + + _Delegate_, Territorial, position of, in Congress, II. 256. + + _Democracy_, did not originate in America, II. 7. + Principle of, how modified in America, 7. + + _Departments of Government_, division of, I. 118. + + DICKINSON, JOHN, in favor of tax on exports, II. 284. + + _Dictatorship._ See _Washington_. + + _District of Columbia_, under exclusive government of Congress, II. + 277. + + _Dock-Yards_, authority of Congress over, II. 340. + + DORSET, Duke of, reply of, to the American Commissioners, I. 289. + + DUANE, JAMES, efforts of, to procure adoption of Constitution by New + York, II. 585. + + _Duties_, power to levy, asked for by Congress in 1781, I. 173; + not given, 174. + Power of Congress to impose, II. 322. + To be uniform throughout United States, 325. + What may be laid by States, 368. + Laid by States, net produce of, how applied, 368; + subject to revision of Congress, 368. + Payment of, how compelled, 433. + + + E. + + _Eastern States_, course of, respecting the navigation of the + Mississippi, I. 315. + + _Elections_, frequency of, favored, II. 241. + + _Elective Franchise_, could not be confined to native citizens, II. + 198. + + _Electors_, of President, advantages of, II. 175; + proposed in committee, 220; + number of, 235, 389; + embarrassments respecting choice of, 388; + mode of election by, 390; + case of no choice by, 390; + required to return votes for two persons, 393; + how chosen, 398; + method of proceeding, 399; + new appointment of, when, 403. + Property as a qualification of, 187. + Of representatives in Congress, qualification of, 194, 200. + + ELLSWORTH, OLIVER, compromise respecting Congress proposed by, II. + 141. + Opposed to tax on exports, 294. + Influence and arguments of, in Connecticut convention, 528. + + _Emigration_, from Europe, a subject of solicitude, II. 195. + + _England_, government of, not a model for the Constitution, I. 391. + + _English Language_ spoken by the colonists, I. 3, 9. + + _English Laws_ inherited by the colonists, I. 9. + + _Enlistments._ See _Army_ and _Bounties_. + + _Equity_ and common law, distinction between, preserved by + Constitution, II. 425. + Jurisdiction under Constitution important, 425. + + _Europe_, politics of, as affecting America, II. 80. + + _Excises_, power of Congress to collect, II. 322. + To be uniform throughout United States, 325. + + _Executive_, methods proposed for choice of, II. 59, 171. + Duration of office of, under Hamilton's plan, 100. + Duration of office of, 171; + proposed to be during "good behavior," 173. + Re-eligibility of, different views respecting, 172, 175. + Choice of, directly by people, difficulties attending, 174. + Whether should be subject to impeachment, 175. + Choice of, conflict of opinions respecting, 220; + proposed to be by Congress for seven years, 220; + by electors, 220; + by Senate, in certain events, 221; + by House of Representatives, 222; + by concurrent vote of Senate and House of Representatives, 223, + 230; + proposed negative of Senate in, 232. + Jealousy of, 232. + See _President_ and _Vice-President_. + + _Executive Department_, proposed constitution and powers of, II. 56, + 170. + Relation of, to legislature, 57, 247. + Unknown to Confederation, 60. + Powers of, defined by constitutions in America, 72. + Influence to be allowed to, over legislative, 244. + Action of, requires discretion, 246. + + "_Executive Power_" vested in President, meaning of, 412. + + _Exports_, taxation of, Pinckney's proposition concerning, II. 189; + refusal of South Carolina to submit to, 281, 285; + an undoubted function of government, 282; + consequences of denial of, 282; + when only beneficial, 282; + question of, as affected by variety, 283; + members of Convention in favor of, 284; + report of committee of detail respecting, 290; + great embarrassments respecting, 294; + arguments for and against, 294, 297; + opposition to, not confined to South, 294; + by States, an oppressive power, 295; + finally prohibited, 295; + for what reasons opposed in Convention, 297; + by States, arguments for and against, 368. + + _Ex Post Facto Laws_, definition of, II. 360, 367. + Passage of, prohibited to Congress, 360; + to States, 368. + + + F. + + _Faith and Credit_, to be given to certain acts, &c., I. 143. + + _Falmouth_ (now Portland), burnt, I. 38, 74. + + _Faneuil Hall_, meeting at, respecting a national regulation of + commerce, I. 336. + + _Federal Census_, origin of its rule of three fifths, I. 213. + + _Federal Government_, how distinguished from "national," II. 33. + By what States preferred, 117. + Arguments in favor of, 124; + theoretically sound, 126. + Had proved a failure, 127. + + _Federal Town._ See _Congress_ and _Seat of Government_. + + _Federalist_, original meaning of, II. 496. + Changes in meaning of term, 497. + Miniature ship so called, 543. + + _Federalists_ of Massachusetts, enthusiasm kindled by, II. 541. + Of New Hampshire, action of, 541. + Of New York, justified by Washington, 590; + complaints against, 591. + + _Federalist, The_, published, I. 409. + Character and influence of, 417. + History of the editions of, 418. + Remark of, respecting Confederation, II. 61. + Purpose of publication of, 503. + When first issued, 503. + Authors of, 503. + + _Felony_, various meanings of, II. 331. + Power of Congress to define and punish, 331. + + _Finances_, must rest on some source of compulsory revenue, I. 183. + See _Debts_, _Revenue_, and _Duties_. + + _Fisheries_, great value of, II. 310. + + _Foreigners_, cases affecting, jurisdiction in, II. 443. + Cannot demand sanctuary as matter of right, 457. + + _Foreign Influence_, jealousy of, II. 196, 204, 223. + Necessity of counteracting, 211. + + _Forts_, authority of Congress over, II. 340. + + _Framers of the Constitution_, difficulties and perplexities of their + task, I. 380. + Their qualifications, &c., 386. + Their success, 393. + + _France_, debts of the United States to, I. 172. + Contracts with the king of, 177. + Relations of the United States to, 178. + + FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN, his plan of union in 1754, I. 8. + Advises a Congress in 1773, 10. + Appointed Postmaster-General by Continental Congress, 35. + One of the committee to prepare Declaration of Independence, 50. + One of the commissioners to procure commercial treaties, 287. + Returns from Europe, 433. + Public services of, 433. + Character of, 435. + Influence in the Convention, 436. + Speech of, at the close of the Convention, 437. + Witnesses the success of Washington's administration, 439. + Proposition of, respecting representation in Congress, II. 146. + Views of, respecting money bills, 218. + Opposed to paying President, 405. + In favor of plural executive, 405. + Views of, respecting executive, quite unlike Hamilton's, 405; + respecting consequences of rejection of Constitution, 487. + Unbounded confidence of people in, 498. + + _Free Inhabitants_, privileges of, I. 143. + + _French Loans._ See _France_. + + _French Revolution_, early writers of the, I. 378. + Begun when Constitution went into operation, II. 80. + Interest felt in, in America, 80. + + _French Troops_, arrive at Newport, I. 156. + Join the army at New York, 156. + + _Fugitives_, from justice, provision for surrender of, under the + Confederation, I. 143, II. 449. + From service, clause in Constitution respecting, history of, 450. + See _Slaves_. + + + G. + + _General Convention._ See _Constitutional Convention_. + + _Georgia_, a provincial government, I. 4. + Constitution of, formed, 122. + Appoints and instructs delegates to the Convention, 369. + Had but one chamber in legislature, II. 132. + Opposed to equality of suffrage in House of Representatives, 138. + Divided on question of equal vote of States in Senate, 141, 148. + Had three representatives in first House, 149. + Opposed to census of free inhabitants, 153; + to equality of States in Senate, 165; + to executive holding office during "good behavior," 173. + In favor of property qualification for national officers, 204. + Vote of, respecting citizenship as qualification for office, 209; + respecting money bills, 216, 218. + Divided on question of each State having one vote in Senate, 227. + Opposed to taxing exports, 296. + Position of, in Convention, respecting slave-trade, 297, 301. + Vote of, respecting slave-trade, 305. + Cession by, in 1802, 357. + Vote of, on suspension of habeas corpus, 360; + respecting citizenship clause in Constitution, 453. + Ratification of Constitution by, 515, 526. + Remoteness of, 526. + Situation of, at close of Revolution, 526. + Motives of, to embrace Constitution, 526. + Address by legislature of, to President Washington, 527. + Exposure of, to ravages of Indians, 527. + Escape of slaves from, to Florida, 527. + + GERRY, ELBRIDGE, opposed to numerical representation in Congress, II. + 49; + to tax on exports, 294. + Refused to sign Constitution, why, 485. + Censured for refusing to sign Constitution, 501. + + GILLON, Commodore, arguments of, in convention of South Carolina, II. + 548. + + GORHAM, NATHANIEL, views of, respecting rule of suffrage for House of + Representatives, II. 135. + A member of committee to apportion representatives, 148. + + _Government_, disobedience to, how punished, II. 61. + Essentials to supremacy of, 62. + Different departments in, advantages of, 245. + Approximation to perfect theory of, only attainable, 247. + Distribution of powers of, when easy, 421; + when difficult, 421. + + _Governor_, part of the provincial governments, I. 4. + + GRAYSON, WILLIAM, opposed to Constitution, II. 506. + + _Great Britain_, re-union with, desired by some, II. 493; + letter of Colonel Humphreys respecting, 493; + Hamilton's views respecting, 494. + + _Green Dragon Tavern_, meeting at, respecting a national regulation of + commerce, I. 336. + + _Grievances._ See _Colonies_ and _Revolution_. + + _Guardoqui_, Spanish minister, arrival of, I. 313. + Negotiations with, respecting the Mississippi, 313. + + + H. + + _Habeas Corpus_, privilege of, when suspended, II. 359; + under common law of England, 359. + + _Half-pay_, resisted by Connecticut and Massachusetts, I. 190. + History of, 194. + Commutation of, 194. + See _Officers of the Revolution_. + + HALLAM, HENRY, Constitutional History of England by, great value of, + II. 244. + + HAMILTON, ALEXANDER, laments the changes in Congress in 1778, I. 127. + Exertions of, respecting revenue system, 176. + Reasons of, for voting against revenue system, 177. + Answers the objections of Rhode Island, 177, 206, 207. + On the commercial advantages of a revenue power, 184. + On the discontents of the army, and the public credit, 197. + Opinions of, concerning the reorganization, &c., in 1780, 202. + Maintains that Congress should have greatly enlarged powers, 204. + Suggests a convention of all the States in 1780, 205. + Enters Congress, 206. + On a revenue, and the mode of collecting it, 207. + On the compatibility of federal and State powers, 207. + On the appointment of revenue officers, 208. + Extent of views of, 209. + On the rule of contribution, 210. + On the necessity for power of taxation, 211. + Seeks to introduce new principles, 211. + On a peace establishment, 214. + Opinions on the powers that should be given to Congress, 219. + Exertions of, to suppress the mutiny at Philadelphia, 220. + Views of, respecting defects of the Confederation, 221. + Opinions of, too far in advance of the time, 224. + Answers New York objections to revenue system, 247. + Opinions of, concerning the Confederation, 263. + Views of, respecting the regulation of commerce, 277; + the statesmanship of America, 278. + Induces New York to send delegates to Annapolis, 345. + Reports at Annapolis in favor of a general Convention to revise the + federal system, 347. + Relation of, to the plan of a general Convention, and a national + Constitution, 350. + Contemplates a new government, 350. + Induces the legislature of New York to urge a general Convention, + 359. + Views of, on the mode of proceeding, 364. + Confidence of, in the experiment of a Convention, 373. + History and character of, 406. + Birth of, 408. + Various public services of, 409, II. 593. + Talleyrand's opinion of, I. 410. + Death of, 410. + Views of, respecting the English Constitution, 411. + Relation of, to the Constitution, 412. + Compared with the younger Pitt, 413, 416. + Eminent fitness of, for the times, 414. + Advocates the Constitution in the Federalist, 417. + Compared with Webster, 418. + Anxiety of, about the Constitution, 419. + Unjustly charged with monarchical tendencies, II. 11, 94, 110. + Views of, respecting Constitution, 94. + Principles of civil obedience, as propounded by, 96. + Views of, respecting rule of suffrage for House of Representatives, + 135; + dissolution of Union, 136; + choice of President, 174, 240, 392; + naturalization, 205; + larger House of Representatives, 213. + Measures of, respecting summoning of Constitutional Convention, 273. + Views of, respecting executive, quite unlike Franklin's, 405; + President's power to adjourn Congress, 420. + Explanation of, respecting appellate power of Supreme Court, 428. + Views of, respecting amendment of Constitution, 477. + Objections of, to Constitution, 487. + Views of, respecting consequences of rejection of Constitution, 487, + 570; + possible reunion with Great Britain, 494. + Essays of, in Federalist, 503. + Believed people predisposed in favor of Constitution, 516. + Arrangements of, for transmission of news of action of States on + Constitution, 551. + Leading spirit in convention of New York, 568. + Anxiety of, respecting action of States on Constitution, 569. + Had great cause for solicitude, 569. + Prospects of usefulness of, 569. + Foresight of, respecting operation of Constitution, 570. + Had profound understanding of Constitution, 570. + Ambition of, 570. + Importance of public character and conduct of, 570. + Contest of, with opponents of Constitution in New York, 571. + Critical position of, as citizen of New York, 571. + Reply of, to opponents of Constitution in New York, 572. + News received by, of ratification of Constitution by New Hampshire, + 573. + Letter of, to Madison, respecting chances of ratification by New + York, 575. + Would have been led by personal ambition to remove from New York, + 575. + Policy of, national, 577. + Reason of, for embracing Constitution, 577. + Efforts of, to procure adoption of Constitution by New York, 577, + 584. + Sends news of ratification by New Hampshire to Madison, 578. + Great speech of, in New York convention, in favor of Constitution, + 586. + Writes to Madison, asking advice respecting New York, 587. + Honors paid to, by city of New York, 592. + + HANCOCK, JOHN, retires from Congress, I. 125. + Returns to Congress, 126. + President of Massachusetts convention, II. 537. + Proposes amendments to Constitution, 537. + Great influence of, 537. + + HARRISON, BENJAMIN, opposed to Constitution, II. 506. + + _Hartford Convention_, met in 1779, I. 205. + + _Heights of Haerlem_, occupied by Washington, I. 92. + + HENRY, PATRICK, Governor of Virginia, I. 126. + Declined to attend Convention, II. 173. + Opposed to Constitution, 505. + Characteristics of, 505, 561. + In favor of submitting Constitution to people of Virginia, 510. + Leader of opponents of Constitution in Virginia, 552. + Jefferson's estimate of, 552. + Great popularity of, 552. + Wisdom of, lacked comprehensiveness, 553. + Great powers of, employed against Constitution, 553. + Views of, respecting American spirit of liberty, 553. + Considered Bill of Rights essential, 554. + Arguments of, against Constitution, 555, 557. + Modern scepticism concerning abilities of, 561. + Quotes Jefferson's views of Constitution, 561. + Opposed to Constitution to the last, in Virginia Convention, 579. + Project of, for amending Constitution, 580. + Patriotic conduct of, on adoption of Constitution by Virginia, 581. + Became earnest defender of Constitution, 582. + + _House of Burgesses_, of Virginia, dissolved, I. 11. + + _House of Commons_, ministerial majority of, during Revolution, II. + 237. + + _House of Representatives_, Constitution of, discussion respecting, + II. 36. + Members of, chosen for two years, 134; + qualifications of, 134. + Rule of suffrage for, great debate on, 135. + Exclusive power of, over money bills, 146, 214. + Power of, to fix salaries of government officers, 146. + Ratio of representation in, 147, 212. + First, apportionment of members for, 148, 151. + Basis of, agreed to, 165. + Members of, must be twenty-five years old, 203; + have been citizens three years, 203; + be inhabitants of States from which chosen, 212. + Larger, favored by Wilson, Madison, and Hamilton, 213. + Ultimate choice of executive by, 222. + To present impeachments, 262. + Quorum of, 262. + To choose its own presiding officer, 263. + To vote for President by States, 394. + Choice of President by, quorum for, 394; + majority of States requisite to, 394. + + HOWE, SIR WILLIAM, proclamation by, respecting oath of allegiance, I. + 106. + Takes possession of Philadelphia, 113. + Estimate of, concerning the American force at the Brandywine, 113. + + HUMPHREYS, Colonel, one of Washington's aids, II. 493. + Letter of, respecting hopes of loyalists, 493. + + HUNTINGTON, Governor, influence of, in convention of Connecticut, II. + 529. + + + I. + + _Impeachment_, executive proposed to be removable on, II. 171. + Whether executive should be subject to, 176. + How to be decided, 232. + To be presented by House of Representatives, 262. + Of President, causes of, 397. + King's pardon cannot be pleaded in bar of, 414. + President cannot pardon, 414. + King may pardon, 414. + + _Impeachments_, proposed plan respecting, II. 235. + Nature of, and constitutional provisions respecting, 260. + To be tried by Senate, 261. + + _Imposts_, power of Congress to collect, II. 322. + To be uniform throughout United States, 325. + What may be laid by States, 368. + Laid by States, net produce of, how applied, 368; + subject to the revision of Congress, 368. + Revenue from, easiest mode of paying expenses of government, 528. + + _Indian Affairs_, superintendence of, assumed by Continental Congress, + I. 35. + + _Indians_, position of, II. 325. + Commerce with, 325; + regulated by federal authority, 326; + provision of Confederation respecting, 326. + Not regarded as foreign nations, 326. + + _Independence_, resolution of, adopted in Congress, I. 49. + Declaration of, ordered to be prepared, 50; + brought in, 51; + adopted, 51; + effect of, 51. + + _Inspection Laws_, subject to what abuse, II. 368. + + _Insurrection._ See _Massachusetts_ and _Shays's Rebellion_. + + + J. + + JAY, JOHN, report of, on the infractions of the Treaty of Peace, I. + 254, 257. + Projected mission of, to Spain, 313. + Proceedings of, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, respecting the + Mississippi, 313. + Essays of, in Federalist, II. 503. + Efforts of, to procure adoption of Constitution by New York, 585. + + JEFFERSON, THOMAS, one of the committee to prepare Declaration of + Independence, I. 50. + Account by, concerning the Congress of 1776, 64. + Account by, of Declaration of Independence, 82. + In the legislature of Virginia, 126. + One of the commissioners to procure commercial treaties, 287. + On the surrender of the Mississippi, 321. + Suggests the decimal coinage, 443. + Views of, respecting admission of States, II. 76. + Resolve of, for organization of States from Northwestern Territory, + 343. + Practice of, respecting cabinet, 409. + Views of, respecting government, 506; + modifications of Constitution, 506. + At Paris when Constitution was adopted, 506. + Did not counsel rejection of Constitution, 508. + Persevered in certain objections to Constitution, 509. + Letters of, respecting Constitution, 562, 564. + + JOHNSON, Dr., of Connecticut, views of, respecting Constitution, II. + 128. + First suggested present constitution of Congress, 138. + + _Journal_, to be kept by each house of Congress, II. 263. + + _Judges_, tenure of office of, II. 67; + in England, 67. + Removal of, 68. + Power of removal of, in England, 69; + in Massachusetts, 70. + "Good behavior" of, 70. + + _Judicial Power of United States_, to settle disputes between State + and nation, II. 54. + Unknown to Confederation, 60. + Necessity and office of, 61. + Intent evinced by introduction of, 63. + Made supreme, 64. + Coextensive with legislative, 65. + Control of, over State legislation, 66. + Formation of, 421. + Great embarrassments respecting, 422. + Admirable structure of, 422. + Jurisdiction of, cases embraced by, 423. + Great importance of clearly defining, 425. + Embraces cases under Constitution, laws, and treaties, 429. + Changes and improvements in original plan of, 431. + Constitutional functions of, 431. + Leading purposes of, 431. + May declare laws unconstitutional, 434. + Simplicity, &c. given by, to operation of government, 437. + + _Judiciary_, functions of, II. 63, 432. + Question concerning number of tribunals in, 65. + Proposed powers of, 66. + Restriction respecting salary of, 176. + Jurisdiction of, respecting impeachment of national officers, 176; + over cases arising under national laws, 176; + over questions involving national peace, 176. + Action of, not to be influenced by other departments, 246. + + _Judiciary of Massachusetts_, attempt to alter the charter in respect + to, I. 6. + + + K. + + _Kentucky_, inhabitants of, resist the surrender of the Mississippi, + I. 322. + + KING, RUFUS, birth and education of, I. 448. + Public services of, 448. + Proposes the clause respecting the obligation of contracts, 452; II. + 365. + Senator in Congress, I. 453. + Minister to England, 453. + A member of committee to apportion representatives, II. 148. + Views of, respecting Senate, 225; + seat of government, 275. + Remarks of, respecting slave-trade, 281. + Views of, respecting representation of slaves, 292. + Effort of, to exclude slavery from Northwestern Territory, 343. + + + L. + + _Land_ as the basis of a rule for contribution, I. 210. + Adopted as measure of wealth by Congress of 1776, II. 160. + Of United States unappropriated, Madison's motion respecting, 351. + + _Lands_, right of aliens to hold, proposed in certain treaties, I. + 280. + See _Western Lands_ and _Territory_. + + _Law of Nations_, offences against, II. 330; + power of Congress to define and punish, 331. + Respecting extradition of fugitives, 456. + + _Laws_ of United States, how enacted, II. 264; + supreme, 372, 374; + to be in pursuance of Constitution, 374; + cases arising under, jurisdiction over, 430. + Of States, constitutionality of, 374. + Constitutionality of, how determined, 434. + + LAW, RICHARD, influence of, in convention of Connecticut, II. 529. + + LEE, CHARLES, General, expedition of, against the Tories of New York, + I. 66. + + LEE, RICHARD HENRY, moves the resolution of independency, I. 49. + Account of, 49. + On the navigation of the Mississippi, 315. + Proposition of, in Congress, to amend Constitution, II. 500. + Opposed to Constitution, 506. + + _Legislative Department_, division of, into two chambers, I. 119. + Omnipotent in England, 72. + Powers of, limited in America by constitutions, 72. + Hamilton's views respecting, II. 100, 103, 105. + Great struggle respecting, in Constitutional Convention, 130. + Objections to one chamber in, 130. + How far may safely be influenced by executive, 244. + Action of, requires discretion, 246. + Close relation of, to executive, 247. + + _Letters of Marque and Reprisal_ issued by Massachusetts in 1775, I. + 75. + Power of Congress to grant, II. 332. + + _Lexington_, battle of, I. 27. + + LIVINGSTON, ROBERT R., one of the committee to prepare Declaration of + Independence, I. 50. + Remarks of, in convention of New York, II. 574. + Efforts of, to procure adoption of Constitution by New York, 585. + + _Long Island_, battle of, I. 91. + + LOWNDES, RAWLINS, opposed to Constitution, II. 510. + Arguments of, against Constitution, 511. + + _Loyalists_, scheme of, respecting Bishop of Osnaburg, II. 492. + Numbers of, small, 493. + Alarm occasioned by supposed scheme of, 493. + See _Tories_. + + + M. + + MADISON, JAMES, enters the Revolutionary Congress, I. 126. + Exertions of, respecting revenue system, 176. + Writes the address in favor of revenue system, 177. + Answers Massachusetts on the half-pay, 193. + Birth of, 420. + Public services of, to the close of the war, 420. + Initiates the Virginia measures leading to a general Convention, + 423. + Attends the convention at Annapolis, 427. + Attends the general Convention, 427. + Labors of, in the Convention, 427. + Opinions and character of, 428. + Described by Jefferson, 430. + Letter of, to Philip Mazzei, 431. + Action of, respecting change in rule of suffrage, II. 36. + Views of, respecting national government, 40; + Senate, 41; + revision by Congress of State legislation, 54; + revisionary check on legislation by executive, 58; + use of force against States, 62; + Constitution, 106; + rule of suffrage for House of Representatives, 135; + dissolution of Union, 136; + Western States, 152. + How far in favor of executive during "good behavior," 173. + Views of, respecting difference between Constitution and league, + 184; + naturalization, 205. + In favor of larger House of Representatives, 213. + Views of, respecting eligibility of members of Congress to office, + 250; + seat of government, 275. + In favor of tax on exports, 284. + Views of, respecting slave-trade, 304. + Proposition of, respecting Indian affairs, 327. + Views of, respecting legislation of Congress of Confederation over + Northwestern Territory, 345, 348, 351. + Views and votes of, concerning Northwestern Territory, 348. + Holds regulation of commerce to be indivisible, 371. + Views of, respecting treason, 386. + Motion of, respecting election of President, 403. + Views of, respecting amendment of Constitution, 477; + consequences of rejection of Constitution, 487. + Proposed amendment of Constitution by Congress, defeated by, 500. + Essays of, in Federalist, 503. + A leading advocate of Constitution in Virginia, 506. + Reply of, to opponents of Constitution in Virginia convention, 558. + Description of new government by, 559. + Efforts of, in Virginia convention, 564. + Opinion of, respecting conditional ratification of Constitution, + 588. + + _Magazines_, authority of Congress over, II. 340. + + _Majority_, principle of, seldom to be departed from, II. 299. + + _Mandamus Councillors_, appointment of, in Massachusetts, I. 25. + Treatment of, by the people, 25. + + MANLY, JOHN, commander of the Lee, I. 74. + Captures a prize, 75. + + _Maritime Jurisdiction_, of courts of United States, II. 445. + Under Confederation, 445. + + MARSHALL, JOHN, a leading advocate of Constitution in Virginia, II. + 506. + + MARTIN, LUTHER, views of, respecting Constitution, II. 92, 121; + rule of suffrage for House of Representatives, 135; + manner of voting in Senate, 186. + Motion of, respecting admission of States, 354. + Supremacy of Constitution, &c. proposed by, 374. + Great opposition of, to Constitution, 484, 512. + Communication of, to legislature of Maryland, 512; + chief ground of, 513. + + MARTINDALE, captain in the Revolutionary naval force, I. 74. + + _Maryland_, a proprietary government, I. 5. + Constitution of, formed, 122. + Remonstrates against the claims to Western lands, 131, 421. + Ratifies the Constitution, 136. + Action of, commended, 138. + Appoints and instructs delegates to the Convention, 369. + Action of, upon the Articles of Confederation, 501. + Delegates from, divided in opinion, II. 121. + Divided on question of national legislature, 133; + equality of suffrage in House of Representatives, 138. + In favor of equal representation of States in Senate, 141, 165. + Had six representatives in first House, 149. + Opposed to census of free inhabitants, 153; + executive holding office during "good behavior," 173. + In favor of referring Constitution to State legislatures, 184; + each State having one vote in Senate, 186, 227. + Vote of, respecting citizenship, as qualification for office, 209; + money bills, 216, 218. + Opposed to nine years' citizenship as qualification of senator, 224; + taxing exports, 296. + Vote of, respecting slave-trade, 305; + admission of States, 354. + Action of legislature of, respecting Constitution, 511. + Convention of, to vote on Constitution, 514; + importance of action of, 542; + efforts made in, to amend Constitution, defeated, 543. + + MASON, GEORGE, views of, respecting Constitution, II. 123. + Objections of, to compound ratio of representation, 151. + Views of, respecting money bills, 218. + Opposed to tax on exports, 294. + Proposition of, to restrain grants of perpetual revenue, 319. + Views of, respecting militia, 337. + Refused to sign Constitution, why, 485, 509. + Great ability of, 505. + Opposed to Constitution, 505. + In favor of submitting Constitution to people of Virginia, 509. + Arguments of, against Constitution, in Virginia convention, 557. + + _Massachusetts_, a charter government, I. 5. + Provincial governor of, appointed by the crown, 5. + Council of, chosen by Assembly, 5. + Representatives of, chosen by the people, 5. + Appoints delegates to first Continental Congress, 12. + Colonial government of, how ended, 25. + Provincial Congress of, how formed, 26. + Authority assumed by Provincial Congress, 26. + Applies to the Continental Congress, for direction and assistance, + 31; + about government, 32. + Army raised by, in 1775, 31. + Issues letters of marque and reprisal, 75. + Establishes prize court, 75. + Money borrowed of, by General Washington, 80. + Constitution of, formed, 121. + Objections of, to the half-pay, 191; + answered by Madison, 193. + Act of, concerning British debts, 253. + Constitution of, dangers to which it was exposed, 263. + Insurrection in, 266, II. 83. + Disaffection in, extensive, I. 273. + Cedes claims to Western Territory, 300. + Proceedings of, respecting a general Convention, 334. + Condition of the trade of, in 1785-86, 335. + Legislature of, proposes a general Convention, 336; + resolutions of, not presented to Congress, 337. + Resolution of, for a general Convention, 361. + Appoints and instructs delegates to the Convention, 369. + Opposed to equality of suffrage in House of Representatives, II. + 138; + equal representation of States in Senate, 141, 217. + Divided on question of equal vote of States in Senate, 148, 165. + Had eight representatives in first House, 149. + In favor of census of free inhabitants, 153. + Opposed to executive holding office during "good behavior," 173. + Qualifications of voter in, 188. + In favor of property qualification for national officers, 204. + Vote of, respecting citizenship as qualification for office, 209; + money bills, 216, 218. + Opposed to nine years' citizenship as qualification of Senator, 224; + each State having one vote in Senate, 227. + Sentiments of, respecting holding of office by members of Congress, + 249. + In favor of States paying members of Congress, 259. + Opposed to taxing exports, 296. + Vote of, respecting slave-trade, 305. + Slavery in, as early as 1630, 454. + Parties in, for and against Constitution, 501. + Reception of Constitution in, 501. + Convention in, to vote on Constitution, 502, 530. + Formidable opposition to Constitution in convention of, 529. + High rank of, 530. + Vacillation of, 530. + Revolutionary history of, 530. + Anxiety respecting action of, on Constitution, 531. + Insurrection in, effect of, 531. + Constitution exposed to peculiar hazard in, 531; + ratified in, by compromise, 531. + Constitution of, excellence of, 531. + Parties in convention of, 532. + Convention in, amendments to Constitution recommended by, 532, 538, + 539; + opponents of Constitution in, 533, 534; + eminent men in, 534. + Probable disastrous effects of rejection of Constitution by, 535. + Convention of, proceedings in, 536; + discussion in, respecting Hancock's amendments to Constitution, + 538; + patriotic conduct of, 539. + Enthusiasm kindled by action of, 541. + + MAZZEI, PHILIP, letter to, by Madison, I. 431. + + MCKEAN, THOMAS, views of, respecting Constitution, II. 523. + Public services of, 524. + + MIFFLIN, General, sent by Washington to the Congress, I. 98. + + _Military Posts_, retained by the British after the treaty, I. 256, + 259. + + _Militia_, relation of, to the Continental Congress, I. 35. + Committee on, II. 319. + Of States, power of general government over, 334; + inefficient as troops in Revolution, 334; + lack of uniformity among, 335; + power of general government over, necessary, 336; + how to be disciplined, 337; + when Congress may call forth, 338; + President commander-in-chief of, 413; + cannot call out without authority of Congress, 413. + + _Ministers._ See _Ambassadors_. + + _Mint_, establishment of, I. 444. + + _Mississippi River_, controversy and negotiations respecting + navigation of, I. 310; + referred to the new government, 327. + Navigation of, a topic of opponents of Constitution in Virginia + convention, II. 565; + Madison's views respecting, 567. + + _Mississippi Valley_, people of, spirit of the, I. 319; + retaliate upon the Spanish authorities, 322; + form committees, &c., 323. + + _Monarchical Government_, dangers of attempting to establish, I. 370. + + _Monarchy_, detested by people of United States, II. 237, 492. + Proposed, rumors of, 492. + Attempt to introduce, averted by Constitution, 494. + + _Money_, power to coin, given to Congress, II. 328; + borrow, and emit bills, 328. + + _Money Bills_, Originated by House of Representatives, II. 146. + Provision concerning, objected to, 147; + origin of, 214. + Originated by House of Commons, 216. + Hallam's discussion respecting, 216. + Vote of States respecting, 216. + Different propositions in Convention respecting, 219. + May be amended in Senate, 222. + + MONTESQUIEU, political discussions of, alluded to, I. 377. + + MORRIS, GOUVERNEUR, Enters the Revolutionary Congress, I. 127. + Birth of, 440. + Public services of, 440. + Chosen Assistant Financier, 443. + Author of the decimal notation, 443. + Prepares the text of the Constitution, 444. + Character of, 444. + First Minister to France, 447. + Senator from New York, 447. + Invited to write in The Federalist, 447. + Death of, 447. + + Action of, respecting change in rule of suffrage, II. 36. + A member of committee to apportion representatives, 148. + Views of, respecting Atlantic and Western States, 152; + respecting compound ratio of representation, 152. + Proviso of, respecting taxation and representation, 158. + Views of, respecting choice of executive, 174. + Remarks of, respecting slave-trade, 281. + In favor of tax on exports, 284. + Views of, on concession to Southern States, 293. + Committee of compromise proposed by, 301. + Proposition of, respecting vacant lands, 355. + + MORRIS, ROBERT, on a committee to inform Washington of extraordinary + powers, I. 101. + Laments the absence of some great revolutionary characters, 104. + Appointed Superintendent of Finances, 174. + Resignation of, 198. + + _Mutiny_, at Philadelphia, of federal troops, I. 220. + + + N. + + _Natchez_, seizure of property at, by Spanish authorities, I. 318. + + _National Government_, how distinguished from "federal," II. 33. + Necessities of, 34. + To be kept distinct from State governments, 37. + By what States preferred, 117. + Arguments in favor of, 122; + theoretically sound, 126; + strengthened by facts of previous history, 127. + Supposed tendency of, to absorb State sovereignties, 128. + Self-defence a principal object of, 292. + + _National Legislature_, how to be constituted, II. 35. + Divided into two branches, 36. + Representation in, diverse views respecting, 36; + as affected by State interests, 43; + difficulty in fixing ratio of, 43. + Unanimity respecting powers of, in Convention, 50. + Negative by, on State legislatures, proposed, 51. + Must operate directly on people, 63. + Proposed powers of, 65. + + _Naturalization_, a subject of solicitude, II. 196. + Formerly a State power, 198, 199. + A proper subject of constitutional provision, 200. + Power of, transferred from State to national government, 201. + Views of Hamilton and Madison respecting, 205. + Embarrassments of subject, 205. + Uniform rule of, power to establish, given to Congress, 328. + + _Naval Force_, employment of, in Massachusetts Bay, I. 73. + + _Navigation Act_, report of committee of detail respecting, II. 290, + 301. + Position of Southern States respecting, 297. + Two-thirds vote proposed by them to be required for, 299. + Interest of different States respecting, 301. + Passage of, by majority, agreed to, 304. + + _Navy_, origin of the Revolutionary, I. 73. + Want of, II. 298. + Power of Congress to provide and maintain, 334; + to make rules for, 334. + Power of President to employ, 413. + President commander-in-chief of, 413. + + _Newark_, Washington's evacuation of, I. 98. + + _Newburgh Addresses_, authorship and style of, I. 168. + Copy of, sent to the States, 177. + Note on, 194. + + _New England_, confederation of, in 1643, II. 453. + + _New Hampshire_, a provincial government, I. 4. + Ante-Revolutionary government of, 4. + Constitution of, formed, 119. + Appoints and instructs delegates to the Convention, 369. + Late attendance of, in Convention, II. 24. + Had three representatives in first House, 149. + In favor of property qualification for national officers, 204. + Vote of, respecting citizenship, as qualification for office, 209; + respecting money bills, 218; + respecting slave-trade, 305. + In favor of taxing exports, 296. + Vote on Constitution in, postponed, why, 510; + effect of, on parties in Virginia, 510. + Population of, easily led to oppose Constitution, 514. + Convention of, to vote on Constitution, 514; + members of, instructed to reject Constitution, 529; + amendments presented to, 541; + majority of, at first opposed to Constitution, 541; + adjournment of, effect of, 541. + Action of Federalists of, 541. + Convention of, meets, on adjournment, 549; + anxiety respecting action of, 549. + Ratification of Constitution by, 573. + Ninth State to ratify Constitution, 578. + + _New Jersey_, a provincial government, I. 4. + Washington's retreat through, 97. + Constitution of, formed, 122. + Proposal of, in 1778, for the regulation of commerce, 129. + Resists the claim of great States to Western lands, 131. + Ratifies the Confederation, 135. + Action of, commended, 138. + Attempts to pay its quotas in paper money, 242. + Recommends the regulation of commerce, 277. + Appoints and instructs delegates to the Convention, 368. + Representation of, concerning the Articles of Confederation, 493. + Act of, accepting them, 497. + Purely "federal" government proposed by, II. 92. + Hamilton's plan of, radical objections to, 99; + condemned by Madison, 106. + Opposed to division of legislature, 133. + In favor of equality of suffrage in House of Representatives, 138; + of equal representation of States in Senate, 141, 148, 165. + Had four representatives in first House, 149. + In favor of census of free inhabitants, 153; + of executive holding office during "good behavior," 173. + Vote of, respecting citizenship as qualification for office, 209; + respecting money bills, 216, 218. + In favor of each State having one vote in Senate, 227. + Vote of, respecting eligibility of members of Congress to office, + 251; + respecting representation of slaves, 293; + respecting slave-trade, 305; + respecting admission of States, 354. + In favor of taxing exports, 296. + Opposed to restricting President to stated salary, 407. + Ratification of Constitution by, 515. + Convention of, 524. + Position of, respecting Constitution, 524. + Always in favor of vesting regulation of commerce in general + government, 525. + Action of, in Constitutional Convention, respecting representation, + 525. + + _New States_, admission of, under the Confederation, I. 292; + under the Ordinance of 1787, 308. + See _Western Territory_ and _Northwestern Territory_. + + _New York_, + Constitution of, formed, I. 122. + Magnanimity of, commended, 137. + Action of, upon the revenue system of 1783, 246. + Act of, respecting British debts, 253. + Trespass act of, 256. + Proceedings of, respecting a general commercial convention, 343, + 358. + Resolution of, for a general Convention, 360; + how received in Congress, 360. + Appoints and instructs delegates to the Convention, 369. + Act of, respecting boundaries, &c., 505. + Rank of, at formation of Constitution, II. 118. + Commerce of, at formation of Constitution, 118. + Views of public men of, 118. + Opposed to division of legislature, 133. + In favor of equality of suffrage in House of Representatives, 138; + in Senate, 141, 148. + Had six representatives in first House, 149. + Withdrawal of delegates of, from Convention, 165, 182, 484, 502. + Rejection of Constitution by, probable, 182. + Vote of, respecting money bills, 216. + In favor of each State having one vote in Senate, 227. + Reception of Constitution in, 502. + Executive government of, opposed to Constitution, 502. + Jealousy of Union existing in, 502. + Letter of delegates of, against Constitution, 502. + Proceedings of legislature of, respecting Constitution, 503; + of parties in, respecting Constitution, 503. + Convention of, to vote on Constitution, 504. + Formidable opposition to Constitution in convention of, 529. + Legislature of, divided on question of submitting Constitution to + people, 536. + Convention of, importance of action of, 542; + time of meeting of, 549; + anxiety respecting action of, 549; + met at Poughkeepsie, 549; + Hamilton leading spirit in, 568; + discussion in, respecting system of representation proposed by + Constitution, 573. + Opponents of Constitution in, arguments and plan of, 572; + Hamilton's reply to, 572. + Effect on, of ratification by New Hampshire, 574. + Opponents of Constitution in, schemes of, 584. + Numerous amendments to Constitution proposed by, 587. + Plan of, to adopt Constitution conditionally, 587. + Great struggle in, over ratification of Constitution, 588. + Circular letter from, to all other States, 588. + Federalists of, justified by Washington, 590; + complaints against, 591. + + _New York City_, applies to the Continental Congress respecting + British troops, I. 31. + Occupied by the British, 91. + Temporary establishment of seat of government at, effect of, 591. + Celebration in, of adoption of Constitution, 592. + Honors paid by, to Hamilton, 592. + + NICHOLAS, GEORGE, a leading advocate of Constitution in Virginia, II. + 506. + + _Nobility_, title of, cannot be granted by Congress, II. 362. + + _Non-Intercourse_, when and why adopted by Colonies, I. 23. + Association for, recommended and adopted, 24. + + _North Carolina_, a provincial government, I. 4. + Constitution of, formed, 122. + Appoints and instructs delegates to the Convention, 369. + Opposed to equality of suffrage in House of Representatives, II. + 138; + to equality of votes in Senate, 141, 217. + Vote of, respecting equal vote of States in Senate, 141, 148, 165; + respecting census of free inhabitants, 153. + Had five representatives in first House, 149. + Opposed to executive holding office during "good behavior," 173. + Vote of, respecting citizenship as qualification for office, 209; + respecting money bills, 216, 218. + Divided on question of nine years' citizenship as qualification of + Senator, 224. + Opposed to each State having one vote in Senate, 227; + to taxing exports, 296. + Position of, in Convention, respecting slave-trade, 297, 301. + Vote of, respecting slave-trade, 305; + on suspension of habeas corpus, 360. + Cession by, in 1790, 357. + Opposed to restricting President to stated salary, 407. + Convention of, Anti-Federal majority in, 596; + debate in, 596; + amendments to Constitution proposed by, 597; + peculiar action of, 597. + Attitude of, placed Union in new crisis, 603. + + _Northern States_, in favor of granting to government full revenue and + commercial powers, II. 292. + Chief motive of, for forming Constitution a commercial one, 298. + Cut off from British West India trade, 298. + Separate interests of, different, 300. + + _Northwestern Territory_ ceded by Virginia, I. 137, 295. + Cession modified, 300. + Ordinance respecting, why framed, 301; + provisions of, 302; + character of, 306. + Ordinance for, reported, 452. + Cession of, II. 15. + Origin and relations of, &c., 341. + Jefferson's resolve for organization of States in, 343. + Slavery in, proposals for prohibiting, 343. + Ceded on what trusts, 347, 349. + Admission of new States under, see _New States_. + + + O. + + _Oath_, of office, proposed by New Jersey in 1778, I. 130. + + _Oath of Allegiance_, to the King, received by Sir William Howe in New + Jersey, I. 106. + To the United States required by Washington in New Jersey, 107; + dissatisfaction occasioned by, 107. + Propriety of, defended by Washington, 108. + Prescribed in Congress in 1778, 109. + + _Obligation of Contracts_, clause respecting, taken from the Ordinance + of 1787, I. 452. + + _Officers_ of United States, appointment of, II. 417. + + _Officers of the Revolution_, treatment of, by Congress, and the + country, I. 159. + Pay of, 159. + Proceedings in Congress respecting half-pay for, 160. + Pennsylvania line, 163. + Proceedings of, respecting their pay, 165. + See _Army of the Revolution_, _Half-pay_, and _Newburgh Addresses_. + + _Oligarchy_, detested by people of United States, II. 237. + + _Orders in Council_, respecting trade with the United States, I. 283. + Efforts of Congress to counteract, 285. + Effect of, on Northern States, II. 298. + + _Ordinance of 1787_, framing of, I. 452. + Admission of new States provided for by, II. 77. + Fixed no mode of admitting new States, 79. + Provisions of, 344. + Slavery excluded by, 344. + Author of, 344, 365. + Passed, 365. + Character of, 366. + Provision in, respecting contracts, occasion of, 366. + Extradition of slaves under, 454. + + _Osnaburg, Bishop of_, rumored purpose of loyalists respecting, II. + 492. + Afterwards Duke of York, 493. + + + P. + + PAINE, ROBERT TREAT, delegate to first Continental Congress, I. 13. + + PALFREY, Colonel, sent to New Hampshire to arrest Tories, I. 65. + + _Paper Money_, first issued by the Continental Congress, I. 78. + Signing of, 78. + State systems of, under Confederation, II. 310. + See _Rhode Island_. + + _Pardon_, + President's power of, II. 413. + See _Treason_. + + _Parliament, British_, authority of, over trade, how recognized by + first Continental Congress, I. 20. + Two houses in, origin of, II. 130; + mutual relations of, 130. + Corruption in, origin and extent of, 242; + effect of knowledge of, on framers of Constitution, 243. + Necessity of officers of state, &c. sitting in, 254. + Analogy of Congress to, 254. + + PARSONS, THEOPHILUS, + motion of, in Massachusetts Convention, to ratify Constitution, II. + 537. + Form of ratification and proposed amendments drawn by, 541. + + _Patents_ for useful inventions, subject of, brought forward by + Pinckney, II. 339. + State legislation concerning, 339. + Power over, surrendered to Congress, 339. + + PATTERSON, WILLIAM, + mover of New Jersey plan of government, II. 93. + Arguments of, in Convention, 93. + + _Peace_, effect of, upon the country, I. 179. + See _Treaty of Peace_. + + _Peace Establishment._ See _Washington_ and _Hamilton_. + + PENDLETON, Chancellor, a leading advocate of Constitution in Virginia, + II. 506. + + _Pennsylvania_, + a proprietary government, I. 5. + Constitution of, formed, 122. + Stop-law of, 253. + Appoints and instructs delegates to the Convention, 368. + Had but one chamber in legislature, II. 132. + Opposed to election of Senators by State legislatures, 135; + to equality of suffrage in House of Representatives, 138; + to equal representation of States in Senate, 141, 148, 165, 217. + Had eight representatives in first House, 149. + In favor of census of free inhabitants, 153; + of executive holding office during good behavior, 173. + Opposed to property qualification for office, 189. + Constitution of, citizenship under, 206. + Vote of, respecting citizenship as qualification for office, 209; + respecting money bills, 218. + Opposed to nine years' citizenship as qualification of Senator, 224; + to each State having one vote in Senate, 227; + to impeachments being tried by Senate, 262. + In favor of taxing exports, 296. + Vote of, respecting slave-trade, 305. + Ratification of Constitution by, 515. + Convention of, first to meet, 519. + Second State in population, in 1787, 519. + Western counties of, insurrection in, 521; + opposition of, to Constitution, 524. + + _People of America_, + when not associated as such, I. 16. + Sole original source of political power, II. 38, 471, 482. + Will of, + how to be exercised, 471; + on a new exigency, how to be ascertained, 483. + + _Petition_, + right of assembling for, asserted, I. 23. + Of Continental Congress to the King, 23, 38. + + _Philadelphia_, + threatened loss of, to the enemy, I. 99. + Falls into the hands of the enemy, 113. + Fought for, at the battle of the Brandywine, 113. + The scene of many great events, II. 519. + Demonstration at, in honor of adoption of Constitution, 582. + + PICKERING, TIMOTHY, suggests academy at West Point, I. 218. + + PINCKNEY, CHARLES COTESWORTH, + Revolutionary services of, I. 454. + Views of, respecting the requisite reform, 455; + on the slave-trade, 456, 459, 460; + respecting consequences of rejection of Constitution, 487. + Proposition of, respecting taxes on exports, II. 189; + respecting extradition of slaves, 189, 452. + Notifies Convention of position of South Carolina concerning tax on + exports, 280. + In favor of Constitution, 510. + Writes to Washington of adoption of Constitution by South Carolina, + 544. + Fidelity of, to South Carolina, 545. + Arguments of, in South Carolina convention, 548. + + PINCKNEY, CHARLES, + plan of government submitted by, II. 32. + Proposition of, respecting House of Representatives, negatived, 40. + Suggestions of, respecting public debt, revenue, &c., 319. + In favor of Constitution, 510. + + _Piracy_, + nature of, II. 331. + Power of Congress to define and punish, 331. + + PITT, WILLIAM, + designs commercial relations with the United States, I. 282. + His bill to effect them, 283. + His extraordinary opportunities, 413. + Estimate of, 414. + + _Political Science_, + among the ancients, I. 374. + In the Middle Ages of Europe, 375; + in England, 376; + in France, 377. + + _Popular Governments_, American theory of, I. 261. + + _Population_ of States in 1790, table of, II. 55. + + _Ports_, no preference to be given to, II. 324. + + _Post-Office_ department, + Continental, first established, I. 35; + colonial, 433. + Power to establish, extended to post-roads, II. 328. + + _Preamble_ of Constitution, + as reported and adopted, II. 372; + language of, important, 373. + + _President_, + making of treaties by, with consent of Senate, II. 234. + Officers proposed to be appointed by, with consent of Senate, 234. + Re-eligibility of, arguments in favor of, 235. + Choice of, proposed method of, 235; + by Senate, objections to, 236, 392; + ultimate, by House of Representatives, 240, 394. + Revisionary control over, where to be lodged, 239. + Extensive patronage of, 252. + Subject to impeachment, 261; + for what causes, 397. + Veto power of, 264. + Objections of, to law, to be entered on journal of Congress, 264. + Choice of, direct, by people, negatived, 388; + by electors, objections to, 388; + advantages of, 389; + method of, 390. + Term of office of, proposed to be seven years, 392. + Choice of, by majority of electors, objections to, 393. + Vacancy in office of, 397; + when Congress to provide for, 401. + "Inability" of, to discharge duties, meaning of, 397; + how ascertained, 397. + Insanity of, 397. + Death of, and of Vice-President, 398. + Choice of, changes in mode of, 400; + if not made before 4th of March, 400; + by House of Representatives, to be from three highest candidates, + 400. + Qualifications of, 404. + Pay of, arguments in favor of, 404; + not to be increased nor diminished during term of office, 406. + Forbidden to receive more than stated salary, 407. + Council for, question concerning, 407. + May require opinions of cabinet officers, 408. + Alone responsible for conduct of executive department, 409. + Powers of, 409; + to make war and peace, 411; + over State militia, 413; + to pardon offences, 413; + to appoint officers, 417. + "Executive power" vested in, meaning of, 412. + Oath of, to execute laws, 412. + Commander-in-chief, 413. + To prosecute war, 413. + Treaty-making power of, 414. + To receive ambassadors, &c., 415. + Cannot create offices, 418. + To inform Congress of state of Union, 419. + To recommend measures to Congress, 419. + May call extra sessions of Congress, 419. + When may adjourn Congress, 419. + + PRINGLE, JOHN JULIUS, in favor of Constitution, II. 510. + + _Prize-Courts_, want of, under the Revolutionary government, I. 73. + Establishment of, urged by Washington, 75. + Of Massachusetts, trials in, 75. + Colonial, appeals from, to Congress, 76. + Under Constitution, II. 330. + + _Property_, urged as basis of representation, II. 148. + As a qualification of elector, 148; + for office, 187, 202. + + _Proprietary Governments_, form and character of, I. 5. + + _Protections_, issued by Sir William Howe in New Jersey, I. 106. + Surrender of, required by Washington, 106. + + _Provincial Governments_, form and character of, I. 4. + + _Public Lands._ + See _Western Territory, Northwestern Territory_, and _Ordinance of_ + 1787. + + + Q. + + _Qualifications_, + of national officers, proposals respecting, II. 186; + landed, rejected, 187; + property, an embarrassing subject, 202. + Of electors, 187, 194, 200. + Of voter in Massachusetts, 188. + Of members of Congress, 194. + Of citizenship, embarrassments respecting, 205; + attempt to exempt certain persons from rule respecting, 205. + Of Senators, 223. + Of Vice-President, 401. + Of President, 404. + Of religious test, never to be required, 479. + + _Queen's County, Long Island_, inhabitants of, to be disarmed, I. 68. + + _Quorum_, discussions in Convention respecting, II. 262. + + _Quotas_, first apportionment of, among the Colonies, I. 34. + Of troops in 1776, 92. + See _Requisitions_. + + + R. + + RAMSAY, DAVID, Dr., in favor of Constitution, II. 510. + + RANDOLPH, EDMUND, + urges Washington to attend the Convention, I. 365. + Revolutionary services of, 480. + Governor of Virginia, 481. + Course of, in the Convention, 481. + Reasons of, for supporting the Constitution, 481. + Genealogy of, 485. + Plan of government proposed by, II. 32, 410. + A member of committee to apportion representatives, 148. + Objections of, to compound ratio of representation, 151. + Proposition of, respecting census, 162; + to strike out "wealth" from rule of representation, 164. + In favor of confining equality of States in Senate to certain cases, + 165. + Views of, respecting money bills, 218. + Resolution of, respecting admission of new States, 349. + Clause introduced by, respecting death of President, &c., 403. + Refused to sign Constitution, why, 485, 555. + Position of, respecting Constitution, 506. + Advocated adoption of Constitution in Virginia convention, 556. + + RANDOLPH, PEYTON, + President of first Continental Congress, I. 13; + of second Continental Congress, 28. + Death and character of, 28. + + _Ratification_ of Constitution, as marking character of government, + II. 85. + Different theories respecting, 177. + Mode of, 375; + resolutions respecting, 375; + purpose of, 375; + an embarrassing question, 479. + Vote of States respecting, 483, 515. + By only part of States, effect of, 484. + Unanimous, could not be required, 484. + By nine States sufficient, 485. + Pageants in honor of, 540. + Public rejoicings in Baltimore at, 543. + By New Hampshire, 573, 578. + By Virginia, 578; + how finally effected, 579; + form of, 581. + Vitiated by condition, in Madison's opinion, 588. + Great struggle over, in New York, 588. + See the different States. + + _Records and Judicial Proceedings_ of States, full faith to be given + to, in other States, II. 449. + Proof and effect of, 449. + + READ, GEORGE, views of, respecting rule of suffrage for House of + Representatives, II. 135. + + _Regulation of Commerce_ proposed by New Jersey in 1778, I. 129. + Not provided for by the Confederation, 148. + Advantages of, not perceived, 179. + Origin of, as a national power, 276. + Washington's views respecting, 334. + Popular meetings in Boston in favor of, 336. + Policy of Congress respecting, in 1785-86, 337. + + _Representation_, views of members of Convention respecting, II. 18. + In Congress, different views respecting, 36; + difficulty in fixing ratio of, 44. + As affected by State interests, 43. + Original division between States respecting, 50. + Under Virginia and New Jersey plans, 105. + Great difficulty in adjusting, 108. + Difficulty of fixing different basis of, for two houses of Congress, + 133. + Committee to adjust whole system of, 145. + Dr. Franklin's proposal in Congress concerning, 146. + Ratio of, in House of Representatives, 147. + Of slaves, 149. + Compound ratio of, depending on numbers and wealth, proposed, 149; + objections to, 151; + how to be applied, 156. + By numbers, as affected by slaves, 153, 291. + And taxation to go together, 156. + System of, proposed by Constitution, discussion on in New York, 573. + + _Representatives_, part of the Provincial government, I. 4. + In the charter governments, how chosen, 5. + Apportionment of, objections to, II. 148; + in first House, how made, 148. + + _Representative Government_ familiar to the American people, I. 117. + + _Reprisals_ authorized by the Continental Congress, I. 34. + + _Republican Government_ involved in the effort to make the + Constitution, I. 391. + Guaranteed to States, II. 177; + by Constitution, 458. + Guaranty of, to States, object of, 468; + meaning of, in America, 469. + + _Republican Liberty_, nature of, II. 8. + How to be preserved, 9. + + _Resolutions_ as referred to committee of detail, II. 190. + + _Requisitions_, provision for, under the Confederation, I. 147. + Of 1781, 156. + Made and not complied with, 174. + From 1782 to 1786, how treated, 180. + In 1784, 240. + In 1785, 242. + In 1786, 242. + Supply received from, in 1781-1786, 243; + inadequacy of, declared by Congress, 245. + Effect of, on the proposed revenue system, 244. + + _Revenue_, report of committee of detail respecting, II. 289. + Power over, generally conceded to new government, 290. + Different systems of, under Confederation, 310. + Powers of government, influence of, 311. + Power, qualifications of, proposed, 320. + From imports, easiest mode of paying expenses of government, 528. + + _Revenues_, of the Confederation, I. 147. + Want of power in Confederation to obtain, II. 280. + Numerous questions respecting, 280. + Collection of, by Congress, 323. + + _Revenue Bills_, privilege of originating, views of members of + Convention respecting, II. 221; + restricted to House of Representatives, 221. + + _Revenue System of_ 1783, origin and purpose of, I. 175. + Modified by Congress, 180. + Defeated by New York, 180. + Design of, 185. + Effect of its proposal, 186. + Character of, 224. + Under consideration in 1784, 240. + How acted on in 1786, 244. + New appeal of Congress on the subject of, 245. + Every State assents to, but New York, 246. + Act of New York concerning, 246. + Hamilton's answer to the New York objections to, 247. + New York again appealed to respecting, 247; + refuses to accede, 248. + Action of New York respecting, 343. + Final appeal of Congress for, 344. + Rejected by New York, 345, 359. + Address on, written by Madison, 422. + + _Revolution_, right of, II. 473. + + _Revolutionary Congress_, take up the Articles of Confederation, I. + 113. + Government of, breaking down, 115. + Change in the members of, after 1777, 125. + Leading members of, in 1777 and 1778, 126; + in 1776, 127. + Weakness of, II. 14. + See _Congress_. + + _Revolutionary Government_, defects of, I. 55. + + _Rhode Island_, a charter government, I. 5. + Resists the claim of the great States to Western lands, 131. + Refuses to grant imposts to Congress, 174. + Hamilton's answer to, 177. + Attempts to pay its quotas in paper money, 242. + Refusal of, to grant duties on imposts, 422. + Not represented in Constitutional Convention, II. 23, 181. + Did not assent to revenue system of 1783, 24. + Admitted to Union in 1790, 25. + Interests of, attended to by Convention, 26. + Had one representative in first House, 149. + Ratification of Constitution by, improbable, 181. + Reason of, for not attending Convention, 329. + Took no part in formation of Constitution, 484. + Opposition to Constitution in, peculiarly intense, 598; + causes of, 598. + Jealous of other States, 598. + Principles of founders of, falsely applied, 598. + Paper money party in, great power of, 599. + Great antagonism in, between town and country, 600. + Opponents of Constitution in, ridiculed and scorned, 600. + Great want of enlightenment in, 601. + Action of General Assembly of, on Constitution, 602. + People of, apparently nearly unanimous against Constitution, 602. + Final prevalence of better counsels in, 603. + Present prosperity of, 603. + Attitude of, placed Union in new crisis, 603. + + _Rights._ See _Colonies_. + + ROBINSON, Mr., Speaker of Virginia House of Burgesses, I. 48. + Celebrated compliment of, to Washington, 48. + + ROUSSEAU, J. J., political discussions of, alluded to, I. 377. + + _Rule of Apportionment_, proposal to change from land to numbers, I. + 241. + + RUTLEDGE, EDWARD, in favor of Constitution, II. 510. + Arguments of, in convention of South Carolina, 548. + + RUTLEDGE, JOHN, a member of committee to apportion representatives, + II. 148. + Motion of, for assumption of State debts, 319. + In favor of Constitution, 510. + + + S. + + _Seat of Government_, action respecting, II. 189. + None under Confederation, 268. + History of establishment of, 268. + Grave questions concerning location of, 274. + Impolicy of establishing at New York, or Philadelphia, 591. + Embarrassments attending selection of, 604. + + _Sectional Jealousy_, causes and operation of, I. 371. + + SELMAN, captain in the Revolutionary naval force, I. 74. + + _Senate_, reasons for present constitution of, II. 41. + Rule of suffrage in, 48. + Numerical representation in, favored at first, 49. + To hold office during "good behavior" under Hamilton's plan, 100, + 105. + Members of, chosen for six years, 134; + qualifications of, 134, 223. + Objects of, 138; + how to be attained, 138. + Difficulty in fixing basis of, 139. + Mr. Baldwin's model of, 139. + Fortunately not founded on relative wealth of States, 140. + Votes of States respecting, 141; + representation in, 165. + Advantages of present constitution of, 166. + Members of, to be two from each State, 186; + to vote per capita, 186; + must have been citizens nine years, 211. + Slight analogy of, to House of Lords, 215. + Equality of votes in, by what States resisted, 217. + Choice of President by, in certain events, proposed, 221, 390. + Scheme of, tending to oligarchy, 222. + May amend revenue bills, 222. + Powers of, as at first proposed, 223. + Number of members of, origin of, 224. + Method of voting in, origin of, 224. + Present mode of voting in, advantages of, 228. + Vacancies in, how filled, 229. + Primary purpose of, 229. + Disposition to accumulate power in, 230. + Constitution of, great embarrassments respecting, 233. + Separate action of, difficult to determine, 234. + Consent of, to certain acts of President, necessary, 235. + Proposed choice of President by, objections to, 236. + Only body fit to have revisionary control over appointments, 239. + Ratification of treaties by, 240. + Ultimate choice of President taken from, 240. + Length of term in, 240. + Biennial change in, 241. + To try impeachments, 261. + Quorum of, 262. + President of, 263. + May choose president pro tempore, 264. + Choice of President by, quorum for, 401; + majority necessary to, 401. + President pro tempore of, when to act as President of the United + States, 403. + Proposed appointment of ambassadors and judges by, 410. + Foreign relations committed to, 410. + Treaty-making power of, 415. + May propose treaty to President, 417. + Certain controversies between States, proposed to be tried by, 424. + Equality of States in, guaranteed by Constitution, 478. + + _Shays's Rebellion_, causes of, I. 266. + Progress of, 266, 269. + How arrested 270. + How acted upon in Congress, 271. + Effect of, upon the political state of the country, 273. + Abettors of, opposed to Constitution, II. 501. + + SHERMAN, ROGER, one of the committee to prepare Declaration of + Independence, I. 50. + Opposed to tax on exports, II. 294. + Views of, respecting tax on slaves, 304. + Motion of, respecting payment of old debts, 321. + + _Slavery_, British government responsible for the existence of, I. 87. + Complex relations of, II. 22. + Regarded by Southern statesmen as an evil, 155. + When and how abolished in States now free, 289. + Existed in what States at formation of Constitution, 313. + Facts respecting, as influencing judgment on Constitution, 313. + A matter of local concern, 313. + State laws respecting abolition of, 313. + In Northwestern Territory, proposals for excluding, 343. + State of, in 1787, 451. + Probable duration of, 451. + Principle of common law and law of nations respecting, 451, 455. + Exclusively a matter of State jurisdiction, 451. + Existed in Colonies at very early period, 453. + In Massachusetts, Dr. Belknap's article on, 454. + Depends wholly on municipal law, 457. + Fortunately left to State control, 459. + Existence of, unjustly made a reproach on United States, 465. + + _Slaves_, as affecting ratio of representation, II. 19. + Control of States over, never meant to be surrendered, 20. + Necessarily regarded in forming Constitution, 20. + As affecting basis of representation, 46. + In fixing ratio of representation, included as inhabitants, 47. + Three-fifths rule respecting, whence derived, 48. + In fixing ratio of representation, how computed, 147; + admission of, proper, 147. + Propriety of counting, as inhabitants, in adjusting representation, + 150. + Rule respecting, under Confederation, 150. + As affecting representation, votes respecting, 153. + Social and political condition of, anomalous, 155. + Number and distribution of, 155. + An important element in determining rank of States, 155. + As affecting representation and taxation, 157. + As subjects of taxation, views of statesmen respecting, 159. + Compromise respecting, how to be effected, 163. + Extradition of, Pinckney's proposition concerning, 189. + Manumission of, a matter of State control, 286. + Representation of, a concession by North, why made, 292; + Morris's motion respecting, 293; + vote of New Jersey respecting, 293. + Specific tax on importation of, 304. + Word not used in Constitution by design, 305. + Ratio of increase of, from 1790 to 1850, 308. + Condition of, ameliorated by Constitution, 316. + Advancing public sentiment concerning, 316. + Colonization of, in Africa, 317. + Representation of, an unimportant anomaly, 317. + Emancipation of, a local question, 317. + Extradition of, under Constitution, history of clause respecting, + 450; + a necessary provision of Constitution, 451; + under New England Confederation of 1643, 453; + under Ordinance of 1787, 454; + importance of proper understanding of clause respecting, 456; + necessity and propriety of clause, 459. + Condition of, much better under State control, 462. + Increase of, since adoption of Constitution, 465. + See _Federal Census_. + + _Slave-Trade_, discountenanced by first Continental Congress, I. 24. + How dealt with by the Constitution, 456. + Abolished in England, 457, 461. + French abolition of, 457. + Danish abolition of, 459. + Compromise respecting, 460. + Legislation against, 460. + Discussions respecting, in England, 460. + Probable encouragement of, II. 153; + embarrassments respecting, 281. + State action respecting, 285. + Necessity of definite provision respecting, 285. + Duty of framers of Constitution respecting, 286. + Had been abolished by no nation in 1787, 286. + A proper subject for national action, 286. + Aspect of, political, 287; + moral, 287. + Economical importance of, to Southern States, 288. + Report of committee of detail respecting, 290. + Grave questions concerning, 296. + Right to continue, insisted on by what States, 297, 301. + Prospective prohibition of, provided for, 304. + Concessions respecting, timely, 305. + Vote of States respecting, 305. + Patriotic course of both sections respecting, 306. + Effect of discontinuance of, on Southern States, 308. + State rights respecting, before Constitution, 314. + Tolerated by European nations at formation of Constitution, 314. + Interdicted by ten States before Constitution, 314. + Refusal of certain States to grant power to suppress, immediately, + 315. + Indefinite continuance of, had Constitution not been formed, 315. + First extinguished by America, 317. + + _South Carolina_, a provincial government, I. 4. + Constitution of, formed, 120. + Tender-law of, 253. + Appoints and instructs delegates to the Convention, 369. + Opposed to equality of suffrage in House of Representatives, II. + 138; + equal vote of States in Senate, 141, 148, 165, 217. + Had five representatives in first House, 149. + Opposed to census of free inhabitants, 153; + executive holding office during "good behavior," 173. + Vote of, respecting citizenship as qualification for office, 209; + money bills, 216, 218. + Opposed to each State having one vote in Senate, 227. + In favor of States paying members of Congress, 259. + Refusal of, to submit to tax on exports, 280, 285. + Exports of, in one year, 285. + Position of, in Convention, respecting slave-trade, 297, 301. + Vote of, respecting slave-trade, 305. + Vote on Jefferson's resolve concerning Northwestern Territory, 346. + Cession by, in 1787, 356. + Vote of, on suspension of habeas corpus, 360. + Condition of acceptance of Constitution by, 452. + Motion for surrender of fugitive slaves made by, in Constitutional + Convention, 453. + Vote of, respecting citizenship clause in Constitution, 453. + Debate in legislature of, on Constitution, 510. + Convention in, to vote on Constitution, 511; + importance of action of, 542. + Ratification of Constitution by, 544; + rejoicings at, 544; + importance of, 544. + Delegates of, responsibility assumed by, 544. + A great exporting State, 546. + Hesitation of, to concede power to regulate commerce, 546. + Amendments to Constitution proposed by, 548. + Eighth State to ratify Constitution, 549. + + _Southern States_, views of, respecting regulation of commerce, II. + 290. + + _Sovereignty_, of the people, established by the Revolution, I. 379; + necessary consequences of declaration of, II. 8. + Resides in the people, 38. + Powers of, may be exercised by different agents, 377. + + _Spain_, claims the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi, I. 312. + See _Mississippi_. + + _Speaker_, of House of Representatives, II. 264; + when to act as President, 403. + + _Standing Armies_, jealousy of, I. 81, 90. + + _States_, interests and relations of, before Constitution, II. 5. + Devotion of, to republican liberty, 6. + Union of, essential to republican liberty, 9. + Weakness of, without union, 9. + General purposes of, in calling Constitutional Convention, 16. + Position of, in Convention, 27. + Powers surrendered by, to Confederation, 27. + Why represented in Congress, 40. + Diverse interests of, as affecting representation, 43. + Tendency of, to encroach on federal authority, 51. + Proposed control over legislation of, by Congress, 52. + Population of, in 1790, table of, 55. + Legislation of, control of judicial department over, 66. + Admission of, 75, 79, 109, 176, 340, 344, 350, 354. + Cessions by, to Union, 76. + Republican government guaranteed to, 79, 83, 177, 458. + Jealous of general government, 91. + Sovereignty of, how reconciled with national sovereignty, 91. + Plan to abolish, 92. + To make partial surrender of power under Virginia plan, 95. + Sovereignty of, preserved under New Jersey plan, 95. + Conflicts of, with nation, probable, under Virginia plan, 102, 103. + Struggle between large and smaller, respecting representation, 104. + Proposed equalization of, 108. + Populations of, at formation of Constitution, 116. + Relative rank of, at formation of Constitution, 117. + Conflict among, as to national and federal systems, 117. + Danger of annihilation of sovereignty of, by national government, + 128, 377. + Danger of alliances of, with foreign powers, 136. + Preservation of, in Congress, conceded to be necessary, 139. + Divided respecting constitution of Senate, 145. + Jealousy among, 150. + Western, views of members respecting, 150. + Slave and free, index of wealth of, 157. + Wealth of, not measured by land, 160. + Position of, in Convention, respecting slaves, 161, 162. + Wealth of, for purpose of taxation, determined by inhabitants, 163. + Smaller, concession to, in constitution of Senate, 166. + Free and slave, populations of, compared, 168. + Relation of, to Confederation, 179. + Whether Constitution could be ratified by government of, 180. + Voting by, history of practice of, 227. + Equal representation of, in Senate, just, 233. + Union desired by, from different motives, 303. + Commercial legislation of, under Confederation, various, 310. + Revenue and paper-money systems of, under Confederation, various, + 310. + Rights guaranteed to, by Constitution, 314. + Power of, over slave-trade, anterior to Constitution, 314. + Ports of one, not to be preferred to those of another, 324. + Compacts between, outside of Articles of Confederation, 347. + New, temporary governments for, Madison's motion respecting, 351. + Admission of, number of votes requisite for, 352; + by dismemberment of State, 352; + by junction, 354; + difference in cases of, 357; + provisions for, general, 358. + Restraints on political power of, 362. + Issuing of bills of credit prohibited to, 364. + Laying of duties and imposts by, 368. + Cannot lay duty on tonnage, 370. + Keeping of troops or ships of war by, 371. + Agreements by, with another State or foreign power, 371. + When may engage in war, 371. + Governments of, how far supreme, 377. + May be multiplied indefinitely under Constitution, 383. + Levying war against, not treason against United States, 385. + Certain controversies between, proposed to be tried by Senate, 424. + Constitutional restrictions on, 432. + Laws of, constitutionality of, how determined, 439. + Courts of, not likely to administer justice to foreigners, &c., 442. + Different, controversies between citizens of, 442; + grants of lands by, jurisdiction of cases respecting, 444. + A party to a suit, jurisdiction in cases of, 444. + Foreign, jurisdiction in cases of, 444. + Full faith given to acts, &c. of, 449. + Have exclusive regulation of domestic institutions, 451. + May exclude foreigners, 457. + Republican government guaranteed to, object of, 468. + Domestic violence in, application to general government in case of, + 469. + Competency of, to abolish constitutions, 469. + Must have executive and legislature, 470. + Protection of, against domestic violence, 472. + Equality of, in Senate, for ever guaranteed by Constitution, 478. + Refusal of, to comply with requisitions of Congress, 572. + See _New States_. + + _State Constitutions_, formation of, I. 116. + + _State Governments_, how formed, I. 36. + + _State Sovereignty_, early assertion of, I. 90. + + _Stop Laws._ See _Debts_. + + STORY, JOSEPH, views of, respecting President's power to adjourn + Congress, II. 420. + + _Suffrage, Rule of_, Governor Randolph's resolution respecting, II. + 35. + Change in, opposed by Delaware, 36. + In Continental Congress, 42. + In Confederation, 42. + In Senate, 48. + For House of Representatives, great debate on, 135. + According to Virginia plan, 145. + Different in different States, 174, 198. + Not universal in any State, 471. + + SULLIVAN, General, president of New Hampshire Convention, II. 541. + + SULLIVAN, JAMES, Governor of Massachusetts, II. 541. + + _Superintendent of the Finances_, appointed, I. 174. + See ROBERT MORRIS. + + _Supremacy_ of United States, meaning and scope of, II. 376. + Of States, extent of, 377. + Of Constitution, as affecting national growth, 383. + + _Supreme Court_, tenure of office of, II. 67. + Judges of, not removable by address, 68, 73; + compensation of, 68; + by whom appointed, 68. + To determine constitutional questions, 74. + Functions of, compared with those of State courts, 74. + Judges of, proposed appointment of, by Senate, 223, 230, 410. + Appointment of, proposals concerning, 234. + Sole interpreters of Constitution, 380. + Judges of, to be nominated by President, 418; + tenure of office and salaries of, 423. + One, under Constitution, 423. + Original and appellate jurisdiction of, 424. + Appellate jurisdiction of, ambiguity concerning, 428. + Doubts about conferring power upon, to declare law unconstitutional, + 434. + + + T. + + TALLEYRAND, Prince, opinion of, respecting Hamilton, I. 410. + + _Taxation_, right of, denied to Parliament, I. 20. + How distinguished from regulation of trade, 20. + Inseparable from representation, 20, II. 157. + Difficulty of applying combined rule of wealth and numbers to, 158. + Report of committee of detail respecting, 290. + By general government, Mason's objections to, 557. + See _Colonies_. + + _Taxes_, odious to the people of United States, I. 180. + Power of Congress to collect, II. 322. + + _Tender_, State laws respecting, restraint on, II. 365. + + _Tender Law_ of Massachusetts, I. 268. + See _Debts_. + + _Territory_, power of Congress over, under the Confederation, I. 141. + Authority of Congress over, under Constitution, II. 340; + purpose of provision respecting, 355; + diverse views concerning, 358. + See _Western Territory_ and _Northwestern Territory_. + + _Territorial Governments_, power to frame, in Ordinance of 1787, II. + 345. + + _Theory_, danger of adhering too firmly to, II. 129. + + THOMPSON, CHARLES, Secretary of first Continental Congress, I. 14. + + TICKNOR, GEORGE, cited for a saying of Jefferson concerning the + Revolutionary Congress, I. 64; + for a saying of Talleyrand about Hamilton, 410. + + _Tonnage_, duty on, States prohibited to lay, II. 370; + proposed exception respecting, 370. + + _Tories_, how dealt with by Continental Congress, I. 36; + in New Hampshire, 65. + Washington's opinion respecting, 65. + Movements of, in the neighborhood of New York, 66; + how met by Washington, 66. + Steps taken by Congress to disarm, 68. + Misunderstanding respecting, between Washington and Congress, 69. + Subject referred to local authorities, 72. + Relations of persons and property of, to the Union, 251. + + _Trade_, inter-colonial, before the Revolution, I. 9. + Regulation of, by Parliament, distinguished from taxation, 20. + With Colonies prohibited by Parliament, December, 1775, 38. + See _Colonies_, _Commerce_, _Continental Congress_, and + _Parliament_. + + _Treason_, definition of, in Constitution, origin and purpose of, II. + 384. + Nature of evidence of, 386. + Punishment of, to be declared by Congress, 386; + how limited by Constitution, 386. + President's power to pardon, different views respecting, 414. + + _Treasury Department_, first established, I. 35. + + _Treaty_ of amity and commerce with France, Sweden, and the + Netherlands, I. 279. + Negotiation for, with the Netherlands, 280; + with Sweden, 281. + + _Treaty of Alliance_ with France, I. 156. + + _Treaty of Peace_ signed and ratified, I. 155, 187, 235, 237. + Objects secured by, 249. + How violated by certain States, 254, 257. + Southern boundary of the United States fixed by, 312. + Accompanied by a secret article, 312, 313. + Question respecting, II. 415. + + _Treaty Power_ under the Confederation, I. 325. + + _Treaties_, supreme law of land, II. 170, 372, 374. + Proposition that Senate should make, 223. + Negotiation of, by numerous body, embarrassing, 232. + Making of, proposals concerning, 234. + Provision respecting, origin of, 240; + how modified, 414. + Rule of Confederation respecting, 416. + May be proposed by Senate, 417. + Jurisdiction over cases arising under, 430. + Cases arising under, how settled, 440. + Power to make, under Confederation, 440. + + _Trial by Jury_, of the vicinage, one of the rights of the Colonies, + I. 23. + Under Constitution, II. 424. + Provision for, in civil cases, not in Constitution originally, 427; + supplied by amendment, 427. + Guaranty of, required by many States, 429. + For crimes, provisions respecting, 431. + Omission to secure, a strong argument with some against + Constitution, 498. + + TUCKER, GEORGE, cited about Madison, I. 421. + + TYLER, JOHN, opposed to Constitution, II. 506. + + + U. + + _Union_, origin of, I. 3. + Unknown to the colonial condition, 7. + Power to form, a result of the Revolution, 8. + Proposal of, in 1754, 8. + Proposed in 1773, 10. + Virginia recommends, 11, II. 12. + As established by the Confederation, I. 142. + Saved by the proposal of the revenue scheme, 188. + Necessary to preserve the good faith of the country, 189. + Of the people, idea of, 373. + Change in character of, II. 4. + Necessarily republican, 10. + Preservation of, essential to independence of States, 10. + Purposes of, at first indefinite, 12. + Previous history of, important, 13. + "Exigencies of," 13; + how only to be provided for, 19. + Objects of, embraced in two classes, 13; + how ascertained, 13; + different views respecting, 39. + Proposed power in, to protect and uphold governments of States, 79. + Dissolution of, Madison's views respecting, 136; + Hamilton's views respecting, 136; + at one time probable, 140. + General interests of, power to legislate for, 170. + Success of, to what attributable, 380. + Sovereignty of, and of States, no conflict between, 380. + Capacity of, for territorial expansion, cause of, 381. + Theory of, respecting domestic institutions of States, 451. + + "_United Colonies_," term of, first adopted, I. 33. + + _United States of America_, title of, adopted, I. 52, 142. + + _United States_, character of, at stake, I. 179. + Laws and treaties of, supreme law of States, II. 170, 372. + Guaranty by, of State institutions, 177. + Became proprietor of crown lands, 352. + Title of, to vacant lands, 357. + Officer of, not to accept present, &c. from foreign king, &c., 362. + Resolutions respecting supremacy of government of, 372, 373. + Supremacy of, meaning and scope of, 376. + Government of, unlike any other, 379; + determines its own powers, 379; + safeguard of, 379; + success of, to what attributable, 379. + Constitution, no impediment to growth of, 383. + Treason against, definition of, 385. + Importance of preserving federal character of government of, 392. + Relation of government to citizens of, 432. + A party to a suit, jurisdiction of cases of, 444. + + + V. + + _Valuation._ See _Land_ and _Contribution_. + + _Vermont_, provision for admission of, II. 353. + Within asserted limits of New York, 353. + + _Vessels_, entry and clearance of, II. 324. + Payment of duties by, 324. + + _Veto_, an essential power, II. 57. + Bill may be passed notwithstanding, 264. + Of President qualified, 265. + Of king of England absolute, 265; + how signified, 265; + in disuse since William the Third, 266. + History of, in Constitutional Convention, 267. + Meaning of "two thirds" in provisions respecting, 267. + Power of, proposed to be given to Council of Revision, 438. + + _Vice-President, ex officio_ President of Senate, II. 264. + Has only casting vote in Senate, 264, 396. + Choice of, embarrassments respecting, 390. + Reasons for having, 395. + Ultimate election of, by Senate, 396, 401. + When to act as President, 400. + Changes in appointment of, 400. + Qualifications for, 401. + + _Virginia_, a provincial government, I. 4. + Advises a Continental Congress, 11. + Elects delegates, 12. + Constitution of, formed, 120. + Effect of claim of, to Western Lands, 132. + Cedes the Northwestern Territory, 137, 295. + Repeals her act granting imposts, 175. + Stop-law of, 253. + Action of, concerning Western posts, 258. + Opposes the surrender of the Mississippi, 315. + Action of, leading to a general commercial convention, 340, 343. + Appoints and instructs delegates to the Convention, 367. + Measures of, respecting commerce, 423. + First to declare for Union, II. 12. + Plan of government proposed by, 89; + Hamilton's doubts respecting, 99; + inconsistency in, 101, 103; + reported to Convention, 109; + vote on, 109; + chasm in, 133. + Opposed to election of Senators by State legislatures, 135; + to equality of suffrage in House of Representatives, 138; + to equality of States in Senate, 141, 148, 165, 217. + Had ten Representatives in first House, 149. + In favor of census of free inhabitants, 153; + of executive holding office during "good behavior," 173. + Vote of, respecting citizenship as qualification for office, 209; + money bills, 216, 218. + Opposed to each State having one vote in Senate, 227; + to impeachments being tried by Senate, 262; + to taxing exports, 296. + Vote of, respecting slave-trade, 305. + Cession by, in 1784, 342. + Strong opposition to Constitution in, 504. + Statesmen of, 504. + Character of people of, 504. + Great influence of Washington in, 505. + Effect of action of New Hampshire on, 510. + Convention of, meets at Richmond, 510, 549; + parties in, nearly balanced, 529, 568; + anxiety respecting action of, 542, 549; + eminence of members of, 551; + responsibility resting on, 551; + discussion on Constitution in, 554. + Had ratified Constitution before news from New Hampshire, 578. + Convention of, final propositions of friends of Constitution in, + 579. + Ratification of Constitution by, how finally effected, 579. + Form of amendments and Bill of Rights proposed by, 581. + Address prepared by opponents of Constitution in, 582. + Adoption of Constitution by, rejoicings at, 582. + + _Virginia and Maryland_, efforts of, to regulate the trade of the + Potomac and the Chesapeake, I. 341. + + _Virginia Reservation_, note on, I. 296. + + _Voters_, qualifications of, in different States, II. 198. + + + W. + + _War_, power to declare, proposed to be given to two branches of + Congress, II. 231. + To be declared by Congress, 332, 413. + When States may engage in, 371. + Ships of, not to be kept by States in time of peace, 371. + And peace, power of President to make, 411. + To be prosecuted by President, 413. + + WASHINGTON, appointed and commissioned commander-in-chief, I. 33. + Arrives at Cambridge, 33. + Mode of his appointment as commander-in-chief, 41. + Previous history and character of, 41. + Embarrassments of, in the early part of the war, 55. + Opinions and actions of, respecting Tories, 65. + Urges Congress to establish prize court, 75. + On the necessity for a standing army, 91. + Leaves Boston for New York, 91. + Compelled to abandon New York, 91. + Retreats through New Jersey, 96. + Complains of his situation, 96. + Asks for extraordinary powers, 100. + Dictatorial powers conferred on, 100; + apology for, 101. + + Requires oath of allegiance to United States, 106. + Proclamation by, at Morristown, in 1777, 106. + Powers conferred on, in 1776, jealousy respecting, 106. + Opinion of, respecting an oath of allegiance, 108. + Third effort of, to raise a new army, 109. + Embarrassments of, 110. + Thwarted by the local authorities, 112. + Adheres to a plan for the campaign, 112. + Anxious about the falling off of Congress, 127. + Letters of, to the States, in 1782, 157; + to the President of Congress, 158, 162. + Situation of, 158. + Warns Congress respecting the officers, 167. + Painful position of, 167. + Proceedings of, upon the Newburgh Addresses, 168. + On the want of a revenue power, 182. + Relations of, to the country during the war, 200. + Opinions of, at the close of the war, 200. + Address of, to the States, on resigning, 201. + On a peace establishment, 218, 219. + Resigns as commander-in-chief, 235. + Address to, 235. + On the insurrection in Massachusetts, 274. + Plans communications with Western settlements, 310. + Opinions of, respecting the navigation of the Mississippi, 311, 315. + Opinions of, in 1785, on the state of the country, 333. + Connection of, with the plan of a general Convention, 341. + Pressed to attend the general Convention, 365, 397. + On the idea of a monarchical government for the United States, 370. + At Mount Vernon, 393. + Views of, on public affairs, 394. + Declines to attend the general Convention, 399; + reconsiders and attends, 399. + Reception of, at Philadelphia, 401. + Placed in the chair of the Convention, 401. + Opinions of, 401. + Character of, as a statesman, 404. + Meets the Alexandria commissioners at Mount Vernon, 425. + Failure of civil power to sustain, II. 14. + Difficulty experienced by, as President, in preserving neutrality + and excluding foreign influence, 82. + In Convention, confined himself to duties of presiding officer, 213. + Suggestion of, respecting ratio of representation in Congress, + adopted, 213. + In favor of tax on exports, 284. + Early nominated for President, 391. + Received no pay as commander-in-chief, 405. + Practice of, respecting cabinet, 409. + Leading man in Constitutional Convention, 476. + Tradition respecting words of, before signing Constitution, 487. + Views of, respecting consequences of rejection of Constitution, 487. + Unbounded confidence of people in, 498. + Great influence of, in Virginia, 505. + Copies of Constitution sent by, with expression of opinion, 509. + Opinion of, respecting action of Maryland on Constitution, 542. + Not a member of Virginia convention, 551. + Justifies course of Federalists in New York convention, 590. + Administration of, topics appropriate to history of, 604. + + _Washington, City of_, an object of affection and pride, II. 277. + See _Seat of Government_. + + WEBSTER, DANIEL, compared with Hamilton, I. 419. + + WEBSTER, NOAH, recommends a new government, I. 350. + + WEBSTER, PELATIAH, recommends a general Convention, I. 350. + + _Weights and Measures_, standard of, fixed by Congress, II. 328. + + _West Florida_, secret article respecting, in the Treaty of Peace, I. + 312. + + _West Point_, academy at, suggested, I. 218. + + _Western Lands_, claims of the States to, I. 131. + Conflicting interests of the States concerning, 132. + Surrender of claim to, by New York, 133. + Cessions of, urged by Congress in 1780, 134. + Motives of the cession of, 137. + Surrender of claim to, by Virginia, 137. + Become the bond of the Union, 140. + Power of Congress over, under the Confederation, 141. + + _Western Posts._ See _Military Posts_. + + _Western Settlements_, position of, after the peace, I. 309. + Connection of, with the Atlantic coast, 310. + Alarm of, about the Mississippi, 318. + + _Western States_, prospective character of, II. 300. + Vast resources of, 310. + + _Western Territory_, controversy respecting, before the adoption of + Articles of Confederation, I. 291. + Cessions of, invited, 292; + Congress declares certain trusts respecting, 293. + States to be formed in, 293. + Power of Congress to deal with, 293. + Cession of, by New York, 293; + by Virginia, 295. + Further legislation respecting, and further trusts declared, 296. + Admission of States from, 298. + Further cessions of, urged, 299. + Proposition by Rufus King to exclude slavery from, 299. + Cession of, by Massachusetts, 299; + by Connecticut, 300. + Ordinance for disposing of lands in, 300. + Cessions of, by Virginia, modified, 300; + by South Carolina, 301; + by North Carolina, 301; + by Georgia, 301. + See _Northwestern Territory_. + + _West Indies_, trade with, II. 309. + + _Whale Fishery_ in Massachusetts before the Revolution, I. 135. + + _Williamsburg_, convention at, I. 12. + + WILLIAMSON, HUGH, views of, respecting rule of suffrage for House of + Representatives, II. 135; + money bills, 218. + + WILSON, JAMES, birth and career of, I. 462. + Sent to the Constitutional Convention, 462. + Services of, 462. + Made a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 465. + Death of, 465. + His defence of the Constitution, 465. + In favor of larger House of Representatives, II. 213; + tax on exports, 284. + One of the ablest framers of the Constitution, 520. + Position and arguments of, in Pennsylvania convention, 521. + Views of, respecting Bill of Rights, 522. + + WOLCOTT, OLIVER, influence of, in Connecticut convention, II. 529. + + + Y. + + _Yeas and Nays_, one fifth of members present in either House of + Congress may require, II. 263. + To be taken on passing bill over veto, 265. + + _Yorktown_, Revolutionary Congress assembles at, I. 113. + + + + + THE END. + + + * * * * * + +Transcriber's Notes: + +Obvious spelling and punctuation errors have been repaired, but period +spellings and valid alternative spellings present in the original were +retained; for example: maleadministration, malepractice and +malpractice, Brearly and Brearley, etc. + +Hyphenation variations in the original were retained. + +Change in format for Article headings beginning P. 629 retained as in +the original. + +Changes not covered above are: + +Contents erroneously states Index begins on P. 623. Corrected to P. 633. + +P. 298 "Southern members." original reads "Southern membe" + +P. 605 Duplicate heading "Appendix" removed. + +P. 622 "Revision and Control"; original reads "Controul." + +P. 623 "Members from two-thirds"; original reads "twothirds." + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of History of the Origin, Formation, and +Adoption of the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 2, by George Ticknor Curtis + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 40679 *** |
